'Transitional Justice, Punishment and Security'

This thesis concerns the normative dimension of transitional justice—the problem of which moral and political values should guide the process of transition from conflict and authoritarian rule to democracy. The central thesis is that the value of security should be a normative priority in the process of transition, because establishing security is a necessary condition for democracy and other transitional measures (lustration, compensation, institutional development and reconciliation, to name but a few). The thesis develops an account of how the value of security informs a justification of the measures utilised in the transition to a politically legitimate state. In doing so, it explores how the value of security (much neglected in political philosophy) informs our understanding of central political problems and concepts—including state legitimacy, democracy, the function, content and value of laws (including the concept of the ‘rule of law’) and the role of human rights in state coercion.

Far from being an issue confined to the academy, the problems of transitional justice are a reality for a number of states around the world who are struggling to achieve democracy. This thesis represents a contribution to the scholarship around this process of political transition. It seeks to show the important insights that moral and political philosophy can provide for the process of moving from conflict and authoritarian rule to democracy. In doing so, it illustrates how the problems of transitional justice are in fact central problems for political philosophy.