MILITARY CORRUPTION AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM MILITARY OPERATIONS

There seems to be agreement on the role and importance of military operations in ensuring peace across the world and most especially in military counter-insurgency operations. The involvement of military across the world in peace operations has however attracted issues that have informed different research endeavours. Specifically, the place of patronage and neopatrimonial conduct in military operation and specifically in Nigeria’s military COIN Operation against Boko Haram in the Northeast has been described from different standpoint and these descriptions have informed a significant debate in academic literature with respect to the overall studies of insurgency and military operations. Therefore, some fundamental questions raised with respect to how military corruption in COIN operation against Boko Haram insurgent is shaped by neopatrimonialsim and patronage politics. The thesis relied on extensive range of literature on military involvement in COIN operation with emphasis on how military corruption is shaped by patronage and neopatrimonialism and presents original empirical data. Nine months of fieldwork research which was based on Key Informant Interviews (KII) and document analysis was conducted in selected Northeast states where Boko Haram insurgents have operated. The analysis of the research laid emphasis on COIN operation strategies undertaken by the Nigerian military in executing the fight against the insurgents and the actions of the officers that falls within the framework of abuse of office for personal and vested interest. The thesis argues that COIN operation strategies have served as the breeding ground for the manifestation of corrupt acts which enables the cycle of patronage and neopatrimonialism in the operation thereby extending the lifeline of the conflict. The thesis presents three fundamental positions within the overall framework of COIN operation strategies undertaken by the Nigerian military and other actors that enable corruption within the cycle of the operation. Firstly, military corruption in COIN operation against Boko Haram insurgent has established links beyond the theatre operation which have consequence on the ability and capacity of the military to deliver on the expected objective of ‘degrading’ the insurgents as expressed by the government. These cartel-like networks have contributed to expand the manifestation of corruption built on patronage and neopatrimonialism. Secondly, the existing networks of corruption built on patronage and neopatrimonialism within the military institution have operated while excluding other uninformed officers who most often are exposed to the consequence of a corrupted military institution. Therefore, the execution of COIN operation strategies against the Boko Haram insurgents only serves as the channel that keep the profiting class in place while also entrenching neopatrimonial character and patronage politics within the military institution. Thirdly, the existence of whistleblowing as a tool for reporting corruption as examined within the context of the on-going COIN operation only exist to serve institutional purposes without significant effect in exposing corrupt practices amongst military officers or their ‘big man’ at the corridors of power who are profiting from the war. The non-functionality of whistleblowing framework for reporting actions that undermine the professional expectation of military officers further unravels the often-contested arguments on the role of professional institution such as the military in the discharge of their functions. These positions have further expanded the conversation on the actions that constitute the core of military corruption in COIN operation against Boko Haram on the one hand and on the other hand, it has contributed to scholarship on the intersections between military corruption, patronage and neopatrimonialism.