The Press in the Arab World

a Bourdieusian critical alternative to current perspectives on the role of the media in the public sphere

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Abstract

The current literature on the role of media in the public sphere in general, and particularly politics, is divided among two opposing trends. The liberal/pluralists argue that media is playing a democratic role consisting of either representing public opinion and/or informing it. The critical theorists argue that media is in fact controlled by and represents elite interests. But even critical theories of the role of media in politics are driven by the belief that media ought to play a democratic and liberal role in society. Both theories therefore share a common normative understanding of what the role of media ought to be and are therefore the product of a common normative ideological framework, the liberal paradigm. This prevents them from properly framing the question of what media actually do in societies which lie beyond the scope of the experience of liberal Europe.

This dissertation seeks to transcend this debate, and the liberal paradigm along with it, by arguing that, given a different historical context than the European one, the practice and ethos of media develop differently, and cannot therefore be understood from the lens of the European experience and the liberal paradigm born from within it. To do that, I use Bourdieu's theory of fields to trace the birth and evolution of the private press in Beirut and Cairo from 1858 till 1916.

I look at journalism as a practice, both in terms of production and consumption, within a social space in constant upheaval. The major metamorphosis of this social space, whether at the level of politics, the economy, society, and ideas, helped constantly shape and reshape this practice throughout this period. The journalist moved from being an educator, to being a spectator, and ultimately a politician. His role in society changed with the changes affecting the field of journalism which was born out of the struggles within the field of education, to become an autonomous field, ending up being absorbed into the field of politics, therefore losing its autonomy. The ultimate conclusion is that the question of the role of the media in the public sphere can only be answered with the more appropriate and precise question of what is the role of what media in what context.

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Chapter I

Introduction

"My people and I have come to an agreement that satisfies us both. They are to say what they please, and I am to do what I please." - Frederick the Great (Knowles, 1999: 324)

Frederick the Great was an enlightened despot. He ruled with an iron grip, but allowed his people to "say what they please" in the bourgeoning Prussian press. But was the freedom of the press in eighteenth century Prussia the same as the one John Milton advocated for in his *Areopagitica*? Why was it important for people in Western Europe to speak freely, even when they could not impact politics in any meaningful way? What then was the role that the press and mass communication had to play in these societies? These questions led to the rise of a heated debate between two camps, pluralists and critical theory. Pluralists, following in the footsteps of Milton and Mill, argued that the media played a liberal democratizing role in society, spreading information on political developments to people, and thus keeping the executive and legislative branches of government in check. Critical theorists opposed this argument and claimed that media in fact acted as a tool of elite propaganda, creating a perspective of the world that served elite interests and cemented the dominant socio-political worldviews. Even today, no synthesis ever came out of this duality, and both sides remain entrenched in their camps. The few recent attempts at bridging this rift (Robinson, 2000; Lawrence, 2000) only managed to present models of media that allow actors to jump from one archetype to the other.

This could be explained by a second-level reading of this debate, where both sides agree on a key assumption about the role of the press in society. Pluralists and critical theorists both seem to assume that theoretically, media should play a democratic, pluralist, and liberal role in society. They disagree only on whether or not media actually plays this role. This normative assumption about the function of media can be traced across disciplines and theories, a fact which escapes almost all of the scholars and academics interested in media. In fact, I have only managed to find one statement criticizing this uncritical assumption about the role of media. Dominique Marchetti

(2002b: 8) wrote that one of the major obstacles facing sociologists of media is their ethical investment in the rhetoric of media as a fourth estate, which makes all their work revolve around the assessment of whether or not journalists perform this supposed function, if they "did their job well" and thus served the public good. Marchetti never went beyond this point though. The liberal paradigm remains prevalent in the literature.

The only form of dissent comes from a marginal approach that criticizes the current literature for being Eurocentric. Alternative and radical media studies recognize that media theories are always constructed around empirical evidence provided by Western case studies; these theories, as a result, are incompatible with the realities of non-Western media operating in non-Western societies. So far, the answer to this academic Eurocentrism has been restricted to the introduction of non-Western media as an object of study in the English language, producing enough evidence to show that Western media theories truly cannot explain non-Western media, their behavior, and their social function (see Downing, 2011; Curran and Park, 2000).

At a time when the media are rapidly and radically changing, technology allowing global access for both producers and consumers of the news, and new mediums providing platforms for the individual to become a producer of news from the comfort of his home, social theories of media need to come to grips with the reality that they have been incapable of delivering satisfying answers, nor of constructing a framework that can be used to assess the role of media and the social and political function it performs beyond the sterile duality that currently characterizes the literature. This thesis addresses the shortcoming in the literature on the role of media in society, and more specifically politics, by challenging the basic assumption around which it is founded. It seeks to formulate an alternative framework, beyond the liberal paradigm, through which we can conceptualize and identify the role media play in a particular society. The research question that will guide such demonstration is: what was the social and political role of the private Arabic press in Beirut and Cairo from its inception in 1858 till the outbreak of World War I?

This question will be answered using Bourdieu's theory of fields. A social field, like journalism, is a particular space within the broader social space, where a social activity is conducted by sets of agents and governed by a set of rules and capitals which are specific to it. Reconstructing such a field first requires identifying the actors who are situated in it, defining where lies their social positions, and understanding their stakes in

the field. And since Bourdieu (1971; 1998; 2000a) presented the workings of a field in the same way as a production cycle, one has to account for how the commodity, the mediated message, came to be produced and consumed. This entails investigating the sets of practices and norms that came to define the journalistic endeavor. How did journalists produce their articles? What did they expect as gain from their labor? How did they interact with one another? How was their product received by the different audiences and how did they react to it? The answer lies in the combination of biographical information on journalists and a discursive analysis of the newspapers.

Also, a defining characteristic of the field is the dominant capital in it. Where is that capital generated and by whom? How is it invested in the field? How is it recognized as dominant, therefore becoming or constituting part of the symbolic capital within the field that can be reinvested elsewhere? The importance of this investigation into the forms of capital relevant to the field is primordial to defining its autonomy, as well as who the key dominant actors in it are, and how the struggles for dominance inside present themselves. For example, while the field of Arabic journalism was constructed around cultural capital, the struggle for dominance came in the form of attempts at introducing other types of capital into the field, capitals which were in the hands of the dominant political actors who wanted to control the press.

Finally, the theory of fields regards a social field as one among many inside the social space. Individuals are not restricted to a position within one field, and can therefore have different interests in different fields, and invest capital from one field into the other if that capital is meaningful there as well. The way actors behave in different fields reflects the relations between these different fields, especially when these actors become dominant in them, as the autonomy of a field is dictated by the capital specific to it. If that capital is generated somewhere else, the field becomes a sub-field of that other field where the relevant capital comes from. This relational perception of the uses of different forms of capital and their different sources is necessary to understand the relation between journalism and politics, the ultimate goal of this thesis. When we want to examine the ways in which journalism affects politics and vice versa, it is necessary to understand how the relation between the two fields comes to be and what rules and power relations govern it. In this case, these will be explained by the transfers of different forms of capital from the one field to the other, a two-way transfer that created

an interesting mix of a non-binding work relationship between dominant political actors and journalists.

The value of the theory of fields for this study is threefold. First, it allows for a multi-level analysis of media which accommodates philosophical and sociological concepts that have often been seen as contradictory. For example, the structure, understood as the social space, does not deny the actor's agency, nor does that agency mean that there is no social structure. Another key example is that the material and the ideational do not work in opposition or in a necessarily causal relationship. Second, reconstructing the social space as the sum of different social fields, journalism being one of them, allows us to examine the relationship between the different fields and how the developments in one could affect the others. Changes to any particular field are thus internal and external processes, therefore not restricting the work of media to a simple discursive analysis or a restricted practice that only answers to the logic of the field itself. Third, the concept of *habitus*, which academics often praise for its bridging of structure and agency, introduces an equally important aspect to the study of media and society more generally speaking, that of time. By virtue of it being the sum of past social and individual experiences which are embedded in the schemes of perception, thoughts, and actions of the individual, the *habitus* places the moment that we are studying within a historical motion (Bourdieu, 1980: 91-2). It tells us that an individual's perception of the world and his freedom of action are swayed, without being directed, by past experiences and therefore historical evolution. To properly understand a practice or an ethos, one would therefore have to study their historical development. The lack of historical depth is considered to be a major weakness in the theories of media (Conboy, 2004; Curran, 2002), a point this thesis will show to be well justified.

Apart from interest and expertise, the choice of case study was dictated by two facts. First, this thesis is grounded in the radical approach to media which criticizes the Eurocentric approach to the topic both in theoretical and empirical terms. Looking at the evolution of a non-Western media, the Arabic press, would therefore attest to the failure of the current media theories to explain its social role. Furthermore, and as this thesis promotes an alternative framework to the study of media's social function, an unconventional case study would be better suited as a blank slate on which to begin construction on such an approach. Second, the Arabic press remains understudied, especially in the English-speaking world, with only one English book dedicated to it. Even

then, Ami Ayalon's *the Press in the Arab Middle East* (1995) lacks a proper theoretical and methodological framework, leading the author into multiple anachronistic analyses and assessments. His account, however, remains valuable as a comprehensive survey of the Arabic press. Arabic sources also leave much to be desired. They are almost exclusively presented as chronicles of the Arabic press, simply compiling basic information without analysis nor reflection (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913; Adib Muruwwa, 1961; Mishal Ghurayyib, 1978). The answer to the research question of this thesis will therefore address our lack of knowledge about the role that the Aabic press played prior to World War I.

I must address at this point something which, from our present perspective, might sound like an oddity. Studying the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo as a single field reflects the contemporary social, cultural, and intellectual realities of nineteenth century and early twentieth century Middle East. Unlike now, these two cities used to be, at least nominally, part of a single state, the Ottoman Empire. That ceased to be the case in 1882 when the British invaded Egypt and established their dominion over the once Ottoman province. Rather than creating a problem for this study, this rift will be considered as a challenge to current uses of Bourdieu's theory which restrict its scope to the national level, in order to show that geographical boundaries, or at least the Westphalian definition of statehood, do not necessarily reflect on the shape of a field. Also, population movement between the two cities was common enough back then. In fact, private journalism was introduced to Cairo at the hands of Syrian immigrants who established newspapers there. Many journalists alternated their work between the two cities. The audiences were also the same, as Beiruti newspapers were read in Cairo and vice versa. This reflected in the continuous interest of the papers of each city with the affairs of the other, all the way up to World War I. Consequently, the experiences of journalists and audiences were the same in both cities, which was even promoted by a parallel political evolution of the Ottoman and Egyptian-British governments and the way they both dealt with the press.

This thesis will therefore reconstruct our understanding of the social field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo, focusing on some key questions. What did certain individuals want from embarking on a career of journalist? What interested them? What were the conducive social factors and how did these journalists rationalize their choice? How was the newspaper received and by whom? How did these audiences react to it? What were the required capitals to become an actor in the field and what did journalists

gain from producing the mediated message? It is obvious at this point that the interest of this research lies both with the producer and consumer of the newspaper, which, for the better part of the period under study, happened to be one and the same. The point is to show through the reconstruction of practices and ethos within the field that the Arab press does not conform to the current theories about the social function of media on both sides of the pluralist-critical debate, nor to the liberal paradigm, as the development of the ethos of journalism had nothing to do with liberal values.

The first step is to identify the actors that constituted the field. Who were they as individuals and as a social class? What did they bring with them into the field in terms of capitals when they decided to become journalists? This leads to the start of the reconstruction of the practice of journalism. How did they justify founding the first newspaper, or their shift to "political journalism"? What was their rationale and what were the reasons for their actions and thoughts which they could not consciously conceive of, i.e. how did their habitus come to be and evolve? Whom did they address and how was their product received and by whom? What were the mechanisms of recognition which journalists adopted; how did they come to acquire symbolic capital within the field of journalism? How did they invest their newfound capital and what did that mean for other fields, most notably the field of politics?

It is important to note that, in my search for answers, I will give priority to the voices of the journalists and their contemporaries rather than to those of present historians who often and for different reasons misinterpret meaning and intent, a point that will be further developed in Chapter III. This means priority will be given for the primary sources over the interpretations of the secondary literature on the Arab press. For the purpose of this study, I have examined eleven newspapers published in Beirut or Cairo between 1858 and 1916. Some of them survived most of this period, while others appeared for some time and then died out. I have focused only on political newspapers and disregarded literary and scientific magazines which despite their importance were of little relevance to this project. A total of almost 1,200 issues, were collected mostly at random. The issues that were specifically targeted, though, were the ones that featured articles and editorials on journalism, the Arabic press, and the role of the journalist. These offered invaluable insight into the minds of these journalists, how they thought of the profession they were building, and how they reflected on their role in society and the system of values that should govern their field. I have also examined autobiographies by

individuals who were involved in one way or another with the press, most notably khedive 'Abbas Hilmi and sultan 'Abdul Hamid, two figures who had a great impact on journalism in the Arab world. Most secondary sources, especially the Arabic ones which I criticized earlier for being too uncritical and descriptive in their surveys of the Arabic press, also reproduced and quoted articles, autobiographies, and books written by journalists, and thus provided one extra access point which I would have otherwise been deprived of.

The thesis is divided according to the following plan. Chapter II will examine the two-level pluralist-critical debate. The first level pits the two approaches as contradictory, each trying to negate the other. The second level highlights the common normative framework which both approaches share, the liberal paradigm. I argue in this chapter that this liberal paradigm is the major obstacle facing the literature in the attempt to find a proper universal theory that explains the role of media in society. Chapter III examines Bourdieu's theory of fields and establishes how it will be used as a framework to study the rise and development of the Arabic press.

Chapter IV is an analysis of the birth of journalism in Beirut. I take a look at the social, economic, and ideological changes that hit the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the nineteenth century to explain the birth of a new social class, the educated professional, and the rise of a new ideology, modernism. The arguement in this chapter is that the promotion of modern education to fill out the needs of the state resulted in the birth of a class with very little prospects for social advancement. Within this class, some individuals chose to invest their newly acquired cultural capital in an innovative venture which held the promise of public recognition, journalism.

Chapter V looks at the development of political newspapers. The chapter will argue that, although there was need for information about political developments, no one knew what the "political" truly meant, as politics had previously been the exclusive domain of the ruler. A definition of what constituted the "political" had to slowly find its formulation on the pages of newspapers. At the same time, the journalist continued in the tradition of social exclusion. He was rejected by the social elites as an unworthy newcomer and he rejected the common man as being unworthy of his knowledge.

Chapter VI takes a look at some major changes that affected the field of politics between the years 1876 and 1882. During those short years, the status of the ruler as the

legitimate and absolute authority was shattered and a new major actor, the British military, came to control Egypt. Journalists had an important part to play in these events. I will argue that it was then, and especially during the 'Urabi Revolution, that they learned of the value of representation and, as a consequence, began talking to and in the name of "the people". It was also then that they acquired a sense of legitimacy to produce political opinions.

Chapter VII examines how the governments in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt began to pay more attention to the press in order to be able to control it. They introduced a new dominant capital into the field of journalism, social capital revolving around the major political actors, which provided journalists with access to information, protection, and prestige. In turn, journalists resisted this encroachment, but were eventually pulled into the political field as they began to invest the symbolic capital they generated in journalism into political capital, allowing them to play a minor role in the political field. But while their own definition of the "political" created the image of politics as a realm of possibilities, journalists, unlike the dominant political actors, did not truly recognize the rules of the game in the field of politics; ownership of the means of physical violence remained the ultimate tool that determined who dominated the political realm in the context of an imperial state system.

Chapter VIII is an analisis of the function that the press played at every junction of its development. The one constant that continually appeared was the desire of journalists to be publically recognized, first among peers, and then from the rest of society. Another important issue to be delineated is that journalism operated along socio-political conservative lines. The worht of the press as a platform of political communication and what it entailed for the politics of the Empire will also be examined. Then, the empirical findings will be put in contrast with the current theoretical explanations of both the pluralist and critical approaches to the role of media in politics to show that they had failed to explain this case study, unlike Bourdieu's theory of fields which has allowed a genuine reconstruction of the field of journalism its ethos, the practices within it, and the broader socio-political role it played.

The aim of this thesis is to therefore contribute to the social theory of media by pointing out a key deficiency that obstructs it, the normative and value-laden assumptions that theorists start with. To solve this issue, I advance Bourdieu's theory of fields as a viable alternative to current theories. When applied to a historical reading of

media in a particular context, it allows for a proper reading of the socio-political role these media play and how this role evolves. Such reading should be guided by the development of that particular media as part of that evolving particular context, rather than by the anachronistic, foreign, and utopian assumptions that current theorists impose on it. I seek to change the question of what is the public role of media into what are the roles of what media in what public. Only such context-specific theory could break the deadlock created by the duality between pluralists and critical theorists.

Literature review

This chapter will be divided into two major parts, each dedicated to a different layer at which the pluralist-critical debate takes place. The first layer presents the debate as traditionally understood in the literature, pitting pluralist and critical theorists in an argument about whether or not media play a liberal and democratizing role in society. Pluralists argue that media promote socio-political diversity, act as a watchdog, a fourth estate, and represent peoples' opinions in the public sphere. Critical theorists argue that media acts as a tool of control in the hands of the elites. These elites could be the economic elites financing media outlets, or political elites who inculcate their opinions and ideologies onto the audiences. For the purposes of this study, I will restrict my examination to the broad lines of the arguments on both sides of the debate, and will not extensively examine each and every theory which appeared on either sides.[1]

The second layer, I will argue, reveals a normative commonality between the pluralist and the critical theorists and scholars. They both fundamentally agree that media has an intrinsic innate role, that of promoting democratic practices. Analysis of this aspect of the literature will focus more on the critical literature; the pluralists are not too coy about proclaiming their liberal normative values. The critical literature, however, hides the prevailing notion that media ought to play a liberal role. Their only problem is that media is not fulfilling this function. This, I argue, is at the core of this thesis' problematique. What would it mean for the way we understand the role of media in society if media is not supposed to play this liberal role to begin with?

I. The pluralist-critical dichotomy

The pluralist tradition can be traced back as early as 1644 with John Milton's *Areopagitica*, in which he makes a case for the freedom of the press as a quintessential element of the freedom of speech and freedom *tout court* (Kendall, 1960). This tradition

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[1] A more comprehensive literature review on this debate would prove to be a colossal task. I refer the reader to James Curran's *Media and Power*, in which the literature review of the works that were produced only in Britain and covered British media alone spanned over fifty-two pages (Curran, 2002: 3-55).

was carried on by some of the great philosophical and political figures of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, most notably John Stuart Mill in his treatise *On Liberty*, in which he argued that the freedom of the press is intrinsic to the freedom of the individual which should, in no case, be trampled upon or else democracy would turn into a "tyranny of the majority" (Mill, 1859: 8). The pluralist literature developed out of these basic philosophical tenets on freedom.

The critical literature on how media affected society can be traced back to Harold Lasswell's *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (1927) in which he studied the techniques belligerents used to influence their constituents, "the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols" (Lasswell, 1927: 627). This study set the epistemological and methodological foundations of the discipline which was to be later named "media studies". But even though media studies grew out of propaganda studies, the ideological and political prerogatives that drove its early existence were entirely opposite to those of its disciplinary predecessor, a point which will be addressed later. The critical theories of the role of the press had to wait till the 1960s to pick up, though, mainly under the influence of the Frankfurt School which produced some of the most groundbreaking analysis on that front, especially with Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964).

This division between the two model-archetypes of liberal and elite-driven media has been constantly used in the literature to analyze the different accounts on media behavior and the relationship between mass media and mass society (Curran, 2002; Bennett, 1982; Robinson, 2008; Corner et.al., 1997; Baudrillard and Maclean, 1985). These two categories have been labeled in multiple ways. Curran labeled them "affirmative narratives", which he divided into five separate trends, the liberal, populist, feminist, libertarian, and anthropological trends, which all point toward a progressive and inclusive role of the media, and the "radical narrative" which opposes them with the idea of elite control (Curran, 2002: 33). Baudrillard calls them the optimistic and the pessimistic accounts, stressing that he belonged to the latter (Baudrillard and Maclean, 1985: 577). But no matter how they are referred to, these two categories remain the cornerstone of the division within the literature, the two opposing sides of the pluralist-critical dichotomy which I will examine next.

A. The pluralist approach

As stated before, media studies as a sociological discipline was the successor of propaganda studies. After the end of World War II, interest shifted toward studying voters behavior; research funding shifted accordingly. The most influential study that set the pace for the future of the discipline was Paul Lazarsfeld's *the People's Choice: how the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign* (1944). Lazarsfeld interviewed 3000 voters to determine how political messages altered their perceptions and choices. Repeated interviews allowed him to statistically compare these changes. His work was so influential that he became known as the "father of American sociology" (Jerabek, 2001: 229). He cooperated with Elihu Katz to produce *Personal Influence* (1955), in which they argued that, through the "two-step flow" of information, a communication theory Lazarsfeld had first introduced in *the People's Choice*, audiences showed resistance to the messages in the media, therefore rejecting the idea that media controlled people. Katz further developed this argument in *Medical Innovation: a Diffusion Study* (Coleman et.al., 1966) in which he argued that medical doctors would respond to a particular media message based on their own experiences, personal connections, and professional networks.

The core argument of these academics, who represented the "Columbia tradition" of communication studies (Peters, 2001: 19), was that media could not control people, but rather people were informed through the media of the social and political developments around them. This presented a sociological and positivist backing for the traditional claim that media acted as a watchdog, a fourth estate that keeps the government in check by informing the public which, in turn, holds politicians responsible for their actions. The watchdog argument remains a strong component of the pluralist approach, with the positivist methodology as one of its constant features. Recently Shyamal Chowdhury (2004) and Brunetti and Weder (2003) have argued that increased press freedom led to higher accountability and therefore reduced corruption. Economist Amartya Sen (1999a; 1999b) argues that a free press is essential to the economic development and welfare of nations since it allows the people to recognize wide-scale poverty and pressure governments to handle it. Sen (1999a: 7-8) makes a remarkable claim, even though he conflates correlation and causation in it: "in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. We cannot find exceptions to this rule, no matter where we look". McNair (2000) has argued that the expanding size and quantity of different media outlets has given the public even more access to information.

Criticisms as to the professionalism and quality of news media, he argued, hid the fact that journalists are becoming more rigorous in their coverage of political news. Other efforts, such as John Keane's (1992) attempt at reverting back to some philosophical grounding of the watchdog argument, are also worth mentioning. He considered that freedom of the media is essential not only to make the public aware of political developments, but to also make social life not boring; for him, " a society [...] which contains no controversies over freedom of expression and representation, is a society that is surely dying, or dead" (Keane, 1992: 129).

The other major argument in the pluralist approach is that of representativeness. Uses and gratifications theory is the most important theoretical formulation of how media represents public opinion; it is the consumer who chooses what medium to follow and what message to digest, which means that the particular message therefore represents the opinion of this consumer. In their 1969 book, *Television in Politics*, Blumler and McQuail examined how British voters reacted to the elections of 1964, and more precisely how they chose to watch particular media messages at a time when short and competing programs were broadcasted simultaneously. Along with Brown, they followed up on their findings to categorize audiences based on the types of gratification they got from watching a particular media production, concluding that there were four major categories: diversion, personal relationships, personal identity, and surveillance (McQuail et.al., 1972: 155). These different categories underlined the differences between audience members, and how each of them identified with a particular program based on their social, cultural, and psychological context (McQuail et.al., 1972: 163). A more complete theory was formulated by Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1973), who examine in their article the different aspects of the uses and gratifications theory, the assumptions behind it, how different medias offer different gratifications, how audience needs have to be socially grounded, and finally, what the effects of the different types of gratifications are. It must be noted that there has been a recent resurgence of the uses and gratifications theory, especially with the increased interest in new media and how people react to the new technology which supposedly brings forth more of the individual into the realm of mass communications (Gilder, 1994; Leung and Wei, 2000; Papacharissi and Rubin, 2000).

It is clear therefore that the pluralist approach favors the informational aspect that media provides for its consumers. Whether from the perspective of a watchdog or

that of the users and gratifications theory, pluralists argue that media brings forth the audience into the public sphere. As a watchdog, it informs this audience for it to take political action. As gratification, it gives its audience a choice, and therefore represents that choice and the consumer of the media product along with it. The major shortcoming of the pluralist approach, however, is that its main focus is on the consumption process, on how audiences interact with the media message, and what the effects of that message are. There is an almost complete disregard for the production aspect of the news. Media messages are presented as if they existed as a bubble, hanging in the air, and waiting to be picked up by a wandering audience. Livingstone (1997: 26-7), writing about Katz in particular, rightfully argues that his functionalist approach, along with the underlying assumptions of his work, hide a normative and undeclared drive to promoting a democratic model of society, a model where the individual is preserved and protected as a self-determining socio-political agent. The same applies to all other pluralist theoreticians, which is the main point that critical theorists seek to address.

B. The critical approach

The basic premise of the critical approach is that the flow of information from the media to the audience only goes one way, which makes the audience a recipient of the produced message which then serves to shape that recipient's worldviews and opinions. This premise took many shapes and developed into multiple theories and approaches to the study of media. The most enduring and influential remains the one launched by the scholars of the Frankfurt School. The first of their publications to come to mind is Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), an analysis of how mass culture in advanced industrial society helped promote false consciousness by creating unnecessary needs for society, needs that are achieved through consumerism. His views on the role of media in this process are scathing:

> Our insistence on the depth and efficacy of these controls is open to the objection that we overrate greatly the indoctrinating power of the "media," and that by themselves the people would feel and satisfy the needs which are now imposed upon them. The objection misses the point. The preconditioning does not start with the mass production of radio and television and with the centralization of their control. The people enter this stage as preconditioned receptacles of long standing. [...] Indeed, in the most highly developed areas of contemporary society, the transplantation of social into individual needs is so effective that the difference between them seems to be purely theoretical. Can one really

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distinguish between the mass media as instruments of information and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and indoctrination? (Marcuse, 1964: 10-11).

