

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE CHUNG-LUN,

with Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas, a basic text of Chinese Buddhism

Brian Christopher Bocking

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Abstract

Brian Christopher Bocking

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The thesis comprises a critical introduction and complete translation into English of the Chinese Buddhist text 'Chung-lun' (Middle Treatise), T.1564, Kumārajīva's translation of a commentary on Nāgārjuna's mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Middle Stanzas) by Vimalākṣa (or Piṅgala), dated 409AD. The translation consists of twenty-seven chapters corresponding to the divisions of the kārikā. The notes to the translation discuss ideas, arguments and allusions in the Treatise as well as textual issues and points of translation.

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Stirling, August 1984

Brian Bocking

Volume I: Introduction, Notes to the translation,
Chinese Text, Bibliography

Volume II: Seng-jui's Preface
The Middle Treatise: Translation

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1. Introduction

1.1 The Chung-lun (Middle Treatise)

The Chung-lun or Middle Treatise is a Chinese text consisting of a translation in four hundred and forty-nine verses¹ of the Madhyamakakarikā, the 'Middle Stanzas' or 'Verses on the Middle Doctrine' of the Indian philosopher-monk Nāgārjuna (ca 150 - 250 AD), together with a prose commentary. This commentary, which comprises the major part of the text, was composed originally in an Indian or Central Asian language, although neither a text nor a title of the original has been traced so far, but it was revised, probably extensively, by the eminent Central Asian translator and scholar Kumārajīva during the process of issuing the Chinese version, the Chung-lun, in or about 409 AD in Chang-an, the capital of China under the later Chin dynasty.²

Notes to section 1.1

1. Four hundred and forty-six if the repeated opening verses (lv1,lv2) and the verse quoted from Āryadeva at 27/24 are discounted.
2. The two sources for the date of issue of the text are the notes at the end of T'an-ying's preface to the Chung-lun (CSTCC,T.2145,p.77b8) and at the end of Seng-jui's Preface to the Shih-erh-men-lun (CSTCC,p.78a5) where the date is given as Hung-shih 11 (409AD). According to a note appended to T'an-ying's preface to the Chung-lun, Kumārajīva issued the translation at the same time as the Shih-erh-men-lun (T.1568). The date of 409 is not necessarily correct, but it is the only date we have, and for a number of other

reasons both historical and textual set out in the discussion of the authorship below, I think that it is probably correct. However, other scholars have assumed that the Chung-lun was published earlier than 409, and that Kumārajīva possessed a text of the Middle Stanzas from the time of his arrival in Ch'ang-an. Prof. Tsukamoto Zenryū, for example, believes that Seng-chao 'drew upon' (Jap. inshō, not inyō, suru) a version of the Chung-lun for his work 'Prajñā has no knowing'. See Robinson, p.250,n.14, Tsukamoto,Z.(Ed.), Jōron Kenkyū, pp.144-5. My thanks are due to Prof. M. Saigusa for clarification of this and other points relating to the authorship of the Treatise.

1.2 The Text

The text used as the basis for the present translation is T.1564 in Vol. XXX of the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, which is the standard Japanese edition of the Chinese canon, largely based on the Korean Tripitaka. The Taishō text lists or incorporates variant readings from a number of Chinese versions of the text. Many changes could, of course, have taken place in the early stages of transmission of the Chinese text, but the edited version of the text in the Taishō Tripitaka shows remarkably few variants, and most of these are obvious copying errors. In only one case (at 22c15 -see note 249 to the translation) where the stream-winner is placed above the arhant in the spiritual hierarchy) was the reliability of the text in all versions called seriously into question. In several cases, where ambiguous readings seemed as good as each other and Hatani, Ui or Walleser preferred variant readings listed in the Taishō edition, I followed, as a rule, the reading in the Korean text.

1.3 The Authenticity of the Middle Treatise

When the Middle Treatise is considered from the point of view of its 'authenticity' as a statement in Chinese of Nāgārjuna's śūnyavāda (teaching of emptiness), several questions are raised in respect of the verses and the commentary, which may be considered separately.

Firstly, are the verses in the Middle Treatise those of Nāgārjuna in the Middle Stanzas?

Secondly, is the translation of these verses accurate?

Thirdly, would a Chinese reader understand Nāgārjuna's meaning from reading the Middle Treatise verses?

And fourthly, is the commentary a reliable exposition of Nāgārjuna's views?

The answer to each of these questions is 'yes and no', as follows:

With regard to the first question, we do not know which verses Nāgārjuna wrote; we only have extant versions of his Middle Stanzas in Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan. The Chinese text is the earliest known text, and the Chinese version may be closest to Nāgārjuna's own words. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that there are some errors in the Chinese, and that some of these errors may be corrected from the Sanskrit or Tibetan sources. Equally, there may be errors in the Sanskrit which could be corrected from the Chinese and Tibetan texts, and so on. There are minor differences in the placing and numbering of

verses in the Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the Middle Stanzas, but the arrangement of verses in the Chinese has as much claim to 'authenticity' as the arrangement of verses in the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions, since no-one knows which version is the earliest, or the most correct.

Regarding the second question, the translation of individual verses is generally accurate, as noted above. This is not to say, however, that the Chinese translation transmits every nuance of the Sanskrit (or Central Asian) original, and omits every wrong implication. In particular, terms like pu k'o te (cannot be, untenable), ying (ought, should), yu (is), wu (is not), etc., are not used systematically to render specific Sanskrit terms. Robinson, in Early Mādhyamika in India and China, pp.83-88 compares Nāgārjuna's stanzas in chapter one as preserved in the Middle Treatise and the Prasannapadā with a view to determining the accuracy of the Chinese translation. He states that

The Chinese is often more explicit than the Sanskrit. It relies less heavily on anaphora and so is clearer. It sometimes supplies explanatory phrases such as one finds in the prose paraphrases of Sanskrit commentaries. In verses 6 and 11 the Chinese reflects Sanskrit variants which are as good as, or perhaps better than, those in the extant Sanskrit text. The Chinese copes successfully with syntactic features ... it possesses a device for handling the highly-important abstract-noun suffixes.

As for the defects: There are several lexical mistakes, and a number of renderings that misrepresent the meaning of the original. The terms yu and wu do duty for all the derivatives of as and bhū as well as for upadyate, yujyate, vidyate, and their negatives ... The worst defect in this chapter and also in the other is the handling of the logical operators - upadyate, yujyate, and prasajyate. When the latter occurs, it is usually rendered by shih shi h pu jan (this thing is not so/true) which fails to indicate

the exact sense - the ensuing of a logical consequence that is unwelcome to the opponent. The translations of these three terms are not consistent, however, and pu te (is not got) may render na vidyate (is not found, does not exist) as well as nopapadyate and na yujyate ... This confusion of the existential, the modal, the logical and the epistemological prevents anyone who does not know the Sanskrit from grasping the subtler points of the text.

But Robinson's conclusion is that the reader 'will be more likely to miss right ideas than to conceive wrong ones', and this broad conclusion applies to the verses throughout the Treatise.

On rare occasions Kumārajīva's rendering of the verses is clearly wrong. For example, in 1v13, Kumārajīva apparently mistranslates vyasta-samasta (separately and together) by lüeh-kuang (briefly and at length), and in 24v18 he translates śūnyatā (emptiness) by wu (nonexistence). Both of these mistakes are in fact corrected by glosses in the commentary. In some cases Kumārajīva's version is substantially different from the extant Sanskrit. For example, 24v40 in the Sanskrit reads; 'One who sees all things as arising in dependence sees suffering and its origin, its cessation and the path to its cessation as they truly are', whereas Kumārajīva has: 'This is why it is said in the sutras/ That if you perceive the dharma of causality/ Then you can perceive the Buddha./And perceive suffering, accumulation, cessation and the Way. On other occasions the Middle Treatise version may be a more reliable version of the original than has come down to us in the Sanskrit or Tibetan. Robinson asserts that the meaning is often clearer in Chinese than in Sanskrit (this is clearly illustrated by the often

considerable divergence amongst the different Western-language translations of the Sanskrit and Tibetan karika) but it should be said that this clarity in the Chinese version may be illusory, since by the very nature of the language, ambiguities in the Chinese verses have often to be resolved one way or the other by reference to the commentary before any meaning for the verse as a whole can be appreciated.

In reply to the third question, 'would a Chinese reader understand Nāgārjuna's meaning from reading the Middle Treatise verses?', this hypothesis remains untested, since in Chinese the Middle Stanzas are never found without an accompanying commentary. Indeed, traditional Sino-Japanese Buddhist scholarship made no distinction between the 'Middle Stanzas' and the 'Middle Treatise'. Both were (and still are), referred to as 'the Chung-lun (Jap. Chūron). But a Chinese reader would hardly be able to understand the verses without the commentary. An example of the difficulty in understanding verses on their own is provided by 14v5, which runs (even in English translation, which is already to some extent an interpretation):

Difference is difference because of difference.
Difference without difference is not difference.
If a dharma issues from a cause,
That dharma does not differ from its cause.

The meaning of 'difference' can only be determined in this case by reference to the commentary.

Fourthly, in answer to the question 'Is the commentary a reliable exposition of Nāgārjuna's views?', we may say that the commentary is both less, and more, than a reliable exposition. On the one hand the commentary fails, in the same way as the verse-translations, to bring out some of the finer meanings of the Sanskrit. It sometimes employs similes which do not work very well and are perhaps unworthy of Nāgārjuna, and it often confuses the epistemological and ontological frames of reference when speaking of emptiness. On the other hand, the commentary adds much to what Nāgārjuna says. It emphasises and expounds ideas that are not conveyed in the verses, such as the reasons for Nāgārjuna writing the Middle Stanzas, and the purpose of individual chapters, and there are many other additional features of the commentary outlined below in the 'survey of contents'. But its particular contribution is that it places the whole of Nāgārjuna's discussion of Mādhyamika in a Mahayanist context, critical of the vehicle of the Śrāvakas. This is in sharp contrast to Nāgārjuna's verses which make no reference to the Mahayana. The 'Mahayanisation' of Nāgārjuna is perhaps the most obvious means by which the commentary diverges from Nāgārjuna's own views, but it is a two-edged sword. The commentary makes Nāgārjuna a Mahayanist, in the developed sense in which Mahayana was understood in fifth-century China, which he is not; but it also shows Nāgārjuna's philosophy as Mahayanist, which it has to be in order to survive within Mahayana Buddhism.

1.4 Previous Translations of the Treatise

Although the Treatise is mentioned in several bibliographies of Mādhyamika works, its content is more or less neglected in Western studies of Mādhyamika. Nevertheless it has been translated, in full and in part, into Western languages and of course into Japanese. The first translation of any part of the Treatise into English was a rendering of Chapter 25 (on Nirvāṇa) by the missionary and Buddhologist Samuel Beal, which appeared in *The Indian Antiquary* of 1881¹, some thirty-seven years after Burnouf had first introduced Candrakīrti's version of Mādhyamika to Europe in his 'Introduction a l'Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien'.² Beal's translation of 25v1 ran:

If all things are unreal,
Then how is it possible to remove
From that which does not exist
Something which, being removed, leaves Nirvana?

In 1911 and 1912 Max Walleser produced translations of, respectively, the Tibetan Akutobhayā and the Chung-lun. These translations have remained the only complete version of either text in a Western language.³ Walleser's German translation is virtually unannotated and has not been found helpful in preparing an English translation. In 1928 Miyamoto, Shōson, then a student at Oxford, presented a D.Phil. thesis entitled 'A Study of Nāgārjuna' which included an incomplete translation of the

Treatise in an excellent English style. Soothill, in his Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms actually records that 'an English translation (of the Middle Treatise) by Miyamoto exists and publication is promised' (p.111), but the translation was apparently never completed, and ends abruptly at 20v7.

Miyamoto's translation is mentioned in Streng's bibliography³ but appears to be otherwise unknown, even to Buddhist scholars in Japan.⁴

In the 1930's two Japanese versions (not translations) of the Treatise were produced within the space of a few years by Ui, Hakuju in the Kokuyaku Daizōkyō series, and by Hatani, Ryotai in the Kokuyaku Issaikyō,⁵ using the technique known as kaki-kudashi bun in which the characters in their Chinese meanings are rearranged and supplemented with hiragana to form Japanese sentences which Buddhist scholars can read. The present translation however is done directly from the Chinese; where the Chinese was difficult I referred to the Japanese versions and when (as was often the case), the Japanese versions faithfully preserved the ambiguities of the original, I referred to the translations of Miyamoto or Walleser.

I have tried to avoid using Sanskrit terms except, following standard practice, in those cases where Sanskrit terms have become English terms, or where the Chinese transliterates, rather than translates them.⁶ The style of the present translation has emerged naturally and I think that it reflects Kumārajīva's

plain form; if it reads like a translation this is at least partly because the Treatise is itself a translation. The vocabulary is as consistent as I could make it while preserving a readable style, and as far as possible I have followed the rule that someone reading the English translation who is familiar with Kumārajīva's style should be able to reconstitute an approximation of the original with reasonable ease. I have interpolated, distorted and supplemented the text as little as possible, with the hope that the result is both readable and accurate.

Notes to section 1.4

1. Beal, S. 'The Chong-lun or Pranyamūla-śāstra-tīka of Nāgārjuna' in The Indian Antiquary, Vol.10, 1881, pp.87-89.
2. The reference to Burnouf is in Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p.3.
3. Walleser, M. Die Mittlere Lehre Nāgārjuna's, Heidelberg, 1911.1912.
4. Until 1982.
5. See the Bibliography, under Ui and Hatani.
6. In translating Sanskrit terms (i.e. where the Chinese has a technical term having only the meaning of the Sanskrit which it translates), I have tried where practicable to conform with Conze's translations in his Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature

2 The Problem of the Authorship of the Middle Treatise

2.1 Traditional Attribution to Piṅgala

Information about the Treatise and its author prior to its translation into Chinese is limited. The Middle Treatise has no particular recoverable Sanskrit title; it is only one of many commentaries on Nāgārjuna's 'Middle Stanzas' written by Indian and Central Asian monks after his death.¹ We know something of the circumstances of its translation into Chinese however from the preface by Kumārajīva's contemporary and disciple Seng-jui² which is preserved in the Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-chi (T.2145).³ In his preface Seng-jui states that the commentary and verses were revised by Kumārajīva before translation, because the original text had a number of faults in it. According to Seng-jui:

The (text) that we are now issuing is the commentary by the Indian Brahman named Pin-chia-lo 賓伽羅 (or Pin-lo-chia; see below), in the Ch'in language 'Blue-eyes' (Ch'ing-mu 青目). Though he believed and understood the profound Dharma, his language is not elegant and apposite. The Dharma-master (Kumārajīva) edited and amended all the errors, deficiencies and redundancies in it, interpreting it according to the

stanzas, so that the principles are definitive, though in some places the language is not entirely excellent.⁴

For later reference, it should be noted that the Chinese does not specify whether both of Ch'ing-mu's eyes are blue, nor does it specify whether Ch'ing-mu 'believes and understands the true Dharma' (that is, is still living) or whether he 'believed and understood the true Dharma' (at the time of writing the commentary). How we translate the preface depends upon who we believe Ch'ing-mu was, and whether he was contemporary with Seng-jui, even perhaps known to him.

In the version of Seng-jui's Preface to the Middle Treatise which appears in Taishō Vol.XXX (see the translation of this Preface reproduced on pp.ii-iv of Vol.2 of this thesis), Ch'ing-mu 'blue-eyes' is said to be the name by which Pin-chia-lo, the commentator, is known in the Ch'in language, or Chinese. Here is the crux of the problem of the authorship of the Chung-lun, for no Sanskrit reconstruction of the syllables pin-chia-lo means 'Blue-eyes'. Since this problem has not been satisfactorily resolved, it is often ignored. The traditional reconstructed Sanskrit reading of pin-chia-lo has been Piṅgala, so for instance Prof. Nakamura refers to the Chung-lun as "Piṅgala (青目) 's commentary".⁵ This reading of pin-chia-lo as Piṅgala dates back at least to 1898 when Suzuki Daisetsu, writing in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, identified Blue-eyes with "Piṅgala-netra, otherwise called Kaṇadeva or Candrakīrtti".⁶

Five years later, however, Takakusu Junjiro pointed out that Ch'ing-mu means blue-eyed, whereas Piṅgala means tawny, or reddish-brown.⁷ In fact, said Takakusu, 'Blue-eyes' meant Candrakīrti, otherwise known as Āryadeva; there was never a Piṅgala. In 1937, by which time no-one believed that the seventh-century Candrakīrti was responsible for the fifth-century Chung-lun, Teramoto, Enga tried to show that Ch'ing-mu was so-called on account of his one blue-eye. The other eye was different, being tawny-coloured. Ch'ing-mu, according to Teramoto, was another name for Kaṇadeva, the squint-eyed, also Āryadeva.⁸

This ingenious solution would have been preferable had Max Walleser not already pointed out, in the introduction to his 1911 German translation of the Chung-lun, that pin-chia-lo is only a conjecture of the editors of the 1881 Tokyo edition of the Chinese tripitaka, and that all the oldest sources give the syllables of the transliterated name in the order pin-lo-chia, which is also the reading preserved in the Ch'u san-tsang-chi-chi version of Seng-jui's Preface in the Taishō tripitaka.

Walleser is not correct in saying that all the oldest sources have pin-lo-chia, for the Korean tripitaka on which the Taisho is based has pin-chia-lo in Seng-jui's preface. This means that the Korean Tripitaka and the 'three editions' of the Sung, Yüan and Ming have preserved different traditions about Ch'ing-mu's name since, probably, the twelfth century. Both readings are

very old, and unfortunately it is not possible to know which reading is the 'original' one; it is of course possible that both are wrong.

2.2 Piṅgalakkha and Vimalākṣa

The name 'pin-lo-chia' Walleser reconstructed in two possible ways; as Piṅgalakkha (a Prakrit form of Piṅgalākṣa), or as Vimalākṣa. Walleser pointed out that no person named Piṅgalakkha is encountered in the rather copious Tibetan histories of Buddhism, and he suggested that Vimalākṣa, Kumārajīva's vinaya-master in Kucha, who came to Ch'ang-an to join Kumārajīva in 406 AD, could have been the author of the commentary, perhaps revising an earlier commentary, traces of which survive in the Tibetan Akutobhayā.⁹

However, Walleser thought that this Vimalākṣa, whose biography is preserved in the Kao-seng-chuan came from Kabul, whereas Ch'ing-mu is said to be an Indian Brahman. Moreover Ch'ing-mu in Chinese means 'blue-eyed', whereas Vimalākṣa in Sanskrit means 'pure-eyed'. If Ch'ing-mu was indeed Vimalākṣa, said Walleser, then Seng-jui made a mistake in the colour-word 'ch'ing', substituting 'blue' 青 for 'pure' 清 or, if the author were called Piṅgalakkha, then Seng-jui confused the Sanskrit words for 'blue' and 'tawny'. Robinson follows roughly this line of argument in his brief discussion of the author's identity. He suggests that through a scribe's error, the water radical 氵 was

omitted from the character ch'ing 青 of ch'ing-mu, and that the character should have been ch'ing 清 meaning 'pure'. In this case Ch'ing-mu 清目 would mean Vimalākṣa (pure eyes).

According to Robinson, however, this Vimalākṣa need not be Kumārajīva's vinaya-master, for "it is not a rare type of name and probably designated some otherwise unknown Indian".¹⁰

However, for both these solutions a residual problem remains; why is Vimalākṣa's name transliterated in the Kao-seng-chuan, the 'Biographies of Eminent Monks' by the syllables

pei-mo-lo-ch'a 卑摩羅叉 and not, as in the Preface to the Middle Treatise, by pin-lo-chia 賓羅伽 ? Like Walleser, 賓

Robinson answers that inconsistencies are not rare in

Kumārajīva's works, although strictly speaking, of course, only the term Ch'ing-mu appears in works by Kumārajīva, and that only marginally in the title colophon of the Chung-lun. The characters pin-lo-chia appear in Seng-jui's Preface to the Chung-lun, and pei-mo-lo-ch'a in Vimalākṣa's biography in the Kao-seng-chuan.¹¹

Some definite pieces of information emerge from this review of the debate so far. One is that the original reading of Ch'ing-mu's Indian name may be constructed either from the syllables pin-lo-chia, or from pin-chia-lo. The second is that all the solutions to the problem of Ch'ing-mu's identity based on the reading pin-chia-lo have involved the supposition that a mistake, - either by Kumārajīva, or by Seng-jui, or by some unknown scribe - has been made, although the only verifiable

alteration to the text seems to have been the one made in 1881 when the editors of the Tokyo edition of the canon changed pin-lo-chia to pin-chia-lo. Walleser offers two possible renderings of the syllables pin-lo-chia, Piṅgalakkha, and Vimalākṣa, but neither of these translates into 'Blue-eyes'. This seems about as far as we can go without assuming a fault in the tradition. What other evidence is available?

2.3 Review of the Evidence

Kumārajīva arrived in Ch'ang-an and began his translation work in 401 AD.¹² According to Robinson, "the order in which works were translated corresponds roughly to how highly Kumārajīva valued the texts, perhaps with the exception of the dhyāna texts requested by Seng-jui".¹³ If so, then the delay of eight years - from 401 to 409 - in the production of translations of the Chung-lun and the Shih-erh-men-lun represents a remarkable exception to this rule. The Hundred Treatise (Pai-lun, T.1569) which belongs to the same Mādhyamika genre as the Chung-lun and the Shih-erh-men-lun was translated in 402, immediately after Kumārajīva's arrival, and revised in 404.¹⁴ Why not also the Chung-lun, which was a more important and systematic statement of śūnyavāda? The usual answer is one inferred from Seng-jui's remark in the Preface that Kumārajīva had to alter the phrasing, remedy various deficiencies and (re)interpret Ch'ing-mu's commentary according to the meaning of the stanzas before issuing

it as a translation. Most scholars have assumed that Kumārajīva had a copy of the original version of the Middle Treatise text when he came to Ch'ang-an, but in fact there is no evidence for this. "As two Mādhyamika texts (Chung-lun and Shih-erh-men-lun) are mentioned in Kumārajīva's biography in the episode of his conversion to Mahayana" says Robinson, "they are established as sufficiently precious to him that he would naturally (sic) have taken his copies with him (to Ch'ang-an), or have carried them in his memory,"¹⁵ but it goes without saying that if Kumārajīva did carry the Chung-lun in his memory he would not need to spend eight years correcting it. However, it seems unlikely that Kumārajīva did spend eight years revising a text as important to his understanding and exposition of Mahayana as the Chung-lun. He was dissatisfied with his first version of the Hundred Treatise but he revised it within two years. The Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise (T.1509) which has occupied Prof. Lamotte for forty years is twenty-five times the length of the Chung-lun, and it includes a great deal of Kumārajīva's own work of editing and revision¹⁶ as well as all the difficult Mādhyamika terminology. Kumārajīva translated it in about two years.¹⁷ It took him less than five months to translate the Lotus Sutra. Thus a long delay of eight years in publishing a translation of the Chung-lun simply does not fit in with Kumārajīva's pace of work. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the text arrived late in Ch'ang-an, perhaps only a short time before it was published in 409. Amongst the textual evidence supporting this view is the absence of direct quotations from the

Chung-lun in any work produced in Ch'ang-an before 409, when the Chung-lun appeared. The Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise of course contains many verses which refer to, or echo, the contents of the Chung-lun, but a comparison shows that whatever borrowing took place was completed before the work was translated into Chinese.¹⁸ More significantly, Seng-chao 僧肇 in his 406 AD treatise 'Prajñā has no knowing' 般若無知論 and later works shows hardly any knowledge of the Middle Treatise, and relies for his understanding of Mādhyamika on the Hundred Treatise and Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise. Seng-chao was a disciple of Kumārajīva and we may assume that he received direct instruction in Mādhyamika ideas from Kumārajīva, but he does not quote directly from either a Sanskrit or Chinese version of the Middle Treatise:¹⁹ This strongly suggests that no written text of the Middle Treatise was available during the first five or six years of Kumārajīva's stay in Ch'ang-an, and lends support to the historical evidence of a date of 409 AD for the translation of both the Middle Treatise and the Twelve Topic Treatise.²⁰

If we suppose, as a working hypothesis, that the text of the Chung-lun which Kumārajīva revised and issued in 409 was brought to Ch'ang-an some years after Kumārajīva himself arrived there, the otherwise inexplicable delay in translation of this important text is explained. Can the late arrival of the text in Ch'ang-an, however, throw any more light on the problem of its authorship?

2.4 Vimalākṣa the Vinaya-Master

If, following one of Walleser's suggestions, we tentatively identify the author as Vimalākṣa, Kumārajīva's old Vinaya-master from Kucha, then we have a date for the arrival of Vimalākṣa in Ch'ang-an, (perhaps bringing his copy of Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas with his own commentary), of 406 AD. This would give Kumārajīva between two and three years, amongst the pressure of other work, to substantially revise Vimalākṣa's commentary and complete the translation into Chinese. Vimalākṣa was an Indian monk from Kashmir (not Kabul, as Walleser wrongly supposed) and he was a specialist in the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya.²¹ Since Mādhyamika was not his special interest it may be doubted whether he would write a commentary on Nāgārjuna's verses. However, he had a close attachment to Kumārajīva, close enough to bring him to Ch'ang-an after a long separation, and it is quite possible that he was amongst those converted to Mahayana by Kumārajīva in Kucha. If he was amongst the seventy or so monks who, according to Chi-tsang's sources, tried their hand at a commentary on the verses²² we would certainly expect the result to be exactly as Seng-jui describes it; the work of a non-specialist, badly-phrased and containing various errors and omissions which Kumārajīva had to repair. At the same time if Vimalākṣa, Kumārajīva's old teacher, was actually present at the time when the Treatise was issued in Ch'ang-an and Seng-jui published his preface, we would expect Seng-jui to say exactly what he does, namely that imperfections in the writing-style of the author in

no way reflect on his understanding of Buddhism. How otherwise could Seng-jui know that, despite all the errors and omissions, Ch'ing-mu "believes and understands the profound dharma" 信解深法?

2.5 The meaning of Ch'ing-mu

There remains, however, the problem of the meaning of the name. Pin-lo-chia may be a transliteration of Vimalākṣa, but Vimalākṣa means 'pure eyes' whereas Ch'ing-mu 青目 means 'blue-eyes'. Despite the various solutions put forward, however, it is not necessary for Ch'ing-mu 青目 to translate as 'pure eyes' in order to establish that Vimalākṣa is Ch'ing-mu. In Vimalākṣa's biography in the Kao-seng-chuan the meaning of the Sanskrit name Vimalākṣa is given as "pure (spotless) eyes" 無垢眼. But almost as an afterthought, the biographer adds that because Vimalākṣa actually had blue eyes (ch'ing-yen 青眼) people at the time called him "the blue-eyed Vinaya-master" (ch'ing-yen lu-shih 青眼律師).²³ 'Blue-eyes' has hitherto been taken as a translation of a Sanskrit name 'pin-lo-chia', but it seems not to be a translation, nor even a proper name, but a descriptive nickname. If Ch'ing-mu is not a proper name, it makes no difference that ch'ing-mu 青目 in Seng-jui's preface, and ch'ing-yen 青眼 in Vimalākṣa's biography, are synonyms for 'blue-eyes' rather than homophones. The translation of that part of Seng-jui's preface which refers to Ch'ing-mu should therefore be read as follows .

The commentary which is now issued is by the Indian Brahman Vimalākṣa, called in Chinese 'Blue-eyes'.

Though he believes and understands the profound Dharma, his language (in the commentary) was not elegant and precise"

In this way, the identity of Ch'ing-mu can be established without recourse to the hypothesis that either Seng-jui, or Kumārajīva, or an unknown scribe made a mistake. One problem, however, remains and this is the inconsistency between the transliteration of Vimalākṣa as pin-lo-chia in Seng-jui's preface, and its rendering as pei-mo-lo-ch'a in Vimalākṣa's biography in the Kao-seng-chuan. Neither of these transcriptions is the responsibility of Kumārajīva, but both seem to derive from Seng-jui, whose Erh-ch'in-lu 二秦錄 (Catalogue of translations made under the former and later Ch'in) provided one of the sources for Hui-chiao's sixth-century compilation of the Kao-seng-chuan.²⁴ Seng-jui was with Kumārajīva from 401 AD until Kumārajīva's death (in ?414), he participated in the translation of the Middle Treatise in 409, and he became an authority on Sanskrit phonology. We may assume from this that Seng-jui would not be careless in rendering Sanskrit names, and indeed this is one very good reason for believing that the equation of pin-lo-chia with 'blue-eyes' is not an error. On the other hand, Seng-jui's concern with the problem of the

transcription of foreign names would presumably lead him to make improvements in the system whenever possible. A new system of dealing with Sanskrit words was developed by Seng-jui (alias Hui-jui) in conjunction with the layman Hsieh Ling-yun in Ch'ang-an in 417-418. This might account for a discrepancy in the records left by Seng-jui, who died more than twenty years after Kumārajīva, in 436.²⁵

2.6 Implications

If Vimalākṣa was the author of the Chung-lun, then Kumārajīva's relationship to the writer of the commentary was that of a pupil to his old teacher. On the other hand, we know that Kumārajīva was an expert in Mādhyamika from his other writings, whereas Vimalākṣa, though he had been Kumārajīva's vinaya-master in Kucha before Kumārajīva was abducted by the Chinese in 383, was a teacher of the vinaya and not a Mādhyamika philosopher. It is probable, though not certain, that he learned Mādhyamika from Kumārajīva, who had been converted to Mahayana some six years earlier on the way back from his travels in India.²⁶ We can only speculate about Kumārajīva's attitude to a commentary written by Vimalākṣa, but we know already that Kumārajīva made very thorough-going revisions to texts which were not canonical - a practice exemplified in his treatment of the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise (T.1509).²⁷ If the assessment of Kumārajīva's relationship to Vimalākṣa which I have outlined is correct, then Kumārajīva was Vimalākṣa's pupil in Vinaya, but his

teacher, or at least his equal, in śūnyavāda.

It is thus doubtful whether Kumārajīva would consider himself bound in any way to Vimalākṣa's commentary on the stanzas, unless perhaps he thought that parts of the commentary represented an older tradition, traceable to Nāgārjuna himself. Before Vimalākṣa's arrival in Ch'ang-an, Kumārajīva may have been prevented from issuing a Chinese translation of Nāgārjuna's major Mādhyamika work because he did not have a manuscript of the Middle Stanzas, but there is no reason to doubt his ability to write a commentary of his own, given the verses upon which to base his commentary. Enough is preserved of Kumārajīva's other writings to show that his understanding of Mādhyamika was complete. With due respect to Vimalākṣa (which is what he receives in the preface by Seng-jui), it seems highly probable that the Chung-lun comprises verses by Nāgārjuna and a commentary which is almost wholly the responsibility of Kumārajīva.

Notes to section 2

1. Chi-tsang's sources mention that up to seventy commentaries were written on the stanzas. Chi-tsang; Chung-lun-shu, T.1824,p.5a7-8. Robinson,n.27.
2. The Preface is reproduced in Robinson's translation at the beginning of volume II of this thesis.
3. T.2145,p.76c14-77a5, also in the Fan-i-ming-i-chi, T.2131, pp.1066c-1067a, and reproduced at T.XXX,p.1.
4. T.XXX p.1a26-b7
5. Nakamura, H. Indian Buddhism p.237
6. Suzuki, D.T. 'Notes on the Mādhyamika Philosophy' in Journal of the Buddhist Text Society,part 3, 1898,p.20
7. Takakusu,J. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,1903,p.182
8. Teramoto, Enga. Ryūjū zo. Chūron muisho, Tokyo 1937.,pp.13-18
9. Walleser, M. Die Mittlere Lehre, 1911,p.x ff.
10. Robinson, pp.29-30
11. Kao-seng-chuan (hereafter KSC), T.2059,p.333b-c. Cf. Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Shidenbu 7, Tokyo,1936,p.41
12. See the account of Kumārajīva's life and translation activities in Robinson,Ch.3, and Kumārajīva's biography in the KSC, T.2059,pp.330-333, translated in Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique in Chine, T.1, and Shih, Robert, Biographies des Moines Éminents, pp.60-84
13. Robinson,76-7
14. Robinson,77

15. Robinson,75
16. Robinson,34-39. See also Ramanan,p.335n6, and Rahder and Demiéville's reviews of Lamotte, TGVS.
17. Robinson,76
18. This judgement is my own; the Mmk verses in the GPWT are identified by Saigusa, M. in an appendix in his *Studien zum Mahāprajñāpāramitā (upadeśa) śāstra*, Tokyo, 1969.
19. Robinson,123-155, especially p.142. Cf. also the contents of Kumārajīva's correspondence with Hui-yuan (Robinson,89) and see note 2 to sec.1.1 of this thesis.
20. See note 2 to sec.1.1
21. The biography of Vimalākṣa is in the Kao-seng-chuan, T.2059,p.333b-c
22. T.1824,p.5a6-8.
23. KSC,T.2059,p.333c13-14, cf. Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Shidenbu 7,p.41.
24. Robinson,247-8,n.4
25. Robinson,116, and see also P.Demiéville's review of Siddham in TP, Vol.XLV,1957,p.243; Zürcher,p.412,n.125, and Liebenthal, Biography of Chu Tao-sheng, p.67,n.15.
26. Robinson,72
27. See n.16 above

3.1 The Middle Treatise and the Prasannapadā

As a work which is in large part a translation from a Sanskrit or other Indic original¹, the Treatise, from the point of view of studies of Indian Buddhism, throws some light upon the development of the Mādhyamika commentarial tradition, subsequent to Nāgārjuna who wrote the Middle Stanzas, probably in the early part of the third century AD, and prior to the later division between the Svātantrika and the Prāsāngika Mādhyamikas which is documented in the seventh-century commentary on the Middle Stanzas, the well-known Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti (Clear-Worded Exposition of the Middle Way) by the Indian Candrakīrti.² The Middle Treatise throws less light than could perhaps be hoped for on the development of Indian Buddhist thought in relation to Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika position, because Kumārajīva's emendations to the text, and the process of rendering the text into Chinese have undoubtedly obscured the true form of the original commentary, and it cannot therefore be said with any certainty that the Middle Treatise version of Mādhyamika really represents an interim stage in a linear development of Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika thought. All that we can say with certainty about the text from the standpoint of the Indian tradition is that the date of its translation, 409 AD, gives us a fixed terminus ad quem for its composition, and it is therefore definitely earlier than the Prasannapadā. This, however, does not tell us how much earlier than 409 AD the original commentary was composed, nor what relationship the

original commentary, preserved in its revised form in the Treatise, bears to lines of thought which culminated in Candrakīrti's efforts to reassert the prāsaṅgika (reductio ad absurdum) interpretation of Nāgārjuna's verses against the arguments of Bhāvaviveka and in support of the position of Buddhapālita three or more centuries later. The problem of finding out how the Middle Treatise fits in to the Indian development of Mādhyamika thought is not simply a matter of reconstructing a Sanskrit text from Kumārajīva's Chinese, and placing the newly-reconstructed Sanskrit into its appropriate place within the Indian tradition, as has been attempted with other of Kumārajīva's translations, for the process of revision and translation, carried out by Kumārajīva, is, in practice, not reversible. This is clearly shown by Richard Robinson in his book Early Mādhyamika in India and China, which focuses on the problem of the transmission of Mādhyamika from India to China, via Kumārajīva's translations and expositions of Mādhyamika in the form of letters and treatises. Robinson takes, as an example of Kumārajīva's translation method, the Sanskrit and Chinese versions of Chapter One of Nagarjuna's verses (without commentary), comparing their meanings when read from Sanskrit and from Chinese. In many cases the meaning of the Chinese is simply different from that of the Sanskrit. This happens for a variety of reasons. The Chinese may have used a different Sanskrit original from the Sanskrit (or Tibetan) versions we have now; the Chinese may correct a wrong (or apparently wrong) Sanskrit word; the Chinese translation may be in error; Chinese may have no

word(s) equivalent to certain Sanskrit terms (this is particularly true of logical terms used in arguments by Nāgārjuna) or Kumārajīva may change a verse in order to make what he thinks is the meaning clearer.

The result of these various transmutations of form and content may be that the meaning of the original text is not reliably transmitted by the translation, or that it is reliably transmitted. Robinson, summing up the results of his comparison concludes; "I do not think that the mistranslations prevent the reader from understanding the Mādhyamika system in the aggregate. Individual verses are wrong or misleading, but there is sufficient repetition in the text that if the student takes over-all consistency as his standard he will not be misled very much by blemishes in the translations. He will be more likely to miss right ideas than to conceive wrong ones ..."

Robinson's conclusion, which applies here to the rather narrow field of Nāgārjuna's verses themselves, is broadly true of the whole Middle Treatise. It may seem presumptuous to claim that we can distinguish 'right ideas' in Mādhyamika from wrong ones, but insofar as we can know what Nāgārjuna originally meant to say in his Middle Stanzas, the Middle Treatise commentary, in aggregate, preserves these 'right ideas' and leads the reader away from wrong ones.

In fact, one of the major virtues of the Middle Treatise is that

it presents an exceptionally clear, uncluttered and readable account of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika position, though this clarity may be at the expense of many finer logical points and connections which Nāgārjuna presupposes and which Candrakīrti, as a logician, cannot allow to pass unnoticed. An example of the differences between the two commentaries may be found in the opening remarks to Chapter Four, (the whole of the Prasannapadā and Middle Treatise versions of this chapter are presented for comparison below). The Chinese opening remark is simply: Question "The sūtras state that there are five skandhas. What do you say about this?" There are implicit assumptions here about the authority of the Buddha's teaching as preserved in the sūtras, but these are not elaborated. Candrakīrti's preamble to this chapter takes a different tack: "Some may argue that, although vision and the other sense-faculties are not real, the skandhas are, because they have not been explicitly denied. The sense-faculties, however, belong to the skandhas and therefore will exist as well. We reply that they would if the skandhas were real ..." Here Candrakīrti unpacks several of the assumptions implicit in the Chinese question. The sense-faculties, says Candrakīrti, have already been shown to be empty (in the preceding chapter three of Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas) but the skandhas have not been explicitly denied (read: by the Buddha) and what is not explicitly denied is real. Candrakīrti here is referring to the Buddha's teaching that 'the self' is no more than the agglomeration of the five skandhas. It may be said authoritatively that the self is not real - but

the skandhas surely are ...? Moreover, pursues Candrakīrti, presenting an imaginary opponent's view; if the skandhas are real, the sense-faculties will be real as well, since the sense-faculties belong to the skandhas. If this were so, it would undo all of Nāgārjuna's argument about the unreality of the sense-faculties in Chapter Three. It may thus be seen that, although the Middle Treatise's and Candrakīrti's approach are the same in substance, Candrakīrti's commentary is both more complex and more alert to logical connections and implications than the Chinese commentary.

Notes to section 3.1

1. Nāgārjuna wrote in Sanskrit. For a discussion of the authenticity of the Chung-lun from this point of view, see Gard, R.A. 'On the Authenticity of the Chung-lun', IBK Vol.3,1,1954,pp.370-376
2. See Inada, K, Nāgārjuna: Mulamadhyamakakarika p.24 for a useful diagram of commentaries on the Stanzas, also Nakamura, Hajime, Indian Buddhism, pp.236-7

3.2 Comparison of one chapter of The Middle Treatise and the Prasannapadā

The differences between the Middle Treatise and the Prasannapadā commentaries may be illustrated by a comparison of their treatments of one chapter of Nāgārjuna's kārikā. Chapter Four is entitled 'Contemplation of the Five Skandhas' in the Middle Treatise and 'Examination of the Skandhas' in the Prasannapadā. Chapter Four of the Prasannapadā has been translated into English by Sprung in his 'Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way' (pp. 98 - 102), and into French by Jacques May in Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, pp. 88 - 96, and it is these translations which are used below in the comparison with my translation of the Middle Treatise. A translation of Walleser's German translation of the Tibetan Akutobhayā commentary on the Middle Stanzas is also provided for comparison in the appendix.

Chapter Four is a brief and relatively straightforward statement of the śūnyavādin position on the skandhas, the 'five aggregates' or what Sprung calls 'the constitutive factors of personal existence'. The argument, in this chapter as in the whole work, centres on causality and its ineffability. It first analyses causality objectively from the point of view of śūnyavāda, then addresses itself to the one who forms theories (views) about causality, and finally turns to a consideration of the role of emptiness as an instrument of debate and a means of liberation.

The comparison which follows takes the form of a synoptic presentation of the Middle Treatise and Prasannapadā commentaries in sections, each section followed by my comments. The Middle Treatise follows a rather strict format in its presentation of Nāgārjuna's stanzas, presenting each verse as a whole and then commenting on the whole verse, or on a group of verses taken consecutively. The Prasannapadā commentary often takes only a line or section of one of Nāgārjuna's verses as a starting-point for its exposition of Mādhyamika. Where this occurs, I have adapted the notation used for the Middle Treatise so that, for instance, 4v3(d) means the fourth line of verse 3 of Chapter 4, and 4/3(a-b) means the commentary to the first two lines of the same verse.

Middle Treatise

4/0

Question: The sutras state that there are five skandhas. What do you say about this?

Prasannapadā

4/0

Some may argue that, although vision and the other sense-faculties are not real, the skandhas are, because they have not been explicitly denied. The sense-faculties however, belong to the skandhas and therefore will exist as well.

We reply that they would if the

skandhas were real. With
reference to material objects
(rūpa) Nāgārjuna says:

Comments

The Chinese introduction is brief and to the point; the Buddha has (authoritatively) taught that there are exist five skandhas. How can a Buddhist deny this? The Sanskrit commentary takes up the topic just dealt with in chapter three, that of the six sense-faculties of eye, ear, etc. and makes substantially the same point but in a different way. The reality of the skandhas has not been explicitly denied (which can mean both that the Buddha speaks of the five skandhas, and that they have not (yet) been refuted by Nāgārjuna), and as a consequence the earlier refutation of the reality of the sense-faculties may not succeed, since the sense-faculties' reality is contingent upon that of the skandhas. The Chinese commentary therefore frames the question as 'what does it mean for the skandhas to exist?', the Sanskrit as 'the skandhas do not exist; in what way do they not exist?'

Middle Treatise

4v1

Form that is separate from the
cause of form

Is inconceivable.

A cause of form separate from
form

Is inconceivable

Prasannapadā

4v1

Objects are not perceived apart
from matter as their cause:

Matter as cause is not

perceived apart from objects.

Comments

The Sanskrit distinguishes matter from objects, the Chinese speaks of form which has the meaning of physical form, but 'the cause of form' is not a standard term and is not glossed in the subsequent commentary. Where the Sanskrit has 'are not perceived', the Chinese has pu k'o te which I have rendered 'inconceivable'. It may also mean 'never found' or, in a logical sense 'untenable'. This term is used throughout the Middle Treatise to render a number of logical operators in a way which obscures any distinction between the logical and the ontological.

Middle Treatise

4/1

As for 'cause of form'. It is like threads being the cause of

Prasannapadā

4/1

Here 'objects' means particular material objects (bhautika

the cloth. If you take away the threads, there is no cloth, and if you cast away the cloth, there is no thread. The cloth is like form, the threads are like its cause.

rūpa) and their material cause (karana) are the four elements. One does not perceive objects - the physical particulars designated sights, sounds, smells, tastes and touch-separated from the four elements and existing by themselves as a piece of cloth is separate from a jar. And matter as cause (rupa-karana) is not perceived existing by itself apart from objects.

Comments

Both commentaries employ analogies to refute the notion that particular forms (matter, material objects) can exist without (material) causes. The Chinese employs the analogy of cloth to show that the whole (form) is at least the sum of its parts (the 'cause of forms'), but without specifying what the cause of forms refers to. The Sanskrit identifies the four elements as the 'matter' referred to in the verse; particular objects are not perceived without the elements of earth, water, fire and air. The Sanskrit analogy is a counter-example. Form and its cause cannot be divorced, they are interdependent and cannot be considered in isolation and unrelated as a cloth and a jar are unrelated.

Middle Treatise

4v2

Form which existed separately
from the cause of form

Would be form without a cause

A dharma which exists without a
cause?

This is not correct.

Prasannapadā

4v2

If objects exist apart from
matter as their cause, objects

must be uncaused: but nothing

is ever without a cause.

Comments

This is a statement of Nagarjuna's axiom that all dharmas are caused. The meanings are identical.

Middle Treatise

4/2

It is like a cloth existing separately from its threads, which would be a cloth without a cause. Things which are uncaused and yet exist are not found anywhere in the world.

Prasannapadā

4/2

As a piece of cloth, being another thing than a pot, cannot be caused by the pot, so objects - material particulars - cannot be caused by the four elements if thought of as separate from them. But 'Nothing is ever without a cause'. Therefore, because causelessness is logically

absurd, it cannot be accepted
that objects are separate from
matter as their cause.

Comments

The Middle Treatise passage quoted here which parallels Candrakīrti's commentary is only the first part of a longer disquisition on uncaused dharmas (see below, 4/2 contd.). The Middle Treatise employs the analogy of cloth and threads to show that cause and effect of form are inseparable. There is an appeal to empirical evidence here for proof that acausal events do not happen, even though elsewhere empirical evidence is regarded as unreliable (see n. 30 to the translation). The following section of commentary (4/3) picks up this loose end and eventually concludes that dharmas are by definition caused, which is a logical argument. The Sanskrit avoids the empiricist trap - it uses the analogy of cloth and pot to show that A (the pot) - cannot cause B (the jar), if A is different from B. This is a standard argument which is encountered again and again in the Middle Treatise. Candrakīrti then states that all things (i.e. all dharmas) have causes. This is axiomatic or, as Candrakīrti expresses it, 'causelessness is logically absurd' (in Sprung's translation. May translates: 'the evil of causelessness follows as a necessary consequence' which is perhaps closer to the notion of 'axiomatic').

Middle Treatise

4/2 (contd.)

Question: In the Buddha-Dharma, in the doctrines of outsiders (non-Buddhists) and in worldly teachings there are dharmas which are uncaused. Buddhism has the three inactive (dharmas) which, being inactive are permanent and therefore without causes. In the non-Buddhist teachings they have space, time, direction, soul, atoms, nirvāṇa and so forth. In the teachings of the ordinary world there are emptiness, time, direction and so on. These three dharmas, being nowhere non-existent are consequently called 'permanent'. Being permanent, they are uncaused, so how can you say that uncaused dharmas do not exist in the world?

Reply: These 'uncaused dharmas' only exist as figures of speech. If we ponder and analyse them we find they are non-existent. If dharmas have their being through causes and conditions, we ought not to say that they are uncaused. If they have no causes and conditions, then it is as we have said.

Question: Causes are of two kinds: one is the actual cause, the other is the 'figurative cause'. These 'uncaused dharmas' have no actual cause, they merely have a figurative cause, to make people know of them.

Reply: Although they have figurative causes, you are not correct. Just as 'space' is refuted, in the (next chapter on the)six elements, so the remaining items will be refuted later. Moreover, since even

visible things can be refuted,
how much more so atoms and
other invisible things? This is
why we state that there are no
uncaused dharmas in the world.

Comments

This extended discussion of 'uncaused' dharmas finds no parallel at this point in the Prasannapadā. It is a denial of the notion of uncaused or unconditioned dharmas, the argument being simply that if something is a dharma (and there is nothing which is not a dharma) then it is the product of causes -in other words, a restatement of the fundamental Buddhist teaching of pratītya-samutpāda, dependent origination. The two assumptions that a)dharmas are caused, and b)reality consists of dharmas, when taken together leave no room for 'uncaused dharmas' such as nirvāṇa, space, time and so on (the 'unconditioned' dharmas of the Abhidarmists and non-Buddhists). Nāgārjuna abandons the notion of unconditioned dharmas, and this is why he can subsequently equate nirvāṇa with saṃsāra. A 'figurative cause' (or 'revealing cause', see n. 86 to the translation) is put forward by the opponent as an example of a cause which is not really a cause - in other words, a device is proposed which would enable the opponent to maintain that there are permanent (uncaused) dharmas without thereby relinquishing dependent origination. The Middle Treatise refuses to have anything to do with this suggestion. Dharmas are dharmas, and the opponent is

referred to the next chapter where space (supposedly one of the uncaused dharmas), will be refuted in exactly the same way that ordinary down-to-earth dharmas such as goers, eyes and tathāgatas are refuted in other chapters.

Middle Treatise

4/2 (contd.)

Question: If (we said that) the cause of form existed separately from form, what would be wrong with that?

Reply:

Prasannapadā

4/2 (contd.)

Now, to show that matter as cause cannot exist apart from objects, Nāgārjuna says:

Comments

These brief introductions to verse 3 demonstrate very clearly the way in which the Middle Treatise is structured as a dialogue, the Prasannapadā as a monologue. The interlocutor in the Middle Treatise represents the voice of the Abhidharmist, or the voice of the sūtras, the basic teachings of the Buddha. The questions posed by the opponent are straightforward, and designed to elicit some clearer meaning from the brief and often aphoristic stanzas. Candrakīrti's task is somewhat different; he is defending his understanding of Nāgārjuna's 'original' insight against rival commentators within the overall 'Mādhyamika' tradition, particularly Bhāvaviveka. He has not only to make clear what

Nāgārjuna originally said but also to anticipate and meet objections to his interpretation put forward by others, including those who take Nāgārjuna as an authority. In the Middle Treatise the presence of the commentator, whether Blue-Eyes or Kumārajīva, is an unobtrusive one. In the Prasannapadā the predominant voice is that of Candrakīrti, to such an extent, indeed, that the formula 'Nāgārjuna says...' or 'the master says ...' is even used to introduce the remarks of Nāgārjuna's putative opponent in the kārikā. (see, for example, the opening verses of Chapter 24). The author of the Middle Treatise does of course supplement both Nāgārjuna's argument and, we may suppose, Nāgārjuna's world-view, especially in respect of the Mahayanist content of the Treatise, but the commentator's voice is seldom distinguishable from Nāgārjuna's, when the Mādhyamika point of view is being put, and equally seldom distinguishable from the Abhidharmist's, when objections are being framed.

Middle Treatise

4v3

If its cause existed, separate from form,

Then this 'cause' would be

without an effect

If you are saying that there are causes without effects,

This circumstance does not exist.

Prasannapadā

4v3(ab)

If matter as cause were separate from objects

4/3ab

If, that is, matter as cause were separate from object as its effects, then, just as the frying pan taken as separate from the pot cannot be the

4/3

If we eliminate the effect, ie 'form', and merely have the cause of form, this would be a cause without an effect.

Question:

What is wrong with there being a cause with no effect?

Reply:

Nowhere in the world do you find a cause without an effect, and why? It is by virtue of its effect that we call something a cause. If there is no effect, how can you call it a cause? Moreover, if there is no effect within the cause, why should things not arise from no-cause? This topic is similar to that dealt with in chapter one, on the refutation of causality. Therefore, no cause exists without an effect.

cause of the pot, as if matter as cause is conceived as existing separated from its effects.

4v3c

Matter as cause would be without any effect.

4/3c

It would be effectless. The condition for the causality of a cause is that it produces an effect. There is no production of an effect if this is thought of as separated from a material cause unrelated to the effect. Nāgārjuna says that a cause without an effect, because it does not cause anything, does not exist, like the horns of a man or of a snake or of a horse.

4v3(d)

There is no cause without an effect.

Comments

The Sanskrit commentary breaks up the verse and intersperses sections of commentary. The Middle Treatise never does this; it invariably presents the verses in their entirety which underlines the fact that while the Prasannapadā uses Nāgārjuna's verses to substantiate Candrakīrti's argument, the Middle Treatise sees itself rather as clarifying and restating what is considered to be the authoritative statement of Mādhyamika by Nāgārjuna. The Middle Treatise does of course regularly take up a verse line by line in its commentary. Here, as in the previous section of commentary, the Middle Treatise tends to emphasise the empirical, the Sanskrit the logical. The Middle Treatise says that we do not find effectless causes in the world (and that this is because an effect implies a cause); the Sanskrit addresses itself only to the incoherence of the notion of a cause with no effect. It is an impossibility, driven home by the analogy of horns on a snake, etc. The Middle Treatise commentary, perhaps anticipating v5, raises the additional topic of things arising from no-causes, and refers us to Ch 1 (lv3, lv14 ff) where 'non-causes' are said not to exist anyway. This is evidence either of a rather mechanical approach designed to exhaust all possibilities or, which is perhaps more likely, evidence of the Middle Treatise's concern with the moral and soteriological implications of particular theories of causality. If there were no causes and yet there were effects, says the Middle Treatise at 1/3, "then giving alms and keeping the precepts etc could drag you down into the hells, while the ten evils and five rebellious acts could lead to rebirth in the heavens, because there would be no causal link".

Middle Treatise

4/3 (contd.)

Moreover:

4v4

If form were already existent,
then it would have no use for
'cause of form'. If form did
not exist then, too, it would
have no use for form.

4/4

In neither case is there a
cause for form. If form
pre-existed in the cause, the
cause would not be called the
cause of form. If no form
pre-existed in the cause, in

Prasannapadā

4/3 (contd.)

Further, what is taken to be
the material cause of objects
must be taken as the cause
either of an object which
exists or of one which does not
exist. Nāgārjuna says that
neither way is logically
possible.

4v4

Matter as cause of an object
which exists is not, logically
possible; matter as cause of an
object which does not exist is
not logically possible.

4/4

If an object is in being (sant)
that is, factually exists
(sanvidyamana), what would be
the point of its having a
material cause? If an object
is not in being, that is, does

that case, too, the cause would not be termed the cause of form.

not factually exist, what could be the meaning of its 'cause'? What would one suppose such a cause to be the cause of? So, if an object does not exist, its cause is not logically possible.

Comment

The Chinese version of the verse incorporates an empirical reason for the (logical) incoherence of the notion of a material cause of an existent or nonexistent object. It does this^{by} placing the cause-effect sequence firmly in a temporal context and asking what need an already existing form would have for a cause. The Sanskrit discussion does not require that cause-effect be seen as a temporal sequence in order for the logical point to be made, and it may be considered a weakness in the Middle Treatise commentary that it is only the 'temporal sequence' model of cause followed by effect which is identified and refuted here although other possible models of causality are later dealt with at length in Ch 20 (see esp 20/7)

Middle Treatise

4/4 (contd.)

Question:

If both these cases are wrong, then what is wrong with there

Prasannapadā

4/4 (contd.)

You may say: Although a material cause of objects is in this way not logically

being simply uncaused form?

Reply:

4v5

For form to exist and yet be uncaused -

This is altogether wrong.

For this reason one who has insight

Should not analyse form.

4/5

Whether the effect inherent in the cause, or whether no effect inheres in the cause: such matters remain inconceivable. How much more so the existence of form without cause? This is why it is said: "for form to exist and yet be uncaused - this is altogether wrong", and therefore one who has insight should not analyse form.

possible, nonetheless objects exist in fact as effects and because of their real existence matter as cause will exist as well. This would be so if the object as effect existed, but it does not. So,

4v5(ab)

An object without a material cause is not, repeat not, logically possible.

4/5(ab)

How it is that there is no material cause has been shown? But if there is no material cause, how could there be an object as an effect which has no cause? By the double rejection of the not, repeat not, 'Nāgārjuna makes clear the harmfulness of the view that things can be without cause. And thus, on being considered

'Analyser' is a name for the common man who, bound by ignorance, desire and attachment to form, consequently develops from his perverted views distinctions and vain argument, speculating that the effect inheres or does not inhere in the cause, and so forth. If you search for form in this way, it is never attainable, and therefore a man of insight should not analyse.

from every aspect, a perceptible material object (rūpa) is not possible. Therefore the wise one (yoga) who sees things as they really are

4v5(cd)

Should not form any theories at all concerning objects.

The meaning is that he does not take objects to be the external base (alambana) to which are attributed such characteristics as penetrable or impenetrable, veridically perceivable or not veridically perceivable, past or future, light or dark.

Comment

The range of possible interpretations to be laid on verse 5 is very limited: it contains two assertions; that objects (form) exist and cannot not have material causes, and that one should not analyse or theorise about the forms. The two commentators draw slightly different emphases, the Middle Treatise seeing evil

particularly in sophisticated arguments about causality, the Prasannapada interpreting 'theories' as the attribution of distinctive properties to externalised material forms, a theme which is taken up again in the commentary to v 6.

