

THE ROLE OF CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;
THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON FOREIGN POLICY WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS
(1949-1986)

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by
ISMAIL DEBECHE

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To the martyrs of the Algerian Revolution
(1954 - 62).

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to examine the role played by China in international relations during the period 1949-86 and the impact of ideology on its foreign policy. Sino-African relations at both state-to-state (with reference to all African states) and people-to-people (with reference to all African national independence, national liberation and revolutionary movements) levels constitute the subject of this study. The thesis consists of three parts and 16 Chapters.

Part I analyses the development of China's world view during the period leading up to the success of the revolution. The main argument relates to China's experience of semi-colonialism and imperialism; CCP's assessment of the prevailing situation; and the revolutionary conditions under which China's view of the world was shaped.

Part II examines the development of China's role in international relations during different periods (1949-55; 1955-59; 1959-66; 1966-69; 1969-76; and, 1976-86).

Part III is devoted to a detailed description and analysis of Sino-African relations since 1949 under the two broad headings:

- i. 'State-to-State' relations between China and African ('progressive' and 'non-progressive') states under the general rubric of a strategy of 'United Front from Above'; and

- ii. 'People-to-People' relations between China and the various African national independence movements, and national liberation movements as well as anti-imperialist forces in general.

Different approaches to the question of anti-colonialism in Africa, arising from the role played by the United States, the Soviet Union and China, are also discussed.

INTRODUCTION

Idealistic expectations require that a communist movement or a socialist government should continuously pursue objectives, adopt policies and undertake actions directly aimed at eradicating non-socialist values, rules (e.g. rule of property) and conditions of political and economic life - both in the internal and international spheres; in other words, there are no conditions under which socialist forces and non-socialist forces can coexist. To achieve such a state of social order, continuous revolutionary struggle would be necessary even after the success of socialist revolutions in individual countries. A state of permanent revolution is the *conditio sine qua non* for revolutionary social, political and economic transformation.

In actual fact, however, this has not been the case in all socialist countries or in effective and popular communist movements and parties. They have all, in one way or another, been compelled (or have 'chosen') to make compromises ('socialism in one country') with a world dominated by the forces of capitalism and imperialism under which social, political, economic and military values of non-socialist kinds flourish; the People's Republic of China (PRC) is no exception.

Throughout its history, PRC has been faced with the fact that a major part of the world is dominated by anti-communist forces and imperialist powers. These powers not

only restricted China's revolutionary objectives externally but also sought to undermine the very existence of the Chinese revolution itself.

In order to remove threats to its security and to extricate itself from the isolation to which it was subjected, (especially by the United States), China defined for itself certain objectives and adopted policies in relation to the rest of the world which were believed to be dictated by the essential needs (or 'national interests') of ^{the} PRC - including territorial unification; national security; military, political and economic consolidation of the revolution; and, the freedom to pursue diplomatic, trade and economic relations with non-socialist countries. As a result of these immediate priorities, China's revolutionary or ideological objectives, - i.e, struggle against non-communist forces, support for communist movements in other parts of the world, and emphasis on revolutionary changes in the world order as it is - have had to be restrained. Its ideological role in international relations has, as a consequence, been somewhat problematic.

This thesis represents an attempt to understand and examine the role of China in international relations as a whole and in Africa in particular, and the impact of ideology on ^{the} PRC's foreign policy. In other words, we hope to show how China's world view has 'affected', or has been 'affected' by , the non-socialist values in the world order as it is; and, in what respects China's role in the world has been adjusted or adapted in accordance with the

principles of traditional international relations, and in what respects China's practice has been in contradiction with them.

It should be stressed that the aim of this thesis is not to provide a general statement about the extent to^{which,} or the relative proportions in which, ideological (or revolutionary) and national interests - treated as two separate issues - have influenced the decision-makers of China's foreign policy - a question which is yet to be answered and may never be answered.' Nor is it the aim of this work to define the precise nature of China's commitment to conventional Marxism-Leninism, or 'decide' to what extent China's foreign policy has been Marxist-Leninist or revolutionary in character, a question which may invite another study in its own right.

Rather, the object of this thesis is to examine and interpret the ideological impact (and context) on the views expressed, aims pursued, policies adopted and actions undertaken by China in the world at crucial junctures during the last 37 years (and how they have been 'influenced' by the existing world order), based on the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) experience of adapting Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions prevailing in China as well as on its own revolutionary assessment of the world situation before and after the liberation of China (1949).

It is hoped that, through a periodisation of the development of the role of China in international relations since liberation (1949), it will be possible to understand

whether (and if so, why and to what extent) China - with its clearly declared socialist objectives - has in fact

- A. challenged or accepted the non-socialist international conditions; and,
- B. opposed or coexisted with the non-socialist world as a whole with its various values - feudalism, capitalism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, hegemonism, racism, nationalism, religionism, monarchism, bourgeoisism, etc.

Two main components are considered when attempting to understand China's revolutionary perspectives on the objective situation in the world and their influence on its foreign policies:

- i. CCP's analysis of, and emphasis on, 'contradiction', the fundamental concept of Marxist-Leninist thought: As early as August 1937, Mao Zedong wrote as follows:

As regards the problem of particularity of contradiction, there are still two sides which must be specifically singled out for analysis, that is the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction.

In the process of development of a complex thing, many contradictions exist, among these, one is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of other contradictions.

For example, in capitalist society, the two opposing forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions...are determined and influenced by that principal contradiction.

In semi-colonial countries like China, the relationship between the principal contradiction and non-principal contradictions presents a complicated situation.

When imperialism wages a war of aggression on such a country, the various classes in that country, apart from small traitors, can temporarily unite and wage a national war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and that country becomes the principal contradiction while all other contradictions among the various classes within that country (including the principal contradiction between the feudal system and the great masses of the people) are relegated temporarily to a secondary...or subordinate position.

...whatever happens, there is no doubt at all that at every stage in the process of development, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role...Thus, in studying any process - if it is a complicated process in which more than two contradictions exist, we must do our utmost to discover its principal contradiction. Once the principal contradiction is grasped, any problem can readily be solved.²

'Contradiction' has been the major underlying ideological motivation of China's strategy of 'unite the many to defeat the few', or 'unite the weaker to defeat the stronger'. In the case of Africa, the principal contradiction has been the one between colonialism, imperialism and foreign domination as a whole on the one hand, and national independence, liberation and revolutionary movements as well as oppressed nations and anti-colonialist forces of whatever hue in general on the other.

- ii. Revolutionary war and armed struggle as the principal means of creating conditions of

revolutionary social changes and of enhancing the prospect of a socialist revolution is the other major component of China's global revolutionary perspective. Support for national liberation wars has been dictated by China's ideological conviction that the strategy of revolutionary war guided by the principles of 'people's war' is necessary for liberation. In his essay (November 1938) 'On Problems of War and Strategy' Mao wrote that

The seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task of the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries...

...having guns, we can create party organisations...we can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yen-an has been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun.³

Mao did not see the army only as an instrument of war against the enemy, but also as an instrument of revolutionary social mobilisation among the masses.

When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organise them, to arm them, and to help establish revolutionary political power: apart from such objectives fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.⁴[Emphasis added]

In order to understand China's ideological world view, and the influence exercised by it on China's role in international relations since 1949, the following

interactive and inter-related factors must be considered together;

- i. The Chinese world view and the process of the Chinese revolution before liberation: This is important as China's ideological world view has been much dictated by ^{the} CCP's adoption of a combined strategy of national democratic revolution and national united anti-imperialist front.

The memory of more than a century of imperialist humiliation and exploitation, and ~~the~~ CCP's vital role in ending this bitter experience, has been an essential thrust underlining ^{the} PRC's international role. In August 1949, two months before ^{the} CCP's final victory (October), Mao Zedong explained that

All these wars of aggression, together with political, economic, and cultural aggression and oppression, have caused the Chinese to hate imperialism, made them stop and think what is it all about? and compelled them to bring their revolutionary spirit into full play and become united through struggle. ⁵

- ii. China's political orientation to the revolutionary process as it affects other countries and its position on 'world revolution': Based on its own experience China has always stressed that whilst support for revolutionary and liberation movements is highly important, their success, in the final analysis, must be based on their self-reliance and their capacity to adapt to local conditions. In other words, revolution must be home-grown. Their struggles

must depend mainly upon their own personal experience, for foreign assistance can only come second.⁶

China's support for national liberation and revolutionary movements has never taken the form of military intervention. A permanent defeat for colonialism and imperialism and their local collaborators can only result from armed struggle and people's war, based on the use of the resources and tools of the indigenous population and taking into consideration the local conditions, and can not be based on military intervention and foreign troops. In other words, revolution cannot be exported. Only the oppressed peoples, namely the peasants and the working classes, where possible in collaboration with the *petit bourgeoisie* and the tenantry, can make the revolution. Only a total mobilisation of the masses can lead to a successful revolution.

China's support for national liberation and revolutionary movements has largely been based on two levels.

- A. The material level, including, military supplies, training, financial assistance and propaganda facilities;
- B. The moral and psychological level, where mobilisation is guided both by China's experience of people's war, and by its strategy of national united front policy.

iii. Realities of power: Moral commitment and revolutionary objectives are subject to power realities and external restrictions. Until the early '70s, China had been a main target of American imperialism. Not only were

China's own security and revolution threatened, but also its support for revolutionary and national liberation forces was contained and restricted by the imperialist powers and governments loyal to them throughout the world.

- iv. China's understanding of State-to-State relations must be clarified, particularly as many critics of China's international role have questioned the normalisation of relations between China and the United States, a move which was seen as a compromise made at the expense of the anti-imperialist front. It must be stressed that the traditional pattern of international relations at the State-to-State level has never been rejected by China. China has always sought to establish diplomatic relations with any state that was ready to recognise PRC and not Taiwan as the sole and sovereign representative of the Chinese people.

we are willing to discuss with any foreign government the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, provided it is willing to sever relations with Chinese reactionaries, stops conspiring with them and helping them and adopts an attitude of genuine, and not hypocritical, friendship towards people's China. The Chinese people wish to have friendly co-operations with peoples of all countries and to resume and expand international trade in order to develop production and promote economic prosperity.⁷

Thus it was possible for China to establish diplomatic relations even with the

United States, its greatest enemy - relations which were based on traditional diplomacy, including, among its various aspects, the mutual benefits of diplomatic, economic and trade relations, while at the same time seeking a broad united front of all nations and peoples including Americans, in support of self-determination - and liberation.

- v. A systematic analysis of the role of China in international relations must take account of international changes and developments that have taken place from time to time during the last 37 years, and of China's response to them.

Part II of this work is devoted to an interpretation of the development of the role of China in international relations since 1949 through six stages.

- A. Alignment with the Soviet Union, Consolidation of the Revolution and the Unification of China (1949-55),
- B. Coexistence with the Anti-colonialist Forces (1955-59),
- C. Third World: A Revolutionary Base for China's Dual Objectives (1959-66),
- D. China's Challenge to the Existing International Order: The Impact of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR: 1966-69),
- E. China's diplomacy and Foreign Policy since 1969, and
- F. 'Modernisation Within and Co-operation With the Adversaries of the Soviet Union (1976-) Without'.

While the above factors underlying the role of China in international relations have all been considered by many of the major studies^e on the subject, in one way or another, each study has focussed on one particular factor to the exclusion of others without seriously considering them together as an inter-active, inter-related and inseparable whole bearing on a clear understanding of the multi-faceted role of China in international relations.

A large number of the major studies on the subject relate their analysis of the shape of China's foreign policy largely to leading figures of the Chinese revolution such as Mao Zedong or Lin Biao. They place little emphasis on the important changes taking place outside China or on the development of revolutionary thought and the different analytical evaluation of emerging new situations put forward by different actors from time to time.

A disproportionate amount of attention has been given in the literature to China's concern with Superpowers and Big Powers - mainly the United States and the Soviet Union, which is lacking in a grasp of the underlying strategy of exploiting and deepening the contradictions between smaller and bigger powers on the one hand, and, on the other, between the imperialist powers and anti-imperialist forces. China more or less consistently viewed its role in international relations, or at least until the early '70s, in terms of a strategy of united front forged by the oppressed peoples of the world to struggle against their oppressors. The Soviet Union was

actively included in this strategy on the side of the oppressors right from 1968 onwards, following its intervention in Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine of 'limited sovereignty'.

Africa has been chosen as the subject of this study for the following inter-related and inter-acting reasons:

1. Africa's role in National Democratic or Anti-imperialist Revolution: Carved up like China by the colonialist and imperialist powers as it was,⁹ it was necessary for Africa as a whole to go through a primary phase of national democratic and anti-imperialist united front in order to end colonialism, imperialism and foreign domination before any possible revolutionary changes could be contemplated in the socio-political context. In other words, an anti-imperialist revolution should precede the socialist revolution. Not only did China recognise such a sequence of events to be historically and objectively necessary, but also to be an essential part of its own revolutionary experience and conviction.¹⁰

Africa at present is mostly occupied with fighting imperialism and colonialism. Its fight against feudalism is not so important and, moreover, its role in the Socialist revolution is in a dormant phase. The important part of its activities lies in its national revolution and in making the United Front spread everywhere on the continent.¹¹

China viewed the revolutionary potentialities of the world (and especially the Third World) during the '50s and '60s as more or less congruent with those which had developed in

China itself during the phases leading up to its liberation.

At present some parts of Africa are going through experiences similar to what we experienced in China 60 years ago in the Boxer uprising. Some of the events were like those which occurred during the Hsin-hai Revolution [1911], while others resembled what happened around the 'May 4th' [movement 1919]. We had not yet begun the period of the Northern Expedition and that of the War of Resistance against Japan, and we were still far from the events of 1949 in China.

We must tell them, in order to help them, about the experience of the Chinese revolution pointing out the significance of the Taiping Uprising, the Boxer Uprising, Dr. Sun yat-Sen, and the revolutionary experience to the communists of this generation.¹²

The divided and complicated character of the leadership of the African national democratic revolution spanning the entire political spectrum from left to right was not seen by China as constituting an insuperable barrier to social change in the long run in the Continent.

The situation of the national revolutionary and the international democratic movements in colonial and semi-colonial territories is exceedingly complicated...Africa looks like the seven powers of [China's] Warring States [403 B.C. to 221 B.C.] with its Nasser, Nkrumah, Hussein, Sékou Touré, Bourguiba and Abbas [sic] each with his own way of leading others. In general everyone is trying to sell his own goods...

Among the independent countries in Africa...if one or two of them complete a real national revolution, solving their problem of resisting imperialism and reaching an internal solution of democratic national democratic revolution, the effect will be very

great, the time ripe for action, the revolutionary wave will be able to swallow the whole African continent, and the 200 million and more Africans will advance to the fore-front of the world. We should take long-range views of this problem.'³

China's 'long-range' views of the revolutionary-social context of the African national democratic revolution were defined by China in the following terms

According to the analysis of Marxism, it is to be confirmed that the embryo of national revolution in these countries will become a genuine people's revolution, give rise to Marxists, form political parties of the proletariat and go towards the socialist revolution.'⁴

Within this context, China's definition of African anti-imperialist revolutionary or national liberation struggles in Africa and support for them has been guided by two major considerations:

- A. National democratic revolution led by the national bourgeoisie clearly committed to bringing colonialism and foreign domination to an end would merit China's support. [e.g. Egypt, (1952) Guinea (1958) Libya (1969)]
- B. National democratic revolutions led by liberation forces with Marxist tendencies [e.g. *Frente de libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), *Partido Africano de Independencia de Guinee Cabo Verde* (PAIGC) and *Union des Populations du Cameroun* (UPC)] or national liberation movements led by progressive forces [e.g. National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria and the African National Congress (ANC) of Azania (South Africa)] were actively supported by China.

It is worth pointing out that China's support for anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in Africa has been based not only on ideological grounds, (i.e., Marxism-Leninism *versus* capitalism and imperialism) but also on historical and political grounds, deriving from its own experience of semi-colonialism and imperialism. Hence

The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our international duty.'⁵

During his visit to Egypt (December 1963), Zhou Enlai explained the same idea in a wider context.

One of the main contents of the foreign policy of the Chinese Government is active support for national democratic movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China is a country that has been liberated from the colonial shackles of imperialism. We shared the same lot as the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Naturally we sympathise with and support each other. Moreover, since China has won its own victory it has the obligation to support countries which have not yet victory or are about to win it.'⁶

China's revolutionary activities in Africa took little account of the existence of communist parties as political organisations in the Continent for the following reasons:

- A. There have not been many organised communist parties in Africa. The few that existed were largely pro-Soviet in character.
- B. Throughout the decisive African liberation struggles during the '60s and '70s, the communist parties in Africa gained little

support, partly because they lacked strong proletarian bases in the continent (with the relative exception of a few countries such as South Africa and Egypt), and partly because they were not willing to extend active support to the leadership of national liberation movements. Their own preference was for negotiating with, rather than offering armed resistance to the colonialist powers. This position stemmed from a blind loyalty to the Soviet Union's policy of *Détente*.

- C. During the decisive period of development of the liberation struggles in Africa in the '60s, most communist parties on the continent were banned by African governments. There was no advantage for China in fraternising with impotent communist parties.

It must, however, be pointed out that China did have contacts with communist parties in Africa through individuals belonging to them, and especially through the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) and visits to China by those among them who were prepared to join national democratic revolution struggles. Such communists were encouraged to take leading positions in national liberation movements, AAPSO, as well as in governments wherever appropriate.

- ii. African peasant-based society and the peasant character of the Chinese revolution constituted an important factor in China's support for people's wars and guerrilla wars waged through national liberation movements.

The CCP's ideological orientation to the revolutionary character of the peasantry dates back to Mao's 'Report On Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan' (1927).

For the rise of the present peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a tornado or tempest, a force so extraordinarily swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to suppress it. They will break all trammels that now bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will send all imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local bullies and bad gentry to their graves. All revolutionary parties and all revolutionary comrades will stand before them to be tested, and to be accepted or rejected as they decide.

To march at their head and lead them? Or to follow at their rear, gesticulating at them and criticising them? Or to face them as opponents?

Every Chinese is free to choose among the three alternatives, but circumstances demand that a quick choice be made.¹⁷

It is necessary to emphasise that the peasant character (at least in the initial stage) of African liberation struggles was by no means socialist. Unlike the Chinese peasantry,¹⁸ the African countryside was not politically or socially amenable to a socialist revolution. As Amilcar Cabral,^{the} PAIGC leader, said, when he compared the peasantry of Guinea-Bissau with its Chinese counterpart

The conditions of the peasantry in China were very different: the peasantry had a history of revolt, but this was not the case in Guinea, and so it was not possible for our party militants and propaganda to find the same kind of welcome among the peasantry in Guinea for the idea of national liberation as the idea found in China.¹⁹

iii. The Sino-Soviet Dispute:

The Sino-Soviet dispute has been influential in shaping China's policy towards African countries. During the '60s, China's policy was underlined by a campaign to mobilise national independence movements and governments of independent African countries to oppose the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence with the colonialist and imperialist powers. From 1969 onwards, (following the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet border clash) China became even more brazenly anti-Soviet after formally characterising the Soviet Union as a 'social imperialist' and 'hegemonic power'.

iv. The diplomatic factor:

China has been interested not only in promoting and facilitating mutual advantage in trade and cultural exchange as well as fostering political understanding with African countries, but also in eliminating Taiwan from diplomatic intercourse, thus building up Afro-Asian solidarity in support of liberation from colonialism and imperialism.

During the '50s, there were nine independent African countries (with the exception of South Africa); their number increased to 41 during the '60s, 49 during the '70s. There are now 50 independent African countries (and, arguably, 51, if Saharawi were included). Their support for China's admission to the UN and the expulsion of Taiwan has been highly significant. During the last debate on the 'China Question' (October 1971) prior to the expulsion of Taiwan, out of a total of 76 countries voting for ^{the} PRC 26 were African.²⁰

v. The economic factor:

China's economic aid to, and trade and economic co-operation with Africa have been advantageous to African countries because of the easy terms offered in contrast to the terms set by Western aid donors.

The aid China offers to all friendly new emerging countries is based on socialist principles and the principle of respecting the sovereignty of the countries concerned. It never takes the form of the export of capital, direct investment and profit-seeking. It consists of providing economic and technical assistance to the governments of these countries and helping these countries develop their own independent national economy.²¹

In Mali (21 January 1964), Zhou Enlai put forward China's principles of aid to and co-operation with other countries as follows

First, the Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.

Second, in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.

Third, the Chinese Government provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.

Fourth, in providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development step by step.

Fifth, the Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient

countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.

Sixth, the Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.

Seventh, in giving any particular technical assistance the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques.

Eighth, the experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient countries. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.²²

Aid given by China to, and co-operation with, African countries, have been given special attention in this thesis, not only because they have been mutually beneficial for the donor and the recipient, in a wider context, but also because they have, positively, in a number of cases, contributed to a consolidation of the anti-Western capitalist and imperialist front - by encouraging African countries to adopt policies aimed at increasing self-reliance and their economic independence and at shaking off economic ties with the capitalist and imperialist powers and the attendant restrictions.

It will be recalled that one of the aims of China's economic policy has been to encourage African countries ruled by moderate governments to join an anti-colonialist front of Afro-Asian solidarity, whilst providing the necessary

stimulant at the same time to anti-imperialist African countries for adopting a much more militant and positive anti-imperialist stance and for providing active support for national liberation movements.

Despite its economic status as a developing country China is the only country in the world (including the Soviet Union) ²³ which gives interest-free loans and credits on the basis of the understanding that the primary aim of aid should not be to bring profit to the donor. Another distinguishing factor of China's loans and credits is their long duration of repayment, (usually between 10 and 30 years, or, in some cases, with no date set for repayment at all). Repayment usually begins within 10 years of receiving the aid.

The major studies²⁴ of China's relations with Africa - usually covering specific areas and not the whole of Africa - invariably pay little attention to mutual interaction between the factors discussed above and their inter-related character; nor have they focussed attention on them in the context of the development of the role of China in international relations as a whole. This study specifically addresses those questions.

A major proportion of the existing work on the subject places too great an emphasis on China's initiative in shaping its Africa policy without considering the extent to which China has simply responded to the objective situation in Africa as it has been developing in the decades of decolonisation and national liberation struggles. They concentrate on China's initiative rather than on Sino-African interaction and the African *milieu* in

which it takes place. Furthermore, although a number of authors refer to China's awareness and understanding of different African orientations to nationalism, Pan-Africanism, socialism, economic development and self-reliance, anti-colonialism and anti-racism, they invariably shrink from the task of analysing the relationship between these different stances and their various nuances in the minds of African ideologues and political actors.

The factors enumerated above should be taken in their totality when we examine China's policy towards Africa and Sino-African relations in general. Within such a framework, China's policy towards Africa has been directed towards the achievement of the fundamental objective of Afro-Asian solidarity and the forging of a united front strategy. There is little in the literature on the subject that is centred in such a global understanding of the subject.

Most analysts²⁵ of China's policy towards Africa tend to pay greater or lesser attention to one area of the continent or the other, basing their choice on such assumptions as China being rejected by one region or country in Africa, and thus having to find alternatives. They often neglect the fact that China's main concern in Africa during the '50s and '60s was with national independence and liberation movements and anti-imperialist forces as a whole. It is true that, apart from Guinea, China almost exclusively concentrated on North Africa during the '50s, because it was concerned with the anti-

imperialist struggle in Egypt (the Suez crisis, 1956) and the war of national liberation in Algeria (1954-62). By the time Egypt won back control over the Suez and consolidated its position and Algeria won its war of national liberation (1962), more African liberation struggles began to emerge in Sub-Saharan Africa (from Guinea-Bissau to liberation struggles in the southern region of the continent). China became actively concerned with these developments. North Africa eventually took a back seat in China's consciousness as far as national liberation struggles were concerned.

China's interest in establishing State-to-State relations on an extensive scale was guided by these new developments. Tanzania and the Congo(B), for example, became as important to China as Egypt and Algeria. It is entirely likely that China would have established relations with national independence movements in Africa during the '50s in the same manner as it did during the '60s if suitable opportunities had presented themselves for such an association in Africa south of the Sahara. During the decade of the '50s, Guinea was the only sub-Saharan country ^(with the exception of the Sudan) to establish diplomatic relations with China (October 1959).

Another important factor given little attention in the previous studies is the political character and orientation of the various African governments with which China entered into diplomatic relations. The moderate or radical, capitalist or non-capitalist, 'progressive' or 'non-progressive' character of the African government

concerned at any given time has played an important role in shaping China's policy towards it. This study has attempted to take into account these factors as well as changes over time sweeping across a single African country or whole region from time to time. It attempts to delineate the style and content of the actual behaviour and general political conduct of the various governments concerned and of China over the period under study. Chapters 12 and 13, in particular, covering the first two phases of Sino-African relations (1955-66) are long and detailed. The reason for this lies in the consideration that an account of this nature might well be found to be less than convincing if it were to content itself with an examination of China's policy towards African states and national independence/liberation movements without a brief historical background.

Our initial aim was to restrict the research to North Africa as a case study for the reason that China's relations with contemporary Africa started there. However, it soon became clear that for our purposes such a study would be far too narrow in scope and could not be expected to provide a sufficiently deep, balanced and well rounded understanding of China's international role in Africa as a whole and the response of African countries to it. Ambitious as it might seem, we decided to expand the scope of the research to include the whole of the African continent for the following main reasons:

- i. China's revolutionary assessment of Africa has been guided mainly by its interest in national

liberation struggles throughout the continent. China's policy towards Africa during the '50s was almost exclusively focussed on the northern part of the continent. But, from the early '60s onwards, China, like Egypt and Algeria, turned its attention more and more to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Furthermore, any discussion of China's relations with national liberation movements is rendered specially problematic when the Soviet Union becomes an influential, if not a decisive factor in determining the precise nature of China's relationship with a particular national liberation movement. This has been the case, especially since the early '70s.

Finally, every national liberation movement in Africa has been characterised by a specificity of ideological conviction - ranging from advocacy of an end to colonialism, imperialism and racism (e.g. ^{the}FLN of Algeria and ANC of Azania) to a determination to establish a framework of socialism in the new State (e.g. FRELIMO of Mozambique, PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and MPLA of Angola).

- ii By the same token, the decision to cover State-to-State relations embracing the whole of Africa was motivated by the following main considerations. China's relations with various individual African countries have taken shape over an eventful stretch of time (brief though it may appear on a chronological scale) involving general re-orientations of the development of the role of China in international relations, and often far-reaching changes in character of the political leadership in control of the power of the state concerned. Most, if not all, African countries with which

China has relations have experienced changes and new developments in their domestic and external policy dictated by *coups d'état*, revolutions, other forms of changes of leadership of the governments concerned, etc., which have played an important part in shaping the relations between China and each particular African state. During the '50s and '60s, China's relations^{was} with African governments ; far less influenced by considerations bearing on whether they were pro- or anti-communist. China's decision to enter into diplomatic relations with a particular African country was based on calculations as to whether such a course of action would enable it to gain easy access to national liberation movements in progress in neighbouring countries. Thus, for example, Morocco and Burundi, which were ruled by monarchs who were far from 'progressive', were given a warm diplomatic embrace by China which wanted easy access to FLN (Algeria) and the liberation forces headquartered in Stanleyville and the Congo(L), respectively. This general position was reversed during the '70s when China forged close State-to-State links with such *régimes* as the government of Zaire under President Mobutu. China used its friendly relations with Zaire, for example, to oppose^{the} MPLA which was the most powerful anti-imperialist movement in the region at the time.

In order to avoid confusion and facilitate a comprehensive discussion of Sino-African relations this study is based on a characterisation - of the implications for the different parts of Africa - of China's strategy of united front. This strategy is viewed in a dual perspective.

i. 'United Front from Below' or People-to-People Relations: This includes China's relations with national independence, liberation, and revolutionary movements as well as ^{the} AAPSO.

ii. 'United Front from Above' or State-to-State Relations. The 'progressive' or 'non-progressive' character of the state concerned is considered from several angles. It must be pointed out that there are difficulties in deciding which criteria should be applied in order to categorise particular *régimes* as one or the other and also in providing a rigid and invariable rationale for so doing. Nor was it easy to arrive at clear-cut answers to the question of why China happened, at a given time, to characterise a particular African *régime* as 'progressive' or 'non-progressive'. Often deduction rather than proven facts had to be resorted to for reaching a conclusion on this question. However the definition of a 'progressive' or 'non-progressive' *régime* in this thesis has been largely guided by whether it gave active and militant support to China on its stance on major international issues (including colonialism, imperialism, hegemonism, armed struggle, people's war, self-reliance and policies emphasising economic and political independence) or opposed it.

The domestic orientation of the various governments concerned is also considered in this work. In other words, we regard as 'progressive' a *régime* which adopts a non-capitalist path of economic development, (e.g. Ghana during the early and mid '60s) or is socialistically orientated (e.g. Guinea, Mali, Algeria, and Egypt during the '60s; and Somalia during the '70s), or which has adopted

scientific socialism [e.g. the Congo(B) from 1969 onwards]. China generally identified with the aspirations of such countries.

This study has relied mainly on English primary and secondary sources and documents, (including English translations of Chinese); a limited number of French and Arabic sources have also been used.

Interviews with a number of African politicians, students and academics have been especially useful in understanding the concrete underpinnings of specific Sino-African interactions as well as in gaining an insight into African attitudes towards China. In the course of fieldwork in Tunisia, Algeria and London, we were able to interview a number of persons who had been either representatives of different national liberation movements or officials of governments and political parties.

In the final analysis, this study represents an attempt to understand and interpret the role of China in international relations in general and Sino-African relations in particular. We are aware that in carrying out this task, we have by no means answered all questions or filled all major gaps or clarified all areas of confusion, and that a number of different approaches can be adopted to study the role of China in international relations or Sino-African interaction. We happened to find this particular method satisfying and preferable to the conventional approach to the study of the field evident in a very large proportion of the existing literature.

NOTES

1. For the following major reasons, it would be problematic to discuss 'national interest' and 'ideological' objectives as two separate analytic categories:

i. Both national and ideological interests can be inter-related. For example, China's involvement in the Korean issue (1951-1953) led to the following results:

A. It accelerated the consolidation of the Chinese revolution.

B. It secured China's borders by safeguarding the integrity of a friendly regime in a neighbouring country (North Korea).

C. It 'saved' a socialist regime.

Similarly, China's relations with the Kingdom of Morocco, for example, served two related purposes:

A. It would have been difficult for China to consolidate its relations with Algerian national liberation forces based along the Moroccan-Algerian border areas, had not China entered into 'friendly' diplomatic relations with Morocco.

B. It served China's own diplomatic, trade and economic interests as well.

ii. The survival of a specific revolution of a particular socialist country cannot be separated from the emergence of world revolution seen as a whole.

iii. Ideology is a long term objective. Ideological objectives require taking primary steps and stages, especially when dealing with countries directly or indirectly controlled by the forces of colonialism and imperialism.

iv. The concept of 'national interests' is vague and can never be consistently identified. For example, if a country was invaded by an imperialist or foreign power, it would have to fight in order to preserve its sovereignty; in other words, it would pursue a vital national interest by fighting. If it did not fight but surrendered, it would have sacrificed its essential national objective, but perhaps saved the lives of its own people.

For debates and conflicting views on the issue of 'national interests' and 'ideology' in general and with special reference to China's foreign policy in particular, see, for example, D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (London: University of California Press, 1977); M. Gurtov and Hwang Byong-Moo, China under Threat: the Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (London, John Hopkins University Press, 1980); D. S. Zagoria, 'Ideology and Chinese Foreign Policy' in G. Schwaby, (Ed.), Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Global Perspective (London: Cyncro Press, 1978), pp. 103-116; B. Schwartz, Communism and China: Ideology in Flux (New York: Atheneum, 1970); D. Mozingo, 'The Maoist Imprint on China's Foreign Policy', in E. F. Armbruster, (Ed.) China Briefing (Chicago: The University of Chicago Centre for Policy Study, 1968); H. S. Dinerstein, 'The Future of Ideology in Alliance Systems', Journal of International Affairs 25 (1971): 2, pp. 238-263; Levi Werner, Modern China (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1953); H. C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1966); N. Kapchenk and S. H. Sanakoyer, 'Foreign Policy and Ideology', International Affairs no. 9 (Moscow: September 1981), pp. 76-78. Contrast the above with, for example, J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974); T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Role of China in International Relations', Political and Economic Weekly vol. 13, nos. 45, 46 and 47, pp. 1851-1859, 1899-1911 and 1941-1955; and J. Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: the Maoist Era and its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980) .

2. Mao Tse-tung 'On Contradiction', Selected Works (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 35-37. Mao listed other contradictions as follows:

contradiction between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the rural petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the proletariat and the rural petty bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the liberal bourgeoisie and the monopolistic bourgeoisie, the contradiction between bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois faction, the contradiction between the capitalist countries themselves, the contradiction between imperialism and other countries, etc. (*ibid.*, p. 35.)

3. Mao Tse-tung (6 November 1938) 'Problems of War and Strategy', Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), pp. 274-275.

4. Mao Tse-tung 'On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party' Selected Works, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), p. 106.
5. Mao Tse-tung (14 August 1949), 'Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle', Selected Works vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), p. 426.
6. Bulletin of Activities no. 17 (25 April 1961), in J. Chester Cheng (Ed.), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: a Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publications, 1966), pp. 484-485.

This is a collection of secret documents of The Bulletin of Activities of PLA which fell into Western hands and was edited by Chester Cheng, among others.

7. Mao Tse-tung (15 June 1949), 'Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference', Selected Works vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), p. 408.
8. See, for example, M. Gurtov and H. Byong-Moo, op.cit., King C. Chen (Ed.), China and the Three Worlds: a Foreign Policy Reader (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1979); Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977 (Colorado: Westview Press, 1978); Wang Gung Wu China and the World Since 1949 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977); Michael B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978); H. C. Hinton, op.cit.; J. A. Cohen (Ed.), The Dynamics of China's Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); J. D. Simmonds, China's World: the Foreign Policy of a Developing State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); D. S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Philippe Richer, La Chine et le Tiers Monde (1949-1969) (Paris: Payot, 1971); Nigel Harris, The Mandate of Heaven: Marx and Mao in Modern China (London: Quartet Books, 1978), pp. 205-240; Harry Harding, 'Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy', Problems of Communism, vol. 32 (March-April 1983), pp. 1-19; F. Fetjö, Chine-U.S.S.R.: le Conflict (Paris: Plan, 1966); I. Fadda, Siyāsah al-Sīn - al-kharījah wa-al-'ālam al-thāliṭh (China's Foreign Policy and the Third World) (Jordan: University of Jordan, 1980); and R. A. Scalapino, 'China and the Balance of Power', Foreign Affairs 52 (June 1974): 2, pp. 349-385.
9. See Chapter 1 of this work.
10. See Chapters 2, 10.2 and 10.3 of this work.

11. 'Bulletin of Activities' no. 17 (25 April 1961) in J. C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 484.
12. Ibidem.
13. Ibid., p. 485.
14. Ibid., p. 484.
15. Mao Tse-tung in Peking Review 11 (15 March 1968): 11, p. 32.
16. Premier Chou En-lai's press conference (Cairo: 20 December 1963) in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism (a collection of documents, speeches and press interviews from the visits of Chinese leaders to thirteen African and Asian countries) (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1964), p. 17.
17. Mao Tse-tung (March 1927) 'Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunana', Selected Works vol. 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), pp. 21-22.
18. See Chapter 2.2 of this work.
19. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: an African People's Struggle (London: Stage 1, 1969), p. 50.
20. See Tables 11.1 and 15.2.
21. 'Premier Chou En-lai Answers Questions from Reporters of the Ghana News Agency' in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 148.
22. Sino-Mali Joint Communique (Bamako: 21 January 1964) in ibid., pp. 186-187.
23. The Soviet Union usually charges between 2 to 3 per cent interest on its loans.
24. See, for example, J. K. Cooley, East Wind over Africa (New York: Walker and Company, 1965); F. C. Schatten, Communism in Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966); A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); B. D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970 (London: University of California Press, 1973); Wei Liang-Tsai, Peking Versus Taipei in Africa (Taipei: The Asia World Institute, 1982); R. Lowenthal, 'China' in Z. Brzezinski, Africa and the Communist World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); W. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure (London: Hutchinson, 1967); P. Lessing, Africa's Red Harvest (London: Michael Joseph, 1962), pp. 41-57; G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964 (New Delhi: School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University 1973)

(unpublished Ph.D. Thesis); Yeh Po-t'ang, 'Peking's Policy Towards Africa as Viewed from the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique', Issues and Studies 10 (December 1974): 15, pp. 2-12; Tareq Y. Ismael, 'The People's Republic of China and Africa', The Journal of Modern African Studies 9 (1971): 4, pp. 507-529; H. C. Hinton, op.cit., pp. 177-197; C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', in A. M. Halpern (Ed.), Policies Toward China (London: McGraw-Hill Books, 1965); W. Weinstein (Ed.), Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa (London: Praeger, 1975).

25. See, for example, J. K. Cooley, op.cit., passim; C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., passim; G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-64, op.cit.; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit.; W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', Current Scene 10 (August 1972): 8, pp. 1-13; 'Chou En-lai on Safari', China Quarterly no. 18 (April-June 1964), pp. 174-193; I. Fadda, op.cit., pp. 91-141; and Philippe Richer, op.cit., passim.

PART I

CHINA'S WORLD VIEW BEFORE 1949

CHAPTER 1

CHINA: SEMI-COLONIALISM AND REVOLUTION

1.1. China's Experience of Semi-Colonialism

During a period of more than a hundred years (1840-1949) of economic exploitation and humiliation at the hands of the imperialist powers of Europe, the United States, the Czarist Russia and Japan, China experienced what ^{the} C.C.P. has referred to as 'semi-colonialism'. It was the penetration of the Chinese economy by imperialism that played an important role in shaping ^{the} C.C.P.'s outlook on the world. As John Gittings has argued

The precise form which imperialism adopted in China - that of a divided and divisive 'semi-colonialism' in which China was the victim of not one but many powers - was of particular importance in shaping the C.C.P.'s (and especially Mao Tse-Tung's) foreign strategy.'

In the early 17th century, the colonial powers intensified their penetration of China. They also became increasingly competitive among themselves. Britain took the lead among the European colonial powers. Its dominant position as the chief commercial power of the world enabled it to put itself forward as the champion of Western interests in China.

Whilst, up until the first three decades of the 19th century, there were only European individuals and groups in China representing particular interests without any

CHINA UNDER IMPERIALISM AND SEMI-COLONIALISM



Source: J. Gittings, China and the World, 1922-1972
 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), p. 31.

Some names have been changed according to the new spellings of the old names. This map is under the title of "Imperialism and China" in Gittings, op.cit., p. 31.

official connection with the Chinese, by 1834, the British, for the first time, were able to establish a permanent official representative of a Western government in China. China was thus, for the first time, in direct diplomatic relationship with a Western state.

However, China produced a number of different products, unavailable in Europe, to which the colonialists were attracted. The Chinese for their part were, however, not much interested in trade with the Westerners. China's products - including silk, cotton, cloth, porcelain and tea - were greatly superior to those of the West. In the famous message to George III, Chinese Emperor Qianlong wrote

we possess all things .. and have no
use of your country's manufactures.²

During the 18th century, trade grew fast and China was exporting silk fabrics, tea, cotton cloth and porcelain to Britain. The value of China's exports to Western countries, particularly Britain, was assessed at an average annual value of about £7 million, whereas imports of Western goods into China amounted to £3.5 million a year only. Payment had to be made in silver. Hence Western traders, particularly the British, faced a serious balance of payment problem.

The British sought to ease the situation by attempting to sell opium to the Chinese. The British, through the British East India Company, began to bootleg its large quantities of opium into China. Between 1796

and 1839, the amount of opium illegally imported into China increased by some thirty times, thus leading to an outflow of silver currency from China. This created serious economic and social problems for China. Whilst, economically, the use of opium as a means of paying for British imports caused a rural crisis as China's balance of trade deteriorated, socially the use of opium had serious ill effects on the health and general morale, especially of the Chinese rural people. When, in the view of the Chinese authorities, the position of China reached the level of a crisis, the Imperial government appealed to Britain to stop the opium trade.³

British investment in the production and sale of illegal opium, however, was so important to the Colonial power that Chinese appeals, in the interest of safeguarding the welfare of their own people, were ignored. As a result of attempts made by the Chinese government to prohibit opium trade by confining British traders to the island of Hong Kong, to cut their supplies, and to seize the opium, the first war between China and the West (Britain) took place (1839-42). This is usually known as the Opium War or, as the British referred to it, the 'trade war'.

Such a war showed the determination of Western colonialism to break up the Chinese trading system. It also aimed at opening the vast hinterland of China to the expansion of trade and economic exploitation by the Western powers. The decisive military encounter between China and Britain resulted in a defeat of the Chinese and

a complete victory for the British. The Chinese people were forced into subjection by Western European powers which were eventually joined by the United States, Russia and Japan. China was thus forced to endure a century of economic imperialism.

The end of the Opium War in 1842 resulted in forcing China to sign with Britain the Treaty of Nan^gking (Nan^jing) which was soon followed by the signing of a series of similar treaties with the United States, France, Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Portugal, and subsequently also with Russia and Prussia. By these 'agreements' Britain's seizure of Hong Kong was effectively confirmed. Under the Treaty of Nan^gking, five ports were opened on the South East coast of China to unrestricted foreign trade and residence. At the same time, the first of many indemnities were also extracted from China, including an indemnity for opium confiscated. It was from that point onwards that the Western powers began to establish the extra-territorial system in several major Chinese cities, under which they set up their own administration and legal system. This system was in effect completely autonomous and exempted Europeans from paying Chinese taxes.

During the second half of the 19th century, a succession of wars between the colonial powers and the Chinese conclusively demonstrated the superiority of Western weapons. Not only was great damage caused to Chinese property and life but also the disintegration of the economy and the social order was accelerated. As a result of a succession of such defeats, the Chinese

grudgingly accepted the concessions that were forced upon them by the imperialist powers.

The military weakness of China compared to the Western powers led the latter to behave in an increasingly aggressive manner. By the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), China was militarily forced by the French and the British to make more economic and trading concessions. By 1860, British and French troops advanced as far as Beijing. In 1884-85, a Sino-French war took place leaving 3,000 Chinese dead in the City of Fuzhou (Foochow) alone. Such a humiliation of China confirmed the Chinese view that the Europeans were uncivilized and barbarian.

Between 1840 and 1860, the Western powers took the opportunity of expanding their colonial empire through their established positions of strength in the strategic areas of China and through their growing economic imperialism.

These Western powers were later joined by Russia, Japan and Germany. During the 1870's, the Russians had begun to acquire Chinese territory along the frontiers of the Chinese Empire. In 1881, Japan gained control over Liuchin Islands. As a result of the war between China and Japan (1894-5), Taiwan and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan. In 1897, Germany occupied Tsingtao and the Gulf of Kiaochow, and in the years that followed, Russia occupied Port Arthur and Dairen, France acquired a sphere in Kwansu, Yunnan with a base at Kwangchow Bay, and Britain Weihoiwei.

As a result of these activities, competition between the various colonial powers became intense during the

latter part of the 19th century. Each country began to delimit areas which it considered to be its own particular sphere of influence, based upon economic and strategic considerations. Central China, around Yangtse valley was recognised as a British sphere of influence. The French maintained control over the south and the south western part of China adjacent to the Northern border of Vietnam. Fukien was reserved for the Japanese. Russian influence eventually included Manchuria and extended to Hopeh (HOPEI) province, while Germans established themselves in the province of Shantung. By the end of the 19th century, it looked as though China was in imminent danger of being carved-up by imperialist powers in a process similar to that which had already begun to take shape in Africa.

By their ability to impose unequal treaties on China, which were favourable to the imperial powers in the commercial, trade, economic and strategic spheres, the latter were able to force China into making concessions. China was thus reduced to the status of a semi-colony. The United States was subsequently to gain influence without using overt force. It thus became an imperialist power which could afford to pursue 'a peaceful way' of exploiting and dominating China.

How could the United States be characterised as another imperialist power humiliating and dominating China for more than a century? While the disclosure of its imperialist ambitions became known to many observers only following its enunciation of the Open Door policy at the

turn of the 19th century, the historical development of American imperialism goes back as far as the beginning of direct British imperialism in China in the immediate aftermath of the Opium War.

