Land Disputes under Legal Pluralism, District-Level Variation in Hybrid Land Governance, and Divergent Outcomes in Timor-Leste, 2020s

My PhD thesis pursues two research aims: first, to investigate the dynamics of land disputes under legal pluralism in Timor-Leste in the 2020s; second, to examine how land governance operates under varying relationships between formal and informal institutions.

My contributions are fourfold. First, I identify the effects of international legal layers on land disputes in a context of legal pluralism and analyse evolving forms of forum shopping. Second, I examine the relationships between formal institutional leaders (state land officials) and informal leaders (suco chiefs) who collaborate within hybrid land governance across Dili (the capital) and Ainaro (a rural district). Third, I describe the mechanisms of land dispute resolution under each relationship. Fourth, I assess the outcomes of these mechanisms from both top-down (institution-building) and bottom-up (user satisfaction) perspectives.

My 2023 fieldwork, using diverse methods such as participant observation, shows that international legal layers—such as neoliberal land governance reforms—create normative fractures between global and customary norms. It furthermore reveals evolving shopping forum dynamics, in which the poor now increasingly engage in forum shopping and forums themselves also shop. This study further foregrounds the cultural dimensions of land, challenges rationalist perspectives, and contributes to understanding state violence in legally plural, post-conflict contexts.

It also reveals two distinct formal–informal institutional relationships: in Dili, formal leaders dominate; in Ainaro informal leaders do. These arrangements produce divergent outcomes. The Dili model relies on ‘written’ mechanisms led by state officials; it ensures enforcement but places heavy burdens on the state, raising sustainability concerns. The Ainaro model relies on ‘verbal’ mechanisms led by informal leaders; it allows low-cost enforcement but yields agreements with weaker binding force. User satisfaction shows that neither model is superior, as each reflects trade-offs among key elements of effective arbitration, such as being heard and cultural fit.