

THE ROLE OF CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;
THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON FOREIGN POLICY WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS
(1949-1986)

VOLUME TWO

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
THE FIRST PHASE (1955-59)

...colonial and semi-colonial states have either won national independence or are engaged in the struggle for national independence. Both the Chinese people and the people of these countries have for a long time been subjected to the oppression and exploitation of imperialism and have suffered long enough...They share a common interest in the wiping out of colonialism, and there are no basic areas of conflict among them...'

The interval, 1954-55, constituted a watershed in China's international relations and heralded a new phase in China's foreign policy (1955-59),² which was characterised by China's peaceful coexistence with the newly independent states of the Third World and aimed at forging a wider anti-imperialist front. This second stage of China's foreign policy coincided with the opening of Sino-African relations. These relations developed within a framework of China's intensive campaign to contain politically and diplomatically, imperialist designs - particularly in Asia and Africa. Africa, which for the most part was under colonial rule, presented the major challenge, provoking a policy of determined opposition to colonialism and imperialism on China's part.

MAP 12.1

AFRICA UNDER COLONIALISM (AS AT 1958)



Source: "Political Map of Africa Changes Fast", Peking Review 5 (5 January 1962): 1, pp. 14-15.

12.1. Bandung Conference and the Beginning of Sino-African Relations.

Six African countries were represented at the Bandung Conference, (18-24 April 1955) which provided the first occasion for a formal and direct meeting between their representatives and those of China. They were Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast (which became Ghana after independence), Liberia, Libya and the Sudan. Kwame Nkrumah, who led a delegation from the Gold Coast government, (well on its way to independence then)³ and the Egyptian leader, Jemal Abdul Nasser, were the only two major African statesmen who later took the lead in the struggle for African liberation. At this conference, China's representatives approached for the first time not only African statesmen, (State-to-State relations), but also made direct and specific contacts with observers and representatives belonging to national independence and liberation movements. Among these was Moses Kotane,⁴ a leading South African figure who ten years later (1965), became the representative of the African National Congress (ANC) in Dar es Salaam.⁵ Also, among African observers at the conference, there was an Algerian delegation led by Mohammed Yazid,⁶ a leading Algerian politician who held various high posts before and after independence, and Salah Ben Youcef, a prominent Tunisian figure.

With respect to the two major issues of colonialism and racism in South Africa, Zhou Enlai affirmed at the conference China's strong support for African liberation

and condemned "racial discrimination and racism in the Union of South Africa".⁷ Zhou Enlai went on to say that

people, irrespective of race or colour, should enjoy fundamental human rights and not be subjected to discrimination ...one should say that now the common desire of the awakened countries of the peoples of Asia and Africa is to oppose racial discrimination and to defend human rights, to oppose colonialism and to demand national independence, to firmly defend their own territorial integrity and sovereignty.⁸

During the conference, China could be reasonably expected to take a pure and uncompromising revolutionary stance on questions relating to Africa, unlike non-communist countries such as Egypt, Gold Coast and Indonesia, or observers from national independence and liberation movements. However, as a matter of fact, China kept a low profile. This was an appropriate tactic on China's part, given the divergent political and social orientations of the various representatives attending the conference. The stand taken by China at the conference was interpreted by some observers as a sign of its lack of concern with Africa. For example, Larkin has argued that

It does not appear that Africa was important to China at Bandung. Although Bandung marked the beginning of significant Chinese initiatives in Africa, there is no evidence that China foresaw this with clarity.⁹

However, China's failure on this occasion to open up contact with Africa,¹⁰ or to make a special effort to bring African issues¹¹ forward at this conference must not

be interpreted as evidence of its lack of concern for Africa and interest in African problems. Rather, it should be evaluated in the context of the general objectives of the Bandung Conference.¹² Bandung was the meeting place of representatives of governments and national independence and liberation movements from different social and political systems in Africa and Asia. They were all united by their opposition¹³ to colonialism and Big Power domination threatening Africa and Asia. Since these major issues also constituted some of the ideological priorities for China, the Chinese representatives did not feel the need to lay special emphasis on African matters, although they would certainly have preferred more activities and discussions emphasising the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist viewpoints. They would certainly have welcomed with enthusiasm the adoption of firm action and hard policy, including armed struggle. But this was not politic. Most states represented there were led by *régimes* hostile to any revolutionary activities or policies, socialist or communist in character. In fact, some representatives, prior to the conference expressed some opposition to inviting China.¹⁴

Had China adopted a tougher line at the conference its earlier efforts to establish friendly relations with other Third World countries (including peaceful coexistence with the Afro-Asian world with a view to widening the anti-imperialist front) might well have come to a bad end. It might also have alarmed those

representatives who had just begun to make cautious contacts with the communist world. China was already regarded as a hardliner in the communist movement. Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, voiced reservations about inviting China to Bandung.¹⁵ The Egyptian debate was, however, disarmed by China's conciliatory attitude towards the non-communist forces in Asia and Africa at the Conference. Not surprisingly, Nasser described Zhou's Enlai as "not an aggressive communist".¹⁷

Whatever may have been the true extent of China's concern with Africa manifested at the Bandung Conference, the Bandung spirit itself was unmistakably generative of meaningful Sino-African relations.

Two major international developments influenced ^{the} PRC's early overtures to Africa. The first was the momentum gained by the forces of African nationalism in opposition to the forces of colonialism. Thus, by the time Sino-African relations entered the agenda of international politics, armed struggle had already begun to be employed in Algeria as the means of achieving liberation.¹⁸ China evaluated the political situation in Africa during the period following the Bandung Conference in the following terms

The people of Egypt and the Sudan, countries in what used to be considered "dark Africa", have achieved independence. The people of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya, Rhodesia and many countries of Africa have awakened. Their heroic struggle against colonial oppression has shaken the whole world.¹⁹

Secondly, the development of the initial phase of Sino-African relations coincided almost exactly with the development of the first phase of the Sino-Soviet ideological rift which can be dated back to Khrushchev's Secret Speech at the 20th Congress of ^{the} CPSU (1956).²⁰ These differences increased China's freedom to play an international role virtually independent of the Soviet Union's new policy of *Détente*. China continued its policy of uncompromising opposition to the leading anti-communist and anti-liberation forces of the West.

It was in such a general international atmosphere that the seeds of Sino-African diplomatic relations were sown. China established diplomatic relations with the first African country, (Egypt: 30 May 1956), three months after Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation speech (February 1956). It must, however, be remembered that China's campaign against *Détente* did not become overt until the Soviet Union rejected China's appeal to halt its conciliatory policy. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's campaign to win the approval of anti-colonialist forces (hitherto regarded by China as its main ideological allies outside the Communist world) for Khrushchev's first summer meeting with Eisenhower (Camp David, 1959) simply fuelled China's ideological resentment against its senior communist ally. However, Sino-Soviet differences did not come out into the open in a big way on the international scene until China entered the third stage of its international policy or the beginning of the second stage of Sino-African relations (1959-66).

12.2. State-to-State Relations Between China and African States - or 'United Front From Above'.

Out of the eight African countries which were already independent during the first period of Sino-African relations (1956-59), China had established full diplomatic relations with four: Egypt, (May 1956), Morocco (November 1958), the Sudan (February 1959), and Guinea (October 1959).²¹

12.2.1. Relations with 'progressive' states

12.2.1.1. Relations with Egypt²²

For basically ideological reasons, (i.e. Nasser's indecisive policy of opposition to Western powers (and especially the United States), no diplomatic relations between China and Egypt²³ had been in existence until the mid '50s and, for similar reasons, Sino-Egyptian relations reached their peak during the first three years after Bandung (1955-58). Again, for ideological reasons Sino-Egyptian relations reached their nadir following Nasser's anti-communist campaign (1958-59), in Egypt and his increasingly moderate line on international issues in co-operation with Nehru and Tito.

12.2.1.1.1. Egypt's Relations (under Nasser) with the West Before and After Bandung Conference.

Before discussing the development of Sino-Egyptian relations during this period (1955-59), it is important to consider the development of the political and ideological

orientation of Egypt following the July 1952 revolution. Egypt's new leaders, after the revolution, made a political about-turn. They abandoned the policy of co-operating with European powers, especially by making overtures to the United States; in effect, they replaced their pro-Western orientation by a policy of more or less active hostility towards the Western powers. This reversal of policy contains a clue to the fluctuations in Sino-Egyptian relations before and after 1955.²⁴

The major and immediate factor which led to the overthrow of King Farūq was the defeat of Egypt and other Arab countries of the Middle East in their first war against Israel (1948). By 1952, Egypt found itself in a situation that required nothing short of revolution to regain a sense of national pride shattered by its military defeat and to rid it of the corrupt *régime* of Farūq.²⁵ Political parties spent most of their time vying for power, instead of finding ways and means of halting the rapidly intensifying political and economic decline of Egypt. Thus, it should have come as no surprise when, independently of any political party or organisation, the 'Free Officers' who had experienced defeat in the war against Israel forced Farouk to abdicate the Egyptian throne as its constitutional monarch (23 July 1952). This signified an end to Egypt's predominantly pro-British policy of long standing and to the monarchical rule which was followed by a new *régime* led by 'Free Officers', who were Egyptian nationalist in the first and last instance.

The new leadership (known as the Committee of the Free Officers) were guided in the determination of Egypt's internal and external policy by their opposition to colonialism, imperialism, and monopolies, strong support of justice, a democratic way of life, and a strong army.²⁶ Nasser explained the domestic political orientation and the revolutionary objectives of the new Egypt in the following terms

...to build up the fatherland in the form of a healthy democratic society where there would be no place for class wars; where no man could feather his own nest at the cost of misery to others; where no minority would have power over the destiny of the majority; and there would be no chance for man to exploit his fellow countrymen.²⁷

In spite of its strong nationalistic character and its determination to remove colonialism from Egypt and the rest of the Arab world and its anti-Western tendencies (including opposition to military alliances), the new *régime* (under Mohammed Nejib's leadership) initially seemed to admit the possibility of co-operation between Egypt and the West in general and the United States in particular.

In American policy making circles however, the change of *régime* in Egypt was seen as providing an opportunity for the United States to increase (at the expense of Britain and France) its influence in the strategically important region surrounding the Suez. Immediately after the overthrow of King Farouk, Caffers, the American

ambassador, established contacts with the new government. CIA officials²⁸ dispatched to Egypt were entrusted with the task of finding ways and means of dealing with the new *régime*.

At the same time, William Forster Dulles, the American Assistant Secretary for Defence, visited Egypt, having been assured by Nasser that the United States "need have no fears of using American arms against Israel"; he promised to recommend military assistance to Egypt to a total of \$100 million.²⁹ An Egyptian delegation led by Ali Sabri, Nasser's Chief Aide, was sent to the United States to follow up Dulles's offer.³⁰

In May 1953 John Foster Dulles, the newly appointed Secretary of State, paid a visit to Egypt. His aim was to win Nasser's support for anti-communist alliances under the leadership of the United States. Nasser, however, was only interested in getting American military aid and modern weapons to be used in case Britain refused to accede to Egyptian demands that it should unconditionally withdraw its troops from Egyptian soil. Nasser saw no danger to Egypt from international communism; it was 'the Western [British] dominance' which constituted the 'greater danger'.³¹ Nasser asked Dulles in Cairo:

How can I tell my people that I am going into a military pact in collaboration with those who are occupying our country?³²

As far as Nasser was concerned, the United States was the only possible source³³ of military aid (and modern

weapons) and the only power capable of exerting any pressure on Britain in international relations.

It was not until July 1953, following the establishment of the Republic of Egypt, that the Free Officers were able to put into effect their policy of opposition to Western influence in the Arab world as a whole and in Egypt in particular. In the economic field, the early promise of economic reform had begun to be carried out. Agricultural co-operatives were set up, whilst more than 11 million people benefited from the policy of distribution of land.³⁴ In 1954, a project to produce iron and steel was launched with the construction of blast-furnaces at Heiwan.³⁵

In October 1954, Britain agreed to withdraw its troops from the Suez canal before June 1956.³⁶ This agreement was welcomed by the United States, which advocated a peaceful settlement of the Canal issue. For the United States, an Egyptian-British military confrontation would only aggravate Nasser's anti-Western proclivities. At the same time, the United States hoped that economic aid to Egypt would perhaps lessen Nasser's determination to oppose military pacts involving the region which were being sought by the United States and its allies, (including the Baghdad Pact).³⁷

Thus, after Britain signed the Suez Base Evacuation Agreement with Egypt, the United States promptly advanced a loan of \$40 million³⁸ to the latter. However, it was already clear that these attempts of the United States to win Nasser over to the Western orbit could not wholly

succeed. For Egyptian opposition to military pacts and its preference for a neutral stance in the Cold War had already been put into effect with the conclusion of the Indo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship³⁹ (April 1953). Thus Egypt became the first African and Arab country to confirm its support for a neutral Afro-Asian region in world politics. Such a development flew in the face of the strategy by which the Western powers actively engaged in creating zones of containment of communism.

Nasser's anti-Western tendency received a boost when the Soviet Union made an offer of arms to Egypt (18 May 1955) through Czechoslovakia. Nasser no longer needed to engage in frustrating attempts to obtain military aid which might have to be used against a Western power such as Britain or an ally of the West such as Israel.

Even when the possibility of a Soviet-Egyptian arms pact loomed on the horizon, Britain and America entertained hopes of saving Egypt from falling irredeemably under the influence of the communist world under the leadership of the Soviet Union. They initiated talks with Egypt six months after the Soviet Union made its offer of arms, (21 November 1955), on the construction of the Aswan Dam. In December, Britain and the United States, along with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), offered to help with the project.⁴⁰

The offer, however, did not lead to Nasser moderating his anti-Western position, especially as he had, by then, already secured arms from the Soviet Union. On the

contrary, Nasser was becoming increasingly anti-imperialist, urging Arab countries to repel Western military designs and pacts in the area. The Western powers had made a serious miscalculation in believing that they could successfully overcome Nasser's strong nationalist ambitions which were decidedly anti-Western and anti-Zionist in orientation.⁴¹ Thus, it came as no surprise when six months later (19 July 1956), the United States and Britain withdrew their offer of aid in respect of the Aswan Dam.

On 21 July 1956, Nasser made the historic decision to nationalise the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal. At the same time, he strongly attacked imperialist exploitation of Egypt in the past. Before the Canal's nationalisation, Egypt was receiving only a sum of \$3 million per annum.⁴² Immediately after nationalisation, Canal revenues soared to figures of more than \$100 million per annum.⁴³ Western influence in Egypt, already seriously undermined by the nationalisation of the Canal, waned even further in the face of the widespread realisation in Egypt of the extent of exploitation that Western control over the Suez had represented in the past.

Not unexpectedly, the nationalisation of the Canal made Egypt vulnerable to a direct threat by Britain and France which were its major shareholders. This threat culminated in the 'Tri-partite Aggression' in the form of a British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt, (October-November 1956).⁴⁴ Immediately after the nationalisation of the Canal, Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister,

informed President Eisenhower (27 July) that only force could put an end to the threat posed by Nasser to Western interests and that

I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan in order to recover our interests.⁴⁵

Britain not only lost face and access to an area of vital strategic importance, but also stood to suffer economic hardship. For 70 per cent ⁴⁶ of the oil required by Britain came through the Canal;⁴⁷ its closure or even restrictions on the transit of goods through it would vitally affect the British economy.

The prime motive underlying France's decision to intervene militarily in the Suez however, lay in its opposition to Egypt's support to the forces of national liberation in Algeria.⁴⁸ An end to Nasser's rule would mean an end to the major source of support for Algerian liberation fighters; in the words of Robert Lacoste, the French Resident Minister in Algeria,

Better one French division in Egypt than four divisions in Algeria.⁴⁹

France also had strong military links with Israel, especially after Guy Mollet, a 'socialist' and strong supporter of Zionism and Israel, became Prime Minister.⁵⁰ During the period July-October 1956, Britain and France appeared to be contemplating a peaceful settlement of the Canal issue, but, in fact, this proved to be only a tactical move to draw attention away from their

preparations for an attack on Egyptian airfields as well as Ismailia and Port Said, along the Suez (31 October 1956).

In the meantime, Israel had received military provisions needed for the invasion of Sinai in the eastern part of Egypt (29 October 1956). In fact, Britain seriously considered invading Egypt even in 1953 before it became involved in negotiations with Egypt for the evacuation of British troops from the Canal. According to a secret document excerpted in The Guardian (19 January 1985), the only reason given by the British Foreign Secretary against the immediate invasion of Egypt was lack of adequate preparation for a successful operation. Eden argued that:

provisions ought also to be made for a more powerful follow-up operation, which would preserve British and foreign lives and property in Cairo and Alexandria by restoring order in these cities. If a situation arose which called for intervention by us, we might have an opportunity to set up an alternative government and we should be ill-advised to miss such an opportunity.⁵¹

Despite its agreement with the general line advocated by its allies (*viz* Britain, France and Israel) in opposition to Nasser's *régime* the United States opposed the use of force against Egypt⁵² since it was likely to attract the Soviet Union to the area. It would also, the United States feared, create anti-Western feelings, even among moderate Arab countries which felt that Israel was their common enemy. In addition, the 'Tri-Partite Aggression'

was widely condemned by Afro-Asian⁵³ countries, including those which were generally pro-Western in their orientation.

Finally, the timing of the invasion coincided with the American Presidential elections (November 1956). The last thing Eisenhower and his associates wanted in the circumstances was to become involved in such an unpredictable conflict. In fact, according to Mohammed Hassenine El Haikel, known as 'Nasser's right arm', Nasser's⁵⁴ timing of the nationalisation of the Canal was deliberate. The possibility of a British military response was real enough, but American military intervention, alongside its ally, during the decisive few months from Eisenhower's presidential campaign was quite out of the question. In the event, American non-intervention in the war helped Eisenhower⁵⁵ ^{to secure} a renewal of his mandate (1957-61) as American resident. This may not have been the case had the United States intervened militarily, for its allies had suffered a humiliating defeat (at the end of December) which caused an anti-Western reaction even among loyal governments in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world which were loyal to the USA. Egyptian resistance, coupled with the Soviet threat both to use intercontinental missiles⁵⁶ and to send a voluntary army against the Anglo-French invasion, as well as world-wide condemnation of the 'Tripartite Aggression', forced the British and the French to withdraw their troops from Egypt. They were replaced by UN emergency forces (23 December 1956). Israel followed suit later (March 1957),

by effecting a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. In April 1957, the control of the Canal was turned over to the Egyptian army. In the same month Egypt decreed the nationalisation of foreign property and issued (24 April) a declaration on the administration of the Canal.

12.2.1.1.2. Sino-Egyptian Relations Before The Bandung Conference (1955)

During the initial phase (1952-54) of the Egyptian revolution, China was not inclined to establish close relationships with the new *régime*, which was still well inside the Western orbit; nor was PRC in any position to encourage Nasser to develop into an anti-imperialist leader.⁵⁷ At the time of the Egyptian revolution, China was already deeply involved in the Korean war, (1951-53).⁵⁸

When Nasser was casting around for alternative sources of military aid, China's limited energies were fully committed to the cause of national liberation in Indo-China where the First Indo-China war was then reaching its end (1953-54).⁵⁹ Also, given its policy of 'leaning to one side'⁶⁰ and Stalin's hostility to national bourgeois *régimes*, China refrained from making contact with such *régimes* in the initial phase of their emergence. During the first period of its role in international relations (1949-55) China concerned itself only with such non-communist countries as India and Burma, which it deemed to be vital to national security, or Indonesia with

its overseas Chinese population of 3.8 million who had close links with their mother country.

China's policy of not becoming involved in the initial stage of the Suez crisis (prior to 1956) and China's lack of concern with the Egyptian revolution and not recognising the new Egyptian government, did not stop Nasser from recognising PRC as the sole representative of the Chinese people. Nasser viewed the absence of China in UN as an 'international joke'.⁶¹ In an interview with John Law of US News and World Report (3 September 1954) Nasser stated that

I have met some people who have visited communist China and informed me that Chinese people love their government and that the Cold War is the cause of their problems. You recognise the few people in Formosa and neglect millions in Red China. This is a joke.⁶²

In the wake of the Bandung Conference Zhou Enlai, Nehru and Nasser were viewed by the Egyptian press as 'the three champions of Afro-Asian independence'.⁶³ By the time Zhou Enlai and Nasser met, Egypt had already actively demonstrated its opposition to imperialism and Western military alliances. Egypt's position was viewed by China as a firm and positive contribution 'entirely in the interests of the whole Middle East'.⁶⁴

TABLE 12.1

AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PRC (AS AT DECEMBER 1985)*

Chronological order by Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations	Name of Country	Date of Independence	Prior to Independence, under the Colonial Control of	Date of Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in China	Remarks
1	Egypt	28 Feb 1922	Britain	30 May 1956	
2	Morocco	2 Mar 1956	France	1 Nov 1958	
3	The Sudan	1 Jan 1956	Britain & Egypt (jointly)	4 Feb 1959	
4	Guinea	2 Oct 1958	France	4 Oct 1959	
5	Ghana	6 Mar 1957	Britain	5 Jul 1960	Following this coup on 20 October 1966, Ghana suspended its relations with China. Diplomatic relations between Ghana and China were resumed on 29 February 1972.
6	Mali	22 Sep 1960	France	25 Oct 1960	
7	Somalia	26 Jun 1960	Italy & Britain	14 Oct 1960	On 1 June 1960, Italy conceded independence to Italian Somaliland. In the same month (26 June), Britain followed suit by giving independence to British Somaliland. On 18 September 1961, China withdrew its personnel from Kinshasa. Relations between Zaire and China were restored on 24 November 1972.
8	Zaire	30 June 1960	Belgium	20 Feb 1961	Relations between China and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (PGRA) were established on 20 December 1958.
9	Algeria	5 Jul 1962	France	3 Jul 1962	
10	Uganda	9 Oct 1962	Britain	18 Oct 1962	
11	Kenya	8 Dec 1963	Britain	14 Dec 1963	
12	Burundi	1 Jul 1962	Belgium	21 Dec 1963	
13	Tunisia	1 Jun 1962	France	10 Jun 1964	On 26 September 1967, relations between the two countries were suspended.
14	The Congo (B)	15 Aug 1960	France	22 Feb 1964	
15	Tanzania	9 Dec 1961	Britain	26 Apr 1964	On 22 April 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were constitutionally united to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Relations with China were suspended on 6 January 1966 and resumed on 20 August 1976.
16	Central African Repub.	13 Aug 1960	France	29 Sep 1964	
17	Zambia	24 Oct 1964	Britain	29 Oct 1964	
18	Benin	1 Aug 1960	France	12 Nov 1964	On 3 January 1966, Dahomey (now Benin) decided to sever its relations with China. Relations were restored on 29 December 1972.
19	Mauritania	28 Nov 1960	France	19 Jul 1965	
20	Equatorial Guinea	12 Oct 1968	Spain	15 Oct 1970	
21	Ethiopia	31 Jan 1942	Italy	24 Nov 1970	Italy occupied Ethiopia for a period of 6 years (1935-41).
22	Nigeria	10 Oct 1960	Britain	10 Feb 1971	
23	Cameroon	1 Jan 1960	France & Britain	26 Mar 1971	Germany occupied the country but was subsequently ousted by France which in turn was replaced by Britain.
24	Sierra Leone	27 Apr 1961	Britain	29 Jul 1971	
25	Rwanda	1 Jul 1962	Belgium	12 Nov 1971	
26	Senegal	20 Aug 1960	France	7 Dec 1971	
27	Mauritius	12 Mar 1968	Britain	15 Apr 1972	
28	Togo	27 Apr 1960	France	19 Sep 1972	
29	Madagascar	26 Jun 1960	France	6 Nov 1972	
30	Chad	11 Aug 1960	France	28 Nov 1972	
31	Burkina-Faso	11 Dec 1960	France	15 Sep 1973	
32	Guinea-Bissau	24 Sep 1974	Portugal	15 Mar 1974	
33	Gabon	17 Aug 1960	France	20 Apr 1974	
34	Niger	3 Aug 1960	France	20 Jul 1974	
35	Gambia	18 Feb 1965	Britain	14 Dec 1974	
36	Botswana	30 Sep 1966	Britain	6 Jan 1975	
37	Mozambique	25 Jun 1975	Portugal	25 Jun 1975	
38	Sao Tome and Principe	12 Jun 1975	Portugal	12 Jul 1975	
39	Comoros	6 Jul 1975	France	13 Nov 1975	
40	Cape Verde	5 Jul 1975	Portugal	25 Apr 1976	
41	Seychelles	5 Jun 1977	Britain	30 Jun 1976	
42	Liberia	26 Jul 1847		17 Feb 1977	Founded in 1847 by black immigrants (many of whom had been freed slaves from the United States or from British and American warships patrolling the Atlantic). Although independent ever since its formation, Liberia was under US domination until the <i>coup d'état</i> (26 April 1986). See Chapter 10.1.) Britain ruled Libya for a brief period (1942-49).
43	Libya	24 Dec 1951	Italy	9 Aug 1978	
44	Djibouti	27 Jun 1977	France	8 Jan 1979	
45	Zimbabwe	18 Apr 1980	Britain & white minority régime of Ian Smith	18 Apr 1980	
46	Angola	11 Nov 1975	Portugal	12 Jan 1983	
47	Ivory Coast	7 Aug 1960	France	2 Mar 1983	
48	Lesotho	4 Oct 1966	Britain	30 Apr 1983	

* China does not have diplomatic relations with only 2 out of a total of 50 independent African countries - viz, Malawi and Swaziland (South Africa not yet liberated).

TABLE 12.2

EXPORTS FROM CHINA TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES : 1952-1985

(in million US \$)

Country	Year	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	July 1985			
Algeria												0.3		10.7	8.2	4.2	6.3	8.1			31.1	10.2	12.1	14.0	15.9	16.9	17.3	32.0	35.0	48.0	88.0	175.0	100.0	85.0	52.0			
Angola																																						
Benin																6.0	1.2				1.1	2.3	7.0	4.9	2.8	3.1	3.4	18.59	17.63	25.03	26.0	25.0	13.0	14.0				
Botswana																																						
Burkina Faso																0.1	0.1		0.1	0.2		1.0	0.4	0.8	2.2	2.4	2.6	1.63	4.00	6.96	5.53	6.66	5.02	1.04				
Burundi																					0.1	0.3	0.5	2.0	2.7	1.5	0.3	3.33	5.82	5.96	5.0	6.0	3.0	3.0				
Cameroon												0.1	0.2			0.7	0.9	0.6			1.9	2.7	5.6	9.5	5.1	12.6	12.1	30.1	26.0	29.7	31.3	29.7	14.1	9.5	4.8			
Cape Verde																																						
Central African Republic																0.1					0.1						0.2	0.1	0.36	0.33	0.4	0.42	0.65	1.0	0.38			
Chad																0.6	0.5	0.4	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.7	1.0	0.8	1.3	1.4	1.5	3.16			1.0	0.9	0.43	0.7				
Comoros																																						
Congo (B)																0.6	2.7	1.6				1.7	3.3	2.9	2.9	5.1	4.4	3.7	3.75	3.99	3.94	7.0	12.0	13.0	11.0			
Djibouti																																						
Egypt	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.8	10.4	19.4	23.6	22.3	18.3	17.8	18.1	18.7	16.2	24.1	36.3	21.2	18.6	11.7	4.8	16.2	23.2	23.6	16.8	33.7	40.9	48.1	54.0	69.0	215.0	173.0	256.0	205.0	167.0	98.0				
Equatorial Guinea																																						
Ethiopia								0.1	0.2	0.3	1.0			1.7	2.2	2.4	2.0	2.4	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.8	3.7	5.1	4.4	4.9	5.4	6.45	10.02	8.35	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0				
Gabon																						2.0	2.1	4.7	5.8	6.9	2.4	5.7	3.6	7.0	3.0	2.0	3.0					
Gambia, The																1.0	1.2				1.7	2.5	3.3	4.2	7.3	8.7	9.4	10.86	18.85	27.05	16.0	14.0	12.0	8.0				
Ghana						0.8	0.7	2.1	2.8	2.3	3.6	2.0	2.5	13.5	6.8	7.0	1.5	3.9	5.5	5.5	3.3	7.3	33.5	14.1	13.7	13.3	14.1	10.6	17.6	4.0	1.0	2.0	3.0					
Guinea										0.6	4.3	0.5	3.9	0.5	0.2																							
Guinea-Bissau																									0.8	2.5	0.3	0.743	0.218	0.651	0.357	1.0	2.0	1.0				
Ivory Coast								1.2		1.2	1.6					0.2	0.2								5.3	5.8	6.3						42.0	14.0	12.0	52.0		
Kenya									0.1	0.1	0.5			1.8	2.5	4.9	2.3	4.1	2.9	3.0	3.6	2.9	3.9	10.7	3.3	6.7	13.0	10.6	12.9	19.4	15.0	13.0	9.0	13.0				
Liberia																	0.7	0.9			2.2	4.2	4.2	5.1	4.9	5.3	5.7	16.5	16.2	14.2	8.5	13.0	48.0	19.0				
Libya								0.1	0.3			0.3	1.4	4.4	7.2	9.2	11.2	13.7	16.2	16.2	23.5	32.2	51.6	10.0	74.5	139.0	22.0	37.0	50.0	126.0	168.0	47.0	59.0	121.5				
Madagascar													1.5	1.5	1.0	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1																			
Mali										0.1	0.8	1.1	2.6	8.9	9.3	9.4	10.6	4.1			3.3	5.8	12.4	14.2	16.0	17.6	19.2	36.77		8.31	8.0	7.0	4.0	5.0				
Mauritania ¹								6.1	6.0	3.1	4.9	2.1			0.8	2.0	15.9	9.5	13.9	0.9	3.3	4.4	2.8	1.2	1.3	1.4					22.0	23.0	20.0	10.0				
Mauritius																12.8					1.2	24.	3.9	3.2	8.3	9.3	10.6	23.32	8.50	17.06	21.20	21.53	20.02	23.40				
Morocco						11.8	15.0	7.5	6.7	8.1	8.4	6.4	10.8	10.8	15.6	12.0	10.9	12.0	13.1	10.8	17.0	13.7	18.9	25.7	18.6	24.6	32.5	40.2	38.5	65.8	49.7	34.6	54.9	35.3				
Mozambique																										0.1	0.1	8.0	3.0	3.0	5.0	2.0	8.0					
Niger											0.2	1.7	2.3	2.3	2.5						1.3	1.1	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	6.83	5.56	10.62	6.72	6.22	6.34	4.19				
Nigeria								4.7	6.0	4.1	4.1	8.0	12.3	9.6							25.6	24.0	32.7	43.8	63.5	128.0	184.5	44.0	25.0	52.0	68.0	39.0	17.0	13.0	4.0			
Reunion																1.0	4.3				0.6	2.2	7.2	4.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.59	4.24	3.45	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.0				
Rwanda																0.1	0.1							2.0	2.7	3.3	4.8	10.61	12.03	21.34	15.0	10.0	14.0	15.0				
Sao Tomé and Príncipe																											1.0	1.0										
Senegal ²													2.1	3.0	2.7	3.6	11.9	5.2	6.1	7.0	5.6	6.5	17.5	16.5	7.9	5.5	3.1	12.11	16.99	19.49	21.0	32.0	20.0	25.0				
Seychelles																												0.8	1.1	1.0	2.0	1.6	2.4	1.8				
Sierra Leone								0.3	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.7	2.1	3.5	2.5	2.5	3.5	4.3	9.8	13.9	15.3	16.7						12.0	4.0	4.0	3.0				
Somalia, Rep.												0.2	2.2	0.5	1.8		1.3				0.8	4.0	18.7	8.2	8.7	9.6	10.5	8.05		7.46	15.0	19.0	9.0	10.0				
Sudan								2.1	4.4	3.6	3.6	6.0	5.9	11.4	11.6	15.6	15.6	10.0	18.8	33.0	26.7	58.9	42.3	25.3	30.5	24.0	16.0	35.0	64.0	46.0	30.0	27.0	11.4					
Tanzania ³												0.3	0.9	4.5	11.2	10.0	12.0	11.1	37.1	76.0	64.2	88.7	80.2	71.2	37.8	11.9	38.0	45.0	9.0	10.0	13.0	13.0	17.0	12.3				
Togo												0.3	0.6	0.6	1.2	2.1	2.0	1.5	1.0	2.5	1.7	1.8	4.9	5.9	5.0	4.1	10.02	11.82	12.77	22.0	18.0	15.0	15.0					
Tunisia					0.6	0.5	1.3	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.9	0.2	1.5	1.6	1.1	0.5			0.1			0.4	2.0	3.2	6.9	2.0	8.8	9.8	14.6	19.7	26.0	22.0	22.0	23.0	21.7			
Uganda												0.8	0.7	2.5	4.4	2.0																						

TABLE 12.3

IMPORTS FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO CHINA 1952-1985

(in millions US \$)

Country	Year	'52	'53	'54	'55	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85						
Algeria															6.9	3.2	10.3			13.9	10.7	5.6	0.5	0.1	0.1	24.0	22.0			4.0	1.0		2.7								
Benin																					0.2	1.8	4.9	8.0	8.8	9.6															
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)																																1.0	6.0								
Burundi																								0.7	1.1	1.0															
Cameroon																						1.9	2.9	4.4	2.2			2.0		4.0											
Cape Verde																																									
Central African Rep.																																	1.0	1.0	1.0						
Chad																												1.0	1.0												
Comoros																																									
Congo (B)														0.3	0.4	0.1					2.9	5.8	0.3	1.3		1.0								2.0	2.0						
Djibouti																																									
Egyptian Arab Rep.	8.9	10.4	11.4	24.5	24.2	42.1	34.9	33.8	44.5	14.6	19.1	16.4	18.9	49.6	35.7	20.7	18.2	15.4	12.6	29.2	27.6	21.0	37.9	57.7	56.5	55.3	63.0	57.0	97.0	126.0	61.0	68.0		7.9							
Equatorial Guinea																																			2.0						
Ethiopia								0.1							1.1	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	5.5	7.8	2.3	1.6	3.2	4.8			1.0	1.0	2.0									
Gabon																					0.1			0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2									11.0					
Gambia, The																																									
Ghana									1.4	0.2	1.2	0.5	3.0	6.2	5.7	0.8	0.7	1.2	2.3	2.8	2.0	7.1	1.8	13.7	20.9	28.1			3.0	22.0	3.0	6.0									
Guinea																																									
Guinea- Bissau																											0.1								1.0	3.0	2.0				
Ivory Coast																																				3.0	6.0	6.0	7.0		
Kenya *									1.0	0.2	0.5	11.4	1.2	1.9	2.8	3.4	1.3	1.5	1.9	2.9	4.5	8.0	6.4	4.2	2.8	3.9										3.0	1.0	4.0	6.0		
Liberia																																				2.0	5.0				
Libya																												2.0								21.0	34.0				
Madagascar																																					10.0	7.0			
Mali														2.2				0.7				1.5	3.6	12.1	20.6	22.7	24.8									9.0	4.0	5.0			
Mauritania																																									
Mauritius																																									
Morocco								3.1	6.5	6.6	3.7	4.2	6.2	15.5	10.1	8.5	9.1	8.0	5.2	2.4	20.4	20.5	29.3	28.0	7.0	3.2	14.0									26.0	32.0	42.0	36.0	8.7	
Mozambique																																					2.0	5.0			
Niger																																									
Nigeria									4.9	3.8		1.0	1.8	2.2		2.8	0.8				0.5	5.3	8.5	6.4	8.6	1.1	13.0	8.0		5.0	2.0	4.0	8.0	4.0	1.3			0.1	0.2		
Reunion																																									
Rwanda																																									
Sao Tome & Principe																																									
Senegal																																						3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Seychelles																																									
Sierra Leone																																									
Somalia Rep.																																									
Sudan							1.7	2.1	2.9	9.4	9.6	9.0			5.3	16.9	12.4	8.3	15.3	20.3	25.3	3.7	39.4	71.8	37.3	41.2	26.6	62.0	18.0	2.0	61.0	28.0	39.0	50.0	39.0	0.7					
Swaziland																																									
Tanzania													10.5	7.3	14.7	10.5	8.4	8.5	12.0	9.0	12.5	20.2	15.3	13.5	16.4	15.1	20.4	55.0	89.0	10.0	3.0	21.0					1.0	4.4			
Togo																																									
Tunisia									0.8		0.5	0.2			0.3	2.7	0.8	0.6	0.9																						
Uganda																																									
Zaire																																									
Zambia																																									
Zimbabwe																																									

Source: See Table 12.2.

* Until 1963 Kenya's figures are shared with those of Tanganyika.

12.2.1.1.3. Bandung and Sino-Egyptian Relations.

Sino-Egyptian relations began at the Bandung Conference (April 1955) when, for the first time,⁶⁶ China and Egypt found themselves in the same Afro-Asian camp united against colonialism and imperialism. During this conference, their representatives were in frequent contact with one another, and they exchanged invitations to their opposite number's country.⁶⁶

Three weeks after⁶⁷ the Bandung Conference, Sheikh Hassan El Baqouri, the Egyptian Minister for Religious Foundations, visited China (11 May 1955) where he saw for himself the 'satisfactory living conditions of Chinese Moslems'.⁶⁸ In August 1955, another Egyptian delegation, led by Mohammed Abu Nosseir, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, also visited Beijing and signed a three-year agreement between Egypt and China. In the protocol of the first year of the agreement, both parties agreed that

each side is to give the other most favoured nation treatment, and that trade representative's offices shall be established in each other's country. The total value of business transacted in the Five Years will amount to £20 million sterling.

In the spirit of this agreement and protocol, contracts were also concluded by which China will supply Egypt with 60,000 tons of rolled steel and Egypt supply China with 45,000 bales of cotton (15,000 tons).⁶⁹

Following this agreement, the value of Chinese imports from Egypt increased from \$8.9 million in 1952 to \$24.2 million in 1956. At the same time, Chinese exports increased from \$ 0.7 million in 1952 to \$10.4 million in

1956.⁷⁰ In July 1955, China agreed to buy 13,000 tons of Egyptian cotton.⁷¹ This was of special commercial value to Egypt because it came precisely at the time when Western powers refused⁷² to agree on the question of the price of Egyptian cotton. It is appropriate to note here that 80 per cent of Egypt's foreign exchange⁷³ was derived from the sale of cotton.

The Bandung Conference, then, represented a watershed in the development of PRC's diplomatic, economic and cultural contacts with Africa. Egypt was the first country to receive a Chinese Cultural Mission which then went on to visit four other African countries - viz The Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia and Ethiopia.⁷⁴

12.2.1.1.4. China and The Suez Crisis (1956):

Anti-imperialist War.

Sino-Egyptian relations reached their peak of friendliness during the Suez crisis (July-December 1956). The Chinese conviction that the colonial powers would give up their interests only after their defeat in armed struggles, and China's ideological strategy of a united front against the common enemy in the form of communist and national liberation forces carried an irresistible appeal for Egypt. Immediately after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, China voiced its strong support for Egypt's initiative. At the same time, Nasser was also praised for his firm stand against British imperialism.⁷⁵

China took the view that the 'Constantinople Convention' (1866) was one of the many unequal treaties

imposed on weaker countries by the colonialist powers in order to legitimise their exploitative interest in their economies. Thus, Nasser's decision, for China was just and legal. China's support was based not only on the ideological merits of the nationalisation policy (i.e. on the merits of socialism as contrasted with capitalism) but also, on China's own direct experience of semi-colonialism.⁷⁶ Four days after the nationalisation of the Canal (30 July 1956) the People's Daily wrote as follows:

Everyone knows that the agreements about the Suez Canal Company in 1866 and afterwards are typical of the unequal treaties used by the colonialists to shackle and exploit oppressed people. Today, the unequal treaties, concluded ninety years ago, are not worth the paper on which they are written. The Egyptian people who have become independent, have the full right to declare such enslaving treaties null and void.⁷⁷

The nationalisation of the Canal was viewed by the Chinese Guangming Ribao as:

a tremendous inspiration to all who oppose colonialism...The Suez which served international monopoly capital for eighty-six years, has now been liberated...the speech of President Nasser on July 26 at Alexandria was a historic document, the vow of the Egyptian people determined to stand against imperialist intervention.⁷⁸

Within three months (30 May-28 July 1956) of establishing official diplomatic relations with the first African country (Egypt), China was in a position to focus on a concrete issue in line with its ideological

objectives of an anti-imperialist nature. China gave not only moral support by praising the nationalisation of the 'Canal' but also gave material help to Egypt, described by one author as 'very impressive'.⁷⁹

Three weeks after the nationalisation, the Chinese Shenyang Rolling Mill sent 500 tons of rolled steel to Egypt.⁸⁰ In the wake of the outbreak of the Suez crisis, China offered Egypt a gift of \$5 million⁸¹ which was warmly received. In Beijing (17 November 1956) the Egyptian Ambassador, A. Hassan Ragab, affirmed this when he said that

New China is writing a clean new page in the history of humanity as seen in the prompt and generous help it is giving to relieve the war casualties in Egypt...within 24 hours of the appeal of the Egyptian people for their help, China responded in a glorious way. Twenty million Swiss Francs were [offered] by the Chinese government in the name of Egypt to buy whatever material she needed in her distress...Thousands of tons of food and other rescue materials were on their way to that country...The Chinese Red Cross had donated the Egyptian Red Crescent 170,000 Swiss Francs as a relief fund for war casualties...A mission of nurses and doctors is being prepared in case Egypt still needs this help.⁸²

A few weeks before the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, China offered (5 September 1956) 29 pilots to serve in the Suez Canal with the aim of adding to the strength of Egyptian forces protecting it.⁸³ In the same month, addressing the Standing Committee on the Suez Canal Issue of the National Peoples' Congress, Zhou Enlai affirmed that:

the Chinese people resolutely support the Egyptian government's action of nationalising the Suez Canal...The Chinese people cannot let pass any move encroaching upon the sovereignty of Egypt and armed intervention against Egypt.⁸⁴

Zhou Enlai's statement confirmed that China was prepared to provide Egypt with military help if requested to do so by the Egyptian government.⁸⁵ Radio Beijing broadcast (7 November 1956) that over 250,000 Chinese had volunteered to join the Egyptian forces.⁸⁶ At the same time, a special committee was set up in support of the Egyptian resistance to the 'Tripartite Aggression'. It began (11 November 1956) to register military, medical, engineering, transport and other personnel to go to Egypt.⁸⁷

In an interview given to a Chinese Journalists' Delegation (23 January 1957), President Nasser expressed deep appreciation of China's efforts to help Egypt, adding that since the Bandung Conference, the relations between China and Egypt had speedily developed.⁸⁸ Indeed, until the beginning of the campaign against the Egyptian Communist Party by Nasser's government (1958-59), China and Egypt seemed to be in agreement on the major international issues, and especially the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

Egypt went even further by expressing agreement with China even on matters pertaining to *Détente* between East and West which at the time was being initiated by the Soviet Union. At the first Afro-Asian Solidarity

TABLE 12.4
CHINA'S AID AND LOANS TO INDEPENDENT AFRICAN COUNTRIES 1955-1985.

(in million US \$)

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
Algeria								1,8	50							40																
Angola																																
Benin																		46														
Botswana																									16,6							
Burkina Faso																			50	2										6,15		
Burundi																		20							40					1,5		
Cameroon																		20	55							100						
Cape Verde																																
Central African Republic										4													10						0,05			
Chad																																
Congo (B)										25,4				1				30												28,4		
Egypt		5								85			10					80												50		
Equatorial Guinea																		10						12,4								
Ethiopia																		84													1,856	
Gabon																																
Gambia																																
Ghana							19,6			22,4																					15	
Guinea				0,5	26							6		45	10			30		1												
Guinea-Bissau																																
Ivory Coast																																
Kenya										27,6																	50			36		
Lesotho																														3,543		
Liberia																													56	15		
Madagascar (Malagasy)																			12					60	10	60				50		
Mali						19,6				7,9		3		5	20			10						4					1,1798	13,184		
Mauritania													9			20				2	37											
Mauritius																										55				17,1	14,2	
Morocco																								32								
Mozambique																																
Niger																				1	5			51								
Nigeria																													4,717	35,397		
Rwanda																																
Sao Tome and Principe																																12
Senegal																															60	
Seychelles																																
Sierra Leone														1,83																1,5	11	
Somalia									22																							
Sudan																42	40															
Tanzania										45,5	1,75	10,5				270	1			75			28		12,8		0,90		15		2,0822	
Togo																		45														
Tunisia																																
Uganda																																
Zaire														23,8																		
Zambia																																
Zimbabwe																															40	25

Sources: A. Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 307 (Table 2);
W. Bartke, China's Economic Aid (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1974), *passim*;
Wei Lian-Tsai, Peking Versus Taipei in Africa (Taipei: The Asia and World Institute, 1982) *passim*;
Keesing, S., Contemporary Archives 1978-1986 (monthly);
Africa Economic Digest 1981-1986 (weekly);
Africa Contemporary Record 1968-1981 (annually);
Africa Confidential 1972-1983 (fortnightly);
Africa Research Bulletin; Economic, Financial and Technical Series 1964-1986 (monthly); and
J.L. Scherer (Ed.), China: Facts and Figures, Vols 1-7 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press 1978-1984).

Figures given in Yuan and the currency of the recipient country have been converted into US dollars at the prevailing rates.

TABLE 12.5

COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC AID FROM SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO POOR COUNTRIES

	1954 -79			1979				
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
Total	32,980	19,190	9,830	4,960	2,585	1,720	730	135
Africa	9,320	4,115	2,425	2,775	270	95	135	40
North Africa	4,230	2,920	980	330	45	-	45	-
Algeria	1,330	715	525	90	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	105	10	10	65	-	-	-	-
Morocco	2,320	2,100	170	55	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	425	95	230	95	-	-	-	-
Other	45	-	45	-	45	-	45	-
Sub-Saharan Africa	5,090	1,200	1,445	2,445	225	95	90	40
Angola	115	15	100	-	-	-	-	-
Benin	50	5	NA	45	-	-	-	-
Botswana	15	-	-	15	-	-	-	-
Burundi	60	-	-	6	4	-	-	40
Cameroon	110	10	-	100	-	-	-	-
Cape Verde	20	5	negl	15	-	-	-	-
Central African Rep	20	5	-	15	-	-	-	-
Chad	75	5	-	70	-	-	-	-
Comoros	NA	-	-	NA	-	-	-	-
Congo	165	30	60	75	-	-	-	-
Equatorial Guinea	25	negl	-	25	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	420	225	95	100	95	95	negl	-
Gabon	25	-	negl	25	-	-	-	-
Gambia	15	negl	-	15	-	-	-	-
Ghana	280	95	145	40	-	-	-	-
Guinea	405	210	110	65	-	-	-	-
Guinea-Bissau	25	10	NA	15	-	-	-	-
Ivory Coast	NA	-	NA	-	-	-	-	-
Kenya	65	45	-	20	-	-	-	-
Liberia	25	-	-	25	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	110	20	negl	90	-	-	-	-
Mali	215	90	25	100	-	-	-	-
Mauritius	40	5	-	35	-	-	-	-
Mozambique	80	5	15	60	-	-	-	-
Niger	55	negl	-	55	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	85	5	80	-	75	-	75	-
Rwanda	60	negl	-	60	-	-	-	-
Sao Tome-Principe	20	-	-	21	-	-	-	-
Senegal	105	10	35	60	-	-	-	-
Seychelles	5	-	-	5	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	90	30	-	60	-	-	-	-
Somalia	330	165	10	155	-	-	-	-
Sudan	385	55	240	80	-	-	-	-
Tanzania	450	40	50	360	-	-	-	-
Togo	45	-	-	45	-	-	-	-
Uganda	30	15	-	15	-	-	-	-
Upper Volta	55	5	-	50	-	-	-	-
Zaire	105	-	-	105	-	-	-	-
Zambia	405	15	60	330	-	-	-	-
Other	505	70	420	15	15	-	15	-
East Asia	1,150	260	550	335	65	-	-	65
Burma	275	15	175	85	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	555	215	290	45	-	-	-	-
Kampuchea	135	25	15	90	-	-	-	-
Laos	35	5	5	25	-	-	-	-
Philippines	65	-	65	-	-	-	-	-
Thailand	NA	-	-	NA	-	-	-	-
Western Samoa	NA	-	-	NA	-	-	-	-
Other	90	-	-	90	65	-	-	65
Europe	45	-	-	45	-	-	-	-
Malta	45	-	-	45	-	-	-	-
Latin America	2,990	965	1,870	155	265	-	265	negl
Argentina	515	220	295	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	120	70	50	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	710	90	620	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	450	240	145	65	-	-	-	-
Colombia	290	210	60	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	25	15	10	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	20	negl	20	-	-	-	-	-
Guyana	65	NA	30	35	negl	-	-	negl
Jamaica	325	30	285	10	250	-	250	-
Mexico	35	NA	35	-	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	10	-	10	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	280	25	215	40	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	85	50	30	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	10	NA	10	-	-	-	-	-
Other	50	15	35	-	15	-	15	-
Middle East	12,065	7,870	3,735	460	1,625	1,600	25	-
Cyprus	5	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	2,465	1,440	690	135	-	-	-	-
Greece	10	10	NA	-	-	-	-	-
Iran	1,850	1,165	685	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	1,245	705	495	45	-	-	-	-
Jordan	25	25	NA	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	10	-	10	-	-	-	-	-
North Yemen	310	145	40	130	25	-	25	-
South Yemen	350	205	65	80	-	-	-	-
Syria	1,785	770	955	60	-	-	-	-
Turkey	3,725	3,330	395	-	1,600	1,600	-	-
Other	285	75	195	10	-	-	-	-
South Asia	7,410	4,980	1,245	1,185	360	25	305	30
Afghanistan	1,500	1,290	135	75	50	25	25	-
Bangladesh	1,590	1,305	210	75	50	-	50	-
India	2,735	2,280	455	-	-	-	-	-
Nepal	210	30	-	180	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	1,755	920	215	620	110	-	90	20
Sri Lanka	475	160	95	220	-	-	-	-
Other	150	-	140	10	150	-	140	10

Source: J.L. Scherer (Ed.), China: Facts and Figures, Vol. 4 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1981), pp. 263-265.

Conference (Cairo: 26 December 1957), Khalid Mohieddin, member of the Egyptian Parliament and deputy leader of the Egyptian delegation, expressed views identical with those of the Chinese delegation. He said that in the global balance of power, imperialism was being weakened by

independent countries, blows by nationalist movements in the liberated countries and the world at large.⁸⁹

12.2.1.1.5. Sino-Egyptian Relations (1958-59):

A Turning Point

The relationship between Egypt and China, which became extremely friendly during and after the Suez crisis, started to decline after the union of Syria and Egypt (1 February 1958) into the 'United Arab Republic' (UAR), and Nasser began a policy of persecution of the Egyptian Communist Party and its supporters (1958). China waited for nearly a month (24 February) before welcoming the formation of UAR.⁹⁰ This delay in the Chinese recognition of UAR was no accident.

The anti-communist character of the merger between the two Arab countries must have preyed on the minds of the Chinese decision makers. For China, Arab unity and solidarity against Western powers constituted a fundamentally and ideologically desirable development; but not Arab unity at the cost of oppression of the communists in Arab countries.

China was in favour of Arab unity made up of a united front of all forces - communist and non-communist - struggling against Western influence in the area. This

was apparent for example, in a report carried by the People's Daily before the proclamation of UAR (19 June 1957) which stated that

only by maintaining unity can the Arab states safeguard their independence. Otherwise, the Arab states will fall into the colonialist trap of divide and rule.⁹¹

For Nasser, however, Arab unity against colonialism and imperialism and their local collaborators did not include the communists, whom he described (May 1954) as:

the best allies of Zionism in this part of the world. In fact Zionism and communism are indistinguishable as to ideology...They are opportunist...Any individual who calls for communism or propagates it is an opportunist.⁹²

During the first two years (1957-58) of the Egyptian government's campaign against the communists, and throughout the first year of its existence, China avoided a direct conflict with UAR. Two major ideological considerations lay behind this policy:

- i. The Algerian war of liberation, of which Egypt was the major supporter, had entered a decisive stage, and the headquarters of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (PGRA) was in Egypt. Less than cordial relations with Egypt would have the effect of undermining China's relations with PGRA and support for FLN in its anti-colonial war of national liberation.
- ii. An active disavowal of Nasser's campaign - which until the end of 1958, did not go beyond

the verbal level, and confined only to attacks against the Egyptian communist Party, would only provide an opportunity for the imperialists to regain the influence that they had lost subsequent to the Suez crisis. The highly unpopular and tendentious Eisenhower Doctrine, had already been initiated (January 1957) with the aim of restoring Western influence in the Arab world. Under it, the United States offered financial assistance (of between \$400 to \$500 million) over a two year period,⁹³ to those Arab countries (including Egypt) which were prepared to join the Western campaign against international communism.

China viewed the Eisenhower Doctrine as 'a symbol of American Imperialism'.⁹⁴ During his visit to Moscow, (January 1957), Zhou Enlai gave expression to China's opposition to the policy of imperialist United States in the Middle East. On that occasion, both the Soviet Union and China stated in a joint communique, that

although Britain, France and Israel have suffered defeat in their aggression against Egypt, United States imperialism is attempting to make use of the situation to take over the British and French colonial positions in the Near and Middle East, to suppress the national independence movement and enslave the peoples in this region, and is also attempting in this region to step up its policy of aggression and war preparations. This is the essence of the so-called 'Eisenhower Doctrine'.⁹⁵

Not unexpectedly, the moderate Arab countries of Tunisia, Morocco and Libya did not heed the advice given them by the Soviet Union and China to reject the American

offer. During a visit to these countries (March 1957), Vice-President Nixon found them only too ready to accept the terms of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'.

There is no area in the world today in which the prestige of the United States is more uniformly high than in the countries which I visited on this trip. The President is respected as the acknowledged leader of the Free World. There is a most encouraging understanding of our programs and policies. 96

In 1958, the United States and Britain found a much more practical means of reviving their declining influence in the Middle East and of containing anti-Western tendencies when Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia sought Western intervention in order to roll back nationalist movements which were rocking the foundations of their monarchical and pro-Western *régimes*. As soon as UAR was formed, Jordan broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt and Syria. Iraq and Jordan joined together to form the Arab Federation (14 February 1958) as a counter to UAR.

Despite its anti-communist character UAR's ideological grounding in moderately anti-imperialist Arab nationalism threatened the monarchical *régimes* of Jordan and Iraq as well as Western influence in the region. King Hussein of Jordan had already survived (with the help of Saudi Arabia and Iraq) an uprising (April 1957) aimed at overthrowing his *régime* and establishing a republic. In June 1958, King Hussein sued for military help to combat the growing threat to his kingdom.

King Hussein's alliance with his cousin, King Fiesal of Iraq, proved a total failure. It only gave a fillip to popular upheaval in the country which virtually put an end to the monarchy (14 July 1958) and heralded the establishment of a revolutionary government under the joint leadership of Brigadier-General Abdul Karim Qassim and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif.

The UAR's increasing influence on Arab nationalism in general and the Iraqi revolution in particular deepened the fears of pro-Western *régimes* in the area even further. Less than a month after the Iraqi revolution, Kamil Shamoun, the Lebanese President, invited (August) the United States Marines to occupy Lebanon in order to protect the *régime*. American intervention in Lebanon was regarded by China as concrete evidence of the imperialist character of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In the Suez, the USA pretended to take exception to the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and posed as a friend of the Arab people. Now the Yankee imperialists are out in front in launching confusion in the Middle East. This shows what the notorious Eisenhower Doctrine really is. Washington and London made no secret of the fact that they resorted to armed intervention in order to cope with the "highly explosive" situation arising from the birth of the new Republic of Iraq. It is therefore only too clear that the US-British aggression against Lebanon and Jordan represents only one aspect of their military adventure. Their objective is to crush the national independence movements in the Middle East and to bolster up their colonial rule in that part of the world.⁹⁷

Following the above developments, China (and the Soviet Union) found itself on the horns of a dilemma. An attack on Nasser's anti-communist campaign would only help the case of Western penetration of the area, whereas not opposing such a policy would be tantamount to a betrayal of China's ideology at an especially sensitive juncture. On the Sino-Soviet front, China was already involved in a vehement criticism of conciliatory moves initiated by the Soviet Union towards non-communist forces in different regions of the world.

Eventually, China's concern with the Algerian situation and desire to limit Western influence in the Arab world prevented it from rushing into headlong opposition, at least during the initial phase of the Egyptian government's campaign against communism. China held its fire until late 1958 when Nasser's verbal abuse against the Egyptian communists gave place to active persecution including the imprisonment of Egyptian and Syrian communists in Egypt and Syria, as well as persuading other Arab countries to follow suit.

The third factor underlying China's resolution to come out publicly against ^{the} NUAR's policy of persecuting communists lay in Egypt being the only African and Arab country with which PRC had diplomatic relations at the time.⁹⁸ Any serious difference with Nasser could well put paid to China's efforts to broaden diplomatic contacts with the ultimate objective of establishing Afro-Asian solidarity on a politically acceptable footing.

the

Relations between China and UAR continued normally until late 1958. In April, a UAR Government Mission, led by Lieutenant General Mohammed Ibrahim, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, visited China.⁹⁹ During this visit, Mao told his guests that:

the Chinese people feel very happy to have the friendship of the UAR... We stand in the same front in the struggle against colonialism.¹⁰⁰

In the same month a Chinese Government Delegation paid a return visit to the UAR.¹⁰¹ Three months later (July) a Chinese Moslim Delegation stopped at Cairo on their way to Mecca. In August China and UAR signed a Postal Agreement. In December, China and UAR extended their 1955 Trade Agreement by another three years. Part of the Agreement read as follows:

Chinese exports to the UAR will include frozen beef and mutton, canned goods, cereals, machinery, chemical raw materials, tea, silk, etc. UAR exports to China will include cotton, cotton yarn, staple fibre and minerals. A trade protocol will be signed separately every year.¹⁰²

By the end of 1958, China had become the second biggest buyer of Egyptian cotton.¹⁰³ Under the Sino-Egyptian Cultural Agreements signed earlier, a UAR Teacher's Delegation, led by the Assistant Under Secretary of the Ministry of Education, paid a three-week visit to China in December 1958.¹⁰⁴

However, by the end of 1958, as Nasser's campaign against the communists intensified, China broke its

silence and voiced its disapproval. Nasser was warned that his true enemies were the Western powers and their local allies and not the communists. Writing on the Middle East situation, Peng Ti (15 December 1958), the NCNA correspondent explained that:

A military and political cordon is being thrown around the UAR and Iraq and other Arab countries simmering with national liberation movements. In Lebanon and Jordan the Americans and the British are making active preparations for long-term occupation.¹⁰⁵

With the outlawing of the Communist Party and the imprisonment of its members¹⁰⁶ and the possibility that the revolutionary government of Iraq might be pressured by Nasser into joining ^{the} UAR, the Sino-UAR relations took a turn for the worse in 1959. At this point, Qassim was opposed to unity with ^{the} UAR at the expense of the communists who were working closely with him. Instead, like China, he called for Arab solidarity against the fundamental threat posed by the Western powers to the nationalistic movement of the Arab world.¹⁰⁷

Following his visit to Iraq (December 1958), Nasser launched a vehement attack on Qassim's co-operation with the communists and his refusal to join UAR. He believed Iraq to be a base for the activities of the communists directed against the Arab nationalist movement. Nasser gave as the reason for extending anti-communist campaign to cover other parts of the Arab world besides UAR

Chinese support for the Iraqi communists to use their political force to take power...and to destroy the Arab

nationalist movement in the Arab world. '08

As a reaction against the Chinese support for the communists, Nasser recalled the UAR *Chargé d'Affaires* from China. At the same time, he sent a message to 25 countries in Africa and Asia to withdraw their Ambassadors from Beijing. '09

China attacked Nasser for persecuting communists and for his hostility towards Iraq for its unwillingness to join UAR. The People's Daily wrote (March 1959) that

the recent utterances and actions of the UAR against Iraq and some other Arab countries did not promote the unity but seriously harmed it...Only the imperialists and their Yugoslav henchmen are rejoiced over this. '10

China accused Nasser of attempting to coerce Iraq into a merger with UAR against the wishes of its revolutionary government.

President Nasser has time and again stated that he does not demand annexation of Iraq. This is a good statement...The point is that the very many facts of current UAR-Iraqi relations do not conform with the spirit of these statements. It seems that official UAR utterances, including those of President Nasser himself, seek to depict all relations between the Arab states and even the foreign and domestic affairs of all Arab states other than the UAR as the internal affairs of the UAR...In other words, they not only want to annexe Iraq, but virtually regard Iraq as already annexed. And not only Iraq, they also regard all the Arab states as though they were already annexed! '11

Not surprisingly ^{the} UAR adopted an anti-Chinese posture when rebellion broke out in Tibet in 1959¹¹² and the conflict between India and China grew in intensity during the same year. China's unification of Tibet was viewed by UAR as an 'Eastern version of the Hungarian revolution'.¹¹³

China, for its part, strongly objected to the attempts made by the UAR press to alienate Asian opinion by insisting that a revolution was under way in Tibet.¹¹⁴ The NCNA correspondent wrote as follows (23 April 1959):

The Information Department of the UAR and newspapers under its direction have launched scurrilous attacks on China and tried to alienate her from other Asian countries following the rebellion of Tibet.

The UAR Information Department recently issued a special sixty-page pamphlet which termed the rebellion in Tibet "the Tibetan Revolution". It said "The red dagger with which the communists stabbed Iraq is the same with which the communists stabbed Tibet...It predicted that Nepal and later India would be the next victims of communist aggression if Tibet was crushed."¹¹⁵

As far as China was concerned, Nasser's position on the Tibet question was a confirmation of his increasingly pro-Western tendencies and of a softening of his general attitude towards Western powers in line with that adopted by Tito and Nehru, the other two leaders of the non-aligned triumvirate. The Hsinhua N.A. (Cairo) issued a statement strongly protesting against reports in the UAR press of Nasser's policy of supporting India in the Sino-

Indian conflict which seemed to be gathering momentum towards the end of 1959. '16

Relations between China and UAR deteriorated even further following the arrest of Farjala Helou, a Lebanese communist, by the UAR authorities (August 1959). The People's Daily (August 1959) carried the following comment:

World opinion has been outraged by the illegal and brutal torture of Farjala Helou...and demands that the UAR authorities release Helou immediately ...Helou was kidnapped in a street in Damascus and was immediately thrown into a secret prison...So far, the authorities of the UAR have flatly denied the arrest and persecution of Helou in an attempt to evade their responsibility... '17

Relations between China and UAR reached their lowest ebb when Khalid Bagdash, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Syria, was invited to attend China's National Day (1 October 1959). In the presence of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Bagdash launched a vehement attack on the foundation of the United Arab Republic. '18 In his speech, which was broadcast over Radio Beijing, he stated that

The attempt to merge Syria and Egypt, the intrigues of the ruling clique of the UAR against the Arab Republic, the understanding between Nasser and King Saud and King Hussein, the opening of the door to imperialist capital, and the slanders against the Soviet Union and People's China - all this shows...that the bourgeois monopoly clique of Egypt are actively distorting, under the slogan of Arab unity...For carrying out their policy

based on narrow-minded and selfish class ambition.

Today Syria is suffering from a despotic and chaotic system never before witnessed in her modern history.¹¹⁹

UAR government retaliated against Baghdash's visit to China by ordering its diplomatic officials to boycott the National Day celebration at the Chinese Embassy in London. In Beijing, the *Chargé d'Affaires* of ^{UAR}UAR absented himself from the ceremony.¹²⁰ On the same occasion, i.e., Baghdash's visit to China to attend China's National Day celebration, the UAR official newspaper El Jemhoria wrote (13 September 1959) as follows:

...the most unexpected thing from China was its adoption of a policy against us and co-operation with a few communists at the expense of a people who were the first to recognise it.¹²¹

Unlike China, the Soviet Union's reaction to UAR's policy of persecution of the communists was not only delayed but also mild in tone.¹²² It was only after his visit to Iraq (March 1959), that Khrushchev expressed the Soviet Union's concern with the UAR anti-Iraq and communist campaign¹²³ in the following terms:

...sense will gain the upper hand and everything will be done to abolish this conflict and not allow the imperialists to use it in their own interests...It must be admitted that we are all grieved by the recent speeches of President Nasser in Damascus. When he speaks of Communism and communists in these speeches he arms himself with the tongue of the imperialists.¹²⁴

The Soviet Union's main concern seemed to be to preserve State-to-State relations between itself and the Arab countries in fact, while mustering international (and in particular Third World) support for its campaign to establish an American-Soviet *Détente*. Nasser's anti-communist campaign did not stop the Soviet Union offering ^{the} UAR a loan of \$175 million.¹²⁵ In October 1959, the Soviet Union offered UAR technical and financial assistance for the High Dam of Aswan. China's policy towards ^{the} UAR stood in stark contrast to the Soviet Union's strategy of ignoring the latter's anti-communist policy and strengthening its state by offering aid and loans on favourable terms.

12.2.1.2. China's Relations with Guinea

With the exception of Algeria which was already deeply involved in a war of national liberation against the colonial power, Guinea was the only¹²⁶ French colony in Africa to reject de Gaulle's proposal for a *Communauté Française* unequivocally (1958).¹²⁷ The *Partie Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG), under the leadership of Ahmed Sekou Touré, demanded total independence without any political, economic, or other conditions imposed by the French colonial power.

PDG led the campaign against the referendum proposed by France (September 1958) for the admission of all their remaining colonies into the French community. 95 per cent of the Guinéan electorate voted for absolute and immediate independence.¹²⁸

A month later (2 October), the Republic of Guinea was proclaimed, but the country had to face adverse reaction from Western countries. France responded to Guinea's independence by withdrawing its technological experts and suspending trade relations with the new country. At the same time aid was cut off, telephones were ripped out, technical equipment was smashed, and even the police were stripped of their uniforms.¹²⁹ According to Legvold, the French burnt (and destroyed) everything which could be burnt, and what could not be burnt was dumped into the sea.¹³⁰

Internationally, France launched a general policy of economic blockade and urged its allies to adopt a hostile position towards the newly independent Guinea.¹³¹ The French behaviour towards their former colony of Guinea, described by one author as an 'appalling act of spite',¹³² only increased the new government's determination to implement its nationalist policy of independent development guided by socialist tendencies.¹³³

Despite the fact that Guinea's refusal to join the 'French Community' led to undesirable economic consequences, it gained considerable political prestige among radical and anti-colonialist forces. Communist countries, and especially China (which was the only one among them with no diplomatic relations with France and which then adopted a non-conciliatory attitude towards the West), became a major source of support to Guinea. Guinea's resistance to pressure from the West could be maintained whilst its political isolation was relieved to

a certain degree by China's offer of friendship. Sekou Touré was already known for his communist sympathies.¹³⁴ Under his leadership, Guinea became the centre of militant trade unionism in French West Africa. By the end of 1956, Sekou Touré succeeded in establishing the first independent Pan-African Trade Union organisation.¹³⁵

Zhou Enlai sent a message (9 October 1958) to Sekou Touré supporting Guinea's defiance of France.

The fact that the people of Guinea have attained independence is another important evidence that the national independence movement in Africa is rising to a new upsurge. May Your Excellency and the people of Guinea achieve new successes in your cause of safeguarding national independence¹³⁶

Guinea was immediately recognised by China and in turn Guinea recognised PRC.¹³⁷ In October 1959 both countries established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.¹³⁸

As a token of support for Guinea, China sent (April 1959) a gift of 10,000 tons of rice¹³⁹ followed by another 5,000 tons which the Chinese ambassador to Morocco presented to Guinea (April 1959).¹⁴⁰

Guinea became more and more friendly and aligned to the socialist countries, not only in the political but also in the economic spheres. The following table shows how Guinean foreign trade with the West dramatically declined while foreign trade with the countries of the East made rapid strides within a brief period of three years.

TABLE 12.6

PERCENTAGE OF GUINEA'S IMPORTS OVER TOTAL IMPORTS
FROM FRENCH ZONE AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 1959-1961

Year	French Zone	Socialist Countries
1959	74%	8%
1960	60%	26%
1961	16%	33%

Source: J. Suret-Canale, 'Les relations international de la Republic de Guinée, in K. Ingham, (ed.), 'French Relations with African States' (London: Butterworth, 1974), p. 266.

12.2.2. Relations with 'Non-Progressive' States

12.2.2.1 China's Relations with Morocco

Effective and united national-political resistance to French colonialism on Morocco's part began in January 1944, when moderate and radical nationalist forces formed the Nationalist Independence Party (NIP). ~~The~~ NIP was dominated by the moderates who were in favour of reviving the monarchy after the departure of the colonial power. As a result of NIP's political resistance to French colonialism Sultan Mohammed V was deposed and exiled - first (August 1953) to Corsica, and subsequently to Madagascar. At the same time, ^{the} NIP was banned by the French authorities.

Inspired both by the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu (April 1954) and the Algerian war of liberation which began in November 1954, politically-conscious Moroccans held a series of demonstrations against the ban on NIP and oppression of its leaders by the colonial power. NIP's resistance against the French colonial power was praised in the despatches published in the Chinese press as the rising nationalistic consciousness against colonialism.¹⁴¹

France was anxious to avoid the repetition in Morocco of political developments that were under way in Algeria with which it was being increasingly preoccupied. In an attempt to defuse any potential forces of resistance that might be lurking in NIP, France . (August 1955) began negotiations on the granting of independence to Morocco. Mohammed V was brought back to Morocco to head the Moroccan government. However, France finally

abolished the Protectorate of Morocco and recognised the country's independence much later (March 1956).

Political differences within NIP, which were initially ignored in the interest of a united national and political resistance to French colonialism, came to the fore after the gaining of independence. Internal divisions arose. Two groups emerged. One was a moderate and traditionalist group led by Allāl al-Fāsi, and the other a radical group, headed by El Mahdi Ben Barka. This division led to a fall of the moderate government, and the formation of a new one led by Abdullah Ibrahim (December 1958). One of the first measures introduced by Ibrahim was the legalisation of the Moroccan Communist Party which had been proscribed by the previous government.

The radical government, however, could not work freely in the face of combined opposition from the monarchy and the moderate forces within ^{the} NIP. Ibrahim's government was dismissed with a view to containing the radical forces in NIP, and King Mohammed V made himself Prime Minister.¹⁴² At the same time, he nominated Crown Prince .Mulay Hdssan II, his son, as Counsellor to the Throne. The latter became King when the father died (February 1961).

Despite the reactionary character of the Kingdom of Morocco, China was more than willing to recognise it and established full diplomatic relations with Morocco. A second major transit route for arms and military equipment from friendly powers (e.g. China) to Algerian liberation fighters passed through Morocco.¹⁴³ China counted itself

among the major supporters of ^{the} FLN in Algeria. Diplomatic relations with Morocco were necessary for China to maintain its contacts with the FLN forces in western Algeria. Thus, with the help of the influential radical forces in the Moroccan government, China established diplomatic relations with Morocco (November 1958).¹⁴⁴

Morocco's recognition of PRC did contravene the wishes of the United States and other anti-China forces. China's contacts¹⁴⁵ with Morocco, however, depended on events in Algeria, and in particular, on the activities of the Moroccan authorities along the Moroccan-Algerian border in facilitating the transfer of arms and other supplies for the Algerian FLN.¹⁴⁶ Towards this end, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Morocco, China set up a Consulate in Wejda and bases for military training along the Moroccan-Algerian borders.¹⁴⁷

Trade also played an important role in promoting Sino-Moroccan relations. In August 1958, four months before the establishment of diplomatic relations (October 1958), between the two countries, a commercial agreement was signed between Morocco and China.¹⁴⁸ In October, another Trade Agreement was also signed.¹⁴⁹ Since then Morocco has been one of the largest trade partners of China in Africa.¹⁵⁰ Chinese exports to Morocco had usually consisted of green tea, silk imports and consumer goods. Moroccan exports have mostly been phosphates and sardines.¹⁵¹

12.2.2.2. Relations with The Sudan

The Sudan was one of the six African countries represented at the Bandung Conference (1955).¹⁵² Its presence at this conference was, however, restricted by its non-independent status. The Sudan became fully independent of British and Egyptian rule only in January 1956.¹⁵³

In contrast to the attraction Morocco held for it, there was no strong objective reason for China to seek close relations with the Sudan. The Sudan's pro-Western policy on the one hand, and on the other, China's preoccupation with the Suez crisis and the Algerian war of national liberation account for the absence of diplomatic relations between China and the Sudan during the first two years of the latter's career as an independent state. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were, however, established in November 1958,¹⁵⁴ following the *coup d'état* in the Sudan led by Ibrahim Aboud. Trade provided the main impetus for Sino-Sudanese relations. In fact, trade relations between the two countries had begun as early as 1956.¹⁵⁵ By 1964, China became the sixth¹⁵⁶ largest purchaser of Sudanese cotton.¹⁵⁷ Politically, however, the two countries did not come together until the second phase (1959-66) of Sino-African relations.¹⁵⁸

12.3. People-to-People Relations or
'United Front From Below'.

12.3.1. China and the Algerian War of Liberation 1954-62

Winning China over to our side is winning over a great power that frightens colonialists, but it does not frighten us because it stands against colonialism, not against liberation.¹⁵⁹

The Algerian war of liberation provided the major ideological impetus for China's early approach not only in Africa, but also in the world as a whole¹⁶⁰ (post-Bandung period) to non-communist national movements against colonialism. It also provided the occasion for the first successful case of supportive relations between China and an African liberation movement. It should be stressed that the ideological character of FLN (Algeria) and its adoption of armed struggle as the method of achieving liberation from colonialism provided the basis for militant solidarity embracing a number of countries in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The FLN's position became even clearer following Algerian liberation. Algeria, under FLN's leadership, became the Mecca of African liberation and revolutionary forces.¹⁶¹

Before discussing China's policy towards the Algerian war of liberation and the relations between PRC and FLN, it would be appropriate to survey in brief the development of the national movement in Algeria and the protracted struggle of the Algerian people against French colonialism (1830-1954). This struggle was described by Zhou Enlai

(29 September 1960) as a "valiant and indomitable revolutionary will".¹⁶²

By 1954, it became clear to Algerian nationals that they had no option but to use armed struggle as the means to liberation. This was in conformity with ^{the} CCP's ideology and practice of armed struggle. A consideration of the similarities and differences between the development of the Chinese and Algerian revolutions is also relevant to a proper understanding of the dynamic feature of the political relationship between China and the Algerian people during this period.

12.3.1.1. French Colonialism and Algerian Resistance

Before 1954

France needed only a swipe with a fly-swatter at its Consul (29 April 1827) by the Dey (Governor of Algiers) to have an excuse to occupy Algeria for 132 years (14 July - 1830 - 5 July 1962). This incident was viewed by the French as an insult not only to their Consul, but also to their King (Charles X). The incident took place when the Dey submitted a protest to the French Consul, Deval, against France's failure to repay debts dating back to a year of famine in France (1792), when Algeria sent aid (mostly wheat)¹⁶³ to the French. France sent an armada in retaliation. On its arrival, Admiral Koli demanded an open apology from the Dey and permission to allow the French flag to fly over El Kasba, a suburb of Algiers and the Headquarters of the Dey's office. These were

described by the Dey as most unwise stipulations that could come only from 'stupid politicians'.¹⁶⁴

The reasons for the harsh French reaction against the Dey, however, lay in their pursuit of colonial, economic, strategic and trade interests in what was, to the French, an important country.¹⁶⁵

Although an open and eventually successful struggle against French colonialism in Algeria began on 1 November 1954, the resistance of the Algerian people politically and militarily went back to the very beginning of the French invasion (July 1830). It took the French colonial power more than 20 years to dominate the fertile areas (mainly in the North) completely, and 86 years (1830-1916) to squash the resistance of the Algerian people as a whole.

Among the resistance movements prior to 1954, was the one (1830-1847) led by Al Amir Abdul Qadir.¹⁶⁶

Unlike other Algerian revolts¹⁶⁷ before 1954, Qadir's resistance was not a passing or local one. It was well organised; and, politically and militarily it was very successful. Right from the beginning, Qadir formed a government (with its capital in Maâscar in north-west Algeria) consisting of ministers and secretaries dealing with internal and external affairs.¹⁶⁸

Militarily, Qadir's People's Resistance was a people's war in the correct sense of the term. It bore a close similarity to people's wars which took place later in China and other parts of Asia and Africa. Qadir relied on the countryside as a strategic base for resisting the

colonial power, on the peasants as the major force in the army, on guerrilla operations as the means of resistance in towns, and on marches as the means of spreading resistance over larger areas. It was these factors that enabled Kader to lead a people's resistance in 38 successful battles against the powerful French army.¹⁶⁹

The French colonial authority was able to put an end to Kader's Peoples' Resistance (1847) only after a ruthless campaign against the masses which gave political and logistical support to Kader. The French, like the Japanese in China during the late '30s, pursued the policy of oppressing and killing inhabitants who refused to obey them, seizing their assets and land, and destroying any obstacles encountered by the French army.¹⁷⁰

The second major resistance movement that took place before 1954 was led by Mohammed Al Muqrāni, Al Sheikh al Haddad, and BU:marzaŷ (1871), who succeeded in liberating many parts of the southern region of the central part of Northern Algeria (from BU:rj BU Arəŷrj to Māl.ŷ za near Sidi Āisā). This revolt however, had no chance of succeeding in its objective in the face of the well-equipped French army which was despatched to the area in the same year.

Algerian Political Resistance

Algerian political resistance began right from the day on which the Dey signed the Document of Surrender (5 July 1830). On this very day a Committee was founded, which demanded the return of the French military forces to their own country. At the same time, it protested to the

French government against the humiliation suffered by Algerians at its hands and the crimes committed by the French against Algerians.

Five major political parties and organisations¹⁷¹ were involved in the development of the national movement of Algeria before 1954.

i. The '*Etoile Nord Africaine*' Party (ENA - literally, the Northern Star of Africa) was founded in Paris (1924). Initially, ENA consisted of immigrants belonging to North Africa living in France.¹⁷² By 1927 ENA assumed a specifically Algerian character under the leadership of Massali El Hadj.¹⁷³ ENA demands included the independence of North Africa, confiscation of big estates owned by the *colons*, opening of Arab schools, encouragement of small enterprise, and an end to the system of racial discrimination.¹⁷⁴

ii. The Association of Muslim Olama (or, broadly speaking, intellectuals) (MOA). Formed in El Djezair (Algiers) (1931). Its objectives can be found in the following slogan given by Abdul El Hamid Ben Badis, its founder:

Algeria our country
Islam our religion and
Arabic our language.

iii. The Party of the Algerian People (PPA) founded in Algiers in March 1937. PPA was originally founded by members of ENA, including Messali El Hadj, who played a leading role in founding both parties. PPA's political activities included the publication of its own paper, El Shaab (The People) in Arabic, demonstrations, and flying the Algerian flag against the

French authorities. The French colonial power responded by banning (1939) the Party.

iv. The Manifesto Movement founded in February 1943. This was a political organisation rather than a political party, and its strategy differed from that of the other political organisations. It attempted to make its views and demands known through internal and international channels and contacts. Its objectives included condemnation of colonialism, respect of the people's right to determine their own future, recognition of Arabic as an official language, freedom of the press, free education, Algerian participation in their government and the release of all political prisoners.¹⁷⁵ The list of these demands was sent (March 1943) to the French authorities in Algiers and to de Gaulle's government in exile which was based in London at the time. It was also copied to the American, British, Soviet and Egyptian representatives in Algiers. The Manifesto Movement's aim was to raise a worldwide awareness of Algerian problems in order to put pressure on France, which was itself then under Nazi occupation.

Algerians hoped that the Nazi Occupation of France would make the French colonial power appreciate the burden of oppression and domination, and lead to their abandoning their racial and colonial practices in Algeria.

During the Nazi occupation of France, Algerian participation in a joint struggle against Nazism and Fascism reinforced these hopes. More than 300,000 Algerians¹⁷⁶ fought alongside the French Army. Algerians believed

that once France was liberated, their own liberation would automatically follow.

- v. The '*Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté*' (Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty - FML) was founded by Ferat Abbas in Setif (East Algeria) in March 1944. The FML consisted of ex-members of ^{the} APP, (which was banned in 1939), ^{the} MOA, and youth organisations. The mixed class structure and political orientation of ^{the} FML made it more of a united front than a political party. It held its first Congress in January 1945. Its major demands included the abolition of the system of mixed *mairies*, an end to the military rule in the south, and introduction of Arabic as an official language.¹⁷⁷

✓ In the event, however, the political means pursued by various Algerian political parties or movements with a view to achieving reform or independence came to nought.. On the very day on which victory over Fascism and Nazism was celebrated in Europe (VE Day - 8 May 1945), and even as the closing stage of the signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco had been reached 'amid pious declarations of self-determination for subject peoples',¹⁷⁸ Algerians prepared for a double celebration: of the victory over Fascism and Nazism, and of their own imminent liberation.

The French authorities did not take kindly to Algerian people assuming that the victory of the Allied powers over Fascism-Nazism brought the hour of their own liberation from colonialism near. Algerians had to pay for waving their flag at demonstrations in the towns of

Setif, Galma, Kharrata and other nearby areas with the lives of 45,000¹⁷⁹ civilians who were put to death by the French soldiers and police within less than 60 hours.¹⁸⁰ Thousands of people, including their national leaders, were sent to prison or deported to isolated areas in other French colonies.

After this massacre, Algerians realised that a civilian political struggle would not lead them to independence. The only alternative left to them was military action. It was left for the national leaders to form a united front in order to fight for Algeria's independence.

