A Vindicatory Theory of Punishment

In this thesis I argue that it is possible to justify state punishment by focusing on its ‘vindicatory’ aim. I begin chapter one by arguing that any theory of punishment whatsoever has to meet four conditions if it is to be truly justified. I name these the adequacy, value, necessity and permissibility conditions. And I evaluate retributive, deterrent and rehabilitative theories of punishment under their scope.
Since none of these views manage to meet these conditions at once, I introduce vindication in chapter two as a promising alternative to the three traditional justifying aims of punishment. I evaluate vindicatory theories of punishment under the scope of the four conditions outlined above. And I conclude that, although vindicatory views manage to meet three out of four of these conditions without much difficulty, they still struggle meeting the necessity condition.
Persuaded that a vindicatory account of the necessity condition is nevertheless possible, in chapter three I begin developing this account by introducing a conceptual framework which allows us to see this necessity more clearly. I call this the ‘criminal conversation’ view. And it allows me to show that the state ought to respond to crime because failing to do so threatens to undermine the legal validity of criminal statutes.
Because failing to respond to crime threatens to undermine the legal validity of criminal statutes, in chapter four I argue that the state ought to vindicate them. Drawing an analogy between love and vindication, I argue that only punishment will do as a means to attain this purpose. And because punishment’s sole adequacy for attaining vindication entails its strict necessity, I conclude this thesis explaining how the vindicatory view which I defend throughout this thesis meets the four conditions for justified punishment introduced earlier.