LEEDS AND THE AMATEUR MILITARY TRADITION:

THE LEEDS RIFLES AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS, c.1859 - 1918

VOLUME III

by

PATRICIA MARY MORRIS

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CHAPTER 13. ORGANISATIONAL MORALE, DISCIPLINE AND ESPRIT DE CORPS

> "The marvel of it was that our men, who were very simple men, should have 'stuck it out' with that patience which endured all things without self-interest and without emotion." (war-correspondent Philip Gibbs)[1]

13.1 Under the stress of battle, combat effectiveness is the complex result of multiple factors.

> "The entire milieu of the soldier seems to become involved, and these include, e.g. intensity of danger, deprivation, motivation, cohesiveness, loyalty, group morale, comradeship, leadership, adequacy of training, condition and quality of equipment, the degree of physical fatigue, effective lines of communication, prompt casualty evacuation and so on."[2]

The factors cited are not to be considered individually in isolation, however, and are best regarded as a cluster of psychological forces, a compl set of attitudes, feelings and beliefs, within a combat group, together with a number of important influencing factors particular to the situation, which motivate it in battle. They can be grouped together under the catego of Discipline, Morale and Esprit de Corps, which are mutually dependent and vary in direct proportion with each other, weak esprit de corps being found in association with low morale and poor discipline, and high morale with strong esprit de corps and a high standard of discipline. For this very reason, many military men have used the blanket term "morale" to collectively embrace all three categories. "Included under the term 'morale declared the Shellshock Committee's Report, "are pride of regiment, belief in the cause, mutual confidence between officers and men, and the feeling t a man is part of a corporate whole."[3]

"The morale of the soldier", wrote Field Marshal the Viscount Montgome of Alamein, "is the greatest single factor in war." "A commander's success or failure of his operations", declared Field Marshal the Viscount Plumer, "depends for the most part, on the morale of his troops."[4]

There are a number of reasons why morale is regarded thus. It is of supreme importance in helping to decondition fear and in preventing the individual from giving up when his store of courage is running low. High morale produces the highest of the military virtues, courage. "Courage may be defined as the mental determination to persist in spite of being afraid,"[5] or as the popular World War II (hereinafter referred to as "WWII' phrase had it, "Courage is running away in a forward direction". Leeds Rifleman Francis W. Smith of the 1/8th, explained what courage was:

> "   ... To combat innate fear
> With noble thoughts and grim determination;
> To put self last when self is threatened most,
> To smile, when danger's near, with false elation
> That others, too, may smile, perhaps forget
> The impending horror - This is true Courage."[6]

Put in simple terms, when morale is good, the men feel confident, satisfied and eager for the fray; when it is bad, they are dispirited, discontented, disorganised and uneager for combat. The USARB carried out during WWII two major studies on a newly activated division which revealed that the troops of higher morale ("expressed more favourable attitudes") performed better in battle and had lower casualty rates in actual combat.[7]

F.M. Sir William Slim, sharing the view that "morale is the most important element in victory", considered that the foundations of morale were, in order of importance, spiritual, mental and material, adding "High morale means that every individual in a group will work - or fight - and, if needed, will give his last ounce of effort in its service."[8] High morale, according to Lt Col John Baynes, manifests itself "in the soldier's absolute determination to do his duty to the best of his ability in any circumstances."[9]

Napoleon is supposed to have said, "In the end the Spirit will always conquer the Sword." All the better-known pre-1914 military theorists, Frenc German and British, and official British military textbooks, placed continua emphasis upon the pre-eminence of the moral and spiritual qualities of troop Their doctrines relied for ultimate success upon the superiority of "the offensive spirit."[10] Two passages from Field Service Regulations Part I Operations, 1909, Reprint 1914 are worth quoting in this respect:

> "Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Skill cannot compensate for want of courage, energy, and determination; but even high moral qualities may not avail without careful preparation and skilful direction. The development of the necessary moral qualities is therefore the first of the objects to be attained; the next are organisation and discipline, which enable those qualities to be controlled and used when required. A further essential is skill in applying the power which the attainment of these objects confers on the troops." "Superior numbers on the battlefield are an undoubted advantage, but skill, better organisation, and training, and above all a firmer determination in all ranks to conquer at any cost, are the chief factors of success [in battle]."[11]

These were Ludendorff's views.[12] Haig's "Backs-to-the-Wall" message of 13th April 1918 embodied these doctrines: "Victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest."

Some recent civilian writers have called into question the long-held maxim that moral qualities must be the final arbiter in war, on the grounds that it had been formulated at the expense of the potential of technological advance in weaponry and other matériel.[13] Many present-day military men would nevertheless take the view that demoralisation of the opponent is still the major or even sole aim in warfare.[14] Certainly, successful guerilla warfare is always devoted to the subversion of the opponent's "will to resist" or "will to conquer". The American Army in Vietnam, with its vast resources and techological superiority, eventually became thoroughly demoralised. "... as every soldier knows", wrote Brigadier Bidwell, "strategy, tactics and weapon technology are valueless without the qualities of 'morale', 'leadership' and 'loyalty'."[15]

13.2 Principles and aims of training

Maj Gen Sir Thompson Capper believed that "it was necessary to commence with the moral training of the individual, particularly in 'the loss of the sense of self in the interests of the community'. The ideal of all military discipline was 'the organised abnegation of self'."[16] Moral training was emphasised by Infantry Training 1914:

> "The object to be aimed at in the training of the infantry soldier is to make him, mentally and physically, a better man than his adversary on the field of battle."
> "The preliminary steps necessary for the efficient training of the soldier are: (i) The development of a soldierly spirit. (ii) The training of the body. (iii) Training in the use of rifle, bayonet, and spade."
> "The objects in view in developing a soldierly spirit are to help the soldier to bear fatigue, privation, and danger cheerfully; to imbue him with a sense of honour; to give him confidence in his superiors and comrades; to increase his powers of initiative, of self-confidence, and of self-restraint; to train him to obey orders, or to act in the absence of orders for the advantage of his regiment under all conditions; to produce such a high degree of courage and disregard of self that in the stress of battle he will use his brains and his weapons coolly and to the best advantage; to impress upon him that, so long as he is physically capable of fighting, surrender to the enemy is a disgraceful act; and finally to teach him how to act in combination with his comrades in order to defeat the enemy. As soon as the recruit joins he should be brought under influences which will tend to produce and increase such a spirit, and it is the duty of all officers and non-commissioned officers to assist in the attainment of this object by their conversation and example."[17]

Discipline, morale and esprit de corps were simultaneously inculcated into the Regular Army recruit during his initial training. This entailed a programme of complete re-socialisation and explains why recruit training is traditionally governed by the concept of shock treatment, making it a harsh and often bullying or brutal process, in order to sever the recruit suddenly and decisively from civilian life.[18] It included drilling at the double as a punishment for carelessness or inattention, and insistence on scrupulous cleanliness and exaggerated polishing of equipment (known as "spit and polish" or "bull") (a) to produce automatic unquestioning obedienc of the orders of superiors, and (b) to stimulate pride in self and unit. A natural emphasis was placed on physical fitness. Route marches, accompani often by singing or other music, built up both physical endurance and esprit de corps, while sports and games pulled the battalion together and impressed upon the recruit the value of teamwork. "Drill in close order is of first importance in producing discipline, cohesion, and the habits of absolute and instant obedience to the orders of a superior" stated Infantry Training 1914.[19] (Ceremonial drill was held to inculcate a sense of commitment. The Guards still place great emphasis on close order and ceremonial drill because they believe they produce teamwork and pride in self. They claim that their record proves the relationship between the drill square and the battlefield: "poor drill means poor discipline which means poor combat effectiveness.")[20] Most important of all, the recruit was presented with the "ideal" image of a soldier and indoctrinated with the set of values embodying "the soldierly spirit".[21] The induction process had a further aim: to make the recruit aware that he was a chattel of the state. This applied equally to the wartime Territorial as to the Regular soldier.

The aim of drill was

> "The implanting of a series of conditioned responses to orders by endless repetition reinforced by reward and punishment ... Drill is still an effective and economical way of teaching soldiers obedience and those military skills which can be performed automatically."[22]

The form that training took, of rote-learning (a teaching method familiar from schooldays) and repetitious drills,had an important and intended psychological effect on the recruit: that of eliciting from him in action automatic and habitual responses to specific danger cues which would effectively help him "to avert the onset of fear or, worse, of panic."[23]

> "Square-bashing turned us all into automatons"
> [recalled a former soldier in 1973].
> "We heard certain commands, and, as if by remote control, the body reacted. There was no thought process, only a reflex action."[24]

Inadequately-trained men frequently became paralysed with fear when in actic for the first time.[25] This phenomenon may account for S.L.A. Marshall's well-known finding that only 15% of infantrymen fired their weapons at the enemy during the course of an entire engagement.[26]

There appears to have been a further cogent reason why a soldier should be trained to produce an automatic response. It has frequently been recorde that many soldiers behave in battle like mechanical dolls or automatons, as if they were in a dream-like state or trance:[27] Charles Carrington describes himself at Third Ypres as "a Zombie", while at the end of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle former newspaper reporter W. Linton Andrews tried in vain to recall its incidents: "I had gone through most of the battle like a sleep-walker."[28] Such phenomena may help to explain the common difficulty of battle survivors in recalling what they did or what had happen during the action (see Appendix I, Section 7).

Inadequate,particularly too brief, training inevitably meant a shortfall in both physical and emotional endurance. Shortly after the London Scottish's charge at Messines Ridge on 31st October 1914, the CO wrote to inform Haig that his much-depleted battalion (which had suffered about 60% casualties) was no longer "in a fit state to take the field. After the last 5 days and nights in the trenches without sleep as the whole Battalion was in the firing line, the men are thoroughly broken."[29] General Jack held the view that it took "over a year" to train an efficient soldier[30] and many senior officers considered that the period should be anything up to 2 years (see Chap. 8, Section 8.6). Weaknesses in training have been blamed for the heavy casualties and poor performance of Kitchener divisions. Since the foundations of morale were laid in training, inadequate training may well have resulted in the level of discipline, morale and esprit de corps in some Kitchener units being below the desirable standard. Lord Moran was convinced that "Neither the creed of the Regiment nor pride in arms ever took root" in Kitchener's Army.[32] It was commonly held that bette educated men from higher social strata were better behaved and more amenable to discipline, but this doctrine as applied to the middle-class "Leeds Pals" appears to have produced lax discipline and poor esprit de corps. While training in the UK in 1915 it was possible for men to "take French leave", stay out all night and never be missed. Pte Edward Woffenden of C Coy overstayed leave in April 1915 and was sentenced by his CO to a fine, 1 days' CB and to have all leave stopped for 3 months, yet when he was supposed to be confined to barracks, he went to the pictures, and he went home on leave 4 times during the following 3 months; in February 1916 he was report for using insubordinate language to his sergeant, but he was not punished. He boasts in the diary of the numerous occasions he has succeeded in dodgin fatigues. He was a frequent attender at sick parade, being given "M & D" (medicine and duty) 15 times between 30th July and 6th September 1915, and he repeatedly complains in the diary of trivial ailments, and of getting his feet wet through (even in December 1916 on the Somme) or having a sore shoulder after firing his rifle. Whenever he went home prior to embarkation he changed into civilian clothes. The enemy raided a post belonging to No. 4 platoon in May 1916 and took away 4 men.[33] Conceding prisoners like this was generally considered to be a sign of poor morale and was regarded by ordinary soldiers as bringing disgrace on the regiment concerned.

The "splendidly equipped" 62nd Division, the first to be sent out complete with steel helmets, was perhaps the best trained of all the new divisions, for it had been trained for 2 years in the most up-to-date method Significantly, Capt Gregory lays "greater stress on its fine spirit rather than its efficiency in training, because it was this that was its salvation": it survived the vicissitudes of fortune both at home and abroad largely by virtue of the "wonderful morale of all ranks."[34] It is difficult not to perceive a correlation between its high level of training and "wonderful" morale and its splendid level of achievement.

The training given to the first-line Leeds Rifles battalions after the outbreak of war was comparable if not identical to that given to peacetime Regular battalions. Serving Regular instructors, NCOs mostly in their early thirties or late twenties, arrived from the West Yorkshire Regiment's Depot in York during the first few days of the war.[35] In view of the many difficulties experienced in and the many criticisms and allegations made in respect of the training of the Kitchener battalions,[36] the Leeds Rifles battalions and the other units of the 49th Division appear to have been fortunate in this respect.

13.3 Adjustment to military life

Stress is the result of maladaptation to a specific situation; morale helps the soldier to withstand stress. The foundations of morale were laid down during initial training, but entry to the military life was itself stressful. For the average recruit, entry represented a high anxiety situat as he adjusted to a completely new environment and way of life. The regimen was an untraditional society and one compounded from a most diversified collection of men. It was a strange culture complex, for it contained no women and no children.

Becoming a soldier in wartime means an abandonment or deferment of previously established life goals, and so may represent a major life crisis to the individual recruit. Both the magnitude of the adjustment problem and the satisfactions found in the military life reflect a man's prior orientations to military service and the conditions under which that service is performed. The recruit may find the abrupt metamorphosis from civilian to soldier a traumatic experience of the type sometimes referred to as "cultural shock". He is expected to subordinate all other previous loyalties which had tied him into the larger social network. His private life is completely disrupted. He is uprooted from family, home, neighbourhood, from accustomed work and leisuretime pursuits, private and public status and responsibilities. He usually undergoes a complete severence of accustomed social relations and he loses his privacy and much of his individu freedom. He has to learn new standards of health, fitness, personal cleanliness and hygiene. He has to adjust emotionally, psychologically and socially to the new milieu.[37] The felt sacrifice of becoming a soldier was greater for some groups of men than others: married men, without or with children, older men, men with dependent parent(s), men with developing careers, student successfully pursuing academic courses. These categories, particularly the first two, may be thought of as being more prone than others to have difficulties in adjustment.[38] It was found that single men under 20 who had gone round in civilian life with a group of peers made a better adjustment to army life than others, the best adjustment of all being made by those who had been keenest on sports when younger.[39]

The frequency with which Leeds Rifles respondents declared that "the happiest days of my life were spent in the Rifles" indicates that they had adjusted well both to training and to combat. Two particular factors seemed to be important here. First, the loss of family support and that of civilian friends, often cited as a major source of stress in recruits, simpl did not occur in the Leeds Rifles battalions in 1914-15. As has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, when a man enlisted in the Regiment he was not leaving his relatives and friends behind, but joining them. This was the great attraction of a local battalion. 2812 Percy Shepherd, 1/8th, remarked, "If you're going to fight in a war you may as well be with people you already know", and as 5155 Abe Freedman, 2/8th, explained, "It's a good thing to go into a regiment where you have got pals already: when you're among friends it means that army life isn't lonely and miserable, and it eases your mind and stops you worrying."[40] Being on active service with relatives and old friends strengthened both esprit de corps and individual morale, for serving in a local regiment meant that "In every bay, round every traverse, on every fire-step, one brushed against men whom one had known all one's days."[41]

Second, just as the upbringing and socialisation of the public schoolboy fitted him to become an army officer, so did the upbringing and socialisation of the young working-class man fit him to become a combat soldier. Most working-class soldiers needed no introduction to the world of struggle and hardship and some had been brought up in appalling living conditions.[42] More important, the working-class soldier had already acquired the psychological toughness and resilience which would enable him to cope better with trench life than those brought up in softer circumstances:[43] a fairly popular view maintains that "mental backbone" or "moral fibre" comes from a man's upbringing.[44] F.M. Slim thought that men who had lived where life was hard were conspicuously more brave, and able to carry on being brave when most men would have given up, than those who had been able to obtain a reasonable standard of living fairly easily. This was also the view of F.M. Wavell and Lt Col H. Green.[45] Like a typical member of the contemporary working class, the combat soldier lived in a continual state of poverty.[46] R. Laudenheimer, a consultant to an Army Corps 1915-18, had found a very low proportion of working-class men generally and no agricultural or unskille workers among his functional nervous cases.[47] A Shell-Shock Committee witnes Gen Lord Horne, thought it probable that miners and outdoor manual workers were less liable to "shellshock" than other occupational categories, but this opinion was discounted by the Committee.[48]

The one category of men which found it very difficult, or impossible, to adjust to military life and to combat were the dullards and the mentally backward. Even as early as 1917 American research demonstrated that dullards preponderated in the groups of maladjustment disciplinary cases designated as "men of low military value" and "unteachable men". There is copious evidence that the incidence of delinquency, particularly absenteeism and desertion, and of venereal disease, scabies and pediculosis, as well as the general sickness rate, were appreciably greater among dullards than among soldiers of average intelligence. When the General Service Corps intake scheme came into operation in July 1942 the extent of the problem of mental backwardness in British army recruits was revealed for the first time: some 8% of all recruits were found to be so dull and backward as to require special conditions of military environment, training and employment.[49] The importance of dullness and mental backwardness in the aetiology of "shellshock" was scarcely realised during WWI and its aftermath, but WWII service psychiatrists were made only too aware that dullards were very much more prone than other men to "battle neurosis".[50]

The working-class sub-culture, having its own mores and its own philosophy and system of values, appeared to change little in fundamentals when it put on a khaki uniform and went to war. Little effort of the imagination is required to perceive close parallels between the soldiers' attitudes described in the present study and the following passage from Alfred Green's Growing Up in Attercliffe: "Everyone was in the same cart and accepted the shaking and bumping without too many complaints." "... amidst all this poverty and depression, the striking thing was the buoyancy, the optimism, and humanity of the people as a whole ... Attercliffe people were able to cope with adverse circumstances. Unemployment, poverty, deprivation of all kinds and sometimes sheer tragedy may have dominated many aspects of life, but their courage and cheerfulness somehow managed to break through at the most unlikely times and in the most surprising way."[51]

There was little essential difference between the philosophy of the working class, its patterns of thought, and its customary modes of social interaction, and those of the well-adjusted front-line soldier. Their whole "survival strategies" were, in fact, remarkably similar.

Working-class patterns of thought found their most significant expressio in aphorisms and apophthegms which embodied the class's living collective experience and which had been adopted as received tags and were not intellectually scrutinised.[52] The studies of both Hoggart and Zweig lean heavily upon them. These stock phrases cropped up continually in respondents' testimony. Carpe diem was the basic philosophy of working people and combat soldiers alike. The response of both groups to insecurity and a general feeling of helplessness was the adoption, as their main principle,of concentration on the present: living in the present and for the present was held to "take your mind off things" or "take you out of yourself": "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof", "Tomorrow never comes". This gave rise to the often-remarked working-class hedonism which "always looks on the bright side", maintains "life isn't worth living without a bit of fun" and exhorts its votaries to "enjoy life while you can". The need to "keep smiling" and "carry on regardless" were stressed aspects of working-life philosophy. A highly-popular 1915 song expressed this perfectly: "What's the use of worrying, It never was worthwhile, So pack up your troubles in your old kitbag, And smile, smile, smile". Pte Perks, the hero of this song, is always smiling: "flush or broke, he'll have his little joke, he can't be suppress'd." The working man's and the soldier's ideal comrade was a man with a happy-go-lucky nature who does not worry about the future, "takes life as it comes", is able to see the funny side of everything and can brighten the existence of those around him: comedians have always been the favourite entertainers of the working classes. (Note how popular fun-loving officers were with respondents: see Chap. 12, Section 12.6). He must be "a good fellow", always ready to do his mates a good turn, always friendly and sociable. Another very important principle of working-class philosophy was the achievement of contentment by getting used to things which cannot be changed: "making the best of it", "sticking it out", "what can't be cured, must be endured", "Life is what you make it". The corresponding soldiers' philosophy was expressed in slang words, like "napoo" ("gone", "non-existent", "finished") and "san-fairy-ann" ("it doesn't matter", a perversion of the French ça ne fait rien), and in sentiments like this of Knowles: "We have had a lot of casualties, and it has been miserable today missing a lot of the old faces, but it's all in the play, kid."[53] Stoicism, expressed in apophthegms such as "grin and bear it", was a working-class characteristic and often it became fatalism: "Whatever will be, will be."

The working man had a strong sense of the brotherhood of man. "Stand by your mates whatever happens" was a maxim which expressed class solidarity: it was readily converted into comradeship. The neighbourliness which helped to ease the misery of the mean streets of back-to-backs helped to ease the misery of the front line. The working-class recruit was already aware of his duty to the family and of the value of group loyalty and strong family life before his instructors ever mentioned "esprit de corps". The abnegation of self he had learnt as a child was carried into "the front-line soldier's religion".

The strong sense of the group in the working-class community can express itself as a demand for conformity. Its members tend to dislike incomers and resent them as interlopers, and to dislike people who do not conform to their customary modes of social interaction. West Yorkshire working-class people certainly dislike "stuck-up folk" the most; they prefer the personal, friendly, homely approach.[54] These attitudes were well-displayed by the vast majority of the working-class respondents, especially in relation to officers.

One working-class respondent, 2607 Walter Atkinson, 1/7th, was convinced that the battalion spirit stemmed largely from the men's upbringing in a working-class community. The working-class family expected help from its children from an early age because it could not function properly without it: in addition to helping Mother look after younger brothers and sisters, running errands and helping with domestic chores from an early age, many respondents had had paid part-time jobs as school-children in order to supplement the family income.[55] Accordingly, the working-class man did not grow up selfish, he had been trained to give all the time in a spirit of self-sacrifice.[56] Sgt Atkinson said:

> "People were a lot more unselfish then. Children were brought up to be unselfish, to always think of the family first, to think of what they could do to help the family, to stick together. Families were people you could rely on, through thick and thin. Neighbours then were real neighbours, real friends who'd do anything for you, who always rushed to rally round if anyone was in trouble, and who always shared things out."[57]

"Sharing out", a feature of the front-line soldier's code of ethics, was an essential feature of the working-class code of ethics in Leeds. Unexpected windfalls, whether a couple of poached rabbits, or an inheritance of clothing or effects, were spontaneously shared with neighbours. If a family bread-winner was hurt at work or suddenly taken ill, his friends and neighbours would have a whip-round for his dependents. Many writers have detected "that necessary habit of mutuality" as central to working-class communities.[58]

The very high level of esprit de corps in the Regiment may well have owed a great deal to the unique quality of Leeds' working-class areas, which were made up of acre upon acre of narrow streets of back-to-back houses, over 80% of which abutted directly upon the street. Thrown together in close physical proximity, the inhabitants formed close-knit communities characterised by human warmth and sociability. Lack of privacy tended to strengthen family and neighbourhood ties.[59]

The Leeds of 1914 was a patchwork collection of villages, as it had been for over 200 years. In 1700 the parish of Leeds, coextensive with the borough, had contained, in addition to the central township of Leeds itself, 13 villages and a number of hamlets.[60] By 1900 many of these urban villages had become self-contained working-class communities[61] which possessed neighbourhood-centred patterns of culture where the lower down the social scale, the greater the part played by the street in the child's upbringing.[62]

Leeds was "the city of the back-to-backs". In 1920 there were 78,406 of this type of house and they formed nearly 70% of the housing stock. Nearly 45% of the back-to-backs had been built before 1872 and typically were single or two-roomed houses without scullery, built in long unbroken rows abutting on to the street. Those built between 1872 and 1890, just over 37%, were 2- or 3-roomed houses, with or without scullery, built in blocks of 8 and abutting directly on to the street: sanitary conveniences and ash pits were built in groups in the gated yards between the blocks. The remaining 18%, built after 1890, were 3-5 room dwellings with side-scullery, many of them having a tiny garden or yard in front and own water-closet.[63] The slum and poor areas of the inner city area contained long rows of back-to-back housing built between 1815 and 1872 and some built between 1781 and 1815. Here houses were crammed 60, 70, 80 or even 90 to the acre.[64]

Despite the fact that there was no housing shortgage in Leeds immediately prior to the war, many of the working class lived in accommodation overcrowded both in terms of living space within the dwelling and the number of dwellings to the acre. In 1914 it was estimated that between 65% and 80% of this class nationally lived in houses with one living room and 3 or fewer bedrooms.[65] In 1901 just over 10% of the Leeds population was living in overcrowded conditions (i.e. more than 2 persons per room) and 31.38% of all houses had 3 rooms or less.[66] There was a very high density of population in slum areas: Cavalier Street, Bank had an average of 288 persons per acre during the period 1922-31, while in Burley Hill, a "good" working-class housing area of "modern" scullery back-to-backs, the density was 175 persons per acre during the period 1924-33.[67] The overcrowding problem existed in all working-class areas, not merely in the worst slums, whilst many new houses having high rents stood empty, as they did in other towns. In 1913 there were 3,574 unoccupied houses.[68]

Life in the working-class areas was both very friendly and very informal,[69] characteristics engendered by the environment. Pre-1890 housing, with its overcrowding, its shared toilets and its doors opening straight on to the street, encouraged a complex, active and, above all, friendly group life.[70] It was said of Armley,

> "You'd no need to be lonely because you'd take your brush and sweep outside and always find someone to talk to. Slip up to t'dustbin or t'toilet, you'd always find somebody to talk to for five minutes. Sit on your step and somebody would come and sit with you."[71]

Children played outside whenever possible. In poor houses there was little comfort: there may have been only one chair and that would be Father's.[72] Neither the style of living nor the housing layout allowed much room for privacy. (Because a lot of working-class recruits were not used to privacy, they did not resent its absence to the same extent as men of other classes).

In the absence of a welfare state, the residents looked to each other for physical, economic and psychological security in times of adversity:

> "Sickness, unemployment, poverty, removal: in the struggle to counter these unsettling conditions of its daily life, the working class looked to neighbourhoods for stability and correctedness. Neighbourhood meant more than houses and streets. It meant the mutually beneficial relationships

one formed with others; a sort of social symbiosis." Neighbourliness meant being ever-ready to assist in an emergency; it implied reciprocity - looking out for one another.[74] When, for instance, a woman was confined, a stream of neighbours would rally round to care for her, look after the children, do the housework and shopping, get the meals.[75] Respondents recalled how people "used to stick together and help each other". Mrs A Greenhough, a former resident of the slum Pea Street, York Road, where most of the houses were one-up and one-down, wrote "There was a real spirit of neighbourliness in the street, even though a lot of poverty existed."[76] As the old music hall song had it, "It's the poor wot 'elps the poor".

In these tightly-knit communities people shared in each other's lives to an unusually high degree. "Family ties were deep and strong and 'give and take' was the order of the day ... more important in accounting for the courage and fortitude of these people, was the fact that constantly they drew strength from their kin and neighbours."[77] A widespread neighbourhood custom was "popping-in":[78] to exchange gossip, impart news, offer to get shopping, offer or obtain small favours. Doors were not locked and a chair or stool was kept just inside the doorway for the neighbour to sit on. The outdoor equivalent of "popping-in" was "kalling" (phoen. ˈKɑ̱tɪŋ) which was indulged in by adult members of both sexes and all ages. "Popping-in" and "kalling" together formed the social cement which knit the community together. The result was that everybody in a given neighbourhood knew everybody else and everybody else's business. In summertime "people lived much in the streets"[79] and on fine evenings sat on doorsteps or on stools or chairs in the street, swapping tales and gossip, often until the early hours.[81] Suggestions have been made to the author that this custom, which helped to strengthen community feeling, was induced by the fact that bed bugs appeared in older housing by the thousand in warm weather and were entirely beyond the control of the householders.[81] From time to time street entertainments would be organised, with neighbours "doing turns": singing, dancing, playing musical instruments (sometimes homemade), or telling jokes, occasionally combined with a communal supper of rabbit stew or baked potatoes.[82] These were known as "laiking neets" or "merry neets", and both the organised and impromptu concerts in the Leeds Rifles bore more than a passing resemblance to them.

13.4 The problem of combat stress

The infantryman in the battle zone was subjected to a barrage of emotiona mental and physical stresses.

> "To enter combat is to undergo an intense emotional ordeal ... A state of fear, tension and anxiety is so prevalent among front-line soldiers that it must be regarded as a virtually normal response."[83]

In addition,

> "among the special stresses of military life which are relevant to psychiatry may be mentioned lack of privacy, discomfort, a hustled and regimented life, boredom in leisure time, interruption of the chosen career, less congenial employment, and a mode of life which produces special strain in certain men with homosexual tendencies. For the overseas soldier specially we must, of course, add to the list the tendency to 'separation anxiety' and all the manifold stresses of battle."[84]

The infantryman's work was undoubtedly dangerous, arduous, unspectacular and unrewarding and called for a higher standard of individual morale than any other: battle stress was greater and more prolonged and the degree of danger and discomfort involved was greater.[85] The list of front-line stresses given by L.H. Bartemeier et al. included reaction to specific types of shell-fire; the frustration and resultant anxiety from immobilisation enforced by harassing fire (often cited as the most severe fear-producing situation); horror and grief; "lack of relief, and any failure to receive adequate and prompt supply of mail, food, clothing and ammunition"; "the constant danger and discomforts of being hungry, cold and wet, and the all-pervading physical and mental exhaustion of continuous fighting."[86] Continual uncertainty is listed by The American Soldier[87] as one of the main types of combat stress and it is commonly emphasised by participant-authors. Considered from the standpoint of the individual ranker or junior officer, war must inevitably appear a meaningless and hopelessly chaotic muddle; the soldier seldom knew what was happening, or where he was going. Whether this represented a source of stress of the magnitude often postulated must be open to doubt, however. The well-adjusted soldier accepted it philosophically as part of the natural order of things. WWII GIs coined an acronym which encapsulated this philosophy: SNAFU, which stood for "Situation Normal - All Fouled Up" (or words to that effect).

The well-trained high-morale soldier who belonged to a unit of high morale and esprit de corps and strong discipline had a high threshold of tolerance to stress: he adjusted best to combat and was best able to cope and to continue coping, with its manifold stresses. The effects of continuous exposure to combat stress are cumulative, however. It is accepted that no soldier is immune and that, if stress is sufficiently severe, adverse psychological symptoms may appear in anyone.[88] Nevertheless, although sooner or later it began to tell upon the "average" front-line soldier and he approached or reached the stage when a break became imperative, "a short period of rest behind the line was all that was usually necessary in order to restore him to a state in which he could 'carry on'."[89] Relatively few men developed an anxiety state or some other psychosomatic response to stress severe enough to incapacitate them for full duty. Most were able to master their anxieties or at least to come to terms with them.[90] Those that were not, the men of very low morale, became psychiatric casualties.

Since no proper statistics were kept, it is impossible to arrive at an accurate or even approximate estimate of the number of psychiatric casualtie sustained by the British Army in World War I. The facts that in 1918 20% of service pensioners were receiving awards for functional nervous and mental disease claimed as having arisen out of war service, and that by 1921, 65,000 pensions had been granted for this group of disorder[91] are no real guide. Only a few suggestive figures are available. The German Army is said to have allocated 5% of base hospital beds for psychiatric admissions.[92] When a representative sample of British casualties admitted to medical units, 1916-1920, totalling 1,043, 653, was analysed, nervous and mental disorders came 11th on the list, totalling 28,429 (2.7% of total), compared with, for instance, 111,923 diseases of the digestive system (10.7% of total). The percentages of nervous disorders compared to sick and wounded of the BEF admitted in the weeks ending 30/3/18 and 13/4/18 and during the period 8/6/18 to 7/12/18 were: officers 1.21% and Other Ranks 0.68%.[93]

In WWII psychiatric patients accounted for 6% of total admissions to British military hospitals.[94] Two important factors influencing this figure have to be borne in mind: the vastly-improved diagnosis of psychiatric disorders and the fact that the cumulative stress to which the combat soldier was subjected in WWII was incomparably greater than that experienced in WWI. (Two major sources of combat stress in WWII were attacks on troops by divebombers, and worries about air raids on the British civilian population.) For example, in the period within 10 days of D Day, 10-20% of casualties in 21 Army Group were psychiatric cases of "combat exhaustion", whilst every survivor of Wingate's 1943 Expedition was regarded as being "a psychiatric casualty for all practical purposes".[95]

The terms "shellshock" (a serious misnomer) and battle or war or combat neurosis have conveyed the erroneous impression that the stresses of war are alone responsible for the various psychogenic disorders which these terms embrace, though the vulnerability of the patient's own personality was a factor of fundamental importance. Psychiatric authors are agreed that there are no essential differences between the psychogenic disorders of combat and those of civilian life. Although all the various forms of neurosis that were labelled "shellshock" were known before the war, misguided public and medical opinion elevated them to "the dignity of a new war disease" which "excited more general interest, attention and sympathy than any other" medical condition, with the inevitable effect upon the ordinary soldier: it became not only "a most desirable complaint from which to suffer" but also "an honourable means of escape to the fainthearted" and, as the signs and symptoms became universally known, the percentage incidence among fresh troops noticeably increased.[96]

The terms "shellshock" and "neurasthenia" were used indiscriminately and included exhaustion states, anxiety states, depression, and different types of hysteria, including conversion hysteria (mutism and paralysis).

Neurotic symptoms[97] are almost invariably insidious in their onset: the neurotic reaction of combat is a progressive process. Only very rarely did a traumatic experience produce a psychopathological state de novo.[98] Psychiatrists describe the development of a psychoneurosis in three or four phases. The initial phase of a "combat neurosis" comprised prodromal manifestations indicative of approaching breakdown. The most common of these were: tenseness, fatiguability, sleep difficulties, restlessness, increasing consumption of tobacco and alcohol, a marked tendency towards unsociability and irritability, loss of interest in the job and disinclination for effort (often described by the soldier himself as being "thoroughly fed up"), jumpiness, and a tendency to be hypercritical of superiors, especially of impersonal higher authority. In the second phase, the "hyper-reactive" stage of Swank and Marchand, or "fatigue syndrome", or anxiety state, which WWI soldiers describe as "war weariness", these symptoms intensified: fatiguability became a constant state of fatigue that could not be relieved by rest periods of 48 hours or so; sleep was disturbed by increasingly terrifying battle dreams; there was difficulty in concentration, loss of self-confidence, diminution of initiative, keenness and efficiency; jumpiness became hypersensitivity to auditory and visual stimuli of battle; hypercriticism of superiors turned into acute cynicism and embittered discontent:

> "This was shown in mild form by his statements that the campaign was being run poorly and that things in general were not working out as smoothly as they had once. The blame for this was always placed on other

> units, which he felt were not performing their mission, or on some higher headquarters, which did not 'know the score'." * 99

Fear reactions appeared more frequently and the soldier often became emotionally unstable, quarrelsome, unable to control his temper, becoming angry for trivial reasons, and showing other deviations from normal behaviour. Emotional crises, such as crying fits and attacks of violent and uncontrollable trembling (known as "the shakes") were common. Physical signs like weight loss and headaches appeared. This phase could last several weeks or several months, depending on the severity of combat stress. In the penultimate phase, new symptoms, which Swank and Marchand referred to collectively as "emotional exhaustion", began to appear. The anxious stare became an emotionless expression, anxiety disappeared to be replaced by apathy, listlessness and lassitude, accompanied by a general slowing up of mental processes. He was overwhelmed by feelings of absolute hopelessness and became preoccupied with thoughts of death. Finally, the soldier sank into a semi-stuporous state of complete apathy; he had become "a non-smiling, rigid-faced person with lustreless eyes." This was a condition requiring prolonged treatment.

The anxiety state which the serviceman developed as he "wore out" was sometimes called "operational fatigue". This was described as a typical syndrome of breakdown occurring in "normal", essentially stable individuals who, by a combination of continued stress, prolonged spells of duty in the face of danger, and cumulative physical fatigue particularly associated with sleep deprivation, develop a condition which is roughly half-fatigue and half-emotional illness.[102]

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*Grinker and Spiegel noted that patients suffering from "combat neuroses" tended to show much more aggressiveness and hostility in their verbalisations and behaviour than was characteristic of their pre-combat personalities. They were resentful, "openly angry" and "destructively critical", and tended to criticise higher command vociferously.[100] Table 1, Chap. 9, The American Soldier, Vol. II, pp. 414-5, clearly shows that military psychoneurotics do not have the same attitudes as men classified as "normal". Perhaps Siegfried Sassoon's notorious 1917 protest, "A Soldier's Declaration", should be judged in the light of his known history of psychoneurosis. The literary critic V.S. Pritchett shrewdly observed that "the cliché of almost all the war novels" of the 1928-31 period was that in which the hero conveys the notion "that the whole war has been declared against him personally."[101] Aldington's Death of a Hero is a prime example of the genre. The prevalence of neurotic symptoms in the memoirs, novels and poetry of the "Disenchanted School" (see Appendix I, Section 6) ought, perhaps, to throw considerable doubt on their possible value as historical sources.

The typical state of combat personnel at the end of a tour of duty, particularly during a period of active operations, was one of acute fatigue produced by a combination of prolonged nervous tension and sleep deprivation, as described in Chap. 11. This is the state to which ordinary soldiers refer as "battle fatigue". Plate 17 in D. Winter's Death's Men and the cover photograph of P. Fussell's The Great War and Modern Memory show the typical facial appearance of sufferers from battle fatigue, instantly recognisable by all battle veterans, the numb, anaesthetised look that WWII GIs called "the two-thousand-yard stare".[103] Fred Majdalany spoke of survivors of the Battle of Cassino as being "in that condition in which the eyes stare without seeing"; John Tucker described men returning from the Somme front line as "like so many living corpses, their faces white, with eyes fixed and staring as if they had just seen into the depths of hell. God knows what they had been through."[104] This was not a form of psychiatric illness, but a state of combined physical and emotional fatigue, requiring sleep, a good rest and change of scene. In WWII the worst cases were treated by RMOs at the Aid Post by a term of "continuous narcosis" lasting up to 10 days, at the end of which they were normally fit to return to active duty.[105] Normally, acute exhaustion states passed off after a few days' rest.[106] If the bad cases failed to get adequate rest, however, they usually began to develop neurotic symptoms relatively quickly.

Brigadier G.W.B. James, consultant in psychiatry to the MEF 1940-43, to the Army at Home 1943-5, saw in both World Wars

> "fighting units reduced to such an utter weariness of body and mind from long-continued calls upon physique and courage that morale had ebbed to a perilously low level ... experience suggested that there was seldom more than fatigue behind the deadly apathy that seemed to grip officers and men."[107]

The incidence of "shellshock" in WWI was found to conform to certain patterns. Firstly, as might be expected, it frequently rose considerably during and after severe military operations. Actively advancing troops, however, were less apt to break down than inactive or retreating troops.[108] The "shellshock" casualty figures for the British infantry in France given in the Official History of the Medical Services show for the period July-December 1916 an approximate 4-fold increase compared with the previous 6 months: officers increased from 183 to 696 (3.8 times) and other ranks from 3,274 to 13,430 (4.1 times).[109] This "explosion" coincided with (a) a sudden escalation of the war, characterised by prolonged fighting in bad trenches and continuous heavy bombardments, and (b) a significant decrease in the length of training given to replacements.[110]

Secondly, observers in various armies were agreed that the incidence of neuroses was relatively greater in certain categories. In descending order of magnitude these were: fresh troops arriving in the front line; battle-tested troops after prolonged trench duty without a break; men over 40, particularly married men; hurriedly- and sketchily-trained men.[111] These observations were amply confirmed during WWII when the first two categories were found to constitute the two main types of psychiatric casualty. The mismanagement of reinforcements, particularly men in the 18-22 age group who had never previously seen action, presented a very serious problem to both army psychiatrists and commanders.[112]

Dr C.S. Myers, consultant psychologist to the BEF and author of Shell Shock in France 1914-18 (1940), was convinced of the dependence of shell-shock on

> "a previous psychoneurotic history and inherited predisposition, on inadequate examination and selection of soldiers fitted for the front line, and on the lack of proper discipline and esprit de corps."[113]

Many psychiatric authors have placed heavy, if not chief, emphasis on predisposition and previous personal history as aetiologic factors in neuropsychiatric conditions seen in the services.[114] Predisposition was also a major aetiologic factor in psychosomatic disorders and neuroses not included under "shellshock". A common, but militarily very important, neurosis of infantrymen was "disordered action of the heart" (DAH), or "soldier's heart", in which the patient presented cardiac irregularities in the absence of organic heart disease. It had been first noted by army doctors in the American Civil War, and was common in contemporary civilian society in both sexes of all ages. Significant factors were found to be poor physique, a sedentary occupation in civil life and a training period too short and rushed to build up physical fitness and endurance, but the chief factor involved was emotional stress and the typical patient was a dependent personality. Various authorities estimated that about 50% of cases had commenced in civil life and a further 12% during training. At least half of the patients suffering from the psychosomatic disorder "dyspepsia" fell ill before they had seen any front-line service and a further one-third developed symptoms during their first week in the firing line.[115] As Maj Gen F.M. Richardson has so aptly remarked, these men had literally no heart or no stomach for the fight.[116] A very large number of psychoneurotic casualties in both world wars were found to have not been subject to any type of combat.[117] Eli Ginsberg and his associates, who analysed the 754,000 discharges from ineffectiveness from the US armed forces, 1942-5, found that the vast majority of all neuropsychiatric casualties had developed their conditions outside combat zones.[118]

The Shellshock Committee was convinced that the totally inadequate medical examination of recruits during the first three years of war had been to a considerable extent responsible for the Army's psychiatric problem: as a result of unselective recruiting methods, "a great number of men who were ill-suited to stand the strain of military service" were admitted into the Army and had "contributed a very high proportion of the cases of hysteria and traumatic neurosis commonly called 'shellshock'."[119] The Americans attempted to screen out the psychologically vulnerable, but the British made no such attempt either before or during World War I. Before the war, however, informal methods to discover abnormal fear reactions in recruits had been used. According to all the Regular respondents, certain exercises on gymnastic apparatus and also the methods of instruction followed in the riding school had been deliberately employed to weed out the faint-heart who could then be discharged "as unlikely to make an efficient soldier" (if he had not already solved the problem himself by deserting). The results could be seen in the autumn of 1914. Official statistics indicate only a tiny number of cases of psychiatric breakdown in the infantry of the BEF between September and December 1914,[120] and no additional evidence appears to exist that would suggest otherwise. Ex-Leeds Rifleman Sgt S.C. Myers described on 18th April 1915 his first encounters with Regulars:

> "Laughing, jovial fellows they all are. Some of them have been as many as six times in the trenches so they will have experienced some horrors. One reads in the English newspapers about men who return from the front not wounded but with broken nerves. Well, the old Regulars I have met say it is all moonshine, and that if there are any such hospital cases the men in question ought never to have been passed for service. At any rate, the men I have so far met do not appear to ail anything."[121]

The available evidence suggests that psychiatric casualties formed a very small proportion of the total sick and wounded, and furthermore, that front-line soldiers of more-than-minimal service formed a minority of all psychiatric casualties. The reasons lay in the generally high average standard of morale, discipline and esprit de corps obtaining in the BEF (indicated, for instance, by good officer-other rank relations) which was the result of good management of troops at all levels, from unit upwards, and of the organisational practices of GHQ. Prophylactic measures concerning the psychiatric health of the combat soldier advocated by the Shellshock Committee and their witnesses included short tours of line duty, adequate rest and organised recreation behind the line, avoidance of monotony by changing sectors etc, the controlled use of rum, and constant attention to the men's physical welfare both in and out of the line.[122] These were, as indicated in Chaps. 9 and 10, put into operation during the war as frequently and as extensively as the military situation would permit, but were continually plagued or frustrated by manpower problems. Interior economy, all aspects of welfare provision including medical services, and certainly the rotation of divisions, appear to have been better in the British Army than in any other. The effect on morale in the last six months and particularly during the last 100 days of the war, if judged only on military results, is striking: for example, from July 18th the British Army captured almost as many prisoners and guns as the French, US and Belgian armies put together.[123] Maj Gen McGhie considered that individual encouragement was important in the prevention of breakdown.[124] This appears to have been properly appreciated by the officers and NCOs of the Leeds Rifles. For example, Cpl 2812 Percy Shepherd, 1/8th, said of Capt Wilkinson

> "He was a real friend to me. He was a right grand fella and a wonderful example to the men. He was very encouraging and used to say, 'Come on lads, show 'em what you can do'."[125]

Squadron-Leader Tyrell thought it important to "direct men's thoughts away from their own persons and their inevitable conditions of life" and he urged the inculcation of "the habit of cheerfulness and the gift of laughter, and a sense of humour."[126] In November 1915 Major H.D. Bousfield, 1/7th, gave advice to the new officers waiting at the Divisional Base to be sent up the line. After giving excellent practical hints on keeping rifle and ammunition clean, he told them,

> "When back at rest don't talk or think about your dangers and escapes. If at Le Touquet hospital wonder how the first hole in the golf links looks."[127]

The psychiatric problem was not new to the British Army. The proper management of fear and anxiety in both the individual soldier and his unit as a whole had been a major preoccupation for generations. Not for nothing had the initial aim of training been declared to be "the development of a soldierly spirit"; not for nothing had prewar training aimed at (a) inculcating the highest possible standard of morale, discipline, esprit de corps, esteem of officers, and confidence both individually and collective and (b) ensuring and maintaining mental, physical and moral fitness and technical efficiency. Such training, the Shellshock Committee agreed in 1922, lessened the incidence of mental and nervous disorders.[128] Nor did the Army need a psychiatrist to tell it that the "protective armour" of discipline and comradeship did much to safeguard the combat soldier "from feelings of anxiety and insecurity."[129] The Army was already convinced of the importance of having good officers who provided leadership and example and who supervised the interior economy of the men. Lord Gort put forward the traditional view when he told the Shellshock Committee that the whole question of "shellshock" was one of morale and esprit de corps, and he maintained that in the "face of strong morale and esprit de corps 'shell shock' would be practically non-existent." All the witnesses, both medical and military, were unanimous that good morale, a high standard of discipline and esprit de corps were the prime essential factors "in diminishing the incidence of nervous and mental disorders in the field", and the Committee was satisfied that "to neglect morale in any of its aspects is to invite large and unnecessary casualties in battle and times of stress."[130] This is now a British Army axiom.

There was a general consensus of opinion among the witnesses that the incidence of "shellshock" varied inversely with the morale of the troops concerned. This phenomenon was repeatedly noted by WWII psychiatrists, as was the associated fact, first noted by Dr W. Brown and his colleagues during WWI,[131] that different front-line battalions, apparently made up of similar human material and fighting under similar conditions, produced startling differences in their numbers of psychiatric breakdowns and parallel differences in the frequency among their personnel of all types of disciplinar troubles. In almost every case the negative factors of morale, poor leadershop, poor team-spirit and poor training in the past were found to be of predominant importance in the more troublesome unit, whilst in units where the quality of leadership, degree of social cohesion, morale, and esprit de corps were at a high level, the number of anxiety cases was significantly lower.[132]

According to respondents, there were very few cases of shellshock in the Leeds Rifles battalions (or in the 1/5th or 1/6th WYR); Territorial John Tucker testified there were only occasional cases in the Kensingtons.[133] Although the men of any appreciable service had evidently experienced some diminution of individual morale over a period, comparatively few appear to have suffered from symptoms of severe anxiety. The vast majority had suffered from little more than typical battle fatigue. 1/8th respondents asked to recall cases of shellshock all named the same man and no other: 2212 Johnny Peck of D Coy who, barely 16 years of age, had what was described as "an instant nervous breakdown" when his twin brother Willie was killed in August 1915. The only 1/7th respondent who could recall a possible case was 1522 Sgt Jack E.T. Wilson who cited his platoon-sergeant, Sgt Patrick, who refused to come out of his dugout. One respondent only, 833 Sgt Joseph W. Goldsack, 1/7th, had personally suffered from shellshock. This was in the autumn of 1916 after more than a year at the front; he had been slightly wounded in 1915. He appeared to be a classic example of the "'Old Sergeant' Syndrome" described by Dr R. Sobel:[134] "operational fatigue" and repeated losses of men of his platoon, to whom he had been attached, together with the prolonged heavy responsibilities of his position, appeared to have been the major causes of his breakdown. He had retained extremely strong attachments to both his platoon and the Regiment; this is characteristic of the syndrome.

The case of a comrade found to have been struck dumb when rescued from a collapsed trench, recalled by 1788 John Allman, 1/8th (see Chap. 10, Section 10.1), may not be an example of conversion hysteria, since he may well have suffered brain damage in the incident. The reactions of Rfm Lazenby and Bandsman Bennett to the trauma of sudden death of comrades during their first tour of trench duty (see Chap. 9, Section 9.3) were in no way uncommon among soldiers in general and both quickly recovered from the experience. Peck was invalided to the UK and after coming out of hospital spent the rest of the war in UK training establishments as a mess orderly. After assessment and treatment, Goldsack was given a medical discharge and awarded a life pension and was able to resume his civilian occupation at Kitson's. The importance of a good RMO was revealed at the Shellshock Enquiry where all medical witnesses with front-line experience stressed the importance of treating men with developing symptoms of "combat neurosis" in the waggon lines.[135] According to Sgt Goldsack, the 1/7th RMO had been hoping to treat him in the waggon lines, but higher authority had decreed he must be removed to one of the new treatment centres.[136]

To judge by the 7th Bn Officers' Casualty List Book 1915-17 a very small and below average number of psychiatric casualties occurred among the Leeds Rifles officers. Only one case diagnosed "neurasthenia", 2/Lt S.J.C. Harvey, 2/7th, and two cases diagnosed "shellshock", Major F.A.L. Wood, 2/7th, and Capt G. St. Clair Stockwell, 1/7th, appear in the book. The first two named had been at the front only a very short time, but Capt Stockwell had been at the front continuously for nearly 17 months when he was taken to hospital on 4th September 1916 with contusions to the back. He was later invalided to the UK with "shellshock". He had been buried and trapped in a trench collapse during a heavy bombardment on 3rd September. His rescuers testified they had found him swearing at the top of his voice and bellowing "Get me out of here!" One man, never dreaming his officer could be injured, had assumed he was "kidding around" as usual and playfully admonished him, saying, "Now, sir, you know the orders are that all wounded must be left." Capt Stockwell was noted by another respondent on 14th July, a day of over 100 casualties, to be already under severe strain. As RMO he was being obliged to tend or see lying dead many of his personal friends. 1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th, testified how very upset he had been when

Cpl Kit Wall, with whom he had served for 7 years, had been brought in wounded.[137]

Several officers were admitted to hospital "sick, case not diagnosed". This does not necessarily indicate a psychiatric illness since the condition may have been trench fever. One of these officers may have suffered psychiatric breakdown: 2/Lt W.S. Dimery, 1/7th, who was admitted on 31/8/16 and had only lately returned from the funeral of his brother, a subaltern in the Leeds Pals, who had died of wounds. 2635 L/Cpl R. Frank Charge, 1/7th, a member of his platoon, testified that by the time they arrived in Aveluy Wood on the night of July 2nd, Dimery was "a nervous wreck".[138]

No statistics are available for the 1/8th, 2/8th and 8th. One 1/8th officer was said by respondents to have become a victim of "shellshock": Capt W. Berry.[139]

Brigadier James was of the opinion that an officer or NCO could last for a year of unrelieved operations, men perhaps two, "after which there is an increasing risk of nervous breakdown, or of loss of interest, and of delinquency with consequent failure in morale and fighting efficiency."[140] When 2668 Sgt Alwyne G. Atkinson, 1/7th, returned to duty after wounds in 1916, this hitherto invaluable NCO started to behave in an increasingly self-centred and irresponsible manner and was demoted,(and promoted again), several times for neglect of duty, drunkenness, and using insubordinate language to his CSM. His delinquency culminated in the early summer of 1917 when he and a fellow sergeant stayed out all night without a pass. Col Tetley made an example of both men. They were arraigned before a Field General Court Martial, found guilty of neglect of duty and ceremoniously stripped of their badges of rank in front of the whole battalion. No respondent, not even fellow-Woodhousites, felt sorry for Atkinson, who in their view had brought public disgrace on the Regiment. He was sent to D Coy (said to stand for "Deadheads" or "Delinquents") to be batman to CSM Joe Carter whose Christian influence, it was hoped, would effect an improvement in his moral character.[141] Sgt Harry Deakin of the 1/7th was known to 2/Lt Whitham during the spring and summer of 1916 as a conscientious and dedicated lance-corporal but to fellow-sergeant 3191 William Colbeck 2 years later as an irresponsible drunkard who was court-martialled after refusing to don his battle order, refusing to obey the orders of his officer (given at gun-point) and attacking the officer and Sgt Colbeck in a drunken rage.[142]

In Lord Moran's view, soldiers are not seasoned by constant fighting, but "wear out" in war like clothes. F.M. Slim held very similar opinions: he likened courage to having money in the bank: it is expendable and can be used up, but a soldier can be trained not to draw too heavily or rapidly on his stock of courage.[143] This fact had begun to be realised in WWI. Richard Aldington considered 6 months in the line the limit for an individual, while Robert Graves claimed that an officer's usefulness due to development of neurasthenia had seriously declined after 6 months' service and that after 12-15 months he was "often worse than useless".[144]

Attempts were made during and after WWII to estimate the maximum period during which fighting men can be relied upon to do their best and to establish time limits in combat beyond which the infantryman was likely to become ineffective due to psychiatric breakdown. Peak effectiveness was reported by Appel and Beebe to have been reached after 3 to 5 months (90 aggregate days) of combat. After somewhere in the region of 200 and 240 aggregate days of actual combat he "wore out", i.e. became non-effective. The fact that the period of tolerance was about twice as long (about 400 combat days) in the British Army was attributed to a policy of more frequent reliefs than obtained in the US Army. The infantryman of the US 5th Army in Italy, for instance, was kept in the line without relief for 20-30 days, frequently for 30-40 and occasionally for 80 days. There was some controversy about the length of combat life. Many of the line officers in the units studied by Appel and Beebe were emphatic that the psychiatric limit of the average soldier was considerably less than 200-240 combat days and maintained that most men became non-effective after 180 or even 140 days. One of the informants of L.H. Bartemeier _et al_. considered 180 days was the maximum figure. The sergeant patients of R. Sobel had a combat life of 180-240 days on average, the shortest being 150 aggregate days, the longest 350. (In his paper, Dr Sobel refers to an unpublished survey of a veteran division that showed that after 210 combat days only 12% of the original members of a rifle platoon would remain in the line). The neurotically predisposed soldiers in S.K. Weinberg's survey had an average combat life of 3.74 months, the non-predisposed 5.05 months. Data presented in _The American Soldier_ indicate a definite peak in combat efficiency: among riflemen the peak was reached 4 months (122 days) and among NCOs 6-7 months (183-213 days) after first entering combat.[145] Swank and Marchand's figures are not comparable, since very severe and continuous stress was involved. All the data thrown up by these various surveys suggest that there is a genuine point of diminishing returns in combat experience.

These American research results cannot, of course, be extrapolated to the BEF of WWI, not least because of the lower cumulative stress of WWI and the operational tour system operated on the Western Front. In terms of actual time spent "under fire", 240 combat days in WWII were perhaps roughly equivalent to about 2 years at the front with the BEF in WWI.

13.5 The military organisation

Though the first-line Leeds Riflemen apparently received the same training as the Regular infantryman, the end product was not identical. Discipline, morale and esprit de corps were all present in both battalions in very considerable strength, yet the character of each differed in many respects from its Regular counterpart. The reasons for these differences were manifold, but many appeared to be connected with the characteristics of the type of organisation to which the Leeds Rifles and other TF units belonged.

A military organisation, with its diversity of skills and specialities and variety of tasks it might be called upon to perform, is a complex organisation and shares many of the problems of other organisations of comparable complexity. Its institutional application of violence to its tasks sets it apart and gives it its specifically military character.[146]

A. Etzioni has classified complex organisations according to the type of compliance with the organisation of its lower participants.[147]

He classifies the US military unit as a dual compliance structure, predominantly utilitarian (calculative involvement of personnel) in peacetime and predominantly normative (moral commitment of personnel) in wartime, having coercive compliance as a very strong secondary pattern.[148] He could well have classified the British Regular Army unit in a similar fashion. The peacetime TF unit, however, was an intermittent structure, i.e. its task required only intermittent activity, and as such had to rely relatively heavily on normative compliance.[149] It was intermittent for all ranks, except the permanent full-time staff. Although the unit had a permanent existence, compliance was required only sporadically, for relatively short periods, and for the control of comparatively unroutinised activities. These, says Etzioni, "are conditions that enhance the creation and maintenance of highly normative compliance; they are one set of conditions which allow organisations to be charismatic in the long run."[150] Its chief organisational characteristic was the very considerable change in amount and pace of activity it showed over time, having little or almost no activity over long periods and a high level of performance over short periods. The TF unit maintained integration by the mailed monthly orders (the equivalent of a club newsletter) and by the monthly battalion parade which served mainly as an expressive function and was much like a collective tribal ceremony in which the various segments of the tribe met each other and their leaders in ritual activity. The unit also applied various reinforcing structures and processes to maintain the commitment of its members in the dormant period, such as the many-sided communal life of the barracks. These gave the TF its unique social characteristics which included, in the Leeds Rifles, communications to the dispersed participants from the permanent staff under the control of the adjutant, and short periods of activation outside of the Annual Training, i.e. drill nights, weekend camps, march-outs, field days, social functions and activities. Distribution of participation over time showed an attendance pattern perhaps typical of many normative intermittent organisations: a number of loyal (regular) participants, the bulk of intermittent participants, and a number of rare (minimal) participants.

The TF unit was an artificial society, not occurring naturally, but one deliberately constituted to advance a specific culture goal, the protection of the nation state from foreign invasion. According to Etzioni's theory, organisations that serve culture goals must rely predominantly on normative compliance.[151] This would explain why the Regular Army unit became a predominantly normative organisation during periods of war. (Note that it has been often claimed that British Army discipline relaxed somewhat as the war progressed.)[152] In peace and in war the Leeds Rifles relied very heavily on both normative powers and the moral involvement of its participants, despite the initial calculative involvement of many recruits noted earlier. Coercive compliance had only a very minor role (except during the initial war training period): coercion as an organisational power remained essentially in the background. A.D. Lindsay pointed out that mores, which in other circumstances rest on moral commitment and normative powers, require the support of coercion in the form of laws when they are expected to hold for all people all the time.[153] The kinds of power an organisation can employ depend inter alia on the resources it can command and the social licence it can attain. Organisation goals are determined in part by the values of the social environment which include public opinion, the electorate, the media and vested interests.[154] These values in World War I appear to have strengthened the normative powers of both the TF, already strong, and the Regular Army. It has been pointed out in Chap. 3 how vital local support was to the individual unit.

There seems little doubt that, by Etzioni's criteria,[155] the wartime as well as the peacetime Leeds Rifles battalions were normative organisations. In a normative organisation, normative power is the major source of control over most lower participants, whose orientation to the organisation is characterised by high commitment. A closer and more personal contact between lower participants and management than in other types of organisation is characteristic of the normative organisation and this tends to increase involvement and commitment. Normative organisations thus tend to be comparatively egalitarian and also to stress the distinction between members and non-members. Consensus between the different ranks on general values, on organisational goals, on means, on participation and performance obligations is typical. (This consensus may be thought to indicate a low degree of coercion.) The theory suggests that normative organisations are best supervised, and are more effective if so supervised, by expressive (group-oriented, or employee-centred) leaders because expressive elites are closer to the normative purposes and compliance structure of the organisation. Virtually all Leeds Rifles officers emphasised the expressive role. It is functional for expressive elites to subordinate instrumental (task-oriented) ones in normative organisations. It may be noted that in a British military unit the adjutant and quartermaster are both subordinate to the CO and 2 i/c. (Although expressive leadership appears to produce the best results in the routine military activities of normative combat units, it is essential for leadership, to be successful in the extreme situations of active military operations, to become task-oriented.) Etzioni hypothesises that culture goals may not be effectively pursued without at least a measure of expressive leadership. He describes charisma as "the nuclear energy of normative organisations" and holds that it is functionally required in positions which require moral involvement of subordinates. He suggests that in normative combat units all, or most, line positions are filled by charismatics. This was certainly the case in the first-line Leeds Rifles and appeared to be also true of the other TF units for which information could be obtained, the 1/5th, 1/6th, 2/6th WYR, the 1/4th DWR, 1/4th Suffolks and 1/5th SR. Etzioni suggests, quoting several studies by other researchers, that there exists an association between compliance positions or ranks and the personality types holding them: this postulates that normative positions would be held by non-authoritarians. The relationship between personality types and vocations is fairly well established. W.J. MacKinnon and R. Centers demonstrated marked differences in authoritarianism among various occupational strata. They found that the lowest percentage (23%) of authoritarians occurred amongst professionals.[156] Professionals did appear to be considerably over-represented in the TF officer class; there seem to have been very few authoritarians among the Leeds Rifles officers.

Since organisations are social systems composed of both formal and informal structures, it was considered crucially important to attempt to assess the extent of the informal, i.e. unofficial, social organisation present in the first-line Leeds Rifles battalions.

13.6 The informal social system and the role of primary groups

The informal organisation, a type of organisation important in virtually all forms of work activity, has a profound influence on the functioning of the entire formal organisation. Kurt Lang has remarked, "It is difficult to overrate the importance of interpersonal ties and of informal groups for organisational effectiveness."[157] Since it is a sociological commonplace that informal adaptations appear most clearly in total institutions, its consequences for military management are especially important.

Informal social systems in business and industry are commonly portrayed by sociologists as defensive structures that protect members collectively from the impersonal demands of "higher authority" of the formal organisation and insure the individual against the loss of his personality in an impersonal system. The function of such informal systems is thus seen as being essentially obstructive or even subversive of the purposes of the formal organisation,[158] and Tony Ashworth bases his whole analysis of the WWI "Live and Let Live" system on this thesis. The military informal social system can be such a defensive structure, especially when organisational leadership is poor;[159] examples are black market or smuggling rings, the "Live and Let Live" system.[160] Defensive structures, however, are not typical of the military informal social system. A number of American investigations, such as Roger W. Little's,[161] have emphasised that informal systems can operate either to facilitate or to impede the goals of the formal military organisation.[162] Experienced observers and participants will be very familiar, for instance, with the way the task-oriented behaviour of an informal system operates within the formal structure of a military bureaucracy: people who attempt to resist the informal system are accused of "going by or sticking by the book". Coates and Pellegrin give several examples of the way in which the informal system promotes efficiency, zeal and initiative, particularly when commanding officers have adopted a laissez-faire attitude to the system or actively participated in it themselves.[163]

Informal systems were understandably well-developed in the TF officer class whose members often failed to perceive either point or commonsense in Army bureaucratic procedures and became impatient with, or even contemptuous of, them. "Old boy networks" flourished, for example, among the officers of the Leeds-based units of the 49th Division, as witness the favoured medical treatment obtained for Signaller Reynard, and the 1/7th's summoning of the assistance of the Otley Howitzer battery and of the 1/6th Bn Bombers. Hardly surprisingly, TF officers developed their own version of "The Book", particularly in the sphere of discipline.

The military organisation is a combination of the formal and informal social systems. The formal system is purposefully created, impersonal and controlled from above: the 1915-18 infantry battalion was organised into 64 combat groups called "sections", together with a number of specialist sections. Its informal system is made up of a network of primary social groups, each composed of people in face-to-face relationship who co-operate with each other, who interact more frequently with each other than with outsiders and who share a common value orientation.

The size of a primary group is determined by the limits of social interaction. Its ideal is often thought to be 11-15 persons, the average size, it can be noted in passing, of a team in organised sports. Coates and Pellegrin wrote:

> "At least in a theoretical sense, the most effective military units would probably be those in which the membership in the primary or informal group is identical and coextensive with that of the formal group, provided formal and informal goals are compatible."[164]

This was happily the case in the British infantry, the size of whose section was fixed by deliberate design at 12-15 men.

In contrast to most formal organisations, in the armed services both the working and non-working hours of the individual members of the organisation are controlled, and on active service members are required to live their entire lives in close spatial proximity to each other. The fact that they lived, ate, worked, drilled, trained and shared off-duty together fostered the growth and maintenance of informal groups. The anonymous author of 'Informal Social Organisation in the Army'[165] found informal primary groups in every unit in which he served and in every case they were coextensive with the formal groups. Primary groups existed in the Leeds Rifles at section and platoon level among private Riflemen and NCOs and at company level among officers.

The notion that the military informal social system is essentially obstructive or subversive is given the lie by the fact that in Britain the military ranks very high, if not at the top, among occupational groups that expedite and encourage primary relationships. The sense of fraternity and social solidarity among both the officer corps and the other ranks is basic to the military professional code (and imparts to military life its special quality). No other occupational group can rival the military in this respect.[166] It is no accident that the phrase "closing the ranks", used to express social solidarity,has an obvious military origin.

Networks of primary groups can and do strengthen organisational solidarity in military formal systems and facilitate the achievement of their organisational goals by (a) strengthening the motivation of their members and increasing combat effectiveness;[167] and (b) acting as socialising agencies accommodating individual members, particularly the newly inducted, to the demands and requirements of the unit. Thus primary groups become indispensable to the operation of the military institution in which they arise.[168] Primary group ties are an important compensation which helps soldiers to adjust to and psychologically accept the new, often horrific, experiences of combat.[169] By their provision of affection and protection primary groups reduce the fear of the individual soldier: they help him to bear threatened injuries and death by increasing his self-esteem and confidence in his own capacities and thus facilitate the execution of the commands of superiors.[170] The primary group can thus be regarded as the fundamental factor in morale and in military behaviour generally and the key to its understanding.[171]

Structurally-induced informal groups, such as often emerge in the civilian work situation and certainly in its military counterpart, can be virtually independent of the personality dispositions of the members. This explains the somewhat puzzling fact that a military group is able to persist no matter what the turnover of personnel might be.[172]

Group cohesiveness and leadership behaviour are held by the military to be all-important factors in group performance and effectiveness, a high degree of cohesiveness (esprit de corps) being considered essential for high performance and effectiveness. Cohesion is itself affected by the character of the group leader and his leadership style. Research suggests that it is fostered by a more equalitarian leadership. Successful combat leaders almost invariably have concern for their men. The men of "considerate" leaders more easily gain confidence in each other and are more willing to go into combat than those of authoritarians. Leaders, however, must not only have sympathetic understanding and other equalitarian qualities, but also know their jobs and have the ability to initiate, to define tasks for subordinates, and to ensure that they are carried out.[173]

Evidence presented in this chapter and in Chapter 12, Section 12.6, strongly suggests that the vast majority, if not virtually all, of the leaders,both officers and NCOs, in the Leeds Rifles battalions practised the equalitarian leadership style. It can also be demonstrated that a high degree of cohesiveness existed in the battalions. This fact was established largely by questioning respondents. Social psychologists have found that the more cohesive the group, the higher the average level of liking within it: caeteris paribus, the more people interact, the more they like each other.[174] A respondent can be asked how many of his group he knew and how well he knew them, and how much he enjoyed being a member of the group, and how much he liked every other member. Here are some typical responses:

> "The 1/8th was one big happy family where everybody knew everybody else. It was a very friendly, 'family' affair, all local lads. I knew tons of lads in the Rifles - you knew nearly everybody. The battalion was full of pals. That's what really appealed to me. That sort of comradeship makes soldiering a pleasure in 'peacetime' and bearable in the front line."
>
> "When I look back, the time I spent in the Leeds Rifles was the only period in my life when I was really happy. There was a very happy and friendly atmosphere and everybody knew everybody else. Just like one big, happy family. I never had so many friends, either before or since."[175]

Members of highly cohesive groups tend to be relatively content and relaxed.[176] A highly specific reaction to leaving a closely-knit group which may be elicited from a respondent, was the guilt feelings, noted by psychiatrists or other observers, of men absent from the group on leave or in hospital.[177]

The empirical findings of The American Soldier demonstrated vast differences between the sentiments of officers, NCOs and privates as status groups. For example, NCOs were considerably more critical towards AWOLs than privates, and generally held more conformist attitudes towards military discipline than did privates. With very few exceptions, officers tended to have more favourable attitudes towards all aspects of the military system than privates.[178] The degree of conformity between the sentiments of the three status groups may therefore be taken as an index of the amount of inter-rank cohesion within a unit. Among the Leeds Rifles respondents very little difference was found to exist between the attitudes of officers and NCOs in all major areas, particularly discipline. Although some differences were found in certain special, but not particularly important areas, such as attitudes to the exploits of Rfm Capp and attitudes to National Reservists, between privates and NCOs and between privates and officers, significant conformity was found in many areas. For example, no difference whatever was discernible in the area of esprit de corps and regimental loyalty. The informal organisation of both the 1/7th and the 1/8th, i.e. officer-other rank primary relations, was evidently strong enough to control officer attitudes by assimilation. Significantly the junior officers, who lived with their men when in the line, assumed the sentiments of the group:[179] the attitudes of H.R. Lupton, J.R. Bellerby and H. Whitham, in virtually every area, were indistinquishable from those of ranker-respondents. Other possible indicators of officer-other rank solidarity in the Leeds Rifles were the unconscious use of dialect words and phrases, like "think on", noted in the letters of public-school men H.R. Lupton, W.G. Kemp and Col E. Kitson Clark, and the fact that most of the junior officers and some of the captains wore Other Ranks' cap badges instead of the quite different officers' badge. Inter-rank cohesiveness was also shown by the amount of "sharing" that took place. 1182 Cpl Arthur Fisher, 1/7th, said that whenever there was any sharing-out of parcels, he was never missed out, adding, "My lads would 'win' things and share them with me!"[180] (A Territorial "Old Contemptible" recalled his section sharing their kippers, just arrived from home, with their CSM.)[181] Junior officers were often invited to share cakes, or tea, or cocoa, while many officers of all ranks, including Major Sir Edward Dunbar, 2 i/c and later acting CO of the 1/7th, shared the contents of their parcels with servants and orderlies, or with NCOs. Cohesiveness in the private Rifleman group was further indicated by an absence of stealing from comrades. "You could trust them with anything", declared 2892 Herbert Creswick, 1/7th. 2122 Robert Vine, 1/7th, had a comrade named Ernest Hart, a professional pickpocket who " used to nick Frenchmen's wallets in estaminets if he got the chance, but he'd never have dreamt of pinching off fellas in his platoon."[182]

The high degree of social cohesiveness of the wartime military unit, particularly one belonging to the TF, was marked by several characteristic features. The first was that self-interest was abrogated, the second was a marked diminution in stress within groups, the third and possibly most important was,despite the hierarchic structure of the unit, its equalitarianism which was reflected in a minimum of social distance between the different ranks.[183] Officers, NCOs and privates nevertheless continued to interact within the framework of military command.