Middle Treatise

4/5 (contd.)

Further:

4v6

If (you say that) the effect resembles the cause,

This is not correct.

If (you say that) the effect does not resemble the cause

This too is incorrect.

4/6

If (you say that) the effect and the cause resemble each other, this is not correct,

Prasannapadā

4/5 (contd.)

Whether one thinks that matter as cause gives rise to an effect which is identical with or not identical with itself, neither alternative is logically possible. Nāgārjuna says:

4v6

It is not logically possible that an effect is identical with its cause. It is not logically possible that an effect is not identical with its cause.

4/6

It is commonly supposed that matter (rūpakāraṇa) is by its inherent nature solid, liquid,

because the cause is subtle,
the effect gross. Cause and
effect, form and function, etc,
are different from each other.

Just as cloth is similar to
thread, but we do not call
thread 'cloth' for threads are
many but cloth is one, so we
cannot say that cause and
effect resemble each other. To
say that cause and effect do
not resemble each other is also
wrong, for just as hempen
thread does not make thin silk,
and coarse thread will not
produce fine cloth, so we
cannot say that cause and
effect are dissimilar. Both
ideas are wrong, so there is
neither form nor cause-of-form.

warm and mobile. Particular
material objects (bautika),
however, whether they are
personal like the eye and the
other sense-faculties which are
by nature of a subtle matter
and are the base of visual and
the other types of
sense-consciousness, or whether
they are the external sense
fields like the visible whose
nature it is to be perceived in
the various types of
sense-consciousness, do not
possess the inherent nature of
the four elements. It follows
that, because they have
different characteristics,
cause, i.e. matter, and effects
i.e. material objects, are not
identical, as in the case of
nirvana. "It is not logically
possible that an effect is
identical with its cause."
Further, one never sees the
real dependence in the
relationship of cause to

effect, even when they are identical, like the rice seed and the ripe grain. "It is not logically possible that an effect is identical with its cause.

And again, 'It is not logically possible that an effect is not identical with its cause'. The meaning here is that it is so because they have different characteristics, as in the case of nirvana.

So perceivable material objects, on being investigated, are not logically possible in any way at all.

Comments

The Middle Treatise proceeds entirely by analogy to show that cause and effect can be neither identical nor different from each other. In line with the previous section, the discussion refers to the causal relationships which are ignorantly attributed to things; we do not call thread 'cloth', ... we cannot say that cause and effect resemble each other. The reference to subtle cause and gross effect indicates that a relationship between the

four (or six) elements is not the only possible model, as the reference to 'form and function' which is a metaphor of Chinese origin, makes clear. The Middle Treatise makes no attempt to relate this argument to particular Buddhist teachings, whereas Candrakīrti refers specifically to nirvana as something which can be neither different from nor identical with its cause (namely samsara). For his part, Candrakīrti leans heavily on arguments from experience of the real world (things perceived, the grain of rice) and an example drawn from the Buddhist teaching (that nirvāṇa is attainable) to illustrate Nāgārjuna's assertion that causal relationships are unfathomable by the ordinary person. His approach here closely resembles that of the Middle Treatise as he follows, rather than propounds, Nāgārjuna's argument.

Middle Treatise

4v7

The skandha of reception, the

skandha of conception

The skandhas of predisposition

and consciousness

And all remaining dharmas,

May be taken together with the

skandha of form.

Prasannapadā

4/6 (contd.)

Nāgārjuna extends this

conclusion to feeling and the

other skandhas as well.

4v7

The inquiry into material

objects holds in every

essential for feeling,

consciousness, ideation and

personal dispositions - for all

the skandhas.

4/7

The (other) four skandhas and all dharmas should also be contemplated and refuted in the same way.

4/7

Feeling and all the skandhas may suitably be considered in the same way as material objects have been. Precisely as śūnyatā, as conceived by Mādhyamika, is expounded for one thing (dharma), precisely so is it to be expounded for all things. And so:

Comments

Verse 7 is a natural conclusion to this discussion of Nāgārjuna's analysis of form as representative of the five skandhas. But in both the Middle Treatise and the Prasannapadā there are a further two verses concerning emptiness and its use in debate with an opponent. The Middle Treatise regards these verses as a departure from the preceding discussion, the skandhas are no more mentioned. Candrakīrti, however, prepares the reader for this change of mood by showing a parallelism between the extension of the critique of form to the other four skandhas, and the extension of the critique of one dharma by means of śūnyatā to all other dharmas.

Middle Treatise

4v8

If a man has a questionAnd you try to answer itwithout emptinessYou will be unable to make ananswerIt will be wholly the same asthe other's doubts.(Note

The Middle Treatise takes vv 8 and 9 together and comments on both. For purposes of comparison the commentary here has been divided into 4/9 (up to 7a25) which refers to 4v 8, and 4/9 7a25ff, which refers to 4v9.)

4/8

If, during a discussion, each party seizes on to a particular position and they debate without reference to the idea of emptiness they will never

Prasannapada

4v8

If a counter-argument has beengiven in terms of śūnyatā andsomeone would offer arefutation of it, he refutesnothing because everything hesays presupposes what has to beproved.

4/8

Here 'counter argument' means discrediting the view of another; 'in terms of the absence of being' (śūnyatā) means by showing that objects

conclude the debate, and all will be together in doubt. For example, a man says 'a jug is impermanent'. His opponent says 'Why is it impermanent?' and he replies 'because it arises from an impermanent cause'. This is not what one would call an answer. Why not? Because there is still the uncertainty of not knowing whether the cause is permanent or impermanent.

are without a self-existent nature so the view that they have a self-existent nature is ruled out. If an opponent would offer a refutation of this, saying, 'but as feeling, ideas and so on are real, so objects must be real too', everything he says lacks the force of a refutation because the actual existence of feeling, ideas and so on must be known in the same way as the actual existence of objects: which is what has to be proved.

Even as material objects, on being thoroughly investigated, do not actually exist whether they are one with their material cause or different, so feeling, which is dependent on contact with objects, ideation which is simultaneous with consciousness, personal dispositions which are dependent on ignorance, and

consciousness which is dependent on dispositions, on being thoroughly investigated, do not exist either as being one with their cause or different. They are like contact and the other factors of the death-birth cycle: all of these are just what has to be proved. And as feeling and so on are the same as what has to be proved, so attributes and the subject of attributes, effect and cause, whole and part and such concepts are things which, like material objects, are just what has to be proved. How could an opponent offer a refutation? His every assertion will be just what has to be proved. Throughout this treatise Nāgārjuna teaches that for Mādhyamika it is to be taken as a rule that refutations offered by opponents are instances of petitio principii.

Comment

The Middle Treatise's point is rather straightforward - that any discussion of the nature of things in terms of the nature of their causes, will inevitably lead to an infinite regression of assertions which omits reference to the idea of emptiness.

Candrakīrti's point is the complementary one (based on a different version of the kārīkā) in which the connection with the preceding discussion in this chapter of cause and effect in the skandhas is far more apparent. His argument is that if one does employ the notion of emptiness, the opponent's argument will always fail, because everything is causally interdependent and hence non-existent (in the sense of being empty of own-being). Both commentators of course presuppose that dharmas and causality are axiomatic.

Middle Treatise

4v9

If a man makes a criticismExplaining the other's errorswithout recourse to emptiness,He will not succeed in hiscriticismIt will be wholly the same asthe other's doubts.Prasannapadā

4v9

If, after an exposition hasbeen made in terms ofemptiness, someone were tooffer a criticism, nothing hesays will be a criticismbecause it will be just whathas to be proved.

4/9

If, wishing to explain the other's erroneous views, he simply declares, without relying on emptiness, that all dharmas are impermanent, this is not what one would call a criticism, and why? Because you by your 'impermanence' have refuted my 'permanence' but I by my 'permanence' can refute your 'impermanence', saying that if things truly were impermanent there would be no karma and consequences, that the dharmas of eye and ear, etc., would cease every instant and that there would be no distinctions (between sin and merit etc.). Such fallacies as these will never succeed as criticisms, being at the same level as the opponent's doubts.

However, if one relies on emptiness to refute permanence,

4/9

If during an exposition some pseudo-disciple raises a critical objection, that objection, it should be known, will be just what has to be proved, as in the case of a counter-argument.

To quote: "Who sees one thing truly, it should be remembered, sees all things truly. The emptiness in one thing is emptiness in all things."

And from the Gaganagañjasamādhi Sūtra: "The one who by examining one putative element realizes that all putative elements are like a magical show, like a mirage: unintelligible, false, deceptive and perishable, he is the one who progresses directly to the haven of enlightenment."

And from the Samādhirāja Sūtra: "Just as you have understood the concept of the self, so

no error is involved, and why?
 Because such a man does not
 cling to the mark of
 'emptiness'. Therefore if one
 even wants to debate, he should
 rely upon the idea of
 emptiness; how much more so if
 he desires to seek the
 characteristic of release from
 affliction, and calm extinction.

should you turn your mind to
 all things; all putative
 elements have the same nature
 as the self: they are as
 transparent as the heavens.
 The one who from one thing
 knows all things and from one
 thing sees all things, in him,
 whatever the paths of his
 thought, there will be no
 egomania [attachment to self]."

Comments

Both the Middle Treatise and the Prasannapadā, though speaking in different ways, agree that the notion of emptiness is the means by which one can resolve debates about the nature of being without being drawn into fruitless arguments. Both commentators then indicate that employing emptiness in debate is not in principle different from seeing things as empty.

Candrakīrti's argument is that to see one thing as empty (which he seems to equate with asserting the emptiness of one dharma) is to see all things as empty, and he quotes sūtras in support of this view. The Middle Treatise regards reliance upon emptiness as a prerequisite for both success in intellectual debate and success in attaining liberation; this makes sense in the light of

the Treatise's earlier equation of evil (ignorance) with these very debates about causality etc, but the relationship between argument and extinction is not made entirely clear. "If one even wants to debate, he should rely upon the idea of emptiness; how much more so if he desires to seek the characteristic of release from affliction, and calm extinction."

4.1 The Middle Treatise in the Sino-Korean-Japanese Tradition

From the point of view of the Sino-Korean-Japanese Buddhist tradition, the Middle Treatise, together with companion texts such as the 'Hundred Treatise' (T 1569), the 'Twelve Topic Treatise' (T.1568) and the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise (T.1509), represents the first lucid, systematic and reliable expression of Mādhyamika thought in Chinese, and thus stands at the beginning of a long development of 'Middle Way' thought in

the sects and schools of Far Eastern Mahayana. In particular, the Middle Treatise, Hundred Treatise and Twelve-topic Treatise (Chung-lun, Pai-lun and Shih-erh-men-lun) were known collectively as the 'Three Treatises' (san-lun) and a school of thought based on these treatises flourished for a time in China, and was amongst the earliest forms of scholastic Buddhist thought to be introduced into Korea and Japan. The T'ien-t'ai (Jap:Tendai) school to some extent based its philosophy on Mādhyamika, using it to develop a theory of the 'sandai' or 'three truths' of emptiness, conventional reality, and the middle way. This philosophy of a middle way between appearance and disappearance of forms had a tremendous impact upon many subsequent developments in Buddhist thought, especially in Japan, where the greatest reformers and innovators - Nichiren, Hōnen, Shinran and the Zen masters Dōgen and Eisai - were all trained initially as Tendai monks.

The position of the Middle Treatise itself within all these subsequent developments is, however, more difficult to evaluate, for while the complete text of the Middle Treatise was presumably always available in the canonical collections of Buddhist scriptures from the time of Kumārajīva onwards, Sino-Japanese interest in the text was mediated almost entirely through the heavily interpretive writings of the Chinese monk Chi-tsang (549-623), a prolific systematiser of the san-lun tradition. As Inada points out:

"Special attention must be called to (Chi-tsang's) famous two-fold analytical division of the ideas of the Karika (Nagarjuna's Middle Stanzas), i.e., into the famous p'o-hsieh-hsien-cheng (破邪顯正) which can be rendered as refutation (or critique) is at once an awakening to the true dharma or reality as such. The influence of this thought on subsequent Far Eastern Buddhism cannot be underestimated. (p.27).

The phrase p'o-hsieh-hsien-cheng may also be translated as 'refutation of wrong and demonstration of right' (for example in De Bary's The Buddhist Tradition p.144), but this obscures the rather important point that the one is the other. The statement is of course self-negating, as Chi-tsang recognises, and his discussion of this point leads him, eventually, back to the statement of first principles in the Middle Stanzas:

Objection If there is neither affirmation nor negation [this is a reference to Chi-tsang's propounding of the Madhyamika idea of 'no viewpoint'], then there is also no wrong and no right. Why, then, in the beginning section do you call it 'The Refutation of Wrong and the Demonstration of Right'?

Answer: [The idea that] there is affirmation and negation, we consider 'wrong'. [The idea that] there is neither affirmation nor negation, we call 'right'. It is for this reason that we have thus called the section explaining the refutation of wrong and the demonstration of right.

Objection: Once there is a wrong to be refuted and a right to be demonstrated, then the mind is exercising a choice. How can one say then that it 'leans on nothing' [Equivalent to 'non-grasping' in the Middle Treatise].

Answer In order to put an end to wrong, we force ourselves to speak of 'right'. Once wrong has been ended, then neither does right remain. Therefore the mind has nothing to which it adheres...

Objection If wrong and right are both obliterated, is this not surely a 'view' of emptiness?

Answer The Treatise on Right Views (i.e. the Middle Treatise) says:

The Great Sage preached the Law of Emptiness

In order to separate men from all views.
If one still has the view that there 'is' emptiness,
Such a person even the Buddhas cannot transform.

(DeBary, pp.147-148.) The verse quoted from the Middle Treatise is 13v9 (De Bary's translation from Chi-tsang).

Chi-tsang's idea that 'refutation is at once an awakening to the true dharma' is not incompatible with the teaching of Nāgārjuna's kārikā or the Middle Treatise, but this is not to say that the idea is explicitly stated in these earlier works. The significant point about Chi-tsang's contribution to Mādhyamika or, more correctly, Three-Treatise, thought, since he based his interpretation of Mādhyamika on the Middle Treatise, the Hundred Treatise and the Twelve Topic Treatise, all translated by Kumārajīva, is that he presupposes a familiarity with certain Mahayana teachings, particularly those of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra which was translated into Chinese only a few years after Kumārajīva's death, and which preaches the innate buddhahood of all beings (including the worst sinners). Such teachings are, on the face of it, alien to Nāgārjuna's way of thinking and indeed to the Middle Treatise as well. Chi-tsang's aim, however, in the context of his overall attempt to systematize a variety of Mahayana teachings in seventh-century China, was to set Mādhyamika and Prajñāpāramitā thought firmly within a Mahayana context provided by the teachings of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, by showing how the Mādhyamika method of intellectual debate might further the cause of attaining enlightenment. His approach may have been somewhat pedantic and rationalistic but his style and

his conclusions are not very different from those of the earlier Mādhyamikas. Much of the force of Nāgārjuna's attack on received notions derives, after all, from the very repetitive, systematic application of the same Mādhyamika critique to a number of different topics. As Sprung points out, for Nāgārjuna, as also for Candrakīrti,

'...reasoning is not ontologically bound; yet they proceed unshakably assuming that what fails the tests of reason - what is less than utterly intelligible - cannot exist... For thinkers often held to be 'mystical' the Mādhyamikas understanding of thinkability is surprisingly narrow and unyielding. Mādhyamika will not, and cannot, agree that the utterly intelligible is the truth; and for a simple reason: there is nothing utterly intelligible...' (Sprung, Lucid Exposition p.9.)

It has to be said that the nature of the relationship which Chi-tsang tried systematically to elucidate, between the Mādhyamika dialectic on the one hand, and liberation or nirvāna on the other, is not easy to grasp, either from a reading of Nāgārjuna's stanzas or in the Middle Treatise itself. This is one of the elusive aspects of Mādhyamika which contribute to its appeal and help to give it its peculiarly subversive Buddhist flavour.

As a result of the introduction of ideas drawn from the Nirvāṇa-sūtra, Chi-tsang and the later Three Treatise schools were, as Aaron Koseki points out, more deeply influenced by this sūtra, by later problems of the conceptualization of the two truths and by the distinction between empty and non-empty aspects

of the Buddha-nature than by Nāgārjuna and the Middle Treatise per se.' (Koseki, p.56)

From the point of view of traditional Sino-Japanese Buddhist scholarship, which developed out of the academic schools of Chinese Buddhism, therefore, the Middle Treatise itself has not occupied a particularly significant place. Apart from Chi-tsang's role in drawing attention away from the Middle Treatise and towards a more eclectic Middle Way philosophy, expounded in much larger and more systematic works than the Middle Treatise, such as the san-lun hsuan-i (Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises), (T.1852) the relative neglect of the Middle Treatise has undoubtedly been due also to the fact that in its expression of Buddhist ideas it is neither fully Indian nor fully Chinese. This is because in its final form it reflects the work of at least three authors: Nāgārjuna, who wrote the verses on which the work is based; 'Blue-Eyes', the Indian or Central Asian author of the original commentary (of whom more below) and Kumārajīva. These three authors wrote at different times, in different circumstances and for different audiences.

In his preface to the Middle Treatise the monk Seng-jui tells us that the translator and editor of the final work, Kumārajīva, 'edited and emended' the text in Chang-an for the benefit of the Chinese sangha in conformity with his own understanding of Mādhyamika, but the text, even though written in Chinese, remains essentially Indian in its style and approach, vastly different

even from Buddhist treatises by Kumārajīva's close contemporary and aide, Seng-chao, which are written in a literary, allusive style of Chinese. Robinson has translated a number of Seng-Chao's Treatises; one example drawn from 'Prajñā has no Knowing' (Chao-lun pt.III, T.Vol.45, pp.153a-154c) will amply illustrate the differences between his work and the Middle Treatise.

Seng-chao is quite capable of quoting accurately from the Indian sūtras (in Chinese translation); it is his glosses and commentary on the canonical material which depart so markedly from the style of the commentary in the Middle Treatise. Embarking on an explanation, Seng-Chao begins with a sūtra quotation:

The Fang-kuang says , "In Prajñā there are no marks at all; there are no marks of arising and ceasing." The Tao-hsing [another Buddhist work] says, "In Prajñā there is nothing that is known, and nothing that is seen."

This specifies [holy] knowledge's function of intuition, but why do we say that it has no marks and has no knowing? It is evident that there is a markless knowing and an unknowing intuition.

For what reason?

If there is something that is known, then there is something that is not known. Because in the holy mind there is nothing that is known, there is nothing that is not known. The knowing of unknowing is termed all-knowing. Thus the sūtra is to be believed when it says, "In the Holy Mind, there is nothing that is known and nothing that is not known.

Therefore the holy man empties his mind and fills (makes real) his intuition. Though he always knows, he never knows. . Thus he can muffle his brilliance and sheathe his light. His empty mind mirrors the metaphysical. Shutting up his Knowledge and blocking his hearing, all alone he perceives the inscrutable.

Consequently, in holy knowledge there is a mirroring that probes the abstruse, yet there is no knowing in it. In the Spirit there is the functioning of responding to occasions, yet there is no deliberation in it. Because there is no deliberation in the Spirit, it is able to reign alone beyond the world. Because there is no knowing in Knowledge, it is able to intuit metaphysically outside of events. Knowledge, though outside of events, is never devoid of events. Spirit, though beyond the world, is always within the world. Therefore, looking down [to Earth] and looking up [to Heaven], he adapts himself to the transformations. His intercourse [with living beings] is illimitable. There is nothing abstruse that he does not discern, yet he has no process (results) of intuition. This is what no-knowing knows, and what the Holy Spirit meets. (R.p.213)

This brief passage contains, apart from sutra material, two quotations from the Tao Te Ching (Therefore the holy man empties his mind and fills his intuition'...'Though he always knows, he never knows. Thus can he muffle his brilliance and sheathe his light'), one quotation from and one allusion to the Chuang-tzu ('His empty mind mirrors the metaphysical. Shutting up his knowledge and blocking his hearing, all alone he perceives the inscrutable'...'His intercourse with living beings is illimitable'), and one ambivalent allusion to the I-Ching, ('Therefore, looking down [to Earth] and looking up [to Heaven] he adapts himself to the transformations').

Quite apart from these allusions to the Chinese classics there is free use of 'un-Buddhist' terms such as '(holy) spirit', and several references of a Taoist kind to a spirit apart from the world, though also in it, 'reigning alone beyond the world'...'able to intuit metaphysically outside of events'.

The fact that Seng-Chao writes differently does not mean that he does not understand Buddhism. It does show however what was considered by the Chinese literati of the time to be a well-written Buddhist text. By comparison, Kumārajīva's translations must have seemed to some extent alien, and inaccessible, and this perhaps explains why the Middle Treatise achieved its influence in the later tradition through Chinese interpreters such as Chi-tsang rather than in any more direct manner.

To say that a text is 'Chinese' or 'Indian' as far as Buddhism is concerned, of course raises many problems about cultural identity, since the penetration of Buddhist ideas and practices into the Chinese intellectual tradition over a period of some ten centuries from about the end of the Han dynasty (200 AD) onwards meant that Chinese Buddhist thought became progressively more 'Indianised', with concepts such as re incarnation, emptiness and the existence of multiple Buddhas and world-systems, each with its own Mount Sumeru at the centre becoming the common currency of philosophical debate and inquiry, but in Kumārajīva's time there was a clear distinction to be made - it might be said that it was Kumārajīva's authentic translations which made the distinction possible - between those texts which presented Buddhism in an Indian way, and those which presented Buddhism in a Chinese way. The distinction stemmed partly from the text itself - either it was written in China by a Chinese or it came

from India - and partly from the translator. It might seem invidious to single out Kumārajīva as the only translator up to the 5th century who both understood Indian Buddhism and could ensure that his understanding survived the process of translation into Chinese, but it is a fact that Kumārajīva is widely regarded as the greatest translator of Buddhist texts on precisely these grounds.

4.2 The Middle Treatise in Studies of Mādhyamika

From a slightly different point of view, that of modern Japanese studies of Madhyamika, the Middle Treatise tends again to be neglected because of the overriding concern amongst Japanese scholars to obtain access to Nāgārjuna's 'original' meaning by establishing an ur-text of the mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā through comparative investigation of the Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan texts. This investigation takes place within the context of a wider 'quest for the historical Buddha' which tends to equate 'earlier' with 'better' and indeed, 'Sanskrit-text' with 'authentic text'.

From this point of view, Chinese materials understandably tend to be treated as secondary, rather than original sources. My own interest in the Chung-lun developed from a rather different, and perhaps from the Japanese point of view rather elementary, perspective. All major studies of Madhyamika in the West have

been carried out on the basis of Indian and Tibetan materials, and the contents of the Middle Treatise have remained virtually unknown and unacknowledged. Although several Chinese and Japanese Buddhist schools trace their intellectual roots to Nagarjuna, Nagarjuna's works were only known to them through Chinese translations and commentaries such as the Middle Treatise. I wanted to know what 'Nagarjuna's Middle Treatise' actually meant for those Chinese who received in the early 5th Century for the first time Kumarajiva's translation of it and who had no knowledge of any Sanskrit or other Indic versions of the text, or access to any other author's commentary on Nagarjuna's verses. The Middle Treatise is seldom, if ever, viewed in isolation in this way by Japanese scholars of Madhyamika, as is reflected in the way that the term 'the Middle Treatise' (Jap: Churon) is used in an all-embracing way to denote all versions of Nagarjuna's Middle Stanzas, with or without their commentaries.

5. Mādhyamika

5.1 Levels of Mādhyamika in The Treatise

Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas, in all versions, are aphoristic. Their meaning is not obvious, and in the early years of Western

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studies of Mādhyamika learned battles were fought over the basic meaning of the Mādhyamika texts. The problem lay in the Buddhist world-view which the Middle Stanzas presupposed. Was it nihilistic, or absolutist? Was Nāgārjuna a crypto-Vedantist (as Śankara was a crypto-Buddhist)? Are the psychological categories of early Buddhism such as are elaborated in the Abhidharma to be abandoned, or is Nāgārjuna's prāsaṅgika (reductio ad absurdum) method predicated on the basis of deep faith in the words of the Buddha? There is no end to the questions that can be asked about Nāgārjuna's purpose and presuppositions, and no limit, too, to the number of commentaries that could be composed around his verses. According to one source, the Middle Treatise was one of seventy commentaries on the Middle Stanzas written in the two centuries after Nāgārjuna. Presumably in Nāgārjuna's own time, he himself explained what Mādhyamika was, but no commentary by Nāgārjuna himself has been preserved. We do not know, therefore, what 'basic Mādhyamika' was; we have only different versions of it according to different commentators.

Nevertheless, within the Chung-lun we can discern at least two levels of discourse. One level is the discourse by Nāgārjuna, including on occasion the voice of his opponent(s), found in the verses themselves and in the straightforward recapitulation of these verses in prose form in the commentary. The other is the discourse of the Middle Treatise commentator, 'Blue-Eyes' or Kumārajīva, expanding and elaborating on the text, drawing out

conclusions, clarifying presuppositions, providing analogies and examples, extending the argument to deal with new objections, and generally making the text accessible to a contemporary Buddhist, or indeed non-Buddhist, Chinese reader. In the following sections (5.2ff), the term 'basic Mādhyamika' will therefore be used to refer to the familiar basic Mādhyamika argument developed in Nāgārjuna's stanzas and recapitulated in the commentary. Section 6, 'Survey of Contents' will focus on the Middle Treatise Commentary, indicating those points at which the commentary diverges from, or adds something to, the discourse of Nāgārjuna's stanzas; in other words, it will highlight those sections of the Chung-lun which are distinctively its own.

5.2 Basic Mādhyamika in the Treatise

Different authors have presented the basic tenets of Mādhyamika in different ways. Among recent works, T.R.V. Murti's The Central Philosophy of Buddhism takes up, first of all, causality as the central Mādhyamika and indeed Buddhist, problematic, and then discusses in turn the following topics: motion and rest; the Abhidharmika categories (the āyatana, skandhas, dhātus etc.); conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas and dependent origination; the Self, the nature of the Tathāgata, and finally, 'philosophy as Prajñāpāramitā'. F. Streng, in his exposition of Nāgārjuna's thought examines Mādhyamika under the headings of dharmas, causal relationships, nirvāṇa, and wisdom or insight (prajñā). Sprung, in the introduction to his recent English

translation of the Prasannapadā, adopts a more thematic approach. He identifies the Mādhyamika method as that of dichotomizing and destroying concepts; ideas are unthinkable; being is repudiated; no thesis or standpoint is advanced; reason is king, and the mind's knowing, conceptualisation, is an obstacle,. Sprung then analyses Mādhyamika under the six headings of Being, Emptiness (or 'the truth of things'), the Two Truths, the Boundaries of Language, Nirvāṇa, and the Middle Way.

Basic Mādhyamika in the Middle Treatise could be analysed under any combination of the above headings, but the major preoccupations of the stanzas may be conveniently gathered under three broad headings, namely (1) causality; (2) the true character of things; and (3) what it is to be a Buddha.

These three are of course interdependent. The true character of things is that they are entirely subject to causality, by which is meant dependent origination, and this is how a Buddha sees them. These relationships will be explored in more detail.

5.3 Mādhyamika and the Buddha's teaching

If these three headings can summarise Mādhyamika however, they can of course also be said to summarise the Buddha's earliest discourses, preserved in the Pali Canon and the Chinese Āgamas.

Yet the Middle stanzas are more than just a restatement of the Buddha's description of the world, for Nāgārjuna deals with questions which the Buddha did not answer. For example, the Buddha in the earliest texts denies the ātman but apparently asserts the existence of the skandhas and of dharmas (factors of experience). Only later, when his teaching became formulated into a general theory of the insubstantiality of things could the question be asked, 'Do the skandhas themselves exist, have self-ness, in the way that the ātman does not? Since this line of questioning is based on two assumptions, one, that the skandhas, and other dharmas are substantial entities having, in Nāgārjuna's words, own-nature or self-nature and the other, that all such dharmas are part of a universal process of dependent origination, as taught by the Buddha, it could and did lead in Abhidharmist thinking to an infinite regression into an increasingly ramified atomism, wherein entities are asserted to be insubstantial and selfless, on the grounds that they are composed of constituent parts, but these constituent parts are themselves selfless for the same reason, and so on. This regression of dissolving causes was intended to preserve the general principle that all dharmas are caused (the principle of dependent origination, pratītya-samutpāda), as well as the notion of dharmas as substantial things

There are four intellectual paths which seem to promise a way out from this infinite and complex regressional impasse. One way is not to discuss or think about the problem beyond the first

stage, that of the insubstantiality of the ātman, composed of skandhas and dharmas. This was the Buddha's way, but it involves mental restraint and, as the subsequent proliferation of Buddhist philosophies testifies, it was not for many a satisfactory intellectual solution. A second way is to pursue the atomistic model, without however examining too carefully the contradictory presuppositions of that model, namely that everything is caused, but that substantial entities (dharmas conceived as finite particles) do ultimately exist. Some Abhidharmists and the 'Satyasiddhi' or 'Tattvasiddhi' (a reconstructed name for the Chinese Cheng-shih) school took the view that by subdividing entities one would eventually arrive at emptiness, the basic characteristic of reality. A third way, favoured also by Abhidharmists was to assert that although most dharmas are entirely the product of causality (i.e. 'conditioned' dharmas), there are some ultimate 'unconditioned' or 'inactive' dharmas, such as nirvāna. In a discussion of this way of thinking the Treatise lists at 4/2 'three inactive (dharmas) which, being inactive are permanent and therefore without causes'. In this way the all-important principle of dependent origination could be upheld, and dharmas deemed to exist, as the Buddha taught, but only the 'unconditioned' ones. such as nirvāna, are ultimately real

The fourth way out of the impasse, at least up to the time of Kumārajīva in China, was the Mādhyamika way, which is summed up by Kumārajīva in one of his letters to the Chinese monk Hui-yuan:

The Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise explains the matter at length. It says that dissociation from all verbalism and quenching all workings of thought is termed the real character of all the dharmas.

This is Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika approach. It takes a sideways step, neither trying through the operation of thought to understand the nature of things (like the Abhidharmists) nor exemplifying mental restraint (like the Buddha), but instead advocating an intellectual path or method which leads, by a process of reductio ad absurdum, to an abandonment of standpoints, including the standpoint of emptiness from which all other standpoints are seen to be erroneous. This, says Nāgārjuna, is 'the Middle Path'.

Whether or not Nāgārjuna's method 'works' is a difficult question to answer. The Mādhyamika method of exposing the incoherence of all views definitely induces a kind of intellectual vertigo in one who pursues it, but whether this is enough, in the sense of being an adequate intellectual concomitant to the meditative insight into the way things really are which distinguishes Buddhas from ordinary unenlightened people, is beyond judgement. If Nāgārjuna is correct to advocate emptiness as a unique and universal panacea for all wrong views, then naturally emptiness cannot be evaluated as one 'view' among others. On the other hand there is a difference between the doctrine of emptiness and properly understanding the doctrine of emptiness. The view of the Treatise is overwhelmingly that only one who already has

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insight can correctly handle emptiness.

Let us examine, then, the three components of the Middle Path according to Nāgārjuna; causality, the true character of things, and what it is to be a Buddha.

5.4 Causality

Causality is the topic dealt with in the first chapter of Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas, and the examination of the causal process is central to the whole work. The notion of causality is susceptible to unlimited analysis and interpretation. In the Treatise it means in particular Buddhist causality, or dependent origination, expressed in the standard and unvarying formulae of the twelve causal links and the four holy or noble truths. Causality in the Mādhyamika context always refers to the process by which one achieves, or fails to achieve, spiritual liberation, the 'calm cessation of things'. All events and processes in the material and psychological realms are considered and evaluated from this point of view. Nāgārjuna's interest in causality is not therefore scientific or philosophical in the sense that he wants to establish a hypothetical causal process and test it against experience or revelation. The causal sequence is 'given' by the Buddha, and its components are not in question. The 'twelve causes and conditions' are detailed in the chapter of that title, chapter twenty-six, as follows:

- (26v1) Living beings, obscured in delusion
Subsequently give rise to the three actions
And through producing these three actions
According to their predispositions they fall into the
six destinies.
- (v2) Conditioned by the predispositions
Consciousness receives a body of the six ways
When consciousness becomes attached
Name and form develop
- (v3) Name and form developing
Cause the six avenues to arise
When senses, objects and consciousness combine
There arises six-fold contact.
- (v4) On account of the six contacts
The threefold reception arises
On account of the threefold receiving
Craving is produced.
- (v5) On account of craving there are the four graspings
And because of grasping there is existence.
If the grasper would not grasp
There would be liberation, and no existence
- (v6) From existence there is birth
From birth comes old age and death
Because of old age and death there are
All the afflictions of sorrow and ill.
- (v7) All such things as these
Arise from birth
Only through these causes and conditions
Does the great suffering of the skandhas accumulate
- (v8) The basis of birth and death
And predispositions just described
Is created by the unenlightened man
The man of insight does not create it.
- (v9) When these things cease
They do not arise
This suffering assemblage of the skandhas
Thus simply ceases.

At two points the chain of causation may be broken; these are
ignorance or delusion (v1) and grasping (v5). The breaking of
the causal circle is itself achieved by a causal process, that of

following the path or Way, also 'given' by the Buddha. This is described in the formula of the four holy truths. The four truths are that there is suffering, accumulation of karma, cessation of suffering and a Way to be practised which will eliminate suffering. This 'Way' is traditionally formulated as the noble eightfold path, but this particular formula is not found in the Middle Stanzas or the Treatise, where emphasis is laid instead upon the fact that this Way is itself a causal process, consisting of the implementation of the four noble truths:

'..The four truths involve cause and effect' says the commentary,
 'If there were no arising and ceasing there would be no four truths, and if there were no four truths there would be no perception of suffering, cutting-off of accumulation [of karma], realisation of cessation [of suffering] or cultivation of the Way, and without perception of suffering, cutting off of accumulation, realisation of cessation and cultivation of the Way there would not be the four śramaṇa-fruits...
 (32b27)

The path or Way is a causal process because it involves directed change, change in which particular actions lead to intended results. Unless directed change is possible, argues Nāgārjuna, there can be no liberation - or at least such liberation could not be achieved by methodically following the Buddha's instructions. If causality operated capriciously (which is to say not 'causally' at all), there would be no possibility of successfully acting towards a goal. Actions tending towards nirvāna and actions tending towards rebirth would be

indistinguishable in their effects. As Nāgārjuna puts it in chapter eight:

(8v6) Where there is no recompense for sin or merit
 There is also no nirvāṇa
 And whatever one may do
 Is completely vacuous and without effect.

It is quite clear that Nāgārjuna accepts without reservation the Buddha's account of the causal sequence leading to nirvāṇa. But there is another important dimension of causality, namely the actual mechanism of causality; how it works. The 'twelve causal links' describe the circular causal sequence 'A causes B causes C causes D...' and so on up to..causes A', but the Buddha did not make it clear how A, 'ignorance' can cause B, 'actions' and so on up to existence and old-age and death. Extremely complex models ('views') of psychophysical interaction could be, and were, developed by Buddhist thinkers on the basis of the Buddha's teaching of causality, but for Nāgārjuna it is attachment to these very views or models of causality which itself constitutes the barrier to following the path laid out by the Buddha. It would not be putting it too strongly to say that for Nāgārjuna 'ignorance' in the twelvefold causal sequence means 'attachment to views about causality'. He identifies 'perverted views' or 'sophistries', theories about the causal process, as the very stuff of ignorance and delusion. These views themselves give rise to actions, craving, and grasping and hence perpetuate the whole miserable round of birth and death

(samsāra). The Buddha, according to Nāgārjuna, taught what he taught precisely in order to extinguish such views. At the beginning of the Stanzas this is forcefully stated in a verse in which a representative selection of views about causality is presented. Each view or aspect of causality is negated at once:

(1v1) No arising and no ceasing
 No permanence and no severance
 No identity and no difference
 No arriving and no departing

And these so-called 'eight refutations' are immediately followed by a verse of homage to the Buddha and the intention of his teaching:

(1v2) To the one who can expound this matter of causality
 And completely extinguish all sophistries
 I bow my head in reverence
 The Buddha, greatest of all teachers.

Similarly, at the close of the Stanzas, Nāgārjuna once again makes clear his view that the Buddha's teaching was motivated by the desire to extinguish all views:

(27v30) To Gautama, Great Sage and Master,
 Who from pity and compassion preached this Dharma,
 Entirely cutting off all views;
 We now bow our heads in reverence.

The method which Nāgārjuna adopts in order to destroy all these 'views' and 'sophistries', and to re-present to those who have misconstrued it what he conceives to be the spirit of the

Buddha's teaching, is to take up, one by one, the views to which his opponents allegedly adhere, (such as that living beings transmigrate in saṃsāra), and then to show that such views are incoherent. To begin with he creates a dichotomy, identifying within a single process two or more constituent parts or dharmas, to each of which he provisionally attributes 'self-nature' or 'own-being'. In chapter sixteen for example, the process being examined or contemplated is that of transmigration. This process is axiomatic in the Buddha's teaching; without transmigration and the law of karmic recompense which is implied in it, self-transformation (directed change) cannot take place, and nirvāṇa cannot be attained.

The Buddha's account of transmigration includes of necessity several overlapping or synonymous terms and concepts such as 'predispositions' (Sanskrit: saṃskāra) which are said to carry through from one life to the next; the 'living being' who of course 'possesses' the predispositions, in a manner of speaking; the 'skandhas, realms and avenues' (Abhidharmic categories and constituents of the living being); 'the body'; 'extinction'; 'bondage' (to the passions); 'liberation' (from the passions); 'the one who is bound'; 'dharmas'; 'reception' (another of the five skandhas); 'birth and death' (saṃsāra) and finally, nirvāṇa. These terms have been misunderstood, says Nāgārjuna. They are merely words used by the Buddha in his teaching to assist beings to attain liberation. They do not refer to real, separate 'things' or 'objects' which, added together, constitute

transmigration. Transmigration no doubt takes place, but its operation is ineffable, and attempting to comprehend it intellectually by subdividing and analysing the process is exactly what the Buddha means by 'delusion'.

The essentially delusory nature of such subdividing and analysing, of grasping onto concepts and generating views, can, says Nāgārjuna, be demonstrated by showing that the picture or model of transmigration thus obtained is incoherent, full of contradictions and incongruities. It is important to remember that Nāgārjuna presupposes that all views will be misleading and inadequate. He does not consider for a moment the possibility that transmigration and other features of the Buddhist world-view described by the Buddha might be susceptible to analysis in other terms than dharmas, skandhas, and so on ('emptiness' and 'thusness' are terms which might from our point of view be said to supersede the Buddha's own terminology, but their meaning, says Nāgārjuna, cannot be grasped by one who is given to analysing). These were the terms sanctioned by the Buddha himself, and Nāgārjuna does not question their validity. But the Buddha's teaching is seen by Nāgārjuna as somewhat analogous to a fairy tale. It conveys a meaning which is real, by means which are fabricated. In the fairy tale, there is no castle in which a princess is sleeping, but nevertheless awakening is a real possibility. In the same way, there are no five skandhas, but the living being may attain nirvāṇa. This understanding of the Buddha's teaching as an expedient, a means,

is characteristic of the developed Mahayanist understanding of the Buddha-Dharma and it is made explicit by Nāgārjuna in a number of places in the stanzas, though the term 'skilful means' which figures so prominently in Mahayana canonical works and which refers not only to what the Buddha taught but to his very appearance in the world, does not itself occur in the stanzas, and occurs only once in the Middle Treatise commentary (at 25a15-18) in a long passage in chapter eighteen, which was almost certainly written by Kumārajīva (see nn.53,270,339 and 340 to the translation). A less developed version of the skilful means idea is however found in the concept of 'two truths' which Nāgārjuna discusses in chapter twenty-four:

(24v8) All Buddhas rely on two types of truth
 In order to teach the Dharma to living beings.
 One is conventional worldly truth,
 The other is the truth of the ultimate meaning.

These will be discussed further below.

In chapter sixteen of the Stanzas, in his discussion of bondage and liberation, , Nāgārjuna demonstrates the delusory nature of words understood as referring to real entities by taking up pairs of terms: predispositions and transmigration; living beings and skandhas, to show that they cannot co-exist, if each is considered to be an entity, an own-nature, distinct from the other entity.

- (16v1) As for the predispositions transmigrating,
If they are permanent they should not transmigrate.
Nor should they if impermanent.
It is the same too, with living beings.
- (v2) If living beings transmigrate
Within the skandhas, the realms and the avenues,
Seek them five ways; they are utterly nonexistent.
Who is it that transmigrates?
- (v3) If something transmigrates from a body to a body,
It will be bodiless.
If it has no body,
Then there will be no transmigration.
- (v4) The predispositions becoming extinct?
Such would never be the case.
Living beings becoming extinct?
This too could not be right.
- (v5) Predispositions have the characteristics of arising
and ceasing,
Not bound, and not liberated.
Living beings too, as formerly explained,
Are not bound and not liberated.
- (v6) If bondage means the body
Then having a body is not bondage.
Not having a body also is not bondage,
How then can there be bondage?
- (v7) If bondage preceded the one who is bound,
Then it would bind the one who is bound.
But in reality no pre-existent bondage exists
The other (aspects) may be answered as in 'going and
coming'.,

After verse 8 the argument shifts from a destructive analysis of held concepts to a comment on the person who holds them -the one who generates views. Nāgārjuna will argue in his stanzas that standpoints only reside in people holding particular views, and absence of views therefore means that there is no-one holding views.

(27v29) Since all dharmas are empty
 Views about the permanence, etc. of the world -
 In what place and at what time
 And by whom, would such views be generated?

To achieve cessation of views is to achieve selflessness, which, all are agreed, is what the Buddha taught. As Nāgārjuna puts it in the chapter on Nirvāṇa (chapter twenty-five):

(25v24) All dharmas are inconceivable.
 Extinguish all futile thoughts.
 There is no person and no place,
 And there is nothing taught by the Buddha.

By contrast, those who seek to preserve selfhood while abandoning views can never succeed, because their desire to enjoy the satisfaction of having abandoned views (in the language of the Treatise, to 'receive dharmas' or 'grasp onto concepts as real') is itself bondage - in this particular case bondage to a deeply-rooted concept of 'nirvāṇa', the cessation of views, as something which the self can 'have'. In fact, argues Nāgārjuna:

(16v9) "If we do not receive dharmas
 We will attain nirvāṇa".
 Such persons as these
 Are themselves the ones in bondage to receiving.

Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are ultimately the same, because to attain nirvāṇa is to abandon the idea of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa being different:

(16v10) Nirvāṇa is not something special,
Separate from birth and death...

In nirvāṇa all distinctions are seen to be unreal. The real character of things is 'thusness':

(16v10) ...The meaning of thusness [the true character] being thus,
' How can there be any distinctions?

This reference in the final verse of chapter sixteen to the 'true character' of things leads into the second major topic in the analysis of basic Mādhyamika in Nāgārjuna's stanzas, the concept of 'The true character of things' and its synonym 'emptiness'.

5.5 The True Character of things

Emptiness is another word for causality, in the Buddhist sense, outlined above, of the ineffable process of dependent origination. This is made explicit in chapter twenty-four:

(24v19) There has never existed a single dharma
Which did not arise from causes and conditions
Therefore no dharma exists
Which is not empty

(24v20) If everything were not empty

There would be no arising or ceasing
 And thus there would not be
 The Dharma of the four holy truths.

And in 24v14 it is said that things can only happen where there is emptiness (i.e. the process of causal change):

By virtue of the principle of emptiness
 All dharmas are established.
 If there were no principle of emptiness
 Nothing would be established.

To deny emptiness is to deny causality and the causal relationships upon which karmic responsibility and the possibility of following the Way are predicated:

(24v36) If you reject the idea of emptiness
 Then there will be nothing which is done,
 There will be doing without doing [i.e. without anything done]
 And a non-doer will be called a doer.

'Emptiness' has the meaning of causality, but it also has a non-meaning. At one level, emptiness describes the way things are according to the Buddhist world-view, in which the whole of existence (using the term in a non-technical sense) is seen as a seamless web of causality, empty of any distinguishable moments or separate entities - an Indra's net of infinitely reflecting jewels, in which everything depends entirely upon everything else and nothing has independent substance or own-being. Speaking conventionally, the Buddha described this reality in terms of 'dharmas' which 'arise' and 'cease', each dharma being

both the effect of the dharma which causes it and the cause of the dharma which it brings about. The sequence of causation is not necessarily to be conceived of as temporal, though a temporal model of cause followed by effect is adequate to convey the general idea of causality.

In the first chapter of the Stanzas Nāgārjuna reviews a rather more complex model of causality (which in the commentary is attributed to the Abhidharmists) in which four types of cause are said to operate on each dharma.

(1v5) Causal condition, sequential cause
Objective cause, predominant cause.
Four causes produce all dharmas
There is no fifth beyond these.

Nāgārjuna is not concerned with showing exactly how these four types of cause are supposed to interact; his purpose is only to show that any model of causality which involves the elements of dharmas arising and ceasing and causing each other is inconsistent and internally contradictory. Although he deals with each of the four types of causes individually in verses six to twelve of chapter one, his conclusion applies to all models of causality involving dharmas as causes and effects:

(1v13) In causes and conditions, whether summarised or at length,
You search in vain for an effect.
If an effect does not exist within conditions
How can you say that it issues from them?

This argument, with minor variations, is repeated time and again throughout the Treatise. If dharma A is said to cause dharma B, or if the two are said to operate interdependently in any process such as seeing, going, burning, suffering and so forth, then either dharma A already presupposes the existence of dharma B, in which case A has not 'caused' B, or dharma A can exist without dharma B, in which case the two dharmas are not in fact interdependent. But the Buddha has taught that dharmas are entirely dependently arising, so neither of these possibilities, argues Nāgārjuna, conforms with the Buddha's teaching.

Nevertheless the Buddha has taught that the causal process operates, and it involves dharmas. How, then, are we to understand it as operating? Nāgārjuna's answer is that the process of causality is incomprehensible to the unenlightened mind. Only 'one who has insight' can comprehend it, and one who has insight does not 'analyse', 'conceptually discriminate' and 'generate sophistries and views' about causality. In other words, the one who has insight not only sees that the causal process is empty in the sense that it contains no elements with own-being (the first meaning of the term emptiness), but he also abandons even the 'view' that the causal process is empty, (acknowledging that even emptiness is empty). This can be accomplished only at the level of praxis, by cultivating the Way, and acquiring insight by means of meditative disciplining of the mind through the techniques taught by the Buddha. But the way things really are can also be hinted at by descriptions of

the causal process which are in a sense more true or accurate than even the Buddha's powerful myth of dharmas arising and ceasing; certainly more true than the rationalised and embroidered versions of that myth propagated by the Abhidharmists. To establish a distinction between explanations which are more true and less true, Nāgārjuna posits two levels of truth, a 'conventional truth' and 'a truth of the supreme meaning' or 'highest truth'. The conventional truth is, in general, the account of dharmas, skandhas, nirvāṇa and so forth, although its meaning can be extended to cover all statements made for purposes of communication, especially communication by the Buddha:

- (18v6) The Buddhas may teach that there is a self,
 Or teach that there is no self...
 - While the 'truth of the highest meaning' is a
 description of the 'true character of things' as seen
 by the Buddha.-
- (18v6) ...Within the true character of dharmas
 There is neither self-nor non-self.

But since the account is not the experience, Nāgārjuna's description of things as they really are oscillates between, on the one hand, straightforward descriptions, such as that things are actually empty, ineffable, like things which the mind cannot grasp

- (27v22) The constant succession of the five skandhas
 Is like the flame of a lamp
 Because of this the world
 Can be neither bounded nor unbounded

and on the other hand warnings against regarding this description as a better conventional account of reality than that given by the Buddha. To appreciate the highest truth one has to have insight. Otherwise

(24v11) If he is unable to perceive emptiness correctly,
A dull-witted man will injure himself.
It is like a spell unskillfully-invoked
Or a poisonous snake unskillfully grasped.

Such warnings are made because the highest truth can easily slip into conventional truth if it is apprehended without the insight of a Buddha, and it is actually misleading and perhaps dangerous for an unsuitable person to encounter the teaching of 'the true character of things'. For the ordinary person, the 'analyser', the Buddha's simple teaching on dharmas and skandhas is safe and true for all practical purposes.

Nāgārjuna's motivation here appears somewhat equivocal. On the one hand he is effectively demythologising the Buddha's and the Abhidharmists' accounts of causality which are couched in terms of dharmas and skandhas arising and ceasing, but on the other hand he is warning that the real character of things - which he describes - cannot be intellectually grasped because the real character of things is not a model of the way things really are, but actually is the way things really are, and this being the case, only a Buddha, or one who has insight can comprehend the

highest truth. Nāgārjuna's 'real character of things' is the highest truth, but unlike the conventional truth 'grasped' by analysing, unenlightened beings, this truth cannot be grasped.

- (18v7) The true character of dharmas
 Is severance of mind, actions and speech.
 With no production and no cessation
 Calm extinction, like nirvana.
- (18v8) All things are real, unreal,
 Both real and unreal, and
 Neither unreal nor not unreal,
 This is called the Buddha's Dharma.
- (v9) To know for oneself, not following others,
 Calm extinction, without sophistries,
 No differences and no distinctions
 This is termed the 'true character'.
- (v10) If dharmas arise from conditions,
 They neither are, nor differ from, their conditions.
 This is why we call the real character
 'No arising and no ceasing'.
- (v11) Not one and not different,
 Not permanent and not cut off;
 This is the flavour
 Of the sweet nectar of the Buddha's teachings.

Since the real character of things is non-grasping, the perceiver of truth has to change, in order to apprehend the highest truth, from an analysing, conceptualising, unenlightened being into a Buddha, a Tathagata, or, in Chinese, a 'Thus-Come One'. The nature of the Thus-Come One or what it is to be a Buddha, is, therefore, a central concern of both the stanzas and the Treatise.

5.6 What it is to be a Buddha.

There are three Buddhas in the Middle Stanzas; one is the Buddha Gautama, who taught causality, another is the Buddha that one can become, by following the prescriptions of the Middle Path, and the third is the Tathāgata, the 'Thus-Come' whose nature is contemplated in chapter twenty-two of the Treatise.

To the first Buddha, Gautama, Nāgārjuna pays homage in the first and last verses of the stanzas, and in scattered references throughout the stanzas this Buddha's characteristics and motivations are recorded. For example, in chapter twenty-four Nāgārjuna reports that:

The world-honoured One knew that this Dharma,
Extremely profound and subtle in character
Could not be approached by the dull-witted.
This is why he was unwilling to teach.

Gautama's presence is always felt, of course, in the teachings on dharmas, the four holy truths, the 12 causal links, the skandhas, nirvana and so on, drawn from his early sermons.

But Nāgārjuna also knows the Buddha's mind in a way that his opponent apparently does not, for he is able to draw a distinction between what the Buddha says, and what he sees, such that, for instance, he is able to identify the teaching of non-self as merely one of a set of alternative teachings which the Buddha could have employed if the circumstances had been different:

(18v6) The Buddhas may teach that there is a self,
 Or teach that there is no self.
 Within the true character of dharmas
 There is neither self, nor non-self

Similarly, although the Buddha taught that dharmas arise and cease, Nāgārjuna asserts that in fact the Buddha taught emptiness, although he is not able to give any examples. He does however quote from a sutra source the phrase 'separate from existence, separate from nonexistence' several times, for example in 15v7:

The Buddha is able to extinguish both existence and nonexistence.
 As it says in the sutra,
 In the 'Instruction to Katyāyana';
 Separate from existence and separate from nonexistence'

The Buddha's teaching is, in any case, a teaching about what is already there; he does not reveal a new truth, but apprehends by his insight and conveys to others a truth which others can also perceive.

(18v12) If the Buddha had not emerged in the world,
 And the Buddha-dharma had utterly ceased.
 The insight of the Pratyekabuddhas
 Would have arisen quite separately.

This understanding of the Buddha-dharma as 'what is true' rather than 'what the Buddha said' enables Nāgārjuna to interpret the Buddha's teaching on causality as an expedient or provisional teaching, and to propound the doctrine of emptiness as a 'higher'

truth than that of the Buddha's first sermons. This distinction between what a Buddha says and what is the case did not necessarily originate with Nāgārjuna, but it became an important element in the defence of Mahayana doctrines which could not be supported by teachings shared by all the Buddhist schools.

Once a distinction is made between what the Buddha says and what is the case, the problem arises of the status of the teachings which the Buddha does convey. What is true, and who is to judge? Nāgārjuna asserts that all Buddhas (including Gautama)

(24v8) ...rely on two types of truth
In order to teach the Dharma to living beings.
One is conventional worldly truth,
The other is the truth of the ultimate meaning.

Of these two truths, the truth made public by the Buddha is classed as conventional; what the Buddha would have said if his hearers had not been 'dull-witted' becomes the 'truth of the highest meaning', and in the stanzas this 'truth of the ultimate meaning' is equated with the teaching of emptiness, the 'non-arising and non-ceasing' of dharmas, and absolute causality. However, it remains the case that this teaching, which is 'profound and noble in character' can therefore still be misconstrued by the dull-witted (see section 6.5, discussion of chapter 24). Such persons may be identified by their tendency to 'grasp on to' or become attached to emptiness itself. They make emptiness itself into a dharma (even though, as Nāgārjuna points

out, the Buddhas only teach emptiness to wean us away from all views), and they say that this is how things really are, without being aware of the need to distinguish between statements made at the conventional level, and statements made at the highest level of truth. One of the characteristics of a Buddha is that he has the compassion and the wisdom to select appropriate teachings for different levels of receptivity in his hearers. The implication of this however is that only one who has insight can really apprehend the highest teaching. Only a Buddha, in fact, can understand a Buddha.

Apart from Gautama the Buddha, who is representative of 'all Buddhas' to Nāgārjuna, there is the Buddha that one can become by following the Middle Way propounded by Gautama and re-presented by Nāgārjuna. The characteristics of this Buddha are that he possesses insight, has no outflows, does not analyse, and perceives the 'true character' of dharmas, which is calm cessation and nirvana. In other words, this Buddha is the being who really sees things as they are, just as they are described at the highest level of truth; empty, like a mirage, like a flame, and so on. While Gautama is the exemplar of the teacher, the saint, sage, or 'man of insight' is the one who holds out hope that an ignorant person can become a Buddha. Nāgārjuna's entire critique of 'fixed natures' is predicated on the belief that transformation can take place, and also on the belief that viewing things from the standpoint of emptiness contributes towards the ultimate realisation of nirvāṇa.

(24v39) If there is not emptiness
 One who has not yet attained will never attain
 Nor will the defilements be cut off,
 Nor will there be termination of suffering

As well as describing the Buddha Gautama and the 'one who has insight', Nāgārjuna devotes a chapter of the stanzas to an examination of the 'Thus-Come', the Tathāgata. Although the chapter is in one sense simply another exercise in creating a dichotomy (in this case between 'the Tathāgata' and 'the five skandhas'), and showing that any attempt to analyse the being of a Tathāgata is bound to fail, chapter twenty-two is nevertheless also a fitting summary of Nāgārjuna's teaching on causality, emptiness and the true character of dharmas, for it is only the Tathāgata who actually perceives things as they really are, and the Tathāgata's characteristic is that he has no self. The Tathāgata thus exemplifies Nāgārjuna's teaching of 'no standpoint'. The truth of things cannot be grasped, for the real character of things is non-grasping, but a Buddha's experience is reliable, because he does not grasp. Nāgārjuna intends to convey the quality of this experience, the 'sweet nectar of the Buddha's teaching', but ultimately it cannot be conveyed unless it can be received. Thus the perceiver has to change, in order to perceive the highest truth, from an analysing, conceptualising, unenlightened being into a Buddha, a Tathāgata, a 'Thus-Come'.