12.3.1.2. The FLN and the Algerian War of Liberation 1954-1962

Nine years after the infamous incident of 8 May 1945, armed struggle for the liberation of Algeria from French colonial rule was initiated by the *Comité Révolutionnaire pour l'Unité et d'Action* (CRUA) founded in March 1954 by the '*Club des Neuf*'¹⁸¹ (the Club of Nine) which was committed to armed resistance.

The CRUA divided Algeria into six *wilayas* (provinces) and appointed a commander for each *wi laya*. From El Aouras (*wilaya 1*) mountains in the east of Algeria CRUA, under its new name - the National Liberation Front - (FLN), launched its first guerrilla attack (1 November 1954)¹⁸² on the French police and army and their headquarters. This marked the beginning of the first war of liberation

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against colonialism not only in Algeria but in Africa as a whole.

The success of the Chinese revolution of 1949, its challenge to the United States, the most powerful imperialist country, during the Korean crisis (1951-53), and the defeat of French colonial power at Dien Bien Phu were the major sources of inspiration for the Algerians in their war of liberation which was described by Fanon as

the most hallucinatory war that any people has ever waged to smash colonial aggression. '63

At the same time as Dien Bien Phu ended in a major historical defeat for French colonialists, and marked the end of their rule in Indo-China (1954), the seeds of a second major defeat for French colonialism were sown in the far more important outpost of Algeria. In Cairo (1 November), ^{the} FLN called upon all Algerians from each and every social section, political party and political organisation to join the national liberation struggle. FLN listed its objectives as follows:

- i. Algerian independence and the founding of a democratic republic within the framework of Islamic principles.
- ii. Preservation of all fundamental liberties without any social or religious discrimination.

Internal objectives

A political cleansing operation and mobilisation of all the people for the task of destroying the colonial system.

External objectives

- i. Awakening the world to the Algerian problem.
- ii. Ensuring the unity of North African people within the Arab-Islamic framework and assurance of sympathy to all nations supportive of the Algerian cause through the UN Charter.

Means of Struggle

In accordance with revolutionary principles and with due regard to internal and external conditions, the Algerian national liberation forces vowed to continue their struggle by every means until they realised [their] objective.¹⁸⁴

Less than two weeks (12 November) after the beginning of the war (1 November), the fighting spread to Jerjera's mountains in the eastern region (*wilaya 2*).¹⁸⁵ By the end of the year, FLN made its voice heard and its objectives were embraced by a vast majority of the people throughout the country.

Like Qadir's Resistance Movement earlier,¹⁸⁶ ^{the} FLN concentrated its activities in the countryside and on the mountain slopes. Its military organisation, the Army of National Liberation (ALN) consisted mostly, if not

entirely, of peasants representing the vast majority of the Algerian population, and who constituted the most deprived segment of Algerian society.

Undoubtedly ^{the} FLN's success sprang from its reliance on the peasants and a systematic understanding and recognition of their revolutionary potential.¹⁸⁷ The revolutionary potential of the Algerian peasant was at the core of Fanon's analysis of the developing situation in colonial areas.

...in the colonial countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays. For him there is no compromise, no possible coming to terms; colonialisation and de-colonialisation are simply a question of relative strength. The exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all means, and that of force first and foremost. When in 1956, after the capitulation of Guy Mollet to the settlers in Algeria, the *Front de Libération Nationale*, in a famous leaflet, stated that colonialisation only looses its hold when the knife is at its throat, no Algerian really found these terms too violent. The leaflet only expressed what Algerians felt at heart; colonialism is a thinking machine, not a body endowed with reasoning faculties; violence is its natural state, and it will only free them when confronted with greater violence.¹⁸⁸

In August 1955, the FLN struggle reached a critical point when Algerians went out into the streets (20 August) demonstrating their loyalty to and support for FLN liberation forces in opposition to French propaganda and

flatly contradicting rumours that ^{the} FLN had been crushed. The colonial authorities reacted to these popular demonstrations by massacring 12,000 civilians, many of them were herded into a stadium in Skikda (in east Algeria) and mowed down.

This incident worked to ^{the} FLN's advantage. Support for the struggle was intensified in all sections of the masses, including leading 'moderate' politicians (amongst them, Ferhat Abbas) who had been initially opposed to armed struggle. Abbas became a prominent ^{the} FLN leader and the first President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (September 1958).

Unequivocal support for FLN was demonstrated by traders, workers and small businesses in their unanimous response to its call for a General Strike (July 1956).

In August 1956, ^{the} FLN held its historic Congress of El Somam,¹⁸⁹ at which the war of liberation took on a more organised and consistent shape.¹⁹⁰ The strategy was to work towards

...the weakening of the French soldiers, an undermining of French economy, an isolation of France internationally and mobilisation of the masses in response to daily French massacre and other crimes against the Algerians.¹⁹¹

At the same time, a National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) was constituted at the Congress. CNRA held its first meeting on the spot, an Executive Committee was formed. In July 1957, this Committee was sent abroad

to Cairo where it could function effectively out of reach of the French authorities.

Until victory of ^{the} FLN became imminent, it did not intensify its campaign for international political and material support. Self-reliance was the hallmark of the Algerian armed struggle until the point of no return. China greatly respected this ^{the} FLN strategy as revealed in the speeches and comments of Chinese leaders on the Algerian war of liberation.

It was only in Cairo, at its second conference (1957), that ^{the} CNRA decided to put more energy into bringing the Algerian issue to international attention and securing international support. The Algerian liberation struggle had already entered a new phase. ~~The~~ FLN and the new provisional government (PGRA), founded on 19 September 1958, embarked on the task of forging links with forces that were prepared to work towards the advancement of their armed struggle against the French colonial power. This development coincided with China's decision to continue its anti-imperialist policy rather than embrace the Soviet Union's conciliatory approach towards the Western world. Thus, FLN and China were thrown together into a situation that could only cement their relationship.

12.3.1.3. China and the First Stage of the Algerian War of Liberation

Four major factors have influenced China's ideological posture towards the Algerian war of liberation and its relations with ^{the} FLN.

- i. The FLN's adoption of the correct method for liberation, i.e., armed struggle through the people's war, guerrilla warfare, and trust in the ability of the masses to confront a powerful French army consisting of 80,000 troops.¹⁹² A similar strategy was used by CCP against both Japanese imperialism and Jiang Jieshi's army before liberation, subsequently urged by China as a practical example for other countries under colonial rule to follow. China's appreciation of Algerian tactics was clearly expressed by Zhou Enlai in his speech at the Meeting of Cadres of ^{the} FLN (Algiers: 25 December 1963) when he said that

the great victory of the Algerian peoples' revolutionary struggles shows that confronted with imperialist armed oppression, the oppressed nations can win independence and liberation by fighting the counter-revolutionary armed forces with revolutionary armed forces. The Algerian revolutionaries have defeated colonialism precisely because they firmly relied on the peasants and all revolutionary people launched and persisted in armed struggle with the countryside as their base, and combined the other forms of struggle with armed struggle.¹⁹³

- ii. The Algerian war of liberation provided a practical example demonstrating the validity of China's insistence that armed struggle was an effective means for true liberation from colonialism in Africa and other parts of the

world. 'Peace can only be achieved by fighting for it, not by begging...' 194

In the above speech, Zhou Enlai stressed that

The independence of Algeria is a great event in the contemporary African national liberation movement. It has set for the other African Peoples a brilliant example of daring to wage an armed struggle and daring to secure victory, and indicated to the oppressed nations throughout the world the correct road to win independence and freedom. 195

- iii. The Algerian war of national liberation was viewed by China as a part of a nationalist wave spreading throughout the Afro-Asian world. It required the support of communist as well as all other anti-imperialist forces. In a commentary, Ta Kung Pao (June 1956) explained this in the following terms:

The struggle of the Algerian people for national self-determination is part and parcel of the wave of national awakening that is sweeping the Asian and African continents. As an old Arab saying has it "when a horse smells water in the desert, no rein can check him". It is unthinkable that when Morocco and Tunisia their neighbours, have won their independence, the Algerian people should continue to live under foreign rule. 196

- iv. The Algerian war provided early evidence for China's opposition to the Soviet Union's new policy of peaceful negotiation as the best means of achieving liberation from colonialism and imperialism.

12.3.1.3.1. Soviet Attitude Towards the Algerian War: '87
An Algerian Point of View

The Soviet position towards the Algerian war of liberation was greatly influenced by the following two factors:

1. The Soviet Union was certainly conscious of its Big Power status during the Cold War. It exploited any opportunity that presented itself for provoking splits and exploiting seeming contradictions within the imperialist camp. For the Soviet Union, France's commitment to the aim of achieving a united Europe as a bulwark against the expanding influence of the United States, provided an early occasion for attempting to experiment with a policy of providing encouragement to France in the achievement of its European objectives. Thus, the Soviet Union's friendly overtures to France during this period had the result of its condoning French colonialism by adopting a luke-warm attitude to ^{the}FLN. As one ^{the}FLN journalist put it

The Algerian problem was the victim of Soviet global concern, not mass concern. ¹⁹⁸

It is interesting to note in this context a point of view towards the Soviet Union expressed by Dr. Abdul Qadir Zabādia, (October 1983), Director of Documentation in the Arab League (Tunis), and a former Professor in the Politics Department at Algiers. He argued that the Soviet Union's policy of *Détente* with

Western powers, whether under the leadership of Stalin or of Khrushchev, would have held sway. The Soviet Union could not survive solely on a policy of committing its energies to the maintenance of a balance of power with the West as a whole in the Cold War. The Soviet Union needed some relaxation in the tension between East and West in order to realise its economic targets.

According to Zabādia, the Soviet Union's position during the '60s was not dissimilar to that adopted by China during the '70s, but differed fundamentally from that during the '50s and '60s. Unlike the Soviet Union, China was under direct threat from the United States. In order to overcome its feeling of insecurity, China needed to forge links of solidarity with forces which were prepared to resist instead of being content to coexist with imperialist forces. Sino-Algerian relations during the Algerian national liberation war were fundamentally guided by this necessity.

Strong criticism of the Soviet policy towards the Algerian war and warm appreciation of China's support for the Algerian struggle was expressed by Soukhal, ^{the} FLN's Director of the Department of Foreign Relations and an influential diplomat during the war. He argued that:

Before the Soviet Union supports any movement or country, first and foremost it satisfies its global strategy and interests as a Superpower. The FLN during the war did not fit into the Soviet scheme because we could not be interested in -more than our daily struggle for liberation. The Chinese, despite our non-communist nature, understood our nationalist striving perfectly, and provided us with all

possible means of support for an anti-imperialist war.¹⁹⁹

In an article appearing (April 1958) in the FLN organ, Al Mujāhid, the editor strongly criticised the Soviet Union's policy of appeasement towards France at the expense of ^{the} FLN, for the sake of winning over the so-called 'French socialist government' led by Guy Mollet to its side. The editorial went on to argue that this Soviet position served no-one but the French colonialists. It was foolish of the Soviet Union to expect France to take an anti-American stance in view of the fact that the United States was the major source of finance for the costly French war against ^{the} FLN. The Soviet press was strongly criticised for misrepresenting Mollet's statement, during his visit to Moscow (May 1956), to the effect that he was genuinely interested in finding a solution to the Algerian problem. The editorial concluded its argument by going even further and asserting that the Soviet Union's reservations about the Algerian nationalists were motivating the fear that America might replace France had the latter been expelled by Algeria.²⁰⁰

- ii. Another major factor which determined the Soviet attitude towards the Algerian revolution was closely related to a desire not to offend²⁰¹ the Communist Party of France (PCF), and its branch in Algiers. ^{The} PCF was clearly committed to winning seats in the French National Assembly, in accordance with Khrushchev's doctrine of 'a parliamentary process' of socialism.

Influenced by the decisions of their Soviet comrades, Algerian communists failed

both to understand the nationalist character of Algerian struggles, and to give their support to ^{the} FLN. Throughout the war, the Algerian communists spent most of their time analysing the FLN leadership's class character, while the people were being massacred daily. They failed to understand that neither the masses as such, nor ^{the} FLN which represented their revolutionary force, could at that time, be preoccupied with class struggle or social change. Throughout the period of nearly 8 years during which ^{the} FLN was engaged in its anti-colonial struggle, only one major congress was held (El Somam, 1956). This conference was geared to the purpose of leading a successful national liberation war, and not to formulating an ideology for a future, post-war Algeria. Right from the beginning, FLN made it clear that it was a national front which welcomed any individual who was prepared to put the national interest of liberation from colonialism above all ideological and social differences.²⁰² In practical terms, communists in Algeria contributed almost nothing to the Algerian struggle and offered no credible challenge to French colonialism.

Unlike the French and Algerian communists, CCP leaders repeatedly stressed that national liberation struggles waged in Africa, Asia and Latin America were inseparable from the interests of the working people in the capitalist countries. China urged socialist countries and Marxist-Leninists everywhere to support

these just struggles resolutely, without reservation'.²⁰³ Failure to support them would not only be detrimental to socialist interests, but

also serve the interests of the capitalists in the Western world.²⁰⁴

Had the Algerian communists adopted a positive attitude towards the Algerian war, FLN would have welcomed their contribution to the Algerian revolution after independence,

a position they not only desired but died for, in accordance with the parliamentary road to socialism' (sic.).²⁰⁵

In short, the Soviet Union's orientation to the Algerian war was, as one commentator put it

the realistic and typically un-heroic attempt of a great power to serve contradictory interests at the same time.²⁰⁶

The above analysis of the Soviet position on the Algerian war was echoed in an early statement of Khrushchev's in an interview with ^{the} Pravda (4 October 1955), two months after the French massacre of Algerian civilians,²⁰⁷ (20 August). Khrushchev stated the Soviet Union's view on the Algerian question in a way which could only be rejected by ^{the} FLN as taking, on balance, the side of the French colonialists.

...concerning events in North Africa, my first consideration was and is that the USSR does not intervene in the domestic affairs of other states and that a correct solution to this question can be found which will take account, of course, of the legitimate rights and national interests of the peoples of the French Union.²⁰⁸

12.3.1.3.2. China's Attitude Towards the Algerian War

Unlike the Soviet Union, China's concern with the Algerian situation and support for ^{the} FLN dated back to the earliest stage²⁰⁹ of the Algerian war. At the Bandung Conference (April 1955) Zhou Enlai reaffirmed his country's support for North African demands for independence. He argued that:

The people of all independent countries should enjoy all fundamental human rights and not be subjected to maltreatment and discrimination... However, we cannot help being aware that the peoples of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and other dependent peoples have ceased to be suppressed with violence.²¹⁰

The FLN regarded the Bandung Conference as constituting the initial basis for its solidarity and close relations with anti-imperialist forces in Asia and Africa, independently of non-Afro-Asian forces, (including the Soviet Union). Al Mujāhid^{the} FLN's weekly journal, argued that, for the first time, Afro-Asian peoples

had a conference initiated by themselves not an execution of a foreign idea. Significantly, no European, American or Russian was represented.²¹¹

In the same article Al Mujāhid pointed out that

the Bandung Conference did not only demonstrate Afro-Asian solidarity for its common objective of liberation from colonialism, but it also demonstrated that Africa and Asian countries became no longer committed to United States non-recognition of China and that allegations of communism as a danger in the world was irrelevant when Nehru

proclaimed "resistance to colonialism as the major task".²¹²

At Bandung itself the Algerian delegation, led by Mohammed Yazid, played an active part in the Bandung Conference. They met Ho Chi Minh, who led an inspiring victorious war against the French colonialism. Among the statements he made during his long conversation with them was "Les Français...that is a problem we know all".²¹³

The Bandung Conference strongly supported the Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan right to independence and urged France to seek an immediate solution towards self-determination of North African territories. The *Joint Communiqué* of the conference contained the following view of North African independence:

In view of the settled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Afro-Asian conference declaims its support of the right of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urges the French government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.²¹⁴

The Bandung Conference not only marked the beginning of FLN's solidarity with the anti-imperialist forces in African and Asian countries, but also imparted international status for the first time to the Algerian issue and to FLN itself as the legitimate voice of Algerian independence. Five months after the Bandung Conference, the Algerian issue was formally included in the agenda of the UN General Assembly (October).²¹⁵

After the Bandung Conference, China's concern with North African problems in general and the Algerian question in particular assumed great importance in China's anti-colonialist struggle and its support for liberation. The Chinese leaders found the resolutions of the conference to be highly satisfactory as they had Afro-Asian solidarity against the colonialist powers as their major objective. In his report on the 'Afro-Asian Conference' to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (13 May 1955), Zhou Enlai reaffirmed this orientation in the following manner:

The phrase 'in all its manifestations'²¹⁶ here denotes colonialism in all its political, military, economic, cultural and social manifestations and there cannot possibly be any other interpretation. The Asian-African conference supported the cause of freedom and independence of all dependent peoples, especially the fight for self-determination and independence of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.²¹⁷

During the Suez crisis, (June-December 1956) the Chinese leaders, their press and propaganda seemed to have given little attention to the Algerian problem. This, however, should not be attributed to a lack of concern.²¹⁸ The major aim behind the French invasion of Egypt during the Suez crisis was to put an end to Nasser's *régime* in Egypt which provided the main external base and acted as a major source of support for the Algerian FLN.²¹⁹ After all, China's support for Egypt as an Arab country constituted, at this stage, an indirect contribution to

the Algerian cause (even though China was not as yet a direct protagonist of FLN) not only because of the support that ^{the} FLN received from Nasser as the leader of the Egyptian anti-colonialist revolution, but also because of Algeria's Arab character.

For these reasons, there was no reason whatever for Algerian national leaders to question in any manner China's support for Egypt against Israel and France, their common enemies. When the Suez crisis was over, China was able to devote attention to the Algerian national liberation struggle in an explicit manner. This became evident when the Algerian question was discussed (February 1957) by the UN Political Committee (UNPC). Under pressure from France and its allies, UNPC did no more than express the hope that:

a peaceful democratic and just solution would be found through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of UN Charter. 220

This UN resolution

was far from compatible with FLN's demands. China viewed the resolution as an integral part of the designs of the NATO allies, under the leadership of the United States, to block the national demands of liberation forces and to protect the joint Western-capitalist interests by perpetuating the colonial system. On the day following the UNPC resolution, (15 February) the People's Daily wrote (16 February) as follows:

US opposition to any practical UN decision on the Algerian question was in fact support for the French colonial policy.

The resolution in the UN Political Committee with the American support disregarded the essence and the ways of solution of the Algerian colonialism... The US was an arch supporter of colonialism. It had all round supported France's Colonial Policy towards the Algerian people and subsidised the French government's heavy war expenditure.²²¹ Through NATO the US had continuously supplied France with arms which were used to slaughter the Algerian people.

The Algerian people have taken up arms against French colonialists because they can no longer endure colonial slavery and want to free themselves from the dark prison of oppression. The UN should check the French colonial atrocities, meet the national aspirations of the Algerian people and safeguard peace.²²²

For China however, the Algerian nationalists had already taken on board the correct political strategy i.e., of armed struggle, in order to force French colonialism and its allies as well as UN, to recognise the independence of Algeria. International pressure on France and support for the Algerian struggle, as a secondary necessity, could come only through direct solidarity with anti-imperialist forces outside and not through ^{the} UN, dominated as it was by the leading anti-imperialist forces.

Accordingly, China intensified its relations with FLN and solidarity with the Algerian people. In March 1957, Oujina Dris, Secretary of the General Union of Algerian Trade Unions, (UGTA)²²³ visited China where he was promised all means of support for a 'complete victory'.²²⁴

During his visit, Dris addressed a meeting in Beijing of over one thousand workers' representatives for solidarity with the Algerian struggle.²²⁵ In June, a five-member Algerian Students' Delegation, led by Mohammed Khmisti, Secretary of the General Union of Algerian Moslim Students, was received by prominent Chinese leaders, including Zhou Enlai.²²⁶

In the same year, China offered (as it had done during the Suez crisis) volunteers to take part in the struggle of the liberation fighters in Algeria, including fighter bomber pilots, and those well versed in techniques of guerrilla warfare.²²⁷ In line with China's general policy, such an offer was strongly conditional on ^{the} FLN wishing for it; in no way was it sought to be imposed on the Algerian freedom fighters. In the event, this offer, was neither taken up by ^{the} FLN, nor was it ideologically compatible with China's emphasis on self-reliance. The very fact that such an offer was on the table, however, had the effect of lifting the morale²²⁸ of the Algerian fighters, and causing alarm in French colonial circles.

China did not usually publicise (or, for that matter, does not at the present time in the few areas of the world such as Kampuchea where it is involved) its material aid to African and other liberation movements which usually took the form²²⁹ of weapons, military equipment, financial help and material supplies, for two reasons.

1. Security, as mutually understood between China and the liberation movements concerned; and,

ii. China regards it as its duty and as being in its ideological interests to support anti-colonialist and imperialist forces in whatever manner appropriate. This was clearly explained by Zhou Enlai in his speech at the Meeting of the Cadres of the Algerian National Liberation Front (December 1963):

Our Algerian friends have often mentioned the Chinese people's assistance to Algeria. In our opinion, to give assistance to the fighting Algerian people is our bounden duty. Assistance is always mutual. In fact, the help the Algerian peoples' struggle has given us takes first place. Our assistance to the Algerian people has been limited. The struggle and victory of the Algerian people are a great support and assistance to the people of China, the other socialist countries and all oppressed nations and peoples of the world.²³⁰

The news of the size and content of military and financial aid given by China to any particular liberation movement is usually derived from unconfirmed sources or from individuals attached to, or active in it. It could also be gleaned from delegations, especially military ones, visiting China from time to time.

In relation to the FLN, it was reported that the aid given initially by China (i.e., before 1958) was estimated at \$4.9 million²³¹ in addition to arms and military equipment provided through the Chinese embassy in Cairo.²³² A visit to China by an FLN Military Delegation (March 1958), led by Ibrrahim Ghafa,²³³ was undertaken in part with a view to arranging such military aid and equipment. Another reason for Ghafa's visit was to attend

a big rally 'Support Algeria Day', held in Beijing (30 March 1958). Addressing the rally, Ghafa stressed the common Sino-Algerian cause and the interest of both countries in opposing the NATO allies led by the United States which gave major military and financial support to the French colonial authorities.²³⁴ On the same occasion People's Daily (30 March) wrote:

The French decision to carry its suppression of Algeria to the bitter end is largely due to the backing of the United States... Washington has poured into France huge quantities of arms and millions of vehicles and hundreds of millions of dollars in loans and 'aid' to make up French losses in Algeria and meet the costs of the Algerian war.²³⁵

12.3.2. Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation
(AAPSO)

In the absence of any effective communist party or movements in Africa following the international line of CCP, especially in relation to armed struggle against the forces of imperialism and colonialism, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) founded in January 1958 was valued highly by China for its contacts and solidarity with national independence and liberation movements in the continent. Some analysts²³⁶ went even further by viewing the organisation as the principal vehicle for China's influence in the Afro-Asian world as a whole, and in Africa in particular.²³⁷

The AAPSO served as an important outlet for attempts to mobilise anti-colonialist forces for more positive

action (e.g., armed resistance) and for extending material support to freedom fighters. It also served as a major channel for the Chinese policy of promoting Afro-Asian solidarity, not only at a people-to-people, but at a State-to-State level. Most African governments had official or non-official representatives accredited to the organisation. China hoped to exert political influence on African countries through ^{the} AAPSO, along lines similar to the Soviet Union which had a powerful following in other international organisations, such as ^{the} WFTU and ^{the} WPM.

It must be stressed that AAPSO was by no means the only channel open to China for extending its support for anti-colonialist forces. OAU's Liberation Committee has also been an important outlet through which aid to liberation movements has been delivered and received. Progressive African *régimes* such as Ghana under Nkrumah (until 1966), Algeria, and Tanzania, have also served as effective venues for facilitating the transfer of aid from socialist and other sympathetic countries to liberation forces, whilst acting as the headquarters of a number of liberation organisations and as bases for guerrilla training.²³⁸

The first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held in Cairo (26 December-1 January 1957), was attended by 500 delegates representing 45 entities, organisations and national independence as well as liberation movements.²³⁹

Among the issues discussed in the preparatory stages of this conference, was whether or not an invitation should be extended to the Soviet Union. It was, however,

eventually settled when the Soviet Union hastily established, in its domestic sphere of relations, a Soviet National Asian Solidarity Committee.²⁴⁰ Initially at least, this was sufficient to give the Soviet Union an Asian status and the qualification to attend the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference.

China was concerned that the presence of the Soviet Union might transform it into yet another Soviet-dominated international front. Until 1959, however, (i.e., until Khrushchev's visit to the United States), Sino-Soviet ideological differences were still contained within the bounds of friendly public debate,²⁴¹ without seriously undermining the relations between the two countries. They had not yet reached a stage at which each would openly condemn the other's world view or compete with the other for influence or leadership in international peoples' organisation, or in the world as a whole.

Thus, at this first conference, neither the Soviet Union nor China engaged in explicit criticism of one another. China would ideally have liked the Soviet Union excluded from the AAPSO, in order that its specifically Third World character was not compromised. In believing so, China was inspired by the example of the Bandung Conference which three years earlier, had succeeded in excluding the Soviet Union without causing offence. People's Daily (27 December 1957) gave expression to China's strong support for, and clear understanding of the aims of the conference:

Delegations from more than 40 African and Asian countries or areas, representing two thirds of the world's population, are attending the Congress. Although these countries or areas have different social systems, ideologies, languages and customs, the people there share a similar experience and a common desire. The overwhelming majority have suffered - or are suffering from imperialist oppression, enslavement and slaughter... Common experience and fate has joined all the African and Asian peoples together at heart. Their common demand is to fight for and safeguard independence and freedom, consolidate world peace and promote friendly coexistence among the people of all countries.²⁴²

This conference adopted three important resolutions, all pro-Chinese²⁴³ in character:

- i. A resolution giving expression to a general stance opposing colonialism, imperialism and the Western powers. The general theme of this resolution was based on an adherence to the ten major²⁴⁴ principles of the Bandung Conference - but more emphatically to liberation from colonialism, including the advocacy of armed struggle²⁴⁵ "to oppose imperialism and colonialism".²⁴⁶
- ii. The conference made a strongly worded demand for the restoration of China's legal and rightful place in ^{the} UN.²⁴⁷
- iii. The third major resolution concerned the emphasis on direct revolutionary action against colonialism and imperialism and Western policies as a whole, in opposition to policies emphasising *Détente*, disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons.²⁴⁸

China hailed the outcome of the conference and its resolutions with characteristic enthusiasm. People's Daily wrote immediately after the conference thus:

The people of the two continents want to take their destiny into their own hands and want to take an active part in determining the destiny of all humanity. They are profoundly aware that in the present peace is unadvisable. The establishment of lasting peace is inseparable from national independence movements. Only when the people of all countries have gained independence and equality can a stable and lasting peace come into being. This is a good for which all our nations in Asia and Africa should jointly fight.²⁴⁹

China did not seem to consider the favourable results of the first conference of the AAPSO as transit. It placed a high value on the resolutions of the conference as fundamentally important for the anti-imperialist front. Zhou Enlai chose the National People's Congress (February 1958) as the forum for communicating China's understanding of the positive revolutionary role that could be played by Afro-Asian solidarity.

The conference maintains that all people are entitled to the same rights of freedom, self-determination, sovereignty and independence. These resolutions without doubt voiced the common will of the hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa. There is still a long struggle ahead in the national independence movements in Asia and Africa and there will inevitably be more twists and turns in their future development, but the Asian and African peoples have already stood up and will never again be crushed.²⁵⁰

Despite the failure of the conference to endorse its early moves in the direction of *Détente* the Soviet Union, too, seemed to be satisfied with the outcome of the conference. This is understandable in view of the Soviet Union's much publicised though not yet practiced, policy of peaceful coexistence at the time of the conference; (Khrushchev confirmed his non-hesitation regarding *Détente* when he visited the United States in 1959 (a year after the conference) and from its attempts to win over the organisation to the Soviet camp. Rashidov, the head of the Soviet Delegation, explained the Soviet support for the conference in the following terms:

this Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, its spirit and its ideas are supported by all honest men throughout the world, because it is...anti-colonial and anti-imperialist and thus at the same time just, progressive and humane...

The Soviet people support the consolidation of those forces in the Afro-Asian countries that will henceforth play an important role by extending the zone of peace in the struggle against the rotten system and piracy of imperialism...Brothers, Comrades and Friends, lift up your heads, the end of your enslavement is at hand.²⁵¹

The conference was endorsed not only by the progressive and socialist forces, but also by anti-communist ones. The shared objective was an Afro-Asian solidarity for independence and liberation. In an interview with one commentator, John Kale, the General Secretary of the Uganda National Congress, for example, explained:

For those of us who were taking part in such an important international conference for the first time, and rubbing shoulders with cabinet ministers, presidents and prominent trade unionist, scientists, artists, and writers from countries all over the world, Cairo was a tremendous experience. For the first time we felt we were being taken seriously. They all treated us as equals, whether they had won independence forty years ago or perhaps only a couple of years back... Although many of us instinctively, and some of us even consciously, rejected Soviet interference in our works, although many of us distrusted the communists, this mistrust was outweighed by a feeling of real gratitude that a great world power should support our demands.²⁵²

At this conference, Cairo, as the first host, and as a strategic centre splicing Asia and Africa together politically, was chosen to be the permanent headquarters of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Council (AAPC). Anwar As-Sadat was nominated as President of the Council (with representatives of the Soviet Union and India as Vice Presidents).

Youcef As-Sibai,²⁵³ another Egyptian, was elected Secretary General of ^{the} AAPC.²⁵⁴ The members of the permanent Afro-Asian Secretariat (initially proposed by the Soviet Union) were either communists representing China, the Soviet Union, Japan, India and the Sudan, or militant nationalists (in opposition to colonialism and imperialism) representing Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria.²⁵⁵ Yang Shuo, the Chinese representative, arrived in Cairo in April 1958.²⁵⁶ China's initial financial

contribution to ^{LHR}AAPSO (\$28000) was larger than that of the
Soviet Union (\$25,000). 257

TABLE 12.7

AFRICAN DELEGATIONS VISITING CHINA (1958-1959)

<u>Country of Origin</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>59</u>
Algeria		5	6
Angola		1	1
Botswana		-	-
Burundi		-	-
Cameroun		1	6
Congo-Brazzaville		-	-
Congo Kinshasa		2	1
Central African Republic		1	1
Chad		-	1
Dahomey		-	-
Ethiopia		-	-
Gabon		-	-
Gambia		-	-
Ghana		1	3
Guinea		-	3
Guinea (Bissau)		-	-
Ivory Coast		-	-
Kenya		1	2
Lesotho		-	-
Libya		1	-
Malawi		-	-
Mali		1	1
Mauritania		1	1
Mauritius		-	1
Malagasy		1	2
Mozambique		-	-
Morocco		2	4
Niger		-	-
Nigeria		1	1
Rhodesia		-	-
Rwanda		-	-
South Africa		1	1
Senegal		3	1
Sierra Leone		1	1
Somali Republic		1	-
Sudan		2	3
South West Africa		-	-
Swaziland		-	-
Tanganyika		1	-
Zanzibar		-	-
Tunisia		1	2
Uganda		1	2
United Arab Republic		9	1
Togo		1	-
Zambia		-	-
Blk. African Youth		3	3
Blk. African Trade Un.		1	2
<u>Annual total</u>		<u>44</u>	<u>50</u>
<u>General Total</u>		<u>94</u>	

Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 270 (Table 2).

TABLE 12.8

CHINESE DELEGATIONS VISITING AFRICAN COUNTRIES (1958-1959)

<u>Country Visited</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>59</u>
United Arab Republic		11	3
Morocco		3	2
Tunisia		2	2
Sudan		2	1
Ghana		2	-
Guinea		-	2
Algeria		-	-
Congo-Kinshasa		-	-
Ethiopia		-	-
Mali		-	-
Somali Republic		-	-
Dahomey		-	-
Niger		-	-
Nigeria		-	-
Senegal		-	-
Sierra Leone		-	-
Tanganyika		-	-
Zanzibar		-	-
Togo		-	-
Upper Volta		-	-
Burundi		-	-
Gabon		-	-
Ivory Coast		-	-
Uganda		-	-
Kenya		-	-
Cameroun		-	-
Central African Republic		-	-
Congo-Brazzaville		-	-
Zambia		-	-
Mauritania		-	-
Mauritius		-	-
Equatorial Guinea		-	-
Libya		-	-
Annual total		20	10
General total		30	

Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1974),
p. 269 (Table 1).

NOTES

1. Chu Jung-fu, 'Foreign relations of New China during the past five years', World Culture (5 October 1954), in Current Background 307 (6 December 1954), pp. 1-9.
2. See Chapters 4 and 5 of this work.
3. Following many strikes and anti-colonial disturbances in 1948, Nkrumah formed the Convention People's Party (CPP) in 1949. The CPP led a campaign of positive action against the colonialist power which included strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience etc. Britain was, as a consequence, obliged to grant internal autonomy to Gold Coast (1952). Nkrumah became the head of the first 'responsible government'. Four years later, CPP's continuous demands for complete independence forced Britain to grant independence to Gold Coast (1956). Nkrumah was elected the first Prime Minister of Gold Coast, then renamed Ghana.
4. With Kotane were two other South African observers representing the ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC).
5. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 17.
6. A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 131 and p. 246.
7. 'Premier Chou En-lai's speech at the Bandung Conference' (19 April 1955), in People's China (16 May 1955), p. 9.
8. Ibidem.
9. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 14. For a similar view, see A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 14.
10. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese representatives at the conference made any specific attempts to open up contact with Africa, it would be reasonable to assume that the conference must have provided a number of occasions for representatives to meet informally and exchange views on ^{African} matters.
11. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 19.
12. See Chapter 5 of this work.
13. Ibidem.
14. At Bogor Conference some countries (e.g. Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines) suggested that Taiwan should also be invited to the conference. However, this was opposed by the vital majority including Arab

- countries which succeeded in preventing Israel being invited to the conference. See G. H. Jansen, Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 173-176.
15. Ibid., p. 176.
 16. Zhou En-lai, Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno emerged from the Conference as the four major champions of the Afro-Asian independence movement.
 17. cited in G. H. Jensen, op.cit., p. 220.
 18. Mau Mau in Kenya was a short lived movement and it did not constitute a positive contribution to the development of a strategy of liberation. It failed to lead the country to independence. See Chapter 13.3.2.8 of this work.
 19. People's China (21 January 1956), cited in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 23.
 20. See Chapter 5 of this work.
 21. China also established diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA) in September 1958. See Table 4.1.
 22. References to Egypt in this thesis should be viewed in the light of internal developments which led to the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958, from which Syria effectively withdrew in September 1961, and of the fact that Egypt continued to refer to itself as UAR until 1972, when Sadat altered its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt. For consistency's sake, we refer to African countries by their geographical names rather than by their changing political nomenclature throughout this thesis.
 23. There was no possibility of China establishing diplomatic relations with King Farūq's government. See Chapters 3 and 4 for the rationale underlying this observation.
 24. Similarly, a brief discussion of the character of the political regime or movement is included in every case dealt with in Part III.
 25. For a succinct discussion of Farūq's role, see D. Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981 (London: George Allen Unwin, 1982), pp. 19-33.
 26. Nasser̄ Mon I'm Eddine, Arab-Chinese Relations 1949-1979 (Beirut: Institute for Research and Publishing, 1980), p. 40.
 27. Ibid., p. 4.1

28. A. Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable, 1972), pp. 45-6.
29. Ibid., p. 46.
30. Ibid., p. 50.
31. quoted from R. R. Bowie, Suez 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 8.
32. cited in A. Nutting, op.cit., p. 50.
33. Until the death of Stalin (1953), for ideological reasons, the communist world was not prepared to support or recognize national bourgeois regimes and non-aligned countries of the Third World. Thus, military aid from the Soviet Union and its allies as an alternative source was out of the question at this juncture so far as Egypt was concerned.
34. J. Mushri' (Ed.), op.cit., p. 63
35. Prensa Latina, The Non-Aligned Countries (A publication by Harney and Jones, translated from Spanish by Dr. Ivo Dvorak) (London: Harney and Jones Limited, 1982), p. 208.
36. R. R. Bowie, op.cit., p. 5.
37. This pact was virtually as good as signed by Turkey and Iraq, even though it did not formally take effect until February 1955. Britain (February), Pakistan (September) and Iran (November) followed suit by joining the pact. The United States acted as the coordinator of the pact. In Nasser's view the pact constituted an integral part of imperialist and neo-colonialist designs against the Arab people.
38. R. R. Bowie, op.cit., p. 8.
39. O. Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), p. 44.
40. R. R. Bowie, op.cit., pp. 10-11.
41. This is widely emphasised by Arab academic observers and ordinary people, certainly those whom the author interviewed in Tunisia (October 1983) and Algeria (various dates 1983-5).
42. R. R. Bowie, op.cit., p. 2.
43. Ibidem.
44. For details on the Suez Crisis, see, for example, C. Pineau, 1956/Suez (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1976); T.

Robertson, Crisis: Inside the Story of the Suez Conspiracy (London: Hutchinson, 1965); H. Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967); L. L. Whatten, The Canal: Four Power Conflict in the Middle East (London: The MIT Press, 1974); J. Massu (Ed.), Vérité sur Suez 1956 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1978); S. Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978); and A. Nutting, op.cit.

45. M. H. Haykal, Qissat al-Sūwēs (The History of Suez) (Beirut: Sharikat al-matbā'ah lil-tawzī' wa al-nāshr) (Publishing and Delivering Company), 1977], p. 138.
46. R. R. Bowie, op.cit., p. 18.
47. The Company's main office was in Paris and its General Manager was a French person.
48. 48 per cent of the French oil supply came through Suez; France shared about 50 per cent of the shares of the company. See R. R. Brown, op.cit., p. 26.
49. cited in R. R. Bowie, op.cit., p. 26.
50. M. H. Haykal, op.cit., pp. 198-203.
51. S. Milne, 'Egypt Invasion Already Planned', The Guardian (2 January 1985), p. 3.
52. For a detailed account of the implication of American links with the Suez crisis and its relations with its Western allies, see, for example, S. Lloyd, op.cit., passim; T. Robertson, op.cit., passim and M. H. Haikel, op.cit., passim.
53. Yeh Po-t'ang, 'Peking Policy Towards Africa as viewed from the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique', Issue and Studies 10 (December 1974): 15, p. 3.
54. M. H. Haykal, op.cit., pp. 147 FF.
55. Eisenhower served as an American President for eight years (1953-1961).
56. Yeh Po-t'ang, op.cit., p. 2.
57. The Egyptian revolution was still viewed by China and the communist world as a whole as springing from Anglo-American or inter-imperialist competition for expanding their spheres of control rather than as carrying the seeds of genuine socio-economic change or change of international orientation. The Soviet Union's Encyclopaedia (1952) characterised the Free Officers as a "reactionary group of officers in alliance with the United States". cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 8.

58. See Chapter 11 of this work.
59. See Chapter 4 of this work.
60. See Chapter 4.1 of this work.
61. China's decision in 1952 (see I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 104), to let the Chinese Muslims go on pilgrimage (Al Haj in Mecca) through Cairo must have contributed to the building of goodwill between China and Egypt.
62. Author's translation from I. Fedda, ibid., p. 105.
63. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 8. In admiration of their heroism, the photos of Nehru, Zhou En-lai and Sukarno hung on the wall of Nasser's office.
64. Ta Kung Pao (Peking, 18 July 1955), reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, [New Delhi: School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1973] [unpublished Ph.D. Thesis], p. 26.
65. Zhou En-lai and Nasser first met in Rangoon (capital of Burma) on their way to Bandung. See B. D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970 op.cit., p. 8.
66. Ibid., p. 17.
67. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong 11 May 1955), reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 27. See also King-yip Hsu, 'Communist China's Diplomacy in the Middle East', Issue and Studies 16 (March 1980): 3, pp. 73-4.
68. Less than three weeks (1 April 1955) before the Bandung Conference (18 April), People's China (later Peking Review and now Beijing Review) published a report on the historical ties between China and the Arab world tracing Sino-Arab relations as far back as the closing century B.C. and developed further after the introduction of Islam. See Pai Shou-yi, 'Historical Ties between China and the Arab World', People's China 1955 (1 April¹⁹⁵⁵), pp. 24-7.
69. People's China (16 September¹⁹⁵⁵): 18, p. 24 reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 127.
70. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
71. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 15; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 21.
72. Ibid., p. 15.

73. Ibid., p. 198.
74. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 9; and G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 28.
75. New China News Agency 28 July 1956) in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 134 (1 August 1956), reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, 'Strategy of the United Front Against Imperialism: A Study of Sino-UAR Relations 1956-1959', IDSA (India) 14 (1975): 3, p. 357.
76. See Part I.
77. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 136.
78. cited in J. E. Khalili, 'Sino-Arab Relations', Asian Survey 7 (August 1968): 8, p. 680.
79. G. P. Deshpande, 'Strategy of the United Front Against Imperialism: A Study of Sino-UAR Relations', op.cit., p. 358. The canal was nationalized on 26 July 1956. The Chinese papers carried reports of it beginning on 28 July.
80. Ibid., p. 358.
81. See Table 12.4.
82. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 31 ..
83. New China News Agency (5 September 1956) cited in ibid., p. 31.
84. New China News Agency (20 September 1956) cited in ibid., p. 32.
85. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 9 and pp. 21-22; Z. Brzezinski^(ed.) op.cit., p. 157; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 24-25.
86. King-yi Hsu, op.cit., p. 74. J. E. Khalili reported that as many as 280,000 volunteers offered to fight on Egypt's side, see his 'Communist China and the United Arab Republic', Asian Survey 10 (April 1970): 4, p. 311.
87. New China News Agency (11 November 1956), reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit.,
88. New China News Agency (Cairo: 23 January 1957) cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., pp. 40-41.
89. Hsinhua News Agency no. 59 (30 December 1957), p. 17.

90. See, for example, Peking Review 1 (11 March 1958); and New China News Agency (24 February 1958) in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 48.
91. cited in ibid., p. 47.
92. cited in ibid., p. 52.
In the same year, in an article in Foreign Affairs, Nasser affirmed his strong opposition to communist infiltration.
- There would not be any communist infiltration in any part of the Middle East and Africa if the United States could develop a courageous policy -and the only morally correct one - of supporting those who are anxious to get rid of foreign domination and exploitation.
- see his 'The Egyptian Revolution', Foreign Affairs 33 (April 1955): 3, p. 211.
93. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 41.
94. People's China (12 January 1957) cited in ibid., p. 41.
95. New China News Agency (19 January 1957) cited in ibid., p. 42.
96. cited in ibid., p. 45.
97. Peking Review 1 (22 April 1958): 21, p. 3.
98. See Table 4.1 of this work.
99. Peking Review 1 (April 1958): 5, p. 21.
100. Survey of China Mainland Press no. 1766 (May 1958), p. 30 reproduced in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 34.
101. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 49.
102. New China News Agency (15 December 1958), cited in ibid., p. 49.
103. Peking Review 1 (21 October 1958): 34, p. 13.
104. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 34.
105. Survey of China Mainland Press no. 1819 (23 July 1958), cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., pp. 50-51.

106. King-yi Hsu, op.cit., p. 74.
107. Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955-75 (London: Kegan Paul International Ltd., 1981), pp. 3-5.
108. quoted in I. Fadda (author's translation), op.cit., p. 115
109. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
110. New China News Agency (Peking: 19 March 1959), cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 58.
111. People's China (20 March 1959), reproduced in Peking Review 2 (24 March 1959): 12, pp. 6-9.
112. See, for example, A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 25; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 21, G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., pp. 59-60.
113. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 21.
114. Peking Review 2 (13 October 1959): 41, p. 25.
115. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 60.
116. Peking Review 2 (13 October 1959): 41, p. 25.
117. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 61.
118. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 26.
119. JMJP (Jen-min Jih pao: People's Daily 30 September 1959) cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 62.
120. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 26.
121. I. Fadda, op.cit., p. 111 (author's translation from Arabic).
122. See, for example, D. R. Hopwood, op.cit., pp. 67-70; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 22; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 24-25; and G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., pp. 53-54.
123. I. Deutscher, op.cit., p. 218 and passim.
124. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 54.
125. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 23 (note 1).

126. Tunisia and Morocco had won their independence before de Gaulle proposed a Union of African Colonies under French protection (see Table 12.1). Other French colonies accepted membership of de Gaulle's 'French Community'. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 110 and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 30.
127. In September 1958, de Gaulle submitted the constitution of the Fifth French Republic to a popular referendum. It provided for the admission of French colonies into a 'French Community'.
128. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 265.
129. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 53 and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 30.
130. R. Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 111.
131. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 265,
132. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 53.
133. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 265
134. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 53, and C. R. Allen, Communist China and Africa [Washington D.C.: Political Sciences General, The American University 1969] [unpublished M.A. Thesis], pp. 96-97.
135. C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 96.
137. Peking Review 2 (13 October 1959): 41, p. 26. See also Table 12.1.
138. P. Richer, op.cit., p. 261. See also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 40.
139. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 40.
140. Ibidem. See also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 40.
141. See Chapter 12.1 of this work.
142. Expecting the failure of the radical government of Ibrahim, Ben Barka broke with the NIP (January 1959). In the same year Ben Barka formed (September) his own party, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). Until he was ^{kidnapped} by the joint French-Moroccan secret police (26 October 1967), Ben Barka played a major role in the African, Asian and Latin American movement against imperialism.
143. This was similar to Burundi's role in 1964. See Chapter 13.3.2.5 of this work.

144. Peking Review 1 (4 November 1958), p. 22.
145. In July 1959, a Chinese Muslim group visited Morocco. See Peking Review 2 (11 August 1959): 32, p. 21. Also, in the same year (18 November), Ahmed Belfrag, a former Moroccan Prime Minister, paid a visit to China. Belfrag was praised by Zhou En-lai for his anti-colonialism. See Peking Review 2 (24 November 1959): 47, p. 21.
146. The author had a prolonged conversation with an ex-FLN Commander (at the time of the meeting, a taxi driver) on the way from Wahran oran, in the Western region of Algeria, to Algiers: similar views were expressed by F. C. Schatten, Communism in Africa (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 198; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 28; W. A. C. Adie, 'Chinese Policy Towards Africa', in S. Hamrell (Ed.), The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa (Uppsala: the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964), p. 50; C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 82; and R. Lowenthal, 'China', in Z. Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 65.
147. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 30. See also I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 119.
148. Peking Review 2 (25 August 1959), p. 20
149. Peking Review 1 (21 October 1958): 34, p. 13; and 1 (4 November 1958): 36, p. 22.
150. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
151. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 38 and p. 89, and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 92.
152. See Map 11.1 of this work.
153. See Table 12.1 of this work.
154. Peking Review 1 (9 December 1958): 41, p. 16. See also Table 7.1 of this work.
155. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
156. After West Germany, India, Britain, Italy and Japan. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 192.
157. At the level of economic cooperation, it was reported in 1958 that China offered some aluminium technicians to the Sudan.
158. See R. Lowenthal, op.cit., p. 157. See also Chapter 13.3.2.6 of this work.
159. Al Mujahid (FLN's weekly journal) no. 39 (12 April 1959), p. 7.

160. The first war of liberation in Indo-China ended (7 May 1954) before the Bandung Conference. Unlike the Algerian war of liberation, the Indo-Chinese wars of liberation were, from the beginning, communist-led and communist-orientated.
161. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work.
For a brief but valuable analysis of Algeria's major contribution to liberation struggles in Africa, see, for example, R. A. Mortimer, 'The Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution', The Journal of Modern African Studies 8 (1970): 8, pp. 363-387.
162. Premier Chou En-lai's speech at banquet in honour of Premier Ferhat Abbas (29 September 1960), in The Chinese Resolutely Support the Just Struggle of the African People (a publication compiled by the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association), (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1961), p. 19.
163. Kayfa tcharraret Al Jazā'ir? [How Algeria was liberated?] a publication by Wizarat Al-Ḥam wa Thaqafa (Ministry for Information and Culture) [Algiers: Al Sharika Al Watanyā: Lil nashr wa. al daw 216] (SND), December 1979], p. 9.
164. Ismail Al Arabi, Al Muqāwama Al Jazā'iriya tahta Liwā' Al Amir Abdul Qadir (Algerian Resistance under the leadership of Al Amir Abdul Qadir) (Algiers: SND, 1982) p. 10
165. For English sources on the development of the Algerian National movement during the period 1830-1954, see, for example, A. Horne, op.cit., pp. 23-60; C. H. Moore, Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 1-132; A. Humbaraci, Algeria: a Revolution that Failed (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), pp. 1-31; W. B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968 (London: The MIT Press, 1969), pp. 1-148; J. Dunn, Modern Revolution: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 146-172.
166. Al Amir Abdul Qadir is honoured in independent Algeria by his portrait being used on Algerian paper currency.
167. Among other insurrections were the Matija Rebellion (near Algiers) (1830-2); Boumaâza's Resistance (1845-1947) in Wahran District (Oran) (1845-47); People's Resistance, under the leadership of Al Haj Ahmed Bay in Cansantina (Constantine) District (in the East) (1837-1848); Ibn Nasser's Revolt in El Aghu'at and Boughar (centre of Algeria) (1846-1875); the Revolt

of Al Zaatisha and Ziban in Biskra (towards the desert from the centre of Algeria) (1849-1850); the Revolt of Al Sharif Mohammed Abdullah (north-eastern part of the desert) (1815-1871); Lalla Fatima's Revolt (north-centre of Algeria) (1851-1871); the Revolt of Shuyūkh Al Zawia Al Rahimia in the Jārjara Mountains (north-central Algeria) (1856-1857); Revolts of Al Khanga and Biskra (1858-1859); the Revolt of Mohammed Ben B Ūknāsh in Al Hudna near M'Sila (central Algeria) (1860); Revolt of Awlad Sidi Al Sheikh (it spread from the east to the west of the country) (1864-1884); the Revolt of Ben Hamzas in Wahran District (1862-1867); Lazraq Bel Haj's Revolt (near Wahran) (1864); Revolt of Mohammed Tawmi Boushasha in north-east district (1870-1871); Revolt of Ibn Khaddoma in Ghalizan district (north-west) (1881); Revolts of Al Sabayhi in the centre and east of Algeria (1870); the Revolt of Ahmed Aidoune Beni Tlilan in Mililya, in the east of the country (1871); Casantina's Revolt (1871); Revolt of Wahat Al Umran, near Biskra (1871); the Revolt of Sheikh Bouāmama, in Wahran district (1881-1904); and, many other revolts which took place during the period 1914-1916 in different parts of the country.

168. See Ismail Al Arabi, op.cit., p. 44, Al Hashmi Būrayu, Adhikra Al miḡāwiyā - Liwāfat: Al Amir Abdul Qadir (The 100th Commemoration of the Death of Al Amir Abdul Qadir); Al Jā'ish (a monthly bulletin of the National Popular Army of Algiers - ANP) no. 231 (June 1983), pp. 66-71 and A. Horne, op.cit., pp. 30-31.
169. Kayfa Teharraret Al Jazair?, op.cit., p. 13.
170. Ibid., p. 16.
171. Among other political organizations and parties founded before 1954 were those of the conservative alliance (1900), the Elite Association (1907), the Reformist Party (1919); the Algerian Moslem Congress (1936); the Algerian Movement (1925); the Rally of Algerian-French Moslems (1938); the People's Union of Algeria (1939); the Liberal Party (1927); and the French Communist Party of Algiers (1924).
172. Kayfa Teharraret Al Jazair?, op.cit., p. 51.
173. E. O'Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 29.
174. Kayfa Teharraret Al Jazair?, op.cit., pp. 52-53.
175. Ibid., p. 57.
176. Prensa Latina, op.cit.
177. Kayfa Teharraret Al Jazair?, op.cit., p. 58.

178. A. Horne, op.cit., p. 25.
179. Kayfa tsharraret Al Jazair? op.cit., p. 59. According to Horne's interview with Bourguiba, President of Tunisia, the figure was more than 50,000 people. See A. Horne, op.cit., p. 27.
180. This incident represented the dénouement of a week of demonstrations and protests against French arrest of prominent Algerian leaders such as Ferhat Abbas and Saādān Ben Khalil. The 8 May was chosen because it was the day of German surrender and an open market day (Tuesday) in most Algerian towns.
181. These were Mohammed BŪ Diāf, Mohammed (known as Ahmed) Ben Bella, Bel Karem Drim, Mohammed Khayder, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Rabah Bitat, Al Arbi Ben Khalifa, Murad Didush and Mustafa Ben Bu 167d.
182. This night was particularly chosen because it was All Saints' Day. Rabah Bilat, member of the 'Club of Nine' (see note 181 above), and currently President of the National Popular Council of Algeria, 'Interview with Al Shaab' (official daily paper of the Algerian government) no. 6919 (15 January 1986), p. 12.
183. F. Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1967), p. 23.
184. Galān Fatih November 1954 (The Manifesto of 1st November 1954) [a document from Moudiriāt El Bahth (Direction of Documentation and Research)] [El Jezair (Algiers): Wizaret El Moujehidine (Ministry of ex-El Moujehidine), 1983]
185. See Map 12.2.
186. See Chapter 12.3.1.1 of this work.
187. Interestingly enough, there was vehement competition among the peasants themselves to join ^{the}ALN, ^{the}military arm of ^{the}FLN. One of the conditions for an Algerian to be an ALN MU jahid (a faithful soldier) was to participate in operations against the military colonialists in order to prove his genuineness and readiness to join ^{the}FLN's army. As the war progressed, the French army was mostly concentrated where FLN fighters were believed to be hiding, there used to be 2 or 3 Algerians vying with each other to kill a French soldier, in order that a place might be guaranteed him in ^{the}FLN as a true MU jahid. - More interestingly still, some people went even further by attempting to bribe or use mediation or personal contacts with leading figures of FLN to allow them to join ALN.

188. F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1983), pp. 47-48.
189. The Congress took place in the Valley of Al SUMām (see Wilaya 3 in Map 12.2), a strategic place isolated from the colonial authorities. By the time this congress took place, ALN had grown in strength from 450 (1 November 1954) to 10,570 (August 1956), whilst the strength of FLN militants (Al MUjāhidin) had reached the figure 87,044. See Māhala Al SUMām (Report of Al SUMām) [a document from Mudīriyya Al Bahth wa al-Bawthiq (Direction of Documentation and Research)] [Al Jazair (Algiers): Wizarat Al MUjāhidin (Ministry of ex-Al MUjāhidin), 1983], p. 3.
190. Al MUjāhid no. 9 (20 August 1957), p. 1.
191. Kayfa tharraret Al Jazair?, op.cit., p. 73.
192. Hsinhua News Agency no. 59 (30 December 1957), p. 26.
193. Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, (a collection of documents, speeches and press interviews from the visits of Chinese leaders to thirteen African and Asian countries) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 67.
194. New China News Agency, cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 25.
195. Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 66.
196. cited in People's China (1 July 1956), p. 40.
197. The following analysis is based on conversations and interviews with Algerian ex-El Moujehidin and observers.
198. Author's conversation with Tāhir Shbīra, an FLN journalist (21 November 1983). Similar views were expressed by academics in the Institute of Political Studies, University of Algiers.
199. In an interview with the author in Algiers (21 November 1983). A similar view was expressed (26 November 1983) by Youcef Ben Khadda, former President of PGRA.
200. Al MUjāhid, Al Siyāsa Al Rūsiyya wa Harb Al Jazair (Russian Policy and the Algerian War) no. 19 (1 March 1958), p. 4.
201. See, for example, B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 27; and W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., pp. 196-197.
202. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work.

203. 'Unite under Lenin's revolutionary banner', Peking Review 3 (26 April 1960): 17, cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 100.
204. Ibidem.
205. Author's interview with a former ALN commander (November 1983).
206. As quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 26. Hutchison did not cite the commentator's name. More of Soviet attitude towards Algerian war is discussed in Chapters 13.3.1.3.2 and 13.3.1.3.3 of this work.
207. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work.
208. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 72.
209. It seems likely that the Chinese press and broadcasting would have covered the news of the day of the instigation of the Algerian war (1 November 1954). Yet the Arabic, the French and the English sources used in this thesis date the Chinese references to the Algerian war to the Bandung Conference and after.
210. Chou En-lai, 'Speech at the Afro-Asian Conference' (19 April 1955), op.cit., p. 91.
211. Al Mujāhid no. 15 (1 January 1958), p. 5.
212. Ibid.
213. cited in A. Horne, op.cit., p. 131.
214. 'The Joint Communique of the Afro-Asian Conference', Supplement to People's China (16 May 1955), p. 5.
215. A. Horne, op.cit., p. 131.
216. This phrase was stated in 'The Joint Communique of the Afro-Asian Conference', Section D, 'Problems of Dependent Peoples' no. 1. It read as follows:

The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation [and agreed] ... in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end. [emphasis added]

- See the Supplement to People's China (16 May 1955), p. 5.
217. People's China (16 June 1955) [Supplement], p. 3.
218. For a contrary view that China ignores the Algerian question during this period - see G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 74.
219. See Chapter 13.2.1.1.1 of this work. During the '50s, Cairo was a sort of capital for liberation movements throughout the continent just as Accra and Dar es Salaam became havens of radical nationalist movements in subsequent decades.
220. cited in Koŷfa Taharraret Al Jazair?. op.cit., p. 97.
221. See Chapter 10 of this work.
222. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 75.
223. UGTA was established by FLN on 26 February 1956.
224. cited in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 78.
225. Ibid., p. 78
226. Ibidem., see also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 38. At the end of independence, Mohammed Khemisti was appointed Foreign Minister.
227. See I. Fedda, op.cit., pp. 119-120. See also A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 27.
228. See, for example, I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 119.
229. See Introduction of this work.
230. cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., pp. 74-75.
231. W. Bartke, China's Economic Aid (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1975), pp. 8-9 (Table 1). See also W. A. C. Adie, 'Chinese Policy Towards Africa', op.cit., p. 51. Adie's figure is given in Yuan (Yuan 500,000).
232. Author's interview with Ben Khedda, former President of PGRA (26 November 1983).
233. Peking Review 1 (8 April 1958): 6, p. 21.
234. G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., pp. 83-84.
235. cited in Peking Review 1 (April 1958): 5, p. 20.

236. See, for example, C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', in A. M. Halpern Policies Toward China: Views from Six Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 392; C. Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-1967 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 2; and A. D. Barnett, China Policy: Old Problems and New Challenges (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), passim.
237. Africa provided the base of AAPSO (founded in January 1956) because its headquarters have always been in Cairo. Also, during the first decade of its existence, large parts of Africa were still in the grip of colonial rule.
238. This is markedly evident in the cases of China's relations with progressive states in Africa.
239. I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 44; C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 12; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 38.
240. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 38.
241. See Chapters 5 and 6 of this work.
242. cited in Hsinhua News Agency p. 59 (27 December 1957), p. 17.
243. Not all the resolutions adopted by the conference were satisfactory as far as China was concerned. Thus, for example, confidence expressed by the conference in the United Nations as an agency capable of maintaining peace and human rights was undoubtedly not shared by China. For the text of the resolutions see Full text of Resolutions adopted at the Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo, December 26th, 1957 to January 1st, 1958 [unpublished pamphlet in School of Oriental and African Studies (21 January 1958) pam. Misc. 176279].
244. See Chapters of this work.
245. Full Text of the Resolutions Adopted at the Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo, op.cit., p. 1.
246. The People's Daily (18 April 1961), cited in Peking Review 4 (21 April 1961): 16, p. 11.
247. Full Text of the Resolutions Adopted at the Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo, op.cit., p. 21.
248. Ibid., passim. See also C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 14.
249. cited in C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 14.

250. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 40.
251. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 38.
252. F. C. Schatten, op.cit., pp. 274-275.
253. Later during the same year Youcef As-Sibai was among honoured guests of the Tenth Anniversary of PRC in Peking (1 October 1958), see B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 47.
254. R. Lowenthal, op.cit., pp. 153-154.
255. C. Neuhauser, op.cit., notes 19 and 21. (Notes to Chapter 11, p. 84.)
256. Ibid., p. 14.
257. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 46 note 4.

CHAPTER 13

SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS: THE SECOND PHASE (1959-66) OF INTENSIVE INTERACTION

When Zhou Enlai in Mogadiscio (Somalia) (February 1964) claimed that "revolutionary prospects" were "excellent throughout the African continent", it was the prospects of revolutionary liberation rather than socialist revolutionary prospects that he had in mind. In other words, China's ideological assessment of the situation in Africa was not based on the existence of ripe conditions for socialist revolution, rather it was based on the existence of ripe conditions for national liberation struggle in the continent.

...the main content of what we refer to as a revolutionary situation in Africa is that African peoples are demanding complete destruction of colonial rule and through elimination of the colonial forces are striving for complete independence of all African countries. At present a number of African countries are waging a struggle to achieve independence and to win initial victories in the national democratic revolution. The people of many African countries that have won independence are pushing revolution forward, with the aim of carrying through the national democratic revolution and building their countries.²

China's ideological assessment of Africa and its revolutionary optimism were based on such developments in the continent as the victory of the anti-imperialist war in the Suez (1956), the successful Algerian war of liberation (1962), the liberation struggles in the

Cameroon (from 1960 onwards), the crisis in the Congo(L) (1960-65), the decision of national independence movements in the Portuguese colonies and in southern Africa to opt for armed struggle as the correct method for liberation (from 1960 onwards), the Zanzibar revolution (1964), and, finally, the policies and actions adopted by the militant independent African countries against the former colonial powers and imperialism as a whole. A new phase in Sino-African relations may be said to have begun in 1959.

The Egyptian people thwarted the Anglo-French armed oppression and recovered their Suez Canal. The Algerian people are valiantly fighting on. The Congolese people are pressing forward with their just struggle. All Africa, from Capetown to the Mediterranean coasts, from Zambia to Gambia, are lit with the flames of national liberation struggles. The final nails are being driven into the coffin of colonialism.^a


This period (1959-66) constituted the most intensive and active phase in the history of Sino-African interaction. It formed the third phase of China's role in international relations as a whole and the second with special reference to Africa.

Sino-African relations during this period were characterised by the following ^{major} five factors:

1. For the first time in its history, during this period Africa appeared to exercise an important impact on international relations. Between January 1960 and December 1965, 29 African countries became independent (in 1960 alone, 16 of these gained their independence)

MAP 13.1

AFRICA UNDER COLONIALISM (AS AT 1961)



1961

Source: "Political Map of Africa Changes Fast", Peking Review 5 (5 January 1962): 1, p. 15.

and were recognised by the UN. Thus, in a quantitative sense, they became an important force in the decision-making of the UN. This change in the African international scene was important for China in the diplomatic sphere of its role in international relations.

By 1965, more African countries recognised PRC and not Taiwan. They repeatedly urged the UN to restore China's seat in the organisation. At the same time, most African countries subscribed to the idea of a non-aligned foreign policy. Thus, African countries also developed into a major force in the non-aligned movement. At the First Summit Conference on Non-alignment (Belgrade: September 1961), 11 African countries took part as full members. At the second Non-aligned Summit (Cairo: October 1964), the number of African countries increased to 19.

Another important development during this period contributed to the shaping of the international role of African countries. For the first time, they had succeeded in forming an Africa-wide inter-governmental organisation, the OAU (May 1963), with a long term political, social and economic agenda. This organisation was meant to symbolise African unity and African goals for independence and liberation. Towards this end, a Liberation Committee was set up in order to provide support for African liberation movements.⁴

ii A number of national independence movements in Africa transformed themselves into national liberation movements adopting armed struggle against the forces of imperialism and its local allies (rather than negotiation with the

colonial power) as their general strategy. This development met with the approval of China.

iii. It was only during this period that China's insistence on armed struggle was widely accepted in those parts of Africa which were still under colonial rule. China also found ways of expressing its views which reflected an awareness of how radical African countries thought about problems of national liberation. It was also the case that only during this period did China find the leaders of countries such as Guinea, Algeria, Ghana and Tanzania identifying themselves with its international stance that the imperialist powers should be resisted and not placated.

iv. It was only during this period that China found ways of extending its influence in Northern Africa to include Sub-Saharan Africa;⁶ and

v. finally, it was only during this period that China put into practice its rejection of the Soviet Union's policy of *Détente*.⁶ Thus, the Sino-Soviet dispute became an influential factor in China's policy towards Africa.

13.1. Sino-Soviet Dispute and National Liberation Movements.

The centre of the struggle against colonialism is Africa; the centre of the battle between East and West for the intermediate zone is in Africa; hence, Africa has become the focus of contemporary world problems.⁷

If China's alliance with the Soviet Union proved to be both economically undesirable for China's ambitions for a rapid development of socialism and militarily unreliable for China's security and territorial integrity internally, internationally the alliance proved to be a disappointment to China's ideological objectives of forging a consolidated united front of global dimensions against the imperialist powers led by the United States. Instead of joining China in such a task, the Soviet Union was actively engaged in preparing the ground for *Détente* with imperialism.

During this period (and especially after the Belgrade Conference of 1961), the Western powers found themselves in a favourable position even among the leading non-aligned countries such as India and the UAR, which had begun to adopt an increasingly moderate attitude to the forces of colonialism and imperialism. In India's case, it might be said that its international policy and objectives were consonant with the aims pursued by the imperialist powers in their relation with the non-aligned world, especially during the period when Kennedy activated the policy of the American Administration towards the Third World countries. In fact, India reversed its earlier policy (following the Pancha Shila agreement) on the Tibet question by giving support to Tibetan separatists in 1959.

The leading founders of the Bandung Conference such as India and Egypt (joined by Yugoslavia) were engaged in preparing the ground for moderating their approach to the

forces of colonialism and imperialism. Such a line culminated in the First Non-aligned Countries Summit Meeting in Belgrade (September 1961).

By the end of the '50s, the Soviet Union was no longer prepared to accept China's ideological opposition to peaceful ^{coexistence}. Nor were the leading co-founders of the Bandung Conference willing to push the Bandung spirit for positive action against colonialism and imperialism further along a more radical direction as suggested by leaders such as Sukarno.

China continued to maintain its uncompromising line on the importance of continuous armed struggle against imperialism in opposition to the policy of *Détente* pursued by the Soviet Union, the policy of physical containment of China and other liberation forces pursued by the United States, and the generally favourable orientation towards the forces of imperialism of the dominant conservative elements within the non-aligned movement. The Third World as a whole and Africa in particular,^a directly or indirectly ruled by the colonialist and imperialist powers, was the area in which China believed that there was a golden opportunity for the forces of national liberation to confront the forces of colonialism and imperialism.

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TABLE 13.1.

CHINA AND AFRICA (1955-1986): IDEOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY OF UNITED FRONT¹

UNITED FRONT FROM BELOW
OR
PEOPLE TO PEOPLE RELATIONS

Phase 1: 1955-59

Anti-State Policy ²	National Independence and National Liberation Movements	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO)
UAR ³ (1959): China was opposed to Nasser's anti-communist campaign	Algeria	A major vehicle for China's early approach to Africa

Phase 2: 1959-66

Anti-State Policy	National Independence and National Liberation Movements	AAPSO
Cameroon The Congo Niger Zanzibar	Algeria (until 1962) Angola Guinea (B) and Cape Verde Mozambique Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) Azania (South Africa)	Became a major link for promoting Afro-Asian solidarity against Imperialism

Phase 3: 1966-69

Anti-State Policy	National Independence and National Liberation Movements	AAPSO
Biafra The Congo/Zaire	Angola Guinea (B) and Cape Verde Mozambique Zimbabwe Azania Namibia	China loses interest in AAPSO because of its dispute with the Soviet Union.

UNITED FRONT FROM ABOVE
OR
STATE TO STATE RELATIONS

Phase 1: 1955-59

'Progressive' States: Active and positive contributors to the Anti-Imperialist Front and National Liberation struggles	'Non-progressive' States: useful for access to liberation forces	'Non-progressive' States: opening up of formal relations against the wishes of western powers
UAR Egypt Guinea	Morocco (access to FLN of Algeria)	Morocco (pro-western) The Sudan ('moderate')

Phase 2: 1959-66

Bandung II: Afro-Asian Solidarity and Containment of Imperialism	'Progressive' States: Active and positive contributors to the Anti-Imperialist Front and National Liberation struggles; China for Armed struggles and against the Soviet Union's policy of <i>Détente</i>	'Non-progressive' States: useful for access to liberation forces	'Non-progressive' States: formal diplomatic relations and mobilization for Afro-Asian solidarity
	Egypt Algeria (1962 onwards) Guinea (pro-China) Mali (pro-China) Ghana (1960 onwards) The Congo (B) (1964 onwards) Tanzania (subsequent to the Zanzibar revolution which helped radicalise it and won the approval of China) Uganda	Morocco: access for FLN of Algeria (until 1962) Burundi: access for revolutionary forces at the Congo (L)/Zaire Zambia: access for liberation forces in Southern Africa	Morocco (pro-western) Tunisia (pro-western) Benin (Dahomey) Central African Republic (CAR) (pro-western) Burundi ('moderate') The Sudan (pro-western) Somali ('moderate') Kenya (pro-western) Malawi (pro-western) Zambia ('moderate')

Phase 3: 1966-69 [GPCR]

'Progressive' States	'Non-progressive' States: useful for access to liberation forces	'Non-progressive' States: formal diplomatic relations
Egypt Algeria Mali Guinea Ghana The Congo (B) Tanzania	Zambia ('moderate')	Mauritania ('moderate') Somalia ('moderate')

National Liberation Movements	AAPSO
Guinea (B) and Cape Verde (until 1975) Angola Mozambique (until 1975) Zimbabwe Azania Namibia	Because of China's obsession with the Soviet Union it tended to ignore this avenue of political influence.

Phase 5: 1976-86

National Liberation Movements
Western Sahara People's Republic (Saharawi Republic) Zimbabwe Azania Namibia

- NOTES: 1. This table is a summary based on our periodisation and characterisation of Sino-African relations discussed in Part III.
2. See Chapter 13.2.3.
3. Egypt before 1958 and (effectively) after 1962; see Chapter 12 (Note 22).
4. The major objective of Zhou Enlai's tour of Africa (1963-64) was to mobilise both states and people's organisations for a militant Afro-Asian solidarity; see Chapter 13.3.3.

'Progressive' States: Members of the Anti-Imperialist Front and active contributors to National Liberation Movements	'Non-progressive' States: Economic cooperation and against the hegemonism of both superpowers
Algeria Mali Guinea The Sudan Benin The Congo (B) Somalia Tanzania (pro-China) Zambia: viewed by China as 'progressive', not because of its politically progressive character, but for its importance as a vital strategic base for national liberation forces in the region. China and Tanzania on the one hand, and the Tan Zam railway on the other, contributed to Zambia becoming a 'progressive' state?	Egypt (from 1970 onwards) (anti-Soviet) Tunisia (pro-western) Chad (pro-western) Niger ('moderate') Mauritania ('moderate') Senegal (pro-western) Sierra Leone (pro-western) Gambia (pro-western) Burkina Faso (pro-western) Togo (pro-western) Ghana (anti-Soviet & pro-western) Nigeria ('moderate') Cameroon (pro-western) Equatorial Guinea Gabon Zaire (anti-Soviet) Rwanda (pro-western) Burundi Uganda (1971 onwards) (anti-Soviet 1975 onwards) Ethiopia (until 1974) (anti-Soviet & pro-western) Botswana (pro-western) Mauritius (pro-western)

Phase 5: 1976-86

'Progressive' States: stability and economic cooperation, and active support for national liberation movements	'Non-progressive' States: Stability, economic cooperation and opposition to hegemonism
Algeria Libya Mali Guinea Cape Verde Guinea-Bissau Benin Sao Tome The Congo (B) Burundi Rwanda Somalia and Ethiopia (Horn of Africa) Angola Tanzania Mozambique Seychelles Madagascar	Egypt (pro-western & anti-Soviet) Tunisia (pro-western) Morocco (pro-western) Chad (pro-western) Niger ('moderate') Mauritania ('moderate') Senegal ('moderate') Gambia (pro-western) Sierra Leone (pro-western) Liberia ('moderate') Ivory Coast Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) ('moderate') Ghana Togo (pro-western) Nigeria ('moderate') Cameroon Equatorial Guinea (pro-western) CAR (pro-western) Gabon (pro-western) Zaire (pro-western & anti-Soviet) The Sudan (pro-western & anti-Soviet) Djibouti ('moderate') Uganda ('moderate') Kenya (pro-western) Zambia ('moderate') Botswana ('moderate') Lesotho (pro-western) Comoros (pro-western) Mauritius (pro-western)

5. See Chapter 16.1.1.10.
6. See Chapter 16.1.1.11.
7. See Chapter 16.1.2.13.

- 13.2. People-to-People Relations or 'United Front From Below'.
- 13.2.1. Relations Between China and National Liberation Movements
- 13.2.1.1. China and the Final Stage of the Algerian War of Liberation (1958-62).

Between September 1958 [following the proclamation of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (PGRA)], and July 1962 (when Algeria became independent), three major inter-related developments in the Algerian war of liberation leading to the second and final stage of the Algerian struggle contributed to a strengthening of the Sino-Algerian relationship.

- i. The proclamation of PGRA (19 September 1958) signified that FLN's struggle for liberation had become irreversible and that negotiations with the French within the framework of a 'French Federal State' or '*Algérie Française*' was no longer possible. Such a transformation of the Algerian national liberation struggle occurred as a response to France's implacable determination to liquidate the liberation fighters (*Al Mujahidin*) physically. By 1959, the FLN liberation fighters found themselves facing a well-equipped French force consisting of 800,000⁹ soldiers, reinforced by a full NATO unit (the 'Division Lorraine'), armoured vehicles of every description, and radar detection equipment.¹⁰ Most of the NATO military equipment was supplied by the United States, its leader.¹¹

...we have not forgotten that the United States stands at the head of

NATO. Facts show who are our sincere friends and who are our enemies, we shall never forget this.¹²

As in the case of Japanese imperialism in China during the late '30s,¹³ the French colonialists destroyed or burned houses used or suspected of being used by FLN fighters and massacred or imprisoned their inhabitants. Electric fences were built along the Algerian-Tunisian border (Morice Line) in order to stop the infiltration of guerrilla forces trained and based in Tunisia. More than 280,000 Algerians were forced to leave the country and live in Tunisia and Morocco. In 1958 alone, more than 200,000 people were imprisoned or sent to internment camps.¹⁴

However, neither the powerful French Army which massacred thousands of Algerian people nor de Gaulle's proposal (16 September 1959) of 'a self-determination' undermined FLN's determination to lead the Algerian people to complete liberation (5 July 1962). The liberation war was won at the cost of 1½ million Algerian lives and ended in another great and humiliating defeat (after Dien Bien Phu) to French colonialism.

The FLN's success in Algeria "opened the gates"¹⁵ for other African anti-imperialist forces and movements to follow suit. Not only revolutionary uprisings in the Congo (1960-65) Cameroun (1960-65) and Zanzibar (1964) but also the transformation of national independence movements in the Portuguese colonies and in southern Africa were inspired by the victory of FLN in Algeria.

If the people of Algeria went through all the annihilation and torture at the hands of the French and succeeded, we

shall also go through it, unless we are made of a different material.'⁶

China had no doubt that:

The path to which they (the Algerians) adhere and their indomitable spirit are of extremely great significance to the development of national liberation movements in Africa.'⁷

It is interesting to note that some observers appeared to believe that FLN's success was due more to divisions within France over the Algerian question and the costly nature of the war, than to the correctness of the strategy adopted by the liberation forces (i.e. armed struggle through people's war and guerrilla warfare exercised in the countryside and the mountains).

Thus, for example, J. Dunn has argued

The Algerian revolution was successful, in so far as it was at all, ^{not} because of the extent of its military triumph - which even after seven and a half years of fighting was exiguous, but because of the internal divisions of France and the vast cost to the metropolitan country which the struggle had meant, simply made its continuation intolerable.'⁸

He failed to consider that weakening France economically and financially on the one hand, and creating contradictions within the French people on the other, constituted a major part of FLN strategy right from the beginning.'⁹

- ii. The second development of the Algerian war during the period 1958-62 related to the national liberation struggle acquiring a more and more systematic and revolutionary

character not only in the military field but also in the economic and social fields of reconstruction of Algeria after liberation. It was only during this period that one could characterise the Algerian war of liberation as a 'revolution' in the socio-economic context.

Influenced by the revolutionary spirit²⁰ of the masses which was developed in the battlefield, and guided by the strong voices of radical leaders such as Ben Bella and Boumedienne, the FLN leadership during this period envisaged a socialist future for Algeria. The social content of the Algerian revolution was put forward for the first time in formal terms by the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) which adopted the "Tripoli Programme"²¹ (Tripoli, July 1962).

Armed struggle through people's war had thus given rise to a revolutionary situation, which rejected not only the political and administrative institutions of the colonial era, but also (and more importantly) the social, cultural and economic structures of capitalism. FRELIMO²² of Mozambique and MPLA²³ of Angola were other obvious instances of similar kinds of strategy. A major distinction thus arises in practice in former colonies between independence movements and national liberation movements. Whether or not the revolutionary spirit created through people's wars was subsequently channelled into the task of socialist construction is a separate question which deserves careful consideration in its own right. But the two issues of the character of a national liberation movement itself on the one hand, and on the other of how the society actually

develops after liberation should not be conflated.

- iii. The third development related to the fact that the war of national liberation in Algeria reached its decisive and successful phase (1958-1962) at a time when the Sino-Soviet ideological differences had already become all but irreconcilable. Algerian victory certainly contributed much to Chinese insistence that armed struggle for liberation, as opposed to the Soviet campaign for a conciliatory policy towards the colonialist and imperialist powers, was the way of the future.

Against the background of the three developments outlined above, that is, the proclamation of ^{the} PGRA, the transformation of the struggle of Algerian liberation into a wider revolutionary confrontation between the two sides and the increasingly sharp ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and China - the relations between China and Algeria (FLN) became closer and closer until they reached a point at which the two sides found themselves in some sort of ideological partnership with one another in most areas of international affairs, especially those linked to independence and liberation.

Unlike the Soviet Union, which took more than three years (October 1960)²⁴ to recognise ^{the} PGRA, China's recognition of the Algerian government came only three days (22 September 1958)²⁵ after it came into existence (19 September 1958). Unlike the Soviet Union which was

clearly afraid that France might in fact carry out its threat of breaking off diplomatic relations with any country which recognised PGRA,²⁶ China viewed the birth of the Algerian Provisional Government as a major development that would:

exert a tremendous influence on the national independence movement of African people. The armed struggle of the Algerian people has always been a source of great inspiration to the other African peoples under the yoke of colonialism.²⁷

At the same time, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai sent congratulatory messages to Ferhat Abbas, President of PGRA, through China's Ambassador in UAR. In his message, Mao wrote as follows:

On behalf of our country and the entire Chinese people...I warmly congratulate you on the establishment of the Provisional Government of Algeria. May the heroic Algerian people win more brilliant and still greater victories in the struggle for national independence against colonialism.²⁸

Abbas responded to China's recognition by expressing his deep appreciation of Chinese solidarity with the Algerian revolution.

...we consider the recognition of the Provisional Government by the six hundred million Chinese people a great encouragement and we believe that it is only the beginning of friendly co-operation between the two countries.²⁹

Chinese recognition of the PGRA was described by Ait Sh aâlal, Chairman of the *Union Générale des étudiants*

Musulmans Algériens (UGEMA), who was in China at that time, as a proof that

the Chinese government is always on the side of the just people and against imperialism and colonialism.²⁰

The birth of PGRA not only intensified the militant stance of non-reconciliation with imperialist forces to which both China and Algeria subscribed, but also contributed to a strengthening of Sino-Algerian relations in the diplomatic sphere. Both the PRC and the PGRA governments were faced with the problem of the refusal by the United Nations to recognise them as sovereign members of that body. In the face of international isolation, China and Algeria identified with each other.

Countries which refused to recognise the PGRA, including the Soviet Union, were sharply criticised by China. Two days after the proclamation of the independent Algerian Government, the People's Daily (21 September 1958) wrote as follows:

Let those colonialist overlords cling to their ostrich policy of 'non-recognition'. Their hue and cry is but groaning despair in the face of surging tide of the national independence movement.

The Chinese people know this policy of 'non-recognition' by heart. Throughout the nine years since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic, the United States and some of its partners have blindly refused to recognise it...What loss does this bring to the Chinese people? None whatsoever...This policy of 'non-recognition' of France and its colonialist partners cannot possibly halt the forward pace of the Algerian people towards victory.

What is more, the position taken by the colonial powers...will help the Algerian people see even more clearly who are their friends and who are their enemies. In the past...the United States paid lip-service to its 'friendship' for the Algerian people. Now this mask of hypocrisy is torn off. Compared with the excitement and rejoicing...in the Asian and African countries and of the progressive forces in every corner of the world, the 'non-recognition' of the colonial powers is trifling and unimportant. 3'

China's criticism of Soviet non-recognition of ^{the} APGRA was criticised in the above statement as the 'ostrich policy of non-recognition', which was aimed not only at the colonialist and imperialism powers but also at any other force or country withholding recognition from the new Algerian government.

India, as a leading force in the Afro-Asian movement, was also one of the targets of China's criticism of countries which had failed to recognise the Algerian government. India not only refused to recognise the Algerian government, but also sought to exclude it from Afro-Asian meetings. Nehru's conciliatory policy towards the colonial powers was in sharp contrast to ^{the} FLN's use of force in order to secure the liberation of Algeria.