Although the men accustomed to social inferiority derived particular satisfaction and new self-confidence from the sense of equality that pervaded the battalions of the Leeds Rifles, it appealed to men from all classes and walks of life. One of the things a man learns in the Army is how to make friends with anybody. All social obstacles now removed, a soldier made friendships easily with literally hundreds of men with whom he might not have been compatible in civil life and of whose lives he would have been otherwise totally ignorant.[184] Several middle-class respondents declared that their period in the Leeds Rifles had been "as good as a University education". Civilian social prejudices based on religious, racial-ethnic, class, educational and other sectional differences rapidly lost their divisive powers and ceased to have relevance or meaning in a community whose relationships were principally based on the need for mutual aid.[185] Although Leeds was generally regarded as being the most anti-semitic city in Britain,[186] no Jewish Leeds Rifles respondent reported either the slightest hostility or any kind of discrimination. Members of racial-ethnic minority groups were, if anything, shown "positive discrimination" by their comrades. A half-caste Negro and certain Italians and Jews were particularly popular in the Regiment, while Jewish soldiers were given special leave for Yom Kippur, even in periods when leave was suspended.

Several respondents looked on their Leeds Rifles battalion as "the ideal socialist society where everybody was equal", echoing Robert Blatchford's old gibe that "the only true socialism is found in the barrack room." C.E. Montague likened the life of the soldier to that of the common man in a Communist state and noted that many men appeared to like it,[187] while socialist journalist F.H. Keeling found the Kitchener battalion he joined was "communistic in just the aspects in which Communism is convenient and stimulating" and seriously wondered whether he "could ever find a family an adequate substitute for a regiment."[188] Lt Col H. Page Croft told his Parliamentary colleagues that "for over a year I have been with that wonderful democracy, the British Army, where we have no politics, and where we have no class, that wonderful brotherhood which has grown up ..."[189]

The high degree of social cohesiveness produced a caring and compassionate community in which each man, whatever his rank, was deeply concerned for his comrades. For example, when Signaller 2222 W.H. Reynard, 1/8th, returned from convalescent camp a few days after the explosion which had killed his 3 compansions, he reported at Bn HQ. Col Alexander was there.

> "He stared at me and asked why I had returned so soon. He went off the deep end about the medics and told me to do nothing except to go to the QM stores and get kitted out and then put me on light duties. All the chaps and the officers were very concerned about me and actually regarded me as a miracle to be alive."[190]

The high degree of cohesiveness in the Leeds Rifles also led to organisational harmony. All management levels worked closely together. Platoon sergeants, the military equivalents of foremen, were consulted by their superiors and were permitted to criticise them where reasonable justification existed. Subalterns had to learn their work on the job and chiefly from the NCOs. If a subaltern made a mistake it was often up to his sergeant or CSM, whose role as "military nannies" of officers was well-known,[191] to take him on one side, point out he had "made a horrible bleeding mess of things, sir", and give him a "rollicking", i.e. tell him not to do it again. 1522 Sgt Jack Wilson, 7th, complained about his officer, Lt Ernest Walling (the one who was deliberately not warned about a deep sump and allowed to fall in, "to larn him"), who was about a year older than himself: "He thought he knew it all. He wouldn't take advice about anything, and you couldn't tell him anything."[192]

Although rank etiquette practically disappeared and social distance between officers and men decreased in the front line, the standardised formal cultural (command) framework of the Army continued to operate unchanged in its essentials. It was this framework that enabled a unit largely composed of strangers (draftees) to quickly become a fairly effective fighting organisation. The tremendous turnover of personnel, especially of officers, emphasised the critical importance of the standardised formal organisation,[193] which was thus fundamental to the British concept of the inviolability of the Regiment.

Alexander L. George, after studying the American references given in this chapter, has listed the factors which affect the formation in wartime of primary group ties in military units.[194] They are: (1) a common social background of unit members; (2) the ability of unit members to offer and receive affection in an all-male society and the importance of family stability as affecting individual capacity to enter into informal group relationships; (3) the protectiveness of immediate leaders; (4) the performance of immediate leaders, tactical leadership based on example and demonstrated competence promoting social cohesion and reducing the need to rely on coercion; (5) military discipline and professionalism; (6) ideology and commitment to one's social-political system; (7) war indoctrination, which typically stresses two themes, legitimacy and/or justification for the war and the wisdom and/or necessity for fighting for it; (8) exigencies of military life and of the combat situation; (9) technical aspects of weapons systems; (10) social prestige of the soldierly profession; (11) egalitarian practices within the military organisation; and (12) the replacement system and rotation policy.

As far as the development of primary groups in the Leeds Rifles is concerned, these factors do not appear to be of equal importance. Some are comparatively unimportant; factor (6) appears to be inapplicable. Factors (1), (2), (3) and (4) were certainly very important. There is ample support in Vol. II of The American Soldier for the hypothesis that the protective-exemplary function of officers is of great importance in the formation of officer-men primary groups. The evidence presented in the present study (Chap. 12, Section 12.6 and below) suggests that it played the major role in officer-men relationships in the Leeds Rifles. Esprit de corps was undoubtedly strengthened by the fact that many of the men came from large families and so were used to "mucking-in", and that many came from neighbourhood-centred communities.

Homogeneity of social background, an important source of regimental pride and identification in the TF, is an important correlate of cohesion in small groups and a source of cohesion in military units. A common social background - similarities in regional origin, social class, age - greatly assist the group members in developing close interpersonal relations, since the greater the number of background characteristics people have in common, the more similar their values tend to be. An urban working-class background, where boys early tended to develop predispositions to peer solidarity, would be particularly helpful in this respect.[195] Group solidarity in the Wehrmacht of WWII was found to be enhanced by the geographical basis on which units were mostly organised.[196] 4726 John W. Stephenson from Skipton was put in the Skipton Company (A) when he joined the 1/6th DWR on a draft:

> "I knew every single man in it. All the lads I'd been to school with, played football with, sung in Christ Church choir with, were there. One of the older privates was Pte Dawson who was my Sunday School teacher when I was a nipper. The platoon sergeant, Sgt Herbert Bastow, lived near us in Skipton and I was a pal of his younger brother, Ernest. The company officer was my family's solicitor in Skipton and before the war he used to go golfing with my uncle."

Edward Flatley, 1/7th, claimed that he already knew over 100 of his comrades before he joined, because he knew them from school, church, the Boys' Club, his neighbourhood, etc:

> "On the Bank we were great on sticking together, so when the war broke out, all the pals of those who were already in rushed down to join, just to be in the war with their pals."[197]

Both the organisation and training of the British Army of 1914 were clearly based upon a sound empirical knowledge of social psychology accumulated over many years.[198] Many of the "discoveries" made during and after WWII by mainly American researchers were merely confirmations of facts already well known to the British Army: the value of frequent reliefs and the importance to both individual and group morale of "leadership by example" are two outstanding examples that readily spring to mind.[199]

The Army was deliberately organised in units comprising interlocking informal groups that were identical and coextensive with formal groupings. The regimental system itself had, in fact, such a cogent influence on morale that it must be regarded as a significant war-winning factor. The fact that networks of primary groups are "the core source of organisational solidarity and esprit de corps, or the lack thereof"[200] had long been accepted by the Army, certainly since before 1914, as has the USARB finding that the primary group "served two principal functions in combat motivation: it set and enforced group standards of behaviour, and it supported and sustained the individual in stresses he would otherwise not have been able to withstand."[201] E.A. Shils equates good primary group relations with good morale[202] and there is rich evidence in The American Soldier as to the extraordinary importance of primary group relations in sustaining morale. British soldiers of 1914 were formed into groups where they were expected to become what is now termed "ego-involved".

> "The authorities were aided in this by the desire of the soldier himself to have something which, in his eyes, and in the eyes of his companions, is worth identifying himself with, a group which gives him distinction and prestige. This is achieved by laying stress on regimental history and repute, by distinctive marks of membership, by the growth of regimental mythology and customs, and, in some cases, by linking army units with different parts of the country. The general aim is to induce loyalty so that as well as habits of obedience learnt in training there is an additional control established which prevents the soldier doing anything that 'lets the regiment down'."[203]

The propensity of the primary group to undermine the long-term aims of the formal organisation seems to have been realised, since the emphasis placed during training on the soldierly virtues, especially that of obedience, is an effective counter-measure to this powerful social force.

Generals, issuing their Special Orders of the Day, realised the psychological value of sincere praise.[204] Prior to 1914, British instructors were promoting esprit de corps and easing the adjustment to army life of recruits by inter-group competition:[205] J.W. Julian, D.W. Bishop and F.E. Fiedler published a paper in the USA more than 50 years later which concluded that inter-group competition can lead to improved work relations in the group, high self-esteem, improved adjustment, lower manifest anxiety, and greater satisfaction with conditions of group life.[206]

Inter-rank Relationships

Owing to the leader's psychological position as "father" of his combat group, leader-followership relations are extremely important.[207] So important that in the British Army the state of inter-rank relations is regarded as the prime index of morale and combat effectiveness.

13.7 Officer-Other Ranks Relations

Because of the disruptive, and potentially disastrous effects (frequently insufficently appreciated) of the "Officer-Other Ranks Dichotomy", the officer-other ranks relationship is particularly important. Poor relations substantially reduce organisational effectiveness chiefly through their deleterious effect on morale and efficiency.[208]

The USARB discovered that "the combat situation itself fostered a closer solidarity between officers and enlisted men than was usual in the rest of the Army." All the evidence obtained by them indicated that officer-men relations were better in combat units than in units to the rear.[209] Relations in some front-line units, however, evidently left much to be desired.[210] There were often real tensions between officers and men in training establishments.

A method of assessing officer-men relationships used by the USARB was to ask the men if their officers were "the kind who were willing to go through anything they asked their men to go through."[211] This was frequently said by respondents of highly approved-of Leeds Rifles officers.

The strength of popularity of an individual officer or of the unit officers as a whole appears to be an indicator of the strength of officer-other rank primary groups. Social psychologists have noted that in effective (i.e. strong) groups the leader is always highly approved of by followers, and the greater a leader's esteem, the higher is his authority. A leader's popularity and the ready acceptance of his followership may well reflect a high level of "good" feeling within the group.[212] The Other Ranks' opinion or assessment of their officer(s) may accordingly not depend solely, or even mainly, upon his (their) objective personal qualities, but may tend rather to be a function of the social atmosphere obtaining in the unit.[213] This would account for the extraordinary frequency with which officers appear as paragons of all the virtues in the testimony of respondents belonging to the Leeds Rifles and other TF units. A social atmosphere described as "good" may well be largely derived from the leadership style practised by the officers. A "human-relations" approach, one that includes consideration for and sensitivity to the well-being of subordinates, does much to reduce unnecessary tension, and research evidence has shown it to have a positive effect on both personal adjustment and general satisfaction within a unit.[214]

Officer-other rank relationships in the first-line Leeds Rifles battalions were in general remarkably harmonious and often close. It was remarkable how the opinions of respondents cut across all class, age, educational and military rank groupings.

Section 12.6 of Chapter 12 shows that the average Leeds Rifles ranker wanted a personal relationship with his officer, and that he wanted an officer who conformed to a protective-exemplary stereotype. Interestingly, the average WWII American combat soldier's desire for some kind of personal relationship with his officer, particularly for one with a protective-exemplary leader, is well-documented in Vol. II of The American Soldier;[215] Lang observes that "soldiers expect more consideration from their military supervisors than civilian subordinates expect from theirs."[216] Although Leeds Rifles rankers laid down severe standards of personality and conduct for their officers, the vast majority of officers apparently fulfilled the men's expectations and many even exceeded them. The men gave unstinting loyalty, co-operation, admiration, respect and affection to the officers who met these standards. The following testimony is a typical private Rifleman's opinion of a particularly popular officer:

> "I can't find adequate words to express my opinion of Lt Glazebrook. It would be absolutely impossible to praise him too highly. He was a wonderful man. We simply idolised him. He was so intensely human and so wonderfully kind and thoughtful and considerate, far, far beyond the call of duty. He cared deeply about each one of us. Every one of us would have gone to Hell and back for him. We were intensely proud of him when he got the MC. He was our officer."[217]

Claims made by respondents that the officers and other ranks of the 1/8th were "brothers-in-arms" were not exaggerated. A postscript of a letter written by company commander Capt W.G. Kemp to his friend Capt H.R. Lupton on 29th November 1917 reads: "Rfm Sharples wishes me to give you his kind regards. He is very glad to hear that you are getting along satisfactorily." An immensely strong bond of mutual trust, confidence and goodwill characterised both the officer-men and officer-NCO relationships of this battalion. Expressions of high regard and great affection figure prominently in the testimonies of both NCOs and private Riflemen.

The following extracts are typical of opinions of Leeds Rifles officers found in Riflemen's wartime letters:

> "They are a fine lot of fellows, and their hobby is their men."
>
> "Our officers are a fine lot, and if you searched the whole world you could not find better. They inspire the men with that 'Never say die' influence so much that they neither fear 'Jack Johnsons' nor the men who fire them. With these officers and men I am sure we could tackle the finest army the Kaiser possesses ... and you can bet they would regret the day they ever met us."
>
> "We have a champion officer that takes an interest in our band, and I believe he thinks the world about us, it is Captain - [censored] of A Company (late old H Company) and I can tell you he's a right sport."

It was said of Lt Eric Wilkinson, 1/8th, that "He was simply idolised by his men and they were prepared to go anywhere with him."[218] Capt Maurice Lupton's company all "held him in the greatest regard." The Leeds Mercury of 20th July 1915 published a photograph of a specially designed memorial drawing made by Rfm P. Maltby "with the object of placing it on the dead officer's grave."

Many Leeds Rifles officers knew the value of the human touch. They took a keen personal interest in their men's welfare, often showing sympathy and kindness beyond what was conventionally expected of them. When Knowles' baby became dangerously ill, there were already over 40 priority applications for leave in C Coy of the 1/7th, but despite this, Knowles was granted compassionate leave. He wrote:

> "I told you the Captain was a dandy, this is a real favour he has done me, in fact it has never been heard of for anyone to get leave on so short a notice. Our Lieutenant expressed his sympathy for my trouble."[219]

Such demonstrated interest in the men as human beings generated friendly relations all round and an atmosphere of confidence which increased everybody's morale. It may be noted that the psychological dimension in industrial relations was scarcely realised in the Britain of 1914.

There were many other indications of the excellence of officer-men relations. 1327 Walter Garnett, 1/8th, was so attached to his platoon commander, Lt W.H. Brooke, that when he was drafted to the 10th WYR on discharge from hospital he walked 10 miles specially to visit him "to find out how he was going on." "Mr Brooke was right pleased to see me," he added.[220] While on trench duty junior officers were often invited to share rankers' meals, tea and contents of parcels from home. Several respondents unwittingly revealed that their officers had addressed men by Christian name or nickname. It was common for rankers to ask officers, both during the war and afterwards, for a photograph of themselves. One officer's photograph seen that was given to a ranker respondent during the war was signed "Your sincere chum"; a studio portrait of Capt W.G. Kemp given by him after the war to a member of his old platoon was inscribed "In memory of old times and with grateful thanks for loyal service and support during the Great War." Whenever an informal group photograph was being taken, out of the line, officers would often be invited to appear on it and in the place of honour. Many officers continued to keep in touch with their men after the war and several left them small legacies in their wills. Not a few would give their men small handouts of money if they chanced to meet them in the street. According to respondents, unemployed men would often hang about the entrance to the office or business premises of their former officer, waiting to greet him when he arrived. Col J.H. Hastings of the 6th WYR, a cloth merchant, kept a special supply of shillings in a drawer in his front office so that he always had something to give to his old comrades.[221] (As previously explained, this was not considered begging.) Quite a considerable number of men took employment with their former officers (see also Chap. 4), e.g. 2880 William A. Bywater, Major Longbottom's servant, became his chauffeur. When he was appointed to the personal staff of the Governor of Malta, Major W.H. Brooke of the 8th asked 2227 Gilbert Freeman if he would accompany him as his private secretary.[222]

Wyrall cites two "by no means uncommon instances of the very close comradeship" that existed in the Leeds Rifles "between officers and their men, who were always ready to take risks and sacrifice themselves, if needs be, one for the other." The first concerned the incident in the 1/8th in July 1915 in which 2/Lt Eric Wilkinson and Rfm Clough together brought back, under continuous fire, the mortally wounded Rfm Mudd from patrol in No Man's Land. The second took place two years later. 2/Lt George Edwards of the 7th was out on patrol, with L/Cpl C. Elsworth following closely behind, when a German bomb, thrown from close range, landed at his feet. All he had time to do was to stamp his foot on it in an attempt to press it into the ground and so contain the blast of the explosion. Although this gallant act succeeded in protecting Elsworth from injury, the subaltern's foot was blown off.[223] He remained dangerously ill for several weeks but, although his leg was later amputated,[224] he eventually recovered. Other similar incidents could be quoted.

Officer-other ranks relations in the Leeds Rifles were traditionally very good. In Volunteer days it was often stated that "a thorough understanding and good feeling" existed between the officers and the ranks.[225] This was maintained in the Territorial era; "Non.-Com." reported in the summer of 1908 that the "hail fellow, well met" feeling of the Volunteers was continuing "unabated" in the Territorials.[226] Officer-NCO relations were particularly cordial, as they were in other West Riding units.[227] The Leeds Rifles officers played rugby, cricket and hockey with the men in mixed teams, although association football was a game for the other ranks only, since none of the officers played.[228] The captain of the 7th Bn cricket team was not an officer but a senior NCO, Col Sgt Harry Lodge, a well-known local cricketer.

The cordiality of relations may be attributed in part to the traditional patterns of life that existed in Leeds up to 1914. Many of the leading families were well-known to the citizenry at large, as employers of labour and/or on account of the prominent part they played in local affairs. As members of the "ruling classes of Leeds" to whom their men were accustomed in civilian life to give a traditional loyalty and respect, officers of the local TF units were able to make easy social contact with men of the lower classes because each group had a firmly established status.[229]

Writers have often remarked upon the close comradeship that existed in many units between officers and other ranks and which is well-represented in both the prose and poetry produced by participants. An officer frequently loved his platoon or company collectively with the protective, possessive emotion of a father. This is vividly expressed in the poem, 'In Memoriam', of a Territorial officer, E.A. Mackintosh:

> "Oh, never will I forget you,
> My men that trusted me,
> More my sons than your fathers' ..."[230]

The very close relationship between men and their platoon officer is recorded, for example, in the poem 'Comrades: an Episode' by Robert Nichols which describes the efforts of men to rescue their mortally wounded officer. Many officer-poets wrote of "the fellowship of the trenches". One was Sir Edward de Stein, later president of Gallaher's Tobacco, who had about 20 poems published in leading newspapers and periodicals during the war. After the war, many officers felt keenly the loss of the fellowship of their men. One was Edmund Blunden:

> "When will the stern fine 'Who goes there?'
> Meet me again in midnight air?
> And the gruff sentry's kindness, when
> Will kindness have such power again?"[231]

Another was Guy Chapman: in the preface to A Kind of Survivor, his wife, Storm Jameson, wrote "When he lost the companionship of the trenches he lost an integral part of himself."[232]

Writers have also particularly remarked upon the excellent spirit of comradeship that existed between officers and men in the Dominion Forces. In the Canadian force new commissions were granted only to selected NCOs who had proved their worth on active service. In the Anzac forces virtually the entire officer corps had been recruited from the ranks. The army of socialistic Australia pointedly prided itself on its democratic system of officer recruiting.[233] However, a causal relationship cannot be inferred between the system of officer recruitment and the excellent officer-other rank relations existing in the Dominion Forces.

The Leeds Rifles officer-respondents had admired and genuinely liked the men under their command. Many officer-authors too had admired and genuinely liked their men, such as John Nettleton, who declared, "It was an honour to be accepted by them as an equal", and 2/Lt Stephen Hewett, who wrote "I am very keen altogether on the men."[234]

This officer admiration for the other ranks was possibly typical only of units of good morale. Officers particularly admired the ranker's phlegm and frequently associated it with his preoccupation with creature comforts and the means of obtaining them. Admiring officers often tended to think, quite sincerely, that rankers had no nerves and no imagination and that the only thing they were frightened of was of being without a Woodbine. A typical officer's anecdote about the phlegmatic other ranks appears in the 1/8th Bn Unofficial War Diary, where Lt Rigby quotes from a letter he has recently censored written by a man of his Company: "Please send me some more cigarettes. The other night Jim was killed, shot through the back. His pal volunteered to help bury him and as he was stooping down to pick up the body, he too was killed and in the confusion I lost my cigs."[235]

One officer who put forward this view was Ian Hay, a schoolmaster-turned-professional writer whose work is characterised by shrewd observation. According to him, the British Tommy "settles down to war like any other trade, and, as in time of peace, he is chiefly concerned with his holidays and his creature comforts."[236] This tended to be also F.M. Wavell's view,[237] but it is one evidently not shared by Malcolm Brown.[238] Rankers' testimony and the documentary sources indicated that both creature comforts and recreational activities loomed very large among the concerns of the men of the Leeds Rifles. It would be a serious mistake, however, to equate the carpe diem philosophy of the well-adjusted combat soldier with "absolute lack of imagination" as Ian Hay appears to do. Lt Bellerby of the 1/8th considered that a "saving lack of imagination" was "the one trait" that characterised all ranks of the BEF and in particular the rankers:

> "The average British soldier was fairly continuously unafraid largely because he saw nothing that was not before his nose. Past unpleasantness appeared to be readily forgotten; future unpleasantness was invisible."[239]

This shows that the apparent lack of imagination was an essential component of the soldier's philosophy that was the linch-pin of his "survival strategy".

The officer-other rank relationships existing in the Leeds Rifles in WWI were in startlingly complete contrast to those existing in the US Army in WWII as revealed by The American Soldier and depicted in so many American WWII novels.

W.J.H. Sprott pointed out that relations between officers and men "will be different in a culture in which inequality is deprecated from what they are where inequality is accepted as right and proper."[240] American enlisted men have never accepted the officer as a superior being.[241] This attitude reflected some of the dominant values of American culture: equality of opportunity, freedom, opposition to authoritarianism, the concept of individual worth. Distinctions in the Revolutionary Army between officers and men were deliberately minimised, lest the latter refused to serve.[242] Many enlisted men who entered the American Army during WWII were not well-disposed to the officer corps. The notion of the officer as a social parasite, a critical attitude dating from the Revolution, was pervasive in all strata of American society. In addition, anti-militarist attacks had regularly appeared in broadly circulated magazines in the prewar period. These had served only to reinforce what had become the traditional pacifist critique, which regarded the officer as a brutal militarist, a fascist-sadist, a strike controller and an oppressor of the labouring classes.[243]

No underlying hostilities and resentments towards officers as a class or status group, such as those presented so vividly in The American Soldier Vol I, Chap. 8, were noted in the present study. The authors of the chapter particularly noted a great deal of resentment and criticism of the Army's status system, which ascribed to an elite group (officers) special social privileges from which the non-elite (other ranks) were legally debarred and which enforced symbolic deferential behaviour at all times, which jarred against the "democratic" civilian habits of the enlisted men, particularly the better educated. The question of officers' privileges remained a real issue in the US Army throughout WWII. As the war progressed, there was a swelling chorus of discontent which eventually forced the Army in 1946 to appoint a board of investigation ("The Doolittle Board") to review the problem of officer-enlisted men relationships.[244]

Nor were there any parallels, as has already been made clear, between the attitudes of the Leeds Rifles officers towards relationships with the other ranks and those said by novelist Simon Raven to have been typical of British Army officers of the 1950s. Raven described these latter attitudes as "neo-feudal", i.e. based on rooted convictions of superior status. According to him, these officers "regarded themselves as so much set apart as to belong to a totally different class of human being - a class naturally designed to impose its will on all inferior classes."[245]

The respondents who had served in both World Wars unanimously compared WWII officers most unfavourably with those of the Leeds Rifles in WWI. 2096 Charles Cameron, 1/7th, expressed a typical view:

> "The 7th Bn officers were a good lot, much better than the officers we had in the Second World War, much better in every way. They studied psychology a lot better and understood the men better. They shared the same hardships as us - the last war lot wouldn't![246] And they were much better trained for their jobs. I won't have anybody running down Territorial officers."[247]

13.8 Intra-officer relations

A high degree of social cohesion existed within the officer group of every good unit. Such cohesion was essential in a mess of up to 35 officers who not only had to live together harmoniously but also work together effectively. Disunity and a lack of harmony among the officers frequently characterised the low morale unit. A long history of unhappiness in the officers' mess was held to be an important factor in the sudden collapse, manifested by a rush to the rear, of the 1st Essex Regiment in November 1940 in an attack on Metemma, Sudan.[248]

It is evident that the senior officers of the 1/7th, Kirk and Tetley, realised the very great importance of cohesion. Recruiting policy showed that they considered it vitally important that new officers should fit in socially. They tried to maintain as far as was possible the social elitism of prewar days when the officers tended to have attended the same sort of schools, moved in the same social circles and shared the same attitudes and values. This, it was doubtless felt, enabled the officers to work better together as a team. The mess was regarded as a club and the atmosphere inside it was very relaxed. It was a small,tightly-knit group whose members all knew each other well (most of them knowing each other's families) and liked each other.

While the ranker's life centred on the platoon or on the specialist section the officer's life centred on the company and the company officers' mess.[249] The 1/7th officer-respondent, Harry Whitham, belonged to B Coy, whose officer group appears to have been a particularly happy one. Its original OC, Capt Stockwell, the darling of the Other Ranks, was just as popular with his fellow officers. The six officers were extremely close friends, got into scrapes together off-duty, and called each other by nicknames. The 2 i/c, Capt Glover, was known as "Feyther", 2/Lt F.W. May as "Frankie", 2/Lt Glazebrook as "Sloppy", 2/Lt Findlay as "Krizzie", and 2/Lt Briggs as "The Babe" (on account of his cherubic appearance). By the time Whitham reached B Coy only May and Findlay remained, but according to his testimony, intra-officer relations continued to be excellent during his term of service. He and Frankie May remained very close friends for life.[250]

The three 1/8th officer-respondents spoke in affectionate terms of the officers they had served with. They were completely agreed that the vast majority of their fellow-officers were "good chaps": easy to get on with, affable, likeable, outgoing bon-vivants, extremely fond of swapping jokes and leg-pulling, the sort of young men found in large numbers in the gentlemen's cricket and rugby clubs of the period to which many of them indeed had belonged. They liked to call each other by nicknames, eg. Hugh Lupton was "Luppy", Max Ramsden "Rammy", Eric Wilkinson "Wilky", Sydney H. Elkington "Tiny", John Chadwick "Chadders", T.P. Reay "Pip", J.E. Appleyard "Apples", and the Hon. R.D. Kitson "Rollo". William Halliley Brooke, known as "Lally", the battalion wit, always referred to Capt "Tommy" Longbottom as "Ars longa".[251]

Affectionate, gentle leg-pulling or a teasing, bantering tone often characterises the style of the various authors of the 1/8th Unofficial War Diary. In the entry for 6/6/15, Rigby purports to give an account of the embarkation of the Advance Party in April "dictated by Capt Longbottom". He has missed off all final g's and well-sprinkled the passage with upper-class words like "toppin'" and "top-hole". In the entry for 18/8/15, Lupton wrote:

> "The bow tie made its appearance in the dress of one of our most beautiful officers but was thought to presume the granting of leave in the near future and was abandoned."

In the entry for 11/6/17, Brooke wrote:

> "The Divisional Horse Show ... was attended by Major Sykes, Sir Douglas Haig and other celebrities."

In December 1917 he pokes mild fun at the new RMO, an American:

> "The MO learns he is a father. The new arrival was toasted with all due honours, the Intelligence officer singing what he fondly thought to be 'The Star-Spangled Banner' but which turned out to be the Bulgarian National Anthem."
> "The HQ mess begins to become Americanised through contact with our excellent MO. One officer in moving off a party was heard to give the command 'Twos into fours, git', and the CO was heard to describe a lady as 'some good looker'."[252]

Genuine affection is the hallmark of the touching obituary notices which were included in the Unofficial Diary for all officers who lost their lives up to the end of August 1916 (when the practice was discontinued, perhaps due to heavy officer casualties). These are no mere routine obituaries composed by working colleagues, but expressions of that special kind of friendship forged only in "the community unto death", eg. the notice for Capt Leslie C. Hossall reads:

> "His death was a great loss to the battalion as he had proved a most capable company commander with considerable powers of initiative and leadership. His ready wit and constant good humour had enlivened many dull hours and endeared him to all ranks."[253]

Hugh Lupton, the longest-serving by far of the officer-respondents considered all his fellow officers his friends. While he was Signals Officer he had three special friends on HQ staff: the MO; Capt Dundas, the Adjutant; and 2/Lt Sam Coates, the Transport Officer, all of them considerably older than himself. He usually shared quarters with Capt Dundas who named his first son, born in the summer of 1915, after him. He regarded the 1/8th officer group as a happy, united and closely-knit "family". When he became a company commander, he had, according to his own testimony, a good relationship with all his subalterns.[254] This is amply corroborated by the closing sentence of a letter sent to him, when in hospital recovering from wounds, by his best friend W.G. Kemp in November 1917: "Many send love and wishes - SSS [acting CO Major Sykes], Shelley, Buckley and others."[255] Shelley and Buckley were Capt Lupton's two surviving subalterns. The highest standards of gentlemanly behaviour were maintained in the 1/8th officers' mess throughout. J.R. Bellerby, the grammar-school educated son of a substantial painting and decorating contractor, was somewhat surprised to be initially welcomed by his fellow officers in the most affable and friendliest manner possible.[256]

No direct information could be obtained on the state of intra-officer relations in the second-line battalions when on active service, though respondents had gained the impression that it was good. Grammar school educated Harry Whitham had originally trained in the 2/7th and had requested, at the end of 1915, a transfer to the first-line battalion at the front because he was unhappy. The majority of the officers in the 2/7th at the time, even a majority of the subalterns, were considerably older than himself. These older officers, mostly public school educated, well-to-do if not actually wealthy, men of standing, who had been friends or business associates in peacetime, cold-shouldered the young juniors who were, for the most part, impecunious undergraduates or pupils in the professions. Whitham spoke bitterly of the clannishness of the older officers, their patronising and overbearing manner and socially exclusive cliques.[257]

After being discharged from hospital, both Lupton and Whitham were drafted to the 7th Reserve Bn. Neither was particularly happy there. Because it was a training-cum-home service unit with a huge turnover this battalion had no formal establishment of officers, NCOs or men. It was considerably over-loaded with officers (many awaiting a posting or a medical board): a photograph of one company shows 12 officers and 15 sergeants. All ranks, including officers, tended to disapprove strongly of the CO chiefly, one suspects, because he was not a Leeds Rifleman. No respondent who served with this battalion could even remember his name. Petty jealousies and all kinds of tensions appeared to exist among the officers, who were under-employed because the unit was chronically over-officered. The literature gives the impression that intra-officer relations in training units were typically less than satisfactory.

13.9 Officer-NCO relations

In 1943 the USARB questioned 2,265 officers and 3,029 other ranks about the abilities they considered important in NCOs. They were asked to list in order the two they considered most important out of five abilities/qualities:

two executive abilities (1) ability to carry out orders promptly and correctly, (2) ability to think for himself, and three human relations abilities (3) ability to help and advise the men under him, (4) ability to gain the personal liking of the men, and (5) ability to explain things clearly. Officers rated (1) and (2) by far the most highly; NCOs also rated (1) and (2) the most highly, but nevertheless accorded considerable weight to (3) and (4); privates rated the human relations abilities (3) and (4) the highest, with (1) a close third.[258]

A special working relationship existed between the platoon sergeant and his officer and between the company sergeant-major and his company commander and often this blossomed into a close friendship. Where both men survived the war, the friendship was frequently carried over into civilian life: a notable example in popular literature is that of Lord Peter Wimsey and the faithful Bunter, his former sergeant. Where death intervened, the survivor often cherished the memory of the friendship. Stories like the following can be duplicated a thousand-fold:

> "Former sergeant Frank Hardy went back to France last week to pay tribute to the officer he could never forget. Mr Hardy, aged 82, stood alone, head bowed, before a simple white tablet marked 'Second Lt W. Hesseltine 21st August 1916'. He had waited 58 years for just that moment. 'I always dreamed of going back to pay my respects to an officer who understood his men and fought for them and with them.' ... Mr Hardy, then a 24 year old sergeant, pushed on through No Man's Land. His platoon commander was alongside him. Then Second Lieutenant Hesseltine was hit. Sergeant Hardy caught him in his arms, and dragged him into a nearby crater. But his commander was dead. 'It just didn't seem possible that he was gone', said Mr Hardy. 'I vowed then that one day, if it was ever possible, I would come back. When I saw the grave I cried like a baby'."[259]

Leadership of the platoon was divided between "the executive" (the platoon sergeant) and "the aristocratic leader" (the subaltern) between whom there exists ideally, according to Brigadier Bidwell, a prime minister-king relationship.[260] This was essentially the Leeds Rifles officer-respondents' view of the officer-NCO relationship and is in complete accord with the result of the USARB survey. Sergeant- and warrant-officer-respondents, on the other hand, quite clearly looked on their role in the relationship as being that of "the military nanny".

Officer-NCO relations seem to have been extremely cordial in the 1/8th. The officer-respondents were full of admiration for their senior NCOs generally. H.R. Lupton:

> "For the most part, a wonderful set of men. There come to my mind Sgts Flockton, Pearson, Fozard, Leach, Edgar Green, Norman Mason - they were on the whole a remarkable

> collection. Quartermaster-sergeants did a wonderful job under great difficulties in getting the meagre supplies through to their companies. CQMS McBretney comes to my memory in that connection."

J.R. Bellerby:

> "I had excellent NCOs as a platoon officer. Sgt North and the senior corporal were both ex-Regular Army and knew their stuff well. They made no noise, except on parade. [Ex-Volunteer] Platoon-sergeant Woodhead was a very gentle kind of father-figure; he did everything in a low key. When I was appointed Machine Gun Officer I knew nothing of the Maxim, but fortunately the NCOs were extremely able. The senior sergeant, Tommy Hunter, was a warehouseman in Leeds with a most capacious memory. Whether his training had been a sort of Pelman course enabling him to develop exceptional powers of memory, or for whatever other reason, he was from all points of view a treasure. Cpl Pallister, later CSM in the MGC, was exceptional among NCOs. His unfailing cheerfulness and wit was a wonderful example to us all. There was plenty of good NCO material to follow."[261]

His platoon sergeant and his CSM held the highest opinions of and bore the greatest affection for 2/Lt, later Capt, Hugh Lupton. 1219 CSM Arthur Fozard:

> "Everyone knows what a grand and gallant officer Capt Lupton was. Never would he send a man where he wouldn't go himself and was always ready to help where needed and was very highly respected by all who came in contact with him. During the attack on Poelcappelle, someone shouted to me, 'Your old pal's down with a machine-gun burst all to himself'."

(Note the use of the term "old pal". Men often referred to officers they felt to be a real friend as "my pal.") Platoon Sgt 2455 Norman James Mason:

> "The finest officer in the British Army and the bravest man on the Western Front. I was very fond of him - and I still am. I'd give him my last ha'penny. Tell him that if he's ever broke and got nowhere to live, he can come and live at my house for nothing. I got on famously with him. He was a super fella, a real man's man, a real good 'un, a born leader of men. I used to accompany him from post to post and he was always taking me into No Man's Land with him - too often for me - as he used to like to read German notices. He always looked after my welfare and got me nice billets whenever possible. He was always thinking about the men's welfare. Whenever we came out of the line he used to arrange for us to have steaming hot porridge laced with rum waiting for us. He didn't use to interfere with my men at all - he gave me carte blanche. He seemed as though he put his trust in me and had faith in me."[262]

Capt Lupton kept in touch with both CSM Fozard and Sgt Mason until their deaths.

167 Platoon sgt Charles Young, 1/7th, also kept in touch with his officer, 2/Lt Harold Boyes Watson, until the latter's death. Sgt Young said of him:

> "He was a very fine gentleman, very considerate, no 'side' at all. All the men loved him. I was very sad to lose him."

Mr Watson left the platoon to become Bombing Officer. Sgt Young was an old Volunteer, the type of dedicated soldier that young Mr Watson and his fellow subalterns seemed to admire as a class, and this fact perhaps enhanced the cordiality of their relations. Sgt Albert Bowden, 1/8th, was another old Volunteer, who enjoyed an excellent relationship with both his platoon officer, 2/Lt Alexander, and as Machine-Gun Sergeant, with the Machine-Gun Officer, Lt Gawthorpe. He and Lt Gawthorpe continued to hold each other in the highest regard until the end of their lives.[263]

2812 Cpl (acting platoon sergeant) Percy Shepherd, 1/8th,enjoyed what he regarded as an ideal relationship with his officer, 2/Lt John C. Chadwick, a man who was virtually old enough to be his father. Cpl Shepherd said,

> "Mr Chadwick relied on his NCOs. He was a damn' good man and I was very fond of him. His wife wrote to me and came to visit me when I was in hospital. He was very considerate: when the men were skint, he used to give me money to share with them to buy cigarettes etc. I was very upset when he died. It was the 25th March 1917. It was dark by 5 pm. We'd been out and found nobody in the German trenches, so we laid a trail and went back a bit later. There was somebody there this time. I got a machine-gun bullet in my arm and Mr Chadwick got one. He didn't seem bad at all, but I told him to just lie still and I'd fetch help. When we got back, he'd gone west - and I'd never said Goodbye to him."[264]

1090 Sgt James Rhind, 1/8th, said:

> "I had quite a lot of platoon officers, and never had a bad one. They were all very nice fellas, but I had to 'father' them. They relied on me and always took my advice."[265]

1918 Sgt George W. Pemberton of D Coy, 1/8th, was so upset by the death of his former platoon officer, Capt L.C. Hossell, to whom he had been devoted, that he organised an unofficial bombing raid to avenge the officer's death. None of the bombers returned.[266] The newspaper obituary notice for RSM W. Fear of the 1/8th, written by "an officer who knew him well", stated that he was "universally respected, and I think I might say loved, for his never-failing good temper."[267]

A somewhat unsatisfactory relationship existed between 2/Lt Harry Whitham, 1/7th, and his platoon sergeant, Harry E. Stagg. They worked together well enough on the whole, but Mr Whitham found that his personal dislike of Sgt Stagg prevented their relationship from being an ideal one. Sgt Stagg was widely disliked by all ranks in B Coy as a vain and bumptious person. Both the personal and working relationships between platoon sgt 1522 John Edward T. Wilson, 1/7th, and his officer, Lt Ernest Walling, were poor in the extreme. "We were always at daggers drawn," said Sgt Wilson, who found Lt Walling "impossible to get along with." This officer alienated and antagonised his NCOs and his colleagues to such an extent that he was transferred to 146 Bde Trench Mortar Battery.[268] In the best-managed organisations personality clashes inevitably arise and some persons appointed to supervisory or managerial positions prove to be temperamentally or otherwise unsuitable. All other evidence suggests that these were isolated instances. Sgt Wilson enjoyed good relationships with other platoon officers, while other 1/7th sergeant-respondents had been on excellent terms with their respective officers. The following extract from a letter written by Capt Salter to Col Sgt Wilkinson's widow appears to be far more typical of officer-NCO relations in the 1/7th than the experiences of Whitham and Wilson:

> "There had grown between us a greater bond of friendship than I can tell you of in words. Losing him out here has taken away from me a comrade I could trust anything to."[269]

13.10 NCO-private Riflemen relations

The USARB found that attitudes towards unit NCOs were highly correlated with attitudes towards officers. A survey of 4,247 privates in the US in 1943 showed that favourable attitudes towards officers and/or NCOs varied directly, both independently and cumulatively with other attitudes (as measured by scale scores) that reflected pride in outfit, personal adjustment, feeling of Army interest (the desire to be a soldier), attitude to discipline, job satisfaction, and criticism of the Army. The highest percentages with high scores on the attitude scale in every attitude area were obtained by those privates who had favourable attitudes towards both officers and NCOs.[270] Good officer-men and NCO-men relations were thus correlated with good morale and good combat motivation.

It was supremely important for senior NCOs to keep in very close touch with the lower ranks in order to find out what they were thinking, what the state of their morale and of their health was. W. Korpi has shown that squad leaders who practised the "equalitarian" leadership style (the style commonly employed by NCOs in the Leeds Rifles) clearly had more accurate estimates of the attitudes and opinions of their men than authoritarians.[271]

The platoon sergeant needed to possess the abilities (1), (2), (3) and (4) listed in the USARB survey quoted in the previous section, those, it should be noted, rated the most highly by the American NCOs themselves. He can be regarded as the counterpart of a senior supervisor in manufacturing industry. His chief role was not an active fighting role, but that of facilitating the work of the rest of the platoon: allocating duties, ensuring the flow of rations and other supplies, introducing new draftees to the group, listening to and taking up any personal problems or complaints of the platoon members, interpreting orders from the CSM, company commander and platoon commander, representing the platoon's views to the platoon commander or CSM, and generally dealing with any problems that arose. According to Capt Peter Horsfall, "a good platoon sergeant is worth his weight in gold as he has to be a father not only to all his men but also particularly to his officer."[272]

As was the case with officer-other rank relations, NCO-men relations in the Leeds Rifles were traditionally cordial. Etzioni's theory would predict that inter-rank relationships would not resemble those found in the Regular Army. The application of strict Regular Army style discipline was entirely ruled out in the Volunteers and peacetime TF for practical reasons. Over-strictness would have damaged recruiting since this was largely dependent on existing members canvassing friends, workmates and relatives. Physical or psychological bullying by an NCO would have led to requests for his demotion or explusion and/or wholesale resignations. Moreover, in peace and war, status dilemmas were commonplace: an NCO might have under his command men who were his seniors in civil employment, or his relatives, or his old school chums. Knowles, for instance, had gone to school with Sgt Bell, his platoon sergeant, and several other sergeants in C Coy of the 1/7th.[273] Volunteer NCOs had had to learn to manage men by other, more subtle methods than those normally found in the Army.[274] Former Volunteer sergeants were invariably spoken of as "firm, but kind, fatherly and understanding". In peace and in war the Regulars could insist on meticulousness in matters of administration and training, but even in wartime they were obliged to allow the Territorials a large measure of latitude in the manner they conducted inter-rank relationships.

NCO-private Riflemen relations in the first-line battalions while on active service were excellent (insufficient data exists on the state of relations in the second-line battalions). They were characterised by mutual affection, admiration, respect and trust. Sergeants knew their men well and off parade usually called them by their Christian names or nicknames.

Cpl Herbert Reginald Gaines, 3/7th, was deluged with birthday cards by his men on his 21st birthday and given a present. When Sgt Joe Knowles returned from leave in December 1916 the lads of his platoon gave him "a right royal welcome home". Platoon sgt Arthur Fozard, 1/8th, was wounded in the right leg and arm in December 1915:

> "Never shall I forget the lads of my platoon who carried me down to the Canal Bank at Ypres and saw me into the MO's dugout."

Platoon sgt Norman J. Mason, 1/8th, lost a leg in 1917:

> "It was a terrible blow. I really liked the Army life and I loved the Regiment, the finest regiment in the British Army

> bar none, and I loved my men. I can't tell you how much I missed them. A lot of my lads came from the Bank, very rough and very tough. Marvellous soldiers, very stout-hearted. You could rely on them absolutely. You knew that, no matter what, they'd never let you down. A number had criminal records, but handled the right way they made marvellous soldiers. I didn't have much trouble with my lads. I never had one of my men up in front of the company commander, let alone the CO."

1182 Cpl Arthur Fisher, 1/7th, said:

> "We had really tough fellas from the slums, but, do you know, they were no bother and I had them eating out of my hand. One, a miner called Sonny Taylor, told my young lady, when we were at Gainsborough, that he was going to win the VC saving my life, and he meant it quite seriously. The vast majority of our company were really decent types, the salt of the earth, however humble the home they came from. These scruffs from the Bank would never steal off you. One of the men in my section was a big fella from an Irish family on the Bank - Mick Manley, about 6'2", good physique to match. A lot were frightened of him - it took three or four MPs to run him in when he got drunk - but if you treated him right, took a kindly interest in him, he was one of Nature's gentlemen. He was fantastically conscientious in the carrying out of his duties and he kept discipline for me - anybody who let me down in any way got a thumping from him!"[275]

The following anecdote illustrates the highly informal and familistic affectionate relationships that existed in the 1/8th between private Riflemen and senior NCOs: 2715 Jim Eastburn was in a crowded dugout sitting next to his platoon sergeant, Bob Moss, and CSM Arthur Fozard when his particular pal Harry Moss, the sergeant's younger brother, informed him that he had been appointed a lance-corporal. Unable to contain himself, Jim burst out, "Nepotism, that's all it is! Who writes thank-you-letters to donors of lonely soldier's parcels? Who does ...?" "That lad's not well," remarked Sgt Moss. "He wants looking after," remarked CSM Fozard. Without saying any more, they each got a lump of chalk and solemnly drew a large flattened-V on each sleeve of Jim's tunic. "Such a thing," commented Army pensioner Jim, "could only have happened in the Territorials."[276]

Private-respondents expected NCOs to be protective, supportive and "human", and like the American privates, they rated most highly the human relations abilities of NCOs, ie. ability (3) to help and advise their men, and ability (4) to gain the personal liking of their men. Although all drafted-in Regular NCOs seem to have been heartily disliked, unpopular or personally disliked NCOs seem otherwise to have been rare, for a considerable number of respondents could not recall any, and those that did nominate one or more unpopular NCOs tended to name the same men. All those nominated were, significantly, rated very low on abilities (3) and (4), particularly the Regulars. The only Territorial Acting RSM in the 1/7th, Frank Stembridge, DCM and bar, who came from a prominent Leeds Rifles family (his father having served with 1699 Bugler Harold Booth's father), though admired for his bravery, was not particularly popular because he was considered too strict and too distant and unbending.

Sergeant-majors in general were thought to be fine men, considerate, reliable and fair, often very strict, but who nevertheless were "very good to" both NCOs and privates. For example, ex-Regular CSM Connors of the 1/8th "could have been a lot worse than he was. Many a time he could have created over something, but he didn't." He was "extraordinarily nice for a warrant officer. He was very 'hail fellow, well met.' Not too 'keen' at all. Everybody was very fond of him."[277] CSM "Dave" Myers, 1/8th, "was beloved, respected, and looked up to by every man" in D Coy.[278]

Since relationships within the battalions were familistic, the notion of the platoon sergeant or sergeant-major as the surrogate mother or father, or occasionally as the elder brother, is, not surprisingly, well to the fore in respondents' testimony. In this connection perhaps we should consider the implications of the army "folk song":

> "Kiss me good-night, Sergeant-Major,
> Sergeant-Major be a Mother to me!"

and take note that in the Leeds Rifles' version of 'Sing me to sleep where bullets fall' the last line is "Waiting for the sergeant to sing me to sleep" (see Chap. 11).

Genuine affection and quasi-filial respect characterise the vast majority of testimonies. Some NCOs were greatly loved and several respondents were overcome by emotion while talking about them. Perhaps the most loved and most admired NCO in the 1/7th was the RSM, Herbert Fenton, an ex-Regular who had joined the 7th as a Territorial in 1910 and who had held the rank of sergeant in 1914. Like every good RSM, he commanded the respect of every officer and man in the battalion. He was "The Father of the Regiment", the standard bearer of army and regimental traditions and the embodiment of all the military virtues. He died on 16th April 1918 on Wytschaete Ridge, "defending the honour of the Regiment to the last", as was expected of an RSM. According to all the respondents without exception, he had, to avoid the disgrace of capture, "saved the last bullet for himself".[279] The following testimonies illustrate how much and why he was so loved and admired. The first three were given by former members of his 1915 platoon.

> "Sgt Fenton was very strict as regards army duties but he was like a real father to us nevertheless, especially in the line. He always looked after us, saved us from ourselves and stopped us doing silly things we didn't

> realise were silly. You could really learn a lot from a chap like him. When he was CSM he came round every night without fail to see if we were all right. I've even seen him carrying rations and billycans of hot soup into the line. We young lads liked to lead him on a bit and he'd say, 'I'll have you b-s shot yet!' But he loved us, you know. His bark was much worse than his bite."
>
> "A very fine chap indeed. When he was CSM he used to go round estaminets ordering us young ones out - he thought we might get into bad ways. When he was our sergeant he'd lend us money when we were skint. He was a kind-hearted chap, quite human. He was a stickler for appearance and made us shave every day etc. Whenever we came out of the line our black buttons always had to be oiled and our boots always had to be greased. It wasn't 'bull' at all. Only silly people grumbled. It stopped you from getting slack and you needed to be on your toes all the time, my goodness."
>
> "I thought the world of Sgt Fenton, I really did. He was a real soldier. He was very stern, but very fatherly. He looked after us like a mother hen her chicks. He'd charge you and then when you came up before the officer he'd be finding every excuse he could to get you off."
>
> "At first sight RSM Fenton seemed very stern and strict, but he was very fatherly and very kind underneath, though he did his best to hide it. He liked to do people good turns by stealth, without them finding out."
>
> "RSM Fenton was very highly thought of. He was a wonderful chap, everybody looked up to him. There were a lot cried when they heard he was dead."[280]

NCO-respondents tended to emphasise the executive abilities of RSM William Fear of the 1/8th, e.g.

> "RSM Bill Fear was a really good soldier, a soldier first, second and last. He never bullied anyone, was very thorough in everything he did; his arrangements and orders were always complete down to the smallest detail. He was highly respected by everyone, but rather distant. He kept his place and didn't fraternise with either officers or other ranks, including sergeants."[281]

Private Riflemen, however, were more in a position to appreciate his human relations abilities, for example, 2880 William A. Bywater said that he made a special point of visiting the teenage soldiers in the front line to see if they "were getting on all right", adding "We lads appreciated his kindly interest."[282] Fear's successor, Hollings ("Jim") Hemingway, a Leeds man from Moortown, who had been RSM in the 3/8th, proved to be an ideal RSM. He was greatly admired and respected for his efficiency and soldierliness and was extremely popular with all ranks, so much so that when the Old Comrades' Association was started after the war, he was elected President. Hemingway was an Army pensioner who had retired from the HLI in 1912 and enlisted in the Rifles late in 1914 at the age of 40 and been retained in the UK initially as a musketry instructor. A CSM said,

> "He was a very fine fellow indeed, both in private life and on active service. He was quiet and amiable, very strict on parade, yet people who gave their best service found him easy to get along with. It was a privilege to serve with him."[283]

Hemingway was in complete sympathy with the Territorials' progressive approach to discipline and contributed to it new ideas of his own. He completely revolutionised FP2: pack drill was abolished because it was not "useful work" and arduous, perhaps unpleasant, but necessary fatigues substituted.[284]

As a status group, sergeant-majors and sergeants were popular in the Leeds Rifles.

> "Dear old Joe Carter sticks in my memory with the deepest admiration which I formed for him when I was a humble Rifleman in his platoon. He was the kindliest and 'good-living-est' NCO I ever had the good fortune to meet in all my career in the army."
>
> "Sgt, later CSM, Billy Winters was a very good fella and looked after us like a father. He didn't used to frighten recruits, he fathered you instead and you felt at home with him. Whenever anybody went away, sick, wounded, leave, on a course, he always seemed glad to welcome them back and made a fuss of them. That sort of thing made you feel good."
>
> "CSM Wheeler was a very nice fatherly sort and you felt really at home with him. He had such a pleasant homely face you took to him on sight."
>
> "CSM George Cusworth was a soldier and a gentleman and I was very fond of him. If I could have picked anyone for my elder brother I would have picked him."
>
> "Sgt Cusworth was the sort of chap I'd have wanted for my own brother if I'd been picking one. He endeared himself to everybody, including the officers. Everybody thought the world of him. Only in his middle twenties, he was well made and good-looking. As CSM he was very smart and a very efficient chap indeed, but he never let the position go to his head."
>
> "I always found CSM Harry Lodge a gentleman and I liked him very much. On 20th November 1915 my best friend and workmate 1925 Ben Midgeley who'd got me to join in June 1914 was killed by a sniper while standing at the side of me in the front line. CSM Lodge was soon on the scene. I just sat down on what bit of firestep there was and he could see I was taking it hard. Putting his hand on my shoulder he said quietly, 'We're all in it together, lad'."
>
> "CSM Hardcastle always tried to be very smart. I remember once we had no water in the line and we hadn't been able to wash or shave that day. Charlie came round on his usual inspection and he looked very smart. He must have got some water from somewhere- even his moustache was curled. We were so ashamed of ourselves when we saw his appearance that we shaved in our tea, just so's we wouldn't let him down."

> "Sgt Fred Yeadon was a very good chap and had his heart and soul in soldiering. He was like a father to us all."

> "Kit Spence was a very good sergeant, a toff, a real man and always ready to help us. He would write letters for illiterate men. He looked after us like a mother. He was a right grand chap."

> "Dear old Kit Spence - what a grand chap he was, one of the best. Lived for the Regiment, that fella, and looked after us like he was the mother hen and we were his chicks. We all thought there was no one like him."

> "Sgt Frank Dilley was very kind-hearted and did his best to father everybody."

> "Sgt Sykes was a great chap, a man for whom all would do what they could."

> "Sgt Jack Wright was a bit rough and ready because he came off the Bank. He was a matey sort and he always stuck up for you and saw you tret right."

> "Sgt Green was a right good sort. He wasn't very big and we used to kid him on about there being less of him for the Jerries to hit."

> "Sgt Guthrie was a grand fella, very fatherly. A Woodhouse fella, same as me. He didn't bully you, he always spoke to you like a father."

> "Our platoon sergeant, Sgt George Mundy, was one of the nicest and best gentlemen I ever met in my life. On Bonfire Day 1915 he asked me if I'd go for the rations. A sniper got me in the chest and Sgt Mundy waded through all that dreadful mud to come to me to see how I was, and he got Sgt Stagg and Dave Leonard, the Big Drummer, to carry me down to the dressing station."[285]

Rfm W.R. Morcombe, 1/8th, wrote on the death of his platoon sergeant, 1476 William North:

> "It gave me a great shock, for I was only a yard off him. He did not live long. The Sergeant was highly respected by all our lads. He was always happy. He was buried next to a Scots Guard's grave. Our lads made a wreath and covered his grave with flowers. We all saw him put away. Our Captain read the burial service. His parents have our deepest sympathy. He is missed by us all."

1813 Stanley Holmes, 1/7th, wrote on the death of his first platoon-sergeant:

> "I am very sorry to tell you that we have lost one of the best sergeants in the battalion through the death of Sgt Simon, who was killed the last day we were in the trenches. I can tell you we shall miss him very much, for he was always willing to help us out of any difficulty."

Rfm Frank Hallam, 1/7th, wrote:

> "Poor Dick Simon - he was one of the best-liked sergeants in the battalion."[286]

2992 George A.Walker said:

> "Sgt Simon was a very good soldier. He got a dum-dum bullet from a sniper. We were all terribly upset, it was a real blow to us all. He was a very kind and fatherly sort and we

> loved him. There was never no dictatorial stuff from him."

1953 George Wood, 1/7th, said,

> "Dick Simon was a really grand chap, a practising Christian and very just in all his dealings with the men. We were very upset when he got killed. We felt we'd lost a real friend."

2635 Reginald Frank Charge, 1/7th, said of his platoon-sergeant:

> "Sgt Schutz was a grand chap, very friendly to us all, never any bullying. He would help anyone in trouble."

1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th, could not recall Sgt Schutz ever putting anyone "on the peg" (on a disciplinary charge before the company commander). Sgt Schutz figures in the following anecdotes which illustrate inter-rank relationships in B Coy of the 1/7th, told by Signaller Norman Drake, 1/7th:

> "Capt Stockwell had a car in York and my old comrade, Frank Charge, used to drive it for him. One weekend Stocky had a bad cold and was obliged to take to his bed. What a golden opportunity for Frank to nip over to Leeds - unofficially, of course - in the car. No one would ever be any the wiser. On the Saturday afternoon, he drove to Leeds in the car with Sgt Clarrie Schutz as passenger. It was a lovely run, so I was told, but when they reached the shopping parades at Harehills, disaster struck. The first person the miscreants met was none other than Mrs Stockwell who naturally asked where her husband was and, on being told he was ill in bed, told them they must take him back some grapes. Back to York Saturday evening, scene, Capt Stockwell's quarters: timid knock on the bedroom door, enter one apprehensive Rifleman. 'Mrs Stockwell has sent you these grapes, sir.' 'Where the hell have you seen Mrs Stockwell?' 'In Leeds, sir.' 'Leeds ??!!!' roared Capt Stockwell. Naturally the whole story had to come out."

Rfm Charge explained:

> "I wouldn't tell Stocky that it had been Sgt Schutz who'd been with me in the car, because I couldn't let him down, but he went and made a clean breast of it himself. He didn't get into trouble with 'Stocky' because, being an old Volunteer, he was one of 'Stocky's special pals', and I didn't either."

Norman Drake again:

> "There was an interesting sequel some months later when B Coy was stationed at Donna Nook in hutments adjoining the coastguard station. The orderly room was in a cottage near the camp. Capt Stockwell's horse was called Dolly and she got her daily exercise delivering her master safely to the orderly room from the officers' billets some distance away. One day Dolly was safely tethered outside the orderly room when someone suggested that Sgt Schutz should mount to see if the seat was comfortable. Being a good sport, though no horseman, he agreed, although he did not seem too happy when he was up. It seems a dirty trick when you look back, but it was good fun at the time. Someone untied Dolly, gave her a sharp slap on the rump and off she went, hell for leather, back to her stable. The rider was helpless to stop her - he couldn't find the brake. It might have been a coincidence, of course, but there was a minor disturbance

> and some cheering outside the orderly room and Capt Stockwell emerged to find out what all the noise was about and was just in time to see Dolly fast disappearing into the distance. Things were said, naturally, and when the rider eventually returned, the Captain gave him a large economy-sized rocket. 'Not content with making away with my motor car,' he cried, 'you've now got to go and pinch my blasted horse!'"[287]

It could only have happened in a Territorial regiment.

Inter-rank relationships of a type approaching or resembling those found in the 1/7th and 1/8th may have existed in many other Territorial units of all arms. They appear, as far as can be judged, to have existed in the 1/5th, 1/6th and 2/6th WYR, in the 1/6th DWR, in the Leeds ASC, in the Leeds and Bradford Artillery units, in the 4th WR Howitzer Brigade and in the 1st and 3rd WR Field Ambulances, as well as in the second-line Leeds Rifles battalions. Inter-rank relationships in the 2/20th London Regiment (Queen's Own) appear very similar; B. Livermore wrote: "We certainly had men of the highest calibre to lead us, men we could trust and under whom it was a pleasure to serve." Inter-rank relationships were excellent in the 1/4th Black Watch, while NCO-private relations were very good in Territorial Patrick MacGill's regiment, the London Irish Rifles.[288]

13.11 Discipline

The object of discipline, in addition to the rather obvious aims of keeping order and instilling unthinking obedience, was to counteract the immense socially disintegrating strain of battle on the group,and to produce staunchness and steadfastness in battle in the individual soldier, firstly, by providing him with a buttress against his own fears and secondly, by inculcating in him a high sense of duty.[289] In other words, the main aim of discipline, the training of the will, is the inculcation and maintenance of high morale. Carrington wrote: "The merit of discipline is that it strengthens the nerve of every man by filling him with the general courage."[290] The experience of both world wars showed clearly that units with high standards of self-discipline and general efficiency were less liable than others to suffer psychiatric casualties.[291] No military force can thus function effectively without discipline, since it prevents soldiers from giving way to their natural emotions and inclinations in times of stress and danger. H. Spenser Wilkinson wrote in 1900 that discipline "is always, and will always be, the foundation stone of an army."[292]

Viscount Plumer expressed the official view when he said "The morale of an Army must be sustained by the maintenance of a very high standard of discipline. That is generally recognised."[293] This unfortunately somewhat mis-states the causal relationship between discipline and morale: that each is dependent on the other. Many senior officers were convinced of the apparent demonstrated value of imposed discipline, particularly of close order drill and arms drill, to units of waning morale.[294] The Canadians drilled constantly out of the line to maintain their morale.[295] Alan Thomas, when appointed to the command of a company in the Kitchener battalion, 6th Royal West Kents, in early 1917, tackled its "state of slackness and indifference" by imposing "a kind of Prussian discipline" which included a stiff course of barrack square drill for the NCOs.[296] The beneficial effects so often noted may have been largely due to latent factors such as the occupation it gave to the men and the physical activity involved.

The following passage, written in 1916, illustrates the meaning and value of discipline: "When you note a Company on the march - slack-looking, miserable, dirty, slow, and almost sulky in coming to attention, with half a dozen stragglers creeping on behind, and the officers and NCOs taking no notice - you can tell at once that these are bad officers, and that no discipline and no energy exist there ... When you take your men into action, either in ordinary trench warfare or in a big attack, all this discipline will repay you and your men themselves a thousand-fold."[297]

The American Soldier defines "good discipline" as "the cheerful and understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team." Ludendorff wrote, "Discipline is not intended to kill character, but to develop it." "Discipline is a positive quality closely connected with the right spirit."[298] Unfortunately, in the civilian mind it is more commonly associated with coercion and punishment. According to John Keegan, the 19th century French officer Ardant du Picq, author of the influential Battle Studies (1870), believed that soldiers fought from fear: fear of the consequences first of not fighting (punishment), then of not fighting well (getting killed).[299] W.H.A. Groom claims that men went over the top because there was no alternative but the firing squad.[300] Discipline maintained by fear of punishment has been heartily condemned by authorities as diverse as F.M. Wavell[301] and The Manual of Military Law. As Carrington points out, "No one can make soldiers fight if they have no heart to fight."[302] Control based on fear and authoritarian discipline is inefficient in every respect.[303] Innumerable industrial and other studies have demonstrated that reliance on coercive motivation based on fear and autocratic leadership produces apathy, alienation or hostility in the subordinate towards both the superior and the organisation and its objectives,[304] and an army or any other military group which has to rely on coercive measures to any great extent is highly vulnerable to stresses and strains.[305]

Leadership style has been found to have a significant effect on the led. The research findings of Lewin, Lippit and White are particularly well-known.[306] The "persuasive", or "equalitarian", or "human relations-oriented", leadership style, so clearly preferred by Leeds Rifles respondents, has been found by American military research to result, because it does much to reduce unnecessary tensions, in fewer disciplinary infractions, lower AWOL rates and intra-group hostility.[307] A study of recruits carried out in the 1950s found that those who approved of their officers and NCOs were less likely to express various unacceptable forms of aggression such as going AWOL, excessive grousing, drunkenness, losing temper and fighting among themselves.[308]

The USARB found it impossible to evaluate the importance of the sheer coercive power of Army authority as a factor in combat motivation. They gained the impression that instances in which leaders compelled men to continue fighting at gun point were rare. Enlisted infantrymen in a veteran division were asked to state what factor, in their experience, was most important in making them want to keep going and do as well as they could. Only 1% cited leadership and discipline.[309] Leaving all punitive considerations aside, coercive authority was important in only one aspect of the combat situation and here it played the key role: that of prescribing concrete actions to be taken in confused and uncertain situations. Over and over again, it was demonstrated that men expected orders from their officer or NCO. The men of the 1/7th on Wytschaete Ridge in April 1918 held their ground not because they were in fear of execution for running away, but simply because they had not been given orders to retire.

Many men who had joined the Army only for the duration of the war would perhaps have shared Colin MacInnes' opinion that "three-quarters of military discipline is mindless, obsolete and wastefully self-frustrating - apart, of course, from being highly irritating."[310] Such an attitude may indicate inadequate resocialisation. At the end of 1914 Ian Hay explained the sound thinking behind the much-criticised "cumbrous" and "grandmotherly" military regulation that in every task a soldier was always supervised by one of the next higher rank or the senior soldier present: it impressed upon the individual soldier the necessity not only to place himself under the command of his nearest superior in action but also to take command himself in every situation where no superior or senior was present.[311] No respondent, Regular or Territorial, criticised military discipline. The following attitudes were quite typical: Cpl George M. Dowling, a member of a cavalry regiment of iron discipline, the 10th Hussars:

> "I liked soldiering. I didn't object to the discipline. It was only irksome if you tried to kick against it":

2313 Herbert C. Sweetman, 1/8th:

> "So long as you did as you were told it was all right. We had a few big-heads who knew more than the NCOs and they had a bad time. If you ask for it, you have got to expect it."[312]

Etzioni's theory predicts that, since the Regular Army and the Territorial Force were different types of organisation having differing compliance structures, their styles and perceptions of discipline would be very different. This, in fact, was the case.

The Regulars, for the most part, abided by the age-old British Army maxim, "The sterner the discipline, the better the soldier, the better the army,"[313] which was quoted by a number of respondents, both Regular and Territorial. This dated from the army of more than a century earlier which appears to have been then a purely coercive organisation. Very many officers believed, with the Duke of Wellington, that all punishments should be for the sake of example:[314] Viscount Allenby declared: "... the severity of the penalty indicates the enormity of the offence, and it creates a moral atmosphere which causes him [the soldier] to abhor that crime and anything that would affect his honour and duty as a soldier"; General Jack wrote: "if discipline is not strictly upheld on active service an army may become a rabble."[315] This was the reason why the names and units of deserters who had been executed were ordered to be read out by the Adjutant of every unit in the BEF on 3 successive parades.[316] Many unit commanders often tended to award the maximum punishment on the principle that only harsh punishment could bring home to potential offenders the lengths to which their superiors would go to ensure their orders were obeyed.[317] It was not uncommon for men who fell out on the march to be awarded FP1 for malingering. Discipline seemed to be sternest in the elite regiments: in the 20th Hussars, for instance, the punishment was "7 days' CB if you hadn't polished the inside of the buckle that went under your foot!"[318]

Before the war,

> "the weakness of the Territorial battalions was thought to lie in discipline and training. In peacetime the former was easily maintained in the annual two weeks' camp and weekly drill nights at the local drill hall by a most willing and co-operative obedience. A subconscious attempt to emulate the Regular Army by observing and copying the Regular Adjutant and RSM greatly helped. But it was thought probable, although by no means certain, that if war came this almost self-imposed discipline would not stand its only test, the ability in action to stand firm when times are bad and the enemy looks like being successful. In the event it greatly exceeded the wildest hopes."[319]

Territorial discipline was not less, it was merely different in style. It was, according to the serving Regular officers interviewed, very similar to the discipline now practised in the present-day Regular Army. In 1980, ex-war correspondent, American David Reed, wrote:

> "In Britain's new army, discipline is considerably more relaxed than, for example, in the American Army where, despite civilian egalitarianism, a whiff of Prussianism persists ..."

Interviewed by Reed, Sgt-Major John Watts of the 9th/12th Royal Lancers, a veteran of 23 years' service, comparing the present all-volunteer army with his early days, said:

> "Discipline isn't less. It's changed its style. It was discipline by fear before; it's discipline by respect now. Before, NCOs would walk in and say, 'Hey, you, do this or that!' Now they say, 'Hey, fellows, let's get the job done'. It's a more civilised system and it makes for a better army."[320]

The type of discipline on which high morale depends is self-discipline[321] and Territorial discipline emphasised self-discipline:

> "... discipline in the London Rifle Brigade was always the discipline of men who knew by their upbringing when discipline was necessary and to whom obedience was due. They did not need to have it drilled into them on the parade ground."

Of the men of the 1/5th SR on embarkation, the Regular Adjutant wrote: "the discipline was perfect since they disciplined themselves."[322]

The self-discipline of the Territorials was associated with their social cohesion. A Territorial Old Contemptible wrote of his battalion:

> "Being closely knit in civil life, their discipline was different to the Regular Army; they had 'Discipline by Consent'. It paid; all did their best to work in a 'smart and soldierly manner' worthy of their professional comrades."[323]

Capt E.V. Tempest wrote of discipline in the 49th Division:

> "The personal element had been all important in building up the Territorial units. At first commands were obeyed and work carried out simply because of a mutual confidence and respect between officers and men, similar to that in a workshop or any small society. The first bond was personal. Discipline came later, and was used to strengthen and regularise relationships already existing."

As Brig Gen M.D. Goring Jones remarked to commanding officers soon after taking over command of 146 Bde in December 1915, "Your discipline is one of goodwill." In June 1915 the Commander-in-Chief wrote to GOC 49 Division to congratulate him on the fact that during May not a single conviction by Court Martial had occurred in his division, "a condition which does not obtain in any other Division of the Armies." The letter was accompanied by a note from GOC 1st Army:

> "Sir Douglas Haig wishes to add an expression of his great satisfaction at the state of discipline in the 49th (West

> Riding) Division, and also desires to congratulate the Division on its soldier-like bearing and efficiency."

