


‘Pour le bien du roy et de son royaume’:
Burgundian Propaganda under John the Fearless,
Duke of Burgundy, 1405-1419

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ABSTRACT

This doctoral dissertation is an examination of the propaganda campaign initiated by John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy (1404-1419) during the first phase of the fifteenth-century French civil war. The position taken is that John the Fearless was the more efficient propagandist in the conflict. He set the ideological pace, forcing his rivals, Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs, to implement counter-propaganda to undo the damage he had caused to their reputations.

So that we may investigate John the Fearless' ideological campaign accurately, this study investigates the theoretical concept of propaganda, questioning whether it is a relevant term to use in a late medieval context. The issue is critical because many theorists in the field of propaganda argue that it did not exist as a phenomenon before the twentieth century. We argue that this assessment is not valid, using the criteria outlined by academics in the discipline to demonstrate that the terms 'propaganda' and 'public opinion' are applicable to our present case study. It is our contention that John the Fearless consciously disseminated his ideology as widely as possible, seemingly to win over public opinion. His approach was dynamic and adaptable, employing all available channels of communication to convey a very consistent rhetorical message to his extensive audience base. These factors, we argue, are conditions of a pre-modern forerunner to 'mass media', and are further evidence establishing that John the Fearless' ideological warfare was as important as armed battle in his dispute with his rivals.

This thesis is divided into four parts, which correspond to the most important elements of a successful propaganda campaign: the underlying structure of thought, the ideological message of the campaign, the media employed, and the audience who received it. The first chapter offers a detailed explanation of the methodology employed in this thesis, and the theories relating to propaganda that frame it. The second contextualises the climate of political thought within which the duke of Burgundy's ideology operated. It teases out the main ideas that academics, courtiers and lay people were contemplating in the fifteenth century, so that we will understand more fully how his propaganda, and the counter-propaganda of his rivals, corresponded in a practical way to fifteenth-century mentalities. The third and fourth chapters offer a close examination of two of the predominant themes underscoring his propaganda, as they related to the public profiles that he wished to convey of himself and of his rivals, respectively. Chapters five through eight analyse the various media Burgundy employed to communicate the rhetoric examined in the previous two chapters. These are: the Burgundian texts, the letters, the visual symbols, and the public ceremonies. It is our contention that propaganda exists only where dissemination was widespread and deliberate. Therefore, this section is pivotal to our study. It argues that although each of these media was used effectively individually, Burgundy's success was due mainly to the manner by which his media collaborated together. Finally, chapter nine examines the audience of the rhetoric – the *bonnes villes* – focusing primarily on Paris. It analyses the partisanship that occurred, with the objective of ascertaining whether the duke's propaganda achieved an impact upon the townspeople of the realm.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ARCHIVES

ACO	Archives Départementales de la Côte d'Or, Dijon.
ADN	Archives Départementales du Nord, Lille.
ADO	Archives Départementales de l'Oise, Beauvais.
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris.
Arch. Comm. d'Amiens	Archives Communales d'Amiens.
BNF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Bourgeois	<i>Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris, 1405-1449</i> , ed. A. Tuetey (Paris, 1881).
<i>Demandes</i>	G.-A. Crapelet (ed.), <i>Les demandes faites par le roi Charles VI, touchant son état et le gouvernement de sa personne. Avec les réponses de Pierre Salmon, son secrétaire et familier</i> (Paris, 1834).
<i>Geste</i>	Kervyn de Lettenhove (ed.), 'Geste des ducs de Bourgogne', in <i>Chronique relative à l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne</i> (Bruxelles, 1873), pp. 259-572.
<i>Histoire de Charles VI</i>	Jean Juvénal des Ursins, <i>Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France et de son règne, depuis 1380-1422. Des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIII^e siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIII^e</i> , eds. Joseph François Michaud and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat, vol. 3 (Paris, 1851).
Monstrelet	Enguerran de Monstrelet, <i>La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400-1444</i> , vols 1-3 (Paris, 1857).
<i>Ordonnances</i>	Eusèbe Jacob Laurière and Secousse, Denis François et al. (eds.), <i>Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race</i> , 21 vols (Paris, 1723-1849).
<i>Pastoralet</i>	<i>Pastoralet</i> , ed. J. Blanchard (Paris, 1983).
Plancher, <i>Preuves</i>	U. Plancher, <i>Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne...</i> , <i>Preuves</i> , vol. 3 (Dijon, 1739-1781).
Mirot, <i>Pièces</i>	Léon Mirot, 'L'enlèvement du dauphin et le premier conflit entre Jean sans Peur et Louis d'Orléans (juillet-octobre 1405), <i>Revue des questions historiques</i> , 46 (1914), pp. 395-419.
RSD	Religieux de Saint-Denis, <i>Chroniques du Religieux de Saint-Denis contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380-1422</i> , trans. M. Bellaguet (Paris, 1852).

SECONDARY SOURCES

<i>ABSHF</i>	<i>Annuaire-bulletin de la société de l'histoire de France.</i>
<i>Annales. ESC</i>	<i>Annales. Économie, Société, Culture.</i>
<i>BEC</i>	<i>Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes.</i>

NOTE ON CONVENTIONS

All dates have been altered to correspond to the modern system, rather than the Easter method employed in France during the fifteenth century. Thus, any document relating an event between January and Easter of a particular year will be ascribed the modern equivalent. For example, where Amiens' deliberation log recorded an assembly on the 25 January 1413, it will be noted here as 25 January 1414 (Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 1, fols. 32v-33r). Secondly, with regards to spelling conventions, we have chosen to use the English word over the French where normative usage permits. Thus, the French town of *Reims* will be referred to here as Rheims, Orleans for *Orléans*, John the Fearless rather than *Jean sans Peur*, whereas Jean Petit will retain its French spelling. Additionally, we have remained true to all original spellings in non-printed archival sources. Where flagrant inconsistencies in spelling or punctuation occurred in printed source material, slight alterations have been made. Finally, all translations here are our own unless otherwise specified.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The reign of Charles VI (r. 1380-1422) was one of the most tumultuous in French history, due mainly to the devastation which befell the realm as a consequence of the ongoing Hundred Years War with England, and the outbreak of the French civil war in 1410. There is little doubt that the foremost internal difficulty was the king's mental illness, which began when Charles VI succumbed to the onset of dementia in July 1392. Subsequent psychotic episodes were generally shorter, but also more frequent until his death in 1422. When ill, the king could not recognise his queen, Isabeau of Bavaria, or his children, and he would sometimes attempt to erase Isabeau's coat of arms from the decor around him. He frequently ran around the royal household shouting and screaming until he was exhausted. Although the king had periods of lucidity, some of which were substantial, his ongoing mental illness severely weakened royal authority. It was, therefore, the primary cause of the quarrel that developed between the house of Burgundy and Orleans, as they became entangled in a desperate battle for control over the king and royal council.

The conflict only worsened with time. In early 1410, it erupted into a full-scale war between partisan factions, which were popularly referred to as the 'Burgundians', and the 'Armagnacs'.¹ John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, led the first of the two factions; Charles, duke of Orleans, Bernard, count of Armagnac and John, duke of Berry, the second. Written with hindsight in the mid-fifteenth century, the chronicle accredited to Jean Juvenal des Ursins included a fantastic allegorical anecdote relating to the events of 1410,² which foretold the destiny of the French realm:

¹ RSD, 4: 446; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 467. The Bourgeois de Paris chronicler's version of events held that the Armagnacs received their name in 1410. Bourgeois, p. 10.

² Peter S. Lewis argued that this particular chronicle was probably not actually written by Jean Juvenal des Ursins. Yet because the author has not yet been determined, Lewis suggested that we cite him as the 'Jouvenal compiler'. Henceforth we will comply with this suggestion, but we shall cite the chronicle as *Histoire*

Environ le premier jour de juillet, il advint choses merveilleuses. Car les cicognes s'assemblerent d'une part, et les herons d'une autre, et se combatirent cruellement; et pareillement les pies contre les corneilles. Et y eut desdits oiseaux de morts bien deux chariots pleins. Et aussi les moineaux, ou passereaux, et autres oiseaux és maisons, se combatoient et tuoient les uns les autres. Laquelle chose estoit en grande admiration, et espouvente à plusieurs gens d'entendement.³

The author claimed to have witnessed this large battle in July 1410, several months before the peace treaty of Bicêtre was ratified (2 November 1410). Here then, we are witness to an inspired analogy alerting readers to the devastation brought upon the French realm as a result of the infighting between the royal princes, who were here embodied by the swans and herons. Under them were the ravens and the magpies, representing the nobles, whilst the sparrows and the 'other house birds' represented the lower estates of the realm. This literary motif was both astute and accurate, for there is little doubt that what started as a conflict between princely houses ended as a full-scale civil war involving people of every social stratum until the peace of Arras was ratified in 1435.

The lingering question is: how were the greater magnates able to sweep the lower estates up into the dispute? It is implicit in the Jouvenal chronicler's allegory that they engaged in the violent struggle by their own volition, much to the surprise of those of 'standing', who were, presumably, the scholarly and clerical elites in French society.⁴ Hence, we must discern firstly whether or not it was indeed the case that the wider populace was encouraged to take part in the conflict, and, more importantly, how this was achieved.

It is the aim of this doctoral dissertation to begin resolving this issue by undertaking an exhaustive examination of John the Fearless' multifaceted propaganda

de Charles VI. Lewis 'Some Provisional Remarks upon the Chronicles of Saint-Denis and upon the [*Grandes*] *Chroniques de France* in the Fifteenth Century' in *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 39 (1995), pp. 146-181. See also *La vie et l'oeuvre. Écrits politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins* (Paris, 1992), 3: 88-91.

³ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 454.

⁴ I am basing this assumption on the fact that this appears to be a personal statement about the chronicler's own astonishment. There is little doubt that both he and Michel Pintoin, the author upon whose work our chronicler based his own, were clerics. For background on Pintoin, see: Bernard Guenée, *L'opinion publique à la fin du Moyen Âge d'après la 'Chronique de Charles VI' du Religieux de Saint-Denis* (Paris, 2002), pp. 12-13, and Guenée, *RSD*, 1: xxii-xiii. See also Lewis 'Some Provisional Remarks', p. 153.

campaign during the initial stage of the conflict, between 1405 and his assassination at the hands of the dauphin, Charles, and his 'Armagnac' partisans in 1419. First, it is our contention that John the Fearless was the more assertive propagandist from the outset. Second, we will establish that he was more proficient in judging the potential impact of a highly coordinated ideological campaign. Interestingly, despite the intensive academic interest in the conflict for well over a century, to date there is very little analytical information available on how he executed his propaganda campaign, and why his rivals appear, initially, to have been less successful at it than he was.⁵ Our first aim is, therefore, to redress the imbalance in the historiography of the French civil war. Concurrently, we will undertake the first systematic study of the many facets of a medieval propaganda campaign.

To accomplish this objective, this thesis is divided into four parts. Part One includes our introduction and the methodology employed. The second part of this dissertation dissects the thematic and semantic content of the duke of Burgundy's ideology; the third analyses the diverse channels through which he articulated it; the fourth examines the intended audience's response and interrogates why the duke of Burgundy prioritised an urban audience. Regarding the latter, we are primarily concerned with the way that recipients in Paris and the other *bonnes villes* of the realm received and responded to the duke of Burgundy's rhetoric. For it is our view that propaganda existed only where it is evident that the propagandist deliberately attempted to disseminate his material widely and to diverse audiences, rather than circulating it exclusively within the social sphere of society that was directly linked to high politics.

⁵ For the most recent monographs outlining the details of the conflict and its immediate impact, see: Richard Vaughan, *John the Fearless: the growth of Burgundian power*, rep. (Woodbridge, 2002); Richard C. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: crisis at the court of Charles VI, 1392-1420* (New York, 1982); Françoise Autrand, *Charles VI: la folie du roi* (Paris, 1986); Jean de Berry: *l'art et le pouvoir* (Paris, 2000); Bertrand Schnerb, *Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons: la maudite guerre* (Paris, 1988), and *Jean sans Peur. Le prince meurtrier* (Paris, 2005); Bernard Guenée, *Un meurtre, une société. L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans 23 novembre 1407* (Paris, 1992). See also the earlier monographs by Françoise Lehoux, *Jean de France, duc de Berri: sa vie, son action politique (1340-1416)*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1966-1968), and Michael Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté. Études sur la rivalité des ducs d'Orléans et de Bourgogne, 1392-1407* (Uppsala, 1964).

This thesis will provide a methodical analysis of Burgundy's propaganda campaign between 1405-1419 by employing an approach that is at once empirical and epistemological.⁶ Accordingly, we will concentrate on ascertaining both how John the Fearless became an effective propagandist, and his motivation. We will argue throughout that there were a number of factors that contributed to his ostensible success. These were: a holistic and collaborative approach to the media he employed to convey his message, his ability to anticipate when propaganda would be useful, his skill at foreseeing its potential impact, the level of consistency in the articulated polemic, and his shrewd ability to appeal to the lower estates of fifteenth-century society. We will demonstrate that while the lower and higher aristocracy, and especially the royal courtiers, were not excluded from his various campaigns, they were also not his primary concern. Rather, it will be evident that he was specifically interested in targeting a far wider audience, and therefore concentrated his efforts on the urban contingent of French society.

Additionally, it is our intention to contest the position held by modern propaganda theorists, which holds that it is anachronistic to apply the term to the middle ages. This view was first posited by the eminent communications theorist, Jacques Ellul, who argued that propaganda did not truly exist until the twentieth century, when technological 'efficiency' encouraged people to consciously acknowledge its importance and its potential impact upon political and social affairs. It was this awakening that Ellul identified as the 'social phenomenon' which was only after World War I worthy of intense study. Any propaganda that was produced and disseminated before this period, he claimed, was merely

⁶ To enable a deeper understanding of the way propaganda works and why, Stanley Cunningham suggested that scholars consider its epistemology: 'Given that the social construction we call "propaganda" is constituted by a skein of cognitive and ethical conditions, it needs to be situated and understood through the kinds of philosophical analysis such as we are used to finding in ethics and epistemology. More to the point, propaganda is originally, primarily and unavoidably a philosophical concept.' Stanley Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda: a Reconstruction* (Westport, 2002), pp. 1-5, and especially, 4.

an 'antecedent' to modern occurrences.⁷ As Stanley Cunningham stated, 'it is problematic to read anything like modern or contemporary propaganda back into periods before the emergence of mass media and mass communications.'⁸ According to this standpoint, the essential differences lie in the diversified media of communication and the frequency with which propaganda inundates our modern-day society. However, although there are indisputable differences in the implementation and mass impact of pre-modern and modern propaganda, this does not in itself constitute a solid argument for negating the existence of medieval propaganda. It is the aim of this thesis to establish that the terms 'propaganda' and 'public opinion' are both relevant and useful concepts to discuss medieval ideological warfare, for, as Bernard Guenée explained, 'dans ce domaine comme dans tant d'autres, les réalités ont largement devancé les mots.'⁹

Furthermore, it is our position that modern definitions of propaganda, and that which occurred in the fifteenth century, are not incompatible. As indicated by Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell: 'Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.'¹⁰ This thesis will demonstrate that John the Fearless used the technology available to him to implement an ideological programme specifically designed to achieve the above criteria. Therefore, I will argue that medieval propaganda was an existent social phenomenon by the fifteenth century, and that public opinion did matter to those involved in high politics.

⁷ Jacques Ellul, *Histoire de la propagande* (Paris, 1967). Subsequent theorists of [modern] propaganda have generally followed this line of argument. For example, Stanley B. Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda*, pp. 17-19.

⁸ Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda*, pp. 17-18.

⁹ Bernard Guenée, *L'opinion publique*, p. 10.

¹⁰ Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park, California, 1992), p. 4.

1.1. HISTORIOGRAPHY

One might reasonably question how a study of medieval propaganda fits within the wider, well-established historiography of the fifteenth-century French civil war.¹¹ The highly empirical nineteenth-century historians, who satisfied their curiosity in the many facets of the conflict with their diverse works, first set the historiographical pace. As was the general trend of the period, many of the monographs produced during this period were important compilations of diverse pieces of documentary evidence from the early fifteenth century. For example, Louis Douët d'Arcq's edition of Enguerran de Monstrelet's fifteenth-century chronicle (1857) remains the only one in scholarly use at present.¹² Additionally, in his *Choix de pieces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI* (1863-1864) he assembled a varied selection of documents relating to Charles VI's reign – documents that, when examined together, provide a much clearer picture of how the civil war affected both the countryside and high politics.¹³ These two volumes include royal and ducal letters patent, documents relating to judicial process, and royal mandates. As a result of these endeavours, his work provided a wider view of the context in which the princely factions battled for power.

Others writing in the nineteenth century were more specialized in their approach to the conflict, choosing to investigate the development of each of the two factions. In providing a detailed analysis of Louis of Orleans' political career, Eugène Jarry wrote a history of the war through the lenses of the house of Orleans (1889).¹⁴ Pierre Champion assumed a similar approach in his historical analysis of the life of Charles of Orleans (1911).¹⁵ On the Burgundian side, Ernest Petit undertook the considerable task of

¹¹ The narrative of events is, therefore, also well known, and for this reason it will not be examined in singular depth here.

¹² Louis Douët d'Arcq (ed.), *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pieces justificatives 1400-1444*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1857).

¹³ Douët d'Arcq, *Choix de pieces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1863-1864).

¹⁴ Eugène Jarry, *La vie politique de Louis de France, duc d'Orléans 1372-1407* (Paris, 1889).

¹⁵ Pierre Champion, *La vie de Charles d'Orléans (1394-1465)* (Paris, 1911).

surveying the ducal accounts of the first two Valois dukes, Philip the Bold and John the Fearless, which enabled him to write the highly esteemed and very practical *Itinéraires...des ducs de Bourgogne* (1888).¹⁶ Similarly, Léon, marquis de Laborde compiled a three-volume oeuvre listing the account holdings relating to 'art and industry' of the house of Burgundy at Dijon (volume three) and Lille (volume two). And for the purpose of making convenient comparisons with the house of Orleans, he included the ducal accounts at Blois (volume one).¹⁷ As a scholar at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred Coville must be included in our discussion here. In addition to editing one of the extant manuscripts of the ordinance published during the 1413 'Cabochien Uprising' in 1891, Coville has written two valuable monographs for scholars of the early fifteenth-century: *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413* (1888), and *Jean Petit et la question de tyrannicide au commencement du XV^e siècle* (1932).¹⁸ As empirical studies that offer a detailed analysis of the subjects they explore, they are very useful, but both are rather dated analyses, and were written to the detriment of both Louis of Orleans and the queen, Isabeau of Bavaria.

Notwithstanding Coville's prejudicial viewpoint on the war, Schnerb illustrated in his recent historiographical survey of John the Fearless, that he was typically vilified in the greater majority of traditional historical accounts of the Charles VI's reign, and of the civil war in particular.¹⁹ Indeed the convention among historians writing a positivist history of France, from Jules Michelet to the very Burgundian-centric B.A. Pouquet du Haut Jussé, and even more recently, the eminent scholar Bernard Guenée, have described John the Fearless in a remarkably pejorative manner.²⁰ This was obviously due to his decision to

¹⁶ Ernest Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi et de Jean sans Peur, ducs de Bourgogne (1363-1419) d'après les comptes de dépenses de leur hôtel, recueillis et mis en ordres par Ernest Petit* (Paris, 1888).

¹⁷ Léon, marquis de Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne. Études sur les lettres, les arts et l'industrie pendant le XV^e siècle*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1852).

¹⁸ Alfred Coville (ed.), *L'Ordonnance cabochienne*, (Paris, 1881). Coville, *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413*, rpt. (Geneva, 1974); 'Le véritable texte de la *Justification du duc de Bourgogne* par Jean Petit (8 mars 1408)', in *BEC* 72 (1911): 57-91; *Jean Petit et la question de tyrannicide au commencement du XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1932).

¹⁹ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 11-14.

²⁰ *Ibid.* For Pouquet du Haut Jussé's work, see: 'Jean sans Peur, son but, sa méthode', in *Annales de Bourgogne* 14 (1942): 181-196; *La France gouvernée par Jean Sans Peur. Les dépenses du receveur general du royaume* (Paris, 1959);

have the king's brother, Louis, duke of Orleans, assassinated in September 1407. French history has been biased against the house of Burgundy because Louis XII (r. 1498-1515) and his heirs were issues of Orleans' bloodline.

It was not until the early and mid-twentieth century that scholars such as Léon Mirot (1914), Joseph Calmette (1949) and Henri David (1959) attempted to redress the balance in French historiography.²¹ These more impartial studies, in addition to Johan Huizinga's seminal work on aristocratic culture *Le déclin du moyen âge*, which paid particular attention to the Valois dukes of Burgundy, paved the way for a surge in interest in Burgundian history, one that remains strong at present.²² Yet, it is arguably the detailed monographs on the four Valois dukes of Burgundy written by Richard Vaughan that offered the first most objective historical narrative of the civil war from a Burgundian perspective.²³ Additionally, Schnerb has offered several detailed studies on the Valois house of Burgundy, including a larger biography on John the Fearless (2005).²⁴ The latter provides a thorough analysis of every aspect of the duke's life from his political endeavours, to the organisation of his ducal court and courtly interests, and is therefore an essential point of reference for any historian wishing to gain a thorough understanding of this particular duke's motivations and personality. Other recent historians who have contributed to the general re-writing of the Burgundo-Armagnac civil war are: Richard Famiglietti, Françoise

and 'Jean sans Peur, programme, moyens et résultats' in *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* 7 (1954-55): 385-404. Guenée, *Un meurtre, une société*.

²¹ Léon Mirot, 'Autour de la paix d'Arras, 1414-1415' in *BEC* 75 (1914): 253-327; *L'Assassinat de Louis d'Orléans et la théorie du tyrannicide au XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1933); 'L'enlèvement du dauphin et le premier conflit entre Jean sans Peur et Louis d'Orléans (juillet-octobre 1405)' in *Revue des questions historiques*, vol. 51, n. 45 (1914): 329-355; vol. 52, n. 46 (1914): 47-68. Joseph Calmette, *Les grands ducs de Bourgogne* (Paris, 1949); Henri David, *Du nouveau sur Jean sans Peur* (Dijon, 1959).

²² For Huizinga, see *Le déclin du moyen âge*, trans. J. Bustin (Paris, 1948). Recent Burgundian scholarship has been promoted through scholarly associations such as the *Centre européen d'études bourguignonnes* headed by Jean-Marie Cauchies. Consult for example, Jean-Marie Cauchies (ed.), *Relations entre princes et villes aux XIV^e-XV^e siècles: aspects politiques, économiques et sociaux*, (Neuchâtel, 1993).

²³ Vaughan's monograph that concerns us most here is: *John the Fearless*.

²⁴ Schnerb, *Armagnacs et les Bourguignons*, also, *L'État bourguignon 1363-1477* (Paris, 1999), and *Jean sans Peur*.

Autrand, and Bernard Guenée.²⁵ As we shall see, Guenée's influential work has also paved the way for French historians in the field of medieval propaganda and public opinion.²⁶

Yet it was the historians of later medieval England, and in particular, scholars of the Hundred Years War and the Wars of the Roses, who were the forerunners in the field of medieval propaganda. John Hale, for example, published his article on the development of public opinion during periods of war over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in 1962.²⁷ This work discussed the change in attitudes regarding war over the course of the two centuries, highlighting the dichotomy between the glamourization of the war, and the reality that it became 'more impersonal, brutal and squalid.'²⁸ Hale urged historians to keep looking beyond the battlefield to tease out what the soldiers, the general population, and the literary and artistic communities commonly thought about war.

Within the three decades since, a plethora of works on medieval propaganda in England emerged. John Maddicott's article on the 'making' of public opinion in the counties appeared in 1978, echoing the inroads made by Hale the decade before.²⁹ Here, Maddicott employed the historiographical approach typical at that time, which involved moving away from high politics to focus more on the localities. Consequently, Maddicott argued convincingly that the county court played a crucial role in formulating and regulating public opinion during periods of war. He stated: 'The political consciousness thus created was not confined to a provincial elite.'³⁰

²⁵ Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*. Autrand, *Charles VI*; Jean de Berry. Guenée, *Un meurtre, une société*.

²⁶ In particular, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe*, trans. Juliet Vale (Oxford, 1985); 'Les campagnes de lettres qui ont suivi le meurtre de Jean sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne (septembre 1419-février 1420)', in *ABSHF* (1993): 45-65; *L'opinion publique*.

²⁷ John Hale, 'War and Public Opinion in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries', in *Past and Present* 22 (1962): 18-35.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁹ John Maddicott, 'The County Community and the Making of Public Opinion in Fourteenth-Century England', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series 28 (1978), pp. 27-43.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

More recent historians, such as Alison Allan, Colin Richmond, and James Doig have examined more particular channels of propaganda.³¹ For example, Allan, Ross and Doig were predominantly interested in the royal proclamation as an important vehicle for the dissemination of propaganda, though other scholars examined different forms, such as literary texts, news-bills, painting, and historiographical works (or the lack thereof).³² The general consensus held that the Yorkists were, initially, the better propagandists. The above-mentioned scholars tend to agree that it was the Yorkists who perfected the use of proclamations as an instrument of propaganda.³³ They outline weaknesses in Henry VI's attempts to provoke the people, which paled in comparison, they claimed, to the very strong, disparaging proclamations that Edward IV used against him. This king skilfully hailed the Yorkist military victories as the result of divine intervention from God, who had put things 'right' after nearly more than half a century of usurpation.³⁴ Ostensibly, Henry VI's proclamations did not seize the opportunity to communicate and influence the public in the same effective way. To further highlight Henry's inefficiency in this regard, Richmond demonstrated that where a propagandist manipulates information and lies 'when versions of the truth could not be depended on in the endeavour to win support', Henry VI only used this approach under exceptional circumstances.³⁵ He added that, generally, 'English kings became propagandists only when driven to it'.³⁶ This lack of foresight, he

³¹ Alison Allan, 'Royal Propaganda and the Proclamation of Edward IV', in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 59, n. 139 (1986): 146-154; Colin Richmond, 'Propaganda in the War of the Roses', in *History Today*, 42 (July 1992): 12-18; James Doig, 'Political Propaganda and the Royal Proclamation in late Medieval England', in *Historical Research*, 71 (1998): 253-275.

³² See for example, Allan, 'Yorkist Propaganda: Pedigree, Prophecy and the "British History" in the Reign of Edward IV', in *Patronage, Pedigree and Power in Later Medieval England*, ed. C. Ross (Gloucester, 1979), pp. 171-192. Elizabeth Danbury, 'English and French Artistic Propaganda during the Period of the Hundred Years War: Some Evidence from Royal Charters', in *Power, Culture and Religion in France c.1350-c.1500*, ed. Christopher T. Allmand (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 75-97; Sarah Gaunt, 'Visual Propaganda in England in the Later Middle Ages', in *Propaganda. Political Rhetoric and Identity 1300-2000*, pp. 27-39; Paul E. Gill, 'Politics and Propaganda in Fifteenth-Century England: The Polemical Writing of Sir John Fortescue', in *Speculum*, 46 (1971): 333-347.

³³ Especially Richmond, 'Propaganda in the Wars of the Roses', pp. 12-18; Allan, 'Royal Propaganda', pp. 146-154; Doig, 'Political Propaganda', pp. 253-80.

³⁴ See Allan, 'Royal Propaganda', pp. 148-149.

³⁵ Richmond, 'Propaganda in the Wars of the Roses', p. 13.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

explained, was unlike the more effective strategy their neighbours across the channel employed.

French scholarship in medieval propaganda has also been flourishing for some time. Without doubt Bernard Guenée has been the leader in this field, composing several seminal works on the relevance of the concept in medieval historiography, public opinion, and propaganda, and their particular usages in analyses on the French civil war.³⁷ Guenée has, arguably, been so influential in this area because he has addressed the theoretical problems inherent in using a concept so embedded in our contemporary mindsets as a purely 'modern' phenomenon to describe that which occurred in the later middle ages. Moreover, he has accurately identified the most common misappropriation of the concept with regards to medieval propaganda among both historians and literary scholars, who tend to characterise all politically charged literature of the period under this blanket term. In fact, Guenée had long since argued emphatically, that it is entirely inappropriate to label a small number of controlled polemical texts as propaganda literature.³⁸ He claimed that scholars should reserve this term for texts which were widely disseminated; texts whose circulation was limited, we ought to characterise strictly as '[politically] engaged' literature.³⁹ This is a position with which we agree.

Other influential French scholars such as Philippe Contamine, Nicole Pons and Claude Gauvard have also made substantial contributions to medieval propaganda, providing insightful and constructive models from which we may extend the field of study.⁴⁰ Contamine, for example, stated: 'L'on considère comme propagande de guerre

³⁷ See above, n. 25.

³⁸ Guenée, 'Les tendances actuelles de l'histoire politique du moyen âge français', in *Actes du 100e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes, Paris, 1975. Vol. 1. Tendances, perspectives et méthodes de l'histoire médiévale*, ed. BNF. Paris, 1977), 1: 59.

³⁹ Guenée, 'Campagnes de lettres', p. 45.

⁴⁰ Philippe Contamine, 'Aperçus sur la propagande de guerre, de la fin du XII^e au XV^e siècle: les croisades et la guerre de cents ans', in *Le forme della propaganda politica nel due e nel trecento*, ed. Paolo Cammarosano (Rome, 1994), pp. 5-27. Nicole Pons, 'La propagande de guerre française avant l'apparition de Jeanne d'Arc', in *Journal des Savants* (April-June 1982): 191-124; 'Informations et rumeurs: quelques points de vue sur des événements de la guerre civile en France (1407-1420)', in *Revue historique*, 297 (1997): 409-433, and 'Michel de

toute action psychologique menée par des pouvoirs, formels ou informels, en vue d'accroître médiatement ou immédiatement l'efficacité d'une entreprise guerrière quelconque.⁴¹ He also provided a very practical, analytical outline of the diverse media used by medieval propagandists, arguing that any message whose destination is public is a rudimentary form of propaganda.⁴²

Even before Guenée and Contamine, interest in this field was growing across the channel. Peter S. Lewis' influential article, 'War Propaganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England' (1965) examined various polemical texts written under Charles V and Charles VI, which he identified, hastily, as literary propaganda.⁴³ In a more recent article in *Saint-Denis et la royauté. Études offertes à Bernard Guenée* (1999), Lewis acknowledged Guenée's parameters for the classification of literary propaganda in his discussion on later medieval French polemic texts. Yet Lewis rightfully queried the rigidity of Guenée's framework, arguing here that these particular politicised texts 'avaient, eux, quand même, du moins pour leurs auteurs, quelques chances d'être influents sur la conduite des hommes; sinon pourquoi les écrire?'⁴⁴ Craig Taylor added to the field by developing on Lewis' original propaganda article.⁴⁵ Taylor argued that the various texts discussed in his first work on the subject were not direct 'propaganda documents' as we might typically interpret them. Rather, they were primarily produced by royal officials for their administrative and diplomatic colleagues, functioning as 'resource documents' with which government officials might prime themselves for public assemblies and

Pintoin et l'historiographie orléanaise', in *Saint-Denis et la royauté. Études offertes à Bernard Guenée*, eds. Françoise Autrand, Claude Gauvard and Jean-Marie Moeglin (Paris, 1999), pp. 237-260. Claude Gauvard, 'Le roi de France et l'opinion publique à l'époque de Charles VI', in *Culture et idéologie dans la genèse de l'État moderne. Actes de la table ronde organisée par le Centre national de la recherche scientifique et l'École française de Rome (Rome, 15-17 octobre 1984)*, (Rome, 1985), pp. 353-366.

⁴¹ Contamine, 'Aperçus sur la propagande', p. 7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴³ Lewis, 'War Propaganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series 15 (1965), pp. 1-21; 'Des humanistes en mal d'écrire'. Réflexions sur la motivation et sur la réception de la polémique, en France, à la fin du moyen âge', in *Saint-Denis et la royauté*, pp. 637-646.

⁴⁴ Lewis, 'Des humanistes en mal d'écrire', p. 638.

⁴⁵ Craig Taylor, 'War, Propaganda and Diplomacy in Fifteenth-Century France and England', in *War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France*, ed. Christopher Allmand (Liverpool, 2000), pp. 70-91.

negotiations.⁴⁶ Therefore, although these documents would indeed serve as propaganda documents in the larger sense, they were not designed for wider dissemination for the purpose of persuasion.

1.2. DEFINING PROPAGANDA

If the main objective of propaganda is to persuade audiences, to ‘manipulate behaviour and behaviour patterns’, that is, to influence public opinion or alter commonly held perceptions, then the ideological message that the propagandist conveys to his audience is paramount.⁴⁷ To accomplish his goal, the propagandist diffuses his ideology employing a corrupted variation of ‘informative communication’.⁴⁸ The latter is defined as a process of sharing information that is designed to instruct or enlighten audiences. Yet because the propagandist carefully controls both the outflow of information and how it is transmitted, the process is, from the outset, biased toward the sender. This allows him to exert influence over the perceptions of the audience.

Recent theoretical scholarship on propaganda has shown that it can be broken down into diverse categories. The principal types are generally classified as agitation and integration, political propaganda, and empirical, or, ‘rational’ propaganda.⁴⁹ Agitative propaganda is essentially subversive, and used to provoke audiences, whilst its converse is the more passive subtle manifestation of the same. John the Fearless frequently employed the former, which is most easily observed in the justification speech master Jean Petit gave on behalf of John the Fearless for the murder of Louis of Orleans (8 March 1408).⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Taylor, ‘War, Propaganda and Diplomacy’, p. 72-73.

⁴⁷ Jowett and O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, p. 34.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20, 31.

⁴⁹ Foulkes, *Literature and Propaganda* (London, 1983), pp. 10-11. See also Jowett and O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, pp. 3-4, 8-13.

⁵⁰ In this thesis I use the copy of the *Justification* transcribed in Enguerrand de Monstrelet’s *Chroniques*, 1: pp. 177-242. Hereafter noted as Petit, *Justification*. This choice of text is justified by three factors. First, upon close comparison, there are only minor divergences between Monstrelet’s copy and one of the three remaining fifteenth-century illuminated manuscripts (BNF, ms. fr. 5733.). Second, Monstrelet’s transcription was the most readily accessible. Finally, because the objective of this doctoral thesis is to examine the main themes

Immediately following the presentation, Petit's speech was copied into four illuminated manuscripts, and numerous paper copies.⁵¹ This example reveals Burgundy's deliberate attempts to excite the people of the realm against the duke of Orleans, a strategy that didn't go unnoticed. In January 1414, the Armagnacs accused John the Fearless of writing to the *bonnes villes* 'pour faire commotions'.⁵² Here, then, is an acknowledgement of John's purported propaganda objective, but the Armagnacs' statement was itself agitative propaganda.

'Political' propaganda can be defined as the techniques that governing bodies employ to transmit particular information to the governed with the intention of influencing a reaction that is consistent with their own interests. 'Empirical', or 'rational' propaganda is used to denote that which is 'factual', or presented as such. As Foulkes warned however, regardless of whether this form of propaganda is truthful or merely appears to be, the anticipated result is to evoke an impassioned response.⁵³ Propaganda theorists agree that the question of truth is very important for the purpose of building public credibility. To maintain any measure of integrity, the propagandist must therefore construct a rational ideology that is based, at least superficially, on facts; if his statements are unbelievable he

and accusations that the duke of Burgundy made in his propaganda campaign over the long term, it is sufficient for our purpose in bringing out the most important arguments, to use a close transcription of Jean Petit's presentation.

⁵¹ At present, there are fifteen known extant manuscripts including Monstrelet's transcription. Of these fifteen, there are twelve fifteenth or sixteenth century copies: Vienna, Oesterreichische National-Bibliothek, Cod. 2657 (illuminated); BNF, ms. fr. 991 (fifteenth century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 2885 (fifteenth century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 5060 (fifteenth century paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 5061 (fifteenth century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 5733 (illuminated); BNF, ms. fr. 5732 (fifteenth century, paper); BNF, ms. fr. 11512 (sixteenth century, paper compilation); BNF, ms. fr. 17513 (fifteenth century, paper compilation); Paris, Arsenal, ms. 3726, n. 158 (fifteenth century, paper compilation); Chantilly, Musée Condé, ms. 878, n. 1197 (illuminated); Chantilly, Musée Condé, ms. 879, n. 1694 (fifteenth century, paper); BR, ms. 10419 (fifteenth century, parchment); BR, ms. 4373/6 (fifteenth century, paper). For specific details on the various BNF manuscripts in order of appearance above, consult Henri Omont, *Catalogue [générale] des manuscrits français. Ancien fonds* (Paris, 1868-1902), 1: 171, 511; 4: 499-500, 500-501; 5: 85. And of the same catalogue, *Ancien supplément français* (Paris, 1896), 2: 319-320; and *Ancien Saint-Germain Français*, (Paris, 1898), 2: 112. For the Arsenal manuscript, Henri Martin, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal* (Paris, 1887), 3: 497. The Chantilly manuscripts: *Chantilly. Le Cabinet des livres. Manuscrits* (Paris, 1911), 3: 142-143. See also Coville, 'Le véritable texte', pp. 79-91.

⁵² *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 491. Monstrelet, 2: 459.

⁵³ Foulkes, *Literature and Propaganda*, pp. 10-11.

will not find success.⁵⁴ Moreover, the condition of credibility depends upon the propagandist's ability to ensure that the message conveyed conforms to pre-existing frameworks of thought and political understanding, frameworks which reflected the world-view of the recipients. Regarding medieval society, this fundamental propaganda principle is closely related to the central social concept of good *fama* (good repute). The concept of reputation, also known as *renommé*, was a complex but integral aspect of medieval thinking, and was bound to both honour and prestige. Consequently, John the Fearless concentrated on promoting a public image consistent with good governance, one where he emphasised his heroic character and loyal service to the king and dauphin.

Adherence to these multi-faceted conditions is observed in John the Fearless' propaganda. Although on the surface his arguments may appear to modern critics to have been radical statements, they were consistently reliant upon a measure of truth. For example, when in his 1405 campaign he called for a general reform, he focused attention on Louis of Orleans' corruption and mishandling of royal finances. As we shall understand in chapter two, this was a popular rhetorical tool in the later middle ages. The widespread conception of the importance of protecting the common good encouraged a general awareness, at least in theoretical terms, of the monarchy's responsibility to sustain a system of government that safeguarded justice, in establishing equitable laws, and vigorously defending peace in the realm. This way of thinking was even more important in a period fraught with internal and external conflict. Therefore, Burgundy employed a well established and popularly received trope to agitate his urban audiences into reacting in a hostile way to the duke of Orleans. It is noteworthy from the outset that the latter had increased his personal wealth exponentially in the year 1404-1405, and in the view of many,

⁵⁴ Bernard Taithe and Tim Thornton, 'Propaganda: A Misnomer of Rhetoric and Persuasion?', in *Propaganda. Political Rhetoric and Identity 1300-2000* (Pheonix Mill, 1999), p. 2.

he had done so at the expense of the crown's revenue.⁵⁵ Therefore, when Orleans moved to raise yet another supplemental tax in March 1405 for the purpose of war against the English, many Parisian citizens were outraged.⁵⁶ Burgundy shrewdly played upon Orleans' negative public reputation, exploiting an issue that appeared, at least superficially, to be true 'fact'.⁵⁷

Empirical propaganda can be very effective because although it always appears accurate, honest and exact, propagandists generally combine it with irrational, misleading or untruthful information.⁵⁸ Theorists define propaganda in shades of 'white', 'grey' and 'black' to assess their level of reliability. The differences between them are important in any discussion on propaganda because they are helpful epistemological markers. White propaganda is defined as mainly accurate and truthful, relying predominantly, though not exclusively, upon fact.⁵⁹ Jowett and O'Donnell added that when using white propaganda, the sender frequently tries to appear as the hero of a given situation.⁶⁰ As the middle ground between white and black, grey propaganda is generally characterised as being vague or ambiguous, as distorted facts, and as irrelevant information which diverts recipients from receiving the knowledge that they believe they are actually acquiring.⁶¹ Finally, 'black' propaganda is described as the transmission of untruthful, misleading information, and is also frequently identified as 'disinformation'.⁶² Political leaders commonly employ this tactic by either creating a defunctive source of the original, official information, which the propagandist then communicates to audiences personally, or by using a valid, authoritative source that takes possession of the information.⁶³ Ultimately the propagandist coordinates

⁵⁵ Jarry, *La vie politique de Louis de France*, pp. 324-325; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 30-31; Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 171-172; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 39-46.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ I explore this issue in depth in chapter 4, 'Desloiaulx traistres'.

⁵⁸ Foulkes, *Literature and Propaganda*, p. 11.

⁵⁹ Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda*, p. 66; Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, p. 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13; Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda*, p. 68.

⁶² Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda*, p. 67; Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, pp. 13-15.

⁶³ Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, p. 15.

its publication legitimately, thereby distancing himself from any social or political accountability.

There are many examples whereby we observe John the Fearless using both models of black propaganda, or 'disinformation'. Concerning the first model, one observes John implementing black propaganda of the first degree in the early months of 1414. It was during this period that he deflected his own accountability in laying siege to Paris in February, which he launched from Saint Denis. He claimed that the dauphin, Louis duke of Guyenne, had sent him three letters in January in which he begged John to free him from the control of the Armagnac princes. In assuming this particular pretext for war, Burgundy's unlawful military action was mediated by his observance of his duty to his lord, the dauphin.

An example of how John the Fearless used the latter form of 'disinformation' by creating a legitimate source for his propaganda occurred in November 1411, when the Armagnacs were excommunicated from the Church on the grounds that they had gathered in arms against the king's sovereign power.⁶⁴ On the surface, therefore, it was the University of Paris and the representatives of the Church who used the very public platform of a liturgical procession to publicise this papal bull; Charles VI consequently had the proclamation decreed across the realm. However, it would be exceedingly naïve to assume that the duke of Burgundy had little to do with this event. Firstly, it was his princely rivals who were the victims of both religious and secular persecution and public defamation; this was not mere coincidence. Secondly, this event came at the beginning of the height of Burgundy's control over the royal council. The scholars who recovered and authorised the bull purportedly did so on the orders of the royal council.⁶⁵ Furthermore, it

⁶⁴ *Ordonnances*, 9: 652; RSD, IV: 532-550; Monstrelet, 2: 210; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 470. For critical scholarship on this issue see Laurent Tournier, *L'Université de Paris dans les événements politiques du royaume de France (1405-1452)* (Doctoral diss., Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, 2000), pp. 79, 88; Lehoux, *Jean de France*, 3: 253, n. 1.

⁶⁵ This is substantiated by Michel Pintoin, the 'Religieux de Saint Denis' chronicler. RSD, 4: 532.

is likely that these men were either supporters of the duke of Burgundy's campaign, or at least on his payroll. We know that at least nine scholars from the University of Paris were given wine and monetary gifts in February 1412.⁶⁶

A final type of propaganda that Cunningham termed 'linguistic propaganda' is relevant for our discussion. It is characterised as prejudicial words and motifs, expressions and epithets used to demonise the 'other'.⁶⁷ Such repetitious use of language was, as we shall observe in chapters three and four, a strategy that the duke of Burgundy and his chancery employed in their propaganda against the Armagnacs. This is because for propaganda to be successful, it is always necessary that it bear an intelligible level of rhetorical consistency, so that the main tenets of the ideology permanently resonate with audiences.

Because structuralist theory states that everything in the realm of communication, verbal and non-verbal, textual and non-textual, has an underlying system from which it draws its usage, propaganda is arguably best explored by loosely employing a structuralist methodological framework. Indeed structuralism and semiotics are concerned with the realm of 'codes, signs and rules that govern communication'.⁶⁸ Based on the writings of the eminent French linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, the theory of structuralism argues that there are established systems, or *langues*, that prevail which governs usage, or *parole*, through a series of set rules and conventions.⁶⁹ Thus it is only within the larger system that one may perceive the 'usage', or 'code', which is characterised successively through the articulation of 'signs'.

⁶⁶ ACO, B 1570, fols. 233-235.

⁶⁷ Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda*, p. 70.

⁶⁸ Charles E. Bressler, *Literary Criticism. An Introduction to Theory and Practice*, 2nd edn. (New Jersey, 1999), p. 93.

⁶⁹ Ferdinand de Saussure, 'The Object of Study', in *Modern Criticism and Theory: a Reader*, eds. David Lodge and N. Wood, 2nd edn. (Harlow, 2000), pp. 5-8; Terrence Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics* (London, 2003), p. 13; Bressler, *Literary Criticism*, p. 92; David Macey, *The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory* (London, 2000), pp. 342-343, 351-352.

Within our early fifteenth-century context, the underlying system was made up of contemporary political thought, notions that were made accessible to a varied range of social spheres. We have identified the code, or *parole*, as whichever form of propaganda Burgundy used to communicate the message at that particular moment. Moreover, there were set systems within the overarching system of political thought – a pre-conceived language for ceremony, for heraldic and popular badges, for letters and manifestoes. These were well-established and familiar frameworks, and it was up to the propagandist to use them effectually. Therefore propaganda is ‘structuralist’ by its very nature. Furthermore, this manner of thinking is useful for understanding how rituals and symbols affected their audiences. This is the notion upon which semiotic methodology is founded. It is valuable to this thesis because it helps us to understand how meaning is transferred to signs, which includes the realm of the symbolic. For the reason that propaganda is not restricted to verbal or textual communication, it will help elucidate the process of interpretation between sender (John the Fearless) and receivers (his target audiences).

The noteworthy semiotic theorist, Roland Barthes, stated that the meaning of the sign is derived from the relationship between its two components, the signifier (word or image) and the signified (the concept).⁷⁰ He also emphasised that a binary nature of opposition exists between all signs, and these fit within the wider system of discourse, or *langue*.⁷¹ Using John the Fearless’ propaganda, we see Barthes’ theory in practice. John the Fearless adopted a carpenter’s plane with wood shavings as his badge in 1405. On its own, as a word-image, the plane is merely a building tool, and therefore an empty signifier. However, placed in conjunction with the ‘signified’ –the conceptual image of the sign– the sign becomes meaningful. This is because the concept/signified was something that Burgundy actively chose in response to his rival’s badge, the knotty cudgel and accompanying motto ‘Je l’envie’ (‘I challenge’). Thus he actively assigned meaning to the

⁷⁰ Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, pp. 106-107.

⁷¹ Bressler, *Literary Criticism*, p. 97.

carpenter's plane, which he complemented with a reactionary motto 'Ich houd' ('I accept'). It is generally accepted among scholars that the intended meaning ascribed by the duke of Burgundy to this symbol correlated to the fundamental concept of good government in medieval political thought. This is argued mainly because of the two clear binary oppositions that Burgundy evoked by using this badge and motto. Firstly, the discharged wood shavings suggest that the tool had, metaphorically, already been put into use. It is not a far leap to draw a connection between it and the duke of Orleans' knotty stick. Secondly, the duke of Burgundy's main platform in 1405, when this badge was adopted, was in point of fact centred on reform and the concept of 'good government'. Because this was a firmly grounded political, cultural and social trope within medieval mentalities, it is logical to assume that Burgundy's plane was a palpable metaphor which referred to the 'rebuilding' of what he identified as the duke of Orleans' oppressive, dishonest government. Whether audiences interpreted it in this way is debatable. Yet the American leader of semiotics, Charles Peirce, has argued that it is through repetition and experience that recipients begin to recognize signs and ascribe learned meanings to the relevant symbols.⁷² Therefore, it is a reasonable conjecture to state that the association between the two badges and mottoes, which was reinforced by Burgundy's explicit platform for reform, would have been accessible. It is therefore likely that through learned, shared experience, the destined audience(s) would have been able to make the necessary connections and draw the same conclusions.

To assist us in our inquiry, chapter two examines the underlying structure of political thought during our period of interest so that we may contextualise John the Fearless' propaganda and the Armagnac counter-propaganda correctly. The prevailing political theories of the period under study are significant because issues of the common good, fair taxation, reform, the implementation of justice, and the defence of the king's

⁷² Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 100.

peace were important elements relating to the notions of 'good government', and its antithesis: tyranny. These were highly important because they were essential components in John the Fearless' propaganda.

Part two of this thesis is comprised of chapters three and four, which concentrate on the duke of Burgundy's ideological message. From the outset, John the Fearless' constructed a clear dichotomy between him and his rivals, Louis of Orleans and later, the Armagnacs, which adhered to the rather typical medieval trope opposing 'good' and 'evil'. This overarching contrast was in turn broken down into smaller binary oppositions which gave primacy to the duke of Burgundy. The two predominant ones were made between loyalty and betrayal to the crown, and good government and tyranny. To preserve the integrity of the important contrast John deliberately evoked between himself and the Armagnacs, chapter three and four are separated accordingly: chapter three examines the public profile that the duke of Burgundy advanced of himself; chapter four discusses the negative profile of Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs. In both, we scrutinize the recurring themes and semantic uses of the language employed. We also consider the import of good and bad *fama* and how critical it was in the formulation of Burgundy's ideological campaign.

Part three examines the way by which this multi-layered message reached audiences. John the Fearless' propaganda campaign was not restricted to textual forms of media. From as early as 1405, the first moment of true conflict between him and the duke of Orleans, Burgundy relied on a number of collaborative channels for the dissemination of his ideology.⁷³ In a matter of weeks, the duke employed ceremonial discourse in the forms of an entry ceremony and the encampment of his army around Paris, symbolic propaganda

⁷³ The incident to which I refer here is the so-called 'kidnapping' of the dauphin from Paris. For a complete discussion of the events relating to this incident (August to November 1405) see Mirot, 'L'enlèvement du dauphin', pp. 348-349. See also Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 166-171; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 46-51; Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 172-177 and *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 58-64; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 33-37; Jacques D'Avout, *La querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons* (Paris, 1943), pp. 78-81; Autrand, *Charles VI*, pp. 403-407.

in the form of the adoption and dissemination of his badge and motto – both of which were direct and aggressive overtures to the duke of Orleans. This he complemented with a hard-hitting letter campaign aimed at denigrating his rival. This concerted approach set the tone for all his later propaganda. In March 1408, a further dimension of the duke's propaganda was added. Only four months after having the duke of Orleans assassinated, John defended his actions by having the *Justification de monseigneur le duc de Bourgogne* drafted and presented by the scholar Jean Petit in Paris, to an audience consisting of the king, queen and dauphin, the princes of the royal blood, numerous members of the nobility, scholars from the University of Paris, and burgesses of the capital. After the presentation, these were made available in paper format for mass consumption. So that we might understand the manner by which Burgundy disseminated his propaganda effectively, chapters five, six, seven, and eight are each committed to analysing in depth the following mediums: the Burgundian texts, the letters, the symbols, and the ceremonial display.

The final section of this thesis examines the duke of Burgundy's predominant audience base: Paris and the *bonnes villes*. In this chapter we interrogate why the duke was more preoccupied with appealing to the lower estates of the realm than he was in securing the favour of the aristocracy and 'gentry' of French society, although the latter groups were not entirely excluded from his destined audience base. In this chapter we consider why Burgundy approached the *bonnes villes* with such determination, and whether or not he was successful in securing the great majority of public opinion. Therefore we question whether the obvious partisanship in the realm during the duke of Burgundy's political career was the direct result of his propaganda, or whether there were other factors which may have led them to adhere to his policies, at least overtly.

CHAPTER 2

MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT: MONARCHY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT

One of the predominant concerns among political theorists, jurists and moralists throughout the middle ages, was to define the role of the king and the measure of his authority.¹ From Thomas Aquinas to Jean Gerson, the intelligentsia borrowed from several different ideological frameworks including ancient philosophy, Roman law, Christian theology, and feudal discourse, to determine precisely how a monarchical government should operate, and what the practical implications of this system were for the king and his subjects.² By the second half of the fourteenth century, a nascent consciousness had developed which considered political thought as an important tool in effective governance, and increasingly, a science to be studied. Nicolas Oresme was the first to articulate this change in mentality in his translated editions of Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* (1370-1374).³

It is well known that Charles VI's father, king Charles V, the 'Wise' (r. 1364-1380), had a keen interest in endorsing literature, and in particular, the translation of tracts on astrology, liturgy, history and politics from Latin into French. Indeed between 1370 and 1380, his enthusiastic interest in scholarly work resulted in the translation of a number of highly political texts. In addition to Oresme's translations of Aristotle's most important works, Raoul de Presle translated St. Augustine's *City of God* between 1371 and 1375, Denis

¹ There have been a number of survey studies on the evolution of political thought. Walter Ullman's *A History of Political Thought: the Middle Ages* (Baltimore, 1965). For more recent works, see Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought 300-1450* (London, 1996); Antony Black, *Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450* (Cambridge, 1992); James Henderson Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350-c. 1450* (Cambridge, 1988), and especially Jean Dunbabin 'Government', pp. 477-519. For works specific to the development of French political thought: Jacques Krynen, 'Droit Romain et état monarchique. A propos du cas français' in *Représentation, pouvoir et royauté à la fin du moyen âge*, ed. Joël Blanchard (Paris, 1995), pp. 13-23, *Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la fin du moyen âge (1380-1440): étude de la littérature politique du temps* (Paris, 1981), and *L'empire du roi. Idées et croyances politiques en France XIII-XV siècles*. (Paris, 1993). See also Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 25-45; and Dunbabin, 'The Political World of France, c.1200-c.1336', in *France in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. David Potter (Oxford, 2002), pp. 23-46.

² Antony Black, *Political Thought*, pp. 14-24, 136-146.

³ Autrand, *Charles V: le Sage* (Paris, 1994), pp. 731-732.

Foulechat translated John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* in 1372, and the *Songe du Vergier* was translated, probably by Évart de Trémaugon, between 1374 and 1378. As Autrand stated: 'La nouveauté avec Charles V et son club, avec Nicolas Oresme et ses traductions, est que la science politique est reconnue comme telle, qu'elle fait un bond en avant et qu'elle sort de l'université pour se diffuser largement dans la culture des hommes de pouvoir.'⁴ Without doubt, this dynamic literary activity resulted in a progressive intellectual culture, one that was aimed, the scholars claimed, at preserving the common good.⁵ Accessible to the king, his councillors, and any other governmental advisors or administrators, the many translated texts were designed to educate the king and his entourage in the practice of good governance, which in turn protected the common interests of his subjects.⁶

The vibrant intellectual culture of Charles V's court spilled over into the reign of his son, Charles VI, though the latter was not the same bibliophile as was his father. Yet for a number of very critical reasons, the practice of publicly discussing political issues continued. Mainly, these were the three major crises the royal government faced: the continuation of the Hundred Years War with England, the king's debilitating mental illness, and the civil war that ensued due to the king's inability to rule the realm effectively. As a natural response to such substantial political upheaval, writers used their pens to encourage those in a position of power – the royal princes, the royal councillors and administrators – to accept their responsibility to conform to prevailing theories on good government. Above all, these continued to be primarily concerned with promoting the common good.

The fifteenth-century conception held that it was the king's main duty to dispense justice and to rigorously defend peace and *tranquillitas* in all parts of his realm.⁷ Indeed peace was only possible if justice was firmly established; without it the expectation was that the

⁴ Autrand, *Charles V*, p. 372.

⁵ For more details on the literary culture see Jeannine Quillet, *Charles V, le roi lettré. Essai sur la pensée politique d'un règne* (Paris, 1984), pp. 96-105, and also 105-113.

⁶ Autrand, *Charles V*, p. 725; Quillet, *Charles V*, pp. 96-97.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 152-153; Dunbabin, 'Government', pp. 482, 484-485, and 'The Political World of France', p. 44; Jacques Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 155-157.

realm would descend into chaos and violence.⁸ Emphasising the importance of harmony between the various groups within the social hierarchy, the expectations of the king were most regularly expressed, by the early fifteenth century, by the corporate metaphor known as the body politic. This *topos* described the realm in terms of a human body, whereby the king was the head, and the other sections of society were its lower members and limbs. It was a classification system that reinforced the descending hierarchy of the middle ages. Nevertheless, it also emphasised that each part of society had an equally important role to fulfil for the healthy functioning of the 'body'. This is evident in Christine de Pizan's version of the body politic in the *Livre de la paix* (1412-1414):


O! voirement, qui seroit la puissance qui peust oprimer ne fouler tel corps s'il est tout ensemble, sans separacion de nulz de ses membres, c'est assavoir le chief qui est le roy, les espaules et parties haultes qui representent les princes et seigneurs, les bras qui est la chevalerie, les flans qui est la clergie, les reins et ventre qui sont les bourgeois, les cuisses qui sont les marchans, les jambes et piéz qui sont le menu peuple.⁹

This image is even more interesting if we consider that the *Livre de la paix* was written during the height of tension between John the Fearless and his Armagnac rivals. Pizan began writing part one of the text immediately following the peace treaty of Auxerre (August 1412), but was interrupted by the renewal of violence during the notorious Cabochien uprising (April-July 1413). She did not recommence her work until 3 September 1413, following the publication of the Peace of Pontoise.¹⁰ The corporal metaphor given above was written during that latter period, after the 'paix deffaillie'. Because it was written shortly after a period of violent upheaval Pizan's analogy is rather telling about the conceptual importance of harmony and unity within the political body.

⁸ Krynen, 'Droit Romain', p. 20. According to Ben Lowe, by 1380 the concept of 'peace' was firmly equated with the restoration, or preservation of order, stability, and concord between subjects. Lowe, *Imagining Peace. A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340-1560* (Pennsylvania, 1997), pp. 142-143.

⁹ Christine Pizan, *The 'Livre de la Paix' of Christine de Pizan; a Critical Edition with Introduction and Notes by Charity Cannon Willard*, ed. Charity Cannon Willard (Gravenhage, 1958), p. 124.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57. John the Fearless was not at this assembly, for it was mainly Armagnac princes. John the Fearless had left Paris on 23 August 1413. In a letter to the duchess of Burgundy, John's chancellor, Jean de Saulx described his flight. ACO, B 11942, n. 24. See also Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 141-143.



Yet to summarise later medieval theories on government solely in terms of the corporate metaphor would be a tremendous over-simplification of what was essentially a complex combination of theories that helped define the role of the king, notions of sovereignty, and the concepts of tyranny, 'good government' and the 'common good', all of which were circulating at this time. If we are to understand the claims made by John the Fearless and his Armagnac rivals in their propaganda and counter-propaganda campaigns between 1405 and 1419, it is critical that we examine how they fit within the underlying structure of political thought and performance in which it operated.

2.1. THE COMMON GOOD AND THE BODY POLITIC

Although the concept of the common good was in itself an abstraction, it was nevertheless made more tangible through various legislative applications such as issues relating to obedience to the crown, the punishment of treason, and the systems of taxation.¹¹ Medieval society's predisposition for shared communal identities was equally manifest in the regular collective groupings such as guilds, assemblies, religious orders, and also through a variety of rituals and symbols.¹² So important was the notion of a common good that it was an effective political tool used to justify political action.¹³ Certainly by the fifteenth century it was a very important rhetorical formula, one that people in high politics, such as John the Fearless, used ceaselessly in the propagation of their political platforms.¹⁴

The origins of the notion of the common good stretch back as far as Aristotle, whose argument held that the common good was the natural goal of a political community

¹¹ Matthew Sean Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford, 1999), p. 9.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 17.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 8.

¹⁴ It is one of the aims of part 2 to prove this point in regard to John the Fearless in particular. For other works maintaining this view, see Lewis, 'France in the Fifteenth Century', p. 4.

because it led to a high degree of universal morality.¹⁵ But, his philosophy was not the only influence upon the formation of a medieval notion of the common good. It was already well established in medieval consciousness, due partly to Roman legal and philosophical tracts. The Roman *utilitas publica*, a principle formally articulated in Roman law, claimed that the good of the community was greater than the individual. As a result, it was reiterated in civil and canon law in the high middle ages, which explains its prominence in royal ordinances and letters patent from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth century, and beyond.¹⁶ Cicero's role was equally significant in the evolution of the concept. In his *De officiis* he stated: 'non nobis solum nati' (We are not born for ourselves).¹⁷ This view reappeared throughout the middle ages in various works, like that of John of Salisbury.¹⁸ Because John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* (1159) was itself highly influential in articulating theories on the body politic, it is unsurprising that we find Christine de Pizan and Jean Gerson expressing views that echoed Ciceronian thought. Pizan explained: 'un prince doit cognoistre que la vie est ainsi comme ou milieu du monde, et qu'il n'est pas néz ne ordonné à estre seigneur pour lui, mais est establi pour le bien d'un chascun.'¹⁹ This was confirmed also by her contemporary, Jean Gerson, who explained that the king's power was legitimately based on the laws of succession, but that 'le bien commun vault mieulz que le particulier personnel.'²⁰

Because of these crises the issue of health and illness within the political body was a popular theme in political writings during this period. On 5 October 1405, during the

¹⁵ Kempshall, *The Common Good*, p. 24.

¹⁶ The reform ordinances during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries provide an interesting example. The language used in these ordinances gave the illusion that the reforms were initiated for the public good, and generally as the result of the dissatisfaction among the people. See Raymond Cazelles, 'Une exigence de l'opinion depuis Saint Louis: la réformation du royaume', in *ABSHF* (1962-1963): 91-92; Gauvard, 'Ordonnance de réforme et pouvoir législatif en France au XIV^e siècle (1303-1413)', in *Renaissance du pouvoir et genèse de l'état. Publications de la société d'histoire du droit et des institutions des anciens pays de droit écrit*, eds. André Gouron and Albert Rigaudière, vol. 3 (Montpellier, 1998), pp. 90, 94.

¹⁷ Quentin Skinner, 'Ambrogio Lorenzetti: the Artist as Political Philosopher', in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 72 (1986): 10.

¹⁸ Kempshall, *The Common Good*, p. 15.

¹⁹ Pizan, *Livre de la Paix*, p. 121.

²⁰ Jean Gerson, 'Vivat Rex, Vivat Rex, Vivat Rex', in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 7, part 2 (Paris, 1968), p. 1149.

height of the first armed conflict between the duke of Orleans and the duke of Burgundy, Pizan wrote a letter to the queen in which she insisted that it was her responsibility to resolve the conflict, thereby acting as the human remedy for the realm.²¹ In the same year, Jean Gerson explained that the health of the body depended upon the princes putting aside their own agendas to defend the king's sovereignty.²² Although Gerson sought to highlight the royal princes' obligations to preserve the health of the body politic through unification of purpose, he was equally emphasising their natural obligation to obey the king.²³

The princes' infighting was a serious threat to the king's sovereignty, particularly because they frequently disregarded his commands forbidding the assembling of their armed forces. Consequently, John the Fearless and his rivals attempted to demonstrate throughout their conflict how committed they each were to the king and the realm, in their various forms of propaganda. For example, in a letter John wrote on 14 March 1414 to the *bonnes villes* he attempted to justify his march on Paris in January by stating that he had done so 'pour obeir a lui [Louis de Guyenne] comme drois est et tenus y sommes et a lonneur de monseigneur le Roy, de ma dame la Roïne et pour le bien publique et utilité du dit roiaulme'.²⁴ Similarly, in his April 1417 letter to the *bonnes villes*, in which he stated his intention to embark on a military campaign to 'liberate' the king, he wrote: 'nous vous promectrons par la foy et loyaulte que Nous devons a Dieu, a mon dit seigneur, et a la chose publique de son royaume, que tout nostre entencion et voulente est d'empescher de tout nostre pouvoir que mon dit Seigneur ne son royaume ne vienquerir a la destruction...'²⁵ These were palpable attempts to appease accusations that his rivals made against him, in which they declared that John's numerous military campaigns had subverted the best interest of the king and the realm, and that he had, consequently, committed

²¹ 'An Epistle to the Queen of France', in *The Epistle of the Prison of Human Life With 'An Epistle to the Queen of France' and Lament on the Evils of Civil War*, ed. and trans. Josette A. Wisman (New York, 1984), pp. 70-72.

²² Gerson, 'Vivat Rex', p. 1147.

²³ Canning, *Medieval Political Thought*, pp. 61-62.

