MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE : A PARADIGM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN NEW NATION STATE SYSTEMS

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PART ONE : THE MODEL

1 : METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

The first prerequisite of any single body of research must be to establish clearly the rationale and orientation of that research. This process involves two related though quite distinct tasks: first the identification of the substantive field of study, and second the establishment of the methodological foundation and the prescription of the means and goals of analysis. These two tasks constitute the theme and primary aim of this introduction.

The first task is relatively simple and brief. The last two decades have witnessed an increasing assumption of major civilian political offices by domestic military forces in many new nation state systems. The phenomenon of widespread total intervention by the military, long established in Latin America, has become manifest in the Middle East, South Asia, and finally Africa. It is the generic area of the total assumption and retention of major civilian political organs and offices by the military, i.e. intervention and performance, which provides our substantive frame of reference.[1] It is the apparent propensity for widespread military coups and governments in new nation state systems, and the obvious import of such a significant change of regime or government, which constitutes the substantive rationale for the investigation of this problem.

Although the identification of the generic substantive area is relatively easy to establish, the second task is considerably more complex. The basic methodological premise is that the type of questions formulated about any given research area, the manner of satisfying these questions, and therefore the type of answers received are closely related to methodological considerations. In other words, the substantive formulation and payoff are intimately tied to problems of methodology. Hence the necessity of formulating explicity the methodological framework and rationale of this particular study. In order to establish our own

methodological framework and to appreciate the rationale for the adoption of such a framework, it is necessary initially to examine briefly the existing literature on military intervention and performance.

Critique of Current Studies

Given that the many studies on intervention could be organized according to a number of criteria, the most useful would appear to be methodological. The existing studies may be divided into individualizing and synthesizing studies.[2]

The individual or particular studies are characterized by the examination of a particular phenomenon, usually a coup or a series of coups, or occasionally of a particular feature of the military such as organization or ideology.[3] The geographic focus falls mainly on one particular system, though occasionally on a region. In approach they range from the anecdotal, to the descriptive-chronological, to the descriptive-explanatory.[4]

The major limitation of these studies, quite apart from their narrow substantive focus, is that none attempts, either prior to or as a consequence of research, to produce a related set of concepts which may be useful in guiding research and in calibrating the results of research. Invariably the stimulus for research and the rationale for data collection have relied more on chronological description than on an explicit attempt to provide generalized categories of examination and explanatory uniformities. As a consequence we are left with the difficulties of providing a satisfactory understanding of a diffuse, fragmentary and unconnected set of results. As historical material, the individual studies are rich, though often uneven; but as a source of stimulating explanatory generalizations, they are not very useful.

It is the perception of the somewhat confused nature of the individual studies that has provided the stimulus for the synthesizing studies. The

primary motivation of these latter studies is to afford a generalized or synthesized concept around which the various cases of military intervention may be ordered. Since these studies are considerably fewer than the individual type, and since they are of greater relevance to our own study, we may note briefly some difficulties pertinent to each.

Thus Janowitz, after a simple classification of types of society, focuses only on the internal dimensions of the military as factors favouring intervention, and further he makes no attempt to relate the five dimensions of internal military organization to the broader societal forces preciptating intervention and conditioning the development of these dimensions within the military itself.[5] In the last analysis, Janowitz provides a static, albeit interesting, comparative scale divorced somewhat from any explanatory frame of reference. The analysis based on professionalization, as suggested by Huntington, can amount only to a partial explanation.[6] In the first place, a number of highly professionalized armies have become engaged in civilian politics, while a number of low professional armies have shown no such proclivity; and secondly, professionalization may even legitimately precipitate intervention, as for example when a government demand violates the professional code of the army. A second very different and very interesting approach provided by Huntington has been in terms of mobilization, institutionalization and praetorianism (the product of certain degrees and relations between mobilization and institutionalization[7]). The major problems with this approach are that all three concepts are rather catch-all in nature and difficult to measure empirically, further certainly the evidence concerning the relation of mobilization to stability is ambiguous, and finally the main concepts are incapable of precise differentiation. Thus for example it is impossible to explain the differential incidence of military coups in West Africa in terms of these concepts. A fourth approach has been that

of Finer[8]. This too has a number of difficulties. Firstly, to relate increased propensity for military intervention to weak attachment to civilian institutions is to offer a rather shallow explanation, further it is impossible to account for the differential incidence of coups in situations of similar cultures, and finally since neither the determinants not the relations between the three main components (i.e. disposition, opportunity and culture) are not established, Finer's explanation must be seen to represent a flow chart rather than a theory. The final approach is that which has used correlation and regression analysis in the attempt to identify precipitant conditions of coups[9]. Although this approach marks a direction in which research must move, it is subject at present to three major difficulties. First the scales are rather primitive and limited. Thus economists would point out that gross indicators such as G.N.P. levels tell us very little, or again political scientists would point out that one party v two party v multi-party indicators equally tell us very little, or again the scales usually cover only readily identifiable socio-economic indicators. Second, the current indicators are rather superficial. Thus a relationship between a low G.N.P. and a coup does not tell us the form of that relationship or indeed what factors govern low G.N.P.s. Third, much correlation analysis tends to be static in that it fails to examine the time dimension (though there is no reason why the necessary adaptation cannot be made).

We may now integrate both types of study to examine the main defects which have characterized the field as a whole. Three such defects may be noted. In the first place, empirical data is random and further there are certain gross substantive lacunae. Thus analysts have chosen varying sets of variables for examination, which have vitiated the possibility for comparative examination. In addition whole substantive areas have been ignored, of which perhaps the most striking example has been the neglect

of the general syndrome of military political performance and the complex of problems surrounding the military transfer of power and withdrawal from politics.

In the second place the vast subject area of military intervention and performance has remained highly confused, and there have been no attempts to order or structure the field. The bewildering array of military intervention and performance can be easily documented. Thus some coups are led by military factions, others by civil-military alliances; some coups are initiated by well-trained, well-equipped, professional armies and others by less well organized forces; some coups involve a high degree of conflict and violence, while others take place at civilian invitation; some coups occur in societies with high G.N.P.s and with complex civilian political institutions, others in societies of a much less complex nature; some coups are explicit and easily identified, others more indirect; some coups preceed military governments of long duration, others of short; some military governments initiate massive reform programmes, others only limited or repressive measures. Such a list could be extended but would serve little purpose. The main point is clearly evident. Even at a relatively simple level, the unqualified statement and identification of a military coup or government can involve such a host of complex variations, which, if unspecified, leave us with such an over-generalized subject area as to defy any meaningful analysis.

Finally, despite the increasingly rich and extensive body of empirical findings on the subject of military intervention, this information has remained discrete and unconnected. Few explanatory concepts have been advanced and few attempts have been made to integrate the empirical findings into explanatory generalizations.[10]

Given these three main limitations of the research on military intervention and performance, the next logical task must be to inquire into the

reasons for these limitations. The reasons will be seen to be primarily of a methodological nature.

In the first place, the research area of military intervention and performance is a comparatively new area of investigation. The primary reason for this is that the widespread occurence of domestic military coups is a recent phenomenon. (Thus most independent systems in the Middle East and South Asia either became independent or began nation state development some time after 1946, whereas most African systems followed the same pattern only from 1960.) Given the contemporaneity of the majority of coups, it is understandable that the initial stages of investigation should be concerned both to compile information and outline the boundaries of the problem.

Secondly, a considerable degree of normative judgement surrounds military coups and governments. The usual evaluation is negative and is made from two very different standpoints. The one sees military coups as representing breakdowns or deviations from some non-defined, idealized civilian democracy; while the other sees the military as the repressive arm of the state. Occasionally a more positive evaluation is made by those who see the military as harbingers of law and order (and a bastion against communism). All these evaluations lead analysts to focus on some issues to the neglect of others and to see all military coups and governments as part of a single, uniform syndrome, and none helps us to confront the empirical question of the conditions underlying coups and the patterns of military governmental performance.

A third problem lies in the confused or non-explicit general conceptual and methodological foundation of research. In general, the normal approach has been founded on three relatively simple givens: that it is a non-problem or a matter of common sense as to what constitutes the military, a coup and a new nation state system. From this point the method has been to focus on a particular coup and suggest a number of seemingly pertinent

determinants. However, if interest lies in the production of explanatory generalizations, a necessary preliminary task must be to clearly identify the activities or processes under study. In all non unitary or simple problem areas (which military intervention is clearly not), this task involves some kind of typological or taxonomic exercise. Without an initial ordering or classifying of variations within the area of military intervention and performance so as to identify and isolate behavioural similarities and differences, it becomes impossible to execute explanatory analysis. An important corollary to this is that if the aim of the investigation is to provide empirical explanations, then the variables of the typological organization must be cast in heuristic terms and not in simple descriptive terms. (As for example in the case of the three simple givens above.)

A final problem relates to the failure to produce any comprehensive conceptual framework. The absence of any criteria for a systematic inclusion or exclusion of key variables has had two main consequences. First, the absence of a common guide for research has led to the randomized collection of empirical data. Second, the absence of a general framework means there is no mechanism by which empirical observations and findings of research may be comparatively assessed and calibrated. It is the failure in this area, which is responsible for the fragmentary and unconnected findings of most studies.

Methodological Framework

Given these criticisms of the existing body of studies on military intervention and performance, it is now possible to outline the nature and rationale of this particular study. The primary aim is to establish the first stages of an empirical theory of military intervention and performance in new nation state systems. An empirical theory may be defined as an interrelated body of empirical propositions or generalizations (i.e.

empirically validated propositions) having reference to a particular area of behaviour - in this case military intervention and performance. The main aims of empirical theory formation are: first, to order and structure an otherwise complex area of behaviour; second, to identify and isolate uniformities and common patterns of behaviour within this area; and third to identify the conditions underlying such patterns and their interactions in terms of interrelated explanatory generalizations.[11]

With reference to an empirical theory of military intervention and performance, these aims may be translated as: first, an attempt to classify and order the varying manners of military take-over of civilian power and the varying forms of military governmental performance contingent on such take-over; secondly, to identify common patterns and uniformities with respect to such take-over or political performance; and third, to provide explanations or isolate the conditions accounting for such patterns, i.e. the conditions precipitating and governing both the various forms of military coup and the subsequent form of military political performance.

The primary reason for attempting to formulate a synthesizing empirical theory is that such a theory may most adequately satisfy the complex of problems and limitations affecting the present general field of study of military intervention and performance, and thereby may hopefully make a useful contribution to that field.

However, given that our particular approach, i.e. a synthesized empirical theory of military intervention and performance, has been determined by a consideration of some of the basic methodological limitations of the current body of study in this area, it follows that our approach must be founded on and conditioned by certain methodological prerequisites. These prerequisites are a function of two sets of factors: first the basic assumptions and orientations of empirical theorizing, and second the nature

and scope of the substantive problem of military intervention and performance itself. Five such prerequisites may be identified.

In the first place, since the area of military intervention is both vast and complex, the theory must be capable of organizing and structuring this area and of formulating the boundaries and definition of the problem. Furthermore, since the empirical theory involves explanation, the form of boundary definition must be in heuristic terms. Second, the theory must be capable of identifying the major areas of inquiry, of providing the conceptual means for analysis, and of integrating the subsequent body of empirical research. Thirdly, the theory must be sufficiently general to distinguish and account for the differences between military and non military governments, but also it must be sufficiently flexible and precise to differentiate between military coups and governments. Fourthly, it must be capable on account of the problem of taking account not only of factors pertinent to the military but also of the general political system of which it is a part. Finally, to the extent that the problem is of both comparative and historical dimensions, it follows that the theory must be composed of concepts and variables derived in terms of processual activity and independent of structural parameters.[12]

Given these prerequisites, the next logical step must be to posit the method of theory construction, and the basic units of this theory.[13] The particular method of theory construction will be a two stage one involving firstly the establishment of a conceptual framework or model, and secondly detailed empirical research based on this model. Specifically, the model will serve as the basis for empirical research in that it will define the boundaries of the problem, point out the areas for investigation, and provide the means for integrating the product of research. In itself the conceptual framework or model does not provide a theory (although it is possible to deduce theoretical propositions from a conceptual model). An empirical theory can only be said to be constructed once empirical

evidence and generalizations are collected and related in terms of the conceptual framework. The advantages of this method of theory building are that it can establish areas and variables of investigation and patterns of interrelation among these variables prior to research, it can afford the means for abstraction from particular cases, and finally it can afford a modicum of deductive reasoning. The particular basic units of the conceptual framework are system and function. These two conceptual units are especially suited to our problem in that they are independent of any phenomenal structure, they focus on process and activity, they provide the means for abstraction, and they are ideal both for historical and comparative analysis.

Given that we are interested in formulating an empirical theory of military intervention and performance, and given that we have adequately outlined the goals and aims of such an analysis, the final problem of this introduction must be to posit the main qualifications of this approach.

In the first place, middle range empirical theory does not provide the sole or comprehensive approach to the study and analysis of human behaviour. Three limitations are noteworthy. Different forms of approach to a problem are suitable at different stages of the development of knowledge with respect to that problem. Further different forms of approach provide different payoffs. Finally, since the constraints of empirical theorizing force a certain focus, empirical theory, far from being comprehensive, must consciously neglect certain problems (given our focus, one obvious area which will be neglected is the actual technical process of the coup). In the second place, we must reiterate a point made above that our particular approach to empirical theory building represents only one of several possible approaches. (Needless to say we have adopted this particular one since it promises the greatest return at the present time.) Thirdly, our particular application of system and function does

not represent the only conceptual tools to confront the problem of military intervention and performance. In this respect two qualifications are in order. On the one hand, it is quite conceivable that other concepts or conceptual frameworks may be utilized, which would overlap with our own conceptualization in proportion to the comprehensiveness of our formulation. On the other hand, our application consciously provides only a certain range or variance of explanation. Thus in focusing on the social system, our framework deliberately avoids that complex of issues pertaining to the psychological or personality system, (i.e. our framework is inter-personal and not intra-personal) and that complex of issues pertaining to the general ecological system. Fourthly, it is inconceivable that our theory will provide all the generalizations having reference to military intervention and performance. Such a task is obviously beyond the scope of a single work. It is claimed, however, that our study will provide a number of interesting findings and generalizations and that the conceptual framework is applicable to any case of military intervention and performance (within our definitional boundaries). Finally, it will be appreciated that we are not presenting an enduring scheme or theory. The development of empirical theory, irrespective of the degree of sophistication or scope of any one theory, represents a constant movement between on the one hand abstraction (in the form of concept formation, testing different variables, collecting variables into patterns) and empirical research and data collection on the other. The two processes are mutually reciprocating and inevitably interlocked. Thus given a body of discrete empirical data, we attempt to order or classify it into empirical variables and generalizations, which are reapplied to empirical research and analysis, and either are retained as satisfactory (i.e. can explain a particular phenomenon), or are rejected, or are refined. Whichever particular method is temporarily adopted, the process indicates the constant movement between data and abstraction. It follows in the case

of our own theory, assuming it is not rejected outright, that future research will attempt to produce more empirical data, to refine some of the concepts and variables, and even to reject and replace others. In short we are not positing an immutable theory.

It will be realized that we are very far from providing a theory of military intervention and performance to end all theories of military intervention and performance, and even further from providing a comprehensive explanation of all aspects of all coups and a prediction of future ones. Rather given the more modest general aims of empirical theory formation and the utility of such an approach, and given the current stage of development of the discipline of research on military intervention and performance, it is hoped that our approach will make a significant contribution to an understanding of this area. The final payoff and justification for our thesis may be easily and simply assessed in terms of whether our analysis has helped to order and explain and thereby to facilitate comprehension of one small yet interesting and important area of social life.

PART ONE : THE MODEL

FOOTNOTES 1 : METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

1. The subject frame of reference is rather vaguely defined, and as such would seem to correspond to a criticism, which will shortly be levelled at existing studies. However, the subject area will be considerably refined later. It is necessary at the present simply to note the generic area.

2. The distinction between the two categories is not of course always easily drawn with the result that there are a number of transitional studies. These studies are either of a broad focus but employ essentially descriptive techniques, or examine only selected issues. Examples are W.F.Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in New States, Pall Mall, 1965; or H.Daalder, Role of the Military in Emerging Countries, Mouton, 1962.

3. The individualizing studies far outnumber the synthesizing ones, and are too numerous to list. They appear as anthologies, e.g. W.C. McWilliams, ed., Garrisons and Government, Chandler, 1967, or J.J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton Univ. Press, 1962, or H.Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes, Sage, 1968; or as single works with either a regional focus, e.g. G.M.Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East, Speller, 1965, or J.J.Johnson, Military and Society in Latin America, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964, or a single system focus, e.g. G.S.Harris, "Role of the Military in the Turkish Republic", M.E.J., 1965.

4. Compare for example: M.Howard, Soldiers and Government, Eyre, 1957, with E.Lieuwen, Generals v Presidents, Pall Mall, 1964, with G. Germani and K.Silvert, "Military Intervention in Latin America", Eur.J.Sociol., 1961.

5. M.Janowitz, Military in the Political Development of New Nations, Chicago Univ. Press, 1964.

6. S.P.Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard Univ. Press, 1962.

7. S.P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale Univ. Press, 1968, and an interesting application A.Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army," Comp.Pol., 1969.

8. S.E.Finer, The Man on Horseback, Pall Mall, 1962.

9. See for example, R.D.Putnam, "Towards Explaining Military Intervention in Latin America", World Pol., 1967.

10. Given the negative criticisms, it is important to realize their positive empirical contributions, which are twofold. First, the studies have afforded a considerable amount of empirical data (which it is impossible to summarize.) Second, they have called attention to areas of interest in the form of the documentation of the range of military political behaviour (e.g. puppet military regimes, military as counterbalance, military as restorers of the status quo, military as caretakers, military as innovators etc.), and in the form of empirical correlates (such as socio-economic indicators, military variables, and international variables.)

11. Theory formation is not of course the only activity within the area of empirical political analysis. This type of analysis may be restricted to classification or data collection, but invariably works towards theory formation. For statements on the assumptions and goals of empirical political analysis and on the position of empirical theories within this field, see A.Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, Chandler, 1964; J.LSimon, Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences, Random House, 1969; H.Blalock, ed., Methodology in Social Science Research, McGraw, 1968; J.Galtung, Theory and Method of Social Research, Allen and Unwin, 1967; D.P.Forcese and S.Richer, ed., Stages of Social Research, Prentice-Hall, 1970; C.Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press, 1965.

12. Examples of the early writings on the comparative method are R.C. Macridis, The Comparative Study of Politics, Random House, 1955; H.

Eckstein, "Perspectives on Comparative Politics: Past and Present", in H.Eckstein and Apter, ed., Comparative Politics, Free Press, 1963; G.A.Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in G.A. Almond and Coleman, ed., The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960. The brunt of more recent work has been to point out that there is no such thing as the independent comparative 'method', but that it is an integral part of the scientific paradigm, and also to point out that problem definition can only be made in terms of process parameters and that spatial-temporal parameters only have the status of residual identifiers. See R.T.Holt and Turner, "The Methodology of Comparative Research", in ibid., ed., The Methodology of Comparative Research, Free Press, 1970; but in particular A.Przeworski, and Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, J.Wiley, 1970.

13. There are of course several methods of theory construction. For a discussion see A.L.Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, Harcourt and Brace, 1968; H.Blalock, Theory Construction, Prentice-Hall, 1969; A.Kaplan, op.cit.

2 : THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTEM

One of the main products of the first chapter was the establishment of the general methodological orientation of this inquiry in the form of an attempt to produce an empirical theory of military intervention and performance in new nations state systems. Furthermore, the procedure to be adopted in constructing such a theory was by means of the development of a formal model, and the subsequent application of this model in empirical research. The following chapters of Part One will be concerned in the main to elaborate this conceptual framework.

The subject of this chapter will be the first and most important stage in the development of this conceptual framework. More specifically, this will involve the construction of a conceptual model of the nation state social system. As the core of the total conceptual framework, this model will also be the primary foundation for this research. The model of the nation state system will be constructed in two main stages. The first involves an identification of the abstract analytic model; the second involves the establishment of the empirical analytic model as an elaboration and application of the abstract analytic one.

The Abstract Analytic Conceptual Model

The methodological introduction was of import not only in establishing the goals and general format of the research (in terms of an empirical theory constructed by means of a formal conceptual framework) but also in dictating a number of prerequisites which any such research must take into account. These prerequisites were derived from a consideration both of the substantive scope of the research (i.e. a complex area of macro behaviour having wide comparative and historical reference), and the methodological orientation of the research (i.e. the obligation to identify patterns and uniformities of behaviour within the substantive frame of reference, and to provide explanations of these). These substantive and methodological

prerequisites impose a number of constraints on the nature of the composition and structure of the conceptual framework.

The logical consequences of these prerequisites for the development of the conceptual framework may be summarized in the need to evolve a conceptual framework derived in terms of processual activity independent of phenominal structure and capable of heuristic application and development. The basic concepts, which most adequately satisfy the requirements for a macro conceptual framework of comparative viability focusing on process, are system and function. Both concepts have been the focus of intense debate in which we do not intend to become involved. Rather we shall proceed directly to define how we intend to designate system and function.[1]

System and function represent paradigms for analysis, and have been applied in a wide diversity of manners (this is particularly true of functionalism). For our purpose a weak interpretation of function (in which it is virtually synonymous with role) is subjugated into our master paradigm of systems. A systems model simply describes a collection or patterning of any group of elements, variables or relations which can be so aggregated as to form a mutually interdependent whole. Analytically the concept of a system as a set of interacting elements may be identified in a wide variety of different spheres, such as social, biological, or mechanical, and at a variety of different levels within these spheres (for example, intra- or inter-personal levels in the social system). Our focus is the social system at the inter-personal level as a collection of human relational interaction constituting an identifiable and interdependent whole.

The next problem must be to identify why and to what extent any group of interactions may be said to constitute a system. A social system may be said to exist when any collection of human interaction so coheres as to form an interdependent whole oriented to self-maintenance. Obviously no

absolute or specific end purpose for self maintenance can be identified, but this problem necessitates a solution in terms of the identification of exigent processes independent of any phenomenal social system organization and common to all self-sustaining social systems. This may be accomplished through a modified form of teleological reasoning, namely functionalism.

To the extent that social systems represent enduring patterns or collections of interaction oriented toward self-maintenance, it follows that interaction within the social system is functional to the extent that it serves either the survival or the adjustment or the maintenance of the system. This demands that we identify the ends or activites that functional behaviour plays in serving the existence or maintenance of the system. In short, we need to posit the major functional activities which are seen to support every social system and thereby to be manifested in every social system.

Social systems may be resolved into a number of functional subsystems which are defined and identifiable in terms of functional activity. There are four functional subsystems: the political, the economic, the cultural and the social. It is the first which is of primary importance for us. The major activites peculiar to the political subsystem are goal attainment and conflict regulation. These two major functions may be resolved into the following activites: decision-making, institutionalization, support mobilization and monitoring. Decision-making relates to the determination of goals, rules and offices; institutionalization relates to the formation of consensus, rules and the legitimation of the modus operandi of the political system and of its main structures and goals; support maintenance relates to the stimulation and aggregation of support for the main goals and structures; and monitoring relates to the capacity of the political system to maintain itself and implement its goals, which activities become

tied to administrative and supervisory duties and the development of authority.

The political system, however, represents but one part of the matrix of relations forming the total social system. In this respect it both influences and is influenced by the other subsystems. Its influence lies in its own output, i.e. the definition of major collective goals to be implemented, their order of priority, the allocation of sanctions, and so on. In turn it is influenced by its continuous dependence on the inflow of resources, services and supports needed to sustain its own outputs. These resources are drawn from the economic subsystem responsible for labour, manpower, material and monetary resources; the cultural subsystem which contains the basis of support for the regime, identification with symbols and so on; the social subsystem rejects social stratification and organisation and provides necessary support for different policies.

At this stage a number of important deductions may be drawn. First, in formal terms any collection or patterning of human relational interaction constituting some form of self-sustaining whole may be said to form a social system. Second, any social system may be seen to manifest a number of activities which may be resolved into four main functional categories. Third, the four functional areas of interaction of any social system are highly interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Finally, the various activities of the functional spheres represent the permanent enduring social processes of any social system.

This conceptualization of the social system in terms of system and function represents the initial outline of the conceptual apparatus. However, it is clearly evident that some considerable elaboration is necessary before this framework can be of empirical value. The first stage in such an elaboration can be made at the formal abstract level; the second and more important elaboration will be made in the following section.

The first elaboration hinges on the necessary requirement that the conceptualization of the social system be capable of identifying various types of social system. In this respect, social systems may be differentiated in two main fashions: abstractly and phenomenally. From the abstract standpoint social systems may vary in terms of the differential salience of various subsystems. Thus in some social systems the political subsystem may predominate, whereas in others the economic or cultural ones may do so. Further, social systems may vary in terms of the degree of differentiation both between and within the various functional subsystems. Thus in social systems with a high degree of social division of labour and role differentiation, the various subsystems will be more clearly demarcated. Finally, social systems may vary in terms of the size and their degree of comprehensiveness, i.e. in terms of the scope of interaction. From the phenomenal standpoint, social systems may be differentiated in terms of the empirical referrents of the various functional activities. Although the same functional processes and activities may be found in all social systems, the empirical nature or referrent of these universal processes will vary. Thus social systems may differ for example in the substance of the different collective goals sought by the political system or in the means of conflict regulation; or in the types of economic inputs such as tribal barter, feudal land taxes or progressive income tax or corporation tax; or in the various forms of cultural legitimation such as hereditary principles, natural law, divine right or principles of popular representation and responsibility; or finally in different social organizations such as rates of mobility, types of family organization or forms of stratification.

Given these analytic and phenomenal criteria of differentiation, several further deductions may be added to these outlined above. First, a wide variety of phenomenal social systems may be seen to exist. Second,

the abstract functional exigencies may be represented in a wide variety of empirical forms. Third, since any social system manifests a high degree of interrelation among its various functional components, it follows that different types of social system uphold and are upheld by particular empirical manifestations of the basic functional processes. Finally, all phenomenal types of social system develop and function under specific social conditions and therefore the continuity of any social system is related to such specific conditions.

The Empirical Analytic Model

Thus far we have elaborated the abstract analytic conceptual framework in terms of a systems-function model. As it was pointed out above, the abstract model of a social system is not immediately amenable to empirical research. However, it was further argued that the adaptation of the systems-function model for empirical research could be achieved through a two-stage elaboration. The first stage of this elaboration has already been accomplished through the specification of the formal mechanisms whereby social systems may be differentiated. It is the capacity for the differentiation of various types of social system which provides the means whereby it is possible to achieve the second stage of the elaboration, namely the translation of the formal abstract conceptual framework of the systems-function model into the empirical conceptual model. This will be accomplished by translating the abstract social systems model into an empirical social systems model of the nation state social system.[2]

However, before we proceed to establish this model of the nation state, it is useful to make a small digression to examine briefly existing approaches to the study of the nation state. In general, two main approaches may be isolated: the traditional and the modern.

In considering the traditional approach, it is necessary to note that the nation state encompasses two distinct concepts, which have had different

intellectual histories. The state became central to western political discourse following the consolidation and centralization of power in several European countries under despotic monarchs (approximately from the 16th century onwards), and the introduction of concept of sovereignty. On the other hand, the concept of nation has been used at least from the time of the Middle Ages when it was defined in terms of a group of people which had some factor in common (i.e. were born in the same area or had the same occupation, etc.). The French Revolution partially destroyed this usage and gave rise to two different meanings of the nation, which were integrated over a century later. The political dimension to the concept of the nation spawned by the French Revolution was a mass element. The second and legal dimension was that of the nation as a sovereign independent state. It was natural that with the rise of popular government and the establishment of stronger central authority after the French Revolution, the concepts of the state and the two strands of the nation should merge. The marked variations in the individual traditional approaches may be subsumed along three main dimensions. The first and most obvious is the historical, which was of import in conditioning the stage of development of the concepts.[3] The second relates to the emphasis given to political obligation and the grounds on which such obligation was based.[4] The third relates to the emphasis given to the historical description of the rise of the nation state and the different variables posited for this rise.[5]

However, the variety of approaches within the traditional complex have been subject to a number of limitations. In the first place, the two concepts of state and nation were rarely integrated (a problem which has clear historical linkage). Secondly, both concepts have engendered a high degree of emotive response which has generally limited analysis. Thirdly, the conceptual definitions were very loose. This is particularly true of the concept of nation which was employed much as we would use either

group identification or culture.[6] Finally, the use of empirical data was random and haphazard, and evidently subject to severe limitations in availability.

The modern approach has a strong germinal connection with the traditional one in that it retains the notions of state authority and self-determinacy. It differs firstly in that it sees the nation state specifically as a single phenomenon of 19th century western development. Secondly, the modern approach has abandoned the emotive, philosophical or descriptive approach to focus on the empirical analysis of the dynamic processes of nation state emergence and development. Further it is founded on empirical quantification and definition. Finally, it views the nation state as a cluster of variables which manifest varying degrees of intensity or development.[7]

The discussion of the traditional and modern approaches is useful in that it illustrates the intellectual history of the two concepts of state and nation, and points up the germinal strands which have persisted and developed through that history. The modern approach is particularly useful not only in that it provides a wealth of empirical data and a number of interesting empirical variables which have been used to define the nation state, but also in that it has fused the nation and the state into a macro form of social organization, which has developed initially in the West over the last century and later diffused throughout the world.

It is now possible to return to the main discussion and to resume the elaboration of our conceptual framework. It was pointed out in the introduction to this section that the second stage in this elaboration was to be the construction of an empirical model of the nation state. This may be achieved by constructing an empirical analytic model of the nation state derived from and mirroring the abstract systems-function model. Thus the nation state is taken as a specific, concrete, macro type of social system

which could be juxtaposed to other macro phenomenal social systems such as feudalism, bureaucratic empires or despotic monarchies. The precise nature of this concrete social system, viz. the nation state, may be identified in terms of particular empirical referents of the abstract functional processes. It is these empirical referents of the abstract functional processes which define and support the nation state social system. In sum, our empirical conceptual model is a social systems model of the nation state defined in terms of certain empirical referents of the abstract functional processes.

In constructing an empirical analytic model of the nation state derived from the abstract systems-function model, two stages are involved. The first involves the identification of the boundaries of the system, which in part corresponds to the identification of some of the traditional notions of the state; the second stage involves the identification of the empirical referents of the major abstract functional processes which define and support the nation state as the current major macro form of societal organization.

The boundaries of the system are defined initially in terms of the demarcation of patterns of interdependence and intercommunication of political, economic, social and cultural goods, services and values among the constituent units of the system. The major factor differentiating the boundaries of the nation state system from other types of social system (which are similarly identified and defined in terms of intensities of interaction and intercommunication) is the exclusive nature of the authority structure within the system, i.e. the manifestation of sovereign authority. (Thus families, churches, Trade Unions, corporations, etc., may be identified as systems but none has a monopoly of authority over its members, nor does it represent the highest manifestation of authority over its members.) Thus the existence or boundaries of a nation state system are initially recognizable in terms of a collection of political, economic, social and

cultural interaction and intercommunication within which there is an exclusive authority structure. Invariably in the case of the nation state the boundaries are formally defined in legal-territorial terms.

Within the framework of the sovereign authoritative demarcation of patterns of interaction, the nation state is uniquely differentiated from other social systems (some of which may possess the above properties) in terms of the empirical referents of the major functional adtivities. It is necessary therefore to identify the empirical manifestations of these processes which define and constitute the nation state.

The main functional activities of the economic subsystem are identifiable in the high degree of development of specialization, the emergence and consolidation of industrial production, and the development of a complex market and distributive system. The most important process involves the change-over from largely subsistence (and in some cases also a high luxury commodity production) to factory production, involving a high degree of machine production. Agriculture itself becomes more specialized and intensive either vertically through improved techniques, and experimentation, or horizontally through the reclaiming of new lands, a process often based on the application of new industrial techniques. However, the major change lies in the appearance of industrial factory production, which itself is founded on and further reciprocates capital and machine-intensive as opposed to labour-intensive production, the large-scale employment of investment for productive returns, the development of secondary and especially of tertiary employment. The development of a complex market and distributive system entails a much higher exchange of both goods and services, a more mobile and complex labour force, the development of a monetary economy, and the responsiveness of production to pressures of supply and demand. The major economic repercussions of the emergence of these particular economic functional activities are: a massive rise of G.N.P., the development of a high degree of division of labour, a large

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working force, the freeing of a large part of the population from purely subsistence activity, the commercialization of agriculture, the emergence of monetary techniques and a developed market system, the development of technology and the increasing application of technical knowledge, and finally the diversification of general economic activity.

The major functional referents of the cultural system are manifest in terms of the development of rationality and scientific thought. In definitional terms, rationality implies that a logical or empirical bond may be established between any two elements. A thought or action may be said to be rational to the extent that such bonds may be said to exist. As such two main types of rationality may be distinguished: substantive and formal. Thus the ideology of divine right of monarchs may have been said to be substantively rational in the sense that it served as a useful myth which consolidated and supported the rule of a certain class of people, and was therefore rational in assisting the perpetuation of such rule. In formal criteria the myth of divine rights is obviously untenable since no logical or empirical bond can be established showing either the existence of a god or a god-given prerogative for a particular hereditary group to rule and dominate others. It follows that all societies manifest some degree of rationality to the extent that they possess moral codes and legitimating ideologies which serve as rules and norms of conduct whereby behavioural expectation patterns may be established. The same, however, need not hold true for formal rationality.

The cultural subsystem of the nation state is characterized by two major developments in rationality which differentiate it from other types of social system. These developments involve certain changes in substantive rationality, and secondly an increased manifestation of formal rationality. The changes in the former relate to the extension in the range of persons within a system to whom normative and behavioural codes are applicable, and

the increasing impartiality and levelling in this process. The change in the latter relates to the divorce of normative codes from magic, custom, religion and their reliance on mechanical taboos, unchanging and unchangeable rules external to society, to appeals to the quality of behavioural acts in themselves or the attempt to employ formalized concepts of rationality by setting the frame of reference within the total frame of human behaviour and not relying on external laws, advice or sanction. The apotheosis of these changes lies in the development of secular law. However, the major impact of formal rationality has been in the emergence of science and technology. Science represents a method of inquiry identifiable in terms of a particular complex of rules whereby the empirical investigation of the nature and organization of man's environment may be accomplished. The object of such scientific investigation is to isolate patterns of uniformities of interaction of elements within this environment and to provide explanations of these patterns. The major offshoot of science is the development of technology, which is the application of scientific laws and theories to the control of man's environment. The nation state is characterised by the continuous expansion of science and technology. The major repercussions within the cultural sphere of the dual revolution of rationality and science are several. In the first place there develops a changed perspective on time, which is no longer seen as cyclical, nor is human existence within time seen as a preordained phenomenon but rather as a constant process from the past into the future. Secondly, there is a changed perspective on nature which is now viewed as a universe or collection of phenomena amenable both to being ordered in identifiable patterns and to being controlled and monitored by human activity. Finally, there exists a changed perspective on the relation of man to man in society which is the consequence both of the development of science and of the major changes in substantive rationality.

The social subsystem is characterized by the manifestation of certain

forms of societal organization and stratification. The most salient characteristics are a high degree of role and structural differentiation, social mobilization, increased mobility (whether in prestige, occupational or geographical terms), and the greater salience of achievement oriented norms and organizations.

The definitional characteristics of the political subsystem may be examined more precisely in terms of the empirical referents of the four main functional activities. The political function of decision making may be divided into two considerations: the method and the scope of decision making. The former becomes tied to some kind of legislative activity, to the emergence of some kind of central executive, and to the development of a complex administrative structure. The latter becomes tied to the maximization of the major political and economic goals, to the production and distribution of political and economic goods, to the means of conflict regulation, to the regulation of external contact, to the choice of occupants of political roles and so on. The institutionalization function refers to the attempts to increase the survival capacity of the political system through the development of a body of rules governing orientation and modes of political action and the creation of consensus on such a body, the development of legitimate channels for the circulation of political incumbents, offices and regimes, and the development of institutional autonomy for major political organizations. These activities involve the development of a constitution, rules of succession, voting and electoral mechanisms, specification of the spheres of competence of various organizations, the development of a juridicial apparatus. Support mobilization, the third major political function, is oriented not only toward small groups, cliques or organizations but to the populace as a whole. The mobilization of support is manifested in such activities as rationalization of policies and goals to the populace, in the use of mass media and in public

opinion. However, the major feature of support mobilization lies in the development of political parties. Factions or cliques are to be found in most social systems, but the emergence of a large mass political party oriented to the recruitment and production of leaders, to the winning of popular support for various policies, to the articulation and aggregation of a wide variety of representative views and opinions, is a feature unique to the nation state. The monitoring function involves the development of the central authority structure capable of regulating and combining the major demands made upon it and of executing its own policies and decisions. This involves the creation and development of administrative activity related to large central complex organizations (such as the civil bureaucracy, police and military forces) based on centralization, standardization and achievement rules of recruitment and promotion; the attempt to create and legitimate central authority resources; the mobilization of various national symbols; and the creation of functionally specific associations such as local government bodies, commissions and central specialized policy bodies.

The nation state may be identified and is defined as a gross type of social system which is supported by and which manifests certain empirical referents of the abstract functional processes. It is the manifestation of these empirical functional activities within an interactive system which constitutes the nation state. Thus, in this manner the abstract analytic systems-function model has been translated into an empirical analytic model of the nation state.

Before any possible problems raised by this conceptualization of the nation state are considered, a further prelimintary elaboration of the conceptual framework is necessary. The outline of the abstract systems model contained not only an elucidation of a complex of functional activities but also an indication of the systemic interaction among these functions.

The next section will seek to illustrate the interrelations among the major empirical functional activities in the nation state.

Interrelations among the Functional Activities of the Nation State

It is important to note that we are not concerned with the identification of any pattern of the emergence of the major functions. We are still engaged in elaborating our basic definitional model and as such are interested in outlining only a number of necessary logical or empirical connections between the major functional activities. These interrelations may be considered under two headings: the interrelations between the economic, cultural and social subsystems, and the interrelations between the political, economic and cultural subsystems. In examining primarily the interrelations between the varying subsystems, we may also note interrelations between functional processes within subsystems.

The single most striking factor of economic activity in the nation state has been the development of manufacturing and industrial production. Manufacturing and industrial production may be used to refer to the change-over from agricultural to factory production (as such the processing of agricultural or raw materials can involve significant developments of manufacturing and industrial activity). These spheres of reciprocal repercussion of the development of manufacturing or industrial production may be noted. The most immediate concerns the development of capital intensive production, of large-scale investment and the longer time lag for the returns on this investment, and of secondary and tertiary production. A second and less direct sphere of repercussion has been manifested in the emergence of a high degree of the division of labour and role and structural differentiation, the development of complex market systems, and of a high degree of interdependence and communication. These factors have a high degree of reciprocating influence. The developed market systems are a direct product of the development of secondary and tertiary industries, which themselves demand more complex distributive and indeed collective systems

both to afford the materials and skills for the development of these sectors and to distribute the product of those sectors. The development of a high degree of division of labour bears a similar relation to the development of industrialization. In turn the new division of labour and the new increased market system demand improved communications, which in turn are made possible by technological improvements of industrial development. The net result of these three features, i.e. the division of labour, increased markets and communication systems, have the effect of inducing a higher degree of interdependence and intercommunication. This involves a greater degree of exchange of goods and services, greater communication among the various parts of the system and increased mutual dependence of the various units within the system. All these factors have the effect of enhancing the intensity of interaction and interdependence within the system, and thereby of differentiating more clearly one system (as a pattern of interaction) from another.

A third sphere of reciprocal repercussion relates to the development of urbanization. Urbanization has existed independently of industrial production, but never to the same level as found in industrial society. Thus urbanization can only develop when there is sufficient agricultural surplus to support an urban populace, and where that populace has its own means of production from which it may purchase such surplus. Furthermore, urbanization requires at least some development in the market system, division of labour, and communication system, and also some investment or capital exchange production. Thus, not only does urbanization contain many of the features necessary for industrialization, but industrialization in turn demands a large and regular working force which urban communities are best able to provide. In short, industrialization both necessitates and fosters urbanization.

We may now examine some of the necessary logical and empirical

connections between the cultural and economic subsystems. It will be recalled that the major characteristic features of the cultural system in the nation state were firstly the change in the nature of substantive rationality, and secondly the use of formal rationality, especially in the development of science and technology. With respect to the former, it has been well established that certain substantive value complexes facilitate the emergence of industrialization. In general terms, a value complex is required which places high in its hierarchy the importance of material over other worldly pursuits, such factors as savings or thrift and discipline which are conducive to investment formation and complex organization, the commitment to regular and organized labour, and finally some favourable evaluation of industrialization. This value complex, which in the West was provided by the Reformation and Enlightenment, is most effective when it can provide a generalized legitimation of industrialization, and a more specific legitimation for the essential internal processes of industrialization. The second major influence of the cultural on the economic subsystem lies in the development of formal rationality and especially in the development of science and technology. The essence of science is the untiring drive to provide explanatory empirical laws governing the natural world of man's environment. The most generalized repercussions of science have been of a substantive form. In this respect, science has fostered a world view based on the belief in the capability of man to control and harness the forces of nature. To the extent the industrialization is partially founded on this belief as well as providing the credibility for the belief, a direct connection between the cultural and economic subsystems may be established. More specifically, the investigation and experimentation, so central to the scientific method, have led to conscious attemps to improve the capabilities and range of choice open to man through the continuous inventions of machines, tools, methods of power generatinn, modes of transport and communication and

so on. Technology, as the applied branch of science, coupled with industrial and manufacturing skills has become the continuously expanding motivating force and input into the economic subsystem. Finally, formal rational techniques have been used to improve industrial techniques of production, distribution and marketing.

In turn the economic subsystem has influenced the cultural. Firstly, economic and industrial expertise have improved man's control over his environment and thereby have supported a specific form of substantive rationality and enabled the explanation of man in society to move away from external sanctions and controls by taboos or gods or god-given laws. Further, industrialization has provided massive improvements in transportation and communication which have enabled the diffusion of new world views. Finally, economic development under the stimulus of industrialization has provided the necessary surplus capital to finance educational programmes and increased government expenditure on welfare and juridical programmes. Such developments have enhanced the ideology of universalization in the evaluation of behavioural acts (i.e. that behaviour be judged in and of itself and that the same normative standards be applied to all incumbents of the social system), and the mechanism by which such universalization may be established.

In continuing the examination of the patterns of interaction among the economic, cultural and social subsystems, it is now pertinent to examine the interaction between the economic and social subsystems. The major economic functional activities of the nation state demand a permanent and expanding labour force with an increasing degree of adaptability and mobility. The labour force must be permanent to permit stable patterns of production to develop and to allow for the necessary acquisition of industrial skills and discipline (it follows that the lower the level of industrialization the less the need for a permanent or skilled working force). The labour force

must be adaptable as industrialization represents a continuous growth of complexity and differentiation. Thus the labour force has to be both willing and capable, in terms of educational and skill levels, to adapt to more complex and demanding tasks. This becomes particularly important as industrial production diversifies and secondary and tertiary manufacture outstrip primary production. Finally, the labour force must be mobile both occupationally and geographically. The ramifications of such demands have been several. In the first place there has been a marked increase in role and structural differentiation. For example, a basic social organization, such as the family, has been stripped of many of its functions, such as education, job training, job placement, etc. Generally, a nuclear or modified extended family emerges as the modal size of familial organization. A second major social ramification has been the emergence of a new group of people dependent for their livelihoods on activities other than subsistence agriculture. As economic growth advances through diversification and secondary and tertiary production, that group of people outside agriculture has come to occupy a wide diversity of occupational groups and statuses. A final ramification has been in changing stratification and mobility patterns. The continuous rapid and complex growth of economic production has made simple and enduring patterns of stratification an anomaly. Although stratification or status gradations, in terms of differential financial or prestigious rewards have far from disappeared, they are more loosely drawn. Similarly mobility becomes increasingly, though far from solely, dependent on achievement criteria and skill levels, and more a function of individual as opposed to group movement.

However, if the demands of certain economic changes and processes have induced certain changes within the social subsystem, the contributions of the social subsystem have been just as important in adapting to those

demands. Thus, for example, increased social specialization, division of labour and mobility are just as important in giving momentum to certain economic changes, as vice versa. Economic growth levels cannot be maintained in the face of non-response by the social system.

Finally, it is possible to examine the functional interrelation between the cultural and social subsystems. More so than in other patterns of interaction, the forms of interaction are of a reciprocal rather than a causal nature. The major effects of the change in substantive rationality and the development of formal rationality have been in conditioning the quality and quantity of social stratification and organization. Qualitatively the universalization implicit in the change of substantive rationality has meant a greater standardization and levelling in the application of codes of conduct. This has entailed for example greater emphasis on equalization in the application of societal rules as in the standardization and sovereignty of secular law, or the greater emphasis on achievement orientation. Quantitatively the changes in stratification relate to the availability of channels of mobility. The substantive and formal rational elements of the cultural subsystem do not tolerate stratification or mobility based on such grounds as tradition, hereditary rights or natural rights. This does not imply that the cultural values of the nation state run counter to stratification, which they manifestly do not, but that the grounds on which stratification is based do change, i.e. become founded to a greater degree on occupation or skill. In sum, the major effects of the cultural system have been inchanging the grounds for stratification and mobility through greater emphasis on achievement, education, occupation and skill, in standardizing norms of behaviour through the universalization of substantive rationality, and in increasing the volume of change and mobility. The social subsystems major contribution to the development of the cultural system has been in providing the necessary degree of structural differentia-

tion to afford the requisite number of groups capable of stimulating and sustaining the particular cultural values.

The second major heading relates to the examination of the functional interrelations between the political and economic and cultural subsystems. We may examine initially the relationship between the economic and political subsystems.

The first major repercussion of the economic subsystem relates to the development of the high degree of functional interchange and interdependence. The division of labour and the specialization of production, the growth of market interchange and the development of transport and communication systems have all served to increase the extent and intensity of interaction. The primary effects of this change have been twofold. In the first place, the increased intensity of interaction facilitates the process of boundary demarcation. By definition any system is demarcated from others in terms of interaction, and it follows therefore that the higher the rate and the greater the intensity of interaction, the greater the ease of boundary formation. (Invariably boundary formation is formalized by the establishment of territorial limits.) In the second place, the clarity of boundaries and the high degree of intercommunication and interdependence provide the basis on which stable and persisting patterns of behaviour and expectations may be established. Such patterns mean that behaviour becomes more predictable and complementarity of interests may develop. The major payoff of such developments is in the greater ease of national authority formation.

The second major repercussions of the economic on the political subsystem has been the increased load it has placed on the latter. This increased load is of two main forms. The first is the more direct and is a product of the increased scope and complexity of economic production, which have led to a number of regulative and protective demands to be made

on the political subsystem. The second is more indirect and relates to an increased load as a ~~consequnece~~ consequence of certain economic changes. The phenomenon of import in this respect is that of mass mobilization. Although economic changes are not the sole cause of mobilization, the changes precipitated by the processes of manufacturing and industrial production, increased markets and improved communications have been of paramount importance. The main consequence has been manifested in the tide of rising expectations in the form of demands made upon the political system for educational facilities, welfare services, regulative and integrative services and so on.

The final major contribution of the economic subsystem has been to provide the political one with greater and more constant resources than those available in any other form of social system organization. The surplus educational and financial capital of the economic processes within the nation state has provided the necessary support to finance both the major bureaucratic structures of the political system and also many of the political system's main policies.

The contributions of the political to the economic system to a great extent mirror the inputs of the economic to the political system. The major effects are, firstly, the general monitoring and control fumctions, and, secondly, specific promotional policies. With reference to the former, in order that a complex, highly differentiated and interdependent economy may develop, it is necessary that a number of basic political conditions prevail. Thus there must exist a relatively well defined area within which economic growth may freely take place, and further there must be some common authority structure within that area providing not only internal law and order and therefore security of production and trade but also for a legal network to monitor economic transactions. The more specific promotional effects include either the provision of goods and services which the

economy itself is unable to provide, or regulative and control functions. The former includes such features as transportational or communication systems, which the economic system may be unable to provide on account of either the large capital sums involved or the need for standardization. Perhaps the more important promotional role is in the regulative and control function. The most obvious manifestation of this is the protection of internal trade against foreign competition through the erection of tariff barriers. A further index of the control function of the political system is the centralization of currency and control of currency circulation and exhange. Without this complex control, the economic system would soon collapse. Centralized direction by the political system is maintained through direct ownership, fiscal controls (such as bank rates, levels and types of taxes, tax incentives and so on) and a foreign exchange budget.

We may now consider the functional interchange between the cultural and political systems. The two major repercussions of the cultural system may be considered in terms of differentiation, i.e. the change to rationality of action in terms of the action itself, and universalization. The former has meant a change in the cultural legitimation of politics which can no longer rest on divine rights or natural law but is much more closely related to the actual pay off from the polity in terms of the demands made upon it and the success with which it meets these demands. Thus the political system is obliged to rationalize its various policies in terms of the perceived consequences of such policies. The latter, i.e. universalization, has meant that the cultural legitimation of politics, largely in terms of rationalization of policies and successful payoff, must be made to a much larger group of people involving the majority of adults within a system. Political culture in the nation state as the internalization of authority and processes relating to that authority becomes widespread throughout the populace. This means that not only must the polity rationalize its policies

to the whole populace, but that it must take regard of the demands of the total populace in trying to affect a suitable payoff coefficient between success in satisfaction of major political goals and demands for these goals. The political system has responded to the change in quantity and quality of political culture by devising institutionalized means whereby the changes in culture may be accommodated. This has involved the development of relatively open legislative mechanism as a means for accomplishing decision making for collective political goals; the development of mass political parties as a means for recruitment of political personnel, channels for the mobilization of demands and interests and as means for the subsequent rationalization of political action; the development of formalized rules for the transfer and acquisition of power, and finally a formalized code of rules governing general norms of behaviour.

The interrelations between the political and social subsystems tend to be of a more indirect nature, being expressed either through the economic or cultural subsystems. Nonetheless, two important and interesting interrelations may be noted. The first pertains to the connection between social stratification and the nature of political support. The emergence of mass popular participation in the political subsystem both is influenced by and influences certain changes in social stratification. On the one hand, for example, a more mobile population demands increased access to mass popular participation, some degree of control over political leaders and the reference and rationalization to the total populace. On the other hand the changing nature of political support (especially the extension of political participation) can provide the mechanism whereby changes in social stratification can be effected, which in turn can have consequences for the organization and composition of the political subsystem itself. The primary consequence of the extension of political participation is to inhibit large-scale, enduring inequalities in social stratification. The

second important interrelation pertains to the responsibility assumed by the political subsystem for a wide range of policy decision-making areas which have direct relevance to the structure and organization of the social subsystem. On account of demands from the social, economic and cultural subsystem, the political subsystem comes to assume either control or at least some direction for a number of policy decision making areas, such as education, health, welfare, housing and population control (especially with reference to immigration). The consequences of such control or direction for the organization of the social system (and in turn for its response to the political subsystem) are both direct and obvious.

In conclusion, a number of main points may be summarized. The nation state social system is seen as the major macro form of societal organization, which has diffused globally. The nation state is defined in terms of a number of interrelated political, economic, social and cultural processes, which have begun to interact and cohere over the last century. The focus on the nation state does not preclude examination of interactions between nation state systems or examination of those global forces to which all nation state systems are subject.[8] To the extent that such forces are relevant, they are examined indirectly as they are filtered and monitored by the nation state. (For example, a strong economic influence through external corporations would be represented as a structural weakness in the economy.) Further the nation state is not seen as the final or idealized unit of macro societal organization but simply as the current most prevalent type of macro societal organization. (Indeed examination of the interaction between the major political, economic, social and cultural processes reveals a number of major contradictions which must ultimately terminate and transform the current form of nation state organization.) Further, the state and nation become redundant as individual concepts so that the appellation the nation state refers simply to a particular type of social system. The

state and the nation as single concepts have been rejected on account of their tortuous confusing history and because they are difficult to operate empirically and have had little heuristic pay-off. Finally, our model of the nation state system defined in terms of a number of empirically identifiable processes (which as will be shown later can have several possible permutations) will be seen as satisfying all prerequisites of comparative analysis outlined in the first chapter.

FOOTNOTES 2 : THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTEM

1. The primary reasons for side-stepping the discussion of systems and function are that the debate is too vast to do justice to in a short space and that the debate has been conducted fully elsewhere. On systems, see W. Buckley, ed, Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientist, Aldine, 1968; F. K. Berrien, General and Social Systems, Rutgers Univ. Press, 1968; W. Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, Prentice-Hall, 1967; D. Easton, A Framework of Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall, 1965. On functionalism, see C, Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis", in L. Gross, ed, Symposium on Sociological Theory, Harper & Row, 1959; M. Landau, "On the Uses of Functional Analysis in American Political Science", Soc. Res. 1969; A. J. Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis", A.P.S.R., 1967; R. Parsons, "A Paradigm for the Analysis of Social Systems and Change", in N. J. Demerath & Peterson, ed, System, Change, and Conflict, Free Press, 1967; E. Nagel, "A Formalization of Functionalism", in ibid.

2. For a similar type of activity though with reference to a very different type of social system, see S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires, Free Press, 1963. Works such as K. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, Free Press, 1963, or W. Mitchell, The American Polity, Free Press, 1962, make a more detailed analysis of different types of political system organization.

3. Thus the particular chronological date would dictate the referrent of the nation or state: the degree to which these concepts had been merged. For two books which highlight this point, see C. J. H. Hayes, The Evolution of Modern Nationalism, McMillan, 1961, and L. L. Synder, The New Nationalism, Cornell Univ. Press. 1968.

4. For example, the basis of obligation varied markedly between such writers as Meinecke, Cassirer, Fichte, Hobbes, Locke or Mills.

5. Most writings on the state, if not of a philosophical or polemical nature, were historical descriptions. However, it is important to distinguish earlier writings which took an organic evolutionary approach (see O. Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective", in R. Bendix, ed, State and Society, Little Brown, 1968), from the more modern historians, who generally focus on post French Revolution organisations (see for example, H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, Collier, 1967; E. Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson, 1966; R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Harvard Univ. Press, 1962).

6. In this context, it is still common to find definitions of the nation in terms of a group of people who think they constitute a nation. For definitional and analytic purposes such a conceptualization is highly confusing as it raises a host of problems as to the identification of such units and as to the dimensions along which such identification can take place, e.g. religious, ethnic, economic, regional. We suggest that given the presence of interaction (by virtue of a system), the degree of interaction and identification is all empirical and not a definitional problem.

7. The outstanding work in this area is K. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, M.I.T. Press, 1966.

8. This includes on the one hand the whole field of "International Relations" which sees "states" as the main actors, and on the other hand a new area of inquiry which moves in a very different direction to the traditional "International Relations" approach, namely Global Systems, which focus on gloval resources, patterns of economic trade flow, population, arms control, environmental decay, etc.

3 : DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE NATION STATE SYSTEM

The model of the nation state system outlined in the previous chapter has two major limitations. In the first place, the method of differentiating phenomenal nation state systems has not been outlined; and second the model cannot as yet take account of change. The primary aim of this chapter is to satisfy these two limitations and to extend and elaborate the existing model by introducing a dynamic dimension. This will be accomplished through the analysis of development and political instability in the nation state system.

Conceptual Prerequisites for an Analysis of Development

Before we outline our own conceptualization of development, modernization and instability, it is useful to survey briefly the existing discussion.

The majority of the discussions of development and modernization, which are now legion, has taken these two concepts as synonymous and attempted to define them in terms of a number of variables.[1] Occasionally either development or modernization is taken singly to be defined similarly in terms of a number of variables, and then the other concept is seen as the process whereby such a condition is achieved. Thus we may speak either of development as the process leading to modernization, or modernization as the process leading to development. Usually some variant of the western advanced industrial nation state is taken as the modern or developed form of societal organization which is contrasted against its obverse, namely the traditional or underdeveloped organization. The developmental or modernizing process involves the movement from the underdeveloped or traditional to the developed or modern society.[2]

Although the majority of discussions of development or modernization may be summarized in this manner, it is important to note, within this general configuration, four dimensions along which the numerous definitions may vary. The first and most obvious relates to the referents of

development, i.e. the criteria or variables which are seen to define development. Thus the number of definitional variables ranges from a single component (Deutsch), to two (Binder), to four (Eisenstadt, Pye, Parsons), to five (Emerson), to eight (Ward and Rustow). More importantly, the criteria are variously defined in terms of legal constitutional elements (Wilson, Burgess), levels of economic development (Lipset, Rastow), democracy, pluralism and competitiveness (Almond, Lerner, Coleman, Verba), psychological or leadership elements (Shils, Pye, Spengler), mobilization, urbanization, literacy (Deutsch, Cutwright), participation (Almond, Weiner), or structural differentiation (Eisenstadt, Riggs).[3] The second dimension relates to the alternative conceptualizations of political development as a dependent variable, i.e. as the product of a number of other societal changes such as industrialization, urbanization or mobilization, or as an independent variable. The third dimension relates to the alternative conceptualization of development as an open-ended phenomenon, i.e. as open process, or as a state of affairs, i.e. end product. Finally, the developed society is invariably juxtaposed, though not always explicity, to the underdeveloped one. In other words, an evolutionary scale is seen to underlie development.[4] The representations of this progression are sometimes in the form of a dichotomy, or a continua, or a 3-stage model (of the traditional-transitional-modern format), or even as a double dichotomy.[5]

It is now pertinent to consider some of the criticisms of this body of literature on development. It will be appreciated that any collective body of criticisms must be selectively applied - some conceptualizations of development are considerably more sophisticated than others. Seven major criticisms may be noted.

In the first place, the traditional-modern progression is invariably based on an overly simple image of traditional society. There is no one such traditional society, but rather a wide range, which may have very different repercussions on development.[6] Secondly, the concepts of

industrialization, development and modernization have been used synonymously with all change being reduced to one of these concepts.[7] Thirdly, development is frequently conceived as a state of affairs rather than as a process. This of course precludes any change beyond the particular state of affairs defined as development. Fourthly, development is usually defined in parochial terms. It is thus impossible to speak of a developed tribal authority, city state, or bureaucratic empire. All systems which are not modern are presumably underdeveloped - this would include 5th century Athens, 3rd century Rome, Han and T'ang Empires in China and so on.[8] Further, the choice of variables, employed to define,development, has usually been very arbitrary, and no attempt has been made to defend any particular selection. Sixthly, there have been few provisions for reversals. Development is seen as a continuous process moving inevitably to some postulated end. Thus almost anything that happens, whether it be coups, revolutions, religious or ethnic wars, becomes part of the process of modernization or development. Finally, the discussion of development has frequently engendered a strong normative and ethnocentric element. This is manifested in the assumption that the typical conditions of modernity pertain to the social, political or economic characteristics of western liberal democracy, which is therefore established as the idealized norm against which underdeveloped deviation may be measured.[10]

In sum, the main criticisms that may be levelled against development are that the concept is confused and vague, that it is over generalized, that it is too static, that it is based on the notion of unilinear convergence, and that it is normatively oriented.

Given these criticisms and given the requirements of comparative analysis, it is possible to outline the necessary prerequisites for a more adequate discussion of development.[11] These prerequisites may be ordered under two main headings: prerequisites of conceptual meaning and of conceptual

technicalities. The latter refers to the technical prerequisites of concept formation which must be satisfied if the concept of development is to be viable in a comparative and explanatory frame of reference. The former refers more to semantic prerequisites.

With reference to conceptual technicalities, several technical improvements to the concept of development are necessary if the criticisms, outlined above, are to be avoided. In the first plade, it is necessary to differentiate quite clearly a number of the different elements constituting development (especially the political and economic dimensions but also the social and cultural). Secondly, development must be defined in an open-ended manner. Change must not be viewed as inevitably directioned or evolving towards a certain end; rather development must focus on process rather than a state of affairs. Thirdly, development must be globally defined and not restricted geographically. This means that the variables constituting development must be defined in terms of process and not in terms of any particular structural manifestation of such process. Fourthly, development must be open-ended in respect to the direction of process and must not start from any ideological bias. Finally, development must be tied to some form of social system organization, as development obviously begs the question of development of what.

With reference to conceptual meaning, three major different meanings may be distinguished. It is the failure to differentiate these several meanings which is responsible for a considerable amount of the confusion surrounding the discussion of development. In the first place, development can refer to some form of vertical movement or elaboration along a single dimension. Thus we may speak of the development of the physical body in terms of growth in height as movement along an inch or meter scale or growth in weight as movement along a pounds or kilogram scale. A second meaning of development can be identified in which development connotes horizontal movement. In this sense movement does not represent

vertical growth along a single dimension but rather growth in that additional dimensions or facets are incorporated, i.e. some qualitative change is involved. Thus physical development in this meaning does not relate to ever-present dimensions such as height, but rather to the development of additional physical features, as for example in the process of adolescence. We may refer to this type of growth or elaboration as horizontal development. The third meaning of development, though still related to the above two meanins, does differ rather markedly. In a third usage, developed refers to a statement on the maturity or performance of the dimension or object under consideration. In this respedt we may speak of a dimension or object as being developed to the extent that it manifests a satisfactory level of performance.

It is now possible to undertake an alternative discussion of development which combines and satisfies both categories of prerequisites. The conceptual technical prerequisites may be satisfied by placing the analysis of development within the conceptual framework of the nation state, which it will be recalled is constructed in comparative and heuristic terms. The conceptual meaning prerequisites may be satisfied by retaining the three distinct meanings of development and by identifying the nature and format of each of these three meanings within the frame of reference of the nation state.[12]

The first meaning of development may be identified in terms of vertical movement along the various dimensional indices of the nation state. Thus given the range of political, economic, social and aitural variables which were used to define the nation state, we can speak of vertical nation state development in terms of movement or expansion along these dimensions (for example in the extension of political parties, or of popular participation, or of industrial and manufacturing production, or of social and geographical mobility, or of education, or of juridical rules of law). The second meaning of development may be seen in the

horizontal expansion of the indices of nation state organization. Thus horizontal development may be pointed to in the case where a macro social system begins to manifest one of the major functional indices of the nation state, which previously it had not manifested. The third meaning of development relates to the capacity of the total social system to persist and maintain self-sustaining growth. In the context of the nation state, it is possible to speak of a developed nation state in terms of its capacity to cope with the demands made upon it, i.e. to maintain satisfactorily its major functional processes.[13]

Before we evaluate this conceptualization of development, it is necessary to elucidate the three main meanings. The section below will examine the first two dimensions, i.e. vertical and horizontal development. The following section will make a slight digression to introduce the discussion of modernization. The subsequent section will then return to the main line of examinatinn to discuss the third meaning of development, which in turn will provide the threshold for the analysis of political instability in the nation state.

Vertical and Horizontal Development in the Nation State

Since the vertical and horizontal conceptualizations of development are closely interrelated in that they both represent movement along the dimensions defining the nation state, it is possible to examine them under the same ~~nebric~~ rubric. Development, as the process of motion, does not in itself denote any intention of speed or intensity, but it does by the very implication of movement entail some conception of direction. This direction can only be provided by the incorporation of the discussion of development into any phenomenal form of social system organization. In the present discussion, this will be achieved by the analysis of development within the framework of the nation state.

In this context nation state development may be assessed in terms of both the number of nation state indices manifested by any one social system

(horizontal development) and the extent or intensity of these indices (vertical development). The indices of nation state development are of course derived from the major political, economic, social and cultural processes, which define and support the nation state.

The major political indicators are: the existence of a broad based legislature, the responsibility of the legislature to the populace and of higher organs to the legislature, the emergence of a specialized executive body and especially of centralized specialized agencies surrounding such an executive (such as planning and banking agencies), the development of a national authority structure and functionally specific organizations to maintain parts of this structure (such as police forces), participation through electoral mechanisms by the majority of the population, the development of mass political parties, the national societal orientation of the government in such manifestations as welfare expenditure, specification of minimum wages, increased percentage of the budget of G.N.P., the development of central controls and direction (such as fiscal or legal controls), and the development of large-scale bureaucratization, centralization and the rationalization of codes of rules. The major economic inidces are: the movement from subsistence existence, the development of industrial and manufacturing production, the development of secondary and tertiary production, the emergence of an internal commercial market exchange system, the consolidation of a complex monetary exchange system, the development of urbanization, the large-scale development of communication, transportation, and mass media mechanisms. The major cultural and social indicators include the emergence of rational-legal juridical structures, the universal application of secular, rational-legal codes, the development of universal education, the increasing development and application of technology, geographic and occupational mobility and the establishment of stratification in occupational or achievement terms,

and the emergence of the modified extended family.