To cynics who might declare discipline to have been, on the contrary, extremely slack, Capt Tempest points out that

> "in the typical Territorial unit during its early days of active service there was an unusual esprit de corps and sense of personal responsibility. Men refused to disgrace their platoons or companies, or let down their officers and NCOs whom they had known personally in civilian life."[324]

It was popularly claimed that "the Territorial Spirit" was the source of Territorial discipline:

> "And always there is that great SPIRIT - which is the discipline of the volunteer Territorial Army. Officers and men are united therein by a strong and free and easy comradeship which could not, naturally, apply to, nor would it work in, the Regular Army. A Territorial officer of the dark ages before 1939, on being asked whether discipline was 'good' replied: 'It is either non-existent or perfect, as you care to look at it'."[325]

Respondent Staff-Sgt-Major Ted Welburn of the Leeds ASC was convinced that the source of the very high standard of discipline in his unit was the immense pride taken by the men in every aspect of their work, a fact amply confirmed by photographic evidence and Special Orders of the Day; all the animals wore individually-fitted collar harness and saddles made by the unit tradesmen and, as a result, saddle-gall and collar-gall were unheard-of ailments.[326]

The Territorial style of discipline was, in fact, that practised by the "Father of the Light Infantry" himself, Sir John Moore:

> "He insisted that the men should be treated as human beings. The officers must know their men, be their friend and look after their wants; even orders were to be given in the language of moderation. It was a discipline of kindness, an appeal to the heart inspired by mutual respect, affection, and comradeship. Officers learnt to prevent crime by winning the affection of their men. Control from without had been replaced by control from within."[327]

The Territorial style of discipline offended against neither the spirit nor the letter of military law. The Manual of Military Law had this to say on the underlying purpose of both discipline and punishment and how discipline was "best maintained":

> "Without discipline all military bodies become mobs, and worse than useless, but discipline enforced by punishment alone is a poor sort of discipline, which will not stand any severe strain. What must be aimed at is that high state of discipline, which springs from a military system administered with impartiality and judgement, so as to induce in all ranks a feeling of duty." "The object of awarding punishment is the maintenance of discipline ... The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted is the least amount by which discipline can be efficiently

> maintained. Occasionally the exigencies of discipline, apart from the circumstances of that particular case, may render a severe sentence necessary."[328]

Every section of Part I of the annual Army Act, after stipulating the maximum penalty for its particular category of crime, ended with the phrase, "or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned." The Territorial Force manual pointed out that this meant that the Act was

> "less rigid in its practical application than would at first sight appear from the phraseology of its enactment. It is subject to considerable relaxation in proper cases, and its general purpose may be described as deterrent rather than punitive."[329]

The Army Act and King's Regulations were intentionally formidable. It was believed that the individual soldier, whatever his rank, had to be impressed that he was the chattel of the state, and that he was helpless in the face of an uncircumventable system which demanded of him total obedience to the orders of his superiors, and which enforced these orders, if necessary, by dire penalties.[330] The claim that the British army was "the most rigid army of the Great War; the army, too, of harshest discipline and the most severe punishments"[331] was based on the category of offences and their stipulated maximum punishments found in the Army Act rather than on the Act's practical application.

A major difference between the Territorials and the Regulars appeared to be one of definition. The former tended to include in the term "discipline" both imposed- and self-discipline; the latter tended to restrict the term to imposed discipline and to employ the term "morale" for self-discipline: Lord Moran, who served with the Regular Army, certainly used these terms in this way.[332] The Regulars thus tended to be obsessed with imposed discipline and its outward trappings and consequently felt free to criticise not only the Territorials for their alleged lack of discipline, but also the Dominion forces. Troops from the Antipodes, particularly Australia, had little soldierly finish or outward discipline: according to respondents, noticeably less of both than even the Territorials. Sir John Monash, interviewed in September 1918, said:

> "One has heard a good deal of scepticism on the question of the discipline of the Australian troops. Some thought we had too much freedom in our Army, too much of the spirit of civil life, too little of the character of a machine ... We do not make too much of the mere signs of discipline, but discipline itself. There is one supreme and final test of discipline. It is that every man at the appointed time and place should be on hand and resolute to do his job. By this test the Australian Army passes 100 per cent. clean."[333]

The prevalent view in the Army that the only "true" discipline was imposed discipline, with its implicit assumption "that the men would run away if not kept under iron control all the time", has been attacked by Regular Officer, John Nettleton.[334]

The principal reason perhaps why the Regulars considered the Territorials ill-disciplined was that the latter tolerated, nay encouraged, "undue familiarity" between the ranks, and not only between officers and other ranks, but also between NCOs and privates. Despite its active promotion of esprit de corps, the Regular Army paradoxically frowned upon or even forbade fraternisation between rankers of different ranks on the grounds that it undermined discipline. For instance, a private was not allowed to walk out with an NCO, and he always had to address an NCO by his rank and stand to attention when speaking. To address a corporal by his Christian name was considered, according to Graves, to be "using insubordinate language to an NCO."[335] When a man got his first stripe he remained with the platoon, when he got his second he transferred to another company, when he got his third he was transferred yet again.[336]

Robert H.P. Schulze, 8th, "a barrack rat" who had been born and brought up in the Regular Army, said,

> "The Regular Army hated the idea of mateyness - call it 'togetherness', if you like. My father said that when he was a senior NCO in the Regulars he always had trouble knocking these 'silly ideas' out of the heads of lads who'd joined straight from the Territorials and Special Reserve. He thought it bad for discipline. Silly idea or not, it welded together conscripts and volunteers, men from all parts of the country and from all walks of life. We were just one big happy family in the 8th, and speaking personally, that's what appealed to me about it."

2227 Gilbert Freeman, 1/8th:

> "I dare say all the mateyness in the battalion would have been bad for discipline in peacetime, but it wasn't in wartime. I really think it helped discipline. You felt you could rely on everybody else."

2006 Sgt Ernest Woodhead, 1/7th:

> "The 1/7th was a very homely battalion, very nice to be in. Everybody knew everybody else. They were a right decent set of lads, easy to get on with. I never had much trouble with mine, and I was a sergeant at 20. The sergeants had been brought up with a lot of the men, and they really pulled together. It was because they were all Leeds lads, you see. When you've known a chap all your life, you don't have any trouble with him. It's much better all round when everything's matey, because it's easier to get men to do the things you want them to do. I don't for the life of me know where Regulars got the idea that mateyness was bad for discipline. It's just the reverse. We used ranks when we were in the

> line and on parade, but Christian names otherwise.[337] We had a saying, 'On parade, on parade, off parade, off parade'. There was very little trouble with discipline in the 7th, very little crime at all, and it was a tiny number of men who were responsible for most of the crime that there was."[338]

Not all Regular regiments disapproved of close inter-rank relationships and considered them prejudicial to good order and discipline. An outstanding exception was the Rifle Brigade. The founders of this Regiment made "comradeship between all ranks the foundation of its achievements", aiming to establish "a happy family under discipline". A very close comradeship between officers and men was deliberately fostered in order to replace subordination to the officer by two-way trust and respect between the ranks and produce a closely-knit brotherhood-in-arms. This policy was held to be "one of the most important factors which help to maintain discipline of the right sort, i.e. a cheerful, ready and loyal obedience."[339]

> "The relations of officers and men in the Battalions of the Rifle Brigade, under the combined spell of regimental tradition and esprit de corps, was something for which a parallel has to be sought in the relationship of the members of a Highland clan."[340]

> "Comradeship between men who had learnt to know and respect one another, as with all good Regiments, was the cement which kept the Rifle Brigade so cohesive a force. The touchstone of such comradeship was unselfishness. It existed between officer and officer, and Rifleman and Rifleman, thus transforming the discipline of authority and fear into that stronger discipline whose sanction is the wish to obey."[341]

The parallels with the Leeds Rifles are striking.

In awarding punishments, Leeds Rifles officers worked by two rules: they stuck wherever possible to the letter of military law - "The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted is the least amount by which discipline can be efficiently maintained" - and they judged every disciplinary case on its merits. Company commander Capt H.R. Lupton remarked in 1917: "Like punishments cannot of course be meted out to all, and as a matter of fact we get along with hardly any at all." The officers "could not see that any useful purpose would be served by applying the rules and regulations harshly; they had no desire to break a man's spirit."[342] Compassion and commonsense guided officers' judgements. A 1/8th man who had managed to filch a partially filled rum jar and was later discovered in his billet attempting to stab pink rats with his bayonet was removed to hospital, not the guard room. "Nobody ever got put on a charge for falling out. Men would fall dead beat in a hedge bottom and then find the battalion when they woke up. I only ever fell out once. You just kept going as long as you possibly could."[343] The 1/8th marched the 42 miles from Wormhoudt to

Calais in two days in January 1916. The march "tired the men considerably but no one fell out", though the "tramping told a great deal on the men's feet which were soft with trench life and the wearing of gumboots."[344] Good morale had triumphed over physical weakness, for L/Cpl Espin noted the day after arrival in Calais "Nobody can hardly walk."[345]

A feature of military law administration was that charges could and frequently were "reduced", i.e. withdrawn and a less serious charge substituted. As a result, many Regular NCOs tended to bring charges carrying the higher penalties. Rfm Langton, cracking jokes while up to the waist in water was charged by his NCO, an over-zealous ex-Regular, with the serious crime of "intentionally occasioning false alarms". This was dismissed by his OC who gave him several bars of chocolate by way of compensation. Rfm Appleyard, who had committed a capital offence by kicking his immediate superior for attempting to rouse him, was sentenced by his medically-qualified company commander to act as orderly man for 7 consecutive days. Cpl George Taylor who fell asleep in hot sunshine while on duty in the front line was not charged with the capital offence of "sleeping on post" but with neglect of duty (of which he was found guilty and reduced to the ranks). Cpl Sanderson who refused to obey an order given by a shell-shocked officer was not even reprimanded, since it was held that the officer had not given a lawful command; the incident moreover had indicated to a concerned CO that the officer needed immediate evacuation to hospital.[346] When tents were inspected on 1st February 1916, a civilian chicken was found tied by the leg to the tent pole of a man of A Coy of the 1/8th; according to the Rifleman's explanation, "The chicken had apparently taken a natural fancy to him and had followed him to camp."[347] He was not charged with looting, but was ordered to sell it and give the money to the Regimental Canteen funds. In December 1914 B Coy of the 1/7th was sent on a musketry course to Long Eaton where it was billetted over the shop premises of the local retail Co-operative Society who later submitted a bill for a box of missing prunes: every man in the company was required to contribute one penny in reparation.[348]

Not a single respondent of the 1/8th and 8th could recall any man receiving FP1, although several recalled George Pemberton being sent to the Glasshouse in 1914 and Rfm Farnell, variously described as "a complete waster", "a thorough bad lot" and "a hardened sinner", being sentenced in 1917 to death, commuted to 20 years' imprisonment, for desertion. 1/7th respondents could recall seeing only 2 men undergoing FP1: Capp and Mangham. No second-line respondent could recall any man being sentenced to FP1.

Though the scale of punishments in the Leeds Rifles battalions may give an impression of leniency when compared with those of some Regular units, discipline was nevertheless very strict. Orders were expected to be obeyed without hesitation, with energy, and with cheerfulness. No lapse from duty, however trivial, was allowed to pass unnoticed. Neglect of duty by or drunkenness in an NCO was always punished by reduction to the ranks.[349] Any slackness, slovenliness and particularly disobedience were severely dealt with. During the 1914-15 training period, for instance, men guilty of disobedience or of over-staying leave passes were given 5-15 days' detention in a military prison.[350]

The number of men of the Regiment sentenced to death, 3 out of a strength of over 21,000 who passed through its ranks 1914-18, and the number executed, 0 (nil), were very much below the average for the British Army as a whole. The total number of officers and men who served in the Army was 5,215,162.[351] 2,690 death sentences were passed but only 291 carried out.[352] This gives an average sentencing rate of 1 in 1,939 of strength, and an execution rate of 1 in 17,921. Some battalions had rates well above the average: e.g. William Moore claims that 3 men of the 18th Manchester Regt. were executed.[353] Many of the Regular respondents knew of executions in their own units or in units of their brigade; one claimed to have taken part in an execution of an officer as a member of a firing party. None of the Territorial respondents had ever heard of executions, either "official" or "unofficial", taking place in Territorial units, and several put forward the interesting theory that when court-martial records become available, it will be found that TF units display a below-average incidence of serious military crime as well as a below-average execution rate.

Capp and Mangham of the 1/7th appeared to be classic examples of one of the major groups of "military misfit", the psychopathic delinquent who is a constant headache to his officers and NCOs. Both came from eminently respectable working class families. Capp was an incorrigible, completely amoral but likeable rogue who was extremely attractive to women. His mother and sisters doted on him. A chronic delinquent at school, where he was a persistent truant, a born exhibitionist, he was a creature of impulse, continually craving for new experiences, impatient of routine and discipline, and possessed of a restless wanderlust. He had early thrown up an apprenticeship in a very highly paid skilled trade in order to work on the barges plying on the Aire and Calder Navigation. He hated the routine of soldiering out of the line and soon became bored with normal trench warfare. He had quickly formed liaisons with local girls. He disappeared one very dark night while on a carrying party over the Yser Canal. It was popularly believed he had drowned, but some suspected he had gone AWOL to escape from an irate French father. He was arrested by the military police several months later while selling chocolate to British troops masquerading as a Frenchman and speaking English with a heavy French accent. Respondents claimed that he had been cohabiting contemporaneously with two French girls and that one had discovered this perfidy and informed the authorities. He was duly court-martialled for desertion and sentenced to death. The recently passed Suspension of Sentences Act, however, enabled Col Kirk to have the sentence commuted to a suspended sentence of 10 years' penal servitude, which meant that Capp returned to the battalion and "became a nightmare to all orderly sergeants."[354] Out of the line he was kept in the guardroom, from which he repeatedly escaped, often displaying great ingenuity, for he was frequently manacled. Most of his absences were of short duration: on a number of occasions he was arrested while serving quite openly behind the bar of a local estaminet. It was said that in 1918, posing as a soldier who had lost his unit, he had attached himself to an American battalion, gone into action with them and led a bayonet charge, his masquerade only coming to light when the American CO had sent in a recommendation for him to receive a high-ranking gallantry award. Out of bravado Capp had not bothered to give an assumed name.

Mangham, also typically attention-seeking, appeared to be a potentially dangerous aggressive psychopath, an overtly hostile, over-self-assertive moral defective of vicious propensities upon whom no amount of punishment had any discernible effect. He was openly aggressive and constantly attempted to dominate others. He was resentful of and reacted against any authority and had an opinion of himself as being superior in every way to others. He had a very low threshold of control even when sober and was an extremely violent man, both verbally and physically. Though he was of no more than average physique it would take 5 or 6 men to restrain him. The 1/7th Regimental police always had to put the gag-rope on him to quieten him. Respondent Provost-sergeant 2586 William Wilson of the 3/7th had found it advisable to keep him incarcerated in the guardroom, wearing heavy leg-irons as well as handcuffs, and he had, at the RSM's insistence, sent him out hand-cuffed on a draft to France. A large part of his service was spent in detention for serious aggravated assaults on both NCOs and private Riflemen, one the attempted shooting of a warrant officer, and he is thought to have ended up in one of the penal battalions set up in the later stages of the war to deal with "habitual bad characters". He had had a life-long history of maladjustment at home, at school and at work, and his parents had completely disowned him. Three 8th Bn respondents who had known him in civilian life claimed he had been in their battalion before the war and been discharged as unsuitable, but this could not be verified. He joined the 2/7th in the autumn of 1914 and shortly afterwards, for coming on parade drunk, was clapped in "the cells" at Carlton Barracks. These had been hastily converted from the Bandroom and he escaped, half-dressed and in his bare feet, through an insecure skylight and was arrested some hours later by the civilian police near his brother's home more than two miles away. It was alleged that the 2/7th had put him on the first available draft to the 1/7th in order to get rid of him. Apart from a tender-hearted soul who felt sorry for him because his parents had disowned him, no respondent could see any good in him at all. The consensus view of all ranks among respondents was that Mangham was a complete disgrace to the Regiment and should have been discharged with ignominy. Unfortunately,no machinery existed in WWI for dealing with and discharging psychopathic delinquents,[355] since the relevant provisions of King's Regulations had been suspended. Attitudes to Capp, on the other hand, were quite different. Most of the NCO-respondents were inclined to regard him as "The Black Sheep of the Regiment" but agreed that it had been wise to retain him in the battalion, if only to preserve the Regiment's good name. The remainder were very much inclined to admire this "living legend" and laugh over his amazing exploits. No one thought his death sentence should have been carried out.

The following testimonies sumup the style of discipline found in the wartime Leeds Rifles. Lt J. B. Gawthorpe:

> "The behaviour of the Leeds Rifles was like that of civilians in uniform, only better, and Leeds was an extremely law-abiding place at that time. The 8th was well-disciplined, but it wasn't the type of discipline found in the Regulars. It was mostly self-imposed, not imposed from without. The men were keen and knew each other well, so they didn't need much telling."

2/Lt J.R. Bellerby:

> "There was never even the beginnings of a problem of discipline. The behaviour of our chaps either here or abroad was little different from what would be expected in holiday seaside lodgings - unless it was better. Nor were they bothersome to their NCOs and officers. This was a civilian army. Its conduct, I would emphatically say, was little altered by its being at war."

Rfm G. Oswald Plackett, 1/8th, who had been invalided out of the 18th Hussars earlier in 1914:

> "They weren't ultra-smart, but then you couldn't expect it. The esprit de corps was extremely high - they were all terrifically keen and very willing. As for discipline, it was perhaps not quite as strict as in the Regulars. That surprises you, doesn't it, my saying that. I would describe the discipline more as self-discipline. The 8th

> was very well behaved and there was very little need for imposed discipline such as you saw in the Regular Army."[356]

A potential disciplinary problem in the TF unit was the status dilemma. This did not appear to cause problems in the Leeds Rifles; it was a familiar enough situation in peacetime. According to respondents, NCOs usually tackled the kinship dilemma by being twice as strict with relatives as with the other men in their charge.

Lt Gawthorpe makes the important connection between self-discipline, which can be defined as the soldier's "own willingness to do his duty", and social pressure, the opinion of a man's comrades. This was of particular significance in a local regiment like the Leeds Rifles where, in any given company, a man had known many of his comrades in civilian life, and so the social controls of family and neighbourhood were carried over, at least to some extent, into the military milieu. The fact that news of a man's bad behaviour would inevitably reach his family and friends at home usually acted as a valuable constraint on his conduct.[357] As 2006 Sgt Ernest Woodhead, 1/7th, put it: "You never had no trouble with lads you'd been brought up with; they knew you too well." He personally had never even had trouble with the egregious Capp, whom he had known throughout their childhood and adolescence, since the Capp family were neighbours of his grandparents.[358]

The Leeds Rifles disciplinary style was marked by understanding, sympathy and commonsense. This may well have been typical of the TF. W.H.A. Groom stated that in the London Rifle Brigade

> "good understanding and esprit de corps was the basis of the disciplinary system ... We had first class NCOs of good understanding from the Sergeant Major downwards and that meant so much in the wretched conditions under which we lived."[359]

Primary group relationships and esprit de corps were the major sources of self-discipline in a military unit.[360] Strong inter-rank relationships may have had considerable bearing on the more relaxed style of the Territorials: R.W. Little's study of an infantry combat group suggests that the greater the social solidarity between the ranks of a military unit, the less rigid its discipline becomes.[361] Pte Thomas R. Kitson said of the 1/5th WYR:

> "Morale and discipline in our battalion were excellent. Our battalion was exceptionally well-behaved, I should think. I don't recall any serious crime at all, or anyone deserting, or getting sent to prison, or even getting FPI. I always did as I was told. It was the way I'd been brought up. I've always maintained that our battalion was well-behaved because they'd all been well brought up. When I was a kid you knew what you'd get if you didn't behave properly - a damn' good hiding. There were a few at first who wouldn't

> have discipline. They only made it hard for themselves. One thing I can tell you. Tales about military police having to threaten to shoot men running away during the Retreat in 1918 may be true, though I can't believe it myself, but it certainly never happened in the 49th Division. We never even thought of it. It would never have even occurred to us to do such a shameful thing as retire without orders. We always stuck together through thick and thin, no matter what. It was never 'every man for himself'."[362]

A major reason for the high standard of behaviour in the Leeds Rifles, the 1/5th WYR and other TF units may very well be, as Pte Kitson maintained, the upbringing and education of the personnel. Throughout the Respectable working class strict disciplinary standards were imposed upon the children, whose parents were frightened by the independent youth culture of the streets. The working class father completely dominated his family and even the labourer was "King" at home.[363] Self-control was as much valued in the Respectable working class as it was in the public school, particularly in the North of England; children were often obliged to stand at table as an exercise in discipline: it was supposed to strengthen moral fibre.[364] (Guy Chapman's nurse was a strict disciplinarian who used to make him stand in a corner for considerable periods at a stretch, which he described as "an exercise to which I owe my ability to stand on parade for long hours without fidgeting or flinching."[365]) Many respondents recalled how Mother would sit them on a chair and "dare" them to move or utter a sound until she gave them permission. Contemporary educational methods developed habits of obedience and docility in school pupils. Large classes of 60 or more were frequently to be found in Edwardian elementary schools and, not surprisingly, the continual maintenance of classroom discipline, with its "orderly quiet", became "almost an end in itself." The well-disciplined children thus acquired "a reliable habit of exactness and obedience."[366] At both home and at school children were taught "to respect their elders and betters."

13.12 Esprit de corps

Esprit de corps, usually translated by officers as "family spirit" or "feeling of family", is the core of morale. It is traditionally held by the British Army to be the key to combat effectiveness: the successful combat unit is that which fights "as a family" in which every man knows and trusts his comrades.[367] It appears to be the strongest moral force that holds a unit together and keeps it going as an effective fighting unit.

It is much more than a high degree of primary group cohesiveness, though this may be paramount. Like morale itself, it is in its turn a complex cluster of related socio-psychological forces and attitudes: the British Army employs the French term "esprit de corps" as an untranslatable portmanteau phrase embracing regimental pride, group loyalty, group morale, commitment, team spirit, "battalion spirit" and the spirit of duty. It was also "fighting spirit". The Official History considered that the esprit de corps of the Australian divisions made them "always formidable adversaries."[368]

Its importance, according to Lt Col Baynes, "cannot be over-emphasised - it is essential to realise that it was the strongest single influence on the lives of everyone in the battalion."[369] Development of esprit de corps was the mental training which increased the soldier's resistance to the nervous and mental strain of combat and conditioned him to endure its concomitant hardships and deprivations.[370] It was capable of producing a high level of commitment in both the individual and the group and so keeping the soldier at his task. The less personally involved a soldier was in his task the more likely he was to seek some avenue of escape such as neurotic illness, a self-inflicted wound, or desertion. It was capable of producing a high level of performance, particularly when associated with informality and compression of the organisational structure (it may be noted that esprit de corps, informality and close superior-subordinate relations are characteristics inherent in modern Japanese industry).[371] It was epitomised in the unwritten law that everyone, whatever his rank, rushed to the assistance of any comrade in difficulties: when 3880 James Foster, 1/8th, fell into a shell-crater "filled to the top with slimy mud, Lt Appleyard, CSM Spence and five of the lads" formed a human chain to haul him out.[372] Respondent Capt Peter Horsfall, a Guardsman of long service as ranker, RSM and Quartermaster, considered that a high level of esprit de corps resulted in a "good" regiment, and that it was produced by a good RSM and good officers: "Everyone looks to the RSM and the officers for their lead and example. If they're good, you get good NCOs and everybody really pulling their weight."[373]

Strong esprit de corps is associated with marked feelings among the unit members of belonging to a community. If a community is defined as an association of people whose members ordinarily share a common culture or practise a common way of life, a regiment can be termed a "military community."[374] The feelings were more than those of mere community, however. Every retired or serving British soldier of any service is familiar with the concept of the regiment as a military tribe or clan and the platoon (or its organisational equivalent) as a sub-tribe or "highland sept".[375] In any unit whose members had been associated for a considerable time and accordingly got to know each other very well, social relationships were familistic, bearing more than a fleeting resemblance to those existing in a tribe or 18th century Scottish clan. A Territorial regiment like the Leeds Rifles whose recruitment of both officers and other ranks was completely dominated by social inheritance, was the "family gathering", the "military tribe" par excellence. W.L. Andrews wrote, in fact, that "We were more like a Highland chief and his faithful fighting men than an ordinary battalion."[376] In the Regular unit it was the building of esprit de corps that eventully transformed it into the military tribe, but in the Territorial unit it was the recruitment by social inheritance that simultaneously produced both esprit de corps and the military tribe.

Retired long-serving soldiers, particularly those of high rank, will often claim that the esprit de corps of the British Army is something unique among armies.[377] Certainly it seems significant that neither regimental pride nor "esprit de corps" was accorded much importance in the text of The American Soldier and that both were relegated to "a cluster of attitudes associated with favourable combat motivation."[378] The British, however, elevated esprit de corps to the level of a religion: some Regular respondents actually called it "the soldier's religion". Lord Moran, who served with the 1st RF as RMO from 1914 to 1917, stated that "there was only one religion in the Regular army, 'the regiment'," and he referred to "the creed of the Regiment which blossomed into a living faith till nothing else mattered."[379]

The "religion of the Regiment" was very much influenced by the ethos of medieval Christian chivalry and embodied the knightly noble ideals of unselfishness and self-sacrifice, duty to King and Country, honour, loyalty, steadfastness, bravery and comradeship. Esprit de corps, according to F.M. Slim, "is the old Christian virtue of unselfishness, of standing by your neighbour, your comrade. It is the sacrifice of a man's comfort, inclination, safety, even life, for others, for something greater than himself."[380] It engendered among the unit's members the belief that only the Regiment mattered:

> "I remember", wrote Lord Moran, "men recruited at the street corner by starvation who came to act on the principle that if the Regiment lived, it did not matter if they died, though they did not put it that way. This was their source of strength, their abiding faith, it was the last of all the creeds that in historical times have steeled men against death."[381]

Edward Flatley, 1/7th, considered that he and his fellow slum-dwellers had found their real niche in life in the Leeds Rifles and that in "the Religion of the Regiment" they had found at last something worth living for and worth dying for:

> "A man's got to have ideals or else life is not worth living. He has to have something to believe in. I was fighting for those very ideals myself. We didn't want to get killed, of course, but we had a job to do, one that we'd chosen ourselves, and getting killed was unfortunately one of the risks."[382]

The readiness to die for the Regiment, which lay unspoken at the back of the soldier's mind, was thus no ideal cliché coined by writers of military-jingoistic romance.

Historical factors lay behind the unique characteristics of British esprit de corps. Regiments traditionally looked upon themselves as autonomous units. G. Harries-Jenkins attributes this to a combination during the Victorian period of the lack of proper military organisation on the brigade and divisional system and the failure to undertake regular training in large-scale formations.[383] This attitude was also at least in part the product of the hostile (in every sense of the word) environment in which the regiment was obliged to live both at home and abroad. Moreover, because of the Army's Empire-policing role, the British regiment was never able to put down roots and was obliged to draw "its sustenance from its own resources, and most copiously from its sense of difference from others." Regiments "hug their sense of difference tight about themselves, cultivate separatism and are prepared to recall days when they did not belong to the British army at all." John Keegan takes the view that the Cardwell system, by abolishing purchase, had "quite accidentally, made loyalty to the regiment, and service within the regiment, and to no other regiment, the passport to a successful career" as an officer.[384]

The result was an army comprising a collection of regiments,[385] each with its own sacred tribal differences, its own traditions and its own "glorious past". Both the ranker- and the officer-recruit specifically joined a regiment, not the Army as such, and it was usual in peacetime for a man to spend his entire military career in one regiment. It was accordingly common to find senior NCOs and senior officers in a unit who had known each other since they were, respectively, privates and subalterns. This system which, conventional British military wisdom holds, makes for good soldiering, does not obtain in the American Army.[386] The US Army Chief of Staff, Gen Edward Meyer was reported in 1981 as attempting "to solve some problems over morale and cohesion" by imposing "a British-type regimental system which will give soldiers unit and territorial affiliations and, as far as possible, keep them with one outfit and the same commanding officer."[387]

Tradition and ritual are forces which make for group loyalty, solidarity and discipline in any group, but in the military group they are in addition "powerful determinants of shared value orientations."[388] This was probably the reason why they were considered so important in the British Army.

Every regiment and corps cherished its corporate self-image and its own particular traditions, particularly those of loyalty and courage. These permeated organisation, administration, training and drill. In the RFA, for example, three gun drills were practised: Action-left, Action-right, and Action-front. There was no drill called Action-rear, since the Royal Artillery never retires.

The "elite of the infantry", the Rifle Brigade, had a particularly lengthy list of peculiarities of custom, organisation and drill. These included a distinctive uniform, black buttons, calling a private "Rifleman", not carrying Colours (battle honours are displayed on the drums), marching at 140 paces to the minute (ceremonial marching was a double, at 180 paces to the minute) with rifles at the trail, drilling to the bugle call [which explains why the NCO i/c the corps of drums and bugles is styled "bugle-major", not "drum-major"], and not using certain words of command such as "Attention" (it was "Stand to your front"), "fix bayonets" ("fix swords"), or "slope arms". The Rifle Brigade inspired hereditary family devotion: "It was the greatest pride of a Rifleman to be 'born in the green jacket'. There were families both of officers and men who sent their sons into the Regiment generation after generation." It evoked in its members complete dedication that was embodied in the sayings, "He lived and died for the Regiment" and "Once a Rifleman, always a Rifleman". "The highest praise one Rifleman could pay another was to say he was 'a good Rifleman'."[389] The 95th Rifles ("The Fighting 95th"), which prided itself on being "the first in the field and the last out of it", was removed from the Line during the Napoleonic Wars and constituted a separate brigade having precedence over all Line regiments, styled the Rifle Brigade, in recognition of its services in the Peninsula. From then on, it assiduously cultivated a special kind of "separateness" or clannishness. Its members looked down upon non-rifle infantry regiments who were collectively referred to dismissively as "The Red Army" or "brass button regiments".

Noticeable differences from other regiments, since they confer a special sense of identity, strengthen esprit de corps. However risible apparently trivial differences between regiments in tradition and dress may seem to civilians, they are of the greatest importance in the Army, and if necessary, the men will invent their own. This desire to be as different as possible from every other unit in the British Army marks off the unit of high morale and strong esprit de corps.[390] When Harry Martin joined the 1/7th in June 1916 he was immediately informed by his new comrades that he had joined the "Leeds Gurkhas". (In August 1915, it will be recalled, the Regulars of the VIth Corps had christened the Leeds Rifles "the Yorkshire Gurkhas.")

It was obvious that respondents had felt themselves to be members of an elite Regiment and so superior to men of other regiments:

> "We in the 7th and 8th were different from everybody else in the 49th Division and everybody knew that Rifle Regiments were the elite of the infantry and took precedence over the Line. We were terribly proud of our buttons and badge and we didn't really think of ourselves as West Yorks at all. We were in a Regiment of our very own - the Leeds Rifles."[391]

Nearly all the respondents, even including officers, spoke unconsciously of the "7th Leeds Rifles" or "8th Leeds Rifles" as though "the Leeds Rifles" was the name of a regiment of the Line. Some of the Regular respondents used these titles and one even referred to the "1st battalion" and the "2nd battalion" of the Leeds Rifles, a striking accolade indeed.

Such feelings of eliteness would be common to all high morale units. Notwithstanding this, it is possible to trace the development of the Leeds Rifles' immensely strong esprit de corps. Its immediate source was the fact that the 1914-15 men had been indoctrinated during training to believe that they belonged to the only worthwhile regiment in the entire British Army. 2812 Percy Shepherd, 1/8th, on being asked whether he had believed the assertions of the instructors at Carlton Barracks that the 8th Bn was the finest regiment in the British Army, replied, "Why not? When I got to Strensall I found out it was true."[392] Added to this was the power of local chauvinism. The slogan, "Leeds leads", had been widely and frequently quoted since local journalist W.H. Scott had suggested it as the city's unofficial motto in 1902.[393] The men were immensely proud of belonging to Leeds' very own regiment which bore its name.

Esprit de corps engendered a striving for excellence. To any officer or NCO it meant taking a great pride in one's platoon or company and in bringing their standard of work, turnout and drill etc. to the highest possible level. Platoon Sgt 1219 Arthur Fozard, 1/8th, said:

> "Although naturally each platoon sergeant thought his platoon was the best, I knew mine was, or wanted some beating."

Capt Stockwell of the 1/7th used to shout out to his company on the march, "Swank like Hell, you Rifles!" He always wanted his Company to be the best in the battalion, a credit to him at all times. He concentrated on the virtues of smartness, turnout, physical fitness, proficiency in drill, and marksmanship (in which he was the Regimental Instructor). Capt Braithwaite was a worthy successor.

> "I remember very clearly Capt Braithwaite taking over command of B Coy when Stocky left to go to the RAMC. We were assembled at dusk in a village street on the Somme before proceeding to the front line in front of Thiepval. Some lads had just joined us from England and it was to be their first time in action. He gave us a speech and it went something like this: 'Now you men that have just joined us, I would like to say a few words to you. The Company has - (he gave the number) DSOs, DCMs, MCs, MMs and I want the honour of the company upholding. We've got no time for dodgers who don't want to pull their weight, so I am looking forward to very good reports from your immediate superiors. All right? Then Good Luck.' And I thought, Good Lord, that'll have put the wind up them before they start. But, funnily enough, it didn't."[394]

Esprit de corps manifested itself in personal behaviour in myriad ways. When James Kitson II went to Paris on behalf of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce in 1868 to receive from Emperor Napoleon III himself a gold medal for the products and manufactures of Leeds, he wore his Leeds Rifles officer's full dress uniform for the imperial audience.[395] 1182 Arthur Fisher, 7th, worked at his firm's Newcastle office from 1911 to 1914. Throughout this period he was attached to the 5th NF, but although he saw his comrades of the Leeds Rifles only once a year at camp, he repeatedly refused to transfer. In the war zone, whenever passing troops on the march, catching sight of the black buttons and cap badge, sang out, "'Oo are you?" Sgt Daniel Duffy of A Coy, 1/8th, would shout "The LRs!" so fiercely no enquirer would ever dare to ask what it stood for.[396] When the steel helmets were issued in 1916, the Leeds Rifles insisted on having the regimental badge stencilled in black on the front before they were served out. When Hugh Lupton was wounded in July 1916, hospital orderlies tried to take away his tin hat bearing its precious badge. He thereupon insisted on signing a paper to the effect that it was his personal property.[397] A young officer in C.M. Slack's battalion was sentenced by a "subalterns' court martial" to have a 'T' shorn on his head for removing the Ts from his tunic.[398]

Above all, it manifested itself in devotion to duty. At least three of the 1/7th Bn officers were medically unfit for overseas military service. They were: Major H.D. Bousfield who suffered from very bad varicose veins and was obliged to wear specially made surgical elastic puttees; Major C.H. Tetley, who was deaf in one ear; and Capt G.E. St Clair Stockwell who had as a child suffered from poliomyelitis which had left him with one leg relatively undeveloped and a permanent limp. Capt Stockwell was transferred out to the RAMC early in 1916, but he managed to contrive to obtain a posting back to the Leeds Rifles as RMO within a month or two.[399] Transport driver 2149 Walter Medley, 1/7th, a labourer who was convinced that Capt

Stockwell "had a soft spot" for him and who referred to him as "my pal", said,

> "When they sent word that all doctors had to report to the RAMC, Stocky was very upset, as he didn't want to go one bit. He had me drive him down when he left and he cursed and swore every inch of the way. But he came back later as MO. Whenever he saw me after that, he'd say, 'Well, if it isn't Medley, the man who took me away from my beloved 7th!'"[400]

Capt W.G. Kemp, 8th, who had lost an eye at Bucquoy, wrote from hospital only 4 weeks later: "I suppose my front line days are over, but I shall still be fit for some other job, I hope."[401] He served in the 8th Bn for several years after the war. Another 8th Bn officer of noteworthy personal esprit de corps was Sydney Elkington, who had an arm blown off on 2nd July 1916. After coming out of hospital he went to the Reserve battalion where, his rugby playing days now over, he took up soccer with equal enthusiasm and learnt to drive a car with one hand and his knees. He served in the 8th for a considerable period after the war and rose to command it. The devotion to the battalion welfare of Capt Benny Farrar, the much-admired Quartermaster of the 8th, was legendary. He could have been described much in the same terms as John O. Nettleton described his counterpart of the 2nd RB:

> "Though a normally upright and honest person, he never hesitated to perjure his immortal soul if he thought it would do the battalion any good. And he had ways and means of getting what he wanted unknown to lesser mortals. The result was that we got our rations, and even luxuries, regularly in the most impossible conditions and in spite of all that the enemy or storm and tempest could do to hinder."[402]

The spirit of duty in all ranks was the "battalion spirit", all men pulling together, each determined to do his duty to the very best of his abilities. "The battalion spirit" was the core of esprit de corps. It manifested itself, for example, in men of the 1/7th, 1/8th and 1/6th readily and voluntarily undertaking extra turns of sentry duty for a comrade who was too unwell or exhausted to carry on. Capt Tempest wrote:

> "Many thousands of men would have given all they possessed to close their eyes at some critical moment and sleep. But they determined not to do it, from no fear of punishment, but from a sense of duty and responsibility."

The results were best seen in the worst periods the battalions were called upon to face. Of the 1/6th WYR in November 1915, he wrote:

> "The men refused to give in. The officers heard no complaints and took their turn of duty with absolute confidence that their platoons were with them to a man ... Men who never failed to bring up rations in spite of shell fire and appalling conditions: who volunteered for dangerous work when sullenness would have been almost excusable: who took messages without delay by the direct route, shelling or no shelling: who maintained signal lines in spite of bombardments...[403]

Territorial W.L. Andrews described the battalion spirit of the 1/4th Black Watch:

> "We had an intense self-respect. We were not men going helpless to our doom, but men of honour who meant to do to the end our sworn duty. The worse the conditions the more the battalion steeled itself to overcome them. This is not the vainglorious claim of a militarist, but the simple truth as seen by one who was not a militarist, not much of a soldier,and hated war."

He was quite appalled by the attitude of the sergeant-instructor at the Officers' Training Unit in 1918 whose best advice was to "keep your head down, and don't volunteer for a single damned thing", as it was "quite out of keeping with the spirit that prevailed in our old battalion."[404] The maxim quoted by Barrie Pitt, "Never obey orders - they're already cancelled",[405] is so thoroughly unsoldierly and so alarmingly indicative of lack of "the battalion spirit" that it can have had currency only in units of extremely low morale.

2227 Gilbert Freeman said of the 1/8th:

> "I bet there wasn't a battalion in the whole of the British Army with a better spirit than ours. Everybody considered what he could do to help the rest of the battalion. For example, Cpl Lee was a great scrounger. Every time he went down to Divisional Stores he'd knock something off, a sack of bread, anything. But he wasn't doing it for himself or his own mates, he was doing it for the battalion. Whatever he got buckshee went into the battalion rations and everybody shared. Same with the canteen. The stores NCOs used to scour the countryside for things to buy to sell in the canteen, barrels of beer,etc. All the profits were used to buy crates of eggs and fresh produce which were then added to the battalion rations. Out of the line the battalion always got 4 cooked meals a day. We were known far and wide in the British Army for it ... Benny Farrar made his reputation for it, but it was all due to the fact that he had such a good staff. I reckon we chaps in the stores did more for the morale of the battalion than anything or anyone else."[406]

Major G.H. Brooke, in his closing remarks of the 1/8th Bn Unofficial War Diary, wrote on 31st January 1981:

> "There can have never been a Battalion with a better spirit, more 'esprit de bataillon', more comradeship between officers and men. From England to Festubert, Ypres, the Somme, Laventie, Nieuport, Passchendaele, in shows and trench warfare, in huts, bivvys, or billets, in comfort or discomfort, in happiness or difficulty, safety or danger, the old Battalion hung together. There was never a quarrel, no serious crime, everyone pulled together. Though the personnel of the Battalion changed time after time, it was the same. Officers were killed, wounded, or got jobs, the same with the men, yet the spirit went on."

Regimental pride in the 1/8th was expressed by the verse on their 1915 Regimental Christmas Card;

> "We've fought a bit and marched a bit,
> We've been wet through and through ,
> We've often been a lot too hot
> And a lot too chilly, too;
> We've lost our rations, tempers, kit,
> And boots in mud like glue,
> But through all ills we haven't lost
> Our love for home and you."

and the whole design of the card, which included photographs and the regimental crest. It was also expressed in the regimental marching song:

> "We are the Yorkshire boys,
> We are the boys who like our beer,
> We have no manners, (alternatively, We know our manners)
> We spend our tanners
> We are suspected (alternatively, respected) wherever we go.
> And when we march down Briggate,
> Doors and windows open wide.
> We can dance, we can sing,
> We can do the Highland Fling,
> We are the Yorkshire boys."

Versions of this song were sung in at least two other TF regiments, the 1/4th Black Watch and the 13th London Regt.[407]

Regimental loyalty in the Leeds Rifles was such that any man who asked for a transfer to another unit was regarded as some sort of class traitor and any man who was involuntarily transferred to another unit looked on it as an unmitigated misfortune, almost a fate worse than death. 1543 Harper Stott, 1/8th, who had already volunteered for overseas service, was found medically unfit in 1914 and sent to a provisional battalion guarding the coast:

> "I was very fed up at having been chucked out of the battalion, but it was no use protesting, you'd have only got into serious trouble. Orders were orders."

15 year old 1688 Harry Slater, 1/8th:

> "To go home was the last thing I wanted. I was having too much fun! After a few weeks they sent all those they knew were under-age back to Carlton Hill. That included me because I was officially 17. I was heart-broken about it because I was mad keen to go out to France with the battalion. I felt I'd been swindled."

Both men continued to wear their Imperial Service badges as a silent form of protest. The parents of many of the under-age men who embarked with the Regiment in 1915 later attempted to claim them out. 1891 Thomas Hunter, 1/7th, only 17:

> "My mother wanted to claim me out, but that was the last thing I wanted. I liked being in the battalion too much to want to leave it voluntarily. I said I'd never go home again if she claimed me out, so she never did."

Maurice Shaffner, 2/7th, was drafted to the 2nd WYR after being wounded. He was very unhappy about it:

> "It wasn't like being in the Leeds Rifles, Regular Army or no Regular Army."

1159 Thomas Darbyshire, 1/8th, took his discharge time-expired in May 1916 and was shortly afterwards conscripted into the 1st WYR who

> "couldn't hold a candle to the Leeds Rifles, Regulars or no Regulars. I cursed myself for a complete fool for not stopping with my old mob when I'd had the chance."[408]

Being disbanded, or "mustered out" as it was officially termed, was the worst fate of all. It inflicted upon the high-morale soldier a trauma closely akin to that of family bereavement. The testimony of 2221 George A. Fletcher, 1/8th, disbanded in 1918, was typical:

> "I was in the batch to be sent to the 1/6th. We were extremely disgruntled and went in a body to complain to the acting CO, Major Longbottom. In particular we didn't think it fair that all those Durhams, who hadn't been with us long, should be allowed to go to the second line. It should have been 'last in, first out', everybody knew that. We thought that all the genuine Riflemen should be sent to the 2/8th - and nobody else. Major Longbottom was very apologetic and we could see he was very upset. 'I'm sorry, lads', he said, 'there's absolutely nothing I can do about it. It's all been decided higher up and I have no say in it. I've had my orders and I've got to carry them out.' We found out later that he'd had to go to another regiment himself. It was just awful being kicked out of the Rifles. It was like being evicted from your home and being put out in the street, only worse. None of us wanted to go to the 1/6th but we had no choice."[409]

The respondents who had been with the 1/8th at the time described the gestures of protest, all of them legal, they and their comrades had made. For example, 1326 John Speechley, a shoeing smith, promptly applied for a trade test with the REs and transferred; Sgt Harry Hookey, who was being transferred to the new 8th Bn, nevertheless handed in his stripes; Sgt Frankland, who was to be transferred out, applied for a commission. 3167 Albert E. Wood was sent to the 1/7th, but he could not settle down and obtained a transfer to the Machine Gun Corps. 1310 William Gill also went to the 1/7th: "I never really felt at home in the 7th. In fact, I felt quite lost for a long time."[410]

The 1/8th was not, strictly speaking, being completely disbanded, since part of it was being absorbed into the 2/8th to form a new battalion, the 8th. One TF battalion that was mustered out, the 1/7th London Regt, protested by holding a mock funeral and erecting a wooden cross inscribed "Burial Place of the 1/7th Londons."[411] Capt L. Rodwell Jones MC (later Professor of Geography at London University) wrote to Col Tetley on 13th February 1919 on the disbanding of the 2/7th:

> "It was a bitter blow to us all when the Battalion was broken up, for we certainly did not lack esprit de corps, as perhaps the following little story may show: A few weeks after the disbandment of the 2/7th Battalion, the reformed Brigade, containing in the 2/5th and 8th Battalions many of our men went with the Division to fight with the French SW of Reims. The Brigadier General (Viscount Hampden) happened to meet a little group of men who were returning from a successful engagement. Their shoulder discs indicated that they belonged to the 8th West Yorks, and the Brigadier - it was his way - stopped one of them to say how pleased he was with the work of the Battalion. 'Yes, but I'm a 2/7th man really, sir', was the somewhat unexpected reply. The man had every reason to be proud of his new Battalion, but I like to think that he did not easily forget the old one."[412]

One way a soldier could express his resentment of and resistance to a sudden weaning from his former regimental affiliation on being transferred out[413] was to continue to wear the badges and buttons of his old unit. 1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th, transferred against his will to the REs in June 1916 refused to stop wearing his Leeds Rifles buttons and cap badge. Riflemen transferred to the RFC produced photographs of themselves as mechanics or trainee pilots still wearing Leeds Rifles cap badges. Although machine-gunners were transferred to the Machine Gun Corps at the beginning of January 1916, they remained with their battalions; only their tactical command changed. The Riflemen machine-gunners continued not only to wear their black buttons but also their shoulder titles; some even wore their cap badge in addition to that of the MGC, a practice which respondent 2317 John H. Taylor of the 1/6th WYR machine-gun section admitted to.[414] Many formations (but not the military police) in the forward zone appeared to take a permissive stance towards these token gestures.

The soldier's love of his Regiment was "an intensely felt emotion"[415] and was expressed in letters home, in memoirs and reminiscences, in Old Comrades' and regimental associations, in annual reunions, in regimental magazines, and in oral testimonies. The Leeds Rifles respondents were asked to express their feelings for the Regiment. The great majority replied in the vein of Fred Hearn, 1/8th:

> "The saddest day of my life was the day I was discharged. I would have done it all over again if I had the chance";

or of 2735 Cyril Clarkson, 1/7th, disabled for life at Poelcappelle, who talked only with pride of the achievements of his battalion:

> "I wouldn't have missed serving with them for all the tea in China."

Ex-private Rifleman John B. Gawthorpe described the day he took command, as Lt Colonel, of the 7th Bn Leeds Rifles, as "the happiest and proudest day of my life."[416]

The testimonies of the more articulate demonstrate the power and appeal of the Religion of the Regiment and emphasise pride in regiment, comradely love and the upholding of the soldierly virtues. Here is a selection of typical testimonies:

> "They were a wonderful regiment, a really good lot of lads. Wonderful comrades, all of them, and I'm proud to have served with them. The 7th was one big, happy family where everybody knew practically everybody else. It was a real triumph of teamwork, everybody pulled together. You've no idea how grand it was being in a local regiment with so many wonderful pals. I can't really express my feelings for them, not having had much education. I only wish I could. I was lucky to get back to the 7th when I was wounded. A lot didn't and it made them very resentful. They only wanted to be with their friends,you see."
>
> "It was a wonderful regiment, the finest in the British Army. They were a right good lot, all grand lads. Everybody looked after everybody else, everybody helped each other, everybody shared everything,everybody stuck together through thick and thin. If you fell in a shell-hole off the duckboards they'd all rush to pull you out. I've been rescued myself more than once out of shell-holes I could never have got out of myself. I'd have drowned for sure, otherwise. We had plenty of rotten times but, by God, we had plenty of laughs and plenty of good times an' all."
>
> "The 7th was a very fine Regiment indeed. It was very nice being in a local regiment and you had that distinction of being in a Rifle Regiment as well. Everybody always tried their best and the comradeship was marvellous. Everybody stood by you through thick and thin, no matter what. My heart is still very much in the 7th. I got buried in a dugout by a shell during the Battle of the Somme, but I refused to go to hospital. My heart and soul were in the war and in the Leeds Rifles. I didn't want to leave the battalion and I knew I wouldn't get back if I went to hospital. Nobody ever did."
>
> "It was funny, we never thought of ourselves as West Yorkshires, only Leeds Rifles. It was a very fine regiment and I'm very proud to have served with it. In the Rifles it was 'One for all and all for one'. That was our creed, our motto, if you like. We felt we were something special. The lads of the Leeds Rifles were the grandest set of lads who ever breathed. We were a real band of brothers - I think that is the best way of describing it."
>
> "It was very nice being in a local regiment because you knew such a lot of people. I was in a very happy family of my own in my own platoon. We did everything together, we were always next to each other in the line, in dugouts together, in billets together. We had a load of laughs. We had very happy times together, and of course we went through some bad times, but we were together, which was what mattered. I think, and I've always thought so, that the 7th were the finest regiment in the British Army. They were all courageous in the 7th. There was no lack of volunteers for anything - ration parties, wiring parties, raids, etc. There was always a lot more volunteers than were needed. Perhaps they'd only

> want 6 for a dangerous patrol, but 50 would rush forward to volunteer. That was their spirit. Never thought of self. I'd go through it all again quite willingly. If I had my time over again, I'd still do the same and join No.5 platoon, B Coy, First Seventh Leeds Rifles. It was the happiest time of my life and that's the truth."

Finally, two conscripts:

> "Even at the beginning of 1918 three-quarters of the battalion were still Leeds lads. That's what appealed to me about the 8th. It was a Leeds regiment for Leeds lads. They were a marvellous lot of lads and the 8th was a wonderful regiment. Well, they won the Croix de Guerre, didn't they? I'm glad I had the opportunity to serve in the Leeds Rifles. I wouldn't have wanted to miss it for anything. I enjoyed every minute!"

> "[In September 1918] it was like one big happy family party. Everybody knew everybody else. A band of happy warriors, that was us. There weren't many of the old hands left and there weren't many Leeds men in the battalion either. They were mostly conscripts and came from all over the country, though quite a lot hailed from the West Riding. I was never so happy in my life and I'm very proud to have served in and been associated with such a magnificent regiment. My only regret is that my period of service was so short, and I'm particularly disappointed that I missed the Battle of Montagne de Bligny. We felt ourselves to be something special, a bataillon d'élite, as the French had named us. Our drill and quick march and our buttons and cap badge set us apart from ordinary mortals."[417]

13.13 Combat Motivation

It is common for writers to refer to the "idealism" of the volunteers of 1914 and to express puzzlement at the way men continued to fight after they had "lost" their ideals, their faith in the aims of the war.[418] This approach or concept almost automatically guarantees that the experience of war would transform "idealism" into "disillusion" or "disenchantment". John Ellis, for example, follows his chapter "Patriotism and Honour" with one entitled "Disillusionment and Protest", though being "fed up" was hardly the same as being "disenchanted", as Charles Carrington pointed out.[419]

Statements like "Idealism perished on the Somme"[420] appeal to modern thought, but did idealism ever figure significantly in combat motivation? Writers and historians have been misled by the "Militant Crusader" stance and similar idealistic sentiments which influenced many volunteers to enlist in 1914 and by the contemporary sentimental attitude towards death in battle. Soldiers were proud to die for King and Country: Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.[421] Letters of condolence frequently reflected this conventional attitude. Hugh Lupton was sent a copy of the letter reporting the death in action of his best friend at school. His response was, "It is a truly glorious end."[422]

Although both World Wars were overtly ideological struggles, all the evidence suggests that patriotism and other abstract concepts like "liberty" played a relatively tiny part in the soldier's own ideology. Philip Gibbs failed to find any self-conscious patriotism among the rank and file: "The word itself meant nothing to them."[423] Brigadier Bidwell dismisses the concept of morale as a sense of mission as "a romantic notion."[424] The three well-known American studies (E.A. Shils and M. Janowitz; R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel; and The American Soldier) revealed that formal ideology had little effect on the conduct and commitment of the combat soldier: The American Soldier stated quite unhesitatingly that

> "The issues behind the war were singularly unreal to him in contrast to the issues and exigencies of his day-to-day existence."[425]

"Idealism" was likely to influence only "green" troops, whether in divisions, units or as individual replacements. As George Coppard remarked, patriotism soon burned itself out.[426] This can be noted in the soldiers' letters published in the Leeds papers in the second half of 1915. After the first few months, "distant ideals" such as "patriotism" and "freedom" were simply no longer perceived as goals:[427] psychiatrist Dr R. Sobel discovered that of his postulated critical factors of defence against anxiety, "distant ideals" were the first to disappear.[428] It is thus unwise to assume that the disappearance of "idealism" and "patriotism" was in any sense associated with a significant decline in morale. Christopher Dowling, Keeper of Education and Publications at the Imperial War Museum, in the preface to Coppard's With a Machine-Gun to Cambrai (1980 edn.), discounted both patriotism and the threat of punishment as factors which kept the British Army in the field:

> "Men endured the horrors and privations of trench warfare because their self-respect and their sense of duty would not allow them to give in."[429]

Etzioni thought it was unclear what kind of normative power plays the chief role in normative compliance in combat units. The three American studies had shown that internalised values, such as esprit de corps and military honour, were very significant, and that the nature and ideology of the unit's leadership determined to a considerable degree the combat commitment of soldiers, particularly when officers and NCOs were included by the men in their primary groups. Although these studies indicated the crucial importance of social cohesiveness in military morale, both Etzioni and Janowitz considered that many interpretations of these studies appeared to have over-emphasised the role of social cohesion at the expense of other factors. Primary group cohesion alone does not account for organisational effectiveness in the military or any other type of institution.[430]

There have, of course, been many interpretations of the motivations of men in combat. Many American authors, after studying World War II, have taken the view that the strength of primary group relationships is the most important positive factor in combat motivation.[431] It has often been remarked that men fight hard in battle at least as much because they will not let their comrades down as because they want to beat the enemy. According to Homans, the soldiers' determination not to let their comrades down contributes more than anything else to the unit's fighting power.[432] Two separate major enquiries carried out by the USARB found this to be one of the most important of all factors which motivated the soldier to keep going.[433] Many American studies tend to suggest that the primary group is the soldier's strongest single sustaining force in combat. Personal motivation tends to weaken in the face of the environmental and emotional stresses of combat. As already noted in the previous section, a common, perhaps traditional, British view holds that the only countervailing force which can keep at a high level a man's determination to continue in combat is group morale, esprit de corps. Literary works frequently appear to support this contention, for many participant-authors have remarked upon, or emphasised the power of comradeship. George Coppard wrote that "the daily comradeship of my pals, whether in or out of the line, gave me strength." Carrington wrote of "the comradeship and the mutual support without which the men in the trenches could not have survived a single day", and of 1917, after his battalion had spent 2 years at the front, "The sustaining force at this stage of the war was esprit de corps."[434]

Motivation, however, is a much more complex matter than these quotations might suggest. This is what Maj Gen Richardson, who was as much a soldier as a doctor, has to say on both combat motivation and the individual control of fear:

> "Unseen by any on his own side, he 'stayed put' because of a complex tissue of loyalties - to his country, his family, his comrades and his regiment, especially if it is one in which he has been helped to absorb a moral and military code of behaviour, a sense of what is 'done', and 'not done', has learned to practise self-control and has acquired self-confidence". "Although the fear of disgrace, fear of the contempt of his comrades, or fear of punishment, may help a man to subdue his fears, it is better for his own self-esteem that his self-control should arise from confidence in his comrades and determination not to let them down, from his pride in the unit, and from confidence in himself as a well-trained soldier, and confidence in his personal weapons and the supporting arms."[435]

The British Army takes the view that the soldier is motivated on a personal basis, out of affection and loyalty, to his particular combat group, to his military tribe (his regiment) and to his immediate leaders.[436] The Regular soldier traditionally fights to uphold the honour of his Regiment, and this explains why the soubriquet, "a contemptible little army", whoever invented it,[437] so aroused the ire of the BEF in 1914. Modern British Army thought recognises that the basis of morale and the principal factor governing its maintenance is good leadership combined with good man-management to which many officers, like Brigadier Bidwell,[438] would add esprit de corps. The role of the officer is nowadays heavily emphasised, but as long ago as 1945 psychiatrist Brigadier J.R. Rees wrote:

> "The capacity for leadership, the ability, character and insight of the officer are of paramount importance for the happiness and welfare as well as for the efficiency of the men he commands. Far too many men have broken down because of having indifferent officers. Too many units have failed in their task at some vital moment because they were inadequately led and insufficiently knit together as a team."[439]

The importance of good leadership and good man-management had already been recognised by the Leeds Rifles and very many other units of the TF by 1914.

A high incidence of psychiatric casualties has repeatedly been found in association with poor, especially inconsistent, leadership. L.H. Bartemeier et al. found a high measure of agreement among psychiatrists that the most important factor in preventing "combat exhaustion" is good leadership.[440] Shell-Shock Committee witnesses Col [later Maj Gen] J.F.C. Fuller and Squadron-Leader W. Tyrell considered that leadership and example were the most important factors in maintaining morale and reducing "shellshock" and, in fact, every military witness, including RMOs, laid stress on the importance of the officer's example in combat motivation.[441]

This could be either positive or negative. The disastrous effects on their men of officers and NCOs who were suffering from developed neuroses are well-known in the armed services, and service psychiatrists have repeatedly noted that combat neurosis in officers and NCOs tends to be suggestible to others.[442] In contrast, it has been demonstrated time and time again to what incredible lengths of sacrifice and effort the men will willingly go - "to the mouth of Hell" is a common expression in this connection - for a leader who has their confidence and affection. Many observers have been amazed how the men endured the severest and most revolting environmental conditions cheerfully, jokingly and philosophically so long as they felt that their leaders were doing everything possible for them.[443]

The authors of The American Soldier seemed uncertain about the ways in which officers might influence their men's combat motivation. All they seemed able to state with confidence was that those men with relatively more favourable attitudes to their officer appeared to be significantly better motivated than men with less favourable attitudes. The researchers asked a small sample of veterans which officers' leadership practice made them feel more confident in a tough or frightening situation. The most frequent replies were leading by example (31%), encouraging the men (26%) and showing active concern for the welfare and safety of the men (23%).[444]

The British Army of WWI harboured no such doubts and uncertainties. It had long ago realised that the nature of the group's leadership determined to a considerable degree the combat commitment of its members and that morale and esprit de corps were important spontaneous products of leader-followership relations, even under the most trying conditions.[445] It traditionally placed great emphasis on leading by example in combat motivation and indeed the concept of "heroic" leadership was fundamental to the official officer stereotype (see Chap 12, section 12.6). Many British officers who have seen active service would seriously doubt whether armies or units can function effectively under battle conditions in the absence of an "heroic" example.[446]

The Leeds Rifles battalions were certainly not lacking in "heroic" leaders: for example, Major H.D. Bousfield's absolute fearlessness and supreme contempt for danger were a byword in the 1/7th. He was described by several admiring respondents as "a real iron man, apparently completely without fear" and "a proper soldier from A to Z and looked it every inch."[447] Respondents appeared to take the view that leading by example was a major, if not the major, factor in combat motivation. Many testified that following their officer's example had enabled them to cope with, or conquer, their own fears, eg.

> "Luppy would never duck his head and always wanted to be in the thick of it. I got to keeping my head up just like him because I was frightened of showing myself up when I was with him. And, do you know, when I got to doing that, I stopped being afraid any more! I would have followed Capt Lupton to hell, if he'd asked me."[448]

Respondents from other units, including Regulars, gave similar testimony, eg. Bombardier Bill Pratt, 73rd Battery RFA, usually accompanied his major on reconnaissance trips:

> "He was a very brave man and I never dared show any signs of fear when I was with him, although many times I was a bit afraid. I did not want to die, so I had to fight against the fear and it is not easy."[449]

After Lt Lupton, 1/8th, was wounded in July 1916, Col Alexander wrote to his father

> "modesty will prevent him from adding that his temporary absence will be a great loss to the battalion especially since he has been commanding his company for the last ten

> days. I hear from the men how much they were encouraged by his fearless activity in the initial stages of the battle. In fact in every way he bore himself in the manner which we have learnt to expect of him and that is saying a great deal."[450]

L/Cpl Clifford Walton, 1/8th, wrote to Lt J.R. Bellerby, his former officer, on 15th December 1969:

> "You mention being scared, which I suppose we all were at times, but, believe me, no one I know saw you in such a case; you always gave the impression of almost contemptuous indifference to shell-fire."

Like John O. Nettleton, author of The Anger of the Guns, Lt Bellerby was frequently scared but his awareness of the duty of example to the men he knew were depending on him always drove him on. On one particular night of brilliant moonlight he reached a sap-head whose occupants seemed jittery. After receiving their report, he took a book out of his pocket and affected to read it. His apparent insouciance achieved the desired result. On another occasion he calmed his men by lying down and pretending to go to sleep, though inwardly he was quaking. Respondents considered him "lucky", "a miracle man", and felt safe when they were with him.[451] Lord Reith thought it made a great deal of difference on which side of the wire the officer stood while supervising a wiring party.[452]

The protective function of the officer appeared indeed to be an important emotional bulwark to the men. They were always glad to see the officer in the front line: his presence at the sap-head, his visit to the outpost, his words of encouragement to the sentries, were always welcome. As John Nettleton remarked, his mere presence seemed to help them.[453] Although these were military duties, they were also demonstrations of active concern and it was significant that, to take but one example, 1/8th respondents interpreted Col Alexander's nightly tour of the battalion trenches as "coming to see we were all right."[454] The USARB found that the one particularly primary group component in the Other Ranks' assessment of officers, namely "active concern", appeared to have a significant positive influence on both motivation and morale.[455] This manifested itself in the Leeds Rifles in two particular ways: the men had complete trust in their officers and were confident that they understood them and sympathised with their hopes and fears;[456] they endured the most appalling conditions with considerable stoicism because they were confident that their officers were doing their very best for them.

The American Soldier explains why officer-other rank primary groups were so vitally important to the unit's combat effectiveness:

> " The officer who commanded the personal respect and loyalty of his men could mobilise the full support of a willing

> followership: he therefore had at his disposal the resources of both the formal coercive system and the system of informal group controls. If, however, the officer had alienated his men and had to rely primarily on coercion, the informal sanctions of the group might cease to bear primarily on the combat mission."[457]

Although the example of officers and NCOs was particularly important, the example of others in general, whatever their rank, played an important part in bolstering up an individual's courage or morale and strengthening his motivation.

> "Joe Ball had wonderful esprit de corps. His spirit was such that it really was very helpful to younger soldiers like myself and encouraged us, put heart into us."
>
> "It was pretty nerve-wracking being on the Salient. Some men could control their nerves better than others and they steadied the rest. There were always plenty of people who could crack jokes and pass comical remarks no matter how grim things got. We'd have gone quite crackers otherwise."[458]
>
> "Although I was, more or less, only a boy, the older men of my regiment inspired me and boosted my morale, their comradeship put 'heart' into me. I was often addressed by them as 'young fellow'. I very often secretly admired these seasoned soldiers as they possessed plenty of guts."[459]
>
> "There on the open field of death my life was out of my keeping, but the sensation of fear never entered my being. There was so much simplicity and so little effort in doing what I had done, in doing what eight hundred comrades had done, that I felt I could carry through the work before me with as much credit as my code of self-respect required."[460]

NOTES

1. *Realities of War* (London, 1920), p. 219.
2. Maj Gen J. McGhie, RAMC, 'The Psychology of the Soldier in the Battlefield', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, 118, 2, June 1973, 40.
3. *Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into 'Shell-Shock'* (hereinafter referred to as the "Shockshock Committee Report"), p.93; 1922 Cmd. 1734, xii, 759.
4. *The Memoirs of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein* (London, 1958), pp. 83-4; 77 HL Deb. 5s. 15 April 1930, col. 132.
5. '"Fear and Pain": report of a Seminar held at the RUSI on 7th November 1979', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, 125, 3, September 1980, 70.
6. *'The Great Sacrifice' and other poems* (London, 1917), p. 31.
7. S.A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier* (Princeton, NJ, 1949), Vol. II, pp. 30-41, 5-30.
8. *Courage and Other Broadcasts* (London, 1957), pp. 13, 17-18.
9. *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage* (London, 1967), p. 108.
10. See, for example, Keith R. Simpson, 'Capper and the Offensive Spirit', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, 118, 2, June 1973, 51-6.
11. pp. 13, 131; author's italics.
12. *My War Memories 1914-1918*, English edn., (London, 1921), esp. pp. 28, 270, 368.
13. See, for example, J. Ellis, *Eye-Deep in Hell: the Western Front 1914-18* (London, 1976; 1977 Fontana paperback edn.), pp. 82ff.
14. See, for example, R.G.S. Bidwell, *Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories* (London, 1973), p. 134; R.H. Ahrenfeldt, *Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War* (New York and London, 1958), pp. 197-8.
15. R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit.*, p. 12; see also R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *Men Under Stress* (Philadelphia and London, 1945), p. 45.
16. K.R. Simpson, *op.cit.*, 53.
17. pp. 1, 2.
18. M. Janowitz and R.W. Little, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (1959; 3rd edn. Beverly Hills, Calif., 1974), pp. 78-9.
19. p.2
20. Testimony of Capt Peter Horsfall, Coldstream Guards, Retd.
21. See, for example, R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit.*, p. 16; Field Marshal Earl Wavell, *Soldiers and Soldiering, or Epithets of War* (London, 1953), pp. 117, 125-6.
22. R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit.*, p. 38.
23. J. Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London, 1976), pp. 21-2.
24. *Yorkshire Post*, 15 May 1973.

25. E.A. Weinstein, 'The function of interpersonal relations in the neuroses of combat', Psychiatry, 10 (1947), 308; J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War II (Newton Abbot, 1980), pp. 336-9; S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 202, 227-8; '"Fear and Pain" ...', 69.

26. Men Against Fire (New York, 1947), p. 54. Marshall himself explained this low fire-ratio as being due to the fear or horror of killing instilled into a man by his upbringing (pp. 54-6, 78). Sociologist Tony Ashworth explains it in terms of social factors - informal group norms - which he sees as decisive in determining limits on aggression (Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System (London, 1980), p. 218). Additionally, it may be noted that military psychiatrist E.A. Weinstein identified as one of the three main types of "character-conditioned" psychoneurotics the passive, dependent man. Such men made poor soldiers and many said they had never fired their rifles during the entire time they had been in combat (op.cit., 312).

27. See F. Manning, Her Privates We (London,1930), p. 18; D. Winter, Death's Men: Soldiers of the Great War (London, 1978; 1979 Penguin paperback edn.), pp. 179-81; J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War, pp. 108-110.

28. Soldier from the Wars Returning (London, 1965; 1970 Arrow paperback edn.), Chap. 13, section 2; Haunting Years: The commentaries of a War Territorial (London, [1930]),p.7.

29. Quoted J. Terraine, Douglas Haig, the Educated Soldier (London, 1963), p. 123.

30. J. Terraine, ed., General Jack's Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1964), Appendix V, p. 306.

31. For a plea in mitigation on behalf of the 21st and 24th Divisions at Loos, see OH Vol. IV, 1915 (London, 1928), pp. 293-4.

32. The Anatomy of Courage (London, 1945), p. 184.

33. Diary of Pte Edward Woffenden, C Coy, 15th WYR, 1/1/15-31/12/16. I am indebted to the owner, Mr Robert C. Reed of York, for the loan of this document.

34. History of the Sixth Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment, Vol. II, 2/6th Battalion (Bradford and London, 1923), pp. 51, 55.

35. Testimony of Lt J.B. Gawthorpe, Asst. Adjutant, 1/8th, and others.

36. See, for example, C.E. Montague, Disenchantment (London, 1922; 1968 edn.), esp. pp. 17-25, 35; C.E. Carrington, op.cit., pp. 61-4; OH 1918, Vol. V (London, 1947), pp. 590-1; OH, Gallipoli, Vol. II (London, 1932), p. 140.

37. K. Lang, 'Military Organisations', in J.G. March, Handbook of Organisations (Chicago, 1965), pp. 846-7; C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life (University Park,Md., 1965), p. 293; H. Brotz and E. Wilson, 'Characteristics of Military Society', American Journal of Sociology, LI (1945-6), 374; A.B. Hollingshead, 'Adjustment to Military Life', ibid., 439-47.

38. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. I, p. 125; Major H.N. Roback, 'The Emotionally Unfit Soldier', Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 104 (1946), 531.

39. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 141-3.

40. Oral testimonies.

41. G. Stowell, The History of Button Hill (London, 1929), p. 328.

42. For some contemporary descriptions of slums that may have approached living conditions at the front, see B. Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (London, 1901; 1971 edn.), pp. 156, 155.

43. Compare A.B. Wilkinson, The Church of England and the First World War (London, 1978), p. 170.

44. J. Baynes, op.cit., pp. 101-2.

45. Courage and Other Broadcasts, pp. 10-11; Soldiers and Soldiering, p. 113; Lt Col H. Green, The British Army in the First World War: The Regulars, The Territorials and Kitchener's Army, with some of the campaigns into which they fitted (London, 1968), p. 58.

46. Compare G. Coppard, With a Machine-gun to Cambrai (1968; 1980 edn.), p.77.

47. 'Predisposition to Neuroses in War', Medical Press and Circular, 204, 10 July 1940, 43-5.

48. Shellshock Committee Report, pp. 16, 96.

49. R.H. Ahrenfeldt, op.cit., pp. 22-3, 77-8, 78-81.

50. S.A. MacKeith, 'Lasting lessons of overseas military psychiatry', Journal of Mental Science, 92 (1946), 549.

51. A. Green, Growing Up in Attercliffe (Sheffield, 1981), pp. 17, 32.

52. This paragraph is partly based on F. Zweig, The British Worker (Harmondsworth, 1952), pp. 14, 215, 218, 211, 220-2, 233, 168, 177; and R. Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (London, 1957; 1971 reprint), pp. 29, 144, 110, 113, 142, 186, 78.

53. Knowles letter, 5 July 1916.

54. R. Hoggart, op.cit., pp. 72, 73, 89-91.

55. On the topic of employed schoolchildren, see Standish Meacham, A Life Apart: The English Working Class 1890-1914 (London, 1977), pp. 175-6; P. Thompson, The Edwardians: The Remaking of British Society (London, 1975), p. 54; E. Roberts, 'Working Class Standards of Living in Barrow and Lancaster 1890-1914', Economic History Review, 30 (1977), 306-21; J.H. Treble, Urban Poverty in Britain 1830-1914 (London, 1979), p. 122.