²⁴ ADN, B 658, n. 15.253.

²⁵ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. See also the copy, AN, K 60, n. 8.

treason. John's more concrete objective was thus to prove his campaigns were for the good of the king and the realm, whilst in a figurative way, to demonstrate that he had always been a contributing member of the body politic.

To avoid openly criticising the king or his peers, the allegory of the ailing body expounded by the *literati* referred directly to the lack of leadership in the realm. This was arguably due in some part to the king's genuine infirmity. However, whilst the king was unable to rule his realm properly, the princes ought to have rallied around the king to preserve the common good. Consequently, the early fifteenth-century writers concentrated their efforts on reminding the princes of their duties to the crown (the institution), to the king (the individual ruler), and to the people of the realm. According to Pizan, one of the foremost responsibilities of a prince of royal blood was the defence of the public good.²⁶ These were explained in advice manuals, as a manner of 'truth-telling'. They came predominantly in the form of the *mirrors for princes* tradition, and was one way that the prevailing political theories were made accessible, at least notionally, to a courtly audience.²⁷

Indeed, their main purpose was to provide a model for the 'art of governing' within a moralistic context.²⁸ The fifteenth-century conceptualisation of rulership echoed earlier views in binding peace, justice, and the common good together, and in firmly establishing them as an integral condition of the king's right to rule. Pierre Salmon was direct about the importance of establishing a just society for the king's subjects, stating: 'Et furent les Roys jadis créez pour justice maintenir et garder.'²⁹ To achieve this, virtue would govern the prince, and he would rule according to certain steadfast principles: justice, magnanimity,

²⁶ '[L]es nobles entenderont à la defence de la couronne et la chose publique si que c'est leur mestier'. Pizan, *Livre de la paix*, p. 90.

²⁷ Joël Blanchard, 'Vox Poetica, Vox Politica. The Poet's Entry into the Political Arena in the Fifteenth Century', in *Selected Writings of Christine de Pizan*, ed. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski (New York, 1997), pp. 362-371. Also, Liliane Dulac, 'Authority in the Prose Treatises of Christine de Pizan: the Writer's Discourse and the Prince's Word', in *Politics, Gender and Genre: the Political Thought of Christine de Pizan*, ed. Margaret Brabant (Boulder, Colorado, 1992), pp. 129-140.

²⁸ Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 52-53, pp. 97-106; Kate Langdon Forhan, *The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan* (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 34-35.

²⁹ *Demandes*, p. 31.

prudence, liberty and honesty.³⁰ Furthermore, he should be 'semblable à Dieu en aucunes manières'.³¹ Accordingly, a king should condemn all crime or malice, and should be merciful, courteous, wise and humble, and work diligently to preserve his royal dignity.³² Salmon explained that these virtues were necessary because of the very nature of kingship: 'Le Roy est nommé Roy pour arrêr et gouverner, et pource doit-il bien gouverner sa personne; car qui ne scet gouverner soy-mesmes, il ne deveroit pas bien gouverner un autre.'³³ Finally, it was very important that the prince be counselled well, and by loyal subjects who desired to preserve the common weal.³⁴ All political and moralistic writers during the first decades of the fifteenth century placed great emphasis on the prince's advisors because, if he were to allow people who were motivated by covetousness to assist him in governing, then the common good would most certainly suffer.³⁵

2.2. TYRANNY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT

An irresponsible prince, who acted for his own personal gratification rather than for the good of his subjects, was a tyrant by definition.³⁶ In the *Livre de la paix* Christine de Pizan explained the difference between the good prince and the tyrant: 'le prince naturel soit entre ses subjiéz si comme le père sus ses enfans, ou le Pasteur en la garde de son parc, prest de exposer sa vie pour la defence d'icellui; et le tyrant est comme le loup ravissable entre les brebis'.³⁷ The former's main focus was on dispensing justice, which he achieved

³⁰ Pizan, *Livre de la paix*, pp. 57, 64. See also Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 109-136.

³¹ *Demandes*, pp. 24-25.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³⁴ Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 144-145. Christine de Pizan explained to the dauphin in the *Livre de la paix* (p. 73) that 'celui qui moult de choses a à faire doit ouvrer par conseil, pues tu veoir que selon prudence par laquelle te convient ouvrer se bien te veulx disposer, tu qui moult de choses a à faire, t'est besoing avoir consiel.' See also Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 144-154.

³⁵ Consult chapters 7, and 9-15 in Book 1 in *The Livre de la Paix*, pp. 69-71, 73-87. Also, Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 144-154. For the prevalence of the concept of 'evil councillors' among the king's royal officers see Gauvard, 'Le roi de France et l'opinion publique', pp. 353-366, and especially pp. 364-365.

³⁶ Quillet, 'Tyrannie et tyrannicide dans la pensée médiévale tardive (XIV^e-XV^e siècle)', in *D'une cité l'autre. Problèmes de philosophie politique médiévales* (Paris, 2001), p. 149; Dunbabin, 'Government', p. 493; Black, *Political Thought*, pp. 140, 149.

³⁷ Pizan, *Livre de la Paix*, p. 143.

only when the powerful did not dominate the weak, when he established fair laws, where he maintained order, and where he raised and acquired taxes equitably and morally.³⁸ The tyrant ruled with violence, aggression and self-interest, he disregarded established laws or norms, over-burdened his subjects with excessive taxes, subjected them to the destruction of private property, allowed corrupt royal officers to remain in their positions, and generally treated his subjects as slaves by ruling against their collective will, and hence, was against the common good.³⁹

Aristotelian scholarship posited that there were two distinct categories of tyranny: 'tyrannie régitive' and 'tyrannie acquisitive'.⁴⁰ In the former case, the tyrant held legitimate authority as the sovereign ruler, but deliberately abused it without exercising any thought for his subjects; in the latter, the tyrant had usurped power unlawfully, most likely through violent means. Usurpation was particularly offensive to medieval theorists, because they stubbornly maintained the illusion that princes only held their sovereign position with the approval of their subjects.⁴¹ Although in France and England the majority of theorists agreed on hereditary succession, they did believe that the people originally elected kings, and that God sanctioned their choice through their spiritual anointment.⁴² Because of this tradition of thought, therefore, the usurpation of sovereign power from the rightful ruler was illegitimate not only because it was unlawful, but also because it was not founded upon the communal will of the people in either theoretical or rational terms.⁴³

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69. Jacques Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 184-193.

³⁹ Lewis, 'Jean Juvenal des Ursins and the Common Literary Attitude towards Tyranny in Fifteenth-Century France', in *Essays in Later Medieval French History*, pp. 180-187; Black, *Political Thought*, p. 141.

⁴⁰ Coville's expressions that he explained in detail in *Jean Petit*, p. 180. For a detailed overview of the theoretical development of tyranny, see pp. 179-206.

⁴¹ Black, *Political Thought*, p. 137

⁴² See also Black, *Political Thought*, pp. 146-148.

⁴³ Aquinas' *De Regno* and Coluccio Salutati's *De tyranno* were clear on this point. For the former, see Black, *Political Thought*, p. 25. For the latter see Quillet, 'Tyrannie et tyrannicide', p. 149.

However, the most contentious issue for theorists was not in defining the tyrant; rather, it was in deciding how to lawfully proceed against him.⁴⁴ Regarding the quandary over whether it was licit to commit tyrannicide, many Christian obstacles impeded a straightforward answer, particularly the Sixth Commandment prohibiting homicide.⁴⁵ Additionally, St. Augustine argued that God had sent tyrants to test the wills of men.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, there were some who advocated tyrannicide. John of Salisbury had given his approval to the forceful removal of a tyrant, though his position was deliberately complex to avoid excessive opposition.⁴⁷ Coluccio Salutati argued that a tyrannical ruler could be legitimately deposed if his subjects collectively agreed on this course of action.⁴⁸ John of Paris maintained that the pope legitimately held the power to excommunicate anyone who followed a tyrannical king. This would, Paris hoped, incite people to depose any tyrant who stood against papal authority in this regard.⁴⁹

Equally, there were allowances made for the deposition of tyrants who did not hold sovereign power – these were typically categorised as ‘usurpers’. Aquinas argued that a tyrant could be lawfully killed if there was sanction from the higher authority, such as the king. Master Jean Petit attempted to justify John the Fearless’ murder of the duke of Orleans in March 1408, by claiming that the latter’s treasonous attempts to usurp the throne and kill the king, his brother, were tyrannical. In fact, he attempted to prove that such a severe case of lèse-majesty was by its very nature tyranny. To make his case, he ensured in his text that Louis of Orleans fit every criterion of the tyrant’s profile: he had, purportedly, tried to kill the king and the royal family through various means, including poison and maleficium; he had over-burdened the king’s subjects with taxes, which he

⁴⁴ Coville *Jean Petit*, pp. 179-206; Simon Cuttler, *The Law of Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France* (London, 1981), pp. 4-27; Quillet, ‘Tyrannie et tyrannicide’, pp. 147-157; Black, *Political Thought*, pp. 148-149; Dunbabin, ‘Government’, pp. 494-495. Also, Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 190-193.

⁴⁵ Coville, *Jean Petit*, p. 180.

⁴⁶ Canning, *Medieval Political Thought*, p. 113.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Quillet, ‘Tyrannie et tyrannicide’, p. 152.

⁴⁹ Black, *Political Thought*, p. 149.

allegedly diverted to his own funds and to the king of England; and he was directly responsible for the despoilment of the French countryside due to his futile engagement in war with England.

Yet we must bear in mind, that these types of disparaging accusations were conventional rhetorical tools during this period, and could be applied as easily to one faction as the other in any campaign whose purpose was to discredit the rival.⁵⁰ According to Black, to call someone a tyrant during the later middle ages was in fact 'an exercise in winning hearts and minds'.⁵¹ For corroboration on this point, we need only look at the various letters patent, letters close, and manifestoes sent during the period under study here, 1405-1419, where accusations of tyranny abound.⁵²

2.3. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

That which constituted 'good government' in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was not merely ideological; there was a concrete socio-political structure within which the prince had to operate before he was guilty of misgoverning the realm, or worse, of tyranny. Universal expectations held that the monarchy should establish fair and equitable taxes, both ordinary and extraordinary, preserve the royal domain, protect the realm from corruption and dishonesty among royal officers, and establish and maintain security within the realm from both foreign and domestic threats. It is very clear that these aspects, which made up the edifice of 'good government', were very closely bound to the conceptualisation of the common good, the preservation of justice and the defence of peace. Yet, during the first two decades of the fifteenth century, and in particular, whilst Louis of Orleans or his Armagnac successors had control of the royal government (1404-1407 and 1413-1418 respectively), it was popularly believed that all of the above were

⁵⁰ Kempshall, *The Common Good*, p. 8.

⁵¹ Black, *Political Thought*, p. 149.

⁵² See chapter 4 'Desloiaulx traistres'.

compromised to varying degrees.⁵³ In many respects this was not purely an illusion. For example, between 1404 and 1405, the duke of Orleans was able to increase substantially increase his personal wealth with royal funding during a period in which he also raised a number of extraordinary taxes in the king's name for the war with England.⁵⁴ This caused outrage among the people of Paris, and was one of the things John the Fearless accused him of in his letter campaign between August and September 1405. It subsequently appeared in Jean Petit's *Justification*. In addition, we know that John the Fearless had an aptitude for putting himself forward as the paragon of 'good government' whilst making a case against his rivals for corruption and ruthlessness.⁵⁵ To understand how he accomplished this, it is necessary to examine briefly the tangible factors that constituted 'good government'.

One of the fundamental ideas advocated a very distinct division between what funds belonged in the royal coffers, and what funds were to be kept in the public domain, to be used for the good of the king's subjects.⁵⁶ This was based on the traditional, feudal convention which stipulated that the king should live off the revenue of his own royal demesne, which included rents, fees and tariffs, and all other forms of revenue that were customary in each region. This made up the *recette ordinaire*.⁵⁷ It was also commonly held by jurists, theorists, and equally in public opinion, that the king should not alienate his physical domain by partitioning it off. However, it was also necessary to accommodate the needs of his closest male relatives: the princes of royal blood. The fourteenth-century creation of

⁵³ On the negative public image of Louis, see Jarry, *La vie politique de Louis de France*, p. 325; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 31-32; Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 168-171; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 39.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ One example of this, which we shall subsequently examine in greater detail, was first his requests for reform in September 1405, and the implementation thereof October 1408-January 1409. See chapter 3, 'Le bon duc Jehan'.

⁵⁶ Cazelles, 'Une exigence de l'opinion', p. 98.

⁵⁷ David Potter, 'The King and his Government under the Valois, 1328-1498', in *France in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 172; Maurice Rey, *Le domaine du roi et les finances extraordinaires sous Charles VI 1388-1413* (Paris, 1965), p. 41, and *Les finances royales sous Charles VI. Les causes du déficit 1388-1413* (Paris, 1965), pp. 14-16; Cazelles, *Société politique, noblesse et couronne sous Jean le Bon et Charles V* (Geneva, 1982), p. 15; Norberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, p. 4.

apanages for royal princes was designed to circumvent the problem: only male heirs could inherit, and if there was any lapse in the blood line the territory would return to the crown.⁵⁸ The holders of the apanage were essentially the king's vassals, and therefore owed the king homage and an oath of fidelity upon reception of the large holding.⁵⁹

The notion that the royal demesne be the primary means of royal finance was not merely a theoretical principle that was aimed at protecting the common good. According to Maurice Rey, 'le peuple y croyait fermement', and perceived any act which opposed this principle as 'malhonnête, un vol.'⁶⁰ Nevertheless there was little dispute that the king had the right to raise taxes outside the *recette ordinaire*. In theory, this was acceptable only if he consulted his subjects and acquired their consent either by convoking the Estates General, or smaller local assemblies.⁶¹ Moreover, to raise extraordinary taxes, there had to be an urgent need, such as for the purpose of war.⁶² Indeed Charles V had used the extraordinary taxes to help fund the ongoing conflict with England, and also to pay his father's ransom, though he did so with the agreement of the Estates General and the provincial estates.⁶³ However, after the crisis of the 1350s, the Jacquerie revolt and the failure of the estates to collect the taxes to which they conceded, Charles V began to devise a system that did not depend solely upon consent.⁶⁴

By the mid and late fourteenth century, the situation had reached a point where the revenues from the royal demesne were insufficient for the king to support himself and the

⁵⁸ See Michael Jones, 'The Crown and the Provinces in the Fourteenth Century', in *France in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 66-73; Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, pp. 4-8.

⁵⁹ Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, p. 4.

⁶⁰ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 41.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, and *Les finances royales*, p. 15; Potter, 'The King and his Government', p. 172; Lewis, 'Pourquoi aurait-on voulu réunir des États Généraux, en France, à la fin du moyen âge?', in *Représentation, pouvoir et royauté*, pp. 119-120; Michael Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, p. 11.

⁶² Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 41. See also Jones, 'The Crown and the Provinces', pp. 83-87, and Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, pp. 8-12.

⁶³ Ferdinand Lot and Robert Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions françaises au moyen âge* (Paris, 1958), 2: 259-260; Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, p. 8.

⁶⁴ Jones, 'The Crown and the Provinces', p. 86.

royal family.⁶⁵ The war with England had drained the realm and caused a substantial deficit.⁶⁶ Also the increasingly extravagant lifestyle of the king, his family and the princes of royal blood, in addition to the many pensions for the nobility and tax exemptions for royal officials, meant that it was necessary to substantially augment royal expenditure.⁶⁷ Consequently, during the reigns of Charles V and his son Charles VI, raising extraordinary taxes became a regular occurrence, and more often than not, without public consent. Yet, however permanent the event of raising the royal *aides* became, it was still perceived publicly as an extraordinary measure.⁶⁸ Moreover, the fact the royal government retained the conventional terminology for these measures, such as the *finances extraordinaires et aides levees pour la guerre* only exacerbated the problem.⁶⁹ Consequently, the regularity of raising the *aides* met with a great deal of resistance, in the forms of recurrent rebellion (1358, 1382, 1413) and strong polemic.⁷⁰ In 1405 John the Fearless criticised the duke of Orleans openly for burdening the king's subjects with the *aide* he had raised in 1404.⁷¹ This was a cyclical recrimination, which reappeared in Jean Petit's 1408 justification speech after Orleans' assassination, and in later propaganda letters such as the letter that John had sent to the *bonnes villes* on 8 October 1417.⁷²

Whereas the revenues from the royal demesne itself might only produce approximately 300,000 *livres tournois* (l.t.) per year, the *aides* and *tailles* could produce over two million, three quarters of which would come directly from Languedoil.⁷³ However, it should be noted that only about a third of this sum would actually reach the royal

⁶⁵ Rey, *Les finances royales*, pp. 9-10; Cazelles, *Société politique*, pp. 15-17; Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, p. 8.

⁶⁶ Potter, 'The King and his Government', pp. 172-173.

⁶⁷ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, pp. 198-199; Potter, 'The King and his Government', pp.

⁶⁸ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 41. See also Jones, 'The Crown and the Provinces', pp. 83-87, and Norberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, pp. 8-12.

⁶⁹ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 197.

⁷⁰ For a detailed background on the impact of the extraordinary taxes upon urban society, see Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 164-167, and 195; Potter, 'The King and his Government', p. 176. See also Lot and Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions*, 2: 262-263.

⁷¹ AN, X¹a 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 402.

⁷² Petit, *Justification*, p. 241. For the 1417 letter, Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 307, n. 305.

⁷³ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, pp. 177-180; Potter, 'The King and his Government', p. 175; Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, pp. 8-11.

government.⁷⁴ The holders of royal apanages, and other great fiefs were given a large portion of the income collected in their territories, which amounted to approximately one third of the total revenue.⁷⁵ In Burgundy, Flanders, and Brittany the fief holders had the traditional right to the full revenue of the *aides*.⁷⁶ The final third of the total revenue of the *aides* within the realm would evaporate unexplicably. One cause was probably that a substantial number of social groups were excluded from tax collection, such as royal officials and the nobility.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the crown was entirely dependent upon local cooperation in the collection of taxes. Finally, it was virtually impossible for the royal government to know precisely how many taxpayers there were in the realm.⁷⁸ This provided the opportunity for corruption among the administrators of the tax system, especially among the *receveurs*, and the *élus*. Given that the princes had been authorised a percentage of the *aides* raised in their apanage or fief holding, the officers in the two top tiers were most susceptible to influence by noble or princely intervention, and likely to be more interested in prioritising the latter's needs over those of the crown.⁷⁹

Finally, Rey argued that the tax collectors at all levels were in concert to acquire great fortunes, which they did by falsifying accounts and extorting money through various other means.⁸⁰ Due to this type of corruption, it was commonly felt that the tax collectors were primarily interested in self-enrichment at the expense of the royal demesne and the public good.⁸¹ The result was that many people who were in higher positions of authority, in the king's treasury or the *finances extraordinaires*, and especially the *généraux-conseillers des*

⁷⁴ Potter, 'The King and his Government', p. 175.

⁷⁵ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, pp. 197-198; Potter, 'The King and his Government', p. 173; Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, p. 7.

⁷⁶ Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté*, p. 7. For the duke of Burgundy's holdings (Burgundy and Flanders) specifically, see pp. 25-38. See also Rey, *Domaine du roi*, pp. 269-270.

⁷⁷ Potter, 'The King and his Government', p. 173.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 173-174.

⁷⁹ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 179.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 196.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pp. 195-196.

finances, were vulnerable to attack.⁸² The very public fall of Jean de Montaigu, the *grand maître d'hôtel*, from his position of power in 1409 stands as a compelling example. On 7 October 1409, he was arrested by Pierre des Essarts, the provost of Paris, on the order of the duke of Burgundy, and convicted of being an accomplice to Louis duke of Orleans. He was subsequently found guilty of causing the king's mental illness, and also for appropriating funds from the *tailles* and the *aides*.⁸³

According to Claude Gauvard, it was the royal officials who received the brunt of the public's dissatisfaction. Indeed, they took on rather typical stereotypes which embodied persecution, wealth and self-interest.⁸⁴ These were naturally at variance with both academic theories and popular understanding relating to the common good. For this reason many considered the tax system to be unjust. Slanderous attacks against those controlling royal finances and against administration regarding over-taxation were, therefore, useful rhetorical tools for those searching for a way to appeal to the king's subjects: '[c]'est le thème universellement répandu à l'époque, répété à satiété, et qui, chaque fois qu'il est repris, ne manque pas d'obtenir un plein succès.'⁸⁵ Chevalier argued that the *bonnes villes* were more inclined in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to support those leaders who promoted the idea of reform, and consequently allied themselves with self-assured princes such as Charles the Bad, king of Navarre and John the Fearless. These two formidable princes had appeared capable of imposing improvement upon the evil counsellors and administrators of the king.⁸⁶

Therefore, it is certain that because there were some very obvious abuses in the royal administration, particularly in the farming of taxes, the call for change was the

⁸² *Ibid*, pp. 282-312. Rey, *Les finances royales*, pp. 10-11.

⁸³ RSD 4: 273-277; Bourgeois, p. 6; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 451. Lucien Merlet, 'Biographie de Jean de Montaigu, grand maître de France (1350-1409)' *BEC*, 3rd Series 3 (1852): 273-279; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 79-80; Farniglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 78-81; Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 101-103.

⁸⁴ Gauvard, 'Le roi de France et l'opinion publique', p. 365.

⁸⁵ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 195.

⁸⁶ Bernard Chevalier, *Les bonnes villes de France du XIV^e au XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1982), p. 100, and 94-99.

preferred way to allay social tension. It was in effect an important political convention whereby the king, or one of the peers of the crown, publicly identified the many purported abuses committed by royal officers scattered around the realm. On the surface this was all done for the 'utilité publique'.⁸⁷ To oversee the reform programme, King Philip V (r. 1316-1322) had created the official post henceforth known as the *réformateurs généraux du royaume*, whose duty was to correct the corruption of royal officers such as the king's provosts, *baillis* and *sénéchaussaux* around the realm.⁸⁸ Throughout the fourteenth and the early fifteenth centuries, the reform programmes were repetitive with very little innovation, but they were nonetheless ideologically effective. Cazelles and Gauvard have argued in their respective studies on public opinion, that it was one of the most important propaganda themes during times of political crisis.⁸⁹

Indeed, the presentation of the ordinances is very revealing of their late medieval value. Although there was very little modification to the template provided by Philip IV's 1303 reform ordinance, and despite the fact that the actual reforms were either ephemeral, or not implemented at all, it was the principle behind them that was important in a real and practical way.⁹⁰ This is because the ordinances acknowledged the unease among the populace; they were, superficially, the result of the 'clamour' of the people.⁹¹ Nonetheless, we must not blindly assume that the royal governments were responding in a direct way to the dissatisfaction of the people. Even if there had been 'clamour' among the king's subjects regarding abuses of power when the twenty-four reform ordinances issued between Philip IV and Charles V, and the six ordinances between 1389-1413 under Charles VI, were promulgated, it was not direct pressure from the people that had led to their

⁸⁷ Cazelles, 'Une exigence de l'opinion', pp. 91-99.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

⁸⁹ According to Cazelles, 'Une exigence de l'opinion', pp. 94-95. Gauvard, 'Ordonnance de réforme', p. 89.

⁹⁰ One major change between earlier ordinances and later ones was the language used: the 1303 ordinance for reform was in Latin, whereas later ordinances would always be published in French. Gauvard, 'Ordonnance de réforme', p. 89.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94, and 'Le roi de France et l'opinion publique', pp. 356-359; Cazelles, 'Une exigence de l'opinion', pp. 95-96.

publication. Regardless of the socio-economic standing of those who had requested change, they were always suppliant to the king. This was an important sign of his authority. Therefore there is little reason to suggest that the popular view held much sway in practical terms. Gauvard reminded us that even the violent Cabochiens were compelled to plead with the king for reform.⁹²

What is important here, is that the ordinances gave the public impression that the king was responding to the clamour of the people; it was effectively a rhetorical device, which reinforced the ideology of good government at ground level. Evidence to this effect is found in the request for reform presented on the behalf of John the Fearless and his brothers to the king and the Parlement the 26 April 1405, where he explained: 'il est moult à doubter qu'il n'en aviegne grans inconveniens, attendu le murmure qui de ce est entre gens d'eglise, nobles et autre de vostre royaume, et s'en porroit ensuir de tres grant commocion, que seroit moult perilleuse...'⁹³ This in turn strengthened the notion that the prince maintained peace, order and justice within his realm for the good of his people.

In this chapter we have charted the development of theories on monarchical government and the concept of good rulership in order to understand the underlying structure of political thought and affairs. It was within this context that the fifteenth-century civil war erupted. The main understanding of what constituted good government was the establishment, maintenance and vigorous defence of peace and justice within the realm, which essentially equated to protecting the common good. However, Charles VI was unable to perform his duty as the defender of his people and the guardian of the common good adequately due to his incapacitating mental illness. Those who were left to oversee the government in his stead, were thus vulnerable to attack, and incurred culpability for failing to meet the responsibility of the royal government. Such was the case, as we shall see, for Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs under the consistent onslaught of John the

⁹² Gauvard, 'Ordonnance de réforme', p. 91.

⁹³ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, pp. 402-403.

Fearless' ideological warfare. John the Fearless criticised Louis of Orleans freely for misgoverning the realm, accusing him of misappropriating public money for his own personal gain, of nepotism, of despoiling the countryside, and for attempting to usurp the French throne. These accusations fell within the well-established doctrinal and practical frameworks of thought, which were accessible to the nobility, and indeed to the urban and rural populations. With regard to the intelligentsia, it is self-evident that the academic works and juristic treatises circulating throughout the period under study here, were available to the universities of the French realm, and in particular, that at Paris. The didactic treatises for princes, allegories and sermons allowed the theories to reach the royal and princely courts of the French realm, and also many royal officials. With regard to the townspeople and villagers in the realm, the theories were expounded in documents such as royal ordinances, reform mandates, letters patent and official proclamations, which were constantly being published throughout the realm, typically to large and mixed audiences.⁹⁴ As we shall see, the leading burgesses of the towns were able to respond to these documents using the same politicised language. Additionally, the active engagement of the townspeople in fifteenth-century political process, including the taking of arms during this civil conflict, suggest that many were not only actively aware of the prevailing political discourse, but contributed to its edification. Therefore, this present study argues that John the Fearless' main advantage in his conflict against Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs was his approach to propagandising his position with a barrage of visual, textual and oral cues by tapping into this very recognisable ideological framework which he ensured were accessible to all levels of society.

⁹⁴ The publication process and the response of the *bonnes villes* to these documents will be discussed in Chapter 6, 'Letters'. For their impact on the king's subjects see Chapter 9 'Paris and the *bonnes villes*'.

PAGE

NUMBERING

AS ORIGINAL

CHAPTER 3

‘LE BON DUC DE BOURGOGNE’¹

Successful propaganda campaigns must bear an intelligible level of rhetorical consistency if the main tenets of the ideology are to resonate with audiences. Therefore, effective propaganda relies upon repetitive rhetorical devices such as recurring turns of phrases, expressions and constructs. These must fit within a conceptual framework that is familiar to audiences. It is our contention that this was the approach that John the Fearless undertook in his propaganda campaign, one that reflected current thinking on loyalty and disloyalty to the crown, on the practice of good government, and on tyranny.

By and large, Burgundy’s propaganda cultivated a constant opposition between himself and his Orleanist rivals, which corresponded to the dichotomy between good and evil – a typical medieval trope. Thus, John the Fearless was very concerned with promoting a public persona of himself as a good leader, whose loyalty to the king and to the public good was ‘notoire’ (well-known). Conversely, he ardently endorsed a profile of Louis of Orleans and the later Armagnacs which emphasised their tyranny, dishonesty and treason. John the Fearless was a ‘loyal subget du roy’, whereas Louis of Orleans, it was said, was a ‘desloial traistre’. Distilling a good reputation – ‘fama’ or ‘renommé’ – was an essential component in John the Fearless’ propaganda. Bound to honour and prestige, *fama* was an integral aspect of medieval thinking. It will, therefore, help us to gauge whether, whilst preserving his own reputation, John the Fearless’ propaganda was effective in compromising that of his rivals.

John the Fearless was not the first to employ recognisable theoretical and semantic devices in his propaganda. He was innovative, however, in the organisation of his campaign and in his decisive implementation of it. It is our objective here to investigate how John’s

¹ This was a phrase used repeatedly in the *Geste* to describe John the Fearless. See, for example, lines 3320 and 3464, pp. 358 and 362 respectively.

various media of propaganda – the letters and manifestoes, the symbols, the ceremonies and the texts – collaborated to convey his message with clarity. In this chapter, we will centre our focus on how he presented his devotion to the crown and to the realm by examining two of the central themes that he used to set himself quite apart from his rivals: his loyalty to the crown and his programme for ‘good government’.² The latter focused mainly on reform and anti-taxation, two very popular ideas among the urban population.

3.1. LOYALTY TO THE CROWN

One of the most important recurring themes that John the Fearless advanced in his propaganda was his duty to serve and protect the king, a responsibility that was determined by his various ‘obligations’ to his monarch and to the realm. These were frequently underscored in the letters and manifestoes that he sent to the *bonnes villes*, and figured prominently in the introduction to the 1408 justification speech given by Jean Petit on his behalf. This motif put his blood lineage ahead of the other obligations: John the Fearless was the grandson of King John II (r. 1350-1364), and was, therefore, Charles VI’s first cousin. This he followed by explaining that he was a double peer of the crown, due to his feudal holdings as the duke of Burgundy and the count of Flanders.³ Moreover, because he held the title of duke of Burgundy, he held the additional honour of being the *doyen des pers* of France, the highest-ranking peer of the crown.⁴ Indeed, Petit reminded his audience that the office of the *doyen des pers* offered ‘la premiere prerogative qui soit en ce royaume de seigneurie, noblesse et dignité, après la couronne.’⁵ He was further tied to the king via the double marriage alliance between his daughter Margaret of Burgundy and the dauphin,

² There were other oppositional themes that he evoked in his propaganda, such as spiritual purity and its opposite, sacrilege, but due to the confines of this doctoral thesis, these will not be examined here.

³ In total, there were twelve peers of France - six ecclesiastical and six lay. These were the archbishop of Rheims, the bishops of Laon, Langres, Beauvais, Noyon and Châlons-sur-Marne, the dukes of Burgundy, Normandy and Aquitaine, and the counts of Flanders, Toulouse and Champagne. See Lot and Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions*, p. 297; Schnerb, *L’État bourguignon*, p. 42.

⁴ It was established feudal tradition that the dukes of Burgundy held the title *doyen des pairs*. Schnerb, *L’État bourguignon*, p. 42.

⁵ Petit, *Justification*, p. 180.

Louis duke of Guyenne, and between his only son and heir Philip, count of Charolais, and Michelle of France.⁶ However one of the more dramatic reasons given for his loyalty to the king was because he and his brother Anthony had sworn to their father, on his deathbed, that they would protect the king and serve the *bien public*. According to the official reform manifesto that he, Anthony, and their younger brother Philip presented to the king's royal council, the Parlement, and later sent to the *bonnes villes* the 26 August 1405, they had promised to 'servir et obéir [Charles VI] devant et sur toutes choses mondaines.'⁷

The story of John and Anthony's oath resurfaced in 1408, when Jean Petit presented the duke's *Justification* at Hôtel St. Pol.⁸ By the time it was included in the *Geste*, it had taken on near mythical significance. The reason it was so important was because it helped to set the tone for his ideology: henceforth Burgundy claimed that everything he did was to further the interests of king and the *bien public*. The *Geste's* imagined version of Philip the Bold's speech to his two sons in confirms its importance within the Burgundian ideology:

Que vos metés vo cuer et vo discretion
A warder le roiaume de tout présomtion
Et le cose publique sans nulle variation
Et le roi vo segneur c'on apielle Carlon.
Siervés, cremés, amés en vraie opinion
Lui et tous ses enfans de generation;
Gardés-les loiaument, car ils en ont besong.⁹

The most important feature of this oath was clearly his sons' duty to protect the realm and the *chose publique*, and serve the king and royal family loyally 'car ils en ont besong.' This supplemental clause alluded to the king's madness and his inability to govern independently, but primarily it referred to the general view that a king should have help

⁶ To confirm the consistency of these 'obligations' between documents, see for example Petit, *Justification*, pp. 179-180. The letter John and Anthony wrote requesting reforms the 26 August 1405 in AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, p. 400; and the letter John wrote to the *bonnes villes* from Hesdin, 25 April 1417 in ACO B 11895, layette 72, n. 39 (and AN, K60 n. 8).

⁷ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, p. 400. See also Jean Chousat's letter to the *chambre des comptes* (Dijon), ACO, B 11942, n. 10. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 29, 70; Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 132-133.

⁸ Monstrelet, 1: 180-181.

⁹ *Geste*, p. 295.

from his peers and counsellors.¹⁰ There is little doubt that for both these reasons, Charles VI needed someone who was both trustworthy and steadfast to protect the interests of the crown of France. John seems to have recognised that, if he hoped to play an important role in the government, he had to appropriate that role for himself. Hitherto, he had been prevented from taking up his father's chair in the royal council. Because Philip the Bold was Charles V's brother, he had joint guardianship with his brother, John Duke of Berry, over Charles VI during the latter's minority.¹¹ John found that he was justly refused the same distinguished standing as his father, and that the king had reduced his royal pension to half of what he had formerly given to Philip.¹² This was a significant problem for John as he had been left with his parents' debts; in order to maintain his duchy and counties, he was in need of substantial financial support from the crown.¹³ John had to find an alternate route leading to a position of significant power within the governing council. Consequently, he embarked on a programme whereby he promoted himself as the king's loyal subject and protector, though Vaughan astutely remarked: 'Obedience and loyalty to Charles VI meant dominating and making use of this periodically insane ruler.'¹⁴

Yet it was important to outwardly appear as though he took his subservient position seriously. Therefore, he persistently reiterated it in his communications with the *bonnes villes*. For example, in the 1405 request for reform, the duke made a public declaration of his obedience to the king 'comme raison est, que chascun de vostre royaume est naturelment tenus et obligié de vous apres Dieu servir, amer et obeir.'¹⁵ Similarly, John's Hesdin letter (25 April 1417) to the *bonnes villes* emphasised that he had indeed

¹⁰ Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, pp. 144-145.

¹¹ Autrand, *Charles VI*, pp. 19-21.

¹² Between 1402-1403, Philip the Bold received 198,941 francs in pensions and gifts, and 188,000 between 1403-1404. The king terminated John the Fearless' pension, and although he was offered several gifts, he received only 37,000 francs in 1406, and 2,000 in 1407. The king still owed John 347,591 in April 1407. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 41-42. See also Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 55-56; Schnerb, *L'état bourguignon*, p. 143.

¹³ Pouquet du Haut-Jussé, 'Jean sans Peur, son but, sa méthode', p. 184.

¹⁴ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 29.

¹⁵ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 399. See also BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 54, fols 95r-96r.

fulfilled his natural duty to the king, explaining he had been ‘obligies a luy et a la couronne comme chascun scet’.¹⁶ John’s addendum, ‘as everyone knows’, demonstrates that the theory had become convention within all levels of society by 1417, including urban *milieux*. Moreover, John used it to suggest that everyone ought to know already that he himself had always complied with the concept, and had only ever laboured to protect the king and his realm from any potential ‘inconveniens’ that might arise. Thus the second meaning of the phrase ‘comme chascun scet’ attended to the question of what was common knowledge regarding his personal repute and his intentions concerning the king. Public renown centred on forging positive *fama*, which was inexorably related to honour and credibility.¹⁷ Although the Hesdin letter was for the most part tacitly aggressive, it integrated a defensive element which was designed to influence his *fama* in a constructive way. This was crucial, because his 1417 campaign relied in great part on winning the people of the realm over to his cause, and for that, it was necessary that any public talk that circulated about him – the rumours and *bruit* – remain positive. The concept of loyal service to the king had gained such prevalence in fifteenth century France that it became a useful feature of political propaganda.

To further support his public image, John the Fearless unfailingly claimed that whatever plan he had executed to protect the king and dauphin, was done to ‘pourveoir aux inconveniens qui de ce pourroient ensuir...’¹⁸ It was an expression that John generally followed with a statement emphasising his unwavering devotion to Charles VI and his family. Thus, he continuously made analogous declarations to that which featured in a letter he disseminated the 19 August: ‘nous qui de tout nostre cuer et de toute nostre

¹⁶ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

¹⁷ Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail, ‘Introduction’ in *Fama. The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca, 2003), pp. 1-11.

¹⁸ Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41 n.1, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, pp. 396-397. For this quotation see p. 397. In his letter requesting reforms, he explained that if the reforms were not implemented, ‘grans inconveniens...s’en porroit ensuir de tres grant comocion, que seroit moult perilleuse...’ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189v, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, p. 403. In the 1417 Hesdin letter, he wrote that he was beginning a military campaign to ‘purchasser de tout nostre pourvoir que lesdits inconveniens cessassent et que bonne reparation feust mise en la dicte chose publique...’¹⁸ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

chevance et puissance nous vouldrions sur toutes autres choses mondaines entierement employer au bien de mon dit seigneur le Roy et de mes seigneurs ses enfans et de tout son royaume.¹⁹ His fidelity to the king, to the royal family and to the realm here expressed remained his foremost rationale behind any verbal and military attacks against Louis of Orleans and his Armagnac successors.

Indeed it was ubiquitous, appearing more than once in every letter John sent to the *bonnes villes*, featuring in every Burgundian text that appeared after the *Justification*. Similar assertions also frequently appeared in royal letters and ordinances which were published around the realm. In a royal mandate issued the 2 November 1411, the king acknowledged that the duke of Burgundy had always shown him and the dauphin 'grande loyaulté et bonne amour'.²⁰ In the second letter written that same day for the same purpose, the king described the duke of Burgundy's character as decidedly loyal: 'la preudomie, leaulté et bonne diligence, grant sens, strenuité et vaillance de nostredit cousin le duc de Bourgoigne le quel savons certainement avoir à nous et à nostredite lignée, parfaite et entiere amour et trez grand courage à ceste besongne.'²¹

Later, in 1412, a royal mandate published in the king's name, which authorised Burgundy to take charge of the royal army, declared 'il nous attaint la bonne amour loyaute et vraie obeissance quil a tousiours eue et portee envers nous et notre couronne, et aussi envers le bien publique de nostre dit Royaume, et a la conservation protection et defense dicellui, en quoy il le temps passe sest grandement et loyaument emploie'²² There is a danger here of presuming that these letters were mere hyperbole, overstating the duke's loyalty to the crown. However, the suggestive force of repetitive discourse may well have affected audiences significantly. Moreover, the letters were the medium through which Burgundy could express precisely what he wanted to. In issuing letters, he ensured that

¹⁹ For this example, see again Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41 n.1, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, p. 397.

²⁰ ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8.

²¹ Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 277, n. 276.

²² ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 10.

whatever message he imparted was conveyed unambiguously, irrespective of any exaggeration therein.

In addition to letters and manifestoes, Burgundy also used symbolic and ceremonial discourse to communicate his ideology. The 1405 'kidnapping' and the aftermath provide an excellent case study of how many channels of communication were used in tandem by him. In particular, we note how prevalent the issue of loyalty was to John's rhetoric from the outset. Superficially, his reason for coming to Paris was legitimate: he was responding to the king's summons to pay homage for his newly acquired county of Flanders (1404).²³ But John had already gained some momentum for his political agenda by gaining the respect of the Parisians earlier on, in March 1405, when he refused to support the tax that the duke of Orleans had ostensibly raised for the war with England.²⁴ For this reason, John had already secured the affections of a great many Parisians.²⁵ Many subsequently hoped that he would become their advocate in governmental affairs, and in particular, a great number of merchant families who hoped for its improvement, offered him their full support.²⁶ Therefore, the popular perception was that John was coming to Paris to defend the people's rights.²⁷ Although the removal of the dauphin from Paris by Louis of Orleans and the queen was entirely unexpected, it was, in point of fact, a timely stroke of luck for the duke of Burgundy. According to Guenée, by the end of the fourteenth century, most townspeople believed that the king's rightful place of abode was Paris, and for that reason, the king's absence from the capital for any lengthy period of time was a source of

²³ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 33.

²⁴ 'Et adonc défendi à tous ses subgetz d'icelles deux contez, que nul ne paiast la taille dernièrement imposée à Paris par le conseil royal, dont Loys d'Orléans, au gré duquel la plus grant partie des besongnes du royaume se conduisoient pour ce temps'. Monstrelet, 1: 97-98.

²⁵ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 31-33; Coville, *Jean Petit*, p. 105, 113; Guenée, *L'opinion publique*, pp. 181-196.

²⁶ Autrand, *Naissance d'un grand corps de l'État: les gens du Parlement de Paris, 1354-1454* (Paris, 1981), pp. 83-89. See also Marie-Reine Lobry, *Les relations entre la cour de Bourgogne et les milieux d'affaires parisiens sous Jean Sans Peur* (Diplôme d'Études Supérieures d'Histoire, Mémoire Principal, L'Université de Lille, 1958), p. 16-27; Jean Favier, *Paris au XV^e siècle, 1380-1500* (Paris, 1974), pp. 154-155.

²⁷ Jarry, *La vie politique de Louis de France*, pp. 324-325.

considerable agitation.²⁸ Burgundy must have recognised that in ‘rescuing’ the dauphin his desire to protect the king, the royal family, and realm might well be celebrated. This would have increased his positive *fama*. Therefore, to ensure that his hurried decision to intercept the dauphin’s convoy was publicly legitimised, he staged an entry ceremony, which he followed by a substantial letter campaign and a solemn request to Parlement and royal council for governmental reform.²⁹ At this time, John also adopted the emblematic repertoire of carpenter’s planes, reinforcing his rhetorical platform against Louis. All of these elements collaborated in the effort to justify his decision to return the dauphin to Paris by delivering a full-scale ideological attack on Louis.

Although John played a central role in the entry ceremony, he was prudent not to appropriate for himself the role customarily reserved for the king. This would have been ruinous for the duke, for the people were very fond of their king; he was their ‘Roi bien aimé’. Instead, the dauphin was the centre of attention during this performance, while Burgundy simply emphasised his role as his son-in-law’s natural protector. The event was highly dramatised in his subsequent letters to the towns, where he was lauded as a hero who had rescued the innocent child from the wicked clutches of his uncle. The whole affair was tailored to highlight John’s intrepidity, claiming that he had saved both the dauphin and the realm from the certain turmoil that would have ensued had Orleans’ plan been successful.³⁰ Indeed Louis was highly criticised in Burgundy’s letters to the *bonnes villes* for lacking any concern for the dauphin’s health, or giving any heed to the terrible weather through which the convoy drove.³¹ In his mid-fifteenth century chronicle, Monstrelet’s account romanticised Burgundy’s passionate desire to rescue the dauphin, writing:

Lesquelles lectres par lui visitées, un peu se dormy, et puis au son de la trompète, avecques ses gens, de ladicte ville se party

²⁸ Guinée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 121-131.

²⁹ For more detail on the entry ceremony, see chapter 8, ‘Ceremonial Discourse’, pp. 187-188.

³⁰ Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, E[E] 41 n.1, and EE 41, n. 2. Both letters cited respectively in Mirot, *Pièces*, pp. 396-397, and 405-413.

³¹ Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 2, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 407.

très matin, et hastivement s'en ala audit lieu de Paris afin de trouver ledit duc d'Aquitaine... Et pour ce, icellui duc de Bourgongne, sans descendre ne atarger, chevaucha très fort, à tout ses gens, parmy ladicte ville de Paris, tant que son cheval povoit troter, et suivy ledit daulphin, lequel il raconsuivy près de Corbueil.³²

Interestingly, the chroniclers who are generally considered pro-Armagnac appear at first glance to be in agreement with this perspective. The Jouvenal compiler highlighted his great diligence and speed, and the joy of the people upon his return with the dauphin.³³ Michel Pintoin's account explained that John had ridden so hard that when he finally did reach the young prince he was completely covered in dust.³⁴ Although this account seems initially rather straightforward, one could instead take Pintoin's story as a criticism of Burgundy's undue haste. This is supported by the fact that the first line of the segment dealing with this particular event referred back to the discord between the princes.³⁵ From this angle, a dusty duke of Burgundy is a rather ridiculous character. Likewise, the Jouvenal compiler also appears to have passed a moral criticism of his own: after providing his description of the event, the chronicler explained how significant this event had been in exacerbating the hostility between the parties, ultimately contributing to the destruction of the realm.³⁶ Therefore, whereas Monstrelet's portrayals of John the Fearless' great haste to save the dauphin helped reinforce a view that John was the loyal guardian of the king, his children, and the realm, Michel Pintoin and the Jouvenal compiler used this story to demonstrate how injudicious and damaging his reaction had been. Indeed Pintoin's exaggerated descriptions highlighted the irrationality in the duke's choice to 'save' the dauphin from his own mother, and of course, Louis of Orleans. Nevertheless, during the

³² Monstrelet, 1: 109.

³³ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 432.

³⁴ RSD, 3: 294.

³⁵ '[D]iscordia inter majores regni'. RSD, 3: 292.

³⁶ 'Si peut-on penser que grands debats y avoit, et que la reyne et le duc d'Orleans estoient tres-mal contens, et se dispoient les choses à un bien grand mal, pour estre cause de la destruction finale du royaume.' *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 432.

event in question, Burgundy sought to unsettle the Parisians by insisting on the need to shut the dauphin in the Louvre for his own 'protection'.

This event was, however, an excellent opportunity for Burgundy to launch an aggressive letter campaign against Orleans.³⁷ The latter was portrayed as a man who deliberately benefited from the king's illness. Burgundy claimed in his official complaint 26 August 1405 that, because of his natural obligation to serve the king earnestly and loyally, he was forced to inform him of the corruption in Orleans' government. Furthermore, he claimed that if reforms were not swiftly implemented, 'great inconveniences' would befall the realm as a result of 'le murmure qui de ce [a present] est entre gens d'eglise, nobles, et autres de vostre royaume'. In this way, John's open criticisms of Orleans' government were executed 'au bien de mon dit seigneur et son royaume'.³⁸ To emphasise awareness of 'public talk' – or the *fama* – of the people, was a common trope medieval political leaders used as a sign of their concern for the common good, although this did not necessarily mean that it was true.³⁹ Thus, by claiming it here, Burgundy gave the impression that he was averting any undue violence, thereby protecting the king and the interests of the king's subjects.

One of the first of the four major issues discussed in the request for reform forthrightly criticised Orleans for diminishing the royal dignity of the king by refusing to provide proper provisions, forcing him to live in near squalor.⁴⁰ The king's inability to provide for himself and maintain his royal dignity was obviously due to his mental illness, and therefore was not addressed here. However, the question of the 'gouvernement de la personne du roy' served John's cause well because it emphasised the king's pitiable state. The tacit contrast he thus created between the king's vulnerability and his own strength of

³⁷ See Miro, *Pièces*, pp. 395-414.

³⁸ As noted by Jean Chousat in a letter to his colleagues at the *chambre des comptes* in Dijon. BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 54, fol. 99r.

³⁹ Gauvard, 'Ordonnance de réforme', p. 94, and 'Le roi de France et l'opinion publique', pp. 356-359; Cazelles, 'Une exigence de l'opinion', pp. 95-96.

⁴⁰ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fols 189, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, pp. 400-401.

character helped to consolidate his position because it insinuated that the king needed a strong custodian. Thus, whilst Burgundy put himself in a position of great influence, his ostensible desire to uphold the natural order was nonetheless evident. This was significant because it framed Burgundy's ideology throughout the conflict with the house of Orleans and their allies until his death in 1419.

In reality, the consequences of the 1405 'kidnapping' was merely the first instance whereby John highlighted the necessity for the physical 'rescue' of the king or the dauphin. The second occasion was, unsurprisingly, the assassination of Louis of Orleans. Throughout the *Justification* Jean Petit gave numerous examples of Orleans' attempts on the king or the dauphin's life by using sorcery, poison, and arson.⁴¹ By killing Louis of Orleans, John had effectively removed the king and dauphin from physical danger.

The third time that Burgundy was called upon to 'rescue' the king was in the autumn of 1408. When he returned to Paris after the brief war with the Liègeois, the Parisians implored him to retrieve the king from Tours, where the queen and the princes of royal blood loyal to the late Louis of Orleans were purportedly holding him against his will. So momentous was this occasion for the Parisians, that the king made a formal entry ceremony upon his return to the capital in March 1409.⁴² The king's subsequent return to the capital with John's help was, for this reason, of great rhetorical significance to the latter's political ideology. This is evident in the volume of time and space that the author of the anonymous *Geste* committed to the detailed description of the circumstances.⁴³ In the *Geste*, the duke entered Paris to the joyous acclamation of the people crying 'Noël'. They personally thanked the duke for saving the king and the dauphin:

Ayl Dus de Bourgongne, nobles prinches gentis
Par foi, *se te ne fusses, li rois seroit finis*
Et trestous li roiaumes permués et honnis.
Helas! Or est nos *rois vilainement traïs*,

⁴¹ See Jean Petit's Minor. Monstrelet, 1: 223-242.

⁴² Bourgeois, p. 5.

⁴³ *Geste*, pp. 333-342.

Menés et eslongiés ensu de son païs.⁴⁴

It is significant that in this account, John the Fearless rescued the king from the *trahison* of the dukes of Berry and Bourbon. The message here is unambiguous: had it not been for John's involvement, the king would have been 'finished'. It is certainly an exaggerated view, as it is certain that no one would have caused the demise of the king at Tours. However, what is important, is that the Burgundian text claimed that it would have happened. This was done to underscore John's heroic intervention. Critically, it tells us what import this particular event had within the Burgundian ideology, and what message the duke had initially hoped to convey to the people: he had done his duty and acted as the king's guardian and protector, releasing him from the control of the treasonous Orleanist princes.

John continued to publicise his ideology via symbols and letters even while he was excluded from the government. During his exile from Paris, following the violent Cabochien Uprising in 1413, he included in his emblematical repertoire the image of the diligent bee for himself and his partisans.⁴⁵ Although this is not one of his more recognisable badges, the message it conveyed was just as powerful as those discussed above. The imagery of the bee and beehive was a well-established trope in the later Middle Ages, symbolising loyalty. In the *Quadriologue Invectif*, Alain Chartier used this analogy to outline the responsibilities that the nobles had in maintaining the state. The nobles ought to 'deffendre et entretenir leur assemblee et leur petite pollicie et pour garder la seigneurie de leur roy' and, 'se laissent mourir pour luy maintenir sa seigneurie et sa vie'.⁴⁶ By appropriating this symbol for himself and his Parisian supporters, a predominant number of whom had been officially banished, John was expressing his ideological view that he and his partisans had continued to perform their duty to defend the kingdom for their

⁴⁴ My italics. *Geste*, p. 342.

⁴⁵ Laurent Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente. Le rôle des devises et des ordres dans les relations diplomatiques entre les ducs de Bourgogne et les princes étrangers de 1380 à 1477', in *Revue du Nord*, 84, n. 345-346 (April-September 2002): 83.

⁴⁶ Alain Chartier, *Quadriologue Invectif*, ed. Eugénie Droz, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1950), p. 65.

sovereign out of loyalty and subservience. His emphasis on his continuous loyal conduct implied also that his exile was unjustifiable, while the subtextual meaning of the image supported his prevailing theme of fidelity to the crown.

Furthermore, several of John's letters to the *bonnes villes* during different periods of crisis corroborate how central the king's need for protection was to the duke's public platform. Between January and February 1414, for example, John insisted that the king and dauphin were being held captive by the Armagnacs. He claimed that the dauphin had begged him to march on Paris and release him, and had done this by writing three letters of request. John used the dauphin's letters as 'evidence' of the Armagnac's treason, and wrote several of his own letters to the *bonnes villes* before he took his army to Paris. He also sent letters after his siege of Paris had failed. The introduction to a letter written on 11 February 1414, reminded the towns of his reason for coming to Paris with his army, asserting that he had simply followed the dauphin's orders. He declared that he would persist in fighting the Armagnacs until they released the dauphin, and returned to their own territories. Additionally, he accused his adversaries of contravening the peace treaty that they had sworn to uphold at Pontoise (July 1413) by remaining in Paris in the first place.⁴⁷ Dramatising the issue further, he claimed that he would rather die than leave the king and dauphin in a state of confinement.⁴⁸ He expressed surprise that any loyal subject of the crown would allow the subjugation of the king and his heir to continue without resistance, and he reprimanded the Parisians in particular for refusing to open their gates to him. He concluded by asking for help from the *bonnes villes*, arguing that only those who supported his campaign were loyal servants of the king. Finally, he asserted that because he held the moral high ground in the conflict, God had chosen to support his cause over the

⁴⁷ The Peace of Pontoise was sworn on 26 August 1413, and published by a royal herald in Paris on 8 August. RSD, 5: 136-142; Bourgeois, pp. 34-35. See also Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 100-101.

⁴⁸ 'Nous ne nous departirons ne deporterons de nostre entrepinse; car nous ariesmes plus chier à mourir que de voir Monseigneur le Roy et Monseigneur d'Acquitaine ainsy estre demourez en servaige'. Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 297, n. 289. See also, Monstrelet, 2: 434-436.

Armagnac faction. For these reasons, he had already secured the help of several other *bonnes villes* in the realm.⁴⁹

This letter serves as an excellent example of ‘subversive disinformation’, because it was designed to obtain a reaction from audiences that would favour his cause: he hoped that they would join him in his campaign against the Armagnacs, who at that time had control of the royal government.⁵⁰ Additionally, the ‘legitimate’ information that Burgundy sought to use as the catalyst for agitation among the townspeople, was the alleged imprisonment of the dauphin. He thus created a deflative source of original information by insisting that the military campaign was the direct result of the dauphin’s written request for assistance, and not because he had come to Paris ‘pour quelque ambition ou concupiscence d’avoir administration ou gouvernement de ce Royaume’. Thus the dauphin’s letters became the ‘legitimate’ basis for his siege of Paris. Because the duke of Burgundy was, for all intents and purposes, laying siege to the king’s city of Paris against the king’s will, Burgundy was, effectively, committing lèse-majesty. Yet, because Burgundy used the dauphin’s alleged captivity as his declared cause for the campaign, he distanced himself from culpability. Portrayed as the victimised party, he asserted that he was wrongly castigated for obeying the dauphin. Far from being a traitor, he declared that his attempts to save the heir apparent from captivity proved the opposite.

Furthermore, the dramatic statement that he would rather die than see the king or dauphin oppressed was an effective declaration of his loyalty, and a firm challenge to his rivals that he would not back down. He used a similar tactic in the letter he wrote from Hesdin to the *bonnes villes* in April 1417, in which he declared that he was about to launch a military campaign to free the king from Armagnac control. According to the duke,

⁴⁹ ‘[C]ar a l’ayde de Dieu et du bon droit que nous avons en ceste querelle’. At this time, he did have garrisons in Compiègne, Soissons, Laon and several others.

⁵⁰ See chapter 1, pp. 16-18.

‘Monseigneur le Roy, sa noble génération leurs gens et officiers estoient tenus petitement’.⁵¹ He explained that, as a result of this and the many other atrocities the Armagnacs had committed, he was declaring war: ‘car nous vous promectrons par la foy et loyaulte que nous devons a Dieu, a mon dit seigneur, et a la chose publique de son royaume, que tout nostre entencion et voulente est d’empescher de tout nostre pouvoir que mon dit seigneur ne son royaume ne vienquerir a la destruction.’⁵² In a manner similar to the February 1414 letter, he hoped that the *bonnes villes* would believe that it was his utter devotion to the king and the realm that was his primary motivation for embarking on his military campaign(s).

His commitment to liberate the king from the control of the Armagnacs was reinforced in a subsequent series of letters that he sent to the *bonnes villes* in the autumn of 1417. When, for example, ambassadors were sent to Troyes in October 1417 to find out why the town had not responded to John the Fearless’ letter patent, the ambassadors insisted that they publish it, explaining that it was important because it was ‘la declaration du bon [...] affection qu’il a au bien du Roy’.⁵³ The letter patent to which his ambassadors referred, was likely the letter that had been drafted on 29 September 1417 and sent to the *bonnes villes*. Indeed, the strong introduction of this letter unambiguously explained that his intention was to make war on the Armagnacs and to protect the king and the realm.

Comme pour le bien de... monseigneur le Roy, à la conservation de sa seignourie et aussy pour la reparation de la chose publique de ce royaume qui par long espace de temps a esté moult desolée par la culppe de aucuns gens de petit estaz qui de leur auctorité... ont entrepris le gouvernement de la personne de mon seigneur le Roy et de tout son royaume... nous soyons mis sur le champs en armes en nostre compaignie tres grande quantité de seigneurs, barons, chevaliers et escuyers et autres gens de guerre en intention et ferme propos desditz gouverneurs dejectter et ouster dudit gouvernement pour eviter que par leur convoitise et ambition ledit royaume ne sois perdu...⁵⁴

⁵¹ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 248r.

⁵⁴ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fols. 254r-v. For this quote, see fol. 254r.

The duke of Burgundy's message was unequivocal here, where he insisted that he would fight the Armagnacs and all of their supporters with every ounce of strength, for the good of the king and the realm. Interestingly, he noted that it was the covetousness and ambition of the Armagnacs that would, if he did not intervene, lead the realm to ruin.

The insistent repetition of contrasting terminology between the duke of Burgundy and the Armagnacs was intended to impress upon the audiences the stark contrast between Burgundy's natural propensity to righteousness, and the duke of Orleans' and his successors' natural inclination to *convoitise*. This was also very clearly stated in the introduction to the later Burgundian text, the *Pastoralet*, where the author explained that, in order to produce an example of what to avoid in the future, he would narrate a tale about shepherds and shepherdesses who 'a bon droit les loiaux loe / Et les faulz desloiaux desloe'.⁵⁵ The dichotomy presented in the Burgundian literature was designed to associate certain ideas with the corresponding personality: John the Fearless with positive characteristics such as 'bon', 'loyal', 'noble'; Orleans and his allies with disparaging characteristics, such as 'convoitise', 'desloial', 'criminel' and 'tyrant'.⁵⁶

Moreover, there were many occasions where the duke of Burgundy claimed that his own personal cause against the Armagnacs was, in fact, the king's cause. Significantly, this occurred most frequently when he was officially branded as a traitor to the crown, between the autumn 1413 and spring 1418. The letters that he sent during this period defended his campaigns on the grounds that he was trying to liberate the king from the oppressive clutches of the Armagnacs. Therefore, he argued, loyal subjects of the king were required to surrender their support to him as well.⁵⁷ In the letter sent from St. Denis 11 February 1414 for example, he explicitly stated that his side in the quarrel with the Armagnacs was the virtuous side. He explained that those who were the king's loyal subjects should help

⁵⁵ *Pastoralet*, p. 39-40.

⁵⁶ 'Leonet, le loial, le vray / Le hardy plus que ne prouvay / Le bon, le franc et le nobly...' *Pastoralet*, p. 147.

⁵⁷ For example, in a letter dated 29 September 1417, he wrote: 'veillons savoir qui en ce seront amis de mondit seigneur le Roy et de nous...' BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 254r.

him, warning that those who did not would eventually be found guilty of treason.⁵⁸ He similarly used this tactic in the 25 April 1417 letter written at Hesdin, where he stated that he would achieve his end with the help of the king's loyal subjects. He threatened that he would advance on all those who didn't help him 'par voye hostile de feu et de sang', regardless of their social standing, because they were acting disloyally to the king.⁵⁹

Given that he claimed that his military campaigns of 1414 and that of 1417 were both to 'free' the king from the control of the Armagnacs, he could insist also that those who refused to help him were actually colluding with the king's real domestic enemies: the Armagnacs. Consequently, subjects such as these were as disloyal as the Armagnac princes, and were therefore traitors. This view was clearly expressed in the Hesdin letter:

Et pour ce vous prions, requérons et neantmoins tournons sur la loyauté et obeissance que [vous] devez a mon dit seigneur et a la chose publique de son royaume, et pour eviter le crime de lese majeste que vous et chacun de vous nous soiez aidans, conseillans et confortans a faire punir les destructeurs de la noble maison de France et coupables des faulsses traysons, meurdries, tirannies et empoisonnements dessus diz que tenus y estes selonc raison divine, naturelle et civile.⁶⁰

Threatening the towns in this way was a clever, if unoriginal, tactic. By calling the towns supporting his rivals his 'enemies' and hence, those of the king, he created a false legitimacy for any prospective sieges.

Furthermore, his 29 September 1417 letter made it clear that Burgundy's campaign would right the wrongs done by the Armagnac administration. To do this, he would replace any corrupt officers of the crown with his own reliable men, and in particular those involved in financial control. First he stated that he was giving the lord of Toulonjeon full plenary powers to act 'ou nom de mondit seigneur le Roy et de nous' to carry out a policy

⁵⁸ '[R]equierant à tous les bienveillans et loyaulx subjects, qu'ils nous veuillent aider et conforter et nous servir contre tous ceulx qui ainsy ont mis en dangier et servitude mondit seigneur d'Acquitaine, en eulx signifiant du fait contraire de en temps et en lieu accuser du fait contraire de desloyauté envers leur souverain Seigneur et de ce n'ayent point de doubte'. Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 297, n. 289.

⁵⁹ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

change in the towns in Champagne, Brie, Burgundy and ‘autres villes sujettes à mondit seigneur le Roy’, such as Sens, Auxerre, Langres, Lyon, Mâcon and others that continued to support ‘le parti des adversaries de mondit seigneur le Roy et de nous’ that is, the Armagnacs. To claim that his deeds would be executed in the king’s name was truly audacious, for it is clear that the duke of Burgundy did not have royal backing for this campaign. Nevertheless, Toulonjeon was instructed to operate in the following way:

De yceulx lieux et places veoir et visiter et a la garde et provision y mettre telle personne que bon luy semblera, de veoir les estats des receveurs et autres gens de finances, des deniers, des receptes de mondit seigneur le Roy tant du domaine comme des aydes, prendre et arrester et faire recevoir par telle personne qu’il verra estre expedient et necessaire de pouvoir oster et desapointer tous officiers quelsconques et en mettre et instituer autres en leurs lieux tells qu’il verra estre convenable et neccessaire pour le bien de la chose dessus dite.⁶¹

For a number of reasons it is significant that John stated his intention to control the outflow of royal finances on behalf of the king. First, camouflaged within this piece of rhetoric was his need for financial assistance, and likewise his desire to regain control of the central government. Second, it is very telling of the level of legitimacy that he wanted to impart to the *bonnes villes* to encourage them to join his side in the conflict. The reforms that he intended to implement in the name of the king were effectively attempts to authenticate his illegal campaign, and advance his ostensible devotion to the common good. This was obviously part of his other predominant propaganda theme, relating to good government, which focused primarily upon reform and anti-taxation.

3.2. GOOD GOVERNMENT

John’s consistent platform for reform is pivotal to our present study. On the façade, reform programmes were introduced for the public good. Logically then, it was an efficient political tool for the purpose of manipulating public favour. It was also an

⁶¹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 254v.

expedient means of criticising the government, without attacking the king himself. Indeed the above letter (29 September 1417) demonstrates how vital it was in currying public opinion. In the letter, John the Fearless explained that his military campaign was undertaken ‘pour le bien de... monseigneur le Roy, à la conservation de sa seignourie et aussy pour la reparation de la chose publique de ce royaulme’.⁶²

His ostensible devotion to the common good is equally evident in the other letters he wrote during the 1417 campaign. In the Hesdin letter (25 April 1417), he first discussed his enemies’ crimes against the king, the *chose publique*, and against himself in great detail. Here again, John explained that he had been victimised by the Armagnacs for his attempts to liberate the king and realm from excessive control. However, he added that he had taken comfort in knowing that throughout history people had suffered from similar persecution. He wrote: ‘Et en oultre poursuivrons la dicte reparation de ce royaume par nous commencee comme dit est le relevement du povre peuple qui tant est grevé et oppressé de subsides, aydes, impositions, tailles, gabelles, dixiemes, empruns, pilleries, roberies et autres exactions.’⁶³ He complemented this by claiming that he was ‘nez pour les homes aidier et conservez.’ Willing to sacrifice himself for the preservation of the *chose publique*, he was the epitome of the ‘good’ prince described in didactic treatises. Whilst Burgundy called the Armagnacs false traitors, rapists, and perjurers, he referred to himself and his partisans as men who ‘aymoient et aiment mondit Seigneur’.⁶⁴ Accordingly, Burgundy had sworn on his loyalty to God, the king and the *chose publique* to pursue his good intention to ‘empescher de tout nostre pouvoir que mon dit Seigneur ne son Royaume ne vienquerir a la destruction que noitoirement pourchassent lesdits traistres, destruisers, rapineurs et empoisonneurs et que punition raisonnables soit faictes.’

