Remorse: A Prospective Genealogy

Although moral philosophy has seen an upsurge of work in moral emotions, remorse is significantly neglected. Part of what explains the neglect, I argue, is a commitment to a narrow, ultimately distorted, conception of remorse. Central to my line of argument is the idea that what makes remorse distinctively moral is its special focus with those directly affected by what one has done. Foregrounding this claim, however, reveals the narrow conception to be detached from what is widely taken to ground it. If we preserve the special moral character of remorse two controversial conclusions follow: (i) that the scope of remorse is broader than standardly taken to be, and, (ii) that the ubiquitous assumption that remorse is merely the first-personal mirror of justified blame comes into problematic doubt. New lines of debate concerning the adequacy of the narrow conception as well as key objections against moral theories committed to it are opened.