Perhaps it is interesting, before examining the role of the United States in China prior to its declaration of the Open Door policy, to look at how it, by comparison with the other imperialist powers, viewed China. In a letter transmitting the White Paper on the relations between the United States and China (dated July 30th 1949), Dean Acheson stated that

The interest of the Chinese people and the government of the United States in China goes far back into our history. Despite the distance and broad differences in background which separate China and the United States, our friendship for that country had always been intensified by the religious, philanthropic and cultural ties which have united the two people, and has been attested by many acts of good will over a period of many years, including the use of the Boxer indemnity for the education of Chinese students, the abolition of extra-territoriality during the second world war, and our extensive aid to China during and since the close of the war. The record shows that the United States has consistently maintained and still maintains those fundamental principles of our foreign policy toward China which include the doctrine of the Open Door, respect for the administrative and territorial integrity of China, and opposition to any foreign documentation of China.⁴

Indeed, Acheson's letter tries to show that, unlike other imperialist powers, the United States never pursued an exploitative and dominating policy. It also seeks to

deny that the United States had any imperialist ambitions in China. However, historically and logically, such a letter hides the real policies that were pursued by the United States throughout its period of investment in China, right from the second half of the 19th century until 1949. Acheson's policy statement does not reflect in any way the actual policy pursued and the actions undertaken by the United States in China for nearly a century. It is true that, unlike the other imperialist powers, the United States never used its own military force to gain privileges and take advantage of opportunities. But this fact alone does not exempt the United States from being considered as an imperialist power. The first American move in establishing its exploitative economic position in China began in 1844, the year in which the French concluded their own treaty with China by force.

The United States and China signed the Treaty of Wanghi (modelled on the Treaty of Nanking between Britain and China following the Opium War, 1840-42) on 3 July 1844. By that treaty the United States was given the guarantee, as the State Department put it, to the effect that

... whatever treaty rights other powers gained with respect to trade, residence, religious activity, tariffs or other commercial regulations would automatically accrue to the U.S.⁵

From this official statement of the Department of State, hardly any difference between the position of the United

States and other imperialist powers in China can be gleaned. As John Gittings has argued

The fact is that the fine differences between American policy and that of other powers were not readily apparent to the great majority of the Chinese. What was apparent was the essential similarity between the U.S. and the other powers, and their common aim in seeking to force China into close contact with them by the scruff of China's neck and to their own economic advantage.⁶

Equal opportunities, free trade and a division of the spheres of influence between the major imperialist powers constituted the main features of American policy towards China. As a consequence, the United States signed a series of treaties with China which resulted in enhancing its trade and expanding its economic ties with China. The Open Door policy was subsequently formulated (1898-99) to cover such advantages which had already become well entrenched in the relations between the United States and China. Such a policy came in the wake of the inability of the United States either to gain as strong a position as the other foreign powers were already able to establish in China or to take part in the extra-territorial system. The Open Door policy was by no means a

demonstration of disinterested concern for Chinese territorial integrity. It was concerned in 1898-9, the years of the great battle for concessions and extortion of spheres of influence by Russia, Germany France and Britain when the U.S. feared that the resultant carve-up would leave its own business interests out in the cold.⁷

Hence the Open Door policy did not constitute a gesture of goodwill from the United States towards the Chinese people engaged in a struggle to defend their territorial integrity; nor did it represent any effort on the part of the United States to help China seek economic prosperity and development. Following the launching of the Open Door policy, its author and Secretary of State, Hay, sought a naval base in Fukien in 1900.⁹ Moreover, as the rivalry between imperialist powers in their efforts to enlarge their spheres of influence intensified, the American minister in Beijing went so far as to suggest that, 'in the event of the partition of China, the U.S. might choose the province of Chihli as its sphere'.⁹ Finally and most clearly, the intention underlying the Open Door policy was spelt out by none other than President Woodrow Wilson (1913-21) himself when he described the Open Door policy as 'not the Open Door for the rights of China but the Open Door to the goods of America'.¹⁰

If the Open Door policy was initiated in favour of China's territorial integrity and the Chinese interests, the United States would have been disposed to help the Chinese stop Japan's aggressive designs during the 1930's. Though the Open Door policy claimed to respect China's territorial integrity, the United States never gave China a helping hand in its struggle against the Japanese imperialism; nor indeed, could Guomindang (KMT), a staunch ally and collaborator with United States imperialism, persuade the latter to come to its rescue.

The United States either took a neutral position or adopted a policy of moral (i.e rhetorical) condemnation of the Japanese. This was not what the Chinese people expected from an ally dedicated to an Open Door policy. No American aid was forthcoming to China in its struggle against Japan until 1940 when Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour precipitated a war between Japan and the United States. Indeed, the Open Door policy merely served as an apology for American economic imperialism and represented an essential stage in the historical development of American policy and intentions leading to its becoming the main imperialist power of this century. As Sathyamurthy has argued

The Open Door policy marked the beginning of a historical development the substance of which consisted of the expansion of American presence in China into an imperial hegemonic influence dominating Chinese politics during the early decades of this century ...''

Such an intensive exploitation of China's economy by the imperialist powers led to a series of organised insurrection of varying economic and social content, beginning with the Taiping rebellion and culminating in the successful communist revolution of 1949.

How and when did the Chinese struggle against feudalism and imperialism begin, and, to what extent did such a struggle affect the Chinese revolution led by ^{the} CCP? To what extent did China's position as a 'semi-colony', and the revolutionary events and movements of the 19th and

20th centuries, affect ^{the} CCP's views of China's role in international relations?

1.2. The Development of the Chinese Revolution: From the Taiping Insurrection to the May 4, 1919 Movement

The process of the transformation of China into a semi-colony and colony by imperialism allying with Chinese feudalism, is at the same time the process of the struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism and its lackeys. The Opium War, the movement of the T'aip'ing Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the *coup d'etat* of 1898, the Yi Ho Tuam (Boxer) Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4th Movement, the May 30th Movement, the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the present Anti-Japanese War all testify to the stubborn resistance of the Chinese people, who refuse to submit to imperialism and its lackeys.

Thanks to the unyielding and ever-renewed heroic struggles waged by Chinese people during the last 100 years, imperialism has not been and will never be able to subjugate China.¹²

Indeed China has a long history of revolutionary events and peasant rebellions against the dynastic power of a long line of Chinese emperors as well as against the colonial powers, a history which, in its most recent phase, went back to more than 130 years. However, the first politically organised rebellion in the modern sense of the term occurred during the interval 1851-1864. It was known as the Taiping insurrection.

The unequal treaties that were imposed upon China and the territorial concessions which the ruling Manchu

dynasty was forced to make to the colonial powers came as a severe blow to the prestige of the dynasty. In 1851, the Taiping rebellion took place which constituted a most formidable political challenge to the Manchu dynasty. It based its opposition to the dynasty on a coherent ideology purporting to introduce an element of egalitarianism and social reform into Chinese life rooted in a mixture of traditional Chinese and Christian ideas. The rebellion sought solutions for the problems of landless peasants, famine, food, refugees, and agriculture which was on a steady decline. Other aspects of the Taiping rebellion included the notion of common property and sexual equality.

The Taiping insurrection set its face firmly against opium, tobacco and alcohol. The insurrectionary government ruled the Taiping state for over thirteen years (1851-64). At one point its control extended as far north as the province of Honan, but though the rebels captured Nanjing, they failed to take Peking as itself with their small armies. However, the rebellion could not survive in the face of foreign powers which eventually sided with the dynasty in order to suppress the movement. Thus, the rule of the Taipings was brought to an abrupt end by means of foreign military intervention. The colonial powers realised that such a radical movement, no matter what its political colouring, would not tolerate the treaties which they had imposed on the defeated Manchu dynasty.

Despite its defeat, the Taiping rebellion proved to be the prelude to a number of other uprisings and revolts which finally brought about the collapse of the ruling dynasty. The main significance of the Taiping rebellion, however, lay in the fact that it came as a great blow to feudalism. Under the impact of social, political and economic forces unleashed in the aftermath of the Taiping rebellion, the struggle of the Chinese people against the Manchu imperial throne and its foreign supporters and collaborators became more and more intense.

While, on the one hand, the post-Taiping phase of nineteenth century Chinese history witnessed the rise of forces opposed to the imperial dynasty and the foreign powers, there appeared a new '*comprador bourgeoisie*' class which owed its origin directly to the imperialist powers themselves. Such a class became a strong economic base for the imperialists by facilitating their economic exploitation of China in return for which they gained pecuniary profits for themselves.

The successive defeats suffered by the Chinese forces at the hands of the imperial troops - particularly following the successful Anglo-French invasion of Northern China during which the capital was occupied by foreign forces for the first time - had the effect of undermining the faith of the Chinese dynasty in its own superiority. As a result, arsenals were built, ships were ordered, and envoys were despatched to the governments of foreign powers. With the envoys, were sent young men to be

trained as officers and engineers to command and man the new fleet and control the arsenals.

It was this Chinese acceptance of the technological and military superiority of the Western civilisation which resulted in an oscillation between their traditional view of their own moral superiority and the inescapable compulsion of their having to learn from the materially superior Western powers. The Chinese strove to create a new world in which even though the structure of the Confucian society would remain unchanged, foreign technology could be used for the material needs of defence and communication. Such an aim met with the approval of even Mao Zedong who said on one occasion, 'Let the West serve China'.¹³

However, the notion of 'Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning for use',¹⁴ far from easing China's situation, completely failed to solve its problems. The colonial powers continued to put unacceptable pressures on China, and did not abandon their policy of economic imperialism and humiliating China. China's sovereignty itself came under threat. As a result, another Taiping rebellion aimed at the destruction of the Manchu Dynasty was imminent; it would also be directed against the landlords and the newly arisen '*comprador bourgeois*' class which had become the main supporter of the imperialist powers in China in whose continued semi-colonialism it had an obvious vested interest.

All the attempts aimed at reforming the political system and transforming it into a new, consolidated and

united empire proved to be of no avail. Serious political contradictions developed during the latter part of the nineteenth century which seemed to indicate that the end of dynastic rule in China was imminent.

The contradiction between, on the one hand, a nominally 'free' China and, on the other, the reality of the imperialist powers in the country, gave rise to other serious contradictions within the Chinese society. The unequal treaties imposed on China during the nineteenth century, which eventually created the new *comprador bourgeois* class:

accelerated the contradiction between the oppressed classes of China particularly including the rural areas, the proletariat which had risen mainly in the urban areas, and the intelligentsia and petty traders on the one hand, and on the other, the landlords, the foreign powers and the Comprador Bourgeois whose several and combined interests were actively served by the traditional bureaucracy and army as well as powerful warlords who had a vested interest in the perpetuation of feudalism in China.¹⁵

Different ideas were generated which underlined the conflict between those who were deeply conservative on the one hand, and a new young radical generation on the other. Among the younger reformers was Sun Zhongshan (Sun yat-sen) one of the great founders of modern China, a Chinese Christian who was familiar with Western democratic ideas. He revolted against the ineffectual Manchu rulers and sought the establishment of a democratic republic. Sun's support came from the overseas Chinese in Malaya, the

Pacific Islands and Japan, as well as from intellectuals within China. He received relatively little support from the West. Though he did lead several uprisings, he could not succeed because he attracted neither real military support nor a mass following in the initial stages. However, although the uprisings failed to overthrow the empire, they succeeded in leading the Chinese people, and particularly the educated younger generation, to oppose the imperial dynasty.

At the turn of the century, the Boxer rebellion occurred. During the war with Japan, which broke out in 1894, China was rapidly and completely defeated. It was forced to cede Korea, Formosa and the southern part of Manchuria to Japan. A movement of protest broke out in 1900 among the peasantry of Shantung. Claiming that foreigners were responsible for the ills from which China was suffering, the Boxers demanded their expulsion. They persecuted all Chinese who adopted foreign ways. They were opposed to the use of foreign goods by the Chinese. As they were mainly anti-foreign to start with, the Boxers were used by some of the reactionary elements in the Imperial court in their struggle to avoid even the few 'reforms' of a cosmetic nature which the government was prepared to consider.

The imperialist powers, however, were once again quick to suppress the Boxer movement by entering Beijing and driving the Dowager Empress to the safety of Sian. They imposed new restrictions on China. But the imperialist powers were extremely reluctant to get rid of

the empire in favour of a republic, because an end to the empire could pose a serious threat to the semi-colonial rule of the imperialist powers.

Moreover, any military occupation of China on a large scale would also prove disastrous because of the size of China and the rapidly rising nationalist and anti-imperialist protest which had penetrated many parts of the country during the second half of the nineteenth century. If, in the face of such a concerted opposition, the imperialist powers were to opt for a policy of a total and final 'carve up' of China, they would have had to face the serious problem of how the territorial spoils should be divided among themselves. In the event, the colonial powers engineered the return of the discredited Manchu dynasty to Beijing.

In order to avoid further rebellion, the court promised reforms that never in fact materialised. The dynasty, which was reduced to impotence, was eventually removed from power. The younger generation, mostly in the south, had not only sought the destruction of the dynasty but also the overthrow of the monarchy as an institution. Only a republic could rid the country of feudalism which, together with its new ally in the form of *comprador* Capitalism, constituted the bulwark of Western economic imperialism in China. In October 1911, after a series of uprisings over the previous decade, a mutiny of the army at Wuhan quickly developed into a republican revolution. The revolutionary forces, which had sprung up in different parts of China, brought down the weak imperial dynasty.

China became a republic for the first time in its long history.

The revolutionary leader, Sun Zhongshan, who had led many uprisings, eventually formed the Guomindang (KMT) which constituted the first political party in the modern sense of the term in Chinese history. The major principles of the party were contained in the 'Three Principles of the people' according to Sun Zhongshan: Nationalism (freedom from domination); democracy; and people's livelihood,

Although the revolutionaries terminated the life of the imperial dynasty, their hopes for the creation of a republic were not to be easily fulfilled. Yuan Shi-kai, the former Imperial Commander-in-Chief, made himself the President of the new republic after driving Sun Zhongshan, the popular revolutionary leader, along with other leaders of his party, to the south. He soon became virtually a dictator. Yuan sought to put down the revolutionary forces by setting up a new repressive régime. Under his rule China, particularly to the north, gradually came under the control of rival generals, each of whom strove either to seize Beijing or to set up sovereign rule in areas which he controlled with the support of foreign powers.

While in the north, warlords were vying with one another for power, in the south, Sun Zhongshan was trying to gather together new forces in order to resist them. After his death (1916), Yuan Shi-kai's successors did not improve the situation. China continued to remain in a

state of crisis. Real power remained in the hands of military *cliques* and not republican institutions. As J. Chesneaux states

... the country had never been in such a state of disorder, its prestige abroad so low, nor its government so despised and incompetent.¹⁶

As a result, a revolutionary struggle against the 'republic' of the warlords seemed imminent. The intelligentsia joined forces with the working class, the petty traders and certain groups of the rural class along the coast. Together they sought to overcome their disappointment with the outcome of the revolution of 1911 by forging a much more consciously political and nationalist bond which was dramatically manifested in the May ~~Fourth~~ 1919 Movement. This movement constituted the third great revolutionary movement in China's history, following the Taiping insurrection and the Boxer rebellion.

Mao Zedong, who later became one of CCP's founding members in 1921, took part in this movement. Early in 1919, in Hunan province, Mao founded labour unions, led strikes, organised workers' schools, and sought to educate the masses. Such pioneer work as that by Mao and other workers with a similar political bent constituted an important factor underlying the May ~~Fourth~~ Movement which carried the echoes of not only a political but also a cultural revolution.

Despite the fact that the May Fourth Movement was basically a student movement directed mainly against Japanese imperialism and the unjust terms that were sought to be imposed on China under secretly agreed provision of the Versailles Treaty, it did carry a revolutionary flavour. New political and social ideas were spread for the first time which were to constitute a sort of baptismal introduction to the Chinese revolution. Under its banner, the forces of the left favourably inclined to Marxist political ideas made a common cause with main line nationalists for the first time in contemporary China.

In the same way as the nationalist upsurge manifested itself in many parts of the world following the break-up of the great European Empire, in China too the May Fourth Movement constituted a powerful base for an almost universal mobilisation of Chinese nationalism simultaneously directed against the local warlords and the 'foreign' imperialist powers (especially the United States) that were dominating China. By this time, the United States, with its Open Door policy, had indeed become the major force of economic imperialism in China.

If semi-colonialism, on the one hand, and the revolutionary process which the struggle against it engendered, on the other, constituted the two major factors in shaping the Chinese view of the world, there was at this time no systematic formulation in existence of the links between internal and international factors.

However, the younger generation seemed to have learnt from the past the necessity to establish links of a

historical and political nature between the internal and external conditions of China. China's position as a 'semi-colony' required that Chinese people must join the struggle of other people who were also similarly afflicted by colonialism and imperialism. China's concretely felt experience of semi-colonialism has been advanced as the ground on which its claim to be considered as an integral part of the Third World rests. Above all, it was the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions and not the adoption in literal terms of the Marxist-Leninist ideology by ^{the} CCP as a whole in general and Mao in particular, that led to a systematic analysis of China's relations with the rest of the world as a basis for future action involving

the question of the inter-relationship between the construction of socialism in China and the role of China in international relations.'7

It was the Maoist conception of the inter-relatedness of the world affairs and internal Chinese developments that finally led to the accomplishment of the successful Chinese revolution and strongly influenced China's view of world development and its international role during the thirty seven years preceding its culmination in 1949.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CCP'S WORLD VIEW:

1921-1949

2.1. A General Overview

CCP's main foreign policy preoccupation has always been the overthrow of imperialism. For ^{the} CCP, democratic revolution within China was impractical as long as it was kept separate from the fight against imperialism. Feudalists, national capitalists and 'comprador bourgeoisie' were able to survive and flourish because of the presence of imperialism; their end could not be brought about without an end to imperialism. Imperialism and feudal landlordism constituted the chief enemies of the Chinese people, and their abolition was the major task of the Chinese revolution.

In 1939 Mao emphasised this fact as follows:

These two tasks are interrelated. Unless imperialist rule is overthrown, the rule of the feudal landlord class cannot be terminated, because imperialism is its main support. Conversely, unless help is given to the peasants in their struggle to overthrow the feudal landlord class, it will be impossible to build powerful revolutionary contingents to overthrow the imperialist rule, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of imperialist rule in China and the peasantry is the main force in the Chinese revolution. Therefore the two fundamental tasks, the national revolution and the democratic revolution, are at once distinct and united.'

While the successive rebellions and insurrections which began in 1851 (with the Taiping insurrection) eventually brought an end to the dynasty in 1911 (the 1911 Revolution) the hopes of the revolutionaries were frustrated and destroyed by the oppressive *régime* of the warlords. Although the corrupt government of the warlords had succeeded in establishing repressive *régimes* in different regions, they failed to survive not only because of the division that characterised their rule but also (and more importantly) because the revolutionary process that had been developing throughout China's history, right from the Taiping rebellion, seemed irreversible.

Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) had already become the founder of republican China in the south and was determined to bring the oppressive *régimes* of the warlords to a speedy end. Western bourgeois democratic ideas continued to make an impact on the political consciousness of the Chinese intelligentsia. Neither the dynasty nor the *régimes* of the warlords were able to fulfil the Chinese aspiration of putting an end to economic imperialism and the humiliation of China by foreign countries. The dynasty had already sold China through 'unequal treaties' and territorial concessions. The warlords were not only oppressive but had also become collaborators with imperialist powers in order to ensure their survival. But, collaboration with imperialist powers (of which China was an ally in World War I) proved fruitless and jeopardised their very existence when the allies decided that, on the defeat of Germany, its

concessions in Shandong province instead of being restored to China should be transferred to Japan. An end to the rule of the warlords had indeed become inevitable after the end of World War I.

If Western democratic ideas had first been influential among the majority of the Chinese intelligentsia, only Marxism seemed to offer a practical solution to the problem of ending feudalism and imperialism, particularly after the successful Russian Revolution of 1917. As Mao commented in June 1947,

The Russians made the October Revolution and created the world's first socialist state...then and only then did the Chinese enter an entirely new era in their thinking and their life. They found Marxism-Leninism the universally applicable truth, and the face of China began to change.²

Although the social and political ideas of the first generation of advanced reformers had developed throughout the early years of this century and constituted a major factor in bringing down the dynasty, the restoration of the Republic in China (1921) might not have taken place without that most significant event: the Russian Revolution. This revolution took place at a time in China's history when two important factors had already greatly affected the rise of nationalism in China. First, there was the failure of the first 'Chinese republic' to solve China's internal and external problems. Second, following the First World War, the strength of the Western nations declined because of conflicts between them. This,

in turn, weakened the unity of their collective imperialist position in China.

The Russian Revolution put an end to Chinese hatred of Czarist Russia. The Soviet Union viewed all Asian peoples as its equals. It denounced all the concessions that had been extracted by foreign powers from China and the 'unequal treaties' that had been imposed on it. The Soviet Union was no longer China's enemy but became the supporter of its territorial integrity and of Chinese liberation from feudalism and imperialism.

If Western bourgeois ideas as well as Marxist ideological inspiration and the impact of the Russian Revolution played an important role in creating a strong nationalist movement in favour of the restoration of the Chinese republic, the political and economic transformation which Japan was undergoing also exercised a great influence on the Chinese intellectuals. They were in search of a modern political system that would rid China of its backward economic military and international status. As fellow Asians and as the progenitors of Japanese mainstream culture, the Chinese intelligentsia were profoundly impressed by the fundamental institutional changes and the great economic achievements that were taking place in Japan following the Meiji Restoration (1868). By the end of the nineteenth century, Japan had become one of the great powers of the world and the greatest power in Asia. By 1915, following its defeat of Russia, Japan had begun to exercise its imperialist ambitions on China itself.

Thus Western ideas, Marxist ideology, the impact of the Russian Revolution, the appearance of Japan as a great modern power in Asia, and the rise of nationalism in the world following the break-up of the European empires, were the major factors which influenced the development of the contemporary Chinese nationalism and the course of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese democratic revolution³ had to grapple with two fundamental contradictions in Chinese society - the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation on the one hand, and on the other between feudalism and the great mass of the population. CCP, particularly following the highly intensive Japanese aggression of the late '30s, stressed that the "contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese revolution is the principal one."⁴

CCP's characterisation of imperialism as the principal contradiction of China, which was bound to exercise a great influence on the shaping of CCP's orientation to the outside world in general (and foreign policy in particular) from its early stages, was not imported from Leninist theory; rather it resulted from a century of China's concrete experience of imperialist domination and exploitation of the country, reducing it to a semi-colony.⁵ During the Japanese invasion in the early '30s, northern China even became a colony of Japan.⁶ CCP's emphasis on putting an end to imperialism and its impact on China resulted from a situation in their country with which they were only too familiar. The following statement is contained in CCP's manifesto of 1922:

During eighty years invasion by the imperialist powers, China has become their joint colony. They not only occupy broad territories, islands, protectorates, and new colonies, but have robbed China of many important harbours in order to create foreign settlements; and finally have divided China into several spheres of influence in order to realise their policy of monopolistic exploitation.

In China one-third of the railways are owned by the foreign capitalists; others are also directly or indirectly controlled by foreign creditors. Foreign steamers freely navigate in Chinese harbours and rivers, postal and telegraph services are closely supervised, and the tariffs are dependent on and controlled by the foreign imperialists. Under such a *régime* it is not only convenient for the foreigners to import their capital, absorb raw materials, but most of all, the soul of Chinese economic life has mercilessly been clutched in the imperialistic claw.

The foreign capitalists also occupy many mines; they have established factories in Shanghai and Tientsin, and drive the Chinese labourers with whips in the mines and factories as their productive slaves. At the same time the imports of the foreign commodities rise like a relentless tide. Not only the cloth and paper, but the old home-made needles and nails are obliged to give way to the imported ones.

The disastrous effect of this is the rise in the cost of living. Three hundred million peasants tend to become jeopardised by the handsome imported manufactured commodities.⁷

Not only were the Chinese communists all too familiar with the role of imperialism, they were also fully aware of the inter-imperialist competition for spheres of influence⁸ and their search for dominant positions in China. It was this situation which placed China in a position similar to that in which many if not most

contemporary Third World countries find themselves in relation to the strategic, political and economic interests of imperialist powers. Thus China is entitled to claim that it is not only an integral part of the Third World, by virtue of the economic and social problems of development that it faces, but also that it is the only power which in its recent history has suffered from the effects of imperialist domination now experienced by a number of former colonies.

Whilst the impact of the Russian Revolution and the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism constituted major factors in systematizing the revolutionary tendencies in China, the presence of imperialist powers which exploited the Chinese economy, destroyed Chinese traditional industries and humiliated China's sovereignty were without doubt major factors underlying the new development of the revolutionary potentialities of Chinese society. By the beginning of the century, China had become divided and contradictory by its class structure as a direct consequence of its experience of semi-colonialism and imperialism.

During the late '30s, Mao and his associates viewed the social contradictions of China as a serious threat to the continuous process of revolution towards which ^{the}CCP was struggling. With the aim of keeping alive the Chinese revolutionary struggles, they urgently sought a united front formed by all classes that were ready to join the Chinese revolution against the direct threat of Japanese imperialism. Here it must be stressed that Mao did not

accept Trotsky's view that the Chinese revolution must be proletarian socialist in character. In fact, Mao (1939), envisaged that the first stage of the Chinese revolution should be 'bourgeois-democratic' in character⁹ and would include an alliance of the peasantry, the proletariat, the petty-bourgeoisie, the patriotic bourgeoisie, and even a section of the landlord class. It was on this basis that Mao sought to create a united front with Guomindang (KMT) against Japan, and, on this basis too that CCP assessed the situation in other colonial countries which were ripe for a united front strategy based on a bourgeois-democratic revolution as a pre-condition for socialist revolution in feudal, semi-feudal, colonial and semi-colonial societies.

Mao, in 1939, stressed this fact when he claimed that

This kind of revolution is developing in China as well as in all colonial and semi-colonial countries, and we call it the new democratic revolution.¹⁰

This statement by Mao could be regarded as a first indication of CCP's claim that the Chinese revolution provided a pattern for all anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist Liberation Movements to follow. Ten years later, such an indication was clearly voiced by one of the great leaders of the Chinese revolution. In November 1949, following the success of the Chinese revolution, Liu Shaoqi claimed at a conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions (hereafter WFTU) that

...the course followed by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its

lackeys, and in founding the People's Republic of China, is the course that should be followed by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.''

2.2. Characteristics of the Chinese Revolution

2.2.1. The Revolutionary Character of the Chinese

Peasantry

The Chinese peasants, who have always constituted the vast majority of the population, had suffered oppression and misery throughout history. The rule of various imperial dynasties of China was interrupted by peasant uprisings against the landlords, the government and the external invaders. For example, the founder of the Ming dynasty was a Buddhist monk from a poor peasant family who, in 1368, led a successful revolt against the Mongols with the support of secret societies.¹² Similarly, in 1851 ^{the Taipings,} the first and most organised insurrection in China's history was directed against the dynastic authority and the feudalists from Taiping. At the same time, the Taiping insurrection challenged not only the foreign powers themselves, but also the Christian missions which were their mouthpieces.

The importance of the Taiping rebellion lay in the fact that it not only sought the end of dynastic rule but also was committed to bringing into operation new social and political ideas that were aimed at social welfare and egalitarianism.¹³ When the Chinese revolution subsequently came to be systematized in the form of

Marxism-Leninist practice, under ^{the} CCP's leadership the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasants had already become clear. The revolutionary roots of the peasantry in Chinese history together with China's rural structure greatly influenced Mao's view that the countryside should be the base of the Chinese revolution:

In thousands of years of the history of the Hans, there have been hundreds of peasant insurrections, great or small, against the *régime* of darkness imposed by landlords and nobility. And it was the peasant uprisings that brought about most dynamic changes. All the nationalities of China have rebelled against the foreign yoke and striven to shake it off by means of resistance...the Chinese nation is also a nation with a glorious revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage.¹⁴

2.2.2. The non-religious Character of the Chinese Society

The essentially irreligious character of Chinese society throws some light on the revolutionary potential of its peasantry. Confucianism is an ethic outlining the responsibilities of individuals to society rather than a religion based in a church or on superstitious beliefs. Confucius stressed this fact when he said that he had

enough to do worrying about the problems of man without bothering about God.¹⁵

This is an important point to note because religion has been one of the most sensitive factors influencing or undermining the process of revolutionary uprisings - communist as well as others - in many parts of the world.

Any movement that has adopted a socialist or communist strategy has been opposed by those who believe in God and who regard communism as the enemy of God, citing, for example, Marx's view of religion that it 'is the opium of the masses'.

2.2.3. Adaptation, not mechanical adoption of Marxism

-Leninism

Unlike the ideology of the Bolshevik revolution, the ideological basis of the Chinese Revolution was intimately connected with the growth of the communist movement in China and the active part it played in shaping internal and external conditions during a period of nearly three decades (1921-1949) between its establishment and the victory of the revolution. The involvement of ^{the}CCP in the day-to-day development of China during the inter-war period necessitated the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to suit the specific conditions of China. In the carrying out of this important task, Mao played a leading role. Also, as has been observed by one writer, the Chinese revolution offers a contrast to the Soviet Union in one important respect

...whereas in the Soviet Union civil war followed the success of the revolution, the revolution in China was completed by civil war.¹⁶

When the civil war ended before the victory of the revolution, revolutionary China did not have to face the prospect of political instability and uncertainty. The

construction of socialism could be begun without disturbance or confusion, even though frictions in class relations would continue. At the same time, the new régime could make some progress through the activities of CCP and the Chinese state, the power of which it gained control in 1949, that class antagonisms would not be allowed to undermine the objectives of the Chinese revolution.

2.2.4. CCP's Foreign Policy before Liberation:

Internal and International Contradictions

China's nineteenth century history was mainly characterised by the development of feudal and semi-feudal relations, and the emergence of the comprador bourgeoisie under the impact of semi-colonialism and imperialism. Right from the beginning, the course of the Chinese revolution was influenced by global imperialism which spread to China during the period following the opium wars. The role played by imperialism in Chinese history proved to be of considerable significance in the shaping of CCP's foreign policy.

In particular, ^{the} CCP applied its knowledge and concrete experience of imperialism in an immediate practical manner during the period of the most intensive struggle against Japanese imperialism in the Second World War. This was followed by the Civil War (1945-49) in which ^{the} CCP dealt with international pressures (mainly from the United States and the Soviet Union'⁷ by adopting a foreign policy

stance which even before the revolution became a *fait accompli*.

In fact, the actual course of the Chinese Revolution was greatly influenced by international factors. During the period of its most intensive development the Chinese revolution was compelled to grapple with serious international problems, failure to pay heed to the international environment would almost certainly have prevented the revolution from reaching its final stage in 1949. For example, China was invaded by Japan through Manchuria long before the outbreak of the Second World War (during the early stages of which the Soviet Union signed a pact with Germany) The Japanese attack against Pearl Harbour, the United States and Soviet intervention in China as mediatory¹⁸ forces in the *impasse* between Guomindang and ^{the}CCP (1946), the displacement of Europe by the United States as the imperial power in South East Asia, and finally the Cold War, which began at almost the same time as the Civil War between ^{the}CCP and Guomindang - all these developments had a more or less direct effect on the conduct of the Chinese revolution.

2.2.5. The Chinese Revolution as the outcome of a long history of internal strife

Unlike other socialist revolutions in Eastern Europe, which in effect were more or less engineered from the top (as it were) after the Second World War, the Chinese revolution had a background of internal strife against feudalism and imperialism, stretching back at least as far

as the Taiping Rebellion¹⁹ (1851). With the exception of the revolution in Yugoslavia, which bore several similarities to the Chinese revolution, the revolutions in Eastern Europe after the war were very different from the Chinese revolution which, from the mid-'30s onwards, was strategically, politically, and militarily no longer dependent on the Comintern or the Soviet Union.²⁰

Whilst the Chinese communists relied on their own skill, resources and conditions, without any effective assistance from the Soviet Union, the revolutions in Eastern Europe were either imposed on the countries or directly guided by the Comintern and the Soviet Union. In an assessment of the size of ^{the}CCP, Snow wrote (1939) that

It is the strongest Communist Party in the world, outside Russia, and the only one, with the same exception, that can boast a mighty army of its own.²¹

Another distinctive feature of the Chinese revolution lay in the fact that none of its most effective economic planners and political strategists had been taught by or trained in Moscow, the Comintern's capital. Zhou Enlai became a Communist in Paris, Mao Zedong had never been out of China until 1949; and, interestingly enough, he spoke no foreign language.

Having outlined the process of the Chinese revolution, its characteristics and ^{the}CCP's world view in a broad manner, we consider in the following section the 'course' that it pursued in leading the Chinese revolution to its final success in 1949.

2.3. The Chinese Revolution (1921-35)

At the start of this period, the Chinese revolution was effectively guided by a United Front between ^{the} CCP and Guomindang. This alliance, however, ended in 1927. United Front, it must be remembered, functioned under the dictates of the Soviet Union and Comintern. But, the ; Massacre (Shanghai, 1927) demonstrated that the Soviet analysis and understanding of the Chinese revolution was inadequate. However, even after United Front collapsed, instructions and even orders continued to issue forth from the Soviet Union and the Comintern until their influence completely collapsed when ^{the} CCP came under the influence of Mao's philosophy of revolution.

2.3.1. The United Front between CCP and Guomindang

The interval between the May 4th Movement and the establishment of normal centralized control over China under the National Government in 1928 was marked by two important events: the rise of the Guomindang [Kuomintang (KMT)] and the birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both these movements arose in response to internal and external crises which had intensified following the establishment of the corrupt landlord government in the political vacuum left by the First Republic of 1911. While landlords dominated the countryside, the foreigners and the *comprador bourgeoisie* controlled the major cities. The so-called Republic under the warlords was "even more at the mercy of imperialist forces than its predecessors".²²

China was once again humiliated by its supposed allies (1919) who transferred German concessions on its territory to Japan. Under these circumstances, it seemed inevitable that the Chinese revolution should develop into a continuous struggle, based on nationalism, which appealed to the Chinese population as a whole, and was aimed at ending the rule of the warlords and imperialism. Consequently, with Soviet assistance, experts and supplies, Sun Zhongshan reorganised his Nationalist Party and soon established a republic in Guangzhou (Canton)

It must be stressed that, in 1921, Joffe, a Soviet envoy, arrived in Beijing as a representative of the Soviet Government. Later in the same year, Joffe met Sun in Shanghai, where he agreed with the latter that 'communism' was not suitable for China because it was a semi-feudal society dominated by imperialism. The Soviet Union's decision in principle to return all territory claimed during Czarist rule, its initiative in abolishing unequal treaties, and, above all, the Soviet pledge to support all oppressed peoples in their struggles for national independence, were all highly important for the Chinese. In fact, out of all the major powers, the Soviet Union was the only one that gave support to the Chinese nationalist revolution against the warlords and imperialists. In Canton, with Soviet moral and material help, Sun Zhongshan built a new modern army which eventually enabled him to overcome the local warlords.

While the Guomindang, under Sun Zhongshan's leadership was the official representative of the Chinese

nationalist cause of anti-imperialism and national revolution, a fast-growing communist movement, inspired by the success of the 1917 Russian Revolution, also developed. In 1921, a group of Chinese (including Mao) who had played an active role in the May 4th Movement, founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Almost at the same time, the Chinese students in Paris formed another branch, which soon became fused with ^{the} CCP. Influenced by the Russian example, the Chinese Communists proceeded to organise militant Workers' Unions in the cities, especially in the ^{south}, in the region between Guangzhou (Canton) and Shanghai. The aim of setting up these Unions was to lead the workers into a revolutionary struggle.

From 1920 to 1924, ^{the} CCP's membership grew fast. While at the time of its founding, ^{the} CCP had only 12 members, by 1921, it had a membership of 57. By 1923, this number had increased to 432, and, by 1924, ^{the} CCP was nearly as strong numerically as Guomindang's.²³

Following the formation of ^{the} CCP, the Soviet Union urged both parties, the Communists and the Nationalists, to form a United Front with the aim of bringing an end to militarism and imperialism. But, until 1923, the extremists in both parties were opposed to the United Front strategy. ^{The} CCP members who were in opposition to alliance with Guomindang insisted on preserving the political identity of the party. This position was officially adopted by CCP at its First Congress (July 1921) at which it was stated that

Towards the existing political parties, an attitude of independence, aggression and exclusion should be adopted...Our Party should stand up on behalf of the proletariat and should allow no relationship with other parties or groups.²⁴

However, under the instructions of the Soviet Union, the leader of Comintern, and inspired by Sun's revolutionary principles against warlordism and imperialism, ^{the} CCP, at its third Congress, (1923) decided to join the Guomindang to form a United Front. The CCP Manifesto claimed that.

...the Kuomintang should be the central force of the national revolution and should stand in the leading position.²⁵

Soon, the CCP members began to infiltrate Guomindang as individual members. Mao, one of the most active communist leaders, began to work on the Central Committees of both ^{the} CCP and Guomindang. Indeed, Mao's . . . position enabled him to gain knowledge of Guomindang's strategy and orientation towards the CCP. This was to have considerable significance for Mao's dealings with Guomindang during the second United Front (1937), as well as during the Civil War. ^{The} CCP avoided all attempts at fusion between Guomindang and itself on Guomindang's conditions.

The extremist, conservative factions of Guomindang who were opposed to an alliance with ^{the} CCP also eventually agreed to the formation of a United Front as well as the admission of the communists into Guomindang as individuals. This agreement in principle was soon to be

justified by Guomindang's political and military position.²⁶ In addition Sun Zhongshan was able to convince those pro-Western elements which were opposed to the Communists joining Guomindang, that the advantages of such an alliance would outweigh the disadvantages. Needless to say, such an alliance was not only urged upon CCP but also even ordered by the Soviet Union as the only power ready to support China's national revolution.

These facts were confirmed by Sun Zhongshan when he claimed that

the Chinese revolution has never been liked by the foreign powers, and some of them even assisted our opponents, hoping to crush our part. It is clear that no capitalist country will show us any sympathy. We can only hope for sympathy from Russia and from aggrieved countries and peoples.²⁷

It must be stressed that during this period the United States and other imperialist powers continued to recognise the corrupt and militarist régime of the landlords, while ignoring the southern republic of Sun Zhongshan.

By way of reciprocation, the Soviet Union increased its military support and advisers to the Guomindang's leadership in Guangzhou (Canton), Sun's military forces became substantial enough to be in a position to launch the Northern Expedition against the warlords. The alliance between ^{the} CCP and Guomindang, coupled with the Soviet strong endorsement and support, provided the impetus for the growth of a revolutionary movement with

prospects of nationwide support for putting an immediate end to the corrupt government of the warlords.

Though Sun died in 1925, the alliance outlived him; Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) took over as Sun Zhongshan's 'successor'. However, Jiang's commitment to the 'three People's Principles' seemed doubtful from the outset. Jiang came from an East Chinese land-owning family; and he had close ties with the banking and commercial classes, as well as with the industrialists in Shanghai, who were certainly far from being pro-communist despite their nationalist leanings.²⁹ Even so, Jiang's feudal and capitalist colouring did not prevent Stalin from insisting on an indefinite prolongation of the United Front strategy.

The increased strength of Guomindang's left-wing on the one hand and the presence of communists in Guomindang on the other convinced the Comintern that Guomindang could still be a leading force of the national revolution. Indeed, within two years, (January 1924-May 1926), the Communists occupied nearly 20% of the total number of seats on the Central Executive of Guomindang.²⁹ Stalin claimed that the Chinese revolution must in the first instance be national while expressing the hope that the position of both the left-wing within the Guomindang and that of the Communists would eventually result in a Chinese proletarian revolution.

This position was never accepted by Trotsky, Stalin's arch rival for the leadership of ^{the} CPSU. Arguing for the dissolution of United Front, Trotsky urged the

establishment of soviets in China by the workers and peasants. However, the two common major aims of anti-warlordism and anti-imperialism provided the impetus for CCP to continue to maintain its alliance with Guomindang under Jiang Jieshi's leadership.

Jiang continued to welcome ^{the} CCP's support, while taking advantage of Soviet support to strengthen the Chinese Government, the ruling party and the army. The revolutionary forces led by Jiang started the Northern Expedition campaign against the warlords. Within a period of two years, China was reunited under a new régime.

But this unity did not last long. Co-operation with ~~the~~ CCP in overcoming the warlords did not mean, for the Nationalists, (in particular Jiang's group), working together with ^{the} CCP in order to consolidate the Chinese revolution. During the course of their struggle against the warlords, a split between Guomindang and ^{the} CCP soon developed. As it became more and more explicit, Jiang was able to strengthen his position not only with the anti-Communists in general but also with the anti-leftists within his own party.

In the Spring of 1927, Jiang's troops launched a savage campaign of extermination of the Communists and their left-wing Guomindang supporters in Shanghai and Wuhan. This was followed by the rupture of the alliance between Guomindang and ^{the} CCP. After 1927, they never really became re-united again except during the brief shaky second United Front period against the Japanese during World War II. Soviet advisors were expelled from China,

and the Chinese communists were executed or driven out. Thus the Comintern's and Stalin's strategy of a Chinese national revolution based on co-operation with the Guomindang ended in total failure, ^{the} CCP's forces took to the hills of southern China, launching the first campaign (August 1927) of the Communist Party's period of activity spearheaded by guerrilla struggle.

Once Jiang had consolidated his power (1928) he turned to the imperialist powers, particularly the United States and Britain, for the protection of his *régime*. The Guomindang *régime* had in fact fallen into the hands of a coalition of warlords, capitalists and landlords who were ready to compromise with the imperialists for their own advantage. Even after Guomindang took power, imperialist penetration of China continued unabated because the ruling class in control of state power was basically feudal, bourgeois and comprador bourgeois in character and was in no way committed to fulfilling the political ambitions of the mass of the Chinese people. Jiang's commitment was not to the three People's Principles laid down by Sun, rather, it was to the liquidation of the communists in China.

But Jiang's consolidation of power (1928) did not last for long. Under his rule China soon found itself in desperate straits. In the words of Snow,

While the mass of the rural population was rapidly going to bankruptcy, concentration of land and wealth in the hands of a small number of landlords and landowning usurers increased in proportion to the general decline of independent farming.³⁰

With the establishment of the Nanjing Government, the workers were forced into a retreat. What they had gained through struggle during the period 1927-28, they rapidly lost under the Nanjing Government's rule. The Massacre in Shanghai (192) was followed by wage cuts, whilst rising inflation led to a decrease in the value of existing wages and a rapid rise in unemployment.³¹

If the Chinese economy fell into the hands of the landlords, warlords and capitalists in co-operation with their imperialist allies, the very existence of China's sovereignty was threatened by Japanese imperialism. In 1931, the Japanese seized Manchuria. Soon afterwards, they established Pu Yi, the deposed Manchu Emperor as a puppet ruler of the new state, which was given the name of Manchukuo In order to accommodate the Japanese and attract aid from Japan with a view to consolidating his own power, Jiang gave formal recognition to the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo³²

Jiang was more concerned with consolidating his power in the fight against the Communists than in resisting Japanese imperialism. As a result of the Nanjing Government's introduction of a No War policy towards Japan, the latter was able to expand and seize nearly 20% of China's territory.³³

Following Japan's invasion of China, CCP proposed a common programme of resistance against Japan, and demanded that Guomindang should return to the principles of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. CCP, for its part, would

be ready to submit its Red Army and its soviet districts to central Government rule from Nanjing. Jiang and his cliques had no wish to sacrifice their class position and interests for the sake of national resistance against Japan which would have required their putting an end to the suppression of Communism. When Marshall Zhang Xueliang proposed a programme of national front of resistance to Japan, Jiang replied as follows:

I'll never talk about this until every Red soldier in China is exterminated and every Communist is in prison.³⁴

However, following his arrest by his own North-Eastern Army in Xian (11 December 1936), Jiang was forced to accept, 'a united' patriotic front together with the Red Army and to suspend attacks against the Communists.³⁵ The Red Army was renamed the Eighth Route Army.

It should be noted that the aim of Jiang's visit to Xian was to organise a new campaign of extermination of the Communists, and not the Japanese. It must be remembered too that it was the Communists who had initiated United Front against Japan, albeit this time at the expense of their early demands for the related tasks of ending both feudalism and imperialism. Towards this end, ^{the} CCP went so far as to moderate and even, in many aspects, abandon its programme of agrarian reform.

