An Investigation of Corruption and Clientelism in Afghanistan Hindering Law Enforcement: With a Specific Case Study in the Afghan National Police

Afghanistan is debatably the joint most corrupt country in the world. There have been extensive efforts of the international community, aid agencies, foreign governments and international financial institutions to enhance Afghan state institutions and state effectiveness with anti-corruption strategy as corruption is deemed a contributor to increased poverty and a waste of donor aid. Such anti-corruption strategy includes enhancing the role of law enforcement actors such as the police and judges with security sector reform (SSR), the promotion of the rule of law and justice, vetting, pay reform and anti-corruption units.
Despite such efforts, corruption and clientelism still impedes Afghan security, justice and the public sector. This results in cronyism within President Hamid Karzai’s presidential family and close aides, street level corruption and petty bribery due to low wages and bidding for senior positions as governor or a district police chief who then appoint individuals to preserve loyalty and lucrative engagement in the opium industry. The causes of corruption in Afghanistan are analysed. This includes systemic corruption, patronage, nepotism, low wages and state capture infiltrating parts of the state to serve and protect drug trafficking and illegal armed group interests that hinders SSR, the rule of law and justice. There are multiple causes of corruption which lead to anti-corruption strategy and SSR addressing some causes that may address some cause but may unintentionally exacerbate other forms of corruption.
This thesis provides an investigation of pay reform and a critical examination of police anti-corruption strategy in the lower levels of the Afghan police as there is a gap in the literature of primary research conducted with patrolmen. The researcher finds that internal Afghan police anti-corruption strategy includes pay reform which has not hit the lower levels significantly despite an increase in force size. In addition, the lottery assignments and rotation of Afghan police in random away provinces to reduce patronage-based appointments and loyalty with police commanders and warlords has actually increased survival-based corruption, including bribery and extortion, as a means of economic necessity due to many policemen having to live on low wages as the sole breadwinner for large families. Pay reform has the potential to combat petty corruption in the lower ranks but systemic corruption, clientelism and state capture will remain and the lottery assignments need further revision to avoid enhancing survival corruption which is counterproductive to successful anti-corruption strategy.