At first sight it looks as if the idea of a philosophical novel is too vague and
loosely applied to be of much theoretical interest. However, the term is widely
used and cries out for clarification. The thesis seeks to offer that, not by
proposing some single strict (but seemingly arbitrary) definition, but by
accepting flexibility in interpretation and application, and drawing some
plausible bounds between different kinds of cases. The main proposal is that
there are three tiers (or levels) of philosophical novels: “strong”, “moderate”,
and “marginal”. This suggests a foundation that is neither arbitrary nor
inflexible.
For a novel to belong in one of the tiers, it must meet a set of criteria centred
on what can be disclosed in interpretation. Three case studies provide
paradigms for these tiers: Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s
Crime and Punishment, and Jane Austen’s Emma. Detailed analyses show not
only how each work successfully meets the relevant criteria, but also offer a
solid justification as to why three distinct tiers are necessary for adequately
characterising what a philosophical novel is.
The thesis confronts some potential threats from within philosophy.
Philosophical purists will deny that a work of pure imaginative fiction lacking
argumentative structure could be genuinely philosophical, while philosophical
pluralists see no problem with that. If the former are right then the thesis
cannot get off the ground, if the latter are right then the thesis is redundant. A
compromise is sought between purism and pluralism.
Each of the tiers invites and rewards a different mode of interpretation—
“discovery”, “reconstruction”, and “creativity”—according to how the text of a
novel sustains a philosophical reading of a strong, moderate or marginal kind.
The broad conclusion is that the idea of a “philosophical novel” is theoretically
valid and useful under the constraints proposed.