The CCP called for an alliance of all forces opposing the Japanese, which became "...the basic feature of their present situation" (Wayaopao Resolution, 1935).³⁶ Mao explained this in the following terms

We have already accepted a decision not to confiscate the land of rich peasants, and, if they come to us to fight against Japan, not to refuse to unite with them. We are not confiscating their property and factories of the big and small merchants and capitalists. We protect their enterprises and help them to expand so that material supply in the Soviet districts, so necessary for the anti-Japanese campaign, may be augmented.³⁷

2.3.2. The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution:

An Evaluation

Before examining the broad position of the Comintern on ^{the}CCP's strategy, we shall briefly consider the position adopted by the Soviet Union in the wake of Jiang's expulsion of ^{the}CCP from the government, towards the Chinese Revolution.

Whilst the Soviet Union continued to blame ^{the}CCP's leadership for failing to take advantage of ^{the}Guomindang's left-wing and thus strengthen its own position by overcoming the pro-Jiang cliques, during the early 1930's, Stalin became increasingly alarmed by the general drift towards war of the major world powers and the Soviet Union's diplomatic isolation. As Soviet foreign policy became more and more concerned with securing alliances with leading European powers against Nazi Germany the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations which had been characterised by Lenin (during the '20s) as 'the League of Imperialist Bandits'.

State-to-State relations occupied a great deal of importance in the international behaviour of the Soviet

Union. This usually resulted in the Soviet Union moderating its policy towards the Communist parties. This was not seen as an ideological compromise because the world situation, following the rise of Nazism in Germany and the expansion of Japanese power, required a drastic, if temporary, moderation of the revolutionary ambitions of even the communist parties in industrialised countries and their eventual co-operation with parties of the bourgeoisie against the threat of fascism by joining or supporting Popular Front administrations.

In Asia, it was inevitable that there should be a United Front with patriotic forces against Japanese imperialism which had already physically occupied major parts of China, the largest Asian country. Mao was a powerful advocate of a United Front strategy for dealing with the Japanese imperialist menace. In 1937, he urgently sought an alliance with all the national forces as long as they were ready to fight Japan. However, it must be stressed that by joining United Front against Japan, ^{the}CCP was in no way giving up its political identity or military power or political strategy. In fact, by joining Guomindang, ^{the}CCP was able to step up its policy of mobilising the peasants and bringing more of China's territory by pushing the Japanese back into its sphere of control at the expense of its domestic political adversary.

If the Soviet Union misunderstood the conditions of the Chinese revolution during the '20s and '30s, its preoccupation with its own security was a factor which

stood in the way of a clear comprehension of the roots of the revolutionary tendencies in China. The Soviets, however, continued to influence and guide ^{the} CCP during the 1927-35 period by urging upon it a policy of workers' strikes and mobilization of the workers. Such a broad strategy was inappropriate not only because of the rural character of Chinese society but also because of the fact that Guomindang forces were concentrated in urban areas where they were ready to suppress any movement or action calculated to undermine the Nanjing Government.

Winning as many international friends as possible became the main preoccupation of the Soviet Union during the '30s. In the Far East, the Soviet Union pursued the major aim of preventing the Guomindang government striking up an alliance with Japan, especially after Jiang had declared a no-war policy towards the latter. The Soviet Union was therefore quick to recognise the Nanjing Government and conclude a non-aggression pact^{ss} with China.

Until the overthrow of the warlords' government, ^{the} CCP had been an ally, if not in a state of political fusion with the Guomindang.^{ss} It was the commingling of the two political parties (^{the} Guomindang and ^{the} CCP) that was seen by Comintern as a vital first step in the long road to the Chinese revolution. The Comintern took the view that Guomindang was the only party capable of carrying through the Chinese national revolution. For the Comintern and Stalin, Guomindang was 'a block of four classes' (the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, the workers and peasants),

^{the} and the CCP should not only seek a united front with it but should be a block of the Guomindang while maintaining its own organizational structure.⁴⁰ Stalin assumed that the anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution would automatically nudge the national bourgeoisie ^{to play a more progressive role than the liberal bourgeoisie} of Russia before the Russian revolution. In the context of the bloc of four classes, Stalin chalked out three stages that would be involved in a successful socialist revolution in China:

- i. A bourgeois democratic revolution in which the proletariat would be an ally to the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie of the towns and the national bourgeoisie.⁴¹ This stage would come to an end when the national bourgeoisie (together with the urban petit-bourgeoisie) moves into counter-revolutionary action.
- ii. The leadership of the revolution would be taken over by the proletariat and its allies (*viz* the peasants and the progressive segments of the petty-bourgeoisie). The character of the Chinese revolution would still remain unchanged, i.e. it would continue to be bourgeois-democratic. Any triumph of the Chinese revolution at this stage would lead to a victory for the proletariat and the peasantry;
- iii. This stage, i.e. the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic China into a socialist China would only take place if the revolutions led by the dictatorship of the proletariat were able to carry out the major tasks of a proletarian revolution by putting an end to

the feudal structures and continuing the struggle against imperialism.⁴²

In accordance with this Stalinist strategy, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) even went so far as to admit Guomindang to membership of the Comintern as a sympathising party. Until 1926, ~~the~~ Comintern's insistence on CCP's infiltration of Guomindang, seemed successful. ~~The~~ CCP members in Guomindang were increasingly effective and able to gain key posts. As a result, in late 1926, ^{the} Comintern instructed CCP to work with Guomindang's left wing in the Nationalist Government at Wuhan in which the national bourgeoisie seemed to be ineffective.

But, by 1927, the united front, which was both overwhelmingly supported and also dictated to by Comintern, became unworkable. The right wing in Guomindang, led by Jiang Jieshi, felt that there was a threat to its position from the leftist elements which were in control of the revolutionary Government in Wuhan. At the same time, Jiang feared the Communists who were establishing themselves as an effective force at Wuhan. Consequently, Jiang Jieshi undertook a purge of the CCP members from ^{the} Guomindang. He moved to Shanghai where his troops perpetrated the infamous ^{of 1927} ~~of 1927~~ ⁴³ ~~of 1927~~

Until the Shanghai *coup* against the Communists in April 1927, two nationalist governments were in power in China, both taking the name of Guomindang. One was the right-wing government led by Jiang, which had established

itself at Nanjing, and was in control of the coast provinces. The other was the left-wing Guomindang government centred in Wuhan, which controlled the interior of the southern part of China. But Jiang's anti-communist campaign did not stop in Shanghai; it soon spread to Wuhan, where the Guomindang leftists in the Wuhan Government eventually found the Communists to be too radical even for their liking.

The Communists sought to eliminate the landlord elements and militarists, aiming at the transformation of the class alliance - the United Front led by Guomindang, which consisted of the national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, even a few warlords and feudal elements, the proletariat, and the peasants, into a revolutionary force that would be capable of confronting the counter-part of the Wuhan Government in the form of the Nanjing Government. Consequently, the left-wing Guomindang Government itself, along with the Nanjing Government, unleashed a purge against the Communists as well as their supporters from Guomindang which resulted in numerous executions. Jiang's Guomindang government was recognised as the legitimate central authority in China. The rise of Jiang to undisputed power in China made nonsense of the revolutionary predictions for the Chinese revolution made by Stalin and ^{the} Comintern.

However, this failure was not recognised by the Soviet Union as being due to ^{the} Comintern's wrong judgement about what the correct revolutionary strategy should be for China; rather, the Soviet leaders blamed the

leadership of ^{the} CCP in general, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu in particular, for failing to prepare the workers in Wuhan for action and for failing to comprehend the impact of the left forces in ^{the} Guomindang.⁴⁴ Consequently, at the fifth Congress of ^{the} CCP (Moscow: July-September 1928), the Chinese leadership was squarely condemned as opportunist and ^{the} CCP was urged to prepare for armed insurrection in view of the inevitable arrival of a new revolutionary rising tide.⁴⁵

The Congress also declared that the agrarian revolution was "the main content of the Chinese revolution as a whole, but [it] could be achieved only under proletarian hegemony".⁴⁶

From 1928 to 1933, ^{the} Comintern continued to dictate CCP's policies as well as actions. Obeying Moscow's instructions, the Communists attempted to seize large cities by organising urban workers to take part in political strikes and armed uprisings. But all such strikes were vigorously suppressed by the government. The future of CCP appeared to be bleak at this juncture. It was clear that communism could not be built in China by methods imported from abroad.

A new strategy was desperately needed for the Chinese revolution. Starting from Kiangsi^(Jiangxi), the Red Army started its Long March, during which ^{the} CCP leaders disseminated political ideas among the Chinese population on their way to Yen-an. On the way, too, Mao was elected as ^{the} CCP's new Secretary. The second decade of the Chinese revolution, according to Fairbank "was to see an indigenous adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese potentialities".⁴⁷

After the crushing of the workers' movement in the urban areas, Mao and his followers established a strong presence in the rural areas of southern China. Although the triumph of the Maoist conception of adapting Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China had to wait until 1935 to become officially recognised within ^{the} CCP, its origin goes back to the very beginning of the alliance between ^{the} CCP and ^{the} Guomindang. Even though Mao, to all intents and purposes was 'loyal' to ^{the} Guomindang during 1924-27 and to ^{the} Comintern during the '20s and early '30s, he had always concentrated his political attention on the backward districts of rural areas of China. In March 1927, Mao wrote his famous report in which he focussed revolutionary attention on the peasant problem. Mao pointed out that in China it was the poor peasants, and not the proletariat, who must be regarded as the 'vanguard of the revolution'.⁴⁸ Mao had set up his first Soviet by the end of 1927, on the provincial border between Kiangsi and Hunan, where no railways or modern roads existed.⁴⁹

During the period 1927-1935, however, the differences between the Maoist line and ^{the} Comintern's line did not come to light. Mao never challenged the theoretical conception of the Chinese revolution that was espoused by ^{the} Comintern; in fact, Mao was much more fundamentally opposed to Trotsky's line. Trotsky, who strongly criticised Stalin's three-stage strategy for the Chinese revolution, blamed CCP's defeat in the 1927 *coup* on it. According to Trotsky, CCP, by following Stalin and ^{the} Comintern, had

become reduced to the position of a mere appendage to Guomindang's bourgeois leadership.

Trotsky insisted that the Chinese revolution, which had already suffered failure, could not possibly succeed unless it was a socialist revolution from the first to the last under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky questioned the role that the Chinese national bourgeoisie could play against imperialism, China's main enemy. As far as he was concerned, as long as the Chinese national bourgeois class, which was not very different from the *comprador bourgeois* class, shared interests in common with the imperialists, they were not ready to sacrifice their own interests, even though they themselves would continue to be exploited and oppressed by imperialism.⁵⁰

However, even though Trotsky may have been superficially proved correct as against Stalin, in his contention that a successful Chinese revolution must be socialist and that the Chinese national bourgeois class was not ready to play a progressive role, it is important to stress that neither Trotsky nor Stalin had a correct understanding of what would constitute victorious Chinese revolution. Neither Trotsky's dictatorship of the proletariat, nor Stalin's 'bloc of four classes' and three stages of the Chinese revolution figured in the strategy fashioned by the successful Chinese socialist revolutionaries.

Mao's conception of the Chinese revolution and the strategy for achieving it was based on the mass of poor country folk (the peasants). It must be remembered at the

same time that Mao never questioned the role of the proletariat that had been emphasised by Trotsky. But the predominance of the rural structure and population in China, and the failure of strategies imported from Comintern resulting in the 1927 internal conflict, left CCP with no alternative but to adapt Marxist-Leninist ideology to China's condition governed by its predominantly rural character.

It must be stressed that, while Mao's revolutionary analysis relied on the peasant movement to a considerable extent, he was ready to enter into compromises and alliances with the national bourgeoisie so long as this had beneficial effects on ^{the} CCP's struggle against the physical occupation of China by Japanese imperialism. But in contrast to the strategy advocated by Stalin during the period 1927-1935, Mao was always clear in his mind that readiness to form class alliances did not mean that ^{the} CCP would subordinate itself to the political party (i.e. Guomindang) representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie.

Mao had already learnt valuable revolutionary lessons from the failure of ^{the} Comintern's Chinese policy during the '20s and the early '30s. Following the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Yen-an, the Maoist conception of the revolutionary strategy became ^{the} CCP's strategy. This new conception and Mao's strategy became the revolutionary basis of the war against Japan.

Thus freed from the shackles of ^{the} Comintern, ^{the} CCP formed its revolutionary strategies and policies which eventually

led to the success of the revolution in 1949. Indeed the Comintern's influence over ^{the} CCP ended at the time when the group led by Mao assumed the leadership of the party. Mao emphasised this fact when, in 1943, he said

Since the seventh World Congress of Communist International in 1935, the Communist International has not intervened in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party and yet, the Chinese Communist Party has done its work very well, throughout the whole anti-Japanese War of National Liberation.⁵¹

However, if Mao's strategy for the Chinese revolution based in the countryside was a major reason for preventing the Comintern from interfering in CCP's internal affairs, the Soviet Union too, was not ready to oppose Mao's policy as long as it coincided with the Soviet policy in the Far East during CCP's struggle against Japan. Thus, there was no need for Moscow to interfere in ^{the} CCP's internal affairs. This was important because Soviet or Comintern non-intervention allowed Mao's conception of the Chinese revolution to be consolidated without any pressures or disturbances.

2.3.3. Yenan: The Base Of The New Strategy.


The gigantic scale of peasant uprisings and peasant wars in Chinese history is without parallel in the world. These class struggles of the peasants, the peasant uprising and peasant wars, alone formed the real motive forces of historical development in China's feudal society.⁵²

Under Guomindang rule, the Chinese economy had seriously deteriorated by 1935. Once again, China came under a

military régime. Jiang's commitment to the view that ^{the} \CCP and not the Japanese was China's Enemy Number One which should be exterminated first created difficulties for the ruling class. By spending huge sums of money on weapons, China's government brought great damage to the Chinese economy. China was even faced with widespread famine during the '30s. While it was true that the country had to be armed in order to ensure China's security and survival, the use of such arms to fight Chinese communists instead of the Japanese enemy became very unpopular. Far from feeling threatened by such development, ^{the} \CCP was able to enhance its political support, particularly among the peasants, who had come to realise that Jiang had broken his promises of land distribution.⁵³


As CCP gained in popularity, the Chinese ruling class was caught in a double bind. Although, under ideal conditions, it would have liked the army to concentrate on rolling back the Japanese invaders, it became more concerned that its long term survival depended on stopping the communists in their tracks. However, Jiang's attempts to crush the Communists during the period 1928-35 failed; instead, the communist influence spread. In 1935, Jiang thought of a new plan which would put an end to the Communists: viz, the economic blockade of the provinces held by ^{the} \CCP. At the end of the Long March, the communists established their new capital in Yen-an. It was during the Long March (1934-35) that Mao was chosen as ^{the} \CCP's undisputed leader (January 1935). For the first time, the

JAPAN, GUOMINDANG AND CCP



Source: Adopted from J. Gittings, China and the World, 1922-1972 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), p. 69.

INTERVENTION IN CHINA: 1945



Source: J. Gittings, China and the World, 1922-1972
(London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), p. 119.

leadership of the Party was motivated by Chinese rather than the Comintern's revolutionary ideas.

All the operations of ^{the} CCP were directed from Yanan, the capital of communist China. The leadership of ^{the} CCP defined its major task as inflicting a decisive defeat on the Japanese occupying forces and beating back their full-scale invasion begun in 1937, and the arming and mobilisation of the Chinese peasantry not only on the communist side but also actively opposed to Guomindang.

Japan's general invasion of China (July 1937), in which all the major industrial and railway towns of northern China were seized, resulted in the Guomindang forces taking refuge in the distant plateaux and basins of the south-west. The invasion was so quick and widespread that it led to change in the character of the struggle of the Chinese peasants under the CCP's leadership. The peasants' insurgent bases were now directed to concentrate their might against Japan;⁵⁴ their struggle against the landlords and Guomindang took a secondary place. In its message, addressed to the Chinese people as a whole and in particular to the northern peasants who were vulnerable to Japanese occupation, justifying this change of emphasis in its strategy, CCP declared as follows (September 1938):

Comrades: Japan has invaded our Shansi, killed large numbers of our people, burned thousands of our houses, raped our women in countless numbers, and robbed us of our food and wealth...Everybody rise up and join a guerrilla self-defence unit! Exterminate the Peace Maintenance Committee which sells out the Nation! Defend our anti-Japanese Patriotic People's Government! Assist the all-

out resistance of Commander Yen Hsi-ghan . Act in unison with the Army and people to overthrow Japanese imperialism! ⁵⁵

In northwest China the Communists found themselves in a good position strategically, politically and militarily to monitor the Japanese-occupied zone; and, as the peasants in the area, who were suffering from Japanese occupation, were ready to fight, ^{the} CCP addressed itself to the task of mobilising them for an armed struggle against the Japanese.

Despite their occupation of all the major urban centres of North China, the Japanese would not extend their operations into the countryside, where they expected strong resistance from the peasants, organised and mobilised under the banner of ^{the} CCP's strategy of People's War. ⁵⁶ However, as the guerrilla bands appeared on the scene and the peasants were ready to resist the Japanese, Japan was forced to recruit civil labour and military troops (officially under the command of the pro-Japanese puppet government in Nanjing) to suppress the peasant movement which was developing quickly.

In 1942, Okamura, the Japanese General, issued his policy statement on the 'three alls': "Burn all, kill all and destroy all." ⁵⁷

By 1938, the Japanese had achieved substantial success in their campaign of taking over all the northern territories of China, and, the communist guerrillas were able to win the support of the peasants. In fact, resistance to the Japanese came only from the communist

guerrillas.^{ss} The regular army, the peasant militia and the local guerrillas organised together in a flexible manner, were the major ingredients of ^{the} CCP's strategy in the face of the Japanese military superiority in technological terms. It was ^{the} CCP's strategy, based on unity between the armed forces and the peasant population, demonstrating the practical side of the conception of People's War, that distinguished the Chinese revolution under Mao's leadership.

The CCP's strategy during the late '30s was based on a national mobilisation for the fight against Japan. It even went so far as to seek alliances with the landlords (the peasants' enemies) as long as they were ready to participate in the struggle against Japanese imperialism if not physically, then at least by giving financial and material support. For the sake of a united front against imperialism, ^{the} CCP agreed to put in abeyance its radical agrarian policy and the confiscation of landlords' holdings without compensation. But these concessions did not last long.

Even during the fight against the Japanese, Communists were able to obtain important concessions for the peasants from ^{the} Guomindang (with which they made a temporary alliance). Guomindang's agreement to refrain from attacking ^{the} CCP's armed forces and military bases enabled the peasants to keep their arms for the next stage of the Chinese revolution which would inevitably follow the defeat of the Japanese.

Moreover, by seeking a broad United Front against Japan, CCP was able to isolate anti-patriotic forces in Guomindang. ~~The~~ CCP's prestige was thereby enhanced and support for it grew, particularly among the peasants and the intelligentsia, at the expense of the ruling class.

It must be stressed that ^{the} CCP's United Front strategy of devoting primary attention to curbing the Japanese imperialism did not mean avoidance of agrarian reform. A reduction in the economic power of the landlords did continue even during the most intense phase of anti-Japanese resistance. Under the slogan "hit the rich and help the poor", peasants paid less tax or were completely exempted from tax, while increased taxes were demanded from the landlords. In Shansi, for example, interest rates for the very poor peasants were fixed at 10 per cent.⁵⁹

2.4. The Civil War and the final stage of the Chinese Revolution

Internally, developments leading up to the end of the war seemed to favour ^{the} CCP's general position; yet obstacles appeared in the form of factors of international provenance.

By the end of the Second World War, ^{the} CCP was domestically in a much stronger position in terms of discipline, military strategy and national liberation (based on guerrilla forces). Most importantly, there was the great military support that ^{the} CCP had gained from the rural poor and the intellectuals who rejected

~~the~~ Guomindang.⁵⁰ This fact was later to be recognised even by the United States, Guomindang's ally and ^{the} CCP's enemy. In a letter summarising US relations with China, Acheson, Secretary of State, stated that

A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the conclusion that the only alternative open to the US was full-scale intervention on behalf of a Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people.⁵¹

On the international plane, however, the end to aggression against China by the forces of Japanese fascism and imperialism did not mean an end to Guomindang which played a collaborating role with imperialism. Thus, putting an end to Guomindang became ^{the} CCP's major task. With the end of World War II, United Front was set for a complete breakdown. The scene was set for a civil war in China. The Cold War, which began close on the heels of World War II, was to exercise an impact on the Chinese revolution, because the Soviet Union and the United States, the rival powers, sought to mediate between the Guomindang and ^{the} CCP, the protagonists in China.

The United States was, as was to be expected, opposed to CCP gaining power in China. Despite its claims to seek unity and stability in China, the United States cast its lot with Guomindang by supporting it to the hilt.

For its part, the Soviet Union was not prepared to give up its old ways. It was still interested in maintaining State-to-State relations with China. This meant the Soviet Union was not keen to offer effective

support to ^{the} CCP. Neither did ^{the} CCP bank on the Soviet Union. CCP had already learnt to rely on its own forces, strategy and army in the struggle against Japan, without relying on military aid from any foreign power including the Soviet Union.

Despite its consolidation of political and military power during the war years, ^{the} CCP's main aim was to avoid civil war and seek a political solution with Guomindang. However, an attempt to form a coalition government sought by Guomindang and its allies under their own terms, failed in the face of the Guomindang's insistence that ^{the} CCP should disband its armed forces before power could be shared by the two protagonists. ^{The} CCP, understandably, rejected this demand because they knew that, in the final analysis, its armed forces represented the best guarantee of the success of the final phase of the Chinese revolution. Civil war became unavoidable. It broke out in July 1946, and ended in defeat for ^{the} Guomindang and a great victory for ^{the} CCP (October 1949)

2.4.1. The Policy of the United States Towards China during the Civil War

Attempts made by the United States to conciliate between the Guomindang and ^{the} CCP in order to reach a political settlement were expected to fail since Jiang Jieshi was determined to crush the communists by force. The United States could have withdrawn its aides from the Nationalist Government, thus bringing pressure to bear upon Jiang to reach a political settlement with ^{the} CCP. But

such a course of action, while theoretically possible, was in practice difficult to implement because the United States was unwilling to lose an important Asian ally and make room for the penetration of Soviet influence into China. It was therefore not surprising that the United States gave its unconditional support to Guomindang.

During the course of the Civil War the United States doubled its economic and military aid to China.⁶² However, American support to Guomindang never developed to military intervention on the side of Jiang's troops.⁶³ American military intervention would have involved the United States in a land war in Asia which it had shunned during World War II. This was out of the question in the immediate aftermath of the war, at a time when American public opinion favoured the return of the troops.

Moreover, a full-scale military commitment would have reduced the commitment of the United States to the Cold War, which at this stage was essentially European and not Asian in character. This fact was emphasised by the Secretary of State (February 1948) when he claimed that

We cannot afford, economically or militarily, to take over the continued failure of the present Chinese Government to the dissipation of our strength in more vital regions where we now have a reasonable opportunity of successfully meeting or thwarting the communist threat, that is, in the vital industrial areas of Western Europe with its traditions of free institutions.⁶⁴

2.4.2. The Relations between the Soviet Union and CCP during the Civil War.

Following the Soviet Union's entry into Manchuria after defeating the Japanese forces,^{the} CCP's troops moved to Manchuria, where they were able to gain some material and moral aid from the Soviet presence in that area. But, at the same time, the Soviet Union was engaged in negotiating with the Nationalist Government on the question of joint management of key Manchurian industries.

The Soviet Union's diplomatic policy towards China bore a remarkable similarity to the policies pursued by the United States and Britain. All three powers were united in the view that negotiations between the Nationalist Government and ^{the} CCP should be kept alive and Cold War avoided. Not yet awakened from his slumber where the Chinese revolution was concerned, Stalin, during the late '40s, continued to support ^{the} CCP's integration with Guomindang, presumably in the name of safeguarding national unity. This aspect of the role of the Soviet Union in the Chinese revolution was emphasised by Mao himself when he claimed that it did not allow China to make revolution. This was in 1945, when Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese revolution by saying

we must collaborate with Chiang Kai-Shek. Otherwise the Chinese nation would perish. At that time, we did not carry this into effect, and the revolution was victorious.⁶⁵

Indeed, the Soviet Union's behaviour during the civil war was a confirmation of the success of the Chinese

revolution. Diplomatic relations between the Nationalist Government and the Soviet Union continued even during the most intensive and decisive phase of the Chinese revolution. While ^{the}CCP's troops were already in the final stage of capturing state power, the Soviet Union was still steeped in negotiations with the Nationalist Government for extending agreements on trade and mining rights for another five years. This constituted great moral support to the Nationalist Government even in its death throes. Even when Nanjing fell into the hands of ^{the}CCP's troops, the Soviet ambassador followed the Nationalist Government to Guangzhou.

NOTES

1. Mao Tse-tung, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party Selected Works vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 318.
2. Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, Selected Works vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), p. 413.
3. Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 313
4. Ibidem.
5. See Chapter 1 of this work.
6. See, for example, J. Gittings, The World and China 1922-1972, Part I, op.cit, passim.
7. ~~cited in~~ Ibid., p. 32.
8. See Map 1.1.
9. Mao Tse-tung, On the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, Selected Works vol. III, (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 96.
10. Ibidem.
11. cited in R. Lowenthal, 'China', in Z. Brzezinski, Africa and the Communist World, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 143.
12. I. Herdan, op.cit., p. 15.
13. See Chapter 1.2 of this work.
14. Mao Tse-tung, On the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, Selected Works vol. III (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 74.
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16. T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Role of China in International Relations', Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XIII, no. 46 (November 1978) p. 1899.
17. See Chapters 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 of this work.
18. See ibidem.
19. See Chapter 1.2 of this work.
20. See Chapter 2.3.3 of this work.

21. E. Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 140.
22. quoted from A SACU working group, China's World View, Modern Series no. 10 (London: Anglo-Chinese Educational Institute, 1979), p. 2.
23. For a further analysis, see, for example, C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). See also his A Concise History of East Asia (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 134-141.
24. cited in J. D. Armstrong, op.cit., p. 28.
25. cited in Harold Isaac, 'The New Awakening', in F. Schurman (Ed.), China Readings 2 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 103.
26. In fact in the beginning CCP had hardly any effective military support. This was mainly because the Soviet military aid went to the Guomindang, and not to CCP.
27. Levi Werner, Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), p. 175.
28. In fact even the wife of Jiang Jieshi came from one of the wealthiest families in China.
29. F. W. Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism (London: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 25.
30. E. Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Random House, 1944), p. 84.
31. N. Harris, The Mandate of Heaven: Marx and Mao in Modern China, (London: Quartet Books, 1978), p. 16.
32. E. Snow, Red Star over China, op.cit., p. 85.
33. Ibidem.
34. cited in I. Herdan, op.cit., p. 25.
35. Troops of the Guomindang government in the north-east under Marshall Zhang Xueliang had no interest in civil war. Their concern was to recover their homeland from Japanese occupation. They gained great sympathy from the Red Army. See ibidem.
36. J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 52.
37. cited in N. Harris, op.cit., p. 22.
38. Ibid., p. 21.

39. See Chapter 2.3.1 of this work.
40. J. Fairbank , The United States and China, op.cit., p. 230.
41. Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: from Comintern to Cominform (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 285.
42. For a valuable account of the Comintern's evaluation of the Chinese Revolution, see, for example, ibid., pp. 271-94.
43. See Chapter 2.3.1 of this work.
44. F. Claudin, op.cit., p. 275.
45. J. Fairbank, The United States and China, op.cit., p. 230.
46. Ibid., p. 231.
47. Ibid., p. 232.
48. See Introduction of this work.
49. J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 35.
50. F. Claudin, op.cit., pp. 285-6.
51. cited in ibid., p. 239.
52. Mao Tse-tung(1939) cited in A. B. Buss, China: The People's Republic of China and Richard Nixon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 7.
53. See E. Snow, The Red Star Over China, op.cit., p. 85. See also J. Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), pp. 80-90; and his China: From the 1911 Revolution to Liberation (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp. 212-304.
54. See, for example, J. Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949 op.cit., pp. 121-123; and Chou-Chuanlen, 'Pre-1949 Development of the Communist System of Justice', China Quarterly no. 30 (April-June 1967).
55. cited in J. Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949, op.cit., p. 122.
56. For a further analysis of this point ('people's war'), see, for example, J. Belden, China Shakes the World (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1973), pp. 74-107.

57. See J. Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949, op.cit., p. 122.
58. Ibid., pp. 121-132.
59. Ibid., p. 195.
60. Ibid., p. 195.
61. cited in J. Gittings, 'The Origins of Chinese Foreign Policy', op.cit., p. 195.
62. American aid to Guomindang was estimated at \$3087 million. See ibidem.
63. Ibid., pp. 195-6.
64. Ibid., p. 195.
65. ^{Mao Zedong (1962)} cited in J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 141.

PART II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S ROLE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 1949-86

CHAPTER 3

CHINA AND THE WORLD 1949-86: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

China's view of the world, although fairly clearly defined during the period of the revolution,¹ has had to be adapted to the actual changes that have been taking place in the international environment since 1949. A periodised analysis of China's foreign policy will reveal important aspects of how China has attempted to apply its world view and pursue its international objectives in dealing with the world order as it stands.² It should also demonstrate how changes of the international scene and important international issues which have arisen from time to time since the foundation of ^{the} PRC have affected the character of China's role in international relations. Particular attention will be paid in our analysis to issues such as the confrontation between PRC and the United States during the period 1949-1975,³ and the Sino-Soviet dispute from the late 1950's onwards. This analysis will also serve four major purposes:

- i. It will demonstrate how the impact of the international environment has affected the Chinese world view.
- ii. It will seek to provide information about China's international activities with special reference to the revolutionary character of its state power.

- iii. It will attempt to shed light on the essential factors underlying both the continuities and discontinuities in China's role in international relations.
- iv. It hopes to show how Sino-African relations were reflected within the framework of China's foreign policy as a whole.

Broadly speaking, China's domestic and foreign policies have been shaped with two basic political goals in view:

- i. Internally, in order to ensure the continuation of the Chinese revolution (a task which has never been easy and which still has its difficulties), an attempt was made to apply the lesson of Yanan China to the larger scene of revolutionary China. Class struggle in China has occurred not only among the masses, but also, and more importantly, within the structure of the state and the party.⁴ Revolutionary domestic reforms in China have, characteristically, served the purpose of reflecting the class struggle going on within the state and party structures. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was a practical example of an attempt to remove the causes underlying such a struggle.⁵ Mao explained the major objective of GPCR in the following words:

The current Great Cultural Revolution is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism.⁶

It must be stressed that changes in the international scene exercised a stronger

influence (than changes on the domestic political scene have) on the more or less radical posture assumed by China's foreign policy from time to time. However, the different stages in the development of China's international role and behaviour during the last 37 years have been more or less in alignment with the development of the tasks faced by the Chinese revolution. Internal developments relating to such matters as security and the economic reforms of 1949-57; the Great Leap Forward (GLF) 1957-62; GPCR 1966-69; the re-construction and modernisation 1976- (the role of imported technology and foreign capital) may have, in varying degrees, claimed the attention of Chinese foreign policy makers.⁷

- ii. Internationally, the elaboration and consolidation of the Chinese revolution required solidarity with those peoples who were engaged in struggles against the common enemy of imperialism and its indigenous collaborators. This was pursued within the framework of China's own analysis of the world^a and the developments which have shaped China's role in international relations during the last thirty-seven years (as examined in this part).

PRC's foreign policy has undergone a number of changes in its development over time. Each particular period corresponds to a specific phase in which those in charge of making foreign policy have sought to alter the existing image of China and create a new one. During the initial years of PRC (1949-63), the Chinese adopted the view that

the world was divided into two camps - the revolutionary camp and the imperialist camp. Neutrality⁹ or non-alignment was held to be meaningless under such conditions. Each country either joined the world's progressive forces or their enemies. In subsequent years¹⁰ (1963 onwards), however, the socialist world has come to be seen by the Chinese as having lost its original momentum. Since the break with the Soviet Union in 1963, China has increasingly reduced its links with those socialist countries that share the Soviet 'revisionist' world view.¹¹ Consequently, China has moved closer to the Third World. Its international activities and contacts, particularly during the 1960's and most of the 1970's¹² were concentrated in Asia, Africa and, to a lesser degree, in Latin America.¹³

Changes in China's conception of the world are closely linked to its relations with the two Superpowers. During the '50s, relations between the Soviet Union and PRC were largely positive in character. In fact the Soviet programme of economic and technological assistance to China during the '50s has been described by Schurmann, an American scholar, as ^{one of} the greatest international assistance programmes in modern history'.¹⁴ Since then, however, relations between the Soviet Union and China have steadily deteriorated. They have already fought a brief war (in 1969). In addition, 52 Soviet divisions have been deployed along the Sino-Soviet frontier.¹⁵ This Soviet deployment is seen by the Chinese as proof of their own view that the Soviet Union is a major hegemonist power.

In an article which appeared in the People's Daily (1 November 1977), it was stated that

...both the Soviet Union and the United States are the biggest oppressors of the people of the world. Of the two imperialism powers, the Soviet Union is the more ferocious and the most dangerous source of world war.¹⁶

Meanwhile, in a number of aspects the relations between China and the United States have been marked by steady progress (especially during the period following the 1972 visits to China by Kissinger and Nixon).

The Chinese, however, still argue that their view of the world has remained consistent. They stress that their stance towards colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, hegemonism, self-reliance, united front, and support for national liberation movements remains mutually consistent. Changes which appear to have taken place in China's international relations have been, the Chinese argue, related to developments in the international environment and changes in the policies of others.¹⁷ For example, in his report to the 12th National Congress of the CCP (September 1982), Hu Yaobang claimed that:

...China's foreign policy is based on the scientific theories of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, and it proceeds from fundamental interests of the people of China and the rest of the world. It follows an overall long-term strategy, and is definitely not swayed by expediency or by anybody's instigation or provocation...We have firmly applied the basic principles of our foreign policy formulated by the late comrades Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.¹⁸

The Chinese argue that the so-called changes in China's foreign policy are no more than adjustments corresponding to the

substantial changes [which] have taken place both in the world and in China's own state security and foreign relations.¹⁹

However, while over time the Chinese leaders may have had a generally consistent view of China's role in international relations (and therefore of what China's foreign policy should be), they have examined the world situation from time to time with a view to evolving specific policies towards different regions of the world and towards different political tendencies.²⁰

Have these policies been related to specific foreign policy paths conceived in the light of the assumption that they constitute the *sine qua non* for the consolidation and continuation of the Chinese revolution? Or, are they the result of China's adherence to the principles of traditional international relations including the search for international influence and eventual Big Power, if not Superpower status?

Throughout the CCP's history especially from 1945 onwards, following the beginning of the civil war when America openly sided with the Guomindang, the United States has been a fundamental factor in shaping its world view. During the 1945-68 period, the CCP characterised the United States as the most dangerous imperialist power on the

offensive. This view was justified in view of the fact that whilst the United States was no more than an ally and partner of the other colonial powers in China, (and also in other parts of the world) up to 1945, after 1945 it actually played a leading role in preserving the semi-colonial, colonial and imperialist systems in different parts of the Third World²¹

New developments emerging during the late '60s compelled the United States to abandon its direct military offensive position, particularly in Asia. Military alliances uniting the United States with countries in South Asia and South-east Asia were facing political difficulties.²² Already, by 1969, eventual American defeat in Vietnam seemed to be a foregone conclusion.²³ These developments were perceived by the Chinese as forcing the United States to assume a defensive posture. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union itself was already engaged in an offensive in Czechoslovakia while extending its diplomatic and strategic influence deep into the South Asian sub-continent. The Chinese saw in these developments a tendency on the part of the Soviet Union to fill the partial vacuum left by the waning of American influence in Asia. Thus, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Sino-Soviet border clash (1969), and Brezhnev's proposal during the late '60s for an Asian collective security arrangement²⁴ appeared to the Chinese as clear indications that the Soviet Union was becoming the Superpower on the offensive.

The second phase can be dated from the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1968 and 1969 respectively. It reached its climax in 1975, following the American defeat in Indo-China.²⁵ During this period, the Soviet Union was placed on a par with the United States. Both Superpowers were regarded as representing equally dangerous hegemonist and imperialist forces in world politics.

During the third phase, dating from 1975 following the victory of the Indo-Chinese national liberation movements and the establishment of socialist governments in Laos, Cambodia (now Kampuchea) and Vietnam,²⁶ direct American military involvement in South-east Asia was ended, at least for the time being. While the Chinese were able to prove that their characterisation of the United States²⁷ as a Paper Tiger was essentially correct, the Soviet Union was seen as attempting to impose its own political and strategic influence on weaker countries.

During the last decade, the Chinese have consistently advanced the claim that their foreign policy is conducted within a framework of three related themes:

- i. Unity with the genuine Marxist and true revolutionary forces, including national liberation movements. According to the new constitution of CCP (1977)

The Communist Party of China upholds proletarian internationalism and opposes great-nation chauvinism; it unites firmly with the genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organisations the world over; unites with the proletariat, the oppressed people and

nations of the whole world and fights shoulder to shoulder with them to oppose the hegemonism of the two Superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, to overthrow imperialism, modern revisionism and reaction, and wipe the system of exploitation of man by man off the face of the earth so that all mentioned will be emancipated.²⁸

- ii. Solidarity with oppressed peoples and nations and with the victims of neo-colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism, i.e. the Third World.
- iii. The creation of a broad United Front, consisting of the Second and Third Worlds in opposition to the two dominant Superpowers - the Soviet Union and the United States - with the aim of 'uniting the many to defeat the few'.²⁹ In his report on the world situation (1977), Huang Hua (Minister of Foreign Affairs) offered the following explanation.

...At the global level, the struggle is centred on how to unite all the governments and the people of the world in eliminating the residue of colonialism and foreign capitalist intervention to achieve a real independence, and on bringing to a head the struggle against the two hegemonist powers.³⁰

Based on the 'Three Worlds' theory, exploitation of the inherent contradictions between the policies of the stronger and the weaker imperialistic powers was systematically put into practice by China after Mao's death. But, it must be noted that even during Mao's heyday China's world view was shaped according to the 'Three Worlds' theory.³¹ According to it, the two

Superpowers constituting the First World exercise economic, political and military domination over the countries of the Second World (the intermediate zone which includes Western Europe, Canada, Japan and the Eastern European countries); whilst the Third World consists of the vast majority of the world's population - the peasant and the proletarian forces of Asia (including China), Africa and Latin America. China's strategy was based on the contention that the Second World could be used in a broad united front against the main enemy (viz the First World). By manipulating the contradictions between the Superpowers and the rest of the capitalist world, on the one hand, and on the other, the contradictions between Superpowers and the socialist world, China believed that the position of the Third World could be qualitatively improved.³²

We shall discuss the role played by China in international relations during the last thirty-seven years by focusing on four major aspects:

- i. Factors underlying the relations between China and the two Superpowers.
- ii. China's outlook on and evaluation of the legitimacy of the existing world order.
- iii. China's assessment of the objective situation prevailing in the world.
- iv. The extent to which China has intensified or reduced its international activities and the factors that lie behind these changes.

No complete and satisfactory scheme can be devised for characterising and producing China's foreign policy since 1949. This difficulty is mainly related to the many different types of countries³³ organisations³⁴ and movements³⁵ (both socialist or anti-imperialist in character and capitalist or anti-communist in nature) in the world and to the variety of international issues which periodically arise. Such issues may directly or indirectly concern China's national security or its political and ideological objectives in the world.

Nevertheless, it is useful to divide the development of China's foreign policy into six stages:

- i. The period 1949-55, when China aligned itself with the socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union and sought radical changes in the world as it existed.
- ii. The period from 1955 to 1959, when Chinese hostility to the non-communist world, (particularly Third World countries) was somewhat lessened, in the hope not only of forging a wider united front against colonialism and imperialism but also of reducing China's isolation.
- iii. The period 1959-66, when China adopted a hard line similar to that of the early '50s, asserting its independence from the Soviet bloc.
- iv. The period 1966-69, representing the most turbulent period, when China isolated itself diplomatically from almost all other countries

by pursuing a hard line on the question of revolution.

v. The period 1969-76,³⁶ during which China, following the climacteric of ^{the}GPCR, once again reverted to stressing the importance of State-to-State relations and was guided by a more 'reformist' or flexible line towards the rest of the world.

vi. The period from 1976 onwards, during which China has been integrating itself with the rest of the international order rather than attempting to transform it. China's role in international relations during the last decade seems to have been influenced by its membership of ^{the}UN, its relations with the United States, and its obsession with the Soviet Union carried to paranoic proportions.

NOTES

1. See Part I.
For a further analysis of the Chinese world view before 1949 see, for example, C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World op.cit.; J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., pp. 17-179; and J. D. Armstrong, op.cit., pp. 47-64.
2. The existing world order has been and still is, dominated by rules and conditions, a large number of which contradict the socialist considerations of the Chinese world view. The rules have mostly been dictated by forces which are capitalist and imperialist in nature, including the United Nations Organisation and international financial institutions.
3. Relaxation of Sino-American relations only took place following the complete withdrawal of American forces from Indo-China in 1975. See Chapter 8 of this work.
4. These struggles were between those who were interested in the continuation of the revolutionary character or the mass line of the Chinese revolution including emphasis on 'politics in command' and rural areas as the basis for socialist construction on the one hand; and, on the other, those who favoured the 'revisionist' line and laid greater emphasis on rapid industrialisation and modernisation. For an account of the ideological debate within the two lines on international affairs, especially in relation to the Soviet Union and the United States, see, for example, M. G. Gandhi 'Peking's Foreign Policy: Ideological Debate', Journal of Political Studies 12 (November 1979): 2, pp. 56-67.
5. Other major revolutionary reforms were the Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1956 and the Great Leap Forward (1957-62), see Chapter 5 of this work.
6. quoted by I. Herdan, op.cit., p. 40.
7. For a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between the domestic and external developments in China's foreign policy see, for example, J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972 op.cit., passim. See also M. B. Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy: a Process of Interaction', in I. Wilson (Ed.), China and the World Community, (London: Angus and Robertson, 1973, pp. 41-69.
introduction and
8. See Chapters 1 and 2 of this work.
9. See Chapters 4 and 11 of this work.

10. 1963 was the year of the final break in Sino-Soviet relations. See Chapters 5, 6, 10, 12 and 13 of this work.
11. China continued good relations only with the socialist countries of Albania, North Korea and North Vietnam which supported armed struggle against US imperialism.
12. By the mid-'70s, China's major international activities had begun to shift from the Third World to the First and Second Worlds. See Chapters 8 and 9.
13. Unlike Africa where China's major concern has been with anti-colonialism, and Asia where China's role has been guided mainly by anti-imperialist struggles (especially in south east Asia), in Latin America (until the early '70s) there had been little attraction for China's search for a wider anti-imperialist front. With the exception of the Cuban Revolution (1 January 1959), Peru following the radical coup of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (3 October 1968) and Chile following the inauguration of the socialist President Salvador Allende (24 October 1970), most Latin American countries had been predominantly pro-Western. They had no interest in struggling against imperialism. Distance also prevented China from making intensive contacts with the anti-imperialist forces in Latin America.

Until February 1972 when Mexico and Argentina recognized PRC, China had diplomatic relations only with the three progressive countries in Latin America, *viz.* Cuba (since 1960), Chile (from December 1970) under the leadership of Salvador Allende, and Peru (November 1971) led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado (See Table 4.1). Thus, during the first two decades or so of China's foreign policy (1949-1972), Latin America was of little significance to China's international relations at the state-to-state level.

Unlike Asia and Africa, where a number of senior Chinese leaders (including Premiers Zhou En-lai and Zhao Ziyang), frequently went on official visits, the first high level official Chinese visit to South American continent took place only in October 1985 when the Prime Minister went to Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela (28 October-12 November 1985). See Beijing Review 28 (28 October 1985): 43, p. 4; and 28 (25 November 1985): 45, p. 6. [(In November 1981 Premier Chau Ziyang visited Mexico. This was the first visit by a Chinese Premier to a Latin American country, see Beijing Review 24 (9 November 1981: 45, p. 8)]

Most reciprocal visits and contacts between China and Latin America took place at people-to-people level. China sent numerous delegations, ranging from trade

missions to acrobatic teams. In return, a large number of Latin Americans visited China. They included former government officials, legislators, communist party leaders, artists and students. For a discussion on Sino-Latin American relations see, for example, C. Johnson, 'China and Latin America', Problems of Communism 21 (July-August 1972): 2, pp. 53-67; E. Halperin, 'Peking and Latin American Communists', China Quarterly 29 (January-March 1967), and K. C. Chen, China and the Three Worlds (New York: M. E. Sharp Inc., 1979), p. 24.