In this short paragraph, Marcuse created a paradigm shift from simply looking at media as a consumption activity, to examining the production of media and the social, cultural, and ideological processes that shape and structure this production. He had taken Adorno and Horkheimer's concept of "culture industry", which they had advance in their 1944 book, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and transformed it into a mature view of media production, breaking past its status of quasi-Nietzschian rant against popular culture.

The Frankfurt School's take on the production of culture, mainly through mass communications, coincided with an increased interest by European thinkers, scholars, and academics in critical assessments of the role of media in social life. This was a symptom of the rise of the European critical approach, an overarching category which combined different Western Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, as well as the theories which splintered off from them. There seems to have been enough of a disciplinary and theoretical division at this level for the study of media to have been seen as of the 1960s as being divided between a North American "administrative" approach and a European "critical" one (Corner et.al., 1997: 2-4). This "critical" approach was shaped by the work of French structuralists, such as Althusser and Lévi-Strauss, and the British New School and its notable scholars, Stuart Hall and E.P. Thompson., two of the founders of the discipline of cultural studies (Curran et.al., 1982: 18). However, the critical approach to media was less homogeneous than this categorization presents it to be with its internal theoretical, methodological, and disciplinary divisions that accompanied the rise of contending scholarly trends: political economy of the media, cultural studies, post-modernism, post-structuralism, social history, as well as a deviation toward the positivist North American tradition of media studies, albeit with a critical view on the role of media.

The political economy approach strongly relied on a Marxian analysis of the role of media. They argue that mass media is primarily a commercial enterprise and that, as a result, the prime motivator of media production must be catering to the needs of advertisers, sponsors, and investors. Aside from the commercial imperatives which some academics stress (see Murdock and Golding, 1997; Curran, 1977; Herman, 1997), the bulk of the political economy argument revolves around the ideological hegemony that such imperatives lead to. Media is thus seen as structured by social controls, and

simultaneously exerting control over the audience through the mediated message. The ideology of the dominant class which owns the media therefore comes to create social consciousness, or more precisely false-consciousness, through mediated mass communication (Bennett, 1982: 45-6; Murdock, 1982: 114). It must be noted that the theory of the political economy of media grew as a reaction against both the traditional Orthodox Marxist literature on the topic and the American domination of the field. It was an attempt at introducing Marxism into media studies without being stuck at the dogmatic discourse. Marxism, or at least the economic lens it provided, had been completely absent from Western European media studies tradition (Curran, 2002: 108).

The efforts of academics such as Curran, Bennett, and Murdock, to introduce the economy as a key component of media studies was met with much resistance, especially from fellow critical theorists. One of the most famous opponent to their "economism" was none other than Stuart Hall, one of the key thinkers of the New Left, and a founding father of cultural studies and the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies. His approach was influenced by the writings of Louis Althusser, especially on the relationship between media, ideology, and the state (1969), in which the French structuralist accepts that the reproduction of the dominant ideology is not a direct linear process, and that the medium through which this ideology spreads has a relative degree of autonomy of practice, and Gramsci's theory of "hegemony", especially in relation to the "crises of hegemony" in the different spheres of the superstructure (Woollacott, 1982: 105-6). In his edited book, *Policing the Crisis* (1978), Hall criticizes the political economy argument, which he compares to "simple conspiracy theories", and offers an alternative view where the news producer has a relative room to maneuver free from structural constraints. This freedom, however, comes as a "secondary definer" to the systemic reproduction of the interests of the powerful as "last instance", to quote Althusser (Hall et.al., 1978: 57). Hall later advanced the notion that a more complex approach to media ought to be adopted, one which transcended the study of the simple transmission-reception linearity. He presented his Encoding/decoding model, in which he argued that each step between the formation of the news and the consumption of the news is governed by its own practice and rationale, which he studies at the discursive level, where the process of communication takes place. The encoding of the message contains a "preferred reading" which the producer seeks to transmit. This preferred reading is embedded with the dominant ideology. This, however, does not mean that this is the reading that the consumer of news will absorb. The social position and context of the consumer will

determine one of three possible decodings. If he accepts the preferred reading, he would then abide by the "dominant-hegemonic code". If he accepts the grand significance of the code, i.e. the legitimacy of hegemony, but opposes its situational message, then he would read a "negotiated version" of the message. If through decoding, the consumer rejects the hegemony of the dominant ideology, then he would have adopted the "oppositional code" (Hall, 1980: 125-7). Hall's theory has come under a lot of criticism for not being developed or sophisticated enough, which is to be expected since his only contribution to this topic has been his ten-page paper "Encoding/Decoding" (for a detailed enumeration of the different critiques, see Pillai, 2006). His contribution, however, needs not be restricted to this specific theory. Within the critical tradition, he shifted attention from the acts of social and political participatory resistance to hegemony which characterized other critical theories to the act of individual resistance at the level of consumption. He was also among the first in Britain to focus on the importance of discourse in understanding power relations and their distribution and reproduction, a hallmark of cultural studies.

A similar philosophical and sociological shift was also taking place in France during the same time. The postmodernist post-structuralist approach to media found its philosophical formulation in the works of Michel Foucault, most notably *l'Archéologie du Savoir* (1969) and *Surveiller et Punir* (1975). Foucault set the stage for a discursive analysis of power in which language represents a system where power relations manifest, are reproduced, and resisted. Jean Baudrillard was also a major figure in this respect, especially with regards to his article, "the Masses: the Implosion of the Social in the Media" (1985), a follow-up on his book, *à l'Ombre des Majorités Silencieuses* (1982). Baudrillard viewed the role of media with from a pessimistic perspective, claiming that what he sees is a tool of "noncommunication", since media is not a space for exchange and dialogue, "a reciprocal space of speech and response" (Baudrillard, 1985: 577). Still, he claims that the audience has managed to resist this one-way flow of information by simply being disinterested, not only by the message, but by the political process altogether. He concludes on a somehow nihilistic note that this resistance is childlike behavior at best, since the system only offers no real escape (Baudrillard, 1985: 588). His is the propaganda argument taken to the extreme, as he is the only scholar to claim that there is no possible answer to the oppressive control that is channeled through the media.

The effect of postmodernism and post-structuralism on the theories and studies of media cannot be underestimated. They brought forth a very important aspect to the study of discourse, which is the historical dimension of meaning. Meanings and words now had an "archaeology", they evolved. Social constructionism had a major impact on media studies, especially that it brought forward the question of how we came to understand certain aspects of social life as we do today. While this was not a new invention in absolute terms, especially with the rise of social intellectual history in the 1950s with its two famous schools, the French School and the Cambridge School, Curran rightly argued that media studies had undeservingly completely forgotten about the history of media, and I might add history *tout court* (Curran, 2002: 3). The result of this theoretical shift was a renewed interest in some of the core assumptions guiding journalism, most notably the ethos of journalists and news creators. David Mindich (1998) discussed how the concept of objectivity evolved across time in the United States, and how it slowly came to dominate the ethos of journalism. Stephen Ward (2004) did the same with his analysis of the evolving construction of the ethics of the journalist. He concluded that objectivity in news presentation is more of a pragmatic rather than an absolute approach to objectivity. The scope of this approach, however, no matter how valuable for someone looking at the broad picture of the role of media in the public sphere, and more precisely politics, retains a certain aspects of depoliticizing of media, in the sense that they are presented as studies of the evolution of meaning s and concepts within the closed circle of the media, disregarding the broader power relations that shape not the defining of the meaning, but of society's relationship with those operating under said definition as a result of its formulation and reformulation (Thornham et.al., 2009: 13).

One must also mention at this point that the American tradition of media studies witnessed a critical shift as a response to the challenge posed by the European approaches. While American scholars and academics retained their positivist and behavioralist methodologies, they began to question some of the liberal premises around the role of media. One of the first and most influential study in this regard remains Shanto Iyengar, Mark Peters, and Donal Kinder's "Experimental Demonstrations of the "Not-So-Minimal" Consequences of Television News Programs" (1982), in which they introduced the concept of "news priming". Grounded in cognitive psychology, they argued that since the viewer does not have ready access to knowledge and information, he will make political decisions based on what is readily available, that is what is being

offered in the news. This includes how to form normative judgments and values, as well as how to assess certain issues. Media was therefore not only setting the agenda for the viewer, but also shaping how issues are perceived to be important (Iyengar et.al., 1982: 852-5). In another study, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) experimented with different factors that might shield the viewer from the effects of media, arguing that political activism would minimize the effects of agenda-setting, but that, contrary to popular beliefs, education did not. Priming, on the other hand, proved to be much more pervasive despite the different mitigating factors. The conclusion of their work is quite remarkable: "in commanding attention and shaping opinion, television is now an authority virtually without peer. Near the close of the twentieth century, in the shadow of Orwell's *1984*, it would be both naive and irresponsible to pretend that such an authority could ever be neutral" (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987: 133). Back in 1972, Dallas Smythe (1972: 25) wrote: "one might hope that the results of rigorous logic and observation pursued *outside* the laboratory might in this area acquire status as intellectually valid 'evidence'". It had taken American media studies forty years to reach a conclusion which had been a given for their European counterparts ever since they started discussing the role of media in society in the 1940s; but now they had the numbers to support this argument.

This divergence from the traditional tenets of American media studies continued and intensified. The early 1990s saw the introduction of news framing theory. It was a theory that was based on the realization that space is one of the major constrictions facing the production of a news piece. All opinions and points of view could not possibly fit inside a single news story, which means that gatekeepers must make a choice concerning what to include, a choice which reflects their values and norms that necessarily find their way into the news piece they are in the process of constructing (Kuypers, 2010: 299). According to Robert Entman, "frames typically perform four functions: problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion" (Entman, 2010: 336). Framing studies further revealed that the individual's political decisions are heavily influenced by how media frames the political issue at hand, confirming "the inherently circumstantial nature of human judgment" (Iyengar, 1991: 130). What is most important in this shift in perception of American scholars is that they were no longer looking at media in simple terms of effects on an audience. The production of news had become a key variable in their studies, as news producers insert a clear political agenda into the news frame, deliberately shaping and affecting the political consciousness of their viewers (Denton and Kuypers, 2008: 117; Entman, 2007).

Entman rightly noticed that framing theory has allowed academics to highlight the notion of power, one which was completely absent from American media studies (Entman, 2010: 333).

Peters (2001: 26) identifies one further critical approach to the study of media, the radical approach, mostly represented by Noam Chomsky. In one of the most influential books on the role of media in politics, *Manufacturing Consent* (1988), Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky present their "propaganda model" through which they explain the hold media moguls and states and governments have over the media, with special emphasis on the United States. They conduct an extensive content analysis of different cases to show the dichotomy in the produced news between a worthy story and an unworthy one, a legitimate political procedure and an illegitimate one. Their conclusions are straightforward. Basically, big businesses have better access to news production and tend to reproduce the official storyline that perpetuates the socio-political order. *Manufacturing Consent* actually provides the conceptual tools to assess the systematic bias in news production, and this is what mainly separates Chomsky and Herman from the rest of the political economy of media theorists. Their other publications consolidate this approach to the examination of bias, and how such bias creates the illusion of truth, especially in democratic societies (Chomsky, 1989; 2002; Herman, 1993). The most important contribution of Chomsky and Herman, though, was that they opened the mind of the American audience to the fact that media are structured in a way that forces propaganda not only on the audience, but on the producers themselves; and they did so in a language that was broadly accessible, unlike their fellow social scientists who still clung to positivism and the absolute truth of correlating numbers. Others followed and tried to fill the major gap that *Manufacturing Consent* left, which was the link between the practice of producing a news piece and the content in that piece. Accounts of the practices of producing the news under the structural restraints of politics and business such as Sparrow's *Uncertain Guardians* (1999) began to appear and be received with more legitimacy at the American front of media studies.

C. Dialogue of the deaf?

It seems that the pluralist-critical debate revolves around two clear and opposite presuppositions. The pluralists argue that media helps promote democracy, as it informs the citizens of political developments they have no other access to, and it represents

their opinions at times when the traditional mechanisms of checks on the government, like elections, are pending. Proponents of the critical approach view media as a tool of propaganda and population control working for the benefit of elites and the structure of power which benefits them. But after the review of the major theories and approaches which drive both arguments, one cannot hope but wonder if this debate does not mask a false dichotomy.

Proponents of each of the two arguments look at different aspects of the cycle of media, here meant to include both the production and consumption of news, and all of the ramifications that grow out of each of these actions-practices. They also use different tools, methodologies, and epistemologies to explain the specific part of the cycle they are looking at. Liberals usually follow a behavioralist approach to look at audience effects. What matters for them is how and to what extent people resist the message of the media. Alternatively, they are interested in showing that, when the message is not resisted, it is because of the willingness of the audience member to accept it and, therefore, becomes represented by it. Critical theorists, on the other hand, are more interested in the process of producing the news, and most importantly the ideological constraints that come up with this production. Prior to the adoption of a critical view in media studies in North America, there has rarely been any critical theorist to approach the subject from a positivist lens. In fact, all of the European media theorists and sociologists interested in media have approached the topic from an anti-positivist interpretive perspective. Whether or not this means that we need to rethink if there is truly a debate between the two sides is an issue that will be touched upon later, based on the findings of this research. It is something that must be kept in mind when questioning some of the underlying assumptions of the theories that try to explain the role of media in politics.

II. The debate's second tier, where they all just get along

The notion that the two contradictory arguments might not be so contradictory after all is a thought that has been out there for some time now. In fact, there has been recent attempts at both sides of the ocean to try and come up with a unifying theory, or at least a theory that would present the two sides of the argument not in mutually exclusive terms. In this section, I will start by examining these attempts, first because

they are in and by themselves important and influential theories that have been gaining much ground recently, but also because they are a prelude to the core and contribution of this literature review, in that they indicate, by the mere fact of their existence, that there is a certain unifying factor that underlines all of the current approaches to the study of the role of media in society. I will then argue that this unification takes place not at the methodological or epistemological levels, but at the ontological level where dormant liberal normative values pervade the analysis of even the most radical of leftist thinkers and academics.

A. Alternatives and middle-grounds

Two recent theories have come to recently challenge the pluralist-critical dichotomy: Piers Robinson's "policy-media interaction model" and Regina Lawrence's "event driven news". They both share some very similar features, in that they both agree that media is usually elite-driven, but, occasionally, it can perform a critical role which forces policymakers to respond to a sort of popular pressure. For Robinson (2000; 2002), this takes place when policymakers and elites are not too certain about what their position is from a particular issue. Then, media can play a critical role and influence the policymaking process. For Lawrence (2000), it is when unexpected events occur and elites do not have sufficient time to process them and come up with an "official line", that journalists manage to escape the boundaries of controlled media and promote a critical attitude toward the particular event. Robinson and Lawrence therefore recognize the dichotomy as valid and that the two archetypes exist, except that they claim that media behavior might jump from one side to the other depending on circumstance.

Habermas, in his now classic *the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989), also offers an alternative view of the role of mass communication in society. During the eighteenth century, Habermas argues, the major European cities' public sphere, as represented by their reading houses and cafes for example, were a vibrant realm where rational ideas and communication devoid of the influence of interests roamed freely. This model of a free, successful, and rational public sphere should have become universal. It was a sort of "golden age" for mass communication. Instead, Habermas claims, the rise of commercial mass media, the destruction of the boundary between the private and the public spheres, and the "refeudalization" of society, all combined to crush the bourgeois public sphere. The ultimate goal of mass

communication, however, remains to convey free and rational thought that is unimpeded by statist or social forces.

Habermas' theory of the public sphere received much attention in the realm of media studies, mostly in the form of negative comments, which reflected the general attitude to *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* in the different disciplines of social sciences. His account was mostly deemed ahistorical, as it relied on a fictional utopian view of the bourgeois public sphere in modern age Europe. His theory was self-contradictory. It claimed that the bourgeois public sphere represented the height of liberal democrtic ideals, but consciously rejects the participation of other elements of modern society in public debates. Also, it completely disregards the fact that the public sphere by then had become so diverse in form and in content that it was impossible to assess it from such reductionist perspective, especially when looked at as a "dialogical" entity while disregarding mass media as a factoring innovation born out of the modern age (Thompson, 1993). John Thomspon, one of Habermas' most quoted critics, presents his own argument on the function and development of mass communication in Europe from the age of modernity onward. In *the Media and Modernity* (1995), Thompson chooses an approach which had been previously somehow disregarded for being too technologically deterministic, Marshall McLuhan's media-centric approach (1964). Thompson's account focuses on what Habermas misses, the rising role of the media and their becoming the dominant form of human interaction and communication. The core argument in his account is that the development of commercial mass media has generally pointed toward a clear identification of the relations of power in favor of the owners and producers of media, but that the technological progress of media could contribute to the development of a "'deliberative democracy' - not so much as an alternative to representative institutions but as a way of developing and enriching them" (Thomspon, 1995: 255). Media has therefore the potential to be liberal, if people were willing to see it develop in that direction.

The final model of a middle-ground position I will examine here is the one advanced by Cees Hamelink. Hamelink looked at the behavior of certain media, like the Nazi propaganda machine and the radios in Rwanda, and realized that media could serve to promote violence and conflict rather than being a tool for enlightenment and progress. In what he calls the "escalation spiral", Hamelink (2011) identifies a trail of rhetorical development that media use to promote social violence and incite to war.

While this might seem like a banal statement, Hamelink (2008) argues that the literature had not previously portrayed the behavior of media as such, nor did it expect it to work this way. All previous studies on the link between media and violence generally focused on the impact of violent messages on the behavior of individuals, but never on how they incite social violence (Hamelink, 2011: 36-8). His claims should come as no surprise, seeing how his article "Media between Warmongers and Peacekeepers" (2008) featured in the opening issue of the journal *Media, War & Conflict*, the first journal dedicated to studying the effect of media on mass violence. It was only then that the academic world first began to imagine that media could actually play a role in war. Still, for Hamelink, this behavior is deviant and atypical of regular media behavior, which, for the purpose of our examination, means that he perceived that media could play any of the two roles. What is even more interesting, but remains a point that he barely reflects on, is that he accepted that the abhorrent role media play is not restricted to the non-Western world.

From the scholars advancing models and theories that lie in-between the two archetypes, and therefore remain entrenched in a pluralist-elite spectrum, I will move to examine some theories that present an alternative framework to the role of media. Here, I must start with Bourdieu's small treatise, *sur la Télévision* (1996), in which he gave one of his very few commentaries on journalism and television, first because his theory of fields is the theory I chose to guide my own research, and second, and more importantly, because neither he nor his students and colleagues fully used this theory to answer the question of what role media play in society, even though it is a question Bourdieu set out to answer. He approached the topic from the examination of the practice of journalistic production and most notably from the structural restrictions that are imposed on the journalist while producing his message. These structural limitations, as Bourdieu presented them, had more to do with the practical aspect of journalistic production, i.e. the choice of a story, how to make it interesting for the viewer, the speed of thinking and reporting, competition among journalists, and competition for a share of the market. Bourdieu's account therefore dismissed any larger implications for the journalistic practice and how it related different fields and actors in the social space to one another. Journalism was reduced from a medium of mass communication, a platform for broad social interaction, into a practice within a field, which at best reduces the public's interaction with other fields to one governed by the simple modalities of a consumer society. He called that the "audimat", the illusion of a free-to-choose audience which is governed by the law of media marketing (Bourdieu, 1996: 78). While this may seem like

Bourdieu's account might fit into the critical approach, his economic model of a production-consumption nexus, even though it lexically borrows from a traditional economic analysis, is centered around the trade in the symbolic good of the information flow. It is the message that is the commodity, and not the audience numbers, like the political economy of media theorists argue. Still, the brevity in which he addressed the topic leaves much to be desired from his analysis; he forced on himself some of the same restrictions that he claimed were facing journalists, since he presented his treatise in the form of a televised lecture and was therefore forced to limit his message, both in form and in content, to account for a broad lay audience as well as a different medium than the one he usually used, the printing press.

His approach, though, has gained a lot of attention in the academic world, not only because of *sur la Télévision*, but also because his theory of fields had attracted academics who were looking for an alternative framework from which to look at media. The merits of his theory will be more fully examined in Chapter III, but it suffices to say here that his framework allowed for an examination of the media as an autonomous social field and, at the same time, as a field that interacts with other fields around it. It permits looking at the specificities of the act, media production, as a set of practices, rituals, and relations, and understand this activity and how it relates to other social acts. French academics had been using the theory for years. Eric Neveu wants to bring everyday's journalist to the center of the political communication process, focusing on his "ordinary functioning" and the "ordinary moments" (Neveu and Kuhn, 2002: 5). Everyday's practice and the *habitus* of the journalist, guided by field theory, represent, according to Neveu, a promise of a social theory that is more complex than the traditional public sphere theory and better suited for empirical investigation (Benson and Neveu, 2005: 1-2). Dominique Marchetti did a little more than translate Bourdieu's ideas. He implemented them to study particular phenomena that developed in the French media, like the rise of scandal as a characteristic of successful journalism, linking this phenomenon to changes within the judiciary and political fields (Marchetti, 2000), or the development of sub-fields within the field of journalism (Marchetti, 2002a). Even outside of France, the theory of fields proved to be a strong attraction to scholars who needed an alternative framework to study media. Nick Couldry (2003b; 2006) relies heavily on Bourdieu's theory to map out a new road for media studies; it addresses "two crucial landmarks (*knowledge* and *agency*) that imply a third (*ethics*)", claiming that this map eventually leads to answering the question of the role of media in the social order

(Couldry, 2006: 25). Still, the only impediment in the face of reaching an answer to this question has been that researchers have applied this theory only to narrow case studies, like the ones mentioned above, usually shying away from answering the major question that Couldry wants to address.

The final alternative current that needs to be addressed here is that which Couldry and Curran (2003: 6) labeled "alternative media: the forgotten land". The label here might be misleading, as the major scholars who represent this trend use different headings to categorize it. John Downing (2011) refers to it as "radical media" or "social movement media". Clemencia Rodriguez et.al. (2014) call it "alternative, radical, and citizens' media". No matter what we call it, though, the objective of the study of alternative media is the same: to examine the experiences from the global south, women, different communication formats, non-English media and studies, and both repressive and progressive media (Downing, 2011: xxv); more simply, it is to look at the fringes of mass communication and its studies, to look at what has been largely neglected for not being part of the mainstream media, both in form and in content. The stress in this theory is put on the local and the locale, even though recent transformation in the uses of the internet has brought a new perspective to the study of alternative media. Still, one of the core foundations of this approach is its consciousness of the pervasion of Eurocentrism across the literature, both in terms of theoretical and conceptual formulations, as well as in terms of interest in empirical studies. It must be of some indication that, until this point in this literature review, the claim that no theory and approach was interested in looking at media outside of Western Europe and North America was made. Outside of this fairly recent development from the peripheries of the discipline, there is not even a confession, let alone a reflection, on the exclusiveness of the field in terms of social, political, or cultural diversity. The European experience is so engrained in the minds of scholars and academics of media that they do not even question this point; but that will be addressed in the next section. What matters most for this research here, is that alternative media studies bring to the fore the question of difference with the mainstream versions of media and, even more interestingly, the commonplace understandings of what role media play in society. It is an academic discipline which recognizes that media is a different tool in different contexts and it is therefore within this prism that this current research is located.

In this regard, I must mention two works that can be situated under this loose umbrella called "alternative media research", and which target the Eurocentrism in the literature. First, Curran and Park (2000) try to de-Westernize media studies. To do so, they dedicate eleven of their twenty-two chapter book to non-Western case studies, that is if we consider Russia to be non-Western, and most of these chapters are ironically written by Westerners who still try to forage how media promotes democracy in areas like the Middle East and how it is introducing a modernity that challenges the backward ways of the locals (Sreberny, 2000). Such Orientalist view, however, does not diminish from the fact that Curran and Park sought to address a problem which they thought hindered the discipline. The opening paragraph of their volume read: "this book is part of a growing reaction against the self-absor[p]tion and parochialism of much Western media theory. It has become routine for universalistic observations about the media to be advanced in English language books on the basis of evidence derived from a tiny handful of countries" (Curran and Park, 2000: 2). It is therefore important to point out that there was a certain level of consciousness as to the limitations of the literature in its understanding of anything "foreign". This skepticism toward Eurocentric approaches and the Eurocentric socio-historical experience is at the core of this current research project.

The other book that I want to mention here is Noha Mellor's *Modern Arab Journalism* (2007) in which she uses Bourdieu's theory of fields to assess the field of Arab journalism in recent years. Of great interest to this thesis is how Mellor understood the role of media, in parallel to that of education, in the attempted cementing of a modernization project, and the obstacles it faced. She situated journalistic practice within its social context, linking it to the pertinent fields with which it interacts and to which it contributes. But, what is more relevant than her findings is the questions she asks and which this research project seeks partly to answer. Three points must be addressed here. First, she acknowledges that the lack in current knowledge about Arab media is caused not by the unanswered questions, but by those that remain unasked. Second, Western-developed theories, even Bourdieu's theory of fields, cannot be uncritically adopted in other contexts. Third, she pays attention to the issue of the Arabic language and the different forms its takes, and the development and evolution of these forms across time and communication platforms (Mellor, 2007: 1-5). Her subsequent analysis is a very interesting mapping of the state of Arab journalism in recent years, a snapshot of what the field looks like. This dissertation should be read as further development of the foundations that Mellor set, focusing on two key points. First, like most sociological

accounts, *Modern Arab Journalism* offers a momentary glimpse, an analysis of the "present moment" that describes the field of journalism, even though the author examines the prior decade as historical background. This thesis will adopt a more extended view of the historical process, to show a very important point that a snapshot of the field misses: practices evolve and develop, so does the ethos of the field, and consequently, its social function. Second, I will take Mellor's argument which firmly belongs to the alternative approach to media studies and a criticism of Eurocentrism within the broader literature as a starting point for more engagement with the social theory of media.