At the preparatory meeting for the First Non-Aligned Conference (scheduled to take place in Belgrade in September 1961), which was held in Cairo (June 1961), India took the lead in a minority group which was opposed to the admission of ^{the} APGRA and of Gizenga's government in Stanleyville. India's position was influenced by Nehru's conviction that: 'The enemy was no longer colonialism, but

the Cold War'.³² However, India and its followers failed to prevent the Algerian and Stanleyville governments attending the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned Summit.³³

Less than three months (7 December 1958) after its birth (19 September), a PGRA delegation led by Youcef Ben Khedda, Minister of Social Affairs, paid a three-week visit to China at the invitation of the PRC government. The delegation was given an extremely warm and tumultuous welcome. Ben Khedda was greeted as a hero and given a reception by the Chinese which could only have been given to a major statesman.³⁴ The Chinese press and media greeted the visit of the Algerian government's delegation as the biggest event of the day.³⁵ At a banquet held in honour of the Algerian delegation (7 December 1958), Chen Yi, China's Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterated its unequivocal support for Algeria's inevitable victory, and its condemnation of France, and the United States, France's major ally.

Ever since the Algerian people began their armed uprising against French colonial rule, the Chinese people have looked on the Algerian people's struggles and victories as their own. Because of their own experience in the protracted struggle against imperialism, the Chinese people are utterly convinced that, no matter how tortuous the progress of that struggle, the Algerian people, who have raised the banner of national liberation, will surely triumph.

The birth of the Republic of Algeria is another sign of the new stage of the victorious development of the national independence movement in Africa. Although the French colonialists have mobilised several

hundred thousand colonial troops armed with modern equipment, and although the United States imperialists have given all-out support to France in its aggression against Algeria, the victorious struggle of the Algerian people proves that a people which has stood up to fight imperialism resolutely is invincible.³⁶

At the end of the Algerian delegation's visit the PGRA and PRC governments issued a joint communiqué (27 December 1958) stressing their

United stance towards the liberation of the Afro-Asian territories and their common approach to international issues as a whole.³⁷

This was the first joint communiqué issued by ^{the} PRGA with a foreign country.³⁸ During its visit to China the PGRA delegation was given arms worth 2 million French francs.³⁹ Ben Khedda, the head of the PRGA delegation to China on this occasion who later (27 August 1961) became President of ^{the} PRGA, summarised the experience of his visit in an interview given to this author (Algiers, 26 November 1983) in the following words:

We deeply appreciated the Chinese not only for their material support, but also, and more importantly, for their moral encouragement and campaign for support for our war and government. In addition exchanges of views and listening to their experience of a people's war were highly beneficial for our peoples war and guerrilla warfare.⁴⁰

In March 1959 another Algerian delegation led by Omar Oussedik (one of the State Secretaries of PGRA) ^{the} paid

a visit to China. The aim of the visit was to arrange the transfer of military and financial aid to ^{the} FLN in the Algerian war of national liberation.⁴¹ During this visit, the Algerian delegation attended the 'Support Algeria Week' (13-20 March 1959) organised by the Chinese authorities.⁴² According to AL MUJAHID, FLN's weekly organ, the purpose of this visit was

to learn from the Chinese leaders and people and to study their experience of a long peoples war against colonialism and reactionism.⁴³

The Algerian delegation was received by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Marshal Chen Yi.⁴⁴ China undertook to provide support for FLN forces in the form of increased military aid and medical staff.⁴⁵ Financial aid at an estimated \$12 million was also promised.⁴⁶ In September 1959, another Algerian delegation visited China through which FLN was promised more support in the form of automatic weapons, rifles and infantry equipment.⁴⁷

At the 14th session of the UN General Assembly (September-December 1959), the United States which claimed to be the 'Champion of Freedom', declared unequivocal support for French colonialism which it was prepared to support not only militarily and financially but also diplomatically.⁴⁸ At this session, the United States not only voted in favour of its ally (France), but also took the lead in a campaign against the Algerian issue being discussed in the forum of the General Assembly. Thus, in the United States, both Algeria and China were faced with

a common enemy not only militarily (as evidenced in the threat posed by the United States to Algeria through NATO, and to China through the 7th Fleet), but also diplomatically by blocking the discussion in the General Assembly of the Algerian issue and the admission of China to the UN. On this American position, Al Mujāhid, the FLN weekly journal, under the title 'We will not forget America' wrote as follows:

This American act did not puzzle us, nor did we want the so-called 'Champion of Freedom' to have the honour of having its name on the list of the defendants of liberation. The United States stance did not surprise us because it is huge arms and military supplies from the United States that have been behind the massive massacres of Algerian people and the destruction of their houses. What angered us was United States pressure on other countries to vote against us.⁴⁹

As the liberation war progressed and the guerrilla forces engaged in a 'fiercest struggle'⁵⁰ against French colonialism backed by NATO, China's moral and material support was highly valued by Algerians. China became the most reliable ally in the Algerian struggle. Sino-Algerian relations during this period were characterised by feelings of deep friendship and a sense of common purpose. The ties between Algeria and China were so strong that even Egypt could not undermine them. The close ties forged between China and FLN thus played a notable part in the Algerian struggle leading to the proclamation of the PGRA.

According to Ben Khedda,⁵¹ one of the major reasons⁵² for transferring the headquarters of ^{the} NPGRA from Cairo to Tunis lay in the fact that the Algerians refused to subject themselves to Nasser's foreign policy orientation in general and especially to the imperatives underlying Egypt's policy towards China.⁵³ Despite the suspicions which communists entertained against Bourguiba,⁵⁴ the President of Tunisia, Algerians saw no obstacle in the way of conducting foreign policy on the basis of alignment with anti-imperialist forces and solidarity with those communist forces which were prepared to support the Algerian cause and the methods adopted by FLN to achieve liberation through armed struggle.

When the Algerian struggle reached its decisive stage (i.e. from 1958 onwards), the Soviet Union was actively engaged in pushing forward its policy of accommodation with the West. At the same time, the leading champions of non-alignment such as India, Egypt and Yugoslavia departed from the Bandung spirit and had become more and more active in their campaign to appease rather than oppose colonialism and imperialism. Like China, Algeria identified itself with those who opposed the policy of compromise towards colonialist and imperialist forces which the Soviet Union, the supposed leader of the anti-imperialist front, vigorously espoused. The Soviet Union was reminded by AL MUJĀHĪD (30 October 1958) that it was pursuing a friendly approach towards France at the expense of the Algerian struggle. The Soviet Union, AL MUJĀHĪD argued,

must not forget that in Algeria there were hundreds of its people dying every day at the hands of French indiscriminate massacre and facing the most brutal torture and destruction.⁵⁵

The FLN made it clear that it was opposed to the Soviet policy of peaceful ^{coexistence} and supported China's uncompromising line on imperialism and Khrushchev's claim (31 October 1959) that

[t]he recent proposal of General de Gaulle for a solution of the Algerian question on the basis of self-determination and a peoples referendum in Algeria can play an important role...⁵⁶

was roundly rejected by ^{the} FLN. Khrushchev failed to realise that France's approach to the Soviet Union was dictated by its strategy of isolating ^{the} FLN internationally and obtaining support to defeat the Algerian liberation fighters. Friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the nominal leader of anti-imperialist forces, would well serve the French interests. Khrushchev was far more interested, in Deutscher's words, in playing 'de Gaulle against Eisenhower than [in] using Abbas against de Gaulle'⁵⁷. For Khrushchev:

To side with Abbas against de Gaulle was in Khrushchev's eyes, tantamount to driving de Gaulle into Eisenhower's arms.⁵⁸

Khrushchev attempted to justify his rather ambiguous position with the following assertion:

In this area of the great retreat of imperialism, when so many colonial peoples are obtaining independence, de Gaulle will have to honour his promise

of self-determination for Algeria. In any case, the Algerian conflict must not be used to estrange Gaullist France from the communist bloc and to cement the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance.⁵⁹

The Soviet Union's real convictions were however based on the fact that the Algerian struggle contributed to an undermining not only of its *Détente* objectives in general, but also of its relations with France in particular.

Soviet failure to give direct military assistance to the Algerian, Congolese and Angolan progressives is revealing of Khrushchev's calculus of roles and gains.⁶⁰

Ironically, Khrushchev viewed the war of national liberation in Algeria as 'a tiny spark' that 'can cause a world conflagration'⁶¹ and thus 'he will work hard...to put out the sparks that may set off the flames of war'.⁶²

[Khrushchev] conveniently failed to distinguish between just wars of national liberation as in Africa and unjust wars initiated by imperialism.⁶³

Whilst France was thus well placed to exploit the Soviet Union's self-made dilemma, the United States stepped up pressure against China by provoking a fresh crisis in Quemoy and Matsu islands, off China's coast (August-October 1958). Within a few years, the United States was to intervene directly in Vietnam (1963-5) following the conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) (April 1963).⁶⁴

In sharp contrast to the Soviet Union, China viewed de Gaulle's plan for a ceasefire and self-determination

as "sugar-coated poison" aimed at maintaining French colonial interests in Algeria, a political trap designed to induce Algeria to surrender. Under cover of this plan which tries to deceive public opinion both inside and outside France, the French Government is intensifying its campaign of bloody military suppression in Algeria.

De Gaulle's new plan only represents a change of tactics. De Gaulle reluctantly made this change because he has failed in his previous attempt to get a quick settlement of the Algerian question by a double-barrelled attack of military suppression and political chicanery. The Algerian question has landed the French ruling clique in insuperable difficulties.⁶⁵

As far as China's understanding went, both Eisenhower and de Gaulle shared the common aim of crushing the Algerian Liberation Army (ALN). Khrushchev's attempts to provoke friction between de Gaulle and Eisenhower, the leading imperialists, were viewed by China and the Algerian FLN with serious misgivings.

Addressing the Second Conference of ^{EW} AAPS⁰ (Conakry: April 1960), Liao Ch'eng-Chih gave clear expression to China's assessment of the Algerian situation and the immediate priorities of the anti-imperialist front in that country.

We pay special homage to the heroic Algerian people and their gallant National Liberation Army. They are standing at the forefront of the struggle against imperialism. They have won admiration and support from the Afro-Asian peoples and the whole world...The imperialists dream they can crush the struggle of the Algerian people by "superior weapons" and save their colonial empire by means of armed suppression. But they are digging their own graves for history has shown

In the same speech, Belkacem listed the factors that were important for the maintainance of good relations between Algeria and China.

The vast distance which separates Algeria and China is only geographical... In reality, our two countries are very close to each other. A common struggle against the reactionary forces of colonialism and imperialism, a common aspiration for peace based on independence and progress and a sincere desire for co-operation based on mutual respect - all this has forged close ties between our two countries and sealed a solid friendship. ⁶⁹

Ho Lung, Belkacem's counterpart in ^{the} PRC and Vice-Premier, expressed China's great admiration for the Algerian struggle for national liberation. He praised ^{the} FLN's ability to

[keep] down the main force of the French colonial army, thus constituting powerful aid to the independence and freedom of other peoples of Africa under French colonialist oppression, [and] also provide a brilliant example for the national liberation cause throughout Africa and the world, encouraging other people in independence struggle. ⁶⁹

Prime Minister Zhou Enlai praised ^{the} FLN for its reliance on the masses as the 'decisive factor' in its 'protracted and arduous struggle' and as the 'correct strategy of defeat of colonialism'.⁷⁰ During its visit, the Algerian delegation had talks and exchanged views with prominent Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong, whose reception of the delegation was described by Al Mujahid on its front

page as a 'salute of sincere friendship and support' by a great revolutionary leader'.⁷¹

The continuing Algerian war of liberation, in opposition to the conditional ceasefire advocated by the Soviet Union, constituted the central theme of the visit to China (October 1960) by Ferhat Abbas, President of the PGRA.⁷² China used Abbas's visit to put forward a more direct criticism of the Soviet Union's advocacy of a policy of conciliation and a peaceful approach to liberation. A similar strategy had already proved a failure in the Congo(L) a few months earlier (July 1960) now expected to lead to Algerian liberation.

The tremendous change that has taken place in Algeria proves once again that the situation in which the enemies are strong while we are weak is only temporary; it will change to its reverse. This is because imperialism which represents forces of decay, though outwardly strong, is actually weak. Its temporary ascendancy is merely a death-bed struggle. It is absolutely not decaying imperialism, but the awakened, united and fighting Algerian people that is truly powerful and invincible.⁷³

Abbas clearly voiced Algeria's disapproval of the Soviet line on negotiated independence, because

The Algerian people know from their long experience that, in order to compel the imperialists to give up their criminal undertakings, it is necessary to arm ourselves with guns. In fact, all colonial domination is a matter of force, and what has been established by force can only be destroyed by force. To forget this principle is to commit a tragic error, to expose oneself to a great illusion and to leave the people to chance.⁷⁴

This position was given expression in the Sino-Algerian joint communiqué at the end of the Algerian delegation's visit.⁷⁵ Abbas's stance favouring China's general line was not only confined to the international sphere; it also extended to the sphere of Algeria's internal problems.

[The] Chinese model of development could be practical even in those non-communist countries especially in the Third World.⁷⁶

Less than a week after Abbas's visit to China, a big rally was held in Beijing. More than 15,000 citizens attended. An Algerian delegation took part.⁷⁷

In May 1961, a PGRA diplomatic mission led by Kioune Abderrahmane visited China.⁷⁸ Kioune expressed his deep appreciation of China's contribution of moral and material support for the Algerian cause which formed the basis of a strong and solid friendship between China and Algeria at a 'decisive period in Algerian history'.⁷⁹

French oppression⁸⁰ (e.g., the massacre on 24 October 1961) of Algerians residing in France because they dared to demonstrate publicly against French colonialism in Algeria) was viewed by China as consisting of

outrageous acts by the de Gaulle government constituting an open challenge to the Algerian people; such brutality and flagrant disregard of human rights and justice cannot but anger the Chinese people and all other peoples of the world.⁸¹

By late 1961 the French colonialists became aware that neither their conditional negotiations nor their continuous oppression and massacres of Algerian people were leading their country out of a seven year dilemma. Algerian leaders rejected any solution short of complete and unconditional independence. The outcome was the conclusion of the Evian Agreement (18 March 1962) between the PGRA and France recognising Algerian independence and liberation. The Algerian FLN's struggle was the first successful anti-colonial movement in Africa to receive China's support. It was, according to Zhou Enlai

the result of armed struggle waged heroically by the Algerian people for more than seven years, and of their perseverance in insisting on negotiations on an equal footing and on the basis of armed struggle.⁸²

We conclude this session on Sino-Algerian relations and China's policy towards the Algerian war of national liberation (1954-1962) with a brief comparison of the Chinese (especially during the period 1935-1949) and Algerian revolutions (1954-1962), based on Ben Khedda's impressions.

Ben Khedda argued that while both Algeria and China fought successful people's wars based in the countryside and led by the peasants, they differed in the concrete conditions facing them. Algeria had no option but to adopt the people's war and guerrilla warfare as its sole revolutionary strategy against a colonial power with immense military power and backed by its NATO allies. The

Algerians did not, at least in the initial stages of the struggle, have any organised military troops or arms which they could use to liberate the cities which were dominated by French settler-colonialists under the protection of one of the most advanced armies in the world. Thus, guerrilla warfare and people's war were the only options open to Algeria in order to launch a successful revolution.

According to Ben Khedda, China differed from Algeria in an important respect. Although Mao and his followers insisted that the rural areas and peasants were to form the backbone of the Chinese revolution against Japanese imperialist invaders and the Guomindang troops supported by the Western imperialist powers (and especially the United States), this course of action was not followed until other strategies had failed. Moreover, at the time of the Algerian war, the population of Algeria was less than 10 million, whereas China's population, during CCP's struggle against Japanese colonialism and the reactionary Guomintang government, was about 450 million. Ben Khedda argued that in view of its much larger population, China, unlike Algeria, offered more favourable conditions for the conduct of people's war in an adventurous spirit. The Algerian revolutionaries could not afford to launch a national liberation struggle on a trial and error basis as the much smaller Algerian population had a much lower tolerance of loss of lives and experimentation.⁸³

Ben Khedda's comparison however, did not mention the major difference between the Chinese and Algerian revolutions stemming from the communist character of the

former and the nationalist character of the latter. ^{The} FLN's fundamental objective was to put an end to colonialism. Until 1962,⁸⁴ its policies did not explicitly mention social reforms or other domestic ideological objectives. It gave much greater importance to the struggle against French colonialism than to the kind of post-colonial Algerian society it hoped to create.

Unlike ^{the} FLN, ^{the} CCP (particularly following the Long March and the establishment of Mao's leadership of the party) had a fairly clear commitment to social reforms based on an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to suit Chinese conditions. Its fight against Japanese imperialism and Guomindang reaction were means to the end of 'socialist construction' in China.

The *pied noir* problem was unique to Algeria, and ^{the} FLN had to adapt its national liberation strategy to take account of the entrenched settler population. Except during the brief *interregnum* of Japan's physical occupation of China during the '30s, the Chinese revolution did not have to grapple with a settler population of foreign origin in China.

However, if the options open to, and conditions faced by the Chinese revolution and the Algerian national liberation war were different, the rural nature and the peasant character of the two countries constituted the basis of similarities necessitating the use of 'people's war' strategies. The victory of both these revolutions, would, perhaps have been put in doubt had the rural factor and the peasant character of society been neglected.

It is worth adding that another similarity between the Chinese revolution and the Algerian national liberation struggle lay in the fact that both societies had a long history of revolutionary uprisings dating back at least to the Taiping insurrection 1851-53 in the case of China, and to the People's Resistance of Amir Abdul Kader 1830-47 in the case of Algeria.

Finally it is worth pointing out that in both cases, victory was followed by stability without any effective domestic challenge to the new order. In this respect, the aftermath of the Algerian revolution, like that of the Chinese revolution, was strikingly different from the aftermath of the Russian Revolution.

13.2.1.2. China and National Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies

13.2.1.2.1. Angola

Having witnessed the successful means of armed struggle in Algeria and the failure of negotiated independence in the Congo(L), the Angolan national independence movement became convinced in 1961 that the only possible real guarantee of independence and liberation lay in physical resistance. No one was more satisfied with this decision than China, which had shown itself to be intensively active in finding ways and means of refuting the Soviet Union's advocacy of peaceful means of achieving liberation. The emergence of a movement committed to armed struggle in Angola added weight to the view espoused by CCP that the main contradiction between

capitalism and imperialism on the one hand, and socialism on the other, was centred in the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In view of the fact that, by the mid-'70s, Angola proved to be the most controversial case in Africa illustrating the ideological vagaries of China's policy, it is appropriate that the historical and ideological basis of Angola's major national independence movements should be briefly considered here.

Three national liberation movements became involved in the process of Angolan independence. These were: the *Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola* (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto; the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), led by Agostino Neto, and the *União Nacional Para de Angola a Independencia Total* (UNITA) led by Janos Savimbi.

i. ~~The~~ MPLA: The first Angolan movement with a national-political character was formed in 1953, following the foundation of a secret party - the *Partido da Luta Unida Dos Africanos de Angola* (PLUA) - by a group which followed Marxist ideas.⁹⁵ Three years later this group - including Viriato Francisco Clemente da Cruz⁹⁶ (who described himself as being 'absolutely possessed by a communist mentality'), Mario Pinto de Andrade⁹⁷ (who had had links with Portuguese and French communists during his student days in Lisbon and Paris), and Agostino Neto - joined by national-political activists, organised a common front by the name of the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA).⁹⁸

Despite its early career when it adopted peaceful methods for independence, right from the beginning ^{the} MPLA believed that Portuguese colonialism

wouldn't fall without a struggle. It would not gracefully leave through a series of peaceful negotiations: the Angolan people must force it to leave.⁸⁹

Another important aspect of ^{the} MPLA was its non-racial and non-ethnic character.⁹⁰ National unity constituted the fundamental basis of ^{the} MPLA's objectives and strategy. MPLA strongly believed that the failure of the Angolan national movement hitherto had been due to 'tribal' divisions.⁹¹ ^{The} MPLA's initial physical resistance began when its leader Dr. Angostino Neto was placed under detention by the colonial authorities in 1960. The demonstrations of the Angolan people against Neto's detention were crushed by the Portuguese troops.⁹² After this incident, MPLA⁹³ decided to use armed struggle as the ultimate means for liberation.

...political struggle alone could go no further. It was time to take up arms.⁹⁴

The first serious resistance to Portuguese colonialism took place in Luanda (4 February 1961). Under ^{the} MPLA's leadership, an attack was launched on the prisons in the city with the aim of releasing the political prisoners.⁹⁵ The Portuguese authorities unleashed terror by gunning down 3,000 people within a week.⁹⁶

The independence (in June 1960) of neighbouring Congo(L), under Lumumba's anti-

imperialist leadership, provided the only⁹⁷ hope for Angolan liberation movements to base themselves in hospitable territory from which they could offer effective resistance to Portuguese colonialism. Andrade (MPLA's acting President) in the place of Neto who was in prison, and da Cruz, moved the headquarters of ^{the} MPLA headquarters from Conakry to Léopoldville.⁹⁸ With Lumumba's murder (February 1961), however, the new government ruled by anti-Lumumba forces were no longer prepared to give any quarter to ^{the} MPLA.

ii. ^{the} FNLA: The historical foundations of ^{the} FNLA were 'tribal' in character⁹⁹ and dated back to the appearance of the Union of Populations of the North of Angola (UPNA) in Léopoldville. UPNA consisted of those immigrants from the north of Angola who escaped from the deplorable conditions prevailing in that area.¹⁰⁰ In 1958, ^{the} UPNA, led by Holden Roberto, was re-named the *União das Populações de Angola* (UPA). ^{the} UPA did not show any clear political commitment; not until late 1960 did ^{the} UPA adopt a moderate anti-colonialist line

After the liberation of Ghana, Guinea, Cameroun, Togo, the Congo and Somalia, European colonialism has been in swift retreat.

Accordingly, no people in Africa has any longer the right to mark time or to play around with the ruling powers. Thus Portugal must stop dreaming of subjugating millions of Africans indefinitely and must realise, as have all other European States, that the Angolan people and all others under its control at the *rendez-vous*, having understood that freedom is an inalienable right which the Creator has accorded to all human beings to enjoy in this earthly sojourn.¹⁰¹

The UPA began its political activities in Congo(L) in close association with the pro-Western government of Abdula, Mobutu and Kasavubu. The 'moderate' UPA was more acceptable than the radical MPLA. In March 1961, only 5 weeks after the first Angolan attack on Luanda's prisons, a similar attack was spearheaded in the north of Angola by UPA. Although its target was the Portuguese troops, the end proved to be disastrous and highly undesirable. 200 European civilians were killed. The UPA had shown itself to be adventurist in character and lacking in revolutionary discipline and ideological maturity.¹⁰²

The Portuguese army reacted to this incident by killing 50,000 Angolans and by driving more than 300,000 into exile in Congo(L).¹⁰³ In November 1961, Holden Roberto was responsible for ^{the} UPA's attack against an MPLA detachment (which went to take part in ^{the} UPA's resistance to intensive Portuguese reprisals).¹⁰⁴

The MPLA, unlike ^{the} UPA, found itself in a difficult situation in Congo(L). The government of Congo(L) was rapidly becoming anti-MPLA and pro-UPA.¹⁰⁵ The radical leadership of ^{the} MPLA was subject to frequent criticism by the pro-Western government under Adoula's leadership. With Gizenga's arrest (January 1962), ^{the} MPLA's presence in Léopoldville became even more precarious. The UPA was given facilities for communication and contacts and enjoyed the propaganda edge over ^{the} MPLA as the leading national independence movement of Angola.

In an attempt to isolate ^{the} MPLA, Holden Roberto was able to win over a small group -

Partido Democratico de Angola (PDA) - with which UPA formed a coalition under the name of the National Front of Angolan Liberation (FNLA) (March 1962).¹⁰⁶ ~~the~~ MPLA's attempts to form a national front failed. Holden Roberto, the UPA leader, felt that his well-established position in the Congo(L) would enable him to isolate if not completely eliminate, ^{the} MPLA.¹⁰⁷

In April 1962, ^{the} FNLA was able to improve its political and diplomatic position by creating a Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) with Holden Roberto, the President of UPA as its Prime Minister. Division within the MPLA leadership reduced the effectiveness of its opposition to ^{the} FNLA which appeared to grow in strength.¹⁰⁸

The support given by the pro-Western government of the Congo(L) ^{to FNLA contrasted} with almost complete ^{international} isolation of ^{the} MPLA. ^{The} FNLA made itself appear as the leading force in the Angolan national movement. ^{The} FNLA was able to win the support of even such radical African countries as Algeria. In January 1963, Holden Roberto visited Algeria where he received promises of unconditional moral and material support.¹⁰⁹ In July 1964, ^{the} OAU recognised ^{the} FNLA and its government (GREA) as the sole representative of the Angolan national movement.¹¹⁰

^{The} FNLA's position thus consolidated and strengthened, did not last for long. This was not only because of divisions within its leadership, but also because of the restrictions on its internal and external activities imposed by the new government under Tshombe's leadership. Tshombe was a close ally of the Portuguese authorities which had extended assistance to him when he led the secessionist government in Katanga.¹¹¹ FNLA's

political credibility was seriously weakened and its growing popularity was contained by the new turn of events in the Congo(L).

iii.' UNITA: in protest against Cruz joining ^{FNLA} FNLA, Jonas Savimbi, GREA's Foreign Minister resigned (July 1964). Savimbi perhaps feared that China might well divert its support to Cruz because he was the more radical of the two.¹¹² Another reason for Savimbi's resignation was his opposition to the moderate character of Roberto's leadership. Savimbi was especially critical of Roberto's concentration on political activities neglecting the task of offering physical resistance to Portuguese colonialism.¹¹³ Savimbi was strongly opposed to FNLA's readiness to subordinate Angola's interests to the American interest.¹¹⁴

In March 1966, Savimbi created a new organisation - the *União Nacional Para a Independência Total* of Angola (UNITA)¹¹⁵ with its office in Lusaka (Zambia) and its headquarters based among the Ovimbundu people of central Angola.¹¹⁶ The people of the southern part of the country also gave support to UNITA. The peasants in this region had a history of fighting for their land and offering resistance to the Portuguese laws.¹¹⁷

China made its first direct contact on a personal level with the Angolan nationalist movement through Mario Pinto Andrade,¹¹⁸ a prominent MPLA leader, at the conference of Afro-Asian countries held in Tashkent (in the Soviet Union) in 1958.¹¹⁹ Andrade and Cruz were

already known to the international communist movement for their communist tendencies.

Direct organisational contacts between China and Angolan liberation movements, however, only began following the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Guinea.¹²⁰ In September 1960, months before the February uprising in Angola, Radio Beijing was the first to broadcast (in Portuguese)¹²¹ the development of Angolan national resistance to Portuguese colonialism and to express China's strong support, without naming any specific Angolan national movement.¹²² The objective of the resistance was described as a limited national struggle which would eventually lead to inevitable victory.

In May 1961, in a rally held in Beijing in support of the Angolan struggle, and attended by the Angolan delegation, Li Chien-po (Vice President of the All China Federation of Trade Unions) expressed the view that the instigation of armed struggle in Angola was another decisive step forward in bringing about the imminent destruction not only of colonialist rule, but also of the imperialist penetration of the country.

The imperialist colonialist system... is fast collapsing in Africa. The day is not far off when the imperialists will finally be driven out of the continent of Africa.¹²³

Angolan resistance to Portuguese colonialism was viewed by China as an important new development in the progress made

by national liberation movements'²⁴ and as a 'historical point in the Angolan national independence movement.'²⁵

During the period 1959-66, which constituted the second phase of China's policy in Africa and the first stage of the Angolan struggle, China showed no concern with winning one movement or the other in favour of its ideological position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This was especially interesting because China's main interest lay in the fact that all the national movements active in Angola recognised the necessity of armed struggle for its liberation. China's concern was with a united national resistance against Portuguese colonialism.

The 650 million Chinese people resolutely support armed uprising of the people of Angola against colonial rule and for national independence; they support the national liberation movements of the people of the other Portuguese colonies in Africa.'²⁶

The Chinese press'²⁷ gave equal support to MPLA and FNLA'²⁸ and as the leading liberation movements in the Angolan struggles for liberation.'²⁹ On 4 February 1965, the 4th anniversary of the Angolan struggle was celebrated in different parts of China.'³⁰

13.2.1.2.2. Mozambique

Following the independence of Tanganyika (December 1961), Dr. Eduardo Mondlane was able to mobilise Mozambican groups and parties in a national united front for Mozambique's independence under the name of the *Frente de Liberta ção de Mozambique* (FRELIMO, June 1962).

FRELIMO has been unquestionably the most popular and effective liberation movement and political organisation in Mozambique both before and since independence (June 1975).¹³¹ Right from the beginning FRELIMO believed that only direct action¹³² against Portuguese colonialism (and not negotiations with it) would guarantee the complete independence of Mozambique. FRELIMO leaders were convinced that

they must answer colonialist violence with a counter-violence, and prepare for a guerrilla war.¹³³

Towards this end FRELIMO

- i. [set up] a clandestine political organisation within Mozambique;
- ii. [established] a military training program to produce a corps of freedom fighters to undertake armed struggle; and
- iii. endorsed a crash educational program at all levels to prepare leadership cadres for the needs of a liberated Mozambique.¹³⁴

By 1964, like its partner PAIGC (in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde) FRELIMO had prepared the ground for carrying armed struggle into Mozambique. A group of freedom fighters, including Samora Machel and Alberto Chipande (who were to play a leading role in FRELIMO after Mondlane's assassination) entered Mozambique after receiving training for a period of two years (September 1962-September 1964) in Algeria.¹³⁵ FRELIMO launched its

first attack on the Portuguese troops in northern Mozambique (September 1964).¹³⁶

China's relations with FRELIMO began almost two years (January 1963) before the beginning of guerrilla warfare in Mozambique (September 1964). In 1963, five FRELIMO delegations visited China, one of which (January) was led by Mondlane himself.¹³⁷ On his return from China, Mondlane described the Chinese model for national liberation as stimulating to the African people and that he was

very much impressed by the enthusiasm of the Chinese people towards the national liberation movement in Africa and their willingness to support the African people's struggle.¹³⁸

FRELIMO was not only an anti-colonial but also an anti-imperialist movement. As far as FRELIMO was concerned, Portuguese colonialism could not be separated from its NATO allies in the Mozambican people's struggle for national liberation. In February 1964, seven months before launching the armed struggle for the liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO condemned the United States, Britain and other Western powers for their policy of co-operation with Portuguese colonialism. Such co-operation

cannot but signify the coincidence of the interests of an imperialist alliance against the popular will.¹³⁹

FRELIMO's use of a strategy of people's war and armed struggle, coupled with its condemnation of imperialism under the leadership of the United States, lay at the root

of the close relationship that it was in a position to forge with China. Through Tanzania with which it had friendly relations,¹⁴⁰ China was able to provide financial and military support to FRELIMO. When FRELIMO's armed struggle had begun, Tanzania's relations with China deepened to the point of the former accepting military aid from the latter.¹⁴¹ This development made arms transfer to FRELIMO easy. The pro-Chinese character of FRELIMO and its admiration of the Chinese model of people's war were expressed in the following words by Manuel Mahluza, Education Secretary of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee

By arming ourselves with Chairman Mao's great thesis on people's war, we can defeat the Portuguese colonialists who are nothing but paper tigers.¹⁴²

13.2.1.2.3. Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde

Throughout its history, the national independence movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was the only Portuguese colony in Africa in which there were no serious internal dissensions among the leadership. The national movement, spearheaded by the African Party¹⁴³ for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde¹⁴⁴ (PAIGC) under Cabral's leadership took great care not to let the Sino-Soviet dispute affect its foreign policy. Its united leadership contributed much to its success in obtaining support from both the Soviet Union and China.

Though founded in September 1956, PAIGC began a career of effective physical resistance to Portuguese

colonialism only in January 1963. During the intervening period (1956-63), it had been engaged in the task of mobilising the masses.¹⁴⁵ During the same period, PAIGC organised and led strikes and demonstrations demanding political and economic reforms to ameliorate the appalling conditions under which the people lived.¹⁴⁶ Four major factors inspired and encouraged the PAIGC to launch guerrilla operations and people's war against Portuguese colonialism in 1963.

- i. The victory of the liberation war in Algeria (1962) provided a great stimulus to PAIGC's conviction that people's war would unquestionably guarantee the achievement of liberation.
- ii. By 1963, two years had elapsed since the beginning of armed struggle in Angola (1961). The Angolan struggle was particularly inspiring for PAIGC; Angola and Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde faced the same enemy - Portuguese colonialism.
- iii. Unlike Mozambique [prior to Tanganyika's independence (1961)], PAIGC found the neighbouring Guinea, independent since 1958, prepared not only to allow it to have a base in its territory but also to facilitate external financial and military support. In Guinea, China was very active in channelling financial aid to the PAIGC.¹⁴⁷
- vi. PAIGC was encouraged to launch armed struggle in 1963 by the formation of the OAU Liberation Committee (May 1963) for providing material support for African liberation movements.

By 1965, the PAIGC liberation Fighters were able to control a third of the country.¹⁴⁸ By 1969 the PAIGC forces were able to liberation the entire length of the frontier with Guinea.¹⁴⁹

Prior to 1963, of all the Portuguese colonies in Africa PAIGC based in friendly Guinea offered the easiest access to China. PAIGC's first contact with China took place in Guinea.¹⁵⁰ In July 1960, a PAIGC delegation visited China.¹⁵¹ From the following year, PAIGC guerrilla forces received training in China.¹⁵² In 1963 a group of PAIGC guerrilla fighters went to China for advanced training after undertaking their initial training in Ghana.¹⁵³

Although supported by both China and the Soviet Union, PAIGC was, on balance, rather more pro-Chinese in character.¹⁵⁴ China's advocacy of armed struggle and its own experience of people's war provided inspiration to PAIGC in adhering to its ideological position on people's war. On the eve of Zhou Enlai's visit to Guinea (21-6 January 1964) Amilcar Cabral expressed his admiration for China's readiness to support African liberation struggle.

The China delegation will surely be accorded the warmest welcome...this welcome will express the active solidarity of the African people with the Chinese people in their struggle. The Chinese people have consistently shown their firm solidarity with the African peoples in their struggle for national liberation and consolidation of their independence.¹⁵⁵

Accordingly, the Chinese press, Radio and propaganda instruments too, widely publicised and praised PAIGC's determination to engage in an armed struggle for which China was ready to give support.¹⁵⁶ In October 1964, Aristedes Perreira, a member of the Political Bureau and Deputy General Secretary of PAIGC visited China where he attended China's National Day (1 October).¹⁵⁷

13.2.1.3. China and the National Liberation Movements of Zimbabwe and Azania

Unlike the national liberation movements in the rest of Africa, those of Zimbabwe, Azania and Namibia faced a much more difficult task in their struggle against imperialism, racism and colonialism. They were not only faced with the task of destroying their colonialist and imperialist roots, but also, with the task of overthrowing a firmly entrenched racist régime in which white minority government was determined to maintain its power.

13.2.1.3.1. Zimbabwe

The whole of Rhodesia - named after Cecil Rhodes (1888), the British colonialist - remained under direct British rule until 1923 when the white settlers in the southern part of the colony (since 1980, Zimbabwe), were given internal autonomy at their request.

Serious African resistance to the exploitative and racist rule of the white colonialists, coupled with demands for independence and the establishment of a majority government, did not begin until 1957 when the

African National Congress (ANC) was founded under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, Robert Chikerema, and George Nayandor. ~~The~~ ANC also included among its founding members Robert Mugabe and Ndbaningi Sithole, both of whom were to play a leading role in the liberation of Zimbabwe.

However, it did not survive for long. In February 1959, it was banned and its political activists were detained.¹⁵⁸ Nkomo escaped detention because he was then in Cairo where he was attending the AAPSO conference. In London (January 1960), after a year's campaign, Nkomo was able to found a new movement under the name of the National Democratic Party (NDP). In less than a year (December), ^{the} NDP was banned.¹⁵⁹

Immediately afterwards, Nkomo formed another party named the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). In 1962, ZAPU was banned and had to move to Dar es Salaam where it became a political movement in exile.¹⁶⁰ The united leadership of the national movement in Zimbabwe did not last for long. Nkomo seemed to be more concerned with wooing international support for ZAPU¹⁶¹ rather than with forcing the pace of social and political change inside Zimbabwe. By concerning himself with the international dimensions of the problem and forgoing the revolutionary task Nkomo's leadership had put the cart before the horse.

Nkomo and Sithole fell out in 1963. Their ideological differences culminated in Sithole founding (8 August) the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) with Robert Mugabe as the Secretary General.¹⁶² Sithole summarised the purpose of the new party as follows:

African politics in Zimbabwe, as well as in European-ruled Africa, began as 'reformist politics', but now we have entered the phase of 'take over' politics, as it is impossible for the present minority to rule Zimbabwe for...the benefit of the voteless African majority. We have entered the period of political confrontation. ZANU represents the fighting spirit which began with an imposed rule in 1890 and shows the unity of spirit between those who have gone and those who are still living. We have a duty to ourselves and to the urban generation of Zimbabwe, and that duty is to free Zimbabwe. We are our own liberators. '63

As with most national liberation movements in Africa, China's initial contacts with representative of Zimbabwe took place at ^{the} AAPSO. At the Conakry Conference, (April 1960), Joshua Nkomo was elected to ^{the} AAPSO's Executive Committee along with Liao Ch eng-chi (China), Ouandic (Cameroon), Oginga Odinga (Kenya), J. Kozonguizi (South West Africa i.e. Namibia), Ahmed Tlili (Tunisia), and Patrice Lumumba [Congo(L)]. '64 In support of the national independence movement in Zimbabwe, China organised a 'Zimbabwe Day' rally in Beijing (17 March 1963). '65

At the third AAPSO conference held in Moshi (February 1963)), Sithole was among the representatives of the African national movements who made useful contacts with representatives of China. '66 China condemned the imprisonment of Sithole (September 1964) followed by the banning of both ^{the} ZAPU and ^{the} ZANU by the Southern Rhodesian government. '67 At the same time, it expressed strong support for both ^{the} ZAPU and ^{the} ZANU for their determined stance against Britain's support for white minority rule. '68

With the removal of Sithole and Mugabe from the scene, ZAPU became increasingly moderate in its stance on the nature of political resistance to be offered to colonialism and imperialism.¹⁶⁹

As ZAPU became more and more moderate, China became more and more actively pro-ZANU, and less and less interested in ZAPU. ZAPU, for its part, was more and more attracted to the Soviet view that liberation could and should be achieved through peaceful means. China regarded ZANU as the most 'important nationalist party'¹⁷⁰ in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

In September 1963, the first ZANU guerrilla group went to China for training. It was followed by the second and third groups of trainees in 1964 and 1965 respectively.¹⁷¹ It is worth noting that China laid a great deal of emphasis on the formation of united national front with the aim of engaging in concrete positive action against white minority rule. Thus, even though China appeared to be more favourably inclined towards the more revolutionary ZANU, it hoped that ZANU and ZAPU would unite in order to consolidate the national movement of Zimbabwe. In February 1964 when James Robert, a ZAPU leader, visited China on his way to Moscow, China offered a financial contribution of \$19,700 to ZAPU.¹⁷² In April 1966, five months after Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, (UDI) (November 1965), ZANU effectively demonstrated its revolutionary character by launching (April 1966) a full-scale¹⁷³ guerrilla war against the

Smith régime from its bases in Zambia. China viewed UDI as an act of the white colonialist authorities:

[to] carry on a fascist rule of the South African type in a more unbridled way than before and to go further with oppressing the struggle of the Zimbabwe people for genuine independence, that constitutes a wild attack on the Zimbabwe people and a grave threat to all African peoples. The Chinese government and people strongly condemn the colonialist authorities in Southern Rhodesia for this criminal act and express firm support for the Zimbabwe people in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and for national independence.¹⁷⁴

On the same occasion, the People's Daily (13 November 1965) wrote that the aim of UDI was to:

cloak their bloodthirsty rule with sham independence, thus giving a legal figleaf to their barbarous rule, so that they may maintain Southern Rhodesia as their 'paradise' where they can continue to rule supreme.¹⁷⁵

At the same time, China urged that the consolidated racist régime could be overthrown only by a united national front guided by positive political and physical actions:

The independence of Southern Rhodesia can only [be achieved by] the unremitting struggle of the Zimbabwe people. The minority rule of the white settlers must be overthrown... Final victory certainly belongs to the Zimbabwe people so long as they strengthen their unity and persevere in their struggle.¹⁷⁶

13.2.1.3.2. Azania

Like ZAPU and ZANU, the African National Congress (ANC) founded in 1912,¹⁷⁷ the South African Communist Party (SACP) founded in 1921,¹⁷⁸ and the Pan African Congress (PAC) founded in 1959,¹⁷⁹ faced the basic task of overthrowing the South African apartheid régime. However, unlike ZAPU and ZANU, ANC, SACP and PAC, faced and still continue to face, one of the most powerful military forces in the world, and certainly the most powerful in Africa. In March 1960, both ANC and PAC began their effective resistance by urging the people to challenge¹⁸⁰ the 'pass laws', under which Africans were required to carry their identity cards at all times. The South African régime reacted by killing at least 69 unarmed Africans injuring more than 180 people¹⁸¹ in the Sharpeville Massacre. At the same time, ^{the}ANC and ^{the}PAC were both outlawed and their leaders, including Mangaliso Sobuke, PAC's founder-leader, arrested¹⁸² (April).

Until the mid-'60s ANC was much influenced by SACP which strictly followed the Soviet international line.¹⁸³ PAC, however, seemed to be much more militant and revolutionary in character. As a matter of fact PAC was founded as a result of an ideological dispute within the leadership of ANC.¹⁸⁴ The PAC's aim could be found in its manifesto which aimed at creating a society

...socialist in content, democratic in form and creative in purpose - a democracy in which man shall at long last find his own true self, and in which the human personality shall blossom to the full.¹⁸⁵

By virtue of its opposition to ^{the}ANC's (and SAP's) moderate character, ^{the}PAC attracted popular support among militant African nationalists as well as progressive forces outside Africa, including China. China, however, was keen that ^{the}ANC and ^{the}PAC should unite together in a common front.¹⁸⁶ It extended equal support to both organisations. As has already been noted, China's early contact with Africa was with ^{the}ANC on the occasion of Walter Sisulu's visit to China (1953).¹⁸⁷

Two years later, at the Bandung Conference (April 1955), the Chinese delegates met representatives of the South African national movements. By its strong opposition to racial discrimination, and its campaign for adopting effective means for eliminating the apartheid régime of South Africa, China made a strong impression on the South African leaders.¹⁸⁸ It viewed struggles against colonialists and imperialists as inseparable from those against racists, as all three were monopolist and imperialist in character:

The policy of racial discrimination and oppression is aimed at further enslaving all people other than the white, turning them into the cheapest labour force for the mines, factories and farms owned by the white man. It aims at turning them into slaves deprived of all rights so as to maintain the reactionary and predatory rule of the fascists and monopolists.¹⁸⁹

It was, however, not until 1962,¹⁹⁰ following the creation of the Republic (31 May, 1961), that ANC became convinced that change could no longer be achieved by peaceful means in South Africa.

Armed struggle is the only means for the people to recover their lost rights and gain freedom [and that] assault and violence -are the methods to be used in their political struggle for freedom. '91

China issued a strongly worded statement attacking the establishment of the Republic of South Africa and its Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd. '92 At the same time, it strongly criticised those who advocated the view that pressure on the South African minority régime or UN resolutions could bring about any change because:

The United Nations, controlled by the United States, have not taken and never will take any measure of sanctions against the South African authorities. '93

This statement came in the wake of attempts '94 made by UN and many of its members to apply pressure on the South African authorities to release Nelson Mandela before his trial (June 1964) at which he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

A conference of an 'international trade union committee for solidarity with South African workers and people' was organised by China to take place in Accra '95 (March 1964).

In the absence of any easy access to South Africa (especially before the '70s when, with the exception of Botswana, '96 all the neighbouring South African countries were still under direct colonial rule), China urged the South African national liberation movements to adopt self-

reliance as the fundamental means and method of achieving their aims.

The Chinese people are full of confidence in the liberation of the South African people. The oppressed nations should not count on anyone but themselves to win freedom. The aid that comes from the outside is important, but it can only be a secondary and auxiliary factor in the struggle conducted by the people themselves. It cannot replace this. We are sure that the South African people, thanks to their own strength and to the experience that they accumulated during their long struggle, will certainly find a true pathway to their liberation. ¹⁹⁷

13.2.2. ^{the} China and AAPSO

The meetings, conferences and activities of AAPSO were directly affected by the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute from the beginning of this period (1959-66). Soviet efforts and activities in the organisation were guided more by their global concerns than by a concern with AAPSO's fundamental objectives of unity and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, these objectives were of secondary importance because they conflicted with its 'relentless effort to reach *Détente* with the United States'. ¹⁹⁸

The first direct Sino-Soviet clash over ideological issues in AAPSO took place at its second conference (Conakry: April 1960). Both the Soviet Union and China attached a great deal of importance to this conference as a forum for explaining and drawing support for their world

views from the 68 Afro-Asian representatives of parties, associations, committees and trade unions present.¹⁹⁹ For the Soviet Union, any solution short of complete support for disarmament and peaceful coexistence with imperialism was less than desirable. For China any solution short of opposition to Soviet *Détente* policy and without 'a definite line on the struggle against imperialism'²⁰⁰ would be a major setback to the anti-imperialist front.

During the conference, the Chinese representatives²⁰¹ actively promoted resolutions condemning imperialism and opposing *Détente*. Chu Tzu-chi, the Chinese representative in the organisation's Secretariat, argued as follows:

It is imperative for the Asian and African peoples first of all to oppose and end colonial rule, liquidating the control and bondage of the imperialist forces of aggression, and completely wipe out its influence in all fields before they can obtain a solution to the social problems facing them and achieve a social program.²⁰²

The Soviet delegation, for its part, attempted to include *Détente* and peaceful coexistence as important *desiderata* for economic development. It proposed a resolution stating that the economic development of the newly independent countries could be greatly speeded up if the Cold War and the arms race were ended.²⁰³

China regarded the Soviet proposal as propagating an illusion regarding the fundamental nature of imperialism. Its general argument seemed to be more logical and convincing to the Africans and Asians present. In the words of Ogunsanwo,

Events have shown that the Great Power *Détentes* and the relaxation of tension usually led to a decline in competitive aid-giving to the developing countries - the Great Powers find other uses for their resources when the bogey of world communism or imperialism has been removed.²⁰⁴

Another major issue raised at the conference related to the removal of AAPSC's headquarters from Cairo to Conakry where Sekou Touré was becoming an increasingly militant leader. Touré was prepared to provide all possible support for liberation movements involved in armed struggles for their liberation. China gave strong support to this proposal.²⁰⁵

Sino-Egyptian relations had already reached a nadir following Nasser's anti-communist campaign.²⁰⁶ For China, AAPSC's presence in Cairo, where Nasser was increasingly identifying himself with such leading moderate figures as Nehru and Tito, would only lead to an undermining of its militant character. The issue was, however, eventually dropped without China offering any resistance.²⁰⁷ As the Chinese delegation was concentrating its activities on consolidating Afro-Asian solidarity and unity, a direct challenge to Egypt would have made it difficult for China to pursue its main objectives.

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council (AAPSC) was re-named the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) at the Conakry session. An Executive Committee was constituted consisting of 14 African and 13 Asian representatives. Also, at this conference, an Afro-Asian Fund Committee (AAFC) was created.²⁰⁸ China was

able to use ^{the} AAFC as an important channel through which moral and material support for armed struggles for liberation could be extended under the terms of the resolutions passed at the conference.

The AAFC created an Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund (AASF) which was sponsored by China²⁰⁹ (Conakry: February 1961), with Ismail Touré, Guinean Minister of Public Works as its Chairman, Mehdi Ben Barka, the Moroccan opposition leader of UNFP²¹⁰ and Chu Tzu-chih of China as his deputies.²¹¹ AASF's aim was to channel aid to national liberation movements which were engaged in armed struggles and in urgent need of help to consolidate their resistance to colonialism and imperialism.

As stated by the Fund Committee, the purpose of the AASF was to provide

[material and financial aid to organisations and persons who participate in the struggle for the objectives and principles of the AAPS movement...priority will be accorded to those organisations which are confronting armed aggression launched by imperialism and colonialism and are therefore in urgent need. The Committee may take all such actions as (are required) to reinforce the solidarity of the Afro-Asian people. The Fund is destined to help in cash or kind: those political organisations, syndicates and others, national or international, of Asian and African countries which are struggling in their own countries for the liquidation of imperialism and colonial and neo-colonial systems, in all their forms and manifestations, and desire to accelerate the liberation and progressive development of the peoples of Asia and Africa; and those who become victims of persecution or are obliged to leave their own countries as a result of those activities, as well

as the families of partisans of the national liberation movements who become victims in that struggle.²¹²

China responded to ^{the} AASF's appeal for financial aid by donating a sum of \$40,000 and offering scholarships.²¹³

As the Sino-Soviet dispute was becoming more and more difficult to reconcile (especially from 1961 onwards), the Soviet and Chinese delegations began to clash openly with each other at ^{the} AAPSO meetings and in AAPSO branches. ^{The} AAPSO found the views expressed by the Chinese delegates to be more convincing than those espoused by the Soviet delegates. At an emergency session of the AAPSO Council (Cairo: January 1961), the activities and involvement of ^{the} UN in the Congo(L) were strongly condemned.²¹⁴ At consecutive meetings of the Council and of the Executive Committee of ^{the} AAPSO (Bandung: April 1960) ^{the} UN was again condemned for its controversial role in the Congo, where Lumumba's government was being sacrificed to satisfy imperialist countries. At the same time, liberation movements were urged to intensify their struggles against colonialism and imperialist intervention in Africa and Asia.²¹⁵ China's proposal for the inclusion of Latin America in ^{the} AAPSO was also endorsed.²¹⁶

At the conference of Afro-Asian Writers (Cairo: February 1962), China sharply attacked the Soviet Union for supporting a resolution introduced by the Tunisian delegation in support of disarmament.²¹⁷ At an Afro-Asian Lawyer's Conference meeting (Cairo: October 1962), the Chinese delegation supported resolutions in support of

armed struggle for national liberation movements. At the same time, they urged the meeting to adopt resolutions condemning disarmament and coexistence with imperialism as advocated by the Soviet delegation. Yang Yu-yu, the Chinese delegate, argued that

we are absolutely opposed to such remarks that the struggle for general and complete disarmament is all-embracing and supreme or that the struggle for winning and safeguarding national struggle is subordinate to the struggle for international disarmament. For countries that are not independent it is imperative that they conduct the struggle in various forms, including armed struggle; for those countries and peoples which have independence, it is necessary to strengthen their national defence in order to safeguard and strengthen their national independence. 218

At the third conference of ^{the} AAPSO (Moshi, Tanganyika: 4-11 February 1963) only three months after the border conflict between India and China (October 1962), a new dimension of international conflict was added to the debate. This conference was of great significance for China's campaign to put pressure on the Soviet Union not to give effect to its *Détente* policy and to influence Afro-Asian countries to withhold their support for the Soviet Union's policy. China vehemently criticised the Soviet Union's collusion with the United States by using *Détente* as a vehicle for exercising Big Power chauvinism on major international issues, without the consent of the majority of the people of other countries.

The attempt to decide the major problems of the world and to manipulate

the destiny of mankind by one or two countries runs counter to the trend of our times and is against the interest of the peoples.²¹⁹

In his speech at the opening of the conference, Nyerere, in line with China's stance, indirectly criticised the Soviet Union's use of its power and prestige, which he described as capitalist in character, when he said:

I believe that the socialist countries themselves, considered as individuals in the larger society of nations, are now committing the same crimes as were committed by capitalists before. On the international level they are now beginning to use wealth for capitalistic purposes, that is, for the acquisition of power and prestige.²²⁰

The 'use of wealth for capitalistic purposes' aimed at 'the acquisition of power and prestige' clearly referred to the Soviet Union. During the '60s China was still a weak and poor country. It was one of the first, if not the first, to be subjected to the powerful Soviet Union's abrupt punishment in the form of a withdrawal of aid to and experts from China (1960).

The results of the conference represented a setback to both the Soviet Union and India. Neither the Soviet priority for disarmament and world peace, nor India's attempts to get the conference to discuss its disputes with China were considered.²²¹ The conference gave priority to the question of the liberation of the remaining areas under colonialism. The means to achieve such an objective was, the conference emphasised, to force

the colonialist powers out of Asia and Africa, not to negotiate with them.²²² The conference declared that the struggle for national liberation would constitute a

...mighty force in achieving peace and disarmament.²²³

The resolutions passed at the conference were in conformity with a speech made by Liu Ning-qi' head of the Chinese delegation in which he advanced the following argument:

It is impossible for the peoples of Asia and Africa to realise genuine independence, nor for the newly independent countries to consolidate their independence, if they do not shake completely imperialist and colonialist enslavement and domination and eliminate the influence of imperialism. Any words or acts aiming at weakening or doing harm to the Afro-Asian people's anti-imperialist struggle will never be countenanced by the peoples of Asia and Africa and will certainly be opposed and rejected by them...The decisive factor in the development of history is always the people. What is really powerful is the strength of the masses of the people, and not that of the decadent imperialists and reactionaries, nor any kinds of modern weapons...we are against any Great Power "using aid" as a means to barter the rights of a recipient country in international bargainings. At a time when the imperialists are frantically carrying out arms expansion and war preparations, we have every reason to say that the proposition of aiding so-called underdeveloped countries with money supposedly saved from disarmament is an unrealistic illusion and deceitful nonsense...The attempt to decide the major problems of the world and to manipulate the destiny of mankind by one or two countries runs counter to the trend of our times and

is against the spirit of the peoples.²²⁴

China also won a highly important revolutionary objective when the conference condemned Cyrille Adoula's government which the Soviet Union had already recognised. The Soviet Union^{also} failed to persuade the conference to convene a tri-continental conference including Asia, Africa and Latin American countries. It must be noted at this point that, China had already reversed its earlier position in favour of including Latin America in ^{the} AAPSO because it faced the penetration of such Soviet sponsored organisations as WPC in an expanded organisation.

China had reason to be satisfied with the results of the third conference of ^{the} AAPSO. Addressing a rally (Beijing: 7 March 1963) to celebrate the success of the conference, Liu Ning-yi said that the decision of the conference represented

...a frontal blow at the revisionists who persistently advocated that the people should not fight, but should wait for the bestowal of independence by imperialism.²²⁵

The Soviet Union showed its displeasure with the conference by accusing China of seriously undermining AAPSO's peaceful character. In an article in Tass (19 August 1963), V. Chriiradze, a former Soviet Secretary of WPC, wrote as follows:

The Chinese try to liquidate organisations and replace them with their own executive groups. In 1959 their objectives began and in December 1961 Liu Ning in Stockholm attacked the

whole WPC. The Chinese have practically withdrawn from participation in the activities of the world peace movements and use its meetings merely to undermine it. They aim particularly at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement.²²⁶

At the Afro-Asian Journalist's Conference (Djakarta: April 1963), the Soviet Union again failed to win the delegates to its side. Before the opening session of the conference, the Afro-Asian journalists made it clear that they were opposed to *Détente* and disarmament and to the existence of colonialism and imperialism. The conference banner raised the slogan: 'We Love Peace but We Love Freedom More'.²²⁷

The Soviet delegates were not even recognised as full and equal members at the Djakarta conference.²²⁸ Representatives of national liberation and revolutionary movements looked upon China, and not the Soviet Union, as their reliable revolutionary friend.²²⁹

In the following year, at the 6th session of the AAPS Council (Algiers: March 1964), Mm. Kuo Chien made an unprecedentedly sharp and vehement attack against the Soviet union's policy of peaceful coexistence, and the reactionary nature of the *Détente* policy towards Western imperialism.

At the fourth conference of the AAPSO (Winnaba: 9-16 May 1965), China was able to put its ideas across in an effective manner on matters relating to the second Afro-Asian conference which was scheduled to take place in Algiers in June. China needed the support of the Winnaba

Conference to prevent the Soviet Union's participation in the Algiers Conference.

The Winnaba Conference also took place at a time when the United States had already become directly involved in Indo-China. The United States (in collaboration with Belgium) had also intervened directly and militarily in the Congo against the revolutionary forces based in Stanleyville (November 1964). These events were fresh in the minds of the conference delegates. China hoped that the conference, alarmed by such events, would adopt firm and positive policies against the Soviet Union's accommodation with the imperialist powers, and in favour of a widening of revolutionary struggles.²³⁰

Afro-Asian meetings and conferences became highly important for China to make its international position on world issues of peace and freedom understood.

At the Winnaba Conference, Liao Cheng-chih, head of the Chinese delegation, made an impressive speech - at least in the eyes of militant anti-imperialists - when he argued that:

we believe that all friends of patriotism and justice will certainly not be misled by United States imperialism's plot of "peaceful negotiation" once they understand the truth of the Vietnam question. How can it be imagined that so-called "peaceful negotiations" will be held at a time when United States imperialism hangs on in South Vietnam, sends more troops there, is bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam?²³¹

In the same speech, Liao also strongly attacked the oppressive role played by the United States against liberation movements in the Congo(L), Indo-China, and other parts of the world.²³² The conference ended by once again standing behind China's views and policies and against those of the Soviet Union.²³³ The Soviet Union again failed to persuade the conference to give its endorsement to the policy of *Détente* and disarmament.²³⁴ The conference expressed the view that

[I]t is the legitimate right of the Afro-Asian peoples to answer imperialist violence by revolutionary violence in their struggle for national liberation and for safeguarding national independence.²³⁵

AAPSO's confirmation that China would play host to its fifth conference in 1967²³⁶ was another feather in its cap.²³⁷

13.2.3. China and Africa: Anti-State Policy

During this period (1959-66), China's intensive campaign for a broad and united Afro-Asian solidarity at State level (i.e. a strategy of a united front from above), was not extended to the oppressive *régimes* of their local militant anti-imperialist and radical forces. China did not seem to be too concerned with promoting State-to-State relations with such governments. When local uprisings against such *régimes* took place, China invariably neglected its interest in State-to-State

relations preferring to give support to anti-government revolutionary forces.²³⁸

13.2.3.1. Cameroon

Cameroon was one of the early cases in which the Soviet and Chinese views and methods of opposing imperialism sharply differed. As in the case of Algeria, the Soviet Union failed to support armed struggle waged by the national liberation movements in Cameroon, preferring instead to seek good relations with the rabidly pro-Western and pro-imperialist government of Ahmadou Ahidjo. In sharp contrast to the Soviet Union, China gave unequivocal support to the advocates of total liberation from French colonialism.

Dominated by the Germans before the First World War, and ruled by the British and the French²³⁹ between the wars, Cameroon was made into a UN Trust Territory in 1946. Since then Cameroon's demands for complete independence began to take a more political character and organised manner. The *Union des Populations du Cameroon* (UPC), founded by Ruben Um Nyobe in 1947, became the first effective political party to lead the country towards independence and the re-unification of the two Cameroons.²⁴⁰

UPC's radical character and communist inclinations developed at a time when even the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), known for its close ties with communist countries, broke relations with the French

Communist Party and the international communist movement as a whole (1950).²⁴¹

As a reaction to the rise of nationalism and resistance to colonialism, the French colonial power, as in the case of Algeria ten years before,²⁴² was responsible for the 'Douvala Massacre' (May 1955). At the same time, UPC was banned.²⁴³

This ruthless and oppressive behaviour of the French, gave UPC no option but to undertake an armed struggle. From Cameroon's thick forests,^{the} UPC organised and launched a guerrilla war (1956). Nyobe was among the victims in a battle between the UPC liberation fighters and French troops (Autumn 1958). ^{The} UPC's armed struggle against French colonial rule (from 1958 onwards) coincided with China's early approach to African liberation. It also overlapped with the ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union in (among others) the question of the best means for an end to colonialism and imperialism. China urged UPC to intensify its guerrilla activities and People's war. In 1958, Ernest Ounadie the Vice President of UPC paid his first visit to China where he was promised its continuing and resolute support.²⁴⁴

The Soviet Union, too, gave financial and political support to UPC.²⁴⁵ This support was, however, aimed not at encouraging UPC's commitment to a war of liberation but rather at persuading it to follow a less belligerent course of action. As in the case of the Algerian War of Liberation, the Soviet Union was more concerned with creating conditions favourable to the immediate

independence of Cameroon through negotiation. For the Soviet Union, a negotiated settlement by peaceful means sought by the moderate and anti-UPC elements in Cameroon, was compatible with its conciliatory policy towards imperialist powers in general and France in particular.

Rejecting the Soviet Union's overtures, UPC drew closer to China.²⁴⁶ In February 1959, Jean Paul Sende, a UPC leader, visited China where he attended a mass rally in Beijing organised by the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity to commemorate 'Cameroon Day' (18 February). In his speech, Sende expressed his deep appreciation of China's support for Cameroon's struggle, a support that made the

Cameroon people stronger than ever in their fight for national independence and against the imperialists.²⁴⁷

Under the leadership of the radical and pro-communist Felix-Ronald Moumié (who came from a peasant background), Nyobe's successor, UPC became much more determined to continue the practical armed struggle. Moumié advocated the view that a truly independent Cameroon could not be created through negotiations, but only through armed struggle.²⁴⁸ Khrushchev's thesis of peaceful coexistence and *Détente* was viewed by Moumié as 'nonsense'. In 1959, Moumié visited China where he was not only 'wooed', but also given financial assistance.

Moumié's initial step was to remove UPC's headquarters from Cairo to Accra, a location which was strategically better suited to the organisation of

guerrilla operations and armed activities. Ghana had by then become a major base for African liberation movements.²⁴⁹ It had also become (along with Guinea) China's major ally, following the deterioration of relations between China and ^{the}UAR (1958-59).²⁵⁰

By 1959, UPC's guerrilla activities were developing into a large full-scale liberation war. More than 80,000 French troops were sent to the colony. Over 50,000 Cameroonians were thrown into concentration camps. French oppression of UPC supporters only made the latter the most popular party in the country.²⁵¹

Thus it came as no surprise when the French, realising the inevitability of the independence of Cameroon, quickly moved to find an alternative party to UPC that would guarantee a perpetuation of French colonial interests in their country after nominal political independence was granted. Founded in 1958, the National Cameroon Union (UNC) was the obvious choice for the French authorities. In January 1960, Ahmadou Ahidjo, the UNC leader, was made the first President of the French-occupied eastern region of Cameroon. A year later (October 1961), the British-administered southern part was integrated with the eastern Cameroon into the newly-established Federal Republic of Cameroon.²⁵² French troops remained in the country at the request of Ahidjo's government, allegedly to safeguard internal security.²⁵³ The granting of independence by France was described by UPC as 'fictitious'.²⁵⁴

The first step taken by Ahidjo's government was the suppression of UPC and other radical forces in the country. As a result of the oppressive measures taken by the government a crisis erupted, culminating in a civil war between the ruling party and the populist ^{EN}UPC, which was determined to continue its struggle for a united and liberated Cameroon, free from the 'bourgeois and French-loyal government of Ahidjo'.

China's response was to give weapons and financial aid to UPC²⁵⁵ in addition to training its guerrilla forces in Ghana.

Cameroon was the first instance of a country in Africa in which China openly took the side of a national liberation movement led by militant party (UPC) against the established government.²⁵⁶

In 1960, China opened a special department for contacts with UPC.²⁵⁷ At the same time, ^{HC}UPC promoted strong links with ^{UN}DVR, China's ally.²⁵⁸ At an AAPSC meeting in April 1960, China strongly attacked Ahidjo's government for its oppressive role in Cameroon and loyalty to the French colonial power.

During mid 1960 Mounié visited China again where he was pledged more material support and given moral encouragement.²⁵⁹ In the same year, Ounadie, Mounié's deputy, also visited China; these two visits were followed by visits by Cameroonian trade unionists loyal to ^{EN}UPC.²⁶⁰

Unlike China, the Soviet Union supported the government of Ahidjo and urged UPC leaders to give up their armed struggle and join the central government.²⁶¹

Instability and revolutionary struggles were incompatible with Soviet efforts to bring about *Détente* with the West, and the exercise of its influences as a global power. The Soviet Union urged UPC to reach a compromise with Ahidjo's government on practically any terms.²⁶² Khrushchev advised Moumié to

[r]eturn to Cameroon...and come to power legally through elections!²⁶³

Having failed to convince UPC to join the government, the Soviet Union began to encourage moderate elements within UPC to split away from Moumié's leadership.²⁶⁴ This policy led to a deterioration in the relationship between the Soviet Union and UPC. In an interview with Schatten, Moumié expressed his deep appreciation of and full praise for China, whilst failing to mention the Soviet Union.²⁶⁵ In an interview with the NCNA (11 September 1960), Byiavve-Nicanor, UPC's Permanent Representative in Morocco, made UPC's pro-Chinese character clear in the following words:

The Chinese people have never hesitated to support our struggle...The daily growing interest of the Chinese people in our struggle is tangible proof of their attachment to the principles of anti-imperialist struggle and of proletarian solidarity. The great Chinese contribution encourages the people of Cameroon to continue and intensify their revolutionary struggle. The rich experience of China amassed during twenty eight years of victorious battle against imperialism and its lackeys, and China's great economic successes with the Great Leap Forward, and the establishment of the people's communes, add up to a valuable example for the peoples of Africa, particularly

as the conditions of life and struggle in Africa do not differ greatly from those which existed in pre-revolutionary China.²⁶⁶ [emphasis added]

By late 1960 [especially after the death by poisoning²⁶⁷ of Moumié in Geneva],^(3 November 1960) the revolutionary situation in Cameroon and the UPC's struggle began to weaken. In the absence of Moumié the UPC leadership became more and more divided internally. UPC's political and organisational shape suffered with the rapid decline in its revolutionary character.

Factionism and rivalries between members undermined UPC from within.²⁶⁸ Despite such bleak prospects for revolution in Cameroon, China continued to support radical forces in ^{the} UPC, urging them to continue the struggle in UPC's original spirit of revolution. Moumié's widow, and other radical leaders continued to work closely with China; and, China continued to be the central theme of Ahidjo's attacks on what he described as 'terrorism in Cameroon'.²⁶⁹

In September 1963, the UPC leaders seemed to play down their differences when they were able to hold the Party's People's Assembly. The Cameroonian people were urged to use armed struggle to bring down Ahidjo's oppressive régime. China continued to be the reliable source of support for ^{the} UPC. In March 1964, the editorial of La Voix du Kamerun the Party's newspaper, highly praised

...the militant action of the advance guard of the Cuban, Chinese, Algerian and Ghanaian peoples at the side of the

revolutionaries of Latin America, Asia and Africa.²⁷⁰

The same issue of La Voix du Kamerun revealed in detail Ahidjo's crimes against ^{the} UPC and the execution of its members. At the same time, ^{the} OAU was urged to investigate the military occupation of the Cameroon by the French and NATO troops. ^{The} UPC's immediate objectives were to secure the release of all political prisoners, to seek an end to the presence of French troops and military bases in the country, and to ensure land reforms.²⁷¹

China's continued support for UPC and Zhou Enlai's revolutionary predictions for Africa, during his African tour (December 1963-February 1964) were the main reasons for Ahidjo's refusal to recognise China.

...if we do not recognise the People's Republic of China it is not because it is communist. It is because we have observed that it interfered in our internal affairs...if we have proof that China will no longer interfere with our internal affairs, we will not find it inconvenient to recognise Communist China and vote for its admission to the United Nations.²⁷²

At the same time, Ahidjo appealed to China to stop its support for ^{the} UPC, quoting China's claim that 'revolution is not for export'. He argued that if

the Peking government acts in accordance with what Chou Enlai said, we shall recognise it at once.²⁷³

However, Ahidjo's appeal to China to stop its support for UPC was bound to be ignored, especially in view of the

fact that China was moving into a phase in which it was to adopt an even more hardline policy towards bourgeois and pro-Western governments than during the previous decade. Ahidjo's offer of recognition did not lead to a moderation of China's support for UPC. State-to-State relations did not seem to matter to China at this stage.

13.2.3.2. The Congo(L) Crisis (1960-65)

In 1960, 17 African countries²⁷⁴ gained independence and made an impact on ^{the} UN which they joined as full members. 1960 was also the year of undesirable developments in Africa. Congo, one of the newly independent countries, faced direct and indirect external threat, not only from Belgium, the ex-colonial power, but also from the United States, the leading NATO power. This threat was embodied in the controversial role played by UN during the Congo (Léopoldville) crisis (1960-64). Congo(L), renamed the Republic of Congo following independence,²⁷⁵ was one of the most important examples of an African country in which revolutionary opposition forces were actively supported by China which effectively abandoned State-to-State relations.

Congo(L),²⁷⁶ was the eighth African state to gain²⁷⁷ its independence. By the end of June 1960, a Congolese government was formed.²⁷⁸ The two leading figures, Lumumba and Kasavubu, held opposing views based on their political and ideological beliefs about internal and external matters.

In the domestic sphere, Kasavubu was in favour of a Federal System with a capitalist economic orientation; by contrast, Lumumba advocated that all the political and economic forces should be mobilised towards the building of a strong nation.²⁷⁹ Lumumba, a political leader committed to a non-tribal nationalist ideology, insisted on a centralised government, and sought a non-capitalist path inspired by socialist ideas.²⁸⁰ In the international sphere, Kasavubu favoured a pro-Western policy; by contrast Lumumba preferred a positively and actively anti-imperialist posture for independent Congo. He was a strong advocate of Continental unity in the form of a United States²⁸¹ of Africa, a continent free from colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, hegemonism and oppression.²⁸²

In the presence of the Belgian King Baudouin, on the day on which the independence of the Congo was proclaimed (30 June 1960), Lumumba directly attacked Belgian colonial crimes (and racist policies) as well as their King's claim that the newly won independence had been unhesitatingly granted. In his speech, Lumumba claimed that

no Congolese worthy of the name will ever be able to forget that independence has only been won by struggle, a struggle that went on day after day, a struggle of fire and idealism, a struggle in which we have spared neither effort, deprivation, suffering or even our blood.

We have experienced contempt, insults and blows, morning, noon and night, because we were 'blacks'. We shall never forget that a black was called 'tu', not because he was a

friend, but because only the whites were given the honour of being called 'vous'.²⁸³

Unlike Lumumba, Kasavubu addressed the King in a conciliatory manner, with a moderate speech complimenting the Belgians.

Your majesty...the independent Congo which you have all worked so magnificently to create thanks you with an infinite gratitude and solemnly assures you that you will never be forgotten.²⁸⁴

13.2.3.2.1. Beginnings of the Crisis.

Five days after independence, Congolese soldiers in the Congo's *Force Publique* revolted (especially in Léopoldville and Thysville), against the continuing dominance of the army by the old colonial officers, under the command of General Janssens and his Belgian staff. For the Congolese soldiers, independence had not made much²⁸⁵ difference, for their national army still continued to be the colonial²⁸⁶ *Force Publique*.

They wanted the army, although renamed the Congolese National Army (ANC), to become effectively the responsibility of Lumumba, as the Minister of Defence, and the leadership of the army to be Africanised.²⁸⁷ They protested to the government and disobeyed orders given by Janssens and his officers. General Janssens reacted by issuing a direct warning to Lumumba about the dire consequences of such mutiny. At the same time, he

confronted the Congolese troops in person and wrote on a blackboard '*Après Indépendance = Avant Indépendance*'.²⁸⁸

As the revolt gathered momentum and General Janssens was taken captive, the government unanimously decided to Africanise the leadership of the army. It must be remembered that Lumumba regarded the Belgian dominance of the army as a necessary evil, to be corrected in the future by the Congolese taking over the leadership.

This view, however, seems to have been²⁸⁹ shared only by the more progressive cabinet ministers (e.g., Gizenga and Mulele), so that when Lumumba urged, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers "there can be no question of merely reforming the *Force Publique*...it must be revolutionised', he was opposed²⁹⁰ by a majority of government ministers.

Not until General Janssens and other Belgian officers took total command²⁹¹ of ANC, and the direct clash between Belgian officers and Congolese soldiers threatened the very existence of the government, did cabinet ministers unanimously approve changes in the structure of the army (July 1960). Joseph Mobutu was nominated Chief of Staff of the army, with Victor Lundula as Commander-in-Chief in place of General Janssens.²⁹² Other high army posts, however, continued to be occupied by Belgian officers.

As a retaliation against these changes in ANC by the government, Belgium sent (10 July 1960) its paratroopers to Congo. Immediately after landing in Elisabethville, they disarmed the Congolese troops and occupied the town.²⁹³ Thus Katanga was subjected once more to a

Belgian colonial take-over. At the same time, Belgian troops occupied the town and the airport of Léopoldville.²⁹⁴ Belgium claimed that the aim of such action was to contain the mutiny of the *Force Publique* while protecting Belgian lives and property.

However, the true motive behind Belgian intervention, as it turned out, was to gain a foothold in the country and provide encouragement for the secession of Katanga (now Shaba Province) - the richest²⁹⁵ area in the country, which at that time held 80% of the country's mineral reserve (especially uranium and copper).²⁹⁶

Less than 24 hours after the armed intervention by Belgium, Moïse Tshombe, with British and Belgian support,²⁹⁷ announced the formation of an independent government (11 July 1960). Along with the Belgians,²⁹⁸ Tshombe accused Lumumba's government of being pro-communist. Within a month (8 August 1960), the secessionists in Katanga were joined by Emperor Albert Kallondji as the head of the Luba-inhabited Kasai province (south of Kasai), and formed a Federation consisting of what they claimed to be secessionist states.²⁹⁹

On the day of Tshombe's proclamation of his own government, the central government requested (11 July 1960) UN to intervene. The Léopoldville government hoped that UN troops would put an end to both Katanga's separatism and Belgian military intervention in the country.³⁰⁰ The UN response to the Congo government's request was immediate. The first UN troops arrived in Léopoldville on 15 July 1960. American Ralph Bunche, UN

Under Secretary for Special Affairs, one of Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld's closer political advisers,³⁰¹ was sent as the head³⁰² of the UN operation.

Thus, within a fortnight of its independence, the Congo found itself in a crisis involving UN in a controversial role. The United States, for its part, demonstrated its imperialist character towards the crisis by abstaining, along with its allies (France, Britain, Taiwan and South Africa) from a resolution before the UN Security Council calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Republic of the Congo.³⁰³

The French (like the Americans) did not see Belgian intervention as an act of aggression by one member state of UN against another, or as interference in the internal affairs of an independent country. In fact, they were full of praise for the Belgian action.³⁰⁴

In the case of Britain, four conflicting factors seem to have influenced its position as a whole towards the Congo crisis:-

- i. The Katanga lobby, which was very active in Salisbury (capital of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe), Johannesburg and London sought to influence Britain's abstention from the vote on the UN Security Council resolution.
- ii. Actually taking the side of the separatist government³⁰⁵ of Katanga would have jeopardised its position in other parts of the country under the leadership of the central government in Léopoldville controlling the

vast raw material wealth and the strategically important centre of Africa.

- iii. Had Britain supported ^{the} UN intervention in the Congo(L), it would have found it all the more difficult to resist a similar UN intervention in Rhodesia where armed resistance to its colonial and racist rule seemed imminent.
- iv. Even more to the point, Britain feared that any support given to ^{the} UN in order to put an end to the secessionist 'government' of Tshombe would have an adverse effect on its economic interests in Katanga in the event of the latter's victory.

Having regard to the above considerations, Britain gave its support to ^{UN} UN action in the Congo with great reluctance. It effectively ^{so} let its businessmen and bankers invest in Katanga and collaborate with the Belgian army and Tshombe's troops against the central government.

13.2.3.2.2. The Role of the NATO Powers under the Leadership of the United States in the Congo Crisis.

The United States responded enthusiastically to the joint appeal of Lumumba and Kasavubu with the aim of undermining the government led by a Prime Minister who, in his speeches and statements, made no secret of his anti-imperialist and nationalist inclinations. At the same time, the Soviet Union could be kept in check only by filling the political vacuum in the Congo with ^{UN} UN forces which would provide an effective cover for the activities

of American advisers. Furthermore, American interests in the Congo were, by and large, under the control of the central government in Léopoldville.³⁰⁷ In Katanga, American investors and bankers could not successfully compete with their French, British and Belgian opposites.³⁰⁸

Like its NATO allies, the United States failed to condemn Belgian intervention. In fact, it saw such an action as legally justifiable. In the words of the American delegate to^{UN} UN

We can understand the anxieties of the people and government of Belgium and their feeling that they had to send urgent contingents to protect their nationals.³⁰⁹

By the end of July (1960), the political situation in the Congo had seriously deteriorated. In the words of Kanza (an Ambassador of the Congo to^{UN} UN, under Lumumba):

The Congolese crisis had proved how quick the Western countries were to unite when it came to the protection of their interests and privileges anywhere in the world. And Lumumba had discovered for himself that American businessmen, whatever assurances they might give to the Congolese government, distrusted him personally, and paid heed to the counsels of prudence and reserve emanating from Brussels, London and Paris.³¹⁰

None of the NATO allies was prepared to condemn Belgium for its military intervention, or to use^{UN} UN forces to get the Belgian troops to withdraw from the Congo. Their major concern was not with preserving the

independence of the Congo, but to overthrow the anti-Western government which proclaimed its determination to put an end to the imperialist and neo-colonialist exploitation of the Congo. They opposed Lumumba's government not only because of his communist leanings, but also because of his insistence that foreign investments must be made to serve the interests of the Congo. Lumumba put this point clearly in a meeting with American businessmen:

The exploitation of the mineral resources of the Congo should be primarily for the profit of our own people and other Africans. We have decided to open the gate of the Congo to any foreign investors prepared to help us get the fullest and most immediate value from our mineral resources and energy, so that we may achieve full employment, an improved standard of living for our people, and a stable currency for our young country. Belgium will no longer have a monopoly in the Congo.³¹¹

The arrival (17 August 1960) of Soviet civilian aircraft and motor vehicles in the Congo at the government's request was regarded by the United States as constituting a Soviet military intervention, whereas the Belgian military occupation of the country was regarded as justifiable. In the words of President Eisenhower:

The United States deplors and takes a most serious view of Russia's unilateral intervention which is thereby aggravating an already very serious situation.³¹²

The position adopted by the United States towards the Soviet Union, was supported not only by its allies but

also by ^{the} UN itself. Major General Karl von Horn, the Swedish Commander of ^{the} UN forces in the Congo, protested against the government's acceptance of Soviet aid.

No such incident should ever again occur while he was in charge of the UN operation there.³¹³

In contrast to their anti-Soviet stance, neither UN nor the United States asked Belgium to justify its direct military assistance to Kasai and Katanga. The government of the Congo eventually came to the conclusion that UN was not only working with the United States, France and Britain against the central government, but also providing cover to Belgian troops. The government became increasingly impatient with the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld's promises that the Belgian troops would be removed from the Congo and ^{the} UN forces would enter Katanga.³¹⁴ Throughout July and August 1960, instead of taking armed action, Hammerskjöld was engaged in negotiating with the Belgian authorities and the Katanga secessionists. The United States and its allies had increasingly become the dominant forces determining the role of ^{the} UN in the Congo. All decisions, resolutions, attempts at settlement or any move in or out of the country by ^{the} UN had to receive the approval of the United States.³¹⁵

Following the eruption of the crisis between Lumumba and Kasavubu, Andrew Cordier, the American ^{the} UN Executive Assistant Secretary-General in the Congo, was given a free hand to strengthen Kasavubu's hand and work against

Lumumba. He closed down the National Radio and the national airports, with the exception of those in Katanga, where, with Tshombe's co-operation, they were already under Belgian occupation. Cordier showed his direct opposition to Lumumba's government when he prevented³¹⁶ Lumumba from using the national radio for broadcasting his speech to the nation. Lumumba accused the UN of being directly against his government and declared as follows:

We will not tolerate the occupation by the United Nations.³¹⁷

Hammerskjöld's views and comments were revealed to and broadcast by Lumumba's internal and external enemies,³¹⁸ including Tshombe. Hammerskjöld himself claimed that he could work fruitfully with Tshombe.³¹⁹ Hammerskjöld seemed to accept the guidance of the United States.

It became clear to the central government of Lumumba, that UN rule in the Congo was increasingly dictated by Western powers, rather than serving the interests of the Congo and its legitimate government.

Throughout the period, Kasavubu had clearly been working with Lumumba's enemies, including Tshombe and Kalonji through their Belgian advisers. By September 1960, Kasavubu made public his anti-Lumumba tendencies. Lumumba's internal and external enemies were pleased when Lumumba's dismissal was announced by Kasavubu (5 September 1960). Kasavubu accused Lumumba of

slipping [the country] slowly but surely towards dictatorship and international communism.³²⁰

Lumumba responded to Kasavubu's decision by refuting all of his opponent's allegations.