14. F. Schurmann (Ed.), China Readings: 3: Communist China (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 238.
15. See D. Buchan and C. MacDougall, 'Why Russia worries about even a friendly China', The Financial Times (9.4.1985). See also H. Harding, 'Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy', Problems of Communism 31 (March-April 1984), p. 2; and N. Harris, The Mandate of Heaven (London: Quarto Books, 1978), p. 223.
16. The People's Daily, (1 November 1977); 'Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism' cited in Peking Review 20 (4 November 1977): 45, p. 21-22.
17. See, for example, Chou En-lai (the Chinese Premier), 'Political Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CCP', (August 1973) in Peking Review 16 (7 September 1973): 35 and 36. See also Hua Guofeng, 'Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP', (August 1977) in Peking Review 20 (26 August 1977): 35.
18. Beijing Review 25 (13 September 1982): 37, p. 29.
19. Zheng Weizhi, 'Independence is the Basic Canon', Beijing Review 28 (7 January 1985): 1.
20. The Chinese understanding and tendencies are discussed in this Chapter, particularly in terms of the factors behind each new phase of China's foreign policy.
21. See Chapter 10 of this work.
22. Among these difficulties was the formation of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Although the founders of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) were all pro-imperialist in character, the Asian character of ASEAN and its dominant political and economic objectives seemed to undermine the military nature of SEATO (which included two ASEAN members: the Philippines and Thailand). The founders of ASEAN

were more concerned with peace and stability. The escalations of the war in Indo-China not only seriously undermined stability in South East Asia but also brought more political and social pressure and uprisings against governments loyal to the American military presence in the region. Thus despite the reactionary character of ASEAN's founders, it was widely feared that a further military association would seriously undermine the local political regimes.

23. See Chapters 7 and 8 of this work.

24. At the World Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow (8 June 1969), Leonid Brezhnev stated that:

We believe the course of events is also placing on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.

Pravda (9 June 1969) cited in A. L. Horelick, 'The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: a Club in Search of Members', Pacific Affairs 47 (Fall 1974): 3, p. 269.

25. It must be stressed that the Vietnamese issue was one of the very few cases in which the Soviet Union and China adopted a more or less similar approach in opposition to US imperialism.

26. Until 1975, only North Vietnam had a socialist government. In 1975, following the fall of the government of Saigon, both North and South Vietnam were united into a single socialist country with the capital in Hanoi.

27. For a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese understanding of imperialism as a paper tiger see, for example, Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958). See also J. D. Simmonds, China's World: the Foreign Policy of a Developing State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 165-176.

28. Constitution of the Communist Party of China, adopted by the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP (8 August 1977), Peking Review 20 (2 September 1977): 36, p. 16.

29. This is a common saying in China which refers to the general strategy adopted by ^{the} CCP during the war of resistance against Japanese imperialism. See Chapter 2 of this work.

30. Huang Hua (Minister for Foreign Affairs), 'Report on the World Situation (30 July 1977)', Issues and Studies 13 (December 1977): 12, p. 89.

31. See Chapter 8.3 of this work.
32. See, for example, A SACU Working Group, 'China's World View' (London: Anglo-Chinese Educational Institute, 1979), pp. 78-97; J. Camilleri, op.cit.; and K. C. Cheng, op.cit.,
33. In relation to the Third World, where the majority of China's international activities were concentrated during the two decades 1955-75, there have been three different types of countries with which the Chinese have made contacts or established diplomatic relations:
1. pro-imperialist countries, including some former members of SEATO (Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. SEATO officially expired on 1 July 1977), CENTO and other military alliances.
 2. neutral or non-aligned countries which adopted a more or less anti-colonialist stance, but pursued policies against national liberation and revolutionary forces in opposition to the regimes in power.
 3. non-aligned but progressive (i.e. positively non-aligned) countries such as Ghana during Nkrumah's rule and Algeria, which adopted a similar position to China against imperialism (i.e. through armed struggle). This was brought to my attention by a similar characterization, but for different reasons, proposed by T. V. Sathyamurthy 'Changes in power struggle in international relations', Socialist Scientist no. 96 (1980), pp. 6-7.
34. such as UN and its sub-organisations or other international institutions.
35. These included national independence, national liberation, revolutionary and socialist movements.
36. 1969, the year of the Ninth National Congress of CCP (April) is usually considered to be the starting point of a flexible approach on China's part towards the world.

CHAPTER 4

ALIGNMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE UNIFICATION OF CHINA: 1949-55.

The foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was undoubtedly the most important event following the end of the Second World War. Immediately after a long and destructive war against Japanese imperialism came the civil war involving ^{the} CCP and Guomintang on opposite sides. This conflict escalated during the period of the most intense development of the Cold War and finally resulted in ^{the} CCP's victory. Since ^{PRC,} the establishment of China has been directly or indirectly exposed to threats from the United States and Japan along the eastern seaboard, in northern China and on its border with Indo-China. These threats have been ostensibly aimed at containing if not strangulating China.

The first task of the revolutionary government was to ensure that China's domestic affairs were properly organised; i.e., that appropriate security measures were taken and socialist economic reforms were carried out. In the field of external affairs, China's main policy aim was to check American influence in Asia, and to deflect the geographical and political pressure which was being exerted on the Chinese seaboard by American imperialism. The support given by the United States to the remnants of the Guomintang régime established in Taiwan, and threats on the northern border during America's direct military intervention in the Korean crisis were soon followed by

the development of a serious situation along China's south-eastern border with Indo-China. China viewed the latter development as constituting a serious potential threat to its security. The political integration of Tibet and the absorption of Taiwan were among the major concerns of the Chinese state.

During the period 1949-54, China had to face imperialist threats along most of its borders. Vietnam, which was struggling for its independence from French colonialism was separated from China's south-eastern border by only a short distance. Inside the mainland itself, the Chinese strongly believed that a conspiracy to undermine the absorption of Tibet was masterminded by America, with the co-operation of India as well as Western European countries which offered moral and political support to Tibetan separatists who united under the Dalai Lama.¹

On the eastern border, China faced a much more imminent and direct threat from Taiwan, which was under the umbrella of the American forces.² Because of the American military presence, not only was any form of direct military action to realise China's claim to the island of Formosa impossible, but, in addition, China's entire coastline was vulnerable to American threat at any time.³

The other areas - the Senkaku Islands, Hong Kong and Macao - have not featured prominently in the government's published propaganda on the unification of the whole of China. In the case of the Senkaku Islands, which the

Japanese claim as an integral part of their territory, China seems reluctant to raise the issue lest reasonably good Sino-Japanese relations should suffer an unnecessary setback. However, despite this, the Chinese seemed intent on advancing their claim on these islands when in April 1978, they despatched fishing boats carrying the PRC flag to a position near them. This action angered the Japanese, who once again stressed their own claim to the islands.⁴

In the case of Hong Kong, the political situation was somewhat conditioned by the fact that China stood to gain financially from the Crown Colony, as it was a convenient source of foreign exchange through trade. At the same time, China could look forward to the absorption of Hong Kong following the expiry of the Anglo-Chinese agreement by which it would revert to China in 1997 with the lapse of the lease, without feeling any threat to its territorial sovereignty. All the above mentioned factors have contributed to China's relaxed attitude towards the Hong Kong issue.⁵ On the question of Macao, which was occupied by the Portuguese 400 years ago, the Portuguese seem to be prepared to hand back the territory to China. This was confirmed by Antonio Ramalh Eanes, the Portuguese President during his visit to China in May 1983.⁶

4.1. 'Leaning To One Side'.

As a new state emerging from an undesirable experience of semi-feudalism, capitalism, semi-colonialism and imperialism; being politically and economically weak

and unable to deal on an equal basis with countries already dominating the international system; having undergone a revolution contrary to the interests of the imperialist powers; and as a new state brought into existence in the middle of the Cold War with objectives directed towards the destruction of semi-feudalism, capitalism and imperialism the People's Republic of China was compelled by circumstances not of its choosing to identify with the already established socialist states under the leadership of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was assumed to be the only power capable of contributing to the consolidation of the Chinese revolution. Accordingly, it was expected that it would respond positively to China's requirements of economic, financial and technological assistance, while at the same time China hoped that such identification of the objectives of the two socialist powers would result in the provision of political and possibly military support aimed at reducing American pressure.

As early as November 1948, Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, the leaders of ^{the} PRC, stressed the need for their country's struggle against imperialism to be joined to the anti-imperialist front led by the Soviet Union.⁷ Six months later, (30 June 1949), Mao once again stated that China must:

...unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us equally and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the

people in all other countries and form an international front...

The forty years experience of Sun Yat-Sen and the twenty-eight years experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it...all Chinese...must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Chiang Kai-Shek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism and we also oppose the illusions about a third road.⁸

Stalin's indifference to the Chinese revolution did not stop Mao from visiting⁹ the Soviet Union less than two months after ^{the}CCP took power. This visit, which lasted for two months,¹⁰ reinforced China's intention to lean to the side of socialism and was marked by the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. This treaty included the following provisions: a thirty year military alliance; joint use of the naval base Port Arthur until either the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan or the end of 1952; Chinese administration of the international trading port of Dairen; a Sino-Soviet guarantee of the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic; and a Soviet economic credit of US \$300 million¹¹ spread over a period of five years. In addition, all unequal treaties between the two countries concluded before the revolution were scrapped. Thus, the Soviet Union gave up its right to administer the Changchun Railway jointly with the Chinese government.¹²

While the immediate objectives of 'leaning to one side' during the 1950's were largely economic in nature,

the Chinese themselves attached a great deal of importance to the political and strategic interests of the revolution. Therefore, China felt secure following the conclusion of the treaty. It was in a position to launch its programme of socialist economic reconstruction in an atmosphere of national and political security. Perhaps this was what caused Liu Shaoqi to claim, in May 1950, that 'the international conditions for carrying out our construction are...very good'.¹³

However, the Soviet perception of the alliance may not have been one in which the Sino-Soviet treaty was regarded as particularly favourable to the advancement of the Soviet Union's strategic interests especially during a period in which the Soviet strategic concern lay predominantly to the West, in Europe.¹⁴ On the contrary, it may well have been the case that the Soviet Union did not regard the alliance as particularly desirable from the point of view of its strategic interests, particularly in the event of China becoming involved in a war against US imperialism and its Asian allies, aimed at maintaining its territorial integrity or reducing the physical pressure along its eastern, northern and south-eastern borders. Because of its limitations as a world military power, the Soviet Union did not wish to be dragged into such a war when it was already involved in the Cold War in Europe.¹⁵

4.2. Diplomatic Contacts.

During this period (1949-55), the international Communist line was fundamentally hostile to the greater

part of the rest of the world, including countries which refrained from taking sides in the Cold War. Neutral countries were regarded by the socialist world as serving the interests of the imperialist powers. In line with such an understanding of world politics, China too initially adopted a standoffish attitude to colonialist powers as well as towards non-communist national movements and governments, especially those in the Third World. Thus, China extended moral support to Communist parties and insurrectionary movements in India, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Indonesia and the Philippines.¹⁶ In Vietnam, where the anti-imperialist national liberation movement was already well advanced, China strongly supported the revolutionary forces by making available Chinese volunteers, bases for military training, and technicians.¹⁷ Since 1950, ^{the} PRC's activities and tactics were predicated upon giving moral and material support to communist movements. Ideological objectives abroad were taken into consideration alongside China's own national interests. The Chinese were of the view that independence, social reform and freedom from foreign domination had no meaning unless they were won by Communist-controlled governments in a struggle against imperialism. According to such a perspective, China, like the Soviet Union, found it difficult to co-operate with governments of such newly independent countries as India, Indonesia and Egypt¹⁸ which adopted an indecisive and vague posture towards imperialism.¹⁹

However, despite its alignment with the socialist bloc and its hard revolutionary line in international affairs, China was anxious to establish State-to-State relations with countries which were not socialist in character. This was in line with the stress that China has always placed on the need for complying with the requirements of diplomacy based upon 'equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty'.²⁰ In fact, even before the establishment of PRC, CCP had repeatedly emphasised the importance of State-to-State diplomacy without regard to the political and ideological character of the countries concerned.²¹

Thus, by 1950, China had already exchanged formal diplomatic representation²² with five Third World countries²³ and seven Western European countries.²⁴ However, in the case of Israel, China simply did not reciprocate its gesture of recognition of PRC with the establishment of diplomatic relations.

4.3. The Korean War 1950-53

Without doubt, the most decisive moment for PRC's external role came at the point at which it became directly involved in the Korean Crisis (1950-53) for, within a year of its inception, PRC found itself face to face with an enemy along its northern border.

On 26 June 1950, hostilities broke out between North and South Korea. Shortly afterwards the North Korean armed forces captured Seoul, the capital of South Korea, driving the South Korean troops as far as the Pusan area.

TABLE 4.1

COUNTRIES HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL
WITH CHINA/AS AT FEBRUARY 1984

Chronological Order	Name of Country	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
1	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	3 Oct. 1949
2	People's Republic of Bulgaria	4 Oct. 1949
3	Socialist Republic of Romania	5 Oct. 1949
4	People's Republic of Hungary	6 Oct. 1949
5	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	6 Oct. 1949
6	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic	6 Oct. 1949
7	People's Republic of Poland	7 Oct. 1949
8	People's Republic of Mongolia	16 Oct. 1949
9	German Democratic Republic	27 Oct. 1949
10	Socialist People's Republic of Albania	23 Nov. 1949
11	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam	18 Jan. 1950
12	Republic of India	1 Apr. 1950
13	Kingdom of Sweden	9 May 1950
14	Kingdom of Denmark	11 May 1950
15	Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma	8 Jun. 1950
16	Swiss Confederation	14 Sept. 1950

TABLE 4.1 cont.

Chronological Order	Name of Country	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations	
17	Republic of Finland	28 Oct.	1950
18	Islamic Republic of Pakistan	21 May	1951
19	Kingdom of Norway	5 Oct.	1954
20	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	2 Jan.	1955
21	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan	20 Jan.	1955
22	Kingdom of Nepal	1 Aug.	1955
23	Arab Republic of Egypt	30 May	1956
24	Syrian Arab Republic	1 Aug.	1956
25	Yemen Arab Republic	24 Sept.	1956
26	Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	7 Feb.	1957
27	Democratic Kampuchea	19 Jul.	1958
28	Republic of Iraq	20 Aug.	1958
29	Kingdom of Morocco	1 Nov.	1958
30	Democratic People's Republic of Algeria	20 Dec.	1958
31	Democratic Republic of the Sudan	4 Feb.	1959
32	Republic of Guinea	4 Oct.	1959
33	Republic of Ghana	5 Jul.	1960
34	Republic of Cuba	28 Sept.	1960
35	Republic of Mali	25 Oct.	1960
36	Somali Democratic Republic	14 Dec.	1960
37	Republic of Zaire	20 Feb.	1961

TABLE 4.1 cont.

Chronological Order	Name of Country	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
38	People's Democratic Republic of Laos	25 Apr. 1961
39	Republic of Uganda	18 Oct. 1962
40	Republic of Kenya	14 Dec. 1963
41	Republic of Burundi	21 Dec. 1963
42	Republic of Tunisia	10 Jan. 1964
43	Republic of France	27 Jan. 1964
44	People's Republic of the Congo	22 Feb. 1964
45	United Republic of Tanzania	26 Apr. 1964
46	Central African Republic	29 Sept. 1964
47	Republic of Zambia	29 Oct. 1964
48	People's Republic of Benin	12 Nov. 1964
49	Islamic Republic of Mauritania	19 Jul. 1965
50	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	31 Jan. 1968
51	Canada	13 Oct. 1970
52	Republic of Equatorial Guinea	15 Oct. 1970
53	Republic of Italy	6 Nov. 1970
54	Socialist Ethiopia	24 Nov. 1970
55	Republic of Chile	15 Dec. 1970
56	Federal Republic of Nigeria	10 Feb. 1971
57	State of Kuwait	22 Mar. 1971

TABLE 4.1 cont.

Chronological Order	Name of Country	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
58	Republic of Cameroon	26 Mar. 1971
59	Republic of San Marino	6 May 1971
60	Republic of Austria	28 May 1971
61	Republic of Sierra Leone	29 Jul. 1971
62	Republic of Turkey	4 Aug. 1971
63	Islamic Republic of Iran	16 Aug. 1971
64	Kingdom of Belgium	25 Oct. 1971
65	Republic of Peru	2 Nov. 1971
66	Republic of Lebanon	9 Nov. 1971
67	Republic of Rwanda	12 Nov. 1971
68	Republic of Senegal	7 Dec. 1971
69	Republic of Iceland	8 Dec. 1971
70	Republic of Cyprus	14 Dec. 1971
71	Republic of Malta	31 Jan. 1972
72	United States of Mexico	14 Feb. 1972
73	Republic of Argentina	19 Feb. 1972
74	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13 Mar. 1972
75	Mauritius	15 Apr. 1972
76	Kingdom of the Netherlands	18 May 1972
77	Hellenic Republic	5 Jun. 1972
78	Co-operative Republic of Guyana	27 Jun. 1972

TABLE 4.1 cont.

Chronological Order	Name of Country	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
79	Republic of Togo	19 Sept. 1972
80	Japan	29 Sept. 1972
81	Federal Republic of Germany	11 Oct. 1972
82	Republic of Maldives	14 Oct. 1972
83	Democratic Republic of Madagascar	6 Nov. 1972
84	Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	16 Nov. 1972
85	Jamaica	21 Nov. 1972
86	Republic of Chad	28 Nov. 1972
87	Commonwealth of Australia	21 Dec. 1972
88	New Zealand	22 Dec. 1972
89	Spanish State	9 Mar. 1973
90	The Burkina-Faso	15 Sept. 1973
91	Republic of Guinea-Bissau	15 Mar. 1974
92	Republic of Gabon	20 Apr. 1974
93	Federation of Malaysia	31 May 1974
94	Republic of Trinidad and Tobago	20 Jun. 1974
95	Republic of Venezuela	28 Jun. 1974
96	Republic of Niger	20 Jul. 1974
97	Federative Republic of Brazil	15 Aug. 1974
98	Republic of the Gambia	14 Dec. 1974

TABLE 4.1 cont.

Chronological Order	Name of Country	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
99	Republic of Botswana	6 Jan. 1975
100	Republic of the Philippines	9 Jun. 1975
101	People's Republic of Mozambique	25 Jun. 1975
102	Kingdom of Thailand	1 Jul. 1975
103	Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe	12 Jul. 1975
104	People's Republic of Bangladesh	4 Oct. 1975
105	Fiji	5 Nov. 1975
106	Western Samoa	6 Nov. 1975
107	Islamic Federal Republic of Comoros	13 Nov. 1975
108	Republic of Cape Verde	25 Apr. 1976
109	Republic of Surinam	28 May 1976
110	Seychelles Republic of	30 Jun. 1976
111	Papua New Guinea	12 Oct. 1976
112	Republic of Liberia	17 Feb. 1977
113	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	7 Apr. 1977
114	Barbados	30 May 1977
115	Sultanate of Oman	25 May 1978
116	Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	9 Aug. 1978
117	United States of America	1 Jan. 1979
118	Republic of Djibouti	8 Jan. 1979

TABLE 4.1 cont.

Chronological Order	Name of Country	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
119	Republic of Portugal	8 Feb. 1979
120	Republic of Ireland	22 Jun. 1979
121	Republic of Ecuador	2 Jan. 1980
122	Republic of Colombia	7 Feb. 1980
123	Republic of Zimbabwe	18 Apr. 1980
124	Republic of Kiribati	25 Jun. 1980
125	Republic of Vanuatu	26 Mar. 1982
126	Antigua and Barbuda	1 Jan. 1983
127	People's Republic of Angola	12 Jan. 1983
128	Republic of Ivory Coast	2 Mar. 1983
129	Kingdom of Lesotho	30 Apr. 1983
130	Holland	1 Feb. 1984

1. A mission of the Palestine Liberation Organization was set up in Beijing on 22 March 1965.

2. The Republic of Indonesia established diplomatic relations with China on 13 April 1950. On 23 October 1967, the Indonesian authorities announced the closing of the Indonesian Embassy in China and demanded that China close its embassy and consulates in Indonesia. On 27 October of the same year, China issued a statement in protest. Relations between the two countries were suspended three days later.

3. Holland is not included in the source cited below.

Source: China Handbook Series: Politics (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1985), pp. 175-190.

TABLE 4.2

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE 1950-85

(in million US \$)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
1950	620	590	1,210
1951	780	1,120	1,900
1952	875	1,015	1,890
1953	1,040	1,255	2,295
1954	1,060	1,290	2,350
1955	1,375	1,660	3,035
1956	1,635	1,485	3,120
1957	1,615	1,440	3,055
1958	1,940	1,825	3,765
1959	2,230	2,060	4,290
1960	1,960	2,030	3,990
1961	1,525	1,490	3,015
1962	1,520	1,150	2,670
1963	1,575	1,200	2,775
1964	1,750	1,470	3,220
1965	2,035	1,845	3,880
1966	2,210	2,035	4,245
1967	1,960	1,955	3,915
1968	1,960	1,825	3,785
1969	2,060	1,835	3,895
1970	2,080	2,245	4,325
1971	2,455	2,310	4,765
1972	3,150	2,850	6,000
1973	5,075	5,225	10,300
1974	6,660	7,420	14,080
1975	7,180	7,395	14,575
1976	7,250	6,005	13,255
1977	7,520	7,148	14,668
1978	9,745	10,915	20,660
1979	13,657	15,675	29,332
1980	18,139	19,505	37,644
1981	21,476	21,631	43,107
1982	21,865	18,920	40,785
1983	22,096	21,313	43,409
1984	24,824	25,953	50,777
1985 (July)	16,0843	25,4004	41,4847

Source: The figures for the period 1950-76 are taken from the following source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, China's International Trade, 1976-77 [ER 77-100674, November 1977, reproduced in T. Finger (Ed.), China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s (Colorado: Westview, 1980), p. 203 (Table 4.1)].

The figures for 1977 were compiled from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book 1983, 'China, People's Republic' (Washington D.C.: I.M.F., 1983), p.127.


The figures for the period 1978-84 were compiled from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1985, 'China, People's Republic' (Washington D.C.: I.M.F., 1985), p.137.

For four months after the Korean war, Chinese diplomacy was directed towards avoiding an escalation of the conflict. China warned the UN forces, which were in fact dominated and led by the United States, not to cross the 38th Parallel.²⁵ However, on the very day a Chinese General arrived at ^{the} UN to discuss possible plans for de-escalating the war and removing external forces from the area,²⁶ General McArthur's troops ignored China's warning and crossed the 38th Parallel. Thus, only six years after the end of the war against Japan, the Chinese once again faced a direct imperialist threat from across the Korean border.

Under these conditions, China feared that the American forces and Jiāng Jiesh's army might join together to occupy the vital industrial area of Manchuria. Consequently, in response to the American assault against Manchuria, when China's repeated warnings against foreign troops crossing the Yalu River were ignored, the Chinese government decided to intervene in the war. During the two-month interval (October to December 1950), North Korean troops were joined by Chinese troops in a determined bid to push the American forces back south of the 38th Parallel.

This war, which claimed thousands of lives,²⁷ placed an incredible strain on China's plan for economic development. At the same time, a direct outcome of the war was the decision of the United States to station the Seventh Fleet just off the Chinese coast in order to protect Taiwan. The American defence perimeter along the

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Source: J. Gittings, China and the World, 1922-1972
 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), p. 189.

The title of the map, the 38th parallel and changes of the old Chinese names to new ones are by the present author.

Pacific coast of China, which extended from Japan down to Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines²⁸ was thus bolstered. At the same time, along China's south and south-western border, the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, which was then under negotiation, would be expected to contain and protect the land mass bordering China's south-western provinces (i.e. Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Burma).

On the domestic scene, more stringent measures were taken against the remnants of the Guomintang forces which were seeking to exploit the 'war atmosphere'; measures which the Chinese authorities would perhaps have delayed under more favourable circumstances and which might have not even proved necessary.²⁹

In the sphere of external relations, China not only became more vulnerable to American threats, but also was in danger of increased economic restrictions. Diplomatically too, the chance of wresting China's seat in the organisation from the Guomintang government suddenly began to look rather remote. As a matter of fact, taking advantage of the Uniting for Peace resolution, the United States was able to get China condemned as an 'aggressor' in the UN General Assembly.³⁰ Sino-American reconciliation after the Korean war thus became too difficult even to contemplate. These developments resulted in an increase in China's economic and military dependence on the socialist bloc, especially on the Soviet Union.

However, despite the undesirable consequences (both internally and externally) of the Korean War, China did reap some political and ideological advantages.

First, under the Communist Party, China acquired international respect as never before and emerged as a power capable of challenging the United States, which at that time was undoubtedly the most powerful state in the world. That China 'taught the US a lesson' at a time when the Cold War was in an intensive state, simply added to its distinction on the international stage. China's actual performance in the war was proof of PRC's ability to play the role of a major power and its potential for eventual independence from the Soviet Union.

As a consequence of its determined opposition to imperialism China was able to exert its influence in the resolution of conflicts between Asian countries. Both at the Korean armistice negotiations and at the Geneva Conference following the First Vietnam War (between the Viet Minh and the French colonial power), China took part as one of the major interested powers. China followed this up with policies directed towards attaining diplomatic success in the Third World as a whole. This phase of Chinese diplomacy culminated in China's participation in the 1955 Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Bandung.

Second, not only was China well placed to remove military pressure along its northern borders, but it was also able to consolidate its revolution by ensuring the survival of the Socialist *Régime* in neighbouring North

Korea, which subsequently became China's most trusted ally. China's intervention in the war prevented American attempts to force the unity between the two parts of Korea under conditions of imperialist and capitalist domination.³¹ China's role in the Korean War thus represented an important contribution to the consolidation of the international socialist movement and anti-imperialist front.

In 1962, referring to the situation in Korea, Mao wrote as follows:

Even after the success of the revolution, Stalin feared that China might degenerate into another Yugoslavia and that I might become another Tito. I later went to Moscow and concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty Alliance. Stalin did not wish to sign the treaty; he finally signed it after two months of negotiations. It was only after our resistance to America and support for Korea [in the Korean War] that Stalin finally came to trust us.³²

Mao's retrospective assessment of the situation was intended to show that Stalin's misunderstanding of the Chinese Communists stemmed from differences over ideological questions involving Marxism-Leninism. For he doubted CCP's capability to lead China to a successful revolution which was taking place in a developing international atmosphere of Cold War and running into internal and external difficulties. In fact, Mao's purpose in offering such an assessment of Stalin was more to discredit Khrushchev than to compliment Stalin.

In response to the Sino-Soviet treaty, the Soviet Union did speed up the economic aid promised under its

provisions. This aid was critically important for China's First Five Year Plan. In September 1953, aid for the construction or renovation of 141 industrial enterprises was given to China. In October 1954, Khrushchev paid an official visit to Beijing, the first of its kind to China by a Soviet leader. During this visit, several agreements were concluded with China. These included arrangements for:

- i. The complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur before May 1955; (the removal of the Soviet military presence had had to be delayed because of the sudden eruption of hostilities between North and South Korea in 1950 and the sudden escalation of the war under American auspices).
- ii. The provision of credit to the amount of \$230 million for the construction of 15 additional industrial projects, and co-operation in the technological and scientific fields.
- iii. The transfer by the Soviet Union to China of its interests in the four mineral, petroleum, civil navigation and shipbuilding companies jointly controlled by the two powers.³³

Indeed, until 1956, the year in which Khrushchev publicly denounced Stalin, Sino-Soviet relations appeared to be progressing in a smooth manner.

As the negotiations for an armistice in the Korean War were proceeding apace, the first Vietnamese War (1946-54) was reaching its climax along China's southern border.

In the conflict, the French colonial power and its allies directed their hostility not only against the Viet Minh forces in Vietnam, but also against ^{the} PRC itself.

The author of an article published in The Guardian (2 January 1985) has pointed out that in a memorandum to the Cabinet, the British Chief of Staff stated that the Allies were prepared to use nuclear weapons against China before the Indo-China peace settlement.³⁴ In the event, the Allied powers decided against such an action, not because of moral considerations but for reasons stated in the memorandum of the British Chief of Staff:

Although the use of nuclear weapons in war against China would, from the military point of view, obviously be more effective than the use of conventional weapons, their deployment would have a serious effect on Asian opinion generally.³⁵

During the first Vietnamese War, China was Viet Minh's most important supporter.³⁶ This war culminated in the victory of the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu (in the spring of 1954), which was followed by the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China and Korea.³⁷

The Korean armistice (July 1953) and the end of the first Vietnamese War, following the signing of the Geneva accords on 26 July 1954 had, at least in the short term, the effect of reducing any direct threat to China's security that might have loomed large during the initial phase of the hostilities in the area. The net result of such a development was that China began to moderate its foreign policy.

By 1954, China's foreign policy had entered a new phase aimed at creating international conditions favourable for the emergence of a united front with a wide political and ideological base. China was prepared to recognise non-alignment as a sufficient base towards this direction.

This new line of China's foreign policy was adopted with vigour in its relations with non-aligned countries. India was the first country to sign a bilateral treaty with China embodying the five Principles of peaceful coexistence - the *Pancha Shila*^{(28 June 1954)³⁸}. A year later,

at the Bandung Conference (1955), the peaceful coexistence approach towards international relations was extended to Africa as well as other countries in the Third World.³⁹

NOTES

1. India even offered asylum to Tibetan separatists, including the Dalai Lama. This action was in violation of India's earlier position following the signing of the Pancha Shila agreement which recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet. (See S. S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 75.

In fact, India's behaviour not only seriously undermined its relations with China but also questioned the very basis of its non-aligned policy, that is, that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

2. See Map 4.1.
3. See ibidem.
4. In April 1978, it was reported that more than 100 Chinese fishing boats had entered the waters of the Senkaku (Tia Tuy Tai) islands. See Sussume Awanoora, 'An Ill wind from the Senkakus', Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (28 April 1978): 17, p. 10. For the Chinese position over their claim to the Senkaku islands as a part of Taiwan and hence an integral part of PRC, see ^{the} a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ^{the} PRC (30 December 1971) in Peking Review 15 (7 January 1972): 1, pp. 12-14. See also Peking Review 21 (30 June 1978): 26, p. 95.
5. The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (September 1984) has removed speculation concerning the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland in 1997. For the text of the Declaration see Beijing Review 27 (1 October 1984): 40.
6. See Beijing Review 28 (3 June 1985): 22, p. 6.
7. See J. Gittings, 'The origins of China's foreign policy', in D. Horowitz, (Ed.), Containment and Revolution (London: Anthony Blond, 1967), p. 205.
8. Mao Tse-tung, 'On the people's democratic dictatorship', in Selected Works (Vol. IV) (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969), p. 415. In October 1950, Zhou En-lai made a similar statement when he said that:

The People's Republic of China resolutely sides with the world camp of peace and democracy, headed by the Soviet Union

cited in People's China, 2 (16 October 1950): 8, p. 5.

9. On 16 December 1949, Mao went to Moscow. It was his first visit abroad.
10. Not many leaders would have stayed away from their country for such a long period, especially within two months of taking power. Mao must have been confident that the two-line struggle within the CCP would by no means undermine the popularity of his leadership with the masses.
11. This huge amount of Soviet economic aid was not, it must be explained, by way of charity or moral commitment. Payment of interest, albeit at very low rates, was required under the provision of the Sino-Soviet arrangements during the signing of the treaty of 1950.
12. For a documentary analysis of Soviet and Chinese views of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, see J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 43-52.
13. cited in J. Gittings, The World and China: 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 155.
14. From the end of the Second World War until at least 1954 when the Warsaw Pact was formed (May) (see Chapter 5, note 19), the Soviet Union was mainly preoccupied with Europe and the Cold War between the imperialist camp and the socialist bloc in this region.
15. However, it must be explained that Soviet reluctance to give direct support to China was not simply motivated by its commitments in Europe. Soviet distrust of China has been an important factor in determining Sino-Soviet relations. This means that, so far as the Soviet Union was concerned, military aid to China on a large scale was less desirable than economic assistance. An economically powerful China was perhaps acceptable, but a militarily powerful one was not. A militarily strong China would not only be potentially difficult to control or to keep within a Soviet-led socialist bloc; it would also undermine the Soviet claim to the leadership of the anti-imperialist front in the world as a whole and in the third world in particular - a region of the world with which China would most strongly identify.
16. It must have been in the minds of the CCP leaders that their triumph over the Nationalists during the crucial 1947-1948 period would contribute to the spread of revolutionary struggle throughout the rest

of Asia, in a way similar to the influence exerted by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. However, despite this, when armed uprisings did occur in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines in 1948, CCP was not in a position to provide concrete assistance to these movements, either before or after it took power in China.

17. Chinese training and military support played a great part in building the Vietnamese People's Army. By the summer of 1950, it was reported that 4,000 Vietnamese conscripts had returned from China after receiving basic military training and political indoctrination. See J. Taylor, China and South East Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements (London: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 5.
18. See Chapter 12.2.1.1 of this work.
19. See, for example, J. Armstrong, op.cit., passim
20. Chou En-lai on 'China's New National Day' (1 October 1949) cited in J. Gittings, The World and China 1922-72, op.cit., p. 153.
21. See Introduction to this work.
22. Until January 1950, China had diplomatic relations only with the socialist countries [i.e. Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Korea (DPRK), Poland, Mongolia, Germany (Democratic Republic), Albania and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam] ^{see} (Table 4.1.). Although Yugoslavia recognised PRC right from the beginning, relations between the two countries were only established on 2 January 1955.
23. These were India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and Afghanistan (see Table 4.1).
24. That is, Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden). British recognition of ^{the} PRC was not based on a de facto recognition of the reality of communist China; rather, it had as its main basis the safeguarding of British interests in and the colonial status of Hong Kong, as well as the protection of British trade and investment in the Chinese mainland. Politically, Britain rather) entertained the forelorn hope that China might avoid becoming totally aligned with the Soviet Union. India's recognition of PRC must have served as a stimulus to Britain's recognition, for India was, after all, an important member of the newly-refurbished Commonwealth.
25. See Map 4.1.
For a clear account and documentary analysis of the Korean issue and its implications for the United

States as well as the Soviet Union and PRC, see, for example, P. R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975). See also I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (London: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

26. J. Gittings, The World and China: 1922-74, op.cit., p. 182.
27. Mao's son was among the victims of this war.
28. See Map 4.1.
29. See J. Gittings, 'China's Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change', Journal of Contemporary Asia 2 (1972): 2, p. 24.
For a more analytical treatment of the consequences of the Korean War, see J. Gittings, China and the World: 1922-72, op.cit., pp. 180-195.
30. Under United States auspices, ^{the} UN passed a resolution (30 January 1951) by a vote of 44 to 7 (adopted first by the United States on 19 January 1951) branding China as an 'aggressor'. See P. R. Simmons, op.cit., p. 190.
31. For the American terms for a ceasefire in the Korean War, see ibid., pp. 186-193.
32. cited in J. Gittings, 'The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy', China Quarterly, no. 39 (July-September 1969), p. 44.
33. K. C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 12.
34. Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Notion of nuclear attack rejected: China', The Guardian (2 January 1985), p. 3.
35. Ibidem.
36. See note 17 above.
37. The first Indo-China War ended with the convocation of the General Conference (26 April-20 July 1954). This conference was supposed to discuss both the Korean and the Indo-Chinese issues. The case of Korea, however, was eventually dropped from the agenda after a deadlock in the talks between the powers concerned with this issue. Thus, following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (7 May 1954), only the case of Indo-China was seriously considered. On the next day (8 May), the participants (France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, the Viet Minh, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) began serious negotiations.

38. A day later (29 June), China concluded a similar agreement with Burma which repeated the five principles of peaceful coexistence stated in the Pancha Shila. These were mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. See People's China (16 August 1954), p. 5.
39. There were indications of China's new policy during the earlier phase (1949-55). Thus, in 1951, at a meeting in Moscow, the communist countries seriously discussed the possibility of engaging in trade relations with non-communist countries. In October 1952, at a conference on 'Peace in Asia and the Pacific', held in Beijing, China proclaimed its

..... adherence to the new line of economic and social systems, and advocated a halt to fighting in various countries of South East Asia.

[see A. G. Marsot, 'The Chinese Perspective', in S. Chawla (Ed.), South East Asia under the New Balance of Power (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 55].

During the negotiations on the Korean issue, Zhou En-lai even insisted that prisoners of war should be turned over to a non-aligned country rather than to UN. This must be seen as an early recognition of non-alignment. Also, in a political report to the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference (4 February 1954), nearly 4 months before the signing of the Pancha Shila, Zhou En-lai affirmed that 'countries with different systems can coexist peacefully'. [See for example, Shao Kuo-kang, 'Chou En-lai's Diplomatic Approach to Non-Aligned States in Asia', China Quarterly no. 78 (June 1979), p. 324.]

CHAPTER 5

COEXISTENCE WITH ANTI-COLONIALIST FORCES: 1955-59

We have to admit that among our Asian and African countries, we do have different ideologies and different social systems. But this does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being united. Many independent countries have appeared since the Second World War. One group of them are countries led by the Communist Parties; another group of them are countries led by nationalists. There are not many countries in the first group...The countries in the second group are greater in number...Both of these groups of countries have become independent from the colonial rule and are still continuing their struggle for independence. Is there any reason why we cannot understand and respect each other...We Asian and African countries, China included, are all backward economically and culturally. In as much as our Asian-African Conference does not exclude anybody, why couldn't we ourselves...enter into friendly co-operation?'

By the mid-'50s, three major international developments appeared to signify the emergence of a new phase in China's foreign policy - a phase in which China was prepared to accept the reality of having to function in a world which was predominantly non-socialist in character. These developments were:

- i. National independence movements and national liberation struggles against colonialism and imperialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America were gathering fresh momentum.

- ii. The imperialist powers took the offensive in order to contain communism more effectively by establishing military bases in allied countries and client states as well as by signing regional collective security treaties (e.g. NATO, SEATO, CENTO etc.) with them.
- iii. Unlike the situation obtaining during the first stage of China's foreign policy (1949-54), diplomatic relations with governments such as India and Indonesia were not yet brought to full fruition leading to closer² 'political' co-operation which had to await the Bandung Conference. By the mid-'50s, these countries expressed through their policies a strong desire to be politically independent of imperialist powers in general and the United States in particular. In relation to the struggle against the colonialist and imperialist powers in South East Asia, China welcomed the progressive role played by non-aligned countries such as India. During the Korean crisis, India refrained from voting in favour of the resolution condemning China as an aggressor. Instead, India took the view that the Korean issue could be solved only by ^{the} PRC³ playing its rightful role as a regular member of UN.⁴ India's commitment to non-alignment had found expression even as early as 1949 when Nehru said that

We are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral.⁵

India took part as an informal participant⁶ in the proceedings of the 1954 Geneva Conference. It played an active mediating role in the discussions that led up to the signing of the Geneva accords (1954). India was asked to chair the International Commission for Supervision and Control⁷ of the Geneva accords.⁸

China responded to these developments by accepting that non-aligned countries constituted a progressive force with which it was prepared not only to coexist, but also to co-operate, particularly during the period 1955-58.

However, China's understanding of non-alignment was based on the 10 principles enunciated at the Bandung Conference. It was a far cry from the rather conservative mould in which non-alignment was to be set towards the end of the decade by such leading practitioners as India and Yugoslavia and reflected in the First Non-Aligned Summit Meeting (Belgrade: September 1961).⁹ For the Chinese, non-alignment could be meaningful and practical only if it was positive in character in its opposition to colonialism and imperialism (positive non-alignment). China's main concern lay in the emergence of Afro-Asian solidarity in the Bandung spirit so that the struggle against colonialism and imperialism could be pushed forward. Within this context, China's attitude towards non-alignment, as viewed by Camilleri, was

...to create the basis for a provisional alliance between the socialist and neutralist camps by demonstrating its support for the process of de-colonisation, by encouraging the policy of non-alignment and where possible enhancing its

radical content and by strengthening the anti-Western tendencies underlying the outlook of much of the Afro-Asian world.¹⁰

It was on this basis that China developed an increasingly flexible attitude towards the Afro-Asian world, and its relations with Asian and African countries became more positive in character. According to Camilleri, the Chinese saw this policy as

...an effective means of containing the expansion of the US military presence in the Asian rim lands, of strengthening the Afro-Asian movement for national independence and of cementing the bonds between the newly independent states, thereby creating a region of peace free from great power intervention...the intention...was to demonstrate China's independence of the Soviet Union as well as her capacity to thwart the American policy of containment.¹¹

The Geneva Conference (April 1954) represented China's diplomatic debut in international relations on a basis of equality with major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain).¹² At this conference, China played an important part in establishing the political conditions for a ceasefire in the first Vietnamese War against French colonialism. China thus came to be an independent power in its own right and not a client of the Soviet Union.

A year later, in April 1955, China played a prominent role in the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian powers. China's international activities during the Geneva and Bandung Conference enhanced its diplomatic status. Moreover, China attached great importance to a regional

policy aimed at containing the American pressure on its western and southern neighbours. It was in this atmosphere of relative calm that China launched its First Five Year Plan (1953-57). Within this context, Zhou Enlai explained (August 1955) China's aim of peaceful coexistence as follows:

...we all recognise that socialist construction and socialist transformation are gigantic and arduous tasks. Therefore, at home, we need the strength of a united people, and abroad we need a peaceful international environment. Only thus can the early conversion of China into a prosperous, mighty and happy socialist state be assured.¹³

However, the relative calm of the years 1953-54 was seriously undermined by offensive moves directed by the United States to containing China along its eastern and south-eastern borders. The failure of the American strategy in the Korean War and refusal of the United States to sign the Geneva accords on Indo-China¹⁴ were followed by direct American military pressure along China's eastern borders. China's aim of absorbing Taiwan became, in the words of Gittings, not only

...a question of assuaging national pride, but rather a necessary step to diminish the American threat from a potentially explosive quarter.¹⁵

By the end of the Geneva Conference (July 1954) the United States and Taiwan were already well on their way to concluding a Mutual Defence Treaty.¹⁶ In the same year (8 September 1954) the United States had brought the South

East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) into being. In January 1955, the American President was authorised by Congress to commit American forces to the defence of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu (among others) if, in his judgement, China was likely to attack Taiwan.¹⁷ In March 1955, Dulles (the United States Secretary of State) issued a statement threatening China with dire consequences should it be tempted to engage in open armed aggression against Taiwan.¹⁸

Hence, although by 1954 China had neutralised the pressure along its north-eastern border and gained a diplomatic victory by winning the support of the non-aligned states (including its neighbours, India and Burma), the eastern borders had become more vulnerable to America's nuclear threat than they had been at any previous time. The Seventh Fleet of the United States was active in the Chinese territorial waters near the islands lying between Formosa and mainland China. In the wake of these serious developments, China felt that it was left with no option but to make clear its determination to press its claims on what it regarded as an integral part of China. Thus, on 3 September 1954, China embarked on a low profile offensive in which the offshore islands were shelled. Internationally, this action was aimed at eliciting the sympathy of the world community, particularly the newly independent states, and testing the depth of Soviet commitment to China's security.

The Soviet Union however, did not wish to be deflected from its preoccupation with European problems

and the negotiations that were then under way leading to the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁹ The Soviet Union would have much preferred a negotiated political settlement on the question of Taiwan and the offshore islands. It favoured the preservation of the military *status quo* in the areas surrounding the Chinese mainland. Once it became clear that the Chinese were implacably opposed to any American presence in areas which they regarded as an integral part of China, the Soviet Union sought to internationalise the issue.²⁰ Such a Soviet policy naturally was strongly opposed by China, Zhou Enlai, for example, affirmed at the Bandung Conference that the liberation of Taiwan and the coastal islands

...is entirely a matter of our own internal affairs and exercise of our sovereignty.²¹

By April 1955 the Chinese were able to place the American military forces on the offshore islands on the defensive, thus temporarily reducing the tensions affecting these areas. China, for its part, was at this stage anxious to avoid prolonged conflict with the United States which would have prevented its concentrating on the task of implementing the First Five Year Plan. The Chinese government therefore, sought talks with the United States, aimed at bringing about (at least temporarily) a de-escalation of the American threat.²² At the Eight-Nation Meeting (April 1955) to discuss the question of reducing the tension in the Far East, Zhou Enlai affirmed the Chinese desire of holding talks with the United States.

