Familiar Paths: The Rationality of Habitual Action

What contribution do habits make to the explanations of what habit-bearers do when they act habitually? More specifically, do they make a rational contribution by shaping the landscape of the habit-bearer’s reasons? Many think the answer must be ‘no’, since habits are mere behavioral dispositions which manifest in automatic, mindless behavior. In this thesis, I argue that this is false. Habits make a rational contribution by figuring in what I call ‘broad rationalising explanations’ when they manifest. That is, they have some rational bearing on the reasons for which a habit-bearer acts when they act habitually. I call this ‘the Rationalising View’. Further, I argue that habits do this because they are tendencies to do things for the reason that doing this is familiar, where this reason is unavailable to people without the habit-bearer’s history of action. Therefore, I elucidate the rational role and metaphysical nature of habit by connecting it to the notion of familiarity, and showing the theoretical benefits of doing so.

Chapter 1 argues against Gilbert Ryle’s view of habit as an internally simple disposition to do things mindlessly. In Chapter 2, I argue for a framework for thinking about rationalising explanations within which we can assess arguments for and against the Rationalising View, and I outline my argument for that thesis. Because the argument requires some claims about intention, in Chapter 3 I consider the connection between reasons and intention. I argue for the Rationalising View in Chapter 4, and defend it from objections in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I reject some models of the Rationalising View in favour of one which centres on familiarity. In Chapter 7, I argue that this model does explanatory work in the theory of habit, particularly in giving us an account of the force of habit.