In Africa who is on the side of the people and against imperialism is a communist, an agent of Moscow! But anyone on the imperialist's side in their pay, is a fine man whom they cannot praise highly enough.³²¹

Kasavubu's decision however was rejected by the Parliament. Both Kasavubu and Lumumba were thus compelled to continue working together. Lumumba was given full powers³²² by the Parliament (13 September 1960). However, as it became clear that the role of the UN in the country was becoming predominantly pro-Western in character, progressive countries in Africa (namely Guinea, UAR and Ghana), which had initially favoured UN intervention withdrew (August 1960) their support. Sekou Touré called on all "democratic forces"³²³ and all African countries to stand by Lumumba's government as the struggle was

no longer only a struggle of the Congolese nationalist movement against the imperialists and colonialists; but a struggle to gain complete independence and take full advantage of its freedom to oppose those who still want to dominate and exploit it.³²⁴

Following Kasavubu's failure to dismiss Lumumba, the Western powers as well as Lumumba's internal enemies reached the conclusion that his government could only be removed through a military *coup*. Mobutu, the Chief of

Staff, was chosen to lead the *coup*. The UN forces in Léopoldville under Kettani, a Moroccan General, provided the financial and military help with which a *coup* was organised to take place 14 September 1960. Lumumba was effectively placed under house arrest. The Soviet and Czechoslovakian embassies were closed.³²⁵ Thus, by the end of September 1960, the Congo had become a satellite country of the Western bloc,³²⁶ especially after the overthrow of Lumumba's forces. It was not until 20 September 1960, after making sure that a pro-Western government was in power, that the Western powers recognised the Republic of the Congo(L).³²⁷

Despite his virtual imprisonment, Lumumba persisted in his refusal to obey Mobutu's orders. From custody, Lumumba wrote to his colleague Kanza as follows:

I shall probably be arrested, tortured, and killed. One of us must sacrifice himself if the Congolese people are to understand and accept the ideal we are fighting for. My death will hasten the liberation of the Congo, and help rid our people of the yoke of imperialism and colonialism.³²⁸

By November, the situation in the Congo changed in favour of Kasavubu and he was able to consolidate his position after the *coup*. Internationally, Kasavubu's *régime* was recognised (23 November 1960) by all Western powers and pro-Western countries as the only legal and legitimate government in the Congo.³²⁹

Having consolidated his position in the central government, Kasavubu proceeded to get rid of Lumumba

physically. Being imprisoned, or kept in custody, could only increase Lumumba's popularity. Kasavubu, in consultation with the Western powers, chose Katanga as the scene of Lumumba's execution.³³⁰ Lumumba was flown to Katanga (17 January 1961) where he, along with two other ministers (Okila and Mpopo) of his Cabinet was murdered by the Belgian and Tshombe's forces (13 February 1961).³³¹ It was subsequently revealed³³² by an investigating commission of the United States Congress that CIA was directly involved in masterminding Lumumba's murder.

Gizenga was able to escape to Stanleyville (since re-named Kisangani) where he formed (30 November 1961) a Lumumbaist government. Thus, by January 1961, the Congo had come under the rule of three governments - Léopoldville under Kasavubu and Mobutu, recognised by UN ^{a number} despite protests of African nations and anti-imperialist states; a Katangese government under Tshombe (in federation with South Kasai) centred in Elisabethville (since re-named Lubumbashi); and the Lumumbaist government based in Stanleyville under Gizenga.³³³ Gizenga's government was widely recognised by almost all anti-imperialist countries, including 24³³⁴ socialist countries, African and Asian countries and AAPSO.³³⁵

Kasavubu nominated Joseph Ileo as the new Premier. A few months later, Ileo resigned (August 1961). He was replaced by Cyrille Adoula. Adoula was able to convince, presumably under Soviet pressure, Gizenga to join his government. Surrounded by Lumumba's enemies, including

Kasavubu and Mobutu, Gizenga was dismissed and later arrested (February 1962).

It was not until Kasavubu, Mobutu and Adoula consolidated their hold on the central government, and the Western powers as well as the UN made sure that Congo was under the rule of a pro-Western government, that UN forces entered Katanga (January 1963), in order to put an end³³⁶ to the secessionist government in Elisabethville and to drive out Tshombe. At last, the time seemed ripe for UN to withdraw from the Congo (30 June 1964) after having witnessed the coming to power of a strong pro-Western government wherein even the *Armée National Congolais* (ANC) was being trained and commanded by Belgian and Israeli instructors.³³⁷

In an attempt to consolidate central power and to put an end to remnants of secessionist elements in Katanga, Kasavubu and Mobutu invited Tshombe to form a new government (5 July 1964). Within eighteen months, Adoula was dismissed in 1965; Tshombe and Kasavubu were overthrown by Mobutu, who made himself President (November 1965).

13.2.3.2.3. The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis

Throughout all these crises involving NATO powers and UN's collective role in opposition to the legitimate government of the Congo, the main concern of the Soviet Union was to avoid direct confrontation with Western powers and to ensure that no step was taken which was likely to undermine its *Détente* policy towards the United

States. The Congo crisis was chosen as an example of crisis in which the Soviet Union could prove to the United States the genuineness of its commitment to a policy of peaceful coexistence.

On this basis, the Soviet Union supported³³⁸ the resolution of the Security Council favouring UN intervention in the Congo. The Soviet Union mistakenly believed that UN troops in the Congo, guided by Western or pro-Western Generals and Commanders, would ensure that Lumumba consolidated his hold on the government and brought unity to the country. Not until it realised that the UN role in the Congo was directed towards the aim of overthrowing Lumumba's government (an aim which Western powers were sharing), did the Soviet Union begin to question, and later attack, the UN role in the country.

At the same time, under pressure from pro-Lumumba forces both within the country and outside, the Soviet Union began to channel limited funds and equipment to Lumumba,³³⁹ without in any way wishing to intervene in an effective manner with arms. The Soviet Union was clearly prepared to sacrifice the interests of an independent anti-colonial Congo in order to placate the United States into accepting its *Détente* policy. Even after Lumumba was jailed and finally murdered, the Soviet Union did not act. The Soviet Union, as described by Nielsen, intended to

probe an apparent opportunity, not to undertake a direct confrontation with the United States.³⁴⁰

Stability and preservation of the *status quo* at a State - to-State level constituted a major preoccupation in the Soviet Union's perception of its international role. Changes of a revolutionary character,³⁴¹ in such a scenario, could only undermine the Soviet Union's desire to play the role of a true Superpower in competition with its adversaries led by the United States.

The Soviet Union equivocated in its attitude towards Gizenga's government in Stanleyville.³⁴² By August 1961, the Soviet Union restored its relations with the central government in Léopoldville led by Kasavubu-Mobutu with Cyrille Adoula the new Premier. The Soviet diplomatic mission was transferred from Stanleyville to Léopoldville.³⁴³ In fact, the Soviet Union, even when its Embassy was in Stanleyville, had continued to recognise the government in Léopoldville.³⁴⁴

13.2.3.2.4. China and the Congo before the Crisis.

China's direct concern with the situation in the Congo dates back to 1958 when it attended the All African Peoples Conference (Accra: December 1958) as an observer.³⁴⁵ At this conference, Yang Shuo, China's representative at AAPSO in Cairo, met³⁴⁶ Patrice Lumumba, the National President of the *Mouvement Nationale Congolaise* (MNC).³⁴⁷ Lumumba impressed observers from the socialist countries and the other anti-imperialists present. He emphasised that the Congolese struggle for independence could not be separated from the struggles of all African and all Anti-colonial forces against

imperialism and racism.³⁴⁸ Thus, despite his nationalist credentials and non-communist tendencies, he was regarded by China as the unquestionable leader of the Congolese national independence movement. As a tribute to his positive anti-imperialist stance, he was appointed the Congo's representative on the Steering Committee of the conference.³⁴⁹

The bloody³⁵⁰ clash (4 January 1959) between the Congolese led by ^{the} MNC and the Belgian police and armed forces, was viewed by China as a clear demonstration of the political character of the struggle of the people of the Congo against colonialism and racial discrimination.³⁵¹

The struggle of the people of Congo shows that today there is no longer an 'oasis' of stability in the world for the colonialists...the flame of anti-colonial rule is burning in the oasis of stability. This flame though not so big at the moment will eventually develop into a scorching prairie fire. Patrice Lumumba, delegate of the National Movement Party to the All African Peoples Conference, said last year: "After eighty years of colonial rule, we determined to break with the old régime. We want to bring a new countenance to our country, that of a people free from all yokes." Last year witnessed the upsurge of a national liberation movement. Now the new year has dawned on us with the news of the people of Congo rising against the colonial rule and the Cuban people's victory in overthrowing dictator Batista's régime. This heralds the growth both in depth and breadth of the National Liberation Movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the coming year.³⁵²

The Congolese revolt of January 1959 was seen by China not merely as a political challenge to Belgium, but also as a promise of future revolutionary acts inspired by the heat of international anti-imperialist struggles, which were already well advanced in Cuba, Algeria, the Cameroon, and Angola as well as in China itself (the Quemoy Crisis: August-October 1958).³⁵³ Under the title 'Victory belongs to the Congolese', People's Daily wrote (24 January 1959) that African peoples'

revolts have taken place in the French Duyo and Portuguese Angola. In the Central African Federation, the Nyasaland Africans have demonstrated and the Southern Rhodesian people held an anti-colonial rally protesting against the British colonial authorities' suppression, and demanding the breaking up of the CAF. In East Africa, the Buganda National Assembly has adopted a resolution demanding the abolition of the status of British Protectorate. In Mauritania, Chad and the Cameroons, armed struggles are being waged by the people against colonialism.

The Congolese people are not isolated in their struggle for independence, their struggle and that of the African people have profound sympathy and support of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union the Asian countries and all progressive mankind.³⁵⁴

The Chinese became more and more impressed by Lumumba's anti-imperialist credentials and by his ability to unite the various national parties³⁵⁵ for the sake of Congo's independence.³⁵⁶ At the second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference (Conakry: 11-15 April 1960), Lumumba had indeed represented all Congolese

national independence movements. He was elected to the executive committee along with China's Liao Cheng-chih³⁵⁷ and Kenya's Oginga Odinga.³⁵⁸

By 1960, China had become increasingly interested in the Congo's anti-colonial struggle. In the same year, Alphonse Nguvulu, belonging to one of the leading national parties of the Congo, paid a visit to China. Nguvulu also met Lin T-ien, the Chinese representative at the 30th Congress of the Belgian Communist Party⁽¹⁹⁶⁰⁾. China formed⁽¹⁹⁶⁰⁾ a Congo-China Friendship Association in Léopoldville.³⁵⁹

When Congo won independence, China promptly recognised the new government headed by Lumumba. China firmly supported the Congo government's efforts to unite the country and, against the wishes of the United States and its allies and their local supporters,³⁶⁰ urged all countries in Africa and Asia to support a united Congo.

The Lumumba government's recognition of Taiwan³⁶¹ did not seem to affect China, at least initially. China seemed to be more interested in Lumumba's potential as a revolutionary and anti-imperialist African leader. At the same time, Lumumba's anti-imperialism was viewed as holding a promise not only of the eventual de-recognition of Taiwan, but also of a close working relationship between the two countries to give concrete shape to China's major ideological objective of forging the solidarity of Afro-Asian countries in opposition to American imperialism and its allies.

In April 1961, the first Ambassador of the Republic of the Congo^(C) arrived in Beijing. At his presentation

ceremony, both the Congolese Ambassador and Tung Pi-Wu, PRC's Vice-Chairman, expressed their solidarity in the fight against imperialism. Tung stressed that

the imperialists and the colonialists...can never separate the people of our two countries. The common struggle against imperialism and colonialism has linked and will always closely unite our peoples.³⁶²

13.2.3.5. China's Stand on the UN Intervention in the Congo

China was openly opposed to the UN intervention in the Congo right from the beginning.³⁶³ The UN role in the Congo was seen as a substitute for Belgian colonialism³⁶⁴ serving the interests of the United States and its NATO allies. China was convinced that the UN operation, headed by Ralph Bunche, an American, would be dictated by his government in Washington.

Chinese opposition to UN involvement was based on the belief that self-reliance and independence could be realised only through a consolidated and united country free from the interference of any external power.³⁶⁵ Lumumba was viewed by China as the only leader in the Congo capable of maintaining Congolese nationhood.³⁶⁶ China was aware of the undesirability of ^{UN}UN intervention.

China seemed to be aware of the controversial character of ^{the}UN's role and of the composition of its forces which reflected Western interests and were opposed to the anti-imperialist government of Lumumba. China was convinced that the UN's role in Korea eight years earlier

had not really changed in the Congo. It was still dominated by the United States which, during this period, had become even more aggressive than during the '50s.³⁶⁷ China strongly criticised the Soviet Union and other anti-imperialist countries which supported ^{by} UN intervention.

...some naïve people were inclined to believe that the UN intervention could help the Congolese people... They did not realise that the United States has always used the UN as an instrument of aggression, and inviting the UN means letting in United States imperialism.³⁶⁸

As the situation in the Congo became increasingly frustrating, Gizenga, the PSA leader³⁶⁹ and Lumumba's deputy, requested (8 September 1960) military and financial aid from China in order that the government of the Republic of the Congo might protect itself from danger menacing its territorial integrity.³⁷⁰ China's prompt response to Gizenga's request took the form of a million pound fund placed at the disposal of the Lumumba-Gizenga government.³⁷¹

China, however, was unable to send arms, military equipment or volunteers as requested by Gizenga, not only because of the geographical distance, but also because of the refusal of the Sudan to allow Chinese arms and weapons to be transferred to the Congo through its borders.³⁷² According to China, the situation in the Congo in late 1960 constituted a true reflection of the frustration of African people with and anger against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. A Chinese spokesman claimed (November 1960) that

[i]n recent months the development of the situation in Congo provided a concentrated picture, reflecting the complex, tortuous and strenuous nature of the African people's struggle.²⁷³

Under the title 'The Crimes of Aggression and Intervention Against the Congo Must Be Stopped Immediately', People's Daily (15 September 1960) listed six major crimes committed by the United States in the name of UN.

- i. The forcible occupation and closing down of all airfields in the Congo and banning their use by the Congolese government and troops.
- ii. Seizure of the Congolese government broadcasting station and forbidding the Congolese government to make nationwide broadcasts to its people.
- iii. Backing Congolese separatist cliques of such imperialist agents as Tshombe and others, shielding the Tshombe separatist clique's use of the Elisabethville airfield to transport weapons and other equipment, and protecting the Belgian colonialists in supplying Tshombe's army with large quantities of weapons and ammunition, aeroplanes and even colonialist commanding officers.
- iv. Allowing so-called "volunteers" led by Western colonial officers to give support to the Kalongi traitorous clique in Kasai Province.
- v. Instigating the radio station of Tshombe clique and secret radio stations of the other separatists to agitate for the dismemberment of the Congo.
- vi. Open support by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld for his illegal activities directed

towards subverting the Congolese government.³⁷⁴

Based on the following assessment of the revolutionary situation in the specification of the Congo, China outlined three possibilities for the unfolding of the revolutionary process. It is likely that China's assessment was known to Gizenga and Mulele who maintained close personal contact with the Chinese leaders, and paid visits³⁷⁵ to China in April and October 1960 respectively.

We estimate that there may be the following three possibilities in the development of the situation in the Congo. First, the people's strength may be very quickly developed and organised to undertake armed struggle to sweep away the imperialist and unity. The concrete process of this struggle will be for the nationalist party headed by Lumumba and Gizenga to overcome continuously its own wavering and utilize correctly all internal and external revolutionary forces and the support of all the nationalist and democratic forces; then to use the Oriental Province as a base and to rely on the people to concentrate forces and to follow the correct policy, to start and persist in opposing external aggression and the internal armed struggle for splitting up the country; and then to fight back from Stanleyville to Léopoldville to unite the whole Congo.

Second, imperialism and comprador feudalistic influences may enjoy a certain period of superiority over the nationalist democratic forces in the Congo. They cannot exterminate the revolutionary forces of the Congo and the Congolese people cannot achieve national victory... (attempts will be made at a grand coalition).

Third, the people's forces of the Congo will be in an inferior situation for a comparatively long period, the proportion of forces of the various reactionary influences within the country will be more or less equal for

a certain period, the comprador feudalistic influences will individually rely on imperialist elements, each occupying a place and advocating independence so that there will be many factions in the whole country of the Congo...

No matter which possibility may materialise, the revolutionary forces of the Congolese people will achieve organisation, refinement and growth. The road of struggle of the Congolese people is winding, but the future is bright. The key to achieve final victory is the further awakening of the Congolese people and the question whether the nationalist party which leads the struggle will follow a correct policy or not. The situation is favourable but the leadership is weak. This situation will add to the permanency of the revolutionary struggle of the Congo.³⁷⁶

Despite the fall of Lumumba's government which came as a major blow to anti-imperialist forces in Africa as a whole, and in the Congo in particular, Chinese leaders believed that it carried a lesson for the mass of the people on the true character of the big powers of the world, and especially the United States. As a commentator wrote in Remin Ribao

Although the national liberation movement in the Congo has suffered setbacks as a result of United States imperialist intervention under the UN flag, the flames of revolution in the Congo cannot be put out.³⁷⁷

Thus, it was claimed in China that, even though the situation in the Congo following UN intervention appeared to be confusing and extremely problematical for progressive forces, it was potentially favourable because

[ilt has tempered the Congolese people, made them realise who is enemy and who is friend, enabled them to differentiate right from wrong, so that they may further consolidate their triumphs and prepare to engage in a new struggle for national liberation...The present situation in the Congo is advantageous to the development of the Congolese people's struggle against imperialism, advantageous to the revealing of the "new" colonialism of American imperialists in invading Africa, and advantageous to making the national independence movement of the Congolese people and the African people enter a new stage.³⁷⁸

Indeed, the situation in the Congo in the wake of the UN intervention and the controversial role played by UN in the Congo not only raised the revolutionary temper of the mass of the people against the imperialist powers led by the United States but also created a revolutionary atmosphere within the country against local capitalists and bourgeois and pro-Western elements.

At the same time, Africans could see for themselves how Western powers clashed among themselves as a result of the competitive and exploitative nature of the capitalist system, whilst simultaneously uniting together in order to shore up their international interests collectively. This was evident from the fact that in the initial stages of the crisis, Britain, Belgium and France adopted different means of opposition to Lumumba's government from those adopted by the United States, their leading ally. Once they succeeded in overthrowing Lumumba's government and putting a puppet government, led by Kasavubu and Mobutu,

in power all the imperialist powers met in Léopoldville to consolidate their support for the latter.

China's evaluation of the revolutionary situation in the Congo was not based solely on revolutionary optimism. It represented a serious attempt to examine the objective situation; the conclusion was reached that four unfavourable factors must be seriously considered before a systematic anti-imperialist policy (or, indeed, any action to bring about revolutionary change in the Congo) could be reached.

- i. At present the national liberation movement of the Congo is mainly led by the capitalist nationalist elements. Among them wavering and compromise prevail and so they cannot undertake correct and firm leadership. The strength of the nationalist party is also scattered and there is no single force to unite the whole country.
- ii. As a result of long colonial control, there exist various places of the Congo the comprador class and the reactionary, feudalistic tribal influence. They are in collusion with the imperialists to oppose the people and occupying different places to engage in secession activities.
- iii. The struggle of the Congo people is extensive, severe and heroic, but at present there is no core guidance organised by the workers' class.
- iv. The Congolese people, in addition to the above unfavourable factors, also confront an enemy more ferocious, more crafty, than the Belgians, and that is the new American colonialism. The Congolese people may need a process of struggle and tempering before they can understand clearly the real state of affairs of the

new American colonialism and before they can learn how to struggle against it.²⁷⁹

The first stage of the Congo Crisis (1960-61) carried two important lessons, both of which were compatible with China's ideological argument.

i. It became clear to Africans (especially those who were positively anti-colonialist in character) that US imperialism was no less dangerous to Africa than colonialism. In fact, the Congo crisis made it clear that the United States (the leader of NATO and dominant power in ^{the} UN) constituted a major threat to African independence and liberation.

ii. Armed struggle and people's wars, rather than peaceful negotiations, were the practical means of putting an end to imperialism and colonialism. The case of the Congo, along with the cases of Algeria and Cameroon, taught African national independence movements that unconditional and real liberation could effectively take place only by offering physical resistance to the colonial powers and forcing them out of African countries, and not by appeasement or conciliation with them.²⁸⁰

Imperialism will never easily give up its colonial rule and it constantly resorts to arms to deal with our struggles...we have to oppose armed imperialism with armed struggle.²⁸¹

China and Gizenga's Government in Stanleyville

Immediately after Gizenga announced (30 November 1960) the formation of his government, China gave it

diplomatic recognition. China insisted that the Lumumba-Gizenga government continued to be the legitimate representative of the people of the Congo.

The lawful Congolese government is still there; its Deputy Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga, is acting on behalf of the Prime Minister (Lumumba) and the lawful Congolese government continues to exercise powers...the people in the Oriental Province have mobilised themselves to resist the imperialist aggression. Patriotic soldiers in Kivu Province have risen to action and fought heroically against the forces of imperialism and its agents there.³⁸²

At the same time, China played a major role³⁸³ in convening a meeting of thirty-two representatives³⁸⁴ from African and Asian countries³⁸⁵ (Cairo: 21-22 January 1961). At this meeting, a special thirteen-member ^{EM}AAPSO International Committee for Aid to Algeria³⁸⁶ and the Congo was set up with the aim of devising ways and means of extending support to the Stanleyville government.³⁸⁷

At this extraordinary session of ^{EM}AAPSO's Council the intervention in the Congo by Western powers was condemned, and a message sent to the UN Secretary General protesting against ^{EM}UN's co-operation with the United States and its allies, which were acting against the Lumumba government.³⁸⁸ Under pressure from anti-imperialist forces and fearing isolation from such radical countries as Ghana and Guinea, the Soviet Union felt compelled, much against its natural inclinations, to accept the objectives of the meeting and to join the committee.

China was concerned to push forward a more positive and firm action against the new central government in Léopoldville. It was strongly opposed to Gizenga's participation in the ruling coalition. His initial refusal to join Adoula's government drew China's praise.³⁸⁹ The People's Daily wrote (2 January 1961) as follows:

The legal Congolese government headed by Acting Premier Gizenga will never be liquidated, but this will certainly be the fate of the rebel cliques of Kasavubu, Tshombe and Mobutu, agents of the United States and Belgian imperialism, and are universally condemned by world public opinion.³⁹⁰

China attacked the Soviet Union's recognition of the new government (along with India and Yugoslavia).³⁹¹ At the same time it warned that

the United States is trying to make friends with the compromising countries of the Afro-Asian bloc (like the United Arab Republic, Ghana etc.). These countries recognised and expressed their readiness to support the government of Gizenga, and they are also in conflict with the American plot to monopolise the Congo. But they still have illusions about the United States and the UN, and struggled among themselves for the leadership of African affairs. The United States now is utilising their weak points, to induce them to compromise and to influence Gizenga through them.³⁹²

- China tried hard to stop Gizenga from joining Adoula's government; it was argued that the invitation to join the government in Léopoldville was a manoeuvre of Kasavubu, Mobutu, and other western allies, aimed at


preserving the *status quo* in the Congo in their own interests.

A Congolese Embassy representing the Stanleyville government was opened in Beijing (February 1961), followed by China's despatch of Chang T'ung, a senior colonel in PLA, as the new Chinese representative at its Embassy in Stanleyville.³⁹³ At the same time, it continued its campaign against the United States and its allies and their use of UN in the Congo to their own advantage at the expense of the interest of the majority of the people of the Congo. The People's Daily (1 December 1962) argued that

United States imperialism is stepping up its aggressive policy in Africa in the political, economic and military fields. The Kennedy administration continues to support the colonialist powers in their bloody suppression of liberation movements of the African colonies and at the same time professes "sympathy" for national independence in Africa and is using the UN as its tool for penetrating into that continent. To grasp colonies in Africa has become one of the major objectives of the Kennedy administration's "grand strategy". The events in the Congo and the rest of Africa have shown that the United States is the most vicious and dangerous enemy of the African people.³⁹⁴

Under Soviet pressure, after having been deprived of diplomatic, political and military support which his government had initially enjoyed at the hands of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, Gizenga was forced to make a retreat and join the Léopoldville government (5 August 1961). Thus, China was left with no

AREAS UNDER CONTROL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES
IN CONGO(L) (AS AT 1965)



Source: M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion", Africa Report 10 (April 1965), p. 6.

option but to withdraw its mission from Stanleyville (18 September 1961). China criticised the Soviet Union for co-operating with the imperialist powers and pro-Western elements and sacrificing the revolutionary element in the Congo in the process. An editorial appearing in the People's Daily (22 October 1963) contained the following expression of China's viewpoint on the Congo question.

Again, let us examine the part played by the leaders of the CPSU in the Congo Question. Not only did they refuse to give active support to the Congolese people's armed struggle against colonialism, but they were anxious "to co-operate" with United States imperialism in putting out the spark in the Congo. On 13 July 1960 the Soviet Union joined with the United States in voting for the Security Council resolution on the despatch of UN forces to the Congo; this helped the United States imperialists to use the flag of the UN in their armed intervention in the Congo. In a cable Khrushchev said that "the UN Security Council has done a useful thing."

Clearly these wrong policies of the leadership of the CPSU rendered United States imperialism a great service in its aggression against the Congo. Lumumba was murdered, Gizenga was imprisoned, and the Congolese people's struggle for independence suffered a setback. Does the leadership of the CPSU feel no responsibility for all this?³⁹⁵

13.2.3.2.6. China and the Mulele-Gbenye Insurrection

The end of Gizenga's government did not mean that revolutionary struggle in the Congo had been brought to an end. Pierre Mulule, who helped Gizenga to establish the government of Stanleyville, continued to be active in Cairo where he was the representative of the Stanleyville

government. Mulele made intensive contacts with Chinese representatives in Cairo where he organised aid³⁹⁶ for the Gizenga government from China and other sources. Following Gizenga's failure in Stanleyville, Mulele went³⁹⁷ to China (1962) where he received training and military aid³⁹⁸ and was encouraged to launch guerrilla warfare. Mulele was described as 'one of the most prominent Chinese-trained African revolutionaries'.³⁹⁹

At the same time, Christopher Gbenye, former Minister of the Interior in Lumumba's government (in co-operation with Gaston Soumialot, who had been Minister of Justice for Kivu Province in Gizenga's government and who had also been previously in the Congo-Brazzaville) established the Congolese National Liberation Committee (NLC)⁴⁰⁰ in order to wage their campaign against the Léopoldville government.

Initially, Gbenye and Soumialot sought Soviet aid for overthrowing the government. In November 1963, Gbenye made an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Adoula's government. His forces kidnapped Joseph Mobutu, the ANC Commander, and Victor Nendaka, the *Sûreté* Chief. Both Mobutu and Nendaka escaped. NLC failed mainly because it concentrated its efforts in the capital (Léopoldville) where the central government was relatively strong.⁴⁰¹

In July 1963, Mulele had returned to the Congo, where he formed a Youth Movement (*Jeunesse Mouvement*) in Kwilu Province (South-Western Congo - East Léopoldville).⁴⁰² - Mulele's movement was influenced by China's strategy of

people's war and Mao's 'Eight simple and straightforward rules'

- i respect all people;
- ii honest purchases from villagers;
- iii return in time everything borrowed;
- iv pay for anything damaged;
- v don't beat or curse others;
- vi don't destroy or damage farmland of villagers;
- vii respect women and don't insult them; and
- viii don't maltreat prisoners of war, don't confiscate or take their personal belongings such as rings, money, watches and other things.⁴⁰³

Despite their limited material resources, Mulele's guerrillas posed a serious threat to the central government in Léopoldville. They were able to control the entire area of Gungu and Idiofa.⁴⁰⁴ Even the Soviet Union recognised Mulele's movement as a 'patriotic uprising'⁴⁰⁵ despite its pro-Chinese orientation. The Soviet Union however, failed to extend support to the movement led by Mulele despite the fact that its embassy was expelled by the hostile Léopoldville government.

No wonder then that the movement under Mulele's leadership was highly critical of the Soviet Union and greatly appreciative of China. In a document which appeared in the African Mail (10 January 1964), Mulele's forces explained their position towards the Soviet Union and China in the following terms:

We have done everything to get our Russian comrades to help us, but they have never comprehended our difficulties. That is the reason Comrade Mulele's left for China. China

gave him a course to enter a military school. After having pursued the course, the Chinese friends gave him arms, munitions and material to make plastic bombs. We don't have confidence in the Russians.⁴⁰⁶

China fully endorsed the means and methods pursued by the movement led by Mulele in opposition to the government and its Western allies:

We never conceal our position and we regard it as our unshakeable international and honourable duty to support the revolutionary struggle of all oppressed nations and peoples.⁴⁰⁷

The People's Daily (28 January 1964) clearly expressed China's support for armed struggle in the Congo and its recognition of the revolutionary promise held by that country:

Now a people's armed struggle has broken out in the Congo. The unyielding people have risen again. Although these patriots, in the Kwilu region east of Léopoldville, are armed with nothing better than bows and arrows, spears, and machetes, yet they have dared to fight the puppet troops equipped and commanded by US imperialists and have expanded their area of operation.⁴⁰⁸

By 1964, the situation in the Congo had developed into a much sharper and wider⁴⁰⁹ revolutionary struggle affecting most parts of the country.⁴¹⁰ The departure of UN 'troops' accompanied by UN recognition of Adoula's government (June 1964), gave rise to a new situation favourable to the nationalist and revolutionary forces.⁴¹¹ In a pitched battle (May 1964), Mulele's guerrilla forces

seriously threatened the Léopoldville government.⁴¹² This situation was described by the People's Daily (6 May 1964) as 'a new upsurge in the Congolese liberation movement'.

It is impossible for the Congo to achieve national liberation through so-called parliamentary struggle, but only through armed struggle.⁴¹³

Inspired by Mulele's guerrilla operations, Gbenye and Soumialot, in co-ordination with pro-Lumumba forces in Kwilu, entered the Congo from northern Katanga and led offensive attacks on the government troops.

Through its friendly relations with Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi,⁴¹⁴ China was able to supply military and financial aid to the anti-government forces led by Mulele and Gbenye.⁴¹⁵ China's financial support was estimated in the region of \$3 million.⁴¹⁶ At the same time, Chinese military instructors (led by General Wong Ping⁴¹⁷ an expert on warfare) were active in training Congolese guerrilla forces in Tanzania and Congo (Brazzaville).⁴¹⁸

In August 1964, new revolutionary forces known as 'Simbas' (lions) launched attacks on the Stanleyville authorities. By this time, Gbenye had become greatly influenced⁴¹⁹ by the Chinese strategy and model for national liberation by creating conditions (like Mulele before him) favourable for people's wars and continued guerrilla activity as the ultimate means of practical struggle against the government.

Within a month (September 1964), in co-operation with Gbenye's forces, the *Simbas* were able to capture Stanleyville and proclaim a 'People's Republic of the Congo'⁴²⁰ with Gbenye as Prime Minister and Soumialot as Defence Minister. The Gbenye government and not the government in Léopoldville led by Tshombe was regarded by a large number of people (especially those in the Stanleyville region who were in direct contact with it) as the sole legitimate representative. The former also enjoyed wide international⁴²¹ support especially in Africa. In the words of Max Close, Gbenye's government was

[t]he first purely African government to be installed in the Congo since the fall of Lumumba.⁴²²

It was a well organised government with a revolutionary army (the *Armée Populaire*), largely consisting of soldiers who had defected from the National Army (ANC) of the central government.⁴²³ It had its own newspaper (The Martyr)⁴²⁴ which explained the government's world view and policies. The government ideology was based on struggles against the forces of neo-colonialism represented by the United States and Belgium in collaboration with their local allies. At the same time, it advocated

[t]he indispensibility of a "socialist revolution" to rid the Congo of bourgeois governments and false rulers and place the destiny of the country in the hands of the people.⁴²⁵

Based on Lumumba's ideas, the Gbenye government stressed that

[w]e must create in the country new structures adapted to the exigencies of an African evolution, to reconvert the methods that were imposed upon us, to rid ourselves of mental attitudes, complexes, habits in which colonialism subjected our people for centuries...Lumumba is the conscience of the nation, the affirmation of the African personality.⁴²⁶

The tactics, strategies and methods used by the leaders of the Stanleyville government, including those concerning the prosecution of anti-revolutionary activists, the policy of cutting off ties with the Western powers, and the priority of liberating the country from the imperialist powers and Western influence in general, were inspired by China's model of liberation⁴²⁷ and China's assessment of the revolutionary situation in the Congo.

The revolutionary victories won by the Stanleyville government inspired even Mao personally to make a special statement conveying China's support for the Congolese struggles.

Congolese people, you are not alone in your just struggles. All the Chinese people are with you. All people throughout the world who oppose imperialism are with you. US imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries are paper tigers. The struggle of the Congolese people will surely prove this too. By strengthening national unity and persevering in protracted struggle, the Congolese people will certainly be victorious, and US imperialism will certainly be defeated.⁴²⁸

By November 1964, the revolutionaries based in Stanleyville had established control over 60 per cent of the country.⁴²⁹

Towards the guerrilla operations of the Stanleyville revolutionaries and their other political activities, the Soviet Union adopted a luke-warm policy. In fact, the Soviet Union criticised the guerrilla operations as adventurist and too revolutionary in character.⁴³⁰ The Soviet Union avoided direct support for the anti-Léopoldville government forces fearing that such support would undermine its State-to-State relations with those countries in Africa which supported the Léopoldville government. The Soviet Union was keen to restore normal diplomatic and political relations with the Léopoldville government.

However, the revolutionary success scored by the Stanleyville government was short-lived in the face of the joint offensive of the mercenaries from the United States, Belgium and South Africa (24 November 1964). The guerrilla forces were defeated and disbanded. Such a joint action by the United States, Belgium and South Africa was widely condemned, not only by progressive African countries but even by countries such as Ethiopia and Senegal which were pro-Western.⁴³¹

The Soviet Union took advantage of failure of revolutionary action in the Congo(L) to attack China's policy towards the Stanleyville government. In an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta (2 June 1966), it was claimed that

[t]he uncontrolled efforts to 'revolutionise' all the process in Africa without any profound scientific analysis had their effect on the rebel movement in the Congo...The adventurism of the initiators of the 'super revolutionary war' produced a crop of light-hearted performers. The tragic events in Stanleyville exposed the whole theory of the adventurist theory of 'certain victory' under any conditions grafted onto unprepared soil.⁴³²

In stark contrast to the Soviet Union, China once again took the view that such a revolutionary setback should be seen as containing an important lesson for other liberation forces in Africa as well as in other parts of the world engaged in the task of consolidating their liberation struggles and taking tougher action against the imperialist powers which were their targets. China continued its support for the struggles of the people of the Congo and urged all factions and organisations to unite in opposition to the central government in Léopoldville.⁴³³

In April 1965, Gaston Soumialot organised a Supreme Council of Revolution (SCR); he appealed to other revolutionary leaders of the Congo(L), including Gbenye and Mulele, to join SCR. In August 1965, Soumialot and six other members of SCR were invited to China where they received a warm reception from Mao Zedong.⁴³⁴ During this visit, the SCR delegation discussed with those whom they met in China the possible means and strategy for the next stage of the revolutionary struggle in the Congo(L).⁴³⁵ Earlier the same year, Lumumba's widow was invited to

China (16 June 1965), where she was received with the warmth due to the widow of a great African revolutionary hero.⁴³⁶

13.2.3.3. Niger

Although independent since August 1960, Niger, unlike its neighbour, Mali, did not establish diplomatic relations with China until July 1974,⁴³⁷ following the military *coup* (April 1974) which resulted in the overthrow of Hammani Diori's government.⁴³⁸ As in the case of Cameroon and the Congo(L), the absence of diplomatic relations between Niger and ^{the} PRC was related to the latter's support for the liberation party (Swaba) under the leadership of Djibo Bakary, against the so-called Niger Progressive Party (PPN) which was led by Hammani Diori.

Confrontation between Sawaba and PPN began in 1957, when the former won most of the votes in the Executive Council endorsing the rule of the country under the statutes of autonomy granted by the French colonial powers. Bakary, the Sawaba leader, became the President of the Executive Council.⁴³⁹ Immediately thereafter, Sawaba, along with the African Socialist Movement (ASM), demanded complete independence for Niger, rejecting the Statute of the French Community.

The French government reacted to Sawaba's move by forcing Bakary's government to resign and helping Diori, the PPN leader to take power (September 1958).⁴⁴⁰ Predictably, Diori's government, launched an intensive

campaign against the progressive and radical forces in the country. Within a year (September 1958-September 1959), Diori prosecuted or jailed most of the progressive activists in the country.

In October 1959, Sawaba was outlawed.⁴⁴¹ Bakary fled the country and tried to organise support in nearby Ghana and Mali, which were the only possible sources of strategic support. All the other neighbouring countries which were independent - *viz*, Libya, Nigeria, Benin, Upper Volta (now Bourkinā Faso), and Mauritania - were pro-Western in character, and were opposed to any progressive changes in Niger.

China's first contacts with Bakary took place at the end of the AAPSC's second conference in Guinea (1959). At this conference, China affirmed its support for Sawaba's resistance to French colonialism and offered the equivalent of \$1 million.⁴⁴² Unlike the Soviet Union which was anxious to establish diplomatic relations with Niger when it became independent (August 1960), China continued to support Sawaba's⁴⁴³ struggle for non-constitutional and complete independence, in opposition to the French-dominated *régime* of Diori. Sawaba's guerrilla forces were trained by Chinese experts in Ghana, Algeria⁴⁴⁴ (after the latter's independence in July 1962), and in China⁴⁴⁵ (Nanjing).

The first serious resistance to Hammani's *régime* began in October 1964 when Sawaba commanders made an abortive attempt to overthrow his government. China, Ghana and Mali were accused by Hammani's government of

organising such a guerrilla action.⁴⁴⁶ Not surprisingly, unlike most of the governments of former French colonies, the government of Niger voiced its strong opposition to France's diplomatic recognition of China.

You will easily understand that after being so attacked we are not prepared to establish relations with the PRC. We expressed to the French government how embarrassing and distressing its recognition of the PRC government is for countries like ours, which are exposed to Chinese subversion.⁴⁴⁷

Like Ahidjo in Cameroon, Diiori's only reason for not recognising and establishing diplomatic relations with China rested on the latter's support for revolutionary forces in his country as well as in other parts of Africa during this period (1959-66). Diiori explained that his *régime* could not establish relations with a country that

gives ideological and military training to nationals of other countries, and assists them financially.⁴⁴⁸

As in the case of the Cameroon,⁴⁴⁹ China was not concerned with promoting good relations with the pro-Western government of Niger as long as an active resistance movement to overthrow such a government was actively in existence. Thus, despite the fact that Niger did not establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan until July 1963, (i.e., for three years after independence)⁴⁵⁰ this did not influence PRC into rushing to establish state-to-state relations with Niger. China's main concern was with Sawaba's revolutionary struggle.

13.2.3.4. Zanzibar

Zanzibar was the only African country before 1964 to experience a successful revolution against a predominantly pro-Western government in an independent country in Africa. When Zanzibar became independent (10 December 1963), the colonial power prevented⁴⁵¹ the majority of the African population, (80 per cent)⁴⁵² led by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) from taking power. Alternatively, the British colonial authorities used their rule in the country to help the minority party, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party,⁴⁵³ led by Sultan Sayyid Djamshid Ben Abdullah.⁴⁵⁴

Inspired by mutinies in rapid succession against British officers in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika (late 1963 and early 1964), leaders with communist leanings such as Abeid Karume and Rahman Mohamed Babu,⁴⁵⁵ were able to bring about the overthrow of the monarchy (11 January 1964) only a month after independence.⁴⁵⁶ They were helped in this task by Hanga⁴⁵⁷ who had been educated in Moscow whilst it was John Okello,⁴⁵⁸ who stumbled into the realisation that the *régime* could be overthrown by a minimum show of force. A new government was formed with Karume, (the ASP leader), as President of the People's Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.⁴⁵⁹ It initiated measures to break off diplomatic relations with the United States and to expel - the British High Commissioner.⁴⁶⁰ At the same time, it expressed a strong determination to stand against all 'imperialist machinations'.⁴⁶¹

China had already recognised the Sultan's government upon independence, establishing diplomatic relations (11 December 1963) with Zanzibar.⁴⁶² However, when the revolution took place, China withdrew its recognition of the monarchy, and became the first socialist country⁴⁶³ to recognise (17 January 1964) the new revolutionary government.⁴⁶⁴ The Zanzibar revolution was a victory for China's advocacy of a revolutionary approach to national liberation in contrast to the Soviet Union's advocacy of peaceful means. For the leaders of the Zanzibar revolution it was China, not the Soviet Union, that provided the inspiration for their success. Babu, the new Foreign Minister, put this view clearly when he said that:

[t]he victory of the Zanzibar revolution was only a step in the revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Zanzibar people send greetings to Chairman Mao because they learned a lot from his words.⁴⁶⁵

Babu's emphasis on revolutionary change was hardly compatible with Khrushchev's hope that relations between the two countries, viz the Soviet Union and Zanzibar,

would develop along lines of peaceful coexistence.⁴⁶⁶

The revolution took place during Zhou Enlai's tour of Africa (December 1963-February 1964).⁴⁶⁷ This, along with the pro-Chinese orientation of some of the Zanzibar revolutionaries such as Babu, led some observers⁴⁶⁸ to claim that China's was the hidden hand behind such a revolution. However, it does not appear that China had

any direct link with the revolution in Zanzibar.⁴⁶⁹ When Zhou Enlai, at a press conference (Mogadisco, Somalia: 3 February 1964) was asked by an American correspondent whether China had any knowledge of the revolution he replied that

[t]he Chinese communists are indeed quite surprised at this unexpected honour.⁴⁷⁰

At the same conference, Zhou Enlai explained that the revolution in Zanzibar was the outcome of the work of its people and not that of outside communists because

[r]evolution can neither be exported nor be imported; only when the people of the country have awakened can they drive the aggressors out and overthrow their oppressors. Of course we do not conceal the fact that we sympathise with and support the revolutionary struggles of the peoples.⁴⁷¹

China's material contribution to Zanzibar consisted of a grant of \$500,000 (February 1964)⁴⁷² earmarked for easing the country's difficult economic situation after the revolution. This was followed by gifts of tractors, irrigation machinery and technical help.⁴⁷³ In the military field, by mid-1964, China along with the Soviet Union and East Germany was engaged in the task of training the Zanzibar army.⁴⁷⁴

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13.3. China and Africa: State-to-State Relations or 'United Front From Above'

In order to isolate US imperialism the broadest possible international united

front must be established against US imperialism and its lackeys...

We must unite with all the people in the world who are against colonialism and imperialism...⁴⁷⁵

13.3.1. China's Relations with 'Progressive' States

13.3.1.1. Relations with Egypt

Despite China's hardline policy against national bourgeois régimes (especially those such as India and UAR which advocated a moderate or flexible line towards imperialist powers), and its antagonism towards ^{the}UAR during the latter's witchhunt against Egyptian communists⁴⁷⁶ during the late '50s, there was a marked improvement in Sino-UAR relations during this period (1959-66). By 1964, Egypt had again become, in China's eyes, one of the leading progressive countries of Africa. Five major factors contributed to such a characterisation of Egypt by China.

- i. China could not afford to disregard the pre-eminent position enjoyed by Cairo as a major base for African liberation movements, and AAPSO's headquarters and venue for meetings of Afro-Asian representatives. During the period 1961-1964, the Congo crisis absorbed much of China's anti-imperialist activities in Africa including the search for venues⁴⁷⁷ for transferring arms and aid to the revolutionary anti-government forces in Stanleyville. Cairo was a major base for Gizenga, and later also for Gbenye's revolutionary government. Strong Egyptian support for the revolutionary nationalist forces in the Congo(L) played a

significant part in restoring a friendly relationship between China and Egypt. Like China, ^{the} UAR strongly criticised UN's controversial role which negated that of the militant nationalist government of Lumumba. Nasser, in a speech to the African Summit Conference (Casablanca: 4-7 January 1961) strongly attacked

the UN [for closing] its eyes in order not to see the situation in the Congo; and sent in its troops which were used against Lumumba. After the arrest of Lumumba the UN left the stooges entirely free to exterminate the nationalist elements.⁴⁷⁸

In the same speech, he strongly condemned Kasavubu's collusion with the imperialists in murdering Lumumba. Like the Chinese leadership, Nasser argued as follows:

We hold the imperialists responsible for the developments in the Congo. The United States supported and recognised Kasavubu as the legal President of the Republic of the Congo. We cannot help wondering what Kasavubu had done to deserve the support of the United States!

Kasavubu usurped the Congo government, dissolved the legal government, yielded to the imperialists, and gave orders to hand Patrice Lumumba over to the imperialist stooge, Tshombe. Who is then, responsible for the murder of Lumumba?⁴⁷⁹

Nasser also urged that the situation in the Congo must be viewed in the whole context of imperialist attempts to contain the liberation forces in Africa. In this he concurred with China's assessment of the situation.⁴⁸⁰

...it should not be forgotten that the struggle against imperialism in the Congo and Algeria is part of the struggle against imperialism in the whole African continent.

If imperialism wished to make of the Congo an example to terrorise the African struggle then we should all join to make the battle of the Congo an example of African victory in order to encourage the whole continent...⁴⁸¹

The Algerian war of national liberation was yet another anti-imperialist cause which contributed to the rapid improvement of Sino-UAR relations. During the period 1959-62, the Algerian war of national liberation reached its decisive and final stage. ~~The~~ UAR was a major supporter of ^{the} FLN both in a moral and in a material sense. It also constituted a base for the transfer of arms and material from other FLN supporters to the scene of the struggle for national liberation. Thus China needed friendly relations with ^{the} UAR in order that the continuation of a successful Algerian struggle might be encouraged and supported collectively by like-minded powers. At the same time, China was afraid that Nasser's increasingly moderate attitude towards imperialist powers could have the effect of undermining ~~the~~ UAR's strong support for continuous armed national liberation struggle in Algeria. It was imperative that Nasser should at all costs be discouraged from diluting his stance on Algeria to the extent of agreeing to any settlement likely to compromise FLN's revolutionary objectives.⁴⁸²

- ii. Nasser's neutrality towards the Sino-Indian border clash (October 1962) contributed to the restoration of the warm relationship between China and ^{the} UAR. Even though he enjoyed the

confidence of Nehru and had only recently been attacked by China for his policy of persecuting local communists, he refrained from openly taking India's side in the dispute. Instead, Nasser urged an immediate ceasefire, and offered to mediate in the dispute.⁴⁸³ In the wake of the Sino-Indian border clash, the Presidential Council of UAR issued a statement stressing that the conflict

has caused the pain in the hearts of the sons of the UAR who are linked with Indian and Chinese peoples with bonds of friendship and closer co-operation. In view of the serious situation the UAR could not stand by as a spectator. The spirit of Bandung and the principles of Afro-Asian solidarity impelled the UAR to take rapid action and carry out a positive role.⁴⁸⁴

iii. China's campaign (1961-65) for the support of a second Afro-Asian Conference paid rich dividends in the form of a normalisation of Sino-UAR relations. As a co-founder of the Bandung Conference, and as a strategic link between Asia and Africa, Egypt's support for the Afro-Asian Conference was of paramount importance. At the same time, China hoped that Egypt's support for a second Afro-Asian conference as an important power at the Belgrade summit and as a leading campaigner for the second meeting of the heads of state of non-aligned powers would win the support of many who had reservations of a second Bandung-type conference, for fear that it would detract from their commitment to non-alignment as such.

iv. The conviction of the Chinese decision-makers that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the

commitment of the United States to Israel was bound to keep Nasser within the militant anti-imperialist front acted as an important incentive to the restoration of good relations between the two countries. China strongly condemned the shipping of large tanks and other weapons to Israel by West Germany in co-operation with the United States.

The Chinese people strongly condemn the aggressive schemes of the United States and West Germany in jointly fostering Israel and resolutely support the people of the UAR and Arab countries in their just struggle to oppose imperialism, old and new colonialism and in striving for and defending their national independence.⁴⁸⁵

- v. China approved of Egypt's decision (May 1962) to embark on domestic social and economic policies based on the principles of 'scientific socialism'.⁴⁸⁶

UAR's decision (October 1959) to return its *Chargé d'Affaires* to Beijing⁴⁸⁷ paved the way for the normalisation of relations between China and the UAR. Relations between the two countries improved further following Zhou Enlai's visit to Egypt (14-21 December 1964),⁴⁸⁸ which resulted in China offering (December 1964) Egypt the supply of machinery and incorporated industrial equipment in respect of some of the projects in its Second Five Year Plan. The offer, incorporated in a Sino-Egyptian economic and technical co-operation agreement,⁴⁸⁹ was to be financed by an an interest-free Chinese loan of \$85 million.⁴⁹⁰ China perhaps hoped that such an offer of its greatest single offer of aid to an African country

prior to 1965⁴⁹¹ would act as a counterbalance to the growing economic influence of the Soviet Union, particularly in view of its involvement in the gigantic Aswan dam project. It hoped that its initiative would encourage Nasser into taking a positive attitude towards the convening of a second Afro-Asian conference without the Soviet Union. On the eve of the second Afro-Asian conference, Zhou Enlai paid yet another visit to Egypt⁴⁹² (19 June 1965) on his way to Algeria. China's aid to Egypt must have been in Nasser's mind when, after some initial reluctance, he assured Zhou Enlai this time that

the second Afro-Asian conference must be a success; it must accomplish the mission which it has pledged itself to accomplish, it must fulfill the hope attached to it by many peoples aspiring to a world of genuine peace, under the protection of which they can proceed with their political, social and cultural development with no threat from power policies or the domination of imperialist monopoly.⁴⁹³

13.3.1.2. Algeria

The following four major factors contributed to close, comradely and militant⁴⁹⁴ Sino-Algerian relations during the post-liberation period (1962 onwards).

- i. The successful Algerian war of national liberation and China's unequivocal support for its continuation without any 'polemical disputes'.⁴⁹⁵
- ii. China's characterisation of Algeria as a fundamental base for its 'vision of a broad

based anti-imperialist front' and as 'the first successful test-case of a national liberation movement⁴⁹⁶ in Africa' enabled it to use recent Algerian developments as armour in its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union over the need to oppose the leading anti-liberation forces. In his message of congratulation to Ben Khedda, PGRA's President, Liu Shaoqi stressed that Algeria's victory would exert a great impact on anti-colonialist forces. He argued that

Algeria's independence is a great event in the African national liberation movement today. It shows that the people of Algeria and those of the rest of Africa are invincible and that imperialism and colonialism, old and new, can be defeated. The brilliant example set by the heroic Algerian people is sure to help bring about a further upsurge in the national independence struggle in Africa.⁴⁹⁷

- iii. The emergence of Algeria as the major champion of and model for liberation forces in the rest of Africa.
- iv. Algeria's adoption of socialism as the only path reflecting mass struggles.

China established diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (PGRA) four years (September 1958) in advance of the formal independence of Algeria (July 1962). This was in contrast to China's practice in relation to African countries before 1962.⁴⁹⁸ In the words of Houari Boumedienne, President of Algeria (1965-78), during a visit to China

(February 1974), China's relations with Algeria developed at a time of

Algeria's most difficult period, and Chinese solidarity with us and their deep understanding of the problems facing our people.⁴⁹⁹

Thus, when Algeria became independent (1962), the resumption of diplomatic relations with China was only a mere formality.⁵⁰⁰ In response to an appeal by FLN to friendly countries for aid, China, two days (3 July 1962) before the formal announcement of Algerian independence (5 July) gave Algeria a gift of 9,000 tons of wheat, 3,000 tons of rolled steel for building purposes, and 21 tons of medicine.⁵⁰¹

The Sino-Indian conflict, culminating in the border clash between the two countries later during the year (October 1962), constituted the first major test facing Sino-Algerian relations. Despite its claim to remain neutral on this question in the interest of Afro-Asian solidarity, Algeria adopted a policy that seemed to satisfy China's position rather than India's. Unlike India and the Western powers, Algeria did not view China as an aggressor. China's decision to call a ceasefire unilaterally was described by El Moujehid (quoted in Peking Review) as:

[having furnished] indisputable proof of China's desire for the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute...the interests of the Chinese and Indian people demanded that the border issue be solved by peaceful means through negotiations, in accordance with the spirit of the

Bandung Conference, because the continuation of this dispute could only benefit the imperialists. Asian and African solidarity must be upheld and the non-aligned countries should make efforts to enable China and India to maintain good neighbourly relations.⁵⁰²[emphasis added]

Even although it would have preferred to see Algeria adopting a clearly pro-China line on the dispute, China did not wish to use third world countries' specific attitude on the dispute as a decision on which to base its own relationship with them. By the time the Sino-India border clash took place (October 1962), China had already turned its back on the international line of the Soviet Union. The Third World as a whole, and Africa and Asia in particular, became the central focus of China's world view and constituted the fundamental base on which it moulded its role in international relations.⁵⁰³

China was keenly interested in promoting general understanding of the effect that FLN's victory against colonialism was a successful example of liberation war, and that Algeria was a major champion of the world anti-imperialist front. This was evident in comments issuing from Chinese sources in the wake of the Sino-Indian border clash. Thus, for example, Liu Ning-yi, speaking at the 8th Anniversary⁵⁰⁴ of the Algerian Revolution (1 November 1962) stated that

- the experience of the protracted struggle of the Algerian people proved that all colonialists, even though armed to the teeth, can be defeated The victory of Algeria

also...proves that the national liberation movement is an important force in smashing the policies of war and aggression of imperialism.⁵⁰⁵

China's ideological expectations on fundamental international issues, especially those relating to resistance to colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism had been fully met by ^{the} FLN's struggle in Algeria. During the Cuba crisis (October 1962), China praised Algeria for condemning 'US aggression against Cuba' as

aggression against all peoples waging constant struggle against colonialism in all its forms.⁵⁰⁶

An editorial in People's Daily characterised Algeria's stance as being in conformity with

not only their own interests but also the common interests of people throughout the world struggling against imperialism. What US imperialism wants is that the Algerian people should give up the goal of their revolution...and that they should part company with the other revolutionary people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁵⁰⁷

At the Moshi conference of AAPSO (January 1963), Algeria played a leading role in getting policies and resolutions⁵⁰⁸ urging struggles of a non-conciliatory nature against the colonialist and imperialist powers adopted. It 'fully supported China in overt opposition to Soviet doctrines'.⁵⁰⁹ Soviet advocacy of negotiations and peaceful coexistence as an overall strategy of liberation from colonialism and imperialism had already been rejected by Algeria during the war of liberation. Training

bases⁵¹⁰ in Algeria were provided for African freedom fighters, arms were sent to national liberation movements, and people's wars were advocated by Algeria at international meetings and in its foreign policy statements.

In January 1963, the Algerian government announced that it had sent arms to Angola and freedom fighters from Portuguese colonies were being trained in Algeria.⁵¹¹ During the revolutionary struggles in the Congo, Algeria played a major role not only by providing arms and money for those engaged in struggles against the Kasavubu-Mobutu government, but also worked hard⁵¹² to persuade the Sudan to allow arms and military equipment to pass through its territory to the revolutionary forces in Stanleyville. By 1965, Algeria had trained, with China's support,⁵¹³ more than 2,000 African freedom fighters while it had been handsomely contributing to the OAU Liberation Fund. The practical support given by Algeria to liberation movements was appropriately described by Humbaraci in the following passage

There is no doubt that Ben Bella and the Algerians generally were perfectly honest and sincere in their desire to liberate the whole of Africa, to extinguish the racialist régime of South Africa and the Salazarist colonialism in Portugal's possessions. I cannot think of one instance where the fighters for freedom in African territories still under European rule have not acknowledged (in private of course) that the general help provided from Algeria was the best that they had received from anywhere, communist or not. (Though when it comes to guerrilla-type help, they unanimously give the palm to China).⁵¹⁴

No wonder then, that, in March 1963, more than 15,000 people rallied to welcome a delegation of Algerian journalists including Djamila Bouhired (a national heroine of Algeria) and the Maoist-inclined⁵¹⁵ Jacques Vergés 'Mansour' (who had played an active role during the Algerian war of liberation and who became director of the Algerian weekly *Révolution Africaine* after Algeria's independence) when it visited Beijing (China). At this rally, Bouhired praised China's contribution to the Algerian struggle, whilst Vergés affirmed that Algeria had made common cause with China on the Congo question. He condemned the role of UN in the Congo.

The African people do not believe in the UN. In the Congo, the UN has been an instrument of US imperialism.⁵¹⁶

In the same speech, he rejected the peaceful Soviet policy towards the colonial powers.

There is no such thing as decolonialisation that is peaceful or without a struggle. We do not trust the 'goodwill' of the imperialists.⁵¹⁷

In October 1963, an Algerian government delegation led by Amar Ouzegane, Minister of State, paid a visit to China. During this visit, Ouzegane strongly criticised the French and Algerian communist parties for doubting the victory of the Algerian People's War and for advocating that Algerian independence should be negotiated through 'parliamentary struggle' by Algerian representatives in

the French National Assembly.⁵¹⁸ Ouzegane's criticism of the Algerian and French communist parties constituted an indirect attack against the Soviet Union's advocacy of compromise during the Algerian war.

At the end of the Algerian delegation's visit, China pledged to help Algeria in the construction of small-scale industrial plants.⁵¹⁹ In addition, China gave Algeria a long-term, interest-free loan (repayable over a period of over 20 years) estimated at \$50 million,⁵²⁰ for furthering

the relations of friendship and co-operation between the two countries and assisting the Algerian government and people in their efforts to develop their national economy.⁵²¹

Algeria and China also signed an economic and technical co-operation agreement (28 October 1963) on the occasion of a visit by a Chinese delegation to Algeria to attend the Ninth Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution (1 November). Included in this agreement was a Chinese loan of 25,000 million Old Francs.⁵²² Abdel Aziz Boutefliqa, the Algerian Foreign Minister, described the agreement as

...a new page in the history of relations between the peoples of China and Algeria.⁵²³

China's aid came at a time when Algeria had just embarked on a policy of economic development based on the socialist promises contained in the 'Tripoli Programme'⁵²⁴ (1961). Algeria's initial socialist measures were to include a comprehensive land reform programme. At the same time, almost 3 million hectares from former owners (mostly

colons) were confiscated (October 1963)⁵²⁵ and redistributed to 1,391 self-administration committees in rural communities.⁵²⁶ These measures were viewed by China as a promising

prelude to the new revolutionary struggles and national construction.⁵²⁷

The Chinese experience and model was highly valued by the Algerians, not only in respect of how a liberation struggle should be waged, but also in respect of how economic development should be carried out. On the occasion of opening a Chinese trade exhibition⁵²⁸ (September 1963), Ben Bella, the Algerian President, expressed his deep appreciation of

the just value of the experience of that country, that just as we had, learned from its experience during our liberation struggle, we would likewise learn with fitness and foresight from it in the building up of our country.⁵²⁹

Algeria's brief war with Morocco (October 1963) provided the occasion for the second serious test of the soundness of Sino-Algerian relations. Even as Algeria had advocated a peaceful solution of the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, so too China favoured a peaceful solution of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict (1963) without any outside interference. This was motivated by China's vital aim of maintaining Afro-Asian solidarity. *The* OAU's success in bringing about a ceasefire between Algeria and Morocco (October 1963) was welcomed by China. Peking Review (29 November 1963) wrote:

It is welcome news that the Algerian-Moroccan dispute is being solved by the Africans themselves...through peaceful negotiations and without interference from the imperialists. Like the Asian countries, the African states need friendship and solidarity to wage a common struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism. While force can settle none of their disputes, they can all be resolved by peaceful negotiations. The imperialists must not be allowed to set newly independent states at loggerheads.⁵³⁰

Despite its claim to neutrality in the Moroccan-Algerian border war, China, in effect, seemed to be more favourably inclined to Algeria than to Morocco. Thus, an Algerian military delegation led by Chadil Ben Djedid [Commander-in-Charge (now President of Algeria)] of the western region [the second military zone] along the Moroccan-Algerian border paid an official visit to China (30 October) only two days before the declaration of ceasefire (2 November 1963). The delegation attended the celebration in China of the 9th Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution (1 November 1963).⁵³¹ // Algeria was the second country (after Egypt) to be visited by Zhou Enlai in the course of his African tour which took place only a month after the ceasefire (21-27 December). Zhou Enlai was received by Ben Bella as the great hero of the revolutionaries

At the dawn of its regained freedom, Algeria is proud and happy to welcome - the messengers of those who took part in the Long March.⁵³²

Zhou Enlai was the first⁵²² foreign statesman to be given the honour of addressing the Meeting of Cadres of the Algerian national Liberation Front (25 December).⁵²⁴ During this visit, Al-Muǧ̃hid (26 December 1963) published a long report entitled 'Honorable Attitudes by China During Our Struggle for Liberation'. In this article, the Chinese revolution was praised for its unique victory over imperialists and reactionaries both before and after China's liberation.⁵²⁵

The positive character of Sino-Algerian relations, however, has never reached the extent of Algeria taking sides, at least publicly, on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Algeria, like most progressive countries in Africa has always viewed Sino-Soviet differences as a setback to the anti-imperialist struggles and as detrimental to Afro-Asian solidarity. China and the Soviet Union were urged to reconcile their differences in order to preserve the unity⁵³⁶ and solidarity of the Afro-Asian world and the anti-imperialist front as a whole. Although Algeria, after independence, continued to advocate armed struggle as a practical option for national liberation, it never officially opposed the Soviet Union's policy of *Détente*. FLN leaders however, made it a point to tell Soviet leaders, whenever the opportunity arose, that in their view liberation could not be achieved through peaceful negotiations as the Algerian example unquestionably proved.⁵³⁷

At the Preparatory Meeting for the second Afro-Asian Conference, (Djakarta: 10-15 April 1964) the Algerian

delegation stressed that non-alignment and Afro-Asian conference

should have the same objective: liquidation of all sorts of domination and the promotion of equality among nations as a pre-requisite for eternal peace.⁵³⁸

At the second Non-Aligned Conference (Cairo: 5-10 October 1964), Algeria (along with the 'progressive' countries of Ghana, Indonesia, Guinea, Mali and Uganda) focused attention on struggles against colonialism and imperialism.⁵³⁹ In his speech to the conference, Ben Bella put forward Algeria's understanding of non-alignment in the following terms:

Non-alignment must be translated into constant struggle for national independence, a constant fight against any attempt at subjugation. It implies that one must avoid playing the game of the power blocs or becoming an accomplice of the imperialist powers...For us, peace is indivisible. It requires first and foremost total liquidation of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. In our view, to achieve this end it is necessary to go beyond formal resolution and to launch concerted and rigorous action to give effective assistance to the peoples who are fighting for their independence.⁵⁴⁰

Algeria (along with Egypt, Sudan, Congo(B), Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Mali and Somalia) also played a major role in giving effect to the decision to expel Tshombe's government from the conference.⁵⁴¹ This move left the Conference in no doubt about Algeria's clear stand on the Congo question. The Léopoldville government under Tshombe

was strongly condemned by Algeria for the murder of Lumumba and the suppression of the revolutionary forces in the Congo.⁵⁴²

Algeria's policy of uncompromising opposition to colonialism and imperialism contributed to the development of close co-operation between China and Algeria in the political and economic spheres. On the occasion of a visit to China (January 1964) by an Algerian delegation (led by Ben Abdallah Abdessamd, President of the Commission of the National Assembly of Justice and Legislation),⁵⁴³ Algeria was presented with 4 transport planes.⁵⁴⁴ In August 1964, a group of children belonging to the families of Algerian liberation fighters who had lost their lives in the revolution were invited to spend a summer holiday in China by the Chinese People's National Committee in Defence of Children.⁵⁴⁵

On the occasion of a visit to China (September 1964) by an Algerian delegation led by Eachir Boumaza, Minister of National Economy, a trade agreement was concluded between the two countries⁵⁴⁶ by which Algeria pledged to sell China 400 Beriet lorries.⁵⁴⁷ In December, Ben Bella sent Amar Ouzegane, Minister of Tourism of Algeria, to China as his special envoy, presumably for talks on the second Afro-Asian conference which was then being planned to be held in Algiers in the following year.⁵⁴⁸ This visit had been preceded by a visit to Algeria (October 1964) by a Chinese delegation led by Chen Yi, Foreign Minister, to take part in the 10th Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution.⁵⁴⁹ An Algerian Militia Delegation,

led by Mahmoud Guenez, its Superintendent, paid a visit to China (December 1964), during which the Chinese hosts conveyed their admiration for the methods adopted to defend Algerian national sovereignty of forming the militia, which, along with Algeria's

'People's Army' would smash any aggression or subversion by imperialism or colonialism.⁵⁵⁰

In February 1965, China gave Algeria a cargo ship of 13,000 RT and an interest-free loan of \$2 million.⁵⁵¹

In 1965, the most significant development in the Sino-Algerian relationship consisted of the co-operation between the two countries in the Algiers Conference of Afro-Asian states. During Zhou Enlai's second visit to Algeria (March 1965), the hosts assured the visiting Prime Minister that the idea of convening an Afro-Asian conference in militant opposition to colonialism and imperialism was compatible with the international revolutionary situation.⁵⁵² In their joint *communiqué*, Algeria and China affirmed that

[the] two parties are of the opinion that the main salient feature of the present international situation is the staunch fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism being carried on by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America.⁵⁵³

Also in this *communiqué*, US imperialism and its aggressive role in Indo-China, Congo(L), and other parts of the world were condemned.⁵⁵⁴ An Algerian delegation led by Mohamed Yazid, President of the Foreign Affairs

Committee of the Algerian National Assembly, visited China (6 June 1965) for consultations on the preparations for the Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to commence in three week's time (28 June 1965).⁵⁵⁵ Following this visit, China gave 1,000 tons of school equipment to the Algerian Ministry of Education, and Chinese equipment to the Algerian Militia.⁵⁵⁶

The deposition of President Ben Bella (19 June 1965) by Houari Boumedienne, Vice President (responsible for National Defence), a week before the scheduled second Afro-Asian conference to be held in Algiers (28 June), did not undermine the positive and dynamic character of Sino-Algerian relations. China viewed the deposition of Ben Bella as a change of government,⁵⁵⁷ and not as a *coup d'état* as was presented by the Western media. Tsang Tao, China's Ambassador to Algeria, met with Boumedienne the day after Ben Bella was removed from power, and affirmed China's support for the Algerian Council of the Revolution under his leadership. At this meeting with Boumedienne, Tao reiterated the view that

China never interferes in the internal affairs of other countries. It has consistently supported Algeria's national liberation cause and the development of its national economy. We support all that is in the interests of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist cause. The Chinese government is convinced that the Fraternal Friendship between the governments of the two countries will continue to be consolidated and developed.⁵⁵⁸

China was convinced that the new Algerian government under the leadership of Boumedienne was even more determined than its predecessor to push further the militant foreign policy of Algeria and to maintain a high profile of the Sino-Algerian relationship. At the same time, China perhaps hoped that immediate recognition of Boumedienne's government would result in Algeria's support for its campaign for the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Afro-Asian conference. In fact, it was perhaps China's determination that the second Afro-Asian conference should materialise without delay which constituted the major reason for the immediate recognition given to the new Algerian government. Tao gave clear expression to China's view on this matter at his meeting with Boumedienne

...we insistently advocate that the conference be convened as scheduled. In the present circumstances, we still hope that it will be held as originally planned.⁵⁵⁹

Unlike China, the Soviet Union distanced itself from Algeria when Ben Bella was deposed by remaining temporarily neutral, whilst its Eastern European allies were hostile to the Boumedienne government.⁵⁶⁰ Fearing China's influence in Algeria and that Algeria would support China's campaign for the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Conference, the Soviet Union soon overcame its neutrality by recognising Boumedienne's government.⁵⁶¹

Throughout the summer immediately following Ben Bella's deposition, China and Algeria continued their warm

relations and contacts. In August, an Algerian government delegation led by Rabah Bitat, State Minister, paid a visit to China. During this visit, Bitat expressed Algeria's continuing close relations with China which

were forged and consolidated in the difficult years of revolutionary struggle. The Algerian people will always advance together with the Chinese people on the road of revolution.⁵⁶²

13.3.1.3. Guinea

In order that a genuine and just peace may be realised, imperialist aggression and the rule of colonialism must be terminated and the oppressed nations in the colonies and semi-colonies must be masters of their own country and exercise their state sovereignty. So long as colonialism continues to exist and the colonial and semi-colonial peoples are oppressed it will be impossible for the world to achieve genuine peace.⁵⁶³

Two important factors were largely responsible for the political and ideological co-operation in international relations between China and Guinea during this period (1959-66):

- i. As a result of its militant policies against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, Guinea, after independence, (like China) found itself under direct pressure from imperialist powers and especially France. China and Guinea found common ground in their policies which were opposed to imperialism and neo-colonialism.

ii. During this period, Guinea became the first sub-Saharan African country to express at a State-to-State level, dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Like China, Guinea urged the use of armed struggle for the achievement of national liberation. In Sekou Touré's view, peace could not be achieved by appeasement with the targets of the liberation forces, but only by 'the political consciousness and struggle of the people'.⁵⁶⁴

Sino-Guinean relations became closer, especially as relations between the Soviet Union and Guinea deteriorated.⁵⁶⁵ In fact, Guinea even expelled Daniel Solod, the Soviet Union's Ambassador, accusing him of subversive activities against the state by stirring up unrest amongst students.⁵⁶⁶

China's interest in Guinea did not stem from Sekou Touré's communist background;⁵⁶⁷ nor did it signify China's recognition of Guinea's 'socialism', rather it was based on Sekou Touré's uncompromising and aggressive posture against colonialist and imperialist powers, and on the firm support given by his government to national liberation movements and revolutionary forces in the Cameroon, the Congo and other parts of Africa. During Sekou Touré's visit to China (September 1960), both China and Guinea strongly condemned

imperialism's schemes to interfere in the Congo and encroach on its territorial integrity.⁵⁶⁸

- In the case of Algeria and the Cameroon, Guinea was very critical of the wavering support given by the Soviet Union to ^{the}FLN and ^{the}NPC.⁵⁶⁹ China's ideological perception

of Guinea was also influenced by the latter's position as a strategically vital base for the liberation movement in the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Guinea's condemnation of the 'illegal occupation of Formosa'⁵⁷⁰ by the United States constituted yet another factor governing the militant friendship between the two powers.

• Simultaneously with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Guinea and China at the ambassadorial level, a cultural co-operation agreement was signed between the two countries (4 October 1959). It included co-operation in the fields of education, arts, culture, news broadcasting, medicine, public health and sports. It was also agreed that, by the end of 1959, 10 Guinean students would be given scholarships for study in China by the Chinese government.

Guinea and China also agreed that Guinea would send a delegation to China to 'study popular education'. China agreed to send in December 1959 an 'acrobatic troupe' to perform in Guinea.⁵⁷¹ China's aid to Guinea in 1959 amounted to \$0.5 million.⁵⁷² As a part of the cultural agreement signed between China and Guinea, the Guinean Minister of Education visited China in December 1959. He returned home full of admiration for China's experience, saying that he was

quite convinced of the efficacy of Chinese methods. I was greatly impressed by the similarity of the economic problems that China has succeeded in solving and those that are now facing the peoples of Africa and China. I saw what can be done if you

mobilise the vital forces of a nation. With all due regard to the difference in magnitude we now propose to do the same. ⁵⁷³

Ahmed Sekou Touré was the first African Head of State to visit China (10-15 September 1960). He was well received, with more than half a million⁵⁷⁴ Chinese people rallying to welcome him as an anti-imperialist hero. He told them that

the sentiments of fraternity that united the people of Africa and Asia have a political and historical basis...these sentiments have been reinforced by their common hatred of imperialism and colonialism and also, and above all, by their common will to pursue and continue the struggle until imperialism vanishes and each nation on earth can be master of its destiny with freedom and dignity. ⁵⁷⁵ [emphasis added]

Sekou Touré showed a deep appreciation of the Chinese revolution and the application of its principles to African struggles for liberation.

...all the progress of your revolution, but to carry away lessons that could be applied to the actual conditions of the African struggle, so as to be able, in a unity of action and in understanding, to carry out more fully our programs for justice, democratic advance and civilisation for the benefit of all society...We already recognise the great contribution of your revolution and the unceasing efforts you have made at all times to push back the frontiers of misery and war, for the benefit of justice and peace. ⁵⁷⁶

In particular, Sekou Touré greatly admired the unique character of the Chinese revolution. It was

a revolution at once political, social, cultural and humane.⁵⁷⁷

Sekou Touré's visit ended with the signing of a Sino-Guinean Treaty of Friendship⁵⁷⁸ which was the first of its kind between China and an African country. China expressed the view that the signing of the Treaty constituted a

momentous event, not only in the history of Chinese-Guinean relations but also in the history of relations between China and Africa.⁵⁷⁹

Under this Treaty, both countries agreed to develop their cultural relations and contacts (Article 3).⁵⁸⁰ During Sekou Touré's visit, China and Guinea also signed an Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation under which

the government of the PRC is willing to grant the government of the Republic of Guinea within the period from September 13, 1960, to June 30, 1963, a non-interest bearing loan without any conditions or privileges attached. The amount of the loan is 100,000,000 (One Hundred Million Roubles) [i.e. \$26 million]. The above loan shall be repaid within a period of ten years from 1970 to 1979.⁵⁸¹

It was also agreed that the salaries of the Chinese experts, technicians and skilled workers, as well as their standard of living 'shall not exceed that of personnel of the same rank' of Guinea (Article 3).⁵⁸²

By 1966, China's aid to Guinea amounted to \$32.5 million.⁵⁸³ Guinea was the third⁵⁸⁴ largest recipient of

TABLE 13.2

AFRICAN STATE VISITS TO PRC

Year	Nation	Heads of State Visiting the PRC
1960	Guinea	Sekou Toure
1961	Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah
1964	Mali	Modibo Keita
1964	Congo	Alphonse Massamba-Debat
1964	Sudan	Ibrahim Abboud
1965	Tanzania	Julius K. Nyerere
1965	Somalia	Aden Abdulla Osman
1966	Ghana	*Kwame Nkrumah
1967	Mauritania	Ould Daddah
1967	Zambia	Kenneth Kaunda
1968	Tanzania	*Julius K. Nyerere
1970	Sudan	Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiry
1971	Ethiopia	Haile Selassie
1972	Somalia	Mohammed Siad Barre
1973	Congo	Marien Ngouabi
1973	Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo
1973	Mali	Moussa Traore
1973	Sierra Leone	Siaka Stevens
1973	Zaire	Mobutu Sese Seko
1974	Mauritania	*Ould Daddah
1974	Zambia	*Kenneth Kaunda
1974	Algeria	Houari Boumediene
1974	Nigeria	Yakubu Gowon
1974	Gabon	Omar Bongo
1974	Zaire	*Mobutu Sese Seko
1974	Senegal	Leopold Sedar Senghor
1974	Togo	Gnassingbe Eyadema
1974	Tanzania	*Julius K. Nyerere
1975	Gabon	*Omar Bongo
1975	Gambia	Dawda Kairaba Jawara
1975	Mozambique	Samora Moises Machel
1975	Sao Tome e Principe	Manuel Pinto da Costa
1976	Benin	Mathieu Kere Kou
1976	CAR	Salah Addis Ahmed Bokassa
1976	Madagascar	Didier Ratsiraka
1977	Sudan	*Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiry
1977	Gabon	*Omar Bongo
1977	Cameroon	*Ahmadou Ahidjo
1977	Mauritania	*Ould Daddah
1977	Equatorial Guinea	Macias Nguema
1977	Niger	Seyni Kountche
1978	Rwanda	Juvenal Habyarimana
1978	Seychelles	Albert René
1978	Congo (B)	Joachim Yhomby-Opango
1978	Mozambique	*Samora Moises Machel
1978	Liberia	W.R. Tolbert
1978	Chad	Felix Malloum Ngakoutou Bey-nedi
1978	Gabon	*Omar Bongo
1979	Djibouti	Hadj Hassen Gouled
1979	Burundi	Jean Bagaza
1980	Zaire	*Mobutu Sese Seko
1980	Zambia	*Kenneth Kaunda
1980	Guinea	*Ahmed Sekou Touré
1980	Mauritania	Mohamed Khouna Oubl Haidalla
1980	Congo (B)	Denis Sassou N'Guesso
1980	Kenya	Daniel Arap Moi
1978	Zimbabwe	*Robert Mugabe
1981	Tanzania	*Julius K. Nyerere
1981	Zimbabwe	*Robert Mugabe
1981	Mali	*Moussa Traore
1981	Togo	Gnassingbe Eyadema
1982	Liberia	Samuel Kanoya Doe

1976	CAR		
1976	Madagascar	Salah Addis Ahmed Bokassa	
1977	Sudan	Didier Ratsiraka	
1977	Gabon	*Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiry	
1977	Cameroon	*Omar Bongo	
1977	Mauritania	*Ahmadou Ahidjo	
1977	Equatorial Guinea	*Ould Daddah	
1977	Niger	Macias Nguema	
1978	Rwanda	Seyni Kountche	
1978	Seychelles	Juvenal Habyarimana	
1978	Congo (B)	Albert René	
1978	Mozambique	Joachim Yhomby-Opango	
1978	Liberia	*Samora Moises Machel	
1978	Chad	W. R. Tolbert	
1978	Gabon	Felix Malloum	Ngakoutou Bey-nedi
1979	Djibouti	*Omar Bongo	
1979	Burundi	Hadj Hassen Gouled	
1980	Zaire	Jean Bagaza	
1980	Zambia	*Mobutu Sese Seko	
1980	Guinea	*Kenneth Kaunda	
1980	Mauritania	*Ahmed Sekou Touré	
1980	Congo (B)	Mohamed Khouna Oubl Haidalla	
1980	Kenya	Denis Sassou N'Gouesso	
1978	Zimbabwe	Daniel Arap Moi	
1981	Tanzania	*Robert Mugabe	
1981	Zimbabwe	*Julius K. Nyerere	
1981	Mali	*Robert Mugabe	
1981	Togo	*Moussa Traore	
1982	Liberia	Gnassingbe Eyadema	
1982	Algeria	Samuel Kanyon Doe	
1982	Zaire	Chadli Ben Djedid	
1982	Cape Verde	*Mobutu Sese Seko	
1983	Egypt	Joao Bernardo Viera	
1983	Seychelles	Hosni Mobarak	
1983	Rwanda	Albert Rene	
1983	Central African Republic	Juvenal Habyarimana	
1983	Sao Tome & Principe	Andre Diedanne Kolingaba	
1983	Gabon	Manuel Pinto da Costa	
1983	Botswana	*Hadj Omar Bongo	
1983	Lesotho	Quett K.J. Masire	
1984	Senegal	Leabua Jonathan	
1984	Mozambique	Abdou Diouf	
1984	Sudan	*Samore Moises Machel	
1984	Niger	*Gaafar Nimeiry	
1985	Sierra Leone	Seyni Kountché	
1985	Zimbabwe	Siaka Stevens	
1985	Tanzania	*Robert Mugabe	
1985	Equatorial Guinea	*Julius K. Nyerere	
1985	Ghana	Teodoro Nguema Mbasogo	
1985	Madagascar	Jerry Rawlings	
1985	Mauritania	Didier Ratsiraka	
1986		Maaouya Ould Sid'ahmed Taya	

* Repeat visit.

TABLE 13.3

AFRICAN DELEGATIONS VISITING CHINA (1960-66)

Country of Origin	Year	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
Algeria		6	3	2	8	9	4	6
Angola		-	1	-	1	2	2	3
Botswana		-	-	-	-	-	1	2
Burundi		-	-	-	2	2	-	-
Cameroun		6	3	1	2	2	-	1
Congo-Brazzaville		-	1	-	-	3	11	16
Congo Kinshasa		11	2	1	3	-	2	1
Central African Republic		1	-	-	-	1	4	-
Chad		1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dahomey		-	-	1	-	1	1	1
Egypt		1	1	2	2	5	10	2
Ethiopia		-	1	-	1	-	-	-
Gabon		1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gambia		-	-	-	-	2	3	-
Ghana		6	3	2	6	4	8	2
Guinea		7	5	4	6	5	8	7
Guinea (Bissau)		2	1	1	1	-	1	2
Ivory Coast		3	-	-	1	-	-	1
Kenya		3	1	5	11	7	5	-
Lesotho		1	-	-	3	1	2	2
Libya		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malawi		1	-	-	-	1	-	-
Mali		5	4	2	7	10	8	10
Mauritania		1	-	-	-	-	-	2
Mauritius		1	-	-	1	1	1	-
Malagasy		1	-	-	2	1	-	1
Mozambique		-	-	-	5	1	2	1
Morocco		6	2	-	4	3	3	5
Niger		-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Nigeria		4	4	2	4	1	-	1
Rhodesia		-	1	-	2	3	-	2
Rwanda		-	-	-	1	1	-	1
South Africa		-	1	-	5	2	3	3
Senegal		-	7	-	1	1	2	-
Sierra Leone		4	1	-	-	2	-	2
Somali Republic		6	3	3	6	3	6	7
Sudan		4	7	1	2	4	4	7
South West Africa		1	-	-	3	1	2	1
Swaziland		-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Tanganyika		1	1	3	9	5	16	13
Zanzibar		5	-	4	8	10	-	-
Tunisia		2	1	1	-	-	1	1
Uganda		2	1	1	3	3	2	3
Togo		3	-	1	-	-	-	1
Zambia		-	-	-	-	3	1	3
Blk. African Youth		2	2	-	3	1	1	1
Blk. African Trade Un.		-	1	-	-	1	-	1
Annual total		98	58	37	113	103	114	114
General Total					637			

Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 270 (Table 2).

