Knowledge and Content: A Theory of Interpretation

This thesis proposes a new theory of content: optimizing dispositions to know. According to this theory, the correct interpretation of an agent is that on which they are best disposed to know. It is a development of the Interpretationist tradition, surveyed in Chapter 1, and especially of the recent work of Robert Williams, discussed in Chapter 2, and Timothy Williamson, discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explains the theory and argues that it combines the strengths and mitigates the weaknesses found in the ideas of Williams and Williamson. Chapter 5 explains how it delivers plausible verdicts across a range of edge cases, including BIV cases (5.A), Swampman cases (5.B), and a new ‘Vatbrain’ case combining features from both of these more traditional examples (5.C). Finally, Chapter 6 argues that focusing only on belief, and not action, leaves the theory at no disadvantage against rationality-maximizing views, either in general (6.A) or with respect to moral terms and concepts (6.B).