It is possible to examine horizontal nation state development in terms of the progressive manifestation of the above indices by any macro social system. It is possible to examine vertical development in terms of intensity or progression along each of the main indices. The intensity of the major political indices may be assessed: in the existence of a popular legislature as opposed to a collection of clan elders, nobles, or in the existence of formalized means whereby the legislature is responsible to its base through elections, rationalization, formal rules and offices, or in the formalization of the central executive body and the number and degree of specialization of central agencies, or in the size and differentiation of authority maintenance bodies, or in the degree of development of mass political parties (which may be assessed in terms of the percentage of the population they attempt to recruit), or in the popular orientation of the government which may be assessed in terms of progressive income tax, percentage of the budget of GNP, the extent of welfare expenditure, or in the scale of central or bureaucratic control which may be measured in terms of the percentage employed by the government, the diversification of the bureaucracy, the range of state penal controls, the range of fiscal controls and so on. The intensity of the economic indicators can for the most part be assessed even more precisely. Thus it is possible to measure per capita income and production, the percentage of GNP from industrial and manufacturing production, the percentage employed in secondary and tertiary production, the degree of internal market trade and interchange, the formalization and centralization of control of the monetary system, the percentage of the population living in urban communities, the level of communication and transportational development, and the levels of literacy. The intensity of the cultural and social indicators may be assessed by the salience of the secular rational-legal codes, by the percentage of the population governed by universal codes, by the levels

of education, by the salience of technology (as measured by the general cultural adaptability to scientific innovation and more precisely by the number of specialized technical bodies and the percentage of the working population employed in research), by the degree of geographic and occupational mobility, and by the salience of the modified extended family.[14]

It is quite easy to set precise cut-off points for each of the dimensions, and thereby to give a clear definition of the nation state. It would even be possible to carry out a multidimensional correlation and regression analysis of the various indices and their intensities.[15] However, desirable this latter exercise would be, it would scarcely be profitable for our immediate purpose. The latter exercise would simply be too vast, whereas the former would set limits of cut-off points which were too rigid.[16] Furthermore, the more salient problem for our research inquiry is not to expend the greater resources on refining for measurement purposes a model of the nation state (involving weighting of dimensions, etc.), but rather to use the dimensional indices of the nation state a little less precisely and to concentrate the analysis on more complex and elaborate identification and classification. We can therefore employ a much more simple schematic representation of the number and intensity of the indices of the nation state, in which we shall introduce the concept of the threshold nation state.



Diagram 1: Schematic Representation of Number and Intensity of Indices of Nation State

If we plot the two dimensions of nation state development against each other, two major cut-off lines may be established EF and GH. The cut-off line EF is set on the basis that any social system must manifest a majority of the characteristics or dimensions of the nation state if it is to be termed a form of nation state organization. The cut-off line GH is defined in terms of the minimum intensity in which the nation state dimensions may be recognized as clearly developing into a nation state manifestation and which are sufficient to maintain the activities of the other dimensions forming the nation state. The heavily shaded area indicates forms of nation state organization, the more lightly shaded areas indicate threshold nation states.[17]

Given this discussion of vertical and horizontal development in the nation state, it is possible to make a number of observations and elaborations on the basic conceptual model of the nation state outlined in Chapter Two. In the first place, it is quite clear that any particular phenomenal nation state does not suddenly appear in toto, but does in fact develop from other types of social organization. In this respect, the analytic model does not represent any single nation state but it does isolate the major processes and dimensions which define and support the nation state. In this manner, the analytic model points up the major dimensions along which any social system transforming into a nation state must develop (though not of course the particular sequence or rate which are empirical problems). Secondly, it is possible to take account of movement up or down or even contraction of the major indices of the nation state by any particular threshold nation state or any particular nation state. Thirdly, it is possible to differentiate various nation states in terms of the differential development of the various subsystems or activities within these subsystems. Given the minimum interrelation between the political, economic, social and cultural variables, it is

possible to identify varying interesting patterns and constellations of the major variables. Thus one interesting research problem which immediately demands attention is that of trying to isolate different constellations of political, economic, social and cultural variables (both in terms of the phenomenal form of the variables and their intensity), and to isolate the factors which account for these different patterns.[18] It is the capacity to point out the major lines of nation state development, to permit account to be taken of movement along these dimensions and to isolate different constellations of dimensions and thereby to differentiate nation states both comparatively and over time which introduces the first major mechanism by which the analytic conceptual framework can be elaborated to take account of change.[19] The fourth observation that may be made is that the discussion of development is not normatively bound, and is constrained only by the framework of the nation state. This means first that it is possible to speak of development on alternative forms of macro social systems assuming that the major processes and dimensions defining such systems have been isolated; second that there is no reason to suppose that the nation state is the final form of social organization (hence in the future it will be possible to speak of alternative forms of development); and third that within the framework of the nation state there is no specification as to the idealized pattern of development or structuring of the major political, economic, social or cultural processes, nor of the phenomenal form that these processes may take. Finally, it will be noted that the boundaries of the nation state as encompassed by the threshold nation state are relatively loosely drawn. Two main reasons account for this. On the one hand, the process of nation state development may take many different forms; and on the other hand, since the nation state represents a complex macro form of social system, it would be anomalous to establish too rigid cut-off points.

Modernization

Before turning to examine the third meaning of development (and thereafter instability), it is necessary to make a small but related elaboration to the general discussion by introducing the concept of modernization. (The primary reason for the brevity of the discussion is that we shall rely strongly on a previous exposition).[20] The introduction of modernization at this point is relevant on two accounts: first, modernization has frequently been used synonymously with development, and we wish to make a differentiation; secondly, we shall employ modernization within the context of nation state development, as defined above.

One of the major lacunae thus far has been the neglect of the external context of interaction between social systems. Although all social systems are by definition self-maintaining bodies of interaction and can be differentiated from each other in terms of such intensity of interaction among their component units, all social systems are influenced to varying degrees by other social systems in an external sphere of interaction. In the case of the nation state, this area of interaction is of course the international arena. The external sphere of interaction between nation state social systems may be discussed on two levels.

The first is the more specific and involves direct interaction between individual nation states or groups of nation states or even such interaction through an international organization. In this context interaction takes the form of outputs from the functional subsystems of any one nation state which then become inputs into any other nation state social system. For example external economic interaction may take the form of trading, exchange of services, external investment, aid, or direct exploitation; or again political interaction may range from simple patterns of interaction, such as exchange of diplomats or conferences, to direct attempts to influence the process of goal formation in another political system, as for example through direct intervention or manipulation. Important as

such individual patterns of interaction may be, given that their existence has been noted, they need detain us no longer at the moment.[21]

The second and more general level of discussion of the external sphere of interaction between nation states involves the discussion of modernization. Modernity represents the projection and aggregation of a number of the major ideas, aspirations and processes of the dominant form of social system organization onto the external sphere of interaction. As such modernization in the context of the global emergence of the nation state represents a kind of world culture, consisting of activities and aspirations derived from the nation state organization which become projected beyond individual nation states into an international osmosis.[22] Modernization then represents the dual processes of perception and evaluation by individual social systems of elements constituting this international osmosis of ideas, aspirations and activities, and the subsequent attempts to incorporate or internalize such desired features by these social systems into their own social organization. In the terms of Nettl and Robertson modernization is the process of reduction of atimic status whereby less well placed nation states attempt to move toward equivalence with better placed ones.

A number of interesting observations may be made with reference to this conceptualization of modernization. In the first place, to the extent that international culture can only be derived from the units constituting the international system as a whole, it follows that modernization at the present time must represent many of the ideas, aspirations and processes (and reactions to these) abstracted from the nation state.[23] In short, modernization is identifiable in terms of extrapolations from the process of nation state development (and transformation). Furthermore, as such modernization has proved a magnetic force since the nation state as a type of social system has been diffused virtually throughout the globe.

Although there have been stagnations or even temporary reversals, there have been no large-scale rejections or reversals of the major values and processes of modernization. Thirdly, modernization represents a relativistic phenomenon which is constantly changing and developing in response to the political, economic, social and cultural changes in values and processes within the nation state. Since modernization is constantly changing and relativistic (in that perception and selection of "things valued" in the international market may vary), it follows that there is no ultimate climax or final stage of modernization. Fourthly, modernization does not represent a single closed aspirational cluster which all nation states must blandly follow, but rather a generalized cluster of open-ended values (such as economic development, welfare expenditure, literacy, participation) which individual nation states can take over to varying degrees and develop in different forms. One corollary that must be noted, however, is the strong limitation element involved in the drive of less well placed nation states to achieve equivalende with better placed ones. A fourth observation concerns the relationship between modernization and certain economic and technological developments within the nation state, especially those relating to communication and transportational developments. Recent advances in communication systems have broken down virtually all insulated areas, and thereby made possible the diffusion of information on a world scale. The interesting ~~consequnece~~ consequence of this is that although change is essentially a domestic process, increasingly the stimulus for change has come about through a response to international forces.[24]

The relation between vertical and horizontal nation state development and modernization is evident. However, to the extent that a large gap exists between less well placed nation states and their modernization aspirations, there must be important repercussions for their degree of

development in terms of performance, i.e. the third meaning of development. It is to the discussion of this dimension of development and political instability that we may now turn.

Development and Performance in the Nation State

The third meaning or dimension of development, i.e. development as a measure of the performance of a social system, must be clearly differentiated from vertical and horizontal development. The developed, or stable, condition is defined in terms of capacity and capability. It is defined in terms of the capacity to persist, that is to continuously and successfully absorb the demands made upon it, i.e. to maintain self-sustained growth. Thus it is possible to point to a developed nation state or bureaucratic empire or tribal system to the extent that such a system can continuously absorb and satisfy the demands made upon it. It follows, of course, that the substantive demands made upon such systems will vary markedly, but nonetheless each may be developed to the extent that it can satisfactorily cope with the demands made upon it. The developed condition or stability is a function of the resolution of the two forces of the demands made upon the system and the capacity of the system to respond to such demands. It follows that ceteris paribus the greater the persistence of a system over time, the greater the degree of development or stability.

Given this definition of development two general elaborations may be introduced. In the first place, the analysis of development or stability need not be limited to the discussion of the total system but may be applied to any specific subsystem. Thus political development, in which we shall be primarily interested, may be defined as the capacity of the political system to cope with the demands made upon it. The second elaboration concerns the different levels at which we may conceptualize the political system. Given that we wish to operationalize

the capacity of the political system to cope with demands made upon it, it becomes evident that we must refine the gross conception of the political system. Thus it is useful to identify three different levels at which change and stability may be discussed within the political system.[25] The most comprehensive level relates to community, which refers to the gross substantive nature and organization of the major political, economic, social and cultural processes within a social system. An example of community change would be the establishment of the nation state as the basic form of social organization; it follows therefore that change in the political system at the community level would involve in this instance the establishment of political structures consonant with nation state organization. The second level relates to regime, which applies to a particular patterning of the major political functions and structures within the context of community. Thus political regime change within the nation state would involve change in the different methods of structuring the political system but without affecting the gross nature or existence of the nation state social system itself. The third level, the most specific and explicit, relates to intra-regime change, which includes the organization of rules, offices and incumbents. Three observations may be made with reference to these levels. Firstly, these three levels are not discrete but are interrelated. Secondly, we may speak of change and development at any of these three levels, e.g. change in incumbents or offices may take place irrespective of any change at regime level. Finally, change may be sudden, as in community changes following Soviet or Chinese Revolutions, or more prolonged, for example in nation state development in Britain.

Although this conceptualization of development is not as yet very sophisticated and quite obviously demands a number of operational elaborations, it is easy nonetheless to identify a number of its considerable

advantages. In the first place, it is quite clearly viable comparatively and can easily be applied to different social systems. Secondly, it is relativistic in the sense that development is only discussed in the frame of reference of the demands and capabilities of any particular social system. Thus, it is possible to find developed nation states, or developed bumaucratic empires, and also developed nation states at different levels of vertical and horizontal nation state development.[26] This leads to a third advantage, namely that this discussion of development is clearly not normatively biased. A further advantage is that it is open-ended and involves no final developed state (indeed would imply that such a state is impossible), nor any specification on the ideal condition. Finally this conceptualization of development is both dynamic and heuristic to the extent that it demands a direct focus on change (recognizing change as a constant) and on the forces stimulating, executing or even forestalling such change.

Given the germinal utility of this conceptualization of development (as assessed by its satisfaction of the conceptual prerequisites outlined above), the process of extending the discussion may be undertaken by introducing the analysis of political instability. The elaboration and operationalization of the basic discussion, which this analysis of political instability will achieve, may be effected by a concentration on the functions of the political system and by the positioning of the analysis of instability in the context of the nation state.

Political Instability

The analysis of political instability represents one of the major syntheses in the development of the conceptual framework, and as such will provide one of the main keystones of the study. It is in the analysis of political instability that we may integrate the discussions of the formal conceptual framework, the application of this formal abstract

framework in the construction of a model of the nation state, and the major dimensions of development.[27]

The conceptualization of instability follows logically from the analysis of development above. Instability is defined in terms of incapability or incapacity for persistence and function, i.e. the inability to cope with demands. Instability is a breakdown in the process of social system function and existence. Political instability is, therefore, the incapacity of the political subsystem to absorb and satisfy continuously the demands made upon it, i.e. the incapacity for sustained growth.

The incapacity of the political system to cope with demands may be expressed more precisely in terms of the failure of the political system to satisfy its major functions. Since the abstract conceptual framework identified four major political functions, it follows that four main types of political instability may be identified. These are: dedisional breakdown, institutionalization failure, support failure and monitoring failure. Furthermore, since the formal abstract functions have been translated into empirical referents in the process of the identification of the nation state, it is possible to identify the empirical forms and indices of political instability in the nation state.

Decisional failure implies a breakdown in the decision-making capabilities of the political system and an atrophy in the determination of its goals, rules and offices. It has proved convenient to categorize the decision-making process under two headings: method and scope. The former implies dislocations and discontinuities in the decision-making organs and is manifested in such indices as failure of government formation and maintenance, failure of coalition formation, conflict between major decision-making bodies and factionalization of parties. Any of these dislocations means that the decision-making channels are non-productive and incapable of function satisfaction. Breakdown in decision-making

scope is manifested in the inability of the polity to act with reference to the major goals of nation state development, due either to inanticipation of such goals or conflict over goal achievement. The institutionalization of the political system entails processes designed to legitimize, regularize and clarify the major procedures of the political system, such as the provision of a constitution, of a body of rules governing political action, the development of electoral procedures and rules governing such procedures, the provision of regularized means for the appointment and rotation of political offices, and the delineation of the spheres of competence of the major institutions. Institutionalization failure is manifested therefore in the atrophy of such processes, i.e. the failure to establish a constitution, the failure to develop consensus on the mode of orientation to political interaction, the failure to develop successful electoral procedures, the failure to develop accepted channels for recruitment to political office and for the transfer of power, the development of corruption and patronage, and the failure to establish the autonomous sphere of competence of major institutions. Support failure may be of two basic kinds: withdrawal or insufficience. The former implies simply the retraction of support and may be manifested in a range of indices, such as decline of electoral support, refusal to abide by the decisions of the polity, or opposition to the polity. Insuffieiency is of two basic kinds. The first typifies a too narrowly restricted locus of support, i.e. support drawn from an insufficient percentage of the population. The second is more generalized and relates to the incapacity to mobilize sufficient support. This may be observed in the failure to develop political parties, in the assification of parties, or in the closing or failure to develop adequate channels for the expression of political support. Monitoring failure is represented by a breakdown in the authority and monitoring capacity of the polity. It is manifested in the failure of the polity to establish its authority and the machinery necessary to implement its policies and

decisions, in the decline of governmental authority and the increased use of power and force to achieve its goals, in the rise in domestic violence, in the incapacity of the polity to collate demands, and in the incapacity of the polity to satisfy demands.[28]

Not only is it possible to identify different types of instability, but also to give some assessment to the degree or intensity of instability. This may be achieved by employing three different measures. The first relates to the level at which instability may be expressed, namely intra-regime or community. It is quite evident that the higher the level of inability to cope with demands, the more serious the consequence for the political system. In the second place, it is possible to note the number of functional impairments, i.e. the range of indices of instability. Finally, since all the indices have been defined in empirically operational terms, it is possible to give some assessment of the development of each index.[29] Thus it is possible to speak of the range, intensity and level of political instability and thereby to make gross assessments in terms of minor dislocation to stagnation to paralysis.[30]

Having indicated the main types of instability and the manner of assessment of such instability, a small elaboration on the focus on political instability is necessary before the discussion is further elaborated. In the first place, the focus on political instability does not exclude analysis of other processes within the social system. Although as political scientists we may be oriented more toward the study of political phenomena, this in no way precludes examination of other phenomena. Indeed such an examination is necessitated by the nature of the interrelated major processes outlined by systems analysis. We are interested, therefore, in other functions and processes derived from the other subsystems to the extent that they impinge on the political subsystem. Thus a consideration of economic, cultural and social processes will not be undertaken whenever such processes have no immediate relevance for the political system. In short, the

necessary infringment of non-political processes on the political system is the criteria of inclusion for the analysis of these processes. The second elaboration that must be made relates to external systemic interaction. Again the same criteria for inclusion may be employed. The external influences will be examined to the extent that they impinge directly on the political system or more indirectly via one of the other sub-systems, such as the economic. We are not interested in such forms as external influence as direct take-over or conquest, as this is not an indication of instability within any one system. Direct intervention can obviously lead to the breakdown of a system, but this is of a different form from the cases of internal breakdown. Thus we are interested primarily in domestic political instability but we may take, and indeed are obliged to take, into account external factors to the extent that they influence political stability or instability within any specific system through the structure and organization of that system. The third elaboration is to emphasize that instability is not necessarily synonymous with the collapse of regimes. A collapse of a regime (assuming no external intervention) may involve the interaction between two variables: on the one hand the condition of instability, and on the other a substitution by another regime. The availability of an alternative regime is not a variable which should form part of an instability syndrome. In sum, instability may lead to a continuing situation of stagnation or paralysis with no regime change, or it may lead to a condition in which the incumbent regime undergoes transformation, or it may lead to a condition in which the incumbent regime is supplanted.

It is now pertinent to return to the main line of discussion to consider the penultimate development in the analysis of political instability. Given the capacity to identify and assess the four main types of political instability, the next logical task must relate to the attempt to account

for and explain these types of instability. The process of isolating the conditions underlying instability involves two levels of analysis. The first and more general level may be examined immediately; the second more specific level, which takes off from the first, will be examined below in the final part of this section.

The more general level of accounting for instability is essentially an analytic and deductive task. Instability is attributable to dissynchronizations and dislocations in the major patterns of interaction within the social system. To the extent that any social system is composed of a body of activities and processes among which there is an exigent minimum of interaction, it follows that dissynchronizations or dislocations in such interaction must lead to instability, i.e. must lead to some functional breakdown. Given that the major political, economic, social and cultural forces defining and constituting the nation state have been outlined, it follows that instability in the nation state may be attributable to dissynchronizations in these functional processes.

Two main types of dissynchronization may be identified. The first relates to dissynchronizations between the political subsystem and any or all other three functional subsystems; the second relates to dissynchronizations within the political subsystem between the major functional processes. Each type may be of two different forms. The first dissynchronization is that caused by imbalance due to conflict or irreconciliability between major functional processes; the second is caused by imbalance due to the failure of a particular function to develop (vertically) sufficiently. We may illustrate both main types of instability with examples from the nation state. With reference to the first type; the political system may be incapable of providing sufficient central direction for the economy; or the economy may not be able to provide the necessary budgetary resources for the polity to achieve some of its main goals; or the form of social

stratification may inhibit certain political developments such as the growth of mass political parties; or again certain elements in the cultural sphere may inhibit the orientation to economic development which in turn will have ramifications for the political system. With reference to the second type of dissynchronization: the administrative structure may be insufficiently developed to implement the decisions of the polity; or the political parties may not be developed beyond the clique stage and thereby out of tune with certain other political developments; or again the major political groups may be unable to develop mechanisms of political intercourse. These examples could be multiplied many times. In each case the argument is similar. To the extent that the major activities within the nation state demand a minimum input from other major processes, it follows that whenever such minimum input is lacking the processes cease to be mutually reinforcing and a contradiction or dissynchronization develops.

It is now possible to make several important observations with respect to this discussion of instability. In the first place, there are varying intensities of exigency of interrelation among the major functional processes; some of the major processes are linked only indirectly, whereas others demand much closer interaction and interdependence. It follows that ceteris paribus the intensity of instability will vary directly with the degree of necessary relationship between the processes. Secondly, given that nation states at different levels of development (vertical and horizontal) will manifest different patterns of interaction, it follows that nation states at different levels of development may manifest varying patterns of intensity among the major processes. It follows from the first observation above that such varying intensities can lead to greater instability intensities. In other words, patterns and intensities of instability are related to varying patterns of interrelation between the major functional variables found at different levels of development.

The third observation relates to the identification of necessary patterns of interaction. Such patterns may be identified in three main ways: on the basis of logical deductions from the conceptual model, or as a consequence of empirical observation over a sufficiently large number of cases, or post hoc when instability is apparent and therefore indicates some pattern of dislocation. However, several factors complicate the identification of these patterns. First there is a wide range of permutations of the basic functions. Second, the major processes of the nation state can assume a wide range of phenomenal forms which have different consequences for instability. Thirdly, given the problem of equivalence, different processes may assume differential salience in different societies. Fourth, since the nation state is in a constant process of change, it is sometimes difficult to anticipate new patterns of interaction. Furthermore, this task is complicated by two additional factors. On the one hand, nation states emerge and develop from a variety of non-nation state organizations which can have different repercussions for the patterns of nation state development. On the other hand, the international environment is constantly changing which in turn means different effects may be felt by social systems developing as nation states at varying times. Fifthly, the political system itself can execute a certain range of policies to control dissynchronizations. However, given a number of inevitable qualifications, which these problems must raise, it is possible to point out a number of counteracting measures. Firstly, despite the range of permutations of nation state processes (or more strictly the levels of development of nation state processes), there does exist a minimum degree of coherence among such processes, and further there exists a limit to the phenomenal manifestation of processes in the nation state. Secondly, whatever range does exist, may be simplified by typology formation. Further, the problems of equivalence can be controlled for by the types of concepts

and measures we use and by comparative investigation over time. Fourthly, constant change only inhibits long term predictions when change is assuming novel forms, and demands that dynamic analysis be pursued. Finally, the problem raised by the capacity of the political system to anticipate or control dislocations can be countered by pointing out that the various roles the political system may play is one of the main variables of which we would take account in any probability or explanatory statement on instability, and that furthermore the policy capacity range of the political system is limited. In sum the problems, pointed to above, do not hinder in any way the capacity to explain political instability but only provide limitations either on the capacity to predict instability or on the precision of any such statements. Where it is possible to identify logical dissynchronizations or dissynchronizations which empirical investigation have documented several times, it is possible to formulate probability statements on political instability, the various forms it may take, and on the range of policy decisions which may be made to alleviate it. Where predictive capabilities are more delimited, explanatory analysis (in the form of identifying dissynchronizations) can be made on a post hoc basis.

Both the method of accounting for instability (at the more general level) and some of the related problems, which this engenders, have been considered. The discussion of our conceptualization of political instability may now be concluded by synthesizing the various elaborations in illustrating the method of construction of an empirical theory of political instability in the nation state (and in the process of developing the second stage in the process of accounting for instability as referred to above).

To recall the initial methodological discussion, an empirical theory was defined as an interrelated body of empirical generalizations governing the substantive frame of reference of that theory. One of the primary methods whereby such a theory may be constructed is through the initial

establishment of a conceptual model. The purposes of such a model are: firstly to identify the problem; secondly to outline and provide the conceptual means of procedure; thirdly, to provide an explanatory mechanism of analysis; and fourthly, to integrate the findings of empirical research. Our analysis thus far has quite evidently not provided an empirical theory of political instability, but it has achieved the first major part of the process in that a conceptual model, drawn in empirically identifiable terms and satisfying the above requisites, has been constructed. The building of an empirical theory is contingent in the main on the application of this model to empirical research.

The process of theory building in this application involves a number of stages. The first problem is to take a single or group of social systems, which may be identified as nation states, and to identify their levels of development (vertical and horizontal) and to document the nature of the clustering and constellation of the main processes. The second problem is to identify the nature of political instability in terms the indices defining the four main types. Our analysis has indicated not only the means whereby instability may be identified, but also the means by which some assessment of the intensity of such instability may be made. The third problem is that of providing an explanation of the manifestation of instability - a problem which involves two stages. The first stage relates to the identification of the dislocations and the dissynchronizations in the major functional processes and has already been examined above. The second stage involves the identification of the specific concrete factors which have precipitated the dislocation, and has not as yet been examined. Given that it is possible to identify certain dislocations or dissynchronizations, the problem here is to isolate those conditions or variables which underlie and govern such dislocations. This stage is necessary on two accounts. Firstly two political systems may

be manifesting functional breakdown which may be attributable to the same basic dislocation, yet the specific factors acoounting for such dislocations may vary. Secondly, and partially related to the above observation, such an elaboration increases idiographic flexibility and payoff. For example, a breakdown may be attributable to conflict between the bureaucracy and government which in turn may be attributable to a variety of possible causes such as conflict due to resistance on the part of the bureaucracy to politicization or to different recruitment and training patterns; or again a monitoring breakdown may be ascribable in the first place to a breakdown in the main national authority structure which in turn may be attributable to such a range of factors as domestic riots, factional strife (of religious, ethnic, linguistic, regional basis, etc.), secession demands, external aggression, emergence of an internal revolutionary party, excessive abnormal loads such as massive refugee movements, or even natural disasters. In short, the first stage of explanations is the one by which we are able to synthesize a wide number of discrete cases in terms of abstract comparative concepts; whereas the second stage permits account to be taken of individual nuances and the possibly unique constellation of factors which account for the more abstracted dissynchronizations. The fourth and final problem is that of integrating the product of research. This takes the form of building up a body of empirical generalizations relating the three elements of the conditions which underlie instability, the various forms of instability, and the nature of the nation states in which such instability is manifested.

In sum, the four purposes of the conceptual model enable us to define, produce, explain and integrate a body of findings governing political instability in the nation state. Thus, it is through the application of this model to the investigation of a wide range of specific concrete cases of political instability that it is possible to begin to build a body

of empirical generalizations and thereby to construct an empirical theory of political instability in the nation state.

The Problems of Late Nation State Development

The purpose of the final section of this chapter is to examine those problems of late nation state development which engender an increased propensity to instability in social systems experiencing later nation state development.[31] The method, that may be adopted, is to take the major functional processes found in the nation state, and to isolate the problems affecting the development of these processes which are derived from the changed internal or external context of nation state development. Thus the object is to isolate a cluster of general factors derived from the changing environment of nation state development which pose greater strains on new nation states, and thereby increase their propensity for instability. After examining two generalized factors pertaining to the totality of the nation state, we shall focus primarily on economic and political variables.

Three preliminary observations are in order. Firstly, although the parameters of the study have not yet been established, the term new nations states (to be seen as synonymous with late nation state development) has already been used to refer to that complex of social systems which have begun the major processes of development within the last three or four decades and as such are clearly differentiated from advanced industrial nation states, which began the process of development in the main in the 19th century. Secondly, the subject matter of this section goes beyond the strict elaboration of the conceptual framework in that it takes in to some degree the empirical application of this framework. Nonetheless, this discussion is introduced at this point because it is closely related to the discussion of nation state development and instability (and indeed represents a primary and obvious empirical extension of this study), and because it is of a very general nature and as such may provide a useful background

to the more specific work of Part 2. Thirdly, although a number of generalized economic and political problems will be isolated, these problems do have differential import for different emerging nation states. However, despite the unquestioned variation, such problems are sufficiently general and sufficiently important to merit examination.

The two generalized factors, derived from the total structure of the nation state, are the degree of interrelation between the major process defining the nation state and the rate of absorption of change by the nation state. These two factors may be examined before the more specific economic and political problems.

A major characteristic of the nation state is the development of a high degree of interrelation and interdependence in the main patterns of interaction. The development of such a high degree of interdependence is a consequence of two major classes of factors: those factors conditioning higher rates of interaction (primarily the processes of differentiation and mobilization), and those factors conditioning the reintegration of new forms of interaction. All the major functional subsystems in the nation state serve to increase mobilization and differentiation.[32] The economic subsystem, fosters such changes in the development of the division of labour, in the diversification of economic production, in the freeing of a vast number of people from subsistence agriculture, and in such technological developments, which facilitate increased communication and the diffusion of information. The cultural and social subsystems foster such changes in the increased structural differentiation of many basic institutions (such as education and the family), in increased mobility and in the process of cultural universalization. The political subsystem fosters such changes in increased political participation and in the extension of the role of the polity (i.e. in distributing economic and political goods, in collection taxes, in stimulating certain areas of development, etc.). In turn

the major subsystems have undergone certain changes to accommodate new patterns of mobilization and differentiation. Thus economic reintegration takes place in the development of large and complex market systems manifesting a high rate of interchange of goods and services, in the development of large-scale production units, and in the more pervasive and efficient communication systems. Political reintegration takes place in the development of political parties to encompass larger numbers of people, in the development of complex agencies such as civil service, welfare or employment agencies to monitor and control the complexity of demands, and in the employment of certain forms of policy (especially fiscal policies) to supervise and control the balance of interdependence. Cultural and social subsystem changes include universalization of education and the standardization of juridicial rules of conduct. In sum, the nation state demands a high degree of functional interaction and interdependence. It follows that any factors which inhibit such patterns of interaction and interdependence must threaten the stability of the system. The importance both of the patterns of interaction and their breakdown will become evident in considering some of the political and economic strains on new nations.

The second generalized factor that may be noted is the high rate of change in the nation state. Change is of course a constant in all social systems. However, the rate of change in the nation state is unique. The continuously high level of change in the nation state is a function of two major forces: On the one hand, the cumulative progression of economic and technological growth and the many ramifications of such growth throughout the system; and on the other hand the inclusion of ever-wider numbers of people in more intense patterns of interaction. The scale and intensity of change, engendered by the development of the major processes and activities, mean that the nation state must continuously absorb and adapt to a high level of change if it is to survive. Again the relevance of

this factor will become evident in considering the political and economic strains.

It is now possible to examine the greater economic and political problems, derived from the changing internal and external context of nation state development, which confront new nations. The major economic problems centre around the changed nature of the international economic market and the obligation of new nations to trade on this market.[33] It is important in this context to point out that although periods of economic growth have been experienced throughout world history (though for the most part such economic growth has been the unplanned consequence of factors such as isolated inventions, conquests or favourable harvests), it is only in the last century and a half that any social system has experienced sustained economic growth. Not only do new nation states begin the process of economic development in an environment where several nation states have manifested continuous growth rates for decades resulting in massive productive capabilities, but also on account of the demands of the economic processes of the nation state they are obliged to trade and survive on this international market.

One initial and obvious problem is that new nation states are faced with a more forced process of economic growth. In the emergence of early nation states economic development, in the form of industrialization, caused considerable dislocations, but it was a largely spontaneous process precipitated by the coincidence of a number of political, economic, social and cultural forces. In many new nation states the stimulus for economic development is externally derived, and to this extent they may lack a suitable internal political, economic, social and cultural organization in which economic growth may take place (even adding the important qualification that such a suitable organization need not be a precise parallel of that found in early nation state development).[34] To this extent, economic devel-

opment becomes a forced process and is likely to encounter a host of general social obstacles.

Not only is the process of economic development a forced one in that stimulation is externally derived rather than produded by a coincidence of appropriate internal conditions, but also the very process of stimulation has frequently involved a complex of debilitating effects. Thus the process of stimulation was in many cases the product of external economic exploitation and domination by economically more developed nation states, which may or may not have been formalized through the structure of colonialism.[35] The earlier nation states undergoing the process of economic development quickly realized the benefits to be gained from exploiting external underdeveloped markets both in selling their own products and in extracting cheap raw materials. The ~~conseuqneces~~ consequences for these social systems which experienced direct economic exploitation are several. In the first place, a subsistence (and frequently an economic system advanced beyond subsistence) was shattered to become attuned to the economic demands of the more powerful country. This took the form of channelling the productive drives of the exploited countries into those areas deemed profitable by the exploiting country.[36] Secondly, many of the profits accruing to the process of economic expldtation of the poor areas were not reinvested in these areas but repatriated to the exploiting nation. Thirdly, so strong were the economic lines of trade and exploitation, that many newly independent nation states have been unable to break from these ties. Furthermore many new nations were tied to the currency of the exploiting power, with the result that any fluctuation in the fortune of such a currency in the colonizing economy would be felt by the colonized. Finally, although it could be claimed that by economic exploitation the stimulus for economic development was transmitted, the economic development so stimulated was very much stunted. Already it has been noted that the form

of exploitation was directed to the interests of the colonizing power, but perhaps more importantly such production was very much truncated. Thus the only part of production to be executed in the colonized economy was the extraction of the raw material, whether agricultural or mineral. The more important and profitable processing and manufacturing stages of production were carried on in the more developed economic systems. Thus not only did more profits accrue to the colonizing country but also the secondary ramifications (of job employment, marketing further subsidiary production) could be enjoyed by these countries.

These factors lead to another problem area, namely the balance of the international market and the terms of trade on this market.[37] Although the new nations have well over half the world's population, they produce only a small percentage of the world's income (about 10% in Asia and Africa and 20% in Latin America). Agricultural production is in fact declining in the new nations (which is important when it is recalled that 60% of their population is employed in agriculture), though extractive industries are increasing output. However, the major imbalance is that industrial and manufacturing production is almost a complete monopoly of the advanced industrial nation states. However, not only do the economically advanced nation states dominate the international market by virtue of their industrial power, but also the terms of trade are adversely weighted for the non-industrial new nations. Thus the per unit value of agricultural or raw material production is either stagnant or declining, whereas that of industrial goods is increasing. Given that the marginal utility of industrial goods is greater than that of agricultural or raw material products, such a trend would seem inevitable. Thus on the basis of current trading patterns and the terms of such patterns, the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing.

A further major problem is that of the demonstration effect. The

demonstration effect relates quite simply to the projection of certain processes and demands by one group of social systems and their imitation or internalization by another. As such the demonstration effect relates very closely to the modernization process. Several general factors may be noted concerning the demonstration effect. In the first place, it has ramifications beyond simply the economic sphere (for example, it was of major importance in stimulating nationalist movements), although for the moment we shall concentrate on the economic ramifications. Secondly, the very process of nation state development has increased the degree and impact of the demonstration effect through such factors as improved communication and transport systems, and the extension of literacy and education. Finally, as nation state development has progressed in some social systems, the potential range of phenomena constituting the demonstration effect has been manifested in the rising tide of expectations. The more generalized effect of increasing per capita income may be divided into the demands for consumer goods and for public and welfare services. With reference to the former, as an industrial economy expands, it is increasingly able to produce consumer goods (as can be clearly seen in the development of the advanced industrial countries). However, consumer investment on any significant scale is very unwise in an economy at a low stage of development. With reference to the latter, public and welfare expenditure raises a number of problems. Thus it assumes that surplus capital exists which can be harnassed for such investment; secondly public and welfare expenditure beyond the minimum needed for basic growth is very expensive; further the returns on such investment tend to be either indirect or long-term; and finally such investment if not harnassed to an economic development programme can easily increase demands. In the case of early nation state development, such demands were mobilized only after industrialization and economic development were well established. Thus early nation state did

not have to meet consumer and welfare demands which would have encouraged capital flow from more fundamental investments. However, the demonstration effect has placed such demands on new nations at an earlier stage of development and thereby increased the strain on already limited capital supplies. Furthermore the demonstration effect is likely to ensure that many of the social costs incurred in the first stages of industrialization in early nation state development are not incurred in new nations. Thus the capital formation, essential for economic growth, could be supplied in the earlier cases of growth largely at the expense of the working class, which was obliged to suffer poor housing, low wages, long hours and frequent economic crises. It was not until industrialization and capital formation was well established that the working class began to organize itself. However, the demonstration effect makes this method of capital formation in new nations impossible.

A further problem pertinent to the external economic environment is that this environment is now considerably less flexible. The global emergence of social systems with clearly defined territorial limits means that there are much greater restrictions on the movement of population, capital or labour. Thus no new nation can experience the expansion of frontiers or economic resources in the gross manner of the United States, nor can they plunder and exploit economic resources as did the major colonial powers. So again one of the major means of capital formation which could be employed by early nation state development is denied to later development.

The economic strains mentioned above derive in the main from the changed external environment, as a consequence of nation state development. The major problem posed by the changing internal context of nation state development relates to the changing role of capital and technology. In a subsistence economy, investment plays a minimal role and whatever surplus

may be produced is normally channelled into luxury commodities. Sustained economic growth requires at least increased efficiency and the expansion of existing factors of production (i.e. through increasing the quantity of land, labour or capital or through the invention of land-, labour-, capital-saving devices), but more likely requires some diversification involving qualitative changes with reference to capital formation and investment and the development and application of technology. It is only through capital formation and the related deployment of technology that continuous economic growth may be sustained. The new nations state encounter a number of interesting problems and differences which demarcate them from early nation state development. In the first place, in early nation state development it was private investment which played the early dynamic role. In new nations partly bedause the process of economic development is more forced and partly because of different cultural values, an entrepreneurial group is missing. (It will be noted in this context that it is not the private aspect which is important but the existence of an entrepreneurial innovative group.) Secondly, in the early development public investment only became vital at a later stage in order both to control the market and to develop facilities which the private sphere was unwilling or incapable of doing. New nations, because they are obliged to compete on the international market, are compelled to develop the public role much earlier. Yet it is in this area in which massive investment levels are demanded and on which returns are very long-term.[38] Thirdly as economic growth has proceded the absolute levels of investment and the length of time over which payoffs on these investments can be realized have increased.[39] This proves particularly problematic of course for these countries which experience acute capital shortages. Finally, it must be noted that the development and application of technology provides the major economic input into advanced industrial economies. Yet technological development

goes hand in hand with high investment rates and industrialization. Thus many new nations lack the necessary conditions under which a technological revolution may take place.[40]

It is now pertinent to examine the major generalized political problems for new nation states. Exactly the same format may be used as in the attempt to isolate economic strains, i.e. of examining the changed internal and external context of nation state development.

The first problem relates to the expanded role of the political system. In the first stages of early nation state development, the political system, though far from ineffective, was not very extensive. However, in the process of nation state development, the political system has come to assume a much more dynamic and responsible role. Thus it has come to assume some responsibility for stimulation and regulation of economic activity, for the provision of numerous public and welfare services, for the regulation of numerous social problems (such as crime, housing, immigration). Furthermore, to the extent that patterns of interaction have become more complex and subject to more rapid change, it follows that many of the basic monitoring tasks also have become more complex and extensive. Whereas the political systems in early nation state development experienced a more gradual extension of demands for goods and services, late nation state development had demanded a more dynamic and extensive political system much earlier. The basic problem which new nations face in this context is that many of the resources needed to support such an extended role are lacking (such as financial resources, educational skills, sufficient time to adapt to the new demands).

A second problem relates to the extension of participation. Again, early nation state development manifested a gradual extension of participation. The demonstration effect has resulted in the sudden and extensive expansion of participation in many new nations, and in so doing has created

a number of problems. In the first place, there is no reason to suppose that the wide range of demands encouraged by participation expansion must of necessity be aggregated into any coherent public choice or why individual preferences should be synthesized into any collective preference. Secondly, to the extent that broad participation patterns are new and uninstitutionalized, such participation tends to mobilize localized demands which may prove impossible to integrate centrally. Finally, a sudden participation extension placed an enormous burden on political parties which must attempt to regulate and aggregate new participation rates. The organization, financial and general aggregative burdens of this task were unknown in early nation state development where mass political parties were either a gradual extension of clique parties or emerged to satisfy a particular constellation of group demands.

A further problem relates to the identification of the authority structure. Again early nation state development proceded usually on the basis of a clearly identified territorial unit with some form of centralized monitoring process. It will be recalled that the nation state manifests a high degree of interrelation among the functional processes and to that extent demands a high degree of interaction and interdependence in the formulation and execution of major collective goals and the distribution of political goods. In this context many new nations face severe difficulties on two accounts. On the one hand, national patterns of interaction may be tenuous on account of such factors as arbitrary boundaries, or deliberate colonial policies to foster separatism, or discrete areas of interaction with no common patterns of economic or political interdependence.[41] On the other hand, even where collective patterns of interaction are more pronounced the political system frequently lacks the resources necessary to sustain the extended monitoring functions.

In sum, a complex of internal and external political and economic changes in the structure and context of nation state development place a

range of problems and strains on late nation state development, which were not encountered in early development. To the extent that all these factors indicate greater demands on the satisfaction of the major functional activities, they may be said to encourage instability. It is against this background of generalized pressures to instability, that the development of any single nation state must be examined.

FOOTNOTES 3: DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE NATION STATE SYSTEM

1. Another usage of development, which will be ignored as it lacks any analytic utility, is that of development as a generalized synonym for change. Thus it is common to find indiscriminate references to the political development of Ghana or Uganda or Brazil etc., when in fact reference is being made to political change in those countries.

2. Although the majority of discussions of development and modernization follow this format, it is important to note some more recent critical discussions, to which reference will be made later. Such discussions include: M.R.Doornbas, "Political Development: the Search for Criteria", Development and Change, 1969; S.P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale Univ. Press, 1968; J.P.Nettl and Robertson, "Industrialization, Modernization, and Development", Brit.J.Sociol., 1966; K.de Schweinitz, "Growth, Development, and Political Modernization", World Pol., 1970; C.Hah and Schneider, " A Critique of Current Studies of Political Development and Modernization", Soc.Res., 1968; and S.P.Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics", Comp.Pol., 1971.

3. For some of the referents, see the two summary articles by Packenham and Pye, written five to six years ago. These articles are concerned primarily to summarize the multiplicity of definitions, which were manifest at that time. R.A.Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development", World Pol., 1965; L.Pye, "The Concept of Political Development", Annals, 1965.

4. Although development is not a new concept, it has become especially salient in political vocabulary in the last 15 years as a direct stimulus of the rise of a large number of newly independent systems. Until this recent expansion of studies on development, the major approaches to this discussion had been those of the evolutionists and Marx. These writers saw development as the unfolding of society

according to some identifiable pattern, whether it be status-contract, community-association, or capitalism-communism. Although recent studies differ from these discussions in not providing large-scale 'theories' of history, they place nonetheless strong reliance on an evolutionary dimension. See A.A.Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization", World Pol., 1968.

5. For the use of the transitional stage, see as but one illustration: F.W.Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, Houghton Mifflin, 1964; as an illustration of the double dichotomy see D.E.Apter, Politics of Modernization, Chicago Univ. Press, 1965.

6. Thus within the context of Africa, anthropologists have pointed to a wide diversity of so-called traditional structures. Compare for example the Ashanti with the Hausa-Fulani with the Ibos with the Buganda with some of the more nomadic or pastoral tribes. Or again such organizations could be contrasted with the structure of the Ottoman Empire, or the caste system of India, or the Bureaucratic system of China, or the latifundista system of Latin America.

7. This point is made by Nettl and Robertson, op.cit.

8. This point is made by Huntington, op.cit.

9. It is true that all concept formation is arbitrary to a degree, but to a degree only. Variables and concepts can be evaluated along a number of dimensions, such as clarity, economy, explanatory payoff. The majority of discussions of development are characterized by the failure to justify on any grounds the selection of a range of variables from a larger possible array.

10. This is revealed firstly in the blatant use of indices taken from Western liberal-democracies, and secondly in the preoccupation of many analysts in accounting for the failure of 'democratic' forms, i.e. the two or multi party system with 'liberal-civil' rights, in many new nation states. The 'gap' analysts list obstacles to dysfunctioning, while 'requisite' analysts specify the prerequisites and attributes

of 'democratic' society derived from the indices of the West, (such as high per capita income which is seen as a safeguard for democracy.

11. The prerequisites for comparative analysis were outlined in Chapter 1.

12. The importance of putting the analysis of development within the context of the nation state should be emphasized. In this manner, it is possible to solve the basic problems of development of what and also the problem of the justification of variables. Furthermore, it follows that to the extent that the nation state as a form of social system organization will be or even is being superseded, then the discussion of development would have to be extended to cope with the new form of emerging system.

13. This is the basic meaning of development as used by Huntington, op.cit., or S.N.Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest or Change, Prentice-Hall, 1966. However, our development of this particular conceptualization will vary markedly from that of either Huntington or Eisenstadt.

14. It will be recalled that because we have not weighted the variables, it is impossible to say that one nation state is more developed than an other (vertically or horizontally) unless it is more developed along all the indices. However, this is of little import as this task is non-interesting. The factors of import are that we are able to make comparisons and identify different clusters of variables.

15. Some work has been done in this area. See D.Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Free Press, 1958; or R.J.Rummel, "The Dimensionality of Nations Project", in R.L.Merritt and S.Rokkan, ed., Comparing Nations, Yale Univ. Press, 1966 or "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and their Behaviour", World Pol., 1969.

16. Thus given the number of variables being used to define the nation state, the possible range of permutations among these variables and the size of the unit being considered, it would be anomalous to establish over precise cut-off points. This is not to imply that we

are opposed to more precise quantification of the major dimensions, but rather given the complexity of the nation state, we prefer to use a broader cut-off region by employing thethreshold nation state.

17. Examples of relatively highly developed antion states are the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and most of Western Europe. Examples of low level nation states are most of the independent African systems. Examples of threshold nation states are Ethiopia, pre-coup Libya, or Thailand. Examples of non-nation states are Nepal, Kuwait, or Muscat.

18. In general terms, new nation states in Africa represent greater political over economic developments than in cases of earlier nation state development. Latin America represents in general an interesting variant on the modal line of late nation state development in that economic development is more advanced than political development. Slightly different examples of the same general process may be provided by the Republics of S.Africa and Rhodesia, which would both be classified as threshold nation state systems.

19. These observations counter some of the limitations noted at the end of Chapter 2 and in the introduction to this Chapter.

20. J.P.Nettl and Robertson, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies, Faber and Faber, 1968.

21. Some of the problems raised by generalized interaction in the international sphere will be raised in the final section of this Chapter, i.e. 'Problems of Late Nation State Development'.

22. In this context the work of Pye is interesting. See L.W.Pye, Personality Politics and Nation Building, Yale Univ. Press, 1962; and Aspects of Political Development, Little Brown, 1966.

23. It follows of course that to the extent that the nation state does not constitute any finite organization, the modernization complex may well contain elements generated by the nation state indicating its transformation.

24. A number of writers have pointed to the importance of communication

patterns in the general analysis of politics, see K.Deutsch, op.cit.; and L.W.Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1963.

25. These are taken from D.Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, 1967.

26. For example if Tanzania were compared with Britain, the latter would show more vertical development, but in terms of development as performance it could be claimed that at the present time Tanzania is developed. Furthermore, vertically developed nation states may well manifest a greater degree of instability than less well developed (vertically) nation states.

27. In general the analysis of instability has been rather neglected in political science. The most common approach in the context of development studies is to take the Western liberal democratic systems as the constellation of dimensions from which any variation, such as a one party state or a military coup, may be seen as an index of instability. Some more interesting work has been done by Eisenstadt, op.cit., Huntington, op.cit., and C.Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Univ. of London Press, 1968.

28. Most discussions of instability, which are not clearly normatively hide-bound, are restricted to attempts to provide indices of monitoring breakdown, e.g. in terms of domestic riots, deaths, etc.

29. The major problem is that of equivalence. Thus in somesocial systems at different periods in time and at different stages of development, various activities and processes may assume differential salience. Thus an index of instability found at similar levels in two systems may have differential repercussion for performance. This problem can be countered to some degree by making comprehensive anaysis of each system over time. Further it may be pointed out that given the exigencies of nation state development only a certain range of variance may be tolerated.

30. It will be appreciated that this analysis of instability has the same advantages as were outlined above for the conceptualization of development. It is comparatively viable, it is relativistic, and it has no normative bias. Instability can be identified in any political system without incorporating any evaluative element.

31. Some of the most interesting work, which has been done in this area, has been done by economists. See especially K.de Schweinitz, Industrialization and Democracy, Free Press, 1964, and "Growth, Development, and Political Modernization", World Pol.,1970; see also D.A.Rustow, A World of Nations, Brookings Instit., 1967.

32. In this context, it is important to point out that in the process of general structural differentiation we may include compressed structural differentiation, c.f. Nettl and Robertson, op.cit.

33. For general background, see C.P.Kindleberger, International Economics, Irwin, 1965; B.Higgins, Economic Development, Constable, 1959; W.Krause, Economic Development, Wadsworth, 1960; C.P.Kindleberger, Power and Money, Basic Books, 1970; J.Bhagwati, ed., International Trade, Penguin, 1969; D.Sears and Joy, ed., Development in a Divided World, Penguin, 1971.

34. It could be argued that in Japan for example the stimulus for economic development was externally derived. However, this would be a gross oversimplification for already by the time of the external stimulus there had been a major agricultural revolution, and even response to the external stimulus was a consequence of certain internal changes.

35. It must bepointed out that the process of economic exploitation is not terminated. Although direct exploitation through colonialism has ceased in most areas of the world and although new nation states make some gains from external exploitation, the economic domination of the advanced industrial nation states makes exploitation easy. Further it must be pointed out that the means of exploitation,

increasingly improved by advancing technology and the growth of corporations are currently considerably greater than in the time of colonial empires. The economic domination and exploitation strand of the neo-colonial thesis is unquestionable.The problems centre around the degree of such exploitation, the leverage of such economic control for political control, and the degree of conspiracy and cooperation imputed to the advanced industrial nation states.

36. Frequently this involved the development of a single line of production. The consequence of this was that many newly independent nation states were left with a non-diversified economy and with a product which was subject to marked fluctuations in the international market.

37. These problems have been pointed out for some time. See for example S.Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, Yale Univ. Press, 1966; or more recently P.Jalee, Pillage of the Third World, Monthly Review Press, 1968, and P.Jalee, The Third World in World Economy, Monthly Review Press, 1969; or C.P.Kindleberger, op.cit.

38. In this context it should be noted that new nation states cannot afford to go through the same stages of economic growth as did the earlier nation states, by virtue of the fact that early methods of production (demanding lower investments) cannot compete with later methods in terms of productive returns.

39. See the ever growing literature on corporations, and in particular J.K.Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Penguin, 1968; and A. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, Oxford Univ. Press, 1966.

40. It could be pointed out that new nation states have two main advantages over earlier nation state economic development. These are first that aid may be provided, and second that in imitating technological developments new nation states are saved the expense of research and failure. However, it must be realized that aid is negligible (approximately 0.5% GNP of the more advanced industrial

countries, and even such aid is frquently tied both economically and politically); and that the imitation of advanced technology is of little value when sufficient resources are not available to finance such technological developments. (For a discussion of the later factor see D.L.Spencer, Technology Gap in Perspective, Spartan, 1970.)

41. The best example of arbitrary boundary demarcation is probably to be found in Africa as a consequence of the Treaty of Berlin, when most of Africa was divided by a number of European powers to suit the strategic interests of those powers. The problem surrounding arbitrary boundary definition is that many groups with no common patterns of interaction are incorporated into a single formal unit with certain minimum obligatory patterns of interaction. This has generally led to the mobilization of local interests and in some cases to a high degree of conflict.

4 : THE MILITARY IN THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTEM

The aim of this final chapter in the elaboration of the conceptual framework is to introduce the analysis of the military in the nation state. The introduction of the discussion of the military has been delayed to this stage because the military represents but one part of the larger social system. The military is that organization whose primary function is the maintenance, through its monopoly of the means of force, of the external (and to a lesser degree internal) integrity of the system of which it is a part. As such different phenomenal forms of social system will generate differing types of military organization. The master concept in the discussion of the military in the nation state will be professionalization. However, in isolation, this concept is inadequate in taking stock of the various forms of military organization, hence it has been necessary to introduce a second though subsidiary concept, namely politicization. The concepts of professionalization and politicization may initially be considered individually, after which their interrelation may be established through the construction of a typology of professionalized-politicized military organization.

The National Professional Military Organization

The major summary concept which has been employed in recent research to cover the "modern" military is that of professionalization.[1] As such military professionalization represents only one dimension of the broad process of professionalization, which has had repercussions for several major occupational groupings in the nation state.[2] Professionalization, in the military context, does not represent a single specific type of military organization but rather a basic form of military organization, within which several permutations may be found. It is evident that any singular definition of professionalization would both confuscate the comparative variability of different forms of military organization, and provide little heuristic payoff. Thus we shall define the professional

military organization in terms of five dimensions, which may be manifested to varying degrees in different military organizations and thereby may constitute different patterns or clusterings of professionalization.[3]

A military organization represents that body of persons constituted for the maintenance of external defense and security of the social system of which it is a part, and to which end it has a monopoly of the physical means of violence. A national professional military organization is that military organization which manifests the following five dimensions: the development of a specialized body of knowledge, the development of institutional autonomy, the development of corporateness, the development of internalized control and internal affective neutrality, and the development of a professional ethic and external affective neutrality.

The first criterion of professionalization relates to the development of a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge and skills based on a complex of technical and intellectual advancements. The knowledge and skills involve such factors as the mechanical and technical development of weapons and ballistics, the increasing complexity of logistics and administration, and the sophistication of tactics and strategy. Such a development of an expert body of knowledge must precipitate and encompass the emergence of formalized means for the education in and training of such skills. Furthermore, these educational and training patterns must be accompanied by methods of validating the levels and means of training. The primary manifestation of the development of training has been in the emergence of military academies, and compulsory and satisfactory attendance at these academies by would-be officers. This first dimension of professionalization may be assessed in terms of the levels of technical knowledge manifested by individual armies (i.e. sophistication and complexity of weapons systems, logistics, tactics, administration, etc.), and in terms of the type of training (i.e. number of academies, parcentage officer corps graduating from such academies, duration and level of training, etc.).

The second dimension relates to the development of institutional autonomy. As an occupational organization becomes a profession, it is necessary that it develops a high degree of autonomy within its own sphere of activity or competence. Thus the military must develop a significant degree of autonomy with respect to the management of its own functional sphere of activity, i.e. external defense and security. Furthermore, this autonomy must be accompanied by formal, institutional means validating it. This dimension is manifested and may be examined in terms of a number of indices: the existence of formal legal documents (such as constitutions, codes of rules) or organizations (such as Ministries of Defense or High Commands) which specify the nature of the profession and its sphere of competence; the non-infringement of this sphere of competence by other organizations; the development of formalized employment tenure and payment in terms of contracts and salaries; and the development of a complex of factors which differentiate that organization from others and which define the legitimacy of anyone within that organization (e.g. Uniform, Symbols, functionally specific requirements for entry and promotion).

The third dimension is corporateness. Corporateness is a function of two processes: on the one hand, the development of differentiation of the particular organization from others, and on the other hand the development of internal processes of unity, involving especially egalitarian patterns of interaction. In the military context, external demarcation is fostered by the structural differentiation precipitated by the increasing development of skill levels and technical knowledge (and enhanced by the security aspect of the military's monopoly) and complemented by a host of internal factors such as uniforms, symbols, confined living patterns, acceptance of and dedication to a common purpose (i.e. national defense) and incorporation in an extensive network with well-established patterns of communication. Corporateness may be assessed in terms of consciousness

of differentiation on the part of incumbents of the organization, in terms of loyalty to the organization, and in terms of the levels and intensity of conflict and cleavage within the organization.

The fourth dimension involves the development of internal controls and internal affective neutrality. The development of internal controls involves two processes. The less formal involves the socialization and internalization of values and norms of donduct and interaction which is achieved through the lengthy training period, the process of confined living and so on. The more formal involves an elaborate system of rank, clearly identifiable and specified rules of behaviour based on rank, an extensive body of formalized rules and regulations, and formalized mechanism possessing a range of sanctions which may implement such rules (i.e. sanctions such as fines, confinement, loss of rank, expulsion from the military and in some cases formal prison sentences involving even death penalities, which are implemented through an elaborate internal juridicial system). The development of internal affective neutrality relates firstly to the institutionalization of the achievement norm as the basis for recruitment and promotion, and secondly to the universalization of the application of the rules and sanctions to the patterns of interaction.

The final dimension relates to the development of a professional social ethic and of affective external neutrality. It is evident that the increasing development of a branch of technical knowledge and skill provides those possessing such knowledge with powerful tools for the control of nature or society. In the case of the military's monopoly of the means of violence, the degree of potential control is self-evident. The final dimension of professionalization requires that this body of knowledge be applied beyond organization interests. Thus the orientation of the application of this knowledge must be beyond personal, group or organizational interests to the total social system of which the military is a part. It is the social responsibility which distinguishes the professional man from

other experts. External affective neutrality means simply the impartial external orientation of the profession, i.e. its orientation toward societal as opposed to more particularistic goals. In the context of the nation state, this involves the application of the military's body of knowledge to the direction by the polity except where the polity specifically absolves any such directional responsibility (as for example during a war or crisis situation).

As in the case of the nation state it is possible to identify different levels of vertical development of each main dimension, and horizontal development in terms of expansion over the five dimensions, and changes (both up and down) in movement along these dimensions over time. This conceptualization of professionalization in terms of indices which can be measured quite easily empirically has a number of important advantages. In the first place, it is quite clear that professional military organizations do not suddenly appear but emerge over time and frequently from other forms of military organization. The several dimensions which we have elucidated enable us to take account of paths of development in the emergence (or decline) of a professional army. Secondly, it is possible to differentiate various professional armies in terms of their levels of development of the major indices. Thus, any two professional military organizations may manifest different skill and technical expertise levels and differing complexities of weapons systems; or varying degrees of structural demarcation and autonomy; or differing degrees of dohesion and conflict, and so on.

Given that a wide range of permutations of professional military forces may be identified, it is possible, nonetheless, to identify the minimum criteria which define a national professional military. For a military organization to be designated national professional, the military must manifest firstly technical and skill levels sufficient to demand extensive training through an academy system; secondly, the military must constitute a single, unified and cohesive body with well-established

patterns of interaction; fourthly, the military must institutionalize the achievement norm as the criteria for recruitment and promotion, and establish a formalized body of rules governing recruitment, promotion and means of interaction and a functionally specific internal body to apply such norms universally and impose sanctions on any deviation; finally, the activities and energies, derived from the primary function of the single, cohesive military body, must be oriented to direction by the national popular authority structure.

Military Politicization

In contrast to the case of professionalization, there is very little publication on politicization. Politicization is the process involving either the inculcation of values and attitudes or the expression of action towards the polity based on such values and attitudes, which lie outside the political frame of reference dictated by the functional sphere of competence of any organization. To the extent that the major functional occupation of the military in the nation state has been the provision of national security, any inculcation of values or political activity which lies outside the sphere dictated by national security requirements represents politicization.[4]

Politicization is of two very different types: induced and overt. Overt politicization represents the deliberate or overt drive by the polity to inculcate extra-military political values into the armed forces. Induced politicization has the same end result as overt, i.e. the acquisition of an enlarged sphere of political reference, but differs in the process of the acquisition of the political values. Thus, as opposed to being deliberately imposed by the polity, they are acquired or induced more spontaneously through the general process of interaction between the military and the polity. Each type of politicization may be examined in greater detail.

The overt inculcation of extra-military political values and attitudes

by the polity must be clearly differentiation from the simple infusion of political values. To some degree all polities attempt to infuse various values of patriotism or national loyalty in varying degree. (In this respect Israel represents a more explicit case than Britain.) However, this type of inculcation of political values differs radically from politicization in that it concerns only political values related to national security and which are therefore consonant with the role of the military; politicization involves the inculcation of values on a much broader front. Although the conditions precipitating overt politicization need not detain us, it is interesting to note that overt politicization is primarily the product of the existence of that type of system in which only one party is seen as legitimate, and in which the functions of the party extend beyond simple support mobilization and the recruitment of leaders to become synonymous with the national authority structure.

Overt politicization is manifested in several manners. First, recruitments and promotions may be made in terms of party affiliation. Thus the achievement norm of professionalization either becomes eroded or supplemented by party loyalty as the dimension for the evaluation of personnel. Secondly, the party can attempt to recruit members by distributing party cards among the military and thereby to build a corps of loyalty. Thirdly, the polity may delegate government posts to top military leaders, thereby involving the army in the general policy making process. Fourthly, the party may utilize political commissars both to encourage the military personnel to become party members but also to propagate and supervise. Finally, the polity can engage in political education and indoctrination through special ideological schools. In general, these last two factors indicate a higher degree of politicization.

Indeed politicization is a more spontaneous phenomenon, and may be the product of four main classes of factors. In the first instance, the incidence of a high degree of instability in the civilian polity may lead

to an increased reliance on the military in the form of declarations of martial law, the use of military communication systems, the employment of military personnel in top administrative posts, etc. This expansion of the role of the military into the civilian polity in turn stimulates an expansion of politicization in that the military is obliged to make major policy decisions and cooperate with major civilian political groups in issue areas beyond its own sphere of competence. The second condition relates to the situation in which civilian political cleavages and conflicts are projected into the military so that the military organization encompasses rival political groups. In this context the military's assimilation process breaks down and the military includes rival political groups. The third condition relates to the situation in which attempts are made to induce military personnel to join or explicitly support certain civilian political groups, or to distribute promotions and rewards in the military on the basis of political patronage.[5] The fourth condition is that produced by a period of military rule which may stimulate politicization by virtue of the fact that military personnel are obliged to make and debate major policy decisions which lie outside their sphere of competence.

Military Professionalization and Politicization: A Typology

Given the five dimensions of professionalization, it is possible to differentiate various military organizations in terms of movement along these dimensions. For example, using the first dimension, i.e. the level of expertise, it is possible to differentiate those military organizations possessing more complex weapon systems, e.g. nuclear ballistic missiles, from those with less complex ones. However, given that we are interested primarily in the military in its political sphere of reference, an additional political dimension must be included, which in our case is that of politicization. Using the two concepts of professionalization and politicization, it is possible to produce the following typology.

Type Politicization	Type Professionalization	
	Professional	Non-Professional
Non-Politicized		
Induced Politicization	Generalized	1.Military Partisan 2.Civilian Sectional
Overt Politicization		1.Civilian Sectional

Diagram 2: Typology Professionalized-Politicized Military Organizations

Using professionalization as the major concept, we may examine the varying combinations. The non-politicised, professional military is self-explanatory and may be illustrated by the present British army. The non-politicized, non-professional seems an unlikely combination.

Induced politicization can lead to three forms of military organization, one of which is professional and the other two non-professional. The particular ramification of induced politicization for professionalization is contingent primarily on the source of the politicization. The first and third classes of factors noted above (when the third condition is resisted) may lead to a generalized politicization, which usually takes the form of a heightened political awareness, which has no debilitating consequences for professionalization. In thecase of military partisan and civilian sectional politicization, some erosion of professionalization is involved. Military partisan politicization can be precipitated by the first condition, but is more commonly the product of the fourth. Military partisan politicization involves the adoption of an independent autonomous inculcation of values, attitudes and political activity on the part of the military in which the political evaluation involves a considerable degree of projection of military values. Civilian sectional politicization is usually precipitated by the second condtion, but also the third (when it is not resisted by the military). Civilian sectional politicization involves heightened political awareness and activity in which there is a dominant identification with a sectional civilian group, such as a party, a regional, a class or an

ethnic group. The latter two cases of politicization involve differentiation from the professionalization syndrome in the erosion of low level of development of affective neutrality both concerning internal controls and external responsibility. Political promotions and recruitments tend to erode the development of neutral achievement internal norms while the increased political sensitivity of the army inhibits neutral impartial external interaction. Furthermore, it may be noted that the latter two types of politicization can easily generalize to induce low levels of development of the other dimensions of professionalization. This is particularly true of civilian sectional politicization, which usually involves rival groups within the military and thereby leads to an erosion of corporateness, which in turn can have repercussions for skill and efficiency levels.

Overt politicization is manifested in such armies as those of the Soviet Union, China and to a much less degree Algeria. It is not of necessity antithetical to the development of professionalization but usually leads to a low level of development of institutional autonomy. However, it may be noted by way of qualification that all major professions in the nation state are never completely autonomous in that they are subject to government inspection, or tied to the government through salaries, or have government defined spheres of autonomy.[6] Overt politicization can lead to an erosion of professionalization in the situation in which the focus of politicization is transferred to a sectional civilian group. This may take place either when there is a division within the civilian polity and the military identifies with one section, or in the case where overt politicization has been executed by a small sectional civilian group. In this instance there is an erosion of internal and external affective neutrality.