B. The liberal paradigm, the theory's *cul-de-sac*

The importance of the alternative and middle-ground theories is that they point us in the direction of the argument I will present in this section, albeit each from a different perspective. The in-betweeners suffer from exposed symptoms of the liberal paradigm, as their whole aim is to desperately try and find the liberal behavior among all the structural and elite-driven propaganda that they discern. The alternative approach, on the other hand, tries to put its finger on the real problem. They recognize that it comes from the exclusive focus on European media as a basis for empirical studies and theoretical formulations. Still, their efforts remain largely peripheral and rarely touch on the theories of media. What they often offer is an indigenous look at fringe media, and I include in that peripheral media within Europe and North America, or at areas that have yet to be academically explored, especially in the English language. In fact, I would not be surprised if there is a non-English tradition of media studies which has yet to find its way into Western academia. What I can tell for certain is that it is not the case in the Arab world.[2] In this section, I will take the alternative approach a step forward, specifically pointing at the root of the problem facing the theories of media. It is, I argue, the imposition of a liberal normative understanding of the role of media which truly restricts a proper understanding of this role. I will trace the pervading liberal norms in the literature, especially among critical theorists, to show how they try to impose their values on the role of media, and more precisely on how media *should* function and behave

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[2] I have managed to locate three books written in Arabic on the topic of the role of media in society. Two of them are preoccupied with how media should play a liberal role of promoting freedoms in Arab societies (Ramzi Mikha'il Jayd, 1987; Muhammad Husam ad-Din, 2003). Only the third book offers an alternative which, sadly, is too dogmatic in its approach to nationalism and to political developments to make it of any serious value. Still, it is noticeable that Sabah Yasin (2006) argued that the ethos, *an-nasaq al-qiyami*, of journalism should revolve mainly around national liberation and the renaissance of Arab civilization.

socially and politically. It therefore becomes meaningless to separate them from the pluralists, as they both agree on a supposed ultimate function of media and society, one which falls squarely under the liberal paradigm. The liberal paradigm therefore refers to both the pluralist and critical theories when examined at the second tier, that of the liberal norms they both share.

Habermas is a prime example of this trend. He literally invented an imaginary "public sphere" to justify a superior and utopian liberal reality to which media ought to aspire. What is even more surprising than his close to fiction work is that his audience considers him of the Left, even after he laments the death of the laissez-faire's public sphere of civil society at the hands of the political public sphere of the social-welfare state (Habermas, 1989: 232). In his book, the liberal ideology is not quite hidden. Thompson (1995: 253) wants to see in the media the agora of modern democratic societies, the "bridge [...] between electors and representatives". Media is thus categorized as a platform where political deliberation takes place, where the people trade in information about political issues and learn about the opinions of others. It seems for both scholars that the conclusion dictated the rest of their works. The goal was to reach a point where media promotes liberal democracy. For others, this conclusion is less striking, but nevertheless equally dominant. Piers Robinson's (2002) work, as well as Regina Lawrence's (2000), seem to focus on glimpses of liberal behavior on the part of media. It is the stated aim of their books to look for instances when media behave as liberal institutions. Again, the question is not how media act, but when are they conducive to democracy. This conclusion thus leads much of their research. Again, the question of why exactly should media operate this way is never even asked.

For others, liberal norms present themselves in the form of a political plan, a desire that they seek to achieve through their work. Hamelink's (2011: x) goal from studying the "escalation spiral" is to be able to turn it around, "bringing people together peacefully (and keeping them together democratically)". The very notion that media is a magical tool that can promote or halt social violence is quite ludicrous to begin with. Still, Hamelink makes no attempt at situating the role of belligerent media in a socio-political context that would make it possible to understand the role of violence, rather than the message of violence, thus deflecting responsibility from the message, and therefore the message producer, onto the medium. Again, this is explained by the fact that he was driven by the assumption that there is a particular role that media play in society. It is the

ultimate source of information for regular people of their political realities, and it is therefore to be blamed for making such realities violent. It is as if conflicts like the Rwandan war could have been prevented had media played a democratic, understanding, and accepting role.

For Couldry, the whole aim of finding a new path to study media is to achieve a post-culturalist defragmentation of the political, so as to go back to Hanna Arendt's "publicity". "Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of public life" (as quoted by Couldry, 2006: 79). Again, the underlying drive to find this elusive democracy flattens all the social space, even in a book whose author claims to want to examine the social surrounding of media. The context does not matter as long as the aim is set on the Holy Grail and the scholar faithful to the task. What makes my claim even more relevant is the fact that Couldry is not unaware that his ultimate vision is, at the very least, contested. He writes: "a virtue of producers outside mainstream media channels [...] is that they refuse to take for granted either the question of what social ends media serve or the connection between those ends and the hard-pressed ideal we call "democracy"" (couldry, 2003a: 51). How come, then, he could not get past his own assumptions about society and media's role in it, assumptions that he was aware were socially, politically, and ideologically situated?

Bourdieu adopts a similar attitude in *sur la Télévision*. In his opening words, he claims that it would be easy to argue that the behavior of journalists represented a danger to political life and democracy, citing several case studies which he could have used. Instead, he wanted to focus on the discursive aspect of the ordinary practice of journalism (Bourdieu, 1996: 5-7). This means that he recognized the difference between the two positions and it was not only that they were two separate objects of study. Being a danger to democracy is a characterization of the function of media, whereas looking at the practice of journalism is a value-less description of what journalists do; it is a snapshot of the field. Still, Bourdieu's (1996: 8) hopes were that his analysis would serve those who are fighting for what could have been an extraordinary tool of direct democracy, but which could also become a tool of symbolic oppression. It could be seen as surprising that Bourdieu, who is generally very critical of the liberal paradigm, seems to be so taken by its values to the point that they overshadow his account.

From this perspective, Chomsky is the most honest scholar to have written on this issue. Along with Herman, they confess that freedom of expression should not be defended in instrumental terms, but should be upheld as a value in itself. If anything, they argue, the instrumental argument favors media operating as a defender of economic, social, and political privilege, which is the societal function it performs according to their "propaganda model" (Herman and Chomsky, 2002: 298). The ultimate goal for them is for peripheral, radical, and progressive social forces to recognize how they are excluded from media production so as to find ways to penetrate the realm of participating in the public discourse. While this means that, for Herman and Chomsky too, the goal is democracy, their own type of democracy. It was to achieve this goal that their "propaganda model" was designed. The difference with other scholars, however, is that Herman and Chomsky are clear about their normative grounds, as well as to the difference between seeing the social world through the lens of their values, and through an "objective" lens.

But why would this common theme among theoreticians and scholars be detrimental to our understanding of the role of media in politics? Why am I claiming that it creates a cul-de-sac, a dead end for the theories of media? The answer lies in two sections and each, alone, could explain why studying media with such normative assumption would not allow us to escape the restrictive, and possibly ill-constructed, pluralist-critical debate. First, this fascination with liberal values and the promises of democracy is socially, culturally, and ideologically situated firmly within the European experience of the age of enlightenment and onward. The liberal ideology as both an intellectual promise and a political program, irrespective of its merits and limitations, was born out of a particular context that culturally and politically favored both its rise and its adoption. Imposing this ideology, along with the norms and values which it represents, on societies that lay outside of the social, cultural, and geographical boundaries of Western Europe and North America has been greatly criticized (Amin, 1988; Hobson, 2012). Eurocentrism has more specifically been addressed in this case by the radical and alternative approaches to media. From Mellor and Rodriguez to Curran and Park, attempts at introducing a radical theory of media have first tackled the Eurocentric anchor of the mainstream academic literature. They realized a simple fact that current media theory does very little to explain the role of media in a non-Western context. At the very least, it cannot properly situate it within its indigenous social and cultural context, and cannot therefore present an image of media as a social and political actor.

This stressed the importance of properly contextualizing the media under study, a contextualization that must account for the different social fields that operate around it.

In the second section of my answer, I take this criticism of the liberal paradigm a step forward and argue that the normative assumptions about the preferred role of media in society are what make the pluralist-critical debate exist. As the liberal normative assumptions serve as the foundational basis of both pluralists and critical theorists, they frame the debate inside a set and rigid binary framework. Such prescriptive judgment can only be addressed and assessed in either positive or negative terms. If the general agreement is that media ought to be a democratic force, the only available and conceivable debate becomes whether or not it performs this function, which is what characterizes the great majority of the literature. The problem here is not with the initial assumption per se, but with the overwhelming agreement over it. Once this agreement is broken, then the debate can take many more forms. If we simply address the assumption rather than the debate, which is but a symptom, we can then open up the discussion to a wide spectrum of positions, and the binary archetype simply disappears. When we ask what role does media play without a particular teleological goal in mind, we can then assess different possibilities that lie outside of the field of vision of the current literature. The main goal of this research project is to therefore examine whether or not the normative foundations of the pluralist-critical debate apply in a case were culture, society, and politics were foreign to the historical experience that led to the rise of the liberal paradigm in Europe; by showing that the Arab experience with the press was different in practice and in the social values which drove it and which it promoted, I would have falsified the fundamental assumptions that restrict the debate into this inescapable duality.

Chapter III

Theory and method

In very many ways, the methodology and the theoretical framework guiding this research project are one and the same. This chapter will show how Bourdieu's theory of "fields" (*champs*) will serve as the guideline to try and answer the question pertaining to the function of the Arab press across time, i.e. the purpose it served at the time of the genesis of the field, and how this purpose evolved with time. The guiding principle is that, to understand this function of the journalistic field in Beirut and Cairo, we must understand the field itself, i.e. how it functions and how this function fits in relation to other fields within the broader social sphere. The aim is to therefore reconstruct this field, along with the different elements structuring, constituting, and operating within it. Bourdieu's theory not only offers us a road map to construct this field and the social space it operates in, but also addresses many issues that would have otherwise impeded this research, most notably some of the dichotomies which generally plague most sociological theories, like structure/agency, objectivism/subjectivism, base/superstructure, etc., a fundamental aspect of his anti-dualistic thought (Wacquant, 2008: 264).

This chapter will also dwell on how to add a historical perspective to the theory of fields from a methodological perspective. Since this thesis is an examination of the production of past thought, the discourse in the newspapers and the intellectual framework within which they were produced will be assessed using Skinner's method for the study of intellectual history. It focuses on an understanding of meaning and intent that are genuine to the actor that is being studied, rather than imposing an anachronistic assessment and understanding to words and thoughts produced in a context foreign to that of the researcher.

I. The theory of fields

Society, or the social space, is divided into social fields, each of them representing a particular social activity or domain, like the field of politics or the field of journalism. Each field is governed by a particular form of capital, whether economic,

cultural, or social, and functions according to a particular set of rules that govern the interaction of the individuals positioned within this field. These individuals are in a constant state of struggle to ameliorate their position in the field, either by accumulating more of the dominant capital, or by trying to change the rules of the game within the field by either changing the stakes or the dominant form of capital so as to have a relatively better position than their competitors. This section will examine these concepts in detail, showing how they will be used to reconstruct the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo.

A. The social space as conditions of possibilities

In the same way as building a car first requires a frame, a chassis, constructing the field first needs a space, a structure, inside which to exist and function. The social space, or social structure, represents the context within which a particular field operates. It is the space where the different social fields coexist and where actors and the different forms of capital they possess are positioned in relation to one another. So, unlike his contemporary French structuralists, Bourdieu's perception of the "structure" of the social space is not a deterministic one; it can only run in a dialectical fashion with the subjective moment of the manifestation of the *habitus* to lead to practice (*pratique*), concepts I will deal with later in this chapter (Bourdieu, 2000a: 235; 1977b). The main point here is that, in many ways, Bourdieu only defined the "social space" in opposition to the structuralist "structure". It was not merely the structuring schema which restricted agency and presented human behavior as a fait accompli, but rather a generating principle of the multiple possibilities of human behavior in a particular context, the social space itself (Bourdieu, 2000a).

The role of the social space, as a historically evolving structure of social conditions, has many repercussions on a field that exists within it. This social structure represents the conditions within which the habitus comes to exist during a particular period, as well as the context within which it operates at a particular point in time (Bourdieu, 1980: 94). This role of the social structure reveals some of the reasons why Bourdieu's theory fits this study best. First, it takes into account historical evolution at the different levels of the social space. Structures evolve due to their continuous restructuring by an evolving habitus, the unconscious accumulation of historical experience; and the field itself, as a space of production and reproduction, circulation and consumption of the commodities which are specific to it, in this case, the symbolic

good that is the message in the press (Bourdieu, 1980: 94; 2000a: 312). Second, it takes into account the evolution of the field itself, allowing for a more contemporary and context-specific reading rather than a static one.

In this case, viewing the social structure as evolving dialectically with the habitus it generates and, which in turn, reshapes and reproduces this structure, helps us examine the field of the press in the Arab world from its birth onward as part of a broader historical evolution of society, the economy, the state, the intellectual arena, etc., all of which witnessed major changes in the Arab world during the period under study. I will thus be able to demonstrate that the function of the press was also altered to answer these contextual changes.

An equally important impact the social structure has on the field is that it "structures" it both internally and externally. The "external structuration" allows us to see the similarities in the properties of particular social groups, permitting classification of predispositions, a perception of closeness within the social space. The "internal structuration", on the other hand, revolves around the particular agent's position within the social space, and how it affects his perception of other elements within it; it is a perception of symbolic power relations within the field (Bourdieu, 1985: 727). This double structuration Bourdieu presented is one element of his theory which transcends the structure/agency dichotomy. It advances a model of a structure which defines the different possibilities for the agent to freely maneuver, taking into consideration the dynamics of power relations (symbolic, social, cultural, etc.) which link this agent to others within the field.

To construct this social structure, the social conditions leading to the rise of particular social classes and the genesis of certain activities, behaviors, and dynamics specific to these classes within a field, I will rely on historical materialism to understand the major changes the Arab region witnessed during the period under study. Historical materialism here does not refer to a particularly teleological philosophy of history, in that I reject the sheer economism and reductionism which pervades most of the classical Marxist theory and literature. It rather refers to the focus on the economic structure and, more importantly, and as Paul Hirst (1985) has aptly pointed out, on the *relations of production* as the main constructing factor of the social structure more broadly envisaged. It therefore becomes a method rather than a theory, a method of historical

writing rather than an essentialist rationalization of history, and, from this perspective, could be more easily reconciled with Bourdieu's own views on the matter.

On this point, Bourdieu (1985: 723) clearly opposed the economism of classical historical materialists, their tendency to reduce everything to the role of a resultant of the economic base. He favored an approach which focused more on the *relationships* between agents in order to construct a social space. However, in view of the many works of historical analysis dealing with the social, political, and intellectual developments in the Middle East, Bourdieu's criticisms of historical materialism can be safely disregarded in favor of an approach which has proven to be very convincing in the way it described developments there, especially in Beirut and Cairo. This is so especially because the fields which affected the birth of the press, the fields of education and the economy, have been extensively studied and analyzed in a way that would allow us to recreate the social and intellectual context which led to the rise of an educated class who embarked on their journey to establish a field of journalism.

It is therefore for the sake of simplicity that when I will be setting up the broad context that led to the founding of journalism, I will rely on established and comprehensive analyses of the economic, social, and intellectual changes that affected the region. In his seminal work *the Middle East in the World Economy* (1993), for example, Roger Owen studied the economic history of the Middle East since the incorporation of the region into the global capitalist economy. He demonstrated how this inclusion altered the local economy, society, and politics at their core. This historical materialist reading of Arab society, especially in Beirut and Cairo, the two centers linking the region to Europe, will shed light on the social metamorphosis experienced in the region in general and the effects it had on the field of the press in particular. On this point, we must also consider Albert Hourani's classic work *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (1983), in which he stressed the role of the new social structure, as well as the "encounter" with Europe in shaping the intellectual, cultural, and political scenes in the Arab world.

B. A field of production and consumption

Inside the social structure of the Arab world, exists the field of the Arab press. In the simplest form of presentation of this analytical tool, the field is a particular space within the broader social space which is concerned with a particular social activity or

concern, and which is governed with a set of rules, authority, and capital particular to it. Understood as such, Bourdieu (1971: 52) presented a way in which to develop a model for a given field, specifically targeting in his writings the field of journalistic production, among others. Simply put, he saw journalism as a production process in which producers, journalists, create a commodity, the message, that caters to the need of a consumer market, the audience, in order to generate a desired surplus, an accumulation of the capital specific to this field.

But before explaining how to empirically address the field as a production process, it is imperative to lay down an important conceptualization of the field in which Bourdieu seems to borrow from mechanical physics to separate the field as one of forces and one of struggles (*champ de forces* and *champ de luttes*). Similar to statics, the field of forces represents a snapshot of the field, an image of the field in a state of equilibrium. The forces are the regulations, codes, and particular capital operating in the field at a particular moment. The field of struggles, on the other hand, is similar to dynamics. It incorporates the competing tendencies and forces within the field - weights, counterweights, and friction if we were to completely adopt the analogy with dynamics. It represents the competition among different agents for primacy in the field, a primacy which can take many forms, depending on the stake within the field, whether it is one of consolidation, preservation, and accumulation of an already dominating form of capital, or one of transformation and shift in power among competing agents through a shift in the possession of the already dominating capital, and even shifting the very form of capital dominating the field, and therefore changing the rules of the game altogether (Bourdieu, 1977b: 410; 1981: 8; 1994: 55; Wacquant, 2008: 268). This conceptualization of the different forms of forces operating within the field is important because it helps first explain consolidation and changes within the field, but also because it incorporates the issue of the evolution of the field across time; it is therefore a theory which is not transfixed in time, but rather understands the importance of the impact of historical evolution and of time as a major variable of change, another major contribution of Bourdieu's thought which will be discussed later in this chapter.

This approach allows us to separately study the different elements constituting the field, whether they are the actors (producers and consumers), the message in the press, the relations among these different elements, the division of labor in the field, production, reproduction, and diffusion of the message, etc. (Bourdieu, 1971: 54). Also,

one of Bourdieu's major contributions in this regard was that he saw the need to look at the *internal* dynamic of each different element, to see the *distinction* which governed the different actors playing in the field, most importantly among the producers whose distinction and different social positioning are in fact the main reason behind dynamism inside the field.

For example, at the level of the production of symbolic goods, and most notably political messages, the very target of this research, Bourdieu (1985: 738) wrote about the "structural duplicity" of the political discourse. Indeed, as any act of production in a particular market seeks to occupy the largest share of consumption within this market, the usual target of this production becomes the consumer whose opinion is not only shaped by the message, or even comes to exist because of it, but also shapes the message itself, mainly through a process of self-censorship and targeting which the producer, willingly or not, imposes on himself in order to attract the largest audience possible by allowing it to identify with his message. But similarly, the producer needs to promote his own distinction within the field, his own self-perception of his role, identity, and opinion which separate him from his contenders and competitors, and therefore through promoting his own interests as defined by his position within the social structure, undergoes a process of communicative distinction with his peers and competitors in the field (Bourdieu, 1985).

This duplicity finds itself in Bourdieu's theory as a dual-dynamic of the production of symbolic goods which needs to be addressed. First, this production, and especially that of intellectual products as is the case with the journalistic message, operates as a "restricted production" (*champ de production restreinte*) in that it addresses the public of producers themselves (Bourdieu, 1971: 54-55). This aspect of production is what leads to formulation of norms and values guiding the field, what is generally called the "journalistic code" being one such sets of values, its evaluation criteria, and general recognition among peers.

Second, this production operates at the level of the broad public of non-producer consumers as "broad symbolic production" (*champ de grande production symbolique*). This aspect of production is important on two accounts. Since it targets an outside audience, it must obey to the simple rules of the market in that it answers to the laws of supply and demand. Supply is therefore guided by a conscious need to acquire a broader section of the consumer market, and, in view of competition, requires of the producer to

adjust his product to the needs of his targeted audience (Bourdieu, 1971: 81). Also, because of the political outlook of the field of journalism and the press, it is imperative to recognize that broad symbolic production is primordial to restricted production if only because competition over power, the stake in the political field, translates into a competition over the ownership of the right to speak for and represent the lay public, or parts of it (Bourdieu, 1981: 13). Indeed, if journalistic production reverts onto itself in a process of restricted production, it would negate the very basis of the external outlook of the field, resulting in the loss of support from and representative claim over a certain public (Bourdieu, 1981: 15). The case of the rise of the Arabic press, however, constitutes a very interesting test to this theory since journalists, even though expressing a desire for attracting larger audiences, did not manage for a long time to address anyone but their own peers. They managed to combine both broad symbolic production and restricted production, a process which played an important role in the shaping of the ethos within the field.

It is interesting to note at this point, that this particular theoretical contribution of Bourdieu might help us elucidate some of the key contradictions and explain some of the biggest frictions between the normative and practical drives within the field. Indeed, it is this very separation between restricted and broad productions which might even explain the internal dichotomy found in the critical approaches to the study of media, the one which I referred to as the second-level rhetoric in the literature review chapter. Indeed, these critical approaches recognize that media operates in practice in a different fashion than it is normatively supposed to operate. This normative assessment, as previously discussed, hides the dichotomy between restricted and broad productions within a field, as it understands media production as broad production, yet evaluates it as restricted production. It is important to note that Bourdieu himself fails to make this distinction when studying journalism, a point I will address later in this chapter.

C. Classes and positions in the field

Bourdieu (1985) provided a very elaborate analysis of what he understood as a social "class" which he specifically defined as: "sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances" (Bourdieu, 1985: 725). Classification for Bourdieu therefore takes place at the level of the predispositions,

closeness in the social space which generates similar tendencies among its different individuals. Class is therefore the set of individuals sharing similar habitus, a system of common dispositions and common conditioning, and is therefore simply a group of individuals who most closely resemble each other in this regard, and, from this same perspective, differ from others who are part of other classes (Bourdieu, 1980: 100; Bourdieu, 1994: 25).

The developments within any field can be therefore understood as a resultant of the social positioning of actors, not only as individuals, but also as groups or classes. And explaining their predispositions based on their positioning also leads to understanding their stances, actions, and behaviors in specific actual contexts. This is because of the subjective impact of structuration previously discussed as part of the "double structuration" of social groups. Positions, as a result, shapes the "schemes of perception and appreciation available for use at the moment in question" for agents (Bourdieu, 1985: 727). The particular position of the agents offers them a paticular perception of the world. It gives them a particular spectrum from which to recognize their options and even act the way they do.

This, in turn, results in *distinction*, the differences in choices between different agents of different social positioning. The importance of this concept lies in the fact that it ties production and consumption very closely together, not because of the simple laws of the market which posit that production seeks a particular niche, a targeted market demand, and shapes itself to supply this demand, but rather because it ties producers and consumers of symbolic goods at the social level through their positioning. The production process itself therefore becomes a communication tool among producers of symbolic goods and their consumers.

Distinction in this sense becomes a social expression of the interest of the group which combines both producers and consumers sharing proximity in the social space (Bourdieu, 1985: 738; Bourdieu and Christin, 1990: 68). It manifests, for example, in the choices and opinions of the educated class to which journalists belonged, and how, through their newspapers, they rejected the "common man" as socially and intellectually inferior. Through their newspapers, they expressed their own social and cultural tastes for modern sciences and literature, and showed an interest in a newly formulated vision of politics which other social classes still had not assimilated. This interest is itself a result of the position of the groups and individual agents, which expresses both the interests of

the body of the group (an objective structural interest), as well as a perceptual interest (a subjective, individual, and conscious definition of what is the interest of this group) which finds direct expression in the communicative act that is the political message in the press. The producer of the political message therefore becomes a representative of the social group which identifies with his message, partly because of the shared social position which parallels the opinions, viewpoints, and interests shared by both producer and consumer of this particular symbolic good, and partly because the producer assumes the role of this representative, an individual substitute of the group, who not only expresses himself in its name, but also grants it the power to exist because of his recognition of it, a mutual recognition of roles between them which Bourdieu labeled the "mystery of ministry" (Bourdieu, 1985: 740). Bourdieu made this point in reference to politicians in positions of power, giving examples like Louis XIV's famous quote: "l'état c'est moi". But, facing an altogether different socio-political system, his theory of distinction within the field and the expression of interest of body and positions of groups will prove to be very revealing of the behavior of the Arab press, especially during its foundational stage (the first phase this dissertation examines), when journalists began crafting and acquiring this "mystery of ministry" Bourdieu wrote about. The case of the Arabic press will show the true meaning of "mystery", as the assumption that speaking in the name of the group created the group was consciouly adopted by the journalists, but never by the group they supposedly created.

D. Habitus and *sens du jeu*

But what is this *habitus* that I have mentioned earlier? A core concept which Bourdieu developed as an answer to the problems posed by the deterministic nature of structuralism, habitus helps us explain how agency still exists within the overarching structure, as well as the power this agency has in reshaping the structure. Bourdieu (1980: 88; 2000a: 25) defined it as a:

> system of durable and transposable *dispositions*, structured structures
> that are predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as
> principles generating and organizing practices and representations that
> can be objectively adapted to their goals without assuming the conscious
> aim toward ends and the explicit mastery of the necessary operations to
> attaining them, objectively "ruled" and "regular" without the least being
> the product of an obedience to rules, and, in addition to all that, be
> collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing
> action of an orchestra conductor.

In simpler terms, the habitus is the sum of past collective social experience imbedded in the agent's unconscious, a forgotten history lingering in the form of a second nature allowing this agent to recognize the different possibilities of action within a particular field (Bourdieu, 1980: 94; 2000a: 263). Reminiscent of Jung's "collective unconscious", the habitus is a resulting development of the particular social space within which it exists. It is born out of a particular social context, evolves in it through the incorporation and accumulation of social experiences, and, in turn eventually reshapes the social structure itself because of the accumulation of new experiences, whether through consolidation or transformation.