56. Compare F. Zweig, op.cit., p. 63.

57. Oral testimony.

58. B. Jackson, Working Class Community (London, 1968), p. 166.

59. Compare A. Green, op.cit., pp. 32, 33.

60. R.G. Wilson, 'Georgian Leeds', in D. Fraser, ed., A History of Modern Leeds (Manchester, 1980), p. 24; see also W.L. Andrews, Picture Post, 12 June 1954, quoted O.A. Hartley, 'The second world war and after, 1939-74', ibid., p. 456.

61. See S. Lovett, ed., The Armley Album (Leeds, 1980) p. 6; compare R. Roberts, The Classic Slum: Salford life in the first quarter of the century (Manchester, 1971), p. 3.

62. Compare H. McLeod, Class and Religion in the late Victorian City (London, 1974), for example, pp. 134-5; P. Thompson, op.cit., p.23.

63. Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health's Department, Leeds City Council, for the year 1920, p. 101.

64. M.W. Beresford, 'The Back-to-Back House in Leeds 1787-1937' in S.D. Chapman, ed., The History of Working-Class Housing, A Symposium (Totowa NJ, 1971), Chap. 3, Appendices 3.1, 3.2, 3.3

65. B.S. Rowntree and A.C. Pigou, *Lectures in Housing* (Manchester, 1914), pp. 4 ff.

66. Calculated from *Census of England and Wales 1901, County of York: Area, Houses and Population*, Table 20, p. 165; 1902 Cmd. 1107, cxxi, 639.

67. Counc. The Rev. Charles Jenkinson, *The Leeds Housing Policy* (City of Leeds Labour Party pamphlet, 1934), p. 17. (Copy available in Leeds City Reference Library).

68. *Report of the Sub-Improvements(Housing) Committee on the present position and future policy of Housing in the City of Leeds*, 1932. (Copy available in Leeds City Reference Library).

69. See, for example, letters to the Editor, *Evening Post*, 4, 11, 18, 22, 25 June, 7 July 1977.

70. For a description of the group life of working-class Hunslet, see R. Hoggart, *op.cit*., pp. 52-3, 69. For an account of British and American studies showing that neighbourhood social relations are enormously influenced by the physical lay-out of housing, see W.J.H. Sprott, *Human Groups* (Harmondsworth, 1958; 1967 reprint), pp.94-7.

71. S. Lovett, *op.cit*., p. 6.

72. See P. Thompson, *op.cit*., p. 23.

73. Compare W.J.H. Sprott, *op.cit*., p. 176.

74. S. Meacham, *op.cit*., pp. 45, 52, 55, 59.

75. Testimony of Mrs Lucia Dobson.

76. Letter to Editor, *Evening Post*, 22 June 1977.

77. A. Green, *op.cit*., p. 34.

78. See, for example, R. Hoggart, *op.cit*., p. 33; W.J.H. Sprott, *op.cit*., pp. 90-1.

79. R. Roberts, *A Ragged Schooling: growing up in the classic slum* (Manchester, 1976), p. 14; see also P. Thompson, *op.cit*., pp. 48, 50-1.

80. Letters to Editor, Mrs J. Howard, *Evening Post*, 22 June 1977; Mr and Mrs C. Murray, *ibid*., 18 June 1977; Article, F. Metcalfe, 'Caring folk of good old days', *Yorkshire Evening Post*, 30 May 1981.

81. Testimonies of Mrs Lucia Dobson, Mrs Lily Blackburn; see also letter to Editor, J. Brown, *Evening Post*, 24 February 1979.

82. Testimonies of Mrs Alex Latto, and many others.

83. S.K. Weinberg, 'The Combat Neuroses', *American Journal of Sociology*, LI (1945-6), 471; see also Maj Gen J. McGhie, 'The Psychology of the Soldier in the Battlefield', 41; Shellshock Committee Report, pp. 94-5.

84. S.A. MacKeith, 'Lasting lessons of overseas military psychiatry', 549.

85. R.H. Ahrenfeldt, *op.cit*., p. 205.

86. L.H. Bartemeier *et al*., 'Combat Exhaustion', *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 104 (1946), 367. A somewhat similar, but more extensive, list is given in S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, p. 77.

87. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, p. 77.

88. R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *Men Under Stress*, pp. 53, 82.

89. *MOH, Diseases of the War*, Vol. II (London, 1923), p. 18; see also E.D. Wittkower and J.P. Spillane, 'Neuroses in War', *British Medical*

Journal, (1940 Vol. I), 308.

90. R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, op.cit., p. 55; Shellshock Committee Report, pp. 94-5.

91. E. Miller, ed., The Neuroses in War (London, 1940), pp. 8, 170.

92. Ibid., p. 170.

93. T.J. Mitchell and G.M. Smith, MOH, Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War (London, 1931), Table 21, p. 286; (calculated from) Table 19, p. 116.

94. R.H. Ahrenfeldt, op.cit., Appendix C, Table III, p. 276.

95. Ibid., pp. 175, 207-8; J.W. Appel, G.W. Beebe and D.W. Hilger, 'Comparative incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties in World War I and World War II', American Journal of Psychiatry, 103 (1946-7), 196-9.

96. MOH, Diseases of the War, Vol. II, p. 9; see also Shellshock Committee Report, pp. 6, 7, 5, evidence of Dr F. Burton Fanning, p. 22, evidence of Squadron-Leader W. Tyrell, p. 32; R.D. Gillespie, Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier (London, 1942), p. 32.

97. This paragraph is based upon: R.L. Swank and W.E. Marchand, 'Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Exhaustion', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 55 (1946), 236-47; R.D. Gillespie, op.cit., pp. 191-2; E.D. Wittkower and J.P. Spillane, op.cit., 266; E. Miller, ed., op.cit., pp. 15-17; S.K. Weinberg, op.cit., 471-3; L.A. Kahn, 'A discussion of some causes of operational fatigue in the Army Air Forces', Psychological Bulletin, 44 (1947), 36-7; L.H. Bartemeier et al., op.cit., 374-6; E.A. Weinstein, 'The function of interpersonal relations in the neuroses of combat', 309-310; R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, op.cit., pp. 54-5; Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War (London, 1978), pp. 78-9, 172.

98. See, for example, W.R.D. Fairbairn, 'The war neuroses: their nature and significance', British Medical Journal, (1943 Vol. I), 185.

99. R.L. Swank and W.E. Marchand, op.cit., 239-40.

100. Op.cit., pp. 308ff, 79-81.

101. Quoted B. Bergonzi, Heroes' Twilight: a Study of the Literature of the Great War (London, 1965; 1980 2nd edn.), p. 182.

102. L.A. Kahn, op.cit., 34-5.

103. J. Jones, World War II (London, 1975; 1977 Futura paperback edn.), p.86.

104. The Battle of Cassino (London, 1957; 1975 Mayflower paperback edn.), p. 214; Johnny Get Your Gun: A Personal Narrative of the Somme, Ypres and Arras (London, 1978), p. 80. Perhaps the best-known literary description of "battle fatigue" is that of Henry Williamson in The Patriot's Progress (London, 1930; 1968 new edn. with preface), pp. 97-8, which was quoted by J. Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell, pp. 119-21. An early description was given by war correspondent G. Valentine Williams in With Our Army in Flanders (London, 1915), p. 80.

105. Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, op.cit., p.76

106. E.D. Wittkower and J.P. Spillane, op.cit., 225.

107. 'Psychiatric Lessons from Active Service', Lancet (1945 Vol II), 804.

108. Shellshock Committee Report, p. 150; E.D. Wittkower and J.P. Spillane, op.cit., 225.

109. MOH, Diseases of the War, Vol. II, Table III, p. 4.

110. See Shellshock Committee Report, p. 190, evidence of Lt Col Scott Jackson, MD, p. 47, evidence of Lt Gen Sir John Goodwin, RAMC, p.13. Continuous bombardments, accompanied by loss of sleep and loss of close friends, were found by WWII psychiatrists to play a leading role in the production of the typical anxiety state ("neurasthenia"): see, for example, S. Burack, 'Problems of Military Neuropsychiatry', *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 104 (1946), 293.

111. Shellshock Committee Report, p. 95; E. Miller, ed., *op.cit*., p.8.

112. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, pp. 227-8, 202; E.A. Weinstein, *op.cit*., pp. 310, 308; E. Ginsberg *et al*., *The Ineffective Soldier: Lessons for Management and the Nation*, Vol. I, 'The Lost Divisions' (New York, 1959), Tables 11 and 12, pp. 61-2, quoted C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, *op.cit*., pp. 288-9; R.H. Ahrenfeldt, *op.cit*., pp. 214-5.

113. Cited R.H. Ahrenfeldt, *op.cit*., p. 14.

114. See, for example, R. Laudenheimer, 'Predisposition to Neuroses in War', 43-5; A. Gordon, 'The Problem of "Neurotics" in Military Service: Some Recommendations', *Medical Record*, 93, 9 February 1918, 234-7; J.M. Wolfson, 'The Predisposing Factors of War Psycho-Neuroses', *Lancet* (1918 Vol. I), 117-80; A.M. Rose, 'Conscious Reactions Associated with Neuropsychiatric Breakdown in Combat', *Psychiatry*, 19 (1956), 87-94; Millais Culpin, Chap. 2 *passim*, E. Miller, ed., *The Neuroses in War*; *MOH, Diseases of the War*, Vol. II, Table IV, p. 5; S.K. Weinberg, 'The Combat Neuroses', 465-78; E.A. Strecker and K.E. Appel, *Psychiatry in Modern Warfare* (New York,1945); S. Burack, *op.cit*., 284-95; Shellshock Committee Report, p. 95.

115. *MOH, Diseases of the War*, Vol. I (London, 1922), pp. 522-7; E. Miller, ed., *op.cit*., pp. 18-20, 21-2, 53, 74.

116. *Op.cit*., p. 69.

117. See, for example, W.R.D. Fairbairn, *op.cit*., 183-6.

118. *The Ineffective Soldier*, pp. 61-2.

119. Shellshock Committee Report, p. 169.

120. *MOH, Diseases of the War*, Vol. II, Table III, p. 4.

121. *Yorkshire Post*, 26 April 1915.

122. Shellshock Committee Report, pp. 151, 191, 149.

123. J. Terraine, *Douglas Haig, the Educated Soldier*, p. 480.

124. 'The Psychology of the Soldier in the Battlefield', 40.

125. Oral testimony.

126. Shellshock Committee Report, evidence, p. 33.

127. Quoted Col E. Kitson Clark letter to wife, 13 November 1915, G. Kitson Clark Papers, Leeds City Libraries Archives Dept., Acc. 2004.

128. Shellshock Committee Report, p. 150.

129. E. Miller, ed., *op.cit*., preface.

130. Shellshock Committee Report, pp. 50, 150, 156.

131. *Ibid*., pp. 150, 43.

132. S.A. MacKeith, 'Lasting lessons of overseas military psychiatry', 547-8; S.K. Weinberg, 'The Combat Neuroses', 473.

133. *Op.cit*., p. 131.

134. 'The "Old Sergeant" Syndrome', *Psychiatry*, 10 (1947), 315-21.

135. Shellshock Committee Report, e.g. evidence of Col A.B. Soltau, p.73.

136. Oral testimony.

137. Testimonies of L/Cpl Ernest Pickering, 2/Lt H. Whitham and 1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th.

138. Oral testimony.

139. Testimony of Capt H.R. Lupton, 1/8th, and others.

140. 'Psychiatric Lessons from Active Service', 804.

141. Testimonies of Henry Spurr, 1854 Sgt Clarence Baddeley, 2642 Sgt George H. Guthrie, and 2290 CSM Joseph Carter, 1/7th.

142. Testimonies of 2/Lt H. Whitham and 3191 Sgt William Colbeck, 1/7th.

143. _The Anatomy of Courage_, p.x; _Courage and Other Broadcasts_, pp. 6, 9.

144. _Death of a Hero_ (London, 1929; 1965 Consul paperback edn.), p. 23; _Goodbye to All That_ (London, 1929; 1957 revised edn., 1973 Penguin paperback reprint), p. 143.

145. J.W. Appel and G.W. Beebe, 'Preventive psychiatry: an epidemiologic approach', _Journal of the American Medical Association_, 131 (1946), 1470-1; L.H. Bartemeier _et al_., 'Combat Exhaustion', 380; R. Sobel, _op.cit_., 317, 316; S.K. Weinberg, _op.cit_., 468; S.A. Stouffer _et al_., _op.cit_., Vol. II, p. 289, Chart III, p. 285.

146. K. Lang, 'Military Organisations', pp. 838, 839.

147. _A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations_ (New York, 1975 revised edn.). Although some criticisms have been made of Etzioni's theory, he presents in the 1975 edition a considerable amount of evidence in support of his hypotheses and there is a fair level of consistency in the results: see S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, _Organisation, Class and Control_ (London, 1980), pp. 149-152.

148. See A. Etzioni, _op.cit_., pp. 56-9, 66. Calculative elements are always stressed in the orientation of peacetime US (and British) soldiers to their jobs (see _ibid_., note 39, p. 56).

149. For intermittent structures and their characteristics, see _ibid_., pp. 444-51.

150. _Ibid_., p. 444.

151. _Ibid_., p. 116.

152. F. Richards, _Old Soldiers Never Die_ (London, 1933; 1964 Faber paperback edn.), p. 204.

153. _The Modern Democratic State_ (London, 1943), Vol. I, p. 92.

154. A. Etzioni, _op.cit_., p. 119.

155. The bulk of this paragraph is based on _A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations_, pp. 40, 39, 278, 241, 235, 155-6, 157-8, 170, 196, 199, 174, 218, 310, 313, 323, 434-5.

156. 'Authoritarianism and urban stratification', _American Journal of Sociology_, 61 (1955-6), 610-20, esp. 617.

157. _Military Institutions and the Sociology of War: A review of the literature with annotated bibliography_ (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1972) p. 71.

158. See, for example, R. Dubin, _Human relations in administration; with Readings_ (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1968 3rd edn.), Chap. 5, esp. p.104.

159. See A. Rose, 'The Social Structure of the Army', _American Journal of_

Sociology, LI (1945-6), 362-3.

160. See also C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology, pp. 165-6.

161. 'Buddy Relations and Combat Performance' in M. Janowitz, ed., The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organisation (New York, 1964), pp. 195-223; reprinted in O. Grusky and G.A. Miller, eds., The Sociology of Organisations: Basic Studies (New York, 1970), pp. 361-75.

162. This has been amply demonstrated in many contexts: see A. Etzioni, op.cit., e.g. p. 282; M. Janowitz and R.W. Little, op.cit., p. 94.

163. Op.cit., pp. 165-170. Although the military organisation appears to be regarded in sociological theory as a bureaucracy, Coates and Pellegrin point out that it has some important non-bureaucratic characteristics and frequently lacks a basic characteristic of bureaucratic structures, an atmosphere of impersonality and dispassionateness. A combat-ready military unit certainly cannot be classed as a bureaucracy approximating to Weber's ideal-typical type (ibid., pp. 95-116).

164. Ibid., p. 313, see also pp. 153-176.

165. American Journal of Sociology, LI (1945-6), 365-70.

166. M. Janowitz and R.W. Little, op.cit., p. 127.

167. See R.W. Little, 'Buddy Relations and Combat Performance'; E.A. Shils, 'Primary Groups in the American Army' in R.K. Merton and P.F. Lazarsfeld, eds., Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of 'The American Soldier' (New York, 1950), pp. 22-7; E. Gross, 'Primary Functions of the Small Group', American Journal of Sociology, 60 (1954-5), 24-9.

168. Compare Bryan Wilson, 'A Sociologist's Footnote', in Margaret Phillips, Small Social Groups in England (London, 1965), pp. 297, 300.

169. J.A. Blake, 'The Organisation as Instrument of Violence: The Military Case', The Sociological Quarterly, 11 (1970), 33.

170. E.A. Shils, op.cit., p. 27.

171. See R.G.S. Bidwell, Modern Warfare, pp. 104-5.

172. Compare Bryan Wilson, op.cit., p. 301; 'Informal Social Organisation in the Army', 366-7.

173. See K. Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War, pp. 72-3.

174. G.C. Homans, Social Behaviour (London, 1961), pp. 184, 309.

175. Testimonies of 2812 Percy Shepherd, 1/8th, and 1479 Harold Waterhouse, 2/8th and 8th.

176. H.G. Hicks, The Management of Organisations: A Systems and Human Resources Approach (New York, 1967; 1972 2nd edn.), p. 165; see also E. Gross, op.cit.

177. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 136-7.

178. Ibid., Vol. II, Table 4, p. 116; Vol. I, Table 1, p. 93, p. 393.

179. Compare R.W. Little, op.cit., pp. 369, 372.

180. Oral testimony.

181. The Old Contemptible, No. 413, June 1968, 15.

182. Testimonies of 2227 Gilbert Freeman, 8th, 2952 Lawrence Tallant, 2892 Herbert Creswick and 2122 Robert Vine, 1/7th.

183. R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *op.cit*., p. 22; S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, p. 101; S. Andrzejewski, *Military Organisation and Society* (London, 1954), p. 30.

184. Compare Colin MacInnes, 'Pacific Warrior', *New Society*, 7, no. 196, 30 June 1966, 21.

185. Compare R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *op.cit*., pp. 21-2.

186. See article,'They Came to a City', *Evening Post*, 2 September 1975.

187. *Op.cit*., pp. 65-6.

188. Quoted E.J. Leed, *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 26.

189. 75 HC Deb. 5s. 16 November 1915, col. 1735.

190. Oral testimony.

191. Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, *Fighting Spirit*, p. 89.

192. Testimonies of 1090 Sgt James Rhind, 8th, and 1522 Sgt J.E.T. Wilson, 7th.

193. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, pp. 101-2; see also G.C. Homans, 'The Small Warship' in his *Sentiments and Activities: Essays in Social Science* (London, 1962), p. 53.

194. 'Primary Groups, Organisation, and Military Performance', in R.W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1971), pp. 303-5.

195. A. Etzioni, *op.cit*., pp. 292, 297; M. Janowitz and R.W. Little, *op.cit*., p. 96; G.C. Homans, *Social Behaviour*, pp. 216, 218.

196. E.A. Shils and M. Janowitz, 'Cohesion and disintegration of the Wehrmacht in World War II', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (1948), 280-315.

197. Oral testimonies.

198. Compare R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit*., pp. 93, 99.

199. J.W. Appel and G.W. Beebe, 'Preventive psychiatry: an epidemiologic approach', 1471; S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, eg. Table 6, p. 125.

200. C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, *op.cit*., p. 168, see also p. 161.

201. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., pp. 130-1; author's italics.

202. 'Primary Groups in the American Army', p. 33.

203. W.J.H. Sprott, *Human Groups*,p. 172.

204. Compare H.G. Hicks, *The Management of Organisations*, p. 479.

205. R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit*., p. 102.

206. 'Quasi-Therapeutic Effects of Intergroup Competition', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 3 (1966), 321-7.

207. See R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *op.cit*., pp. 46-7.

208. C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, *op.cit*., p. 254.

209. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, pp. 119, 121, also Vol. I, pp. 366-7.

210. For the 9th KOYLI, see L.D. Spicer, *Letters from France 1915-1918* (London, 1979), esp. introduction, p. xv.

211. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, Chart II, p. 120.

212. G.C. Homans, *Social Behaviour*, pp. 288 ff, 313, 294-5.

213. Compare J.A.C. Brown, *The Social Psychology of Industry* (Harmondsworth, 1954), pp. 153-4.

214. K. Lang, *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War*, pp. 68-9.

215. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, esp. pp. 124, 125, 134.

216. K. Lang, *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War*, p. 69.

217. Testimony of 2010 I. Harry Butcher, 1/7th.

218. Rfm Arthur Fozard, 1/8th, *Yorkshire Evening Post*, 10 May 1915; Signaller J. Fenton, 1/7th, *Yorkshire Evening News*, 17 July 1915; Rfm J. Appleyard, 1/7th (a member of Joe Ball's comic band), *Leeds Mercury*, 24 June 1915; *Yorkshire Evening News*, 26 August 1915.

219. Knowles letter, 26 October 1915.

220. Oral testimony.

221. Testimony of Pte William Greaves, 2/6th WYR, his private secretary.

222. Testimonies of 2880 W.A. Bywater and 2227 G. Freeman, 8th.

223. *The West Yorkshire Regiment in the War 1914-1918*, Vol. I (London, [1924]), p. 104, Vol. II (London, [1928]), pp. 142-3.

224. Casualty List of Officers, 7th Bn, 1915-1917.

225. For example, *Yorkshire Post*, 7 June 1892.

226. *Yorkshire Evening Post*, 15 June 1910, 12 August 1908.

227. For the 4th DWR, see *Yorkshire Evening News*, 19 August 1908; for the 5thY & L,see *Yorkshire Post*, 12 August 1908.

228. *Yorkshire Evening News*, 29 March 1911; testimony of Lt J.B. Gawthorpe,8th.

229. Compare G.C. Homans, *Social Behaviour*, p. 333.

230. B. Gardner, *Up the Line to Death: The War Poets 1914-1918* (London, 1964; Methuen paperback revised edn. 1976), pp. 94-5.

231. *Ibid*., pp. 38-41, 181, 'The Watchers', p. 150.

232. *A Kind of Survivor* (London, 1975), pp. 57-76; preface, p. 13. See also Vivian de Sola Pinto, 'My First War: Memoirs of a Spectacled Subaltern', in G.A. Panichas, ed., *Promise of Greatness: The War of 1914-1918* (London, 1968), pp. 75, 78.

233. See, for example, the interview with Sir John Monash, *The Observer*, 22 September 1918.

234. *The Anger of the Guns: An Infantry Officer on the Western Front* (London, 1979), p. 113; J. Laffin, ed., *Letters from the Front 1914-1918* (London, 1973), pp. 62-3. See also P. Liddle, *Testimony of War 1914-1918* (Salisbury, 1979), p. 8; J. Ellis, *Eye-Deep in Hell*, pp. 198-200; Sir Arthur Bryant, *Jackets of Green: a study of the History, Philosophy, and Character of the Rifle Brigade* (London, 1972), p. 284.

235. Entry for 15 October 1915.

236. 'Carry On! The Continued Chronicle of K(1) By the Junior Sub', *Blackwood's Magazine*, 202 (1917), 381.

237. *Soldiers and Soldiering*, p. 28.

238. *Tommy Goes to War* (London, 1978), pp. 12, 124.

239. Bellerby Memoirs.

240. *Op.cit*., p. 174.

241. H. Brotz and E. Wilson, 'Characteristics of Military Society', 373.

242. C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, op.cit., pp. 28-33, 24.

243. C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views (Westport, Conn., 1973), esp. p. 191.

244. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 71ff. For the conclusions and recommendations of the Doolittle Board see ibid., pp. 379-81.

245. 'Perish By the Sword', in H. Thomas, ed., The Establishment (London, 1959), pp. 70-5.

246. Compare J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War, p. 231.

247. Oral testimony.

248. J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War, p. 266.

249. Compare H.E.L. Mellersh, Schoolboy into War (London, 1978), p. 65.

250. Testimonies of 2/Lt H. Whitham and Capt Frank W. May, 1/7th. 2/Lt Glazebrook, never the tidiest of dressers, earned his nickname at Lord Roberts' memorial service held at York Minster in 1914. Marching up the nave with his sword scabbard trailing in the fashion worn by officers in Rifle regiments, a leg became entangled and he tripped and fell. Angered by being shamed in front of the officers and men of so many other regiments, Lt Col Kirk, momentarily shaken out of his usual imperturbability, hurled at him, "You sloppy officer!" The name stuck (testimony of son, Lt Col Richard Glazebrook, OBE).

251. Testimonies of H.R. Lupton, J.R. Bellerby and J.B. Gawthorpe.

252. Entries for 6 June, 18 August 1915, 11 June, 19, 20 December 1917.

253. Ibid., 7 August 1916.

254. Oral testimony.

255. Lupton letters, W.G. Kemp to H.R. Lupton, 29 November 1917.

256. Testimony of J.R. Bellerby.

257. Oral testimony.

258. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. I, chart IV, p. 405.

259. Sunday Express, 29 September 1974.

260. Modern Warfare, p. 98.

261. Oral testimonies.

262. Oral testimonies.

263. Oral testimonies.

264. Oral testimony.

265. Oral testimony.

266. Testimony of 1090 Sgt J. Rhind, 1/8th.

267. Yorkshire Post, 23 September 1916.

268. Testimonies of 2/Lt H.Whitham and 1522 Sgt J. E.T. Wilson, 1/7th.

269. Leeds Mercury, 29 June 1915.

270. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. I, Tables 9 and 10, pp. 403, 404, Chart III, p. 128.

271. 'A Note on the Ability of Military Leaders to Assess Opinions in their Units', Acta Sociologica, 8 (1965), 293-303.

272. Oral testimony.

273. Knowles letter, 3 March 1915.

274. See, for example, "Non.-Com.", Yorkshire Evening Post, 27 July 1905.

275. Knowles letter, 24 December 1916. Testimonies of Cpl H.R. Gaines, 3/7th; 1219 Sgt A. Fozard; 2455 Sgt N.J. Mason, 1/8th; 1182 Cpl A. Fisher, 1/7th.

276. Oral testimony.

277. Testimonies of 2260 Edgar Taylor and 3085 Sidney Bailey, 1/8th.

278. Yorkshire Evening Post, 28 August 1915.

279. There was something of a tradition of this in the British Army, akin to that of the captain going down with his ship. It was not an invention of Victorian writers of military romance, as might be thought. Compare Capt E.V. Tempest, History of the Sixth Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment. Vol. I. 1/6th Battalion (Bradford, 1921), pp. 223, 231.

280. Testimonies of 2607 Walter Atkinson, 4328 L. Frederick Hudson, 2605 Ellison Whitley, 3149 Sgt James W. Warman, 2122 Robert Vine.

281. Testimony of 2455 Sgt Norman J. Mason, 1/8th.

282. Oral testimony.

283. Obit., Yorkshire Evening News, 15 October 1940.

284. Testimony of 1090 Sgt J. Rhind, 1/8th.

285. Testimonies of 3149 J.W. Warman, 1/7th; 2880 W.A. Bywater, 1/8th; 1891 Thomas Hunter (his batman), 1/7th; 2992 George A. Walker, 1/7th; 1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th; Ernest Pickering, 1/7th; 1090 J. Rhind, 1/8th; 2260 Edgar Taylor, 1/8th; 1159 Thomas Darbyshire, 1/8th; 5155 Abe Freedman, 8th; 2430 Jack Espin, 1/8th; 1326 John Speechley, 1/8th; 1813 Stanley Holmes, 1/7th; Henry Spurr, 1/7th; 2122 Robert Vine, 1/7th.

286. Leeds Mercury, 16 June 1915; Yorkshire Evening News, 27, 28 October 1915.

287. Oral testimonies.

288. Long 'Un - A Damn Bad Soldier (Batley, 1974), pp. 91-2, also pp. 16, 93; The Great Push: an episode of the Great War (London, 1916), eg. p. 64; W.L. Andrews, Haunting Years, esp. p. 216.

289. See J. Baynes, Morale, pp. 180-1.

290. A Subaltern's War (London, 1930; 1972 facsimile edn.), p. 201. It may be noted here that George Washington, in his Letter of Instructions to the Captains of the Virginia Regiments, dated 29 July 1759, wrote "Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all" (J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (London, 14th edn. 1968), p. 460b.).

291. Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, op.cit., pp. 89-90.

292. War and Policy (London, 1900), p. 142, quoted A.R. Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home (London and Montreal, 1977), p. 136.

293. 77 HL Deb. 5s. 15 April 1930, col. 132.

294. See, for example, J. Baynes, op.cit., pp. 196-7; R. Graves, Goodbye To All That, p. 156.

295. Shellshock Committee Report, p. 50.

296. A Life Apart (London, 1968), pp. 69-72.

297. 'The duties of an officer', Times, 1 April 1916, 7d.

298. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, p. 550; My War Memories 1914-1918, p. 28; Lt Gen Sir Arthur Smith, letter to Editor, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 118, 3, September 1973, 80.

299. The Face of Battle, pp. 70-1.

300. Poor Bloody Infantry (London, 1976), p. 134.

301. Op.cit., p. 116.

302. Soldier from the Wars Returning, p. 119.

303. See J.A.C. Brown, The Social Psychology of Industry, p. 168.

304. See R. Likert, The Human Organisation: Its Management and Value (New York, 1967), p. 159.

305. S. A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, p. 550.

306. For a brief description and list of references, see T.M. Newcomb and E.L. Hartley, eds., Readings in Social Psychology (New York, 1947), p. 340.

307. K. Lang, 'Military Organisations', p. 849.

308. Hanan C. Selvin, The Effects of Leadership (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), pp. 70-88.

309. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, n.3, p. 113; Table 1, p. 109.

310. 'Pacific Warrior', 21.

311. 'The First Hundred Thousand by the Junior Sub', Blackwood's Magazine, 196 (1914), 744.

312. Oral testimonies.

313. Quoted J. Baynes, op.cit., p. 180.

314. Compare W. Shakespeare, The Life of King Henry V, Act II, sc. ii, ll. 45-6.

315. 77 HL Deb. 5s. 15 April 1930, col. 135; J. Terraine, ed., General Jack's Diary 1914-1918, p. 56.

316. H. Williamson, A Fox Under My Cloak (London, 1955; 1963 revised Panther paperback edn.), p. 319; see also G. Coppard, op.cit., p. 20; C.E. Carrington, Soldier from the Wars Returning, p. 193; L. Macdonald, They Called it Passchendaele (London, 1978), testimony of Cpl J. Pincombe, p. 140.

317. See, for example, F. Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die, p. 53.

318. Testimony of Trooper Horace Merry. For the severe punishments in the Coldstream Guards, see J. Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell, p. 32.

319. Lt Col H. Green, The British Army in the First World War ..., p.37.

320. 'The Professionals - Britain's New Army', The Readers' Digest, 117, no. 700, August 1980, 67-72. According to Regular informants, discipline began to change its style only after the disappearance of the last National Serviceman,which marked the establishment of the new all-volunteer army.

321. Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, op.cit., p. 90.

322. B. Latham, A Territorial Soldier's War (Aldershot and London, 1967), p. 23; Lt Col R.M. Benzie et al., The Fifth Battalion The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1914-1919 (Glasgow, 1936), p. 10.

323. The Old Contemptible, no. 413, June 1968, 15.

324. Op.cit., pp. 10 (author's italics in quote), 44-5.

325. Lt Col M.J.P.M. Corbally, 'Twice A Citizen': Souvenir, Golden Jubilee of the Territorial Army (London, 1958), p. 36.

326. Oral testimony. Sgt Major Welburn's scrapbook, containing the Special Orders of the Day and a fine selection of photographs, is now in the Royal Corps of Transport's Museum, Leconfield, Beverley, E. Yorks.

327. Lord Moran, op.cit., p. 173.

328. (London, 6th edn. 1914), Chap. V, paras. 87, p. 51, 80, p. 49.

329. H. Baker, The Territorial Force, A manual of its law, organisation and administration (London,1909), p. 221.

330. See also John Brophy's Introductory Essay to J. Brophy and E. Partridge, The Long Trail: What the British Soldier Sang and Said in the Great War of 1914-1918 (London, 1965), p. 14.

331. A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: an illustrated history (London, 1963), p. 101.

332. Op.cit., pp. 177-8.

333. The Observer, 22 September 1918.

334. The Anger of the Guns, pp. 68-9. For attacks in a similar vein, see S. Graham, A Private in the Guards (London, 1919) and Challenge of the Dead (London, 1921), quoted D. Winter, Death's Men, pp. 40-1.

335. Goodbye to All That, p. 150.

336. Testimony of RQMS Edgar S. Fendley, 2nd WYR.

337. Compare W.L. Andrews, Haunting Years, p. 95.

338. Oral testimonies of L/Cpl R.H.P. Schulze and 2227 G. Freeman, 8th, and 2006 Sgt E. Woodhead, 7th.

339. Sir Arthur Bryant, Jackets of Green, pp. 15, 158, 299.

340. R. Berkeley, The History of the Rifle Brigade in the War of 1914-18, Vol. I, August 1914 to December 1916 (1927), p. 240, quoted ibid., p. 284.

341. Jackets of Green, p. 166.

342. Lupton letter, 12 July 1917; testimony of Lt J.B. Gawthorpe, 1/8th.

343. Testimonies of 2891 Charles E. Hannan, 1/8th, and 976 Thomas Wilson, 1/7th.

344. 1/8th Bn Unofficial War Diary, 16, 17 January 1916.

345. Espin Diary, 18 January 1916.

346. The incidents involving Langton, Appleyard and Taylor were detailed in Chapter 11, that involving Sanderson in Chapter 12, section 12.6.

347. 1/8th Bn Unofficial War Diary, 1 February 1916.

348. Testimonies of 2812 L/Cpl Percy Shepherd, 1/8th, and 1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th.

349. Testimony of 1757 L/Cpl George A. Blaymire, 1/8th, and others; see also 2/8th Bn War Diary, January-February 1917, P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], War Office, WO 95/3082.

350. Testimony of 1891 Thomas O. Hunter, 1/7th.

351. J.M. Winter, 'Britain's "Lost Generation" of the First World War', Population Studies, 31, 3 (1977), Table 2, 451.

352. *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War* (London, 1922), Part XXIII, Table (vi)(b), p. 649.

353. *The Thin Yellow Line* (London, 1974), pp. 2, 105-6.

354. Testimony of 1522 Sgt J.E.T. Wilson, 1/7th. (Virtually all 1/7th respondents gave testimony, often lengthy, about Capp and Mangham). The intention of the Suspension of Sentences Act was to stop men deliberately committing serious crimes in order to get sent to the safety and comparative comfort of a military prison.

355. R.H. Ahrenfeldt, *op.cit*., pp. 112, 104-5.

356. Oral testimonies.

357. See R.D. Gillespie, *Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier*, p. 211; W.J.H. Sprott, *Human Groups*, p. 184; A. Green, *Growing Up in Attercliffe*, p. 34.

358. Oral testimony.

359. *Poor Bloody Infantry*, p. 45; see also C.E. Carrington, *Soldier from the Wars Returning*, p. 275.

360. J. Baynes, *Morale*, p. 184.

361. 'Buddy Relations and Combat Performance', esp. pp. 369, 372.

362. Oral testimony.

363. Standish Meacham, *op.cit*., pp. 160-1; P. Thompson, *op.cit*., pp.60-1, 56, 52; R. Roberts, *A Ragged Schooling*, p. 75, *The Classic Slum*, pp. 29, 33.

364. P. Thompson, *op.cit*., p. 58; R. Roberts, *The Classic Slum*, p.90.

365. *A Kind of Survivor*, p. 23.

366. *Report of the Consultative Committee on Attendance, Compulsory or Otherwise, at Continuation Schools*, Chap. IV, p. 52; 1909 Cmd. 4757, xvii, 1. See also B. Simon, *Education and the Labour Movement 1870-1920* (London, 1965), pp. 118-9.

367. See, for instance, the participant-account of the capture of Mount Tumbledown, Falkland Islands, by the 2nd Scots Guards, *Yorkshire Post*, 11 August 1982.

368. *OH*, 1918 Vol. V, p. 178.

369. *Morale*, p. 43.

370. Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, *op.cit*., p. 125.

371. See, for example, J.L. Riggs and K.K. Seo, 'Productivity: next Japanese import?' *Management Services*, 26, no. 1, January 1982, 12-15.

372. Testimony of 3880 James Foster, 1/8th.

373. Oral testimony.

374. Compare C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, *op.cit*., p. 374.

375. See R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit*., pp. 98, 99.

376. *Haunting Years*, p. 249.

377. See, for example, Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, *op.cit*., p. 15.

378. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit*., Vol. II, p. 142.

379. *The Anatomy of Courage*, pp. 197, 183.

380. *Courage and Other Broadcasts*, p. 50.

381. *Op.cit*., p. 166.

382. Oral testimony.

383. The Army in Victorian Society (London, 1977), p.200.

384. 'Regimental Ideology' in G. Best and A. Wheatcroft, eds., War, Economy and the Military Mind (London and Totowa, NJ, 1976), pp. 15, 9.

385. In a Parliamentary debate on the Crimean War, Sidney Herbert had referred to "that collection of regiments that calls itself the British Army" (quoted Col A.C.T. White, The Story of Army Education 1643-1963 (London, 1963), p. 31).

386. See David Reed, 'The Professionals - Britain's New Army', 72.

387. Article, 'America's "hollow army"', The Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1981.

388. C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, op.cit., pp. 49, 159.

389. Sir Arthur Bryant, Jackets of Green, pp. 158-9, 160-1. An appreciable number of Leeds Rifles respondents quoted these RB sayings. The Rifle Brigade itself "considered the Leeds Rifles to be true Riflemen. No higher praise can be given by an RB" (personal communication, dated 19 April 1974, from the Custodian of the Regimental Museum, The Royal Green Jackets HQ, Winchester).

390. See R.G.S. Bidwell, op.cit., pp. 102, 103.

391. Testimony of 2880 William A. Bywater, 1/8th.

392. Oral testimony.

393. The West Riding of Yorkshire at the opening of the Twentieth Century (Brighton, 1902), p. 5.

394. Testimonies of 1219 Sgt Arthur Fozard, 1/8th, 2606 L/Cpl Tom Watson and 1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th.

395. Yorkshire Post, 23 December 1896.

396. Testimonies of 1182 Arthur Fisher, 1/7th, and Capt H.R. Lupton, 1/8th.

397. Lupton letters, 20 May, 13 July 1916. One of the 8th Bn helmets is on exhibition at the Imperial War Museum.

398. Grandfather's Adventures in the Great War 1914-1918 (Ilfracombe, 1977), pp. 74-5.

399. Testimony of 2/Lt H. Whitham, 1/7th.

400. Oral testimony.

401. Lupton letters, W.G. Kemp to H.R. Lupton, 24 April 1918.

402. The Anger of the Guns, p. 84.

403. History of the Sixth Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment. Vol. I. 1/6th Battalion, pp. 38 (author's italics), 61.

404. Haunting Years, pp. 249, 270.

405. 1918: The Last Act (London, 1962; 1965 Corgi paperback edn.), p.27.

406. Oral testimony.

407. W.L. Andrews, Haunting Years, p. 132; J.F. Tucker, Johnny Get Your Gun, p. 13.

408. Oral testimonies.

409. Oral testimony. Compare the testimony of 2/Lt Farmer, 8th Leicesters, quoted M. Middlebrook, The Kaiser's Battle 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive (London, 1978), p. 87.

410. Testimonies of 1326 J. Speechley, 2222 W.H. Reynard, 1090 Sgt J. Rhind, 3167 A.E. Wood and 1310 W. Gill, 1/8th.

411. M. Middlebrook, op.cit., p. 87.

412. Letter included in a small collection of papers written by Capt L. Rodwell Jones, 2/7th, LRMT.

413. See S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 507-8.

414. Testimonies of 1987 S. Appleyard and 1726 Jack Barker, 1/7th; 2317 J.H. Taylor, 1/6th WYR.

415. J. Baynes, Morale, pp. 160-1.

416. Oral testimonies.

417. Testimonies of 3149 Sgt James W. Warman, 1/7th; Albert Edward Pitts, 1/8th; William Kendrew, 1/7th; 2455 Sgt Norman J. Mason, 1/8th; 2122 Robert Vine, 1/7th; 5155 Abe Freedman, 2/8th and 8th; Robert H.P. Schulze, 8th.

418. See, for example, E.J. Leed, No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I, p. 68.

419. A Subaltern's War, p. 205.

420. A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War, p. 105.

421. See, for example, letter of Capt A.D. Talbot, dated 14/5/15, in M. Moynihan, ed., Greater Love: Letters Home 1914-1918 (London, 1980), p. 48; P. Gibbs, Realities of War, p. 434; J. Laffin, ed., Letters from the Front 1914-1918, p. 81.

422. Lupton letter, 6 July 1915.

423. Op.cit., p. 64. See also R.G.S. Bidwell, op.cit., p. 93; J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War, pp. 316-7; S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, p. 169.

424. Op.cit., pp. 143-4.

425. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, p. 167.

426. Op.cit., p. 109.

427. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 167, 169.

428. 'The "Old Sergeant" Syndrome', 319.

429. p. ix.

430. A. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, pp. 57, 59; M. Janowitz, ed., The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organisation (New York, 1964), p. 191. See also C.C. Moskos, Jnr, The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military (New York, 1970), p. 147.

431. These interpretations are outlined in C.C. Moskos, Jnr, op.cit., pp. 134-6. It may well be that substantive differences in motivation exist between soldiers of different nationalities in the same war and between soldiers of the same nationality participating in major wars at different periods: the reader is referred to Moskos' interesting chapter, based on his own participant observations during 1965 and 1967, 'Behaviour of Combat Soldiers in Vietnam', op.cit, pp. 134-56.

432. Social Behaviour, pp. 294, 391.

433. S.A. Stouffer et al., op.cit., Vol. II, Table 1, p. 109; Chart XII, p. 174.

434. With a Machine-Gun to Cambrai, p. 109; A Subaltern's War, pp. 202,126.

435. Op.cit., pp. 130, 173-4.

436. See, for example, R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit.*, p. 142.

437. See, for example, P. Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (London, 1975), p. 116.

438. Maj Gen J. McGhie, 'The Psychology of the Soldier in the Battlefield', 39; Maj Gen F.M. Richardson, *op.cit.*, p. 79; (see also R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *op.cit.*, p. 46); R.G.S. Bidwell, *op.cit.*, p.143.

439. *The Shaping of Psychiatry by War* (London, 1945), quoted R.H. Ahrenfeldt, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

440. 'Combat Exhaustion', 518; see also J.W. Appel and G.W. Beebe, Preventive psychiatry: an epidemiologic approach', 1474.

441. Shellshock Committee Report, esp. pp. 30, 33.

442. S.K. Weinberg, 'The Combat Neuroses', 473.

443. R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *op.cit.*, pp. 47-8.

444. S.A. Stouffer *et al.*, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 123-4; Table 7, p. 126; Table 6, p. 125.

445. "Discovered" by WWII researchers: E.A. Shils and M. Janowitz, *op.cit.*, 286-8; S.A. Stouffer *et al.*, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, eg. pp. 118, 125; C.H. Coates and R.J. Pellegrin, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

446. J. Keegan, 'Regimental Ideology', 16.

447. Testimonies of 1182 Cpl A. Fisher, 2893 George Nichols, 2780 Harold Kirk, 2771 Harold Edward Hirst, 3257 George S. Yeomans, 1/7th.

448. Testimony of 2455 Sgt N.J. Mason, 1/8th.

449. Oral testimony. Compare A. Thomas, *A Life Apart*, p. 60.

450. Lupton letters, Col Alexander to Hugh Lupton Snr, 10 July 1916.

451. Oral testimony.

452. *Wearing Spurs* (London, 1966), p. 217.

453. *Op.cit.*, p. 192.

454. Testimony of 2222 W.H. Reynard and others.

455. S.A. Stouffer *et al.*, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 125, 126, 124-5.

456. Compare A. French, *Gone for a Soldier* (Kineton, 1972), p. 29.

457. S.A. Stouffer *et al.*, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 118.

458. Testimonies of 1699 Bugler Harold Booth, 1/7th, and 2363 Ben Clark, 1/8th.

459. *The Old Contemptible*, No. 462, July 1972, 11.

460. Patrick MacGill, *The Great Push*, pp. 72-3.

CHAPTER 14. THE NATURE OF MORALE ON ACTIVE SERVICE

4.1 In a 1948 paper E.A. Shils and M. Janowitz postulated a continuum of social/organisational disintegration for a military unit. At the top end is "last ditch" resistance, indicating absence of disintegration, in the middle token resistance and passive surrender, moving downwards to active surrender and finally individual desertion at the opposite end.[1] They could have included with individual desertion, the group desertion represented by "retiring without orders", and mutiny,[2] another form of failure of group morale. The continuum is, however, an over-simplification since it fails to include the well-known signs of waning morale that warn of incipient disintegration: large sick parades, an above-average desertion rate, an above-average incidence of both psychiatric cases and self-inflicted wounds, and escalating indiscipline.[3] Etzioni adapts their continuum as an "involvement continuum". Another, obvious, adaptation is the "morale continuum", to which should perhaps be added at the bottom the psychiatric casualty, who represents the final stage in the failure of morale.

Swank and Marchand's profile of combat efficiency,[4] with its time-scale changed, can be adapted as a graph of unit and of personal morale. The graph shows a rapid climb to a plateau where it remains for a period and then becomes a downward slope as disintegration sets in. The length of the plateau and the length and steepness of the down-slope depend on how the unit is managed, particularly with regard to the amount of attention given to morale-building factors,[5] and how it is led. Those of the individual soldier's graph depend partly on his own personality disposition and partly on the degree of his inherent and acquired threshold of tolerance to stress (or, psychological stability). Training and resocialisation can so raise this threshold that inefficiency due to psychological difficulties appears only after very severe and prolonged stress.[6]

Good morale is not generated automatically. It must be deliberately fostered and, once achieved, must be carefully and continually nurtured. If it goes, it may take a long time to rebuild.[7] It was instilled into the men during training that they must face difficulties and danger with optimism; that the worse the situation, the more incumbent it became on everyone to make light of it.[8] Rfm R.H. Stockdale, 1/7th, wrote in May 1915:

> "We sing and keep each other happy in the trenches ... It is not nice to see your pals shot down by your side. My pal was very ill the other day with his nerves. He fell down to the ground with fright, poor lad, and was shouting out: 'They are coming'. It was a terrible time with the noise though most of us were all right, laughing and singing ... Bullets fly over our heads during the



Fig. 11. PROFILE OF COMBAT EFFICIENCY

Source: R.L.Swank & W.E. Marchand, 'Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Exhaustion', *Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry*, 55 (1946), 238.

> day and all night long, but out here we sing and do all we can to keep each other happy. Aeroplanes keep flying over the trenches like flies. I don't care so long as I get plenty to eat."

Singing was warmly and continually recommended to keep the spirits up. Knowles wrote:

> "Last night when we got to where we had met the Buses we had to wait in the pouring rain for a full hour. Everyone was wet through, but they were all singing all the songs imaginable."[9]

Everyone smoked feverishly and sang during bombardments.[10] 18-year-old 1866 L. George Clough, 1/7th, wrote to his mother to tell her of the heavy bombardment, the gas shells and the threatened attack of the previous night:

> "I have just had breakfast and a wash and I feel as fit as a fiddle again. We were all singing as the shells flew about, and we were quite ready for the Germans if they had come."[11]

Sgt William Alchorne's memoirs mention morale-building:

> "As we all said to one another time and again. You said you could do it and it's all part of the game, so get on with it."

Knowles wrote,

> "We have a saying out here, 'We said we could do it', whatever comes along."[12]

Very many of the methods of inculcating morale and esprit de corps were not detailed in the manuals but were enshrined in the oral tradition of Regular Army instructors and handed down from one "generation" to the next.[13] This striking similarity suggests a common origin, this oral tradition.

Within their general trend, the graphs of both unit and personal morale fluctuated considerably, rather in the manner of a graph of air temperatures, not only from day to day, but also during the 24-hour period. Capt. Gregory of the 2/6th WYR noticed how the men's spirits approximately moved with the barometer. He repeatedly noted how remarkably responsive "everyone" was to changes of weather and conditions, dispirited and feeling sorry for themselves when it was snowing, for instance, but "in fine fettle" when the weather was fine and warm. Spirits always revived considerably whenever the sun began to shine after rain, as they always did at dawn if the sun was visible.[14] Morale could be affected by what may appear trivial things. One day while on his rounds, 1090 Sgt James Rhind, 1/8th, found a dugout full of glum and despondent men of his platoon looking the very picture of misery. They were silent, not even playing cards. The trouble was, he soon discovered, that they had nothing to smoke. Sgt Rhind had just received a large parcel of cigarettes from home and he gave a packet to each man. They cheered up immediately and began to gossip and joke in their usual animated manner.[15] Morale was usually below-average at the end of a tour of duty, its level naturally dependent on the severity of the tour. On withdrawal from combat, the majority of men "quickly recovered their morale": "a long sleep and a square meal perform miracles."[16] A drink of tea and a cigarette, or a tot of ration rum, were guaranteed to put life into the weariest. Although the young and strong, like Carrington,

> "stood the physical conditions pretty well, and generally recovered from the effects of trench life after a night's sleep."[17]

even the middle-aged Knowles could write

> "the first day we are out of the firing line and get a drink or two and a good meal we forget all our hardships."[18]

Day-to-day fluctuations can be noted in collections of letters and in personal diaries. Even the morale of the cheeriest spirits could be severely dented by loss of friends or by heavy bombardments when

> "You could only cower in the bottom of the trench like a frightened animal, too numbed even to think."[19]

"Wind-up" feelings during routine bombardments were the norm. Even men like Cecil Slack could write: "I am fed up with shellfire", though on 17th October he wrote,

> "It is raining fast and it is very cold but we are very happy because we are not in the trenches."[20]

Graham H. Greenwell wrote after a very heavy bombardment of 36 hours' duration:

> "I have never been so absolutely cowed before ... I was quite done up by the last day-and-a-half, as I had had no sleep and very little food ... But now after a really excellent English breakfast ... I feel like a new man."

On August 17th 1916 he wrote from the Ovillers trenches:

> "I shall never look on warfare either as fine or sporting again. It reduces men to shivering beasts: there isn't a man who can stand shell-fire of the modern kind without getting the blues",

yet only a week later he was writing from the same trenches:

> "... not that I am a bit depressed or downhearted: I never felt better in my life, though the surroundings are revolting."

Even in January 1917 he was writing:

> "I am as happy as a schoolboy: there is really no life like it."[21]

The ebullient Hugh Lupton, when he learnt of the death of his first cousin, Maurice, in the 1/7th, wrote:

> "This trench warfare is indeed a rotten thing - so commonplace and dull and yet slowly so fatal."

On 9th January 1916 he wrote:

> "The other day when with the batt$^{n.}$ I got so fed up and envied those with Blighties, but now that I have stopped a shrapnel bullet my chief desire is to get back."

On the 16th he was told he was marked down for "Blighty" and he was considerably ill-pleased, grumbling

> "I only hope the 49th won't get anything very thrilling to do while I am away."[22]

The typical profile, showing growth, maintenance and decline of morale, may sometimes be approximately plotted, at least to a certain extent, from letters, memoirs and oral testimony. The initial period of adjustment to combat, which Swank and Marchand describe as becoming "battle-wise" is quite well-documented. Three weeks after first entering the line, 2/Lt H.R. Lupton, 1/8th, reported that "I haven't half the respect for artillery fire that I had" and a month later that trench mortars "seemed to be treated as a mere joke by our people."[23] Chapter 9 recounted how, for the first few months, the men of the first-line Leeds Rifles battalions looked on front-line soldiering as a high-risk sport, "a kind of dangerous fun", "a rough game to be relished", as indeed men of other regiments often seemed to regard it. Capt Tempest remarked that the 49th Division soldier "often affected to treat warfare as a game."[24] Carrington greatly enjoyed his first few months: "This was Life".[25] Warfare appeared at first to John Tucker as "rather thrilling and heroic": "the novelty and strange and interesting happenings helped to keep one's mind off the immediate dangers until they became more commonplace."[26]

The "plateau" period of peak efficiency was often described by respondents as becoming "case-hardened so that you got to be able to ignore shells and bullets."[27] Morale remained on a high plateau in the Regiment throughout the six months' spell in the Salient in 1915. On 18th July the 1/8th reported:

> "At 7 p.m. we received a message from Bde to the effect that the enemy were reported to be massing opposite the left of our division and we were warned to be in readiness: but no attack was made much to the disappointment of our men who were longing to come to close quarters with the enemy."[28]

In August, Rfm George Howe, 1/8th wrote:

> "We have just come out of the trenches after twenty days of awful buffetting, but we are still singing the old refrain, 'It's a long, long way to Tipperary'",

and Lt Lupton:

> [The whizzbangs] "did no harm, as is usually the case, but one burst in a traverse where one of our lads was asleep. It never woke him, but sprinkled him with earth. When someone woke him he merely said that was no reason to stop his sleep and slept once more. His nerves must have been good."

In September, Mr B. Thompson wrote of "the fine, cheerful, never-say-die, no-matter-what-comes, spirit of our boys", and Rfm Arthur Oates wrote:

> "We are having a very strenuous time just now. Sometimes the communication trench is waist deep in water, and when we go down for rations it is terrible. But even then we are not down-hearted. It is marvellous how bright and cheery everybody is."[29]

The high personal morale of Sgt Marsh of the 1/8th, who was wounded in November, was cited by Philip Gibbs as an example of the indomitable spirit of the British Tommy. On the evening of his amputation, after being brought into the WR Field Ambulance not expected to live (the mortality rate for amputees was about 70%),[30] he wrote to his wife by the padre:

> "'I hope this will find you in the pink, as it leaves me', he began. He mentioned that he had had an 'accident' which had taken one of his legs away. 'But the youngsters will like to play with my wooden peg', he wrote, and discussed the joke of it. The people round his bed marvelled at him, though day after day they saw great courage."[31]

Capt P.G. Bales described the morale of the 1/4th DWR during the same period as "splendid" and the men's enthusiasm as "almost boundless". He considered that the courage of the battalion in the late autumn of 1915 was of a far higher order than that required to go over the top: it was

> "the heroism which, with no excitement to buoy them up, can make men coolly and quietly face horror and death in their worst forms ... they simply obeyed orders without question and held on."

Significantly, he quoted from Kipling's 'If', a poem learnt by heart by Edwardian pupils of elementary and secondary schools alike:

> "If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
> To serve your turn long after they are gone,
> And so hold on when there is nothing in you
> Except the will which says to them 'Hold on!'"[32]

Sgt 2607 Walter Atkinson, 1/7th, declared that

> "what they called 'bravery' was usually nothing but the product of nerves, foolhardiness, like 'Cappy' capturing the machine-gun single-handed. I bet a lot of VCs got earned this way - if they did really get earned! You got worked up, carried away, you felt you didn't care what happened. That's what they mean when they talk about 'bravery'. But I'll tell you what 'bravery' really is. It's carrying on, day after day. Manning the front line, when you never know whether the next moment's going to be your last or not."[33]

Recklessness, foolhardiness, bravado, was commonly regarded by the experienced soldier as sign of imminent breakdown. Personal factors were sometimes significantly involved. "Mad" McHugh, the 2/7th Lewis Gun Sergeant, had earned his nickname because "nothing frightened him, he'd brave anything." Bugler 2657 William Laycock, 2/7th, considered his reckless bravery was born of the fact that his wife was co-habiting with another man and he was consequently indifferent to his own fate.[34] This particularly distressing type of marital problem of the soldier on active service was said to be the motive for the suicide of a man in the 1/8th.

After 4 months of training and working parties in Corps Reserve, morale in the Leeds Rifles at the beginning of the Battle of the Somme was at a very high level. L/Cpl Clifford Walton, despite being wounded during his spell in the German trenches on July 1st/2nd, nevertheless declared:

> "I enjoyed every minute of the sally. After the dreary monotony of trench warfare it was a truly exhilarating experience."

On return from his sojourn in the Schwaben Redoubt, Knowles wrote:

> "There was some sights - I daren't tell you Maud, it was awful, but I was steady and kept my napper a treat. The torments of thirst troubled me more than the scrapping."[35]

The morale profiles of the Leeds Rifles battalions appear to have assumed an asymmetrical wave pattern, having troughs well above the base level. The morale of some battalions that suffered very heavy casualties the first time they went into action appeared to suffer permanent and irreparable damage and these units came to be looked upon as "unlucky": the 18th Manchester Regt. was one example.[36] Only battalions of already low morale succumbed to these traumas, however. Battalions of high morale were extremely resilient and were so able to make a complete recovery from severe casualties within about 3 months, as the examples of the 2nd and 1/8th WYR show, moreover, the high-morale battalion always had something in reserve to sustain it. When its personnel had apparently reached the limit of endurance there was always duty, "the soldierly spirit", to spur them on to further efforts. The 2/8th was engaged in the Battle of Cambrai from 20th to 29th November 1917. Lt Col A.H. James wrote on 2nd December that

> "The men were very exhausted after the fighting and hardships" [when they eventually returned to camp on the 29th]. "We were told that we were going to have a good rest, and then going to a quiet part of the line ... Well, on the 30th, just about lunch time, I got orders to be ready to move off in 1½ hours' notice, and at 6 p.m. we trekked back to the line, or rather crawled there, as the men were still very sore. I write today from a Boche dugout, and what is in front of us of course I must not say, even if I knew. We must just stick it out, and do our best."

James himself had been quite badly gassed on the 29th, but had refused to go off duty and leave his battalion.[37]

Although battalions like the 1/7th, 1/8th and 1/6th WYR began to lose their local character in the late summer of 1916, according to respondents present to the end and to Capt. Tempest,[38] the same "battalion spirit" continued to distinguish them virtually unchanged throughout the war, despite each losing on several occasions 60% or more of its strength, i.e. becoming effectively wrecked. The high degree of social cohesion and high level of esprit de corps typical of TF units stemmed directly from the fact that they had been raised in small, well-defined geographical areas. "Regimental spirit" was thus initially "the local spirit". After being tempered in the heat of battle, however, it assumed a mystical quality and took on a life of its own as the invincible spirit of an inviolable regiment, a tradition to be handed down orally by veterans to draftees. This is expressed in a couple of passages dating from 1918. First, a message sent by GOC 49 Div to GOC

146 Bde on 2nd May 1918:

> "My great hope now is that you will find that you have sufficient old hands remaining to carry on the great spirit which has animated the 146th Brigade and infuse it into the new drafts which I hope to see joining you soon, in order that the name of the 146th Brigade shall live for ever."

Second, a letter from Lt Col Norman A. England, commanding the 8th Bn, to Col E. Kitson Clark, on 20th September:

> "Though the personnel under my command has changed very frequently lately, the old spirit still exists and we keep up the traditions of both the 1/8th and 2/8th West Yorkshire Regts."[39]

2/Lt J.R. Bellerby, 1/8th, described the plateau period of individual morale:

> "During the ordinary front-line activity and trench life of World War I, a man lived in a continuous and uniform state of tension. Once he was screwed up there appeared to be comparatively little effort involved in remaining outwardly calm and in suggesting to himself that his nerves were good."[40]

This "everlasting strain", however, slowly but surely eroded away the individual's morale. After a year at the front Carrington discovered he was not the man he was: "fighting had entirely ceased to be good fun."[41] Private John Tucker did not experience "the cold, belly-gripping fear, almost paralysing the senses" until he had been at the front for about a year; he considered this to be a "fairly common" phenomenon - "the longer one survived the more the fear would be felt."[42] Bellerby awoke trembling for the very first time on 19th December 1915, 8 months after arriving at the front.[43] This phenomenon can be due to any one of a number of disparate factors, the most likely of which here were prolonged fatigue or anxiety.

As personal morale declined, "feelings of dread" assailed "the survivors of the recent battles" when the "Move" order to return to the front line arrived.[44] Tucker admitted to having "queasy" feelings after a time at the prospect of the next tour of duty.

> "The longer one survived the more windy one felt of going up to the line. Luck could not last for ever ... Peculiarly this feeling would pass off once we had arrived, so long we could keep fairly active."[45]

George Coppard describes how "the haunting thought of the next spell up the line" undermined the veteran's morale:

> "Every return to the trenches was a new battle for the individual Tommy. It mattered little to him what was going on at other parts of the front. His fight was chiefly against the fears within himself and a few days' rest was not enough to restore his morale. Just as he was beginning to feel some benefit, he was back in the front line again."[46]

A tremendous psychological mobilisation was thus necessary to make the individual veteran keep going into combat.[47]

The "everlasting strain", exacerbated by insufficient sleep, which men experienced during a tour of trench duty, even in so-called quiet sectors, prematurely aged young soldiers and on their leaves relatives would notice how all traces of the Boy had disappeared.[48] It comes as something of a shock to be shown a photograph of an officer or NCO who looks well over 30 only to be informed he was actually 21 or so. Capt. Tempest noted how

> "men grew older visibly ... upon the older men the result was much marked. They often aged years in as many weeks. But", he went on, "a week's rest worked marvels: the face lost its hard lines, and the eyes relaxed."[49]

The "feelings of dread", which must have been virtually universal, are surprisingly poorly documented in the literature, and, strangely, the documentary material used in the present study conveys little, if anything, of the pervading atmosphere of tension and foreboding that, according to Capt. H.R. Lupton, 1/8th, overshadowed the periods of line duty and both the periods immediately preceding them, i.e. between the "Move" order and actually entering the trenches, and the periods immediately preceding some expected action:

> "Not only was it personal danger that gave rise to this Forebodement but, in the case of NCOs and officers, it was also the anxiety born of their responsibility that destroyed their peace of mind throughout their periods of duty."[50]

NCOs and officers were also particularly subject to the strain caused by the need to keep up an appearance of courage.[51]

The "feelings of dread" are nowhere to be seen in Knowles' letters, which show how he maintained his personal morale at a consistently high level, though sometimes by a conscious effort of will, for more than two years. The following extracts also show the importance of the love of wife or sweetheart as a morale-aiding factor and of homesickness as a morale-sapping factor.

29th May 1915:

> "I am in the pink, never better in my life for all we are roughing it. I have given my mind to it from the start. As regards feeling nervous, I don't think I have any nerves."

8th August 1915:

> "We stick it very well considering what we have to go through but sometimes you have an absolute craving for home, but you soon shake it off as it wouldn't do to study too much."

15th August:

> "It is marvellous what circumstances you can live under when you are put to it. You wouldn't think it was possible to sleep when the cannons of both sides were raining shots over the dugout, but a chum who is sharing the dugout with me woke me up to show me a piece of shrapnel that had fallen just outside. It hardly seems possible Kid, but it is a fact, and happens to other lads many a time. I actually hadn't heard a single shell burst."

28th August:

"It is surprising how well everyone looks, as the conditions just now are the limit."

8th September:

"I don't want to get homesick, as it is the only thing that makes me miserable. I am in the pink and never looked better in my life, so you know I am not worrying."

18th September:

"I can rough it with the best and do my whack at everything for I am afraid of nothing or anybody."

23rd September:

"We have some hellish times, but I am always thinking of you, kid. I don't know what it is to be afraid of anything, or have the 'wind up' as they call it out here, but I don't run into danger or take unnecessary chances. I refuse to let anything worry me - it wouldn't do. All I have studied about in some dangerous corners has been you, Maud."

25th October:

"The guns were booming, but no one takes the slightest notice. It is wonderful the contempt with which the Germans and their guns are held. You hardly turn your head."

6th December:

"I always stick it kid. After the doings we have had lately we can stand anything."

14th January 1916:

"The weather is wretched, lathered in mud all the time, but I always keep my spirits up and refuse to be downhearted ... I do love you, kiddie, as long as I know my true little girl loves me I can stick it and soldier with a good heart."

29th February:

"I must be case-hardened as I am ready for anything."

3rd March:

"I am prepared for anything. I am never surprised at anything. There are only a few of the originals left, but they are all game for anything and never a grumble. I am pleased to say I am in the pink again and in just the same good heart and spirits as when I first came out. Do you remember, kid, how I was always in dead earnest about coming out to fight? I want a hell of a lot of beating, and I am a long way from being beat yet."

16th April (first anniversary of landing in France):

"I was thinking of you and longing for you all the time, Maud love. You have no idea what a longing for home comes over us at times. It's a miserable feeling and wants a lot of shaking off."

28th April:

"I was never fitter in my life than I am just now, so I am not worrying."

3rd May:

"I am in the best of health and as happy as possible under the circumstances. I refuse to be miserable, sweetheart. If I was, it would be unbearable.

August Bank Holiday Tuesday:

> I don't let anything trouble me from chats to rats."

22nd December (recently returned from leave):

> "I have been a bit down-hearted since I came back. You have never been out of my thoughts."

24th January 1917:

> "Hardships and danger are nothing when a fellow knows he has got a good wife's love."

8th February:

> "I never get downhearted, lass. I am thinking of you and loving you all the time."

5th April:

> "I never grumble. I just stick it and always look forward to the good time coming."

1st July (last letter):

> "I am in the best of health but I feel war weary. It seems marvellous to have gone through over two years of this terrible racket, and still be here pushing them back. I tell you kiddie it has been hard to stick it at times, but I have always thought about my bonny wife and kiddies, and just gritted my teeth and carried on ... the war will be over a cert before my next pass in due, and the next time I come home I want to come for good. It was hard to part last time, wasn't it, sweetheart. I can see you yet standing on the station with tears in your eyes as the train moved out. I had to be cheerful, kiddie, but my heart was aching. I love you more than my life, or anything else in the world, and as long as I know you are my own true little wife I can stick anything."[52]

He had recently had all his remaining teeth extracted and a full set of dentures fitted. Since these occurrences commonly make people feel depressed, they might have had some bearing on his feeling "war weary".

14.2 It has often been confidently claimed, indeed it appears to have become virtually accepted, that by the autumn of 1917 the morale of the BEF as a whole was low. It is not infrequently claimed that the troops, following the failures to obtain decisive victories, first on the Somme in 1916 and then in the Ypres Salient in 1917, became convinced that the war would go on for ever and that the only way of escape was by a Blighty wound or death. This was the conviction of those of low personal morale and certainly Philip Gibbs met men of such views.[53] The claims are generalisations, however, and only partially true. The morale of the 49th and 62nd Divisions, for instance, was the very reverse of low, while one of Lyn Macdonald's respondents, Lt L.J. Baker MC, 2nd Suffolks, emphatically denied that morale had gone down in 1917 in his battalion.[54]

At any given period or point of time wide variations in the level of morale would exist, for all sorts of reasons, between Armies, between corps, between divisions and between units, and at the end of any prolonged period of severe operations there would be a considerable number of exhausted, depleted and usually (but not invariably) demoralised formations. In the final analysis, there are only two criteria by which the state of morale can be measured or assessed: (i) reliability, and (ii) performance in battle, judged in the light of circumstances. Even by 19th December 1915, after more than 5 months in the Salient, the 49th Division, as we have seen, was still completely reliable. The 35th (Bantam) Division's morale, on the other hand, had slumped so low by November 1916 that it had become unreliable, no longer to be trusted to hold front-line sectors, and had to be completely reorganised.[55]

Units of very low morale had lost or abandoned all soldierly virtues. They refused orders, i.e. mutinied; or surrendered "prematurely", i.e. with minimal resistance; or they "retired without orders", i.e. ran away, like the 6th Royal West Kents (37 Bde, 12th Division) on 17th July 1917.[56] Although there were no mutinies among combat troops as in the French Army, instances of retirement without orders and premature surrender occurred. Examples of the former occurred in the 21st and 24th Divisions at Loos and in the 12th and 20th Divisions at Cambrai and examples of both in the Fifth Army in March 1918.

Middlebrook has shown that there were considerable variations in morale even within the Fifth Army at the time, and that to speak of "the collapse of the Fifth Army" is something of an exaggeration. The biggest divisional collapse was that of yet another Kitchener Division, the 14th, whose commander was immediately dismissed. In complete contrast, however, the 59th, 61st and 66th Territorial Divisions emerged from the fighting with enhanced reputations.[57]

The German break-in on the Laventie front of 9th April was accomplished against the very low-morale Portuguese, who offered minimal resistance, many of them fleeing on bicycles stolen from the XIth Corps Cyclists, leaving the battlefield to three Territorial divisions, the 55th, 50th and 51st. Although it was attacked by 3 German divisions, the 55th achieved complete victory over the enemy. The Official History's account makes it clear that the 55th's outstanding success was the result of adequate training and preparation of the defences, good leadership, and above all, the high morale of all ranks. The 50th and 51st Divisions, despite having been rushed up "in a state of exhaustion, without their artillery, from a ten days' battle in which they had lost seventy or eighty per cent of their infantry", also accomplished a near miracle in holding back the German advance in the Portuguese's area.[58]

By the end of 1917 the BEF's manpower problems had become acute,[59] and at the insistence of the Cabinet Committee, the establishment of all British divisions was reduced from 12 battalions to 9. Meanwhile, there remained in the UK including Ireland a total of 74,403 officers and 1,486,459 other ranks, excluding Dominion troops, of whom only 359,270 were "unavailable".[60] By March 1918, as Terraine has pointed out, many morale-sapping or -destroying factors appeared to be present in the BEF: heavy casualties, low strengths, great fatigue and strain, units disbanded and their men dispersed. A worried GHQ had the Censorship Dept. compile a report on the state of the BEF's morale as revealed in the letters soldiers were writing home.[61] The disbanding of so many battalions had a particularly damaging effect upon morale, which the civilians who made the decision could not have foreseen or appreciated.

The effect of the break-up of the 1/8th has already been noted. In the later mustering out of the 2/7th in June 1918, care was taken to minimise the upsets. All Leeds men in the battalion were given the choice of transferring either to the 1/7th in the 49th Division or to any battalion in 185 Bde of the 62nd Division.[62] A large number went to the 8th (3 officers, 130 OR); 4 officers and 160 OR went to the 2/5th and when this latter battalion was mustered out in August owing to lack of reinforcements, the bulk of the personnel went to the 8th to complete it to an establishment of 900.[63]

In support of their assessment of low morale in the BEF in 1917 and 1918 commentators have cited one or more of the following factors: the existence of battle police; the majority presence of conscripts as opposed to volunteers; the "live and let live" policy.