In conclusion, three points may be emphasized. First, military organizations may be differentiated along two dimensions, i.e. development of the five indices of professionalization and development and type of

politicization. Second, professionalization and politicization are not necessarily antithetical. Third, professionalization is the master concept with politicization providing a secondary elaboration of a political format along the professional/non-professional dimension.

Professionalization and the Nation State System

Having defined a basic form of military organization, i.e. the national professional military, it is now necessary to examine its relation to the analytic model of the nation state. In this context, the main proposition to be substantiated is that the development of the nation state has precipitated the development of a particular kind of military organization, namely the national professional military organization. The relation between the professional military and the nation state will be examined by relating the growth of professionalization to the development of the major indices of the nation-state. The establishment of the relationship between the indices of the nation state and the professional military organization is of importance both from the point of view of extending the basic conceptual framework and of including the discussion and analysis of the military as an integral part of the framework, and also from the point of view of clarifying and elaborating the definitional conceptualization of the national professional military.

At a general level, it has frequently been pointed out that the emergence of professionalization is a recent phenomenon. None of the ancient societies possessed professions, as defined above. A frequent date-line manifesting the appearance of professionalization has been taken as the first time that the word "profession" appeared in the Oxford dictionary, sometime in the 17th century. Although it is plausible to argue that medecine and law were manifesting some characteristics of professionalism, it was not until the 19th century that the development of professionalization became consolidated. It is quite clear that historically

professionalization bears a close relation to the emergence of the nation state, and indeed has come to represent one of the major occupational innovations associated with the nation state. This relationship can be examined more precisely by taking the major spheres of functional activity of the nation state, i.e. the cultural and social, economic, political and also external, and examining the manner in which the indices of the pfo-fessional military have been conditions by these spheres.

The major processes of the social subsystem have probably had the least direct effect on the changing patterns of military organization, but are nonetheless important. The main social changes have been associated with social differentiation and the changing forms of mobilization and mobility. The primary factor of importance has been the changing nature of stratification. The increased mobilization, greater mobility and chang-ing foundation of stratification have had marked repercussions on recruit-ment patterns to the military. The major consequences have been in emphasizing achievement criteria for entry and also in broadening the base of recruitment.[7] This contrasts markedly with medieval armies in which only knights were permitted to fight, and also armies of the 14th-18th centuries in which the officer corps was the monopoly of the nobility. Under the stimulus of the changing basis of social stratification, many of the requirements of aristocratic entry and the practices of officer purchase were limited or abolished in the 19th century. Thus the changes in recruitment fostered by changing patterns of social stratification in the nation state have relevance for the fourth dimension of professionaliz-ation.

The major cultural influences on the rise of professionalization have been threefold. In the first place, the Renaissance brought to a close the monopoly of the church over education, so that education became increas-ingly diversified and divorced from purely theological concerns. Related to this change was the emergence of secularization which began to pervade

all areas of social life. The major cultural product of secularization was the development and consolidation of formal rationality. Finally, these developments were to some extent mirrored in and reflected by the development of science, as a method of intellectual inquiry, and technology, as the application of these rules to the solution of practical problems. The direct consequence of these cultural changes was to provide the where-withall and legitimation for the collection of a body of technical skills. Until the period of the continuous and systematic application of science and technology to the study of war, war had demanded only a modicum of intellectual and organization skills. However, the developments fostered by technological change began to demand higher skill levels and increased training, which ultimately led to the establishment of the first military academies. (The major change-over in military education occured at the close of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries and lead to the establishment of a large number of academies in Britain, France and Prussia.) Thus cultural influences on educational changes were directly responsible for the establishment of military academies and of the first major dimension of professionalization. A more indirect and generalized consequence of the above cultural changes was in stimulating the rationalization and universalization process, which in turn was to play an important role in prompting the emergence of the professional ethic and affective neutrality.

The major economic influences on the emergence of professionalization have been industrialization and the growth of the division of labour. Technological and economic innovations have persistently throughout history altered the nature of war and of the armies engaged in these wars. However, until the time of industrialization, such innovations had been sporadic. Industrialization was of import firstly in introducing more manufactured weapons and secondly in bringing standardization and economies of scale. This meant that increasing numbers of men could be employed to carry arms,

frequently at a reduction in cost. (The Napoleonic Wars mark the first major period of industrial production of weaponry, which has now escalated to the production of nuclear ballistic missile systems.) Furthermore, increased sophistication of weaponry systems has meant that their control and management has demanded increased educational and skill levels.[8] Closely related to the development of industrialization has been a second major economic process, i.e. the development of the division of labour. The primary eonsequence of this development has been the emergence of the military as an increasingly specialized occupational structure. Such developments as the navy and airforce, the intelligence systems, the communication and medical corps, the various armoured units, the increasing complex logistical systems, the tactical systems, all testify to the occupational diversification which has taken place within the military. The development of the division of labour has had a number of repercussions for professionalization. Firstly, the military has been consolidated as a large and permanent organization; secondly, occupational specialization has led to the emergence of a complex, large-scale, hierarchical administrative and managerial system, necessary to coordinate the many specialised branches; thirdly, the military has become clearly demarcated and differentiated from other occupational structures; finally, increased specialization which has led to increased educational and technical expertise has demanded both longer training periods and military academies, and also some degree of internal autonomy. In sum, the technical developments of industrialization and the administrative and managerial developments of the division of labour have had ramifications for every dimension of professionalization.

The major political influences on the emergence of professionalization may be subsumed under the development of a national authority structure. One of the cardinal features of the nation state has been the development

of a complex and pervasive authority structure, both as a stimulus and response to increasingly complex patterns of general interaction. The major points of interest concerning this authority structure for the analysis of professionalization are that the authority structure has taken the form of a unified, centralized structure, and that the primary locus for the legitimation of this structure lies in popular public bodies. The development of the nation state authority organization has several repercussions for military professionalization. In the first place, it has afforded a single central authority focus with clearly demarcated limits, usually defined in territorial terms. Secondly, this central authority is based on popular rationalization. The major consequence of a single popular authority structure within clearly defined territorial boundaries is that a focus for the development of social responsibility for the military is provided. Thus a clear central authority body emerged to which the allegiance of the military could be pledged and on behalf of which the technical skills of the military could be applied. To the extent that this authority structure encompasses popular legitimation, then there emerges a focal point around which the social responsibility, or the external affective neutrality, of the military may develop. A further influence of the dentralized authority structure is in providing the means whereby military development may be monitored. Thus the polity of the nation state provides the main economic resources for the military budget (including both armaments and training facilities) and can supervise the level and type of training. In this context, the polity both supplements the economic system in providing the basic economic backing for the military, and exceeds it in that it can control and monitor the deployment of such resources.

The final area of influence relates to the international arena. The progressive differentiation and demarcation of various nation state systems has two main repercussions. In the first place, the crystallization of

the security confrontation has encouraged the development of nation state forces. Secondly, the increasing facilitation of international exchange encourages the process of osmosis in the demonstration and imitation of various military developments. As professionalization has emerged in one nation state and immediately manifested itself as a more efficient form of military organization, it has been adopted quickly by others.

In sum, the political, economic, social and culture forces which define and constitute the nation state have conditioned the development of a particular form of military organization, namely the national professional military. Furthermore, the international network has served to generate and demonstrate this form of military globally.

Problems in the Development of Professionalization

This section represents the third elaboration and extension of the initial conceptualization of the five dimensions of professionalization. The first took the form of the introduction of the variable of politicization to identify three main types of professionalization; the second was concerned to establish the relationship between the development of the nation state and the emergence of the professional military organization. This section attempts to qualify and extend the discussion of professionalization by noting some of the major issues, problems and limitations of professionalization which have relevance for civil-military relations. Such an examination may be undertaken by investigating each of the five dimensions.

With reference to the first dimension of professionalization, two main comments are pertinent. In the first place, the military is unique in that its technical expertise relates to the monopoly of the means of violence, and as such the military must remain an object of acute sensitivity for the polity.[9] Secondly, the continuing advancement of the level of technical expertise of weapons systems has undermined to some degree the autonomy of the professional military. This may be illustrated on two accounts.

Firstly, much of the research and development of advanced weapons system is carried on by civilian agencies and organizations, and furthermore much of the long-term military planning is executed by civilians. Secondly, to the extent that the military represents a complex large-scale organization structure, many of the managerial and even some of the technical roles are transferable between military and civil institutions.[10]

Three factors are of significance comerning autonomy. Firstly, the client of the military is the national authority structure of the social system of which it is a part. Thus, unlike other professions, the expert does not have a choice of client. Secondly, in addition to the limitation of an autonomy noted above, the polity controls directly the monetary allocations to the military, and thereby can control to some degree the size and resource base of the military. A final problem and contradiction relates to the definition of the relative spheres of competence of the civil polity and the military with reference to national security. It is within this area that the primary vocation of the military and the polity's responsibility for national goal and policy formation overlap. Even the most clearly defined operation and the one which falls most obviously to the military, i.e. the actual process of fighting, is not without possible conflict as military and political victories are not necessarily synonymous.[11] Beyond the actual process of fighting, the national security syndrome becomes even more ambiguous as it takes in estimates of security threat, form of security system, and general foreign policy,[12]

Three factors are of interest with reference to corporateness. In the first place, no other profession is subject to the same sudden expansions and contractions (precipitated of course by war). The expansion rarely has deleterious consequences (due usually to the stimulation of patriotic loyalties), but the process of demobilization can prove proble-

matic. In the second place, the very expansion of the modern army and the development of expertise, in the form of increased specialization and interchangeability of civilian and military roles, have posed problems for corporateness. The final factor relates to the hierarchical nature of the military organization. The development of formal, rational hierarchical organization as the means of coordinating complex actions and resources is a hall-mark of nation state society. The high degree of hierarchy found in the military erodes the fraternity and egalitarian principles found in the majority of professions. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that this type of limitation of corporateness differs from that noted in the case of induced politicisation, in that in the former it is precipitated by functional and occupational criteria whereas in the latter by extra-functional criteria.

Two factors may be noted concerning internal affective neutrality. Firstly, it is impossible to establish fully the achievement norm for recruitment in a vacuum. Although it may be possible to achieve short-term affective neutrality by applying certain standards for recruitment and training, it can always be objected that to the extent that the educational system has its biases, then these will be reflected in the recruitment system. Secondly, universal achievement criteria must be eroded in that not all individuals wish to join certain organizations, and in that all organizations have value and norm structures, which condition not only recruitment but also promotion. Both these factors influence again the sample attracted to the military, and the body of rules and norms built by that sample.

Three interesting questions may be raised concerning external affective neutrality. The first concerns the issue of whether the military could legitimately deviate from such neutrality if it perceives that its occupational expertise and competence is being invaded by the polity. The second problem is one which has already been noted, namely

the possibility of differential perceptions of roles and functions by the military and the polity. The final problem relates to the identification of the client for the military. Thus is the military's focus of social responsibility a group of politicians, or the government, or the total polity, or some perceived though not articulated national interest? The problem of the source of the national authority structure becomes particularly difficult when the political system is experiencing a marked degree of instability.

The problems relating to the dimensions of professionalization which have been noted above, are of importance in indicating the limitations of professionalization, in indicating some of the internal contradictions, and in indicating some of the potential lines of conflict with the polity.

FOOTNOTES 4 : THE MILITARY IN THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTEM

1. For some of the several discussions, see S.P.Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard Univ. Press, 1959; M.Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, Free Press, 1960; S.P.Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession", Daedalus, 1963; J.van Doorn, "The Officer Corps: A Fusion of Profession and Organization", Eur.J.Sociol., 1965.

2. For general discussions see H.Vollmer and Mills, ed., Professionalization, Prentice-Hall, 1966; W.E.Moore, The Professions, Sage, 1970; A.Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, Free Press, 1961; H.L.Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?", A.J.S., 1964; T.Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Society, Free Press, 1960.

3. Unfortunately there is no single accepted definition of professionalization. However, a number of dimensions reappear so frequently that there is no major definitional problem (from the point of consensus.)

4. The phenomenon of a non-political military, i.e. a military which does not engage in political activity, is inconceivable. Politicization is not to be contrasted with non-political, but is rather a measure of the intensity of political activity, i.e. that which lies outside the sphere of competence of any particular organization. A good hypothetical example of the movement between non-politicized and politicized may be provided in the case of the British military and Rhodesia. Had the British military been ordered into Rhodesia, and had it refused, then a non-politicized military would have become a politicized one.

5. This is clearly differentiated from overt politicization by virtue of being more random, less pervasive, and more conciliatory.

6. It is interesting to note the type of conflict generated in the overt politicized professional armies stimulated by the strong drive of the civilian polity for control. In the Chinese case see E.Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps,

Harvard Univ. Press, 1965; or in the Soviet case R.Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton Univ. Press, 1967, or R.L.Garthoff, "The Military in Russia", in J.van Doorn, ed., Armed Forces and Society, Mouton, 1968.

7. Even in the context of military organizations which are readily classified as professional, the degree of development of the achievement criteria concerning entry and promotion must not be overemphasized. For limitations in the British case see P.Abrams, "Democracy, Technology, and the Retired British Officer", in S.P.Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics, Free Press, 1962, and C.Otley, "Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite", in J.van Doorn, ed., op.cit.

8. For a comprehensive discussion of these factors, see A,Vagts, A History of Militarism, Hollis and Carter, 1959; S.Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

9. For a variety of discussioms on this topic, see S.P.Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op.cit.; J.K.Galbraith, How to Control the Military, Doubleday, 1969; C.W.Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford Univ. Press, 1956.

10. See M.Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, op.cit.; and M.Janowitz, ed., The New Military, Sage, 1964.

11. For good illustrations see the military victory and political defeat of the British over Suez in 1956, or the MacArthur-Trman conflict over Korea, or the American failure in S.Vietnam.

12. See B.Abrahamsson, "Military Professionalization and Estimates on the Probability of War", in J.van Doorn, ed., Military Profession and Military Regimes, Mouton, 1969; and B.Abrahamsson, "The Ideology of an Elite - Conservatism and National Insecurity", in J.van Doorn, ed., Armed Forces and Society, op.cit.; M.Janowitz, op.cit.

SUMMARY

The aims of this concluding section are twofold: the first is to summarize the various stages in the development of the conceptual framework; the second is to illustrate the manner in which the conceptual framework may be applied for empirical research (and thereby to provide a transition to Part II of this study).

The point of departure for this study was a basic methodological discussion, which was useful on three main accounts. It served firstly to criticize and assess the current state of the study of military intervention and performance, secondly to outline our own approach in the form of the attempt to construct an empirical theory of military intervention and performance (an approach conditioned by the critique of existing studies), and thirdly to outline the methodological and conceptual prerequisites for such a study. The second chapter sought to construct an empirical analytic conceptual model of the nation state, derived from an abstract systems-function model, and defined in terms of a collection of certain substantive functional processes. The model was outlined in terms of the dictates of the conceptual prerequisites of comparative political analysis. The third chapter represents an extension and elaboration of the basic framework established in Chapter 2. This extension and elaboration takes the form of the introduction of development and political instability which in turn permit account to be taken of differentiation and change. The fourth chapter moves from a generalized to a more specific elaboration of the basic conceptual framework by introducing the discussion of the professional military organization. This discussion is directly related to Chapter 2 in that the professional military organization is precipitated by the development of the nation state.

In sum, the conceptual framework represents a developmental series

of empirical conceptual elaborations from an abstract systems-function framework which encompasses the conceptualization of a particular phenomenal macro social system, and the particular type of military organization found in that system. The primary purpose of the study, as will become evident shortly, is to integrate the analysis of political instability (i.e. chapter 3) with the analysis of the professional military (i.e. chapter 4). Both parts of the study are derived from the model of the nation state (i.e. chapter 2) and conditioned throughout by the methodological prerequisites of chapter 1.

Given this interrelated conceptual framework, it is now pertinent to examine the manner in which it may be applied for empirical research and more specifically for the construction of an empirical theory of military intervention and performance in new nation states. The conceptual framework is integral to the production of an empirical theory in two main ways: first, it provides the parameters and therefore defines the scope of the study, and second, it provides the means of analysis. We may examine each of these contributions.

Given the immense diversity of forms of military political activity, both in terms of an historical and comparative perspective and in terms of the variety of forms such activity may assume, it is essential that some order and uniformity be imposed on such diversity in order that comparative analysis may be undertaken. On the one hand, it is quite clear that it is impossible to deal with all cases of military political activity (the total frame of reference) by virtue of the very scope and complexity of the task, but on the other hand, it is equally clear that no progress can be made unless the discrete fallacy (i.e. that each case is unique and therefore incomparable) is avoided. We attempt to control for the first problem by simplifying the problem area by establishing a number of parameters; we attempt to control for the second problem by constructing the

parameters so as to satisfy a number of methdological prerequisites.

A parameter is an analytic tool, which has been developed by probability analysis where it refers to boundary establishment and area definition within the probability distribution. The concept of a parameter has been generalized from probability analysis to characterize the primary mechanism whereby problem definition is made. The functions of a parameter are to establish the definition and boundaries of a problem area, and are therefore fundamental preliminaries of vital importance in any research project. Prameter definition is not a random task but one which is dictated by the prerequisites and assumptions of empirical analysis. Given that we are interested in comparative political analysis, i.e. the identification and explanation of uniformities in political interaction, it is necessary that the parameters be attuned to the major dictates of such analysis, i.e. must facilitate the identification of uniformities in behavioural patterns of interaction. Thus the parameters must be drawn from the main conceptual body of analysis, they must be expressed in terms of behaviour and processual patterns or collections of patterns of interaction, and they must be capable of heuristic application.

We shall establish three parameters, which will define our subject area of investigation and thereby make the problem of military intervention and performance amenable to comparative analysis. The first parameter refers to the form of military political activity. In this context we are interested only in the explicit take-over of the major organs of civilian government by a domestic, i.e. internal, military force. The second parameter refers to the type of military organization which makes the intervention. Thus we are concerned only with national professional armies (which excludes Roman Legions, Janissaries, Candillo armies, etc.) manifesting non- or induced-generalized-politicization (which excludes both overt categories). The professionalization-politicization parameter not

only provides information on the organizational nature of the military (professionalization) but also on the motivation of the intervention (politicization), in that politicization refers to the political values and attitudes of the military. Thus coups precipitated by sectional motivations (military partisan or civilian sectional) are excluded. The third parameter refers to the type of social system in which the military intervention takes place. In this respect we shall be concerned with nation state systems or threshold nation state systems manifesting a high degree of development towards a nation state system.

These three parameters define with some degree of precision our problem area, namely military political activity involving total take-over initiated by a professional military motivated by non- or induced generalized politicization in a threshold or nation state system. It is, therefore, within this area that we are interested in identifying behavioural uniformities and in providing explanations for such uniformities.

The second utility of the conceptual framework for the construction of a theory of military intervention and performance is in providing the means of analysis. We may consider firstly the process of intervention.

The main proposition with respect to intervention is that military intervention is a function of political instability and military predispositions and capabilities. The first task of analysis is therefore to examine the process of the development of political instability within any specific social system. The various stages, which this entails, have already been outlined. Thus we attempt initially to identify the form and intensity of instability in terms of the four main types of political instability; this is followed by the attempt to isolate the dissynchronizations and dislocations in the major functional processes of nation state development; finally the attempt is made to identify the specific phenomenal factors accounting for the dislocations. Within the more

generalized framework of political instability we may examine the predispositions and capabilities of the military. The capability syndrome will be examined in terms of four main variables: skill level, composition and structure, autonomy and cohesion. The predisposition syndrome is attitudinal and involves the examination of two categories: attitudes favouring and attitudes inhibiting intervention. The former involves the examination of military dissatisfaction towards three phenomena: the major structures and organs of the political system, the major policies (both general and army-specific), and the incumbents of the political system. The latter involves the military perception of alternative potential ruling groups and the threat of opposition. The military's predispositions and capabilities are influenced partly by the development of professionalization, which in turn is reducible back to the development of the nation state, partly by the military's own pattern of development, and partly by the interaction of the military with the development of instability.

Three main points may be emphasised concerning the method of analysis of military intervention. In the first place, the conceptual framework dictates the structure which empirical research must follow in that it not only points out the major focus for analysis, i.e. patterns and types of instability and military predispositions and capabilities, but it also points out the major classes of factors which influence instability and predispositions and capabilities and the various stages which must be followed to identify these factors. Secondly, both parts of the major proposition are closely interrelated by virtue of being derived from the same conceptual framework. Thus instability and military predispositions and capabilities are interrelated in that they are both derived from the nature and development of the nation state, and in that the development of instability has a marked effect on the military. Thirdly, it will be appreciated that the

method of analysis can be applied to a wide number of seemingly discrete cases and can also integrate data provided by these cases.

It is now pertinent to outline the method of analysis of performance. Performance may be analysed in terms of four main issue areas. The first relates to the manner in which the military tries to cope with the ongoing processes of national state development. In this context we shall be particularly concerned to examine the military's performance with reference to the four major political functions of decision-making, institutionalization, support mobilization and monitoring as these condition and are conditioned by the other major processes of the nation state. The second dimension relates to the manner and success of the military in attempting to alleviate the conditions which predipitated the situation of instability which led to the intervention. The third dimension relates to the examination of the repercussions of the military's predispositions and capabilities on its performance, i.e. the manner in which it satisfies the major political functions, and vice versa. The fourth dimension concerns the analysis of the transfer of government controls back from the military to a civilian body, and examines the process of and the conditions underlying such a transfer.

Four main points may be noted concerning the analysis of performance. Firstly, as in the case of the examination of intervention, the conceptual framework dictates the lines of research. Secondly, there is the same continuity in the conceptual apparatus in that the focus of attention still lies on the direction of the major functional processes in the nation state and the interaction of the military's predispositions and capabilities with these processes. Thirdly, the analysis of intervention and performance are closely related. Intervention and performance are not seen as discrete processes but as part of a larger phenomenon. Thus the analysis of intervention and performance is interrelated both by virtue of the continuity

of the same conceptual apparatus and also by virtue of the deliberate analysis of the repercussion of the conditions of intervention on performance both concerning the pattern of instability and the military's predispositions and capabilities. Finally, it will be appreciated that the analysis of performance in terms of the four dimensions, outlined above, permits the comparative analysis of a wide number of otherwise discrete cases.

In sum, the primary utilities of the conceptual framework are in defining the area of analysis, in providing the means of analysis, in directing the lines of research, and in providing the mechanism whereby the product of this research may be collated. To this extent we have provided a comparative conceptual apparatus which is capable of integrating the analysis of otherwise discrete patterns of behaviour. Although the conceptual framework does not in itself represent an empirical theory, to the extent that it provides an interrelated frame of analysis capable of comparative, heuristic and empirical application and capable of identifying uniformities and explanations for such uniformities in the area of military intervention and performance, then the conceptual frameworkmay be said to afford the outline of and introduction to an empirical theory of military intervention and performance. Such an empirical theory can only exist once a body of empirical findings, generated by the application of this framework to empirical research, has been collected. It is the purpose of Part Two of this study to initiate such a collection.

PART TWO : EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Part Two is to apply the model, outlined in Part One, to empirical research. The method of application of the model for empirical research is that of case study analysis. In each case study the format for the analysis of intervention and performance will be identical in following the procedure outlined in the summary of Part One.

The primary advantages of a case study approach employed within a conceptual model are twofold. First, it permits a longitudinal analysis of the development of political instability, and the interaction of such instability with military predispositions and capabilities. Second, it is possible to reconcile the demands and prerequisites for the development of comparative patterns and uniformities with the demands for the identification of individual permutations.

The only remaining problem is to stipulate the rationale for case selection. The three parameters outlined above have outlined the boundaries, which define the total number of cases which fall in our frame of reference. This number is sufficiently large and diverse to inhibit the examination of every single case, but not sufficiently large to permit a random sample. Thus we shall attempt to make a more comprehensive survey of the diversity of cases within the three parameters by constructing a typology of military regimes and taking examples as defined by that typology.

Using the dimensions of period of rule and degree of change induced by the military regime, it is possible to identify four main types of military regime: the guardian, the caretaker, the equilibrator and the innovator.



Diagram 3: Types of Military Regimes

A number of points of explication of this diagram may be made. The degree of change dimension is of course a continuum ranging from simple change of incumbents or offices to the revamping of a new regime. The time dimension centres around the 5 year line, which is taken as the modal length of rule of civilian regimes. The unbroken line represents a line beyond which a type of military regime may not transgress without becoming transformed; the broken line may be crossed without any type transformation taking place assuming a projection of the unbroken line is not crossed. (For example a caretaker regime could move vertically downwards into the equilibrator sphere without becoming transformed but could not move beyond the 2 year time cut off line without becoming transformed into an equilibrator. Thus the unbroken lines are rigid type definition lines, whereas the unbroken ones are definition lines indicating most likely cluster boundaries. Finally, it will be appreciated that the diagram can take account of changes in regime format over time.

The final problem relates to the selection of examples of the basic regime types. The cases to be examined are Pakistan under Ayub Khan and U.A.R. (Egypt) under Nasser as innovators; Indonesia until mid 1970 (this is not to suggest any basic change at that date) and Ghana as equilibrators; and Turkey (1960-1) and Burma (1959-66) as caretakers. Guardian regimes will not be considered in the main body of the analysis as they have

negligible ramification for performance. There are no technical reasons for the selection of the six cases. However, the six cases do represent a wide diversity on a number of accounts such as levels of political and economic development, population levels, geographic location, or size of military.

5 : INNOVATIVE MILITARY REGIMES

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN PAKISTAN

INTERVENTION

The nature of the creation of Pakistan out of the larger system of India meant that the existence of Pakistan as a distinct social system dated virtually exclusively from its accession to independence in 1947.[1] At that time Pakistan could only be classified as a threshold nation state system, manifesting in embryo form most of the indicators of an independent nation state system. Although even in 1947 Pakistan was clearly committed to nation state development, by the declaration of martial law on October 7 1958 and complete military rule on October 24 Pakistan had shown very little vertical or horizontal nation state development.

Furthermore there had been a gradual growth from the time of independence of all four major types of political instability, each of which by 1955 had reached a high level of intensity. Although it is possible to see indicators of all four types of instability developing immediately after independence, the first most marked type was monitoring failure (which is understandable given the massive dislocations associated with the creation of Pakistan). Monitoring failure was followed and reinforced by decision-making failure (scope), to which were added by the time of the death of Liaquat Ali Khan (1951) decision-making (method) and support failure. Institutionalization failure, not usually as easily identifiable as other types, soon became explicit. From 1955 when all types of instability had reached high levels, there was no appreciable decline in any of the four types and indeed decision-making instability became increasingly more pronounced - by 1958 the political system of Pakistan was virtually paralyzed. The first task is to identify the indicators of political instability in the period up to the military intervention of 1958.

Both types of decision-making failure, i.e. method and scope, were manifested. Two main indicators may serve to illustrate the former. In

the first place, the tenure of the executive organs was very short. At the central level there were four Governor-Generals and eight Prime Ministers in the 11 years from independence to October 1958.[2] The same high circulation of executive organs, punctuated by periods of Governor Rule or Martial Law is even more marked at the provincial level. In West Pakistan from 1947-55 there were 7 Ministries in Sind and 4 in the Punjab (excluding periods of Governor's Rule); following unification in 1955 there were four major ministries and a period of President's Rule.[3] The situation in East Pakistan was essentially the same and reached a climax in 1958 during which year (from March to September) the Premier was changed three times, the Governor-General was dismissed, there was a period of Governor-General Rule, and finally there were three days of fighting and chaos in the Assembly during which period the Deputy Speaker was killed.

A second major indicator relates to the conflict and rivalry between executive and legislative organs. Under Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan there was no major problem, but in 1951 when Nazimuddin moved from Governor-General to Prime Minister and Ghulam Mohammad became Governor-General, relations began to deteriorate.[4] In October 1954 Ghulam dissolved the Assembly and in March 1955 conferred complete authority on himself. Although Ghulam was forced to resign, the subsequent Governor-General Mirza continued basically the same policies. Indeed Mirza apparently made a number of approaches to the army to assist in dissolving the Assembly. The conflict at the provincial level has already become explicit and resolved along an axis of National and/or Provincial Governor-General against the regional Cabinets.

The second type of decision-making failure (scope) is rather all-inclusive and will become explicit as the discussion proceeds. Nonetheless, it is possible to point out a number of indicators, which adequately demonstrate this type of instability. Thus with reference to the organization

of the polity itself, a constitution was not produced until 1956, provincial elections were not held in the East until 1954, there was no major attempt to restructure the bureaucracy, and no universally elected central Assembly had been elected by the time of military intervention. Furthermore many of the immediate substantive problems, such as the settlement of refugees or Kashmir, remained unsolved. Finally, there were a number of indicators of economic policy making failure. Thus per capita product was stagnant, exports as from 1950 were falling, and there had been no major change effected in the structure of the economy.

Table 5:1 : Pakistan's Per Capita Product at Constant Prices (1953 = 100) (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

1950	1952	1954	1956	1958
97	96	99	103	101

Table 5:2 : Pakistan's Exports (in £m) (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

1948	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
494	533	439	359	401	340	358	302

Table 5:3 : Industrial Origin Pakistan's G.D.P. (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

	M. Rupees	Percentages					
	Total	Agriculture	Manufacture	Transport	Trade	Pub-Admin	Other
1950	18,146	60	7	3	9	5	16
1953	19,973	58	9	3	9	5	16
1957	21,523	56	11	3	9	6	15
1958	21,638	54	12	3	9	7	15

The second main type of instability was institutionalization failure. Three main indicators were prevalent: the failure to develop a common body of rules on political interaction, the failure to delineate the sphere of competence of major political institutions, and finally corruption and patronage.

The first indicator was manifested in several manners. In the first place, there was a failure to produce a constitution. At independence

Pakistan had only the provisional constitution drawn up for British India, which was of course totally inadequate for independent Pakistan. It was not until 1956 that the Constitution Bill was drafted and passed, by which time most observers agree it was ineffective.[5] In the second place, there was a failure to develop any common consensus on the modes of orientation to political intercourse. This failure may be indicated on three accounts. First there was the development of personal, factional cliques, which could only cohere on the basis of personal profiteering motives and not on any agreed programmes.[6] Second the ML employed a wide range of obstructionist tactics to delay the provincial elections in East Pakistan and to forestall the reconstitution of the Central Assembly. Thirdly, there was a rising level of political conflict between rival factions, which reached its apotheosis in the death of the Deputy Speaker in the East Pakistan Assembly.

The second indicator is closely related to the first and may be documented in two examples. Firstly, there was an inability to define the major executive position. At the time of independence the main political office was that of the Governor-General. On the death of Jinnah, Nazimuddin became Governor-General but due to the personal influence of Liaquat Ali Khan, the most important position became that of Prime Minister. (Note the change in emphasis was not on formal, constitutional grounds but personal influence and prestige.) On the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, Nazimuddin moved to the office of the Prime Minister but by 1954 Ghulam Mohammed, the incumbent Governor-General, had succeeded in reconstituting the office of the Governor-General as the dominant one (having arbitrarily dismissed Nazimuddin in 1953). The second example relates to crisis of 1954-5. In October 1954 Ghulam Mohammed declared a state of emergency following deadlock over the constitution. In February 1955 the Sind Chief Court declared this action illegal. The Federal Court

finally reversed the Sind decision but ruled that all bills needed the assent of the Governor-General, thereby invalidating 45 bills with some important consequences.[7] To meet this situation Ghulam Mohammed proclaimed a state of Emergency, issued Emergency Powers Ordinance, which legalized 35 of the bills, and gave the Governor-General powers to draw up a new constitution. Again the Federal Court ruled that only the Constituent Assembly could draw up a constitution and that the Governor-General had no powers to revalidate. Thus Ghulam Mohammed was obliged to order the constituent convention to meet, assented to all laws of the former constituent Assembly and issued an Ordinance validating all acts passed by the Governors of Punjab, Sind and East Bengal.

The third indicator of institutionalization failure is that of corruption. Thus by 1949 both the Punjabi and Sind cabinets had to resign on corruption charges; in the same year Prime Minister Ali Khan introduced a bill in an attempt to clean up political life; again in 1950 the Sind cabinet fell under Governor's Rule on account of corruption. However, little action was taken generally to curb corruption, the scope of which became most explicit when martial law investigations took place. Those who were subsequently penalized in anti-corruption measures included one High Court Judge, one Provincial Governor, ten Chief-Ministers, 84 Senior Officials, 120 East Pakistan officials, over 600 police were down graded, and £87.75 millions of untaxed income was declared.[8]

The third major type of instability to be considered is support failure. The two major subdivisions of support failure are withdrawal and insufficience (the latter again subdivides into too narrow a base of support and incapacity to mobilize support). Although both bypes of support failure were manifested in Pakistan, the second was the more important. With reference to the former, there was clearly some withdrawal of support at the intra-regime level in the eastern section of Pakistan. Thus in the 1954 provincial election in the eastern province

the ML, which up to that date had been the monopoly party, was soundly beaten by a united opposition, the United Front. (United Front 223, ML 10, Independents 3, Minorities 72.) Although the United Front subsequently made demands for the resignation of the central government and the autonomy of East Pakistan, which would suggest withdrawal of support above intra-regime level, it can be argued that at that time these demands were not very forcible since the Awami League subsequently participated in the central government. Indeed the only significant opposition to be organized above the intra-regime level was the National Awami Party, founded by the Eastern peasant leader Bhashani after his split with the AL in July 1957, and the All-Pakistan Peasants Association, founded by Bhashani in January 1958 which proved capable of mobilising thousands of peasants.[10]

Although it is possible to find some evidence of support withdrawal but little evidence of organized alternatives, the second subtype of support failure is much more clearly indicated. Concerning the narrow base of support three indicators may be noted. In the first place, as in many situations of colonial system transformation, elections were held immediately prior to independence. Again as is common in many colonial situations, the percentage participating in the election was very small (an estimated 15%). The problem in Pakistan was exacerbated because no further central election took place before the military intervention of 1958. (The new central Assembly of 1956 was indirectly elected by the Provincial Assemblies.) In the second place, although provincial elections were held on the basis of universal adult suffrage, participation in these elections was also low. Thus the participation level in the 1951 Punjab election was 30%. Thirdly, the political party, which dominated Pakistan politics at the central level (and also Western province) certainly up to 1956, was largely recruited from and representative of a small section of the population. The ML was founded in 1906 by Muslim

landed interests and although it was later expanded to include certain educated and professional groups, after the death of Jinnah the landlord interests again came to the fore. Thus until 1956 and to a certain extent after that date, the polity was dominated by a group of politicians elected prior to independence, with a narrow base of support and representative of a small group of interests.[11]

Concerning the failure to mobilize support, three indicators may be noted. In the first place, the Muslim League after the death of Jinnah failed to become a national dynamic party but became a collection of a small number of cliques whose primary concern was to continue to dominate the central spoils system (hence the efforts to obstruct and delay elections in the eastern province where defeat was suspected and the refusal to carry out universal central elections). Secondly, as the proliferation and factionalization of parties proceeded, parties became more oriented towards personal struggle for political goods and patronage rather than constructing party organizations and recruiting support.[12] (This is borne out by the nature of the rise and fall of coalitions.) Finally, no party developed a consistent national programme of action. The closest approximation to this were the 21 points of the United Front, but the qualification must be noted that the United Front was itself an unlikely coalition.

The final type of instability to be considered is that of monitoring failure. Three indicators may be noted. The most important indicator relates to the failure to establish governmental authority. Two particular geographic areas may be noted: the outer regions and East Pakistan. At independence Pakistan consisted of 18 units of Government, of which 17 belonged to West Pakistan. (4 provinces: East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier; Baluchistan; four Baluch princely states, 4 more princely states on the North-West Frontier; Bahawalpur, Kaipur and Karachi.)

A major problem for the government was to integrate the princely states and the quasi-autonomous provinces.[13] In this exercise, the polity proved largely ineffective until the integration of West Pakistan as a single unit in 1955 at great political cost. (This effort may be contrasted with the Indian government which got rid of a much larger number of states - 600 in all - much more quickly.) Even after the 1956 constitution many of the states continued to be autonomous and to exert a conservative parochial influence on the central government.[14] The second area is that of East Pakistan. It has already been noted that the January elections of 1954 in the East signalled a massive rejection of the ML and thereby, on account of the artificial structure of the polity, of the government itself. Although there was no major mass protest in the East during this period, it can be assumed that governmental authority was low.

The second indicator relates to the low range of resources available to the polity. Three indices may be noted. Firstly, Vorys points out that the taxes available to the government were very low amounting to less than 7% N.I., a level which is low even compared to many Asian countries. Taxes were low, evasion was high, many agricultural taxes were set prior to World War 2 and many records had been lost during independence upheavals.[15] Secondly, the administrative structure was very ill-equipped. Thus only 157 officials were available from the Indian Civil Service to join the Pakistan Administrative Service (renamed the Civil Service of Pakistanin 1950) and of these only 136 were free for work within Pakistan; only 15 had experience in central secretariat work; half of the 136 had less than 10 years service; 50 of the 157 were British and about 25% of the more experienced were British, most of whom left by 1958; approximately 74 positions above the rank of assistant secretary had to be filled in the provinces but only 22 had held such positions before. Furthermore the CSP

remained a conservative elite group unwilling to accept any major innovations and unsuitable to cope with many of the problems of post independence Pakistan.[16]

The third indicator relates to the increasing reliance by the polity on force to maintain itself. In 1953 and 1954 there had been serious rioting involving several hundred deaths; in 1958 the violence had even entered the legislative assembly when the Deputy Speaker in East Pakistan was clubbed to death; but perhaps most significantly many parts of Pakistan had spent considerable periods under Governor's Rule due to general functional impairment. Thus marital law had been declared nationally from February to May 1953; In October 1954 a state of emergency had been declared; in West Pakistan Governor's Rule had been delcared in the Punjab from January 1949 - April 1951; in Sind from January 1951 - May 1953; in West Pakistan from March - July 1957; in East Pakistan Governor's Rule had been even more extensive, being declared from May 1954 - June 1955 and from August 1956 almost continuously to the coup.[17]

Having indicated the main profile of political instability in Pakistan, the next major problem is to identify the dissynchronizations which account for that profile. Four major dissynchronizations internal to the political system and three more generalized ones may be noted.

The first two more generalized dislocations relate to the interaction between the economic and political systems and concern in the first place the structure of the economy and in the second the polity's directives to the economy.

With reference to the structure of the economy, three factors are of import. In the first place, Pakistan was a primary producer and as such was subject to a number of major difficulties. This mineral resources were low with the consequence that most had to be imported; there was little control over a number of ecological factors which affected the primary production of agricultural goods; further there was strong reliance on a

limited number of goods for export earnings (in 1954 cotton and jute constituted about 80% of the exports); and finally Pakistan had no control over external demand for its exports which together with the non-diversified pattern of exports meantsthat Pakistan was very vulnerable.[18] The second major factor concerns the regional composition of the economy. Three factors may be noted. Firstly, prior to independence there had been no patterns of trade between the wings. Indeed both areas of East and West Pakistan had been hinterlands to Indian sections of Bengal and Punjab. This problem was particularly acute in East Pakistan, which after partition was cut off from a major port and from the industrial area (i.e. Calcutta) which had previously manufactured its raw products.[19] Secondly, the thousand miles separating the two wings of Pakistan introduces a transport factor of such an intensity as to inhibit the tendency for factor price equalization across the regions (and presumably also exacerbates the psychological aversion to movements of capital and labour). Thirdly, the problem of two clear economic units provides problems for balanced or unbalanced growth. Both wings are very different: the East has only 15% of the land area but 55% of the population; agricultural holdings in the West are large and concentrated and in the East very small; there are more mineral resources in the West; and finally the West has better power potentials. Most edonomists have resolved the debate of balanced v. unbalanced growth in favour of the latter,[20] but this poses major problems when ~~the~~ one clearly identified region is likely to benefit more than another.[21] The third major factor is that of partition. Partition had deleterious consequences for the structure of the economy on three accounts. Firstly, partition involved massive dislocations through population movements. Up to December 1947 4.68 million refugees arrived in West Pakistan with the figure ultimately rising to 9 million (about 25% of the population of West Pakistan).[22] Secondly partition (though partially stimulated by communal rioting) led

to virtual civil war in the Punjab in August 1947. Thirdly, partition involved major resource movements in which Pakistan fared badly. Thus as has already been noted both West Punjab and East Bengal were hinterlands; Pakistan received only a comparatively small section of the ICS etc.[23]

With reference to the second dislocation, i.e. the failure of the political system to monitor the economy, two precipitants may be noted. The first concerns the failure to develop satisfactory planning mechanism. Thus the first plan did not appear until 1951 and was soon rescinded and replaced by a 2 year Priority Plan (1951-51); the 5 Year Plan 1955-60 was not submitted until May 1956 and not approved until April 1957; and finally within the relatively small industrial allocation of that plan, the primary emphasis was on consumer goods and not on the more dynamic producer goods.[24] The second major problem was the underestimation of the difficulties inherent in regional integration. Economic integration involves the progression through a number of inclusive stages: extensive trade interaction, abolition of restrictions on commodity trade, the development of free trade areas, the development of customs unions, the establishment of common markets, some degree of harmonization of policies to complete economic integration involving the unification of all economic policies. Pakistan proceeded to the last stage of integration without sufficiently developing the initial and intermediate stages.

The third and final generalized dissynchronization that must be examined is that of system cleavage. Since system cleavage is an important phenomenon, which has ramifications beyond the Pakistan case study, a brief note on the nature of system cleavage as a dissynchronization in the nation state is essential before the causes and consequences of the specific cleavage in Pakistan are examined.

Given that any system represents a collection of interrelated and interdependent variables, it follows that any major dislocation of such

interrelation will lead to a breakdown of that system. Given that a social system represents a collection of behaviour interaction sustained by certain political, economic, social and cultural forces, it follows that breakdown in the patterns of interaction must lead to a breakdown of that social system. The severity of cleavage depends upon a number of factors: the numbers involved in the cleavage; the degree of salience of the cleavage, the orientatinn of cleavage groups (i.e. intra-regime, regime community or discrete alternative systems), and the degree of simplification of the cleavage.[25] The consequences of cleavage may be at one extreme to precipitate a breakdown necessitating certain system transformations ar at the other extreme to lead to the creation of two or more discrete systems. The main types of cleavage in the case of nation state social systems, i.e. the lines along which communication and the attempted redefinition of interaction take place, are: regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious and class.[26]

Given that all social systems may experience cleavage formation there are a number of important factors associated with the phenomenal system of the nation state which must be noted. In the first place the nation state system demands a particularly high level of intensity of interaction, contingent particularly on the degree of economic differentiation and the development of widespread political participation.[27] Secondly, new nation state systems emerging from colonial systems have interaction patterns which are very tenuous due partly to the arbitrary definition of the boundary of the system and the modicum of interaction during colonial status.[28] Thirdly, the process of nation state development tends to exacerbate cleavage lines. Thus numerous process associated with nation state development, such as central expenditure, taxation, voting, central fiscal controls, movement of goods and capital, etc., demand new patterns of interaction governing the total system. However, where central collating organs are weak and where more easily identifiable systems of

interaction exist within the larger system, then the processes of nation state development can exacerbate internal cleavage lines.

Given the above brief introduction to cleavage formation, it is not surprising to find the development of regional cleavage in Pakistan. Regional protests were evident soon after independence as for example in the Eastern protest when Pakistan did not follow the Indian devaluation, and in the disturbances following the attempt to impose Urdu as the national language.[29] The degree of regional hostility between East and West became most explicit in January 1954 when the perceived Western ML was soundly defeated and the United Front made a series of demands for the resignation of the central government, the autonomy of East Pakistan and the rejection of the draft constitution.[30] The more important task is to identify the political, economic, social-cultural conditions accounting for the cleavage and then to consider the consequences of the regional cleavage for political instability.

Several factors were of import in precipitating the development of the regional cleavage. In the first place, there was the complex of economic factors associated with the regional division, noted above. Secondly, a number of economic policies have served to perpetuate and exacerbate the regional division. Thus the disparity in per capita income grew from 18% 1951-2 to 29% 1959-60; consumption in West Pakistan is higher (19 times as much electricity, 10 times as many cars, 8 times as much tea and petrol); the investment level in the West has been 5-7% higher than the savings rate, whereas in East Pakistan the relationship has been reversed (investment 5-6%, savings 7%); and finally exports from the West to the East have been persistently higher than vice versa.[31] Thirdly, prior to independence West Punjab and East Bengal had had no common patterns of interaction. This lack of interaction led to the mutual fear that either wing could dominate the other. (This was reinforced in West Pakistan since the East Pakistan population was slightly larger and in

any proportional representative system could always dominate the central legislature.) Fourthly, there were a number of socio-cultural differences between the two wings. The population of East Pakistan speaks Bengali and is divided into small agricultural units of production; the population of West Pakistan contains a number of ethnic groups (principally Sindhis, Punjabis, Baluchis) which do not speak Bengali, and is divided into much larger units of agricultural production.[32] Fifthly, the West began with a number of advantages: the capital was located in the West; most of the ML politicians, the elite members of the civil service and the bulk of the officer corps came from the West. In addition, there were no major attempts to redress the imbalance. Thus there were no major changes in recruitment to the civil service or military; the East was generally under-represented in the cabinet; and the West was very reluctant to elect a new Central Assembly. Finally with the collapse of the ML as a national party after the death of Jinnah, no major civilian political structure existed or subsequently emerged that was capable of accommodating the conflict.

It is now possible to examine the consequences of the three generalized dissynchronizations for political instability. The primary consequences of the first two dissynchronizations were for decision-making (scope) and monitoring failure. The consequences of the system cleavage were more diffuse. The cleavage led to decision-making (method) failure in providing a permanent atrophy or obstacle to those policy areas requiring regional co-operation, and in undermining the basis for coalition formation. The major consequences for institutionalization were to erode the basis for the development of stable patterns of expectations, and to increase mutual suspicion and rivalry leading to patronage and corruption. The consequences for support mobilization were to negate the basis on which national party organization could be established. Finally the consequences for monitoring failure were to undermine central authority.

The first of the more localized political dissynchronizations, which

may be examined, is the failure of mass party formation, which took the form of the proliferation, and factionalization of parties.[33]

The most important reason for this dissynchronization, was the decline of the ML, which in turn is attributable to the following main factors.[34] Firstly, prior to independence the ML had had very little experience of government (having formed a ministry only in Bengal and Sind); secondly, soon after independence, it lost its two main leaders, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan; third, although it had campaigned for a Muslim state, little attention had been devoted to how this state ought to be constituted; fourth, the orientation of the ML toward political action had been largely that of violence, mob riots and oppositional tactics; finally the ML was strongly tied to the landowning interests of West Pakistan. Thus the ML had no strong group of provincial leaders, no strong party organization, no collective leadership, no means for dealing with intra-party conflict, no clear programme and a clear identification with West Pakistan. A second major reason was that, as in many cases, the nationalist movement, which had acted as an umbrella organization for a wide diversity of groups and interests, fragmented. Thirdly, the availability of political and economic rewards after independence led to an unremitting scramble for the spoils of office, which in turn led to the formation of factional cliques forming and regrouping to gain control of such spoils. Fourthly, since there had been no large-scale elections prior to independence and since the post independence ruling groups succeeded in obfuscating any attempts tohold elections, one of the major mechanisms, around which and towards which party organization is oriented, was removed.

The consequences of party factionalization and proliferation for political instability were substantial. Concerning decision-making, it meant that the major mechanism for recruiting national leaders was defunct, it precipitated the condition of perpetual coalition rule, and it resulted in politicians devoting their energies to maintaining themselves in power

rather than engaging in long-term planning and policy formulation. With reference to institutionalization failure, the lack of party discipline led to the stimulation of personal and factional rivalry, and to the ephemeral nature of major patterns of interaction. Party proliferation and fragmentation were the most important factors in accounting for the large-scale neglect of support mobilization and for the narrow base of support.

A second dissynchronization within the political system related to the failure to produce a national assembly, i.e. a legitimated central rule making body. The independence congress was an outgrowth of the provincial assemblies of India and as such had been elected by only 15% of the population. This assembly persisted until 1955 when it was reconstituted not through any spontaneous action but through a constitutional crisis. Furthermore this assembly was increasingly anomalous in that being dominated by the ML, which after 1950 disintegrated and declined rapidly, it was increasingly divorced from any public opinion or demands. The new assembly was constituted by indirect election by the provincial assemblies, but this too proved equally inadequate in providing a central assembly based on universal suffrage. At the time of the coup, i.e. after 11 years of independence, the Pakistan political system still had not produced a universally elected national legislature. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, the entrenched interests of those politicians within the assembly made them reluctant to prepare a new assembly in which they may be displaced. It is interesting to note that the demand in 1954 from East Pakistan for the election of a new assembly was rejected on the grounds that the assembly had a specific duty (i.e. to draw up the constitution) and that since it had not been elected by the populace, it could not be repealed by them. Second, contingent on the progressive development of regional cleavage, there was little consensus on what form the new assembly

should take (particularly with reference to representation). The major consequences of this dissynchronization for decision-making were: first to constitute an atrophy of one of the main decisional goals; and second, in the particular anomalous form that the assembly took, to provide a major obstacle to decision-making. The main consequence for institutionalization failure was to inhibit the formal rule-making procedure and legitimation of that procedure and thereby to encourage the development of the indicators of non-consensus on the modes of orientation to political behaviour. The consequences for support mobilization were to debilitate one of the main organs whereby effectiveness of political performance (and thereby of the allocation of retraction of support) could be made, and second to negate one of the main organs capable of support mobilization. Finally, the consequences for monitoring failure were to render ineffective one of the main organizations capable of monitoring and collating demands, and second to undermine one of the primary sources of national authority.

A third dissynchronization which in this particular case is closely related to the one above is the failure to produce a constitution. Thus at independence, Pakistan had only a provisional constitution. Though a constitution was enacted in 1956 again as a consequence of the constitutional crisis. (It is interesting to note that after 8 years of stagnation, the 1956 constitution passed through all its assent stages in 55 days.) Nonetheless the new constitution did not serve it s function, but indeed induced a more fluid pattern of political interaction.[35] Most of the causes of the constitutional failure have already been noted, namely regional conflict and provincial autonomy, weakness of ML and subsequent factionalization of alternative parties, and the predominant influence of a number of Western influences. The consequences of this dissynchronization were most obvious for institutionalization failure. Thus there was no adequate formal body of rules outlining the structure and mode of operation of the political system from which stable patterns of behaviour

could develop; second, such an absence permitted and encouraged the development of personal and factional rivalries and cliques; and finally, such a failure led to the development of corruption and political profiteering.

The final political dissynchronization relates to the central administrative organization. Several observers have pointed out that neither the machinery nor the official disposition was adequate to satisfy past independence demands. The administration was compartmentalized and aloof, there was relative immobility between cadres and major classes, technical administrators were subordinate to generalists and the whole structure became rather conservative.[36] The reasons for this are several. In the first place, the manpower available for the administration was very limited. The CSP was founded by 157 members of ICS (Muslims constituted approximately 9% of the ICS) of which 136 were available for internal administration. Furthermore, mcuh of the personnel had limited experience: half of the 136 had less than 10 years experience, only 15 had experience in central secretariat work, and almost one-third of the 157 were British (most of whom had left by 1958). Secondly, Pakistan received few records (many of which were destroyed during partition disturbances) and few physical assets. Thirdly, the central public service commission responsible for recruitment and selection (changed in 1956 to the Federal Public Service Commission) was very weak in that its authority was circumvented by bills limiting its functions and in the inadequate size and competence of staff at its disposal. The fourth and most important factor accounting for the ineffectiveness of the administration was that the structure, designed to colledt taxes and preserve law and order was not revamped to promote goads of social and economic change but continued essentially as under the British.[37] Most of the basic administrative units remained unchanged and furthermore the ex-patriate British continued to have a dominant influence for 3 or 4 years. Finally, West Pakistan continued

to be over-represented in the CSP. The major consequence of the lack of adaptation and transformation on the part of the administration was for monitoring failure in that the major monitoring mechanism was devoid of much of its effectiveness.

The final task involves an examination of the organizational capabilities and predispositions of the military.

With reference to skill level, a number of factors point in the direction of this being comparatively quite high. Thus the army was large and diversified; or again British training patterns had been adopted and a number of training academies established; and finally the educational requirements were strict. (For officers there was 100% literacy in local languages and English and languages of both wings were required.)[38] With reference to the composition and structure five factors may be noted. First the armed forces were large, having expanded from 150,000 at independence to 200,000 at the time of the intervention.[39] Second, although Pakistan possesses both an air-force and navy, the army constitutes the bulk of the military forces. Third, there was a strong recruitment bias in favour of West Pakistan. This trend had started under the British, who after the Mutiny of 1857 began to recruit extensively from the so-called martial races of the North-West (i.e. Punjabis, Pathans, Sikhs). At the time of the coup only 1-2% of the ranks and 5% of the officers were from East Pakistan. Fourthly most of the officers were drawn from lower middle class and rural groupings of West Pakistan.[40] Finally, the army had nationalized fully. There appears to have been a high degree of internal autonomy, although externally the army had been increasingly drawn into the civilian polity. Thus the army had been employed extensively in emergency operations concerning floods, cyclones, etc.; it had been employed to control smuggling (Operation Jute 1952 and Operation Close Door 1957); in October 1955 - May 1956 it had taken charge of the administration and rationing in the food crisis in East Pakistan; it had been

employed on several occasions to control riots; and finally Ayub Khan had drawn up the plans for the unification of West Pakistan and had joined the cabinet to implement them in 1955.[41] Finally, there is no evidence of any significant cleavage within the military. The only division was in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951, which in general appeared to be a rather insignificant affair. Indeed given the high degree of internal autonomy, the long-standing existence, the continuous training procedures and homogeneous recruitment, it may be concluded that cohesion was high.

With reference to predispositions, it seems clear that army dissatisfaction at all levels was high. At the level of structure of the political system two factors may be noted. First the military, as has been noted above, was strongly in favour of the unification of West Pakistan and equally strongly opposed to continuing suggestions for decentralization. Second, the military was highly dissatisfied with the structure and activities of the political parties and was particularly opposed to the factionalism and degree of corruption (in several army investigations of corruption, the army had been called off before investigations were completed in the event that politicians may be inculpated.)[42] At the level of policies, the most general comment is that the military was opposed to the slow rate of policy-making. More specifically with policy decisions that had reference to the military, the army had been strongly opposed to the partition settlement or again it had resented the decision of Ali Khan to call in the U.N. during the Kashmir war; or again the military resented attempts at interference by party politicians as for example in the use of ex-servicemen welfare agencies as patronage mechanisms.[43] With reference to the third level, the two preceding levels of dissatisfaction were so generalized as to lead to the hostility towards all civilian politican incumbents in the polity. Given these favouring predispositions, it must be noted that inhibiting predispositions were negligible. There was no organised group within the civilian political system capable of maintaining the major

decision-making positions; there was no major antipathy towards the army; and since there were no armed groups external to the army and since the army was cohesive, then there was no threat of armed retaliation.

In sum, from 1950 the political system of Pakistan was manifesting an increasing degree of instability as it became more factionalized and ineapable of output. This was paralleled by the increasing skill level and cohesion of the army, which though divorced both from the immediate political conflicts and from the dissynchronizations precipitating instability, was becoming increasingly aware of and involved in the progressive breakdown of the civilian political system. On October 7 1958 Mirza proclaimed martial law and established Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator; on October 28 Mirza was ousted and total military intervention was achieved.

PERFORMANCE

A number of introductory comments may be made on the general format of the military regime of Ayub Khan. First, the regime was seen as innovative over the period 1958-62, after which date it became transformed into an equilibrating regime. Second, although there was progressive civilianization particularly from 1962, the regime is still classified as military in that the primary executive post was held by a military member who initially assumed that position through a coup and in that the regime was designed and ultimately supported by the regime. Thirdly, during the period of the regime, the induced politicization (generalized) of a professional military began to manifest increasing indicators of military partisan and sectional politicization.

The first issue area to be examined is the method and success of the military regime in coping with the four main political functions. With reference to the decision-making method, two main factors may be

noted. First, there was a strong reliance on administrative techniques and resources, which can be indicated in a number of manners. First, immediately following the coup Pakistan was divided into a number of administrative zones, headed by military personnel. Secondly, 33 major commissions involving 280 persons covering most areas of policy formation were established.[44] Although the reports of these commissions were only advisory, with a number of significant exceptions many of the recommendations were enacted, and thereby provided the basis for much governmental policy formation. Thirdly, the military government was soon obliged to rely very heavily on administrative personnel.[45] Although the close partnership which was to develop between the military and the civil service, did not appear immediately (indeed the CSP had good cause to fear some major dislocation),[46] fourteen months after the intervention the 272 military officers placed in the civil service to oversee certain civilian departments had been reduced to 53, the civil service constituted 42% of the membership of the commissions (60% if military officers, judges and corporation directors are included),[47] and little action was taken on the Cornelius Report, the Pay and Service Commission, which was very critical of the CSP and included some suggestions for major changes. Fourthly, even when the process of civilianization was underway, Ayub Khan sought explicitly to reject the procedure, style and resources of the civilian politicians. Thus, even after legislative assemblies were constituted in 1962 and 1965, Ayub Khan and his cabinet of advisers were not responsible to those bodies; or again many former politicians were disqualified through EBDO (Elective Bodies disqualification Order);[48] or again Ayub Khan eschewed direct elections far more orderly and easily controlled indirect elections.

The second factor of import concerning decision-making method is centralization. The high degree of centralization is manifested in a number of indicators. First, the high degree of centralization under

martial law, during which period the constitution was abrogated, the central and provincial assemblies dissolved and political parties banned, is self evident. However, through the 1962 constitution Ayub Khan managed to retain a high degree of centralization. Ayub had made it clear from October 1958 - February 1960 that he favoured a unitary system with a strong executive President and a unicameral legislature indirectly elected with no political parties.[49] However, the commissions report submitted in May 1961 was largely ignored, and a constitution, more in tune with Ayub's known preferences, was evolved over the following ten months by a series of cabinet sub-committees.[50] A second indication of the high degree of centralization is provided by the Basid Democrat System. The B.D. system, one of the major innovations of the Ayub regime, was proclaimed in May 1959 and established in October 1959 as the primary mechanism for popular participation in the polity.[51] Developed from a number of Ayub's ideas on participation, the BD system has a number of important implications for the discussion of centralization. The five tiers (ranging from Union/ Town Council to Sub-District to District to Divisional to Development Provincial Councils) corresponded to administrative levels; the chairman of the councils belonging to the top four tiers was a government official; as the hierarchical system progressed so too did official representation;[52] only the lowest level was directly elected - the non-appointed members at higher levels being indirectly elected; and finally it is interesting to note in the original announcement of the BD system, there was no provision for the highest level.

The scope of decision-making may be considered under three main headings: restructuring of the polity, general policy output, and political control and direction of the economy. The restructuring of the polity involved in the main the establishment of 3 political structures: the BDs, the 1962 Constitution and new central and regional assemblies. The

BD system was established in 1959 as a five tiered hierarchy based on 80,000 elected members, which was fully integrated with the civil service and as such manifested increasing official representation as the pyramid was ascended. The BD system was devised both as the primary mechanism whereby the populace could participate in policy formation and as the mechanism by which the central government could execute and explain its policies. The constitution of 1962, as has been noted, ran contrary to many of the recommendations of the constitution commission, and reflected the known preferences of Ayub for a strong unitary Presidential system.[53] (Indeed the only compromise on the part of Ayub was in the provision of Provincial Assemblies.) In 1964 four important constitutional issues were clarified: 20 fundamental rights outlined in the 1956 Constitution were reinstated, cabinet ministers were not allowed to participate in the assembly, a number of regional assembly duties were outlined and finally the courts overruled the executive wish to ban the Jamaat.[54] Thereafter the constitution remained basically unchanged until the fall of Ayub. The central and regional assemblies were established in 1962 and 1965 on the basis of indirect election by the Basic Democrats. Both assemblies had strictly delimited roles.

With reference to general policy formulation, the early stages of the military regime contrasted markedly with the former one in assuming a much more dynamic role. It is possible to document this with several examples. The most graphic example is the large number of commissions established under martial law, which submitted reports on a wide diversity of areas. The most important, excluding those having reference to the constitution, were the commissions on the reorganization of the civil service, land-reform, law-reform, and education. The most important element of welfare legislation was the atempt to rehabilitate many of the refugees. Finally there was a large-scale ~~anit~~anti-corruption drive involving

screening committees, Public Conduct security ordinance (requiring all senior government servants to declare their assets and later expanded to include Judges and MPs), Scrutiny Ordinance, Public Offices Disqualification Order, Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance, and tax evasion measures. Under the PCSO, SC and PODO 1662 were punished, 813 bureaucratic officials dismissed; under EBDO 7000 were disqualified from political life; £87.75m of untaxed income was declared.[55]

With reference to the control and stimulatiion of the economy by the polity, the following observations may be made. In the first place, there was a strong emphasis on austerity and anti-corruption in the form of the reducfion of consumer goods, rationing, measures to clean up smuggling and collect undisclosed tax. Second, a more dynamic planning section was established. This included an Export Bonus Scheme; commissions to investigate commercial maritime affairs, textile industries, jute industries and commercial law; the establishment of a new Economic Council and Planning Commission (which when reorganized in 1962 gave Pakistan a comprehensive planning machine); and the promulgation of Five Year Plans 1960-65 and 1965-70, which were more extensive and better organized than previous ones.[56] Third, there was considerable reliance on foreign and private investment, although the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was established to stimulate industrial growth.[57]

It is now pertinent to examine the success of the Ayub military regime in terms of decision-making. With reference to the method of decision-making, no significant dislocations appeared until the last few months of 1968 (to be examined below). On the other hand, a number of features associated with the decision-making method, especially the degree of centralization, and bureaucratization, were responsible for precipitating other functional failures. With reference to the success of the decision-making scope, it is evident that the military regime was successful in establishing

a new polity, although as noted above the phenomenal nature of the polity was instrumental in precipitating alternative instability. Concerning the general policy formation, two general comments may be made. First, the extensive scope of decision-making which characterised the martial law period was not sustained; and second many of the early policies were either not successfully executed, or not sufficiently extensive. Thus although large numbers of refugees were resettled, the problem was far from concluded; or again the corruption measures were restricted to the public services and later began to reappear;[58] or again the land reform was very mild involving only 2½ million out of 46 million acres, most of which was bad land, and furthermore by 1964 only half had been redistributed.[59]

With reference to the polity's control and direction of the economy, two observations may be made. First the rate of growth of the economy was undoubtedly much higher than during any previous regime; second although investment patterns and planning machinery improved intensely, the rate of growth was not sufficiently diffused throughout the population. With reference to the former, the rise in GNP began very soon after the military government came to power (rising by 9.7% over the first two years), and over the 10 year period as a whole GNP increased twice as fast as population averaging a 5½% growth rate. As regards the second point, although planning machinery improved, and industrialization began to develop (increasing as a percentage of GNP from 5% (1955) to 8% (1960) to 12% (1965) with the third five year plan allocation to Industry being 26% as compared 17% in the first Five Year Plan),[60] industrial expansion came to be concentrated in a small sector. Thus 20 families (of which Ayub's was one) owned 66% of the industrial capital, 80% of the country's banking and 97% insurance (of the remaining 34% industrial capital, half was owned by foreign firms).[61]

The major processes involved in institutionalization were fourfold:

the BD system intended to involve the population in local government and to provide the primary means for participating; indirect election (Ayub first sought ratification in the BD elections held in December 1959 to January 1960, thereafter indirect elections were held for the Presidential election of 1965 and the national and provincial assembly elections of 1962 and 1965); the promulgation of a new constitution in 1962 intended to clarify and legitimize the new political structure; and finally new central and regional assemblies. Since these phenomena have already been examined, it is possible to proceed directly to analyze the effectiveness of the institutionalization procedure.