Aside from providing us with the conceptual link between the social structure and the freedom of movement of the agent within it, understanding the predispositions of agents within a field also allows us to understand their behavior as a symbiotic product of a historical process and a quasi-momentary choice of action during a particular event. This encounter between the process and the moment allows for the dialectical materialization of the structure and the habitus into a "practice", a behavior which implies a choice among many other choices available to the agent, i.e. a choice from within the already available predispositions, which does not entail a necessary reproduction of past choices, but rather one which is unconsciously informed by them. Bourdieu (1980: ff.89) claimed that it might even be more conceptually useful to understand habitus not only as a principle allowing agents to perceive possible moves at a particular moment, but also as a system of acquired dispositions which first and foremost allows them to eliminate false problems and false solutions, and therefore identify more suitable solutions and behaviors to better address the particular moment.

The encounter between the habitus imbedded in a particular individual and class, and the field within which this individual and class are invested gives rise to a *sens du jeu*, or "feel for the game", the game being the field itself. This feel for the game is, according to Bourdieu (1980: 111; 1994: 45), the quasi-miraculous encounter between the incorporated history, habitus, and the objectivated (*objectivée*) history of the moment in the field, which allows for possible *anticipation* of possible futures, of the foreseeable outcomes of the set of choices available to an agent in the field. It is somehow the logic of the habitus, internalized in the field to create a sense of intelligibility for invested agents, thus creating an internal logic to the field itself, as well as to the stakes within the field.

Bourdieu (1981) advanced the example of the politician whose success relies on the mastery of the rules of the game of politics and the skill required to play it. It is through this knowledge of the field that the politician can calculate the possible results of his actions, foreseeing most importantly how contenders or opponents would or could react to his play; the *sens du jeu* is what informs his position-taking within the field (Bourdieu, 1981: 6). This notion of the "feel for the game" is quite important for studying the journalistic field. Whether during its foundational period, or later when it became more incorporated into the field of politics, the field of journalism was one of constant competition among its different agents, if only because of its very nature which forces competition for larger audience shares, and consequently for more representative claims. It is therefore essential when looking at the behavior of journalists to understand their choices as being motivated and driven by a particular *sens du jeu* proper to the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo. The logic of their action is therefore understood as a chain of plays, actions and reactions, which follow a strategy internalized in the field, i.e. one which is only dictated by the logic of this particular field. This internalization entails that the *sens du jeu*, while specific to the field, does not lead to the necessary rise of conscious intent of the agents, but could do so if the agent is more skilled in and adapted to the game (Bourdieu, 2000a: 257).

E. Economic, social, and cultural capitals

Another one of Bourdieu's contributions stems from his critique of the economic determinism of Marxism, which he addressed by introducing a new conceptualization of capital, one which is not restricted to the economy. He defined capital as "power over the field (at a given moment) and, more precisely, over the accumulated product of past labor (in particular over the set of instruments of production) and thereby over the mechanisms tending to ensure the production of a particular category of goods and so over a set of incomes and profits" (Bourdieu, 1985: 724). This definition, although seemingly very Marxian, hides the major alteration Bourdieu introduced, namely that capitals vary in nature.

Indeed, he identified four major types of capitals: the economic capital, cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1985: 724; 1989: 17). Economic capital is the form of capital traditionally defined in the Marxist literature as the one operating in the economic sphere (financial, operational capital, equipment, etc.). Social capital is the capital generated from belonging to a particular social group, whether class,

family, clan, school, political party, etc... It is the accumulation of actual or potential resources generated by the belonging to a form of institutionalized network of recognized relationships, a closeness within the social space where the individual is located (Bourdieu, 1986). In regards to social capital, Bourdieu had a special affinity to the belonging to a particular educational institution and how that belonging was primordial in positioning individuals in the social space and also impact their position-taking (see for example Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage (1994) on the role of education in reshaping the bureaucracy of the French state; Bourdieu (1981) on its impact on politics; Bourdieu (1984) on the impact of belonging to a particular school on the positions and position-takings of academics).

The concept of social capital is very important for this research on the account that belonging to particular networks was a precondition for many to enter into the journalistic field, and to flourish within it. During the foundational phase of the Arab press for example, this belonging was to a particular sect (most journalists belonged to the Christian minorities), a specific social class (they were all part of a nascent educated class of professionals tightly linked to European interests in the region), and the network of intellectuals who themselves ended up constituting the producers in the field of journalism. The educational institutions within which journalists studied also played an important role in creating networks of ideologically and socially coherent camps in the journalistic field during the different eras this research focuses on.

Defining cultural capital can best be accomplished by listing the three forms in which it manifests itself. In its "incorporated state" (*état incorporé*), cultural capital is durable knowledge, expertise, and experience which the individual accumulates throughout his life through the processes of socialization and education. It is a form of capital which, once possessed, remains with the individual throughout his life, but also dies with him as he cannot transfer it through inheritance or any other form of capital transfer. In its "objectivated state" (*état objectivé*), cultural capital becomes palpable in the form of books, paintings, instruments, and machines which endow their owner with a transferable form of cultural capital that he can sell, inherit, purchase, and endow. Finally, in its "institutionalized state" (*état insitutionnalisé*), cultural capital takes the form of official acknowledgment of certain forms of cultural capital in its objectivated state, most notably in the form of academic titles and certificates (Bourdieu, 1979: 3). Cultural capital cannot be overlooked when studying the Arab press, as it was the dominant

capital which shaped the journalistic field. It was the capital that journalists sought to exhibit in order to gain recognition and the capital audiences needed to be able to process the mediated message.

F. Symbolic capital

The issue of recognition of cultural capital takes us to the final form of capital which Bourdieu focused extensively on in his writings, symbolic capital. Bourdieu (1989: 17; 1994: 116) defined symbolic capital as being any form of capital (physical, cultural, social) when it becomes perceived and recognized as legitimate by social actors who have the ability and capability to notice and recognize it as valuable within a given field. The importance of this form of capital, and the reason why it is presented here separately from the previous capitals, is that symbolic capital is located at a crossroad between the dynamics of a field (forces and struggles, as well as production and consumption), the social positioning of actors, the habitus, and other forms of capital as well.

First and foremost, symbolic capital helps us establish the forces and struggles within a field. A group of individuals who are in a position of power within any field are in fact those who possess a large amount of symbolic capital, that is any form of capital which is recognized by other actors in the field as being the dominant capital, i.e. the capital that matters. The struggles within the field can take one of two forms. They are either struggles for the acquiring and accumulation of this symbolic capital, or struggles with the aim of changing the stakes of the game, the nature of the dominant capital within the field. It is interesting in this regard to mention Bourdieu's treatment of Baudelaire and Flaubert in *les Règles de l'Art* (1998). It is according to him the differences in the type of struggles within the literary field which allowed Flaubert to prosper while Baudelaire was rejected both socially and literarily. Flaubert tried to navigate the field of power, while Baudelaire refused to play by its rules and tried to impose his own rules of the game, an attempt at which he failed because he simply lacked symbolic capital, a contemporary recognition of his legitimacy as a literary figure.

In this sense, symbolic capital as a concept becomes primordial in our assessment of the Arab press. In the first foundational stage, one of the main characteristics of the development of the journalistic field is the accompanying formulation of a symbolic capital proper to the field. Indeed some of the most important questions that will arise later on in this project is why do certain newspapers and journalists gain credence and

legitimacy while others are ridiculed and fail. Who accumulates symbolic capital in this field? How is it generated or acquired? How is it invested within and outside the field? At later stages, the question of symbolic capital will reappear, especially with the transformations of the field itself (the boundaries of the journalistic field being as dynamic as the social space which surrounds it). Are the struggles within the field over the same type of dominant capital, or do some groups and camps try to change it and impose a new form of dominant capital and therefore a different source of recognition and legitimacy?

One answer lies in the theory itself. One of the most important functions of symbolic capital, according to Bourdieu, is that it grants its possessor enough symbolic power to affirm his own worldview (and here we must remind the reader that this worldview is tightly linked to his position in the social sphere), his own classification of the world, or at least of the field within which he possesses enough symbolic capital. This symbolic power becomes the ultimate force behind the creation of social groups, in the sense that these groups become recognized as such through the representation of the symbolic capital holder. Symbolic capital, as a generator of symbolic power, is therefore a two-way street. It is a social recognition of the authority of a certain individual who, in turn, recognizes and identifies the social group as such (Bourdieu, 1977b: 410; 1989: 23).

This has been discussed earlier in the chapter when I dealt with Bourdieu's "mystery of ministry", or the ability of the recognized individual to shape groups and represent them through an act of mutual recognition (Bourdieu, 1985: 740). I only come back to this issue and how Bourdieu described it as being a direct resultant of distinction or, more precisely, how distinction and homology are required for this ministry to be attained, because, at one point, Bourdieu (1985: 731) claimed that distinction and symbolic capital are one and the same. Based on Bourdieu's own writings (1971; 1998), however, one can safely argue that marginal cultural production can exhibit distinction, but, if it does not generate symbolic capital, it remains obscure and marginalized. The issue is of importance because in the case of the Arab press, there are many cases of marginal papers appearing and disappearing regularly, not being able to find a place in the field for one reason or another. Examining their failures is equally as important as examining the successes of others, and how these successes impacted the social space, or what might be called the "public sphere" to better fit with the current literature and what it defines as the social space which surrounds the media.

II. A historical perspective

One of the big questions facing this research project is why find refuge in the past in order to seek answers to the current question the project raises. There are theoretical implications to the use of the theory of fields which necessitate a historical outlook. If we were to go back to each concept introduced by Bourdieu in order to form his sociological theory, we notice the importance of the element of evolution in both the form, consolidation, or change to the field (Steinmetz, 2011). None of these concepts discussed earlier are static; they cannot be read as simple snapshots, even when they are such snapshots (like the field of forces for example) because, even then, the instantaneous view which they offer us is but a fragment of a broader evolution of social behavior.

This chapter has already touched on this point when dealing with the concept of habitus. The very definition of this concept reveals the intimacy between Bourdieu's theory and the historical depth required in any case study. Indeed, the habitus is the product of history, past individual and social experiences which find themselves incorporated into schemes of perception and action. Habitus is therefore the durable persistence of past experiences in the contemporary spectrum of choices available to a social actor and his class (Bourdieu, 1980: 91).

Similarly, Bourdieu sees the concept of "practice" as being an introduction of time into the equation. "Practice unfolds itself in time" (Bourdieu, 2000a: 347), he wrote, and this factor is what changes the relationship between the structure and agency. Through time, social actors make choices, different choices, which are not always in compliance with their position in the social structure, one of the main points that positivism and objectivism find difficulties explaining because of their binding of society to the *rules* of the structure. Bourdieu substituted these rules by *strategies*, the possibility of choice within the larger parameters within the structure.

Needless to say, the issue of social positioning is equally affected by time, especially since Bourdieu's theory allows for the accumulation, loss, and transfer of different forms of capital which might change the positioning of particular actors. This brings us to the forms of capitals operating in a social space which, because of the constant struggles within each field, change in nature, form, and value. In one of his essays reproduced in *Raisons Pratiques*, for example, Bourdieu (1994: 44) showed how a

change of dominant capital accompanied the social transfer of power from the hands of the nobility to that of the state bureaucrats.

Finally, the very field we are studying is not static in its shape, size, autonomy, constituents (Steinmetz, 2011: 54). This project, for example, focuses on the field of the Arab press, as it is found in Cairo and Beirut, which I argue is a single field during the period under study. Journalists in the two cities all belong to the same social group, predominantly Lebanese Christians, educated in European schools, and belonging to the new class of professionals that saw the light with the inclusion of the region into the global capitalist economy. They equally wrote to a similar crowd in both cities which were still nominally (at least before 1882) part of the same state, the Ottoman Empire, and which shared social and cultural closeness that rendered them, for all practical purposes one and a single social space. In fact, Lebanon was the preferred summer resort and touristic attraction of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, while Cairo had become the major center of intellectual and cultural life in the Middle East since the rise of Muhammad Ali in the first half of the nineteenth century, which attracted all Lebanese intellectuals and men of letter who, as previously states, founded the biggest and most influential Egyptian newspapers like *al-Ahram* and *al-Muqattam*. But after from the 1890s onward, the field of journalism lost its autonomy to the field of politics and became a sub-field within it. The field of politics, on the other hand, was split after the British invaded and established their authority over Egypt.

The goal of this quick historical survey was to show the reader that the concept of field cannot be understood as a static one, a particular space within the broader social space which does not change in time. In fact, the structures, rules of the game, capitals, and habitus are all products of a historical development and we therefore need a theoretical framework where history can be accounted for, where we take into account the changes to the context itself, the social space within which the press operates. The different forms of changes that affected the Arab world since the start of the nineteenth century make this case study extremely interesting, as they show how a field is affected by, but also affects, a changing social, economic, cultural, and political context.

But the focus of this research project, the press in the Beirut and Cairo, coupled with a historical approach to the topic, raises the issue of the method used in reading primary sources, whether newspaper articles and editorials, or autobiographies and essays written by notable journalists and editors, texts which were produced in the past

and therefore must be contextualized as such. Bourdieu, in many of his writings, dealt with the issue of past ideas, their contextualization, and how to relate them to each other in terms of perceived influence, and to other contemporary competing ideas and ideologies (Bourdieu, 1971: 120-121; 2002). He also focused on the issue of the consciousness of the full meaning of ideas, whether to the contemporary, or to the social scientist going back to examine such ideas (Bourdieu, 1976: 52). His notes have a lot in common with the Cambridge School of intellectual history which featured names like Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, and John Pocock. In many ways, we can read their works as an expansion of Bourdieu's notes on the topic, or his as a summary of theirs since their publications predated his.

Bourdieu's remarks are essential in helping this project avoid the pitfalls of reading past texts, especially the autobiographies of particular journalists, editors-in-chief, and newspapers owners. In "le Sens Pratique" (1976), he claimed that the sociologist (a term which also denotes the social historian) had the advantage that he could examine the totality of the evidence available to him to form an idea which the original informant, the original producer of this evidence, could not. The original informant can in no way understand himself and the changes he is bringing to his own context and practice in the same way, at least not at the moment when this practice and these changes are taking place. The role of the sociologist is therefore to find the patterns, the logic of the system which escapes the consciousness of the contemporary witness or actor (Bourdieu, 1976: 52).

This entails that, when reading autobiographies, one must not simply take their content at face value, both for theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, and as argued by Bourdieu, it is more difficult for a social actor than for a sociologist to see the larger patterns characterizing a particular social context, if only because he does not have at his disposal the amount and breadth of evidence available to the sociologist, and most notably the advantage of hindsight. Practically, autobiographies are always the product of this hindsight which I have mentioned, meaning that they offer a different vantage point from which the social actor sees his own experience, thus, consciously or not, altering his memories and opinions of past events. This is not to reject the meaningfulness of autobiographies, especially since they offer us unique insight on important actors in the field of the Arab press whose conscious minds we could not access otherwise. It is, however, an invitation to a critical reading of their accounts and

analyses, their autobiographies and reflections on their lives' works. It is therefore not a question of the evidence being right or wrong, but rather of asking the evidence the right questions, most notably what did the author mean by his statement, how we can understand his statement within its historical context (Collingwood, 1946: 275; Skinner, 1969; 1978).

The reading of such texts, alongside the examination of the texts appearing in the Arab press, must therefore follow a particular logic of history, a historical method which seeks to contextualize them both socially and intellectually (let us not forget that much of what appears in the press, especially in terms of editorials and analyses, is in fact an intellectual product). In "les Conditions Sociales de la Circulation Internationale des Idées" (2002), Bourdieu briefly explained the need to contextualize ideas in order to understand their true meaning, i.e. their function when they were born. It is by doing that, that we can delineate the field of ideological struggles at a particular point in time. Situating an idea in the broader realm of ideas, thoughts, themes, and problems arising at a certain epoch allows a true understanding of the position-taking of the social actor professing this idea (Bourdieu, 1971: 121; Skinner, 1969).

Doing so entails reconstructing in parallel with the social sphere where the field of the press existed the intellectual realm in which political messages were produced. During the foundational period, editorials calling for social, political, and economic modernity and modernism were appearing as part of the broader intellectual realization of the need for modernization in the face of a superior Europe. It is under this broad intellectual question that we must situate the messages in the press. This will allow us to situate their producers as position-takers, people navigating these issues, with their own stakes and goals, and behaviors and possibilities of behavior.

III. Collecting and analyzing primary material

The main archive which I have examined to acquire my sources was the library of the American University of Beirut, which contains one of the largest and most complete collections of historical Arabic newspapers. But even in such an exhaustive collection, I encountered the problem of availability and readability of the newspapers. Many papers are not available in their entirety, and even more feature issues that are simply too worn

out to be able to read or even decipher. I estimate that around half of the contents of the newspapers examined were unavailable.

Still, I managed to go through a total of thirteen newspapers that were published in Beirut and Cairo between 1858 and 1916.[3] I collected more than a thousand issues totaling 2,617 newspaper pages to analyze. This was after I had gone through all available material in the library's collection. Data collection followed two major criteria. First, I specifically looked for issues where there was mention and treatment of journalism as a profession, of the work of journalists, details on the day-to-day operation of a newspaper, and the ethics of the profession. These provide insight into the mind of journalists at the time, as they represent their conscious attempts at explaining and justifying their work, positions, and role. Second, I applied a process of exclusion, not saving issues that were for all practical purpose a repetition of previous issues. I still collected representative sample issues at regular intervals, ranging from one every two weeks to one per month, depending on the readability and availability of the publication in full. If newspapers were missing many issues, I would try and collect them at a more frequent rate because of the more inherent possibility of missing major changes. The goal of this approach to collecting data was to account for the different trends appearing on the pages of these papers. Layout, design, topics covered, front page subjects, and any changes that affected them in form and content were taken into account. The aim was to assess short, medium, and long term changes in interests, and also in the general way in which the profession evolves, as attested by the product of the field of journalism. This also meant that I excluded pages which featured irrelevant information, like advertisements (even though I would take a couple of examples of advertisement from each journal to track possible sources of financial income) and pieces of literature, like plays and poems. In the latter case, I kept in mind the possibility that such literary pieces might have held hidden political meaning and messages; from my initial examination, none did. In total, this meant that I had examined the totality of the available newspaper, and collected almost a fourth of all available material, thus guaranteeing representativeness of my sample.

It can therefore be said that the material collected is representative of the overall production of media during the period under study. It covers all the main political newspapers, as well as a good sample of less influential ones. Furthermore, I have

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[3] These were *Hadiqat al-Akhbar, al-Janna, Lisan al-Hal, Thamarat al-Funun, al-Haqiqa, al-Ahram, al-Muqattam, al-Mu'ayyad, al-Liwa', al-Jarida, al-Manar, at-Taqaddum*, and *al-Misbah*.

focused in my collecting on representing all trends, changes, interests, opinions, formats, and topics that different newspapers featured.

A final form of primary material that I used is autobiographies by contemporary figures who were involved in one way or another in the field of journalism. These included the autobiographies of the two rulers who interacted and used the press the most during the period under study, sultan Abdul Hamid II and khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II, as well as that of Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, an Egyptian lawyer and intellectual who ventured into journalism and politics for a short while. I am also well aware that there are other relevant published autobiographies of journalists like Jurji Zaydan which I could not access directly, but still managed to find excerpts of in secondary sources. I am equally aware of the methodological problems facing the use of autobiographies, and therefore only critically employ them as anecdotal evidence (see Collingwood, 1946).

There were multiple factors that guided the choice of the birth and development of the press in the Arab world as this thesis' case study. First and foremost, I am very well informed about the topic and am vastly knowledgeable about the literature, both primary and secondary, that has been written about it. Indeed, the rise of the press in Beirut and Cairo was at the center of my studies in history while I was pursuing past degrees. This familiarity allowed me in great part to discern how this specific case had the potential to address my research question.

Second, since my critique of the current literature is strongly based on the radical approach of media studies, which places great emphasis on the Eurocentric roots of media theories, the option of a medium operating in a non-Western context seemed appropriate. In this regard, my choices were somehow restricted because of the language barrier and my lack of knowledge about alternative cases like China, India, Latin America, or Sub-Saharan Africa.

Third, the Arabic press remains a largely understudied phenomenon, especially in the English language, where Ami Ayalon's *the Press in the Arab Middle East* (1995) remains till today the only published book on the topic. Empirically, this is a chance to revisit the history of the development of the Arab newspaper from a fresh perspective, especially that Ayalon's account suffers from many shortcomings. Theoretically, this means that this case can be seen as a blank slate, a new venue to explore, and therefore offers great potential to construct a framework and an approach around.

Having said that, I must stress that this case study has been equally chosen because it proves as much a test to the current literature as well as to Bourdieu's theory of fields. Indeed, one of the main issues I seek to contest is the national framework which has been traditionally applied to the theory of fields, since all the uses of the theory have restricted the social space to the level of the state, if only because it has mainly been applied to cases within Western Europe, i.e. cases where it could be argued the Westphalian model of the state exists. The case of the press in Beirut and Cairo will definitely create a challenge to assess from this perspective, but they also offer an opportunity to assess the elasticity of the theory and the extent to which it can account for non-traditional cases. Indeed, Beirut and Cairo were for the better part of the period under study officially part of the same state. Still, they were in effect governed by two contending rulers and even became two separate states when Britain decided to invade and occupy Egypt in 1882. This shows a rift between the fields of politics in the two capital cities, while socially, both Beirut and Cairo remained to a large extent united by common culture and history, especially for the educated and well-to-do middle class that traditionally moved back and forth between the two cities either for work or for leisure.

Furthermore, this case study offers the possibility for historical analysis, a point which I argue is necessary for the construction of an appropriate framework for the study of the roles the media play in different societies. Indeed, the field of the Arabic press in Beirut and Cairo presents us with a clear starting point, the year 1858 when the first private Arabic newspaper appeared in Beirut, and a clear closure with the complete obliteration of the field in 1916. But aside from historiographic feasibility, this case is a chance to examine both the birth and the development of the field of journalism in a dynamic and constantly changing context. Conceptually, this is necessary because it reveals the different possible factors which might affect the development of the field, whether the forms of capital, social classes, changing positions, and developing ethos. A socio-historical lens provides dynamic insight rather than a static picture of the state of a field.

This last point can be easily identified in Bourdieu's theory of fields and theory of practice, as previously explained in this chapter. Indeed, Bourdieu defines the major components of his theory as temporally mobile. Focus is generally placed on the dynamism of the relational aspect of his theory, at the expense of the dynamism of historical motion. Still, the way he defines *habitus* holds a major historical component. It

is, after all, *habitus* is a "system of durable and transposable *dispositions*" (emphasis in the original text), "*structured* structures that are *predisposed* to function as structuring structures" (emphasis added) (Bourdieu, 1980: 88; 2000a: 25). Dispositions, structured, and predisposed, are all connotations of processes occurring in the past rather than the moment, even though their practical manifestation takes place in the immediate moment under examination. Bourdieu (1980: 94; 2000a: 263) even makes this exact point when he elaborates that *habitus* is a sum of past collective social experience, a forgotten history that is incorporated into the social agent's unconscious mind, a sort of instinct within a field. The manifestation of this *habitus* is but *one* of the many possibilities that the agent has available and, therefore, a non-historical approach would fail to grasp all the other possibilities that remain obscure at a particular moment in time. Historical motion is therefore inherent to the theory of fields.

Using a theory of practice means that the whole lives of the journalists I study can be considered to be the primary data that founds this research. Their social positions, education, and social networks are as relevant as the documents that would traditionally be understood as primary sources. And in this regard, much work has already been done in terms of biographies and histories of the lives of the individuals and groups that constituted the class of journalists, or more broadly the then nascent modern and educated middle class. Understanding this is primordial to situating the role of the "primary documents" and how they are analyzed in this thesis. Indeed, this chapter began with the assertion that the theory is in very many ways the methodology when trying to reconstruct the field of journalism.

Still, the use of the journalistic product, newspaper articles and editorials, remains equally important in order to demonstrate how the practices and ethos of the journalist materialized. The challenge was to find a method of analysis that could incorporate the broad breadth of this research, i.e. a research method that can look at broad trends stretching over decades of journalistic production, while at the same time allowing for the extrapolation of specific details and short-term trends and transformations. The problematique of this thesis, a critique of theories that inadequately reflect social contexts and realities, also implied that I had to start from the evidence, and therefore required an inferential approach. As a result of this research logic, the best choice was to combine different strategies of quantitative content analysis.

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three trends of qualitative content analysis, two of which I use in this research. Directed content analysis uses an existing body of literature and theory to identify key variables as initial coding categories (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1281). Because of the heuristic and inferential aspect of my approach, I fall short of coding the data, which Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1282) argue increases the trustworthiness and lack of bias of the research. Indeed, I allow the data to guide my findings, since it is this data that reveals the different forms of practice. Directed content analysis is therefore the first step I use toward answering the traditional questions that content analysis pose.

The second trend I rely on is summative content analysis, a step further in the comprehension of a particular text. Summative, or latent, content analysis seeks not only to perceive trends in the text, but to further understand the meaning inherent to this text (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1283-4). It is this specific aspect of content analysis that I emphasize, and where I use Quentin Skinner's method for studying intellectual history, a method that can be used for the study of any idea. Skinner argues that the most important factor in understanding an idea is to contextualize it, not only as a social product, but also as the product of a particular thought process within a particular society. This implies that *meaning* is not ephemeral, but rather contextualized, and that it is at the same time specific in the sense that it should be as the original author of the particular idea *intended* it to be (Skinner, 1969; 1978). Skinner's approach, which I have previously addressed in this chapter, distances us from the possibility of anachronistic and decontextualized assessments of thought, which, in this case, will prove a powerful hermeneutic tool in differentiating between actual practice and imposed versions of practice, which is the central aim of this thesis.

