The right to work in international human rights documents often have broad, sweeping assertions that people have a right to work, but are vague in what that right actually entails. That is why there is a wealth of literature written on rights at work, or labour laws, which are identifiable and easy to understand and legislate, but a noticeable gap in the literature on the right to work. This thesis aims to explore that gap within the context of post-work literature, where the right to work has not been explored.
While the right to work is established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international legal documents, many argue there should also be a duty to work, because of religious reasons, civic duty, or moral and ethical beliefs. I argue that while a right to work is relevant and necessary within a global, capitalist economy, this does not mean that a right to work equates to a duty to work.
This thesis aims to contribute to a growing body of literature on work and labour in political theory, human rights and international human rights law, and post-work theory. My thesis makes an original contribution in two ways: first, in arguing that modern human rights are contingent upon the neoliberal global economy, but are mutable in nature; and second, the main argument I advance is that while there is a human right to work, there should not be a corresponding duty to work, legally or morally.