The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States of America. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.²³

This was an appropriate policy, especially in view of the consideration that the Soviet Union was not prepared to commit itself to full support of China in the event of a direct Sino-American confrontation. The Soviet Union had already adhered to such a position during the Korean War.²⁴

At the same time, it was also clear to China that if it wished to appear in 'the best possible light'²⁵ at the then forthcoming Bandung Conference which was to be attended by the Heads of a number of anti-communist *régimes*, multilateral diplomatic overtures and political approaches would be more fruitful than direct military confrontation with the world's greatest Superpower.

Improving its international image in order to secure wider support for gaining admission into UN; international isolation of Taiwan; promoting trade relations with the newly independent countries of the world and reducing or (if possible) eliminating the influence of the United States in the neighbouring states, constituted the very basis of China's international activities during the period 1955-1959. China did not wish to pursue policies that could be interpreted as being hostile to the neighbouring non-communist Third World states, for it was

anxious to avail itself of every opportunity to broaden the anti-imperialist front and avoid alienating such important and potentially anti-imperialist countries as India, Burma and Egypt.

American attempts to establish as many military alliances as possible against communist countries could be undermined only by seeking co-operation with non-communist countries which were opposed to joining such alliances. Thus China came to regard the non-aligned countries as constituting a zone of peace. Non-alignment could indeed, under such circumstances, constitute an obstacle to the expansionist designs of imperialist powers.

A commercial agreement with India, signed in April 1954, represented the first practical step in this direction. Two months later (June 1954) Zhou Enlai paid an official visit to India where he signed the *Panch Shila* agreement with Nehru.²⁶ At the Bandung Conference these principles of peaceful coexistence were reaffirmed by Zhou Enlai and extended to all Third World countries. By the mid-'50s, the Third World had become a main focus of China's international relations. Representatives of 29 Asian and African countries²⁷ i.e. 1.3 billion people or more than half of the world's population met for the first time at Bandung in 1955 (18-24 April). The conference was guided by the following four major objectives which had been outlined earlier (December 1954) at Bogor in Indonesia²⁸

- i. To promote goodwill and co-operation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and

advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly relations;

- ii. To consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented;
- iii. To consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, for example, problems affecting national sovereignty and of racism and colonialism;
- iv. To review the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.²⁹

China created a favourable impression on the minds of visiting statesmen, who approved of its new conciliatory international policy, while at the same time taking note of its importance as a large Asian country, its past history of subjection to semi-colonialism and imperialism, and its economic character as a developing country. Taking all these factors into consideration, it was natural that those attending the Bogor meeting should have decided to invite China to attend the Bandung Conference.³⁰ During this conference, Zhou Enlai played a prominent role, and succeeded in winning friends, presenting China as a conciliatory and peaceful country, and confirming its readiness to adhere in practice to the principles of peaceful coexistence. Zhou Enlai argued that:

In the interest of defending world peace, we Asian and African countries, which are more or less under similar circumstances, should be the first to co-operate with one another in a friendly manner and put peaceful coexistence into practice. The discord and separation created among the Asian and African countries by colonial rule in the past should no longer be there. We Asian and African countries should respect one another and eliminate any suspicion and fear which may exist between us.³¹

The conference ended by adopting ten major principles which were embodied in a final communique. These were as follows:

- i. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- ii. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
- iii. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.
- iv. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
- v. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- vi. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the Big Powers.
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

- vii. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
- viii. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiations, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- ix. Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.
- x. Respect for justice and international obligations.³²

At the Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai made the acquaintance of Nasser. A year later, Egypt accorded recognition to ^{the} PRC. Egypt soon became a major political and ideological base for China's links with Africa, particularly following the first Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference which took place in Cairo (1957). Indeed China's role in both the Geneva and Bandung Conferences resulted in its gaining considerable international respect. An era of favourable foreign and diplomatic relations was thus begun for China. During the period 1954-1959, 15 countries extended diplomatic recognition to ^{the} PRC. These included seven Asian and four African countries. During 1956 and 1957, Zhou Enlai visited eight Asian countries³³ where he was well

received.³⁴ At the same time, Asian leaders also began a succession of visits to China.

During this period, when China's international activities were guided by attempts to secure its revolution and to forge links of an anti-imperialist nature with under-developed countries, the new leadership of the Soviet Union was already engaged in the task of refurbishing Soviet foreign policy in a radical manner. Following Stalin's death (5 March 1953), the new Soviet leadership recognised the need to coexist with the national bourgeois *régimes* of the Third World. In doing so, the Soviet aims were brought into line with those of China. But, unlike China, the Soviet Union desired peaceful coexistence with US imperialism as well. This development constituted a fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy and eventually led to the Sino-Soviet split. The Chinese regarded the Soviet *Détente* with the United States as a serious blow to the national liberation movements and revolutionary forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This was particularly important in view of the aggressive stance adopted by the United States towards anti-imperialist forces³⁵ throughout the Third World. As Claude comments, for the Chinese,

coexistence with Asian nationalist was acceptable, but with the leader of the imperialist camp was not.³⁶

The Chinese insisted that peaceful coexistence should never be applied to relations between the oppressed and oppressor nations. China's ideological approach to the governments of the newly independent countries was motivated at least in part by the aim of forming a worldwide united front against American imperialism by winning over the national bourgeois *régimes*, especially those of the Third World. China also hoped that it could use its diplomacy to stimulate the non-socialist but anti-imperialist nations of the world into making a positive response to the radical forces in their domestic policies.

Whatever the Chinese expectations of the changes brought about by Stalin's successors in the sphere of international relations might have been, they had already succeeded in forging close links in their own right with the countries of the Third World, particularly during and after the Bandung Conference, as has already been indicated. The Chinese had also succeeded in pursuing their policies towards the Third World countries without compromising the objectives of the socialist countries. In fact, Chinese policies had, during this period, contributed to a widening of the anti-imperialist front far beyond the confines of the socialist world.

However, during the years following the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 1956), the Sino-Soviet friendship, which had reached its peak during the mid-'50s, began to decline. On this occasion, besides denouncing Stalin and the

personality cult, Khrushchev went so far as to dismiss the necessity of armed struggle and war against imperialism.³⁷

China was not pleased with this development, for although they were critical of Stalin's cult of the individual and his wrong assessment of the Chinese revolution, before liberation it had always remained firm in its rejection of coexistence with imperialism.

In fact the Chinese regarded Stalin as a great leader of the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist front. At a meeting of the Polit-buro of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (25 April 1956), Mao delivered a speech entitled "On the Ten Major Relationships",³⁸ in which he stated that:

It is the opinion of the Central Committee that Stalin's mistakes amount to only thirty per cent of the whole and his achievements to seventy per cent, and that all things considered, Stalin was nonetheless a great Marxist... This assessment of thirty per cent for mistakes and seventy per cent for achievements is just about right. Stalin did a number of wrong things in connection with China. The 'left' adventurism pursued by Wang Ming in the latter part of the Second Revolutionary Civil war period and his right opportunism in the early days of the War of Resistance against Japan can be both traced to Stalin. At the time of the War of Liberation Stalin first would not let us press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation ran the risk of destroying itself. Then when fighting did erupt, he took us half seriously, half sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very great indeed.³⁹

Despite the growing rift between the Chinese and the Soviet policies, China was anxious to avoid direct criticism of Soviet foreign policy. Instead, it pursued a policy that on the one hand avoided a split in the socialist bloc, and on the other hand attempted to press for a consistent Soviet anti-American foreign policy.

At the same time, China favoured a policy of supporting countries in the socialist camp which approached the task of socialist construction in a flexible and independent manner in accordance with local conditions. China agreed with the Soviet view that the Hungarian uprising (November 1956) was anti-socialist in character. In fact CCP went even further, by questioning the Socialist structure of Hungary, and claiming that

It is doubtful whether a dictatorship of the proletariat was ever really established in Hungary.⁴⁰

China's position during the Polish uprising (October 1956) was however dramatically off-hand. Here China was opposed to Soviet intervention, arguing that every socialist state should be left free to develop in its own right and that in any case Poland had not the slightest intention of relinquishing socialism.

Poland has insisted on its socialist system. It has continued its support of the Warsaw Treaty and its policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. But in Hungary the counter-revolutionaries have the upper hand and the Nagy Government has announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty.⁴¹

China now stressed that each socialist state or communist movement should be allowed to build socialism in accordance with its own local conditions, and that the socialist bloc as a whole should look to fashion a united international strategy against imperialism. However, in both the Hungarian and the Polish cases, China and the Soviet Union adopted a similar position in practice.⁴² Eventually the Soviet Union did refrain from physical intervention in Poland, perhaps because of China's mediating role during the Polish crisis or perhaps because 'neither China nor Russia wanted anarchy within the Communist bloc'.⁴³

At the Communist and Workers' Parties Conference (1957), China and the Soviet Union attempted to heal their potential rift. The Soviet Union outlined a dual strategy. While sticking to its original determination to achieve peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union also appeared to recognise the need for armed struggle against imperialism and its allies.

However, the concept of armed struggle was incompatible with the post-Stalin doctrine of peaceful transition to socialism and stabilisation of its relations with the United States. In practice, therefore, armed struggles and national liberation movements were relegated to 'a level of relative unimportance'⁴⁴ in the Soviet scheme of international relations. In its new role as a major world power, the Soviet Union had become much more concerned with its rivalry with the United States and competition for spheres of influence in different parts of

the world, than in 'strengthening the anti-imperialist front'.⁴⁵

The successful test of an international ballistic missile and the launching of the first artificial satellites (July 1957) were not intended as a prelude to a harder Soviet line against imperialism,⁴⁶ but rather they were a pre-requisite to protracted negotiations with the United States which eventually led to *Détente*. The Soviet leader's revised view of the world was in contradiction with Lenin's conviction that war between imperialism and socialism was inevitable, for he now argued that a situation of war could no longer exist in the nuclear era. The Soviet emphasis on coexistence even went so far as to advocate avoidance of local wars against imperialism.

China argued the opposite view, suggesting that Soviet technological success, coupled with the transformation of national independence movements into armed struggles for liberation, could put an end to imperialism without any need for 'peaceful coexistence' with it.

China pronounced the view that imperialism was a paper tiger and the tide of revolution was strong enough to drive the U.S.A. and its European allies into a defensive position...the international role of Western European countries was predicated upon the view that they, together with the U.S.A., constituted a united imperialist bloc in contradiction with socialism and national liberation throughout the world.⁴⁷

In line with its own assessment of the situation emerging in the late '50s, China continued to be a strong supporter of people's wars and guerrilla warfare. Thus, for example, the Algerian anti-colonial war was one of the cases in which the attitudes of the Soviet Union and China markedly differed. China openly supported the Algerian armed struggle against French colonialism.

The Sino-Soviet split began to widen, particularly when the Soviet Union, instead of rushing to China's support, admonished it for shelling the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu (August-October 1958), which were under American nuclear and naval threat. At the same time, the Soviet Union denounced the sharp turn to the left taken by China, particularly in the economic sphere.

By the end of 1957, China, after a long debate which dated back to at least the time of Mao's famous speech on the Ten Major relationships⁴⁸ (April 1956), had already prepared a new model of economic development, which called for rapid industrial progress and the Great Leap Forward policy in the sphere of agriculture (People's Communes).

Even though Soviet aid had been a substantial contribution to the revival of the Chinese economy, the Soviet model of development had failed to create conditions of rapid economic and social growth in China. China therefore decided to embark on an alternative strategy which resulted in the policy of the Great Leap Forward which was formally inaugurated in May 1958.⁴⁹

The Soviet Union feared that the Great Leap Forward would prove to be an attractive model to the

underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as to some of the economically and agriculturally backward socialist countries. Thus, not only was China's revolutionary model of armed struggle against colonialism and imperialism (People's War) undermining the Soviet model of peace, but, in addition, the Soviet model of economic development was challenged by the international implications of the Great Leap Forward. The Soviet Union saw this as a serious threat to its claim to the leadership of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement.

China's leaders gradually reached the conclusion that Stalin's successors represented a new class, which was emerging in the Soviet Union and would eventually lead it to a form of capitalism. The Soviet Union propagated the view that economic development should be based on the strategy of each socialist country achieving the transformation from socialism to communism by concentrating on its own specific problems (and, by implication, not considering the needs of weaker socialist countries or of the socialist camp as a whole). This approach was thrust upon all the other socialist countries, including China.⁵⁰ However, China had already launched its own plan, the Great Leap Forward (1958-62), by which:

the process of building socialism and the beginning of Communism could be accelerated.⁵¹

China's Second Five Year Plan (1958-62) did not follow the Soviet model of development. It was purely Chinese in character. The Great Leap Forward claimed to

harness the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses to go all out, aim high, achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism on both the agricultural and industrial fronts.⁵²

From 1957 onwards, a number of developments took place which radically affected the relationship between China and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and between CCP and CPSU on the other. By 1963, the hostility between the two great socialist neighbours had reached fever pitch. The *Détente* between the Soviet Union and the United States had begun after it became clear that the policy of containment of communism under Eisenhower (Dulles and Nixon) had proved to be counterproductive in the aftermath of Stalin's death and particularly against a background of mounting Soviet challenge in the sphere of space technology. As *Détente* progressed, the United States concentrated its active hostility towards the socialist world movement in general and China in particular.⁵³ By 1957, Sino-American talks on such issues as Taiwan and the offshore islands (which began in August 1955) had come to a deadlock. In December, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the talks. The United States had already decided in May to deploy nuclear-tipped surface-to-surface Matador missiles in both South Korea and Taiwan. In June 1957 Dulles, the American Secretary

of State, stressed that 'Communism is repugnant to the Chinese people' and that communism in China was:

a passing not perpetual phase...We owe it to ourselves, our allies and the Chinese people to contribute to its passing.⁵⁴

In September 1958, the United States not only deployed its nuclear-tipped missiles ostensibly for the protection of Taiwan, but, more seriously, it posed a grave threat to the security of the mainland from the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The Soviet Union again failed to rally to the support of China in the face of the American threat that was thus looming on the horizon. Instead, it became even more firmly wedded to its policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. That such a policy would have to be pursued at the expense of an intimate socialist ally such as China did not appear to matter.

Soviet foreign relations during this period became increasingly governed by the Soviet Union's economic, strategic and political interests. In June 1959, the Soviet leaders made it clear that they had no intention of assisting China to develop its own nuclear capacity. The obvious aim of such a policy was to prevent China from becoming a strong power in its own right. Soviet aid to China was rapidly scaled down.

There is reason to believe that, towards the end of the '50s, China felt somewhat aggrieved that the amount of

Soviet aid it received bore no comparison with Soviet aid to such non-socialist countries as Egypt.⁵⁵

While it is true that the very large population of China would be able to absorb almost all the extra Soviet resources available, the Chinese felt strongly that their needs should be given priority because of China's position as an important socialist ally of the Soviet Union. However, by 1960, in the wake of a damaging encounter between the Chinese and the Soviet delegates at the Third Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party (June 1959), the Soviet economic and technical mission was formally withdrawn.⁵⁶

After 1954, the gap left by the departure of the French colonial power in Indo-China was filled by American forces in violation of the Geneva accords. In Iraq, following the overthrow (14 June 1958) of its close ally, King Faisal the Second (Faisal El Ghazi) the United States (along with Britain) threatened to put down the successful revolution by force unless the new revolutionary *régime*, led by Abdo El Karim Quassim, agreed to leave the Western oil companies undisturbed.⁵⁷

In 1958, Cuban revolutionaries were able to depose the oppressive President Fulgencio Batista. The United States reacted to this development by issuing a direct threat to the Cuban revolutionaries and intensifying pressure on the new revolutionary government.⁵⁸

In China itself a crisis was brewing in Tibet in which, according to the Chinese authorities, external forces were attempting to undermine China's efforts to

unify the territory.⁵⁹ The international tension between India and China can be attributed to the former's intervention in what China jealously regarded as its own internal affairs by offering asylum to the Dalai Lama and giving refuge to nearly 13,000 Tibetans.⁶⁰ The tension generated by such developments externally and the design of the Chinese government and ^{the} CCP to initiate the Great Leap Forward internally contributed to a hardening of the Chinese foreign policy. A new stage in Chinese foreign relations was thus inaugurated (1959-66).

NOTES

1. Chou En-lai, Supplementary Speech at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference (19 April 1955), supplement to People's China (16 May 1955), pp. 11-12.
2. Until 1954, relations between China and countries such as India and Burma had only reached the stage of negotiations over national and political issues. Sino-Indian negotiations, which had begun as early as January 1950 (following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries), only attained a friendly atmosphere and political understanding after the signing of the Pancha Shila in May 1954 [see K. M. Panikkan, In Two Chinas (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953)]. However, in the case of Burma, Sino-Burmese relations became more relaxed only after the signing of the five principles of peaceful co-existence between these two countries in May 1954. (See Chapter 4, note 38 of this work.) After this, the two countries were motivated to solve their border dispute in an amicable manner by concluding a preliminary boundary agreement in 1960.
3. India was the first non-communist country to establish diplomatic relations with PRC. See Table 4.1.
4. See A. Appadorai (ed.) Essays in Politics and International Relations (London: Asia Publishing House, 1969), pp. 139-144.
5. The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Special Number: Modern India 12 (August 1966): 2.
6. The United States was opposed to India's attendance at the Conference. Neither India's non-alignment nor its role in the Korean War were acceptable to the United States adventurous designs in Asia.
7. Poland and Canada were the other members.
8. The Geneva Agreement was signed (20 July 1954) between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (based in the north, with Hanoi as the capital). Under the ceasefire terms, the French troops would be confined to the south of the country until their evacuation was completed. At the same time, the People's Army of DVR would be concentrated north of the 17th Parallel, which was set as the provisional demarcation line between the two parts of Vietnam. According to the Agreement, the division of the country was to end after an election, which was to be held in 1956, with a view to reuniting the whole country. However, these elections never took place. The United States, which refused to sign the Geneva Agreement was therefore not bound by it. The United

States, in cooperation with France, established a loyal government in the south. Both of these imperialist powers, the United States and France, and their allies, feared that if elections took place DRV would win the majority of the Vietnamese votes. In order to prevent the possibility of elections the United States decided to intervene directly in Vietnam. For the full text of the Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam and the final declaration of the Geneva Conference, see D. Lancaster, 'The Conference at Geneva', in M. E. Gettleman, Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions on a Major Crisis (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 144-159.

9. During the '60s, China's major concern lay in Afro-Asian solidarity, not with non-alignment. China's attempt to hold a second Bandung Conference in Algiers was a practical example of this position. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
10. J. Camilleri, op.cit., p. 78.
11. Ibid., p. 80.
In Asia, China's strategy of non-alignment was to create a buffer zone that might, at least in the short term, enhance its security and prevent the United States from expanding its physical threats territorially. See, for example, A. M. Halpern, 'The Chinese Communist Line on Non-alignment', China Quarterly no. 5 (1961), pp. 99-115.
12. Participants included France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), Cambodia and Laos. Dulles, the American Secretary of State, had left the conference before the beginning of the talks on the Indo-China issue. The United States was represented only by Walter Bedell Smith, its Under-Secretary of State. The United States hoped the conference would fail so that it would be free to continue to play its role as the leading imperialist power.
13. Chou En-lai, (Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs), 'The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy', People's China (16 August 1955), pp. 3-5.
14. America therefore felt that it was under no obligation to observe the terms of the ceasefire.
15. J. Gittings, The World and China: 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 197.
16. This treaty was eventually concluded on 2 December 1954.

17. See H. C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., p. 29.
18. Ibid., passim.
19. As a reaction to the setting up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 4 April 1949), the socialist countries began talks to consider the formation of a similar organization on their side. This possibility was seriously considered, particularly following the Paris Agreements among the Western Allies which were aimed at forming the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and including it in the military organization of NATO. A month later (2 November 1954), representatives of 8 East European countries (the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania) met in Moscow. At this meeting, they discussed the possibility of setting up a military organization for ensuring their security on a basis of mutuality. A few days after the Paris Agreements came into force (5 May 1955), the socialist countries met in Warsaw (11-14 May 1955), where they founded the Warsaw Pact. China attended the meeting as an observer. In 1968, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. However, even from 1962 onwards, following Soviet Union's *détent* with the United States and other ideological disputes, Albania had not taken part in the meetings of the Warsaw Treaty.
20. It is worth remembering that despite direct intervention by the United States, the Formosa issue had essentially been a domestic one, affecting only PRC and Taiwan.
21. Chou En-lai, 'Supplementary Speech at the Afro-Asian Conference', (19 April 1955), in People's China (16 May 1955), p. 11.
22. Before the Sino-American negotiations following the Korean crisis were begun in 1955, Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General, had visited Beijing to prepare the way. His aim was to negotiate on behalf of the United States for the release of six American prisoners of war held during the Korean crisis. Later during the year (August), talks began at ambassadorial level between the United States and China. The subjects of these talks included the release of Americans held in China, the use of force in the Taiwan Straits, the lifting of trade embargoes, exchange of official visits, exploring the possibility of a cultural pact between the two countries and the exchange of students, scholars and journalists. However, these talks reached a deadlock in July 1958. Neither the United States nor China was prepared to abandon its position towards central issues, particularly in the cases of Taiwan and of

the American military presence in the Taiwan Straits. For a detailed and analytical discussion of Sino-American relations during the '50s and '60s, see, for example, J. Gittings, The World and China: 1922-1972, op.cit., Part 2; J. Camelleri, op.cit., Chapters 2 and 7; and R. MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations 1949-1971 (Newton Abbot: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972).

23. People's China (16 May 1955), p. 13..
24. Unlike the dispute over Taiwan, United States intervention in Korea threatened Soviet security along its border with Korea.
25. quoted from H. C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., p. 29.
26. The five principles of peaceful coexistence (Pancha Shila) were: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.
27. These included two socialist states - China and North Vietnam - and 27 non-communist countries - viz. Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Siam (Thailand), South Vietnam, Syria, Sudan, Turkey and Yemen.
28. The Bogor meeting was attended by the Prime Ministers of Indonesia, India, Ceylon, Burma and Pakistan.
29. G. McT. Kahin, Afro-Asian Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 3.
30. Neither the Western powers nor the Soviet Union was included among the countries involved. China, though by no means non-aligned in view of its close association with the Soviet Union, was seen as an Asian country entitled to attend such a conference, in the same manner as Pakistan and Ceylon, which were pro-Western in their general orientation, were also allowed to attend. For obvious reasons, Western powers were excluded. The general targets of the Bandung Conference were the colonial powers and their imperialist ambitions.

In the case of the Soviet Union, as the leading military power of the Warsaw Pact (of which China had never been a member: see note 19 above), and as one directly involved in the Cold War with the imperialist camp, it was excluded. In fact, despite

its anti-imperialist nature, the Soviet Union was viewed by many participants at the Bandung Conference as one of their targets. This was because of the Soviet Union's military alignment and dominant position in international relations. In addition, it must have been in the minds of many African and Asian leaders - as it was indeed subsequently made clear (see Chapter 13.3.3 of this work) - and observers represented at the conference, that despite the fact that two-thirds of the Soviet land-mass was in Asia, the Soviet capital and most of its strategic and political concerns, were in Europe.

Furthermore, the Bandung Conference consisted of economically backward countries and peoples, of which most, if not all (including China), had been or were still under colonial and imperialist domination. It was this factor that linked China, as a communist power, with the African and Asian countries in the common tasks of economic development and opposition to colonialism. The Soviet Union, with its superpower status, did not share these tasks. However, during the first three years after Stalin's death (1954-56), the Soviet Union was slowly edging towards a position which permitted recognition of the value of cooperating with national bourgeois regimes of Third World countries which were non-aligned in character.

The Soviet Union was not yet enthusiastic about attending the Bandung Conference and had not sought participation by promoting good relations with the founder members of the conference. Unlike the Soviet Union, China had prepared the ground for its participation by signing the Pancha Shila agreement with India and by promoting good relations with the founding members of the conference (particularly India and Indonesia). However, at least until the Bandung Conference, Sino-Soviet relations continued to be positive in character. Thus, China's presence at the conference was perhaps seen by the Soviet Union as representing the socialist world. Therefore the Soviet absence from the conference did not entirely undermine its claim to the leadership of anti-imperialist front in the world.

31. quoted in J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 211.
32. 'The Joint Communique of the Asian-African Conference', (24 April 1955), cited in People's China (16 May 1955), p. 7.
33. North Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal and Ceylon.
34. K. C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 16.

35. The replacement of French presence by American military advisers and troops in Indo-China during the '50s was the most practical and clear example of the United States offensive policy and its imperialist role in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. For a discussion of the role of the United States in Africa, see Chapter 10 of this work.
36. quoted from A. B. Claude, China: the People's Republic of China and Richard Nixon (San Francisco: W. H. Freedman and Company, 1974), p. 52.
37. See Chapter 10.3 of this work.
38. The Soviet Union's decision to recognise Japan in 1956 constitutes one of the early indications of its reversal of a stand which was a very important part of China's policy. For China, the time was by no means ripe for the establishment of diplomatic relations with a country such as Japan which played a major role in the American policy of containment of China. The main targets of the United States-Japan treaty (1951) were China's north-eastern borders and North Korea.

At an enlarged meeting (25 April 1956) of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao made the famous speech entitled 'The Ten Major Relationships'. These are as follows:

- i The relationship between Heavy Industry on the one hand and Light Industry and Agriculture on the other.
- ii The relationship between Industry in the Coastal Regions and Industry in the Interior.
- iii The relationship between Economic Constructions and Defence Construction.
- iv The relationship between the State, the Units of Production and the Producers.
- v The relationship between the Central Authorities and the Local Authorities.
- vi The relationship between the Han Nationality and the Minority Nationalities.
- vii The relationship between Party and Non-Party.
- viii The relationship between Revolution and Counter-Revolution.
- ix The relationship between Right and Wrong.

x The relationship between China and Other Countries.

For the full text of the speech, see Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Ten Major Relationships (25 April 1956)', Peking Review 20 (1 January 1977): 1, pp. 10-25.

39. Ibid., p. 24.
40. cited in a publication entitled China's World View (By A SACU Working Group) (London: Anglo-Chinese Educational Institute, 1979), p. 23.
41. 'Patriotic Hungarians Strive to Defend Socialism and Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Restoration', (Editorial), The People's Daily (4 November 1956) cited in J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 70.
42. In both the Hungarian and the Polish crises, China unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the Soviet Union assuming a hegemonic role in the socialist bloc. At the same time, it pressed for the unity of the socialist countries and was opposed to national chauvinist tendencies of individual socialist countries. With such a general aim in mind, Chou En-lai visited Hungary and Poland (January 1957). For a more detailed and documentary analysis of Sino-Soviet relations during the period 1955-60, see ibidem. See also D. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), passim.
43. quoted from A. B. Claude, op.cit., p. 52.
44. quoted from T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Role of China in International Relations', Economic and Political Weekly 13 (18 November 1978): 46, p. 1901.
45. quoted from J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 25.
46. China viewed the technological success of the Soviet Union as providing a major forward thrust for the socialist forces as a whole against the imperialist powers. In his report to the National People's Congress (February 1958), Chou En-lai explained that

A decisive change has taken place in the international situation that favours our socialist construction, the socialist camp, the cause of world peace and the progress of mankind. As all the world knows, in October and November 1957, the Soviet Union launched two artificial earth satellites..... Everybody can now

see that, compared with the imperialist camp, our socialist camp has definitely gained supremacy in population and popular support, in the rate of industrial and agricultural development and in a number of important fields in science and technology.

cited in A. Hutchison, China's African Revolution, op.cit., p. 18.

Ironically, the Soviet leaders did not share such an optimistic view.

47. quoted in T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'The European Community and China', in J. Lodge (Ed.), Institutions and Politics of the European Community (London: Francis Printer 1983), p. 228.
48. While placing emphasis on heavy industry, Mao urged in this speech (April 1956) that

...the relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other hand must be properly handled.

without enough food and the daily necessities, it would be impossible to provide for workers in the cities in the first place, and then what sense would it make to talk about developing heavy industry?

Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Ten Major Relationships', op.cit., p. 11.

This speech of Mao's was followed by a campaign against the rightist tendencies or the so-called revisionists in ^{the}CCP. At the same time, another campaign began in June 1957, aimed at fighting rightist and bourgeois tendencies outside the party. This became known as the 'Hundred Flowers Campaign'. For a detailed discussion of this, see, for example, D. Zagoria, op.cit., pp. 77-145. See also J. Lifton, 'The Intellectuals: The Dilemma of the Educated', in F. Schurmann, (Ed.), China Readings 3 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 146-148.

49. The actual date of inauguration of the Great Leap Forward is usually taken to coincide with Liu Shaoqi's speech at the Eighth National Party Congress (5 May 1958). See, for example, G. Jukes, 'Soviet

- Views of China', in J. Wilson (Ed.), China and the World Community, op.cit., p. 101.
50. See D. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op.cit., p. 77.
51. quoted from G. Jukes, op.cit., p. 101.
52. quoted from I. Herdan, op.cit., p. 101.
53. For a more comprehensive analysis of this, see, for example, M. B. Yahuda, China's Foreign Policy Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), pp. 34-35. See also his China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., pp. 64-126.
54. cited in R. Macfarquhar, (Ed.), Sino-American Relations 1949-1971, op.cit., p. 141.
55. For example, Nigel Harris has pointed out that the quantity of aid based on per capita figures for the recognizing countries showed a proportion of Egypt:Iraq:China :: 154:78:9. N. Harris, The Mandate of Heaven: Marxism and Mao in Modern History op.cit., p. 221.
56. In July 1960, the Soviet Union withdrew its experts and advisers from China (estimated at 10,000 to 12,000). They left behind them many projects which were only half-completed, while others were in the early stages of development. (See I. Herdan, op.cit., p. 31). Soviet exports to China rapidly declined from 2,176 million old roubles (in 1957) to 891 million old roubles (in 1965). Meanwhile, between 1955 and 1962, India, for instance, was granted Soviet loans to a total equivalent to US \$ 800 million. This was more than China had received in the two grants given in 1950 and 1954. (See J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, op.cit., p. 131 and p. 94). The Soviet withdrawal of economic aid and its specialists came at a time when China faced serious economic difficulties, mainly caused by the bad droughts during the year 1959-61.
57. J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 213.
58. On 17 April 1961, for example, mercenaries trained and armed by the United States landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Their aim was to overthrow the new Cuban revolutionary regime. However, the attempt failed and the invaders were completely routed.
59. In China, the United States and its allies gave support to the separatists in Tibet and were behind the Tibetan rebellion of 1958. Outside China, Western powers attempted to turn the Tibetan case into an international issue by introducing it at the

14th Session of the UN General Assembly (October 1959). For an official statement of China's strong condemnation of such an act see, for example, Peking Review 2 (27 October 1959) passim.

60. By doing so, India violated its early recognition of China's sovereignty over Tibet (formally declared soon after the signing of the Pancha Shila agreement).

CHAPTER 6

THE THIRD WORLD: A REVOLUTIONARY BASE FOR CHINA'S DUAL OBJECTIVE: 1959-1966

6.1. The Third World as a Revolutionary Base

During this phase, China began by pursuing the dual objective of challenging the new Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence on the one hand, and on the other, promoting armed struggle against the United States which had assumed the offensive role in the liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America - the Third World. From the beginning of this period (1959-66) the Third World, viewed by the Chinese as the intermediate zone' between the imperialist camp and the socialist bloc, had become the major focus of China's role in international relations. Also it was by giving encouragement to national liberation movements in the Third World that China hoped to put into practice its determined opposition to the Soviet Union's policy of *Peaceful coexistence*,

Such an independent policy coincided with massive decolonisation in Africa. During this interval, China urged the use of armed struggle and seemed prepared to promote a revolutionary front against imperialism and its collaborators if necessary even at the expense of State-to-State diplomacy. This hard line was by no means confined to the creation of a broad international front against imperialism; it was also extended to *régimes* which were facing local revolutionary uprisings. Such a revolutionary reorientation of policy happened to coincide with China's assault² on bourgeois elements within the

Chinese society during the latter half of the '50s. In October 1959 Wang Chia-hsiang, the Deputy Foreign Minister stressed that:

...the bourgeois class is after all a bourgeois class. As long as it controls political power it cannot adopt a resolute revolutionary line and it can only adopt a wavering conciliatory line. As a result these states can never expect to effect the transition to socialism, nor indeed can they thoroughly fulfill the task of the democratic revolution. It should be added that even the national independence they have won is by no means secure...The capitalist classes that control the political power of certain Afro-Asian states prefer to develop their economy along the road of capitalism or state capitalism, and moreover, call it by the beautiful name 'the road to democracy'. Actually, by following this road they can hardly free themselves from the oppression and exploitation of imperialism and feudalism; indeed, they may even pave the way for the emergence of beurocratic capitalism which is an ally of imperialism and feudalism...In the final analysis, they can never escape from the control and bondage of imperialism.^a

China appeared to abandon its earlier posture of appeasement of national bourgeois régimes which were given to oppressing their local Communist and revolutionary movements, and instead, adopted a line of militant opposition to them.

In his report, 'Long Live The People's War' (September 1965), Lin Biao reiterated Mao's words

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. The Marxist-Leninist

principle holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.⁴

China's condemnation of Nasser's anti-Communist campaign in domestic politics during the late '50s led to a deterioration in Sino-Egyptian relations. In Iraq, where China had supported Quassim's coup when it occurred, the *régime* was criticised after 1959.⁵ In Egypt and Iraq - both of strategic concern to the Soviet Union - the latter had decided to support the established anti-Communist *régimes* led by Nasser and Quassim who were populist leaders.

It was clear that after Stalin's death the Soviet leaders had become increasingly concerned with their own sphere of influence as well as winning international support for their policy of peaceful coexistence and *Détente* with imperialism. This stance was fully confirmed during Khrushchev's official visit to the United States (September 1959). The Chinese fiercely criticised the new Soviet line and warned that

Marxism-Leninism absolutely must not sink into the mire of bourgeois pacifism.⁶

China took the occasion of Stalin's 80th birth anniversary (21 December 1959) to describe him as "uncompromising enemy of imperialism".⁷ Thus, by 1962, China had successfully propogated the view that its enemies were "[the] imperialists and [the] reactionaries of various countries, and modern revisionism".⁸ In January 1962, Mao expressed the view that

the party and the state of the Soviet Union now have been usurped by the revisionists.⁹

An illustration of the sharp contrast during the early '60s between the Soviet and the Chinese conceptions of the developing world situation can be gleaned from two statements, one from each source. In an interview given to Izvestia (31 December 1952) Khrushchev claimed that:

understanding between these powers (the USSR and USA) and their willingness to co-operate with each other in the settlement of outstanding international issues on the basis of the UN Charter and the principles of peaceful coexistence, today largely determine the general state of affairs in international relations.¹⁰

For their part, the Chinese leadership gave clear expression to its view of the developing world situation. In 'A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement' (June 1963), China claimed that:

the various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America...The national democratic revolution in these areas is an important component of the contemporary proletarian world revolution. In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletariat revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population.¹¹

The Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, following the Cuban-American missile crisis of October

1962; the Soviet Union's anxiety not to get involved in the Sino-Indian border clashes of October 1962; and the conclusion ¹² of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (July 1963) resulted in a serious and irreversible deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. China, on the contrary, claimed that:

it is most obvious that the tripartite treaty is aimed at tying hands. The US representative to the Moscow talks has said publicly that the US, Britain and the Soviet Union were able to arrive at an agreement, because we could work together to prevent China getting a nuclear capacity... This is a US-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple. ¹³

By the middle of 1963, China's view of international relations was put forward in terms of four contradictions:

- i. the connection between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp.
- ii. the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries;
- iii. the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism; and
- iv. the contradiction among imperialist countries and among monopoly groups. ¹⁴

Despite the fact that during this phase of its foreign policy, ideologically speaking, China's world view was dominated by the above four contradictions, internationally, China was active mostly in Asia, Africa

and Latin America. These Third World countries constituted the main battleground for the struggles between imperialism and its allies on the one hand, and national liberation movements and anti-imperialist and neo-colonial states on the other. This is clearly expressed by Lin Biao in a famous report (1965) on 'People's War', in which he singled out as 'the principle contradiction in the contemporary world' the one between:

the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists, headed by the United States...The development of this contradiction is promoting the struggle of the peoples of the whole world against US imperialism and its lackeys.¹⁵

For Africa, the interval from 1960 to 1965 represented a high point in the decolonisation movement. 29 African countries entered the post-colonial era of independence during this period. At the same time, national liberation struggles were underway in a number of countries throughout southern Africa (that is, Africa to the south of Zambezi). Africa was seen as one of the most important, if not the major area of the world in which both revisionism and the imperialism of the United States and its allies had to be challenged.

In accordance with such an orientation towards Africa, China mounted a vigorous political campaign to gain widespread African support for the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Second Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to be held in Algiers¹⁶ in 1965. 1963 could be

termed the 'Year of Africa' in the annals of Chinese foreign policy. During that year, Zhou Enlai visited a number of African countries. This was the first visit to Africa by a Chinese Premier since the success of the Chinese revolution. In Mali, Zhou proposed the eight principles of economic aid (as discussed earlier)¹⁷ in which emphasis was placed on self-reliance, functional relationship between countries, training reciprocity, fairness, and absence of conditions. In Somalia, Zhou Enlai claimed that 'revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent'.¹⁸ China's emphasis on revolutionary change led to diplomatic setbacks with anti-Communist and pro-Western countries such as Tunisia and the Republic of Central Africa.

Of great significance to China's foreign policy during this period (1959-66) was the overthrow of two of its major political and ideological allies in the military *coups* that took place in Indonesia (September 1965) and Ghana (February 1966). However, these setbacks in State-to-State relations were offset by revolutionary gains as a number of liberation movements in southern Africa had adopted the strategy of armed struggle and people's war as their path for national liberation. It must be stressed that, in southern Africa, serious and intensive organised armed struggle did not take place until the early '70s.

However, although importance must be given to the decisions made during the '60s by most of the national liberation movements in southern Africa (as will be examined elsewhere in this work¹⁹) to follow the path of

armed national liberation struggle, at this period it was in Indo-China that the most serious armed struggle and people's war was under way against imperialism following direct involvement on the part of the United States (1964-65).²⁰

Until the final defeat of the United States (1975), China was the most important military, political, economic and strategic supporter of the Indo-Chinese anti-imperialist national liberation movements as a whole and of the Vietnamese movement in particular.

6.2. 'A Second Intermediate Zone'.

During this period (1959-66) China's most intensive activity in international relations lay in the area 'the First Revolutionary Intermediate Zone',²¹ that is, in Asia, Africa and Latin America. From 1964 onwards, however, China put forward the idea of a second intermediate zone. This referred not to those countries which were between the imperialist camp and the socialist bloc, but to those which were within the imperialist camp itself. This new concept meant that countries such as Canada and the countries of Western Europe and Oceania, which adopted imperialist postures less strong than that adopted by the United States, should be encouraged in their tendency to seek independence from the United States.

At the same time, the ruling classes of countries within the imperialist camp should be encouraged in their 'nationalistic aspirations'²² against the hegemonism of

the United States. China hoped that this strategy would sharpen the contradictions within the imperialist camp and the position of the United States as leader would be shaken. China's new world view was first put forward in an editorial in People's Daily (21 January 1964)

It can thus be seen that the US Imperialist attempt to seize the intermediate zone is bound to turn up against the opposition of all the peoples and countries in that region. This vast intermediate zone is composed of two parts. One part consists of the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America; it may be called the first intermediate zone.

The second part consists of the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada and other capitalist countries; it may be called the second intermediate zone. Countries in this second intermediate zone have a dual character. While their ruling classes are exploiters and oppressors, those countries themselves are subject to US control, interference and bullying. They therefore try their best to free themselves from US control. In this regard they have something in common with the socialist countries and the peoples of various countries. By making itself antagonistic to the whole world, US imperialism inevitably finds itself tightly encircled.²³

However, it was not until the early '70s that this concept of a 'second intermediate zone' began to have a wider and more practical influence on China's role in international relations. During the '60s only France, under de Gaulle, assumed a nationalist posture independent from US hegemonism, and sought a united Europe.²⁴ It may have been this show of independence by France which led China to announce its concept of the 'second intermediate

zone' in the '60s rather than wait until the '70s when the conditions for the development of such a concept were to become much better suited.

In January 1964, when the normalization of relations between China and France occurred, China introduced its concept of the 'second intermediate zone'. However, neither China's admiration of de Gaulle's 'authentic national identity'²⁵ nor Sino-French *Détente* led to any significant development in the relations between France and PRC, let alone to any political co-operation between the two countries against American hegemonism. In fact, with the advent of ^{the} GPCR, relations between the two countries were soon interrupted, partly because of China's diplomatic challenge to the outside world and partly because of the French students' and workers' movement of 1968.²⁶ Thus despite the development of the concept of the 'second intermediate zone', it was the Third World, and in particular, the national liberation movements and anti-imperialist states, that remained the only zone capable of negotiating the peaceful co-existence line adopted by the Soviet Union.

NOTES

1. This concept entered Mao's world view in 1946 when he described the countries of the American and the Soviet blocs as an intermediate zone.
2. During the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956-57) and the introduction of the Great Leap Forward (1957-62).
3. cited from Red Flag (October 1959) in J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 214.
4. This statement was quoted from Mao Tse-tung, 'Problems of War and Strategy', speech given at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (6 November 1938). See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 219. See also Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of People's War (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 44.
5. Following Quassim's campaign of oppressing Iraq's communists, even though he had pursued an anti-imperialist policy.
6. cited in K. C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 20.
7. Ai Ssu-Chi, 'In Commemoration of the Eightieth Birthday of Stalin, The People's Daily (21 December 1959), quoted in H. C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 41.
8. 'Communique of the Tenth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee', cited in New China News Agency (23 September 1962). quoted in H. C. Hinton, op.cit., p. 44.
9. Stuart C. Schram Mao Tse-tung, Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters, 1956-71 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 181.
10. cited in a SACU Working Group, op.cit., pp. 14-15.
11. This proposal was contained in a reply by CCP (14 June 1963) to an earlier letter (30 March 1963) sent by CPSU. cited in Peking Review 6 (26 July 1963): 30. For China's analysis of its differences with the Soviet Union, see, for example, People's Daily Editorial Department, 'The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves (6 September 1963)', cited in Peking Review 6 (13 September 1963): 3, pp. 6-20.
12. Initially, TBT was signed by the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain (30 July 1963).
13. The People's Daily (3 August 1963), quoted in M. B. Yahuda, China's Foreign Policy After Mao, op.cit., p.

34. For a documentary survey of Chinese reaction to TBT and the Soviet response see, for example. J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, op.cit., pp. 184-92.
14. 'A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement', op.cit., p. 11.
15. Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of People's War, op.cit., p. 53.
16. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
17. See Introduction to this work.
18. See Chapter 13 of this work.
19. See Chapters 13.2.1, 14.1.1 and 15.2.1 of this work.
20. See Chapter 7 (note 2) of this work.
21. M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., p. 154.
22. quoted from ibid., p. 149.
23. The People's Daily (21 January 1961). cited in Peking Review 7 (1964): 4, p. 7. The conception of a 'second intermediate zone' was stressed by Mao himself in an interview with Japanese journalists.

At the present time there exists two intermediate zones in the world. Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the first intermediate zone. Europe, northern America and Oceania constitute the second. Japanese monopoly capital belongs to the second intermediate zone.

cited in F. Schurmann, 'Mao Tse-tung: Interview with Japanese Journalists', in China Readings 3, op.cit., p. 368.

24. In July 1966, France withdrew its forces committed to NATO commands and its personnel assigned to the staffs of those commands. It must be stressed that this does not mean an end to French membership of NATO. France affirmed that

This ... does not by any means lead the French government to call into question the treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 ...

See F. B. Beer, Alliances: Latent Communities in the Contemporary World (London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1970), p. 349.

This was followed by the expulsion of US troops from French bases in the same year. France insisted that Europe must be for Europeans only. The United States was the main target of this French policy. For a further analysis, see, for example, P. G. Cerney, The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), passim.

25. quoted from M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., p. 149.
26. See Chapter 7 of this work.

CHAPTER 7

CHINA'S CHALLENGE TO THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION (GPCR)' 1966-69

Five major developments exercised a considerable influence on China, leading to the adoption of a much tougher ideological line both internally and externally. A new phase in China's foreign policy was thus inaugurated. Traditional means of contacts with the outside world (i.e. mainly State-to-State diplomatic contacts) were all but abandoned. In seeking to consolidate the Chinese revolution and prevent its becoming too closely identified with the dominant world order as it stood, the Chinese leadership shifted its focus to internal developments to the exclusion of external considerations.

