A Gricean Account of Assertion: closing the gap between the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony

Austin, David ORCID: 0000-0002-9012-3762 (2020) A Gricean Account of Assertion: closing the gap between the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony. PhD thesis, University of York.

Abstract

Metadata

Supervisors: Currie, Gregory and Stoneham, Tom
Keywords: Assertion, testimony, implicature, Grice, knowledge transmission, Lewis, mutual default expectations, epistemic normativity, Moore's paradox, lying, conversational perversions, conceptual engineering, Davidson.
Awarding institution: University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Philosophy (York)
Identification Number/EthosID: uk.bl.ethos.834126
Depositing User: David John Joseph Austin
Date Deposited: 30 Jul 2021 16:35
Last Modified: 21 Aug 2021 09:53

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