This thesis argues that liminal animals, defined as wild animals who live in spaces with significant human presence, are owed positive duties. To do so, it uses the methodology of analytical philosophy, using an ecumenical approach to show that this conclusion follows from a variety of theories.
The thesis is divided into three main parts. In the first one I argue that three ethical theories lead to the view that there are positive duties towards liminal animals. Chapter 1 argues that is the case using consequentialist theories. In it, I argue that according to them, if there is a possibility to improve the lives of liminal animals, then there is a duty to do so. In Chapter 2, I argue that autonomy-based theories can ground positive duties to improve the autonomy of liminal animals by providing them with more choices and of better quality. Chapter 3 explores how relational theories, which ground positive duties on morally relevant relationships, also entail that there are positive duties towards liminal animals.
In Part 2, devoted to principles of political inclusion, I explore how according to three of these principles (the All-Affected Interests Principle, the All-Subjected Principle, and the Social Membership Principle), liminal animals should be considered full members of our political communities, which would entitle them to positive duties stemming from political institutions.
Lastly, in Part 3, I explore the practical implications of the idea that there are positive duties towards liminal animals. In it, I first claim that population control programmes can be a form of assisting liminal animals, and therefore of fulfilling our positive duties towards them. Then, I argue that the interests of liminal animals should be included in urban planning decisions, and then show what this implies for decisions that harm them and for those that potentially benefit them.