In the first place, it must be noted that the institutionalization measures were very limited. Thus the only universal elections were for the election of the BDs, the BD structure itself was increasingly dominated by officials at the higher levels, and the functions and constraints of the central and regional assemblies were very slight (thus Ayub chose the cabinet which was not responsible to the legislature and further Ayub also controlled the budget; concerning regional assemblies Ayub had not even wished to establish these and their list of powers was very small). Secondly there was a strong reliance on formal means of control. Thus martial law was not lifted until 1962 (during which time decision-making was executed through ordinances and military courts existed throughout most of the period to supervise conformity to such ordinances); emergency rule was declared in 1965 and endured throughout most of the period until the resignation of Ayub; strong restrictive measures were employed against press and students (by 1961 only one free press association existed) and many political oponents were held under emergency laws (especially EBDO); and finally Ayub refused to repeal the ordinances passed under martial law. Thirdly, it is claimed that corruption began to reappear. Thus the BDs became sources of local patronage, whereas Ayub himself became a primary central source.[62] In conclusion, although the channels and modes of

political interaction were established and defined with a high degree of clarity, the major institutionalization drives were too restricted and not legitimated on a sufficiently broad base. Thus as soon as the regime moved out of the martial law period, during which time institutionalization is not of primary importance, it began to encounter increasing demands motivated largely on account of the narrow base of institutionalization. These demands were to prove one of the major factors in precipitating the collapse of the regime.

The third major process, support mobilization, as institutionalization, was not particularly problematic during the martial law period. The army initially was very popular, the former polity was bankrupt and Ayub could rely on the civil service. Nonetheless Ayub had realised the need for support mobilization (as evidenced by the ratification at the end of 1959) and it was one of the functions of the BD system to accomplish this. However, the military regime's assessment of both the means of mobilizing support and of the necessary level of such support was hopelessly inadequate. Ayub's regime from 1962 onwards began to show indicators of both main types of support failure, which by 1968 had reached very high levels and together with institutionalization failure was responsible for the downfall of the Ayub regime. It is possible to examine the support failure under the headings of the two main types: insufficience and withdrawal.

Insufficience may be examined by three main indicators. The first relates to the re-emergence of political parties.[63] Under martial law, political parties had been banned and the ban had been retained under the 1962 constitution.[64] However, soon after the first meeting of the National Assembly several members gave notice for private bills to legalize political parties. The government forestalled them with the Political Parties Bill of July 1962. It is important to note the early stage at which this bill was introduced, that it was introduced despite Ayub's known recriminations,

and that no licensing clauses or restrictions on the number of parties or the regulation of the collection or administration of party funds were drafted. The Jamaat emerged in July 1962, Nizaam in August, ML (Convention) in September, ML (Council) in October 1962, and the Awami League in December 1963 - in May 1963 Ayub was forced to join the ML (Convention) of which he became President in December.[65] In the second place, the newly emerged political parties closely resembled those of the pre-coup period both in organization and personnel, and as such proved equally incapable of crystallizing support. Indeed many of parties even looked back to 1947: the ML (Convention) was organized by Khaliquzzaman who failed in the 1948 organization, and the ML (Council) was organized by Nazimuddin, Governor-General 1948-51, and PM and League President 1951-53.[66] Thirdly, the basic support for the regime was very narrow and unrepresentative. Thus 136/156 of the National Assembly were landlords, lawyers or businessmen, or again the BDs were monopolized by the larger landowners (which is true even for East Pakistan).[67]

Withdrawal of support can be demonstrated by two indicators, the withdrawal of support from the regime and the progressive development of opposition. In the ratification December 1959-January 1960 by the BDs, Ayub received 95% of the vote. In the 1965 election despite the much greater resources of Ayub, the structuring of the electoral process by the incumbent regime, Ayub won only 64% of the total vote (73% in West Pakistan and 53% in East Pakistan).[68] In the subsequent elections for the national and provincial assemblies, although the ML appeared as the dominant party, it won only 55% of the central votes, and 49% and 38% in the West and East Assemblies.[69] In the second place, it is possible to note rising opposition to the Ayub regime. Thus in October 1962 Suhrawardy formed the National Democratic Front; the COP emerged to fight the 1965 elections and performed well, but after its defeat in the Presidential elections it

disintegrated; in 1966 Mujibur Rahman produced the Awami League's 6 Point Programme which made a demand for full regional autonomy; in 1967 5 opposition parties formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement. But the main opposition disturbances began in October 1968 from student protests against the University Ordinance in West Pakistan which spread to include workers and then in December to include workers and students in East Pakistan. The period from December 1968 to March 1969 was a series of riots, strikes and demonstrations involving all sections of the population.[70] It is significant to note that the massive popular rejection began independently of any organized political party and although the opposition parties may have played some role in fanning the protest (a combined opposition the Democratic Action Committees was formed in January 1969) they could not channellize or crystallize the protest. In sum, the regime established by Ayub completely underestimated the role of support mobilization in the nation state and the means of mobilizing and integrating such support. Despite the increasing evidence of support failure after 1965, the Ayub regime proved completely incapable of accommodating such failure and consequently experienced a total collapse.

The major monitoring methods of the Ayub regime are already evident: the military's monopoly of force, the use of martial law and emergency powers and the reliance on the administratinn.[71] Initially the martial law administration had considerable success. Thus the locus of government became clearly established, massive corruption drives were initiated, the policy-making procedure was extended and revitalized under the commissions, the economic monitoring mechanisms were revamped and some considerable progress was made in a number of pressing problems. Nonetheless, by 1965 it was clear that some degree of monitoring failure was beginning to reappear but it did not become extensive until the final collapse of the regime from December 1968 onwards. Thus corruption began to reappear,

a number of major policies were not fully implemented (including land reform and the reorganization of the civil service); governmental authority began to wane in East Pakistan after 1966; but the main indications of monitoring failure appeared after December 1968 and lasted until the resignation of Ayub in March 1969 by which time the BD system had completely collapsed, several hundreds had been killed in riots and in East Pakistan the police had been confined to barracks. The monitoring failure, which was largely contingent on the dislocations which precipitated institutionalization and support failure, reached chronic proportions by the beginning of 1969, and since the regime could not control the consequences of the monitoring failure or alleviate the dislocations precipitating it, it collapsed.

In conclusion, the military regime established by Ayub Khan showed considerable success in decision-making (method) and to a lesser degree in decision-making scope and monitoring; but it manifested a continuous failure of the institutionalization and support mobilization processes.

It is now necessary to examine the second major problem area, namely the success of the military in alleviating the basic dissynchronizations which precipitated the pattern of instability prior to the intervention.

With reference to the first two dissynchronizations, many of the main points have been noted in connection with the examination of the success of the military in dealing with decision-making scope. Hence the main observations on this problem area may be summarized. The main conclusion is that although the military made major strides in alleviating the second dislocation, there was no fundamental change in the first, i.e. the economic structure. On the one hand, the planning machinery improved; investment-schemes, such as the Indus Basin, were initiated; and agricultural and industrial production expanded markedly.

Table 5:4 : Pakistan's Agricultural and Industrial Production and Per Capita Production Index (1963 = 100) (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

	1958	1962	1964	1966	1968
Agriculture	83	93	99	103	119
Industry	50	83	111	130	155
Per capita Production (at constant prices)	85	94	102	108	117

On the other hand, as noted above industrial wealth was concentrated in a very small sector thereby prohibiting the diffusion of income rises to the bulk of the population; further there was little change in the structure of the economy[72]; and finally as will be noted below the attempts to redress the regional imbalance, though very marked, were not sufficiently extensive.

With reference to the regional cleavage, although it may be argued that the military regime was able to diminish the salience of the cleavage it was not able to alleviate it. The indicators of the regional cleavage were present in 1962 when even before parties reemerged in the National Assembly, groups of "like-minded" persons began forming along provincial lines.[73] In 1966 the Awami League made a demand for full regional autonomy for the East and thereafter became consolidated as the major party of the East. Finally the riots immediately preceding the resignation of Ayub were more severe in the East: more people were killed, more groups participated in the demonstrations, the BD system collapsed more convincingly (involving the deaths of many Basic Democrats), and the police were rendered completely ineffective. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the 1966 6-Point programme contained a number of other major demands in addition to regional autonomy; and secondly, the massive disturbances of 1968 and 1969 were not a regional phenomemon and in fact started in the West.

Given the observation that regional cleavage continued although in more moderate form, a more comprehensive picture may be gained by examining the military's performance with reference to the conditions underlying the cleavage dissynchronization. Concerning the political factors some degree

of improvement was made to each but none was alleviated. In the first place, although attempts were made to even recruitment to some of the major political organizations, the West continued to be more favourably endowed, Thus although in 1964 provincial recruitment to the civil administration was evened out, the West continued to be better represented particularly in top posts, e.g. in 1965 of 17 central secretaries only 2 were from the East[74]; or again the position in the military was even worse where the East contributed only 20,000 out of 500,000; and represented only 5% of the officers (of 17 top army posts only 1 Major-General came from the East)[75]; or again the number of Basic Democrats was evenly divided between the two wings despite the larger eastern population. Secondly, no dominant national party emerged. Although Ayub's ML did have support in both wings, its support in the East was less and further it was rather a defunct political party. In the same vein, some degree of improvement in the economic factors was evident, but again none was alleviated. In the first place, the geographic disparity could not of course change. Secondly, there was however an increase in the trade between the two wings, which was particularly marked in the increase of exports from East to West Pakistan.[76] Finally there was an increase in attemps to redress the imbalance between East and West. Thus the growth rate in the East 1959-64 was 5.8% against 4.9% in the West,[77] the allocation for the Third Five Year Plan for the first time gave more to the East (53% of the total allocation),[78] and finally there was some equalization of per capita income which was reduced from 7.7% in 1959-63 to 2.8% in 1967.[79] Concerning the social-cultural factors, there is no evidnece to show any marked changes. In sum, three conclusions concerning regional cleavage may be drawn. First, although the military regime did not alleviate any of the basic causes, it did induce a certain diminuation in their salience. Second, the regional cleavage under the Ayub regime was not nearly as important a factor in influencing political instability. (Indeed its

repercussions for instability were confined primarily to support failure and were scarcely noticeable concerning decision-making.) Third, the diminished effect of regional cleavage for political instability was somewhat artificial in that central military regime was not a spontaneous product of the political forces of Pakistan. Hence given that only moderate improvement had been made in decreasing the factors conditioning the cleavage, it was to be expected that once the unifying regime was removed cleavage mobilization could be expected.

With reference to the fragmentation and proliferation of parties, the Ayub regime was successful in diminishing the repercussions of party proliferation on political instability, but was unsuccessful in alleviating the conditions underlying the dislocation. Many of the indicators of the reemergence of party fragmentation have already been noted: by October 1962 the ML had split into three factions in addition to the AL, NAP, KSP, Nizaan, Jamaat and Republican Parties; many of the former politicians dominated these parties; there were no restrictions, regulations, or registration of parties, nor any inspection of the collection or distribution of funds; and the parties were still cut from any popular base and soon became embroiled in oppositional tactics and manifested the same vagaries in the forming and reforming of temporary alliances.

Given the continued indicators of party proliferation, it is possible to examine the ramifications of military rule on the conditions underlying the dissynchronization. The factors which underlay the decline of the ML still continued. Thus no cohesive group of national and provincial leaders appeared; the dominant party (Ayub ML) remained assoaciated with Western landowning and business interests; but on the other hand there were more-indicators of more experienced and longer-term planning. In the second place, although some degree of patronage continued, there was not the same degree of factionalization within the ML, and due to Ayub's

monopoly of office not the same scramble for spoils. Thirdly, the dearth of elections, (the 1965 election of BDs was the only significant one for parties) combined with the very curtailed functions of parties, continued to negate some of the primary mechanisms around which parties can consolidate.

Three conclusions on party fragmentation may be noted. First, the Ayub regime was able to diminish the ramifications of party proliferation and fragmentation for decision-making and institutionalization instability (in that caalition problems were removed) but not for support mobilization. Second, although the military regime made some progress in alleviating the causes of the party breakdown, such causes were not removed. Finally, as has been noted above, the military regime was unable to develop a viable national party.

The dissynchronizations of the national assembly and the constitution may be examined together. Three major conclusions may be noted. In the first place, the military regime unlike the previous civilian one was able to produce a constitution and regional and national assemblies. Secondly many of the factors which underlay the dislocations of these institutions prior to the military intervention reappeared, e.g. the same small group interests dominating the BD system and the assemblies. Thirdly, the phenomenal nature of the constitution and assemblies established by the Ayub military regime contained a number of major contradictions. Thus as we noted above the constitution was very narrow, involved extensive centralized controls, whereas the assemblies had negligible controls and functions and were narrowly recruited.

Two observations on the final dislocation of the civil administration may be made. In the first place there was some reorientation both in the composition and role of the administration. Thus after 1964 there was some attempt to even out the recruitment to the administration,[80] or again there had been more attempts to examine critically the structure and function

of the civil service,[81] or again through the Basic Democrat system there had been channels for the criticism of the administration and furthermore local administrative units had been used to undertake rural works programmes.[82] On the other hand, the administration had proved resilient to any major changes. Thus the most radical report, "The Pay and Services Commission Report", recommending unification of the disparate services and the replacement of the CSP, had effectively been shelved, the elitist position of the CSP had been preserved (although it must be admitted that this was now based more on training capabilities), and finally the very nature of the military regime enhanced the salience of the civil service (thus CSP members presided over the most important branches of the BD system).[83]

In conclusion, it is argued that after an undoubted successful martial law period, the military regime of Ayub Khan made comparatively little progress towards alleviating the basic dislocations of instability. It is true that the regime had stimulated a number of significant economic developments but had acted as an artificial constraint on political development. Thus while there had been a dimunuation of political instability, since the military regime had been unable to remove the dislocations which had previously stimulated instability and since it also had been unable to establish any viable alternative, its rule represented a type of freezing operation at the conclusion of which many of the former problems reappeared.

The third major problem concerns the analysis of the repercussions of performance on military predispositions and capabilities and vice versa.

The primary consequence of the skill level of the Pakistan army on performance was that the military regime experienced no manor difficulty in providing the requisite number of technically qualified personnel, who were capable of occupying the necessary executive positions. The main consequences of composition and structure were twofold. Firstly the homogeneity of the military regime enabled it to maintain a high degree of cohesion during the period of rule. Secondly, the Western bias underlay

the incapacity to alleviate the regional cleavage. Although there is no evidence to indicate a regional sectional bias on the part of the Ayub regime, the regime was increasingly identified in the East as Western-oriented, and furthermore it made no major attempts to rectify the regional imbalance. The degree of internal autonomy was instrumental in precipitating the large-scale overt employment of the army in the Ayub regime as civilianization progressed. Finally the influence of the high degree of cohesion has already been illustrated in the context of composition and structure.

The consequences of the military dissatisfaction and hostility towards the structure, policies and incumbents of the pre-coup political system were very clearly manifested. The antipathy towards parties and factionalization were reflected in the BD system, the strong executive constitution, the use of indirect elections, the reliance on bureaucratic techniques and the stringent monitoring controls. The antipathy towards policy failure was responsible for the period of innovation in the immediate post coup years. Finally, the antipathy towards politicians was evident in the use of E.B.D.O. and the attempt to negate the role of parties.

The consequences of performance on the organizational capabilities of the army were not extensive. It may be assumed that the skill level of the military increased. Allocations to the military continued to rise (though in proportion to pre-coup increases), and further the military continued to play an important external role. With reference to composition and structure, three factors may be noted. First it is interesting to note that there were no large purges in the military, which is an indication of the high degree of homogeneity and uniformity of politicization in the military prior to the coup. Second, the size of the military increased to over 250,000.[84] Finally, there was no significant change in the regional composition of the army, which continued to be a Western monopoly.

With reference to autonomy and cohesion, there was no evidence of any change.

The major predispositional change was that the level of politicization increased. This could only be expected given the extended period of rule. However, there were indications of changes from generalized-induced to military-partisan and civilian-sectional politicization. The former was indicated by the reluctance of the Ayub regimes to undergo any major civilianization or attempt to establish the conditions for a transfer; the latter was indicated by the inability to redress the regional imbalance. However, it must be noted that at the time of the collapse of the Ayub regime, these changes were not very significant. Thus the military did not intervene to prop up the failing Ayub regime, and further regional discrimination was not nearly as marked as pre-1958.

In conclusion, it is possible to note the post Ayub situation. As has already been noted the Ayub regime developed a high degree of instability which in March 1969 led to the complete collapse of the regime. Since no civilian body emerged from the disturbances as being capable of forming an alternative regime, the military formed another regime under its commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan. The subsequent civil strife in East Pakistan, the extent of which is still unknown, was a product essentially of the changing politicization of the military, and of increased regional pressure from East Pakistan. Although the riots and disturbance from December 1968 - March 1969 occurred in both wings (and even started in the West), the Ayub regime collapsed more dramatically in the East. Given that one of the major reasons for the collapse of the Ayub regime was participation failure, the Eastern wing was now confronted with a new military regime of Western hue in which participation was even less (i.e. martial law had been declared and there were no civilian trappings). In sum, the new military regime was simply compounding the instability of March 1969 unless it

achieved some major transformation. Procedures for elections and a transfer to civilian rule were established and this led to a containment of the instability. The subsequent tantamount rejection of the elections by the Yahya Khan regime, which could only be attributable to regional-sectional politicization, cryztallized the situation which led to the civil strife in East Pakistan. With the rejection of the elections, the institutionalization and support failure of the Ayub regime were returned and intensified and were bound to stimulate a massive monitoring failure; the stronger Western identification of the military regime conditioned the source and direction of the monitoring failure. The combination added up to the civil war in East Pakistan.

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN U.A.R. (EGYPT)

INTERVENTION

At the time of the military intervention in 1952, Egypt could be classified as a threshold nation state system. Unlike formal colonial systems, such as Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia or Ghana, Egypt had enjoyed a semi-independent status in the 19th and 20th centuries under the Ottomans and the British. As a consequence, Egypt had manifested nascent nation state processes (such as an economy integrated into larger external markets, an independent constitution, political parties, etc.) at a much earlier stage than even Pakistan or Burma. On the other hand, whereas colonial systems undergo rapid transformation into low level nation state systems through independence, the development of the nascent nation state processes in Egypt manifested a high degree of stagnation. Thus the 1950 patterns of production, consumption and income did not differ markedly from those at the beginning of the 20th century; political parties had neither expanded nor organized; or finally the strong monarchical constitution of 1923 persisted.[1] In similar manner, the indicators of political instability had been clearly identifiable for some considerable time, and, by virtue of their continued existence within a changing international framework, were becoming more acute.[2]

All four major types of instability were manifest. With reference to decision-making (method) failure, two indicators may be noted. Firstly, there was a considerable degree of conflict inherent in the tripartite decision-making framework of the monarch, the conglomeration of political parties and parliament, and the British. Thus the British forced the resignation of the Zaglul cabinet in 1924; the British obliged the King to reinstate a cabinet in 1926; a period of royal decree existed from 1930-35; popular pressure brought the royal decree government to an end but again in 1937 the king managed to force the resignation of the civilian government; again in 1942 the British forced the resignation of another civilian govern-

ment. The second indicator relates to the short tenure of governments. Thus from 1922 only one parliament had lasted its full term; there had been 10 general elections; there had been three major periods of rule by royal decree covering almost 9 years; and finally in the last two parliaments, i.e. 1945-52, there had been 11 Prime Ministers.[3]

Two major areas of decision-making (scope) failure may be identified, namely the economic and political fields. In the economic area there had been considerable stagnation following World War 1. Despite 19th century increases per capita farm output was falling, the land tenure system had not changed, industrial output was very small-scale (in 1950 60% of industrial concerns had annual outputs of less than £1000 and 75% employed less than 10 workers), and again despite a World War 2 boost industrial production was falling. In sum, by 1952 the Egyptian economy was stagnant and over the period 1937-52 had registered a growth rate per capita of 0.01%.[4] In the political area, there had been no major change in the structure of the polity from the early 1920s. Although the influence of the British had probably declined, it was still significant; the powers of the autocratic monarch were undisturbed; the monarchical constitution of 1923 remained; the territorial problem of the Sudan was unsolved; and the status and role of political parties and parliament had not changed. In sum, from 1923 to 1952 there had been virtually no change or adaptation on the part of the polity - the threshold status of 1920 was perpetuated until 1950.[5]

Three indicators of institutionalization failure may be noted. First, there was no progress in the development of a formal body of rules or more informal modus operandi governing political interaction. Thus the 1923 constitution, which conferred extensive powers on the monarch, was something of an artifact; the British played a role, which is not encompassed by independent nation state development; there was a marked propensity for government to undo the acts of the preceding one; and finally there was a marked tendency towards overt and explicit manipulation

particularly on the part of the British and the monarch. The second indicator, that of the failure to delineate the spheres of competence of major institutions, was closely related to the failure to develop a modus operandi. The manipulatory and arbitrary powers of the monarch meant that none of the major political organs, such as cabinet, legislative bodies, civil administration, could develop autonomous spheres of action. The third indicator is that of patronage and corruption. The corruption and patronage of the monarch is evident from the attempts to undermine the constitution and civilian parties (particularly the Wafd) and to place royal puppets in the civilian polity. However, patronage in the civilian polity was no less marked. The main means of patronage were the replacement of personnel within the civil administration (thus following the elections of 1924, 1929, 1942 and 1950 the Wafd replaced large numbers of bureaucratic officials with its own supporters), and the extensive use of emergency powers to curb and inhibit opposition parties (this is particularly true of the Wafd in 1942-44).[6] The attempts to restrict corruption and patronage were minimal, and indeed there even appeared to be an increase after World War 2.[7]

The main type of support failure was that of insufficience. Both forms of insufficience,namely too narrow a base of support and incapacity to mobilize, were present. With reference to the former, the monarch made no attempt to accommodate to any of the political parties or to mobilize any mass political base,[8] whereas the political parties remained essentially clique parties though they did have broader orientations.[9] With reference to the latter, the political parties remained weak organizations with very limited party structures,[10] party organization or activity had not expanded significantly from the post World War 1 period, the parties themselves had become increasingly fragmented and the Wafd party which had been the major nationalist party had experienced two major splinter groups by 1939, the parties had remained relatively discrete and had been unable to combine into effective units, and finally the political parties had become

more attuned to manoeuvering for central power and patronage positions than to mobilizing popular support.

There were three main indicators of monitoring failure. The first relates to the rise of domestic violence, which became increasingly more marked after World War 2. The pattern of domestic violence was that of frequent, prolonged and violent rioting in the major cities and of guerilla activity in the Suez zone. Thus rioting in February and March 1946 led to 37 deaths, similar rioting for several days in November involved two deaths, two more deaths occurred in September 1947, serious riots reappeared in January 1951, and riots which began in October 1951 continued into the following January and climaxed in 60 deaths. The rise in domestic violence was reflected in the development of para-military wings by all the major political parties. The guerilla activity in the Suez area became progressively more pronounded after World War 2 so that by 1950-51 it was clear that neither the monarch nor the political parties were able to control it. The second indicator, that of the rise in the government use of force, involved both British and Egyptian deployments. In 1951 British troops occupied the entire Canal Zone, Ismailia and Port Said; martial law was declared from May 1948 to February 1950 and reimposed again in January 1952.[11] The third indicator relates to the general inefficacy of the civil administration. However, this weakness was not as chronic as in many ex-colonial systems nor was it directly attributable to a shortage of trained personnel. Rather the weakness was a product of party patronage and also of the chronic level of instability.[12]

The second major task involves an examination of the major dislocations which precipitated the above profile of instability. The first two that may be considered are the related ones of the economic inputs to the political system and the political directives to the economy.

With reference to the structure of the economy two factors may be

noted. In the first place, Egypt was heavily dependent on a single export crop, namely cotton (contributing approximately 80% of foreign exchange). As in the case of all economies heavily reliant on a single crop, the economy was very vulnerable on account of both price and production fluctuations.

Table 5:5 : Index Yield, Price and Total Value Egyptian Cotton Crop (1920=100)[13]

	1920	1938	1942	1946	1950	1952
Yield	100	141	182	152	130	153
Price	100	31	81	125	363	175
Total Value	100	46	55	123	513	292

Secondly, land holding was badly skewed with the conseuqnece that many small units were non-viable and many of the larger ones were inefficient.

Table 5:6 : Percentage Distribution Land Ownership and Total Area Owned by Size Ownership[14]

	Number Land Ownership			Total Area Owned		
	1916	1936	1950	1916	1936	1950
Less than 1 Acre	62	70	71	8	12	13
1-5	29	24	23	19	20	21
5-10	5	4	3	10	10	10
10-21	2	2	2	9	9	10
21-52	1	1	1	11	11	11
52+	1	1	1	43	39	37

Thirdly, a number of major enterprises were owned and controlled by foreign capital - the most notable enterprise being the Suex Canal. With reference to the second dislocation three factors may be noted. First, there had been no attempt to expand significantly land under cultivation from World War 1 onwards. Second there was very little central stimulus either to agricultural or industrial production, so that by 1952 private enterprise employed 92% labour force, produced 84% national output and 75% fixed capital formation. Thirdly central planning and monitoring controls were negligible. There had been a 5 Year Plan in 1935 for a limited number of public services and utilities but World War 2 had interfered with this; there had been a second

plan in the 1940s but this had largely remained on paper.[15]

The third dissynchronization was that of system cleavage. The particular type of cleavage experienced in Egypt was one which could only be found in a threshold nation state and was represented in terms of the conflict between the non-nation state forces of the autocratic monarch and the role of the external influence of Britain and the emergent nation state forces of the various political parties. The system cleavage hinged on two very simple factors: the relatively equal strengths of each of the three groupings and the very different interest and perceived role of each. The British could maintain themselves by virtue of a strong army and strong economic interests. Although the formal Protectorate had terminated in 1922, the British were able to maintain a significant control over political events in Egypt. The major interest was in maintaining Britain's economic interests and in excluding other European powers. The monarchy had been established in the 19th century by an Albanian and had continued to be dominated by Albanians, Greeks and Syrians, i.e. non-Egyptians. The important factors concerning the monarchy in the 20th century were that no accommodation had been made to nation state developments (i.e. in developing for example a constitutional monarchy) nor had the monarch been capable of stimulating any significant economic development. These two non-nation state forces were confronted by the political parties and parliament. But the problem was that the later grouping, through finding itself in contradiction both to the British and the king, had insufficient resources to resolve the contradiction. The consequence of this tripartite cleavage was to produce a basic atrophy in patterns of interaction, which inhibited any significant nation state developments. This condition of stagnation, contingent on the cleavage, had repercussions for each of the main types of instability.

The fourth dissynchronization, which relates closely to an aspect of the above cleavage, was that of participation failure. The participation

failure was related primarily to the ineffectiveness of political parties. The weak structure of the political parties has already been indicated and may be attributed to several factors. In the first place, the monarch was unwilling to be opposed by strong parties and took extensive measures to undermine the major parties. Second the British were equally unwilling to see the emergence of any strong nationalist group. Third the Wafd party itself, which emerged after World War 1 as the primary nationalist movement, was unable to maintain its cohesion. Fourth the political parties never developed beyond the clique stage, and although each had pretentions to mass movements none could contain the increasing popular dissatisfaction following World War 2. Finally, the political parties, though maintaining an anti-royalist position, accommodated to the type of political interaction fostered by the monarchy with the consequence that the parties became primarily occupied with an attempt to dominate the main executive posts. The consequences of this dissynchronization related primarily to institutionalization and support failure.

The final dissynchronization was the failure to develop a satisfactory constitution. The 1923 constitution, which was in force at the time of the intervention in 1952, was promulgated as a consequence of the British surrender of independence in 1922. Nonetheless the British managed to sustain sufficient controls to render independence rather anomalous. (Thus the British retained control of security of communication, defence of Egypt and protection of foreign interests in Egypt and Sudan.) As a consequence of British and monarchical influence, the constitution, which was finally promulgated in 1923, was heavily biased in favour of the Monarch. Thus the monarch could select the Prime Minister, dismiss the cabinet and Assembly, appoint the President and 20% of the Senate, and approve all bills. Under this constitution, which experienced periods of suspension and even replacement, it was inconceivable that any significant nation state development could take place.[16] However, until the time of the military

intervention no manor revisions or replacements in the direction of nation state development had taken place.

Having examined the major dissynchronizations, the final problem in the analysis of intervention is the analysis of the organizational capabilities and predispositions of the military.[17]

Two factors are of note concerning the skill level of the Egyptian army. In the first place, the Egyptian army was not a novel arganization. Indeed the first signs of a professional army with training schools were evident from the reign of Muhammed Ali. Although this army was largely dissolved following the Orabi Revolt in 1881 the British retrained another one.[18] The second factor concerns the opening of the Military Academy in 1936 to Egyptian officers. The combination of a relatively long-standing army together with British training and a permanent Military Academy meant that the skill level of the Egyptian army was considerably in excess of the other ex-colonial armies that we have examined. However, from the speed of the defeat during the Palestine War (even given several caveats such as the army not being fully prepared), it was clear that in the context of more advanced nation states the technical expertise of the Egyptian army was not very high.

Three factors may be noted concerning composition and structure. First, the Egyptian military was primarily an army so that the potential for interservice rivalry was largely excluded. In the second place, progressive Egyptianization had taken place. Follwoing the dissolution of the army after the Orabi Revolt, exemption from the new army could only be made on a financial payment, which meant the army came to consist primarily of the peasant fellahin. The opening of the Military Academy in 1936 permitted the further Egyptianization of the officer corps. The third factor of interest is that given the British and royal group control of many of the major economic concerns (the royal group consisting of the

Greek, Syrian and Albanian interests) and given the stagnant nature of the political parties, which were largely controlled by large land-owners, the military provided the only means of mobility for the poorer, more rural Egyptian.[19]

Two factors are of note concerning internal autonomy within the army. Firstly, the British attempted to retain strong controls, though these controls weakened progressively up to the time of the intervention. In the period following the Orabi Revolt the British retained almost total control of the structure and composition of the army. After World War 2, in consonance with the rise of the Wafd demands for independence, there was pressure to remove the British Commander-in-Chief to relax British inspection. However, the treaty of independence in 1922 continued the firm British hold on the army. However, with the opening of the Military Academy in 1936, British controls began to wane. The second source of internal influence was from the royal stratum. Despite the high degree of Egyptianization in the lower ranks, Hurewitz points out that the top army ranks were dominated by those groups of Ottoman-Circassian descent.[20] It is reasonable to assume therefore that the royal entourage and the top military leaders were closely allied and that consequently the royal group had strong influence within the army. However, it must be noted that in both cases of external influence evidence points out that each was declining. The decline of British influence was sealed by the 1936 Treaty, whereas the decline of royal influence was indicated by the rejection of the King's candidate in the Army Officer club elections. Concerning external autonomy, two points may be noted. Until the time of World War 2 the army was effectively sealed from any extensive participation in the civilian polity. However, from the time of world War 2 army participation began to expand. Thus the commitment to the Palestine War when the army was unprepared and scarcely consulted led to large-scale disaffection and later involved the army in the defective arms deal controversy, or again the increased rioting

and two periods of martial law had the effect of increasing the military involvement in the civilian polity.[21]

Two factors are of importance concerning cohesion. First, there was a division between the Ottoman-Circassian elite group and the rising group of Egyptian officers, though this division does not appear to have been acute. It is interesting to note that the Free Officer Group, the clique responsible for the coup, was founded in 1949 by 11 members, 8 of whom entered the Military Academy in 1936, 2 in 1937 and 1 in 1938. Thus the F.O.G. was all Egyptian and of more junior rank.[22] Second, given this division, there is no other evidence of any serious cleavages. This is attributable to two major factors. On the one hand, the army had never been a great attraction for the non-Egyptian groups, and on the other hand, unlike Syria for example, the Egyptian population is relatively homogeneous and thus the army did not have to contend with any serious regional, ethnic or religious lines of cleavage.

With reference to predispositions, the favouring factors, i.e. the levels of dissatisfaction, were high whereas the inhibiting factors were low. Concerning the first factor, the degree of dissatisfaction with major structures and groups, the military (or that part of it which made the coup) was opposed to all the major political groups. Thus the military even from the 1920s had resented the British presence both in Egypt and in the army; the monarchy was also opposed in that it was perceived as a non-Egyptian obstacle to "national development"; and finally the existing parties were opposed since they were perceived as ineffective and corrupt.[23] The degree of dissatisfaction against the major political groupings was such as to generalize to the major political structures of the parliament, cabinet, constitution, etc. Dissatisfaction at the second level, i.e. against policies, included the following. The most important general ones were hostility to the British presence, the failure to solve

the Sudan problem, the failure to break the economic stagnation and to achieve a more equitable land distribution. The most important grievances against policies which specifically affected the army were threefold. In the first place, the army was very dissatisfied with the levity to which it was committed to a war against Israel for which it was totally unprepared. Second, the army was frustrated both by the bad supplies of munitions, which were either defective or delivered too late, and also by the abortive attempts to gain an inquiry. Third, the army was opposed to attempted infiltrations. Thus the King's nomination of General Osman to the executive of the Army Club was defeated, or again the military was opposed to the appointment of the King's brother-in-law, a person with no military experience, to the post of Defence Minister in the Second Hilaly Cabinet. With reference to the third level, that of incumbants, the degree of dissatisfaction at the first two levels was of such intensity as to involve virtually the total incumbents. With reference to the inhibiting factors, there was no evident alternative group in Egypt which appeared capable of alleviating the increasing political instability.[24] Second, although there was a division in the army between the higher non-Egyptian and lower Egyptian ranks, this could not have been very serious for the F.O.G. since the upper ranks were identified with the incumbents of the civilian polity and would therefore have to be replaced.

In sum, by 1952 the dissynchronizations in the Egyptian social system had induced a condition of stagnation at the level of threshold nation state development, which in turn was precipitating an increasingly acute degree of political instability. The only major change within the Egyptian social system was the progressive development of a national-professional Egyptian army, which was increasingly dissatisfied against the sources of the instability. It was the interaction between the rising instability and the increasing military capabilities and predispositions for intervention, which accounts for the coup of July 1952.

PERFORMANCE

A number of introductory comments may be made on the general format of the military regime. First, until Neguib was ousted in 1954 the regime had an equivocal status between equilibrator and innovator. From the time of the consolidation of Nasser, the military regime became innovative and remained as such until the end of 1964, by which time it had become an equilibrator. The military regime of Egypt provides an interesting contrast to that of Pakistan in that the innovative drive was both more intensive and extensive. Second, although there has been considerable civilianization, the regime of Nasser could be considered military in that former military and incumbent military personnel controlled all main executive positions, and formulated the construction of the new political system. The civilianization process differed from that in Pakistan in that on the one hand it was less marked (military personnel were deployed and retained in primary executive posts more extensively) and on the other hand less salient (the party and the national assemblies organized by the military regime more closely paralleled a civilian polity than did the corresponding institutions in Pakistan). Thirdly, there has been some movement of induced politicised professionalization towards the overt category.

The first issue area to be examined is the method and success of the military regime in coping with the four main political functions. With reference to decision-making method, two factors are of import: the high degree of centralization and the continued salience of the military in the decision-making process. These two factors may be illustrated by the following indicators. The first relates to the strong executive. Immediately following the coup the main executive body was the Revolution Command Council to which was attached an advisory civilian cabinet; but by the time of the declaration of the 3 year transitional period in January 1953 this cabinet had become largely defunct.[25] The constitution of 1956 outlined an executive president to be Head of State, Chief Executive, Commander-in-

Chief of the armed forces with powers to formulate general policy and to nominate and dismiss officials. The subsequent establishment and fall of the U.A.R. and the promulgation of the National Charter and the 1964 provisional constitution made no significant changes. The second indicator relates to the weak powers of the legislative and party counterbalances. Thus by January 1953 the Assembly and all political parties had been dissolved; the Assembly envisaged by the 1956 constitution was elected only in July 1957 with only one party permitted. The third index relates to the high degree of military control. Thus after Maher resigned as P.M. in September 1952 no civilian held the post of P.M. or President; immediately following the coup approximately 30 army officers were placed in each government department; the RCC, composed entirely of military personnel, was the primary executive until 1956; all members of the 1957 and 1964 National Assemblies had to be approved by the executive of the NU and ASU respectively (both executives were headed by Nasser); defence committees were a military monopoly; and although military titles were dropped (after 1956), ex-military personnel headed the organizational committees of the various party organizations and were represented in all top executive and administrative bodies.[26]

There were major changes in all the main areas of decision-making. With reference to the economy the two most important changes that must be noted are: the increase in central control and the increase in public ownership. Both changes were apparent as from the time of the coup but became more marked after 1956, and both were initially directed mainly at foreign concerns, though later encompassed also Egyptian ones. The major factors involved in the extension of central control were: the replacement in October 1952 of the defunct Economic Advisory Committee by the Permanent Council for the Development of National Production;[27] this was followed in 1953 by the establishment of a Permanent Council for Public services; the

National Planning Committee was established in 1955 but was rather ineffective until 1957, on account of the Suez crisis and the continued existence of the two Permanent Councils, when it was reorganized; in addition on the abolition of these two councils, the Economic Development Organization was established to run the nationalized properties; by 1960 the full planning mechanism was established and there was sufficient control of investment and planning for the first comprehensive National 5 Year Plan to be produced; in 1961 the Alexandria Cotton Exchange was nationalized with the consequence that full control over the buying and exporting of cotton was soon established;[28] and finally in 1965 the Second Five Year Plan was instituted.[29] The major factors involved in the extension of public ownership were: the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which was followed by a number of decree laws in 1957 sequestering all British and French property (this led to government control of all specialist banks, 7 commercial banks and 68% of all insurance); in September 1959 all foreign banks were made into corporations with U.A.R. nationality (i.e. 70% of shares belonged to Arab citizens); in 1960 the nationalization drive turned to Egyptian property and the Bank of Egypt and Bank Misr were nationalized; in 1961 large-scale nationalization got underway so that by 1964 virtually only small retail trade remained in private hands.[30] The success of the military regime can be seen from the following tables:

Table 5:7 Index Number Egypt's Industrial Product (1963=100) (U.N. Stat.Yearbook)

1953	1958	1962	1964	1966	1968
16	37	77	116	117	131

Table 5:8 Index Number Egypt's Agricultural Product (1952/3-1956/7 = 100) (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964
102	107	116	127	136	144

Table 5:9 Index Number Egypt's per capita Product at Constant Prices (1963 = 100) (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

1953	1955	1957	1958	1961	1962	1964	1965	1967
63	68	68	75	89	94	103	105	97

However, from 1964 and particularly after the war in 1967 there were a number of indicators of economic strain. Thus trade deficits began to increase; the consumer price index rose markedly;[31] although the rate of growth from 1960-65 was 7%, many of the 5 year plan targets were not reached, and there was no major revision for the second Plan period;[32] and finally the 1967 war had a number of crippling consequences.[33] However, it appears by 1969 that these strains had been contained (there was a positive trade balance, industrial production was rising and the consumer price index had stabilized).

The second major decision-making area that is to be examined is that of the complete revamping of the structure of the polity. Thus immediately following the coup the monarch was obliged to abdicate in favour of a Provisional Regency Council, though by June 1953 Egypt had been declared a Republic. The second decree law of the new regime obliged political parties to purge their ranks and to devise specific programmes, but in January 1954 all political parties were dissolved and their funds confiscated. The abolition of the 1923 Constitution in December 1952 followed by the declaration of a 3 Year Transition Period completed the temporary demise of the pre-coup structure. However, it was not until March 1954 when Nasser ousted Neguib and a decision on the forthcoming elections was postponed until the end of the transition period that it became clear that the temporary demise was a permanent one. The format of the new polity emerged with the declaration of the 1956 constitution, which provided a strong executive Presidency and a single political party (the National Union), which would nominate candidates for a National Assembly. The establishment of the Union with Syria led to a number of structural changes but the essentials of the strong executive, the single party and an Assembly based on that party continued. The collapse of the U.A.R. led to the establishment in February 1962 of a National Congress which approved

the National Charter presented by Nasser. In September 1962 Presidential and Executive Councils were established and plans for a new political party, the ASU, were announded. In March 1964 a further provisional constitution was announced and elections for a new National Assembly based on the ASU were announced. From 1964 until the death of Nasser, there was no major structural alteration.

A number of policy decisions resulted in a number of changes in the third decision-making area, i.e. the social and cultural systems. Thus the abolition of the monarch, the nationalization measures and the land reforms brought about a number of important changes in social stratification; literacy rates increased; the role of Islamic institutions was curbed, e.g. in the abolition of the MB and of religious courts; and finally a wide number of social welfare measures were enacted, e.g. stipulated minimum hours, fixed maximum rents, insurance and welfare benefits, and community welfare units.

The attempts of the military to institutionalize the regime have not been as successful as performance in the decision-making process. There have been two indicators of institutionalization failure. The first relates to the failure concerning the establishment of the rules of procedure of the political system, which may be illustrated by two indicators. First there has been a high degree of political restructuring, which at the most intense periods of change inhibited the development of any stable patterns. From 1952-56 a temporary military regime became transformed through a severe conflict into a long-term one; 1956-58 witnessed the formal establishment of that regime; the Union with Syria involved a number of bewildering changes in the attempt to develop integration;[34] the period from the collapse of the Union in 1961 until 1964 led to another transitional stage; from 1964 a further formal structure was established. Second, there have been few formalizations of the rules of procedure. Thus from 1952-6

there was no constitution, in 1956 a provisional constitution was promulgated only to be replaced in 1958 and again in 1964 by further provisional ones. The second main indicator relates to the delineation of the sphere of competence of a number of major political organs. The problem is not that the delineation is not explicit but that it is so restricted, i.e. there is a too narrow base of institutionalization. In this aspect Egypt has experienced the same failure as Pakistan. Thus from 1952-56 there was no legislative body, the cabinet was very weak, there were no elections or referendums and no organized political groups were permitted (parties were banned for most of the period, the military-sponsored Liberation Rally was transitory and the Republican Socialist Party was stillborn); the Assembly envisaged in the 1956 constitution did not convene until July 1957, and a decree promulgating the political party (similarly envisaged in the constitution) was not passed until November 1957; the period of union with Syria involved, as has been noted, an extensive number of charges which culminated in the dissolution of the Assembly; from 1962-64 there was no National Assembly and the only popular body was the 1750 strong Congress of National Forces, whose only task was to ratify the National Charter; in 1964 another National Assembly was elected under a provisional constitution, and the NU was replaced by the ASU. In sum, the role and autonomy of a number of major political institutions has been very small.

However, a number of factors have mitigated these two indicators of institutionalization failure to some degree. In the first place, despite the large number of changes in the structure of the polity from the time of the coup, there has been a considerable common denominator throughout the period in the form of the strong executive. Second, there has been progressively more stabilization, particularly since 1964. The most acute period of institutionalization failure was 1952-56, subsequently followed

by the period of union; but from 1964 with no major constitutional changes and a stronger legislative body, the rules of procedure have become more clearly routinized.[35]

The performance of the military regime with reference to support mobilization has a number of factors in common with performance on institutionalization, namely evidence of a degree of failure matched by a number of compensating factors. Indications of failure relate primarily to insufficience (incapacity to mobilize). In this context three factors must be noted. First, the military regime has been slow to organize political parties. Although the Liberation Rally was instituted soon after the coup, it was only a transitory affair and the more permanent projected Republican Socialist Party was never launched; the National Union was not launched until the end of 1957 though it had been previewed in 1956 and was dissolved in 1961; finally although the ASU was envisaged in 1962, it had a long gestation period and even by 1965 many of the higher levels had not been fully established.[36] Second, there has been strong central control over the main organs of mass participation. Thus in the assemblies established on the basis of the varying constitutions all candidates had to be party members and approved by the central party executive;[37] or again the central party executive was controlled by a small group of people with a high degree of overlap with the Presidential executive body.[38] Thirdly, as has been noted already no alternative political parties were permitted, Trade Unions were rather ineffective, and particularly prior to 1964 the Assembly was a very weak organization.[39] On the other hand, there have been a number of mitigating factors. First, although there has been delay in organizing the two main parties, the NU and the ASU, both have been extensive organizations. The NU was organized on three major levels: foundation, district and governate and as may be expected closely paralleled the structure of the administration (a local government law of 1968 had

divided Egypt into 24 governates). The ASU was composed in basic units (which existed not only in villages and towns but also in factories and other public enterprises), district units (elected from basic units), governate units, and finally an ASU general Conference (which is composed of members from governate councils and other functional organizations, is supposed to meet every two years but its General Council meets every 6 months).[40] Second, elections have been held regularly both for Assemblies and the President. The Presidential elections have never been contested, though the Assembly elections of 1957 and 1964 were contested by approximately 1250 and 1750 candidates respectively for 350 seats. (It is difficult to interpret election results owing to compulsory voting.) Third, the regime appears to have been successful in expanding the base of support. Prior to the coup the main parties were clique ones, and even the Assemblies of July 1957 - March 1958 and the UAR one had been dominated by lawyers, bureaucrats, army officers and businessmen (with only 3% workers). However, the Assembly of 1964 had 60% workers and farmers and all levels of the ASU were obliged to have 50% representation of workers and peasants.[41] Fourth, the regime could use a wide range of support control mechanisms. Control and utilization of propaganda and mass communication have been extensive (initially through censorship and later through nationalization); public enterprises, i.e. cooperatives, factories, etc., have served as channels of participation; and finally the regime has been able to rely on the continuing support of the army. Fifth, the regime had undoubtedly been successful in enacting a wide range of popular policy decisions having relevance for large sections of the population. In sum, as in the case of institutionalization, the compensating factors indicate that complete breakdown is not imminent but there are nonetheless indications of a degree of failure.

With reference to the monitoring process the military regime has experienced little difficulty, although the extensive range of monitoring

controls is an indication of some degree of instability. The extensive monitoring controls have included the widespread use of arrests[42]; in the post coup period the use of purge committees and Revolutionary Tribunals;[43] the use of martial law (which was not lifted until June 1956); and a host of mechanisms, which have already been reviewed and which are indirectly related to force, e.g. single party, press controls, control and supervision of Assembly and party candidates, and a strong central executive. In maintaining these controls the regime has been able to rely on the army, which has continuously furnished top administrative personnel, and the bureaucracy, which unlike any ex-colonial bureaucracy was of such a level of development as to be able to expand and accommodate successfully to a much more comprehensive role. There is no significant evidence of any failure to establish government authority, or in the rise of domestic violence, or in the failure to implement decisions, or in the incapacity to collate demands, but there has been evidence of the third indicator of monitoring failure, the use of force on the part of the polity, namely in terms of the widespread use of arrests noted above. However, again it must be noted that the time of the most acute problems was 1952-56.

The second major task in the analysis of performance concerns the examination of the success of the military in alleviating the basic dis-synchronizations of instability. In general, the military regime has been very successful.

With reference to the three factors underlying the first dislocation, the structure of the economy, the military regime was successful on all accounts. The skewed land distribution was eased through two land reform measures and the establishment of cooperatives and rural welfare centres. (The land reform of 1952 placed a ceiling of 200 feddans on any single holding and led to a redistribution of 10% of the land; the second reduced the ceiling to 100 feddans). The success of the agricultural policy (which

did involve more than redistribution) can be seen from the agricultural index noted above. The second factor, the strong dependence on cotton for foreign exchange, has been alleviated to some degree by the diversification of the economy through an expansion of industrial and manufacturing activity.

Table 5:10 Percentage Distribution Industrial Origin of Egypt's G.D.P. at Factor Cost (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

	G.D.P. at factor cost £E millions	Agriculture	Indust. Activity		Construction	Transport	Trade	Others
			Total	Manuf.				
1952	760.2	36	9	9	3	7	7	38
1954	880.6	35	12	11	3	7	10	33
1956	918.2	33	13	12	3	-	-	51*
1958	1185.0	31	15	14	4	—21—		29
1960	1516.6	25	22	17	4	9	10	30
1963	1739.6	27	24	23	6	9	9	26
1966	2193.5	28	23	22	4	9	9	27

(* includes transport, trade and others)

However, it must be noted that raw cotton, cotton yarn and cotton products still constituted 63% of Egypt's exports in 1967.[44] With reference to the third factor, by 1960 most of the expatriate concerns had been nationalized (see above).

There was also some considerable success with reference to the second dissynchronization, the polity's controls over the economy. For the first time in the twentieth century concerted efforts were made to expand the land under cultivation and to improve irrigation facilities (see in particular the construction of the Aswan Dam).[45] The response to the second and third dissynchronizations, namely the lack of stimulus to production and the poor planning mechanisms, has already been noted. Central stimulus increased through nationalization, rising investment, etc.(by 1959 74% of gross capital formation was undertaken by the public sector, in 1952 72% had been undertaken by the private one), and in addition, by 1960 a compre-

hensive planning and supervisory mechanism had been established.

The system cleavage which represented the third dissynchronization was quickly terminated through the elimination of the major cnnflicting units. The enforced abdination of Farouk, the declaration of the Republic in June 1953, together with the extensive purges eliminated the monarchy. The role of the British was similarly diminished following the coup as the British influence had been contingent on the balancing forces of the monarchy and the political parties. The nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent sequestrations completed the minimization of the British role. The elimination of the pre-coup political parties did not become finalized until the victory of Nasser over Neguib in April 1954 and the cancellation of the projected July elections. Prior to that date although there had been a number of major moves against the parties (ile. the Reform of Political Parties Decree in September 1952 and the dissolution of parties in January 1953), Neguib had insisted that early elections be held and that there be civilian involvement in the preparation of a constitution. The removal of Neguib combined with the measures taken against the parties ensured their non-reappearance. The military regime was able both to alleviate and to eradicate the cleavage partially on account of the relatively restricted nature of the cleavage (in terms of numbers involved), and partially on account of the military's own strong monitoring controls and its capacity to substitute an alternative regime.

The performance and success of the military regime with reference to the fourth and fifth dissynchronizations closely parallels the performance on the above dissynchronization. On the one hand, the military regime eradicated the immediate source of the dislocations by eliminating the pre-coup parties and abolishing the 1923 constitution. On the other hand, the military regime was then obliged to attempt to substitute alternatives. The equivocal success of the military regime in both these respects has already been examined under the support mobilization and institutionalization

processes respectively.

The third major problem for investigation concerns the examination of the repercussions of the military's predisposition and capabilities for performance and vice versa.

The skill level of the military was such that the military experienced no major difficulty in occupying and maintaining a wide range of executive positions. In this context the Egyptian military differed significantly for example from the Ghanaian military, which lacked the requisite range of skills to execute the type of innovative programme of the Egyptian military. The particular composition of the Egyptian military, in particular the high degree of Egyptianization and the form of recruitment base, has been of vital importance in conditioning the whole range of policy decisions ranging from the expulsion of the British to land reform. The primary impact of the particular configuration of the Egyptian army's autonomy was in leading it to dismantle the pre-coup political structure. Since there were no ties or interactions between that segment of the army represented by the F.O.G. and the pre-coup polity, there was no inhibition or problem for the army in proceeding to a swift and drastic alteration of the pre-coup system. The ramifications of the nature of cohesion were twofold. In the first place, the cohesion format was responsible for an important struggle for direction of the military regime during what was to appear later as the consolidation period. The F.O.G. as a young and relatively junior officer group was faced with the problem, common to many such coup groups, of attempting in the immediate post coup period to legitimize its position both within the army and the Egyptian system in general. Its solution was the most common one, namely of adopting a more senior, more popular but sympathetic figure-head, i.e. Neguib. The ensuing conflict after the coup was established was between the younger officers demanding a longer military rule to execute a number of major changes and the

older more conservative officers wishing to execute a modicum of changes and thereafter to accommodate to civilian forces.[46] The victory of the former group set the format of the regime for a number of years.[47] The second consequence of the nature of cohesion has been in contributing to the stability of the regime (once the initial leadership conflict had been resolved). There have undoubtedly been a number of disputes within the military regime (as witnessed by the sporadic purges) but in general the regime has enjoyed a high degree of support from the army and in particular at the top level from the continuity and cohesion of the original F.O.G. (In 1963 10 of the 13 members of the U.A.R. Presidential Council had belonged to the F.O.G.) Finally, the high level of dissatisfaction and the widespread focus of this dissatisfaction on the part of the military prior to the coup was instrumental in influencing the innovative orientation of the military regime.

The consequences of performance for the skill level of the military have undoubtedly been in the direction of increasing this level. The military have been able to control their defence allocation, and further the military has been used oontinuously to supply top administrative and executive positions.[48] Thus not only has the direct military skill level increased by virtue of an expanding army adopting more sophisticated weaponry, but also the skill level of administration and generalized policy decision-making has increased by virtue of continued occupation of a wide-ranging number of executive positions. The major changes with respect to composition and structure are twofold. First, the armed forces have expanded to over 200,000 with compulsory universal two year service, and the size of the navy and air-force has expanded.[49] Second, the military is no longer a non-prestige occupation and hence attracts a wider base of Egyptian recruits than prior to the coup. With reference to autonomy there has been an obvious decline in that the regime and the armed forces are firmly infused.

Thus as noted above the military or ex-military hold many positions in the administration, executive and specialized bodies, in the only political party and in the Assembly; or again the President is the active Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. With reference to cohesion, there has been no evidence of army major cleavages after the solution of the post-coup leadership dispute. Indeed even the death of Nasser did not precipitate any fundamental, immediate breakdown in cohesion. Although there have been numerous policy divisions, such divisions have always been contained.[50] The specific attitudinal dispositions of the pre-coup period have of necessity lost much of their immediate relevance by virtue of length of duration of the military regime and by virtue of the unanticipated form of this regime. Nonetheless despite these inevitable changes, there has been a marked continuity in a number of the original policy orientations towards the establishment of an independent Egyptian nation state committed to continuous economic development. The most important general attitudinal change has been in the obvious and inevitable increase of military politicization.

The fourth and final problem area to be examined is that of the military transfer of power. From the discussion above it is clear that very little transfer has taken place, and even in the post-Nasser period very little transfer is either evident or envisaged. From the time of the coup the regime, despite numerous changes, has maintained a strong central executive, strong monitoring controls and extensive military and ex-military personnel employment in key administrative and executive posts. The only transformation that has taken place is that the solid military core of the regime has permitted the development of a number of civilian trappings. Thus there has been developed a Presidency, elections, a National Assembly and a quasi political party. The only foreseeable direction of further transfer in the immediate future is a greater devolution of authority within the current structure (particularly the A.S.U.)

and a wider involvement of civilians in executive bodies. Three factors would seem to underlie the form and extent of the military transfer. In the first place, the condition of instability in 1952 was such that there were no existing viable civilian bodies capable of exerting pressure on the military. In the post coup period, the military regime has made a sufficient degree of accommodation on the one hand and imposed a number of restrictions on the other, so that organized civilian opposition to the military has been preempted. Second, the military regime has experienced a high degree of performance-success. Thirdly, the crisis situation concerning Israel has served to maintain the salience of the military. Unless there is any marked change in these three factors, it is unlikely that the current direction of transfer will be significantly affected.

FOOTNOTES 5: INNOVATIVE MILITARY REGIMES

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN PAKISTAN

1. For general background on the creation of Pakistan see P.Spear, India,Penguin, 1965; I.Stephens, Pakistan,Penguin, 1964; K.Sayeed, Pakistan: the Formative Phase,Oxford Univ. Press, 1968.

2. The Governor-Generals date Aug.1947-Sept.1948 (Jinnah), Oct.1948-Oct.1951 (Nazimuddin), Oct.1951-Aug.1955 (Ghulam Mohammed), Aug. 1955-Oct.1958 (Mirza); the Prime Ministers date Aug.1947-Oct.1951 (Liaquat Ali Khan), Oct.1951- April.1953 (Nazimuddin), April.1953-Oct.1954 (Mohammed Ali), Oct.1954-Aug.1955 (new Ali government), Aug.1955-Aug.1956 (Chaudri), Aug.1956-Oct.1957 (Suhrawardy), Oct. 1957-Dec.1957 (Chundrigar), Dec.1957-Oct.1958 (Noon). Keesings Contemporary Archives.

3. K.Callard and R.S.Wheeler, "Pakistan", in G.M.Kahin,ed., Major Governments of Asia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1963; and Keesings Contemporary Archives.

4. G.M.Haddad, "Military Rule in Pakistan", in G.M.Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East, Speller, 1965.

5. See for example, K.P.Misra et. al., Pakistan's Search for Constitutional Consensus, New Dehli, Impex India, 1967.

6. See K.Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, Allen and Unwin, 1957; H.Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967; K.Callard, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ and Wheeler, op.cit.; G.M.Haddad, op.cit.

7. Thus in 1950 the Constituent Assembly had changed its composition as a result of laws not passed by the Governor-General and could therefore be seen as an illegal body and all acts subsequently passed by it as illegal; all actions under Governor's Rule became invalid; and finally the Constituent Assembly had introduced adult suffrage into provincial elections and since this did not receive the Governor's assent, all bills passed by the Provincial Assemblies could be seen as null and void.

8. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

9. The United Front was founded in 1952 in E.Pakistan and at the time of the election consisted of the Awami League, Nizaam-i-Islam, and the Krishak Sramik Party.

10. T.Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples Power, Morrow, 1970.

11. See ibid.; T.Manruzzaman, "Group Interests in Pakistan Politics: 1947-58", Pac. Aff., 1966.

12. For a discussion of the decline of the Muslim League and other parties see, K.Callard, op.cit.; and K.Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

13. Under the British colonial rule numerous alliances had been made with princely states subsequent to which such states were virtually

autonomous, and received special representation in the Chamber of Princes.

14. Thus of the N.W.F. states, Dir did not even send representatives to the central assembly; and Kalat, one of the Baluchistan states, was lawless and experienced a tribal rebellion in October 1958. It was not until the advent of the military regime that princely rule was broken and central authority established throughtoùt Pakistan. For a discussion see, W.Wilcox, Pakistan: Consolidation of a Nation, Columbia Univ. Press, 1963; and C.M.Ali, The Making of Pakistan, Columbia Univ. Press, 1967.

15. K.von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, Princeton Univ. Press, 1965.

16. R.Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", in J.LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1963.

17. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

18. K.L.Seth, Pattern of Economic Development in Pakistan, Dehli, Sterling Pub., 1967.

19. K.L.Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, Dehli, Sterling Pub., 1968.

20. For a discussion of balanced v. unbalanced growth see, B.Higgins, Economic Development, Constable, 1968; W.Krause, Economic Development, Wadsworth, 1960; A.O.Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale Univ. Press, 1958.

21. Basically three alternatives seem to appear. First, E.Pakistan could develop as a satellite emphasizing agricultural production, whereas W.Pakistan could develop industrially. Although this would provide the greatest complementarity, it is not feasible. Second, an attempt could be made to develop industrial and agricultural complementarity in the two wings, but this is a case of almost impossible balanced growth. Third, the two wings could develop broadly independent of each other as self contained units. See K.L.Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op.cit.

22. The figures are from C.M.Ali, op.cit.; K.Sayeed, op.cit., cites 7.2m. refugees of which 6.5m. were located in W.Pakistan.

23. C.M.Ali, op.cit.

24. K.L.Seth, Pattern of Economic Development in Pakistan, op.cit.

25. For the most recent and sophisticated statement on cleavages, see D.W.Rae and M.Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages, Yale Univ. Press, 1970.

26. The first important statement in this area was C.Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution", in C.Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States, Free Press, 1963. For more recent work see the articles by Smith and Kuper in L.Kuper and M.Smith, ed., Pluralism in Africa, Univ. California Press, 1969.

27. Two important elaborations may be noted. First, although there is no definitional specification of the size of a nation state system (although the size must be sufficient to maintain the necessary functional activities), once a formal system has been established it follows that any cleavage redefinition within that system must lead to a breakdown. Second, there are a variety of means of accommodating intensities of interaction, e.g. the centralization-decentralization dimension.

28. It can be argued that all formal nation state boundaries are arbitrary. The major difference between early and late nation state development in this context is that in the former case there was always some spontaneous internal definition, whereas in the latter the formal definition was frequently imposed externally.

29. The Indian devaluation of the rupee in 1949 had the effect of isolating E.Pakistan economically. (In 1948-9 E.Pakistan had 80% of its trade with India). The attempt to impose Urdu was first made in the 1950 First Report on the Basic Principles Commission.

30. Fighting broke out in Dacca between Bengali and non-Bengali Muslims in which 400 were killed, (Keesings Contemporary Archives).

31. Interwing Exports in Pakistan (in crorers of Rs.)

	Exports into W.Pakistan	Exports into E.Pakistan
1948-9	1.98	14.03
1954-5	19.82	30.50
1959-60	36.24	56.94

(K.L.Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op.cit.)

32. The landholdings were particularly concentrated in Sind, where 24 mindars owned 87% of the land, (C.M.Ali, op.cit.) For socio-cultural differences, see von Vorys, op.cit.

33. The major parties to emerge were the Awami League, the National Awami Party, Nizaam, Krishak Sramik Party, Republican Party, and of course the Muslim League. In the 1955 Assembly the M.L. held 25 seats, United Front 16, Awami League 13, Independents 4, and 6 other parties held the remaining 14 seats.

34. For a discussion of the decline of the M.L., see K.Sayeed, op.cit.

35. See K.P.Misra, et. al., op.cit.

36. See R.Braibanti, Research into the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, Duke Univ. Press, 1966; R.Braibanti,"Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", op.cit.; R.Egger, The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan, Karachi, 1953. Both the Egger Report of 1953 and the Gladieux Report of 1955 were hostily received by the C.S.P.

37. See R.Braibanti, op.cit., and A.Gorvine, "Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change" in G.S.Birkhead, ed.,

Administrative Problems in Pakistan, Syracuse Univ. Press, 1966. (Note in 1960 when British foreign training ended all but one of the 332 C.S.P. officials had received advanced training in a British or Commonwealth country, R.Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", op.cit.)

38. R.A.Moore, "The Army as aVehicle for Social Change in Pakistan", J. Dev.Areas, 1967, and Keesings Contemporary Archives.

39. J.C.Hurewitz, Midle East Politics: The Military Dimension, Pall Mall, 1969.

40. K.Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan", in J.van Doorn, ed., Armed Forces and Society, Mouton, 1968; and G.M.Hahhad, op.cit.

41. K.Sayeed, op.cit.; R.A.Moore, op.cit.

42. See in general M.A.Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967.

43. Gen. Muqueem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Karachi, Oxford Univ. Press, 1963; and S.P.Cohen, "Arms and Politics in Pakistan", India Quart., 1964.

44. R.Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op.cit.; and H.Feldman, op.cit.

45. See T.Ali, op.cit., or K.Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan", op.cit.

46. Thus the C.S,P. was seen as partly responsible for the 1958 breakdown, the new regime had a comprhensive scheme for change, and several members of the C.S.P. had been charged with corruption, see S.J. Burki, op.cit.

47. Ibid.; and R.Braibanti, op.cit.

48. In the 1962 election, 6500 were disqualified, see G.M.Haddad, op.cit.

49. M.A.Khan, Speeches and Statements, Karachi, Pakistan Publications, vol.2, 1960, and vol.3, 1961.

50. See K.P.Misra, et. al., op.cit.; E.A. and K.R.Schuler, Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan, 1958-62, Michigan State Univ. Press, 1967; D.P.Singhal, "The New Constitution of Pakistan", AS. Surv., 1962.

51. The B.D. system has been widely discussed, see G.M.Haddad, op.cit., K.Callard and Wheeler, op.cit., K.Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, op.cit., K.Sayeed, "Pakistan's Basic Democracies", M.E.J., 1961.

52. At the lowest level there were 10 elected and not more than 5 nominated; at the second level the division was that the nominated should not exceed the elected; at the third and fourth levels 25% were elected; at the fifth level only 17% were elected, see K. von Vorys, op.cit.

53. The Constitution Commission carried out 6269 questionnaires and 565 interviews. Its major findings were: 1. Form of government: equally divided Presidential and Parliamentary government; 2. Unitary v. Federal: 66% for federal; 3. Legislature: majority opinion for unicameral but commission recommended bicameral; 4. Division of Powers: 41% for only defence, foreign affairs, and currency for the centre - the commission recommended three lists but the constitution provided only one for the centre; 5. Electorate: the commission favoured universal direct elections; 6. Political Parties: the recommendation was for the lifting of the ban; 7. Fundamental Rights: the commission recommended these but they were not included in the constitution. See E.A. and K.R.Schuler, op.cit.

54. R.Braibanti, "Pakistan: Constitutional Issues in 1964", As.Surv., 1965.

55. See K.von Vorys, op.cit.; Keesings Contemporary Archives; Feldman, op.cit., cites £118m. recovered out of a total money circulation of £375m.

56. K.L.Seth, The Pattern of Economic Development in Pakistan, op.cit.

57. G.F.Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, Harvard Univ. Press, 1967.

58. Evidence will be provided below.

59. See Feldman, op.cit., and T.Ali, op.cit. The limit was set at 500 acres of irrigated or 1000 acres of unirrigated land, but this did not affect significantly the distribution of land given that the average holding was 10 acres. (6000 persons or 0.1% of the population owned 7.5m. acres, 2.2m. persons owned less than 5 acres, and 2.5m. owned no land at all.)

