A justification for violent protest in the grounds of law within democratic constitutions

This research examines the justification of violent protest in liberal democratic states. By identifying and critiquing principles of “constitutional morality” from which states make moral claims to legitimacy, the research frames state appeals to law as “legitimacy claims,” or moral arguments seeking obedience from citizens. Conversely, protest can act as a “legitimacy counterclaim” against morally irrational laws and policies which the state enforces, as protesters engage in democratic dialogue with the state and the wider public. Violence is deconstructed as a concept, its meaning being highly politicised and contextual, before “violent protest” itself is examined as a potential method for legitimacy counterclaims against perceived state injustices. A critical evaluation of arguments against violent protest – from deontological, consequentialist, pragmatic, and constitutional theoretical frames – reveals that these objections only present limitations on justifiable violent protest, rather than convincing reasons for its absolute moral prohibition. Taking an interdisciplinary approach incorporating legal theory, liberal democratic political theory, criminological and sociological literature and moral philosophy, the research examines notable examples of both violent and nonviolent protest movements internationally (including Black Lives Matter, Extinction Rebellion, gilets jaunes, Hong Kong pro-democracy protests and the Stansted 15). It is shown that violent protest can be an effective and morally coherent method of redress against unjustifiable state laws and policies, subject to certain moral and practical limitations.