⁶² BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 254r.

⁶³ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

To distance himself from the tyranny of the Armagnacs, Burgundy further emphasised the dissimilarity between them and the Armagnacs. In his 8 October letter written at Montlhéry he accused the Armagnacs of establishing a ‘trez mauvais gouvernement’, whilst he insisted that his goal was to ‘perseverer, quelque chose qu’il nous puist advenir, affin que puissant cesser lesdits inconveniens, et que marchandises puist avoir cours, et le Royaulme soit gouvernez en justice en tant que pourrons, et ce avons ferme en nostre propos et intention pour acquitter nostre loyauté.’⁶⁵ The message was explicit: Burgundy’s primary aim was to re-establish justice and stability by removing the traitors from control of the government. He assured the people that he would restore the realm to its former glory and would personally ensure that the needs of the *bonnes villes* were looked after.

As early as August 1405 the duke tried to actively manufacture a public reputation for himself as the defender of the people. In his very first letter to the *bonnes villes* (19 August 1405), Burgundy explained that he had come to Paris not only to pay homage for his newly acquired lands, but because the king asked him to ‘pourveoir au bon gouvernement de son royaume.’⁶⁶ This he reiterated in his letter patent to the *bonnes villes* written 8 September, in response to Louis of Orleans’ attack, stating that his two reasons for coming to Paris were to pay homage to the king, and to ‘remonstrer l’estat de son royaume...et lui supplier que reparation y fust mise.’⁶⁷

So that he might achieve the level of authority in the government that he desired, it was essential that he eliminate Louis of Orleans. To accomplish this, it was most expedient to substantiate Louis’ ostensible corruption, whilst putting himself forward as a reformer prince. In this way, he would appear to be responding directly to the ‘clamour of the people’, and thus serve the *bien public*. Therefore, in his official complaint (26 September

⁶⁵ Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 307, n. 305.

⁶⁶ Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 1, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 396.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 2, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 409.

1405), he asked that changes be made in the administration of the government and the raising of taxes, so that all 'inconveniences' would be avoided for the king and his subjects. Here was an unambiguous criticism of Louis of Orleans' notorious nepotism with regard to the government.⁶⁸ The swiftness with which the remonstrance was presented to the royal council, and subsequently to the Parlement, suggests that it was intended to take Orleans off balance. Orleans, he hoped, would be unable to react swiftly enough.

Moreover, because the king was incapacitated by his mental illness, John portrayed himself as the man to fulfil the king's administrative responsibilities, a programme which corresponded to current theoretical trends. It is clear in his final statement where he declared that he would not leave Paris until the wellbeing of the king and the realm was assured, that he hoped to be taken seriously in his role as the faithful defender of the crown and of the *bien public*.⁶⁹

In actual fact, John did not leave the capital immediately. Instead, he retained a considerable army with him in Paris, to 'protect' the king and the citizens of the city. John the Fearless' *receveur général* in 1405, Jean Chousat, described the army as overwhelming, and explained that they were in Paris to help him while he waited to find out whether the royal government would implement the programme of reform that he and his brothers had recommended on 26 August.⁷⁰ Chousat's estimate of the size of Burgundy's army was 4500 'lances ou hommes d'armes, chevaliers et escuyers'. Although it seems rather unlikely that such a substantial army could be anything less than intimidating, Chousat's account records of that year explain that Burgundy's army was in Paris 'pour le bien du roy et de son royaume'.⁷¹ This account was, of course, written in this particular way to advance a

⁶⁸ Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 49-51; *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 166-168.

⁶⁹ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 403.

⁷⁰ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 54, fol. 99r; Monstrelet, 2: 108-114; RSD, 3: 306-308; *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 432-433.

⁷¹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 77v. See also Petit, *Itinéraires*, p. 580.

consistent view of the duke's endeavours in Paris at that time rather than to give an honest report of any problems that may have arisen from the mass assembly of men-at-arms.

As an additional support for his reform programme, John complemented his letter campaign and his armed 'protection' of Paris with his new badge: the carpenter's plane. With such a massive army surrounding Paris at this time, it is certain that John the Fearless' carpenter's planes would have been highly visible around the city. The carpenter's plane and the motto 'Ich houd' was a personal challenge to Louis of Orleans. The device intimated that he would plane down the knots on Orleans' stick, an image that doubtless represented his intention to strip Orleans' government of its corruption and vice. Its heraldic significance denoted judiciousness, prudence and moderation, and represented the desire of the bearer to 'conform all his actions to the laws of right and equity.'⁷² These qualities were naturally found in Saint Joseph, who was a carpenter by trade. Cynthia Hann explained that there was a surge in social and devotional interest in Joseph in the early fifteenth century, which had centred on his virtues as a conscientious provider for his family; he was a model of perfection.⁷³ Admired as Jesus' devoted and virtuous father, artistic works of the period began including Joseph hard at work in scenes with Mary and Jesus. The concept was not a new one. Saint Ambrose had commented extensively on Joseph, praising him as Jesus' earthly father, and made the direct connection between Joseph and God. As the 'artisan of all things', God trims men's souls by cutting off that which was worthless, or sinful, with his axe.⁷⁴

Ambrose's comparison between the earthly and divine artisan was influential, according to Hann, surfacing in a number of important patristic texts, including the *Glossa Ordinaria* for the Bible.⁷⁵ But for our purposes, the fact that Ambrose likened God to an

⁷² Cecil Wade, *The Symbolism of Heraldry* (London, 1898), p. 98.

⁷³ Cynthia Hann, 'Joseph will Perfect, Mary will Enlighten and Jesus Save Thee': the Holy Family as Marriage Mode in the Mérode Triptych', in *The Art Bulletin*, 68 (March 1986): 54-58.

⁷⁴ Hann, 'Joseph will Perfect', p. 58.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

‘artisan of the soul’, whose duty was to cut down the vices of the ‘unfruitful trees’, is exceedingly significant. There is a very clear parallel between this image and what John the Fearless’ plane expressed symbolically with regard to Louis of Orleans and his knotty club. Moreover, Joseph’s relationship to Jesus was not unlike John the Fearless’ relationship to the dauphin: both were father figures to two ‘princes’: one the prince of the French realm, the other the prince of mankind. John’s choice in badge therefore evoked an interesting parallel to Christ’s earthly father, particularly when we consider that the catalyst for this choice had been the issue of the alleged kidnapping of the dauphin. John used the incident to underscore his father-son relationship to the young dauphin, making direct references to it in his manifestoes and letters. Most intriguing is the inscription on the back of a cameo ring, similar to that which he gave to the dauphin circa 1412. It reads: *Veret filius Dei erat* (‘Truly he was the son of God’), and is accompanied by a carpenter’s plane (fig. 2).⁷⁶

Furthermore, early fifteenth-century imagery surrounding the Holy Family emphasised their humanity over their divinity, making them more accessible. Although blessed by God, Joseph was the head of a hard-working artisan family. This model was compatible with John’s own model; his carpenter’s plane conveyed his desire to associate himself with the artisanal orders of French society.⁷⁷ It suggested that rather than restricting himself to being the people’s advocate, he was, in a figurative sense one among them. It implied that he understood them, and would fight for their interests, by constructing a strong edifice of good government.

This argument is further corroborated by Burgundy’s adoption of corresponding badges to help develop his ‘rebuilding’ theme.⁷⁸ For the *étrennes* gift exchange on 1 January 1410, he adopted the carpenter’s level, which like the carpenter’s plane, was also a heraldic

⁷⁶ See *L’art à la cour de Bourgogne. Le mécénat de Philippe le Hardi et de Jean sans Peur (1364-1419)* (Paris, 2004), p. 134.

⁷⁷ This was the conclusion that Bertrand Schnerb also drew in *Jean sans Peur*, p. 519. For details on the level and the hammer as additional badges, see chapter 7 ‘Symbols’.

⁷⁸ Simona Slanička, *Krieg der Zeichen. Die visuelle Politik Johanns ohne Furcht und der armagnakisch-burgundische Bürgerkrieg* (Göttingen, 2002), pp. 170-173. Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 514-519.

symbol of equity and propriety, and represented the command of reason and justice over all deeds.⁷⁹ Thus John used this emblem to symbolise the restructuring that he would undertake within the government, and to emphasise the stability that he wished to re-establish within the realm.⁸⁰ According to Monstrelet the meaning behind the symbol was discernable:

Et lesdiz dons estoient en certaine significacion, car ilz estoient en semblance de ligne ou d'une rigle qu'on appelle nivel de maçon... Laquelle chose estoit en significacion, comme on povoit croire et penser, que ce qui estoit fait par aspre et indirecte voie, seroit aplanyé et mis à son reigle, et le feroit mectre et mectroit à droicte ligne.⁸¹

Here it is clear that this was an assertive emblem which explained that Burgundy would keep the king's subjects 'in line' and that those who did not conform to his reformatory programme, would suffer the consequences. Certainly this had been the case for Jean de Montaigu, the king's *grand maître de l'hôtel*, who had been executed in October 1409.⁸² Montaigu was arrested for his alleged embezzlement of royal funds, but when the allegations could not be proven, he was accused and convicted of conspiring with Louis of Orleans to murder the king. Many other royal officers and administrators were either fined, arrested, or decommissioned following Montaigu's execution, including the five *conseillers généraux de finances des aides*.⁸³ Monstrelet acknowledged this, explaining that 'ceulx qui estoient commis à la réformation devant dicte besongnoient soigneusement chascun jour, et tant y continuèrent que à plusieurs de ceulx qui avoient gouverné les finances furent recouvrez grans deniers.'⁸⁴

It is significant that John chose the mason's level as an additional emblem shortly after implementing his programme for reform in earnest because there was a clear

⁷⁹ Wade, *The Symbolisms of Heraldry*, p. 98.

⁸⁰ Denis Bruna, 'De l'agréable à l'utile: le bijou emblématique à la fin du Moyen Age', in *Revue Historique* 301, no. 609 (January-March 1999): 17; Slanička, *Krieg der Zeichen*, pp. 170-177; Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 518-519.

⁸¹ Monstrelet, 2: 57. See also BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 91r.

⁸² See Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 516; Farniglietti, *Royal intrigue*, p. 78.

⁸³ Rey, *Domaine du roy*, pp. 299-301.

⁸⁴ Monstrelet, 2: 59-50.

association between the two, which made its intended meaning more accessible. Thus we observe a conscious effort to choose emblems representative of his programme; these evoked a very specific message that was, doubtless, intelligible to audiences of all social standing. By taking first the plane, then the level, which he sometimes complemented with the hammer, the three building implements were ideal for communicating his plan for constructing a strong, virtuous government.⁸⁵ Additionally, the three tools also carried assertive undertones to those who would stand in John's way. It is doubtless true that John the Fearless knowingly chose these emblems for those reasons. The confirmation lies in the association between the badges and the actions Burgundy undertook concurrently. First, the plane and the knotty stick had a direct figurative relationship; this association was underscored in his declaration of Orleans' corruption and the need to implement reform. Second, we note a parallel comparison between the level and the number of arrests he had ordered, purportedly for the good of the king, and of the *bien public*.

An additional theme underpinning John's programme of good government related to establishing and defending the peace. This is explained by the fact that it was expected that the princes help the king maintain peace and implement justice in the realm; it was considered to be one of their primary obligations to the crown of France.⁸⁶ Given that this was such an entrenched expectation in the late medieval France, the duke of Burgundy underscored this obligation in the letters that he dispatched and published throughout the conflict. It became an additional way of justifying his course of action, especially when he had disobeyed a royal ordinance. For example, Burgundy's 1414 letter emphasised his intention to restore peace even though he was defending the siege he lay to the capital. He explained that there had been two reasons why he had driven his army to Paris: the first

⁸⁵ The hatchet may have referred to St. Joseph's axing of the 'unfruitful' and 'worthless' tree, freeing it of its vice. Ambrose of Milan cited in Hann, 'Joseph will perfect', p. 58.

⁸⁶ See for example Christine de Pizan's, 'Lament on the Evils of Civil War', in *The Epistle of the Prison of Human Life*, pp. 84-95 and Chartier's *Quadriologue Invectif*, p. 65.

was because the dauphin had requested his help; the second was to ‘exposer aucunes besongnes touchans le bien de paix et de tout ce royaume’.⁸⁷

After the Jargeau Manifesto was published in July, Burgundy insisted in his letter to the queen that he had never personally broken any of the peace treaties:

[J]e n’aye sceu aucune chose par quoy l’en me puisse noter que j’aye [re]quis voye de fait contre la paix et bien publique de ce royaume, pour laisser voye de traité, ainsy que mandé m’avez n’agueres par vos autres lettres, et que toujours depuis la paix de Chartres et traité de Vincestre [*sic*] ...⁸⁸

One of the reasons why it was so important that Burgundy insist he had not contravened either peace treaties was because Charles of Orleans and his brothers accused him of doing so. One example that the brothers gave was the forced confession Burgundy’s men had extracted from Jean de Montaigu through torture. His ‘confession’ had led to a guilty verdict for complicity in Louis of Orleans’ alleged plot to dethrone the king.⁸⁹ Montaigu’s unjust trial not only offended the Orleanist camp because he was one of theirs, but it was, effectively, public slander against Louis of Orleans. This was not in keeping with the negotiations for a peaceful settlement between the two factions. The princes of Orleans called the peace treaty of Chartres ‘nul et de nulle valeur’, and insisted that Burgundy’s pardon was ‘une chose delusoire et illusoire et a proprement parler une vraye derision et moquerie de justice.’⁹⁰

The importance of upholding peace treaties is also evident in publication of the amended version of the peace treaty of Arras, signed at Rouvres on 30 July 1415.⁹¹ Burgundy had this published widely so that all of his allies and vassals would swear to

⁸⁷ Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 297, n. 289. See also, Monstrelet 2: 434-436.

⁸⁸ Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 274-275, n. 274. Cited with only minor discrepancies in pp. 465-466.

⁸⁹ For these specific references, Plancher, p. 282; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 461. For the whole document, ADN, B 657 n. 15.183. For copies, see AN, K 56, n. 18.

⁹⁰ For the specific quotes, Plancher, p. 281; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 460.

⁹¹ For the original document John disseminated regarding the peace: ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34. See also BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fols. 173r-175r. For details on the negotiations leading to this treaty, Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 601; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 164.

uphold the agreement, including the count of Charolais. The letter emphasised that he himself had conformed to the king's desire to re-establish peace in his realm.

[Le Roy] veuillans les subgez relever, garder et preserver d'icelles oppressions, et desirans de tout son cuer ferme propos ou volonté faire cesser toutes voyes de fait, et en bon amour et union, soient doresnavant entre ses subgiez tellement...considerant le bien de paix qui est inestimable et les grans maux qui par guerre seront.⁹²

Although this letter provided a reflection of what the king willed regarding the re-establishment of peace, when Burgundy declared his agreement to it publicly he transmuted it into an element of his ideology. Crucially, however, this did not truly represent what was happening behind the scenes. The reality was that the duke of Burgundy had continuously challenged the treaty from the moment that his sister and brother had conceded to it on his behalf (4 September 1414). In fact, Burgundy even refused to agree to the Rouvres settlement, insisting that the five hundred banished Cabochiens' be pardoned by the king and re-admitted to the realm. Under pressure, the dauphin granted absolution on 31 August 1415 to all but forty-five on the list.⁹³ Yet John the Fearless remained unsatisfied, and continued to try to secure the pardon of all his remaining partisans. Obviously it would do Burgundy little good to publicise these surreptitious activities alongside the treaty, which were, for all intents and purposes, against that for which good government stood. Therefore, it was essential that Burgundy outwardly appear to be an obedient vassal of the king, one who complied to the king's desire to re-establish order and stability in the realm for the good of the people.

To ensure that his many political manoeuvres were not perceived as dubious it was important that John the Fearless distract the people from his many illegal decisions, such as the 1405 interception, the 1414 siege of Paris, or the 1417 military campaign. In order to accomplish this, he strongly emphasised his loyalty to the crown, and his fulfilment of his

⁹² ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34; BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fols. 173r-175r.

⁹³ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 512-513. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 204.

duty to the king and realm. John assumed an identity that made him the king's natural guardian. In this way, his professed devotion to the king legitimised his many military campaigns against the Orleanists, and was also an efficient way to contrast himself to his rivals. As a result, this theme was more likely to improve his *fama*. If this were the case, he would avoid resistance from the people of the realm, whilst effectively deprecating the reputation of the duke of Orleans and his successors.

CHAPTER 4

‘*DESLOIAULX TRAISTRES*’¹ LOUIS OF ORLEANS & THE ARMAGNACS

In the previous chapter we examined the duke of Burgundy’s positive profile as presented in the various media of propaganda, noting that his arguments fit into wider trends in fifteenth century thought and popular culture. In this chapter we will take a similar approach and consider the diverse media and universal ideological devices he implemented to examine how Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs were portrayed. We will disentangle the rhetorical complexities to assess how Burgundy attempted to construct a negative *fama* for the Orleans and the Armagnacs through his overt criticisms against them, by closely analysing the central themes that underscored this facet of his propaganda: tyranny, disloyalty and misgovernment.

4.1. TYRANNY

It is well known that the main argument advanced by Burgundy’s spokesman, master Jean Petit, in the *Justification* address (8 March 1408), held that John the Fearless had justly committed tyrannicide rather than homicide when he had ordered the assassination of Louis of Orleans.² This was the first overt Burgundian accusation of tyranny against John the Fearless’ rival. However, once Petit had set a precedent in this particular composition, claims for tyranny against Louis of Orleans persisted in Burgundian propaganda, featuring prominently in Burgundy’s various manifestoes, letters patent and close. They also appeared in texts written in honour of John the Fearless, such as the *Geste*

¹ John the Fearless’ propaganda frequently referred to his rivals as ‘desloiaulx traistres’ and ‘faulx traistres’. Petit, *Justification*, p. 206. See also his letter from 14 August 1411 in Monstrelet, 2: 160.

² Petit wrote: ‘Je dy que l’occision dudit tirant n’est point homicide, pour ce qu’elle fut juste et licite.’ *Justification*, p. 210. See below, chapter 5 ‘Burgundian Texts’. For a comprehensive analysis of the *Justification* consult Coville, *Jean Petit*. See also Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 194-199; Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 80-83; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 70-72.

des ducs de Bourgogne (1412-1420),³ and the *Pastoralet* (c.1422).⁴ Burgundy made similar claims against the Armagnac faction after Louis was killed. For example, in August 1411, shortly after Charles of Orleans and his brothers wrote and published the 'Jargeau manifesto' in which they openly challenged the duke of Burgundy and claimed his assassination of their father was unjust, Burgundy published a series of letters defending himself, which he sent to the *bonnes villes*.⁵ In one of these letters, written 14 August 1411, he claimed that Charles and his brothers were as treasonous as their father, insisting that, '[ils] sont venus et yssus de si faulx, mauvaise et desloial traistres comme a esté leur père, ainsi qu'il est tout notoire et commun par tout le royaume.'⁶ By likening the Orleans princes to their father and emphasising the 'false treason' of their House, Burgundy's letter marks his deliberate attempt to malign their reputations, whilst also reinforcing his original accusations of treason against their father. Jean Petit devoted much of his work in the *Justification* to explaining the concept of tyranny in relation to high treason against the king, which he synonymously called lèse-majesty. He frequently used the term 'tirant' alongside 'traistre' and the adjective 'desloial'.⁷ By conflating the nouns, they became mutually inclusive. This made the necessary bridge between the potential gaps in Petit's argument of a just tyrannicide, and established resolutely that Louis had the motive and intention to usurp the crown. Both tyranny and lèse-majesty were therefore central to the case against Orleans,

³ *Institut de Paris*, ms. 303. It was Kervin de Lettenhove, the only editor of the poem, who gave it its current name, the *Geste des ducs de Bourgogne*. According to him, the first instalment of this work was completed in 1412. However, there is a second manuscript of which he had no knowledge. It reveals that the narrative continued up to 1420, after John the Fearless' death in 1419. Consult Georges Doutrepont, *La littérature des ducs de Bourgogne*, rep. (Geneva, 1970), pp. 79-82.

⁴ BR, ms. 11064. The date for this anonymous allegory is also unknown. The catalogue of the 1967 exhibit of Philip the Good's library indicates that it was composed 'peu après 1422.' Joël Blanchard specified that it was written between 1423 and 1425, but admitted that no precise date can be given. Georges Dogaer and Marguerite Debae, *La librairie de Philippe le Bon. Exposition organisée à l'occasion du 500^e anniversaire de la mort du duc* (Brussels, 1967), p. 131. Blanchard, 'Introduction', in *Pastoralet*, pp. 25-28.

⁵ ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278v.

⁶ Monstrelet, 2: 161.

⁷ For example, 'La septiesme vérité ou cas dessusdit, est qu'il est licite à ung chascun subject, honorable et véritable, occire le tirant traistre dessus nommé et desloial à son Roy et souverain seigneur...' In a second example, Petit explained that anyone who used fire to appropriate the king's sovereign power and dominion for himself 'commet crime de lèse-majesté ou premier degré et est tirant, traistre et desloial à son Roy'. Petit, *Justification*, pp. 216-217, and 219 respectively.

and against his later Armagnac rivals. For the reason that Jean Petit's case against Louis of Orleans for tyranny was in many ways used as a foundation for later propaganda, it is imperative that we first analyse the portrait of Louis of Orleans as it was presented in the *Justification*.⁸

4.1.1. The *Justification* (1408)

Jean Petit incorporated the two traditional views of tyranny (*régitive* and *acquisitive*) in his work to argue that Louis of Orleans had attempted to acquire sovereign power illegitimately for his own profit, and secondly, that he was responsible for misgovernment and abuse of power in his legitimate capacity as a prince of royal blood. It was important that Petit base his arguments within the framework of both forms of tyranny because it was crucial to emphasise that it was Orleans' ambition and greed that had compelled him to attempt usurpation. Louis' *convoitise* was in effect the main thrust of Petit's entire work, because, as he explained as his first line of reasoning of the *Justification*, 'convoitise est de tous les maux la racine.'⁹ The fact that the king was not only Louis' sovereign lord but was his brother only helped to further vilify the prince. Petit underscored both betrayals to strip Orleans of morality, which, he hoped, would reinforce his argument that Orleans had a tyrannical spirit:

Loys naguères duc d'Orléans, fut tant embrasé de convoitise et honneurs vaines et richesses mondaines, c'est assavoir de obtenir pour soy et sa génération, et de toler et substraire pardevers lui la très haulte et très noble seigneurie de la couronne de France au Roy notre sire, qu'il machina et estudia par convoitise, barat et sortileges et malengins, pour destruire la personne du Roy de ses enfans et génération, en tant qu'il fut espris de tyrannie, convoitise et temtacion de l'ennemi d'enfer, que, comme tyran à son Roy et souverain seigneur, il commist crime de leze-majesté divine et humaine en toutes manières et degrez...¹⁰

⁸ For details on the extant manuscripts of this document see chapter 5 'Burgundian Texts'.

⁹ Petit, *Justification*, p. 185

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

Thus, according to Petit, it was clearly Louis' *convoitise* that had tempted him, causing him to be a 'tyrant to his king'. Moreover, it had led him to commit all the various forms of tyranny, those which Petit had outlined as the four degrees of corporal lèse-majesty, and the two degrees of divine lèse-majesty.¹¹

Petit also explained that if any man was proven to execute any of these high crimes of treason, they should be tried for it, even if it was done posthumously; if proven guilty, the person's lands, property and goods ought to be confiscated by the crown.¹² Therefore *Justification* was, effectively, an ideological trial in which Petit intended to prove Louis of Orleans' guilt of numerous crimes of high treason against the king and the common good. It was an approach used to validate his exceptionally aggressive attack on the duke of Orleans, for to accuse the king's brother of such serious offences was a rather precarious endeavour.

It was because the crimes of divine and corporal lèse-majesty were so severe that Petit's entire justification centred on the argument that it was morally permissible, and just, for any subject of the king to kill any person who had committed these crimes, even without the official permission of the king. He argued:

Il est licite à chascun subject, sans quelque mandement, selon les lois morales, naturelles et divines, de occire ou faire occire traistre desloial ou tirant, et non point tant seulement licite, mais honorable et méritoire, mesmement quant il est de si grant puissance que justice n'y peut estre faicte bonnement par le souverain.¹³

Having established that it was just to kill a tyrant in this, his first part of the work, the *sequitur major*, Petit's *sequitur minor* focused on providing specific examples of Orleans' tyranny as evidence of his attempts to usurp the throne. He divided Louis' conspiracies to kill the king into three distinct categories. First, he accused Louis of using 'maléfices,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 187-188.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

sortilèges et supersticion'; secondly, Louis had also used 'poisons, venins et intoxicacions'; and finally, he argued that Orleans had tried to kill the king 'par armes, eau, feu ou autres violentes injections'.¹⁴ These he tried to 'prove' by providing specific examples for each category of corporal lèse-majesty.

He argued that Orleans was directly responsible for the king's illness which he had contrived through sorcery: 'feu le criminel duc d'Orléans fut acteur des dessusdictes invocacions de dyables, supersticions, charmes, exoracions, sortilèges et maléfices.'¹⁵ Petit listed numerous incidences where Orleans had made use of black magic by summoning the devil, and attempting to use poison and charms to achieve his goals. In one of the tales, Orleans solicited the help of an apostate monk, a knight and an *escuier* so that he could 'parfaire les maléfices en la personne du Roy'.¹⁶

Poison was the second means by which Petit claimed Louis of Orleans attempted to slay the king and the royal family, though supposedly he only resorted to poison when his spells had proven unsuccessful.¹⁷ One story posits that Orleans had paid two individuals to poison the king.¹⁸ The two would not do the deed, so Louis of Orleans purportedly turned on them, accusing them publicly of conspiring to poison the king. According to Petit, he had done this so that he could save himself from reprisal. Feeling guilty perhaps, Orleans only later intervened on behalf of the two men: 'Et lors empescha l'exécution de justice, à fin que sa deslaulté ne feust decouverte'.¹⁹ Having saved the two from execution, Louis then sheltered them in his domains. This story was important because it contended that Louis' intervention was effectively a miscarriage of justice in addition to underscoring his betrayal of the king by scheming to murder him. Because the implementation of justice

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 225-226. See Jan. R. Veenstra, *Magic and Divination at the Courts of Burgundy and France. Text and Context of Laurens Pignon's 'Contre les devineurs (1411)'* (Leiden, 1998), pp. 59-67.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

was the most important duty of the king, Orleans' interference had prohibited its natural course. This in turn was demonstrative of his general lack of interest in good government.

Petit also alleged that Orleans had tried to poison the dauphin.²⁰ Interestingly, the poisoned apple story had already surfaced in 1396, when his wife Valentina Visconti was permanently exiled from Paris. According to the tale, in attempting to give the dauphin an apple she had tampered with, she inadvertently killed her own son.²¹ Moreover, as per popular rumour at this time, Valentina was also held accountable for the king's madness, which she had engineered through sorcery. However, the chronicler Michel Pintoin was adamant that these were merely malicious rumours.²² For our purpose, it is interesting that Louis was held responsible for this crime in the *Justification* whereas Valentina took the blame earlier, in 1396, and later, in the *Geste*.²³ Yet the discrepancies between the texts and the rumours simply highlight the improbability that any such event actually took place.²⁴ As a form of slander, the disparaging stories were tools with which Petit's *Justification* and the later Burgundian texts attacked both Louis of Orleans and his wife so that they would both be discredited for the texts' respective audiences.

The audiences had considerable bearing on who was held culpable for this incident. The audience of the *Justification* was considerably wider than the *Geste*, including the royal family, the high nobility, members of the University of Paris, and a great number of burgesses from the capital. Given that the main purpose of the former was to prove that Louis of Orleans was a tyrant who intended to usurp the crown, there is little wonder that the focus of the above anecdote was centred on his personal culpability in the alleged poisoning, excluding Valentina from the discussion entirely. Conversely, because there was not the same urgency in the *Geste*, there was room to return to the rumours of 1396. Blame

²⁰ Petit, *Justification*, p. 239.

²¹ Veenstra, *Magic and Divination*, pp. 81-85.

²² RSD, 2: 406.

²³ Lines 2128-2166, *Geste*, p. 322.

²⁴ See also Veenstra, *Magic and Divination*, p. 83; Emile Collas, *Valentine de Milan, duchesse d'Orléans* (Paris, 1911), pp. 219-227.

for the outbreak of civil war could be shared out between Louis of Orleans and his allies, Philippe de Mézières, Gian Galeazzo Visconti, and Valentina. It is true that Mézières and Visconti were maligned in Petit's *Justification* as well; Petit had, for example, called Mézières a 'faulx ypocrite..le propre ministre de la trahison'.²⁵ However, it was more important to spread the guilt between all of Louis' allies in the *Geste* because this text argued the alliance between Orleans, Mézières and Visconti was the root of the civil war: *Pourquoy la guerre esmut [...] / Mais tous ces fais vinrent par mauvaise alianche*.²⁶ In this way the evil conspiracy against which Burgundy fought was made even more perilous; Burgundy was, thus, made all the more heroic for his endeavours to protect the king. This literary device was inevitable considering that the main objective of an epic *chanson de geste*, such as our *Geste des ducs de Bourgogne*, was to praise the prowess, courage and loyalty of the protagonist.²⁷

According to Petit, the third way by which Louis had allegedly conspired to kill the king was by fire, at the infamous *Bal des Ardents* on the 28th January 1393.²⁸ At a party thrown at the Hôtel St-Pol, the king and princes decided to disguise themselves as wild men and dance around so that they could shock the ladies of the court. According to the perspective provided in the *Justification* and the later Burgundian texts, Orléans' ultimate plan was to kill the king at this moment; it was he who had suggested the costumes of hair in the first place, though he refused to wear one himself. Furthermore, he insisted upon leading the men into the ballroom holding a lit torch. The story goes that the men were suddenly, and without explanation, set on fire. Due to the swift reaction of the duchesses of Burgundy and of Berry, who enveloped the king in the skirts of their gowns, Charles VI

²⁵ Petit, *Justification*, p. 230.

²⁶ *Geste*, p.261.

²⁷ D'Arcy J.D. Boulton, *The Knights of the Crown. The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe 1325-1520* (Woodbridge, 1987), p. 7.

²⁸ For the Burgundian account of this event see Petit, *Justification*, pp. 233-234; *Geste*, pp. 273-277; *Livre des trahisons*, pp. 4-5. For the fifteenth-century chroniclers' perspective: RSD, 2: 64-70; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 390; Monstrelet, 2: 233-234. Finally, for scholarly analyses of this event, see Coville, *Jean Petit*, pp. 332-337, and Veenstra, *Magic and Divination*, pp. 89-95.

narrowly escaped death.²⁹ Others were not so lucky: the bastard of Foix, the count of Joigny, Aymerie of Poitiers and Huguet de Guisay were all burned alive.³⁰ Michel Pintoin explained that it was later discovered that Louis of Orleans was indeed responsible for the incident, but that it had been unintentional. Pintoin remarked that it was because of his rank that the duke was not punished for his grave blunder, but that he publicly sought forgiveness by founding a chapel at the Célestins' convent.³¹

It is significant that Jean Petit used this actual event in his text, because it offered a perfect opportunity to manipulate the 'true' facts to the prejudice of Louis of Orleans. This was crucial, for propaganda is always most effective when it is based in truth. Most of the nobility would have had some knowledge of this event, and Pintoin divulged that upon hearing the news many burgesses in Paris and in the surrounding area had gone immediately to the royal palace of Saint Pol to be sure that the king had survived the tragedy.³² Therefore Burgundy's spokesman must have recognised that here was an excellent opportunity to rehash the entire catastrophe for those who did remember it, whilst providing a biased version for those who did not. This was evidence that would categorically prove, he hoped, that Orleans was guilty of attempting to murder of the king.

Even though many did not believe Petit's arguments in the *Justification*, we know that it had a negative impact on Louis of Orleans' *fama*.³³ This is certain because it was one of the Orleanist camp's foremost complaints against John the Fearless thereafter. Indeed in his refutation, Cérisy referred to arguments made against Louis for divine and corporal lèse-majesty as a 'defamatory libel and full of lies... [designed] to forever tarnish his

²⁹ RSD, 2: 66; Petit, *Justification*, p. 233; *Geste*, pp. 273-275.

³⁰ RSD, 2: 66.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

³² RSD, 2: 70.

³³ Regarding the disbelief among many after the presentation, see RSD, 3: 764; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 445; and Monstrelet, 2: 244.

reputation and that of his family.³⁴ This was in effect Louis of Orleans' 'second murder'. Furthermore, Cérisy claimed that Burgundy's slanderous *Justification* was an even greater crime than ordering the 1407 assassination, because by defending a homicide in this way, Burgundy maintained his sin through his own obstinacy. He was, therefore, resisting God, who desired that all sinners seek forgiveness.³⁵ The Orleanist princes took the same line of reasoning as Cérisy in the 1411 manifesto written at Jargeau, in which they wrote of the duke of Burgundy:

[L]equel non content d'avoir une fois tué & meurtri si dampnablement son cousin germain, vostre seul frere, comme dit est, mais en perseverant en l'obstination de son tres desloyal, faux & mauvais courage, s'est efforcé de le tuer & meurtrir encores une autre fois; c'est assavoir de vouloir esteindre, damner & effacer entierement sa memoire & renommée par fausses mensonges & controuvées accusations, comme la Dieu grace, il vous est bien apparu notoirement et à tout le monde.³⁶

Not only did John the Fearless disregard these statements by tenaciously standing by his accusations, he reiterated them in his letters of response addressed to the king and to the *bonnes villes*. According to the Jouvenal compiler these letters were 'mal comburée et dirigée, et en effet se fondait sur la proposition de maistre Jean Petit.'³⁷

We can thus see that the accusations against Orleans for tyranny persisted well beyond the remit of the *Justification's* presentation in March 1408. In the autumn of that year, the queen, the duke of Berry and others who were sympathetic to the Orleanist cause took the king to Tours. Negotiations between their party and John the Fearless reveal that this group demanded that Burgundy give a public apology for Louis' assassination.³⁸ Predictably, John the Fearless refused. A similar situation arose just prior to the infamous

³⁴ 'Sed inde proponi fecit contra eudem libellum unum diffamatorium et mendacem, sibi imponendo crimina lese majestatis divine et temporalis, et ut famam suam et progeniei sue in perpetuum redderet denigrandum...' RSD, 4: 114.

³⁵ '[...] preleverando per obstinacionem mentis in peccato, et, ut scitis, qui defendit peccatum, resistit Deo, approbando id quod Deus odit.' RSD, 4: 114. Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 206-207.

³⁶ ADN, B 657 n. 15.183. For copies, see AN, K 56; Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 279, n. 277; and *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 458.

³⁷ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 464.

³⁸ Merlet, 'Biographie de Jean de Montagu', pp. 273-279.

‘Cabochien Uprising’ in 1413. It seems that Jean Jouvenal, lord of Traignel, then one of the king’s *procureurs* in the Parlement, approached the duke of Burgundy and asked him to admit his wrongdoing in the murder of the duke of Orleans so that the obvious tension in the capital would abate.³⁹ Again Burgundy flatly refused, claiming he had done nothing wrong.⁴⁰ After the devastation of the rebellion, Jean Gerson set upon having the *Justification* and the allegations of Orleans’ tyranny and lèse-majesty condemned by the papal see. This he accomplished at the Council of Constance in 1415.⁴¹

Notwithstanding these counter-attacks, Burgundy not only went unpunished for killing Louis of Orleans, he was also granted absolution from the king for Louis of Orleans’ assassination.⁴² His ostensible success provided fertile ground for the cultivation of later accusations of tyranny against his sons and their allies. Indeed Burgundy’s letters continued to emphasise that it was the Armagnac’s greed that had compelled them to act like tyrants. This is clear in the letters that Burgundy wrote during the course of the 1411 war, in which he routinely exaggerated the purpose of the Orleanists’ armed campaign. Whereas they were merely interested in pursuing the duke of Burgundy, the latter claimed that their intent was far more sinister. According to the Jouvenal compiler, Burgundy ‘faisoient entendre au peuple, et de faict escripvoient aux bonnes villes “qu’ils [les Armagnacs] vouloient faire un nouveau roy, et priver ses enfants de la couronne.”’⁴³ Similar statements were made during the 1417 campaign. In April 1417, he wrote to the *bonnes villes* from Hesdin, calling the Armagnacs ‘les destructeurs de la noble maison de France et coupables des faulsses traysons, meurdries, tirannies et empoisonnements dessudiz’, and insisting that the towns ‘chastier leur tyrannie, inhumanite, desloyaulte, fureur, cruaute, vanite et avarice.’⁴⁴

³⁹ *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 480-481.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 103v. For the letter of condemnation published in Paris by the archbishop: AN, K 58, nos. 8⁴⁵.

⁴² For the letter of absolution published in March 1408: ADN, B 656, n. 15.088; Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 254, n. 256. For that of March 1409 ACO, B 11892, no. 18 and 18bis; Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 256-258, n. 258.

⁴³ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 467.

⁴⁴ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

4.2. DISLOYALTY TO THE CROWN

We note, therefore, that in John the Fearless' propaganda, tyranny and treason to the king remained very closely linked, and were effectively interdependent. However, whereas the Burgundian concept of tyranny centred on the acquisition of power and the misgovernment of the realm, disloyalty was a far more general, yet still a severe offence, encompassing acts of treason, the disregard for feudal or natural obligations to the crown, and the mistreatment of the royal family. For example, 5 April 1412, during the height of the first conflict, a royal mandate was published in Charles VI's name, giving John the Fearless command over a substantial royal army. It also officially confiscated the lands of the Armagnac princes for their alleged treason. John was given this army so that he could help the king impose obedience on the Armagnacs:

Comme pour mettre à sujection et vraye obeissance, et reduire en nostre main et seigneurie, plusieurs villes, citez, terres, chasteaulx et forteresses que ont tenu et occupé, tiennent encore et occupent en nostre royaume Jehan nostre oncle, duc de Berry, Charles nostre nepveu d'Orleans, Jehan de Bourbon, Jehan d'Alençon, Charles de Lebret nos cousins, Bernard d'Armignac, et autres leurs adherans, alliez et complices, nos ennemis rebelles et desobeissans ...⁴⁵

It is clear that disloyalty to the crown carried its own self-determining significance in medieval political thought and practice. This was not a detail that the Burgundian propaganda machine overlooked.

Whereas John was represented as an intimate of the king, Orleans' wickedness was highlighted in the *Justification*, where Petit almost exclusively referred to him as 'le criminel duc d'Orléans'. Petit employed the expression at least fifteen times in the second part of his work. The repetition of this term was designed to negate Louis of Orleans' true identity as the king's only brother, the first prince of royal blood, by turning him into an anonymous traitor of the crown. He became a man devoid of any sense of duty, loyalty or personal

⁴⁵ Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 290-291, n. 285.

affection for Charles VI. Although Orleans was admired by the majority of his peers and considered to be very intelligent, eloquent and charming, the ‘criminal duke of Orleans’ from the *Justification* was a man whose only distinguishing characteristic was his treason.⁴⁶ This transmutation was possible for Petit because he had already proven how Louis had subverted his natural duties to the king. As a confirmed traitor, Orleans had forfeited his right to be mourned. Petit was unambiguous about the magnitude of Orleans treachery in his conclusion, where he encouraged the king not to despair over the loss of his brother, but instead to rejoice that the ‘criminel duc d’Orléans’ was punished for his evil scheme: ‘le Roy nostre sire ne doit pas tant seulement estre content, mais doit avoir mondit seigneur de Bourgongne et son fait pour agréable et le auctorizer en tant que mestier seroit.’⁴⁷

Repetitive language was an important instrument in sustaining Burgundy’s ideology. As ‘the root of all evil’ and mainspring of the civil war, *convoitise* was evoked recurrently. The same repetitive style was present in the Burgundian texts. For example, within only thirty lines of the *Geste* (lns. 15-45), ‘convoitise’, its cognates and derivatives are found seven times, while ‘hayne’ is evoked twice.⁴⁸ Other epithets such as ‘desloial traistre’ and ‘faulx traistres’ were repeated unremittingly throughout the texts. Additionally, Louis of Orleans and his allies are regularly called ‘fémons’ and ‘traîtres’, but they are also associated with an assortment of negative nouns or adjectives such as ‘convoitise’, ‘envie’, ‘hayne’, ‘mauvaise pensée’, ‘mauvais ceur’, ‘folie’, ‘faus’, and ‘diabolique’. Conversely, the duke of Burgundy was most frequently called ‘le bon duc Jehan’ or ‘le noble duc Jehan’, and predominantly associated with loyalty as a both a noun and an adjective.⁴⁹ In one example, the *Geste* compared Orleans’ ‘convoitise et folle pensée’ to ‘le bon duc Jehan [qui] a le loial

⁴⁶ For Louis’ reputation among his peers, see Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 143-144.

⁴⁷ Petit, *Justification*, p. 242.

⁴⁸ *Geste*, pp. 261-260.

⁴⁹ For example, ‘Dou noble duc Jehan qui par grant loyauté / Siévy le trache au père qui l’avoit engénéré’ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

pensée'.⁵⁰ Likewise: 'Le bon duc de Bourgogne au gentil cuer s'atant'⁵¹ was opposed to the 'mauvais cuers [que] en va tout déchevant!'

Likewise, the vocabulary, semantic constructions, and discursive stereotypes in a large number of Burgundy's letters effectively mirrored the *Justification de monseigneur de Bourgogne* and the later Burgundian texts. Indeed Burgundy faithfully labelled his rivals 'faulx traistres' or 'desloiaulx traistres'. In a letter written to the town of Châlons (likely Châlons-sur-Marne in Champaign) post-Agincourt, he described the Armagnacs' administration of the realm as 'dampnable gouvernement'.⁵² In the letter written at Hesdin in April 1417, he called his rivals 'faux traitres, seditieux, perjures, tyrans, meurtriers et rapineurs, dissipeurs et empoisonneurs', and blamed the decay of the *bien public* on their 'dampnable avarice et convoitise'.⁵³ Burgundy used the word 'rapineurs' eight times in this particular letter. Meanwhile, he associated himself only with terms of loyalty and fidelity, and claimed that he was embarking on a campaign to fight for the 'bien et conservation de son Roy et souverain seigneur'.⁵⁴

One of the more overt propaganda letters that Burgundy sent to the *bonnes villes* during his career was drafted on 14 August 1411.⁵⁵ The date is significant, because it was one month after the Orleanists published their 'Jargeau Manifesto' around the realm, and therefore also a month after the Orleans princes' letter of defiance to the duke of Burgundy. Burgundy had not responded to Charles and his brothers until 13 August, only one day before publishing this particular letter. In wider context, the document was dispatched after the king's initial mandate forbidding any of his subjects from arming in

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 337 and 338: line 2624 and 2655 respectively.

⁵² ACO, B 11895, layette 72. The date of the letter is missing entirely. The parts of the letter which are readable appear to refer back to the defeat at Agincourt, and the arrests of John the Fearless' ambassadors in Paris in late December 1415. It was, therefore, written after these two incidents.

⁵³ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ The letter to Amiens is transcribed in full in Monstrelet, 2: 159-161.

favour of any of the princes involved.⁵⁶ The letter began by acknowledging the king's mandate, which John followed with an explanation of how diligently both he and the king had worked to allay the hostility the duke of Orleans and his brothers for John:

[C]es faulx et desloiaulx traistres, rebelles et inobédiens, Charles, qui se dit duc d'Orléans, et ses frères, qui nous ont envoyé leurs défiances et qui, devant icelles, se sont plusieurs foiz efforcez desloialement et traistreusement contre leur serment, nous on diffamé, dommagé, et deshonnouré, et, tant de fait comme autrement, pourchacié.⁵⁷

This selection is critical for it demonstrates the semantic resonance of the 'faulx et desloiaulx traistres'. These deliberate repetitions corroded the receivers. It was a defamation tool – a hostile attempt to damage the *fama* of his opponents. Indeed the formation of a bad reputation was the result of commonly held knowledge of something relating to an individual; it could also be considered 'notoire', as was the case here.⁵⁸ The consequences of such public accusations is manifest also by Burgundy's own complaint in this letter that the Orleanist letter both defamed and dishonoured him. In legal terms, when slander was used for the purpose of damaging a reputation, it was considered to be a very serious crime. Therefore, retribution was generally condoned by society.⁵⁹ This might explain Amiens' agreement with the duke of Burgundy, who concluded the letter with the assertion that the king would not impede anyone from joining him so that he could 'garder nostre honneur et icelle maintenir et défendre avecques nosdiz subgetz.'⁶⁰ Monstrelet explained that the *bailli* of Amiens and other royal officers of the *bonnes villes* were happy to comply.⁶¹

Burgundy arranged to have royal support on this issue. On the 2 November 1411 a letter patent was published in the king's name which explained to the *bonnes villes* that John

⁵⁶ Monstrelet, 2: 159.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁵⁸ F.R.P. Akehurst, 'Good Name, Reputation, and Notoriety in French Customary Law', in *Fama*, p. 82. For an analysis of the term 'notoire' and its cognates, pp. 83-86.

⁵⁹ Akehurst, 'Good Name', pp. 86-87.

⁶⁰ Monstrelet, 2: 161.

⁶¹ 'Auxquelles lectres, Ferry de Hangest, qui lors estoit bailli d'Amiens, et tous autres qui avoient le gouvernement de la justice, furent très contens de favoriser et eulx encliner à la requeste dudit duc de Bourgogne.' Monstrelet, 2: 161.

the Fearless would lead an army against the Armagnacs, with the duke of Brittany's help.⁶² In this letter, the king explained that his 'treschier et tres amez cousin' would challenge the Armagnacs, to 'obvier et pourveoir a la male volenté et entreprinse de plusieurs de nostre sang et lignage'. After listing all the terrible atrocities they had, and continued to commit, including raping and pillaging the countryside, the king officially branded them 'rebelles et desobeissans'. Interestingly also, the Armagnacs' allies were referred to as 'complices', or 'adherents', whereas Burgundy's allies were named without the same prejudice as his 'compaignie', or his 'gens-d'armes et de trait'. This particular contrast highlighted the official permission that Burgundy had to assemble an army, while emphasising that those who helped the Armagnacs were accomplices to their treason.

Furthermore, on numerous occasions, royal letters issued by Charles VI while John the Fearless controlled the government frequently likened the rebel Armagnacs to enemies of the realm. Indeed this was the case with the royal letter discussed immediately above (2 November 1411). After giving a full description of the evil deeds that the Armagnacs had committed Charles VI claimed: 'encores ne cessent de comectre et perpetrer chascun jour sur nous et nosdiz subjez tous les maux que ennemis de nous et nostre di Royaume pourroient faire...'⁶³ In the same letter, Charles VI acknowledged Burgundy's 'grande loyauté et bonne amour'.⁶⁴

It was essential to rely so heavily on expressions such as 'tyrant', 'traitor', or 'treason' in official documents, such as royal or ducal letters patent, and also in the duke of Burgundy's *Justification* text because these were vehicles for the publication of 'white' propaganda; also known as 'empirical propaganda'. This term describes what a propagandist presents which would be perceived publicly as 'truth', or 'fact, but is

⁶² ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8. Plancher transcribed a letter that was also written by the king on 2 November 1411 but there are noticeable differences between the two. Plancher's is much longer, and makes no reference to the duke of Brittany's assistance. There were probably two separate letters written that day. See Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 277, n. 276.

⁶³ ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

surreptitiously designed to agitate recipients.⁶⁵ It is also a tool used to typecast the propagandist as a hero. By encouraging Charles VI to officially brand his rivals 'rebelles desobéissants', John was able to disassociate himself from the legitimate source of the information: the king and his royal council's official condemnation of the Armagnacs, as though he had no involvement. He could then appropriate this information for his own campaign and use it against the Armagnacs, thereby producing an image in which he was the protector of the king and his realm.

This is further evident in the royal council's decision to publish what was both a royal and ecclesiastical mandate excommunicating the Armagnacs and their supporters from the Church for having raised arms against the king.⁶⁶ It is important to note that Burgundy was in control of the royal council in 1411.⁶⁷ Therefore, although these were royal documents that were published, they were orchestrated by the duke of Burgundy and expressly served his propaganda. Burgundy altered facts; he disseminated 'disinformation'. Indeed we must not forget that when the Armagnacs published the manifesto in July 1411, they had restricted themselves to challenging the duke of Burgundy. Yet because Burgundy was able to manipulate the king and his royal council, he was able to gain royal sanction for his cause. The conflict had escalated from here, resulting in full-scale war.

In actual fact, Burgundy's initial reaction to Orleans' manifesto was rather weak. He wrote his own letters to the *bonnes villes* in which he simply restated what Petit had outlined in the *Justification*: he accused the late duke of Orleans of trying to usurp the throne, and suggested that Charles of Orleans and his brothers were intending to execute a similar plan to their father's: 'et pour ce que toy et tes dits freres ensuives la tres faulse et desloyalle et fellonie de vostre pere, cuidans venir aux dampnables et desloyaulx fins.'⁶⁸ Burgundy's letters did not originally have their desired effect, which partly explains why he was so

⁶⁵ Foulkes, *Literature and Propaganda*, p. 11.

⁶⁶ See chapter 8, 'Ceremonial Display'.

⁶⁷ See chapter 6, 'Letters', p.136.

⁶⁸ ADN, B 657, n. 15.183.

reliant upon producing royal documents in the autumn that would offer firm support for his ideological campaign. Moreover it suggests that John's successful attempt to get the king on his side was, in fact, part of the duke's organised strategy.

4.3. MISGOVERNMENT

4.3.1. Administration

After Philip the Bold died in April 1404, Louis of Orleans took over the governance of the realm with the help of the royal council, but he was an exceptionally unpopular leader with the people because of his alleged dishonesty. According to Bertrand Schnerb, Orleans looked after his own men very well, and placed many of his clients and adherents in high positions within the royal administration between 1392-1407.⁶⁹

For this reason, the duke of Burgundy's letter campaign in August and September 1405 focused on criticising Louis of Orleans openly for mishandling the government and included a list of reforms that were presented to the Parlement, which he hoped would be implemented immediately. He explained to the king and royal council that currently the state of the king and his government was a disgrace to the royal dignity. Therefore he would expose 'les choses qui se font au dommage de vous et de vostre royaume.'⁷⁰ The list of suggested reforms that John's spokesman, Jean de Nielles, presented on behalf of him and his younger brothers to the Parlement (26 August 1405) is an excellent example of John's propaganda in action.⁷¹ The document was structured according to the four points that the duke of Burgundy and his brothers claimed were threatening the king's sovereignty and the welfare of the realm: the flagrant neglect of the king; an acute failing of justice in the realm; the diminution of the royal demesne; and the negative effects of the current

⁶⁹ Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 49-51.

⁷⁰ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 400.

⁷¹ Jean de Nielles later became the duke of Guyenne's chancellor in December 1409. See Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 81.

government on the common good.⁷² As pieces of rhetoric, these four premises are very interesting because they touched on the major concerns of political theorists and moralists, in regards to the theories on good government. First, the royal dignity and the inalienability of the royal demesne were exceedingly vital to the preservation of the crown and issues of sovereignty. Moreover, because the king was still expected, in theory, to live off his domains alone, it was imperative that he not compromise his revenue by partitioning his lands.

The administration of justice was vital to the preservation of the common weal, and was therefore the primary responsibility of the royal government. For this reason, it was one of the principal concerns of the *bonnes villes*.⁷³ According to this particular reform document the French realm's reputation for the preservation of justice had, hitherto, been unsurpassed.⁷⁴ Yet according to the Burgundian princes: 'Or va il au present tout autrement, et communement à ceulx qui les procurent à y mettre non mie à vous mais contre vous, dont voz droiz et revenues sont moult fortement diminuées.'⁷⁵

Developed 'au regart des gens d'église, nobles, et peuple de vostre royaume', Burgundy's fourth and final article centred on the abstract notion of the common good. Unsurprisingly, Burgundy claimed that the lack of justice and the manner by which the government was administering the realm was destroying the people. He argued that officers of justice and men-at-arms alike oppressed the realm's churchmen by stealing their victuals. The lesser nobles and gentry classes were equally demoralized, he maintained, because they were constantly called to arms 'soubz umbre de vostre guerre'.⁷⁶ Regarding the remaining people of the realm, Burgundy further claimed 'il est tout cler et nottoire qu'il va presque

⁷² AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 399-403.

⁷³ '[E]lles [les bonnes villes] veulent un roi qui fasse son office comme gardien de la paix et défenseur du royaume.' Chevalier, *Les bonnes villes*, p. 95.

⁷⁴ '[V]ostre justice, de laquele ou temps passé vostre royaume a esté sur tous les autres le mieux renommé', AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 189, cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, p. 401.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

tout à destruction', because the people were overworked and exploited by the king's own officers. According to the duke, men-at-arms had occupied a presence in the countryside under the smokescreen of war for too long, adding that God would surely become enraged if something was not done to end their false occupation.⁷⁷

On war, Burgundy's remonstrance argued that the conflict with the English persisted because 'on ne met aucun remede souffisant'. While the English attacked the coast of the realm, 'moult de vaillans gens marchans et autres sont destruiz et desheritez'. Additionally, he described what he called 'irreparable damages' in Picardy, Flanders, Normandy, Brittany and Aquitaine. Naturally Burgundy emphasised the current economic uncertainty so that it would stand as a clear example of how the common good was compromised, arguing that the current government was wholly unable to safeguard the realm adequately, or administer finances equitably. Therefore, Burgundy blamed the ongoing war on the fact that the *aides*, taxes, and subsidies that had been raised were being diverted to alternative ends. Yet these forms of income 'devroient estre converties en vostre guerre et non autre part'.⁷⁸ Although there was no conjecture as to where the money was diverted, the clear implication was that the duke of Orleans had appropriated it; he had, after all, been the one to suggest the supplemental taxes between 1402 and 1405.⁷⁹ This was a very important point for his case against Louis of Orleans because it demonstrated the latter's refusal to govern morally and in accordance with established political principles. It was universally agreed that the crown should keep the revenue it raised for the royal coffers separate from that which it raised for the public domain in the form of *aides* and *impôts*. These were to be used strictly for the good of the realm, such as in the defence and protection of the king's subjects. Thus John's letter of recommendation concluded by stating that if the money was not used for the proper reasons 'great

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Jarry, *La vie politique de Louis de France*, pp. 324-325; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 30-31; Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 171-172; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 39-46.

inconveniences' would naturally result from the rumours which were circulating at that time. He insisted that the king call upon properly elected and 'non-suspect' officials to help him administer to the realm, and closed the letter stating that he and his brothers would remain in Paris until 'le bien de vous, vostre generacion et de vostre royaume n'y soit avant pourveu.'⁸⁰ This early request for reform was, and remains, a very significant document from John the Fearless' propaganda campaign. It is important because as the first public criticism of Louis of Orleans, it was very influential in setting the tone of future propaganda, thereby helping to construct the Burgundian conceptual framework within which the ideology would operate over the course of the following decade.

The claim against Louis of Orleans for misgoverning the realm gained momentum in Jean Petit's *Justification*, where his corruption became another example of his multifaceted tyranny. Indeed under Petit's interpretation of lèse-majesty, misgovernment was the final degree of corporal treason. Whoever was found to commit the four degrees of corporal treason and the two degrees of divine treason was ultimately a tyrant. Tyrannical government was in all ways the direct opposite of good government, as a 'good' prince made decisions with the public good in mind, and demonstrated that he actually cared about the people.⁸¹ Therefore when Jean Petit justified Burgundy's killing of Louis of Orleans, he claimed that Louis had been a tyrant, declaring that the assassination was 'perpétré pour le très grant bien de la personne du Roy, de ses enfans et de tout le royaume'.⁸²

The importance of tyranny as the absolute opposite of a good prince who fulfils his duty to the common good is now clear.⁸³ To compare these two models of government effectively, Christine de Pizan frequently employed pastoral imagery.⁸⁴ In the *Body Politic*

⁸⁰ AN, X^{1a} 8602, fols. 189, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, p. 403.

⁸¹ Quillet, *Tyrannie et Tyrannicide*, p. 149.

⁸² *Geste*, p. 181.

⁸³ Chapter 2 'Political Theory', pp. 32-34.

⁸⁴ Pizan, *Livre de la paix*, pp. 68-69.

(1407), she explained that the nobles were responsible for protecting the people from their enemies, just as shepherds would protect their sheep.⁸⁵ The pastoral allegory was effective in defining the theoretical role of the prince as regards his subjects, because there was, in point of fact, a recurrence of wolf attacks on cattle, and wolves thus posed a general threat to the king's subjects during the period under discussion.⁸⁶ Therefore, it was genuinely expected that, for the sake of the common good, princes would resolve this problem by organising large wolf hunts.⁸⁷ Accordingly, John the Fearless was an avid hunter of the animal.⁸⁸ However, he also recognised the allegorical expediency of this type of activity, and used it in his long conflict with the house of Orleans and their allies. The frontispiece of the illuminated versions of the *Justification* featured the courageous lion of Flanders killing the wolf of Orleans, because the latter had attempted to steal the crown of the *fleurs-de-llys* (fig. 7). It was equally present in the *Geste*, and most obviously in the *Pastoralet*.⁸⁹

In the *Pastoralet* the Armagnac faction was known as the 'Lupalois'. This name was a direct reference to Louis of Orleans, which the author used to call attention to the tight bond between the duke of Orleans and his 'successors' – the league of princes that had grouped around Charles of Orleans and his father-in-law (Bernard of Armagnac). According to the text the Armagnacs were, effectively, the wolves lurking among the herd that Pizan had been concerned with in the *Livre de la paix*.⁹⁰ If in theory and practice it was the princes' duty to protect the sheep from wolves and other similar enemies, by reversing this trope the Lupalois became the very enemies that they should have been fighting. It was

⁸⁵ Pizan, *Body Politic*, pp. 16-18.

⁸⁶ 'Les loups représentaient, au début du XV^e siècle, l'animal nuisible par excellence. Leurs hurlements nocturnes, qui causaient l'effroi... Leur pullulement, dans un période marquée par l'extension des friches et des bois, les ravages qu'ils causaient aux troupeaux et au gibier et le danger réel qu'ils représentaient pour l'homme constituaient les vrais motifs de la peur et de la haine suscitées par cet animal et étaient autant de raisons d'organiser des campagnes de destruction systématique.' Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 478-479.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 480-481. The wolf was one of Louis of Orleans' main badges. Colette Beaune, 'Costume et pouvoir en France à la fin du Moyen Âge: les devises royales vers 1400', in *Revue des Sciences Humaines*, 55 (1981): 144.

⁹⁰ '[L]e tyran est comme le loup ravissable entre les brebis' in Pizan, *Livre de la paix*, p. 143.

an efficient way to show how tyrannical the Armagnac rule truly was, and how much damage the countryside had sustained because of them.

The *Pastoralet* did not hesitate to develop the allegory further. When describing the devastation that the Lupalois imposed on the countryside during their war, the author accused the Lupalois shepherds of actually being wolves:

Car, pour vous vray dire, a ce tour
Ja deviennent loup ly pastour;
Et plusours pillent la proie [...]
– Ce sont les bestes portans laine –⁹¹

To accuse the Armagnacs of being ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’ was a severe indictment of their behaviour, one that the author used to epitomise their wickedness. Although they were the nobility of France, they had essentially shown themselves her enemies by their incessant warmongering and the devastation it caused in the realm. The consequence of their unremitting pursuit against the Burgundians was that the Armagnacs’ ‘prey’ had effectively become the king’s own subjects.

Although the *Pastoralet* was posterior to the period under examination, it is nonetheless valuable because it was the product of a natural rhetorical progression in the Burgundian propaganda. One observes, for example, similarities between the devastation of the herd in the *Pastoralet* and a number of letters and manifestoes sent by Burgundy to the *bonnes villes*. In the letter sent on 8 October 1417 to the *bonnes villes*, the duke of Burgundy focused exclusively on the Armagnacs’ ‘evil government’. Echoing the 26 August 1405 remonstration for reform, he declared that although justice had always been practiced diligently in the realm, at present it was being utterly neglected.⁹² Throughout the document he accused the Armagnacs of abusing their power and sending the realm to its ruin.

Les dessusdits gouverneurs l’ont gouverné a leur
plaisir...tellement que leur ambition et convoitise a esté cause
de la perdition des dominations que mondit seigneur a perdu et
perd chascun jour, de la destruction des nobles morts et

⁹¹ *Pastoralet*, p. 117.

⁹² Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 307, n. 305.

destruits par les anciens ennemis de ce royaume, et avec ce des
grands finances sans nombre levees par yceulx gouverneurs en
ce royaume, dont tous les bons sujets de mondit seigneur, les
nobles, le clergé, les bourgeois et le commun peuple de ce
royaume, sont a peu prez tous deserts et destruits.⁹³

Here was a clear reference to the crushing defeat at Agincourt. The outcome of this battle had caused great humiliation for the French realm, and had also left it vulnerable to the English advances in the northern regions of France. In particular, Normandy, Picardy, and Champagne were under serious threat.⁹⁴ Yet the king, under Armagnac influence, had prohibited John the Fearless from participating in the battle, providing Burgundy with the ideal opportunity to use the defeat to his ideological advantage.⁹⁵ He accused the Armagnacs of mishandling the *aides* that they had raised for the purpose of war, which had consequently led to the death or captivity of many nobles, and the financial ruin of the king's loyal subjects. This, Burgundy implied, was evidence of the Armagnacs' excessive avarice and self-interest at the expense of the common good. It was an expedient accusation to make, because *aides* were indeed raised for the war against the English. Therefore John the Fearless recognised the opportunity to convince the *bonnes villes* that it was the misuse of royal funds, rather than what was essentially an ineffectual combat strategy, that was the cause of the devastating loss. This struck at the very heart of the common good. Any regime that did not raise and use taxes morally or defend the peace adequately was tyrannical by its very nature.

Furthermore, Burgundy accused his enemies of openly despising the people of the realm. After explaining that he had tried to intervene on several occasions to put an end to the 'inconveniences' that the Armagnac government notoriously caused in the realm, he

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War* (Basingstoke, 1993), pp. 94-102; Curry, 'Henry V's Conquest of Normandy 1417-1419: The Siege of Rouen in Context[o]', in *XXXI Semana des Estudios Medievales, 18 a 22 de Julio de 2004* (Pamplona, 2005): 237-254. See also Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, 617-623.

⁹⁵ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 619-621. Juvenal transcribed a letter from John to the king in which he declared that he was offended that he was not asked to go to war against the English because the peace with Orleans was still too fresh. He explained that 'je n'ay pas intention de laisser perdre vostre seigneurie, là ou je pourray loyaument employer mon service.' *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 510-512.

alleged that the Armagnacs 's'efforcèrent de continuer les dessusdits gouverneurs en leur mauvaise gouvernez, pour toudis plus destruire et anihiller les pouvres subgets de mondit seigneur contre lesquels ja pieça ils ont conceu hayne mortelle pour ce qu'ils scevent bien que leur desplait et mauvais gouverneurs, perditions et destructions par eulx advenues et qui adviennent chascun jour en ce Royaulme.'⁹⁶ It is significant that Burgundy accused his enemies of having 'mortal hatred' for the people of the realm because it declared that the Armagnacs were more than indifferent to the common good: they were overtly hostile to it. In an attempt to make it sound plausible, he argued that the Armagnacs were aware that the people were unhappy, yet they continued governing as they always had. Their blatant disregard for the welfare of the people was thus self-evident.