These five developments were:

- i. The escalation of the Indo-Chinese conflict following direct American intervention and heavy involvement in 1965.²
- ii. The explosion of the first Chinese atomic bomb in 1964. This was followed by others in 1965 and 1966, and also by an experiment in thermo-nuclear explosion (1967). However, if China's nuclear experiments gave it a new look of respectability in the Asian and the Third World contexts they also made it more vulnerable to attacks from its major adversaries, viz, United States and the Soviet Union. Despite this, in contrast to the Soviet Union's technological successes, and

nuclear explosion of an intercontinental ballistic missile (1957) which paved the way for *Détente* with the United States, China's successful nuclear experiments were seen by its leaders and by other anti-imperialist forces (particularly the Indo-Chinese who were directly engaged in liberation wars) as a major thrust to the promotion and widening of armed struggle against imperialism. The Chinese leaders argued that

The success of the three tests conducted by China in the one year of 1966 is a heavy blow to the plots of US imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism which have been collaborating in a vain attempt to enforce their nuclear monopoly and sabotage the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed people and oppressed régimes. It is a great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people who are waging the struggle against US aggression and for national salvation and to all the revolutionary peoples of the world who are now encouraged in heroic struggles, as well as an important contribution to the defence of world peace.³

At the same time, China's success as a developing country served as an example to the newly independent states of the world that it would be possible for them to achieve, through self-reliance, what had previously seemed only possible for the Big Powers.

- iii. The period 1958-66 witnessed the failure of China's diplomatic and political objectives, including its aim of mobilising the Third World against the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, for example, the second Afro-Asian conference had to be cancelled following the deposition of Ben Bella of ^{Algeria} (19 June 1965),

ten days before the conference was scheduled to take place. At the same time, State-to-State relations experienced a setback even with China's most trusted allies such as Ghana, where Nkrumah was overthrown (February 1966). In Asia, China lost an important political and, to some extent, ideological ally, with the virtual overthrow of Sukarno (1965).⁴

iv. By the mid-'60s, following the deterioration of its relations with China, the Soviet Union altered its neutral stance in the Sino-Indian conflict in favour of a pro-Indian posture. It offered increased military and economic aid to India.⁵ India came to be seen by the Soviet Union increasingly as a counter-weight to China in its dealings with the two Asian powers. China took the view that this constituted a clear indication of the Soviet Union's emphasis in its foreign policy on the containment of China.

v. The eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its irreconcilable ideological character led to an intensification of the division within CCP itself, between the protagonists of two opposite sides. Both sides feared, each from its own perspective, that the Chinese Revolution was in danger of being undermined by the other side. The high point of this struggle was marked by the commencement of the Cultural Revolution and by the attempts of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao and others to re-constitute the Yanan experience of the Chinese revolution in the light of the developments that had taken place since 1949.

It was during this period (1966-69) that China finally came forward with a clear characterisation of the Soviet Union as a 'social-imperialist power', while at the same time not letting up in its struggle against imperialism as a whole and American imperialism in particular. Thus, during the most intensive phase of American aggression in Indo-China, China readily committed itself to a policy of moral and material support to the forces of national liberation in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Throughout all of the different phases of China's foreign policy examined so far, as well as during the subsequent phases (right to the present time), Indo-China as a whole, and Vietnam in particular, have continually occupied the most careful attention of the Chinese foreign policy makers.⁶

During this period the revolutionary campaign, which was spearheaded by the Red Guards, took the form of political demonstrations against foreign embassies in Beijing as well as in the Chinese embassies abroad (especially in Western countries).⁷ This was received rather unfavourably abroad, even by most of the Communist Parties, which were opposed to the Cultural Revolution.

However, unperturbed by such opposition, China carried on with the Cultural Revolution. Its diplomatic representatives in a number of countries were recalled and diplomatic activities almost completely ground to a halt. Out of a total of 45 Chinese ambassadors accredited to different foreign countries, 44 were more or less abruptly recalled.⁸ Only Huang Hua remained in Cairo.⁹ Exchanges

of delegations between China and other countries dropped from 1,322 in 1965 to a mere 66 in 1969.¹⁰

In the ideological sphere, GPCR exercised a profound influence on the mobilisation of revolutionary movements and uprisings outside China, particularly in South-East Asia. In Thailand, for example, guerrilla warfare in the north-east did not begin to make impact until 1968, when China started to give moral and even financial support to the Thai armed insurrectionaries.¹¹ In Burma, China endorsed the Burmese White Flag communists, who announced the formation of a National Democratic United Front to overthrow the government.¹²

In Africa as a whole, the national liberation movements (mostly situated in southern Africa), were supported and encouraged by China.¹³ Tanzania became a major base of such support and, perhaps, this is why the relations between the two states were always friendly. Thus it is not surprising that on 5 September 1967, China intimated that it would fulfill its 1964 undertaking to build the 1,000 mile railway line linking Zambia and Tanzania.¹⁴ President Nyerere visited China in 1967, mainly with a view to negotiating the Tan-Zam Railway project, on which 400 Chinese technicians were already actively engaged in Tanzania.¹⁵

Relations with other communist countries were strained. Party-to-Party contacts were confined to a few Communist Parties such as those of Albania, Vietnam and Rumania. China also continued to enjoy close relations with a few revolutionary groups in Burma and elsewhere

which were anti-Soviet in their ideological orientation.¹⁶ Though China condemned the Dubcek leadership as revisionist, it was explicitly opposed to direct military intervention in Czechoslovakia (August 1968).¹⁷ Sino-Soviet tension had already reached a climax in 1968, following the Soviet Union's declaration of the Brezhnev doctrine of 'unlimited sovereignty' (of the other socialist countries in Eastern Europe) and China's characterisation of the Soviet Union as a 'social-imperialist Superpower'. China feared that Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia might well become a precedent for future military interventions in other countries or in China itself.¹⁸

NOTES

1. While the autumn of 1965 marked the formal launching of the GPCR, the roots of the Cultural Revolution can be traced back to at least the 10th Cultural Committee Plenum (September 1962) when Mao Zedong put forward the slogan 'Never forget the class struggle'. See J. Gitting's Survey of Sino-Soviet Dispute, op.cit., p. 271. The Cultural Revolution was officially announced on the occasion of the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP (August 1966).
2. Following serious attacks (1,500 attacks took place in 1964 alone) by the revolutionary forces of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam against the government of South Vietnam during 1963-64, the United States decided to increase its military mission from 16,000 to 21,000 in July 1964. A month later, after this reinforcement, the United States attacked North Vietnam in the infamous Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964.
3. New China News Agency, (December 1966) in Peking Review 10 (January 1967): 8, p. 7.
4. Sukarno had been increasingly identifying himself with the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). He even went to the extent of withdrawing his country from the UN (7 January 1965). As an alternative, Sukarno called for a Conference of the Emerging Forces (CONEFO). This decision was described by China as a 'bold revolutionary move'. For this and more details of Chinese support for Sukarno, see Peking Review 8 (5 January 1965): 3, pp. 7 ff.
5. Following the Sino-Indian armed confrontation of 1962, the Soviet Union offered MIG fighters to India. At the same time, the Soviet Union pledged aid, estimated at an equivalent of US \$504.000 million, to India under its Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1966).
6. Starting with French colonialism (until 1954) and continuing with American intervention (1954-1975), which was followed by the Soviet Union gaining a favourable position not only in Vietnam but also in Indo-China as a whole from 1975 onwards. The conflict that developed towards the concluding years of the decade of the '70s simply emphasised the threat to China from the Soviet Union on its southern border. Britain was directly affected by the Cultural Revolution. In Hong Kong, Chinese patriots held protests (July 1967), expressing sympathy with events taking place in their homeland and demanding the departure of the British colonial power. Britain reacted by suppressing such demonstrations. Such behaviour evoked strong Chinese reaction. See, for example, Peking Review 10 (14 July 1967): 29, p. 34.

In London, in the same year (July 1967), it was reported that the Chinese delegation was involved in a violent exchange with the police. See J. Camilleri, op.cit., p. 109. For the Chinese reaction against the British treatment of the Chinese delegation, see, for example, Peking Review 10 (14 July 1967). In Beijing, the Red Guards ransacked the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires. For a detailed account of this, see The Guardian (23 August 1967).

7. By the end of 1967, nearly 5 million copies of Mao's Thoughts were distributed outside China. See M.T. Faddah, op.cit., p. 40.

In Italy, the Captain of the Chinese freighter Li Ming, docked in Genoa, refused to carry out an order from the port authorities to remove propaganda posters from his ship. As a result, the ship was ordered to leave. For details of this incident, see, for example, China Quarterly no. 32 (October-December 1967), pp. 226-227. In Rome (May 1968), demonstrating students held aloft portraits of Lenin and Mao. See Peking Review 11 (31 May 1968): 22, p. 13. In France, the upheaval of May 1968, led by workers and students, had been at least in part inspired by the revolutionary wave of GPCR. The Chinese unequivocally supported this movement. See, for example, Peking Review 11 (24 May 1968): 21, pp. 17-23; and 11 (31 May 1968): 22, pp. 16-17. See also J. Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 105-113; M. Gurtov. 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution', China Quarterly, no. 40 (October-December 1969); and T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Role of China in International Relations: the Impact of the Cultural Revolution', Economic and Political Weekly, 13 (25 November 1978): 47, pp. 1941-1955. For a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the impact of GPCR on the outside world, see, for example, M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., pp. 190-209. See also his 'Chinese Foreign Policy After Mao', China Quarterly, no. 36 (October-December 1968), pp. 102-113; P. Richer, op.cit.; and B. Brugger, (Ed.), China: the Impact of the Cultural Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1978), passim.

8. See K. C. Chen, op.cit., p. 35.
9. Even Huang Hua was later recalled (in 1969).
10. See K. C. Chen, op.cit., p. 28.
11. See Lo Shin-fu, 'Peiping's Current Policy Towards Taiwan', Issues and Studies, 11 (October 1975),: 10, p. 47.

12. China attacked Ne Win's government for leaning towards the West and openly supported the Burmese National Democratic Party. See, for example, Peking Review 10 (14 July 1967): 29, pp. 30-33. For a discussion of the impact of GPCR on the overseas Chinese and the governments under which they lived, see, for example, S. Fitzgerald, 'Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution', China Quarterly no. 40 (October-December 1969), pp. 103-127.
13. The Cultural Revolution also had some impact on African countries such as Guinea and Tanzania. See Chapters 13.2.1.4 and 13.2.1.7 of this work.
14. China Quarterly no. 35 (July-September), p. 197.
15. See Chapter 14.2.1.7 of this work.
16. See B. Brugger, China: Radicalism to Revisionism 1962-1979 (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 120.
17. We have noted that when the Polish Crisis began China did not actively oppose Soviet intervention. But by 1968, China's perspective of the role of the Soviet Union in international relations had changed qualitatively. The Soviet Union was no longer a leader of socialist countries but a social imperialist. Hence the Soviet revisionist policy had to be not only opposed by China but also resisted by socialist and revolutionary forces throughout the world.
18. In fact, China was convinced that a Soviet attack on its borders was imminent. In late February 1969, China reported that some of its soldiers had already been killed and wounded by the Soviet troops massed along the Sino-Soviet border, particularly in the region of Chenapao Island and the Ussuri river. See Peking Review 12 (7 March 1969): 10, pp. 4-12.

CHAPTER 8

CHINA'S DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1969

During the 1954-58 period, so too after the most dynamic phase of the Cultural Revolution (1969),¹ China's international role was guided by diplomatic and political goals based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. However, unlike the situation during the mid- to late '50s, the principles of peaceful coexistence and the pursuit of foreign policy through diplomatic channels were extended during the period since 1969, to include all countries² and international organisations³ (irrespective of ideological considerations) which were thought to be useful not only in trade and commerce but also in achieving the broad aim of limiting Soviet influence in the world and constructing an international political front against hegemonism⁴ exerted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Lin Biao explained this at the 9th Congress of CCP (April 1969) in the following manner

All countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by US imperialism and Soviet revisionists unite and form the broadest possible united front and overthrow our common enemies.⁵

Changes in the international environment since 1968 - particularly those occasioned by the Superpowers (since the mid-'70s) - coupled with China's own re-evaluation of its efforts in the sphere of socialist construction, paved the way for a new alignment of its role in international

relations. During this phase, China entered ^{the} UN, espoused peaceful coexistence on a universal scale, complied with the requirements of traditional diplomacy, and adhered to the canons of the political conduct initially observed in the relations between states.

This re-alignment of China's role in international relations appears to have taken place in two stages: the first, lasting from 1969 to 1976, and the second from 1976 onwards.

8.1. China's Foreign Policy Since the Cultural Revolution: The Fifth Phase (1969-76)

During the early '70s, China seemed to abandon its earlier hard line in favour of a more flexible approach to its overall objectives in the field of foreign relations. Formal diplomatic relations and other activities in the sphere of state-to-state relations came to dominate China's international activities. At the same time, China seemed to have embarked upon a new era in its domestic policy, in which decreasing emphasis was laid on explicitly revolutionary goals.⁶ This, it must be emphasised, does not mean that changes in China's domestic priorities influenced its external policy. Rather, it was the changing picture of international forces that led to a remoulding of China's foreign policy.⁷


Three major developments of the period since the commencement of ^{the} GPCR provided the impetus for a re-orientation of China's world view.

- i. At the end of the '60s and even more so during the early '70s, rapid changes occurred in the attitude of the world powers, including the United States, towards China.⁹ In particular, the United States was keen to establish 'friendly' relations with PRC and was prepared to recognise it as the only legitimate representative of the Chinese people, not only on the mainland but also gradually in the contentious areas of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. Indications of this new approach towards China by the United States had already begun to appear in 1968 when Nixon won the presidential election. By mid-1969, the United States had begun a series of small and limited steps, which, although only symbolic, were directed at reducing restrictions on trade with and travel to China.⁹

- ii. China was keen to obtain access to science and technology by cultivating good relations with the advanced countries of the world (and particularly Europe).¹⁰

- iii. By 1968, after nearly a decade of protracted ideological struggle between ^{the}CCP and ^{the}CPSU, China had come to view the Soviet Union as a fully fledged enemy. During GPCR, the Soviet Union was actively engaged in the task of containing China. Over a million Soviet troops were deployed along the northern and western borders of China including the areas bordering Siberia and Mongolia. This action was seen by China as a warning of an imminent attack by the Soviet Union which virtually took place in March 1969. At the same time Soviet containment of China also advanced along China's south-western border with India.

CONTAINMENT OF CHINA BY THE SUPERPOWERS:
CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC FLEXIBILITY AND THE AFTERMATH
OF THE HIGH POINT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION




Source: J. Gittings, China and the World, 1922-1972

(London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), p. 257.



The original title of J. Gitting's map is "China between the Superpowers, July 1970".

Additions of neighbouring countries are made by the present author.

SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASH IN 1969



Sino-Soviet borderlands



The disputed frontier between China's westernmost province of Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and Soviet Central Asia. "X" marks the area where an armed clash took place on August 13, 1969.

The Amur-Ussuri boundary between China and the U.S.S.R. The arrow points to Zhenbao Island, one of the riverine islands involved in the 1969 border conflict.

Source: H. J. Ellison, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective (London: University of Washington Press, 1982), p. 12.

Following the Sino-Indian border clash (1962), and the growth of tension between China and the Soviet Union during ^{the} GPCR, Soviet-Indian relations had become closer in political, economic and military spheres. The Soviet-Indian association continued to grow throughout the latter half of the '60s, culminating in the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation between the two countries (9 August 1971). On the eve of India's military action in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) Soviet containment of China added another serious threat to Chinese security to those which already existed in the south and south-east of China where at least 120 American military bases were stationed.' By the end of the '60s, China had become vulnerable to both Superpowers and their local allies surrounding China. Thus, both the Soviet Union (social imperialism), and the United States (imperialism) had to be resisted simultaneously. In order to achieve this purpose, China sought the co-operation of a broad united front against both kinds of imperialism.

The Sino-Soviet contradiction reached its climax when an armed clash took place between the Soviet Union and China in March 1969.¹² China was awakened to the rather unpleasant reality that the Soviet Union could, by applying massive force along the border, virtually isolate and pin down China.¹³ China was therefore motivated to carry out a radical reappraisal of diplomatic isolation following GPCR, and this resulted in an intensive international campaign being waged by China in the world. ^{The} report to the 9th National Congress of ^{the} CCP (1 April 1969), ^{presented by Lin Biao,} stressed that China's foreign policy was

To develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian revolutionary struggles of all oppressed people and nations; to strive for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles. That is what we did in the past and we will persist in doing the same in the future.'⁴

In the sphere of security, Chinese diplomatic flexibility during the '70s was indeed comparable to that of the period preceding the Great Leap Forward. During both phases the policy of peaceful coexistence was predicated upon the major aim of averting what in China's view seemed to be a threat from the United States during the '50s and '60s and from both the United States and the Soviet Union during the latter part of the '60s.'⁵ Moreover, the Soviet Union was not only engaged in a policy of containment of China in Asia, but was also rapidly gaining a more favourable position for itself in the Third World, at China's expense. China's preoccupation with ^{the}GPCR and the involvement of the United States in Indo-China during the latter half of the '60s provided the essential ingredients for an Asian setting in which the Soviet Union could successfully extend its influence in south-east Asia as a whole.

As in the '60s, so too, in the '70s the Chinese world view continued to be characterised by the four contradictions which have already been adumbrated in the discussion of the third period of China's foreign policy.'⁶ But, following the Chinese characterisation of

the Soviet Union as a 'social-imperialist' power, the nature of each of these contradictions was reviewed or adjusted so as to take account of China's new assessment of the role of the Soviet Union and other socialist revisionist countries. At the 9th Congress of CCP (1 April 1969), Lin Biao listed four major contradictions in a revised form as follows:

- i. The contradiction between oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other.
- ii. The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries.
- iii. The contradiction between the imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among imperialist countries.
- iv. The contradiction between the socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other.¹⁷

China saw the first contradiction as the principal contradiction, that is, the contradiction between imperialism and social-imperialism on the one hand and the oppressed nations of 'the first intermediate zone' of the capitalist advanced countries and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe on the other. The Chinese world view of the '60s, which had been based on the contradictions between the oppressed peoples of the Third World on the one hand (that is, the national liberation movements and

2
anti-imperialist states in Asia, Africa and Latin America) and the imperialist camp . . . on the other was thus replaced by a new perspective, in which the major contradiction was between the oppressed nations on the one hand, and United States imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism on the other.

In the 'second intermediate zone', however, China was particularly keen to promote friendly relations with countries which sought independence and were becoming increasingly critical of American and Soviet policies, in particular France in the Western world, and Rumania in the socialist bloc. The Chinese perspective in the '70s was in many respects similar to CCP leaders' outlook during the war of resistance against Japanese imperialism (1937-45).

Throughout this period, as has already been discussed,¹⁹ CCP was highly flexible in its policies. Its aim was to construct an intermediate international front against the main enemy, namely Japan. In August 1971, based on Mao's analysis of 'On Policy'¹⁹ 30 years earlier (December 1940), which justified a broad united front consisting of all the forces prepared to join the war against Japanese imperialism, Peking Review published an article entitled 'Unite the People, Defeat the Enemy'.²⁰ This article gave a general presentation of the basis of the Chinese world view as at the '70s when the international situation was dominated by China's two main enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union. For the Chinese, the situation in the '70s, as during the '40s,

required a flexible approach towards all international forces which were prepared to join, or could be convinced to take part in, a broad united front against the two dominant powers - viz the Soviet Union and the United States.

China hoped that this strategy would further sharpen the contradictions between the United States and its allies within the imperialist camp on the one hand, and, on the other, between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, in the socialist bloc. In addition, they hoped that their strategy would create divisions between those countries of 'the second intermediate zone' which were critical of the Superpowers and those which were not. This would then weaken the influential positions of the United States and the Soviet Union within this zone.

At the same time, China took the view that the contradictions within the 'second intermediate zone', particularly those within the imperialist camp, would serve to strengthen the growing resistance to neo-colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is why China continued to argue that the foundation of its world view had always been and continued to lie in the Third World. It is only by working within the framework of China's analysis of the world (a broad united front) that one can hope to understand the motivation behind China's flexible approach towards the developed world.

It is also within this same framework that it is possible to assess China's co-operation with reactionary and anti-communist countries in the Third World. China's support for Pakistan against the liberation forces in Bangladesh (1971), and its continuing friendly relations with the governments of Ceylon and the Sudan²¹ despite their oppression of local revolutionary uprisings in the same year can all be attributed to China's determination to form an international front of nations against both the Superpowers.

From the Chinese perspective, the international situation of the '70s required friendly relations with countries that were prepared to join, or could be convinced to take part in, a united front in opposition to the two Superpowers. In his report to the 1st Session of the 4th National People's Congress (January 1975), Zhou Enlai claimed as follows:

We should uphold proletarian internationalism and strengthen our unity with the socialist countries and the oppressed people and oppressed nations of the world, with each supporting the other. We should ally ourselves with all forces in the world that can be allied to combat colonialism and imperialism and above all superpower hegemonism. We support the countries and people of the second world in their struggle against superpower control, threats and bullying. We support the efforts of Western European countries to get united in this struggle.²²

The aim of China's strategy was to loosen the grip of the two Superpowers and to extricate itself diplomatically and

politically from the containment imposed on it by the United States and the Soviet Union. Within the space of two months following the 9th National Congress of CCP (1 April 1969), three Chinese ambassadors were sent to three important countries. These were Albania,²³ the ideological ally of China, particularly in opposition to Soviet social-imperialism; France,²⁴ the advanced capitalist country whose policy of independence from the United States had been supported by China during the '60s; and Rumania,²⁵ the 'socialist-revisionist' country which was the only country within the socialist bloc to have become openly critical of the Soviet Union.

In alignment with China's support for the adoption by Western European countries of policies independent from American imperialism, EEC's decision to accept Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway as full members of the Common Market was praised by China. It was described as

...a new step by the Western European countries against the hegemony of the two Superpowers, especially US control and interference in Western Europe.²⁶

Later in the same year (1972) Maurice Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, and Alec Douglas Home, the British Foreign Secretary, (November 1972), were received in Beijing. The central theme of their discussions related to the enlargement of an independent Europe.²⁷

China's search for a wider international front in opposition to imperialism and social imperialism as a whole, and its obsession with the Soviet Union in

particular brought China closer to Yugoslavia, which had hitherto been one of China's main ideological rivals. Signs of Sino-Yugoslavian *rapprochement* appeared as early as February 1969, (two months before the 9th National Congress of CCP) when the first Yugoslav delegation visited China after nine years.²⁸ In November 1969 Yugoslavia and China decided to elevate diplomatic representation in each other's capital to ambassadorial level. Less than a year later (August 1970), China resumed full diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia after almost two decades of hostility over ideological issues.²⁹ Following a visit to China by the Yugoslavian Foreign Secretary (June 1971), Sino-Yugoslavian relations improved. Thus, China accorded full recognition to Yugoslavia's own specific brand of non-alignment which, during the '50s and '60s had been viewed as conservative in character.³⁰

However, it must be pointed out that China's approach to Yugoslavia was guided not so much by a new emphasis on peaceful coexistence³¹ as by expectations of winning support from Yugoslavia in its capacity as an important and founding power of the non-alignment movement. In fact, even after the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong (1976) and the rise of a new leadership, which is seen by many observers as 'moderate' in its ideological character, China has continued to characterise the Yugoslav brand of socialism as revisionist in character.

Shortly before the visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to China (30 August 1977), Huang Hua, the

Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated (30th July 1977) that

Yugoslavia was and still is a revisionist country...But we still want to tell comrades that publicly denouncing Tito as revisionist will do no good. On the contrary, it will do harm and deprive us of an ally, thus undermining the strength of the struggle against the two Superpowers.³²

From 1969 onwards, China manifested renewed vigour in the sphere of diplomatic activity. Three months after the 9th National Congress of ^{the} CCP (April 1969), China dispatched 16 ambassadors to various countries including North Korea, South Yemen and, as has already been mentioned, Albania, France and Rumania.³³

In October 1970, China established diplomatic relations with Canada and, from then onwards, Canada began to sympathise with China's position towards Taiwan³⁴ and favoured the PRC's admission to UN. The Chinese reciprocated by welcoming a ministerial team from Canada in Beijing (June 1971). During their visit to China, the Canadian delegation discussed the possibility of expanding trade between the two countries. A month later, a Chinese delegation visited Ottawa, where a major new contract for importing Canadian wheat was signed.³⁵

During the same year, an important development occurred in Sino-American relations, when an American table tennis team visited China (Spring 1971) at the latter's invitation. This was followed by a secret visit to China by Henry Kissinger, (July 1972) who was then

special assistant to the President on national security. The purpose of this visit was to organise Nixon's official visit to PRC.³⁶

Later in 1971, China normalised its relations with Japan and West Germany. Also, in the same year (25 October 1971), after a protracted debate, the UN General Assembly voted (by 76 to 35 votes) for PRC's membership and the exclusion of Taiwan.³⁷ By September 1974,³⁸ 97 countries had established diplomatic relations with PRC, and a total of 150 countries were trading with China.³⁹ By 1977, China had diplomatic relations with 114⁴⁰ nations, and by 1984, China had established diplomatic relations with 130 countries.⁴¹

8.2 Sino-American Relations

...there are some comrades who say that, in the past, we interpreted negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union as US-Soviet collusion, but we now too are negotiating with the US. Hence, they asked whether we have changed our policy...

Our invitation to Nixon to visit China proceeds precisely from Chairman Mao's tactical thinking: exploiting the contradictions, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and destroying them one by one. And this by no means indicates a change in our diplomatic line.

The two arch enemies facing us are US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. We are to fight for the overthrow of these two enemies. That has already been written into the new [1973] Party Constitution. Nevertheless, are we to fight these two enemies simultaneously, using the same might?

Are we to ally ourselves with one against the other? Definitely not. We act in the light of changes in situations, tipping the scale diversely

TABLE 8.1

COUNTRIES IN FAVOUR OF PRC'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

AND THE EXPULSION OF TAIWAN AS AT OCTOBER 1971

(76 For, 35 Against, 17 Abstentions)

African Member States in Favour	Non-African Member States in Favour	African Member States Against	Non-African Member States Against	African States Abstaining	Non-African States Abstaining
Algeria	Afghanistan	South Africa	Saudi Arabia	Mauritius	Argentina
Botswana	Albania*	Central Africa	Australia		Bahrain
Burundi	Austria	Chad	Bolivia		Barbados
Cameroon	Belgium	Congo (K) (Zaire)	Brazil		Cyprus
Congo (B)	Bautan	Ivory Coast	Cambodia		Colombia
Egypt	Byelorussia	Dahomey	Costa Rica		Spain
Ethiopia	Burma	Gabon	Dominican Republic		Fiji
Ghana	Bulgaria	Gambia	United States		Greece
Guinea	Canada	Upper Volta	Guatemala		Indonesia
Equatorial Guinea	Ceylon	Lesotho	Haiti		Jamaica
Kenya	Chile	Liberia	Honduras		Jordan
Libya	Cuba	Malagasy	Japan		Lebanon
Mali	Denmark	Malawi	Malta		Luxembourg
Morocco	Ecuador	Niger	Nicaragua		Panama
Mauritania	Finland	Swaziland	New Zealand		Qatar
Nigeria	France		Paraguay		Thailand
Uganda	Great Britain		Philippines		
Rwanda	Guyana		Salvador		
Senegal	Hungary		Uruguay		
Sierra Leone	India		Venezuela		
Somalia	Iceland				
Sudan	Ireland				
Togo	Israel				
Tunisia	Italy				
Tanzania	Kuwait				
Zambia	Laos				
	Malaysia				
	Mexico				
	Mongolia				
	Nepal				
	Norway				
	Pakistan				
	Low Countries				
	Peru				
	Poland				
	Portugal				
	Rumania				
	Singapore				
	Syria				
	Sweden				
	Czechoslovakia				
	Trinidad & Tobago				
	Turkey				
	Ukraine				
	USSR				
	Yemen				
	South Yemen				
	Yugoslavia				
	Iran				
	Iraq				
26	50	15	20	1	16

Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 285-286.

* Sponsor of the UN resolution calling for PRC's admission into and the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN.

TABLE 8.2

VOTING IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE CHINA ISSUE

Year	All Nations: Percent of Votes			Total	All Nations: Number of Votes		
	For Taiwan	For PRC	Abstain*		For Taiwan	For PRC	Abstain*
1950	56	27	17	59	33	16	10
1951**	62	18	20	60	37	11	12
1952	62	12	18	60	42	7	11
1953**	73	17	10	60	44	10	6
1954	72	18	10	60	43	11	6
1955	70	20	10	60	42	12	6
1956	60	30	10	79	47	24	8
1957	59	33	8	82	48	27	7
1958	54	35	11	81	44	28	9
1959	54	35	11	82	44	29	9
1960	42	34	24	99	42	34	23
1961	46	36	18	104	48	37	19
1962	51	38	11	110	56	42	12
1963	51	37	12	111	57	41	13
1965	40	40	20	117	47	47	23
1966	47	38	15	121	57	46	18
1967	48	37	15	122	58	45	19
1968	46	35	19	126	58	44	24
1969	44	38	18	126	56	48	22
1970	39	40	21	127	49	51	27

Source: Wei Liang-Tsai, Peking Versus Taiping in Africa 1960-1978 (Taipei, The Asian and World Institute, 1982), p.382 (Table 39).

* Including those registered as absent or not voting.

** No roll-call vote in 1951 or 1953; only total are available.

at different times. But where is our main point of attack and how are we to exploit their contradictions? This involves a high level of tactics...

Whether or not these tactics are applied properly is a question of paramount importance that determines the fate of the world. Standing on a tower overlooking the general situation of the world, having farsightedness and a correct recognition of questions, and correctly laying a firm hold on contradictions, our great leader Chairman Mao sent out all at once our ping-pong teams and invited Nixon to visit China.⁴²

The *rapprochement* between China and the United States constitutes the most significant development in China's foreign policy during the period following the most intense phase of ^{the} GPCR. Stemming from China's successful overtures to the United States, a number of questions have arisen and much controversial debate concerning the ideological character of China *vis à vis* American imperialism has occurred during the last decade or so (and particularly since 1976). Following the opening of Sino-American negotiations in the early '70s, many observers and students, Marxists and non-Marxists alike, wondered why China had decided to normalise relations with the foremost among the imperialist powers of the world.

Those who claimed to be orthodox Marxists⁴³ cast doubt on the very basis of China's ideology because, in their view, China had decided to form close links with the main enemy of socialism and of world revolution. Western-orientated scholars and publicists, on the other hand, not only welcomed China's new approach to the world but also

enthusiastically espoused the view that China had at last begun a policy of turning back the clock by de-emphasising the ideological and revolutionary aspects of its foreign policy.

But neither the Marxists nor the Western commentators were inclined to consider in objective terms the situation as it was already developing during the late '60s⁴⁴ and which led to a re-shaping of China's foreign policy.

However their arguments concerning China's weakening ideological perspective towards the rest of the world might have been justified, both these mutually antithetical views were based on an interpretation of China's behaviour which focused on the question (or problem) of the normalization of relations with the United States, to the exclusion of all other considerations.

Whereas, during the '50s and '60s, the United States had pursued a relentless policy of military opposition to national liberation movements throughout the world (and especially in Indo-China, where it was directly involved in a national liberation conflict of major proportions), by 1975 it was forced out of Indo-China and American imperialism in South East Asia had at last been contained. Thus, the strategic field was freed for the first time to permit China's entry. In the wake of these developments, a new era of *rapprochement* between China and the United States began.

Gittings (1972) clearly explains the rationale and motivation for China's decision to open a new chapter in its relations with the United States.

When imperialism is on the offensive, deep in our territory, negotiations are out of the question. Now...imperialism is on the defensive...In fact it is part of exactly the same process whereby imperialism...has moved from the offensive into the defensive.⁴⁵

China had at no time in the past rejected talks or diplomatic relations with the United States or any other power. In Halliday's words

China never refused to enter the UN or recognise the US - on these issues it is not she that has changed her policy toward them, but the US and the world that has changed its policy towards China. China has responded to this new situation, and her response has not been an arbitrary one. It has also reflected objective changes.⁴⁶

Thus, even as early as 1958, in a statement on the possibility of a visit to China by John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, Mao claimed that:

our policy is that we will not invite him as a guest, but should he knock at our door, we would entertain him.⁴⁷

Kissinger's visit to China 13 years later (1971) was on a similar basis, for China took the view that it formed part of the 'struggle' which followed the decline of the American military position in Asia and other parts of the world. Zhou gave clear expression to such a view in 1971

Holding talks is struggle. Not holding talks is also struggle...Our policy is to continue to struggle and to negotiate at the same time.⁴⁸

To the Chinese leaders, Sino-American talks throughout the '70s⁴⁹ constituted no more than a continuation of those that had proceeded in the '50s and '60s on different subjects and at different levels.⁵⁰ The only difference between the earlier period⁵¹ and the '70s lay in the fact that, by 1972, China had achieved a formidable position in international relations in comparison with a majority of powers in the world. The United States found itself negotiating with China not only as a widely recognised and influential power in the diplomatic and political field; in the military field also the United States found itself negotiating with one of the five nuclear powers, and, arguably, one of the greatest powers in the world.

As far as China was concerned, not much was at stake at this time. By welcoming the American initiative in 1972, China was merely signalling that it was prepared to enter a new perception of the changes that had occurred in the configuration of the international forces.

In December 1971, three months before Nixon's visit to China (February 1972), Zhou Enlai expressed the official Chinese view of the rationale behind the opening of talks with the United States in the following terms:

It is to our advantage if negotiation succeeds, but it constitutes no detriment to us if the negotiation fails. We will never give up our principles and sell out our people and revolution...

The USSR and the US are now dealing with us by means of dual tactics. The US invades Taiwan and Indo-China and negotiates with our country. At the same time the Soviet revisionists deploy millions of soldiers along the Sino-Soviet border

and simultaneously engage in negotiations with us. These are dual tactics and we should respond to them with dual revolutionary tactics.⁵²

In contrast to the Sino-American negotiations of the '50s and '60s, those of the '70s were characterised by the fact that the United States was no longer in a position to dictate terms. In fact the United States found itself with little option but to concede to China's major demands, including the eventual withdrawal of American recognition of Taiwan. As a result of its heavy military involvement in the work of national liberation in Indo-China, the United States had become engaged in a domestic crisis which was reflected in general worldwide inflation and a weakening of the American dollar.⁵³ In addition, American public opinion had become more and more divided on the question of Indo-China.⁵⁴ The loss of American lives in the war and the weakening of America's influence in other parts of the world seemed to compel the United States to find ways to normalise its relations with China.

China's ideological assessment of America's declining position can be found, for example, in an article which appeared in the Peking Review (21 January 1972) a month before Nixon's visit to China. Under the title 'Decline For US Imperialism', it argued that:

US [imperialist] decline is above all the result of the perseverance of the world's people in revolutionary struggle. Since the end of World War II, US imperialism, acting as an overlord of the world with the atom bomb in the one hand and the dollar in the other, has carried out aggression, subversion, control, interference and bullying against other countries. This has aroused strong resistance from the

people all over the world...More and more medium-sized and small countries are joining forces to a greater extent to oppose the hegemony and power politics of the superpowers. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and people want revolution. This has become an irreversible trend of history...

US imperialism's decline clearly shows that the capitalist system will certainly be buried.⁵⁵

From the side of the United States, the immediate object of *rapprochement* with China was to minimise domestic and international political, economic and military difficulties caused by its direct involvement in the Vietnam War,. However, in the long term, the United States hoped to find ways of restoring its declining position in Indo-China and South East Asia as a whole. For the United States, the growing influence in this area of the economically powerful Japan and of the militarily powerful Soviet Union could only be counterbalanced by improving Sino-American relations. In addition, continuing hostility towards ^{the} PRC would only increase the likelihood of Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*.

In the economic field, having no relations with PRC had so far meant a great loss of the huge potential for economic, commercial and trade relations offered by China. Japan, one of America's economic rivals, was already engaged in a flourishing trade relationship with PRC. During the period 1969-71, when the Vietnamese struggle reached its climax and Sino-American negotiations were already under way, the two-way trade between Japan and China rose from US \$172.16 million (in 1969) to \$9229.3 million (in 1971).⁵⁶

If we don't recognise Peking, we encourage the Soviets to try to heal up the Sino-Soviet split and completely shut out the US...And we stand in danger of seeing Japan obtain an unbeatable economic foothold.⁵⁷

As has already been noted, China too had by this time, come to the view that circumstances were propitious for a diplomatic *rapprochement* with the United States on a comprehensive scale. This could only have been given an additional spur by the state of confrontation into which Sino-Soviet relations had lapsed over the two preceding years.

By 1971, the Soviet Union had trebled its ground force on its border with China, and had equipped it with nuclear missiles.⁵⁸ Any accommodation with the United States at this juncture would contribute to an easing of tension between China and its most formidable enemy since 1949. In thus pursuing its new policy of relaxation of its foreign relations on the Sino-American front, China was merely heeding the warning well entrenched in traditional Chinese political thought, that it could not afford 'to have two enemies at once'.⁵⁹

Moreover, China believed that friendship with such allies of the United States and Japan could result in enormous advantages in the diplomatic, trade and commercial fields. It also hoped that any normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations would result in an undermining of the possibility of close co-operation in Eastern Asia between Japan and the Soviet Union. No wonder that the Chinese leaders were persuaded that *rapprochement* with the

United States would pave the way for such beneficial political results all round.

Moreover, following its *rapprochement* with the United States, China was able to scale down its defence expenditure. Therefore more investment could be devoted to the economic field for socialist construction. Finally, China hoped that relations between the United States and the Chinese government would pave the way for a better understanding between the Chinese and the American people. In fact, the Chinese leaders went even further, claiming that

Through mutual exchange we can disseminate among Americans Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought, which are like seeds taking root, sprouting and growing strong in the United States, and will thus quicken the pace of the US revolutionary movement. If the door to Sino-American relations is opened, we will open up the road to revolution in the United States. ⁶⁰

Despite all advantages thus predicted, until 1976 China did not seem very keen to rush headlong into normalising its relations with the United States. It was not prepared to take advantage of the American relaxation of trade restrictions during the initial years of Sino-American *rapprochement*. To China, political settlement of such crucial issues as Taiwan, the continued American military presence off the Chinese coast and, above all, the withdrawal of the American forces from Indo-China, should precede, and not follow, better economic relations with the United States. Immediately before, during and after Nixon's visit to Beijing⁶¹ (February 1972), China

continued to be the major base for the Indo-Chinese struggles against American imperialism. Further military aid was supplied to the liberation fighters in Indo-China; and, additional ports were opened for the passage, among others, of Soviet and Eastern European military aid to D.V.R. Furthermore, in the joint communiqué issued by the United States and China (27 February 1972), China made it clear that any normalisation of Sino-American relations would depend on an end to the United States aggression in Indo-China as a whole and the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.⁶²

Until 1972, trade between China and the United States was minimal, consisting mainly of a few shipments of Chinese silk and foodstuffs to the United States.⁶³ By 1973, however, when total American withdrawal from Vietnam was already on the horizon, and a political settlement between the United States and China seemed more likely than ever before, the total volume of Sino-American trade reached the \$800 million mark and passed during the following year beyond the \$1,000 million mark.⁶⁴

However, Sino-American *rapprochement*, coming as it did in the wake of the most intensive period of the Indo-China wars of national liberation, was eventually followed by an estrangement between China and North Vietnam, its erstwhile ally, which throughout the '70s had moved closer and closer to the Soviet Union. As Gittings noted in 1979:

China's open courtship of the US has gone from bad to worse since President Nixon first visited Peking [Beijing] in 1972 while American bombs were still

falling in Vietnam and it has helped to push them [the Vietnamese] toward Moscow.⁶⁵


8.3. China and the Third World

The overall ideological objective of China's international activity during the period 1969-76 has already been discussed. We have seen that China's aim was to help sharpen the contradiction between the newly independent states on the one hand (which were the most directly oppressed nations), and neo-colonialism and imperialism on the other hand. Motivated by this world view, China strongly supported the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)⁶⁶ made by the non-aligned countries when they met for their Fourth Summit Conference in Algiers⁶⁷ (September 1973).

The oil embargo (October 1973) by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)⁶⁸ was seen by China as a powerful weapon aimed at undermining the basis of neo-colonialism in the Arab countries. At the same time, China saw in this action of OPEC a lesson for other countries in the developing world to follow in their efforts to control their own national resources.

The Third World is the main force in combatting colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. China is a developing socialist country belonging to the Third World. We should embrace our unity with countries of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America and resolutely support them in their struggle to win or safeguard national independence, defend their state sovereignty, protect their national resources and develop their national economy.⁶⁹

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Source: Beijing Review 1 January 1974): 3, p. 8.

It is useful to note that, by the early '70s not only had China passed through the most dynamic phases of GPCR, but, in addition a number of Third World countries (including many that were non- or anti-socialist and pro-Western in character) had developed a new international identity as southern powers, with common economic interests cutting across ideological differences and any special ties by which each of them might be bound to one or the other of the major powers. These countries viewed the industrialised countries of the North 'capitalist' (and 'socialist' alike) as pursuing economic interests injurious to their aim.

Moreover, a majority of Third World countries were keen to promote good relations with PRC which, by the early '70s, had come to attach great public importance to its own Third World characteristics. Thus, the growing influence of the Third World countries in international relations coupled with their attempts to develop a collective international political and economic identity in opposition to neo-colonialism and Big Power chauvinism was welcomed by China at a time when it was ready to draw closer to the governments of the under-developed countries of the world.

It was within the context of such an understanding of the new developments in the Third World that, in an effort to make them part of its new international strategy of creating a broader united front against imperialism and social imperialism, China adopted during the early '70s a friendly posture even to the governments of countries such

as Zaire (under Mobuto's rule) and Iran (under the Shah) which had been implacably hostile towards China only a few years before.⁷⁰ At the same time, China reduced or abandoned the support it had hitherto given to revolutionary uprisings in a number of Third World countries against governments in power.⁷¹ Priority, in other words, was thus given to the consolidation of State-to-State relations.⁷²

8.4. The 'Three Worlds Theory'

During much of this period (1969-76), China pursued the major objective of cultivating the support of the nations in 'the second intermediate zone' that were either already independent or vigorously sought to become independent of the two Superpowers. By 1974, however, the concept of the 'the second intermediate zone' was extended by China to include all those countries in the capitalist camp (irrespective of whether or not they were critical of American colonialism) as well as those under the control of the Soviet Union in the socialist bloc.

From China's perspective, both the socialist camp and the socialist bloc constituted zones in which the two Superpowers were engaged in political collusion and/or conflict leading to an intensification of their military expansion and economic control. Thus both sides capitalist and socialist alike formed a second world *vis à vis* the First World which consisted of the two dominant powers - *viz*, the United States and the Soviet Union. With the exception of Albania, Yugoslavia and Rumania, the

whole of Europe belonged to the Second World. Albania and Yugoslavia, which were both anti-'Soviet social colonialist' and Rumania, which was increasingly critical of the dominant role played by the Soviet Union in the affairs of the socialist bloc, were classified along with China itself as Socialist Third World countries.

China's analysis of the world divided into three parts was first put forward by Mao Zedong⁷³ (May 1974) and formally introduced later in the same year (October) by Deng Xiaoping at a special session of the UN General Assembly. Deng claimed that:

Judging from the changes in international relations, the world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World.⁷⁴

'The First World'

Deng went on to define and characterise each of these three worlds in the following manner

The two superpowers are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today... They both possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. They carry on a keenly contested arms race, station massive forces abroad, and set up military bases everywhere, threatening the independence and security of all nations. They both keep subjecting other countries to their control, subversion, interference, or aggression. They both exploit other countries economically, plundering their wealth and grabbing their resources.⁷⁵

'The Second World'

The case of developed countries in between the Superpowers and the developing countries is a complicated one. Some of them still retain colonial relations of one form or another with Third World countries, and a country like Portugal even continues with its barbarous colonial rule. An end must be put to this state of affairs. At the same time, all these developed countries are in varying degrees controlled, threatened or bullied by the one superpower or the other. Some of them have in fact been reduced by a superpower to the position of dependencies under the signboard of its so-called "family". In varying degrees all these countries have the desire of shaking off superpower enslavement or control and safeguarding their national independence and the integrity of their sovereignty.⁷⁶

'The Third World'

The numerous developing countries have long suffered from colonialist and imperialist oppression and exploitation. They have won political independence, yet all of them still face the historic task of clearing out the remnant forces of colonialism, developing the national economy and consolidating national independence. These countries cover vast territories, encompass a large population and abound in natural resources. Having suffered the heaviest oppression, they have the strongest desire to oppose oppression and seek liberation and development. In the struggle for national liberation and independence, they have demonstrated immense power and continually won splendid victories. They constitute a revolutionary motive force propelling the wheel of world history and are the main force combatting colonialism, imperialism and particularly the superpowers.⁷⁷

The timing of the introduction of this theory of the Three Worlds was by no means accidental. Crucial changes

taking place in the international environment during the period 1972-1974 played an important part in the development of China's view of the world as being divided into three parts. These changes were:

1. The intensification of acute rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union over the control and domination of the European land mass and access to it from the surrounding seas. Following the Paris Agreement (January 1973) between the United States and DVR, which ended direct United States military involvement in Vietnam and signalled the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces from Indo-China and South East Asia as a whole, the United States found itself free to concentrate its interest on Europe with a view to consolidating its position as the major imperialist power of the world. As has already been noted, American preoccupation with Indo-China had given the Soviet Union the freedom to push forward its military presence and actively to strengthen its position in Europe.