6. Survey of Contents

6.1 Chapters 1-5

The first Chapter, 'Contemplation of Causality' begins with Nāgārjuna's 'eightfold negation' in lv1,lv2, introducing the central topic of the verses and of the Treatise, the nature of causality. The subsequent commentary (1/0) explains in general terms Nāgārjuna's motives for writing the Stanzas, thus introducing a second major theme, the question of how things really are. 'The true character of things' is the phrase most often used in the Treatise) to signify what the Buddha sees, and hence what he is really referring to in his teaching, the 'True Dharma'. The 'True Dharma' is here identified variously first with the Śravaka-dharma, then with the Mahayana and finally with the teaching of the Treatise itself, which is intended to cut off attachment to any 'characteristic of emptiness' (that is to say, any notion that emptiness is itself a doctrine or viewpoint to which one should adhere) apprehended in the Mahayana. The notion of 'True Dharma' in the Treatise functions in much the same way as 'highest truth' in the Mādhyamika device of two truths (see Chapter 24, below), in the sense that it is true only insofar as it is not misconceived, 'grasped' or hypostatized by one who is inadequate to the task of understanding or dealing with it. Even emptiness itself is not foolproof, as the commentary points out, and indeed Nāgārjuna is here said to have written his stanzas precisely in order to refute the errors of those who cling to

emptiness as a 'characteristic', that is, who regard emptiness as itself a viewpoint or position. For those whose faculties are dulled, hearing either the doctrine of the Sravakas or the Mahayana provokes attachments to concepts. The purpose of the Treatise therefore is to wean even these hardened cases away from grasping at characteristics, by spelling out again and again, topic by topic, the meaning and purpose of emptiness.

The commentary at 1/2 addresses itself to the content rather than the purpose of Nāgārjuna's verses, elaborating systematically upon 'no arising', 'no ceasing' and the negation of the other six ways in which the causal process (the process described by the Buddha in terms of the twelve causal links from ignorance to old age and death) might be conceptualised. The section from 2a8ff. invokes 'direct worldly perception' as a reliable means of knowing things, though in other contexts ordinary perception is held to be inherently unreliable. The Treatise invokes empirical verification in support of Nāgārjuna's argument, but when the same evidence is brought in defence of the 'opponent's' point of view it is dismissed on the grounds that what is perceived by the senses is illusory. "What you see with the physical eyes cannot be trusted" says the commentator at 2/17, and:

5v8

The superficial see dharmas
As having the characteristics of existence or
non-existence
And thus are unable to perceive
The calm serenity of the cessation of views.

and at 21/10:

If someone says 'arising and ceasing exist since we see them with our eyes; how can they be refuted by words and teachings?' this is not correct, and why? Seeing arising and ceasing with one's eyes is due to ignorance and delusion ... the unenlightened man has attained his eyes on account of his delusion in a former world. Because of his false conceptualisation and discrimination in the present world, he says that his eyes see arising and ceasing....

lv3 is concerned with the nature of arising, and the commentary additionally draws out the implications of a false view of arising for Buddhist morality and soteriology and the operation of karma. This is another major preoccupation of the Treatise, perhaps too easily overlooked in the context of the intellectual argument. 'Where there is no cause there is no effect' is a truism no doubt, but it has ramifications beyond the purely logical:

(2b10ff.) Where there is no cause there is no effect; if there were no causes and yet there were effects, then giving alms, keeping the precepts and so forth could drag you down into the hells, while the ten evils and five rebellious acts could lead to rebirth in the heavens, because there would be no causal link.

This concern to preserve the possibility of moral cause and effect ties in with a third major preoccupation of the Treatise, the importance of the possibility of directed change within the causal process. Nāgārjuna is delineating a path between absolute fixedness on the one hand and total randomness on the other. In

a world where things are fixed, bondage cannot be transformed into liberation. In a world where nothing is fixed, there is no possibility of liberating wisdom, because there is no connection between events. But the Buddha has said that causal co-arising describes the way things are, and he also says that liberation is possible:

26v5 ... If the grasper would not grasp
There would be liberation and no existence

Following on from the discussion of cause and effect is a more detailed discussion of the four types of cause mentioned by Nāgārjuna in 1v5. The Treatise follows Nāgārjuna's lead in rejecting these theories, which are identified as products of the Abhidharmist schools, although it should be borne in mind that, later on in the Treatise, the explanatory value of the Abhidharmist account is explicitly approved:

(36c19) ..The meaning of the arising and ceasing of these twelve causal conditions is just as explained in detail in the Abhidharma-sūtra.

From 1v5 to 1/10 the Treatise refutes the four types of cause listed in 1v5. Here, as throughout the Treatise, a double standard is applied in cases where the Buddha-word is involved. The Commentary invokes the Buddha's word on behalf of the Mādhyamika: (1/10 'The Buddha has taught that 'all active dharmas cease in successive instants. There is not one single instant

when they abide', so how can you say that a present dharma is both on the point of cessation and not on the point of cessation?' and 1/11 'The Buddha teaches in the Mahayana that the characteristics of dharmas - whether they have form or do not have form, whether they have outflows or do not have outflows, whether they are active or inactive and so forth - all these characteristics enter into the Dharma-nature; everything is entirely empty and so there are no characteristics and no conditions...'). but a similar appeal to the scriptures by the opponent is not allowed, for 'You may believe in the True Dharma, but what is taught as an expedient does not constitute true reality'(1/11). The opponent, according to the Treatise, has misinterpreted the Buddha's intention, appealed in one context to a teaching intended for another, mistaken an expedient teaching for the 'true dharma', or hypostatized a process which is fundamentally inconceivable (1/12 'In relation to the sūtras' teaching of the twelve causal links, to say that 'because this thing exists, therefore that thing exists' is wrong, and why? ... It was only in accordance with the distinction made by ordinary people between existence and nonexistence that the Buddha spoke of them).

'Dharma' is a term best left untranslated, since it covers a range of meanings for which there is no corresponding single term in English, but in the sense in which it is most often used by Nagarjuna, to signify a component in the process of dependent arising, the most appropriate translation is probably 'factor of

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experience'. Dharmas feature prominently in the Buddha's teaching, in the Abhidharmists' elaboration of that teaching and in Nāgārjuna's refutation of the Abhidharmists' theories. Dharmas are a 'given', like the twelve causal links and the whole Buddhist teaching of causality. This is why Nāgārjuna can say that there are no dharmas-if by that is meant something which has 'own-being' or 'self-nature' or 'substance'- since nothing which is thus 'fixed and settled' could participate in a process of causality. The notion that dharmas have no self nature, because they are causally produced, is expounded in 1/15 - 1/16, where it is explicitly stated that something which is caused and hence has no self-nature is not (i.e. cannot be) a dharma. Since there are no uncaused dharmas (because all dharmas are caused, according to the Buddha's teaching), there are no dharmas or, as the commentator notes in a rare reference to the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras in 1/10, 'when a Bodhisattva is established in the seat of enlightenment, he views the twelve causal links as like the inexhaustibility of empty space'.

In chapter two, the 'going and coming' of the title refers to 'wandering in saṃsāra', hence the chapter has here more of a 'Buddhist' significance than the rather arid content of the verses alone might suggest. The commentary in the Treatise lends weight to this interpretation of the subject-matter of the chapter by using the example of the twelve causal links to illustrate 'movement' and 'stopping'.

(2/17) ...It is like the process of ignorance, causing predispositions and so on up to old age and death, being called 'movement', and when the predispositions and so forth cease because of the cessation of ignorance this being called 'stopping'.

The central soteriological significance of the chapter however lies in its refutation of any conceivable relationship between the components of going, such as goer, moment of going, place of going, action of going, characteristic of going, and other elements said by the opponent to be involved in the process of 'going'. The refutation of the 'three periods of time', the gone, the not-yet-gone and the moment of going, is significant because the model of causality which perhaps seems most 'natural', even though it may not stand up to close examination, is that of a temporal series of cause-effect. While the final verse (2v25) states that the components of going 'do not exist' the commentary is careful to gloss this 'nonexistence' as 'false and insubstantial ... empty ... being merely unreal designations, like illusions or apparitions'. 'Illusory' in the sense of 'only apparently existent' is one of two different meanings of emptiness which are not strictly separated in the Treatise. The first is ontological emptiness, the view, as here, that things are empty in the sense of being insubstantial and only apparently real

(7v35) Like an illusion, like a dream
 Like a Gandharva-city
 The arising, abiding and ceasing of which we speak
 Have characteristics such as these.

While the other meaning of emptiness is the epistemological version of emptiness, the 'emptiness which is itself empty'

(24/13) Because you say that we are attached to emptiness, you produce errors and attribute them to us. But the emptiness of natures of which we speak -this emptiness is itself empty. There are no such errors.

(33b17) Emptiness moreover is itself empty. But in order to guide all beings, it is taught by means of conventional designations. Because it is separate from the extremes of both existence and nonexistence, it is called the middle path.

This emptiness which is itself empty is an instrument of debate. The Treatise argues that it does not refer to anything and should not be understood as a viewpoint. This argument is difficult to uphold, but also difficult to knock down. In the context of a discussion in chapter thirteen about the inconceivability of dharmas which are non-empty (i.e. which have self-nature), the opponent accuses Nagarjuna of holding a view of emptiness.

(18c11) Question: You say that because no non-empty dharmas exist, empty dharmas do not exist either. If so, this is a doctrine of emptiness. But since there is no reciprocal dependence there should not be any clinging (to a position) ... It is in this way that we regard your doctrine of emptiness.

To which Nāgārjuna replies:

(13v9) The Great Sage speaks of the emptiness of dharmas
In order to wean us from all views.
If you then reinstate a view of 'emptiness',
You cannot be taught by all the Buddhas.

From the Treatise's perspective, 'emptiness' held as a doctrine is actually of no more value than, say, a doctrine of the substantiality of dharmas.

(13/9 It was in order to destroy the sixty-two views, as well as ignorance, craving, etc., and all the afflictions, that the Buddha spoke of emptiness. If a person produces further views about emptiness, such a person is incorrigible. As an example, a sick man has to take medicine to be healed. If the medicine makes him ill again he cannot get better. Or it is like a flame coming out of firewood which can be extinguished by water. If it had been produced by water, what could one use to extinguish it? In the same way emptiness is the water which can extinguish the fires of affliction. There are some people who, because they carry a heavy load of karma, have a mind steeped in craving and attachment and are dull in insight, produce views of emptiness. They either say that there is emptiness, or that there is not emptiness, and through (these ideas) they again generate afflictions. If one tries to instruct this kind of person in emptiness, he will say 'I have known this emptiness for a long time'. But without this emptiness there is no way to nirvana, for as the sutra says, 'Unless you pass through the gate of emptiness, marklessness and non-doing, your liberation will be nothing but words'.

In the concluding part of this passage, the description of emptiness as an instrument of debate shades off almost imperceptibly into the idea of emptiness as the means of liberation. The relationship between these two senses of 'emptiness' is never made explicit in the Treatise, but the Treatise insists nevertheless that there is a close relationship between understanding what emptiness means and attaining release from suffering. Following a rather technical discussion of criticism and counter-criticism in debates based on emptiness in chapter four, the Treatise seeks to establish a close parallelism

between the intellectual deployment of the concept of emptiness, on the one hand, and the attainment of nirvāṇa on the other.

(7b1) ...If one relies on emptiness to refute permanence, no error is involved, and why? Because such a man does not cling to the characteristic of 'emptiness'. Therefore if one even wants to debate, he should rely upon the idea of emptiness; how much more so if he desires to seek the characteristic of release from affliction, and calm extinction.

The relationship between using the idea of emptiness in argument and seeing the ultimate of emptiness of things can only be clarified in the end by reference to the idea of levels of insight, and the assumption that the 'man of insight' (see below) uses the notion of emptiness in order to teach others, from which it may be concluded that to understand emptiness is to partake of insight. But the seemingly intractable problem is that even a proper understanding of emptiness is not possible unless one has insight. Nāgārjuna's final word on this problem, as quoted above, is that those who do not, or cannot, understand emptiness except as a 'view', 'cannot be taught by all the Buddhas' (13v9). The Treatise's view is more equivocal; although such people are 'incorrigible', they are only so in their present state due to their karmic burden. If they cannot see the point of emptiness it is regrettable, 'But without this emptiness there is no way to nirvāṇa ...'

Chapter four deals with the five skandhas, beginning with the sūtra's assertion that there are five skandhas. Form,

representing the five skandhas of form, reception, conception, predispositions and consciousness, is analysed in terms of its being an effect of a cause, in this case the 'cause of form'. What this 'cause of form' is, is not specified in the Treatise, but the analogy of cloth and threads in the commentary makes it clear that it is not a temporal causal sequence which is being examined here but the notion of form (as a dharma) being itself a fabrication of causes. Thus 'form' stands not only for the five skandhas but for all dharmas, which are taught to be causally dependent. The Treatise's argument rests on the assumption that 'things which are uncaused and yet exist are not found anywhere in the world', which is another way of saying that uncaused dharmas are inconceivable, since the Treatise does not recognise any distinction between a logical, and empirical, impossibility. This assertion, that all dharmas are uncaused, raises a question in the Treatise which is not dealt with by Nāgārjuna in his stanzas. The opponent asks about uncaused dharmas. There are three Buddhist ones, he states, and also in non-Buddhist philosophical systems there are said to be uncaused dharmas such as space, time, soul and so forth. Curiously, the three Buddhist uncaused dharmas are not specified, though this is probably a reference to the Abhidharmist notion of space and two forms of nirvāṇa which are said to be uncaused, or unconditioned (see n.85). The axiom that all dharmas are caused, nirvāṇa as much as saṃsāra, is fundamental to Nāgārjuna's argument in the Middle Stanzas. It is therefore important for the Treatise that the notion of uncaused dharmas is refuted, since uncaused dharmas

might appear, if they did appear, to be exceptions to the rule that all dharmas are caused. The Treatise states that 'uncaused dharmas are mere figures of speech; they are not in fact dharmas but mere terms. But if this is true, it is no less true of all other dharmas, according to Nāgārjuna, and the Treatise in fact can do little more than restate the axiom:

(6c3) These 'uncaused dharmas' only exist as figures of speech. If we ponder and analyse them we find they are non-existent. If dharmas have their being through causes and conditions, we ought not to say that they are uncaused. If they have no causes and conditions then it is as we have said.

The commentary on 4v5 picks up the theme earlier introduced in the Treatise in section 1/0, of the distinctions between different degrees of insight. Since the relationship between form and its cause is inconceivable, argues Nāgārjuna, the man of insight does not analyse form, whereas one who is bound by ignorance and desire develops distinctions and sophistries, about form as about everything else. Here the distinction is not simply between those who 'know' and those who do not, rather it is between those who remain aloof from conceptual traps and those who are snared by them; in other words, the man of insight is characterised by mental detachment, whereas the common unenlightened man, analysing and grasping at forms, is enslaved by mental attachments. A rather literal metaphor for this polarity between detachment and attachment is furnished by the notion of the 'eye of insight' which may either be focused and

'without outflows' like the Arhat's, able to see the Dharma-Body of the Buddha, or inverted, with outflows, pursuing sophistries, and seeing dharmas as discrete self-natures. Dharmas vary in their nature according to the eye of insight of the perceiver, and if the eye of insight is not veiled by thoughts of 'I' and 'mine' one can perceive the true character of dharmas. There is a hierarchy of spiritual beings based on the opposition between 'with outflows' (the haemorrhaging of the attention into forms and shapes) and 'without outflows', which is the state of the Arhat or Buddha. A clue to the purpose of Mādhyamika may be found in Nāgārjuna's assertion that 'Sophistries destroy the eye of insight':

(22v15) The Thus-Come (Tathāgata) transcends sophistries
 Yet men still produce sophistries
 Sophistries destroy the eye of insight
 Such as these do not see the Buddha.

The Treatise's gloss on this verse elaborates on the notion of 'sophistries'

(22/15) 'Sophistries' means recollected thoughts, grasping of characteristics, distinguishing this from that, saying that the Buddha is extinct or is not extinct, and so forth. Since man in order to pursue sophistries inverts his eye of insight, he is unable to see the dharma-body of the Thus-Come.

And seeing the dharma-body of the Thus-come means seeing things as a Buddha sees them for

(22/16) ... The nature of the Thus-Come ... is in fact the nature of all the worlds.

Question: What kind of thing is this nature of the Thus-Come?

Reply: The Thus-Come has no nature. Equally, the world has no nature.

Space, in chapter five, 'Contemplation of the Six Elements' was referred to in chapter four as one of the 'uncaused dharmas', but in this chapter it is analysed as an ordinary dependent dharma representing all of the six elements, earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness, and is shown to be an untenable mental construct on the grounds that it cannot be conceived to exist either independently of or together with its 'characteristic', i.e. that which gives space the quality of spaceness. Nor, argues the Treatise, can space be termed nonexistent, for existence and nonexistence are, in the view of the Treatise and of Nāgārjuna, reciprocally dependent, and it has already been shown that there are no existents (i.e. self-natured dharmas). The commentary in this chapter does little more than recapitulate the verses, although it does put forward two explanations of why space is chosen to represent the other elements, the first being that space is the least obviously impermanent and changeable of the six elements, and therefore the element most likely to be construed by the unenlightened as an 'existent', the second being that, from the point of view of Buddhist cosmology, space 'supports' the four elements of earth, water, fire and wind, and consciousness in turn exists because of them. 'Therefore we first refute the basic thing, and the others are automatically

refuted'(5/7). The assertion that consciousness is dependent upon the four bodily elements seems curiously materialistic. The order of priority seems to be better reflected in the traditional listing which puts earth lowest and consciousness highest, and in the standard sequence of the twelve causal links consciousness precedes name and form, which would be equivalent to the four elements.

The conclusion to chapter five returns once more to the theme of the true character of dharmas, exploring once again the relationship between seeing things as empty, on the one hand, and generating views and vain arguments on the other

(5v8) The superficial see dharmas
 As having the characteristics of existence or
 non-existence.
 And thus are unable to perceive
 The calm serenity of the cessation of views.

(5/8) When a person has not yet attained the Way, he is unable to perceive the true character of dharmas, and because of his desires and false perceptions he generates all kinds of vain arguments. Seeing a dharma as it comes into being he asserts that it is 'existent'. Clinging to its characteristics he says that it exists. Seeing a dharma ceasing to exist he asserts that it is cut off, and clinging to this characteristic he says that it is inexistent. The man of insight, seeing that dharmas arise, extinguishes the view that they are non-existent, and seeing that they cease extinguishes the view that they exist. Consequently, although there is something in regard to dharmas which he sees, it is like an illusion or a dream, so that he ceases even to hold a view of 'a Way free of outflows'. How much more so other views? Therefore, someone who does not perceive the calm tranquility of the cessation of views, will only see them existing or see them as not existing.

6.2 Chapters 6-10

The Treatise commentary at 6/0 prefaces Nāgārjuna's argument concerning the conceptual aspects of the relationship between passion and the impassioned one with a brief account of the causal process which relates desire, hatred and delusion (the three poisons) to existence. This account is put in the mouth of the opponent, but, as an alternative version of the twelve causal links it is knowledge which is presumed on the part of the hearer, and it is against this background that Nāgārjuna's argument proceeds.

The opponent quotes from a sūtra: desire, hatred and delusion have various names such as love, attachment and passion. 'Such obsessions depend upon living beings, and these living beings are 'impassioned'. Desire means the dharma of passion. Because of the dharma of passion and the impassioned one, there is desire. It is the same with the other two passions. Where there is anger there is an angry being, and where there is delusion there is a deluded being. It is because of these three poisons that the three forms of karmic activity arise, and it is because of the three forms of karmic activities that the three realms arise, and all dharmas have their existence'.

The three poisons, three kinds of karmic activity, three realms, and existence are interdependent. The three poisons of desire, hatred and delusion function in the three worlds or realms of

Buddhist psycho-cosmology, the material realm of desire, the realm of form, and the spiritual realm of no-form, through three types of actions, the 'three forms of karmic activity'. Although at another place in the Treatise these three are described as actions of body, speech and mind, the reference here is almost certainly to the three forms of action described in chapter seventeen in connection with a discussion of the Abhidharmist notion of the 'non-disappearing dharma', which is an entity rather like a soul, bound to the three worlds (see nn. 114-117). Here, the three types of karmic activity are good and bad actions in the world of desire, and 'neutral' or 'unmoving' actions in the worlds of form and non-form. The three realms and their corresponding actions constitute existence, and the motivating forces for action in these realms are the three poisons. Nāgārjuna, however, argues in this chapter that 'the three poisons' cannot be conceived of as entities distinct from the being who is a victim of these poisons, for the impassioned one and the passions must be either combined (that is to say, a unity), or they must be different.

(6/4) If they are one then they do not combine, and why? How can one dharma combine with itself? It is like a fingertip which cannot touch itself. As for them combining as different dharmas, this too is impossible, and why? Because they are different. If each dharma is already complete then there is absolutely no need for further combination, for even though combined, they will still remain different...

The Treatise once again asserts that what the Buddha says is true, but all explanations are untenable.

(6/10) As with passion, so it is with hatred and delusion. As with the three poisons, so it is with all the afflictions and all dharmas, which neither precede nor succeed each other and are neither combined nor separate, but are wholly established through causality.

Chapter seven examines the 'three marks' of dharmas, beginning with the authoritative sutra statement that dharmas arise, abide and cease, but denying any further reification of these characteristics. In Nāgārjuna's verses, the three marks of dharmas are refuted on the grounds that they themselves are neither 'active' nor 'inactive', since active (caused, conditioned) marks would themselves be dharmas, and inactive marks could not achieve anything. The line of argument reveals how extremely narrow are the parameters of thought in Mādhyamika; either something is a dharma or it is not; if it is a dharma, it is caused, and if it is caused it has no own-nature and is therefore simply a conventional term used by the Buddha. If there were any second-order terms in the Mādhyamika repertory which were not subjected to this kind of destructive analysis, (the most likely candidates would be dharmas, causality and emptiness) we could say that Nāgārjuna was inconsistent and that his method fails, but he is insistent that these are just terms amongst others. He maintains that there is causality, but two chapters of the Stanzas (chapters one and twenty) are devoted to showing that the notion of cause and effect is untenable. He

analyses processes only in terms of dharmas, but shows in Chapter eighteen that dharmas are inconceivable. Finally, he rests his whole system on emptiness, but is insistent that it is only emptiness properly understood which describes the true character of dharmas. Only a Buddha, a man of insight, can penetrate this reality, and a Buddha does not rest his perception of how things really are upon right views, (such as that things are 'empty') but upon non-views. Indeed, in one verse Nāgārjuna remarks that even 'perverted views', normally held to be the mark of the unenlightened being, can be held by a Buddha. So long as there is no attachment, no self 'clinging' to these views, they are not wrong:

(23v16) If there is no dharma of clinging
 Incorrectly speaking, these are perverted views.
 Correctly speaking, they are not perverted views.
 For who is there to have these things?

Chapter seven is itself an attack on causality, echoing themes which arose in the first chapter, such as the possible ways in which 'arising' might be conceived, and in the second chapter, where the idea of causality as a temporal sequence was discussed ...

(7v15) Arising is not produced after it has arisen
 Nor is it produced before it has arisen.
 Nor is it produced at the same time as it arises
 This has already been dealt with in 'going and coming'.

... and the Treatise once again emphasises the soteriological significance of this discussion of causality at 10b9ff.

Moreover, if a dharma not yet arisen could arise, all dharmas in the world not yet arisen should arise. All the ordinary people in whom enlightenment has not yet arisen could now produce the dharma of imperishable bodhi. An arhat freed from the afflictions would now develop the afflictions...

Verse seventeen anticipates the concept which is no more than an application of Nāgārjuna's axiom that all dharmas, including nirvana, are equally caused and conditioned, of the identity of what is produced by causes, and nirvāṇa.

(7v17) If a dharma arises from conditions
 Its nature will be calm extinction.
 Therefore arising and the moment of arising
 Would both be nirvāṇic.

This concept is developed more fully in chapter twenty-five in the well-known formula

(25v19) Between nirvāṇa and the world
 There is not the slightest distinction
 Between the world and nirvāṇa
 There is not the slightest distinction.

But in chapter seventeen the nirvāṇa-quality of dharmas is examined from, as it were, the standpoint of dharmas. Dharmas, being produced by conditions, have no self-nature and are consequently nirvāṇic, says the commentary, and it goes on to

describe all dharmas as like cloths composed of threads, mats made of rushes, and fire which is indistinguishable from what is burning. 'All dharmas are like this; therefore dharmas arising from causal conditions have no self-nature, and having no self-nature are empty and unreal like a mirage.' The idea being developed here is that nirvāṇa is 'no-self-nature', whether this is applied to views, to beings or to any other dharmas. This current of thought is taken up once again towards the end of the present chapter when the opponent asks, in the light of Nāgārjuna's denial of arising, abiding and ceasing:

(7/34) If these (marks of) arising, abiding and ceasing are absolutely non-existent, how can you speak their names in this treatise?

Nāgārjuna's reply is less forthcoming than that of the Treatise commentary. He says:

(7v35) Like an illusion, like a dream
 Like a Gandharva-city;
 The arising, abiding and ceasing of which we speak
 Have marks such as these.

But the commentary expands this considerably by reaffirming the distinction between, on the one hand, unenlightened people who cannot use such terms as 'arising' and 'ceasing' without clinging to them, and on the other hand, saints and sages whose 'minds are different', the difference being of course that saints and sages do not cling, and do not perceive self-nature in dharmas.

(7/35) The characteristics of arising, abiding and ceasing are not fixed and real. Unenlightened people with their voracious attachments assert that they are fixed and real, so saints and sages, out of pity and compassion and a desire to bring to an end their perverted views, revert to using those terms to which people are attached. Though the expressions are the same, their minds are different. To speak thus of arising, abiding and ceasing should not attract criticism, just as the acts of an illusionist should not be censured, because of his motive. There should be no feelings of grief or joy in this regard; one should simply see with one's eyes and that is all, just as one should not seek in the world for something seen only in a dream, and just as, for example, a Gandharva-city, manifesting with the sunrise is not real, but merely a conventional designation which soon ceases to be. 'Arising', 'abiding' and 'ceasing' are also like this. The unenlightened man differentiates them as existents; the sage investigates and finds them untenable.

Both groups, therefore, see the same 'dharma's', but they differ in that the unenlightened conceive of dharmas as existent or nonexistent, while the sage has no views about such dharmas and, being devoid of attachment to dharmas is free to employ conventional designations for the purpose of teaching others.

The eighth chapter examines the relationship between doer and deed. The now-familiar argument ('You should not raise these questions again, yet being deeply immersed in mental attachments, you have raised more questions, to which me must now give more replies' says the commentary) develops by first dichotomising the process of doing into ostensibly separate dharmas such as 'doer', 'doing' and deed' and then arguing that since each of these components inevitably presupposes all of the others, none can exist in and of itself, and something which does not exist independently does not, in Nāgārjuna's terms, 'exist' at all:

(8v1) If there is a fixed, existent doer
 He does not do a fixed deed.
 If there is no fixed, existent doer,
 He does not do a fixed deed.

The Treatise prefaces Nāgārjuna's text with a brief discussion of both active and inactive dharmas, adopting here a slightly different argument to refute non-active or unconditioned dharmas, namely that 'the three marks ... have been negated, and since the three marks do not exist, there are no active dharmas. Since active dharmas do not exist, there are no non-active ones ...' This refutation of non-active dharmas via active dharmas is once again no more than a repetition of the axiom that everything can be described in terms of dharmas which are entirely subject to causality. That this axiom is important for Buddhist soteriology is however underlined by the way in which Nāgārjuna's argument develops. Having shown that a 'fixed deed' and a 'fixed doer' are untenable (within the overall presupposition of causality) he argues that

(8v5) If there are no dharmas of doing
 Then there is no sin or merit.
 Where there is no sin or merit
 No recompense for sin or merit exists either.

and

(8v6) Where there is no recompense for sin or merit,
 There is also no nirvāṇa.
 And whatever one may do
 Is completely vacuous and without effect.

The relationship between sin and merit, on the one hand, and nirvana on the other, is difficult if not impossible to characterise. In the Buddhist view actions (karma) are binding, 'good' actions as much as 'bad' ones, since it is cessation of ignorance or cessation of grasping alone which can effectively break the round of the twelve causal links leading to successive rebirth and suffering. Later in the Treatise, in Chapter seventeen, this matter is dealt with at considerable length, but in the present chapter Nāgārjuna's argument is simply that causelessness entails, in general terms, the impossibility of traversing any path governed by relationships between cause and effect. The Treatise perhaps too hastily makes the path to nirvāṇa somehow contingent upon the process of karmic retribution.

(8/6) ... Also there will be no sin or merit, and because there is no sin or merit there will be no recompense or retribution for sin and merit and thus no path to nirvana ...

For in chapter seventeen it becomes clear that the path to nirvāṇa is not of the same order as the paths of good and bad actions. For the present, however, the Treatise is content to refute the opponent's assertion that there are doers and there are deeds, by the argument that, if this were so, sin and merit and the operation of the karmic process would be nullified. This could itself be taken for a description of nirvāṇa, of course, but the matter is not taken further. Nāgārjuna's view about the issue of doers and deeds is made clear in verse eleven:

(8v11) The doer exists by virtue of the deed,
 The deed exists by virtue of the doer.
 This is how we establish the meaning of 'deed'
 There is nothing to add beyond this.

And lest this is taken to be an assertion that there are such things as 'deeds' the commentary explains that it is only because of a 'doer' that there can be a 'deed', and 'if something emerges from a combination then it has no self-nature, and having no self-nature it is empty ... Because it is empty there is nothing which is produced'. In what sense, then, are there doers and deeds? The Treatise asserts that in one sense there are doers and deeds, and in another, true, sense there are not. It appeals to the distinction between unenlightened and enlightened perception, and also to the distinction between what is conventionally said to be the case, and what is actually the case in 'the highest sense', thus anticipating the more detailed examination of the 'two truths' used by the Buddhas to teach the unenlightened which appears in chapter twenty-four. Finally, the analysis of doer and deed is extended to cover 'all other dharmas' and the commentary makes a very clear statement about emptiness (though the term is not used in this particular passage) in relation to the Buddha's original teaching of non-self.

Just as deed and doer cannot be separated from each other and, not being separable, are therefore non-fixed, and having no fixed (nature) therefore have no self-nature, so it is with reception [one of the five skandhas]. Reception stands for the body of the five skandhas; the recipient is the person. There are no five skandhas

apart from the person, and no person apart from the five skandhas, which merely arise from causality. Just as with receiving and the recipient, so it is with all other dharmas, which should be negated in the same way.

Chapter nine is titled 'Contemplation of a Substrate'. The Chinese term translates literally as 'originally abiding' and is intended to be synonymous with 'self' conceived of as permanent and unchangeable. It is, to all intents and purposes, the atman denied by the Buddha, or the 'doer' refuted in the previous chapter. The opponent's argument (9vv1-2) is that there must be someone who 'has' all the mental and sensory faculties, and that someone must be some kind of soul. Nāgārjuna's reply is at first tantalising. He asks,

If...
 There were a pre-existent substrate,
 How could we know it?

And the Commentary enters into an extended debate on this question in the form of a dialogue in which, amongst other theories, the Vaiśeṣika reasons for asserting the existence of the soul are put forward and refuted. There is a long disquisition (from 13b25) on the possible relationships between body and soul, in the course of which several humorous possibilities are ventured;

If such a soul does exist, then it must be either inside the body, like a pillar within a wall, or outside the body, like armour worn by a man. If it were inside the body, then the body could not be perishable, since the soul would always be dwelling inside it. Therefore to

say that a soul dwells in the body is mere words, absurd and unfounded. If it dwells outside the body, covering the body like armour, then the body ought to be invisible, because the soul would closely cover it ... If you say that when an arm is cut off the soul shrinks back inside and cannot be cut off, then when the head is cut off (the soul) should also shrink back in and one should not die, but infact one does die ...
... If you say that where the body is big, the soul is big, and where the body is small, the soul is small, ... then if the soul follows the body in this way it should not be permanent ...

These arguments, which surely qualify as 'sophistries' in their preoccupation with the physical attributes of a soul rather than with the logical impossibility of a permanent soul as a component of a causal process characterised by impermanence, contrast rather markedly with Nāgārjuna's answer to his own question, 'If there were a pre-existent substrate, how could we know it? He points out a simple flaw in the opponent's argument:

(9v4) If, separate from eye and ear etc.,
 There were a substrate
 Then also, without a substrate
 Eyes and ears, etc., should exist.

And it is this argument, which concentrates on the untenability of the idea of a permanent and unchanging substrate which takes part in yet is unaffected by mental and perceptual processes, which dominates the chapter from here onwards, until at 9v10 the argument is extended to cover not only the substrate but any of the other elements involved in seeing, hearing and so forth.

(9v10) All the functions of eye and ear, etc.,
 And all the dharmas of pain, pleasure, etc.,
 -The elements from which they are produced
 These elements have no souls

'These elements' refers to the four elements of earth, water, fire and air, as the commentary makes clear, but the critique of course applies to all dharmas, which, since they have 'no souls' (no substrate, no self, no self-nature) do not, in that sense 'exist'. But Nāgārjuna's argument is not completed when he has shown that dharmas do not exist. The view that they do not exist is as one-sided as the view that they do. The Buddha's words which come closest to Nāgārjuna's own formulation of the meaning of emptiness are those quoted (in this case from the Samda-Kātyāyana-sutra), at 15/7 'Separate from existence and separate from nonexistence'. Here in chapter nine Nāgārjuna in effect asserts that 'separate from existence and nonexistence' means 'not to make any distinction between existence and nonexistence':

(9v12) In eyes, etc. there is no substrate,
 Now and in the future there will be none.
 Since there is none in the three periods of time
 There is no distinction between existence and
 non-existence.

And the commentary expands upon this brief statement by explaining that 'no distinction' means 'not making vain distinctions', in other words, not generating sophistries about causality

(9/12) Though we contemplate and search for a substrate, it never existed in the eye, etc., and does not exist now, or in the future. Not existing in any of the three periods of time, it is the nirvana of non-arising, in which there should be no obstacles. If there is no substrate, then how can there be the eye, etc.? Debates and vain arguments such as these consequently cease, and when vain arguments have ceased, all dharmas are empty.

'Fuel' in chapter ten, 'Fire and Fuel' is perhaps a misnomer (though no more appropriate word exists) for by fuel Nāgārjuna means that which is actually burning and itself constitutes the fire. For the purposes of Nāgārjuna's argument, the other meaning of fuel as 'that which may be used for burning' has to be set aside. When this is understood, it becomes obvious that 'fuel and fire' is simply another version of 'doer and deed', 'goer and going' and so forth; in other words fuel and fire are two components of what is actually a wholly interdependent and indivisible process; a metaphor for causality itself, and the Treatise makes this point in some detail at the outset of the chapter. The objection which the opponent brings forward here is of interest; his argument is that the Mādhyamika critique of fire and fuel, which is developed in terms of the identity or difference of the two 'dharmas' presupposes a recognition that fire and fuel exist. 'We can see with our worldly eyes that things do exist', says the opponent,

(14b18) 'If there were no fire or fuel, we would not be able to examine them in terms of identity and difference. If you allow that there is unity and difference of dharmas, then you must recognise that fire and fuel exist, and if you allow that they exist, then this is to consider them as already existent'(14b18).

The reply makes use of the concept, developed later in chapter twenty-four, of 'conventional worldly expressions'.

(14b24) ...'Apart from conventional worldly expressions, there is nothing with which to argue. If we did not speak of fire and fuel, how could anything be refuted? If nothing is spoken about then meanings cannot be clarified. Thus, if a commentator wishes to refute existence and non-existence, inevitably he has to speak of existence and non-existence. He takes up (the terms) existence and non-existence

but does not thereby accept existence and non-existence. He is following conventional worldly usage so there is no error involved. If putting words in one's mouth was at once to accept them, then for you to say 'destroy' would constitute self-destruction. It is the same with 'fire' and 'fuel'. Although the expressions exist, these are not accepted either. Therefore we may consider whether fire and fuel are one dharma or different dharmas, (and say) that neither can be established ...' This line of argument once again applies a double standard; it defends the deployment of conventional terms to refute the 'grasping' use of terms, with the implicit assumption that the Madhyamika is able to use terms as mere 'conventional expressions' while the opponent, (read: the unenlightened person), takes words to be references to things which they embody. This is partly a common-sense argument about language which recognises that words like 'destroy' do not in themselves carry destructive force, and partly a foreshadowing of a more fundamental point about the Buddhas employing skilful means and

using conventional truths to convey ultimate truths. The two are not entirely separate, for at the heart of the Treatise's attitude to 'sophistries' and 'vain arguments' is the belief that intellectual but unenlightened Buddhist minds such as those of the Abhidharmists have woven for themselves a web of linguistically-based reality, a Buddhist world-view based on Buddhist words, which does not conform to the true character of things, and that sweeping away this web of illusion based on false conceptualizing is the concomitant of enlightenment or nirvāṇa, at least to the extent that nirvāṇa is unattainable without abandonment of such views.

In the concluding commentary to this Chapter there are, unusually for the Treatise, references to specific Buddhist schools, in this case the Sarvāstivādins and their offshoot, the Vātsīputrīyas. The beliefs generated by adherents of these schools exemplify, according to the Treatise, the vacillating dogmatism of 'vain arguments'.

If a person asserts that there is a characteristic of 'self' as the Vātsīputrīya school teaches, he cannot say that there is a self apart from form, but only that self resides in the 'fifth indescribable storehouse' [a reference to the doctrine ascribed to the Vātsīputrīyas that the self exists but is inexpressible]. This is like the Sarvāstivādins who teach that each of the dharmas has its own characteristics, distinguishing this one as skilful, this one as unskilful, this as neutral, this as outflowing or not outflowing, active or inactive, and so on. Such people as these do not attain the nirvāṇa-quality of dharmas, but fabricate various kinds of sophistries, using the Buddha's words.

6.3 Chapters 11-17

Chapter eleven, 'Contemplation of Original Limits' deals with the beginningless round of saṃsāra. The Buddha has taught, argues the opponent, that beings come and go in beginningless birth and death. Therefore there are beings, and there is birth and death. Nāgārjuna argues however that the Buddha refers to beginninglessness because the concept of a beginning is untenable - and for the same reason that a middle, and an end are inconceivable. Nāgārjuna's argument is based on the assumption that opposite and complementary categories are interdependent:

(11/2) Beginning exists because of middle and end, and end exists because of beginning and middle. Where there is no beginning and no end, how can there be a middle? Within saṃsāra there is no beginning and no end, hence we say that before, after and simultaneity cannot be. Why is this?

(11v3) If we suppose that first there is birth,
 And afterwards there is old age and death;
 Then there will be birth with no old age and death,
 And old age and death with no birth.

In other words, birth and death is a chicken-and-egg situation. One cannot exist without the other, nor can they exist simultaneously, for they are part of a causal sequence. This argument is extended in verses seven and eight to all dharmas, for as the Treatise explains, what applies to one dharma applies to all dharmas.

(11/8) 'All dharmas refers to cause and effect, marks (characteristics) and what is marked, receiving, recipient and so on. All are without original limits. It is not only birth and death that has no ultimate limits, but in order to summarize all the details he talks only about birth and death having no original limits.

The interdependence of opposites is a theme which is explored again in chapter twelve, 'Contemplation of Suffering'. Suffering means 'the five skandhas' in the Buddhist view. To exist, to be embodied is to suffer. As the first of the four truths asserts: 'Existence is suffering'. In this chapter Nāgārjuna investigates four possible ways of characterising the source of suffering:

(12v1) 'Self-created, created by another
Jointly created or created by no cause'.
In these ways they describe suffering
But in fact these are wrong.

They are wrong from the point of view of the Mādhyamika critique because each of these explanations presupposes a being who 'receives' suffering. But, asks the Treatise

... in what other situation, apart from in the suffering of the five skandhas, do you find a person who could create his own suffering? You should give an account of such a person, but you cannot give an account of him...

Since there is no person apart from this 'suffering assemblage of the skandhas' (26v9) suffering cannot be caused or originated by anyone who is not already subject to suffering. The possibility

is raised (in 12/9) that suffering arises without a cause. This is perhaps a logical possibility but within the Buddha's teaching of causality, causelessness is an error. The Treatise speaks of the 'numerous errors' of causelessness and refers back to chapter eight, where, in the discussion at 8/6 the implications of causelessness were discussed. There, the main argument was that causelessness entailed the loss of karmic recompense, 'and thus no path to nirvāṇa'. Once again, therefore, the point is made that without causality there can be no directed change, no 'path'.

Chapter thirteen examines the predispositions, one of the five skandhas, which here represents them all (13/2: 'Predispositions' means the five skandhas). The opponent describes predispositions in traditional terms: they are false deceptions, and their mark or characteristic is 'misapprehension'. In contrast to them, nirvāṇa is that dharma which is not characterised by misapprehension. If what the Buddha says is true, then the predispositions exist, just as nirvāṇa exists. Nāgārjuna's argument turns on the interpretation of 'false' in this description of the predispositions.

False deception and misapprehension;
 What is apprehended in these?
 The Buddha has spoken thus
 In order to point to the meaning of emptiness.

The argument is somewhat analogous to Śāṅkara's parable of the rope misperceived as a snake. Since the reality perceived by

misapprehension is only apparent -there is no snake - it is not a 'reality' at all. By reality Śaṅkara means that which is permanent, while for Nāgārjuna the equivalent term is 'the true character of things' or its synonym, as here, 'emptiness'. The Treatise explains what emptiness means in respect of another skandha, the skandha of form, in a series of analogies in 13/2, ranging from the stages of growth (from infant to toddler, youth, adult and old age) to the lump of clay and the pot, firewood which burns, a banana tree consisting entirely of bark and leaves, and the flame of a lamp. Within each of these examples it is impossible says the Treatise, to distinguish any fixed stages of transformation, any 'fixed forms' within fluid processes. Therefore, '... form has no nature and is empty, existing only through conventional expressions', by which the Treatise means the conceptual discriminations generated by the unenlightened. By contrast, a sage or wise man investigates the skandhas in various ways, but 'since they are sequential and similar, it is difficult to distinguish their arising and ceasing; they are like the succession of flowing water' (17c11). The critique which has been applied to the predispositions is applied to each of the other skandhas, reception, conception and consciousness, and the argument is developed in a passage of commentary which is exceptionally rich in analogies of emptiness. Such analogies, however, demonstrate only that forms are difficult to isolate, not that fixed entities are logically impossible. Rather, fixed entities are assumed to be impossible in a world whose character is that of impermanence

and change, as described by the Buddha. The characteristic of impermanence is graphically evoked in the description (at 18a5) of 'diminishing' and 'increasing' predispositions (a reference to diminution and increase of quality rather than amount). Beings are on a razor's edge - they may ascend or descend in the cycle of rebirths; at any moment they can neither be said to be going forward, or to be going back:

Those with pure predispositions, since they have already received their rewards either as humans, or in the heavens of desire, or in the heavens of form or the formless heaven, are 'diminishing', but now in resuming their activities they are called 'increasing'. Those with impure predispositions are also like this. Having already received their deserts in the hells, in animal births, and amongst the hungry ghosts and asuras they are 'diminishing', but in resuming their activities they are called 'increasing'. Therefore, since all predispositions are increasing and decreasing they never abide. It is like a man who is ill. If he is given suitable treatment his illness will subside, but if it is unsuitable his illness will get worse. Predispositions are like this. Because they increase and diminish they are not fixed, but exist only through conventional worldly expressions. It is by means of the worldly truth that we manage to perceive the supreme truth.

The concluding sentence echoes the earlier assertion in the Treatise that one has to adopt conventional expressions in order to refute wrong views, but adopting conventional terms does not have to involve grasping apprehension of those terms, such that one takes the word for the reality, and generates sophistries. Since, in the Treatise, generation of sophistries and vain arguments is virtually equated with 'ignorance' in the twelvefold causal chain it is not surprising that the Treatise here restates

the twelve causal links (at 18a12), asserting that ignorance causes predispositions, and therefore ... 'all sufferings have their origin in predispositions'. Since ignorance causes predispositions, ignorance is the link in the causal chain which has to be broken.

The Buddha's teachings rely on conventional worldly truth, but if you attain to the truth of the supreme meaning and develop true insight then ignorance will cease...

Here, attaining to the truth of the highest meaning is equated with insight (see n. 26 to the translation for a discussion of the two truths), but a merely intellectual attainment is not intended. The Treatise assumes that cutting-off of ignorance will be accompanied by

(18a19) ... that which meditation cuts off, namely attachment and craving, anger, contamination by forms, contamination by non-form, lust and ignorance ... Because these are cut off, each link (of causation) ceases, which is to say that ignorance, predispositions, consciousness, name and form, the six avenues, contact, reception, desire, grasping, existence, birth, old age, death, sorrow, grief, suffering, affliction, the pain of separation from those you love, and the pain of associating with those you hate, and so forth, all cease. Because of this cessation the five skandhas completely cease, with nothing at all remaining, only emptiness.

The commentary to verse three of this chapter (18b5ff) explains the usefulness and use of emptiness in debate, rather in the manner of chapter four. 'It is solely to refute their (presumed) nature that we say dharmas have no nature'. Finally, the

commentary at 13/8 discusses briefly (and dismisses) the charge of the opponent that the Madhyamika holds 'a doctrine of emptiness'. Since the Treatise in its preamble (1/0) has already recognised that not all those who hear about emptiness are capable of dealing with it, it can hardly sustain the argument that Nagarjuna's teaching of emptiness is effective per se. Emptiness has to be held in a non-grasping manner, and it is not given to all to be non-grasping and to have the 'great mind'. Nagarjuna's verse 13v9 recognises this fact; even a Buddha cannot teach (the Chinese word also means 'transform') one who cannot be taught.'

The Great Sage speaks of the emptiness of dharmas
 In order to wean us from all views.
 If you then reinstate a view of 'emptiness',
 You cannot be taught by all the Buddhas.

And the Treatise takes the same view, explaining that

... There are some people who, because they carry a heavy load of karma, have a mind steeped in craving and attachment and are dull in insight, produce views of emptiness. They either say that there is emptiness, or that there is not emptiness, and through (these ideas) they again generate afflictions. If one tries to instruct this kind of person in emptiness, he will say 'I have known this emptiness for a long time'. But without this emptiness there is no way to nirvana, for as the sutra says, 'Unless you pass through the gate of emptiness, marklessness and non-doing, your liberation will be nothing but words'.

The implication seems to be that unless one is already ready to understand emptiness, it will not be effective. And if one is

required to be already a saint or sage in order to understand emptiness correctly, what is its practical value? To this question, neither Nāgārjuna nor the Treatise gives an answer, but if there is an answer, it must lie in the preoccupation of the Treatise with the question of what it is to be a Buddha. Rather as the Prajñāpāramitā literature describes the state of being (and non-being) of a Bodhisattva, so Nāgārjuna's teaching on emptiness seems to foreshadow the experience of liberation of the Thus-Come.

'Combination' is the subject of chapter fourteen. Nāgārjuna's argument is a straightforward refutation of the Abhidharmist analysis of seeing and knowing which bases itself on the idea that by a combination of, for example, 'self, mind, sense-function (or faculty) and object, knowing is produced' The method of refutation is by now routine; knowing only takes place when all function together, and without all, none contributes to 'knowing'. Therefore, they are all utterly interdependent and none exists by and of itself. Moreover, combination, properly speaking, can only take place amongst things which are 'different' (i.e. separate from each other), but the so-called components of seeing and knowing, such as seer, seeing, thing being seen, etc., are all comprised in the process of seeing. The Mādhyamika definition of 'difference is 'being a different dharma', but it is presupposed that all dharmas are combinations of conditions and causes. The analogy of a house which is the same thing as its beams and rafters is employed to illustrate

this assumption, and the analogy of a fist which is not different from its five fingers to illustrate the point that dharmas are not different from each other. The Treatise at 14/6 introduces a concept of a 'universal characteristic' which is not found in Nāgārjuna's stanzas, but which is found in Abhidharmist works (see n. 202). The Treatise deals with this concept by reinterpreting particular characteristics (subsets of this 'universal characteristic', and therefore deemed to be neither the same as nor entirely different from each other) as 'causally conditioned dharmas. To the Treatise, everything can be described as a dharma, and refuted accordingly.

Chapter fifteen, 'Contemplation of Existence and Nonexistence' deals with the concept of 'self-nature' or 'own-being' of dharmas. 'Existence' in the Treatise means 'having self-nature'. The notion of a self-nature is incompatible with the notion of a dharma, and since it is axiomatic in Mādhyamika thought that everything consists of dharmas, the argument proceeds on the assumption that natures are either dharmas (in which case they are not unconditioned self-natures) or that they are self-natures, in which case they cannot be dharmas, and therefore cannot be, if the Buddha's teaching on dharmas and causality is true. Nāgārjuna states the alternatives in verse one:

(15v1) That a nature exists within conditions
 Is not correct.
 And a nature issuing from conditions
 Would be termed a 'created dharma'.

A wrong understanding (an understanding couched in terms of self-natures) is characteristic of one who is 'deeply attached to dharmas', says the Treatise at 15/6. Such a person

...will inevitably pursue a view of existence. If you refute self-nature then he will see other-nature. If you refute other-nature he will see existence. If you refute existence he will see nonexistence. If you refute nonexistence he will become confused. But if he is clear-witted and his mental attachments are slight, and he knows the calm serenity of the cessation of all views, he will nevermore generate these four kinds of sophistries. Such a person sees the Buddha-dharma.

Once again, perceiving the true requires that one already has insight. The next verse, therefore, provides an example of such a one:

(15v7) The Buddha is able to extinguish both existence and nonexistence.
 As it says in the sūtra
 In the 'Instruction to Kātyāyana'
 'Separate from existence and separate from nonexistence'.

In a rare reference to the eightfold path, the Treatise explains that in this sutra the Buddha expounds the meaning of 'right view' as 'separate from existence and separate from nonexistence'. The meaning of this statement is expanded in terms of permanence and severance, (the idea that things last for

ever or the idea that there is a complete break between one dharma (as 'cause') and another (as 'effect'). The danger of these views is that one who holds them has abandoned moral (karmic) responsibility. 'If you have views of severance or permanence, then sin and merit, etc., will not exist and you will negate all worldly processes. For this reason you should relinquish them.'

Chapter sixteen, 'Contemplation of Bondage and Liberation' has already been discussed in section 5.4 of this introduction in the context of the discussion of causality. The argument here is similar to that of chapter fourteen, on 'Combination'; the process of transmigration is analysed into component parts and these component parts are then shown to be interdependent and therefore not 'parts' at all, but the product of an analysing and conceptually discriminating mind. The argument may be summed up by one brief quotation from 16/7:

If the living being existed separately, prior to the five skandhas, then the living being would be bound by the five skandhas, but in reality there is no separate being apart from the five skandhas. If the afflictions existed separately, apart from the five skandhas, then the five skandhas would be bound by the afflictions, but in reality there are no separate afflictions apart from the five skandhas.

The chapter contains the first statement of the equality of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra;

Nirvāṇa is not something special
Separate from birth and death

The Commentary adds a quotation from the (Prajñāpāramitā) sūtras:
'Nirvāṇa is saṃsāra, saṃsāra is nirvāṇa' and asks, rhetorically;
'Within this true character of all dharmas, how can you say "This
is saṃsāra, this is nirvāṇa"?'.

Karma and moral action is a particular concern of the Treatise,
and the commentary considerably amplifies Nāgārjuna's argument in
chapter seventeen, 'Contemplation of Karma', with details of
Buddhist teaching about actions and rewards. The commentary
begins with a sūtra quotation by the opponent:

'As the sutra says, 'all living beings take birth
according to their karma'. An evil person goes
into the hells, one who cultivates merit is reborn
in heaven, and one who traverses the path attains
nirvāṇa. Therefore, these dharmas are not empty.

And the first five of Nāgārjuna's verses are devoted to the same
theme. In the Middle Treatise translation, the first verse and
its commentary bring out very clearly the relationship between
cultivation of the mind and moral action (see n. 223):

(17v1) A person can subdue his mind
 And benefit living beings.
 This is called compassion
 The seed and fruit of the two worlds.

(17/1) The three poisons in a person cause distress to others
 and give rise to actions, so the good person first of all
 destroys his own evil. This is why it is said that

subduing one's own mind benefits others. 'Benefiting others' means almsgiving, holding to the precepts, humility, etc., and not harming others.

Verses two to five outline types of karma, such as 'mental karma' (thoughts and mental configurations) and body and speech karma. There is an extended explanation of the seven types of karma mentioned in 17v5 which is not entirely consistent with the account in the verses (see n. 229). The commentary explores different aspects of sin and merit such as intention, action and effect arising from the action. The commentator is clearly interested in transmitting the Buddhist teaching here; there is no suggestion that this knowledge is useless, but in the final sentence of 17/5 the opponent draws his conclusion: 'Therefore there are fixed, real (karmic) actions and their results. Hence, dharmas cannot be empty'.

In 17v6 and 17/6, Nāgārjuna's response to this view is expounded. He argues and demonstrates that actions and rewards cannot ever meet because actions arise and cease momentarily. If they lasted up to their reward they would be 'permanent', but all dharmas are by definition fleeting. On the other hand, if actions cease once performed (are 'severed'), they cannot cause rewards in the future. The opponent then proposes the analogy, taken up by the commentary, of the seed and the fruit. One cannot say that the seed is separate from the fruit, or that the seed is the same as the fruit. The process of maturation is ineffable and 'there is no severance and no permanence involved. The analogy is followed

up with a reference to the 'ten paths of 'white' actions'.

'White', says the commentary, means 'good and pure'. Following these ten paths results in 'no-killing, no-stealing, no-lewdness, no lying, no deception, no evil speech, no useless gossip, no jealousy, no anger and no perverted views' (see n. 36 to the translation).

Nāgārjuna, however, is unimpressed by the analogy of seed and fruit, even though the Treatise had employed a virtually identical analogy (seed and sprout) to dismiss alternative views of the causal process in chapter one (2a8ff.) The Treatise interprets Nāgārjuna's reference to 'extremely numerous errors' to mean that the opponent wishes to establish some 'continuity of characteristics' (read: some model of causality) in the process of action and reward. The Treatise argues that even if seed growing into fruit seems to embody an observable causal process, being tangible, observable, having form, and so forth, this does not mean that the causal process is as the opponent has described it. 'How much less so with thoughts and actions, which are intangible, formless and invisible?' This is another example of empirical evidence brought by the opponent being dismissed as unreliable (see n. 30)

Verses fourteen to nineteen outline the Sāmmatīya doctrine of the 'non-disappearing dharma', a neutral, permanent entity, likened in the stanzas to a bond in relation to which actions are like the goods owing. The commentary explains all the references in

this theory, culminating in the distinction made between those with outflows and those without outflows (a reference to the outflowing of the attention into the worlds of form, etc.). The text is almost certainly corrupt here, since the commentary places the stream-winner, the srotāpanna, at the top of the hierarchy of spiritual attainers, in a position which should be occupied by the Arhat (see n. 249).

This account, however, falls into the same errors of 'severance' and 'permanence', according to Nāgārjuna. His view is stated as follows:"

(17v20) Although empty it is not severed.
 Though it exists it is not permanent.
 Karma and reward never disappear.
 This we call the teaching of the Buddha.

The Treatise attributes the 'non-disappearing dharma' doctrine to the opponents' 'attachments to perverted views and ignorance of the true character', which lead them to say that 'this is the teaching of the Buddha'. Nāgārjuna's somewhat enigmatic statement of his own view is expanded in the commentary along familiar lines. The Mādhyamika avoids severance and permanence (with their attendant dangers) by perceiving that

... karma is utterly empty and has the characteristic of nirvāna. Its self-nature being separate from existence, what dharma is there to be cut off, and what dharma is there to disappear?

This view receives classic statement in the verse following:

(17v21) All dharmas are fundamentally non-arising
 Since they have no fixed nature.
 All dharmas are also non-ceasing
 Because they do not arise.

The next four verses turn the argument upon the opponent, showing how, if dharmas were permanent, if they had self-natures, there could be separate and unconnected entities co-existing in the world; without acting there could be sins, without lapsing from pure conduct there could be impurity, and 'doing evil and doing good would not be distinguished'. The absurdities consequent upon a theory of 'fixed' and self-existent dharmas are illustrated in the commentary; if there were non-acting actions (i.e. actions which did not have an actor attached), then this man could commit a sin, and that man would receive the retribution. This would negate all moral action.

