BMD Under the Radar? Explaining Labour's Ballistic Missile Defence Policy 1997-2010. A Strategic-Relational Approach.

While in office from 1997 to 2010 the Labour government incorporated the US’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) system into the UK's defence policy. Based on an upgrade of the radar systems at RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill, this experimental technology was intended to detect and track incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and launch US interceptor missiles to destroy them. What is unusual about these developments is that they took place during the administration of a Labour government initially committed to the maintenance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty, and emerged from a party with a history of antimilitarism. These events cannot be explained without referring to two themes running within and above British domestic politics. First of these is the skill of the Conservative Party in appealing to voters on defence issues. New Labour's promilitarism, including support for BMD, was an attempt to counter the Conservatives’ dominance in this field. The second and perhaps overriding factor was the UK's Special Relationship with the United States. The UK relies on the US in order to augment its power internationally, and missile defence is part of this. Due to these constraints on the Labour government’s defence policy, this research draws on the theoretical concepts of structure and agency, specifically the strategic-relational approach (SRA), to explain the UK’s support for BMD. Labour’s involvement with BMD during this time should be an area of substantial research. Yet it has been almost totally eclipsed by the UK’s involvement in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. This thesis deepens understanding of this under-explored subject and seeks to explain this research puzzle with reference to the structural factors relevant to Labour’s policy towards BMD.