The main focus is therefore on the meaning of the text, rather than simply on the trends and their evolution, but also on the meaning of these trends and the changes they witness. This is why coding in a more traditionally rigid sense was not used in this research, especially because of the informed strategy adopted. When concepts and keywords evolve in meaning, using them as a category becomes entirely inappropriate. "Politics", "people", "subscription", "journalism", etc., are constantly evolving concepts during the period under study, and it is the evolution of the meanings they held which is more telling. This might seem at odds with the traditional positivist tendencies of content analysis which promote a belief in the "scientific", "objective", and "statistically relevant"

(see for example Shapiro and Markoff, 1997: 12-14). Recently, however, there has been acknowledgment of the shortcomings of this positivism, especially in what relates to meaning, communication as a two-way process, and social systems (Krippendorff, 2004: xviii-xix).

This is where I add the layer of discourse analysis, an examination of the text as a representation of particular realities, but also as an active construction of reality, especially in evolving socio-political contexts when novelty often transcends immediate understanding and requires its contemporaries to search for definition. When looking at the journalistic product, I therefore see two processes, one where the social context influences the text, and the other where the text creates a particular vision of social reality and therefore participates in its construction. Bourdieu's theory of fields takes into account this act of dual-construction, especially when we consider the relational nature of his theory, as well as the spatial division he promotes to visualize the social space and the fields existing within it.

It might therefore be sufficient to claim here that my approach seeks to extrapolate from the message information about three elements constituting the chain of production and consumption of the newspaper, the product itself, the producer and production process, and the audience and consumption of news. Content, style, and meaning imbedded in the message, which I extrapolate using the previously mentioned methods, will illustrate how and why the producer of news, the journalist, constructed his message, and how and why the audience consumed it. But, again, these methods only serve to illustrate particular practices which can only be observed and fully understood when contextualizing them in a broader social, political, educational, and economic context.

Chapter IV

The journalist educator: the social space, new cultural capital, and the birth of journalism

The first privately owned newspaper appeared in Beirut in 1858. Before that year, there were only a couple of Arabic newspapers which saw the light in the Ottoman Empire, but, with the exception of one obscure and very short-lived newspaper in Istanbul, all of them were government owned and run. Apart from the symbolic importance of their emergence, they had very little impact on journalism in the region, both in terms of production and consumption. In fact, it was not until the 1950s that public media acquired an audience in Egypt and the region, only to wither after the defeat of 1967. This chapter seeks to examine the appearance of private journalism in Beirut and Cairo, which set the stage up for the formation of a field of journalism in the two cities. I will argue that the birth of journalism was in fact a byproduct of the struggles within the field of education, where new cultural and social capitals were being introduced by new actors, and that, from 1858 till the early 1870s, it operated as a component of that field. It was a period when the journalist was an educator.

This chapter starts out with a description of the social space and, for our purposes, restricts the scope of this examination to the political and economic components of this space. The two fields of politics and economy were in a state of upheaval during the period under study and this directly and indirectly affected the formation of the field of journalism. The theme of the encounter with Europe will overshadow all other factors impacting the construction of the field of journalism, and the social space more generally, simply because this encounter left a major impact socially, economically, politically, and inevitably, intellectually, in Arab society. Europe during this period became the "Other" that local politicians and intellectuals obsessed with. It was this superior entity which they suddenly had to compare themselves to. From the moment Europe integrated the region into the global economy, a feat which it could only have done after it demonstrated to the Ottomans that it had become militarily superior, Arab society had to contend with the many changes it endured because of this encounter.

This encounter with Europe also altered the field of education, a very important section of the social space because it was in its bosom that journalism was born. Indeed, primordial to this research are the transformations to the educational system across the Ottoman Empire which led to the rise of a new educated group of people with very little employment prospective. This exclusion was one major component of their choice to integrate into the new field of journalism, and it will remain a salient feature describing journalists for decades, as will be seen in the following chapters. But the struggles within the education field did not only affect journalism by creating the new educated class of professionals which was to inhabit the field of journalism from then on. It was also the channel through which a new idea spread across this new class, an idea which reflected both the political changes as well as the economic colonization of the region. "Modernity", a concept which was both structurally imposed on the region, as well as consciously adopted by the different local elites to try and make sense of the world around them, became the most pervasive idea which shaped the way this new class thought, and reflected the dichotomy between the new forms of education and the more traditional ones (Sharabi, 1970; Hourani, 1983).

Having established the context in which journalism was born, this chapter will further trace the practice of early journalism to try and understand what the first journalists tried to do with this new endeavor that represented their newfound social position, the social dichotomies of traditional versus modern, and the ideas that they professed. Inspecting this period of formation of the field of journalism will allow us to follow the birth of the practices of the new profession, the formation of its ethos, and the forms of capital which came to determine the field. These components will help us reconstruct the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo in its foundational stage and help us visualize how journalistic production and consumption came to be there, thus understanding what the broader role of journalism was in this particular social space before it became a field. Reconstructing the social space will also contextualize the remainder of this study; it is the broad setting in which journalism and politics as fields and activities evolved all the way until World War I.

I. The modern Middle East, a social space in a state of upheaval

Historians generally agree that the beginning of what can be coined as the "modern" Middle East coincides with the last couple of years of the eighteenth century. This modern Middle East came about as a result of pressure from two directions. By then, the eastern shores of the Mediterranean had to come to terms that, for the first time since the Roman invasion, Europe had become the superior power. But reaching the modern age was not simply a result of this external process; it also one of internal decline, as the Ottoman administration had been experiencing deterioration throughout the previous century and a half. The tax-farmers who had constituted the backbone of the Ottoman local administration and tax collection system had become too powerful and wealthy to be controlled by the central government. The janissaries who were once an elite army corps unparalleled in the world had degenerated into a band of thugs quarreling for power and doing very little in terms of providing security for the people of the Empire and for the Empire itself and its borders (Cleveland, 2004; Palmer, 2011; Shaw, 1976).

It was in this context that Europe demonstrated without a doubt that it has also become militarily superior to the Ottoman Empire which, not long before, had caused the continent to shake in its boots. Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798 and, facing relatively little resistance, moved north through Palestine in a bid to take over the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. It was only though the combination of an unexpected staunch local resistance in Akka, a major Ottoman counter expedition, and British naval support for the Ottomans that the French general and his adventurous expedition were defeated and Egypt returned to the bosom of the Ottoman Empire (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 60; Cleveland, 2004: 65; Cole, 2007). The Ottoman Empire thus safeguarded its territorial integrity in the Arab East for another three quarters of a century.

A. Modern armies, modern education

The most direct result of Napoleon's campaign in Egypt was that a young Albanian officer who took part in the campaign to retake Egypt for the sultan managed to climb up the ranks of the army, getting close to the Egyptian notables and subsequently getting appointed as governor of Egypt in 1805. His name was Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt and the first of a dynasty of rulers who later became Khedives and then kings of Egypt, heading the country for almost a century and a half. After consolidating his power internally, Muhammad Ali embarked on a comprehensive reform program, focusing most on the modernization of his army and the consolidation of his

own power. All the reforms that he ushered during his reign went solely to serve this purpose (Fahmy, 1997: 19, 30; 1998: 139).

One of the things he understood early in his endeavor was that a reform of the army had to be accompanied by a more wide-ranging overhaul of both state and society. Not long before he acceded to power, he had seen a sultan fail in his attempt to modernize the Ottoman army because he did not have full control over society. Indeed, Selim III (r. 1789-1807) tried to reform the Ottoman army by creating a new infantry corps, the *Nizam-i Cedit*, to replace the old inefficient corps of janissaries and sipahis. Not realizing that the old military system had become ingrained in a particular socio-political structure, the lack of social and economic reforms accompanying his shuffling of the military led to a revolt against him and his eventual deposition and assassination (Shaw, 1976: 264-5). Muhammad Ali was not going to have any of that.

His reforms were to target the political realm, society, bureaucracy, and the economy. Each of these reforms affected down the line in one form or another the creation and development of the journalistic field. The political and economic reforms went hand in hand. Simply put, Muhammad Ali needed to get rid of the competition, the remnants of the old Mameluk elite which ruled Egypt before him, as well as the 'ulama, the religious leaders of the Egyptian community. These two groups were also holding the main source of revenue in Egypt, the land. He approached the problem with a simple solution: he killed all the leaders of the Mameluks and confiscated agrarian lands from tax-farmers and clergy alike, imposing new taxes which would help him raise his new army (Owen, 1993: 57, 67). He also chose to gear his economy toward Europe, focusing the efforts of the agricultural sector on the production of cotton which guaranteed him the highest income he could generate from the land (Fahmy, 1997: 11). In 1816, he also adopted an import substitution policy, establishing textile factories, importing machines and skills from Europe to do so. This went hand in hand with the establishment of other factories aiming to reduce Egyptian reliance on Europe, especially in terms of armaments and military equipment (Owen, 1993: 69-71).

All these reforms required a new breed of state employees. Indeed, a new army needs medical doctors, engineers, officers who knew mathematics and physics; new taxes need bureaucrats trained in the arts of accounting; new factories required skilled workers and even more skilled administrators. Muhammad Ali's initial impulse was to send missions to Europe, to learn skills in European schools, absorb European

techniques, and acquire European languages and know-how (Owen, 1993: 57; Heyworth-Dunne, 1938: 104-5; Silvera, 1980: 1-2). In parallel, he began a process of establishing a new form of local schools. Unlike the traditional Egyptian school, the *kuttab* school that taught students to memorize the Quran and offered the most skilled and financially able among them the chance to receive further religious education at the famous al-Azhar, Muhammad Ali's new school system was more in line with secular European schools. Before the end of the 1830s, he had already established cavalry, artillery, infantry, naval, medicine, pharmaceutics, veterinary, war munitions, mineralogy, engineering, applied chemistry, signaling, and arts and crafts schools; in addition to the military schools, he also established maternity schools, schools of irrigation, translation, agriculture, and languages (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938: viii; Gesink, 2006: 328-9).

Evidently, people receiving education either in Europe or in European-like schools formed the core of a new group in Egyptian society, one that received a secular education, an education imbued with the positivist spirit of Europe, if not explicitly, then at least implicitly due to the nature of the subjects learned there. They formed the scion of a new class, an educated elite whose sole purpose was to serve the different machines of the state revolving around the person of the ruler, Muhammad Ali Pasha. However, in a bid to further consolidate his already absolute power over Egypt, Muhammad Ali never allowed for this new class to effectively manage the new sectors of Egyptian economy and education. In fact, the management of most of the new factories resided in the hands of what Owen describes as the "still fundamentally Turkish/Mamluk military elite", the pasha's men, rather than in the hands of the young men who were sent to Europe for education (Owen, 1993: 72-3). This was the beginning of the process of alienation that this group of people was to experience; they were a nascent group of young men who learned the European ways, most notably the way politics and public administration were understood in Europe during its "liberal age", but whose access to the real positions of political, administrative, and bureaucratic power was almost completely restricted. Nothing illustrates this claim better than Muhammad Ali's response to one of the young men whom he had sent to Europe, and who tried to give him advice based on the knowledge he had acquired there. The pasha simply answered him: "it is I who govern. Go to Cairo and translate military works" (as quoted by Hourani, 1983: 52).

B. Integrating Europe and spreading modernization

At the start of this chapter, I have mentioned that Europe played a major role in the birth of Arab journalism. But to this point, it might seem to the reader that the efforts of Muhammad Ali took the region in the opposite direction. In fact, all his efforts were geared toward advancing and modernizing independently from Europe. Two of his actions, however, created a backlash, opening wide the doors of the Middle East to European integration, economically, politically, socially, and culturally. First, his reliance on a single cash-crop, cotton, that found an almost exclusive market in Europe, made Egypt into a center of focus for European capitalist penetration, especially later on in the 1860s when, due to the American civil war, Egypt became the main source of cotton for Europe. Second, his failed military expedition to Syria in the 1830s permitted the imposition of European rules on the economy of the region. His monopoly over cotton production and sale was terminated when the pasha's forces were defeated by Ottoman and British forces combined. The British coerced the Ottomans into a treaty, the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1838, which resulted in an opening of the Middle Eastern markets to European exploitation, banning monopolies over the production of local goods, and placing tariffs on imports of processed goods at a low five percent, making imported products cheaper than locally produced goods (Owen, 1993: 75-6). The introduction of the Middle East into the capitalist world-system and the accompanying European encroachment had officially begun.

This European integration was far reaching for the establishment of the class of intellectuals who later on founded the field of journalism. But first, it must be mentioned here that the successes of the pasha's reforms led the sultan at the time, Mahmud II, to usher reforms of his own. The weakness of the central government in its control of the imperial peripheries and the lesson the sultan had learned from his predecessor, Selim III, led him to undertake a slower transformative process, one which first sought to remove the threat of the janissary corps, the old order. By taking his time to empower a counter-weight to the janissaries in the form of the local religious leaders, Mahmud II made sure that social reforms that gave power to these 'ulama was enough to guarantee their support in the transition, one which was as bloody as the one undertaken by Muhammad Ali. The janissaries were slaughtered in their garrisons, and their barracks were burnt with them inside. The road of reforms was opened for Mahmud II who ushered the era of *tanzimat*, or reforms (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 20-21). His reforms of the central government, as important as they are in themselves, are not as useful to us here.

The era of Ottoman reforms, however, permitted social changes that altered the imperial peripheries, especially with the introduction of the imperial decree of 1856 which guaranteed equality between subjects of the Empire irrespective of their sects and creeds (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 118; Hourani, 1983: 47). The importance of this reform was not that it brought about a secular code of laws, but rather that it served the purpose of European integration in the region in that it empowered indigenous minorities who were in direct contact with Europe both commercially and culturally. Indeed, since the beginning of the era of integration into the global economy, European merchants had to rely on a local group of people to conduct their trade with, a group which mainly understood both European languages as well as local culture of commerce to be able to link the local peasant with the European trading houses (Owen, 1993: 99; Firro, 1990: 160; Issawi, 1977: 98). The family names of some of the Beiruti merchants dealing with European trading houses are worth noting here: Khuri, Thabit, Bayhum, al-'Aris (Issawi, 1977: 198); some of the most prominent journalists during this period came from these families, including the founder of the first newspaper in Beirut, Khalil al-Khuri.

C. An age of reforms and changes

In this section, I have shown through the historical account of the first half of the nineteenth century that the social space of Beirut and Cairo during that period was one of transition and change. The changes were brought about by the reform attempts of the local governments, that of Muhammad Ali in Egypt and Mahmud II in the rest of the Empire, as well as by European encroachment on the economy, an encroachment which ushered a series of social and cultural changes that will be explored in the next section in this chapter. The reason why Beirut seemed absent so far was that reforms and changes there started to become apparent a little later than in Cairo, which might be a bit peculiar seeing how Beirut was the place where Arab journalism was really born. Indeed, it was not until the end of the Lebanese civil strife of 1860 that major changes were introduced to the Mountain, and consequently to Beirut, the link of Mount-Lebanon to the rest of the world, a link which exponentially grew in importance with the rise of silk prices, Mount-Lebanon's single cash-crop, leading it along with Beirut, to be of major importance to Europe, and mainly France, the largest market for Lebanese silk in the 1860s and 1870s.

But changes in Beirut began earlier than in 1860, even though on a small scale. Indeed, the trade of silk with Europe became more important starting in the 1830s and

accelerated during the 1840s with the establishment of French silk reeling factories in Mount-Lebanon (Firro, 1990: 151). Beirut and Cairo were simultaneously being absorbed into the European sphere of influence and the global economy. Culturally, Beirut had also been connected to Europe, and specifically France, for a longer period. Ever since the capitulations of the sixteenth century, France had acquired the right to protect Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. The Maronites of the Mountain having reestablished contact with the Vatican became the target of such protection and French influence grew among this community. Similarly, Russia protected the Greek Orthodox after the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk Kinardji (Hourani, 1983: 39-40). Hourani (1983: 44) argued that "by the 1820s and 1830s therefore there existed Ottomans who, without being torn from their roots, had become members of the European community and were conversant with its ideas".

Changes were therefore taking place across the entirety of the social space. Politics, society, the economy, culture, and even identities were changing. The remainder of the period under study, all the way until the division of the region by the French and the British in the Sykes-Picot agreement and the San Remo Conference, was one of constant metamorphosis, especially at the political level. The political field in Beirut and Cairo constantly changed, with major milestones like the Lebanese civil strife of 1860 and the accession of Ismail pasha in Egypt in 1863, both events leading to the administrative autonomy of Mount-Lebanon and Egypt respectively, the British invasion of Egypt in 1882 and the tanzimat of sultan Abdul Hamid II starting almost simultaneously, the removal of the almighty Lord Cromer in 1907 and the Young Turks revolution in 1908. By some weird twist of historical coincidence, these changes took place in Beirut and Cairo at the same time, maintaining a momentum of cultural and social attachments between the two centers. As a result, these changes, although apparently dividing Beirut and Cairo, never created a socio-cultural wedge between them. Many fields, not just the field of journalism, remained common between the two cities. This was not in spite of the changes, but rather because of them. One example of importance which will further be developed in the next chapter would be the immigration of many educated Lebanese men from Beirut to Cairo in the 1870s and 1880s, where they founded a private Arabic press, a continuation of their efforts in Beirut.

II. New educations and the birth of new cultural and social capitals

Prior to the nineteenth century, education tended to be disregarded in the provinces of the Empire, including in Egypt and Syria. Young children learned for a short while in the local religious schools which taught them the basics needed to fulfill their religious obligations, while part of a minority which was a bit more lucky to come from a relatively more privileged background, i.e. some of the sons of notables and local community leaders, would be sent to Istanbul for higher education and the enrollment in the service of the Ottoman government (Bashshur , 1966: 452). In Egypt, there was one (and the only) institution of higher learning, al-Azhar, founded in the year 972 and solely providing Islamic teaching (Gesink, 2006: 326).

For the purpose of this study, the changes to the education system, and more precisely the introduction of new types of education in the Arab East will be stressed as the major factor which allowed for the birth of private journalism. This new education, whether the missionary education of the Protestants in Beirut, or the government schools established later during the nineteenth century in Egypt, did not simply imbue individuals with a set of liberal values and a sense of radical criticism which was unfamiliar to the local people as much of the literature suggests (Bashshur, 1966: 453; Dodge, 1972; Faksh, 1976: 236). It also offered these individuals new forms of cultural and social capitals which had previously been unavailable. Cultural capital is obviously the main outcome of education. In this case, the particular cultural capital offered by the new European or European-styled education systems was the key component of the creation of a social class which, as seen in Chapter III, represents "sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances" (Bourdieu, 1985: 725). Furthermore, belonging to this new educated class imbued the individual with social capital generated from the adherence to networks of individuals with similar predispositions - indeed most of the journalists during this period belonged to such networks - and, more importantly, because of their knowledge of European languages, were also linked in one way or another, usually through employment and prospective employment, to European missions and consulates. These social links were fundamental in the establishment and survival of the Arabic press both in Beirut and Cairo.

A. Traditional education and the power of the status quo

Traditional religious education is mostly disregarded in the literature which stresses the role of education in the rise of the Arabic press simply because it did not impact during this period the field of journalism much and only produced three major journalists: 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani, Rashid Rida, and Yusuf 'Ali. Qabbani received his early education at a local *madrasa*, but later joined the ranks of Butrus al-Bustani's newly founded secular National School on the outskirts of Beirut (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 100). Rida received his early education at a traditional Islamic school in Tripoli and his theological and religious development came as a result of his reading *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa*, the polemic revolutionary Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's famous publication (Ryad, 2009: 33). 'Ali's venturing into the field of journalism was actually a reaction to his Islamic education at al-Azhar which he found to be boring and wanting (Goldschmidt, 2000: 230). All three journalists were therefore the product of an escape from the traditional religious education institutions.

There were a few other shaykhs who later on became journalists, like shaykh Yusuf al-Asir but were of little impact in the founding and evolution of the field of journalism. In his account of the first one hundred years of journalism in Egypt, Hamza mentioned one other al-Azhar graduate to have gone into journalism. Shaykh Hamza Fathullah published *al-Burhan* in Alexandria in 1881. The paper quickly failed because, according to the author, it was but a caricature of its editor, a man who lived outside his age ('Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-61]: 76-7). Some have attributed this discrepancy to the "outdated" curriculum of the traditional religious schools, a curriculum which only taught grammar, religious history, jurisprudence, philosophy, theology, mysticism, and commentary (Gesink, 2006: 327; Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 112; Faksh, 1980: 43).

Some also have argued that the rift between traditional education and the press was in fact an extension of the problem traditional education, and the 'ulama' it created, had with the printing press. The main example of this rift is usually found in the story of the first Arab encounter with the printed word which can be found in the account of the historian and al-Azhar graduate 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Jabarti. The printing press that Napoleon brought with him to Egypt in 1798 created a sense of revulsion in al-Jabarti when he read the printed declaration of intent of peace Napoleon addressed to the Egyptians. Al-Jabarti went and denounced the grammatical, lexical, and literary shortcomings of the general's first declaration, an act which for him was tantamount to destroying the French attempt at communicating with the locals since it revealed that the

French and their invention, the printed word, failed to produce a satisfying level of Arabic language and were therefore inferior to the local learned men (Ayalon, 1995: 168).

Many, including Ayalon (1995), have ascribed this opposition to printing as a revolt against the competition it might have brought to the realm of the written word that the clerics had once monopolized. The assumption is that the written word in the Arabic world was mainly used to preserve religious ideas and sacred texts, and the act of writing was therefore equal to the possession of this knowledge which rested with the *'ulama'*. But even if we assume that they were afraid they had lost control over the production of the written word, and therefore their monopoly over the sacred, they were still at that time in firm control of teaching, and therefore reading. It would therefore seem hardly a problem for them to control access to the written word because they were in control of both its production and consumption. This whole argument also disregards that a lot of writing in Arabic was in fact dedicated to history and literature, and not only religious studies; it equally ranged between the most sacred holy scriptures of Islam to the most blasphemous poems of one of the greatest Arab poets of all times, Abu Nuwwas.

But when the field of education changed and more people learned to read and write, the press became more accessible to the public. Only then we can understand why al-Jabarti's position became a matter of more urgency, as the challenge to the *'ulama'*'s possession of knowledge and its dissemination tools became more serious, as a new group of people would become an alternative that they could not control. The printing press, in this case, threatened and undermined their position of dominance by creating a complete chain of production and consumption of independent knowledge; but this might only have been possible after education was widespread enough to create a class of learned men from outside of the circle of *'ulama'*. This means that the reason for this opposition between traditional views and print must be found elsewhere during this early stage, which will be examined later.

B. Missionary education, the womb of Arab journalism

Talking about missionary education in the Middle East in general might be misleading and not entirely accurate from a historical point of view. It was in fact around American Protestant missions in specific, that the individuals who founded Arab journalism and populated most of its field during its inception congregated. And it was

specifically because they were Protestant missions that their imprint was felt more strongly in the field of education, as well as in society in general. Indeed, unlike other missions, the most notable during this period being the French Catholic missions and the Russian Orthodox missions, the Protestant missionaries sought to educate the locals differently as well as convert them spiritually. Bashshur (1996: 453) stressed this difference, claiming that the Protestants sought to instill an independent and radical spirit of self-initiative, while the Catholics were neither radical nor motivating; they represented the spirit and qualities of much of the local population, or at least the Christians of Beirut and Mount-Lebanon, the majority of which were Catholics themselves.

If we were to just compare the mission statements of Protestant and Catholic missionaries who established and managed institutes of higher education in Beirut, we could very easily understand how Bashshur reached his conclusion and why missions other than the Protestant mission in Beirut failed to mold individuals who were interested in new endeavors such as journalism. Daniel Bliss, one of the founders of the Syrian Protestant College from which most of the early generation[4] journalists emerged, said on one occasion:

> Tyrant, Despot, Pope and Priest are ever the enemies of agitation, and
> when in their domains a master spirit arises and disseminates freedom
> and truth, the rack and inquisition claim another victim. There can be no
> quiet when antagonistic principles meet. The great model Agitator
> brought not peace to human society but a sword (As quoted by Kedourie,
> 1966: 77).

Traditionally, the literature paints a very rosy picture of the impact of this mission on the local society, usually stressing how it instilled the liberal values of the West on the locals, giving them an understanding of Western civilization, a point which will be rectified in the course of this dissertation (Dodge, 1972; Kedourie, 1966).

The French, on the other hand, had a completely different approach. By establishing one of the most prominent schools at their Beirut university, the Oriental school at the Université Saint Joseph, the French hoped to "guarantee [their] prestige and establish [their] intellectual supremacy in Syria" (as quoted by Herzstein, 2006: 317).

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[4] The use of the term "generation" in this thesis refers to groups of journalists who appeared in the field at roughly the same time, viewed their role in the same way, shared similar journalistic interests, and had a similar attitude toward their social surroundings. It builds, to some extent, on Bourdieu's notion of social class, except that it takes into account time.

Their effort was therefore not aimed at the local population, but rather at the Protestants who were challenging the Catholic dominance in Mount-Lebanon and, by extension, Beirut. This challenge was to become a salient feature of the relationship between the Protestant and Catholic missions. Any further effort by the missionaries was directed not at educating the locals, but rather at teaching themselves about the locals. In the words of a contemporary professor referring to the oriental school: "what better occasion and under what better guidance could have we learned about the Orient here?" (as quoted by Herzstein, 2006: 320). The aims and goals of the Catholic missionaries were exclusive of the local population and not as driven as the Protestant ones. It is therefore not surprising that they left so little impact on the changing social scene, enough to make it very difficult to find any piece of primary or secondary literature dedicated to their efforts in this regard.

