From Realism to Illusionism: Revaluating Phenomenal Consciousness in a Physical World

“The Hard Problem of Consciousness” is a term coined by philosopher David Chalmers (1995) to refer to the challenge of explaining subjective conscious experience, also known as phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers argues that even if we achieve a complete understanding of the physical processes and their correlations with mental states, there still appears to be an explanatory gap between physical and subjective experiences. The hard problem challenges traditional reductionist approaches that aim to explain consciousness solely in terms of brain activity, suggesting that purely physical explanations may not fully account for the subjective aspect of consciousness.
This thesis is motivated by philosophers' views supporting the hard problem of consciousness. I will explore the fundamental tension between physicalism and phenomenal consciousness and argue that this conflict stems from an irreconcilable divide between first-person and third-person perspectives. Drawing from personal experiences and philosophical inquiry, the work traces the evolution of my understanding from early dualistic beliefs to a critical examination of physicalism and its limitations.
The central argument posits that physicalism, in its attempt to provide a comprehensive worldview, faces a significant challenge when confronted with the subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness. This challenge arises from physicalism’s reliance on a third-person, observable approach which fundamentally clashes with the first-person, subjective experiences that characterize phenomenal consciousness.
The thesis contends that for physicalism to maintain its status as a coherent worldview, it must demonstrate that third-person observations are sufficient to explain all aspects of reality, including subjective experiences. However, this necessity leads physicalism into a dilemma: either expand its definition to accommodate first-person experiences, thereby risking its distinctiveness, or maintain a strict physical stance that fails to account for the qualitative aspects of consciousness.
The thesis argues that this dilemma has driven physicalism towards more radical positions, particularly illusionism. Illusionism attempts to resolve the tension by denying the reality of phenomenal consciousness altogether, asserting that our sense of having rich, qualitative inner experiences is itself an illusion generated by cognitive processes.
Through a critical analysis of these perspectives, the thesis highlights the ongoing struggle in the philosophy of mind to reconcile our subjective, inner world with the objective, physical reality described by science. It concludes by suggesting that the incompatibility between first-person and third-person perspectives may be fundamental, challenging the very foundation of physicalist approaches to consciousness and opening new avenues for philosophical inquiry into the nature of mind and reality.