60. K.L.Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op.cit., and K.L.Seth, The Pattern of Economic Development in Pakistan, op.cit.

61. See G.F.Papanek, op.cit.; T.Ali, op.cit,; K.Sayeed, "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy", Pac.Aff., 1963. Papanek points out that the new entrepreneurial class is dominated by four small communities of about 0.05% of the population, which control over half Pakistan's industrial wealth.

62. In E.Pakistan B.D.membership was highly skewed with 66% of the B.Ds. being drawn from 10% of the population, (families with annual incomes over Rs.3000); and further by dint of the provision of rural development funds, the B.Ds. became the main source of patronage. See R.Sobhan,"Social Forces in the Basic Democracies", As.Rev., 1968. T.Ali, op.cit., notes the general corruption in the distribution of land, (gained from evacuees, land reform, former 'CrownLands' etc.); and more specific corruption in the Ayub family. The eldest son, a B.D. member, had taken over three large industries, the second son was a director of 32 firms, and Ayub was reputed to have a large bank account in Geneva.

63. Political parties were seen by Ayub as the basic cause of instability prior to 1958, and as such were excluded from Ayub's conception of the new political system.

64. The martial law ban was reinforced in May 1962 by the Prohibition of Unregulated Activity Ordinance to ban parties before the issue was discussed by the National Assembly, and the National and Provincial Assembly Order of April 1962 warning candidates who projected themselves as candidates of a group or party would be guilty of corrupt practices. See S.M.Qureshi, "Party Politics in the Second Republic of Pakistan", M.E.J.,1966.

65. Ibid.

66. R.Wheeler,"Pakistan: New Constitution, Old Issues", As.Surv., 1963.

67. See K.von Vorys, op.cit., for the National Assembly; see R.Sobhan, op.cit., for a discussion of the B.Ds.

68. Ayub won unanimous support in the NWFP and Baluchistan and about 75% of the votes of Sind and Punjab (where large landholdings were prevalent), but lost Dacca, Chittagong, and Karachi. See S.al. Mujahid, "Pakistan's First Presidential Elections", As.Surv., 1965.

69. See S.al.Mujahid, "The Assembly Elections in Pakistan", As.Surv., 1965; and M.Huq, op.cit.

70. See M.B.Naqui, "Pakistan: Revolution without a Plan", As. Rev., 1969; G.S.Bhargava, Pakistan in Crisis, Dehli, Vikas Pub., 1969; T.Ali, op.cit.

71. Two major mechanisms employed by the government to regulate law and order were Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code (involving restrictions on meetings and invoked almost every month), and the Defence of Pakistan Rules (framed under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1965 and used to detain persons). See K.Sayeed, "Pakistan: New Challenges to the Political System", As.Surv., 1968.

72. Industrial Origin of Pakistan's GDP at factor cost(U.N.Stat.Yearbook)

		Percentage					
	total	Agricul.	Indust.	Construct.	Transp.	Trade	Other
1958	28:0	52	10	2	6	11	18
1960	34.8	53	10	2	6	12	17
1963	41.4	48	12	4	6	12	17
1967	62.8	47	12	4	7	13	17

73. S.M.Qureshi, op.cit., notes that they were the Pakistan's Peoples, a group of 20 led by Ahmad of Nizaam; Democrats led by M.Ali of ML (East); Progressives led by Bari of the Republican Party; Independents of ML (West); Independent neutrals; an undefined Independent group from E.Pakistan led by Mushahed; and members for Sind and Karachi.

74. K.Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan, op.cit.

75. R.A.Moore, "Pakistan: the Role of the Army", Pol.Sci. (Wellington), 1968; and K.Sayeed, op.cit. Furthermore it appears that the low contribution of the East has remained relatively constant.

76.

	Exports to W.Pakistan	Exports to E.Pakistan
1959-60	36.24(crores of Rs.)	56.94
1960-61	36.85	82.89
1965-66	52.23	84.39

(K.L.Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op.cit.)

77. T.Manruzzaman, "National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan", As.Surv., 1967.

78. Although the East got 53% of the allocation, this did not include 900m. dollars for the Indus Basin Scheme; and furthermore there was a greater emphasis on consumer goods in the East and capital goods in the West. See K.L.Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op.cit.

79. K.Sayeed, "Pakistan: New Challenges to the Political System", op.cit.

80. K.Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan, op.cit.

81. R.Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op.cit. Braibanti notes that there had been 28 major efforts to reform the bureaucracy - 11 of these reports and half the volume had been presented in the martial law period.

82. A.Gorvine, op.cit.

83. S.J.Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: A Reevaluation", As.Surv., 1969.

84. Pakistan's Force Level and Allocation (J.C.Hurewitz, op.cit.)

	Force Level(000s)	Defence(Rs.m.)	Defence %GNP
1955-6	200	814.3	4.2
1958-9		837.3	4.0
1960-1	225	1044.3	3.2
1962-3		960.7	2.5
1965-6	253	1360.9	2.6

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN U.A.R. (EGYPT)

1. It is interesting to compare the sequence of political and economic developments of Egypt and Turkey in the twentieth century. Although Egypt and Turkey were far from identical prior to World War 1, within the framework of the Ottoman Empire they had many elements in common, such as relative autonomy, limited political parties, decaying monarchies, reasonably advanced bureaucracies and central sevices, and a significant degree of external economic interaction. Following World War 1, whereas in Turkey a nationalist movement was able to depose the non-nation state forces and to thwart external domination, in Egypt the pre-war societal organization was perpetuated.

2. For general surveys of historical developments in Egypt, see P.M. Holt, ed., Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt, Oxford Univ. Press, 1968; N.Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, Harvard Univ. Press, 1961.

3. Figures from Keesings Contemporary Archives, and P.J.Vatikiotis, Modern History of Egypt, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969.

4. See P.O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System, Oxford Univ. Press, 1966; M.M.el-Kammash, Economic Development and Planning in Egypt, Praeger, 1968; C.Issawi, Egypt in Revolution, Oxford Univ. Press, 1963; P.J.Vatikiotis, op.cit.

5. P.J.Vatikiotis, op.cit.

6. An expelled Wafdist leader produced a 'black book' containing a record of corruption and venality in the Wafd.

7. Thus in June 1950 a Royal Decree removed 29 Opposition Senators and replaced them with 19 Wafd ones in an attempt to halt Senate interpellations calling for an inquiry into scandals concerning the supply of munitions to the army and funds to a Cairo hospital and to prevent further inquiries of other alleged irregularities, including Wafd involvement in the Alexandria Cotton Exchange. (Later in June the Saad and Liberal-Constitutional Parties decided to boycott the Assembly in protest.) In November 1950 the opposition parties presented a petition to Farouk alleging corruption on the part of palace officials and the Wafd government. Again in April 1952 Prime Minister Hilaly set up inquiry commissions in each Ministry, an action which led to his downfall in June. See Keesings Contemporary Archives; and also P.J.Vatikiotis, op.cit.

8. Several monarchs have been successful in support mobilization by mobilizing traditional groups, placating an number of nationalist groups, and executing a number of nation state policies. (See for example Haille Selassie in Ethiopia). However, the monarchy in Egypt was subject to a number of limitations. First, it was not an indigenous monarchy; second, it did not rely on indigenous groups but small numbers of Syrians, Greeks, and Albanians; and third, the monarchs in the twentieth century proved to be weak.

9. See P.Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, Penguin, 1965; and P.J.Vatikiotis, op.cit.

10. Thus the political parties had proved almost completely ineffective in containing the arbitrary dismissals of cabinets and parliaments by the monarch. The two most notable exceptions are 1922 when the Wafd gained a veiled Independence Treaty, and in 1935 when it forced the termination of a period of Royal Decree.

11. Figures from Keesings Contemporary Archives.

12. See M.Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, Princeton Univ. Press, 1957.

13. M.M.el-Kammash, op.cit.
14. Ibid.

15. P.O'Brien, op.cit.; C.Issawi, op.cit.; A.Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, Random House, 1968.

16. The constitution was of course suspended during the periods of Royal Decree. During the third period of Royal Decree, 1930-35, a new constitution was promulgated in 1931 but was repealed in 1934 and the 1923 constitution was finally restored in 1935.

17. For pertinent general background on the military in the Middle East see E.Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Pall Mall, 1970; S.N.Fisher, ed., The Military in the Middle East, Ohio State Univ. Press, 1963; G.M.Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East, Speller, 1965; J.C.Hurewitz, Middle East Politics - The Military Dimension, Pall Mall, 1969; M.Halpern, "The Army in the Middle East", in M.Halpern, Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and N.Africa, Princeton Univ. Press, 1963; M.Khadduri, "Role of the Military in Middle East Politics", A.P.S.R., 1953.

18. The Orabi Revolt was the first important independent intervention by the Egyptian army into the civilian polity. The revolt does not fall within our parameters since the army was not professional, the revolt was not an explicit take-over, and it was largely motivated by purely army grievances. For accounts of the Orabi Revolt, see M.Berger, "Military Elites and Social Change: Egypt since Napoleon", Res. Mono. 6, Centre for Internat. St., Princeton, 1960; and P.J.Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics, Indiana Univ. Press, 1961.

19. Ibid.

20. J.C.Hurewitz, "Egypt: Military Rule in a Rapidly Changing Society", in J.C.Hurewitz, op.cit.; and E.Be'eri, op.cit.

21. See P.J.Vatikiotis, The Army in Egyptian Politics, op.cit.

22. For an analysis of the Free Officer Group see ibid. and E.Be'eri, op.cit.

23. See A.Al-Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, Wingate, 1957; M.Neguib, Egypt's Destiny, Doubleday, 1955; and G.A.Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Egypt, National Publishing House, 1954.

24. Although it must be recognized that the potential armed resistance from civilian groups was not insignificant, especially from the MB and the para-military units of the Wafd. To this end the F.O.G. adopted Neguib as a popular figure-head.

25. In February 1953 Neguib annoùnced his sovereign powers including the right to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers; in June Neguib became President.

26. For an emphasis on the high degree of centralization see, M. Rodinson, "The Political System", in P.J.Vatikiotis, ed., op.cit.; and A.Abdel-Malek, op.cit.

27. The Permanent Council for the Development of National Production produced a 4-Year Plan for Public Investment in 1953, which was immediately enacted, see P.O'Brien, op.cit.

28. The nationalization of the Alexandria Cotton Exchange in 1961 led to the establishment of the Egyptian Cotton Commission as the sole buyer of cotton; export firms were 35% government owned and export prices were fixed by the government; by 1963 the whole cotton industry was fully nationalized.

29. On the two Five Year Plans see, B.Hansen, "Planning and Economic Growth in the U.A.R. (Egypt) 1960-65", in P.J.Vatikiotis, ed., op.cit.; F.Dolp and D.Breebaart, "Evolution of Planning Organization in the U.A.R. (egypt)", M.E.J., 1966; and P.O'Brien, op.cit.

30. In 1953 the output of the private sector was six times that of the public one, but in 1963 it was less than twice, (P.O'Brien, op.cit.) For an account and discussion of the nationalization process, see Keesings Contemporary Archives; M.M.El-Kammash, op.cit.; C.Issawi, op.cit.; S.El-Serafy, "Economic Development by Revolution", M.E.J., 1963; C.Leiden, "Egypt: The Drift to the Left", M.E.Aff., 1962.

31. Egypt's Imports,Exports,Trade Defecits (dollars m.)

	1958	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Imports	667	740	916	953	933	1070	792	666	638
Exports	478	398	520	537	604	604	566	622	745
Defecit	-189	-342	-396	-416	-329	-466	-226	- 44	+107

(U.N. Stat.Yearbook).

Egypt's Consumer Price Index (1963=100) (U.N.Stat.Yearbook)

1953	1960	1962	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
99	102	99	104	119	130	131	104	107

32. B.Hansen, op.cit., gives a detailed breakdown.

33. The major losses were canal tolls (which had been 227m. dollars in 1966), 50m. dollars per annum from oil refineries, 56m. dollars of oil from Sinai, an estimated 84m. dollars from tourist trade in 1967, and 1-1.5 billion dollars of military equipment. See E. Kanovsky, "The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War", M.E.J., 1968.

34. The original plan envisaged an executive President, a single cabinet, a single legislature, and two regional councils; these plans were amended to provide a central cabinet of joint ministers and ministers with separate regional heads; in October 1958 a return to the original plan was made with reference to cabinet organization; in October 1959 Field-Marshall Amer was made effective President of Syria; in March 1960 a single UAR National Assembly was announced;

in August 1961 Regional Executive Councils were abolished.See Keesings Contemporary Archives. For explanations of the split see A.Etzioni, Political Unification, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964; M.Palmer, "The UAR: an Assessment of its Failure", M.E.J., 1966; and P.Mansfield, op.cit.

35. See R.K.Dekmejian,"The UAR National Assembly - A Pioneering Experiment", M.E.St., 1967; or M.Rodinson, op.cit.

36. For an account of the structures of the various parties, see P. Mansfield, op.cit.; P.J.Vatikiotis, "Some Political Consequences of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt", in P.M.Holt, ed., op.cit.

37. Of 2528 candidates in the 1957 election 1210 were rejected, c.f. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

38. For example in 1962 4 main executive bodies were established: a Presidential Council, an Executive Council, National Defence Council, and a provisional Supreme Executive Committee (to organize the A.S.U.). Both the Presidential and Executive Councils were appointed by the President with the Executive Council headed by Sabry, a former F.O.G. member; the National Defence Council was headed by Nasser with Amer, a former F.O.G. member, as Vice-President together with 14 members of the Presidential and Executive Councils and the three Chiefs of Staff and Head of Intelligence; the Supreme Executive Committee consisted of Nasser, Sabry, 11 members of the Presidential Council, and the 7 most senior members of the Executive Council. (Keesings Contemporary Archives).

39. Although direct expressions of popular withdrawal of support have not been extensive, there are examples of popular demonstrations against the regime, e.g. in 1965 there were large demonstrations on the death of Nahhas, former leader of the Wafd, and the trial of hundreds of MB members, or again there were massive student demonstrations in 1968. Furthermore in 1968 plans were announced for far reaching reforms of the ASU to provide for increased participation.

40. It is interesting to note the similarities and differences vis-a-vis the BD system of Pakistan. On the one hand, there were indirect elections, the party structure parralleled the civilian administration, and further it was not very powerful. On the other hand, in Egypt the National Assembly had a greater degree of independence from the party system and was not indirectly elected, and further there was not the same progressive diminuation of party members as the party hierarchy was ascended.

41. See R.K.Dekmejian, op.cit.; P.Mansfield, op.cit. For a more critical view of the base of support see either A.Abdel-Malek,op.cit. or J.Heaphey, "The Organization of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-Political Model for Nation Building", W.P., 1965.

42. In the period of the succession struggle following the coup, there were widespread arrests: 50 in Sept. 1952, 205 Jan. 1953, over 100 in Feb. 1953, 40 Ap. 1954, mass arrests Ap. 1955, thereafter there were sporadic periods such as Ap. 1957, the end of 1958, mass arrests June 1966, 181 arrests Sept. 1967. (Keesings Contemporary Archives.)

43. In August 1952 7 purge committees were established with powers of arrest, search and trial; the Revolution Tribunals were disbanded in June 1954 after 32 trials; and the last decree of the R.C.C. gave the Minister of the Interior powers to arrest or imprison persons previously condemed by the various revolutionary tribunals. (Keesings Contemporary Archives).

44. Egypt's Cotton and Total Exports (Europa Yearbook 1970)

	1967	1968	1969
Total Exports(£Em.)	246.1	270.3	323.9
Cotton Exports	164.4	164.1	183.0
Cotton % Total	66.8	60.7	56.5

45. M.M.El-Kammash, op.cit.; M.R.El-Ghonemy, "Economic and Institutional Organization of Egyptian Agriculture since 1952", in P.J.Vatikiotis, ed., op.cit.

46. By the time of the declaration of the Republic Neguib was President, Nasser Vice-Prime Minister, and Amer C-in?C of the armed forces. The struggle between Nasser and Neguib became open in February 1954. On Feb. 25, it was announced that Neguib had resigned and had been replaced by Nasser, on Feb. 27 Neguib with army backing was reinstated; the move toward greater civilian involvement began but in March there were large army, navy, and police demonstrations for Nasser and in April Nasser replaced Neguib as P.M. See Keesings Contemporary Archives; and P.J.Vatikiotis, The Army in Egyptian Politics, op.cit.

47. Comparison with Turkey is interesting in that the ratio of higher to lower ranks in the Turkish junta was much higher than the Egyptian case and led to a victory for the higher ranks. (It is also important to realize that the levels of development and types of instability were also very different.)

48. For example, in 1961 3400/4100 employees in the Ministry of the Interior were either active or resigned military; there were 300 military in the remaining ministries; in 1964 22/26 Provincial Governors were military, see J.C.Hurewitz, op.cit.

49. Egypt: Force Level and Expenditure (J.C.Hurewitz, op.cit.)

	Force Level	Defence % GNP
1952-3	80000	5.3
1955-6	80000	9.3
1960-1	160000	7.1
1965-6	180000	9.1

50. Evidence of such divisions is provided by the several purges: Sept.1952 purge of 450 officers; Jan.1953 25; April 1954 15; widespread purge of army and police during 1966; arrests and trials 1967 of Field-Marshall Amer and 181 other military and civilian officers, see Keesings Contemporary Archives.

6 : EQUILIBRATING MILITARY REGIMES

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN GHANA

INTERVENTION

The British colony of the Gold Coast became independent in March 1957 and in the process became transformed into a low level nation state.[1] While the economic indicators of nation state development were at a very low level, the political indicators were at a much higher comparative level of development thereby differentiating Ghana from other African colonial systems.[2] Following independence there was some considerable vertical and horizontal economic development (and to a lesser degree social and cultural development) but very little accompanying political development despite some considerable changes in the phenomenal representation of political processes.

In gross terms, all types of instability with the exception of decision-making (method) were represented in 1966 at the time of the coup. The two most marked types of instability (monitoring failure in particular was notvery extensive) were institutionalization and support failures. These two types had become significant by 1961 and continued to increase with only a number of minor oscillations until the time of the coup.

The first task is to identify the indicators of political instability. Decision-making (scope) failure was restricted for the most part to economic policy decision making.[3] Four indicators represent this failure. In the first place, there was a growing imbalance between imports and exports. Exports which had doubled from 1948-59 became stagnant from 1959, whereas imports, which had been persistently lower than exports, overtook the export level and continued to rise.[4]

Table 6:1 Ghana's Exports and Imports (millions US) (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

	1953	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Exports	224	263	286	294	292	291	273	293	291
Imports	207	237	317	363	394	333	365	341	448

The reserves of £180m at independance had been transformed by 1964 into an external debt of £132m and by 1965 reserves showed a deficit of £250m. In the second place, following the imposition of import restrictions in 1961 there was a rising inflation (exacerbated for the consumer by a wage-freeze imposed in 1962).

Table 6:2 Ghana's Consumer Price Index (1963=100) (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

	1953	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
All items	76	80	80	82	82	88	96	100	112	144
Food	75	81	80	83	82	87	96	100	116	158

Thirdly, there was a gradual slowing down of rates of growth. Rimmer suggests a GDP growth rate of 6% in the 1950s had been cut to 2.5% 1960-68 (just less than population growth). Kraus suggests a GNP increase 1955-62 of 4.8% had been reduced by 1964 to 2.8% and by 1965 to 0.2%.[6]

The index numbers of total per capita product are:

Table 6:3 Ghana's Index total per capita product at constant prices (1963=100) (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
97	97	99	100	100	98

Finally, although Ghana was a primary producer, it was importing food at the rate of £20m per annum.[7]

There were three major indicators of institutionalization failure. The first relates to the failure to produce a satisfactory body of rules governing political interaction. Three indicators illustrate this phenomenon. First, a large number of measures were enacted to harrass the

opposition and thereby to inhibit the institutionalization of interaction between the dominant convention peoples party and any other of the opposition parties. This process had begun even prior to independence as the CPP, which dominated the major executive offices from the 1951 elections, used the perquisites of office to sustain its hegemony (for example, see the financial expropriations from the Cocoa Purchasing Company.) After independence, the moves against the opposition increased. Thus in 1957 the Avoidance of Discrimination Act forbidding the existence of parties on a regional, tribal or religious basis,was passed; a number of bills were enacted inhibiting individuals within the opposition, such as the Deportati on Act, (by December 1958 deportations numbered 61), the Emergency Powers Act of 1957, and the Preventive Detention Act of 1958 (extended in 1962 so that detainees could be held beyond 5 years without trial); in November 1958 40 members of the United Party (the consolidated opposition group) were arrested on an attempted Nkrumah murder charge; in April 1959 a bill was enacted to unseat those who boycotted ten consecutive sittings of parliament or were detained under PDA; the Presidential Affairs Act and Emergency Powers Act and Public Order Act of 1961 attempted to control public meetings and processions; finally in 1964 all parties other than the CPP became illegal.[9] A second indicator of the failure to develop a satisfactory body of rules of political interaction relates to the inadequate nature of the two constitutions. The first constitution, which had been drafted by the British and unduly influenced by a number of Ghanaian opposition demands, was totally inappropriate for a low income nation state system intent on rapid economic and political development. (In particular there was a need for a stronger executive and second the regional division of powers was excessive.) The first constitution encouraged a number of manipulations, e.g. the Regional Assembly elections were not held until 1958 and then

in 1959 the Assemblies were dissolved or the large number of control bills outlined above could be seen as attempts to increase the executive controls of the PM. The second constitution of 1960 swung to the opposite extreme in that patterns of political interaction were ambiguously defined and excessively controlled by the executive President. Thus there was no limit on the term of the Presidency, the President could appoint all judges, control appointments and dismissals in the civil service, and there were virtually no legislative controls.[10] The third indicator relates to electoral manipulations. The first election to be held after independence was the Regional one of October 1958 which was boycotted by the opposition on charges that there were insufficient controls. In the 1960 referendum and Presidential elections, the constitution was approved by 1,008,740 to 131,425 and Nkrumah elected by 1,016,076 to 124,623. The 1964 referendum resulted in a claimed poll of 96.5% of which 99.9% voted favourably.[11] The referendum was generally considered a farce: 96.5% turn out was virtually double anything previously experienced in Ghana as was the percentage voting for the CPP; there was not a single 'No' vote in Ashanti, the main opposition area, each voter had a serial number and could be checked on, and there were widespread reports of intimidation and the 'No' voting boxes with the covered slots.

The second major indicator of institutionalization failure relates to the undermining of the sphere of competence and autonomy of many of the major political functional organizations. The process may be illustrated with reference to a number of groups. The erosion of the sphere of competence of the opposition had already been noted, The judiciary came under attack as from 1960. The 1960 constitution gave the President powers to appoint judges; the nature of PDA and a number of related bills put a proportion of offences beyond the control of the judiciary; the 1961 amendment to the criminal procedure code enabled the President to take certain offences out of the jurisdiction of district magistrates; and

finally in November 1963 when a special court dismissed treason charges against three persons, the Chief Justice was dismissed and a bill was rushed through parliament (and made retroactive) enabling the President to quosh court decisions.[12] The erosion of the sphere of competence of the civil administration began soon after independence. In 1957 the administrative Regional Officer was replaced by a party appointee; in 1959 Gardiner, the British trained Ghanaian head of the civil service was sacked; and increasingly the most important administrative departments were transferred to the Presidents Office. However, it must also be noted that particularly in the 60's, there began a movement to grant greater autonomy to and encourage increased efficiency in the administration.[13] Finally, it is necessary to note the extensive array of associations which were incorporated into the CPP, including the TUC, the Cocoa Farmers Union (UUFC). (The CPP also controlled a number of lesser associations such as Youth Groups, Womens Associations and the Workers Brigade.)

The final indicator of institutionalization failure relates to corruption and patronage. The first charges of corruption and patronage were levelled in 1954 and 1955 (see especially the Korsah Commission) in connection with the activities of the Cocoa Marketing Board. The CPP had control of the CMB which at that time was a very profitable organization and furthermore the CPP used the Cocoa Purchasing Company, a CMB subsidiary, to build up a patronage machine by giving loans to CPP backers[14] (in the 6 week period prior to the 1954 election advancesfrom the CPC rose Again in 1961 Nkrumah made a famous dawn broadcast against corruption and a Committee of Inquiry showed that many ministers had assets far in excess of their salary. Although 2 or 3 leading members were forced from the cabinet, the corruption drive was halted. Again following the coup, a number of commissions were established to investigate corruption and ministerial malpractices, though it is significant to note that little corruption could be directly related to Nkrumah.[15] The mechanisms for

corruption and patronage were those which become available in many low income systems evolving from colonisation, i.e. a large number of posts to be distributed, control of Import Licences, distribution development grants etc. It appears in the case of Ghana that not only was there evidence of considerable corruption and patronage (exacerbated by CPP hegemony) but that also the efforts to combat it were rather ineffective.

With reference to support failure, both major types, i.e. withdrawal and insufficience, were manifest, although the more important would appear to be the latter. The degree of support failure of the regime became most explicit at the time of the coup, when not only was there no popular opposition whatsoever to the coup with the CPP apparently collapsing totally, but alsm the coup was popularly received.

Although it is difficult to estimate precisely the degree of support withdrawal, two indicators may be noted. In the first place, it can be argued that by 1960 all opposition support for the regime had been with-drawn, and certainly with the enactment of the 'one-party-state' in 1964 this process must have been finalized. Apter argues that in the post World War 2 period the first two organised groups to appear from the morass of ethnic factions and pressure groups prior to that period were the national progressive chiefs and the constitutional progressives. These two groups were preempted by a third, a populist group, which became the CPP calling on the partially educated, the young, the new Urban groups, journalists and ex-servicemen.[16] Although the first two groups could not adapt as easily as the CPP to rising political and economic demands, they were nonetheless still very prevalent at Independence. However, through bills to curtail the secular opposition (e.g. PDA, deportations etc outlined above) and to demote chiefs (e.g. destoolments or 3 major Chieftancy Acts of 1959 which placed chiefs at the disposal of the government), these groups by 1960 had become totally excluded.[17] Second and perhaps of

greater significance, there does appear to have been some loss of urban support for the CPP and also some loss of support by the cocoa farmers. Thus there had been large scale protests in 1958; in 1961 the Sekondi-Takoradi strike took place despite the ban on strikes and CPP control of the TU's; the animosity engendered by the 1961 strike could be expected to be continued given the increasing inflation and wage freeze; the cocoa farmers became more disaffected as cocoa prices were reduced.[18]

Two main types of insufficience of suppost mobilization have been outlined: too narrow a base and inadequate mobilizing mechanisms. The narrow base of support of the CPP can be seen from an examination of the 1954 and 1956 elections which illustrate quite vividly the small percentage of the vote won by the CPP. It has been one of the ill-examined generalizations of comparative political analysis that single party systems are attuned to mass mobilization - a generalization which has only recently been dismissed.[19]

Table 6:4 Performance CPP in Ghanaian Elections of 1954 and 1956[20]

	% Electorate Registered	%Poll	% Poll won by CPP	No. of CPP Seats	% Total Electorate won by CPP
1954	50	60	55	72/104	16.5
1956	60	50	57	71/104	17.0

Since there were no elections after 1956 it is difficult to provide any further comprehensive evidence. Nonetheless given the indicators of incapacity of mobilization which will be outlined below, it would not be expected that the CPP population would expand significantly. Two strands of evidence would seem to support this. Thus Austin notes in the 1960 Presidential elections Nkrumah won only 16.8 of the Accra vote; and at the local level Owusu notes the static nature of political and electoral mobilization between 1953 and 1958.[21]

The incapacity to mobilize support in the case of Ghana was contingent on two processes: the ossification of the CPP and the sealing of alternative channels of mobilization. These factors will be examined in greater detail in the dislocations. At the present it is simply necessary to note three major indicators of the incapacity to mobilize support. In the first place, the CPP made no concerted drive to recruit members especially in rural areas. Although some effort was made to revitalize the party in 1960, the CPP never seriously applied itself to mass mobilization.[22] Second, there was an increase in the decline of the significance of constitutional and branch organizations, and increasing dissatisfaction and intrigue both at the centre and local levels as the centre became unable to sustain economic pay-offs and the local levels became more attuned to localized problems.[23] Finally, a whole range of measures served to seal channels of mobilization which lay outside the CPP hierarchy. Thus opposition parties were curtailed and finally banned; alternative organizations were taken over by the CPP and any non-compliant personnel abandoned in the process;[24] elections were made redundant; the parliamentary body was transformed into a self-perpetuating body in which members were selected by the CPP central committee; and finally internal CPP recruitment became closed and excessively dependent on Nkrumah.[25]

There is no evidence of any large-scale monitoring failure. It is usual for monitoring failure in the form of the rise of domestic violence or the increased use of force on the part of the government to accompany any high levels of other types of instability. The primary reason accounting for the absence in the case of Ghana is that no co-ordinated groups existed which could mobilize sufficient protest against the regime. In other words, although there were significant disaffected groups, the monitoring mechanisms of the regime combined with the nature of these groups inhibited any significant protests.[26] Although there had been a

number of cases of domestic protests both immediately following independence (e.g. Ewe rebellion in former British Togo, aggressive Ga movement in Accra, the threatened strike of public service personnel, the state of emergency in Kumasi) and a number of more isolated incidents thereafter, (e.g. Sekondi-Takoradi strike), these cases were relatively isolated or involved only very small sections of the population and could not therefore be seen as indicators of significant levels of monitoring failure. Only two indicators of monitoring failure may be noted, and again it must be emphasized that neither of these had reached chronic proportions. The first relates to the establishment of governmental authority. Although there had been no challenge made to the regime's authority either in terms of a secessionist movement or an alternative national challenge, there is sufficient evidence to deduce that the regimes authority in some areas of Ghana was most certainly flimsy. The primary basis for this argument lies in an analysis of the distribution of voting figures in the 1956 election.

Table 6:5 Distribution of seats in Ghanaian Election 1956 by Region[27]

	CPP	NLM	NPP	Others	
Gold Coast	44	-	-	-	44
Ashanti	8	12	-	1	21
Transvolta	8	-	-	5	13
N.Territories	11	-	15	-	26
	71	12	15	6	104

It becomes clear from this breakdown that the CPP did not have a majority in either Ashanti or the Northern Territories. This may not have been significant were it not that the CPP failed to extend its support effectively and that it subsequently excluded non CPP groups from political participation. Hence we argue that certainly outside the Gold Coast area, regime authority was far from substantiated. On the other hand, we wish

to qualify this position by arguing that although regime authority was weak, it was not seriously challenged. Thus it will be noted that the CPP was the only national party (and indeed the only party to win any significant number of seats in at least two regions), and furthermore the alternative parties, especially the NPP and MAP, were very weak and ineffective organisations.[28] The second indicator relates to the regime use of force. The argument again is a qualified one, namely that although the regime made little explicit use of force, there were a large number of control mechanisms in which force was an important element, and a secondary array of mechanisms, which, though not contingent on force, had the same consequence or effect as force, i.e. the perpetuation of the regime irrespective of demands. The first category refers to such mechanisms as PDA and deportation measures; the second category relates to press controls, the 1960 constitution and 1964 amendment, the ban on strikes, the range of bills forbidding criticism of the CPP or the President (e.g. the Presidential Affairs Act 1961, the Public Order Act 1961 or the 1961 Amendment to the Criminal Code making it illegal to undertake anything likely to make the President an object of hatred ridicule or contempt), and finally the measures which incorporated control of political bodies additional to the CPP within the CPP.

Having examined the main profile of political instability, the next task is the examination of the main dissynchronizations. The first two dissynchronizations relate to interaction between the economic and political systems. The first relates more particularly to the organization of the economy (upon which inputs to the political system are contingent); the second relates to the mechanisms employed by the political system to monitor the economy.[29]

Three factors are of import concerning the first dissynchronization. In the first place, Ghana could be classified as a single crop economy, i.e. one in which excessive dependence lies on a single product. In the case of Ghana, the product was of course cocoa, which earned approximately

65% of the export earnings. Single crop export economies are subject to a number of severe problems. Given the nature of agricultural product it is difficult to control the amount of production, and furthermore the price of the commodity is largely beyond the control of the primary producer being set by the world market.[30] Ghana was particularly unfortunate in that cocoa manifests one of the highest price fluctuation rates, and further from 1958 the world price of cocoa began to decline so that although Ghana doubled her exports after 1958 the earnings remained stationary.[31]

The second factor responsible for the structural dissynchronization was the very weak position of Ghana in the international economic system. The weak position of low income systems in the global economic system was noted in the first section of this work and was seen to be a function of the type of production of various systems and the profitability and stability of such productions. The weak position of Ghana, whose level of economic development until 1961 was tied to export proceeds over which Ghana had little control, is not unique among African nation states (which manifest some of the lowest levels of economic development in the world), but became exacerbated after 1961 when Ghana attempted to develop some degree of economic insulation and autonomy. The primary consequence of the weak low income economies is the small degree of control over external patterns of economic interaction, whether these be trade or external investment. The vulnerability of Ghana in this respect is easily documented. For example, although Ghana was left with not inconsiderable reserves at independence, these had been invested by the Colonial Office in Britain and not in Ghana; or again even after 1961 Ghana was unable to dictate the most favourable terms for the Volta project.[32]

The third factor relates to the very small size of the market in Ghana. With a population of about 7m (even so considerably above the African average), Ghana has an internal market considerably smaller than any of the other systems we have examined. Small markets are not problematic

in subsistence economies but immediately become of significance once growth is anticipated. In this situation small markets provide one of the many vicious circles (encouraging low demand and low investment and low production) and become a major inhibiting factor in the progressive development of basic goods as economies of scale become more important.[33]

The second dislocation relates to the control by the policy of the economy. The first causal factor of import with reference to this dislocation is that the diversification of the economy and the attempt to generate internal expansion which was not contingent on external cocoa earnings took place too late. Until 1961 there had been little diversification (which had not been encouraged by the first two plans which invested 89% and 80% respectively in social services) and economic development had been financed and stimulated only through export earnings or accumulated export reserves. After 1961 Ghana embarked on a much more ambitious path of development and began to try to produce some degree of economic autonomy through the introduction of exchange controls and import restrictions, measures to make the banking system autonomous, and through the development of state corporations. Though this was a very correct line of development for Ghana, severe problems could be expected on two accounts. First, the foreign reserves essential to buy machinery were exhausted (and cocoa prices were in marked decline); and second the new industries must operate at lower costs than imported goods and also demand a time lag, i.e. a period over which there is no immediate return on investments.[34]

A second problem was that there was little central control or even knowledge of the external debt. In 1963 the economic survey recorded the external debt as £38m, but in 1964 after a critical inquiry the debt was found to be at 187m of which 157m was in suppliers credit with the bulk of repayment due in 4-6 years time.[35]

A third causal factor, which has been widely noted is that the state corporations were not functioning very satisfactorily. A 1964 Report gave spectacular delays in the purchasing of equipment and its installation. Again the 1965 Budget reported that although £40m had been invested in 32 state enterprises, virtually no dividend had been received in 1964 except for two banks and the National Trading Corporation - accumulated losses at the end of 1963 were £15m. In this context, it is also important to note that the CMB was not working well. The rationale behind the CMB is such that it should pay a low price when there is a large crop and vice versa for a small crop. However, the price was determined at a time when it was difficult to estimate the size of the crop (with the result that there were sometimes high prices for large crops) and further after 1959 the price of cocoa was fixed (though later reduced to a lower fixed rate. In fact the CMB requires to receive £200 per ton for its cocoa sales (and the 3 plan was contingent on this) but in fact the price of cocoa was less than £200 per ton since 1960.[36]

Finally, it appears that there were a number of planning failures. Thus some of the import licences were badly applied and led to inadequate supplies of essential goods, particularly salt, sugar, milk, soap and materials for new industries.[37] Or again Dowse argues that the 7 year Plan was the work of CPP politicians and its amendments and changes of emphasis were a reflection of this.[38] Finally, it would appear that the management of foreign loans was badly executed in that much of the loans from the West were short-term whereas a number of bad barter contracts had been signed with a number of communist systems (although the communist loans had much more favourable interest rates.)

The primary consequences of the economic dissynchronizations were threefold. The most direct of course was for decision-making failure (scope). The second consequence was for institutionalization failure with reference to the development of corruption. The third consequence

was for the withdrawal aspect of support failure.

The third dissynchronization relates to the failure to develop channels of political participation. The primary reasons for this dislocation would appear to be a function of two major factors: the ossification of the CPP and the total failure of alternative participation mechanisms. The ossification of the CPP had already been adequately illustrated and appears to be responsible for three main factors. In the first place, the role of Nkrumah seems vital. Nkrumah emerged prior to independence as the most popular political leader within Ghana and certainly until the 1960s maintained this position. However, the dominant position of Nkrumah within the CPP and thereby in Ghana (cf early grant of life executive responsibility of CPP), which was never seriously challenged until 1966, encouraged a certain assification in that Nkrumah could arbitrarily appropriate political functions or issue directives or executive posts.[39] In the second place, it could be argued that from its very inception the CPP had a strong tendency towards spoils and the distribution of patronage.[40] The CPP was the first organised group which could successfully participate in the spoils formerly monopolized by the colonial system. From the evidence of the CPC, it seems clear that the CPP quickly adapted to the control of spoils. After independence, the CPP control over the distribution of spoils significantly increased and indeed the CPP used extensive measures to protect these spoils and conversely employed the spoils to maintain its own position. Indeed Owusu argues that the ability of the CPP to handle economic rewards was the primary rationale for that party.[41] The repercussion of the development of the spoils and patronage network for assification is that it tends to divest party activities and encourage the emergence of intrigue, localism, non-circulation etc. A third factor contributing towards assification was that the CPP developed into a control mechanism rather than a device for mobilizing support.[42] The reason for this would

appear to be that given the relatively weak party organization, the party could only ensure its continuation given excessive controls as opposed to spontaneous supports.

The second major factor contributing to the failure of the development of political participation would seem to be the atrophy of alternative participation mechanisms. A number of reasons account for this. In the first place, the CPP enacted a host of measures designed to curtail the emergence of any alternative parties (e.g. PDA, Avoidance of Discrimination Act, 1960 constitution etc.) Secondly, the alternative political parties were exceptionally feeble organizations, which relied on localized interests and which had ineffective organizations or programmes. It is certain that none of the opposition parties at the time of independence could have successfully adapted to mass mobilization. Finally, many of the associations which became absorbed into the CPP not only found little capacity for participation but also lost many of their more active members in the process of absorption. Thus it appears that much rank and file support was lost as such organizations became monitored by the CPP.

The consequence of the failure of the development of political participation had direct relevance for all the indicators of institutionalization failure and for all the indicators of support failure.

A fourth dissynchronization, which was not nearly as important as the above dislocations, was the failure to develop and adapt the civil administration. Several reasons account for this. In the first place, the type of administrative system established by the British was designed primarily to maintain law and order from the British vantage and was consequently of ill-design as far as assisting major development programmes were concerned. Second, there were insufficient trained personnel at independence. The civil service plans of Guggisberg were sabotaged and by 1948 only 94/1300 senior posts were held by Africans. Thirdly, it was not until 1960 that the College of Administration was established. Finally,

it appears that there was considerable interference and manipulation within the administration, especially with reference to branches being transferred to the Presidential Office.[43]

The consequences of the general weakness of the civil administration for institutionalization failure were twofold. In the first place, the administration was unable to establish its own sphere of competence; and second, to the extent that there was insufficient personnel, corruption and partisan appointments were encouraged. There was also a ramification for monitoring failure to the extent that the bureaucracy could not assist in the establishment of regime authority.

The third task in the analysis of intervention concerns the examination of military organizational capabilities and predispositions.

The first variable that must be examined with reference to the organizational capability category is that of skill level. Within the context of professional armies, it was clear that the skill level within the Ghanaian military was not very high. This can be illustrated by three indicators. First the officer corps was comparatively small and for the most part of recent standing. At independence there were 220 British officers to 25 Ghanaian and by April 1961 230 British to 150 Ghanaian, although shortly after this date total Africanization was achieved.[44] The plans for Africanization had been drawn up by General Alexander, who had replaced Major-General Paley as Chief of Defence Staff, for full Africanization by late 1962, but in September 1961 Nkrumah summarily dismissed Alexander and the remaining British officers.[45] Second, like most African armies, the Ghanaian one has a simple and non-diversified command structure due to its small size. Finally, the Ghanaian army did not have a very complex range of equipment.[46] On the other hand, it appears that given the size and equipment available to the military, it was well-trained - a Ghanaian military Academy had been established

in 1960, and all officers had at least secondary training.

With reference to the second variable, composition and structure, two factors are important. In the first place, there had been a marked growth in the size of the armed forces. At independence, they consisted of 3 batallions almost completely dominated by British officers.[47] By 1966 the army had expanded to 15000 being composed of 1,200 in the 2 brigades of 6 infantry battalions, 1 reconnaissance squadron, some paratroop, engineer and transport formations - the navy and air force had about 1000 men each.[48] The second factor related to recruitment. The British had initiated a recruitment drive whereby approximately 2/3 of the ranks were drawn from the north but the bulk of officers were drawn from the more educated southerners. It seems that a similar type of policy was continued after independence.[49]

With reference to the autonomy of the military, it seems clear that up to 1960 the army was clearly divorced from the civilian polity. The army, as noted, had been small at independence, it was officered mainly by the British, it had not been involved in the independence movement and had not been deployed much after independence (Ghana had no significant border problems or internal insurrections.) After 1960, although the army became much more involved in the development of political instability, it still retained a high degree of autonomy. The major factors impinging on the military's autonomy were twofold. In 1961 the army was ordered to send 400 recruits to the USSR for training. This was highly resented by the army, which thought that a second major type of training would only lead to confusion and a diminution of its effectiveness.[50] In the end only 68 recruits were sent and they returned after one year. The second factor concerned the President's own Guard Regiment. This had initially been established by the British as a ceremonial body. However, Nkrumah began to develop it as his own bodyguard, employed Soviet arms and personnel

to train it and finally in 1965 the command of the POGR was removed from the army and placed in the Presidential Office. By 1966 the POGR had 50 officers and 1142 men.[51] In sum, by the time of the coup the Ghanaian army was a reasonably autonomous body which had cut its explicit ties with the former role of colonial police-force and had become identified as an explicitly Ghanaian military force.

With reference to cohesion of the military, there was little to point to any major cleavages (with the exception of the POGR). There were no major ethnic rivalries as in the case of Nigeria, the army was not very large and there was no significant interservice rivalry, there was no partisan rivalry, and finally the divisions which had appeared were not very significant.[52] The most serious potential threat to cohesion lay in the fact that with the relatively rapid expansion and Africanization, many officers had received rapid promotions, which in turn meant that future promotion channels would be rather atrophied.

With reference to the predispositions favouring intervention, a high level of dissatisfaction against the civilian polity began to develop from 1960 onwards. Although there was strong dissatisfaction against all three major points of reference (i.e. structures, policies and incumbents), it would appear that it was dissatisfaction against certain policies, which was instrumental in precipating dissatisfaction against structures and incumbents. Hence the examination of predispositional dissatisfactions may focus on the policy level.

One of the first problems to occur centered around the Ghanaian deployment in the Congo. Even prior to the Congo's independence, Nkrumah had established a special office in Leopoldville to link with Lumumba. On July 12 1960 a 6 man Ghanaian delegation, led by Colonel Otu, was sent to the Congo to see how Ghana could assist Lumumba in controlling the army. The subsequent conflict appears to stem from the confusion of the Ghanaian troops' responsibility to the UN mission and Nkrumah's occasional attempts to be of assistance to Lumumba. The second issue appeared in 1961 when Nkrumah ordered 400 cadets to be sent to the USSR. This move was strongly and successfully resisted by the military, which did not wish

to mix either training patterns or arsenals.

A third problem related to the 1962 move to open an Armed Forces Bureau designed to engage officers in political discussion. This was followed in 1964 by more concerted efforts to persuade the military to join the CPP.[54] Fourthly, Nkrumah attempted to undermine the autonomy of the armed forces. Thus there was considerable military resentment at the POGR, a number of measures were enacted to balance the police against the military (e.g. the police were given control of a national radio network or against the police force was very large), in June 1964 military training was introduced into the Workers Brigade, and finally when the POGR was transferred to the Presidential Office so too was the control of defence affairs moved from the Ministry of Defence to a secretariat in the Presidential Office.[55] Fifthly, in July 1965 major Generals Otu and Ankrah were suddenly dismissed and replaced with more favourable Nkrumah men, Afferi and Barwah. Finally, it seems that the military was strongly opposed to the consequences of the economic policies of the regime (especially rising inflation) and also to the level of corruption (i.e. the more visible aspects of the growing instability.)

The factors inhibiting intervention were much higher than in either the case of Pakistan or Egypt. The main factor, which would inhibit intervention, was the threat of opposition from the POGR and branches of the CPP. Furthermore the coup-makers could not count on the support of the head of the armed forces. (It was probably this constellation of forces, which led to the alliance with the police-force.) The CPP opposition did not materialize, although the POGR did make some armed resistance. On the other hand, the military could assume it would receive civilian support from non-CPP groups.

Although the Ghanaian military did not become directly involved in the condition of instability (on account of the absence of a high degree of monitoring), by 1966 Ghana was manifesting a high degree ofinstability

which was intimately related to the military's predispositions. In 1966 the military made a coup in coordination with the police.[57]

PERFORMANCE

A number of introductory comments on the Ghanaian military regime may be made. In the first place, the regime was clearly an equilibrating regime. Although the pre-coup regime was totally dismantled and an alternative substituted, the military regime at no time constituted an alternative, and further the revamped regime contained many elements of a previous form of political organization. Secondly, a significant degree of civilianization took place in the course of the regime in terms of the employment of civilians in executive and top administrative positions. There was no civilianization, as in Pakistan or Egypt, whereby the military regime itself attempts to imitate or conform to standardized patterns of a civilian regime (as in the formation of a political party). Thirdly there was no major change in the induced generalized politicized professional syndrome during the regime, although it must be noted that at the time of the coup the indicators of partisan and sectional identification were stronger than in either the case of Pakistan or Egypt.

The first problem area to be examined relates to the manner and success of military performance with reference to the major nation state political functions.

Two factors are of import concerning the method of decision-making. The first relates to the structure. Although there was a considerable degree of centralization, there was a progressive and marked devolution in the decision-making process during the military rule. The degree of centralization is indicated in that the National Liberation Council remained the primary executive body until the return to civilian government in September 1969[58]; or again political parties were banned and the CPP dismantled. Nonetheless there were a number of indications of

significant devolution. First there was considerable reliance on the administration, to be examined below; second in June 1966 the NLC appointed an advisory political committee of 23 (overwhelmingly composed of professional groups and led by former supreme court judge Akafu-Addo); third in July 1967 an executive council of 17 commissioners (14 of whom were civilians) was appointed;[59] a week after the establishment of the Executive Council, the Political Committee was abolished and a National Advisory Committee of 31 established;[60] finally in January 1969 a constituent Assembly was established to consider the draft constitution.[61] The second general factor of import concerns the reliance on administrative techniques and the civil administration itself. Thus with the exception of the period of the Constituent Assembly (which could be seen to some extent as a popular body), all bills and policies were direct decrees. (It must further be noted that the constituent Assembly was not a powerful body and was concerned only with a limited area of decision making.)

The reliance on the civilian administration can be seen from two indicators. Firstthe NLC relied on a large number of commissions for policy formulation: for example an economic commission (consisting solely of government officials and the governors of the Bank of Ghana and Ghana Commercial Bank) was established on the day of the coup, this was followed a few days later by a constitution commission and in later months by additional commissions such as commission on Public Services, commissions to inquire into malpractices, Prices and Incomes Commission etc. Second, the nine regions of Ghana were headed by military or police officials, i.e. the military used the administrative chain of command; or again principal secretaries were placed at the head of the various ministries and directly responsible to the NLC.[62]

With reference to the scope of decision-making two major areas require analysis, namely those policies concerning the reorganization and restructuring of the political and economic systems. Six factors

are of import with reference to the economic reorganization. In the first place, a large number of the state enterprises were offered either for total private sale or partial private ownership. The Peoples Trading Corporation and the United Ghana Farmers Council Cooperative were dissolved. Secondly, the 7 Year Plan, representing the first major attempt to diversify the Ghanaian economy and promote industry, was abandoned for a much more limited two year plan focused primarily on agriculture. Third, considerable attempts were made to balance the budget, which was cut by over half. The budgetary cut was associated with a number of austerity measures such as, reduction by 40% of the Ghanaian embassy staff, a number of projects such as the Accra-Tema motorway and the construction of Temale airport were stopped. Fourth, in July 1967 a further range of stabilization measures were introduced, including a 30% devaluation, the reduction of import duties and sales taxes on certain commodities and the increase of the minimum wage. Fifthly, a number of control measures were improved. Thus import licensing was improved, imports were cut drastically, in September 1967 the remaining state-run enterprises were reorganized, and in March 1968 a Prices and Incomes Commission was established to control all pay increases and prices. Finally, Ghana's external debts were rescheduled in December 1966 to ease repayments. Further there were increased loans and aid from the West.[63]

Although the military regime did undoubtedly experience some success in its economic performance, this success was certainly equivocal. In the first place, the military was successful in drastically reducing imports (in consonance with easing imports on certain essential goods) and also after an initial decline in boosting exports.

Table 6:6 Ghana Imports and Exports in U.S. millions (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Imports	448	352	310	308
Exports	291	244	278	307

In this context the military were undoubtedly assisted by the rising price of world cocoa, a factor clearly beyond their control.

Table 6:7 Ghana's Cocoa Exports (Europa Yearbook)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Tons 000s.	493.9	391.5	329.6	329.9
Value £000s.	68,238	51,529	65,335	92,800

Secondly, the military had some success in controlling inflation as recorded by the consumer price index, although by 1968 such control was clearly diminishing.

Table 6:8 Ghana's consumer Price Index (1963=100) (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
All Items	144	151	140	155
Food	158	163	139	157

Thirdly, there was a significant rise in the industrial production index though it is dubious as to how much this can be attributable to the military regime, (certainly the rise in electricity output was a consequence of the Volta project.)

Table 6:9 Ghana's Industrial Production Index (1963=100)(U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Total	104	112	120	135
Manuf.	104	108	122	149
Electricity	129	163	222	247

Fourthly, in 1967 the budget was made to balance. These successes were tempered by four (not too-favourable) factors. In the first place, the public debt continued to rise.

Table 6:10 Ghana's Public debt in new cedis millions (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Domestic	407.1	464.7	487.3	538.1
Foreign	378.4	414.7	401.0	492.7

Secondly, there was a decline in per capita product.

Table 6:11 Estimates Ghana's per capita GNP at market prices (In U.S.$) (U.N.Statistical Yearbook)

1965	1966	1967	1968
287	314	250	238

or again:

Table 6:12 Index no Ghana's total per capital product at constant prices (1963=100) (U.N. Statistical Yearbook)

1965	1966	1967	1968
98	96	95	94

Thirdly, as state enterprises were cut back and the budget reduced, there was a marked rise in unemployment. Although there appears to be consensus

on the marked increase, estimates of it do vary. Bing sites unemployment of 105,000 in April 1967 and 30% unemployment in Accra, while Dowse cites unemployment in 1968 of probably not less than 80,000 and that 40,000 of 52,000 middle-school leavers in 1967 were unemployed.[64] Finally, there was a rise in foreign dependence, and from early 1968 there were strong efforts to reduce the number of foreigners involved in business enterprises and there were provisions established for the reservation of certain categories of trade to Ghanaians.

The major policy decisions concerning the reorgnization of the political structure were fivefold. First, the whole of the CPP establishment was dissolved. The CPP, which had made no resistance to the coup and more or less spontaneously disintegrated, was banned, as were the associated organs of the Young Pioneers, the Bureau of African Affairs, the Nkrumah Ideological Institute, the United Ghana Farmers Council and the Peoples Trading Corporation. Second, the civilian administration was reorganized in the form of a reduction of Ministries from 32 to 18, and of districts from 168 to 147, a commission of public services was appointed to overhaul the entire administration, many Regional and District Officers were replaced, and finally since many state enterprises were relinquished the load on the civilian administration was lightened. Third, a number of changes in the juridicial apparatus was effected. In September 1966 many local court magistrates, who had been appointed on grounds of loyalty to the CPP than any other qualifications, were replaced; the number of judges was reduced from 36 to 29 (with 16 of the original number not being reappointed); the final changes in the juridicial structure were effected in the new constitution. Fourthly, a new constitution was promulgated. The major provisions of the new constitution were to list a number of general safeguards for civil liberties (e.g. no detention for longer than 24 hours without a charge) safeguards against election rigging, against tribalism and press restrictions; there was provision for a non-executive President; for a

Prime Minister and a cabinet of collective responsibility and responsible to Parliament; for a parliament of 140 members in which procedure was laid down in detail (all bills were to be examined by committees, salaries were set by the President, there were penalties for defamation and loss of seat for absence of 15 sessions or for crossing the floor); and finally for an independent judiciary whose members could only be removed by an elaborate procedure involving a tribunal. Fifthly, political parties, which had been banned at the time of the coup, were allowed to reform in April 1969 in accordance with a number of provisions approved by the constituent assembly. The major provisions were that parties were not to be formed on tribal or religious bases, were not to include certain members of the former regime, and before being registered had to submit 54 members with at least three drawn from each of the regions.

Since most of the policy decisions concerning the reorganization of the political system had reference to the future civilian regime, their success or non-success may be examined below.

With reference to the institutionalization process, the longer-terms problems were avoided for a number of reasons. First, the military was not committed to any long-term rule - in fact in May 1968, after, just two years of rule, the withdrawal date was set for September 1969; and second it was clear that the previous regime had little support and that the military regime had been received with considerable popular enthusiasm. Having made this caveat, it seems clear that the military regime made little effort to institutionalize its regime. Thus it provided no body of rules for its rule (as the provisional constitution in Turkey), there were no rules for political succession (and there did appear to be some covert jockeying in the NLC) and finally there did appear to be some degree of corruption.[65] The only degree of institutionalization was contingent first on the fact that the NLC was a clearly identifiable body

and that all decrees were to be channelled through it, and second in that the sphere of competence and autonomy of a number of major organizations did increase. The small scale development of military regime institutionalization would have led to severe problems had the regime perpetuated its rule.

Three factors are of import with reference to support mobilization. In the first place, unlike the previous cases which had been examined, the military sought no formal popular mandate. Indeed the only degree of popular participation was in the constituent assembly and even in this case the Assembly was not popularly elected. Secondly, although the military regime did not seek any popular support, it could count on the tacit support of a number of salient groups. Firstly, it could count on the support of both the army and police-force, both of which received increased allowances and had a number of functions restored. Second, it could count on the support of the civil administration. The administration was closely involved in the regime, its burden had been lightened, its structure had been made secure and finally it had received a significant pay increase. Thirdly, the military could rely on a large number of miscellaneous groups which had been suppressed during the Nkrumah regime, such as former members of the United Party, exiled or deposed members of the CPP, deposed former members of the courts, the universities and the press. Fourthly, the TUC soon swung round to support the new regime, as also did the private entrepreneur who now found easier credit and tax restrictions. Finally, although the coup could not be seen at all as tribal, the regime did enlist a degree of chieftancy support when in December 1966 the chiefs dismissed by Nkrumah were restored and 194 wrongly elevated paramount chiefs reduced, and further the new constitution gave them increased power in local councils where they had a majority over elected members. The third general point is to reiterate an observation made in connection with the institutionalization process, namely that the coup was popularly received and that there was no organised

popular support for any political body in 1966.

In sum, although the military made no attempt to mobilize any mass support, the nature of instability in 1966 combined with the military's short-term rule plus its support groups meant that the military regime experienced no major problem with reference to the maintenance of support. Indeed a national poll of over 8000 people in December 1967 showed that 91.8% were happy with the NLC, 45% did not want a return to civilian rule, 44% wanted a return in 1970 and 31% wanted it in 1971 or 1972 or were uncertain.

As in the case of most military regimes, the NLC had an extensive array of monitoring mechanisms, including its control over the police, armed forces, administration. However, although short-term monitoring is rarely a problem for a united military, particularly when it is backed by the civil administration, there were a number of indications that the military regime was experiencing a number of difficulties. In the first place, it was not completely unified as illustrated by the attempted coup of April 1967 (to be examined below) or the changes in the NLC. Second although PDA was abolished, it was replaced by Protective Custody and Bing claims twice as many were held as under the PDA. Further in January 1967, military tribunals were established to try certain offences. Thirdly, a degree of press control was retained as evidenced by the dismissal of the editors of three major newspapers which criticized the policy of the NLC with reference to the foreign companies of Abbott and Norement.

The second major task in the analysis of the military performance is to examine the degree of success of the military in allieviating the basic conditions of instability. With reference to the first dissynchronization, i.e. the nature of the economic structure, the following points may be noted. In the first place, there was no significant change in

the dependence on a single crop economy. Although there was greater attention devoted to agricultural development and although the industrial production index rose, the 7 Year Plan, the first technical plan and the first major attempt to diversify systematically,was abandoned and further, considerable credit for the rise in industrial production index must antecede the military period of rule. Secondly, the weak position of Ghana within the international financial system was not improved. The policies of the Nkrumah era had left Ghana in a rather ambivalent position in that although the policies were correctly directed towards closing an 'open' economy, they had been so badly devised and executed that Ghana was still in a weak position, cf size of external debt. The approach of the military was much more pragmatic and eclectic. Although as will be shown below, economic decision-making improved, the basic policies of the military began to retract from the drive to autonomy, i.e. in surrendering state enterprises, encouraging more foreign capital, increasing the external debt. In sum, the longer-term prospects of the military economic policies would not have produced the same degree of autonomy and insulation for Ghana as these anticipated under Nkrumah. Thirdly there was of course no basic alteration in the internal market size, although it is likely that the military regime found more favourable external markets.

The following observations are pertinent concerning the second dissynchronization. The military could not of course affect the fact that the decision to close the economy was taken too late. Second, the problem of the malfunctioning of a number of state enterprises was cured to some degree by releasing state control; further a number of other state organizations were reorganised, e.g. CMB. Finally, there was an undoubted increase in the efficiency of economic decision-making. The multiple focus of decision-making under Nkrumah was simplified, there was greater leeway given to economic experts, and there was greater

general efficiency and organization. Thus imports of essential goods were stimulated and made easier, import controls in general were much more rigorously and selectively applied, a number of necessary austerity measures were enacted, superfluous and prestige spending was cut, and some success was achieved in rescheduling external debts.

In sum, with reference to the economic dissynchronizations, the performance of the military regime was ambivalent. It was undoubtedly much more pragmatic and efficient in its economic policies, and although its long-term policies would not guarantee Ghana as strong a position as those of Nkrumah, it must be recalled that the Nkrumah policies were far from successful and that the military inherited a chronically weak economic position.

With reference to the dislocation of the atrophy of political participation, the military regime was generally more successful. The first factor precipitating this dissynchronization, the essification of the CPP, was easily solved by the removal of that party. This action was easily executed and had no significant ramifications because the CPP had become so moribund that its dissolution was virtually spontaneous. The factors which contributed to the assification of the CPP are unlikely to reappear since the new constitution has created a number of mechanisms which would severely inhibit the development of the hegemony of any single party. The second factor contributing to the atrophy of political participation was the restriction of alternative channels and mechanisms of participation. In this context three observations may be made. First, the military regime has opened up more channels of participation by virtue of the removal of the CPP. Second, since the CPP never had any mass support, and did indeed suppress a number of significantly large groups, there has been no problem or dearth of groups which have emerged and

coalesced to form political parties.[67] Third, a large number of the re-emerged groups are precisely those which were excluded at independence and to that extent it would appear that the new political parties are far from strong organizations. In sum, the military had some degree of success with reference to the dislocation of participation in that not only did the military regime itself experience little major difficulty in this area, but also the nature of instability meant that there was little problem in removing the former political party and permitting the reemergence of new ones.

With reference to the final dislocation concerning the administration, the military again registered some success. Thus by easing the load on the administration, it was able to ease the problem of the shortage of insufficiently qualified personnel. Secondly, the administrative structure was rationalized and given a greater degree of autonomy.

The third major problem concerns the repercussions of performance on military capabilities and predispositions, and vice versa. With reference to the main indicators of capabilities, the following observations may be made. First, performance had very little effect on skill levels. Second, there were very few changes with reference to composition and organization. Since the coup had no significant party or tribal or regional motivation, there was no change in recruitment patterns. Estimates of the size of the army indicate that there was a decline in size from 17000 in April 1966 to 15,900 in April 1970;[69] the structural organizational of the army in terms of 2 brigades of 6 batallions plus engineering and transport supports was unchanged; the relative sizes of the navy and air-force were unchanged; the military allowance does seem to have risen.[70] Indeed, the only significant change in the composition was that the POGR was dissolved and the advisers from Eastern Europe expelled. There, were however, a number of changes in autonomy in the direction of increasing military

autonomy. Thus the POGR, which had not been under army command, was dissolved, as were the other para-military organizations; a number of functions, such as border patrol, which had been taken from the military and police, were restored; and finally in the new constitution control of the army was split between the President who chose the Chief of Staff and the Armed Forces Council which was under the Prime Minister. Fourthly, a number of threats to the cohesion did appear in the army. Two main changes may be examined. The first pertains to the splits precipitated by the NLC. Since the coup was not led by the top army commanders, it was clear that these commanders, Barwah and Aferi, had to be removed (Barwah was in fact killed during the coup), but there were no mass dismissals following the coup. Further there appeared a number of conflicts within the NLC and top army command. In 1968 Ankrah gave up the post of commander-in-chief to Otu, but the latter was arrested in November and replaced by Ocran. In April 1969, Ankrah was replaced by Afrifa, at the time of the coup only a major, as head of state and chairman of the NLC. The second main cleavage was the attempted coup of April 1967 led by Lt. Arthur and two other lieutenants. Although the attempted coup very nearly achieved its objectives (Kotoka one of the main originators of the 1966 coup was killed), it appears that the attempt was not really serious. Thus it was led only by lieutenants, it involved only 120 troops of Squadron B of the Reconnaissance Regiment, it seems as though the motivation was personal grievances, and even before it was suppressed students were organizing in favour of the NLC.[71]

The ramifications of performance for the military predispositions were twofold. In the first place, the total collapse and removal of the CPP regime immediately removed the specific military grievances.

Secondly, performance led to a heightened military involvement in the policy. Not only could the military have some determining effect on the nature and structure of the new civilian regime, but also by occupying certain government posts. Thus there was permanent provision for the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the Presidential Council of State, and further for the first three years of civilian rule the trio of Afrifa, Hartley and Ocran w ere to constitute the Presidency.

The general consequence of the organizational capabilities of the army, it is suggested, did not predispose it to stay in power too long. Thus it evidently did not possess the requisite skills to execute a fully economic or political programme and was increasingly dependent on various civilian bodies. Further, although the cleavages were never very severe, it was equally clear that military rule was not fostering cohesion. The general predispositions led to an eclectic, pragmatic period of rule during which time most of the policies were directed to establishing greater austerity or efficiency. Certainly this consequence is clear seen both in the economic policies and in many of the provisions for the return to civilian rule. The more specific predispositions, derived from interaction, with the Nkrumah regime, are quite clearly reflected in individual policy decisions, such as establishment of the autonomy of major functional organizations, and measures to inhibit the legemony of any single party etc.

The fourth and final problem relates to the examination of the military transfer of power. The two main problems to be examined are: the nature of the transfer and the conditions underlying the transfer. With reference to the former, three factors are of import. In the first place, the transfer was peaceful and clear-cut. Second the mechanism of transfer was the most common in the situation where such a clear transfer is effected. That mechanism consists of the promulgation of

a constitution which receives some popular ratification and which precedes national elections prior to which political parties are allowed to reorganize.[72] Third, although the military rule by necessity influenced the nature of the subsequent civilian regime, the direct military controls on the subsequent civilian regime were very small and concentrated largely in the occupancy of the Presidency, which is a non-executive post and is of only 3 years duration, (the Busia cabinet contains no military members.)

The peaceful and successful transfer of power could take place because three essential conditions were satisfied. In the first place, the military was clearly committed to withdrawal. The military clearly did not possess the requisite skills to perpetuate their rule; the cleavages within the NLC were becoming problematic; and the military had had some success in achieving its/perceived goals. In the second place, on account of the nature of political instability prior to the coup, there existed civilian forces which could assume the/central decision-making positions. Finally, the military regime had had some small degree of success in all/eviating the constellation of instability, though this was particularly ambivalent in the case of the economic dislocations.