Going back to the Protestant mission and its flagship educational institution in the Middle East, the Syrian Protestant College, later renamed the American University of Beirut, I first examine what they offered their students. The curriculum of the medical school and the school of arts and sciences included subjects ranging from chemistry, anatomy, pharmacy, and zoology, to Latin, Arabic, French, English, geometry, physics, history, and philosophy (from Shahin Makarius' study of education in Syria in 1882/3, translated by Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 116). The novelty lied not in the subjects themselves, but rather in the teaching methods and material. Indeed, the locals had their own brand of medicine and pharmacy still known till today as Arab medicine. They could also learn European languages at traditional Christian schools which, even after the establishment of modern schooling in Syria still graduated pupils who then went to European institutions of higher education. The schools of Suqah and Bqarqasha, one of them founded in 1584, and the famous school of 'Ayn Waraqa, which was founded in 1793 and graduated many of the founders of the Arabic press, are but few of the more prominent examples (as quoted by Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 125).

What was therefore the meaning of these new scientific subjects that were being introduced to the pupils of the Syrian Protestant College? It was simply new forms of cultural capital that they were accumulating. The positivist approach to European sciences came imbued with a set of philosophical underpinnings characteristic of the age of enlightenment that the West experienced during the previous two centuries. These new sciences were accompanied by new methodologies and new goals. What the

Protestant missionaries offered was therefore the positivist spirit prevalent during the nineteenth century. The form of the incorporated cultural capital had therefore changed and modern education offered them a new type of knowledge that was different from the forms of knowledge previously known to the region. They also introduced cultural capital in an objectivated state, a set of material goods that contained knowledge. Students acquired books and instruments which became necessary to the accumulation of cultural capital in its incorporated state. Finally, the missionary institutions offered their students cultural capital in an institutionalized state. They gave them degrees and certificates, pieces of paper which guaranteed their status as possessors of a particular cultural capital. Still, generally speaking, cultural capital, especially in its institutionalized state, was not yet a prerequisite to enter the job market; it did not always translate into a capital useful in other fields. For a while, the only real prospects for graduates was to either teach or be employed as translators for the missionaries themselves or European embassies and consulates (Dodge, 1972: 20). Such demand on the job market was bound to dry up quickly, especially that modern education began to graduate exponentially more students. But going back to the new type of cultural capital that modern education introduced, its importance lies in that it presented a new type of knowledge, driven by different methodologies and transmission tools than traditional education. Students learned to think differently about a different type of knowledge, a transformation which must not be disregarded when trying to understand why they embarked on an innovative project such as journalism.

A factor which might partially explain the birth of journalism as a possible outlet for these graduates was the new social capital that missionary schools generated among their students. Indeed, many networks were created in and around these new institutions of learning. Literary and scientific societies emerged with the help of American missionaries and they slowly grew to become the intellectual hotbeds of the formulation of modern Arab nationalism. But even before that, the first journals and newspapers saw the light from their midst (Bashshur, 1966: 453). Hafez (2000: 17-18) argued that it was specifically the activity of these networks which led to the rise of journalism. With the adoption of new methods of thinking and new approaches to reality, people gathered in groups to discuss their newfound ideas and communicate them among each other. The only tool that could spread these ideas beyond the immediate group was journals and publications. Without such dissemination, this accumulation of cultural and social capitals would have been useless. Therefore, if we

transpose Hafez' argument onto Bourdieu's theory of fields, we see that the new class which saw the light as a result of the new education system, and acquired new social capital because of it, was now investing both cultural and social capitals outside of the confined circles of individuals within the field of education. It was therefore addressing a broader public and seeking to spread education to more people. Although there is no evidence to this point, the only logical deduction for such an approach was that the nature of modern liberal education had the spread of knowledge among people, rather than an accumulation of this knowledge in a close circle of individuals, embedded in its message. There seems to be no ulterior plan or purpose for the creation of the first newspapers and journals beyond this spread of knowledge, a point I will return to later in this chapter.

The most important of these societies was the Syrian Scientific Society, *al-jam'iyya al-'ilmyya as-suriyya*, which featured among its members Butrus al-Bustani and his son Salim, Nasif al-Yaziji, Muhammad Arslan, and Husayn Bayhum, as well as Eli Smith, Cornelius Van Dyck, and William Thompson, the founders of the Syrian Protestant College (Antonius, 1938: 53; Ayalon, 1995: 31; Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 105). Many of the local members became very prominent journalists. Another society in Beirut was *jam'iyyat al-funun*, the Arts Society, which was the Muslim counterpart of the secular Syrian Scientific Society and whose members decided in 1875 to publish the first Muslim newspaper, *Thamarat al-Funun* (the Fruits of the Arts), to counter the successes of the papers established by Christians (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.1: 25; Ayalon, 1995: 36). It becomes apparent that the role of the new social capital forming around the missionary education in Beirut was primordial in shaping the birth of the journalistic field.

C. Government schools, an alternative modern secular education

As was previously mentioned in this chapter, the reform of education first started with Muhammad Ali who established schools to train employees needed to fuel his armies and bureaucracy. These schools were mostly technical and their graduates did not need to go and look for jobs; the state already had a place for them (Faksh, 1976: 235; Gesink, 2006: 328-9). But a decade and a half after his death, education in Egypt had relatively stagnated under the reign of his two successor 'Abbas I and Sa'id, and it was not until the reign of the pasha's grandson, Isma'il (r. 1863-79), that educational reforms were picked up. having been educated in Paris, he exhibited a very strong passion for the spirit of modernity which he tried to impose on Egypt through a series of major

modernization projects that reflected his attachment to the European ideal. During his visit to Paris in 1867, he said: "over the past thirty years Europe's influence has transformed Cairo. Now... we are civilized" (as quoted by Raymond, 2000: 312). After his abdication in 1879, he was even reported saying: "My country is no longer in Africa; we are now part of Europe. It is therefore natural for us to abandon our former ways and to adopt a new system adapted to our social conditions" (as quoted by Scham, 2013: 318).

Educational reforms during his reign were part of his grand vision of modernization; and it is important to stress this fact because, like many of his other reforms, their effects on Egyptian society were unpredictable. New preparatory schools were founded as early as 1863 to educate the sons of government officials and other wealthy subjects, some of whom became prominent public figures (Reid, 1983: 377). Military schools also received a facelift and civil schools based on European models were established to educate the youth (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938: 348-355). By the late 1860s, the educational reforms reached most of Egypt, and the state provided a primary school for every village of two thousand inhabitants (Gesink, 2006: 330). One of the most visible results of these reforms was that the reign of Isma'il saw the real creation of an Egyptian middle class of educated professionals, a new elite (Yousef, 2008: 109).

The educational system kept expanding from the time Isma'il was deposed in 1879 till World War I, even though the literature seems to be in agreement that the British administration of Egypt did not pay much attention to education. Evelyn Baring, known as Lord Cromer, and the governor of Egypt from 1883 till 1907, had a conscious policy of restricting the expansion of education for he believed that it would be better for Egyptians to stick to the social position in which they were born, where they would be far happier than if they received an education (Reid, 1977: 357). His declarations hid a fear that a new educated class would create more problems to the British administration of Egypt than a more docile uneducated rural society (Tignor, 1963: 148). Still, as will be shown in later chapters, demand for education grew despite of the lack of development in the sector of education, as more people wanted to acquire higher levels of education. The impact of these new schools was to create a larger pool of educated people in Egypt, an obvious pre-requisite for the establishment of a successful field of journalism simply because it provided it with the required readership. But what is interesting to mention at this point is that not many graduates of the government educational system ended up

being journalists during this period, even though they played a central role in the field in the years after World War I.

The final point concerning government education revolves around the most important and unintended result of Isma'il and his successors' reforms. Efforts to modernize focused on creating a new Egypt, a new society, and new institutions. Writing about the transformation that the city of Cairo endured, Andre Raymond (2000: 318) argued that the new Egypt did not replace the old one, but rather came to exist right next to it, not symbolically or metaphorically, but physically through the new urban planning of the city. This was the case with all other modernizing efforts. A rift was created between the old and the new, the "traditional" and the "modern". This rift became quite noticeable at the social level, especially with the introduction of modern government education in Egypt. The new system did not quite compete with the old traditional education, as each served a particular class of people. The traditional religious education served the masses and provided them with basic learning, while the new schools catered for people who were maneuvering the social space (Faksh, 1976: 236; Reid, 1977: 350). The real issue here was not that the rift was simply irreconcilable, as Raymond (2000: 318) noted that "Cairo is like a cracked vase whose two halves can never be put back together". It was that, in fact, it divided society along lines where communications would become much more difficult to achieve. It was during this particular time when journalism was introduced to Cairo. As a result, in this chapter, government education has no real place except that it was an additional producer of consumers of journalism, educated people who could read and who learned that skill outside of the religious establishments of learning. But the significance of the impact of this type of education will be felt later, when the social rift between the educated and non-educated, the modern and traditional segments of society, will divide the local communities and equally separate their modes of public communication.

D. Modernity and the field of education: social context for the birth of the press

I must begin the conclusion of this section by pointing out that, unlike the case for Arab journalism during its foundational period, education in Cairo and Beirut followed different paths of development and constituted two separate fields of education in which two different processes were taking place. This was because the actors and their challenge to the status quo of the educational field that was common to the whole of the Ottoman Empire were different in Beirut and Cairo. In Beirut, the missionary education

sought to replace traditional education not simply as a learning institution, but equally, if not more importantly for the missionaries themselves, at the level of society broadly speaking (Hanssen, 2005: 164). It was a mission of spiritual and social conversion and, needless to say, it opposed the status quo which the encroachment of Europe on the local economy had already perturbed. In Egypt, on the other hand, the creation of a secular government-led education system did not really challenge the traditional Islamic educational institutions, but rather operated beside it, the two targeting different classes, offering their students different capitals and opportunities to invest these capitals elsewhere in the social space. The fact that I do not stress this difference much is that its impact on the field of journalism is negligible. The fields of education in Beirut and Cairo produced the same class, sets of agents who enjoyed the same type of education, acquired the same knowledge, and came to constitute the same producers and consumers of journalism. The two fields of education fed into a single field of journalism.

To understand the role of the field of education in the birth of the Arabic press, I must return to the process of political modernization which created the context that allowed for European-styled education to challenge traditional religious education, creating in along the way new processes of producing and consuming knowledge, and a new class that could operate this new chain. This began as a result of the project of modernity which swept the region starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and intensifying in its final third under Abdul-Hamid II in the Ottoman Empire and Khedive Isma'il. The results of the attempted introduction of modernity varied in each case. In some aspects, like with the economy and society, it led to the creation of what Issawi (1961) labeled a "lop-sided development", or the development of a two-speed and two-direction economy, one which was geared toward trade with the center, Europe, and one which remained entrenched in the old ways of the periphery. Socially, it created the divide previously mentioned between a large majority of the population which remained within the traditional sphere, while a small segment of society adhered to the new class of educated professionals. This social division, which the struggle within the field of education was but a symptom, also came to define the formation and evolution of the field of journalism.

Politically, the results of the attempt to modernize can be located somewhere between the surreal and the ridiculous. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire was completely

devoid of institutions which could efficiently support the reforms. And not only were there no alternatives for the modernizing governments except to copy in form Western ideas and concepts, but there was not even the socio-cultural prerequisites for such an emulation. Heyworth-Dunne (1938: 343) argued that public life was not just incompatible with such political innovations, but was rather completely non-existent as people in general were politically ignorant, a state of affairs which had been actively promoted by the absolute despots of the age of reforms in the nineteenth century. One example illustrates perfectly this claim. When Isma'il called for the formation of a parliament in 1866, he directed the deputies to sit to the right if they supported the government, to the left if they opposed it, and in the middle if they were neutral; they all went to the right, wondering how they could possibly oppose the government (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938: ff343).

The literature has traditionally framed this dichotomy between traditional and modern, or local and Western, in civilizational terms, where modernity was incompatible with a backwards society strongly clinging to the ways of the past. This rhetoric also applied to analyses of educational developments during this time (Yousef, 2008: 111). There are, however, few accounts that tried to sociologically understand the phenomenon of the opposition between traditional and modern educations. Faksh (1976: 236), for example, noted that different types of education served different clientele. Western education was meant for a new elite, the new middle class, while traditional education served the poor and the masses. The result was that the position of the clergy as an intellectual and social elite was threatened, especially that the new rising educated class was replacing them in many government positions due to the creation of the new modernized bureaucracy (Faksh, 1976: 235). This necessarily created a strong backlash against modernization both socially and in the sector of education (Gesink, 2006: 339-342).

Such analysis can be more solidly conceptualized in Bourdieu's own terms. This social division and the opposition between traditional and modern, especially within the field of education, was a symptom of a struggle within the field which was seeing new players challenge the status quo. Indeed, education in the nineteenth century had become a *champ de luttes* between the traditional religious education system, the European missionary education, and the secular European-styled government schools. These new education systems were threatening traditional education by providing new

types of cultural capital in the form of natural and administrative sciences (Hanssen, 2005: 164). Previously, the field was monopolized by clerics who produced and reproduced cultural capital, only allowing specific individuals of their own choosing to own and distribute such capital through a process of recognition from the producers of knowledge themselves that such individual was worthy of such a position. But with the advent of modern education, whether missionary education or government schools, the rules of the game had changed. New actors could invest, produce, reproduce, and, most importantly, propagate new cultural capital through a process of production and consumption that lied totally outside of the control of the *'ulama'*. Individuals populating the traditional sector of education were on the defensive trying to preserve the old rules which privileged their own position as holders of knowledge and the cultural capital it represented. It was therefore natural for them to reject the tools introduced by agents of the modern sectors of education since these were the tools that challenged their own position of dominance. Journalism was one such tool.

As a result of this Bourdieusian reading of the traditional/modern divide, we can thus understand why traditional education could not either produce or consume journalistic production, but also why the people who possessed the old form of cultural capital, represented by the traditional types of knowledge taught in traditional schools, could not easily accumulate or invest cultural capital produced in modern schooling or the press, which, as I argue in this chapter, was a product of this modern schooling and the particular cultural capital it generated. This was because the individuals possessing these two different types of cultural capital had different social positions and professed different dispositions. This was best described by the famous author Taha Husayn who, even though he was writing in 1938, seemed to adhere to Bourdieu's theory of fields to the letter when describing the duality in the way of thinking between the graduates of al-Azhar and modern schools:

> the graduate of the Azhar conceives it in one sense, while the graduate of the modern schools conceives it in another sense. Thus the two different graduates agree in neither their thinking nor in their evaluation; nor do they agree in judgment and decision; nor in procedure and action (as quoted by Faksh, 1980: 42-3).

Even Husayn's terminology reveals the effects of the struggle in the field of education on other fields where graduates pursued their careers, and most notably in journalism. It is easy to explain from this perspective the aversion traditional schools,

scholars, and graduates expressed against the novelty of the press. It was part of the attack they were sustaining from the project of modernity. This rejection was therefore a sign of a social struggle rather than a mere ideological one. Traditional scholars needed to preserve their privileged position as owners of the means of producing and consuming knowledge and modern education threatened this position by creating an alternative and even alien cycle of knowledge production and consumption. The most appropriate supporting evidence of this claim might simply be that the key intellectuals who promoted modernity and the renaissance of Arab thought, *an-Nahda*, during this period were usually Muslim clerics like at-Tahtawi, al-Afghani, and 'Abduh, educated in the traditional schooling system. Secondary sources do not even question the rigidity of their representation of this dichotomy between traditional and modern, even based on historical facts. Throughout most of the Arab and Islamic history, we know of many scientists and pioneers who emerged from the same traditional Islamic education system. It is enough to mention Ibn Sina, al-Khawarizmi, al-Kindi, and al-Farabi to make the simple point that traditional Islamic education was not in essence intrinsically opposed to scientific enquiry and progress. This reinforces the argument that the difference was in the social positioning and predispositions of the actors in the field, rather than a mere ideological deference conservatives had in the face of modernists.

III. The birth of journalism in Beirut, an educational endeavor and a modernizing project

In 1857, notables in and around Beirut received letters from Khalil al-Khuri (1836-1907), asking them to subscribe to an endeavor on which he was to embark soon. The letter read:

> A collection of news will be printed in the Arabic language in a private printing house in Beirut. It will contain news of these lands and foreign news translated from the best and greatest European journals. It will also feature general scientific benefits and experiences that would prove beneficial to the other classes of people. This endeavor will be charged to a group of the smartest and most alert writers, translators, and editors in the country, some of whom will later become famous, especially people like Umar effendi al-Unsi al-Husayni and shaykh Nasif al-Yaziji. [...] We pray every civilized person who wants to benefit these lands to honor us and place his name on this list of subscribers (as quoted by Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57).

In January 1858, this endeavor appeared under the name *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, the Garden of News, the first Arabic newspaper in Beirut, and the only such private enterprise until 1870. The question that I seek to address here is why al-Khuri chose to embark on such an adventure. Not only was the public unaware of the invention that was the newspaper, but al-Khuri himself had no benchmark on which to measure his chances of success and expectations. The possible knowledge he could have had on journalism would have even discouraged him. The only periodical during that time was the official government newspaper in Cairo, *al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyya*. It informed state officials of the decisions of the government. The other Arabic newspaper to have appeared before 1858 was *Mir'at al-Ahwal* (the mirror of the state of affairs), founded by Rizqallah Hassun in Istanbul. He published it for more than a year in Istanbul, criticizing the sultan and siding with the Russians in the Crimean War. He was sentenced to death and barely escaped with his life. The fact that his publication persisted for a year probably meant that it received very little attention, even if its owner was reported to have jubilantly written in response to his death sentence: "I am the son of Hassun Rizqallah, more famous than fire on a banner; everyone knows about me" (as quoted in Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 55).

The first relatively lengthy Arabic commentary on the press appeared in 1830 in a book written by one of the students Muhammad Ali sent to Paris. The student was the shaykh Rifa'a Rafi' at-Tahtawi whom many consider to be the first figure in the intellectual renaissance of the Arab world during the nineteenth century, the Nahda. In a commentary on his stay in France, entitled *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz* (extracting the gold from a summary of Paris), Tahtawi devoted sections to the leafs of paper the French called "journaux" which contain the opinions of anyone who had anything they wanted to say, as long as it does no harm to others. These papers contained various news from inside and outside the kingdom and, even though they were filled with lies, they still contained some bit of useful advice. Tahtawi even encouraged this practice: "do not despise a worthy opinion, even if uttered by a lowlife" (Rifa'a Rafi' at-Tahtawi, 2011: 115). These papers also publicized great deeds as well as mischief, thus earning praise or shame to their doers. He moved on to describe the mechanics of journalism. It allowed the French to say their mind and criticize the administration of the state, and the press enjoyed full freedom to do so. This freedom is only restricted by the sensibility to the wellbeing of others whom it might hurt because it would then make it legally accountable. But in practice, Tahtawi (2011: 192) argued, newspapers are the rallying point of political groups which promote their views in them, making these papers a

collection of lies, and everyone knows what liars the French are! On the same page, he went on to socially classify journalists. They were less significant than public speakers, even though they fulfilled a somewhat similar role. But they were definitely of a higher class than poets. Khalil al-Khuri began his career as a poet, so maybe he read Tahtawi and thought he was making an upgrade.

A. The first journalists, a social class

So why exactly did al-Khuri choose to invest in an activity which promoted lies, was so insignificant that no one would care about it, and, if they did, might end up with him being executed? The answer probably lies in the combination of all the elements previously discussed in this chapter, in the character of al-Khuri and his associates in this endeavor, their social position as a group and a class. He came from a well respected Greek Orthodox family in Mount-Lebanon, worked for a commercial firm for awhile, and wrote poems in Turkish and French (Ayalon, 1995: 31). Even though there is no evidence pointing toward his education, his knowledge of these languages and his relationship to Butrus al-Bustani tends to indicate that he learned at one of the newly established schools in Mount-Lebanon or Beirut. The person who funded his paper, Mikha'il bin Yusuf Mudawwar, was a notable from Beirut who worked as a merchant and a translator for the French embassy there, indicating that he also received modern education (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57; Zachs, 2012: 163). Nasif al-Yaziji, who was supposed to contribute to the paper, also came from an old family of Catholic notables. He received his education in a traditional school, but became quickly affiliated with the Protestant mission in Beirut which used his vast knowledge of the Arabic language to translate some works. In the course of his work there, he became acquainted with Butrus al-Bustani and taught Arabic at the school the latter had established (Antonius, 1938: 45-47).

Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883) himself received his education at 'Ayn al-Waraqa. In 1840, he converted to Protestantism and was employed by the Protestant missionaries for a few years, teaching at their preparatory school in 'Abay, translating some of the textbooks they used and parts of the Old Testament, and finally establishing his own secular school, al-Madrasa al-Wataniyya, or the National School. He wrote one of the most famous Arabic dictionaries, *Muhit al-Muhit*, and also compiled the first Arabic encyclopedia, *Da'irat al-Ma'arif*. In between, he founded with his son three periodicals, the newspapers *al-Janna* (Paradise) and *al-Junayna* (the Garden), and the magazine *al-Jinan* (the Gardens) (Hourani, 1983: 99; Houtsma, 2012). His immense knowledge

coupled with his life mission to spread this knowledge among his compatriots earned him the title of *mu'allim*, or master. The first generation of journalists was almost entirely affiliated with him.

What these men had in common was more than the personal relationship that bound them together. They all came from families of notables, a class which was not part of the old feudal system but which served various functions around it, like providing secretaries and administrators to assist the local feudal lords, or *muqata'ji*. They all received a modern education which put them in contact with representatives of Europe, whether the Protestant missionaries or the French embassy. They all received training in languages and presented a tendency toward the literary world. As their biographies attest, they exhibited a sense of enterprise which cannot be disregarded when considering that they embarked on an adventurous mission to establish a newspaper. All this helps us place these individuals in a very close location in the social space. They constituted a class from a Bourdieusian perspective. They shared similar predispositions which materialized both in the messages they spread in the early days of the rise of the press, as well as in their lives more generally speaking.

B. Positions and dispositions, or Modernism as a worldview

The ideology of Modernism came to represent the mindset of this class. But this ideology never managed to transcend the boundaries of the local social conditions and experiences. As Zachs (2012: 159-163) pointed out, Mudawwar was part of a group of merchants who also happened to be men of letters, or at least interested in literature and thought. Historical evidence shows that they apparently adopted a stance of modernization without Westernization, wanting to adopt technologies and techniques without having to immerse in Western culture which they were very ambivalent about. The word *tamaddun*, literally meaning becoming urbanized but used more broadly to refer to the combination of civilization and modernity, became a cornerstone of their rhetoric. It "was essentially an economic and cultural social ideal, indicative of an ongoing process of revival and progress" (Zachs, 2012: 160). Europe, at this point in time, was still a promise. The problem was only how to properly discover the formula which could reconcile this promise with the local culture (Hourani, 1983: 67-8, 103).

As mentioned earlier, they focused extensively throughout their careers on the development of the Arabic language. They translated European works into Arabic, wrote

textbooks for sciences in Arabic, and established the first newspaper also in the same language. In fact, the close circle that formed around al-Bustani is credited with the articulation of the modern style of writing which characterized the Arabic novel since. This was part of their answer to the question of what to take, or more precisely what not to take from Europe.

Another part was to promote among the public what they thought to be the necessary elements which local society needed to pick up from Europe. In the first issue of *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* (January 1, 1858), Khalil al-Khuri introduced his readers to the function of his newspaper. It was to

> promote sciences and arts, as a form of love of progress and as a step toward modernity and civility (*at-tamaddun wat-tahdhib*) in these lands, especially with the spread of the printing press, the biggest factor in the proliferation and success of newspapers that were beacons of civility in civilized countries [...]. This Ottoman journal will not print anything which would harm public morality and will shy away from all religious issues. It will only promote sciences and morality and will feature the news of these lands and foreign countries [...], shedding light on the conditions of this wondrous world. [...] We will print this publication in a way that, by the end of the year, subscribers could bind the papers of this journal and make a book out of it.

In one of the seminal historical accounts of the rise of the press in Beirut, Ghassan Bustrus (1977: 8) described al-Khuri and Bustani as intellectuals and men of principle. *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* tends to corroborate this claim. Furthermore, it reveals that the aim of the individuals involved in its appearance remained educational for a long time. The "news" that it presented its readers with was mostly social commentary and advice, focusing on the way Europeans behaved, the way they taught their children and the books they read (*Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, 22 April, 1858), and what fell under the title of "political summary" was mainly concerned with events happening in Europe (*Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, January 19, 1859; February 19, 1859). The only debates in which the paper took part for a while were with *al-Jawa'ib*. Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, the owner and editor-in-chief of the Istanbul based paper would quarrel with other newspapers over the lexical innovations introduced into the Arabic language as a result of the translation of modern scientific terminology from European languages.

Ayalon (1995: 32) argued that al-Khuri showed caution by shying away from political issues, following the lead of official bulletins, and adopting factual reporting "so

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as not to irritate the authorities". This view, however, seems to be imposed on the evidence. It presents al-Khuri to have wanted to do something he never admitted to. His approach to journalism as being an educational endeavor never changed throughout his whole life, nor did he ever aspire to play a role in politics or had any publically professed political opinions. All that Khalil al-Khuri seems to have wanted to do was to spread education and the message of modernity to the broadest possible audience. Even in 1883, twenty-five years after he had established his paper and well after other political newspapers had seen the light in Beirut, his idea of the "political" was still to simply and quickly report on the activities of state officials without any commentary, and then move on to write on issues of science and technology, like recent findings about the stars and the invention of a steam engine cart that looks like a horse (*Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, May 28, 1883).

