Continuous-variables quantum cryptography: asymptotic and finite-size security analysis

In this thesis we study the finite-size analysis of two continuous-variables quantum key
distribution schemes. The first one is the one-way protocol using Gaussian modulation of
thermal states and the other is the measurement- device-independent protocol. To do so,
we adopt an efficient channel parameter estimation method based on the assumption of
the Gaussian variables and the central limit theorem introduced by Ruppert et al. [Phys.
Rev. A 90, 062310 (2014)]. Furthermore, we present a composable security analysis of the
measurement device independent protocol for coherent attacks with a channel parameter
estimation that is not based on the central limit theorem.
We also investigated, in the asymptotic regime, an asymmetric situation for the authenticated
parties against the eavesdropper caused by fast-fading channels. Here we assume
that the eavesdropper has the full control of the communication channel and can instantaneously
change its transmissivity in every use of it. We assumed the simple model of
a uniform fading and addressed the cases of one-way protocols, continuous-measurement-device-
independent protocol in symmetric configuration and its star network extension for
three users. Finally, we extended the asymptotic study of the one-way protocols using
an arbitrary number of phase-encoded coherent states assuming a thermal loss channel
without using a Gaussian approximation.