This dissertation examines how works councils influence the dynamics of power and control in the platformmediated food delivery sector in Germany, using the pseudonymised company BiteFleet as an example.
Against the backdrop of the erosion of the German institution of the works council and the power asymmetries associated with algorithmic workforce management, the thesis poses the central question:
Can institutionalised co-determination mitigate the asymmetrical power relations in platform work?
Theoretically, the study integrates Edwards' (1986) Theory of Conflict with Power Resources Theory (Arnholtz and Refslund, 2022; 2024) to address a key limitation of PRT: its tendency to equate the availability of resources with effective worker power.
The integrated framework treats power resources as conditional capacities and asks whether and how they translate into shifts at the frontier of control.
Methodologically, it follows an explanatory single-case study design that combines process analysis with thematic analysis of 37 expert interviews, participant observation, and 39 Works Agreements, collected during a one-year field stay (2022–2023).
The results can be summarised into four core findings:
Firstly, the engagement of works councils was strongly shaped by an internalised understanding of industrial citizenship, with the 'German model' serving as an ideational power resource.
Secondly, two waves of works council formations demonstrate a dynamic interplay between associational power and institutional opportunity structures: initially, collectivisation originating from embryonic solidarity created the conditions under which codetermination rights could be activated, while these institutional channels later became catalysts for further organisation of labour.
Thirdly, the activities of works councils led to noticeable improvements in working conditions, particularly in areas such as shift planning, health protection, and continued pay during illness.
Fourthly, workplace co-determination remained excluded from the core of the algorithmic work organisation, signalling a managerial strategy based on recognising a structural incompatibility between algorithmic control and the principles of co-determination.
The study contributes to industrial relations theory by demonstrating that institutional power should not be inferred from the formal availability of codetermination rights but is better understood as an outcome of struggle whose existence must be established empirically.
It further shows that works councils in precarious sectors can serve as a central infrastructure for trade union influence.
Politically, it highlights the limitations of existing legal instruments for regulating algorithmic control.
Overall, the study demonstrates how traditional labour movement institutions, such as the Works Council, can establish a presence in platform work. However, they can only endure if they adapt strategically to the unique challenges posed by platform work.