What is more important about pointing out Ayalon's mistaken explanation is that it hides a very important component of the early rise of journalism. Indeed, al-Khuri's behavior can be understood not just in terms of interests, but also as a foundation of what might be called at a later point the ethos of the field of journalism. Being the first and only major newspaper to have appeared for more than a decade in Beirut, the values advanced on the pages of *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, and professed through the behavior of its founder and editor-in-chief, became the standard of proper behavior of journalists. This will be shown more clearly in the next chapter, but it is necessary to point out how Khalil al-Khuri came to strongly define the basis of the ethos of the field. We need not go beyond the above quoted paragraph to discern the lines of such beliefs. He stressed the issues of civility, public morality, and morality tout court. A journalist was supposed to behave like a "gentleman" and preserve public morality while promoting proper behavior, civility. Being the only major newspaper at this point gave a particular monopoly for these beliefs and they remained unchallenged for a long while. As will be seen in later chapters, journalists would accuse each other of breaking these particular rules to deprive each other of recognition.

Also, the formation of this particular ethos helps us better perceive an alternative explanation to that of Ayalon as to why Khalil al-Khuri never bothered with politics. His particular understanding of what was supposed to be the role of a journalist was more in line with a conservative view of society. Civility and morality had a very strong conformist component to them. Proper behavior, or conformism, was not solely restricted to social

conduct, but also to political practice. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, politics during this period was not the realm of all men, but that of the ruler alone. It was inconceivable for someone like al-Khuri to think that he had a role to play in politics, if only because it was not his place, nor was it the "proper" thing to do. In fact, the statement that his paper "will shy away from all religious issues" is but a confession that he will not ponder on political matters, for this was the extent to which a dweller of Beirut and Mount-Lebanon during this period thought to be the political realm.

C. Journalism as a social prospect

What becomes apparent in *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, as well as with the other publications of this small group of intellectuals, is that their claimed mission was, broadly put, to educate the public and promote civility and progress. For them, this meant the propagation of rationality and secularism, which would result in the love of the *watan*, the nation, rather than the love of the sect and the confession. More than anything, this was the result of their experience with the sectarian civil strife which hit Mount-Lebanon in the late 1850s, culminating in the massacres of Christians in the Mountain and even in Damascus.[5] Many secondary sources have heavily taken this sectarian divide as a core component of their analysis of the rise of particular intellectual trends and ideologies, arguing that this intellectual rebellion was "for the typical Christian [...] a total existential experience" (Sharabi, 1970: 89). Christians were supposedly completely excluded from public life and therefore found themselves to be socially and politically excluded in the context of the Ottoman Empire. But these same accounts cannot escape the fact that, even if that were true, these Christians found their way into the civil service, not because of their belonging to a minority per se, but because of their new education (Sharabi, 1970: 4). This new education offered them new opportunities, as proven by the biographies of some personalities who went into the business of translation and the printing of translated works, like Mikha'il bin Yusuf Mudawwar, the man who funded the first Arabic newspaper in Beirut and who worked as a translator for the French embassy

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[5] It must be pointed out that there existed no contradiction between the local political identity and the broader identity of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, as one of many Islamic empires across history, the Ottoman Empire was a supra-national political entity that acknowledged and permitted its different constituents to profess their own ethnic and racial differences as long as they recognized their belonging to the larger *umma*, or nation. It would therefore be erroneous to consider that the identity and ethnic particularity of these Syrian intellectuals promoted a particular political program as understood from a Eurocentric understanding of nationalism. Their self-identification along geographical, ethnic, or religious lines did not, in this case, constitute something different than their Ottoman identity, as it was an integral part of it.

(Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57), and Faris ash-Shidyaq, the founder of one of the most famous Arabic newspapers in Istanbul and who was a translator for the Protestant missionaries before that (Hourani, 1983: 98; Karam, 2012).

The fact that Muslims too did not have any political role to play does not seem to dampen such arguments, nor that it was mainly because of modern education, and therefore the cultural and social capitals it generated, that certain individuals ended up in the civil service. Modern education, even the missionary one, did not exclude individuals based on confession and schools such as the Syrian Protestant College accepted students of all creeds, in the hopes of converting them (Hanssen, 2005: 184-5). Equally, people of all creeds did not find themselves integrated into the Ottoman political structure and were therefore excluded. So, while the socio-psychological argument might point out certain intellectual tendencies for Christian intellectuals - and here we cannot forget that all secular, socialist, and nationalist ideologies in the Arab East were formulated by Christians - it would certainly not help us explain the way in which they tried to break this exclusion, which I argue they tried to eventually do through the press.

As for the experience of *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, it was but the first attempt to create a newspaper, a tool of communication that aimed to spread a particular kind of knowledge, one which was found in the midst of the modern missionary education and involved modern sciences and the accompanying interest in reviving a language that could understand this "modernity". This chapter was a social contextualization of this endeavor and an attempt at trying to understand why a small group of individuals would embark on such an original adventure. The answer, as explained above, lies in the social position of this class, its dispositions, the capitals it accumulated, and the opportunities it had to maneuver the social space and the different fields within it. Modern education, a byproduct of the dual process of modernization and colonization, introduced new cultural capital into the social space. This new capital had very small opportunities of investment outside of the field of education itself, and individuals possessing it found employment only as translators, educators, or low level bureaucrats. These positions also offered very little prospects, as there was no room for improvement for the individuals occupying them. These individuals, who had come from more or less well-to-do families, possessed vast amounts of cultural capital in contrast to the great majority of the population back then, and professed a modernist ideology, found an outlet that could satisfy their newfound social position, answer their intellectual and ideological

dispositions, and in which they could invest the cultural and social capitals they had accumulated in the field of education.

Journalism was therefore seen as both a tool and a solution. The medium belonged to the "modern world" of Europe and was therefore natural to the process of social modernization. Through it, communicating modern knowledge was possible. It became a tool of choice for these intellectuals who wanted to propagate sciences and progress, while at the same time, it offered them a chance to be more than simple employees, as reflected by the opening statement of *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* that promised its writers fame and recognition for their work. It was thus also a chance for them to invest their newfound capitals in a new chain of production which they could manage and where they could, as a result, garner symbolic capital. The private press was therefore a point of convergence between different social processes which all affected its foundation. At the macro or structural level, the birth of journalism was part of colonial modernization at play; people needed to be educated and civilized, and now there was a medium for the intellectuals who have seen the light to help them achieve this. At the micro or agential level, it was the action of a new class which came to possess new forms of capitals it needed to invest somewhere, and no other activity offered good enough prospect for that.

This early effort lasted for a little more than a decade before major changes hit journalism. Educating people remained the primary professed target throughout this period and the one newspaper which survived and succeeded, *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, remained above all else a platform where messages of sciences and social progress circulated. This intellectual project eventually gave way to a different form of journalism, political journalism, which stemmed from a perception that spreading modernity, civility, and progress was not entirely an educational endeavor, but rather a political one. And while it also came from the bosom of missionary education, I will argue next that it was more a reaction to the partial realization of the colonizing nature of the educational institutions and their tool of public dissemination, the educational press.

Chapter V

The journalist spectator: journalism as an independent field

I have examined in the previous chapter how private journalism appeared in Beirut. It was a byproduct of the introduction of new cultural and social capitals into the field of education. These capitals were channeled through European and American missionary educational institutions and the result of this novelty in the realm of education was the rise of a new educated class of professionals. This class was neither part of the peasantry nor was it part of the feudal order that reigned in the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Its function was restricted to serving the demand for a modern workforce in the few positions introduced through the processes of modernization which the rulers of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt embarked on from the early years of the nineteenth century. The nucleus of producers and consumers of the press belonged to this class. It was for some of them the answer to their intellectual curiosity which they developed in the literary and scientific societies that sprung around the missionary educational institutions. It was also a promising outlet where they could transcend the mere status of low-level employees of the state bureaucracy, translators for diplomatic missions, or school teachers. The press presented potential for these individuals to "later become famous", celebrated and recognized by "every civilized person" (as quoted by Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57).

In this chapter, I will analyze the changes that affected the Arabic press after 1870. It was then that political newspapers began to appear in Beirut and Cairo, and I will argue that it was at this point that we can consider that a field of journalism came to exist in the region. The journalists of this second generation, having lost interest in the educational mission of the founders of the private Arabic newspaper, invested the cultural capital they had acquired through modern schooling in an activity which lied outside the boundaries of the field of education: political journalism. The meaning of "political" was almost as new as journalism itself, having been the exclusive field of the ruling elite, the *khassa*. This necessarily meant that political journalism itself was a concept under construction at this period in time. But, it still held for the journalist better prospects for fame and recognition, and the production of news and journalism as

practice evolved in a way as to make cultural capital central to the structuring of a symbolic capital in the field.

This chapter will thus focus on the transformation of cultural capital from an operating capital in the field of education to an initial capital in the field of journalism, where it became the key component of symbolic capital there. This capital, I will argue, became independent by virtue of the social position and dispositions of both the producers and consumers of news. They were all part of the same social class which existed in a state of social exclusion, unwilling to be associated with the common man, the *'amma*, and rejected by the political and social elites, the *khassa*. This condition of marginality greatly affected the possibilities of choices journalists had in the field. It clearly defined their audience, their message, and the practice and ethos prevailing and being shaped in the field at the time. In turn, this will show that the field of journalism during this period existed in a state of almost complete independence, to the extent that it was marginal to society, as it rarely interacted with the surrounding fields in the social space.

I. Political newspapers, a new product

For more than a decade, *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* remained the only newspaper in Beirut and Mount-Lebanon. Its only competitor was the Istanbul based *al-Jawa'ib* which was also available on the Syrian markets. Ayalon (1995: 33) claims that *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* boasted 400 subscribers shortly after its appearance. I came across no numbers for *al-Jawa'ib* during that period. In Cairo, all journalistic endeavors prior to 1875 failed. The only newspaper which survived the early period was still *al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyya*. Even this government paper barely stayed alive, as it was cancelled for a few years. Newspapers had been badly received in Cairo, 'Abbas pasha (r.1848-1854), Muhammad Ali's successor, reportedly considered the reading of newspapers "an increasing disgrace" (Kendall, 2006: 9). The Beiruti paper also remained a one-man institution, with Khalil al-Khuri writing most of its editorials and articles, and very few other people contributing to it until the day he died. The paper was then discontinued by his heirs, showing the extent to which journalism during that time was the activity of individuals (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 58). All this tends to indicate that journalism as a concept and a profession spread very slowly in the region. In his 1913 study on the history of the Arabic press, Filib di

Tarrazi (1913, vol.2: 3) introduced his second volume by claiming that "before 1870, Arab journalism was nothing worth mentioning; but after this date, it expanded and evolved due to the efforts and successes of the men who were involved in it". This section will follow a similar line of argument, examining the new product and its producers, the agents who truly constructed the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo.

A. Identifying the new product

The new form of journalism differed greatly from Beirut's first newspaper. This first clear difference is that the new periodicals began focusing on politics in the narrow sense of the term. Filib di Tarrazi (1913, vol.2: 7) attributed this to the level of freedom the press enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt at the time, discussing and criticizing the administration of the Empire at will. Traditional and popular history in the region tells us that it was at this point in time that censorship drove many of the journalists to Egypt, seeking freedoms which were denied to them in Syria and Beirut (Cioeta, 1979: 179). Evidence, however, shows that even though a censorship office had been established under the law of 1865 dealing with periodicals, stringent restrictions were not imposed on the press in Beirut until 1889. Even then, most incidents of warnings and suspensions seem to have been the result of ignorance of the Arabic language on the part of the Turkish censor, the mektupcu (Cioeta, 1979: 168, 178). It was therefore in an environment of relative freedom of expression that the political press in Beirut came into being (Farah, 2005: 217). Similarly, freedom of opinion was allowed and even encouraged to some extent by Isma'il, especially during the 1877 Crimean War when he permitted newspapers to take sides in the war and reflect on political developments within the Empire, in an effort to curtail the influence of the sultan with whom he was having a hard time ('Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 33-4; Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.3: 5). Freedom, however, is a conducive context rather than a causal one. Thus the reason for why the press took this turn is to be found elsewhere.

Certainly, the big question here is why Salim al-Bustani decided to describe his first newspaper, *al-Janna*, as "political, commercial, and literary". As discussed earlier, the "political" was something foreign to local population in both Beirut and Cairo. It was the realm of the ruler and no one else. Even when *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* transmitted "political news", it always referred to foreign events, while local news were dubbed *hawadith dakhiliyya*, or "internal events" and rarely referred to political events, unless civil servants and officials appointments count as such and which the paper only

mentioned in a matter of fact style. But, as soon as *al-Janna* appeared in 1870, this trend was to shift very quickly. Salim al-Bustani, who was publishing *al-Janna* on Tuesdays and Fridays, created in 1871 another newspaper, *al-Junayna*, a "political and commercial" periodical which appeared on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, practically making him the first Arab to publish a daily (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 22). In 1874, Yusuf ash-Shalafun published *at-Taqaddum*, first described as a "pulbic" newspaper, then a "political, literary, and commercial" newspaper (*at-Taqaddum*, January 14, 1874; January 1, 1881). In 1875, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani published *Thamarat al-Funun*, "a newspaper that contains political, local, commercial, and artistic events" (*Thamarat al-Funun*, June 22, 1875). In 1877, Khalil Sarkis published *Lisan al-Hal*, a "political, commercial, and literary" newspaper (*Lisan al-Hal*, October 18, 1877). Published by Nqula Naqqash, *Al-Misbah*, a "political, commercial, scientific, and literary" newspaper, appeared in 1880 (*al-Misbah*, January 31, 1883). *Al-Ahram* was one of two major newspapers to appear during this period and not describe itself as "political"; in fact, it did not describe itself at all, not even in the introductory editorial of its first issue (*al-Ahram*, August 5, 1876). It would change this trend the very next year when it became headed by "a political, commercial, and literary newspaper". The other newspaper published during this period that did not claim to be political was the weekly *al-Bashir*, a publication in which Jesuit priests sought since 1870 to counter the Protestant heretics and was therefore not concerned with lesser worldly matters such as politics (Ayalon, 1995: 34). Though even *al-Bashir* would later start featuring political news.

But what news did they exactly qualify as "political"? An examination of some of the early issues of these newspapers tells us that the focus was still mainly on European political developments, but that, at the same time, a definition of what constituted the political realm was also developing, and this reflected in some of the articles that appeared during this period. In *al-Ahram*, one issue discussed the problems the Ottoman Empire faced for the past three years, mainly with regards to financial problems, the need for a fairer government, and a free parliament. The editorial was followed by a translation of the editorial of the French paper *Débat*, discussing the politics of governmental appointments in Egypt. The third page contained the "faits divers" from Syria, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Russia, and the United States with news topics ranging from the progress in the construction of the railway in Syria to the amounts of minerals and metals extracted that year in the United States (*al-Ahram*, February 27, 1876). In 1877, with the Turko-Russian war raging, *Lisan al-Hal* was reporting on the Russian attack on

Ottoman troops, troop movements in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, as well as the French elections (*Lisan al-Hal*, October 22, 1877). The next issue updated the readers on the war, using both official sources, as well as other newspapers and news agencies telegraphs to convey the views from the different European capitals and illustrate their positions from the war (*Lisan al-Hal*, October 25, 1877). *At-Taqaddum* (February 12, 1874) reported on the eligibility of voters in the French elections, conscription laws to the Russian army, and epidemics in Hungary. Its "faits divers" were about a woman and her troubles with her husband, rain during that season, and the problems the Lebanese gendarmerie faced because officers would not show up to their posts.

The differences between what each paper considered "political news" might partially explain why *at-Taqaddum* never became a successful newspaper in comparison with *Lisan al-Hal* and *al-Ahram*. It also tells us that the "political" was still being discovered and formulated and as will be discussed later, unfolding political events and crises helped create a demand for political news. This might indicate that there could have been a process of shaping this demand and need for a particular type of product on the part of journalists. But the inconsistency in what was considered to be political might also indicate that the journalists themselves did not particularly know what this type of product was exactly. It was a period when , in contrast with the politics of the palace, public politics, like political journalism, was in a stage of formation in the minds of this class, a point which will become more apparent throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Whatever periodical was not intended to be "political" became a magazine. The truly literary and scientific publications became concentrated in such form, appearing at a slower rate, usually monthly, and with more pages than the usual four-page newspaper which appeared at least once a week. The most important ones that we need to mention here are *al-Jinan*, published by Butrus al-Bustani in 1870 to supplement his son's two newspapers, and *al-Muqtataf*, published in 1876 by three young men, Ya'qub as-Sarruf, Faris Nimr, and Shahin Makarius, who would later emigrate to Egypt and found one of its most influential political newspapers, *al-Muqattam*. It therefore becomes very clear that it was during this period that political journalism came to define the Arabic press, or at least the Arabic newspaper.

B. The second generation of journalists and the breakaway from education

Salim al-Bustani (1848-1884), Salim Taqla (1849-1892), Bishara Taqla (1852-1901), 'Abd al-Qadir Qabbani (1849-1935), Khalil Sarkis (1842-1913), Nqula Naqqash (1825-1894), Muhammad Rashid ad-Dana (1857-1902), Adib Ishaq (1856-1885), and Salim bin 'Abbas ash-Shalafun (1853-1912) constituted this second generation of journalists. Like their predecessors, they shared two very important features. First, they were all graduates of modern schooling. Even Qabbani and ad-Dana, who had both received traditional Islamic schooling as young children, eventually joined the ranks of the National School (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 100, 119). All of these individuals were also trained extensively in different languages, granting them the same privileges and possibilities as the first generation in terms of employment possibilities. Second, they also adhered to the same types of social networks and circles as the previous generation. Butrus al-Bustani was, once again, at the heart of these networks. Indeed, his son and Khalil Sarkis, who was to become his son-in-law in 1873, Taqla, Qabbani, ad-Dana, and ash-Shalafun were all linked to him either through the National School, or through the Syrian Scientific Society. It was therefore logical for all of these young people to know of the press and its theoretical value to society, which had been repeated non-stop on the pages of *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* and in the words of *al-Mu'allim*. "There is no doubt that newspapers are among the most important vehicles in educating the public," Butrus al-Bustani is known to have stated in 1859, while congratulating Khalil al-Khuri on the success of his endeavor (as quoted by Ayalon, 1995: 31). A decade later, he wrote that the role of the newspaper was to "serve truth and serve the interests of the lands" (as quoted by Ghassan Bustrus, 1977: 8).

The major difference between the first and second generation of journalists in Beirut is that the second generation did not dedicate its life to education. Apart from Salim al-Bustani serving as a teacher and vice-principle of the National School for a while and Salim Taqla teaching Arabic in a local religious school for a short while, all the journalists of this period finished their learning and found employment outside of the business and mission of education. Qabbani, Sarkis, and ash-Shalafun worked in printing, Sarkis becoming one of the most successful print masters of his time, his publishing house having put out 650 books by 1914 (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 100, 130, 151; Ayalon, 2008: 566). Naqqash and ad-Dana found jobs in the civil service, the first as an employee at the customs and the second as an employee at the telegraph post (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 123, 120). In a sense, they had gone out and seen the world. Socially, they were no longer restricted to the small number of people who worked in the field of

education. They were now entrepreneurs and civil servants; they were working shoulder to shoulder with what could have been seen then as the "public".

At the same time, this generation was experiencing the same process of modernization as the first generation, except that, by now, Europe had become part and parcel of the political scene in the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman Empire by then had become the "sick man of Europe", a term which European leaders used to justify their political, economic, and also military incursions into Ottoman affairs (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 134). Therefore, modernity was no longer an abstract social and cultural notion to the Ottomans, but it availed itself to them in all its glory under the guise of British, French, and Russian navies and armies. European encroachment also encouraged some of the European provinces of the Empire to rebel, following in the footsteps of the Greeks who had gained their independence with European support in 1832. During the 1860s, most of the provinces of the Balkans were in a state of rebellion. Serbia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Crete had all seen one form or another of rebellion before 1870 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 147-152). It was a period of political struggle both within the Ottoman Empire and without.

In this context of turmoil, demand for political news became a necessity. Newspaper readers could no longer be satisfied with the simple "internal events" section which merely reported short headlines on appointments and meetings. This was definitely the reason Khalil Sarkis gave for the establishment of a newspaper which was "political" in nature; many people had asked him to do so (*Lisan al-Hal*, October 18, 1877). In *Thamarat al-Funun*, the interest in politics became clearer with their articles and editorials. The first page of the newspaper became usually used in its quasi-entirety for long editorials analyzing the political situation, focusing on the major issues of the day, like for example the disturbances in Herzegovina in 1876 (*Thamarat al-Funun*, March 22, 1876; July, 20, 1876; October 12, 1876). Editors were now analyzing events and explaining their significance to their readers. This was in combination with the headlines and telegraphs which they reproduced as *faits divers*. The priority was thus given to the world of politics and political news. All other subjects took a backseat, but the reader could still find other topics being discussed in newspapers, most notably commercial news which included the prices of certain basic commodities like flour, wood, and grains, and sometimes even the stock prices of gold or silk.

It is therefore clear from journalistic production itself that it had broken away from the realm of education. The journalists were no longer educators, the stated aim of the periodicals was no longer to "educate the people" in civility, morality, and progress, and the actual subjects covered on the pages of the political newspapers were no longer educational in nature; they were not matters of general knowledge, sciences, history, language and literature anymore. It is clear that, at this point in time, the individuals who came to be the actors in the field of journalism chose to invest the cultural capital they had acquired from the modern educational system and the social capital which came from their networks around intellectual societies into a different field than the educational one.

II. The formation of the field of journalism

One of the basic foundations of a field is its ability to be autonomous in terms of the capitals that function within it from other surrounding fields. As previously mentioned, cultural and social capitals which were produced within and around modern education were now being invested in an activity which was completely unrelated to education. The education system at this point served nothing more than a support field for journalism. It produced people who could write and it produced people who could read. Of course, this means that, if someone was to embark on a career as journalist, they still needed the cultural capital offered by modern education at least. But the supplier of this type of capital no longer had sway over how it is invested.

A. Cultural capital as the main component of symbolic capital

But this does not mean that cultural capital was no longer the decisive capital in the field of journalism at this point. For even though the subject of the information produced in newspapers changed from educational to political, the type of information provided, as previously shown, still qualified as a cultural product generating cultural capital in its incorporated state, creating durable dispositions since it produced information about the world of political affairs. And as will be discussed next, the "public" recognition of this particular cultural capital, the one produced and displayed by journalists, came to constitute the core of the symbolic capital within the field of journalism. Promoting cultural capital as the main source of recognition was a conscious act on the part of the journalists, but the process was not very straightforward since, as I

argue throughout this chapter, the field of journalism was still being founded and was therefore in a bit of disarray, whether at the level of the ethos in the field, the investment of the recognition and capital generated, and the concept of politics and the public sphere itself.

When Khalil al-Khuri started his endeavor, barely anyone knew of him. In fact, what he guaranteed his readers was the promise of future recognition of him and his colleagues as people worthy of teaching readers (*Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, January 1, 1858). But all the second generation journalists had become people of some repute before they entered into the business of journalism. Salim al-Bustani benefited from the reputation of his father, *al-mu'allim*, and was also a fine intellectual himself. 'Abd al-Qadi Qabbani was recognized by his society, the Society of Arts, as the most capable individual to manage the printing house and newspaper they wanted to establish (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 25). Khalil Sarkis was already famous for owning one of the most successful printing and publishing houses in Beirut (Ayalon, 2008). Nqula Naqqash had been a public figure for more than a decade, having been appointed as member of the administrative council of the vilayet of Damascus, and then serving as a member of the ill-fated *majlis al-mab'uthan*, the Ottoman parliament which was convened from 1876 till 1878, when sultan Abdul-Hamid II became bored with other people giving opinions on how to run things and abolished it along with the constitution (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 13).

It seems that public recognition that these individuals were worth listening to, their opinion worth being read, was a major factor in the success of their newspapers; the other factor being that competition over the supply of political news was almost non-existent yet. The story of the only journalist who went from being an obscure figure into publishing a newspaper tends to corroborate this claim. Muhammad Rashid ad-Dana was a simple employee at the telegraph directorate when he decided to publish his newspaper, encouraged by his brother who was at that time the president of Beirut's Commercial Tribunal. The only subscribers to his papers were the unfortunate merchants of Beirut and its surroundings to whom the paper was sent and who felt compelled by virtue of the position of the editor's brother to subscribe to it; they did not like reading it (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.2: 38). This strongly indicates that the generation of symbolic capital in the field was not simply a matter of displaying cultural capital and producing any type of product. There needed to be an initial pool of resources that the producer must have been endowed with before embarking on a career of journalist, forms of

capital previously earned somewhere else and then invested into the field. Most important during this time was that the producer of news must have been publically recognized elsewhere to be trusted by his readers.

It is important to note that symbolic capital, or the recognition of an individual's cultural capital, quickly became transmissible in the field, and the press became a vehicle through which individuals sought to gain a reputation of possessors of incorporated cultural capital. Many contributors to *Lisan al-Hal*, for example, were not regular editors in the newspaper; they generally remained anonymous when published. Some, however, sought to be named to receive public acknowledgment and make themselves known to the broad public, while not becoming regular contributors so that they do not become committed to the paper ('Abd al-Rahim Ghalib, 1988: 89). The press became a popular vehicle for gaining symbolic capital, especially since the owners and editors of newspaper encouraged this approach. As soon as *Lisan al-Hal* appeared, its owner claimed its second issue that he was inundated with articles by "reputable men of knowledge who are renowned to everyone for their skills and their grace" (*Lisan al-Hal*, October 22, 1877). *At-Taqaddum* addressed its readers with the same vocabulary (April 6, 1885). Even in the first issue of *al-Ahram*, the owners also invited their readers to contribute to the newspaper; they invited "eloquent men of letters to decorate the pages of the newspaper with their magnificent writings and wisdom which readers of good taste will relish" (*al-Ahram*, August 5, 1876). This was in practice a self-fulfilling prophecy. What educated man would not then send his contribution to be published on the pages of the newspaper? At the same time, the paper would gain further repute by featuring the names of prominent men on it pages.

