The Foreign Market Entry Process of Multinational Enterprises into Infrastructure Assets: The Case of Italian Ports

Despite international business scholars having long studied MNE-host country bargaining, they assume that the negotiation for FDI happens between the MNE and a central monolithic environment. Bargaining scholars have accordingly argued for the necessity to update the most used theoretical perspective, the so-called obsolescing bargaining framework. In this thesis, I argue for the need to start by positioning a theory of the firm within this framework that allows for multi-actor and multi-level bargaining dynamics. Internalisation theory’s assumption that the firm is the result of optimal managerial maximisation does not shed light on the influence that actors at different governance levels have on the process of internalisation. Accordingly, I propose to build on the Coasean property rights framework, where the firm is conceived as a bundle of rights. By bridging the bargaining power literature with the property rights perspective, I examine how and why host-country actors at different governance levels influence foreign direct investment. Using a comparative case study approach, I interrogate four attempts by Chinese firms to negotiate access to Italian ports. In particular, I show that for a port investment to occur, there has to be an alignment between the various actors of the property rights nexus regarding the allocation of rights. Investors need to understand actors' bargaining positions and property rights across multiple levels and space and be mindful of changes over time when negotiating an infrastructure investment. Host-country governments need to have an explicit port infrastructure strategy to avoid wasting resources in lengthy negotiations and useless infrastructure projects.