Authority, Objectivity, and Progress in Naturalistic Ethics

The purpose of this thesis is to argue that moral progress is possible within a naturalistic framework. Moral progress is possible in principle even in the absence of any kind of non-natural, irreducible normative components of reality. This is because it is the nature of moral progress to solve moral problems and overcome limitations, not to approach ethical reality. Moral progress is possible without appealing to Kantian rationality or impersonal, objective perspectives. It is possible because we have moral sensibilities and imaginations, and we are capable of dialogue and collaboration to solve moral problems. Justification for why we should engage in projects of moral practice is possible from a naturalistic perspective. The authority of morality consists in its function of contributing to the solution of the problems that arise in living together. Objectivity, as non-arbitrariness, can be pursued in problem-solving through a process of reflecting on our own aims, concerns, and desires in light of other aims, concerns, and desires. David Hume, Adam Smith, and John Dewey provide insights into how moral progress can be made on the basis of sympathy, imagination, and cooperation. Hume’s general point of view and Smith’s impartial spectator show that partiality can be overcome while still drawing on sympathy or empathy. Dewey’s emphasis on moral inquiry as experiment shows that moral norms can be refined based on inquiry grounded in imagination and conversation.