From showing how the opponent's theory leads to absurdity, Nāgārjuna moves to a statement of how things really are, the Treatise invoking 'saints and sages' (17/27) to substantiate his view. Since action (karma) arises from the afflictions of lust, anger, greed and so forth, and the afflictions are not real, which the commentary says is because they in turn arise from conceptualised distinctions (see n. 251 and the discussion of the afflictions in chapter twenty-three), actions themselves are not real. Moreover, if actions are not real, and actions are the

cause of bodies (i.e. of rebirth), then bodies are not real either. By 'not real' the Treatise means 'not having a fixed nature', hence 'empty'.

The opponent, however, insists that there must be, as the sutras assert, an 'originator of karma', and if this being exists, then actions and rewards exist as well. In reply, Nāgārjuna agrees that there is such a one, but that the one who performs an action cannot be said to be the same as, and cannot be said to be different from, the one who experiences the reward, for, as the commentary explains

If he were the same, then when a man who did evil received the form of an ox, the man would not become an ox [i.e. he would have to remain a man], and nor would the ox become a man. If they are different, then all action and reward is lost and we fall into causelessness, and causelessness is annihilation. Therefore the present recipient is neither the same as, nor different from, the former doer.

In a final appeal to empirical evidence the opponent points out that regardless of what Nāgārjuna has said about karma and rewards, nevertheless 'we can see that all living beings manifestly perform actions and receive their rewards. What about this?' (23b24)

Nāgārjuna replies with the analogy of an illusionary man created by the Buddha's spiritual power, who then transforms into another illusionary man. The point of this analogy (for it is an analogy

and not a description of how things are) is that an illusionary man has no consciousness of self. Similarly, says the commentary, 'all karmas ... are empty and without nature, like an illusion, like a dream, like a flame or like an echo'.

6.4 Chapters 18-22

Nāgārjuna's argument in chapter eighteen is first set out in the stanzas, uninterrupted by commentary. The chapter is entitled 'Contemplation of Dharmas' but is as much about the 'real character' and about no-self as it is about dharmas (although of course the real character of dharmas is that they are without self). 'How do you know that all dharmas are without self?' asks the opponent in the commentary. Nāgārjuna replies that there is no self but the five skandhas, that the five skandhas arise and cease (being dharmas), that without self there can be no 'I' and 'mine', that the extinction of 'I' and 'mine' is called 'attaining the insight of non-self', and that 'viewing reality', is the mark of an enlightened one. Such a one is rarely found.

There is another illustration at 18v6 of Nāgārjuna's view that what is true is not what the Buddhas say, but what is actually the case:

The Buddhas may teach that there is a self,
Or teach that there is no self.
Within the true character of dharmas,
There is neither self, nor non-self'.

And he goes on to explain that

(18v7) The true character of dharmas,
Is severance of mind, actions and speech.
With no production and no cessation
Calm extinction, like nirvāṇa.

At 18v12 there is an interesting allusion to Pratyekabuddhas. Clearly Nāgārjuna regards them as equal to other types of Buddhas. They are not ranked lower than the bodhisattvas, for:

If the Buddha had not emerged in the world,
And the Buddha-dharma had utterly ceased.
The insight of the Pratyekabuddhas
Would have arisen quite separately.

The commentary in chapter eighteen is the most interesting and wide-ranging in the Treatise. Since it is not interleaved in the verses, it reads as a continuous piece, and it covers a number of topics in addition to the points raised in the stanzas. Chief among these are the discussions of self as analogous to empty space, at 24a25ff. and 24b24ff., a rather thorough discussion of (Nyāya) pramāṇas as possible means to knowledge of a self in the five skandhas at 24a7ff., a discussion of the 'eye of insight', the attainments of saints and the types of nirvāṇa at 24b29ff., the concept of expediency as applied to the selection of appropriate teachings by the Buddhas (cf. 25a15), the dialectical relationship between teacher and hearer and the use of conventional designations such as 'self' at 24c10ff., a reference to the Prajñāpāramitā denial of both self and non-self at 24c20ff., and a discussion of the true character of dharmas as the cessation of mental activities (based on 18v7) at 24c25ff. The section from 24c29 onwards refers to different types of samādhi (see n. 269) and in doing so reaches the pragmatic heart of Mādhyamika. 'If one's mind were real (i.e. enlightened), what

use would be such ways to liberation as emptiness, etc.?’

The only explicit reference to skilful means in the Treatise occurs here at 25a15, in a context which emphasises that compassion is the motivation of Buddhas. ‘All the Buddhas have unlimited powers of skilful means, and dharmas have no fixed characteristics. In order to save all living beings, they may teach that everything is real, or they may teach that everything is unreal, or that everything is both real and unreal, or that everything is neither unreal nor not unreal’. The following passages examine each arm of this tetralemma in an interesting way, relating each type of teaching to a particular level of insight. ‘Everything is both real and unreal’, for example, is explained as follows:

There are three levels of living beings; superior, average, and inferior. The superior person sees that the characteristic of dharmas is that they are neither real nor unreal. The average person sees the characteristics of dharmas as either all real, or all unreal. The inferior man, since his powers of perception are limited, sees the characteristics of dharmas as a little real, and a little unreal, regarding nirvāna, because it is an inactive dharma and does not perish as real, and regarding saṃsāra, because it is an active dharma, empty and false, as unreal.

25b4ff. discusses the nature of firm faith in the Buddha's teachings to explain the reference to ‘knowing for oneself, not following others’ in verse 9. One who does not follow others, says the commentary, is one who,

... when non-Buddhists, even though they display supernatural powers and teach that this is the way and

this is not the way, has faith in himself and in his own mind and does not follow them. Even if they transform their bodies so that he does not know that they are not the Buddha, his mind cannot be diverted because he well understands the true character.

At 25b13 the Treatise rebuts the charge that emptiness is either nihilism or eternalism, repeating that emptiness is not a view. Rather, emptiness, which is the true character 'has no sophistries ... the characteristic of mind is calm extinction and ... it cuts off any ways of verbal expression'.. At 25b17ff. the practical advantages of emptiness for the traveller on the Buddhist path are explained. If he can penetrate the meaning of emptiness, then all dharmas will be neither identical nor different, neither cut off nor permanent (in other words, he will avoid 'views' about causality and dharmas). Thus he will achieve 'the cessation of all afflictions and sophistries', and attain lasting bliss and nirvāṇa. The Buddha's dharma is likened to a sweet nectar, for just as a divine elixir will prevent someone from growing old or dying, so the Buddha's teaching leads to nirvāṇa. 'This dharma of the true character is the true taste of sweet nectar'.

Finally, the difference between the śrāvaka, Mahayana and pratyekabuddha-Dharmas is explained. Here no mention is made of arhants and stream-winners, and the hierarchy is of the 'three-vehicle' kind found in the Lotus Sūtra and other Mahayanist works. It is interesting to note that the description of the śrāvaka-dharma corresponds most closely to the teaching of

Nāgārjuna, though the characteristics of the Mahayana dharma, compassion and wisdom, are recognisably the motivating force of the Buddha described in the Treatise. The account of the three types of dharma is given here in order to explain the reference in verse 12 to the pratyekabuddhas, and it devotes most space to them:

The true character taught by the Buddha is threefold. To attain the true character of all dharmas and end all the afflictions is termed the śrāvaka-dharma. To produce great compassion and arouse the unexcelled mind is called the great vehicle (Mahayana). If a Buddha does not enter the world and there is a time when there is no Buddha-dharma, pratyekabuddhas because of their isolation develop insight independently, for even if a Buddha, after saving living beings enters nirvāṇa without residue, and the dharma he bequeathed completely dies out, if there are any who from a previous world are supposed to attain the Way, then if they meditate a little on the causes for despising and leaving saṃsāra and go alone into the mountains and forests remote from any bustle and confusion, they will attain the way. These are called pratyekabuddhas.

In contrast to the previous chapter, chapter nineteen is an entirely straightforward presentation of Nāgārjuna's critique of time. Time is conventionally conceived of in terms of past, present and future. Nāgārjuna argues that if these three together constitute time, then, like any other components refuted in the Treatise, they must be interdependent, in which case each presupposes the other and none exists in and of itself. And if none exists, how can we say that time is comprised of them? The commentary in this chapter merely supplements the stanzas with two analogies: light and lamp in 19/1, and pots and clothes at 19/2.

The commentary to Chapter 20, on 'Cause and Effect' is a similarly straightforward recapitulation of the argument. The argument takes the two elements of 'cause' and 'effect' separately and demonstrates that they cannot possibly be separate entities which combine to comprise the process of 'cause and effect', since a cause presupposes its effect, and an effect presupposes its cause. The argument presented in verse one of this chapter

If causes and conditions combine
 And an existent effect is produced,
 It already existed within the combination.
 What need has it to be produced by combination?

is no different from the argument presented in chapter one:

(1v8) An effect already given in a cause
 Can neither exist nor not exist.
 If previously non-existent, what would the cause
 produce?
 If already existent, why would the cause be needed?

The present chapter however explores some versions of cause and effect not previously encountered, such as the notion that a cause changes into its effect (20v9), or that a cause does not completely cease, only its designation as 'a cause' ceases (27a2). From verse sixteen onwards the concept of an 'empty' cause is discussed, but 'empty' here is not the Mādhyamika emptiness, rather it refers to the idea of a nonexistent,

ineffective or vacuous cause, one which does not produce an effect, compared by the Treatise to someone who is not pregnant and therefore cannot produce a child. Such a cause is not a cause at all, of course. The discussion proceeds with a refutation of the ideas both that cause and effect become one and that they are different, and concludes with an argument which is intended to destroy the notion of combination of causes resulting in effects, on the grounds that no effects possessing 'self-substance' are to be found.

Chapter twenty-one is a critique of becoming and dissolution, which are alternative terms for 'arising' and 'ceasing'. The Treatise sets out the opponent's view in the form of an empirical observation: 'Everything in the world manifestly has the characteristic of dissolution. Therefore dissolution exists'. Not so, says Nāgārjuna, for;

21v2 If separate from becoming,
 How can dissolution exist?
 It would be like death without birth.
 This is not correct.

In other words, a restatement of the same argument that has been applied to all pairs of opposites throughout the Treatise. The Treatise supplies a useful example which exploits the interdependence of terms:

- (21/4) If there were dissolution apart from becoming, then with no becoming, what would dissolve? It is just as when there is no jug, we cannot say that the jug has dissolved. Hence, there is no dissolution apart from becoming.

There is a reference in 21/5 to dharmas being 'exhausted and ceased' and yet manifestly existing, and 'exhausted and ceased' is said in 212/6 to refer to the constant flow of dharmas. The commentary likens the process to a mirage which cannot be grasped, and this description applies generally to the way things are according to the Treatise.

- (21/6) All dharmas, morning noon and night, instant by instant, are constantly ceasing, becoming exhausted and passing away, like flowing water which never stands still. This is termed 'exhaustion'. This process cannot be grasped, and cannot be explained. Like a mirage, which has no fixed nature to get hold of, so exhaustion has no conceivable fixed nature. How can one subdivide it and assert that becoming exists?...

The problem with such analogies is that they show only the difficulty, not the logical impossibility, of comprehending such processes. Time, cause and effect, and so forth are abstract concepts which Nāgārjuna has to refute logically, and compared to them, mirages and flowing water are relatively 'graspable'. Nevertheless, images of illusion and flow are clearly useful to Nāgārjuna, since he employs them himself in the stanzas (cf. 17vv31-33).

At 21/10 the commentary offers an explanation for the opponent's

mistaken perception of things. The opponent had argued at 21/0 that 'everything in the world manifestly has the characteristic of dissolution. Therefore dissolution exists'. Nāgārjuna now answers that

(21v10) If you say that arising and ceasing
 Are seen by the eyes to exist,
 Seeing arising and ceasing as existent
 Is considered a delusion and a deception.

And the commentary explains that when one sees the (real) nature of dharmas they are empty and have no fixed nature; they are like an illusion, like a dream.

It is only that the unenlightened man has attained his eyes on account of his delusion in a former world. because of his false conceptualisation and discrimination in the present world, he says that his eyes see arising and ceasing. In the ultimate sense, there is, in reality, no arising or ceasing ...

By the end of the chapter, the argument has moved away from the initial topic of becoming and dissolution, via arising and ceasing, to the broader subject of the continuity of existence. This means in Buddhist terms existence within one of the three realms of desire, form and formlessness (see n. 287), but Nāgārjuna argues that a continuity of existence cannot be found through the three periods of time (past, present and future have already been refuted), and hence cannot be found at all. The Treatise explains this in terms of the opposition between 'true insight' and 'delusion'. 'It is because one is unable to attain

true insight within beginningless saṃsāra and death, that the three existences eternally succeed each other ... You should know that the continuity of existence exists only by virtue of delusions and perverted views. In reality, it does not exist.'

Chapter twenty-two is an analysis of the Tathāgata, the Thus-Come. A Tathāgata is incomprehensible, because although he appears in the world and has a body and so forth, the defining characteristics of a Buddha are that he is not afflicted by lust, anger, delusion and the other passions, is not the slave of the five 'receptive' (grasping) skandhas, has no karmic burden, and in general does not belong within the twelvefold causal chain. How, then, does one characterise a Buddha? Nāgārjuna's answer is that a Buddha is to be understood just as any dharma is to be understood. The argument proceeds as follows.

The opponent asserts that the Buddha exists; '...He is called 'King of the Dharma' and 'omniscient one'. But the Treatises' definition of existence is suffering; that is to say, bondage to the skandhas. 'Now examine and consider this.: If he exists, then he must be grasping. If he does not exist, what is there which grasps?'

The Thus-Come...

(22v1) ...is neither the skandhas nor separate from the skandhas,
He and they are not in each other.
The thus come not having the skandhas
In what place does the Thus-Come exist?

The Treatise commentary then expands on all possible ways in which the Thus-Come could or could not be combined with the skandhas, using logical arguments (if the Thus-Come existed separately from the five skandhas ... the Thus-Come would have the error of permanence) and analogies (If the five skandhas were within the Thus-Come, this would be like fruit in a bowl, or fish in water; they would be different from each other. If the Thus-Come were within the five skandhas, this would be like a man being in bed ...). Once having established that the Thus-Come cannot be found in any way apart from the five skandhas, Nāgārjuna then denies that the Thus-Come is the product of the combination of the five skandhas, for 'If the Thus-Come exists by the combining of the five skandhas, then he has no self nature' (22v2). Arguments to the effect that the Thus-Come exists prior to the skandhas, or that he exists in a relationship of difference from or unity with the skandhas are also refuted in the usual way, and Nāgārjuna concludes that

(22v10) By such interpretations
 (The skandha of) receiving is empty, the receiver
 is empty...

The opponent charges that this is 'a fixed, existent, emptiness' but Nāgārjuna has recourse to the device of the two truths:

(22v11) Emptiness cannot be expressed
 Non-emptiness cannot be expressed.
 Both, and neither, cannot be expressed
 They are discussed merely as conventional names.

Which the Treatise glosses as 'merely for refuting their opposites ...' In the next verse Nāgārjuna refers to the 'four views' of permanence, impermanence, etc., and limit, no limit, etc. These are views about the nature of the Tathāgata which derive from the Buddha's 'unanswered questions' about whether or not the Tathāgata exists or does not exist after death, etc. (see n.300). Although the following discussion in the Treatise concerns the permanence of 'the world' the world is to be understood as the realm of existence experienced by the living being. The Treatise's view is that all such views are misapprehensions of the reality:

(22/12) In calm quiescence none of these exists at all, and why? The true character of all dharmas is utter clarity and purity, and cannot be grasped ... These four views all arise on account of reception, but within the real character of all dharmas there is nothing which is caused by receiving. Through these four kinds of views we regard ourselves as noble and regard others as base, but in the true character of dharmas there is no 'you' or 'I', and this is why it is said that in calm quiescence the four views do not exist.

In 22/13 there is a discussion of different types of false views regarding the existence or nonexistence of the Tathāgata.

Although Nāgārjuna's verse (22v13) clearly refers to Buddhists who speculate on the nature of the Buddha's being in the world in terms of 'existence' or 'nonexistence', the commentary chooses to interpret the view that the Buddha is nonexistent as a rejection of the Buddha's teachings by the 'coarse, immature man' who says that there is no sin and merit, no saints and sages such as

Thus-Comes, etc. and who therefore 'forsakes good and does evil'. One who believes in the existence of the Buddha is described as 'denying the path to nirvāṇa' - in other words he regards the Buddha as eternally self-existent, - which implies that no-one can become a Buddha by following the path. Doing good, he attains worldly bliss, but not nirvāṇa. His approach is flawed because 'the Thus-Come has the characteristic of calm quiescence yet you are making various distinctions, differentiating within the characteristic of calm quiescence, the Thus-Come as existing or not existing'. Once again, the only remedy for one who habitually discriminates and makes distinctions is to acquire 'the eye of insight':

(22v15) The Thus-Come transcends sophistries
 Yet men still produce sophistries.
 Sophistries destroy the eye of insight,
 Such as these do not see the Buddha.

Which the commentary glosses:

'Sophistries' means recollected thoughts, grasping of characteristics, distinguishing this from that, saying that the Buddha is extinct or is not extinct, and so forth. Since man in order to pursue sophistries inverts his eye of insight, he is unable to see the dharma-body of the Thus-Come.

'The dharma-body of the Thus-Come' points to the Mahayanist concept of the eternal Buddha, revealed in the Lotus Sūtra. Nāgārjuna's conception of the Buddha's nature carries different connotations. Just as nirvāṇa is not something special,

different from birth and death (cf.25v19ff.), so

(22v16) The nature of the Thus-Come
 Is the very nature of the world.
 The Thus-Come has no nature
 The world, also, has no nature.

6.5 Chapters 23-27

Chapter twenty-three deals with perverted views (see n. 304). 'Perverted' in relation to views means much the same as 'inverted' in relation to the eye of insight. One whose perception is inverted or perverted has outflows into the world of desire, the world of form or the formless world; he grasps or receives dharmas and does not see things as a Buddha does, in their real aspect or character of calm quiescence. Nāgārjuna's interest in perverted views is almost entirely academic; he is not interested in the details (knowledge of which must be presumed on the part of the hearer) but on the logical relationships between such entities as 'lust' and 'the self'. Nāgārjuna agrees with his opponent that the defilements and passions arise from conceptual discriminations, but he does not agree that they therefore 'exist'.

(23v2) If you say that perverted views of purity and
 impurity
 Produce the three poisons,
 Then the three poisons are without self-nature
 Consequently, the defilements have no reality.

Moreover,

(23v4) Who has these defilements?
 Such a one cannot be established.

And if the defilements exist apart from this (self)
Then they are not part of it.

The argument, in short, is identical to that applied to the
Tathāgata in relation to the five skandhas.

The opponent puts forward a further argument in verse seven,
claiming that the sense-faculties, their realms and their objects
are at the root of evil. This is an inversion of the usual
Buddhist model of perception, in which the mind flows out into
the realms of form etc., since it suggests that external objects
affect the senses and thence the mind. Nāgārjuna's response is
to assert the illusory and empty quality of the play of the
senses. They are all empty, he says,

(23v8) ... like flames or dreams
 Or like a magic Gandharva-city.
(23v9) ... They are just like an illusionary man
 Or a reflection in a mirror.

The commentary repeats these analogies but emphasises also the
primacy of mind. Sense-experiences it says 'are merely
deceptions in the mind and have no fixed characteristics'
Lust, anger and the other defilements breed on the distinction
between purity and impurity, according to the opponent.
Nāgārjuna's points out however that purity presupposes impurity,
and that both presuppose someone making the conceptual
distinctions between purity and impurity. Therefore, purity and
impurity are based on (false) conceptual distinctions made by

(illusory) selves. None of this is real.

Specific examples of perverted views are then put forward by the opponent. The four referred to in 23/12 and represented by 'clinging to permanence in impermanence' in 23v13 are those views which are the antitheses of the four characteristics of all conditioned things taught by the Buddha, namely impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self (see nn. 286,313) To regard things as permanent when they are actually impermanent is the perverted view of permanence; other perverted views are that things are blissful, pure and possessed of a self. From Nāgārjuna's point of view it is not the view but the clinging which constitutes the perversion. The opponent is caught up in 'correct' views, but Nāgārjuna asks; since everything is empty, who is there to hold views? Even a view of permanence, if held without clinging, is not a perverted view, because one who does not cling to views has perceived the real character of things.

(23v16) If there is no dharma of clinging
 Incorrectly speaking these are perverted views.
 Correctly speaking, they are not perverted views,
 For who is there to have these things?

This is a rather subtle argument, for the term 'views' is here being used in a way that suggests that one can hold views and at the same time be non-clinging. Ordinarily, Nāgārjuna reserves the term 'views' for products of the unenlightened mind; here the term is being used to denote something much more like the disinterested use of conventional terms by the Buddha in his expedient teaching of self or no-self, etc. In subsequent

verses, however, Nāgārjuna reverts to using 'views' to denote 'perverted views', arguing however (from 23v20 onwards) that if perverted views such as that things are permanent, blissful etc., had any substance (i.e. if things really were permanent and blissful), then these views would not be 'perverted', they would be true perceptions, but since things are not permanent and blissful, such views are illusions and as such have no substance. This being the case, however;

(23v21) If permanence, self, bliss and purity
 In reality do not exist
 Impermanence, suffering and impurity
 Should also not exist.

Because, the commentary explains 'there is no reciprocal dependence'.

Nāgārjuna then implicitly equates the refutation of perverted (and non-perverted) views with the cessation of such views, and hence with the cessation of ignorance, which is of course the root cause in the twelve causal links:

(23v22) When perverted views cease in this way
 Ignorance also ceases.
 By the cessation of ignorance
 Predispositions and so forth cease.

The Treatise also makes the connection between (intellectual) refutation and 'cessation'. 'In this way', it says, 'means by this kind of interpretation.'

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When perverted views are extinguished, ignorance which is at the root of the twelve causes and conditions is also extinguished. Through the extinction of ignorance the three kinds of predispositions and actions etc. up to old age and death and so forth are all extinguished.

Chapter twenty-four 'Contemplation of the Four Truths' is the best-known chapter of the Middle Stanzas and is often regarded as a definitive statement of Nāgārjuna's position. The commentary in the Treatise adds very little to the verses, following Nāgārjuna's argument closely and merely clarifying minor points along the way. The commentary at 24/5 restates the opponents opening argument in verses one to five, which is that Nāgārjuna's doctrine of 'emptiness' and 'no arising and no ceasing' completely negates the Buddha's teaching summed up in the four truths (see n. 330) of suffering, accumulation of karma, cessation of suffering and the Way to the cessation of suffering, but is also careful to emphasise that 'the four truths involve cause and effect' and to couch the opponent's argument accordingly. Nāgārjuna's reply begins at verse seven. Despite the previous twenty-three chapters expounding emptiness, he says,

(24v7) You really cannot understand (lit. 'lack the capacity to know').
 Emptiness, or the reasons for emptiness.
 Or understand the meaning of emptiness.
 Therefore you create difficulties for yourself

And he proceeds to explain that the Buddhas employ two types of truth in order to teach the Dharma to living beings (v.8), and

that someone who does not realise this and is unable to sift conventional from ultimate truth will not 'know the real meaning of the profound Buddha-Dharma' (v9).

The commentary interprets conventional and ultimate truth in terms of two realities. Because of our perverted perceptions 'we produce false and illusory dharmas and this is worldly reality'. On the other hand, the saints and sages who know the true nature of these perverted perceptions 'know that all dharmas are utterly empty and that there is no arising, and this is the truth of the ultimate meaning which constitutes reality for the saints' (24/9).

On the face of it, the Middle Treatise's account of the two truths does not correspond to Nāgārjuna's understanding. There is a complex dialectical interaction here which involves two types of reality, (a) false and (b) real, being (c) described, and (d) comprehended, by two types of beings, (e) enlightened saints and sages, Buddhas, and (f) unenlightened grasping ordinary people. At one extreme, an enlightened saint can effortlessly comprehend and skilfully describe (teach) in terms of both, conventional truth (expedient falsehood) and the real character of things (emptiness). At the other extreme, an ordinary unenlightened being is incapable of comprehending, except by grasping, even the expedient conventional description of reality offered by the Buddha. Somewhere in between is the person who realises that there are two levels of truth but 'grasps' at

reality (emptiness), and the teacher who describes reality but realises that he is addressing a mixed audience, which is essentially Nāgārjuna's situation. Clearly, the way forward is by stages; those who are grasping and ignorant should first put into practice the Buddha's expedient teaching (that there is no self, that dharmas arise and cease, etc.,) in order to develop a clearer perception of the way things are. Therefore, Nāgārjuna says:

(24v10) Unless you rely on the conventional truth
 You will not attain the ultimate meaning.
 Unless you attain the ultimate meaning
 You will not attain nirvana.

Developing a clearer perception involves learning that words and expressions are merely conventions. Only when this is understood is it possible for someone to receive, without grasping at the concepts, the description of the way things really are. The meaning will be conveyed in words and phrases, but the words and phrases themselves will not constitute the meaning. As the Treatise puts it:

(24/10) The ultimate meaning is entirely dependent on words and expressions, and words and expressions are mundane and conventional. Therefore, without reliance on the conventional and the mundane, the ultimate meaning cannot be expounded. Unless one attains to the ultimate meaning [i.e. unless one can become non-grasping], how can one attain nirvāṇa? Therefore, although dharmas are non-arising, there are these two levels of truth.

The next five verses and their commentary (24v11 - 24/15) concern the dangers of mismatching the teaching and the hearer. It was this danger which, says Nāgārjuna, caused the Buddha to hesitate before teaching the Dharma, and it is a danger which persists for those who take on the doctrine of emptiness without suitable mental preparation. Nāgārjuna then turns the opponent's initial argument (that emptiness negates the Buddha's teaching) against him, using the argument that dharmas which are not empty must be conceived to have own-nature, and

(24v16) If you perceive all dharmas
 As having fixed, existent natures
 Then you will see all dharmas
 As without causes and conditions.

A denial of causality is of course a denial of the possibility of directed change, the 'path', outlined by the Buddha. Therefore, argues Nāgārjuna, it is emptiness which makes the path possible, not a doctrine of existent dharmas.

(24v20) If everything were not empty
 There would be no arising or ceasing
 And thus there would not be
 The dharma of the four holy truths.

Verses eighteen and nineteen, which equate emptiness with dependent origination or causality, are often quoted as cardinal statements of Nāgārjuna's position. They are significant in chapter twenty-four taken on its own, but for anyone who has read this far in the Treatise, they offer little that is new, except

perhaps the reference to the 'middle path' in verse eighteen. The assertions that emptiness means causality, that causality is what the Buddha taught, and that the Buddha taught the 'Middle Way' are hardly controversial, and the meaning of 'dharma ... constitute conventional names' has been hammered home in every chapter of the Treatise. The commentary adds that 'emptiness moreover is itself empty', which is another way of saying that the way things really are cannot be apprehended by grasping at the notion of 'emptiness'. This is in recognition of the fact (already referred to in the commentary's discussion of Nāgārjuna's reasons for composing the Middle Stanzas, in chapter one) that unsuitable people 'seized hold of the characteristic of emptiness' when they heard it taught in the Mahayana-Dharma (1b29ff.)

The rest of chapter twenty-four consists of a detailed resumé of the arguments for adhering to the notion of emptiness, in relation to various aspects of the Buddhist path and the four truths. All these arguments take as their premise that fixed, self-existent things cannot change, whereas the path presupposes change, and the transformation of one thing into another; for example, an unenlightened person into a Buddha.

(24v39) If there is not emptiness
 One who has not yet attained will never attain
 Nor will the defilements be cut off,
 Nor will there be termination of suffering.

'And why?' says the commentary; 'Because of fixed natures'.

Finally, verse forty reads; 'if you perceive the dharma of causality, then you can perceive the Buddha', which is explained as 'the Buddha's dharma-body' in the commentary. This reference to the dharmakāya is unique to the Chinese version of the stanzas and perhaps reflects a Mahayanist interpolation in the text (see n. 366).

The examination of nirvāṇa (see n. 368) in chapter twenty-five takes a predictable course. As has already been stated many times in the Treatise, nirvāṇa is a dharma like any other, and all dharmas may be nirvāṇic or saṃsāric, depending upon whether they are perceived with grasping or without grasping. The opponent starts from the assumption that nirvāṇa, since it has the meaning of extinction or cessation, must entail the cessation of something, and that something must therefore exist, and cannot be empty. However, this view is based on a misconception of the meaning of 'empty' (as 'nonexistent'). Nāgārjuna therefore reasserts the meaning of emptiness as causality, on which the operation of the twelve causal links relies. 'Neither existence nor nonexistence' says the commentary, quoting the Buddha's words (see 25v10), 'is the gate that leads to nirvāṇa' (25/2). By this is meant that nirvāṇa is empty, just as all other dharmas are empty and have always been so.

(25/3) ... since the five skandhas have been utterly empty from the beginning, when one attains the Way and enters nirvāṇa without residue there is nothing which is cut off ...

In verses four to eight Nāgārjuna argues against various conceptions of nirvāṇa as either 'existent' or 'nonexistent'. In 25v9, when the opponent asks what kind of thing nirvāṇa is if it is neither existent nor nonexistent, Nāgārjuna answers:

(25v9) Because we receive causes and conditions
 We revolve in saṃsāra.
 Nor receiving causes and conditions
 Is what constitutes nirvāṇa.

And the commentary explains:

(25/9) Because we do not know our perverted views for what they really are, we wander in saṃsāra, on account of the five receptive skandhas. When we recognise our perverted views for what they really are, then we no longer wander in saṃsāra on account of the five receptive skandhas. When there is no longer any succession of the nature-less five skandhas, this is said to be nirvāṇa.

'Not knowing our perverted views for what they are', like 'ignorance', has of course a double meaning in the Mādhyamika context, where the whole burden of Nāgārjuna's argument is that 'views' are the hindrance par excellence and emptiness is the remedy, but this change of perception equally refers to the practice of meditation and the proper orientation of the 'eye of insight' which, when inverted, generates perverted views. This statement about nirvāṇa and its attainment, like the later

reference (at 25/19) which identifies 'the world' with 'the succession of the five skandhas' well illustrates the indivisibility of ontology and psychology in the Treatise as a whole. From a similar point of view, the Treatise at 25/21 discusses various views about the existence, limits and permanence of the world in relation to the Thus-Come's experience of the world, since it is only the Thus-Come's experience of the world which is a reliable guide to its true character. Verse nineteen is the well-known statement of the identity of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra:

Between nirvāṇa and the world
There is not the slightest distinction.
Between the world and nirvāṇa
There is not the slightest distinction.

Which of course means that nirvāṇa and the world are both dharmas, factors of experience, without any fixed nature of their own.

Verse twenty-four is a rather radical statement of the view that what the Buddha said differs from what he knew and what is the highest truth:

(25v24) All dharmas are inconceivable.
 Extinguish all futile thoughts.
 There is no person and no place
 And there is nothing taught by the Buddha.

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But the teaching is actually familiar. 'There is no person and there is no place' means that there is no self apart from the constantly fluctuating five skandhas, which are like a dream or a mirage. All views which seek to establish some substantial entity in the psyche are to be dismissed. In the Treatise such views are referred to as the 'sixty-two wrong views' (see nn. 198,392); they include such ideas as that the body contains a soul. The section of commentary which concludes the treatment of nirvāna in this chapter is a brief summary of the Treatise's approach to views in general; the way things really are is incompatible with the existence of views, and this is the true meaning of the Buddha's teaching.

(36b9) What body is there to be the same as a soul, and what body to be different from soul? It is the same with all of the sixty-two wrong views; within utter emptiness they are all untenable. When every existence which is conceived is at rest, futile thoughts entirely cease, and when futile thoughts cease one penetrates into the true character of dharmas and attains the Way of calm serenity ...

As already seen from the chapter on causality (chapter one), if we discriminatingly investigate dharmas we find that they are neither existent, nor nonexistent, nor both existent and nonexistent, nor neither existent nor nonexistent. This is what is meant by 'the true character of all dharmas' and it is also termed thusness, dharma-nature, real-limit and nirvana. This is why the Buddha, at no time and in no place, ever taught anyone any fixed characteristics of nirvana, and this is why we say that when every existence which is conceived is at rest, all futile thoughts are extinguished.

Chapter twenty-six, like the following chapter, is identified in the Treatise's introductory commentary as pertaining to the

śrāvaka-dharma, as opposed to, or in the Treatise, incorporated into, the Mahayana-dharma. The 'way of the ultimate meaning' mentioned in the commentary perhaps goes beyond both yanas, and is to be identified with the teaching of the Treatise, although it might equally well refer to the Mahayana in general. As in chapter eighteen, the verses are presented all together, followed by a commentary on the whole chapter, which is an entirely straightforward account of dependent origination and the twelve causal links. The tone is so different from that of the preceding chapters that it seems likely that this chapter, and perhaps the following one on 'Wrong Views' were originally appendices to the Middle Stanzas, which would otherwise have concluded on a rising note, with the contemplation of the goal, nirvāṇa, in chapter twenty-five. This chapter provides a definitive account of the twelve causal links, which are an important presupposition of Nāgārjuna's exposition of emptiness. The commentary to chapter twenty-six adds little to the verses; it emphasises the role of ignorance and also its remedy, namely seeing things as they really are;

(36c19) ... By assiduously cultivating insight which views the arising and ceasing of the twelve causal conditions, these things cease, and because they cease, all of them including birth, old age and death, sorrow, ill, and the great suffering of the skandhas really and completely cease.

Chapter twenty-seven is a refutation of wrong views 'in the śrāvaka-dharma' (27/0), which deals almost entirely with the

concept of the self and errors associated with various theories of the self. Verses one to three deal with the idea of a self which continues from the past to the future, verses four to five with possible relationships between self and body, and verse eight with the self and (the skandha of) reception. The chapter is rich in analogies; the caṇḍāla and the brahman, Devadatta, a washerman and a reaper, a man who becomes a god, and so on. Once again the Treatise commentary relates Nāgārjuna's primarily conceptual problematic to moral and soteriological factors such as sin and merit, the operation of the twelve causal links (37b14), the results of deeds (37b21), suffering (37c4), disruption of the social order (37c24, cf. 13/3; 17b15ff. both of which deal with the father-son relationship, important in China), and keeping the precepts (37c28). There is a reference at 39all to the 'Four Hundred Contemplations', which is the original version of the Hundred Treatise by Āryadeva (see n.443), and a verse is quoted which is not preserved in the Chinese version of that treatise. In verse twenty-nine Nāgārjuna restates his argument that all views are insubstantial because they derive from delusory perceptions by beings who have no self-nature:

Since all dharmas are empty
Views about the permanence, etc. of the world -
In what place and at what time,
And by whom, would such views be generated?

The commentary spells out the implications of this argument with definitions of 'place' and 'time'. Although the chapter deals

with wrong views, Nāgārjuna's critique, it says, applies to 'all views:

(39b18) If there are fixed views of permanence, impermanence, etc., there must be a person who generates these views. When self is destroyed there is no production of views by such a person. There must be a place for manifestly observed dharmas to be negated; how much more a time? If all these views exist they should have a fixed reality, but if they were fixed they could not be destroyed, and we have already negated them on various grounds in what has gone before; therefore you should know that views have no fixed substance; how can they arise? As the verse says: 'In what place, and at what time, and by whom would such views be generated?

The final verse of the stanzas is a verse of obeisance to the Buddha, which links compassion, wisdom, and the cessation of views:

(27v30) To Gautama, Great Sage and Master,
Who from pity and compassion preached this dharma,
Entirely cutting off all views;
We now bow our heads in reverence.

The commentary makes no reference to compassion, although this is implied in the Buddha's decision to preach the Dharma. Instead, the Buddha's insight is emphasised.

(27/30) ... It was in order to cut off all these views that he preached the Dharma. The Great Sage and Master, Gautama, has immeasurable, unbounded and inconceivable wisdom and insight, and this is why we bow our heads to him in reverence.

6.6 Conclusion

The commentary therefore functions in two ways in the Treatise as a whole; it reaffirms or clarifies what is said in the verses, but it also interprets and draws out the Buddhist meaning of the text, in some cases introducing new material. The commentary's major concerns can be classified in a number of ways; it seeks to preserve Buddhist morality and soteriology, which is only possible in the context of absolute causality, to clarify the nature of the enlightened one without falling into extreme views, and to re-establish a proper understanding of the emptiness taught in the Mahayana-Dharma.

In order for actions to receive their rewards, for causes to have effects, change must take place, and change is only possible if dharmas have no fixed nature and are empty, as taught in the Mahayana-Dharma. However, the Treatise is not simply reaffirming the Mahayana-Dharma, which has been irretrievably misconceived; it states that although things are empty, as taught in the Mahayana, there are two levels of truth. Emptiness is something which cannot be conveyed either in words and expressions or apart from words and expressions; it is an emptiness, in other words, which can only be attained by the man of insight. Insight is gained through the perception of truths and meditation, through samādhi and cultivation of the Way, for which the prerequisite is holding to the precepts, and it is defined as, amongst other

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things, perceiving the true character of dharmas, cutting off all views, and calm cessation. Unenlightenment, by contrast, is to cling to and produce views, including a view of emptiness, to generate sophistries, and to invert the eye of insight. Views are the antithesis of enlightenment and the substance of ignorance. They lead to I and mine, to self-aggrandising evaluations and conceptual discriminations, and ignorance itself is the first link in the twelvefold chain of existence. Once these facts are not grasped, bodhi is achieved.

Appendix

A draft English translation of Walleser's German translation (1911) of the fourth chapter of the Tibetan Akutobhaya , Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas with a commentary traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna himself but almost certainly by another author.

- 4/0 Question: The five skandhas exist, because acknowledgement of them is taught.
Answer:
- 4v1 Form is not found apart from form-cause
Cause of form is not found separately from form.
- 4/1 Without form-cause, form is not perceived. Free from form also form-causes will not be seen. Also with reception, cognition, predispositions, consciousness (the other four skandhas) is this proof to be taken into consideration. Like seeds and sprouts.
Question:
If form could be perceived, free from causes of form, what errors would occur?
Answer:
- 4v2 If you had form without form-causes, then form would be without cause.
- 4/2 If someone thinks 'if without cause, all the better' then it should be said:
- 4v2(contd) Nothing exists anywhere without a cause
- 4/2 No causeless thing exists anywhere-as in the case of space. Seed and sprout.
Question: If however separate from the thing called 'form the cause of form is present, what errors then occur?
Answer:
- 4v3 If apart from form the form-cause were to exist, this would be causes without effects

- 4/3 If, separate from form, there were causes of form, the causes would be without effects. If one said, holding fast to the proposition 'the cause is without effect, that 'it is so', then we should reply:
- 4v3 'Effectless causes do not exist'
- 4/3 No causes without effects exist. Like father and son. Further:
- 4v4 If form exists, the cause of form is untenable (upapadyate)
If form does not exist, the cause of form is also untenable
- 4/4 In neither case does the cause of form occur. If form exists, the cause of form is untenable, and if form does not exist, the cause of form is equally non-existent. Like the burnt and not-yet-burnt. If at this point someone thinks: 'form is without cause' then the answer should be:
- 4v5: Causeless forms are untenable.
- 4/5 Causeless forms are in no way anywhere tenable. Because this is so,
- 4v5 Therefore one should not discriminate forms.
- 4/5(contd.) 'Therefore' signifies the conclusion. 'Form' means 'standing/resting upon form'. Because we have investigated it in this way, form is in every respect untenable. Therefore, no differentiations which rest upon forms should be undertaken. Like empty space. Further:
- 4v6 An effect identical with its cause does not occur. An effect not identical with its cause does not occur.
- 4/6 If correctly examined, the sentence 'The effect is identical with the cause' is not correct, and 'the effect is not equivalent/identical to the cause' is not tenable (either). Like seeds, sprouts, and fruit.
- 4v7 Vedana, . . . , . . . , . . . and all things (bhava) Are in every way, in respect to the method, equal to rupa.

4/7 The groups/skandhas and all things are in every way in the teaching of the method of nonapplicability of cause and effect and of the method of the nonoccurrence of form, to be observed/seen as equivalent. Like Canaka-gold.

4v8 When a counter-refutation is raised in a debate on the basis of emptiness
With this person, everything is without counter-refutation, and is equivalent to the contention.

4/8 When somewhere in a dispute employing emptiness someone utters a (counter) refutation through non-emptiness, with this person everything is without counter-refutation (lit: not contradicted). This is to be understood as just the same as the thing to be arrived at (the contention).

4v9 One who in an explanation expounds errors by means of emptiness; with this person everything is without ('with' - some texts) error-exposition and is equivalent to the contention, which is to be arrived at.

4/9 Wherever at the time of teaching by means of emptiness someone expounds the errors via non-emptiness, with that person everything is to be understood as a failed/without error-exposition and as equivalent to that which is to be arrived at.

The two last slokas of this chapter are to be observed as the kernel of all debates bound up
emptiness. Like the emptiness of a Gandharva-city.

with

Comments

The above translation is third-hand, from Walleser's rather difficult German translation of 1911 of the Tibetan original. Even so, certain similarities and differences between the Chung-lun, the Prasannapadā and the Tibetan Akutobhayā may be distinguished. The arrangement of verses is identical in all three versions (although this is not true of all chapters), but whereas the Chung-lun presents Nāgārjuna's ideas as an argument

for a Mahayanist Buddhist understanding of the true nature of things, and Candrakirti argues for a particular interpretation of Nagarjuna's thought over against his Madhyamika adversaries, the Tibetan commentary emphasises debating points in the text, in line with the Tibetan tradition of learned monastic debate. These differences of emphasis do not outweigh a rather fundamental similarity of outlook in all three texts. Each version presents the basic Madhyamika argument in two stages: First, nothing which is part of the process of dependent origination can exist by itself, without cause or effect. Second, the assertion that things are empty is a non-assertion, and can safely be employed to negate all views without the danger of constructing an alternative view. 'Emptiness' is the key to the successful determination of views, debates, and conceptual discriminations. It may therefore be employed with equal effect to destroy the wrong views of others, and of oneself.

Notes to the Translation

References to verses in the Treatise take the form 6v9, etc. References to sections of commentary take the form 6/9, but in the case of long sections of commentary an additional reference to the Taishō text is given, e.g.: 6/9;10b23 means 'commentary 6/9, page 10, column b, line 23'.

1. The Middle Treatise 中論 is the name given to this work in Seng-jui's preface. In Japanese studies of Mādhyamika the term 中論 is often used to indicate both the present Treatise and Nāgārjuna's stanzas, which were of course unknown to the Chinese except through the medium of their translation and explanation in the Treatise. This reflects the Sino-Japanese assumption that the Treatise faithfully transmits the thought of the stanzas. The relationship between the verses in Sanskrit and Chinese is in many ways analogous to the relationship between cause and effect analysed in the Treatise; the verses are not the same, but they are not different either. There are however significant differences between the Treatise as a whole and the Sk. verses taken alone, and in this sense the Chung-lun is not 'Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas'. The problem of the transmission of Mādhyamika thought to China from India is the focus of Robinson's 'Early Mādhyamika in India and China'.
2. 'verses' is supplied, since the Chinese has only 造 'composed by'.
3. The Bodhisattva Dragon-Tree 龍樹菩薩 is the usual translation of Nāgārjuna.
4. Brahman = 梵志, Nakamura (hereafter Nak.) 1271b gives several equivalents such as brāhmaṇa, brahma-cārin, parivrājaka etc.

5. Yao of Ch'in = Yao Hsing 姚興, king of the 'Tibetan' empire of later Ch'in from 394-416, who sponsored Kumārajīva's translation activities in Ch'ang-an. Zurcher, BCC.212-216.

6. Sk. title 'pratyaya-parīkṣā' (pratyaya = condition, Conze, Dict. 280), trans. by Inada as 'Relational Condition'. 因 and 緣 both mean cause or reason. The chapter is concerned with causality, but in particular with Buddhist causality, which is to say the train of events leading towards or away from liberation, expressed in the standard formulae of the 12 causes and conditions 十二因緣 and the four truths 四諦 (cf. 1/0; 1b25ff.) Elsewhere 因緣 is translated as 'causes and conditions' or, where context demands, as 'grounds' or 'reasonings'.

The Treatise accepts and invokes causality as axiomatic. cf. 2/20.

7. (Verses 1v1 and 1v2 are repeated after commentary 1/0). Nāgārjuna's 'eight negations' 八不 refer to a representative selection of ways in which dharmas might be said to come into existence (if dharmas were existent). 'Arising' 生 means a dharma which was not previously existent becoming existent, while 'ceasing' 滅 means the reverse. 'Permanence' 常 means that a dharma which existed in the past continues to exist after its successor has arisen and beyond the instant of its existence, (its 'abiding' 住 as a dharma). 'Severance' 斷 means that there is a cut-off point when the previous dharma has ceased and before its successor arises, such that they are not connected. 'Identity' 一 (or oneness, unity) means that the previous dharma is itself also the subsequent one, and 'difference' 異 means that the two dharmas are quite separate and distinct. 'Arriving' 來 (lit: coming) means that a dharma appears (comes from somewhere) and

in this sense exists at a particular time and place, and 'departing' 出 means that it becomes inexistent by going away from that time and place. The eight negations are examined again at 1/2 after verses 1v1 and 1v2 have been repeated. There the derivation of dharmas from Īśvara, prakṛti and atoms is loosely associated with 'arriving'. Since all these possibilities and by implication all others (see 1/2) are negated, it adds nothing to our understanding to define them more closely. Any view, however precise, about the way in which dharmas come into existence is to be similarly rejected, because dharmas do not exist in any conceivable sense. The meaning of 'no arising' etc., also depends on the level of truth in the context of which it is asserted. Cf. 24/10 'although dharmas are non-arising, there are these two levels of truth'.

8. 戲 Sophistries 戲論 (Sk. prapañca. Conze. Dict.283 = 'futile discoursing, multiplicity, that which delays'). Hurvitz has 'frivolous assertions' (pp.276,89,216) and 'discourse frivolously' (p.217) (=LS 67b16,27d11,53c13,53d8). In the Treatise it has the meaning of fruitless mental activity, whether expressed in words and arguments or not. In 25/24 sophistries are said to cease when things are no longer conceived as existents, and when they cease one attains the 'way of serenity' 隱安隱道. Hence sophistries is a more pejorative term for 'views' 見 (cf.27/31). At 18/12;24c5 all afflictions (defilements) and actions are said to arise from conceptual discriminations which in turn originate in 'vain thoughts' 戲論, but if one attains to utter emptiness, the true character of all dharmas, then such vain thoughts cease and this is termed 'nirvāna with residue'. At 18/12;25b10ff. sophistries are

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described as being of two types, the first being 'argument from desire', the second 'argument from opinion'. Neither of these two can encompass, or survive within, 'the characteristic of calm extinction'. At 18/12;25b18 whoever achieves 'the cessation of all afflictions and sophistries' will also 'attain lasting bliss and nirvana'; this seems to be the highest goal of the sravaka-dharma (25b23) but falls short of the Mahayana, which requires more in terms of great compassion and an unexcelled mind. According to Nāgārjuna; 'the Thus-come (Tathāgata) transcends sophistries/ Yet men still produce sophistries./ Sophistries destroy the eye of insight,/ Such as these do not see the Buddha' (22v15) and Blue-Eyes in his commentary (22/15) offers a definition of sophistries as 'recollected thoughts, grasping at characteristics, distinguishing this from that, saying that the Buddha is extinct or not extinct, and so forth'. He says that to pursue sophistries it is necessary to have 'inverted the eye of insight' as a result of which one is unable to see the Dharma-Body of the Buddha (22/15).

9. Great Self-Being 大自在 = Sk. Maheśvara S.94a
10. See ch.14 for a discussion of combination 和合 in the context of seer, eye and object etc., but combination here refers to a (non-Buddhist?) doctrine of existence brought about by the coalescence of elements. In 20v12 - 20/15 combination of cause and effect is examined. See Nak.1466a-c for various possible meanings of 和合.
11. A non-Buddhist view; ch.19 refutes time 時 as an existent entity, and in 7/15 time and space are mentioned by the opponent

as necessary for the arising of dharmas.

12. 世性 Sk. prakṛti. A Sāṃkhya doctrine, though not identified as such in the Treatise. R.68 refers to T.1509 (the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise, hereafter GPWT) p.545c17-29 which explains the Sāṃkhya principles.
13. 變 R.68 has 'modification' (Sk.vikāra). This presumably refers to the Sāṃkhya concept of the transformations from prakṛti to gross nature in which nothing is lost, cf. Radhakrishnan and Moore, p.431 'there is the unmanifest as the cause gone before; it operates through the three attributes, by blending and modification....'.
14. 自然, R.68 has 'the self-so (svabhāva, svayambhū)'. See Nak. 557d and 558b 'The 自然外道 are those who deny (Buddhist) causality, believing that things arise spontaneously out of themselves'. 自然 differs from the notion of 自性 which in the treatise means svabhāva but in the more static sense of 'own-being, self-nature'.
15. 微塵 Sk. aṇu or paramāṇu. 'the smallest visible particle' (Nak.1294b). Refers to non-Buddhist materialist theories but is also applicable to the idea of real atoms forming the basis of all matter in the Abhidharma-Kośa (JEBD 84r).
16. The twelve causal links 十二因緣 are detailed in ch.26 which is unique among the 27 chapters of the Treatise in being a straightforward traditional non-Mahayana account of Buddhist soteriology without any mention of emptiness. The 12 causal

links are given there as 1. ignorance 無明 2. predispositions 行
 3. consciousness 4. name-and-form 名色 5. the six avenues
 受 六入 6. contact 觸 7. reception 受 8. craving 愛 9. grasping
 取 10. existence 有 11. birth 生 and 12. old age and death 老死
 (cf. Nak.656c-d). The same sequence of 12 causal links is found
 at 13/2;18a10ff. The relationship between two of the twelve
 elements - birth and old age and death - is examined at 11/0ff.
 Cf.n.171

17. 聲聞 (lit: the hearers) See ch.26 in toto and 18/12;25b23 where
 the distinction made here between the śrāvaka-dharma and the
 Mahayana is repeated. The term 小乘 ('hīnayāna') does not occur
 in the Treatise.
18. Mahayana is translated as 大乘 (great vehicle) throughout except
 for 26/0 where it is transliterated. cf.18/12;24clff.
19. This is one of only two overt references in the Treatise to the
 Perfection of Insight literature (cf.18/12;24c22). It is invoked
 here to demonstrate that the Buddha himself taught emptiness, in
 the sense in which 空 is used in the Treatise.
20. Seat of enlightenment 坐道 Sk.bodhimaṇḍa. Nak.1015c. In LS 14a1
 the term occurs and is rendered 'platform of the path' by Hurvitz
 (p.23) but 道 almost certainly means 'the Tao' (= enlightenment,
 bodhi) here, in accordance with Kumārajīva's usage.
21. cf. LS68a3,68a10 (Hurvitz.280) where virtually the same phrase is
 used, implying a standard formulation known to Kumārajīva of 500
 years of 正法 followed by 500 years of 像法. Nevertheless, the

phrase could mean that the five hundred years after the Buddha's death constituted the period of the 'patterned' (i.e. formalized) dharma, since no 正法 is mentioned here.

22. For (決)定 Miyamoto uses 'real' but this pre-empts its use for 實 etc., (cf 2/4) but n.b. 23/20 where 實 and 定 are synonymous. 'Fixed', which is used frequently throughout the Treatise, means reified, having an essence grasped, appropriated, received, clung to by the subject, having a nature, or having a self, and its obverse 不決定 as 'really nonexistent from the beginning' 本實無. The term is normally used in a disparaging way - if something is 'fixed' then it is not really fixed, but only seems to be to the unenlightened (cf.24v16). It is used in a different way at 27/8;38a18 'these are definite principles so you must realise them' 此是定義是故當知 and at 24b26 as 'firm insight' with the connotation of samādhi 決定智慧.
23. see n.80
24. These are the six sense-faculties and either their six realms, or consciousnesses or objects. See chapter 3.
25. The six sense-faculties, and their corresponding consciousnesses and objects. see JEBD 147b-148a, Nak.660c. cf. ch3 and previous note. These categorisations are part of the Abhidarmist analysis of consciousness.
26. Worldly truth 世諦 is any form of words sanctioned by the Buddha to lead beings to enlightenment. This may include apparent heresies, cf. 18/12;24c10ff. It means the Buddhist teaching as a

whole. However, Nāgārjuna/Blue Eyes considers himself to be addressing Buddhists who have misunderstood Buddhist teaching, as a result of which Buddhist truths including that of emptiness do not lead them to enlightenment but simply provide fuel for their 'voracious attachments' (cf. Murti p.50,n.1.). The 'truth of the supreme meaning' 第一義諦 therefore has to be a truth which does not involve words and concepts to provoke attachments, which preserves ordinary Buddhist morality and soteriology (the twelve causal links) and which corrects existing false views. In a limited sense emptiness can itself be described as 'the truth of the supreme meaning' (as at 1/2). Nāgārjuna holds that it can preserve Buddhist morality and soteriology (because it explains how things can change (cf.24v20ff) and it can rectify false views in the limited sense of exposing their internal contradictions. If 'emptiness is itself empty' as Blue Eyes asserts (24/13) then when emptiness as a concept finally dissolves out of the realm of worldly truth, the 'emptiness' that remains is 'the truth of the supreme meaning', but to achieve this degree of insight requires that one becomes a saint or sage (24/9) in order to see perverted perceptions for what they really are. 24v8ff. offers a full account of the two truths.

27. 相 is throughout translated as 'characteristic' except in ch.7 where it is rendered 'mark' for economy of style and in 實相 which is rendered 'true character'. A characteristic (Sk. lākṣaṇa, nimitta) is, conventionally speaking, an attribute or property of a dharma, and by extension it is that by which something exists and is known to exist. 'Characteristic' and 'dharma' are in fact interchangeable; one might say that characteristics exist by virtue of their dharmas, or as the

opponent puts it: 'The sutras say that dharmas have the three marks of arising, abiding and ceasing. Things arise through the dharma of arising, they abide through the dharma of abiding, and they cease through the dharma of ceasing, and this is how the various dharmas exist'. (7/0). For something to possess or display a characteristic is for it to be reified or hypostatized by the subject. To regard emptiness, for example, as a characteristic is to regard emptiness as a dharma (in this case also a doctrine), an existent thing. cf.22/10.

28. The verses are repeated, but each is counted only once in the numbering of verses.
29. 不可得 is best rendered 'untenable' though the context sometimes demands that it is rendered 'inconceivable' 'cannot be found' 'cannot be obtained' etc. This and 不然, 應, do service for a number of Sankrit logical operators, (cf. Robinson's discussion of this topic in Early Madhyamika pp. 85-88), none of which was known to Chinese readers of the treatise. It is virtually interchangeable with 無, 'nonexistent' in the sense of 'is not found'. It is not possible to match Kumārajīva's use of these terms with their Sk. originals since no text of Blue-Eye's commentary has survived.
30. direct worldly perception 世間現見 is invoked against the opponents of emptiness, and by the opponents against the Treatise's teachings. In the former case empirical observation is held to be a reliable guide to what is or is not the case (cf. the following passage), but in the latter case ordinary perception is said to be inherently perverted and unreliable. (cf.5/8,21/10,

2/18,2/1). What constitutes 'reality' depends on the degree of insight.

31. the meaning is not clear unless we substitute 'inference' for 'direct worldly perception', in which case Blue-Eyes is saying that corn cannot have arisen ex nihilo at the beginning of the kalpa (time-period during which the universe evolves and dissolves) because, as we can see, it does not arise now except as a result of already-existing seed-corn.
32. continuity of characteristics 相續 also translates as 'succession', 'continuity' according to context. 相 means both 'characteristic' and 'reciprocal', so that 相續 may equally well mean 'succeed each other'.
33. shoots of corn, stalks of corn, etc... The argument is obscured here by the intrusive parallelism of corn shoots and tree shoots, etc., which is irrelevant. Blue Eyes means to say that if such things as the shoot, the stalk and the leaf are really completely unrelated to each other, why do we regard them all as pertaining to, e.g. one 'tree'.
34. Here, as throughout the treatise, Nāgārjuna takes the fact of causality as axiomatic while at the same time rejecting any view about how it operates.
35. 'No causes' here implies a constant reality, with no changes taking place due to the operation of causes. Permanence is a Buddhist heresy and needs no further condemnation. This vista is then extended for 'where there is no cause there is no effect'

and therefore good actions would not affect one's destiny any more than bad ones. Almsgiving and holding to the precepts etc. represent merit-producing activities and Buddhist morality in general. A more comprehensive list of good actions (the 'ten paths of pure actions') is given at 17/11.

