Hope and understanding : aspects of a theory of rational inquiry.

The thesis aims to establish two claims that have a role to play in any theory of rational inquiry :
• The aim of rational inquiry is understanding; this is achieved to the extent that we end up with an adequate model of the object of our inquiry.
• Rational inquiry presupposes fundamental hopes in the orderliness of the universe, and in our ability to discern that order, which it is legitimate for us to entertain.
Chapter I sets the scene by describing how the two main themes of the thesis - hope and understanding - are treated in Plato's Meno dialogue , and in Peirce 's more diffuse writings on the nature of scientific inquiry .
Chapter 2 is a detailed analysis of the nature of hope and its role in our inquiries. The chapter aims to answer two questions - what is hope; and when is hope legitimate - and to apply those answers to the specific hopes that underlie the possibility of rational inquiry.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are concerned with understanding , the goa l of inquiry. Chapter 3 makes some important initial distinctions, and presents an analysis of dynamic understanding (which occurs at a particular moment in time). The chapter also introduces the concept of a model , and shows how it may be used to shed light on the nature of static understanding (which persists over a period of time).
Chapter 4 presents an argument from analogy: understanding and spatial orientation have many features in common; the best way of accounting for this is to assume that understanding a domain involves having a map-like representation - a model, in other words - of it.
Finally, chapter 5 argues that current work on the nature of scientific theories and scientific explanation provides further evidence for the claim that understanding a given domain is a matter of having a model of it.