At the same time, European countries (and especially West European powers) resented the competition between the two Superpowers for influence in the region.⁷⁸ In the economic field, the leading Western European countries, (namely, France, West Germany and Britain) had already overcome their differences for the sake of enlarging EEC, thus increasing their independence of the United States. In China's view, EEC constitutes the most effective challenge to both Superpowers in the economic sphere; and the United States in particular. EEC's formal decision (1 January 1973) to

accept Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway as full members was received enthusiastically by China.

The development and enlargement of the Economic Community shows the growing trend among the West European countries to strengthen unity, combat the two superpowers and protect their own interests.⁷⁹

At the same time, in the military field, NATO was seen by China as the only military organisation capable of resisting Soviet hegemonism. Meanwhile, in the long term, China hoped that the growing independent economic tendencies among Western European countries would push them further towards adopting policies in the military field similar to those adopted by France in 1966.⁸⁰ Thus, despite the imperialist character of the Western countries and their economic and military organisations, they were viewed by China as powerful and useful forces which had a common interest in resisting the expansion and domination of the Superpowers, and the Soviet Union in particular, while accepting that second world countries were capitalist in character and exploited not only their own people but also other peoples of the Third World. China hastened to point out that none of them was

in an economic, political and military position to contend with the two superpowers for world domination, while all of them face the growing threat and restriction by either of the two superpowers. Because of these countries' strategic importance, bountiful resources and technology, the two superpowers prey upon them.⁸¹

It is this assessment of the economic and military position of the rest of the developed world *vis à vis* the two Superpowers which led China to seek a united front consisting of the Second and Third Worlds. For,

The hegemonic and power politics of the two superpowers have aroused strong dissatisfaction among the developed countries of the second world. The struggles of these countries against superpower control, interference, intimidation, exploitation and shifting of economic crises are growing day by day. Their struggles also have a significant impact on the development of the international situation.^{e2}

- ii. In the Third World itself, China was convinced that Third World countries were beginning to apprehend the hegemonist tendencies of the Soviet Union. The expulsion of the Soviet military experts from Egypt (July 1972), and the Arab-Israeli War (October 1973) which was waged without consulting the Soviet Union, were seen as clear indications of such a development.^{e3}

...the people of the Arab countries and Palestine broke through the control of the two superpowers and the state of "no war, no peace" and won a tremendous victory over Israel.^{e4}

When the oil-producing countries used their major resource as a weapon, mainly against the United States (as during the oil embargo of 1973 coinciding with the events leading upto the October War), it became clear to China that Third World states too could play a progressive role in international relations and bring about alterations in the balance of power. This event was followed by a sudden trebling of oil prices by the oil-producing countries (OPEC)^{e5}

In the recent Middle-East War, the Arab countries, united as one, used oil as a weapon...They did well, and rightly too. This was a pioneering action taken by developing countries in their struggle against imperialism ... It ... fully demonstrated the might of a united struggle waged by developing countries.⁸⁶

Thus, China's desire to strengthen relations with the Third World, based on State-to-State relations, became stronger than ever before. An increasing number of countries recognised that only through challenging the injustice of the international economic order imposed by the imperialistic powers could the conditions for genuine economic development be created.

Third World countries shared a common lot in the past and now face the common tasks of opposing colonialism, neo-colonialism and great-power hegemonism, developing the national economy and building their respective countries. We have every reason to unite more closely, and no reason to become estranged from one another.⁸⁷

Thus, China's characterisation of the Third World and its relations with the developing countries came to be based on a shared history of colonialism and semi-colonialism and on the common economic tasks faced by the poor countries of the world (including China) of overcoming exploitation and oppression by colonialism and imperialism. Revolutionary considerations and attention to factors favouring class struggle in the domestic scene in Third World countries gave way to the more important international struggle of oppressed nations as a whole against their oppressors.

The following factors contributed to China's decision to adopt a more flexible line in its foreign policy: total American withdrawal from South East Asia; the deaths in quick succession of the two great leading figures of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai; the fall of the 'Gang of Four'^{ee} and the victory of those Chinese leaders who 'opted for a path of development which emphasised rapidity of progress, urbanisation, and unchecked mechanisation of agriculture and technological nemesis of advanced industrialised countries as its frame of reference and source of assistance';^{ee} and the promotion of trade required for the 'Four Modernisation Programme', the implementation of which was begun in 1978. Thus, from the mid-'70s, a new phase in Chinese foreign relations got under way. Its main characteristics were: domestically, the modernisation of the Chinese economy; and internationally, co-operation with almost every country or political force in the world was prepared to oppose the Soviet Union in any manner whatsoever.

NOTES

1. Although the spirit and actual impact of GPCR continued to play a fundamental role in Chinese politics at least until 1976 (until the overthrow of the Gang of Four), the 9th National Congress of the CCP (April 1969) marked the beginning of a new development in China's foreign policy. This was revealed by Lin Piao in his Report to the 9th National Congress of ^{the} CCP (1 April 1969) cited in Peking Review 12 (28 April 1969): 16, pp. 11 and 23.
2. excluding South Africa, because of the racist nature of its regime, and Israel, because of its Zionist character. Also excluded were those few countries of the Third World, such as Saudi Arabia, which continued to recognise Taiwan. See Table 4.1.
3. including relations with such capitalist international institutions as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
4. A hegemonic power is one which uses its Big Power status for activities of international expansion, economic encroachment, political infiltration, political subversion and for military domination over weaker nations and peoples.
5. Lin Piao, 'Report to the Ninth National Congress of the CCP (April 1969)', op.cit., p. 29.
6. J. Camilleri, op.cit., p. 137.
7. So-called diplomatic ^{the} and political isolation, including absence from ^{the} UN for more than 20 years (1949-71), were imposed on China by the United States and a number of its allies. Once these powers had changed their position towards PRC by recognising its importance as a leading power in international relations, China responded in a similar way to that which it followed in relation to the countries which had recognised it during the '50s and '60s. As early as November 1960, Zhou En-lai affirmed this Chinese position. In an interview with a British television correspondent, Zhou En-lai explained that

The facts show that China has consistently pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence, and that China's stand has never changed. If other countries, the United States included, also cherish the same desire, China is of course willing to coexist peacefully with them on the basis of the five principles.

See Peking Review 3 (8 November 1960): 45, p. 23.

8. For a brief but penetrating analysis of China's flexible approach to the world in the early 1970's, see, for example, F. Halliday, 'China's New Course', 7 Days (weekly magazine, 1-7 March 1972), pp. 9-13. See also J. Gittings, 'China's Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change', Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 2 no. 1 (1972), pp. 30-33.
9. A. D. Barnett, China Policy: Old Problems and New Challenges (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 190.
10. For a comprehensive analysis of China's relations with Western Europe and China's objectives in trade and economic deals with the advanced countries see, for example, T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'The European Community and China', in J. Lodge (Ed.), Institutions and Policies of the European Community (London: Francis Pinter, 1983), pp. 227-239; R. Boardman, Britain and the People's Republic of China 1949-1974 (London: Macmillan, 1976); D. T. Stuart and W. T. Tow, 'China's Military Modernization: the Western Arms Connection', China Quarterly 90 (June 1982), pp. 253-271; T. B. Millar, 'The Triumph of Pragmatism: China's links with the West', International Affairs 55 (1979), pp. 195-206; M. B. Yahuda, 'China's Foreign Relations and Modernization Programme', in J. Gray (Ed.), China's New Development Strategy (London: Academic Press, 1982), chapter 3 (especially pp. 47-54); and I. Deutscher, Russia, China and the West: A Contemporary Chronicle, 1953-1966 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
11. T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Role of China in International Relations', Economic and Political Weekly 13 (5 November 1978): 47, p. 1945.
12. This was followed by the deployment of 50 Soviet divisions (with 1.2 million troops) along the 11,000 kilometer Sino-Soviet border. See H. Harding, 'Change and Continuity in China's Foreign Policy', Problems of Communism 17 (March-April 1983), p. 1. See also N. Harris, op.cit., p. 223; and also M. Gurtov and H. Byong-Moo, op.cit., p. 212.
13. J. C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1980), p. 240.
14. Lin Piao, 'Report to the Ninth National Congress of the CCP (1 April 1969)', op.cit., p. 26.
15. China's concern with (or fear of) the Soviet Union can be found, for example, in Zhou En-lai's 'Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CCP', Peking Review 16 (7 September 1973): 35 and 36, p. 24. See also his 'Report on the Work of the Government', Peking Review 18 (24 January 1975): 4, pp. 23-25.

16. See Chapter 6 of this work.
17. Lin Piao, 'Report to the Ninth National Congress of the CCP (1 April 1969), op.cit., p. 26.
18. See Chapter 2 of this work.
19. Mao Tse-tung, 'On Policy (25 December 1940)', Selected Works Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 441-449.
20. This article was written by the Writing Group of the Hupen Provincial Committee of CCP, 'A Study of "Open Policy"', published in Peking Review 14 (27 August 1971): 35, pp. 10-13.
21. See Chapter ^{15.1.4.} of this work.
22. Chou En-lai, 'Report on the Work of the Government to the Fourth National People's Congress of the PRC (4 January 1975)', Peking Review 18 (24 January 1975): 4, p. 4.
23. Albania was the first country to receive a Chinese ambassador after GPCR. However, relations between Albania and China were cordial even during the Cultural Revolution. The Albanian Defence Minister visited China in October 1968. He was promised more aid. See J. Camilleri, op.cit., p. 117.
24. A year later (July 1970), a French delegation, led by André Bettencourt, the Planning Minister, visited Beijing. In October Couve de Murville, a former French Prime Minister, also visited China. See ibidem.
25. China's relations with Rumania became more positive in character after Nicolas Ceausescu, the Rumanian President, visited China (June 1971).
26. Peking Review 15 (February 1972): 5, p. 22.
China's support for British entry into EEC dated back even to the height of GPCR. In March 1968, during the German-French talks on the question of the admission of Britain into EEC, China had urged the British Government to accept the conditions set for its entry by the Common Market. For example, the Peking Review editorial contained the following passage:

unless Britain "changes" sufficiently to meet the conditions set for her...her application must not be accepted. Britain must be satisfied with some sort of trade "arrangement" with the Common Market.

See Peking Review 11 (8 March 1968): 10, p. 30.

27. J. Camilleri, op.cit., p. 117.
28. The delegation negotiated a trade protocol with China on 17 March 1969 ibid., p. 117.
29. Tito's compromise with imperialist powers took place even during the most intensive phase of the Cold War and the campaign of imperialist powers against communism and socialist forces. Thus it is not surprising that Churchill told Tito during the latter's visit to Britain (March 1953) that 'we are your allies'. See P. Willets, The Non-Aligned Movement (London: Francis Pinter, 1978), p. 10.
30. During the '50s and '60s, China had been dismissive of the concept of non-alignment and its founding members such as India and Yugoslavia. Instead, China, during this period, was more concerned with various popular organisations such as the movement of Afro-Asian Solidarity. See Chapters 12.3.2, 13.2.2 and 13.3.3 of this work.
31. Although peaceful co-existence was an important factor in Sino-Yugoslav relations, it was by no means the only one. Sino-Yugoslav relations were hostile even during the period (1954-1959) of China's peaceful approach to the non-imperialist world (i.e. the third world).
32. Huang Hua, 'Report on the World Situation', Issues and Studies 14 (January 1978): 1, pp. 94-5.
33. K. C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 35.
34. Canadian recognition of PRC was not only a moral blow to Taiwan authorities; it was also an initiative for Canada's Western partners to follow suit. Italy, Australia, Turkey and Belgium recognized PRC during 1970-71. It should be noted that Canada initially did not fully support China's position over Taiwan as an integral part of PRC. In the Joint Communique, Canada only took note of China's claim over the island. See Joint Communique between the Governments of PRC and Canada reproduced in Peking Review 13 (16 October 1970): 42, p. 12.
35. J. Camilleri, op.cit., p. 18.
36. This visit took place in February 1972.
37. 76 for, 35 against, and 17 abstentions. Thus, by a majority vote, the UN General Assembly decided that

representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China were the only lawful representatives of China in the United Nations, and that the People's Republic of China was one of

the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Accordingly, the UN General Assembly decided to restore the legitimate representative and rights of PRC in UN and to expel the representatives of the Government of Jiang Jieshi from its other organizations which they had been unlawfully occupying. See 'Questions relating to Asia and the Far East', Yearbook of the United Nations Vol 25 (United Nations: Office of Public Information, 1971), Chapter 7, p. 132.

38. 47 of these countries did so after 1971. This shows that the number of countries which established diplomatic relations with China almost doubled during the period 1970-74 (see Table 4.1).
39. See Chou En-lai, 'Report on the Work of the Government to the 1st Session of the 4th Congress of the PRC (13 January 1975)', in Peking Review 18 (24 January 1975): 4, p. 22.
40. By comparison, only 23 countries continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan. With the exception of Saudi Arabia (and South Africa), all these are regimes of minor importance or relevance.
41. Weizhi Cheng, 'Independence is the Basis: An Analysis of the Principles of China's Foreign Policy', Beijing Review 24 (7 January 1981): 1, p. 7.
42. This was a response by a secret Chinese Foreign Policy briefing (1973), in response to critics (in and outside China) of Sino-American talks. Such a response was given to those who saw talks as collusion between "China and United States" and "an alliance with United States against the Soviet Union". See Issues and Studies 10 (June 1974): 9, pp. 103-5.
43. See N. Harris, op.cit., pp. 218-39 (especially pp. 218-21); L. Evans, China after Mao (New York: Monad Press, 1978), pp. 91-109; and China's Alliance with US Imperialism (A Spartacus Youth League Pamphlet) (New York: Spartacus Youth Publishing Co., January 1976), passim.
44. See Chapters 3 and 7 of this work.
45. J. Gittings, 'Continuities and Changes', op.cit., p. 32.
46. F. Halliday, 'China's New Course', 7 Days (Weekly Review) No. 18 (1-7 March 1972), p. 9.
47. cited in N. Harris, op.cit., p. 219.

In 1964, it was reported that Mao told a visiting French delegation that American protection of Taiwan was the main barrier for Sino-American relations. He said:

If Americans quit Formosa there is no reason why they should not be our friends

- New York Times (21 February 1964), cited in M. B. Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963', China Quarterly no. 36 (October-December 1968), p. 98.
48. W. Hinton, 'Interview with Chou En-lai' (in 4 parts): China Now no. 53 (Part 1), p. 6.
 49. These talks eventually led to normalization of Sino-American relations in January 1979.
 50. Up to May 1971, China and the United States held 137 discussions in Warsaw. See N. Harris, op.cit., p. 219.
 51. See Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this work.
 52. This statement was made by Zhou En-lai in a secret explanation to CCP officials (December 1971). cited in K. C. Cheng, op.cit., pp. 33-34.
 53. Between 1965-1971, The United States spent more than \$300 billion on its involvement in Indo-China. See Peking Review 15 (21 January 1972): 3, p. 16.
 54. See N. Harris, op.cit., p. 219.
 55. Peking Review 15 (21 January 1972): 3, p. 17. For a similar Chinese analysis see, for example, Shih Ching-tung, 'Sharp Decline of US Imperialism and Economic Resistance in Capitalist World', Peking Review 13 (13 February 1970): 7, pp. 25-26 and 31.
 56. These figures were compiled from International Monetary Fund, Directory of Trade and Statistics, Yearbooks of 1977 and 1984 (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1977/1984).
 57. A State Department spokesman, quoted from Newsweek (February 1973) in J. Gittings, 'China: Half a Super Power', op.cit., p. 79.
 58. See Maps 8.1 and 8.2 of this work.
 59. A. B. Claude, op.cit., p. 64.
 60. Huang Hua (China's Foreign Minister), 'On the World Situation', (30 July 1977) in Issues and Studies 14 (January 1978): 1, p. 116.

61. For China's strong condemnation of American aggression in Vietnam on the eve of Nixon's visit, see, for example, the Renmin Ribao (The People's Daily) editorial (4 February 1972) entitled 'US Imperialism must immediately stop War of Aggression against Vietnam', [published in Peking Review 15 (11 February 1972): 6, p. 13].
62. See Joint Communique between Chinese and American governments reproduced in Peking Review 15 (3 March 1972): 9, pp. 4-5.
63. These were in addition to an inquiry about 3 in-shore oil rigs from an American subsidiary in Singapore. See C. McDougall, 'China, Trade since the Cultural Revolution', The World Today 28 (January 1972): 1, p. 25.
64. M. B. Yahuda, 'China's Foreign Policy after Mao', op.cit., p. 40.
65. J. Gittings in the Manchester Guardian Weekly (25 February 1979) cited in M. B. Frederica (Ed.), China: a country study (Washington D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, the American University, September 1980), p. 403.
66. See, for example, Renmin Ribao (The People's Daily) editorial (13 September 1973), republished in Peking Review 16 (21 September 1973): 38, pp. 10-11.
67. The first, second and third summit conferences of non-aligned movement held in Belgrade (September 1961), Cairo (October 1964) and Lusaka (September 1970) respectively. For a comprehensive analysis of the development of non-aligned movement see, for example, P. Willetts, Non-Aligned Movement (London: Francis Pinter Ltd., 1978). See also T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Tanzania's Role in International Relations and Non-Alignment', Geneve-Afrique 19 (1981): 2, pp. 75-82.
68. Initially the oil embargo was adopted by the Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC). Most of OPEC, however, were Arab oil producing countries.
69. Chou En-lai, 'Report on the Work of the government, (13 January 1975) to the 1st National Session of the 4th National Congress of the PRC', Peking Review 18 (24 January 1975): 4, p. 4.
70. The governments of both Iran and Zaire had been seen by China as agents of imperialism (especially before 1970).
71. For example, the cases of Sri Lanka in April 1971 (formerly Ceylon) and the Sudan (1 July 1971). For an understanding of China's position in the case of

Sri Lanka, see, for example, a SACU Working Group, op.cit., pp. 31-4; see also T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Role of China in International Relations' (part 3), Economic and Political Weekly 13 (25 November 1978): 4, p. 1953 (note 50). The case of the Sudan is discussed in Chapter 15.1.1.4 of this work.

72. For an account of China's understanding of revolutionary process, see Introduction. For a brief but valuable analysis of China's emphasis on united front of states, rather than united front of masses during this period, see, for example, F. Halliday, 'Nixon has left but why did they ask him in the first place', 7 Days (3 March 1972), pp. 9-13.
73. In an interview with the Zambian President Kaunda (22 May 1974), Mao stated that

In my view, the United States and the Soviet Union form the first world. Japan, Europe and Canada, the middle section, belong to the second world. We are the third world. The third world has a huge population. With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to the third world. The whole of Africa belongs to the third world and Latin America too.

See 'Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism' (Editorial in The People's Daily reproduced) in Peking Review 20 (11 November 1977): 45, p. 11. Although The People's Daily editorial did not name the actual third world leader who interviewed Mao, it is reported that it was President Kaunda. See, for example, M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., note 1, p. 266.

74. Deng Xiaoping (Chairman of Delegation of PRC)'s speech at special session of UN General Assembly, Peking Review (Special Supplement) 17 (12 April 1974): 15, p. 1.
75. Ibid., p. II.
76. Ibidem.
The Second World also subsumed Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan.
77. Ibidem.
78. Unlike Western Europe, members of the COMECON and Warsaw Pact are heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. This is not so much the case with NATO members. In the economic field, European NATO members have their own economic organization (EEC) independent of the United States. In the military

field, some countries, particularly Britain, are themselves major military powers and exercise considerable influence on NATO policies.

79. Peking Review 16 (12 January 1973): 2, p. 18.
80. See Chapter 6 (note 24) of this work.
81. 'New Democracy, The Three Worlds Theory: A Scientific Thesis of Marxism-Leninism' (Columbia Paper reproduced) Peking Review 21 (14 April 1978: 15, p. 20.
82. Deng Xiaoping, 'Speech at Special Session of UN General Assembly', op.cit., p. II.
83. M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., p. 239.
84. Deng Xiaoping, 'Speech at Special Session of UN General Assembly', op.cit., p. II.
85. See M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., p. 239; see also S. S. Kim, op.cit., chapters 1 and 5.
86. Deng Xiaoping, 'Speech at Special Session of UN General Assembly', op.cit., p. IV.
87. Ibidem.
88. For a valuable discussion of China's emphasis on modernization, extensive trade activities, import of technology, etc. in opposition to that of the 'Gang of Four', self-reliance, minimisation of imports, etc. see C. McDougall, 'Policy Changes in China's Foreign Trade Since the Death of Mao, 1976-1980', in J. Gray (Ed.), China's New Development Strategy (London: Academic Press, 1982) chapter 7. See also M. B. Yahuda, 'China's Foreign Relations and the Modernization Programme', op.cit., chapter 3.
89. T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Role of China in International Relations', Economic and Political Weekly 13 (11 November 1978), p. 1858.

CHAPTER 9

MODERNISATION WITHIN AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE ADVERSARIES OF THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT: 1976-86

In order to make China a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the century, we must work and fight hard in the political, economic, cultural, military and diplomatic spheres, but in the final analysis what is of decisive importance is the rapid development of our socialist economy.'

From the mid-'70's onwards, China embarked on a policy of expansion of international trade and import of industrial plants from Western countries and Japan. This was in line with the new 'open door' policy which extended even to the use of capitalist methods of production. The new leadership justified its policy on the ideological grounds that Mao had recognised Western technology as a relevant source for China's modernisation when, for example, he had argued in 1956 that:

We must firmly reject and criticise all the decadent bourgeois systems, ideologies and ways of life of foreign countries. But this should in no way prevent us from learning the advanced sciences and technologies of capitalist countries and whatever is scientific in the management of their enterprises. In the industrially developed countries they run their enterprises with fewer people and greater efficiency and they know how to do business. All this should be learnt well in accordance with our principles so that our work can be improved...Neither the indiscriminate rejection of everything foreign, whether scientific, technological or cultural, nor the indiscriminate imitation of everything foreign that...has anything in common

with the Marxist attitude...in no way benefit our cause.²

Indeed, Mao went even further by stating on a different occasion that capitalism had positive features whilst a socialist country such as the Soviet Union had a number of undesirable features.³ Mao's successors took one short step from such considerations to reach the conclusion that any foreign policy that would aid the consolidation of the socialist construction in China would be acceptable.⁴ Trade, the most important element of the modernisation programme, rose from an equivalent of 4,765 million in 1971 to an equivalent of \$13.255 million in 1976, and to an equivalent of \$43,107 million in 1983.⁵ Between 1979 and 1984, the Chinese government borrowed more than \$10 billion.⁶ By 1985, Chinese business representatives had signed more than 17,000 agreements with overseas businesses concerning the import of foreign investment.⁷

Following the death of Mao Zedong foreign trade and the import of technology were expanded in an attempt to fulfill the targets of the economic plans (1975-85) for modernisation.⁸ The aim of the economic plan was to:

produce 400 billion kilogrammes of grain and 60 million tons of steel. In each of the eight years from 1978 to 1985, the value of agricultural output is to increase by 4 to 5 per cent and of industrial output by over 10 per cent. The increase in our country's output of major industrial products in the eight years will exceed that in the past twenty eight years.⁹

As a result of its modernisation programme, China has radically shifted from its position in the '70s when it was a major aid donor, with more than 70 developing countries receiving Chinese aid. China publicly announced that it is no longer an important aid donor, because it is itself in need of aid to push forward its programme of modernisation. As an alternative to its earlier orientation China has placed great emphasis in recent years on South-South co-operation which should permit exchange of experience between the less and the more developed countries of the Third World, the technological knowledge available in some countries would be shared, and trade and investment would be promoted. China has argued that it is only through such co-operation that the Third World countries could 'make up for each others deficiencies'.'°

9.1. China Moves Closer To The Capitalist-Developed

World:

There is no conflict of fundamental interests between China and Western Europe, nor are there any major outstanding issues. The two sides have identical and similar positions on many international issues.''

Although China still claims that the Third World provides the essential basis of its international identity, and that its relations with the capitalist-developed world are only a subsidiary goal for a broader international united front against American imperialism

and Soviet 'social imperialism', it must be pointed out that the last decade or so of its international activities and contacts do not seem to be entirely compatible with such a conception.

- i. The major base for pursuing the four modernisations (in the areas of agriculture, technology, national defence and security and science) is the Western countries and Japan, not the Third World or the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Import of technology, foreign investment in China, economic and trade relations, agreements with international capitalist institutions and world bankers extending credit and loans have absorbed the greater part of China's international activities, and have driven China economically closer to the West.

China has a vast territory with rich natural resources and a great potential market. Western Europe has a developed economy, advanced technology and abundant funds. Both sides have their strong positions, share common needs and can make up for each others' deficiencies. There are broad prospects and great potential for co-operation.¹²

- ii. Although a great deal of China's activity has been in the economic field, it has also played an active role in international politics and diplomacy. Its diplomatic efforts have been largely devoted to rallying support for China's territorial integrity. In particular, China has been engaged in persuading (or pressurising as the case may be) Britain and the United States to accept PRC's position regarding Hong Kong and Taiwan respectively.

To this end, China has used British and American economic interests and their need for investment in China (both directly and indirectly) as bargaining leverage for obtaining its political gains. Britain's concern with its growing and increasingly beneficial economic interests in China, coupled with fear of possible military action by China when the Sino-British agreement over Hong Kong is due to expire in 1997, have played a major part in persuading Britain to accept China's terms for the settlement of the Hong Kong issue.¹³ In the case of Taiwan, the United States has not only denied direct diplomatic recognition to the island which it has protected for so long, but it has also increasingly reduced its military aid to the régime. In fact, in recent reports following Weinberger's (the United States Secretary of Defence) visit to China (April 1985) it was claimed that the United States is prepared to aid the PRC in its drive for modernisation in the military field.

- iii. Preoccupation with the influence of the Soviet Union in the world has, in many cases, led China to adopt policies which have been rejected by oppressed peoples and supported by imperialist powers. An obvious example of this was China's support for President Sadat's so-called 'peaceful trip' to Israel (19 November 1977). Although China's motivation in this case was based on its support for policies independent of both Superpowers, the essential factor which weighed in the matter was Egypt's hostility towards the Soviet Union, and not Sadat's attitude to the United States. In fact, from October 1977 onwards,

Sadat had increasingly become an important and trusted American ally in the Middle East. His trip to Israel (November 1977) and the Israeli-Egypt agreement (Camp David September 1978) were all recommended, and indeed dictated, by American imperialism and its allies in order to calm the revolutionary situation which had already shaken the basic interests of the capitalist world following the oil embargo of 1973.

9.2. China and the Soviet Union

Obsession with the Soviet influence¹⁴ in the world and domestic preoccupation with the modernisation programme have been the main themes of China's role in international relations throughout the decade following the death of Mao Zedong. Revolutionary considerations seem to have been largely neglected. It is no wonder, therefore, that China's new world view has been admired and praised by reactionary forces throughout the Third World (especially in Africa) which, during the previous phases of China's foreign relations, had been afraid of the revolutionary line of Zhou Enlai.

By late 1975, within a few months of the defeat of American imperialism in Indo-China, China even went to the extent of offering an unsolicited loan to the Chilean military junta to an amount equivalent to US \$58 million. Praising such a generous gesture, Pinochet, the military dictator of Chile, contrasted the Soviet Union and Cuba unfavourably with China.

Russia and Cuba are trying to recover their position, to make Chile the South

American base it was under Allende. This country was then a centre of all their activities throughout South America. But China, that is different. China has not participated in this. China has behaved well.'⁵

By the mid '70s, China had publicly begun to refer to the Soviet Union as its most dangerous enemy. The full thrust of Chinese foreign policy, including the new emphasis laid by the policy-makers on the 'Three Worlds Theory' has thus been aimed against the Soviet Union. Huang Hua, China's Foreign Minister, has described the Soviet Union's initiatives in Czechoslovakia, Angola, South Asia and the Indian Ocean as 'clear cases of the Soviet Union replacing the old imperialists and as even more flagrant and brutal.'⁶

During the '60s and early '70s, China espoused the view that Sino-Soviet differences were motivated by ideological differences which deeply divided the Soviet and the Chinese understanding of the nature of socialist construction in the prevailing world situation, and the role of the socialist states in international relations. In the aftermath of Mao's death, however, the new leadership seems to have been mostly concerned with differences between the two countries over questions of national interest and spheres of influence.

Hu Yaobang, for example, in his report to the 12th National Congress of ^{the} CCP (September 1982) chose to emphasise the role of the Soviet Union only with respect to certain major questions such as Kampuchea and Afghanistan'⁷ or in the deployment of Soviet armed forces

along the Sino-Mongolian border. Hu went even further by characterising the Sino-Soviet dispute in terms of major conflicts of interest between the two states rather than profound differences of an ideological nature.¹⁸

Since the end of the Indo-China wars of national liberation, ideological debates have more or less ceased to reach the surface of Sino-Soviet relations. The 'revisionist-socialist character' of the Soviet Union is no longer the central theme of the Chinese side of the debate on China's differences with the Soviet Union. The People's Daily (April 1980) announced that the nine Chinese commentaries on Sino-Soviet polemics, published in 1963-64,

were incorrect on the nature of Soviet economic policy and its revisionist nature.¹⁹

At the same time, Liu Shaoqi who had been described during the late '60s as a Chinese 'Soviet revisionist', was viewed by the People's Daily (April 1980) as a 'great Marxist'.²⁰ His ideas were described as representing:

...the correct principles and methods of economic construction and management derived by our party from practical experience.

But Lin Biao and the gang of four slanderously called these correct principles and methods "revisionist". Professing to criticise revisionism, they flatly denied the achievements in the work of economic readjustment made between 1962 and 1969.²¹

In fact, the Soviet Union has been recently described by Hu Yaobang, Secretary General of ^{the} CCP, as a socialist

country, not 'a revisionist-socialist' state. In an interview with reporters from Hong Kong and Macao, Hu claimed that China has always wished to maintain friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Why should we not have friendly, good-neighbourly relations with a socialist country which shares the longest common border with us.²²

Furthermore, unlike the situation prevailing during the '60s, when China regarded Soviet Union's peaceful coexistence with imperialism as

...erroneous, anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist, because in reality it boils down to endless appeasement, endless compromises and endless concessions to imperialism. This can only result in peaceful coexistence turning into its opposite.²³

during the '80s, it seems to have taken upon itself the role of a champion of East-West *Détente*

...we favour *Détente* and oppose any action of worsening international tension...We are in favour of the development of relations between Eastern and Western Europe and improvement of Soviet-US relations, which will contribute to the peace and stability in Europe and the world as a whole.²⁴

For the time being at least, China seems to endorse international rules fully and to accept bourgeois norms of international behaviour.²⁵

...all countries should observe the norms guiding international relations and abide by the UN Charter.²⁶

TABLE 9.1

PERIODISATION OF CHINA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1949-86):

(a) In General(b) With Special Reference to Africa

(a)			(b)	
Sixth Phase:	Modernisation within and cooperation with the adversaries of the Soviet Union without	1986 ↑ 1976	Fifth Phase:	Stability and economic cooperation
Fifth Phase:	Chinese foreign policy since the Cultural Revolution	1976 ↑ 1969	Fourth Phase:	Broader united front
Fourth Phase:	China's challenge to the existing international order: the impact of GPCR	1969 ↑ 1966	Third Phase:	Selective interaction
Third Phase:	The Third World: a revolutionary base for China's dual objective	1966 ↑ 1959	Second Phase:	Intensive interaction
Second Phase:	Coexistence with anti-colonialist forces	1959 ↑ 1955	First Phase:	Initial approach
First Phase:	Alignment with the Soviet Union, consolidation of the revolution and unification of China	1955 ↑ 1949		

NOTES

1. Hua Guo-feng, 'Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country', Report on the Work of the Government to the 5th National People's Congress (26 February 1978), in Beijing Review 21 (10 March 1978): 10, p. 18.
2. Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Ten Major Principles', (Relationship Between China and Other Countries), op.cit., pp. 24-5.
3. In a speech to the Politburo (1956), Mao explained this in the following terms:

We must not blindly follow the Soviet Union; we must be more discriminating... We must study what is appropriate for China, including the good points of capitalism.
- cited in J. Gittings, China and the World 1922-1972, op.cit., p. 236.
4. M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, op.cit., pp. 213-234.
5. See Table 4.2.
6. Beijing Review 28 (11 January 1985): 6.
7. Ibidem.
For an account of Chinese law on foreign investment and economic contacts, see Beijing Review 28 (8 July 1985): 27; and ibid., 28 (26 August 1985): 34.
8. This included the establishment of 120 large scale projects. Among them were the development of iron and steel complexes, 9 non-ferrous metal complexes, 8 coal mines, 10 oil and gas fields, 30 power stations, 6 trunk railways and 5 ports/major harbours.
See M. B. Yahuda, 'China's New Look', The World Today 35 (May 1979): 5, p. 181.
9. Hua Guo-feng, 'Report on the Work of the Government (February 1978)', op.cit., p. 19.
10. Mu Youlin, 'Three Aspects of the Open Policy', Beijing Review 27 (17 December 1984): 51, p. 4.
11. Zhao Ziyang (Chinese Premier), 'Speech to the French National Assembly (Paris: May 30 1984)', in Foreign Affairs China (Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC 4 (September 1984): 3, p. 18.
12. Ibidem.

In December 1985, the largest Chinese trade delegation ever to visit Europe (200 strong) signed 60 contracts with EEC (Brussels), totalling US \$120 million.

See China Now 116 (Spring 1986), p. 5.

13. Under the provisions of this agreement, detachments of the Chinese People's Liberation Army will be stationed in Hong Kong (see also Article 2). Also the Chief Executive of Hong Kong will be appointed by the Chinese government in Beijing (see article 4). Under these two articles Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy may not last for long after 1997. Hong Kong soon after that may become only one of the major big cities in Chinese mainland. This, of course, will complete China's full claim of Hong Kong and displease the British.

For the full text of the agreement, see Beijing Review 26 (1 October 1984): 40, pp. 16-17.

14. Angola was an obvious example of a country where, because of its obsession with the Soviet Union, China found itself siding with forces supported by the United States, South Africa and their allies. See Chapter 15.2.1.2.

15. China's Alliance with US Imperialism (New York: Spartacus Youth Publishing Co., January 1976), p. 42.

16. Huang Hua, 'Report on the World Situation', Issues and Studies 13 (December 1977), 12, p. 88.

17. For an analysis of China's attitude towards the Afghanistan question, see, for example, G. Dutt, 'China and the Developments in Afghanistan', International Studies 19 (October-December: 4, pp. 597-608.

18. See Hu Yaobang, 'Report to the 12th National Congress of the CCP (September 1, 1982)', Beijing Review 24 (13 September 1982): 37, p. 31.

19. Cited in J. Gittings, 'China, Half a Super Power', op.cit., p. 90.

In the last two years, Sino-Soviet relations have markedly improved, especially following the visit to China by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa (December 1985) and Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov (March-April 1986). See China Now no. 116 (Spring 1986), p. 6.

20. 'Marxism should not be confused with Revisionism', (People's Daily), cited in Beijing Review 22 (21 April 1980): 16, p. 19.

21. Ibid., p. 20.

22. Beijing Review 27 (22 April 1985): 16, p. 6.
23. Red Flag (Hongqi) No. 5 (1962) cited in V. Fetov, 'On a New Style in Chinese Diplomacy', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11 (December 1981), p. 23.
24. Li Xiaonian (President of China), 'Speech at the Dinner Given by President Nicolas Ceausescu in Bucharest (27 August 1984)', cited in Foreign Affairs China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 4 (September 1984): 3, p. 8.
25. This is in contrast to its position towards UN during the '60s when China sought radical changes in almost every aspect of international rules and conditions. For Chinese assessment of UN during the '60s see, for example, Peking Review 8 (15 January 1965): 3, pp. 4-5 and pp. 7-15.
26. Wu Xueqian (Chinese Foreign Minister), 'Speech at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly (September 26, 1984)', reported in Beijing Review 27 (8 October 1984): 41, p. 18.
- China, however, still argues that the UN Charter has been misled and exploited by the Big Powers at the expense of small nations. Chinese delegates insist that all nations, small or large, must manage UN on an equal basis. For a detailed account of China's role in the United Nations Organisation and its specialised agencies, see S. S. Kim, China, United Nations and the World Order, *op.cit.*; and N. G. Lichtenstein, 'The People's Republic of China and the Revision of the United Nations Charter', Harvard International Law no. 10 (Summer 1980), pp. 221-232.

China has been more concerned with stability in the world. Conflicts, in China's view, would only lead to intervention by Big Powers which would have the effect of undermining its campaign for third world solidarity against the two hegemonic super powers.

For a further elaboration of this point, see, for example, Hu Dingyi, 'China Today', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science no. 476 (November 1984), pp. 11-18; see also Marthe Engelborghs-Bertels, 'Les Conceptions Chinoises en Matière de Relations Internationales', Etudes Internationales 12 (June 1981): 2, pp. 321-341.

PART III

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND AFRICA: 1949-86.

CHAPTER 10

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION OF ANTI-COLONIALISM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFRICA

Both the friends of the Chinese people and their enemies understood that the victory of the people's revolution in a country with a population of more than 500 million substantially changes the relation of forces in the world arena in favour of socialism. It strengthens still further the forces of the national liberation movement throughout the world.'

The American, Soviet and Chinese attitudes to the anti-colonial movement should be considered before discussing the relations between China and Africa for the following reasons:

- i. In relation to the United States, it is necessary to focus on its co-operative role in relation to the European colonial powers which are also its close allies as well as on its claim to be the 'champion of freedom' during the post-war period, in order to understand the *rationale* underlying the friendly disposition of a majority of the African anti-colonialist forces towards the communist world.
- ii. In the cases of China and the Soviet Union, although different aspects of their views on the anti-colonialist movement are frequently discussed in the following chapters, it is important to set out at this stage how and why China and the Soviet Union have differed in their understanding of, strategy towards, and support for independence and liberation of

large parts of the world from the grip of colonialism and imperialism.

The post-war era has given rise to a new dimension in international relations with the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as powerful centres representing two opposing social systems. The interests of various nation states and international organisations, the foreign policy of almost all governments in the world have been affected by the conflicting interests of the United States and the Soviet Union and their competition for influence in different parts of the world. The Cold War (1945 onwards) marked the beginning of direct conflict between the socialist and capitalist camps.

In sharp contrast to its status following the First World War,² China after the Second World War was internationally recognised as one of the leading powers in the world. This recognition was reinforced by its being given a permanent seat on the Security Council of UN (1945), signifying its status as one of the Big Five powers with veto, along with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.

However, upon the victorious conclusion of the Chinese revolution in 1949, ^{the} UN refused to expel the Guomindang government which continued to represent China. The new government in control of the mainland of China and under the leadership of ^{the} CCP was not allowed to take up its place in UN. The government in exile of Jiang Jieshi, which had been established on Formosa, one of the islands

of China, with the help of the United States continued to speak for the Chinese people in the international assembly.

This anti-China act was inspired by ideological antagonism towards PRC on the part of Western powers in general and the United States in particular. The deep hostility felt by the United States towards ^{the} PRC resulted from the latter's determination to rid China of the feudal system perpetuated by a ruling élite upon which a comprador capitalist system was superimposed with the result that no national bourgeois class emerged and to pursue objectives of which the imperialist powers outside and pro-imperialist elements inside China deeply disapproved.

The PRC not only had to face the intensive campaign of imperialist powers to isolate it, but also had to face up to the undesirable consequences of the Cold War, and attempts by the United States and its allies to contain China politically.³

However, ^{the} PRC at its founding (1949), unlike the Soviet Union before 1938, was far from being isolated from the rest of the world. Politically, China was able to win the support of those newly independent states - such as India, Burma and Egypt - which viewed themselves as essentially anti-imperialist in orientation.⁴ Ideologically, China identified with the socialist countries under the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Despite Stalin's misgivings⁵ and lack of enthusiasm for the Chinese revolution, PRC never openly defied the

Soviet Union. The CCP had always seen revolutionary China as an integral part of the socialist system and as one of the socialist countries of the world, led by the Soviet Union.⁶

China's orientation to the rest of the socialist world (and especially the Soviet Union) was, however, drastically altered when (from 1956 onwards) Khrushchev opposed China's policy of offering resistance to rather than seeking *Détente* with colonialist and imperialist powers, especially on questions relating to its territorial claims.

By 1959,⁷ following the Camp David Talks,⁸ China and the Soviet Union had evidently departed from their earlier ideological partnership and consensus on international questions (1949-59). Their understanding of the role of socialist countries in international relations and their orientation to the question of how colonialism and imperialism should be resisted and challenged diverged.

China came to the view that the policy of *Détente* would have the net effect of undermining the revolutionary forces and the forces of national liberation by giving the colonialist and imperialist powers a free hand in suppressing them. Africa, the continent in which anti-colonial forces were most active from the '60s onwards became an arena in which the rival strategies of China and the Soviet Union were tested - at least until 1975 with the liberation of the Portuguese colonies. Armed resistance to the colonialist, imperialist and racialist governments by mass based African national liberation

movements was favoured by China. The policy of *Détente* with imperialism, pursued by the Soviet Union, prevented it from adopting an ideologically and politically unequivocal stance on questions of African national liberation.

10.1. The United States and the Anti-Colonialist Forces in Africa.

...our NATO alliances with France and Britain require us to pursue or restore the old colonial interests of our allies.⁹


Neither the French Revolution (1789), nor the 'Open Door Policy' pursued by the United States during the latter part of the 19th and the early 20th Century, or for that matter Wilson's '14 Points'¹⁰ (1918) provided the key to the establishment of democratic and human rights, or contributed to equal opportunities for all peoples and nations in the colonised and semi-colonised parts of the world.

The French Revolution was followed by a re-division of colonial possessions in other continents between France and other European countries with a view to sharing material sources and pursuing their colonial interests and objectives at the expense of the peoples of those countries.

At the same time, the main aim of so-called 'Open Door Policy' was to consolidate the colonial routes and to preserve the interests of international capitalism by the United States itself actively playing a leading

MAP 10.1

AFRICA UNDER COLONIALISM (AS AT 1946)



Source: "Political Map of Africa Changes Fast", Peking Review 5 (5 January 1962): 1, p. 14.

imperialist role in Latin America, the Pacific and, to a lesser degree, other parts of Asia and the African continent as a whole.

Viewed from an African perspective, the policy pursued by the United States in the three major spheres of resistance to colonialism in general and the white racism in the southern and the Maghrib regions of the continent in particular, and of economic development, had the effect of stimulating Africans (and especially the progressive among them) to join forces with Asian nationalist and socialist movements and régimes.

Unlike Soviet and Chinese policies, the policy pursued by the United States in Africa (like its 'Open Door Policy' in China) has been based on active opposition to anti-colonialism and anti-racism. Verbal claims on the part of the United States of championing the cause of anti-colonialism bore no real relation to its actual policy towards Africa. Throughout the African peoples' struggle for independence and national liberation, the United States has been remarkably consistent in its policy of co-operation with its European colonialist allies. In the words of Wallerstein

...except for the minor nuance of voting for a few US resolutions on Portugal and on southern Africa, US attitudes towards nationalism in as yet non-independent states were substantially the same under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as under Eisenhower. The US still argued that the prime initiative should lie with Europe.¹²

The requirements of international capitalism, the context of the Cold War (from 1945 onwards), the 'Marshall Plan' (1947-51) through which the United States helped Western European powers back on their feet, the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO: 24 August 1949), and the increasing allied commitment to containing communism wherever possible, provided clear evidence of the willingness of the United States to give direct and indirect support to the colonial powers which had become deeply entrenched in Africa.