36. The ten evils and five rebellious acts 十惡五逆. The ten evils are traditionally killing, stealing, adultery, lying, bad language, slander, double-tongue, coveting, anger and false views (S.50a, JEED 146a, Nak.651b). Their opposites are listed at 17/11 as 'no-killing, no-stealing, no-lewdness, no lying, no deception, no evil speech, no useless gossip, no jealousy, no anger and no perverted views'.

The five rebellious acts are parricide, matricide, killing an arhat, shedding the blood of a Buddha and destroying the harmony of the Saṅgha. (S.128a, Nak.357a JEED 79b)

37. 'self-nature' or own-nature' 自性 is the attribute or property of anything which exists in and of itself. Its synonyms are 'fixed' 決定 'existent' 有 'self-substance' 自體 etc. According to Nāgārjuna dharmas are conceived by the unenlightened man to be like this, but are not really so.

38. This statement anticipates the better-known formulation of 24v18 and the commentary to that verse (24/19) recapitulates what is said here. ~~The 'merely' obscures the problem of whether the combination of causes and conditions 'really' takes place and~~ The argument stands or falls by whether ~~'mere'~~ designations may themselves be hypostatized.

39. An unspecific reference to the Abhidharma. Although there are some references to specified writers (Kātyāyana, Sarvāstivādins, Vātsīputrīyas) most of the canonical and commentarial quotations in the Treatise are unattributed.

40. The four types of cause are:

1. causal conditions 因緣
2. next-number condition 次第緣
3. condition-condition 緣緣
4. increase-over condition 增上緣

These are Robinson's literal translations (R.84). The Sk. verse is translated as: 'There are four conditions; the cause, the object-basis, the immediate, and the dominant. There is no fifth condition' (R.84). The four causes are explained as follows:

1. Sk. hetu-pratyaya. The direct cause.
2. Samanantara-pratyaya. This cause refers to the necessity of the first moment of thought passing out of existence before the next moment of thought can occur in the mind, i.e. the disappearance of the first moment of thought serves as the cause for the appearance of the second moment of thought.
3. Ālambana-pratyaya. This refers to the necessity for an object, to be present before a consciousness can function, e.g. sight can function only when there is an object to be seen.
4. Adhipati-pratyaya. All causes, apart from those above, which contribute to the emergence of a thing or at least do not hinder its emergence.

(JEBD 276a-b, Nak.508d). 1/12 however indicates that in the Treatise no. 4 should be understood as a general principle of causality ('this exists, therefore that exists'). I have translated as 'cause' rather than 'condition', following the

internal logic of the Treatise and supported by Nakamura (縁はこの場合、因に同じ) who provides a diagram to explain a relationship between the four causes and five effects (Nak.508d).

The Treatise however shows a thoroughgoing lack of interest in the precise meaning of these terms. No. 1, it says applies to 'all active dharmas' while 3 and 4 apply to 'all dharmas'. All dharmas are in fact 'active' (有為, which is often translated 'conditioned' for the Sk. samskrta, but which I have translated throughout as 'active'), for as the Treatise later reveals, 'inactive' 無為 dharmas exist only in the sense that there are not 'active' dharmas. (25/5: 'All the myriad things arise from conditions; they are all active. There is not a single dharma which may be termed an inactive one...'). Cf.n.85.

'Next-number condition' I have translated as 'sequential cause' because it refers to an event immediately preceding and thereby occasioning another. Arhats (see n.41) by virtue of attaining nirvana, step out of the causal sequence. Each of these types of cause is refuted individually in what follows (1v9-1/11).

41. An arhat 阿羅漢 is one who, as the context here makes clear, has passed beyond thought and mental configurations 心心數. He is free from all cravings and rebirth, has attained the fourth (highest) level of spiritual attainment, is free of defilements, perfect in knowledge and worthy of respect and offerings. According to the GPWT, which is thoroughly Mahayanist, Arhats (and Pratyeka-Buddhas) are something less than Bodhisattvas (T.1509,p.267c26ff., Ramanan pp.288,371n56) but the Treatise mentions Bodhisattvas on only two occasions, at 1/0;1b28 in a

quotation from the Prajñāpāramitā, and at 11/1 in a rather rudimentary hierarchy in which the Buddha is ranked highest amongst the various types of Buddhist and non-Buddhist saints and sages. Arhats are mentioned on a number of occasions without (but n.b.n. 249) any suggestion that they belong anywhere below the highest rank of spiritual attainment. (7/15; 10b9ff, 17/19; 22c15ff, etc.) Most frequently mentioned are 'saints and sages' or holy men in general 賢聖、聖人. See n.249 for the four stages leading to arhatship.

42. Indeterminate 無決定 'not fixed' in the sense of having no definite own-nature. See 1/0(1c1ff.)
43. 緣 here = 因緣 the first of the 四緣 referred to in 1v5. existent, inexistent, both existent and inexistent... are the first three propositions of the tetralemma. The fourth, 'neither x nor not x' occurs less often and adds nothing to the argument. See the discussion of these four terms in e.g. 25/16, 27/29. Once the first two mutually exclusive terms (x and not x) are negated there is no possibility of 'both x and not x' being tenable, or of 'neither x nor not x' being tenable.
44. refers to the 次第緣 of 1v5, and requires that the cessation of the previous dharma be the precondition or occasion for the arising of the subsequent dharma.
45. the three periods of time 三世 past, present and future, lit: already-past, present and not-yet-come.
46. inactive dharmas see n.40, n.85.

47. active dharmas always have the characteristic of cessation because cessation is one of the three characteristics 三相 of all dharmas. See 7/0.
48. If there is no permanence there can be no sin and merit, because actions cannot operate causally on effects, hence actions and rewards would be independent of each other.
49. You deny your own dharma: one of several suspected puns in the 法 chung-lun, since dharma 法 means both 'doctrine' and 'concept of a dharma' cf. 13/3; 17c5, 16v10, 27/8; 37b14)
50. see 1v5
51. Dharmas being factors of experience vary in their nature according to the level of insight of the one who observes the dharmas. Thus, some perceive dharmas as having a form or shape while the srotapannas or the saints see dharmas 'without outflows' which is to say their perception of dharmas does not involve any haemorrhaging of attention into forms and shapes. Since their eye of insight is not inverted or veiled by 'I' and 'mine' (18/12; 24c1ff.) they can see the true character of dharmas 諸法實相 (which transcends the characteristics listed above at 1/11). The Treatise distinguishes the Arhat from the other stages of sainthood on the basis of the distinction between 'with outflows' and 'without outflows' (17/19; 22c17ff.)
52. This is the language of mysticism, typical of the commentary rather than of the verses.

53. cf. the Treatise's sole reference to skilful means (18/12;25a16) and nn.339,340.
54. In contrast to the lengthy analysis of sequential condition in 1/10 'objective cause' is merely rejected as an 'expedient' 宜 . The Sk. verse is itself problematic; it states that true dharmas do not have objective causes, so where would objective causes exist? but the text may be corrupt (R.85,v11, Inada.41,v8). Kumarajiva's reading (R.86) refers to the 'True Dharma', hence the commentary speaks of the Mahayana doctrine that dharmas of all kinds are empty and enter into the 'Dharma-nature'. This is not in itself a refutation of the concept of objective cause.
55. This verse deals, though not explicitly, with the fourth of the conditions mentioned in 1v5, the 増上縁, which is a general principle of causation operating as and within the twelve causal links, (see 1/0,1625ff.n.) and expressed in the traditional formulation 'this being, that becomes' (Majjhima Nikāya II,32, Samyutta Nikāya II,28. Inada p.17)
56. What the Buddha said was in accordance with his hearers mis-perceptions. The implication is that nothing of what the Buddha said can be taken at face value.
57. 'summarized or taken at length' is a mistranslation, corrected in the commentary by redefinitions of the two terms. (see R.86, remarks on V. 13)
58. 'Going and coming' is Kumarajiva's rendering of the Sk. title 'gatagata' (Gone and not gone). 'Coming' is not mentioned in the

chapter after this, but the phrase 去來 means transmigration, or wandering in saṃsāra (cf. 27v19). Hence this chapter, which in the Sk. is a purely technical discussion of 'what has and what has not transpired' (so Inada) is imbued with soteriological significance in the Chinese, for it now deals implicitly with the reality or otherwise of transmigration, rebirth and karma, and explicitly with the twelve causal links (2/17).

59. 三世 past, present and future. See n.45.
60. Action of going 去業 i.e. an act of going in addition to the process of going. Other terms which the opponent attempts to introduce as disparate but conjoined elements in the process of going include dharma of going 去法 (2/1,2v3); place of movement 動處 (2v2,2/2); situation of karmic activity 作業處 (2/2); a goer 去者 (2v6ff); a beginning (of going) 發 (2/11,2v12ff); characteristic of going 去相 (2/16) and movement of the body 身動 (2/25). The treatise accepts none of these but identifies going, like movement 行 as a designation for 'continuity of characteristics' or 'succession' 相續 (2/17;5a16).
61. at rest 住 (abiding) is one of the three marks (see n.27). It is not used here as the antithesis of going 去 but as a situation in which a goer or non-goer might be identified. (cf.2/15).
62. A reference to the 12 causal links. see n.16
63. On the untrustworthiness of (the opponent's) perception see n.30
64. 人常法無常 A curious assertion for any Buddhist unless taken

in this limited context of a refutation of the identity of 'goer'
and 'dharma of going'.

65. see n.22

66. 'these three' 三種 lit: 'three kinds' but the verse has only
三 and the 'three editions' of the Tripitaka omit 種 (T.1564,
p.5,n.22).

67. Anything neither existent 有 nor nonexistent 無 is illusory 幻,
apparitional 化 and 'exists' only as an unreal designation
cf. the 六如 in the Diamond Sutra (T.235,p.752c27) 'like a dream,
phantasm, bubble, shadow, dew, lightning'.

68. These are listed in 3v1

69. The sutra's description of the elements of perception is straight-
forward, the Treatise however rejects any explanation of how these
elements co-operate, if it involves existents. The six objects
塵 六塵 corresponding to the faculties 六情 are forms 色, sounds
聲, odours 香, tastes 味, tangible objects 觸, and dharmas
法. (JEBD 237d, Nak.1455d)

70. mind 意, (Sk. manas). Here used as an abbreviation of 意識 (Sk.
vijñāna) (JEBD 123a,278b). Nak. (40b) gives as equivalents
思量 (consideration), ニニる、思い、思いめぐらす心のはたうき。
(the operation of the mind in relation to thinking).

71. See ch. 2

72. 識等四法 These are listed in the commentary at 3/7.
73. 四取等 See 3/7
74. 諸緣 causal links. see 3/7
75. The four dharmas are nos. 3,6,7, and 8 of the list of twelve causal links given in ch.26. Omitted in the sequence are 4. name-and-form and 5. the six avenues, which may therefore be considered as equivalent to the six faculties and their seeing of objects, etc. refuted here.
76. 取 Attachment or grasping (Sk. upādāna) is the ninth of the 十二因緣 and is subdivided into four kinds.
1. attachment to desire 欲取
 2. attachment to views 見取
 3. attachment to non-Buddhist practices 戒禁取
 4. attachment to ideas of selfhood 我語取
- (Nak.514d, JEBD 289a). Other commentators give 愛欲、惡見、戒禁取、我見 (Nak.515a). Cf. Treatise 26v5 'On account of craving there are the four graspings/ And because of grasping there is existence./ If the grasper would not grasp/ There would be liberation and no existence'. 26/9 adds: 'When the four graspings grasp, sin and merit are generated by the actions of body, mind and speech'. At 23/16 grasping is defined as 'discriminative conceptualising of this and that, being and non-being and so on'.
77. See 3v1
78. See 3v1, n.69

79. Hearer 聞者 is included in seer, etc. 3v5ff.
80. The five skandhas: 五陰^陰 is the usual translation of skandha in Kumārajīva's works. The list of five is not given until 4v7. Up to 4/6 the treatise deals with form 色 the first skandha, as representative of the five, which are:
1. form (Sk.rūpa) 色
 2. reception (vedanā) 受 受
 3. conception (saṃjñā) 想
 4. predispositions (or: volition, saṃskāra) 行
 5. consciousness (vijñāna) 識
- (cf. 4v7, Nak.355d). Predispositions, consciousness, (name and) form, and reception are common to both the five skandhas and the twelve causal links. See 26v1ff. where causal links and skandhas are integrated into the account of dependent origination, and the discussion in 13/2.
81. 色因 no specific cause of form is referred to. Inada p.54 proposes as causes the four great elements 四大 earth, water, fire and wind, but the 色因 seems more likely to be consciousness 識 which 'precedes' it in the 十二因緣 and which is itself said (in 5/7) to exist by virtue of the four great elements. 4/1 makes it clear that 因 here means not a temporally precedent but an integral part or aspect of the effect, like threads which 'cause' cloth. 4/6 however indicates that the cause is subtle 細, the effect gross 麤, which could apply equally to 識 or the 四大. 麤 識
82. See 4v1, n.81

83. That dharmas are caused is axiomatic. Otherwise they would be permanent, which is a heresy, and the principle of causality would be negated (cf.2/20).
84. An appeal to empirical evidence. see n.30
85. 三無為 These inactive dharmas are not elaborated upon in the text. Nak.491c has 1. 虛空無為 (Sk.ākāśa); 2. 擇滅無為 (pratisamkhyā-nirodha) and 3. 非擇滅無為 (apratisamkhyā-nirodha). 1. is 'empty space', 2. is 'nirvāṇa attained through selection/ nirvāṇa attained through the exercise of prajñā' (JEBD 29a) and 3. as one of the three non-created elements in the Abhidharma-kośa means 'extinction and non-reproduction due to the lack of a productive cause, as distinct from that gained through intellectual power' (JEBD 104a). At 7/34 however the Treatise argues that 'inactive dharmas' is a figure of speech which depends for its meaning on 'active dharmas'. 'The inactive has no special marks of its own' (but see 5/2;7b18). Hatani, p.257 says that space, time, direction and atoms are conceived to be permanent and uncaused by the Vaiśeṣika school (勝論) and both the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya (數論) conceived the soul to be a spirit. Hatani reads 識 instead of 神 (p.84).
86. The two kinds of causes are 1. actual cause 作因 (lit: effective cause) 2. figurative cause 言說因. The Treatise dismisses figurative causes but without saying why, and promises (4/2; 6b28ff) to refute time, direction, soul, atoms, nirvana etc., later. These are presumably references to chs. 9, 19 and 25. Atoms, which are not separately refuted in the Treatise, are regarded as real dharmas in the Kośa. (JEBD 84r). Nak.(429c)

says that 言說 means the same as 了因 (ryōin, 1422d 'a revealing cause'), (S.20a) and he gives as an example 'smoke in relation to fire'.

87. i.e. the unenlightened man

88. cf. n.8

89. 色力 This compound appears in LS 37a11 as 'physical strength' (Hurvitz. 142) but clearly has a different meaning here.

90. The argument is that coarse thread only makes coarse cloth, and that cause and effect, even though not identical, are intrinsically related.

91. Verses 4v8 and 4v9, like the commentary following them are difficult to understand without the Sk.; Inada's translation gives, (v8) 'When a refutation is based on śūnyatā, and an opponent counter-refutes, he is not able to counter-refute everything since the counter-refutation will be the same (nature) as the contention' (p.56). Kumārajīva puts the argument the other way round: if you do not use śūnyatā, you will not succeed. The Sk. v.9 gives: "When an exposition is based on śūnyatā and an opponent censures (?censures) he is not able to censor everything since the censorship will be the same (nature) as the contention' (Inada.56).

92. The six elements 六種 (lit: six kinds) are, like the five skandhas in ch.4, investigated through one as representative of all. The full list is given at 5/7 as:

1. earth 地
2. water 水 水
3. fire 火
4. wind 風
5. space 虛空
6. consciousness 識

where the commentary states that space supports the four great elements which in turn are the causes and conditions of consciousness (5/6;7c27ff).

93. 論者 Miyamoto has 'the (writer of the) Abhidharma' (p.35)
94. for 相故 read 相故。(T.text)
95. The treatise argues at 4/2 that non-arising, etc. are not characteristics. See 4/2;6b28ff.
96. Fire and water are two of the six elements.
97. 'then it would be uncaused' because every active dharma has the characteristics of arising, abiding and ceasing 生住滅(cf.5/2) by virtue of being a component in the causal process.
98. That which has characteristics 有相
99. The characteristics 相
100. Characterisation 可相 (lit: 'the being-characterised') cf. ch.10
 燃可燃 'fire' and the 'being-burnt' (i.e. fuel) but 'the being characterised' is awkward and conceptually indistinguishable from

有相. See n.103

101. Entity 物 = 'thing' (Sk.bhāva)
102. 一切法皆無 this is either a misunderstanding of the fourth line of the stanza (5v5) ('no other entity exists') or a mistake for 空 (cf.24v18). The Treatise accepts neither existence nor nonexistence of dharmas (cf.5/5;7c16ff)
103. Characterisable 可相
104. See . n. 92
105. That earth, water, fire and wind are, as the Treatise states, causally combined can mean either that (e.g.) gross earth is seen to be a mixture of mud, water, stones, etc., or that the element earth 地大 is itself composed of atoms 極微 or some other entity, as the Kośa holds (JEBD.84b). The former seems to be indicated here since it is 'the ordinary man' who misapprehends the nature of space.
106. 四大因緣有識 I can find no explanation for this view, since in the 十二因緣 consciousness precedes name-and-form which are equivalent to the 四大. It seems to anticipate the Shingon view of the identity of the six elements. The statement does not occur in the Prasannapadā. (cf.Sprung.103-108).
107. 隱滅見空隱法 Nak.25c, = Sk.Draṣṭavyopāśamaṃ śivaṃ which Inada translates as 'the wonderful quiescence of things' (p.59).cf25/24.

108. 得道。道 stands for bodhi, cf. Nak1020, 'to attain enlightenment' さとりを得ること . GPWT, T.1509, 59c6.
109. 諸法實相 True character of dharmas; a synonym for Tathatā (thusness).
110. See n.51
111. The view that they exist.. The use of 即 indicates immediacy, but a temporal sequence is clearly not intended, since the 'man of insight' does not alter his views but is aloof from all views of existence and nonexistence.
112. 'a way free of outflows' 無漏道 or 'Bodhi without outflows' i.e. enlightenment, nirvāṇa. LS29a9, Nak.1352c. cf. n.51 cf. mn. 249,302.
113. Passion 染 is a generic term for the afflictions or defilements (see n.114)
114. 貪欲、瞋恚、愚癡 are the 'three poisons' 三毒 (see n.115). In LS 41a2 Bodhisattvas manifest the three poisons as an expedient device. (Hurvitz 160). This is a way of thinking not found in the Treatise, though the Buddhas may teach doctrines according to the capacity of the hearers. (cf.18/12;25a16)
115. The three poisons 三毒 (Nak.484b) are given above (8/0). In Sk. rāga, dveṣa, moha, they are associated here as in LS 54c1 with the 'three worlds' (see n.117) which are the worlds or realms of desire, form and no-form. Cf. 滅三毒出三界 'annihilating the three

poisons, leaving the three spheres' in the Lotus Sutra (Hurvitz 219)

116. The three forms of karmic activity 三業 are referred to at 26v1 as the 三行 which are somewhat ambiguously glossed (since 行 usually means predispositions) at 26/9 as 'actions of body, speech and mind' 身口意業. This accords with Nak. 462b; 身、口、意のはたらき. The 三業 here are however more likely to be the three forms of action at 17/19;22c7 which refers to deeds classified in the Abhidharma as good, bad or neutral 善、不善、無記 and bound to the three worlds (cf. Nak.462b(3)). Nak. 462b(2) lists another Abhidharma version from Kośa 15.12 in which three types of action correspond to the three worlds: 福業(欲界の善業)、非福業(欲界の悪業)、不動業(色、無色界に属す了禅定). 'Good actions (skilful actions in the world of desire), bad actions (evil actions in the world of desire) and non-moving actions (dhyānas belonging to the worlds of form and non-form)'.
 117. The three realms or worlds 三界 are the world of desire 欲界, the world of form 色界 and the formless world 無色界. 欲界 includes the six heavens of desire, the human world and the hells (cf. the 六道 six paths, 26v2) or 六趣 six destinies, 26/9. The world of form is above the realm of desire and those who dwell in it are free from desire for sex and food; it contains seventeen heavens 十七天. The world of no-form is 'a realm which transcends all forms, a purely spiritual existence'. (Nak. 456d-457b, S.70b, JEBD.252a)
118. In the discussion which follows 'unity' means 'combination into a

unity'.

119. combination without any associating ^離離伴應有合伴 lit: 'a comrade, associate, keeping another company'. 合 'combination is equivalent to 'oneness'. The terminology is bound to be confusing here because the argument is directed at the internal self-contradiction of the notion of oneness in diversity.
120. 三相 Although dharmas have marks (characteristics) the marks, for the purposes of Nāgārjuna's argument are also considered as dharmas, i.e. as having own-nature 自性. These three are the marks of 'active' 有為 dharmas. cf. Nak.480d.
121. 有為 = 'conditioned' (Sk. saṃskṛta)
無為 = 'unconditioned' (Sk. asaṃskṛta).
122. operate is 作 lit: make, do, constitute, become.
123. arising of arising, etc. A reference to the theory of secondary characteristics (anulakṣana) expounded in the Kośa (K.I.224-6; T.XXIX,27b8ff.) The Kośa holds that there is no infinite regression. cf. R.257.
124. This is an Abhidharmist analysis. cf.n.123
125. self-substance 自體 a synonym for 自性, 自相, 有 etc.
126. 及闇 because light 'reaching' darkness means that darkness becomes light; the two cannot co-exist.

127. 得賊乃名爲破 because the thief, once caught, can no longer steal and is thus no longer a thief, cf. the Japanese haiku: 'We chased the thief and caught him; he was our son'
128. imperishable bodhi 菩提不壞法 cf. 18/12; 25b17ff.
129. arhat 阿羅漢 see n.41
130. We do not exactly say 我不定言. 定 here also imputes a fixed existence to arising.
131. calm cessation 寂滅 Nak.618d 'calm' (Sk. śānta). Conze.Dict.379 'calmly quiet'. It is equivalent to nirvāṇa.
132. 寂 寂滅 see previous note.
133. as n.132
134. reasonings 因緣 i.e. grounds, causes. cf. n.6
135. 三世 see n.45
136. Hatani and Ui both take line three (in my trans.) together with lines 1 and 2. 'If ... apart from arising of arising, then dharmas can produce themselves' (Hatani, 109, Ui, 277).
137. presumably a reference to 5v6ff. Existence and nonexistence is discussed later in this chapter at 7v31ff, and at 8/7 and passim.
138. for T.text 無不滅法 離有爲。無有 etc. read 無不滅法。離有 etc.
離有

(following Hatani, p.109)

139. 因去故有住 Hatani reads 去 but asks whether 去 should not be 生 (p111n53). But the opposition movement-rest makes sense.
140. 推求滅法...Hatani reads 'according to our investigation of cessation, dharmas are non-arising'. I follow Ui's phrasing.
141. cf.25v5,25/5.
142. Gandharva-city. 乾闥婆城(Sk. Gandharva-nagara). A Gandharva is a heavenly musician, one of the (eight kinds of beings) who protect Buddhism. A Gandharva-city is 'an illusory thing lacking any real substance used for analogies' (Nak.325c). Gandharvas, but not Gandharva-cities, are mentioned in the LS passim, and Gandharva-cities in GPWT (T.1509) at 325a2,691a11, etc.
143. sin or merit... For the Treatise's definition of sins and merits and their rewards and retributions see 17/1ff. Ten specific merits (the ten paths of 'white' actions) are listed at 17v11ff, with their obverse, the ten evil deeds. A Sutra quotation at 17/0 says 'all living beings take birth according to their karma' and the Treatise (the opponent) continues: 'An evil person goes into the hells, one who cultivates merit is reborn in heaven, and one who traverses the path attains nirvana'.
144. reception 受 represents all the five skandhas (cf.18/12).
145. substrate. 本住 means 'originally-abiding'. The Sk. title has

- pūrva which Inada translates as Antecedent State of the Self, May as 'pre-existent' and Sprung as 'Self as Subject of Perception'. The term is a synonym for a permanent 'self' conceived as spatially and temporally located and existent, and to that extent resembles the 'doer' of ch.8
146. eye, ear etc. are the 六根 see 3v1ff.cf9/2.
147. pain and pleasure are the 'objects' of consciousness see 9/2, and 5/7, 7c27ff.
148. cf.1/5. Nak.767c gives 'Mind and operations of the mind (Sk. citta-cait asika)'.
 149. 有論師言 Miyamoto has 'Abhidharmists' but this quotation is from Vaiśeṣika-sūtra III,2,4.(R.69).
150. 異相而分別 Miyamoto has 'discriminate by their different qualities', and Hatani 異相にして分別す which is ambiguous. The Sk. verse translates as 'By means of the different functions of seeing, etc., the entity appears in different moments' (Inada.78). The commentary (9/6) glosses: 諸根各自能分別 'each of the functions can discriminate individually'. 分
151. 塵 'objects' but also with the connotation of the world, worldly dust.
152. 六向 i.e. via any of the 六根 six faculties.

153. 難 lit: difficulties. This may refer to the nature of nirvāṇa or to the opponent's criticisms of the concept of non-arising nirvana.
154. 燃可燃 lit: fire and what is being burnt, that is to say, fuel as an active component of fire. There is no fire without fuel. The concept is analogous to that of doer and deed (cf.10/1) and the 'person' of the five skandhas (cf.10/14;15c14ff).
155. ineffectual fire 無作火 i.e. fire which does not burn. see 10/2.
156. in vain 空 lit: 'empty'.
157. effect 功 is shorthand for 'this phenomenon of human effort having an effect'.
158. i.e. if you say that nothing changes, only the designation.
159. i.e. when is fuel not fuel? When it is a fire.
160. 'extinguish' 滅 (elsewhere 'cessation'), is a reminder that the discussion is related to the Buddhist analysis of existence and how to leave it; the world is a burning house, and the fire must be either escaped from or extinguished. (cf. Lotus Sutra. Ch.3).
161. own-mark 自相 is equivalent to 自性 own-nature, etc.
162. In the Sk. the verse has 'woman' and 'man' and is a reference to sexual union but Prof. Saigusa tells me that Chinese propriety prevented Kumārajīva from attributing such a risqué analogy to

Nāgārjuna; instead the genders are revealed by Blue-Eyes in 10/6.

163. ch.2. This passage parallels the discussion of future, past and present going, place and dharma of going etc. see n.60
164. A five-line verse. Both Hatani and Ui place 可燃中無火然 at the beginning of the commentary (10/14) but the T.text follows the Korean text's arrangement of five lines, and the translation of the Sk. verse is incomplete without the fifth line. 'Again, fire is not wood, nor is it in something else than wood. Fire does not contain wood. There is neither wood in fire nor fire in wood' (Inada.84).
165. 犢子部 The Vātsīputriyas are a school derived from the Sarvāstivāda about 300 years after the death of the Buddha, which claimed to have been founded by Śāriputra. (JEED320a). Like the Jains it advocated a concept of the pudgala (individual) as neither identical with nor different from the states (e.g. body), a doctrine examined in chs. 9 and 10 of the Treatise. Murti reproduces (from Stcherbatsky) the debate between the Vātsīputriya and Vasubandhu on the relationship between the living being and the soul, (Murti 42-3,205), cf. Nak.1184. See also T.1509 (GPWT) where there is disapproving mention of 'the Vātsīputriyas inclusion of the empirical self under the category of the inexpressible' (Ramanan,363a). This explains the reference to the 'fifth indescribable storehouse' 第五不可說藏 in the Treatise. (10/16;15c29). The T.1509 passage is at p.61a24ff.
166. Sarvāstivādins 薩婆多部 S.468. One of the major Abhidharma sects descended from the Sthaviras about 300 years after the

Buddha's decease. The Sarvāstivādin analysis of existence reached final form in the Abhidharma-Kośa of Vasubandhu (T.1552). 'Sarva does not mean that they accepted the reality of everything, but only of the elements variously understood in the Buddhist scriptures' (Murti.185) (cf. the meaning of 'worldly truth' n.26.) These elements include skandha, āyatana, the sense-functions etc. dealt with in successive chapters of the Treatise. Sarvāstivādin texts came to China but not the school.

167. 本際 means any ultimate ('original') starting-point of things, and by implication an end, since what begins must end; cf.25/21; 36a24.
168. I can find no reference to a 無本際經 in the present canon or in the usual sources, and it is not mentioned in the GPWT according to the T. Index, vol.13.
169. This is obviously a hierarchy but it lacks enough detail to bear analysis. 三種聖人 seems not to be a formula in the Treatise, though it later became one, cf.S.74b.
170. 共 Simultaneity i.e. birth and death together in one instant.
171. This refutes the 十二因緣 conceived as a temporal sequence. see n.16.
172. suffering 苦 the first of the four truths 四諦 (see ch.24), which analyse the causes of suffering and its remedy. Again, causality is admitted, but distinctions made within or about causality (such as in v.1) are rejected.

173. 'These skandhas' refers to the sequence of skandhas, cf 12/2
For the five skandhas see n.80.
174. the five receptive skandhas ^受五受陰 i.e. the five skandhas
characterised by receiving or grasping. cf. 27v27.
175. predispositions 行 fourth of the five skandhas. see n.80. It
represents all the five skandhas here. cf.13/2;17b7ff.
176. false deceptions 虛誑 Nak.349b. 'いつわり' (falsehood, deception).
(Sk. mṛṣa).
177. misapprehension 妄取相 Nak.1363b has for 妄取; 虚妄友了法
'a delusory dharma' (Sk. moṣa-dharma).
178. form 色 the first of the five skandhas. n.80
179. 'core' 實 which means both truth, reality, and a small black
fruit. Possibly a play on words since neither is found in a
banana-tree.
180. receiving 受 second of the five skandhas. n.80
- ~~181~~ { 'learned it'; Miyamoto (p.97) has 'perception' but 学 is rarely
used and may be taken in its non-Buddhist sense, with of course
the implication that we see what we have learned to see. ^{學?} ^{學?}
182. the three receivings 三受 refer to the reception of pleasure,
樂 樂 , the reception of pain 苦 , and the reception of
neither pleasure nor pain 不樂不苦 Nak.470c.

183. conception 想, third of the five skandhas, defined here as 'the discriminative knowledge of names and terms'.
184. The shadow following the substance 影隨形 is perhaps a literary allusion (given in Math. 7484.22) since it does not occur in the GPWT, LS or Buddhist dictionaries.
185. consciousness 識 fifth of the five skandhas.
186. form, sound ... mouth, body etc., cf. 3v1, 3/1.
187. predispositions; see n.175.
188. humans ... formless heaven; cf. the 三界 'three worlds' n.117
189. hells ... asuras; see the 六道 six paths, 26v2.
190. see n.26
191. i.e. through the twelve causal links listed here. The predispositions are however caused by ignorance.
192. perception of truth 見諦 Nak.322b: 真理を見よ明ら力にする
こと諦は真理のこと ... which is probably the meaning here, although acceptance of the 四諦 of suffering, etc., (ch.24) is also possible. cf. 17v15, 17/19; 22c5ff.
193. meditation 思惟 can mean rational investigation, thinking etc., but here I follow Miyamoto's 'meditation'. Nak. gives Sk. 'buddhi' etc., (541c). Cf. 22v14 where the term is used for Sk.

cintā 'reasoning', but clearly reasoning cannot cut off lust, ignorance, craving etc., since they determine its direction.

194. vary 有異 that is to say, things change and become different over time. cf.17v15,17/19;22c5ff.
195. This is curiously expressed; it means that for A to become B, either A has to remain as A whilst becoming B, or A has to change into B. Either way, A cannot 'become' B because A is defined as A, and B is defined as B.
196. this charge by the opponent which is developed in 13/8;18c11ff and then answered anticipates 空亦復空 'emptiness is itself empty' at 22/13 and 24/19;33b17.
197. The opponent identifies a view of emptiness; his evidence is that Nāgārjuna has put forward an argument. see previous note.
198. The sixty-two views are listed in various canonical sources such as the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, the Nirvāṇa-Sūtra, and in the Daśabhūmika-vibhāṣā etc. They refer to sixty-two Indian views regarding the self and the world, permanence and nihilism etc. considered erroneous at the time of the Buddha (Nak.1454d). They are referred to again at 27/31, 25/24 as representing all views (sophistries, vain arguments) which are to be abandoned.
199. Combination, 合 or 和合 refers to the combination of the elements of seer, seeing, eye, object etc. discussed in Ch.3 which makes sight possible, according to the Abhidharmists.

200. realm 方 lit: direction, quarter.
201. Difference is difference because of difference 異因異有異...
means: if A is completely separate and distinct from B, it is 'different'. If there is not complete separateness, they are not 'different'.
202. Universal characteristic 總相 Nak. 877c (Sk. sāmānya). The reference to sutras 經 is perhaps misleading since the term belongs to the commentarial tradition of treatises such as the Kośa. It does not occur in the MMK themselves. A scheme of 六相 (whole, parts, unity, diversity, established, dissolved) of which 總 is the first derives from later Hua-Yen philosophy. (Nak.1456b).
203. Function 力用 . A rare term, the precise meaning of which is not clear. Nak. (1418d) has "作用 (effect, action), 機能 (function), 活動 (operation), はたうき (operation) (Sk.kriyā?)" "The commentary (15/0) indicates that 力用 is equivalent to 性 (nature) 'a pot has the nature of a pot' etc. The term may be an alternative for 作用 (operation, etc.) which occurs in Kośa, 5.16-17 etc. (Nak.439b)
204. 'created dharma' 作法 Sk.kṛtaka 'made or manipulated' (Inada 97) Also 'effect' (Sk.karaṇa). Cf.24v17,ch4, passim etc. It means a dharma viewed as the result of causes. Cf.15/1
205. 'nature' 性 defined
206. serenity 支隱 Nak.25c. Cf.5v8,5/8.

207. The Kātyāyana referred to here is one of the Buddha's disciples. Cf. Sāmañña-phala sutta, SBB, vol II, p.74 (Dialogues of the Buddha, Pt.1, Rhys Davids). Another Kātyāyana is an Abhidharma-master, author of the Jñānaprasthāna (T.1543/1544) whose teachings were supposedly refuted by Aśvaghōṣa. He is mentioned frequently in the GPWT. Lamotte (TGVS) Vol. I, p.109 n2 discusses the traditions relating to both Kātyāyanas. Cf.T.1509p.70a10,303b18, etc. (T.Index p.18). References to a Kātyāyana-sūtra (sic) 迦旃延經 are found at T.1509p.292b,110b. (Cf.n.412 below) Kumārajīva in his 'Chief Ideas of the Mahayana (T.1856) states that 'it is Kātyāyana's disciples who say that conditioned dharmas have four marks, and not the Buddha who says so' (R.182). cf. Treatise 7/4;9b10. The four marks are arising, abiding, alteration and cessation (R.257n.1). (Abhidharmasāra 阿毘曇心論 T.1150 pp.811b18-28).
208. Existent characteristics. Both Ui and Hatani have 有性相. I read 有有相 with the Korean text.
209. bondage and liberation; see nn.238-40.
210. going and coming 去來, the title of ch.2 of the Treatise. See n.58.
211. skandhas 陰 see n.80
realms 界 see n.117
avenues 入 see n.24
212. five ways 五種 i.e. through any one of the five skandhas conceived as a 'self'

213. fire and fuel ch 10.
214. 'it will be bodiless' i.e. that which transmigrates is a disembodied entity (and therefore not an 'entity')
215. 諸行滅若衆生滅 Hatani reads 若 as 苦 (p.159,n.6). The Korean has 若 'or'.
216. predispositions have no nature; see ch.13
217. having a body is not bondage; because the living being is not itself the body, and only the body is bound, cf. 16/6
218. going and coming see ch. 2.
219. receiving 受 in the sense of grasping. Cf.16/9, and Ramanan's use of 'grasp' for 受 throughout his exposition of T.1509.
220. thusness ; lit. 實相 The true character or 'real mark' as translated elsewhere, but it is also a synonym for thusness (tathatā, JEBD 140), hence my translation. Cf.18v9,18/12,24c10ff, Nak.598a-b. Neither term is in the Sk. verse which translates: 'Where nirvāṇa is not (subject to) establishment and saṃsāra not (subject to) disengagement, how will there be any conception of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra?' (Inada.103)
221. Cf. 25v19
222. 'karma' and 'action' are used interchangeably for 業 in the translation.

223. More clearly than the Sk. (in Streng or Inada's translations) the Treatise equates subduing the mind with benefiting others. Cf. 7/1: 'the three poisons in a person cause distress to others' with Streng: 'The state of mind which is self-disciplined, being favourably disposed towards others, and friendship; that is the dharma' (Streng.201).
224. Cf. Inada's schematic explanation of the two kinds of karma, bodily and mental (Inada. 104). These are later subdivided, see 17v5.
225. conception 思, third of the five skandhas. see 1/5, n.80.
226. configurations 數 or 'functions' see n.41 數
227. performed and non-performed karmas; 作業 is usually a synonym for 表業 (as in the Sk. verse) 'manifest actions' (Sk. vijñapti), which is to say, bodily and verbal actions. 無作業 is 無表業 'unmanifest actions' (Sk. avijñapti), i.e. thoughts. (T.1564p21n. 17,18, cf. JEBD 122b). However, in 17/5 作 and 無作 are explained differently. See n.229.
228. effect 用 lit: 'use' (u.f. Sk. paribhoga 'enjoyment'). It means 'making use of', 'enjoying the benefit of'.
229. These seven dharmas. In the Sk. verse these are listed in vv.4 and 5. Streng's translation has: (v4) 'Sound, gesture, and that which does not rest which is considered as unknown, Also the other unknown which is considered to be at rest. (v5) That which is pure as a result of enjoyment, that which is impure as a result of

enjoyment, And volition; These seven basic elements (dharma) are considered (by the tradition) as the modes of actions'. The Treatise lists (v4) good and bad body and speech karma, and performed and non-performed karma, and (v5) their effects both good and evil, and conception, as seven 'kinds' of karma. The commentary 7/5 then refers to four kinds of speech karma and three kinds of body karma to arrive at the total of seven. In the subsequent discussion body and speech karma are subdivided into 'active' 有作 and 'nonactive' 有無作 with the meaning of 'initial' and consequential' actions, in a quite different sense than that expressed by 'performed and non-performed' 作、無作 in 17v4, where the distinction is between thought and subsequent deed.

The 'six kinds of karma' referred to in 17/5;22a2 are thus six kinds of body karma (1. active, 2. non-active, 3. good, 4. evil, 5. benefit (good effect), 6. sin (evil effect)). The seventh kind of karma is conception. The discrepancy between the Treatise's account and the Sk. vv4 and 5 occurs because 作 / 無作 in v.4 (performed/non-performed, vijñapti/avijñapti) is understood by Blue-eyes/Kumārajīva as 有作 / 有無作 (initial action/consequential actions), rather than as thought/action.

230. The four kinds of speech karma are not discussed further. This is perhaps a reference to nos. 4-6 of the ten evils and their opposites (see n.36) which are all concerned with speech. See below, 17/11.

231. Continues up to its reception of reward 至受報 i.e. if the action is not 'cut off' before its effect occurs, then it must be 'not cut off', which means permanent, any middle state being excluded.

232. The sprout, etc. Cf.1/2;2a8ff and 17/10.
233. The initial mind 初心 acquired the sense of 'the first thought of enlightenment' but in the Treatise it has no technical meaning. Cf.Nak.679c.
234. Initial thought 初心 = initial mind, n.233
235. Ten paths of 'white' actions. 十白業道 These are listed in the commentary at 17/11. See n.36
236. 'Among gods or men' 天人中 This could mean either 'honoured by gods and men' or 'honoured as a god, or as a man'. The translation preserves both meanings.
237. Even so.... cf.1/2;2a8ff, and n.30.
238. The 'non-disappearing dharma' 不失法 is a Sāmmatiya (正量) 量 doctrine (Prasanna padā.148, Nak.705b) of a neutral, imperishable entity (Nak.1161c) which, like the predispositions may be bound to the realms of desire, form and no-form, and the non-outflowing realm, which fourth realm, being unbound (i.e. characterised by liberation) is referred to as 'unbound' in the Treatise (17/19; 22c5).
239. i.e. neither good nor bad.
240. 'Fourfold' means bound to the realms of desire, form, etc. See n.238, and 17/19;22c5ff.
241. 見諦 cf.13/2;18a19ff, and the explanation in 17/19;22c5ff. It

is equivalent to the cessation of views.

242. 思惟 cf. 13/2;18a20ff, and 17/19;22c5ff. Its practise cuts off the 'non-disappearing dharma' between one instant and another.
243. reached similar rewards (i.e. appropriate rewards). 至相似 means actions still producing effects resembling themselves. The Sk. verse has instead of 'similar' *samkrama* 'transformation' (Inada. 108), or 'transference' (Streng. 202). The meaning of this verse in Chinese is obscure, and the commentary simply repeats it, stating that this topic is fully explained in the Abhidharma. The Sk. verse runs 'If (the imperishable force) were that which is destroyed by (usual) destruction or by transference of action, fallacies (like) the destruction of action would logically result! (Streng.202).
244. i.e. the disparate karmic effects are consolidated to issue in one realm-body.
245. i.e. similar and dissimilar actions.
246. This verse is interpreted at 17/19 to mean that for arhats and ordinary people the rewards of actions are exhausted only at death, but in the case of Srotāpannas (see n.249) each reward is exhausted as it manifests; that is to say the Srotāpanna creates no 'new karma' with his actions. 17/19 however may be a corrupt text, since arhats rank higher than srotāpannas who are not even 'once-returners'.
247. cf.17v15 and nn.241-2.

248. This echoes the 17/5 account of 'active' and 'inactive' dharmas.
249. The stages of sainthood. If the text is correct, Blue-Eyes' account places 'the srotāpannas etc.' at the apex of the spiritual hierarchy, as being 'without outflows' with arhats and ordinary people in another category 'with outflows'. Since the srotāpanna is the first, and the arhat the fourth stage of attainment it is difficult to understand the meaning of this passage except as an error. The traditional hierarchy is given in the Lotus Sutra Ch.18: 'The srotāpanna (the first-stage śrāvaka), ... the sakṛdāgāmin (once-returner), ...anāgāmin (non-returner)... arhant..' (Hurvitz.259). Cf.Nak.628d. The T.text follows the Korean at this point and notes no variants in any of the editions on which it draws. Ui follows the text but Hatani (p.167) alters the reading (without comment) to give 'for the srotāpannas and arhats etc, they cease at fruition, but for ordinary people they cease at death' (須陀洹及び阿羅漢等は度果し已って滅し...) perhaps the most likely explanation is that 'srotāpanna' and 'arhat' have been used in place of each other, and that the text should read 'for the arhats they cease at fruition, but for ordinary people and srotāpannas etc. they cease at death ... (and) that all the stages of sainthood should be distinguished from the Arhat...'.
250. pure conduct 梵行 Sk. brahmacarya; spiritual discipline. cf.23v9 - 23/12.
251. conceptualised distinctions 憶想分別 These are distinctions between things as pure and impure, from which lust, anger and delusion arise. Cf.23v1ff.

252. No 無始經 is mentioned in the GPWT, etc. It is probably the same work as the 無本際經 referred to at 11/0 where a similar passage is cited.
253. Because a man who remains the same cannot become an ox, he can only remain a man. Any theory of transmigration is untenable, as indeed is any theory.
254. Karma has three aspects 業有三種 could equally be read 'karma is of three kinds (i.e. body, speech and mind)', but almost certainly it refers here to the triad of the originator of karma, the action, and the reward or the carrying out of the action, comparable to the doer, doing and deed done whose refutation is a central concern of the Treatise.
255. Nāgārjuna's verses (17v31; 17v33) are 'secular' in the sense that they refer to any magical apparition. The Treatise however hints at the Mahayana Buddha or bodhisattva who, though illusionary observes the precepts, preaches the Dharma, etc. Cf. Lotus Sutra Ch.11 (Hurvitz.186-7 etc.)
256. See n. 114
257. These are various Abhidarmist versions of the defilements or afflictions (lust, anger, greed, etc.). There is no standard list. (JEBD 34b). The 九十八使 (not in Nak.) are given in the GPWT under various names at 110b, 131c, 546a etc., (S.16a, T.Index p.30). The 九結 are given at Nak.253c as 愛、恚、慢、無明、
 婬、取、疑、嫉、慳. The 十纏 are listed at Nak.656c, and the 六垢 are equivalent to the 六煩惱垢 (Nak.1462b).

258. cf. 5/8ff., 18/0.
259. The insight of non-self 無我慧, is equivalent to 無我智 in 18v2, and means that state of prajñā-consciousness where 'I' and 'mine' no longer obtains. (Nak.1317b). Cf.T.1509p.266b (無我智), 252b(無我智慧).
260. Viewing reality 實觀 The Sk. verse has been turned round here. 'Whosoever sees (it with) non-individuality and non-self-identity cannot see or grasp (the Truth)' (Inada.114). But cf. T.1509 215c (Lamotte TGVS IIIp.1298)
261. 'Belief' 信 here renders Sk. pramāṇa (means of knowing, verification) and the reference is to the Nyāya doctrine 'since it posits four pramāṇas while the Vaiśeṣikas only admit two, and the Sāṅkhyas three' (R.69). Robinson translates the four as verification by: 1. manifestation of the thing (Sk. pratyakṣa), 2. comparative knowledge (anumāna), 3. analogy (upamāna) and 4. the statements of the holy ones (śabda). (p.69). The second pramāṇa is further discussed at 18/12;24b7ff.
262. uttara-kura 鬱單曰 or 鬱單越. The continent to the north of Mt Sumeru, greatest of the four continents of Buddhist cosmology, whose inhabitants enjoy a lifespan of a thousand years (Nak.94b,S.491a).
263. The sun. This argument of course rests on the assumption that the sun does in fact 'go' but that its motion is imperceptible.
264. See ch.3

265. See ch.24, and n. 330.
266. Firm insight 決定智慧, a non-perjorative use of 決定 with the connotation of 定 samādhi. Cf. n.269.
267. Cf. the discussion of this passage in Pye, *Skilful Means*, where 有我 / 無我 is rendered 'asserts the existence of self/asserts non-self' (p.113).
268. i.e. cessation does not mean extinction, but nirvāṇa.
269. samādhi 禪定 lit: meditation-concentration (Nak.855b-c). The samādhi of cessation, or cessation-samādhi 滅盡定 'resembles death except for a sense of warmth, life and consciousness. Classified as one of the citta-viprayukya-saṃskāra (one of the five categories into which the seventy-five dharmas, according to the Kośa, are classified)'. It is practised by non-returners (anāgāmin) or higher, i.e. those in the third or fourth stage leading to arhatship. (JEBD 196b,66a,60b). Not listed in Nak. Cf. Kośa I,203-14 where a definition of nirodhasamāpatti is given, and alternative Abhidharmist interpretations are noted. It is, according to Lamotte 'un dharma qui arrête la pensée et les mentaux' (p.203).
270. Power of skilful means 方便力 occurs only once in the Treatise. It is discussed by Pye (*Skilful Means*, p.113) who identifies a parallelism of thought between the selection of possible teachings about self, non-self etc., by the Buddha and the idea of 'provisional' and 'absolute' truth expounded by Nāgārjuna in 24vv8-10. This passage (25a15-18) makes clear the Treatise's

- view that the exercise of skilful means is founded upon compassion for living beings. Cf.18/12;24c14ff.
271. The reference is to the four views or theses just discussed.
272. Follow others. The ref. is to 18v9.
273. Conceivable 可意知 i.e. knowable through thought.
274. Preceding producing cause 前生因 is 'a cause which is temporally prior, the effect arising subsequently' (Nak.845a). Inada has 'already originated cause' (p.121). 'Co-operative producing cause' 共生因 suggests a cause simultaneous with but different from the effect. This is refuted at 20/9;27a2ff on the grounds that a particular cause is itself and cannot be anything else.
275. i.e. there is more to clay than its designation. It has 'substance' (cf. 20/9;27a6ff.)
276. 'Seeing the effect' is tantamount to saying that the effect has begun to exist while the cause still persists, such that both are 'visible' to each other. Inada has 'projected and unprojected' which he describes as 'peculiar translations for $dr̥ṣṭvā$ and $adr̥ṣṭvā$ respectively'. $Dr̥ṣṭvā$ and $adr̥ṣṭvā$ mean 'seen' and 'not seen'.
277. 'Empty' 空 here means vacuous, in other words not a cause at all. Cf. 'ineffectual fire' in 10v2,10/2. 'Empty' is used in this sense from 20v16 to 20v19. It means 'there is nothing which exists' (20/19).

278. See previous note.
279. Becoming and dissolution 成壞 are analogous to 生滅 'arising and ceasing' but refer to existence as well as dharmas, if the two concepts can be meaningfully distinguished. (Cf. 21/11; 28c6 'dharma means an existent').
280. Or possibly 'if it did exist he (the Buddha/Nāgārjuna) would surely say so' but this rendering seems unlikely.
281. Exhausted and ceased 盡滅 refers to 21v6, corresponding to the Sk. 21v7, and is defined in 21/6 as the constant flux. Sk. kṣayasya is rendered 'épuisement' (exhaustion) by Lamotte (Kosa I.285) but 'ceased' by Inada (p.127), 'destructible' by Streng. Candrakīrti takes 'indestructible' to be the opposite of production; therefore, a thing which has the characteristic of exhaustion cannot be produced (May. Prasannapadā, p.62). The allusion 'dharmas are said to be ...' refers to either an Abhidharmist or sutra source, more probably the former.
282. See previous note.
283. Empty in the sense of vacuous (cf. n.277). Its opposite (non-empty) means 'having a fixed existence'; both are rejected here.
cf. 24/19; 33b19
284. Disappear or reach refers to the cause disappearing before the effect is produced (= severance) or persisting into the effect (= permanence).

285. Accepts 受 is the skandha of receiving, so that 'accepting dharmas' means mentally grasping and being attached to them.
286. Impermanent ... without self. The four characteristics of existence according to the first of the four truths, the truth of suffering (cf. ch.24). Nak.526a gives them in the order 苦、空、無常、非我 (ref. Kośa, T.XXIX,137a). Some other variants of two, three and four marks are given in the GPWT (T.1509, 324a,650c etc.), and this formula appears frequently in the GPWT. (193a,195c and passim.) (T.Index,p.183, p.31). These four characteristics are to be distinguished from the four marks of active dharmas (arising, abiding, changing and ceasing) although they are predicated upon these characteristics of dharmas. See also n.348.
287. The three existences 三有 are defined at 21/20 as desire-existence, form-existence and non-form existence, in other words the 'three realms' 三界 of desire, etc. Cf. 17/9. The following verse (21v17) analyses these states of existence in a temporal series, i.e. in terms of the three periods of time 三世, anticipating 21v20.
288. i.e. the first existence in any series; the previous existence. This is explained at 21/17.
289. See n.287.
290. Past, present and future. Cf.7/18.
291. Thus-Come 如來 or Thus-Come One, a translation (rather than transliteration) of Tathāgata, the Buddha. The chapter is

concerned with what kind of 'existence' such a being has, whether in the past, present or future, a legacy of the 'unanswered' questions' about the nature of nirvāṇa.

292. 'Honoured in all the worlds' is an extended (perhaps earlier) form of **世尊** 'world-honoured (one)', Sk. bhagavat.
293. Right and perfect knowledge **正遍智** = Sk. samyak-sambuddha. A later tradition ascribes ten epithets **十號** to the Buddha (cf. the **十號經** T.782, trans. by **天息災** between 980-1000 AD) (Hōbōgirin pp.44,51, Nak.653a-b, JEBD 147b). The ten include **如來** and **正遍智** but not **法王** or **一切智** (see next note).
294. **法王** an epithet of the Buddha not included in the **十號** (see n. 293)
295. Grasping **取** is the ninth of the **十二因緣** and here equivalent to **受** receiving (see 22/1) as representative of the five skandhas. Cf. 4/0
296. 'By the combination'. The Chinese is less specific: lit: 'five-skandhas - combine - exists - thus-come'.
297. On account of another.. The question at 22/1;30a3 about the combination of the five skandhas is answered in the first two lines of this verse, and subsequently commented on in 22/2, but the 'question' to which lines 3 and 4 of 22v2 are the answer is not posed until after the verse, in 22/2;30a8.
298. If the Tathāgata needs to receive the five skandhas in order to

be the Tathāgata, then he does not exist until he receives them, and, if he does not exist, he cannot receive anything. See 22/9.

299. Empty here means having no own-nature 自性 in the śūnyavādin sense, rather than vacuous, as at 20v16, etc.
300. These four views depending on the past, and those depending on the future may be understood in various ways, but in the context of this discussion about the Tathāgata they are to be understood to refer to the Buddha's 'unanswered questions' about whether or not the Tathāgata exists after death (see 22v14 where this is made explicit). Here the Treatise extends the question to whether the Tathagata existed in the past (i.e. before coming into the world). Cf. 22v13 about whether the Tathāgata exists in the present. The Treatise is interested in living beings, not material processes (cf. 27/24, and n442)
301. 'Does not exist' is a play on words and concepts, since the worldly man who denies the existence of Buddhas in principle is denying their existence in a different sense from one who accepts that there are Buddhas but holds that the Buddha is not 'existent' after his decease in the ordinary sense of the world.
302. See n.366, to 24v40. Inverting the eye of insight is like inverting a cup - the result is outflows. Cf. .249, n.112.
303. Cf. 25v19-21 on the relation between nirvāṇa and the world, and these four views.
304. Perverted views 顛倒 lit: perversions (cf. n.302 where the imagery

is also of 'turning upside down'). Sk. is viparyāsa and it has the meaning of erroneous or delusory perception, arising (cf.23/1) from conceptual discriminations (see Ramanan 352a-353a), Sk. samkalpa 'false representation (of what is not)' (Conze. Index p.392). In this chapter the conceptual discrimination or dividing is into two categories of pure and impure on the basis of which certain dharmas are accepted and grasped, others rejected and denied; in other words they become the objects of lust, anger, and delusion, the 'three poisons' (23/1). Cf.23v12: 'if there is no purity how can there be lust? If there is no impurity how can there be anger?' In 23v7 perverted views are said to arise from the six sense-avenues 六入 and in 23/12 they are specified as the four views of permanence, etc. discussed in Ch.22. Cf. 27/31.

305. The phrasing of this verse is questionable. Streng (from the Sk.) has 'It is said that desire, hate and delusion are derived from mental fabrication, because they come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and unsalutary' (p.210). Inada reads: 'Covetousness, enmity and delusion are said to arise from ideation... Indeed they come about in virtue of the perverse relational play of purity and impurity' (p.137). Sprung: 'Desire, aversion and illusion are born of volitive thought and.., arise in dependence on the 'good', the 'bad' and 'misbelief'' (p.207). May agrees with Inada for the first half, then 'en effet, elles viennent a l'existence en raison du bon, du mauvais, et des méprises' (p.179). Hatani (p.205) and Ui (p372) (from the Treatise) both have 'From conceptual distinctions, lust, anger and delusion arise. They are perverted views of purity and impurity (浄不浄眞眞倒なり). They arise entirely from

conditions'. In neither the Sk. nor the Chinese nor in any of these translations is the precise relationship between the three terms 1. conceptual discrimination, 2. the three poisons, and 3. perverted conceptions of purity and impurity, made clear. Perhaps this is why Kumārajīva adds (Whatever the causal process) 'all are produced from conditions'. The commentary (23/1) suggests that lust, anger and delusion arise because of conceptual discrimination which consists in perverted ideas of purity/impurity, and 23v2 that the perverted views of purity/impurity produce the three poisons. Cf. 25/9 for a discussion of the relationship between the perverted views, the five skandhas and nirvāṇa.