PAGE NUMBERING AS ORIGINAL

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN INDONESIA

INTERVENTION

Indonesia differs from the other case studies on two important accounts. In the first place, it is inadequate to consider the development of instability within a single regime, but rather it is necessary to examine two breakdowns: that of the regime existing from independence to the inception of Guided Democracy (dating formally from 1959),[1] and that of the Guided Democracy Regime. Although the second period is the more important for our purposes, it cannot be analyzed satisfactorily without an examination of the preceding regime. The second difference relates to the nature of the coup itself. The coup was not an immediate, explicit military take-over in that it was precipitated in the short-term by factors immediately outside the sphere of control of the military, and in that it was a period of months before the military government was completely established. Nonetheless the Indonesian case may be analyzed within our frame of reference in that although the coup was precipitated to a degree by factors outside the immediate military control, these factors were the product of the instability profile, and further a coup is clearly identifiable in that a civilian government was replaced by a military one.

Until the Japanese occupation in 1942, Indonesia was a colonial system which manifested very little nation state development. Although the colonial status of Indonesia was not significantly changed until the end of the occupation, many of the nascent nation state processes were allowed to develop.[2] During the period 1945-49 two competing political systems existed in Indonesia. One was that of the emerging Indonesian nation state system occupying about half of Java and most of Sumatra (as in 1947) and organized under a 1945 constitution; the other was that of the returning Dutch forces which sought to isolate the Republic through the establishment of federal negaras and through military force (despite U.N. pressure and the Linggadjatiand Renville Agreements). Ultimately the Dutch attempts

to reimpose their colonial system proved abortive and in 1949 Indonesia became formally independent, and established as a threshold or low level nation state system.[3]

During the period up to 1959 all the main types of instability developed. Until 1953 instability was not particularly marked but after 1956 very high levels had been reached. It is interesting to note that with the exception of institutionalization failure, which showed a continual and progressive growth, the other types of instability showed marked degrees of oscillation. The first task concerns the idenfification of the indicators of instability.

The indicators of decision-making method are numerous. In the first place there was a high degree of cabinet instability. From August 1949 to July 1959 there were 11 cabinets; in no cabinet did a single party have a majority and in only one cabinet did two parties hold a majority (2nd Hatta cabinet August-December 1949); and considerable difficulties were experienced in the formation of cabinets.[4] Secondly, there was considerable conflict within and between cabinets. (The policy oscillations between cabinets can be seen most clearly in the four successive cabinets from August 1953, all of which reversed a significant number of policy decisions of the previous one.) Thirdly, the fragmentation of cabinets was represented in parliamentary committees, which had one member from each party. Fourth, there was increasing conflict and obstruction between the parliamentary parties and cabinets and the President. The conflict between the President and parliamentary bodies stemmed from the 1945-49 period during which time the powers of the President had been successfully curtailed. However, given the increasing cabinet instability, the President was able to reassert an increasing degree of control until in 1957 the first extra-parliamentary cabinet was introduced and later in 1957 the National Advisory Council was introduced.[5]

With reference to decision-making scope, two main areas may be noted.

The first area is that of the economy in which decision-making failure can be represented by three indicators. In the first place export production was declining:

Table 6:13 : Indonesia's Exports as Percentage G.D.P.[6]

1951	1953	1955	1957	1959
22	11	9	6	5

Second government deficits were beginning to increase so that the deficit in 1959 was almost half of the government revenue.

Table 6:14 : Indonesian Central Government Finances (Rupiahs '000s m)[7]

	Receipts	Expenditure	Deficits
1955	14.2	16.3	-2.1
1956	18.4	20.7	-2.3
1957	20.6	25.6	-5.0
1958	23.0	35.3	-12.3
1959	30.3	44.4	-14.1

Thirdly, although inflation was reasonably contained until 1956, a marked rise was becoming apparent. Thus the cost of living index rose from 100 (1953) to 250 (1958) to 292 (1959), or again the money supply began to rise:

Table 6:15 : Indonesia's Money Supply (in '000s m Rupiahs)[8]

1951	1953	1955	1957	1958	1959
5.03	7.49	12.24	18.91	29.36	34.88

With reference to the second decision making area, the major problems appeared to be the incapacity to establish the major national political structures. Thus the draft constitution of 1950 was still in force when it was repealed in 1959 and the Constituent Assembly, which had not been established until 1956, had made no progress by that date; or again the national elections foreshadowed in the 1950 constitution were not held until 1955; or again elected regional assemblies were not established until 1957.[9]

There were three indicators of institutionalization failure. In the

first place, there was no established body of rules for conducting politi-- cal interaction. The draft constitution of 1950 soon became ineffective and was virtually superceded by 1956-7; both the President and the army played an increasingly large non-institutionalized role; or again there was an increasing personalization of political interaction as parties fragmented.[10] In the second place, there was an increasing erosion of the spheres of competence of a number of major institutions. Thus cabinet authority was increasingly undermined by the President until in April 1957 the first non-parliamentary cabinet appointed by the President took office; or again in 1959 when the cabinet refused to reenact the 1945 constitution, it was issued by Presidential decree. The cabinet decline was again part of the larger process of decline of parliament, which was finally dismissed in 1960 when it refused a budget. The same process of the erosion of the defined role and limits of a number of other political organizations was also evident as in central planning associations or the civil administration. Thirdly, there is general consensus that by 1953 corruption and patronage had reached high levels. Thus in the change from the Ali cabinet to the Harahap one in 1955, there was a massive change in the civil service; or by 1954 smuggling and tax evasion in the regions had become extensive; although the Harahap cabinet tried to launch an anti-corruption drive this gradually slowed and an emergency law to make the prosecution of corruption easier was defeated and in the succeeding Ali cabinet the anti-corruption drive came to a halt.[11] In sum, there had been little concerted attempt to institutionalize the political system: in 1959 Indonesia remained under a provisional constitution, the major channels and processes of political interaction remained unclarified and became increasingly fluid, and finally patronage and corruption expanded continuously.

Two types of support failure were evident: withdrawal and insuffi-

cience. There were two main cases of withdrawal. The first was the regional protest which began in 1957 when a number of regional governments in Sumatra were overthrown; unrest later spread to include East Indonesia and Kalimantan. Efforts at negotiation between the regions and the centre, i.e. Java, failed so that in February 1958 a Provisional Regional Government was declared. Finally government troops were deployed in April 1958 and by the end of May the major armed opposition had been broken.[12] Nonetheless, the length of time taken to quell the rebellions together with the conciliatory attitudes towards the rebels has been taken as an indication of the significance of the protests and the comparative weakness of the centre. The second source of withdrawal of support was the transfer of allegiance of the PNI and PKI away from the parliamentary regime of the 1950 constitution to the outline of the Guided Democracy regime which was increasingly propagated by Sukarno after 1957.[13] The second type of support failure was that of insufficience which is characterized primarily by the atrophy of political parties. The political parties, which by the 1955 election numbered approximately four dozen (though it must be noted that 4 parties claimed 75% of the vote), never developed beyond loose clique structures, which in the situation of progressive institutionalization failure became transformed into patronage seeking organizations.[14]

The major indicators of monitoring failure are threefold. In the first place, there are a number of cases of the inability of the government to establish its authority. The most important of such cases have been regional rejections of central government authority. The first protests followed immediately after independence in the Westerling rebellion in West Java, the Aziz rebellion in East Indonesia and a more severe revolt in Amboina. However, these cases of government authority rejection could not be seen as very significant since most were easily defeated and since by August 1950 the Republic had managed to establish a unitary

government integrating the last of the former Dutch negaras. The second incidence of authority failure was the series of regional protests of 1957, which were of a much more extensive nature and posed a much more serious threat to the central government. Nonetheless, the central government did manage to survive the crisis, though there are several indications that survival was not easily achieved.[15] The second indicator, that of the rise of the government use of force, is closely related to the regional protests noted above. This is indicated by the maintenance of a large military force, by the oontinuously high volume of violence in regions, and finally by the declaration in August 1957 of full martial law. The third indicator relates to the failure to implement decisions. This process was tied to the increasing ineffectiveness of the civil bureaucracy which became progressively more marked after the first Ali cabinet.[16]

The second task is that of identifying the major dissynchronizations. The first two concern the interaction between the economic and political systems. With reference to the first dissynchronization, the structure of the economy, four factors are of import. In the first place, the conflict with the Dutch 1945-49 led to a number of major dislocations including a scorched-earth policy and a debt by Indonesia to the Dutch of $1,130 m.[17] Second, until 1957 the most important sectors of the economy continued to be held by the Dutch. Although it could not be denied that the Dutch economic interests had some beneficial ramifications for Indonesia (especially the shipping lines), nonetheless many of the Dutch enterprises were of an enclave nature with little diffusion from the capital intensive sectors of the economy to the labour intensive ones.[18] Thirdly, there was a significant regional imbalance. Colonialism had failed to promote domestic inter-island trade and many of the colonial trends became accelerated after independence. Thus Java became increasingly dependent on the exports of the Outer Islands with the ratio of Java's exports to the Outer Islands moving from 1.21 in 1940 to 6.70 in

1959.[19] Finally, the export pattern of Indonesia was a very unstable one. As in the case of Ghana, foreign exchange was dependent to a large degree on a single agricultural export (and as such was subject to the dangers of wide price fluctuation, production fluctuation, etc.). Pelzer notes that agricultural exports provide two-thirds of all foreign exchange with rubber contributing about 45%.[20]

With reference to the second dislocation, four points are of import. In the first place there was little coordination of investment and production. There was no central planning body to allocate production and investment resources, and there was little coordination among the various agencies participating in this process. Both the first two plans (the Urgency Economic Plan 1951, and the First Five Year Plan 1956-61) proved ineffective, were frequently revised and finally abandoned. Secondly, there was little attempt made to contain inflation. Although the situation was reasonably contained until 1954, although a number of stabilization attempts were made later, and although as Schmitt points out some degree of inflation was implicit in the attempt to control Dutch interests, the stabilization measures were not sufficiently extensive, and the government deficits were getting beyond control. Thirdly the government made no major attempt to increase its revenue through internal taxation and continued to rely heavily on indirect taxation of imports and exports. Finally, the nationalization of the Dutch enterprises took place both too late and was generally mismanaged in that Indonesia did not possess the requisite personnel and skills to suddenly replace the Dutch. This dislocation was later compounded by the expulsion and restriction of many Chinese retail traders.[21]

The third dissynchronization is that of system-cleavage, which in the case of Indonesia was of a regional nature.[22] Three factors contributed to the development of this system breakdown. The first and most

evident is the regional diversity of Indonesia. In the second place, a number of historical factors have provided the basis for regional conflict. Thus although 90% of the population is recorded as Islamic, Islam has had a very uneven impact.[23] More importantly Dutch impact was very uneven. Dutch penetration of the Outer Islands was generally more laissez-faire and of a later date that that of Java. As has been noted already the structural economic dichotomy between Java and the Islands was established by 1930 and thereafter enhanced as the initiative for development (rubber, petrol, tin, copra) moved to the Outer Islands. Finally, the Japanese occupation continued the uneven development.[24] Thirdly, the imbalances created through geographical and colonial factors were perpetuated in the first years of independence particularly through economic policy making. The consequences of regional cleavage were primarily for support failure (withdrawal) and monitoring failure.

The fourth dissynchronization was the failure to develop the mechanisms of participation as evidenced in the atrophy of political parties and the failure to develop electoral mechanisms. Five factors explain the atrophy of political parties. First there was no unified nationalist movement which was dominated by a single large grouping. Second the parties were largely clique groupings which operated primarily at the national level with very poor linkages to intermediate and local levels. Thirdly, with the exception of the PKI, party factionalism, based on personal ambitions and not issues, was high. Fourthly, it was only the secular parties which were concerned with popular mobilization and recruitment. Fifth, until 1955 all party members were appointed and could easily move from one party to another thereby inhibiting any party discipline.[25] Electoral mechanisms were restricted largely by patronage considerations of incumbent power groups. The failure of participation mechanisms had consequences for decision-making (method) (particularly with

reference to cabinet instability), institutionalization (particularly the failure to develop stable bodies of expectations concerning interaction and also corruption) and support instability (especially insufficience).

The final dissynchronization concerns the failure to develop satisfactorily a number of political institutions. Three major ones may be considered. With reference to the first, the constitution, the draft constribution, drawn up in October 1949 by the Republic and representatives of the 15 Dutch states, was a weird and unbalanced constitution designed to favour Dutch interests.[26] Although demand for a unitary system led to the promulgation of a further draft constitution in August 1950, this constitution also was very inappropriate. The powers of the Presidency were ill-defined, as also were relations between a number of major decision-making bodies, or again the Assembly could only be dissolved if elections were held within 30 days (but no electoral law was specified). The second major organization to be considered is the parliamentary or legislative body. The independence legislative body was composed largely of appointed or nominated members who were unwilling to face elections; there had been little experience of legislative institutions prior to independence; and finally parliament had no substantial resource base since it was opposed both by Sukarno and the army and since the weak parties were unable to consolidate its position. The third major organization, to be examined, is the civil administration. A number of factors account for the inefficacy of the administration. First the Dutch had trained very few Indonesians in higher education and had allocated very few top bureaucratic posts; second during the Japanese occupation and anti-Dutch struggle, the bureaucracy had expanded to twice its necessary size and further several autonomous administrative structures developped; third after independence no major successful attempt was made to revamp the bureaucracy so that its large size was maintained as it was used to catch

the urban unemployed, or again there were inadequate facilities to train the bureaucrats, or again extensive party politicization was taking place, or again the low salaries encouraged corruption.[27] The major consequences of the constitution failure were for all the major indicators of institutionalization failure; the major consquences of parliamentary failure were for institutionalization failure (stimulated erosion any stable patterns of interaction and facilitated corruption) and support failure (proved incapable of providing a stable source of support); the major consequence of the administration failure was for monitoring failure.

During 1959 and 1960 the Indonesian polity was completely transformed. The 1965 Constitution was reenacted by Presidential decree, the President became the main executive post, a Kerdja (Work) Cabinet was established, two advisory bodies (the Supreme Advisory Council, replacing the National Council, and the National Planning Council) were instituted, in 1960 a Gotong Rojong (Mutual Aid) Parliament replaced the formeroone and a Peoples Consultative Assembly was established, and a new political credo (the Manipol-Usdek) was pronounced.[28] The new political organization had the effect of changing the patterns and dissynchronizations of instability.

In general, there was a reduction of decision-making method failure in that the immobilism stimulated by party fragmentation and cabinet instability was eliminated. However, this form of instability was replaced to a degree by breakdown manifested in the over-centralization of decision making, which in turn introduced a high degree of stagnation.[29] However, the level of instability with reference to the scope of decision-making increased. The failure with reference to economic decision-making can be represented by the following indicators. First, the consumer price index became tied to a massive escalation:

Table 6:16 Indonesia's Consumer Price Index (1963 = 100) (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
10	13	17	46	100	205	830

Second budgetary deficits were increasing so that in 1965 central government expenditure was almost three times the revenue.

Table 6:17 Indonesia's Budgetary Deficit (Rupiahs '000m) (U.N. Stat. Yearbook)

1958	1963	1964	1965
-12.04	-117.12	-308.14	-1347.8

Third, the money supply had likewise become involved in a marked escalation.

Table 6:18 Indonesia's Money Supply (Rupiahs '000m) (Roeder, op.cit.)

1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
67.64	135.9	263.36	675.11	2713.69

Fourth, export earnings had declined from $750m 1960, to £450m 1965. Finally, the foreign debt was $2,400m.[30] With reference to the second major area of decision-making (scope) failure, there was a similar continuation of the incapacity to establish the major national political structures. Thus the provisional constitution of 1949 was still in effect by 1965, the requisite elections for the new central decision-makihg bodies did not take place.

With reference to institutionalization, there was a general increase on all the three indicators noted above. In the first place, although there was no explicit breakdown in the manner of interaction until 1965, no formal body of rules crystallized. Thus relations betweentthe major central bodies were not specified, there was considerable confusion between the civilian and military martial law administration and finally the Indonesian polity came to be balanced on a shifting triangle of forces which bore little relevance to any formal prescription. In the second place, the erosion of competence of many bodies cntinued. Thus each agency had very poorly demarcated responsibilities (for example control of the NPC seemed to be passed around a number of organizations), new

bodies continued to be created (such as state leadership consultative council 1962 and the Council of Assistants to the Leadership of Revolution 1963), administrative heads became dependent on civilian ministers, the new regional assemblies were effectively truncated and regional heads became central appointments. Thirdly corruption and patronage continued to increase. In sum, the fluidity, non-routine patterns of interaction involving personalization and patronage, which increasingly characterized the pre-1959 period, continued to grow.[31]

It is difficult to estimate precisely the nature of support failure, but it would appear that this type of instability also increased. With reference to withdrawal, it would seem that much Muslim support was cut off with the banning of the Masjumi Party. (In fact all but 10 parties were banned though with the exception of the Masjumi, all were small) However, the second type of support failure was more marked than the first. Thus Sukarno came to rely for support partially on mass rally type campaigns (as "Liberation West Irian" or "crush Malaysia") but were particularly on the growing strength of the Communist Party, PKI. The PKI prior to 1959 was the only organized mass party and after the inception of Guided Democracy became the only significant party organization. The failure to mobilize support may be illustrated by a number of factors. Thus the weak parties became even more circumscribed through the Political Party Simplification Ordinance of 1954 and through being balanced by functional groups and through martial law restrictions;[33] or again the new quasi-party bodies did not materialize. The National Front established by the military was taken over by Sukarno and soon after faded; the BPS (Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism) likewise faded, though this time under direct PKI pressure.

There was in general a decline in monitoring failure, although it must be noted that the monitoring controls employed by the polity increased.

On the one hand, there were no major challenges to central government authority and again there was a decline in domestic violence. On the other hand martial law remained in effect until 1963; central controls were increased (as in the diminution of autonomy of regional assemblies, or in the increase in appointive powers of the President, or in the stronger press controls, or in the control of the Supreme Court); and finally as there was no increase in the effectiveness of the civilian administration and since its load was increased, there was a paralleled increase in the failure to implement decisions.[34]

The next task must be to examine the dislocations underlying the new pattern of instability. With reference to the structure of the economy, there had been only one significant change, namely the nationalization of the Dutch enterprises and the expulsion of many Chinese traders. Although these moves had given greater economic control to the polity, their immediate economic consequences had not been beneficial. The expulsion of the Chinese traders led to a serious debacle in retail trading until government-run organizations could replace them. The nationalization of the Dutch enterprises generally led to a fall in production since insufficient personnel were available to replace the Dutch.[35]

With reference to the second dislocation, i.e. economic decision-making by the polity, three factors are of import. In the first place, the planning mechanism was not satisfactory. The NPC was a very large body, which was not immediately controlled by economic experts and which had to vie with a number of other bodies for control of the plan. It was replaced in March 1965 by a new planning body, the National Development Planning Assembly, whose first priority was to "Nation and Character Building" with the production of basic necessities taking second place.[36] Secondly, there was no concerted commitment to execute the 8 Year Plan. There was general mismanagement and a serious shortage of raw materials and spare

parts; in December 1964 only 200 out of the 335 A projects were being implemented and not one of the B projects had been realised; or again the plan was explicitly based on the need to attract a considerable amount of foreign currency yet a number of major policy decisions were deliberately aimed to repell overseas investors; or again the "Crush Malaysia" campaign could only aggravate economic difficulties.[37] Thirdly, there was no attempt to control inflation. Although Djuanda introduced a moderate stabilization programme in May 1963, with Djuanda's death at the end of 1963 all the May Regulations were soon rescinded. Budgetary deficits stimulated by the military expenditure on the "Crush Malaysia" campaign, continued to increase.[38] Thirdly, there contined to be no major effort to increase the government revenue, which as a percentage of net national product fell from 13% 1960 to 1.5% 1965.[39] In sum, there was a total neglect of economic problem-solving as economic decision-making became tied to other policy outputs.

The third dislocation analyzed above, i.e. regional system cleavage, was alleviated to some degree, although many of the basic factors conditioning this cleavage remained unchanged.

The fourth dislocation, the failure to develop satisfactorily mechaniams of participation, remained. This dislocation was attributable to three factors. The first was the legacy of the former regime during which time political parties had become ineffective. The second factor was the formal nature of Guided Democracy which itself did not provide any extensive measures for participation. Thirdly, the three major groupings of Guided Democracy were such that none wished to see any other extra-external group develop a mass base, and none wished to see any of the other two develop a strong independent popular base.[40]

The final dissynchronization concerns the failure to develop satisfactorily a number of major political institutions. The 1945 constitution

which replaced the 1950 one was equally unsuitable. It was a draft constitution which was prepared in the last two months of the Japanese Occupation by a very small number of people and contained few clear structural provisions. By 1965 there was no indication that this draft constitution was to be replaced by a fuller one. In the second place, many of the major organizations or instruments of Guided Democracy were ineffective organizations. The regional assemblies were replaced by appointed ones, the Peoples Consultative Assembly was still by 1965 a provisional one, and the Gotong Rojong was largely appointed. Finally, the civilian administration continued to be ineffective on the following accounts. First there was still no attempt to reduce its size. Second patronage within the administration increased, and the post of secretary-general as head of a government department was destroyed and replaced by a number of principal assistants directly dependent on the Minister. Third, the increased area of government controls together with rising inflation and the low pay of civil servants combined to enhance corruption.[41]

Having examined the profiles and dissynchronization of political instability, the next task must be to analyze the military's organization capabilities and predispositions. With reference to the organizational and predispositional indicators, there was some considerable variation over the period from independence to 1965.

The index of skill level probably shows the most continuous development. Under the Dutch Colonial system skill levels of Indonesians were virtually nill, but under the Japanese extensive Indonesian training was introduced. From the time of independence there was a continuous growth in skill levels on account of the relatively frequent deployment of the military and the large grants given to the military in order to acquire complex weaponry (and the most important arms build up began after 1961 with Soviet and East European aid which totalled $1.2 billion).

With reference to composition and structure the following factors may be noted. In the first place, the Indonesian armed forces are large. By 1945 the Peta forces trained by the Japanese numbered some 62,000 but by independence the Indonesian armed forces stood at 200,000. Although strenuous efforts were made by some military officers to reduce this number to 120,000 there was some considerable resistance.[43] However, unlike the civilian administration there was some successful reduction in numbers. Again following the regional revolts and the implementation of the West Irian and Crush Malaysia Campaigns the size of the armed forces increased reaching 355,000 in 1963 but by 1965 had been reduced to 234,000. In the second place, unlike for example Ghana or Burma, Indonesia has naval and air-force services. Although much of the Soviet aid was channelled to these services, they are not very large constituting something less than 20% of the total armed forces.[44] Thirdly, the Indonesian army has experienced a diversified recruitment base. Two major problems have plagued the army with reference to recruitment, the regional aspect and the training origin of the army personnel.[45] In the years preceding and succeeding independence both problems were compounded, but though the salience of the latter faded rapidly after 1962, the former continued to be problematic. The issue of the training origin of the army was problematic given its wide diversity. The main stream was composed of Indonesian officers trained by the Japanese in a force known as Peta, numbering by 1944 about 35,000. However, during the struggle against the Dutch two other groups came to be included, independent guerilla units and additional groups which had been trained by the Japanese but not armed and which had subsequently taken to arms. Finally, in 1950 a number of elements in the Dutch trained KNIL became incorporated into the Republic army. The strains of these diversified origins were evident in the KNIL protests in 1950 and the October 17 Affair 1952. Although the two groups in the October 17

Affair became reconciled in 1955, the regional problem persisted. Regional recruitment dated to the Japanese Occupation after which effectively two independence armies emerged, the one based on Java and the other on Sumatra. Further the nature of the struggle against the Dukh enhanced the decentralized, regional focus of the armed forces. Although following independence the army was centralized to a degree under 7 districts, the regional recruitment and focus of several units continued to be a major problem which climaced in the rebellions of 1957.

Internal autonomy of the military has again shown a number of oscillations. During the conflict with the Dutch there was obviously a high degree of interaction between military and nationalist leaders. Immediately following independence efforts were made to rationalize the army and to increase its autonomy. However, the defeat of the Nasution group in October 1952 led to three mutinies against divisional officers which received the approval of Sukarno. However, following the Charter of Unity and the reinstatement of Nasution in 1955, internal autonomy again increased.[46] During the period of Guided Democracy some degree of Sukarno intervention in the armed forces was evident, as in the replacement of Nasution by Yani in 1962, but this did not become excessive. The external autonomy, i.e. the degree of divorce, of the army from general political activity has never been great. Numerous examples illustrate the extensive military involvement: the nationalist struggle 1945-49 is self-evident; October 1952 amounted to a major attempt to influence policy decision-making; the military have formed or participated in a number of front or quasi-political parties such as the I.P.K.I., the Democratic League, and the National Front of 1960 and the B.P.S.; in 1967 martial law was declared and this lasted until 1963 during which time the military had extensive controls through the martial law administration; again in 1957 the military took over the management of many of the nationalized Dutch enterprises and again played an important economic role following

the expulsion of the Chinese traders; from 1957-59 the military were the major force pushing and supporting Sukarno to declare the reintroduction of the 1945 constitution and the banning of political parties; in the subsequent Guided Democracy Regime the military enjoyed a major position (in the 1959 cabinet 25% of the positions were held by the military and the new parliament included 40 military members).[47]

Military cohesion in Indonesia has generally been much higher following the successful defeat of the regional revolts than in the decade of the 1950s. Even post 1960 it has not been very great, which is understandable given the regional diversity of Indonesia and the large size of the armed fordes. However, it is most certainly true that cohesion increased markedly after 1959 over the number of serious cleavages, which had appeared in the 50s, i.e. the October Affair of 1952, the smuggling 1952-57, and the outright civil war of 1957.

The pattern of military predispositions also evidenced a number of important changes.

In the period up to 1959, military dissatisfaction against the political structure was high and very generalized. Thus part of the motivation for the 1952 Affair was the attempt to replace parliament with a new type; in 1955 the army successfully resisted attempts by Sastroadmijojo to politicize the officer corps and indeed brought about the fall of that cabinet; following the defeat of the Sumatron uprising Nusttion banned 4 political parties in central Sumatra, and later in 1959 banned all party activity; finally the military was one of the major groups supporting Sukarno in his attempt to replace the parliamentary system and to reintroduce the 1945 constitution based on stronger executive controls and functional representation. However, after the inception of Guided Democracy, military dissatisfaction against the structure of the political system declined markedly. The military played an extensive role and was probably

the major group supporting Sukarno in the establishment of the post 1959 structure. The military's main point of dissatisfaction was its antipathy towards the Communist Party. The antipathy to the Communist Party stemmed from 1948 when a PKI uprising at Madiun was seen by the military as a stab in the back. The subsequent reappearance of the PKI after the 1955 elections and then as a rival counterbalance to the military during Guided Democracy exacerbated the tension between the military and the PKI. With reference to dissatisfaction against policy outputs, it may be assumed that, as the military was an important integral unit in the GD system, there was no generalized policy dissatisfaction. The two main policy areas, which were not favoured by the military, were the economic and external relations (particularly the "Crush Malaysia" Campaign and the rapprochement with China) decision-making areas. With reference to incumbents of the political system, military dissatisfaction was much more specific than the cases we have examined previously, and was related primarily to antipathy towards C.P. members and only to a much less degree to the Sukarno entourage. The inhibiting factors were also much higher than the previous cases that have been considered. The two most important elements were the perceived strengths of Sukarno, based on a degree of popular support and an extensive patronage network, and the PKI, which possessed an extensive popular organization and a more limited armed-capacity.

In sum, it will be seen that both from the negative and positive standpoints the military predispositions for intervention were not high. Thus although Indonesia in 1965 was experiencing a high degree of instability, and although the military's organizational capabilities were high, a coup was unlikely on account of the low predispositions. However, the events of September 30 and its immediate aftermath were sufficient to change the pattern of interrelation between instability and predispositions-

capability by significantly increasing the degree of instability by shattering the triangle of interaction between the military-PKI-Sukarno and by significantly increasing the military predispositions. It is necessary therefore to survey briefly the September 30 Affair.

Unfortunately the explanation of the events of September 30 (known as the Gestapu Affair) remain clouded. However, the sequence of events of September 30 and its aftermath is more clear and may be elaborated in three stages.[48] On the night of September 30 army, air-force and communist units murdered 6 top army Generals (Nasution narrowly escaped). A Revolutionary Council was proclaimed but in the confusion General Suherto with loyal troops quickly stabilized the situation. Stage one was over. Stage two began with reports of the murders spreading together with accounts of communist complicity, which in turn led to one of the worst massacres of modern times in which thousands of PKI supporters were slaughtered.[49] Stage three involved the question of how to reconstitute the polity with one of the major props of Guided Democracy virtually annihilated. This had largely been solved by March 1966 by which time Sukarno, who had failed to emerge unscathed from the Gestapu Affair, was obliged to confer full powers on Suharto.[50] The Sukarno regime was at an end and a military government was installed. Although there is consensus on the sequence of events, interpretation of the Gestapu affairs are legion.[51] It is impossible within our frame of reference to debate fully these interpretations but simply to note the consequence of events, namely that by March 1966 the Sukarno regime was ended, the PKI was decimated and a military government was installed.

PERFORMANCE

A number of introductory comments concerning the military regime may be made. First, the regime (until mid-1970) was clearly an equilibrating

one, which manifested a greater degree of continuity with the previous one than did the Ghanaian military regime. Second there has not been a movement towards the progressive civilianization of the regime (though there was some adaptation in 1971 with the formatinn of a military political party) but rather the military regime incorporated a degree of civilianization from its very inception. Thirdly, of the several case studies that have been examined in this study, the Indonesian military shows the clearest movement from induced generalized to partisan politization.

The first issue area to be examined relates to the manner and success of military performance concerning the major nation state political functions.

With reference to decision-making (method), the following main points may be noted. In the first place, the interim period from September 1965 to the consolidation of the military regime in March 1966 was one of considerable confusion. Unlike the majority of coups. the Indonesian one was not followed by an abolition of the constitution and of all the central decision-making bodies. Sukarno retained the dominant executive positions; this was counterbalanced to some degree by Suharto becoming commander in chief of the Armed Forces and by the establishment in December of an inner cabinet (Koti) including Nasution, the Sultan of Jogjakarata and Abdulgani. However, in February 1966 Sukarno made a number of changes in the total cabinet (standing at 97) but more significantly in the inner cabinet, which was renamed "Crush Malaysia". The ensuing demonstrations obliged Sukarno to confer full powers on Suharto. In the second place, there were no major structural changes after March 1966 except that in general the decision-making structure was clarified. In March a Praesidium of six deputy Prime Ministers was announced (each Praesidium member headed a group of ministries); in July the Praesidium was reduced to five; in October 1967 the Praesidium was abolished and replaced in June 1968 by a new cabinet. Thirdly, there

was a high degree of concentration of control by the military. Thus in July 1966 Suharto became head of the Praedidium and 11 out of 24 ministries were headed by the military; in March 1967 Suharto became provisional President and full President for a 5 year term in March 1968; 5 out of 23 members of the 1968 Development Cabinet were military; by 1957 22 out of 25 heads of the provisional regional governments were military; further there was extensive representation of the military in the parliamentary bodies with large-scale appointive powers being reserved (in February 1968 the parliament was enlarged from 347 to 414 including the purging of 123 members with 75 places reserved for the army and 90 members to be appointed); additionally many military personnel were drafted into the civil administration; and finally Suharto began to build a presidential advisory corps.[52]

With reference to decision-making scope, the primary area of activity has been in the economic sphere. The main brunt of activity has been to reduce inflation largely through monetary and fiscal policies. The main activities have included the following. First external debts were rescheduled so that payment on many existing debts would not recommence for a number of years. Second Indonesia has sought large sums of external aid and has tried to attract foreign investment (e.g. in 1967 foreign banks were legalized and 13 industrial companies confiscated during confrontation were restored and Indonesia rejoined IMF). Third, attempts have been made to balance budget accounts both by increasing revenues and by cutting expenditures involving both defence cuts, a cessation of the crush Malaysia Campaign, a reduction of subsidies and an end to administrative recruitment. Fourth, planning procedures have been improved. The Ministry of Finance has received greater autonomy and control; a stabilization programme was drawn up with the IMF in August and September 1966 (which in turn involved a unitary exchange rate, abolition of preferential treatment to state

enterprise, a new credit policy, etc.); a priority listing of imports has been established; professional economists have been more widely utilized; and finally in 1969 a 5 Year Development Plan was produced.[53] The non-economic decision-making areas have not attracted as much attention. There have been no major policy-dècisions which have affected social or cultural organization. With reference to the political system the most important changes within our period of examination have been with reference to occupants of major decision making positions. The most important have been the annihilation of large numbers of PKI members and the subsequent banning of the party and the removal of Sukarno. The structural changes, involving the changes in size of the parliamentary bodies and the modifications of the cabinet bodies, have not been as extensive.

Three points are of import with reference to the institutionalization process. In the first place, unlike most non-guardian regimes the Indonesian military left virtually unchanged the institutionalized structure of the previous regime. Thus most of the major political bodies have remained with very few changes and the 1945 constitution has been retained as the overall legitimation. In the second place, some clarification to rules of interaction has been made and a greater degree of autonomy towards many decision-making bodies has been granted. Thus parliament and the MPRS have been given greater powers, the President is supposedly responsible to parliament, and professional planners and administration heads have been given more autonomy. Third, although corruption remains a major problem, a number of drives have been made to eradicate it and in February 1970 Suharto announced an advisory committee to make recommendations on corruption. Despite these efforts, the institutionalization process in Indonesia remains at a low level of development. The 1945 constitution is a vague and ambiguous document, military control and centralization remains very high, and the rules of procedure are still vague (e.g. the 1968 elections were

postponed for 3 years, or again parliament was suddenly expanded, or again military appointive powers were increased).

Three factors were of assistance to the military with reference to support mobilization. In the first place, the nature of the coup removed the major source of organized opposition, namely the PKI; the other major potential source of opposition to the military, i.e. Sukarno, had been weakened by complicity in the Gestapu Affair and also through a gradual loss of support during Guided Democracy. Secondly, the military could rely on a number of groups which had been opposed to or excluded by the Guided Democracy regime. These included in particular the Muslim groups, and of great importance in the period up to March 1966 the student population.[54] In the third place, the military regime has continued to use existing modes of support mobilization. Thus the major parliamentary bodies have remained intact as also have the functional groups within them; furthermore to the extent that these bodies have been revitalized then so too has support mobilization been increased. On the other hand, until the elections of 1971 and the organization of the quasi-military-party Golkar, the military made no direct or explicit attempt to mobilize support. Further the military regime is confronted with the problem that it has excluded the best organized political group in Indonesia, which, through the main party and the numerous and more populous branch and subsidiary organizations, was in communication with an estimated 30-40% of the Indonesian population.

The military regime has experienced no major difficulty in the monitoring process. As in the case of support mobilization it has continued to rely on existing structures and organizations and also the expertise and body of knowledge gained from the long martial law period 1957-63. The military has a monopoly of force and also has had extensive operational contact throughout the whole of Indonesia. On the other hand,

it must be noted that the military has continuously relied on a high degree of coercion, and further the problem of the reconciliation of the former PKI population remains.

The second major area of performance analysis concerns the examination of the success of the military in alleviating the conditions of instability. With reference to the first two dissynchronizations the military regime has had some degree of success. First, planning mechanisms have been improved technically in terms of greater autonomy granted to professional planners and administratively in clarifying and centralizing the planning offices. Second, more concerted efforts have been made to implement both the stabilization programme and also the Five Year Plan of 1968/9-73. Third, there has been an extensive array of measures introduced to control inflation. These have included devaluation, balanced budgets (as from 1968), credit squeezes, etc. Finally more attention has been devoted to increasing government revenues, which in turn have risen markedly. The moderate success of the military regime in alleviating in large part the major factors precipitating the dislocation of the polity's failure to control the economy (the second dislocatinn examined above) can be demonstrated as follows. After 1966, during which year all the indicators of economic breakdown increased, the economy began to move rapidly towards stabilization. Thus in 1968 the budget balanced, and the inflation rate was cut from 860% 1966 to 170% 1967 to 85% 1968.[55] However, the activities of the military regime have largely been confined to monetary and fiscal policies, which though they have made considerable progress in alleviating the conditions of the second dislocation have had little effect with reference to the structure of the economy, i.e. the first dislocation. Indeed in this area the most important structural change is that the economy has been forced to become more open and dependent on external aid. Thus in 1966 it was calculated that

Indonesia required a minimum of $560m to finance necessary imports, without which any development would be impossible. Since estimated exports were only approximately 80% of this figure, in addition to which debt payments had to be included, it was inevitable that Indonesia must borrow externally.[56] The consequence has been that Indonesia has been obliged to increase the 1966 foreign debt of $2,400m. It is this external dependence on IMF, American, Japanese and West European finance which tempers the economic success of the military regime.

With reference to the next dissynchronization, that of the failure of participation mechanisms, the military have made no advance. Thus the Guided Democracy constraints on participation continue: political parties have a small role and are still not very effective bodies, elections are few and countered by extensive appointive powers, and regional influences are very slight; furthermore the only viable political party, the PKI, has been banned (though it must be noted that the Masjumi party has been allowed to reorganize). Thus the underlying conditions of participation dislocation continue. The only mechanism for alleviation rests in a revitalization of the parliamentary bodies and of the functional groups. Although undoubtedly some progress has been made in this sphere, the threshold still remains very low on account of the extensive and dominant position of the military in this network.

There was also very little change with reference to the final dissynchronization, namely the failure to develop sufficiently a number of major political institutions. Thus the 1945 draft constitution with all its ambiguities remains in force and there appears to be no commitment to replace it. However, there has been more success with reference to the civil administration. First, the size problem is being solved partially by the termination of recruitment and partially by a cut-back. Second, it appears that greater autonomy is being ceded and interference by non-

administrators is lessening. Finally although corruption is still a problem it can be expected to decline as inflation comes under control, as administration salaries rise, and as the administration becomes better organized and more efficient.

In general, with the exception of the second dissynchronization, the military regime has had only very limited success in alleviating the conditions of instability. This would appear to be a function of two factors, on the one hand the level of political instability prior to the coup and on the other hand the failure by the military regime to stimulate those civilian forces to which a transfer of power may be made.

The third major task is to examine the ramifications of military predispositions and organization capabilities for performance and vice versa.

The military predispositions have had three important ramifications for performance. In the first place, the degree of identification with the Guided Democracy regime accounted for the rather slow rate by which the military took control of the polity. Secondly, the low level of grievances by the military against the structural organization of the political system under Guided Democracy explains the retention of the basic format of Guided Democracy under the military regime. (In this context it is interesting to note the parallel between Guided Democracy and the Basic Democratic regime of Ayub Khan or the Egyptian system in terms of strong central control, emphasis on administrative and technical efficiency and controlled participation especially through functional groups.) Thirdly, the major spedific grievance of the armed forces, i.e. their animosity towards the PKI, also became very evident. Thus the military made very little effort to contain the PKI massacres and later banned the party.

The organizational capabilities had four ramifications. First, the

skill level and structural composition and deployment of the military meant that it experienced no severe difficulties in decision-making, as for example in Ghana. Second the skill level and composition of the military conditioned the prggmatic, efficiency-oriented programme of the economic stabilization. Third, the nature of the military's external autonomy reinforced the military's acceptance and retention of the basic format of Guided Democracy. Finally, the nature of the cohesion of the armed forces conditioned the slow progress of the ousting of Sukarno and the adaptation of the previous regime.

The consequences of performance on predispositions-capabilities are not very marked. This would be expected given the relatively small transformation of military role involved as a consequence of its take-over. The primary conseuqence for organizational capabilities is that cohesion has been increased, though the primary mechanism whereby this has been achieved is through partisan personnel selection. During 1967 massive purges took place within the armed forces, involving 11,000 in Central Java alone; and again in 1967 the three services were reunified in the Ministry of Defense though in 1969 responsibility was transferred to the Presidency.[57] The primary consequence for predispositions thus far has simply been to increase the military's level of partisan politicization.

The military regime is of course still in existence (1971), hence an examination of the transfer of control to a civilian polity is impossible. Certainly an imminent return to civilian control seems most unlikely since basically sufficiently well-organised civilian groups do not exist. The continuation of the current military-civilian coalition seems more likely, a trend which has received further confirmation by the elections of 1971. However, the longer-term projection of the current regime could expect in its present form to experience institutionalization and support failure and if these reach sufficiently high levels and the PKI begins to reorganize it can expect to experience monitoring failure also.

FOOTNOTES 6: EQUILIBRATING MILITARY REGIMES

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN GHANA

1. For a very early history of the Gold Coast see D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928, Oxford Univ. Press, 1963; for accounts of the post-war movement to independence see D. E. Apter, Ghana in Transition, Atheneum, 1963, and D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, Oxford Univ. Press, 1964.

2. With the exceptions of Liberia and Ethiopia, Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African territory to gain independence. Given the variations in different colonial policies which have relevance for subsequent economic and political development (see for example, T. Hodgkin, Nationalism and Colonialism in Tropical Africa, Muller, 1951; M. Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, Hutchinson, 1970), Ghana seems to have achieved considerably more political development than most African territories at the time of independence. Thus there had been recognizable political parties from the late 1940s, in 1951 Native Authorities had been replaced by 34 local councils universally elected, there had been a legislature of 84 (75 Africans) in 1950, Africans had had a majority on the Executive Council from 1950, and there had been two universal direct elections in 1954 and 1956 (and a more limited election in 1951).

3. There appears to be no significant evidence of decision-making (method) failure. Although there was undoubtedly some degree of conflict within the polity (e.g. between central and local party organizers), there appears to be no significant evidence of any major atrophy in the decision-making process.

4. D. Williams, "The Ghana Economy", World Today, 1966.

5. In 1965 interest on and repayment of the debt amounted to £24m. or about 20% external earnings, see D. Rimmer, "The Crisis in the Ghana Economy", J. Mod. Af. St., 1966, and D. Williams, op.cit.

6. D. Rimmer, "The Economy of Ghana", in Africa South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, 1971, and J. K. Kraus, "Aims and Politics in Ghana in C. C. Welch ed, Soldier and State in Africa, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970.

7. D. Williams, op.cit. Dowse notes that in 1962 Ghana was importing five times as much food as the average West African country and that even 30% of rural food consumption was purchased, R. E. Dowse, Modernization in Ghana and the USSR, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

8. See D. Austin, op.cit., and R. Murray, "Second Thoughts on Ghana", New Left Review, 1967.

9. See H. L. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah, Pall Mall, 1967, R. E. Dowse, "Ghana: One Party or Totalitarian", Brit. J. Sociol., 1967, D. Austin, op.cit., Keesings Contemporary Archives.

10. See H. L. Bretton, op.cit.; W. B. Harvey, Law and Social Change in Ghana, Princeton Univ. Press, 1966; J. C. Juergensmeyer, "African Presidentialism", J.Af.Law, 1964; K. Robinson, "Constitutional Autochthony in Ghana", J.Commonwealth Pol.St., 1961.

11. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

12. Bretton, op.cit., Dowse, op.cit., Harvey, op.cit.

13. L. Tiger, "Bureaucracy and Charisma in Ghana", J.As.& Af.St., 1966.

14. Prior to independence the CPP had considerable control over the CMB which at that time was a wealthy body making approximately 50% profit on 50-70% of Ghana's exports.

15. G. Bing, Reap the Whirlwind, MacGibbon & Kee, 1968.

16. D. E. Apter, op.cit., and D. E. Apter, "Ghana", in J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, ed., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Univ.California Press, 1966

17. Ghana fortunately did not have major tribal or chieftaincy problems in that there were a large number of tribes, no uniformity of chiefs and many of the chiefs had begun to decline. (Even the Ashantis which had a strong chieftaincy system had elections among the royal group for the position of Ashantene.) Further the moves against the chiefs had begun in 1951 with the Local Government Act. Nonetheless chiefs were far from being an insignificant force, and Nkrumah continued to use his appointed chiefs.

18. St. Clair Drake & L. A. Lucy, "Government and Unions: The Sekoni-Takoradi Strike 1961", in G. Carter ed., Politics in Africa, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966, and B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion, Monthly Review Press, 1966.

19. The traditional typologies and statements are presented in R. Schachter Morgenthau, "Single Party Systems in West Africa", A.P.S.R., 1961; J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, op.cit.; D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Univ. Chicago Press, 1965; the critical reviews are: S. E. Finer, "One Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations", Gvt.& Opp., 1967; S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale Univ. Press, 1968 (Ch.7, "Parties and Political Stability"); E. Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States", in J. La Palombara and M. Weiner, ed., Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1966; and H. Bienen, "One-Party Systems in Africa", in S. P. Huntington and C. Moore, ed., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, Basic Books, 1970.

20. The figures are adapted from D. Austin, op.cit.

21. Ibid. and M. Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, Univ. Chicago Press, 1970.

22. J. Kraus, op.cit., M. Owusu, op.cit.

23. D. E. Apter, "Nkrumah, Charisma and the Coup", Daedalus, 1968, M. Owusu, op.cit.

24. Fitch and Oppenheimer, op.cit., note that when the CPP took over the Trade Unions, many of the militant leaders, who had been instrumental in the rise of Nkrumah and the CPP, were dropped.

25. Given that the effectiveness of many parties in Africa had been overestimated, it is not surprising to find that many experienced the same type of problems as the CPP. For an example of a party system which has generally been more successful in combatting these problems, see T.A.N.U. of Tanzania: H. Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1969; H. W. Stephens, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika 1920-67, Praeger, 1968; L. Cliffe, ed., One Party Democracy, E.Af.Pub.Ho., 1967; G. A. Maguire, Towards Uhuru in Tanzania, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969.

26. Indeed had it not been for the military coup, there was no immediate reason why the Nkrumah regime could not have continued for some time.

27. Figures from Keesings Contemporary Archives.

28. J. Kraus, op.cit.

29. Despite the many failures in the Ghanaian economy, two important factors must be noted in qualification. First after 1961 Ghana embarked on a very ambitious economic development line which would (had it been successful) have provided Ghana with internal self-sustaining development and given Ghana some considerable insulation from the vagaries of the international economic system. (Many low-income systems have maintained better short-term developments but with worse long-term prospects.) Second there had been some considerable achievements in terms of infra-structure development, education, expansion government services, the construction of Tema harbour and especially the heavy investment project of the Volta Dam complex.

30. See D. Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer in the middle of the Twentieth Century", Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 1963. It is true that some degree of insulation and protection can be established through the creation of buffer stocks (CMB played this role) and international commodity arrangements, but both mechanisms have severe limitations. For a discussion, see for example W. Krause, Economic Development, Wadsworth, 1966, or B. Higgins, Economic Development, Constable, 1959.

31. G. Bing, op.cit., B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, op.cit. and T. Killick, "The Economics of Cocoa" in W. Birmingham et al., A Study of Contemporary Ghana, vol.I, Allen and Unwin, 1966. Austin, op.cit. notes the following cocoa prices:

World Cocoa Price 1949-61 (£ per ton)

1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
190	208	285	301	287	467	302	221	247	352	285	225	177

32. G. Bing, op.cit., and B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, op.cit. Thus for example loans on the Volta Dam were due for repayment before the project was making a profit or again Jamaican bauxite was made into alumina powder in the USA before being brought to Ghana for the final processing, i.e. local materials were not used.

33. Nkrumah had clearly perceived this problem and included it as one of his Pan-African demands. See K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, Heineman, 1963, and K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism, Nelson, 1965; see also R. H. Green and A. Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism, Penguin, 1968.

34. D. Rimmer, op.cit., T. Killick, "The Possibility of Economic Control", in W. Birmingham, op.cit.

35. D. Rimmer, op.cit.

36. R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana, Praeger, 1969; B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, op.cit.; E. Omaboe, "The Process of Planning", in W. Birmingham, op.cit.

37. In 1965 the Minister of Trade was dismissed and the portfolio came under the Presidential Office. In 1966 the Commission of Enquiry into Trade Malpractices made strong criticism over import licensing, see D. Rimmer, op.cit.

38. The plans up to the 7 Year Plan 1963-70 were limited efforts and were much tampered with. The 1963-70 Plan, though a much better plan and well drawn up by experts, was largely ignored by the politicians. See R. E. Dowse, Modernization in Ghana and the USSR, op.cit., and D. Rimmer, "The Economy of Ghana", op.cit., R. Genoud, op.cit.

39. We have deliberately avoided the use of the concept of 'charisma' which has been widely applied in the case of Nkrumah. We have chosen to ignore this concept since it is used as a catch-all concept, since it is very difficult to provide empirical indicators to measure it, and since it seems to have little heuristic utility. The original discussion of course stems from Weber (M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Free Press, 1947), became popular in the field of development via E. Shils (see for example E. Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries", World Politics, 1958) and has been widely applied in Ghana (see for example: W. G. Runciman, "Charismatic Legitimacy and One-Party Rule in Ghana", Eur.J.Sociol., 1963, or L. Tiger"Ghana: A Charismatic Nation", Current History, 1963, or L. Tiger, "Bureaucracy and Charisma in Ghana", op.cit. or D. E. Apter, "Nkrumah, Charisma and the Coup", op.cit. /though it must be pointed out that Apter is very critical of the concept and in fact limits Nkrumah's 'charisma' to 1949-54/).

40. For a general discussion see A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order, Rand McNally, 1966, and "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", A.P.S.R., 1968, and H. Bienen, "One-Party Systems in Africa", op.cit.

41. M. Owusu, op.cit.

42. B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, op.cit., and R. Murray, op.cit. and for a very full description and emphasis of the CPP failure see R. Genaud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana, Praeger, 1969.

43. See A. L. Adu, The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa, Allen and Unwin, 1969, and G. Bing, op.cit., and R. E. Dowse, op.cit.

44. J. Kraus, "The Men in Charge", Africa Report, 1966. Gutteridge notes that by mid 1961 3 out of 4 battalions were commanded by Ghanaians and 1 out of the 2 brigades were commanded by Ghanaians, W. F. Gutteridge, "The Armed Forces of Ghana Today", Canadian Army Journal, 1961.

45. See H. T. Alexander, African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff, Praeger, 1966.

46. See in general R. Murray, "Militarism in Africa", New Left Review, 1966; or more precisely D. Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States", Adelphi Papers, 27, 1966.

47. In general, the British did not recruit such large armies as the French, since the French recruited for the metropolitan army, and also the British tended to recruit regionally (although the West Africa Frontier Force had various regiments corresponding to its major constituent units). See W. F. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, Methuen, 1969, and J. S. Coleman and Brice, "The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa", in J. J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton Univ. Press, 1962. (The only exception to the small size of British colonial forces was when Britain had a major security interest in that area, e.g. Sudan.)

48. D. Wood, op.cit. The army had grown from 4000 (1957) to 6000 (1960) to 15000 (1966); military expenditure as a percentage of the budget had grown from 4-5% (1957-60) to 7.5% (1962-3) to 8% (1965). J. Kraus, "Arms and Politics in Ghana", op.cit.

49. See M.J.V. Bell, "The Military in the New States of Africa", in J. van Doorn, ed., Armed Forces and Society, Mouton, 1968, and W. J. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, op.cit.

50. A. A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, F. Cass, 1966; H. T. Alexander, op.cit.; I. Markovitz, "Ghana without Nkrumah", Africa Report, 1966.

51. J. Kraus, "The Men in Charge", op.cit., and J. Kraus, "Arms and Politics in Ghana", op.cit.

52. There had been a mutiny of 200 soldiers during the Congo Mission, and in 1958 Major Awhaitey had been involved in some nefarious plot against Nkrumah, see E. W. Lefever, Spear and Sceptre, Brooklings Institution, 1970.

53. See A. A. Afrifa, op.cit., E. W. Lefever, op.cit., and for a broader view E. W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of UN Congo Operation, J. Hopkins Univ. Press, 1967, and W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-66, Princeton Univ. Press, 1969.

54. J. Kraus, "The Men in Charge", op.cit.

55. J. K. Sale, "The Military in Ghana", in W. C. McWilliams, Garrisons and Government, Chandler, 1967, or E. W. Lefever, Spear and Sceptre, op.cit., A. A. Afrifa, op.cit.

56. A. A. Afrifa, op.cit., I.Markovitz, op.cit.

57. For a military account of the coup, see A. K. Ocran, A Myth is Broken, Longmans, 1968.

58. The NLC had 7 members: 4 from the military - Ankrah, Kotoka, Ocran and Afrifa - and 3 from the police - Hartley, Deku and Yakabu.

59. The Executive Council had a number of subcommittees of which only three (defence, economic and international affairs) were under the direct control of the military. See Keesings Contemporary Archives.

60. J. Kraus, "Arms and Politics in Ghana", op.cit.

61. The Constituent Assembly was composed of 150 members: 49 were elected through electoral colleges formed by 133 local councils, 91 were chosen by 38 electoral bodies (e.g. army, TUs), and 10 were nominated by the NLC.

62. See D. Austin, "The Ghana Case", in The Politics of Demilitarization, Instit. Commonwealth Studies Papers, 1966, and A. K. Ocran, op.cit., R. E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development", in C. Leys, ed., Politics and Change in Developing Countries, Camb. Univ. Press, 1969, and J. Kraus, op.cit.

63. Ghana's Foreign Aid (million U.S.$) (Europa Yearbook)

	Up to 1964	1964-66	1967	1968	1969
U.S. Grants	16.0	6.3	3.6	2.0	2.7
U.S. Credits	14.3	30.4	32.5	18.3	26.9
IBRD Loans	26.0	20.5	-	0.2	-
Other Internal African Aid	9.0	77.0	25.0	9.9	10.8
Western Aid	10.0	15.3	20.3	15.9	22.1
Soviet Aid	104.2	25.2	10.4	-	15.6
Chinese Aid	42.0	1.1	-	-	-
Czech Aid	14.0	20.6	4.2	-	-
Other Communist	59.7	10.1	3.9	1.1	0.3

64. R. E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development", op.cit. and J. Kraus, op.cit.

65. Thus the originally most junior officer ended up as head of the NLC - and Ankrah the original head was ousted for corruption.

66. Cited in J. Kraus, op.cit.

67. The major parties to emerge in April 1969 were: Progress Party (led by Busia), National Alliance of Liberals (led by Gbedemah), United National Party (led by Appiah), and the Peoples Popular Party (led by Lutterodt), which was banned in June because it was held to be a resurrection of the CPP.

68. See E. Feit, "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria", World Pols., 1968, and R. E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development".

69. See B. Wood, Armed Forces and African States, Adelphi Paper 27, 1966, and R. Booth, Armed Forces of African States, Adelphi Paper 67, 1970. Slightly different figures are given in T. N. Dupuy, The Almanac of World Military Power, Dupuy and Stackpole, 1970, where the 1970 armed force level is given as 17000.

70. Wood gives the 1966 military allocation as $42m. and Booth the 1970 allocation as $48 m., but Dupuy gives the 1970 allocation as $42m.

71. See C. E. Welch, "Ghana: The Politics of Military Withdrawal", Current History, 1968, and E. W. Lefever, op.cit.

72. On the election see D. Austin, "Elections in Ghana 1969", Indian Council for Africa, 1970, and D. Austin, "Ghana Election Background", "What the Parties Say", "Good Guys and Bad Guys", West Africa, 1969.

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN INDONESIA

1. The major formal mechanisms of Guided Democracy were introduced in 1959 and 1960 (i.e. the 1945 constitution, the Supreme Advisory Council, the Peoples Consultative Assembly, the Gotong Rojong), although discussion of and movement towards Guided Democracy was evident from 1957 onwards. In other words the breakdown and transformation of the 'parliamentary' regime was not abrupt.

2. For example there was greater Indonesian participation in the civil administration, freer rein was given to ~~xxxxxx~~ political parties, and in March 1945 a committee of 60 Indonesians and 7 Japanese was established to draw up plans for independence.

3. For general accounts of this period see, G.Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1952; and B.Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, Pall Mall, 1971.

4. Thus in 1951 Sartono failed to form a cabinet following the demise of the Natsir cabinet, and it was one month before the Sukiman cabinet was formed; following the fall of this cabinet 2 attempts were necessary to form the Wilopo cabinet; 58 days and 4 attempts were necessary to form the next Ali cabinet; and two attempts were necessary to form the Harahap cabinet. See Keesings Contemporary Archives and H.Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1962.

5. The decision-making immobilism is clearly stated in a number of works, see for example D.Hindley, "Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: Indonesia's Search for a Political Format", Govt. and Opp., 1969.

6. D.S.Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided Democracy", in R.T.McVey, ed., Indonesia, HRAF Press, 1963.

7. O.G.Roeder, "An Expert Review", Far East Econ. Rev., 1966.

8. D.S.Paauw, op.cit.

9. In 1950 'temporary councils' were established by government appointments, and since there was no electoral law persisted until 1956 when they were replaced by transitional councils (established on the basis of the national election returns of 1955) until the first regional elections of 1957. See J.D.Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1961.

10. On the decline of any acceptance of a common set of political rules see H.Feith, op.cit.

11. See G.Kahin, "Indonesia", in G.Kahin, ed., Major Governments of S.E. Asia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1963.

12. On the major regional revolt of 1957, see J.D.Legge, op.cit.; H.Feith, op.cit.; H.Feith and D.S.Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion", Pac.Aff., 1963.

13. The Masjumi Party was the only large party to resist the introduction of Guided Democracy.

14. See H.Feith, op.cit.; G.Kahin, op.cit.; and D.S.Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia", J.of S.E.As.Hist., 1967.

15. Thus there was considerable delay in quelling the revolts or again the centre adopted a very conciliatory positions towards the rebels both before and after the uprising.

16. See G.Kahin, op.cit.; H.Feith, opcit.

17. Ibid.

18. See D.S.Paauw, op.cit.; and H.O.Schmitt, "Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia 1950-8", Econ.Dev.Cult.Change, 1962. On the take-over of Dutch interests see, K.D.Thomas and B.Glassburner, "Abrogation, Take-Over and Nationalization: The Elimination of Dutch Economic Domination from the Republic of Indonesia", Aust. Outlook, 1965.

19. D.S.Paauw, op.cit.

20. K.J.Pelzer, "The Agricultural Foundation", in R.T.McVey, ed., op.cit.

21. There are a number of accounts of economic decision-making with its attendant problems up to Guided Democracy. See B.Glassburner, "Economic Policy Making in Indonesia, 1950-57", Econ.Dev.Cult.Change, 1962; D.S.Paauw, Financing Economic Development, the Indonesian Case, Free Press, 1960; B.Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development, Instit.Pac.Rel., 1957; B.Higgins, "Indonesia's Development Plans and Problems", Pac.Aff., 1966; H.O.Schmitt, op.cit.

22. The background to system cleavage was provided above in the analysis of Pakistan.

23. See C.Geertz, The Religion of Java, Free Press, 1960; or more generally H.Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities", in R.T.McVey, ed., op.cit.

24. Not only did the Japanese establish three major autonomous administrative zones with neglible intercommunication, but also carried out varying policies within these zones. On colonial policies with refrrence to regional conflict, see G.Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, op.cit.; G.Kahin, "Indonesia", op.cit.; W.F.Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, van Hoeve, 1959.

25. For a good account of political parties, which also takes account of important differences between parties, see R.W.Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration, Yale Univ. Press, 1970.

26. G.Kahin, "Indonesia", op.cit.

27. H.Feith, op.cit.; G.Kahin, op.cit.; Feith notes that in 1950 the bureaucracy was twice its necessary size at 420,000; Kahin notes that in 1953 the bureaucracy stood at 599,721.

28. On the new organization see J.A.C.Mackie, "Indonesian Politics under Guided Democracy", Aust. Outlook, 1961; or H.Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in R.T.McVey, ed., op.cit.

29. G.Kahin, op.cit.

30. H.W.Arndt, "Economic Disorders and the Task Ahead", in T.K.Tan, ed., Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, Jacaranda Press, 1967.

31. H.Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in R.T.McVey, ed., op.cit.; H.Feith, "The Politics of Economic Decline", in T.K.Tan, ed., op.cit.; and G.Kahin, op.cit.

32. There is a good literature on the PKI. See for example J.van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Internat.Pub.Serv., 1967; D.Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-63, Univ.Cal. Press, 1965; or on the PKI's role in GD: D.Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: the Politics of Domestication", A.P.S.R., 1962; or J.van der Kroef, "Dilemmas of Indonesian Communism", Pac.Aff., 1963.

33. The Political Party Simpilification Ordinance provided that any party which contravened Sukarno's directives could be dissolved; the Gotong Rojong had about 50% functional group representation, functional representation in the Provisional Peoples Consultative Congress was higher; in 1959 Nasution banned party activity under martial law.

34. H.Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy", op.cit.

35. On the increasing government controls, see J.A.C.Mackie, "The Political Economy of Guided Democracy", Aust.Outlook, 1959; and on the government management of former Dutch interests see J.A.CMackie, "Indonesia's Government Estates and their Masters", Pac.Aff., 1961, and J.A.C.Mackie, "The Government Estates", in T.K.Tan, ed., op.cit.

36. T.K.Tan, "Sukarnian Economics", in T.K.Tan, ed., op.cit.

37. The 335 A projects were largely welfare programmes, whereas the B projects were designed to provide the necessary finance. The 8 Year Plan was finally shelved in April 1965.

38. T.K.Tan, op.cit.; H.Feith, "The Politics of Economic Decline", op.cit.

39. H.W.Arndt, op.cit.

40. Invariably the discussion of GD is couched in terms of the triangle of forces of the PKI, the army, and Sukarno. Political activity is seen essentially as the attempt of each of these forces to balance itself against the others. See H.Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle Changes Shape", As.Surv., 1964; D.Hindley, "The Political Situation in Indonesia", Aust,Quart., 1963; M.Leifer, "The Process of Political Change in Indonesia", Roy.Cent.As.J., 1967; G.Y.Pauker, "Indonesia in 1964: Towards a Peoples Democracy?", As.Surv., 1965; E.T.Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?", As.Surv., 1964; J.van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communists Revolutionary Gymnastics", As.Surv., 1965; D.Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup", J.As.St., 1967; J.Pluvier, "Indonesia before the Holocaust", J.Contemp.As., 1970.

41. See H.Feith, "The Politics of Economic Decline", op.cit.; D.S.Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia", op.cit.

42. T.N.Dupuy, The Almanac of World Military Power, Dupuy and Stackpole, 1970.

43. The major confrontation occurred in what has been termed the October 17 Affair. The attempt to rationalize the army and cut back its size

angered the 'bapakist' revolutionary leaders. A censure motion against Nasution was taken up in parliament, and despite army demonstrations against parliament President Sukarno and the PNI supported the 'bapakist' group and Nasution was dismissed. See H.Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, op.cit.

44. In 1963 the navy and air-force were repectively 25,000 and 30,000 in a total of 355,000; and in 1965 much the same proportion 16,000 and 20,000 in a total of 234,000 (Europa Yearbook).

45. See G.Y.Pauker, "The Military in Indonesia", in J.J.Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton Univ. Press, 1962; H.Feith, op.cit.

46. In February 1955 a Charter of Unity was signed by 270 officers of both the pro- and anti-October 17 Affair. Bambang Sugeng, who had replaced Nasution,resigned, and the Ali government installed Utojo (a clear 'political' appointment). But the army boycotted this installation and the government fell.

47. See in general G.Y.Pauker, op.cit.; D.S.Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia", Pac.Aff., 1963; R.K.Paget, "The Military in Indonesia", Pac.Aff., 1967; K.D.Thomas, "Political and Economic Instability: the Gestapu and its Aftermath", in T.K.Tan, ed., op.cit.; and D.Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup", op.cit.

48. For an account of the immediate events see, J.Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, D.MacKay, 1967.

49. As many as one million PKI supporters may have been killed. Most ofthe killing was done by youth groups, affiliated with the NU and by local self proclaimed 'civic guards' with the tacit support of the army commanders.

50. The process of the replacement of Sukarno was a slow one, and was not terminated until 1967. In the period from September 30 to March 1966 Sukarno had initially failed to support the Revolutionary Council, but in February 1966 had attempted to regain his former control. This had led to violent student demonstrations, which enabled the military to isolate Sukarno and place many of his colleagues in custody.

