The British government, the last Weimar governments and the rise of Hitler, 1929 - 1933

This thesis seeks to examine the impact of German domestic developnents on the course of British foreign policy. The main emphasis of this work is on the period 1929 to 1933 though chapter one presents an overview of the perception the Foreign Office had of Germany from the end of the Great War to the end of the nineteen-twenties. Chapter two provides a description of the British reaction to the formation of the first Bruening Cabinet and the spectacular emergence of the Nazis in the Reichstag elections of September 1930. The efforts by the British Government to support the beleaguered German Government in the first half of 1931 are covered in chapter three, and chapter four analyses British policy concerning the abortive Austro-German Customs Union proposal of March 1931. Chapter five discusses the impact of the financial crisis of the sUITmer of 1931; the negotiations surrounding the Hoover Moratorium; the protracted efforts of the British Government to have the London Conference meet; the impact of the Wiggin-Layton and Basle Reports and the preliminary discussions between London and Paris towards the convening of a reparations conference. The final chapter discusses the aims of British policy makers at the Lausanne Conference during June and July 1932 and the difficulties they faced in dealing with the opposing French and German positions. The reaction of London to the fall of Dr. Bruening and to the successive governments of Papen, Schleicher and Hitler is also examined. Throughout the period covered by this thesis the concern felt within the Foreign Office regarding German domestic developnents was real, but the ability to help, particularly Dr. Bruening, was severely limited by the international dimension of the questions - disarmament, reparations and territorial revision - most at issue. The attitude of France was of central importance in the resolution of these issues, and this thesis reflects that undoubted fact. Whether Britain could have done any more to prevent the appointment of Hitler by offering concessions to Bruening is a major question dealt with by this thesis. Hopefully by the end of it, the constraints under which British foreign policy was made will answer this question for the reader.