Manipulation and influence: a trickery account of manipulation applied to three scopes

Manipulation is a form of influence that has received little attention compared to other forms of influence, such as coercion. Those accounts of manipulation which do exist often fail to address how a single account can function within different scope. An account should be able to explain manipulation in the context of an abusive relationship just as well as it explains mass manipulation between groups such as corporations and nations towards large, non-specific audiences. My thesis aims to correct this by developing Robert Noggle’s trickery account. I will explain and solve some key flaws in the account and also argue the definition of manipulation should be extended to include manipulation by ‘bullshit’, following from Harry Frankfurt’s concept and his use of it regarding deception, which the trickery account necessarily counts as manipulation. Next, I explore the ethics of the act of manipulating, the manipulator and potential responsibility of agents acting under the influence of manipulation. Finally, armed with a robust, developed account of manipulation as trickery, I explore how the theory can be applied to account for mass manipulation to large audiences, as well as how individuals and groups can manipulate through the design of systems and interfaces. I argue these scopes each provide unique challenges which must be solved by any account. Overall, I argue that the trickery account, with further development, offers a complete account of manipulation.