51. See for example: A.J.Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia", China Quart., 1966; J.van der Kroef, "Gestapu in Indonesia", Orbis, 1966; L.Rey, "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama", New Left Rev., 1966; W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia before and after the Untung Coup", Pac.Aff., 1966; W.F.Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup", J.Contemp.As., 1970; M.Leifer, op.cit.; D.Hindley,"Political Power and the October 1965 Coup", op.cit.; D.Hindley, "Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: Indonesia's Search for a Political Format", op.cit. The interpretations include PKI plots/coups, military plots/coups, military faction plot/ coups, Sukarno plot/coups. The interpretation that we favour is that of Hindley (1969), namely that no coup was planned but rather a PKI-Sukarno attempt to remove the top army command in order to sustitute a more pliant one failed.

52. See particularly Keesings Contemporary Archives, but also D.Hindley, "Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: Indonesia's Search for a Political Format", op.cit.; G.Y.Pauker, "Indonesia: The Age of Reason", As.Surv.,

1968; J.D.Legge, "General Suharto's New Order", Int.Aff., 1968.

53. See H.W.Arndt, op.cit.; K.D.Thomas and J.Panglaykim, "Suharto Plans Again", Far East Econ.Rev., 1967; K.D.Thomas and J.Panglaykim, "Indonesia's Development Cabinet, Background to Current Problems and the 5 Year Plan", As.Surv., 1969.

54. On the vital role of the student groups, organized in KAMI and KAPPI, during this period, see P.N.Lyman, "Students and Politics in Indonesia and Korea", Pac.Aff., 1965.

55. See K.D.Thomas and J.Panglaykim, op.cit. The consumer price index began to stabilize:

Indonesia's Consumer Price Index (1963=100) (U.N.Stat.Yearbook)

1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
830	9502	25612	57712	61250

The budget figures are:

Indonesia's Budget 1966-9 (000s m. Rupiahs) (U.N.Stat.Yearbook)

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Expenditure	29.01	87.56	185.28	58.64
Receipts	13.68	84.90	185.28	58.79
Balance	-15.23	-2.66	-	+0.15

56. See H.W.Arndt, op.cit. However, by 1968 all routine expenditure was covered by domestic revenue.

57. See Keesings Contemporary Archives.

7: CARETAKER MILITARY REGIMES

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN TURKEY

INTERVENTION

Of the various case studies, the Turkish social system represents the one which showed the greatest degree of vertical and horizontal nation state development. The Turkish nation state system emerged from the total breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, which in turn was precipitated by the incapacity of the Ottoman system to accommodate to nation state development. The resistance to nation state development was dominated by a number of social groups, such as the Caliphate, Sultanate, and Ulama, which supported a number of processes antithetical to a number of the major processes of the nation state system, (particularly industrialization, participation, and certain changes in social stratification.)[1]

The major period of attempted innovation was during the Young Turk period which saw the first significant civilian participation through the Constituent Assembly and the Union and Progress Party. This period proved abortive nonetheless due to factionalization of the civilian forces, corruption, and the incapacity to initiate any major changes, such as the removal of the Caliph or Sultan. From the defeat of World War 1, the flight of the trimmvirate of Talat-Enver-Cemal, the ineptitude of the Sultan and the Allied invasion, there appeared a resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal organized as a civil-military coalition (Defence of the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia), which by 1924 had succeeded in driving out the Allies, abolishing the Treaty of Sevres, deposing the Caliph and Sultan, establishing a popular civilian government and thereby establishing Turkey as an autonomous nation state system.[2] From the early twenties until the coup of May 1960 Turkey experienced continuous nation state development. The major change in the pattern of nation state development occurred after World War 2, partially as a consequence of the

war itself and the changing international context, and partially as a consequence of the relaxation of the hegemony of the RPP (until that time the Republican Peoples Party founded by Ataturk had been the sole permitted party.) The most important period for the analysis of political instability is that following World War 2, and particularly from 1950 onwards during which time the Democratic Party (the major party to emerge from the RPP relaxation) initiated a number of policies having important repercussions for nation state development.

The most marked type of instability that could be seen to be developing continuously from the early 1950s was institutionalization failure. This type of instability was accompanied at a later stage and to a less marked intensity by decision-making (scope) failure and monitoring failure. The initial task is to identify the indicators of instability.

There is little evidence of any significant decision-making (method) failure. The major aspect of decision-making (scope) failure relates to the polity's control of the economy. Although there was a continuous increase in per capita income from 1950-60 and in the investment ratio,[3] two major indicators of failure in this area may be noted: rising inflation and the rising foreign debt. Two indicators of inflation may be listed. In the first place there was a marked rise in the money supply of 98% from 1948-53 and by a further 106% up to November 1957; second the wholesale price index rose from 100 (1948) to 107 (1953) to 148 (1956) to 231 (1958)[4] and the cost of living index in Ankara was growing at a rate of 2.5% proir to 1954, at 9% in 1954, and at 15% after 1954.[5] In the period 1950-60 there was also a colossal rise in the size of the foreign debt. The reliance on foreign borrowing to support balance of payments defecits (there were defecits for all 15 years up to 1960) became marked by 1952 when the defecit to the European Payments Union was $233.9m.; loans from the U.S.A. were $30.8m. in 1953, $91.2m. in 1957, and $359.0m. in 1958; the foreign debt rose from $297.3m. in 1954 to $1.0 billion in 1956 to $1.5 billion in 1960 (or about 25% GNP.)[6]

The second and most pronounced type of instability was institutionalization failure. The emergence and development of institutionalization failure was related primarily to the rise of the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party was the first major opposition party of any significance to appear in Turkey, and in 1950 it won a convincing victory in the general elections and thereby ousted the RPP for the first time.[7] The manifestations of institutionalization failure are largely cast within the context of the failure of the DP to cope with the institutionalization process of the nation state particularly as related to the context of its emergence. The major indicators of institutionalization failure are threefold: the drive to undermine the sphere of competence of a number of major organizations, the erosion of formal patterns and rules of interaction, and the manifestation of corruption and patronage.

With reference to the first indicator, the main offices and structures that may be considered are: opposition parties, the administration, and the courts. The undermining of the sphere of competence of the RPP (by far the largest alternative party) began in 1952 with a bill providing for the confiscation of all liquid assets and real properties of the RPP, the taking-over of the premises of the RPP newspaper, and the closing of 200 branches of the RPP. In 1956 a bill was passed curtailing the meetings of political parties except under certain specified conditions. Outside the period of 45 days prior to an election, parties were allowed only three conferences per annum and such conferences were open only to card-carrying members and ~~xxx~~ excluded the press, permission for meetings was to be sought from the government 48 hours in advance and the names of speakers and the subjects were to be submitted also, and finally political demonstrations, processions and other forms of propaganda were illegal. In April 1960 the DP tabled a motion demanding an inquiry commission to investigate the opposition on charges of interfering in the army, blackmailing and so on.[8] The Inquiry Commission was composed entirely of

DP members and issued two orders on the very day of its establishment: the one suspending all political activity during the period of the inquiry, and the other prohibiting the publication of any news about the inquiry or the debate leading to it. Some days later the Assembly passed a bill giving the Commission powers of press censorship, powers to subpoena persons or records and to impose sentences of up to three years.[9] With refernce to the other main offices and structures, the major move against the civil service came in 1954 when civil servants were made liable to dismissal without appeal. A move was made against the judiciary in May 1956 when 16 judges were compulsorily retired.[10] In June the President, Vice-President and four members of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General were removed.[11]

The erosion of formal mechanisms of political interaction can be indicated by the manipulation of electoral procedures. The first most blatant action occurred immediately prior to the 1957 election when the government amended the electoral law in an attempt to prevent a coalition of the three opposition parties (RPP,FP,RNP) and tp prevent the Democratic deputies who had recently resigned from running for the opposition.[12] Further, the 1957 election results were never officially announced and were generally considered to be fraudulent.[13] The RPP contested the validity of the results in five provinces; in Istanbul the results were announced before the counting was completed; and there were two deaths in S.Turkey following riots in which several thousnad RPP supporters claimed their names had been omitted from the register.[14] Finally opposition party activities were restricted within parliament by a number of measures such as limitations on the number of questions that may be asked and the time allocated to these questions.[15]

Patronage and corruption were generally considered to be extensive. Thus in 1955 several Ministers, including a Finance Minister, Minister of Commerce and Deputy Prime Minister were accused of irregular practices in

in granting import licences; several judges were dismissed or retired to make way for more favourable appointments; and the 1957 election was held to be fraudulent. However, the most extensive boost to patronage was provided by the large increase in foreign aid. This was particularly true in the distribution of rural construction programmes.[16]

There is no evidence for support failure. Thus the DP had managed to sustain a significant percentage of the vote: 1950 55%, 1954 58%, and 1957 48% (further the elections showed high turnouts with 89% and 90% in 1954 and 1957.)[17] Furthermore the DP possessed a dynamic party organization.[18]

There was increasing evidence of monitoring failure, particularly after 1957, but it must be noted that it never reached a high degree of intensity. Two indicators may be noted. First, the government developed an increasingly broad array of mechanisms intended to sustain itself. The measures to restrict opposition parties, the control of elections, widespread appointments, and the control of the press indicate this tendency.[19] The second indicator relates to domestic violence. The major disturbances prior to 1960 had been confined to the anti-Greek riots of 1955 and a number of disturbances after the elections of 1957. In 1960 the two major focal points of domestic protest were the students and the army. In April mass student demonstrations followed the establishment of the Inquiry Commission which led to the declaration of martial law and four deaths in Istanbul and Ankara; the maj or army involvement in the anti-government demonstrations occurred in May when hundreds of cadets from the Ankara War College paraded against the government. But again it must be noted that the protests were not very extensive or prolonged, and were confined to urban areas.[20]

Given the above pattern of instability, the next problem is to identify the major dissynchronizations. The first two dislocations concern the relationship between the political and economic systems and as such may be considered conjointly. The first relates to the general structural

organization of the economic system, (i.e. a dislocation of the economic system having repercussion for the political system); the second relates to the failure of the political system in monitoring the economy.

The causes of the structural deficiency are several. First, Turkey has constant problems, as do all low income systems, with capital shortage. During the earlier part of the nation state development, the capital shortage was exacerbated by a number of factors, such as the continuation of the Ottoman debt, the refusal of the RPP to borrow external loans, and the small trader population loss of 1924.[21] Second, an equitable ratio between industrial and agricultural production had not been achieved. Thus in 1938 the industrial contribution to GNP was 12.6% and only 13.7% in 1960; or again, in 1960 70% of the population was employed in agriculture, but agriculture yielded only 40-45% GNP. Furthermore, agricultural production was subject to marked fluctuations - in 1953 Turkey was the world's largest exporter of grain but in 1955 had to import grain.[22] Third, agricultural organization was subject to a number of problems. Thus land was highly concentrated (62% of the population owned only 18.6% of the land whereas 1.5% owned 24.8%), and more importantly land was highly fragmented (only 5% of the farms were in one unit, and the average number of unite per farm was 7.)[23]

With reference to the second dislocation, the failure of the polity to develop effective specialized agencies for the control of the economy may be examined under the following headings. First, although a number of coordinating agencies did exist (such as the Bank Credit Regualation Committee, the Central Bank, the Foreign Exchange Committee, the Internal Finance Committee, and the Ministries of Finance, Commerce and State Enterprises), there was no central coordinating agency with the consequence that decisions were made on a day to day basis by diverse agencies.[24] Second, there was inefficient usage of capital resources both regarding the allocation and deployment. Only 6.7% of government investment was

distributed to industry, 12.7% to public works, 28.2% to agriculture, and 52.4% to transport and communication.[25] Furthermore investment failed to flow into areas of high productivity or to yield reinvestible funds; infra-structure projects and industrial plants were badly planned; and political pressure resulted in huge wastes of investment in the public sector.[26] Thirdly, there had been no attempt to cope with agriculture. With the exception of a limited number of measures, the Ottoman Laws of 1858 were still valid;[27] the most important attempts at land reform had failed; although too many resources were channelled into agriculture, these were rarely in the most necessary and productive areas of irrigation and fertilizers; and finally land taxes were too low.[28] Fourth, planning attempts were feeble. There were no plans; the railways were never a well-planned network; the Karabuk steel plant was badly located and its capacities never coordinated; there were no adequate surveys of economic resources; and until 1956 there were no austerity programmes or attempts to control inflation, and even the stabilization programme of 1956 was ineffective.[29] Finally, the attempt to encourage foreign captial was misdirected. Although foreign capital is one of the easiest ways to increase capital resources, it is wise to place a number of restrictions on such investment. The Turkish polity failed to place any restrictions whatsoever (a policy encouraged by the U.S.A. and O.E.C.D.) Thus in 1951 and 1954 the government guaranteed the right to withdraw investments (including original capital, value of installations, and value of trade marks and patents) in the original currency. (There was an import surplus jump from 62.3m. TL in 1950 to 246.4m. in 1951 to 516m. in 1952.)[30]

The consequence of these two dissynchronizations for political instability was restricted primarily to decision-making (scope) and did not have further ramifications because large groups were not effected. Thus the bulk of the agricultural population was protected because either it was not a firm part of the monetary system or it was compensated by the various rural grants.

The third type of dissynchronization was that of party polarization.[31] Party polarization represents a particular type of system cleavage, which is manifested in terms of party identification. Party polarization began after 1950 and became increasingly pronounced as indicated for example in the number of occasions on which fighting broke out in the Assembly, and by the number of occasions on which the Opposition walked out of the Assembly. Although the polarization was acute in terms of the relatively equal proportions involved in each group, the polarization was constrained to some degree in that it was largely intra-regime (which meant that some degree of interaction continued between the parties) and in that neither of the polarized groups was completely closed.[32]

Two basic factors contributed to the party polarization. The first relates to the position of the RPP at and prior to the emergence of the DP. From the very inception of the Turkish nation state, the RPP had been the dominant party. Thus the RPP had proved intolerant of all opposition: the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate had removed the traditional and religious groups, the independence tribunals and the suppression of the Kurdish Revolt (1925-29) had been used to eliminate additional opposition, and finally both formal opposition parties (the PRP of 1924 and the Liberal Party of 1930) were both very short-lived. Furthermore the RPP increasingly strengthened its control throughout the political system. Thus party members were put in government posts (for example regional inspectors were in charge of both party and government affairs, Provincial Governors were appointed by the local party organization , and the Minister of the Interior was the Party General Secretary,) the Labour Law of 1936 forebade strikes, and the Law of Association forebade political parties.[33] In sum, until 1946 the RPP completely monopolized the political system.

The second factor relates to the different groups mobilized by the RPP and DP, and the degree of antagonism between these groups. On account

of the severity of controls maintained by the RPP and on account of the perfunctory nature of the elections prior to 1946 (1950 was the first secret, universal ballot), there were many groups which had become disaffected and which until 1950 had not successfully united to express such disaffection. The major groups were: the religious elements, the businessmen, the minority groups, and most importantly the peasantry. The religious groups had been opposed to the secular drive under Ataturk; the business groups were opposed to the government controls; the minority groups had been opposed to the Varlik Vergisi tax introduced in World War 2, and under which non-Muslims could pay as much as ten times as much tax as Muslims; the peasantry represented a large and generally conservative orthodox Muslim force, which had in many repects been excluded from the urban-industrial drive of the RPP. Although the need to mobilize support among the peasantry had been perceived, as is evidenced in such measures as the Village Law of 1924 and the Peoples Houses of 1931, such measures were generally ineffective or antagonistic to the peasantry.[34]

The importance of both these factors was increased by the role of the DP. Thus not only did the DP displace the RPP and completely undermine its former monopoly, but it also sought to reestablish for itself the hegemony previously enjoyed by the RPP. Further by a whole range of policies, the DP won the support of the former disaffected groups and thereby provided representation for formerly quiescent groups.

The consequences of party polarization relate directly to the three main indicators of institutionalization failure and to the indicators of monitoring failure. It may be noted that the constantly large size of the polarized groups explains why there was no significant support failure or decision-making (method) failure.

Having outlined the pattern and dissynchronizations of political instability, the next task must be to analyze the military predispositions and capabilities.

The first variable of organizational capabilities to be examined is

skill level. By the end of World War 2, it appears that the Turkish army was in a state of disrepair. It wa still equiped with World War 1 weapons; it was still horse-drawn; and as opposed to the time of Ataturk, the army was no longer the major channel of mobility.[35] However, as a consequence of U.S.A. aid, a massive reorganization scheme was initiated in 1948. By 1959 $2 billion of U.S.A. and European equipment and assistance had been channelled to Turkey.[36] The consequences were that the Turkish army was reduced from 700,000 to 400,000 well-trained and well-equipped men; service training schools were opened; and there was a great expansion in technical training and training abroad. In sum, the military was revamped to manifest a high level of technical expertise.

The second variable relates to the structure and composition of the army. First, unlike the other military forces that have been examined, the Turkish military possessed significant services in addition to the army. Second, although the armed forces were fairly large, the officer corps was disproportionately so. The reason was that the DP in an attempt to control the army had engaged in a programme of rapid promotions and slow retirement with the consequence that the army had 250 Generals though it required only 50 and 2600 Colonels though it required only 1200.[37] Finally, after having become rather frozen by the end of World War 2, the military had once again opened its channels of mobility, particularly for lower middle class groups.[38]

With reference to autonomy, two main points may be noted. First, from 1919 onwards the large-scale involvement of the military in civilian politics (as under the Ottomans, the interventions of 1908,1909, and 1913, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic after World War 1) ceased. Extensive measures were taken to divorce the military from the RPP and civilian politics in general. Thus in 1919 Ataturk resigned from the army (whenever he took up military command on subsequent occasions, command was only taken from the Civil Assembly); the 1923 constitution

made it impossible for Assembly members to hold additional government posts; the Progressive Party suppressed in 1925 contained opposition Generals; in 1949 a Supreme Council of Defence, including several cabinet Ministers, was established to counterbalance the General Staff; in 1946 and 1950 the articles 8 and 9 of the electoral laws of those years withdrew the vote from the military; and finally the percentage of retired military in the National Assembly declined: 1920 17%, 1943 13%, 1950 5%, 1958 4%.[39] In the second place, certain developments in political instability during the 1950s forced the military to play a more direct role in the civilian polity. Thus martial law had been declared in 1955 following the anti-Greek riots; in April 1960 four military were obliged to resign after refusing to halt Inonu, head of the RPP, on a campaign journey; and again in April 1960 the military were employed in quelling anti-government riots, which led to the reimposition of martial law.

The fourth variable relates to cohesion. Although it is difficult to gain direct information, a number of indicators may be isolated. On the one hand, a number of factors point to an erosion of cohesion: the army was large and both occupationally and geographically diversified, the DP had made a number of attempts to attract a number of military officers, the officer corps was too large, and a number of conspiratorial groups had emerged after 1954.[40] On the other hand, party politicization was not extensive and on account of the history of the armed forces within the Turkish nation state and the increase in technical expertise after 1948, it seems that the military was a relatively autonomous and cohesive organization.[41]

With reference to the military's predispositions, as in the case of most caretaker regimes, there was little explicit dissatisfaction on the part of the military against the structure of the political system. The main dissatisfaction was at the level of policy and at the level of incumbent. Three basic policies in particular would appear to have

encouraged this negative evaluation.[42] The first concerned the measures of the DP to restrict the RPP (these have been reviewed above.) The military opposition to such measures can be deduced from two events. The first, the Kayseri incident, occurred in April 1966 when a number of military men were ordered to bar Inonu from making a campaign journey. The consequence was that four officers were obliged to resign.[43] The second was a letter sent by the retiring General Gursal, second in rank to the Chief of General Staff, to the Minister of Defence demanding the resignation of President Bayar, the abolition of the committee investigating the RPP, and the release of students and journalists.[44] The second policy concerned the revival of Islam and the perceived threat to 'modernity' and secularism.[45] The opposition of the military to such a revival was explicit from post coup interviews.[46] The third policy area was that of general economic and social policies including the planning failure, agricultural tax invasion, increasing inflation, failure of land reform.[47]

From the discussion of military disatisfaction at certain policies, it is clear that incumbent disatisfaction was directed at the DP. It must be emphasized that although the military was in greater consonance with the RPP, there was no evidence of civilian sectional (party) identification or politicization. The specific dissatisfaction at the incumbent level against the DP was attributable partly to the lack of dissatisfaction at the generalized structural level and partly to the fact that the DP xxx was seen as directly responsible for the above policy dissatisfaction. There is no evidence of any any strong inhibiting factors. Thus although the RPP could form an alternative ruling group, there was no means in 1960 whereby it could establish its rule.

In sum, growing political instability was concomitant with and indeed stimulated the increasingly negative evaluation by the military of the incumbents and policies of the civilian polity. The military cliques which existed from 1954 became more extensive in 1957 when military interest

began to move beyond military reform alone. After initial contacts with civilian leaders were rejected, one of the military groups decided to locate a military leader.[48] The only problem then was the timing and planning of the coup, which took place on May 27 1960 in a well-planned and executed exercise.

PERFORMANCE

A number of introductory comments on the military regime in Turkey may be made. First, the regime maintained a caretaker focus in conforming to a strictly defined time period and in initiating a limited number of political changes. However, the caretaker orientation was not finalized until the defeat of the Turkes group. Second, given the limited focus (both in the time and change dimensions), the military regime involved a significant degree of civilian participation, though there was no overt civilianization on the part of the military regime itself. Third, although the period of rule led inevitably to increased politicization, there was no evidence of the development of any partisan or sectional politicization.

The first issue area to be examined concerns the manner and success with which the military coped with the major nation state political functions.

With reference to the decision-making method, a brief survey of the structure of the primary decision-making bodies may be made before the main points of interest are extrapolated. Immediately following the coup a military executive, the National Unity Committee, was established under General Gursel and was composed of the unusually high number of 38 members. A provisional government containing 17 members (of which 2 were Generals, one a politician, and the remaining were civil servants or non-party experts) was established.[49] (The former Assembly had been dissolved and political parties banned.) In June 1960 a provisional constitution was

published and provided for a division of function between the cabinet and the NUC, in which the NUC was to be the legislative body, and the Council of Ministers, chosen and headed by Gursel from among the members of the NUC or those citizens who had not belonged to a political party at the time of the coup and consisting of 15 civilians and 3 military, was the main executive body. Two important changes to this structure took place. In November 1960 the NUC split and 14 members were expelled.[50] In January 1961 a tempory National Assembly was established. The NUC became transformed into the upper house, while the lower one consisted of 272 representatives recruited in the following manner: 10 nominated by Gursel, 18 by the NUC, the 19 members of the Council of Ministers, 75 elected representatives from the provinces,74 representatives from the political parties (49 from the RPP and 25 from the RPNP), and the rest from other organizations.[51] Gursel formed a new cabinet which initially contained 2 but later3 NUC Generals. This structure remained essentially unchanged until September 1961 when the Assembly and NUC were dissolved to be replaced by the new civilian parliament.

Concerning the decision-making method, the following observations may be made. First, as compared with the previous regime there was a marked increase in centralization. Thus the Assembly and parties were temporarily dissolved; martial law was retained throughtout the whole period; and Gursel and NUC members held key positions in all major decision-making bodies. Second, there was considerably more structural differentiation within the central decision-making framework than is found in such early stages of the majority of military regimes, (see the majority civilian representation in the cabinet and the establishment after 7 months of the National Assembly.)[52] Third, although the NUC did appoint a number of commissions, such commissions were not nearly as extensive as for example in Pakistan. Finally, it is necessary to note the emphasis on simplicity and order in the decision-making process, a phenomenon manifested by most

professional military regimes. Thus, for example, the military deliberately eschewed politicians, since politicians were seen as likely to engender partisan lines and thereby to obfuscate decision-making.

With reference to the scope of decision-making, the military regime was primarily occupied with three major problem areas: the first was to introduce a number of economic controls, the second was to change a number of personnel, and the third was to provide the basis for an alternative civilian regime. The most important economic measures were: state expenditure was reduced by approximately £55m.; interest rates on bank credits were adjusted to accord with the type of economic activity; a State Planning Office was established to prepare long term investment plans; a number of austerity measures were introduced (for example work on 448 major projects was suspended, the number of directors in state enterprises was reduced, and three departments in the Foreign Ministry were dissolved); forced savings of 3% on salaries above a certain level were introduced; a number of import controls was established; and a number of tax changes was introduced including agricultural income tax and a declaration of wealth to prevent tax invasion.[53]

The second area of interest relates to the military's attempt to remove a large number of personnel. Three groups were concerned,(namely DP members, military officers, and university teachers). Immediately following the coup large numbers of DP members were arrested, and a High Court of Justice was established to try these persons. The consequence was the Yassaida trials, which resulted in 14 death sentences (although three only were implemented), 31 life sentences, 418 2-15 year sentences.[54] With reference to the removal of military personnel, in August 235 Generals were removed and almost 5000 Colonels and Majors.[55] Although a primary motivation for this move was to streamline the officer corps, which as noted previously was too large, the number of retired officers also included those who had identified with the former regime. The third large movement of personnel was the retirement of 147 university teachers, who

were seen as occupying a position analagous to that of the retired military.

The third area of decision-making relates primarily to the promulgation of a new constitution. One of the first acts of the NUC was to establish a commission of ten professors with instructions to submit a draft constitution. (This constitution was submitted five months later.) Meanwhile the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University also submitted a draft constitution on their own initiative. There was some dispute over the draft constitutions, which were therefore passed over to a constitution commission drawn from the 1961 National Assembly, which in turn submitted a final draft in March. This draft was approved by the Assembly in May and by popular referendum in July. The major provisions were for a series of checks and balances against personal rule: a number of political, economic, individual and social security rights were given constitutional protection; there were to be two houses; the Council of Ministers was to be nominated by the Prime Minister who in turn was designated by the President; the President was to be elected by the combined houses; an independent judiciary, including a constitutional court, was to oversee all legislation; and finally civil servants were not allowed to join political parties.[56] This constitution provided the basis for the return to civilian rule after the October 1961 elections.

Concerning the degree of success of the military in relation to decision-making, the following points may be noted. Although there was no indication of any decision-making (method) failure, there were a number of indications of potential lines of breakdown. The first relates to the split in the NUC between those who wished simply to execute a caretaker role and those who wished to play a more extensive one. The second relates to the degree of strain between the NUC and the Supreme Military Council.[57] The third relates to pressure from civilian groups for a return to civilian power. Thus the RPP was never seriously dislocated, the DP quickly reformed as the JP, and again a large National Assembly was established only 7

months after the coup, which indicated that civilian groups were strong and that in the event of any sustained military occupation would provide a major source of instability.[58] With reference to the scope of decision-making, it must be noted that the military was not preoccupied with an extensive area of decision-making, but on the other hand there was no indication of instability due to the failure of policy decision-making. With reference to the major policies implemented, the military had a limited degree of success. Given the poor economic situation, the military did achieve some stabilization. Although unemployment rose, price stabilization was achieved; the trade gap was narrowed; and the 1961 budget was balanced.[59] The policy concerning the removal of personnel associated by the military with the former regime was largely unsuccessful. The DP reemerged, albeit with a new group of leaders, as the JP; the issue of the Yassaida trials proved a major problem in civilian governments after 1961; the military retirements were generally more successful although a number of the retired military joined the JP, which was initially strongly opposed to the military; and finally many of the 147 university teachers were later restored. Finally, the policy concerning the redrafting of the constitution was successful. In sum, there were no indicators of decision-making instability, although there were a number of signs that such instability could develop should the military regime persist too long.

The institutionalization process for the military was largely non-problematic. Assuming a condition of instability at intervention and assuming no severe internal breakdown on the part of the military, then the long term problems of institutionalization are largely non relevant; the shorter term problems of the definition of the major offices and rules of interaction are also non problematic given a relatively cohesive military and no major revamping of the political system. The interesting feature in the Turkish case is that the military paid some considerable

attention to institutionalizing its position. Thus in a matter of days following the coup, the military produced a provisional constitution, which was to regulate the period until the establishment of a National Assembly (and stipulated among other things the division of power and various areas of competence between the NUC, the Council of Ministers, and the High Court of Justice); these procedures were changed slightly by the introduction of the National Assembly in January 1961; and finally one of the major themes of the new constitution was to stipulate the early institutionalization of the subsequent regime.

The problem of support mobilization though not as important as decision-making was more urgent than institutionalization. Two major factors were of assistance to the military. First the intervention was popularly received; and second the military was committed to short term rule. On the other hand, four main factors were responsible for restricting or undermining support maintenance of the military. First, there had been no significant support failure for the regime prior to the coup. Thus unlike the case of Ghana where the CPP had ossified or Indonesia where once the PKI was removed there was no significant support mobilization mechanism, the Turkish military following the coup was confronted with two large and well-organized parties. In the second place, the military made no attempt to organize directly any support either through some kind of party mechanism or referendums. It could be said to have mobilized some indirect support through the civilian Council of Ministers, the civilian constitutional commission, and the National Assembly. Third, the military regime engendered the hostility of the former DP members through not only displacing a large and popular party but also through prosecuting about 400 of its leaders. The continued support for the DP and inversely the opposition to the military regime were manifested quite clearly in the October 1961 elections when the JP won 34.7% of the vote in the lower house (the second

largest bloc of votes to 36.7% by the RPP) and 70 seats in the upper house (the largest bloc of seats.) Finally, once the DP leadership had been decimated, it was evident that the RPP would be the victors in the next election, and hence the RPP was constantly applying pressure to the military to prepare civilian elections as soon as possible. In sum, at the end of just over one year of military rule, it became clear that although there was no mass violent opposition to the military, the military did not enjoy widespread support. Thus in the July referendum for the new constitution, there was a positive poll of only 61% or just less than half the total electorate, or again the Assembly was increasingly refusing measures introduced by the military. Nonetheless, the successful transfer of power back to civilians in October 1961 forestalled any major problems developing from the military's gradual loss of support.

The military regime experienced no major problems with reference to the monitoring process. The military was able to employ extensive monitoring facilities through martial law, additional powers granted to Governors, and the special Revolutionary Tribunals. Given the extensive range of monitoring capabilities of the military in addition to its short term commitment and the non reappearance of other indicators of instability, it is not surprising to find few indicators of monitoring failure.

In conclusion, it is argued that the caretaker regime managed successfully to sustain the major nation state political functions. On the other hand, despite the absence of any significant indicators of political instability, it was evident that had the military regime continued without undergoing some major transformation it would have quickly experienced a number of critical problems particularly within the areas of support mobilization and decision-making (method) but also in the other functional areas.

The second major problem concerns the analysis of the degree of

success of the military in alleviating the basic conditions of instability. With reference to the structural organization of the economy, it was evident that the military could make no major changes in such a short period of rule. One of the few small attempts in this area was the removal of 55 feudal-type large land-holders in E.Turkey, and the confiscation of their land for redistribution. However, with reference to the failure of the polity to control the economy, the military registered some marked successes. First, it established a State Planning Organization, and the necessity for planning was later included as article 129 of the constitution. Although the subsequent enthusiasm of the civilian governments for planning did not equal that of the military, a Five Year Plan was produced for 1962-7 envisaging investment of £T59,646m. (or 18% GNP) and aimed at 7% growth rate, (and in fact achieved a 6.6% rate.) Second, the military was more critical concerning the allocation of resources. Although there were no major changes in budgetary allocation, the military cut back on a number of projects and initiated an austerity programme. Third, the military renewed the demand for land reform, but was not as successful in implementing any changes as it was for example in the sphere of planning. Article 37 of the new constitution stipulated the need for land reform, but although a Land Reform Bill was drafted (limiting farm size, encouraging the establishment of cooperatives, and prohibiting renting and share-cropping), there was insufficient time to present it and subsequent civilian governments have persistently stalled in this area.[60] Finally, the military regime provided the basis for the reexamination of the tax system involving an increase in income tax and the establishment for the first time of an agricultural tax.[61]

Three main observations are of import concerning the performance of the military regime with reference to the dissynchronization of party polarization. In the first place, the two dominant parties of the pre-coup period reemerged virtually unchanged after the coup. There had been a

change of name of the DP to the JP and there had been a change of the top leadership, but otherwise party programmes were essentially the same, and the parties continued to recruit the same groups.[62] Indeed the period of military rule exacerbated the cleavages through the Yassaida trials in two ways. First the harsh and extensive sentences on the DP members increased the animosity of the surviving ones; and second the issue of the amnesty for the Yassaida prisoners proved a major point of controversy until 1966. The amnesty was responsible for the resignation of the coalition in May 1962 due to conflict between the RPP and JP; in October 1962 after a bill releasing 280 prisoners there was a violent demonstration and the JP offices were sacked; in February 1963 fighting broke out in the Assembly over an amnesty debate; in March 1963 Bayar was released for 6 months to a triumphal JP welcome but was retained after four days of hostile demonstrations; but in November 1964 Bayar was released and 50 others pardoned (leaving only 7 or 8 out of 400 still in prison) and in July 1966 extensive pardon measures were granted by the JP government.[63] The second main observation relates to the manner in which military performance minimized the party cleavage. In the first place, the proportional system of representation permitted greater repersentation for the smaller parties at the national level, and furthermore their percentage of the popular vote was increased. In 1957 the two small parties, NP and FP, won respectively 7% and 4% of the vote but only 4 seats each (or 0.66% of the seats); in 1961 the distribution of seats was RPP 173, JP 158, NTP 65, and RPNP 54.[64] Although the RPP and JP were still the dominant parties, the simple polarization was no longer as marked. In the second place, the new constitution provided an extensive array of mechanisms to prevent any single party undermining the autonomy or sphere of competence of another. The third major observation is that the type of instability caused by the continued dissynchronization of party polarization changed. Thus after December 1961, the end of martial law, there was a marked increase in decision-making (method) failure, which had not been present in the pre-coup period. Thus from December 1961 to

the elections of October 1965, there were four coalition governments; furthermore these governments were frequently difficult to form (two attempts covering two months were necessary to form the government of June 1962, and in December 1963 Gumuspala proved unable to form a government); and finally it is clear that coalition formation would have been even more problematic had it not been for military pressure.[65]

Although the military regime did not alleviate completely all the conditions of instability and although these conditions in part persisted and in part changed their ramifications, it did achieve some degree of success particularly with reference to some of the economic conditions of dislocations and to a lesser degree in containing and minimizing party cleavage.

The third problem in the analysis of military performance concerns the repercussions of performance on the military's predispositions and capabilities and vice versa. The major effects of performance on the military were threefold. First, occupation of the major decision-making posts enabled the top military command to change its immediate structure. Thus, as has already been noted the military quickly purged 5000 officers. In addition the military managed to secure an increase in its budgetary allocation.[66] The second ramification of performance was to exacerbate a number of divisions within the army. Such divisions could be expected given the number of conspiratorial groups that had existed prior to the coup, and given that the coup was initially motivated by the more junior officers. It is important to note that the major cleavage that appeared was not a simple sectional one, such as tribe, regional, ethnic etc., but one based on different perceptions of the role of the military government. The split was between a group that wished to play a short-term role and one which demande a long-term regime to execute a number of major economic and social changes. The conflict between the two groups in the NUC became evident immediately following the coup when the more radical group wanted all ministries to be held by NUC members, whereas the more moderate group

wanted to use civilians (the subsequent cabinet was largely civilian with only three military members.) Although in October 1960 it appeared that some compromise had been reached between the groups, any such compromise was soon eroded for in November 14 members of the NUC were dismissed.[67] The next major problem for the regime was the decision to move Lt.Gen. Tansel, Chief of the Air-Force, to Wasington. Tansel had criticized two NUC members for continuing to hold army positions (all other NUC members had resigned from the army.) The Supreme Military Council ordered 86 jets to buzz Ankara and Eskisehir until finally the NUC rescinded its decision - Tansel was not moved and the two NUC members reigned their military posts.[68] The final cohesion problem during the period of military rule occurred following the October elections. Following the success of the JP and the proposal that the JP support Basgil for the Presidency, a large group of officers wished to annull the election results. Only after Gursel and the Supreme Military Council had succeeded in getting the Presidential nomination for Gursel and a number of undertakings from all the political parties(not to revise the laws of the NUC, not to grant an amnesty to the Yassaida prisoners, and not to reistate the officers retired in August 1960), did the threat be withdrawn.[69] Two further threats to army unity appeared in two attempted coups in February 1962 and May 1963. The first was the more serious but resulted only in 68 army retirements and one from the air-force, the leniency of the sentences being attributable to a degree of general army sympathy for some of the demands. The second attempted coup was again led by the now retired Colonel Aydemir together with 27 of the 69 retired after the February attempt and the unsuspecting Ankara Cadets. This coup was easily suppressed and resulted in a 5 month period of martial law and 2 death sentences.[70] Despite these four cases of evident cleavage, the army remained relatively cohesive. The Turkesh group did not have widespread support and his RPNP won only 2.2% of the Votes in 1965, and the two Aydemir coups did not involve large sections of the army.

A third repercussion of performance was to increase the involvement

and thereby the level of politicization of the army. This was a function not only of having provided the major decision-making positions during the period of rule but also of a desire to safeguard the changes, which had been introduced and to protect themselves against any recrimination. The increased level of politicization can be represented by two indicators. First, the number of serious military threats to the civilian politymay be noted, namely that following the October elections of 1961 and the two attempted coups of 1962 and 1963.[71] Second, the military continued to play an enhanced political role above that of pressure group. Thus, in October 1961 Gursel, together with the NUC and the Supreme Military Council, were responsible for virtually forcing a civilian coalition government and extracting from civilian politicians a number of undertakings (see above); not only was Gursel elected President but all NUC members were given ex-officio places in the Senate; in March 1962 the military backed a bill entitled "A Law Concerning Acts which disturb the Constitutional Regime and National Order and Tranquility";[72] and finally Gursel and the Supreme Military Council continued to be instrumental in forming coalitions and in considering domestic problems.[73] However, there were also a number of factors which counterbalanced the military's increased involvement and which deterred in general any further total intervention. First, the military was well aware of the internal divisions, which had been created; second it had been subject to constant civilian pressure for withdrawal; third, it had also to endure some considerable civilian criticism; and finally, it had undoubtedly lost much of its former popularity.

In conclusion, performance had effected the military's organizational capabilities in the following manner: there had been no appreciable change in level of expertise although some change could be expected by virtue of the increased budgetary grant; the structure and composition had been changed partially by the forced retirement of a large group of officers and partially by the increase in the physical size of the army; the degree of autonomy had obviously decreased; and finally the degree of internal

cohesion had also dereased. With reference to predispositions: the military was able to effect a number of changes which would make its gross evaluation of the general part of development more favourable; it was unlikely that its attitudes towards politicians changed; and finally many of the specific grievances were removed.

The consequences of the military's predispositions and capabilities for performance were fourfold. First, the military's predispositional antipathy at the policy and incumbent levels was very clearly reflected in the new constitution, the emphasis on and the restructuring of the planning mechanism, and the Yassaida trials. Second, the particular structure and composition of the military was responsible for the mass retirement programme. Third, the degree of separation of the military from the civilian polity meant that although the military became considerably more involved in the political system, no partisan or sectional politicization took place, and further the military could successfully transfer power back to a civilian regime. Finally, the number of divisions which appeared in the military seems to have been an important, though not sole, factor in restricting the military to a short period of rule.

The final problem area relates to the examination of the military transfer of power. The two basic problems to be examined are: the nature of the transfer, and the conditions underlying the transfer. With reference to the former, three factors are of import. The mechanism of transfer was the most common in that the military permitted political parties to reorganize and to campaign prior to a national election. Second, the transfer was peaceful and relatively clear-cut. Third, although military rule by necessity influenced the nature of the subsequent civilian regime, the direct military controls were not extensive. Thus, there were no major restrictions on political parties, (the exception being that the DP was not allowed to reappear, but the JP represented very little change); the elections of 1961 were free; although Gursel became President and the NUC members became Senators, a number of bills were passed contrary

to the expressed wishes of the military; and finally, the conditions under which the NUC relinquised control (as embodied essentially in the "Law Concerning Acts which disturb the Constitutional Regime and National Order and Tranquility") were not extensive and some were easily circumvented, (e.g. the early release of the Yassaida prisoners.)

The peaceful and successful trasfer of power could take place because three essential conditions were present. First, the military was committed to withdrawal. The dominant group within the military had always been committed to short term rule (although the division within the NUC was close, the Supreme Military Council backed the Gursel group); the cleavages which appeared in the military crystallized this view; the declining popularity of the military further reinforced the short term committment; and finally the military managed to achieve its perceived goals. Second, there existed civilian political forces which could assume the central decision-making positions. In this context, it will be recalled that the pattern of political instability prior to the coup had not had any major debilitating effects on the majority of civilian political organizations. In addition, the changed nature of the political system as a consequence of military rule was not extensive. Third, the military regime had had some success in alleviating some of the basic conditions which had precipitated the pattern of instability prior to the coup.

In sum, although the military regime did not completely alleviate political instability and although its period of rule did produce a number of problems for the subsequent civilian regime, the caretaker regime was generally successful in containing a situation of acute instability and in managing the consequent return of a civilian government.

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN BURMA

INTERVENTION

At the time of the Japanese invasion in early 1942, Burma had experienced over one hundred years of British penetration and an extensive period of absoption in the British Indian Empire (1886-1935). Under two constitutions there had emerged a number of political groupings, of which the most important was to be the Thakins.[1] The Japanese occupation did not immediately grant the promised independence, but as in the case of Indonesia the worsening Japanese involvement in World War 2 led to a grant of independence in August 1943. Furthermore, the occupation permitted the development of a number of indigenous nation state forces. These forces had reached a sufficient level to be able to resist the British attempts of 1945 to reinstate the former colonial system.[2] In January 1948 Burma became independent and was established as a low level nation state system.

In the period up to September 1958, when the caretaker military regime was established, Burma experienced all four types of instability. Four factors are of interest concerning the profile of political instability. First, decision-making and monitoring failures were the most marked; second, the most intense period of instability was in the two years immediately following independence; third, following these two years there was a decline in decision-making and monitoring failures, though all four types of instability remained clearly identifiable; finally, the immediate precedent of the intervention was a marked rise in decision-making (method) failure.

The first major problem is to examine the indicators of instability. In the first years following independence, decision-making method failure was evidenced by three indicators. First, Prime Minister U Nu had difficulty in maintaining the cabinets; second, the AFPFL, the major political party, was rent by a number of quarrelling factions of Socialists, and

PVO members; finally, the channels of communication between central bodies in the capital and branch organizations elsewhere were very weak.[3] From 1950 the degree of decision-making failure diminished as U Nu became more firmly established, the cabinet became more stable, many of the warring factions had gone underground and had not fared very favourably, and finally channels of communication were reestablished. On the other hand, decision-making became more stagnant as governmental bodies proliferated. Nonetheless, such failure was contained until 1958 when a major split occurred in the AFPFL. The split led to a division throughout the polity in the cabinet, parliament, party executive, planning councils etc. The consequence of this division was to induce a complete atrophy in the decision-making process. It was decided that a special session of parliament would be called for June in an attempt to vote a majority group. This session did give a U Nu group a very small majority (127 to 119), but since each of the two opposed groups contained a number of smaller groups, which were unlikely to cooperate on any significant range of issues, it was clear that no majority group could be maintained.[4]

With reference to the decision-making (scope) failure, there was a degree of failure in the economic area, though it must be noted that this failure did not reach the same chronic degree as for example in Indonesia. The major problem was not that Burma was incapable of maintaining any growth rate, but that such a growth rate was so modest that on many growth indicators it was not until 1959-60 that Burma was achieving pre-war levels of production.

Table 7:1: Burma's GDP in constant prices (1938-9=100) [5]

1938-9	1947	1951	1953	1955	1957	1958	1959
100	72	74	82	90	95	102	107

Table 7:2: Burma's Agricultural Production (1938-9=100) [5]

1938-9	1947	1951	1953	1955	1957	1958	1959
100	77	74	79	81	82	95	100

On the other hand, it must be noted that there were a number of promising indicators. Thus, the consumer price index had been held relatively constant, or again gross domestic capital formation was increasing.[6] A second indicator of weakness was that there was an increasing reliance on foreign aid (although it must be noted that reparations constituted 20% of such aid.)

Table 7:3: Origin of Resources Available for Public Capital Expenditure in Burma[7]

	1952-3	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
Domestic	39.1	25.7	26.5	26.5	16.1	8.5
Foreign	-	-	10.0	35.2	23.0	31.8
+ or -	6.4	-52.1	-11.8	8.0	-13.2	-11.4

There were three major indicators of institutionalization failure. With reference to the first indicator, i.e. the definition of a body of rules for political interaction, although a full constitution and its requisite elections had been enacted, two major problems remained.[8] The first centred on those groups which were unwilling to accept the structural organization of independent Burma's polity, namely the Communists, the PVO, and a number of minority groups (most notably the Karens.) However, with the exception of these groups, there is no evidence of any deterioration in the acceptance of a common body of rules up to 1958. The second problem area concerned the personalization of political interaction. Several observers have pointed to the personalization in terms of faction formation, distribution of various rewards etc., which in turn undermined more stable bodies of rules.[9] The second major indicator , the delineation of the sphere of competence of major political organizations, was very marked. Most observers of the Burmese political system have pointed to the high degree of centralization, which has inhibited the clear development of spheres of autonomy and competence of a number of major institutions, notably the planning agencies, the state enterprises, and the upper echelons of the civil administration. Thirdly, there was

widespread recognition of corruption and patronage. Although a Bureau of Special Investigation was established in 1951 under the Prime Minister, attempts to curb corruption were largely ineffective. Indeed as the AFPFL maintained its hegemony and as government bodies expanded, then so too did the scope of corruption and patronage.[10]

The indicators of support failure were rather more marked. The major indicators of the first type of support failure, i.e. withdrawal, were of course the retraction and susequent armed insurrection of a number of groups immediately preceding and following independence. The major groups were fourfold. The Communist Party of Burma (the 'Red Flag Communists') had been banned in January 1947 and began its insurrection in March 1948 together with the second group, the Burmese Communist Party ('the White Flag Communists'), which did not go underground until the end of 1947. The third group was the Peoples Voluntary Organization, a private army organized by Aung San which had cells throughout the country and which had been incorporated by Aung San into the AFPFL. The majority 'White Band' of the PVO joined the insurrection in July 1948. The fourth group was the Karen National Union which through its militant wing, the Karen National Defence Organization, joined the insurrection in December 1948.[11] It has been estimated that these groups provided some 20,000 armed personnel, which together with the sympathizers and other supporters constituted a significant section of the population. However, by 1951 the insurrection had been contained and although it continued until the time of the military intervention, many groups surrendered or were defeated and further there were no other major withdrawals.[12] Both types of the second category of support failure were evident. The first, the narrow base of support, can be illustrated from the voting figures for the elections of 1952 and 1956. From these figures, it is clear that a large percentage of the population was not participating and that although the absolute vote of the AFPFL increased, its vote as a percentage of the total vote declined.

Table 7:4: Voting Figures for Burmese National Elections 1952 and 1956 [13]

	1952	1956
% Population Voting	19	40
AFPFL Vote % Total Vote	60	48
AFPFL Vote % Total Electorate	11	19

The second type of insufficience relates to the failure of party and other organizations to mobilize support. Thus, although two post independence elections were held and although a number of additional organizations existed (such as the All-Burma Peasants Organization, the TUC, the All-Burma Youth League with the ABPO and TUC having 550,000 and 60,000 members respectively) and although a more threatening opposition emerged, the political parties were generally rather moribund. Thus channels of communication between Rangoon and other areas were poor; the AFPFL did not hold a conference from independence to January 1958; in June 1956 the AFPFL organization was so bad that U Nu resigned as P.M. for a year to reorganize it.[14]

In the case of Burma, the first three indicators of monitoring failure (failure to establish governmental authority, rise in domestic violence, and the rise in the employment of force) were closely interrelated and centred primarily around the various insurgent groups, which have been outlined above. First, in territorial terms, at a time in early 1948 government authority was restricted to an area immediately around Rangoon, but following the recapture of Mandalay in April 1949, government authority was reestablished throughout most of Burma. Thus, in 1952, elections could be held in 233/250 districts.[15] The position remained relatively stationary after 1952, Second, the incidence of domestic violence can easily be documented by the number of deaths precipitated by the insurrection (which in 1955 came to 28,000) and by the amount of damage (which again by 1955 totalled some $950m.)[16] Third, martial law was declared in August 1948; Ne Win as Defence Chief joined

the cabinet from April 1949 to September 1950; or again government expenditure on defence remanied relatively high at about one third of the budget.[17] In sum, by 1950 the chronic level of monitoring failure as manifested by these three indicators declined markedly up to 1952. Thereafter the situation stalemated so that by the time of the intervention in 1958 there was still an estimated number of 10-12,000 rebels with 6-7,000 active supporters.[18] The fourth indicator of monitoring failure is that of the inability to implement decisions. This indicator was again more marked during the initial stages of the insurrection. Thus, for example, land revenue ceased during the disturbances and writing off continued into 1950 (even by 1952-3 revenues were only 32% of the value 1938-9), or again there was no serious attempt to implement the 2 Year Plan of 1948, or again the scheduled elections of 1949 had to be postponed four times.[19] Although this indicator did decline after 1952, the decline was not as marked as in the three cases above. For example, the State Agricultural Marketing Board was notoriously inefficient, or again until 1956 the Land Resources Development Corporation implemented virtually none of the programmes outlined by the U.S. consultants.[20]

Having examined the patterns of instability, the next major problem is to identify the major dislocations. The first two dissynchronizations that may be considered are the interactions between the economic and political systems. With reference to the first dislocation, i.e. the structure of the economy, three factors are of import. First, the economy experienced massive dislocations during World War 2 as a consequence of which agricultural output fell by two thirds, much land returned to jungle, the mines ceased to function, the oil well at Chauk and the refinery at Syriam were destroyed, and timber trade virtually ceased. Thus, not only were trade patterns disrupted, but many basic sevices and productive units were destroyed. Second, in common with most ex-colonial systems, the output of Burma is extractive. Under the colonial system one sixth of the total output was transferred abroad, and the capital-intensive sectors tended to

be expatriate enclaves, which stimulated very little diffusion. Third, Burma's exports are heavily dependent on a single export commodity, viz. rice. In this context three factors may be noted: first the rice exports have remained fairly constant since 1948 at approximately 75% of the total exports; second, this percentage is higher than the pre-war figure;

Table 7:5: Burma's Total and Rice Exports[21]

	1938	1947	1951	1955	1957	1959
Total Exports (K crores)	47.8	74.4	110.0	117.0	89.0	117.0
Rice Exports (K crores)	22.8	58.4	81.0	87.7	66.3	82.7
Rice % Total Exports	47	78	74	75	74	70

third as in the case of other agricultural exports both the volume and the export price tend to fluctuate markedly. In the case of Burma exports have

Table 7:6: Price (£) and Volume (m.tons) Burma's Rice Products[22]

	1938	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
Price	-	-	60	50	42	36	34	32	33
Volume	3.3	1.16	1.22	1.27	1.63	1.93	2.0	1.46	1.61

gradually been rising with one major drop in 1957-8, but the price has been constantly falling.

With reference to the second dislocation, two factors may be noted. First, the major mechanisms involved in the planning and supervising processes were not fully coordinated. The first plan was neither comprehensively and thoroughly defined, nor was it implemented. Although the second plan had a much more comprehensive and flexible format, it still experienced a number of coordination problems.[23] Thus no comprehensive agricultural plan was executed; there was poor coordination between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning; the public enterprises had insufficient autonomy, lacked adequate accounting procedures, and were dominated by Ministers who were both nepotistic and inexperienced; finally the Economic and Social Board, responsible for supervision and coordination, met only infrequently, failed to follow through decisions or to check on programme progress, made

inconclusive decisions and had an insufficient secretariat. The second problem was that the plan was founded on a number of assumption which proved incorrect. Thus the export price of rice in 1959-60 was projected to be £50 but was in fact only £32.5; the budget was supposed to stay at K70 crores but by 1957-8 had reached K90; and finally the insurrection was projected to have been terminated by 1954 but was of course still in progress in 1958-9. In sum, it is interesting to note that despite the comprehensive 8 Year Plan, there was little change in the structure and output of the economy.

Table 7:7: Industrial Origin Burma's GDP by % (U.N.Stat.Yearbook)

	Agricul.	Manuf.	Mines	Construct.	Transp.	Trade	Admin.	Other
1951-2	46	10	2	3	2	24	7	6
1953-4	43	10	2	3	2	27	8	5
1957-8	42	12	2	3	3	24	9	5
1958-9	41	12	1	3	3	23	11	6
1959-60	43	12	2	3	3	20	11	6

The consequences of both the political-economic system dislocations were for decision-making failure (scope) and monitoring failure.

The third dissynchronization to be examined is that of system cleavage of which two types were apparent, namely regional cleavage and party polarization. Burma is a federated system containing in addition to the Burmese populace a number of semi-autonomous units, such as the Shans, Mons, Kachins, Karens, and Arakanese, of which the most important and most populous is the Karen unit. The Karen regional protest bears all the hallmarks of this type of regional cleavage in new nation state systems. Traditional patterns of interaction between the Karens and Burmese had not been extensive, and this situation had become crystallized under the British colonial rule, which was generally more favourably directed towards the Karens. Consequently the Karens fought more strongly against the Japanese invasion, and even fought against the Burmese Independence Army, which led in 1942 to a Karen massacre by the B.I.A. Thus at the time of

independence the Karen system with its own political and military organization was faced with the prospect of incorporation into a larger unit with which it had few patterns of interaction and considerable suspicion and hostility. The mediating mechanisms of the Frontier Area Inquiry Commission and the Karen National Board and its successor the Karen Central Organization failed to achieve any consensus and the Karen revolt broke out soon after the enforced union through independence. The second cleavage, that of party polarization, involved the Communist Parties and the PVO. It is interesting to note that in comparison with Turkey the degree of polarization was more acute in that all patterns of non-violent interaction atrophied and were replaced by open conflict, but not as acute in that the numbers involved were not as extensive. The party polarization was a function of two interrelated forces: the adoption of alternative paths of nation state development and the failure to reconcile or accommodate such paths. The Communist Party was originally one of the groups within the AFO. The CPB, a splinter of the CP, was banned and in 1947 went underground; the BCP was effectively removed from major decision-making posts by Aung San and joined the CPB in the insurrection in March 1948. The PVO had by independence developed from its original position as a private army to almost a rival party to the AFPFL. With the death of Aung San, its founder, relationships with the AFPFL deteriorated until faced with either total integration with the AFPFL or insurrection, the PVO chose the latter. The consequences of these two types of system cleavage relate directly to support failure (withdrawal) and monitoring failure.

The fourth dissynchronization was that of participation failure as manifested primarily in the failure to develop viable mass political parties. Thus until 1956, the only legal mass party was the AFPFL; the other opposition parties were small coterie organizations. Several factors explain the low level of development of the main party. First, the AFPFL developed from a very amorphous and loosely integrated nationalist

movement. Prior to World War 2, the parties had been clique ones which operated through patronage. Under Thakin influence the AFO (which later became the AFPFL) emerged to crystallize these various groupings with the consequence that the AFPFL itself was a very loose organization. Prior to independence the Communist groups left and these were soon joined by the PVO, but still cohesion within thw AFPFL did not increase. Factional groups within the AFPFL remained clearly visible, until in 1958 the split between the better-educated, urban-industrial-oriented versus the rural less well-educated groups (i.e. Kyaw Nyein-Ba Swe v. Tin-Nu) crystallized.[24] Second, the AFPFL remained a feeble organization. There were no annual conferences, party dues were not collected regularly, many local units were moribund, and there were no procedures for the election of central executives.[25] The ramifications of this dislocation related to all types of instability, but particularly to the decision-making (method) failure of 1958, and support failure (insufficience.)

The final dissynchronization to be examined is that of the failure to develop satisfactorily a number of major political institutions, of which the civil administration is the most important. It is also necessary to examine the legislature. Several factors account for the weakness of the administration. First, there had been little training of Burmese administrators under the British, which left a void after independence especially as few British expatriates remained. (Of 99 in the superior civil service immediately prior to independence, 71 had left immediately following independence.) Second, the framework of the old colonial structure, which was completely ill-adapted to post independence tasks, remained virtually unchanged. Third, the personnel distribution was badly skewed in that therewere too many clerks and too few executive officers. Fourth, there were few established procedures, considerable overlapping, and extensive depaertmentalism. Finally, the civil service was either penetrated or in competition with AFPFL units.[26] The consequences of this dislocation related primarily to monitoring failure but also to institutionalization

failure. The legislative Assembly was a weak body. Although the legislative Assembly had been quickly established through the constitution and was reelected regularly, it was nonetheless largely a rubber- stamping mechanism, which had very few powers. (For example, draft bills were frequently made available only on the day that they passed through the Assembly.) The primary reason for the weakness of the legislative body was the hegemony of the AFPFL and the negligible size of the opposition parties, combined with the high degree of centralization of the executive leadership of the AFPFL.[27] The consequence of this failure was primarily for institutionalization failure but all other types of instability were also effected.

Having examined the major dissynchronizations, the next task is that of identifying the military's organizational capabilities and predispositions.

With reference to the variable of skill level, five factors may be noted. First, following the usual colonial pattern, there had been no extensive training of a Burmese officer corps, although there were four battalions in Burma by the time of World War 1. Second, the first major intensive training of Burmese officers was that of the 'thirty comrades', who had been taken to Japan.[28] As in the case of Indonesia, the later stages of the Japanese occupation led to an expansion and improved training of Burmese troops (particularly after the establishment of the Burmese National Army in August 1943.) Third, after independence stringent efforts were made to improve the organization and training level of the Burmese troops. Thus a number of academies were established (notably at Rangoon and Maymyo) both for training and retraining. Fourth, the large military budgets, noted above, enabled the military to build a large and well-equipped force. Finally, on account of the insurrections, the military had had considerable experience in local administration.[29]

The size of the Burmese armed forces has varied markedly.[30] The Burmese Independence Army reached 23,000 but was quickly pruned to 3000 once the Japanese invasion was achieved. By September 1945 the Burmese

Army stood at approximately 5000 men and 200 officers. However, soon after independence the government troops, following the mutinies and desertions, numbered something just over 1000. From this figure the army grew rapidly to 6 battalions, in 1949; the battalions numbered 9 and 41 in 1952 and 1953 respectively; and finally the army expanded to 125,000.[31] With refernce to composition and recruitment, three factors are of import. First, until the post independence era, the recruitment base of the army was very variable. From 1925 Burmese recruitment to the colonial army ceased with the consequence that the army became dominated by Karens, Kachins, and Chins. The BIA was more solidly Burmese, as was also the subsequent BNA. The return of the British led to the reintroduction of a strong Karen section, but this issue was finally solved after the start of the Karen insurrection after which time the army has been predominantly Burmese.[32] Second, the majority of the senior officer corps consists of those officers introduced into the armed forces through the BIA.[33] Third, the army constitutes the dominant service with little rivalry from either a navy or air-force.

With reference to autonomy, there was a marked change after independence. The first political parties tended to organize private armies. Although the BIA superseded any such status, the nature of the struggle during World War 2 and the role of Aung San and the Thakins made for a very close interaction between the armed units and what was to be the AFPFL. The single fusion of military and civil administration failed with the collapse of the BIA attempt to establish a local government network. From that time onwards despite the close alliance between military and civilian units, the political party of the AFPFL and the military began to develop autonomous and independent chains of command. The phenomenon of the private army ceased when the PVO went underground.[34] After independence the AFPFL and the military continued to develop autonomously.

The level of cohesion in the military was low until the conclusion of the first stage of the post independence insurrections, after which time

cohesion has expanded continuously. The low level of pre independence cohesion was largely a function of the relatively low level of training (particularly in the BIA) and the recruitment patterns. Fragmentation within the military reached its highest point at the beginning of the insurrections. Thus in August 1948 2 battalions under Major Sein Tin and Lt.Col. YE Htut mutinied; and at the start of 1949, the Karen battalions also rebelled.[35] Although these secessions almost defeated the government and its remaining military force, they did have the effect of removing the divergent elemants from the armed forces leaving a very cohesive and homogeneous residue. Until 1958 there were no indicators of any reversals in the trend towards increased cohesion.

With reference to predispositions, there is no evidence of any high level of disatisfaction at the structural level. At the policy level, two disatisfactions may be noted. First, there was opposition to the slow rate of policy output on the part of the civilian polity, which became more marked as the military's own organizational expertise increased. Second, the military was opposed to any major concessions to the Communist and secessionist groups. This issue was not the cause of any hiatus between the military and civilian polity until the split in the AFPFL in 1958 when U Nu was only able to support his coalition by making extensive concessions to the crypto Communist and minority groups.[36] At the level of incumbents, the military was dissatisfied with the performance of the AFPFL politicians in their failure to build a strong party organization capable of more dynamic policy output.[37] Although the disatisfaction predisposition of the military was not very generalized, the more specific disatisfactions may be assumed to have taken a sharp rise following the split in the AFPFL. There is no indication of any major inhibiting predispositional factor. Any potential threat of retaliation or opposition from the civilian polity was dispelled when an overt invitation was made from the civilian polity to the military to assume the major decision-making positions.

As 1958 progressed it became increasingly clear that on account of the AFPFL split no stable civilian government could be expected, and further that the complete atrophy in decision-making was exacerbating a number of other problems, such as the insurrections. As the breakdown in the civilain polity became more evident, the armed forces remained the only cohesive complex organization. In September U Nu asked Ne Win, as head of the armed forces to assume th e position of P.M. in a temporary capacity until arrangements could be made for the execution of elections in early 1959.

PERFORMANCE

A number of introductory comments on the Burnese military regime may be made. First, the very clear caretaker role was much more clearly defined and maintained than in the case of Turkey. Second, as in the case of Turkey, the military regime involved a significant degree of civilian participation (or rather conformity to civilian dictates), though there was no overt civilianization on the part of the military regime itself. Third, although there was an increase in military politicization and although the military was more favourably disposed to the Socialist faction in the AFPFL, there was no evidence of any partisan or civilian sectional politicization.

The first issue area to be examined is the manner and success of the military in coping with the main nation state political functions.

Two factors are of import with reference to the process of decision-making method. First, a large number of civilian trappings were maintained. Thus the legislative assemblies were maintained, the cabinet contained only one military member (Ne Win himself), and the new regime continued to rule through parlimentary approved bills and not through decrees. The second factor of import is that such trappings should not be overestimated. Although the Ne Win regime was unusual in retaining the civilain trappings outlined above (a factor which can be explained primarily by the caretaker

role), it did share many elements in common with the majority of military regimes in their early stages. Thus military personnel were placed in charge of almost all important government operations;[38] the civilian cabinet contained only 5 politicians (these were the representatives of the state governments and were required by the constitution);[39] more important than the civilian cabinet as the primary executive body was the Military Staff Council presided over by Brigadier Aung Gyi and Colonel Maung Maung (to which all military officers in the various government departments and enterprises reported); and finally there was a much stronger emphasis on streamlining and improving the efficiency of the administrative procedures, such as filing and record keeping, the checking of personnel files, and the dismissal of non-qualified office holders.[40]

With reference to the scope of decision-making, the Ne Win programme made few innovations but was primarily an austerity-efficiency programme, which was applied within the framework of existing policies and structures. This may be illustrated with reference to those areas which attracted the most persistent attention from the military. In the economic area, a large number of prices were lowered through price ceilings, hoarders were penalized, food supplies were increased, two-thirds of registered importers lost their licences, many development projects wre reviewed, and a number of state enterprises were put on a profit making basis, and finally a number of agricultural measures were introduced, such as the enlargement of the capital of the state Agricultural Bank.[41] The only major problem concerning the organization of the civilian polity was that of preparing the elections for the return to civilian power. Although this process involved more time than was originally envisaged, it must be pointed out that the most extensive register in Burma's history was compiled and that the 1960 elections were the most scrupulous. The third major problem area was that of controlling the insurrections, the comparative success of which operation will be examined below.[42] Finally, the military moved

200,000 squatters into satellite towns, and effected a clean-up of Rangoon. In sum, the major point concerning decision-making scope is that the military were preoccupied primarily with a broad-scale austerity programme with few structural innovations. There were no indicators of instability with reference to either the method or scope of decision-making.

Short term military regimes can expect to experience few problems concerning institutionalization. This was even more marked in the case of Burma given both the nature of the intervention and the structure of the military regime. With reference to the former, the intervention was made on the ostensible invitation of the civilian polity, and Ne Win was voted P.M. with a very large majority. With reference to the latter, several factors may be noted. First, the military regime continued to use many of the formal mechanisms of the civilian polity. Thus, the constitution was retained, parliament was not dissolved, parliamentary bills and not military decrees were issued, and finally when Ne Win wished to retain office longer than six months (this was the maximum period defined by the constitution that non-elected personnel could hold executive posts), a constitutional amendment was voted. Second, as with most military regimes, the formal structure of decision-making and the definition of offices was very clear. The Ne Win regime was additionally aided in that the coup was led by the most senior officers and the armed forces remained cohesive. In sum, the nature of the intervention and the structure of the military regime served to minimze institutionalization problems, and again there was no evidence of any instability in this area.