306. Lust, anger and delusion, the 'three poisons'. See 23v2
307. See previous note.
308. The defilements. (or; the afflictions) See note 257. They are summarised here as the 'three poisons'. See 17/33 for the various lists of defilements referred to in the Treatise.
309. Body-as-self 身見 The (false) view that the body contains or is itself a substantive self; that it exists. (Nak.771b-c)
310. Form....dharma*s* i.e. the sense faculties, their realms and objects. Cf. Ch.3 and note. Perverted views are said to arise because of these (23v7), but cf. also 23v1.
311. Gandharva-city; see 7v35,7/35.

312. 'Could one speak of impurity'; this presupposes that in order for there to be distinction there must be one who distinguishes, cf. 27v30ff.
313. The four perverted views 四顛倒 are the opposites of the four characteristics of things according to the truth of suffering (see n.286). They are that things are permanent, 常 blissful 樂, possessed of self 我 and pure 淨. (So Nak.528a-b, T.1509 p.560c), but the 'four marks' in the Treatise are impermanence, suffering, emptiness and non-self (21/14). The four perverted views are however listed at 23/20 as views of permanence, self, bliss and purity.
314. 諸法性空中. The 諸 makes it clear that this is not the concept of 法性 (dharmatā, a synonym for śūnyatā, prajñā, bhūtakoti, bhuddatā, etc. Cf. R.108, Murti.5) which is Candrakīrti's understanding of the term, and Kumārajīva's. Cf. Hui-yüan's question: 'When the sutras talk about dharma-nature then they say that whether there is a Buddha or is not a Buddha, the nature abides in suchness' (T.856p.122a, trans. in R.184). Cf. 23/14; 31c17-18 below.
315. Clings 著 is translated also as attachment. (e.g. 24v23).
316. This passage introduces the idea that in order for views to exist there must be a viewer, and hence that no contradictions exist except those which are a result of 憶想分別 conceptual discriminations. See 23/0 above.
317. See n.315.
318. The meaning of 所用著法 is unclear since the conventional triad

of doer, doing and deed has already encompassed the whole process of grasping. The commentary (23/15) adds nothing to the meaning. Sk. has (Inada.140) 'That which depends on perceiving', (Streng. 211) 'That by which a notion is formed'.

319. Ref. is to Ch. 22.

320. If I understand this verse correctly, it is saying that even the view that everything is permanent, if held without clinging, is not incorrect (perverted). (In fact, however, non-clinging means no 'views' as such, at all).

321. And so on.. See 23v1

322. Properly 善 lit: skilfully, well.

323. Because all the ways in which perverted views could be produced (from self, other, etc.) have been refuted in 23v17-18, the Treatise now refutes the notion of non-produced (i.e. non-arising 不生) perverted views, on the implicit standard premise that all dharmas, even the non-outflowing dharmas (see 17/19;22c17ff, 10/16; 16a1ff) have the characteristics of arising, abiding and ceasing. See ch. 7 on the 三相 three marks, and cf. 24/9; 32c23ff 'to say that 'dharmas are non-arising' is the truth of the ultimate meaning and that the other conventional truth is not necessary, is not correct'.

324. see n. 313

325. Real and existent natures. 實 = 定 Cf. n.22

326. See n. 286.
327. And so forth: i.e. the remaining ten causal links. See 23/22
328. see n.22
329. Predispositions and actions 行業. There is some ambivalence in the Treatise about the difference between 行 'actions' (but more usually predispositions) and 業 'actions, karma' of which there are three kinds, those of body, speech and mind (but see n.229). Cf.26/9;36c9ff. I have translated 行 'predispositions' here to conform to its use in the verse (and from the Sk. saṃskāra). The 'three kinds of predispositions' is very rare; Nak.460a refers back to the Treatise 26v1 which is where the elision of meaning between 行 and 業 occurs most markedly in the Treatise, (cf.26/1). He suggests also good, 福 bad 罪, and non-moving 無動 predispositions, applicable only to the realms of form and non-form. Cf.24/27;34a1 where 行 refers to 'practising, faring' (or as Conze would say, 'coursing'), in the context of implementation of the four truths Cf.n.401.
330. The four Truths taught by the Buddha soon after his enlightenment are common to the whole Buddhist tradition, and expounded in numerous canonical works, e.g. Lotus Sutra Ch.3 (Hurvitz.74-5) Refs. to the Pali sources are given in Ramanan 344a. They are the truths that 1. all existence is suffering 苦, 2. there is a cause of suffering (in Kumārajīva's works this is 集 'accumulation', i.e. the accumulation of karma, etc., 3. there is a cessation of suffering 滅 (i.e. nirvāṇa) and 4.

there is a Way 道 to the cessation of suffering which is, in the traditional formulation the 'noble eightfold path' 八正道 (JEBD.101b,Nak.1109b), the first element of which is right view 正見, which is to say true perception of the 四諦 four truths. The concept of a 'path' assumes the possibility of directed change and progress, hence the pivotal role of a theory of causality (cf. Ramanan pp.47-8) which is the focus of the Treatise's interest in the four truths. Cf. the discussion of the path as a cause-and-effect series in 24/5. 'The four truths involve cause and effect'.

331. the four śramaṇa-fruits. Śramaṇa 沙門 is a generic term for a Buddhist monk; the term is transliterated rather than translated by Kumārajīva. The four fruits, 'fruits of the Way' (24v3) are attained by putting into practice the four truths (cf. 24/5; 32b27ff); perceiving suffering, cutting-off accumulation, realising cessation and cultivating the Way. (Cf. 24v2). They are the states of 'stream-winner (Sk. śrotāpanna), 'once-returned (sakṛdāgāmin) non-returned (anāgāmin) and (enlightened) worthy (arhat), which are further subdivided (in 24v3) into those who have attained these fruits and those who are aspiring to them. Those who have attained and those who yet aspire to the four fruits are termed 'the eight types of holy person' 八賢聖 in 24v4. Cf. Nak. 四向四果 512c-d). Cf. Lotus Sutra ch.18 (Hurvitz p.259). Kośa (Lamotte Vol I, p.134-6) has a detailed account of the aspiration to and achievement of the four fruits. Cf. Treatise 1/5.

332. see n. 331

333. four fruits of the Way: see n. 331
334. attains or aspires see n. 331
335. see n. 331
336. Saṅgha-Jewel. The 'Three Jewels' are Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, the three essentials of the Buddhist path.
337. Dharma meant in the sense of 事 (affairs) but it carries also the sense of duty (hence: dharma)
338. cannot understand; 不能知 lit. 'lack the capacity to know' cf 24/7
339. cf. 25a15(n) and the discussion of the audience at whom the treatise is directed in 1/0,1c5ff. According to the treatise, the two truths constitute two realities (cf.24/8), because the ontological realm is an epistemological misconception, and is composed of 'false and illusory dharmas', Cf. Pye's discussion of these verses in 'Skilful Means' pp.124-6.
340. Pye, in his discussion of 24v11,12 points out that 'nevertheless the verses are based on the premise that he did proclaim it' (the dharma) (Skilful Means p.125). The Treatise preserves the ambiguity of the stanzas in not overtly identifying 'The Dharma' with 'the teaching of emptiness'. As we have already seen (1/0, 1c1ff) the Prajñāpāramitā sutras are invoked as canonical evidence for the Buddhas own teaching of emptiness, but the treatise itself says in this connection (1/0) that the Buddha first taught the Śrāvaka-dharma (the twelve causal links etc.) and then to those who were

capable (who had the 'great mind') he taught the Mahāyāna Dharma of utter emptiness. The treatise addresses itself to those who, having heard the Mahāyāna Dharma, conceive doubts and views about emptiness (1/0,1c1ff) and in this sense one can say that it presupposes a Buddha-Dharma which consists in the teaching of emptiness; on the other hand the Dharma, which as all the legends testify, the Buddha was reluctant to teach, refers equally clearly to the Śrāvaka-dharma, and it may be that Nāgārjuna's verse refers merely to this Dharma, and not to a Mahāyāna Dharma of emptiness.

A.K. Warder in 'Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist?' argues for the view that Nāgārjuna's verses were written without reference to any conception of a Mahāyāna Dharma. 'The M.K. nowhere mentions Mahāyāna nor does it appear to make reference to any Mahāyāna sutra (canonical text), either by name or by quoting. On the other hand, it does refer, in both these ways, to sūtras found in the Tripitaka as accepted by the early schools' (p.79) Wayman, in his scathing review of this paper points out evidence drawn from other works attributed to Nāgārjuna which places him in a Mahāyānist context, but he does not refute Warder's argument on the basis of the M.K. alone. The Treatise, of course, which is to all intents and purposes a 5th century Chinese work, presupposes the truth of the Mahāyāna. 'For him (Kumārajīva) Mādhyamika was simply Mahāyāna in śāstra form' (R.95). V.12 presupposes that a Dharma was taught, but does not itself specify which Dharma.

341. 'This emptiness is itself empty'. This phrase repeated at 24/19 (see below), echoes 22v11,22/11 that emptiness is a 'conventional name' taught only to refute its opposites. Cf. the opponent's charge 13/8, its commentary (18c11ff), and Nāgārjuna's reply 13v9: 'The Great Sage speaks of the emptiness of dharmas/in order to wean

us from all views/If you then reinstate a view of 'emptiness'/
 You cannot be taught by all the Buddhas'. (Cf. Ram. 342b,359a
 (n.2)). Hachiriki, Hiroki 八力廣喜 in 'Chūron ni okeru
 mujishō to mu' 中論における無自性と無 ('No-self-nature and
 nothingness in the Chung-lun') discusses the passage in relation
 to the concepts of own being and dependent origination and
 suggests that the phrase 'emptiness is itself empty' can be
 interpreted "as referring to the idea of 'making emptiness empty'
 in the sense of a remedy for the erroneous tendency to interpret
 it as nothingness" (p.722), though his interpretation draws on a
 variety of Mādhyamika sources including Candrakīrti. The
 treatise's intention in this phrase is, I believe, made clear at
 13v9,13/9. The phrase occurs in T1509 at 314b,327a,581b (T.index
 p.34).

342. This is a curious example of 無 (nothingness, nonexistence) being
 used for Sk. śūnya, emptiness (the commentary glosses 無 as 空
 (emptiness) (but cf. 空=non-existent at 24/19,33b19)). The reading
 is common to the Korean text and to all ms. used for the Taishō
 text. The verse became important as a doctrinal starting point
 for the later Tendai doctrine of the 'three truths' 三諦 and
 consequently came to be interpreted in a variety of ways. Since
 the treatise talks elsewhere of two truths and not three, there
 seems no reason to follow the Tendai interpretation here and make
 中道 equivalent to both 空 and 假; rather, the middle path is the
 path of the two truths employed by the Buddhas who exemplify it.
 Cf.24v8,ff.

343. Conventional names 假名 cf. 24c12ff, 18v6,18a10,13a14 etc.

344. What arises causally is empty, but just as no particular interpretation of causality is tenable, so no particular view of emptiness is tenable either. Cf.27,13v9ff.
345. see n. 341
346. Vacuous 空 lit: empty. see n. 277
347. i.e. in 24/0-24/6.
348. Suffering and impermanence are two of the four characteristics of existence listed at 21/14, now considered as two aspects of one characteristic. The first of the four holy truths, that of suffering, is referred to here. See n. 286
349. 集 = accumulation of karma, second of the four holy truths.
'Principle' 義 in the same sentence is 'idea', 'meaning', cf.24v7
350. Cessation 滅 is the third holy truth, also translated 'extinction'.
351. This verse and 24v25 deal with the fourth holy truth of the way to the extinction of suffering.
352. 24v26 and 24v27 deal with the implementation of the four truths.
Cf.24v2.
353. not occur 不然 lit: not so, not thus.
354. Four fruits 四果 see n. 331
- 355 Cf. 24v4

356. Cf. 24v5
357. Putting into practice 行, lit: 'coursing in' with the connotation of religious practice.
358. Tao 道 stands for bodhi (enlightenment) in Kumārajīva's writings. Here it is partly redundant since bodhi is also transliterated 菩提 in anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, lit: 'unexcelled perfect enlightenment'. Bodhi and Buddhas are inseparable, see 24v31. Tao is used in the reduced sense of 'path' in conjunction with bodhi in 24v32.
359. No-one, in the sense of a doer who is separate from the deed done.
360. The translation of the first half of the verse is uncertain. It may be read either (following Hatani) 'if you deny the causes and conditions/causality and the meaning of emptiness, of dharmas...' 汝一切法の、諸因縁と空義を破すれば" or, (following Ui), as an ambiguous 'If you deny the meaning of the emptiness of causality of dharmas...' 汝一切法の、諸の因縁空の義を破せば" My translation tries to preserve both meanings, since the commentary 24/36 does not clarify the relationship between 衆因縁法 and 第一空義 (both Hatani and Ui evade the problem there by reproducing 衆..... 義 without anymore syntactical information, Hatani p.222, Ui p.387). The Sk. verse is also ambivalent. Inada has 'The śūnyatā of relational origination' (p.152). 24v18 presents a similar problem with the relationship between 空 and 假.
361. 無作而有作 i.e. there will be a fixed dharma of 'doing' even

when nothing is being done. Cf. 24/37.

362. Strictly speaking, or perhaps in the sense of 23v16 'incorrectly speaking', the Buddhist version of karma does not require a 'doer' in the sense of a self. The notion of actions, rewards, retributions and reception without a doer here assumes that these would be disparate entities, which is incorrect because it negates Buddhist morality based on causal processes. Any explanation of how these elements might be associated, especially under the aegis of a separate 'doer' would of course be equally untenable.
363. Cf. the three marks (ch.7) of 生, 住 and 滅 to which a fourth, decay, now appears to be added. It is a synonym for 滅 cessation and occurs in 27v23, 27v24 with that meaning. But 壞 is not a fourth mark, and nor is 住 'abiding' in this context. It is included here only to emphasise the permanency of non-arising, non-ceasing dharmas (as opposed to their non-existence).
364. Characteristics 相 here is equivalent to 性 'natures'. On the relationship between characteristic and nature according to the GPWT see Ramanan, p.77.
365. See n.257
366. 'Then you can perceive the Buddha' (glossed as 'the Buddha's Dharmakāya' in 24/40) is not found in the Sk. (or Tibetan) verse which reads: 'He who perceives dependent co-origination/Also understands sorrow, origination and destruction, as well as the path (of release)' (Streng, 215). The dharmakāya is mentioned also at 22/15 (only in the commentary) but is a favourite theme

of the GPWT (see T. Index p.166) as is 'seeing the Buddha' (T. Index p. 38.) Ramanan (p.313) quotes; 'when one's heart is pure then does one see the Buddha; when one's heart is dirty then one is not able to see him' (T.1509p.126b).. 'The Buddha knows the time when one's faculties have matured (Cf. Treatise 22/13) and then he renders His help' (p.126c). The elements that constitute the dharmakāya, 'being undefiled are truly no occasion for clinging; even these are not anything substantial; these are also conditionally originated and impermanent...'
(Ramanan 314). At 22/15 one whose eye of insight is inverted is unable to see the Dharma-Body of the Buddha.

367. See n. 366

368. Nirvāṇa in the Treatise is equivalent to cessation (of views, of the defilements, of conceptual discriminations), 'cutting off the afflictions and extinction of the five skandhas' (25/1) and liberation 25v11. Nirvāṇa may be 'without residue' (18/12;24cff) when I and mine, the afflictions inner and outer and reception have ceased, along with the innumerable future bodies, or 'with residue' (18/12;24c5ff) when vain thoughts have ceased and one has attained to utter emptiness and the true character of dharmas. Its synonyms are calm extinction 寂滅, anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, and (in a different sense, cf. this chapter) samsara 生死.
Cf. Nak. 1076b-c and Treatise 8v6,9/12,16v10ff,17/20,18v7,21v11 etc. As neither arising nor ceasing (18/12;25a5ff) it is an 'inactive' dharma, which is how the Abhidharmists (e.g. the Vātsīputriyas mentioned at 10/16) conceived of it, (cf. Kośa I.7,n.2 and the Abhidharmist definition of nirvāṇa at Kośa IV.205,n.5) but according to the Treatise there are no inactive dharmas, since

there are no active ones in relation to which inactive ones exist.
Cf. 7v34ff, 25v5.

369. Cf. the argument in 24v25
370. Cf. 24/19
371. Cf. Kosá IV.205 'comment peut-on 'faire' le Nirvāṇa... De même que l'on dit: 'Fais l'espace! Fais tomber la maison!'
372. Cf. 18/12; 24c1ff.
373. Cf. s.105a 'emancipated from desire'. S. refers to Lotus Sutra Ch.25 in which Kuan-yin (Avalokiteśvara) does not accept an offering from the Buddha. 'This attitude is attributed to his 不受 samadhi...' which, as 不受三昧 is referred to in GPWT, T.1509p.367b, etc. (T.Index p.153). The discussion there is couched in the language of the Prajñāpāramitā. Nak. gives 不受 = 不取 and refers to the Treatise 25v8 which has 不受. (1162b-c).
374. Old age and death represent the 十二因緣 in general (see n.16) as well as the characteristics of arising and ceasing common to all dharmas, and old age and death in the bodily sense.
375. Cf. 7v34ff. and n. 368.
376. Cf. n. 373.
377. 'Because we receive causes and conditions'. The Sk. verse is aphoristic, as evidenced by the variety of renderings by Streng

(p.216), Inada (p.156), Sprung (p.255) and Stcherbatsky (p.195).

The commentary suggests that it is not causes and conditions which are the object of reception so much as reception which is the cause and condition of wandering in samsara, and this is what the verse might be expected to say as well. Kumārajīva clearly takes 諸因縁 to be the object of 受 (so too Inada p.228). Ui differs but not, I think very convincingly: 受と諸の因縁との故に... 'because of receiving, and causes and conditions...' (p.392).

378. Cf. Ch.23. 'Sūtras' are not mentioned in the Sk.
379. The three existences 三有 are the three realms 三界 of desire, form and no-form. See n. 117.
380. Cf. Ch. 22
381. Cf. the dialogue between Sāriputta and Yamaka referred to by Murti p.53 on the nature of the Tathāgata.
382. This comment subtly anticipates 27/30 'by whom would such views be generated?' by stating that only the one who does not discriminate nirvāṇa as existent, nonexistent, etc., attains it.
383. Cf. 25/21,16/10, both references to the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras.
384. i.e. in 4v1ff,8/12,13/2 etc.
385. i.e. because of the concept of nirvāṇa as being either existent or nonexistent.

386. That is, the future of the Tathāgata after his death.
387. i.e. whether past dharmas (or selves, or Tathāgata) persist into the present, and hence are 'permanent'.
388. Cf. Ch.11 on the 本際
389. Status 等 or: level, category, kind, class. Cf. also n. 383
390. Inconceivable 不可得 lit: tenable, but in English views are tenable, not dharmas.
391. Neither the Sk. nor Chinese verse makes clear the subject of 'extinguish(es?) all futile thoughts'. (Cf. Inada, p.159, Streng, p.217) 'The cessation of accepting everything (as real) is a salutary (śiva) cessation of phenomenal development (prapañca)...' Stcherbatsky has 'Our bliss consists in the cessation of all thoughts, In the quiescence of plurality...' (p.208). Hatani takes refuge once more in the -te form; 諸法は不可得にて、一切の戲論を滅す。 (p.232), as does Ui (p.396). Since the inconceivability of dharmas does not extinguish futile thoughts automatically, I have translated the verse as an instruction or exhortation, in line with the rhetorical style of 25/24.
392. See n.198. Cf.13/9, 27/31
393. The Way of calm serenity 安隱道 see n.107. Cf.15/6
394. Ch. 1

395. This is why we say 是故說.. 'we' is not specified in the text, but this statement repeats an earlier one in the commentary (at 25/24;26b11) rather than recapitulating 25v24, q.v.
396. See n.16. This chapter is a straightforward, traditional account of dependent origination. Inada identifies the influence of 'Hīnayānistic' teachings and finds śūnyatā 'hinted at' in the last two verses. In fact neither the Treatise nor the Sk. kārikā mention Hīnayāna (though the Treatise at 26/0 does mention 'the ultimate meaning' and its relation with the śrāvaka-Dharma). Mahayana and Hinayana are not terms which, as the Treatise might say, are reciprocally dependent. I agree with Rawlinson: 'I hesitate to use the term 'Hīnayāna' because, a) it's impolite, b) we have no hard evidence that the Hīnayāna preceded the Mahāyāna - more likely the activities of what we now call the Mahāyāna served to define both yānas'. (Lancaster, Ed. Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems, p.26n.67). In the context of the Treatise as a whole this account of causality does serve to emphasise that emptiness and dependent origination are compatible.
397. Mahāyāna is here transliterated 摩訶衍. Elsewhere in the Treatise it is invariably 大乘 'Great Vehicle' which I have translated as Mahāyāna because Mahāyāna is by now an English term meaning 'Great Vehicle'.
398. See n. 17
399. See n. 26
400. delusion here stands for the three poisons, see ch. 306.

401. 行 'Actions' and 'predispositions' (see Ch. 13) are perhaps confused here, cf. 23/22 and the commentary at 26/9. The Sk. verse introduces both predispositions and actions in 26v1, and I have followed suit, but it is impossible to square the account in 26v1 and 26v2 with the gloss in the commentary (26/9) since there is no formula of the '三行' meaning 'three predispositions' (Cf. n.329)
402. These are the hells, hungry spirits, animals, asuras, human birth and heavens. (JEED 238) Cf. 13/2; 18a5ff, 16/1. From here 26v2-26v9 runs through the remaining causal links.
403. See n.24
404. See Ch. 14
405. 觸, contact of, e.g. eye with object of vision, ear with sound, etc. up to mind with dharmas. (Nak.1456c).
406. i.e. of pleasure, pain, and neither pleasure nor pain.
407. Another name for the afflictions; they are given as 1. 欲取 desire (for forms, sounds, etc.) 2. 見取 views, 3. 戒禁取 (non-Buddhist) rituals and observances and 4. 我説取 assertion of self (Nak.514d, JEED 289a).
408. 大苦陰 is not listed as a formula in Nak., or found in the GPWT. The Sk. translates as 'That single mass of sorrow' (Streng.218) or 'This simple suffering attached to the Skandhas' (Inada.163). Perhaps, a scribe misheard 大 for 但 which is included with 大 at
although this is rather unlikely

26/9;36c16, though 大 could be used there to fill the line.

409. See n. 401

410. here 三有 means the 三界 of desire, form and no-form, but also the temporal succession of these existences in the 三世 of past, present and future. See 21/20.

411. See n. 408.

412. Abhidharma-sūtra. Sūtra is transliterated 修多羅 here, elsewhere it is 經. This is probably a reference to the Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra, T.1543 also known as the 阿毘曇經八
 鍵度論 (T.mokuroku p.4, cf. R.72). It was composed by Kātyāyana (cf n.207) (not the Buddha's disciple of the same name mentioned at 15v7), and translated into Chinese by Chu Fo-nien who worked in Ch'ang-an from 365AD. (Hōbōgirin, Fasc. Annexe, pp.91,140). It was therefore known to Kumārajīva and his contemporaries in Chinese. 'the meaning of' (義) refers to the relationships between the twelve elements, etc., not, presumably, to the ways in which causal relationships are there hypostatized.

413. Wrong views 邪見 lit: harmful views, vicious, depraved or heterodox views. 'Heterodox' is probably too formal in this context since 'all views' are ultimately rejected, including Buddhist ones. Cf. LS31b20, Hurvitz pp. 106-7, the parable of the rain cloud. The Buddha teaches those of right views 正見 and of wrong views 邪見. 'Wrong views' in fact includes 'right views' (27/29) Cf. also 22v13 where false views are said to be of two kinds, and 27/31 where all views are said to be the five or

- sixty-two views rejected by the Buddha. (Nak.611b-d)
414. Cf. the similar introductory passage at 26/0.
415. This verse and the next spell out the 'four views depending on the past' dealt with at 22v12, 27v3ff, and the 'four views depending on the future' analysed at 25v17,27v21ff. These views refer to the nature of the enlightened one.
416. This is the burden of the whole argument about the indivisibility of doer, means of doing, action and deed done, etc. Cf. Ch.9 on the substrate.
417. Cf. the discussion at 13/2, esp. 17c10ff.
418. The following argument shows that this process cannot in fact take place since if 'man' and 'god' are defined as such, they cannot be interchangeable.
419. A caṇḍāla 旃陀羅 is a member of the lowest caste whose members are fishermen, jailers, slaughterers, etc. (JEBD 263a). They are mentioned in the Lotus Sutra (Hurvitz pp.209-10) as amongst those whom a bodhisattva does not approach with familiarity - along with Brahmans.
420. Which is self-contradictory, because a caṇḍāla is a caṇḍāla.
421. Śrāvastī is one of the two cities of Uttara-Kośala at the time of the Buddha. JEBD 266b,191a.

422. Though no particular Devadatta is intended here, using the name of the Buddha's infamous cousin lends drama to the analogy. He became the Buddha Devarāja. (Hurvitz pp.196-7). Interestingly enough the Buddha in the Lotus Sutra insists that the relationship between such former and later selves is one of identity; 'Now what do you suppose, O mendicant monks? Was the king at that time and on that occasion anyone else? Such a view is not to be taken! For what reason is that? I was the king at that time and on that occasion...(etc.)'. But this passage is not found in Kumārajīva's Chinese translation. (Hurvitz p.378, n.3).

423. Rājagṛha is the capital of Magadha, where the Buddha preached the Lotus Sutra etc., LS9a4.

424. i.e. the 六道 of 13/2;18a5ff. n.402.

~~425. Equanimity. 等 is perhaps a play on words since 等 is both 'level', 'equal' and an indicator for a list of terms. Perhaps 'disturbance and the rest' would better convey the sense.~~

426. 不豫出家^家人 ~~lit: 'without first having left the household'~~. does not occur in T.1509 but several synonyms do occur such as 出家沙門(77b) and 出家菩薩 85a,111a,271b,628b, etc.

427. The point of this statement is unclear and it seems superfluous, or perhaps misplaced from the discussion of body and self preceding the analogy. The translation follows Ui (p.402)

428. creative power 作力 cf. 15/0, I have used 'creative' here for 作 only to distinguish the meaning from 有為 'active' (conditioned).

429. thinker 念者 this term is introduced in a non-technical fashion as equivalent to 'knower' (cf. 27/8;37b23), i.e. the doer as a conscious being. Cf. 'power of thought, not power of self' (27/8;37c22).
430. 'What you said before about the seer being the self': since the opponent has not stated that the seer is the self this must be a reference to 27/8;37b21ff, 'Surely the knower is the self'?
431. without a self; i.e. a barren woman's child (a non-existent entity) could be a 'doer' since being a doer would not involve actually 'doing' anything (such as seeing, etc.)
432. Evil error of the perverted view; strong language perhaps because it is a Buddhist view (albeit a misconception) which might place a Chinese son above his father in the present life by identifying him as a returned grandfather. Cf. the reference to 'loss of any family structure with no fathers and no sons' at 13/3;17b15ff.
433. Grape juice or possibly 'grape or peach juice', if peach vinegar exists.
434. The view that skandhas function intermittently and are continuous only in this sense seems wholly Abhidharmist and not worthy of the Treatise. Do they cease to function before starting to function again? If so, this is severance etc. The same criticism applies to the grape juice/wine/vinegar example.
435. 'You earlier said', a ref. to 27v7 and the discussion at 27/8;37b1ff.
436. 'Reach it' i.e. it should have some function in the process of

seeing, etc.

437. Definite principles 定義 Because they are the Buddha-word?
438. operate 作 do, act, become.
439. Cf. ch.2 where the Treatise identifies coming and going with movement in saṃsāra.
440. prajñā-insight: 智慧 is equivalent in other texts to Sk. prajñā (Nak.950b-c). Cf. the references to the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, n.19.
441. Cf. 21v17
442. 'The final body' clarifies the relationship between this discussion and the existence or nonexistence of the enlightened one after death (cf. 1/5 on the last thoughts of arhats). 'The world' means living beings rather than the physical world (see following).
443. The Four Hundred Contemplations is the original of what is now known as the 'Hundred Treatise' 百論 T.1509. In Sk. it consisted of 400 stanzas in 16 chapters (preserved in Tibetan). As an abbreviated version with a commentary on Āryadeva's stanzas by 'Vasu', it was translated into Chinese twice by Kumārajīva and has been translated into English by Tucci (Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic). See Murti.93, R.33,34). Kumārajīva was particularly fond of this text (perhaps because it was the only Mādhyamika treatise he possessed until the arrival of Vimalākṣa? - see 'The Authorship of the Chung-lun' in this thesis).

444. This verse is a quotation from the 'Four Hundred Contemplations' and as such is not numbered amongst Nāgārjuna's verses. It does not occur in the Sk. kārīkā but is quoted in the Tibetan commentary Akutobhayā according to Hatani (p.246n.24). It is not quoted (and the boundedness or otherwise of the world is not dealt with) in those sections translated into Chinese as the Hundred Treatise 百論 (see previous note).

445. This verse identifies 'views' not as particular views but as the generation of views. Cf.23v1.

446. right views cf.n. 413

447. Gautama is transliterated here, conforming with the Sk..'Great Sage and Master' is added.

448. Cf.1v2 The five views are listed by Nak. as:

1. 有身見 (the false view that the self is a substantial reality)
2. 辺執見 (the false view of holding to extremes of nihilism or eternalism)
3. 邪見 false views
4. 見取見 attachment to heresies
5. 戒禁取見 attachment to heretical observances
(Nak.358d-9a, JEBD 83b)

The Kośa mentions five and sixty two dr̥ṣṭis (v.15,ix.265). The five are briefly explained as 'the view of I and mine, the view of eternity and severance, the view of negation, the view which takes as high what is low, that which takes as cause and path that which is not cause and path; (K,IV.15) The five are then discussed. (also by Lamotte p.15nnlff). See 13/9, and n.198 for the 62 views.

Chinese Text of the Middle Treatise

(with Seng-jui's Preface).

Korean Edition

不介是故世間无邊是事不然世間有二種因土世間衆生世間此是衆生世間復次如四百觀中說

真法及說者聽者難得故如是則生死非有邊无邊

不得真法因緣故生死往來无有邊或時得聞真法得道故不得言無邊今當更破亦有邊亦無邊

若世半有邊世間半無邊是則亦有邊亦无邊不然

若世間半有邊半無邊則應是亦有邊亦無邊若介者則一法二相是事不然何以故

彼受五陰者 去何一分破 一分而不破 是事則不然 受亦復如是 去何一分破 一分而不破 是事亦不然

受五陰者去何一分破一分不破一事不得亦常亦无常受亦如是去何一分破一分不破常無常二相過故是故世間亦有邊亦無邊則不然今當破非有邊非无邊見
若亦有无邊是二得成者非有非無邊是則亦應成

中論第四卷 第三十頌 寶

與有邊相違故有無邊如長相違有短與有無相違則有亦有亦無與亦有亦無相違故則有非有非无若亦有邊亦無邊定成者應有非有邊非无邊何以故因相待故上已破亦有邊亦無邊第三句今去何當有非有邊非无邊以無相待故如是推求依止未來世有邊等四見皆不可得復次一切法空故世間常等見何處於何時誰起是諸見

上以聲聞法破諸見今此大乘法中說諸法從本以來畢竟空性如是空性法中無人無法不應生邪見正見處名土地時名日月歲數誰名為人是名諸見體若有常無常等決定見者應當有人出生此見破我故無人生是見應有處所色法現見尚可破何況時方若有諸見者應有定實若定則不應破上來以種種因緣破是故當知見無定體去何得生如偈說何處於何時誰起是諸見

瞿曇大聖主 憐愍說是法 志斷一切見 我今稽首礼

中論第四卷 第三十一頌 寶

一切見者略說則五見廣說則六十二見為斷是諸見故說法大聖主瞿曇是元量無邊不可思議智慧者是故我稽首礼

中論卷第四

癸卯歲高麗國大藏都監奉
勅雕造

中論卷第四 第三十一頌 寶

我不作今我是事不然復次
如過去世中有我無我見若共若不共
是事皆不然

如是推求過去世中邪見有無亦有
亦無非有非無是諸邪見先說因緣
過故是皆不然

我於未來世為作為不作如是之見者
皆同過去世

我於未來世中為作為不作如是四
句如過去世中過各應在此中說復次
若天即是人則墮於常邊 天則為無生
常法不生故

若天即是人是則為常若天不生人
中云何名為入常法不生故常亦不
然復次

若天異於人是即為元常 若天異人者
是則無相續

若天與人異則為無常無常則為斷
滅等過如先說過若天與人異則無
相續若有相續不得言異復次

若半天半人則墮於二邊 常及於元常
是事則不然

若眾生半身是天半身是人若介則

中論第四卷 第三十五頌 實

中論卷第四

有常無常半天是常半人是無常但
是事不然何以故一身有二相過故
復次

若常及無常 是二俱成者 如是則應成
非常非元常

若常無常二俱成者然後成非常非
元常與常無常相違故今實常元常
不成是故非常非無常亦不成復次
今生死無始是亦不然何以故

法者定有來 及定有去者 生死則無始
而實無此事

法若決定有所從來有所從去者生
死則應無始是法以智慧推求不得
有所從來有所從去是故生死無始
是事不然復次

今若無有常 六何有無常 亦常亦元常
非常非無常

若介者以智慧推求無法可得常者
誰當有無常因常有元常故若二俱
無者云何有亦有常亦無常若無有
常無常云何有非有常非無常因亦

有常亦元常故有非有常非元常是
故依止過去世常等四句不可得有

中論第四卷 第三十六頌 實

邊元邊等四句依止未來世是事不
可得今當說何以故

若世間有邊 云何有後世 若世間元邊
云何有後世

若世間有邊不應有後世而今實有
後世是故世間有邊不然若世間無
邊亦不應有後世而實有後世是故
世間無邊亦不然復次是二邊不可
得何以故

五陰常相續 猶如燈火炎以是故世間
不應邊元邊

從五陰復生五陰是五陰次第相續
如象緣和合有燈炎若象緣不盡燈
則不滅若盡則滅是故不得說世間
有邊無邊復次

若先五陰壞 不因是五陰 更生後五陰
世間則有邊 若先陰不壞 亦不因是陰
而生後五陰 世間則元邊

若先五陰壞 不因是五陰 更生後五
陰如是則世間有邊若先五陰滅已
更不生餘五陰是名為邊邊名未後

身若先五陰不壞 不因是五陰而生
後五陰世間則元邊是則為常而實

中論第四卷 第三十七頌 實

四五一

中論卷第四

但屬舍主不屬他人答曰是喻不然何以故舍主有形有觸有力故能治舍汝所說我無形無觸故無自力自無作力亦不能使他作者世間有一法無形無觸能有所作者則可信受知有作者但是事不然若我是作者則不應自作苦事若是念者可貪樂事不應忘失若我不作苦而苦強生者餘一切皆亦自生非我所作若見者是我眼能見色眼應是我若眼見而非我則違先言見者是我若見者是我我則不應得聞聲等諸塵何以故眼是見者不能得聞聲等塵故是故我是見者是事不然若謂如刈者用鎌刈草我亦如是以手等能有所作者是事不然何以故今離鎌別有刈者而離身心諸根無別作者若謂作者雖非眼耳等所得亦有作者則石女兒能有所作如是一切諸根皆應無我若謂右眼見物而左眼識當知別有見者是事不然今右手習作左手不能是故無別有作者若別有作者右手所習左手亦應能而實不能

中論卷第四 第三十三張 寶

是故更無作者復次有我者言見他食果口中涎出是為我相是事不然何以故是念力故非是我力又亦即是破我因緣人在眾中愧於涎出而涎強出不得自在當知無我復次又有顛倒過罪先世是父今世為子是父子我一但身有異如從一舍至一舍父故是父不以入異舍故便有異若有我是二應一如是則有大過若謂无我五陰相續中亦有是過是事不然何以故五陰雖相續或時有用或時無用如蒲桃漿持戒者應飲蒲桃酒不應飲若變為苦酒還復應飲五陰相續亦如是有用有不用若始終一我有如是過五陰相續無如是過但五陰和合故假名為我無有決定如標椽和合有舍離標椽無別舍如是五陰和合故有我若離五陰實無別我是故我但有假名無有定實汝先說離受別有受者以受分別受者是天是人是皆不然當知但有受無別受者若謂離受別有我是事不然若離受有我云何可得說是我相若

中論卷第四 第三十三張 寶

元相可說則離受無我若謂離身無我但身是我是亦不然何以故身有生滅相我則不尔復次云何以受即名受者若謂離受有受者是亦不然若不五陰而有受者應離五陰別有受者眼等根可得而實不可得是故我不離受不即是受亦非無受亦復非無此是定義是故當知過去世有我者是事不然何以故過去我不作是事則不然過去世中我異今亦不然若謂有異者離彼應有今我住過去世而今我自生如是則斷滅失於業果報彼作而此受有如是等過先無而今有此中亦有過我則是作法亦為是无因過去世中我不作今我是事不然何以故過去世中我與今我不異若今我與過去世我異者應離彼我而有今我又過去世我亦應住彼此身自更生若尔者即墮斷邊失諸業果報又彼人作罪此人受報有如是等无量過又是我應先無而今有是亦有過我則是作法亦是無因生是故過去

四五

中論卷第四 第三十四張 寶

滅以因滅故果亦滅如是修習觀十
二因緣生滅智故是事滅是事滅故
乃至生老死憂悲大苦陰皆如實正
滅正滅者畢竟滅是十二因緣生滅
義如何毗曇修多羅中廣說

中論觀邪見品第二十七 三一偈

問曰已聞大乘法破邪見今欲聞聲
聞法破邪見答曰

我於過去世 為有為是无 世間常等見
皆依過去世 我於未來世 為作為不作
有邊等諸見 皆依未來世

我於過去世為有為無為有無為非
有非無是名常等諸見依過去世我
於未來世為作為不作為作不作為
非作非不作是名邊无边等諸見依
未來世如是等諸邪見何因緣故名
為邪見是事今當說

過去世有我 是事不可得 過去世中我
不作今世我 若謂我即是 而身有異相
若當離於身 何處別有我 離身無有我
是事為已成 若謂身即我 若都無有我
但身不為我 身相生滅故 六何當以受
而作於受者 若離身有我 是事則不然

中論第四卷 第二十九頌 實

中論卷第四

無受而有我 而實不可得 今我不離受

亦不即是受 非無受非无 此即決定義
我於過去世有者是事不然何以故
先世中我不即作今我有常過故若
常則有無量過何以故如人修福因
緣故作天而後作人若先世我即是
今我者天即是人又人以罪業因緣
故作旃陀羅後作婆羅門若先世我
即是今我者旃陀羅即是婆羅門辭
如舍衛國婆羅門名提婆達到王舍城
亦名提婆達不以至王舍城故為異若
先作天後作人則天即是人旃陀羅
即是婆羅門但是事不然何以故天
不即是人旃陀羅不即是婆羅門有
此等常過故若謂先世我不作今我
如人浣衣時名為浣者刈時名為刈
者而浣者與刈者雖不異而浣者不
即是刈者如是受天身名為天我
受人身名為人我不異而身有異者
是事不然何以故若即是者不應言
天作人今浣者於刈者為異為不異
若不異浣者應即是刈者如是先世
天即是人旃陀羅即是婆羅門我亦

中論第四卷 第三十頌 實

有常過若異者浣者即不作刈者如

是天不作人我亦无常無常則無我
相是故不得言即是問曰我即是但
因受故分別是天是人受名五陰身
以業因緣故分別是天是人旃陀
羅是婆羅門而我實非天非人非旃
陀羅非婆羅門是故無如是過答曰
是事不然何以故若身作天作人作
旃陀羅作婆羅門非是我者則離身
別有我今罪福生死往來皆是身非
是我罪因緣故墮三惡道福因緣故
生三善道若苦樂瞋喜憂怖等皆是
身非我者何用我為如治俗人罪不
豫出家人五陰因緣相續罪福不失
故有解脫若皆是身非我者何用我
為問曰罪福等依止於我我有所知
身無所知故知者應是我起業因緣
罪福是作法當知應有作者作者是
我身是我所用亦是我所住處譬如
舍主以草木泥墜等治舍自為身故
隨所用治舍有好惡我亦如是隨作
善惡等得好醜身六道生死皆我所
作是故罪福之身皆屬於我譬如舍

中論第四卷 第三十一頌 實

四四九

凡陰相續往來因緣故說名世間五
 陰性畢竟空無受寂滅此義先已說
 以一切法不生不滅故世間與涅槃
 无有分別涅槃與世間亦无分別復次
 涅槃之實際 及世間際 如是二際者
 無毫釐差別

究竟推求世間涅槃實際無生際以
 平等不可得故無毫釐差別復次
 滅後有無等 有邊等常等諸見依涅槃
 未來過去世

如來滅後有如來無如來亦有如來
 亦無如來非有如來非無如來世間
 有邊世間无边世間亦有邊亦无边
 世間非有邊非无边世間常世間無
 常世間亦常亦無常世間非有常非
 無常此三種十二見如來滅後有無
 等四見依涅槃起世間有邊无边等
 四見依未來世起世間常无常等四
 見依過去世起如來滅後有無等不
 可得涅槃亦如是如世間前際後際
 有邊无边有常无常等不可得涅槃
 亦如是是故說世間涅槃等無有異
 復次

中論第四卷 第二十六張 寶

一切法空故 何有邊无边 亦无边亦無邊
 非有非無邊 何者為一異 何有常无常
 亦常亦无常 非常非無常 諸法不可得
 滅一切戲論 無人亦無處 佛亦無所說
 一切法一切時一切種從眾緣生故
 畢竟空故無自性如是法中何者是
 有邊誰為有邊何者是无边亦有邊
 亦无边非有邊非无边誰為非有邊
 非无边何者是常誰為是常何者是
 無常常無常非常非無常誰為非常
 非無常何者身即是神何者身異於
 神如是等六十二邪見於畢竟空中
 皆不可得諸有所得皆息戲論皆滅
 戲論滅故通達諸法實相得安隱道
 從因緣品來分別推求諸法有亦無
 無亦無有無亦无非有非無亦无是
 名諸法實相亦名如法性實際涅槃
 是故如來無時无處為人說涅槃定
 相是故說諸有所得皆息戲論皆滅
 中論觀十二因緣品第二十六 九偈
 問曰汝以摩訶衍說第一義道我今
 欲聞說聲聞法入第一義道答曰
 眾生癡下覆為後起三行以起是行故

中論第四卷 第二十六張 寶

隨行隨六趣 以諸行因緣 識受六道身
 以有識者故 增長於名色 名色增長故
 因而生六入 情塵識和合 而生於六觸
 因於六觸故 即生於三受 以因三受故
 而生於渴愛 因愛有四取 因取故有有
 者取者不取 則解脫無有 從有而有生
 從生有老死 從老死故有 憂悲諸苦惱
 如是等諸事 皆從生而有 但以是因緣
 而集大苦陰 是謂為生死 諸行之根本
 無明者所造 智者所不為 以是事滅故
 是事則不生 但是苦陰聚 如是而正滅
 凡夫為無明所盲故以身口意業為
 後身起六趣諸行隨所起行有上中
 下識入六趣隨行受身以識者因緣
 故名色集名色集故有六入六入因
 緣故有六觸六觸因緣故有三受三
 受因緣故生渴愛渴愛因緣故有四
 取四取取時以身口意業起罪福今
 後三有相續從有而有生從生而有
 老死從老死有憂悲苦惱種種眾患
 但有大苦陰集是故知凡夫無智起
 此生死諸行根本智者所不起以如
 實見故則無明滅無明滅故諸行亦

中論第四卷 第二十六張 寶

先有今無則名無濕勝則不亦何以故非有法變為無故是故元亦不作濕勝復次

若無是濕勝 云何名不受 未曾有不受而名為無法

若謂無是濕勝經則不應說不受名濕勝何以故無有不受而名无法是故知濕勝非无問曰若濕勝非有非無者何等是濕勝答曰

受諸因緣故 輪轉生死中 不受諸因緣是名為濕勝

不如實知顛倒故因五受陰往來生死如實知顛倒故則不復因五受陰往來生死無性五陰不復相續故說名濕勝復次

如佛經中說 斷有斷非有 是故知濕勝非有亦非無

有名三有非有名三有斷滅佛說斷此二事故當知濕勝非有亦非無問曰若有若無非濕勝者今有無共合是濕勝耶答曰

若謂於有無合為濕勝者 有無即解脫是事則不然

若謂於有無合為濕勝者即有有无二事合為解脫是事不然何以故有無二事相違故云何一處有復次

若謂於有無合為濕勝者 濕勝非无受是二從受生

若謂有無合為濕勝者經不應說濕勝名無受何以故有無二事從受生相因而有是故有無二事不得合為濕勝復次

有無共合成 云何名濕勝 濕勝名無為有無是有為

有無二事共合不得名濕勝 濕勝名無為有是无是有為是故有無非是濕勝復次

有無二事共 云何是濕勝 是二不同處如明暗不俱

有無二事不得名濕勝何以故有无相違一處不可得如明暗不俱是故有時無無無時無有云何有無共合而名為濕勝問曰若有無共合非濕勝者今非有非無應是濕勝答曰

若非有非無名之為濕勝 此非有非無以何而分別

若濕勝非有非無者此非有非無因何而分別是故非有非無是濕勝者是事不然復次

分別非有無 如是名濕勝 若有無成者非有非無成

汝分別非有非無是濕勝者是事不然何以故若有無成者然後非有非無成有相違名無無相違名有是有无第三句中已破有無無故云何有非有非無是故濕勝非非有非非無復次

如來滅度後 不言有與無 亦不言有无非有及非无 如來現在時 不言有與無 亦不言有無 非有及非無

若如來滅後若現在有如來亦不受無如來亦不受亦有如來亦無如來亦不受非有如來非無如來亦不受以不受故不應分別濕勝有元等離如來誰當得濕勝何時何處以何法說濕勝是故一切時一切種求濕勝相不可得復次

濕勝與世間 無有少分別 世間與濕勝亦無少分別

中論第四卷 第三十三頌 寶

中論第四卷 第三十四頌 寶

中論第四卷 第三十五頌 寶

中論卷第四

四四七

若有決定性世間種種相則不生不滅常住而不壞

若諸法有定性則世間種種相天人畜生万物皆應不生不滅常住不壞何以故有實性不可變異故而現見万物各有變異相生滅變易是故不應有定性復次

若無有空者未得不應得亦无斷煩惱亦無苦盡事

若無有空法者則世間出世間所有功德未得者皆不應得亦不應有斷煩惱者亦無苦盡何以故以性定故是故經中說若見因緣法則為能見佛見苦集滅道

若人見一切法從眾緣生是人即能見佛法身增益智慧能見四聖諦苦集滅道見四聖諦得四果滅諸苦惱是故不應破空義若破空義則破因緣法破因緣法則破三寶若破三寶則為自破

中論觀涅槃品第二十五 二十四偈

問曰

若一切法空無生無滅者何斷何所滅

中論卷第四 第五張 寶

而稱為涅槃

若一切法空則無生无滅無生无滅者何所斷何所滅而名為涅槃是故一切法不應空以諸法不空故斷諸煩惱滅五陰名為涅槃答曰若諸法不空則無生无滅何斷何所滅而稱為涅槃

若一切世間不空則無生无滅何所斷何所滅而名為涅槃是故有無二門則非至涅槃所名涅槃者

無得亦无至不斷亦不常不生亦不滅是說名涅槃

無得者於行於果無所得无至者無處可至不斷者五陰先來畢竟空故得道入無餘涅槃時亦無所斷不常者若有法可得分別者則名為常涅槃寂滅無法可分別故不名為常生滅亦亦如是相者名為涅槃復次經說涅槃非有非無非有非非有非非無一切法不受內寂滅名涅槃何以故

涅槃不名有 有則老死相終無有有法離於老死相

中論卷第四 第五張 寶

眼見一切万物皆生滅故是老死相涅槃若是有則應有老死相但是事不然是故涅槃不名有又不見離生滅老死別有定法而名涅槃若涅槃是有即應有生滅老死相以離老死相故名為涅槃復次

若涅槃是有 涅槃即有為終無有一法而是無為者

涅槃非是有何以故一切万物從眾緣生皆是有為無有一法名為無為者雖常法假名無為以理推之无常法尚無有何况常法不可見不可得者復次

若涅槃是有 云何名無受 無有不從受而名為有法

若謂涅槃是有法者經則不應說無受是涅槃何以故無有有法不受而有是故涅槃非有問曰若有非涅槃者無應是涅槃耶答曰

有尚非涅槃 何況於無耶 涅槃無有有何處當有無

若有非涅槃無云何是涅槃何以故因有故有無若无有何有無如經說

中論卷第四 第五張 寶

修道則無有定性復次
 若無有苦諦 及無集滅諦 所可滅苦道
 竟為何所至
 諸法若先定有性則無苦集滅諦今
 滅苦道竟為至何滅苦復次
 若苦定有性 先來所不見 於今去何見
 其性不異故
 若先凡夫時不能見苦性今亦不應
 見何以故不見性定故復次
 如見苦不然 斷集及證滅 修道及四果
 是亦皆不然
 如苦諦性先不見者後亦不應見如
 是亦不應有斷集證滅修道何以故
 是集性先來不斷今亦不應斷性不
 可斷故滅先來不證今亦不應證先
 來不證故道先來不修今亦不應修
 先來不修故是故四聖諦見斷證修
 四種行皆不應有四種行無故四道
 果亦無何以故
 是四道果性 先來不可得 諸法性若定
 今去何可得
 諸法若有定性四沙門果先來未得今
 云何可得若可得者性則無定復次

中論第四卷 第十七章 寶

中論卷第四

若無有四果 則無得白者 以無八聖故
 則無有僧寶
 無四沙門果故則無得果向果者無
 八賢聖故則無有僧寶而經說八賢
 聖名為僧寶復次
 無四聖諦故 亦無有法寶 無法寶僧寶
 云何有佛寶
 行四聖諦得涅槃法若無四諦則無
 法寶若無二寶云何當有佛寶沙以
 如是因緣說諸法定性則壞三寶問
 曰汝雖破諸法究竟道阿耨多羅三
 藐三菩提應有因是道故名為佛答曰
 汝說則不因 菩提而有佛 亦復不因佛
 而有於菩提
 汝說諸法有定性者則不應因菩提
 有佛因佛有菩提是二性常定故復次
 雖復勤精進 修行菩提道 若先非佛性
 不應得成佛
 以先無性故如鐵無金性雖復種種
 鍛煉終不成金復次
 若諸法不空 無作罪福者 不空何所作
 以其性定故
 若諸法不空終無有人作罪福者何

中論第四卷 第十八章 寶

以故罪福性先已定故又無作作者
 故復次
 汝於罪福中 不生果報者 是則離罪福
 而有諸果報
 汝於罪福因緣中皆无果報者則應
 離罪福因緣而有果報何以故果報
 不待因出故問曰離罪福可無善惡
 果報但從罪福有善惡果報答曰
 若謂從罪福 而生果報者 果從罪福生
 云何言不空
 若離罪福無善惡果云何言果不空
 若亦離作者則無罪福汝先說諸法
 不空是事不然復次
 汝破一切法 諸因緣空義 則破於世俗
 諸餘所有法
 汝若破衆因緣法第一空義者則破
 一切世俗法何以故
 若破於空義 即應無所作 無作而有作
 不作名作者
 若破空義則一切果皆无作無因又
 不作而作又一切作者不應有所作
 又離作者應有業有果報有受者但
 是事皆不然是故不應破空復次

中論第四卷 第十九章 寶

四四五

得第一義大何得至涅槃是故諸法
雖無生而有二諦復次

不能正觀空 能根則自害 如不善呪術
不善捉毒蛇

若人能根不善解空法於空有失而
生邪見如為利捉毒蛇不能善捉反
為所害又如呪術欲有所作不能善
成則還自害能根觀空法亦如是
復次

世尊知是法 甚深微妙相 非能根所及
是故不欲說

世尊以法甚深微妙非能根所解是
故不欲說復次

汝謂我著空 而為我生過 汝今所說過
於空則無有

汝謂我著空故為我生過我所說性
空空亦復空無如是過復次

以有空義故 一切法得成 若無空義者
一切則不成

以有空義故一切世間出世間法皆
悉成就若無空義則皆不成就復次

汝今自有過 而以迴向我 如人乘馬者
自志於所乘

中論卷第一 第十七段 寶

汝於有法中有過不能自覺而於空
中見過如人乘馬而忘其所乘何以故
若汝見諸法 決定有性者 即為見諸法
無因亦無緣

汝說諸法有定性若介者則見諸法
無因無緣何以故若法決定有性則
應不生不滅如是法何用因緣若諸
法從因緣生則無有性是故諸法決
定有性則無因緣若謂諸法決定住
自性是則不然何以故

即為破因果 作作者作法 亦復壞一切
萬物之生滅

諸法有定性則無因果等諸事如偈說
眾因緣生法 我說即是無 亦為是假名
亦是中道義 未曾有一法 不從因緣生
是故一切法 無不是空者

眾因緣生法我說即是空何以故眾
緣具足和合而物生是物屬眾因緣
故無自性無自性故空空亦復空但
為引導眾生故以假名說難有無二
邊故名為中道是法無性故不得言
有亦無空故不得言無若法有性相
則不待眾緣而有若不待眾緣則無

中論卷第一 第十七段 寶

法是故無有不空法汝上所說空法
有過者此過今還在汝何以故
若一切不空 則無有生滅 如是則無有
四聖諦之法

若一切法各各有性不空者則無有生
滅無生滅故則無四聖諦法何以故
若不從緣生 云何當有苦 无常是苦義
定性無无常

若不從緣生故則無苦何以故經說
无常是苦義若若有定性云何有無
常以不捨自性故復次

若若有定性 何故從集生 是故元有集
以破空義故

若若有定性者則不應更生先已有
故若介者則無集諦以壞空義故復次
若若有定性 則不應有滅 汝者定性故
即破於滅諦

若若有定性者則不應滅何以故性
則無滅故復次

若若有定性 則無有修道 若道可修習
即無有定性

法若定有則無有修道何以故若法
實者則是常常則不可增益若道可

中論卷第一 第十七段 寶

無者無常苦無我不淨是四應實有不名顛倒顛倒相違故名不顛倒是事不然何以故

若常我樂淨而實無有者無常苦不淨是則亦應無

若常我樂淨是四實無故元常等四事亦不應有何以故無相因待故復次

如是顛倒滅無明則亦滅以無明滅故諸行等亦滅

如是者如其義滅諸顛倒故十二因緣根本無明亦滅元明滅故三種行業乃至老死等皆滅復次

若煩惱性實而有所屬者去何當可斷誰能斷其性

若諸煩惱即是顛倒而實有性者去何可斷誰能斷其性若謂諸煩惱皆虛妄無性而可斷者是亦不然何以故若煩惱虛妄無性無屬者去何當可斷誰能斷無性

若諸煩惱虛妄無性則無所屬去何可斷誰能斷無性法

中論觀四諦品第二十四 四十偈

中論卷第四

中論卷第四

問曰破四顛倒通達四諦得四沙門果若一切皆空無生亦无滅如是則無有四聖諦之法以無四諦故見苦與斷集證滅及修道如是事皆无以是事無故則无四道果無有四果故得向者亦無

若無八賢聖則无有僧寶以無四諦故亦无有法寶以無法僧寶亦無有佛寶如是說空者是則破三寶

若一切世間皆空無所有者即應无生无滅以無生無滅故則无四聖諦何以故從集諦生苦諦集諦是因苦諦是果滅苦集諦名為滅諦能至滅諦名為道諦道諦是因滅諦是果如是四諦有因有果若無生无滅則無

四諦四諦無故則无見苦斷集證滅修道見苦斷集證滅修道无故則無四沙門果四沙門果無故則無四向四得者若無此八賢聖則无僧寶又四聖諦無故法寶亦無若無法寶僧寶者去何有佛得法名為佛无法何有佛汝說諸法皆空則壞三寶復次

空法壞因果亦壞於罪福亦復志毀壞一切世俗法

若受空法者則破罪福及罪福果報亦破世俗法有如是等諸過故諸法不應空答曰

汝今實不能知空之因緣及知於空義是故自生惱

汝不解去何是空相以何因緣說空亦不解空義不能如實知故生如是疑難復次

諸佛依二諦為衆生說法一以世俗諦二第一義諦若人不能知分別於二諦則於深佛法不知真實義

世俗諦者一切法性空而世間顛倒故生虛妄法於世間是實諸賢聖直知顛倒性故知一切法皆空無生於聖人是第一義諦名為實諸佛依是二諦而為衆生說法若人不能如實分別二諦則於甚深佛法不知實義若謂一切法不生是第一義諦不須

