Honneth’s Project of Normative Reconstruction: An Analysis and Critique

This thesis analyses the theory behind Axel Honneth’s attempt to identify an empirical
reference point in social reality to justify a critical social theory that inherits the Frankfurt
School’s left-Hegelian tradition. I argue that Honneth is mistaken to express the degree of
distance he interprets between Kantian and Hegelian moral theory, that Kantian
transcendental philosophy can be dissociated from Kant’s transcendental idealism, and
when it is separated in this way, it can complement the recognition based social theory
developed by Honneth. I examine the post-metaphysical pragmatic turn Honneth develops
from the work of Habermas that enables Hegelian ethical theory to function as a critical
social theory. Properly understood Kantian constructivism and transcendental critique are
resources for this tradition. To defend this view, I present a novel account of Kantian
constructivism.