Here we note that the duke of Burgundy shrewdly manipulated 'truth' to serve his own purpose. It was a categorical fact that the realm had faced a disgraceful defeat at Agincourt, and that many in the realm were displeased with the loss of life and valuable revenues raised through endless taxes.⁹⁷ John seems to have recognised that successful propaganda must be convincing for the intended audience to receive it willingly; it must, therefore, rely to some degree on reality.⁹⁸ If the common feeling among a great number of people truly held that the Armagnacs were not governing the royal finances equitably, Burgundy's claims were clearly prescient accusations to articulate at this time of uncertainty, a period when the English army was such a threat to the peace and security of the realm. Because of this, the king's subjects had a vested interest in how the *aides* they gave for war were being used.

His concentration on this issue is further evident in the Hesdin letter, where Burgundy wrote: 'Nous avons trouvé la disposition de la noble chose publique de ce dit

⁹⁶ Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 307, n. 305.

⁹⁷ All the chroniclers, even those who were sympathetic to the Armagnac party, attested to the excessive taxes, and the general displeasure among the people of the realm from 1414-1418. For example, *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 505, 531.

⁹⁸ Taithe and Thornton, 'Propaganda', pp. 1-2; Cunningham, *The Idea of Propaganda*, pp. 13, 24, 50.

royaume dissipée et depouillée par gens de petit estat incogneuz es lignage qui nous entendu que a eux allier et ensemble par maniere de monopole puiser en appert et occultement par voyes innumberables les finances de la dicte chose publique”⁹⁹ Once again the duke chastised the Armagnac government for allegedly raising excessive ‘tailles, emprunts et autres exactions’ without putting any of the money that they had raised back into the defence of the realm. John the Fearless focused on taxes and *aides* frequently because this was something tangible which had a direct bearing on the well being of the king’s subjects. If Burgundy was to really seize their attention and maintain it in his propaganda, he had to ensure that it was not simply abstract rhetoric, but had meaning to his audience’s lives.

This is also why his propaganda concentrated on the implementation of justice, arguing for the forceful ejection of ‘evil counsellors’ and corrupt officials from the king’s entourage and government. Thus the execution of Jean de Montaigu in 1409 and prominent Armagnacs in 1413 reflected the duke of Burgundy’s ideological agenda, and the message that he had conveyed to his partisans as far back as 1408, when he had attempted to publicly justify his assassination of the duke of Orleans. Indeed John the Fearless alleged that Montaigu had participated in the conspiracy to bring about the king’s demise. One finds that the *Geste* later incorporated Montaigu’s alleged complicity in its long tale of Armagnac greed and corruption.¹⁰⁰ Even though Montaigu was rather notorious for his ostentatious lifestyle, the execution was nonetheless contentious, and was consequently not well received at street level, or within the courtly circle.¹⁰¹ It was therefore necessary to validate the duke of Burgundy’s decision to put Montaigu to death by vilifying him ruthlessly in the literature.

⁹⁹ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

¹⁰⁰ *Geste*, pp. 362-370.

¹⁰¹ RSD, 4: 274.

4.3.2. Enemies of Peace

In addition to wickedly over-taxing the people for their own selfish needs, Louis of Orleans and the Armagnacs were equally accused of physically destroying the realm by allowing their armies to devastate the countryside, a common trope for fifteenth-century discussion on war. In Petit's *Justification*, he alleged that Orleans' men-at-arms had despoiled the land, raped women and murdered innocent peasants:

[Il] a tenu les gens d'armes sur les champs en ce royaume par l'espace de quatorze ou quinze ans, qui ne faisoient autre chose que menger et exiller le povre peuple, piller, robber, raençonner, occire, tuer, et prendre femmes à force; et mectoit capitaines ès fortresses, pons et passages de ce royaume, pour parvenir à sa faulse et dampnable entencion, c'estassavoir usurper la seigneurie du royaume.¹⁰²

Likewise, the royal ordinance of 2 November 1411, which Burgundy orchestrated, claimed that the Armagnac princes were increasing their army daily, and subjecting his people to countless evil deeds.¹⁰³ They had allegedly destroyed various churches, pillaged, killed and murdered innocent people, ransomed the king's men, kidnapped women, raped virgins and generally committed all the common evil deeds that enemies of the realm would commit.¹⁰⁴

Whether or not there was some truth to the claims that Orleans' soldiers had robbed, pillaged and raped the land and people, we must be aware that this was a common stereotype – part of the standard discourse of war. Indeed it is found in a broad range of texts of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, and in particular during the Hundred Years War.¹⁰⁵ Chroniclers, such as the Jouvenal compiler, used it indiscriminately when referring to armies of all allegiances: English, Orleanist/Armagnac and also Burgundian.¹⁰⁶ Gauvard has insisted that these stereotypes were based in truth, but that they were a means of

¹⁰² Petit, *Justification*, p. 16.

¹⁰³ ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 8.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Gauvard, 'Rumeur et stéréotypes à la fin du moyen âge', in *La circulation des nouvelles au moyen âge. Actes du XXIV^e Congrès de la S.H.M.E.S. (Avignon, juin 1993)* (Paris, 1994), p. 160.

¹⁰⁶ Compare his descriptions of the newly-formed League of Gien in the summer of 1410 and John the Fearless' army in 1417. *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 455, and 533 respectively.

creating a clearer image of war based on the collective memory. They often 'correspond to the specific needs of the people', because it was, effectively, a reflection of the values that the community held dear.¹⁰⁷

Burgundy's propaganda is replete with this literary device because it was such an effective and familiar convention. There can be little doubt that he was fully aware that this particular issue was one of the dominant concerns of the people of the realm. The French countryside had truly experienced great destruction at the hands of marauding soldiers over the course of the Hundred Years War.¹⁰⁸ Yet Burgundy's army was equally vile. Even Monstrelet agreed that it was as guilty of destruction as the Orleanist one: 'Si fut pour ce temps faicte très grant assemblée ou royaume de France, tant d'un parti comme d'autre, ou prejudice du povre peuple.'¹⁰⁹ Yet despite his own blameworthiness, he continued to try to deflect any responsibility from himself. According to Burgundy, the Armagnacs were the warmongers. He maintained that he had never imposed upon the people of the realm with his army, and claimed that his army had always paid their own way.¹¹⁰ Once again, it is clear that Burgundy used 'empirical' or 'white' propaganda, continuing to manipulate truths for his own personal gain: there is little doubt that various armies were indeed terrorizing the king's subjects.

Furthermore, when Burgundian propaganda, such as Jean Petit's *Justification*, employed the standard war stereotype in his attack on Orleans, it did so to put a face to an existing problem, and try to show its audience that this was one part of Orleans' ultimate plan to destroy the king and the realm. This was because the destruction of the realm was

¹⁰⁷ Gauvard, 'Rumeurs et stéréotypes', p. 160.

¹⁰⁸ Allmand, 'War and the Non-Combatant', in *Medieval Warfare. A History* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 253-272. Allmand, 'Changing Views of the Soldier in Late Medieval France', in *Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIV^e-XV^e siècle*, eds. Philippe Contamine, Charles Giry-Deloison and Maurice Keen (Lille, 1991), pp. 171-188.

¹⁰⁹ Monstrelet, 2: 79. See also p. 89.

¹¹⁰ For example, the letter written at Lille the 11 March 1414 reads: 'Et ja soit ce que en faisant le dit voyage, ne a laler ne au retourner <nous> en entretenant nostre dicte entencion et volente naions meu ne fait guerre a personne quelconque ancois sommes paisiblement aler et repassez en paiant noz despens en chemin senz meffaire.' ADN, B 658, n. 15.253r.

corporal treason of the fourth degree, and was therefore an important element of Petit's version of tyranny. Attacks on the public good were, allegedly, the worst crimes that the public experienced at the hands of Louis of Orleans and his successors. It was, consequently, a very useful convention to employ.

Burgundy used a second strategy to expose his enemies' ostensible disregard for the common good during the war: he highlighted the number of peace treaties that they had allegedly transgressed. For example, in 1417 he explained that '*lesdiz rapineurs et empoisonneurs ne veulent entendre par effect a la dicte paix ne prendre pitié du peuple de France qui incessamment en mis a desercion a l'occasion des debats dessudiz, moult maligne, maleureuse et indigne est leur nature qui ne veult que mal et division et qui a enfraint six traicties de paix solennellement jurés c'en scavoit de Chartres, Vincestre, Auxerre, Pontoise, Arras, et Rouvres en Bourgogne*'¹¹¹ The comparison Burgundy created between himself and his rivals in terms of their disregard for peace treaties was also included in his Lille letter (11 March 1414). First, Burgundy cited the previous group of letters he had sent to the '*citez et bonnes villes de ce royaume*', in which he had previously justified his siege to Paris. The Lille letter insisted that in going to Paris, John had intended to put an end to the '*tres mauvais exemple*' of his adversaries, through whom '*tant de maulz sont taillié d'en ensievir a la destruction du dit roiaulme et du peuple d'icellui*'.¹¹² Once again, he admitted to bringing his army to Paris, but insisted that it had never pillaged or stolen from the people. His adversaries had, however, turned '*notoirement contre la dicte paix et les sermons et promesses pour faire guerre et mettre division ou dit roiaulme a la destruction d'icellui et pour empescher le fait de la marchandise laquelle se fait ou profit commun de la chose publique*'.¹¹³

¹¹¹ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

¹¹² ADN, B 658, n. 15.253.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

Because the aristocracy, and the royal princes in particular, were expected to help the king maintain peace, if they did the opposite by arming themselves, or making war contrary to the king's explicit orders, they would compromise their feudal obligation to their lord. This in turn compromised their honour. Consequently, the king's letter patent written 1 March 1412 castigated the Orleanist princes for aiding the English.¹¹⁴ This alliance was analogous to breaking any internal peace treaties. Yet to claim that such an alliance existed was a long-held accusation of the Burgundian camp. Jean Petit's *Justification* claimed that Orleans had embezzled the money for himself to share with the English army.¹¹⁵ By accusing Orleans of such a perfidious relationship, Petit implied that he was as much an enemy of the realm as the 'ancien ennemi du royaume'.

This theme was pursued in later Burgundian propaganda, as it was very effective in highlighting the Armagnac tendency towards disloyalty and treason. The ideal opportunity arose in 1412, when the dukes of Berry, Orleans, and Bourbon, and the count of Alençon decided to negotiate an alliance with Henry IV, the purpose of which was to gain English assistance against the duke of Burgundy. The first point of interest here is that Burgundy had already solicited, and received, help from the English earl of Arundel and his army.¹¹⁶ They were, according to the duke of Burgundy's letters to the *bonnes villes*, there to fight for the good of the king and realm, to help restore peace.¹¹⁷ To a modern audience, it may appear rather hypocritical of John the Fearless to use the Armagnacs' request for English assistance as a further reason to attack them, but the difference would, perhaps, have been much clearer in 1412. The duke of Burgundy had the king's full support in his war against the Armagnacs; he was given official permission to raise an army against them, and the king had asked the *bonnes villes* to offer their categorical support to his cause. Thus, the support that his army had received from the earl of Arundel was also given royal sanction.

¹¹⁴ ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 9. Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 286, n. 281.

¹¹⁵ Petit *Justification*, p. 241.

¹¹⁶ ACO, B 1571, fol. 99r.

¹¹⁷ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 470.

Conversely, the dukes of Berry and Orleans must have known that in inviting the king of England to send them an army to help their cause without royal sanction, they were effectively committing lèse-majesty.¹¹⁸ This is explained by the fact they had unequivocally disregarded the king's many mandates forbidding the assembly of troops. As a result, the king, who appears to have enjoyed respite from his illness in the spring of 1412, raised 600,000 francs for war against the Armagnacs, and eventually chose to lay a royal siege against the Armagnacs at Berry's town of Bourges.¹¹⁹

Indeed, on 1 March 1412, the king published a letter giving John the charge of raising troops to 'chase the English from the realm.'¹²⁰ At the end of the month, the 30 March, Burgundy disseminated a letter patent in which he had the king's royal mandate transcribed verbatim.¹²¹ In the letter, the king explained that the English had descended onto the realm, and were, with 'plusieurs de nos vassaulx et sujets' committing the usual evil deeds in the realm, including pillage, murder, molestation and mutilation of loyal subjects of the king, the rape of virgins, the kidnapping of married and religious women, and the robbing of churches.¹²² The fact that Burgundy republished the king's royal letter from 1 March by transcribing it into his own letter patent published 30 March, demonstrates how important his appointment to the head of the royal army actually was to his own ideological and military campaign(s). He did this firstly to underscore his position of grace and favour with the king so that he could oppose his rivals, the 'ennemis rebelles et desobeissans'. Additionally, it helped reinforce his military authority during the

¹¹⁸ This is confirmed by the royal mandate confiscating their lands and titles, published across the realm 5 April 1412. In this letter the dukes of Orleans, Berry and Bourbon, John of Alençon, Charles of Albret and the count of Armagnac with their allies and 'accomplices' were identified as 'ennemis rebelles et désobeissans'. The confiscation and forfeiture of lands was part of the two-pronged punishment 'comme il appartient'. The royal army's campaign, led by John the Fearless, was the second part of the punishment. Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 291, n. 285.

¹¹⁹ For the king's recovery, see Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 104.

¹²⁰ ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 9. See also Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 286-287, n. 281.

¹²¹ ACO, B 11983, layette 81, n. 25. Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 289-290, n. 284.

¹²² ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 9. See also Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 286, n. 281.

campaign, and his right to do whatever was necessary to be victorious on the king's behalf, including receiving royal revenue, and troops for war.

CHAPTER 5

THE BURGUNDIAN TEXTS

If literature is, as Foulkes stated, ‘a network of relationships which involve the text in a series of causes, intentions, effects and acts of mediation’, than it is not a far leap to assume, as George Orwell did, that all literary works are, to some degree, propaganda.¹ This appears particularly true if we consider that propaganda is a form of communication whose primary purpose is to influence the mentalities, choices, or actions of its audiences to the benefit of the propagandist. These criteria appear, at first glance, to apply to the works that are directly linked to John the Fearless, namely the *Justification de monseigneur le duc de Bourgogne* (1408), the *Geste des ducs de Bourgogne* (c.1412-1420), and the *Pastoralet* (c.1422-1425). According to the eminent scholar, Georges Doutrepoint, these texts represented a particular Burgundian ‘spirit’, ostensibly confirming John the Fearless’ more direct political and cultural inclination towards Burgundy, rather than to France.² In his seminal work, *La littérature française à la cour des ducs de Bourgogne* (1909), Doutrepoint argued that the Valois dukes of Burgundy consciously detached themselves from the royal house of France to build a cultural and political domain that would rival royal authority. One aspect of this development was that the house of Burgundy created a distinct ‘littérature bourguignonne’ antithetical to ‘la grande littérature de France’.³ Notwithstanding the fact that John spent the majority of his time in Paris and his northern territories (Flanders and Artois), Doutrepoint argued that John the Fearless ‘n’est pas un Français: il n’en a pas le tour d’esprit ou la mentalité...[s]a politique est bourguignonne et sa littérature en bonne partie aussi.’⁴ Accordingly, many of the works produced during the fifteenth century were

¹ Foulkes, *Literature and Propaganda*, p. 7, 18.

² Georges Doutrepoint, *La littérature française à la cour des ducs de Bourgogne. Philippe le Hardi, Jean sans Peur, Philippe le Bon, Charles le Téméraire* (Paris, 1909), pp. 81-82. For his analysis of the *Justification* see pp. 283-289, and for the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet* see pp. 69-90.

³ *Ibid.*, p. v.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

expressly created for the princes and their relatives, designed to glorify their illustrious family history. In addition, he argued that the *Justification* became the foundation upon which later Burgundian poetry and historiography was based: 'Elle [the *Justification*] pénétrait, mais résumée, dans la *Geste des ducs*, le *Pastoralet* et le *Livre des trahisons*, trois productions essentielles de notre littérature'.⁵

It is indisputable that to effectively analyse politicised literature we must interrogate the cultural, social and historical conditions within which the work was produced to unearth the underlying motivations behind each work, and whose interests it served in the process of consumption.⁶ However, Doutrepoint overlooked the fact that the first two Valois dukes, Philip the Bold and John the Fearless, were very much involved in French politics; it was John's son, Philip the Good, and grandson, Charles the Bold, who were mostly intent on distinguishing themselves from France. Doutrepoint's work was nonetheless highly influential. French historians have subsequently relied on his assertions to argue almost universally that the literature produced for or about John the Fearless was, effectively, propaganda. For example, in his study on magic at the royal court, Jan R. Veenstra commented that to malign his rivals, John the Fearless 'employed the most effective means at his disposal, namely literary propaganda', listing the *Justification*, the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet* under this heading.⁷ Charity Cannon Willard wrote: 'In addition to the obvious propaganda to be found in the *Geste des ducs de Philippe et Jehan de Bourgogne*, and *Le Pastoralet*, the curious manuscript variations to be found in Pierre Salmon's *Réponses* to Charles VI should not be overlooked.'⁸ Many scholars have indeed flagged Pierre Salmon's overt sympathy to the Burgundian cause in his *Demandes*, suggesting that he was a partisan

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 289. The *Livre des trahisons* will not be examined in this chapter because it was written at the end of the fifteenth century and is, therefore, well outside the temporal boundaries of this present study. For information on the composition date of this text see Lettenhove, 'Introduction', *Chroniques*, 2: i-ii.

⁶ Foulkes, *Literature and Propaganda*, pp. 2-17, especially p. 8.

⁷ Veenstra, *Magic and Divination*, p. 45.

⁸ Charity Cannon Willard, 'The Manuscripts of Jean Petit's *Justification*: Some Burgundian Propaganda Methods of the Early Fifteenth Century', in *Studi Francesi* 13 (1969): 272-273.

of the duke. G.-A. Crapelet, who remarked on Salmon's blatant partisanship throughout his edition, was the first to advance this view, a view that seems to have endured.⁹ Guenée, Brigitte Roux, and more recently, the *Paris 1400* catalogue all suggest, with varying degrees of obstinacy, that Salmon was a Burgundian agent.¹⁰

The common standpoint that all four texts were media of Burgundian propaganda is appealing, for all superficially appear to meet the necessary criteria of propaganda literature in terms of the rhetorical importance of the highly charged politicised content within. The inflammatory style, the exaggerated accusations, the scare tactics and the common elements of discourse which one observes therein were certainly intended to transmit a particular Burgundian ideological perspective, and was, perhaps, also intended to influence the opinions of the intended audiences. Moreover, as we will see below, the content corresponded to the underlying themes of John the Fearless' propaganda throughout his conflict with the Armagnacs. Yet it is the question of circulation and audience that makes this general assumption rather problematic. Because the *Justification* was the only text to have undergone a deliberate attempt at wide scale dissemination, the other texts cannot, on their own, be considered individual pieces of propaganda.

However, it is our position that although Jean Petit's *Justification* was the only true propaganda text, due to John the Fearless' direct involvement in its composition and publication, the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet* were important works of literature in their own right. As records of John the Fearless' conflict with the house of Orleans, they were deliberately designed to glorify his achievements, whilst vilifying the deeds of his rivals. Even more importantly, they were, along with Salmon's *Demandes*, highly influenced by the content and structure of the *Justification*. In the two previous chapters we noted the very

⁹ Observe, for example, a footnote to the transcription of the 1 November 1408 letter addressed to Charles VI: 'Déjà l'ont voit que Salmon commençoit à embrasser les intérêts du duc de Bourgogne...' G.-A. Crapelet in *Demandes*, p. 101, n. 1.

¹⁰ Guenée, *Un meurtre*, p. 213; Brigitte Roux, *Les dialogues de Salmon et Charles VI : images du pouvoir et enjeux politiques*. Geneva, 1998, p. 25; *Paris 1400: les arts sous Charles VI* (Paris, 2004), p. 122.

close parallels between what was written in the aforesaid literary texts and John the Fearless' underlying propaganda message. It is our contention, therefore, that all the above-mentioned works represent a progression of Burgundian thought. In addition, they are useful for gauging how effectively the Burgundian ideology might have influenced other literature drafted during this period. Salmon's first edition of the *Demandes* (c. 1409) was, for example, distinctly pro-Burgundian, yet was written by a man who was not necessarily a true partisan, and for an audience (mainly the king) that was not necessarily 'Burgundian'.

5.1. JEAN PETIT'S *Justification* (1408)

There is little doubt that Jean Petit's *Justification* stands as one example of 'propaganda' literature: it was replete with highly provocative criticisms of the duke of Orleans which were intended to influence its audience; it was presented to a large and varied audience, which included the royal family and council, members of the university of Paris, and a large number of Parisians; and was subsequently transcribed into four illuminated manuscripts, and an unknown number of paper copies for popular consumption.¹¹ Unfortunately it is still unclear how many of the *Justification* texts were copied and distributed, and whether the texts reached an audience outside strictly pro-Burgundian circles.

Shortly after the duke of Burgundy admitted to having ordered the murder of Louis, duke of Orleans, in November 1407, he fled Paris for Flanders where he immediately embarked upon a political campaign of self-justification.¹² On 15 December, he met with his councillors to consider the situation. According to Burgundy's account

¹¹ On 27 July 1408, Jean Petit was paid for 'quatre copies escrite a la main reliees et enluminees dor et dazur couvert de parchemin du discours qu'il a fait pour le duc en l'hôtel du roy a Paris, a St. Pol. L'un pour le duc, l'autre la duchesse, le xxxeme pour le duc de Brabant et le ive pour le comte de Charollois, F ii^cvii'. BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 84r. See above, p. 14, n. 51. Also, Willard, 'Some Burgundian Propaganda Methods', pp. 274-275.

¹² See Petit, *Itinéraires*, p. 362. For a full description of John the Fearless' activities between the assassination on 23 November 1407 and the *Justification de monseigneur de Bourgogne* given in Paris 8 March 1408 see Coville 'Le véritable texte', p. 57-91; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 67-102; Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 78-97; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 65-72; Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 180-184.

records, the meeting was held at Senlis 'ou fut resolu de quelle maniere l'on soustiendrait que le duc avoit deu faire tuer le duc d'Orleans.'¹³ Master Jean Petit and brother Pierre au Boeuf, both of whom were doctors of theology and the duke's counsellors, were listed as present in this meeting. Later, John held an assembly in Ghent to which he invited the Three Estates of Flanders, his most important relatives and allies, and the leading members of Paris' urban society to hear his first oral justification of the assassination.¹⁴ By mid-January 1408, the duke came to Amiens accompanied by 'un grant nombre de soldats, seigneurs, bannerets, bacheliers et escuyers.'¹⁵ He had come to hold a conference with his uncles, the duke of Berry and the king of Sicily, his brother, the duke of Brabant, and several other 'grans seigneurs'.¹⁶ However, he had also brought with him master Jean Petit, master André Cotin, Nicole de Savigny and Pierre de Marrigny, 'licentier ez loix', who worked diligently on the duke's defence for twenty days, until 3 February.¹⁷

From Amiens, Guillaume Euvrie, master in the arts, 'dressa des lettres en forme de manifeste pour justifier le duc, et le prieur de Moustier (Simon de Saulx), docteur en decret et conseiller du duc, assista à ses conseils le premier mars [1408]'.¹⁸ Although the destination of these manifestoes is unknown, one can reasonably assume that the letters were sent to his allies in neighbouring territories and probably also some of his own towns in Flanders, Artois, and Burgundy, to ensure that he had their full support.¹⁹ Perhaps these were the 'introductions données par le Duc de Bourgogne après son demêlé avec le duc d'Orleans' that had been sent to the duchess of Burgundy, the duke of Lorraine, and 'les nobles du pais de Bourgogne', which were recorded in Burgundy's financial accounts.²⁰ Before he could attempt to win over the royal council and the French realm, it was critical

¹³ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 80v.

¹⁴ Probably given by Simon de Saulx, abbot of Moustier Saint Jacques. Coville, *Jean Petit*, p. 97-98.

¹⁵ This is recorded in BNF, *Collection de Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 194.

¹⁶ Arch. comm. d'Amiens, BB. 1, fol. 40r; BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 83v.

¹⁷ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 80v. See also Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 68-69.

¹⁸ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 80v.

¹⁹ This was also Vaughan's view. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 68.

²⁰ ACO, B 11892, layette 59, n. 33.

that John explained himself adequately so that he could gain the support of his own allies and subjects. The effort that the duke had put towards his self-justification demonstrates that he was very much aware of the importance of gaining public acceptance for what was in actual fact, a treasonous homicide. Therefore, this endeavour to secure public opinion was his first initiative in manipulating the king and royal council into granting absolution.

On 8 March 1408, Jean Petit presented the *Justification* to a large audience which included the king and queen, the dauphin, the princes of royal blood, a number of scholars from the University of Paris, and representatives of the Parisian bourgeoisie.²¹ The main argument of the *Justification* claimed that John the Fearless had committed 'tyrannicide' rather than homicide when he had ordered Louis of Orleans' assassination, by providing tangible examples of Orleans' alleged treason, sorcery and most importantly, tyranny. Although Michel Pintoin and the Jouvenal compiler both testified that many considered the *Justification* 'odd' and even 'reprehensible', no one challenged the duke's defence.²² Monstrelet's chronicle was in agreement. He stated that the duke of Burgundy's pardon surprised many 'grans seigneurs et aussi autres sages'.²³ It is fairly certain that if many found the duke's justification incredible it was probably not the content of the text that had secured a royal pardon. The Jouvenal chronicler claimed that no one was bold enough to challenge the duke of Burgundy.²⁴ If this was an exaggeration, it must only have been slight, for the duke of Burgundy had arrived in Paris just prior to the presentation with a rather intimidating entourage, consisting of at least 800 men.²⁵ According to Monstrelet, he arrived in Paris the 28 February, and was met by the Parisians who cried 'Noel!' as he

²¹ Monstrelet, 1: 178.

²² Michel Pintoin reports: 'Sic parlamento soluto, quosdam presentes circumspectos et eminentis sciencie memini perorata in mutlis reprehensibilia cencuisse'. RSD, 3: 764. According to the Jouvenal chronicler: 'Et concludoit qu'il estoit licite à un chascun de le tuer, ou faire tuer, veu que autrement, comme il disoit, ne se pouvoit faire. Laquelle chose sembloit bien estrange à aucuns gens notables, et clerics: mais il n'y eut si hardy qui en eust ozé parler au contraire.' *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 445.

²³ Monstrelet, 2: 244.

²⁴ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 445.

²⁵ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fols 84r-85r.

entered the capital.²⁶ A Burgundian reporter named Thierry le Roy gave his impression of the duke's procession through Paris on 8 March, claiming: 'la compagnie des gens de mon dict seigneur duroit et estoit telle que ains que les derreniers de son hostel fussent parties, les premiers estoient jà entrez en l'hostel du Roy à Saint Pol, et estoient en les rues, entre deux, plaines des chevaulx de mon dict Seigneur'.²⁷ Although this particular report is almost certainly an embellishment, it is nonetheless valuable because it was a representation of the witness' overall impression of the cortège. One is therefore inclined to agree with Alfred Coville, that '[l]e duc de Bourgogne avec ses hommes d'armes était maître de la ville'.²⁸

After he was officially pardoned for the murder by the king on 9 March 1408, John commissioned the production of several illuminated manuscripts of the text for his more powerful relatives and allies. Towards the end of 1408, he paid clerks to make copies of the text for popular consumption.²⁹ It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy how many reproductions were made, and who received or paid for them, but there were enough distributed throughout Paris to have at least two book burnings following the Bishop of Paris' condemnation of Petit's work in 1414.³⁰ When the University of Paris called a meeting to discuss whether the text was heretical, they ordered everybody to submit their copies of Jean Petit's *Justification* to the University, in both 'quaternis et transcriptis voluminibus'.³¹ This would suggest that there were a large number of paper copies circulating, and perhaps more copies in manuscript form than has previously been imagined.

²⁶ Monstrelet, 2: 176. See also Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 67.

²⁷ Thierry le Roy's report to the duchess is printed in full in Douët d'Arcq, 'Document inédit sur l'assassinat de Louis, duc d'Orléans (23 novembre 1407)', in *ABSHF* part 2 (1864): 11-26. For this particular quote, see p. 13.

²⁸ Coville, *Jean Petit*, pp. 105, 113.

²⁹ Coville, 'Le véritable texte', pp. 63-70.

³⁰ Michel Pinton explained the process by which the text was condemned at Paris, and the first of the book burnings which followed their public announcement in front of Notre Dame cathedral on 23 February. *RSD*, 5: 270-278, and especially p. 276. Coville, 'Le véritable texte', pp. 68-70; Willard, 'Some Burgundian Propaganda Methods', pp. 274-276.

³¹ *RSD*, 5: 270-272

In the preceding chapter we examined the most important underlying theme of Jean Petit's text: that of tyranny. This theme he developed by relying on examples of Orleans' alleged lèse-majesty and general misrule as the king's substitute. Burgundy's desire to serve the king and realm loyally, and his intention to establish a stable and righteous administration was thus contrasted to Orleans' *convoitise*, and his foolish mishandling of the government. The disparity between John the Fearless and the duke of Orleans in terms of their character and their handling of the government was typical of all the Burgundian texts. The appeal of the later texts is that the authors were able to trace the progression of the Armagnac party after Orleans died, and in particular, appreciates how his supposed treachery continued among his predecessors, the Armagnacs. For modern historians, they are excellent source material for gauging how the Burgundian perspective of events was regenerated and presented after John the Fearless was assassinated in 1419.

5.2. THE LATER BURGUNDIAN TEXTS

It is regrettable, however, that very little is known about the circulation of the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet*. Thus far, there is no extant evidence of the *Geste* featuring in any of the prominent libraries inventories that survive, including the Burgundian inventory records.³² The *Pastoralet* was listed in Philip the Fair's library where it remained until the end of the nineteenth century, but the range of dissemination is questionable as there is only one existing copy, and little to suggest that others were ever transcribed.³³ Although the specific dates of completion for the two are unknown, it is certain that they were published after John the Fearless' death in 1419.³⁴

³² Doutrepont, *Littérature française*, p. 82.

³³ Dogaer and Debae, *La librairie de Philippe le Bon*, p. 131; Blanchard, 'Introduction', *Pastoralet*, p. 7; Doutrepont, *Littérature française*, p. 82.

³⁴ According to Doutrepont, both the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet* made their appearance under Philip the Good's reign as duke of Burgundy. *Littérature française*, p. 90.

The story told in the *Geste* followed the events from the beginning of the civil war up to the defeat of the Armagnacs by the duke of Burgundy's army at the village of Saint Cloud in 1411. The *Geste* alleged that the root cause of the civil war was the marriage between Louis of Orleans and Valentina Visconti in 1389, which was the result of the 'mauvaise alianche' between the duke of Orleans and his rapacious father-in-law, Gian Galeazzo. The latter had allegedly nurtured Orleans' natural ambition and greed.³⁵

It is obvious when one reads the *Geste* that the *Justification* had a profound influence on its content. Regarding the narrative up to 1409, the *Geste* reiterated the majority of Petit's text, modifying it into verse poetry. This is evident in the introduction where the author explains the purpose of his work:

Signeur, or entendés cançon bien ordenée
Qui nouviellement a estet faite et rimée
Pour donner connissance et manière ordenée
Comment par convoitise et par folle pensée
Fu France en plusyeurs lieus mout désierte et gastée.³⁶

The notion that *convoitise* was to blame for the devastation that the realm had sustained was a distinctive echo to Jean Petit's statement in the introduction to his major in the *Justification* where he argued 'convoitise est de tous maux la racine.'³⁷ Just as Petit had sought to defend Burgundy's assassination of Louis of Orleans by exposing the latter's greed, and most importantly, his tyranny, it would also feature as the founding premise in the *Geste*. Indeed, the poem was replete with forms analogous to the *Justification*. The description of the marriage alliance between Gian Galeazzo's daughter and Louis of Orleans is a good example because it provides an interesting comparison between the texts: there are a number of close similarities, but also several subtle differences. Petit wrote:

³⁵ 'Pourquoy la guerre esmut... /...Mais tous ces fais vinrent par mauvaise alianche', *Geste*, p.261. Because Bernabó Visconti was related to the Wittlesbachs, and therefore affiliated to the Burgundian family, the Wittlesbachs despised Gian Galeazzo for assassinating his uncle and usurping the ducal throne. The details of the usurpation were recounted in the *Geste*, pp. 262-267. For an historical account, see Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 155-157.

³⁶ *Geste*, pp. 269-270.

³⁷ Petit, *Justification*, p. 187.

Aussi apparut, par ce qu'il convoita merveilleusement que sa fille feust royne de France et pour y cuider parvenir fist tant qu'il traicta d'elle et dudit feu duc d'Orléans... Commune renommée est que quant sa fille se partit de luy pour venir en France, il lui dist : "Adieu belle fille ! Je ne vous vueil jamais veoir tant que vous soiez royne de France." Et pour parvenir à ce, les dessusdiz ducs d'Orléans et de Milan par diverse voies ont depuis continuellement machiné en la mort du Roy et de sa génération."³⁸

The *Geste*'s author paralled this account very closely:

Chieux vot donner sa fille à tout grande finanche
A Loy duc d'Orliens dès le tans sen enfance
En France la tramist, mais il ot d'espérance
Qu'encore seroit roine [...]
De Melant la citet, il li dist par beubanche
'Adieu, ma belle fille, menés lie samblance
Mais ne vous quier veir, telle est bien m'espérance
Tant que vous serés dame et royne de France."³⁹

The similarity between the two farewell speeches is one example that demonstrates to what extent the later text relied upon the *Justification*. Both literary works stressed the duke of Milan's envy and his scheming nature by demonstrating that his actions were premeditated: he had every intention of seeing his daughter become the queen of France. As an active agent in the complicity between him and Orleans, Gian Galeazzo's became a scapegoat: he had planted the seed of *convoitise* in the soul of his son-in-law.

Jean Petit's *Justification* was nearly eighteen thousand words long, and highly theoretical. Hence, a second advantage of the *Geste* was that it provided an opportunity to present the arguments made against Louis of Orleans and his successors in a style that was more accessible and palatable for courtly audiences; it was most certainly designed to be read aloud, as this was usual during this period.⁴⁰ The obvious difference between the two texts here, however, is that the author of the *Geste* employed verse poetry rather than prose narrative. Evidently, he aspired to write a type of a *chanson de geste*, an epic poem reminiscent

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 229.

³⁹ *Geste*, p. 261.

⁴⁰ Ruth Crosby, 'Oral Delivery in the Middle Ages', in *Speculum*, 11 (1936): 91-99.

of the twelfth-century model that sought to praise the military virtue, prowess, courage and loyalty of its heroes.⁴¹ Although Doutrepoint argued rather too severely that the work failed to achieve the proper 'epic spirit', or, the 'art' of French verse,⁴² it did indeed correspond to the rise of the 'cult of heroism' in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries identified by Boulton and Keen.⁴³ As Boulton stated:

Deeds of these latter-day 'preux' were usually recorded for the edification of posterity, often by a herald, in the form of a 'chivalric biography' not different from romance. The line between romance and reality was thus blurred in the present no less than in the past.⁴⁴

The *Geste* had a similar purpose. Using a style first employed to celebrate Charlemagne the Great's era, he attempted to underscore the duke of Burgundy's valiant heroism and loyalty in the service of his lord. The by-product was necessarily the vilification of the Armagnacs. This text, then, aimed to provide a 'history' of the root cause of civil war for present and future audiences, though it was, clearly, a prejudicial version.

Similarly to the *Geste*, John the Fearless would figure as the *Pastoralet's* epic hero. The prologue of the anonymous poem reveals that the author's intention was to call attention to the duke of Burgundy's loyalty to the king and his courage in the face of adversity. The author was very explicit about the fact that he had written the text in honour of John the Fearless 'qui en son tamps fu moult preux et vaillans, et tant loialment ama le roy Charles Sisime, le roialme et le bien de la chose publique qu'en la fin en morut, comme appert ou livre qui s'ensieut'.⁴⁵ The author claimed that his work was a truthful, though indirect narrative of the first phase of the French civil war. His focus consequently

⁴¹ Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, p. 7.

⁴² Referring to the 10,540 verses of the *Geste*, Doutrepoint commented: 'Ils s'offent à nous comme une geste, mais c'est une geste ou une chanson de geste à laquelle on ne saurait reconnaître, sans un excès de bonne volonté, l'accent ou plutôt l'esprit épique.' *Littérature française*, p. 78, 80.

⁴³ Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 11-12; Maurice Keen, 'Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', in *Medievalia et Humanistica. Medieval and Renaissance Culture*, series 8 (1977): 5-7.

⁴⁴ Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, p. 12.

⁴⁵ *Pastoralet*, p. 39.

remained on the duke of Burgundy's steadfast loyalty. His tale, he claimed, would help avert civil wars in the future:

Sy m'estoet laissier droite histore
 Et tourner aux fables couvertes
 Ou seront dittes et ouvertes
 Les paix, les gherres et les tours
 Des bergieres et des pastours
 Qui sont de haulte extraction [...]
 Pour exemple c'on doit fuir
 Le mal et le bien ensuir.⁴⁶

In this story, Florentin, the 'maistre du pourpris', oversaw a large group of shepherds tending their flocks.⁴⁷ Florentin was betrayed by his *amie* Belliguère (Isabeau of Bavaria) and Tristifier.⁴⁸ Consequently, the 'hault pastour' descended into madness and, because of his incapacity to oversee his flocks properly, his sheep suffered greatly.⁴⁹ His story would draw attention to the renown of loyal shepherds (*pastours*), and would reproach the 'false disloyalty' of others so that he might use them as paradigms of good and evil. Unsurprisingly John the Fearless, who was personified by Léonet, became the epitome of the loyal shepherd, whilst Louis of Orleans' character, Tristifer, was its direct opposite. Reflecting on the disastrous circumstances during Charles VI's reign, the *Pastoralet* paralleled the civil war between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs up to the invasion of France by Henry V, king of England, and concludes with the latter's death in 1422.

The fact that the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet* were written after John the Fearless' death reveals the more enduring importance of the arguments made in the *Justification*. By the time of John the Fearless' murder in the presence of the dauphin Charles in 1419, the two parties had been in conflict for well over a decade. The duke's murder at the hands of the dauphin, an 'Armagnac' prince, substantiated the Burgundian claim that the Armagnacs were 'desloiaux traistres', a phrase commonly used by John the Fearless to describe the

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴⁸ 'Tant seront d'amours eschaudés / Que Florentin sera fraudés.' *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁴⁹ Florentin is also referred to as the 'hault pastour' *Ibid.*, p. 46.

Armagnac princes and their partisans. His death ultimately presented the opportunity to revisit the alleged tyranny of Louis of Orleans, thereby reinforcing their statement that his treachery was the root cause of the civil war. Equally, the later texts allowed the Burgundian authors to expose the subsequent duplicity of his supporters, which had prolonged the war. Perceived in this way, John the Fearless was blameless in the conflict; he was, in effect, a victim. Whereas Louis of Orleans had been assassinated because his *convoitise* had led him to try to usurp the crown and misgovern the realm, John the Fearless had been murdered out of spite and malice. Therefore, the Burgundian party led by Philip the Good had an unimpeachable case against the Armagnacs for having killed John the Fearless. According to their perception, the latter was an unjustifiable murder.

The later Burgundian works kept returning to the illusory origin of the conflict between the house of Orleans and the house of Burgundy because their purpose was, to some extent, dictated by their function as memorial artefacts for the Burgundian cause. Mary Carruthers, an expert in the field of memory, has provided modern historians with a useful conceptual framework for approaching texts and art as memorial artefacts. Although literary critics and historians generally look at texts with the objective of interpreting their meaning, she urged scholars to examine also how the interpretation was constructed so that we may begin to appreciate how these works were used for the purpose of remembering.⁵⁰ How, we should then ask, did the Burgundians construct the interpretation of John the Fearless' rivalry with Louis of Orleans and his successors so that it could be both memorable, and effective in the long term? This was achieved by using common forms and constructs from the larger structure of political discourse, and the more particular system of Burgundian rhetoric. Hence, the *Justification* fit within the wider language of tyranny and misgovernment; the *Geste* corresponded to the rise in chivalric 'epic' writing; the *Pastoralet*

⁵⁰ Mary Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought. Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 4-5.

allegory conformed to the popular shepherd metaphor that was a useful trope for illustrating the constitution of good government.

Carruthers added: 'Before a work can acquire meaning, before a mind can act on it, it must be made memorable, since memory provides the matter with which human intellect most directly works.'⁵¹ She suggested that the most effective way to make something memorable is for the author or compiler to draw on emotional experience, or to make certain characteristics of the narrative particularly distinctive.⁵² Thus, the illuminated manuscript of the *Justification* opened with a provoking verse and an extraordinary miniature (fig. 7). The accompanying verse reads:

Par force le leup rompre et tire
A ses dens et gris la couronne
Et le lyon par tres grant ire
De la pate grant coup luy donne⁵³

Images have long been associated with the *ars memorativae*, acting both as rhetorical tools for a text and mnemonic devices for remembering.⁵⁴ Moreover, the medium used to communicate a message influences its method of delivery and interpretation. It is as important as the meaning itself.⁵⁵ Thus the words and the accompanying image collaborated as the trigger for recalling the content of the *Justification*, though it should be noted that this illumination was not included on the paper copies. However, on at least some of the paper copies, the four-line verse describing the scene was incorporated. Therefore, the miniature and the verse evoked the figurative battle between the duke of

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 114-117.

⁵³ BNF, ms. fr. 5733. For a clearer image see Vienne, Österreichischen National bibliothek, Cod. 2657, which is reproduced and accompanied by short description of the text with the historical context in *L'art à la Cour de Bourgogne*, pp. 39-40. The BNF image does not differ in any significant fashion from the Vienne version. The former features a cliff landscape from which the lion seems to jump to attack the wolf, whereas the latter takes place on flat wooded ground. The lion in the former seems to appear from the woods beside the tent when he rescues the crown.

⁵⁴ Brigitte Buettner, 'Profane Illuminations, Secular Illusions: Manuscripts in Late Medieval Courtly Society', in *The Art Bulletin* 74 (1992): 78-80.

⁵⁵ Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 111.

Burgundy and the duke of Orleans for the sake of the crown of France. They did, therefore, contribute to the very fabric of the rhetoric.

Moreover, the scenario played out in the miniature and verse is an excellent example of how the *Justification* text played on the emotions of its audience. Both functioned as a moral exempla, which very clearly differentiated loyalty from treason, and virtue from vice.⁵⁶ Similarly, the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet* employed textual referents as mnemonic tools. Each introduced their narratives by calling attention to the 'original sin' of the conflict, recalling that it was Louis' *convoitise* that lay at the heart of the conflict. The fact that the *Pastoralet* explained that the work was written in honour of John the Fearless confirms that one of the main functions of the texts was to remember the past: to edify a particular history. Doutrepont was correct in assessing the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet* as representing the 'spirit' or 'passions of the time'.

5.3. PIERRE SALMON'S *DEMANDES* (1409, c. 1411-1415)

Regarding Pierre Salmon's *Demandes*, there are two different versions of the text, BNF, ms. fr. 23279, and Geneva ms. fr. 165, both of which were written by and illuminated under the eye of the author. These are the only two extant manuscripts. The first of these was completed toward the end of 1409, and the second, between 1411 and 1415.⁵⁷ The generally accepted position is that Salmon's work was a Burgundian propaganda text.⁵⁸ However, this raises a number of important problems. First, it is important that we question how this text would actually have functioned as piece of active propaganda literature if the primary audience was the king. It is true that the text may have been

⁵⁶ Buettner, 'Profane Illuminations', p. 83.

⁵⁷ *Paris 1400*, p. 123.

⁵⁸ To date only Anne D. Hedeman has provided a convincing case arguing against the accepted position. She argued that although Salmon was very plain with regard to his sympathy for the Burgundian cause, employing certain elements of the Burgundian discourse in his work, his purpose was not to denigrate the duke of Orleans by generating the Burgundian ideology. Rather, Orleans' refusal to heed Salmon's advice and change his ways was a powerful exemplum for the king, encouraging him to take Salmon's advice. This would restore the king's royal dignity. Hedeman, *Of Counsellors and Kings. The Three Versions of Pierre Salmon's 'Dialogues'* (Urbana and Chicago, 2001), pp. 19-21.

accessible also to others among the high aristocracy. Because the text's circulation was so restricted it is doubtful that it was of any benefit to the duke of Burgundy as a piece of propaganda regardless of how partisan its content was. If we put it within its rightful context, the accepted view of Salmon's manuscript is even more perplexing. At the time of its composition, Burgundy had already been successfully pardoned for the assassination of the duke of Orleans, he had negotiated the return of the king from Tours to Paris, the peace of Chartres had long since been ratified (March 1409), he had just had the *grand maître de l'hôtel* executed, his project of reform was underway, and had been offered the guardianship of the dauphin.⁵⁹ There was very little need to try to persuade or manipulate the opinions of the intended audience of the text. The only benefit the manuscript would have had as a 'Burgundian' text was as a reinforcing medium.

This is particularly patent when one examines part three of Salmon's second version of the *Demandes*, produced between 1411-1415 (Geneva, ms. fr. 165). The *Paris 1400* catalogue argued that the manuscript was probably written between 1411 and 1413, 'pour tenir compte de la tournure défavorable des événements (mort Alexandre V, démission de Salmon en 1411) était lors destiné à Charles VI, mais l'enluminure resta inachevée, peut être du fait des émeutes de 1413 et du départ de Jean sans Peur.'⁶⁰ The dating of the Geneva manuscript is problematic because there is no concrete evidence to determine when it was begun, or when it was left incomplete. There are nonetheless clues built in to the text that suggest Salmon completed it between 1414 and 1415. For the sake of brevity, we will examine only the most pertinent here.

The most suggestive indication that this text was written between mid-1414 and the dauphin's death in December 1415 was Salmon's plea that the princes finish the peace

⁵⁹ For the issue of the dauphin's guardianship: ACO, B 11892, layette 4; and, Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 262-263, n. 261.

⁶⁰ *Paris 1400*, p. 123.

process that they had started by concluding the peace treaty.⁶¹ Although throughout the civil war there had been many broken peace treaties, including the 1412 Peace of Auxerre (22 August) and the 1413 Peace of Pontoise (26 July), this particular statement would seem to apply most accurately to the long-drawn-out negotiations between the first peace arrangement at Arras at the end of the royal campaign against Burgundy in October 1414, and the publication of the peace treaty a year later in July 1415.⁶² Salmon's comment in his highly edited version of the 1 November 1408 letter to the king stated that if one princely group rises up, that the king should resolve the issue with reason rather than arms.⁶³ This would appear to be a direct comment on the most recent royal campaign, which was against the duke of Burgundy in 1414, and Salmon's desire that it not repeat itself.

Furthermore, the author made a 'prediction' that if the princes did not end their war, enemies of the realm would take advantage of France's vulnerability. Considering that this is precisely the fate endured by France in 1415, this prophecy suggests that Henry V had already begun his aggressive negotiations with France, during which he demanded a treaty strictly on his terms.⁶⁴ It seems truly doubtful that Salmon would have had this insight had overt threats not already been placed. Perhaps Henry V's eventual debarkation into Normandy, and his subsequent successes throughout August 1415 had occurred, or were in the process of occurring.⁶⁵ If Salmon wrote this before the Peace of Arras was finalised at Rouvres in Burgundy on 30 July 1415, it would then make sense to place it

⁶¹ '[V]ous mettez a fin et a effect ce que vous avez ja commencee et entrepris a faire et encore proposez et preserverez de jour en jour sicomme le fait sen demonstre assez estes en aventure de devenir a telle et si miserable fortune comme cy dessus povez avoir oyr et entendu se dieu et vous mesmes tous ensamble dun mesme accort' Geneva, ms. fr. 165, fol. 100r.

⁶² Publication of the Peace of Arras: ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34. For the reparation of John's honour and letters concerning the banishments, consult ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34-37. For the original peace agreement, RSD, 5: 394-398; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 501. The latter includes full transcriptions of the letters of negotiation throughout 1415, pp. 512-516.

⁶³ 'Et se aucunes questions divisions ou descors estoient meuz ou se mouvroient entre vous trespuissants prince et aucuns de mes seigneurs de vostre noble sang ou autres vous vassaulx ou subgiez ou entre aucuns deulx samblablement ne vueilliez de present procedez ne souffrir proceder par voie de fait. Mais y vueilliez comme roy et souverain pourveoir par voie de raison et de justice et pour cause. Et afin aussy que vostre pueple puist mieulx et plus paisiblement vivre soubz vous.' Geneva, ms. fr. 165, fols. 84r-84v.

⁶⁴ *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 504-505.

⁶⁵ Curry, *Hundred Years War*, pp. 94-102, and, 'Henry V's Conquest of Normandy 1417-1419', pp. 237-254.

while the English were, at the very least, threatening war. This would then account for his insistence that peace be reached with the enemies of the realm.⁶⁶

Putting the date of composition aside, Salmon was noticeably neutral in this second text. The drastic shift in perspective suggests that Salmon was naturally inclined to Burgundy's ideology in 1409, but realised that it was highly inappropriate to include in the later manuscript, due of course to Burgundy's exclusion from the royal council and banishment from Paris. The change in tone, therefore, underscores the important role of the audience in determining the function of the text. Truly if there was any time where Burgundy could have benefited from a 'propaganda text' within the royal council, it was at that time, rather than in 1409.

Hence, rather than identifying Salmon as a Burgundian agent, it is more appropriate to conclude that the Burgundian perspective had an important impact on the content, at least with respect to the first manuscript. Likewise, there is little doubt that the *Justification* was an equally strong influence over the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet*. As a result, the latter texts reinforced the duke of Burgundy's ideological rationale behind the assassination of his rival. Yet in the case of the texts examined here, only the *Justification* had a direct and immediate impact on its audience. It is therefore difficult to ascertain whether the other texts produced within the Burgundian sphere of influence, which do not seem to have been disseminated widely, had any impact at all on people outside the immediate, elite circle of the Burgundian nobility. For Salmon this is even less clear, for there is no evidence to suggest that it extended beyond the royal court, or even whether either version (BNF, ms. fr. 23279, or Geneva ms. fr. 165) met with any success there. Yet putting Salmon's work aside, we can be certain that the specific political function of the three Burgundian texts

⁶⁶ 'Item pour pourveoir et resister aux choses dessusdictes il seroit bon que vous fiessez paix ou treves ou bonnes alliances aux ennemis de vostre royaume et que de present vous ne souffrez faire aucunes assamblees de gens darmes de nobles ne de communes en vostre dit royaume. Et se aucunes en estoient la faites ret[i]re chascun en son lieu reserve toutesfoiz ceulx qui seront neccessaires et ordonnez es frontieres contre les ennemis de vostre royaume.' Geneva, ms. fr. 165, fol. 84r.

discussed above, was to communicate John the Fearless' ideology, and to justify his conduct. They were therefore necessarily a part of the wider Burgundian political discourse during the civil war in France and a central element of the larger Burgundian perspective.

CHAPTER 6

THE LETTERS

As the primary vehicle for communication in the middle ages, letters were vital sources of information. Because chanceries could manufacture letters in large numbers they had the potential to reach a wide audience across far distances. Letters were thus the ideal medium for passing on official news between secular and ecclesiastical lords and their subjects. The publication process contributed to their efficiency: townspeople and surrounding villagers generally gathered together to witness the public reading of the information.¹ Indeed, royal and ducal proclamations were customarily read out in very public places, such as town squares, markets and crossroads.² Important writs and letters were also frequently attached to doors of churches as visual reminders of what had been read aloud, and were subsequently accessed by those who could read the documents themselves.³

Although letters adhered to conventional formula of composition, there was ample room for inflammatory rhetoric designed to persuade or mislead audiences. A letter was, therefore, an incomparable medium for the transmission of propaganda during periods of conflict.⁴ Certainly there was widespread use of letter campaigns during the conflict

¹ See for example, Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols. 17v-18v. Mâcon's letter of response to John the Fearless 1 September 1405 reads: 'lesquelles lettres ont esté leues present le commun de la ville...' Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 8, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, pp. 403-404, n. 5.

² Many royal letters stipulated that letters patent, ordinances and mandates be read aloud in all public places according to local custom. For example, 1 September 1411, a royal mandate which requested John the Fearless' military assistance to expel the 'gens d'armes et de trait' from the realm, was very explicit about the manner by which it should be published: 'Si donnons en mandement à nostre prevost de Paris et à tous nos seneschaux, baillis, provosts, justiciers et officiers quelxconques, que ils et chascun d'eulx, ez mettes de leurs senechaussées, baillages et jurisdictions et resorts d'yceulx et lieux où l'en a accoustumé à faire cris et publications, ils facent crier et publier ces presentes, tellement que aucun n'en puist pretendre ignorance.' Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 276, n. 275.

³ Monstrelet, 2: 434 and. 459.

⁴ For some examples of general studies on letter writing as a form of medieval propaganda, see B. Guenée, *States and Rulers*; Yves Renouard, 'Information et transmission des Nouvelles', in *L'Histoire et ses méthodes* (Paris, 1961), pp. 95-142; Pons, 'Informations et rumeurs', pp. 409-433.

between Milan and Florence at the turn of the fifteenth century (1394-1402, 1423-28),⁵ the Hundred Years War (1337-1453),⁶ and the Wars of the Roses (1455-1487).⁷ It was equally the case with the Burgundo-Armagnac civil war. Scholars of the fifteenth-century civil war in France have long considered John the Fearless' letters as one element of his political propaganda, though mostly in passing.⁸ Yet if modern historians have acknowledged Burgundy's letters as one important element of his propaganda campaign, there are no current studies which offer detailed analyses of his letter campaigns.

So that we may fill this important void, the focus of this chapter is Burgundy's ability to use letters efficiently as a channel for his propaganda. Although the Armagnacs produced letters against John the Fearless in turn, in addition to engineering the publication of royal ordinances to his detriment while they had control of the king between August 1413 and May 1418, we argue that theirs was primarily a defensive counter-propaganda campaign. We will demonstrate that it was Burgundy's initiative in 1405 that set the pace. This he did by writing more prolifically, and more assertively. For these reasons he appears to have met with greater success than his Armagnac rivals. Consequently, this chapter is primarily concerned with the duke's missives, letters patent and close, and the royal proclamations published in his favour, which he disseminated en masse to the towns outside his own domains, to the *bonnes villes* of the French realm.

⁵ Albert Rabil, 'Humanism in Milan', *Renaissance Humanism. Foundations, Forms and Legacy*, ed. Albert Rabil (Philadelphia, 1988), 1: 235-263; *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism*, ed. Jill Kraye, (Cambridge, 1996), especially J. Hankins, 'Humanism and the Origins of Modern Political Thought', pp. 118-141. See also pp. 63-64; Willard, 'The manuscripts of Jean Petit's *Justification*', p. 272.

⁶ Contamine, 'Aperçus sur la propagande de guerre', pp. 5-27; Hale, 'War and Public Opinion', pp. 24-25.

⁷ Richmond, 'Propaganda in the Wars of the Roses', p.13; Maddicott, 'The County Community', pp. 33-35.

⁸ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 30, 35, 92-93. Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 174-75, 588; *État bourguignon*, pp. 147, 162, 164-166.

6.1. THE 'PROPAGANDA MACHINE': THE DUCAL CHANCERY

6.1.1. Composition

Although the duke of Burgundy oversaw the production of letter writing, like most princes of this period, he left the actual drafting of the documents to his chancery.⁹ This is obvious in the careful, complex construction and the eloquence of the letters, all of which conformed to the language of political discourse in the early fifteenth century. Moreover, many of the themes evoked in Burgundy's letters overlapped with other texts and documents. Burgundy would not have been able to construct such sophisticated texts without the specialized training that his chancellor and secretaries had received. In the later middle ages, the style and techniques of letters were taught according to the *ars dictaminis* tradition, a practice that provided a clear rhetorical framework for letters. Letters were typically read aloud, as they were derived from the art of oration and retained similar characteristics.¹⁰ The *ars dictaminis* spread rapidly from the twelfth century through the later middle ages, its development shaped mainly by French and Italian academics. The circulation of treatises on the art of writing increased in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and those trained in letter writing learned the conventions under the guidance of the chancery.¹¹ This was a highly specialised field.

Notwithstanding, there is little doubt that it was only on Burgundy's orders that the chancery composed these documents. For example, letters patent and close that were sent 'De par le duc' were typically sent from wherever John the Fearless resided at that specific

⁹ Christian de Borchgrave, 'Diplomates et diplomatie sous le duc de Bourgogne Jean sans Peur' in *A la cour de Bourgogne. Le duc, son entourage, son train*, ed. Jean-Marie Cauchies (Turnhout, 1998), p. 74, and Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 231.

¹⁰ Because the compositional structure of letters was based on the oration formula, letters consisted of the *salutatio*, *captatio*, *proverbium*, *narratio*, *petitio*, *conclusio*. Martin Camargo, 'Ars dictaminis, ars dictandi', *Typologie des sources du moyen age occidental*, 60 (Turnhout, 1991); Ronald Witt, 'Medieval Italian Culture and the Origins of Humanism as a Stylistic Ideal', in *Renaissance Humanism*, 1: 29-70; Peter Mack 'Humanist Rhetoric and Dialectic', in *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism*, pp. 82, 89. Georges Tessier, *Diplomatique royale française* (Paris, 1962), pp. 215-217; Sarah Williams, *English Vernacular Letters c. 1400 - c. 1600: Language, Literacy and Culture* (PhD diss., York, 2001), p. 41.

¹¹ Camargo, 'Ars dictaminis, ars dictandi', pp. 33-40; Witt, 'Medieval Italian Culture', pp. 45-47; Williams, *English Vernacular Letters*, pp. 34, 40-43.

moment.¹² Cazelles explained that letters close were '[une] acte qui eminent directement de [sa] personne et qui est la manifestation précise de ses volontés.'¹³ Whenever the duke of Burgundy was travelling he was always able to seal and sign letters patent in front of his council. This is evident in the letter patent sent from Hesdin, 25 April 1417:

En tesmoing de ce nous avons signees ces presentes de nostre main et y fait metre nostre seel secret en absence du grand. Donne en nostre chastel de Hesdin le xxv^e jour d'Avril, lan de grace mil quatre cens et dix sept après Pasques. Jean.¹⁴

The differences between letters patent and letters close were considerable. The most obvious distinctions between them were the presentation format and sealing.¹⁵ Letters patent were open documents such as privileges or ennoblements that the chancellor authenticated with the great seal. They were official writs, most frequently ordered by the king or princes in their duchies, but under the control of their chancellors. After the sovereign had given the order for the letter, there was no further need for his involvement in the writing process. This is because the chancellor oversaw the procedure and inspected the letters for legal and compositional errors before sealing the document.

The most important interrelating differences between letters patent, close and missive, with regard to propaganda, were their purpose and nature. Whereas letters patent were permanent, official documents, letters close were the result of a direct order from the sovereign given to his accompanying secretaries. According to Cazelles, these reflected precisely what the prince wanted to impart to the receiver. They were also effective because in passing over the authentication process, dissemination was rapid.¹⁶ For this reason, a

¹² Cazelles explained that letters 'De par le roy' could be either letters patent or close, depending on which seal was used, where it was placed, and the purpose of the letter. Cazelles, 'Lettres closes, lettres 'De par le Roy' de Philippe de Valois', in *ABSHF* (1958): 63.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

¹⁵ For this section I have relied on chapters 13 and 16 in Tessier, *Diplomatique royale*, pp. 229-250, 295-315; Lot and Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions*, pp. 85-96; Arthur Giry, *Manuel de Diplomatique*, rpt. (Paris, 1974), pp. 766-784; Cazelles, 'Lettres closes, lettres 'De par le Roy'', pp. 60-84; Pierre Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie de Bourgogne-Flandre sous les ducs de Bourgogne de la Maison de Valois (1384-1477)*, (Kortrijk-Heule, 1982), pp. 58-59, 158-167.

¹⁶ Cazelles, 'Lettres closes', p. 63.

letter close was the preferred way for the rulers of France to communicate with the *bonnes villes*.¹⁷ As the duke's personal guard and the guardian of the privy seal in the duke of Burgundy's household, the first chamberlain sealed letters while the chancellor was away.¹⁸

Similarly, letters missive were documents declaring the personal will of the prince: they were regularly used for issuing direct orders or used in personal correspondence. This might explain why they included petitions and prayer clauses. Frequently, letters missive concluded with a salutation formula, omitting the year of composition from the date given. The imprecise dating method was a feature that missives shared with letters close. This is explained by their ephemeral and urgent nature as mediums of personal correspondence. They were also useful for transmitting brief orders, instructions, and concise explanations in times of need. This may explain why so few remain in the ducal archives. Nevertheless, letters close and missive could be valuable tools of propaganda. They provided the opportunity for the sender to communicate his personal views more liberally, and in an efficient and timely manner. In August 1411, Burgundy hired several clerks to copy the letters of defiance by the house of Orleans and his reply, which he sent with letters close to his allies.¹⁹ They also wrote out 'mandemens patent'.²⁰ Therefore, in addition to providing a brief explanation of the circumstances for the letters, these epistles probably outlined his intentions and gave specific orders to his allies for retaliation. The accompanying copies of the defiance provided the necessary evidence to demonstrate the gravity of the situation and to show that his victimisation was genuine, thereby legitimising his planned response. In this way, a letter close was an efficient form of communication and a useful means of propaganda.

What is crucial for our retention here is that the duke was involved in the writing of documents insofar as he would instruct his chancery to draft whatever documents he

¹⁷ Tessier, *Diplomatique royale*, pp. 295-297.

¹⁸ Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 58-59.

¹⁹ ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278r.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

needed to serve him in that moment. There is little doubt that he had direct input into his letters close and missives; therefore there is no reason to suppose he did not have the same measure of input into his letters patent. Nevertheless, it was his chancery that took over the technical aspects of writing the documents. This is of great consequence because it helps us understand the mechanics of letters as a medium of propaganda. The chancery provided the necessary framework for the composition and the distribution of letters as widely as possible. Moreover, it was the chancery that was able to make letters useful as a channel of communication by ensuring that the rhetoric fit within familiar structures of discourse, employing overlapping themes. These were important facets of letter writing, because it was critical that the message imparted by the duke of Burgundy resonate with the intended audience – the *bonnes villes*.

6.1.2. The Chancery

The importance of a prince's chancellor in the drafting of propaganda letters is manifest when one examines the development of chanceries across Europe. For example, James Hankins claimed that the Italian chanceries controlled what he called the 'propaganda machine'.²¹ According to Willard, 'it is an established fact that the early Italian humanists were often the paid ghost writers of princes and city governments and that their writings sometimes served the purpose of accompanying the war of swords with the war of words'.²² Yet the expression 'ghost writer' is misleading; the humanist chancellors were actually responsible for writing the propaganda letters against their employer's enemies, and this was not a hidden fact. Referring to the conflict between Milan and Florence in the last decade of the fourteenth century, Rabil called the letter campaigns of the Florentine chancellor Caluccio Salutati and the Milanese chancellor Antonio Loschi 'a striking instance

²¹ Hankins, 'Humanism', p. 122.

²² Willard, 'The manuscripts of Jean Petit's *Justification*', p. 272; Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought* (New York, 1965), 2:8.

of letters serving arms.²³ On Florence's behalf, Salutati attacked the city's enemy, Gian Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, with a barrage of disparaging letters. Gian Galeazzo allegedly declared that the letters had done more damage to him than an army one thousand strong.²⁴

The chancellor was the duke of Burgundy's first and most important minister and counsellor, and was his assistant in all areas of his administration and government.²⁵ Philip the Bold had united the chanceries of Burgundy and Flanders into one body, calling the minister the 'chancelier de monseigneur de Bourgogne'.²⁶ During this period, the ducal chancellor's role emulated that of the chancellor of the king of France in terms of function and prestige.²⁷ A 1388 ducal ordinance gave the chancellor the autonomy to act on his own accord.²⁸ Therefore, the chancellor had considerable influence over his chancery and indeed over the ducal administrative body.²⁹ In fact, this change was essential for the dukes of Burgundy because the duke and the chancellor frequently resided in different locations.³⁰

Both Philip the Bold and John the Fearless spent the majority of their time in Paris, and the remainder travelling between Paris, Burgundy and Flanders. John the Fearless was in Dijon only six times throughout his reign (1404-1419). The remainder of his time he divided between Paris and his counties of Artois and Flanders.³¹ Because of his itinerant

²³ Rabil, 'Humanism in Milan', p. 238.

