Scibilia, Vincenzo (2021) Delineating A- and B-Time: Against the Indistinguishability of the A- and B-Theories. MA by research thesis, University of Leeds.
Abstract
This essay sets out to refute the indistinguishability thesis (IT), which states that there is no 
substantive disagreement between the metaphysics of the A-theory of time and its alleged 
antithesis, the B-theory of time. It begins with an overview of the dichotomies historically 
taken as defining the contrast between A-time and B-time. Part I appraises IT’s success at 
undermining the first of these, the dichotomy between tensed and tenseless time, which is
interpreted as the dispute between a metaphysics comprised solely of temporary
(temporal) facts and one comprised solely of permanent (temporal) facts. It is argued that 
(a) IT fails to evidence any intertheoretical equivalence, and (b) there exists an alternative 
position that does succeed in deflating the permanent-temporary fact contrast. Part II then 
appraises IT’s success at undermining the second defining dichotomy of A- and B-time, i.e. 
as a dispute between dynamic and static models. The at-issue content here is whether time 
contains ‘passage’ or ‘transition’. After addressing some terminological concerns, two 
arguments to establish that all conceptions of time tacitly accept transition are pacified: one 
claims that without transition temporal extension would be indiscernible from spatial 
extension, the other claims that without transition we would be ‘stuck at a given time’. The 
latter half of Part II demonstrates that the ‘stuck’ counterfactual is coherent but ambiguous 
between theories of persistence, which when probed further implies another point of 
distinguishability between A- and B-time in their respective ways of coping with persistence-related challenges. The account set forth in Parts I and II actively excludes an increasingly 
prevalent view called presentism – Part III vindicates this dismissal by arguing that 
presentism is insufficiently motivated, on the grounds of its being causally unintuitive and, 
although ontologically more parsimonious, no more theoretically virtuous than vying 
doctrines
Metadata
| Supervisors: | Le Poidevin, Robin | 
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Indistinguishability thesis; A-theory; B-theory; Time; Metaphysics; Philosophy | 
| Awarding institution: | University of Leeds | 
| Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and the History of Science | 
| Depositing User: | Mr. Vincenzo Scibilia | 
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jun 2022 12:54 | 
| Last Modified: | 15 Jun 2022 12:54 | 
| Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:etheses.whiterose.ac.uk:30532 | 
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