Much has been made of the battle police[64] stationed during Third Ypres and during the Retreat in 1918 to stop stragglers by turning them back at gunpoint and if necessary, by shooting them dead. Since panic was contagious, battle police were a necessary and sensible precaution in formations of unknown or doubtful reliability. The 62nd Division went over the top for the first time at the Battle of Bullecourt, 3rd May 1917. Orders for the 2/6th WYR included the following: "The Regt. Sergt.-Major will detail Regimental police to stop stragglers at B18c40."[65] No 49th Division respondent had ever heard of battle police and it can be stated with certainty that no Regimental police in the Leeds Rifles were deployed to stop stragglers at the Battle of Poelcappelle in 1917. The 1/7th Provost-Sergeant 2008 Harry Ellis was badly wounded while going over with the first wave, while a respondent (2735 Cyril Clarkson, 1/7th) witnessed the death by shellfire of the 1/8th Provost-Sergeant George Limbert ("Kid Currie") who was advancing in the second wave.[66]

The very large and increasing numbers of conscripts present in units from the end of 1916 onwards has frequently been held to be an important contributory factor to lowered morale. This view appears to be based, at least in part, on the hoary "old sweat's" myth, put about by volunteers and publicised by Montague and others of liberal views, that conscripts were lazy, spiritless, unwilling, unsoldierly and generally useless.[67] Thanks largely perhaps to Montague's astonishing theory of retrovolution - "a process by which the fittest must more and more dwindle away and the less fit survive them"[68] - it appears to have become received wisdom that conscription must be dilution, despite the fact that this leaves unexplained the victories of the very largely conscript British Armies of 1918 and 1945. Conscription certainly did not appear to dilute the 8th Bn. Part of the poor reputation of conscripts in WWI was undoubtedly connected with inadequate training and the mismanagement of reinforcements. W.L. Andrews thought their fighting value was "inevitably" less than that of the original volunteers: "For one thing they were often sent straight into the most frightful experiences, whereas we veterans had been trained by a gradual process into self-control under stress."[69]

Quiet, or inert, sectors of the British front were commonly manned by novitiate formations and by exhausted divisions of relatively low morale who had been sent for a rest. It was totally impracticable to maintain all-out offensives on all sectors simultaneously. Nevertheless, the need to motivate the men manning quiet sectors and to improve their morale was seen by GHQ as a problem. This was because inert sectors tended to foster "inertia", which was officially defined in a War Office booklet published in March 1916 as "the insidious tendency to lapse into a passive and lethargic attitude"[70] and which amounted to the adoption towards the enemy of an attitude of non-aggression. "Inertia" undoubtedly led to a decline in "the offensive spirit" and the associated will to fight and was often accompanied by a fading of hostility, perhaps even a growth of goodwill, towards the enemy.[71] "Inertia" manifested itself most strongly in the adoption by the troops in the front line of an unofficial policy of "Live and Let Live".[72] Both the French and the Germans in the intervening periods between large-scale offensives often adopted a "live and let live" policy which permitted the trench routines of both sides to proceed unhindered.[73]

"Inertia" was evidently regarded as a problem of morale by GHQ, who, from about the end of 1914, adopted the policy of "the active front", the harassment of the enemy at every opportunity by patrols, raids, etc. Sir John French, when laying down the principle of the policy in a memorandum of

February 1915, asserted that aggression must be encouraged since it would "relieve monotony and improve the morale" of British troops and at the same time exhaust the enemy morally and materially, and, further, that aggression was the most effective form of defence.[74]

It should not be too readily assumed that all troops in quiet sectors invariably followed the unofficial "Live and Let Live" policy. The 49th Division, for instance, followed orders, not its own inclinations. American experience in Vietnam suggests that the adoption of the policy was a consequence of bad leadership and a failure in discipline, i.e. it was associated with, if not actually a collapse of, at least a marked decline in morale. An investigation carried out in Vietnam in 1970 by the US Defense Department discovered that the infantry had replaced the official patrol policy of "search and destroy" with their own unofficial policy of "search and evade". Breakdowns in discipline were general. A "fantastic generation gap" had opened between officers and NCOs on the one hand and enlisted men on the other. There was a significant increase in the incidence both of "fragging" (the throwing of fragmentation grenades at officers and NCOs with intent to kill or maim) and of refusal of orders. The Report placed the chief blame for the failure in discipline and the general atmosphere, indeed policy, of permissiveness in the US Army in Vietnam on widespread drug abuse.[75]

Several writers have cited as evidence of falling morale and of the troops' loss of faith in their commanders a passage from Frederic Manning's novel, which is set in the autumn of 1916:

> "They had been brought to the last extremity of hope, and yet they put their hands on each other's shoulders and said with a passionate conviction that it would be all right, though they had faith in nothing, but in themselves and in each other."[76]

It indicates, on the contrary, that the levels of morale and esprit de corps in Manning's battalion were quite high. Misinterpretation of this passage may be partly responsible for the often-repeated assertion that "idealism perished on the Somme."

14.3 Guides to Morale

The standard guides to the morale of an on-going military unit are the state of its inter-rank relations, the state of its discipline and its standards of general behaviour, health, enthusiasm, self-confidence, and turnout. There are obvious difficulties in applying these to a unit that existed in the past within living memory and it is, moreover, totally unrealistic to expect an ex-ranker to make a definitive assessment of the state of morale of his unit during his period of service. Nevertheless, there is a method by which the state of morale in a unit may be evaluated retrospectively, providing there are available sufficient ex-members who were serving with the unit during the period under investigation. By adopting the aetiological approach familiar in medical research, it was found possible to build up, from the works cited in this and the previous chapter, a syndrome or list of factors or components involved in good or bad morale. The respondents can then be questioned specifically on these. They can be asked questions such as, Did you feel you were an essential member of the unit? Did you have confidence in your comrades/NCOs/officers? Did your officers do everything possible to maximise your personal welfare? Were you satisfied with the standard of medical care provided, the organisation of mail, etc.?

The following list of indices of high morale was used in the present study. It should not be assumed that they are listed in order of magnitude. A positive response by the respondent to all, or virtually all , 14 indices was judged to indicate high morale. All the Leeds Rifles respondents, except possibly 4, responded positively to every indice. The four exceptions were one very long-serving ranker-respondent, who did not make a positive response to index (13), and the three officer-respondents who were university graduates who appeared to strive to adopt a "professional", detached or "neutral" attitude to index (13).

Indices of high morale

(1) Favourable attitudes to and high degree of confidence in officers.
(2) Favourable attitudes to and high degree of confidence in NCOs.
(3) Pride in unit/regimental loyalty.
(4) Favourable attitudes on personal esprit and personal commitment to the task.
(5) Favourable attitudes on discipline and the disciplinary code.
(6) Favourable attitudes to the Army as an organisation, and an interest in soldiering *per se*.
(7) A strong sense of duty and spirit of self-sacrifice present in all ranks.
(8) Confidence in ultimate victory.
(9) Confidence in combat stamina and willingness for combat.
(10) Confidence in the medical services.
(11) Confidence in the Quartermaster and his staff.
(12) A welcoming attitude to replacements and friendly relations with men of associated units.
(13) Expressions of hatred of the enemy.
(14) Expressions of envy and antagonism towards rear echelons and the home front.

It might be possible, using these indices, to assess morale from memoirs, personal diaries or collections of letters.

Indices (1), (2), (3) and (5) are discussed at length in separate sections. An example of index (7) is this extract from a letter written by Rfm A. Appleton, 1/7th:

> "You can take it from me that there is not a man in our company who has tried to shirk his work while we have been out here."[77]

The men of the Leeds Rifles had complete confidence in ultimate victory (index (8)), in British superiority in arms. It never even crossed Knowles' mind that the British Army could be beaten.[78] F.M. Slim considered this a characteristic attitude of the British combat soldier.[79] Knowles' over-optimism about the ease of winning the war was reflected by his continual inaccurate estimates of its duration:

> "It is a cast iron cert to finish by autumn"; "I am certain we shall finish and pack up for Christmas"; "the Boches are getting a right tawsing all over the shop. We never stop shelling them night or day. I think they are forced to crack up shortly"; "I think the Huns are on their last legs. If they last the summer out it will surprise everyone out here."[80]

It is strikingly noticeable how these estimates, together with the persistent belief that Germany was on the point of collapse, buoyed up his morale. The USARB found that over-optimism about the war's duration was a continuing phenomenon, the men surveyed continually under-estimating the time it would take to win the war.[81]

Confidence in front line medical care (Index (10)) made patrol duty and all other work seem less threatening. Stretcher bearers were a universal source of reassurance. They were highly respected and admired as very brave men for their devotion to duty in the face of personal risk. 2455 Sgt Norman J. Mason, A Coy, 1/8th, said of stretcher-bearer 1712 Cpl Jack Sanderson, a member of his platoon:

> "He was a very staunch fella altogether. The younger ones all looked up to him. His medical skill was a by-word in the Company, if not in the battalion. I can't begin to tell you how many men's lives he saved. I can tell you this, though - it really gave the lads confidence to know that a chap like him was to hand if they should get hit."[82]

Frederick the Great had asserted that an army travels on its belly, while the Duke of Marlborough had maintained that "No soldier can fight unless he is properly fed on beef and beer."[83] Brigadier Bidwell re-stated this maxim as "Good quartermasters win many more battles than brilliant tacticians."[84] The truth of the maxim was illustrated particularly well in the report submitted by Acting Lt Col C.K. James DSO, of the 2/7th, on the factors which had contributed to the battalion's brilliant achievements at Cambrai. He described how the cookhouse had been set up in close proximity to the assembly point and how his men had been issued with both a substantial haversack ration and a cooked breakfast before going over the top. He wrote:

> "The advantage of having an extra breakfast ration cannot be overestimated. It undoubtedly improved the troops' spirits and the most trying time of the attack - the waiting between the forming up time and zero - was spent almost entirely in issuing and eating food."[85]

Respondents were highly satisfied with the services provided by and had complete confidence in the Quartermasters and their staffs (Index (11)).

R. Sobel described hatred of the enemy (Index (13)) as "a potent positive defence against anxiety" and noted it as one of the critical factors of defence that disappeared early on in the sequence of psychiatric breakdown.[86] E.A. Weinstein described how the soldier's anxieties on entering combat developed into hostility. If he was well-adjusted, a well-integrated member of a well-led, closely-knit combat group (a high-morale unit), he directed his hostility in a rational and logical manner towards the enemy or, if he was out of the line, towards groups outside his own such as rear-echelons, civilians, etc. If, however, he was in an anxiety state he directed his hostility irrationally and illogically, often at his own group. He was openly resentful and bitter against his comrades, his officers, or the Army as a whole, or the Allies; or he blamed himself for the death of comrades. Hostility was never directed at the true source of his anxiety, the enemy. He found it difficult, perhaps even impossible, to hate the anonymous enemy with whom he tended to identify as a fellow-sufferer. Lack of hatred for the enemy thus tended to be characteristic of the neurotic pattern of hostility.[87] A.M. Rose also suggests that expressions of envy and antagonism towards rear echelons and the home front (Index (14)) are more likely to be made by troops of normal or high morale.[88]

Personal commitment involved the sense of obligation which the individual soldier felt to serve his unit and his country, his acceptance of the soldier role and his willingness to make sacrifices. This last was a particularly important point, since becoming a soldier itself meant a very real deprivation involving felt sacrifice (see Chap. 13, section 13.3). The USARB showed that on personal esprit and personal commitment the married tended to have less favourable attitudes than the unmarried, and men aged 25 and over to have less favourable attitudes than those aged under 25. In general, younger men were found more likely than older men to express willingness for combat, and men of 30 years and over to be the age group with the lowest motivation for combat. It was found, time and time again, that NCOs had, quite consistently, more favourable attitudes in every aspect of military life than privates, and tended to possess a noticeably higher degree of personal commitment and esprit de corps. This was not found to be the case in the present study (see Chap. 13, section 13.6). Since the USARB found that soldiers with a strong sense of personal commitment tended to be more favourable on other attitudes,[89] it may be concluded that strong personal commitment is an integral part of personal morale.

Nearly all the Leeds Rifles respondents had enlisted voluntarily. The vast majority, even including those who had initially volunteered with no great eagerness, had accepted the soldier role with enthusiasm. An enthusiastic attitude towards military service served largely to deflect attention away from the day-to-day frustrations of the new environment, in particular the deprivational features of Army life.[90] On personal commitment, some respondents were asked whether they thought they could have done more for their country as a munitions worker or a coal miner. This question provoked such a hostile reaction that it had to be dropped from the schedule.

It became apparent to the USARB investigators as early as the spring of 1943 that a kind of limited commitment had emerged, that fundamentally the desires to be safe, or at home, or free to pursue civilian concerns, had become, or were becoming, stronger than any motivation to make a further personal contribution to winning the war. For example, of 2507 men in the S. Pacific interviewed early in 1944, 66% agreed that a man who had been overseas for 18 months had done his full share in the war and deserved to go home, while only 18% disagreed. Since a fall in personal commitment can be seen as a symptom of failing combat effectiveness, the pervasiveness of this attitude so alarmed the authorities that an indoctrination programme, involving films and "orientation courses", was launched, aimed specifically at promoting a stronger sense of personal commitment.[91]

This concept of limited commitment had its counterparts in the British Army of World War I. First, in the time-expired Territorials who would not re-engage. W.L. Andrews wrote:

> "I could not blame them. They had, as they said, done their bit. It was time someone else had a turn. This was a general feeling. We had done our best, and as the months went on most of us had become battered and worn."[92]

It is not known, nor can it be estimated, how many time-expired men in the Leeds Rifles re-engaged or failed to re-engage; there were respondents in both categories. Many time-expired men had, of course, good jobs awaiting them in Leeds where industry was booming and wages soaring. 2780 Harold Kirk, 1/7th, recalled with amusement his time-expired CSM, Charles Hardcastle, who was in his late 30s and had a managerial position in the tailoring industry to return to:

> "We were getting it thick and heavy in the front line in the Salient and poor old Charlie was walking up and down the trench saying 'Only another 9 days to go', and so on each day until they sent him down the line. It must have been agony for him, with shouts of 'stretcher-bearers!' going on each day and wondering if it was to be his turn before he got away."[93]

Those who had completed their engagements prior to embarkation mostly re-engaged for a further year, as was still their right. This was described by respondents concerned, somewhat significantly, as "doing a year for the King". Eventually the pre-conscription time-expired Territorial had to be offered the inducement of a £20 bounty if he re-engaged for the duration of the war. All time-expired men, whether Regulars or Territorials, were entitled to one month's furlough on termination of engagements.[94] This was continued even when conscription caused the bounty to be abolished.

Limited commitment, however, was chiefly revealed by the widespread longing for "Blighties", references to which in the literature are legion.[95] Some participant-authors make patently clear the relationship between low or waning personal morale and this desire for a wound which would result in evacuation to a hospital in the UK: an officer:

> "The past weeks in the Salient have about done in my power of resistance. Oh! how fine it would be to get to Blighty";

a private Regular soldier:

> "I am almost done and candidly speaking I have often longed to be wounded to get away from this place for a little while ... I do wish it was all over. I have had quite enough of this life and my nerves are not of the best now. I cannot get to sleep and when I do I have the most horrible dreams ..."[96]

Lt Col A.H. James, in the autumn of 1916, when he was CO of a Kitchener battalion, the 8th NF, wrote:

> "To be honest, they all hope for one thing, a 'blighty' wound. No one can ever pretend to enjoy war nowadays when this shelling has reached such a pitch."[97]

2222 William H. Reynard, 8th, one of the longest-serving respondents (from Embarkation to Armistice), denied that fear or anxiety had an important role here. He maintained that it was the desire to escape the hateful and dangerous fatigues, such as ration carrying, RE portering, and working parties, that caused men to long for "a nice, comfortable, safe Blighty." Lt Lupton wrote in July 1915:

> "Two other men were nastily wounded but were pleased as Punch at the idea of a rest. Some of them seem to be as hard as nails."[98]

This tends to lend support to Signaller Reynard's contention.

The attainment of a "Blighty" might be dependent entirely on the whim of an individual doctor at the CCS or base hospital. Two under-age respondents considered themselves extremely lucky to get "Blighties". 1610 Thomas Doran, 1/8th, got trench fever in June 1918. The hospital doctor asked him his true age and how long he had been at the front. When he replied 3 years and 2 months, the doctor remarked that he had done his bit and put him down for Blighty by the next hospital train. Harry Martin, 1/7th, was asked for the same details by a doctor who immediately marked him down for Blighty.[99]

According to J.A. Jackson, to be successful a military organisation requires "total commitment" on the part of its personnel to "the ideology, normative discipline and aims of the organisation."[100] Etzioni states that in a normative organisation the orientation of the lower participants is characterised by high commitment, and that in the military unit commitment, since it correlates with inter-rank cohesion, can be measured by two items: the respect men award their officers and their willingness to follow their superiors into combat. The average level of personal commitment in the Leeds Rifles battalions, being normative organisations, would be expected to be high, and judged not only on these two criteria but also on all other available evidence, this certainly seems to have been the case. Etzioni points out that normative organisations which can exercise little selectivity have to rely mainly on socialisation of members to gain the level of commitment required.[101] It is significant here that the British Army takes the view that very considerable socialisation (in the form of inculcation of esprit de corps) is necessary to ensure attainment of organisational goals, and higher performance is believed by conventional military wisdom to be the result of effective socialisation efforts, i.e. the empirical rule is: the higher the esprit de corps, the higher the performance will be.

Commitment is associated with three related attitudes: willingness for combat, confidence in combat stamina (Index (9)), and confidence in combat skill. The USARB claimed that these attitudes tended to predict subsequent performance.[102] It can be repeatedly noted in the present study that the men of the Leeds Rifles had very favourable attitudes in these areas, particularly in 1915 when they were very keen to get into the actual battle zone and take an active part in the fighting as soon as possible. They expected to stand up to battle conditions very well, they felt in very good physical condition, felt fully trained and were confident in their combat skill. The idea obviously prevailing in the Regiment in the first few months abroad was that the Leeds Rifles had "nowt to beat". The attitudes of Knowles, a member of the group claimed by researchers to possess the least favourable attitudes and the lowest motivation for combat,[103] are of great interest here. The following are extracts from letters he wrote during training for the Somme:

> "I won a 100 yd sprint match yesterday, so you can bet I am well ... you say you think the war is getting worse. I don't. We were never better than at present, and when the big smash comes (it won't be long) Germany will be smashed like an egg." "I don't care how soon we get stuck into it." "I feel confident this is the beginning of the end." "Just a few lines to let you know we are for the big do proper. It has all been guesswork up to now, but our General inspected the whole Brigade this morning and told us definitely we were for it. It will be the greatest show in history and there is no doubt about the result. Well, sweetheart, I shall do my best and that best is good I can tell you. I know exactly what we have to do and that is a fine thing. I bet we give the German bastards hell ... don't get worrying about anything. I am not. I feel in the pink again, and you can rely on me to keep my napper. There is one cert - there isn't a Boche at the other side that is as good as us."[104]

Combat units were subject to high personnel turnover. A comparatively very small proportion of men were still with their units after 3 years at the front, e.g. exactly 3 years after embarkation there were only 11 "originals" left in 1/7th Sherwood Foresters; the 2/6th WYR lost about 60% of its strength, approximately 600 men, in its first 4 months of active service and when it was disbanded only 11 months after first entering the line, "a mere handful" remained of over 1,000 men that had embarked.[105] Reference was made in Chap. 11 to the high rates of turnover in the Leeds Rifles. Much of the evidence is inferential, but some further impressions can perhaps be gained from statistics that have been compiled from the Roll Book of B Coy of the 8th Bn, 1/1/19, which gives the date of joining the BEF, not the battalion, of 156 men of the Company.

Less than 3 months	6
3-5 months	46
6-8 months	11
9-11 months	18
1 year-17 months	15
18-23 months	12
2 years	25
25-30 months	8
31-35 months	6
3 years - 44 months	7
3 years, 9 months	2
	156

Length of Service in the BEF of men in B Coy of 8th Bn as at 1st January 1919[106]

From this table it will be noted that exactly one-third of the men had less than 5 months' service, which meant they had joined the battalion since the capture of La Montagne de Bligny. A total of 81 men, about 52%, had less than 12 months' service and 66, over 42%, had between 1 and 3 years' service. 25 men (16%) had embarked with the 62nd Division 2 years earlier, but only 2 (1.3%) with the 49th Division 3 years, 9 months earlier. The average length of service of the men was 14.3 months. For the bulk of these men, part of their BEF service, if no more than only 2 or 3 weeks, had been spent at an Infantry Base Depot.

Though the personnel was constantly changing, a "good" battalion, i.e. one of high morale, "was like a good school - it absorbed new members without any loss of spirit."[107] A large draft of 10 officers and 200 men, many of whom had never previously been under fire, which joined the 8th Bn on 27th July 1918, was absorbed and integrated so completely that its members fought the following day as though they had never served with any other unit. (A similar phenomenon occurred in the 1/4th DWR during the Battle of the Lys in April 1918; Capt P.G. Bales ascribed it to high morale.)[108] The reputation of the 8th Bn among ordinary soldiers at Infantry Base Depots as a regiment soldiers were keen to join may have facilitated the integration process:

> "Whilst I was still at the Base in 1918 waiting to be sent up", recalled Robert H.P. Schulze, 8th, "a Regular asked me which Battalion I had been posted to. When I told him 8th West Yorks he exclaimed, 'You lucky bugger! They get well fed in that battalion - they've got the best Quartermaster in the whole of the British Army!'"[109]

A reinforcement was not armoured against neurosis until he became integrated into his new unit, been adopted into the unit "family" and made friends. Poorly integrated men "often developed overwhelming anxiety and had to be evacuated before the platoon leader had even learned their names."[110] Sent into battle without satisfactory pre-battle orientation, due to inadequate and too brief training, he often froze with fear or became hysterical.[111]

It was obviously in the veterans' own interest to assimilate replacements into the platoon or section as quickly as possible and get them into the routine.[112] Members of drafts, however, are often portrayed in the war literature as being friendless among strangers, with veterans showing resentment or hostility towards them and generally giving them a hard time.[113] This kind of behaviour towards replacements, particularly the attacking of their equanimity by, for example, describing battle incidents in the most lurid and gruesome detail, has been shown by L.A. Kahn to be typical of units of low morale, the great majority of whose members were in or approaching an anxiety state and unable to relax when no longer in actual combat.[114] In such circumstances, replacements found adjustment extremely difficult.

Replacements to the Leeds Rifles battalions, however, found adjustment extremely easy, they were rapidly assimilated and hence there was no diminution of the battalion spirit. The respondents who had been replacements all testified as to the great warmth of the welcome given them by their new comrades, how very helpful they had been and how ready to pass on their experience in the shape of useful advice and tips. Harry Martin from Dewsbury felt at home immediately in B Coy of the 1/7th. Adjustment was particularly easy for the pre-Somme replacements, since nearly all of them were Leeds men with friends, acquaintances or relatives already in the Regiment. 4328 L. Frederick Hudson already knew most members of No. 10 platoon, 1/7th, including his corporal, when he came up. Ted Flatley was joining his brother and over 100 other lads from his neighbourhood: for him, "joining the 1/7th was like coming home." 2006 Ernest Woodhead, 1/7th, got a shock one day when a comrade said to him, "Guess who's just arrived in the new draft - your Dad!"[115] A greater collective effort to assimilate replacements was called for from the veterans from August 1916 onwards, as two NCOs explained:

> "We used to tell the drafts as soon as they arrived - 'You're in the 8th Bn Leeds Rifles now, the finest regiment in the British Army and don't you ever forget it!' They didn't either, even if they weren't Leeds lads."
>
> "The authorities stopped sending us drafts of Leeds lads. It was all a big mistake in my opinion, because it was such a lot easier to make friends of, and so good soldiers of, lads from your own home town. We used to do our best to instil the Leeds Rifles spirit into all these 'foreigners' and turn them into 'Leeds lads', as you might say. We'd tell them from the start they'd joined the finest regiment in the British Army."[116]

How well they succeeded is illustrated by the capture on 28th July 1918 by the 8th Bn of La Montagne de Bligny, as re-told by an anonymous Rifleman, "Blue Chevron", obviously a participant, in a newspaper account over 19 years later:

> "At 4 a.m. they launched the attack on the Montagne. Neither their weariness from their exertions of the previous days, nor the steep ascent of the gun-riddled hill deterred them. 'Onward, lads', said somebody, 'We'll show 'em they can't turn us Loiners back.' Soon the surprised Germans were routed and fled, leaving the hill to the Leeds boys."[117]

"Loiners" was a dialect term for an inhabitant of Leeds.

From August 1916 Capt. H.R. Lupton, 1/8th, always tried to pick out the coal-miners in drafts for his Company. Miners were not only physically tough, and used to working in teams, both large and small, but they also possessed, as he put it, "built-in esprit de corps" and accordingly rapidly settled in.[118] They were used to living in "closely-knit communities where there is a strong projection of the group on the individual."[119]

Ideally drafts arrived while the battalions were in billets. Those that arrived during periods of active operations, however, since they were given little opportunity to integrate into the battalion, frequently caused nothing but harm to the morale of both veterans and replacements. The History of the 1/6th WYR illustrates this. This unit suffered heavy casualties on 1st July 1916. In the very middle of an enemy attack on 15th July 289 reinforcements from the DLI arrived. They were hurriedly divided up and "sent off into the most hard-pressed parts of the line: several of them were killed before there was any possibility of taking their names." At the end of August further drafts arrived while the battalion was sending out by day and night all available men on carrying and working parties. By 3rd September, when the 1/6th was to participate in the attack on St. Pierre-Divion, it had become a mixture of reinforcements from 27 different battalions from all parts of England "who had had no opportunity of shaking down into one efficient unit."[120] This experience was duplicated in every battalion in the 49th Division and undoubtedly was a major factor in the division's failure that day.

Indicators of unsatisfactory morale which can be culled from memoirs, letters, diaries etc., and oral testimony include:

1. Poor esprit de corps, lack of regimental pride. In both West Riding divisions strong esprit de corps existed at brigade and divisional levels, as well as at unit levels. The old soldier who belonged to a high-morale unit is not hard to spot: he will enthusiastically aver that he belonged to "the finest regiment in the British Army". Some veterans, however, have so little divisional, brigade or unit esprit de corps they cannot remember, or they are unwilling to divulge, the number or name of the formations in which they have served.
2. Poor or bad inter-rank relationships. Excessive, often unreasonable, criticism of officers and allegations of malpractice against officers and NCOs as status groups (not as individuals), such as purloining Other Ranks' rations or rum, are two sure indicators of low morale.
3. Poor social cohesion (for questions to be asked, see Chap. 13, section 13.6). Particular manifestations are: shirking; the existence of cliques having a disproportionate influence; men stealing money, articles of kit etc. from comrades.
4. Bad social atmosphere. Some manifestations are: quarrelling; malicious gossiping about superiors; accusations of favouritism; excessive grousing.[121] Low-morale soldiers are much more inclined to complain than others.[122]

5. Poor discipline and general slackness. Behaviour is a good guide to morale. No unit of good morale has continual cases of bad discipline.[123] A situation described as "a breakdown in discipline" indicates rock-bottom morale, a state of social disintegration. Research undertaken during World War II indicated a fundamental relationship between low morale and military crime, and between low morale and a high incidence of disciplinary and social problems. The lack of morale-building factors and/or presence of morale-destroying factors were found to be important in a major study of desertion undertaken by Col J.C. Penton. This and other studies revealed the deserter to be atypical: he tended to be in the lower age groups, in the lower half of the intelligence rating scale, and to present some form of psychiatric instability, chiefly of failure to adjust.[124]
6. Personnel are discontented and dissatisfied. This is often a sign of lax discipline.[125] In any organisation where forces of external and/or internal social disruption are relatively strong, members tend to be anxious and insecure.[126] Discontented soldiers are not good soldiers, and will react much in the same way as their civilian counterparts. It is well-known that discontent in work organisations manifests itself in deliberate restriction of output, restrictive practices, poor quality work, high absenteeism, high turnover rates, as well as by various forms of industrial action such as "working to rule", or going on strike. In a military unit, the discontented soldier does not have the same scope to demonstrate such attitudes. He cannot opt out by resigning and none of the tasks assigned to him are open to negotiation. He cannot go on strike or refuse to obey orders without incurring the severest punishment. Nevertheless, he can avoid work ("dodging the column" or, more recently, "skiving"), make a pretence of work ("scrimshanking"), make fewer personal sacrifices (e.g. not volunteer for any kind of duty), feign illness ("swinging the lead") or deliberately make himself ill (according to "popular" war literature, chewing cordite was a favourite method) or otherwise unfit for duty.

Low-morale units had a poor CO, poor officers and NCOs, possessed little or no esprit de corps and were ill-disciplined.[127] Norman Gladden's unit, the 7th NF, a pioneer battalion of the 50th Division, was perhaps typical: it was characterised by disunity, the men were depressed and clannish, and the officers and NCOs were hopelessly incompetent and took little interest in either their work or their men.[128] Poor morale was a frequent criticism of pioneer battalions.[129]

14.4 Morale-Building Factors and Aids to Morale

1. The greatest aid to morale was an inner feeling of security, the priceless gift of comradeship, the soldier's confidence that he was being looked out for by his comrades, that his unit was a caring and compassionate community. The combat soldier derived a considerable sense of power and security from being among comrades on whom he could depend;[130] as The American Soldier amply testifies, one of the most important functions of the primary group is the reduction of fear.[131] Psychiatrist L.H. Bartemeier and his associates considered group bonds to be the most important factor in a soldier's psychological defences. They repeatedly emphasised the fact "that the organised pattern of the unit and its emotional bonds constitute the dominant constructive and integrative force for the individual soldier in his fighting function." "This group life *is* his inner life." They expressed the opinion that this total significance of the group as the core of the soldier's personality organisation had not, at the time of publishing (1946), been adequately grasped by many psychiatrists.[132]

2. Good leadership and good management were powerful determinants of morale. Respondents have described the Leeds Rifles battalions as well-led and well-managed and pointed to their record of achievements. Interestingly, the present study offers data which lend support to the following modern management theories:
(i) R.R. Blake and J.S. Mouton have shown that "the ideal manager" has high concern for both people and task, having integrated the requirements of both;[133] (ii) A fairly popular view suggests that people should adopt decision-making styles to suit different situations. Professor Fred E. Fiedler's "Contingency model of leadership effectiveness"[134] (which applies only to interacting groups whose task requires close co-operation among group members) belongs to this school. His research into situational determination led him to conclude that it is easier to be a successful leader if one has (1) good leader-followership relations, (2) a clearly defined task (such as is assigned to a combat group), and (3) a powerful position (such as is possessed by an army officer); in such circumstances the leader should be expected to give clear directions and orders. The average Leeds Rifles officer would be classed under the theory as being "fit for the group-task situation." (iii) The science-based system management of Rensis Likert, which is founded on the model of Creative/Self-Actualising Man developed by A.H. Maslow[135] and others, features employee-centred organisations in which special emphasis is placed on relationships between colleagues. He claims that adoption of this system will result in high productivity/performance, much improved management-labour relations and a happier and more satisfied work force.[136] This system is dealt

with in more detail below. In 1978 T. Vitalis, after reviewing all the main theories of work motivation, concluded that "the answer" lies "with the relationships that exist among individuals in an organisation."[137]

There are two major approaches to supervision: "management-by-results" and "management-by-directives."[138] In the former, the employee is given considerable freedom in the way the work is performed, but within clearly defined limits embracing necessary external discipline and control over the employee. This approach, which employees are said to prefer, offers them a working environment of gradually decreasing external discipline, relies on self-motivation and self-discipline and so develops a large measure of self-reliance and self-confidence, at the same time increasing the individual's personal involvement in his organisation. The latter emphasises the following of prescribed procedure at the expense of individual freedom. Discipline for its own sake and conformity-producing techniques are often encouraged. It requires an extensive and detailed set of rules and instructions. Employee initiative is minimised, for he is told in detail what to do and how to do it. The approach tends to become self-limiting, since it can result in prescribed performance but fails to challenge workers to their full potential. Generalship in WWI followed the "management-by-directives" approach. In the Leeds Rifles battalions and in the other TF units for which data could be obtained, the officers appeared to follow the "management-by-results" approach wherever possible. Occasionally this latter approach was employed by the GOC Brigade. Chapter 10 contains two striking examples of the approach as applied to small-scale operations where the high-morale 1/8th was given complete autonomy and where tactics were worked out by group consensus among the participants. Both were successful.

3. Good interior economy, including welfare provision.
4. Good medical services.
5. Religion, including "The Religion of the Regiment", esprit de corps (see separate sections).
6. The inspiration afforded by the example of (i) officers; (ii) NCOs; (iii) older, seasoned soldiers.

The next 4 factors can be classified as psychological adjustments to the stress situation:

7. Various personal philosophies, such as fatalism and carpe diem (see below, separate section).
8. Humour (see below, separate section).
9. Elements of "popular" religion and particularly prayer (see below, separate section). Fear of being found lacking in moral fibre and of appearing afraid was often a greater fear than fear of what would happen in action.

Fear of being afraid is a constant fear of soldiers. 1712 L/Sgt John W. Sanderson, 1/8th, quoted 'A Soldier's Prayer' which he attributed to R. Tagore:

> "Lord, shelter me not from danger
> But give me courage to face it."[140]

10. Play activities, which were constantly indulged in, both on and off duty, and which provided release from accumulated psychological tensions. In addition to "horseplay", recognised games and recreations, including singing, there were gossiping and "kidding around" and, as a specific reaction to the continual deprivations of army life, grousing. A hypothesis continually put forward in the British Army at command level was that grousing, as long as it was not excessive, was a valuable means of maintaining morale, because it released pent-up emotion under conditions of frustration and so cheered up the participants. It was for this reason that trench newspapers were officially encouraged. A good illustration of the value of grousing is given by Alan Thomas.[141] The research findings of both I.L. Janis and A.M. Rose support this hypothesis; the former described grousing as another form of "kidding around" and remarked that it was "indulged in so frequently and so persistently that it is highly likely that it affords some psychological satisfaction."[142] Ex-ranker H. Elkin states that grouses were often earmarks of social solidarity and were used as remarks for establishing social contact,[143] as indeed they are commonly employed in present-day civil life. Taken out of living context, grouses are liable to misinterpretation and so can give rise to entirely erroneous impressions of soldiers' attitudes, as C.E. Montague's work Disenchantment shows only too clearly. As Antony Brett-James pointed out,

> "To hear the British soldier grousing at his most cheerful sometimes sounded to the uninitiated only one degree off open mutiny, but he was keeping his spirits up and demonstrating that he was still full of heart."[144]

Nor did the mocking content of many soldier's songs indicate their true feelings and attitudes: "They were not symptoms of defeatism, but strong bulwarks against it."[145] The apparent parody of "official values" in 'Fred Karno's Army', for instance, proves on closer scrutiny of the words to be a morale-booster.

11. The operational tour. The British soldier was constantly being moved about to different parts of the line and to different billets. Both continual moves and frequent reliefs decelerated the progressive process of attrition and placed limitations on stress. He had appreciably shorter periods in the line than, say, his German counterpart. An "Old Contemptible" recalled taking prisoner in 1917 two wounded Germans who were "shockingly dirty; it was obvious that they couldn't have bathed for months."[146] The German High Command tended to be indifferent to the suffering of their troops and left divisions in the

line until they were incapable of further effort.[147] Such treatment was morally repugnant to the British.[148]

12. Love for wives or sweethearts.[149] Symbols or representations of home assume exaggerated value to the soldier and he displays marked augmentation of sentimentality.[150] This explains why mail and parcels from home, Leeds newspapers and Leeds beer were so extraordinarily important for maintaining morale in the Leeds Rifles, why the Riflemen were so fond of singing love ballads and buying sentimental postcards, and why they named trenches after Leeds streets or Leeds itself. The invisible umbilical cords attaching Leeds-born Riflemen to Leeds and home were never severed.

13. Local support and local patriotism were important aids to morale for locally-raised units. W.L. Andrews wrote:

> "We were upheld by a feeling of spiritual oneness with the people of our own homes. Dundee was proud of us. There was no question of that ... we were a city's own, Dundee's very own, and her first thoughts every day were for us."

Local patriotism was said by Gibbs to have fired the men of the 47th(London) Division which distinguished itself at Loos:

> "It was to be London's day out. They were to fight for the glory of the old town ... They would show the stuff of London pride."[151]

14. Personal commitment to the war (see above).

15. Personal identification with the war (see above).

16. The consciousness of participating in great historical events and the consequent sense of exhilaration. 2430 L/Cpl Jack Espin, 1/8th, was very impressed to be informed on parade by his officer that "We are now where Blucher and Wellington were in the old days." 2222 William H Reynard, 8th, felt thrilled and very proud when he realised at Bucquoy that he was one of "The Thin Red Line" holding back the German hordes. Knowles too had a sense of history: "I think the Waterloo of the war will be fought shortly"; "We are where the fiercest bombardment ever known has just taken place."[152]

17. Army routine itself, by providing an ordered existence of purposeful activity, helped the men to keep going by defeating sloppiness and irresponsibility.[153]

18. The chauvinistically-biassed elementary school curriculum which tended to inculcate a sense of superiority of Britain and things British may have been an important aid to morale. School-children were "fully indoctrinated with the British Empire cult."[154] The maps of the world which hung on classroom walls were based on Mercator's Projection which considerably over-exaggerated the extent of the area coloured pink or red. History lessons tended to be dominated by popular British heroes like Arthur, Drake, Nelson, Wellington, King Henry V and the Black Prince. Certain of Shakespeare's great patriotic speeches - The Tragedy of King Richard II, Act II, sc. i, ll. 40-50; The Life of King Henry V, Act III, sc. i, ll. 1-34; Act IV, sc. iii, ll. 40-67 - were

often learnt by heart. Many German soldiers were said to be inspired by "the invincible German spirit".[155]

19. The fact that the soldier's physical horizons were so limited may have helped to conserve morale at some stages of the war. During the winter of 1917-18 the West Riding troops on Broodseinde Ridge could see many towns of the Belgian Plain and this gave them "a tremendous sense of superiority over the enemy." No man doubted the 49th Division's ability to hold the Ridge against any enemy attack. In spite of the appalling ground conditions and terrific artillery fire, the morale of the battalions remained excellent throughout the winter.[156] From the summit of La Montagne de Bligny the men of the 8th Bn, already flushed with the success of conquest, fancied they could see all the way to Germany[157] and this belief enhanced their high morale even further.

20. Associated with the conventional wisdom that people possess recognisable regional characteristics[158] is the popular folklore that some parts of the UK produce better soldiers than others. Dour Scots immediately spring to mind in this connection. Graves wrote: "The mess agreed dispassionately that the most dependable British troops were the Midland county regiments, industrial Yorkshire and Lancashire troops, and Londoners."[159] Lt Col Baynes wrote at some length on the influence of regional and national characteristics on the morale of troops.[160] The characteristics of the so-called typical Yorkshireman may well have contributed more than a little to the fighting qualities and morale of the two West Riding Territorial divisions. Generations of living in a harsh physical environment amidst the historical background of a hard industrial struggle had produced in the industrial areas of the West Riding a certain type of man: a born survivor, mentally tough and resilient; pugnatious; doggedly persistent, stubborn to the point of bloody-mindedness; capable of strenuous single-minded devotion to the task in hand; incredibly proud, unwilling to own any man as his equal, let alone his superior. Coal mining areas have always contained the type par excellence. The bloody-mindedness of the Yorkshire miner is legendary: he is a man "who carries independence almost to the point of rebellion, and is more sturdily jealous of any infringement upon his rights or liberties than the artisan of the city or the worker in the fields."[161]

21. Leeds Rifles respondents reported a high degree of satisfaction with their jobs. In view of everything that has been written about the dreary monotony of the infantryman's existence, this may seem surprising. Artillery respondents expressed a high degree of satisfaction and took great pride in their jobs. Their work had plenty of variety: drill was on the "change rounds" system in which every member of the team learned everyone else's work, so

that when casualties occurred there would always be men left able to take command or work the gun. As infantry work was the least interesting of all military work, factors other than the intrinsic nature of the work itself must be sought to account for the high degree of job satisfaction expressed by respondents. These seem to have been all closely associated with the battalions' high morale. (i) The very good social atmosphere: the importance of social atmosphere in job satisfaction is highlighted, for example, in the National Economic Development Office's report What the Girls Think! (1972). A happy man seldom complains about the monotony of his job. (ii) Outdoor jobs and teamwork jobs are hardly ever regarded as monotonous by the people who perform them. (iii) The men were in constant touch with each other, able to converse and joke. (iv) The interest of his superiors who gave the ranker words of encouragement and recognition increased his interest in the job.[162] (v) In the trenches there was no close supervision and every man knew what his job was and how important it was. (vi) Etzioni found that a high degree of personal commitment is positively associated with high intrinsic job satisfaction. (vii) Research has confirmed a positive correlation between inter-rank cohesion and job satisfaction.[163] (viii) The prestige of an elite regiment is a source of satisfaction to its members. Men in combat groups commanded by particularly popular officers derived extra satisfaction from the enviousness of others, "Rammy's men" of the 1/8th considering themselves the crème de la crème on these grounds alone.[164]

A popular piece of Army folklore concerns the sergeant who asks for four volunteers who are music-lovers and then orders them to shift a piano. The fact that large numbers of skilled men were employed in unskilled work in the armed services in WWII caused not only a very considerable and serious loss of effective manpower, but also much neurotic illness in the men concerned.[165] In the Leeds Rifles, however, every effort was made, as far as was possible, to utilise an individual's skills and abilities and place men in the most appropriate regimental employment. For example, civilian clerks and shorthand typists went to work in the Orderly Room. 2222 William H. Reynard, 1/8th, who had been trained in telegraphy to a high level of proficiency in civilian life, was asked if he would like to join the Signals section. Cobbler Rfm H.R. Varley, who was wounded in June 1915, was promoted to Sergeant-shoemaker when he returned to the 1/7th. Sgt Tommy Shimeld, the 1/8th Machine-gun Sergeant, was a typewriter mechanic. Tradesmen either had to have served a recognised apprenticeship or pass a trade test: regimental butchers were required to be fully proficient in dressing meat. The Transport sections naturally tried to get men experienced in horse management and driving, though no previous experience was needed for packhorse men. Percy Noble, Transport sergeant of the 2/8th, was a coal merchant. The Bombing sections sought men who were keen on cricket or on hard body-contact sports like rugby football: the 1/8th Sergeant, Arthur Sykes, was a professional Northern Rugby Union player and former light heavyweight boxing champion of the Household Brigade. Interestingly, while the rugby men tended to gravitate to the 1/8th Bombing Section, nearly all the boxers and soccer players of above-average talent in the 1/7th were to be found in the Transport Section (a fact which several respondents maintained was no coincidence). The Provost-Sergeants were chosen for their toughness and physically intimidating presence. 2008 Harry Ellis, 1/7th, was an industrial blacksmith; Sgt Ward, 2/7th, was a Leeds City policeman; Jack Eagers, 2/8th, was a professional Northern Rugby Union player and brother of the celebrated Hunslet forward; 2618 George Limbert, 1/8th, was a professional boxer who had taken the name of an American outlaw, Kid Currie, as his occupational pseudonym. He had been born and brought up in Leeds but had emigrated to the USA as a boy. He later enlisted in the US Navy and became its welterweight boxing champion. In June 1914 he came to England on tour and in September joined the Leeds Rifles in which several of his relatives were already serving. He spoke with a pronounced American accent and never smoked anything but large cigars. He was extremely unpopular and his men were said to have been "much more terrified of him than of the Germans" (though this is a popular soldiers' joke often made about provost-sergeants).[166]

Although certain of these factors and aids were more important perhaps than others, they have not been listed in ranking order, nor would it be possible to attempt to do so. Each one had a contribution to make to morale and they generally reinforced each other in a substantial and cumulative manner. Two in the "more important" category were humour and the carpe diem philosophy, which both represented good adjustment to stress, particularly the stress of combat.

Humour. Humour played a vital role in the maintenance of morale; in the worst conditions it often appeared to be the only thing that helped.[167] After the war the Germans held an investigation into the causes of morale and attributed much of the British soldier's staying power to his sense of humour.[168]

Humour is a natural response to a life of stress and danger and it is a necessity to people who are obliged to live in a confined social and physical space, since it allows a safe discharge of dangerous tensions. It enables them to achieve a measure of distance from their threatening experiences. That most percipient of observers, Philip Gibbs wrote:

> "Laughter and high spirits disguised the soldiers' real thoughts - their fear of being afraid, their hatred of the thought of death." "Laughter is an escape from terror, a liberation of the soul, by mental explosion, from the prison walls of despair and brooding." "They found a joke in grisly things which do not appeal humorously to sensitive men." "It was astonishing how loudly one laughed at tales of gruesome things, of war's brutality."

He often heard front-line men laughing "between explosive curses." He described the behaviour of off-duty officers who "showed no sign at all of apprehension or lack of nerve control": he noted

> "the rather deliberate note of hilarity with which they greeted their friends", the "gusts of laughter for no apparent cause", "their tendency to tell tales of horror as things that were very funny."[169]

Edward de Stein recalled

> "the perpetual sense of the ridiculous which, even under the most appalling conditions, never seemed to desert the men with whom I was privileged to serve, and which indeed seemed to flourish more freely in the mud and rain of the front line than in the comparative comfort of billets."[170]

"Ex-Private X" wrote,

> "One could always say light-hearted and stupid things even when one was frightened to death."[171]

Particularly important, as Gibbs noted, was the "funny man in every billet who played the part of court-jester, and clowned it whatever the state of the weather or the risks of war."[172] The 1/7th had its self-appointed "battalion-jester-cum-regimental-character" in Joe Ball, but all the Leeds Rifles battalions were well supplied with "funny men" of unfailing cheerfulness who were able to extract humour from hardships and make even the most despondent begin to feel less depressed. 1813 Stanley Holmes said: "My special pal, Charlie Lascelles, was a right comic. One day we got half buried by a shell and when they dug us out he said, 'By gow, that were a near 'un, Stanley'." The comic of 1182 Cpl Arthur Fisher's section was Billy Whitley who would say "daft" things to cheer up comrades such as, in cold weather, "Would anyone like a dollop of ice cream warmed up?" At Donna Nook where the fine sand clogged up everybody's rifles, he remarked cheerfully, "If the Jerries come, we'll just have to club 'em to death." Capt.H.R. Lupton, 1/8th, gave an example of the unfailing sense of humour of the Leeds Rifleman in the ugliest situation. In the early morning of 10th October 1917 he was lying on a stretcher outside Calgary Grange, a captured German pill-box that was being used as a forward dressing-station. Arrangements for the evacuation of wounded had temporarily broken down, for the ground conditions were appalling and the position was under constant "area" shellfire. Next to him was a Rifleman who had had one leg badly shattered. Suddenly a shell-splinter smashed into his other leg. "Ah, well", he said, "t'buggers may as well match", groaned loudly and died. Some NCOs, like Bugle-Major Jimmy Metcalfe, 1/7th, were themselves "funny men" and used their talents to comfort and bolster the morale of their men.[173] During "the first bad bombardment in the trenches", 3 shells landed over the breastworks near 53-year-old Sgt Wormald, the doyen of the 1/7th. He pretended to be very annoyed with the Germans for disturbing his sleep. He got up and shouted to the enemy, "If tha doan't mind, tha'll be laming sum on us. So Ah've telled thi."[174] ("If you aren't careful, you'll be injuring someone. So I've warned you.") Respondent Pte "Taffy" Phillips was one of the "funny men" in 148 Bde Machine-Gun Company. In the winter of 1915-16 he had learnt to clog dance on the trench grids to keep his feet warm. He would often entertain his comrades out of the line with a clog dance to the tune whistled, sung or played, of 'The more we are together, the happier we shall be': "It gave one such happiness to do one's best to cheer up such comrades when we were up against terrible conditions." He quoted an instance when the machine-gunners were going into action. As they started to advance he called out to his comrades "Come along, lads", took off his steel helmet and ostentatiously placed it over the front of his trousers. His comrades were so very amused by this clowning, he said, "that they forgot all the dangers of going over the top chasing Jerries."[175]

Capt. Gregory of the 2/6th WYR pointed out that humour was vital to the corporate life of a battalion because it strengthened its social fabric and built up its esprit de corps and was accordingly particularly valuable during training.

> "Some joke or humorous incident would spread like wildfire through the whole Battalion, and laughter would do more towards esprit de corps than any amount of training ... with a battalion, its inner personality does not consist in its smartness on parade, its discipline and other outward manifestations of the military spirit, important as those are, but in its good-humoured acquiescence in discomforts, in its general good nature and in its common appreciation of Regimental jests, and in all the little things that make up its life."[176]

Regimental life in the Leeds Rifles, in and out of the line, was rich in jokes. Two of the more celebrated concerned "Molly and the carrots" and the smell of chloride of lime that was mistaken for poison gas (see Chaps. 8 and 9). Jokes against authority held a perennial appeal, such as the one about the 1/7th sergeants who immediately donned their gas helmets when they heard a Yorkshireman shout "Garçon!". The 1/8th pack-horse that dropped dead had no name, only a number, 83. Later that night several men, including the Transport Sergeant, came back and told their comrades in the waggon lines about the wonderful meal of meat and vegetables, followed by coffee, they had just enjoyed at a house in the village. They let them go on at some length, then one Rifleman remarked, "I'll bet your supper was old 83". The whole battalion laughed about it for days.[177]

Misunderstandings and blunders made popular jokes. It was laid down in orders in 1915 that any unexploded bomb found had to be immediately buried. One was brought to a captain of the 1/8th "who had it buried straight away a good two feet down. Soon afterwards his landlady came round enquiring for her clock-weight ..." Another bomb story concerned the narrow escape from death of 2/Lt Alexander and his platoon when a trench mortar bomb dropped among them and did not explode. On investigation, the mysterious "dangerous-looking green ball" found lying "half-buried in mud" at the spot revealed itself to be a German shrapnel helmet.[178] Examples of official incompetence were always great jokes, particularly when the hated REs were involved. In the Fauquissart sector in 1917, near the intersection of Rifleman's Avenue and the Rue de Tilleloy, about 500 yards behind the front line, was a hollow and amazingly realistic-looking dummy tree that had been designed by an eminent Royal Academician, which was intended for use as an Observation Post. When the 49th Division arrived it was standing in a trench four feet deep in water and so was impossible to enter; moreover, it had been so fixed that no part of the German trenches could be seen from it.[179]

Perhaps into the category of regimental jokes came "The Incredible Exploits of the Incorrigible Rfm Capp, the Black Sheep of the Regiment", which in truth read like the script of a Hollywood serial and were declared by more than one respondent to be "as good as the pictures" and which, handed down by veterans to draftees like folk tales, made a significant contribution to morale by keeping the men of the 1/7th diverted and entertained throughout the battalion's entire term of active service. They even talked about him in PoW camps in 1918.[180]

The carpe diem philosophy. The soldier of satisfactory-to-high morale was well-adjusted to his condition and had ceased to worry about the future. He lived only for the moment and from one moment to the next. Wyn Griffith found that the Guardsman from whom he took trench instruction "measured life on a scale of comfort and not according to the possibility of its extinction."[181] This personal philosophy, which "forgot the peril or the misery that had passed and did not forestall the future by apprehension",[182] perhaps did more than anything else to help the individual maintain his mental stability and sense of equanimity. Many thought it the only way to achieve a full life.[183] From it developed the carpe diem philosophy. Life became intensified:

> "When pleasures were few they were snatched and enjoyed with an intensity such as no civilians knew. Respite for a week or a day from the fear of death gave absolute enjoyment for a week or a day."[184]

Off-duty all ranks over-indulged themselves, believing that over-indulgence was a cathartic sort of release of feelings.[185] Drinking and gambling were always prominent: Coppard thought that "carousing was the best medicine for battle-weary soldiers."[186] Capt. Tempest noted the faces of the audience at Tykes' concerts near the line:

> "the pathetic eagerness to be amused, and to forget everything: the intense way the men took their pleasures: in many cases the slight hysteria ..."[187]

Officers lived in style:

> "It was very much a case of eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow ye die."[188]

Gibbs noted that they dined and wined in Amiens

> "as though subconsciously they believed that this might be their last dinner in life, with good pals about them. They wanted to make the best of it - and damn the price."

He observed that RFC pilots, the group most at risk,

> "crowded in all life intensely in the hours that were given to them, seized all chance of laughter, of wine, of every kind of pleasure within reach."[189]

2/Lt F.W. May, B Coy, 1/7th, wrote:

> "Capt Stockwell had called a pow-wow of his officers following our first trip up the line as individuals under Instruction and suggested that, as the outlook for an infantry officer was dark and bleak, we might as well get organised and request our relatives at home to send each of us 6 officers one parcel of special edible luxuries per week, as in his opinion we might as well do the best possible for ourselves whilst we remained in the land of the living. Even when in the front line we contrived to dine about 7.30 p.m. and make the most of a 2- or 3-course meal followed by coffee."[190]

Likert's "System 4" syndrome of organisational characteristics. Judged according to modern conventional military wisdom, the Leeds Rifles battalions satisfied the criteria for high-performance, i.e. combat-effective, units. Morale was very high; both discipline and esprit de corps were strong; a high degree of social cohesiveness existed within the units; inter-rank relations were excellent; the units had, by current standards, been highly trained in the UK prior to despatch overseas. They also satisfied the great majority of the criteria laid down by Rensis Likert for high-performance work organisations which he describes as tightly-knit social systems whose highly-motivated members have come to know each other well and have learnt to work together in a co-operative and co-ordinated manner. He claims that a "System 4" organisation "can accomplish with great success almost anything it sets out to do." He sees the three basic concepts of his system as (1), the central principle of his system, the use by the manager of the principle of supportive relationships in which the superior-subordinate relationship is crucial, (2) his use of group decision-making and group methods of supervision; and (3) the setting for the organisation of high-performance goals.[191]

Despite the extremely limited opportunities which presented themselves for group-decision making and the obvious fact that the economic reward aspect of motivation was inapplicable, the first-line Leeds Rifles battalions appeared to present what was essentially the System 4 syndrome of organisational characteristics. On the basis of both respondents' testimony and documentary evidence, it is suggested that the battalions possessed the following profile of organisational characteristics. (The numbers in brackets refer to the corresponding characteristic listed by Likert in his Table 2-1, pp. 4-10 and Appendix II, pp. 197-211).

Superiors and subordinates had complete confidence and trust in each other in all matters (1(a), 1(b)). Superiors displayed supportive behaviour towards subordinates fully and in all situations (1(c)). Subordinates felt completely free to discuss all aspects of the job and any personal or welfare problems with their immediate superior (1(d)). Certain immediate superiors, particularly platoon commanders, frequently sought subordinates' ideas and opinions in order to make constructive use of them (1(e)). Full use was made of both ego (desire for status, affiliation, and achievement) and group motivational forces (2(a)). Attitudes toward the organisation and its goals were strongly favourable, and personnel at all levels felt responsibility for the organisation's goals and behaved in ways to implement them (2(c), 2(e)). All members of the organisation had favourable, co-operative attitudes towards other members (2(f)). There was high, or relatively high, satisfaction throughout the organisation with regard to membership of the organisation, to supervision, and to one's own achievements (2(g)). A great deal of interaction and communication with both individuals and groups aimed at achieving the organisation's objectives (3(a)). Information flowed down, up and sidewards with peers. Very little information on sideward communication emerged. Rumour tended to flourish when there was no information to pass on (3(b), 3(e)). Superiors, subject to the exigencies of the situation, willingly shared information with subordinates. Communications were generally accepted (3(c)). (In units of poor morale they were rejected outright, viewed with suspicion, or accepted in a spirit of cynicism.) Upward communication via NCOs was more than adequate: officers and senior NCOs knew what their men were thinking. NCOs felt considerable responsibility in communicating all relevant information from their combat group. There appeared to be no forces at work to distort information and so deceive superiors. On the contrary, there existed powerful forces to communicate accurately and honestly. Subordinates were thus able to exert some influence on the goals, methods, and activity of their different groups (3(d), 4(c)). Superiors and subordinates were usually very close psychologically:

there was extensive friendly interaction. The superior invariably knew and understood the problems of subordinates very well, and perceptions by superiors and subordinates of each other were usually quite accurate (3(f), 4(a)). The amount of co-operative teamwork was very substantial throughout the organisation (4(b)). The command structure did not enable any one part of the organisation to exert disproportionate influence upon other parts (4(e)), as often happens in business organisations. Regarding the character of the decision-making process (5), major decisions affecting the organisation were made outside the organisation and decisions, not always autonomous, were allowed only on day-to-day administration of the organisation. Decisions within a limited prescribed framework could be made at lower levels within the battalion. The organisation decision-makers were well aware of problems, such as sickness, state of morale, within the organisation, particularly those at lower level, and these were communicated to the decision-makers above them, i.e. at Brigade HQ. Regarding the character of goal-ordering (6), goals were usually set outside the organisation. All levels of the hierarchy strove to achieve high-performance goals. Goals were fully accepted, both overtly and covertly; there were no forces present to resist or even reject goals. There was a powerful informal social structure present but it was co-extensive with the formal organisation. They were one and the same, hence all the social forces in the organisation supported the efforts to achieve its goals.

Of the four battalions, only the second-line units were recognised by higher command as high-performance units and only the 8th Bn was able to achieve its full potential. Often sheer luck decided a unit's or a division's reputation: perhaps it happened to be in the right condition and in the right place at the right time, like the 62nd Division at Cambrai; or perhaps it happened to fall victim to a cruel combination of adverse circumstances, like the 49th Division at St. Pierre-Divion. Moreover, the concept of the high-performance unit, its identification and its proper employment, did not appear to figure significantly in the thinking of higher command at Corps level and beyond. Though it is evident that some units were more frequently employed in active sectors and in active operations than others,[192] this does not necessarily indicate an optimum utilisation of available manpower. Selection of formations appeared often to be based on military elitism, ingrained prejudice, or mere expediency. Although the "old" Regular Army possessed no monopoly of high-performance units, the majority, if not all, of its battalions were perhaps over-used. Many TF battalions were often employed below their potential, and some, e.g. 5th Border Regt., were completely wasted by being turned into pioneer battalions. Fortune and circumstance denied the 49th Division the chance of a headline-grabbing victory. Capt. Tempest wrote: "Its work was magnificent: its spirit unbroken: but there was no opportunity for any great and inspiring feat of arms"[193] as several times fell to the lot of the 62nd Division.

14.5 Morale-Sapping, -Destroying Factors

Certain factors tended to weaken or break down individual morale. Some appear rather obvious, like the loss of close friends, environmental and deprivational stresses,[194] infrequent reliefs, and in particular not knowing when relief would take place. Poor leadership, especially inconsistent leadership, within the group was highly destructive of both individual and group morale.

Fatigue caused by sleep deprivation lowered morale. General Jack was so overcome with fatigue and numbed with cold and rain during the 1914 Retreat that he scarcely cared what happened.[195] The extremes to which such fatigue can drive troops is shown by the example of the survivors of the 1st Royal Warwicks and the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers who, during the Retreat, arrived at St. Quentin so exhausted and so thoroughly demoralised that the Mayor was able to persuade them to wait for the Germans and surrender.[196]

Although memories of home, family and loved ones could be a great source of strength, men were occasionally, or chronically, assailed "with a deadly nostalgia."[197] The most heart-rending scenes took place on the railway platform at Leeds every night when the 10 p.m. "weeping train", so-called because it was almost exclusively used by servicemen returning from leave, was about to depart.

One less obvious, specialised, factor was the demoralising effect of living in captured German dugouts and tunnels. "Ex-Private X" indeed wrote of "the celebrated dugout disease."[198] The feeling of absolute security engendered was so strong that their British occupants needed all their will power to leave them.[199] "You felt too secure in them, you relaxed too much. Then when you came out, you felt terrified. You couldn't screw your nerves up again, so you went to pieces."[200] Another was over-reliance on "popular" religion. It was a double-edged weapon: although its beliefs and practices could be helpful, too often they appeared as a fifth column which insiduously but effectively destroyed what little inner resources the man had left. Capt Wilkinson's death at Poelcappelle had a particularly depressing effect on the survivors, who had regarded him as a "lucky mascot" (see below).

Strangely, none of the authorities on military morale give much attention to frustration which industrial studies have amply demonstrated to be a frequent major factor in poor morale. A prime cause of frustration is unsatisfactory leadership which commonly produces a climate of resentment, grievance and general dissatisfaction which is manifested particularly by a poor social atmosphere and poor inter-rank relations.

14.6 The role of Religion in Morale

The alcohol and tobacco used by front-line soldiers can be seen as essential narcotics which made life appear momentarily tolerable and blotted out some of the horrors of everyday. Gambling was a further means of escape from harsh reality. As boosters of individual morale they were of limited and transient value. Of far greater and more lasting and more constant value was "religion". Dr R. Sobel found that church-orientated religion had a definite role to play as a defence against anxiety, many of his patients saying that "if it weren't for prayer they would have found it difficult to keep going."[201] Maj. Gen. Richardson firmly believes that religious faith is "a strong component of high morale" and "a war-winning factor", and he lists "sound religious beliefs and moral principles" among the more important factors that sustain personal morale. F.M. Slim pointed out that institutional religion "is and always has been one of the greatest foundations of morale."[202] These were, traditionally, the views of the Army leadership, which recognised the warrior's desire for spiritual fortification before battle.[203] Religion, defined as "a system of beliefs or doctrines of faith", takes several forms, of which institutional religion is only one. In combination they form perhaps the most important, the most essential component of morale.

Particularly during periods of intense anxiety and consequent insecurity, religion appears to fulfil a basic psychological need. There seems to be an especial need to believe in the existence of a supernatural control over man's earthly environment, whether it is named God, Providence, Nature, Fortune, or Fate. Research has established the very long-standing co-existence with official, i.e. organised or church-orientated, religion embodying church-related religious beliefs, of unofficial or unorthodox religion, the widespread "popular", "folk" or "common" religion which is part of popular culture.[204] J. Obelkevich describes the latter as not an organised cult but a collection of

> "non-institutional religious beliefs and practices, including unorthodox conceptions of Christian doctrine and ritual ... it can best be understood as an amalgam, a loose combination of unofficial Christianity and a rather larger measure of pagan 'survivals' ... popular religion had no creed, liturgy, or corporate identity; indeed to call it a religion is misleading: it was not a religion among other religions but rather a congeries of religious phenomena."

Nevertheless, in persons whose official religion had been formed in the Sunday and day schools rather than in the family and not by adult worship in church or chapel, "popular" religious beliefs and practices tended to assume dominance over others. To the poor and ignorant, Christianity may well have appeared as a better and more powerful form of magic. Obelkovich found that in 19th century Lincolnshire virtually every feature of the Anglican faith was treated as a mere packet of magical power at the disposal of anyone who cared to exploit it.[205] To the non-practising nominal Christian, prayer is a method of coping with misfortune at times of personal crisis.

The Leeds Rifleman on active service, in common with the majority of soldiers, was simultaneously exposed to the influence of 4 separate but nevertheless inter-related and inter-dependent "religions": institutional religion, "popular" religion, "the front-line soldier's religion and "the religion of the Regiment." Their respective boundaries blurred and merged into one another. For example, the insiduous influence of pagan elements of popular religion, such as beliefs in luck, talismans and portents, particularly on men of Protestant upbringing, can frequently be noted. Capt. Eric F. Wilkinson, 1/8th, was a committed Christian who had no fear of death and was ready and willing to die for his country, yet many of his published poems show that he considered his chances of surviving the war were remote[206] and he had a premonition of his own death (see below). Since the soldier was much more dependent on and in much closer contact with the forces of nature than the average civilian, a resurgence of paganism in his beliefs was to be expected.

In the inter-war period the Great War was stigmatised as the chief agent of Britain's apostasy. S.P. Mews examined the popular thesis that the war had driven people from the Christian religion: he found the evidence contradictory.[207] It was claimed during the war that a religious revival was under way among the troops at the front, but both Mews and A.B. Wilkinson[208] concluded that such claims were over-optimistic and based on wishful thinking. Statements such as that made by Lt Col H. Page Croft MP, who returned from the Front in 1915 and told the House that "In half an hour of an intense action I have seen more Christianity, more elevation, and more nobility than I have seen in the rest of my life",[209] were seized on by contemporaries as evidence supporting such claims. As far as institutional religion was concerned, the conclusions of Mews and Wilkinson cannot be gainsaid. The 1918 Church Council on War Problems estimated that as many as 70% of soldiers were "alienated from Christianity".[210]

As far as "religion" in the broadest sense was concerned, however, the claims were not at all exaggerated. Service in the war zone undoubtedly engendered a greatly enhanced religiosity.[211] Soldiers had an immense spiritual need for a religion of some kind to cling to. In common with occupational groups that worked in conditions of danger at the mercy of the forces of nature, such as coal miners and deep sea fishermen, soldiers were remarkably susceptible and responsive to religious influences.

Despite the inherent difficulties of reconciling Christianity with the use of military force, service in the forward zone was in many respects favourable to institutional religion. Narrow escapes from death were frequently viewed as "a deliverance": a soldier could easily become convinced that God or Providence was on his side. The doctrine of providences thus became a morale-booster of some consequence. Horace Calvert, Grenadier Guards:

> "During my school days I attended a Church of England day school and the Sunday School where I had guidance of how to live a Christian life and to pray. During the war I am sure my prayers were answered. I survived many dangerous situations when other comrades did not. I felt a protective atmosphere or influence around me and it made me lift up my heart and mind to God whom I know had answered my prayers. I noticed the men in Holy Orders who were commissioned who, without thought for their safety, so freely gave help, comforted the dying and were cheerful in the darkest hours when endurance was stretched to its limits. This made me realise that God, through them, was playing a very important part in my life and it was right to believe in God and to continue praying."[212]

In August 1915, after he had been struck by several shrapnel bullets which smashed his razor and his brass cigarette box and tore his tunic to ribbons, Rfm Robert Nugent of the 1/7th wrote to his wife:

> "It must have been God's will that I escaped, because I have not a mark on me. A number were killed and wounded at the time ... After this I do not think I shall have to go under;"[213]

he survived the war. 1987 Sydney Appleyard, 1/7th, described how he became convinced of the existence of a Guardian Angel:

> "We had not been in France very long: it was our second or third time in the trenches. Every so far along the trench was a 'firing point' which was a bullet-proof steel plate with a hole to put the end of the rifle through and a little door to close it when not in use. Behind the German lines was a farmhouse and being a kid of 17, I liked to make use of a firing point to fire at the roof and see the dust fly. A German sniper must have spotted where the shots were coming from, and whilst I was sighting for another shot a bullet hit the plate and it was so close to the hole that a bit of the bullet fell on my side. Needless to say, I promptly shut the little door. Well, I was not afraid because I thought some Power had saved me, and instead of it depressing me, I was buoyed up.
> At the Battle of Aubers Ridge we were ordered to lay on top of the parapet and give rapid fire on the German line. Eventually, when back in the trench, I found a bullet had gone clean through my cap and the track of it could be seen by a streak burnt out of the lining. I got the same buoyancy then - I was sure I had a guardian angel. Up in the Salient I had a machine-gun bullet go through my left breast pocket, cutting some Woodbines in half. These near-misses with bullets, and two dugouts blown up when I'd just left them, instead of instilling fear into me, did the exact opposite."[214]

Many Riflemen carried the pocket New Testament and the knife, fork and spoon in the left breast pocket as a protection against bullets, and stories were told of men being saved from death or wounding thereby.[215] 1880 David W. Young, 1/7th, had such a miraculous escape: a bullet passed through each of the eating implements in turn and lodged in his Bible (these were produced for inspection). Anglican ordinand 2453 Henry Thackray, 1/8th, kept his prayer book/hymnal inside the lining of his cap. Two bullets passed through the book, destroying it without harming him; his comrades were extremely impressed.[216] The numerous crucifixes in ruined churches and wayside calvaries that had escaped destruction, apparently miraculously, impressed many soldiers as symbols of the immunity of Christianity.[217] A particular legend grew round the famous Hanging Golden Virgin of Albert: it was widely believed that her fall would presage the imminent end of the war. The statue was maintained in its precarious position by steel hawsers.[218]

Many committed Christians found in their faith a great source of strength. 3500 William Hall, 1/4th KSLI, wrote in his reminiscences:

> "I had been brought up in a Christian home, and what thoughts passed through my mind, knowing that, whatever happened now, death had been overcome and life did not end on any battlefield ... With these thoughts fear vanished, and I had a Companion always."[219]

Several respondents were comforted by the words of the 23rd Psalm;[220] others also mentioned the 91st Psalm, which seems to have been intended for the citizen-turned-combat soldier. General Jack was convinced that church parades helped "to screw up one's sense of duty",[221] but Capt. H.R. Lupton, 1/8th, did not think they were of appreciable moral significance, though he was willing to concede they improved morale if only because they effected a considerable smartening-up of the men.[222] According to respondents, church parades in the Leeds Rifles were not in the least unwelcome. Hymn singing was particularly popular and frequently practised. Not only were familiar hymns and prayers a link with home, childhood and Mother,[223] but men found the words themselves comforting as well as offering advice on how to cope with daily problems. CSM 2290 Joe Carter, 1/7th, supplied the following experience told in the third person:

> "A youth of 19 lay in a trench. His companion saw little hope for him - his wounds were terrible, he had lost both his eyes. His lips were moving. His companion leaned over him, and softly heard the words of the beautiful Sunday School hymn, 'There is a friend for little children, above the bright blue sky.' And on these last words he died."[224]

Riflemen believed in an after-life. Their conception of the after-life was a soldiers' heaven: the average Rifleman envisioned an idealised continuation of life on earth, reunited with all the comrades he had loved.[225] Many respondents referred to this. Respondents also stressed the importance of the necessity of funeral rites.[226] To be buried without the funeral service and without the marker of a wooden cross was completely abhorrent to the Rifleman. He desired to honour the dead, and he found non-burial or partial burial distressing. 2430 Cpl Jack Espin, 1/8th, was upset when Rfm Levi Fearnley's grave was dug too small in the frozen ground and his body had to be squashed into it.[227] The men liked to have the Burial Service read and a special prayer said for the dead (although the Church of England had frowned on explicit prayers for the departed at the beginning of the war and did not give them official sanction until 1917).[228] Bunches of flowers or wreaths of evergreens would be put on the graves whenever possible. A full funeral service conducted by the padre and attended by the whole platoon, such as that given to 15-year-old 2724 Gavin Browning Cathcart of Woodhouse,[229] was naturally preferred, if conditions permitted, but if not, the service and prayers would be read by an NCO or a subaltern. Wesleyan CSM Carter had always carried the Book of Common Prayer for this purpose since being promoted corporal.