There were no objective grounds for the United States being regarded as the 'Champion of Freedom' by African nationalists irrespective of their political hue - ranging from those who sought independence for their countries through peaceful negotiation with the colonial power to those who fought wars of national liberation against colonialism and imperialism.

In effect, the United States, by its actions, demonstrated to anti-colonialist forces in Africa, its leading imperialist role and its support for those forces which have been responsible for deepening colonial penetration and perpetuating racism.

The existence of racism in the United States simply served to heighten this general impression. For example, George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near-Eastern and African Affairs in the American government said (8 May 1950) that

Racial discrimination in the United States has produced unfortunate

reactions on the part of many educated Africans.¹³

Policy-makers in the United States believed that American commercial and strategic interests would be best served through African countries continuing to remain in the direct or indirect grip of European colonial powers. Therefore, co-operation between the United States and its European allies in Africa was seen as vital by the former in relation to its political commitment to the latter. But the main thrust of American policy in Africa remained geared to the penetration of the commercial power of the United States and its multinational capital.

The history of American economic and commercial penetration of Africa dates back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1885, the United States took part in the Berlin Congress as an observer. Although the United States never considered itself bound by the agreements concluded on that occasion on the question of the political, administrative and military role of Western powers in Africa

[On] behalf of commercial and economic objectives however, the United States was not only prepared to sign formal agreements, but repeatedly made it clear that it was prepared to send military forces, if necessary, to enforce what it considered to be its rights.¹⁴

As in the case of China,¹⁵ during the same phase of the development of the global strategy of the United States, what was purveyed as an 'Open Door' policy proved

to be colonialist and imperialist in its results in Africa. In the same manner, repeated sloganeering on the part of the United States about freedom and human rights during the decades following World War II has not been followed¹⁶ by action.

Africans - particularly those in the North (Tunisians, Algerians, and Moroccans) - who had fought alongside the Allied armies against the Nazi and Fascist forces, were led to believe¹⁷ that independence would be granted to colonies after the War. Such an undertaking appeared to have the support of the United States. Thus, for example, Cordell Hull, American Secretary of State, (23 July 1942) wrote as follows:

In this vast struggle, we Americans stand united with those, who like ourselves, are fighting for the preservation of their freedom, of which they have been brutally deprived; with those who are fighting for the opportunity to achieve freedom.¹⁸

When it grasped the long term consequences of political freedom, the United States went back on its slogans, preferring to co-operate with the oppression by the colonial powers of the forces of national independence and liberation in Africa. NATO was used as a clearing house. 40 percent¹⁹ of the US contribution to it was made available to France to maintain its colonial empire. The Marshall Aid Plan, which provided financial aid for economic development and 'European Recovery', took the form of a contribution by the United States of a total sum of \$17 billion²⁰ for the purpose over a period of four

years (1947-51). Marshall Aid had a direct and substantial impact on the consolidation and restoration of colonialism. This was recognised by representatives of the government of the United States themselves. In his report, already quoted from, McGhee (May 1950) argued that

our ECA (Marshall Plan) programme is an important object of suspicion, as there is some tendency to regard this programme as it applies to the overseas territories of European powers as a device to strengthen the hold of the European powers over African territories.²¹

In both the Indo-Chinese and the Algerian wars of national liberation, the United States was clearly committed to the restoration of French colonialism. The United States thus came out into the open as an imperialist power, no longer even wishing to pretend to a championship of anti-colonialist causes. Eventually, in Indo-China, the United States moved from a position of sharing the cost of the war with the French colonialists to one of assuming the entire financial and military burden. It simply refused to comply with the Geneva Accord of 1954.²²

In the cases of Algeria, the United States fully supported a total consolidation of French colonial rule. Ironically, Algeria was considered as belonging to the NATO zone, and, therefore, regarded territorially speaking, as an integral part of France under the direct control of the *Ministère de l'Intérieur de France*. Even some years prior to the establishment of NATO (24 August

1949), American Ambassador Robert Murphy, then Special Diplomatic Representative of the President, had in a letter (2 November 1942) to General Henri Geraud, the French Representative of the Allied Forces for North Africa, contradicted the policy statement made four months earlier (23 July) by Secretary Hull. In this letter, Murphy wrote as follows:

Referring to the declaration made on various occasions by President Roosevelt and to the engagement already entered upon by the American Government as well as by the British Government I am in a position to assure you that the restoration of France in all her independence, in all her grandeur and in all the area which she possessed before the war, in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims of the United Nations. [sic]²³

It is well understood that French sovereignty should be re-established as soon as possible all over territories, metropolitan as well as colonial, over which The French Flag waved in 1939.

The government of the United States considers the French nation as an ally and will treat it as such.²⁴

The United States pursued its economic objectives largely indirectly in collaboration with the European colonial powers during the interval between the Berlin Congress of 1885 and World War II. A concrete awareness of its political and strategic interests in the continent has been reflected in the foreign policy of the United States since World War II.²⁵ Furthermore, the question of the political future of the former Italian colonies of Libya, Somalia and Eritrea was one in which the United States took a keen interest.

On such issues, the major concern of the United States was to pursue its own strategic interest and facilities in the important areas of the Horn and North Africa. This simply meant that the United States cast itself in the role of a powerful advocate of the colonial powers and of an implacable opponent of any strategic or political moves that the Soviet Union might make in the region.

The international tension marking the Cold War increased dramatically in 1949 following the end of American atomic power monopoly with the successful detonation by the Soviet Union of its own atomic bomb, the victory of the Chinese revolution, and the powerful impetus given by nationalist movements to anti-colonialism in different parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The United States not only supported its allies, but it even assumed a position of leadership in offering resistance to independence movements in general and national liberation forces in particular in Africa as well as in other parts of the world.

The failure of American attempts to stop the revolutionary process in China gave rise to uncertainty about the future of Africa. This fear was enhanced by the increasing popularity of nationalism, and the rapidity with which it spread throughout the colonised régimes of the world. Opposition to colonialism went hand in hand with opposition to white racism.

...If this [Africa] is one area in the world arena where in the broadest sense no major crisis exists, then it is

imperative that advantage can be taken of the absence of pressure to plan against the time when such pressure may be apparent.

Advantage must be taken of this period of grace to further the development within Africa of healthy political, economic and social institutions, to create an understanding on the part of the Africans of the forces of communism which are disturbing the peace and security and hundreds of millions of people elsewhere in the world, to inspire a determination to resist those forces.²⁶

As far as the United States was concerned the independence or liberation of African countries lay in the hands of the colonial powers. In the report cited above, McGhee emphasised that the United States had to

keep in mind the fact that we are not in a position to exercise direct responsibility with respect to Africa. We have no desire to assume the responsibilities borne by other powers, and indeed, our principles, our existing commitments and our lack of experience all militate against our assumption of such obligations.²⁷

Even if the above statement was logical and justifiable (even assuming that US policy makers were unaware of the objective situation in Africa), how could they explain colonial rule by the United States in such countries as the Philippines (1898-1946) and Haiti (1915-1934), direct imperialist penetration by it of China²⁸ (1898-1949), its monopolistic rule in Liberia - including the extraction of the concession enabling the American Firestone Plantation Company to exploit 1 million acres of land for the purpose of growing rubber trees over a period

of 99 years (beginning in 1926)²⁹ - and its imperialist rule exerted in the name of pursuing American commercial and economic interests in many other parts of the world during the decades prior to the publication of the McGhee Report (1950).

In actual fact, however, the United States has a longer history as a major imperialist power in Asia and Latin America, whilst in Africa its influence was rather more indirect before the '50s. With the start of the Cold War, the United States abandoned any pretence of anti-colonialism in Africa fearing that thereby its control of foreign markets and raw materials would be undermined and infiltration of new regions of the world by communism under the leadership of the Soviet Union could not be prevented.

While a consistent pro-colonialist stance was maintained by the United States outside UN by means of huge economic, financial and military supplies to Western European colonial powers in Africa, within UN it has always rejected, vetoed and/or voted against any resolutions that were likely to lead it to adopt policies inconsistent with the aim of collaborating with its partners, i.e., European metropolitan powers. In a reference to the Algerian issue, for example, Henry Cabot Lodge, the American Ambassador to UN (6 February 1957) openly opposed the Soviet and Afro-Asian countries in the General Assembly when they attempted to focus international attention on the Algerian war of national liberation against French Colonialism. In his view, no

'international initiative' should be taken in respect of Algeria.

Moral and material support given by the United States government to the forces of colonialism in Africa, particularly in the North, evoked a reaction even in the Senate, where Senator John Kennedy (2 July 1957) spoke as follows:

This dismal recital is of particular importance to us in the Senate because of the attitude towards the Algerian question which has been adopted throughout the period by our spokesmen in Washington, Paris, and the UN headquarters. Instead of contributing to our efforts to a cease-fire and settlement, American military equipment - particularly helicopters purchased in this country, which the natives especially fear and hate, - has been used against the rebels. Instead of recognising that Algeria is the greatest unsolved problem of Western diplomacy in North Africa today, our special emissary to that area this year, the distinguished Vice-President,³⁰ failed even to mention this sensitive issue in his report...

No matter how complex the problems posed by the Algerian issue may be, the record of the United States in this case, is, as elsewhere, a retreat from the principles of independence and anti-colonialism regardless of what diplomatic niceties and legal technicalities or even strategic considerations are offered in its defence.³¹

It should, however, be emphasised that this statement did not signify Kennedy's support for Algerian independence;³² rather, it summarised neatly the actual policy that was being pursued by the United States government in Africa at the time. In fact, when he became

President three years later, he did not pursue a more enlightened policy than the Republican administration which he criticised in 1957 on internal partisan grounds. It was Kennedy's administration which abstained from voting for the resolution adopted³³ by the UN General Assembly (20 December 1961), calling for a resumption of negotiations between FLN and the French government. This action had been urged by the Kennedy administration itself less than two months earlier (31 October 1961), when Governor G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, claimed that

We feel that the key to the solution lies in negotiations between France and the FLN [National Liberation Front]. We hope these negotiations can be soon resumed, and that a settlement based on the principle of Algerian self-determination will be achieved.³⁴

A similar position had been adopted earlier, July 1961, by the United States in respect of the French invasion of Tunisia at Bizerta. It abstained in the vote called by the UN General Assembly for the withdrawal of French troops from Tunisia.³⁵

It was during Kennedy's administration too that the United States refused to abide by the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly calling for a boycott and break in diplomatic relations with South Africa, and for a ban on the sale of arms to Portugal.³⁶ Finally, it was during Kennedy's term in office that the United States voted in UN against a resolution setting a time limit within which de-colonisation should be completed. The United States

gave full support to Britain against all efforts by UN to press for decisive action against the colonial-racial administration imposed on Rhodesia by the British colonial power.³⁷

The smell of gunpowder is more evident in Kennedy's administration than in Eisenhower's...the facts have proved that the cards he played in Laos, Cuba and the Congo did not show any indication of relaxation...we must be very watchful of this smiling tiger, who looks relaxed externally but tense internally.³⁸

In the case of the Congo(L) crisis, American policy favouring UN intervention derived from its concern with the Cold War, its preoccupation with the spreading influence of the Soviet Union, as a Super Power and of socialism internally, its determined opposition to progressive forces in Africa, and its aim of overthrowing the anti-imperialist government of Patrice Lumumba. The United States was not in favour of adopting a policy actively advocating independence and unification of the country.³⁹

President Lyndon B. Johnson continued President Kennedy's⁴⁰ policy. He began his mandate by reiterating humanitarian words and expressing American support for African freedom and economic development.⁴¹

We began a revolt from colonial rule which is now reshaping continents... Having helped create hope, we must now satisfy them or we will witness a rising discontent which may ultimately menace our own welfare. Let there be no mistake about our intention to win the war against poverty at home, and let there be no mistake about our

intention to fight that war around the world...The world must not be divided into rich nations and poor nations, or white nations and coloured nations. In such a division, I know you must realise, are the seeds of terrible discord and danger in the decades to come. For the wall between rich and poor is a wall of glass through which all can see.⁴²

However, President Johnson's humanitarian words had in practice hardly any effect upon the conduct of American policy. Arms continued to flow from the United States into Portugal. The whole world, including the American government and CIA, knew that such arms were being used against the freedom fighters in Portuguese African colonies.⁴³

In South Africa, American investments and enterprises expanded. In the Congo(L) (November 1964), the United States intervened directly in African internal affairs, when, along with Belgium, its ally, it took part in a military operation aimed at 'rescuing' white hostages held by the guerrilla forces.

In Vietnam, by the end of 1964, the United States had shown itself to be unable to check the deteriorating situation for imperialism. Following the removal, by stratagem, of Ngo Diem, its loyal ally, in 1963, the United States became directly involved in a war against the national liberation forces in Vietnam and against the North Vietnam government by expanding its air, sea and land forces to include as many as 21,000 troops.⁴⁴

In Latin America, the United States militarily intervened (1965) in the Dominican Republic with the

ostensible aim of 'saving' it from an alleged communist plot against the popular President Bosch.⁴⁵

Interestingly enough, whilst throughout the Congo(L) crisis (1960-63) the United States identified itself with the UN intervention in support of the Central Government in Leopoldville, in the Nigerian civil war its initial policy (1967-68) was one of giving active moral support to the separatist Biafran forces against the Central Government in Lagos.⁴⁶ In both cases, the United States was directly concerned with its own national and international strategic political and economic interests, and was quite unconcerned about the fate of the mass of the people in the two countries.

In relation to racism in Africa, while verbally continuing to express its opposition to *apartheid* in the southern part of the continent, the United States backed and indeed reinforced *apartheid*: either directly or indirectly through its investors and bankers in the region.

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists.⁴⁷

Under the Reagan administration (1981-), American alignment with the South African racist régime has been consolidated even further. The massacre (e.g., the Uitenhage Shootings of 21 March 1985) of innocent people

by the South African government has been viewed by the Reagan administration as an unfortunate incident complicating attempts at reformism of the government headed by P.W. Botha.⁴⁸

The general thrust of American policy in the continent has been consistently determined by its interests as an imperialist power, its global strategy as a Super Power, and by its aim of containing communist influence⁴⁹ in any form and at any place. The United States can hardly be considered as being interested in the impact that such a policy might have on the anti-colonial and anti-racist sensibilities of the African peoples.⁵⁰

10.2. Communism and anti-colonialism in pre-War Africa

Until the mid-'50s (and certainly when Stalin was still alive),⁵¹ the international communist movement had hardly any direct interest in or contact with Africa. Communist interest in colonialism, imperialism and anti-racism in Africa constituted only a chapter of secondary and subsidiary importance in the main task, confronting the communist parties of the world, of creating the conditions favourable to the final victory of the proletarian revolution in Europe.

The relatively small proportion of the proletariat in the population as a whole and the notable lack of militancy among the workers convinced the leaders of the Soviet Union and the International Communist Movement,

(Comintern) that the leadership of world socialism must come from a socialist Europe. The metropolitan and colonial struggles were seen as integrally related to one another. In 1919, at its First Congress, Comintern claimed in its manifesto that

The workers, not only of Annam, Algiers and Bengal but also of Persia and Armenia will gain their opportunity of independent existence only when the workers of England and France have overthrown Lloyd George and Clemenceau.⁵²

The Soviet Union, the leading force in Comintern and later in Cominform, had consistently ignored⁵³ Lenin's writings on the colonies as being the weakest link of the imperialist chain and the need to

[support the democratic content of every oppressed nation.⁵⁴

In his Report On The Tactics of The RCP (5 July 1921), Lenin wrote that

...millions and hundreds of millions, in fact the overwhelming majority of the people of the globe, are now coming forward as independent, active and revolutionary factors. It is perfectly clear that in the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and will, perhaps, play a much more revolutionary part than we expect.⁵⁵

It is perhaps worth pointing out that although Lenin's thesis on imperialism proved a major contribution

to an understanding of its roots, characteristics and motives, it did not focus upon the means methods and strategies of struggling against it. It was CCP which, starting from Lenin's analysis of imperialism as the 'highest stage of capitalism', devised the strategy of fighting against the forces of imperialism and successfully completed its task by achieving the victory of the Chinese revolution.

Neither did Stalin have confidence in 'Third World' nationalism and Pan-Africanism (which, after all, were incompatible with the aim of international communism and proletarian internationalism in the long run), nor did the objective reality of the world and in its domestic economy by the Soviet Union during his rule (1924-53) provide him with the opportunity to put to the test within the African context the 'much more revolutionary part' which Lenin expected forces of nationalism to play in the colonies. Stalin concentrated his attention on consolidating his own position within CPSU and on giving effect to his doctrine of 'socialism in one country'.

The Soviet Union's main obsession with pushing communism forward in Europe, continued during the inter-war years. The threat of Nazism (from 1933 onwards) simply underlined this obsession, at least until war became inevitable. When the war ended, the Soviet Union found itself in confrontation with imperialist powers engendered in the tensions of the Cold War.

The non-confrontational and 'peaceful' anti-colonialist stance advocated by such countries as India

and Indonesia during the early stages of the Cold War (i.e., before the Bandung Conference: 1955) simply intensified Stalin's already acute distrust of the nationalism of such figures as Sukarno and Nehru, whom he regarded as 'lackeys of colonialism and imperialism'.⁵⁶

However, during the '20s and '30s Comintern could count among its active members, for example, George Padmore⁵⁷ (the editor of 'The Negro Worker')⁵⁸ who tried to bring about a direct understanding within the international communist movement of the progressive character of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism in opposition to colonialism and racism which were so deeply entrenched in Africa.

Some European communists too - particularly those in the French Communist Party (PCF) who held jobs in French West Africa - showed their concern with the African colonial situation by treating Africans as colleagues rather than as inferiors. During the war, the PCF favoured the formation of groups consisting of young Africans in the major French West African towns with the aim of discussing African problems in general and colonialism in particular. Among those who took part in such groups were Sekou Touré (Guinea) and Modibo Keita (Mali), who later became leading figures in African national independence movements and Presidents of their countries.

Until a decade after the end of the war, it was perhaps only ^{the}CCP among the major communist parties and movements of the world - guided by its own experience -

that shared a correct understanding of the objective features of the colonial situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The CCP seriously considered the importance of support to, and co-operation with nationalist forces of different shades and inclinations in different parts of the colonial world.

As has already been noted,⁵⁹ Mao even went to the extent of linking the revolutionary development which was taking place in China during the late '30s with those in the rest of the colonised world. An end to colonialism and imperialism formed part of the core of the Chinese revolution. By the late '30s, class antagonism was de-emphasised, and even neglected for a short period, in the interest of forging a united front against Japanese imperialism.⁶⁰

The immediate needs of African countries required that the impetus of class struggle and its integration with the metropolitan proletariat should not be given paramount emphasis at least in the short run. As Mazrui and Locke have argued, Mao Zedong

... appreciated early the distinctiveness of the predicament of colonised peoples and the potential autonomous thrust that they were capable of launching for their own liberation even before the proletariat of the industrialised imperialist powers had captured control of the state.⁶¹

Like China,⁶² Africa was carved out by the imperialist powers. In the same manner, revolutionary prospects in Africa would be likely to open up only through the forces

of nationalism and a national united front directed against the common enemy - viz colonialism and racism. Nationalism would thus, at least initially, constitute the main ingredient of the national democratic or anti-imperialist revolution in the African context.

10.3. National Liberation in Africa:

Soviet and Chinese views

Direct concern with Africa on the part of the major communist powers dates back to the mid '50s, following the death of Stalin (1953). The Soviet Union, the leading power in the socialist bloc, under the leadership of Khrushchev, fashioned a new doctrine advocating peaceful coexistence with imperialism and postulating communist victory and establishment of socialism through parliamentary means. The main planks of this policy were adumbrated in Khrushchev's secret speech (1956) in which he claimed that

- i. America was no longer invulnerable to Soviet nuclear weaponry and therefore war was no longer inevitable.
- ii. That because of Soviet strategic parity, peaceful coexistence with the non-communist world could now be conceived as a long term policy rather than as a tactic for short term survival. The struggle would shift more and more towards peaceful economic competition.
- iii. That peaceful transition to socialism in many states was now possible because America could be less ready to oppose national liberation movements by violent means.⁶³ [emphasis added]

Thus, unlike China, which viewed the successful Soviet testing of an international ballistic missile and the launching of the first artificial satellite (July 1957) as 'the East wind' prevailing 'over the West wind',⁶⁴ or the socialist and liberation forces becoming 'overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism',⁶⁵ the Soviet Union viewed such technological success not as a prelude to the adoption of a hard line against the imperialist powers, but rather as a major thrust for pushing forward *Detente* with them.

The peaceful transition of liberation from and peaceful coexistence with the imperialist powers, advocated by the Soviet Union, came at a time when the campaign of imperialist powers against national independence and liberation as well as communist movements in various parts⁶⁶ of the world was at its height. China rejected the Soviet Union's thesis on peaceful coexistence and competition.

In Africa, China's ideological position was shared by a number of militant leaders of newly independent countries - such as Sekou Touré of Guinea (1958 onwards), Keita of Mali (1960 onwards), and Nkrumah of Ghana (1960 onwards) as well as of the national independence and liberation movements - such as those of Algeria (1954 onwards), and Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique (right from early '60s).⁶⁷

In terms of African revolution, we can not speak of a balance of forces, or even of coexistence as long as the problem of colonialism remains unsolved. Until colonialism and

imperialism in all their various forms and manifestations have been completely eradicated, it would be inconsistent for the African Revolution to coexist with imperialism.⁶⁸

The Soviet Union's concern with, or support for, Africa and African national liberation became increasingly guided by the global context of its status as a Big Power in fact and a Superpower—in-theory, in competition with the imperialist powers for influence in the world.⁶⁹ in the economic, political and strategic fields. The Soviet Union became less and less keen to give active support to, and strongly opposed to provoking, wars of national liberation in Africa.

In fact, wars of national liberation were viewed by the Soviet Union as inimical to the policy of *Détente* and provocative of direct confrontation between the socialist world and the imperialist camp, which could lead to a Third World War. The Soviet Union made no distinction between global war which could be avoided, and national liberation struggles involving local wars against the forces of imperialism, colonialism and domestic reactions which were unavoidable because the colonial powers refused to comply with the demands of the various national independence and liberation movements.⁷⁰

China's view of liberation wars was diametrically opposed to the Soviet Union's. China saw them as wars of national liberation constituting a barrier against world war, and a contribution to world peace.

The national and democratic movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America are

converging into a mighty, irresistible torrent. Their broad and intensive development has tied the hands of imperialism, upset its plans for launching a world war and deepened the contradictions and crises of the imperialist camp headed by the United States, thus making great contributions to the defence of world peace.⁷¹

Some communist critics⁷² accused China of being far too preoccupied with the anti-colonialist wars led by non-communist forces and neglectful of the revolutionary changes sought by communist parties and organisations. China, for its part, claimed that while it was second to none in stressing the importance of giving support to communist forces and forging links of solidarity with them, it nevertheless believed that

[i]n order to treat the complicated and variable international situation correctly, we must have clear understanding of ... The national democratic revolutionary movement.

To a great extent the general situation in the world depends upon the development of the national democratic movement.⁷³[emphasis added]

The main thrust of this chapter relates to the evidence which enables us to establish that, during a crucial period in the post-war era, when great changes were taking place in the general orientation of the Soviet Union towards the United States, China remained steadfast in its opposition to colonialism, racism and imperialism and was prepared to take the side of those struggling against them in Africa.

NOTES

1. Khrushchev's speech at 'the jubilee banquet' (30 September 1959) given by Zhou En-lai during his visit to China, reported in Peking Review 2 (6 October 1959): 40, p. 8.
2. See Chapter 1 of this work.
3. See Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this work.
4. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work.
5. See Chapter 2 of this work.
For a recent and valuable analysis of the Soviet Union's position toward the Chinese Revolution prior to liberation (1949), see Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 5-66.
6. See Chapter 4 of this work.
7. See Chapters 5 and 6 of this work.
- 8.. Here, it needs to be emphasised that China was not opposed to Sino-American talks as such [see Zhou En-lai's speech during Khrushchev's visit to China reported in Peking Review 2 (6 October 1959): 40, p. 7]. As we have explained in Part II of this work (see especially Chapters 4, 5 and 8.2), China itself had begun talks with the United States as early as 1951. The difference between China and the Soviet Union lay in the fact that China did not believe that the United States was interested in an ideological Détente in view of the fact that it was behaving in an aggressive manner towards national liberation and socialist movements.
9. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State of the United States said, in a speech to the Nation (1 June 1953), following his tour of the Near East and Southern Asia, cited in I. Wallerstein, 'Africa, the United States and the World Economy: the Historical Bases of American Policy', in F. S. Arkhurst (Ed.), US Policy Towards Africa (London: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 16.
10. On 8 January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson put forward 14 points to the Congress as American ideals for 'peace and justice' in the world.
11. See Chapters 1 and 2 of this work.
12. I Wallerstein, 'Africa, the United States and the World Economy', op.cit., p. 18.
13. George McGee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs, in a speech before the

- Foreign Policy Association (8 May 1950), cited in W. A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), p. 257.
14. Ibid., p. 246.
 15. See Chapter 2 of this work.
 16. For a valuable analysis of the point, see, for example, A. Gavshon, Crisis in Africa (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 143-168.
 17. J. Mūshri (Ed) Al-tārīkh Al-muāsir (The Modern History) [Algiers: Al-Ma'had al-watani Al-tarbiawi (The National Institute of Education, 1972) pp. 186-187]
 18. cited in W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 247.
 19. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 148.
 20. Ibidem.
 21. cited in W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 257.
 22. See Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this work.
 23. It would appear that the author by mistake, wrote 'the United Nations', instead of 'the United States'. cited in W. L. Langer, Our Vichy Gambo (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 333.
 24. Ibidem.
 25. The Horn of Africa represents the earliest case of an area in which the United States pursued a coherent African policy.. For a brief and valuable account of this, see F. Halliday, 'US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy', Review of African Political Economy no. 10 (September 1977), pp. 8-33. See also F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London: Verso, 1981), pp. 211-237.
 26. George McGee, cited in W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 225.
 27. Ibid., pp. 256-257.
 28. See Chapter 1 of this work.
 29. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 425.
 30. Vice-President Richard Nixon paid a visit (February-March 1957) to 8 African countries - Morocco, Ghana, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Libya and Tunisia. See Chapter 12.2.1.1 of this work.
 31. cited in W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., pp. 268-270.
 32. See Chapter 13.2.1.1 of this work.

33. See W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 289; and A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 153.
34. cited in W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 289.
35. Ibidem.
36. A. Gavshon, op.cit., pp. 153-154.
37. Ibidem.
38. Bulletin of Activities no. 17 (25 April 1961), in J. C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 486.
39. See Chapter 13.2.3.2 of this work.
40. J. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas (November 1963).
41. A. Gavshon, op.cit., pp. 154-156.
42. President Lyndon Johnson, cited in W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 306.
43. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 153.
44. See Chapter 7 (note 2) of this work.
45. See Chapter 14.1.3.1 of this work.
47. This was the option which the United States government chose to adopt out of five alternatives reported to it in National Security Memorandum 39, on the American policy towards racism in Africa, cited in L. B. Ekpebu, 'An African Perspective on US/USSR/China', Alternatives 6 (March 1980): 1, p. 114.
48. The Guardian (25 March 1986), p. 6.
49. Henry Kissinger, who was largely responsible for the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy during the period 1969-74, explained the anti-communist strategy underlying it in the following terms:
- If strategic forces are today less important, regional balances gain more significance..... In these circumstances our task is to find ways to restrain Soviet power over an historical power..... by balancing off Soviet power around the world through a combination of political, military and economic means.
- cited in New York Times (7 April 1976), p. 2.

50. See Henry A. Kissinger, 'American Global Concern in Africa', International Affairs Bulletin 6 (1982): 6, p. 7.
51. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work.
52. cited in A. A. Mazrui and R. Locke, 'The Chinese Model and the Soviet Model in Eastern and Southern Africa: Strategies of Liberation and Development', Asian Forum 9 (Winter-Spring 1976-1977): 1, p. 1.
53. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 89.
54. quoted from T. V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives, op.cit., p. 50.
55. V. I. Lenin, Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P., (5 July 1921), in his Collected Works: Volume 23 (December 1920-August 1921) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), pp. 481-482.
56. quoted from T. V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in Contemporary World: Strategies of Liberation and Development, op.cit., p. 63 (note 43).
57. See his Africa and World Peace (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1972); and Africa: Britain's Third Empire (London: Dennis Dobson, 1949).
58. C. Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (London: Macmillan Press, 1976), p. 4.
59. See Chapter 2 of this work.. See also, for example, G. Padmore, Africa and World Peace, op.cit., p. 150.
60. See Chapter 2.3.1 of this work.
61. A. Mazrui and R. Locke, op.cit., p. 2.
A clear account of the dynamic features of nationalism in the context of Marxist thinking can be found in, for example, T. V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in Contemporary World, especially Chapter 2.
62. See Map 11.1.
63. cited in G. Jukes, 'Soviet Views of China', in I. Wilson (Ed.), China and the World Community, op.cit., pp. 102-103.
64. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 50.
65. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 15.
66. The oppressive role played by the United States in collaboration with its Western European allies is

repeatedly documented throughout this part of the Thesis.

67. See Chapters 13.2 and 13.3.1 of this work.
68. K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London: Panaf Books, 1964), p. 204.
69. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., pp. 90-95; R. Lyons, 'The USSR, China and Africa', Review of African Political Economy no. 12 (May-August 1978), passim; F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., pp. 237-250; A. A. Mazrui and R. Locke, op.cit.; and D. Zagoria, 'Sino-Soviet friction in under-developed areas', Problems of Communism, 10 (March-April 1961), pp. 1-3.
70. An analysis of China's interpretation of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'just war' can be found in 'A proposal concerning the general line of the international communist movement'. A letter (3 March 1960) from CCP to CPSU published in Peking Review 5 (26 July 1963): 30, pp. 10-23.
71. Peking Review 3 (21 April 1961): 16, p. 11.
72. See I. C. Ojha, Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: the Diplomacy of Despair (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 191.
73. Bulletin of Activities no. 17 in J. C. Cheng, op.cit., pp. 481 and 483.

CHAPTER 11

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND AFRICA BEFORE THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE


The November revolution is the classic type of a revolution in imperialist (that is to say capitalistically developed) countries. The Chinese revolution is the classic type of a revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries, and its experience is of incalculable value to the peoples of such countries.'

Despite the fact that ^{the} CCP's interest in the colonial situation in Africa was aroused at least 10 years² before the foundation of ^{the} PRC, no direct approach to Africa was made by China until the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung (1955).³ It was there that the Chinese delegation came face to face for the first time, with African representatives as well as observers from National Independence and Liberation movements. Underlying the absence of contact between PRC and African countries during the earlier period (1949-55) were the following major factors:

- i. China was committed to the international, Soviet inspired, communist line of non-cooperation with the non-communist movements and governments.⁴ Until the death of Stalin (1953), the Soviet Union was hostile not only to monarchies, but it also refused to recognise, or to deal with any national bourgeois *régimes* in Asia and Africa even though some of them may have appeared to be moving towards the adoption of a policy of opposition to colonialism which would

MAP 11.1

AFRICA UNDER COLONIALISM (AS AT 1955)



Source: "The Changing Afro-Asian World 1955-1965",
Peking Review 8 (23 April 1965): 17, p. 21.

constitute an important contribution to the anti-imperialist front. Understandably, the Soviet position towards non-communist forces was not only underwritten by the ideology of CPSU⁵ but also dictated by the Soviet Union's concern with its own security in Europe and by the events of the Cold War.

In a similar sense, China too was concerned with its own security, which was bound up with its political position in relation to the rest of Asia. China's major international activities and initiatives during the period 1949-54 were aimed at protecting its revolution by seeking friendly relations with neighbouring countries. Thus, during the years immediately following the revolution, China did not seem to be very keen on establishing formal diplomatic relations and promoting peaceful coexistence with the few independent countries in Africa - i.e. Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and Libya.⁶ Africa did not present any direct threat to China's security. As such it was not practically necessary for the latter to extend friendly relations to the independent countries in Africa which were, after all, dominated by the imperialist powers. Even the Ethiopian troops which fought against the Chinese Koreans during the Korean crisis (1951-53) were not viewed as constituting a direct threat to China from an African country. The fact that the international designs of the time, spearheaded by the United States for the containment of communism in general and PRC in particular included the deployment of Ethiopian forces in the Korean Campaign did not cause any special fear of Africa on China's part.

Within this context, the imperialist powers, led by the United States, sought to contain China in three different ways:

- A Through military alliances and bases.⁷
- B Through international collective action by the United States and its allies, using their influence and power in different parts of the Third World.
- C By provoking China's neighbours to adopt a hostile attitude towards the Chinese revolution.

ii. The absence of any special Afro-Asian (international) institutions or organisations capable of facilitating direct Sino-African contacts was an underlying factor in China's initial failure to fashion a policy towards Africa. The only international organisations through which China was able to make a few contacts with African representatives were those sponsored and organised by the socialist countries, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the World Peace Council (WPC).⁸

iii. The determination of the United States and its allies to isolate China from the rest of the world was another factor complicating the establishment of Sino-African relations, especially before the Bandung conference. The Western⁹ powers, under the leadership of the United States, not only attempted to contain China physically,¹⁰ but they also tried to block China economically (through trade boycott), politically (by trying to persuade other countries such as India to turn against China) and diplomatically (including the

barring of China from UN). China's absence from UN ruled out the possibility of making its world views heard, or of exercising any political and diplomatic impact on the Organisation and its members for promoting freedom and justice for all peoples and nations under the provision of the UN Charter. At the same time China was effectively prevented from establishing contacts with African countries which might have led to a better understanding and to collective action towards African independence and liberation, while removing any mistrust of communism implanted there largely by Western powers.

- iv. It was only in 1954 that China became somewhat more relaxed (both internally and externally) than in previous years. The international atmosphere seemed to be conducive to China pursuing a policy aimed at widening its diplomatic and revolutionary strategy of opposition to the United States and its allies.¹¹ China's position was further strengthened by the decision taken at the Bogor Conference (29 December 1954) to invite China to attend the first Afro-Asian conference (Bandung, 1955). China enthusiastically endorsed¹² the objectives of this conference.¹³ By this time (December 1954) China had already taken a big step towards Afro-Asian solidarity by establishing good relations with leading Asian powers such as India, Burma and Indonesia¹⁴ which were the major champions of the Afro-Asian movement. Being almost completely under colonial rule, (with the exception of Egypt, Ethiopia and Libya)¹⁵ before the Bandung Conference, (1955), Africa constituted the most dynamic

zone for China's anti-colonialist policy. In the wake of the Bogor Conference, the People's Daily (January 1954) commented that

most of the areas of Asia and Africa have too long been subjected to oppression and enslavement by colonialism and the great majority of the Asian and African peoples have suffered the scourge of threats of war by the imperialist aggression. Our voices have been ignored for a long time and our aspirations and demands mocked or suppressed by others.¹⁶

- v. Another factor inhibiting effective Sino-African contact before 1955 was the absence of genuine national governments in Africa (including Egypt),¹⁷ prepared to challenge the colonial powers and capable of providing the bases and facilities that would be needed for mounting anti-imperialist campaigns inside and outside Africa. Egypt's contribution to this necessary precondition effectively began only after the Bandung Conference. None of the other nominally independent African states, Libya, Ethiopia and Liberia, ruled by kings or emperors and under the political supervision of their Western allies took the initiative or had the desire to make contacts with anti-imperialist forces.

However, despite these above factors inhibiting Sino-African relations prior to Bandung, China and the African countries did enter into contact with each other, mostly at a people-to-people level during the period preceding the Bandung Conference. Walter Susulu was one of the first Africans who visited China on a few occasions. In 1953 he visited China as Secretary General of the African

National Congress (ANC) of South Africa.¹⁹ Also during this period, foreign visitors to China included among others, Jaques Vergés. Even though he was not an African, he was a prominent communist¹⁹ who represented African views. Vergés's major concern was African national aspirations towards independence and liberation. He was particularly involved in the Algerian liberation movement. He came to China as a representative of the Communist Party of Réunion at the International Union of Students Executive Committee (IUSEC) (Beijing, 1951).²⁰ Vergés was an admirer of the Chinese revolution and of Mao's thought, which earned him, from some observers, the epithet of "French Maoist".²¹ Other Sino-African contacts took place during the late '40s and early '50s at international meetings and through organisations sponsored by socialist countries. As early as the late '40s African representatives met the Chinese at ^{the} WFTU on a number of occasions.²²

The Chinese also visited Africa before 1955. Thus, for example, three postal representatives of ^{the} PRC attended a joint meeting of the International Air Transport Association and Universal Postal Union (Cairo, 1951).²³ However, China's policy towards Africa took a political and diplomatic shape for the first time only during and after the Bandung Conference. This conference had three implications for China's international role in general and for Africa in particular.

- i. It provided the occasion for the first direct meeting between Chinese and African representatives at the State-to-State level.
- ii. It took place at a time when the United States "was pursuing a harder line against China and playing a more interventionist role in the Third World"²⁴ against communist and national liberation forces. Such a policy of the United States and its allies led to the formation of military alliances with loyal governments in Asia²⁵ and the establishment of military bases in friendly countries in the Third World as a whole. Thus, the Bandung Conference played the very important role of providing China with new opportunities (in addition to those which it had already grasped in Asia) to halt the expansionary and interventionist policies of the United States in the Third World.
- iii. China, for the first time, participated in a major meeting without any of the Big Powers (including the Soviet Union, China's ally) being present. It could therefore put itself forward as an independent agent. Most of the participants of the Conference particularly its founders, India, Indonesia, Burma and Egypt were opposed to the military alliances favoured by both Superpowers.

Although China was aligned with the Soviet Union, its status as a developing country, its experience of imperialist penetration, its geographical location (fully situated in Asia), and, finally, its political inclination in favour of the newly independent countries (particularly

in Asia during the years 1953-55)²⁶ contributed to China assuming a prominent role at the first Afro-Asian conference.

Sino-African relations have been governed by the following major factors²⁷

- i. China has a historical background as a semi-colony, and identifies itself as a Third World country.²⁸
- ii. CCP's understanding of African nationalism was based on the priority accorded by Chinese revolutionaries to the ending of imperialism.²⁹
- iii. Afro-Asian solidarity (positive non-alignment): Until the post-dynamic period of the Cultural Revolution (1969 onwards), the fifth stage of China's foreign policy in general, and the fourth stage with reference to Africa, China was mainly concerned with Afro-Asian solidarity. Non-alignment was regarded by China as a negative movement *vis à vis* colonialism and imperialism. Non-aligned countries (such as Indonesia, Guinea, Ghana and Algeria) which advocated a much more positive policy, including armed struggle, were in a minority. China's formal recognition of non-alignment was no more than a tactical move on its part to win international support for Afro-Asian solidarity in the Bandung spirit. China's views were however undermined by more established non-aligned states such as Yugoslavia and India. The low opinion in which China held the non-aligned approach of such countries towards colonialism and

imperialism was clearly reflected in its attempts to hold a second or alternative Bandung.³⁰

iv. African appreciation³¹ of China's genuine concern for economic development and self-reliance, a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and South-South co-operation:

In the field of economic co-operation, China introduced a unique system of interest-free³² loans; such generous terms had never been offered by Western aid donors, or even by the Soviet Union.³³ Another feature of China's aid lay in the fact that it was invariably politically linked to anti-imperialism and therefore to national liberation, independence and self-determination of oppressed peoples.³⁴ This unique form of aid was offered by PRC to the African countries right from the start when economic aid was given to Egypt and trade relations were established between the two countries on easy terms during the Suez crisis³⁵ (1956).

The gratitude of African states to China for its aid does not, of course, reflect the views of anti-Chinese forces both inside and outside Africa.

v. Shared opposition between China and African countries to the Big Powers' expansion and hegemony gave a fillip to Sino-African relations. Most African countries are non-aligned and jealous of their independence. They more or less share China's opposition to the competition between the Superpowers for spheres of influence in the Third World countries. Since almost all African countries

have experienced the colonialist and imperialist threat, directly or indirectly, they share a common objective which can only be attained through a strategy of united front. China's policy of State-to-State relations can be seen as a move in the direction of establishing united front. For three decades³⁶ (until 1978, the year of the normalisation of Sino-American relations), the Chinese revolution and China's territorial integrity were subject to direct or indirect threat by the United States. China needed solidarity with smaller nations in Africa as well as in other parts of the world in order to gain international recognition for itself as well as to create conditions conducive to the condemnation of the expansionist and interventionist designs of the Big Powers.

An analysis of China's policy in Africa during specific periods in history will help place Sino-African relations in a proper perspective and reveal the extent to which China's international impact has been compatible with its role in Africa. It might also help us to understand the motives underlying the changes and adjustments in China's policy towards Africa from time to time. We may be able to gauge the alignments and contradictions between the interests of China and the African countries, and guess to what extent China's ideological objectives are consistent with its day-to-day interactions with African states. It will be seen from the evidence gathered and presented here that China's policy in Africa has, by and large, followed

the pattern of its general foreign policy, which has already been discussed in Part II.³⁷

NOTES

1. Mao's panegyrist Lu Ting-yi (1951) cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 7.
2. See Chapter 2 of this work.
3. See Chapter 12 of this work.
4. As has already been discussed (see Chapters 4 and 5), this general ideological position adopted by them did not apply to neighbouring countries to which, for reasons of national security, it adopted the appropriate policy, especially after the Korean War.
5. See Chapter 5 of this work.
6. When PRC was founded (1949), apart from 3 'independent' African states (Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt), the rest of the entire continent was under colonial rule. The possibility of contact between China and these African countries at a formal level was far from simple, particularly in view of the political nature of their so-called 'independent' character. Hope was reposed in future efforts to create an atmosphere favourable for cooperation between peoples and states. Any contact that might have existed between PRC's representatives and these African states, could only have been indirect and informal.
7. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work.
8. The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) which could perhaps promote Sino-African relations was founded only in 1958.
9. See Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this work.
10. See Map 4.1.
11. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work.
12. B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65: a Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', China Report 14 (May-June 1978): 3, p. 51.
13. See Chapter 5 of this work.
14. Ibidem.
15. The Sudan did not become totally independent until 1956.
16. cited in B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65: a Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', op.cit., p. 51.

17. Egyptian anti-imperialism began to take concrete shape only in 1954. See Chapter 12.2.1.1.1 of this work.
18. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 15 (note 2).
19. His father was a communist leader of Réunion, an island which lies between Madagascar and Mauritius.
20. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 15 (note 2).
21. F. Fejto, 'A Maoist in France: Jaques Vergès and Revolution', China Quarterly 19 (July-September 1964), pp. 120-127.
22. Liao and Liu were Vice-Presidents of WFTU.
23. Ibid., p. 16 (note 4).
24. quoted from M. B. Yahuda, China's Foreign Policy after Mao, op.cit., p. 33.
25. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work.
26. See Chapters 3 and 4 of this work.
27. See also Introduction to this work.
28. Not all former colonies are part of the third world. First world countries such as the United States and 'Canada' were once colonies of Britain and France. At the same time, the United States, a former colony, has itself been a dominant imperialist power for over a hundred years. Third world countries are those underdeveloped, geographically concentrated in Asia (with the exception of Japan and those parts of the Soviet Union which lie in Asia), Africa (with the exception of South Africa's white minority) and Latin America. Australia, New Zealand, Greece, Malta, Spain and Portugal, although (economically, militarily and technologically) less developed than their industrialized partners of the West, still fall into the category of the industrial world though they themselves have been victims of imperialism under the aegis of the bigger powers.
29. See Chapters 1 and 2 of this work.
30. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
31. In this part, African recognition and appreciation of China's economic support is discussed with examples of economic aid given by China to Africa in different cases.
32. See Introduction of this work.

33. The Soviet Union usually charges between 2 to 3 per cent interest on loans.
34. J. Bermingham et al., 'Sino-African Relations 1949-1976', Munger Africana Library Notes Issue 59/60 (July 1981), p. 10.
35. See Chapter 13.2.1.1.4 of this work.
36. See Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of this work.
In fact, even now, the United States, under the Reagan administration, continues to deal with Taiwan in the economic and military field. This policy is strongly condemned by China which views it as constituting both an interference in its internal affairs and a breach of the recognition by the United States of the government of PRC, as the sole representative of the Chinese people.
37. See also Table 9.1.