²⁴ Charles Stinger, 'Humanism in Florence', in *Renaissance Humanism*, 1: 183; Kristian Jensen, 'The Humanist reform of Latin and Latin Teaching', *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism*, p. 63; Willard, 'The manuscripts of Jean Petit's *Justification*', p. 272; Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*, p. 8.

²⁵ For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the function of chancellor under the dukes of Burgundy, consult Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie*. For comparisons with the chancellor of the French kings, see pp. 56-65, and 85-96. See also Tessier, *Diplomatique royale*, pp. 125-149; Pons, 'Les chancelleries parisiennes sous les règnes de Charles VI et Charles VII', in *Cancellaria e cultura nel medio evo. XVI Congresso di Scienze Storiche (Stoccarda, 29-30 agosto 1985)* Germano Gualdo ed. (Rome, 1990), pp. 137-168; Gilbert Ouy and Tessier, 'Notaires et secrétaire du roi dans la première moitié du XV^e siècle d'après un document inédit', in *Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu'à 1610) du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques* (1963): 861-90.

²⁶ Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 12-14; Schnerb, *L'État bourguignon*, p. 96-98.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

²⁸ Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 12-13; Schnerb, *L'État bourguignon*, pp. 232-233.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 298-301.

³⁰ Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 16-17, 32; Schnerb, *L'État bourguignon*, p. 233.

³¹ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 9.

way of life, Philip the Bold retained his *Grand conseil* with him at all times.³² Likewise, John the Fearless' *curia ducis* accompanied him in his displacements; it included specialised administrative servants, foremost of whom were the first chamberlain and private secretaries.³³ Additionally, numerous *chevaucheurs de l'écurie* (mounted couriers) accompanied Burgundy.³⁴ It is significant that all of these functionaries remained with him wherever he went, because these were among the most important individuals involved in the writing process and dispatch of all letters patent and letters close under the duke's great seal, the privy seal or the signet. They were on hand to transmit letters and other documents upon the duke's immediate orders. This further supports the argument that the duke was wholly in charge of his letter writing.

Although the first chamberlain was responsible for sealing documents when the chancellor was absent, there were many occasions when John the Fearless' chancellor was with the duke; he was most certainly involved in John the Fearless' letter campaigns. Indeed Jean de Saulx, lord of Courtivron, who was the duke's chancellor from April 9 1405 to 1419, actively engaged in the 1405 letter campaign.³⁵ His first signature among the collection appears at the end of the letter of requests the duke of Burgundy and his two brothers (Anthony, then duke of Limbourg, and Philip, count of Nevers) presented to the duke of Guyenne, who was standing in for his father during one of his 'absences', and the royal council.³⁶ Jean de Saulx was the first to sign the 8 September 1405 letter patent. His

³² André Leguai, 'Les ducs Valois et les villes du duché de Bourgogne' *Les Relations entre princes et villes aux XIV^e-XV^e siècles: aspects politiques, économiques et sociaux. Rencontre de Gand (24 au 27 septembre 1992)*, ed. Jean-Marie Cauchies (Neufchâtel, 1993), pp. 21-25, but especially p. 24; Schnerb, *L'État bourguignon*, p. 100. See also John Bartier, *Légistes et gens de finance au XV^e siècle. Les conseillers des ducs de Bourgogne Philippe le Bon et Charles le Téméraire* (Brussels, 1955), p. 37, and Eugène Lameere, *Le Grand Conseil des ducs de Bourgogne de la Maison de Valois* (Brussels, 1900), p. 23-29.

³³ Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 58-162; Lameere, *Grand Conseil*, p. 23.

³⁴ Takemi Kanao, 'Les messagers du Duc de Bourgogne au début du XV^e siècle', in *Journal of Medieval History*, 21 (1995): 195-226.

³⁵ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 295; Cockshaw, *Le personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 39-40; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 134.

³⁶ John's secretary Baudes des Bordes translated these requests from their Latin original. Immediately below 'signé Sauls', reads: 'Cedula suprascripta traditi fuit curie et allata per magistrum Baldum de Bordis, ducis clericum et secretarium, XXVI die augusti, anno domini MCCCCV.' AN, X^{1A} 8602, fol. 189v, cited in full in Mirot, *Pièces*, pp. 399-403, especially 403.

signature was followed first by Anthony's chancellor (J. Le Merchant) and Philip's notary (Joudrier).³⁷ The lord of Courtivron is not to be confused with one of the most important ducal secretaries, Jean de Saulx, the former's bastard son.³⁸ We know that Saulx was an important secretary to John the Fearless because twenty-five percent of all ducal ordinances bear his signature.³⁹ Moreover, in 1412 he was made *audiencier*, that is, the first chancery officer after the chancellor.⁴⁰ Among other duties, the *audiencier* was in charge of policing and supervising the secretaries and notaries attached to the chancery.⁴¹

The use of secretaries for letters issued directly by the prince was standard practice at the ducal court, as it was at the French royal court in the second half of the fourteenth century.⁴² Notwithstanding his many displacements, the sovereign's highly qualified personal secretaries were continuously attached to his court. As noted above, these men were specialists in letter writing, having undergone the necessary training in the *ars dictaminis*. Drafting and signing letters was their primary function, though they tended to other important tasks within the prince's court such as the duplication of documents.⁴³ In the duke of Burgundy's court, his private secretaries supervised clerks charged with the task of copying letters close, though he only permitted selected secretaries to sign or make changes to letters concerning finances or gifts.⁴⁴ In one example, a messenger was sent

³⁷ Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 2, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, p. 413.

³⁸ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 297, 348-349.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ For further details on this role, see Tessier, *Diplomatique royale*, pp. 166-167.

⁴² Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 129-130; Cockshaw, *Personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 158-164. For a more general examination of personal secretaries in the royal context, see Tessier, *Diplomatique royale*, pp. 161-166; Lot and Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions*, pp. 86-93; Kathleen Daly, 'Mixing Business with Leisure: Some French Royal Notaries and Secretaries and their Histories of France, c. 1459-1509', in *Power, Culture, and Religion in France c. 1350-c.1550* (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 99-115.

⁴³ Cockshaw, *Personnel de la chancellerie*, pp. 158-164.

⁴⁴ Cockshaw, *Personnel de la chancellerie*, p. 162; Tessier, *Diplomatique royale*, p. 162; Lot and Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions*, pp. 87-88. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 129.

from Ghent to Saint-Omer in October 1413 to obtain changes to the address on the back of a letter close from John the Fearless' secretary Guillaume Vignier.⁴⁵

Guillaume Vignier featured in another interesting account document in the *chambre des comptes* in Dijon. A record under the *Despenses communes* witnessed a payment made to several clerks hired to write letters patent, which were sealed and sent. They were a call to arms sent from the duke of Burgundy to his vassals. Once they achieved this task, they made copies of John the Fearless' response to the duke of Orleans' letter of defiance in the summer of 1411:

A maistre Guillaume Vigniers secretaire de mon dit seigneur... lesquelz il avoit baillier par le comandement de mon dit seigneur a plusieurs clerks estranges qui au mois d'aoust 1411 ont escript les mandemens patens...[d']aler devers lui pour le servir en son armee. Et aussi ont escript plusieurs coppies tant de defiance a mondit Seigneur par le duc d'Orleans, comme de la response par mondit Seigneur scellees sur icelles defiances, lesquelles copies avec lettres closes ont esté envoiees.⁴⁶

There are several points to highlight here. First, there was a clear distinction made between the letters patent that requested military aid from Burgundy's vassals, and the letters close, which accompanied the copies of the letters of defiance and Burgundy's response. These he sent to his allies, the 'Quatre Membres de Flandres', Ypres, Bruges, Ghent and the Franc,⁴⁷ and several royal towns, notably: Thérrouanne, Amiens, Péronne, Noyon, Montidier, Corbie, Abbeville, and Tournai. Furthermore, the *chambre des comptes* record reveals that the clerks, whom the secretary had hired personally, were *clerks estranges* – that is, clerks from outside the ducal chancery.

Similarly, Jean Petit had employed outside help when he supervised the reproduction of the *Justification* text. First, the duke had several manifestoes duplicated by

⁴⁵ These were: Guillaume Vignier (1403-1419), Baudes Des Bordes (1405-1419), Georges d'Oostende (1408-1419) and Jehan Seguinat (1412-1419). His other secretaries included Jehan Fortier (1402-c.1416) and Jean de Saulx. See Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 129 and Cockshaw, *Personnel de la chancellerie*, p. 166.

⁴⁶ ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278r.

⁴⁷ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 14.

Guillaume Euvrie, and sent out on 1 March 1408.⁴⁸ After the presentation of the *Justification de monseigneur de Bourgogne*, it was copied into several illuminated manuscripts for John's most important allies, and a 'popular edition' on paper. Almost immediately after Petit gave the *Justification* in the Hotel St. Paul on 8 March 1408, Petit brought between six and eight masters and students from the University of Paris to his quarters in the Collège du Trésorier where Master Johan Johanis dictated the text to them so that they could copy it to paper.⁴⁹ Jean Petit was himself paid for 'quatre copies escrite a la main reliées et enluminées d'or et d'azur couverte de parchemin du discours qu'il a fait pour le duc en l'hotel du Roy a Paris, a St. Pol; l'un pour le duc, l'autre pour la duchesse, le iii^e pour le duc de Brabant, et le iiij^e pour le comte de Charollois'.⁵⁰ The *explicit* of ms. fr 5732 (Paris), fol. 56 reads: *collatio facta de verbo ad verbum*, which, Coville argued, indicates that it was either one of the original paper copies transcribed immediately following the presentation, or was at the very least one that was copied directly from one of the exemplars from that period.⁵¹ Dictation was the common manner by which much literature was copied in the fifteenth century. Clearly John the Fearless had outside help hired when increased demands necessitated it, and that he did so with the intention of circulating the documents as widely as possible.

6.2. JOHN THE FEARLESS' LETTER CAMPAIGNS

From as early as August 1405 John the Fearless began using letter campaigns to transmit his polemic, and met with a level of success. Yet according to Richard Vaughan, this was not the case. Vaughan claimed that the 1405 letter campaign was a 'sterile pamphlet war', one that ultimately served no purpose.⁵² Although it is true that the duke of

⁴⁸ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 80v.

⁴⁹ Coville, *Jean Petit*, pp.134-137, and 'Le véritable texte', 63-70.

⁵⁰ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol 84r.

⁵¹ Coville, 'Le véritable texte', p. 79.

⁵² Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 35.

Burgundy's letter campaign did not result in significant practical changes in the government, Vaughan's assessment was nonetheless rather pessimistic. Firstly, Burgundy's swift letter-writing campaign resulted in the support of the University of Paris.⁵³ Secondly, it is abundantly clear that the duke went unpunished for disobeying the queen by intercepting the dauphin at Juvisy. Finally, the very fact that Burgundy was so concerned with informing the king's subjects of the events reinforced his public persona as a 'reformer', one who was interested in preserving the common good. Whether the people bought in to his hyperbole is not our primary concern in this chapter. What is prevalent here is that the duke of Burgundy was more efficient in his letter writing than his opponent: he maligned the duke of Orleans in letters close, letters patent, and indeed in a formal request for reform. This he accomplished more quickly and efficiently than his rival. From a purely technical perspective, this was a triumph for Burgundy.

Louis of Orleans also engaged in letter writing during this period, but it appears that it was primarily a response to John the Fearless' initiative.⁵⁴ The letter campaigns nonetheless became an important medium for propaganda on both sides throughout this period because letters were an ideal platform for airing grievances. Moreover, the letters provided the opportunity for the protagonists to implore their intended audience to choose their side in the conflict, so that they might offer up financial or military assistance. Additionally, because the king suffered from dementia, the faction that had control over Charles VI and his royal council could rely upon the widespread publication of royal letters and proclamations to 'officially' deprecate the other party. Regarding the royal council, Ferdinand Lot and Robert Fawtier explained:

⁵³ Monstrelet, 1: 112-113 ; Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 170-171; Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, p. 143.

⁵⁴ Louis of Orleans wrote his first letter to the *bonnes villes* on 2 September 1405, several weeks after the alleged kidnapping had taken place (18 August 1405), and after John's first letter of justification to the towns written on 19 September (AN, J 1044, n. 39; and Douët d'Arq, *Choix*, 1: 273-283). Orleans' letter was essentially a outlet through which he tried to defend himself against the numerous accusations of corruption against him in John's letters, and the measures for reform that Burgundy had presented to the Parlement on 26 August, which were also published and subsequently sent to the *bonnes villes*.

‘Le Conseil est donc tout. Tout part de lui, tout aboutit à lui, et ses attributions sont aussi étendues que celles de la monarchie elle-même. C’est à dire que celui qui est maître du Conseil domine l’État.’⁵⁵

The measure of control that Burgundy had in 1411 over the publication of royal letters was evoked in the chronicle typically attributed to Jean Juvenal: ‘le duc de Bourgogne estoit à Paris, et avoit en ses mains le Roy, et monseigneur le Dauphin, toutes lettres qui s’escrivoient à monseigneur de Berry, et autres seigneurs, se faisoient au nom du Roy, ou dudit monseigneur le dauphin.’⁵⁶ We can be certain that the same was true for any form of official communication issued in the name of the king.

Yet the duke of Burgundy felt as though his reputation had been maligned when a number of royal proclamations were published against him once he was ousted from Paris in August 1413.⁵⁷ Consequently John sent a letter of complaint to the king, claiming that it was unjust to have been so publicly disgraced. He explained that there had been numerous speeches and sermons given, and letters sent to all parts of the realm, which were deliberately designed to defame him. He asserted that although they were frequently allegorical, the criticisms were nonetheless perfectly clear to those who were even moderately enlightened.⁵⁸

However, it was his party that was the first of the two to exert real influence over the writing of royal letters during the initial stages of the conflict between March 1409 and August 1413. In effect Burgundy used royal proclamations to his advantage early on, when his absolution for Louis of Orleans’ murder was published throughout the realm in 1408.⁵⁹ Later, in 1411, when the duke of Burgundy had firm control of the king and the royal council, Charles VI published a number of royal letters accusing the Armagnac faction of

⁵⁵ Lot and Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions*, 2: 80.

⁵⁶ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 455.

⁵⁷ For one of the royal letters, written 18 September 1413: AN, K 58, n. 5. See also RSD, 5: 210-220.

⁵⁸ RSD, 5: 214.

⁵⁹ ADN, B 656, n. 15.088; See also Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 254, n. 256. For the letters published after the Peace of Chartres, 9 March 1409, see ACO, B11892, and Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 256-258, n. 258.

high treason.⁶⁰ The letters gave the duke of Burgundy full royal backing for his military campaign against the Armagnacs, and confiscated the Armagnac princes' goods and titles.⁶¹ Charles VI's chancery also published an ordinance that excommunicated Burgundy's rivals and their supporters from the Catholic Church.⁶²

Thus, the epistolary evidence and the profusion of transcribed letters incorporated in the diverse chronicles of the period confirm that John the Fearless used letter campaigns very effectively to propagate his ideology to the towns of the realm.⁶³ John's letters were so effective that in January 1414 the Armagnac government found cause to forbid the towns of the realm from publishing any epistle that the duke of Burgundy might send.⁶⁴ The royal mandate published in Charles VI's name stipulated that should John send the towns any letters, the townspeople were required to forward them to the king's royal council immediately.⁶⁵ The royal letter threatened the towns, warning: 'si de ces choses, vous, ou aucun de vous, faites le contraire, nous vous en ferons si grievement punir et en brief, que ce sera exemple à tous autres.'⁶⁶ It also demanded that the town publish it without delay by having it cried in all the areas that were customarily used for public readings, so that no one in the community could feign ignorance of the edict.

⁶⁰ For example : AN, K 57^b, n. 13-13^b. See also Monstrelet, 2: 193-195; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 470.

⁶¹ For one of the letters giving John the Fearless the right to assemble an army for this purpose, see Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 273, n. 272. The later royal letters supporting the duke of Burgundy's military campaign against the Armagnacs are found at: ACO, B 11893, layette 85, cotes 5, 8 and 9.

⁶² This ordinance appropriated pope Urban V's papal bull, issued 9 May 1367, which excommunicated any men-at-arms who had assembled against the king. *Ordonnances*, 9: 652. For the excommunication bulls see RSD, 3: 532-550; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 467, 470. See also Monstrelet, 2: 210. Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, pp. 79, 88; Lehoux, *Jean de France*, 3: 253, n. 1.

⁶³ Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Michel Pintoin and the Jouvenal compiler transcribed a vast number of letters in their works. Whenever possible, I have cross-checked the transcriptions with surviving letters and archival records, or those transcribed in published sources such as Urbain Plancher's *Preuves*, and Douët d'Arcq's *Choix*. The chronicles themselves are useful for this purpose, as all three texts generally include publication details for the same letters.

⁶⁴ The publication of a document such as a letter patent or royal mandate generally entailed either a public reading of the letters by town criers at various locations throughout a town or city, or more officially in an organised assembly consisting of the town officials and the other 'habitants et manants'. See, for example, the Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2 series.

⁶⁵ This letter cited in *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 495-496.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

The Armagnac government sent an additional ordinance to this effect in February 1414. Amiens' town deliberation records reveal that they received the royal letter.⁶⁷ Interestingly, the count of St. Pol had sent envoys to the town of Amiens carrying letters close from the duke of Burgundy only the day before, on 15 February 1414. Amiens was doubtless intimidated by the king's threats to punish the town severely should they not comply with the royal ordinance, because they decided, after much consideration, to send Burgundy's letters to the king and royal council immediately. The concentrated attempt by the king's royal council to control the publication of Burgundy's letters implies that they were concerned with the potential impact that the letters would have in the towns that were exposed to them. It suggests that Burgundy's letters were a successful source of communication for him, and a genuine threat to Armagnac hegemony.

Following the duke of Burgundy's exile from Paris, a royal proclamation made in the autumn months of 1413 restored the honour and repealed the banishment of the Armagnacs.⁶⁸ More importantly perhaps, the proclamation explained that all the defamatory libels that had been previously published by town criers and attached to doors of certain churches against them were erroneous, and henceforth considered by the crown of France to be null and void. In addition, it asserted that the malevolence of some 'seditious, disturbers of the peace' had led to the publication of previous proclamations against the Armagnac princes and their allies in the name of the king.⁶⁹ According to the mandate, these counsellors had purportedly given false reports to the king, and engaged in intrigue to achieve their 'damnable objectives'. The 'seditious' counsellors to whom the Armagnacs referred were clearly Burgundy's partisans, for the royal council that presided over the drafting of the anti-Armagnac letters issued during this period was full of the

⁶⁷ Archives Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2. fol. 36v. For a transcription of the letter patent written by the duke of Burgundy on the 11 February 1414 consult Monstrelet, 2: 434-437, and 442-456.

⁶⁸ The royal letter is transcribed in full, but in Latin. The original letter would have been written in French. RSD, 5: 184-194. *Ordonnances*, 10: 163-165. 167-170

⁶⁹ AN, K 58, n. 5; RSD, 5: 190.

duke's loyal servants. For example, the royal council, which published a royal proclamation on 10 September 1411 in favour of the duke of Burgundy, included known Burgundian partisans such as the count of Saint Pol; Jean de Nielles, the dauphin's chancellor; the bishop of Tournai (Jean de Thoisy); the Guillaume de Vienne, lord of St. Georges and St. Croix; Charles of Savoisy; Antoine de Craon; Pierre des Essarts, the provost of Paris; Eustace de Laitre, and Nicole d'Orgemont.⁷⁰

It is highly significant that the two royal ordinances described above were focused on retracting the letters that Burgundy had sent while in power, and in controlling any further information he might dispatch via letters.⁷¹ It is plain that there were two reasons why the Armagnacs were concerned with repealing the official documents that had been published against them while Burgundy had enjoyed control over the government, between 1409 and 1413. The first was to retract their label as traitors, thereby repairing their *male fama*. Additionally, this counter-propaganda campaign suggests that the duke of Burgundy's verbal assaults against the Armagnac faction must have made an impact on audiences; otherwise the Armagnacs need not have been so anxious to set the record straight and to forbid any further Burgundian letters from being published.

The sense of urgency among the Armagnac party is more easily understood in the context of the events leading to the outbreak of war in August 1411, the violent Cabochien

⁷⁰ For the letter, ACO, B 11893, n. 13. Charles duke of Orleans accused the bishop of Tournai, Jean de Nielles, Antoine de Craon, and Charles of Savoisy of being the king's enemies as well as his own in a letter sent to the king in April 1411 (Orleans' letter is transcribed in full in Monstrelet, 2: 116-121). The bishop of Tournai was one of John the Fearless councillors, later becoming Philip the Good's chancellor. (Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 202 and 395, 304). He also received two *queues* of wine from the duke of Burgundy in 1411 (B 1560 fols. 64-64v). Likewise, Eustache de Laitre, the king's president of the *chambre des comptes*, received wine gifts from Burgundy in 1412 (ACO, B 1572, fol 37). He was later a member of the 1413 Cabochien throng (Monstrelet, 2: 343). D'Orgemont also received wine gifts from Burgundy in 1412 (ACO, B 1572, fol. 37). In 1416 he was arrested by the Armagnacs government for his collusion in a conspiracy to help the duke of Burgundy back in to Paris (Bourgeois, pp. 70-71; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 531). Michel Pintoin referred to the lord of St. George as a celebrated baron of the county of Burgundy (RSD, 3: 304). He frequently acted as an ambassador for the duke of Burgundy (e.g. ACO, B 1558, fol. 179r. Monstrelet, 3: 129). The count of St. Pol received an annual pension from John the Fearless from as early as 1405 (ACO, B 1542, fo. 62r), and his daughter was married to John's brother Anthony, the duke of Brabant (Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 246, n. 41). Jehan de Nielles and Antoine de Craon also received annual pensions beginning in 1406, and both were councillors and chamberlains of the duke of Burgundy (ACO, B 1543, fols. 68v and 69r).

⁷¹ See again, AN, K 58, n. 5.

uprising from May to July 1413, and John the Fearless' subsequent fall from power in August 1413. There is little doubt that the armed conflict in 1411 had caused the towns of the realm to divide into partisan groups, which were henceforth called 'Armagnac' and 'Burgundian'.⁷² The subsequent 'Cabochien Uprising' further exacerbated the divisions among the people in the principal towns of the realm. When the Armagnacs gained control of the government, they recognised that John the Fearless still had many sympathisers in the northern towns, particularly in Picardy and Champagne.⁷³ They acknowledged that if the towns published the duke's letters, it might encourage the remaining Burgundian loyalists to join Burgundy's campaign. The more people who joined him in arms, or helped fund his military campaign, the more powerful the duke would become. This was particularly true if entire towns joined Burgundy's side. Therefore, to maintain a firm grip over the government of the realm, it was vital that the Armagnacs dissuade the king's towns from offering any assistance to John the Fearless.

To this end, the royal mandate issued in January 1414 was very specific about the type of support the towns and their surrounding villages were forbidden to proffer to the duke of Burgundy.⁷⁴ In the letter that Charles VI sent to the town of Paris, he ordered, 'que en nostredite ville ne souffriez ny laissez entrer, demeurer, sejourner, passer ny repasser nostredit cousin de Bourgongne, ou autres de par luy, ou à luy favorisans, quels qu'ils soient, qui en armes voudroient venir par deça, comme dit est, et ne leur donniez conseil, confort, ny aide, en quelque manière que ce soit.'⁷⁵ Ostensibly this referred mainly to provisions, predominantly lodging and food supplies.

Yet this was precisely what Burgundy was soliciting. Monstrelet explained that when John the Fearless sent letters to the towns in Picardy in August 1417, requesting that

⁷² RSD, 4: 446; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 467. Also, Bourgeois, p. 10.

⁷³ Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, p. 89.

⁷⁴ *Histoire de Charles VI*, 495-496.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

they ‘ouvry la voye’, he was in effect asking for provisions.⁷⁶ Burgundy’s primary need for provisions is evident in an earlier letter written to the *bonnes villes* the 25 April 1417, in which he explained that he had tried, ever since his exile had begun, to come to the king’s aid, but had been thwarted when the Armagnacs had forced the towns of the realm to reject him: ‘les dessus dits rapineurs et dissipeurs firent faire defense par les cités et bonnes villes fermés que l’en ne nous laissast entrer ens ne nos gens, ne baillast aucuns vivres ne autres necessitez comme se nous feussions propres ennemis de ce dit Royaume.’⁷⁷ Burgundy claimed that he deserved the help of the *bonnes villes* because his intention was to free the king from tyranny. According to his viewpoint, the treatment that he had received was more appropriate for the enemies of the realm than a loyal subject. This statement was well placed: it came immediately after he had blamed the Armagnacs for devastating defeat at Agincourt by the English in October 1415. In likening his mistreatment by the *bonnes villes* to that which should rightfully have been reserved for the real enemies of the realm – the English – he implied that the Armagnac faction should be rebuffed by the towns in his place.

When Burgundy did obtain the material support he solicited, the towns assumed that he would pay for it. This was an ideal in the later middle ages, but was not a policy that all men-at-arms adhered to.⁷⁸ As Allmand has shown, the ability to efficiently provide for and control one’s army tested the effectiveness of the ruler.⁷⁹ Yet, ‘the civilian was no longer the accidental victim of war but was now becoming one of the chief targets of those who were waging a ‘just’ war with royal or princely authority.’⁸⁰ This was the result of years of raids by the English into the French countryside where peasants and townspeople alike

⁷⁶ Monstrelet, 3: 184.

⁷⁷ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39. For a copy of the document AN, K 60 n. 8.

⁷⁸ Allmand, *The Hundred Years War. England and France at War c. 1300 - c. 1450* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 97.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 97; ‘Changing Views of the Soldier’, p. 179.

⁸⁰ Allmand, ‘War and the Non-Combatant’, p. 263.

were either plundered or had their holdings razed to the ground.⁸¹ In consequence, most generally accepted that the enemy might, as a natural by-product of war, appropriate civilian possessions without offering restitution, though the non-combatant himself should remain unharmed as long as he did not resist.⁸² However, the rules of civil war were less clear. Although theoretically the king's subjects had to obey the king in all matters, Charles VI's inability to rule the kingdom undermined this ideal in practice. The Burgundian and Armagnac factions had control over the king and royal council at different times, and this frequent fluctuation in the royal government had a destabilising effect upon the realm. In effect, it forced the king's subjects to take a huge gamble in choosing which faction to support.

Yet because both factions claimed to be fighting to preserve the interests of the king and the common good it was, in theory, easier for the non-combatants to insist upon compensation. If either party did not want to risk compromising their ideological standpoint, it was imperative that they try not to destroy the countryside as they proceeded. This must have been widely understood, because there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the king's subjects felt justified in retaliating should they not be compensated for their livestock or other goods. Such was the case in 1417 when a garrison of six Burgundian men-at-arms stationed near Sommereux allegedly attempted to acquire some cattle 'pour la provisions des compagnons de ladicte garnison.'⁸³ Evidently this caused great upset in the village, inciting 'soixante compagnons et vint femmes ou environ' to seek out the Burgundian partisans. They called them 'faulx traistres bourgignons', and threw sticks and rocks at them. After the Burgundians shot and killed the ringleader with an arrow, the

⁸¹ Ibid, pp. 259-262; Clifford Rogers, 'By Fire and Sword. *Bellum Hostile* and "Civilians" in the Hundred Years' War', in *Civilians in the Path of War* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 2002), pp. 34-55.

⁸² Allmand, 'War and the Non-Combatant', p. 268.

⁸³ AN, JJ 170, n. 163 cited in Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 2: 103-105.

animals were returned to their owners, and one of the duke's men was captured and brought to Amiens to stand trial.⁸⁴

The importance of remuneration is further manifest in the letter of alliance that the citizens of Beauvais and the duke of Burgundy signed and published on 23 August 1417. It stated: 'Item que les dits de Beauvais recevront mondit seigneur le Duc et les siens en ladite ville, leur bailleront pour leur argent, vivres et autres choses dont ils auront besoin, et garderont et deffendront comme eux mesmes, pourveu que ladite ville demeure la plus forte, et feront a leurs pouvoir que les marchands de ladite ville ameneront vivres auprès mondit seigneur le Duc en son ost pourvu qu'ils seront tenus seurs et païés de leur denriés.'⁸⁵ A similar arrangement was made with Doullens.⁸⁶ It was an important article to include in the alliance, because John the Fearless frequently boasted that his army paid for everything that it needed while on military campaigns. This statement was in itself important for Burgundy's ideological platform because it provided theoretical 'evidence' of his concern for the *bien public* and his desire to preserve the common interests of the realm.

However, it is questionable whether John the Fearless and his army actually adhered to this policy or merely took advantage of it for its rhetorical value in encouraging the towns to offer him their support. In a letter he issued on 11 March 1414 from Lille, John assured his audience that 'en faisant le dit voyage [à Paris], ne a l'aler ne au retourner nous en entretenant nostre dicte entencion et volonté nous avions meu ne fait guerre à personne quelconques [...] sommes paisiblement aler et repassez en païant noz despens en chemin'.⁸⁷ Yet regardless of whether he paid his way or not, for our purpose it is important that this was a significant element of John's propaganda. It was effectively one

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.105.

⁸⁵ ADO, *Collection Bucquet-aux-Cousteaux*, vol. 55-56, pp. 402.

⁸⁶ This letter patent is transcribed nearly verbatim in full in Monstrelet, 3: 185.

⁸⁷ ADN, B 658, n. 15.253r.

that he used to separate himself from his rivals, whom he claimed devastated the *bien public* with their warmongering.⁸⁸

Ironically, to be able to pay his way Burgundy needed to acquire both supplies and financial assistance. In his letters to the *bonnes villes* in July 1411 whilst preparing for war with the Armagnacs, John specifically asked the merchants to send 'denrées et marchandises' to his army.⁸⁹ In a letter written to the town of Amiens on 3 October 1417 and presented by two of Burgundy ambassadors, the duke highlighted how his desire to serve the king above all things had 'cousté et coustoit grandement'. For this reason, his ambassadors asked the mayor, the alderman, the burgesses and the inhabitants of the town to consider raising an *aide* to help alleviate the costs and expenses of his large army.⁹⁰ Clearly the ambassadors' affirmation of John the Fearless' loyalty to the realm and love of the king was merely a preamble to his request for their financial assistance. This request is not surprising because the duke of Burgundy had won Amiens to his cause earlier, in August. Indeed on 15 August 1417, he made his entry into the town and celebrated the feast day of the Assumption in the cathedral of Notre Dame.⁹¹ The town of Amiens granted John the Fearless an *aide* of three hundred *livres tournois*.⁹² Amiens gave him a further *aide* in December 1417, and on 16 May 1418, gave him a third *aide* for the siege of Senlis.⁹³

What is remarkable, however, is that only seventeen days after the ambassadors had presented their case to the burghers back in October 1417, Amiens refused to send two

⁸⁸ See, for example, Petit in Monstrelet, 1: 241. A similar statement was made in a royal letter issued on 2 November 1411, while Burgundy controlled the royal council. ACO, B 11893, layette 85, no. 8.

⁸⁹ ACO, B 1570, fols. 277v-278.

⁹⁰ '[L]edit monseigneur de Bourgogne avoit exposé et exposoit son corps et toutes sa chevance ou service du Roy nostre sire, pour le bien d'icellui seigneur et de son royaume, qui lui avoit cousté et coustoit grandement, et requierent de par lui advis maieur et eschevins, bourgeois et habitans qu'il vaulsissent faire aucun aide, tel que à eulx plairoit, pour aidier à supporter les frais et despons de l'armée par lui mises sus, pour la cause dicte.' Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fol. 113v.

⁹¹ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 658.

⁹² Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fol. 113v.

⁹³ For the *aide* granted to Burgundy on 23 December 1417, see Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols. 120v-121r. For the third *aide* in May 1418, see 126v.

leading burgesses to John the Fearless so that he could ‘traictier, pacifier et accorder sur ce qu’il leur vorroit faire exposer au bien du Roy nostre sire et de son royaume’⁹⁴ Unfortunately, no reason is given in the deliberation records for their refusal. However, their vacillating decisions may represent the tension between the rival parties, the towns, and the obligation to the crown of France. Indeed the *bonnes villes* had to tread very carefully during this conflict for fear that they might choose to back the ‘wrong’ faction.⁹⁵ The autumn of 1417 was particularly perilous because any town that opposed the Armagnacs in favour of the duke of Burgundy was theoretically committing lèse-majesty. This was the major obstacle that Burgundy had to overcome, and therein lies the reason why he orchestrated such an aggressive letter campaign to persuade the towns to back him.

The *bonnes villes* had much to be concerned about, because the duke was a formidable force to oppose.⁹⁶ This point is made very clear in the letter John wrote and sent to the *bonnes villes* the 29 September 1417. The letter began by declaring that John had undertaken his military campaign to ‘dejecter et ouster dudit gouvernement [les Armagnacs], et pour eviter que par leur convoitise et ambition, ledit royaulme ne sois perdus...’⁹⁷ He added that he would maintain peaceful relations with anyone who was ‘a friend’ of the king, and therefore loyal also to him. Yet, he was not at all subtle in his threats to attack those who did not help him. He asserted that it was not enough to ‘soy obstenir de mal faire’. Rather, he expected everyone to engage in the conflict and help him achieve his ends: ‘car en ycelle poursuite avons employé et entendons employer nostre corps, nostre devance,

⁹⁴ Arch. Comm. d’Amiens, BB.2, fols. 114r-114v. The letter they sent explaining this to John the Fearless was described in an assembly on 20 October 1417. See fol. 115v.

⁹⁵ Anne Curry examined this issue closely in a case study of Mantes, emphasising the necessity for towns to sit on the fence in order to survive the many changes in power. See ‘Bourgeois et soldat dans la ville de Mantes pendant l’occupation anglaise de 1419 à 1449’, in *Guerre, pouvoir et noblesse au moyen âge. Mélanges à l’honneur de Philippe Contamine* (Paris, 2000), pp. 177-178, 184.

⁹⁶ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 215-223; Kelly de Vries, ‘John the Fearless’ Way of War’ in *Reputation and Representation in Fifteenth-Century Europe*, eds. Douglas L. Biggs, Sharon D. Michalove and Albert Compton Reeves (Leiden, 2004), pp. 39-55.

⁹⁷ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fols. 254r-254v.

nos amis et bienveillans et allies et tout que Dieu nous a presté sans y riens epargner.⁹⁸

With his intimidating army standing outside the town gates, northern towns such as Amiens, Beauvais, Doullens, and the many other towns within close proximity to Paris ultimately had little choice but to pledge their support to the duke of Burgundy.⁹⁹

Yet according to the Jouvenal compiler, it was John's letters to the *bonnes villes* that generated positive results rather than the army.¹⁰⁰ Allegedly, Rouen took up the Burgundian cross as a symbol of their allegiance to him following their reception of his letters.¹⁰¹ Rheims, Châlons, Troyes and Auxerre followed Rouen's example.¹⁰² Yet to maintain the appearance of autonomy, towns that had capitulated to Burgundy could maintain that it had been their own choice to join the duke. This was certainly the case with Troyes in August 1417.¹⁰³ Burgundy's original letter to the town of Troyes announced his intention to liberate the king and to save the realm from imminent destruction. He justified his armed march on Paris by claiming that he was compelled, through his ardent concern for the king's well being and that of the entire realm, to liberate him from the tyranny of the Armagnacs. Just as Rouen declared itself in favour of John the Fearless following their reception of his letter, it was also the ostensible catalyst for Troyes' own change of heart.

6.3. RECEPTION

6.3.1. The publication of letters to the *bonnes villes*

The 1405 'letter war' that followed the alleged kidnapping of the dauphin in August of that year is very useful for piecing together the process of publication. Additionally it tells us something substantial about the reaction that the senders (Burgundy and his rivals)

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ These were: Senlis, Beaumont-sur-Oise, Provins, Vernon, Mantes, Poissy, Monthéry, Chartres, Rouen, and Rheims. Schnerb, *État bourguignon*, p. 165. See also Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 215-222.

¹⁰⁰ This was also the view taken by Schnerb, *État bourguignon*, p. 165.

¹⁰¹ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 533.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ For this and what follows, BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 248r.

anticipated from their audiences. In his first letter to the inhabitants of Mâcon on 19 August 1405, Burgundy gave very precise instructions as to how the inhabitants should respond to his letter. He claimed that the letter was written so that they would know exactly what his intention had been, and remained – that is, to endeavour to protect the king, the dauphin, and the realm. He asked that they ‘rescrivez ce que [vous] aurez entencion de faire sur ce’ and give their letter to his messenger. According to Burgundy, whatever the town wanted him to do regarding the issue, he would do it ‘tres voulentiers.’¹⁰⁴

It is interesting that in this letter Burgundy asked that the town send some of their burgesses to hear his intentions relating to the king, his family and the good of the realm. This was a rather oblique question, which was designed to feel out where their loyalty lay. Naturally, the townspeople of Mâcon responded by stating that they were and would remain loyal subjects of the king, and by association, to anyone who ‘par lui sont et seront commis et deputez à garder le bien, honneur, estat du Roy nostre seigneur’. For this reason, they would send some of their burgesses to ‘oir ce qu’il plaira au Roi et à son bon conseil commander.’¹⁰⁵ This is an interesting response for a number of reasons. First, because it was a safe answer: Mâcon was not committing to anything other than serving the king, and whomever the king himself charged with overseeing affairs in his stead. By sending deputies to Paris, they were not necessarily supporting the duke of Burgundy, but were waiting to hear what the king and the royal council agreed would be the best solution to the crisis.

Alternatively, Mâcon’s assurance of their undying loyalty to the crown was essentially meaningless. This is because there wasn’t another appropriate response to give, or at least not one that would have impeded potential repercussions. When John the Fearless asked them to send representatives of their town out of their duty to the king and

¹⁰⁴ This is a copy of Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41 n.1, cited in Miro, *Pièces*, p.404, n. 4.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

his realm, it was in actual fact a hollow question that deliberately deflected any chance of losing their support entirely. Propagandists typically ask questions of their intended audience which outwardly appear to reinforce their ideology, but that are actually inconsequential.¹⁰⁶ This is because it adds to the hyperbole, which makes the rhetoric appear meaningful on the surface.

In a later letter, dated 17 September, Burgundy not only asked for the townspeople's response, but also gave very specific instructions for the way that the letter should be published. He asked them to publicly read the letter verbatim so that everyone would be assured of the validity of the previous accusations that he had made against Orleans. These accusations were made in Parlement on his behalf for the improvement and restructuring of the realm, and were subsequently published in the form of a letter patent. The letters were then dispersed around the realm. Once the townspeople were assured of the 'truth', Burgundy expected that they would feel compelled to help him implement the new reforms.¹⁰⁷ Hence, we can conclude that the sender intended his letters to inform the townspeople of the situation, while simultaneously inviting them to engage with him in political dialogue.

Finally, the instructions given in a royal letter patent stresses the importance of distributing the letters as widely as possible. In one of the many royal ordinances published against John the Fearless after his exile from Paris in August 1413, the king insisted that the proclamation be sent to the provost of Paris, to all the bailiwicks, seneschals, provosts and other royal officers of justice scattered around the realm. He demanded that the letters be published to the towns in their 'sièges et auditoires', in the markets and all the other usual places for publishing royal ordinances and proclamations so that 'personnes n'en puisse

¹⁰⁶ Noam Chomsky, *Media Control. The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*, 2nd edn. (New York, 2002), pp. 25-29.

¹⁰⁷ Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n.4 cited in Mirot, *Pièces*, pp. 413-414, n. 8.

pretendre cause d'ignorance.'¹⁰⁸ The auditoria to which the royal letter referred were likely the assembly halls used by the towns to deliberate on various issues relating to the good of the community. This was clearly an event wherein the king's royal officers and townspeople around the realm gathered together to hear the reading of the letter. Amiens' records of assemblies and deliberations held in communal archives in Amiens create a clearer picture of the involvement that the townspeople had in the ritual.

The record of the assembly held on 9 August 1412 at Malmaison in Amiens, lists the names of those present, including the bailiwick, the mayor, the aldermen and other town councillors, the bishop of Amiens and 'un grand nombre de bourgeois manans et habitans en ladite ville'.¹⁰⁹ The record further specified that the reading had included all the neighbouring villages under the jurisdiction of the bishopric of Amiens. In another assembly held 13 July 1417, Burgundy's letters, which were signed by the duke's own hand, were read out to the captain of Amiens, the mayor, the town councillors, and 'plusieurs bourgeois, manans et habitans'.¹¹⁰ The fact that the 'manans and habitants' were included in the address of the letter and also in the assembly suggest that it was important for the information to reach each level of urban society, rather than remaining an exclusive document reserved for the town's ruling elite. The records are full of evidence that prove that it was more usual than not for the entire town and its surrounding rural villages to gather together to hear the reading of letters that were sent by the highest levels of French society. The record of an assembly held on the 6 April 1414, stated that it was the unanimous decision of the town to reject the duke of Burgundy's request for military assistance in his campaign against the Armagnacs.¹¹¹ Another Amiens town record reveals that on 3 October 1417, at least five hundred 'bourgeois et habitants' participated in the reading of the duke of Burgundy's letters close which addressed his ongoing military

¹⁰⁸ RSD, 5: 249-269.

¹⁰⁹ Archives Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols. 17v-18v.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 108r.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, fols. 38v-39v.

campaign to 'liberate the king' from Armagnac control.¹¹² The vast number of people involved in this particular public reading demonstrates how comprehensive and inclusive these assemblies were.

Furthermore, one of Burgundy's letters to Beauvais written the 1 September 1417 illustrates this process of inclusion, in addition to clarifying the impact that the letters may have had. In this document the duke explained that after the town had published his letters, which declared his 'vraye et loyale entencion que avons au bien et honneur de mondit seigneur et a la bonne et brieve reparation de son dit Royaume', the bishop and the dean of the town, the captain of Beauvais, the mayor, and the 'bourgeois, manans et habitans' had all officially declared themselves in favour of the duke of Burgundy, and swore to assist the duke 'en corps et en biens'. They legitimised their agreement with the duke by sealing the letter patent with the town's official seal. It is interesting that the duke of Burgundy claimed that the townspeople of Beauvais gave him their full support based solely on the reading of his letter. In truth, the army that was camped outside the city probably had much to do with persuading them. Yet regardless of his army's influence, it is significant that the duke claimed that the letters had won the support of the Beauvaisis.

This assertion is consistent with statements made in other Burgundian letters. A descriptive letter sent by two of Burgundy's men, Jean de Fraignant and the lord of Toulonjeon, to the duchess of Burgundy following the capitulation of Troyes in 1417 provides one example.¹¹³ The letter explained that the two men had asked the townspeople of Troyes to provide their official response to the duke of Burgundy's letter patent that had previously been sent to them. The duke's initial letter had declared his intention to free the king and realm from the tyranny of the Armagnacs. When the duke's representatives had not received any reply they asked to see the bailiwick of Troyes, who was, incidentally, an Armagnac sympathiser. He refused outright to publish the duke's letters, and also refused

¹¹² *Ibid.*, fol. 133v.

¹¹³ For this and what follows, see BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 248r.

to give them leave to enter the city to do so themselves. They explained to the duchess that they nevertheless found a way into the suburbs of the town, and spread the word that they had letters to publish on behalf of the duke of Burgundy. In less than an hour, they claimed that between six and seven thousand people turned up fully armed and insisted that Burgundy's letters be read aloud. Because they were angry for being excluded from the reading in the first place, the bailiwick was compelled to allow the reading to take place. Thus, Fraignant read the letter 'en la plus grand et haulte place de Troyes, appelé le marché de Blé, aprez laquelle lecture ledit peuple fut tres joyeux et content crians à haulte voix: Noel! Vive le roy et monseigneur de Bourgogne!'

It was commonplace for the bearer of the letter or the herald to read it out in full view of the predestined audience, in very public places, such as town squares, assembly halls, markets and crossroads to a wide and varied audience. Frequently the publication of a royal proclamation – or one made on the king's behalf by either the duke of Burgundy or the Armagnacs while they controlled the royal council – was heralded in by the sound of the trumpet. When the king wanted to publish the Peace of Auxerre (22 August 1412), for example, his orders to the Parlement of Paris and the provost stated the following instructions: '[V]ous mandons et expressement enjoignons que la dicte paix vous faites crier et publier de par nous solennellement et a son de trompe en notre bonne ville de Paris par tous les carrefours et autres lieux accoustumés a faire cris en ville en commandant de par nous a tous nos subgiés'.¹¹⁴ Evidently, the king wanted to make a spectacle of the reading and to gain the full attention of all potential participants in this particular exchange of information. This publication process was, according to Michèle Fogel, a particular

¹¹⁴ AN, K 60, n.3

'cérémonie de l'information.'¹¹⁵ The trumpet not only served to seize the attention of the audience, it effectively invested the message with royal authority.¹¹⁶

Although writing and literacy gained more prevalence in medieval society between the eleventh century and the beginning of the fourteenth century, Michael Clanchy has shown that oral communication, including reading letters aloud, remained the favoured and more trusted means of reception.¹¹⁷ In fact, the visual materiality of the letter was designed to substantiate the oral message, to act as an evidentiary document. This explains why most letters patent began with 'A tous ceux qui ces lettres verront, salut.' The formula was unlikely to imply that the sender intended everyone to read the letter personally, but rather to see its physical manifestation while the crier read it aloud.¹¹⁸ When important writs and letters were also frequently attached to doors of churches they became visual manifestations of what had been read aloud, there as reminders or as resources for those who could read them. For example, when John the Fearless realised that he would not be successful in his siege of Paris in February 1414, he returned to Saint Denis where he 'fist escrire lectres lesquelles il fist atacher par nuit par aucuns de ses favorisans aux portaulx de l'église Nostre Dame, du Palais et ailleurs aval Paris, et lesquelles il envoya en plusieurs bonnes villes.'¹¹⁹

Therefore it is clear that the publication of letters was designed to incorporate a wide and varied audience in the exchange of information. This complemented the senders' direct request for a response, which naturally encouraged an active reading and reaction to the content of the letter. Moreover, most contemporaries seemed to have recognised the potential threat that letters posed in manipulating public opinion. Indeed the main purpose

¹¹⁵ See Michèle Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information dans la France du XVI^e au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1989), pp. 23-59.

¹¹⁶ Fogel, *Les ceremonies de l'information*, pp. 24-25; Clouzot, 'Le son et le pouvoir', p. 625.

¹¹⁷ Michael Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1993), pp. 1-2. See also Crosby, 'Oral Delivery in the Middle Ages', pp. 88-110.

¹¹⁸ Williams, *English Vernacular Letters*, pp. 60-70.

¹¹⁹ Monstrelet, 2: 434. The letter itself is transcribed in full pp. 434-436, and in Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 297, n. 289.

behind the publication of official information was to exert control over the 'clamour' of the people – to control public talk (rumours), because it was not recognised as an 'official' form of speech.¹²⁰ Those in positions of authority perceived these forms of dialogue as highly dangerous because they were considered the first step towards sedition, or for our purpose, partisanship.¹²¹ It was expedient therefore to ensure that public talk was monitored, and where possible, manipulated to suit the needs of the propagandist. In this way, John the Fearless tried to accomplish two things when he embarked upon a letter campaign. Firstly he attempted to control public talk so that the people of the realm would not react against him. The second was in some ways a by-product of the first, because in trying to control what people said publicly about him he was effectively trying to control his reputation (*fama*). Clear evidence to this effect is found in the intense propaganda campaign against John the Fearless in the months between his exile (August 1413) and his siege of Paris between January and February, about which he complained to the king.¹²²

But how did the townspeople react to the content of the letters sent during this period, and in particular, to the duke of Burgundy's letter campaigns? Did the message imparted by the duke of Burgundy persuade the townspeople to accept his position and to join his cause? If we are to believe Fraignant and Toulonjeon, the town of Troyes capitulated to the duke of Burgundy upon hearing the content of the his letter. This may have been the case, but it was the bailiwick's refusal to publish the letter in the first place that led to mass discontent and consequently contributed to the town's acceptance of the duke's terms. The townspeople's reaction against him suggests that they felt that it was their natural right to have access to all manner of information so that they could make their decisions independently. The most important point to draw from this example is that the townspeople of Troyes clearly wanted to be included in political affairs, and to maintain the

¹²⁰ Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information*, p. 13.

¹²¹ Gauvard, 'Rumeur et stéréotypes', p. 165.

¹²² RSD, 5: 214.

illusion that they had the right to make their own choices when they were confronted with the information that they received via letters.

A similar story can be told of Beauvais' capitulation in 1417 to John the Fearless. Ostensibly the Beauvaisis had agreed to the terms by their own volition upon hearing of the duke's 'true' intentions to save the king by the reading of his letter. Likewise, in his March 1414 letter to the *bonnes villes* John explained that the townspeople in Compiègne and Soissons had collectively agreed to Burgundian garrisons in their towns after they had listened to his version of events, which were recounted to them in letter format.¹²³ Thus the towns clearly reacted to the letters even if it was not because they sincerely believed in what he was saying. What is important here is that the towns claimed to have believed him, which is, at the very least, a passive acceptance of the propaganda that John the Fearless disseminated.

Burgundy's main audience for his letter campaigns comprised the *bonnes villes*, who were consequently of great importance to his strategy, since, over the course of the fourteenth century, they had become influential voices in the government of the realm. The very fact that Burgundy felt the need to justify himself to the *bonnes villes* during periods of political crisis, confirms that their opinion mattered to him. This explains why the duke's letters requested a response and frequently invited them to engage in the political dialogue. However, the most important point that has been addressed here was Burgundy's ability to use letters more efficiently to promote his ideology than his Orleanist rivals. Although in later years they seemed to take John the Fearless' example and use missives, royal ordinances and letters close and patent to their advantage, their letter writing was initially defensive counter-propaganda. This is significant because it determines that Burgundy was, in effect, setting the bar. Even the Armagnac counter-propaganda campaign between 1413 and 1414, which had devastating consequences for John's fama, was defensive; it was

¹²³ ADN, B 658, n. 15.235.

designed to attack at the heart of Burgundy's previous propaganda campaigns – insisting, for example, that what letters the king had published under Burgundy's influence were false and even treasonous. In 1417, John's intensive letter campaign that accompanied his military manoeuvres was triumphant. Although the military threat did have a great influence over his success with the bonnes villes, the letters did play an equally vital role.

CHAPTER 7

SYMBOLS

'Symbols are matters of relationships which must in some way be publicly recognized and remembered – they are not absolutes, but function entirely within social life.'¹ Indeed a symbol is effectively a complex 'sign', consisting of a connection between a signifier (an object, image or sound) and what is signified (the meaning, or concept); this connection is what allows receivers to subjectively ascribe meaning.² Semiotic theory states that 'the true nature of things may be said to lie not in things themselves, but in the relationships which we construct, and then perceive, between them.'³ Hence, no observer is passive in the process of interpretation of sign form, that is, of symbols, icons, or rituals. Meaning can be derived through learning and experience, or can imposed upon us from persons in positions of power.⁴ This is important within the medieval context, for, as Beaune states: 'Signs and symbols can carry enormous weight in a society where communication is primarily orally based and belief in appearances strong, often more meaningful than texts.'⁵

It follows that the symbols that formed the emblematic language of heraldry, livery, and badges in the middle ages were indeed exceedingly suggestive influences in medieval society.⁶ According to Keen, '[d]isplay was necessary to make power meaningful.'⁷

¹ Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 260.

² Ferdinand de Saussure was the first to coin these terms in his linguistic studies. Saussure, 'The Object of Study', pp. 5-8. Also, Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 13; Macey, *Dictionary of Critical Theory*, pp. 342-343, 351-352; Bressler, *Literary Criticism*, p. 92.

³ Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7, 100-101; Esther Cohen, *The Crossroads of Justice. Law and Culture in Late Medieval France* (Leiden, 1993), p. 157.

⁵ Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology. Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France*, trans. Susan Ross Huston (Berkeley, 1991), p. 197.

⁶ Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', pp. 320-341; Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology*, p. 197; Beaune, 'Costume et pouvoir', pp. 125-146; Huizinga, *Le déclin du moyen âge*, pp. 285-286; Adrian Ailes, 'Heraldry in Medieval England: Symbols of Politics and Propaganda', in *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England*, eds. Peter Coss and Maurice Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), p. 83.

⁷ Keen, 'Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', p. 10. See also Boulton, *The Knights of the Crown*, p. 2.

Accordingly, this present chapter examines the way that John the Fearless incorporated his personal emblems into his propaganda campaign. These he distributed widely to retainers and partisans in all social orders for the purpose of recruitment, which, as we shall see, helped to foster a strong sense of identity among both elite and non-elite partisans. In distributing his personal badges to aristocratic and urban followers alike, the duke was able to manufacture a distinct 'Burgundian' community, and a correlating, hostile Armagnac anti-community. Identity is one of the most important facets of a successful propaganda campaign. According to Taithe and Thornton, propaganda is a

two-way process which reaches out for unanimity within a group it often helps to define. This purpose, that is, to define, is central to the concept, and it is a tool of exclusion as well as inclusion.⁸

Furthermore, the badges that Burgundy chose as his own personal emblems – the carpenter's plane and the mason's level – reinforced his policy of reform, thereby conveying also his ostensible devotion to the crown. In this way, the medium was more than simply the vehicle through which the message was conveyed; it was itself an important component of that message.⁹ This is most evident in the way that John made what were originally abstract symbols more tangible by turning them into items to be worn on clothing as brooches, or on armour, horse trappings and banners.

It should be noted however that the duke of Burgundy was not the first to distribute badges to his allies and supporters. Rather, his innovation lay in the fact that he was ultimately responsible for turning what had, hitherto, been a private dispute between princely houses and their allies, into a full-scale civil war involving the townspeople of the realm by distributing Burgundian ensigns among them. At the end of August in 1411, John's ally, the count of Saint Pol, who was then the captain of Paris, mobilised a large group of Parisian butchers, skimmers and tanners to seek out Orleanist supporters in the

⁸ Taithe and Thornton, 'Propaganda', *Propaganda*, p. 3.

⁹ Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 111.

capital. The provost of Paris, Pierre des Essarts, another Burgundian ally, declared by royal ordinance in September that all Orleanists were henceforth considered rebels, and that it was therefore permissible to kill and confiscate their property. Doubtless as a direct consequence of violent coercion, those who claimed to support the duke of Burgundy's cause began to wear lead and pewter badges with crosses of Saint Andrew (figs. 10-13) to differentiate themselves from non-partisans.¹⁰ Fearing exclusion and potential reprisals, the pressure on townspeople to openly pledge allegiance to Burgundy's faction by wearing his badge(s) must have been great. Consequently, many probably accepted his badges out of panic.

Notwithstanding the coercion, Burgundy's second innovation was that his badges buttressed his main ideological tenets regarding reform, anti-taxation and good government. Thus, while Burgundy tried to win the hearts and minds of the people by ensuring that his use of symbols conformed to his underlying platform, he simultaneously made use of psychological and violent duress to recruit less decisive partisans to his cause. These two approaches made a formidable combination, and one that was undoubtedly difficult for many to resist. We will, therefore, examine both aspects within this present chapter.

7.1. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

The vogue of secular badge-wearing for the purpose of personal identification gained momentum in the mid-fourteenth century.¹¹ Lead and pewter badges were a common appearance on clothing of people across Europe in the middle ages and in

¹⁰ Bourgeois, p. 12; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 467.

¹¹ Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', pp. 3-22; Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', pp. 320-341; Ronald W. Lightbrown, *Medieval European Jewellery, with a Catalogue of the Collection in the Victoria and Albert Museum* (London, 1992), pp. 188-201; Beaune, 'Costume et pouvoir', p. 125.

particular, among pilgrims.¹² Likewise, they were distributed to persons who were attached to aristocratic households. Denis Bruna explained that secular brooches such as these were available for use by the general population in both France and England as far back as the mid-fourteenth century.¹³ A large number of lead and pewter badges have been found in England to support this assertion.¹⁴ This pattern of distribution was so vast that it sometimes led to outbursts of violence among disparate social groupings. Consequently, both Richard II and Henry IV instituted laws to limit distribution. This confirms that the less valuable brooches were widely available and were disseminated to a broad range of social groups.¹⁵ In France, badges were no less fashionable and useful among the *menu peuple* during the fourteenth century. When Etienne Marcel led the popular revolt in the 1350s, he and his partisans wore ensigns of small red and blue enamel shields on which was written the motto: 'A bonne fin'.¹⁶ We can be sure, therefore, that by the time of the Burgundo-Armagnac war the practice of distributing badges to all members of a faction was firmly in place.

The most important socio-political development that influenced the progression of badge-wearing among the aristocracy was arguably the great importance placed upon appearances, and in particular upon clothing and jewellery. In any age, clothing and accessories are a form of communication, part of 'a system of signs that derives meaning from its context'.¹⁷ Indeed clothing and other forms of semiological display tend to

¹² See Bruna, *Enseignes de pèlerinage et enseignes profanes*, Musée National du Moyen Age Thermes de Cluny (Paris, 1996), pp. 13-20.

¹³ For this and what follows, Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', pp. 14-21.

¹⁴ See Brian Spencer, *Pilgrim Souvenirs and Secular Badges, Salisbury Museum: Medieval Catalogue. Part 2* (Salisbury, 1991), p. 97-106, 123-127.

¹⁵ Spencer, *Pilgrim Souvenirs and Secular Badges*, p. 96.

¹⁶ Lightbrown, *Medieval European Jewellery*, p. 200, cited in Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', p. 15.

¹⁷ Nathan Joseph, *Uniforms and Nonuniforms: Communication through Clothing* (New York, 1986), p. 1. For more on the importance of clothing as symbolic signs see chapter 2 'Sartorial Signs: A Social Vocabulary', pp. 9-30. See also Françoise Piponnier and Perrine Mane, *Dress in the Middle Ages*, trans. Caroline Beamish (New Haven, 1997), p. 114.

communicate a strong message to spectators about power, prestige and authority.¹⁸ This was particularly true in the middle ages, in a society in which the primary function of clothing was to distinguish one's rank and estate. An obvious instance is the importance of the sumptuary laws instituted across Europe in the fourteenth century, though these were, at best, representative of an ideal. The theory was that these 'laws' would attempt to control the display of wealth.¹⁹ Fastidious rules of display were equally observed among the differing ranks of nobles, where the style and cut of personal clothing, trimmings and ornaments were representative of position within the social hierarchy.²⁰ Moreover, extravagance in both costume and ritual at princely courts was a traditional feature of chivalric society.²¹ The aristocracy continued to make their wealth and prestige manifest with increasingly extravagant costume and jewellery, frequently incorporating symbols such as heraldic emblems, devices, and chivalric orders. This trend accelerated at the French royal court and in other princely affinities during the second half of the fourteenth century.²²

It was not merely the aristocratic estate of medieval society that recognised the important symbolic value of clothing and accessories. The general understanding that royal emblems were representative of the king's majesty and royal dignity had increased under

¹⁸ For information on the colours used in clothing as a means of confirming the hierarchy within the royal house of France for example, see Christian de Mérindol, 'Le prince et son cortège. La théâtralisation des signes de pouvoir à la fin du moyen âge', in *Les princes et le pouvoir, 23e congrès de la S.H.M.E.S., Brest mai 1992*, eds. Dominic Boutet and Jacques Verger (Paris, 1993), pp. 310-317. Piponnier and Mane, *Dress in the Middle Ages*, p. 74; Beaune, 'Costume et pouvoir', p. 127. Peter Arnade argues that the dukes of Burgundy displayed themselves in such a way as to create a 'public profile worthy of lordship', *Realms of Ritual. Burgundian Ceremony and Civic Life in Late Medieval Ghent* (Ithaca, 1996), pp. 9-10.

¹⁹ Frédérique Lachaud, 'Dress and Social Status in England before the Sumptuary Laws', in *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display*, pp. 105-107. See also Piponnier and Mane, *Dress in the Middle Ages*, p. 81-89, 72; Piponnier, *Costume et vie sociale. La cour d'Anjou XIV^e-XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1970), p. 25; Lightbrown, *Medieval European Jewellery*, pp. 79-88.

²⁰ Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 4-5.

²¹ Keen, 'Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', pp. 5-9; Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, p. 2.

²² Michel Pastoureau, *Traité d'héraldique*, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1993), pp. 215-220; Hablot 'L'emblématique', pp. 81-83; Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', p. 319-321. See chapter 5 in Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 267-210, and also p. 272.

Charles V.²³ Insisting that magnificence and luxury played a major role in distinguishing the king's authority from his lesser peers, Strubel argued 'c'est l'habit que fait le roi'.²⁴ This was a fundamental feature in preserving the royal dignity of the king, because his appearance and ritualised performance was as much a gauge of his pre-eminence over all his subjects as it was of his commitment to his royal duty.²⁵ Other princes began to borrow the strategy employed to bolster the 'royal image', which attests to its efficacy in reinforcing the notion of sovereignty.²⁶ Indeed ducal household accounts indicate that outer appearances were exceedingly important to a prince's image.²⁷ Charles V's eldest son, Louis, was concurrently the duke of Anjou and the king of Sicily. His accounts disclose that he was deeply concerned with ensuring that his clothing and jewels befitted both exalted titles.²⁸ His brothers, the dukes of Burgundy and Berry, appear to have had similar preoccupations. The duke of Burgundy's sumptuous court and extensive patronage of the arts is well documented, and one needs only look at the *Très riches heures du duc de Berry*'s illuminated images to call witness to the magnificence of display in courtly circles.²⁹

²³ Armand Strubel, 'Le chevauchier de Charles V: Christine de Pizan et le spectacle de la majesté royale', in *Penser le pouvoir au moyen âge (VIII-XV^e siècle)*, eds. Dominic Boutet and Jacques Verger (Paris, 2000), p. 390. For a brief overview of the heraldry of the lilies as the official arms of France in the fourteenth century see Beaune, *Birth of an Ideology*, p. 210-213. See also William Hinkle, *The Fleurs de Lis of the Kings of France 1285-1488* (Carbondale, 1991), pp. 4-33.

²⁴ Strubel, 'Le chevauchier de Charles V', p. 390.

²⁵ For the symbolic aspect of his royal duty see Peter Lewis, 'Pourquoi aurait-on voulu réunir des États Généraux en France, à la fin du moyen âge?', in *Représentation, pouvoir et royauté à la fin du moyen âge*, (Paris, 1995), pp. 122, 128-129.

²⁶ Mérimondol, 'Le prince et son cortège', pp. 316-317. Michael Jones' study of the dukes of Brittany charts the development of this trend in the duchy from Jean V (r. 1399-1442) to Anne (r. 1488-1514). "En son habit royal": Le duc de Bretagne et son image vers la fin du moyen âge', in *Between France and England. Politics, Power and Society in Late Medieval Brittany* (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 253-277. For a similar phenomenon in the House of Anjou under King René of Sicily, duke of Anjou, see Piponnier, *Costume et vie sociale*, p. 255-259.

²⁷ Strubel, 'Le chevauchier de Charles V', p. 390; Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', p. 3.

²⁸ For information on Louis I d'Anjou's expenditure on his and his wife's wardrobe see Piponnier, *Costume et vie sociale*, pp. 19-45. For his rivalry with all his brothers (Charles V, Philip duke of Burgundy and John duke of Berry) see pp. 44-45.

²⁹ For Philip the Bold's patronage of the arts, see *L'art à la cour de Bourgogne*. Vaughan, *Philip the Bold: The Formation of the Burgundian State* (London, 1962), pp. 188-207. For the duke of Berry's patronage, see Millard Meiss, *French Painting in the Time of Jean de Berry, I. The Late XIVth Century and the Patronage of the Duke* (London, 1967); Autrand, *Jean de Berry*, pp. 385-392, 428-459, 473-489.