The essential elements of Christianity dominated both "the front-line soldier's religion" and "the religion of the Regiment". The former was a development from "working-class Christianity", which was a code of practical everyday ethics, a repository of good rules for community life, a Christianity without Christ: "It was popularly understood to mean that a Christian was defined by his moral qualities - that he was fair, honest, unselfish - all of which were possible without attending church."[230] The allied concepts of "the good neighbour" and "good fellowship" were regarded by F. Zweig as "the real religion" of the working man .[231] The "front-line soldier's religion" was dominated by the Christian teachings of St. John 15:13 ("Greater love hath no man than this ...") St. Matthew 25:35-36 ("I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink ..."), St. Luke 10:27 and Leviticus 19:18 ("Love thy Neighbour as thyself"), Romans 12:10 ("Be kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love" and Genesis 4:9 ("Am I my brother's keeper?"). Men shared everything they had with comrades. They would go without water, say, to give it to the wounded. The spirit of complete unselfishness and self-sacrifice was often in evidence. Many stories have been told of men being killed or wounded whilst attempting to rescue wounded comrades or to retrieve bodies for burial. An idealistic desire for self-sacrifice is very evident in some published poetry and letters.[232]

It was "front-line religion", not institutional Christianity, to which Lt Col Page Croft MP was referring. Of it, Sidney Rogerson wrote:

> "In spite of all differences in rank, we were comrades, brothers, dwelling together in unity. We were privileged to see in each other that inner, ennobled self which in the grim, commercial struggle of peacetime is all too frequently atrophied for lack of opportunity of expression. We could note the intense affection of soldiers for certain officers, their absolute trust in them. We saw the love passing the love of women of one 'pal' for his 'half section' ... We were privileged, in short, to see a reign of goodwill among men, which the piping times of peace, with all their organised charity, their free meals, free hospitals, and Sunday sermons have never equalled. Despite all the propaganda for Christian fellowship and international peace, there is more animosity, uncharitableness, and lack of fellowship in one business office now than in a brigade of infantry in France then. Otherwise, we could never have stood the strain."[233]

2815 Harry Richmond, 1/7th, an under-age soldier, said:

> "There wasn't a good deal of orthodox religion in the line, but there was a very great deal of genuine Christian feeling amongst us. Once you'd been in the front line together and seen your friends getting wounded or killed, you all had this shared experience. You had this invisible bond of shared experience, a deep love for your comrades surpassing, greatly surpassing, the love of women, which drew you all together. We always did everything we could to help each other. Previous differences or barriers all disappeared, we'd become as one. Even after the war you'd do anything to help an old comrade. If that isn't true Christianity I don't know what is."

Edward Flatley, 1/7th, said:

> "The brotherly love and friendship in the 7th were truly wonderful. It's funny how such a dreadful thing as war draws you so very close together. We really did love one another, just like the Holy Bible teaches."[234]

These extracts support the received wisdom that war has an extraordinary power to create satisfying and purposeful community life. They also support the views of Max Weber who, in a paper published in November 1915, compared the brotherliness of combat troops and religion. He maintained that war

> "makes for an unconditionally devoted and sacrificial community among the combatants and releases an active mass compassion and love for those who are in need. And, as a mass phenomenon, these feelings break down all the naturally given barriers of association. In general, religions can show comparable achievements only in heroic communities professing an ethic of brotherliness. The community of the army standing in the field today feels itself ... to be a community unto death, and the greatest of its kind."

He felt that the soldier

> "can believe that he knows he is 'dying' for something", and referred to "this location of death" as being "within a series of meaningful and consecrated events."[235]

The editor of the 1919 report, 'The Army and Religion', Dr D.S. Cairns, was greatly struck by the importance attached by his respondents to the remarkable brotherliness of the front-line.[236] Everyone who experienced it, however, and not merely army chaplains, felt that, to use Dr Cairns' phrase, they had "got hold of something worth keeping." Many Leeds Rifles spoke feelingly on the topic. 1610 Thomas Doran, 1/8th, another under-age soldier, said:

> "If only the wonderful comradeship had lasted after the war we'd really have had a land fit for heroes to live in. But when the war ended, it all vanished and all the unselfishness and generosity and consideration for other people - the true Christian spirit of brotherly love - with it."[237]

Many respondents, particularly the church and chapel attenders, recognised the "front-line soldier's religion" for what it essentially was, non-institutional practical Christianity. It was clearly an integral part of morale and was strongly developed in units of high morale, and weak in units of low morale. This may help to explain some of Mews' contradictory findings: 'The Army and Religion' report revealed that some Christians completely lost their faith and that army chaplains were frequently riddled with doubts; there were, on the other hand, many spiritual reawakenings. The number of clergymen who realised their vocation whilst serving in the army was "quite remarkable"; some were men from outside the social strata from which the clergy were usually recruited.[238] To judge from respondents' testimony, a letter published in the Western Morning News on 1st February 1916, quoted by Mews, appears to encapsulate the effects of active service on the average participant. According to the writer, who signed himself "Subaltern", the religious man became more deeply religious, whilst those with a mere veneer of religion drifted away from the church and its teachings.[239]

The church and chapel attenders agreed unreservedly with this appraisal. Only one respondent claimed that his war experiences had alienated him from institutional religion: he had never previously attended church, chapel or even Sunday school; he came from a lower working-class one-parent family; he was not a Leeds man and joined the 1/7th in the field as a replacement after the minimum period of basic training. The respondents of religious upbringing reported that their faith had increased; one 1/8th respondent had been so impressed by the example set by the two Anglican ordinands in his platoon, W.E. Worsley and F.W. Smith, that he became a Christian; one 1/7th respondent renounced Judaism and became a convert to Anglicanism. All the candidates for the ministry in the Regiment who survived duly became ordained after the war; W.E. Worsley sought and obtained appointments in the Leeds area so that he could become the Leeds Rifles' chaplain, a post he held until retirement. 2024 Cpl Christopher Wall, 1/7th, became a prominent lay-preacher and seriously contemplated entering the ministry.[240]

Respondent Pte Thomas ("Taffy") H. Phillips, 148 Bde Machine Gun Company, 49th Division, had a religious experience which illustrates both the altruism of the "front-line soldier's religion" and the value of firm religious beliefs to the individual soldier. On the evening of 21st July 1917 he was sharing a small cellar in Nieuport with his best friend, Cpl Fred Riley (ex-Leeds Rifles). Shells of all calibres were raining down in "an inferno of fire." Terrible screams for help started to come from about 150 yards away. "Taffy" decided he must go to the rescue of these men, despite the shelling, and he was given permission to leave his post. He had not been long enough in Nieuport to discover the whereabouts of the RAMC Advance Dressing Station. The bursting shells dazzled him and it was impossible for him to see his way through the ruins amid the clouds of smoke while wearing his gas mask so he removed it. As he picked his way through the craters and piles of rubble he was praying to God to help him find the RAMC and singing the hymn "Hark, Hark my soul, Angelic songs are swelling."

> "Suddenly it seemed that three young angels appeared above the shells bursting all around me and guided me to the Advanced Dressing Station about 450 yards away, and some wonderful Divine Power took safe charge of me."

On arrival he explained to the stretcher bearers that the wounded were in the open about 600 yards away and told them he would have to lead them there without his mask. The four stretcher bearers and their NCO, all wearing masks, followed him without delay, and he led them to and fro, all the time continuing to sing hymns, until all the wounded had been safely brought in. He then left without giving his name and number. A few hours later gas poisoning symptoms appeared and by 7 a.m. he had gone blind, his voice had gone and his skin was covered in blisters. All his clothing and the personal possessions he was carrying at the time, including his English language hymnal, being heavily contaminated, had to be burnt. He made an excellent recovery, his health suffering no permanent impairment. His sight returned in about 3 months and he was able to rejoin his company, where he learnt that all the stretcher bearers he had led that night had been "very highly decorated."[241]

Both "the front-line soldier's religion" and "the religion of the Regiment" could be called religions because they fulfilled the sociological role of a religion. Sociologists have long held that religion plays an important part in determining and reinforcing the values which constitute the goals of man's social behaviour. The sociological role of religion is mainly an integrative one, binding together members in society and tending to conserve social values. A necessary counterpart to the integrating role is its functional contribution to the socialisation of the individual members of society.[242] "The religion of the Regiment" had many characteristics in common with institutional religion. It possessed an explicit moral code and sought to instil in its members the general principles of conduct and a consistent moral outlook. Its most important aspect as a religion was the building of confidence among its members. It coped with nearly all the ordinary exigencies of life on active service: the members of the "community unto death" knew they could rely completely on each other. It had at least as many public rites and ceremonies as the Church. It held an eternal message of hope and optimism, however grim the current situation: the Regiment is inviolable, it lives for ever.[243] The testimony of 2221 George A. Fletcher, 1/8th, gives some insight into the power of "the religion of the Regiment", here the 1/6th WYR: in April 1918, now a Lewis-gunner, he watched, thoroughly sick at heart, the spectacle of the battalion he knew to be the 1/7th being completely overwhelmed on Kemmel Ridge and taken prisoner.

> "A shiver ran down my spine. I thought, 'We've really had it this time', but my comrades in the 6th didn't seem too bothered by it. 'Oh, stop worrying. We've been in situations just as bad as this before and we've come through all right' was their attitude."[244]

"Popular" religion essentially provided the individual soldier with forms of psychic self-defence with which he could protect himself against the development of anxiety. It slipped smartly into all the gaps left by the three genuine religions. In the civilian sphere, orthodox Christianity had failed to oust or even to subjugate popular religion which, dominated by pagan beliefs in luck (both good and bad), fate and destiny, and riddled with superstition, was widespread in the poorer classes who, living in a hostile universe, sought methods of combatting or placating the invisible malignant forces ranged against them.[245] In these circumstances, those persons who were, or believed themselves to be, the least able to control their physical and social environment could be expected to be the most superstitious. There is ample evidence that popular religion gains ground and superstitious beliefs and practices increase in periods of great anxiety, such as war. Stories of supernatural deliverances, notably the legend of the Angels of Mons, obtained wide credence in Britain during World War I.[246] According to Gilbert Murray, one effect of the Great War was "to discourage the higher kind of religion and immensely strengthen the lower."[247]

Magical practices, such as carrying mascots, or wearing protective amulets, provided a sort of safety-valve.[248] Though objectively ineffectual, subjectively they comforted the practitioner and bolstered his morale.[249] Although he was wounded three times, the last time quite seriously, Maurice Shaffner, 2/7th, felt immune from death because he wore inside his shirt holy parchment scrolls containing certain passages from the Scriptures sent to him by his Rabbi in Leeds.[250] A feature of combat units were the human "regimental lucky mascots" such as Capt. Eric Wilkinson of the 1/8th who had had so many hair-breadth escapes that everyone had become convinced he had a charmed life.[251] Pte "Taffy" Phillips, who claimed that after 5 or 6 months at the front he had "developed into a very hard, tough soldier and did not know the meaning of the word 'Fear'", said, "I knew I was never to be killed, so I always used to be the first to volunteer for most of the dangerous jobs going." As his comrades regarded him "as the fellow Jerry could not put out of action", they adopted him as their lucky mascot and "always wanted to keep close to me whenever things were at their worst."[252]

Knowles regarded himself as "extra lucky" and during the Battle of the Somme cited the following "evidence".

> "There is three of us in a dugout having our breakfast when a piece of shell flew in and smashed a biscuit to smithereens. We finish breakfast and go down the road to a well for a wash - a shell burst over us and wounded a lad next to me."[253]

Fantasies of immunity or invulnerability materially contributed to the soldier's psychic defences in mastering his fear.[254] Some men had become convinced of their own invulnerability following narrow escapes.[255] Others felt protected by supernatural power, like Rfm Shaffner, Pte Phillips, and R.L. Scott, author of God is My Co-Pilot (1943). 2/Lt J.R. Bellerby, 1/8th, who had an arm blown off in 1917, said,

> "For a considerable part of the war I experienced a sense of virtual immunity. I don't mean that I had no fear. A form of claustrophobia made me afraid of being trapped underground in a dugout, and my deepest horror was of being taken prisoner. But when neither of these risks was present I was buoyed up by the sense that I was not destined to be a billet for a bit of steel."[256]

One respondent knew he was invulnerable because, being the seventh son of a seventh son, he had "the second sight."[257]

The petitionary prayer of individuals at moments of intense personal difficulty or danger, when all else had failed, gave them moral strength and also allayed anxiety by mitigating their feelings of helplessness: "Not many of us are religious in the true sense of the word though a lot of us turn to God for help and comfort when we are afraid: that does not make us religious"; "It is shells everywhere. I am trusting to God to pull me through ... I know a lot of men here before the war were great sinners but I know that they often pray now, it is the time the Germans are shelling our trenches that they think there is a God";[258] "I say my little prayers when I'm in a blue funk";[259] Cpl Espin's diary entry for October 3rd 1915 reads: "Harry and I are lucky; trench mortar fell between us and never burst. Harry prayed to God."[260] As the cynical WWII saying had it, "There are no atheists in foxholes." N. Abercrombie et al. found among their respondents a relatively high belief in the efficacy of prayer, especially of "saying a little prayer."[261] Much of the prayer may have been essentially a mode of adjustment to situations of stress and unpredictable circumstances entirely beyond the control of the individual and if so, should properly be classified as "popular" religion rather than an institutional religious practice.

Men unable to place their confidence in the protective benevolence of a magical or supernatural power accepted the likelihood of death or maiming with a fatalistic resignation. Fatalism is frequently regarded as the soldier's normal personal philosophy,[262] though it seems not to be generally realised that beliefs in "fate" and in "luck" are incompatible.[263] There are many references to fatalism in the literature, and particularly to the age-old soldier's belief of the bullet or shell that bears the name or number of the recipient.[264] Lt F.W. Smith, 1/8th, wrote a poem about it: 'A Bit of Advice'.[265] Fatalism allays anxiety and controls fear by holding that worry is pointless since the future is pre-ordained and therefore inevitable:

> "There were many songs and sayings that gave expression to this mood of resignation", wrote Sir Herbert Read. "I believe that it was only possible to endure prolonged periods of dread by means of a stoical acceptance of one's fate."[266]

It seemed evident from respondents' testimony that "popular" religion was a function of low and failing group and individual morale, expanding to fill the gaps left by shrinking esprit de corps.[267] Fatalism was the last refuge of the war-weary. 2607 Walter Atkinson, 1/7th:

> "We were there to do a job of work, and we accepted all the dangers that went with the job. They were there, we couldn't avoid them, so we had to make the best of it. Getting your friends killed was something you took for granted. We were all full of superstitions, like not accepting promotion if it meant missing leave. Some chaps even had premonitions about getting killed. We got very fatalistic. We didn't care any more, and that's why we were able to stick it."

Pte Edward Bilton, 2nd KOYLI,

> "At first, you felt timid, but as you got more experienced and more confident, you lost all fear. I felt there wasn't one with my name on. As more and more time went on, you were getting worn-out and war-weary, and you felt you couldn't care whether you got killed or not, so you still didn't feel frightened."[268]

(R.B. Talbot Kelly, RFA, wrote that "tiredness and mental strain eliminate all but the most acute terrors. The senses grow numbed through overwork.")[269] A survey undertaken among veteran enlisted men of the US infantry in the Pacific theatre in 1944 of the "thoughts which helped them when the going was tough" showed that the "more frightened" men (those suffering more from combat stress) were much more likely to say "prayer helped a lot" than were the "less frightened"; the data established a definite relationship between stress and reliance on prayer. Significantly, those who said they were helped a lot by prayer "were reliably more likely than other men to have been replacements" (who were less self-confident and had fewer inner resources for coping with stress.)[270]

Standard features of "popular" religion were beliefs in oracles, divination and omens. The men of the Leeds Rifles, being confident of both the outcome of the war and the inviolability of the Regiment, had no religious need for these. Portents of death, however, were very numerous, and were taken very seriously, however implausible they were objectively, as they were in many other units.[271] Many stories of premonitions were told: four strange examples of the phenomena of apparent foreknowledge of imminent death follow:

The night before the Battle of Poelcappelle Capt Wilkinson told 2812 Cpl Percy Shepherd, with whom he had served in the 1/8th for over 3 years: "That was the last good dinner I shall ever eat, Percy." A Coy Bugler 2891 Charles Edward Hannan marched alongside CSM Connors and his platoon officer, Lt Hartnell, on the long march from Belgium into France in June 1915. On 30th June, "as we passed the frontier marker Mr Hartnell said, 'I shall never see France again'." He was killed by a shell on 16th July.

> "No one was surprised when Hartnell went", recalled 2/Lt Bellerby. "He changed from general cheerfulness to a condition of being oppressed by the sense of something impending. His depression lasted for a fortnight or so before his death. He quite obviously knew the end was close - the odd phrase, say, about wishing it were his turn for leave, became unusually frequent."

4158 Sgt George S. Ibbitson, 1/7th, recounted the following incident which took place on 20th December 1917:

> "I was returning from leave and was detailed to stay in Ypres until nightfall along with more men who were also returning from leave. I happened to be in conversation with a L/Cpl Herbert Dixon when we were both warned to go up the line at dusk. This would be about lunch time. Straight away poor Dixon said, 'It is always leave men that get killed.' Naturally I replied that I had been on leave before and I was still here. However, he couldn't be persuaded any differently. He got so agitated that he was putting the wind up me, not that that took much doing. However, the time came to proceed up to the front line. We got as far as Zonnebecke with very little shellfire. We were then to go forward to the end of F Track and thence to our respective platoons. We were a few hundred yards up the duckboards when Jerry dropped a salvo of HEs. Of course, up went the duck-boards and we were into a shell hole. When the mud, water, debris and stink had subsided, I called to Dixon but got no reply. After searching a bit I found him. He must have got the full force of the explosion and been killed instantly."[272]

L/Cpl Clifford Walton, ex-1/8th, was shot in the thigh while in the German lines 1/2nd July 1916 and by the time came to make a run for it back to the British lines his leg had stiffened up considerably. He said to his gun-mate Illingworth

> "who had behaved impeccably throughout the show, 'We'll manage it now, Sam.' He replied, 'You will but I won't.' Very much surprised I said, 'Surely you haven't got the wind up,' and he replied very calmly, 'No'. It was the last time I saw him alive."

Illingworth was killed running at top speed across No Man's Land, the only casualty of the party, which included the German prisoner.[273] Several respondents combined a belief in premonitions with that in immunity, e.g. "I never had a premonition so I felt immune."[274]

In view of the significant content of Christianity in both "the front-line soldier's religion" and "the religion of the Regiment", it appears surprising that institutional religion should have made so little progress in the army during the war. The dismissive and often derisive verdict on the work of Anglican chaplains made by well-known participant-authors like Graves, Sassoon, Montague and Chapman has been repeatedly and uncritically retailed by writers and historians as being typical of the British soldier. This generally received picture of the chaplain was decidedly not the one given by Leeds Rifles (and many other) respondents, who spoke highly both of the regimental padres and of the chaplains attached to Field Ambulances. The latter filled a particularly valuable role, ministering to and comforting the dying, sick and wounded, writing letters or postcards for patients, feeding them. Dr Bickersteth, the Vicar of Leeds, accompanied the Regiment to France in 1915,[275] but was soon ordered to return. According to Mews, in April 1915 it was decreed that no chaplain was to be attached to a specific regiment.[276] The two chaplains of the first-line Leeds Rifles battalions, however, were still serving with the Regiment during the Battle of the Somme and did not always remain at the waggon lines whenever the battalions moved up into the forward zone. Both men were very highly regarded by all ranks. Capt. H.R. Lupton recalled that H. St. J.S. Woollcombe, Suffragan Bishop of Whitby, formerly the 1/7th's chaplain, once told him that the finest compliment he ever received was paid by a Rifleman who declared "Tha's a reet b---- of a parson."[277] The 1/8th's chaplain earned his flock's admiration by holding impromptu services in dugouts in the forward zone (see Chap. 11). (The 1/6th's padre, the Rev R. Whincup, was a frequent visitor in front-line trenches.)[278] Many respondents had grateful memories of the Rev. Philip ("Tubby") Clayton's Talbot House - "Toc H" in signallers' language - where rankers could feel completely at ease. The army hierarchy regarded the chaplain's chief task as that of keeping up morale. In addition to his normal pastoral duties, he often assumed the role of a combined entertainments and welfare officer, organising competitions and concerts and running the regimental canteen. Many respondents had grateful memories, too, of the generosity of the two padres, who were never seen without their haversacks stuffed with sweets and cigarettes.

14.7 Attitudes to the war

A paradox confronting the military social historian is that while soldiers are invariably against war in principle, a very considerable number undoubtedly enjoyed it.[279] "I'm glad I went; I'm proud of it, and no mistake" a former member of the 1/4th Suffolks told Ronald Blythe.[280] He was speaking for many thousands of war veterans.

Part of the reason seems to lie in the soldier's fierce love for his regiment and his comrades. The testimony of 2363 Ben Clark was typical of Leeds Rifles respondents:

> "I am very proud of having served in the 8th Bn. No regrets at all. I had loads of wonderful pals and we had a load of laughs. We had our job to do, and we did it. Anybody can be proud of saying that, can't he. I'd be a liar if I said I enjoyed it all, because I didn't, but when you're fighting a war, there are a lot of very unpleasant things you've got to put up with and you've just got to make the best of it. I wouldn't have wanted to have missed the experience. The 8th were a great battalion, a grand mob to be in, the grandest lot of officers and men you could ever hope to soldier with anywhere."[281]

There was the undoubted fact that actively participating in a war was the biggest experience of the average man's life. "For most people it is a type of worldly experience unobtainable in any other way": life acquires new meaningfulness.[282]

> "Many veterans who are honest with themselves will admit, I believe, that the experiences of communal effort in battle, even under the altered conditions of modern war, has been a high point in their lives. Despite the horror, the weariness, the grime, and the hatred, participation with others in the chances of battle had its unforgettable side, which they would not want to have missed. For anyone who has not experienced it himself, the feeling is hard to comprehend and, for the participant, hard to explain to anyone else."[283]

This consciousness of shared experience under great emotional stress, as respondents' testimony shows, was quite unforgettable. Many spoke of the war as a great experience not to have been missed, often referring to the sense of privilege they felt at having been able to participate in world-shattering events, and often regretting, like Rfm Schulze, that they had missed some particular action. Such sentiments are not lacking in the literature.[284] Guy Chapman wrote of

> "the fascination of war, the extreme pleasure, partly of the mind, more of the senses, it can give, that heightened sensitivity of body and soul of which Teilhard de Chardin wrote. There is no denying this. It may not be true for all men, but those who have once felt it do not, and cannot, erase it from their memory."[285]

For the respondents, the compensations of war far outweighed its horrors and sorrows.

> "Soldiering was for me a job - an enjoyable one for most of the time," said 2/Lt J.R. Bellerby, 1/8th. "One lived a real life in those days, and one can share the joy of it again with all others who knew it."[286]

Soldiering was frequently exciting, interesting and fun. Many of the junior officers discovered a remarkable personal fulfilment, not only in tackling the more dangerous of their regimental duties, but also in terms of human relations. Just as there is in peacetime civilian life no shortage of young men anxious to participate in high-risk sports and pastimes, so there was never any shortage of men anxious to take part in the various forms of military activity. A number of ranker-respondents admitted to having enjoyed the more dangerous of their experiences and fighting generally; one recalled the thrill he had always felt when the whisper came down the trench: "Pass the word to fix bayonets quietly." Those who had held particularly dangerous regimental jobs like runner, bomber and stretcher-bearer were, without exception, extremely proud of their individual achievements and retailed their experiences with gusto.

Membership of a high-morale unit brought two particular compensations to the soldier. The first was the feeling of identity, that he was somehow special, better, braver and more efficient than men in other, less fortunate, mobs. In the curious enclosed world of the Regiment was a whole set of values far removed from those found in the average workplace. The second was that the close association of ranks produced a caring, compassionate community.

It was war as a social experience, the human relationships of the front line, the emotional security of the military tribe, that chiefly appealed to respondents. Sir Herbert Read wrote that "The greatest joy of the war was its comradeship."[287] Comradeship was the soldier's compensation for the surrender of individuality and individual freedom. Described by Edmund Blunden as "the incomparable loving kindness of all", it overcame, or ignored, all distinctions of class, rank, creed or education.[288] Respondents found their group membership psychologically rewarding: it gave them identity, status, self-respect, satisfying human relationships with comrades, pride of craftsmanship, feelings of achievement and appreciation from seniors. The satisfaction given by social relations has an important "halo" effect: participants tend to gain more satisfaction (or less frustration) from the other elements of the job situation.[289] This would explain why, despite incredible hardships and horrifying experiences, the personnel of units of good-to-high morale could be, and remain, apparently so happy and contented, as respondents have so amply testified.

The British soldier of the legendary cheerfulness, the unfailing good nature, the indomitable and indefatigable spirit was far from being the creation of propaganda-makers, or a figment of mere sentimental hyperbole. He was a member of the good-to-high-morale unit that was to be found in large numbers not only in the infantry but also in every other arm of the service. Among those of many regiments, he wore the badge and buttons of the 7th and 8th battalions, the West Yorkshire Regiment - the Leeds Rifles.

NEC ASPERA TERRENT.[290]

NOTES

1. 'Cohesion and disintegration of the Wehrmacht in World War II', Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 (1948), 282-3; see also M. Janowitz and R.W. Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (1959; 3rd edn., Beverly Hills, Calif., 1974), p. 110.
2. The term "mutiny" must here be confined to collective insubordination occurring within a unit and exclude mutinies of men separated from their own units in bases, transit camps etc. "Family spirit" and divisional loyalty actually prompted the mutiny of 192 men of the 50th and 51st (Territorial) Divisions at Salerno on 20 September 1943 (Alan Patient, 'Mutiny at Salerno', The Listener, 25 February 1982, 8-9). It may be noted that the men concerned were Alamein veterans convalescing from wounds, and, individually, their morale may well have been below average. Dr R. Sobel found that, in the sequence of psychiatric breakdown, group loyalty was the last and most important stronghold of defence against anxiety to disintegrate ('The "Old Sergeant" Syndrome', Psychiatry, 10 (1947), 320).
3. See, for example, R.G.S. Bidwell, Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories (London, 1973), p. 131; R.H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War (New York and London, 1958), p. 272.
4. R.L. Swank and W.E. Marchand, 'Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Exhaustion', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 55 (1946), 238.
5. See R.G.S. Bidwell, op.cit., p. 132.
6. See R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, Men Under Stress (Philadelphia and London, 1945), pp. 55, 82.
7. Ibid., p. 45; Major-Gen. F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War (London, 1978), p. 172.
8. Compare Sir A. Bryant, Jackets of Green: a study of the History, Philosophy, and Character of the Rifle Brigade (London, 1972), pp. 166-7.
9. Yorkshire Evening News, 21 May 1915; Knowles letter, 6 December 1915.
10. S. Rogerson, Twelve Days (London, 1933), pp. 80-1.
11. Leeds Mercury, 20 July 1915.
12. 'With the 62nd Division in the Great War', unpublished MS, 1922, p. 103; Knowles letter, 13 December 1915.
13. Testimony of RQMS Edgar Fendley, 2nd WYR, and others.
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15. Testimony of 1090 Sgt James Rhind, 8th.
16. J.F. Tucker, Johnny Get Your Gun: A Personal Narrative of the Somme, Ypres and Arras (London, 1978), p. 151; J. Terraine, ed., General Jack's Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1964), p. 93, also pp. 152, 212.
17. A Subaltern's War (London, 1930; 1972 facsimile edition), p. 118.
18. Knowles letter, 18 August 1915.
19. J.O. Nettleton, The Anger of the Guns: An Infantry Officer on the Western Front (London, 1979), p. 95.
20. Grandfather's Adventures in the Great War 1914-18 (Ilfracombe, 1977), letter of 6 April 1916, p. 55; p. 111.

21. An Infant in Arms: War Letters of a Company Officer 1914-1918 (London, 1972), pp. 64, 128, 130, 151; see also R.B. Talbot Kelly, A Subaltern's Odyssey: Memoirs of the Great War 1915-1917 (London, 1980), pp. 53-4, 130-1.

22. Lupton letters, 20 June 1915, 9, 16 July 1916.

23. Op.cit., 238; Lupton letters, 16 May, 18 June 1915.

24. G. Coppard, With a Machine-gun to Cambrai (London, 1968; 1980 edn.), p. 62; C.E. Carrington, 'Some Soldiers', in G.A. Panichas, ed., Promise of Greatness: The War of 1914-1918 (London, 1968), p. 163; History of the Sixth Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment. Vol. I. 1/6th Battalion (Bradford, 1921), p. 239.

25. A Subaltern's War, p. 26.

26. Op.cit., p. 65; see also P. Gibbs, Realities of War (London, 1920), p. 116.

27. Testimony of Thomas R. Kitson, 1/5th WYR.

28. 1/8th Bn War Diary, 18 July 1915, P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], War Office, WO 95/2795.

29. Leeds Mercury, 18 August, 4 September, 1st October 1915; Lupton letter, 21 August 1915.

30. J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War II (Newton Abbot, 1980), p. 169.

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32. The History of the 1/4th Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment, 1914-1919 (Halifax and London, 1920), pp. 33, 50-1.

33. Oral testimony.

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161. J.S. Fletcher, A Book About Yorkshire (London, 1908), Chap. X, 'The Yorkshire Folk', pp. 196-219.

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174. Letter from an unnamed officer in the 49th Division, Yorkshire Post, 12 May 1915; letter Col E. Kitson Clark to wife, 13 November 1915, G. Kitson Clark Papers, Leeds City Libraries, Archives Dept., Acc. 2004.

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177. Testimonies of 2686 Vincent W. Warrillow, 7th, and 2221 George A. Fletcher, 8th.

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200. Testimony of Thomas R. Kitson, 1/5th WYR.
201. 'The "Old Sergeant" Syndrome', 319.
202. *Fighting Spirit*, pp. 43-4, 171; *Courage and Other Broadcasts*, p. 17.
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224. Oral testimony.

225. Compare A.B. Wilkinson, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

226. Compare Capt.E.V. Tempest, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

227. Espin Diary, 22 February 1916.

228. A.B. Wilkinson, *op.cit.*, pp. 76-8.

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231. *Op.cit.*, pp. 211, 120, 121.

232. See, for example, E.F. Wilkinson's poem, 'To My People', in *Sunset Dreams*; J. Laffin, ed., *op.cit.*, p.6.

233. *Twelve Days*, pp. 59-61.

234. Oral testimonies.

235. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London, 1948), p. 335, author's italics.

236. S.P. Mews, "The Effects of the First World War ...", pp. 185-6.

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239. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

240. Testimonies of Harry Martin, 1803 Alfred K. Owen, 2815 Harry Richmond, 1/7th, Mrs Christopher Wall. For American evidence on the lasting effect of army service and battlefield experiences upon religious attitudes, see S.A. Stouffer, *et al.*, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, Chart XIV, p. 187.

241. Condensed from an unpublished account of the incident written by Thomas H. Phillips about 1960.

242. Elizabeth K. Nottingham, *Religion and Society* (New York, 1954; 1967 edn.), pp. 13ff, 17.

243. Compare Maj. Gen.F.M. Richardson, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

244. Oral testimony.

245. See K. Thomas, *op.cit.*, pp. 647-50; J. Obelkevich, *op.cit.*, pp. 307-9. Mayhew noted the working man's belief in both "luck" and "fate": *London Labour and the London Poor* (London, 1861), Vol. II, p. 325.

246. For a critical examination of this legend, see J. Terraine, *The Smoke and the Fire*, Chap. 1, *passim*. H. Cantril suggested that the readiness to take Orson Welles' famous hoax seriously was due in part at least to the prolonged economic depression and unrest of the period and the consequent insecurity felt by many people: 'The Invasion from Mars' in T.M. Newcomb and E.L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1947), pp. 619-28.

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248. See, for example, C.E. Carrington, *A Subaltern's War*, pp. 161, 162, 164.

249. J. Obelkevich, *op.cit.*, p. 307.

250. Oral testimony. On the wearing of amulets by Jewish soldiers, see *Yorkshire Evening Post*, 29 January 1915.

251. See Introduction to his *Sunset Dreams*, pp. 20, 24.

252. Oral testimony.

253. Knowles letter, 17 July 1916.

254. See L.H. Bartemeier *et al*., *op.cit.*, 368.

255. See examples above; P. Gibbs, *op.cit.*, pp. 326, 327; R.R. Grinker and J.P. Spiegel, *Men Under Stress*, p. 130.

256. Oral testimony.

257. Testimony of Harry Smith, 223 Bde, Royal Field Artillery.

258. Pte Archie Surfleet, quoted M. Brown, *Tommy Goes to War* (London, 1978), p. 245; Pte D.J. Sweeney, 2nd Lincolns, quoted M. Moynihan, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 70, 71.

259. Quoted P. Gibbs, *op.cit.*, p.82.

260. Espin Diary, 3 October 1915.

261. *Op.cit.*, p.107.

262. See, for example, Lord Moran, *op.cit.*, p.52; A.B. Wilkinson, *op.cit.*, pp. 162-3.

263. See, for example, P. Gibbs, *op.cit.*, pp. 117, 319.

264. See G. Coppard, *op.cit.*, p. 26; H. Williamson, *A Fox Under My Cloak*, p.13; W.H.A. Groom, *op.cit.*, p.46; C.P. Clayton,*op.cit.*, p. 186; T.P. Marks, *op.cit.*, p. 171; L. Macdonald, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

265. *'The Great Sacrifice' and other poems* (London, 1917), p.25.

266. Article, 'The War as a Soldier Saw It', *Yorkshire Post*, 5 August 1964; see also the definition of the fatalism philosophy of ex-Corporal James Jones, *World War II* (London, 1975; 1977 Futura paperback edn.), p. 41.

267. See also Guy Chapman, *A Passionate Prodigality*, pp. 152-3.

268. Oral testimonies.

269. *A Subaltern's Odyssey*, p. 99.

270. S.A. Stouffer *et al*., *op.cit.*, Vol. II, Table 20, p. 179, pp. 182-5; E.A. Shils, 'Primary Groups in the American Army', in R.K. Merton and P.F. Lazarsfeld, *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of 'The American Soldier'* (New York, 1950), p. 26.

271. See, for example, S. Rogerson, *op.cit.*, p. 25; C.P. Clayton, *op.cit.*, pp. 145, 175; W.H.A. Groom, *op.cit.*, pp. 105, 152; P.H. Liddle, *Men of Gallipoli* (London, 1976), p. 221.

272. Testimonies of 2812 Cpl Percy Shepherd, Bugler 2891 Charles E. Hannan, 2/Lt J.R. Bellerby, 8th; 4158 Sgt George S. Ibbitson, 7th.

273. From the written account of events of 1/2 July 1916 by J.R. Bellerby and C. Walton.

274. Testimony of Thomas R. Kitson, MM, 1/5th WYR; compare L. Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

275. *Leeds Mercury*, 16 April 1915.

276. "The Effects of the First World War ...", p. 197.

277. Testimony of Capt. H.R. Lupton, 8th.

278. Capt. E.V. Tempest, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

279. See, for example, D. Winter, *Death's Men*, pp. 224-5; Introduction by R.G. Loosmore to R.B. Talbot Kelly, *A Subaltern's Odyssey*, p. 17.

280. R. Blythe, section 'The Beloved Holocaust', in *The View in Winter: Reflections on Old Age* (London, 1979), p. 176.

281. Oral testimony.

282. M.H. Maskin and L.L. Altman, 'Military Psychodynamics: Psychological Factors in the Transition from Civilian to Soldier', p. 268.

283. J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors: reflections on men in battle* (New York, 1967), p. 44; see also Capt. E.V. Tempest, *History of the West Yorkshire Regiment* (Bradford, 1941), p. 60.

284. See, for example, Edward de Stein's poem 'Envoi' in B. Gardner, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 147; C.M. Slack, *op.cit.*, pp. 112, 37; J.F. Tucker, *op.cit.*, p. 201. They are also found in Sgt Alchorne's Memoirs, p.204.

285. *A Kind of Survivor* (London, 1975), pp. 64-5.

286. Oral testimony.

287. *Op.cit.*

288. 'Infantryman Passes By', in G.A. Panichas, ed., *Promise of Greatness*, p. 25. For the value of comradeship, see also his *Undertones of War* (London, 1928; 1956 edn.), pp. 239, 240, 266; Sir Herbert Read, Foreword, G.A. Panichas, ed., *op.cit.*, p. vi; G.A. Panichas, Introduction, *ibid.*, p. xxi.

289. See A.Etzioni, *op.cit.*, pp. 301-2.

290. "Nor do calamities appal."

APPENDIX I

METHODOLOGY

The following methods of data collection were used in the construction of this social history: (1) the study of unpublished documents and manuscripts and of photographs; (2) the study of published primary sources, including newspapers and periodicals; (3) interviewing and observation; (4) mailed questionnaires.

A comparatively very small proportion of the unpublished primary sources used was easily accessible in public and institutional collections. Virtually all the unpublished materials were in private hands. Access to them was gained only with difficulty, often considerable. Intermediaries were found necessary in some cases. An appreciable proportion was actually rescued from a building in the course of demolition. Many personal documents were obtained from respondents, including surviving next-of-kin of deceased members of the Regiment.

In this Appendix the principal sources are discussed and their shortcomings and defects and the methods employed to deal with them described. The advantages and the shortcomings and defects of oral evidence as a historical source are discussed. The methods employed in the present study to select and contact respondents and the methods of interviewing them, as well as the problems and pitfalls encountered, are described in some detail. The mailed questionnaires used are described and their defects outlined.

1. Regimental Records

King's/Queen's Regulations regarding the keeping and preservation of historical records did not apply to the Volunteer and Territorial Force/Army, nor were any of its constituent formations required to lodge their records at the Public Record Office. The records of the Leeds Rifles that have been used in this study represent all that now survives of a very considerable body of documents that suffered from the ravages of fire, mice, thieves, and the unauthorised spring-cleaning activities of over-zealous but stupid regimental clerks. Large areas of the regimental history are not covered by the surviving records: there are, for instance, no attestation forms. Certain documents relating to the Leeds Rifles were kept at the York offices of the County Association, which administered the two divisions comprising the West Riding Territorial Force, but they, too, have not survived, since, when the West Riding Association was amalgamated with that of the East Riding in the 1960s, virtually all its records and correspondence relating to the war period were destroyed. The battalion War Diaries were the property of the War Office and are now in the Public Record Office.

The large gaps in the regimental records of the 1914-18 period resulted in the attempted reconstruction of records by the use of (1) oral evidence, and (2) local newspapers.

A collection of local military records may not necessarily be a historian's treasure house. The standard of record-keeping in the Leeds Rifles was never better than fair, commonly indifferent, and not infrequently extremely poor. There is no reason to suppose that this was in any way untypical of the Volunteer and Territorial Force/Army as a whole. Attestation Forms especially must be accorded a low credibility rating: it was common for recruits, despite the penalty, to supply false personal particulars, frequently in collusion with or at the instigation of the recruiting staff.

A close examination of the regimental records demonstrated that few, possibly none, could be accepted at face value. Each had to be carefully compared with others where possible and checked against other available local records such as census enumerators' books, directories and school admission registers. An attempt, for instance, to determine the social composition of the Leeds Rifles 1859-1875 by analysing the Muster Roll as it stood would have been a completely worthless exercise historically, and an entirely different (and quite misleading) picture from that presented in Chapter 1, Tables A, B and C, and in Tables 1 - 4, Appendix II, would have resulted.

The Muster Roll, which covers the period 5th November 1859 to 15th September 1875, bears the date "Nov 11th 1893". It appears to have been a Fair Copy of the original (which by that time would have been in a dilapidated condition), perhaps supplemented by information obtained from attestation forms. Up to 30th October 1861 (regtl. no. 924) only scattered entries give details of height, age and occupation; from 1st November 1861 to 4th March 1866 just under a quarter of the entries give these details; from 4th March 1866 to 1st December 1867 the proportion rises to just over three-fifths; after 1st December 1867 these details are given as a matter of course. The Roll was found to contain an appreciable number of incorrect entries (see below).

Several persons around the turn of the century did a certain amount of work on the history of the Regiment: Edmund Wilson (who served from 1863 to 1900), Walter Braithwaite (1868-1904; 1914-15), George Herbert Rowe (1883-1910), and Edwin Kitson Clark (1891-1917). In the first ten pages of the Roll various hands, one identified from letters in the possession of the University Library as being that of Wilson, have added details of occupation, home or business address, name of employer, or date of resignation against a large proportion of the entries. Left concealed in the pages of the unused portion of the Roll Book were four foolscap sheets of names in Wilson's hand, entitled 'List of names for the use of the Prize Committee taken from a copy of the first Muster Roll' and dated 15th November 1900. This list contained the names and most of the addresses of retired members who were evidently sufficiently affluent to be asked to donate prizes, and large crosses have been inserted against their names on the Roll. In addition, someone else has placed a small cross against nearly 250 names on the Roll. These names would make up a list of prominent citizens; only seven could not be positively traced. Wilson and Braithwaite between them must have known virtually all the men on the Muster Roll personally.

The two printed membership lists of the "Leeds Volunteer Rifles" give business or home address. The first comprises 161 names and addresses, the second 212 names and addresses. They contain errors in address and misspelt names.

The printed Company Rolls of 1860 list names only.

The Agreement Book, which covers the years 1867-1869, appears to be the third of a series. Every page is a printed form of legal agreement in which the recruit, signing over a sixpenny stamp, undertook to serve for a period of four years. The form did not ask for the recruit's occupation, but 54 recruits gave this information.

The List of Honorary Members in 1863 is a notebook (in the handwriting of James Wardell, Deputy Town Clerk, and Treasurer and Secretary to the corps) which, additionally, contains lists of the names and home or business addresses of military members who were in arrears with annual subscriptions and/or payments for uniform, etc. relating to the years

1863-1865. It contains several errors in address.

It was found completely impossible to reconcile these five sets of documents. Each document or set of documents contains names which do not appear in the others. This merely emphasises the fact that records are only as accurate and reliable as the people who have kept them.

The first few pages of the Muster Roll, enrolments up to March 1860, are in a hopelessly confused state: dates of enrolment are jumbled up, several names appear twice and a fairly large number of names are missing altogether. Four names of privates who were elected to commissions and gazetted (nos. 9, 13, 23 and 24 in the List of Officers 1859 to 1909 (1909) compiled by Lt. Col. G. H. Rowe), eleven names in the Debt Book, and several names in the printed membership lists and Company Rolls, together with at least three names in the Agreement Book, do not appear in the Muster Roll, while seventeen names which do not appear on the printed membership lists appear on one or other of the other documents and/or on the List of Officers, where appropriate. One early name on the Muster Roll appears in none of the other documents: he may have resigned almost immediately, or, as seems more likely, he may be a substituted name (see below).

Considering the circumstances, that these early records are in such a confused state is hardly to be wondered at, and it is likely that the early records of other corps are similarly muddled. Errors and omissions were perhaps inevitable. There was no Orderly Room nor orderly room staff; an Adjutant was not appointed until June 1860. The administrative work fell upon James Wardell and his clerks or other members of the corps who may have helped him out in their spare time. The practice of allowing recruits to enrol at out-stations instead of at Headquarters increased the opportunity for errors to be made, as a comparison between the Muster Roll and the records of the Brewery (No. 9) Company clearly shows. Enrolments do not begin to be entered up systematically in chronological order in the Muster Roll until the autumn of 1862.

A major, and probably the chief, cause of errors and omissions in the Muster Roll seems to be the reprehensible practice of re-allocating the regimental numbers of Volunteers who have been struck off. This deplorable administrative procedure appeals to a certain type of tidy-minded person who believes something is being wasted if it is not adopted.

This practice is deserving of the historian's censure on several counts: first, errors were made inevitable; second, identification of the Volunteers is rendered difficult, if not impossible; third, it distorts the recruitment pattern by presenting a false picture of recruiting and turnover; fourth, its possible extent cannot be guessed at.

The practice was only brought to light by comparing the Muster Roll with the other documents. According to the Brewery records, No. 713 was Francis Owen, who resigned in April 1861. On the Muster Roll, however, No. 713 is Ezekiel Nelson, entered as being a member of No. 9 Company, though the Tetley wages records for the period show that he was not employed at the Brewery and so could not have been a member of No. 9 Company. A further twelve recruits to No. 9 Company, up to May 1866, cannot be traced in the Muster Roll, other names having been substituted. Invariably, when a regimental number has been re-allocated and a name substituted, the date of enrolment of the original number-holder has not been altered: this means that, had the records not been compared, the substitutions would have gone undetected. Comparisons of the Muster Roll with the Debt Book and with the Agreement Book evince further evidence of name substitution. They also reveal failure to alter original occupational listings when making a substitution.

The Record of Officers' Services, 3rd VB PWO, 1905-, which became that of the 8th Bn 1908-1918, was kept in Army Book 83. Certain information was not listed, such as previous profession or occupation and father's profession or occupation, nor was it asked for. It is by no means a complete record: some names are missing and not a single record sheet has been completed in full. The standard of Capt. A. C. Dundas' record-keeping prior to August 1914 is indifferent-to-poor, whilst the standard for the period August 1914 to November 1915 can only be described as deplorable, the sheets full of careless mistakes and omissions, even dates of birth or of gazetting being missing from some entries.

The Army Form B 199A, from which records of officers' services were, or could be, compiled, had several serious deficiencies from the viewpoint of a social historian. It did not ask for the officer's home address, his civil profession or occupation, or his father's name, address and profession/occupation; or for his vital statistics of height and weight, as required by Army Book 83.

The List of Officers, 1/7th (Leeds Rifles) Bn West Yorkshire Regt., 1915-1918 lists the officers in chronological order of joining the Regiment. Normally given are the officer's full name, the name and address of his next-of-kin and relationship to same, the date of his commission and the dates of gazetting of any promotions, together with details of previous service in other units. In most cases the officer's civil occupation and the reason for his leaving the battalion are given. The following details have not been given: educational institutions attended; educational qualifications; date and place of birth; nationality of self and parents; details of children (if any); father's name, address and profession or occupation. The officer's religious denomination was not entered on a regular basis until November 1917. Some of the sheets, particularly at the beginning of the List, have been entered up sketchily, several entries containing little more than the officer's name and date of gazetting. These may have had to be reconstructed to replace records that had been lost or destroyed.

The Adjutant was responsible for the unit records. Capt. L.M. Cradock-Hartopp, 2nd WYR, occupied this post until 6th August 1916 when he was appointed GSO3, 12th Division. His record-keeping was no more than indifferent, sometimes extremely poor. The new Adjutant was 2nd/Lt Charles Victor Beale, an ex-ranker in the 7th and 5th WYR, who had been commissioned on 12th March 1915 and who rejoined the 1/7th on 14th January 1916. He had been bank accountant at the central York branch of the National Provincial Bank and was therefore an eminently suitable candidate for the post of administrative officer. The indifferent-to-poor record-keeping of both Capt. Dundas and Capt. Cradock-Hartopp lead one to wonder whether their slap-dash administrative methods were characteristic of Regular Army adjutants as a whole, or merely of those serving with Territorial battalions.

The Casualty List of Officers, 7th Bn, 1915-1917 was kept by the staff of the Regimental Depot office, Carlton Barracks. The details given are usually very brief, e.g. "2/Lt F. J. Baldwin: slight GSW leg 14.7.16". These records show no consistent administrative style. The War Office casualty records appear no longer to exist.

The Company Roll of B Coy, 8th Bn, as at 1st January 1919 was a highly confidential document written up by the OC himself, Capt. A. M. Ramsden, for the purpose of assessing the order of priorities in demobilisation. It has columns for army number, name, age, rank, regimental employment, marital status, date of enlistment, length of service in the BEF, geographical origin, religion and civilian occupation; it is divided according to sections and platoons. It has been compiled in an inefficient and on the whole unsatisfactory manner.

The Battalion Roll Book of the 7th Bn 1930-1937 was intended to assemble a comprehensive range of information about each member. Many different people have helped to compile this roll: personal details would have been copied from Attestation Forms by the orderly room staff; addresses were probably written in by platoon or section NCOs and the handwriting and aberrations of spelling suggest a generally low standard of literacy. Some errors and omissions were readily apparent, eg. in CSM Fred Scruton's entry, his former service is given as "WYR 1914-1919", though he had served in the Leeds Rifles since before the second Boer War; CSM Frank Stembridge's previous service is given as "WYR 1908-1919", though he had served in the Leeds Rifles since Volunteer days and furthermore, an adjacent entry reading "Clasp T.A. Eff. Med. 24.11.22" is inconsistent with this entry since it indicates 24 years' service in the Territorials/Volunteers. A number of men appearing on this roll were traced, shown their entries and asked to confirm the details given. Not one of these entries was found to be completely accurate. For example, no particulars of former service were given for Sgt Hector William McMasters who stated that he had a period of service in the 7th Bn prior to 1930 and also several years' service in the Regular Army. Examination of the Roll itself revealed several instances of re-enlistments (as opposed to re-engagements) where these details have been omitted. Several men, however, cheerfully admitted to having given a false date of birth on enlistment and they averred that the practice was widespread among both younger and older recruits.

2. The Muster Roll, 1859-1875, and problems of identification and classification

The analysis of the social composition of the Leeds Rifles at various periods is central to this study. Because of the great importance of the factors of time and expense in volunteering which involved a greater sacrifice on the part of some sections of society than on others, it was felt essential to differentiate between the self-employed and employed men. The Registrar-General's 1951 classification of social classes was accordingly rejected, and the following classification, based on occupational categories, was adopted:

Class I:	non-employed
II:	professional
III(a):	self-employed (manufacturing and allied trades)
III(b):	self-employed (wholesale, retail and service trades)
IV(a):	employed (white collar and supervisory workers)
IV(b):	employed (manual workers) : (i) skilled, (ii) semi-skilled; (iii) unskilled.

Class III included the petit bourgeoisie and small masters. It was considered impracticable to place these in a separate class or category.

Before attempting the classification of the Volunteers for the period 1859-1875, the information given in the Muster Roll was checked as far as was humanly possible and as many as possible of the omissions of age and occupation made good. The aids to identification used were: the pencilled notes and crosses already on the Muster Roll (see above), the Census enumerators' books for 1861 and 1871, the local directories, the Leeds Grammar School Admission Books from 1820 to 1900 (1906), and the Debt Book.

It is a commonplace that census enumerators' books have a somewhat limited value as a historical source.[1] In addition to discrepancies in age as between 1851 and 1861 censuses, for instance, both enumerators and the enumerated put different interpretations upon the census schedules. Occupation is unfortunately the part of the censal information most liable to interpretative error. Enumeration of occupational status is inconsistent and cannot be relied on. There are a great many ambiguous occupational names which do not clearly indicate whether the person described is an employer, an employee or self-employed in a one-man business, e.g. butcher. The Registrar-General found three main problem areas here, "the main difficulty encountered was that masters often omitted to return themselves as such due to a lack of sufficient interest to study the notes on the back of the schedules." In addition, masters rarely followed the instruction to return the number of persons they employed.[2] The third problem was "the extremely inaccurate and inadequate manner in which uneducated and often, indeed, even educated persons, describe their calling", allied with a "foolish but very common desire of persons to magnify the importance of their occupational condition."[3]

Not all the early Volunteers could be traced in the enumerators' books. Some 1861 books are unfortunately missing, said to have been destroyed by PRO mice. Some were traced in the local directories. Yet others were identified by means of the Leeds Grammar School Admission Books, a book which gives, wherever possible, the age or date of birth of pupils admitted; name, address and occupation of parent or guardian; and details of subsequent career. The book revealed not a few instances of incorrectly entered details of age and/or occupation in the Muster Roll.

Many of the ages given in the Muster Roll up to the autumn of 1863 were found to be incompatible with those given in the 1861 and 1871 Census enumerator books and in the Leeds Grammar School Admission Books: 38 (nearly 29%) of the 132 ages given in the Roll in the sequence of numbers 1-1000, were assumed to be incorrect.

A large proportion of the entries added by Wilson et al., appear to be correct; the men concerned who were still alive and living in the Leeds area at the end of the century may have been circularised. Some, however, are in error. 40 Edward Bishop, a Headingley surgeon who was commissioned in the corps as Assistant Regimental Surgeon, is entered as "surveyor"; 17 Charles Edward Wurtzburg is entered as "sharebroker" instead of "woollen cloth merchant." Some have been assigned occupations that appear only in the 1871 Census enumerators' books and/or the 1872 Directories, e.g. 46 Thomas Henry Tilburn was a clerk at Benjamin Gott and Sons when he enlisted, not a cloth manufacturer on his own account. Use was also made of the small crosses on the Muster Roll as an aid to identification when corroborative evidence existed. A certain amount of doubt still attaches itself to 7 of the names, e.g. 861 J.B. Carter of No. 5 (Chapeltown) Company, who enrolled on 3/8/1861, may or may not be the Joseph B. Carter, LRCP, MRCS, Physician of Chapel Allerton, who appears on the 1861 Census, and who later appears in Kelly's 1897 Directory as "medical officer and public vaccinator for 6b district."

It was seldom possible to identify employed persons. A certain degree of success, however, was achieved with the original members of No. 6 Company, who enrolled in 1860: 28 of the 58 men were identified from the 1861 Census enumerators' books covering the area in which the Monkbridge Foundry was situated.

The common tendency of persons "to magnify the importance of their occupational condition" caused some problems. Many recruits gave not their own trade or occupation but that of their employer, particularly in retailing and printing. This was no doubt a familiar problem to recruiting sergeants of both the Regular and auxiliary forces. When checked against the Tetley wages records for 1860, of 12 recruits to No. 9

Company in 1860 entered in the Muster Roll as "brewer", 3 were found to be draymen, 3 yardmen and 6 unspecified or general labourers; 2 men described as "clerks" worked in the yard checking the loading of drays; of 2 men described as "storekeepers", however, one was the Head Cellarman and the other the Yard Foreman. The sergeant-major, or perhaps the regimental clerk, seems to have tired at times of supposed social climbers. For example, 2385 Sidney Herbert Knocker entered his occupation on his Agreement Form as "banker", but "bank clerk" was entered on the Muster Roll; 1053 John Wilson France, apprenticed to and heir of a law stationer and lithographer, was entered as "clerk"; 2011 Joseph Whiteley Hebblethwaite, apprenticed to and heir to his father's wine merchanting business, was also entered as "clerk"; 3618 Alexander Muir Smeeton, apprenticed to and heir of a general draper and silk merchant trading in Leeds' premier shopping street, was entered as "draper's assistant".

Because of the large number of ambiguous occupational terms and the incidence of deliberate misrepresentation, as well as a number of unspecified "merchants" etc., every occupational listing on the Muster Roll was checked against the contemporary documents and aids to identification, the chief of which was the Trades Section of the directories. As a result, over 200 listings were found to need some significant alteration, such as "draper" to "draper's assistant", "printer" to "master printer", "gentleman" to "medical student", "engineer" to "civil engineer", "merchant" to "woollen merchant", "iron trade" to "galvanised iron strand fencing manufacturer/oil and tallow merchant". Any man who was not listed in the Commercial or Trades sections of the relevant local directory was automatically classed as an employed person. This unfortunately discriminates against those who were apprenticed or articled to maternal relatives as well as against those omitted from the directory.

In classifying the occupational data, no attempt was made to differentiate between apprentices, journeymen and fully-fledged craftsmen or between pupils in the professions and practising professional men. Apprentices are listed wherever possible as craftsmen. This leads, however, to certain anomalies. Categories have had to be preserved for "pupil teachers", "medical students" and "university undergraduates". Bald listings of "apprentice" which could not be identified have been allowed to stand. Articled clerks raised a particular problem. All men under the age of 25 articled to solicitor fathers and who later practised themselves as solicitors have been classified as "solicitors". The men classified as "articled solicitor's clerks" were not the sons of practising solicitors. All men working for a father have been classified automatically as having the father's occupation, trade or profession when listed as such, and placed in the appropriate category unless they were recorded otherwise in the census enumerator's book.

A further complication was introduced by the fact that some occupational terms have undergone a change in meaning over the last century or so, e.g. Kelly's 1893 Directory of Leeds describes John Henry Wurtzburg, managing director of Greenwood and Batley Ltd., as a "machinist". Other such words include "warehouseman", "clothier", "fireman" and "salesman". Because of these changes in meaning, no attempt was made in Tables 1 - 4, Appendix II, which cover the period 1859-1875, to differentiate between the three main sub-categories of manual workers.

In Tables 6, 6a, 7, 8 and 10, Appendix II, which cover the period 1896-1937, the manual workers, with one exception, have been classified according to the Hall-Jones Scale of Occupational Prestige for Males.[4] The exception is that of "sheet metal worker" which is classed by Hall and Jones as semi-skilled, but by AUEW as skilled.

Architects and self-employed surveyors have been placed in the occupational category II (Professional) throughout the study for the sake of uniformity, although they were not classified as Professionals in the 1861 Census. Musicians who were not bandmasters or teachers of music and artists and artist/photographers (who were essentially tradesmen offering a service) were excluded from Class II.

The occupational term "gentleman" is used in the Muster Roll. An attempt was made to confine the use of this term to men of substantial independent means who were not gainfully employed. It was, however, frequently used by sons of businessmen, university undergraduates, medical students and pupils in the professions who had not yet embarked on a career that earned them any money of their own and who were living on allowances from parents or grandparents. Men who were listed by the census enumerator as, say, "retired merchant","proprietor of railway stock", or "landed proprietor", have been entered in the Tables under these descriptions. There are occasional listings in the Muster Roll of "no trade" or "none" where the recruit might have been expected to be listed as "gentleman", for example, 3096 John Aicheson Gott, great-grandson of Benjamin Gott, and cousin of Thomas Kinnear. James

Wardell, in his entries in the Debt Book, drew the contemporary social distinction between the "misters" and the "esquires".

3. Other records

The Minutes of the Territorial Force, West Riding of Yorkshire County Association, 1908-1919, and the Minutes of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce, Vol I, both suffered from the fact that neither of their recorders took shorthand or were skilled in the taking of notes. In each case, press reports were found to give fuller and more satisfactory accounts of the proceedings of the meetings of these organisations.

4. The War Diaries

All units of the British Army were required to keep a War Diary. Entries were supposed to be made daily on the specially printed Army Form C2118, which had to be forwarded to the officer i/c the A.G.'s office, Base, without fail on the last day of every month. Instructions for the completion of war diaries were clearly set out in Field Service Regulations, Part II. The object of war diaries was "to furnish an accurate record of the operations from which the history of the war can subsequently be prepared".[5] As the diary was required to be "carefully safeguarded" at all times, it would normally have been kept at the waggon lines whenever the battalion was in the line. The keeper of the diary, the Adjutant or his assistant, while in the line, may have made diary entries in a notebook, or even on the back of an envelope, to be copied down at a later date. War diaries were almost always entered up some considerable time after the events to which they referred, e.g. on 29th July 1917 Lt A. Milligan was recalled from the First Army School, where he had been since the 15th, to assume the duties of Adjutant of the 1/8th, yet every entry in the July War Diary from the 13th onwards is in his handwriting.[6]

As many military historians have discovered to their immense dismay, war diary entries are characteristically brief, often meagre and inadequate, and written in a terse, often cryptic, style. Generally speaking, the Leeds Rifles diaries conform to this norm. The 1/8th Diary for September 1915 is full of very laconic entries like "In front-line trenches" and "In right support". The 1/7th Diary entries for 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th April 1918 fail to mention the continual heavy enemy artillery bombardments, while the entry for 16th April baldly states "430 am. Heavy enemy barrage opened and enemy attacked." For the most part, the official instructions for the completion of diaries have been totally disregarded. For instance, all casualties, including those of animals on the strength, and numbers comprising drafts of reinforcements were ordered to be noted. The officer who completed the diary in the most satisfactory fashion, among all Leeds Rifles officers, was Lt Milligan. The diary entries of the 2/8th for February and March 1917, for instance, largely consist of regurgitations of B Coy Orders, hardly what was required.

The wretchedly low standard of war diaries may be due in large measure to the practice of retrospective recording. Col. E. Wyrall, evidently unfamiliar with Section 140 of Field Service Regulations, Part II, thought that diaries were "designedly vague" for fear of their falling into enemy hands, while Lt. Col. H. Green considered that the sketchiness of diaries may often have been due to the fatigue of the writer.[7] Many writers of war diaries, however, may have looked upon entering them up as yet more "bumph", another tiresome and hated chore, like the submission of returns, imposed by faceless "base wallahs".

The junior officers of the 1/8th kept an 'Unofficial War Diary'. This, according to a preface written in January 1918 by Capt W.H. Brooke, was intended as "a more personal record of the doings of the Battalion on active service than would be provided by the Official Diary". It was felt that such a document "would be of considerable interest after the war to officers and men of the 1/8th WYRt and their relatives and friends". As Capt. Brooke freely admitted,

> "It is far from a complete record, much of it was - 'owing to the exigencies of the Service' - written up some time after the events referred to took place, many incidents have failed to find their way into the book and changes of authorship, owing in some cases to casualties, were frequent".

(Compare the Lupton letter, 18/8/15: "it gives me something humorous to put in the War Diary which I am now taking on (but which can't be written until a fortnight after the event)").

In essence, these remarks equally applied to the "official" war diaries. Comparison of the diaries with the Tetley, Espin and Butcher Diaries, with the letters, and with respondents' testimony clearly demonstrate that the war diaries were far from being complete records. A few examples will illustrate this. The 1/8th Diary of July 1916 is very badly completed: no mention is made of the operation that was ordered to take place on 7th July, nor of the burial parties furnished that day, nor of the German attack of the 16th. The Diary of September 1916 gives incorrect times for the attack of the 3rd and fails to mention Col. Alexander's invaliding on the 9th. The entry in the 1/8th Diary regarding the trench raid on 11th February 1917 states that no identification was obtained, yet the Unofficial War Diary for the same date states that it was and gives details of the German regiment concerned. The recording of casualties is particularly poor in the 1/7th Diary. The diaries of the 1/7th and 1/8th for 21st-27th September 1916 contain little more than "nothing to report". According to the Official History, 146 Brigade continued to hold the front line after the rest of the 49th Division was relieved on the night of 24th/25th September,[8] a fact recorded in neither diary. Respondents Harry Martin, 1/7th, and 2880 William A. Bywater, 1/8th, stated that on 26th September their companies were sent forward into the area captured earlier by the 18th Division to "mop up" and to take charge of very large numbers of German prisoners that were being sent back unaccompanied. The Germans gave no trouble and were in fact eager to give themselves up, one man, who had spent 6 or 7 years immediately prior to the war working in Leeds, being quite overjoyed to be taken into the custody of the Leeds Rifles.[9] Yet nothing of these events is recorded in either diary.

The Espin Diary records the following events which have received no mention in the 1/8th War Diary: 14th June 1915: heavy enemy bombardment, 1 man killed, 8 badly wounded; 16th August: bombing raid; 19th August: heavy bombardment by gas shells; 13th September: Battalion inspected by General Plumer; 7th October: 1/8th line attacked by German bombing party, repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy; 21st October: enemy bombardment of 6 hours' duration; 27th February 1916: unsuccessful raid by 1/8th bombing party to capture prisoners. The Butcher Diary and the 1/7th War Diary are sometimes at complete variance, e.g. 18th August 1915: "Nothing much to say during day" (Butcher Diary), "Heavy trench mortars fell in our line doing considerable damage at 5 am and 6 pm" (1/7th War Diary); 30th August 1915: "Heavy bombardment by both sides during the day" (Butcher Diary), "Nothing to report" (1/7th War Diary). As Espin and Butcher were on the spot, kept their diaries in their tunic pockets, and pencilled in their entries whenever they had an odd moment to spare, their records should be fuller and more complete as regards events than those of their battalion war diaries.

5. Personal documents: diaries, notebooks, memoirs and letters

With the exception of letters written to Editors of local newspapers and the possible exception of C.H. Tetley's Diary, the personal documents used in the present study were private and were never intended for publication or to be read outside the family and acquaintance circle. The Reynard Memoirs were intended to assist research for the present study and were not written with publication in mind. Sgt Alchorne appears to have written his memoirs chiefly for himself, in an attempt to assuage his physical and emotional sufferings.

As C. A. Moser and G. Kalton point out, at their best personal documents "can give a personal and authentic picture of how people see themselves and their environment."[10] The personal documents, together with oral evidence, were used to reconstruct attitudes of Leeds Riflemen during the 1914-18 period. There are no grounds for doubting the authenticity of the letters published in the local newspapers. Nearly all appeared with names and personal details appended; some had been written by respondents, who delightedly vouched for their authenticity. Many of the letters were accompanied by photographs. Moreover, there was a high level of correspondence in tone and content between these letters and the other personal documents and oral evidence.

The veracity of a good many soldiers' letters published in newspapers in earlier wars had been challenged. A letter to his comrades at Carlton Barracks, dated 29th May 1900, from Sgt Frank Hirst, serving with the Volunteer Service Company in South Africa, which gives details of the Sick List and which is stuffed with typical soldier's grouses such as "We have forgot what beer is like out here", carries the postscript "Don't let a line of this go in the Papers". Col. Sgt. Harry Rhodes, who in nearly two years' service in South Africa never fired a shot in anger and never caught so much as a glimpse of the enemy, wrote to comrades on 29th August 1900:

> "I was shown Capt. MacKillop's letter[11] which appeared in the Leeds papers and I hoped nobody would be foolish enough to publish any of my letters as I don't want any war correspondents denouncing me in public lectures. Some fellows from here are writing tales of thrilling experiences and the only fire they have seen has been in the cookhouse."[12]

In guerilla wars, lengthy periods of inactivity and boredom, inevitably accompanied by feelings of frustration and discontent, fall to the soldiers' lot.

It seems highly unlikely that any World War I soldier at the front for the first time would find the life so boring and unexciting that he found it necessary to embroider his experiences in letters home, despite the criticisms of junior officers (who censored letters) who failed to recognise that differences in perception of events existed. 2nd/Lt Hugh Lupton told his parents in June 1915:

> "there have been some rather amusing and absolutely absurd letters in the papers (chiefly YEP) from our men. One I censored from a man who has hardly heard a rifle bullet but who in the letter had had multitudinous hair-breadth escapes. I have never seen such inventors as a lot of our people are, otherwise censoring would scarcely be tolerable."[13]

This was hardly fair, coming from a member of HQ staff. The battalion had lost 24 men killed and at least 40 wounded by 19th June, the date of Lupton's letter. His remarks should be viewed in the context of his other letters to his parents in which he constantly strove to reassure them that he was in little personal danger.

Reassurance is a major source of bias and distortion in World War I soldiers' letters. Ian Hay wrote in 1915 that his soldiers' letters were characterised by "assurances to anxious wives and mothers that the dangers of modern warfare are merely nominal. There is an almost entire absence of boasting or lying, and very little complaining. There is a general and obvious desire to allay anxiety. We are all 'fine', we are all 'in the pink', 'This is a grand life!'"[14] These remarks may have applied to the more thoughtful soldier. They certainly applied to 2/Lt Lupton, and to Sgt A.L. Pearson, 1/8th, who wrote to his mother on 6th November 1915, the day he won the DCM,

> "Since I started this letter we have had a dugout blown in, and four chaps shaken up. I don't think they are very bad. We set to, and soon got them out. It was a very unnerving experience for them, but they will soon recover."[15]

They did not apply to Knowles, nor to the majority of the writers of other letters seen. Insurance clerk Signaller 2304 Harold Richardson, 1/8th, for instance, wrote from the Salient on 21st July 1915:

> "things are.... more exciting and dangerous than some of you at home imagine, for we don't know whether we shall be living 15 minutes hence."[16]

One of Knowles' remarks, "their Artillery are rotten shots and it is only rank bad luck when anyone gets hurt",[17] might appear to be a soothing reassurance, but it was actually only a slightly exaggerated statement of fact.