TABLE 13.4

CHINESE DELEGATIONS VISITING AFRICAN COUNTRIES (1960-66)

Country Visited	Year	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
Egypt		5	10	5	6	7	8	8
Morocco		3	3	3	6	2	3	-
Tunisia		3	1	-	-	1	-	-
Sudan		1	1	3	-	2	2	2
Ghana		1	5	8	5	7	8	-
Guinea		7	4	9	3	6	8	6
Algeria		1	-	5	15	17	11	2
Congo-Kinshasa		1	1	1	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia		1	1	2	-	2	-	1
Mali		1	3	8	7	9	8	7
Somali Republic		1	1	1	-	2	3	3
Dahomey		-	1	1	-	3	-	-
Niger		-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Nigeria		-	1	-	-	2	-	-
Senegal		-	2	-	1	-	-	-
Sierra Leone		-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Tanganyika		-	1	1	2	14	6	7
Zanzibar		-	-	-	1			
Togo		-	1	1	-	-	-	-
Upper Volta		-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Burundi		-	-	1	1	-	-	-
Gabon		-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Ivory Coast		-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Uganda		-	-	1	1	-	-	-
Kenya		-	-	-	2	4	-	-
Cameroun		-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Central African Republic		-	-	-	-	1	4	-
Congo-Brazzaville		-	-	-	-	4	8	7
Zambia		-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Mauritania		-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Mauritius		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Equatorial Guinea		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Libya		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Annual total		25	39	52	50	87	69	47
General Total					369			

Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 269 (Table 1).

TABLE 13.5

TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN PRC AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Name of Country	Date of Signature*	Date of Commencement
Guinea	13 September 1960	1 July 1961
Ghana	19 August 1960	28 March 1962
Congo (Brazzaville)	2 October 1964	9 January 1965
Mali	3 November 1964	20 April 1965
Tanzania	20 February 1965	9 November 1965

* All treaties were signed in Beijing.

Chinese aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (9.8% of China's total aid to Sub-Saharan Africa) during this period (1959-66). A few months after Sekou Touré's visit to China (February 1961), China sent 4,500 tons of rice, 10 cinema projectors, X-Ray apparatus, and 100 cases of pharmaceuticals to Guinea.⁵⁸⁵

Guinea's uncompromising policy against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, in contrast to the Soviet Union's moderate line, made it, in Chinese eyes, one of the more militant pro-Chinese countries of Africa.⁵⁸⁶ At a meeting of the World Peace Council (Stockholm: December 1961), Guinea, like China opposed the Soviet proposal that the conference should be given the name of a 'Congress For Peace, National Independence and Disarmament'.⁵⁸⁷

The militant political relationship between Guinea and China developed side by side with strong economic co-operation between the two countries. In May 1963, two protocols relating to the Agreement already signed between Guinea and China were signed. It included a package of military aid for the liberation fighters of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.⁵⁸⁸ A few months later, two large shipments of heavy Chinese goods arrived in Guinea and 100 Guinean teachers went to China.⁵⁸⁹

In May 1964, the Chinese Minister of Education, visited Guinea. He concluded his visit by signing a new cultural agreement between the two countries. More aid was promised in the field of education, and more grants of studentships to enable Guinean students to study in China.⁵⁹⁰

Soon after the conclusion of the first Sino-Guinean economic agreement, Chinese agricultural experts arrived in Guinea to help the country in the cultivation of rice and other crops. Chinese technical experts were also sent to work on other industrial projects financed by China.⁵⁹¹ By September 1964, the Chinese completed the construction of a cigarette and match factory in Conakry.⁵⁹² This made Guinea self-sufficient in cigarettes and matches.

In February 1965, China agreed to build a conference centre in Conakry.⁵⁹³ In January 1967, a Hydro-Electric station for supplying power to the region of the Djallan Highlands (Central Guinea) was completed. China's economic aid proved very useful to Guinea in its attempts to promote self-reliance and to combat the economic blockade mounted by hostile Western powers against it. Sekou Touré publicly acknowledged Guinea's debt to China on the occasion of Zhou Enlai's visit⁵⁹⁴ to Guinea (January 1964). Sekou Touré expressed his thanks to the Chinese for their 'disinterested help' to Guinea's 'fight of consolidation' and 'rapid development'.⁵⁹⁵

If it is true that revolution can be neither imported nor exported, it is just as true that revolutions, born in similar historic conditions, based on the same principles, directed towards similar goals, necessarily partake of the same nature, are under the same banner and in one and the same historical current determining the nature and universal evolution. It is through joining their awakened material and human faces that the Solidarity, uniting the PRC, and the Republic of Guinea is established, independently of the feelings of deep and true friendship which bring together the peoples of China and of Guinea within

the framework of Afro-Asian relations.⁵⁹⁶

Chinese goodwill, aid and hard work was grudgingly recognised at the time even by Western analysts

Few of the personnel of the communist bloc embassies or missions, except the Chinese, have attempted to employ local labour or have made much effort to learn local languages.

The Chinese have an entirely different approach. They stress manual labour and do not hesitate to perform the humblest tasks, as in road-building, along with Guineans, in native villages, without PX or commissary privileges, earning no more, eating no better than Guineans they work with. They create an impression of frugality and austerity. As a result they are far more popular than western missions and their air-conditioned offices, big cars and the rest.⁵⁹⁷

Guinea was the first country in Africa in which the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai found President Sekou Touré to be in agreement with him⁵⁹⁸ on the major issues affecting international relations. He found the ideological atmosphere in Conakry so agreeable that he felt free to spell out China's revolutionary assessment of the world in a manner similar to that which was to be adopted by the more flamboyant⁵⁹⁹ Lin Biao a year later (1965)

the world situation today is favourable to the struggle of the peoples to win and preserve independence and freedom and unfavourable to imperialism and new and old colonialism. The national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have formed an irresistible torrent bounding the embankment of imperialism and

colonialism. The powerful national democratic revolutionary movements in these areas are effectively hitting at and weakening the imperialist forces of war and have contributed immensely to the cause of the people throughout the world in opposing imperialism and defending world peace.⁵⁰⁰

Indeed, Sino-Guinean relations during this period reached such a level of intimacy that China characterised Guinea as one of the leading progressive countries in Africa as well as in other parts of the world to join forces with it in order to strengthen Afro-Asian solidarity.

13.3.1.4. Mali

From 1960 (the year of its independence) until the overthrow of President Modibo Keita in 1968, Mali was perhaps the only African country which openly took China's side as opposed to the Soviet Union's on most international issues - and especially those concerning the best means of struggle against colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism. During Zhou Enlai's tour of Africa (December 1963-February 1964) Mali was perhaps the only African country to issue a joint *communiqué* fully endorsing China's international line.⁵⁰¹

During the brief interval (1958-60) of participation in de Gaulle's project of autonomy based on the system of *Communauté Française* (1958),⁵⁰² Mali did not have any diplomatic or political contact with China.

In June 1960, the French Sudan and Senegal formed the Mali Federation with Leopold Sedar Senghor as President,

and Modibo Keita as Prime Minister. The Federation, however, did not last long (20 June-20 August¹⁹⁶⁰). Right from the beginning, Keita was actively engaged in preparing the ground for a break with the *Communauté Française*, because of ideological differences⁶⁰³ between his actively militant party of the *Union Soudanaise* (US)⁶⁰⁴ and Sedar Senghor's moderate *Union Progressive Sénégalaise* (UPS). Internally, UPS advocated capitalist development policies. Externally, it sought closer co-operation with the colonialist and imperialist powers, and especially France.⁶⁰⁵ Unlike US, which saw *Communauté Française*, (and the continued presence of French troops and bases) as 'disaster for Africa',⁶⁰⁶ UPS viewed them as a necessary step, and that

[France] has realised in part the dream of the old African Emperors. It has done more; it has organised their dream of creating a federation out of individual countries and building a common spirit through the French language.⁶⁰⁷

US sought immediate independence from France,⁶⁰⁸ advocated socialist policies⁶⁰⁹ for economic development for the Federation and urged continuous struggles against colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa, as well as in other parts of the world. As a result of these differences, US left the Federation and formed its own government in Mali (20 August 1960). This was followed by the establishment of the Republic of Mali, with Keita, as President. The socialist orientation of the country was

written into its new constitution (approved by the National Assembly) which in part read as follows:

The Republic of Mali is an indivisible, democratic and social State. It guarantees before the law the equality of all, irrespective of social origin, race, sex or religion. 610

The new government strongly condemned the neo-colonialist designs of the Colonial Powers. France's military bases were closed down and its troops were ordered to leave the country, whilst French policies and action against liberation fighters in Algeria were condemned. At the same time, UN came in for strong criticism for its passive role in the process of de-colonialisation. The United States' intervention in Vietnam was condemned. British policy in Rhodesia was vehemently attacked; the new government broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. Zionism and the aggressive role played by Israel in the Middle East with the support of the West were also condemned. 611

Less than 5 weeks (25 October 1960) after becoming President (20 September), Keita invited Ko Hua, China's Ambassador to Guinea, to Bamako (capital of Mali) where he discussed with him Mali's willingness to establish diplomatic relations with China. Two days later, (27 October), the two countries established diplomatic relations at Ambassadorial level..

My government supports the efforts of the Government of the People's Republic of China to have her place restored in ...the international community. This is a position of objectivity and

reason. It is in fact illogical and unthinkable merely to pledge the attainment of peace and security without admitting to international gatherings, which discuss the conditions for the maintenance of peace, representatives of a great and powerful nation such as People's China with a population of 650 million... My Government takes the firm position of opposing any division of territory for the sake of creating an artificial State which constitutes a permanent menace to peace and security.⁶¹²

Commenting on Mali's recognition of PRC⁶¹³ and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries,⁶¹⁴ *People's Daily* (18 October 1960) wrote as follows:

The mutual recognition of China and the Republic of Mali not only marks a new development of friendship between the Chinese and Mali peoples and opens up broad perspectives for relations of friendly co-operation between the Governments of the two countries; it also shows that the friendly relations between China and the newly independent African countries are growing rapidly.⁶¹⁵

On the occasion of a visit to Mali by a Chinese Trade Mission (February 1961), a Trade and Payment Agreement was concluded between the two countries, under which China agreed to export machinery, farm machines and tools, scientific instruments and electrical appliances, chemicals, drugs and medical apparatus, metalware and steel products⁶¹⁶ etc., to Mali. In view of the fact that Mali had very little to export to China, and that its capacity to repay loans with foreign exchange was very

limited to say the least, this agreement was really an aid agreement in substance.⁶¹⁷

Maderia Keita, Mali's Minister for the Interior and Information, visited China (September 1960) where he signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the two countries.⁶¹⁸ Included in this agreement was an interest-free Chinese loan of \$19.8 million.⁶¹⁹ The agreement was followed by the arrival of experts from China (January 1962) to work on labour-intensive irrigation projects and the planting of rice, tea and sugar cane.⁶²⁰ China's aid was described by *l'Essor*, the official party organ of US, as a major contribution to Mali's efforts in the spheres of economic development and independence which 'is another form of the struggle against imperialism'.⁶²¹ China's model of economic development was described by Foreign Minister of Mali (November 1964) as

[a] most remarkable test of the capacity for development of underdeveloped countries.⁶²²

During Zhou Enlai's visit to Mali (16-21 Jnuary 1964), President Keita paid a warm tribute to China's aid pointing out the

low cost of its technical assistance, for the readiness of its technicians to adapt themselves to the lives of our people, for the speed and competence with which the projects...are carried out one by one, and all these are done without the slightest intention of interfering in our internal affairs.⁶²³

Militant relations between the two countries drew closer especially after Mali refused to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) (April 1963), and urged small nations of the Third World to stand up against the collusion between the two Super Powers.

In the face of the stubborn refusal of imperialism to disarm and its determination in defiance of the unanimous opinion of the peoples, to pursue the foolish policy of all-out disarmament...the strengthening of the self-defence capability of the Asian, African and Latin American countries becomes an urgent necessity.⁶²⁴

Relations between Mali and China were further consolidated when President Keita visited China (October 1964) where he, like Zhou Enlai earlier during the year (February), stressed that

the situation is most favourable for revolution throughout the continent of Africa.⁶²⁵

At the same time, Mali reaffirmed its

support for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for the just struggles of the Chinese Government and people to liberate their own territory, Taiwan.⁶²⁶

China's success in exploding its first atom bomb (16 October 1964) was viewed by Keita as a 'tremendous scientific political and moral success'.⁶²⁷ In a New Year's message (1965) Keita stated that

the atom bomb of socialist China...was also the bomb of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and other parts of the world.⁶²⁸

Mamadou Gologo, Mali's Minister of Information and Tourism, a strong admirer of the Chinese Revolution, called China's technological achievement a contribution to 'world progress'.⁶²⁹

The success of the Chinese people are the fruits of its realism, its ingenuity, its will, its patience, its moral and physical courage.⁶³⁰

Mali and China signed a Treaty of Friendship⁶³¹ (3 November) at the conclusion of Keita's visit to China and an economic agreement in which China agreed to supply industrial equipment to Mali.⁶³² This was in addition to a donation of \$7.9 million⁶³³ given by China to Mali (3 November) during Keita's visit. In December, as part of the economic agreement, China sent workers to begin the construction of factories to make cigarettes and watches, and of refineries for sugar, vegetable oils and a cotton mill.⁶³⁴ Chinese experts received wages at an estimated \$80 a month, roughly one-third the salaries of experts belonging to other socialist countries.⁶³⁵ By 1965, work on the construction of a sugar refinery and a cigarette and match factory had been thus completed,⁶³⁶ while at least 13 other projects were nearing completion - including rice plantations and several light industrial projects such as a ceramic factory, a textile mill and a brick factory.⁶³⁷

13.3.1.5. Ghana

Although Ghana became independent in March 1957, and like China had taken part in the historic Afro-Asian conference (Bandung: April 1955), it established diplomatic relations with China only in July 1960. Three major factors would seem to account for the delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

i. China might have thought that in view of his strong attachment⁶³⁸ to the Commonwealth, Nkrumah was unlikely to be an active opponent of colonialism and imperialism. It therefore adopted a 'wait and see' attitude towards Ghana. Unlike Morocco (with which China was not stopped from establishing diplomatic relations despite its monarchical system for reasons already given), Ghana was not at this point central to the revolutionary and liberation struggles that were actually taking place in Africa.

ii. Until 1960, Nkrumah was not favourably disposed towards communism or to the communist powers of the world ideologically and politically.

...colonialism and imperialism [may] come in a different guise - not necessarily from Europe.⁶³⁹

iii. Nkrumah's Pan Africanism was strongly nationalist and African oriented in character. As such, it contributed little to the primacy attached by China to the idea of a united and solid Afro-Asian world against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism.

Until it became clear that his policy of support for UN intervention in the Congo(L) was a failure, Nkrumah was convinced that his fundamental aim of building a United States of Africa could be achieved in collaboration with the Western powers. It was only after Lumumba was murdered (February 1961) that Nkrumah realised that being wedded to peaceful political methods of achieving an independent and liberated Africa could only lead to an entrenching of the forces of neo-colonialism in the continent and an undermining of the forces of Pan Africanism and African unity. Influenced by events in the Congo(L), Nkrumah and his radical advisers reached the conclusion that the task of 'founding a Pan-African State' could not be accomplished through a search for the political kingdom alone.

Neo-colonialism had become too potent in Africa...now he became convinced that without an economic revolution political independence would be impossible, and that economic independence could only come through Socialism! This was in agreement with China's viewpoint.⁶⁴⁰

Ghana's eventual disenchantment with the West and realisation that the Communist world had unquestionably contributed to the achievement of African liberation were the obverse and reverse of the same coin. Ghana's policies, during the '60s, developed accordingly, coinciding with China's decision to continue its policy of uncompromising opposition to the imperialist powers in

preference to the Soviet Union's new approach of 'peaceful coexistence' with them.

In this new political ambience, China and Ghana began their diplomatic relations (5 July 1960) which rapidly developed into a close relationship between like-minded states (1959-66). Huang Hua, a senior administrator in the Chinese Foreign Ministry who later (1978) became Foreign Minister, was nominated as China's first Ambassador to Ghana. In August 1961, Nkrumah became the second (after Sekou Touré of Guinea) African Head of State to visit China. More than 100,000 Chinese people⁶⁴¹ greeted Nkrumah on his arrival in Beijing (14 August). During this visit, Ghana reaffirmed its strong support for China's admission to UN. Its absence from the international organisation, Nkrumah argued

raises the fundamental question of the structure of the General Assembly itself.⁶⁴²

On the occasion of Nkrumah's visit to China, the two countries signed Trade and Payment agreements as well as an agreement on economic and technical co-operation (including provisions for an interest-free loan of \$19.6 million⁶⁴³ and for experts from China to help diversify Ghana's agriculture which was then almost entirely dependent on cocoa).⁶⁴⁴ The financial loan was to be invested in an integral textile and knitwear factory and an enamel-ware factory, and in State farms.⁶⁴⁵ China also pledged to train Ghanaians in China to take over the running of such projects. China agreed that its experts

in Ghana would only be paid maintenance allowances by the government of Ghana without any special privileges.

These generous Chinese terms must have influenced the Soviet Union's easing of the restrictions on its aid in order to win Ghana's appreciation. The salary of Soviet personnel for which Ghana was liable was thus reduced by half, the Soviet government undertaking to pay the other half.⁶⁴⁶

In June 1964, China offered Ghana another interest-free loan (\$22.4 million)⁶⁴⁷ aimed at enabling the achievement of some of the targets of its seven year plan.⁶⁴⁸

The cordial and militant relations between Ghana and China helped the flow of trade between the two countries.⁶⁴⁹ China's imports from Ghana steadily expanded during the period 1960 (\$11.4 million) - 1965 (\$6.2 million); during the period 1957-65, its exports increased from \$0.8 million to \$13.5 million.⁶⁵⁰

Sino-Ghanaian relations were consolidated further with Ghana's condemnation⁶⁵¹ of the transfer of arms from Britain to India following the Sino-Indian border clash (October 1962). Nkrumah made his country's opposition to British military support for India clear when he said that he was 'distressed and saddened' by such a deal. At the same time, Nkrumah appealed to Britain to refrain from

any action that may aggravate the unfortunate situation.⁶⁵²

It is worth noting that Ghana's position in this respect was influenced by its opposition to British intervention in the internal affairs of another Commonwealth country rather than by a predisposition in favour of China in the dispute itself. But Ghana's specific objection had the effect of appearing to favour China at India's expense.

Nkrumah's developing conviction that armed struggle and people's war were the only practical means for the achievement of a united and liberated Africa must have led him to refer to the Chinese leaders as his 'natural allies'.⁶⁵³ Whatever the precise nature of the ideological differences between Nkrumah and the Chinese leaders, Nkrumah recognised the fact that they

were right in their view of the liberation movement.⁶⁵⁴

Nkrumah realised that China and not the Soviet Union was prepared to offer the services of practical experts in guerrilla warfare and people's wars. Soviet instructors were expelled (June 1962) from Ghana's training camp, Mankrong (which was opened in November 1961). Nkrumah had no reason to trust the Soviet Union's commitment to the idea that armed struggle was necessary because of its preoccupation with *Détente* and advocacy of peaceful coexistence

...the Russian instructors themselves proved to be a problem. They were given a car, a cook, a houseboy, and an unlimited supply of food and alcoholic drinks.⁶⁵⁵

The head of the camp in Mankong accused two Soviet instructors of

wasting food and drink, of being arrogant and of bad behaviour.⁶⁵⁶

He

was glad to see them leave in June.⁶⁵⁷

The first group of Chinese guerrilla experts led by Colonel Yen Lenga arrived in Ghana in October 1964. They set to work on giving training to liberation fighters in the major base at Halfalf-Assimi (a small village close to the border between Ghana and Ivory Coast).⁶⁵⁸ A few months later the base was removed to Obenemasce for security reasons.⁶⁵⁹ By January 1965 nearly 20 Chinese instructors and guerrilla experts were actively engaged in training liberation fighters.⁶⁶⁰ Takoradi, Ghana's port, was opened for the transport of arms sent by China to the liberation movements of the Congo(L), Portuguese colonies and Southern Africa.⁶⁶¹

Despite his claim to being neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute,⁶⁶² Nkrumah seemed to be more favourably inclined to China's view of the world than to the Soviet Union'. As early as 1949, Nkrumah told members of the nationalist movement in Ghana to follow the advice of the Chinese leaders.

Go to the people
Live among them
Learn from them
Love them
Serve them
Plan with them

Start with what they know
Build on what they have
This would have been my advice to
members of any nationalist and
progressive party. ⁶⁶³

Later, during the '60s, Nkrumah expressed the following
view:

Only China, with its huge population
and massive land extent, combined with
its noncompetitive, centrally planned
system of production and distribution,
has a rate of productivity that is
making her a potential challenge to the
only two powers whose weight counts in
our present world. That is the reason
why the United States refuses to admit
China into the United Nations and why
the Soviet Union is respectful of her
attitude. ⁶⁶⁴

On another occasion, Nkrumah stated that

Ghana could learn much from the Chinese
to help Ghanaians in their plans for
the development of the country. ⁶⁶⁵

China's refusal to follow the Soviet Union's approach
to international relations was welcomed by Ghana. During
a visit to China (October 1963) by a Ghanaian Trade
delegation, both China and Ghana jointly reaffirmed their
ideological alignment on major international questions.

Both sides unanimously recognised
imperialism as the source of war and
the enemy of national liberation and
world peace, and held that independence
and peace can be won only when resolute
struggle is waged against imperialism
and colonialism. Both sides expressed
unanimous support for all oppressed
nations and peoples in their struggle
against imperialism and colonialism and
for national liberation. ⁶⁶⁶

Like most radical and revolutionary leaders in Africa, Nkrumah felt that the Sino-Soviet dispute would have the effect of undermining the solidarity of liberation forces and the international support they were capable of attracting. Thus Nkrumah argued that the African orientation towards the Sino-Soviet Union dispute

should be to seek the unity of the socialist countries, for it is only through this unity that they can support us in our struggle against imperialism and colonialism.⁶⁶⁷

Zhou Enlai received a warm welcome when he visited Ghana (11-16 January 1964). On this occasion, Nkrumah reaffirmed Ghana's support for China's stance on major⁶⁶⁸ international issues,⁶⁶⁹ its opposition to the support given by imperialist powers to India⁶⁷⁰ against China, and its condemnation of the British policy of thwarting the revolutionary forces in East Africa.⁶⁷¹ At the farewell banquet given in honour of Zhou Enlai, Nkrumah again expressed his admiration for China's economic, political and ideological methods. At the same time, he urged the use of China's experience not only for African liberation but also for African economic development.

We have learned with interest the methods by which the people of China have mobilized their resources for the reconstruction of their country and the improvement of their living conditions...the example of China's determination, organisation, discipline and unity cannot be lost on Africa at this time.⁶⁷²

13.3.1.6. Tanzania

I gather - that even the suits I wear have been adduced as evidence of pernicious Chinese influence ... sometimes I wonder whether the Western countries are not rapidly developing an inferiority complex towards the eastern countries, and China in particular.⁶⁷³

The national independence movement in Tanganyika effectively began only after the foundation (July 1954) of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) with Julius K. Nyerere as its Chairman. TANU's objectives were listed as follows:

to fight against tribalism,
construction of a nation,
attainment of a democratic government,
promotion of African economic and
cultural development,
rejection of all forms of racism and
discrimination, and
establishment of close ties between the
Party and trade unions and co-operative
organisations.⁶⁷⁴

TANU advocated peaceful negotiations rather than physical confrontation with the colonial powers as the appropriate method to be adopted in order to achieve and bring racism to an end. In the election of 1960 of the 'Legislative Assembly', TANU won 70 out of a total of 71 contested seats. Only one seat was won by United Tanganyika Party, (UPT)⁶⁷⁵ a pro-British party opposed to TANU. In December 1961, Tanganyika won its independence with Nyerere Prime Minister. A year later, he became the President of the Republic of Tanganyika.⁶⁷⁶

On the day of independence (9 December 1961), Tanganyika recognised China. After a meeting between Huang Hua (China's Ambassador to Ghana) who attended the country's independence ceremony, and Nyerere, both China and Tanganyika agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level.⁶⁷⁷

Tanganyika's recognition of China was by no means based on the former's radical and progressive character, but rather on Nyerere's 'belief in the illogicality of not recognising a big country'.⁶⁷⁸ However, the radical forces in the Tanganyikan government played an important part in Nyerere's recognition of China. Similarly, it was the radicals in the government and trade unions⁶⁷⁹ of Tanganyika who persuaded Nyerere to invite Zhou Enlai to visit⁶⁸⁰ the country during the latter's African tour (December 1963-February 1964). Otherwise, until 1964, Nyerere had been regarded by the Western press as 'moderate' and 'realistic'.⁶⁸¹ By virtue of both his education and his strong adherence to the Catholic religion, he was naturally pro-Western in his inclinations.

Less than three years after Tanganyika's independence (9 December 1961) and only four months after the independence (10 December 1963) of Zanzibar which was swiftly followed by a revolution (12 January 1964), a merger took place between the two (26 April 1964) first into the Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and subsequently (from October 1964) into the United Republic

of Tanzania. Nyerere became the new republic's first President, with Karume as First Vice-President.

It is beyond the scope of this work to enter into a detailed discussion of the motives and forces underlying the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The factors (there is no one single reason) given below were at work in the emergence of political forces leading to the unification.

- i. Despite the progressive character of the AAPS-UMMA⁶⁰² coalition in Zanzibar and the moderate character of ^{the} TANU in Tanganyika, both parties appeared to share the same objective of uniting the two territories with a view to consolidating their sovereignty and independence in the face of threats and disturbances from external sources.
- ii. Nyerere perhaps hoped that the incorporation of Zanzibar and Tanganyika into a single nation would serve the purpose of preventing Zanzibar moving further in the direction of becoming a Marxist-Leninist state,⁶⁰³ whilst at the same time a long standing ambition of Tanganyika could also be achieved through such a union. As far as the radical leaders of the AAPS-UMMA coalition were concerned, unity represented a major thrust in favour of consolidation of their revolution in East Africa. Babu, Zanzibar's Foreign Minister at the time, saw the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar as a necessary step in the revolutionary process as it unfolded itself in Africa, Asia and Latin America.⁶⁰⁴

iii. Both countries faced serious economic problems.⁶⁸⁵ The leaders of both sides thought that the pooling of their financial resources - Zanzibar's economic advantage derived from its position as the world's major producer of cloves, accounting for for 80 per cent of the total world production⁶⁸⁶ and Tanganyika's position as a producer of cereals, coffee, tea and cotton, and as a major producer of sisal - would ease their economic difficulties.

iv. Both Tanganyika and Zanzibar shared the aim of toning down the adverse publicity given by the Western powers and the pro-Western régimes in Africa, labelling Zanzibar as 'Africa's first Cuba'⁶⁸⁷ or as the 'Red China Agent'.⁶⁸⁸ This was particularly important because Tanganyika had already experienced an army mutiny against British officers in January 1964. As a result of pressure from Britain, Tanganyika cultivated friendly relations with Kenya and Uganda, its neighbours with a moderate and even pro-Western political orientation. It is likely that Nyerere believed that exercising a restraining influence on Zanzibar through union would be to the advantage of East Africa as a whole. Nyerere perhaps feared the involvement of imperialists and Big Powers in Zanzibar as in the case of the Congo. Unity between Tanganyika and Zanzibar would reduce the likelihood of such an undesirable eventuality.

1

The Soviet Union, which had just begun to exert a great influence in the island of Zanzibar, viewed the foundation of Tanzania with a sense of apprehension. Its

disappointment was motivated by the fear that Zanzibar's merger with Tanganyika would undermine Soviet influence in the island as relations between the Soviet Union and the mainland (Tanganyika) had never been friendly. The Soviet Union also feared that Zanzibar might be spurred into de-recognising East Germany⁶⁸⁹ under the influence of the leadership of the mainland. It is not surprising that, as Ogunsanwu noted after a series of interviews with the leaders, the Soviet Union attempted to blockade the region.⁶⁹⁰

Unlike the Soviet Union,⁶⁹¹ China recognised the union immediately after it came into existence. It viewed the union as an important step in strengthening the anti-imperialist front. Perhaps, China also hoped that the revolutionaries in Zanzibar would be able to push Nyerere further towards a positive and effective opposition to colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. At the same time, China hoped to exert more influence in the new united country at the expense of the Soviet Union. Thus, right from the announcement of the union (26 April 1964), China began to deal with the two parts - Tanganyika and Zanzibar - as a single undifferentiated sovereign political unit. As far as China was concerned, the coming into existence of 'the new United Republic of Tanzania' constituted a blow to US imperialism⁶⁹² which had worked hard to breach the union.

In June 1964, Rašhidi Kawawa, the Second Vice-President of the United Republic, led a joint government delegation to China. On the occasion of his visit, China

offered two interest-free loans - one, of \$14 million to aid Zanzibar (with 300,000 population); and, the other of \$28 million⁶⁹² for Tanganyika (with a population of 10 million). This offer made Tanzania the largest recipient of China's aid in Africa in 1964 (40 per cent of the total aid given to the continent).⁶⁹⁴ At the opening of an exhibition of Chinese goods and products (Dar Es Salaam: July 1964), Rashidi Kawawa wrote as follows in the Visitors' Book:

Tremendous strides have been made in China in the war against poverty, ignorance and disease, and it is probably safe to say that more has been achieved for ordinary people there in the last 15 years than in all the previous thousands of years of China's proud history.⁶⁹⁵

In the military sphere, China showed its readiness to back Nyerere with military aid, and, if he also wished,⁶⁹⁶ training too, to replace the arms that were destroyed during the army mutiny against British officers. Tanzania welcomed the offer. China's military aid to Zanzibar before the union⁶⁹⁷ helped remove any possible suspicions on Nyerere's part which might have been provoked by Western propaganda against the presence of Chinese arms and military experts in Africa. In August 1964, Tanzania became the first⁶⁹⁸ African country (at State-to-State level)⁶⁹⁹ to have official Chinese military aid and personnel training.⁷⁰⁰

Not surprisingly, Tanzania's decision to accept China's military aid evoked a strong propaganda campaign

by Western powers warning Nyerere of the undesirable consequences⁷⁰¹ of China's military presence in Tanzania for his government. This Western campaign was, however, much influenced by the fear that Tanzania would become a major base for southern African and Congolese liberation forces, among others. Dar es Salaam had in fact already become the major base for OAU's Liberation Committee.

China's military aid to Tanzania not only stimulated Nyerere's government into adopting a more positive anti-imperialist stance, but also facilitated direct access to China's military aid to liberation forces. In the event, Nyerere's government largely ignored the anti-China campaign of the Western powers.⁷⁰² In contrast to the Western powers, Tanzania viewed China's military presence as a major thrust in favour of African liberation. As for the fear of the risks to his government of accepting China's military aid, Nyerere, at a press conference (31 August 1964) explained that

the maximum risk the government takes is that the army revolt. But my army revolted in January - it was not trained by the Chinese.⁷⁰³ [emphasis added]

In the economic field, Sino-Tanzanian co-operation developed rapidly. Within six months of offering aid to Tanzania China promised in December 1964 to build two high-powered transmitters.⁷⁰⁴ In January 1965, China agreed to help Tanzania establish a 5,000 acre State Farm at Ravu, capable of employing 700 people. China also agreed to give Tanzania an interest-free loan of \$3 million to

Finance construction of an integrated textile mill.⁷⁰⁶ When Babu, Tanzania's Minister for Commerce and Co-operation, led a Trade Delegation to China (February 1965), China agreed to buy from Tanzania 80,000 bags of cotton (about a quarter of its total cotton production), sisal, tobacco, cloth and copra. In exchange, Tanzania undertook to buy Chinese textiles, building materials, hardware, bicycles, sewing machines and stationery.⁷⁰⁶

Faced on one side with Western pressure, and on the other with radical and pro-Chinese forces in ASP, TANU and in his government, Nyerere became much more progressive especially in the sphere of international relations. Nyerere became convinced that despite the ideological differences between the leaders of the two countries, China was a major world force capable of contributing to the achievement of the African aim of liberating the continent. Relations between Tanzania and China were cemented further when Nyerere paid his first visit to China⁷⁰⁷ (16-23 February 1965). During his visit as a head of State, Nyerere expressed his country's great appreciation of China's aid and experience when he stated that

we are the more appreciative because we realise that the capital is not surplus to your own requirements, nor are your technicians otherwise unemployed. Certainly we on our side are anxious to learn what we can about China's development, in the hope that we shall, by its adaptation to our circumstances, be able to benefit from your experience.⁷⁰⁸

By the time Nyerere visited China (February 1965), relations between the United States and Tanzania had reached their nadir as a consequence of direct American intervention in the Congo (during late 1964), coupled with the anti-liberation activities of the United States in the rest of the continent. Tanzania recalled its Ambassador in the United States.⁷⁰⁹ At a State banquet given in honour of Nyerere, Liu Shaoqi hailed Tanzania for its

efforts to strengthen the unity of the African people and the solidarity of Asian and African people against imperialism [and its] energetic support for the national liberation struggles of the peoples of the Congo(L), and of East, Central and Southern Africa.⁷¹⁰

During Nyerere's visit, a Friendship Treaty between China and Tanzania was signed⁷¹¹ (20 February 1965). At the end of Nyerere's visit, China and Tanzania issued a joint *communiqué* which reflected a substantial agreement between the two countries along the line advocated by China of an anti-imperialist revolution through armed struggle. The *communiqué* stressed that

imperialism and colonialism would never be reconciled to their defeat and step down from the stage of history of their own accord...the facts have constantly taught the people that in order to win and safeguard national independence, the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism must be carried through to the end...[both parties] pledged their support to the people of the Congo(L) in their just and patriotic anti-imperialist struggle, and strongly condemned outside intervention in the Congo(L).⁷¹²

In relation to the convening of the second conference of Afro-Asian countries, both China and Tanzania:

expressed [their] deep conviction that the forthcoming conference will contribute to the strengthening of the Asian and African countries' cause of unity against imperialism, to the promotion of economic co-operation between these countries and to the defence of world peace.⁷¹³

At the same time the United States was strongly condemned for its imperialist plot by creating two Chinas while the UN was urged to restore the legitimate right of China's seat in the organisation.⁷¹⁴

China promised⁷¹⁵ in principle to finance and build the Tanzanian Railway⁷¹⁶ - a project which contributed to a special⁷¹⁷ relationship between China and Tanzania and was to create a vital link for southern African liberation movements. Zhou Enlai's visit (re-scheduled in the place of the one he was unable to make in the previous year)⁷¹⁸ to Tanzania less than four months after Nyerere's visit to China had the effect of further consolidating the already rapidly developing relations between the two countries.⁷¹⁹

During Zhou Enlai's visit, Tanzania once again reaffirmed⁷²⁰ its support for the idea of a second conference of Afro-Asian countries which had by then been scheduled to take place on 28 June 1965. Indeed, when Zhou Enlai visited Dar es Salaam, Sino-Tanzanian relations had reached their peak. Tanzania had assumed an important place in China's plans to forge an active anti-imperialist front.

However, this special relationship was challenged, for a short period, by the differences between the two sides over the changes following the deposition of Ben Bella in Algeria (19 June 1965). Unlike China⁷²¹, Tanzania did not come forward to recognise the new government under Boumedienne in a prompt manner. Like a number of radicals and progressives throughout Africa, Nyerere feared that the departure of Ben Bella, a major champion of national liberation movements, would reverse the positive and activist posture of Algeria against colonialism, imperialism and racism.

The Algerian factor, however, did not seriously undermine Sino-Tanzanian relations, with clear proof coming from Algeria that it was no less committed to supporting national liberation movements under the new government than it had been before. In October 1965, China and Tanzania agreed that the second Afro-Asian conference should be postponed.⁷²²

In November 1965, Rashidi Kawawa, Tanzania's Vice-President, paid a visit to China⁷²³ which further strengthened the special and anti-imperialist friendship between the two countries. Tanzania's support for the struggle in the Congo(L), the expulsion of American diplomats from Dar es Salaam, and the status enjoyed by Dar es Salaam as the headquarters of the Liberation Committee of OAU, its tough policy against the South African government and hospitality to the liberation movements of southern African countries, its termination of diplomatic relations with Britain⁷²⁴ over UDI (December

1965), its refusal to sign the Test Ban Treaty⁷²⁵, contributed to the development of a solid and militant relationship between China and Tanzania. In the words of Zhou Enlai

Tanzania has become a glorious banner in East Africa, a banner against old and new colonialism and for national liberation struggles. In the world arena, the United Republic of Tanzania has taken a clear-cut stand against imperialist policies of aggression and war, upholding Afro-Asian solidarity and defending world peace, and has made an active contribution in these respects...

The imperialists and old and new colonialists are unwilling to see an independent Tanzania towering on the East African coast. They have brought political and economic pressure to bear on you and even resorted to frenzied and despicable subversion. But they have met with resolute counter-blows from the people of Tanzania.⁷²⁶

13.3.17. Uganda

Of all the political parties⁶²⁷ involved in the struggle for independence in Uganda, only⁷²⁸ the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) led by Milton Obote, despite its moderate character,⁷²⁹ advocated a more positive anti-colonial and anti-imperialist policy geared to the goal of Ugandan nationalism embracing all the diverse peoples of the country.

When independence (October 1962) was granted, Obote was appointed Prime Minister and the King of Buganda the President of the Republic of Uganda. During the first phase of the UPC government (1962-71), Obote appeared to

be moving towards the left.⁷³⁰ In the domestic sphere, the radical character of Obote's government was reflected in the decision (1968) to adopt socialism based on the concrete conditions in Uganda.⁷³¹ In 1970, Obote nationalised 88 important export companies and firms.⁷³²

In the international sphere, Obote's government had always advocated policies based on a stance of positive non-alignment and anti-imperialist Pan-Africanism. At the same time, Obote advocated a tough line against the racist *régime* in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and favoured a total isolation of South Africa.⁷³³ Obote

was emphatic that South Africa could not be regarded as an independent African country any more than could be the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.⁷³⁴

In relation to anti-colonialist struggle, Obote offered Uganda as a base for all African national liberation movements.⁷³⁵ Uganda however, was not strategically suited for the training of liberation forces, or for passing on military aid to various liberation movements in those areas which were still under colonial rule. During the struggle in the Congo(L) against Tshombe's government, Obote permitted the transfer⁷³⁶ of arms and weapons through Uganda to the revolutionary forces based in Stanleyville. It was reported at the time that some of the guerrilla forces from the Congo had received training from the Ugandan army.⁷³⁷

Like most of its early contacts with national independence movements in Africa, China forged its first links with Uganda (1958) at the AAPSO Secretariat.⁷³⁸ Initially, China's links with Uganda had been with UNC, a nationalist militant party, led by Joseph William Kiwanuka. Kiwanuka was supported by China as the representative of the Ugandan national independence movement in Africa at Afro-Asian meetings and activities.⁷³⁹ Kiwanuka was among the 29 African delegations⁷⁴⁰ which visited China during 1958-59.

Despite China's continued association with UNC, Obote (the leader of the UPC) recognised PRC when Uganda became independent (9 October 1962).⁷⁴¹ At the same time, Obote challenged critics within his own party by supporting China's admission to UN.⁷⁴² China established diplomatic relations with Uganda (18 October 1962) after a visit to Kampala by Ho Ying, China's Ambassador to Tanganyika.⁷⁴³

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Uganda, there was a marked increase in trade. By the end of 1963, China's imports from Uganda made it the largest buyer of Ugandan cotton (a quarter of the total production of cotton in Uganda).⁷⁴⁴

However, because of the moderate character of Obote's government during the early years of Uganda's independence on the one hand, and UPC's coalition with the reactionary⁷⁴⁵ YK Party (coupled with Obote's fresh memory of China's early association with UNC) on the other, no militancy was injected into the relationship during the first three years (1962-65).

This in fact changed following Obote's effective support⁷⁴⁶ for Gbenye's revolutionary government in Stanleyville. Thereafter Sino-Ugandan relations became closer. Uganda's acceptance of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda whom the Chinese supported⁷⁴⁷ contributed to the development of a warm relationship between the two countries.

In April 1965, William Kalema, Minister for Works and Communications, paid a visit to China. This was the first visit to China made by a Ugandan government official.⁷⁴⁸ During this visit, Kalema signed an economic agreement with his opposite number in China.⁷⁴⁹ Included in this agreement was an interest-free loan of \$12.4 million, in addition to a donation of \$2.99 million for Uganda's First-Year-Plan.⁷⁵⁰

Obote himself visited China in 1965 (11-16 June). In a joint *communiqué* armed aggression of the imperialist powers against the Congolese people was condemned. At the same time, China and Uganda reaffirmed their support for

...the national independence struggles of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, the so-called Portuguese Guinea, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Equatorial Guinea, and other African countries still under colonial rule.⁷⁵¹

During the GPCR period (1966-69), there was no significant development in Sino-Ugandan relations. Internal conflicts involving Obote's supporters on the one hand and monarchical and conservative elements on the other,

absorbed much of the country's political energy during this period.

13.3.1.8. Congo-Brazzaville⁷⁵²

The Congo(B), independent since August 1960, was among the French colonies⁷⁵³ which voted in favour of joining *Communauté Française*. Anti-colonial forces in Congo(B) and outside alike felt strongly that the country continued to be economically and politically dependent on the French system of neo-colonialism. As a strong supporter of ^{La} *Communauté Française*, Foulberte Youlou, the Francophile leader of ^{the Democratic Union for the Defence of African} (UDDIA) was helped by the French authorities to become the country's President, despite the opposition⁷⁵⁴ of the nationalist, anti-imperialist and socialist parties such as the *Mouvement Socialiste Africaine (MSA)*, led by Jacques Opangual, and the PPL, led by Felix Tchikaya.

Under Youlou's leadership, Congo(B) became extremely hostile to communist movements and socialist countries. A month before (15 July 1960) Congo's independence, Youlou assured the imperialist powers of his firm anti-communist commitment by indulging in a strongly worded attack against the role played by the communist powers⁷⁵⁵ in Africa, and especially in the Congo.

Thus, it was not surprising to see Youlou's government, immediately after Congo(B)'s independence, recognise Taiwan, followed, less than a month later, by the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states (10 September). It is worth noting that the Youlou

government also recognised⁷⁵⁶ PRC. China however, did not reciprocate because of its rejection of 'two China's'.

Four years after independence (August 1960), Congo(B) not only withdrew⁷⁵⁷ its recognition of Taiwan and established⁷⁵⁸ (January 1964) diplomatic relations with China, but also became one of the most militant and progressive countries in Africa. A popular uprising against the subservient rule of Youlou had swept the country ('The Three Glorious Days') in August 1963 and ended in the downfall of the government. In its place, a National Revolutionary Council (NRC) and a new government under the leadership of Alphonse Massambat Debat⁷⁵⁹ took power (8 December 1963). At a congress of the National Movement of the Revolution (NMR), scientific socialism was adopted as the path of Congo(B)'s economic development.⁷⁶⁰

Following this revolutionary change, the relations between China and the Congo(B) rapidly improved. In July 1964 an economic mission from the Congo(B) visited China where it was offered the equivalent of \$5.2 million to enable the national budget to be balanced.⁷⁶¹ In September, Boukambou Julian, a leading member of the national Trade Union Confederation of the Congo(B) and First Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, paid a visit to China. Julian was warmly received and given assurance of China's strong support for the revolutionary government of the Congo(B).⁷⁶² At the same time, a seven member military goodwill delegation from the Congo(B), led by Major Mouz Abakani Felix, Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces, also visited China (19 September). Felix told his hosts that he and

his colleagues had come to acquaint themselves with the great work done by China since liberation.⁷⁶³

President Debat himself visited China (September 1964) to attend the National Day celebrations (1 October). In a joint *communiqué* issued on that occasion, China affirmed its

firm support for the people of the Congo(B) in their heroic struggle against the imperialists' threats, interference, and subversion against the Congo(B).⁷⁶⁴

For its part, Congo(B) urged

the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and the just struggle of the Chinese government and people for the liberation of their own territory, Taiwan, as well as its opposition to the imperialists' plot of creating two Chinas.⁷⁶⁵

President Debat also took the opportunity to affirm the Congo(B)'s 'readiness to take part in the 1965 second Afro-Asian conference'.⁷⁶⁶ The Congo(B) became the third African country [the others being Guinea (13 September 1960) and Ghana (28 March 1962)] to conclude a Treaty of Mutual Friendship with China.⁷⁶⁷

During Debat's visit, too, China and the Congo(B) signed Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreements under which China granted an interest-free loan of \$26 million to the Congo(B).⁷⁶⁸ The United States reacted to

the Congo(B)'s growing friendship with the communist world as a whole and with China in particular,⁷⁶⁹ by closing down its Diplomatic and Cultural Mission in Brazzaville.⁷⁷⁰ This act of the American government, however, had the effect of pushing the Congo(B) further along the path of friendship with the socialist countries and of militant anti-imperialism.

The hostile attitude of the United States towards the Congo(B), evidenced in the withdrawal of its diplomats, was viewed by China as a prelude to the overthrow of Debat's revolutionary government. On the occasion of the first anniversary (22 February 1964) of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Congo(B), Chang Hanfu, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister said that

US imperialism is engineering a new subversive plot against the Congo(B). It has directed the puppet Tshombe clique to smuggle arms, sent special agents there and even tried to assassinate the leaders of the Congolese(B) government in a vain attempt to topple the revolutionary government of the Congo(B).⁷⁷¹

China's aid to the Congo(B) grew at a rapid pace. In June 1965, China offered a sum of 5 million Francs aid to the Congo(B).⁷⁷² Much of this money was devoted to refugees expelled by the Congo(L) government.⁷⁷³ In July 1965, the Chinese authorities held an exhibition in Brazzaville. China also pledged to build a major flagship project and a textile mill in Kisoundi (near Brazzaville).⁷⁷⁴ The textile mill project became the biggest employer of labour in the country⁷⁷⁵ (capable of

employing 2,000 people and an average annual output of 3½ million metres of fabric).⁷⁷⁶ Within a year of the coming into operation of China's economic aid, the Prime Minister of the Congo(B) claimed that the economic relations between the countries were already proving to be beneficial to the people.

...we will continue to rely, for a long time, on the bi-lateral aid of all countries of the world, particularly France, ...and the Chinese People's Republic whose material aid has already proved...as effective.⁷⁷⁷

The relations between China and the Congo(B) became more and more progressive in character. Within a year of the overthrow of the Youlou government, Brazzaville had become the major base for African liberation forces of the Congo(L) and of Angola's MPLA. With the agreement of the Congo(B) government, China set up (in 1965) three guerrilla training camps based in Bouanga, Dambona and Impfonda. They were placed under the supervision of Kan Mai, a Colonel in China's PLA and head of PRC's military mission in Brazzaville.⁷⁷⁸

13.3.2. China's Relations With 'Non-Progressive' States

13.3.2.1. Morocco

The dismissal⁷⁷⁹ of the government led by Abdalla Ibrahim, the radical Prime Minister, (March 1960), and the enthronement of King Hassan II (who was less nationalistic and more favourably inclined to the Western powers⁷⁸⁰ than his father) stood in the way of the development of

political co-operation between China and Morocco with the aim of challenging Western influence and constructing Afro-Asian solidarity based on a policy of support for independence and liberation movements. Relations between China and Morocco gradually cooled off following the successful conclusion of Algeria's independence struggle in 1962, except in the sphere of trade and commerce. In May 1961 Lu Hsu-chang, the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, visited Morocco with a view to improving the trade between the two countries.^{7e1} By 1963, Morocco had become the third largest partner in China's trade with the Third World.^{7e2}

Morocco's status as a major trade partner of China did not alter China's policy of giving support^{7e3} to revolutionary Algeria during the brief Algerian-Moroccan border war (October 1963). In fact, King Hâssan II accused China of favouring Mahdi Ben Barka, the leader of the Moroccan opposition party National Union of Popular forces (UNFP), who was a supporter of the Algerian^{7e4} revolution.

13.3.2.2. Tunisia

After consolidating its position as the colonial power in control of Algeria,^{7e5} France expanded its control into neighbouring Tunisia where it imposed on the Bey (i.e. the Governor) the Barado Treaty and the La Marsa Agreement (1881). The Bey was thus dispossessed of all his prerogatives, and Tunisia was effectively^{7e6} brought

under French colonial control in the name of a 'French Protectorate'.

Unlike Algeria,⁷⁸⁷ Tunisian opposition to colonialism did not take on a political character until 1920, when the *Destour* (or the Liberal Constitutional) Party (LCP) was founded with 'Tunisian Martydom' as its symbol. Its manifesto sought

...an elected National Assembly...a responsible Tunisian government, equality of Tunisians and Frenchmen at all levels and respect of basic liberties.⁷⁸⁸

Because of its conciliatory attitude to the French colonial power and its failure to launch a struggle for Tunisian independence, LCP was not able to put down political roots among the masses.

The Tunisian independence movement assumed a more positive character in 1933 when ^{the} LCP was dissolved and a new party under the name of *Neo-D. U. & U. r* or the Neo-Constitutional Party (NCP) was established. NCP sought complete independence for the country.

For over two decades, ^{the} NCP campaigned for independence by organising and leading demonstrations and protests against the French colonial power. NCP leaders (including Bourguiba, the leader) and workers suffered imprisonment and many were killed.⁷⁸⁹

Bourguiba was so violently anti-communist that he embarked on a foreign policy aimed not only at preventing China establishing diplomatic relations with Tunisia but also undermining, during the second stage of the Algerian

war of liberation, the militant relationship that China had with the Provisional Government of Algeria (which was based in Tunis),⁷⁹⁰ Bourguiba was critical of the close ties Algeria had with China.⁷⁹¹ He went so far as to try to stop Algeria's FLN from having access to the arms and equipment supplied by China⁷⁹² through Tunisia

On many occasions we had to cover Chinese names on arms and equipment in order to get permission for their access to Tunisia and then to Algeria. Bourguiba was too allergic to communism as a whole and to China in particular.⁷⁹³

Bourguiba was not only opposed to the close relationship between Algeria and China during the national liberation war, but also opposed to the use of armed struggle as the weapon for achieving national liberation because, in his words (June 1956),

[t]he guerrillas in the mountains cannot hurl the French army into the sea. Their role is merely to act on France, on French public opinion, so as to persuade them that granting the people of Algeria the right to dispose of their own destiny is the lesser evil. Military action does not suffice, it resolves nothing.⁷⁹⁴

Despite Bourguiba's opposition to FLN's method of armed struggle, however, Tunisia did provide bases for FLN guerrilla training and operations on the Eastern front. Tunisia was also the headquarters (from 1959 onwards) of PGRA which was carrying out the functions of a government-in-exile. Its support for Algeria's FLN led to a physical attack against Tunisia by French colonial forces (February

1958). China was quick to condemn France's attack against Tunisia. The *Chargé d'Affaires* of PRC in Cairo called on the Tunisian Ambassador to UAR to express the

Chinese people's resolute support for the Tunisian people in their just struggle against the colonialists.⁷⁹⁵

Tunisia's support for the Algerian war of national liberation should not, by any means, be interpreted as reflecting any political radicalism on the part of the government. As in the recent Libyan crisis (April 1986), in which the Arab masses forced all Arab governments, progressive and non-progressive alike to support Libya, the Tunisian government was forced rather than chose to support Algeria's armed struggle against the colonial power. Algerian independence was supported by a large number of Tunisians, some of whom even volunteered to join FLN. FLN leaders were able to make good use of the fact that Tunisia's support did not come from the government as such but rather from the mass of the people.

PGRA ignored the anti-communist character of the Tunisian government and developed a close and comradely relationship with China against the wishes of Bourguiba. For its part, China tried to allay Tunisia's suspicion of communism and to persuade it to leave PGRA to develop its own links with China by sending, whenever possible, delegations of Moslim ^{Chinese} to Tunisia after their pilgrimage to Meccā,⁷⁹⁶ or by offering such easy terms of trade that Bourguiba's government was unable to resist. Three Tunisian trade and cultural delegations

were received in China during the period 1958-59.⁷⁹⁷ In November 1960, China and Tunisia signed a Trade Agreement.⁷⁹⁸ Other contacts between the two countries took place at AAPSO meetings.⁷⁹⁹

Such informal Sino-Tunisian contacts however, did not alter Tunisia's anti-China stance. In 1960, in addition to recognising the Taiwan régime,⁸⁰⁰ Tunisia supported the United States' demand that the Tibetan rebellion should be discussed as an international question in UN.⁸⁰¹ Tunisia's failure to recognise China, however, did not prevent Bourguiba from recognising China's 'great achievements and tremendous efforts'.⁸⁰²

The presence of PGRA in Tunis seemed to have the effect of softening the Tunisian government's strong opposition to China. In May 1961, Wang Chuan-heng, a member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Women's Federation, visited Tunisia where she met PGRA leaders as well as officials from the Tunisian government.⁸⁰³ Two months later (10 July) Mohammed Masmūdi, Secretary of State for Information and Tourism, led a goodwill mission to China.⁸⁰⁴ The delegation was received by both Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi.⁸⁰⁵

There was a significant improvement in relations between the two countries when France violently rejected the Tunisian demand for the return of the military base of Bizerta by dropping paratroops on the city of Bizerta while the French airforce bombed Tunisian positions and shot down a number of innocent civilians (19 July 1961). In a meeting with Ahmed ^{Al} Mistiri, Tunisian Ambassador to

the Soviet Union (who had paid a visit to China during the Bizerta crisis), Chen Yi, the Chinese Vice-Premier, strongly condemned French aggression against Tunisia. He affirmed that

the Chinese government and people firmly support the Tunisian people in their just struggle to recover the Bizerta military base and to defend their independence and sovereignty.⁸⁰⁶

In his reply (23 August) to a message from Djelouli Fares, President of the Tunisian National Assembly, Chu Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, (NPC) strongly 'denounced the French action against Tunisia' and affirmed China's unequivocal support for the

Tunisians' just struggle to safeguard their national independence and sovereignty.⁸⁰⁷

In October 1961 China sent a gift of medical equipment and medicines worth 60,000 Yuan for the relief of the victims of the French attack against Tunisians in Bizerta.⁸⁰⁸ In the following year (7 April 1962), China sent Tunisia more medical equipment.⁸⁰⁹

China's support for Tunisia's just struggle for recovering the Bizerta base, coupled with Sino-Tunisian contacts during the period 1960-62, had the effect of moderating Tunisia's traditionally anti-China policy. This was evident from Tunisia's change of heart (from October 1962 onwards)⁸¹⁰ over the question of China's admission to UN.⁸¹¹ Tunisia and China established

diplomatic relations (February 1964), following Zhou Enlai's visit to Tunisia (9-10 January 1964), On the occasion of the Chinese Prime Minister's visit, Bourguiba told him that

Whatever our differences...isolation of a great people like the Chinese and a great country like China would do no good for peace.⁸¹²

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Tunisia and China was by no means based on a common approach on international issues shared by the two countries. On the contrary, Bourguiba hoped that China's presence in ^{the} UN would help reduce its revolutionary activities and increase its commitment to the traditional rules of the international order. Bourguiba was also perhaps motivated by the hope that the radical movement in Tunisia would be calmed by Tunisia entering into diplomatic relations with a 'hardline' communist country such as China.

The Tunisian government had already banned⁸¹³ (18 July 1963) the Communist Party of Tunisia and adopted 'a much tougher policy' against the radical forces. It is possible that Bourguiba viewed Tunisia's policy of accommodation as a demonstration of the government's ability to adopt policies not liked by its Western allies.

This particular step taken by Bourguiba was to the disadvantage of the United States, whilst it did contribute to China's attempt to increase the diplomatic containment of the West. For his part, however, Zhou

Enlai perhaps saw the presence of Chinese diplomats in Tunisia as an opportunity to mobilize and communicate with radical forces inside the country and to consolidate China's vital aim of people-to-people relations.

Press coverage in Tunisia of Zhou Enlai's visit was largely devoted to comments on Tunisia's differences with China and opposition to China's international stance - especially in relation to its opposition to the NTBT and support for armed struggle.⁸¹⁴ However, differences between him and Bourguiba did not stop Zhou Enlai from finding ways of expressing common ground and shared aims between Tunisia and China:

We Asian and African countries created brilliant cultures as early as the dawn of history. Today we are comparatively backward economically and culturally. This is the outcome of foreign aggression and oppression...the developing Asian and African countries will surely succeed in bringing about a new upsurge in their economies and cultures by mainly relying on their own efforts, while supporting and assisting each other.⁸¹⁵

Upon arrival in Tunisia (May 1964), the Chinese Ambassador presented to Bourguiba a letter sent by Liu Shaoqi, inviting him to visit China. The visit however never materialised.⁸¹⁶ In December a group of Chinese experts arrived in Tunis, at the invitation of the government, to study projects planned in the agricultural and industrial spheres.⁸¹⁷

The fragile relations between Tunisia and China, however, did not last too long. Alarmed by Zhou Enlai's

revolutionary predictions for Africa, and provoked by its Western friends, (especially the United States),^{e19} the Tunisian government, less than a year after the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, launched (February 1965) a vehement attack on China's role in Africa. In his speech (12 February 1965) to the Central Committee of the *Neo-Dustūr* Party, Bourguiba attacked China's opposition to NTBT, accusing it of attempting to undermine peaceful coexistence and world peace. Ironically, Bourguiba attributed the escalation of the conflict in Indo-China to the role played by China, and not to the military aggresssion of the United States.^{e19} In July 1965 Bourguiba went even further by referring to China as

a colonialist country camouflaged by ideology with the aim of subjecting Asia and Africa, and attempting to occupy India and all South East Asia.^{e20}

In an interview with *Réalité*, a French journal (11 September 1965), Bourguiba once again gave vent to his strong 'distaste' for China's role in Africa when he replied to the question 'is there Chinese infiltration in Africa?' with the following statement:

Yes, this is evident by China's infiltration in every country to provoke difficulties, to expand existing contradictions, to arm and train guerrillas against established régimes. Chou En lai does not deny it. In fact he affirms this to anyone he meets, that Africa is becoming the field of revolution.^{e21}

Thus, it came as no surprise when Tunisia voted in favour of convening the Afro-Asian Conference in November 1965 and against China's plea for its postponement.⁸²² Bourguiba's campaign against China was taken even to the extent of Tunisia reversing its support for China's admission to UN, advocating a 'two China' solution.⁸²³

Such a sustained anti-China campaign led Yao Nien, China's Ambassador to Tunisia, to protest strongly against Bourguiba's accusation and to demand an open⁸²⁴ apology from the Tunisian government. Yao stated that

President Bourguiba's words and deeds against China have seriously impaired relations between China and Tunisia. The Chinese government would like to repeat its advice to the Tunisian government and President Bourguiba: It is hoped that you will set store by the interests of the Sino-Tunisian friendship and Afro-Asian solidarity and put an end to all your words and deeds detrimental to friendly relations between the two countries. Otherwise, you will reap what you sow.⁸²⁵

The People's Daily (20 November 1965) viewed Bourguiba's anti-China campaign as serving the interests of the United States and its allies against the wishes of anti-imperialist forces in Asia and Africa.⁸²⁶ Tunisia responded by stating that instead of protesting, China should

stop its drive for subjecting its Asian neighbour to its domination and making trouble in Africa.⁸²⁷

In January 1966, Bourguiba El Ibn, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, threatened to break off diplomatic

relations if China continued to 'provoke Tunisia' or 'slander his father, Chief of State'.⁸²⁸

China ignored Tunisia's threat to break off diplomatic relations and advocacy of a two-China policy⁸²⁹ as it was already well on into GPCR which opened the way to a wider ranging challenge on China's part to diplomatic channels in the sphere of international relations. China launched a vigorous propaganda attack against the Tunisian government. Tunisia's anti-China campaign was viewed as an attempt to divert the attention of the Tunisian people from the government's policy of co-operating with anti-liberation forces

In trying to use its opposition to China to direct the attention of its people and cover up its own crime of entering further into the service of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism and selling out the interests of the Tunisian and other Arab people, the Tunisian government will certainly come to no good.⁸³⁰

Angered by such a challenge, the Tunisian government demanded in vain an unreserved apology from China.⁸³¹ At the same time, Tunisia imposed greater restrictions on the Chinese diplomatic staff in Tunis.⁸³² Al-Amal, an official Tunisian newspaper, strongly criticised China's diplomatic presence in Tunisia and the breach of all the traditional diplomatic rules and conditions, by Chinese officials and objected to interference in the internal affairs of the country.⁸³³

Tunisia's restrictions on the Chinese diplomatic mission did not last long because China had decided to

break off (26 September 1967) diplomatic relations with Tunisia, and withdrew all its diplomatic staff.⁹³⁴ China also withdrew (14 September 1967) four coaches who were in Tunisia under a physical education agreement.⁹³⁵ Commenting on China's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Tunisia, People's Daily (December 1967) commented that

severence of relations can do us no harm. We have no diplomatic relationship with the US, but we carry on just the same. Severence of relations will make a mess of things politically and economically for a given country, since we can then support the people of that country to make a revolution.⁹³⁶

When the political 'mess' began in Tunisia during student riots and protests against the government (March 1968), China gave propaganda support to all anti-government forces.⁹³⁷ In turn, it was accused by the Tunisian government of provoking the student riots at Tunis University, and the disorders and attacks against the police and the army.

13.3.2.3. Benin (néé Dahomey)

Since independence (August 1960), Benin (Dahomey until 1975) has been noted for its political instability. During the period 1960-72 Benin was subjected to seven *coups d'état*, three of them in 1972 alone. Throughout the decade of the '60s Benin remained one of the most loyal supporters of Western powers, especially France,⁹³⁸ in Africa. In January 1962, the government of Benin, under

the leadership of Hubert Marga, established diplomatic relations with Taiwan.⁸³⁹

After the overthrow of Marga's government by Sourou-Migan Apithy,⁸⁴⁰ Benin established⁸⁴¹ diplomatic relations with China (October 1963). The new government's recognition of China must have been influenced by the fact that France had already set an example by entering into a normal diplomatic relationship with it. China, however, was not particularly impressed by the prospect of enjoying Benin's recognition and embassy in Beijing. Chinese leaders were aware that the essentially anti-communist character of the Apithy government would be an obstacle in the way of China's campaign for an anti-imperialist Afro-Asian front. In his message to Apithy, Zhou Enlai did not show much interest in the government of Dahomey. He laid emphasis on the need to provide 'friendship and co-operation between the two peoples, not co-operation between the two governments'.⁸⁴² A similar comment was made by People's Daily (15 November 1964) in the wake of Benin's recognition of China.⁸⁴³

Relations between China and Benin, however, did not last long. Following two military *coups d'état* (November-December 1965), the new government, alarmed, like Tunisia, by China's revolutionary hard line as revealed in the initial events of GPRC, decided (3 January 1966) to break off diplomatic relations⁸⁴⁴ with PRC. China believed the hand of the United States to be behind Benin's change of policy. US imperialism, in China's view, took every

possible opportunity^{to} isolate^{it} in Africa and shore up the power of its own client régimes.

Imperialism, headed by the United States is trying to stir up an adverse anti-China current in Africa so as to bring about a breach in normal relations between China and the African countries and undermine the militant friendship and solidarity between the two peoples. Dahomey's ending and the CAP's severance of diplomatic relations with China under the manipulation of imperialism are part of the adverse anti-China current.⁸⁴⁵

13.3.2.4. Central African Republic (CAR)

CAR, a former French colony which was granted independence in 1960, initially (April 1962) recognised Taiwan.⁸⁴⁶ In August 1964, however, ^{ANC} CAR's government (under the leadership of David Dacko, one of the French régime's favourite African clients), initiated official contacts with PRC by sending a goodwill⁸⁴⁷ mission to Beijing. A month later (29 September 1964), China and the CAR established diplomatic relations,⁸⁴⁸ notifying Taiwan at the same time that PRC was the sole and legal representative of the Chinese people.⁸⁴⁹ A Chinese trade and goodwill mission delegation visited ^{ANC} CAR soon thereafter.⁸⁵⁰ China extended an interest-free and long term repayment loan of \$4 million to CAR when the economic situation deteriorated (1964-1965).⁸⁵¹

In the political sphere, ^{ANC} CAR was included in the West African tour of a Chinese National People's Congress mission (March-April 1965)⁸⁵² soliciting support for a second conference of Afro-Asian countries (excluding the

Soviet Union). CAR's support later during the year¹⁹⁶³ for China's call for an Afro-Asian conference, was not based on a political understanding between the two countries. Rather, CAR must have believed that the longer such a conference was postponed, the better for the political forces in Africa opposed to the consolidation of a militant anti-imperialist Afro-Asian front.

After the overthrow of David Dacko (1 January 1966) by Jean Bedal Bokassa, CAR became even more loyal to the West and rabidly anti-communist. Within a week of assuming power, Bokassa's government severed diplomatic relations with China (6 January 1966). Bokassa justified the rupture on the grounds that even if there had been no *coup*, President Dacko

sooner or later would have been
eliminated by the pro-Chinese
extremists.¹⁹⁶⁴

13.3.2.5. Burundi-Rwanda

What were the actual ideological motives behind China's friendly overtures to the oppressive monarchical *régime* of Burundi in contrast to its indifference bordering on hostility towards the Republic of Rwanda with an overwhelming majority of its population which could only be classified as poor peasantry? In order to establish the extent to which China's relations with both Burundi and Rwanda were guided by ideological considerations, it is necessary to review their historical and political development.

Throughout the period 1600-1959, Rwanda's history was bound up with Burundi's. Under the Treaty of Versailles, both territories were turned over to Belgium (1919).⁹⁵⁵ Following the example of the Congo (1960-61), the twin Belgian colonies of Burundi and Rwanda demanded complete independence. Unlike Burundi, the national independence movement in Rwanda, led by the two parties Rwanda National Union (UNAR) and the Democratic Association of Rwanda (RADER) was opposed to Belgian colonialism.⁹⁵⁶ The twin territories became independent in July 1962 - the Kingdom of Burundi in the South, and the Republic of Rwanda in the North.⁹⁵⁷ Independent Rwanda was plagued by political instability from the beginning. In 1959, the Tutsi minority (15%) and the Hutu majority (85%) clashed in a bloody civil war which ended with the political separatism of the Hutu peasant society from the Tutsi pyramidal monarchical order. In the course of this transformation, the Tutsi were brutally executed, murdered and oppressed.⁹⁵⁸ A mass exodus of the Tutsi from Rwanda to the South, i.e. northern Burundi, took place.⁹⁵⁹ In November 1963, influenced by the revolutionary struggles then taking place in the neighbouring Congo(L), the Rwandan refugees based in Burundi (nicknamed 'Cockroaches') launched a guerrilla attack on the Rwandan government. The guerrillas were defeated with the aid of Belgian military reinforcements. A large number of them was massacred by the Rwandan troops.⁹⁶⁰ The relations between Rwanda and Burundi degenerated soon thereafter.

China supported the Tutsi of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Burundi in this struggle.⁸⁶¹ Rwanda's strong anti-communist policy, including its recognition of Taiwan,⁸⁶² its close association with the West and [especially Belgium which was the major target of revolutionary forces in Congo(L)] its hostile relations with Burundi, and strategic access to Burundi enjoyed by the liberation fighters in the Congo(L) were the main factors underlying China's pro-Burundi policy⁸⁶³ and the opening of diplomatic relations between the two governments (21 December 1963), and China's anti-Rwanda orientation.

The assumption of power by Alban Niamoya as Burundi's new Prime Minister (replacing Pierre Ngendandumwe who retired in early 1964) who was favourably disposed to China⁸⁶⁴ facilitated the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries. Like China, Niamoya also called (November 1964) for a world-wide conference to ban nuclear weapons.⁸⁶⁵ In October 1964, the two countries signed an Agreement on Trade and Payments, under whose provisions China promised to supply cotton, textiles, maize, rice, pharmaceutical products, steel and machines in exchange for Burundi's cotton, coffee, hides, peanuts and other raw materials.⁸⁶⁶ André Mugumbu, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, visited China (December 1964) with the aim of deepening the trade and economic co-operation between China and Rwanda.⁸⁶⁷ Burundi however was not given financial aid or loans by China.⁸⁶⁸

China's interest⁹⁶⁹ in Burundi lay in its strategic location⁹⁷⁰ in relation to the areas in which the liberation forces in the Congo(L) were active.⁹⁷¹ The Queen of Burundi was welcomed to China twice in 1964. Her meeting with Liu Shaoqi during her second visit (June 1964) was believed to have been described by the Chinese authorities as 'a most friendly talk'.⁹⁷²

However, friendly relations between China and Burundi did not last long. In January 1965, Mawami, the King of Burundi, issued a precipitate order arresting Niamoya and other pro-Chinese elements among the Tutsi. It was clear that he was motivated by a desire to eliminate radical elements in the country opposed to the monarchy and fear of China's hardline against African governments which were regarded as non-progressive in character.⁹⁷³

At the same time, Burundi suspended diplomatic relations with China (29 January 1966).

Relations between the two countries rapidly deteriorated with Burundi's accusation⁹⁷⁴ that China was behind the assassination of Ngendaumwe, Burundi's new Prime Minister (7 January 1966). China protested against Burundi's 'unwarranted suspension of diplomatic relations',⁹⁷⁵ simultaneously denying any involvement in the assassination of Ngendaumwe.⁹⁷⁶ China made it clear that it regarded friendly relations with the Royal government of Burundi to be far too important to be subjected to risk through involvement in anti-government activities.

China has consistently supported the Royal government of Burundi in the struggle to oppose imperialism colonialism and neo-colonialism and to safeguard national independence and State sovereignty...

Evidently, the Burundi authorities have taken this action as a result of submission to the pressure of the US and Belgian imperialists...who have from the outside tried to undermine it, by every conceivable means.⁸⁷⁷

Bearing the revolutionary situation in the Congo(L) in mind, China hoped that Burundi would reverse its decision to suspend diplomatic relations with China. A statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry (31 January 1965) stressed that whenever

[t]he Royal government of Burundi wishes to have the relations between our two governments resumed, the Chinese government will give it sympathetic consideration. We are convinced that nothing can disrupt the friendship between the peoples of China and Burundi and that the conspiracy of the US and Belgian imperialism is doomed to failure.⁸⁷⁸

With the overthrow of the newly-crowned King Mwami Ntari V (20 November 1969)⁸⁷⁹ by Michael Micombero who became Burundi's new Prime Minister, friendly relations were once again restored between the two countries. Micombero proclaimed Burundi a Republic, naming himself President.⁸⁸⁰

The *coup* was fiercely opposed by Mobutu's régime in Léopoldville for fear that Burundi might once again become a base for the training of revolutionary guerrillas of the Congo(L) and for conveying arms to them from abroad.⁸⁸¹

The new government of Micombero promptly restored diplomatic relations with China. After a lapse of five years, China's diplomatic mission was established in Burundi once again in October 1971.

During the turbulent years of GPCR,^{see} China had already made the decision that in the sphere of foreign relations it would only deal with anti-imperialist countries and, in particular, countries which were important for liberation and revolutionary struggles. This new policy prevented China engaging in special efforts to cultivate the friendship of 'moderate' and unpredictable governments. Burundi was regarded as belonging to the latter category especially after it ceased to be important in the aftermath of the effective suppression of the revolutionary forces in neighbouring Congo(L) and the cessation of guerrilla activities.

The Congo(B), to which the defeated rump of the national liberation movement of the Congo(L) retreated, became the focus of revolutionary attention, though no concrete struggle was in fact launched. Thus, Burundi, important for China's Africa policy until 1965, sank into unimportance after 1966.

13.3.2.6. The Sudan

During the first stage (1955-59) of Sino-African relations, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Sudan was not motivated by any direct or clear political and ideological consideration.^{see} During the initial phase (1959-63) of

this period (1959-66), China showed little interest in promoting good political relations with the Sudan.^{ee4} Sudan's refusal^{ees} to allow arms originating in socialist as well as other countries, destined for the anti-government forces in the Congo(L), to pass through its territory, constituted a major barrier to political co-operation between the Sudan and China.^{ees}

Sino-Sudanese relations began to take on a political hue only when Sudan, as an African co-founder of the Bandung Conference, supported the convening of a second Afro-Asian conference (initially scheduled to take place in June 1965), following Zhou Enlai's visit^{ee7} to the Sudan (January 1964). General Abboud who reciprocated with a visit to China three months later (May 1964), was received less enthusiastically than other African leaders such as Sekou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah and Modibo Keita.

The Sudan's close ties with the West, and its friendly relations with the Soviet Union,^{eee} acted as disincentives to the deepening of Sino-Sudanese economic relations. Thus, when Abboud visited China, no offer of financial help was made to the Sudan; nor was a Friendship Treaty concluded between the two countries. The joint communication issued at the end of his visit contained little indication of common ground between the two countries on major international issues.^{eee} At a banquet given (18 May) by President Abboud, Zhou Enlai, however, managed to say that

the leaders of China and the Sudan have held cordial and sincere talks on international questions of common

concern and on the relations of friendship and co-operation between the two countries. We have reached identical views on the questions discussed... In the face of intrigues and interference by imperialism and new and old colonialism., the Asian and African peoples will always support each other in their struggle to win and safeguard national independence.⁸⁹⁰

China was particularly appreciative of the Sudan's acceding to its request through Egypt⁸⁹¹ for permission to transport arms through its territory to the Gbenye government based in Stanleyville.⁸⁹² The Sudan's change of heart on this matter took place after General Aboud was overthrown (October 1964) as a result of a mass uprising. However, China itself was no longer in need of safe passage for its arms through the Sudan because Tanzania had already become a major base for such purposes.⁸⁹³

13.3.2.7. Somalia

Both the Northern and Southern parts of Somalia won their independence in June 1960 from Britain and Italy respectively. The two parts of the country underwent a merger in July under the name of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, with Abdullah Osman as President, and Ali Shermake as Prime Minister. Both had been leading figures in the Somalia Youth League (SYL), founded in May 1943, which carried the main responsibility for the anti-colonial struggle.

China promptly recognised the new Republic.⁸⁹⁴ Ignoring Taiwan's request for recognition⁸⁹⁵, Somalia reciprocated PRC's gesture by recognising it as the only

representative of the Chinese people. Understandably, Somalia did not wish to recognise Taiwan also; such a policy would have gone against the grain, given Somalia's own concern that the two territories into which it had been artificially divided by the colonial rulers should become united into a single political entity. Somalia and China established diplomatic relations in December 1960.⁹⁹⁶ In July 1961, a municipal delegation visited China.⁹⁹⁷ The delegation was told by Peng Chen, Mayor of Beijing, that

[w]e underwent the same experience of suffering from imperialist and colonialist oppression in the past. The common task confronting us today, now that we have both been liberated, is to safeguard and build our national independence. We should support and help each other.⁹⁹⁸

During the period 1960-63, Sino-Somali relations were mostly limited to cultural contacts. In 1962, nearly 50 per cent of a total of 400 scholarships⁹⁹⁹ given by China to Africa went to Somali students. In January 1963, a Chinese cultural and goodwill mission visited Somalia where it signed a Cultural Co-operation Agreement between the two countries.⁹⁰⁰

Sino-Somali relations in the political and economic fields began to develop in 1963 when Somalia turned against the West⁹⁰¹ following Britain's support for Kenya in the territorial dispute between Somalia and Kenya.⁹⁰² Rejecting an offer of aid from Britain (1964), Somalia let

it be known that it intended to increase exports to earn foreign currency.⁹⁰³

A Somalia delegation, led by Ali Mohammed Hirav, visited China in May 1963. The visit resulted in the conclusion of a Sino-Somali Trade and Payments Agreement, under which China undertook to export textiles, daily necessities, metal products, machinery, chemicals, medical equipment and tea to Somalia in exchange for Somali oil seeds, cereals, frankincense, myrrh, gum Arabic, hides and minerals.⁹⁰⁴

In August 1963, when Shermarke, the Prime Minister, visited China,⁹⁰⁵ Somalia received an offer of an interest-free loan worth \$22 million.⁹⁰⁶ It was even reported⁹⁰⁷ that Shermarke was pledged military aid in the wake of the withdrawal of Western aid from Somalia and the growing Soviet interest⁹⁰⁸ in the area. During this visit, Shermarke was told by his Chinese hosts that

[although we have internal difficulties and are shut off from most parts of the world, we are prepared and willing to give you whatever is possible.⁹⁰⁹

When Zhou Enlai visited Somalia (February 1964),⁹¹⁰ China gave the Somali government a sum of \$3 million⁹¹¹ as a subsidy to cover a part of its budget deficit. Provoked by Western support for Kenya in the Somalia-Kenya territorial dispute, Radio Somalia took the opportunity provided by the Chinese Prime Minister's visit to broadcast to its listeners that

freedom is not achieved by remaining seated, it is achieved by throwing bombs. If you are a brave man...rise against the hyena who is picking flesh from your bones.⁹¹²

The militant and radical atmosphere which Zhou Enlai witnessed in Somalia perhaps led him to sum his assessment of Africa's revolutionary potential in a speech (Mogadisco: 3 February 1964) as follows:

We have witnessed the African people's strong will to fight imperialism and old and new colonialism; we have seen the strong desire of the African people to build up their respective countries and the marked success they have achieved...the African continent, which gave birth to a glorious civilisation and suffered from most cruel colonial aggression and plunder, is now undergoing earth-shaking changes. More than thirty African countries have become independent, and those African peoples still under colonial oppression and partition are waging heroic struggles to win independence and freedom. Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent.⁹¹³[emphasis added]

During a visit to China by Awil Haji Abdullah, the Somali Finance Minister, an undertaking was given by his hosts agreeing to help Somalia complete the Gelib-Sahlambut road, build a textile factory, and start a State rice farm.⁹¹⁴ During the drought which struck Somalia in early 1965, China donated 1,200 tons of rice and 438 cases of drugs and medical equipment for the relief of famine victims.⁹¹⁵ In July 1965, President Abdoullah Osman paid a visit to China, where he told his hosts that "the PRC government truly reflects the will of 700 million Chinese

people".⁹¹⁶ Osman supported⁹¹⁷ China's proposal that the second conference of Afro-Asian leaders should be convened in October 1965.

In the final analysis, however, the moderate character of the Somali government, on the one hand, and on the other, China's eagerness to win the support of Kenya and Ethiopia⁹¹⁸ (Somalia's hostile neighbour), for convening a second Afro-Asian meeting, stood in the way of close relations developing between China and Somalia during this period.

13.3.2.8. Kenya

Kenya was the first sub-Saharan African country in the post-War period to experience the use of armed resistance and guerrilla war (Mau Mau: 1952 onwards) against colonialism. This resistance, however, proved to be short-lived (1952-1956) and was carried out on a limited scale. The colonial power was well placed to undermine the Mau Mau resistance by exploiting the contradictions among nationalist leaders.

Kenyan opposition to British rule began in 1920 with the founding of the Association of Kikuyu Youth (AKY).⁹¹⁹ In 1924, AKY transformed itself into the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA),⁹²⁰ with Harry Thuku as its leader who was succeeded by Jomo Kenyatta in 1928 as General Secretary.⁹²¹ KCA was a 'tribal' organisation which, at the time, did not speak for the Kenyan people as a whole. Only the Kikuyu were admitted to its ranks.⁹²²

KCA protested against the massive exploitation of 'tribal land' by white settlers, and against European missionary influence.⁹²³ It was outlawed in 1930. Kenyatta, its leader, went to London (to represent KCA) where he remained for 16 years.⁹²⁴ As the African struggle for independence gathered momentum after the War, Kenyatta returned to Kenya to lead the Kenya African Union (KAU), a political party which was founded in 1943.⁹²⁵

Meanwhile the Kikuyu feelings of economic and social grievance⁹²⁶ led to the growth of the militant nationalist Mau Mau movement which launched armed resistance against the colonial power in the Kikuyu homeland on the highlands of Kenya (1952). The immediate objectives of the Mau Mau insurrection was to recover the fertile land of the Kikuyu people which were forcibly occupied by the colonial power and to bring to an end the maltreatment suffered by the native population at the hands of the authorities.⁹²⁷ The Mau Mau insurrection became a formidable force by 1953. Nearly 20,000 fighters were engaged in active fighting.⁹²⁸ Contrary to Western propaganda discrediting it as 'an outbreak of savage activists', the Mau Mau movement swore 'war against [the colonial] system'⁹²⁹ and represented a 'protracted struggle against imperialism and colonialism'.⁹³⁰

The colonial power negated Mau Mau demands and invoked a state of Emergency which, in the event, was prolonged over a period of seven years. All political parties were banned and their leaders arrested.⁹³¹ Kenyatta, the most prominent among them, was kept in

prison from 1953-1961.⁹³² New Pass Laws were introduced, police powers were extended, African and pro-African publications were suppressed. Over 100,000 'squatters' were evicted from white-owned farmland.⁹³³ More than 15,000 non-combatant Africans were killed, and more than 80,000 were sent to concentration camps.⁹³⁴

By 1956, the insurrection, following the capture of Dedan Kimathi, the Mau Mau leader, had begun to disintegrate,⁹³⁵ before being militarily defeated by the colonial power.

The anti-colonial movement in Kenya failed largely because it was confined to one section of the population rather than representing all of Kenya's different people. KAU, however, emerged as a nationalist party eschewing the regional character of ^{the} ~~NKCA~~. Leaders of non-Kikuyu extraction⁹³⁶ joined ^{the} ~~KAU~~ which was re-christened the Kenya African National Union (KANU).⁹³⁷ Oginga Odinga had already become known as the most outspoken nationalist leader in Kenya against British colonialism.⁹³⁸ Oginga Odinga led the Kenyan delegation to the second conference of ^{EA} ~~A~~AAPSO [Conakry, 1960].

