Perceiving what must be: a new argument in favour of Naive Realism

I offer an original argument in favour of Naïve Realism, over Intentionalism. I shall argue that we visually experience: 1. Spatial composition relations, and 2., the metaphysical necessity of those composition relations. Naïve Realism is able to accommodate both 1. and 2., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. Representationalist versions of Intentionalism are unable to accommodate even 1., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology, and other forms of Intentionalism have some trouble accounting for 1., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. No form of Intentionalism is able to accommodate 2., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. I will also develop the Naïve Realist account such that it is, for the first time, able to provide a satisfactory explanation of our perceptual experience of objects (as well as of properties).