第二俗諦者是亦不然何以故若不依俗諦不得第一義不得第一義則不得涅槃

第一義皆因言說言說是世俗是故若不依世俗第一義則不可說若不

中論卷第四 第三頌 寶

中論卷第四 第三頌 寶

四四三

中論卷四

而生諸煩惱

淨不淨顛倒者顛倒名虛妄若虛妄即無性無性則無顛倒若無顛倒六何因顛倒起諸煩惱問曰

色聲香味觸及法為六種如是之六種是三毒根本

是六入三毒根本因此六入生淨不淨

顛倒因淨不淨顛倒生貪恚癡答曰

色聲香味觸及法體六種皆空如炎夢

如乳闍婆城如是六種中何有淨不淨

猶如幻化人亦如鏡中像

色聲香味觸法自體未與心和合時

空無所有如炎如夢如化如鏡中

像但誑惑於心無有定相如是六入

中何有淨不淨復次

不因於淨相則無有不淨因淨有不淨

是故無不淨

若不因於淨先無有不淨因何而說

不淨是故無不淨復次

不因於不淨則亦無有淨因不淨有淨

是故無有淨

若不因不淨先無有淨因何而說淨

是故無有淨復次

中論卷四 第七 寶

若無有淨者何由而有貪若無有不淨何由而有恚

無淨不淨故則不生貪恚問曰經說

常等四顛倒若無常中見常是多顛

倒若無常中見无常此非顛倒餘三

顛倒亦如是有顛倒故顛倒者亦應

有何故言都無答曰

於無常者常是則名顛倒空中無有常

何處有常倒

若於無常中著常名為顛倒諸法性

空中無有常是中何處有常顛倒餘

三亦如是復次

若於無常中著無常非倒空中無無常

何有非顛倒

若著無常言是無常不名為顛倒者

諸法性空中無无常無常無故誰為

非顛倒餘三亦如是復次

可著者著及所用著法是皆寂滅相

六何而有著

可著名物者者名作者者名業所用

法名所用事是皆性空寂滅相如如

來品中所說是故無有著復次

若無有法言邪是顛倒言正不顛倒

中論卷四 第七 寶

誰有如是事

著名憶想分別此彼有無等若元此著

者誰為邪顛倒誰為正不顛倒復次

有倒不生倒無倒不生倒倒者不生倒

不倒亦不生若於顛倒時亦不生顛倒

汝可自觀察誰生於顛倒

已顛倒者則更不生顛倒已顛倒故

不顛倒者亦不顛倒無有顛倒故顛

倒時亦不顛倒有二過故汝今除憍

慢心善自觀察誰為顛倒者復次

諸顛倒不生云何有此義無有顛倒故

何有顛倒者

顛倒種種因緣破故墮在不生彼貪

著不生謂不生是顛倒實相是故偈

說云何名不生為顛倒乃至無漏法

尚不名為不生相何況顛倒是不生

相顛倒無故何有顛倒者因顛倒有

顛倒者復次

若常我樂淨而是實有者 是常我樂淨

則非是顛倒

若常我樂淨是四實有性者是常我

樂淨則非顛倒何以故定有實事故

云何言顛倒若謂常我樂淨倒是四

中論卷四 第七 寶

四四二

諸法實相如是微妙寂滅但因過去世起四種邪見世間有常世間无常世間常無常世間非常非无常寂滅中盡無何以故諸法實相畢竟清淨不可取空尚不受何況有四種見四種見皆因受生諸法實相無所因受四種見皆以自見為貴他見為賤諸法實相無有此彼是故說寂滅中無四種見如因過去世有四種見因未來世有四種見亦如是世間有邊世間無邊世間有邊无邊世間非有邊非無邊問曰若如是破如來者則無如來耶答曰

邪見深厚者則說無如來 如來寂滅相分別有亦非

邪見有二種一者破世間樂二者破涅槃道破世間樂者是魔邪見言無罪無福無如來等賢聖起是邪見捨善為惡則破世間樂破涅槃道者貪著於我分別有無起善滅惡起善故得世間樂分別有無故不得涅槃是故若言無如來者是深厚邪見乃失世間樂何況涅槃若言有如來亦是

中論第四卷 第五頌 實

中論卷第四

邪見何以故如來寂滅相而種種分別故是故寂滅相中分別有如來亦為非

如是性空中思惟亦不可 如來滅度後分別於有無

諸法實相性空故不應於如來滅後思惟若有若無若有無如來從本已來畢竟空何況滅後

如來過戲論 而人生戲論 戲論破慧眼是皆不見佛

戲論名憶念取相分別此彼言佛滅不滅等是人為戲論覆慧眼故不能見如來法身此如來品中初中後思惟如來定性不可得是故偈說

如來所有性 即是世間性 如來無有性 世間亦無性

此品中思惟推求如來性即是一切世間性問曰何等是如來性答曰如來無有性同世間無性

中論觀顛倒品第二十三 二十四偈 問曰

從憶想分別 生於貪恚癡 淨不淨顛倒 皆從眾緣生

中論第四卷 第六頌 實

經說因淨不淨顛倒憶想分別生貪恚癡是故當知有貪恚癡答曰

若因淨不淨顛倒生三毒 三毒即無性 故煩惱無實

若諸煩惱因淨不淨顛倒憶想分別生即無自性是故諸煩惱無實復次我法有以無 是事終不成 無我諸煩惱有無亦不成

我無有因緣若有若無而可成今無我諸煩惱去何以有無而可成何以故誰有此煩惱 是即為不成 若離是而有煩惱則無屬

煩惱名為能惱他者應是眾生是眾生於一切處推求不可得若謂離眾生但有煩惱是煩惱則無所屬若謂雖無我而煩惱屬心是事亦不然何以故

如身見五種 求之不可得 煩惱於垢心五求亦不得

如身見五陰中五種求不可得諸煩惱亦於垢心中五種求亦不可得又垢心於煩惱中五種求亦不可得復次淨不淨顛倒是則無自性 云何因此二

中論第四卷 第七頌 實

四四一

亦無如來如來中亦無五陰何以故
 若如來中有五陰如器中有果水中
 有魚者則為有異若異者即有如上
 常等過是故如來中無五陰又五陰
 中無如來何以故若五陰中有如來
 如器上有人器中有乳者如是則有
 別異如上說過是故五陰中無如來
 如來亦不有五陰何以故若如來有
 五陰如人有子如是則有別異若介
 者有如上過是事不然是故如來不
 有五陰如是五種求不可得何等是
 如來問曰如是義求如來不可得而
 五陰和合有如來答曰
 陰合有如來 則無有自性 若無有自性
 六何因他有
 若如來五陰和合故有即無自性何以
 故因五陰和合有故問曰如來不以
 自性有但因他性有答曰若無自性
 六何因他性有何以故他性亦無自
 性又無相待因故他性不可得不可
 得故不名為他復次
 法若因他生 是即為非我 若法非我者
 六何是如來

中論卷第四 第三張 寶

若法因眾緣生即無有我如因五指
 有拳是拳無有自體如是因五陰名
 我是我即無自體我有種種名或名
 眾生人天如來等若如來因五陰有
 即無自性無自性故無我若无我六
 何說名如來是故偈中說法若因他
 生是即為非我若法非我者六何是
 如來復次
 若無有自性 六何有他性 離自性他性
 何名為如來
 若無自性他性亦不應有因自性故
 名他性此無故彼亦無是故自性他
 性二俱無若離自性他性誰為如來
 復次
 若不因五陰 先有如來者 以今受陰故
 則說為如來 今實不受陰 更無如來法
 若以不受無 今當六何受 若其未有受
 所受不名受 無有無受法 而名為如來
 若於一異中 如來不可得 五種求亦無
 六何受中有 又所受五陰 不從自性有
 若無自性者 六何有他性
 若未受五陰先有如來者是如來今
 應受五陰已作如來而實未受五陰

中論卷第四 第三張 寶

時先無如來今六何當受又不受五
 陰者五陰不名為受無有無受而名
 為如來又如來一異中求不可得五
 陰中五種求亦不可得若介者六何
 於五陰中說有如來又所受五陰不
 從自性有若謂從他性有若不從自
 性有六何從他性有何以故以無自
 性故又他性亦無復次
 以如是義故 受空受者空 六何當以空
 而說空如來
 以是義思惟受及受者皆空若受空
 者六何以空受而說空如來問曰沙
 謂受空受者空則定有空耶答曰不
 然何以故
 空則不可說 非空不可說 共不共且說
 但以假名說
 諸法空則不應說諸法不空亦不應
 說諸法空不空亦不應說非空非不
 空亦不應說何以故但破相違故以
 假名說如是正觀思惟諸法實相中
 不應以諸難為難何以故
 寂滅相中無 常無常等四 寂滅相中無
 邊无边等四

中論卷第四 第三張 寶

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初有名今世有後有名來世有若初有滅次有後有是即無因是事不然是故不得言初有滅有後有若初有不滅亦不應有後有何以故若初有未滅而有後有者是則一時有二有是事不然是故初有不滅無有後有問曰後有不以初有滅生不以不滅生但滅時生答曰

若初有滅時而後有生者滅時是一有生時是一有

若初有滅時後有生者即二有一時俱一有是滅時一有是生時問曰滅時生時二有俱者則不然但現見初有滅時後有生答曰

若言於生滅而謂一時者則於此陰死即於此陰生

若生時滅時一時無二有而謂初有滅時後有生者今應隨在何陰中死即於此陰生不應餘陰中生何以故死者即是生者如是死生相違法不應一時一處是故汝先說滅時生時一時無二有但現見初有滅時後有生者是事不然復次

中論卷第四

中論第三卷 第三九段 寶

三世中求有相續不可得 若三世中無何有有相續

三有名欲有色有無色有無始生死中不得實智故常有三有相續今於三世中諦求不可得若三世中無有當於何處有有相續當知有有相續皆從愚癡顛倒故有實中則無

中論卷第三

癸卯歲高麗國大藏都監奉勅雕造

中論第三卷 第三九段 寶

中論卷第四

寶

龍樹菩薩造梵書目釋 姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

觀如來品第二十六偈

問曰一切世中尊唯有如來正遍知 号為法王一切智人是則應有答曰 今諦思惟若有應取若無何所取何以故如來

非陰不離陰 此彼不相在 如來不有陰 何處有如來

若如來實有者為五陰是如來為離 五陰有如來為如來中有五陰為五 陰中有如來為如來有五陰是事皆 不然五陰非是如來何以故生滅相 故五陰生滅相若如來是五陰如來 即是生滅相若生滅相者如來即有 無常斷滅等過又受者受法則一受 者是如來受法是五陰是事不然是 故如來非是五陰離五陰亦無如來 若離五陰有如來者不應有生滅相 若尔者如來有常等過又眼等諸根 不能見知但是事不然是故離五陰

四三九

若謂以眼見而有生滅者則為是癡妄而見有生滅

若謂以眼見有生滅者云何以言說破是事不然何以故眼見生滅者則是愚癡顛倒故見諸法性空無決定如幻如夢但凡夫先世顛倒因緣得此眼今世憶想分別因緣故言眼見生滅第一義中實無生滅是事已於破相品中廣說復次

從法不生法亦不生非法從非法不生法及於非法

從法不生法者若失若至二俱不然從法生法若至若失是則無因無因則墮斷常若已至從法生法是法至已而名為生則為是常又生已更生又亦無因生是事不然若已失從法生法者是則失因生者無因是故從失亦不生法從法不生非法者非法名無所有法名有云何從有相生無相是故從法不生非法從非法不生法者非法名為無無云何生有若從無生有者是則無因無因則有大過是故不從非法生法不從非法生

中論卷之三 第三十頌 寶

非法者非法名無所有云何從無所有生無所有如兔角不生龜毛是故不從非法生非法問曰法非法雖種種分別故無生但法應生法答曰法不從自生亦不從他生不從自他生云何而有生

法未生時無所有故又即自不生故是故法不自生若法未生則亦無他無他故不得言從他生又未生則無自無自亦無他共亦不生若三種不生云何從法有法生復次

若有所受法即墮於斷常當知所受法為常為元常受法者分別是善是不善常元常等是人必墮若常見若斷見何以故所受法應有二種若常若無常二俱不然何以故若常即墮斷常邊若無常即墮斷常邊問曰

所有受法者不墮於斷常因果相續故不斷亦不常有入雖信受分別說諸法而不墮斷常如經說五陰無常苦空無我而不斷滅雖說罪福无量劫數不失而不

中論卷之三 第三十六頌 寶

是常何以故是法因果常生滅相續故往來不絕生滅故不常相續故不斷答曰

若因果生滅相續而不斷滅更不生故因即為斷滅

若汝說諸法因果相續故不斷不常若滅法已滅更不復生是則因斷若因斷云何有相續已滅不生故復次法住於自性不應有有無涅槃滅相續則墮於斷滅

法決定在有相中亦時無無相如瓶定在瓶相亦時無失壞相隨有瓶時無失壞相無瓶時亦無失壞相何以故若無瓶則无所破以是義故滅不可得離滅故亦無生何以故生滅相因待故又有常等過故是故不應於一法而有有無又汝先說因果生滅相續故雖受諸法不墮斷常是事不然何以故汝說因果相續故有三有相續滅相續名涅槃若介者涅槃時應墮斷滅以滅三有相續故復次若初有滅者則無有後有初有若不滅亦無有後有

中論卷之三 第三十七頌 寶

合法

中論觀成壞品第二十一 三十四

問曰一切世間事現是壞敗相是故有壞答曰

離成及共成 是中無有壞 離壞及共壞 是中亦無成

若有成若無成俱無壞若有壞若無壞俱無成何以故

若離於成者 云何而有壞 如離生有死 是事則不然 成壞共有者 云何有成壞

如世間生死 一時俱不然 若離於壞者 云何當有成 无常未曾有 不在諸法時

若離成壞不可得何以故若離成有壞者則不因成有壞壞則無因又無

成法而可壞成名眾緣合壞名眾緣散若離成有壞者無成誰當壞如無

瓶不得言瓶壞是故離成無壞若謂共成有壞者是亦不然何以故法先別

成而後有合合法不離異若壞離異壞則無因是故共成亦無壞若離壞

共壞無有成者若離壞有成成則為常常是不壞相而實不見有法常不

壞相是故離壞無成若謂共壞有成

者是亦不然成壞相違云何一時有

如人有髮無髮不得一時俱成壞亦

亦是故共壞有成是事不然何以故若謂分別法者說成中常有壞是事

不然何以故若成中常有壞則不應有住法而實有住是故若離壞共壞

不應有成復次 成壞共無成 離亦無有成 是三俱不可 云何當有成

若成壞共亦無成離亦無成若共成則二法相違云何一時若離則無因

二門俱不成云何當有成若有應說問曰現有盡滅相法是盡滅相法亦

說盡亦說不盡如是則應有成壞答曰盡則無有成 不盡亦無成 盡則無有壞 不盡亦不壞

諸法日夜中念念常滅盡過去如水

流不住是則名盡是事不可取不可說如野馬無決定性可得如是盡無

決定性可得云何可得分別說有成是故言盡亦不成成無故亦不應有

壞是故說盡亦無有壞又念念生滅常相續不斷故名不盡如是法決定

常住不斷云何可得分別說言今是

成時是故說無盡亦無成成無故無

壞是故說不盡亦無壞如是推求實事不可得故無成無壞問曰且置成

壞但今有法有何各答曰 若離於成壞 是亦無有法 若當離於法 亦無有成壞

離成壞無法者若法無成無壞是法

應或無或常而世間無有常法汝說

離成壞有法是事不然問曰若離法

但有成壞有何各答曰離法有成壞

是亦不然何以故若離法誰成誰壞

是故離法有成壞是事不然復次

若法性空者 誰當有成壞 若性不空者 亦無有成壞

若諸法性空空何有成壞若諸法性不空不空則決定有亦不應有成

壞復次 成壞若一者 是事則不然 成壞若異者 是事亦不然 推求成壞一則不可得何以故異相

中論第三卷 第三十四 寶

中論第三卷 第三十四 寶

中論第三卷 第三十四 寶

中論卷第三

四三七

若因變為果 因即至於果 是則前生因
生已而復生

因有二種一者前生二者共生若因
滅變為果是前生因應還更生但
是事不然何以故已生物不應更生

若謂是因即變為果是亦不然何以
故若即是不名為變若變不名即是
問曰因不盡滅但名字滅而因體變
為果如泥團變為瓶失泥團名而瓶
名生答曰泥團先滅而有瓶生不名
為變又泥團體不獨生瓶兌變等皆
從泥中出若泥團但有名不應變為
瓶變名如乳變為酪是故汝說因名
雖滅而變為果是事不然問曰因雖
滅失而能生果是故有果無如是各
答曰

去何因滅失 而能生於果 又若因在果
去何因生果

若因滅失已去何能生果若因不滅
而與果合何能更生果問曰是因遍
有果而果生答曰

若因遍有果 更生何等果 因見不見果
是二俱不生

中論卷第三 第三十頌 寶

是因若不見果尚不應生果何況見
若因自不見果則不應生果何以故
若不見果果則不隨因又未有果去
何生果若因先見果不應復生果已
有故復次

若言過去因 而於過去果 未來現在果
是則終不合 若言未來因 而於未來果
現在過去果 是則終不合 若言現在因
而於現在果 未來過去果 是則終不合
過去果不與過去未來現在因合未
來果不與未來現在過去因合現在
果不與現在未來過去因合如是三
種果終不與過去未來現在因合復次
若不和合者 因何能生果 若有和合者
因何能生果

若因果不和合則無果若無果去何
因能生果若謂因果和合時因能生
果者是亦不然何以故若果在因中
則因中已有果去何而復生復次
若因空無果 因何能生果 若因不空果
因何能生果

若因無果者以無果故因空去何因
生果如人不懷妊去何能生子若因

中論卷第三 第三十一頌 寶

先有果已有果故不應復生復次今
當說果

果不空不生 果不空不滅 以果不空故
不生亦不滅 果空故不生 果空故不滅
以果是空故 不生亦不滅

果若不空不應生不應滅何以故果
若因中先決定有更不須復生生無
故無滅是故果不空故不生不滅若
謂果空故有生滅是亦不然何以故
果若空空名無所有去何當有生滅
是故說果空故不生不滅復次今以
一異破因果

因果是一者 是事終不然 因果若異者
是事亦不然 若因果是一 生及所生一
若因果是異 因則同非因 若果定有性
因為何所生 若果定無性 因為何所生
因不生果者 則無有因相 若無有因相
誰能有是果 若從眾因緣 而有和合生
和合自不生 去何能生果 是故果不從
緣合不合生 若無有果者 何處有合法
是眾緣和合法不能生自體自體无
故去何能生果是故果不從緣合生
亦不從不合生若無有果者何處有

中論卷第三 第三十二頌 寶

有中下則不應相因待因一故有異
因異故有一若一實有不應因異而
有若異實有不應因一而有如是等
諸法亦應如是破問曰如有歲月日
須臾等差別故知有時答曰

時住不可得 時去亦得 時若不可得
去何說時相 因物故有時 離物何有時
物尚無所有 何況當有時

時若不住不應可得時住亦無若時
不可得去何說時相若無時相則無
時因物生故則名時若離物則無時
上來種種因緣破諸物無故何有時
中論觀因果品第二十二十四偈

問曰眾因緣和合現有果生故當知
是果從眾緣和合有答曰
若眾緣和合 而有果生者 和合中已有
何須和合生

若謂眾因緣和合有果生是果則和
合中已有而從和合生者是事不然
何以故果若先有定體則不應從和
合生問曰眾緣和合中雖無果而果
從眾緣生者有何各答曰
若眾緣和合 是中無異者 去何從眾緣

中論第三卷 第五十六頌 寶

中論卷第三

和合而果生

若從眾緣和合則果生者是和合
中無果而從和合生是事不然何以
故若物無自性是物終不生復次
若眾緣和合 是有果者 和合中應有
而實不可得

若從眾緣和合中有果者若色應可
眼見若非色應可意知而實和合中
果不可得是故和合中有果是事不
然復次

若眾緣和合 是中無果者 是則眾因緣
與非因緣同

若眾緣和合中無果者則眾因緣即
同非因緣如乳是酪因緣若乳中無
酪水中亦無酪若乳中無酪則與水
同不應言但從乳出是故眾緣和合
中無果者是事不然問曰因為果作
因已滅而有因果無如是各答曰

若因與果因 作因已而滅 是因有二體
一與一則滅

若因與果作因已而滅者是因則有
二體一謂與因二謂滅因是事不然
一法有二體故是故因與果作因已

而滅是事不然問曰若謂因不與果
作因已而滅亦有果生有何各答曰
若因不與果 作因已而滅 因滅而果生
是果則无因

若是因不與果作因已而滅者則因
滅已而果生是果則無因是事不然
何以故現見一切果無有無因生者是
故汝說因不與果作因已而滅亦有
果生者是事不然問曰眾緣合時而
有果生者有何各答曰

若眾緣合時 而有果生者 生者及可生
則為一時俱

若眾緣合時有果生者則生者可生
即一時俱但是事不介何以故如父
子不得一時生是故汝說眾緣合
時有果生者是事不然問曰若先有
果生而後眾緣合有何各答曰

若先有果生 而後眾緣合 此即離因緣
名為無因果

若眾緣未合而先有果生者是事不然
果離因緣故則名無因果是故汝說
眾緣未合時先有果生者是事則不
然問曰因滅變為果者有何各答曰

中論第三卷 第五十五頌 寶

中論第三卷 第五十五頌 寶

中論第三卷 第五十六頌 寶

四三五

不滅或墮常耶答曰不然先說實相無戲論心相寂滅言語道斷汝今貪著取相於實相法中見斷常過得實相者說諸法從眾緣生不即是因亦不異因是故不斷不常若果異因則是斷若不異因則是常問曰若如是解有何等利答曰若行道者能通達如是義則於一切法不一不異不斷不常若能如是即得滅諸煩惱戲論得常樂涅槃是故說諸佛以甘露味教化如世間言得天甘露漿則无老病死無諸衰惱此實相法是真甘露味佛說實相有三種若得諸法實相滅諸煩惱名為聲聞法若生大悲發無上心名為大乘若佛不出世無有佛法時辟支佛因遠離生智若佛度眾生已入無餘涅槃遺法滅盡先世若有應得道者少觀狀離因緣獨入山林遠離憤內得道名辟支佛

中論觀時品第十九 六偈

中論第三卷 第三十三張 寶

上中下一異等法亦相因待故有答曰若因過去時有未來現在未來及現在應在過去時

若因過去時有未來現在時者則過去時中應有未來現在時何以故隨所因處有法成是處應有是法如因燈有明成隨有燈處應有明如是因過去時成未來現在時者則過去時中應有未來現在時若過去時中有未來現在時者則三時盡名過去時何以故未來現在時在過去時中故若一切時盡過去者則無未來現在時盡過去故若無未來現在時亦應無過去時何以故過去時因未來現在時故名過去時如因過去時成未來現在時如是亦應因未來現在時成過去時今無未來現在時故過去時亦應無是故先說因過去時成未來現在時是事不然若謂過去時中無未來現在時而因過去時成未來現在時是事不然何以故

若過去時中無未來現在未來現在時六何因過去

中論第三卷 第三十四張 寶

若未來現在時不在過去時中者云何因過去時成未來現在時何以故若三時各異相不應相因待成如瓶衣等物各自別成不相因待而今不因過去時則未來現在時不成不因現在時則過去未來時不成不因未來時則過去現在時不成汝先說過去時中雖无未來現在時而因過去時成未來現在時者是事不然問曰若不因過去時成未來現在時而有何各答曰

不因過去時則無未來時 亦無現在時是故無二時

不因過去時則不成未來現在時何以故若不因過去時有現在時者於何處有現在時未來亦如是於何處有未來時是故不因過去時則無未來現在時如是相持有故實无有時以如是義故則知餘二時 上中下一異是等法皆無

以如是義故當知餘未來現在亦應無及上中下一異等諸法亦應皆無如因上有中下離上則無中下若離上

中論第三卷 第三十五張 寶

以一切智觀衆生故種種為說亦說有我亦說無我若心未熟者未有涅槃分不知畏罪為是等故說有我又有得道者知諸法空但假名有我為是等故說我無各又有布施持戒等福德厭離生死苦惱畏涅槃永滅是故佛為是等說無我諸法但因緣和合生時空生滅時空滅是故說無我但假名說有我又得道者知無我不墮斷滅故說無我無各是故偈中說諸佛說有我亦說於無我若於真實中不說我非我問曰若无我是實但以世俗故說有我有何各答曰因破我法有無我我決定不可得何有無我若決定有無我則是斷滅生於貪著如般若中說菩薩有我亦非行無我亦非行問曰若不說我非我空不空佛法為何所說答曰佛說諸法實相實相中無語言道滅諸心心行心以取相緣生以先世業果報故有不能實見諸法是故說心行滅問曰若諸凡夫心不能見實聖人心應能見實何故說一切心行滅答曰諸法實相

中論第三卷 第三十張 寶

中論卷第三

即是涅槃涅槃名滅是滅為向涅槃故亦名為滅若心是實何用空等解脫門諸禪定中何故以滅盡定為第一又亦終歸無餘涅槃是故當知一切心行皆是虛妄虛妄故應滅諸法實相者出諸心數法無生無滅寂滅相如涅槃問曰經中說諸法先來寂滅相即是涅槃何以言如涅槃答曰著法者分別法有二種是世間是涅槃說涅槃是寂滅不說世間是寂滅此論中說一切法性空寂滅相為著法者不解故以涅槃為喻如汝說涅槃相空無相寂滅無戲論一切世間法亦如是

問曰若佛不說我非我諸心行滅言語道斷者去何令人知諸法實相答曰諸佛無量方便力諸法無決定相為度衆生或說一切實或說一切不實或說一切實不實或說一切非實非不實一切實者推求諸法實性皆入第一義平等一相所謂無相如諸流異色異味入於大海則一色一味一切不實者諸法未入實相時各各

中論第三卷 第三十張 寶

分別觀皆無有實但衆緣合故有一切實不實者衆生有三品有上中下上者觀諸法相非實非不實中者觀諸法相一切實一切不實下者智力淺故觀諸法相少實少不實觀涅槃無為法不壞故實觀生死有為法虛為故不實非實非不實者為破實不實故說非實非不實問曰佛於餘處說離非有非無此中何以言非有非無是佛所說答曰餘處為破四種貪著故說而此中於四句無戲論聞佛說則得道是故言非實非不實問曰知佛以是四句因緣說又得諸法實相者以何相可知又實相去何答曰若能不隨他不隨他者若外道雖現神力說是道是非道自信其心而不隨之乃至變身雖不知非佛善解實相故心不可迴此中無法可取可捨故名寂滅相寂滅相故不為戲論所戲論戲論有二種一者愛論二者見論是中無此二戲論二戲論無故無憶想分別無別異相是名實相問曰若諸法盡空將不墮斷滅耶又不生

中論第三卷 第三十張 寶

四三三

諸法實者 心行言語斷 無生亦無滅
寂滅如涅槃 一切實非實 亦實亦非實
非實非非實 是名諸佛法 自知不隨他
寂滅無戲論 无異無分別 是則名實相
若法從緣生 不即不異因 是故名實相
不斷亦不常 不一亦不異 不常亦不斷
是名諸世尊 教化甘露味 若佛不出世
佛法已滅盡 諸辟支佛智 從於遠離生
有人說神應有二種 若五陰即是神
若離五陰有神 若五陰是神者 神則
生滅相如偈中說 若神是五陰 即是
生滅相何以故 生已壞敗故 以生滅
相故 五陰是无常 如五陰無常 生滅
二法亦是無常 何以故 生滅亦生已
壞敗故 无常神若是 五陰五陰无常
故 神亦應無常 生滅相但是事 不然
若離五陰有神 神即無五陰 相如偈
中說 若神異五陰 則非五陰 相而離
五陰 更無有法 若離五陰 有法者 以
何相何法 而有若謂神如虛空 離五
陰而有者 是亦不然 何以故 破六種
品中已破 虛空無有法 名為虛空 若
謂以有信 故有神 是事不然 何以故

中論卷第三 第十七

信有四種 一現事可信 二名比知可
信 如見烟知有火 三名譬喻可信 如
國無鎗石喻之 如金四名賢聖所說
故可信 如說有地獄 有天有鬱單曰
無有見者 信聖人語 故知是神於一
切信中 不可得現事中 亦無比知中
亦無何以故 比知名先見 故後比類
而知 如人先見火 有烟後 但見烟則
知有火 神義不然 誰能先見神與五
陰合後 見五陰 知有神 若謂有三種
比知 一者如本二者如殘三者共見
如本名先見 火有烟 今見烟 知如本
有火 如殘名如炊飯 一粒熟 知餘者
皆熟 共見名如眼見人 從此去到彼
亦見其去 日亦如是 從東方出 至西
方 雖不見去 以人有去 相故 知日亦
有去 如是苦樂 憎愛 覺知等 亦應有
所依 如見人民 知必依王 是事皆不
然 何以故 共相信 先見人 與去法合
而至 餘方後 見日到 餘方 故知有去
法 無有先見 五陰與神 合後 見五陰
知有神 是故 共相比知 中亦无神 聖
人所說 甲亦無神 何以故 聖人所說

中論卷第三 第十八

皆先眼見 而後說 又諸聖人說 餘事
可信 故當知 說地獄等 亦可信 而神
不尔 無有先見 神而後說 者是故 於
四信等 諸信中 求神 不可得 求神不
可得 故無是 故離五陰 無別神 復次
破根品中 見見者 可見 破故 神亦同
破 又眼見 鹿法 尚不可得 何況 虛妄
憶想等 而有神 是故 知無我 因有我
故 有我所 若無我 則無我所 修習 八
聖道 分滅 我所 因緣 故得 无我 無
我所 決定 智慧
又無我 無我所 者 於第一義 中 亦不
可得 無我 無我所 者 能真見 諸法 凡
夫人 以我 我所 障慧 眼 故 不能 見 實
今 聖人 無我 我所 故 諸煩惱 亦滅 諸
煩惱 滅 故 能 見 諸法 實 相 內 外 我 我
所 滅 故 諸受 亦滅 諸受 滅 故 无量 後
身 皆亦 滅 是名 說 無餘 涅槃 問曰 有餘
涅槃 去 何 答曰 諸煩惱 及 業 滅 故 名
心得 解脫 是諸 煩惱 業 皆 從 憶 想 分
別 生 無 有 實 諸 憶 想 分 別 皆 從 戲 論
生 得 諸 法 實 相 畢 竟 空 諸 戲 論 則 滅
是名 說 有餘 涅槃 實 相 法 如 是 諸 佛

中論卷第三 第十九

作罪者則無不別異起布施持戒等
 業名為作福起慈盜等業名為作罪
 若不作而有業則无有分別復次是
 業若決定有性則一時受果報已復
 應更受是故汝說以不失法故有業
 報則有如是等過復次若業從煩惱
 起是煩惱無有決定但從憶想分別
 有若諸煩惱无實業去何有實何以
 故因無性故業亦無性問曰若諸煩
 惱及業無性不實今果報身現有應
 是實答曰
 諸煩惱及業是說身因緣 煩惱諸業空
 何況於諸身
 諸賢聖說煩惱及業是身因緣是中
 愛能潤生業能生上中下好醜貴賤
 等果報今諸煩惱及業種種推求无
 有決定何況諸身有決定果隨因緣
 故問曰汝雖種種因緣破業及果報
 而經說有起業者起業者有故有業
 有果報如說
 無明之所蔽 愛結之所縛 而於本作者
 不即亦不具
 無始經中說眾生為無明所覆愛結

中論第三卷 第十四頌 寶

中論卷第三

所縛於無始生死中往來受種種苦
 樂今受者於先作者不即是亦不異
 若即是人作罪受牛形則人不作牛
 牛不作人若異則失業果報墮於無
 因無因則斷滅是故今受者於先作
 者不即是亦不異答曰
 業不從緣生 不從非緣生 是故則無有
 能起於業者 無業無作者 何有業生果
 若其無有果 何有受果者
 若無業無作業者何有從業生果報
 若无果報去何有受果報者業有三
 種五陰中假名人是作者是業於善
 惡處生名為果報若起業者尚無何
 况有業有果報及受果報者問曰汝
 雖種種破業果報及起業者而今現
 見眾生作業受果報是事去何答曰
 如世尊神通 所作變化人 如是變化人
 復變化作人 如初變化人 是名為作者
 變化人所作 是則名為業 諸煩惱及業
 作者及果報 皆如幻與夢 如炎亦如響
 如佛神通力所作化人是化人復化
 作化人如化人無有實事但可眼見
 又化人口業說法身業布施等是業

中論第三卷 第十五頌 寶

雖無實而可眼見如是生死身作者
 及業亦應如是知諸煩惱者名為三毒
 分別有九十八使九結十纏六垢等
 無量諸煩惱業名為身口意業今世
 後世分別有善不善无記苦報樂報
 不苦不樂報現報業生報業後報業
 如是等无量作者名為能起諸煩惱
 業能受果報者果報名從善惡業生
 無記五陰如是等諸業皆空無性如
 幻如夢如炎如響
 中論觀法品第十八 十三偈
 問曰若諸法盡畢竟空無生无滅是
 名諸法實相者去何入答曰滅我我
 所著故得一切法空無我慧名為入
 問曰去何知諸法無我答曰
 若我是五陰 我即為生滅 若我異五陰
 則非五陰相 若無有我者 何得有我所
 滅我我所故 名得無我智 得无我智者
 是則名實觀 得無我智者 是人為希有
 内外我所 盡滅无有故 諸受即為滅
 受滅則身滅 業煩惱滅故 名之為解脫
 業煩惱非實 入空戲論滅 諸佛或說我
 或說於无我 諸法實相中 無我無非我

中論第三卷 第十六頌 寶

四三一

攝在十善道中答曰

若如汝分別其過則其多是故汝所說於義則不然

若以業果報相續故以穀子為喻者其過甚多但此中不廣說汝說穀子喻者是喻不然何以故穀子有觸有形可見有相續我思惟是事尚未受此言况心及業無觸無形不可見生滅不住欲以相續是事不然復次從穀子有芽等相續者為滅已相續為不滅相續若穀子滅已相續者則為無因若穀子不滅而相續者從是穀子常生諸穀若如是者一穀子則生一切世間穀是事不然是故業果報相續則不然問曰

今當復更說順業果報義諸佛辟支佛賢聖所稱歎

所謂

不失法如券業如負財物此性則無記分別有四種見諦所不斷但思惟所斷以是不失法諸業有果報若見諦所斷而業至相似則得破業等如是之過各一切諸行業相似不相似一界初受身

中論卷第三 第三十 寶

亦時報獨生如是二種業現世受果報或言受報已而業猶故在若度果已滅若死已而滅於是中分別有漏及無漏不失法者當知如券業者如取物是不失法欲界繫色界繫无色界繫亦不繫若分別善不善無記中但是無記是無記義阿毗曇中廣說見諦所不斷從一果至一果於中思惟見諦所斷而業至相似則得破業過是事阿毗曇中廣說復次不失法者於一界諸業相似不相似初受身時果報獨生於現在身從業更生業是業有二種隨重而受報或有言是業受報已業猶在以不念念滅故若度果已滅若死已而滅者須陀洹等度果已而滅諸凡夫及阿羅漢死已而滅於此中分別有漏及無漏者從須陀洹等諸賢聖有漏無漏等應分別答曰是義俱不離斷常過是故亦不應受問曰若亦者則無業果報答曰雖空亦不斷雖有亦不常業果報不失是名佛所說

中論卷第三 第三十 寶

此論所說義難於斷常何以故業異竟空寂滅相自性雜有何法可斷何法可失顛倒因緣故往來生死亦非常何以故若法從顛倒起則是虛妄無實無實故非常復次貪著顛倒不知實相故言業不失此是佛所說復次諸業本不生以無定性故諸業亦不滅以其不生故若業有性者是則名為常不作亦名業常則不可作若有不作業不作而有罪不斷於梵行而有不淨過是則破一切世間語言法作罪及作福亦無有差別若言業決定而自有性者受於果報已而應更復受若諸世間業從於煩惱生是煩惱非實業當何有實第一義中諸業不生何以故無性故以不生因緣故則不滅非以常故不滅若不亦者業性應決定有若業決定有性則為是常若常則是不作業何以故常法不可作故復次若有不作業者則他人作罪此人受報又他人斷梵行而此人有罪則破世俗法若先有者冬不應思為春事春不應思為夏事有如是等過復次作福及

中論卷第三 第三十 寶

中論觀業品第十七 三十三偈

問曰汝雖種種破諸法而業決定有能令一切衆生受果報如經說一切衆生皆隨業而生惡者入地獄修福者生天行道者得涅槃是故一切法不應空所謂業者

人能降伏心 利益於衆生 是名為慈善 二世果報種

人有三毒為惱他故生行善者先自滅惡是故說降伏其心利益他人利益他者行布施持戒忍辱等不惱衆生是名利益他亦名慈善福德亦名今世後世樂果種子復次

大聖說三業 思與從思生 是業別相中 種種分別說

大聖略說業有二種一者思二者從思生是二業如何說中廣說

佛所說思者 所謂意業是 所從思生者 即是身口業

思是心數法諸心數法中能發起有所作故名業因是思故起外身口業雖因餘心心數法有所作但思為所作本故說思為業是業今當說相

身業及口業 作與無作業 如是四事中

亦善亦不善 從用生福德 罪生亦如是 及思為七法 能了諸業相

口業者四種口業身業者三種身業是七種業有二種差別有作有無作作時名作業作已常隨逐生名無作業是二種有善不善不善名不止惡善名止惡復有從用生福德如施主

施受者若受者受用施主得二種福一從施生二從用生如人以箭射人若箭斃人有二種罪一者從射生二者從斃生若射不斃射者但得射罪無斃罪是故偈中說罪福從用生如是名為六種業第七名思是七種即是分別業相是業有今世後世果報是故決定有業有果報故諸法不應空答曰

業住至受報 是業即為常 若滅即無業 云何生果報

業若住至受果報即為是常是事不然何以故業是生滅相一念尚不住何況至果報若謂業滅滅則无云何能生果報問曰

如芽等相續 皆從種子生 從是而生果

雖種無相續 從種有相續 從相續有果 先種後有果 不斷亦不常 如是從初心

心法相續生 從是而有果 離心無相續 從心有相續 從相續有果 先業後有果 不斷亦不常

如從穀有芽從芽有莖葉等相續從是相續而有果生雖種無相續生是故從穀子有相續從相續有果先種後有果故不斷亦不常如穀種喻業果亦如是初心起罪福猶如穀種因是心餘心心數法相續生乃至果報先業後果故不斷亦不常若障業有果報則有斷常是善業因緣果報者所謂

能成福德者 是十白業道 二世五欲樂 即是白業報

白名善淨成福德因緣者從是十白業道生不斃不盜不邪淫不妄語不兩舌不惡口不無益語不嫉不恚不邪見是名為善從身口意生是果報者得今世名利後世天人中貴處生而施恭敬等雖有種種福德略說則

生死相續以不決定故無自性故若
眾生往來者亦有如是過復次
若眾生往來 陰界諸入中 五種求盡無
誰有往來者

生死陰界入即是一義若眾生於此
陰界入中往來者是眾生於燃可燃
品中五種求不可得誰於陰界入中
而有往來者復次

若從身至身 往來即無身 若其無有身
則無有往來

若眾生往來為有身往來為無身往
來二俱不然何以故若有身往來從
一身至一身如是則往來者無身又
若先已有身不應復從身至身若先
無身則無有若無有云何有生死往
來問曰經說有涅槃滅一切苦是滅
應諸行滅若眾生滅若曰二俱不滅
何以故

諸行若滅者 是事終不然 眾生若滅者
是事亦不然

汝說若諸行滅若眾生滅是事先已
若諸行無有性眾生亦種種推求生
死往來不可得是故諸行不滅眾生

中論卷第三 第五段 寶

亦不滅問曰若介者則無縛無解根
本不可得故若曰

諸行生滅相 不縛亦不解 眾生如先說
不縛亦不解

汝謂諸行及眾生有縛解者是事不
然諸行念念生滅故不應有縛解眾
生先說五種推求不可得云何有縛
解復次

若身名為縛 有身則不縛 無身亦不縛
於何而有縛

若謂五陰身名為縛若眾生先有五
陰則不應縛何以故一人有二身故
無身亦不應縛何以故若無身則無
五陰無五陰則空云何可縛如是第
三更無所縛復次

若可縛先縛 則應縛可縛 而先實無縛
餘如去來若

若謂可縛先有縛則應縛可縛而實
離可縛先無縛是故不得言眾生有
縛或言眾生是可縛五陰是縛或言
五陰中諸煩惱是縛餘五陰是可縛
是事不然何以故若離五陰先有眾
生者則應以五陰縛眾生而實離五

中論卷第三 第六段 寶

陰無別眾生若離五陰別有煩惱者
則應以煩惱縛五陰而實離五陰无
別煩惱復次如去來品中說已去不
去未去不去去時不去如是未縛不
縛縛已不縛縛時不縛復次亦无有
解何以故

縛者无有解 無縛亦無解 縛時有解者
縛解則一時

縛者無有解何以故已縛故無縛亦
無解何以故无縛故若謂縛時有解
則縛解一時是事不然又縛解相違
故問曰有人修道現入涅槃得解脫
云何言無若曰

若不受諸法 我當得涅槃 若人如是者
還為受所縛

若人作是念我雖受得涅槃是人即
為受所縛復次

不離於生死 而別有涅槃 實相義如是
云何有分別
諸法實相第一義中不說離生死別
有涅槃如經說涅槃即生死生死即
涅槃如是諸法實相中云何言是
生死是涅槃

中論卷第三 第五段 寶

性者亦者他性於他亦是自性亦從
眾緣生相待故亦無無故去何言諸
法從他性生他性亦是自性故問曰
若離自性他性有諸法有何答曰
離自性他性何得更有法若自他性
諸法則得成

汝說離自性他性有法者是事不然
若離自性他性則無有法何以故有
自性他性法則成如瓶體是自性依
物是他性問曰若以自性他性破有
者今應有無答曰
有若不成者無去何可成因有有法故
有壞名為元

若汝已受有不成者亦應受無亦無
何以故有法壞敗故名無是無因有
壞而有復次

若人見有無見自性他性如是則不見
佛法真實義

若人深著諸法必求有見若破自性
則見他性若破他性則見有若破有
則見無若破無則迷惑若利根著心
薄者知滅諸見安隱故更不生四種
戲論是人則見佛法真實義是故說

中論卷第三

中論第三卷 第三張 寶

上偈復次

佛能滅有無如化迦旃延經中之所說
離有亦離無

剎陀迦旃延經中佛為說正見義離
有離無若諸法中少決定有者佛不
應破有無若破有則人謂為無佛通
達諸法相故說二俱無是故汝應捨
有無見復次

若法實有性後則不應異性若有異相
是事終不然

若諸法決定有性終不應變異何以
故若定有自性不應有異相如上真
金喻今現見諸法有異相故當知無
有定相復次

若法實有性去何而可異若法實無性
去何而可異

若法定有性去何可變異若無性則
無自體去何可變異復次

定有則著常定無則著斷是故有智者
不應著有無

若法定有有相則終無無相是即為
常何以故如說三世者未來中有法
相是法來至現在轉入過去不捨本

中論第三卷 第三張 寶

相是則為常又說因中先有果是亦
為常若說定有無是無必先有今無
是則為斷滅斷滅名無相續因由是
二見即遠離佛法問曰何故因有生
常見因無生斷見答曰

若法有定性非無則是常先有而今無
是則為斷滅

若法性定有則是有相非無相終不
應無若無則非有即為無法先已說
過故如是則隨常見若法先有敗壞
而無者是名斷滅何以故有不應無
故汝謂有無各有定相故若有斷常
見者則無罪福等破世間事是故應捨
中論觀縛解品第十六 十偈

問曰生死非都無根本於中應有眾
生往來若諸行往來汝以何因緣故
說眾生及諸行盡空無有往來答曰
諸行往來者常不應往來无常亦不應
眾生亦復然

諸行往來六道生死中者為常相往
來為無常相往來二俱不然若常相
往來者則無生死相續以決定故自
性住故若以無常往來者亦無往來

中論第三卷 第三張 寶

四二七

非但見等法異相不可得 所有一切法皆亦無異相

非但見可見見者等三事異相不可得一切法皆無異相問曰何故無有異相答曰

異因異有異 異離異無異若法從因出是法不異因

汝所謂異是異因異法故名為異離異法不名為異何以故若法從眾緣生是法不異因因壞果亦壞故如因探椽等有舍舍不異探椽探椽等壞舍亦壞故問曰若有定異法有何各答曰

若離從異異 應餘異有異離從異無異是故無有異

若離從異有異法者則應離餘異有異法而實離從異無有異法是故無餘異如離五指異有拳異者拳異應於瓶等異物有異今離五指異拳異不可得是故奉異於瓶等无有異法問曰我經說異相不從眾緣生分別惣相故有異相因異相故有異法答曰異中無異相 不異中亦無 無有異相故

中論第三卷 第四十三張 寶

則無此彼異

汝言分別惣相故有異相因異相故有異法若尔者異相從眾緣生如是即說眾緣法是異相離異法不可得故異相因異法而有不能獨成今異法中無異相何以故先有異法故何用異相不異法中亦無異相何以故若異相在不異法中不名不異法若二處俱無即元異相異相無故此彼法亦無復次異法無故亦無合是法不自合 異法亦不合 合者及合時合法亦皆無 是法自體不合以一故如一指不自合異法亦不合以異故異事已成不須合故如是思惟合法不可得是故說合者合時合法皆不可得

中論卷第一

癸卯歲高麗國大藏都監奉勅雕造

中論第三卷 第四十三張 寶

寶

中論卷第三

寶

龍樹菩薩造梵志青真釋 姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯 觀有無品第十五 十一偈

問曰諸法各有性以有力用故如瓶有瓶性布有布性是性眾緣合時則出答曰

眾緣中有性 是事則不然 性從眾緣出即名為作法

若諸法有性不應從眾緣出何以故若從眾緣出即是作法無有定性問曰若諸法性從眾緣作有何各答曰性若是作者 去何有此義 性名為無作不待異法成

如金雜銅則非真金如是若有性則不須眾緣若從眾緣出當知無真性又性若決定不應待他出非如長短彼此無定性故待他而有問曰諸法若無自性應有他性答曰

法若無自性 去何有他性 自性於他性亦名為他性 諸法性眾緣作故亦因待成故無自

而能作於酪

若是法即異者乳應即是酪更不須因緣是事不然何以故乳與酪有種種異故乳不即是酪是故法不即異若謂異法為異者是亦不然離乳更有何物為酪如是思惟是法不異異法亦不異是故不應偏有所執問曰破是破異猶有空在空即是法答曰若有不空法則應有空法實元不空法何得有空法

若有不空法相因故應有空法而上來種種因緣破不空法不空法無故則無相待無相待故何有空法問曰汝說不空法無故空法亦無若介者即是說空但無相待故不應有執若有對應有相待若無對則無相待相待無故則無相無相故則無執如是即為說空答曰

大聖說空法為難諸見故 若復見有空諸佛所不化

大聖為破六十二諸見及無明愛等諸煩惱故說空若人於空復生見者是人不可化譬如有病須服藥可治

中論第二卷 第四張 寶

中論卷第二

若藥復為病則不可治如火從薪出以水可滅若從水生為用何滅如空是水能滅諸煩惱火有人罪重貪著心深智慧鈍故於空生見或謂有空或謂無空因有無還起煩惱若以空化此人者則言我久知是空若離是空則無涅槃道如經說離空元相無作門得解脫者但有言說

中論觀合品第十四 八偈

說曰上破根品中說見所見見者皆不成此三事無異法故則無合無合義今當說問曰何故眼等三事無合答曰

見可見見者 是三各異方 如是三法異 終無有合時

見是眼根可見是色塵見者是我是三事各在異處終無合時異處者眼在身內色在身外我者或言在身內或言遍一切處是故無合復次若謂有見法為合而見不合而見二俱不然何以故若合而見者隨有塵處應有根有我但是事不然是故不合若不合而見者根我塵各在異處亦應有見

中論第二卷 第四張 寶

而不見何以故如眼根在此不見遠

處瓶是故二俱不見問曰我意根塵四事合故有知生能知瓶衣等万物是故有見可見見者答曰是事根品中已破今當更說汝說四事合故知生是知為見瓶衣等物已生為未見而生者見已生者知則無用若未見而生者是則未合云何有知生若謂四事一時合而知生是亦不然若一時生則無相待何以故先有瓶次見後知生一時則無先後知無故見可見見者亦元如是諸法如幻如夢無有定相何得有合無合故空復次 漆與於可漆 漆者亦復然 餘入餘煩惱 皆亦復如是

如見可見見者無合故漆可漆漆者亦應無合如說見可見見者三法別說聞可聞聞者餘入等如說漆可漆漆者則說聞可聞聞者餘煩惱等復次異法當有合 見等無有異 異相不成故 見等云何合 凡物皆以異故有合而見等異相不可得是故無合復次

中論第二卷 第三張 寶

四二五

人識彼人知此人識為即是知彼人識為異是二難可分別如眼識耳識亦難可分別以難分別故或言一或言異無有決定分別但從眾緣生故眼等分別故空無自性如伎人含一珠出已復亦人則生疑為是本珠為更有異識亦如是生已更生為是本識為是異識是故當知識不住故無自性虛誑如幻諸行亦如是諸行者身口意行有二種淨不淨何等為不淨惱眾生貪著等名淨不淨不惱眾事實語不貪著等名淨或增或減淨行者在人中欲天色天無色天受果報已則減還作故名增不淨行者亦如是在地獄畜生餓鬼阿修羅中受果報已則減還作故名增是故諸行有增有減故不住如人有病隨宜將適病則除愈不將適病則還集諸行亦如是有增有減故不決定但以世俗言說故有因世諦故得見第一義諦所謂元明緣諸行從諸行有識著識著故有名色從名色有六入從六入有觸從觸有受從受有愛從愛有取從取

中論卷第二 第五十三張 寶

有有從有有生從生有老死憂悲苦惱思愛別苦怨憎會苦等如是諸苦皆以行為本佛以世諦故說若得第一義諦生真智慧者則無明息無明息故諸行亦不集諸行不集故見諦所斷身見疑戒取等斷及思惟所斷貪恚色染無色染調戲元明亦斷以是斷故一分滅所謂無明諸行識名色六入觸受愛取有生老死憂悲苦惱思愛別苦怨憎會苦等皆滅以是滅故五陰身畢竟滅更無有餘唯但有空是故佛欲亦空義故說諸行虛誑復次諸法無性故虛誑虛誑故空如偈說
諸法有異故 知皆是無性 無性法亦無一切法空故
諸法無有性何以故諸法雖生不住自性是故無性如嬰兒定住自性者終不作匍匐乃至老年而嬰兒次第相續有異相現匍匐乃至老年是故說見諸法異相故知無性問曰若諸法異相無性即有無性法有何各答曰若無性云何有法云何有相何以故無

中論卷第二 第六十二張 寶

有根本故但為破性故說無性是無性法若有者不名一切法空若一切法空云何有無性法問曰
諸法若無性 云何說嬰兒乃至於老年而有種種異
諸法若無性則無有異相而汝說有異相是故有諸法性若無諸法性云何有異相答曰
若諸法有性 云何而得異 若諸法無性云何而有異
若諸法決定有性云何可得異性名決定有不可變異如真金不可變又如暗性不變為明明性不變為暗復次是法則無異 異法亦無異 如壯不作老老亦不作壯
若法有異者則應有異相為即是法異為異法異是二不然若即是法異則老應作老而老實不作老若異法異者老與壯異壯應作老而壯實不作老二俱有過問曰若法即異有何各如今眼見年少經日月歲數則老答曰
若是法即異 乳應即是酪 離乳有何法

中論卷第二 第六十九張 寶

因多過如破作作者品中說復次
非但說於苦 四種義不成 一切外万物
四義亦不成

佛法中雖說五受陰為苦有外道人
謂苦受為苦是故說不但說於苦四
種義不成外万物地水山木等一切
法皆亦不成

中論觀行品第十三 九偈

問曰

如佛經所說 虛誑妄取相 諸行妄取故
是名為虛誑

佛經中說虛誑者即是妄取相第一
實者所謂涅槃非妄取相以是經說
故當知有諸行虛誑妄取相答曰
虛誑妄取者 是中何所取 佛說如是事
欲以亦空義

若妄取相法即是虛誑者是諸行中
為何所取佛如是說當知說空義問
曰云何知一切諸行皆是空答曰一切
諸行虛妄相故空諸行生滅不住無自
性故空諸行名五陰從行生故五陰名
行是五陰皆虛妄元有定相何以故如
嬰兒時色非匍匐時色匍匐時色非行

中論第三卷 第十四偈 寶

中論卷第二

時色行時色非童子時色童子時色
非壯年時色壯年時色非老年時色
如色念念不住故分別決定性不可
得嬰兒色為即是匍匐色乃至老年
色為異二俱有過何以故若嬰兒色
即是匍匐色乃至老年色者如是則
是一色皆為嬰兒無有匍匐乃至老
年又如泥團常是泥團終不作瓶何
以故色常定故若嬰兒色異匍匐色
者則嬰兒不作匍匐匍匐不作嬰兒
何以故二色異故如是童子少年壯
年老年色不應相續有失親屬法無
父無子若介者唯有嬰兒應得父餘
則匍匐乃至老年不應有分是故二
俱有過問曰色雖不定嬰兒色滅已
相續更生乃至老年色無有如上過
答曰嬰兒色相續生者為滅已相續
生為不滅相續生若嬰兒色滅云何
有相續以無因故如雖有薪可燃火
滅故無有相續若嬰兒色不滅而相
續者則嬰兒色不滅常住本相亦元
相續問曰我不說滅不滅故相續生
但說不住相以生故言相續生答曰

中論第三卷 第三十五偈 寶

寶

若介者則有定色而更生如是應有
千萬種色但是事不然如是亦無相
續如是一切處求色無有定相但以
世俗言說故有如芭蕉樹求實不可
得但有皮葉如是智者求色相念念
滅更無實色可得不住色形色相相
似次第生難可分別如燈炎分別定
色不可得從是定色更有色生不可
得是故色無性故空但以世俗言說
故有受亦如是智者種種觀察次第
相似故生滅難可別知如水流相續
但以覺故說三受在身是故當知受
同色說想因名相生若離名相則不
生是故佛說分別知名字相故名為
想非決定先有從眾緣生無定性無
定性故如影隨形因形有影元形則
無影影元決定性若定有者離形應有
影而實不介是故從眾緣生無自性
故不可得想亦如是但因外名相以
世俗言說故有識因色聲香味觸等
眼耳鼻舌身等生以眼等諸根別異
故識有別異是識為在色為在眼為
在中間無有決定但生已識塵識此

中論第三卷 第三十六偈 寶

四三三

思惟生老死三皆有過故即無生畢
竟空汝今何故貪著戲論生老死謂
有決定相復次

諸所有因果相及可相法受及受者等
所有一切法非但於生死本際不可得
如是一切法本際皆亦無

一切法者所謂因果相可相受及受
者等皆無本際非但生死无本際以
略開亦故說生死無本際

中論觀苦品第十二 十四

有人說曰

自作及他作共作无因作如是說諸苦
於果則不然

有人言苦惱自作或言他作或言亦
自作亦他作或言無因作於果皆不
然於果皆不然者眾生以眾緣致苦
狀若欲求滅不知苦惱實因緣有四
種謬是故說於果皆不然何以故
苦者自作則不從緣生因有此陰故
而有彼陰生

