Mereological nihilism and the Special Arrangement Question

In this thesis, I intend to argue against Tallant’s (2014) argument against mereological nihilism. In Chapter 1, I detail the landscape of mereological nihilisms, highlighting difference between them. In Chapter 2, I present Tallant’s argument against mereological nihilism – the Argument from the SAQ. I introduce the Argument from GLOBALISATION in support of one of the premises in the Argument from the SAQ and replace the principle of GLOBALISATION with the stronger principle of GLOBALISATION*. In Chapter 3, I prevent a potential criticism against Tallant. Namely, I argue that he can maintain GLOBALISATION and that facts of composition are contingent. In Chapter 4, I show how adopting Williamson’s necessitist ontology would help the nihilist answer Tallant’s argument. In Chapter 5, I argue against GLOBALISATION*, showing that it has untenable consequences for its proponent. In Chapter 6, I tie up two loose ends. Firstly, I consider the demonstrative answer to the SAQ. Secondly, I consider what semantic theory nihilists should adopt.