A Gricean Account of Assertion: closing the gap between the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony

Assertion plays a central role within the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony. However, the literature on assertion within the philosophy of language has developed from interests in a variety of different language-based issues, by means of a variety of different apparent cases of the speech act. And, largely detached from that, the literature on assertion within the epistemology of testimony has developed from interests in a variety of different epistemological issues, again, by means of a variety of different apparent cases of the speech act. The lack of integration between these two areas of philosophy on the topic of assertion has resulted in uncertainty about the concept, which has led some to think that it is not a concept we need to explain any significant component of human behaviour. Although I sympathise with this pessimistic view, ultimately, I think it is incorrect. Rather, philosophy simply has not made up its mind about how the concept of assertion is best understood, and so what is needed is a proposal for how it might fruitfully be applied. This involves reflecting on what philosophical work the concept of assertion should do, stipulating a definition based on these reflections, and then developing a theoretical elaboration which is guided by, connected to, and framed within broader philosophical theories, which can carry out said philosophical work. In doing this, and by drawing on Grice’s framework of communication and the notion of knowledge transmission specifically, I offer a novel Gricean account of assertion. My aim is not only to reaffirm the concept of assertion, but also to provide innovative solutions to problems pertaining to assertion’s role in communication and the spread of knowledge, as well as offer principled verdicts on whether certain apparent cases of assertion really are best understood as cases of assertion.