The state and revolution in Britain 1916-1926.

The thesis is an examination and discussion of the responses of British
governments to developments in labour and socialist organisations between
1916 and 1926. The first chapter is concerned with the growing recognition
of the increased power of labour under the conditions of modern war.
Yet governments, it is argued, failed to develop a coherent labour policy
and often acted in a confused and contradictory manner. The second chapter
begins with an analysis of the post war crisis when many politicians
began to regard revolution as a real possibility. They developed two
agencies, the Special Branch and the Supply and Transport Organisation in
order to deal with the situation. It is argued that in its original form
the latter was not only costly but politically dangerous and ineffective.
Later developments were not only cheaper but based on a more sophisticated
understanding of the political strengths of a modern state. The third
chapter is concerned with the responses of British socialists to the state.
It includes some discussion of theoretical influences, an examination of
the attempts of the Communist Party to implement Lenin's teachings on
state and revolution, and a discussion of the first Labour Government in
respect of the implications for socialist strategies with regard to the
state. The final chapter is concerned to argue that while superior organisation
and resources played their part in the Government's victory in
the General Strike, it was Baldwin's political manoeuvres which were the
most important element of the campaign. In conclusion there is some discussion
of attempts which have been made to characterise the development
of the British state in this period. The reality, it is argued, was far
more prosaic than many accounts would suggest. Politicians achieved the
stability they sought but they did so not by dramatic innovation but by
constant political endeavor based on marginal readjustment and this reapplication
of traditional themes and structures.