Heraldic emblems, badges and chivalric orders gained prominence at the French royal court during the Hundred Years War.³⁰ This was the natural extension of what scholars refer to as 'bastard feudalism', where service was given to a prince for a reward that was generally cash-based rather than in land tenure.³¹ Originally, liveries were the clothing given to all those who were attached to a prince's household, and were distributed in measure according to rank.³² To wear a lord's chosen livery was an indication that one was his retainer, and had earned his protection and support.³³ From this practice the term 'livery' took on its present meaning as the specific colours associated with a person or an institution.³⁴ During the course of the fourteenth century, the gifts of clothing given to higher-ranking members of a prince's household or entourage were soon replaced with gifts, and were usually gifts of money or *orfèverie*.³⁵ These types of favours bestowed by a prince were the dominant feature of 'bastard feudalism'. In one example, John duke of Burgundy gave three thousand pounds of 'vaiselle d'argent dorée et blanche' to diverse lords, knights and squires who came to Paris between August and October 1405 to serve him in arms.³⁶ Similarly, lords distributed badges of differing quality to his retainers. The lower ranking members of his household might receive lead or pewter badges with the lord's emblem to wear upon their clothing. The distribution of gold, silver and jewelled badges as gifts were, by and large, reserved for the prince's elite clientele and allies. This

³⁰ Pastoureau, *Traité d'héraldique*, pp. 215-220; Hablot 'L'emblématique', pp. 81-83; Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', p. 319-321.

³¹ This is an area of study which has been examined in great detail, particularly as it concerns England. See Kenneth Bruce McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 20 (1945): 161-180. For an overview of the scholarship, see Gerald Leslie Harriss, 'Introduction', in McFarlane, *England in the Fifteenth Century. Collected Essays* (London, 1981): ix-xxvii; and Michael Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism* (London, 1995). For the French context see Lewis, 'Decayed and Non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France', in *Essays in Later Medieval French History* (London, 1985), pp. 41-68. For a general understanding of the impact of change on courtly culture, see Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 1-26.

³² Piponnier, *Dress in the Middle Ages*, p. 135; Malcolm Vale, *The Princely Court: Medieval Courts and Culture in North-West Europe, 1270-1380* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 93-135; Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', pp. 3-5; Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 4-5; Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, pp. 63-65.

³³ Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, pp. 63-64; Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, p. 3.

³⁴ Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', p. 319, n. 2; Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 3-4; Piponnier, *Dress in the Middle Ages*, p. 135.

³⁵ Piponnier, *Dress in the Middle Ages*, p. 135.

³⁶ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 78v.

was a practice used by princes to tie lesser nobles and knights, vassals and non-vassals to his court according to ties of service.³⁷

His retainers might wear his device in the form of a collar, though collars were typically indicators of membership to a curial order.³⁸ They were, according to Hablot, the most prestigious gift conferred by a prince.³⁹ Because the prince invited the recipient to enter into an exclusive corporate identity under his sovereign leadership, chivalric orders were not merely attempts to bind retainers to princes, but opportunities for princes to exert their influence over them.⁴⁰ This process is observed when we examine John the Fearless' Order of the Golden Tree, an order that was first started by his father, Philip the Bold, in 1403. Firstly, we note that in December 1407, he gave sixteen crowns to his squires Jean de Montjeu and to Huguenin de Marcy for the purchase of silver collars of the order.⁴¹ Additionally, the records reveal that John's personal collar was exceedingly luxurious, deliberately flaunting his great wealth.⁴² Because the display of wealth was representative of noble character, it was one method of legitimising authority. Clearly, then, both badges and chivalric orders were extremely useful gifts with which Burgundy confirmed his power base.⁴³

The military interaction between the nobles of France and England offered ample opportunities for cultural exchange. For example, while being held as hostages of Edward III for king John II's ransom, his sons, the duke of Berry and the duke of Bourbon, were exposed to Edward III's Order of the Garter and his pervasive use of the leopard as his

³⁷ Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', pp. 319-320; Beaune, 'Costume et pouvoir', p. 127; Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', pp. 11-14; Ailes, 'Heraldry in Medieval England', pp. 95-98; Boulton, *Knights and the Crown*, pp. 4-13.

³⁸ The differences between the distribution of badges and membership to a chivalric order are summarised in Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven, 1984), pp. 182-183.

³⁹ Hablot, 'Les signes d'entente', p. 330.

⁴⁰ Keen, 'Huizinga and Kilgour', pp. 9-10; Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 2-3.

⁴¹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, 65, fols. 81v, and 80v.

⁴² *Ibid.*, fol. 81v.

⁴³ For the symbolic significance of displaying wealth see Arnade, *Realms of Ritual*, pp. 10. For chivalric orders as a tool for the acquisition of power, Vale, *Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (London, 1981), pp. 33-62; Keen, *Chivalry*, pp. 174-199; Jones, 'Les signes de pouvoir', pp. 141-143.

personal emblem.⁴⁴ After their release in 1366, they brought this fashion back with them to the French court.⁴⁵ The duke of Berry adopted the bear as his first badge, and the motto 'Le temps venra' in 1365, while his brother-in-law Louis II of Bourbon took the Belt of Hope and the *Écu d'Or* in 1366-67.⁴⁶ Soon their other brothers, Anjou and Burgundy, followed their lead.

Although the vogue was particularly well established in England during the mid-fourteenth century, orders of chivalry and the proliferation of personal badges were nevertheless a universal phenomenon in western Europe throughout the century. In 1325, the Angevin king Charles I of Hungary founded the *Société Fraternelle des Chevaliers de Saint George*.⁴⁷ Other orders were founded throughout Europe in the second half of the fourteenth century in Castille (1330), England (1344), Naples (1352/3), Cyprus (1347), the Empire (1355), Savoy (1364), Brittany (1381), and France, where John II founded the Company of the Star (1351/2).⁴⁸ In 1403, just one year before his death, Philip, duke of Burgundy founded the Order of the Golden Tree, which his son, John the Fearless, continued.⁴⁹

Similarly, princely and noble families across medieval Europe began wearing personal emblems during the second half of the fourteenth century. By the end of the fourteenth century, personal badges were pervasive in aristocratic circles. European princes exchanged badges with one another on an international scale to reinforce political alliances, and according to Hablot, so that they would remain highly visible on the international

⁴⁴ For the French princes' experience in England: Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, p. 272; Hablot, 'L'emblématique', p. 81. For the Order of the Garter, see again Boulton, pp. 96-166. For the leopard, Caroline Shenton, 'Edward III and the Symbol of the Leopard', in *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display*, pp. 69-81.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Hablot, 'L'emblématique', pp. 81-82, and 'Les signes de l'entente', pp. 321-322.

⁴⁷ Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 27-45; Jones, 'Les signes du pouvoir. L'ordre de l'Hermine, les devises et les hérauts des ducs de Bretagne au XV^e siècle', in *Between France and England*, p. 142.

⁴⁸ Castille, the Order of the Band; England, the Order of the Garter; Naples, the Order of the Knot; Cyprus, the Order of the Sword; Holy Roman Empire, the Order of the Golden Buckle; Savoy, the Order of the Collar; Brittany, the Order of the Ermine; France, the Company of the Golden Star. Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 46-95, 96-166, 211-240, 241-248, 241, 249-270, 274-278, 167-210 respectively. Jones, 'Les signes du pouvoir', p. 142. See also Keen, *Chivalry*, pp. 179-199.

⁴⁹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, 65, fol. 81v, and 80v. See also Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 271, 360, n. 8.

political stage.⁵⁰ As most badges would therefore be recognisable within this community, they were effective means of identification within elite circles. Accordingly, the symbols were not necessarily understood outside this rather insular social group unless they were made tangibly accessible to the lower estate. This, as we shall see, was precisely what the duke of Burgundy attempted to do with his personal emblems.

The bearers of aristocratic badges chose the motif for themselves, and they were frequently accompanied by a motto. Often ambiguous in meaning, they were the 'expression of some particular conceit of the wearer'.⁵¹ One reason that they were so prolific among the higher and lower nobility was due to their unrestricted nature; there were no set rules governing composition or the number of symbols one could have.⁵² Hence, they were far less formalised or complicated than heraldic coats of arms. Yet badges were virtually meaningless unless considered in their proper context.⁵³ Because every emblem was intimately associated with the devices of their family, allies, or enemies, all badges derived their own individual meaning from the dialogue between them. During disputes, this element was particularly important, as was the case for the 'emblem war' between the duke of Burgundy and the duke of Orleans.⁵⁴

Finally, the exchange of badges often occurred during the cementing of peace alliances. This was precisely what occurred very publicly between Louis of Orleans and John the Fearless in June 1406. Laurent Hablot explained that as a mode of communication, the exchange of devises made alliances between princes visible to all. With specific reference to the 1406 wedding ceremonies, he argued that the dukes' exchange of badges was also a way of reinforcing their submission to Charles VI's will, given that the

⁵⁰ Lightbrown, *Medieval European Jewellery*, p. 199; Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', p. 321.

⁵¹ Mrs. Barry Palliser, *Historic Devices, Badges and War Cries* (London, 1870), p. 3. See also Lightbrown, *Medieval European Jewellery*, pp. 166, 188.

⁵² Pastoreau, *Traité héraldique*, pp. 218-219 and Hablot, 'L'emblématique', pp. 81-83; Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', pp. 7-8. See also *Dress in the Middle Ages*, p. 133; Huizinga, *Le déclin du moyen âge*, p. 22; Palliser, *Historic Devices*, pp. 1-4.

⁵³ Pastoreau, 'Emblèmes et symboles de la Toison d'Or', in *L'ordre de la Toison d'Or de Philippe le Bon à Philippe le Beau (1430-1505). Idéal ou reflet de la société?* (Brepols, 1996), p. 100.

⁵⁴ See below.

king had insisted that they maintain cordial relations.⁵⁵ Yet as modes of communication, the negative subtext of the duke of Burgundy's badge must have been evident.⁵⁶ However affable their relations appeared after their peace agreement in October 1405 and their exchange of badges in June 1406, the fact that John continued to use what was, at its inception, an antagonistic badge, suggests that the rivalry was not truly appeased. Vaughan agreed, calling the period between the peace agreement in October 1405 and Louis' assassination in November 1407 an 'uneasy truce'.⁵⁷

The significance of this particular exchange is clear when we examine the Orleanist counter-attack against Burgundy in later years. When the Abbot of Cérisy gave his refutation of Jean Petit's *Justification* in September 1408 on behalf of the Orleans princes (Charles, Philip and John), he argued that Louis had willingly exchanged badges with John in 1406 under false pretences.⁵⁸ In their 'Jargeau Manifesto' against the duke of Burgundy, which they sent to the king and to the *bonnes villes*, Louis' sons also emphasised the fact that their father had signed several treaties of peace with John, publicly swearing to uphold the agreement. The manifesto claimed that the exchange of the 'ordre et le collier l'un de l'autre' was a 'grande confirmation desdites fraternité et compagnie d'armes'.⁵⁹ John submitted to convention in August 1412 when he and Louis' sons agreed to the peace treaty of Auxerre, which they finalised by exchanging their badges. John the Fearless gave the Orleans princes horse trappings decorated in his personal colours of white, green and black, 'lequels sont semés de rabos et de coupeaux de laton doré, à la devise de monseigneur'.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', p. 325.

⁵⁶ Schnerb agreed. *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, p. 63.

⁵⁷ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 38.

⁵⁸ Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', p. 328.

⁵⁹ AN, K 56, n. 18. For a contemporary copy of the Jargeau Manifesto see ADN, B 657, n. 15.183. See also: Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 152-153; RSD, vol. 4, pp. 434-436; *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 456-464. And, Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 278-285, n. 277.

⁶⁰ Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 1: 90, 92, nos. 259, 261. See also Hablot, 'Les signes de l'entente', pp. 331-332.

7.2. JOHN THE FEARLESS' BADGES

John the Fearless chose the carpenter's plane with shavings as his personal emblem in 1405, and scholars agree that when he did so, it was a direct challenge to Louis of Orleans' ragged, knotty cudgel during their first conflict in August-October 1405.⁶¹ This assumption is likely due to the way that Monstrelet interpreted the symbols. He claimed that after the duke had been murdered, the Parisians, who had been unhappy with the duke of Orleans' excessive taxation, 'commencèrent à dire l'un à l'autre, en secret: Le baston nouveau est plané!'⁶² The knotty cudgel purportedly symbolised Orleans' intention to club John the Fearless while his accompanying motto, 'Je l'envie' ('I challenge [him]'), was apparently a gaming term.⁶³ John's retort was the Flemish motto 'Ich houd' ('I hold') and, as noted above, the apparatus with which he could plane down his opponent's alleged weapon. To illustrate his continuous efforts to wear down Louis of Orleans and remedy his misgovernment of the realm, John's plane was depicted at all times discharging shavings, an element that strengthened the power of the image. The plane's shavings were thus a significant element of the iconography.⁶⁴

However, there are some problems with the current notion that Burgundy and Orleans' badges and mottoes were chosen as part of an antagonistic dialogue. The first unresolved issue is the fact that John, a French prince with mainly French interests, chose a Flemish motto. If he had indeed chosen his badge as a direct response to the duke of

⁶¹ According to Monstrelet's account of 1405: 'Lors avoit, ledit duc de Bourgogne, très grant nombre de gens d'armes, tant dedans Paris comme dehors, lesquelz portoient en leurs pennonceaulx de leurs lances en flaming *Hich houd*, c'est à dire *Je le tieng*. Et c'estoit à l'encontre des Orlieinois qui, comme dessus est dit, portoient: *Je l'envie*.' Monstrelet, 1: 123. For critical references to the dukes' respective mottoes and badges see: Pastoureau, 'Emblèmes et symboles', p. 99-106; Hablot 'L'emblématique', p. 83; Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, p. 63; Lightbrown, *Medieval European Jewellery*, p. 199; Margaret Scott, *The History of Dress Series: Late Gothic Europe, 1400-1500* (New Jersey, 1980), p. 94.

⁶² Monstrelet, 1: 165.

⁶³ Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, p. 63; Scott, *Late Gothic Europe*, p. 94; Lightbrown, *Medieval European Jewellery*, p. 199.

⁶⁴ For example: 'Le duc de Charolois portoit une escharpe, une ceinture et un poitrail d'argent garny de rabots, rabotures, ais et pierreries comme celle du Duc'. One of the duke's belt was described thus: 'une grosse ceinture toute d'or sans nulle tressure faite d'ais ployer entrelassés ensemble, sur les ais il y a de petit rabots faicts après le vif. Au bas de la ceinture il y avoit des sonnettes d'or au bout desquelles il y avoit de rabotures et des sonnettes entremeslées d'ais...' BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 82r.

Orleans' knotty stick and challenging motto, we should expect Burgundy to have taken a French phrase. However, when one turns to examine his emblematic history, we note that his Flemish 'Ich houd' was not an anomaly.

In 1385, the year in which he married the German princess, Marguerite of Bavaria-Hainaut, John adopted the flowering hop branch, which continued to be a prominent badge until his death. This badge was and remained, according to Hablot, directly correlated to the motto he also took: 'Ich haltz mich' ('I am silent', or, 'I keep silent'), which doubtless signified something political that is, as yet, undetermined.⁶⁵ Later, in 1390 he translated the German motto into Flemish, 'Ich swinghe', and took the *chapeau allemand* as an additional badge.⁶⁶ According to Hablot, once his conflict with the duke of Orleans was firmly underway, Burgundy deliberately alternated between German and Flemish, with regards to his various mottoes, to revise the intended meaning according to his requirements. For example, the notorious Flemish 'Ich houd' ('I hold') translated into German as 'Ich hals mich'. This was an interesting play on words because the rather close grammatical construction cleverly called to mind the abovementioned German motto meaning 'I am silent', whilst its meaning signified something far more assertive ('I hold'). Likewise, the Flemish version of the phrase 'Ich swinghe' could easily be morphed into 'Ich singhe' ('I sing').⁶⁷ These very slight variations on the motto 'I am silent' had important political implications, and are therefore of great consequence to this present study. It is needless to point out the aggressive undertone inherent in the alteration of 'Ich swinghe' (I am silent) to 'Ich singhe' (I sing). If Hablot's assessment is correct in stating that the latter was chosen during the first phase of conflict with Louis of Orleans, it is probable that Burgundy's figurative meaning was to assert that he would not accept a passive role in the

⁶⁵ Hablot, 'L'emblématique', p. 83.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

running of governmental affairs. Indeed it suggests that he would 'sing' loudly of the need for reform, rather than remaining quiet.

Yet the remaining question is why he chose languages that were foreign to typical French subjects if these were who he was predominantly interested in persuading to accept his policies? First, because mottoes are not tangible entities, non-aristocratic observers probably had little direct contact with them anyway. Therefore, the visual symbols themselves (the plane, and later the level and hammer) doubtless communicated his message adequately to French townspeople. Additionally, Burgundy's recourse to German and Flemish as the language he used to reinforce the emblems indicates that he had a strong interest in forging a solid foundation within his feudal patrimony. Where his father and mother's policy regarding the Flemish subjects was generally one of neglect, John not only attempted to appease his subjects in terms of their political requests, but actually spent a significant period of time in Flanders – more than in his ducal capital of Dijon.⁶⁸ This issue was of great importance to his county subjects, and was consequently one of the principal stipulations in the demands that the Four Members of Flanders submitted to him for ratification in March 1405.⁶⁹ Another important clause in this document was that the duke would respect their language by using it in formal proceedings, which they insisted should be held henceforth in the Flemish-speaking part of Flanders rather than French-speaking Lille.⁷⁰ Interestingly, John agreed to these demands by solemn vow, in Flemish. It was then registered in urban centres across his counties.⁷¹ We may reasonably contend, therefore, that John intended to display a degree of solidarity with his Flemish subjects, using language as a symbolic means of strengthening their relationship. One is inclined to agree with Schnerb, who posited: 'D'emblée, les rapports du nouveau comte de Flandre et

⁶⁸ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 14-28.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 15-16; Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 147-148.

⁷⁰ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 15; Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 147-148.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

de ses sujets avaient pris la forme d'un indispensable dialogue.⁷² By identifying himself as a veritable Flemish ruler rather than solely a French prince, he might secure the support of his rather volatile Flemish subjects.⁷³

The second troubling problem with current thinking on the relationship between the two dukes' respective devices is the obscurity that surrounds the early development of the Orleans' badge and motto. Monstrelet first mentioned the duke's motto 'Je l'envie' in his account of 1405, though he does not make any reference to the badge that the duke is said to have used alongside the motto: the knotty stick, or cudgel.⁷⁴ Interestingly, Louis' household accounts at Blois reveal that he used a 'baston tortissé' as far back as June 1401 – nearly three years before John the Fearless would become the duke of Burgundy (April 1404).⁷⁵ Yet this date obviously raises some important problems. Firstly, if Orleans used this particular badge long before he had any hostile dealings with John the Fearless it does not follow that the knotty stick was originally used as an aggressive overture to the latter. Secondly, the sparse documentary evidence between the 1401 entry in Laborde's inventory of the house of Orleans' ducal accounts (1852), and Monstrelet's mention of the knotty stick in the summer of 1405, raises the important question of whether it was in fact a predominant and recognisable badge within his emblematic discourse?⁷⁶ There are few entries in the house of Orleans' inventories amassed by Laborde or F.M. Graves that refer to the knotty stick directly, and none that evoke his motto 'Je l'envie'.⁷⁷ There are only three further references to any sort of stick in Laborde's survey, and it is unclear whether

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ The explosive nature of the Four Members of Flanders is obvious in the fact that they still behaved uncooperatively, and at times spitefully, toward John the Fearless. Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 25.

⁷⁴ Monstrelet, 2: 120-121. For Burgundy's response, see p. 123.

⁷⁵ Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 3: 197, n. 5936. See also Slanička, *Krieg der Zeichen*, pp. 113-114. To confuse the problem, Schnerb dated the knotty stick to 1403. Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, p. 63.

⁷⁶ None of the historians or art historians who examined these badges provided concrete references in support of their claims. Bruna, for example, wrote: 'Ainsi, Louis d'Orléans prit pour *badge* un bâton noueux, sorte de gourdin chargé de protubérance, garni de la légende suivante: "Je le tiens", légende adressée bien sûr à Jean sans Peur' 'Le bijou emblématique', p. 16.

⁷⁷ Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 3; Frances M. Graves, *Quelques pièces relatives à la vie de Louis I, duc d'Orléans et de Valentine Visconti, sa femme* (Paris, 1913).

he is referring to the knotty club, or merely another type of emblem. There are only two final mentions of a *baston* in the two inventories, both of which feature among Valentina Visconti's possessions: 'Un baston à manière de fermail' in Laborde's inventory, and 'une escharpe d'or toute chevronnée de bastons blancs et vers' in Graves'.⁷⁸ It is true that neither of these surveys is necessarily exhaustive, but it is curious nonetheless that both works should mention the stick so sparingly, whereas there are copious mentions in these inventories of Orleans' other badges on clothing and jewellery, such as wolves, porcupines, tigers, or crossbows. The variety and the range of badges included in Louis' accounts is not puzzling in itself, for there were no restrictions on how many badges a prince could have and use. What is curious is that while each of the above-mentioned badges was ubiquitous in the accounts, the knotty stick was not. For this reason, it is difficult to discern precisely how important and how prominent the knotty stick actually was in Orleans' emblematic repertoire.

To add further complication to the issue, the duke of Burgundy's accounts state that the badge Louis of Orleans used during the wedding celebrations in Compiègne in May and June 1406 was the bird's nest rather than the knotty stick.⁷⁹ One can make the necessary connection between a 'baston tortissé' and the intertwining of sticks for a nest. However if, as most scholars suggest, the knotty stick was Orleans' main badge during the 1405 conflict with John the Fearless, it is remarkable that he should choose the bird's nest when they publicly exchanged badges to reinforce their peace agreement. Especially when John the Fearless' plane was unavoidable: it featured prominently on his armour and clothing for the tournaments, and all over that of his men, and he also had a very luxurious

⁷⁸ Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne* 3: 234; Graves, *Quelques pièces*, p. 230.

⁷⁹ 'Le duc prit la devise du rabot en l'an 1405. Celle du duc d'Orléans estoit un nid d'oiseau. Ces devises furent peintes aux armes pour la feste faite à Compiègne au mois de juin au dit an [1406].' BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 191v. See also ACO, B 1543, fols. 154v-155r.

collar with planes and shavings made for the occasion.⁸⁰ During that time he also gave the dukes of Orleans and Berry large jewelled planes embellished with a large pearl and emerald.⁸¹ Famiglietti stated that John the Fearless turned up to the proceedings wearing a black surcoat with images of a cudgel, but unfortunately, he did not back this claim with any evidence.⁸²

There are several coterminous explanations for this quandary. Firstly, it is entirely possible that Louis of Orleans did not regularly use the knotty club after he and John the Fearless had agreed to a peace settlement in October 1405, preferring to use his other less hostile emblems. This would certainly not have been an unusual practice among his peers. Secondly, he may have been trying to negate the message that the club and motto had originally conveyed, thereby deliberately undermining the dialogue that had existed between his symbol and John the Fearless'. If this was the case, he would have weakened the power of Burgundy's intended meaning significantly. Yet, whereas both of these options are plausible, the evidence suggests that the knotty stick did not originally bear the meaning or have the prevalence that modern historians believe it to have had. Although Orleans' motto, 'Je l'envie' was almost certainly an overt challenge to John the Fearless, the ducal accounts have insufficient evidence to categorically prove that Orleans' knotty cudgel was designed alongside his motto, or that it was used against John the Fearless in the same aggressive way.

Nonetheless, it is perfectly clear that Burgundy chose his carpenter's plane and motto 'Ich houd' with both the knotty stick and the motto 'Je l'envie' in mind, and that they were designed to work together. Through his badges Burgundy accepted Louis' ideological challenge, deflecting it back. It suggests, therefore, that Burgundy redefined the meaning of Orleans' knotty stick for his own purpose, turning it in to something altogether

⁸⁰ For the exchange of badges at Compiègne see BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 78v, and 82r. For specific details on the carpenter's plane during the festivities, see fols. 81v-82r.

⁸¹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 82r.

⁸² Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 55.

aggressive. This is significant because it demonstrates that Burgundy had a sense of the impact the symbol could have within a wider political and social context. Indeed he was aware of how his own choices could reflect negatively upon his rivals, a strength which he would use to its full advantage. Therefore, unlike Louis of Orleans, he did not associate himself with a large number of personal emblems; he chose three main badges as his major icons: the carpenter's plane, the hop branch and the mason's level (from 1 January 1410).⁸³ These overwhelmed spectators with their pervasive repetition in the duke's private and public life.

One has only to look at representations of John's appearance as depicted in various manuscript illuminations and portraits to see how much a part of his public image these were. There is little reason for John the Fearless to have advertised his emblems so widely if they had no meaning at all to people outside his immediate social sphere. In the funerary sculpture over his tomb at the Chartreuse de Champmol in Dijon, the duke was depicted wearing an ermine-lined black robe, probably a *houppelande*, covered in golden carpenter's planes. (fig. 8). Similarly, the dedication page of Pierre Salmon's *Demandes* (1409), BNF ms. fr 23279 fol. 1r, depicts the duke of Burgundy in a black and red fur-lined *houppelande*, covered in carpenters planes and levels (fig. 3). He also wears a black *houppelande* in a miniature on fol. 119r, where he sits on a ducal throne over which hangs a canopy covered in carpenter's planes and houblon (fig. 4). His colours, green and white (to which we would add black), accentuates the edges of the canopy, making this space purely his own. Finally, he holds in his left hand what is either a hatchet or a hammer. This implement was one of the attributes he holds on fol. 4r in the Geneva manuscript (ms. fr. 165).⁸⁴ Associated with building and carpentry, the hammer was, of course, complementary to the plane and the level. It would, therefore buttress his ideological platform of 'rebuilding' the government.

⁸³ For the first record mentioning the mason's level, BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 91r. See also Monstrelet, 2: 57. Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', p. 17.

⁸⁴ Roux, *Dialogues*, pp. 83-83; Hedeman, *The Royal Image: Illustrations of the Grandes Chroniques de France* (Berkeley, 1991).

David Nicholas has shown that the same tool was also a symbol of anti-taxation during the 1382 Parisian revolt. The rebels were called 'Maillontins' because they swore an oath on a hammer not to pay the tax imposed by royal authority.⁸⁵ As we have seen, Burgundy's anti-tax position was an important element of his propaganda. Therefore it is likely that Burgundy capitalised on the association between the hammer and the notion of anti-taxation. At the very least, it was an excellent mnemonic cue in manuscript illumination to remind observers of his intention to 'renovate' the government.

Additionally, on Jean de Hayton's dedication page to his *Merveilles du monde*, BNF ms. fr. 2810, fol. 226 (c.1412) (fig. 5), the duke wears a red fur-lined red and black *houppelande* covered in golden planes, levels and hop branches. He wears a collar of gold from which are suspended both planes and levels, which is reminiscent of the collar he wore in May 1406.⁸⁶ In the dedication illuminations of both the *Livre des merveilles* and Salmon's *Demandes*, the duke of Burgundy is portrayed in profile with similar hand gestures. According to Anne D. Hedeman, Burgundy's pose in BNF ms. fr. 23279 'reflects an official portrait.'⁸⁷ Buettner emphasised the importance of portraiture in manuscript illumination on its function. She claimed it was 'a sort of self-celebratory mark of visual ownership, the mimetic equivalent of a heraldic device.'⁸⁸ Certainly it was in line with Burgundy's ostentatious display of his personal symbols; these too were designed for the purpose of self-aggrandizement.

In the Hayton manuscript the duke sits on a spacious bench over which hangs his coat of arms. Four emblems unite the outer border of folio 226. The vertical left border is decorated with a hop branch around which a scroll bears the motto 'Ich swighe' ('I am silent'). It is rather intriguing that John should use an earlier, less aggressive motto here. This manuscript was, after all, completed between 1411 and 1412, during a period of

⁸⁵ David Nicholas, *The Later Medieval City 1300-1500* (London, 1997), p. 128.

⁸⁶ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 81v. See above.

⁸⁷ Hedeman, *Of Counsellors and Kings*, p. 8.

⁸⁸ Buettner, 'Profane Illuminations, Secular Illusions', p. 76.

intense tension between the duke of Burgundy and his rivals.⁸⁹ However, the fact that it was given to the duke of Berry for the *étrennes* of 1 January 1413, only four months after the Peace of Auxerre was ratified, might explain this curiosity.⁹⁰ Perhaps he felt that there was little reason to insult Berry with an aggressive message in this manuscript. Alternatively, this may have indicated to Berry that he would 'keep silent' as long as he was able to continue implementing his policies unhindered. The deliberate inclusion of the mason's levels throughout the manuscript would have reinforced this message.

We note, for example, in the top left corner of this particular folio there remains a mason's level with a banderole now faded. It is apparent that the level was deliberately covered at some point after its composition. Likewise, a lion (the emblem of Flanders) faces right, with a coat of arms hanging from his neck that was originally John the Fearless', but has since been repainted in Jacques d'Armagnac's. In the bottom right, an eagle bearing a shield with an additional coat of arms hangs from his neck. Although this too is faded, the red band across suggests that it was also repainted in Jacques d'Armagnac's arms. Unfortunately, the image and banderole in the top right corner is undecipherable. However, based on the fact that most of John the Fearless' other predominant emblems were included here, one might reasonably posit that a carpenter's plane was figured there. Interestingly this same framing pattern repeats itself several times throughout the manuscript.

Therefore, it is clear that these particular badges were ubiquitously placed upon his person. Loaded in meaning, and solely associated with the duke of Burgundy and his partisans, they thereby helped to create a distinct 'Burgundian' community for his adherents in both elite and non-elite social groups.⁹¹ We have already noted that Burgundy distributed his personal badges in the form of jewellery and armour to his noble retainers

⁸⁹ Hedeman, *Of Counsellors and Kings*, p. 89, n. 4.

⁹⁰ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 454.

⁹¹ He did, however have other emblems which he used, but none as predominantly as the three discussed here.

and to his most important allies.⁹² In 1411 John distributed his badge to higher-ranking members of his household.⁹³ On 1 January 1410, he gave golden mason's levels decorated with sapphires, diamonds and pearls to 'tous les seigneurs, chevaliers et escuyers qui estoient de son party...'⁹⁴ Therefore, by identifying his retainers as belonging to his 'party', he not only emphasised their traditional feudal obligation to him, but also differentiated them from those who opposed him: the Orleanists. This is not surprising given that sartorial uniformity has always been an effective means of creating and strengthening corporate identity.⁹⁵ John may also have distributed rings with his cameo and a carving of a carpenter's plane to his more elite peers, including the dauphin Louis duke of Guyenne (fig. 1).⁹⁶ Guyenne's ring was given to him on 1 January 1412, during the height of the first phase of civil war between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs.⁹⁷ Defining a community and its correlating anti-community was a fundamentally important propaganda process.⁹⁸

The duke's badges were also painted onto the armour and banners of armies in times of tournaments or military conflict.⁹⁹ For the 1406 jousts at Compiègne, John had his carpenter's plane painted onto his armour and that of his men for the jousting tournaments and other festivities that were held for the royal children's marriages.¹⁰⁰ John's accounts of 1407 under the receiver-general of all finances Jean Pressy (November 1406-November 1407) indicated that the duke made three large standards and three thousand banners for

⁹² In just one of many examples, John gave 315 carpenter's planes embellished with diamonds to 'plusieurs chevaliers, seigneurs et escuyers', and also a plane 'en facon d'aneau a un diamant une perle et un ruby' to several other important officers of his household, and to the count of Charollais. BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 78r.

⁹³ Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 1: 28, n. 24.

⁹⁴ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 91r. See also Monstrelet, II: 57.

⁹⁵ Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, p. 64; Joseph, *Uniforms and Nonuniforms*, p. 2.

⁹⁶ *Paris 1400*, p. 66. The ring that was given to the dauphin is only slightly different than that which the Paris 1400 exhibit featured. See also *Art à la cour de Bourgogne*, p. 734.

⁹⁶ *Art à la cour de Bourgogne*, p. 734. *Paris 1400*, p. 66.

⁹⁷ One of Burgundy's main rivals, the duke of Berry, had received similar types of rings with his own cameo from his son-in-law John of Bourbon in 1409, and his grandson, Charles count of Eu in 1413. *Art à la cour de Bourgogne*, p. 734. *Paris 1400*, p. 66.

⁹⁸ Taithe and Thornton, 'Propaganda', *Propaganda*, p. 3.

⁹⁹ Palliser, *Historic Devices*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fols. 78v-82r, 191v.

his army which were all decorated with carpenter's planes and their shavings.¹⁰¹ Similarly, when fighting broke out in September 1411, John the Fearless paid for 'deux milliers de pannonceaux, faits à la devise de mondit seigneur, du rabots' in addition to 'ij^{xxx} pannonceaux à lances fais de sa devise' for war in 1411.¹⁰² When he triumphantly re-entered Paris with the queen on July 1418, Burgundy's army was also carrying banners decorated with carpenter's planes.¹⁰³ In 1414 John paid for a large number of pennants and banners for his trumpets and those of the duke of Guyenne, to be decorated with their coats of arms and personal badges. This was done in preparation for his campaign to 'liberate' the dauphin from the Armagnacs.¹⁰⁴ Trumpets served to announce something important such as the march of an army or an official proclamation. Martine Clouzot argued that in the Burgundian court they were used during entry ceremonies and cortèges as aural symbols of the duke's power, for the reason that the resonance of the noise emanating from the instruments imposed itself on the people who heard it.¹⁰⁵ As a herald of his coming, the trumpets helped to legitimise his prestige and authority.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, in integrating his coat of arms and personal badges with those belonging to the dauphin on the banners of these instruments, John emphasised his and the dauphin's illusory unity, thereby legitimising his siege of Paris. There is little doubt, therefore, that every person who saw John's army, whether a noble person, townsperson or villager, would notice the copious number of planes that decorated its armour, banners and pennants.

¹⁰¹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, 65, fols. 79r.

¹⁰² John also paid for three large banners painted with the king's personal arms to accompany his. Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 1: 29, nos. 28-30. At this time, Charles duke of Orleans also paid for three thousand nine hundred *pannonceaux* to be painted with one of his personal badges, the stinging nettle, 'pour l'armée qu'il envoyait contre le duc de Bourgogne' during the same conflict. Vol. 3: 259, no. 6220.

¹⁰³ Auguste Longon, 'Entrée de la reine Isabeau et du duc de Bourgogne à Paris (14 juillet 1418)', in *Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France* 2 (1875): 106.

¹⁰⁴ 'Item, pour une bannière et I pennons de mondit seigneur de Bourgogne armoyés et fais à sa devises...Item pour deux bannières pour les trompettes de mondit seigneur de Guienne semblablement faittes et armoires à sesdites armes... Item, pour III bannières pour les trompettes de mondit seigneur de Bourgoigne semblablement faittes et armoiee[s] à ses dites armes...III^{xxx} petiz penonceaulx faiz à la devise de mondit seigneur...' Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 1: 94, no. 64.

¹⁰⁵ Martine Clouzot, 'Le son et le pouvoir en Bourgogne au XV^e siècle', in *Revue historique* 302 (2000), pp. 615-628.

¹⁰⁶ Clouzot, 'Le son et le pouvoir', p. 625; Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information*, pp.24-25.

Yet Bruna argued that emblems and badges were part of a form of communication reserved exclusively for the aristocracy.¹⁰⁷ Although it is true that people outside this elite sphere would not have found the meanings of badges necessarily obvious, it does not preclude the fact that they had the ability to interpret the symbols accurately. Firstly, we must not imprudently suppose that the people of the realm were oblivious to what was happening in aristocratic and political circles. There is little doubt that they did follow events, for letters were published widely, informing the townspeople of the realm exactly what was occurring between the houses of Burgundy and Orleans.

Secondly, we must bear in mind that, by their very nature, symbols require an interpretive audience that is equipped with the appropriate references to make sense of what they are seeing; otherwise the symbols are worthless. Charles Pierce has posited that the sole reason that symbols succeed is because the audience learns the signifying message of the sign.¹⁰⁸ With regards to John the Fearless' symbols, we can be certain that they were not so abstract as to have no resonance whatsoever among diverse social strata within the medieval hierarchy. Two of his most predominant emblems – the carpenters' plane and, later, the level – were mundane tools, with which many townspeople (and in particular, artisan families) would have been very familiar. We know that John the Fearless was considerably vocal about his goal to reform the government, and indeed about his desire to serve the common good. In light of the fact that he published his ideology as extensively as he could in towns across the realm, it is not implausible to believe that urban audiences would have understood the metaphor that John the Fearless used, by which he conveyed his plan to 'rebuild' a virtuous and strong government with his plane, level and hammer. This was particularly true if the hammer had remained a symbol of anti-taxation, for this was one of the cornerstones of Burgundy's platform for reform.

¹⁰⁷ Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', p. 16.

¹⁰⁸ Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 100.

Moreover, the fact that his emblems were so pervasive raises the question of why he took the trouble to exhibit them so widely if they were not understood. Not only did his planes and levels appear all over his clothing, on all of his banners during war and as badges on his soldiers, retainers, and his urban partisans, they were featured on the exterior of his Paris residence, Hotel Artois. Indeed on the only remaining tower of his residence one finds a large carving of a level set within a window frame, now facing rue St. Etienne (fig. 9). A closer look at the *Livre des merveilles* reveals that the windowpanes of the duke's residence also incorporated mason's levels. Additionally, in preparation for the December 1407 conference with the dukes of Anjou and Berry held at Amiens regarding the murder of Louis of Orleans, John hung from his place of residence an imposing banner with a carpenter's plane and a combat lance on one side, and a jousting lance on the other. Apparently this banner signified that he was ready for either peace or war, depending on the outcome of the conference.¹⁰⁹ It would be rash to assume that only the dukes of Berry and Anjou had the capacity to understand this less-than-subtle message. This further anecdote makes it patent that Burgundy's emblems were as accessible to townspeople as to the aristocracy.

Certainly we know that urban partisans wore lead and pewter badges with the cross of his patron saint, Saint Andrew, to indicate their affiliation to the duke of Burgundy. Four badges that were found among countless other secular and profane brooches on the riverbed of the Seine when it was excavated in the nineteenth century correspond accurately to the chroniclers' descriptions of Burgundian partisan brooches worn from August 1411 onwards (figs. 10-13).¹¹⁰ All four have saltires, and one is exactly as it was described in the chronicles of the period under study here (fig. 11): 'En ce temps prindrent ceulx de Paris chaperons de drap pers et la croix de Saint Andrieu, ou milieu ung escu à la

¹⁰⁹ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 239-240; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 69.

¹¹⁰ This was done to facilitate heavy shipping. The French archaeologist Arthur Forgeais preserved and catalogued them, and today they are kept at the Musée National du Moyen Age (Paris). There were also four Armagnac badges found. Bruna, *Enseignes*, pp. 20-26.

fleur de lis, et maint de quinze jours avoit à Paris cent milliers, que hommes que enfens, signez devant et derriere de ladicte croix, car nul n'ysoit de Paris qui ne l'avoit.'¹¹¹ Most interestingly, one of the four features a carpenters' plane and level alongside Saint Andrew and his saltire (fig. 10). This is significant because it confirms that the lower estates did indeed have access to the duke of Burgundy's personal emblems, and did, in point of fact, appropriate them into their own iconography – this was their *parole* within the underlying emblematic 'language'. There is no reason to assume that this was the only popular badge to incorporate both the saltire and the plane and level simply because it is the only one found during the excavation.

According to Michel Pastoureau, the Burgundian emblems were consciously filtered down from the top to the bottom: from the prince, the emblems passed unto his household and to his entourage, and finally to his urban partisans. The above-mentioned badge supports this claim. Saint Andrew was the patron saint of Burgundy in general, and of the Valois dukes of Burgundy in particular.¹¹² John the Fearless' Book of Hours reinforces the position that St. Andrew was of foremost importance to the duke by 1411 (BNF, ms. lat. nouv. acq. 3055 fol. 172v). In this image, the plane and the level flank Saint Andrew, and incorporated also the duke's coat of arms (fig. 6). Hitherto, this book has been rather vaguely dated between 1406 and 1415.¹¹³ Yet we know that John did not begin to use the mason's level until 1410.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the fact that there are no other saints within this particular Book of Hours where Burgundy's personal emblems are featured

¹¹¹ Bourgeois, p. 12. The Jouvenal compiler's version is virtually identical. He wrote: 'Et prirent l'enseigne du duc de Bourgogne, ou devise, qui estoit le sautoir, qu'ils appeloient la croix Saint André, et une fleur de lys au milieu. Et y avoit en escrit *Vive le Roy*. Et tous la prenoient, voire les femmes, et petits enfans.' *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 467.

¹¹² Vale, *War and Chivalry*, p. 40. According to Chaume and Drouot it was Philip the Bold who had been given a piece of Saint Andrew's cross from the abbey of Saint Victor in Marseilles: il la plaça dans une église de Bruxelles, et ce fut cette relique qui détermina le mouvement de devotion à la suite duquel saint André prit figure de patron de la principauté constituée par les ducs dans le Nord et en Bourgogne.' M. Chaume and H. Drouot 'Bibliographie bourguignonne. Iconographie et Emblèmes Historiques' in, *Annales de Bourgogne* 11 (1939): 150-151.

¹¹³ John Harthan, *Books of Hours and their Owners* (London, 1977), pp. 98-101.

¹¹⁴ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 65, fol. 91r. See also Bruna, 'Le bijou emblématique', p. 17.

suggests that Saint Andrew had indeed become a highly politicised symbol by the time of composition. The date of composition was, therefore, most likely after August 1411, the moment when his popular partisans began wearing St. Andrew's crosses as symbols of their support. Furthermore, it is revealing of the saint's weight that the artist arranged the four icons together in this way, and exclusively within this image. The four interconnected symbols reinforced the rhetorical dialogue between them, and testified to their importance within John's emblematic discourse; clearly these were all equally important facets of the duke of Burgundy's identity by this time. The abovementioned pewter badge (fig. 10), in which all were carved, establishes that all these symbols did indeed become mutually supporting. This particular badge establishes beyond any doubt that the Parisians appropriated his personal emblems to use alongside his patron saint's attribute in their own emblematic repertoire as signs of their loyalty to his faction.

Although Burgundy's patron saint and his attribute were initially the symbols of popular division of his faction, through time the aristocratic members appropriated them also.¹¹⁵ By the autumn of 1414, the saltire began to take precedence over the carpenter's plane as a badge denoting allegiance to the duke of Burgundy. When the dauphin held the first negotiations for what became the peace of Arras, he demanded that all present remove either their saltires or their white bands, symbols which represented the Burgundian and Armagnac faction respectively.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, with the Virgin Mary, Saint Andrew became the protector of the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece from its inception, and the saltire became one of its most important emblems.¹¹⁷ The first official meeting of the Order of the Golden Fleece was held on 30 November 1431, Saint Andrew's feast day. Moreover, the Burgundian army under Philip the Good always wore a red saltire on the front of their

¹¹⁵ Pastoureau, 'Emblèmes et symboles', p. 101.

¹¹⁶ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 200.

¹¹⁷ Philip the Good was John the Fearless' son and heir. He ascended to his position upon John's death at the hands of the young dauphin, the future Charles VII, in November 1419. For details on the Order of the Golden Fleece, Pastoureau, 'Emblèmes et symboles', pp. 101-104; Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 370-372.

armour. Pastoureau postulated that the two sticks of the later Burgundian saltire were reminiscent of Louis of Orleans' emblem, the knotty stick, which John the Fearless had figuratively smoothed with his carpenter's plane.¹¹⁸

It should be noted here, however, that similarly to the duke of Burgundy's elite faction, the Orleanists princes wore emblems denoting their affiliation to each other by wearing white bands as far back as July 1410, when they made their first armed stand against the duke of Burgundy. According to the *Bourgeois de Paris* it was because of their 1410 alliance that they had first received their name 'Armagnac'. He explained:

Et tout le mal qui ce faisoit de delà, chascun disoit que ce faisoit le conte d'Armignac, tant estoit de malle volenté plain, et pour certain on avoit autant de pitié de tuer ce gens comme de chiens; et quelconques estoit tué de delà, on disoit 'C'est un Armignac', car ledit conte estoit tenu pour tres cruel homme et tyrant et sans pitié.¹¹⁹

Throughout his chronicle, the *Bourgeois de Paris* referred to the Armagnac faction as the 'bandez', often qualifying the adherents as 'faulx bendez'.

Yet before August 1411 only the princes and their allies bore the symbol. It was the Burgundian militia and Burgundian ensigns that swept the general population up into the conflict, and forced them to choose their new identity.

Est à advertir que toutes ces choses se faisoient au nom du Roy et de monseigneur le Daulphin. Mais ils laisserent la croix droite blanche, qui est la vroye enseigne du Roy, et prirent la croix de Saint André, et la devise du duc de Bourgogne le sautoüer, et ce qu'on disoit Armagnacs portoient la bande, et pour ce sembloit que ce fussent querelles particuliers.¹²⁰

Hence, by 1411, all Burgundian partisans who wished to associate themselves with the duke of Burgundy began wearing St. Andrew's crosses as a sign of their loyalty, and those who wished to associate themselves with his rivals wore white bands. The 1411 massacres of Armagnacs from all social strata, and those that similarly occurred in 1413 and 1418,

¹¹⁸ Pastoureau, "Emblèmes et symboles", p. 103.

¹¹⁹ *Bourgeois*, 10.

¹²⁰ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 473.

confirm that those who were responsible for the killings did indeed consider their Armagnac rivals as treasonous and corrupt, or, at the very least, claimed it to be so. Therefore, badges and emblems played a vital role in the drama that unfolded between Burgundians and Armagnacs. The proliferation of Burgundian crosses in 1411 forced the people of the realm to choose whether they wanted to be considered 'Burgundian' or 'Armagnac'. In September 1411 while John's army and noble allies and retainers bore the carpenter's plane on their armour as a symbol of their partisanship, his militia and his other supporters bore the cross of Saint Andrew as a sign of their ostensible allegiance. Yet even if Burgundy's symbols were representative of an iconographical hierarchy, they later blended together and were made available to all members of the party, across all social orders. Therefore the connection between the plane and the level on the one hand, and the saltire on the other, is unquestionable. Both types of badges were highly visible as symbols of war against the Armagnacs, and both thus helped forge a 'Burgundian' identity. The binary process of inclusion and exclusion was crucial to Burgundy's propaganda because on a theoretical plane it reinforced clear policy divisions, whilst on ground level, endorsed an abhorrence of the 'other'. Both further perpetuated the dichotomy between 'good' and 'evil', a cornerstone of Burgundy's ideological platform.

CHAPTER 8

CEREMONIAL DISPLAY

There is nothing in our world that is void of meaning; all of our words and actions transmit messages that communicate something about our society's social, political or cultural structure, or 'language'. Therefore a ritual is, according to the eminent anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, 'a partial expression of the total culture, conceived ultimately as a single gigantic language.'¹ This was a view similarly held by Michèle Fogel, who explained that a ceremony is the 'ensemble articulé d'éléments rituels qui fixent au plus près par les objets, les gestes et les paroles la place qui revient à chacun dans la hiérarchie des pouvoirs.'² Therefore, we must understand rituals and ceremonies as one important form of communication within a larger cultural structure; a sign system that expresses a particular ideology through the symbolic, whereby the meaning is dependent upon the context in which the ritual is performed.³ Moreover, like symbols, rituals are designed to publicise a specific, if complex, message, and relies therefore on the active participation of its spectators who witness the event. Without spectators the ritual would lose signification.⁴ For this reason, they are fundamental in state building.⁵ They are more than a means of legitimising sovereign power: they are, in fact, the very manifestation of the existing power. Arnade argued that power was essentially the authoritative force upon which ceremony depended, claiming 'power served pomp, not pomp power.' In this way, rituals and ceremonies ensured that the authority that medieval rulers held in their respective territories, was preserved. Thus, staged public events such as entries and

¹ Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 21.

² Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information*, p. 18.

³ This interpretation is further confirmed in Kiril Petrov, *The Kiss of Peace. Ritual, Self, and Society in the High and Late Medieval West* (Leiden, 2003), p. 6.

⁴ Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, 'Rituels publics et pouvoir d'État', in *Culture et idéologie dans la genèse de l'état moderne. Actes de la table ronde organisée par le Centre National de la recherche scientifique et l'École française de Rome (Rome 15-17 octobre, 1984)* (Rome, 1985), p. 136; Jacques Heers, 'Les métiers et les fêtes médiévales en France du Nord et en Angleterre', in *Revue du Nord* 55 (1973): 194.

⁵ Arnade, *Realms of Ritual*, p. 4. See also Guenée, *States and Rulers*, pp. 25-28.

processions, executions, and the publication of proclamations were useful media through which John could promote his version of events and attempt to influence public opinion. These were opportunities to reinforce the predominant tenets of his ideology through ceremonial display, that is, his unwavering loyalty to the king and royal family, and the contrast between his own 'good government' and the Orleanists' misgovernment.

There is little doubt that the king's subjects were familiar with this form of semiotic discourse because they were accustomed to relying on ritual to interact with their king and his representatives. Barbara Hanawalt and Kathryn Ryerson emphasised the importance of the 'sensory impact' upon spectators during medieval urban ceremonies, and highlighted the complex symbolic role that townspeople undertook in creating and upholding the multifarious customs and rituals.⁶ Urban officials also depended upon powerful symbols to express their town's dignity and honour.⁷ Thus, townspeople were not only capable of comprehending the complexity of royal symbolism, but helped to create and maintain it. In this way, entries were a semiotic structure in themselves, from which a clear message reinforcing the political hierarchy of the middle ages was issued.⁸

The subtextual dialogue between the carefully organised performances of both ruler and subjects is, arguably, the most intriguing element of medieval royal rituals. For the subjects, it was an event whereby they simultaneously validated their sovereign's authority whilst confirming their urban privileges to preserve their right to self-determination.⁹ Spectators were active participants in the rite: many actually engaged in the progression of a great number of public events, or enthusiastically voiced their approval or disapproval from

⁶ Barbara A. Hanawalt and Kathryn Ryerson, 'Introduction', in *City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe*, eds. Barbara A. Hanawalt and Kathryn L. Ryerson (London, 1994), pp. xiv-xv.

⁷ Lorraine Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome. Ceremonies and Constitutional Development in Later Medieval English Towns', *City and Spectacle*, p. 210.

⁸ Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 110.

⁹ Guenée and Lehoux, *Les entrées royales Françaises de 1328 à 1515* (Paris, 1968), p. 24; Lawrence Bryant, 'La cérémonie de l'entrée à Paris au moyen âge', in *Annales. ESC* 4 (January-February 1986): 515; Bryant, 'Configurations of the Community in Late Medieval Spectacles. Paris and London during the Dual Monarchy', in *City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe*, pp. 9-13; Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome', pp. 208-209, 224.

the periphery. As a result, over the course of the middle ages, urban groups had a considerable influence over the organisation of the majority of public rituals and the semiotic meaning implicit in the practice, which they modified to suit their own collective interests.¹⁰ Urban ceremonies were vital to the preservation of stability and tranquillity of medieval urban society.¹¹ Lorraine Attreed argued that the meticulous details of urban ceremonies, from the clothing that was worn to which social groups were physically included in the ceremonial performance, were of great importance.¹² These, she argued, 'bore witness to the prestige of the community, they expressed the power relations of its members, and they permitted a visual reminder of the ordered and unified structure of all the parts of the urban social body.'¹³ As noted above, this is explained by the fact that meaning is constructed by the receivers, either because it was an established cultural referent, or was learned through experience.¹⁴

According to Guenée and Lehoux, Charles VI's illness impeded the continued staging of grand ceremonies, such as royal entries, unless they were executed in response to a victory or a peace treaty.¹⁵ This is not entirely accurate. In fact there were a large number of impressive spectacles held in Paris and elsewhere during the period under study. John the Fearless orchestrated a number of entries, military and religious processions, and several public executions of high-profile Orleanist sympathisers, particularly in 1405, 1408-09, 1411-12, and 1418. The Armagnac princes also staged some rather impressive processions and entry ceremonies while they were in control of the government, mainly from the end of 1413 and in 1414. While in the long term these events contributed to the

¹⁰ Bryant, 'La cérémonie de l'entrée', p. 513; Bryant, 'Configurations of the Community', pp. 10-11.

¹¹ Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome', p. 209.

¹² See also Bryant, 'La cérémonie de l'entrée', pp. 519-520, 526-530. This interpretation is supported by Roland Barthes, *Elements of Semiology*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York, 1973), pp. 25-30; Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, pp. 110-111.

¹³ Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome', p. 209.

¹⁴ Peirce was the main proponent of this view, though this is one of the fundamental principles of both structuralism and semiotics. See Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, pp. 6-7, 100-101; Macey, *Dictionary of Critical Theory*, pp. 293-294, 352.

¹⁵ Guenée and Lehoux, *Les entrées royales*, p. 18.

divisiveness of civil war, in the short term they had a stabilising effect upon a society where uncertainty and volatility ruled. Laurence Bryant argued that during the Lancastrian occupation of France in the 1420s and 1430s, the government's spectacles 'opened new spaces for political expression and thought at a time when the customary political vocabulary was in disarray and incapable of addressing the malaise and near anarchy of the existential conditions.'¹⁶ Similarly, John the Fearless and his Armagnac rivals appear to have appropriated the language of royal ritual to strengthen their grip over the royal government. Although it was certainly not innovative to use ceremonial display and ritual to promote oneself in medieval society, what was unique about Burgundy's approach was that he used this medium to propagandise his policies. Whereas the Armagnacs appear to have used ritual and ceremony to either counteract the duke of Burgundy's pageantry, or merely to consolidate their power, Burgundy was far more consistent. Indeed he used them as a platform to endorse his programme for reform and to substantiate his ostensible loyalty to the crown of France from the very beginning of his career. This chapter, then, will examine the duke of Burgundy's reliance on 'political dramaturgy' to promote his ideology during his conflict with the Armagnacs, and measure its effectiveness as a medium of propaganda alongside the other forms he used.¹⁷

8.1. ENTRIES AND PROCESSIONS IN PARIS

The most obvious example of the signification of ritual as a code of communication was, arguably, the royal entry ceremony.¹⁸ Townspeople traditionally

¹⁶ Bryant, 'Configurations of the Community', p. 3.

¹⁷ 'Political dramaturgy' is a phrase Arnade used to describe the political rituals that contribute to the 'theatre state' as coined by C. Geertz. It refers to the cultural interaction between urban and political groups, which encouraged the staging of public ceremonies and spectacles. See Arnade, *Ritual and Representation*, p. 4.

¹⁸ For the importance of entries and processions as ritual see Bryant, *The King and the City in the Parisian Royal Entry Ceremony: Politics, Ritual, and Art in the Renaissance* (Geneva, 1986) and 'La cérémonie de l'entrée', pp. 513-542; Guenée and Lehoux, *Les entrées royales*; Guenée, 'Liturgie et politique. Les processions spéciales à Paris sous Charles VI', in *Saint-Denis et la royauté*, pp. 23-49; Ralph Giesey, 'Models of Rulership in French Royal Ceremonial', in *Rites of Power. Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics since the Middle Ages*, ed. Sean Wilentz (Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 41-64.

welcomed the ruler outside their city walls and escorted him through a planned trajectory to a specific destination within the town.¹⁹ This act was symbolic of their autonomy, whilst simultaneously accentuating their deference to their sovereign lord.²⁰ During entry ceremonies townspeople frequently staged small dramas along the processional route on themes that they felt related to their monarch, or to the political circumstances of the period.²¹

Given that entries were reciprocal, signifying rituals of power between subjects and rulers, in theory the former could refuse to welcome a prince into their town. In one instance, Edward of York was initially declined entry to the town of York in 1471 on his way to meet Henry VI, probably because the issue of the throne remained highly contentious. The town finally agreed to let him into the city under the condition that his army remained outside the walls.²² Attreed explained that the Wars of the Roses caused a great deal of confusion for towns.²³ Yet despite the two disparate claims to the throne by the Yorkists and the Lancastrians, the expectation remained that the towns of the realm would welcome their princes with solemnity, in the traditional way. This situation was not unlike that in France in the early fifteenth century, and in particular during John the Fearless' reign as duke of Burgundy. Both the Burgundian and the Armagnac faction competed for the support of the *bonnes villes* in their attempts to secure control of the royal government. Because both factions declared that they stood in the name of the incapacitated king, the towns of northern France were forced to oscillate in their loyalty between parties so that they might avoid accusations of treason to the crown.²⁴ If townspeople were found to support the wrong party, they could have their property

¹⁹ Bryant, 'L'entrée royale à Paris', p. 515, 519 and, 'Configurations of the Community', p. 10.

²⁰ Bryant, 'Configurations of the Community', pp. 11-13, and Giesey, 'Models of Rulership', p. 53.

²¹ Bryant, 'L'entrée royale à Paris', pp. 521-523, 524.

²² Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome', pp. 215-216.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Curry, 'Bourgeois et soldat', pp. 177-178, 184.

confiscated, face imprisonment or even execution. The partisan badges were, therefore, useful in determining who was a 'loyal' subject of the king and who was not.²⁵

The first proper entry that John the Fearless used for the purpose of political advancement was the entry into Paris with the dauphin 19 August 1405. According to the chroniclers, he arrived to the 'grande joye du peuple.'²⁶ The king of Navarre, the dukes of Berry and Bourbon, and some of the town's leading burgesses met the duke of Burgundy and the dauphin at the gates. The cortège proceeded through the streets lined with cheering spectators all the way to the Louvre.²⁷ According to Michel Pintoin, the greeting that Burgundy received from the king of Navarre and the dukes of Berry and Bourbon had been carefully staged.²⁸ This is significant, because if it is an accurate assessment, it suggests that Burgundy was consciously aware of the potential positive impact the entry would have in his cause against Louis of Orleans. As noted above, the initial welcome of a royal entry was important to the ceremony. Accordingly, Navarre, Berry and Bourbon's show of support for Burgundy's act was a considerable sign for the people: it demonstrated their unanimous agreement that Burgundy had not acted inappropriately in bringing the dauphin back to Paris. This was crucial for his public image, because having the sanction of the princes of royal blood for his impulsive decision would help clear him of any wrongdoing. The princes were, after all, Charles VI's most important peers, central members of the royal council, and his royal representatives.

Furthermore, the fact that Navarre, Berry and Bourbon appeared at the gates in full armour helped to underscore the instability that the incident had purportedly caused. Naturally Burgundy blamed the duke of Orleans entirely for the tension that followed the interception, even though he himself had retained a substantial number of armed men

²⁵ Similar emblematic devices were employed during the War of the Roses in urban centres as public manifestations of loyalty. Attreed, 'The Politics of Welcome', pp. 223-224.

²⁶ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 432.

²⁷ RSD, 3: 296; Monstrelet, 1: 111.

²⁸ RSD, 3: 296.

around the capital.²⁹ Burgundy fabricated the illusion of insecurity by choosing the Louvre as the final destination of the cortège. Although the Louvre had the capacity to accommodate the king and the royal family, this was not his regular place of residence; he much preferred the luxurious Hotel St. Pol.³⁰ According to Janet Shirley, the Louvre was preferred as an 'arsenal, a fortress and a prison; only resorted to by the king in times of danger.'³¹ Hence, Burgundy tacitly implied that the duke of Orleans would use armed force to reclaim the dauphin, which in turn would be devastating for the capital. John explained in his letters to the *bonnes villes* that he had specifically chosen the Louvre so that he might better protect the heir apparent.³² Propaganda theorists have commented on the usefulness of this tactic as a way of both distracting people from significant domestic problems, and equally, in whipping up support for what might otherwise be deemed a dubious campaign.³³ Thus the perceived threat of Orleanist retaliation allowed Burgundy to divert attention away from his own misconduct, for, his disregard of the queen's will in having her children brought to her at Melun was unlawful.³⁴ Additionally, the illusion helped edify a heroic public image of the duke of Burgundy. Heroism was a very important feature of chivalric culture, and one to which John the Fearless readily ascribed.³⁵

During the periods when John the Fearless enjoyed his greatest measure of control over the government of the realm (1409-1413; 1418-1419)³⁶ he regularly employed

²⁹ BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 54, fol. 99r; Monstrelet, 1: 108-114; RSD, 3: 306-308, *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 432-433.

³⁰ Guenée, *Un meurtre*, p. 129.

³¹ Janet Shirley, 'Introduction', in *A Parisian Journal, 1405-1419* (Oxford, 1968), p. 11.

³² Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 1. Cited in full in Miro, *Pièces*, p. 397.

³³ For example, the noted scholar Chomsky wrote that this tactic is 'one way [one] can keep the bewildered herd from paying attention to what's really going on around them, keep them diverted and controlled... There's always an ideological offensive that builds up a chimerical monster, then campaigns have to have it crushed.' *Media Control*, pp. 44-45.

³⁴ Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 47.

³⁵ See Keen, 'Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', pp. 6-11; Boulton, *Knights of the Crown*, pp. 11-12.

³⁶ Following the Peace of Chartres 9 March 1409, John the Fearless consolidated his power. The 24 March, he signed a treaty of alliance with the queen, her brother and the count of Hainault (ACO, B 11892, layette 81, n. 18), and the reforms that John had suggested in August 1405 were finally undertaken by the royal administration. It was at this point that Jean de Montaigu, the *grand maître de l'hôtel du roy* was arrested and executed. In December 1409 John was offered the guardianship of the dauphin, his son-in-law. ACO, B

processional ceremonies similar to the 1405 entry to publicly exhibit the measure of his growing power. Yet even before Burgundy's power was truly established in 1409, he boldly organised an immense armed procession through Paris on his way to the oral justification that Jean Petit gave on his behalf for the murder of Louis of Orleans.³⁷ Although he had been warned not to enter Paris with an entourage greater than two hundred, he came to Paris escorted by somewhere between six and eight hundred men-at-arms.³⁸ Pintoin expressed his astonishment at how Burgundy entered Paris. He explained that he had arrived in full armour with a vast army, with his emblems in full view as though making a victory triumph.³⁹ Significantly, Pintoin added that Burgundy feigned he was acting in accordance with the king's orders and that this was not in fact the case. One might be inclined to believe that this was a fabrication by Pintoin, whose intention was to emphasise Burgundy's dishonesty. However, this statement would have been in line with similar assertions the duke made throughout his campaign, and in particular, when he was out of favour with the king. In January 1414, he laid siege to Paris on what he claimed were the specific orders of the dauphin. In 1417, he again claimed, unlawfully, that he was undertaking his military campaign on the king's behalf. Hence, there was a palpable level of consistency regarding the level of alleged cooperation between Burgundy and the king.

A great many Parisians enthusiastically met the duke at the gates of St. Denis.⁴⁰ The duke of Bourbon evidently thought that Burgundy had overstepped his mark, for, during the negotiations for peace in early 1409 the duke chastised the Parisians for their role in John's elaborate entry ceremony. This he deemed both inappropriate and reprehensible.⁴¹

11892, layette 4; Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 262-263, n. 261. See Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 82-84; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 79-81; Schnerb, *Armagnacs et bourguignons*, pp. 101-103.

³⁷ See chapter 5, 'Burgundian Texts', pp. 112-117.

³⁸ RSD 3: 752-754, and 4: 103; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 445.

³⁹ '[T]endens Parisius, ibi, cunctis non immerito mirantibus, in apparatu bellico, velut de hostibus regni feliciter triumphasset.' RSD, 3: 752-754.

⁴⁰ RSD, 3: 754; Monstrelet, 1: 111; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 432.

⁴¹ RSD, 4: 188-190.

