This thesis examines the political drivers of China’s railway expansion since the reform era. While railway development is often explained by economic demand, technological progress, and efficiency considerations, these factors alone cannot account for the scale, speed, and uneven spatial distribution of railway investment across China. The thesis argues that railway expansion is a politically embedded process shaped by the interaction of three institutional logics: state capitalism, nation-building, and decentralised authoritarian governance.
Drawing on historical institutional analysis, documentary research, and semi-structured interviews, the study develops a meso-level framework to examine how central political priorities, sectoral interests, and local government objectives influence railway development.
Three case studies are used to test this framework. Guangzhou demonstrates how market-oriented reforms reinforced state coordination rather than liberalisation. The Qinghai–Tibet Railway illustrates how nation-building objectives can outweigh economic considerations. Jiangxi highlights the role of bureaucratic competition, fiscal constraints, and central–local bargaining in shaping infrastructure outcomes.
The thesis contributes to the literature on political economy and infrastructure governance by showing that large-scale transport infrastructure functions as a mechanism of governance as well as development. It concludes that China’s railway expansion is best understood as the product of interacting political and institutional logics operating within a fragmented yet hierarchical Party-state.
