Hegel, Schelling, and the Problem of Individuality

It is easy to show that the image of Hegel as a philosopher neglecting the reality of individuals is a cliché. However, it is not an easy thing to also show why. This thesis takes up this challenge while also taking seriously the suspicion that there is indeed something wrong with Hegel’s metaphysics of the individual. In this spirit, the thesis 1) shows that Hegel has developed an ambitious way of integrating individuality into his metaphysics of the concept, and 2) explores how Schelling (in his later, post 1846, period) criticises this project. As such, the thesis both sheds fresh light on the perennial problem of individuality, and demonstrates how this problem is also at the heart of the parting of ways between two major figures of the German idealist tradition, namely Hegel and Schelling.
The Introduction specifies the broad issue of individuality in terms of three specific problems concerning the unity, numerical diversity, and uniqueness of individual substances. Against this background, it is shown how Hegel develops innovative solutions for the first two of these problems. However, Hegel’s answer to the third problem concerning uniqueness is shown to be insufficient (Chapters 1–6). In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 7–10) Schelling enters the discussion. While many of his attacks on Hegel are ultimately unsuccessful, it turns out that his argument from individuality poses a serious challenge to Hegel. As Schelling shows in dialogue with Aristotle, even Hegel’s unconventional theory of universals is not enough in order to account for the fact that individuals have a unique identity and are non-substitutable by others. We thus come to recognise both the value and the limitations of Hegel’s metaphysics, and we also come to understand better why Schelling saw the need to make a radical move away from it.