Ian Hay's sweeping generalisation has been accepted as fact by many writers. According to a recent commentator, posterity appears to wonder why, in their letters home, front-line soldiers never told "the truth about the war" [whatever that was], but instead stuck to cliché messages.[18] Yet many letters seen did attempt to describe conditions as they really were, and exhibit a cheerful bloodthirstiness, complete with gruesome details, often explicit,[19] phrased in an unemotional and detached manner which civilians might easily, but quite mistakenly, take as evidence of an insensitive and callous brutality. Rfm W. E. Paul, 1/8th, a National Reservist, a married man with three children, of Kirkstall Road East, wrote to his wife:

> "Only yesterday Sergeant Denton, of Hollis Street [the next street but one to his own], had a peep out of a porthole about the size of a crown piece and immediately half his head was blown off.... In the trench here are dozens of dead bodies, and the stench is horrible. About five yards from our trench are the bodies of two 18 year old lads who had been wounded and crawled back to die. The bodies are horrible to look at, and as we cannot get to bury them, we have to leave them there."[20]

Butcher kept a diary primarily as an aide-memoire for his letters. One of his entries is

> "Capt Redmayne wounded. The same bullet that hit him went through Col. Sgt. Wilkinson's head first."[21]

If front line soldiers appeared to be reticent in their letters about both the conditions and their experiences it was because they lacked sufficient powers of expression or because, after a time, the conditions and experiences had become so commonplace they were seldom considered worthy of comment. The parody of an other ranks' letter produced by Oxford don, Lt. A.G. Heath, 6th Royal West Kent Regt, characterised by its "crudity of construction and poverty of thought",[22] is quite typical of the elementary school educated soldier of average to below-average attainment. Many rankers' letters are full of trivialities, the mundane problems and details of everyday life. This may have been a consequence of the practice in childhood of keeping a diary, so popular an assignment given by Sunday School teachers to their charges; the keeping of diaries may itself be a legacy of childhood Sunday School. Soldiers cannot be blamed for putting lighter-hearted experiences in their letters. Chapter 9, section 9.3 demonstrated how quickly the novelty of the front-line situation wore off and soldiering there became just another job. Richard Aldington was disappointed when he reached the front for the first time to find that veterans spoke of their everyday experiences in such "a trivial and uninteresting way." They did not protest or agonise about the war; they had not even tried to think it out. "They went on with the business" of war.[23] It appears unrealistic to expect the average veteran soldier's letter to be anything more than a routine collection of important trivialities of the "clean shirt today" and "lettuce for tea" category. There is little need to postulate speculative explanations such as Benny Green's: "The truth was simply too obscene to convey to those who had never experienced it for themselves."[24]

Several popular misconceptions about censorship exist. Paul Fussell is in error when he states that if soldiers "did ever write the truth, it was excised by company officers, who censored all outgoing mail."[25] Only items of information valuable to the enemy, such as names of formations, locations, details of casualties, criticism of higher command, were excised. Denis Winter is also in error when he states that the Censor suppressed the publication in the press of serving soldiers' letters in mid-1915.[26] Leeds newspapers continued to publish soldiers' letters throughout the war. The publication of battalion numbers was officially banned at the beginning of April 1916. The Leeds newspapers circumvented the censorship by continuing to refer to the "Leeds Rifles", "Leeds Pals", "Leeds Bantams", etc. This in turn was banned as from approximately 28th August 1916, although a few such references, as well as the appellation "Rifleman" or "Rfm", continued for some weeks to slip through in obituary or wounded notices. An Army Order published in June 1916 forbade officers and soldiers to publish, without special authority, any article, whether purporting to be fiction or fact, which in any way dealt with the war or with military subjects.[27] Letters, however, continued to be published. Despite news management and the under-recording of British casualties, there does not appear to have been any attempt by the authorities to shield the reading public from the horrible realities of modern warfare. The Yorkshire Post, for instance, published on 6th July 1916 a letter, apparently from an officer in hospital in England, giving a vivid but gruesome eye-witness account of hand-to-hand fighting on 1st July, and on 14th July, a horrific letter by Sgt W. Moran, West Yorkshire Regt, of Burley-in-Wharfedale, describing his personal experiences on the same day. Patrick MacGill's often horrifying anti-war book, The Great Push, in which he recounted his experiences at Loos shortly after he had undergone them, was passed by the official censor and published in 1916. The keeping of private diaries by all ranks of serving soldier was forbidden in May 1916.

The number of soldiers' letters published in the Leeds newspapers diminished considerably from 1916. There were a number of reasons: their novelty value wore off; the letters themselves tended to be repetitive; the amount of information, even of the most trivial kind, that a soldier could give was necessarily limited, not only by censorship, but also by his extremely narrow horizons; war correspondents' despatches were available in much greater number and scope than earlier in the war; last, but by no means least, local units rapidly began to lose their local character from August 1916.

The bulk of personal documents and of oral evidence used in the present study is confined to the period up to the end of 1916. Sanderson and Perry never finished their memoirs; Wainwright stopped writing in his notebook in July 1915, Wall was wounded, Smith killed; diarists Butcher and Espin were invalided home, whilst 2/Lt, formerly Sergeant, Burrell obeyed orders to discontinue his diary; the newspapers published far fewer letters from 1916 for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. The vast majority of the respondents were "originals" who had been wounded and/or transferred to other formations by the end of 1916 (the machine-gunners, including Lt Bellerby, were transferred to the Machine-Gun Corps in January 1916). Few were still serving with the Regiment in 1917 and 1918. Conscripts from other parts of the country and men transferred in from other regiments started to appear in the Regiment in ever-increasing numbers from August 1916. There were no respondents belonging to the former category, though there were several in the latter category who happened to be local men.

6. Published Secondary Sources relating to the World War I period

World War I is a historical topic powerfully pervaded by mythology,[28] a mythology that has significantly affected popular images of the war and one that has been considerably strengthened since the 1960s by hypotheses that have been drawn from the published accounts, novels and poetry of a very small number of participants who were clearly highly untypical of the great mass of British servicemen[29] and who may be described collectively as "The 'Disenchanted' School of war literature." Several of these works possess great literary merit and are deservedly widely known.

The literary works, which include "popular" verse and lyrics of soldiers' songs, used as historical sources in the present study are, however, very largely drawn from what might be termed "The Alternative World War I literature", relatively or completely unknown works, many written by Territorials, which have been chosen because they appear, in the views and attitudes they express, to be much more representative both of the mass of British soldiery and of the respondents in the present study, and because they appear to be less subject to the biases and distortions produced by authors' psychoneuroses; by the political climate ruling during the period of composition or at the time of publication; or by the imagination of a significant creative talent. Many of the "Disenchanted" war books of the 1928-31 period were only too readily accepted by the reading public of the time as "the truth about the war".[30] Paul Fussell, in his analysis of World War I literature, The Great War and Modern Memory (1975), has demonstrated that these reminiscences were, in actuality, novels masquerading as memoirs, "a kind of fiction differing from the 'first novel' (conventionally an account of crucial youthful experience told in the first person) only by continuous implicit attestations of veracity or appeals to documented historical fact", and novels, moreover, with stereotyped stage character-types and "plots" conforming to recognised literary conventions.[31]

7. Oral evidence

Oral evidence is information obtained by interviewing. (If a personal document is defined as one which reveals a participant's view of experiences in which he has been involved, it is not absolutely essential that the participant should have written the document himself. A careful verbatim transcription of an interview with the participant may therefore be regarded as a personal document provided it is free from the interviewer's own interpretation.)[32] As a method of data-collection the interview is a significant research tool in a wide range of academic disciplines, eg. medicine, sociology, anthropology, psychology, education, geography. It cannot be said, however, that its use as such is universally accepted in the historical field. Oral testimony is regarded by many historians as untrustworthy, and not without some justification (though, illogically, the Minutes of oral evidence given before Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Select Committees, and the Reports chiefly based on oral evidence, often seem to be accepted at face value). A common objection to oral testimony is that memory is so subject to error as to invalidate the usefulness of the retrospective interview.[33] This is an extreme view with which no medical or legal practitioner, or police officer, would agree. It is, of course, true that no one possesses the power of total recall, but this argument could be used equally tellingly against any kind of historical source. Thompson points out that people can exhibit remarkably accurate memories for things they are particularly interested in. He gives from his own research some striking examples of "remarkable snatches of accuracy."[34]

The retrospective interview is only one of many methods that can be used for constructing social history, none of which can be claimed to be superior or more significant than any other. Every type of source available to the historian has certain advantages and limitations peculiar to itself, and every one contains an inherent bias. There is no such thing as "an absolute historical truth". Oral testimony can be assessed and evaluated in exactly the same way as any other kind of historical evidence, and the problems attached to using it as an historical source are not, in fact, dissimilar to those attached to other historical sources.[35] There are no adequate grounds for believing that oral evidence, properly obtained and properly used, is significantly less reliable as a historical source than any other.

In the present study, oral evidence was turned to in some desperation, but it proved to be not merely a stop-gap substitute for other sources but a valuable historical source in itself, in turns complementing, supplementing, even re-interpreting other types of evidence.

Compared with some other research tools, the interview, provided proper safeguards are used, possesses some positive advantages. Evidence can be obtained in an atmosphere of privacy and confidence; generalisations, ambiguities, inconsistencies can be probed; amplification can be sought where data is inadequate; some sources of bias can be considerably reduced by the interviewer's own behaviour.[36] There are many research situations where the retrospective interview is an invaluable, even indispensable tool, particularly in the reconstruction of the past event that was sketchily documented or totally undocumented (but, see below); in the study of motives, attitudes and opinions; for obtaining information that had not previously been recorded, e.g. because it was thought too trivial to be worth writing down; for obtaining information that was originally recorded but has since been destroyed for one reason or another. For many purposes the interview is the most flexible and versatile method of gathering information, and is the only feasible method of acquiring certain kinds of data.[37] One of its major virtues is that it offers a unique opportunity to the investigator to "check his own interpretation of the data with that of his respondents - an advantage that is virtually essential if he is studying a culture different from his own."[38] To give only one example from the present study: 88, instead of the expected 125, Other Ranks appear on a photograph of G Coy of the 7th Bn taken at the end of August 1914. The explanation given by respondents from this company is not the one that obviously offers itself, that the company was under strength at the time, but that only men who were properly dressed, i.e. possessed the full uniform, were allowed to appear on the photograph.

The interview has a further important value to a historian: it is a method of discovering personal documents.[39] Many of the documents used in the present study were actually obtained in this way.

Oral evidence has several advantages as a historical source. It enables the historian to counteract the bias in conventional historical sources which were commonly produced by the more articulate, better-educated and higher-status members of society. It extends the scope of history. By introducing new evidence from the underside of the past, "by shifting the focus and opening new areas of inquiry, by challenging some of the assumptions and accepted judgements of historians, by bringing recognition to substantial groups of people who had been ignored, a cumulative process of transformation is set in motion. The scope of historical writing itself is enlarged and enriched; and at the same time its social message changes. History becomes, to put it simply, more democratic." It becomes possible to capture the unique flavour of the experiences of ordinary people.[40]

Oral evidence does have a serious disadvantage as a historical source: its own scope is limited. As George Ewart Evans has repeatedly demonstrated, people remember best what they encountered most often in everyday life: work practices, and family and community relationships. Memories are unreliable when it comes to remembering time sequences and disconnected facts. As a 1979 journal editorial on Oral History expressed it,

> "A vast body of existing work demonstrates beyond doubt that memory can be a rich source of information for areas of personal experience; it is when the oral historian moves from the 'personal' into the 'political' arena that memory presents more of a problem."[41]

Thompson admits that it is a very difficult task to reconstruct an historical event entirely on oral evidence.[42]

Some writers of military history take the view that battles ought to be and are best described through the words of participants. Yet very few men are able to recall clearly details of military actions in which they have taken part: everything happens so quickly, everything seems to be in utter confusion, swallowed up in "the fog of war". For his book, which was published in 1923, Capt E.C. Gregory collected all available participant-accounts, written and oral, of the 2/6th WYR's part in the attack on Bullecourt on 3rd May 1917. He was obliged to record: "All personal accounts from those who actually participated in the engagement are very hazy and indistinct."[43] John Ellis found that hardly any veteran giving a personal account was able to give a lucid version of what had happened, and what he or his unit had actually accomplished.[44] 1688 Harry Slater MM, 2/8th, went as far as to declare that any man who claimed to be able to do this was "a bloody liar who was making most of it up."[45] Although he was himself an intelligent man of above-average recall, he was able to recollect only isolated incidents concerning the capture of La Montagne de Bligny. In the present study it was found that respondents' recollections of a particular event were essentially fragmentary, with the result that a great many testimonies would have generally been necessary to establish anything approaching precise facts about any one event. A minor or unusual incident was often enough all a respondent could remember of a major action.

The questioning of respondents in the present study was therefore restricted to areas of personal experience, to what they themselves remembered having done, seen or experienced, and the information given was checked against all other related reliable sources. Emphasis has been placed in the text on respondents' recollections of everyday occurrences and of their opinions and attitudes, which were found to possess a high order of reliability.[46]

The problems and pitfalls to be encountered in obtaining oral evidence are described below.

8. The Respondents

Oral evidence was obtained from 5 different sets of respondents:

(1) [a] 132 men who had served in the Leeds Rifles between 1904 and 1918;

(1)[b] 15 men who had served in the Regiment between 1920 and 1939;

(2) 66 surviving next-of-kin of deceased men in category (1)[a];

(3) 32 ex-members of other Territorial units, all arms, who served in the period 1908-1918;

(4)[a] 14 members of the Leeds and District branch of The Old Contemptibles Association (including 1 Territorial);

(4)[b] 4 men who served in other units of the Regular Army between 1904 and 1918;

(5) 4 senior citizens (who provided background data on certain social areas of the city which could not be obtained from respondents in the other sets), together with a number of other people who provided other information on various topics.

The sets of respondents were not selected at the outset, but increased in number and scope as the study developed. The research topic specified the respondent sets. Certain information regarding demographic characteristics was sought from respondents in set (2), the majority of whom were women. Several were extremely helpful, demonstrating that secondary oral sources are not to be spurned. Typical was Mrs Lily Petty, wife of 560 Cpl William Petty and sister of 1219 CSM Arthur Fozard, 8th Bn: "We used to have Leeds Rifles for breakfast, dinner and tea. Not that I minded. I'd been brought up to it with Arthur. I'm very proud of the Leeds Rifles myself."[47]

Information regarding personal demographic characteristics and information about his regiment or corps, to be used for the purposes of comparison, was sought from respondents in sets (3) and 4[a] and 4[b].

All possible respondents in Category 1[a] were traced, approached and interviewed. No one declined to be interviewed. Respondent set 1[a] can therefore be described as a whole, rare population. It was a heterogeneous population, and contained representatives of all ranks up to Captain. The respondents had only 3 things in common: sex, nationality and previous membership of the Leeds Rifles. The population was very broadly socially representative of the Leeds population of the period under study, although no claim to strict representativeness is possible.

Random sampling was inappropriate. Representative samples cannot be taken from old people in any case. Any group of, say, 80 year olds, cannot be a balanced cross-section of their generation in the past, since it can take no account of migration or of differential mortality between occupations and social classes.[48]

Some of the category 1[a] respondents would have been classed by social surveyors as uninterviewable by reason of deafness, blindness, infirmity, or speech impediments. Each of these so-called uninterviewable men had a valuable contribution of some kind to make. Social surveyors would further disapprove of the interviewing results since (a) every respondent was not asked all the questions, and (b) a large number, probably to be classed as "excessive", of "Don't know" or "Don't remember" replies was received. One interview was not completed because the respondent died suddenly before the second visit.

Although defining the respondents was easy, identifying and tracing them proved a difficult, even colossal task. Richardson *et al.* note[49] that the use of the mass media as a means of communicating the investigator's purposes to the potential respondents may be damaging rather than helpful. This was found to be all too true in this case. Appeals by local press, radio and television for survivors of the Aberdeen Artillery brought no response. Appeals for former members of the Leeds Rifles and other local Territorial units made by the *Evening Post*, by two Jewish newspapers, by the *Dewsbury and Batley Reporter*, and by BBC Radio Leeds, produced respectively 5, 1, 1, and 1 respondents. Fortunately, another source of respondents remained. In 1964 I recruited and organised a Leeds Rifles' Old Comrades Association for men who had joined the Regiment in 1914. It had a membership of over 200 and was disbanded in 1970. Surviving members were contacted and asked for their cooperation. An appreciable number of respondents was additionally obtained by personal contact: every man interviewed was asked if he knew of any other former member of the regiment who had served in the period 1908-1918. In most cases, unfortunately, the respondent had only a vague idea of the man's address (or even, in some cases, of the address of someone who might know his address) and much searching of electoral lists, telephoning people of the same surname and initial, and knocking on doors, was involved in tracing these men. Further respondents were recruited as a result of news items concerning them or letters they had written being published in the local newspapers. The majority of the respondents in sets 3, 4[b], and 5 were obtained by this method.

In readily identifiable groups there are often problems for the investigator with the "gatekeeper", a person having power and/or influence over the set of respondents.[50] In order to obtain a respondent set from the local branch of the Old Contemptibles Association, the assistance of the organising Secretary was first solicited. He provided a most helpful letter of introduction. Thompson emphasises that people are much easier to approach with a personal recommendation from a friend.[51]

Every kind of survey, whatever the topic of research, presents its own problems and difficulties. In the present study, the initial special problems fell into two main categories: (a) those relating to old age, and (b) those relating to the group.

It is axiomatic that many elderly people who may have difficulty in remembering what happened the previous day are capable of recalling their adolescence and early adulthood with astonishing clarity and reliability.[52] The problems of interviewing old people who are healthy are not intrinsically worse than those of interviewing younger people. Thompson found that it "raises no fundamental methodological issues which do not also apply to interviewing in general."[53]

Since a regiment is a total organisation it is not surprising that the old comrades of a regiment form what is virtually a kind of quasi-secret society, with strong religious or mystical overtones, the religion being that of "The Regiment" itself. Anyone who wishes to study a military unit must first penetrate its "freemasonry". This may be an extremely difficult, even impossible, task.

Any investigator who wishes to use the interview as a research tool must take into consideration the customary modes of interpersonal behaviour of his respondents, who fall into two broad yet distinct groups, the "universalistic" (educated and sophisticated persons) and the "particularistic", or "folk", mode (unsophisticated persons).[54] Old soldiers not only conform broadly with these behaviour patterns but also in addition adopt the mode of behaviour of members of an in-group in relation to a member of an out-group who desires to gain admittance to their select circle. The investigator has, to use a military expression, "to pass muster" before the old soldier will permit the interview to take place. It was necessary for me to convince each respondent, irrespective of whether he fell into the universalistic or particularistic category, that I was a fit and proper person to undertake this particular research. The respondents were particularly anxious to establish my family regimental affiliations. Fortunately for me, an article about me entitled "The Daughter of the Regiment", written by the then Editor, himself a former commanding officer of the Leeds Rifles, had appeared in the Evening Post in 1965.

It was on the basis of being recognised as "The Daughter of the Regiment" that I was welcomed into the "freemasonry" to become an "insider".[55] My father and god-fathers had been well-known figures in the 8th Bn and an appreciable number of respondents had known them personally; a number of other respondents had also known my father during his 5 years' service in the 7th Bn between 1908 and 1913. The respondents were able to satisfy themselves that I had been born and brought up in the Regiment and was thoroughly familiar with its folklore and traditions and with the history of its military operations. On making the initial approach to a respondent I always wore a Regimental sweetheart's brooch (to which I drew his attention, if necessary) and always produced a large collection of photographs (which proved an invaluable stimulus to memory) and my father's discharge certificate for his inspection. My "qualifications" were found to be impeccable and, significantly, I did not have one refusal. I am completely convinced, however, that had I not possessed these qualifications, my research project would never have even got off the ground. The kind of information that I sought on this tightly-closed society - on past events, past behaviour, past attitudes, moral values, feelings (whether habitual or stemming from a specific event), habits of recreation, everyday routines - would never have been given by its members to someone considered an outsider. The interviewer's "role as stranger" would have elicited no rich material here. Not a few of the respondents made statements such as: "I have never discussed these matters with a living soul before"; "I never told my wife and family about these things"; "You are privileged - I have never told anybody this."

Old soldiers in general follow a modified mode of this behaviour, as might be expected, since, when recalling his Army days, the former soldier will simultaneously revert to the mental attitudes of a member of an in-group which automatically classes all civilians as outsiders. He expects the interviewer to be familiar with the history of his regiment or corps and with military life, lore and jargon generally. The veteran is not usually prepared to waste his time being interviewed by a person ignorant of these matters.

9. The interview

The interviewing of respondents in set 1[a] was started in the spring of 1973 and the bulk of the interviews was completed by the end of that year. The respondents had to be interviewed as early in the research programme as possible because of their very low life expectancy. The first few interviews were of a general information-gathering nature and constituted a kind of "pilot study". Where possible these respondents were seen again at a later stage in the programme. This was not an ideal method, for as the research began to take shape, new topics and perspectives manifested themselves and frequently respondents who had already been interviewed could not be re-interviewed because they had removed due to motorway building or slum clearance schemes, or developed a serious illness, or died. This is the reason, for instance, why all respondents were not questioned about previous membership of the boys' brigades or Boy Scouts, or asked whether they were teetotalers when they enlisted.

Respondents in set 4[a] were interviewed in 1974. The respondents in the remaining sets were interviewed as they became available during the period 1974-9.

The principles of interviewing followed in this study were those laid down in Chapters 1-6 of S.A. Richardson _et al._, _Interviewing: its forms and functions_ (1965).[56] The historian should note that the principles underlying the research interview are universally applicable, whether the topic of research is child-rearing techniques, courtship customs in the working classes, the nature of early leaving in secondary education before 1960, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, or whatever.

As the same kind of information was required from each respondent in each set, the standardised, or structured, interview, which was designed for this purpose, was used. This takes three forms: (1) the schedule; (2) the non-schedule, or "informal" interview; and (3) a combination of the two, often known as a "guided", or "focused", interview. The "informal" method of interviewing, a flexible technique designed for a heterogeneous population of respondents,[57] was used with respondents in set 5. In all the remaining sets the combined, or "guided", interviewing method was used.

Certain questions that sought information regarding demographic characteristics: full name, regimental number, company, platoon, unit, address and age at and date of enlistment, civilian occupation, name of employer, level of education, father's occupation, were scheduled, while the remaining topics, which formed the bulk of the information sought, were pursued by means of non-schedule interviewing. Instead of a schedule of questions I worked with a list of all the information required from each respondent: reason for enlisting; social inheritance factors involved in decision; parents' attitudes to enlistment and to the Regular Army; personal attitude to the unit; social atmosphere in the unit; personal opinions of the officers and NCOs; personal attitudes to the Regular Army, to other units in the division, to rear echelons, to British civilians, to foreign civilians, to the enemy; reactions to the first time in the line and the first time in action; everyday routines on active service; recollections of major actions and incidents.

The interview was by turns directive and non-directive.[58] A mixture of open and closed questions was used and lines of direction could be planned beforehand. Wherever possible, questions with a respondent antecedent, i.e. linked to something the respondent had said earlier, were used. More information was obtained about respondents' values and feelings and about their interpretations of comrades' values and feelings through subjective rather than objective questions.

Out of respect for the respondents' cultural mores, personal questions on the traditionally taboo subjects, sex, religion and politics, were avoided. Nevertheless, a large number of respondents were willing to answer questions about religious activities within the Regiment, once the topic had been introduced in a roundabout way, preferably by means of a question with a respondent antecedent. Several volunteered information about religious and political convictions. Questions were not asked on private and sensitive matters such as personal grief on the loss of a close friend or relative. Some respondents clearly did not wish to discuss certain topics, for example, the Battle of Poelcappelle, and these were immediately dropped completely unless the respondent himself chose to resurrect them later in the interview.

The ground covered and the length of time spent in each interview varied considerably from one respondent to another. Some respondents were seen only once, others twice or several times. Some interviews were short, perhaps lasting only an hour or so, but considerable time, extending to several interviews each of up to 4 hours' duration, was spent with respondents who seemed particularly knowledgeable or to possess above-average recall. If they demonstrated sufficient knowledge or interest, certain broader or specialised topics, e.g. the role of the Territorials, were discussed with the better educated and more intelligent respondents. Respondents were often asked to comment on opinions or statements of other respondents. They were frequently asked to comment on statements that had appeared in published books, or on the books themselves if they had read them.

Since someone investigating a culture different from his own will often not know what to look for nor understand the significance of what he sees and hears, it is absolutely essential, in order to be able to understand and interpret a testimony, for the historian who is using the retrospective interview as a source to be familiar with and therefore understand the culture and language of the people he is studying.[59] Moreover, it is generally true, as Thompson points out, that "the more one knows, the more likely one is to elicit significant historical information from an interview."[60] It is particularly important for an investigator whose population of respondents consists of ex-soldiers to have a vast military background knowledge and especially a sound knowledge both of the civilian society of the period under study and of military law and the disciplinary code, if only to avoid being duped. The ex-soldier as a type is notorious on account of the ghoulish delight he takes in regaling credulous civilians with highly-coloured stories of his disasters and sufferings.[61]

The necessity for such knowledge is illustrated by the following examples. A respondent who was embodied at the age of 14½ years, though his official age was 18, stated that his mother was pleased he had been called to the Colours. He was one less mouth to feed and the weekly allotment he could make her as an adult soldier exceeded his civilian wage as an apprentice. A respondent gave as one of his reasons for enlisting in the 8th Bn before the war "to escape from the Overseers of the Poor who were trying to put me back in the Workhouse." He had been of no fixed abode and without visible means of support. T F sergeants and officers were people who could find jobs for the unemployed and respectable lodgings for the homeless. Another respondent reported the rejoinder of a comrade to an officer who had made a remark his hearers considered unforgiveable: "We tame lions in the front line here". The man was trying to administer a rebuke without laying himself open to a disciplinary charge; "We tame lions here" was the traditional implied threat of the Regular Army drill-sergeant to "hard cases". Several respondents stated that during the Regiment's first weeks of front-line duty, the Germans had often waved a spade from side to side, the "wash-out sign" used on the rifle range, to signal a "Miss". This was an enemy ruse commonly employed on inexperienced troops. Some writers have thought that it demonstrated that the Germans possessed British-type "sporting instincts" or that it indicated that "Hate the Hun" propaganda had failed to penetrate as far as the front line.[62]

The interviews took place individually in an atmosphere of privacy and confidence. Respondents were not interviewed in the presence of an old comrade or of a friend, because of the well-known "bullfrog effect" seen in groups of ex-soldiers;[63] occasionally, the respondent's wife was within earshot. An attempt was made to standardise the conditions under which the interviews took place: nearly all interviews took place in the respondent's own home, although, as a matter of necessity, one man was interviewed in a cafe (where the management had no objection to their patrons lingering), two men in hospital medical wards, and two in long-stay geriatric wards.

All testimonies were taken down in the form of shorthand notes and written up later the same day in a standardised form which would facilitate analysis. A tape-recorder was not used, because of the expense involved in purchasing suitable equipment.[64] The quotations from respondents' testimony used in the text are literal transcripts. On occasions, for the sake of brevity, a digest of what the respondent said is given.

No respondent was offered, or given, payment, whether in money or in kind, for the interview(s). It did not prove particularly difficult to motivate respondents.[65] The respondents' participation was further encouraged by formulating the questions asked in wording appropriate for each respondent and in language congenial to the respondent, according to his educational level and social class. This meant that the majority of respondents were spoken to in the local vernacular.

A certain amount of oral testimony related to specific topics was obtained from members of the Leeds Rifles 1914 Old Comrades' Association in 1968. A list giving the names of men who supplied such testimony but who died before the present study was commenced is given in the Bibliography, section I.C.

Assessing validity of response:[66] Wherever possible the response was compared with some dependable evidence from a source external to the interview, such as documentary or photographic evidence. The three main methods of evaluating response validity were used: external checks, internal checks and overall assessment of the respondent himself.

In the case of the respondents in set 1, it was possible, in addition, to cross-check the validity of any one response with several others; this was not possible in sets 3, 4[a] and [b] and 5. These external checks on respondents in set 1[a] produced some remarkable examples of correspondence. For example, several groups of respondents who were not in collusion produced almost identical accounts of certain events; one man expressed an opinion of an officer that was later discovered, virtually word for word, in a letter he had written to the officer's mother 56 years earlier; several respondents gave accounts of events that corresponded identically in detail with accounts given in letters written by others at the time. A mustard gas victim stated that he was one of the very last of the 1/8th to go to hospital and that when he left there were only 2 officers and 25 men remaining, figures which correspond exactly to those given in the 1/8th War Diary for July 1917. He could not have read these facts since they have never been published.

A respondent can, of course, be asked a number of questions for which external checks exist in order to test the reliability of his powers of recall. There are kinds of data, however, such as the whole area of a respondent's feelings or his personal interpretation of others' feelings, for which no direct external corroboration can be obtained. In such situations, reliance was placed on evidence available within the interview itself, such as whether inconsistencies existed, whether the various overlapping, related or repetitious pieces of information hung together, whether the account rang true psychologically, and whether the respondents' level of knowledge, his background and experience qualified him to give a valid response to the question asked of him. The last point is an important one. For instance, one respondent challenged his comrades' consensus of opinion that George Mangham, Regimental Public Enemy No. 1 of the 1/7th, was a completely worthless soldier on the grounds that this man was sent out on all A Coy patrols and that the OC, Major Bousfield, never went into No Man's Land without him. The respondent did not know, or had forgotten, that soldiers condemned to a period of Field Punishment No. 1 were obliged to perform all their military duties in the front line under observation, were on call at all times for any dirty or dangerous fatigues or patrols and were deprived of all privileges;[67] this part of the respondent's testimony could therefore be disregarded. Another respondent was firmly convinced that, because his officers did not call up artillery retaliation in the summer of 1915, they were completely lacking in guts.

Because he was virtually illiterate, he did not know about the shell shortage and the strict rationing of ammunition at that period.

If, for one reason or another, an interviewer cannot obtain external or internal validity checks, he is obliged to fall back on an overall assessment of the respondent's manner of response. This is a difficult area, and it is impossible to be dogmatic about the "ideal" type of respondent, since much depends on the research topic and the type of survey involved. Someone with a university education does not necessarily make the best type of respondent, for instance.[68] Deviants, those who are somehow maladjusted in their group, people who have a psychological need for an audience, because they are friendless, or believe themselves to have been unjustly treated by Fate or their fellows, or who are inordinately proud of their personal life-history, tend to be the most easily available of respondents for any kind of survey, but should be eschewed unless they belong to a whole, rare population. "Normal" or "average" people tend to be difficult to persuade to act as informants, and are much less likely to present themselves in response to appeals in the media.

Something of a menace to the historian seeking oral evidence is the person of about or rather below average intelligence who has read books relevant to the research topic. His opinions may be considerably coloured by hindsight, or they may be second-hand, or he may come out, in good faith and quite unwittingly, with a popular myth or historical fallacy which he has obtained from a book or newspaper, thus lending it a specious validity. One fallacy often seen in print is that Pals' battalions were discontinued after 1916 because their decimation brought such tragedy to the areas in which they had been raised.[69] This is a beautiful example of the spurious association. These two facts, though true, were completely unrelated. The alteration in the character and composition of locally-raised battalions was brought about by the necessity to make good, in as short a time as possible, manpower shortages from the central pool available at the Infantry Base; conscription considerably speeded up the process of change.

The best respondents in the present study were found to be the educationally deprived, i.e. men who had had to leave school at the age of 13 or 14 (after being obliged to refuse a scholarship to a grammar school for financial reasons)but who had been capable of benefiting from higher education to the age of 18 or beyond, and who were apparently unaware of the fact. They had keen, but relatively uncluttered minds and possessed exceptional powers of recall. Almost as good were the educationally deprived men who were aware of their deprivation and who had attempted to remedy their deficiency through self-education. It was strikingly noticeable that respondents who had left their pre-war social milieu after returning from World War I, particularly those who had lost all contact with their comrades, performed significantly less well. George Ewart Evans discovered that, in rural areas, his richest material was given to him by "unlettered people" whom he found to be, in any case, "more forthcoming."[70]

Certain barriers to validity exist, such as those of awareness and irrationality.[71] People are frequently unaware of their own motives and attitudes and are thus incapable of giving the fullest possible answers. A respondent's attitude may be largely latent and he may accordingly have never previously given the matter any thought. A real menace to validity is a common tendency for people, when they cannot remember the reason for a past action, to invent a hypothetical, but plausible explanation which may well pass for the real one. A good example of how this can mislead the unwary historian is given in P.W. Turner & R.H. Haigh, Not for Glory (1969), which is the personal history of Gilbert Hall, 13th Y & L (Barnsley Pals), compiled from oral testimony:

> ".... Gilbert and his friends were rejected when they first tried to enlist [in 1914] at the Territorial drill hall in Wath. The medical standards were extremely high and the recruiting officers were at first reluctant to accept colliers, conscious as they were of the importance of coal to the economy."[72]

The respondent has forgotten the real reason for his rejection, that recruiting had been closed, a consequence of the high rate of unemployment among miners in the autumn of 1914, and has substituted two plausible, but untrue, explanations. In the present study it was impressed upon every respondent that it did not matter if he could not answer any of the questions because he could not remember or because he never knew the answer. This appears to have had the desired effect of releasing the respondents from any obligation they may otherwise have felt to invent a plausible reply.

Although "the best safeguard" of validity "is said to be good rapport",[73] it is undoubtedly the interviewer's own knowledge of the research topic. This also applies to personal documents and published accounts.

The interviewer's own knowledge of the subject assumes particular importance in areas of research in which manly virtues and thus personal prestige factors are involved. Such areas include sport as well as war. Interviewers in these areas need to be on constant guard against respondents who are embroiderers, romancers, or even imposters. According to respondents in the present study, men who pretend to be ex-soldiers (often wearing regimental ties to which they have no entitlement) or to have been present at some notable battle are by no means rare. The motivation of such men may vary: a desire to win esteem, admiration, approval, reward, a desire to gain acceptance in a group, as when a man finds himself working, the odd man out, with a group of ex-soldiers who are fond of swapping reminiscences or who are contemptuous of men who did not "do their bit" overseas in the war. They may pretend to be a relative of a locally well-known soldier; they may possess photographs which appear to substantiate their claims. They have heard so many yarns from friends, acquaintances and relatives that they are able to relate them and pass them off to the gullible as their own experiences. The perpetrator of the following story does not appear to be a genuine front-line soldier, for the tale can be challenged on fact in sentences 1, 3, 5, 6 and 8 and it contains three violations of the front-line soldier's code of ethics (sentences 3 and 8):

> "Once there was a shortage of bread. Only one 2lb loaf arrived at our section at the front in the rations for 13 men. No one could decide the best way to divide it, so I suggested we had a race with the winner deciding whether he ate it himself, shared it with his pal or what. The race was a most unusual one. All the competitors took off their body belts, which were coated with tar to catch lice - in those dreadful conditions everyone picked up quite a few. Then the lice were dropped on to a board and bets put on them. Even our officer joined in backing one 'grey back'. However, by the time the race was over, we found some rotter had pinched the loaf and scoffed it while we were involved in the race."[74]

(This tale is known to many WWII infantrymen and can be classed as "military folklore".)

Such men can be unmasked by careful questioning. Any bona fide soldier can usually produce discharge papers or other documents, or give his regimental or Army number (which is stamped on World War I medals) without hesitation. He can give his CO's name and that of other officers and say what company he was in. He can identify people on photographs.

The war historian often encounters the "tale of artistic merit"[75] or "contemporary legend" masquerading as historical reportage. This is a tale which gives pleasure to both teller and listener, which panders to the universal love of the sensational, and in which violence must, by necessity, be done to the facts by distortion, exaggeration or downright falsification, and which brings its teller a reward, particularly if told in a public house or club - applause, murmurs of approval, popularity, perhaps free drink or cigarettes. Some express wishful thinking on the part of the teller. The only check on the verisimilitude of these tales is the listener's own knowledge. One of these tales is given above.

Experience suggests that embroiderers and romancers can be detected fairly easily. They are often addicted to the telling of "tales of artistic merit". They frequently overreach themselves or give themselves away by succumbing to the temptation to add artistic embellishments to their recollections. In the present study, suspects were not challenged, but instead were pressed for details that could be checked by some external means. An unfortunate characteristic of romancers and embroiderers from the investigator's point of view is that they may actually have come to believe the story themselves over the years.

The two items following appeared in the Yorkshire Evening Post of 8th November 1957 as tributes to the late Brigadier Sir A. M. Ramsden. The first was 'A memory of "Rammy" by "Thack"' [132 Sgt Harry Thackray, 1/8th]:

> "I believe I was the first man in the battalion to meet 'Rammy'. I was walking down the communication trench when I saw a young officer wearing black buttons whom I guessed to be new as I didn't know him. I took him to Bn HQ. I couldn't help noticing he was nervous and the officer disclosed that he had been on his way up with two other new officers but the others had both been knocked out by shell-fire on the way. 'So', he admitted, 'I'm rather wondering what the hell's going to happen to me.'"

This story, in which Sgt Thackray had come to believe implicitly himself, was almost completely untrue.[76] Ramsden was commissioned in the 8th Bn on 4/2/15 and immediately joined the 1/8th's officer recruits' squad being instructed by respondent, Lt J.B. Gawthorpe. He appears on the group photograph of officers taken by the Leeds Mercury at Gainsborough on 11th April 1915. He was not selected for the overseas party but, along with 2/Lts Burrows and Bellhouse, reported at the 2/8th on 15th April. Sgt Thackray personally may never have noticed him at

Gainsborough, but few others in the battalion would have not known him there. When he arrived in Belgium, Ramsden would have been wearing a Leeds Rifles badge in his cap, but Thackray omits mention of this. Ramsden's arrival alone was a fabrication. He was accompanied by Bellhouse and Paul Motley, and all three arrived quite unscathed at Bn HQ, to which Thackray was attached. Bellhouse, however, was wounded later the same day, whilst Motley was badly wounded 10 days later. The second concerned the alleged sole instance of Ramsden ever having been disobeyed - by an Irishman who, against specific orders, went out in broad daylight into No Man's Land when 'Rammy's' back was turned in order to capture a German flag. This amusing story was completely untrue. No such incident ever took place in the 1/8th and no respondent could even recall a single first-generation Irish immigrant in the Regiment. However, a cheeky and intrepid miner from Featherstone, Cpl W.H. Lappin of the 1/5th KOYLI, was awarded the DCM in October 1915 for a feat of daring that became celebrated throughout the 49th Division. In daylight under heavy rifle fire he crawled out into No Man's Land and brought back not only a large Bulgarian flag but the 9' high pole from which it had been fluttering.[77]

Tall stories, however, cannot be dismissed too readily, since some may well be true, however strange or incredible. Several respondents told of the circumstances surrounding the recovery of the body of Rfm Bailey, the first casualty of the 1/7th, several days after a swimming accident in the River Lys. A local "wise woman" offered her services in locating the body. She placed a piece of wood, on which stood a lighted candle, in the water and predicted - successfully - that the missing Rifleman would be found at the spot where the candle went out. This is a recognised piece of "folk magic"; it has a sound scientific basis, since a body decomposing beneath the water surface gives off gases which would extinguish a small flame. Lt Lupton wrote to his parents early in 1916 of the cow that was kept for milking at Battalion HQ. Two of his men, independently shown this letter, confirmed it was perfectly true, each adding that he had refrained from including this item in his testimony for fear of not being believed.

10. The mailed questionnaire

All respondents who lived within two hours' journey by public transport from Leeds were interviewed. The handful that remained were sent questionnaires.

14 questionnaires were sent and all were returned. Each was accompanied by an explanatory letter and a stamped, addressed envelope. All were returned within a few days.

The mailed questionnaire has considerable disadvantages.[78] As a form of personal document containing retrospective data on events and opinion, it is likely to be inadequate and unreliable. It is essentially an inflexible research tool. With a heterogeneous respondent set, each questionnaire has to be individually tailored for the respondent. The method of approach has to be carefully worked out in each case in order to minimise non-response, an important source of bias. The wording of the questions is important since "fatal ambiguities may lurk in the most unexpected quarters."[79] Differences in educational background and literacy may produce very different levels of understanding and capacity to respond. According to the different frames of reference of the respondents, the identically worded question may have a different meaning or different degrees of meaning. Owing to regional and cultural differences, words have different meanings and different words can be used to express the same meaning. There is also the important problem of the definitions to be used. For instance, a question to an ex-soldier like "Were you satisfied with the equipment you used?" would be incomprehensible, since "equipment" to him would denote the harness he wore on his upper body. The effect of the questions and their sequence on the respondent must be carefully considered, since the aim is to produce a helpful attitude in the respondent. Open, or free-response, questions cannot be satisfactorily used in a mailed questionnaire, since the respondent tends to give incomplete answers and to put down whatever comes first into his head. Multi-answer closed questions force the respondent to choose between given alternatives and may not supply the answer he wishes to give. A poorly-worded questionnaire will produce a narrow range of responses or be misunderstood by some respondents; it may be too wide in scope, too abstract, or too intimate.[80] The questions themselves may impose too much strain on the respondents' memories.

The questionnaire sent to Riflemen was necessarily short, in order to avoid tiring the respondent. In order to conform to the standardisation of the interviews it had perforce to contain open questions such as "Why did you enlist?" "Why did you choose the Leeds Rifles?" and "Why did you enlist in the 8th Bn instead of in the 7th?" Respondents naturally gave only one reason in answer to such questions and did not add any qualifications. Some answered all questions in as few words as possible;

it may have been difficult for them to see or to write. It was not possible to ask all the questions needed to produce an analysis comparable to that obtained from the interviews. Long covering handwritten letters or telephone calls were found necessary to take the place of the interview opening[81] in order to "sell" the questionnaire to the respondent and explain why it was so important that he took the trouble to reply.

The results of the questionnaire were variable and on the whole unsatisfactory. Only three respondents completed their questionnaires in the manner desired. All three were university graduates; in addition, each man sent a number of letters which amplified certain topics. The questionnaires obtained the demographic data sought satisfactorily, but many questions were inadequately answered. For example, in answer to the question "Did you have any relatives in the Leeds Rifles?" more than one man evidently thought the question applied only to brothers. This question was amended in later questionnaires to include all kinship categories. The chief difficulty encountered in questionnaire design was finding an acceptable format for respondents who were around the age of 80, and reconciling it with a document of acceptable length (two A4 pages and less than 20 questions, leaving space for answers). It was not resolved.

It must be concluded that the mailed questionnaire is not suitable for the kind of survey that was required in the present study. The population was simply not suitable for a mail survey.

An attempt was made in 1974 to obtain comparable information from another infantry regiment in the 49th Division, the 1/4th DWR, based in Halifax. The Secretary of its WWI Old Comrades Association was approached, but he declined to co-operate. A second approach was made, and this time the Secretary replied that his members were far too old to be bothered with questionnaires, but that the members of the Committee would consider completing one, provided it was short and non-controversial. A short, duplicated questionnaire, which did not ask for the respondent's name or address, was sent. Only the following information was asked for: date of enlistment, length of service, rank attained, age, civilian occupation and father's occupation at enlistment, family connections with regiment and Regular Army, reason for enlistment, local public attitudes to the Regular Army and the Territorials, and the respondent's own attitude to his regiment. A detailed reply on the penultimate topic from Halifax men would have been particularly welcomed, but none was obtained. The questionnaire was completed by 3 members of the Committee with whom I had no kind of contact whatsoever.

In order to obtain information on the motivational factors impelling men to enlist in the present-day Territorial Army, the officer commanding the strongest Volunteer unit in Leeds, 217 Squadron RCT Volunteers, was approached early in 1976 and asked if he would allow his men either to be interviewed or to fill in an anonymous one-page questionnaire. He appeared greatly attracted to the idea of a recruiting survey and asked to be supplied with questionnaires as soon as possible. A duplicated questionnaire (see pp.51-2) was accordingly prepared, its content having been carefully vetted by an academic member of the University staff who was himself a company commander in another RCT Volunteer unit, and handed over to 217 Squadron's Administrative Officer for distribution to the members of the unit, who numbered approximately 200. I was not allowed to have any kind of contact with the potential respondents, nor to explain to them, either verbally or in writing, the purpose of the research project. 9 completed questionnaires, all of which had had the responses to Question 6 obliterated by correction fluid, were sent to me 12 months later. No reasons for the delay, nor for the very small number of questionnaires returned, were offered.

NOTES

1. See the following chapters in E.A. Wrigley, ed., *Nineteenth-century Society: Essays in the Use of Quantative Methods for the Study of Social Data* (Cambridge, 1972): M. Drake, 'The census, 1801-1891', pp. 7-46; M. Anderson, 'The study of family structure', pp. 47-81; P.M. Tillot, 'Sources of inaccuracy in the 1851 and 1861 censuses', pp. 82-133; W.A. Armstrong, 'The Interpretation of the Census Enumerators' Books for Victorian Towns', in H.J. Dyos, ed., *The Study of Urban History* (London, 1968; 1971 reprint), pp. 67-85. For the difficulties of classifying occupational data, see, for example, W.A. Armstrong, *Stability and Change in an English County Town: A social study of York 1801-51* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 13.

2. *Guide to Census Reports Great Britain 1801-1966* (London, 1977), pp. 50, 51.

3. *Census of England and Wales 1891*, General Report, p. 36; 1893-4 Cmd. 7222, cvi, 629.

4. J. Hall & D. Caradog Jones, 'Social Grading of Occupations', *British Journal of Sociology*, I (1950), 31-55.

5. *Field Service Regulations. Part II. Organisation and Administration, 1909. Reprint 1914* (London, 1914), Section 140, pp. 174-7.

6. 1/8th Bn War Diary, July 1917, P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], War Office, WO 95/2795. See also the March 1918 War Diary entry of the 8th KRRC, quoted M. Middlebrook, *The Kaiser's Battle 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive* (London, 1978), p. 313.

7. *The West Yorkshire Regiment in the War 1914-1918*, Vol. II (London, [1928]), n.2, p.76; *The British Army in the First World War: The Regulars, The Territorials and Kitchener's Army, with some of the campaigns into which they fitted* (London, 1968), p. 11.

8. *OH*, Vol. VI, 1916 (London, 1938), p. 394.

9. Oral testimonies. On recognising the badge, the prisoner immediately embraced Rfm Bywater.

10. *Survey Methods in Social Investigation* (London, 1958; 1971 2nd edn.), p. 243.

11. *Yorkshire Post*, 27 April 1900. This letter appears to be strictly factual.

12. Sergeants' Mess South African War Correspondence Book, 1900-1.

13. Lupton letter, 19 June 1915. Compare the letter of Lt A.G. Heath, quoted J. Laffin, ed., *Letters from the Front 1914-1918* (London, 1973), p. 45.

14. 'The First Hundred Thousand by the Junior Sub', *Blackwood's Magazine*, 198 (1915), 446. On the lack of frankness, and preoccupation with reassurance, of soldiers' letters, see also V. Walpole, *The Men in the Line. Sketches and Impressions, Western Front, 1916-18* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, [1929]), pp. 64-6.

15. *Yorkshire Evening Post*, 14 December 1915.

16. Richardson letter, 21 July 1915.

17. Knowles letter, 12 August 1915.

18. Benny Green, '*I've lost my little Willie', a celebration of comic postcards* (London, 1976), p.55.

19. Peter H. Liddle encountered many such letters during his researches for *Men of Gallipoli* (London, 1976). See also M. Moynihan, ed., *Greater Love: Letters Home 1914-1918* (London, 1980).

20. *Yorkshire Evening News*, 9 June 1915.

21. Butcher Diary, 19 June 1915.

22. J. Laffin, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 49.

23. *Death of a Hero* (London, 1929; 1965 Consul paperback edn.), pp. 254-5.

24. *Loc.cit.*

25. *The Great War and Modern Memory* (London, 1975), p. 87.

26. *Death's Men: Soldiers of the Great War* (London, 1978; 1979 Penguin edn.), p. 26.

27. *Yorkshire Post*, 23 June 1916.

28. See J. Terraine, *The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861-1945* (London, 1980); C. Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power* (London, 1972), pp.424-35.

29. On the untypicality of the war writers and "the catastrophically far-reaching effects of the war books" on opinion in "the broad middle classes", see C. Barnett, *op.cit.*, pp. 428-35, and his article, 'A Military Historian's View of the Great War', *Essays by Divers Hands*, XXXVI (1970), 1-18. See also George E.C. Catlin, 'Monstrously unnecessary?', in G.A. Panichas, ed., *Promise of Greatness: The War of 1914-1918* (London, 1968), p. 405; P.W. Turner and R.H. Haigh, *Not for Glory* (Oxford, 1969), p.99; C.E. Carrington, *Soldier from the Wars Returning* (London, 1965; 1970 Arrow paperback edn.), pp. 292-6.

30. For some contemporary press reviews of several of these books, see C. Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power*, pp. 434-5.

31. p.310; 191, 128-38, 236; for a critique of Robert Graves' *Goodbye to All That*, which is frequently recommended as background reading to students of World War I history, see pp.203-20.

32. See, for example, R. Angell, 'A Critical Review of the Development of the Personal Document Method in Sociology 1920-1940', in L. Gottschalk, C. Kluckhohn and R. Angell, *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology* (New York, 1945), p.177.

33. See, for example, C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*, p.340. On the memory process, see Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 100-113; on the accuracy of retrospective material, see *ibid.*, pp. 120-122.

34. See his article, 'Problems of Method in Oral History', *Oral History*, I, no. 4 (1973), 7, 8, 9ff. See also P.H. Liddle, *op.cit.*, p.54.

35. See P. Thompson, *The Voice of the Past*, Chap. 4, *passim*; 'Problems of Method in Oral History', 1.

36. For the possible sources of bias, error and distortion in the interview, see S.A. Richardson, B.S. Dohrenwend and D. Klein, *Interviewing, its forms and functions* (New York, 1965), pp. 180-7; A.N. Oppenheim, *Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement* (London, 1966; 1968 HEB paperback edn.), pp.30-2; C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, *op.cit.*, pp.385-8, 406; P. Thompson, *Voice of the Past*, pp. 114-119.

37. See P. Thompson, *Voice of the Past*, p.134; George Ewart Evans, *The Days That We Have Seen* (London, 1975), pp.165-6.

38. S.A. Richardson et al., op.cit., pp. 20-1; see also G.E. Evans, op.cit., p.16.

39. P. Thompson, Voice of the Past, p.58. (This was also P.H. Liddle's experience).

40. Ibid., pp. 122-3, 7. See also G.E. Evans, op.cit., Chap. 11 passim.

41. History Workshop, Journal, No. 8, Autumn 1979, p.ii.

42. Voice of the Past, pp. 132-3.

43. History of the Sixth Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment. Vol. II. 2/6th Battalion (Bradford and London, 1923), p.99.

44. Eye-Deep in Hell: the Western Front 1914-18 (London, 1976; 1977 Fontana paperback edn.), p.102; The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War II (Newton Abbot, 1980), pp. 108-110.

45. Oral testimony.

46. Compare R.G. Loosmore, Introduction to R.B. Talbot Kelly, A Subaltern's Odyssey: Memoirs of the Great War 1915-1917 (London, 1980), p.19.

47. Oral testimony.

48. P. Thompson, Voice of the Past, p.123.

49. Op.cit., p.102.

50. Ibid., pp.96-100.

51. Voice of the Past, pp.160, 175.

52. See, for example, G.E. Evans, op.cit., p.123.

53. Voice of the Past, p.113.

54. For further discussion of these modes, see S.A. Richardson et al., op.cit., pp.67-8.

55. On the advantages to the interviewer of being an insider in any highly-knit group, see P. Thompson, Voice of the Past, pp. 116-117.

56. C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op.cit., Chap. 12, and P. Thompson, Voice of the Past, Chap. 6, also offer useful advice. Very many social research methodology textbooks have been published. It has to be said, however, that it is common knowledge among researchers that there is considerable divergence between how social research (which involves interviewing, of course) is actually done and how the textbooks say it should be done: see C. Bell and H. Newby, eds., Doing Sociological Research (London, 1977), esp. the 'Introduction: The Rise of Methodological Pluralism', pp. 9-29.

57. See S. A. Richardson et al., op.cit., pp. 45-53. It should be noted that "informal" and "guided" methods have a number of advantages and disadvantages: see ibid., p.51; C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op.cit., pp. 298-9, 300, 301. The disadvantages did not manifest themselves in the present study and are indeed more likely to work to the advantage of a historian who is not worried by the amount of detail, difficult to summarise and quantify, that the methods can produce.

58. See S.A. Richardson et al., op.cit., pp. 32-4, 139-42.

59. See Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition : A study in Historical Methodology (London, 1965 English translation), pp. 75, 188-9.

60. Voice of the Past, p.166.

61. See, for example, Lt.Col. H. Green, The British Army in the First World War..., pp.13-14.

62. For example, P.W. Turner and R.H. Haigh, Not for Glory, p.56.

63. See J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, 1976), p.33.

64. For the advantages and disadvantages of tape-recording oral testimony, see G.E. Evans, op.cit., p.118, C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op.cit., p.281.

65. On the topic of respondent participation and establishing rapport, see S.A. Richardson et al., op.cit., pp.46, 63-4, 65ff, 71-3, 91ff, 109ff; C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op.cit., pp. 271-2, 274ff, 322; A.N. Oppenheim, op.cit., p.65.

66. For a general discussion of validity, see S.A. Richardson et al., op.cit., pp. 130-2, 240-3; C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op.cit., pp. 393-8; P. Thompson, Voice of the Past, pp. 209-211.

67. See C.E. Carrington, Soldier from the Wars Returning, p.190.

68. On the danger of stereotyping, see S.A. Richardson et al., op.cit., p. 132.

69. For example, P.W. Turner and R.H. Haigh, op.cit., p.2; M. Brown, Tommy Goes to War (London, 1978), pp.35, 194.

70. The Days That We Have Seen, pp.119-20.

71. A.N. Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.161-2.

72. p.15.

73. A.N. Oppenheim, op.cit., p.72.

74. 'Diary of a Yorkshireman', Evening Post, 13 March 1976.

75. See J. Vansina, op.cit., pp.159-160.

76. This "tale of artistic merit" was incorporated in Edmund Williamson's tribute, The University of Leeds Review, VI, 1 (June 1958), 73-4. The evidence in rebuttal was obtained from: Record of Officers' Services... 8th Bn 1908-1915; testimony of Lt J.B. Gawthorpe, 1/8th; Leeds Mercury, 12 April 1915; 2/8th Bn War Diary, 15 April 1915, PRO, WO 95/3082; 1/8th Bn Unofficial War Diary, 16, 26 August 1915.

77. Yorkshire Evening News, 12 January 1916.

78. See C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op.cit., Chap. 11; A.N. Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.33-5.

79. A.N. Oppenheim, op.cit., p.26.

80. Ibid., pp.27, 28.

81. See C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, op.cit., p.264.

APPENDIX II.

TABLE 1. THE FIRST 97 SWORN IN, 5TH NOVEMBER 1859; OCCUPATION/PROFESSION

[TOTAL: 97]

I.	NON-EMPLOYED		
	Landed proprietor	1	
			1
II.	PROFESSIONAL		
	Accountant	1	
	Auctioneer and commission agent	1	
	Architect and surveyor	1	
	Surveyor and land agent	1	
	Civil engineer and surveyor	1	
	Professional mechanical engineer	1	
	Druggist/pharmaceutical chemist	1	
	Optician	1	
	Professor of music	2	
	Stock and sharebroker	2	
	Solicitor	6	
	Law student	1	
	Deputy Town Clerk	1	
	Surgeon	3	
			23
III(a).	SELF-EMPLOYED (MANUFACTURING AND ALLIED TRADES)		
	Wool merchant	4	
	[Woollen] cloth merchant	7	
	Woollen merchant and manufacturer	3	
	Woollen manufacturer	1	
	Uniform cloth manufacturer and dyer	1	
	Cloth finisher	2	
	Dyer and cloth finisher	1	
	Felt carpet manufacturer	1	
	Colliery agent [i.e. manager]	1	

	Coal and iron mines proprietor/ironmaster/cotton doubler	1	
	Ironmaster	2	
	Ironmonger/ironfounder	1	
	Emery wheel and tool maker	1	
	Iron and steel merchant	1	
	Tanner and currier	1	
	Brewer	2	
	Soap manufacturer	1	
	Druggist/drysalter	2	
			33
III(b).	SELF-EMPLOYED (WHOLESALE, RETAIL AND SERVICE TRADES)		
	Wholesale grocer and tea dealer	1	
	Grocer and commission agent	1	
	Provision dealer	1	
	Corn factor	2	
	Wine and spirit merchant	1	
	Licensed victualler	4	
	Hotel keeper	1	
	Draper and haberdasher	1	
	Fur and skin merchant	1	
	Gunmaker and dealer	1	
	Window glass and lead merchant	1	
	Painter/gilder/decorative paper-hanger	1	
	Carrier	1	
	Agent	1	
			18
IV(a).	EMPLOYED: NON-MANUAL		
	Bookkeeper	1	
	Cashier	1	
	Clerk	4	
	Banker's Clerk	4	
	Articled solicitor's clerk	1	
	Apprentice to cloth trade	1	
	Salesman	2	
	Warehouseman	1	
			15

IV(b). EMPLOYED : MANUAL

Cloth drawer	1	
Leather finisher	1	
		2

NO DATA: 5

Source: Muster Roll, 1859-1875.

TABLE 2. NOS. 1 AND 2 COMPANIES, December 1859 - February 1860, OCCUPATION/PROFESSION [TOTAL: 215]

I. NON-EMPLOYED

Gentleman	1		
Landed proprietor	1		
Member of Parliament/ retired ironmaster	1		
Proprietor of railway stock	1		
Retired merchant	1		
No employment	1		
		6	(2.79%)

II. PROFESSIONAL

Architect	3		
Accountant	1		
Auctioneer and commission agent	1		
Surveyor and land agent	1		
Banker	1		
Druggist/pharmaceutical chemist	1		
Professor of music	3		
Grammar school tutor	1		
Student	1		
Optician	1		
Surgeon	4		
Medical student	2		
Solicitor	12		
Law student	1		
Stock and sharebroker	4		
Professional engineer	3		
Deputy Town Clerk	1		
Clerk to the Leeds Guardians/ Superintendant Registrar Leeds District	1		
		42	(19.53%)

III(a) SELF-EMPLOYED (MANUFACTURING AND ALLIED TRADES)

Woollen merchant and manufacturer	3
Woollen manufacturer	1
Uniform cloth manufacturer and dyer	1

Wool and cloth dyer	2	
Cloth finisher	4	
[Woollen] cloth merchant	11	
Wool merchant	5	
Felt carpet manufacturer	1	
Flax commission agent	1	
Linen manufacturer	2	
Colliery agent	1	
Coal and iron mines proprietor/ ironmaster/cotton doubler	1	
Ironmaster	3	
Engineers, toolmakers and makers of textile machinery	2	
Machinist	1	
Whitesmith	1	
Spade manufacturer	1	
Ironmonger/ironfounder	1	
Manufacturing goldsmith	1	
Galvanised ironstrand fencing manufacturer/oil and tallow merchant	1	
Iron and steel merchant	1	
Tobacco manufacturer	1	
Brewer	2	
Maltster	2	
Seed crusher/colliery owner	1	
Tanner and currier	1	
Soap manufacturer	1	
Flax and oil merchant	1	
Druggist/drysalter	2	
		56 (26.05%)

III(b) SELF-EMPLOYED (WHOLESALE, RETAIL AND SERVICE TRADES)

Draper	2
Draper and haberdasher	1
Silk mercer and carpet dealer	1
Tailor and draper	2
Tailor and clothier	1
Haberdasher	1
Hosier and shirt maker	1
Provision dealer	2
Grocer	2
Grocer/commission agent	1

Ironmonger	1	
Pawnbroker	1	
Wine and spirit merchant	3	
Fruit and game dealer	1	
Fur and skin merchant	1	
Watchmaker and jeweller	1	
Furniture broker/van proprietor	1	
Confectioner/dealer in turtles, ices, etc.	1	
Bookseller	2	
Gun maker and dealer	1	
Lithographer/stationer	1	
Stationer	1	
Cornfactor	4	
Window glass and lead merchant	1	
Wholesale saddler and saddlers' ironmonger	1	
Licensed victualler	5	
Hotel keeper	1	
Publican	1	
Builder	3	
Plumber	1	
Sculptor/marble mason	1	
Carver and gilder	1	
Painter/gilder/decorative paper-hanger	1	
Painter	1	
Hay and straw dealer	1	
		51 (23.72%)

IV(a) EMPLOYED: NON-MANUAL

Accountant	2
Bookkeeper	1
Cashier	3
Clerk	17
Banker's Clerk	11
Articled solicitor's clerk	5
Land surveyor	2
Managing brewer	1
Mechanical draughtsman	1
Traveller	2

	Salesman	2	
	Apprentice to cloth trade	1	
	Woollen warehouseman	1	
			49 (22.79%)
IV(b)	EMPLOYED: MANUAL		
	Boot and shoe maker	1	
	Blacksmith/tinplate worker	1	
	Engineer	1	
	Joiner	1	
	Ostler	1	
	Omnibus guard	1	
	Paper ruler and bookbinder	1	
			7 (3.26%)

NO DATA: 4 (1.86%)

Note: Not included in the above table are the following members of No. 1 Company whose names were missed off the Lists of Members from which it was compiled:

Nominal Roll No. 62	Alfred Wilberforce Sykes	woollen cloth merchant
137	William Pollard	land agent/farmer of 263 acres
138	John William Atkinson	solicitor
139	Grosvenor Talbot	stuff merchant
186	Thomas Greenwood	Engineer, toolmaker and maker of textile machinery

Source: The two undated printed lists of members of the "Leeds Volunteer Rifles", [December 1859 and February 1860].

TABLE 3. ROLL OF NO. 3 COMPANY, as at 7th May 1860: OCCUPATION/PROFESSION

[TOTAL: 99]

SELF-EMPLOYED		
Accountant	1	
[Woollen] cloth merchant	4	
Woollen merchant and manufacturer	10	
Woollen cloth manufacturer and finisher	1	
Cloth finisher	4	
Woollen dyer	1	
Dyer and cloth finisher	1	
Cloth manufacturer	1	
Mungo manufacturer	1	
Shoddy commission agent	1	
Woollen shipper	2	
Teazle merchant	1	
Merchant [unspecified]	1	
Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce	1	
Oil importer and soap agent	1	
Oil merchant	1	
Cabinet maker and upholsterer	1	
Emery wheel and tool maker	1	
Carrier	1	
Licensed victualler	1	
Corn agent	1	
		37
EMPLOYED: NON-MANUAL		
Manager	1	
Traveller	2	
Salesman	3	
Overlooker	1	
Cashier	2	
Clerk	7	
Banker's clerk	1	
Warehouseman	11	
		28

EMPLOYED: MANUAL

Cloth drawer	2	
Wool sorter	1	
Cord maker	1	
Leather finisher	1	
		5

NO DATA:	29

Source: Company roll, dated 7 May 1860.

TABLE 4. OCCUPATIONS/PROFESSIONS OF RECRUITS 1860-1875

		27/10/60- 5/4/66 Regtl No. 737-1750	5/4/66- 10/10/67 1751-2195	27/10/67- 15/9/75 2196-4195
I.	NON-EMPLOYED			
	Gentleman	7	3	10
	Country landowner/farmer	1		
	"Out of business"			1
		8	3	11 (0.55%)
II.	PROFESSIONAL			
	Accountant		1	1
	Architect	2	1	12
	Artist	1		2
	Auctioneer	2		1
	Barrister	1		1
	Solicitor	5	2	4
	Commissioner in the Court of Bankruptcy	1		
	Civil Engineer	4		2
	Consulting Engineer			1
	Consulting engineer/patent agent	1		
	Professional mechanical engineer	3		6
	Mining Engineer			1
	Clerk in Holy Orders			1
	Druggist/pharmaceutical chemist	1		
	Insurance [company's] agent		1	4
	Land agent			1
	Land agent/surveyor	1		
	Optician			1
	Professor of elocution	1		
	Professor of music	2		
	Stock and sharebroker	1		
	Schoolmaster	2	2	37
	Pupil teacher			13
	Tutor			1
	Surgeon	2		1
	Medical student	1		8
	Surgeon dentist			4
	Veterinary surgeon	2		
	University undergraduate	1		
	Student or schoolboy	2		
		36	7	102 (5.1%)

		27/10/60-5/4/66	5/4/66-10/10/67	27/10/67-15/9/75
III(a)	SELF-EMPLOYED (Manufacturing and Allied Trades)			
	Woollen cloth merchant	8	2	16
	Woollen manufacturer and merchant	4	2	
	Cloth manufacturer	2		4
	Apprentice to wool/woollen trade			3
	Fellmonger		1	
	Wool merchant			2
	Carpet manufacturer	1		
	Cloth finisher	2		
	Cloth finisher and dyer			1
	Dyer			1
	Dyer and stover			1
	Commission woolcomber	1		
	Woollen merchant's agent	1		
	Flock and mungo merchant			1
	Flock and waste dealer			1
	Flax and tow merchant	1		1
	Flax spinner	1		
	Flax spinner and linen manufacturer			1
	Linen manufacturer			2
	Cap manufacturer			1
	Manufacturer [unspecified]			1
	Ironmaster			4
	Ironfounder, machine and toolmaker			1
	Engineer and ironfounder	2		
	Engineer and millwright			1
	Engineer and boiler-maker			1
	Machinery manufacturer	1		
	Cloth finishing machinery manufacturer			1
	Cut nail manufacturer			1
	Agricultural implement manufacturer			1
	Fuel economiser manufacturer			1
	Galvanised iron merchant and fencing manufacturer			1
	Brazier and tinsmith	1		
	Tinsmith			1
	Iron and steel merchant	1		1
	Coal agent			1
	Coal and coke merchant	1		
	Timber merchant	1		
	Oil merchant	2		1
	Rope manufacturer, engineer and patentee			1
	Twine merchant			1

	27/10/60-5/4/66	5/4/66-10/10/67	27/10/67-15/9/75
Tanner	2		
Tanner, leather and grindery dealer			1
Chamois leather manufacturer		1	
Leather dresser/glue manufacturer	1		
Wheelwright and smith			1
Apprentice to leather trade			1
Basket manufacturer			2
Brush manufacturer			2
Composition ornament manufacturer	1		
Wall-paper hangings manufacturers	2		
Tobacco manufacturer			1
Brewer	1	1	1
Brewer and black beer manufacturer		1	
Maltster			2
Drysalter			1
Manufacturing chemist			3
Manufacturing chemist and oil refiner			4
Railway company agent			1
	37	8	74 (3.7%)
III(b) SELF-EMPLOYED (Wholesale, Retail and Service trades)			
Agent	1		4
Commission agent	1	1	2
Artist/photographer	1		1
Photographer			2
Asphalter			1
Bookbinder and printer	1		
Bookbinder and stationer		1	
Bookbinder, paper ruler and manufacturing stationer			1
Boot and/or shoe maker	2	1	6
Broker			1
Builder and contractor/brick manufacturer/coal merchant			1
Builder and timber merchant			1
Butcher			1
Carrier			1
Carver and gilder	1		
Corn broker			1
Corn factor	3		
Corn miller			1
Clock and watchmaker			3
Watchmaker	2	1	
Jeweller and watchmaker			1

	27/10/60-5/4/66	5/4/66-10/10/67	27/10/67-15/9/75
Draper			8
Draper and broker			1
Draper and hosier			1
Travelling draper			2
Wholesale draper	1	1	
Fishmonger and poulterer			1
Furrier			1
Game dealer	1	1	
Glass merchant		1	
Grocer and draper			1
Grocer/[Italian] warehouseman	1		
Grocer			4
Hairdresser and toy dealer			1
Hat and cap dealer			1
Hosier and glover			1
Ironmonger	1	2	2
Ironmonger and milk dealer			1
Architect and builder's ironmonger			1
Joiner	2		
Joiner and cabinet maker	1		
Joiner and builder			2
Joiner and machine maker			2
Law stationer/lithographer	1		
Marble mason		1	
Merchant [unspecified]	2	2	2
Musician	1		
Newspaper proprietor and publisher	2		
Pawnbroker/outfitter/silversmith	1		
Pawnbroker			1
Pianoforte tuner/repairer			1
Printer	2		2
Plumber		1	13
Provision merchant			4
Publican	2		5
Printseller and publisher			1
Saddler and harness maker		1	1
Saddletree maker	1		
Stationer			1
Manufacturing stationer		1	1
Wholesale stationer/lithographer	1		
Stationer/engraver/printer	1		
Stone merchant			1
Sweep			1
Tailor	2	2	4
Tailor and draper	3		5
Tailor and [cloth] cap maker			1
Tea dealer			1
Toilet glass framer maker			2
Tobacconist			5
Upholsterer	1		1

		27/10/60-5/4/66	5/4/66-10/10/67	27/10/67-15/9/75
	Undertaker, cabinet maker and upholsterer	1		
	Victualler	1		
	Wine and spirit merchant	1	1	1
		42	18	112 (5.6%)
IV(a)	EMPLOYED: Non-Manual			
	Accountant			4
	Bank cashier	2		1
	Banker's clerk	4		12
	Bookkeeper	7	3	10
	Cashier	1	1	7
	Clerk	41	40	271
	Post Office clerk			5
	Telegraph clerk			13
	Telegraphist			3
	Insurance clerk			1
	Railway clerk	3	2	7
	Private secretary			1
	Working chemist	1		
	Manufacturing chemist's assistant			4
	Designer			1
	Mechanical Draughtsman	4		7
	Lithographic draughtsman			1
	Architectual draughtsman			1
	Surveyor			7
	Land surveyor/fire surveyor	1	3	
	Customs officer			1
	School attendance officer			1
	Iron bailiff			1
	Rate collector	1		
	Stocktaker	1		1
	Salesman	2	1	10
	Traveller	5	4	11
	Dentist's assistant		1	
	Dispenser [pharmaceutical chemist's assistant]		1	
	Optician's assistant	1		
	"Shopman"		1	1
	Draper's assistant	2		29
	Grocery assistant			3
	Haberdasher's assistant			1
	Hosier's assistant	1		
	Ironmonger's assistant		1	3
	Jeweller's assistant		1	3
	Pawnbroker/outfitter's assistant		1	
	Music seller's assistant			1
	Tailor/draper's assistant	1		
	Colliery banksman [foreman]			3
	Gas meter inspector			1
	Gas works inspector		3	
	Railway inspector		1	

		27/10/60- 5/4/66	5/4/66- 10/10/67	27/10/67- 15/9/75
	Overlooker		1	1
	Foreman brushmaker			1
	Wine trade foreman			1
	Manager [unspecified]			1
	Insurance manager			2
	Cloth mill manager			1
	Colliery superintendent			1
	Accountant's articled clerk			3
	Solicitor's articled clerk	1		9
		79	65	446 (22.3%)
IV(b)	EMPLOYED: Manual			
	Apprentice [unspecified]			5
	Artificial flower maker			1
	Baker			3
	Basket maker			1
	Bookbinder	1	2	8
	Boilermaker	1		4
	Blacksmith			18
	Blacksmith's striker	4	1	16
	Blast furnaceman			2
	Boot last maker	1		1
	Bootmaker		1	6
	Boot finisher			2
	Boot/shoe rivetter			17
	Boot top cutter			1
	Brewery drayman			2
	Brewery worker	12	20	28
	Bricklayer	3	3	20
	Brickmaker	1	1	1
	Butcher			2
	Brass finisher			2
	Brushmaker	3	3	4
	"Builder"			4
	Cabinetmaker	8	8	41
	Cap maker	2		
	Card maker			1
	Carpenter	1		3
	Carpet weaver			2
	Carter	1		3
	Carver and gilder	2		3
	Case hardener		1	
	Clicker		1	17
	Cleaner			1
	Clock fitter			2
	Cloth drawer	2	6	5
	Cloth cleaner			1
	Cloth dresser/finisher	8	12	29
	Cloth fuller		1	
	Cloth maker			3
	Cloth miller			2
	Cloth presser			1
	Cloth scribbler			2

	27/10/60-5/4/66	5/4/66-10/10/67	27/10/67-15/9/75
Coachsmith	1		1
Comb maker			1
Coach builder			10
Coach painter			3
Clay worker			1
Coppersmith	1		1
Cooper			5
Compositor			5
Compositor, newspaper	1		
Confectioner	1		2
Cordwainer	2		1
Cork cutter			1
Corn miller		1	7
Currier	7	3	46
Cutter [unspecified]			6
Core maker			1
Driller			2
Drayman [unspecified]			2
Dyer	2	8	18
Engine smith	1		
Engine tenter	1		3
Engineer	4	4	43
Engineman		1	1
Engraver	1		
Fireman [stoker]			1
Fitter	8	4	31
Farrier			1
Flax dresser		1	6
Flax jobber			1
Flax spinner	1		1
Finisher [unspecified]			1
Forgeman	2	4	4
Flute glass cutter			1
French polisher	2		2
Gardener	1	2	4
Gilder			2
Gas fitter			1
Glass porter			1
Grinder	1		3
Hackler	1		
Harness maker			1
Handle setter	1		
Hammerman			1
Hanger on [colliery worker]			1
Hatter			2
Horsekeeper			1
Iron moulder	1	1	
Iron planer			2
Joiner	10	8	74
Labourer	9	8	44
Leather cutter			2
Leather dresser/finisher	15	3	28
Leather dyer	1		
Leather grinder	1		

	27/10/60- 5/4/66	5/4/66- 10/10/67	27/10/67- 15/9/75
Leather shaper			1
Leather shaver	2		
Letter carrier			3
Letter sorter			1
Lithographer		2	8
Loom tuner			2
Machine maker	1		1
Maltster			1
Machinist			2
Mechanic	47	25	120
Marble mason			2
Marble polisher			1
Metal wheelwright	1	2	
Miner			19
Miller			2
Model maker	1		9
Moulder			31
Mule spinner			2
Nail cutter			1
Nail maker			1
Millwright			3
Organ builder			2
Packer			5
Painter	3	3	25
Paperhanger			1
Paper stainer	1		
Papermaker			3
Pavoir			1
Patternmaker			3
Press setter		2	2
"Plainer" [prob. iron planer]	1	1	1
Plasterer		3	6
Platelayer			2
Plumber	4	3	23
Postman			2
Post office employee			1
Potter			1
Printer	6	5	22
Puddler	9	1	2
Quarryman			1
Railway porter		1	12
Railway goods guard			1
Refiner	1		
Rivetter			10
Sawyer		2	2
Saddler			3
Sewing machine maker			1
Sexton			1
Shoemaker		1	19
Shoe finisher			1
Shoe trade [unspecified]			2
Skinner	3	2	10
Skinyard labourer	1		
Slubber		1	

	27/10/60- 5/4/66	5/4/66- 10/10/67	27/20/67- 15/9/75
Slater			1
Slider			2
Slipper maker			1
Spindle maker			1
Spinner		7	
Steam hammerman		1	1
Stockcutter			4
Stuff presser			1
Stonemason	2	1	13
Stoker			1
Stationer's assistant			11
Storekeeper			2
Tailor	2	3	20
Tailor's cutter			1
Tailor's trimmer			1
Tanner	6	4	4
Ticket collector			2
Timekeeper	2		2
Tinsmith	1		
Tinner			4
Tin and ironplate worker			1
Tinker [mender and maker of domestic utensils]			1
Toolmaker			1
Turner	1		10
Tobacco manufacturer's assistant			1
Upholsterer		1	8
Warehouseman	15	8	97
Warp dresser	1		1
Watchmaker		1	3
Weaver			3
Weighman			1
Wheel fettler			1
Wheelwright			1
Whitesmith	1	1	7
Willeyer		1	
Wood carver		1	9
Wood engraver			2
Wood turner	1		6
Wireworker			2
Wool scourer			1
Woollen spinner			5
"Workman"			1
	239	191	1249 (62.45%)
NO DATA	569 (56.33%)	153 (34.38%)	6 (0.3%)
Totals:	*1010	445	2000

*Discrepency in numbers is due to double entries in the Nominal Roll in the first period.