To add further insult to the duke of Bourbon and his peers, the spectators had cried 'Vive le duc de Bourgogne!' as John's cortège drove past.⁴²

Bourbon was obviously as outraged by the fact that the Parisians had given the duke of Burgundy a welcome that was rightfully reserved for kings, as he was that they had rejoiced in the murder of the king's brother. Indeed it appears that Burgundy took advantage of the universal feeling of mistrust that Orleans' government had generated among the populace to assert himself as their champion. There was clearly an important dialogue subtextually vocalised between Burgundy and the spectators of this entry. It spoke of the general approval of the assassination among the Parisians, and therefore emphasised their esteem for Burgundy. Ultimately, his entry displayed his confidence in having done right by the king and realm when he assassinated the king's brother. Moreover, by disobeying the royal mandate limiting his entourage, the large armed contingent that he brought with him was a blatant challenge to any Orleanists in the royal council. It also discouraged any of their potential supporters among the townspeople from speaking out against the duke of Burgundy. This was a carefully staged event, which was designed to exhibit the scale of Burgundy's strength. It was therefore a powerful propaganda channel, and at a critical moment in his political career.

His careful stage-management of the actual presentation performance was the second phase of John's propaganda before the oral justification was given on his behalf. His strategy was to hold a very public and overstated event, inclusive of all social levels in Paris, from the princes of the royal blood to the lower echelons of Parisian society. To this end, he refused to hold it in any other venue than the royal Hôtel St. Pol. The benefit of the palace of St. Pol over the Châtelet or the Louvre was its distance from his own residence, Hôtel Artois. Not only did he have to travel down rue St. Denis within close proximity to the Halles market, where he would undoubtedly find many supporters among the

⁴² *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 445.

spectators, he would have to progress down the main thoroughfare on his way to Hôtel St. Pol. Organising the lengthy route to Hôtel St. Pol was an excellent manoeuvre because it ensured that the spectacle of his procession would be seen by a much greater audience than if he had merely travelled a few blocks to either the Châtelet or the Louvre. As one of Burgundy's reporters on the event explained in his letter to the duchess, the cortège was enormous and overwhelmed the spectators along the route.⁴³

As a means of further ingratiating himself with the burgesses of Paris, he took care to involve a great number of the Parisians in the event. Many were included in the procession, and were invited to sit in on the oral justification.⁴⁴ Others lined the streets. One of Burgundy's reporters, Thierry le Roy claimed that a great number of the Parisians who had not been officially invited to participate in the presentation found their way into the auditorium regardless.⁴⁵ There was no contest to Burgundy's official justification; the duke was absolved of the death of Louis of Orleans the day after the presentation in Hôtel St. Pol, and royal letters to this effect were published and disseminated throughout the realm.⁴⁶ This was a momentous ideological triumph for John, and he did not hesitate to use it to its full advantage throughout his conflict with the Armagnacs.

This is important because it confirms that there is, as Fogel argued, a 'cohesive force between ceremony and the elaboration of a political or theoretical thought for whatever purpose.'⁴⁷ Each individual involved in this particular spectacle helped to assign meaning to his propaganda by taking a part in the proceedings, proceedings that fit well within the established underlying structure of political thought and deed. Therefore, although they were a part of the event, they nevertheless allowed themselves to be

⁴³ Douët d'Arcq, 'Document inédit', p. 13.

⁴⁴ Monstrelet, 1: 178. See also Coville, *Jean Petit*, p. 107.

⁴⁵ Douët d'Arcq, 'Document inédit', p. 12-13.

⁴⁶ For a copy of the letter of absolution, see ADN, B 656, n. 15.088. The letter is also transcribed in full in Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 254-255, n. 256.

⁴⁷ Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information*, p. 18.

somewhat anaesthetised to the fact that they were helping Burgundy construct an alternative reality of the current political situation, one that was of a clear benefit to himself.

It was not long before Burgundy found another opportunity to use ceremony to his ideological advantage. This came in March 1409, several months after the queen, the kings of Navarre and Sicily, and the dukes of Berry, Bourbon, and Orleans had retired to Tours with the king at the beginning of November 1408.⁴⁸ The trouble began when Burgundy achieved a military victory at the battle of Othée on 23 September 1408. This naturally caused anxiety among the royal princes and the queen, who feared the effect that the duke of Burgundy's return to Paris with his army would have on the Parisians. The royal council already sensed general unrest among the people of the realm, and particularly in Paris. The Parisians were unquestionably agitated. They seem to have sustained their scepticism where the queen was concerned, because at this time, they suspected that the queen wanted to disarm them by removing their chains from the capital city.⁴⁹ With the purpose of diffusing the tension, the queen and the royal court fled to Tours. Yet this decision had the opposite effect on the Parisians, who were irate that the royal court removed their beloved king from the capital. Both Monstrelet and the Jouvenal compiler described them as 'moult troublez et esbahis'.⁵⁰ They sent word to the duke of Burgundy, who was equally cross at the situation. Consequently, John the Fearless decided to return to Paris directly with his army. Predictably, the duke of Burgundy's cortège was a large and rather daunting force.⁵¹ Similarly to his entry into Paris earlier that year, many burgesses cried 'Noël!' as he made his way to hotel Artois with his armed guard.⁵² Apparently this displeased a number of the king's officials. Monstrelet explained:

⁴⁸ RSD 4: 181-183; *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 448-449; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 74.

⁴⁹ For an overview on the townspeoples' reliance on chains as a urban defence mechanism see Philippe Contamine, 'Les chaînes dans les bonnes villes de France (spécialement Paris), XIV^e-XVI^e siècle', in *Guerre et société en France*, pp. 293-320.

⁵⁰ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 449. See also RSD 4: 183.

⁵¹ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 449.

⁵² Monstrelet, 1: 391-392.

Et furent aucuns serviteurs du Roy qui dirent à aucuns d'iceulx crians Noël, vous lui povez démonstrer et faire bonne chère et lie, mais pour lui, ne à sa venue, vous ne devez point ainsi crier. Mais ce non obstant, de tous notables hommes et gens d'auctorité lui fut faicte aussi grant honneur et réception comme ils eussent fait au Roy leur souverain seigneur.⁵³

The similarity between this particular entry and the one made in March 1408 is patently clear. Yet whether or not this entry was a deliberate instrument of propaganda is less certain because one is immediately left questioning whether the duke of Burgundy actually planned this event to run so smoothly and successfully. One thing that is certain, however, is that Burgundy did plan to have a large contingent of armed combatants meet him outside Paris and escort him through the city. We should not doubt that this was an important factor here, because this particular entry was, effectively, a victory procession. Furthermore, Burgundy had not been granted leave of the king to undertake his battle with the Liègeois. Thus, to re-enter Paris fully armed and boasting of victory at a battle he was not sanctioned to wage was a powerful statement indeed, and one whose aim was doubtless to win over the hearts and minds of the Parisians. Firstly, it reinforced the notion that he was the chivalric hero *par excellence*, something that was extremely important to the nobility. More importantly from a wider perspective, it left little room for doubt that he was a capable military and political leader. Additionally, the anxiety that the duke's return to Paris caused for the royal court did not go unnoticed by the Parisians. Therefore, as a codified message saturated in both tradition and semiotic form, this armed procession was ritualised propaganda in pure form.⁵⁴

Burgundy began labouring to bring the king back to Paris from Tours on behalf of the Parisians. As the negotiations between his ambassador, the count of Hainault (his

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information*, p. 18; Pratkanis, Anthony R. and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda. The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York, 2000), p. 11.

brother-in-law), and the royal council dragged on, the Parisians grew impatient for results.⁵⁵ The outcome of their decision to engage in the conference led them to confront the duke of Bourbon. Finally, John the Fearless was called to Chartres Cathedral on 9 March, where the king, the royal council and Louis of Orleans' sons had gathered to finalise the first of the many peace treaties between them. John returned the same day 'à tout noble gent'.⁵⁶ Eight days later, the king made his official re-entry into Paris.⁵⁷ Although John the Fearless does not seem to have played a direct role in the performance of this particular ceremony, he could boast a significant backstage role, which was undoubtedly recognised by a significant number of Parisians. They could not have so easily forgotten that they had asked for his help in bringing the king back to Paris in the first place, a situation that inevitably reinforced his role as guardian of the king and realm. Reminiscent of how he justified his actions in August 1405, this was, superficially, a further immediate response that proved his concern for the interests of the king's urban subjects. In the process, he had secured a peace treaty with Louis of Orleans' sons wherein he was able to maintain that his assassination of Louis of Orleans was carried out for the good of the king and of the realm, without fear of future reprisal.

John's exploitation of entry rituals was therefore one successful method whereby he was able to appropriate the semiotic language of royal ritual to communicate a strong message to his audiences. Likewise, he recognised the inherent value in exploiting religious processions for the same purpose. In his article on the political importance of these processions, Guenée argued successfully for their importance as 'instruments of propaganda' during the French civil war.⁵⁸ Although this form of procession was, by its

⁵⁵ During the negotiations Jean de Montaigu spoke on behalf of the queen and royal council and insisted that John the Fearless give an official and public apology for murdering the duke of Orleans. Montaigu incurred the duke of Burgundy's deepest loathing for his part in this event, which would ultimately lead to his execution in 1409. Merlet, 'Biographie de Jean de Montaigu', pp. 273-279.

⁵⁶ Bourgeois, p. 4.

⁵⁷ Bourgeois, p. 5.

⁵⁸ Guenée, 'Liturgie et politique', pp. 23-49.

nature, a 'religious' event, it was nonetheless an ideal vehicle for the transmission of secular messages, by secular authorities, for secular audiences.⁵⁹ Michel Pintoin disclosed that in October 1411, the presidents of the Parlement and the *chambre des requêtes* met with some members of the royal council and scholars from the University of Paris to plan a solemn and general procession to Ste. Genevieve.⁶⁰ The ultimate plan was to have the 'apostolic mandate' – the official excommunication of the Armagnacs from the Church – read aloud, in French, to the crowds that had gathered at the procession's final destination. Royal councillors had recalled a document that had originally been drafted by Pope Urban V on 9 May 1367, which stated that any group who assembled in arms against the king of France would be immediately excommunicated.⁶¹ Scholars working for the royal council on this matter investigated the royal archives thoroughly in search of this document to frighten the duke of Orleans and his allies so that they would 'end the depredations'.⁶² Pintoin explained that professors of theology and scholars in civil and spiritual law who 'favoured' the duke of Burgundy, declared that this mandate was both lawful and incontrovertible.⁶³ On 13 November, a minor pronounced the excommunication on the forecourt of Notre Dame cathedral.⁶⁴ A devastating blow for the Armagnac party, it was a huge triumph for the duke of Burgundy.

That the group had decided to hold a general and a solemn procession the same day as the announcement made the event all the more important and impressive. A 'general procession' was an event in which all the parishes of the city were invited to participate, and could last anywhere from a day to several days.⁶⁵ In terms of display, the general procession was typically a simple parade. A 'solemn procession' was a far more elaborate

⁵⁹ Guenée, 'Liturgie et politique', p. 31.

⁶⁰ RSD, 4: 532-550.

⁶¹ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 470.

⁶² '[E]t qualiter consiliarii regni ducem Aurelianensem ac stipendiaros suos omnes dignum duxerunt terrere, ut deinceps a rapinis, cedibus et incendiis abstinerent.' RSD, 4: 532.

⁶³ RSD, 5: 532-534.

⁶⁴ *Ordonnances*, 9: 652; RSD, 3:532-550; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 470; Monstrelet, 2: 210. See also Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, pp. 79, 88; Lehoux, *Jean de France*, 3: 253, n. 1.

⁶⁵ For this and what follows consult Guenée, 'Liturgie et politique', pp. 32-37.

experience for participants and spectators alike. The most common defining element was the use of crosses, banners and relics, and the special clothing worn by the canons. Additionally, candlelight played a key role in solemn processions, which was generally accompanied by the participants' singing or chanting, frequently in bare feet.

The November 1411 procession is the best example of the way this ritual could be used politically. The duke of Burgundy's men in the royal council, the University of Paris and the Parlement carefully choreographed an event that would have the greatest spiritual and secular influence over its spectators. The solemn procession, in which all the parishes of Paris were invited to participate, underscored the importance of the event, and would have assembled a large crowd. Moreover, the liturgical element of the procession provided an authoritative spiritual platform from which Burgundy's clerical supporters could attack the Armagnacs. The act of excommunication had two important purposes: it publicly rejected the Armagnacs from the religious community of the Church for an indefinite period of time and, likewise, expelled them from the secular community.

During the period that Burgundy had control over the king (1409-1413), there were similar types of religious processions that strengthened the duke of Burgundy's ideological campaign. In the spring of 1412, for example, there were general processions from early May to the end of June.⁶⁶ These were held as public prayers for the king's swift defeat of the Armagnac army, though the subtext of this frenzy was effectively a public manifestation of sympathy for the duke of Burgundy's cause.⁶⁷

Guenée argued that it was John the Fearless who was the first to have the presence of mind to use religious processions to their full political potential.⁶⁸ Although the

⁶⁶ Bourgeois, pp. 20-24; RSD 4: 656-660; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 476. See also Jacques Chiffolleau, 'Les processions parisiennes de 1412. Analyse d'un rituel flamboyant', in *Revue Historique*, 284 (1990): 54, n. 10; Guenée, 'Liturgie et politique', pp. 28, 30, 45.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Armagnacs took from his example, it was in his hands that 'la liturgie se fit propagande.'⁶⁹ In terms of reaching a broad and varied audience, the processions and the entries were so successful because these events had a substantial spectator base. Moreover, entries and processions did not require one general assembly; rather, because they progressed through the streets of Paris, they invited a large crowd along the way, with some people following the procession to its natural end. They were, in effect, a politicised urban ritual.

However, if we are to gauge whether or not the duke of Burgundy was doing something altogether innovative in the way that he used entries and processions as a means of communicating highly politicised messages, we must enquire as to whether the Armagnacs organised any similar entry ceremonies or armed processions. The first of these took place in August 1408, when the queen made a solemn entry into Paris, escorted by those royal princes who would, from 1410 onwards, be identified as 'Armagnacs': the dukes of Berry, Orleans, Bourbon and Brittany, the counts of Alençon and Charles of Albret, the constable of France.⁷⁰

This entry is significant for several reasons. The first is that it confirms that Burgundy's entry in March 1408 was disproportionate to his standing. This we know because the queen's decision to enter Paris herself was apparently motivated primarily by revenge for the murder of Louis of Orleans, and the show he put on. It was, additionally in retribution for a meeting he had held with the leading burgesses of Paris before leaving for Liège.⁷¹ At this conference, the duke asked the Parisians to continue obeying the king. In his speech he added that he had only remained in Paris for so long because he had had to 'detain' people from the University of Paris so that he would determine who the king's loyal subjects were. Before we can examine what followed, it is important that we take note of this remarkable meeting, at which two important things occurred. Here again Burgundy

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ RSD, 4: 56-58.

⁷¹ For this and what follows, RSD, 4: 56.

posed an empty request when he asked the Parisians to remain loyal to the king. As we have already observed, this was a device that propagandists typically employ.⁷² In asking questions relating to national loyalty, for which there is only one available response, the propagandist orchestrates a situation whereby the respondent is either 'with, or against' the state – or here, the crown.⁷³ Consequently, he receives a set response, that is entirely meaningless, but which further supports his illusive platform of protecting the state.⁷⁴ This was precisely the duke's intention here. In addition, his demand was a veiled threat against those who would side with the duke's rivals as soon as his back was turned. This he reinforced with the follow-up comment on the need to discern who were the king's veritable loyal subjects.

This conference infuriated the queen because she took it as a personal offence. In retribution she hoped that her entry into Paris would begin to negate the accusations Jean Petit had made against the duke of Orleans on Burgundy's behalf earlier in the year.⁷⁵ Her first course of action was to plan a ceremony for the 26 August that would surpass that of the duke of Burgundy's in terms solemnity and indeed, in pageantry.⁷⁶ Consequently she ordered the princes of royal blood, the principal officers of the king's household, and her son, the dauphin, to escort her carriage into the capital. Furthermore, she had an innumerable amount of knights and squires meet her at the gates of the city in full armour.⁷⁷ Ultimately, the queen's elaborate entry ceremony and armed guards communicated a 'need' to protect the capital from the duke of Burgundy. Additionally, she used it as a platform from which she too commanded her subjects to remain obedient to the king and the royal family, and that they remain tranquil within the city. Naturally the subtext of the message was that they should not offer any form of support to the duke of

⁷² See chapter 6, 'Letters', pp. 144-145.

⁷³ Chomsky, *Media Control*, pp. 25-29.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ RSD, 4: 56.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-58.

Burgundy or his men-at-arms. The widowed duchess of Orleans entered in to Paris the following day exhibiting her bereavement over the loss of her husband. She was dressed in mourning and was brought into the capital in a horse-drawn carriage draped in black.⁷⁸ The symbolic association of the double entries would not have been lost on observers.

The queen's desire to outdo the duke of Burgundy's cortège proves also that Burgundy's entry into Paris in March 1408 was indeed impressive, implying that it had a significant impact upon spectators. Moreover, the fact that queen planned to use two entry ceremonies to counter Burgundy's arguments against Louis of Orleans corroborates our argument that the entry ritual was truly an essential form of communication between rulers and their subjects. It is clear, then, that urban groups and their political leaders understood the semiotic language of entry ceremonies, and that this particular system of codes, symbolic references and ritualised dialogue was one that was essential to the preservation of their system of communication.

Another important entry ceremony orchestrated by the Armagnacs occurred in August 1413, following the Peace of Pontoise. The first thing we must note is that John the Fearless fled Paris on 23 August 1413, without taking leave of the Parisians or the king. According to Michel Pintoin he deliberately fled to avoid the planned entry ceremony of the Armagnac princes, Louis of Anjou, Charles of Orleans and his brother, the count of Vertus, the duke of Bourbon and the count of Alençon.⁷⁹ This in itself speaks volumes about the negative impact this entry might have for him and his supporters in the capital.

On the king's orders, the duke of Berry led the welcome party, which included, in order, the provost of Paris and numerous men-at-arms, the chancellor, the royal council, the provost of merchants and a substantial number of burgesses from the capital. The Armagnac princes arrived wearing violet surcoats, upon which a straight white cross and

⁷⁸ Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 1: 311.

⁷⁹ RSD, 5: 148-150.

the motto 'le droit chemin' were sewn.⁸⁰ They also wore hoods halved in black and red. Apparently these were designed according to the style of hood worn by the 'majority' of the Parisians.⁸¹ This was an obvious attempt to emphasise their cooperation with the Parisians. To further prove their respect of the townspeople, the Armagnac princes publicly swore at the gates of the city to preserve the dignity and liberties of the townspeople and to pay for all of the provisions they would consume. They were then permitted to enter the city, which they did to the sound of trumpets, and drove the cortège to the king's palace, where he and the dauphin warmly welcomed them. According to Pintoin, the Parisians lined the streets fully dressed in armour, evidently to honour the arrival of princes and to keep the streets open to the cortège.⁸²

What is interesting about this particular entry was the high level of involvement of the townspeople. This, only two months after chaos had reigned in the city, wherein the Armagnacs and their supporters were specifically targeted with violence within its walls. Not only, then, was this entry designed to publicly reinforce their return to the fold in terms of the royal council, it was a sign of the renewal of their relationship with the townspeople. Indeed their very active participation in every stage of the event reveals that they clearly understood the semiological framework within which this ceremony took place. This was due to its intertextual relationship with the 'language' of the ritual. There was, moreover, an inverse relationship between the pageantry here, and the violent events against the faction that had taken place in Paris during 1413. In a sense, this was an attempt to erase the violence and to start fresh. The motto 'le droit chemin' – the true or straight path – only reinforced this notion.

The Orleanist entries and processions are important because they confirm how this particular ritual could be politicised in an effective way. It is equally interesting that these

⁸⁰ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 490; Bourgeois, p. 44. For the details of the costs involved see Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 3: 262, no. 6229.

⁸¹ RSD, 5: 150; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 490; Bourgeois, p. 44.

⁸² RSD, 5: 150.

were ceremonies that were implemented by royal persons of high standing, and who were firmly placed within the Orleanist camp. However, what is clear is that rather than being executed by their own initiative, both entries were reactionary. They were deliberately designed to dismantle the political reality constructed by Burgundy with his earlier ceremonies, which were complemented by his numerous letter campaigns and his use of emblems. We can confidently argue, therefore, that the Orleanist entries here described were elements of counterpropaganda.⁸³

Nevertheless, it is now certain that we may not take the position that the duke of Burgundy was an innovator in the use of entry ceremonies as vehicles of propaganda. However, the fact is Burgundy's entries were effectively his *parole* within the *langue* of entries, and this within the greater language of political discourse.⁸⁴ Because one can argue that everything achieves meaning from that to which it relates, we are able to see that Burgundy was able to use this system of signs effectively to help him construct his ideology.

8.2. PUBLIC EXECUTIONS

Another form of urban ritual that John the Fearless used advantageously was the public execution. Because executions were highly ceremonial events that gathered large urban audiences together, these were perfect opportunities for slander. Moreover, they typically followed very stringent conventions. Therefore, John could appropriate a medium that was accepted and familiar to reinforce his own ideological position against his Armagnac rivals. Moreover, the medium both affected and was affected by the messages it conveyed about reform and lèse-majesty: 'Like numerous other rituals staged by politico-judicial authorities, punitive rites and ceremonies were part of a deliberate set of symbols

⁸³ As further retribution, the queen used her authority to revoke John the Fearless' pardon in the company of the dukes of Berry, Bourbon and the young Charles duke of Orleans while in Melun. AN, K 56, n. 18.

⁸⁴ Saussure 'The Object of Study', pp. 3-9; Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, pp. 10-11; Macey, *Dictionary of Critical Theory*, p. 365.

intended to impress upon the public the majesty and power of the law and its representatives.⁸⁵ In this way, Burgundy was able to use them as opportunities to publicly disgrace his rivals, whilst maintaining the illusion that he was merely a loyal servant of the king and the *bien public*. Although his use of them is our greatest concern here, we need to try to understand how public punishment worked in the early fifteenth century by focusing on some rather specific examples.

When the duke of Bourbon had scolded the Parisians for their over-zealous welcome John the Fearless into Paris in March 1408, he concluded his reprimand with his opinion on what punishment they should suffer for this betrayal of the king. He demanded that those who had consented were to meet the king at the gates of the city with a noose around their neck, begging for the king's mercy. They should also agree to pay whatever fine the king imposed.⁸⁶ This is significant because Bourbon's suggestions reveal that he viewed their role in Burgundy's entry ceremony as evidence of *lèse-majesty*.⁸⁷ One way to punish *lèse-majesty* without having recourse to capital punishment was to initiate a mock-execution.⁸⁸ As a 'ritual of infamy', the aim of a mock-execution was to impose shame upon the transgressors, marking them with disgrace, or *male fama*, while concurrently informing the spectators around them of the serious nature of their crime.⁸⁹ All punishments were in fact symbols through which a judicial message was conveyed to the spectators, and whose primary aim was to reinforce royal authority.⁹⁰ The moral correction that occurred during public punishment rituals was also designed to have a didactic impact

⁸⁵ Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, p. 156.

⁸⁶ RSD IV: 189-191.

⁸⁷ On the ritual aspects of public executions and mock executions see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1977), pp. 3-69; Esther Cohen, 'To die a criminal for the public good'. The execution ritual in late medieval Paris', in *Law, custom and the social fabrication in medieval Europe*, ed. Bernard Bachrach and David Nicholas (Kalamazoo, 1990), pp. 285-304; Cohen, *The Crossroads of Justice*, especially chapters 8-11; Pieter Spierenburg, *The Spectacle of Suffering: Executions and the Evolution of Repression from a Preindustrial Metropolis to the European Experience*, (Cambridge, 1984); Gauvard, 'La peine de mort en France à la fin du moyen âge: esquisse d'un bilan', in *Le pouvoir au moyen âge. Idéologies, pratiques, représentations*, eds. Claude Carozzi and Huguette Taviani-Carozzi (Aix-en-Provence, 2005), pp. 79-80.

⁸⁸ Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, pp. 165-167.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 155-157.

upon spectators – it was designed to be an example both of what would not be tolerated, and how it would be punished.⁹¹ It was, then, intended as a deterrent. Therefore, by having a mock hanging procession of the leading burgesses through the streets of Paris, the proposed punishment of the leaders of the city of Paris was in fact a way of figuratively punishing all the Parisians who had participated in the event, for their collective treason. Equally, it warned others that manifestations of disloyalty to the crown would not be tolerated. The duke of Bourbon clearly felt that this symbolic punishment was appropriate for the treasonous manner by which they had welcomed the man who had wickedly, and inexcusably, killed the king's brother.

However, the punishment was not implemented. Instead the Parisians welcomed their king back to Paris in the usual way: with great pomp and solemnity. No doubt this was because of Burgundy's control of the situation. Unfortunately for the *grand maître de l'hôtel*, Jean de Montaigu, he did not enjoy a similar favourable fate. He was arrested on 7 October 1409 by Pierre des Essarts, the provost of Paris, on the order of the duke of Burgundy.⁹² Montaigu was truly notorious for having enriched himself greatly during his service to the crown under Charles VI.⁹³ As the lord of Marcoussis, he had built an incredibly ostentatious and expensive residence there, for which he was virulently criticised.⁹⁴ Regarding this luxurious castle, the anonymous author of the *Songe véritable* asked, 'Où peut avoir Montagu pris / La finance qu'il y a mis?'⁹⁵ Montaigu's family had also accrued great favour and advancement from 1398 in the form of offices and marriage alliances.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Gauvard, 'La peine de mort', pp. 78-79; Cohen, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

⁹² RSD, 4: 272-276; Bourgeois, p. 6; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 451. Merlet, 'Biographie de Jean de Montaigu', pp. 273-279; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, pp. 79-80; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 78; Schnerb, *Armagnacs et Bourguignons*, pp. 101-103, and *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 515-517.

⁹³ Merlet, 'Jean de Montaigu', pp. 254-273.

⁹⁴ See for example the Henri Moranvillé (ed.), *Le songe véritable. Pamphlet politique d'un parisien du XV^e siècle*, (Paris, 1891), pp. 43-45. Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 515-516.

⁹⁵ *Songe véritable*, p. 45.

⁹⁶ See Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 515-516. Merlet, 'Jean de Montaigu', pp. 270-273.

When the provost of Paris arrested Montaigu, he accused him of being a 'traître infâme'.⁹⁷ It was a contentious decision, which caused a riot in the city.⁹⁸ However, the provost and his men apparently toured around the capital in an attempt to calm them. Essarts declared that they had captured those who had 'betrayed' the king, and there was little reason therefore not to return to their professions.⁹⁹ Essarts' public denouncement of Montaigu and the others for their treason was used as a tool for threatening Montaigu's supporters, whilst appealing to the agitated Parisian crowd with the intention of returning order. It boasted control of an imagined crisis. Therefore the provost's claims of having the traitors under guard exposes the very spirit of the message that the duke of Burgundy wanted to express with this arrest and those that followed. Claiming to be the protector of the realm, John the Fearless had an 'obligation' to eliminate those whom he identified as having committed treason against the king. From Montaigu's arrest to the end of John the Fearless' reign as duke, the public executions and unofficial massacres of known and suspected Armagnacs were justified by the Burgundians' belief that they were obliged, like their leader, to rid the realm of the corruption of the Armagnacs.

Originally Montaigu was charged with misappropriating the king's treasure, but when that charge became difficult to prove, Essarts accused Montaigu of acting as an accomplice to the duke of Orleans. This meant that he was accused of using sorcery with the intention of harming the king and dauphin. He was therefore, guilty of lèse-majesty. After being tortured, Montaigu admitted to the crime but later retracted on the grounds that he had confessed under the duress of torture. Nonetheless he was convicted as being a 'traistre, et coupable de la maladie du Roy, et qu'il desroboit l'argent des tailles et aydes.'¹⁰⁰ His execution was staged like any other high-profile execution of a nobleman: it was highly

⁹⁷ RSD, 4: 272.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*; Bourgeois, p. 6; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 451.

⁹⁹ RSD, 4: 272.

¹⁰⁰ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 451.

public and involved an audience of thousands of people.¹⁰¹ On its own, there was nothing innovative therein. What was important was how this particular execution served the duke's larger political policy, and indeed his propaganda programme. Charges of corruption, sorcery and disloyalty fit neatly within his principal themes of misgovernment and lèse-majesty among the Orleanists. Thus, this execution only further supported Burgundy's own image as a reformer, and as the king's most loyal servant.

On 17 October, Montaigu was driven to the scaffolding in a cart 'à son de trompe et au milieu d'une nombreuse escorte de bourgeois en armes'.¹⁰² To drag the condemned through the streets to the place of punishment was a typical part of the ceremonial aspects of punishment ritual designed to involve the crowd in the dialogue. The procession functioned on two levels: it alienated the criminal from the community, whilst also securing the consent of the spectators for the pending punishment without which the ritual was not supposed to proceed.¹⁰³ Yet Montaigu's procession to the scaffolding at the Halles market square evoked an unparalleled emotional response from the spectators. Even those who had despised the *grand maître* before this moment collapsed in tears, according to Michel Pintoin.¹⁰⁴ Not surprisingly, this is a detail completely overlooked in Monstrelet's account of the execution.¹⁰⁵ Montaigu's head was severed and fixed on a lance, and his body transported to the gibbet at Montfaucon 'et pendu au plus hault, en chemise, à toutes ses chausses et esperons dorés'.¹⁰⁶ The distance of the gibbet from the centre of the city, emphasised the criminal's condemnation to eternal banishment from the community, and was therefore a significant element of the ceremonial of punishment.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, Montaigu's execution and subsequent alienation from the Parisian community not only

¹⁰¹ For the public ceremonial aspects, see again Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, pp. 185-187; Gauvard, 'La peine de mort', p. 79.

¹⁰² RSD, 4: 274.

¹⁰³ Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, p. 185; Gauvard, 'La peine de mort', p. 79.

¹⁰⁴ RSD, 4: 274.

¹⁰⁵ Monstrelet, 2: 44.

¹⁰⁶ Bourgeois, p. 6.

¹⁰⁷ Spierenburg, *The Spectacle of Suffering*, p. 90; Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, p. 189.

highlighted his alleged treason, but also reinforced the difference between Burgundy's programme of 'good government' and the disloyalty of those who had helped Orleans misgovern the realm. Ultimately the subtext of the event served to underscore the division between the two factions.

Significantly, Montaigu's head was axed before the reading of his sentence was carried out, contrary to normal practice.¹⁰⁸ This is significant because it was an important, traditional aspect of the ritual to publish the sentence of high-ranking convicts. Consequently, the dukes of Berry and Bourbon and the other princes queried this matter. The reason given by Essarts was that that Montaigu had told the crowd before his death that he had admitted to his crimes under torture, and showed the people his wounds. He asserted with great conviction that neither he nor Louis of Orleans were guilty of stealing money from the king. The fact that Montaigu had communicated this message to the crowd was immensely significant. As seen above, every public execution was a carefully planned event to the most precise detail so that that the event would have the desired impact upon the audience.¹⁰⁹ All the actors involved, including the royal officials, the culprit and the spectators, played out the staged event according to a carefully scripted language of ritual.¹¹⁰ Montaigu's breach of his duty to accept his punishment and beg forgiveness caused the entire rhetoric of the spectacle to break down, and could have led the crowds to demand his release.

Had the crowd asked that Montaigu be released, it would have undermined the explicit message behind the execution. Indeed John's sense of loyalty to the king and his desire to rid the government of corruption would have been called into question. To avoid these problems, Essarts removed the possibility by skipping the reading and having Montaigu's head prematurely severed. Although this spectacle may not have had its desired

¹⁰⁸ RSD, 4: 274-276.

¹⁰⁹ Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, pp. 157-161; Spierenburg, *The Spectacle of Suffering*, pp. 43-45, 54. See also Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, chapter 1.

¹¹⁰ Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, pp. 157-161.

effect, as the general population understood the real reason behind the execution ('pour oster ledit Montague du gouvernement qu'il avoit'), the symbolic meaning behind the *grand maître's* execution and hanging on the gibbet was nonetheless very clearly articulated: by ridding the government of people he accused of being dishonest and evil, John legitimised his authority over the royal administration.¹¹¹

Interestingly, when Pierre des Essarts fell out of favour with the duke in 1413, he faced a similar fate.¹¹² He too was accused of corruption, and was executed in the Halles, his body subsequently hung high on the gibbet. We must see Essart's execution within this context, because it is suggestive of just how far Burgundy's tentacles reached into public consciousness, and therefore of the effectiveness of his ideology. Even though it was, ostensibly, the Parisians themselves who demanded Essarts, the whole affair is rather suspect. The Bourgeois de Paris described the general public perception of Pierre des Essarts:

Mais il avoit en sa voulenté, s'il eust plus vesqu, de trahir la ville et de la livrer es mains de ses ennemis, et de faire lui mesmes tres grans et cruelles occisions, et piller et robber les bons habitans de la bonne ville de Paris, qui tant l'aymoient loyaulment; car il commandoit rien qu'ilz ne feissent à leur pouvoir, comme il apparoit qu'il avoit prins si grant orgueil en soy, car il avoit assez offices pour six ou pour huit filx de contes ou de bannerez.¹¹³

What the Parisians commonly believed with regards to Pierre des Essarts matched the rhetorical message that the duke of Burgundy and his chancery had worked so hard to propagate regarding the duke's enemies, ever since his ascent to power began in March 1408. The idea that the duke's rivals were intent on committing atrocities against the king and the people and on delivering the realm to its enemies were common threads throughout the duke's ideological campaign against the house of Orleans and the Armagnacs. Regardless of whether they believed it, or merely used it for their own benefit,

¹¹¹ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 451; Monstrelet, 2: 44.

¹¹² *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 481.

¹¹³ Bourgeois, p. 33.

the fact that the Parisians now used this argument against their old provost demonstrates that they had received and contemplated John the Fearless' message, and made it their own.

Similar accusations of corruption and treason were then appropriated and launched at later Armagnac 'criminals', who were then publicly shamed and killed. Burgundy's message regarding his constant loyal service and good government, which was contrasted to the Armagnacs' corruption, was therefore, both implicit and explicit during the executions. The execution of other high ranking nobles from the royal court in 1413 like Jacques de la Rivière, were all justified with the pretext that they were Armagnacs, and had conspired against the king and realm. Jacques de la Rivière met his unfortunate fate after being arrested in June 1413. Apparently Rivière was accused of having written letters indicating his desire to betray the king and dauphin.¹¹⁴ His body was dragged to the Place du Marché where his head was put on a lance, and his body hung from the gibbet outside the city walls.¹¹⁵ Once again we note a direct reference to the accusations made against Louis of Orleans in 1408, and Montaigu in 1409.

A similar situation unfolded in May 1418 when the Burgundians broke into Paris and took over the city from Armagnac control. Crowds of people began wearing crosses of Saint Andrew and crying: 'Vive Bourgogne!' when they met the duke of Burgundy's army.¹¹⁶ Those who did not publicly display their allegiance to the duke of Burgundy and his party were killed rather brutally, as were the count of Armagnac, the chancellor of France and others of high rank within the Armagnac government:

Et si estoient retournez à Paris des bouchers, et autres du temps passé...Ils allerent aux prisons du Palais, et entrèrent dedans: et en icelles prirent le comte d'Armagnac connestable de France, messire Henry de Marle chancelier de France et un nommé Maurignon qui estoit audit comte. Ils les tirerent hors de la Conciergerie du Palais emmy la cour, et là les tuerent bien

¹¹⁴ RSD, 5: 56.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 540.

inhumainement, et trop horriblement, et les despouillerent tous nuds, excepté des chemises: mesme il y en eut qui ne furent pas contens de les voir morts et tuez: mais leur estoient cruellement des courroyes du dos, comme s'ils les eussent voulu escorcher.¹¹⁷

The symbolic value of these murders was great. The Burgundians took extra measures to strip the count of Armagnac and his friends of all their dignity, so that they would ensure they were irreparably disgraced. This was true of all Armagnac partisans who were refused burials in *terra sancta* on the grounds that they were not worthy.¹¹⁸ By disallowing a proper burial in sanctified ground, traitors and criminals helped reinforce the idea that they were spiritually and physically banished from their community for eternity.¹¹⁹ This method of alienation and humiliation seems to have been effective. The Jouvenal compiler explained that those in Paris who wore the straight white cross decided to change allegiance to the duke of Burgundy because they understood the consequences of behaving otherwise.¹²⁰

This chapter has argued that the duke of Burgundy's use of the more visible modes of communication, namely entry ceremonies, processions both secular and religious, and public executions, was instrumental to his ability to influence public opinion and win communal support for his political agenda, whilst securing his authority over the royal government. We have shown that Burgundy consciously staged political spectacles to propagate a very specific message to an urban, Parisian audience about his loyal service to the king and realm. This he achieved by developing the semiotic language of display to suit his interests, which ultimately served to contribute to the creation of a distinct 'Burgundian' identity, and, therefore, an 'Armagnac' anti-community.

The duke of Burgundy took advantage of the symbolic language of ritual to further promote his persona as the guardian of the king and realm. This he accomplished by

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 541.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 512.

¹¹⁹ Spierenburg, *The Spectacle of Suffering*, p. 90; Cohen, *Crossroads of Justice*, p. 189.

¹²⁰ *Histoire de Charles VI*, 541.

appropriating the rituals normally utilised by the crown to demonstrate its legitimate sovereign power. Yet John manipulated the political vocabulary of these ceremonies to articulate his ideology without overstepping his legal boundary. John had to reorganise the performance entirely to focus on the royal majesty of the king or dauphin, whilst still emphasising his role as loyal servant and defender of the king, and endorse his programme of good government. He first accomplished this in 1405 when he and the dauphin entered Paris after he had 'rescued' the dauphin from Louis of Orleans. Similarly, in 1409, John was ultimately held responsible for the return of the king to Paris after his near-captivity at Tours. Later in 1418, he escorted the queen back into Paris to meet the king.

The duke's public persona was also reinforced by the public executions of high profile Armagnacs. Labelled traitors who had conspired to corrupt the government and destroy the king, they were executed on the order of John the Fearless, whose objective was, purportedly, to protect the king from treason, and to maintain stability in the realm. In a society where the majority was illiterate, reliance on the symbolic as a way of communicating was vital. John recognised the usefulness of the semiotic language of ritual and depended on it to articulate his ideological ideas about the corruption of his adversaries. Indeed there was a consistency in the message that the duke of Burgundy communicated to the people of the realm, and this fundamental tenet of his ideology was transmitted through his texts (namely, the *Justification*), his letters and manifestoes, his badges, and his ceremonies.

CHAPTER 9

AUDIENCE: PARIS AND THE *BONNES VILLES*

In previous chapters we have examined the media and the main themes of John the Fearless' propaganda. We have noted throughout this study that whenever the duke publicised his ideology through letters and manifestoes, symbols and emblems, and various ceremonies and rituals, the intended audience was not restricted to an elite courtly audience. Rather, it included persons from all orders of the social hierarchy. Only the Burgundian texts, the *Geste* and the *Pastoralet*, were intended for a strictly aristocratic audience, for even the *Justification* was presented to a large group of spectators which included numerous Parisians, and was subsequently made accessible on paper for wider consumption. Hence, it is clear that one of Burgundy's primary concerns during his political career was to ingratiate himself to the general population, located mainly within the *bonnes villes* of the French realm. Therefore, we may reasonably argue that he was greatly concerned with public opinion, and recognised the value inherent in winning it over to his cause.

Chevalier has shown that it was vital to win the support of the *bonne villes* during a civil war because during periods of unrest, the towns were the only stable element in a government otherwise weakened by endless changes to its personnel and its policies.¹ Additionally, the *bonnes villes* were a valuable source of financial support. Considering that Burgundy would have needed fiscal backing for his numerous campaigns, maintaining a good relationship with the *bonnes villes* was crucial to his political objectives. Furthermore, it was essential during his military campaigns that he have the public support of as many towns as possible within close proximity to Paris, and in particular, those located between the capital and his domains: Picardy, Boulogne, Vermandois and Champagne. The more

¹ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, pp. 46-47.

support that the towns believed that the duke had, the stronger was his backing for war, and equally, the funds to sponsor it. This is evident in a letter written on 11 February 1414 in which he tried to persuade Paris and other towns to support his siege of the capital.² In this letter the duke of Burgundy stated that he not only had God's help in the matter, because, according to him, he held the moral high ground in the quarrel, he also had the assistance of 'plusieurs et notables bonnes villes de ce royaume, lesquelles nous avons trouvé qui demourront avecques nous.'³ Burgundy did indeed have garrisons in Compiègne and Soissons at this time.⁴

If we are to fully appreciate John the Fearless' political propaganda, and in particular, his strategy to win over public opinion, it is necessary to examine the *bonnes villes* in greater depth. After a brief discussion on the *bonnes villes* and their particular relationship with the duke, we will attempt to ascertain what impact, if any, the letters that the duke sent, the ceremonies, rituals and symbols that he employed to propagate a sense of division and partisanship had on the townspeople of the realm.

9.1. DEFINING THE *BONNES VILLES*

Although numerous scholars have endeavoured over the last forty years to define the expression 'bonne ville', the term nevertheless remains vague, and a precise list is still lacking.⁵ The leading scholar in the field, Bernard Chevalier, suggested that if such a list was

² Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 297, n. 289; Monstrelet, 2: 434-436.

³ Monstrelet, 2: 434-436. See also Plancher, *Preuves*, p. 297, n. 289.

⁴ '[N]ous avons fait garnir les villes de Compiègne et Soissons et y mis de noz gens a la garde dicelles...et <pour les dictes> villes mieulz estre gardee a lonneur de mon dit seigneur et les dits habitans <dicelles> et plusieurs des oppressions et menaces que l'on leur faisoit de jour en jour nous pour la dicte <cause et non pour autres, et des responses des habitans> mis et laissie noz gens a la garnisons <et pour la seurte> des villes dessusdictes <et les habitans dicelles> comme aussi faire.' ADN, B 658, n. 15.253. See also Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 590; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, p. 197.

⁵ Gérard Mauduech, 'La *bonne ville*: origine et sens de l'expression', *Annales. ESC* 27 (juillet-octobre 1972): pp.1441-1448; Georges Duby, *Histoire de la France urbaine. Vol. 2. La ville médiévale des Carolingiens à la Renaissance* (Paris, 1980), p. 309. Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*; Chevalier, 'The *bonnes villes* and the king's council in fifteenth-century France', in *The Crown and Local Communities in England and France in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. John Roger Loxdale Highfield and Robin Jeffs (Gloucester, 1981), pp. 110-128; Monique Bourin (ed.) *Villes, bonnes villes, cités et capitales. Études d'histoire urbaine (XII^e-XVIII^e siècle) offertes à Bernard Chevalier* (Tours, 1989); Contamine, Philippe, 'Les chaînes dans les bonnes villes de France', pp. 293-320.

compiled, the number of towns would probably exceed two hundred.⁶ The original sense of the expression 'bonne ville' signified those towns enclosed by fortifications.⁷ Georges Duby has identified these as: '[villes] fortes, riches, importantes, susceptibles de fournir au roi de bons contingents militaires et de forts subsides fiscaux.'⁸ After tracing its meaning back to its origins, Gérard Mauduech explained that the term evolved to designate the principal towns of the realm, the majority of which were probably royal towns.⁹ This change occurred during the thirteenth century, when the *bonnes villes*' civic, economic and political importance began to outweigh its military significance.¹⁰ Due to the ever-increasing participation of these towns in political affairs and their considerable economic force, their political weight and influence increased throughout the fourteenth century and into the fifteenth.¹¹ According to Chevalier: 'L'état monarchique et la ville ne se dominant pas d'abord l'un, l'autre; ils vont ensemble dans le même sens, comme des alliés égaux, mais des alliés qui s'observent.'¹²

Because of their regular involvement in governmental affairs, especially in the second half of the fourteenth century, the *bonnes villes* had a history of direct communication with the king.¹³ As a result of the Hundred Years War, the towns had become more vocal about their desire for peace and stability, and about their dissatisfaction with the government of the realm. Moreover, they wanted the government to keep them informed about how it was spending its money. These were not surprising requests when one considers the destruction sustained in the countryside during the first half of the Hundred Years War, particularly in the northern regions of Normandy, Picardy and

⁶ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, p. 47.

⁷ Nicholas, *The Later Medieval City*, p. 106. For the impact of fortifications for encouraging unity in the towns, Philippe Contamine, 'Les fortifications urbaines en France à la fin du Moyen Age: aspects financiers et économiques', in *Revue Historique* 260 (1978): 32, 47.

⁸ Duby, *Histoire de la France urbaine*, p. 309.

⁹ Mauduech, 'La bonne ville', pp. 1441-1443, 1448.

¹⁰ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, pp. 7-8.

¹¹ Duby, *Histoire de la France urbaine*, pp. 306-309.

¹² Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, pp. 13, 43-47. Similarly, Duby argued: 'Elles sont un réseau de plus en plus intimement lié aux structures monarchiques qui se mettent en place.' *Histoire de la France urbaine*, p. 309.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 322-323.

Champagne, and in Aquitaine and the surrounding areas.¹⁴ The constant desolation that the towns endured during the war with England resulted in a strong desire for reform.¹⁵ Their dissatisfaction caused the towns to choose the king of Navarre as their natural champion in the second half of the fourteenth century, while he and the future Charles V were embroiled in fierce conflict.¹⁶ After he had suppressed the uprisings against him, the dauphin Charles recognised that the *bonnes villes* were a very powerful enemy when they were on the wrong side of royal authority, and that it was therefore necessary to maintain amiable relations with them. Consequently, he committed to undertaking certain reforms to please them in order to sustain their cooperation. It was due to his experience with the *bonnes villes* in the 1350s that Charles V continued to keep his towns well informed about the state of affairs in the government via letters close, patent and royal proclamations. It was his hope that in so doing, the towns would have no need to form assemblies and leagues of opposition against him.¹⁷

Because the towns were such important pillars to the edifice of royal government, it was logical that Burgundy and his rivals attempted to influence public opinion. Ostensibly, the protagonists did this so that they might modify the decisions of the *bonnes villes* during particularly tense periods of conflict, in addition to currying royal favour with what was, essentially a support network. Evidence to this effect is found in the events immediately following the duke of Orleans' assassination in November 1407, and the subsequent public justification given in Paris in 1408. There were two reasons why Burgundy was able to obtain letters of remission from the king for the homicide of the king's brother. The first was that he had a formidable armed host with him; the second was that he had the mass

¹⁴ This issue is emphasised in Burgundy's request for reform. See chapter 4, 'Desloiaux traistres'. For secondary source accounts of the effects of the Hundred Years War on the French countryside, see Allmand, 'War and the Non-Combatant', pp. 163-183; Allmand, 'Changing Views of the Soldier', pp. 171-188.

¹⁵ For the reforms that the townspeople undertook independently, consult Contamine, 'Les fortifications urbaines', pp. 29-47.

¹⁶ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, pp. 95-96.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

support of the Parisians. Had these not been important factors for consideration within the royal council in March 1408, it is entirely possible the duke of Burgundy would not have been pardoned as he was.

As residents of the foremost city of the realm, not least for its sheer size and population, it is unsurprising that the Parisians had a significant collective voice.¹⁸ It was not only the economic centre but also the political capital, where one would find the king's main residence and a great number of royal administrators and officials, in addition to the town residences of the more prominent members of the nobility, such as the royal princes.¹⁹ Furthermore, there were other important influences at work in Paris, namely the University of Paris and the urban elites. It was its economic and political weight that made Paris of such great consequence to political figures such as the duke of Burgundy. Indeed it appears that he recognised the importance of securing favour amongst members of the governing elite in Paris early on in his career. The result was that he had many influential supporters for his cause in the city.

Like all of medieval society, towns were organised in a descending hierarchy. There were three fundamental divisions, or three 'estates', though each was similarly subdivided.²⁰ The three main groups were: the 'gens d'état', the *bons bourgeois* and greater merchants; the 'corps d'arts et de métiers', or the occupational merchants and artisans; and the 'menu peuple', those who generally made up half the population of any given town or city.²¹ Although this was generally a term assigned mainly to men of labour who held no capital, and whose work was their sole means of subsistence, there was a level of ambiguity

¹⁸ Though there have been estimates that the population in Paris at the turn of the fifteenth century hovered around 200,000 Favier argued that it was more likely around 100,000. Favier, *Paris*, pp. 53-54.

¹⁹ For a full discussion on medieval Paris, see Favier *Paris*; Cazelles, *Paris de la fin du règne de Philippe Auguste à la mort de Charles V. 1223-1380* (Paris, 1972); Michel Félibien, *Histoire de la ville de Paris* (Paris, 1725). See also Duby, *Histoire de la France urbaine*, pp. 315-322; Guenée, *Un meurtre*, pp. 121-131; Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, pp. 90-114. Guy Thompson's first chapter 'The Place of Paris in a Divided France' provides some significant insights on Paris before English rule, during the opening phase of the civil war. *Paris and its People Under English Rule. The Anglo-Burgundian Regime 1420-1436* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 3-25.

²⁰ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, pp. 65-66.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

regarding precisely what this term implied to people in the fifteenth century.²² Christine de Pizan's work is one example of where one finds the 'gens de métiers' and the manual workers categorized together as the 'menu peuple'. In her reaction against the violent Cabochien uprising in the *Livre de la Paix* she stated:

Car quel mal aventure avoit enseigné à un homme de mestier qui toute sa vie n'ara exercé autre chose mais son labour ou de bras ou de mains sans se mouvoir de son astelier pour gagner la vie, n'avoir fréquenté gens legiste ou coustumiers en choses de droit et de justice, n'ara veu honneur ne sara que est sens, n'a appris à parler ordeneement par raisons belle et evidens, ne les autres savons et choses qui affierent à gens propres à establir es gouvernements.²³

Her system of classification was clearly determined by the level of cultural or academic education, and the exposure that each group had to the political functioning of government.

The socio-political differences between the 'bourgeois' of Paris and the two lower-order groups were fundamental to French society in the fifteenth century because it related to their political voice as much as their economic clout.²⁴ The main demarcation between groups depended upon their level of intimacy with the trading market.²⁵ The first group among them were the very rich urban dwellers, the *majores* of the towns. Typically, these were men who had gained their fortune through commerce and export, or the entrepreneurs of the textile industry, or those who traded in luxury goods for the nobility.²⁶ Equally, it included clerks involved in royal administration and offices.²⁷ They were essentially the ruling elites of the *bonnes villes*. Nicholas explained that by the turn of the fourteenth century, a rigid differentiation between this group and those below was very clearly defined:

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 84.

²³ Pizan, *Livre de la paix*, p. 131.

²⁴ For a very detailed analysis of the hierarchy, see Nicholas, *The Later Medieval City*, pp. 180-257.

²⁵ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, p. 84; Nicholas, *The Later Medieval City*, pp. 141-142.

²⁶ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, p. 67.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-73; Autrand, *Naissance d'un grand corps de l'État*, pp. 83-88, and especially p. 89.

The officeholding elite was usually distinguished legally from the rest of the population, although all were considered citizens... Although the councillors' social position and political privilege was still determined more by their possession of land, their wealth was being increasingly generated by trade... They had a collective consciousness of their standing and strenuously resisted any effort of artisan organisations to penetrate the inner circles of city government.²⁸

Yet it was not only the artisans whom the 'elites' attempted to exclude from local government. The group designated by Chevalier as the 'corps d'arts et de métiers', the occupation guilds, incorporated the greater majority of merchants, and the upper stratum of craftsmen guilds and confraternities.²⁹ The first factor that restricted these merchants and tradespeople from joining their upper peers was economical. Once again, precedence depended upon one's position in relation to the market.³⁰ Those who were 'true' merchants because the nature of the product they sold, which was such that it instantly went to market, were prioritised over those who either sold or laboured with the raw materials of a given industry.³¹ The second factor was based entirely upon social conditioning: certain trades were less esteemed than others due arbitrarily to how they were perceived in medieval society.³² For example, although many butchers might be wealthy, as many were in Paris, they were not held in high regard. This was also the case for skimmers, tanners, and many artisan trades, such as carpenters and masons.³³ In fact, these were often referred to in documents and chronicles from our period as men of 'petit estat'.³⁴ There is little wonder, then, that writers such as Pizan included many of this second order in her general notion of the *menu peuple*.

²⁸ Nicholas, *The Later Medieval City*, p. 6.

²⁹ Though, Chevalier explained that some masters of certain professions were situated below labourers of others in the social hierarchy due to the type of trade they were involved in. Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, p. 76.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 76.

³³ Interestingly in Flanders masons and carpenters were not in the same position of poverty as in the French realm. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³⁴ In an appeal case recorded in October 1417, a man who was inadvertently killed in a drunken scuffle following his abuse of a Burgundian prisoner was described in the document thus: 'Et adonc icellui Pignères, homme de petit et bas estat'. Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 2: 109.

The social distinctions were very clearly observed in fifteenth-century society, and are discernible in evidentiary documents such as chronicles, letters, proclamations and town deliberation records, and also in contemporary political theories of the period. With regards to the latter, Christine de Pizan's organic model of society is a good example. According to her conception of the body politic, the 'bourgeoisie' was the stomach, the merchants were the thighs, and the *menu peuple* were the legs and feet.³⁵ Because the hierarchy placed the bourgeoisie in a superior position, they were expected to mediate between the other townspeople and the higher levels of society: the clergy (the flanks); the gentry (the arms); the great princes of the realm (the shoulders); and the king (the head).³⁶ This was accomplished by participating in local and royal government.

The bourgeoisie's domination in this province is obvious in a plethora of more tangible contexts. When, for example, Michel Pintoin described in great detail the events of the Cabochien Uprising in his *Chronique*, he related an anecdote about a meeting that occurred the 28 April 1413 that, following custom, the foremost 'quinquagenariis', whom he qualified as both moderate and wise (*graves et modesti viri*), joined several of the privileged burgesses (*auctoritatis cives*), and the provost of merchants and aldermen to deliberate on current affairs.³⁷ The provost of merchants and his aldermen were the seated leaders of the political oligarchy. In addition, it was usual for the 'bourgeoisie', such as it was described above, to be involved in wider governmental affairs, as the king frequently called upon 'notables bourgeois' from the *bonnes villes* to join him and his royal council to discuss certain politically important matters. This was the case in 1412, when he asked Amiens to send two men to Auxerre to swear to uphold the peace treaty signed between the House of Orleans and of Burgundy.³⁸ In another example, a significant number of Parisian bourgeoisie

³⁵ Pizan, *Livre de la paix*, p. 124.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ RSD, 5: 11.

³⁸ 'Assemblée du ix aout (malmaison)...auxquelz furent leues et exposées unes lettres du Roy nostre sire apportees ou jour dier soux le seel de son secret adréchans aux bourgeois manans et habitans de ladicte ville

participated in the reading of the *Justification* in 1408.³⁹ Interestingly however, Monstrelet revealed that there were other townspeople present at the reading of Jean Petit's text. He claimed that, 'un grant nombre de docteurs et autres clers, et très grant nombre de bourgeois et peuple de tout estas.'⁴⁰ For our purpose here, it is very revealing that Monstrelet included the 'peuple de tout estas', but that he did so by distinguishing them very clearly from the 'bourgeoisie'.

Furthermore, we observe the distinction within urban society in royal proclamations and the majority of letters that were addressed to the *bonnes villes*. In a letter written by the duke of Burgundy on 11 March 1414, his salutation reads: 'A l'honneur et sagesse des bourgeois et habitants de la bonne ville de Rouen salut et dilection.'⁴¹ The difference was equally clear in a copy of a previous letter sent by John the Fearless, dated 23 January 1414. In the copy to Amiens, the subscription opens: 'A mes trèschers et bien amez les bourgois, manans et habitants de la ville d'Amiens.'⁴² The tripartite separation of urban society is also found in the town deliberation records in Amiens: in one assembly held the 13 July 1417, letters that had been sent by the duke of Burgundy to the town, were read aloud to an audience comprising of the captain of Amiens, the mayor, the town councillors, and 'plusieurs bourgeois, manans et habitants'.⁴³ Although there remains some ambiguity regarding the precise meaning of the term 'manant' at the turn of the fifteenth century, it is certain that it designated a very specific group of inhabitants within urban

d'Amiens, par lesquelles il leur mande et enjoint expressément qu'il envoient par devers lui en la ville d'auxonne, au x jour de cest present mois deux des plus notables bourgeois de ledicte ville, aians pour jurer et promectre à tenir les ordonnances qui seront faictes par ledit seigneur au bien honeur paix et transquilite du Roy nostre sire et de son royaume...' Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fols 17v-118v.

³⁹ Douët d'Arcq, 'Document inédit', p. 13. According to Monstrelet, 1: 178.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ The state of this particular letter indicates that it is very clearly a draft. The name of the town to which it is addressed has either been deliberately rubbed out, or is no longer visible in its entirety, though one can make out the capital 'R' at the beginning of the name, which appears to end in 'en'. For this reason, and the short length of the name, I have hypothesised that it is, likely, Rouen. ADN, B 658, n. 15.235.

⁴² Letter cited in full in Monstrelet, 2: 424.

⁴³ Arch. Comm. d'Amiens, BB. 2, fol. 108r.

society.⁴⁴ Its placement between the 'bourgeois' and the 'habitants', in addition to its connotations of wealth and power, suggest that it referred to the group that rested below the ruling elites but above the *menu peuple*. Therefore the term 'manant' doubtless designated the mid-range tradesmen and corporations, such as the butchers, the tanners, the tailors, perhaps including also some artisans; a social group who enjoyed some privilege, but who ultimately found themselves excluded from the *haute bourgeoisie*, as did the Parisian butchers.

In Paris, the 'bourgeoisie' and the second order of town dwellers were a significant political and economic force in Paris, a fact that did not elude John the Fearless. Indeed a large proportion of the Parisian elites supported Burgundy and his policies.⁴⁵ To explain this phenomenon, Marie-Reine Lobry has argued that the Parisian 'bourgeoisie' and the duke were involved in a reciprocal relationship wherein Burgundy supported and guarded the latter's political interests in the government in return for financial assistance.⁴⁶ According to Françoise Autrand, a large number of those who supported Burgundy were members of families who had recently established themselves in Paris from the surrounding regions of Burgundy, such as Auxerre. These 'new' families were predominantly reformers who sympathised with the duke of Burgundy.⁴⁷

A powerful group of Parisians from the second order of the urban hierarchy, which was very closely connected to John the Fearless, consisted of the butchers of Paris.⁴⁸ As a long-established community, the *Grande Boucherie* held an influential and central position around the Rue St. Jacques, between the Grande Châtelet and the Seine, not far from

⁴⁴ 'Habitant domicilié', and 'riche, puissant'. Algirdas Julien Greimas, *Dictionnaire de l'ancien français*, 3rd edn. (Paris, 2004) p. 364. This is consistent with Godefroy's edition of the *Lexique de l'Ancien Français*, defines the manant as a noun: 'habitant, qui demeure, domicilié'. He also added that as an adjective, it denoted 'riche, opulent, puissant.' Frédéric Godefroy (ed.), *Lexique de l'Ancien Français* (Paris, 2000), p. 318.

⁴⁵ Favier, *Paris*, pp. 154-155.

⁴⁶ Lobry, *Relations*, pp. 1, 27-40.

⁴⁷ Autrand, *Naissance d'un grand corps de l'État*, pp. 83-89. See also Lobry, *Relations*, p. 16-27.

⁴⁸ For this and what follows on the butchers, see René Héron de Villefosse, 'La Grande Boucherie de Paris' in *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France*, 55 (1928): 39-73. Favier, *Paris*, pp. 37-40; Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, pp. 101-104; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 115.

Burgundy's Parisian residence Hotel Artois.⁴⁹ The *Grande Boucherie* was not only the market stall area, but incorporated the entire community who were under the watchful eyes of the *maitre-chef*.⁵⁰ Additionally, there were other smaller butcher communities who were dispersed throughout Paris, on both the right and left banks. According to Favier, the butchers were a dominant, aggressive and vulgar confraternity in the capital.⁵¹ Héron de Villefosse was less severe regarding their status in the city. He maintained that the butchers were an ancient community in Paris, who held a great many special privileges granted by royal authority.⁵² Nonetheless, it is certain that they were considered 'gens de métiers' rather than greater merchants, due to their unsavoury labour-intensive profession, and were, therefore, typically excluded from local governance.⁵³ Yet however grisly outsiders may have perceived their trade, Villefosse argued that as a community they were concerned with appearing well-groomed and ordered; indeed there were a number of strict regulations that were enforced by the *maitre-chef* and his officers of justice regarding the policing of the 'bonne condui[te]' of the entire community. For example, if a butcher married a woman of ill repute, he was excluded from the *Grande Boucherie* permanently.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, Favier maintained that the reputation of the butchers continued to be rather boorish in Paris, and were therefore isolated from the *haute bourgeoisie*.⁵⁵ There is little doubt that their involvement in the violence of 1411 and 1413 damaged their reputation further. Yet, their strong presence and their highly organised confraternity union made them a very powerful voice in Paris.

⁴⁹ Hotel Artois is now called 'Tour Jean sans Peur', and is located on 20 rue Etienne Marcel.

⁵⁰ Villefosse, 'La Grande Boucherie de Paris', p. 67.

⁵¹ Favier, *Paris*, pp. 37-38.

⁵² Villefosse, 'La Grande Boucherie de Paris', pp. 63-67.

⁵³ Chevalier, *Bonnes villes*, p. 86; Nicholas, *The Later Medieval City*, p. 139.

⁵⁴ Villefosse, 'La Grande Boucherie de Paris' p. 67.

⁵⁵ Favier, *Paris*, pp. 37-38.

A final group that we must consider as important among John the Fearless' intended audience was the University of Paris.⁵⁶ Laurent Tournier has shown that both factions attempted to appeal to the University, because they acknowledged it had the potential to have a substantial impact upon public opinion.⁵⁷ However, he argued convincingly that although the Armagnacs doubled their initiative to get the University of Paris on its side in the conflict, from 1410 onwards, it was John the Fearless who was the first to understand just how important the institution might be to his political strategy.⁵⁸ Indeed scholars generally agree that prior to the Cabochien Uprising in 1413, as far back as 1405, the university favoured John the Fearless over Louis of Orleans.⁵⁹ When John brought the dauphin back to Paris in August 1405, the university sent ambassadors to thank him for his 'bonne amour et affection qu'il avoit au Roy, à sa génération, et à tout le royaume.'⁶⁰ The university delegates stated that they were, and would remain certain that the duke of Burgundy would endeavour 'à bonne fin et à la réformation et réparation d'icellui...'⁶¹ It was his reforming policy which had secured the favour of the institution. In actual fact, it was a programme that they had tried to get to Orleans to accept when they sent a delegation to mediate between him and Burgundy.⁶² Unfortunately for the duke of Orleans, this conference met with disaster, mainly because he insisted that they stay out of the affair entirely and leave the running of the government to 'ceulx de sang royal et du

⁵⁶ Exhaustive studies on the University of Paris' political involvement in this phase of the war, and of individual scholars are well beyond the confines of this present doctoral dissertation. It is our intention here to flag the institution's overall importance as a prospective audience of John the Fearless' propaganda, and to measure, where possible, whether it had any impact upon individuals within the University, or vice versa. For a more thorough examination of the University of Paris political role during the Burgundo-Armagnac conflict, see Tournier's PhD dissertation: *L'Université de Paris*.

⁵⁷ Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, p. 71, and 81-82.

⁵⁸ Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, pp. 72-73.

⁵⁹ The root of this relationship was in all likelihood the fact that the dukes of Burgundy supported the Roman pope and had assisted the University of Paris in encouraging Charles VI to withdraw obedience from the Avignon pope, Benedict XIII. Orleans had always supported Benedict XIII. Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, p. 143; Guenée, *Un meurtre*, p. 170-171. See also Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, pp. 73, 79-80.

⁶⁰ Monstrelet, 1: 113. Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, p. 51.

⁶¹ Monstrelet, 1: 113.

⁶² Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, pp 50-51.

grant conseil'.⁶³ Furthermore, he asserted that it was unnecessary to pacify the relationship between the dukes because, he claimed, there was only a manufactured conflict between them anyway. Apparently the University of Paris was displeased by his arrogance. It is therefore unsurprising that a great many men from the University, like Eustache de Pavilly, later began to support the duke of Burgundy's cause.