Anxious to prevent the nationalist forces becoming so radical as to pose a permanent threat to its economic and strategic interests in the continent, Britain decided, in its own interest, to grant independence to Kenya under Kenyatta's leadership. Kenya -became independent in December 1963, with Kenyatta as Prime Minister and Oginga Odinga as Minister for Home Affairs. Within a few months,

the former made himself President and Oginga Odinga Vice-President.

Chinese propaganda gave support to the Mau Mau movement when it was oppressed by the British authorities.⁹³⁹ When the Mau Mau movement of anti-colonialism gave way to Kenya-wide nationalism from 1956 onwards, China supported ^{the} KANU.⁹⁴⁰ Contacts between Chinese representatives and representatives of the Kenya national independence movement, however, began only in 1958, following the establishment of ^{the} AAPSO based in Cairo. China was particularly attracted to Oginga Odinga⁹⁴¹ who was clearly a radical and militant nationalist leader. In August 1960, Oginga Odinga visited China.⁹⁴² He was full of admiration for his hosts and their socialist achievements.

...the Chinese showed me factories, communes, co-operatives; they showed me their plans for housing, for dealing with unemployment, how they organise farming and small industry, how government worked at village level; how plans for factory and agricultural production was worked out. It was impossible not to be impressed with life in China. So many of the problems of poverty and illiteracy were those of our people, and these problems were being overcome at an impossible rate.⁹⁴³

In February 1961, Zhou Enlai sent a message to Oginga Odinga reaffirming China's 'support for Kenyan independence and the release of Kenyatta'.⁹⁴⁴ In September 1963, two months before Kenya became independent (12 December) a twenty-member KANU delegation visited

China. During this visit, Kenya was praised by the Chinese for its 'heroic struggle' against 'colonial enslavement and for independence and freedom'.⁹⁴⁵

China recognised Kenya immediately after it received independence.⁹⁴⁶ Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, attended the Kenyan independence ceremony. China established diplomatic relations with Kenya soon thereafter (14 December 1963); and, in April 1964, Wang Yu-tien, China's first Ambassador to Kenya arrived in Nairobi.⁹⁴⁷

The first Kenyan delegation to China (after the former's independence) was led by the militant and pro-Chinese Oginga Odinga (May 1964). As a result of the visit, Kenya received from China an interest-free loan estimated at \$25 million, a further 'grant' of \$2.8 million,⁹⁴⁸ the resources required to establish a technical school for 1,000 students, credit financing for a chain of food processing plants, a radio station, and the resources needed for the construction of a hospital with 200 beds.⁹⁴⁹ Upon his return to Kenya, Oginga Odinga reiterated his early admiration for the Chinese model and experience.

...ten years ago, China was poor, but because the people accepted villagisation and worked hard in groups, China is now one of the richest countries in the world.⁹⁵⁰

Not long after Oginga Odinga's visit, (7 August 1964), a Kenyan government goodwill mission, under the leadership

of Ramagi Achieng Onako, paid a visit to China with the aim of bringing China and Kenya close together.⁹⁵¹

However, neither China's aid to Kenya, nor the presence of radical forces such as Oginga Odinga in the Kenyan government could act as a counterweight to President Kenyatta's pro-Western bias in politics.⁹⁵² The relations between China and Kenya were therefore not destined to become intimate.⁹⁵³ Oginga Odinga and Kenyatta had already clashed over the Kenyan government's request to Britain to put down the mutiny in the Kenyan armed forces against their British officers (January 1964), and on the agreement between the two governments over the defence of Kenya.⁹⁵⁴

Not long after Kenya became independent, Oginga Odinga, who had played a major role in the development of Sino-Kenyan relations became the focus of criticism from the ruling circles in Kenya for his radical and pro-Chinese inclinations.⁹⁵⁵

In 1965, Kenyatta was successful in his effort to undermine radical forces in the country, including Oginga Odinga, who virtually left the government and KANU to form the Kenya Popular Union (KPU), a new political party (March 1966), "most dedicated to the just demands of all the people of Kenya".⁹⁵⁶ Kenyatta was thus left with a free hand to promote 'moderation' (i.e., anti-communism) in Kenyan politics.

Zhou Enlai's revolutionary predictions for Africa made in February 1964 alarmed most pro-Western governments in Africa. It became a target of criticism in Kenya also.

The appearance of a pamphlet in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (March 1965), allegedly published in Albania with China's help, labelling Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda, Obote and Banda as 'imperialist stooges',⁹⁵⁷ heightened Kenyatta's antipathy towards China, although it was unlikely that China was involved in the publication of a pamphlet denouncing Nyerere⁹⁵⁸ and Obote.⁹⁵⁹ China denied that it had anything to do with the publication of such a pamphlet, claiming that it had been forged by its opponents in order to undermine Sino-African relations.⁹⁶⁰

In March 1966, a motion was tabled in the Kenyan Senate and adopted by the government to the effect that Zhou Enlai's revolutionary statements (during his tour of Africa in 1964) were behind 'a number of coups, crises and assassinations' ever since, and calling on the government to sever diplomatic relations with China.⁹⁶¹

China's protest⁹⁶² was ignored by the government of Kenya. The relations between China and Kenya rapidly deteriorated and were eventually suspended (22 June 1967).⁹⁶³ China's revolutionary assessment of Africa, reinforced by GPCR, intensified Kenyatta's government's hostility towards it. Mao's works were burned in Kenya⁹⁶⁴ and Li Chieh, China's *Chargé d'Affaires*, was ordered (22 June 1967) to leave the country.⁹⁶⁵ The Chinese Embassy in Kenya registered a strongly worded protest against Kenya's anti-China actions, without denying that it had distributed Mao's publications or revolutionary statements.

[it was at] the request of the Kenyan people that the Chinese Embassy has supplied them with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's works and badges with his profile. This is entirely the normal function of an Embassy in promoting friendship between the two peoples and is in complete accord with international practice.⁹⁶⁶

In the same statement, the Chinese Embassy in Namibia argued that

Mao Tse Tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing towards victory...the eager desire of the peoples of Kenya as well as of Africa and the rest of the world to study Mao Tse Tung's thought in quest of the way for opposing imperialism and seeking national salvation represents a great historic current no force can hold back. The stronger your obstruction and opposition, the greater the peoples efforts to make further exploration and study. Your obstruction and opposition will only result in setting yourselves further against the people. You will come to no better end.⁹⁶⁷

13.3.2.9. Malawi

Malawi was granted independence (July 1964) before Zambia, its neighbour (October 1964). Malawi has since been under the rule of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, an absolute dictator utterly loyal to the West and especially to Britain.⁹⁶⁸ He became one of the most outspoken African leaders against communism, an enemy of African liberation movements, and a friend of the South African racist régime. Malawi refused to join OAU because of its condemnation of apartheid.⁹⁶⁹

Despite the reactionary character of Banda's government, it was reported⁹⁷⁰ that, during the early years of independence, China was keen to establish diplomatic relations with Malawi and to establish an Embassy in Zomba. Although no conclusive evidence can be found to suggest that China adopted unusual means to achieve this end, it is likely that China appreciated the geo-strategic significance of Malawi as an important and convenient base for Mozambique's liberation fighters.⁹⁷¹ Malawi was opposed to China on ideological grounds from the beginning, as was evident in the Banda government's recognition of two Chinas.⁹⁷²

China's attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Malawi were believed to have included an offer of an interest-free loan of \$18 million.⁹⁷³ Assuming that such an offer was in fact made, the motivation underlying it could not have been to win Malawi's support in UN, but rather to gain access to the strategically important area which was situated within it, for the Mozambican liberation fighters. The standard interpretation of China's move in Western analysis, that China's offer of aid represented an attempt to win Malawi's support in UN (at a time when China was not particularly interested in restoring its seat in the organisation), would appear to be a misjudgement. After all, China did not approach other African countries - e.g., the Ivory Coast and Burkinā Faso (formerly Upper Volta) - which, like Malawi, had opposed China's admission to UN during the mid-'60s. At the same time, it is hardly likely that China

overlooked Banda's outburst on the wars of national liberation then taking place in Indo-China.

It is not the Americans, but the North Vietnamese and Chinese who stand in the way of peace.⁹⁷⁴

Nor was it likely that China ignored the fact that Banda was prepared to offer Malawi as a base for the operations and activities against liberation forces in neighbouring colonies by imperialist and racist forces.⁹⁷⁵ China and Malawi are yet to establish diplomatic relations.⁹⁷⁶

13.3.2.10 Zambia

The independence of Zambia was to be not only a great achievement for its people, but also to contain the makings of a great victory for national liberation movements in the region which were desperately in need of access to arms and equipment coming from or through Tanzania, especially Angola.⁹⁷⁷ Britain was well aware of Zambia's strategic vulnerability from the point of view of the imperialist and colonialist powers, of encroachment by anti-imperialist national liberation forces active in the region as a whole. To Zambia's north was Tanzania, an actively anti-colonialist country which gave hospitality on its territory to African liberation movements, to its west was Angola where armed struggle was already well advanced. In the years immediately preceding the granting of independence, the forces of anti-colonialism in Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) were becoming more and more radical even though they were under the leadership of Kaunda whose

natural political inclinations were 'moderate' and pro-Western in character. Rather than stoke any further the dangerous fire of radicalism in Zambian nationalist politics, Britain hastily granted independence to its northern Rhodesian territory in 1964.

Until 1958, the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1946, had played the effective role in the national independence movement in Northern Rhodesia. In 1958, a split occurred in ^{the} ANCZ as a result of friction between Harry Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda, its two main leaders, Kaunda being the stronger anti-colonialist and nationalist.⁹⁷⁸ When the Kaunda-led section of ANCZ rejected the British proposal for a Federation of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, Kaunda was imprisoned (1958). Within a year he was released.

In 1960, Kaunda formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP) which led the country to independence⁹⁷⁹ (24 October 1964). China recognised Kaunda's government and the new Republic (20 October 1964) even before it was inaugurated. The Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania, who had already visited Zambia (June 1964), returned to attend the independence celebrations.⁹⁸⁰ Zambia too, promptly announced the decision to establish diplomatic relations with ^{the} PRC (25 October 1964).⁹⁸¹

In November 1964, China opened its Embassy in Lusaka. ^{Chin}Li-Chen, the first Chinese Ambassador, arrived in the country (March 1965).⁹⁸² Since then, relations between China and Zambia have remained consistently positive. China's overtures to Zambia were motivated by its interest

in providing aid to liberation fighters in Angola and Zimbabwe and a desire to extend its already well established diplomatic relations with Tanzania further into southern/central Africa.

In August 1965, the first official delegation from independent Zambia⁹⁸³ led by E.H.K. Mudenda, Minister of Agriculture,⁹⁸⁴ visited China. This was followed a year later (31 July 1966) by another Zambian goodwill mission to China led by Justin Chimba, Minister of Commerce and Industry.⁹⁸⁵ Reuben Chitandika Kamanga, Vice-President of Zambia, led another delegation to China (19-22 August 1966). An agreement was signed providing for cultural co-operation between the two countries.⁹⁸⁶ Zambia announced in October 1966 that China had offered economic and financial aid.⁹⁸⁷

By 1966, Sino-Zambian relations had gelled into a kind of special relationship. During the latter part of the '60s, China viewed Zambia as a major base for extending support to and establishing relations with a number of liberation movements in southern Africa. On the question, more fundamental to China's view of the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and itself, however, Zambia was to be only of peripheral significance to China's anti-Soviet campaign during the '70s.⁹⁸⁸

In June 1965, during its campaign in Africa in favour of convening a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference, China found Zambia (like Tanzania) to be in favour of its postponement. China however, did not allow Zambia's lack

of enthusiasm for the conference to interfere with the smooth progress of its diplomatic relations in the larger interests of the national liberation and anti-imperialist forces in the region as a whole.

13.3.3. Zhou Enlai's Tour of Africa (December 1963 to February 1964) and its Consequences

The purpose of our rush to Africa is to enhance the mutual understanding between China and the friendly African countries, strengthen the traditional friendship between the Chinese people and the African people, further develop the relations of friendship and co-operation between China and the African countries, increase our knowledge and learn useful things from the African people. 999

In December 1963, Zhou Enlai paid a visit to 10 African countries. 990 His African sojourn lasted nearly two months (14 December 1963 - 4 February 1964). It was the first visit to Africa by a Chinese Prime Minister leading the largest ever official mission from China to visit Africa. 991 In Algeria, Zhou Enlai put forward China's ideological conception and principles of State-to-State relations with Africa. He listed the five principles of peaceful coexistence, widening their scope to include the overall aim of constructing the broadest possible united front against colonialism and imperialism. The Sino-Algerian joint *communiqué* (27 December 1963) contained the following main points:

1. [China] supports the African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism

and to win and safeguard national independence;

2. it supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the government of the African and Asian countries;

3. it supports the desire of the African peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice;

4. it supports the African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultation;

5. it holds that the sovereignty of the African and Arab countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed.⁹⁹²

Four considerations are set forth below in an attempt to clarify the objectives of Zhou Enlai's visit to Africa,⁹⁹³ carrying the torch of militant Afro-Asian solidarity inspired by uncompromising anti-imperialism.

1. Diplomatic recognition: This was important for China not only to win the support of 31 African countries in UN or to secure State-to-State relations with them in order to promote trade, commercial and economic co-operation with them; but also, and perhaps even more important, to persuade governments and national independence movements which were prepared to listen to the voice of anti-imperialism - to draw up firm and positive resistance to the imperialist powers under the leadership of the United States. 'All the world's forces opposing US imperialism unite'.⁹⁹⁴ For China hoped that the role of the United States in the Congo(L)⁹⁹⁵ and its support for France during the Algerian war⁹⁹⁶

of national liberation would constitute evidence to Africans (including 'moderate' Africans) of the need to unite against the forces of imperialism.

- ii. Sino-Soviet dispute: One of the main objectives of Zhou Enlai's visit to Africa was to explain China's position both on the Soviet Union's policy of *Détente* and on NTBT. The latter was particularly important to China, as many African countries were about to sign NTBT.⁹⁹⁷ Zhou Enlai hoped that direct talks would persuade more African countries to join China's oppositon to the NTBT.
- iii. Sino-Indian dispute: Explaining China's line on its border dispute with India, a major power in the Afro-Asian and non-alignment movement, was another objective of Zhou Enlai's *safari* to Africa. India, as well as the imperialist powers, was already engaged in active propaganda throughout the world, branding China as an 'aggressive' and 'dangerous' enemy.
- iv. The second conference of Afro-Asian Powers: Perhaps the most important objective of Zhou Enlai's trip to Africa was to win African suport for the convening of a second Afro-Asian Bandung-type conference in the hope that a militant united front in opposition to the leading anti-liberation forces could be established with continent-wide support. The campaign for a second Bandung-type conference was not only the major objective of Zhou Enlai's visit to Africa, but it also constituted the principal ingredient of China's role in international relations as a

whole during the period 1963-65. In addition to his tour of Africa (1963-64), Zhou Enlai, in 1965, visited Africa twice within an interval of three months. The first visit was to Algeria (March 1965) scheduled to be the venue of the Afro-Asian conference, and Egypt, (April 1965).⁹⁹⁸ The second visit was to Tanzania, the Sudan, and Egypt.⁹⁹⁹ (June 1965).

China viewed Afro-Asian solidarity as consisting of popular forces (i.e. national independence, liberation and revolutionary movements as well as peoples' organisations) on the one hand, and on the other, of governments of independent countries. In other words, united front from both above and below. This, in its view, was the only practical means for bringing about a genuine understanding between oppressed peoples and nations in order to

combat imperialism and old and new colonialism; to oppose aggression and intervention; to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops and removal of foreign military bases; to support the national liberation movement; to defend world peace; and to live in friendship in accordance with the [five] principles of peaceful coexistence.¹⁰⁰⁰

China hoped that the second Afro-Asian conference would, unlike the much more compromising and conciliatory¹⁰⁰¹ Non-Aligned Summit Conference (Belgrade: September 1961), adopt policies and resolutions positively opposed to the policy of *Détente* with imperialist powers and in support of

an all-round condemnation of
colonialism and imperialism.¹⁰⁰²

China regarded a second Bandung-type conference not only as an alternative to non-alignment, but also as an alternative to UN itself. China argued that UN had failed to make any effective contribution to oppressed peoples and nations. A joint *communiqué* (28 January 1965) between China and Indonesia, on the occasion of a visit to Djakarta by Chen Yi, Foreign Minister of China, stressed that

[t]he facts show that the United Nations cannot reflect the anti-imperialism and anti-colonialist desire of the people of the world, nor can it organisationally reflect the reality in which the new emerging and revolutionary forces have far outstripped the decadent forces. It is an organisation manipulated by the United States and other big powers.¹⁰⁰³

China's initial campaign for a second Bandung-type conference began as early as April 1961, even before the first Non-Aligned Summit in Belgrade (September 1961).¹⁰⁰⁴ The reason it launched it was provided by the Treaty of Friendship between China and Indonesia, signed in Djakarta (1 April 1961) in which the two countries urged that it was

very necessary...to convene the second Afro-Asian conference in the shortest time.¹⁰⁰⁵

Indonesia, however, started its own campaign for a second conference only after it failed to win overwhelming

support for its claim to West Irian at the Belgrade Summit.¹⁰⁰⁶ In 1961, China was much more eager and determined than Indonesia to promote the idea of convening such a conference with the aim of providing the basis for moral (and even material) encouragement to national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

We not only have our own tasks - China and Indonesia both have territory, Taiwan and West Irian respectively, not yet liberated - we have also greater tasks: the national liberation movements waged by our brothers in Asian, African and Latin American countries need our help.¹⁰⁰⁷

Despite their initial reluctance to support the convening of a second Bandung-type conference, both UAR and India followed the example of Indonesia by adding their support to it (September 1962). India hoped that the conference would provide an opportunity to win over African and Asian countries to its side in its dispute with China.¹⁰⁰⁸

The conclusion of NTBT (25 July 1963), partly in response to a major demand put forward at the Belgrade conference, represented a major obstacle to China's efforts to convene an Afro-Asian conference which could be depended upon to condemn negotiations on disarmament without the participation of non-nuclear countries.¹⁰⁰⁹

The chances of a second Bandung-type conference became even slimmer when Egypt and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), two founding members of the first Bandung Conference, began


TABLE 13.6

ZHOU EN-LAI'S AFRICAN TOUR (DECEMBER 1963 - JANUARY 1964)

Country Visited	Date
Egypt	19-21 December 1963
Algeria	21-27 December 1963
Morocco	27-30 December 1963
Tunisia *	9-10 January 1964
Ghana	11-16 January 1964
Mali	16-21 January 1964
Guinea	21-26 January 1964
Sudan	27-30 January 1964
Ethiopia	1- 4 February 1964
Somalia	

* After visiting Morocco, Zhou En-lai went to Albania.

AFRICA UNDER COLONIALISM (AS AT 1965)



Source: "The Changing Afro-Asian World 1955-65", Peking Review 8 (23 April 1965): 17, p. 21.

their own campaign¹⁰¹⁰ (October 1963), not for a second Bandung-type, but for second Belgrade-type conference.¹⁰¹¹

China needed to make a special effort and undertake an intensive campaign if the much-desired second Afro-Asian Bandung-type conference was to materialise. With this objective in mind, Zhou Enlai went to Africa. In Egypt, the first country that he visited (14 December 1963), Zhou Enlai praised¹⁰¹² Nasser's prominent role in Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity, and for Egypt's participation in the First Games of the Newly Emergent Forces¹⁰¹³ organised in Indonesia (November 1963).

Nasser was, however, displeased that Zhou Enlai had completely failed to mention the first Conference of Non-Alignment which Egypt viewed as a great achievement. Nor did Zhou Enlai make any reference to the forthcoming Second Belgrade-type Conference for which Egypt, along with India and Yugoslavia were engaged in winning the support of Afro-Asian powers.

Despite his reluctance and lack of enthusiasm for a second Bandung-type conference, Nasser, however, agreed that such a conference should take place, and praised the 'Ten Principles' of the First Bandung Conference. However, Nasser insisted that more time should be allowed in order to prepare the ground for a second Bandung-type conference. He insisted that it should take place only after the second Non-Aligned (i.e. Belgrade-type) Summit Conference (Cairo being its proposed venue) (1964).

At the same time, Nasser expressed the hope that as one of the prominent founding powers of the First Bandung

Conference, as an African country, and as AAPSO's headquarters, Egypt would be called upon to play host to the second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference. Zhou Enlai ended his visit to Egypt without extracting a definite promise that a second Bandung-type conference would be held. However, both China and Egypt agreed that the

Bandung Conference marked an illustrious turning point in the Asian-African people's united struggle against imperialism. The fundamental interests of the Asian and African peoples lies in the further strengthening of the Asian-African solidarity, mutual support and closer co-operation between them. The two parties express their determination to take time to work for the preservation of the Bandung spirit.¹⁰¹⁴

In Algeria, (21-27 December 1963), despite the militant relations between China and Algeria which developed before and after Algerian independence, and the common ground shared by China and Algeria on all major issues dividing the world,¹⁰¹⁵ Zhou Enlai found that Ben Bella had some reservations about a second Bandung-type conference. He did not wish to jeopardise his relations with the Soviet Union, which were becoming a major source of economic and military aid to Algeria.¹⁰¹⁶ Algeria's support for a Bandung-type conference without the Soviet Union, as advocated by China would, in all likelihood, undermine Algerian-Soviet relations. In addition to this major consideration, the special relationship between Nasser and Ben Bella must also have militated against a clear commitment on Algeria's part in favour of convening

in the very near future another Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference.

Zhou Enlai concluded his visit too, without extracting a clear-cut and unequivocal assurance of support for such a conference from his Algerian hosts. In a joint *communiqué* (27 December 1963), the two leaders noted

with satisfaction that since the Bandung Conference the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity has developed tremendously...[and both are] determined to increase their efforts to develop the Bandung spirit and reinforce Afro-Asian solidarity.¹⁰¹⁷

Algeria did not join the campaign for convening such a conference until July 1964 when Algiers was selected as its venue.

In the wake of the reluctance he met with in Algeria and Egypt, Zhou Enlai became rather more conciliatory in his subsequent statements on non-alignment to which he referred in more positive terms as contributing to the emergence of a militant Afro-Asian united front. At a press conference (Algiers: 26 December 1963), Zhou Enlai explained that China was not opposed to a non-aligned (i.e. Belgrade-type) conference as long as it led to a commitment to playing a progressive role and to positively responding to peoples' struggles throughout the world. In that sense, both conferences, Zhou Enlai argued, could be mutually compatible.¹⁰¹⁸

Being a committed country China will obviously not participate in a conference of non-aligned countries.

We support the result of the first of non-aligned countries, in opposing imperialism, defending world peace, combatting colonialism and supporting the national liberation movements. I believe that the conference of non-aligned countries, should it take place, would follow the policy of the previous conference; otherwise it would fail to play the progressive role of arousing the people of the world to struggle.¹⁰¹⁹

At the same press conference, Zhou Enlai also made it clear that an Afro-Asian (i.e. Bandung-type) conference could be more positive and progressive in character.

In our opinion the second Afro-Asian conference, should it take place, would render the Ten Principles of the first Afro-Asian conference more specific, and play a *still bigger role* in the tasks of accelerating the end of colonial rule, further liquidating the colonial forces in Asian and African countries and promoting economic co-operation among Afro-Asian countries.¹⁰²⁰ [emphasis added]

In Morocco (27-30 December) and Tunisia (9-10 January 1964), Zhou Enlai failed to get any commitment on the projected¹⁰²¹ conference. However, he succeeded in getting Tunisia's recognition of PRC as the sole representative of the Chinese people.¹⁰²²

In Ghana (11-16 January 1964), however, Zhou Enlai's campaign for a second Bandung-type conference received an enthusiastic and favourable response. Nkrumah and Zhou Enlai urged that

an Afro-Asian conference was necessary and that active preparations should be made to convene it.¹⁰²³

In addition to giving the proposed second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference his endorsement, Nkrumah also expressed the hope that it would be expanded to include Latin American states.¹⁰²⁴

Nkrumah's proposal however, seemed to be impractical, and the outcome of such a far-flung tri-continental conference could be neither controlled, nor predicted. China was already experiencing great difficulty in its attempt to convene a Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference; the addition of Latin America would only add to the problems, obstacles and disputes already faced by China.

At the same time, a tri-continental conference along the lines suggested by Nkrumah might even undermine the very concept of a Bandung-type meeting. An Afro-Asian-Latin-American conference, though based on the Bandung principles, would appear to many - especially those reluctant or opposed to a second Bandung-type conference - as another Non-Aligned (i.e. Bandung-type) Conference. The inclusion of Latin America in the conference could well have the effect of diluting the basis of Afro-Asian solidarity in the shape of AAPSO.

Furthermore, Nkrumah's suggestion would require more time to implement, and China was in a hurry. China's leaders felt that time was running out for the idea of a second Bandung-type conference to get a grip on the imagination of Afro-Asian leaders, especially because Nehru and Tito were well on their way to preparing the ground for a second Bandung-type non-aligned conference.

Nkrumah's proposal also had the disadvantage of giving the Soviet Union time to bring influence to bear on countries to support its participation in such a conference. Finally a tri-continental conference would, by its very nature, provide greater opportunities to the Soviet Union or Soviet-sponsored (and Soviet-dominated) international organisations to participate in it and influence its proceedings and this would inevitably result in a serious set-back to China's aim of preventing the Soviet Union or its avowed supporters taking part in the conference. Despite all these difficulties, China agreed with Nkrumah that

the convening of an Afro-Asian-Latin American people's anti-imperialism conference was desirable.¹⁰²⁵

China would, in all probability, have been more enthusiastic about a tri-continental conference provided it felt sure that such a conference would result in a militant united front against colonialism and imperialism capable of brushing aside the temporising influence of the Soviet Union and the conservative or 'moderate' elements in the non-aligned movement. For, as far as China was concerned, struggles waged by the peoples of Africa and Asia were by no means separable from those in which the peoples of Latin America were engaged.

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The African people's anti-imperialist struggle is inseparable from that of the Asian and Latin American peoples. Their formation of a broad anti-imperialist united front in the struggle will inevitably promote a greater upsurge of the national

liberation movements in the three continents.¹⁰²⁶

Zhou Enlai's next stop was Mali (16-21 January 1964) where he was received well, and his campaign for a second Bandung-type conference given strong support. Both countries expressed their determination to make such a conference a major success for "the independent countries of Asia and Africa".¹⁰²⁷ Mali was the only African country to support the convening of a Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference before a second Belgrade-type non-aligned Summit.¹⁰²⁸

In Guinea (21-26 January 1964), Zhou Enlai found Sekou Touré to be much in favour of a second Bandung-type conference. A joint *communiqué* stressed that

conditions are ripe for the convocation of a second Afro-Asian conference and that active preparations should be made towards this end.¹⁰²⁹

In the Sudan - one of the six African countries that took part in the first Bandung conference - too, Zhou Enlai was able to get agreement on the holding of a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference.¹⁰³⁰

In Ethiopia (30 January -1 February 1964), one of the founders of the Bandung Conference and an influential member of OAU,¹⁰³¹ Zhou Enlai did not appear to be worried about Haile Selassie's direct criticism of China's revolutionary role in Africa, its refusal to sign NTBT, and its conflict with India.¹⁰³² What mattered was the Emperor's agreement to support the convening of a second

Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference.¹⁰³² At a State banquet given in his honour, Zhou Enlai expressed the view that despite the fact that

[our countries differ in social systems, and the policies we pursue are not completely the same, but as we are getting together our aim is to seek common grounds and to try to eliminate or reserve our differences for the time being.¹⁰³⁴

Zhou Enlai's Ethiopian visit was also notable for his success in winning Haile Selassie's support against the wishes of the United States, a great ally - for China's admission to UN. The Emperor "found it unacceptable to ignore representation of 700 million people".¹⁰³⁵

The Emperor expressed the Ethiopian government's point of view that the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations must be reinstated if this would-be world organisation is to fulfill effectively its mission in accordance with its Charter.¹⁰³⁶

However, strong American influence on the one hand, and on the other, the Emperor's fear of Zhou Enlai's revolutionary hardline¹⁰³⁷ stood as barriers to the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Ethiopia during the phase of Sino-African relations under discussion.¹⁰³⁸ However, this step was eventually to be taken in 1970, when China's foreign policy became somewhat more flexible, and there were indications of a softening towards it on the part of the United States.¹⁰³⁹ On this

particular occasion, the United States was opposed even to the issue of a joint *communiqué* by China and Ethiopia!¹⁰⁴⁰

Somalia, which was the last country (1-4 February) on Zhou Enlai's African itinerary on this occasion, not only gave strong support to China's campaign for a second Bandung-type conference¹⁰⁴¹ but also identified itself with China on the major issues affecting international relations.¹⁰⁴²

Zhou Enlai concluded his tour of ten African countries¹⁰⁴³ after winning the support of eight of them: Egypt and Algeria (albeit reluctantly), Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. He was also able to persuade Tunisia to recognise PRC, and Ethiopia to support PRC's admission to UN.

Zhou Enlai's African odyssey was followed by an Asian tour. After leaving Somalia, he visited Burma (14 February 1964), Pakistan (18 February) and Sri Lanka (28 February). All three countries supported the convening of a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference.¹⁰⁴⁴

In his report to the Joint Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the Plenary Meeting of the State Council (April 1964), Zhou Enlai summarised his impression of his African and Asian travels (December 1963-February 1964) in the following terms

Our visit was crowned with full success and attained the desired objectives...we found everywhere that the Bandung spirit was deeply embedded...in the peoples' hearts and that the Afro-Asian peoples' cause of unity against imperialism had developed

greatly. Leaders of many Asian-African countries hold that the time is ripe for convening a second Asian-African conference and active preparations should be made to this purpose.¹⁰⁴⁵

Zhou Enlai's tour of Africa was followed by a Preparatory Meeting for the second Afro-Asian conference (Djakarta: 10-15 April 1964). This meeting was attended by Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt Guinea and Morocco.¹⁰⁴⁶ At this meeting, Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, enumerated five tasks to be accomplished by the proposed conference:

- i. [to] further strengthen unity and co-operation, and adopt concrete measures to support the Asian and African peoples who are still under colonial rule, in their struggles for national independence.
- ii. [to] further strengthen unity and co-operation in order to oppose outside interference, safeguard State sovereignty and consolidate national independence.
- iii. [to] carry out economic, cultural and technological co-operation on the [basis of the] principles of equality, mutual benefit and non-interference in each others internal affairs, and without imposing any political conditions and privileges, and gradually develop an independent national economy and take the road of regeneration through self-reliance.
- iv. [to] strengthen friendly co-operation in international affairs on the basis of the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference and

strive for our rightful position in international organisations.

- v. [to] further strengthen unity and co-operation in order to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war, and to defend world peace.¹⁰⁴⁷

China's position at this meeting was indeed formidable, to say the least. The Soviet Union was not invited¹⁰⁴⁸ to the conference. This was a set-back not only to the Soviet Union but to India and Sri Lanka, its leading supporters.¹⁰⁴⁹ The Soviet Union protested against such a decision. It argued that two-thirds of its territory lay in Asia; its Soviet territory consisted of 40 per cent of the continent of Asia. It further argued that the Soviet/Asian republics were autonomous states, and as such, were entitled to be represented at a conference of Asian states.¹⁰⁵⁰ For the first time, the Sino-Soviet dispute spilled over into a conference at which non-socialist powers were present.¹⁰⁵¹ Also, for the first time, China found itself well-placed *vis à vis* the Soviet Union on a State-to-State level in the Afro-Asian world.

At this meeting, India argued that its support for the Soviet Union's participation in the conference was motivated by the following considerations:

- i. A large part of the Soviet Union lay in the continent of Asia;

ii. The Soviet Union was already a member of various African-Asian organisations at the peoples' level (e.g. the African-Asian Film Festival, the African-Asian Workers' Conference, the African-Asian Games and so on).

iii. The Soviet Union would make a worthy contribution to all that we are striving for. 1052

India's support was, however, not based so much on the above considerations,

rather it was based on its own dispute with China and the fear that the latter might forge ahead as the leading power in the Afro-Asian world.

In contrast to India's position in favour of the Soviet Union's participation in the projected second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference, Chen Yi, the head of the Chinese delegation argued that

- i. There were eight autonomous Asian republics in the Soviet Union but they were not sovereign states..
- ii. The [second] African-Asian conference was to be a conference of Heads of States and that required formal participation by the country concerned. It was therefore a different matter from peoples' meetings such as film festivals, etc.
- iii. The Soviet Union had not supported a very reasonable proposal made by the Afro-Asian countries in its leading bodies and agencies. And, strangely enough, the Soviet Union had linked its rejection of this proposal with the question of China's membership of the UN. China had already made its stand clear on a number of occasions,

that it was quite ready to allow the overall interests of the Afro-Asian countries to be considered first, without placing its own interests in the way.

- iv. But even if the Soviet Union were to change its attitude and support Africa and Asia in this, China would still not agree to it being invited. A country could not be invited just because it supported Africa-Asia or as a recognition of the debt owed to it. Such sentiments ought to be catered for on other forums, and not by inviting it to an Afro-Asian Conference.¹⁰⁵³

Similarly, the Guinean delegate argued in support of China that even though the relations between Guinea and the Soviet Union were excellent, the latter was

nevertheless a European country...if the Soviet Union lay in Asia, the same might be said of the US with its Hawaii, Puerto Rico etc. in Asia.¹⁰⁵⁴

The Guinean delegate added that, despite the fact that the Soviet Union stretched across from the eastern border of Poland to Siberia.

politically it was a single entity, and the capital of the Soviet Union is in Europe.¹⁰⁵⁵

At the same time, he continued, Soviet participation would create division among Afro-Asian countries¹⁰⁵⁶ rather than uniting them. This, he pointed out, had already happened in previous Afro-Asian solidarity meetings at the people-to-people level.

At this Preparatory Meeting, however, China refrained from antagonising those countries in favour of participation by the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵⁷ For tactical reasons, China made an effort to restrict its opposition to inviting the Soviet Union to the conference in accordance with the spirit of the preparatory stage of the conference. This proved to be the correct approach on China's part, because too great an obsession with the Soviet Union at such an early stage would almost certainly have reduced the chances of the conference taking place at all.

China however, began to raise its critical voice against the advocates of the Soviet Union's participation after the Preparatory Meeting. The People's Daily (31 May 1964) responded to India's argument in favour of the Soviet Union's participation by reminding Nehru that he himself had been opposed to the Soviet Union's participation in the Bandung Conference ten years before, when he, speaking about the composition of the First Afro-Asian Conference at a press conference (Djakarta: 30 December 1954) pointed out that

Soviet Asia was not invited because politically it was part of a European unit, namely the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵⁸

At the Preparatory Meeting it was decided that the Conference would take place in Africa. In July 1964, Algeria was chosen by OAU as the host country.¹⁰⁵⁹ The Conference was originally scheduled to take place in February 1965,¹⁰⁶⁰ but because of the very short time

available for preparation, Algeria requested that the Conference should be delayed¹⁰⁶¹ until 29 June 1965.

Partly to keep up the momentum of China's campaign in favour of the forthcoming second Bandung-type conference, and partly to attend the Anniversary (1 November 1964) of the Algerian Revolution, Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, led a delegation to Algeria (1-6 September 1964).¹⁰⁶²

During the four month period preceding the Conference, scheduled for June 1965, China intensified its campaign. In March, Zhou Enlai visited Algeria, where he found that the atmosphere of December 1963 had changed into one of enthusiasm for a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference.¹⁰⁶³

A National People's Congress delegation from China visited Mali, Guinea, the Central African Republic and Ghana, at about the same time and for the same purpose. During the period May-June 1964, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister visited Morocco, Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Congo(B), and CAR.¹⁰⁶⁴ In June, as has already been noted, Zhou Enlai visited Tanzania, the Sudan, and Egypt.

At the final preparatory meeting held in Algiers (8 June 1965), it was decided that a preparatory meeting of Foreign Ministers would be held five days (24 June) before the actual Conference (29 June).

China's Afro-Asian aspirations and its last-minute campaign, were given a jolt by sudden political developments in the country where the Conference was to be held. On 19 June 1965, Houari Boumedienne, Vice-President

of Algeria and Defence Minister, deposed Ben Bella, the Algerian President.

In its eagerness that domestic political developments should not be allowed to influence the fate of the conference, China recognised without delay the Revolutionary Council and the new government of Algeria under the leadership of Boumediénne.¹⁰⁶⁵ China could not afford postponement of the Conference, especially because support for the Soviet Union's participation in it was increasing day by day.¹⁰⁶⁶

Egypt, as a co-founder of the first Bandung Conference, made a request to the effect that in view of the sudden change of government in Algeria the conference should be postponed.¹⁰⁶⁷ Egypt's position in the matter was not only influenced by the close friendship that prevailed between Nasser and Ben Bella but also by the fact that it was not enthusiastic, in the first place, about a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian Conference.

Despite Boumediénne's revolutionary inclination,¹⁰⁶⁸ progressive African countries feared that Algeria might turn the clock back, and cease to be a major base for guerrilla training and liberation movements. Thus China's immediate recognition of the new Algerian government (and its insistence that the Conference should be held as scheduled) was questioned even by its friends such as Ghana, Guinea and Tanzania which viewed the deposition of Ben Bella 'with disfavour'.¹⁰⁶⁹

By the time the preparatory meeting of Foreign Ministers was to be held, (24 June), most Afro-Asian

members (including Ghana and Tanzania¹⁰⁷⁰ but not Indonesia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and of course China) were in favour of a postponement¹⁰⁷¹ of the Conference. As a consequence it was eventually postponed until November.

The postponement of the Conference was seen as a set-back for China, and a victory for India and the Soviet Union and their supporters who wanted more time in order to gain more support for the Soviet Union's participation in the Conference. Algeria, however, viewed the postponement of the Conference as a set-back for the colonial and imperial powers¹⁰⁷² which tried to undermine Afro-Asian solidarity. Algeria was optimistic that postponement would allow more time to reconcile other differences between the participant countries, and thus to reinforce Afro-Asian solidarity at the expense of the imperialist powers.¹⁰⁷³

By November 1965, new developments had emerged which, paradoxically, led China to seek a further postponement of the Conference.

- i. China was convinced that it would not be possible to get a unanimous resolution passed condemning the United States-led imperialist powers, and supporting armed resistance for liberation, because the influence of the Soviet Union, India and the champions of *Détente* on Afro-Asian states was rapidly increasing. As far as China was concerned, an Afro-Asian conference which would not adopt

resolutions condemning US imperialism,
...would be a waste. ¹⁰⁷⁴

In a letter (22 October 1965) to leaders of African and Asian countries, Zhou Enlai explained China's reasons for requesting a postponement in a clearer manner.

China sincerely hoped that the conference could be held on November 5 and could turn out a success. Unfortunately since the end of June the situation has grown more and more complicated... new tensions and conflicts have occurred between certain Afro-Asian countries during the period, and even now there exist among Afro-Asian countries differences... over a series of questions of key importance to the success of the second Afro-Asian Conference, e.g. whether a non Afro-Asian country is entitled to participate in the Afro-Asian conference, whether the second Afro-Asian conference should have anything to do with the United Nations and whether it is necessary for the conference to condemn the imperialists... and particularly to condemn the US imperialist aggression in Vietnam... It can be said that the present circumstances are more unfavourable to the holding of the conference than those which prevailed in June... ¹⁰⁷⁵

11. China had not been able to convince the majority of participants expected to attend the Conference that they should oppose the invitation of U Thant, ¹⁰⁷⁶ Secretary General of UN, to the Conference. UN was viewed by China, along with Indonesia, as an instrument of the imperialist powers. Following Indonesia's withdrawal from UN (January 1965), China and Indonesia had already started a campaign for the establishment of an alternative UN, under the name of the New Conference of the Emerging Forces (CONEFO).

- iii. During the period June-November 1965, advocates of the Soviet Union's participation in the Conference rapidly increased in number. Even Algeria, China's close friend and host country, started to press for the presence of both the Soviet Union and China at the Conference.¹⁰⁷⁷
- iv. The Indo-Pakistan clash over Kashmir (September 1965) was another obstacle to the Conference. It was anticipated that the conflict between Pakistan and India, both founding members of the first Bandung Conference, would undermine the second Bandung-type Afro-Asian Conference.
- v. Finally, the *coup d'état* in Indonesia (31 September 1965), which clearly represented the beginning of the end of the rule of Sukarno, a strong supporter of a second Bandung-type Conference, came as a major set-back to China. Indonesia, as a non-communist country, under the leadership of Sukarno was expected to influence moderate Afro-Asian members to support resolutions condemning the colonial and imperial powers and urging active support for liberation movements.

China was joined by Kampuchea (then Cambodia) Vietnam, North Korea, Pakistan, Tanzania and Guinea in its campaign to seek a postponement of the Conference again from November 1965 to a later date.¹⁰⁷⁸ The Conference was eventually postponed. Circumstances seemed to be against the Conference ever materialising after such a bad augury.

The postponement of the Conference (November 1965) represented a victory for China and a set-back for the Soviet Union and India, which had campaigned hard to keep to the new date. Algeria once again took the view that postponement of the Conference removed a big threat to Afro-Asian unity and helped preserve the anti-imperialist front, in fact, as the prospect of Afro-Asian countries becoming directly embroiled in the Sino-Soviet dispute receded. 1079

NOTES

1. Premier Chou En-lai's Speech at the Mass Rally of Welcome in Mogadiscio (3 February 1963), in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 274.
2. Premier Chou En-lai's Press Conference in Mogadiscio (3 February 1964), ibid, pp. 285-286.
3. Peking Review 4 (21 February 1961): 16. p. 11.
4. For a detailed account of the political history of OAU see, for example, M. Wolfers, Politics in the Organization of African Unity, (London: Methuen, 1976).
5. With the exception of Guinea, China's diplomatic relations with African countries were almost exclusively concentrated in the North of the continent. This does not mean that China was uninterested in other parts of Africa: the absence of effective liberation movements advocating armed struggle against imperialism was a factor underlying a lack of direct interest in these areas on the part of PRC. In addition, throughout the '50s, none of the independent countries in the sub-Saharan continent (including Ghana, but with the exception of Guinea) was prepared to enter into diplomatic relationship with China. See Chapters 11 and 12.
6. For a brief but valuable analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute during this period, see M. B. Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963', op.cit., pp. 93-113.
7. Kung-tso t'ung-hsun, no. 17 (25 April 1961), p. 22, cited in P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 139.
8. Most Asian countries won their independence from colonial rule before 1950. Most Latin American countries had a much longer history of independent nationhood than Asian countries. In Africa, however, colonial rule continued into the '50s and '60s. During this period, Africa thus became the major area for struggles between national independence and liberation movements on the one hand and the colonialist and imperialist powers on the other. Guided by its ideological priority of bringing imperialism to an end and based on its strategy of a united front of all forces against the main enemy, China's fundamental concern was with the national liberation movements which were ready to use armed struggle. This was particularly so as most communist parties which China earlier identified with, showed their loyalty to Soviet international line of accommodation with, not resistance to, the imperialist forces.

9. See Kayfa Taharraret Al Jazair, op.cit., p. 8; Al Mujahid no. 34 (28 December 1958) p. 7; and A Humbaraci, Algeria: A Revolution that failed, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 35.
10. A. Humbaraci, ibid., p. 35.
11. Al NUSUS Al Asasiyya Lisabhat Al tahrir Al wabani (1962-1954) [The main documents of the FLN (1954-1962)] [Wizaret Al I'lam wa Atharafa 1979 (Algiers: Ministry for Culture and Information, 1979)], p. 94. See also A. Horne, op.cit., p. 335.
12. Ben Khedda, PGRA President, on the 7th Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution (1 November 1961) cited in Peking Review 4 (10 November 1961): 45, p. 11.
13. See Chapter 2.3 of this work.
14. Kayfa Taharraret Al Jazair pp. 81-83.
15. quoted from A. Gilly, 'Introduction', in F. Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, op.cit., p. 4.
16. Joshua Nkomo (Zimbabwe) addressing a rally of 30,000 people (15 August 1962), in The voice of Joshua Nkomo (a publication by the Zimbabwe Information and Publicity Department) (Zambia: The African People's Union, 1972), p. 20.
17. NCNA (18 April 1960) reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 101.
18. J. Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of A Political Phenomenon (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 147. A similar view is expressed by, for example, E. Behr, The Algerian Problem, (London: Greenwood Press Publications, 1961), passim.
19. See Chapter 12.3.1.2 of this work.
20. Here it should be noted that FLN showed itself to be socialistically oriented even as early as August 1956 at its '1 S' mam Congress.
21. This programme included planning policy for Algerian economic development, agrarian revolution, nationalization of foreign trade and material sources. Externally, it sought continuous struggles against colonialism and imperialism and emphasized its unequivocal support to all liberation forces. See Al NUSUS Al Asasiyya Lisabhat Al tahrir Al wabani op.cit., pp. 86-97.
22. See Chapters 13.2.1.2.2, 14.1.1.3, and 15.2.1.3 of this work.

23. See chapters 13.2.1.2.1, 14.1.1.2 and 15.2.1.2. of this work.
24. Al Mujāhid no. 79 (10 October 1960), p. 1.
25. Peking Review 1 (30 September 1958): 31, p. 25. The following countries recognized PGRA without any delay: Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Iraq (19 September 1958); Saudi Arabia, Jordan (20 September); UAR Yemen (21 September); Sudan, China, North Korea (22 September); North Vietnam (26 September); Indonesia (27 September); Guinea (30 September); Mongolia (15 December). See A. Humbaraci, op.cit., p. 51.
26. Author's interview with Ben Khedda (26 November 1983).
27. People's Daily (23 September 1958), reproduced in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 26.
28. cited in Peking Review 1 (30 October 1958): 31, p. 25.
29. Ferhat Abbas speaking on the occasion of China's recognition of PGRA, reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 94.
30. cited in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 38. Sha'alal was accompanied by Reda Malek who, after to independence, held various ambassadorial and ministerial posts.
31. quoted in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 93.
32. quoted from G. H. Jansen, op.cit., p. 283.
33. Ibid., p. 284.
34. Author's interview with Ben Khedda (26 November 1983).
35. Al Mujāhid (24 December 1958), p. 8.
36. quoted in Peking Review 1 (16 December 1958): 42, p. 21.
37. Al Mujāhid no. 34 (28 December 1958), p. 8.
38. Ibidem.
39. A. Horne, op.cit., p. 404.
40. In Ben Khedda's own words, the Chinese told us about their experience of guerrilla war and people's war which had already been put into practice by our liberation fighters. However, the Chinese explanation gave us confidence and provided encouragement that the methods we were using were

correct and would turn out to be undoubtedly successful.

41. Author's interview with Ben Khedda (26 November 1983).
42. Peking Review 2 (7 April 1959): 14, p. 3.
43. Al Mujāhid, no. 39 (2 April 1959), p. 6
44. Peking Review 2 (12 May 1959): 19, p. 25.
45. Ibidem.
This was also emphasized by Ben Khedda in his interview with the author.
46. See, for example, A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 27; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 39; H. C. Hinton, op.cit., p. 185, and I. Deutscher, op.cit., p. 211.
47. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 34 (note 2); A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 276 (table 9); A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 130; R. Lowenthal, China, in Z. Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 259 (note 21).
48. See Chapter 10.1 of this work ; see also A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 148.
49. Al Mujāhid no. 57 (15 December 1959), p. 1.
50. quoted from A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 147.
51. Author's interview with Ben Khedda (26 November 1983).
52. Ibidem.
Another reason for this was the strategic location of Tunisia near Algeria.
53. China strongly objected to Nasser's vendetta against the Egyptian communist party during the period 1958-9. There was a deterioration in the relations between Egypt and China during this period. See Chapter 12.2.1.1.5 of this work.
54. Ferhat Abbas, President of PGRA in an interview with Al Mujāhid no. 81 (1 November 1960), p. 7. See also Chapter 13.3.2.2 of this work.
55. Al Mujāhid (30 October 1958), p. 1.
56. N. S. Khrushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviet (31 October 1959), cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 27.
57. I. Deutscher, op.cit., p. 212.
58. quoted from Ibid., pp. 211-212.

59. quoted from Ibid., p. 213.
60. quoted from A. Dallin, 'The Soviet Union: Political Activity' in Z. Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 38. For similar views, see, for example, D. Zagoria, op.cit., pp. 270-276; Tareq Y. Ismael, 'The People's Republic of China and Africa', The Journal of Modern African Studies 9 (1971): 4, p. 509; and, I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 116.
61. N. S. Khrushchev's Report to the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (October 1959), cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 99.
62. Ibidem.
63. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 99.
64. The Soviet Union was mistaken in its belief that the willingness shown by the United States to sign NTBT would spill over into willingness on its part for a peaceful solution of the crisis engulfing Indo-China. See Chapter 7 (note 2).
65. Hsinhua Commentary (16 October 1959) in Peking Review 2 (27 October 1959): 43, p. 25.
66. cited in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 52
67. cited in Peking Review 3 (3 May 1960): 18, p. 10.
68. cited in ibid., p. 5.
After their visit to China, the Algerian delegation went to North Vietnam (4-6 May) and North Korea (10-13) where they received a warm welcome and received strong support for the Algerian cause. See the 'Joint Communique issued between Algeria and North Vietnam and Algeria and North Korea', in Al M. U. j. a. h. i. d. no. 69 (30 May 1960), pp. 8-9.
69. cited in Peking Review 3 (10 May 1960): p. 14.
70. quoted in Peking Review 3 (24 May 1960): p. 14.
71. Al M. U. j. a. h. i. d. no. 69 (30 May 1960), p. 1.
72. For the text of welcoming speeches and statements by Chinese leaders, see, for example, Peking Review 3 (4 October 1960): 40, pp. 38-40.
73. 'Premier Chou En-lai's Speech at Banquet in Honour of Premier Abbas Ferhat (29 September 1960)', in The Chinese People Resolutely Support the Just Struggle of the African People (a publication by the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 20.

74. Ferhat Abbas, 'Speech in the Great Hall of the PRC', cited in Peking Review 3 (33 October 1960): 41, p. 18.
75. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
76. Ferhat Abbas, 'Interview with Al Mujāhid', op.cit., p.7.
77. Peking Review 3 (8 November 1960): 45, p. 26.
78. The last Algerian delegation to visit China before independence was a diplomatic mission sent by PGRA. During its stay in China, the Chinese Red Cross gave it a cheque for the equivalent of £3,000 in response to an appeal of the Algerian Red Cross. See Peking Review 5 (22 June 1962): 25, p. 20.
79. cited in Peking Review 4 (26 May 1961): 21, p. 21.
80. French oppression of and brutality against Algerians residing in France during the war were very well known though they have not been documented in a systematic fashion.
81. cited in Peking Review 4 (27 October 1961): 43, p. 11.
82. Chou En-lai, in a letter to Youcef Ben Khedda, the Algerian Premier (20 March 1962), reproduced in Peking Review 5 (23 March 1962): 12, p. 5.
83. Author's interview with Ben Khedda (26 November 1983).
84. See Chapters 12.3.1.2 and 13.2.1.1 in this work.
85. B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People (London: Longman, 1972), p. 167. The first Angolan nationalist movement to surface was led by Viriato da Cruz (1948) who, along with other members of Associação dos Naturais de Angola, was permitted by the Portuguese authorities to publish Mensagem (Message). The authorities restricted the publication of Mensagem to the Portuguese language and its subject matter was to cover such non-political subjects as African culture and poetry only. Ibid., pp. 146-154.
86. In 1952, Cruz organized a group known as the International Intellectuals of Angola. It was also reported that he joined the French Communist Party during his student days in Paris during the early '50s. See Pieter Lessing, Africa's Red Harvest (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1962), p. 16.
87. Pieter Lessing, op.cit., p. 15.

88. See B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., p. 163 and 169; and J. A. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', Foreign Affairs 54 (April 1976): 3, passim.
89. Taken from a pamphlet entitled Angola: socialism at birth [a pamphlet by the Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre, (MAGIC)] (London: MAGIC, 1980), p. 8.
90. It also included European members. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 126.
91. For further details see, for example, B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., passim; A Gavshon, op.cit., p. 236; and Angola: socialism at birth.
92. 30 people were killed. See Angola: socialism at birth, op.cit., p. 8; see also M. P. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies 8 (April 1970): 1, p. 17.
93. In 1960, MPLA made it clear to the West (at a meeting in the British House of Commons) that it had decided to adopt a strategy of direct action against Portuguese colonialism. See Report (4-10 December 1977) by Agostino Neto, President of MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola to the First Congress of MPLA after Angola's independence, published by MAGIC (London, 1977), p. 5.
94. As quoted in Angola: socialism at birth, op.cit., p. 8.
95. Ibid., p. 9. See also B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., pp. 183-186; and W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 286.
96. Angola: Socialism at birth, op.cit., p. 9.
97. Other neighbours - Zambia and Namibia - were themselves still struggling for freedom; and, Congo (B), the other possible base, though independent since August 1960, was closely aligned to the West (see Chapter 13.3.1.8 of this work) and reluctant to provide active support for the liberation struggle in Angola.
98. Perhaps among the subjects discussed between Lumumba [during his visit to Guinea (1960)], Sekou Touré, and the MPLA leaders was the shifting of the MPLA headquarters to a nearby country. Andrade served as Acting President in the place of Neto who was in prison.
99. Author's interview with representatives of Angolan Information Bureau (London: July 1985). Similar views can, for example, be found in B. Davidson, In

the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., passim; and, his People's Cause, op.cit., p. 121.

100. B. Davidson In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., pp. 186-211.
101. cited in Mario de Andrade, 'The Origins of the Angolan Insurrection', in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (Eds.) The African Liberation Reader (Vol. 2), (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 10.
102. See, for example, B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 129; and his In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., pp. 187-190. See also Angola: socialism at birth, op.cit., p. 10.
103. See Angola: Socialism at Birth, op.cit., p. 10; and B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 130 and his In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., p. 192.
104. All the 21 MPLA fighters were killed. See B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., pp. 208-211.
105. Ibid., pp. 205-208.
106. See Ibid., pp. 210-211 and P. M. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa', op.cit., p. 17.
107. B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., p. 211.
108. It was at this juncture that Cruz, a prominent MPLA leader, left the organization to form a breakaway organization (MPLA-Cruz). In July 1963, Cruz joined FNLA. Ibid., p. 211 and pp. 229-243. See also P. M. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa', passim.
109. El Shaáb (Algerian national daily paper; 18 January 1963).
110. B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., p. 211. It was not until 1971 that OAU withdrew its recognition of GREA and urged a united front of all the Angolan national liberation forces.
111. See P. M. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa', op.cit., p. 20; 'Arms and the Nationalists: where and what arms do they obtain their support and how important is external aid to their Revolution', Africa Report 15 (May 1970): 5, p. 13. See also R. Gibson, African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggle against White Minority (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 236-237; and Wei Liang-Tsai, Peking Versus Taipei in Africa (Taipei: The Asia and World Institute, 1982), p. 271.

112. See P. M. Whitaker, 'Arms and the Nationalists: where and what arms do they obtain their support and how important is external aid to their Revolution', op.cit., pp. 20-22; J. A. Marcum, 'Three Revolutions', Africa Report 12 (November 1967): 8, p. 10; R. Gibson, op.cit., pp. 234-242; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 106.
113. See P. M. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa', op.cit., pp. 20-22 and R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 11.
114. Angola: socialism at birth, op.cit., p. 11.
115. See, for example, P. M. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa', op.cit., p. 20 and B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., p. 237.
116. Angola: socialism at birth, op.cit., p. 11.
117. A. Vakulukuta, 'The Peasantry of the South', in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (Eds.), op.cit., p. 15.
118. P. Lessing, op.cit., p. 15.
119. In 1958, Angola was represented in the delegation of 8 African countries which attended China's National Day (1 October). See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 34.
120. P. Lessing, op.cit., p. 15; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 106-107.
121. P. Lessing, op.cit., p. 13; J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 126; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 260.
122. See, for example, Peking Review 4 (31 March 1961): 13, p. 22. See also P. Lessing, op.cit., p. 13; J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 126; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 260.
123. cited in Peking Review 4 (12 May 1961): 19, p. 11.
124. People's Daily (24 June 1961), reproduced in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 107.
125. Peking Review 4 (24 June 1961): 21, p. 12.
126. Peking Review 4 (12 May 1961): 19, p. 11.
127. See Peking Review 7 (13 March 1964): 11, p. 13. See also J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 124-129; P. Van Ness, op.cit., pp. 143-144; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 71 and 146; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 179.
128. Ironically, some analysts (see for example Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 259-260; B. D. Larkin, op.cit.,

pp. 177-186; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., passim) seem to relate much of China's support to African liberation movements to the absence of diplomatic relations between China and the colonialist and imperialist powers (in this context, Portugal) concerned. This argument is simply unsustainable in view of such facts as, for example, the support given by China to the new regime in Zanzibar (after the revolution in 1964) even though it had had diplomatic relations with the previous monarchical government (see Chapter 13.2.3.4 of this work). China broke off diplomatic relations with the Leopoldville government as a protest against the policy of oppressing national liberation forces (see Chapter 13.2.3.2 of this work).

129. Peking Review 7 (13 March 1964): 11, p. 13.
130. P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 143.
131. See, for example, B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 189; Ismael Y. Tareq, op.cit., p. 518, C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 183, J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 133; B. Munslow, Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 79-86; C. Simpson, Life in a Frelimo School, 'People's Power in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau', People's Power no. 12 (Autumn-Winter 1978), pp. 34-41. Frelimo's headquarters were in Dar es Salaam which, in subsequent years, became renowned for the hospitality it offered to various nationalist minorities in Africa struggling against imperialism, colonialism and racism.
132. Initially, as in the case of most African liberation movements, Frelimo manifested a flexible attitude; it sought peaceful changes and urged the world to condemn Portuguese colonialism. This, however, seemed only to be a temporary tactic and not a substitute for the strategy of liberation through armed struggle.
133. See B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 132.
134. *Vide* 'Mondlane: Early Days in South Africa' in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (Eds.), The African Liberation Reader (Vol. 2), op.cit., p. 22. (Number of points were made by the author). See also B. Munslow, op.cit., pp. 81-101; and G. House and H. Shore, Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom (New York: The Africa Fund, 1975); pp. 1-36.
135. B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 132.
136. 'Mondlane: Early Days in South Africa' in A. de Bragança and I. Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader (Vol. 2), p. 22; B. Munslow, Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins, op.cit., pp. 84-87. On

25 September 1964, Frelimo issued its first statement for direct action which read as follows:

In the name of [Mozambican people] Frelimo today solemnly proclaims the general arms insurrection of the Mozambican people against Portuguese colonialism for the attainment of complete independence of Mozambique. Our fight must not cease before the total liquidation of Portuguese colonialism...the armed struggle which commences today, is an integral part of the struggle of the people of Africa and of the whole world for the victory of ideals of liberty and Justice.

(Quoted in G. House and H. Shore, op.cit., p. 35).

137. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 172.

138. quoted in C. Legum, 'Africa and China: symbolism and substance', in A. M. Halpern (Ed.), Policies Toward China: views from six countries (London: McGraw-Hill Company, 1965), p. 410.

139. cited in Ibidem.

140. See Chapter 13.3.1.6 of this work.

141. See ibidem.

See also J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 557; and B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', New Statesman Vol. 60 (30 October 1970), p. 557.

142. quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 155.

143. See, for example, C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., p. 410; Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., passim; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 129. Under Cabral's leadership PAIGE became a strong force. His contribution to the development and revolutionary organization of the movement can be gleaned from Amilcar Cabral, Return to the Source: selected speeches of Amilcar Cabral (London: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

144. Other political organizations active in Guinea-Bissau at the time were national bourgeois in character: Frente pour la Liberation et l'Independence Nationale de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (MLG); and Populations de Guinée Dite Portugaise (UPG) which was part of the FLING. See P. Van Nass, op.cit., p. 143; and A. Kitchen (Ed.), A Handbook of African Affairs (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

145. Prensa Latina op.cit., The Non-Aligned Countries, (tr. by Dr. Ivo Dvorak) (London: Harney and Jones Limited, July 1982), p. 265.
146. See P. M. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa', op.cit., passim; B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 136; and Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 272.
147. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 131. In contrast to PAIGE, Frelimo of Mozambique and ^{the} MPLA of Angola in particular experienced difficulties in gaining access to strategic bases in the neighbouring countries for the purpose of carrying out guerrilla operations.
148. P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 142; Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 273; B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 137; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 186.
149. Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 273-274.
150. China established diplomatic relations with Guinea on 4 October 1959. Other possible countries were still under colonialism (Zambia), pro-West [Congo (B) and Congo (L)], or had no friendly relations with China at that time (Tanzania). See Chapter 13.2.3.2, 13.3.1.6, 13.3.1.8 and 3.3.2.10 of this work.
151. See C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 186; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 129.
152. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 129; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 187.
153. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 129; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 187.
154. Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 518; and C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., p. 410.
155. Amilcar Cabral quoted in C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., p. 410.
156. Ibidem. See also Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 518; P. Van Ness, op.cit., pp. 142-143; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 145 and 191; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 131.
157. Peking Review 7 (9 October 1964): 41, p. 7.
158. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 234 and S. G. Ndlovu, Zimbabwe: some facts about its liberation struggle (Zambia: Information and Publishing Department of ZAPU, December 1973), p. 84.
159. S. G. Ndlovu, op.cit., p. 64.

160. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 234.
161. Nkomo spent most of his time travelling from one African capital (see Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 270; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 236) to another, opening offices in Zambia, Ghana, Algeria (and Britain) which led him to devote much less time to the task of forging an effective strategy of national liberation and devising practical means by which armed struggle and political infiltration (see R. Gibson, op.cit., pp. 174-176) in Zimbabwe could be carried out against the racist white minority regime.
162. See R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 174 and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 234. For a further analysis of the historical and political foundations of ZANU see, for example, M. Davis, 'Rhodesia's Foreign Policy', African Report 12 (February 1967): 2, pp. 17-19; E. Dumbutshena, Zimbabwe Tragedy (Lusaka: East African Publishing House, 1975) pp. 46-53; L. H. Gann and T. H. Henriksen, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush, (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 43-52; and D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Faber and Faber, 1981) passim.
163. R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 175.
164. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 48.
165. Z. Brzezinski, ^(ed.) op.cit., p. 262 (note 89).
166. Others were Mario de Andrade (Angola); Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya and Joseph Murumbi (Kenya); Tunji Otegbeye (Nigeria); Oliver Tambo, Robert Resha, Tennyson Makinwane, Duma Nokwe and Moses Kotane (South Africa); Jariretundu Kozonguizi (South-West Africa); Mongi Kooli (Tunisia); and Abdouloye Diallo (Guinea). See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 62 (note 78).
167. See Wai Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 270; and R. Gibson, op.cit., pp. 174-177.
168. Peking Review 7 (18 September 1964): 38, pp. 28-29.
169. R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 175.
170. Peking Review 7 (17 April 1964): 16, p. 13.
171. D. Martin and P. Johnson, op.cit., p. 11.
172. See Africa Report (News in Brief) no. 10 (October 1966) pp. 95-96; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 174.
173. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 270.
174. Text of statement issued by the Chinese Government (14 November 1965) in Peking Review 8 (19 November 1965), p. 10.

175. Reproduced in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 269.
176. People's Daily (4 November 1965), as quoted in ibid., pp. 269-270. -
177. For a brief analysis of the history of ANC see, for example, G. Richard, op.cit., pp. 38-55.
178. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 84; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 274; and Africa Report 6 (March 1961): 3, pp. 5, 6 and 15.
179. PAC was founded by a group of ^{the} ANC dissidents, led by Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, who accused ANC of collaboration with the whites. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 274; and R. Gibson, op.cit., pp. 38-55.
180. The first initiative was taken by PAC (21 March 1960). This was followed ten days later (31 March) by ANC. See R. Gibson, op.cit., pp. 38-56.
181. Ibid., p. 56.
182. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 274.
183. See R. Gibson, op.cit., pp. 55-76; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 275; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 187.
184. See note 179 above.
185. quoted in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 84.
186. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 187; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 69 and 84.
187. Walter Sisulu was Secretary-General of ANC. See Chapter 11 of this work.
188. See Chapter 12.1 of this work.
189. Reproduced from New China News Agency (6 July 1959) in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 56.
190. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 84.
191. cited from New China News Agency (May 1963), in ibid., pp. 84-85.
192. Ibid., p. 82.
193. Reproduced from New China News Agency (20 April 1964) in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 85.
194. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 83-85.
195. See C. R. Allen, op.cit., pp. 68 and 169 and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 85.

196. Botswana, surrounded on all sides by South Africa, independent since 1966, was not in a position to provide practical and active support or active base for armed struggle and guerrilla operations.
197. Mao Tun at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council meeting held in Algiers (March 1964), as quoted in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 168.
198. quoted from A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 93.
199. Ibid., p. 94.
200. Chou En-lai's message to the Conference, quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 94.
201. The Chinese had the largest delegation at the Conference consisting of 25 members. It was headed by Liao Cheng-Chih and Liu Ning-yi. See C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 28.
202. cited in ibid., pp. 27-28.
203. See R. Lowenthal 'China', op.cit., p. 176; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 94.
204. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 94.
205. See, for example, C. Neuhauser, op.cit., pp. 24-29; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 39; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 94.
206. See Chapter 12.2.1.1.5 of this work.
207. C. Neuhauser, op.cit., pp. 23-27.
208. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 95; and C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 35.
209. C. Neuhauser, op.cit., pp. 34-35.
210. See Chapter 12.2.2.1 of this work.
211. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 46 (note 7).
212. quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 95.
213. The Soviet Union, by contrast, offered only \$20,000; UAR offered a sum of \$20,000 and scholarships; Indonesia offered a donation of \$15,000 plus scholarships. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 95-96; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 59; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 46 (note 7).
214. C. Neuhauser, op.cit., pp. 25-26.
215. The April meeting at Bandung also urged the unification of the two Koreas and the United States

- was urged to withdraw from South Korea. Ibid., pp. 26-36.
216. Ibid., p. 36.
217. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 96.
218. cited in C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 37.
219. New China News Agency (Moshi: 11 February 1963), reproduced in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 44. The Conference took place only 3 months before the conclusion of NTNT (1 April 1963).
220. Cited in C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 1.
221. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 165-166 and A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 44-46.
222. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 167.
223. quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 45.
224. quoted in C. Neuhauser, op.cit., pp. 42-43.
225. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 167.
226. cited in C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 45.
China was also accused by the Soviet Union of attempting to weaken the solidarity of other international peace organizations such as WPC.
227. quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 167.
228. Ibidem.
229. C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., passim.
230. See Chou En-lai's message to the Conference in Peking Review 8 (14 May 1965): 20, p. 4.
231. Peking Review 8 (21 May 1965): 21, p. 15.
232. Ibid.
233. For details of the Conference's resolutions see, for example, D. Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement and Foreign Policy (New York: Halsted Press, 1973), pp. 190-193.
234. See I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 131; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 169.
235. cited in Peking Review 8 (21 May 1965): 21, p. 18. For comments by Chinese representatives on their satisfaction with the resolutions passed by the

Conference, see, for example, Peking Review 8 (28 May 1965), passim

236. See Peking Review 8 (28 May 1965): 22, p. 13. See also A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 77.

237. India, the Soviet Union and Mongolia protested against the decision and made it clear that they would not attend such a conference. See J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, op.cit., p. 194.

238. This was strikingly true in the cases of the Congo (L), Cameroon and Zanzibar.

239. The first Europeans to reach Cameroon were Portuguese navigators. They were followed by the English, the French and finally the Germans. Europeans were attracted to Cameroon by trade in ivory, palm oil and slaves. The Germans dominated Cameroon until World War I, after which the British and the French stepped into the breach. Under arrangements agreed under the League of Nations Charter, Cameroon was partitioned into two parts. The French ruled the eastern part and the British the western part of the country.

240. See A. Dallin, 'The Soviet Union: Political Activity', in Z. Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 38; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 179; and V. T. LeVine, 'Cameroon Recent History' in C. Legum, Africa South of the Sahara 1984-1985 (A Yearbook by Europa Publications Limited) (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1985), p. 259.

241. See A. Dallin, op.cit., p. 38; F. C. Schatten, Communism in Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), pp. 203-205; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 179. Until 1947, UPC had been a part of RDA.

242. Except that the number of Algerian victims was much higher. See Chapter 12.3.1.2 of this work.

243. F. C. Schatten, op.cit., p. 203.

244. See ibid., pp. 204-205; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 179.

245. Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., pp. 508-509; and F. C. Schatten, op.cit., pp. 203-205.

246. See F. C. Schatten, op.cit., pp. 203-205; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 54; A. Dallin, op.cit., pp. 38-39; A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 28-29; and R. Lowenthal, 'China', in G. Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 174.

The Soviet Union hoped that by persuading UPC to soften its attack against French colonialism and by creating conditions favourable for a negotiated

independence, France could be made less anti-Soviet and less pro-American.

247. Peking Review 2 (24 February 1959): 8, p. 12.
248. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 28, C. R. Allen, op.cit., pp. 88-90; F. C. Schatten, op.cit., pp. 157 and 203; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 53-54; A. Dallen, op.cit., pp. 38-39; and Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., pp. 508-509. Moumie has been referred to as the first African communist 'professional revolutionary'. See A. Dallin, op.cit., p. 38.
249. See Chapter 13.3.1.5 of this work.
250. Peking Review 2 (24 February 1959): 8, p. 12.
251. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 115.
252. In May 1972 the Federation became a unified state under the name of the United Republic of Cameroon.
253. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 28; and R. Lowenthal, in Z. Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 174.
254. A. Hutchison, ibid., p. 28.
255. See A. Dallin, op.cit., p. 39;; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 140.
256. Similar views expressed by, for example, A. Dallin, op.cit., p. 39; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 140; C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., p. 405; and W. Z. Lequer, 'Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa', Foreign Affairs, 39 (July 1961): 39, p. 615.
257. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 29; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 54.
258. See A. Dallin, op.cit., p. 38; and R. Lowenthal, 'China', in Z. Brzezinski(ed) op.cit., p. 174.
259. C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 92.
260. See A. Dallin, op.cit., pp. 38-39; and F. C. Schatten, op.cit., pp. 157 and 203.
261. F. C. Schatten, op.cit., p. 205.
262. See ibid., pp. 205-206. See also C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 92.
263. As quoted in A. Dallin, op.cit., p. 39.
264. See R. Lowenthal, 'China', op.cit., p. 174; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 93.

265. F. C. Schatten, op.cit., p. 205.
266. cited in F. C. Schatten, op.cit., p. 207.
267. It was reported (see, for example. J. K. Conley, op.cit., p. 101; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 43.) that (as in the case of M. Ben Barka, the Moroccan opposition leader vide Chapter 12 note 142) French secret agents were behind the poisoning of Moumié.
268. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 29.
269. As quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 140.
270. cited in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 102.
271. Ibid., p. 103. See also C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 95.
272. Ahidjo, as cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 141.
273. cited in ibidem.
274. It is interesting to note that out of these 17 newly independent countries, only Mali and Somalia recognized China in the course of this year (see table 12.1). For China, diplomatic recognition was by no means their only objective in these countries. As far as China was concerned, recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations by African countries signified a consolidation of Afro-Asian solidarity against colonialism and imperialism; by the same token, non-recognition signified that China should find ways and means of challenging regimes which were automatically assumed to be pro-Western in orientation and actively opposed to liberation and revolutionary movements. This is documented and examined in a number of cases in this study, especially part III.
275. The Republic of Congo was subsequently re-named Congo Kinshasa [Congo (K)] in 1966 and Zaire in 1971. See Table 16.1.
276. One of the richest countries, the Congo (L), ^{the} ~~third~~ largest country in Africa (after the Sudan) ^{and Algeria} was the third most populous nation (after Nigeria and Ethiopia). For obvious reasons, South Africa is excluded from the independent African countries in this account.
277. Serious moves toward the independence of Zaire, named at that time Belgian Congo, began only on 1 July 1958 when a group of intellectuals in Leopoldville published a nationalistic programme which included a call for an end to privileges enjoyed by Europeans and a promise by Belgium to give independence to the

Congo within a period of 30 years (see Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 775).

Three months later (23 August) the campaign of the group was joined by the Bakongo-Association (ABAKO) founded in 1950 by Joseph Kasavubu. ABAKO sought the support of different ethnic groups for the restoration of the ancient Bakongo Kingdom. It began its campaign by calling for the right to form political parties and organizations (see ibidem.).

At the same time, a regional institution by the name of the Conference of Tribal Associations of Katanga (CONAKAT), led by Moise Tshombe, was also founded. CONAKAT sought close ties and co-operation with the white colonialists in Katanga province.

However, an active and militant nationalist movement for the independence of Zaire began when the Mouvement Congolais Nationaliste (MNC), under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba, was established in 1958 with the fundamental objective of uniting the country and all its ethnic elements into a single independent nation. Within a period of three years, the highly popular MNC was able to compel the colonial power to grant independence (30 June 1960).

278. Joseph Kasavubu was President; Patrice Lumumba was Prime Minister and Minister for Defence; Antoine Gizenga was Vice-Premier; Pierre Mulele was Minister of National Education and Fine Arts; Christopher Gbenye was Minister of the Interior and Joseph Mobutu was State Secretary for the President's Office. See J. V. Lierde (Ed.), Lumumba Speaks: The Speeches and Writings of Patrice Lumumba (Boston: Little Brown and Company), pp. 212-214.
279. See C. Young, 'Congo Political Parties Revisited', Africa Report 8 (January 1963): 1, p. 18; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 156.
280. The radical character and militant nature of Lumumba's ideas were reflected in his speeches and writings. See J. V. Lierde (Ed.), op.cit., passim; see also T. Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Lumumba: Conflicts in the Congo [London: Rex Collins, 1978], passim (especially p. 491). Under the Lumumba government, T. Kanza was the Head of the Congo delegation to UN; he was also independent Congo's Ambassador to Britain; and for a short period, he served as Foreign Minister of the Congo.
281. Lumumba went as far as to sign an agreement (8 August 1960) with Nkrumah for a 'Union of African States' in which it was stated that Leopoldville would be the capital and the Federal government would be responsible for

- a. foreign affairs;
- b. defence;
- c. the issue of a common currency; and
- d. economic planning and development.

The agreement also contained a statement to the effect that

there would be no customs barriers between any parts of the federation and any African state or territory can freely join the agreement.

quoted in T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 252.

- 282. Ibid., pp. 11-136; see also J. V. Lierde, op.cit., pp. 161-162.
- 283. ~~quoted in T. Kanza, op.cit., pp. 161-162.~~
- 284. cited in ibid., p. 158.
- 285. Ibid., p. 86.
- 286. Ibid., p. 220.
- 287. Ibid., p. 86 and p. 190.
- 288. Ibid., p. 187.
- 289. See ibid., pp. 184-194.
- 290. Ibid., p. 186.
- 291. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 776.
- 292. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 193.
- 293. Ibid., p. 187.
- 294. Ibid., p. 209.
- 295. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 151.
- 296. See J. Chester Cheng, op.cit.
- 297. A Gavshon, op.cit., p. 151.
- 298. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 189. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 189.
- 299. J. V. Lierde, op.cit., p. 253.
- 300. The government of the Congo insisted that UN forces must be drawn from neutral countries, and that the United States and its NATO allies should be kept out. See T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 206.

301. Two other Americans - Keynz Wieschhoff (Bunche's deputy) and Andrew Curidor (Bunche's executive assistant) were also working with Hammarskjöld as his advisers. See C. Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 112.
302. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 180.
303. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 208.
304. Ibid., p. 332.
305. Ibidem.
306. Ibid., pp. 331-332.
307. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 151.
308. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 214.
309. Henry Cabot Lodge, US delegate at UN Security Council (20 July 1966), cited in T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 229.
310. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 240.
311. cited in ibid., p. 241.
312. cited in ibid., p. 301.
It was widely believed that the Swedish Command of the UN forces in the Congo was under the influence of the United States.
313. cited in ibid., p. 276.
314. Ibid., p. 251.
315. Ibid., p. 305.
316. Editorial entitled 'United Nations Intervention in the Congo', The World Today 16 (October 1960): 10, p. 411.
317. cited in People's Daily (15 September 1960), reproduced in Peking Review 3 (20 September 1960): 38, p. 18.
318. T. Kanza, op.cit., pp. 217-265.
319. Ibid., p. 268. Hammarskjöld was influenced by the United States representatives. The United States was the major financier of the UN operation in the Congo (see T. Kanza, ibid., p. 305). It has contributed \$400,000,000 (see G. Mennen Williams 'US Objectives in the Congo 1960-1965', Africa Report 10 (August 1965): 8, p. 16.
320. cited in T. Kanza, op.cit., pp. 250 and 281.

321. cited in ibid., p. 158.
322. Ibid., pp. 303-305.
323. Peking Review 3 (20 September 1960): 38, p. 16.
324. cited in Peking Review 3 (30 August 1960): 35, p. 19.
325. J. V. Lierde, op.cit., p. 15.
326. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 305.
327. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 307.
328. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 312.
329. People's Daily (15 September 1960), reproduced in Peking Review 3 (20 September 1960): 38, p. 18.
330. Leopoldville, the other alternative, would not only have caused international embarrassment to Kasavubu and Mobutu as well as their imperialist allies, but also have in all probability triggered off a mass or at least a popular uprising in the capital. See J. V. Lierde, op.cit., p. 20.
331. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 158 (note 9); see also W. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks: A personal Adventure (London: Hutchinson, 1967), p. 192. Attwood served as American Ambassador to Guinea and Kenya during the '60s.
332. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 776.
333. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 159.
334. See C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 339.
335. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 159.
336. D. Austin, 'The Congo and Katanga', The World Today 19 (February 1963): 2, p. 51.
337. H. Kitchen, op.cit., p. 37.
338. H. C. Hinton, op.cit., p. 192.
339. W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., pp. 194-195.
340. Ibid., p. 96.
341. I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 103.
342. W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 195.
343. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 30.
344. I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 103.

345. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 46.
346. J. V. Lierde, op.cit., p. 122.
347. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 156.
348. See Lumumba speeches in J. V. Lierde, op.cit., passim.
349. T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 50.
350. Over 50 people were killed and 200 injured. See T. Kanza, op.cit., p. 52.
351. See Peking Review 2 (13 January 1959): 2, p. 3; 2 (3 February 1959): 5, p. 15; and 2 (10 November 1959): 45, p. 25. See also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 179.
352. 'Oasis of stability aflame', People's Daily 9 (10 January 1959), as quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 55.
353. See Chapters 5 and 6 of this work.
354. As quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 55.
355. Other major parties or organizations, in addition to those listed in note 277 above, were: Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) (Kamitatu and Gizanga Wings); Partie de l'Unité Nationale Africain (PUNA); Union de Congo (UNIMO); and Centre de Regroupement Africain (CEREA). See H. Kitchen, op.cit., p. 36.
356. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 180.
357. Ibidem.
358. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 156.
359. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 180.
360. See 'Chinese Government Statement on the Situation in the Congo', (14 September 1960), in Peking Review 3 (20 September): 38, pp. 16-17.
361. Taiwan was among the guests represented at the independence ceremony. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 156.
362. cited in Peking Review 4 (21 April 1961): 16, p. 8
363. See Peking Review 3 (30 September 1960): 35.
364. See C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 179.
China's absence from UN must not be seen as the only reason (as is the case with, for example, G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 132) for its opposition to UN

intervention in the Congo. China itself had already experienced the undesirable consequences of UN operations in Korea (1950-53). For this reason alone, if for no other, it was highly unlikely that, a decade later, China would support intervention by UN in another country, especially at a time when the organization continued to be viewed by China as a political instrument of the imperialist powers under the leadership of the United States.

365. Under the title 'What has the United Nations brought to the Congo', People's Daily (22 August 1960) listed 6 facts about the UN action in the Congo:

- i. As soon as they entered the Congo, the "UN forces" started to occupy the areas where Congolese troops were defending and resisting aggression by Belgian forces. They also disarmed Congolese soldiers and took control of Congolese airfields and ports.
- ii. UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the American Bunche, who has been active as UN representative in the Congo, have been giving many-sided support to the splitting activities of Tshombe, the imperialist agent in Katanga. Hammarskjöld declared that the UN would not protect civilian and military personnel of the Congolese central government when they arrived in Katanga. Bunche, furthermore, announced that the attempts of the Congolese Government to exercise its sovereign rights throughout its country, including Katanga Province, would not have UN "support".
- iii. Bunche, brazenly trampling on the Congo's sovereignty, denied the right of the Congolese Government to maintain order in its own country and declared that "UN forces alone were responsible for the Security" of the Congo.
- iv. Hammarskjöld alleged that the "basic unity" of the Congo was possible only provided the "UN forces" entered all parts of the Congo; he claimed that the United Nations must be allowed to "guarantee" what he termed "democracy" in the Congo and "protect" what he called "the spokesmen of all the different political views."
- v. Under the shield of the United Nations, the Belgian forces of aggression now have many more troops in the Congo than before they started their aggression. The "UN forces", moreover, have issued UN armbands to Belgian paratroopers and spies for the latters' criminal activities. On August 16, Congolese troops, at the Leopoldville airfield, caught a unit of Belgian armed paratroopers disguised as "UN forces".

Yet Hammarskjöld, who was directly responsible for this dirty trick, went so far as to slander as "illegal action" the just measures taken by the Congolese Government to exercise its national sovereignty.

- vi. On August 18, "UN forces" occupied the Leopoldville airfield, digging entrenchments and forbidding entry to Congolese soldiers. They openly declared that they would "shoot at" Congolese soldiers if necessary and, as part of their threat, continued to send reinforcements into Leopoldville.

reproduced in Peking Review 3 (30 August 1960): 35, p. 18.