Source: Muster Roll, 1859-1875.

TABLE 5. LEEDS RIFLES: STRENGTH, EFFICIENCY, RECRUITING AND DRILL ATTENDANCE STATISTICS 1864-1907

Year Ending	Strength at Year End	Efficients	Extra-Efficients	% of Total Strength	Non-Efficients	% of Total Strength	Resigned & Struck Off	Recruits	Former Members Rejoined	Average Drill Attendance
1864	731	441		60.32	290	39.67	n.d.	202		
65	799	512	81	74.21	206	25.78	184	252		
66	819	434	257	84.37	128	15.62	321	341		
67	903	417	265	75.52	221	24.47	118	202		
68	691	240	434	97.54	17	2.46	398	186		
69	646	252	364	95.35	30	4.64	138	110		
1870	719	239	480	100.00	-	-	219	292		
71	788	250	538	100.00	-	-	267	336		
72	830	170	657	100.00	-	-	228	270		
73	811	-	811	100.00	-	-	240	221		
74	868	-	868	100.00	-	-	221	278		
75	949	1	948	100.00	-	-	190	271		
76	962	-	962	100.00	-	-	236	249		
77	830	-	830	100.00	-	-	365	233		
78	830	1	829	100.00	-	-	201	201		
79	880	3	877	100.00	-	-	201	251		
1880	999	-	997	99.80	2	0.2	244	363		15
81	1004	-	1004	100.00	-	-	103	108		24
82	1004	-	1003	99.90	1	0.1	245	245		21
83	985	985		100.00	-	-	276	257		33
84	976	976		100.00	-	-	246	237		30
85	1003	1003		100.00	-	-	220	246		33
86	966	966		100.00	-	-	281	240		27
87	971	971		100.00	-	-	211	216		n.d.
88	1004	971		96.71	33	3.28	196	201	27	27
89	1004	988		98.41	16	1.59	218	189	29	27.75

Continued/...

Table 5. (Continued)

1890	993	959		96.58	34	3.42	172	124	37	28.07
91	979	926		94.59	53	5.41	183	146	23	25.10
92	1008	991		98.31	17	1.68	210	187	52	29.51
93	1000	953		95.30	44	4.40	208	164	36	32.11
94	1004	995		99.10	9	0.89	229	198	35	34.13
95	970	951		98.04	19	1.96	193	128	31	29.20
96	1000	972		97.20	20	2.0	192	187	35	29.06
97	958	929		96.97	29	3.03	239	157	40	32.06
98	923	904		97.94	16	1.73	237	174	28	33.00
99	1003	987		98.40	16	1.59	207	244	43	38.97
1900	1130	1024*		97.35	30	2.65	131	217	41	47.00
01	1244	1213		97.51	31	2.49	220	311	23	32.06
02	1185	1174		99.09	11	0.93	267	254	13	17.49
03	1047	1023		97.71	24	2.29	236	212	24	n.d.
04	1024	999		97.56	20	1.95	269	225	21	n.d.
05	1009	984		97.52	19	1.88	265	235	15	n.d.
06	1053	1037		98.48	16	1.52	221	246	19	n.d.
07	1015	1008		99.31	7	0.69	213	162	13	n.d.

* excludes the 76 in South Africa who were classed as efficients.

Note: Supernumeraries account for the occasional discrepancies from 1893 onwards.

Sources: Muster Roll, 1859-1875; Account Book, 1859-; Annual Reports of the Adjutant, 1883-1907 (in Braithwaite Scrapbook).

TABLE 6. OCCUPATIONS OF SERGEANTS AND COLOUR SERGEANTS, 1902

[TOTAL: 77]

II.	PROFESSIONAL			
	Journalist	1		
	Theatre director of music	1		
			2	(2.59%)
III.	SELF-EMPLOYED			
	Bookbinder	1		
	Bootmaker	1		
	Boot/shoemaker and repairer	1		
	Builder	1		
	Canal agent	1		
	Wholesale confectioner	1		
	[retired] commission agent	1		
	Cycle dealer	1		
	Draper	1		
	Fancy draper	1		
	Enamelled slate manufacturer	1		
	Gilder and picture frame maker	1		
	Glass bottle manufacturer	1		
	Joiner and carpenter	1		
	Joiner and shopfitter	1		
	Letterpress printer	1		
	Painter and paperhanger	3		
	Public house proprietor	1		
	Shopkeeper [unspecified]	1		
	Slating contractor	1		
	Tailor	2		
	Theatre musician	1		
	Wood engraver	1		
			26	(33.77%)
IV(a)	EMPLOYED: NON-MANUAL			
	Bookkeeper	2		
	Cashier	1		
	Insurance clerk	1		
	Clerk	8		
	Insurance agent	1		
	Rate collector	1		
	Foreman	2		
	Grocer's manager	1		
	Printer's manager	1		
			18	(23.38%)

IV(b) EMPLOYED: MANUAL

(i) Skilled:		
Boot clicker	1	
Coach builder	1	
Compositor	2	
Cutter	1	
Engineer	2	
Fitter	1	
Joiner	3	
Painter	1	
Shopfitter	1	
Stone carver and sculptor	1	
Stonemason	1	
Tailor	2	
(ii) Semi-skilled:		
Postman	1	
Timekeeper	1	
Warehouseman	1	
Warp dresser	1	
		21 (27.27%)

NO DATA: 10 (12.99%)

Source: Leeds Rifles, Annual for 1902, Thoresby Society, 22D3; identifications from local directories.

TABLE 6A. OCCUPATIONS OF SERGEANTS AND COLOUR SERGEANTS, 8th Bn, January 1914 [TOTAL: 49]

II.	PROFESSIONAL		
	Insurance broker and surveyor	1	
	Elementary schoolteacher	1	
	Secondary schoolteacher	1	
	Independent school gymnastic instructor	1	
			4 (8.16%)
III.	SELF EMPLOYED		
	Boot/shoe repairer	1	
	Cab proprietor	1	
	Caterer and dining rooms proprietor	1	
	Cycle dealer	1	
	Joiner and carpenter	1	
	Painter and decorator	1	
	Pianoforte repairer and tuner	1	
	Picture frame maker and gilder	1	
	Letterpress printer	1	
	Monumental mason and marble sculptor	1	
	Tailor	2	
			12 (24.49%)
IV(a).	EMPLOYED: NON-MANUAL		
	Assistant company secretary	1	
	Bank clerk	3	
	Caretaker	1	
	Clerk	7	
	Clerk to the 8th Bn	1	
	Insurance clerk	2	
	Club collector	1	
	Foreman	1	
	Theatre musician	1	
			18 (36.73%)
IV(b).	EMPLOYED: MANUAL		
(i) Skilled:	Compositor	1	
	Mechanic	2	
	Plumber	1	
(ii) Semi-skilled:			
	Cloth finisher	1	
	Millworker	1	
	Postman	2	
	Timekeeper	1	
	Warehousemen	1	
(iii) Unskilled:			
	Labourer	1	
			11 (22.45%)

NO DATA: 4 (8.16%)

Source: 8th Bn Year Book for 1914, Kitson Clark Papers, Leeds City Libraries Archives Department, Acc. 2004; indentifications from local directories.

TABLE 7. OCCUPATIONS OF SOME RANK AND FILE VOLUNTEERS, 1896 [TOTAL: 27]

II.	PROFESSIONAL		
	Professional engineer	1	
			1
III.	SELF-EMPLOYED		
	Wholesale clothier	1	
	Hat and cap manufacturer	1	
	Ironmonger and hardware merchant	1	
	Painter and decorator	2	
	Publican	1	
	Shopkeeper [unspecified]	1	
			7
IV(a).	EMPLOYED: NON-MANUAL		
	Clerk	1	
	Insurance clerk	1	
	Commercial traveller	1	
	Foreman	2	
	Poor rate collector	1	
	Relieving officer, No. 2. district	1	
			7
IV(b).	EMPLOYED: MANUAL		
(i) Skilled:	Bookbinder	1	
	Bricklayer	1	
	Cabinetmaker	1	
	Compositor	1	
	Fitter	1	
	Lithographic printer	1	
	Printer	1	
	Mechanic	1	
	Shopfitter	1	
	Watchmaker's assistant	1	
	Stonemason	1	
(ii) Semi-skilled:	Packer	1	
			12

Source: Regimental Orders, 1896 ; identifications from local directories

TABLE 8. OCCUPATIONS OF RANK AND FILE SOUTH AFRICAN VOLUNTEERS: 1900-1902. First Contingent, 1900 [TOTAL: 38]

III.	SELF-EMPLOYED			
	Leather manufacturer	1		
	Slating contractor	1		
			2	(5.26%)
IV(a)	EMPLOYED : NON-MANUAL			
	Clerk	5		
	Telephone inspector	1		
	Shop assistant	1		
			7	(18.42%)
IV(b)	EMPLOYED : MANUAL			
(i)	Skilled:			
	Boot rivetter	1		
	Bricklayer	1		
	Currier	1		
	Cutter	1		
	Engineer	2		
	Engine driver	1		
	Engine fitter	1		
	Engraver	1		
	Joiner	4		
	Painter	1		
	Pictureframe maker	1		
	Plumber	2		
(ii)	Semi-skilled:			
	Cloth finisher	1		
	Packer	1		
	Postman	1		
	Printer's machinist	1		
	Presser	1		
(iii)	Unskilled:			
	Labourer	2		
			24	(63.16%)
	NO DATA:	5 (13.16%)		

Source: *Yorkshire Evening News*, 3 February 1900.

(REINFORCEMENT Section for the above comprised 2 clerks, 1 employed painter and decorator, and 4 unknowns.)

Second Contingent, 1901 [TOTAL: 37]

No newspaper published any details of occupation, merely names, ages and addresses. The occupations of 23 parent/guardians were obtained. These were as follows:

III. SELF-EMPLOYED

Bookmaker	1	
Bootmaker	1	
Fruiterer and greengrocer	1	
Baker and confectioner	1	
Postmaster and shopkeeper	1	
Tailor	1	
		6

II. PROFESSIONAL

Pharmaceutical chemist	1	
		1

IV(a) EMPLOYED : NON-MANUAL

Clerk	3	
Cloth salesman	1	
Telegraphist	1	
		5

IV(b) EMPLOYED : MANUAL

(i)	Skilled:		
	Boot clicker	1	
	Bricklayer	1	
	Engine fitter	1	
	Glass cutter	1	
	Joiner	1	
	Plumber	1	
	Stonemason	1	
(ii)	Semi-skilled:		
	Cartman	1	
	Dyer	1	
	Gilder	1	
	Warehouseman	1	
			11

Source: Yorkshire Evening News, 11 February 1901; identifications from local directories.

Third Contingent, 1902 [TOTAL: 12]

III. SELF-EMPLOYED

Windowcleaner	1	
		1

IV(b) EMPLOYED : MANUAL

(i)	Skilled:	
	Boot clicker	1
	Bricklayer	1

	Engineer	1	
	Fitter	1	
	Iron turner	1	
	Joiner	1	
	Miller	1	
	Plumber	1	
(ii)	Semi-skilled:		
	Engine cleaner	1	
	Engineman	1	
	Warehouseman	1	
			11

Source: *Yorkshire Evening News*, 10 February 1902.

TABLE 9. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF RECRUITS TO LEEDS RIFLES BATTALIONS 1908-1918, 1930-37

	Peacetime Enlistments (97)	Wartime Enlistments (101)	Workers' Pals Bns. (472)	Wartime Register (676)	National Roll (Leeds) (624)	Roll of 7th Bn 1930-37 (1120)
1. Unhealthy Areas						
Leylands	-	-	8	-	-	2
Quarry Hill	-	-	4	3	14	4
	-	-	12(2.54%)	3(0.44%)	14(2.24%)	6(0.54%)
2. Slum Areas						
Burmantofts	3	3	29	31	42	37
Bank	2	1	13	16	38	43
West Street	-	-	11	9	15	9
Meadow Lane	-	-	4	2	-	3
	5(5.15%)	4(3.96%)	57(12.08%)	58(8.58%)	95(15.22%)	92 (8.21%)
3. Transitional Areas						
Inner City	3	-	6	3	10	4
Inner Holbeck	1	-	8	26	21	41
Inner Hunslet	1	1	10	22	13	48
Park Lane	-	-	5	6	9	9
Newtown	-	2	9	26	14	39
Little London	5	1	11	23	11	48
	10(10.30%)	4(3.96%)	49(10.38%)	106(15.68%)	78(12.50%)	189(16.87%)
4. Poor Areas						
Sheepscar	2	4	18	16	23	18
Kirkstall Rd East	5	1	5	23	43	31
	7(7.22%)	5(4.95%)	23(4.87%)	39(5.77%)	66(10.58%)	49(4.37%)
5. Intermediate/ Mixed Areas						
Whingate	1	-	2	3	-	4
Wortley	-	-	5	7	4	8
North Armley	-	-	1	3	1	4
Central Armley	1	-	7	3	-	1
East Armley	4	3	18	13	16	20
New Wortley	1	2	11	22	19	31
Holbeck	2	1	10	22	19	26
Dewsbury Rd North	-	-	8	16	9	21
Dewsbury Rd South	4	1	2	3	9	8
North Hunslet	3	1	8	18	20	32
South Hunslet	-	1	-	6	-	3
Richmond Hill	-	1	10	4	9	4
East Burmantofts	3	4	7	8	31	10
Woodhouse	16	16	19	47	57	30
Woodhouse Carr	2	1	3	10	2	6
Belle Vue Road	2	2	8	9	7	6
Kirkstall Rd West	3	2	4	19	34	5
	42(43.30%)	35(34.65%)	123(26.06%)	213(31.51%)	237(37.98%)	219(19.55%)

Continued/...

Table 9. (Continued)

6. Better Working Class Areas						
South Harehills	3	2	17	19	-	14
Burley	1	1	7	9	6	4
Beeston Hill	1	2	9	16	16	16
Hunslet Moor	1	1	1	3	3	5
Thwaite Gate	-	-	4	8	8	4
Stourton	-	-	-	3	-	4
Cross Green	1	1	3	3	-	7
East End Park	1	-	13	15	12	16
Roundhay Road	1	2	15	15	-	13
	9(9.28%)	9(8.91%)	69(14.62%)	91(13.46%)	45(7.21%)	83(7.42%)
7. Mixed Middle Class/Upper Working Class Areas						
Bagby Fields	-	3	4	14	8	25
Little Woodhouse	-	1	10	12	2	14
Hyde Park	1	2	3	3	-	4
South Headingley	5	2	12	19	23	7
West Armley	1	-	3	4	-	-
Cross Flats	-	2	8	8	10	5
North Harehills	1	1	1	4	-	-
Potternewton	2	-	3	8	-	6
South Chapeltown	-	-	5	2	-	1
	10(10.30%)	11(10.89%)	49(10.38%)	74(10.95%)	43(6.89%)	62(5.54%)
8. Predominantly Middle Class Areas						
North Chapeltown	-	2	1	1	-	4
Oakwood	-	2	1	-	-	-
Roundhay	1	1	-	3	-	1
Headingley	-	-	1	9	-	-
Far Headingley/ Lawnswood	-	-	-	2	-	1
	1(1.03%)	5(4.95%)	3(0.63%)	15(2.22%)	-	6(0.54%)
9. Outlying "Village" Areas						
Chapel Allerton	-	1	2	4	-	1
Moortown	-	-	2	-	-	2
Shadwell			2	-		
Meanwood		1	2	4	1	1
Kirkstall	2	3	6	22	29	8
Bramley	1	2	12	9		18
Stanningley		2	1	2		2
Farnley			4	2		1
Churwell			2	-	1	8
Beeston				-		1
Halton		2	4	3		8
Crossgates				-		6
Middleton				-		2
	3(3.09%)	11(10.89%)	37(7.84%)	46(6.80%)	31(4.97%)	58(5.18%)

Continued/...

Table 9. (Continued)

10. Towns and Villages surrounding Leeds						
Horsforth	7	6	7	9	14	2
Pudsey	2		7	3		3
Farsley		2	4			
Morley			6	1		101
Barwick-in-Elmet		2		–		
Thorner				2		1
East Ardsley		1				3
Tingley			1	1		11
Rawdon			1			
Rodley				1		2
Guiseley				2		
Aberford				1		
Garforth				2		
Clifford				1		
Birstall			2			1
Gildersome						10
Drighlington						8
West Ardsley						2
Birkenshaw						4
Bruntcliffe						3
Yeadon			3			1
Otley						1
Bramhope						1
East Keswick						2
Stanks						1
Methley						1
Newlay, nr. Horsforth					1	
	9(9.27%)	11(10.89%)	31(6.57%)	23(3.40%)	15(2.40%)	158(14.11%)
11. Others						
Bradford			3			3
Dudley Hill						3
Cleckheaton						1
Batley Carr/ Dewsbury		1				
Woodlesford			1			
South Milford				1		
Rothwell			4	1		1
Carlton, Rothwell						2
Robin Hood			1			
Stanley			1			
Outwood			1	1		
Normanton	1	1	1	1		
Castleford			1	1		
Wakefield		2		1		1
Tadcaster			1			
Harrogate			1			
Knaresborough			1			
York		1				
Scarborough		1				
Sutton, nr. Thirsk				1		
Huddersfield			1			1
Barnoldswick						1
Skirton, Lancs			1			
Milnthorpe, Westmorland			1			
Royston, Barnsley				1		

Continued/...

Table 9. (Continued)

Crofton, Wakefield						1
Thurnscoe, Rotherham						2
South Kirby						1
Ollerton						1
Cleethorpes						1
Doncaster						1
Ossett						1
Sheffield						1
Nottingham						1
	1(1.03%)	6(5.94%)	19(4.03%)	8(1.18%)	-	23(2.05%)
12. Leeds Council Estates						
Belle Isle						4
Middleton						44
Halton Moor & Osmondthorpe						27
Lupton Avenue						10
Gipton						27
Sandford						3
Wythers						3
Burley Hill						2
Hawksworth						7
Cardinals						6
Fairfield						4
Meanwood						11
Miles Hill						9
Scott Hall Rd						12
Sutton Estates						6
						175(15.62%)

SUMMARY (Percentages)

1. Unhealthy areas	-	-	2.54	0.44	2.24	0.54
2. Slum areas	5.15	3.96	12.08	8.58	15.22	8.21
3. Transitional areas	10.30	3.96	10.38	15.68	12.50	16.87
4. Poor areas	7.22	4.95	4.87	5.77	10.58	4.37
5. Intermediate/ mixed areas	43.30	34.65	26.06	31.51	37.98	19.55
6. Better working class areas	9.28	8.91	14.62	13.46	7.21	7.42
7. Mixed middle class/ upper working class areas	10.30	10.89	10.38	10.95	6.89	5.54
8. Predominantly middle class areas	1.03	4.95	0.63	2.22	-	0.54
9. Outlying village areas	3.09	10.89	7.84	6.80	4.97	5.18
10. Towns & villages surrounding Leeds	9.27	10.89	6.57	3.40	2.40	14.11
11. Others	1.03	5.94	4.03	1.18	-	2.05
12. Leeds council estates	-	-	-	-	-	15.62

Sources:

Col. 1&2: Interview data

3: List published in Yorkshire Post, 14 September 1914;

4: Data published in Leeds newspapers 1914-1918;

5: The National Roll of the Great War 1914-1918 (n.d.), Section VIII Leeds;

6: Roll Book of the 7th Bn, 1930-37.

TABLE 10. CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS AT ENLISTMENT OF RIFLEMEN and their PARENTS/GUARDIANS, 1908-1918, 1930-37

	Peacetime Enlistments		Wartime Enlistments		First Enlistments in Workers Pals Bns. 13/9/1914	Wartime Register 1914-18		B Coy 8th Bn. 1.1.1919	Roll of 7th Bn. 1930-37
	Riflemen	Parent/ Guardian	Riflemen	Parent/ Guardian	Parents/Guardians only	Riflemen	Parent/ Guardian	Riflemen only	Riflemen only
Professional									
accountant				1					
articled accountant's clerk			1						
architect							3		
pupil architect/builder			1						
trainee industrial chemist			1						
orchestral conductor/composer							1		
articled solicitor's clerk			1						
student			1						
surveyor							2		
schoolteacher		1					1	1	
	-	1	5	1	-	-	7	1	-
Self-employed (manufacturing & allied trades)									
cloth manufacturer's agent/ commission agent						1			
engineer	1	1							
glass beveller						1	1		
glass bottle manufacturer						2	2		
manufacturer's agent					1				
wool trade apprentice						1			
worsted manufacturer						1	1		
	1	1	-	-	1	6	4	-	-

Continued/...

Table 10 (Continued)

Self-employed (Wholesale, retail, service)								
automobile engineer					1	2		
baker				1				
bookmaker	1	1						
bookseller						1		
blacksmith & farrier				1			1	
boot/shoe maker	1						3	
boot/shoe repairer			2	2	1	1	2	
boot & shoe retailer/cycle agent			1					
licensed broker	1		1	1				
building contractor			1	1	1	2		
building contractor/quarry owner	1							
butcher			2	1			2	2
carpet contractor					2	2		
carting agent							1	
chimney sweep				1	1			
china dealer						1		
public clockmaker					1	1		
coal merchant					1	1		
coal merchant/carting agent/removal contractor				1				
costumier				1				
cutler & tool dealer					1	1		
confectioner (retail)				2			1	
confectioner (wholesale)					1			
dairy keeper						2		
farmer		1	1	1	1	1	9	
fish & game dealer							1	
fried fish dealer			1	3		2		
fruit & vegetable merchant					1	1		
furniture maker			1					
furniture retailer		1	2		1	1		

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

greengrocer		1			1	2	2	1	
hairdresser								3	
ice cream dealer							1		
joiner & builder	1	1							
joiner & carpenter							1		
lodging house proprietor		1			1				
market gardener								1	
milk seller					1				
mineral water maker									1
motor car & motorcycle agent				1					
music hall artiste								1	
newsagent					1		1		1
newsagent & stationer								1	
owner of chain of pawnbrokers & outfitters shops						1	1		
pawnbroker					1				
painter & decorator		2				2	2		
painter & signwriter		1	1	1					
piano tuner/repairer					1				
plumber		1		2		1	1		
poultry dealer					1				
publican		2		2	1	1	1		
refreshment rooms proprietor				1					
removal contractor					1				
shopkeeper (mixed business)		3			3		6	2	
slipper manufacturer					1		2		
tailor							1		
tailoring sub-contractor			2	2					
travelling draper							2		
undertaker							1		
vocalist							1		
wholesale clothier's apprentice			1			1			
yeast dealer					1				
	1	16	7	21	30	21	42	29	4

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

Employed (non-manual)									
assistant company secretary						1			
assistant superintendent of telegraphs				1					
asylum attendant						1			
bank clerk						2			
bank manager		1							
bookkeeper	1			1					
bookkeeper/clerk			2						
canvasser					1				
cashier							2		
caretaker				1	2	1	4		
charge hand/junior foreman			1	1					
chief plant engineer				1					
cinema projectionist									1
civil servant			1					1	
clerk	6	1	3	1	3	15	2	4	13
cloth buyer								1	
clothier's assistant	1					1			
commercial traveller		1		1	2	3	4	2	2
costume designer								1	
Deputy City Parks Superintendent							2		
cemetery superintendent				1					
engineering buyer							1		
foreman/overlooker	1	3		6	1		7	4	1
hairdresser									4
hotel chef						1			
insurance agent			1		3	3	1		
insurance agent/secretary of a Friendly Society							1		
insurance clerk	4					5		2	
local government officer			1			2			
manager (unspecified)				1			4		
retail manager				1	1	2		1	
skinyard manager				1					

Continued/...

Table 10 (Continued)

works manager								1	
Merchant Navy cadet			1						
passenger steamership steward						1			
pawnbroker's assistant						1			1
police constable				2	3		1		
police sergeant		1					1		
police inspector							1		
printers' head reader		2							
professional footballer (Association)						1			
railway company representative				1					
regimental sergeant major (Regular Army)				1					
rate collector							1		
resident inspecting engineer		1							
restaurant head waiter						1			
shop assistant			2			4	1	4	19
shorthand typist			1			1		1	
stocktaker									1
theatre musician							1		5
tramway inspector						1			
waiter					1				2
wholesale draper's assistant			1						
windowdresser			1						
	13	10	15	21	17	47	34	22	49
Employed (manual)									
1. Skilled									
apprentice (unspecified)									1
blacksmith		2		2	1		1		3
bodymaker									1
boilermaker	1				1	1	1		1
boilersmith									1
brass finisher			1			2	2	2	2

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

coppersmith							1		1
crane driver							1		3
crane steelslinger								1	
driller					2	2	1	1	3
electroplater									1
emery wheel maker				1					
enameller									1
engine erector									2
engineer	6	4	5	2	1	3	4	1	41
fitter	5	2	1	2	1	4	3	2	29
forgeman	1				1		2	3	
furnaceman				2			1	1	1
gun inspector		1							
hollowware dresser								1	
instrument maker								1	1
iron dresser									1
iron planer								2	1
mechanic	1				1	2	5	1	6
miller									1
millwright		1	1	1			1		1
moulder	3				5	9	4	4	27
oilcan maker				1					
tinsmith	1		1			1	1		
pattern maker								1	
puddler							1		
reed maker								1	
rivetter		1	1					1	1
screw maker									3
sheet metal worker			1						3
shipbuilding plater								1	
solderer									1
spindle maker									1
"steel worker"								1	2

Continued/...

Table 10 . (Continued)

template maker							1		
toolsetter									1
turner	1				1	1		6	14
centre lathe turner			1						
welder	2		1			1			2
wheelmaker/ wheelsmith									1
wheel turner									1
wheelwright				1					
whitesmith									1
wire drawer								1	
coach painter				1					
japanner				1					
paint mixer								1	
electrician			1					1	7
electrical engineer			2						
auto engineer									1
motor mechanic			1					1	2
driver/mechanic								1	1
tailor	1	5	5	2	4	1	9	5	24
tailor's cutter	1	1	7		3	6	2		11
cloth cutter							1	1	1
shirt cutter									1
currier	1		1	2			4	1	
leather dresser/finisher		3		1			2	1	
leather polisher									1
leather laces maker			1						
tanner	1		1				2		
boot clicker		1					1		
boot/shoe maker		1			1	1	1		12
boot/ shoe repairer									3
boot rivetter					4	1	2		
stockcutter					1				

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

brush maker					1		1	1	1
mill apprentice			1						
cloth drawer							1		
cloth engineer									1
textile engineer									2
gill maker				1					
linen tuner				1					
loom fitter/ loom tuner						2			
spinner	1	1	2	1			1	3	3
textile printer								1	
weaver				1		1		2	3
clay pipemaker				1					
brilliant cutter						1			
glass blower								1	6
glass embosser					1				
mineshaft sinker		1		1			1		
shot firer	1								
cabinet maker	1			1	1	1			4
chair maker							1		
cooper						1			
French polisher	2							1	5
joiner/carpenter		1	1	2	9	1	5	3	11
shop, office, bank fitter						4			
upholsterer	1				1				3
wood carver				1					1
bookbinder									2
compositor	1		2			5		1	1
lithographer						1			1
photo-engraver									1
printer	5	1	2			2	3		6
printer's ruler	1	1							
maltster								1	
bricklayer		1	1	1			3		5
glazier						1			3

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

marble sculptor								1	
plasterer	1					1	1		6
plumber	1			1			1	1	2
stained glass maker						1			
slater/tiler									2
slaughterman								4	
stonemason		1			2	1			1
quarryman		1					1		
decorator								1	13
painter & decorator	1	1	1		4		5		
painter & signwriter						10			
paperhanger							1		
signwriter	1					1			
railway carriage/wagon inspector/ examiner	1						1		
railway engine driver		1					2		
railway guard				1					
railway signalman/lad			1						3
waggon builder					1				
waggon repairer								1	
tramway wireman			1				1		
chauffeur					1			1	
coachman							3		
farrier									1
head groom / groom				1				1	1
horse breaker								1	
horse cabdriver		1					1	1	
horsekeeper			1	1			1		
horseman						1		2	5
farm horseman								4	
motor driver						1		1	19
motor lorry driver		1							
motor man									3

Continued/...

Table 10 (Continued)

binoculars repairer									1
camera maker							1		
plaster model maker							1		
silk hat maker		1							
tobacco pipe maker	1								
window blind maker								1	
baker									3
butcher	1						1		8
confectioner									1
gamekeeper						1			
gardener	1	1			1	3	1	1	2
jeweller									1
watch repairer								1	
lino/carpet fitter	1				1	2			2
toy carver/painter			1						
gas fitter	1	1			1			1	
road ganger			1	1					
water inspector									1
leading seaman RN		1							
	48	39	47	37	50	76	92	80	358
2. Semi-skilled									
blacksmith's striker					2				1
boiler presser									1
cable hand									2
capstan lathe operator			1						
"copper worker"									1
core maker								1	1
dipper									1
electric lamp sprayer									1
engineering finisher									1

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

file cutter					1				
forge cutter									1
rough cutter									1
grinder			1		1	1	1		
galvanised sheet worker								1	
hammer driver									4
iron plate worker								1	
"iron worker"								1	2
iron worker's screwer									1
(GPO?) jointer									1
machine operator						1			2
machinist					1		1		
metal polisher					1				6
metal worker									4
press operator								1	
rivet heater	1		1					1	
sheet mill worker								1	
shipyard plater's assistant								1	
tube inspector									1
wireworker									2
engineman							2		
tailor's machinist				1					
tailor's presser	2				1		2		13
vest fitter									1
leather roller								1	
leather sorter									1
leather sprayer									2
"leather worker"		1						1	15
tannery worker									5
boot/shoe finisher			1	2	1		1	1	2
boot machinist					1				
boot and shoe operative		1				1			3
boot upper maker						1			
cloth finisher	2	1	3	1	1	1	3	1	8

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

cloth singer	1	1							
"cloth worker"									2
dyer/dyehouse assistant	4	1	2		1	4	1	2	1
dyeware maker								1	
bobbin reeler									1
card jobber								1	
cloth pattern despatcher			1						
colour finisher									1
colour mixer									1
mill fettler						2			2
mill hand/mill worker	3		1	1		1			19
mule piecener									2
pattern marker									1
percher									1
twister									2
warp dresser							2		
warp sizer								1	
wool blender							1		
wool comber									1
wool sorter								1	
woollen carder								1	
packer									6
storeman									2
warehouseman	4		2	2	2		6	1	10
"clay worker"						1		1	
"glass worker"						1			4
sanitary glazer									2
miner	2	3	2	1	2	15	4	14	139
miner's lampman					1				
pony driver						1			6
joiner's machinist								1	
woodcutting machinist	1	1	1	1		1			2
wood sawyer	2			1				1	4

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

asphalter							1		
brick maker									2
brick moulder									1
elastic maker								1	
flour miller								1	
paper maker						2		1	
rope slicer					1				
soapworker									3
trimmer									4
wallpaper maker									1
machine ruler								1	
printer's cutter						1			
printer's machine minder						3		1	
"builder"						1			1
railway capstan youth						1			
railway engine cleaner	1					2			2
railway fireman					3			1	
railway ganger				2					
railway lampman								1	
railway platelayer	1				1	3		1	2
railway porter						2	2	2	
railway shunter			1		1		1	1	
garage hand						1			1
tramdriver/conductor					3	13			11
carter/cartman/drayman		1	1	1	2	2	6	2	5
coal leader						4			
deliveryman	2								
laundryman									1
auctioneer's (salesroom) assistant									1
baker's assistant									1
butcher's assistant			2			1			
confectioner's cutter									1
grocer's assistant						4	1		7
fishmonger's assistant			1						2

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

greengrocer's assistant									4
ice cream salesman									1
photographer's assistant						1			
tripedresser						1			
barman						2			1
belt maker									1
bill poster	1					1			
boilerman	1	1		1			1	1	2
farm worker								4	4
assistant greenkeeper			1						
gas works stoker		4					1		
picture framer									1
postman			1				1		4
GPO telegraph messenger						2			
turflayer									1
university porter									1
weighman									2
Regular soldier (private)		1		2					
	28	15	24	16	27	78	38	55	361
3. Unskilled									
art gallery attendant						1			
boatman					1		1		
bobbinman									1
boiler cleaner									2
bottle sorter							1		
bottler						2			1
boxmaker									1
brewery worker (unspecified)					1	3			
brick burner									1
charwoman							1		
coal dealer									1
colliery surface worker		1							
cloth dealer									1

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

Corporation employee (unspecified)		2				1			1
dry cleaner									1
dustman						2			1
errand boy									2
fan lad									1
gas worker						4			2
glass works hand			1			1			
hawker					1		1		4
hotel worker (unspecified)						1			
kitchen hand									1
kitchen porter									1
labourer	3	6	2	3	20	10	25	7	277
lamplighter		1				1	2		1
lowside tenter									1
messenger									3
newspaper seller									3
pedlar									1
pipe layer									1
porter	1						1		3
rag filler									1
rag grinder									1
stevedore								1	
railway yardman	1			1		3			
railwayman (unspecified)						13	2	1	2
roadman						1			
van boy	1								1
window cleaner						1			3
	6	10	3	4	23	44	34	9	320

Note: The manual workers, with one exception, have been classified according to the Hall-Jones Scale of Occupational Prestige for Males (John Hall and D. Caradog Jones, 'Social Grading of Occupations', Brit. J. Sociology, I (1950), 31-55). The exception is that of "sheet metal worker" which is classed by Hall and Jones as semi-skilled, but by the AUEW as skilled.

Continued/...

Table 10. (Continued)

SUMMARY (in percentages)

Number of men in each sample.

Occupational category	97	97	101	101	148	272	251	200	1120
II. Professional	-	1.03	4.95	0.99	-	-	2.79	0.5	-
III. Self-employed (a)	1.03	1.03	-	-	0.68	2.20	1.59	-	-
III. Self-employed (b)	1.03	16.49	6.93	20.79	20.27	7.72	16.73	14.5	0.36
IV. (a) Employed: Non-manual	13.40	10.30	14.85	20.79	11.49	17.28	13.55	11.0	4.38
IV. (b) Employed: Manual									
(i) Skilled	49.48	40.20	46.53	36.63	33.78	27.94	36.65	40.0	31.96
(ii) Semi-skilled	28.86	15.46	23.76	15.84	18.24	28.68	15.14	27.5	32.23
(iii) Unskilled	6.18	10.30	2.97	3.96	15.54	16.18	13.55	4.5	28.57
Total of manual workers	84.54	65.98	73.27	56.43	67.57	72.79	65.34	72.0	95.27
No data	-	5.15	-	0.99	-	-	-	2.0	2.50

Sources:

Cols. 1-4: Interview data
5: Yorkshire Post, 14 September 1914; identifications from local directories
6-7: Data published in Leeds newspapers 1914-1918; identifications from local directories
8: Roll Book of B Coy, 8th Bn, 1 January 1919
9: Roll Book of 7th Bn, 1930-1937.

TABLE 11. LEEDS RIFLES OFFICERS, 1st November 1914: PROFESSION/OCCUPATION

	7th Bn [33]	8th Bn [33]
Architect	1	
Solicitor	3	1
Solicitor's articled clerk	1	
Accountants' articled clerk	2	
Medical practitioner	1	1
Stockbroker	2	1
Insurance official	1	2
Schoolmaster	1	2
Professional engineer	3	2
Pupil engineer	1	
University student	5	8
Schoolboy		1
Managing director		1
Company director	3	9
Engineering manager	1	1
Cornmiller's manager	1	
Employment exchange manager	1	
Wine and spirit merchant	1	
Leather merchant		1
Apprentice to wool/woollen trade	2	
Apprentice jeweller, clockmaker, goldsmith	1	
Civil servant	1	
Commercial agent	1	
Rancher		1
Military professional (NCO)		1
No data obtainable		1

Note: Medical officers and Regular adjutants excluded.

Sources: List of names obtained from Army List November 1914; identifications from local directories.

TABLE 12. OFFICERS, 1st November 1914 : PROFESSION/OCCUPATION OF PARENT/GUARDIAN

	7th Bn [33]	8th Bn [33]
Independent means	1	1
Solicitor	1	
Director of the National Physical Laboratory	1	
Consultant surgeon	1	
Medical practitioner		1
Consulting engineer	2	
Civil engineer		1
Chartered accountant	1	
Stockbroker	1	
Church dignitary	1	
Minister of religion		2
Archaeologist/antiquary		1
University professor	1	1
Headmaster	1	
Schoolmaster/clerk to parish council	1	
Bank manager		1
Chairman/principal in a sizable business/industrial concern	11	14
Proprietor of collieries		1
Newspaper proprietor	1	
Proprietor of restaurants		1
Flax merchant		1
Fell-monger		1
Drysalter	1	
Jeweller, clockmaker and goldsmith	1	
Master painter and decorator		1
Master tinplate worker		1
Military professional (NCO)		1
No data	7	4

Source: As for Table 11.

TABLE 13. OFFICERS OF 1/7th Bn, August 1915-December 1918 : PROFESSION/ OCCUPATION

[TOTAL: 173]

Independent means	1
Medical practitioner	1
Dentist	1
Medical/dental student	2
Solicitor	2
Barrister's pupil	2
Assistant magistrate's clerk	1
Chartered/incorporated accountant	4
Accountant's articled clerk	2
Architect	2
Surveyor and valuer	2
Assistant land agent	1
Stock and sharebroker	2
Actor	2
Journalist	2
Insurance official	2
Insurance clerk	3
Assistant university lecturer	1
Schoolmaster	8
University/college student	15
Divinity student	1
Schoolboy	3
Professional engineer	6
Mining engineer	1
Works manager	3
Wool merchant	1
Woollen manufacturer	3
Cloth exporter	1
Apprentice to wool/woollen trade	3
Buyer	2
Textile designer	1
Winding master	1
Wholesale clothier	2
Wholesale draper	1
Apprentice, fancy dress manufacture	1
Brewer (company director)	1
Drysalter	1
Chamois leather dresser, own account	1
Apprentice, cornmilling	1
Shipping canvasser	1
Job master	1
Commercial traveller	3
Agent and operator, Canadian Pacific Railways	2
Motor engineer, own account	1
Wine and spirit merchant	1
Furrier	1
Chemist	2
Master printer	1
Butcher	1
Builder and contractor	1
Roofing contractor	1
Coal dealer	1
Civil servant	2
Colonial service official	1

Local government officer	1
Bank accountant	1
Bank clerk	6
Commercial/general clerk	11
Cashier	3
Private secretary	1
Farmer	7
Rancher	1
Estancia assistant	1
Stock rider	1
Gamekeeper	1
Forester	1
Wool sorter	1
Foreman bricklayer	1
Steelworker	2
Carriage and wagon examiner	1
Storekeeper	1
Tailor's cutter	1
Woodcutting machinist	1
No data given	20

Note: Medical officers excluded.

Source: List of Officers of the 1/7th (Leeds Rifles) Bn West Yorkshire Regt., 1915-1918.

TABLE 14. OFFICERS OF THE 1/7th Bn, August 1915-December 1918: PROFESSION/OCCUPATION OF PARENT/GUARDIAN [TOTAL: 173]

Independent means	7
Country landowner	2
Regular Army officer (RAMC)	1
Church dignitary	1
Minister of religion	5
Solicitor	2
Land agent	1
Insurance broker	1
Superintendent, industrial school	1
Proprietor of private school	1
Schoolmaster	1
Company chairman (brewery)	1
Woollen manufacturer	2
Wool merchant	3
Wool importer	1
Wool stapler	1
Flock manufacturer	1
Manufacturer's dyer	1
Boot and shoe merchant	1
Manufacturing chemist	1
Wholesale drysalter	1
Wholesale clothier	1
Fancy dress manufacturer	1
Leather manufacturer	1
Chamois leather dresser, own account	2
Cornmiller's manager	2
Wholesale fruit merchant	1
Master letterpress printer	1
Builder and contractor	1
Postmaster	1
Cemetery clerk and registrar	1
Farmer	1
Master butcher	1
Small shopkeeper	1
Cloth finisher	1
Compositor	1
Gilder	1
Tailor	1
Paperhanger	1
No data given	117

Source: List of officers of the 1/7th (Leeds Rifles) Bn West Yorkshire Regt., 1915-1918.

TABLE 15. OFFICERS OF 8th Bn, enrolled August 1914-November 1915: PROFESSION/OCCUPATION OF PARENT/GUARDIAN [TOTAL: 51]

Solicitor	3
Minister of religion	2
Headmaster	1
Auctioneer and valuer	1
Merchant [unspecified]	1
Timber merchant	1
Cigar and tobacco importer	1
Worsted manufacturer	2
Woollen manufacturer	1
Woollen agent	1
Yarn merchant	1
Top maker	1
Loom manufacturer	1
Managing director, engineering	1
Leather and glue manufacturer	1
Brick and tile manufacturer	1
Brewer	3
Brewery general manager	1
Farmer	1
Master joiner	1
Military professional (NCO)	1
No data obtainable	24

Note: Officers appearing in Tables 11 and 12 excluded

Source: Record of Officers' Services, 8th Bn 1908-1915.

TABLE 16. OFFICERS OF THE 1/7th Bn, 1915-1918: GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN

[TOTAL: 203]

Leeds:		47 (23.15%)
Towns and villages immediately outside Leeds:		12 (5.91%)
Stanningley	1	
Pudsey	3	
Horsforth	2	
Rawdon	3	
Garforth	1	
Oulton	1	
Woodlesford	1	
Other towns and villages within 16 mls radius of the centre of Leeds:		34 (16.75%)
Morley	1	
Liversedge	1	
Birstall	1	
Gomersal	1	
Cleckheaton	1	
Mirfield	1	
Bradford	10	
Shipley	3	
Ilkley	1	
Huddersfield	3	
Halifax	2	
Keighley	2	
Wakefield	1	
Castleford	1	
Thorner	1	
Boston Spa	1	
Harrogate	3	[Local: 93 (45.81%)]
York:		5
North Yorkshire:		3
Ripon	2	
Skipton	1	
South Yorkshire:		8
Sheffield	3	
Rotherham	3	
Doncaster	2	
East Yorkshire:		9
Malton	1	
Howden	1	
Kingston upon Hull	4	
Whitby	1	
Scarborough	1	
Bridlington	1	

OFFICERS OF THE 1/7th Bn, 1915-1918: GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN (Contd)

North-East England:		10
Co. Durham	8	
Northumberland	1	
Teesside	1	
North-West England:		11
Cumberland	3	
Lancashire	3	
Liverpool	2	
Cheshire	3	
West Midlands:		
Shropshire	1	
Rest of Midlands and East Anglia:		12
Stoke on Trent	2	
Nottingham	3	
Nottinghamshire	1	
Leicestershire	1	
Oxford	1	
Huntingdon	1	
Lincolnshire	1	
Suffolk	2	
South-East and Southern England:		18
Essex	1	
Surrey	6	
Sussex	4	
Berkshire	1	
Hampshire	1	
Kent	5	
South-West England:		4
Devon	1	
Cornwall	3	
London:		21
Wales:		1
Scotland:		1
Southern Ireland:		1
Canada:		1
South Africa:		3

Source: List of officers of the 1/7th (Leeds Rifles) Bn West Yorkshire Regt., 1915-1918.

TABLE 17. OFFICERS WHO ENROLLED IN THE 8th Bn, 1914-1915: GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN [TOTAL: 61]

Leeds:			25	(40.98%)
Towns and villages immediately outside Leeds:			5	(8.2%)
	Stanningley	1		
	Horsforth	1		
	Weeton	1		
	Woodlesford	1		
	Pool	1		
Other towns and villages within 16 mls radius of the centre of Leeds:			14	(22.95%)
	Bradford	1		
	Shipley	1		
	Ben Rhydding,) Ilkley)	3		
	Huddersfield	1		
	Keighley	1		
	Harrogate	6		
	Knaresborough	1	[Local: 44	(72.13%)]
York:			3	
North Yorkshire (Ampleforth)			1	
North-east England (Tyneside)			3	
South-east England:			4	
	Essex	3		
	Surrey	1		
London:			3	
Scotland:			1	
Ireland:			1	
No data:			1	

Source: Record of Officers' Services, 8th Bn 1908-1915.

TABLE 18. OFFICERS OF 1/7th Bn, April 1915-December 1918: FATE

[TOTAL: 203]

Killed in action	25
Killed accidentally	1
Died of wounds	6
Missing, believed killed	4
Invalided to UK wounded	34
Invadided to UK sick	29
Ordered to UK for medical board	2
Taken prisoner [Sept 1916: 1; April 1918: 10]	11
Returned to UK for 6 months' light duty	3
Returned to UK for home duty	2
Returned to UK, reason unspecified	1
Promoted to the command of another battalion	1
Transferred to another battalion	8
Seconded to Brigade Staff	1
Seconded to RAMC	1
Seconded to Indian Army	3
Seconded to Intelligence Corps GHQ	1
Seconded as Instructor to Corps School	2
Seconded/attached/transferred to RFC/RAF	9
Seconded/attached/transferred to Machine Gun Corps	5
Seconded/attached/transferred to RE	7
Attached to 146 Bde Trench Mortar Battery	11
Returned to UK for duties as Interpreter	1
Apparently still serving with 1/7th on 12.12.18	35

Note: Medical officers excluded

Source: List of officers of the 1/7th (Leeds Rifles) Bn West Yorkshire Regt., 1915-1918.

Some notes on the social composition of Nos. 5, 6 and 9 Companies, 1860.

The two officers of No. 5 Company were both solicitors, the Colour-Sergeant a banker's clerk, the corporal an accountant and the bugler an employed manual worker, an engineer, all Volunteers of several months' standing. 28 of the remaining 38 men on the Printed Roll of 25th April 1860 have been identified as follows: I. Non-Employed: 0 [Nil]; II. Professional: 3 (2 architects, Harry William Fox and Thomas Winn) and 1 professor of music; III(a). Self-employed, manufacturing and allied trades: 3 (1 maltster, 1 manufacturing goldsmith, 1 woollen manufacturer); III(b). Self-employed, wholesale, retail and service trades: 7 (1 haberdasher, 1 tobacconist/dealer in musical instruments, 1 licensed victualler, 1 beerhouse keeper, 1 joiner, builder and undertaker, 2 joiners); IV(a). Employed, non-manual: 8 (2 articled solicitor's clerks, 5 clerks, 1 warehouseman); IV(b). Employed, manual: 7 (1 compositor, 1 printer, 1 tanner, 2 stonemasons, 1 day waiter (Samuel Hudson), 1 domestic servant).

Of the first 58 men who enrolled in No. 6 Company in July, 28 could be identified in the 1861 Census Enumerators' Books. Their occupations were as follows: 1 forge foreman, 10 forgemen (one of whom kept a servant), 4 puddlers, 2 furnacemen, 1 steel melter, 2 blacksmiths, 1 boiler plate roller, 3 iron refiners, 1 hammerman striker, 1 millwright, 1 mechanic and iron turner, and 1 foundry labourer. Their average age was 27.07 years. 20 of the men of this sample were married, 4 had no children, 3 one child, 2 two children, 6 three children, 4 four children, and 1 five children on Census Day.

Virtually none of the men on the first rolls of Nos. 7 and 8 Companies could be identified.

The occupations of the Brewery Volunteers (No. 9 Company) were: managing brewer, his articled pupil, the cashier, the book-keeper, 16 clerks (the entire complement), the stoneroom foreman, the yard foreman, the head cellarman, 3 coopers, 1 engine smith, 2 engine men, 1 painter, 11 yardmen, 8 cellarmen, 4 stoneroom hands, 4 mashroom hands, 1 stableman, 6 draymen, 2 checkers, 2 brewer's labourers, the senior night [watch] man, 1 nightman. The weekly wages of 44 of the manual workers are known: 26 earned 15s - 19.11d; 12 between £1 and 24.11d; 3 between 25s and 29.11d; and 3 earned 30s. or over. The salaries of the non-manual employees are not known. The ages of the Volunteers ranged from 13 to 48, the average being 27.3 years. 41 of the Brewery Volunteers could be traced in the Census Books. 25 of them were married: 4 had no children, 5 one child, 10 two children, 2 three children, 1 four children, 2 five children, and 1 seven children on Census Day.

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  - B. Private Collections
  - C. Obtained from private individuals
  - D. Oral sources

II. Published Primary Sources
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  - B. Directories etc.
  - C. HMSO Publications
  - D. Trench newspapers
  - E. Others : collections of letters, etc.
  - F. Parliamentary Papers: (i) Hansard
    (ii) Command Papers, etc.
  - G. Newspapers and magazines

III. Unpublished Secondary Sources : theses, manuscripts and papers

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I. Unpublished Primary Sources

Virtually the whole of the manuscript sources were in private hands.

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" " " 2/7th " " " " " " WO 95/3082
" " " 2/8th " " " " " " WO 95/3082
" " " 8th " " " " " " WO 95/3083

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(Knowles letters). Collection of letters written by 3300 Joseph Herbert Knowles, No. 11 platoon, C Coy, 1/7th, to his wife, March 1915-July 1917; includes letters of condolence written by comrades to his wife.

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(All the owners of the above documents were asked to donate them, or lend them to be photocopied, to the Leeds City Libraries Archives Department).

I.D. Oral sources

(Leeds Riflemen only : regimental number given before name and company given in brackets after name where known.)

7th and 1/7th

1987 Sydney APPLEYARD (B)
1684 David ARMITAGE (D)
2607 Walter ATKINSON (C)
1726 Jack BARKER (C)
1717 Harry BEDFORD (C)
1699 Harold BOOTH (C)
2010 I. Harry BUTCHER (B)
2096 Charles CAMERON (C)
552 William Wilson CAMERON (G)
2635 Reginald Frank CHARGE (B)
1485 Alfred CLARKSON (B)
2735 Cyril CLARKSON (D)
2892 Herbert CRESWICK (A)
1096 Edgar S. FENDLEY (B)
3407 Ernest FENTON (C)
1182 Arthur FISHER (D)
Edward FLATLEY (A)
833 Joseph W. GOLDSACK (B)
1661 William GREGORY (C)
2651 Herbert HARDCASTLE (G)
2584 Herbert HARRISON (C)
1902 Jack W. HEARN
2771 Harold Edward HIRST (A)
1813 Stanley HOLMES (C)
4328 L. Frederick HUDSON (C)
1891 Thomas HUNTER (C)
William KENDREW (B)
2780 Harold KIRK (A)
Robert L.W. KITSON (C)
William LAYCOCK (G)

3227 Clarence LAZENBY (C)
Harry LEAK (A)
1657 William LEETALL (C)
1679 Charles LONSDALE (G)
Harry Martin (B)
2149 Walter MEDLEY (C)
2834 Thomas NETTLETON (D) (commissioned)
2893 George NICHOLS (A)
1986 Thomas O'BRIEN (B)
Ernest PICKERING (B)
502 Harry RANKINE (G)
2815 Harry RICHMOND (D)
497 Arthur B. ROUTH (G)
2738 Norman S. SANDERSON (A)
Henry SPURR (D)
2122 Robert VINE (B)
2992 George A. WALKER (C)
1393 Fred WARBURTON (C)
3149 James William WARMAN (A)
2606 Thomas Henry WATSON (A)
2605 Ellison WHITLEY (C)
1522 John Edward T. WILSON (D)
976 Thomas WILSON (D)
1953 George WOOD (C)
3354 Edward WOODHEAD (B)
2006 Ernest WOODHEAD (C)
2865 Harry L. YEADON (D)
3257 George S. YEOMANS (A)
167 Charles YOUNG (D)
2/Lt Harry WHITHAM (B)

2/7th:

3018 David CLAYTON
3191 William COLBECK
Clifford DAY
Harry KIRK

3478 Sidney LOFTHOUSE
Maurice SHAFFNER
Tom WOOD
3882 William WRENCH

3/7th; 7th (Reserve) Bn

Herbert Reginald GAINES
Samuel A. HOOD

Christopher G. HORSFALL
James MACKEN

1/8th and 8th:

1788 John ALLMAN (A)
2371 Brian ARMITAGE (C)
3085 Sidney BAILEY (A)
1757 George Alfred BLAYMIRE (B)
Albert BOWDEN (C)
2880 William Arthur BYWATER (C)
2363 Ben CLARK (B)
2505 C.C. (Jim) COULSON (D)
1159 Thomas DARBYSHIRE (B)
2158 Harold DEAN (C)
534 Thomas DICKINSON (B)
1610 Thomas DORAN (B)
2715 James EASTBURN (C)
2430 John ESPIN (B)
2221 George Arthur FLETCHER (C)
Ernest FOSTER
2227 Gilbert FREEMAN (C)
1327 Walter GARNETT (D)
649 John Bernard GAWTHORPE (commissioned)
1310 William GILL (B)
2891 Charles Edward HANNAN (A)
1396 Reuben HARTLEY (B)
Fred HEARN (B)
2223 Herbert HOPKINSON (A)
1294 Alexander LATTO (A)
2473 Leslie F. LIGHTOWLER (A)
1641 John LITTLEWOOD (A)
2455 Norman James MASON (A)
1803 Alfred Kennedy OWEN (D)
2554 Claude N. PEPPER (A)
2381 Joseph PERRY (C)
Albert Edward PITTS (B)
G. Oswald PLACKETT (Transport)
2222 William HORSMAN REYNARD (C)
1090 James RHIND (D)
Robert H.P. SCHULZE (B)
2812 Percy SHEPHERD (A)
1688 Harry SLATER (A)
1326 John SPEECHLEY (Transport)
1022 Walter STEAD (A)
1543 Harper (Arthur) STOTT (C)
2313 Herbert C. SWEETMAN (D)
2952 Lawrence TALLANT (A)
2260 Edgar TAYLOR (B)
1111 Reginald THACKERY (A)
132 Harry THACKRAY (A)
2407 Arthur WAINWRIGHT (A)
2349 Harry WALTON (B)
1479 Harold WATERHOUSE (D)
1382 Charles WATERWORTH (B)
2586 William WILSON (D)
3167 Albert E. WOOD (A)
Sam B. WOOD (Bandmaster, 8th)
2/Lt John Rotherford BELLERBY (C)
2/Lt (Capt) Hugh Ralph LUPTON (A)

2/8th:

Cecil CROWTHER
5155 Abe FREEDMAN
George GOUGH
4998 Charles Myer MYERSON
3572 George William (Gerry) WHEELER

Post-World War I Leeds Riflemen

Brigadier Kenneth HARGREAVES, CBE
Col. John Houston TAYLOR, CBE
Major R.F. FLATOW
Lt. Phillip K. STEAD
Bill BROWN
Edward C. ELLIS
Harold GRANT
Edward HAWKSHAW
Alfred LOWLEY
Hector William McMASTERS
Alan S. PEDLEY
Reginald RIVERS
Harry SANDERSON
Kenneth STOKES
Fred VERITY

Members of other Territorial units who served before and during World War I

Thomas R. KITSON	1/5th WYR
Walter WILSON	-do-
Alfred BRACEWELL	1/6th WYR
Ruskin CHATTAWAY	-do-
Joseph FELL	-do-
John H. TAYLOR	-do-
William GREAVES	2/6th WYR
Col. Sir Douglas Stephenson BRANSON	1/4th Y & L
Fred SELWOOD	1/4th KOYLI
Frederick BARRON	-do-
James SMITH	1/5th KOYLI
John W. STEPHENSON	1/6th DWR
Leslie Victor GIBBS	1/4th Suffolk Regt.
F. KIDBY	-do-
L.S. PASKALL	-do-
W.G. PECK	-do-
B.L. TWEED	-do-
Capt. E. W. GREEN	5th Border Regt.
Archibald MacKELLAR	1/5th SR
Arthur HAWKINS	245 Bde RFA (Leeds Artillery)
Victor George HEAD	246 Bde RFA (Bradford Artillery)
Harry Smith	223 Bde RFA
Reginald NAYLOR	10th Battery (Otley), 148 (4th WR) Bde RFA
Albert MARSDEN	-do-
Thomas H. PHILLIPS	148 Machine-gun Company, 49th Division
Richard R.W. DENNISON	Leeds Engineers
Arthur G. ILLINGWORTH	1/1st WR Field Ambulance
Thomas GREEN	1/2nd WR Field Ambulance
Fred DENT	1/3rd WR Field Ambulance
Alfred Edgar (Ted) WELBURN	Leeds ASC
William WILSON	-do-
William PERKINS	-do-

Regular soldiers who served before and during World War I

Edward BILTON	2nd KOYLI
John CUSWORTH	2nd Green Howards
Horace CALVERT	2nd Grenadier Guards
George M. DOWLING	10th/18th Hussars
George William FIRTH	RAMC
Harry FOTHERBY	2nd Green Howards
Dennis FURLONG	1st KOYLI
Alfred HOLMES	2nd Green Howards
Charles Harry MARSHALL	17th Lancers (Leeds City Police, Mounted Section)
Horace MERRY	20th Hussars
Billy PRATT	73rd Battery, RFA
George Jim SMITH	4th Middlesex
Henry Edward SMITHIN	1st Worcester Regt.
Sam TAYLOR	2nd DWR
Herbert Russell WIDDUS	2nd Leicester Regt.
Stephen WHITACKER	ASC
Arthur WRIGHT	1st WYR

Demographic and motivational information was obtained for the following Riflemen from their next-of-kin. The men asterisked were members of the Leeds Rifles 1914 Old Comrades Association who, before their deaths, provided information in conversations which has been used in the present study.

*1416	Joseph ACKROYD	(8)
	Lawrence BARTLAM	(1/8,A)
	Harry BEADSWORTH	(1/8,B)
	Herbert BOURNE	(1/7,B)
	Reginald BRADBURY	(1/7,D)
*2241	James BRAMFITT	(1/8)
469	Herbert BROWN	(1/7,C)
2481	Reginald BROOK	(1/8,A)
1951	William B. BURRELL	(commissioned)
	Francis BURTON	(1/7)
2748	Charles Arthur CAPP	(1/7,D)
2972	William E. CAPP	(1/8)
	Harry CALVERT	(1/7,C)
1298	Colin CAMERON	(1/7,C)
*1213	Oswald A. CHAPMAN	(1/8,A)
	Sidney CLARK	(1/7,C)
	Walter CORNISH	(1/8,D)
*1332	Charles CORNISH	(1/8,D)
1959	James CRAMPTON	(1/7)
*3056	Robert W. CUNNINGTON	(1/7,D)
	George CUSWORTH	(1/7,C)
*2008	Harry ELLIS	(1/7,C)
*	Albert E. FARRAR	(1/7,B)
* 46	Herbert FEARNLEY	(1/7,B)
	Horace FITZPATRICK	(1/8)
	John FLATLEY	(1/7,A)
*1219	Arthur FOZARD	(1/8,C)
	Tommy GANNON	(8)
	Leonard GLEW	(1/7,A)
3947	Squire GRANT	(1/7,B)
1683	Bernard HESHON	(8)
2654	Albert HILL	(1/7,B)
*1528	Charles HOLMES	(1/8,B)
	Sam HORSFALL	(1/7,B)
2104	Harry KITCHING	(1/7,B)
3300	Joseph H. KNOWLES	(1/7,C)
*1748	John Edwin LANGTON	(1/8,D)
3796	Leonard LEDGARD	(1/8)
2348	Willy LOVETT	(1/8,A)
991	John William LOWLEY	(1/7)
680	James METCALF	(1/7)
*1868	Daniel MURPHY	(1/7,D)
2111	Herbert NAYLOR	(1/7)
	Joe PALEY	(1/7,B)
*2907	Harold PEARSON	(1/8,A)
560	William PETTY	(1/8,C)
	William E. Potts	(8)
371	Ernest Edward POWELL	(1/7,C)
1052	Leslie RANKINE	(1/8)
1208	Frank RHIND	(1/8,D)
6	Harry RHODES	(1/7, RQMS)
1546	John RHODES	(1/8,D)
1547	Harry RHODES	(1/8,D)
1746	Herbert RHODES	(1/8,D)
	Harry RILEY	(1/7)
	Ernest RIVERS	(1/7,C)
824	Harry ROUTH	(1/8)
	Albert RUSTON	(1/8)
2207	George SANDERSON	(1/8,D)
*1712	John William SANDERSON	(1/8,A)
*	Frank SIMPSON	(1/8,B)
315	James SMITH, Snr	(1/7)
1376	James SMITH, Jnr	(1/8,A)
	Clifford SMITH	(1/8,A)
	Tommy SMITH	(1/8,A)
	Jack STANTON	(1/8,A)
	Frank SOLKELL	(1/8,D)
1645	Tom SUTCLIFFE	(1/7,D)
182	James Brown TAYLOR	(1/7,C)
1892	Harry TURTLE	(1/7,A)
*1674	Norman Wm. WADDINGTON	(1/7,D)
2024	Christopher WALL	(1/7,B)
*	Clifford WALTON	(1/8,D)
	Harry WATTS	(1/7,B)
3004	Herbert WOODHEAD	(1/7,D)
	Roy WORSNOP	(1/7,B)
*2686	Vincent W. WARRILLOW	(1/7,D)
	Ernest WALKER	(1/7,C)
*1880	David W. YOUNG	(1/7,D)

The following members of the Leeds Rifles 1914 Old Comrades Association provided information in conversations or in writing which has been used in the present study. They unfortunately died before the study was formally commenced.

1608	Frank Greenwood ALLATT	(1/7,D)
2668	Alwyne G. ATKINSON	(1/7,B)
1854	Clarence BADDELEY	(1/7,B)
1603	Clifford BEAN	(1/7,A)
3230	Charles A. BEANLAND	(1/7,C)
3017	Jack W. BENTLEY	(1/7,B)
1106	Harry BONNER	(1/7,A)
2533	Herbert BRIGGS	(1/8,A)
1960	Percy BROOK	(1/8,B)
2290	Joseph CARTER	(1/7,A)
1666	Benjamin CHILD	(8)
933	George CHAMBERS	(1/8,C)
	Louis CLAYDEN	(1/7,C)
1866	L. George CLOUGH	(1/7,D)
2605	George COLLINS	(1/8,B)
1233	George A. COLLINSON	(1/8,B)
786	George W. CONNORS	(1/8,C)
1460	George (Monty) CROWTHER	(1/8,D)
	Frank DILLEY	(2/8,D)
	Norman DRAKE	(1/7,B)
2006	George N. ELLIOTT	(8)
1966	Harry EMMETT	(1/7,C)
3880	James FOSTER	(1/8,D)
2156	Louis (Len) GRANGER	(1/7,C)
2642	George Henry GUTHRIE	(1/7,D)
1814	Walter HAWKSHAW	(1/7,C)
	James HANSGATE	(1/7, Transport)
4158	George S. IBBITSON	(1/7,D)
1235	Arthur William IRWIN	(1/8,C)
2460	Ernest W. KIRKLAND	(1/8,C)
432	George Alfred MUNDY	(1/7,B)
1117	John Thomas MASKILL	(1/8,D)
2251	Christopher PALLISTER	(1/8,D)
2212	John PECK	(1/8,D)
4817	Frank PICKARD	(1/8,C)
2211	Grainger REX	(1/8,D)
1749	Clifford ROBERTS	(1/7,A)
	W. Sefton POMFRET	(1/7,A)
2226	Leonard SHIRES	(1/8,B)
	Harry P. SIDNEY	(1/7,A)
	James (Jimmy) SEED	(1/8)
	Fred SCRUTON	(1/7,A)
1248	Albert SMITH	(1/7,A)
442	Christopher C. SPENCE	(1/8,B)
1677	George H. STRICKLAND	(1/7,A)
2797	Albert SYKES	(1/7,C)
1701	Harold TAYLOR	(1/7,A)
1165	Norman TAYLOR	(1/8)
2453	Henry THACKRAY	(1/8,A)
1317	George TILLOTSON	(1/7,A)
471	Victor WHITLEY	(1/7,C)
2728	Frederick R. WIGGLESWORTH	(1/7,C)
1380	William WILKINSON	(1/8,A)
	Capt. Francis William MAY	(1/7,B)
	Major Morris MAY	(1/7,HQ)

The following people, nearly all relatives of Leeds Riflemen, provided additional valuable information on people connected with the Regiment; on historical events; on social areas of Leeds; on contemporary social conditions and attitudes; or on the British Army.

Mrs Lily BLACKBURN
Mrs Reginald BRADBURY
Mrs Rene BRAMLEY
Mrs Evaline BURRELL
Arthur CALVERT
Mrs Alice CAIRNS (née CAPP)
Miss Amy CRESWICK
Mrs Charles CORNISH
Col. H.V. DAWSON
Fred DIMMOCK
Mrs Lucia (Lucy) DOBSON
Mrs Madge DOWLING
Sir Archibald R. DUNBAR, Bt.
Miss Bertha FOZARD
Lt.Col. David GLAZEBROOK, OBE
Lt.Col. Richard GLAZEBROOK, OBE
Mrs Leonard GLEW
Capt. Peter HORSFALL, Coldstream Guards (retd.)
Mrs Annie HILL
Mrs Isabel HOLMES
Dr George S. KITSON CLARK
Mrs Alexander LATTO
Dr Charles A. LUPTON
Norman MARSH
Mrs Annie May MORRIS
Mrs Daniel MURPHY
Mrs Lily PETTY
Mrs Louis POPE
George PORTEUS
Cecil M. POTTS
Cecil RHODES
J.A. RUDD
Mrs. Lillian A. SANDERSON
Jack SMITH
Mrs Norman WADDINGTON
Mrs Christine WALL
Mrs Irene WILD (née WHEELER)
Mrs Annie WORSNOP (née POWELL)
Mrs David YOUNG

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Series 5 (HL): Vols. 2 (1909); 5 (1910); 11 (1912); 19 (1915); 77 (1930).

Series 5 (HC): Vols. 1, 2 (1909); 16 (1910); 38, 40 (1912); 51 (1913); 59, 64 (1914); 70, 71, 73, 75, 77 (1915); 80, 81 (1916); 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 (1917); 722 (1965).

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