It is certain that John the Fearless employed a number of *maîtres ès arts* from the university at various times, some of whom became his advisers, such as the theologian Jean Petit.⁶⁴ One finds further evidence in the records of his *chambre des comptes* in Dijon that John the Fearless employed university men as counsellors and ambassadors. For example, the rector of the University of Paris, Pierre Cauchon, *maistre ès arts et licence ès decret*, was in the duke of Burgundy's service as early as February 1406, for which he was given a pension until 1413.⁶⁵ In February 1412, eight other scholars from the university along with Pierre Cauchon, were given wine and money gifts, though the reason was not disclosed in the records.⁶⁶ Presumably the gifts were rewards for services rendered in 1411, perhaps for their assistance immediately following the Jargeau Manifesto and the letters of defiance sent by Orleans and his brothers. Or, perhaps for their involvement in recovering and supporting the legitimacy of the May 1367 papal bull of excommunication that was then promulgated against the Armagnacs in November 1411.

The reason that the University of Paris was so important was because the king and his advisors held the institution in very high regard, and sought its opinion on all political and spiritual matters.⁶⁷ This was particularly true with regard to issues relating to the

⁶³ Monstrelet, 1: 121-122.

⁶⁴ Jean Petit figures in John the Fearless' pension records for 1406. ACO, B 1554, fols. 55r-55v. See also B 1558, fol. 60v.

⁶⁵ The payment was ordered by letters patent written in Bapaumes, stating that from the 6 February 1408, Burgundy had 'retenu son conseiller [Pierre Cauchon] a la pension de cinquante frans par an...' This was recorded in Paris, 19 May 1413. ACO, B 1576, fol. 113v. For more on his relationship to John the Fearless, see Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 324-325.

⁶⁶ ACO, B 1570, fols. 233-235.

⁶⁷ Serge Lusignan, *Vérité garde le roy'. La construction d'une identité universitaire en France (XIII^e-XV^e siècle)*, (Paris, 1999), pp. 179-199. Also, Tournier, *L'Université de Paris*, pp. 48-97.

Church and the papal schism. The University defined its role as the king's counsellor by developing two diverse but inter-reliant metaphorical concepts: the *translatio studii* and the notion that it was the 'daughter of the king'. It was for this reason that when in 1405 Jean Gerson delivered his sermon *Vivat Rex* in the name of the University of Paris to the king and the royal princes, he referred to the University as the 'fille du roy', and defended its right to criticise both the government and the enmity between the princes.⁶⁸ Scholars of the University of Paris were consulted on a number of occasions during the civil war in France, and their opinions were frequently held to represent those of all Parisians. This was particularly clear in the early months of 1413, when the king had called for a meeting of the Estates General. When on the 9 February 1413, the first of the University's spokesmen, Benoît Gentien, a monk of Saint Denis and a professor of theology, presented a speech that some of the University's men considered to be very weak, they asked for a second audience.⁶⁹ The second speech was given by Eustache de Pavilly, who took the opportunity to aggressively condemn the mishandling of the king's finances, the corruption in the Parlement and king's household, and the abuse of justice throughout the realm. Interestingly, he also stated that there was need to reassemble the princes of the realm so that they could renew their oaths to observe the peace treaty, because there were, apparently, a great many lords who were resuming acts of war under the order of the count of Armagnac.⁷⁰ Pavilly later became one of the Cabochiens' spokesmen by May 1413, and defended the extreme measures taken by the group when they seized a number of men and women who were suspected Armagnacs from the dauphin's entourage.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Jean Gerson, 'Vivat Rex', pp. 1136-1185.

⁶⁹ For Gentien's speech, see RSD, 4: 740-742. For the dissatisfaction among the more zealous reforming University scholars, and the subsequent speech given by Eustache de Pavilly, a doctor from the order of Notre-Dame du Carmel, see pp. 744-768.

⁷⁰ RSD, 4: 746.

⁷¹ For information on Pavilly, Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, pp. 167-168, 195, 200-201.

9.2. PARTISANSHIP & PUBLIC OPINION

It is commonly held by scholars of the French civil war that, at least in the first stages of the conflict, Burgundy was more popular among the Parisians than was the duke of Orleans or the Armagnacs. This was naturally due to his consistence in propounding a policy of reform. Yet this hypothesis is taken as a given, based mainly on the events of 1411 and 1413, when partisans seem to have displayed their fervent loyalty to the duke. Because the Cabochiens were associates of the duke, it goes some way to support the general view that up to that point, he did indeed have the support of a substantial portion of Parisian society. Yet upon closer scrutiny, it is apparent that the partisanship that occurred in Paris in favour of the duke of Burgundy's faction from August 1411 until July 1418, when Burgundy re-entered Paris in triumph, was essentially a passive phenomenon for a large number of those who were involved. It is true that he had launched a particularly acute rhetorical invective against his adversaries Charles of Orleans and his brothers in July-August 1411. It is equally true that the duke of Burgundy had been actively displaying his personal emblems and badges in a very pervasive manner, symbols which were loaded with meaning that was conducive to his main ideological campaign. Ostensibly, those who wore the Burgundian badges from 1411 were displaying their solidarity with the Burgundian cause. This was most certainly the case for the more zealous partisans.

However, it is unreasonable to discount how important the threat of violence was as a major coercive force during this particular propaganda campaign. The persecution that the duke of Burgundy's militia imposed upon whomever they suspected of being an Armagnac supporter among the Parisian populace was a very real hazard in September 1411. According to Michel Pintoin, people took advantage of the right to persecute

identified Orleanist supporters, victimising whomever had offended them.⁷² Violence in the capital was so rampant that even Monstrelet, a Burgundian sympathiser, admitted that it was a dangerous time for all people, regardless of their factional membership, 'par ce que le peuple et commun dessudit avoient grant partie de la dominacion dedans icelle.'⁷³

The result of the uninhibited violence was that there were many who would have had little choice but to wear the Burgundian badge of the cross of Saint Andrew, with or without carpenter's planes, if they were to avoid persecution. Yet, even if they did accept and wear the Burgundian badge there is no clear evidence to prove whether they agreed with Burgundy's ideology. Pintoin again makes this clear when he described the ambivalence of partisanship during the duke of Burgundy's military campaign in 1417, whose main objective was to 'free' the king from the alleged tyranny of the Armagnacs. Pintoin recalled that in the autumn of 1417, people in the countryside had once again begun wearing either Burgundian saltires or the upright Armagnac crosses depending on the circumstance, simply so that they could steal and pillage freely.⁷⁴ This was a rather strong indictment of the violence imposed upon the countryside during this phase of war by all participants, and is therefore a fascinating judgment. Even if this was an exaggeration, it was not an unreasonable one to make given peoples' natural proclivity to opportunism. Moreover, it echoes earlier comments by the chroniclers that the distinction between 'Burgundian' and 'Armagnac' was to some degree a superficial construct buttressed by excessive violence. Therefore, although the duke of Burgundy's emblems may have been rich in meaning, there is no certainty that the people of the realm understood or agreed with that significance. Coercion was obviously one of the key factors in encouraging partisanship.

⁷² 'Effrenis eis concessa licencia, inter plurimos quos pariebat abusus, ille permaximus erat, quod si quis in aliquem odium concepisset et eum publice Armeniacum vocasset, et si non occidebatur, carcerem tamen non vitabat, et protinus a prevenientibus bona ejus idstrahebantur libere sine auctoritate cujuscunque.' RSD, 4: 444-446.

⁷³ Monstrelet, 2: 163-164.

⁷⁴ RSD, 5: 154-156.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that there was an obvious group of staunch Burgundian supporters in the towns, and especially in Paris. It was the unanimous opinion of all the chroniclers of the period, regardless of their partiality, that from his entry onto the political stage, the duke of Burgundy had won the favour of a great majority of Parisians. Neither can we deny that the butchers and skinnners of Paris, among other prominent burgesses, were clearly devoted to him. Did these individuals digest and believe in the rhetorical arguments that Burgundy propagated against the duke of Orleans and his successors, the Armagnacs? Or was their devotion and loyalty to the duke of Burgundy based purely on a mutually dependent relationship?⁷⁵ One of the court cases registered in the Châtelet suggests that some did buy into Burgundy's rhetoric. Marguerite la Boitelle, the wife of one of the royal secretaries, Guillaume Barrau, was banished from the realm in December 1413, after having her possessions confiscated for having contravened the Peace of Auxerre (22 August 1413).⁷⁶ Evidently she was disturbed by the fact that everything that had been accomplished prior to the Armagnacs' taking control of the government would be undone. For this reason, she was charged with having 'murmuré et conspiré, et fait murmures, monopoles, conspiracions et assemblées dampnées et illicites, et induit et admonesté sondit mary et autres à faire lesdiz murmures, monopoles, conspiracions et assemblées avecques plusieurs autres sédicieux et violateurs de ladicte paix, en nostredicte ville de Paris et ailleurs.'⁷⁷ The fact that the wife of a royal official was so concerned that the new government would overturn earlier advancements that she conspired with others of similar dispositions suggests that Burgundy's propaganda did indeed have an impact upon at least some people among the ruling urban elites. At the very least, the practical applications that had accompanied the rhetoric were deemed effective.

⁷⁵ This was the position Marie Reine Lobry held in her thesis, *Relations*, pp. 1, 27-40.

⁷⁶ AN, JJ 168, no. 81 cited in Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 2: 178-179. Douët d'Arcq had mistakenly assigned the date of 15 December 1414 rather than 1413 to this document. See volume 1, p. 369.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

The accounts of wine gifts of 1411 also indicate that there were a number of Parisians who were generously rewarded for their loyalty to the duke, including a number of the king's royal officers: Eustache de Laître, *président de la chambre des comptes du roi*; Nicole d'Orgemont, Michel Laillier and Guillaume Le Clerc, all *conseillers & maîtres des dix comptes*; Pierre de Fontenay, a Burgundian court counsellor and *maître d'hôtel*, and *gouverneur de la despense du Roy*; Jehan de Pressy, *trésorier des guerres du Roy*; and finally, Guillaume Varran, the king's secretary.⁷⁸ Of these men, it is certain that Jean de Pressy and Pierre de Fontenay were, without a doubt, loyal Burgundians. Pressy, was, in 1403-1404 the *receveur des aides royales* in Artois, and was given the title of *receveur général* of the duke of Burgundy's finances in November 1406, which he retained until August 1410.⁷⁹ At this juncture, he became a counsellor of the duke and was given an annual pension.⁸⁰ According to Schnerb, it was due to John the Fearless' influence that he was honoured with the office of *trésorier des guerres du roi* in August 1410, which he held until February 1413.⁸¹ Pierre de Fontenay, lord of Rancé, had a similar success story. Fontenay had inherited his new noble title from his father, Nicholas de Fontenay, the *gouverneur général des finances* of Philip the Bold.⁸² In 1405, Pierre was given the office of *maître d'hôtel*, which he retained at least until 1417, and in June 1409 he became one of the duke's *général conseiller*.⁸³ In 1409 Charles VI officially named him the 'gouverneur de toutes les finances qui sont ou seront ordonnées dorenavant, tant sur le fait de notre domaine que sur le fait des aides...pour la dépense des hôtels.'⁸⁴

As for the other men listed above, such as the more moderate Michel Laillier and Guillaume Le Clerc, many had not been specifically involved with the Burgundian cause.⁸⁵

⁷⁸ ACO, B 1570, fols. 233v-234r.

⁷⁹ See Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 326-329. See also the ducal accounts at the ACO. For example the 'Recette générales par Jehan de Pressy' 1407-1408 in ACO, B 1554, fol. 45r and what follows, or B 1560, fol. 33v.

⁸⁰ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 327; ACO, B 1560, fol. 59r.

⁸¹ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 327. Also Rey, *Finances royales*, pp. 392-393.

⁸² Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 335.

⁸³ Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 297.

⁸⁴ Rey, *Finances royales*, p. 53.

⁸⁵ Laillier was a wealthy moneychanger in Paris. Rey, *Domaine du roi*, p. 300. Guillaume le Clerc sat on several royal council meetings in 1411 where letters in favour of John the Fearless were drafted and published. For

Therefore it is likely that Burgundy used the wine to entice them to join ranks. The others that appear on the above list seem to have only allied themselves with the duke of Burgundy over the course of time. This was the case with the Parisian jurist, Eustache de Laître. Laître was from a wealthy 'bourgeois' family, and throughout his career had been a counsellor to the king at the Châtelet, a lawyer in the Parlement, a *maître des requêtes de l'hôtel du roy* (from 1398), and from 1404 had sat in various royal council meetings.⁸⁶ There is little to suggest that Laître had any direct affiliation with the Burgundian faction before October 1409, when John the Fearless included him in his commission for reform (20 October).⁸⁷ But in early December, Laître was rewarded with the new office of president of the *chambre des comptes* in the place of Jean de Montaigu, who, as we have seen, was executed two months before. In May 1414 Laître was banished from the realm alongside Pierre Cauchon and John the Fearless' secretary, Baudes des Bordes.⁸⁸ Similarly, the Parisian cleric Nicole d'Orgemont was a jurist, and had served in the Parlement from as early as 1392, as a *conseiller clerc*.⁸⁹ In December 1409, he too was given a royal office, that of *maître de la chambre des comptes*.⁹⁰ One naturally concludes, therefore, that December 1409 was a turning point for both Laître and d'Orgemont. Indeed d'Orgemont was later arrested by Armagnac government after his collusion in a conspiracy to help the duke of Burgundy back into Paris was revealed.⁹¹

Furthermore, wine gifts were given to the butchers and tanners of Paris and their peers, people whose names are known to posterity because of their involvement in the Cabochien uprising of Paris (1413). These are: Denisot de Chaumont; Thomas Legois and his two sons; Simon de Caboche; Jean de Troyes (surgeon); and finally, the provost of

the royal letter inviting John the Fearless to 'rescue' the realm, 01/09/1411 see Plancher, *Preuves*, pp. 275-276, n. 275. For a second royal letter relating to the same issue, consult: ACO, B 11893, n. 13.

⁸⁵ ACO, B 1570, fols. 233v-234r.

⁸⁶ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 554.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 1: 368.

⁸⁹ Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, p. 555.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Bourgeois, pp. 70-71; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 531.

merchants at the time, Pierre Gencien.⁹² Moreover, in March 1413, Jean de Troyes, ‘bourgeois et eschevin de la ville de Paris’, was given a further gift of eighty gold francs ‘pour considerations de plusieurs agréables services’.⁹³ In the same month, the butchers and skimmers of Paris listed above were given further gifts of wine. The list also included Garnier St. Yon, who was an alderman of Paris from 23 October 1412 to August 1413.⁹⁴ Unsurprisingly, others who were attached to the municipal government of Paris in 1411-1413 received similar wine gifts.⁹⁵ The list included Jean de Troyes for the second time, and Jean d’Olive (both of whom were aldermen during this period), Pierre Gencien and Andriet d’Espéron (both provosts of merchants at different times between January 1412 and September 1413), Robert Louvet, ‘clerc du prévot des marchand’, and many other royal officials. Among them was Elyon de Jacquerville, a ‘chevalier, conseiller et chambellan’ of the king and of John the Fearless. Jacquerville would later become one of the leaders of the Cabochien Uprising.

These gifts might induce some to believe that the relationship between the duke of Burgundy and his partisans in Paris was one which was built entirely upon financial returns. However, this is a rather reductive way of looking at what was a very complex connection. If Burgundy simply used these men to further his own ambitions, there would have been little reason for him to defend them as stalwartly as he did. Prior to the 1413 revolt, Jean Jouvenal, Lord of Taignel, allegedly begged John the Fearless to disassociate himself from the butchers, as he claimed that their relationship was dishonouring the duke’s reputation. According to the Jouvenal compiler’s chronicle, Burgundy’s response was that he would do as he pleased.⁹⁶ It is true that the Jouvenal compiler’s perception of the event here described was naturally predisposed to the lord of Taignel’s version of events rather than

⁹² ACO, B 1570, fols. 233v-234r.

⁹³ ACO, B 1576, fol. 129r.

⁹⁴ For the wine gifts see ACO, B 1576, fols. 193v-195r. For a list of provosts of merchants and of aldermen from 1412-1499, see Favier’s chart, *Paris*, p. 419-431.

⁹⁵ See also Schnerb, *Jean sans Peur*, pp. 555-556.

⁹⁶ This anecdote is not related in any other chronicle of the period. *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 480-481.

to the duke of Burgundy. Consequently, we must approach this story with great caution. Yet it is a significant anecdote nonetheless, because there is other corroborating evidence which proves that the duke did publicly, and without shame, favour the butchers of Paris, regardless of how this affected his public profile. Following the mass exile of those who were involved in the uprising, Burgundy sheltered some of the men in his domains, and supported them with gifts of money.⁹⁷ In addition, he continued to fight to have those who were banished recalled to the realm and their honour restored.⁹⁸ Finally, once the duke of Burgundy had regained control of the government in the spring of 1418, he had the *Grande Boucherie* rebuilt for his loyal partisans, and all their rights and privileges restored.⁹⁹ It is clear, therefore, that John the Fearless went beyond what one might naturally expect had he merely chosen to exploit his partisans to his own advantage. Therefore, one concludes that the duke of Burgundy and this particular group of partisans did indeed have some sort of reciprocal relationship that was mutually beneficial, and one that was durable and permanent.

The question remains however, whether the Burgundian partisans believed in the duke of Burgundy's propaganda, whether they were ambivalent to it, or merely powerless to resist. There is some fairly reliable evidence which provides some insights into the minds of the Burgundian partisans, and suggest that a great many people around the realm, and especially in Paris, did support the duke of Burgundy's ideological perspective against the Armagnacs. The first is an anecdote from February 1416 that was brought to the fore by Douët d'Arcq regarding a rebellion against an *aides* commanded by the royal government by

⁹⁷ Compensation was given to Denisot de Chaumont and Simon de Caboche for their expenses in Besançon and Auxerre in September-October 1413. ACO, B 1576, fols. 138v-139v.

⁹⁸ For example, the Jouvenal chronicler wrote that in 1415, 'estoient à Paris les ambassadeurs du duc de Bourgogne, qui pourchassoient pleine abolition pour les bannis, et reparation de l'honneur du duc de Bourgogne', p. 507. For a detailed description of the negotiations regarding the restoration of honour of the rebels, *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 512-515. See also ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 36.

⁹⁹ When the Armagnacs came to power in 1414, they destroyed the *Grande Boucherie*. Villefosse, 'Grande Boucherie', pp. 52, 69-70; Favier, *Paris*, pp. 37-39.

ordinance in Languedoc.¹⁰⁰ The townspeople of Carcassonne immediately assembled at the *hôtel de ville* to deliberate on whether or not to pay it, and decided in the end to refuse it. It was at this point when they received letters from the duke of Burgundy which had a rather astounding effect:

Et assés tost après les consulz d'icelle ville eussent fait assembler ledit peuple pour ladicte cause, et ilec ledit jour eurent esté leues certaines lettres envoyées par nostre très cher et très amé cousin le duc de Bourgogne, adrécans ausdiz consulz et habitans de ladicte ville, contenans entre autres choses qu'ilz se tenissent fors et qu'ilz ne païassent riens de ladicte taille, et qu'il se faisoit fort de faire tant devers nous ou feu nostre chier et très amé filz le duc de Guienne, dont Dieu ait l'âme, qu'ilz ne paieroient riens. Soubz couleur desquelles lettres ledit peuple se feust tenu en l'opinion de riens paier. Depuis lesquelles lettres ainsi leues, les gens de ladicte ville commancèrent tousjours à murmurer entre eulx...¹⁰¹

After this, the townspeople found arms to defend themselves against royal officials, and accused any who came to the town of being a 'traistre Armignac!'¹⁰² Burgundy's reminder of his anti-tax policy seems to have been well-placed at this particular moment, and was effective in achieving the reactionary response that he desired.

Secondly, we must consider that there were numerous insurgencies on behalf of the duke of Burgundy during his long exile from Paris, 1413-1418. On 11 December 1415 information was relayed to the royal council from the Grande Châtelet that 'il y avoit grant murmure de sédition'.¹⁰³ A plot was discovered wherein a pastry baker situated near the *Grande Boucherie* had sent letters to the duke of Burgundy explaining that he would arrange to open the gates of Montmartre or Saint-Honoré.¹⁰⁴ In 1416 there were additional discoveries of conspiracies to let the duke of Burgundy back in to the capital, which were executed by members of the 'bourgeoisie', among them a 'homme d'honneur et estoit en

¹⁰⁰ AN, JJ 169, n. 67 cited in Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 1: 378-381. According to modern dating conventions, the date of this document is actually February 1416.

¹⁰¹ Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 1: 379.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 380.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 375-377.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 376-377.

ars nommé maistre Regnault [Maillet]', an alderman of Paris, Robert de Belloy, and the archdeacon of Amiens, and canon of Notre Dame, Nicole d'Orgemont.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the most obvious displays of partisanship occurred during the massacres of the Armagnac partisans in August-October 1411 and also the 1413 Cabochien uprising. The Jouvenal compiler described the beginning of the violence in the following way: 'A la fin d'avril, et au commencement de may, se mirent sus plus fort que devant meschantes gens, trippiers, bouchers, et escorcheurs, pelletiers, cousturiers, et autres pauvres gens de bas estat, qui faisoient de tres-inhumaines, detestables, et deshonnestes besongnes.'¹⁰⁶ Here highlighted were not only the *gens de metiers* including the butchers and the associative professions, but also the *menu peuple*. This is significant for several reasons. First, the chronicler's disdain is revealing of the tension that existed between social groups in medieval urban culture. In associating the butchers with the lowest and most poor among Parisian society, the Jouvenal compiler denied them their true place as one of the most privileged confraternities in Paris.¹⁰⁷ Secondly it is important that Juvenal included the 'pauvres gens de bas estat' in his description of the 1413 mob, because it suggests that the group was much more broad than we might imagine. This was certainly the case, for the list of banished men and women in 1413 and 1414 include some of their occupations: 'chaussetier', 'batiller', a pastry baker, a fishmonger, a tavern owner, a tailor, and a wax vendor.¹⁰⁸ It also included numerous people from the higher social spheres, such as a money-changer, numerous valets, and several esquires.¹⁰⁹ This was also true of the 1411 mob. Monstrelet asserted that a large majority of Parisians got involved: 'Et alors, les bouchers, le quartier des hales et la plus grant partie des Parisiens, estoient du tout affectuez au duc Jehan de Bourgogne, et ne désiroient que nul eust le gouvernement du

¹⁰⁵ Bourgeois, pp. 70-71.

¹⁰⁶ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 481.

¹⁰⁷ This was the case for all butchers belonging to the *Grande boucherie*.

¹⁰⁸ Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 1: 367-369.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Roy et de son royaume si non lui, et ceulx qu'ilz scavoient estre ses amis et favorables.¹¹⁰

Therefore, although the butchers of Paris took the lead during the autumn of 1411, there were people from diverse professions included.¹¹¹ There were indeed 'gens de plusieurs mestiers de Paris, chirugiens comme maistre Jean de Troyes [...] et tou[s] gens pauvres, et meschans desirans pillier et desrober estoient avec eux.'¹¹²

The 1413 throng appears to be even more varied.¹¹³ It comprised the president of the *chambre des comptes* (Eustache de Laître), the surgeon Jean de Troyes, at least one academic from the University of Paris (Eustache de Pavilly), at least one *changeur* (André d'Espéron), and several lesser nobles from the duke of Burgundy's household in Paris (Robert de Mailli and Charles de Lens).¹¹⁴ Both Pavilly and Troyes were the Cabochien's spokesmen, and did most of the negotiating between their group and the royal court during the revolt.¹¹⁵ If the men listed above, and indeed other Burgundian supporters, had not joined the Burgundian cause for ideological reasons, they might have been interested in the more practical reforming policies. Many of them were named to another commission for reform in the early months of 1413.¹¹⁶ Among them, the bishop of Tournai, the Moustier de St Jean, Pierre Cauchon, Jean de l'Olive, two men from the Parlement, and several noblemen.¹¹⁷ Their list of reforms became the basis for the notorious 'Cabochien Ordinance' published 26 May 1413. Therefore, they could not have rejected the ideology completely if they were so actively involved. Yet because Burgundy packaged all of the diverse aspects of his propaganda, all of his attempts to publicly vilify the Armagnacs for their ostensible lèse-majesty in addition to the misgovernment, as one underlying ideology, the Armagnacs suffered from mass persecution in 1413 as they had done in 1411. We must

¹¹⁰ Monstrelet, 2: 163.

¹¹¹ For numerous examples of the dominant role of the butchers, see Monstrelet, 2: 162-163, 169, and 199.

¹¹² *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 467.

¹¹³ Douët d'Arcq, *Choix*, 1: 367-369.

¹¹⁴ Monstrelet, 2: 343.

¹¹⁵ Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, pp. 167-168, 179-208.

¹¹⁶ Coville, *L'Ordonnance cabochienne*, p. iii.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* Also, RSD, 5: 4.

not forget that the part of the reason for assembling the Estates General in January 1413 was to discuss a programme of reform to cover the large expenses of the recent campaign against the Armagnacs. Likewise, they had to decide how to deal with the English, who had entered France on the request of the Armagnacs in the first half of 1412. Therefore, although the long-term cause of the deficit ran far deeper than this, the culpability of the Armagnacs seemed, on the surface, obvious. This goes some way to explaining the frenzied attack on the Armagnacs during the rebellion. It is therefore undeniable that Burgundy did have some success in damaging the reputation of the Armagnacs and turning many townspeople against them.

Superficially at least, the concept of Armagnac corruption seems to have dominated the minds of all the Cabochiens, and especially Troyes and Pavilly. On 28 April the angry mob stormed the Bastille Saint Antoine and demanded that Pierre des Essarts surrender himself to them. Burgundy swore to protect him, and took him to the Louvre. The crowd, joined by several other men of arms from John the Fearless' household, immediately stormed the duke of Guyenne's hotel. Jean de Troyes provided Guyenne with a list of the names of certain 'gens de tres-mauvaise volonté' whom they wished to detain, at which (the Jouvenal compiler claims) there was 'tres-grande commotion et sedition'.¹¹⁸ The butchers were victorious and arrested the duke of Bar, Jean de Vailley, Jacques de la Rivière and several others.¹¹⁹ This event set a dangerous precedent for the Cabochiens. During the next three months, they returned to the dauphin's palace several times, chastising him for excesses and arresting people of all ranks, including the queen's brother and several ladies in her entourage. On 25 May, they presented a list of reforms to the king, known as the 'Cabochien Ordinance', which he published the following day in his *Lit de Justice*.¹²⁰ The Cabochiens donned white hoods to demonstrate their solidarity with one

¹¹⁸ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 481.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ For a transcription of the ordinance see Coville, *L'Ordonnance cabochienne*.

another, and insisted that everyone who supported reforms wear one also, even offering their hoods to the royal princes, the dauphin and the king.¹²¹ Anyone who did not wear their rallying symbol, was suspected of being an Armagnac, and could face imprisonment or even death.

Finally, due to the diligence of the duke of Berry and Jouvenal, lord of Tregnay, the king and the royal princes began negotiating a peace, at Pontoise. On 1 August, the articles of the peace treaty were read to the king. Jean de Troyes, Simon Caboche, the Saint Yon and LeGois families tried to impede the peace process, but were overruled by the royal council and a large number of Parisians who had lost patience with the violence within the capital.¹²² The peace was published on 26 August 1413. Their severe and cruel discrimination against the Armagnacs during the uprising only confirms, therefore, that this event was propelled by partisanship, and was inspired on some level by the Burgundian ideological complaint against the Armagnacs. This is corroborated by the proclamation cried at every crossroads in Paris on 6 August 1413 that 'nul ne se meslast de chose que les signeurs feissent, et que nul ne feist armée, si non par le commandement des quaterniers, et cinquanteniers ou diseniers.'¹²³

Yet it is significant that during the uprising, the Cabochiens did not wear St. Andrew's crosses. The fact that Burgundian partisans among the regular Parisian populace wore the crosses in 1411 to distinguish themselves from the Armagnacs, but not in 1413 suggests that there was a conscious attempt by the Cabochiens to disassociate themselves from the duke of Burgundy. The white hoods were reminiscent of the hoods worn by the Flemish during the urban uprisings in the early 1380s, and were therefore symbolic of

¹²¹ Coville suggested that the Ghentois had offered their hoods to the Parisians, hoods that they themselves had worn in their rebellion against royal and comital authority in 1382. Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, p. 3. This is supported by Nicholas, *The Later Medieval City*, pp. 127-129.

¹²² *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 486.

¹²³ Bourgeois, p. 42.

urban strength and power.¹²⁴ Although their victims were certainly the duke of Burgundy's political rivals, they nonetheless had their own agenda. Indeed, the duke of Burgundy had lost all control over the butchers by May 1413. Yet it was notorious that they were his partisans and as noted above, some even remained under his protection in his lands after they were banished by royal ordinance.¹²⁵

The Armagnacs' reaction against the duke of Burgundy in 1414, and against his partisans once they had gained control of Paris and suppressed the rebellion in August 1413, confirms the effect that his epistolary propaganda and the Burgundian partisan symbols had played in the persecution against the Armagnacs. To welcome in the new government, the city of Paris adopted the Armagnac livery of violet, white and silver.¹²⁶ The Bourgeois described the scene in Paris: 'Item, la iii^e sepmaine d'aoust ou environ, furent commencez hucquez par ceulx qui gouvernoient, où il avoit foison feuilles d'argent, et en escript d'argent: *le droit chemin*, et estoient de drap vyollet, et avant que la fin d'aoust fust, tant en avoit à Paris que sans nombre, et especialment ceulx de la bande, qui estoient revenues, à cens et à milliers la portoient.'¹²⁷

The motto 'le droit chemin' and the straight white cross – an emblem representing the French realm – was an overtly anti-Burgundian message. In emblematic terms, the saltire cross that the Burgundians wore had been the direct opposite to the straight white cross.¹²⁸ By re-appropriating the royal emblem, the latter was designed to counteract the saltire entirely. The motto asserted that the Armagnac leadership was the only 'right', or 'true' way forward. It implied that those who wore the opposite had been misled, and those

¹²⁴ Coville, *Les Cabochiens*, p. 193; Schnerb, *État bourguignon*, p. 158.

¹²⁵ ACO, B 1576, fols. 138v-139v.

¹²⁶ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 490.

¹²⁷ Bourgeois, p. 44. See also RSD, 5: 150, and *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 490. Charles of Orleans' accounts for September 1413 indicate that he paid 'cent seize livres cinq sols tournois' to a draper, goldsmith and embroiderer for 'douze aulnes de violet de Bruxelles pour faire quatre heuques brodées à la devise où est escript *le droit chemin*, à Vaillant [the goldsmith] pour avoir fait les feuilles et petites feuilletes dorées'. Laborde, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 3: 262, no. 6229.

¹²⁸ In 1411, 'ils laisserent la croix droite blanche, qui est la vraye enseigne du Roy, et prirent la croix de Saint André, et la devise du duc de Bourgogne, le sautoüer, et ceux qu'on disoit Armagnacs portoient la bande, et pource que sembloit que ce fussent querelles particuliers.' *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 473.

who accepted their badges and livery were the only sincerely loyal subjects of the crown. This was a message that was complemented by an extensive letter campaign organised by the Armagnacs in September and October 1413.¹²⁹ Monstrelet and the Bourgeois de Paris noted that wearing the Armagnac emblem became obligatory, as decreed by royal ordinance.¹³⁰ Furthermore, the Armagnacs took care to remove all Burgundian symbols from Paris and they banned the singing of any songs relating to the duke of Burgundy.¹³¹ They also took care to remove or cover all images of Saint Andrew in Paris with their white scarves. On 13 September 1414, a Parisian artisan was caught tearing a white scarf from an image of Saint Andrew that had hung in the church of Saint Eustache near the Halles market. This he did out of spite for the Armagnac princes, who, Pintoin explained, wore similar scarves.¹³² In punishment, he had his hand cut off in front of St. Eustache and was banished.¹³³ The impact of this punishment was great, for the Bourgeois explains that no one dared complain openly about the Armagnac government again even though the realm was 'tout mal gouvernez et de mauvaies gens.'¹³⁴

Simultaneously, there were a number of important royal proclamations given against the duke of Burgundy. In a royal proclamation written 15 September 1414 (published 11 October), in which the Armagnacs had their banishment repealed, they attacked the duke of Burgundy openly.¹³⁵ We have already noted that although the stated purpose was to restore the honour of the Armagnac princes, the subtext was to shame the royal advisors who were in fact the duke of Burgundy's partisans. It was ultimately a direct condemnation of the duke of Burgundy for his reprehensible conduct since his rise to

¹²⁹ RSD, 5: 184-194.

¹³⁰ Monstrelet, 3: 21; Bourgeois, p. 50.

¹³¹ Bourgeois, p. 46.

¹³² RSD, 5: 447.

¹³³ Bourgeois, p. 56.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ For this and what follows, RSD, 5: 185-195.

power in 1409. Further proclamations were made against Burgundy over the next six months.

Yet, despite the numerous proclamations against Burgundy, the letters patent and the desperate attempts by the Armagnacs to remove every last Burgundian cross from Paris, support for John the Fearless continued to grow in the capital. In December 1415, rumours spread that the duke of Burgundy would advance on Paris. The Jouvenal compiler anxiously calculated that Burgundy had over four thousand supporters in the capital at this time.¹³⁶ Whether he was exaggerating is irrelevant – his estimate is simply representative of what others might have believed. The persecution of suspected Burgundians during this period suggests that they did indeed feel vulnerable. Unjustifiable arrests were regular, they banned assemblies, dismantled the *Grande Boucherie*, removed the Parisians' chains, and locked the Bastille Saint-Antoine.¹³⁷

When the opportunity presented itself in 1417, the Burgundian saltire resurfaced during the duke of Burgundy's campaign to regain control of Paris in the name of the king.¹³⁸ As noted above, John the Fearless' letters to the *bonnes villes* in which he accused the Armagnacs of corruption and 'evildoing' from April to October 1417, met with some success. Several important towns acquiesced to his plea for support and submitted to John the Fearless without incident. The townspeople then began wearing ensigns with Saint Andrew's cross on them, and cried together 'Vive Bourgogne'. Many of the king's officials in these towns were taken prisoner, executed and their goods confiscated. As in 1411 and in 1413, it sufficed to accuse a man of being an Armagnac to kill him, however tenuous the accusation was.¹³⁹ Again, we cannot be certain that the towns actually believed in the duke of Burgundy's claims that the Armagnacs were 'evildoers' and 'tyrants', but it is interesting

¹³⁶ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 525.

¹³⁷ Bourgeois, pp. 69-75; *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 531. For the symbolic importance of the chains to the Parisians, see again Contamine, 'Les chaînes dans les bonnes villes de France', pp.293-320.

¹³⁸ See RSD, 6: 157.

¹³⁹ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 533.

that even the Jouvenal compiler – an Armagnac sympathiser – believed that the letters had an impact on the towns, and had led to their surrender.¹⁴⁰ When the Burgundian army entered into Paris on 29 May 1418, a vast majority of Parisians were already wearing the Burgundian crosses, and openly declaring their support for the duke of Burgundy. '[O]n [eust] trouvé à Paris gens de tous estaz, comme moynes, ordres mendiens, femmes, hommes, portans la croix de Saint-Andry ou de Troyes ou d'autre matière, plus de deux cens mille, sans les enffans. Lors fur Paris moult esmeu, et se arma le peuple moult plustost que les gens d'armes...' ¹⁴¹ He also claimed that the majority of Parisians wore the cross of Saint Andrew and like in the other *bonnes villes*, cried 'Vive Bourgogne!' ¹⁴²

There were some who resisted however. The Bourgeois de Paris alleged that the remaining Armagnacs would rather surrender Paris to the king of England than submit to the duke of Burgundy, and that they would then force everyone to wear the cross of Saint George on a black shield. According to the Bourgeois, this was a reflection of their utter hatred for any Burgundian partisan.¹⁴³ The Bourgeois later added that once the Burgundians had entered Paris, the Armagnacs purportedly cried 'A mort! à mort! Ville gaingnée! Vive le roy et le dalphin et le roy d'Engleterre! Tuez tout! tuez tout!' ¹⁴⁴ The Bourgeois' exaggerated view is interesting here because it is representative of the success that the Burgundian spin had in permeating through urban society, and over the course of time.

There is one final facet of this story which suggests that some of the Parisians who were favourable to the duke of Burgundy fervently believed in him. During the June massacres, Saint Eustache founded a confraternity of Saint Andrew in honour of their protector. The Bourgeois de Paris estimated that the confraternity reached over seven

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Bourgeois, pp. 90-91.

¹⁴² *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 540.

¹⁴³ Bourgeois, p. 87.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

hundred members in Paris.¹⁴⁵ According to the chroniclers, priests used only the cross of Saint Andrew instead of the regular sign of the cross when blessing or baptising, as the latter cross was unequivocally associated with the Armagnacs. Throughout the summer, those identified as Armagnacs suffered greatly. The massacre was extreme; the Jouvenal compiler claimed that the Burgundians spared no one. When they were killed, the Armagnac victims were not given proper burials, but were thrown outside the city walls, or in the river.¹⁴⁶ The divisions among the people of the realm were excessively destructive. The Jouvenal compiler illustrated it well, saying 'C'estoit grande pitié, car le pere contre le fils, et le frere contre le frere estoient bandez, faisans guerre les uns contres les autres en cette maudite querelle, qu'on disoit de Bourgongne et Armagnacs'¹⁴⁷ It was the use of symbols and livery which reinforced the divisions that had already been excited by the publication of so many letters and proclamations against each of the parties. However, the fact that there were three separate occasions where the persecution of Armagnacs was the driving force, suggests that at least some of the people of the realm, and especially Paris, reacted in accordance with the duke of Burgundy's ideology, even if they used it as a pretext for engaging in violence.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁴⁶ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 542; Monstrelet, 3: 266.

¹⁴⁷ *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 539.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

This doctoral dissertation has responded to two significant voids in fifteenth-century historiography. There were two aspects which were the initial cause of inspiration for this study. First, we were stimulated to resolve the issue of how the townspeople of the realm were swept up into what had, up to 1411, remained a private dispute between the princely houses of Burgundy and Orleans. Additionally, we were intrigued by what appeared to be John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy's inadequately explained popularity among the Parisians during the first phase of this conflict. To answer our queries, this study's primary aim was to undertake a methodical and in-depth analysis of his propaganda programme between 1405 and his death in 1419. A closely related second objective stemmed from our first: this dissertation is the first attempt at a systematic study of the mechanics involved in the execution of a medieval propagandist's ideological campaign. Although propaganda is a field wherein there is increasing interest among medievalists, to date there are no studies that are entirely committed to discerning how a campaign worked from either an epistemological or an empirical perspective.

The most significant obstacle to this study was the challenge presented by the uncertainty of whether 'propaganda' is a legitimate term, or concept, to identify the palpable attempts among persons involved in high politics to promote a particular ideology in the later middle ages. To tackle this issue head on, we examined the criteria posited by theorists and historians alike who study propaganda. We have confidently argued that the term and the concept are wholly applicable to the fifteenth century. This was a position that we confirmed by putting forward numerous examples of how John the Fearless' varied attempts to gain public favour during his career corresponded to abovementioned conditions of a 'propaganda campaign'. For example, we have shown that, like most

successful propagandists, Burgundy ensured that the majority of his propaganda was either based in loose truths, or founded upon well-established conventions of medieval political thought. Both were important, because if propaganda is to be effective, it must be framed around elements of shared experience, or resonate with recognisable concerns of the recipients. In Part Two, where we analysed two of the core themes of Burgundy's propaganda, we drew out examples where these aspects were observable in practice. Certainly this was the case when on numerous occasions Burgundy publicly deemed taxes, *aides* or other levies implemented by the Orleans/Armagnac administration as 'unfair' and 'overburdening', as he did in March and August 1405, and again in his letter campaigns of 1417. During the latter campaign, he explained that the Armagnacs were oppressing the 'povre people' with their many different forms of taxations, and likened these actions to pillage and robbery.¹ Likewise, John the Fearless' fixation upon calling for reform to 'repair' the *chose publique* and preserve the integrity of the king and his realm was ubiquitously inserted into his propaganda.² To ensure that this idea of repairing the crumbling edifice of government was firmly implanted into audiences at street level as much as within the higher social strata, we have argued that John deliberately used the carpenter's plane and, after January 1410, the mason's level, as his two predominant personal emblems.

Likewise, we have shown that Burgundy used a corrupt form of information, known to communications theorists as 'disinformation', or 'black propaganda'. The most useful medium for this genre comprised the many letters and manifestoes that he sent. Burgundy intended his disinformation to create a deflective source of origin for the particulars which he conveyed to his audience, a source which he ultimately hoped would legitimise what were, essentially, rather questionable decisions. We have, moreover, flagged numerous other examples wherein John the Fearless employed strategies that corresponded

¹ ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39.

² See for one of innumerable examples, BNF, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 254r.

directly with those put into practice by propagandists, as identified by theorists. For example, we explained that he frequently asked hollow questions of his audience regarding their loyalty to the crown. With this approach, he was able to further reinforce an imagined disparity between his partisans, who were 'loyal' subjects of the king, and the 'treasonous' Armagnacs and their adherents. This strategy, in concert with his manipulation of truths, and the disinformation he spread were designed to damage his rivals' *fama*. As for his own reputation, Burgundy ensured that he appealed to the general population by endorsing a platform that responded to their collective political concerns. He presented the illusion that he was devoted to preserving their natural 'rights': justice and *tranquilitas*. At the fore of these concerns was the ideal of equitable taxation, an issue which made its appearance in all aspects of Burgundy's campaigns.

Furthermore, in our analysis of Burgundy's diverse media of communication – his texts, letters, symbols, and ceremony – we have argued that he employed all the available technology to convey his ideology to manipulate public opinion to his advantage. There is little doubt that the systems in place for medieval communication were not, obviously, as advanced as those of our modern era in terms of both scope and the possibility for instant reception. Nevertheless it is evident that John the Fearless' propaganda was a pre-modern form of *mass-media*, in that he disseminated his rhetoric as widely as possible, using as many forums for interaction as were accessible to him. This is manifest in the sheer volume and vigour with which he circulated his unrelenting letters and manifestoes throughout his career, whenever circumstance induced a need either to self-justify, or to malign his rivals. Moreover, we have observed that Burgundy used other ocular and aural channels of expression to convey his ideology, with the intention of involving his audiences in the exchange. These, and in particular his distribution of badges, served to foster a sense of identity among Burgundian followers. Simultaneously this approach was also a useful method of exclusion, encouraging distrust, anxiety, fear and hatred for the Armagnac anti-

community. This, we noted, is a typical strategem employed by propagandists to isolate non-partisans, and in Burgundy's case, was a tool for coercion.

The fact that much of what Burgundy accomplished during his initial rise to power, between 1408 and 1413, was very publicly denounced and nullified when he was at the nadir of his career, from late 1413 to 1418, suggests that Burgundy was a successful propagandist. Starting in September 1413, the Armagnacs repealed many of the royal ordinances that were issued during his zenith, and removed every last Burgundian satire from Paris. This was, effectively a counter-propaganda campaign to restore the Armagnac's good *fama*, and in turn, devastate Burgundy's. The very public acknowledgement of the power of his symbols, and the speciousness of the many royal mandates he orchestrated, reveals that both Burgundy and the Armagnacs were developing an understanding of what ideological warfare was, epistemologically speaking, and how practical it was to further the purposes of those employing it. When this factor is seen jointly with Burgundy's dynamic strategy in communicating effectively to a very broad, all-encompassing audience base, one discerns that there was indeed an emerging collective consciousness of propaganda as a 'social phenomenon', as described by Jacques Ellul.³ John the Fearless was one person who was able to put this phenomenon into practice, and this is one of the reasons, we argued, that he was initially the more efficient propagandist of the two parties.

Thus, in taking the position that propaganda is, in its most neutral form, a system of communication designed to persuade the intended recipients, our analysis of the duke of Burgundy's propaganda campaign has focused on identifying the underlying message of the rhetoric, the channels through which these were articulated, how the intended audience – the *bonnes villes* – received the information and, where possible, how they responded. Regarding the rhetoric, we centred our attention on two of the predominant binary themes designed to edify a continuous dichotomy between himself and his rivals: loyalty/disloyalty,

³ See above, chapter 1 'Introduction', pp. 13-14.

and good government/tyranny. This contrast was reflective of his awareness of the importance of good reputation, and the usefulness in tarnishing that of his rivals. To achieve this, we have shown that the duke of Burgundy and his chancery ensured that a strong level of rhetorical consistency was maintained. The result was that these themes were firmly conveyed to audiences through the collaboration of various media of communication, that is, in his texts, and mainly the *Justification*, his letter campaigns, his badges, and the ceremonies he used throughout the course of his career. We have argued throughout this dissertation that this collaboration between channels of communication was what made the duke of Burgundy such an efficient propagandist. He reacted swiftly and decisively, and ensured that his rhetoric corresponded to the universal values of his audience, centring his ideology around the interrelated notions of the preservation of the common good, the initiation of reform and continuous loyalty to the crown.

Although we have made significant inroads into discerning how Burgundy's propaganda influenced public opinion, it remains a rather contentious issue, as grasping the true thoughts of people in any age, and in particular in pre-modern societies, is problematic. The difficulty is mainly due to a shortage of source material, evidence that could, potentially, reveal more about how individual people responded to the propaganda they received. Thus far, we have been able to identify general trends among clusters of people with regard to public opinion. For example, we have noted that the majority of urban partisans of the duke of Burgundy spontaneously began wearing badges denoting their allegiance in August 1411. We also considered the superficial causes of the two violent massacres of Armagnacs that Burgundian adherents undertook in 1411 and 1413, and also took note of the numerous Parisian conspiracies to bring Burgundy back into the capital after he had been exiled (1414-1416). We have complemented this by relying on the physical manner through which Burgundy's propaganda was received by the townspeople,

in addition to teasing out some of the links between known Burgundian partisans such as Eustache de Laître, Nicole d'Orgemont, Eustache de Pavilly and others, and the duke.

There are other directions of research that may offer a wealth of information to complement what we have begun here. If we are to gain a more comprehensive understanding of motivations behind loyalties, Parliamentary and local court registries recorded throughout the conflict ought to be examined closely for the testimony of partisans from both factions. Additionally, more solid connections between individual university scholars associated with the duke of Burgundy need to be unearthed. Likewise, more analytical investigation needs to be launched to uncover precisely what Burgundy hoped to achieve in appealing to the *bonnes villes*. This was begun here, but the confines of this doctoral dissertation limited our scope of enquiry. Therefore, forthcoming studies will require an exhaustive search for documents in as many of the king's most important towns as is possible. Medieval propaganda and public opinion is a field of study that is gaining momentum. It is our intention that this dissertation contribute to the growing body of scholarly literature, and become a focal point from which further research in the abovementioned areas could, eventually, spring.

APPENDIX 1

IMPORTANT LETTERS 1405-1418

Date	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	ARCHIVAL SOURCES	PRINTED SOURCES
1405				
18/08	Paris	Letter from Jean Chousat to the <i>chambre des comptes</i> (Dijon).	ACO, B 11912, n. 9.	Mirot, <i>Pièces</i> , pp. 395-396, n. 1.
19/08	Paris	John the Fearless to town of Mâcon.	Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, E[E] 41, n. 1.	Mirot, <i>Pièces</i> , pp. 396-397, n. 2.
21/08	Paris	Letter close from Jean Chousat to the <i>chambre des comptes</i> (Dijon).	BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 54, fol. 97r.	
26/08	Paris	Official letter requesting reform, presented on behalf of John the Fearless and his brothers, Anthony, and Philip, to the royal council, and the Parlement.	AN, Xla 8602, fols. 189v and what follows. ACO, B 11892, 397b. BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 54, fols. 95r-96r.	Mirot, <i>Pièces</i> , pp. 399-403, n. 4. Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 246-248, n. 250.
01/09	Mâcon	Response from the town of Mâcon to John the Fearless.	Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 8.	Mirot, <i>Pièces</i> , pp. 403-404, n. 5.
02/09	Melun	Letter close from Louis of Orleans to the town of Mâcon.	Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 3.	Mirot, <i>Pièces</i> , pp. 404-405, n. 6.
02/09	Melun	Letter patent from Louis of Orleans to the town of Mâcon.	AN, J 1004, n. 39.	Douët d'Arcq, <i>Choix</i> , vol. 1, pp. 273-283.
08/09	Paris	Letter Patent from John the Fearless and his brothers to Mâcon.	Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 2.	Mirot, <i>Pièces</i> , pp. 405-413, n. 7.
17/09	Paris	Letter close from John the Fearless to the town of Mâcon.	Arch. Comm. de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 4.	Mirot, <i>Pièces</i> , pp. 413-414, n. 8.
27/09	Paris	Letter from Jean Chousat to the <i>chambre des comptes</i> (Dijon).	BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 54, fol. 99r.	
1408				
Unkn.	Unkn.	'Introductions' to the duchess of Burgundy, the duke of Lorraine and the nobility of Burgundy from John the Fearless regarding his conflict with	ACO, B 11892, layette 59, n. 33.	

		le duc d'Orleans.		
01/03	Amiens	Guillaume Euvrie paid by John the Fearless for writing letters 'en forme de manifeste' for the justification of the duke of Orleans' assassination.	BNF, Collection Bourgogne, vol. 65, fol. 80v.	
09/03	Paris	Royal letters granting absolution to John the Fearless for the assassination of Louis of Orleans.	ADN, B 656, n. 15.088 (copy).	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 254-255, n. 256.
02/07	Melun	Royal letters patent given under the queen revoking the pardon granted to John the Fearless for the assassination of Louis of Orleans.	AN, K 56a, n. 17.	
11/08	Paris	Royal mandate to the duke of Burgundy regarding the payment of 1000 francs to the duchess of Orleans (copy).	AN, K 56a, 18bis.	
06/11	Avignon	Letter from Pierre Salmon to John the Fearless.	ACO, B 11892, layette 148, n. 1919. BNf, ms. fr. 23279, fol. 86r-90r.	<i>Demandes</i> , pp. 96-106.
1409				
04/01	Paris	Missive from Charles VI to John the Fearless stating that he had received Salmon's letter.	ACO, B 11892.	
08/01	Unkn.	Copy of the duchess of Orleans' complaint against John the Fearless, and the Burgundian response.	ACO, B 11892, layette 72, n. 19.	
09/03	Chartres	Royal letter patent publishing the Peace of Chartres.	ACO, B 11892, layette 72, n. 21.	
09/03	Chartres	Royal letters granting absolution to John the Fearless for the assassination of Louis of Orleans.	ACO, B 11892, nos. 18-18bis.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 256-258, n. 258.
27/12	Royal castle at Vincennes	Royal ordinance granting the 'garde et gouvernement' of the dauphin, Louis, to John the Fearless.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 262-263, n. 261.

1410				
18/01	Paris	Letter from John the Fearless to Pierre des Essarts incorporating a transcribed copy of the royal ordinance granted on 27 December.	ACO, B 11892, layette 4.	
02/09		Letter patent from the duke of Orleans to Amiens		Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 82-86.
09/10	Paris	Royal letter patent granting 6000 l.t. to John the Fearless for his army, in the service of the king.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 267-268, n. 265.
02/11	Paris	Royal letter patent publishing the Peace of Bicêtre.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 269-270, n. 268.
1411				
May		The duke of Orleans letter to the king listing all the 'evil councillors' in his company.		Monstrelet vol. 2, pp. 116-121.
14/07	Jargeau	'Jargeau Manifesto' sent by the duke of Orleans and his brothers to the <i>bonnes villes</i> regarding the murder of their father, Louis of Orleans.	AN, 56a, n. 18. ADN, B 657, n. 15.183.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 278-285, n. 277. <i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , pp. 456-464. Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 124-152. RSD, vol. 4, pp. 418-434.
18/07	Jargeau	Missive from the duke of Orleans and his brothers to John the Fearless, declaring war upon him.	ACO, B 11893, layette 72, n. 22. ADN, B 657, n. 15.183	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 273, n. 271. Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 152-153. RSD, vol. 4, pp. 434-436.
20/07	Paris	Royal letters patent ordering the house of Orleans to give up their complaint.	AN, K 57 ^b , n. 11.	
12/08	Paris	Royal letters patent granting John the Fearless permission to summon his army.	ACO, B 11893, n. 5.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 273, n. 272.
13/08	Douai	John the Fearless' letter close of response to the duke of Orleans.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 274, n. 273. RSD, vol. 4, pp. 436-438.
13/08	Douai	John the Fearless' letter of complaint to the queen, regarding the duke of		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 274-275, n. 274.

		Orleans' <i>défi</i> .		
14/08	Douai	John the Fearless' letter to the town of Amiens.		Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 159-161.
Sept.	Paris	Official mandates sent to <i>baillages</i> and <i>sénéchaussées</i> prohibiting anyone from joining the Armagnacs		Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 190-191.
01/09	Paris	Royal letter patent asking John the Fearless to pursue the 'enemies' of the realm.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 275-276, n. 275.
10/09	Paris	Royal letter patent to the town of Paris.	ACO, B 11893, n. 13.	Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 190-191.
03-04/10	Paris	Two copies of declaration of war by Charles VI against the Armagnac princes.	AN, K 57 ^b , n. 13-13 ^b .	
02/11	Paris	After the Armagnacs take the bridge of Saint Cloud, Charles VI gives John the Fearless the funding to pursue the 'enemies' of the realm.	ACO, B 11893, n. 3.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 276-277, n. 276.
1412				
01/03	Paris	Royal letter patent granting John the Fearless the right to assemble an army needed to chase the English and 'others' from the realm.	ACO, B 11893, layette 85, n. 9.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 286-288.
30/03	Paris	John the Fearless' letter patent transcribing the above letter in full.	ACO, B 11893, layette 81, n. 25.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 289-290, n. 284.
05/04	Paris	Charles VI gives John the Fearless 2000 men-at-arms and 1000 <i>gens-de-trait</i> .		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 290-291, n. 285.
22/08	Auxerre	Peace of Auxerre treaty published by royal letter patent.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 295-296, n. 288;
22/08		Royal mandates ordering Charles of Orleans and Philip of Vertus to renounce his alliance with Henry IV.	AN, K 57 ^b , nos. 20 and 21.	
08/09		Letters patent publishing the terms of the treaty of Auxerre between John the Fearless and the houses of Orleans and Bourbon.	AN, K 57 ^b , nos. 23-25.	
08/09	Melun?	Alliance between John the Fearless and the duke of	ACO, B 11893, layette 81, n. 26.	

		Berry.		
15/09	Melun	Alliance between John the Fearless and the Orleans brothers.	ACO, B 11893, n. 23.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 285-286, n. 280.
1413				
06/06	Paris	Royal letter to Amiens following the <i>Lit de Justice</i> (26 May), denouncing the Armagnac princes.		Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 362-369.
23/08	Paris	Letter close from Jean de Saulx explaining John the Fearless' flight from Paris.	ACO, B 11942, n. 24.	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 297-298, n. 290.
18/09	Paris	Royal letter patent denouncing the uprising in Paris, and annulling all letters that he was forced to write.	AN, K 58, n. 5.	RSD, vol. 5, pp. 210-220.
04/12	Paris	First letter missive from Louis of Guyenne requesting help from John the Fearless.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 298, n. 292.
13/12	Paris	Second letter missive from Louis of Guyenne requesting help from John the Fearless.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 298, n. 293.
22/12	Paris	Third letter missive from Louis of Guyenne requesting help from John the Fearless.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 298, n. 294.
1414				
23/01	Lille	John the Fearless' letter close to the town of Amiens.		Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 421-424.
24/01	Paris	Letter from Louis of Guyenne to John the Fearless demanding him to retract his troops.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 298-299, n. 295.
24/01	Paris	Letter from Paris to other <i>bonnes villes</i> countering that which John the Fearless sent.		<i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , pp. 492-493.
31/01	Paris	Royal letter patent forbidding any town from offering help to John the Fearless.		<i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , pp. 494-496.
11/02	Saint Denis	Letter from John the Fearless to the <i>bonnes villes</i> justifying his siege of Paris.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 297, n. 289. Monstrelet, vol. 2, pp. 434-436.
10/02	Paris	Royal letter patent publicly denouncing John		RSD, vol. 5, pp. 248-268.

		the Fearless.		
23/02	Paris	Condemnation by the Archbishop of Paris, of Jean Petit's <i>Justification du duc de Bourgogne</i>	AN, K 58 n.8 ⁵ and 8 ⁴ (8 ⁵ bis is by the University).	
11/03	Lille	Letter from John the Fearless regarding the dauphin's letters and justifying his siege of Saint Denis. (Draft)	ADN, B 658, 15.253.	
? / 10	Arras	Royal ordinance to John the Fearless listing the terms of the peace treaty.		RSD, vol. 5, pp. 389-394.
16/10	Quesnoy-le-Comte	Letter patent from John the Fearless to the dauphin agreeing to the terms of the treaty.		RSD, vol. 5, pp. 394-398.
16/10	Paris	Letter 'a tous ceux qui les présentes lettres verront, salut.' Ratifying peace treaty of Arras.		RSD, vol. 5, pp. 394-398.
1415				
? / 01	Paris	Royal letter patent reconciling Charles VI and John the Fearless.		RSD, vol. 5, pp. 400-402.
15/04		Letter from Dauphin announcing peace treaty of Arras.	AN, K 60, n. 6.	
Unkn.	Unkn.	Letter missive from the Four Members of Flanders to the king, in favour of John the Fearless.	ACO, B 11894 (Copy).	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , p. 263, n. 262. RSD, vol. 5, pp. 348-350.
30/04	Paris	Royal letters patent of abolition, restoring John the Fearless' honour.		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 300-301, n. 298.
30/07	Rouvres	Letter patent from John the Fearless agreeing to the new terms of the Peace of Arras.	ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 34.	
31/08	Paris	Letters for the 'reparacion de lonneur de Jean duc de Bourgogne'.	ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 35.	<i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , pp. 512-513.
24/09		Letter of complaint from John the Fearless to the king regarding his exclusion from the pending battle with the English.		<i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , pp. 510-512.
25/09	Paris	Royal letter patent acknowledging John the	ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 37.	

		Fearless' ambassadors, and his response to the treaty of Rouvres.		
? /10	Paris	Royal letter patent publishing the peace of Arras.		RSD, vol. 5, pp. 420-436.
13/11	Paris	Royal letter patent of abolition for some of the banished insurgents.	ACO, B 11894, layette 72, n. 36.	<i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , pp. 522-523.
15/11		Royal letter patent to the <i>bonnes villes</i> forbidding any person of royal blood from entering Paris without leave from the king.		<i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , p. 523.
1416				
Unkn.		Letter from John the Fearless to the town of Châlons.	ACO, B 11895	
1417				
25/04	Hesdin	Letter patent from John the Fearless to the <i>bonnes villes</i> justifying his pending military campaign.	ACO, B 11895, layette 72, n. 39 (Original, French), and 39bis (Original, Latin). AN, K 60, n. 8 (Copy).	Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp. 303-306, n. 303. <i>Histoire de Charles VI</i> , p. 533. Monstrelet, vol. 3, pp. 174-175.
03/06	Troyes	Letter to John the Fearless' council that they join him and the queen at Troyes.	ACO, B 11942, n. 33.	
01/08	Troyes	Letter from Jehan Fraignant to the <i>chambre des comptes</i> (Dijon) regarding recent events in Troyes.	BNF, <i>Collection Bourgogne</i> , vol. 55, fol. 248r-248v.	
7/08	Doullens	Treaty between Doullens and John the Fearless.		Monstrelet, vol. 3, pp. 185-188.
29/09	Near Chatillon, Burgundy	John the Fearless to the <i>bonnes villes</i> regarding his plans to 'reform' those towns which he overtakes in the name of the king.	BNF, <i>Collection Bourgogne</i> , vol. 55, fol. 254r-254v (Copy).	
03-06 /11	Charny, Villier Saint Benoît, Chablies, Mâcon and Saint Georges	Letters of response, pledging their loyalty to the duke of Burgundy.	ACO, B 11895, layette 72, nos. 40-40bis.	
08/10	Monthéry	Letter from John the		Plancher, <i>Preuves</i> , pp.

		Fearless to the <i>bonnes villes</i> regarding the tyrannical government of the Armagnacs. Accompanying bill from the Council of Constance in favour of the duke of Burgundy.		307-308, n. 305. Monstrelet, vol. 3, pp. 230-234.
11/11	Troyes	Letters from the queen to <i>bonnes villes</i> in favour of John the Fearless.		Monstrelet, vol. 3, pp. 230-234.
1418				
14/01	Troyes	Letter patent from queen introducing the new <i>receveur général</i> de France.	ACO, B 1593, fols. 6-7 (Copy).	

APPENDIX 2

CALENDAR 1404-1419

<i>Modern Year</i>	<i>Fifteenth-Century Year</i>
1404	30 March – 18 April, 1404
1405	19 April – 10 April, 1405
1406	11 April – 26 March, 1406
1407	27 March – 14 April, 1407
1408	15 April – 6 April, 1408
1409	7 April – 22 March, 1409
1410	23 March – 11 April, 1410
1411	12 April – 2 April, 1411
1412	3 April – 22 April, 1412
1413	23 April – 7 April, 1413
1414	8 April – 30 March, 1414
1415	31 March – 18 April, 1415
1416	19 April – 10 April, 1416
1417	11 April – 26 March, 1417
1418	27 March – 15 April, 1418
1419	16 April – 6 April, 1419

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K Series: 56, 57, 60.

JJ Series: 168, 169, 170.

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BB Series: 1.

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ILLUSTRATIONS



Fig. 1 Cameo ring of John the Fearless similar to one given to the dauphin Louis, duke of Guyenne 1 January 1412. Musée du Louvre, Department of *Objets d'art* – inv. OA 9524. Paris. *Paris 1400: les arts sous Charles VI*. Paris, 2004.




Fig. 2 Inside inscription: *Vere [filius Die erat] iste*. Musée du Louvre, Department of *Objets d'art* – inv. OA 9524. Paris. *Le mécénat de Philippe le Hardi et Jean sans Peur (1364-1419)*. Paris, 2004.



Fig. 3 Pierre Salmon presents his manuscript to Charles VI in the presence of the duke of Burgundy and another courtier. BNF, ms. fr. 23279. fol. 1v. 1409.




Fig. 4 Pierre Salmon and John the Fearless. BNF, ms. fr. 23279. fol. 119r. 1409.




Fig. 5 John of Hayton offering his *Livre des merveilles* to John the Fearless.
 BNF ms. fr. 2810, fol. 226r. 1412.



Fig. 6 Saint Andrew, with carpenter's planes and mason's levels. John the Fearless' Book of Hours (c. 1410-1415). BNF, ms. lat. nouv. acq. 3055 fol. 172v. c. 1411 – c. 1415.




Fig. 7. Frontispiece to Jean Petit's *Justification de onseigneur le duc de Bourgogne*. 1408. BNF, ms. fr. 5733, fol. 2v.




Fig. 8 John the Fearless funerary sculpture. Detail. Dijon.




Fig. 9 Window frame on Hôtel Artois, featuring a mason's level.
Tour Jean sans Peur, rue Etienne Marcel. Paris.



Fig. 10. Pewter and lead badge, c. 1411 - 1419. Saint Andrew holding cross, with carpenter's plane, mason's level and fleur-de-lys. *Musée Nationale du Moyen Âge – Thermes & Hotel Cluny*. Paris.



Fig. 11. Pewter and lead badge, c. 1411 - 1419. Saint Andrew's cross with relief fleur-de-lys shield, and 'Vive le Roy'. *Musée Nationale du Moyen Âge – Thermes & Hotel Cluny*. Paris.



Fig. 12 Pewter and lead badge, c. 1411 - 1419. *Musée Nationale du Moyen Âge, Thermes & Hotel Cluny*. Paris.



Fig. 13 Pewter and lead badge, c. 1411 - 1419. *Musée Nationale du Moyen Âge, Thermes & Hotel Cluny*. Paris.