The Epistemic and Moral Value of Empathy

In this thesis I present and defend an account of empathy and then use this account to evaluate the epistemic and moral worth of empathy. I understand empathy as the activity of recreating in one’s imagination another’s experience, a recreation which does not necessarily imply an isomorphism between the states of empathiser and target. I understand empathy as a tool which one can become skilled at using.

I then go on to argue that empathy so construed has epistemic value. I argue that recreating in one’s imagination certain aspects of another’s experience allows one to learn about other, unknown, aspects of the other’s experience. Then I argue that empathy also has epistemic value for learning about evaluative features of objects; it is like testimony without the middle man.

I am also concerned with the moral value of empathy. I argue that empathy is a morally neutral tool that can be used to moral advantage. I present and assess the existent criticisms of empathy’s moral worth, as well as put forward a criticism of my own. Apart from discussing criticisms, I also make a positive case by arguing that empathy has moral value in three ways: it allows us to make better informed decisions, it increases our motivation to bring about the good to others, and it brings about a valuable kind of togetherness.