Kim, Daniel Sung Hyeok ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4378-1137 (2023) Naïve Realism and Phenomenology: exploring selfhood, temporality, and presence. PhD thesis, University of York.
Abstract
This thesis is about perceptual experience, its subjective character, and how it is essentially structured. It focuses specifically on how the nature of perception is shaped not only by our acquaintance with the world but also by the very structure of experience itself. My central claim is that perceptual consciousness incorporates different aspects, some of which constitute the very way in which experiences are organized, sustained, and structured. Over the course of this thesis, I develop and defend an original account of the nature of perceptual experience by integrating naïve realism, a prominent contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, with insights and ideas from the Phenomenological tradition. In particular, I argue that there are fruitful grounds for combining naïve realism and a phenomenologically grounded account of the essential structural features of experience (‘minimal self’, ‘temporality’, ‘anticipation’). Naïve realism holds that perception is fundamentally a matter of being in direct contact with some mind-independent entities. Proponents of naïve realism often emphasize the ‘object-dependent’ nature of perception. The appeal to the structural features of experience offers us a promising way to delineate the oft-overlooked ‘subject-dependent’ nature of perception and capture the phenomenological richness of our conscious experiential life. This thesis offers a rich, phenomenologically informed account of the nature of perception which in turn places us in a better position to understand the nature of hallucination. The integration of naïve realism and the structural approach to consciousness I develop in this thesis yields a novel solution to the problem of hallucination: structural disjunctivism. According to this view, the ‘partially overlapping’ psychological nature of perception and hallucination is accounted for in terms of their structural similarities and differences. I seek to show how detailed analyses and reflections on the structures of perceptual experience pave the way to reconceive the phenomenological basis of naïve realism.
Metadata
Supervisors: | Allen, Keith and Ratcliffe, Matthew |
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Awarding institution: | University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Daniel Kim |
Date Deposited: | 12 Jan 2024 16:33 |
Last Modified: | 12 Jan 2024 16:33 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:etheses.whiterose.ac.uk:34074 |
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