若苦自作則不從眾緣生自名徒自
性生是事不然何以故因前五陰有
後五陰生是故苦不得自作問曰若

中論卷第二 第十三 寶

言此五陰作彼五陰者則是他作答
曰是事不然何以故

若謂此五陰異彼五陰者如是則應言
從他而作苦

若此五陰與彼五陰異彼五陰與此
五陰異者應從他作如縷與布異者
應離縷有布若離縷無布者則布不

異縷如是彼五陰異此五陰者則應
離此五陰有彼五陰若離此五陰無
彼五陰者則此五陰不異彼五陰是

故不應言苦從他作問曰自作者是
人人自作苦自受苦答曰

若人自作苦離苦何有人而謂於彼人
而能自作苦

若謂人自作苦者離五陰苦何處別
有人而能自作苦應說是人而不可
說是故苦非人自作若謂人不自作

苦他人作苦與此人者是亦不然何
以故

若苦他人作而與此人者若當離於苦
何有此人受

若他人作苦與此人者離五陰無有
此人受復次

中論卷第二 第十四 寶

苦若彼人作持與此人者離苦何有人
而能授於此

若謂彼人作苦授與此人者離五陰
苦何有彼人作苦持與此人者若有者
應說其相復次

自作若不成云何彼作苦若彼人作苦
即亦名自作

種種因緣彼自作苦不成而言他作
苦是亦不然何以故此彼相待故若
彼作苦於彼亦名自作若自作苦先

已破汝受自作苦不成故他作亦不
成復次

苦不名自作法不自作法彼無有自體
何有彼作苦

自作苦不然何以故如刀不能自割如
是法不能自作法是故不能自作他
作亦不然何以故離苦無彼自性若

離苦有彼自性者應言彼作苦彼亦
即是苦云何苦自作苦問曰若自作

他作不然應有共作答曰

若此彼苦成應有共作苦此彼尚無作
何況無因作
自作他作猶尚有過何況無因作無

中論卷第二 第十五 寶

俱不成是過先已說復次
 燃不餘處來燃處亦無燃可燃亦如是
 餘如去來說
 燃不於餘方來入可燃可燃中亦無
 燃措薪求燃不可得故可燃亦如是
 不從餘處來入燃中燃中亦無可燃
 如燃已不燃未燃不燃燃時不燃是
 義如去來中說是故
 可燃即非燃 離可燃元燃 燃無有可燃
 燃中無可燃 可燃中無燃
 可燃即非燃何以故先已說作作者一
 過故離可燃無燃有常燃等過故燃
 无有可燃燃中無可燃可燃中无燃
 以有異過故三皆不成問曰何故說
 燃可燃答曰如因可燃有燃如是因
 受有受者受名五陰受者名人燃可
 燃不成故受受者亦不成何以故
 以燃可燃法說受受者法及以說瓶衣
 一切等諸法
 如可燃非燃如是受非受者作作者
 一過故又離受無受者異不可得故
 以異過故三皆不成如受受者外瓶
 衣等一切法皆同上說無生畢竟空

中論卷第二

中論卷第二 第六段 第六

是故
 若人說有我 諸法各異相 當知如是人
 不得佛法味
 諸法從本已來無生畢竟寂滅相是
 故品末說是偈若人說我相如犢子
 部眾說不得言色即是我不得言離
 色是我我在第五不可說藏中如薩婆
 多部眾說諸法各各相是善是不善
 是元記是有漏無漏有為元為等別
 異如是等人不得諸法寂滅相以佛
 語作種種戲論
 中論觀本際品第十一偈
 問曰無本際經說眾生生往來生死本
 際不可得是中說有眾生生有生死以
 何因緣故而作是說答曰
 大聖之所說本際不可得 生死無有始
 亦復無有終
 聖人有三種一者外道五神通二者
 阿羅漢辟支佛三者得神通大菩薩
 佛於三種中取上故言大聖佛所言
 說無不是實說生死無始何以故生
 死初後不可得是故言無始汝謂若
 無初後應有中者是亦不然何以故

中論卷第二 第九段 第九

若無有始終 中當去何有 是故於此中
 先後共亦無
 因中後故有初因初中故有後若元
 初無後去何有中生死中無初中後
 是故說先後共不可得何以故
 若使先有生 後有老死者 不老死有生
 不生有老死 若先有老死 而後有生者
 是則為無因 不生有老死
 生死眾生若先生漸有老而後有死
 者則生無老死法應生有老死老死
 有生又不老死而生是亦不然又不
 因生有老死若先老死後生老死則
 無因生在後故又不生何有老死若
 謂生老死先後不可謂一時成者是
 亦有過何以故
 生及於老死 不得一時共 生時則有死
 是二俱無因
 若生老死一時則不然何以故生時
 即有死故法應生時有死時无若生
 時有死是事不然若一時生則無有
 相曰如牛角一時出則不相因是故
 若使初後共 是皆不然者何故而戲論
 謂有生老死

中論卷第二 第十段 第十

四二

人切則應空

燃可燃若異則不待可燃有燃若不待可燃有然則無相因法是故不從因緣生復次若燃異可燃則應常燃若常燃者應離可燃別見有燃更不須人切何以故

若汝謂燃時名為可燃者今時但有薪何物燃可燃

若謂先有薪燒時名可燃者是事不尔若離燃別有可燃者云何言燃時名可燃復次

若異則不至不至則不燒不燒則不滅不滅則常住

若燃異可燃則燃不應至可燃何以故下相待成故若燃不相待成則自住其體何用可燃是故不至若不至則不燃可燃何以故無有不至而能燒故若不燒則無滅應常住自相是事不尔問曰

燃與可燃異而能至可燃如此至彼人彼人至此人

燃與可燃異而能至可燃如男至於女如女至於男答曰

論第三卷 第三十段 寶

若謂燃可燃二俱相離者如是燃則能至於彼可燃

若離燃有可燃若離可燃有燃各自成者如是則應燃至可燃而實不尔何以故離燃無可燃離可燃无燃故今離男有女離女有男是故汝喻非也喻不成故燃不至可燃問曰燃可燃相待而有因可燃有燃因燃有可燃二法相待成答曰

若因可燃燃因燃有可燃先定有何法而有燃可燃

若因可燃而燃成亦應因燃可燃成是中若先定有可燃則因可燃而燃成若先定有燃則因燃可燃成今若因可燃而燃成者則先有可燃而後有燃不應待燃而有可燃何以故可燃在先燃在後故若燃不燃可燃是則可燃不成又可燃不在餘處離於燃故若可燃不成燃亦不成若先燃後有可燃燃亦有如是過是故燃可燃二俱不成復次

若因可燃燃則燃成復成是為可燃中則為无有燃

論第三卷 第三十段 寶

若欲因可然而成燃則燃成已復成何以故燃自住於燃中若燃不自住其體從可燃成者無有是事是故有是燃從可燃成今則燃成復成有如是過復有可燃無燃過何以故可燃雖燃自住其體故是故燃可燃相因待無有是事復次

若法因待成是法還成待今則無因待亦無所成法

若法因待成是法還成本因待如是決定則無二事如因可燃而成燃還因於燃而成可燃是則二俱無定无定故不可得何以故

若法有待成未成去何待若成已有待成已何用待

若法因待成是法先未成未成則无无則云何有因待若是法先已成已成何用因待是二俱不相因待是故汝先說燃可燃相因待成无有是事是故因可燃无燃不因亦無燃因燃無可燃不因無可燃

今因待可燃燃不成不因待可燃燃亦不成可燃亦如是因燃不因燃二

論第三卷 第三十段 寶

若見聞各異受者亦各異見時亦應
如是則神多

若見者聞者受者各異則見時亦應
聞何以故離見者有聞者故如是鼻

舌身中神應一時行若介者人一而
神多以一切根一時知諸塵而實不

介是故見者聞者受者不應俱用復次
眼耳等諸根若樂等諸法所從生諸大

彼大亦無神

若人言離眼耳等諸根若樂等諸法
別有本住是事已破今於眼耳等所

因四大是四大中亦無本住問曰若眼
耳等諸根若樂等諸法無有本住可

介眼耳等諸根若樂等諸法應有
答曰

若眼耳等根若樂等諸法無有本住者
眼等亦應無

若眼耳若樂等諸法無有本住者誰
有此眼耳等何緣而有是故眼耳等亦

無復次

眼等無本住今後亦復無以三世無故
無有無分別

思惟推求本住於眼等先無今後亦

中論卷第二 第三頌

中論卷第二

無若三世無即是無生寂滅不應有
難若無本住去何有眼等如是問答
戲論則滅戲論滅故諸法則空

中論觀燃可燃品第十六偈

問曰應有受受者如燃可燃燃是受
者可燃是受所謂五陰答曰是事不

然何以故燃可燃俱不成故燃可燃
若以一法成若以二法成二俱不成

問曰且置一異法若言無燃可燃今
云何以一異相破如兔角龜毛無故

不可破世間眼見實有事而後可思
惟如有金然後可燒可鍛若無燃可

燃不應以一異法思惟若汝許有一
異法當知有燃可燃若許有者則為

已有答曰隨世俗法言說不應有過
燃可燃若說一若說異不名為受若

離世俗言說則無所論若不說燃可
燃云何能有所破若無所說則義不

可明如有論者欲破有無必應言有
無不以稱有無故而受有無是以隨

世間言說故無各若口有言便是受者
汝言破即為自破燃可燃亦如是雖

有言說亦復不受是故以一異法思

中論卷第二 第三頌

惟燃可燃二俱不成何以故

若燃是可燃作作者則一若燃異可燃
雖可燃有燃

燃是火可燃是薪作者是人作是業
若燃可燃一則作作者亦應一若作

作者一則陶師與瓶一作者是陶師
作是瓶陶師非瓶瓶非陶師云何為

一是以作作者不一故燃可燃亦不
一若謂一不可則應異是亦不然何

以故若燃與可燃異應離可燃別有
燃分別是可燃是燃處處離可燃應

有燃而實不介是故異亦不可復次
如是當應燃不因可燃生則无燃火功

亦名無作火

若燃可燃異則燃不待可燃而常燃
若常燃者則自住其體不待因緣人

功則空人功者將護火今燃是功現
有是故知火不異可燃

復次若燃異可燃燃即無作雖可燃
火何所然若介者火則無作無作火

無有是事問曰云何火不從因緣生
人功亦空答曰

中論卷第二 第四頌

四一九

若離眼等根及苦樂等法先有本住者以何而可知

若離眼耳等根苦樂等法先有本住者以何可說以何可知如外法瓶衣等以眼等根得知內法以苦樂等根得知如經中說可壞是色相能受是受相能識是識相汝說離眼耳苦樂等先有本住者以何可知說有是法問曰有論師言出入息視眴壽命思惟苦樂憎愛動發等是神相若無有神去何有出入息等相是故當知離眼耳等根苦樂等法先有本住答曰是神若有應在身內如壁中有柱若在身外如人被鎗若在身內身則不可壞神常在內故是故言神在身內但有言說虛妄無實若在身外覆身如鎗者身應不可見神細密覆故亦應不可壞而今實見身壞是故當知離苦樂等先無餘法若謂斷辟時神縮在內不可斷者斷頭時亦應縮在內不應死而實有死是故知離苦樂等先有神者但有言說虛妄元實復次若言身大則神大身小則神小如

中論第二卷 第十九張 寶

燈大則明大燈小則明小者如是神則隨身不應常若隨身者身元則神無如燈滅則明滅若神無常則與眼耳苦樂等同是故當知離眼耳等先無別神復次如風狂病人不得自在不應作而作若有神是諸作主者云何言不得自在若風狂病不惱神者應離神別有所作如是種種推求離眼耳等根苦樂等法先無本住若必謂離眼耳等根苦樂等法有本住者無有是事何以故

若離眼耳等而有本住者亦應離本住而有眼耳等若本住離眼耳等根苦樂等法先有者今眼耳等根苦樂等法亦應離本住而有問曰二事相離可介但使有本住答曰以法知有人以人知有法離法何有人離人何有法法者眼耳苦樂等人者是本住汝謂以有法故知有人以有人故知有法今離眼耳等法何有人離人何有眼耳等法復次

中論第二卷 第二張 寶

一切眼等根實無有本住眼耳等諸根異相而分別

眼耳等諸根苦樂等諸法實元有本住因眼綠色生眼識以和合因緣知有眼耳等諸根不以本住故知是故偈中說一切眼等根實無有本住眼耳等諸根各自能分別問曰若眼等諸根無有本住者眼等一根云何能知塵若一切眼耳等諸根苦樂等諸法無本住者今一根云何能知塵眼耳等諸根無思惟不應有知而實知塵當知離眼耳等諸根更有能知塵者答曰若介者為一一根中各有知者為一知者在諸根中二俱有過何以故見者即聞者聞者即受者如是等諸根則應有本住若見者即是聞者聞者即是受者則是一神如是眼等諸根應先有本住色聲香等無有定知者或可以眼聞聲如人有六向隨意見聞若聞者見者是一於眼等根隨意見聞但是事不然

中論第三卷 第三張 寶

元所用作法 若無作等法 則無有罪福
 罪福等元故 罪福報亦無 若元罪福報
 亦無有涅槃 諸可有所作 皆空無有果
 若墮於無因 一切法則無因 元果能
 生法名為因 所生法名為果 是二即
 無是二無故 无作無作者 亦无所用
 作法亦无罪 福罪福無故 亦無罪福
 果報及涅槃 道是故不得從 无因生
 問曰若作者 不定而作 不定業有何
 各答曰一事 無尚不能起 作業何况
 二事都無 辟如化人以虚空為舍 但
 有言說而無 作者作業問曰 若元作
 者無作業 不能有所作 今有作者有
 作業應有 作答曰
 作者定不定 不能作二業 有無相違故
 一處則無二
 作者定不定 不能作定不定業 何以
 故有無相違 故一處不應有二 有是
 決定元是不 決定一人一事 云何有
 有無復次
 有不能作無 元不能作有 若有作者
 其過如先說
 若無作者而 無業何能 有所作若元

中論卷第二 中論第三卷 第十六條 齊

中論卷第二

作者而有業 亦不能有所作 何以故
 如先說有中 若先有業 作者復何所
 作若先無業 六何可得 作如是則破罪
 福等因緣 果報是故 偈中說有不能
 作無無不能 作有若有所作 其過
 如先說復次
 作者不作定 亦不作不定 及定不定業
 其過如先說
 定業已破 不定業亦破 定不定業亦
 破 今欲一時 惣破故 說是偈是 故作
 者不能作 三種業 今三種 作者亦不
 能作業 何以故
 作者定不定 亦定亦不定 不能作於業
 其過如先說
 作者定不定 亦定亦不定 不能作於業
 何以故 如先三種 過因緣 此中應 廣說
 如是一切 處求作者 作業皆不可 得
 問曰若言 无作無作者 則復墮 无因
 答曰是業 從眾緣 生假名為 有無有
 決定不如 汝所說 何以故
 因業有作者 因作者 有業 成業 義如是
 更無有餘 事
 業先無 決定因 人起業 因業 有作者

中論第三卷 第十七條 齊

作者亦无 決定因 有作業 名為 作者
 二事和合 故得成 作作者 若從和合
 生則無自 性無自性 故空空則 无所
 生但隨凡 夫憶想 分別故 說有作業
 有作者 第一義 中無作 業无作者 復次
 如破作 作者 受受者 亦尔 及一切 諸法
 亦應如是 破
 如作作者 不得相 離不相 離故不 決
 定元決定 故無自 性受受 者亦如是
 受名五 陰身受 者是人 如是離 人無
 五陰離 五陰無 人但從 眾緣生 如受
 受者餘 一切法 亦應如 是破
 中論觀 本住品 第九十二 偈
 問曰有人 言
 眼耳等 諸根 苦樂等 諸法 誰有 如是事
 是則名 本住 若無 有本住 誰有 眼等法
 以是故 當知 先已有 本住
 眼耳鼻 舌身 命等 諸根 名為 眼耳等
 根若受 樂受不 苦不樂 受想思 憶念
 等心 心數 法名為 苦樂等 法有 論師
 言先未 有眼等 法應有 本住 因是本
 住眼等 諸根得 增長若 元本住 身及
 眼等 諸根 為因 何生而 得增長 答曰

中論第三卷 第十六條 齊

四一七

同處復次

若法是有者 是即無有滅 譬如第二頭 無故不可斷

法若無者則無滅相如第二頭第三 手無故不可斷復次

法不自相滅 他相亦不滅 如自相不生 他相亦不生

如先說生相生不自生亦不從他生 若以自體生是則不然一切物皆從 眾緣生如指端不能自觸如是生不 能自生從他生亦不然何以故生未 有故不應從他生是生無故無自體 自體無故他亦无是故從他生亦不 然滅法亦如是不自相滅不他相滅 復次

生住滅不成 故無有有為 有為法無故 何得有无為

汝先說有生住滅相故有有為以有 有為故有無為今以理推求三相不 可得云何得有有為如先說无有無 相法有為法無故何得有無為无為 相名不生不住不滅止有為相故名 无為相無為自無別相因是三相有

中論第二卷 第三張 寶

無為相如火為熱相地為堅相水為 冷相無為則不然問曰若是生住滅 畢竟无者云何論中得說名字答曰 如幻亦如夢 如乳闍婆城所說生住滅 其相亦如是

生住滅相無有決定凡人貪著謂有 決定諸賢聖憐愍欲止其顛倒還以 其所著名字為說語言雖同其心則 異如是說生住滅相不應有難如幻 化所作不應責其所由不應於中有 憂喜想但應眼見而已如夢中所見 不應求實如乳闍婆城日出時現而 無有實但假為名字不久則滅生住 滅亦如是凡夫分別為有智者推求 則不可得

中論觀作作者品第八十三偈

問曰現有作有作者有所用作法三 事和合故有果報是故應有作者作 業答曰上來品中破一切法皆无 有餘如破三相三相無故無有有為 有為無故无無為有為无為無故一 切法盡無作作者若是有為有為中 已破若是无為無為中已破不應復

中論第二卷 第四張 寶

問汝著心深故而復更問今當復答 決定有作者 不作決定業 決定無作者 不作無定業

若先定有作者定有作業則不應作 若先定無作者定無作業亦不應作 何以故

決定業無作 是業無作者 定作者無作 作者亦無業

若先決定有作業不應更有作者又 離作者應有作業但是事不然若先 決定有作者不應更有作業又離作 業應有作者但是事不然故決定 作者決定作業不應有作不決定 作者不決定作業亦不應有作何以 故本來無故有作者有作業尚不能 作何況無作者无作業復次

若定有作者 亦定有作業 作者及作業 即墮於無因

若先定有作者定有作業汝謂作者 有作即為無因離作業有作者離作 者有作業則不從因緣有問曰若不 從因緣有作者有作業有何答答曰 若墮於無因 則無因無果 無作无作者

中論第二卷 第十五張 寶

若法滅相是法不應生何以故二相相違故一是滅相知法是滅一是生相知法是生二相相違法一時則不然

是故滅相法不應生問曰若滅相法不應生不滅相法應生答曰一切有為法念念滅故無不滅法離有為元有決定無為法無為法但有名字是故說不滅法終無有是事問曰若法無生應有住答曰

不住法不住 住法亦不住 住時亦不住 無生云何住

不住法不住無住相故住法亦不住何以故已有住故因去故有住若住法先有不應更住住時亦不住離住不住更無住時是故亦不住如是一切處求住不可得故即是無生若元生云何有住復次

若諸法滅時 是則不應住 法若不滅者 終無有是事

若法滅相是法無有住相何以故一法中有二相相違故一是滅相二是住相一時一處有住滅相是事不然是故不得言滅相法有住問曰若法不

中論卷第二 第十張 寶

中論卷第二

滅應有住答曰無有不滅法何以故所有一切法皆是老死相終不見有法離老死有住

一切法生時元常常隨逐無常有二名老及死如是一切法常有老死故無住時復次

住不自相住 亦不異相住 如生不自生 亦不異相生

若有住法為自相住為他相住二俱不然若自相住則為是常一切有為法從眾緣生若住法自住則不名有為住若自相住法亦應自相住如眼不能自見住亦如是若異相住則住更有住是則無窮復次見異法生異相不得因異法而有異相異相不定故因異相而住者是事不然問曰若無住應有滅答曰無何以故法已滅不滅 未滅亦不滅 滅時亦不滅 無生何有滅

若法已滅則不滅以先滅故未滅亦不滅離滅相故滅時亦不滅離二更無滅時如是推求滅法即是元生無生何有滅復次

中論卷第二 第十張 寶

法若有住者 是則不應滅 法若不住者 是亦不應滅

若法定住則無有滅何以故由有住相故若住法滅則有二相住相滅相是故不得言住中有滅如生死不得一時有若法不住亦無有滅何以故離住相故若離住相則無法无法云何滅復次

是法於是時 不於是時滅 是法於異時 不於異時滅

若法有滅相是法為自相滅為異相滅二俱不然何以故如乳不於乳時滅隨有乳時乳相定住故非乳時亦不滅若非乳不得言乳滅復次

如一切諸法 生相不可得 以無生相故 即亦無滅相

如先推求一切法生相不可得亦時即無滅相破生故無生無生云何有滅若汝意猶未已今當更說破滅因緣

若法是有者 是即無有滅 不應於一法 而有有無相

諸法有時推求滅相不可得何以故云何一法中亦有亦無相如光影不

中論卷第二 第十張 寶

四一五

緣無作無作者無時無方等故不生
 若有緣有作有作者有時有方等和
 合故未生法生是故若說一切未生
 法皆不生是事不介答曰若法有緣
 有時有方等和合則生者先有亦不
 生先無亦不生有無亦不生三種先
 已破是故生已不生未生亦不生
 時亦不生何以故已生分不生未生
 分亦不生如先答復次若離生有生
 時者應生時生但離生无生時是故
 生時亦不生復次若言生時生者則
 有二生過一以生故名生時二以生
 時中生二皆不然無有二法云何有
 二生是故生時亦不生復次生法未
 發則無生時生時無故生何所依是
 故不得言生時生如是推求生已無
 生未生無生時無生无生故生不
 成生不成故住滅亦不成生住滅不
 成故有為法不成是故偈中說去未
 去去時中已答問曰我不定言生已
 生未生生時生但眾緣和合故有
 生答曰汝雖有是說此則不然何以故
 若謂生時生是事已不成云何眾緣合

中論第二卷 第七張 寶

介時而得生
 生時生已種種因緣破汝今何以更
 說眾緣和合故有生若眾緣具足不
 具足皆與生同破復次
 若法眾緣生即是寂滅性是故生時
 是二俱寂滅
 眾緣所生法無自性故寂滅寂滅名
 為無此無彼無相斷言語道滅諸戲
 論眾緣名如因緣有布因蒲有席若
 縷自有定相不應從麻出若布自有
 定相不應從縷出而實從縷有布從
 麻有縷是故縷亦無定性布亦無定
 性如燃可燃因緣和合成無有自性
 可燃無故燃亦無燃無故可燃亦無
 一切法亦如是是故從眾緣生法無
 自性無自性故空如野馬無實是故
 偈中說生與生時二俱寂滅不應說
 生時生汝雖種種因緣欲成生相皆
 是戲論非寂滅相問曰定有三世別
 異未來世法得生因緣即生何故言
 無生答曰
 若有未生法說言有生者此法先已有
 更復何用生

中論第二卷 第八張 寶

若未來世中有未生法而生是法先
 已有何用更生有法不應更生問曰
 未來雖有非如現在相以現在相故
 說生答曰現在相未來中無若云云
 何言未來生法生若有不名未來應
 名現在現在不應更生二俱無生故
 不生復次汝謂生時生亦能生彼今
 當更說
 若言生時生是能有所生何得更有生
 而能生是生
 若生生時能生彼是生誰復能生
 若謂更有生生則無窮離生有生生
 法皆能自生
 若生更有生生則無窮若是生更無
 生而自生者一切法亦皆能自生而
 實不介復次
 有法不應生無亦不應生有無亦不生
 此義先已說
 凡所有生為有法有生為無法有生
 為有無法有生是皆不然是事先已
 說離此三事更无有生是故無生復次
 若諸法滅時是時不應生法若不滅者
 終无有是事

中論第二卷 第九張 寶

若本生時能生於生本生尚未有何能生

若謂是本生時能生可介而實未有是故本生時不能生問曰

如燈能自照亦能照於彼生法亦如是自生亦生彼

如燈入於闇室照了諸物亦能自照生亦如是能生於彼亦能自生答曰不然何以故

燈中自無闇住處亦無闇破闇乃名照無闇則無照

燈體自無闇明所及處亦元闇明闇相違故破闇故名照無闇則無照何得言燈自照亦照彼問曰是燈非未生有照亦非生已有照但燈生時能自照亦照彼答曰

云何燈生時而能破於闇此燈初生時不能及於闇

燈生時名半生半未生燈體未成就云何能破闇又燈不能及闇如人得賊乃名為破若謂燈雖不到闇而能破闇者是亦不然何以故

燈若未及闇而能破闇者燈在於此闇則破一切闇

若燈有力不到闇而能破者此處燃燈應破一切處闇俱不及故復次燈不應自照照彼何以故

若燈能自照亦能照於彼闇亦應自闇亦能闇於彼

若燈與闇相違故能自照亦照於彼闇與燈相違故亦應自蔽蔽彼若闇與燈相違不能自蔽蔽彼燈與闇相違亦不應自照亦照彼是故燈喻非也破生因緣未盡故今當更說

此生若未生云何能自生若生已自生生已何用生

是生自生時為生已生為未生若未生生則是無法無法何能自生若謂生已生則為已成不須復生如已作不應更作若已生若未生是二俱不生故無生汝先說生如燈能自生亦生彼是事不然住滅亦如是復次生非生已生亦非未生生時亦不生去來中已答

中論三卷 第五頌 寶

無生未生中無作故無生生時亦不然離生法生時不可得離生時生法亦不可得云何生時生是事去來中已

答已生法不可生何以故生已復生如是展轉則為無窮如作已復作復次

若生已更生者以何生法生是生相未生而言生已生者則自違所說何以故生相未生而汝謂生若未生謂

生者法或可生已而生或可未生而生汝先說生已生是則不定復次如燒已不應復燒去已不應復去如是等因緣故生已不應生未生法亦不生何以故法若未生則不應與生緣

和合若不與生緣和合則無法生若法未與生緣和合而生者應無法而作無法而去無滌法而滌無恚法而恚無癡法而癡如是則皆破世間法是故未生法不生復次若未生法生者世間未生法皆應生一切凡夫未生菩提今應生菩提不壞法阿羅漢無有煩惱今應生煩惱兔等元角今皆應生但是事不然是故未生法亦不生問曰未生法不生者以未有

中論三卷 第五頌 寶

中論卷第二

寶

龍樹菩薩造 梵志青目釋

姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

觀三相品第七 三十五偈

問曰經說有為法有三相生住滅萬物以生法生以住法住以滅法滅是故有諸法答曰不介何以故三相無決定故是三相為是有為能作有為相為是無為能作有為相二俱不然何以故

若生是有為則應有三相若生是無為何名有為相若生是有為應有三相生住滅是事不然何以故共相違故相違者生相應生法住相應住法滅相應滅法若法生時不應有住滅相違法一時則不然如明闇不俱以是故生不應是有為法住滅相亦應如是問曰若生非有為若無為有何答曰若生是無為去何能為有為法作相何以故無為法無性故因滅有為名無為是故說不生不滅名無為相更無自

相是故無法不能為法作相如兔角龜毛等不能為法作相是故生非無為住滅亦如是復次

三相若聚散不能有所相云何於一處一時有三相

是生住滅相若一一能為有為法作相若和合能與有為法作相二俱不然何以故若謂一一者於一處中或有有相或有無相生時無住滅住時無生滅滅時無生住若和合者共相違法云何一時俱若謂三相更有三相者是亦不然何以故

若謂生住滅更有有為相是即為元窮無即非有為

若謂生住滅更有有為相生更有生有住有滅如是三相復應更有相若介則無窮若更無相是三相則不名有為法亦不能為有為法作相問曰汝說三相為無窮是事不然生住滅雖是有為而非無窮何以故生生之所生生於彼本生本生之所生還生於生

式論卷二 第三張 寶

三住四滅五生生六住住七滅滅是七法中本生除自體能生六法生生能生本生本生能生是故三相雖是有為而非無窮答曰

若謂是生生能生於本生生從本生何能生本生

若是生生能生本生者是生生則不名從本生生何以故是生生從本生生云何能生本生復次

若謂是本生能生於生生本生從彼生何能生本生

若謂本生能生本生者是本生不名從生生生何以故是本生從生生云何能生本生法應生本生而今生生不能生本生未有自體何能生本生是故本生不能生生問曰是生生生時非先非後能生本生但生生生時能生本生答曰不然何以故

若生生生時能生於本生生尚未有何能生本生若謂生生生時能生本生可介而實未有是故生生生時不能生本生復次

中論卷二 第三張 寶

亦如是問曰若漆法漆者先後相待
生是事不可得者若一時生有何咎答曰
漆者及漆法俱成則不然漆者漆法俱
則無有相待

若漆法漆者一時成則不相待不因
漆者有漆法不因漆法有漆者是二
應常已無因成故若常則多過无有
解脫法復次今當以一異法破漆法
漆者何以故

漆者漆法一一法去何合漆者漆法異
異法去何合

漆法漆者若以一法合若以異法合
若一則無合何以故一法去何自合
如指端不能自觸若以異法合是亦
不可何以故以異成故若各成竟不
須復合雖合猶異復次一異俱不可
何以故

若一有合者離伴應有合若異有合者
離伴亦應合

若漆漆者一強名為合者應離餘因
緣而有漆漆者復次若一亦不應有
漆漆者二名漆是法漆者是人若人
法為一是則大乱若漆漆者各異而

中論第卷 第二十八段 寶

中論卷第一

言合者則不須餘因緣而有合若異
而合者雖遠亦應合問曰一不合可
介眼見異法共合答曰
若異而有合漆漆者何事是二相先異
然後說合相

若漆漆者先有決定異相而後合者
是則不合何以故是二相先已異而
後強說合復次

若漆及漆者先各成異相既已成異相
去何而言合

若漆漆者先各成別相汝今何以強
說合相復次

異相無有成是故汝欲合相竟無成
而復說異相

汝已漆漆者異相不成故復說合相
合相中有過漆漆者不成汝為成合
相故復說異相汝自己為定而所說
不定何以故

異相不成故合相則不成於何異相中
而欲說合相

以此中漆漆者異相不成故合相亦
不成汝於何異相中而欲說合相復次
如是漆漆者非合不成諸法亦如是

中論第卷 第二十九段 寶

非合不成成
如漆漆亦如是如三毒一切煩惱
一切法亦如是非先非後非合非散
等因緣所成

中論卷第一

第卅歲高麗國大藏都監奉
勅雕造

中論第卷 第三十段 寶

如水相中火相不住先有自相故復次若無相中相住者則為無因無因名為無法而有相相可相常相因待故離有相無相法更無第三處可相是故偈中說離有相無相餘處亦不住復次

相法無有故可相亦無可相法無故相法亦復無

相無所住故則無可相法可相法無故相法亦無何以故因相有可相因可相有相共相因待故是故今無相亦無有可相辭相可相已更亦無有物

於因緣中本未推求相可相決定不可得是二不可得故一切法皆無一切法皆攝在相可相二法中或相為可相或可相為相如火以烟為相烟亦復以火為相問曰若無有有應當有無答曰若使無有有云何當有無有無既已無知有無者誰

凡物若自壞若為他壞名為無无不自有從有而有是故言若使無有有

中論第一卷 第三十五張 寶

云何當有無眼見耳聞尚不可得何況無物問曰以無有有故無亦無應當有知有無者答曰若有知者應在有中應在無中有無既破知者亦同破是故知虛空非有亦非無非相非可相餘五同虛空

如虛空種種求相不可得餘五種亦如是問曰虛空不在初不在後何以先破答曰地水火風眾緣和合故易破識以苦樂因故知無常變異故易破虛空無如是相但凡夫怖望為有是故先破復次虛空能持四大四大因緣有識是故先破根本餘者自破問曰世間人盡見諸法是有是無汝何以獨與世間相違言無所見答曰淺智見諸法若有若無相是則不能見滅見安隱法

若人未得道不見諸法實相愛見因緣故種種戲論見法生時謂之為有取相言有見法滅時謂之為斷取相言無智者見諸法生即滅無見見諸法滅即滅有見是故於一切法雖有所見皆如幻如夢乃至无漏道見尚

中論第一卷 第三十六張 寶

滅何況餘見是故若不見滅見安隱法者則見有見無

中論觀染淨者品第六十偈

問曰經說貪欲瞋恚愚癡是世間根本貪欲有種種名初名受次名著次名染次名婬欲次名貪欲有如是等名字此是結使依止眾生眾生名染者貪欲名染法有染法染者故則有貪欲餘二亦如是有瞋則有瞋者有癡則有癡者以此三毒因緣起三業三業因緣起三界是故有一切法若日經雖說有三毒名字求實不可得何以故

若離於染法先自有染者因是染欲者應生於染法若無有染者云何當有染若有若無染染者亦如是

若先定有染者則不更須染者先已染故若先定無染者亦復不應起染要當先有染者然後起染若先無染者則無受染者染法亦如是若先離人定有染法此則無因云何得起似如無薪火若先定無染法則無有染者是故偈中說若有若無染者

中論第一卷 第三十七張 寶

若已有色者則不用色因 若無有色者亦不用色因

二處有色因是則不然若先因中有色不名為色因若先因中無色亦不名為色因問曰若二處俱不然但有無因色有何答答曰

無因而有色 是事終不然 是故有智者不應分別色

若因中有果因中無果此事尚不可得何況無因有色是故言無因而有色是事終不然是故有智者不應分別色分別名凡夫以無明愛染貪著色然後以邪見生分別戲論說因中有果無果等今此中求色不可得是故智者不應分別復次

若果似於因 是事則不然 果若不似因是事亦不然

若果與因相似是事不然因細果麤故因果色力等各異如布似縷則不名布縷多布一故不得言因果相似若因果不相似是亦不然如麻縷不成綸麤縷無出細布是故不得言因果不相似二義不然故無色無色因

中論第卷 第三十二張 寶

中論卷第一

受陰及想陰 行陰識陰等 其餘一切法皆同於色陰

四陰及一切法亦應如是思惟破又今造論者欲讚美空義故而說偈若人有問者 離空而欲答 是則不成答俱同於彼疑 若人有難問 離空說其過是不成難問 俱同於彼疑

若人論議時各有所執離於空義而有問答者皆不成問答俱亦同疑如人言瓶是無常問者言何以故無常答言從無常因生故此不名答何以故因緣中亦疑不知為常為無常是為同彼所疑問者若欲說其過不依於空而說諸法無常則不名問難何以故汝因無常破我常我亦因常破汝無常若實無常則無業報眼耳等諸法念念滅亦無有分別有如是等過皆不成問難同彼所疑若依空破常者則無有過何以故此人取空相故是故若欲問答尚應依於空法何況欲求離苦寂滅相者

中論第卷 第三十三張 寶

六種答曰 空相未有時則無虛空法 若先有虛空即為是無相 若未有虛空相先有虛空法者虛空則無相何以故無色處名虛空相色是作法無常若色未生未生則無滅亦時無虛空相因色故有無色處無色處名虛空相問曰若無相有虛空有何答答曰 是無相之法 一切處無有於無相法中相則無所相 若於常無常法中求無相法不可得如論者言是有是無云何知各有相故生住滅是有為相無生住滅是無為相虛空若無相則無虛空若謂先無相後相來相者是亦不然若先無相則無法可相何以故 有相無相中 相則無所住 離有相無相餘處亦不住 如有峯有角尾端有毛頸下垂頭是名牛相若離是相則無牛若無牛是諸相無所住是故說於無相法中相則無所相有相中相亦不住先有相故

中論第卷 第三十四張 寶

四〇九

已答是事

汝雖作火喻不能成眼見法是事去
來品中已答如已去中無去未去中
無去去時中無去如已燒未燒燒
時俱無有燒如是已見未見見時俱
無見相復次
見者未見時 則不名為見 而言見能見
是事則不然

眼未對色則不能見亦時不名為見
因對色名為見是故偈中說未見時
無見云何以見能見復次二處俱無
見法何以故
見不能見非見亦不見 若已破於見
則為破見者

見不能見先已說過故非見亦不見
無見相故若無見相去何能見見法
無故見者亦無何以故若離見有見
者無眼者亦應以餘情見若以見見
則見中有見相見者無見相是故偈
中說若已破於見則為破見者復次
離見不離見 見者不可得 以無見者故
何有見可見

若有見見者則不成若無見見者亦

中論卷第一 第十九張 寶

不成見者無故云何有見可見若無

見者誰能用見法分別外色是故偈
中說以無見者故何有見可見復次
見可見無故識等四法無 四取等諸緣
云何當得有

見可見法無故識觸受愛四法皆無
以無愛等故四取等十二因緣分亦
無復次

耳鼻舌身意 聲及聞者等 當知如是義
皆同於上說

如見可見法空屬眾緣故無決定餘
耳等五情聲等五塵當知亦同見可
見法義同故不別說

中論觀五陰品第四 九偈

問曰經說有五陰是事云何答曰

若離於色因 色則不可得 若當離於色
色因不可得

色因者如布因縷除縷則無布除布
則無縷布如色縷如因問曰若離色
因有色有何過答曰

離色因有色 是色則無因 無因而有法
是事則不然

如離縷有布布則無因無因而有法

中論卷第一 第二十九張 寶

世間所無有問曰佛法外道法世間

法中皆有無因法佛法有三無為無
為常故無因外道法中虛空時方神
微塵涅槃等世間法虛空時方等是
三法無處不有故名為常常故無因
汝何以說無因法世間所無答曰此

無因法但有言說思惟分別則皆無
若法從因緣有不應言無因若無因
緣則如我說問曰有二種因一者作

因二者言說因是無因法無作因但
有言說因令人知故答曰雖有言說
因是事不然虛空如六種中破餘事

後當破復次現事尚皆可破何況微
塵等不可見法是故說無因法世間
所無問曰若離色有色因有何過答曰

若離色有因 則是無果因 若言無果因
則無有是處

若除色果但有色因者即是無果因
問曰若無果有因有何各答曰無果

有因世間所無何以故以果故名為
因若無果云何名因復次若因中無
果者物何以不從非因生是事如破

因緣品中說是故無有無果因復次

中論卷第一 第三十張 寶

去法即去者 是事則不然 去法異去者 是事亦不然

若去法去者 一是則不然 異亦不然 問曰 一異有何過 答曰

若謂於去法 即為是去者 作者及作業 是事則為一 若謂於去法 有異於去者 離去者有去 離去者有去者

如是二俱有過 何以故 若去法即是 去者是則錯 亂破於因緣 因去有去 者因去者有去 又去名為法 去者名

為人人常法 無常若一者則二俱應 常二俱無常 一中有如是等過 若異 者則相違 未有去法 應有去者 未有

去者 應有去法 不相因 待一法 滅應 一法在異 中有如是等過 復次 去去者是 二若一異法成 二門俱不成 去何當有成

若去者去法 有若以一法成 若以異 法成 二俱不可得 先已說 無第三法 成若謂有成 應說因緣 無去無去者 今當更說

因去知去者 不能用是去 先無有去法 故無去者去

隨以何去法 知去者是去者 不能用 是去法 何以故 是去法 未有時 無有 去者 亦無去時 已去未去 如先有人 有城邑 得有所起 去法去者 則不然 去者 因去法成 去法 因去者成 故復次 因去知去者 不能用異去 於一去者中 不得二去故

隨以何去法 知去者是去者 不能用 異去法 何以故 一去者中 二去法不 可得 故復次 決定有去者 不能用三去 不決定去者 亦不用三去 去法定不定 去者不用三 是故去去者 所去處皆無

決定者 名本實有 不因去法 生去法 名 身動三種 名未去 已去 未去時 若決定有 去者 離去法 應有去者 不應有住 是故 說決定有去者 不能用三去 若去者 不決定 不決定 名本實無 以因去法 得名 去者 以無去法 故不能用三去 因去法 故有去者 若先無去法 則無 去者 去何言 不決定 去者 用三去 如 去者 去法 亦如是 若先離去者 決定 有去法 則不 因去者 有去法 是故去

者 不能用三去法 若決定 無去法 去 者 何所用 如是 思惟 觀察 去法 去者 所去處 是法 皆相因 待 因去法 有去 者 因去者 有去法 因是 二法 則有可 去處 不得言 定有 不得言 定無 是故 決定 知三法 虛妄 空無 所有 但有假 名 如幻 如化

中論觀六情品第三 八偈 問曰 經中 說有六情 所謂 眼耳及鼻舌 身意等六情 此眼等六情 行色等六塵 此中 眼為內情 色為外塵 眼能見色 乃至 意為內情 法為外塵 意能知法 答曰 無也 何以故 是眼 則不能 自見 其已體 若不能 自見 去何見 餘物 是眼 不能見 自體 何以故 如燈 能自 照 亦能 照他 眼 若是 見相 亦應 自見 亦應 見他 而實 不尔 是故 偈中 說若 眼不自見 何能 見餘物 問曰 眼 雖不 能自見 而能 見他 如火 能燒 他 不能 自燒 答曰 火 能則 不能 成於 眼見法 去未去 去時

中論第一卷 第十六段 寶

中論第一卷 第十七段 寶

中論第一卷 第十八段 寶

若難於去者 去法不可得 以無去法故 何得有去者

若難於去者則去法不可得今云何於無去法中言三時定有去者復次去者則不去 不去者不去 難去不去者無第三去者

無有去者何以故若有去者則有二種若去者若不去者若難是二無第三去者問曰若去者去有何咎答曰若言去者去 云何有此義 若難於去法去者不可得

若謂定有去者用去法是事不然何以故難去法去者不可得故若難去者定有去法則去者能用去法而實不介復次

若去者有去 則有二種去 一謂去者去 二謂去法去

若言去者用去法則有二過於一去者中而有二去一以去法成去者二以去者成去法去者成已然後用去法是事不然是故先三時中謂定有去者用去法是事不然復次

若謂去者去 是人則有各 難去有去者

中論第一卷 第十三頌 實

說去者有去

若人說去者能用去法是人則有各難去法有去者何以故說去者用去法是為先有去者後有去法是事不然是故三時中無有去者復次若決定有去有去者應有初發而於三時中求發不可得何以故已去中無發 未去中無發 去時中無發 何處當有發

何以故三時中無發 未發無去時 亦無有已去 是二應有發 未去何有發 無去無未去 亦復無去時 一切無有發 何故而分別

若人未發則無去時亦無已去若有發當在二處去時已去中二俱不然未去時未有發故未去中何有發發無故無去無去故無去者何得有已去未去去時問曰若無去無去者應有住住者答曰

去者則不住 不去者不住 難去不去者 何有第三住

若有住有住者應去者住若不去者住若難此二應有第三住是事不然去者不住去未息故與去相違名為

中論第一卷 第十二頌 實

住不去者亦不住何以故因去法滅故有住無去則無住難去者不去者更無第三住者若有第三住者即在去者不去者中以是故不得言去者住復次

去者若當住 云何有此義 若當難於去者不可得 汝謂去者住是事不然何以故難去法去者不可得若去者在去相云何當有住去住相違故復次

去未去無住 去時亦無住 所有行止法皆同於去義

若謂去者住是人應在去時已去未去中住三處皆無住是故汝言去者有住是則不然如破去法住法行止亦如是行者如從穀子相續至芽莖葉等止者穀子滅故芽莖葉滅相續故名行斷故名止又如無明緣諸行乃至老死是名行無明滅故諸行等滅是名止問曰汝雖種種門破去去者住住者而眼見有去住答曰肉眼所見不可信若實有去去者為以一法成為以二法成二俱有過何以故

中論第一卷 第十三頌 實

佛說大乘諸法若有色無色有形無形有漏無漏有為無為等諸法相入於法性一切皆空無相無緣辟如眾流入海同為一味實法可信隨宜所說不可為實是故無緣緣增上緣者諸法無自性故無有有相說有是事故是事有不然

經說十二因緣是事有故是事有此則不然何以故諸法從眾緣生故自無定性自無定性故無有有相有相無故何得言是事有故是事有是故無增上緣佛隨凡夫分別有無故說復次

略廣因緣中求果不可得因緣中若無去何從緣出略者於和合因緣中無果廣者於一緣中亦無果若略廣因緣中無果去何言果從因緣出復次

若謂緣無果而從緣中出是果何不從非緣中而出若因緣中求果不可得何故不從非緣出如涅中無瓶何故不從乳中出復次

若果從緣生是緣無自性從無自性生何得從緣生果不從緣生不從非緣生以果無有故緣非緣亦無

果從眾緣生是緣無自性若無自性則無法無法何能生是故果不從緣生不從非緣生者破緣故說非緣實無非緣法是故不從非緣生若不從二生是則無果無果故緣非緣亦無中論觀去來品第二十五偈

問曰世間眼見三時有作已去未去去時以有作故當知有諸法答曰已去無有去未去亦無去離已去未去去時亦無去

已去無有去已去故若離去有去業是事不然未去亦無去未有去法故去時名半去半未去不離已去未去故問曰

動處則有去此中有去時非已去未去是故去時去隨有作業處是中應有去眼見去時中有作業已去中作業已滅未去中未有作業是故當知去時有去答曰去何於去時而當有去法若離於去法

去時不可得

去時有去法是事不然何以故離去法去時不可得若離去法有去時者應去時中有去如器中有果復次

若言去時去是人則有各離去有去時去時獨去故

若謂已去未去中無去去時實有去者是人則有各若離去法有去時則不相因待何以故若說去時有去是則為二而實不二是故不得言離去有去時復次

若去時有去則有二種去一謂為去時二謂去時去

若謂去時有去是則有過所謂有二去一者因去有去時二者去時中有去問曰若有二去有何答曰

若有二去法則有二去者以離於去者去法不可得

若有二去法則有二去者何以故因去法有去者故一人有二去二去者此則不然是故去時亦無去問曰離去者無去法可今三時中定有去者答曰

中論卷第一

中論第一卷 第十張 寶

中論第一卷 第十張 寶

中論第一卷 第十張 寶

四〇五

性自性無故不自生自性無故他性亦無何以故因自性有他性他性於他亦是自性若破自性即破他性是故不應從他性生若破自性他性即破共義無因則有大過有因尚可破何況無因於四句中不生不可得是故不生問曰阿毗曇人言諸法從四緣生云何言不生何謂四緣
 因緣次第緣 緣緣增上緣 四緣生諸法更無第五緣
 一切所有緣皆攝在四緣以是四緣万物得生因緣名一切有為法次第緣除過去現在阿羅漢寂後心心數法餘過去現在心心數法緣緣增上緣一切法答曰
 果為從緣生 為從非緣生 是緣為有果 是緣為無果
 若謂有果是果為從緣生為從非緣生若謂有緣是緣為有果為無果二俱不然何以故
 因是法生果 是法名為緣 若是果未生 何不名非緣
 諸緣無決定何以故若果未生是時

中論卷第一 第七段 實

不名為緣但眼見從緣生果故名之為緣緣成由於果以果後緣先故若未有果何得名為緣如瓶以水土和合故有瓶生見瓶故知水土等是瓶緣若瓶未生時何以不名水土等為非緣是故果不從緣生緣尚不生何況非緣復次
 果先於緣中 有無俱不可 先无為誰緣 先有何用緣
 緣中先非有果非無果若先有果不名為緣果先有故若先無果亦不名為緣不生餘物故問曰已惣破一切因緣今欲聞一一破諸緣答曰
 若果非有生 亦復非無生 亦非有無生 何得言有緣
 若緣能生果應有三種若有若無若有無如先偈中說緣中若先有果不應言生以先有故若先無果不應言生以先無故亦應與非緣同故有無亦不生者有無名為半有半無二俱有過又有與無相違無與有相違何得一法有二相如是三種求果生相不可得故云何言有因緣次第緣者

中論卷第一 第八段 實

果若未生時 則不應有滅 滅法何能緣 故無次第緣
 諸心心數法於三世中次第生現在心心數法滅與未來心作次第緣未來法未生與誰作次第緣若未來法已有即是生何用次第緣現在心心數法無有住時若不住何能為次第緣若有住則非有為法何以故一切有為法常有滅相故若滅已則不能與作次第緣若言滅法猶有則是常若常則無罪福等若謂滅時能與作次第緣滅時半滅半未滅更無第三法名為滅時又佛說一切有為法念念滅無一念時住云何言現在法有欲滅未欲滅汝謂一念中無是欲滅未欲滅則破自法汝阿毗曇說有滅法有不滅法有欲滅法有不欲滅法欲滅法者現在法將欲滅未欲滅法者除現在將欲滅法餘現在法及過去未來無為法是名不欲滅法是故無次第緣緣緣者
 如諸佛所說 真實微妙法 於此無緣法 云何有緣緣

中論卷第一 第九段 實

曰法雖無量略說八事則為惣破一切法不生者諸論師種種說生相或謂因果一或謂因果異或謂因中先有果或謂因中先無果或謂自體生或謂從他生或謂共生或謂有生或謂無生如是等說生相皆不然此事後當廣說生相決定不可得故不生不滅者若無生何得有滅以無生無滅故餘六事亦無問曰不生不滅已惣破一切法何故復說六事答曰為成不生不滅義故有人不受不生不滅而信不常不斷若深求不常不斷即是不生不滅何以故法者實有則不應無先有今無是即為斷若先有性是則為常是故說不常不斷即入不生不滅義有人雖聞四種破諸法猶以四門成諸法是亦不然若一則無緣若異則無相續後當種種破是故復說不一不異有人雖聞六種破諸法猶以來出成諸法來者言諸法從自在天世性微塵等來出者還去至本處復次万物無生何以故世間現見故世間眼見劫初穀不生何以故

中論第一卷 第五頌 寶

中論第一

離劫初穀今穀不可得若離劫初穀有今穀者則應有生而實不尔是故不生問曰若不生則應滅答曰不滅何以故世間現見故世間眼見劫初穀不滅若滅今不應有穀而實有穀是故不滅問曰若不滅則應常答曰不常何以故世間現見故世間眼見万物不常如穀芽時種則變壞是故不常問曰若不常則應斷答曰不斷何以故世間現見故世間眼見万物不斷如從穀有芽是故不斷若斷不應相續問曰若尔者万物是一答曰不一何以故世間現見故世間眼見万物不一如穀不作芽芽不作穀若穀作芽芽作穀者應是一而實不尔是故不一問曰若不一則應異答曰不異何以故世間現見故世間眼見万物不異若異者何故分別穀芽穀莖穀葉不說樹芽樹莖樹葉是故不異問曰若不異應有來答曰無來何以故世間現見故世間眼見万物不來如穀子中芽無所從來者來者芽應從餘處來如鳥來栖樹而實不尔

中論第一卷 第五頌 寶

是故不來問曰若不來則應不生不出何以故世間現見故世間眼見万物不出若有出應見芽從穀出如純從穴出而實不尔是故不出問曰汝雖釋不生不滅義我欲聞造論者所說答曰諸法不自生 亦不從他生 不共不無因是故知無生不自生者万物無有從自體生必待眾因復次若從自體生則一法有二體一謂生二謂生者若離餘因從自體生者則無因無緣又生更有生生則無窮自無故他亦無何以故有自故有他若不從自生亦不從他生共生則有二過自生他生故若無因而有万物者是則為常是事不然無因則無果若無因有果者布施持戒等應墮地獄十惡五逆應當生天以無因故復次如諸法自性 不在於緣中 以無自性故他性亦復無諸法自性不在眾緣中但眾緣和合故得名字自性即是自體眾緣中無自

中論第一卷 第六頌 寶

四〇三

中論卷第一

釋僧叡序

寶

中論有五百偈龍樹菩薩之所造也
 以中為名者照其實也以論為稱者
 盡其言也實非名不悟故寄中以宣
 之言非釋不盡故假論以明之其實
 既宣其言既明於菩薩之行道場之
 照朗然懸解矣夫滯惑生於倒見三
 界以之而淪溺偏悟起於獸智耿介
 以之而致乖故知大覺在乎曠照小
 智經乎隘心照之不曠則不足以夷
 有無一道俗知之不盡則未可以涉
 中途泯二際道俗之不夷二際之不
 泯菩薩之憂也是以龍樹大士析之
 以中道使惑趣之徒墜玄指而一變
 括之以即化令玄悟之賓喪諮詢於
 朝徹蕩蕩焉真可謂坦夷路於冲階
 啟玄門於宇內扇慧風於陳枚流甘
 露於枯悴者矣夫百標之構興則鄙
 茅茨之仄陋觀斯論之宏曠則知偏
 悟之鄙倍幸哉此區之赤縣忽得移
 靈鷲以作鎮險陔之邊情乃蒙流光
 之餘惠而今而後談道之賢始可與論

寶矣云天生諸國敢預學者之流無
 不翫味斯論以為喉衿其涂翰申釋
 者甚亦不少今所出者是天生梵志名
 賓伽羅素言青目之所釋也其人雖
 信解深法而辭不雅中其中乖闕煩重
 者法師皆裁而裨之於經通之理盡
 矣文或左右未盡善也百論治外以
 闕邪斯文扶內以流滯大智釋論之
 淵博十二門觀之精詣尋斯四者真
 若日月入懷無不朗然鑒徹矣予既
 之味之不能釋手遂復忘其鄙拙託
 悟懷於一序并目品義題之於首豈
 期能釋耶蓋是欣自同之懷耳
 中論觀因緣品第一 十六偈

龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋
 姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯

不生亦不滅 不常亦不斷 不一亦不異
 不來亦不出 能說是因緣 善滅諸戲論
 我稽首禮佛 諸說中第一
 問曰何故造此論答曰有人言万物
 從大自在天生有言從事細天生有
 言從和合生有言從時生有言從世
 性生有言從變生有言從自然生有

中論卷第一

寶

言從微塵生有如是等謬故墮於無因
 邪因斷常等邪見種種說我我所不知
 正法佛欲斷如是等諸邪見令知佛
 法故先於聲聞法中說十二因緣又
 為已習行有大心堪受深法者以大
 乘法說因緣相所謂一切法不生不
 滅不一不異等畢竟空无所有如般
 若波羅蜜中說佛告須菩提菩薩坐
 道場時觀十二因緣如虛空不可盡
 佛滅度後後五百歲像法中人根轉
 鈍深著諸法求十二因緣五陰十二
 入十八界等決定相不知佛意但著
 文字聞大乘法中說畢竟空不知何
 因緣故空即生疑見若都畢竟空云
 何分別有罪福報應等如是則無世
 諦第一義諦取是空相而起貪著於
 畢竟空中生種種過龍樹菩薩為是
 等故造此中論
 不生亦不滅 不常亦不斷 不一亦不異
 不來亦不出 能說是因緣 善滅諸戲論
 我稽首禮佛 諸說中第一
 以此二偈讚佛則已略說第一義問
 曰諸法無量何故但以此八事破各

中論卷第一

寶

List of Abbreviations

BEFEO	Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient
Conze, Dict.	Conze, E., Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñā-Pāramitā Literature
CSTCC	Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-chi, T, 2145
EB	The Eastern Buddhist
GPWT	Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise, T. 1509
HJAS	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
Hurvitz	Hurvitz, L. Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma
IBK	Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly
Inada	Inada, K., Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
JA	Journal Asiatique
JAOS	Journal of the Americal Oriental Society
JAS	Journal of Asian Studies
JEBD	Japanese-English Buddhist Dictionary
JIABS	Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIH	Journal of Indian History
Kosa	La Vallée Poussin, L. de, Abhidharma-kośa de Vasubandhu
Lamotte	Lamotte, É., Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, 4 vols.
LS	Lotus Sutra in Kumārajīva's translation. References are to the text in Hokkekyō Ichiji Sakuin, comp. by the Institute of Oriental Philosophy
May	May, Jacques, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti
MCB	Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
Miyamoto	Miyamoto, S., A Study of Nāgārjuna
MK	=MMK
MMK	Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
MN	Monumenta Nipponica
Murti	Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism
Nak.	Nakamura, Hajime, Bukkyō-go Daijiten
PEW	Philosophy East and West
Ramanan	Ramanan, K.V., Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as presented in the Mahāprajñāparamitā-Sāstra.
R.	Robinson, R.H., Early Mādhyamika in India and China
S.	Soothill and Hodous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms
Sprung	Sprung, M., Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way

- Stcherbatsky Stcherbatsky, Th., The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa
- Streng Streng, F., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning
- T. Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō
- TGVS = Lamotte
- T.Index Taizōkyō Gakujutsu Yōgo Kenkyūkai (Ed.), Daizōkyō
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- Walleser Walleser, M. Die Mittlere Lehre Nāgārjuna's, 1912
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