Morality and Blame

This thesis argues that moral wrongness, permissibility, and requirement are conceptually and
metaphysically analysable in terms of moral blameworthiness. As formulated in terms of moral
wrongness, the analysis I defend holds:
Moral Wrongness as Moral Blameworthiness (MB): It is morally wrong for an agent to
φ iff (Def) φ-ing violates standards such that, if the agent violated those standards
without a moral excuse, they would be morally blameworthy for violating them, where
‘φ’ stands for an object of deontic moral assessment.
Chapters 1-3 explain MB, situate it in relation to the sentimentalist tradition in meta-normative
theory, and present my main positive arguments for MB. Chapters 4-6 respond to objections to
MB. Finally, Chapter 7 examines the relation between moral wrongness and normative reasons
in light of MB. I argue that MB supports the claim that we always have strong normative
reasons not to act morally wrongly, but not any stronger claims concerning the connection
between moral wrongness and normative reasons.