An autonomy-based framework for surrogacy contracts

Surrogacy is a highly controversial route for alleviating childlessness. The contemporary philosophical literature on the matter raises a number of objections that weigh against the right to surrogacy, such as harm to children, exploitation worries, the commodification of reproduction, gender inequality worries, and negative externalities. However, it is very unlikely that surrogacy will be terminated anytime soon. Therefore, there is a need for good regulation that can better protect the interests of the parties involved, namely surrogates, intended parents and children.
In this thesis, I propose and defend a specific regulatory framework for commercial surrogacy contracts that can protect the reproductive autonomy of surrogates. My case hinges on the premise that surrogacy can be treated as bipartite arrangements, where the first part deals with the childbearing and the second with the transfer of the child. The focus of this thesis is on the first part (the childbearing) and sets aside issues related to the second, such as whether surrogacy amounts to the commodification of children or parental rights. Chapter One argues that we should reject the consumer contract framework under which current surrogacy practices are modelled. I argue that we rather look at more imaginative contractual frameworks that can better protect the reproductive autonomy of surrogates. Chapter Two argues that it is morally permissible for surrogates to accept payment in exchange for their reproductive labour services. Chapter Three advances an autonomy-based account for surrogacy contracts realised through asymmetrically enforceable contracts (AESCs), according to which intended parents would be bound to perform, but surrogates would not. Chapter Four argues that AESCs can be translated into the model of unilateral contracts of the common law of contracts, such as an offer for a reward. Finally, Chapter Five concludes the thesis by considering a further concern to the bipartite approach, to wit: on what grounds do intended parents acquire the right to parent the resultant child, if it is not as a consequence of the contract?