366. H. C. Hinton, op.cit., p. 192.
367. See Chapters 5 and 6 of this work.
368. People's Daily (25 November 1960) quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 30.
369. See note 355 above.
370. Gizenga's reasons for requesting China's aid. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 158.
371. See ibidem. See also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 181.
372. I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 103.
The Sudan changed its attitude on this question only after Gbeyne formed his government. The reasons for this are given in Chapter 13.3.2.6 of this work. See also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 73.
373. Liu Chang-shang, a Chinese spokesman on Foreign Affairs (November 1960), as quoted in C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 3.
374. reproduced in Peking Review 3 (20 September 1960): 38, p. 16.
375. H. C. Hinton, op.cit., p. 111.
376. Bulletin of Activities (published by the General Political Department of the Chinese Liberation Army) no. 6 (7 January 1961), in C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 181.
377. reproduced in Peking Review 5 (7 December 1962): 49, - p. 19.
378. Bulletin of Activities no. 6 (7 January 1961), in C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 179.
379. Ibid., pp. 180-181.

380. See, for example, Chapters 13.2.1.1 and 13.2.3.1 of this work.
381. Peking Review 3 (25 October 1960): 43, p. 21.
382. People's Daily (3 January 1961), cited in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 56.
383. I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 103.
384. People's Daily (26 January 1961), reproduced in Peking Review 4 (3 February 1961): 5, p. 12.
385. These countries were UAR (Chairman), Algeria (Vice-Chairman), China (Vice-Chairman), Morocco (Secretary), the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mali, Sudan and the Soviet Union. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 58 (note 60).
386. Unlike the Congo, Algeria had access to foreign military aid, which was provided by their anti-colonial elements in Morocco and Tunisia.
387. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 58 (note 60).
388. Ibid., p. 58 (note 60).
389. Bulletin of Activities no. 17 (1 June 1961) in C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 480.
390. People's Daily (2 January 1961) reproduced in Peking Review 4 (3 February 1961): 5, p. 12.
391. See Peking Review 4 (24 February 1961): 8, p. 12. See also ibid., p. 399.
392. See C. Cheng, op.cit., p. 399.
393. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 150.
394. reproduced in Peking Review 5 (7 December 1962): 49, p. 19.
395. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 31-32.
396. E. J. Hevi, The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 98.
397. Ibidem.
398. See, for example, Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 161; and W. Attwood, op.cit., p. 192.
399. quoted from Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 161.
400. Ibidem.

401. M. C. Young, 'The Congo Rebellion', Africa Report 10 (April 1965): 4, p. 8.
402. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 108.
403. As listed in Peking Review 'Armed struggle in the Congo', Peking Review 7 (20 March 1964): 12, p. 13. Mao's eight simple and straightforward rules can be found in Beijing Review 21 (25 August 1978): 34, p. 27. The same points with some verbal alterations but no alteration in context, issued by the movement led by Mulele, are listed in C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., p. 407 (note 31).
404. See Map 13.2 in this work. See also Peking Review 7 (20 March 1964): 12, p. 13.
405. ^{quoted from} A Hutchison, op.cit., p. 112.
406. A document captured in the Soviet Embassy in Congo (Brazzaville), cited in C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., p. 407.
407. Peking Review 7 (4 September 1964): 36, p. 10.
408. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 162.
409. See P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 145; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 74.
410. See Map 13.2.
411. For a more detailed analysis of the revolutionary situation in the Congo (Leopoldville), see Peking Review 7 (10 January 1964): 2, pp. 11-14; 7 (17 July 1964): 29, pp. 32-33; 7 (4 December 1964): 49, pp. 8-11; and 7 (11 December 1964): 50, pp. 8-9.
412. W. Attwood, op.cit., p. 192.
413. cited in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 71.
414. See Chapters 13.3.1.6, 13.3.1.8 and 13.3.2.5 of this work.
415. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 163.
416. Gilbert Comte, 'Peking Shows its New African Look', Africa Report 16 (March 1971): 3, p. 19.
417. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 112.
418. Imfondo and Gamboma were the guerrilla training bases in Congo (Brazzaville). See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 112.
419. Max Close, 'The Chinese role in the Congo: Fact or Fiction', Africa Report 10 (January 1965): 1, p. 19.

420. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 164.
421. P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 145.
The economic measures adopted by the Gbenye government included bringing prices to their 1960 level. See Max Close, op.cit., p. 18.
422. Max Close, op.cit., p. 18.
423. See ibidem. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 164.
424. See Max Close, op.cit., p. 18.
425. Ibidem.
426. cited in ibidem.
427. Ibid., p. 19.
428. 'In Support of the People of the Congo (Leopoldville) against US Aggression' (Peking 1965), pp. 2-4, as quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 164.
429. See Map 13.2 in this work. See also Max Close, op.cit., and G. Mennen Williams (Assistant Secretary of State of the United States Government 1961-1964), 'US objectives in the Congo 1960-65', Africa Report 10 (August 1965): 8, p. 18.
430. A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 30-31.
431. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 177; and P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 145.
432. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 31.
433. P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 145.
434. Peking Review 8 (27 August 1965): 35, p. 5.
435. P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 145; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 177.
436. Peking Review 8 (25 June 1965): 26, p. 4.
437. See Table 12.1 in this work.
438. See Chapter 15.1.2.4 in this work.
439. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 529.
440. Ibidem.
441. Ibidem.
442. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 186.

443. See A. Erlinch and R. S. Chrestian, 'The Soviet Union: Economic Activity', in Z. Brzezinski (Ed.), op.cit., p. 74; and G. Comete, op.cit., p. 19.
444. See F. R. Metrowich, Africa and Communism: A Study of Successes, Setbacks and Stooge States (Pretoria: Voortrekkerpers, 1967), pp. 111-112; and W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 226.
445. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 179-181; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 186.
446. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 186-187 and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 184-185.
447. Niamey Niger Domestic Service in French, 18:45 GMT, (4 August 1965), quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 187.
448. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 187.
449. See Chapter 13.2.3.1 in this work.
450. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 186.
451. Elections, held on the eve of independence, were directed by British authorities who effectively barred popular political forces winning a majority in the National Assembly. See, for example, A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 108; and Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 685.
452. See, for example, A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 108-110; and R. Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (Boulder: Westview, 1972), passim.
453. Both parties were founded in 1956. See A. S. Kharusi, op.cit., p. 6; and Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 685.
454. He had been the representative of the British colonial power in the island (under the colonial policy of 'Indirect Rule') since the Second World War. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 685.
455. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 136; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 109; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 65. Babu had been a correspondent of NCNA and had also visited China. Babu not only had communist leanings, it was even reported that before the revolution he founded a Zanzibar communist party (see J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 40-41). It was also reported that Babu ran a newsletter known as Zanews which was pro-Chinese in character (see A. S. Kharusi, op.cit., p. 5; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 109).

456. John Okello, a soldier from Kenya, actually carried out the revolution. See, for example, R. Yeager, op.cit., p. 23 and A. S. Kharusi, op.cit., p. 9.
457. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 136.
458. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 109.
459. For a detailed description of the revolution and its political background, see, for example, M. Lofchie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965); and J. Okello, Revolution in Zanzibar (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).
460. Peking Review 7 (20 March 1964): 12, p. 12.
461. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 686.
462. Peking Review 6 (13 December 1963): 59, p. 5.
463. The Soviet Union recognized the new regime on 18 January. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 204; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 44. Other east European countries followed. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 136; and A. S. Kharusi, op.cit., p. 9. Cuba and the non-communist countries of Kenya and Uganda were the first to recognize the Zanzibar revolution (see Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 136). Note that Cuba formally embraced communism (more or less) upon the formation of the communist party of Cuba (PCC) in October 1965.
464. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 213; and A. S. Kharusi, op.cit., p. 9.
465. cited in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 41.
466. quoted from ibid., p. 44.
467. Zhou En-lai was in Ghana when the revolution took place. See Table 13.6.
468. As reported, for example, in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 136-137; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 109-110.
469. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 109-110.
470. cited in Peking Review 7 (14 February 1964): 7, p. 12.
471. Ibidem.
472. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 205; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 136.
473. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 136.

474. Nearly 300 Zanzibaris were given training by Chinese instructors. Ibid., p. 138, (Note 5).
475. The Communique of the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP (12 August 1966) reproduced in Peking Review 9 (19 August 1966): 34, pp. 7-8.
476. See Chapter 12.2.1.1.5 of this work.
477. See Chapter 13.2.3.2.4 and 13.3.2.6 of this work.
478. President Gamel Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (January-December 1961) (Cairo: Information Department, UAR), p. 20.
479. Ibid., p. 19.
480. See Chapter 13.2.3.2 of this work.
481. President Gamel Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (January-December 1961), op.cit., p. 20.
482. Author's interview with a member of FLN who was Secretary-General of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Algiers; November 1983).
483. See G. H. Jansen, op.cit., p. 326; I. Fedda, op.cit., pp. 113-116; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 109.
484. cited in J. E. Khalili, 'Communist China and the United Arab Republic', Asian Survey 10 (April 1970): 4, p. 313.
485. An article in The People's Daily (17 February 1965) cited in Peking Review 8 (9 February 1965): 9, p. 18. See also Chou En-lai's message to Nasser in Peking Review 8 (2 April 1965): 14, p. 5.
486. See, for example, Abdel-Malek Anouar, Egypt: Military Society: the Army Regime, the Left and Social Change (New York: Vintage Books, 1968) pp. 320-350; and D. Hopwood, op.cit., pp. 97-99.
487. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 27.
488. Details of this visit are discussed in Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
489. The agreement was signed after a visit to China (December 1964) by Azi Sidiy, Egypt's Deputy Minister for Industry.
490. See Table 12.4
491. See Ibidem.
492. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.

493. cited in Peking Review 8 (25 June 1965): 26, p. 3.
494. A country could have warm relations with China based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, but not a military or comradely relationship based on support for and promotion of armed struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Bearing this in mind, one could hardly characterize China's relations with, for example, Morocco, Kenya and Burundi as militant.
495. quoted from H. S. H. Behbehani, op.cit., p. 26.
496. quoted from G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 116.
497. cited in Peking Review 5 (6 July 1962): 27, p. 9. See also Peking Review 5 (13 July 1962): 28.
498. All other African countries which established diplomatic relations with China before 1962, did so only after independence, see Table 12.1.
499. Khutab Al Ra'is Houari Boumedienne in Bikin [speech of President Houari Boumedienne in Beijing (26 February 1974)] [Mudiriyyat. Al I'lam bil Ri'asa. (Direction of Information - Presidential Palace) 1974], p. 3.
500. On 10 September 1962 Hsien Ti, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires interim arrived in Algiers. See Peking Review 5 (14 September 1962): 37, p. 22. See also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 64.
501. Peking Review 5 (24 August 1962): 34, p. 7. See also G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 115; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 92.
502. Peking Review 5 (30 November 1962): 48, p. 2, as reproduced in G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 117.
503. See Chapter 6 of this work.
504. China was represented by a special government delegation led by General Hsu Kwang-ta, Vice-Minister of National Defence. See G.P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 118.
505. cited in ibid., p. 118.
506. cited in ibid., p. 119.
507. As quoted in ibidem.
508. See Chapter 13.2.2 of this work.
509. Quoted from A. Humbaraci, op.cit., p. 184.

510. See Al Mujaahid no. 149 (14 February 1963), p. 6. See also, for example, Ian Grey, Communist Challenge to Africa: an Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (Sandton: Southern African Freedom Foundation, 1977), p. 184; and W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 12.
511. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 170; and B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., pp. 122 and 136.
512. Author's interview with a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of FLN (November 1983).
513. See, for example, B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 171 (note 10); and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 130 (note 1).
514. A. M. Humbaraci, op.cit., p. 159.
515. See Chapter 11 of this work.
516. cited in Peking Review 6 (29 March 1963): 13, p. 6.
517. Ibidem.
518. cited in Peking Review 6 (18 October 1963): 43, p. 4.
519. W. Bartke, China's Economic Aid (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1975), p. 86.
520. See Table 12.4. See also Peking Review 6 (18 October 1963): 42, p. 4; G. P. Deshpande, China's Policy in Africa 1949-1964, op.cit., p. 119; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 155; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 93; and W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 85.
521. SCMP no. 3081 (16 October 1963), as quoted by A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 155-156.
522. Peking Review 6 (8 November 1963): 45, p. 19.
523. Ibid., p. 18.
524. See Chapter 13.2.1.1 of this work.
525. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 155.
526. See Peking Review 6 (11 October 1963): 41, p. 20. See also Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 32.
527. Peking Review 6 (11 October 1963): 41, p. 20.
528. The exhibition was visited by over 150,000 people. Ibidem.
529. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 155.
530. Peking Review 6 (29 November 1963): 48, p. 24.

531. Peking Review 6 (8 November 1963): 45, p. 17.
532. Speech by Ahmed Ben Bella, the Algerian President, on the arrival of Premier Chou En-lai at Algiers Airport (21 December 1963), cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., pp. 81-83.
533. W. A. C. Adie, 'Chou En-lai on Safari', The China Quarterly no. 18 (April-June 1964), p. 181.
534. Some extracts from Chou En-lai's speeches at the meeting of the FLN Cadres have been quoted in Chapters 12.3.1 and 13.2.1.1 of this work. For the full text of the speech, see Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., pp. 65-75.
535. Al MU jâhid no. 194 (26 December 1963), pp. 4-7. Al MU jâhid, weekly during November and December 1963, on the eve of Chou En-lai's visit to Algiers, published a long report praising China's achievements and the Chinese model of liberation and self-reliance. The Report was made by a group of Algerian journalists who had visited China earlier during the year (August 1963). See Al MU jâhid no. 187 (7 November 1963), p. 12; no. 188 (14 November 1963), p. 12; no. 189 (21 November 1963), p. 10; no. 190 (29 November 1963), p. 12; and no. 191 (12 December 1963), p. 12.
536. See D. Kimche, op.cit., p. 88; and C. Neuhauser, op.cit., pp. 50-51.
537. Almost all the prominent FLN members interviewed by the author (November 1983) drew attention to this aspect of private discussion between FLN leaders and Soviet officials of CPSU leaders.
538. cited in D. Kimche, op.cit., p. 103.
539. See ibid., p. 113. See Also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 128; and G. H. Jansen, op.cit., p. 384.
540. cited in Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries (a publication by Ministry of National Guidance - UAR) (Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance - Information Administration, 1964), pp. 111-113.
541. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 177.
542. Al MU jâhid no. 229 (3 December 1964), p. 10.
543. Peking Review 7 (7 February 1964): 6, p. 32.
544. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 87.
545. Peking Review 7 (21 August 1964): 34, p. 13.

546. Peking Review 7 (25 September 1964): 39, p. 3.
547. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 155; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 92.
548. Peking Review 7 (25 December 1964): 53, p. 3.
549. Plans of the then forthcoming Afro-Asian conference were discussed on this occasion also. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 128.
550. Peking Review 8 (1 January 1965): 1, p. 4.
It should be noted that the Algerian National Militia lasted only for a few months and was never properly organized.
551. W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 85-86.
552. This assurance, however, was not coupled with Algerian support for the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the conference. For an account of the reasons for this, see Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
553. cited in Peking Review 8 (9 April 1965): 15, p. 10.
554. Ibid., p. 11.
555. See Hsinhua News Agency no. 2706 (6 June 1965); and Peking Review 8 (11 June 1965): 24, p. 4.
556. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 156.
557. C. K. Cheng, 'Anti-Imperialism: Keynote of the Second African-Asian Conference', Peking Review 8 (27 June 1965): 26, pp. 4-5.
558. cited in Peking Review 8 (25 June 1965): 26, p. 4.
559. Ibidem.
560. A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 240-243.
561. Boumedienne visited the Soviet Union in November 1965. (See Al-Mujahid no. 91, December 1965, p. 4). During this visit, Algeria was promised Soviet aircraft (mainly MIGs) and other weapons (see I. Greig, op.cit., p. 102).
562. cited in Peking Review 8 (27 August 1965): 35, p. 5.
563. Joint Communiqué of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China and the President of the Republic of Guinea (13 September 1960), in Peking Review 3 (14 September 1960): 37, p. 9.
564. Sekou Touré's speech at Peking airport at the start of a 5-day visit to China (10-14 September 1960), in Peking Review 3 (14 September 1960): 37, p. 15.

565. Delay in sending the promised aid to Guinea was one of the reasons for Guinea's disenchantment with the Soviet Union. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 54-56.
566. See, for example, Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 113; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 79; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 56.
567. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 79.
568. Peking Review 3 (14 September 1960): 37, p. 8.
569. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 56.
570. This statement was made by President Sekou Touré after his return from China. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 56.
571. Peking Review 2 (13 October 1959): 41, p. 26.
572. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 109; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 276. On 15 January 1960 a Chinese economic exhibition was opened in Conakry. (See W. Attwood, op.cit., p. 22.)
573. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 31.
574. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 78 (note 1).
575. cited in ibid., p. 77.
576. cited in ibidem.
577. cited in ibidem.
578. For the text of the Treaty see Peking Review 3 (14 September 1960): 37, p. 10.
579. Ibid., p. 6.
580. Ibid., p. 10.
581. Ibid., p. 11.
\$26 million was not actually included in the original text. It was the equivalent of 100 million Roubles. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 78. See also Table 12.4.
582. Peking Review 3 (14 September 1960): 37, p. 11.
Trade with Guinea during this period (1959-66) - as in the cases of Mali, Congo (B), Tanzania, Somalia and the Central African Republic (CAR) - did not play an important part in the relations between the two countries. This was because Guinea, as well as these other countries, had little to offer by way of export. Thus economic relations between China and these countries in the economic field was one-sided

and simply relied on China's aid and supplies to them.

583. See Table 12.4. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 276; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 113.
584. After Tanzania (\$45 million or 16.9%) and Ghana (\$42 million or 15.6%). See Table 12.4. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 113.
585. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 90.
586. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 56.
587. cited in ibid., p. 42.
588. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 141-142; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., pp. 97-98.
589. Ibidem.
590. C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 100.
591. It was estimated that 3,000 Chinese experts and skilled workers were working in Guinea at this time. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 97.
592. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 118.
593. Ibid., p. 45.
594. On the eve of Zhou En-lai's visit, Guinea established direct radio telephone and telegraphic lines of communication between Conakry and Peking. See C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 99.
595. Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 212.
596. Ibid., p. 212.
597. This was said to Cooley by a Western diplomat. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 143.
598. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
599. See Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of People's War!, op.cit., passim.
600. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 66.
601. See the text of the Joint Communiqué issued by China and Mali (21 January 1964), in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., pp. 182-187.
602. Unlike Guinea (and Algeria), French Sudan (Mali), under Modibo Keita's leadership did not go for immediate independence or liberation. In March

- 1959, Keita was elected as the first Prime Minister of the autonomous Republic of Mali. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 122.
- In 1956 Keita was elected -a member of the French National Assembly. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 461.
603. See W. J. Foltz, From French West Africa to Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 211-212; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 147.
604. The Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine (RDA) was founded in Bamako (1946) with Felix Houphouet-Boigny (of Ivory Coast) as President. RDA included nationalist leaders from West and Equatorial Africa. In the same year, Mamadou Konate founded Union Sudanise (US), as a branch of RDA. In 1956, Keita became the new Chairman of US following the death of Konate. See N. S. Hopkins, Popular Government in an African Town: Kita, Mali (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 14.
605. Ibid., p. 212.
606. W. J. Foltz, op.cit., p. 166.
607. cited in ibid., p. 214.
608. Ibid., p. 212.
609. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 147.
610. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 462,
611. Ibidem.
612. Taken from Keita's message to Ko Hua, cited in Peking Review 3 (1 November 1960): 44, p. 15.
613. It should be noted that during the short-lived Mali-Senegal Federation, the Federal government had already recognized both China and Taiwan (see Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 122). Pressure from both France and Sedar Senghar must have been the major factor underlying Modibo's approval of such a contrasting policy despite the latter's radical political orientation.
614. 14 Francophone countries became independent in 1960. See Table 12.1. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 122.
615. reproduced from The People's Daily (18 October 1960) in Peking Review 3 (25 October 1960): 43, p. 12.
616. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 86.
617. A similar view was expressed by A. Ogunsanwo, ibidem.

618. Peking Review 4 (8 September 1961): 36, p. 21.
619. See Table 12.3. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 93; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 123; and W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 129.
620. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 92-3.
621. cited in W. A. C. Adie, 'Chou En-lai on Safari', op.cit., p. 189.
622. cited in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 147. See also Peking Review 7 (13 November 1964): 46, pp. 17-18.
623. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 67.
624. This was a part of a Joint Communiqué issued by Mali and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DVR) (22 October 1964) at the end of President Keita's visit to Vietnam, cited in Peking Review 8 (30 October 1964): 44, p.8.
625. Sino-Mali Joint Communiqué (3 November 1964), Peking Review 7 (13 November 1964): 46, p. 18.
626. Ibidem.
627. Ibid., p. 19.
628. cited in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 150.
629. cited in ibidem.
630. Ibidem.
631. For the text of the Treaty see Peking Review 8 (30 April 1965): 18, p. 25.
632. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 123.
633. See Table 12.1. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 129.
634. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 148-149.
635. Ibid., p. 148. See also C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 109.
636. C. Legum, 'China and Africa: symbolism and substance', op.cit., p. 421.
637. See, for example, A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 98; and W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 129-131.
638. See Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., pp. 507-508; J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 136-137; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 102.

639. Nkrumah, speaking at a meeting of the All-African People's Conference (Accra: December-January 1958), as quoted in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 137.
640. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 80 (note 2).
641. See Peking Review 7 (18 August 1964): 33, p. 5; H. C. Hinton, op.cit., p. 191; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 138.
642. cited in J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 137.
643. Ibid., p. 139. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 117.
644. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 139.
645. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 115.
646. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 91.
647. See Table 12.4. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 118; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 276.
648. This agreement was concluded on the basis of discussion which Zhou En-lai had with Nkrumah during his visit to Ghana (January 1960). See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 67.
649. China's trade relations with Ghana began in 1957, following the establishment of China's first African commercial office in Cairo headed by ~~Chen~~ Chiang-kang in 1956. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 37.
650. See Tables 12.2, and 12.3.
China's imports from Ghana during the period 1957-65 included cocoa, industrial diamonds, manganese; its exports to Ghana included oil products, chemicals, textiles, sewing machines and hardware.
651. See G. H. Jansen, op.cit., p. 327; and Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 508.
652. cited in G. H. Jansen, op.cit., p. 327.
653. quoted from A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 123.
654. This statement (quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 123) was attributed to a Ghanaian official who worked closely with military experts from China.
655. This passage is from a report on the instructors sent to the Ghanaian government from the guerrilla training camp. Quoted in ibid., pp. 131-132 (note 21).
656. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 119.
657. quoted in ibidem.

658. Government of Ghana, Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1966), p. 7.
659. Halfalf-Assimi was considered by the Chinese experts too near the Ivory Coast for training in the use of explosives (see A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 124). Also, Obenemasce was nearer Accra (see Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 119).
660. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 133 (note 32).
661. Ibid., p. 133; see also J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 138.
662. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 142-143.
663. K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, op.cit., p. 545.
664. Ibid., p. 164.
665. K. Nkrumah, Ghana Newsletter (London: 7 February 1964), as quoted in C. Legum, China and Africa: symbolism and substance, op.cit., p. 399 (note 17).
666. 'Joint statements of Chinese and Ghanian Trade Unions (Peking 27 October 1963)', cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 142.
667. Nkrumah's message to the Executive Meeting of AAPSO (Nicosia: 30 September 1963) cited in ibid., p. 143.
668. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 139.
669. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
670. C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 103.
671. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 138.
672. cited in W. A. C. Adie, 'Chou En-lai on Safari', op.cit., p. 187.
673. Julius Nyerere, at a press conference held in London (1965), cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 107.
674. cited in Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 685.
675. Ibidem.
676. Ibidem.
677. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 74-75; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 202.
678. quoted from A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 75.
679. Ibid., p. 135.

680. Zhou En-lai was in fact unable to make such a visit. See note 1043 below.
681. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 134.
682. Babu was the leader of the Umma Party and Abeid Karum was Chairman of APS. For further details, see for example, J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 40-42; R. Yeager, op.cit., p. 22; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 108.
683. Fear of militant and progressive forces led by such figures as Babu with strong communist leanings within the Zanzibar government must have led less radical leaders such as Nyerere and Karume to rush into a political union calculated to undermine them.
684. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 41.
685. R. Yeager, op.cit., p. 22.
686. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 203 and R. Yeager, op.cit., p. 22.
687. See A. S. Kharusi, Zanzibar: Africa's First Cuba, op.cit.
688. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 39-43.
689. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 136-137.
690. Ibid., p. 137.
691. Both the Soviet Union and East Germany continued to deal with Zanzibar directly as a separate country even after the Union. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 137.
692. Peking Review 7 (20 November 1964): 47, p. 15. On 11 November 1964 the Nationalist newspaper (a TANU organ) published photostat copies of three secret letters which read, in part, as follows:
- ... United States ... will support attempt of Portugal to take advantage of all frontier incidents between the Portuguese territory of Mozambique on the one hand and Tanganyika on the other ... to make special arrangements to overthrow the government of Nyerere.
- quoted from Peking Review 7 (20 November 1964): 47, p. 15. See also Peking Review 7 (27 November 1964): 48, p. 29.
693. See Table 12.A

This figure has been derived from the following four sources: A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 137; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 93; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 206; and W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 178.

694. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 206-207. The Soviet Union also made an offer of aid to a total of \$20 million to Tanzania. This offer, however, was not utilized, according to Ogunsanwo, because of the Soviet Union's hostility towards the Union. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 137.
695. cited in Peking Review 7 (24 July 1964): 30, p. 28.
696. Ho Ying, China's Ambassador to Tanzania, in a meeting with Nyerere, reaffirmed that China was prepared to support Tanzania with military aid without conditions or any strings attached. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 138-139.
697. See Chapter 13.2.3.4 of this work.
698. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 138; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 207.
699. China's military aid to national liberation movements (at the people-to-people level) began well before Tanzania was formed. Algeria was an obvious instance of this.
700. Initially China sent 7 military instructors and 4 interpreters to Tanzania. It was agreed that the Chinese military experts would be withdrawn within a period of 6 months. See Peking Review 7 (11 September 1964): 37, p. 31.
701. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 139.
702. Ibidem
703. cited in Peking Review 7 (11 September 1964): 37, p. 30.
704. China undertook to bear half the cost involved, while the other half was offered as an interest free loan. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 139.
705. Ibid., p. 140. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 78-192.
706. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 280.
707. According to Ogunsanwo's interview with Nyerere's entourage, the latter's visit to China was urged by militant elements in the government. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 141 (note 1). For a broader analysis of the development of Tanzania's role in international relations as a non-

aligned country, see, for example, T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Tanzania's Role in International Relations and Non-Alignment', op.cit.

708. cited in ibid., p. 140.

For more Chinese comments and statements during Nyerere's visit, see Peking Review 8 (26 February 1965): 9, p. 6.

709. Peking Review 8 (26 February 1965): 9, p. 5.

710. Ibid., p. 6.

711. For an account of the political context of the Treaty see ibid., p. 9.

712. cited in ibid., p. 8.

713. 'Sino-Tanzanian Joint Communiqué', cited in ibid., p. 10.

714. Ibidem.

715. For further details concerning the TanZam Railway see, for example, G. T. Yu, China's African Policy: a Study of Tanzania (London: Praeger Publishers, 1975); and R. Halland, H. Peyman, The Great Uhuru Railway (London: Victor Gallancz, 1976).

716. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 95.

717. See Chapter 14.2.1.7 of this work.

718. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.

719. See 'Joint Communiqué between China and Tanzania' in Peking Review 8 (11 June 1965): 24, pp. 7-8.

720. Ibidem.

721. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work; see also Chapter 13.3.3.

722. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 82 (note 37); and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 141.

723. Peking Review 8 (26 November 1965): 48, p. 13.

724. O. Aluko (Ed.) op.cit., p. 204.

725. G. T. Yu, China's African Policy: a Study of Tanzania, op.cit., p. 17.

726. cited in Ibidem.

727. Other major parties were the Democratic Party (DP) led by Benedicto Kiwanuka; and the Kababa Yekka (KY). Both the DP (which largely represented the Catholics

and was petit-bourgeois in character) and KY (which represented the Baganda only and was feudal in character) stood for a policy of collaboration with the colonial power before and after independence. See, for example, M. M. Mamdani, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983), p. 22; and J. H. Mittelman, Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From Obote to Amin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 69-72.

728. The most militant party in Uganda was Uganda National Congress (UNC). However, division among UNC leaders led to its distintegration. From 1955 onwards, UNC became divided into factions and parties (including the parties mentioned in note 727 above), while the hard core of UNC itself became a minority.
729. M. M. Mamdani, op.cit., p. 92.
730. For further details see, for example, T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985 (Vol. II) (Bergen: Derap Publications, 1985), pp. 511-558.
731. Ibid., p. 537.
732. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 712.
733. T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985 (Vol. II), op.cit., pp. 534-554.
734. quoted from ibid., p. 545.
735. Ibidem.
736. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 176 (note 1).
737. T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985 (Vol. II), op.cit., p. 549.
738. Peking Review 2 (14 July 1959): 28, p. 22. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 48; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 216.
739. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 70; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 216; and P. Lessing, op.cit., p. 54.
740. Others were from Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo (L), Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Kenya, Madagascar, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Azania (South Africa), Mauritius, Somalia, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tanganyika, Tunisia and the UAR. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 35.
741. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 216.
742. T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985 (Vol. II), op.cit., p. 545.

743. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 75; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 64.
744. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 216.
745. Obote was restricted by the 'Republic's monarchical constitutional patchwork' as well as by the pro-Western elements within his own party. See, for example, A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 86.
746. See Peking Review 8 (26 February 1965): 9, p. 26; and 8 (12 March 1965): 11, pp. 4-5.
747. See Chapter 13.3.2.5 of this work.
748. Uganda was on the agenda of Zhou En-lai's tour of Africa (December 1963-February 1964) but he did not visit Kampala because the break between UPC and KY had just occurred, and the army had mutinied in January 1964.
749. Peking Review 8 (23 April 1965): 17, p. 5.
750. See Table 12.4. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 193; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 94; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 217.
751. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 218.
752. Hereafter it will be referred to as Congo (B).
753. Other countries were the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Madagascar and the Senegal-Mali Federation, see I. Brown, Basic Documents on African Affairs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 459.
754. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 149. During the colonial period, Youlou had served as Mayor of Brazzaville. He had played a large part in securing Congo (B)'s acceptance of de Gaulle's Communauté Française, see ibidem.
755. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 126.
756. Ibidem.
757. Ibid., p. 127.
758. It was a mere coincidence that Congo (B) established diplomatic relations with China at the same time as France. See for example, G. T. Yu, 'Peking's African Diplomacy', Problems of Communism no. 2 (March-April 1972), p. 21; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 156; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 13.
759. In January 1963 Debat resigned as Minister of Planning and Supplies in protest against Youlou's

'subservience' to the French, see Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 149.

760. Ibidem.

761. See Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 519; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 157; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 193.

762. Peking Review 7 (18 September 1964): 38, p. 5.

763. cited in Peking Review 7 (25 September 1964): 39, p. 5.

764. cited in Peking Review 7 (9 October 1964): 41, p. 15.

765. cited in ibidem.

766. Ibid., p. 14.

767. See Table 13.5. For the text of the treaty and comments by Chinese leaders and the press in China on it, see Peking Review 7 (9 October 1964): 41, p. 14.

768. See Table 12.4. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 78; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 127; and Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 519.

769. China was still ideologically the most hostile adversary of the United States and the most uncompromising foe of US imperialism.

770. Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 519.

771. cited in Peking Review 8 (26 February 1965): 9, p. 4.

772. Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 519.

773. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 127; and G. T. Yu, Peking's African Diplomacy, op.cit., p. 21.

774. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 94; W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 107; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 157 and 222.

775. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 94.

776. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 157.

777. cited in ibidem.

778. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 129; P. -Van Ness, op.cit., p. 114; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., pp. 115-117.

779. See Chapter 42.2.2.1 of this work.

780. Soon after his accession, King Hassan II outlawed the communist party of Morocco (CPM).
781. Peking Review 4 (9 June 1961): 23, p. 23.
782. C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 85.
783. See Chapter 12.3.1.2 of this work; see also J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 169.
784. P. Bernetel, 'The Chinese Connection', Africa no. 22 (June 1973), p. 15.
785. See Chapter 12.3.1 of this work.
786. The Bey was given the nominal title of Commander-in-Chief with no power.
787. See Chapter 12.3.1 of this work.
788. cited in Tūnis wa Al masīra Al Shāmilah (Tunisia and the Collective Move) [Tunis: Kitābat Al Dawla Lil I'lam (Secretariat of State for Information) 1976] p. 44. (tr. author)
789. See Tunisia in Brief (a publication by the State Secretariat of Information) (Tunis: Publication du Secrétariat de l'Information, 1975), pp. 4-6; and Wathāiq wa Dirāsāt Al Hizb Al Ishṭirākī Al Dustūrī Lawāih wa muqarraf (Documents and studies of the socialist Dustūrī Party) [Tunis: Al Shari'ka Al Wataniyya Lil Nashr wa al Kawzi] (published by the Company of Distribution and Press, October 1971), p. 12 (tr. author)
790. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 101 (note 1).
791. See Chapter 13.2.1.1 of this work.
792. I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 118.
793. Author's interview with an ex-FLN Moujehid (fighter) (November 1983).
794. cited in Tunisia and Africa (a publication by Société des Arts Graphiques) (Tunis: Tunisian Union of Youth Organization on the Occasion of the First Youth Pan-African Festival, 1973), p. 39.
795. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 29.
796. Ibid., p. 33; and Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 507.
797. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 33.
798. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports: Tuniso-Chinois: 1956-1984 (a document given to the author by the Asian Department in the Tunisian government's

Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his field work in Tunisia in October 1983), p. 1.

799. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 41.
800. Ibid., p. 71.
801. F. C. Schatten, op.cit., p. 166. T
at the Chinese
1960).
802. cited in Peking Review 3 (25 October 1960): 3, p. 21.
The remark was made on the occasion of his dropping at the Chinese pavillion in the Tunis Fair (October 1960).
803. Peking Review 4 (9 June 1961): 23, p. 23.
804. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports: Tuniso-Chinois: 1956-1984, op.cit., p. 1.
805. Al Amal [an organ (daily paper) of the Tunisian government] (12 July 1961).
806. cited in Peking Review 4 (28 July 1961): 30, p. 8.
807. cited in Peking Review 4 (1 September 1961): 35, p. 20.
808. Peking Review 4 (27 October 1961): 43, p. 17.
809. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports: Tuniso-Chinois: 1956-1984, op.cit., p. 1.
810. See Tables 8.2, 12.1 and 15.1.
811. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports: Tuniso-Chinois: 1956-1984, op.cit., p. 3.
812. Al Amāl (Tunis, 11 January 1964) (author's translation).
813. Al Hizb Al shiyū⁶i Al Tūnisi: Mūjāzahu, Tārīkhuhu wa Ahdafuhu (The Communist Party of Tunisia: its History and Objectives) (a publication by the communist party of Tunisia, 1982), p. 17. The party was legalized in 1981. (Author's translation).
814. See Al Amāl; Al Sabāh; and L'Action (Tunis: 11 and 12 January 1964). See also Bourguiba's speech at a state banquet in honour of Zhou En-lai, in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 123.
815. cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 119.
816. Bourguiba gave a non-committal acceptance promising to visit China 'when the time was convenient'. Al Sabāh (a Tunisian daily paper) (30 May 1964).

817. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports: Tuniso-Chinois: 1956-1984, op.cit., p. 3.
818. Tunisia's anti-China stance was much influenced by the United States. Bourguiba is a great admirer of the United States. See Relations Between Tunisia and the U.S.A. (a publication by Ministry of Information) (Tunis: Ministry of Information, 1983), pp. 2-9.
819. See Al Amal (13 July 1965).
820. in an interview given to West German Television; cited in Al Amal (13 February 1965) (author's translation).
821. cited in Al Amal (14 November 1965) (author's translation).
822. Other countries which voted against postponement were Nigeria, Malawi, Egypt, Somalia, Rwanda, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Ethiopia and the Sudan. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 132.
823. In a UN debate (Autumn 1965), the Tunisian delegation put forward this suggestion. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 134.
824. See Al Amal (21 November 1965); and Al Sabah (21 November 1965).
825. cited in Peking Review 8 (26 November 1965): 48, p. 25.
826. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
827. cited in Al Sabah (21 November 1965).
828. Bourguiba El Ibn was the son of Premier Bourguiba. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 134.
829. In February 1967, Bourguiba El Ibn, the Tunisian Foreign Minister, stressed that 'two Chinas' was a reality (see A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 190). Tunisia concluded an agreement for agricultural and technical cooperation with Taiwan (February 1967). See G. T. Hsiao, The Foreign Trade of China, op.cit., p. 29 (note 7).
830. Peking Review 10 (22 September 1967): 39, p. 29.
831. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 191.
832. Ibidem. See also A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 150.
833. Al Amal (28 September 1965).
834. Ibidem.

835. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 191; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 150.
836. as quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 150.
837. Hsinhua News Agency no. 3891 (26 September 1968), p. 18.
838. Benin voted in favour of Communauté Française in 1958.
839. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 344-345.
840. The coup took place during Hubert Marga's visit to Taiwan. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 334.
841. Peking Review 7 (20 November 1964): 47, p. 4.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Benin was perhaps eased by a visit to Benin (8-13 September 1963) by a Chinese government goodwill mission [see Peking Review 8 (18 September 1965): 38, p. 29]. Subsequently, China sent agronomists to Benin to assist in the cultivation of rice (see A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 118 and 162).
842. Peking Review 7 (20 November 1964): 47, p. 4.
843. Ibid., p. 5.
844. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 135; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 103; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 122-123.
845. A report in The People's Daily (9 January 1966) quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 123.
846. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 180.
847. Ibidem.
848. Ibidem.
849. Peking Review 7 (9 November 1964): 41, p. 4.
850. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 162. The two countries, however, did not trade until the late '70s. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3.
851. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 102; J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 183; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 162.
852. The mission visited Mali, Guinea and Ghana in addition to CAR. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 128.
853. Ibid., p. 162.
854. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 182.

855. Belgium had already occupied the two countries in 1916. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 108 and p. 508.
856. Ibidem.
857. A. Segal, 'Rwanda: the underlying cause', Africa Report 9 (April 1964): 4, pp. 3-6.
858. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 903.
859. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 168.
860. A. Segal, op.cit., p. 13.
861. R. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p. 390.
862. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 169.
863. Peking Review 6 (27 December 1963): 51, p. 11. Political contact between the two countries began a year earlier (13 July 1962) when Kao Liang, a senior correspondent of NCNA in Dar es Salaam, visited Burundi. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 15.
864. See C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 127; Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 517; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 174. Before becoming Prime Minister, Niamoya was the leader of the 'Workers' Federation' and the Rwagasore National Youth. See Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 517; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 174-175.
865. C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 127.
866. See Ibidem. See also J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 111.
867. SCMP no. 3350 (4 October 1964), p. 29.
868. During the '60s China gave financial aid mostly to governments with an openly declared anti-colonial policy. See Table 12.4. See also B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 107.
869. Apart from its main concern with the revolutionary situation in the Congo (L), China might also have shown some interest in individuals in Burundi as well as the Tutsi in Rwanda who showed a radical political inclination. See W. Weinstein, (Ed.) Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 171-174; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 171-174.
870. Until 1964 the Congo (B), another area of strategic importance to the revolutionary forces in the Congo (L), was under the control of a counter-revolutionary regime. See Chapter 13.3.1.8 of this work.

871. Similar views can be found in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 172-173; H. C. Hinton, op.cit., pp. 192-193; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 72 (note 105).
872. Peking Review 7 (6 November 1964): 45, p. 4.
873. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 172-173; W. Weinstein (Ed.), op.cit., p. 64; R. Lemarchand, op.cit., pp. 447-451; and H. C. Hinton, op.cit., p. 193.
874. See, for example, B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 127-128; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 119.
875. Statement by Chinese Foreign Ministry (31 December 1965) reported in Peking Review 8 (5 February 1965): 6, p. 10. See also Peking Review 8 (12 February 1965): 7, p. 5.
876. Peking Review 8 (5 February 1965): 6, p. 10.
877. Peking Review 8 (5 February 1965): 6, p. 10.
878. Ibidem.
879. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 177.
880. Peking Review 9 (9 December 1966): 50, p. 37.
881. Ibidem.
882. See Chapter 14 of this work.
883. In this respect, the Sudan offers a contrast with Egypt, Guinea and Morocco. See Chapters 12.2.1.2, 12.2.1 and 12.2.2.2 of this work.
884. Cultural and trade relations between the two countries did develop. For example, in February 1961, a Sudanese cultural delegation visited China [see Peking Review 4 (10 February 1961): 6, p. 21]. In March 1961, China took part in a trade exhibition in Khartoum [see Peking Review 4 (14 April 1961): 15, p. 14] symbolising trade relations between the two countries [see NCNA no. 3795 (21 June 1968)].
885. See Chapter 13.2.3.2 of this work.
886. Author's interview with a Sudanese lecturer at the University of Algiers and a former activist in the communist party of the Sudan (Algiers: November 1983).
887. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
888. President Nimeiri of the Sudan had paid a visit to the Soviet Union in July 1961, during which the Soviet Union extended to the Sudan an open credit of £8

million to be repaid within a period of 12 years at 2.5% interest. In November 1961, when President Brezhnev visited the Sudan, economic and trade agreements were signed between the two countries. See D. Morison, The U.S.S.R. and Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 34.

889. For the text of the Sino-Sudanese Joint Communiqué, see Peking Review 7 (22 May 1964): 21, p. 6.
890. Zhou En-lai, at a state banquet given in his honour, cited in ibid., p. 5. Aboud's speech was not published in Peking Review, presumably because of its moderate political content.
891. Although this passage contains a reference to the representatives of the two countries having reached 'identical views on the questions discussed', it is likely that the related topics of 'revolutionary prospects in Africa' and anti-imperialist struggles did not figure in the talks held on the occasion of President Aboud's visit to China. It is reasonable to assume that President Aboud, a devout Muslim who was politically pro-Western, was alarmed by Zhou En-lai's revolutionary utterances. China did not give any support to the Anyanya rebels in the southern Sudan on the grounds that they were Christians fighting a civil war of secession and not a revolution. They were also thought to be pro-Western in their political orientation and pro-Mobutu in their orientation towards the Congo (L). See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 174.
892. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 73; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 174; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 5.
893. See Chapter 13.3.1.6 of this work.
894. See Peking Review 3 (28 June 1960): 26, p. 32.
895. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 196.
896. On 29 May 1961 Chang Yueh, China's first Ambassador to Somalia arrived in Mogadiscio, see Peking Review 4 (9 June 1961): 23, p. 23.
897. Abubakar Hamuel Socorro was among the delegates who travelled to China with Youcef as-Sibai (see Chapter 12 note 253), Secretary-General of AAPSO, to attend the 10th Anniversary celebrations of PRC (1 October 1958). See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 47 note 33.
898. cited in Peking Review 4 (7 July 1961): 26 and 27, p. 29.
899. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 196.
900. Ibidem.

901. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 59.
902. Somali nationalists objected to Britain's decision to transfer the Northern Frontier District to Kenya. On 18 March 1961, Somalia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 637. For a valuable account of Somali nationalism and its territorial claims for independence see Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).
903. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 153.
904. Peking Review 6 (24 May 1963): 21, p. 5.
905. For comments in the host country on this visit, see Peking Review 6 (9 August 1963): 33, p. 3-5.
906. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 197.
907. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 154.
908. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 59.
Somalia was one of the first African countries to benefit from the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is difficult to guess whether the Somali government was aware of the adverse effect on its relations with the Soviet Union that its cordial relations with China would have, but it is likely that Somalia believed that its geo-strategical importance as the Horn of Africa would guarantee a continuance of the Soviet Union's interest in maintaining good relations. In the short run at least, the correctness of this supposition was borne out by the Soviet Union's policy of continuing its aid to Somalia even after it established cordial diplomatic relations with China. (See W. Weinstein (Ed.), op.cit., pp. 84-85.)

At the same time, the Somali leaders were aware that China's major objective was to challenge the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence. Despite this reservation, China's general orientation, on balance, coincided with Somalia's own in the important sphere of opposition to the forces of colonialism and anti-imperialism which supported Ethiopia and Kenya, Somalia's hostile neighbours.

Thus, the Joint Communiqué expressing agreement with China's stance on major issues in international relations [see B. E. Shinde, 'China and Africa - Asian Solidarity (1)', - op.cit., p. 67], could not have been aimed at undermining friendly relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union.

909. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 154.
910. See Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.

911. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 197.
912. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 89.
913. cited in Peking Review 7 (14 February 1964): 7, p. 6.
914. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 197.
915. Ibid., p. 198.
916. Ibidem.
917. For the text of the Joint Communiqué between China and Somalia, see Peking Review 8 (30 July 1965): 31, p. 31.
918. China did not take sides in the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia on the one hand [see F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, (London: NLB, 1981), p. 257], and Kenya and Somalia on the other (see A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 12).
919. This was followed by the formation of similar associations and parties in many parts of Kenya's variegated society. For further details, see, for example, D. L. Barnett and K. Njama, Mau Mau From Within (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1966), Part I.
920. Ibid., p. 37.
921. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 59; and Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 373.
922. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 373.
923. Ibidem.
924. Kenyatta took part in the first Pan-African Congress which took place (Manchester, 1945).
925. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 374.
926. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Kenya, p. 2.
927. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 373.
928. B. Davidson, People's Cause op.cit., p. 92.
929. Ibidem.
930. Quoted in T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Tanzania's Role in International Relations and Non-Alignment', op.cit., p. 84.
931. B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 91.
932. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 221.

933. B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 98.
934. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 374.
935. B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 92.
936. These included Oginga Odinga, a colourful extrovert left-wing figure much loved among his Luo people and leaders of smaller societies such as the Kambu and the Kalerym. C. Gertzal, op.cit., p. 6.
937. For a detailed account of the development of KANU see, for example, Odinga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (London: Heinemann, 1968); and R. Cox, Kenyatta's Country (London: Hutchinson of London, 1965).
938. C. Geitzel, op.cit., p. 45. For autobiographical and biographical accounts of Oginga Odinga, see his Not Yet Uhuru, op.cit.
939. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 62.
940. See Chapter 12.1 of this work.
941. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 221.
942. Ibid., p. 222 (note 128).
943. cited in Oginga Odinga, op.cit., p. 190.
944. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 221.
945. Peking Review 6 (13 September 1963): 37, p. 4. The delegation was led by John David Kali, a member of the Government Party in Kenya's House of Representatives. See ibid., p. 5.
946. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 221.
947. Ibidem.
948. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 66; and C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 138.
949. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 66.
950. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 222.
951. Peking Review 7 (21 August 1964): 34, p. 6.
952. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 85; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 60.
953. unlike in Kenya, in Tanzania, the radical forces within Nyerere's government, especially after Tanganyika's union with Zanzibar, played a crucial role in Nyerere becoming an active anti-imperialist leader during the second half of the '60s. China's

aid helped this trend. See Chapters 13.3.1.6 and 14.21.7 of this work.

954. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 63-64.
955. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 188; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 61.
956. East African Standard (Nairobi: 14 March 1967), cited in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 137.
957. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 223.
958. See Chapter 13.3.1.6 of this work.
959. See Chapter 13.3.1.7 of this work.
960. See Peking Review 8 (9 April 1965): 15, p. 11; and 8 (14 May 1965): 20, p. 5.
961. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 189.
During the 1965-1966 period, 10 coups d'état took place in Africa - in 'Algeria', Benin, CAR, and Zaire in 1965; and in Burundi (2 coups), Ghana, Nigeria (2 coups), Uganda and Burkino Fasso [see Africa Insight 10 (1980): 1, p. 35]. A majority of these coups were, however, counter-revolutionary in character. China believed that they had been engineered by the imperialist powers. According to the Chinese propaganda organs, these coups were classified under the following three heads:
1. Coups in which imperialism instigated reactionary elements in the armed forces to overthrow nationalist governments which pursued an independent policy with nationalism as the main ideological strand.
 2. Coups engineered by imperialist powers to remove from power governments which had lost credibility among the mass of the population - and could not maintain their rule, and put in power in their place new governments. This was described as consisting of 'the trick of swapping horses to deceive the people' whilst, at the same time, strengthening oppression. The recent coup (7 April 1985) in the Sudan would, in China's evaluations of the mid-'60s, merit classification under this category.
 3. Coups in which the agents of one imperialist country are replaced by those of another as a result of the rivalry between the traditional and new colonialists for spheres of influence.

'Those circumstances fully satisfy the acuteness and the complexity of the struggle between African people on the one hand and colonialism

and neo-colonialism on the other'. (Hsinhua News Agency, as quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 184).

962. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 226; The People's Daily (31 March 1966).

It is common knowledge that US led imperialism is launching frantic counter-attacks against independent African states. Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism have been responsible to a greater or lesser extent for the recent reactionary military coups south of the Sahara. It is preposterous and ridiculous for the Kenyan authorities to attempt to blame China for what imperialists have done.

Cited in Peking Review 9 (8 April 1966), p. 16.

963. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 189; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 227.

964. Peking Review 10 (1 November 1967): 36, p. 37.

965. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 227.

966. cited in Peking Review 10 (1 September 1967): 36, p. 37.

967. cited in ibidem.

968. Dr. Banda had spent 13 years in British gaols before Malawi became independent. But, upon Malawi's independence, he (like Kenyatta) decided to work closely with Britain and South Africa. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 255.

969. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 447.

970. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 254-257; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 149 (note 2); J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 96-98; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 83-84.

971. The southernmost corner of Malawi abuts into the centre of Mozambique. In fact, Ho Ying, China's Ambassador in Tanzania was received by Banda in June 1964. When Malawi became independent (6 July 1964), China was quick to recognise Banda's government. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 255; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 97.

972. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 255.
973. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 99; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 256 reported as much as \$50 million.-
974. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 257.
975. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 96-98,
976. During the 1960s, it was reported that China supported and trained guerrilla fighters opposed to the Banda government, see ibid., pp. 96-98; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 183; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 133.
977. The Congo (B) (before 1965) and the Congo (L) (after Lumumba's murder) were hostile to China and far from friendly to Tanzania. They could not be used for the passage of arms to other countries. See Chapters 13.2.3.2 and 13.3.1.8 of this work.
978. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 785.
979. Ibidem. See also J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 93.
980. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 239.
981. See Table 12.1. See also, A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 118.
982. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 239.
983. Before independence, 3 Zambian delegations had visited China. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 94. See also Table 13.5.
984. Peking Review 8 (28 August 1965): 35, p. 5.
985. Peking Review 9 (12 August 1966): 33, p. 3.
986. Peking Review 9 (26 August 1966): 35, p. 13.
987. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 242 note 5. Precise details of what the aid would consist of were contained in the announcement
988. China and Zambia jointly stood against both the Soviet Union and MPLA during the Angolan Crisis (1975-76). See Chapter 15.2.1.2 of this work.
989. 'Chou En-lai Answers Questions from Reporters of the Ghana News-Agency (15 January 1964)', in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism op.cit., p. 146.
990. See Table 13.6.
991. Chou En-lai was accompanied by Chan Yi, China's Foreign Minister, and 50 other delegates including 10

important officials. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 66; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 61.

992. cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 90.

In Egypt Zhou En-lai listed these objectives too, but with addition of Arab people and governments in each principle, see ibid., pp. 57-58. The same objectives too, repeated by Zhou En-lai in Ghana (see ibid., pp. 143-144).

993. Zhou En-lai's visit began in a week which was marked by the emergence into independent nationhood of 31 African countries. See Table 12.1.

994. The People's Daily (21 January 1961), cited in W. A. C. Adie, 'Chou En-lai on Safari', op.cit., p. 174.

995. See Chapter 13.2.3.2.2 of this work.

996. See Chapter 12.3.1.3 of this work.

997. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 68; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 61.

998. Zhou En-lai visited Pakistan and Burma in Asia on his way back from Cairo. Peking Review 8 (11 June 1965): 24, p. 6.

999. Ibid., pp. 4-7. See also Peking Review 8 (18 June 1965): 25, p. 3.

1000. Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 19.

1001. B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', op.cit., p. 61.

1002. quoted from A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 122.

1003. cited in Peking Review 8 (5 February 1965): 6, p. 6.

1004. See G. J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity', Asian Survey 5 (September 1977): 9, p. 425; D. Armstrong, op.cit., p. 117; and B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (I)', op.cit., p. 62.

1005. cited in Peking Review 4 (7 April 1961): 14, p. 9.

1006. B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (I)', op.cit., p. 70 note 113.

1007. Chen Yi's exhortation to his Indonesian counterparts (Jakarta, April 1961), cited in D. Armstrong, op.cit., p. 117.
1008. See G. H. Jensen, op.cit., p. 322; and B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (I)', op.cit., p. 62.
1009. Ibid., p. 63.
1010. G. H. Jansen, op.cit., p. 322.
1011. In mid-October 1963, Solomon Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, paid a visit to Egypt. In a Joint Communiqué issued on that occasion, Egypt and Sri Lanka urged that a second non-aligned Belgrade-type conference should be convened. See B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (I)', op.cit., p. 64.
1012. Ibidem.
1013. As a reaction to its suspension from the International Olympic Committee, Indonesia organized (November 1963) the First Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFU), see ibidem.
1014. 'China-UAR Joint Communiqué', reproduced in Peking Review 6 (27 December 1963): 52, p. 10.
1015. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work.
1016. By 1964, Soviet aid and grants to Algeria had reached an estimated \$231 million. See T. N. Kanza, 'China and Soviet Aid to Africa: an overview', in W. Weinstein (Ed.), op.cit., p. 246.
1017. cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 89.
1018. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 68 (note 91).
1019. cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., pp. 78-79.
1020. cited in ibid., p. 78.
1021. See speeches by King Hassan II of Morocco and Bourguiba of Tunisia in ibid., pp. 99-102 and 118-130.
1022. See Chapter 13.3.2.2 of this work.
1023. cited in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 160.

1024. See ibid., p. 160. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 124.
1025. China-Ghana Joint Communiqué (16 January 1964), reproduced in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 160.
1026. cited in D. Armstrong, op.cit., p. 217.
1027. For the text of the Sino-Mali Joint Communiqué (21 January 1964), see Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 184.
1028. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 68.
1029. For the text of the China-Guinea Joint Communiqué (26 January 1964), see ibid., p. 223.
1030. For the text of the China-Sudan Joint Communiqué, see ibid., p. 242.
1031. Emperor Haile Selassie played a major role in the founding of the OAU and became its first Chairman for the year 1963-64. (Addis Ababa, May 1963).
1032. See Haile Selassie's speech at the banquet in honour of Premier Zhou En-lai in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., pp. 254-255. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 125; and F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, op.cit., p. 257; and B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (I)', op.cit., p. 67.
1033. For the text of the China-Ethiopian Joint Communiqué (1 February 1964), see Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 259. Zhou En-lai was received at Asmara and not Addis Ababa. The Emperor perhaps hoped that the presence of Zhou En-lai in Asmara would constitute an 'implicit acceptance' on China's part of Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea. This was brought to the author's attention by a passage in F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, op.cit., p. 257.
1034. Premier Chou En-lai's speech at the banquet given by Emperor Haile Selassie (30 January 1964), reproduced in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 247.
1035. W. A. C. Adie, 'Chou En-lai on Safari', op.cit., p. 192.
1036. China-Ethiopia Joint Communiqué (1 February 1964), reproduced in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 259.

1037. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, p. 257.
1038. Note that Ethiopia never recognized or established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 229.
1039. See Chapter 8 of this work.
1040. Commenting on the occasion of the publication of the China-Ethiopian Joint Communiqué, Chou En-lai, at a press conference (Mogadiscio: 14 February 1964) said that
- the US government applied pressure on Ethiopia not only in the political field but in public opinion as well in an attempt to obstruct further development in relations between China and Ethiopia. Contrary to the expectations of the US government, China issued a joint communiqué with Ethiopia (emphasis added),
- cited in Peking Review 7 (14 February 1964): 7, p. 11.
1041. See Sino-Somali Joint Communiqué (4 February 1964), reproduced in Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., p. 302.
1042. See Chapter 13.3.2.7 in this work. See also B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', op.cit., p. 67.
1043. Zhou En-lai was not able to visit Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (included in his African programme) because of army mutinies in these countries (December 1963-January 1964).
1044. See Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, op.cit., pp. 309-435.
1045. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 126.
1046. Ibidem.
1047. cited in B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', op.cit., p. 54.
1048. See ibid., p. 57; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 77; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 80 note 127; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 125; and Peking Review 7 (24 April 1964): 17, pp. 6-8.

1049. B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', op.cit., p. 57.
1050. See I. Fedda, op.cit., p. 133; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 195.
1051. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 126.
1052. Sardar Swaran Singh, the Sudan delegate, cited in B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', op.cit., pp. 52-53.
1053. As quoted in B. E. Shinde, 'China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65; A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy (II)', op.cit., p. 56.
1054. cited in ibid., pp. 55-56.
1055. Ibid., p. 56.
1056. Ibidem.
1057. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 127.
1058. cited in J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute op.cit., p. 250.
1059. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 80 (note 127).
1060. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 75.
1061. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 80 (note 127).
1062. His visit to Algeria was preceded only three weeks before the Non-Aligned Conference.
1063. For the effect of the Joint Communiqué issued by Algeria and China at the end of Zhou En-lai's visit, see Peking Review 8 (9 April 1965): 15, pp. 10-11.
1064. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 128-129.
1065. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work. See also Peking Review 8 (25 June 1965): 26, p. 4.
1066. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 129.
1067. G. H. Jansen, op.cit., p. 394; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 129.
1068. Boumedienne was a leading figure in FLN's war against the colonial power. He was a strong believer in people's wars against imperialism. His dispute with Ben Bella was related to differences between them over internal matters, rather than over

foreign policy. Algerian foreign policy has, on the whole, been consistent since independence in 1962.

1069. Quoted from A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 130.
1070. G. J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity', op.cit., p. 430.
1071. J. Gittings, Survey of Sino-Soviet Dispute, op.cit., p. 246.
1072. El Shaâb [Algerian government daily paper no. 785 (29 June 1965)].
1073. This was an explanation given to the author (30 June 1985) by Sadek Zoueten, who was responsible at the time for liberation movements in FLN (the party) and a member of the AAPSO Secretariat.
1074. Chen Yi, Vice-Premier, at a press conference in Beijing (29 September 1965), cited in Peking Review 8 (8 October 1965): 41, p. 10.
1075. cited in Peking Review 8 (29 October 1965): 44, pp. 6-7.
1076. See Chen Yi's press conference (29 September 1965), as quoted in F. Schurmann China Readings 3, op.cit., pp. 534-536.
1077. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 82.
1078. Peking Review 8 (29 October 1965): 44, p. 5 and p. 8.
1079. Bashir Boumaâza, Algerian Minister for Information, at a press conference, cited in El Moujehid no. 288 (7 November 1965), p. 4.

CHAPTER 14

SELECTIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN CHINA AND AFRICA: THE THIRD PHASE (1966-69) IN SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

We are now in a great new era of world revolution. The revolutionary upheaval in Asia, Africa and Latin America is sure to deal the whole world a decisive and crushing blow.¹

The main developments during the 1965-66 period, including the escalation of national liberation wars in Indo-China as the United States moved from 'threat to action',² the worsening of the ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union, the deterioration of diplomatic relations between China and a number of pro-Western African countries,³ China's failure to convene a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference,⁴ and the revolutionary wave in China accompanying GPCR, contributed to the emergence of a new phase (1966-69) in Sino-African relations.

14.1. People-to-People Relations or 'United Front From Below'

14.1.1. Relations between China and National Liberation Movements

In the Soviet Union they had told us that the decisive factor is weapons. When I got to Itumbi (a military training camp in Tanzania) where there were Chinese instructors, I was told the decisive factor was the people.....now I agree with the Chinese.⁵

14.1.1.1. Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde

PAIGC was the only national liberation movement belonging to the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP)⁶ which was free from serious frictions within its leadership. It was not rivalled by any other organisation in the country. Amilcar Cabral, PAIGC's Secretary General, was an important factor in the unity of the organisation. Thus, during the period 1966-69, PAIGC was the only national liberation movement belonging to CONCP to carry through its armed struggle without being undermined by factionalism or splits. By the end of the '60s, PAIGC was able to control two-thirds of the rural area of Guinea-Bissau.⁷

Throughout the GPCR period, China continued its material support for, and training of, PAIGC liberation fighters through both Guinea and OAU's African Liberation Committee (ANC).⁸

14.1.1.2. Angola

Splits within its leadership,⁹ including the departure of Savimbi (March 1966), to form his own movement (UNITA) seriously weakened FNLA's early strength. Under the dominant leadership of Holden Roberto, moderate and pro-Western in orientation,¹⁰ supported by Mobutu of Zaire, FNLA spent much of its energy during the latter part of the '60s fighting with MPLA and UNITA - rather than actively promoting struggles against Portuguese colonialism.¹¹ During this period, FNLA hardly exerted

any influence in, or had any impact on, the national liberation struggles in Angola.¹²

The overthrow of the pro-Western government of Congo(B) in August 1963 and the independence of Zambia (October 1964), the other strategically important country, provided fresh opportunities^{the} for MPLA during the period 1966-69. By the end of the '60s, ^{the} MPLA became unquestionably the leading and most progressive liberation movement in Angola. It gave Angolan 'nationalism a Marxist content'.¹⁴

In 1964, from the northern enclave of Cabinda bordering on Congo(B), ^{the} MPLA began its military activities and guerrilla operations against the Portuguese colonial power. By 1966, ^{the} MPLA was able to establish 20 bases both in the north of Cabinda and in the east, along Zambia's borders with Angola.¹⁵

^{The} MPLA's general and widespread armed strikes did not, however, gain momentum until 1968. During the intervening period (1966-68), ^{the} MPLA seriously addressed the task of strengthening its leadership and organisation. At the same time, it was looking for more bases in territories adjoining (especially in Zambia) Angola from where guerrilla operations could be launched more easily and effectively.

In 1966, ^{the} MPLA obtained Zambia's consent to launch attacks on the Portuguese colonial power in the provinces of Moxico and Cuamdo-Cubango.¹⁶ In February 1968, ^{the} MPLA transferred its headquarters from the Congo(B) to the interior of Angola, where it began a successful and wide-

spread guerrilla struggle¹⁷ especially in the strategic areas of Moxico, Cuando-Cubango and Luanda.¹⁸ By 1970 the MPLA was in control of at least one third of Angola.¹⁹

At the same time, in the international field, ^{etc} MPLA was gaining support from most of the anti-colonialist countries - especially Egypt, the Soviet Union, and Mali. In 1971, its growing internal and international popularity led OAU to recognise it as the leading liberation movement of Angola.²⁰

While ^{the} MPLA, during the 1966-68 period, was thus engaged in strengthening its political and military position,²¹ UNITA, basing its strategy on self-reliance, with the peasantry as the main force,²² was already engaged in active guerrilla operations from within Angola. Perhaps this was the reason why UNITA had closer relations with, and was given more support by China²³ or by 'Maoist groups in Europe'.²⁴ A report (30 September 1968) by Hsinhua News Agency pointed out that:

The patriotic armed forces of the National Union for Total Independence (UNITA), which was built in Angola two years ago, have attached great importance to arousing masses, strengthening political work and persevering in armed struggle. After going through the difficult and tortuous course of fighting in the past two years, they are now active in the areas of Luanda, Moxico and Cuando-Cubango in the northern and southern parts of Angola.²⁵

However, it must be emphasised that throughout the decade of the '60s, China did not²⁶ publicly and actively identify itself with one Angolan national liberation

movement to the exclusion of the others, even though UNITA seems to have received more of China's attention.²⁷ MPLA and UNITA were also supported²⁸ and encouraged, and their struggles [which, during 1968-69, cost Portugal \$302 million (i.e., 50% of the Portuguese military budget, for maintaining its 180,000 men)]²⁹ were given equal importance in Chinese propaganda.

14.1.1.3. Mozambique

FRELIMO, too, like other national liberation movements in southern Africa, faced, for a short time, a rival. The Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) sprang up as a result of splits within FRELIMO's leadership.³⁰ COREMO accused FRELIMO of adopting 'adventurist armed struggle'.³¹

Unable to win support from, or recognition by OAU, COREMO looked upon China as an immediate source of aid and hence adopted a pro-China stance.³² Thus, for example, COREMO's Deputy Chief was known to have declared that

[t]he methods of the Eight Route Army and the Vietnamese national Liberation Front are right for Africa. The Russian methods are wrong - they are partly afraid of the peasants and crushed and collectivised them. The Chinese had to build a National Liberation Army on solid peasant support, they taught us we had to utilise 30 million Africans in Southern Africa.³³

China, however, showed little interest³⁴ in COREMO. Its support for, and identification with, FRELIMO as unquestionably the leading national liberation movement in

Mozambique continued.³⁵ Through Tanzania FRELIMO continued to receive the largest portion of China's aid to national liberation movements in all Portuguese colonies.³⁶

As friction³⁷ within its leadership rapidly disappeared, FRELIMO became strong in the political as well as the military fields³⁸ by the early '70s. COREMO faded away,³⁹ having lost its momentum even during Mondlane's lifetime.⁴⁰

14.1.1.4. Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia

During the period under consideration (1966-69), Zimbabwe became the first instance of an African country in which China directly favoured one national liberation movement more than its rival. China openly identified itself with the aims and objectives of ZANU and not with ZAPU which received support from the Soviet Union. The reason for this lay not so much in the fact that an ideological dispute was raging between China and the Soviet Union, but rather in the fact that, from its guerrilla bases in Zambia, ZANU was the first national liberation movement to launch a full-scale (April 1966) guerrilla war in Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia. ZANU guerrilla fighters trained in China⁴¹ played a leading role in the war.

ZAPU denounced ZANU's action as 'irresponsible' - and as being dictated by 'pro-Chinese extremists'.⁴² ZANU continued its guerrilla operation against, and offered active resistance to, the illegal Southern Rhodesian white

minority régime. It forged a link with China during GPCR. During early 1966, ZANU sent its third group of guerrillas for training to China.⁴³ In January 1969, a team of eight Chinese instructors arrived in Tanzania to train the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU's military wing.

14.1.1.5. Namibia

Namibia which was formerly under German colonial rule (until 1914), has been under South African occupation ever since. The national independence movement in Namibia did not opt for armed struggle as the ultimate means for liberation until the South African authorities refused to comply with the 1966 decision of the International Court of Justice which affirmed that South Africa had no legal claim to maintain its control over Namibian territory.⁴⁴

The South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO), founded in April 1958, with Sam Nujoma its leader, and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), founded in February 1958 under the leadership of Fanuel Jairetunda Kozonguizi, have been the leading nationalist movements in Namibia.⁴⁵

Initially, SWANU seemed to be more militant and better organised than SWAPO. China supported it and took an interest in its activities.⁴⁶

China's direct contacts with SWANU took place at the second Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference (Conakry: 11-15 April 1960). at which Kozonguizi was elected to the Executive Committee along with Liao Ch'eng-chih (China),

Ouandie (Cameroon), Oginga Odinga (Kenya), Joshua Nkomo (Zimbabwe), Ahmed Tlili (Tunisia) and Patrice Lumumba [Congo(L)].⁴⁷

At the AAPSO Conference (Moshi: February 1963), representatives from China showed considerable interest in SWANU. They regularly held meetings with Kozonguizi during intervals in the Conference.⁴⁸

At the Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference (Havana: January 1960),⁴⁹ SWANU openly expressed its pro-Chinese character. It was among the delegations which openly attacked the Soviet Union's collusion with the United States 'under the guise of peaceful coexistence'.⁵⁰ At this conference, Kozonguizi strongly opposed any resolutions which would fall short of a condemnation of the targets of the national liberation movements. Otherwise, Kozonguizi⁵¹ argued,

It will be useless to go away from here with these general, watered-down so-called "unanimous" declarations.⁵²

At the same time, Kozonguizi argued that armed struggle was the only effective means of liberation.

The independence of Africa is not complete...because of that the armed struggle in that continent of my birth is not complete. Asia will never see peace unless the imperialists are driven out by force. Latin America, except Cuba, will always remain in the US hands without armed struggle...⁵³

Because of its militant and anti-Soviet position, SWANU was expelled at the AAPSO Council meeting held in Nicosia (February 1967).⁵⁴

The resignation of Kozonguizi as President of SWANU (July 1966) in protest against the moderate⁵⁵ leaders of the organisation gave a boost to the fortunes of SWAPO as the leading national liberation movement in Namibia.⁵⁶ SWAPO was soon recognised by the African Liberation Committee as such.⁵⁷

China, however, never openly expressed its identification exclusively with either SWAPO or SWANU, because both organisations advocated armed resistance and expressed admiration of China's successful strategy of people's war. A leading founder of SWAPO told Hutchison (Dar es Salaam: February 1971) that

[w]e all read Mao, as a practical manual of guerrilla warfare, just as we read British accounts of the Malaysian campaign - to show us how the enemy thinks. We respect China's revolution, as we respect all revolutions, and can learn from it.⁵⁸

Moral and material support was extended to both organisations.⁵⁹

14.1.1.6. Azania

As has already been pointed out,⁶⁰ despite ANC's moderate character China's main concern was to see both organisations - ^{ENL}ANC and ^{ENL}PAC - united by their common target. Although this remained China's position during ^{the} GPCR, it effectively seemed to lean more towards the militant ^{ENL}PAC. During this period, two PAC missions visited China and returned with \$20,000 on each occasion.⁶¹

In Cairo (November 1966) PAC, along with the organisations of eight African national movements (viz the Basutoland Congress Party, the Bechuanaland Peoples' Party, the Mozambique Revolutionary Council, the Swaziland Progressive Party, SWANU, ZANU, and an Angolan group), reacted to their exclusion from the seminar 'Africa: National and Social Revolution' (24-29 November 1966), under the Soviet Union's sponsorship, by issuing a joint statement in protest. The statement criticised 'peaceful coexistence' and the 'revisionist line' advocated by the Soviet Union vis à vis national liberation struggles.

The interest of the Soviet ruling clique in the affairs of the African revolution is dictated by its need to secure international backing for its foreign policy, is oriented to the object of maintaining friendly relations with US imperialism and entering into a 'Holy Alliance' with it to prevent jointly, as two Super Powers, the spread of revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial world.⁶²

The impact of the South African Communist Party (SACP) on ANC played a major part in the latter's moderate character.⁶³ ~~The~~ SACP always identified itself with the Soviet Union's line of peaceful means of liberation. PAC's radical character was viewed by ~~the~~ SACP as disruptive of the revolutionary struggle and dictated by Chinese opportunists at the expense of liberation struggles. SACP argued that

[t]he oppressed people of our country and all honest revolutionaries are indignant at the unprincipled backing given by the Chinese government to certain discredited splinter groups of

Southern Africa. These groups are known to all, including the Chinese communists, for their racialism, anti-communism and disruption of the liberation struggle. By associating with them, the Chinese leaders only expose their own opportunism and lack of principle.⁶⁴

In Khartoum (January 1969), at the World Council of Peace which was held jointly with ^{the} AAPSO, ^{the} PAC was among four other national movements⁶⁵ which directly attacked the proposal of the Soviet Union for an 'International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements of the Portuguese Colonies in Southern Africa'.⁶⁶ ^{the} PAC viewed such a proposal as an attempt on the Soviet Union's part calculated

to control the liberation struggles of the Portuguese colonies and Southern Africa in order to further Soviet co-operation with the United States for their joint domination of the world.⁶⁷

It is worth noting that a militant faction in ^{the} ANC also attacked the Soviet Union's collusion with US imperialism and stressed that China's methods and means of liberation were the correct ones for African liberation and that the co-operation between the Chinese and South African peoples

...would continue to grow until our common enemies and the imperialists, in particular US imperialism, the leader of the imperialists in their global strategy, have been wiped off the face of the earth. The establishment of the People's Republic of China was a monumental and indelible achievement in the struggle for national independence and world peace. It was a great

inspiration to all revolutionaries
throughout the world.⁶⁸

14.1.2. China and AAPSO

The failure to convene a second Afro-Asian conference and the growing influence of the Soviet Union on AAPSO contributed to the lessening of China's enthusiasm for a collective and militant Afro-Asian united front *vis à vis* the policy of *Détente* and in favour of firm action against colonialism and imperialism.

Ideological debates between China and the Soviet Union at the meetings not only of the Soviet Union-sponsored international organisations but also of ~~the~~ AAPSO during the period under consideration (1966-69), became much sharper, more direct and confrontational to the extent of China eventually boycotting their meetings.

At the World Council of Peace (WCP) meeting, (June 1966), China's insistence that the United States and its allies should be resisted and not appeased, was rejected.⁶⁹ For China, the need to attend WCP meetings was thus obviated.⁷⁰

China's only remaining practical and immediate hope of counter-balancing the Soviet Union's dominant position in WPC and other international organisations lay in the fact that AAPSO numbered among its members several which were directly affected by colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism.

The Soviet Union's efforts to undermine or even to eliminate China's influence, did not stop with the steps

it took to sponsor other international organisations. The Soviet Union also attempted to influence Third World countries against China. The Soviet Union's initial attempt towards this end faced a set back when the first Afro-Asian-Latin American conference (the Tri-continental solidarity conference) initiated⁷¹ by AAPSO (Havana: January 1966) strongly condemned the line on peaceful coexistence with the United States and its allies.⁷² The General Declaration of the conference stated that:

...the present international situation is favourable to the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles. It roundly condemns US imperialism as the sworn enemy of the people of the world and an international gendarme...The oppressed nations and peoples have the right to wage popular armed struggles to defeat imperialism and its lackeys.⁷³

Hailing the conference, the People's Daily (18 January 1966) wrote as follows:

The broad masses of the Asian African and Latin-American regions have become increasingly convinced that armed struggle is the correct path for the oppressed nations and oppressed peoples to win independence and liberation, and they have firm faith in people's war as the most active way to deal with US imperialism and its lackeys. Many delegates showed by their own experience that it is necessary to use revolutionary violence to answer the counter-revolutionary violence of US imperialism and its lackeys, that the independence and freedom of all peoples can only be won by armed forces, and that only by armed force can their own independence and freedom be defended.⁷⁴

In April 1966 the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA) was convened in Beijing. This meeting adopted firm resolutions against the imperialist powers and urged active support for liberation movements engaged in armed struggle.⁷⁵

The first⁷⁶ formal split in ^{the} AAPSO, caused by Sino-Soviet differences, began at a meeting (June 1966) of the Permanent Bureau of the Afro-Asian Writers' Organisation (AAWO). At this meeting the Soviet Union, in a move designed to undermine China's vigorous influence within the AAWO, attempted to engineer the transfer⁷⁷ of its permanent bureau from Colombo (capital of Sri Lanka, Ceylon as it then was) to ^{the} AAPSO's permanent secretariat in Cairo. The Soviet Union hoped that by doing so, it could increase its own influence on ^{the} AAWO in an ambience of close Soviet-Egyptian brotherhood. The Soviet Union was then already in the final stages of completing the construction of the Aswan Dam. Towards this end, the Soviet Union mobilised a small conciliatory group, consisting of 13 countries⁷⁸ in AAWO to hold a meeting in Cairo (June 1966) which called for a general meeting to be held in Baku in the Soviet Union.⁷⁹ The meeting also adopted a resolution inviting non-Afro-Asian members as guests.⁸⁰

China, along with most of the AAWO members condemned the Soviet Union's policies of thus breeding estrangement between China and Third World countries. A decision was made to hold an Asian Writers' Emergency Meeting in the same month (26-27 June 1966) in Beijing as a counter-

measure against the Cairo meeting.⁸¹ Unlike the meeting in Cairo, the Beijing meeting was attended by 161 delegates and observers from 53 countries⁸² (26 African countries were represented).⁸³ It was decided at this meeting that the next conference of ^{the} AAWO would be held in China in 1967. Also, at this meeting, the Congo(L), Angolan, Sawaban (Niger) and other forces engaged in struggles against imperialism and reaction were given moral support.⁸⁴ In August of the same year an Executive Secretariat of the AAWO Bureau was established in Beijing.⁸⁵

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In opposition to the scheduled ^{EM} AAPSO Council Meeting (February 1967) sponsored by the Soviet Union, China organised (14 January 1967) a meeting in Beijing of AAWJ delegates from 20 countries, at which the 'Soviet revisionist line' was condemned and all Asians and Africans were urged to 'sink their differences' for the sake of solidarity and unity against US imperialism.⁸⁶

The convening of the AAWO meeting (Cairo: June 1966) against China's wish that it should be held in Colombia) marked the first active move on the Soviet Union's part against China being the host of the Fourth AAPSO Conference in the following year (1967). The second active move by the Soviet Union consisted of the pressure⁸⁷ that it brought to bear on the 8th session of the Council of ^{the} AAPSO (Nicosia, Cyprus: February 1967). It was decided at this meeting that the Fourth Conference of AAPSO would be held in Algiers and not Beijing. The Soviet Union initially suggested Hanoi (the capital of

DVR) as the venue of the conference, hoping perhaps that this would create friction between China and Vietnam. DVR however, rejected the Soviet proposal.⁸⁸

China declared that the decision to hold the conference in Algiers was illegal and that it represented an effort on the Soviet Union's part to split the Afro-Asian people's movement for solidarity against imperialism.⁸⁹ At the same time, the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity declared that the fourth meeting of AAPSO would take place in Beijing as planned.

The Soviet Union, however, failed to get enough support for holding the conference in Algiers. Most Afro-Asian members viewed the proposal as having been dictated by the Soviet Union as part of a wider strategy of reinforcing its campaign in favour of *Détente*. At the same time, Algeria, the would-be host, did not seem very enthusiastic about convening the conference either.

According to Belqacem Kaddour (Secretary General of the Association of Afro-Asian Solidarity and Friendship in the FLN party of Algeria, and currently Vice Chairman of the AAPSO Secretariat) this was because

[for our part we could not see how we could be reconciled with the United States in favour of *Détente* when the latter had been actively aggressive in Indo-China, the Congo(L) and in the Middle East, by directly providing Israel with all possible means of support against Arab countries during the June 1967 war.⁹⁰

14.1.3. China's Policy Towards Problematic African States
(China's 'Anti-State' Policy)

14.1.3.1. Nigeria (Biafra)

In the later stages of the Nigerian civil war, China gave its moral support to the Biafran separatist movement against the government in Lagos. It is well known that Biafran separatism received indirect support from the United States and direct support from its allies - France, Portugal, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel. Interestingly, whilst UNITA at least had an anti-colonial flavour, Biafra hardly had anything in common - politically or ideologically - with China. Not only was the Biafran movement not based on a nationality-based construction in political terms, but also Biafra - paradoxically, like federal Nigeria itself - was pro-Western in character.⁹¹

With the exception of Tanzania, Zambia and the Ivory Coast,⁹² all other African countries were either neutral or supported the Federal Government. China's close friends in Africa - Mali, Guinea, Congo(B) and Algeria (with the exception of Tanzania and Zambia) - supported the Federal Government.⁹³ Outside Africa, even China's ideological allies - Vietnam, North Korea and Albania - refrained from taking sides on the issue.⁹⁴ Why then did China support Biafra?

Before any systematic answer can be attempted, perhaps it would be useful to consider the factors underlying the eruption of the Nigerian civil war (1967-

1970) with a view to identifying the political and ideological motivations (if any) of the Biafran movement.

From its independence (October 1960), Nigeria had always been riven by political and economic struggles between the three major societies encompassed by it - the Hausa-Fulani in the north; the Yoruba in the West; and the Ibo in the south and the east. The first Nigerian government was a coalition of two opposing political parties - the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) based in the southern and western regions of the country; and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC). Tafewa Balewa, the NPC's leader, became the Prime Minister of the coalition government.

Opposition to the Federal Government grew to menacing proportions within the army. In January 1966, Tafewa Balewa's government was overthrown. The new *régime*, led by General John Aguiyi Ironsi, an easterner (Ibo), advocated a powerful central government. In a divided country, this was to prove impractical. Ethnic and regional differences not only affected the relations between different parts of the country but also endangered the security of a large Ibo minority living and working in the northern part of Nigeria amid an increasingly hostile Hausa-Fulani population.

A second military *coup* took place later during the year (July 1966), led by General Yakubu Gowon, who did not belong to any of the three major societies of Nigeria but hailed from a less populous and peripheral society; Ironsi's government was overthrown. Gowon embarked on a

policy of decentralisation of power and a return to a federal arrangement. However, by the time this *coup* occurred, the situation in the northern region had deteriorated to such an extent that thousands of Ibo residents were massacred. Nearly two million Ibos fled to eastern Nigeria.⁹⁵

Attempts by General Odumegwu Ojukwu, the commander of the armed forces in the eastern region, to gain central financial grants in order to cope with the flood of Ibo refugees bore no fruit. The situation became even worse when the country was divided into 12 states (May 1967); for under the new arrangement, the eastern region under Ojukwu would no longer control the revenue accruing from the petroleum producing areas. On 30 May 1967, General Ojukwu proclaimed the independence of the entire eastern region under the name of Biafra. Six weeks later (6 July 1967) the conflict developed into a full scale civil war which lasted until January 1970, involving an estimated 1,500,000 casualties.⁹⁶

Even before General Ojukwu decided to form the Biafran government, Shell and American Overseas, the multi-national petroleum corporation (with US and British shares) had assured him that they would be prepared to pay a proportion of the petroleum royalties to Biafra rather than to the Federal government.⁹⁷

It took China more than a year (i.e., until September 1968) to announce publicly⁹⁸ its support for the Biafran 'government' against the Federal government which had not yet established diplomatic relations with China.