Three factors are of import concerning support mobilization. First, the Ne Win regime made no formal effort to mobilize popular support. However, this is not surprising given the short-term commitment of the regime. Second, the military regime could rely on the support of a number of important groups, primarily the armed forces, the administration, and to a lesser dgree many of the constituent elements of the civilian polity.

Third, it was in the area of support mobilization that the military regime experienced its most marked failure. The incidence of support failure may be explained in the context of the combination of the failure to mobilize any support and the withdrawal of support contingent on the austerity programme of the military regime. Several observers have pointed to the increasing dissatisfaction among a number of civilian groups with the Ne Win regime; this trend was confirmed in the 1960 elections when the faction of the AFPFL, which had more closely identified with the military regime, was soundly beaten.[43]

In common with unified military regimes, the Ne Win government experienced no major difficulty with reference to the monitoring process. Two factors are of import. First, the military regime could take more effective action against the insurgents. The possibility for an amnesty was firmly dismissed and Divisional and District Security Councils were established with the consequence that by 1960 the number of rebels and active supporters had been drastically cut to 5000.[44] Second, the military regime could not only cope with the decision-making implementation mechanisms but could even improve them. Thus there was some degree of sympathy between the administrators and the military, and further the military placed a number of technically-trained personnel in the administration. The consequence was to lead to an undoubted increase in the efficiency and efficacy of decision-implementation.

The second major task is to examine the success of the military in alleviating the basic conditions of the dissynchronizations. In general, the military regime did not make extensive progress in alleviating the preconditions of instability, although it was much more successful in its shorter term task of effecting the return of a civilian goverhment.

The military regime made negligible chahge to the structure of the economy (the first dislocation), as may be expected given its short term rule. Only two actions by the military were likely to have any ramification for the structure of the economy. These were, on the one hand, the expansion

of the role of the Defence Services Institute from an organization which simply provided for its own personnel into the largest business organization in Burma with interests in such areas as banking, shipping, department stores, and fishing; and, on the other hand, the implementation of a number of agricultural actions, primarily the enlargement of the capital of the State Agricultural Bank and the emphasis on more intensive farming. However, these two factors were unlikely to have any significant ramification for the weaknesses of the economy. Furthermore the military regime continued the basic pattern of the former regime's allocation retaining the inherited budget for 1958-59, and making very few changes in the one for 1959-60. Thus from the figure above indicating the industrial origin of the GDP, there is no change during the period of military rule.

The consequences of the military regime for the second dislocation are rather more problematic. On the one hand, its rule could have little effect on the consequences of the plan, which as far as possible was retained. However, with reference to the first collection of factors, which precipitated the dislocation, it appears that the military regime was much more successful. Thus coordination by the polity was improved by increasing the autonomy and capabilities of the major coordinating body, the Economic and Social Board; numerous public enterprises were reviewed; staffing problems were alleviated to a degree through the deployment of military personnel; and patronage and corruption were cut markedly through the review of import licehces, the removal of nepotistic ministers, the introduction of stricter auditing and accounting records and raids on hoarders. In sum, although there was no significant change in economic policies having reference to the structure of the economy, the economic policies having repercussions for the coordination and supervision of the economy did change markedly in the direction of increased efficiency. Although it is difficult to interpret results over such a short time scale and although a number of factors such as, increased rice harvest, cannot be

attributed to the military regime, a number of economic indicators would seem to support the success of the military. Thus, the consumer price index for 1959-60 dropped to 89, the index number for GDP rose to 107, and rice and total exports increased to 82.7m. Kyats and 117.0m. Kyats respectively. In sum, the military did have a significant degree of success with respect to the second dissynchronization.

With reference to the third dislocation, that of system cleavage, the military regime had much less success. It will be recalled that the two major lines of system cleavage were regional and party polarization. Towards both the main groups involved in the cleavages, the military decided to abandon any conciliatory programme and to concentrate their efforts on a military victory. To this end the military, without any civilian constraints, could deploy more easily, and further the military established District and Divisional Security Councils. The military did record some degree of military success in that rebel activity was confined to a smaller area and the number of insurgents was reduced. However, the military was unable to eliminate the rebels (which would be an exceptionally difficult task given the terrain of Burma), and they were certainly through this method unable to eliminate the underlying causes of the insurrection. Thus, the insurrection problem remained stalemated on the return of the civilian government in 1960.[47]

With reference to the fourth dissynchronization, the particular conditions underlying the participation failure experienced an ephemeral and rather paradoxical alleviation. The military regime did not take any action to alleviate the party failures. Thus, the military did not chose to organize an alternative party, nor did it execute a number of measures which may have alleviated to some degree the problems which had plagued the AFPFL. The paradoxical success was that one of the former factions of the AFPFL won a substantial majority in the 1960 elections, and thereby alleviated the decision-making method failure, which had been the immediate precedent of the intervention in 1958. (In the 1960 election

in returns for 207 of 250 seats, the 'Clean' AFPFL won 163, the 'Stable' 24, and the NUF 3.) The success was ephemeral in that neither of the two factions had experienced any significant change in terms of organization, policies, or leaders. The parties remained top heavy with local branches being satellites of the centre; the parties were still dominated by personal factions; corruption was still present; and there had been little concerted effort to mobilize mass support.[49]

Concerning the final dissynchronization, the military regime had considerable success in one area and negligible success in the other. There had been no change whatsoever in the structure or role of the legislative assembly. The pre-coup legislatures had continued through the military regime, there had been no constitutional changes having relevance for the legislative assembly, and there had been no other measures enacted to reinforce the role of the legislative assembly. In the second area, that of the civilian administration, the military regime did have some considerable success. Although there were no radical changes in the structure nor any major increases in qualified personnel, a number of important changes were effected. The top administration was reshuffled, politically appointed parliamentary secretaries were dismissed, pay and recruitment were improved, unqualified personnel were dismissed, records and personnel files were improved, efficiency and job discipline were increased, and much corruption was eliminated.[50]

In general, the military regime had a rather limited degree of success in alleviating the basic conditions of instability. This rather limited success is attributable partly to the nature of the dissynchronizations and partly to the caretaker nature of the military regime.

The third major problem area is the analysis of the relationship between military predispositions-capabilities and performance, and vice versa.

Three important factors concerning performance may be noted. First, although the Burmese armed forces did not achieve a major success in

alleviating the conditions of instability, there was no evidence, as in the case of Ghana, that the military experienced any major difficulties in the execution of the main political functions. This factor may be attributed primarily to the skill level and degree of cohesion of the military. Second, the most notable feature of the policy decisions of the military rule, namely the austerity programme, may be attributed both to the skill level of the military and to its more specific grievances against the performance of the politicians prior to 1958. Third, the more specific actions against the rebel forces may be seen as a consequence of the general predispositions of the military concerning their attitudes towards a unitary Burma and anti-Communism.

There were no major consequences for organizational capabilities on account of performance. There was no change in the composition and recruitment of the military;[51] cohesion also was unaffected, which is unusual, but may be attributed partly to the rather limited role of the military regime and partly also to the high degree of cohesion prior to the intervention in addition to which the regime was initiated and led by the top military officers; autonomy was unaffected except that as a consequence of performance the military had a more extensive political role (through the extended Defence Services Institute and the Security Councils);finally, it may be assumed that regime performance increased the skill level of the military. Two factors concerning predispositions may be noted. First, although it may be assumed that performance led to some degree of politicization within the military, this level of politicization was not extensive. Thus, there is no indication that the military wished to maintain its control beyond the necessary minimum period, or again the military made no provisions for continued military supervision after the transfer back so civilian government, as for example in the cases of Ghana or Turkey. Second, there is no evidence of any partisan or sectional politicization. Although the 'Stable' faction of the AFPFL tended to

identify with the Ne Win regime, there is no evidence that the military regime offered any assistance to that party during the 1960 elections, nor was there any indication that the 1960 election results would not be allowed to stand.

The final problem area is that of the transfer of power. With reference to the mechanism of transfer, three factors may be noted. First, the transfer was peaceful and clear-cut. Second, the most common means of selection of civilian government was employed, i.e. the holding of national elections. As opposed to both the Ghanaian and Turkish cases, which also employed elections, in Burma the elections were not preceded by a new constitution nor by a defined period for party campaigning (since parties had never been banned.) Finally, again in contrast both to the Ghanaian and Turkish cases, there were neither any direct military controls on the subsequent regime (as for example in the occupancy of the Presidency), nor any indirect structural controls (as for example in the influence on the structural organization of the new polity through a new constitution.)

The peaceful and successful transfer could take place because three essential conditions were satisfied. In the first place, the military had committed itself only to short term rule. Thus although there was undoubtedly some pressure for military intervention in 1958, the intervehtion was at the formal request of the civilian government; further, the military regime had maintained a number of formal civilian controls (e.g. had retained the legislature and had continued to conform to the constitution); and finally the military regime had not enacted a number of measures which would have been necessary for longer term rule, as for example the banning of political parties or the abolition of the constitution. Second, there existed organized civilian forces, which could assume the central decision-making positions. The pattern of instability prior to 1958 had not vitiated totally the civilian political

organizations, and further more the civilian political groups were permitted to maintain themselves and prepare for transfer during the period of the military regime. Third, as we have argued above, although the military made little progress in alleviating the basic conditions of instability, it was successful in bringing about those conditions, which would permit the transfer of power. These conditions consisted essentially of the temporary assumption of the major decision-making organs in order to forestall further atrophy, and the execution of national elections. It is interesting to note that following the coup of 1962, the military regime immediately dismissed any pretence of short term rule, and began to address itself more directly to the basic dissynchronizations, which in the caretaker regime of 1959-60 it had only contained.

FOOTNOTES: 7:CARETAKER MILITARY REGIMES

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN TURKEY

1. It is interesting to note that the Ottoman ruling groups perceived their relative demise vis-a-vis Europe and attributed this demise to certain European military transformations. As a consequence a number of military innovations were made, (1826 Janissaries were abolished, training schools were established,) but there was no attempt to imitate the broader economic, political, social and cultural changes which were going on in Europe and which underlay the military changes.

2. For a survey of Ottoman history see, B.Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey,Oxford Univ. Press, 1961; G.Lewis, Turkey, Benn, 1965; and F.Bahrampour, Turkey, T.Gaus, 1967.

3. There was a per capita GNP rise of almost 3%, see J.A.Morris, "Recent Problems of Economic Development in Turkey," M.E.J., 1960; and an investment growth rate of 4.1% 1950-58, (although it must be noted that the incremental capital-output ratio had begun to rise from 1:1 prior to 1950 to 2:1 1958-9 and was expected to be 3-4:1 1950-60), see R.D.Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, Harvard Univ. Press, 1963.

4. Morris, op.cit.

5. Robinson, op.cit.

6. Ibid.

7. In 1946 political parties, other than the RPP, were allowed to form. Although a number of parties emerged the DP soon became as the major alternative party. In 1946 it won 64 seats to 395 by the RPP but in 1950 won 408 to 69 by the RPP. For an account of the emergence of the DP, see K.H.Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, Princeton Univ. Press, 1959.

8. An account of these various measures may be found in Keesings Contemporary Archives.

9. In the context of the erosion of the sphere of competence, it is interesting to note some of the major demands of the opposition parties. Thus in 1950 the RPP had called for a second chamber, in 1954 the new RNP had called for U.N. rights to be incorporated into the constitution as well as the creation of a constitutional court empowered to rule on the validity of the bills passed by the Assembly.

10. Karpat, op.cit.

11. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

12. More specifically anyone whose candidature was discussed by a political party could not join another; only parties which produced a list of candidates in every province in which they maintain a political organization could participate in the elections; the number of candidates submitted must equal the number of deputies to be elected; no person could become a candidate for any party but his own; and independents could not be included on party lists. See Keesings Contemporary Archives.

13. See K.H.Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957", W.Pol.Quart.,1961.

14. See B.Lewis, op.cit.

15. K.H.Karpat, Turkey's Politics, op.cit.

16. See G.Lewis, "Turkey: the End of the First Republic", World Today, 1960; W.F.Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-61, Brooklings Instit., 1963; A.T.Payaslioglu, "Political Leadership and Political Parties", in R.E.Ward and D.A.Rustow, ed., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton Univ. Press, 1964.

17. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

18. See A.T.Payaslioglu, op.cit.; K.H.Karpat, Turkey's Politics, op.cit.

19. The most important press laws were passed in 1955 and 1956. The 1955 Law made it a criminal offence for a newspaper to undermine the prestige of the government. The 1956 Law made "false reports" calculated to cause unrest punishable by gaol or fines; publishers, editors and proprietors were to be regarded as collectively responsible; any newspaper infringing such rules could be banned for three months. In 1957 the Syndicate of Journalists was closed.

20. R.D.Robinson, op.cit., particularly minimizes these disturbances.

21. In 1924 there was a floating debt of £48m. and an Ottoman public debt of £401m. (the later was cancelled in 1946 until which time regular payments were made.) See P.F.Sugar, "Economic and Politcal Modernization," in R.E.Ward and Rustow, op.cit.

22. R.D.Robinson, op.cit.

23. R.Aktan, "Problems of Land Reform in Turkey", M.E.J., 1966.

24. J.A.Morris, op.cit.

25. Ibid.

26. N.Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, Pall Mall, 1963; N.Eren, "Financial Aspects of Turkish Planning", M.E.J., 1966.

27. There had been little land measures in 1924 Budget Law, 1934 Settlement Law, and 1937 Forest Law; but the 1930 Land and Settlement Law was never passed, the 1945 land reform was not well publicized or executed, and the DP attempt at land reform had to be withdrawn after back-bench protest. See R.Aktan, op.cit.; N.Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, op.cit.

28. That the agricultural subsidies etc. were biased towards a small group may be seen in that the 1953 farm mechanization programme benefitted only 1% of the population and in that the same 1% received 25% of the public farm credit. See W.H.Nicholls, "Investment in Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries", Amer.Econ.Rev., 1955; and K.H.Karpat, Turkey's Politics, op.cit.

29. J.A.Morris, op.cit.; see also for a more detailed account of the attempt to finance development through inflationary finance, O.Yenal, "Development of the Financial System", in F.C.Shorter, ed., Four Studies on the Economic Development of Turkey, F.Cass, 1967.

30. R.D.Robinson, op.cit.

31. See particularly F.W.Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, M.I.T. Press,

1965; and also G.S.Harris, "Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey", M.E.J., 1970; and N.Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, op.cit.

32. Thus in October 1955 9 DP deputies were expelled over conflict over the press laws. The 9 were joined by 12 others and subsequently joined the Freedom Party. Frey also notes in the ninth Assembly that 40% of the government deputies voted against a government proposal though from 1954-7 this had been reduced to 13%. In general Frey notes that party discipline was strong though not rigid. See F.W. Frey, op.cit. Frey also notes that the party conflict quickly spread to the villages.

33. See A.T.Payaslioglu, op.cit.; B.Lewis, op.cir.; and D.A.Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey", in J.LaPalombara, ed., Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1966.

34. See particularly J.S.Szyliowicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey, Mouton, 1966; and also D.Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Free Press, 1958; and D.A.Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey", op.cit.

35. See R.D.Robinson, "American Military Aid Programme", New York, Instit. Current World Affairs, 1948; and A.Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, R.Hale, 1958.

36. For an account of the start of the U.S. aid, see H.L.Hoskins, The Middle East, MacMillan, 1954; for a later comment D.Lerner and R.D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: the Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force", W.Pol., 1960.

37. J.C.Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension, Pall Mall Press, 1969.

38. A more enthusiastic statement for the military monopoly of mobility is made by Lerner and Robinson, op.cit.; a more qualified statement is made by E.Ozbudun, "The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics", Occasional Papers in Internat. Affairs, Harvard Univ. Press, 1966.

39. D.A.Rustow, "The Army in the Founding of the Turkish Republic", W.Pol., 1959; D.A.Rustow, "The Military", in R.E.Ward and Rustow, ed., op.cit.; D.Lerner and Robinson, op.cit.; G.S,Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics", M.E.J., 1965; F.W.Frey, "Arms and the Man in Turkish Politics", Land Reborn, 1960.

40. G.S.Harris, op.cit.

41. N.Yalman, "The Officer Corps in Turkish Politics", in H.Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes, Sage, 1968.

42. E.Ozbudun, op.cit.

43. There are several accounts of the Kayseri Incident, see for example W.F.Weiker, op.cit.

44. E.Ozbudun, op.cit.

45. See for example N.Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, McGill Univ. Press, 1964; H.A.Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", M.E.J., 1954.

46. C.Baskut, Y.Kemal, E.Guresin, Interviews with Members of Turkey's NUC, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1960.

47. Ibid.

48. Military cliques began to appear from 1954 especially in Istanbul but also in Ankara. In July 1957 the Ataturk Society led by Guventurk and Seyden had united 22 officers. A contact was established with Inonu who rebuffed them. A second group led by Kocas decided to locate a military leader and found General Talan, who was replaced on his death by General Gursel. See G.S.Harris, op.cit. For a discussion of the timing of the coup, see G.S.Harris, "The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey", op.cit.

49. Accounts of the composition of the military provisional government do vary slightly, see W.F.Weiker, op.cit.; G.Lewis, op.cit.; Keesings Contemporary Archives.

50. This split will be examined in detail below.

51. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

52. Both houses had veto powers, and particularly towards the end of military rule the lower house rejected a number of military bills.

53. See Keesings Contemporary Archives; Weiker, op.cit.; Ozbudun, op.cit.; and K.H.Karpat, "Recent Political Developments in Turkey and their Social Background", Internat. Aff., 1962.

54. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

55. See G.Lewis, op.cit.; Weiker, op.cit.; C.H.Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey, Manchester Univ. Press, 1969.

56. See M.Kapani, "Outlines of the New Turkish Constitution", Parlia. Aff., 1961; I.Giritli, "Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution", M.E.J., 1961; R.Devereux, "Society and Culture in the Second Turkish Republic", M.E.Aff., 1961.

57. To be examined below.

58. On the transformation of the DP to the JP, see W.B.Sherwood, "The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey", W.Pol., 1967.

59. See Weiker, op.cit.; Dodd, op.cit., does not give as favourable a review.

60. See R.Aktan, op.cit.; and C.H.Dodd, op.cit.

61. See Eren, op.cit.

62. D.A.Rustow, "Turkey's Second Try at Democracy", Yale Rev., 1963.

63. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

64. See Karpat, op.cit.; and Keesings Contemporary Archives.

65. The governments were: Dec.1961-May 1962 RPP-JP; June 1962- Dec.1963 RPP-NTP-RPNP-ex JP Independents; Dec.1963-Feb.1965 RPP-Independents; Feb.1965-Oct.1965 Urguplu government of opposition parties. On the problems of the coalition governments and the role of the military

in pushing them, see C.H.Dodd, op.cit.; G.Lewis, "Turkey 1962-64", World Today, 1964.

66. In fact the defence expenditure showed a marked rise from 1962. The total defence expenditure was TL1145m. 1960, 1238m. 1961, 2113m. 1962, 2803m. 1963, (U.N.Stst.Yearbook).

67. It is interesting to note the rank and age breakdowns of the two groups. The Turkes group had an average age as of 1960 of 36.8 to the intermediate group age of 38.0 to the Gursel group of 45.3. The Turkes group contained no Generals, 1 out of 8 Colonels, 3 out of 7 Lt. Colonels, 5 out of 12 Majors, 5 out of 6 Captains; the intermediate group contained 1 Colonel, 2 Lt.Colonels, 3 Majors, and 1 Captain; the Gursel group contained 5 Generals, 6 Colonels, 2 Lt.Colonels, 4 Majors, see Ozbudun, op.cit.; and Keesings Contemporary Archives.) On the division see G.M.Haddad, op.cit.; Weiker, op.cit.; Ozbudun, op.cit.; and S.N.Fisher, "The Role of the Military in Society and Government in Turkey", in S.N.Fisher, ed., The Military in the Middle East, op.cit.; N.Yalman, op.cit.

68. Hurewitz, op.cit.

69. See G.M.Haddad, op.cit.; Hurewitz, op.cit.

70. For an account of the attempted coups, see W.F.Weiker, "The Aydemir Case and Turkey's Political Dilemma", M.E.Aff., 1963; and CH.Dodd, op.cit. Weiker also points out that Aydemir was not the only conspirator and points especially to the '14' (the ex-NUC members) and the '11' (the 11 air-force officers who had been retired in 1962.)

71. It is interesting to note the number of retirements. The Feb. 1962 attempted coup led to the retirement of 68 officers, in July 1962 11 Generals known to be sympathetic to Aydemir were transferred, in Dec.1962 11 air-force officers were similarly transferred, and following the May 1963 attempted coup 148 were tried (the military Cadets were expelled, and there were two death sentences on Aydemir and Gurcan), see Keesings Contemporary Archives.

72. The Bill provided: 1. Any criticism of the May 27 1960 coup could lead to prison sentences of 1-5 years, 2. any criticism of democracy in Turkey would receive the same treatment, 3. parties claiming to be ex-DP would be likely to be banned, see Keesings Contenporary Archives.

73. See Weiker, " The Aydemir Case and Turkey's Political Dilemma", op.cit.; and Hurewitz, op.cit.

Military Intervention and Performance in Burma

1. A number of clique groupings emerged in the 1920s. The Thakins (Thakin means 'master' and was restricted to address to the British) emerged 1930-1 as the most militantly anti-British group, and was later to dominate both the AFPFL and the army.

2. In May 1945 Governor Dorman-Smith reimposed the 1935 constitution and attempted to revamp the former system ignoring the nationalist movement of the AFPFL. It soon became clear that this path was impossible. Smith was recalled and the next Governor organized an Executive Council which included a majority number of AFPFL. By the end of 1946 agreement on independence was reached. On the general background see, H.Tinker, Union of Burma, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967; Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma, Columbia Univ. Press, 1967; J.F.Cady, A History of Modern Burma, Cornell Univ. Press, 1958; and J.S.Furnivall, The Governance of Modern Burma, Instit. of Pac. Rel., 1958.

3. See H.Tinker, op.cit.; J.F.Cady, op.cit.; F.N.Trager, "The Political Split in Burma", Far Eastern Surv., 1958.

4. In fact the majority U Nu group was less cohesive than the Ba Swe-Nyein group. Note the following voting figures:

	Stable AFPFL	Clean AFPFL
AFPFL	99	54
Shan United Hill Peoples Org.	3	12
National United Front	-	42
Others	17	21
	119	127

(In the 'Other' category the Stable coalition had 7 groups, and the Clean had 10.) See J.H.Badgley, "Burma's Political Crisis", Pac.Aff.,1958.

5. Figures from L.J.Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma, Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.

6. Burma's Consumer Price Index (1953=100) (U.N.Stat.Yearbook)

1948	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
97	109	102	100	95	99	106	112	108	96

Burma's Gross Domestic Capital Formation (Kyats m.) (U.N.Stat.Yearbook)

	Value	%GNP	Construct.	Transp./Machinery	Increase Stock
1950	330	11	83 %	17 %	-11
1953	652	14	76	24	224
1957	1018	19	60	40	67
1958	1135	21	57	43	48
1959	1015	19	61	39	110

7. L.J.Walinsky, op.cit.

8. For an examination of the constitution and the elections see, J. Silverstein, "Burma", in G.Kahin, ed., Major Governments of S.E.Asia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1964.

9. See for example, F.N.Trager, "Political Divorce in Burma", For.Aff., 1959; H.Tinker, op.cit.; R.Butwell, U Nu of Burma, Stanford Univ. Press, 1969; J.H.Badgley, "Burma's Political Crisis", Pac.Aff., 1958; Maung Maung, "Burma at the Crossroads", India Quart., 1958.

10. J.F.Cady, op.cit.; L.J.Walinsky, "The Rise and Fall of U Nu", Pac.Aff., 1965; Maung maung, Burma and General Ne Win, Asia Pu. House, 1969.

11. There are numerous accounts of the insurrection. See for example, F.N.Trager, Burma, Pall Mall, 1966; B.Crozier, The Rebels, Chatto, 1960; H.Tinker, op.cit.

12. The figure of 20,000 is from Trager, op.cit. In the amnesty period 1955-6, some 28,000 rebels surrendered; a further 5,000 surrendered in an amnesty of 1958 leaving approximately 10-12,000, (figures from Keesings Contemporary Archives.)

13. The figures are taken from H.Tinker, op.cit.

14. See Maung Maung, op.cit.; R.Butwell, op.cit.; H.Tinker, op.cit.

15. Keesings Contemporary Archives.

16. F.Trager, op.cit.

17. Burma's Defence Expenditure (U.N.Stat.Yearbook) (m.Kyats.)

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1953	1955	1957	1958
Defence	48.4	100.8	117.5	136.4	284.6	376.7	368.5	407.6
Budget	489.6	401.3	419.9	517.8	846.3	1028.3	1136.0	1275.7
Def. % Budget	10	25	28	26	33	37	32	33

18. See F.Trager, op.cit.; Keesings Contemporary Archives.

19. H.Tinker, op.cit.

20. L.J.Walinsky, op.cit.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. The first plan was a two year one drawn up in 1948. It was less of a plan than an outline of what needed to be done. The second plan, the 8 Year Plan, was drawn up by three American firms, Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett, Pierce Management Inc., and R.R.Nathan Assoc. The main economic targets were accepted by the Pyidawtha Conference (August 1952) and the full plan presented at the end of 1953. However, plan proposals had been in effect for some time prior to the presentation date.

24. The 1958 split was not unheralded. Indeed in 1949 the Socialist Party, the single largest group within the AFPFL, had left the cabinet; Butwell argues that the line of the 1958 cleavage was clearly evident from 1953.

25. See J.Silverstein, op.cit.; and H.Tinker, op.cit.

26. See J.S.Furnivall, op.cit.; H.Tinker, op.cit.; L.Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, Yale Univ. Press, 1962.

27. See R.Butwell,op.cit.; J.Silverstein, op.cit.; L.J.Walinsky, "The Rise and Fall of U Nu", op.cit.

28. Contacts with the Japanese had been established in the early thirties but it was not until after the start of World War 2 that 30 Thakins were secretly taken to Japan through a Colonel Suzaki. Trained in Japan, these 'Thirty Comrades' formed the organizational nucleus of the first Burmese army. See Maung Maung, op.cit.; and Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, Yale Univ. Press, 1967.

29. L.W.Pye, "Army and Politics in Burma", in J.J.Johnson, ed., Role of the Military in Under-developed Countries, Princeton Univ. Press, 1962.

30. It is necessary to note the various titles of the Burmese armed forces. December 1941 the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) was established; in July 1942 it was transformed into the Burmese Defence Army (BDA), in August 1943 into the Burmese National Army (BNA), in May 1945 into the Patriotic Burmese Forces, and in September 1945 into the Burmese Army.

31. Figures from Maung Maung, op.cit.; F.Trager, op.cit.; H.Tinker, op.cit.

32. L.W.Pye, "Army and Politics in Burma", op.cit.; and H.Tinker, op.cit.

33. D.Guyot, "BIA: Civilian Independence Movement in Military Garb", S.E.Asia Mono.Series, 7, 1966.

34. On the collapse of the BIA see D.Guyot, op.cit. Despite the close alliance of the politicians and the military during the independence struggle, the heterogeneous nature of the AFPFL and the presence of both the Japanese and the British had prevented the various forms of the Burmese Army becoming an integral part of the AFPFL. The movement underground of the PVO, which had originally been established as a private army of the AFPFL by Aung San but had been considerably transformed beyond this, finally sealed the possibility of any party-army relationship as found for example im Algeria or the Communist systems.

35. H.Tinker, op.cit.; Maung Maung, op.cit.

36. L.W.Pye, op.cit.; A.Josey, "The Political Significance of the BWP", Pac.Aff., 1958; Maung Maung, "Burma at the Crossroads", op.cit.

37. Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win, op.cit.

38. F.Trager, op.cit., cites 150 military officers transferred.

39. The cabinet was reduced from 30 to 14, and consisted with the exception of Ne Win and the five state representatives of non-party technical personnel.

40. See for example Maung Maung, op.cit.; R.Butwell, op.cit.; J.Badgley, "Military in Burma", in W.C.McWilliams, Garrisons and Governments, Chandler, 1967.

41. L.J.Walinsky, op.cit.; R.Butwell, op.cit.

42. In this context, it is interesting to note that the crime rate was cut drastically from 6452 to 4604, (L.J.Walinsky, op.cit.)

43. See L.W.Pye, op.cit.; R.Butwell, op.cit.

44. 5000 is the figure given by F.Trager, op.cit.; Keesings Contemporary Archives cites 8000.

45. L.J.Walinsky, op.cit.; Maung Maung, op.cit.

46. The figures are from U.N.Stat.Yearbook, and L.J.Walinsky, op.cit., and should be compared against the tables provided above.

47. It is interesting to note in 1964, during the second military regime (an innovative one), negotiations with insurgent bands were attempted. But the main insurgent groups continued to exist. Both these points are made by F.N.Trager, "Burma 1967 - A Better Ending than Beginning", As.Surv., 1968; and J.Silverstein, "Problems in Burma: Economic, Political and Diplomatic", As.Surv., 1967.

48. Keesings Contemporary Archives. See also R.Butwell and Mehden, "The 1960 Elections in Burma", Pac.Aff., 1960.

49. T.N.Dupuy, "The New Political Outlook in Burma", Far Eastern Survey, 1960; and J.Silverstein, "Burma", op.cit.

50. F.N.Trager, op.cit.; R.Butwell, op.cit.; Maung Maung, op.cit.

51. The military budget remained unchanged. In 1958-9 the military budget was 407.6m.Kyats or 32% of the total budget, and in 1959-60 was 403.3m.Kyats or 31% of the total budget, (U.N.Stat.Yearbook.)

PART THREE : CONCLUSION

8 : EVALUATION

The purpose of this final chapter is to evaluate the total study. This involves two tasks. The first area of evaluation involves a review of the substantive problems of intervention and performance. This will take the form of attempting to produce a number of general summary propositions and observations covering the phenomena of military intervention and performance. The second area of evaluation is closely related to the first and involves an analysis of the model, outlined in Part One. The focus of this evaluation is substantively oriented, and involve s an examination of the value and viability of the basic paradigm in confronting the empirical analysis of military intervention and performance in new nation state systems.

Intervention and Performance: A Review

The most important and rather disappointing conclusion concerning military intervention is that it is impossible at this stage to identify a single or several syndromes of conditions which precipitate intervention. On the one hand, our indicators both of military predispositions and capabilities and of nation state instability are not sufficiently sophisticated, and on the other hand, the conditions under which coups take place are sufficiently complicated, to make this task not feasible at the present. Nonetheless, it is possible to point out, assuming a nation state system and a professional military organization of non- or induced politicization, that the propensity for military intervention will increase in direct relation to the intensity of instability and the military predispositional disatisfactions and organizational capabilities. Furthermore, the more generalized the instability and the military disatisfactions and the higher the organization capabilities, then the more likely that the military regime will move along the scale from guardian to innovator.

The second conclusion involve s a number of elaborations concerning the indicators and dissynchronization of instability. With reference to the indicators of imstability, two observations may be made. First, there

are a wide number of possible permutations of the indicators of instability, and hence a wide variety of conditions under which intervention may take place. Second, itis interesting to note that the different types of instability vary in the immediacy of their debilitating effects on the performance of the political system. Thus, decision-making method and monitoring failure have the most immediately debilitating effects, followed by support failure (of which withdrawal is the more immediate type) and decision-making scope, and finally by institutionalization failure. With reference to the dissynchronizations precipitating instability, three observations may be made. As in the case of the indicators of instability, there is no single syndrome which precipitates instability. second, any single dissynchronization, depending on the factors precipitating it and the particular form it takes, may have varying ramifications for individual indicators of instability. For example, participation failure will always lead to support failure, but it may also in some cases have ramifications for decision-making method or institutionalization failure. Third, the most common dissynchronizations are those of system cleavage, structural inputs of the economy to the polity, the polity's inadequate monitoring of the economy, participation failure, and administration failure. Fourth, the factors conditioning the development of the dissynchronizations are the most extensive and most diverse as it is in this area that the idiosyncratic focus on individual systems is strongest. However, these factors may be ordered under three headings. The first concerns the complex of ramifications from the total global constellation of nation state systems. This complex includes that body of factors, such as the obligation to interact politically and economically in the international market which contains much moe powerful trading partners and the problems of compressed economic and political development, which are contingent on global patterns of political-economic-social-cultural organization and which provide the general backgroundof intense strain to instability common to all new nation state systems. The consequence

of the global patterning of nation state organizations is that the propensities and strains towards instability are much greater for current new nation state systems than were any such propensities for the currently more developed nation state systems in their earlier stages of vertical and horizontal development. The second main heading contains those ramifications from pre-nation state organization, i.e. the legacies of political, economic, social and cultural organization prior to nation state development. The third and most diversified heading contains those ramifications from adaptation to nation state development, i.e. the manner of attempting to cope with and accommodate to the major processes of nation state development.

The third general conclusion relates to military predispositions and capabilities. Two observations may be made. In the first place the varying levels of the development of professionalization and the varying intensities and types of the development of politicization lead to some considerable diversity in the constellations of predispositions and capabilities. Second, despite such diversity in the development of predispositions and capabilities, a number of factors tend to encourage the greater comparative salience of the military organization in new nation state systems from the military organization in the more developed (vertically and horizontally) nation state system. Although it would be grossly incorrect to underestimate the role and position of the military in the more developed nation state system either in terms of budgetary consumption or in terms of their influence on certain policy areas, a number of factors serve to emphasize the greater hiatus in organizational capabilities and predispositional dissatisfactions of the armed forces as against civilian political organizations in new nation state systems as against the same juxtaposition in more developed nation state systems. Two main factors account for the greater organizational hiatus in the new nation state system. First, because the functional sphere of the military is more specific and much less complex than those of the major civilian political

organizations, the military organizational capabilities can develop more easily, more quickly, and more efficiently. Second, the problems of the development of the military are not as intense as the problems of the development of the political system in the context of late nation state development. Thus since the military is less complex than the total structural organization of the civilian polity, it is not faced with the same intensity of difficulties of compressed development; or again it does not experience the complex of pressures of the global patterning of nation state organization, which as noted above provides tremendous continuous strain for the development of instability in the political systems of new nation states. With reference to the greater predisposit-ional dissatisfactions, although the intensity and levels of such dissatisfactions may vary markedly, they have in common the fact that they stem essentially from the military's evaluation of its own organization-al capabilities and performance vis-a-vis the organizational capabilities and performance of the civilian political system. Thus to the extent that the military is a more ready and capable consumer of modern technology, to the extent that it is more readily attuned to external interaction than the greater part of the civilian polity and is as aconsequence more readily attuned to the international context of modernization, and to the extent that on account of the factors noted immediately above the military is more likely to manifest a more satisfactory degree of performance in its own functional sphere than is the civilian polity, then the military in the new nation state is more likely to generate a higher level of predispositional dissatisfaction than is its equivalent organization in the more developed nation state.

The fourth conclusion relates to the interaction between the development of instability and military predispositions and capabilities. The most obvious observation is that the military invariably becomes involved in the development of instability in that when civilian groups atrophy, then the military is frequently left as the only complex national

organization capable of assuming temporarily the major decision-making positions. However, varying types of instability have different ramifications for military involvement in the progression of instability. The types, which have the most immediate ramifications, are decision-making method failure, which frequently leads to military personnel becoming involved in civilian decision-making, and monitoring failure, which frequently leads to military control of riots or temporary control of parts of the administration or even full martial law. A further factor of interest is that the development of instability invariably leads to the development on the part of the military of politicization - it follows that the greater the involvement, the more rapid and intense the development of politicization.

The fifth conclusion is that given a professional military of non- or induced politicization, the development of instability is the more important part of the relation between instability and predispositions-capabilities for predicting intervention. However, as professionalization decreases or alternative forms of politicization appear, then the more important the military side of the relation for predicting intervention. Overt politicization in a professional military is unlikely to lead to total intervention except in the situation of the complete breakdown of the civilian regime, but it is likely to lead to coalition political role on the part of the military intermediate between the pressure group role of the non-politicized professional military and the total intervention of the induced politicized professional military. The most important consequences of partisan and civilian sectional politicization are twofold. In the first place, partisan or civilian sectional politicization can lead to the phenomenon of repetitive coups and are the most common precipitant of this phenomenon (although recurrent instability can also lead to repetitive coups.) Military partisan politicization leads to a low level of external affective neutrality and as such predisposes the military to intervene more frequently. However, military partisan

politicization is more usually the product of military rule and as such is more important in influencing performance than intervention. When partisan identification is found in military organizations prior to coups, it is usually associated with a very low level of military professionalization and with a very low level of nation state development, see for example the first coup in Togo. The more common precipitant of repetitive coups is civilian sectional politicization. Civilian sectional politicization leads not only to a low level of external neutrality but also a low level of internal neutrality and a low level of cohesion. The civilian sectional politicization can take place along a number of dimensions, such as identification with a civilian party (e.g. Syria during the 1950s and early 1960s) or an ethnic group (e.g. Nigeria) or an economic group (e.g. numerous cases from Latin America). The coup can either take the form of a simple military operation or a combined operation with the appropriate civilian group. The phenomenon of a combined coup is very rare on the part of a politicized professional military. Civilian sectional politicization leads to repeated coups in that it tends to generate rival groupings within the military, and so as civilian political fortunes fluctuate then so does the possibility for making coups increase. The most chronic examples are found in Latin America (see for example the post World War 2 history of Argentina), although examples are also found less frequently outside Latin America as for instance in Syria. Furthermore, this phenomenon is likely to become more widespread outside Latin America in systems, which have as yet experienced only a small number of coups, as performance invariably leads to higher politicization and the higher the level of politicization then the greater the likelihood of variations and diversity in military political evaluations. The second consequence of partisan and civilian sectional politicization is to lead to the occurrence of violence at or during the coup. Most coups by politicized professional militaries are bloodless, though they may involve a limited number of

deaths and arrests, since such coups usually take place in conditions of a high degree of perceived instability. Partisan or sectional coups are more likely to lead to overt violence by virtue of clearly defined rival groups existing in situations where there is no consensus on the degree of instability or on the mechanism for the resolution of any such instability. The degree of violence associated with this type of intervention may either be localized and short term, e.g. Argentina, or more extensive and long term involving a civil war, e.g. Nigeria or Spain. The extent of violence is a function of the capabilities and degree of polarization of the rival groups.

The main conclusions concerning performance may be examined under the headings of the four main issue areas. (Unless otherwise stated, the focus is on the professional military of non- or induced politicization in a nation state system.

With reference to the first issue area, several conclusions concerning decision-making method may be made. First, with the exception of care-taker regimes, the military invariably dismisses the legislative body, the parties and the constitution. The caretaker regime may also make some dissolutions, but these are not usually as extensive. Second, following the intervention, two main variants of executive decision-making may be established. On the one hand, the leader of the military coup is established as the President/Prime Minister with a cabinet, in which there is a varying admixture of civilian and military ministers; or on the other hand, a military junta is formed as the supreme executive council below which there is a civilian cabinet. The third point, which is closely related to the one above, concerns the degree of civilianization or civilian involvement. In this sphere four main points may be made. First, the phenomenon of a total military government is rather anomalous, since even the most clearly defined military regime (e.g. Egypt after the Nasser vivtory over Neguib) is obliged to rely on the civilian adminis-tration. It is interesting to note that the lower the level of nation

state development and hence the less complex the major political, economic, social and cultural processes, then the lower the level of any such necessary reliance. Second, military regimes may vary in terms of the degree of militarization in two main ways: the degree of monopoly of main executive decision-making positions, and the number of military personnel employed outside the immediate central executive decision-making positions. Third, the civilian personnel, employed by the military, tend to be technical experts rather than politicians. Fourth, the process of civilianization may take two main forms. The one involves the civilianization of the military itself, i.e. the military becomes a quasi-civilian regime through for example the formation of a political party or the establishment of a strong central civilian assembly. The other involves the increasing employment of civilian trappings by a nonetheless explicit military regime in the form of the greater use of civilians (and especially civilian politicians), the establishment of a more limited assembly, the promulgation of a constitution, or the permitted return of civilian political parties. The type and degree of civilianization is a function of two interrelated forces, namely the duration and the type of the military regime. The caretaker regime generally involves the least degree of the first type of civilianization, but initially the most marked degree of civilian trappings; the equilibrator regime will tend to develop both types of civilianization in direct relation to the length of its rule; the innovator regime will initially show the least amount of civilianization, but over time, if it does not become transformed into an equilibrating regime, it will manifest the highest degree of civilianization. The fourth main point relates to the mechanisms of decision-making. When civilianization is low, the main means of decision-making is through decrees and the extensive use of commissions. As civilianization increases, then so does the propensity to develop a civilian cabinet or some type of civilian body either to participate in

or to monitor decision-making. The fifth point is that the higher the level of sectional politicization, the more likely is the occurrence of civil-military coalitions and a more extensive use of civilian politicians (as opposed to technical experts.) A sixth point concerns what may be termed the style of decision-making. Invariably the military tends to emphasize simplicity, centralization, and efficiency in decision-making. Thus military regimes tend to favour unitary organizations or decentralization under firm central control; the numbers involved in decision-making are curtailed; frequently the administration is revamped and rationalized; and a very clear structure of decision-making is established. Furthermore even under the development of civilianization, there continues to be an emphasis on a strong central executive, a preference for indirect elections, and a preference for representation on functional and occupational rather than a party basis. Finally, given the cohesion and technical expertise of the military together with the usual affinity of the military with the civil administration, it may be noted that military regimes rarely experience any major difficulties concerning the decision-making method.

The scope of decision-making shows much greater diversity than the method of decision-making, and is of course contingent on the type of military regime. The degree of change induced by a military regime is a function of three interrelated factors. The broader the degree of instability, the lower the level of nation state development, and the higher the military organizational capabilities and predispositional dissatisfactions, then the greater the propensity for innovation. Thus, unlike the case of decision-making method, many of the factors governing the scope of decision-making lie outside the control of the military. The success of the military with reference to decision-making scope is again much more variable than the success of decision-making method, and is entirely contingent on the legacy of instability for the military regime and the skill level of the military.

With reference to the institutionalization process, a number of points may be noted. First, although the military can usually satisfy quite easily the clear establishment of the major political offices, the other processes of institutionalization are much more problemmatic. Thus, given the abolition of the constitution and all major civilian bodies, the mechanisms and rules of procedure for political interaction become very difficult to identify. Furthermore, the military is obliged to create legitimacy for the new offices and rules of procedure. Three main factors govern the success of the military with reference to institutionalization. The longer the time period, the lower the degree of military cohesion, and the lower the degree of civilian involvement, then the greater the problems of institutionalization for the military. (It is interesting to note that it is impossible for a partisan or civilian sectional military regime to satisfy the institutionalization process.) The caretaker regime experiences the least difficulty with reference to institutionalization, in that it is committed to a very short time period (it is necessary to recall that institutionalization failure has the slowest reaction for instability) and it is frequently invited to make the intervention and it involves a high degree of civilianizatiom. The shorter term equilibrator and innovative regimes may also experience no major problem assuming there was a high degree of popular support for the intervention and assuming military cohesion was retained. However, as the time period for military regimes extends, then some degree of institutionalization, such as the use of referendums or the promulgation of a constitution must take place. If this process does take place, then the military regime is likely to become progressively transformed; if it does not take place or if partisan or sectional politicization develops, then the military regime will progressively experience the development of instability.

The mechanisms available to the military for support mobilization are fourfold. The first is that of the referendum. Referendums are most frequently employed in an institutionalization capacity in such circumstances as the legitimation of a military man as head of the military junta or the legitimation of a political policy innovation, of which the most frequent is a new constitution. The primary limitation of this mechanism is that it is impossible to use them frequently, they provide for a very retricted type of participation, and usually when employed by military regimes the range of choice inherent in the referendum is very restricted. A second mechanism is the use of a limited form of civilian participation through two main organizations. The one is some form of civilian cabinet, but in this context it must be noted that the cabinet usually has only advisory status and usually consists of non-party personnel. The other is the use of some form of civilian assembly. Such assemblies may be either functionally specific (the most common being that which is established to produce a new constitution) or more generalized. However, such assemblies usually contain a large number of military-appointed members and representation is usually along functional rather than party lines. Except in the case of certain caretaker regimes in which the pre-coup assembly is retained, such assemblies are usually associated with the later stages of a military regime. A further mechanism is for the military tp develop a more comprehensive structure for civilian participation, e.g. the BD system in Pakistan or the adapted GD system in Indonesia. Again it is common to find strong military appointive powers, emphasis on functional rather than party representation, the use of indirect elections, and a close parallel between the participation and administrative structures. Finally the military may organize its own political party. This may take three main forms. First, the military may organize its own political party, or join an existing party

working within the type of framework noted immediately above (examples are the Indonesian military organization Golkar or the joining by Ayub Khan of the ML.) Second, the military may organize its own political party, which is the sole party, e.g. the ASU in Egypt. In both these two basic cases, the party organization in terms of support mobilization is usually very limited in that it is governed by a number of military constraints. The third form is the situation where the military constitutes the leadership of a political party, which then freely competes with other civilian political parties, e.g. S.Korea. This type of party formation is usually coterminous with a high if not total degree of transformation on the part of the military regime. In general, the caretaker regimes will employ either or both of the first two mechanisms; equilibrator regimes will employ either or both ot the second and third mechanisms; innovative regimes will employ either or both of the third and fourth mechanisms.

The key variables covering the success of support mobilization are: length of rule, level of support at the time of the coup, nature of the support mechanism employed by the military, and the degree of transformation on the part of the military. Caretaker regimes generally experience little problems with reference to support mobilization on account of the short period of rule; short term equilibrators may also experience little difficulty assuming a high degree of popular support for the intervention. However, since popular participation is one of the cardinal features of the nation state system, the longer term military regimes are obliged to come to terms with some form of support mobilization and hence are obliged to develop either the third or fourth mechanisms noted above. The degree of support for the military at the time of the coup is very important in providing legitimation for the military regime. The type of support for the military at the intervention may either take the form of a civilian invitation for intervention (e.g. Burma or the first Sudanese

coup), or spontaneous civilian demonstration of support at the time of the coup (e.g. Indonesia, Ghana, S.Korea.) Usually all coups by professional militaries of non- or induced politicization will be accompanied by popular demonstrations of support. However, it must be emphasized that this type of support is both very volatile and of short duration and lies essentially outside the control of the military. The nature of civilian support mechanisms at the time of the coup is of vital importance. Where civilian support mechanisms are defunct, or where civilian parties are of a clique nature, then even the long term military regime may not experience any significant support failure assuming some form of support is mobilized. Thus Ghana or Egypt experienced no major difficulty. (In Ghana the CPP was defunct, the coup was popularly received, and the military regime was of short duration; in Egypt the civilian parties prior to the coup were of a clique nature.) When all civilian support mechanisms are not defunct, then any long term military regime can expect to experience considerable difficulties.(This would have been the case in Turkey had military rule been extended, and was also true to a degree in Pakistan.) The importance of the type of support mechanism and the problems associated with each have already been reviewed. The major problem concerning the degree of transformation on the part of the military regime has reference primarily to the longer term regimes. The problem stems essentially from the fact that since support mobilization is one of the main processes of the nation state system, assuming the military regime is to perform in consonance with nation state development, then the military regime is obliged to use either the third or fourth mechanisms noted above. The main problems then are twofold. First, the military is ill-adapted to mobilize support successfully and further tends to favour a range of mechanisms, such as indirect elections, strong appointive powers, and subordination of party mechanisms to the

administrative structure, which over time tend to be inadequate for support mobilization. Second, military regimes experience the dilemma of total transformation, e.g. S.Korea, in which case where continued reliance on direct military support is maintained in situations where popular civilian support is waning, then partisan or sectional politicization is likely to develop, e.g. Brazil. In sum, long term military rule will lead either to total transformation, partisan or sectional politicization, or a high degree of support failure.

The monitoring mechanisms avaliable to military regimes are generally extensive. Thus the military has control of the monopoly of force; it has control of a complex administrative machine; and with the occasional exception of caretaker regimes, usually invokes martial law in the period immediately following intervention. The more marked the propensity for innovation or the greater the degree of partisan politicization, then the greater the salience and intensity of monitoring mechanisms. Military regimes rarely experience any monitoring failure on account of any default in their own monitoring capacities, but can experience monitoring failure on account of failure in other areas of performance. Invariably a high degree of salience of monitoring mechanisms on the part of a military regime over time is indicative of failure (usually institutionalization or support failure) in other areas of performance.

With reference to the second performance issue area, the conclusions are rather limited. Three main ones may be noted. First, it is impossible to review briefly the success of military regimes in this area, since such a review would have to take account not only of a wide variety of dissynchronizations, involving a large number of idiosyncratic precipitating factors (since the abstract dissynchronizations tell us very little), but also of a wide range of military organizational capabilities. The only possible general observation is that when the factors precipitating dissynchronizations are of a simple pragmatic nature, then, assuming a

high degree of military organizational capabilities, the military regime may be successful. When the factors precipitating dissynchronizations are associated with the major debilitation of a large number of civilian political organizations (inparticular civilian political parties), then the military regime is rarely successful. In sum, the military regime is generally more successful in halting an increase in instability than in alleviating the dissynchronizations. Second, when partisan or sectional politicization take place, then the military regime becomes a major force in fostering instability, and the stability in the political system cannot be restored until the partisan or sectional politicization is eradicated. The combination of an unstable partisan or sectional military regime together with civilian instability can lead to total system breakdown, as is likely in Pakistan. Third, although it is impossible to identify a simple range of conditions governing the success of the military in alleviating the dissynchronizations of instability, it is easy to identify the situation in which successful alleviation takes place, namely the complete withdrawal of the military and the establishment of a stable civilian regime.

The third issue area to be examined is that of the ramifications of military predispositions and capabilities for performance and vice versa. In general, it is the military predispositional dissatisfactions, which dictate the scope of the regime. Simple incumbent dissatisfaction will lead to a guardian regime. A caretaker regime will usually involve specific incumbent, policy and low level structural dissatisfaction. An equilibrator regime will involve a more generalized incumbent and policy dissatisfaction and a higher level of structural dissatisfaction. An innovative regime will involve a high level of structural dissatisfaction, to which policy and incumbent dissatisfactions are subordinate in importance. The primary consequence of skill level for performance relates directly to the success of the military in decision-making and the consequent success of the

military in effecting any degree of change in the system. The composition and structure, the autonomy, and the cohesion of the military only have any significant consequence for performance when the level of professionalization is low. For a military regime to maintain itself without experiencing any major breakdown, it is necessary that any sectional recruitment base loose its significance and that a high degree of cohesion be maintained. The generalized consequence of a low level of development of these factors is to lead to the development of a high degree of partisan or sectional politiciziation. More specifically, when the recruitment base has not lost its significance, then the military regime will tend to perform in the interets of that base; when autonomy is low, military rule is likely to be prolonged; when cohesion is low, repetitive coups, with obvious consequences for performance, are the likely consequence. In sum, performance, under the low level of development of these three factors, is likely to lead to an exacerbation of instability.

The primary ramification of performance on military predispositions and capabilities is through the increase in politiicization. With the exception of skill levels, which may be assumed to increase, politicization becomes the major filter through which organizational capabilities and predispositions are effected. The military assumption of the major political decision-making positions inevitably leads to an enhancement of the degree of politicization. The consequences of such increased politicization for the military can be minimized as long as politicization is uniform, and does not undergo transformation from the induced-generalized type. The two major variables governing the transformation of politicization are the duration of the regime and the degree of change induced by theregime. The shorter the duration and the lower the level of change, the less likely any politicization transformation. However, a number of factors

associated with performance tend to encourage either non uniform or a very high level of politicization. The former may lead to sectional and the latter to partisan politicization. Thus assumption of the main policy decision-making positions encourages debate over different perceptions of the role of the military regime, the particular duration of the regime, the degree of change to be induced by the regime, and the type of regime to which transfer may be made. This type of debate, which takes place in all military regimes, becomes particularly acute when military cohesion is not high. The consequence of partisan politicization is to lead to a marked decline in military autonomy, which in turn affects performance by making the military regime impervious to facilitating a return to civilian government, which in turn leads to the development of institutionalization and support failure on the part of the military regime, (both Greece and Brazil at the present time are good examples.) Civilian sectional politicization leads to a breakdown in cohesion, which may generalize in varying degree to all other military capabilities, and which will in turn lead to the possibility of the development of repetitive coups. It is very unusual for an intervention precipitated by partisan politicization to lead to a military regime in which there is a transformation to induced-generalized politicization, (although there are examples such as Vargas in Brazil.) The most common consequences of interventions precipitated by sectional politicization are to lead either to partisan politicization when military cohesion can be established, or to lead to a continuation of sectional politicization inducing repeated coups.

The fourth and final performance issue area to be examined concerns the transfer of control. Basically three main types, with several subtypes, may be noted. The first type provides the greatest problems for identification, and concerns the civilianization process. The identification problems stem from the fact that the civilianization process is

generally very gradual, and hence it is difficult to establish clear cut-off points. It has already been noted that the conception of a total military regime is rather anomalous and that any military regime must include a degree of civilian involvement. Of the two types of civilianization noted above, only the first is compatible with possible military transfer. Although the process of civilianization is likely to be gradual, transfer can only be said to have been achieved once the former military regime has permitted alternative civilian forms to emerge, and has transformed its support base from the military to a civilian group. This process can be relativèly clear cut, as for example when the military organizes a political party and subsequently competes with other parties in a general election (c.f. S.Korea), or it may be more complex and confusing (c.f. the establishment of Peron.) This type of transfer is not very common and is most likely to take place when the military manifests a high degree of politicization and where alternative civilian ruling groups are weak.

The second basic type of transfer is overthrow of the military regime and has three sub-types. All these sub-types, by virtue of being overthrows, are more easily identifiable than the above type. The first sub-type is overthrow of a military regime by popular civilian forces. This type of transfer is always the product of the development of a high degree of instability within the military regime, usually of an institutionalization or support failure format and will always be accompanied by a high degree of monitoring failure. The consequences of this type of overthrow may be twofold. On the one hand, overthrow can lead to the establishment of a civilian regime (e.g. Sudan 1964); on the other hand, it may lead to the establishment of a new military regime (Pakistan 1969.) The particular form of the consequence of the overthrow is contingent on whether there exists a sufficiently well-organized civilian political body, which is

capable of constituting an alternative regime. The second sub-type of overthrow is that accomplished by an alternative military group manifesting civilian sectional politicization. Given the incidence of non professional politicization, this type of transfer is not necessarily associated with instability on the part of the incumbent regime. The overthrow may lead either to a new military government (see numerous cases in Latin America, but also a number in Africa such as Nigeria, Togo, or Dahomey), or to a coalition civil-military government (this is particularly common when politicization is along party lines, e.g. Syria), or to a civilian government of which the military approves (e.g. Sierre Leone 1968). The third type of overthrow is that effected by a rising professional group in the military against an incumbent partisan or sectional military regime. This type of transfer usually leads to a short term rule on the part of the professional military group, during which time elections are organized for a return to civilian government, (a good example is provided by the Venezuela coup of 1958.)

The third major type of transfer is the spontaneous withdrawal of the military. This type has two very different sub-types. The first concerns the situation where a civilian sectional politicized military will hand over control to a civilian regime of which it approves and to which it will lend tacit support. The second sub-type relates to the classic transfer by a professional military of non- or induced politicization, (e.g. Burma, Turkey). In variably the process by which this transfer takes place involves the promulgation of a constitution, a period during which civilian political parties are allowed to form, the holding of a general election, and the final surrender to the victorious group in the election. This type of transfer can only occur when three conditions are concurrent: the existence of a professional military of induced politicization, the perception by the incumbent military regime of the completion of its tasks, and the

availability of alternative civilian ruling groups. This type of transfer is invariably the most peaceful, and is not indicative of any marked degree of instability. Although the transfer is clear cut, it is interesting to note the types of post transfer control, which may be retained by the military. First, it is possible that no controls are retained, as in Burma. Second, the military may have some indirect control on the post transfer polity by virtue of having framed the constitution of the subsequent civilian polity, or of having banned or placed certain retrictions on parties, as in Ghana or Turkey. Third, the military may retain a number of limited direct controls, such as the occupancy of the Presidency, or a delegated number of seats in the civilian assembly, as again in Ghana and Turkey. Fourth, the military may employ a more nebulous mechanism, namely the threat of a further coup.

The Model and Paradigm: A Review

In general terms, we argue that on the credit side we have provided an empirical paradigm for the comparative analysis of military intervention and performance and also, through the application of this paradigm, to a number of case studies, the beginnings of an empirical theory in the form of a number of interrelated, general, comparative findings. On the debit side, we have not provided a comprhensive empirical theory of military intervention and performance. Both these sides may be examined.

With reference to the limitations of the study, the most general observation is that a comprehensive empirical theory has not been produced. Such a theory would encompass a body of statements with reference to intervention, which would define a single or several sets of conditions, on the basis of which probability statements on the likelihood of intervention could be made. A similar body of statements covering the main issue areas of performance would also be required.

Given this major limitation of our research, three major areas, which

are seen as being responsible for this limitation, may be examined. The first area is that of the nature of the problem. It is something of a truism that different types of substantive problems generate different types of problems for research and empirical theory formation. Our problem area lies in the general field of macro comparative analysis, which in turn means that we are dealing with a very complex phenomenon. The specific ramifications of the complexity of our particular substantive macro comparative problem are several. First, it is necessary to deal with a large number of cases. (Thus even within the parameters defined above, military interventions have been prevalent in Latin America from the 1930s onwards, in the Middle East and Asia from the 1950s, and in Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1960s.) Second, it is necessary to mobilize a large number of variables, which must cover both nation state organization and military organization. Third, given the complexity of the phenomena under examination, it is impossible to identify single syndromes. For example, in the case of the nation state, it was necessary to identify a number of political, economic, social, and cultural processes, which could be manifested in a number of different ways, and which could cohere in a variety of manners - the same holds true for military organization in that the definitional traits may constellate in a number of fashions. Furthermore the problem of permutation becomes even more complex since we are interested not in a single phenomenon but in the interaction between two complex ones. The fourth problem is that of data. Again it is a truism to note that the broader both the comparative and macro focus, the more difficult is the problem of data collection. Although this problem is constantly declining, there are still a significant number of nation state systems on which there is very little data, and a much larger number on which data is rather sporadic.

The second problem area relates to the particular research approach, which is adopted for problem solving, and which in this case was that of

empirical theory formation. As in the case of the type of research problem, the main difficulties stem from the complex nature of empirical theory formation. Two general problem areas having ramifications for research may be noted. The first problem area relates to that constellation of problems concerning the application of the scientific paradigm. Several important problems may be noted. First, the problems of data quantification are much more complex in the social sciences by virtue of the nature of the data. Second, we are dealing with phenomena, which on a relatively short time scale (i.e. a number of years), are undergoing rapid transformation. Third, since for most macro problems variable manipulation is very difficult, if not impossible, itis very difficult to establish precise experimental designs, or to establish good control cases, or to repeat experiments. The second problem area relates to the status of empirical theory within the general perspective of political science inquiry. Since empirical theory formation is in many ways the final goal of political analysis and since empirical theory formation is certainly the most ambitious task within political analysis, an additional number of problems are generated. Thus we are obliged to combine both abstract analysis and empirical reaearch; we are obliged to devise heuristic mechanisms of classification and problem definition; or again we are obliged to move beyond description to provide explanations.

The third problem area relates to the difficulties and limitations inherent in our particular model and the application of that model. A number of main problems may be noted. Although we have extensively employed scales for the identification of nation state processes, types of instability, and military predispositions and capabilities, and although the scales have been rigorously employed on a comparative basis, the scales have been non numerate. The distinction between quantative and non-quantative scales and measures in terms of the distinction between numerate and non numerate scales is rejected by us. Non-numerate scales may be

quantattive in so far as they are empirically defined and are capable through empirical application of identification and differentiation of varying intensities of the phenomenon being scaled. Assuming quantative scales are being employed, then a distinction may be made between numerate and non-numerate quantative scales. The former are more desirable in that as data collection becomes more precise, then so too can data analysis, and hence empirical theory formation can become more sophisticated and more powerful.Thus, although we have used quantative scales, these scales have been non-numerate, and hence have lacked the degree of power associated with numerate ones. A corrollary problem closely related to that of scaling concerns change along these scales over time. Although by virtue of the scales being quantative, it has always been possible to identify changes over time, it is difficult to make precise statements on the importance of varying degrees of change. Such refinement can only be achieved through the use of regression analysis, whereby the main regression line provides the reference line from which amounts of change may be assessed. Regression analysis, however, requires numerate scales. A further corrollary is that there is no method by which it is possible to decide whether the various indices, which have been used to identify the major scales, are unidimensional or whether they tap several dimensions. Although the possibility of multi-dimensionality within a single scale has been tested crudely, itis only through correlation analysis that a satisfactory test can be made, but again our scales are not sufficiently refined to make this possible. A second problem involves the definition of the parameters. Although the parameters are capable of satisfying their primary role, namely boundary identification, they lack a final degree of precision. Thus without clearly identifiable cut-off points, it is impossible to make rigorous classifications, i.e. there is therefore some degree of ambiguity in the inclusion and exclusion of cases. However, this is a perennial problem in the social sciences, which is attributable largely to the nature of our data. The second problem

concerning parameters is a more particular one, and relates to the parameters defining the types of military regimes. These parameters, though satisfying their primary role, are rather inadequate. A more satisfactory typology of military regimes would have to differentiate more precisely the change dimension, and would also have to include dimensions covering the direction of change and the intensity of the composition of the military regime. The third and final problem area relates to the case study aspect of the study. Simple case study analysis involves a number of major problems, many of which were reviewed in the critique of the individualizing studies in the first chapter. By using case study analysis within a comparative model, many of these problems are circumvented. Nonetheless, a number of specific additional problems remain. First, any comprehensive survey of intervention and performance using the case study method is impossibleas there are too many cases. Second, there is no methodological rationale for the selection of our cases. Although the number of cases is too large to cover them all, this number is too small and too diversified to employ satisfactorily standard sampling techniques. Third, since data in macro comparative analysis is not uniform, some case studies have more limited and sporadic data than others. (For example data on Pakistan is much more extensive than on Burma.)

On the credit side, five main factors may be noted. In the first place, we have developed a model or paradigm for research, which is comparatively and empirically viable. Since the model is drawn in abstract processual terms, it is viable across a wide number of hitherto divergent cases. Thus, it is possible to identify and generate a collection of uniformities across a large number of substantive cases of military intervention and performance. Second, since the model has an explanatory basis and is drawn in heuristic terms, which focus on change, it is capable not only of identifying comparative uniformities but also of providing explanatory generalizations governing these uniformities.

In the third place, although the initial focus is on comparative concepts (both in the analysis of instability and of the military), which are independent of individual cases, the utilization of the case study method within a broader model enables account to be taken of idiosyncratic variation, and thereby permits the detailed but still comparative analysis of individual cases. Fourth, the parameters, despite their limitations, have proved of considerable value in identifying and classifying,in a manner amenable to comparative and explanatory analysis, an area, which hitherto has remained rather amorphous. One of the main conclusions of this study is that as long as research regards military intervention and performance as a uniform and unitary subject area without defining varying types of intervention, varying types of military, ~~xxx~~ varying types of system in which intervention is made, and varying types of military regimes, then the body of generalizations, that will be produced, will be very trivial and hopelessly abstracted. Fifth, the attempt to identify various types of instability and varying factors precipitating such instability in the nation state is seen as making some inroad into a complex research area, which has been widely ignored. There is very little work on instability and change in general, which is both empirically applicable and which focuses beyond trivial indicators, such as number of coups or number of deaths in domestic riots, which are both superficial and have no explanatory payoff.

In sum, despite the limitations of the study, it is claimed that we have provided a paradigm for the comparative, empirical analysis of military intervention and performance, which is capable of application to a wide number of seemingly discrete cases. Further, to the extent that the model is not only comparatively viable, i.e. can produce comparative uniformities, but also has an explanatory base, then it is possible in addition to provide explanatory generalizations covering such uniformities. Through the application of the paradigm to empirical analysis, it has been possible to analyze a number of complicated

individual cases through a common rubric. This analysis has produced a body of interrelated generalizations and explanations of these generalizations, and has thereby provided the foundation of an empirical theory of military intervention and performance in new nation state systems.