There were three major reasons for the delay in China's decision to support the Biafran side in the Nigerian civil war:

- i. Prior to the *coup d'état* China had established contact with two parties from different regions in Nigeria. One of them was the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), led by Aminu Kano. Kano was among the Nigerian delegates who had previously visited China. The other was the Dynamic Party in the eastern region, led by Dr. Chike Obi, who had also paid a visit to China on different occasions.⁹⁹ Support for Biafra would have undermined China's relations with NEPU. Neutrality seemed to be the appropriate policy.

- ii. It went against the grain of African nationalism (as viewed from the capitals of African countries) for African states to recognise the sovereignty of Biafra. Hasty recognition¹⁰⁰ of Biafra on China's part would have implied support for the fragmentation of one of OAU's most important members. Support for Biafra would also constitute an indication of China's willingness to recognise a state within a state. This would have amounted not only to a direct intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and a breach of one of China's main principles,¹⁰¹ but also to an undermining of the logic underlying China's claim that Taiwan had no right to separate existence as a sovereign state even were it to renounce its claim to sovereignty over the mainland of China. In 1967, the Sino-Soviet dispute had not yet reached a stage at which the Soviet Union's support for the Federal

Government would automatically propel China in the direction of offering support to the secessionist movement. China had no illusion about the pro-imperialist character of Biafra when it eventually gave it recognition. The statement issued in Beijing recognising the secessionist government contained no reference¹⁰² to the political character of the Biafran war. China's justification of its stand on Biafra seemed to stem from humanitarian grounds rather than political grounds. China accepted the assessment that the mass of the Biafran people were being oppressed and massacred by the federal troops.

iii. Covert support given by the United States through the CIA and other private organisations as well as by other Western private agents¹⁰³ was another factor compelling China's initial stance of neutrality. Under such circumstances, China could not afford to take Biafra's side which would have not only called into question its revolutionary and anti-imperialist credentials, but also, on a less ideological and more practical level, provided some justification of the United States' continued support of Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. The fact that Nigeria was the third largest market for Chinese goods must have figured as a powerful deterrent against a precipitate recognition of Biafra.¹⁰⁴

It is understandable that a delegation from Biafra which went to China (October 1967) seeking military support returned empty-handed.¹⁰⁵

Why did China eventually (from September 1968) decide to support Biafra? Three reasons, identical with those underlying China's earlier non-recognition of Biafra, led to China's subsequent support for Biafra - an as yet unestablished and pro-Western separatist government, against the established and anti-communist Federal Government of Nigeria.

- i. China's recognition of Biafra (23 September 1968) came at a time (after the Soviet invasion in August of Czechoslovakia) when Sino-Soviet relations were fast deteriorating and the Soviet Union had established itself as the major supplier of military aid to the Federal Government of Nigeria. China viewed the Soviet Union's association with the Federal Government of Nigeria as clear evidence of what China had begun to characterise (from 1968 onwards) as 'Soviet social imperialism'.

In its first report in support of the Biafra war, Hsinhua News Agency (23 September 1968) claimed that the Soviet Union

has been pursuing a policy of neo-colonialism in Africa. In order to squeeze into Nigeria and share the spoils with US and British imperialism, it has openly supported the federal military government's war of genocide against the Biafran people.'⁰⁶

- ii. Two months (July 1968) before China recognised Biafra, the United States government, perturbed by the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Nigeria, announced that it too was on the side of the federal government, thus removing any possibility of China being

accused of making common cause with the imperialist United States by taking Biafra's side. China viewed the shifting position of the United States as an example of the Janus-faced character of imperialism when it came to a question of protecting its own interests. In the wake of China's recognition of Biafra, Hsinhua (23 September 1968) wrote as follows:

US imperialism has always regarded Nigeria, a big country in Africa with the largest population and rich in resources, as one of its major targets for infiltration in Africa. After the outbreak of war between the Federal Nigerian military government and Biafra, US imperialism actively supported British imperialism's armed intervention. At the same time, it has been pursuing a double-faced policy so as to reserve its political and economic interests in Nigeria and to reap the spoils of victory. While courting Biafra, US imperialism repeatedly assured the Federal military government that it recognised the Federal Government as the sole legal government of Nigeria. Since June this year, seeing that the war situation in Nigeria tipped in favour of the Federal Government, it gave the latter further support and pressed Biafra to surrender.¹⁰⁷

iii. China's decision to recognise Biafra was perhaps also influenced to a degree by its friendly relations with Tanzania and Zambia, which - along with the Ivory Coast and Gabon - were the only African countries to recognise (April-May 1968) Biafra.¹⁰⁸

...the victims of US and British imperialism and Soviet revisionism in supporting the Federal Nigerian military Government's massacre of Biafran people [had] aroused the indignation of the Biafran people and the people of Tanzania and Zambia and other African countries.¹⁰⁹

The recognition of Biafra by these countries was influenced by their revulsion against the Federal Government which had refused to negotiate with Biafra instead of massacring innocent people in the region.''¹⁰

The only ideological reasoning - and a tenuous one at that - behind China's policy stemmed from the fact that Biafra was pitted against an established military régime.

14.1.3.2. Congo-Kinshasa [Congo (K)-now Zaire]

The failure of the revolutionary struggle in the Congo(L) - from 1966 onwards, following US-Belgian action in co-operation with the Léopoldville government against the Stanleyville government, the Congo(K) - led the active anti-government forces to urge that

It is more necessary than ever to close the ranks of the African revolutionaries still further in a firm fight against the reactionary forces who serve imperialism and have brought shame to our people.'''

Whilst China was actively campaigning'¹² for support against the Mobutu régime which it viewed as a 'US puppet chieftain','¹³ the Soviet Union - which had already recognised the government led by Mobutu and established diplomatic relations with it (3 December 1967)¹⁴ succeeded in persuading Mulele like Gizenga before him'¹⁵ to reach a peaceful accommodation with the central government. Again, the Soviet Union found itself in an embarrassing situation. Lumumba was eventually murdered

because of the presence in the Congo of the UN forces, which had the support of the Soviet Union. In October 1968, Pierre Mulele, after mediation by the Soviet Union and the Congo (B), returned to Léopoldville under a guarantee of safe conduct and amnesty. However, this was not the case. A few days after his arrival Mulele, like Lumumba, was executed. '16

14.2. State-to-State Relations or a 'United Front From Above'

14.2.1. China's Relations with 'Progressive' States

14.2.1.1. Egypt

Egypt was the only country in the world which continued diplomatic relations with China at the ambassadorial level '17 during ^{ENR}GPCR. Huang Hua, a most experienced ambassador who had served in Ghana, was sent to Cairo to replace Chen Chin-kang. '18 This was perhaps related to the following considerations:

- i. Egypt was the first African and Arab country to break the diplomatic containment of China by imperialist powers by recognising and establishing diplomatic relations with it. Thus, Egypt must always have been viewed by Chinese decision-makers as a symbol of the opening of Sino-African relations.
- ii. The strategic significance of Egypt as a geopolitical link between African and Arab countries and indeed as a country occupying a pivotal place and playing a central role in the Afro-Asian world as a whole, must also have been on the minds of China's decision-

makers when the decision was made to continue China's relations with Egypt at the ambassadorial level even during GPCR.

- iii. Egypt was AAPSO's headquarters. AAPSO was China's remaining major ideological asset in the Third World after its failure to have a second Afro-Asian conference convened in 1965. The withdrawal of the Chinese Ambassador from Egypt and lack of proper Sino-Egyptian diplomatic relations would, in all likelihood, have lessened China's communication and contacts with Afro-Asian activists in AAPSO based in Cairo. At the same time, it would provide fresh opportunities for the Soviet Union to deepen its penetration of the organisation, especially because the Soviet Union was already enjoying a great deal of influence in Egypt.
- iv. Sino-Egyptian relations had already suffered a setback during Nasser's anti-communist campaign (1958-59), though they improved subsequently (1959-66). Recalling China's Ambassador at such a juncture would almost certainly have led to greater friction between Egypt and China and alienated the leaders in Nasser's government.
- v. Egypt's reputation in China's eyes as a progressive country was still intact, especially after the second non-aligned conference (Cairo, 1964) adopted a militant policy condemning colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism, and supporting armed struggle as a practical means for achieving liberation. In addition to opposing US imperialism which was linked to the policy of the United States

in the Middle East, Egypt actively supported the pro-Lumumba forces in the Congo(K) against the Mobutu government. When he was re-elected (15 March 1965), Nasser promised to devote his energy to the continuation of Egypt's anti-imperialist struggle.¹¹⁹

vi. Finally, in the domestic sphere, Egypt put forward (from 1966 onwards) economic plans and practical policies based on scientific socialism including the establishment of agricultural communes and national socialist firms in the industrial field.

It must, however, be stressed that the continuous diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level between the two countries should not be interpreted as evidence of a lack of concern on China's part for other progressive countries in Africa during the period of the GPCR because it happened to be represented only at the level of *Chargés d' Affaires*. In fact, in the political and economic spheres, Egypt attracted much less active concern from China than other African countries such as Tanzania.¹²⁰

The Arab-Israeli war (June 1967), involving Egypt's courageous resistance to Israeli forces invading it (with the United States), convinced China that Egypt was serious about its militant anti-imperialist stand.

On the eve of the Israeli invasion of Syria (27 May 1967), the government of PRC issued a statement strongly condemning Israeli and American aggression against the Arab peoples and countries.¹²¹

Following the Israeli invasion of Egypt and Syria (5 June 1967), the Chinese government issued another statement strongly supporting the Arab cause. A mass demonstration, attended by more than 1.2 million people was organised in China to condemn Israeli-American aggression in the Middle East.¹²² The United States and Britain were strongly condemned for their role in the creation of Israel and for their alignment with the Zionist state of Israel.

Israel is a product of the US and British imperialist policy of aggression. After World War II Israel could not have existed at all without US imperialist fosterage, and it would never have dared to launch an attack against the Arab states without imperialist support.¹²³

At the same time, the Soviet Union was accused by China, (and many Arab nationalists)¹²⁴ of collusion with imperialism while 'feigning support' for the Arabs.¹²⁵ The editor of Peking Review (23 June 1967) argued that:

As the Palestinian peoples' struggle moves vigorously forward, Soviet revisionism has made greater efforts to apply its tactics of sham support for, and real betrayal of, the Arab people.¹²⁶

China urged Arab countries to resist not only the forces of imperialism, led by the United States, but also the forces of 'Soviet revisionism'. It accused the Soviet Union of the betrayal of the Arab cause at the decisive moment. The Chinese argued that instead of providing Arab countries with weapons and arms to resist the alliance

between Israel and the United States, the Soviet Union - in collaboration with British imperialism - urged them to accept a peaceful solution.¹²⁷ As far as China was concerned,

It was with malicious intent that the Soviet revisionists had given aid to the Arabs in the past in order to help huge profits in their political schemes. Now they had been unmasked they were again seizing support for the Arabs in order to destroy them again. The Arabs had not forgotten that during his visit to Cairo last year, Kosygin pledged that the Soviet Union would defend its friends with all the weapons in its hands and that Arab people could always look for assistance from the Soviet Union. Facts had proved all the gallant Soviet promises to be sheer lies.¹²⁸

When the United States cut off food aid to Egypt, China promptly despatched 250,000 tons of wheat to Cairo,¹²⁹ in addition to making an offer of an interest-free loan to Egypt of \$10 million without conditions or a date for repayment.¹³⁰ China's political and economic support was deeply appreciated by Egypt in the 'face of a mighty imperialist conspiracy'.¹³¹

14.2.1.2. Algeria

For a brief period (October-November 1965), the militant and warm relations between China and Algeria were undermined because of the latter's support, contrary to China's desire, for the convening of a second Afro-Asian Bandung-type conference in November 1965. China viewed Algeria's stance on this question as

A gross violation of the principle of achieving a consensus of opinion through consultation.¹³²

Algeria's support for convening the conference in *November* was not directed against China and the other advocates of postponement. Algeria's insistence on not postponing the conference derived from its concern with the wide publicity that had been given to it in Algeria and abroad. Its postponement could appear as a setback for the Algerian government in international relations.

Otherwise, Boumedienne, known as a 'penny pincher', would not be willing to spend so much money on a conference the success of which was put in doubt by a number of issues of fundamental importance on which Afro-Asian states appeared to be divided among themselves.¹³³ After all, it was during Ben Bella's rule that Algeria had agreed to play host to the conference. Ben Bella wanted the conference to take place in Algeria in order to increase his own popularity.¹³⁴

Algeria's strong support for national liberation movements as well as the deep-rooted relation between China and Algeria going back to the days of ^{the} FLN's struggle against French colonialism contributed to the continuation of militant relations between China and Algeria during GPCR.

In December 1965, a Chinese medical team consisting of thirty five doctors arrived in Algeria to replace the first team which had been in Algeria since October 1964.¹³⁵ By the time the Chinese medical team left

Algeria, more than 4,500 hospital cases and 60,000 out-patients had been given treatment.¹³⁶

Chinese medical personnel and doctors have been extremely popular among Algerian patients because of their simple life, their hard work, and genuine care for Algerian patients.¹³⁷ When an Algerian patient had a serious illness, s/he would be advised to see a Chinese doctor.

In August 1968, another Chinese medical group consisting of 50 members arrived in Algiers.¹³⁸

At the same time, from September 1965 onwards, China began constructing the first major building project in Algiers, a 'Palace of Exhibition', covering an area of 37,000 square metres.¹³⁹

In September 1966, China undertook the construction of a ceramics factory in Guelma¹⁴⁰ (east Algeria), financed under the terms of the Chinese interest-free loan of 1963.¹⁴¹

In April 1967, as a part of its earlier offer of \$50 million (1963),¹⁴² China gave Algeria \$2½ million in foreign currency.¹⁴³ This was followed by another \$2 million (June).¹⁴⁴ This was described in an Algerian statement as the first occasion on which a socialist country had ever offered this form of assistance to a developing country. Other socialist countries were urged to follow suit.¹⁴⁵ It is worth remembering in this connection that China had previously offered foreign currency to some other developing countries, such as Egypt (1956) and the Congo(K) (1964).¹⁴⁶

14.2.1.3. Mali

The warm Sino-Mali relations which developed during the first half of the '60's on a common anti-imperialist ideology,¹⁴⁷ continued during ^{the}GPCR, during which China's challenge to 'non-progressive' *régimes* reached its zenith. China did not seem to be particularly concerned with the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Mali.¹⁴⁸ Even Mali's approval¹⁴⁹ of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, presumably under Soviet pressure, did not undermine the relationship between Mali and China. The presence of China's agricultural and technical personnel in Mali was perhaps enough to offset Soviet influence.

Like most African states, Mali never openly identified itself with the Soviet Union or China. However, if Mali did perhaps reluctantly approve of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, it also openly opposed its advocacy of peaceful coexistence as well as NTBT. Mali refused to be a signatory to NTBT.¹⁵⁰

Mali's support for national liberation wars and its opposition to the policy of *Détente* with the imperialist powers continued to animate and revitalise the relationship between the two countries. During the '60s, Mali and China were the major supporters of revolutionary Sawaba (Niger).¹⁵¹ Like China, Mali expressed outspoken condemnation of the *coup d'état* by which Nkrumah (Ghana: February 1966) was overthrown. Keita viewed the overthrow of Nkrumah as having been engineered by the imperialists against a government that worked hard to defend its

country's political and economic independence. He pointed out that

We will always side with the people who are fighting in defence of their country to freedom and dignity, to counter imperialism and colonialism.¹⁵²

China's exports to Mali increased¹⁵³ from \$8.9 million in 1965 to \$10.6 million in 1968.¹⁵⁴ At the same time, the number of Chinese experts in Mali increased from 155 to 1,500.¹⁵⁵

In June 1966, Mamadou Medeira Keita, Minister of Justice, led a Malian delegation to China. During this visit, Mamadou Keita hailed the Chinese nuclear test earlier during the year as a 'guarantee for the safeguarding and maintainence of peace'.¹⁵⁶ The delegation ended its visit by signing an economic agreement between China and Mali. Under this agreement, China pledged to furnish additional loans including a credit of \$3 million¹⁵⁷ to Mali's Central bank to help Mali tide over its desperate shortage of hard currency.¹⁵⁸

In February 1967, China completed the construction of a match factory which had been begun in January 1966.¹⁵⁹ In the same month, the final phase of the first sugar refinery in Mali was completed. It began processing some 400 tons of sugar cane daily.¹⁶⁰ In May 1967, China completed the building of a cinema with a capacity of 2,500 seats.¹⁶¹ Later during the same year, (December 1967) a medical group consisting of 19 persons arrived in

Mali from China.¹⁶² By November 1967, China had completed the construction of an hotel,¹⁶³

China's generous aid to Mali evoked the following tribute by Ousmane Ba, Foreign Minister, when he claimed (July 1966) that

In Mali we have no fear of co-operation with the Chinese whose technicians have a great respect for our people, are most courteous and discreet, act with dignity and have at no time interfered with our internal affairs, which is more than can be said for many other agents of foreign technical assistance.¹⁶⁴

At the opening of a Chinese exhibition in Bamako (27 January 1968), President Keita praised China for its assistance to his country's efforts to build an independent national economy. He pointed out that the

Chinese aid has never required us to give an account of what we did at home and abroad and Chinese technical assistance is practical. No words can qualify such economic assistance, which is adapted to our local conditions.¹⁶⁵

Within a period of a little over two years (February 1966-May 1968), Chinese experts in Segou (150 miles from Bamako) completed the construction of a textile combine comprising more than 20 buildings capable of employing 3,200 workers and producing a million metres of cloth a year at an estimated cost of \$16 million given in the form of interest-free credit.¹⁶⁶

In May 1968 China agreed to finance a railway line linking Mali with Guinea. This was much desired by Mali

as it is a land-locked country with no direct access to the sea.

Initially, Mali and Guinea had sought the aid of the Soviet Union for this project. The Soviet Union, however, after surveying the project, declined to provide aid for it.¹⁶⁷ The Soviet Union perhaps found the project to be far too costly, and not in its own political and strategic interests. Unlike Egypt, the strategic position of which warranted a huge commitment of resources by the Soviet Union for the construction of the Aswan Dam, land-locked Mali offered no great attraction to the Soviet Union.

China's commitment to build and finance the project came when a Guinean-Malian joint delegation led by Ousmane Ba, the Malian Foreign Minister, paid a visit to China.¹⁶⁸ The cost of the project was estimated at \$50 million.¹⁶⁹ In August (1968) the first group of Chinese surveyors arrived in Guinea.¹⁷⁰

The project, however, never materialised. The initial reasons for this lay in the difficulties posed by Senegal's refusal to let the Dakar-Bamako railway line be used for transporting equipment and for meeting other requirements of the project.¹⁷¹ During this period, Senegal was hostile to all three countries concerned in the project - China,¹⁷² Guinea and Mali¹⁷³ - because of their 'progressive' character.

The main reason, however, was that by the time China completed the required survey in Mali (November 1968), Keita's government had been overthrown (19 November 1968).

The *coup* came at a time when Sino-Malian relations were developing favourably not only in the economic and political spheres - including Mali's support for the GPCR¹⁷⁴ - but also in the military sphere. During the period 1967-68, the two countries worked closely together for the creation of a Mali militia which was to be supplied with uniforms and arms by China.¹⁷⁵ The militia in Mali was begun by a section of the youth which led demonstrations against the bureaucrats and pro-Western officials who favoured the capitalist road for the country's development.¹⁷⁶

A Malian delegation led by Mamadou Diakite, Minister Delegate for Defence and Security to the the Presidency of the Republic of Mali¹⁷⁷ - visited China (June 1968) to arrange for the transfer of military aid promised by China and also perhaps to discuss with the Chinese leaders the best means and strategies for establishing a successful militia in Mali.

By the time the *coup d'état* took place (November 1968), the militia had grown to twice the size of the army.¹⁷⁸ This was not acceptable to many traditionalist¹⁷⁹ officers, and certainly not to those who led the *coup*, under the leadership of Moussa Traore who feared Keita's 'Marxist' drive in the country. The new *régime* claimed that the aim of the *coup* was

...to end the radicalisation of the Marxist *régime* ...After following a policy of balance between the Marxist and moderate elements. the former President decided in August 1967 to govern with the backing of the toughest of the Marxists.¹⁸⁰

Following the *coup*, relations between China and Mali cooled.^{1e1} But they did not deteriorate, partly because by the time (November 1968) the *coup* occurred, China's foreign policy had already begun to move (particularly after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia August 1968) towards an emphasis on State-to-State relations without regard to the political orientation of other States, and partly because the new government claimed to continue along the progressive lines of the Keita *régime*, especially in relation to its opposition to colonialism and imperialism. The friendly relations between the two countries was to continue into the next phase of Sino-African relations.^{1e2}

14.2.1.4. Guinea

The overthrow of Nkrumah represented a loss of one of the most actively anti-imperialist leaders in Africa in ideological terms. Ghana's importance as a base for providing support to national liberation movements in Africa and for the training of their freedom fighters had become far less important - even during Nkrumah's time because Guinea had rapidly developed into a major base in the region for national liberation movements, especially in relation to PAIGC.

Guinea was one of the few countries not only in Africa but in the world whose relations with China remained unaffected throughout GPCR and remained unaffected by China's challenge to the prevailing

international order. Three major factors contributed to the close relations between China and Guinea which continued during the dynamic period of GPCR.

i. The Nkrumah factor: Both China and Guinea strongly condemned the new régime which overthrew Nkrumah. They re-affirmed their unequivocal support for the return of Nkrumah to power. Guinea was even prepared to send its soldiers to 'help the Ghanaian people' to free themselves 'from military traitors backed by Western power'.¹⁸³ In Conakry (March 1966), President Sekou Touré stressed that

we will always side with the people who are fighting for independence and their right to freedom and dignity, to counter imperialism and colonialism.¹⁸⁴

At the same time, Guinea took the lead in Africa for campaigning against the new government in Ghana. Sekou Touré insisted that

the attitude of each nation towards the rebellion of the military traitors of Ghana will be our criterion for judging the honesty of each state and their relations with Africa.¹⁸⁵

ii. Until the early '70s, China was mostly concerned with promoting warmer relations with countries which were progressive in character at the political and economic levels, and strategically important for national liberation movements. Guinea was not only the major strategic point of access (if indeed not the only one) and base for the liberation movement of PAIGC, but was also the strongest supporter of the movement which, during this

period (1966 onwards), began its most effective and intensive armed struggle and guerrilla operations against the Portuguese colonialists.¹⁸⁶

iii. Guinea's support for GPCR was a contributory factor to its militant relationship with China during this period. In fact, Guinea itself launched (January 1967) its own 'cultural revolution' and formed its own 'Red Guards' - *Jeunesse du Rassemblement Démocratique*¹⁸⁷ (JRDA). JRDA was viewed by Sekou Touré as

the true pioneers of the economic and cultural revolution.¹⁸⁸

Sekou Touré's campaign should not, however, be viewed as an indication of the comparability of the objectives of Guinea's 'cultural revolution' and China's GPCR. The aim of Sekou Touré's 'cultural revolution' represented an attempt to reinforce Guinean-Islamic culture and education *vis à vis* French culture and educational influence in the country.¹⁸⁹

However, Sekou Touré's emphasis on cultural change certainly provided the political atmosphere in which China was able to consolidate its relations with Guinea and express its ideological desire without any feeling of resentment.

In China, in celebration of the Guinean National Day (2 October), Camara Foda Isiaga, *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Guinean Embassy, expressed (2 October 1967) Guinea's full support of GPCR:

the greater the success of the cultural revolution, the stronger would be China's support to the progressive countries recently liberated or struggling against imperialism.¹⁹⁰

During his visit to China (May 1968) Ousmane Ba, Guinea's Foreign Minister, reaffirmed Guinea's support for GPCR initiated by Mao Zedong.¹⁹¹

Aid promised by China and construction projects by Chinese experts which had begun before GPCR were either completed or near completion during this period.¹⁹²

In November 1966, Ismael Touré, Guinea's Minister of Economic Development paid a visit to China, during which he signed four more Sino-Guinea economic agreements. Included in these agreements was an interest-free loan of \$1.5 million.¹⁹³

At the same time, Chinese agronomists were engaged (from 1966 onwards) in developing paddy fields under the Guinean Government's plan for growing rice in an area totalling 40,785 hectares in 12 regions.¹⁹⁴ In the summer of 1967, the number of Chinese experts in Guinean agriculture reached the figure of 3,000.¹⁹⁵

In January 1967, a Chinese government delegation paid a visit to Guinea to attend the opening of the Kinkon hydro-electric power station and Tinkisso dam financed by China and built by its experts in co-operation with Guinean workers.¹⁹⁶ At the inauguration (28 January 1967) of this project, Sekou Touré praised the Chinese personnel for their responsibility and commitment to the work.

Bombs may destroy the power station as well as the dam. But what remains indestructible and imperishable, and what the Chinese workers have brought to us is the example of their great moral qualities, which have enriched the spirit and awareness of responsibility of the Guinean people.¹⁹⁷

Sekou Touré expressed admiration for China's experience and deep appreciation of the role played by Chinese experts especially in the agricultural sphere where most African needs lay.

At present Guinea does not need big technical measures in her agriculture because our peasants have not reached such a level. We want small technical measures that are suitable to their level, to raise agricultural production. China has rich experiences in developing agriculture so we want to profit by the Chinese presence in Guinea to find such measures as are suitable for the farming and rural conditions of our country to develop our agriculture.¹⁹⁸

In February 1968, with Chinese help, a tea plantation and a tea factory were opened in Macenta. In the same year, the Chinese built another tea factory in Dabola, with an annual capacity of 3,500 tons.¹⁹⁹

In July 1968, a Guinean military delegation paid a two-week visit to China. This was followed in September by a Chinese delegation to Guinea.²⁰⁰

In Conakry (2 October 1968: Guinea's National Day) Chinese personnel completed the construction of the biggest public building in Guinea. This earned the Chinese the following tribute by Abdoula, a Guinean worker:

I worked with the French, Americans, Russians and Germans, but I never in my life met experts as good as the Chinese. What is always in their minds is the interests of the Guinean people.²⁰¹

In the same year (October 1958), 34 Chinese medical experts arrived in Guinea in addition to those already working in different parts of the country.²⁰²

In 1969, China gave fresh promises of assistance in more projects including a 200,000 ton cement factory, the modernisation of the Conakry-Karkan railway line,²⁰³ the port of Conakry, and 'a vast agricultural development programme'.²⁰⁴ These projects were to be financed by a Chinese offer of an interest-free loan of \$45 million.²⁰⁵ Indeed, during this period (1966-69), Guinea became the largest African recipient of China's aid.²⁰⁶

14.2.1.5. Ghana

Sino-Ghanaian relations, which reached their most militant level during the preceding phase (1959-66), reached a turning point at the beginning of the GPCR period. While he was on his way back to China after visiting Vietnam, where he condemned²⁰⁷ American involvement in Indo-China, Nkrumah heard the news that his government was overthrown (24 February 1966).

The *coup* brought to an end the militant relations between Ghana and China. It ended the role of Ghana under Nkrumah's leadership as an ideological²⁰⁸ ally of China. It brought into power an openly pro-Western²⁰⁹ and strongly anti-communist régime in Ghana.

China believed that the *coup* had been instigated by the imperialists who wanted to re-establish colonialist rule over the 30 already independent African countries.²¹⁰

Chinese technical experts were searched²¹¹ by Ghanaian soldiers, and ordered by the new *régime* to leave the country.²¹² About 430 Chinese personnel, including 13 guerrilla instructors who were training liberation fighters, alleged to be involved in subversive activities in the country²¹³, were expelled from the country.²¹⁴ Along with the Chinese experts, 1,100 Soviet experts and technicians were also expelled.²¹⁵

The new *régime* ignored the fact that the Chinese personnel, including guerrilla instructors, were in Ghana at the request²¹⁶ of a legal and popular government. In fact, China reminded the new government of Ghana that

...the military experts as well as the economic and technical experts sent by the Chinese government to work in Ghana were despatched at the request of the government of the Republic of Ghana in pursuance of the relevant agreement signed by two countries. They always worked in accordance with the arrangements made by the Ghanaian government.²¹⁷

China's direct and open condemnation of the new government in Ghana was not followed by a complete withdrawal of diplomatic staff.²¹⁸ This was perhaps motivated by hopes entertained by China²¹⁹ and 'progressive' governments in Africa e.g. Tanzania, Mali²²⁰ and Guinea²²¹ that Nkrumah would regain power.

However, circumstances seemed far from favourable for Nkrumah's regaining power. In October 1966, China had to withdraw its diplomatic mission from Ghana following the new régime's suspension of relations with China and recognition of Taiwan.²²²

14.2.1.6. Congo(B)

If Tanzania (and Zambia)²²³ were the major bases for China's support of liberation movements in southern Africa (including eastern Angola) Congo(B) was the only possible base during the latter half of the '60's for both the revolutionary forces in the neighbouring Congo(K) and the liberation fighters of ^{EN}MPLA in northern Angola.

These revolutionary forces in the Congo(K) by 1966, became entirely dependent on the Congo(B) for providing the only strategic access for any revolutionary struggle that could be waged against the Mobutu government. Burundi, which had provided another front, became hostile to them and their supporters, including China.²²⁴

As for Angola, the Congo(K) was becoming more and more pro-imperialist and opposed to any active liberation forces such as those of ^{EN}MPLA which it had already expelled²²⁵ from its territory.

By virtue of the strategic situation occupied by the Congo(B) in relation to the national liberation forces of the Congo(K), and its shared orientation with China on major international issues, it became one of the few African countries to establish warm and co-operative

relations with China in the economic, political and military fields during the dynamic period of GPCR.

10 delegations - governmental and non-governmental - from the Congo(B) visited China, whilst 7 Chinese delegations visited the Congo(B)²²⁶ during this period. China's exports to the Congo(B) leapt from nothing in 1965 to \$4.9 million in 1969.²²⁷ Chinese technicians continued their work on projects which began following the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Congo(B) (1964 onwards).

In January 1966 China agreed to construct a broadcasting station in the Congo(B). Within a short period (March 1967), the project was completed.²²⁸ It was named 'The Voice of the Congolese(B) Revolution'.²²⁹ This station was to be used for revolutionary campaigning in support of liberation forces in the Congo(K), Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and other countries in southern Africa.²³⁰

In August 1966, Mouyabi Andre Georges, President of the National Assembly of the Congo(B), visited China in order to consolidate Sino-Congolese relations and promote further the economic co-operation between the two countries.²³¹ In the same year, 23 persons were sent from the Congo(B)²³² to China to receive training in the administration of the textile combine which was being fabricated with Chinese assistance²³³ and handed over to the Congolese government (May 1969) as a symbol of the 'crystallisation of friendship' between China and the Congo(B).²³⁴

In February 1968, China signed an agreement with the Congo(B) for the construction of a dockyard.²³⁵ China also extended to the Congo(B) an interest-free loan (August 1968) of \$1 million for financing state farms²³⁶ which were being set up with the help of the Chinese experts. At the same time, a Chinese medical team consisting of 20 doctors and equipped with Chinese medicine, was working in the country.²³⁷

The relations between the two countries became even closer when the Congo(B) announced in 1967 the creation of a militia, the *Jeunesse du Mouvement de la Révolution* (JMNR) China was invited to train and arm the militia²³⁸ which 'openly professed admiration for Chairman Mao'.²³⁹

At the same time, China was already involved in training African guerrilla forces in the camps of Bouanga, Dombona and Ipfonda in the Congo(B).²⁴⁰

In June 1968, a high-level military delegation visited the Congo(B) from China to attend the 4th annual celebration of the Congolese(B) People's Army Day (22 June 1968). In July, Major Alfred Raoul visited China²⁴¹ from the Congo(B). Reinforcement of the militia must have been the major subject considered during both reciprocal visits.

However, as in the case of Mali, the militia of the Congo(B) was also short-lived. It ceased to exist following the resignation of Massamba-Debat.²⁴²

It is, however, worth pointing out that Debat's resignation was not directly related to the continuance of the militia. Quite the contrary. It was his increasingly

moderate²⁴³ character which made him subject to direct criticism even by the daily newspaper, *Diapanda*,²⁴⁴ the organ of the national revolutionary council (NRC), which he had founded in December 1963.

The new government under the leadership of Marien Ngouabi was more inclined to 'scientific' socialist construction. In December 1969, CNR was dissolved and replaced by the *Parti Congolais du Travail* (PCT) which announced that its ideology was based on a 'Marxist-Leninist orientation'. The name of the country was changed from the Republic of the Congo(B) to the People's Republic of the Congo(B).²⁴⁵ The 'People's Militia' was incorporated within the army and renamed *Union de la Jeunesse Socialiste du Congo*.²⁴⁶

This change did not affect the relations between China and the Congo(B), nor did it cause any dissatisfaction on the former's part with the abolition of the militia. The termination of the militia in the Congo(B) (December 1969) coincided with the bringing to an end of the people's militia of the 'Red Guards' in China (1966-69).

Thus, the relations between China and the Congo(B) continued to be friendly and warm. In fact, the Congo(B)'s relations with China, under the leadership of Ngouabi became even closer than before. Perhaps, China was pleased to see Debat resign. Debat had begun to soften towards the Soviet Union and seemed to develop a liking for pro-Soviet ideological posture.²⁴⁷

Only a month after the resignation of Debat, Alfred Raoul, the new Prime Minister, paid a three-week visit to China (21 September-14 October 1968). During this visit Raoul signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the Congo(B) and China.²⁴⁸

At the UN General Assembly (November 1968), the Congo(B) was one of the strongest voices in favour of the restoration of China's seat.²⁴⁹ Alphonse Ongogou, the delegate of the Congo(B) pointed out that the Jiang Jieshi *régime*

...had no right at all to represent the Chinese people...Taiwan is reduced to an American colony.²⁵⁰

14.2.1.7. Tanzania and the TanZam Railway

During the second half of the '60's²⁵¹ as armed struggles in southern Africa were rapidly developing and intensifying, China gave a great deal of importance to its relations with Tanzania for reasons which have already been discussed. During the 1966-69 period, Tanzania's position as the centre of gravity of China's Africa policy remained unaltered.

Tanzania was perhaps the only country not only in Africa but in the world as a whole (with the exception of Vietnam, North Korea and Albania) to develop extremely close relations with China in the economic, military and political spheres on the basis of a shared anti-imperialist orientation. Tanzania's unquestionable and active support for armed struggles in southern Africa

played an important part in guiding China's ideological alignment with it.

...legal independence is not enough...the freedom we seek must be freedom for the peoples of Africa without distinction of race, colour or religion...coexistence is impossible; if the African peoples of South Africa and Rhodesia have no human rights to govern themselves then what is the basis of Tanzania's existence, of Zambia's, of Kenya's and so on.²⁵²

As far as China was concerned, the lesson for Tanzania of the *coup* which overthrew Nkrumah was that it should have become 'more determined and resolute' in its struggle for a 'final victory' over imperialism and neo-colonialism.²⁵³

Tanzania's anti-imperialist stance during the initial stage of this period (1966-69) manifested itself in a condemnation of what it saw as British conspiracy which allowed Ian Smith to make the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)²⁵⁴ (November 1965). Britain retaliated by suspending a \$20 million loan to Tanzania.

In a move clearly intended to step into the breach thus created by Britain, China offered (June 1966) Tanzania a \$5.6 million interest-free loan, and a grant of \$2.8 million.²⁵⁵ This

showed that China was a valuable friend in time of need and increased her standing in the country.²⁵⁶

This offer came after a visit to China (4 June 1966) by a Tanzanian government economic delegation led by Paul

Bomani, Minister for Economic Affairs.²⁵⁷ Earlier during the year (May 1966), China had given Tanzania a donation of \$85,000 for the development of the University of Dar es Salaam²⁵⁸ and supplied it with scientific instruments and illustrative material.²⁵⁹ In July 1966, China agreed to construct a new shipping line with an initial capacity of £1.5 million and two 10,000-ton vessels²⁶⁰ with the aim of

[increasing] the invisible earnings of the two countries, reduce imperialist control of shipping and hence arbitrary changes.²⁶¹

In 1967, Chinese aid personnel completed the construction of two printing offices.²⁶² In February 1968, a leather shoe factory built with China's help was also completed.²⁶³ In less than two years (July 1966-February 1968), China had completed the construction of a textile mill in Tanzania. This was the largest project in East Africa and was named the Friendship Textile Mill.²⁶⁴ In August 1968, the Chinese aid officials completed the construction of a pharmaceutical laboratory supplied with Chinese medicines.²⁶⁵ In October (1968), an agricultural tools factory built by Chinese experts, was completed.²⁶⁶ In addition, many more farming projects, buildings and industrial constructions were completed or were brought to near completion.²⁶⁷ Paulo Mwaluko, Tanzania's Ambassador to China was moved to pay a special tribute to the Chinese experts.

Tanzanians have now become accustomed to the excellent hard work, dedication,

high skills and selfishlessness of the Chinese technicians and workers.²⁶⁸

A similar tribute was also paid by Nyerere

...the thing which most impresses Tanzanians about Chinese workers who are now in our country is their enthusiastic hard work.²⁶⁹

In the military field, China provided more²⁷⁰ weapons to Tanzania during this period under consideration (1966-69), whilst Chinese experts were engaged in training Tanzanian soldiers.²⁷¹ In 1970, China responded to Tanzania's appeal for arms by sending two squadrons of MIG-17 type interceptors and more pilots and military experts.²⁷²

During the dynamic period of GPCR, Nyerere was among the few heads of state to visit China (18-22 June 1968). During this visit, Nyerere expressed strong opposition to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT)

...we have opposed this treaty not because we want to reserve our right to make, or receive nuclear weapons. We have neither the ability nor the wish to do so. We have opposed it because it is an unequal treaty, which cannot even contribute to the cause of peace...The relation which we seek between ourselves and the rest of the world is a relation of equality. It is mainly for that reason that Tanzania has opposed the treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons. We regard it as a most unequal treaty. It asks non-nuclear nations...to renounce the right to make or process nuclear weapons. But it does not ask nuclear powers to destroy the weapons they already possess, and worst of all, it does not ask the nuclear powers to pledge that they will neither use, nor threaten to use, nuclear weapons

against states which agree to sign the treaty.²⁷³

Nyerere left his audience in no doubt that Tanzania was not only close to China but also opposed to the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Soviet Union's ambassador to China, along with ambassadors from its allies (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria) walked out of the reception given to Nyerere in Beijing.²⁷⁴

In the same speech, Nyerere attacked Western propaganda against the Sino-Tanzanian friendship and their characterisation of Tanzania as a satellite of China, a 'Big power'.

The friendship between Tanzania and the People's Republic of China is a friendship between equals. Perhaps for that reason some other nations of the world find it hard to understand: they are always trying to suggest that Tanzania is a satellite of China or... alternatively... that our friendship is about to break. This is probably an expression of wishful thinking and an assumption that friendship is exclusive...that you cannot be friends with many nations if these are not themselves close friends.²⁷⁵

Tanzania's anti-Western or anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist position was reinforced by Nyerere's new policy (February 1967) of de-Westernisation²⁷⁶ based on self-reliance. This was embodied in the famous Arusha Declaration which stressed

socialism, nationalisation, rural development, an end to elitism, new educational directions and a greater

attention to the agricultural sector.²⁷⁷

Tanzania's ambassadors to Western countries were temporarily recalled.²⁷⁸ A youth league known as the 'Green Guards' was formed.²⁷⁹

In response to criticisms that the Arusha Declaration was based on Chinese philosophy, Nyerere explained that it

was based on the Tanzanian people's needs, ...but if it is Mao Tse-Tung, brothers, learn from it...go all the way to Peking.²⁸⁰

During this period, Tanzania was one of the most active campaigners in UN for China's reinstatement in the organisation. The Tanzanian delegate to UN repeatedly condemned the occupation of the Chinese island of Taiwan by the United States. At the 23rd Session of the UN General Assembly (11-19 November 1968), Danieli, the Tanzanian representative denounced the United States for:

...obstructing [and] delaying...the restoration [of the] ... legitimate rights [of China] ... the United States must be held responsible for this and should be condemned ... Taiwan is a province of China and is now completely under US military occupation.²⁸¹

14.2.1.7.1. TanZam Railway

Two things convinced me that socialism can be built in Africa and that it is not a Utopian vision. One is that capitalism is ultimately incompatible with the real independence of Africa. The second thing that encouraged me was China ... China is providing an encouragement and an aspiration for younger and smaller nations which seek to build socialist societies.²⁸²

In September 1967, China officially pledged to Tanzania and Zambia that it would help construct the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway (the TanZam Railway). The initial cost of the project, estimated at \$405 million was to be given by China (\$135 million to Zambia and \$280 million to Tanzania) as an interest-free loan. Its repayment was to begin in 1983.²⁹³

This is the most far-reaching and important aid project and aid offer yet committed by China to any African country since the beginning of Sino-African relations.

While, in the long run, the project would promote economic co-operation and mutual benefit for China and eastern and southern Africa, in the short run, it was much more politically and ideologically motivated in favour of liberation movements against the colonialist and racist *régimes* of the region. China signed (September 1967) the agreement at a time when its world view was much more explicitly orientated along political and ideological lines and it was less concerned with diplomatic and trade gains as such.

Undermining the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence with imperialism by provoking and encouraging further liberation wars in the region must have been in the minds of the Chinese decision-makers, as much of their campaign during this period was directed against the Soviet Union and, since 1968, Soviet 'social imperialism'.

Not surprisingly, Western countries took a radically different view of the aim of the project as such. They viewed it as 'China's Trojan Horse in Africa', 'a bridge for Support to Black terrorists', or as 'Chinese economic colonialism' in the name of economic aid.²⁸⁴ However, as Hutchison noted,

...there was no striking discrepancy between what China was actually doing, and what her critics said she was doing, and as I watched the relationship between China and Tanzania develop, it seemed to me highly beneficial for the African country.²⁸⁵

In response to the Western propaganda campaign against China's links with Tanzania and its determination to build the TanZam Railway, Nyerere said on one occasion (July 1969):

To us China is a friend in need. Take for example the railway between Tanzania and Zambia. We tried very hard to get it built by the Western powers. But we failed. The Chinese are ready to build it for us. But the West now does not want China to build it. So, should we go without a railway?²⁸⁶

In the economic field, the project would greatly reduce Tanzania's dependence on Western aid and enhance its economic independence. It would also stimulate the economic development of the southern part of the mainland, as more Tanzanians would be attracted to exploit its agricultural potential.

For Zambia, the project was highly important for the country's economic and political independence.

The completion of the railway line will be of tremendous significance to Zambia's future as a strong, prosperous and truly independent nation, to the fraternal relations of Tanzania and Zambia, to the growing brotherly nations in east Africa and to the friendly ties between us in this part of the world and the Chinese people.²⁸⁷

Land-locked as Zambia was, it was almost exclusively²⁸⁸ dependent on the white minority régime of Rhodesia and on the Portuguese colonialists in the territories of Angola and Mozambique for access to the sea.

Until January 1973, when the Rhodesian authorities closed the borders with Zambia as a reaction against guerrilla forces operating from Zambian bases, Zambia's foreign trade was carried on over the rail bridge at Victoria Falls involving a long journey through Rhodesia to the sea at Mozambique.²⁸⁹

China hoped that the project, which would provide alternative access for Zambia's trade and economic relations with the outside world, would encourage it to undertake more positive action against colonialism and racism in the area without fearing economic retaliation by the racist régimes of Rhodesia and South Africa.

Initially, Tanzania had approached Britain and Canada (1965) for help with the railway project, but its request had been turned down.²⁹⁰

Tanzania had also sought Soviet help in vain.²⁹¹ The Soviet Union was already engaged in the construction of the Aswan Dam. Perhaps it was in no position to become involved in another major project, especially when Soviet-

Tanzanian relations were not particularly close, unlike those between China and Tanzania.

Initially Zambia, despite its desperate need for the project, was somewhat reluctant to become so vastly indebted to China. Kaunda's moderate character and Western tendencies were ^{far} too pronounced to permit too close a friendship between Zambia and China. It was not until he visited China (June 1967), that Kaunda became enthusiastic about the project and more friendly towards China.²⁹² Kaunda was offered an interest-free loan of \$15 million to be used for constructing a road from Lusaka to the Baroste Province.²⁹³

Following Kaunda's visit, relations between China and Zambia became much more friendly²⁹⁴ and even acquired a progressive sheen, at least in relation to China's concern with the liberation struggles in the region.

14.2.2. China's Relations with 'Non-Progressive' States

14.2.2.1. Mauritania

During the period when GPCR was in progress, Mauritania was the only country in Africa not only to recognise and establish diplomatic relations with China, but also to promote warm relations with it. Second only to Somalia,²⁹⁵ Mauritania, among 'non-progressive' countries, was of no strategic significance to anti-colonialist liberation forces which were recipients of economic aid from China during this period.

Like most of the French colonies in West Africa, Mauritania joined the French Community of 1958. Two years

later (November 1960), Mauritania opted for independence. In co-operation with the French authorities, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, the leader of the Mauritanian People's Party (MPP), became President of the country.²⁹⁶

Under French influence, Mauritania remained strongly anti-communist and pro-Western in its political character. On the day of its independence (28 November 1960), Mauritania established diplomatic relations with Taiwan.²⁹⁷

In February 1965, a meeting of 13 African French speaking countries took place at Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania, the major objective of which was to find ways and means of containing communist influence in central and western Africa.²⁹⁸ Tshombe's insistence that there should be no communists in Zaire before the Belgian troops withdrew from the country was strongly supported at this meeting.²⁹⁹

China's opening of diplomatic relations with France (27 January 1964) was an important factor underlying Mauritania's recognition of it (July 1964).

For its part, China wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Mauritania as a part of its intensive campaign in favour of convening a second (Bandung-style) Afro-Asian conference. The opening of Sino-Mauritian relations began with a visit by an agricultural mission from China to Mauritania (June 1965).³⁰⁰

At the Preparatory meeting of Asian and African countries (Algiers: 24 June 1965) for the second Afro-Asian conference scheduled for 28 June 1965, Chen Yi,

China's Foreign Minister, met his counterpart, the Mauritanian Foreign Minister.³⁰¹ The establishment of diplomatic relations between Mauritania and China must have been among the subjects discussed between the two ministers. In the following month (19 July), diplomatic relations were established between the two countries.³⁰²

Mauritania's recognition of China was certainly not welcomed by the United States and other countries opposed to China. For them, Mauritania had now joined the opposition club of the advocates³⁰³ of one China.

Ould Daddah must have been impressed by the favourable economic aid terms offered by China to neighbouring Mali and Guinea. In August 1966, China agreed to send experts to help Mauritania to develop its rice cultivation in the Valley of the Senegal River.³⁰⁴

In February 1967, a Mauritanian delegation led by Briane Mamadou Wane, Foreign Minister, visited China, where he said that

The Mauritanian delegation is firmly convinced that the unprecedented great proletarian cultural revolution movement initiated by the great Chairman Mao Tse-Tung in China with a population of 700 million is of extremely profound and far-reaching international significance. The delegation sincerely wishes China still greater achievements in revolution.³⁰⁵

During this visit, Wane signed an economic and technical co-operation agreement with China in addition to cultural and trade agreements.³⁰⁶ The economic agreement included an interest-free loan of \$4 million³⁰⁷ which was to be

used for developing rice cultivation, land reclamation and the construction of a 13 kilometre long dam in the Rosso region.

It was unlikely that a Western power would have offered such economic help to a poor and thoroughly backward country such as Mauritania, especially in view of the fact that there was no economic or immediate strategic advantage to be gained by so doing; Mauritania's pro-Western tendencies alone were not enough.

In October 1967, President Ould Daddah became the second African head of state after Nkrumah (February 1966), to visit China during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution. China's easy and generous terms of economic aid must have reinforced Ould Daddah's opposition to colonialism and imperialism and Mauritania's support for national liberation movements in the remaining colonies in Africa.³⁰⁸

At the same time, he affirmed his country's strong support for the restoration of China's seat in UN and congratulated his hosts on GPCR.³⁰⁹ Ould Daddah was presented by the Red Guards with a French translation of quotations from Mao Zedong.³¹⁰

In November 1967 a Chinese medical team consisting of 24 persons arrived in Nouakchott.³¹¹ This was followed by China's offer of an interest-free loan of \$5 million.³¹²

In February 1968 China delivered 200 tons of agricultural machinery to Mauritania. These included trucks, tractors and bulldozers for use on an experimental farm in the Rosso region and the first section of a 4,000-

hectare Chinese aid project for stock-breeding and rice cultivation.³¹³ China also presented (February 1968) Mauritania with educational materials, including equipment and machinery for physics teaching in secondary schools.³¹⁴

At the same time, trade between Mauritania and China developed. Demand for Chinese goods - because of their low price, easy terms, and above all their appeal to African needs (non-luxury) - must have been behind the fast increase of trade between China and Mauritania. China's exports to Mauritania began with only \$0.8 million in 1966. In 1969 they reached \$9.5 million.³¹⁵

14.2.2.2. Somalia

Whereas Mauritania did not have any relations with China until the beginning of this stage, Somalia was the only 'non-progressive' African country to continue relations with China on a friendly basis during the GPCR period. Apart from Mauritania, Somalia was the only other 'non-progressive' African country to receive China's aid during the period 1966-69.

Neither the moderate character of the government, nor its tendency of leaning to the side of the Soviet Union - especially in the military sphere³¹⁶ - had a disruptive effect on Sino-Somali diplomatic relations. Close relations between the United States and Ethiopia, the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the absence of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and China, and China's support³¹⁷ for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)

constituted the main factors which contributed to good relations between China and Somalia. At the same time, China was perhaps also drawn to Somalia because it was one of the few 'moderate' African governments which did not show any hostility towards GPCR.

Chinese experts continued their work on agricultural projects in Somalia. In September 1966, a Somali delegation led by Sheikh M.M. Hussein, President of the Somali National Assembly, paid a visit to China.³¹⁸ In August 1967, Chinese experts began the construction of experimental stations for growing rice and tobacco, completing the projects in 1969.³¹⁹ Ali Alido Mohammed, the Somali Minister for Public Works, was all praise for Chinese experts, who, according to him, 'had been working for Somalia heart and soul'.³²⁰ In Mogadisco (March 1968), Chinese experts had completed the construction of a National Theatre (with a capacity of 1,200 seats). It was fully equipped by China and given as a gift to Somalia.³²¹ A Somalian worker paid the following tribute to China:

Only China can complete a big building project like this in such a short span of time.³²²

Another worker said that

I have never seen experts of any other country do work like carrying dirt and ramming on a construction site.³²³

In May 1968, China offered an interest-free loan of \$1.83 million to Somalia, repayable over ten years from

1971.²²⁴ In March 1969, Chinese experts began the construction of two well-sinking projects.²²⁵

During this period, China experienced great ideological upheaval internally. This was also reflected in China's foreign policy and its attempts to re-conceptualise its international role in the light of the great domestic political changes sweeping the entire system. However, even as the country was in turmoil, China was racked by internal tensions among the leadership (e.g. Lin Biao's sudden rise and fall - 1968-72), China's foreign policy in Africa as elsewhere was far from logically consistent in every respect. If the alignments and changes described above appear on the surface to be somewhat unsystematic, it is hardly surprising in view of the enormous difficulties involved in bringing external orientations into mesh with overall policy requirements.

TABLE 14.1

AFRICAN DELEGATIONS VISITING CHINA (1967-1969)

Country of Origin	Year	67	68	69
Algeria		1	-	2
Angola		-	-	-
Botswana		1	-	-
Burundi		1	-	-
Cameroun		-	-	-
Congo-Brazzaville		8	1	1
Congo Kinshasa		2	-	-
Central African Republic		-	-	-
Chad		-	-	-
Dahomey		-	-	-
Egypt		1	-	1
Ethiopia		-	-	-
Gabon		-	-	-
Gambia		-	-	-
Ghana		-	-	-
Guinea		2	4	2
Guinea (Bissau)		-	-	-
Ivory Coast		-	-	-
Kenya		-	-	-
Lesotho		-	-	-
Libya		-	-	-
Malawi		-	-	-
Mali		6	3	1
Mauritania		3	-	1
Mauritius		-	-	-
Malagasy		-	-	-
Mozambique		-	-	-
Morocco		1	-	1
Niger		1	-	-
Nigeria		1	-	-
Rhodesia		-	-	-
Rwanda		-	-	-
South Africa		3	-	-
Senegal		2	-	-
Sierra Leone		-	-	-
Somali Republic		5	1	-
Sudan		3	-	-
South West Africa		1	-	-
Swaziland		1	-	-
Tanganyika)		8	3	1
Zanzibar)				
Tunisia		-	-	-
Uganda		-	-	-
Togo		-	-	-
Zambia		5	-	2
Blk. African Youth		1	-	-
Blk. African Trade Un.		-	-	-
Annual total		57	12	12
General Total			81	

Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 270 (Table 2).

TABLE 14.2

CHINESE DELEGATIONS VISITING AFRICAN COUNTRIES (1967-1969)

<u>Country Visited</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>69</u>
Egypt		-	-	-
Morocco		-	-	-
Tunisia		-	-	-
Sudan		-	-	-
Ghana		-	-	-
Guinea		3	4	2
Algeria		-	1	1
Congo-Kinshasa		-	-	-
Ethiopia		-	-	-
Mali		1	2	-
Somali Republic		2	1	2
Dahomey		-	-	-
Niger		-	-	-
Nigeria		-	-	-
Senegal		-	-	-
Sierra Leone		-	-	-
Tanganyika	}	6	2	8
Zanzibar				
Togo		-	-	-
Upper Volta		-	-	-
Burundi		-	-	-
Gabon		-	-	-
Ivory Coast		-	-	-
Uganda		-	-	-
Kenya		-	-	-
Cameroon		-	-	-
Central African Republic		-	-	-
Congo-Brazzaville		3	1	3
Zambia		2	1	3
Mauritania		-	1	-
Mauritius		-	1	-
Equatorial Guinea		-	-	-
Libya		-	-	-
Annual total		17	14	19
General Total			50	

Source: A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 269 (Table 1).

NOTES

1. Mao Tse-tung (1966) quoted in Peking Review 10 (13 January 1967): 3, p. 21.
2. F. Schurmann, 'Sino-Soviet relations' in F. Schurman (Ed.), China Readings: 3, op.cit., p. 246.
3. In the absence of fully-fledged ambassadors, China continued to deal with a number of African countries at the Chargé d'Affaires level.
4. Paradoxically, whilst China failed to elicit support among African states for such a conference, the revolutionary situation in the continent continued to develop with a number of national liberation movements getting off the ground in their struggle against imperialism and racism. Peking Review 10 (13 January 1967): 3, pp. 21-22.
5. Nhongo, a Zimbabwean liberation fighter, cited in Sharon Morgans, 'The Relationship between the Guerrilla Fighters and 'The People' in the Zimbabwe War of Liberation' (unpublished paper) presented at the University of York [University of York, Centre for Southern African Studies (Conference on Research in Progress in Southern Africa: 25-27 March, 1985), p. 2.].
6. D. A. Anderlman, 'Amilcar Cabral: Pragmatic Revolutionary shows how an African guerrilla war can be won', Africa Report 15 (May 1970): 5, pp. 18-19. The aim of CONCP was to facilitate the sharing of information, and to coordinate representation in the international field. See, for example, P. M. Whitaker, 'Arms and the Nationalists: where and what do they obtain their support and how important is external aid to their revolution', Africa Report no. 15 (May 1970): 5, pp. 12-13.
7. See D. A. Anderlman, op.cit., p. 18; and B. Davidson, The Liberation of Guinea: Aspects of an African Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 142-159.
8. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 232 and 237; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 145; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 244; B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557; and A. Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle (London: Stage 1, 1969), p. 120.
9. See Chapter 13.2.1.2.1 of this work.
10. Ibidem.
11. B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 556.

12. See Tareq Y. Ismael, op.cit., p. 518.
13. See B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 130; and Socialism at Birth, op.cit., p. 9.
14. quoted from N. Ingram, 'The Struggle for Angola' (unpublished paper) [York: University of York (Centre of Southern African Studies), May 1985], p. 7.
15. B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., pp. 131-133.
16. See Socialism at Birth, op.cit., p. 9; and Revolution in Angola (a pamphlet by members of the Liberation Front) (London: Merlin Press, 1972), pp. 12-14.
17. War on Three Fronts [a pamphlet by African Research Group (Ed.) SAOS] (London: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, 1970).
18. See B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., pp. 131-133; and Socialism at Birth, op.cit., p. 9.
19. See War on Three Fronts, op.cit., passim; and B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 556.
20. OAU withdrew its recognition of FNLA at the same time. See B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., pp. 211-235.
21. See B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 1881-89; and Socialism at Birth, op.cit., p. 11.
22. UNITA expressed (1968) its military, political and organizational character in the following terms:
 - i. The systematic mobilization and organization of the peasants inside the country, as a main force of struggle.
 - ii. Integration of intellectuals and military cadres inside and outside Angola in the struggle, side by side with the broad masses.
 - iii. Refusal to ally on military camps created in neighbouring countries for the sake of external propaganda.
 - iv. Active participation of the peoples from both rural and urban areas in the general resistance against foreign domination.
 - v. Refusal to be led by foreign powers. The big powers are trying today more than ever another Yalta and this time through peaceful competition.

- vi. Faith in unity and cooperation of the Angolans in this phase of national liberation, cited in R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 235.
23. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 188-189; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 261.
24. cited in B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557.
25. Hsinhua News Agency no. 3895, Report No. 092913 (30 September 1968), p. 14.
26. See, for example, Peking Review 10 (March 1967): 12, p. 29; Hsinhua News Agency no. 3895, Report No. 092913 (30 September 1968), p. 14; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 244; and B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., p. 210.
27. See Hsinhua News Agency No. 3895, Report No. 092913 (30 September 1968), pp. 13-14.
28. Through OAU, China gave aid to MPLA. See B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557; and his In the Eye of the Storm, op.cit., p. 297.
29. Peking Review 13 (13 February 1970): 7, p. 22.
30. See P. Van Ness, op.cit., p. 144 note 72; and J. Marcum, 'Three Revolutions in Africa', op.cit., 12 (November 1967): 8, pp. 18-20.
31. Author's interview with Alan Brooks, representative of Mozambique Information Office. (London: July 1985).
32. See B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 265-266; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 230, C. R. Allen, op.cit., p. 183; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 256-266.
33. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 230.
34. According to B. Davidson ('The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 556), there was no evidence to suggest that China gave aid to COREMO.
35. Peking Review 11 (25 October 1968): 45, pp. 26-27.
36. B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557; and P. Whitaker, 'Arms and the Nationalists: where and what do they obtain their support and how important is external aid to their revolution', op.cit., p. 14.
37. Some friction was evident immediately following the assassination of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane (February 1969). See, for example, Africa Report No. 2 (March-April 1969), passim.

38. B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557.
39. Author's interview with Alan Brooks.op.cit.
40. B. Munslow, op.cit., p. 84.
41. R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 164; D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Chimurenga War (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), p. 10
42. R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 164.
43. D. Martin and P. Johnson, op.cit., p. 11.
44. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 502-503; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 235.
45. See, for example, R. Gibson, op.cit., pp. 120-140; and J. K. Cooley, op.cit., pp. 88-89.
46. See J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 88; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 43 and 63 (note 78), and p. 188.
47. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 48.
48. Ibid., pp. 62-63 (and note 78).
49. See Chapter 14.1.2 of this work.
50. R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 279.
51. In July 1966 Kozonguizi resigned from SWANU as a result of ideological differences within the organization's leadership. See R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 127.
52. cited in ibid., p. 126.
53. Ibidem.
54. See ibid., p. 128; and R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 279. See also Chapter 15.2.2 of this work.
55. R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 127.
56. Ibid., p. 138.
57. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 279.
58. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 230.
59. Peking Review 11 (22 November 1968): 47, p. 30.
60. See Chapter 13.2.1.3.2 of this work.
61. See R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 97; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 190 and 191; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 275.

62. cited in Peking Review 9 (25 November 1966): 48, p. 31.
63. Editorial, Africa Report 6 (March 1961): 3, p. 5. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 274-277; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 187 and 190-191.
64. cited in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 187.
65. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 276.
66. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 238-240. Others were ZANU, COREMO and UNITA.
67. cited in ibid., p. 239. See als B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 187.
68. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 239-240.
69. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 230.
70. For the same reasons, China refused to attend the 6th Congress of International Journalists (Berlin: October 1966); nor did it attend the Conference of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (Paris: January 1977). See ibid., p. 230.
71. See I. M. Fedda, op.cit., pp. 86-87; D. Kimche, op.cit., p. 198. In his message to this conference, Zhou En-lai expressed the hope that

... the conference will make positive contributions to the strengthening of the revolutionary solidarity of the Asian, African and Latin American people, to furtherance of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism headed by the United States.

reproduced in Peking Review 9 (7 January 1966): 2, p. 3.

72. The conference was attended by a total of 512 delegates belonging to 82 different countries. Of these 150 were African delegates representing 28 countries, and others numbering 197 were from 27 Asian countries whilst 165 delegates were from 27 countries in Latin America.
73. Reproduced in Peking Review 9 (21 January 1966): 4, p. 19. For the contribution of Chinese and Soviet delegates in the conference, see ibid., pp. 20-25.
74. cited in C. Neuhauser, op.cit., p. 64.

75. See Peking Review 9 (29 April 1966): 18, p. 13.
76. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 230.
77. Ibidem.
78. Peking Review 10 (1 January 1967): 1, p. 29.
79. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 230; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 83-84.
80. Peking Review 10 (1 January 1967): 1, p. 29. For further details of this meeting, see G. Neuhauser, op.cit., pp. 44-47. See also D. Kimche, op.cit., pp. 174-196.
81. See Peking Review 9 (15 July 1966): 29, p. 13; see also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 230; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 143-144.
82. See Peking Review 10 (1 January 1967): 1; and Peking Review 9 (15 July 1966): 29, p. 13. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 230.
83. The African delegates attending were from the Cameroon, Ghana, Congo (K), the Sudan, Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Angola, Swaziland, South-West Africa, South Africa, Niger, Madagascar (then Malagasy), Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Mali, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Congo (B), Guinea, Mozambique, Somalia and Uganda. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 230.
84. The text of the resolutions of this conference can be found in Peking Review 9 (15 July 1966): 29, pp. 41-51.
85. Peking Review 9 (10 August 1966): 34, p. 3.
86. The meeting was attended by journalists, writers and freedom fighters from Angola, Azania (South Africa), Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, (then Ceylon), China, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Malaya, Mozambique, West Africa, the Sudan, Thailand, Yemen and Zimbabwe. See Peking Review 10 (20 January 1967): 4, p. 33.
87. See J. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, op.cit., p. 230.
88. See Peking Review 10 (24 February 1967): 9, pp. 24-30. The Third Conference of Afro-Asian Writers took place in Lebanon (Beirut 25-29 March 1967). See Peking Review 10 (14 April 1967): 16, p. 29.
89. Peking Review 10 (24 February 1967): 9, pp. 24-30.

90. Interview with the author (Algiers: 24 July 1985).
91. This is far too complex to be explained in this section. For an analysis of the issue, see, for example, T. V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives, op.cit., Chapter 4, especially pp. 98-108.
92. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 236.
93. Ibidem.
94. Ibidem.
95. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 537.
96. Ibid., p. 535.
97. For further details of external influences on the Biafran War and on the events leading to it, see, for example, R. Unwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War (New York: African Publishing Corporation, 1971); and C. O. Ojukwu, Biafra (London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969). See also a special report on the Nigerian Civil War in Africa Report 13 (February 1968): 2, pp. 8-24 and 41-49.
98. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 156-158; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 233-240 passim; and B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 186.
99. See Table 13.3. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 234; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 157.
100. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 233-235.
101. viz., China's advocacy that internal and international conflicts in African countries (as indeed in other parts of the world) should be resolved by peaceful means.
102. See, for example, China's first statement on Biafra in Hsinhua News Agency no. 3888, Report no. 092215 (23 September 1968), p. 11.
103. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 236 (note 1)
Whilst Western agents were motivated by a desire to safeguard their economic interests in the region by supporting Biafra, they were also alarmed by the Soviet Union's growing influence in Nigeria. See, for example, A. Klinghoffer, 'Nigerian War: why the Soviets chose sides', in Africa Report 13 (February 1967): 2, pp. 47-49; see also Hsinhua News Agency Report no. 3888 (23 September 1968).
104. See Table 12.2. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 86 and 234.

105. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 234.
106. Hsinhua News Agency no. 38888 Report no. 092215 (23 September 1968), p. 11.
107. Ibid., p. 14.
108. R. Unwechue, op.cit., p. 9; and John de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), p. 185.
109. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 158.
For examples of similar remarks in Chinese mass media, see, for example, Peking Review 11 (27 September 1968): 40, p. 29.
It is worth noting that China did not refer to Gabon and Ivory Coast which had also recognized the Biafra, because it was opposed to them.
110. See John de St. Jorre, op.cit., pp. 185 and 196-198; and R. Unwechue, op.cit., p. 9.
111. The Supreme Council of Revolution of the Congo (Leopoldville), cited in Peking Review 10 (8 March 1966): 12, p. 4.
112. See Peking Review 9 (8 March 1966): 12, p. 4; ibid., 10 (28 April 1967): 18, p. 37; ibid., 12 (20 December 1968): 51, p. 31; ibid., 11 (19 January 1968): 3, pp. 25-27.
113. Peking Review 9 (9 December 1966): 50, p. 37.
114. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 233.
115. See Chapter 13.2.3.2 of this work.
116. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 233 (note 1).
117. See Chapter 7 of this work.
118. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 195.
119. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 210.
120. See Chapter 14.2.6.7 of this work.
121. Peking Review 10 (2 June 1967): 23, p. 29.
122. Peking Review 7 (16 June 1967): 25, p. 12.
123. Peking Review 7 (9 June 1967): 24, p. 8.
124. Many demonstrations were held in Arab cities directed against both the imperialists and the Soviet Union. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 229.
125. quoted in ibid., p. 228.

For details of China's policy towards the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, see, for example, H. S. H. Behbeheni, op.cit., pp. 52-73.

126. Peking Review 10 (2 June 1967): 23, p. 32.
For other Chinese comments on this issue, see, for example, NCNA (6 June 1967); and SCMP no. 3955 (8 June 1967), p. 39.
127. Peking Review 10 (8 September 1968): 37, pp. 22-23.
128. B.B.C. SWB, Part III, no. 2492 (16 June 1967), as quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 229.
129. K. Hsu, 'Communist China's Diplomacy in the Middle East', Issues and Studies 16 (March 1980): 3, p. 77.
130. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 228; and W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 112.
131. Cairo Radio (11 June 1967), reproduced in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 228.
132. See Chinese government statement (26 October 1965), reported in Peking Review 8 (29 October 1965): 44, p. 5.
133. A summary of various conversations (1983) between the author and FLN party members in Algiers as well as academics in the University of Algiers (various dates).
134. Ibidem.
Algeria's view of the conference is discussed in Chapter 13.3.3 of this work.
135. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 86.
136. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 156.
137. Author's interview with the General Director of Health in the Ministry of General Health, Government of Algeria (Algiers: November 1983).
138. See Peking Review 12 (1 August 1969): 31, p. 23; Hsinhua News Agency no. 3889 (24 September 1968), p. 15; W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 87; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 224.
139. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 223.
140. Ibid., p. 224.
141. See Chapter 13.3.1.2 of this work.
142. Ibidem.
143. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 224.

144. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 85.
145. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 224.
146. See Chapters 12.2.1.1.4 and 13.2.3.2 of this work.
147. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 216.
148. During this period, Mali's armed forces and air force were completely equipped with Soviet arms and weapons. Ibidem.
149. Ibid., p. 217.
150. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 126 and 176.
151. See Chapter 13.2.3.3 of this work.
152. cited in Peking Review 9 (18 March 1966): 12, p. 4.
153. Considering the fact that Mali had little to export to China and had hardly any foreign currency for repayment, China's exports should be considered as economic aid, rather than as commercial exchanges.
154. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3
155. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 133.
156. quoted in Peking Review 9 (10 June 1966): 24, p. 31.
157. W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 232 (Table 17).
158. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 217 (note 1).
159. For details, see W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 131.
160. Ibid., p. 132.
161. Ibid., p. 130.
162. Ibidem.
163. Ibidem.
164. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 98.
165. quoted in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 218.
166. For details, see W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 132-133 and pp. 119-121; and François Charbonnie, 'Railway No. 2', Far Eastern Economic Review LX (15 August 1968): 33, p. 302.
167. François Charbonnie, op.cit., p. 302.
168. Peking Review 11 (24 May 1968): 21, p. 7.

169. W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p. 234.
For other details, see W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 119-120. The figure of \$20 million given by François Charbonnie, op.cit., p. 202, for covering the cost of the project, does not seem to be a convincing figure for such a large project.
170. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 120.
171. Ibidem.
172. See Chapters 13.3.1.4 and 15.1.2.6 of this work.
173. See Chapter 15.1.2.6 of this work.
174. Following Keita's overthrow, China's exports to Mali declined from \$10.6 million (1968) to zero (1970) (see Table 12.3).
As explained in this section and in Chapter 15.1.1.2, relations between China and Mali resumed their progressive character less than a year after the coup.
175. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 218; and W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', Current Scene 10 (August 1972): 8, p. 6.
176. Ibid., p. 6.
177. Peking Review 11 (7 June 1968): 23, p. 7.
178. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 218.
179. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 146.
180. cited in F. G. Snyder, 'An Era Ends in Mali', Africa Report 14 (March-April 1969): 3 and 4, p. 22.
181. The decision by the new regime of Traoré to condemn Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia (see A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 217), did not gain them China's sympathy. China seemed to be much more upset by the overthrow of Keita, its ally, than it could possibly be surprised by his usurpers' anti-Soviet line!
182. See Chapter 15.1.1.2 of this work.
183. Peking Review 9 (March 1966): 12, p. 4.
184. cited in ibidem.
185. Radio Conakry (2 March 1966), as quoted in B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 132.
186. See Chapter 14.1.1.1 of this work.

187. W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', op.cit., p. 6.
188. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 147.
189. Author's conversation with Abdul Ba and Abo Baker Cham, Guinean lecturers at University of Conakry, who spent a year (1984-1985) at the University of York studying for the M.A. degree in Linguistics.
190. cited in Peking Review 10 (13 October 1967): 42, p. 38.
191. See Peking Review 11 (24 May 1968): 21, p. 7; and Peking Review 11 (7 June 1968): 23, p. 24.
192. See W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 116-120; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 113-115; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 214.
193. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 114; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 214.
194. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 117.
195. Ibid., p. 120.
196. Ibid., pp. 118-119. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 214; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 114.
197. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 114.
198. A statement made by Sekon Touré (February 1967), cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 215.
199. Ibidem.
200. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 115.
201. cited in Peking Review 11 (15 March 1968): 11, p. 34.
202. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 117.
203. See Chapter 14.2.3 of this work.
China's agreement to construct this project took place only 8 months after that with Tanzania for the construction of the TanZam Railway (September 1967). See Chapter 14.2.1.1 of this work.
204. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 215. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 116-120; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 115.
205. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 116.
206. See Table 12.4 of this work.

207. See K. Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (Harmondsworth: PANAF Publications Ltd., 1968), p. 6; and Peking Review 9 (11 March 1966): 11, pp. 9-10.
208. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 188.
209. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London: Verso, 1981), p. 279.
210. Peking Review 9 (18 March 1966): 12, p. 3.
211. Peking Review 9 (11 March 1966): 11, pp. 7-8. Chou Chin-wei, leader of the Chinese construction experts, was beaten up by Ghanaian soldiers and sent home. See ibidem.
212. Ibidem.
213. Peking Review 9 (11 March 1966): 11, pp. 7-8; and Peking Review 9 (7 October 1966): 41, p. 38.
214. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 187; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 120.
215. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 120.
216. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 187-188.
217. cited in ibid., p. 187. Similar comments can also be found in Peking Review 9 (11 March 1966): 11, p. 8. See also A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 125-126.
218. B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 133. Chinese Embassy staff, however, were cut down to 18 [see Peking Review 9 (11 March 1966): 11, p. 7]. Those who remained behind were probably the most capable and influential diplomats and military experts among those manning the Embassy.
219. On 28 February 1966 Nkrumah left Beijing. He was seen off by Liu Shaoqi; Zhou En-lai, and Lin Feng, Vice-President of the Standing Committee of PRC [see Peking Review 9 (11 March 1966): 11, p. 9]. Before his departure Nkrumah told his hosts that

I know that the Ghanaian people are always loyal to me, the party and the government and all I expect of everyone at this hour of trial is to remain calm, but firm in determination and resistance....

I am returning to Ghana soon.....

This rebellion does not deserve the support of any government. I

am determined to stamp out the rebellion without delay, and in this I count on the support of the Ghanaian people and friends of Ghana all over the world.

cited in Peking Review 9 (11 March 1966): 11, p. 9.

Nkrumah, however, never regained power. He died in 1972.

220. See Chapters 14.2~~1~~₃ and 14.2~~4~~₄ of this work.
221. From Beijing Nkrumah went to Guinea where he was warmly welcomed and given pledges of all possible support. See Chapter 14.2.1.4 of this work.
222. Peking Review 9 (7 October 1966): 41, p. 38; and Peking Review (13 October 1966): 42, p. 1. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 188.
223. See Chapter 14.2.1~~7~~₇ of this work.
224. See Chapter 13.3.2.5 of this work.
225. See Chapter 13.2.1.2.1 of this work.
226. See Tables 14.1~~0~~₁ and 14.2~~4~~₄ of this work.
227. See Table 12.2
228. See News in Brief, Africa Report 12 (June 1967): 6, p. 36; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 221.
229. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 107.
230. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 221.
231. Peking Review 9 (2 September 1966): 36, p. 3.
232. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 222.
233. See Chapter 13.3.1.8 of this work.
234. Peking Review 9 (26 September 1969): 39.
235. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 222.
236. W. Bartke, op.cit.
237. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 222.
The medical group arrived in Brazzaville in December 1967. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 106.
238. See W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', op.cit., p. 5; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 222.
239. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 222.

240. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 129; and W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', op.cit., pp. 5-7.
241. W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', op.cit., p. 6.
242. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 223.
243. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 150.
244. Ibid., pp. 148-150.
245. See ibid., p. 150; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 129; W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', op.cit., p. 5; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 147.
246. W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', op.cit., p. 6.
247. Ibid., pp. 5-6. See also A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 129 and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 147.
248. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 129.
249. Others included Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Tanzania, Rumania, the Sudan, Syria, South Yemen and Zambia. See Peking Review 11 (29 November 1968): 48, p. 26.
250. cited in ibid., p. 29.
251. See Chapters 14.1.1.2, 14.1.1.4, 14.1.1.4 and 14.1.1.5 of this work.
252. cited in G. T. Yu, China's Policy in Africa: A Study of Tanzania (London: Praeger Publishers, 1975).
253. Peking Review 9 (18 March 1966): 12, p. 4.
254. Hsinhua News Agency no. 3794 (20 June 1968), p. 7.
255. See G. T. Yu, China's Policy in Africa: A Study of Tanzania, op.cit., p. 19; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 94 and 97; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 212; W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 178; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 198. See also Table 12.4.
256. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 198.
257. Peking Review 9 (10 June 1966): 24, p. 31.
258. See W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 178-179.
259. Ibidem.
260. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 212.

261. According to official sources in Tanzania in an interview reported by A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 198.
262. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 179.
263. Ibid., p. 180.
264. For further details, see W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 184; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 199-204.
265. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 179.
266. Ibid., p. 180.
267. Ibid., pp. 178-191.
268. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 218-219.
269. cited in ibid. p. 219.
270. See Chapters 13.2.3.4 and 13.3.1.6 of this work.
271. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 212 and 225; and I. M. Fedda, op.cit., p. 101.
272. D. Armstrong, op.cit., p. 225.
273. Nyerere, at a farewell banquet during his visit to China (18-21 June 1968), as reported in Peking Review 11 (28 June 1968): 26, p. 7. The same speech can also be found in Hsinhua News Agency no. 3796 (22 June 1968), p. 6.
274. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 210.
275. cited in Hsinhua News Agency no. 3796 (22 June 1968), p. 6.
276. See W. A. C. Adie, 'China Returns to Africa', op.cit., p. 7; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 147.
277. cited in G. T. Yu, China's Policy in Africa: A Study of Tanzania, op.cit., p. 21.
For the impact of Arusha Declaration on Tanzania's role in international relations, see T. V. Sathyamurthy, 'Tanzania's Role in International Relations and Non-Alignment', op.cit., pp. 87-90.
278. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 147.
279. Ibidem.
280. cited in ibid., p. 261.
281. cited in Peking Review 11 (29 November 1968): 48, p. 27.

282. Nyerere (1974), in R. Hall and H. Peyman, The Great Uhuru Railway: China's Showpiece in Africa (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1976), p. 197.
283. For further details of this project, see V. Bartke, op.cit., p. 66; R. Hall and H. Peyman, op.cit.; D. Armstrong, op.cit., pp. 214-236; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 197 and 243; G. T. Yu, China's Policy in Africa: A Study of Tanzania op.cit., and M. Baily, Freedom Railway (London: Rex Collins, 1976). See also Peking Review 10 (15 September 1967): 38, pp. 6 and 38; and Peking Review 11 (19 April 1968): 16, p. 26.
284. For a typical Western anti-China reaction, see, for example, Yeh Po-t'ang, 'Peiping policy towards Africa as viewed from the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique', Issues and Studies 10 (December 1974): 15, pp. 5-8. D. O. Edeani, 'South Africa: what lies behind the red scare', Africa Report 17 (September-October 1972): 8, pp. 23-24; R. Weiss, 'Letter from Africa', Far Eastern Economic Review 83 (January 1974): 2, p. 62; W. A. C. Adie 'Chinese Cheers', The Guardian (23 June 1970); and The Times (26 July 1970).
285. A. Hutchison, (a Western observer who visited Tanzania in 1969), op.cit.
286. cited in Patrick Keatley, 'The Battle for Africa III', The Guardian (Manchester: 18 July 1969).
287. President Kaunda at the ceremony marking the starting of the Railway (28 October 1970), in Peking Review 13 (6 November 1970): 45, p. 17.
288. See Robert Simmons, 'Peking', Africa Report 15 (December 1970): 9, p. 8; and G. Comete, 'Peking shows its new African look', Africa Report 16 (March 1971): 16, p. 21.
289. See M. Baily, op.cit., pp. 1-38; and P. Sircar, 'The Great Uhuru Railway', China Report (India) 14 (1978): 2, pp. 14-15.
290. See G. T. Yu, China's Policy in Africa: A Study of Tanzania, op.cit., p. 129; M. Baily, op.cit., pp. 1-53; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 205; The Sunday Telegraph (14 December 1969); and T. Land, 'The thin red line of Chinese influence', City Press (8 January 1970).
291. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 205.
292. Peking Review 10 (23 September 1967): 26, p. 8. For the Joint Communique between China and Zambia, see Peking Review 10 (30 June 1967): 27, pp. 12-14.

293. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 242.

294. At the UN General Assembly (November 1968), Vernon Nwanga, the Zambian representative, stated that

the People's Republic of China is a peace-loving country and none of today's main international problems could be solved without its participation.

cited in Peking Review 11 (29 November 1968): 48, p.27.

295.

 Unlike Mauritania and Somalia, Zambia's strategic position in relation to the national liberation struggles of the region warranted much of China's concern with the country (see Chapter 14.2.1.7.1 of this work).

296. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 473.

297. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 133.

298. J. K. Cooley, op.cit., p. 75.

299. Ibid., pp. 75 and 120.

300. W. Attwood, op.cit., p. 250; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 133; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 99. Even before 1965, on a number of occasions, Chinese Moslems visited Mauritania after their pilgrimage to Mecca (see A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 33).

301. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 119.

302. See Table 12.1 of this work.

303. See Tables 8.2 and 15.1 of this work.

304. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 133; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 225;

305. 'China-Mauritania Joint Press Communique', in Peking Review 10 (24 February 1967): 9, p. 15.

306. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

307. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 135.

308. Peking Review 10 (3 November 1967): 45, p. 9.

309. 'Sino-Mauritania Joint Communique', in ibid., pp. 8-9.

310. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
311. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 135.
312. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 134.
313. Ibidem.
314. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 135.
315. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
316. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 225-226; and I. M. Lewis, 'Somalia', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85 (a handbook published by Europa Publications Ltd., 1985) (London: Europa, 1985), p. 760.
317. See, for example, F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., pp. 257-258; B. D. Larkin, op.cit., p. 186 (note 45); A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 232; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 231.

In November 1967, it was reported that whilst the guerrilla leaders of ELF were being given training in China, their troops on the fighting front were supplied with uniforms made in China (see Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 231.).

318. Peking Review 9 (16 September 1966): 32, p. 5.
319. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 163.
320. As quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 218.
321. Peking Review 11 (15 March 1968): 11, p. 33.
For details, see W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 164.
322. quoted in Peking Review 11 (15 March 1968): 11, p. 33.
323. Ibidem.
324. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 226.
325. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 164.