This practice provided mutual recognition of importance, since providing a name for their contributors helped newspapers' owners demonstrate to their public how wide and educated their readership is. It also endowed their articles with credence, or at least allowed them to relegate the responsibility of opinions onto their contributor. In fact, *Lisan al-Hal* had a policy of only reproducing the articles they were sent by people who had signed their work, because "knowing who sent the article was knowing half his intent from having it published" (*Lisan al-Hal*, January 31, 1888). They made one exception at one point when the editor read an unsigned letter by mistake and realized that the person who sent it really meant to benefit the readers with what he had to say. In Egypt,

this category of contributors was labeled, *musahif*, which could literally translate to "associate journalist" ('Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 99).

Symbolic capital was also generated by some of the practices of journalists. By reproducing articles featured in European newspapers, newspapers were exhibiting "a degree of pride and boasting of the translator's knowledge of foreign languages" ('Abd ar-Rahim Ghalib, 1988: 102). While some historians have dismissed the reproduction of these articles as a mere necessity because of the inaccessibility to the news due to the lack of a proper communication infrastructure or the high cost of employing news agencies like Reuters and Havas, the practice of reproducing foreign articles persisted well into the interwar period, even when such costs no longer constituted a financial or technical burden on newspaper editors (Tohme, 2012).[6] There was indeed a clinging to the publication of translated articles, essays, opinion pieces, etc. After all, let us not forget the opening statements of the first Arabic newspaper in Beirut and its promise to feature European articles translated by the most capable of men! This is a prime example of cultural capital on display.

Symbolic capital, in the form of recognized cultural capital, quickly became the major capital operating in what can now be certainly called the field of journalism. It was generated by the production and consumption of the news and analyses. It was also regulated to a large extent by the newspapers themselves. In the same way as they could bestow symbolic capital and recognition on an individual, they could as easily take away such capital. One of the recurring elements in all the newspapers of the time was to threaten to expose the names of individuals who subscribed to the newspaper but would neglect to pay the subscription fees. Qabbani threatened to do so on the pages of *Thamarat al-Funun*, asking those who did not pay what would future generations think about them when they discover that they used to practically steal newspapers (*Thamarat al-Funun*, October 12, 1876). This meant that such an act would constitute a shaming for the individual whose name was to appear there. Again, this was because such prestige was generated by the image of social superiority that came with reading the newspaper, an image which was consciously promoted on the pages of these same newspapers that

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[6] This practice remained a major reason why many news were distorted before they reached the audience. In the particular paper I am citing here, I examined how the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war were represented in the Lebanese press. The result was that much of the pre-WWI practices persisted after the war, most notably the translation and reproduction of articles featured in European newspapers at a time when Lebanese paper had already gained access to news agencies.

continuously praised their readers for their fine taste and greater intellect. Now imagine what might happen if these same newspapers were to say that you were a thief. Prestige, same as shaming, was recognized as a process of social recognition that was primordial to the class journalists and their readers belonged to.

B. A field of competition over symbolic capital

Most of the literature focuses on how, during this period, competition for an audience between newspapers, and subsequently the income needed to survive, increased. The argument is that sales were needed to fund the journalistic endeavor, and increased competition necessarily shrunk demand (Ayalon, 1995: 194-5). Some papers even had to close down because they could not compete on the market. This was for example the case of *at-Taqaddum*, *Bayrut*, and *al-Bayan* (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 23, 38; Vol.3: 24-5). But, according to di Tarrazi, these papers went bankrupt because they could not attract a readership due to their boring style rather than because of increased competition. There was also the countless demands for subscribers to pay their subscriptions on the pages of all newspapers, which tends to indicate that, apparently, owners actively sought financial income.

The same sources, however, also provide ample evidence to counter the argument that economic capital was at this point a determining capital within the field of journalism. In fact, most of the journals already mentioned in this chapter were either owned by well-to-do individuals who could afford the costs of publishing, or were financially sponsored and therefore did not have to rely on sales and subscriptions for survival. As was mentioned before, *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* was established with the financial support of the merchant Mikha'il Mudawwar (Zachs, 2012: 163). It also received at one point the support of the government, which prompted Ayalon (1992: 269) to pass the erroneous and ahistorical judgment that it turned the paper into a mouthpiece for the government, since he assumed with no historical basis that the owner wished to produce different opinions but exercised self-criticism for financial reasons, as previously discussed. Khalil Sarkis, the founder of *Lisan al-Hal* had also become a wealthy entrepreneur with a large printing and publishing business (Ayalon, 2008). He even supported his father-in-law and brother-in-law, Butrus and Salim al-Bustani, in their journalistic endeavor when he began printing their newspapers at his printing press, and managed distribution and accounting as well (Ayalon, 2008: 565). This evidence of the persistence of social capital as a determinant in the field of journalism was greatly

publicized on the pages of al-Bustani's *al-Janna* (October 30, 1881). Even when he wanted to feature a story about the expenses newspapers incurred, Khalil Sarkis had to search at the far end of Europe to find the tale of a newspaper's owner who went bankrupt because of his career as a journalist; he could not, apparently, find someone closer to home (*Lisan al-Hal*, October 20, 1888). One of the arguments for why *al-Ahram* managed to maintain a free position in politics, siding with whomever the editors and owners felt deserved their support, was that its publishers were wealthy enough not to barter their intellectual integrity for money (Kitchen, 1950: 160). *Thamarat al-Funun* was also founded with enough capital to ensure its survival. It was the fist Arabic newspaper to have been formed as a joint-stock venture, where all members of the Society of Arts financially contributed to its creation and ownership (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 25).

There is also some anecdotal evidence that economic capital was also not very sought after among some journalists, which eventually led to the rise of a popular belief that the journalist was, by definition, a poor destitute. First, it was apparently public knowledge that becoming a journalist and establishing a newspaper was not an expensive endeavor. A prominent contemporary journalist and intellectual, Jurji Zaydan, claimed that all it took for someone to establish their paper was their thought and a paper and that "rarely would a person be unable to afford it" (as quoted by Ayalon, 1995: 195). This affiliation with poverty and the lack of resources was so prevalent that, even in 1923, at a time when more than a couple of newspapers had become media tycoons, we hear the story of a journalist who tried to rent an apartment in Cairo, but being refused on the ground that a journalist could not possibly afford to pay rent (Ayalon, 1995: 221). All this indicates clearly that financial capital was neither essential, nor determining in the field of journalism before World War I. In fact, as one contemporary journalist put it, "the Arab press does not pay its reporters a salary [...] therefore, the writers of the Arab-Syrian newspapers are only those who wish to become famous as writers" (as quoted by Tauber, 1990: 173).

The obvious question here is why then did newspaper owners kept pressuring their subscribers for their annual fees and publicizing it? This question can only be answered through conjecture, as there seems to be no particular evidence that lays out a direct and clear answer. First, these people were in the process of constructing a profession, that of the journalist. This profession was supposed to represent a career for these individuals and, by definition, this entailed that their labor must be paid for, even if

just as a matter of principle. This explanation falls under the broader argument of this chapter that the field of journalism during this period was a field under construction. Part of this construction also affected how the actors within the field saw themselves and, more importantly, what image of themselves as actors within the field they projected, in this case the image of a professional who took up journalism as a career.

Another explanation for this could be that these demands were another form of publicity for themselves and their brands, the names of their newspapers. This practice was one way in which the editor could point out that his newspaper enjoyed a large audience, by stressing out the numbers of people who did not yet pay their subscriptions, indicating that his paper was in demand. This demand was the basis of their prestige after all. The messages addressed to the subscribers who were late in their payments often included some indicators that support this point. The most noticeable would be the insistence to enumerate the many corners of the empire where subscribers did not pay their fees. *Thamarat al-Funun* (September 21, 1875) mentioned that its subscribers in Beirut, Tripoli, Lebanon, and Acres had paid the newspaper's price while those in Damascus and Egypt were still dragging. *At-Taqaddum* (February 14, 1881) mentioned subscriptions not being paid in Alexandria and other corners of the Empire. *Al-Misbah* (February 23, 1882) mentioned Port Said. Such practice definitely showed the readers of the newspaper that they belonged to a widespread audience and that, as a result, the particular newspaper was prestigious and valuable enough to be read in the four corners of the Empire. This also implies that economic capital itself might not have been the goal of such practices, but rather the image of success it generated as it denoted widespread circulation of the periodical. In that sense, economic capital might have had a small constitutive role in the symbolic capital of the field, but that role had less to do with the financial aspect of that capital than with it being characteristic of levels of circulation and therefore public approval and recognition of the value of the newspaper.

The argument here is that competition in the field was over the recognition of the cultural capital the journalist displayed, i.e. symbolic capital, as shown on the pages of the newspapers themselves and the opinions and behaviors of their editors and owners. There were early signs that symbolic capital, inasmuch as it denotes social recognition of the cultural capital of the journalist, was at the heart of the journalistic endeavor and that, sooner or later, it was to become the dominant capital in the field of Arabic journalism in the Middle East. I have previously mentioned one newspaper which

appeared in Istanbul prior to 1858, *Mir'at al-Ahwal*, published by Rizqallah Hassun. When his paper was closed down and him sentenced to death, he escaped Istanbul with the consolation that he became "more famous than fire on a banner; everyone knows about [him]" (as quoted in Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 55). Fame and recognition were clearly very high on his agenda. Shortly after this, with the establishment of *al-Jawa'ib* in Istanbul, it apparently became the trend for the editor of *al-Jawa'ib*, Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, to resort in his literary debates with other periodicals and intellectuals to foul language and outright personal attacks when he did not have the necessary evidence to prove his point, which according to di Tarrazi (1913, vol.1: 62), happened quite often. This was generally perceived to be a tactic or an argumentative method in these debates which involved some of the major literary and intellectual figures of this period, like Nasif al-Yaziji, Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Butrus al-Bustani, and Adib Ishaq (Karam). But all these debates fell under one objective which as-Shidyaq aimed for, fame and honor. When he could not display his superiority intellectually, he denigrated his opponents to reduce their status by trying to deprive them of their ability to exhibit their cultural capital; theirs was supposedly not worth recognizing. All inconsistencies which plagued his life and thought were geared toward this purpose; he would change faiths based on who recognized his superiority and paid him accordingly, changing masters as he climbed the social ladder, and his ideas were often contradictory and inconsistent, especially when compared to his lifestyle and social behavior. Karam concluded his encyclopedic entry on the man by claiming:

> In the religious sphere no faith satisfied him, and he remained a skeptic, a cynic, a realist, a materialist in search of honors and pleasures. Yet, he rebelled, and, though joining the pan-Islamic movement, extolled the principles of the French Revolution. In revolt against feudalism and all forms of slavery, a supporter of the equality of man and the emancipation of women, a political and a social critic, yet he lived and wrote in accordance with the behests of the Sultan or the Khedive.

In what can be conceived as a very important case of contemporary acknowledgement of the mechanics of fame and recognition in the field of journalism, as well as an act of position taking within this field, it must be mentioned that *Thamarat al-Funun* refused to ever address *al-Jawa'ib* because its owner considered Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq to be ethically inferior due to his use of demeaning vocabulary, as well as intellectually inferior as shown by his petty and banal arguments (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 26). This riposte to Shidyaq denied his strategy and secured for Qabbani the moral high ground, as his

move would have been recognized by his audience as an act of integrity, not stooping to the level of his opponent.

This would have been recognized by the audience because, from the early days of Arabic journalism, the values that a journalist ought to have exhibited were morality and civility, values that Khalil al-Khuri had established as the foundation of his endeavor back in 1858 and which remained his code of conduct for as long as he was the main journalistic figure in Beirut. These values had apparently become entrenched in journalistic practice in the Arab world, to the extent that even in 1913, when Filib di Tarrazi was compiling his encyclopedic work on the history of the Arabic press, he judged Shidyaq based on the barbaric and demeaning behavior he displayed on the pages of his newspaper. It therefore seems that the actors within the field of journalism were also accepting a set of habits and attitudes which came to define the distinctive character of the journalist; they were also incorporating them into their behavior in the way they dealt with each other and the way they publically framed their personal image. Naturally, adhering to this particular behavioral framework also meant further recognition for the journalist who behaved "as he should", as exemplified by the case of Shidyaq and Qabbani. Shidyaq's improper behavior, which was partially caused by the fact that his own context and environment were entirely different in Istanbul, earned him scorn in the rest of the Arab world, while Qabbani's *Thamarat al-Funun* had always been considered an important and respected newspaper. Adhering to the established ethos was therefore also a way to earn or lose recognition, and this would then clearly explain the strategy Qabbani adopted while facing Shidyaq.

It seems clear then, that even during the early phase of journalism, individuals embarking on a career as journalists saw the potential of gaining recognition and fame through the new medium. The trend of exhibiting ones' own moral superiority and denouncing his competitors' lack of values only intensified when journalism turned political during the 1870s, and the struggle for symbolic capital became more vehement. This became a major tool and strategy for acquiring recognition while depriving the opponent of his. In one of the first direct attacks I managed to come across, the editor of *Thamarat al-Funun* attacked the Paris based newspaper *as-Sada* which featured an article promoting fanaticism against Christians within the empire. He described *as-Sada* as an ugly newspaper and its editor as impolite, vulgar, petty, fanatical, and vain, calling for the owner to fire him (*Thamarat al-Funun*, October 13, 1876). One year later, the

same paper dedicated its whole front page to attack *al-Ahram*. Nothing that paper did, according to Qabbani, proved that it was loyal to the nation, even though it was an Arab newspaper. Unlike *Thamarat al-Funun*, it was producing false accounts about the news of the Russo-Turkish war, claiming the Ottomans were losing ground, therefore neglecting its duties to fact check its information. Qabbani ended his tirade by calling for the paper to be punished for its bad behavior (*Thamarat al-Funun*, October 25, 1877). Even though Qabbani was in the wrong, his article was more about producing a bad image of *al-Ahram* rather than anything else.

Playing the game of publicity and counter-publicity to gain public recognition, and therefore symbolic capital, became a widespread practice. *At-Taqaddum* (April 12, 1882) targeted in one of its articles *at-Ta'if*, *al-Waqa'i'*, and *al-Mufid*. It continued its attacks in the following issues, focusing on *al-Mufid* which "did not know of politeness neither in essence nor in form" (*at-Taqaddum*, April 20, 1882). In the same issue, the editor publicized a new magazine published by two of his friends, "the righteous and most skilled, most amazing and fluent author and poet, shaykh Kahlil al-Yaziji [...] and its noble energetic owner, Amin effendi Nasif". It was a game of public image, and every journalist wanted to improve his own and his friends' image by showing their qualities and worth, as well as to diminish his competitors'. It seems that the rules of the game were forming around the public image of the journalist, and it is not surprising to see that the focus was on the individual because the newspaper, all the way up to World War I, remained the endeavor of individuals; except in the cases of *al-Ahram* and *Lisan al-Hal*, rarely any of them institutionalized.

C. The consumers of news. Who were the journalists addressing?

Bourdieu's idea of a "symbolic capital" relies heavily on the parameter of the consumption of the production within a field, especially when the field is outward, rather than inward looking, a point which is stressed in the difference between *champ de grande production* and *champ de production restreinte*. In the political field, and here Bourdieu considered the political journalist a politician proper, reverting to the inside of the political body negates the very basis of the external outlook of the field which aims to control the largest share of the general public (Bourdieu, 1981: 15). At this point, I am not considering the political journalist as politician yet, but this does not contradict the implications of Bourdieu's point that, as soon as it became "political", the Arabic press began to necessarily target a wider audience. The aim of this section is to examine to

what extent this was true in practice, as the success of the initial phase of the political press relied heavily on this component.

In his chapter on readership, Ayalon (1995: 138) began with a very interesting comment: "Arabic-speaking society, naturally, was interested in news. But the nature of the news that was demanded, and the methods used to communicate it, differed from the norms in the society that had first produced the press - Europe - and as such had a crucial bearing on the assimilation of the press in society". He went on to argue that, even though the literate class was very restricted in numbers and that newspaper circulation was even less great, the reach of newspapers far exceeded the amount of copies sold, focusing on some very scant evidence that points out to some practices of public reading and distribution of a single issue among many individuals (Ayalon, 1995: 141-2, 156-8). It is undeniable that there is some level of truth to these observations which are generally shared by other historians and in popular memory alike. But it is equally undeniable that they hide a more prevalent role for the structure of the relationship between newspaper publishing and readership, production and consumption of the news.

One of the obvious realizations that we must start with is that readership was restricted to educated males who possessed more than the basic reading requirement levels, which entails that they must have received some level of education which went beyond the traditional village or religious education. They must have also had at least a minimum level of financial ease, not only as means to purchase a newspaper; they must also have had the time to spend reading it, suggesting the availability of the "leisure" of free time to pursue such interests. In 1870s and 1880s Beirut and Cairo, such characteristics pointed to a relatively small group of individuals which had been previously discussed in this chapter: the merchants, professionals, teachers, and civil servants, all of which belonged to the modernizing sectors of society, the modern capitalist economy, modern education, or modern bureaucracy. In other terms, they were, as individuals, situated in the same position in the social space as the journalists and newspaper owners themselves. They belonged to the same class as them.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, this is to be expected. Bourdieu (1985: 738) described this as "homology" between the producers and consumers of opinion, the self-identification of the individuals within these two groups with each other based on closeness in the social space. They would share similar backgrounds, experiences,

dispositions, and inclinations and are therefore expected to most probably make similar choices. The big issue here becomes obvious. All of society needed news in one form or another, but newspapers were a particular form of production and dissemination of news which served a particular class within society. It is therefore problematic to look at the whole of society as a consumer of journalistic news, an issue which dwells at the heart of the role of the press in society during those years.

Part of the answer lies in understanding the newspaper as a medium competing with other mediums for the dissemination of news. From that perspective, Ayalon (1992: 264) claimed that the local population traditionally sought its information in the mosque or in the marketplace. The physical place has to be considered here a medium rather than a location. While communication there took the form of face-to-face contact, the location was recognized as the place where such contact would take place. Friday prayer, the Sunday market, and the Sunday sermon were all socially recognized instances where people traditionally sought to gain relevant information. In that sense, the mosque, the market, or the church fulfilled the same function as the newspaper and were therefore competitors as communicative tools. This further builds on the previously advanced claim that the press was born out of a dissonant social transformation which pitted modernity versus traditionalism. Examining the social response to the press tends to reinforce this argument.

Indeed, starting from Raymond's argument (2000: 318) that the "new" Cairo could not be reconciled with the "old" Cairo, and transposing this geographical locative comment onto the claims made in the previous paragraph, it becomes reasonable to suggest that the social ramifications of such a divide between "old" and "new", traditional and modern, transcended geography and materialized socially, notably in the field of consumption of news. First, while newspapers were produced and sold in urban areas, the great majority of the population was still rural. But even in urban areas, the practice of publically reading newspapers, which Ayalon and others mention, took place in the "new" parts of town. It took place and became a salient feature of modern establishments called coffee shops, where men would meet to talk, play cards, discuss politics, and, most importantly, enjoy their coffee while reading the papers (Depaul, 2007: 257).

Coffee shops were part of the novelties of modernity which created a backlash in the more traditional circles. It was reported that a religious state official thought that

"God rendered the buying of journals and subscribing to them reprehensible [...]for, as the holy hadith of al-Bukhari says, "you should avoid gossip, waste of money, and asking too many questions." Journals combine all three evils" (as quoted by Ayalon, 1992: 264). The common man, who remained outside of the impact and sphere of modernization and modernity, still went to the mosque, the church, and the marketplace for information. Also, during this period, this same common man, it must be noted, had no place nor interest in the realm of "politics", of opinions in the administration of government and subjects.

Furthermore, the language of newspapers, irrespective of literacy, or lack of, was foreign to many within the potential audience. In Arabic, written and grammatically proper language (*fusha*) is different from the everyday spoken colloquial Arabic, both in Beirut and Cairo, each with its different vernacular dialect. And while most sources do not make this distinction, Fahmy (2010: 84-6) rightfully argued that the language of the political newspapers could not have possibly reached a broad popular basis. Even when we consider that many would be very familiar with the correct Arabic of the Quran, the style of the newspapers was less poetic and did not come with the margin notes and explanations that would render the text comprehensible to those who were unfamiliar with the more nuanced shape and form of the *fusha*.

The alienation of the journalistic field altogether within the social space did not only come because it could not relate to the masses who, because of their exclusion from the modernizing process more than anything else, remained strictly confined to the sphere of the traditional, be it educationally or in terms of public communication. Rejection also came from above, from the state and the feudal elites. In the first generation of journalists, only Khalil al-Khuri managed to be "accepted" within the Ottoman state bureaucracy, but he remained for all practical purposes a mid-level civil servant, the head of a small bureau of censorship. The only notable exception was Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, but it could be argued that he was part of the state machinery even before he established *al-Jawa'ib*; the sultan actually asked him to create the newspaper and it operated for most of its existence as a semi-official organ.

The attempts of other journalists during this period to integrate the field of politics, whenever such attempts took place, failed. Nqula Naqqash even tried his luck in politics before his career as a journalist began; he was elected to the *majlis al-mab'uthayn*, the Ottoman parliament of 1877, which was unceremoniously dissolved by

the sultan eleven months after its founding. It was inconceivable that a parliament could exist in parallel with the figure of the absolute monarch Abdul Hamid II aspired to be (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 123; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 187). There was no real room for this new emerging class within the political structure of the Empire. The best they could aspire to was to become civil servants, which is what 'Abd al-Qadir Qabbani chose to be in parallel with publishing *Thamarat al-Funun*. He became president of the municipal council of Beirut in 1898 and the head of the education office in Beirut until he was dismissed in 1908 (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 100-1). The titles he held are a little misleading, as both offices involved little more than administrative and bureaucratic duties, and had no political or policy-making impact whatsoever.

Journalists were also socially rejected by the feudal strata. In one very famous incident which was to take place in 1904, 'Ali Yusuf, one of the most prominent journalists of the time, the owner of *al-Mu'ayyad*, Cairo's most successful newspaper then, and a close friend of the Khedive, married a young girl from the aristocratic Sadat family. Her father convinced the Islamic court to annul the marriage because the profession of Yusuf, a journalist, was a "dishonorable occupation, and those engaged in it were unworthy of marrying into a sharifi family" (as quoted by Ayalon, 1992: 266; 1995: 164). The court ruling was apparently supported by a large segment of the population who saw in it a victory for society's moral virtues (Ayalon, 1995: 164).

Furthermore, in the equation which pits journalists and their audiences, it seems that it is falsely assumed in the literature that "journalists in the Middle East [...] viewed their role as responding to popular needs and expectations" (Ayalon, 1995: 159). In fact, and as was discussed before, journalism was born out of a mission to impose a particular agenda on the readership, to inculcate it with a particular worldview and civilizational message, or, in more benign terms, to educate the readership. And when it turned political, despite some of the claims we see on the pages of newspapers, the press never saw itself in practice as responding to a particular expectation; in fact, "popular" needs could not have been farthest from journalists' minds. The Arabic press during this period completely rejected the "people", or more precisely the "common people", as a class which was unworthy of the civilizational mission embedded in journalism.

None proclaimed this rejection better than Jurji Zaydan, one of the most renowned Arab journalists, who spent his life between Beirut and Cairo and published one of the most famous and enduring scientific magazines, *al-Hilal*. In analyzing an

incident that took place in Beirut and saw violence erupt in some of the city's shady quarters, Zaydan, quoting local newspapers concluded that the blame was to be placed on the "riff raff conspiring against each other", and because these lowlifes listened to some irresponsible notables who "set their brains on fire with the sciences" (as quoted by Hanssen, 2005: 207). Not only were common people riff raff, but they were also unworthy of receiving the teaching of sciences, a point which he shared with other newspapers' editors. This went in line with his autobiographical analysis in which he divided Arab society into three parts: the elite, *khassa*, which comprised wealthy individuals and state officials; the educated class which came to be after 1860 and "maintained ideas and dress codes which 'the common people considered a sinful breach with tradition'"; and the common people themselves, the *'amma*, "the riff raff, the artisans, all the other people with menial occupations, and the small merchant" who were "immoral crooks" and "idle vagrants", drunks, and uneducated (as quoted by Hanssen, 2005: 16).

Not only do Zaydan's comments reveal the disdain most journalists during this period felt toward the common man, but they perfectly exemplify the alienation of the journalist and most of the educated class. They could not adhere to the "upper class", which at this point still represented people involved with the state and the ruling caste, nor could they belong to the common people, whom for the greater majority were still peasants operating in a predominantly rural society. This was the same alienation that led many of them to go into journalism to begin with, as discussed previously in this chapter. And as will be discussed later, this feeling of alienation and rejection of the common people remained a salient feature of many journalists' behaviors and writings.

Even at a time when many editorials and articles read "advice on the agriculture", it is highly inconceivable that they were in fact addressing the peasant himself; how could they when he could not read, nor could he afford the price of a newspaper! It is also equally doubtful that editors and owners did not recognize this fact. It is also highly unlikely that the theory that the spread of the message in the press reached higher numbers of people than circulation numbers indicate included peasants and even many of the disenfranchised segments of the urban populations, considering the unlikelihood of the scenario in which an educated person who could afford a newspaper would buy it and then make the trip all the way to some village in the vicinity of Beirut or Cairo to read it to peasants who have nothing better to do than to sit there and listen to the news of

people who probably interested them not one bit. In parallel, we must not forget that it was the stated aim of the editors of newspapers to provide reading material for the "readers of good taste" (*al-Ahram*, August 5, 1876) and "reputable men of knowledge" (*Lisan al-Hal*, October 22, 1877). Recognition and symbolic capital did not, in their mind, simply come from anywhere and anyone. It was to be generated by the learned class, those who could socially and culturally identify the worth of a newspaper.

The only exception to this rule seems to have come from *al-Ahram*. It is reported that the Taqla brothers chose to adopt a simple writing style in their editorials, a style which was more easily accessible to a broader audience. In fact, they introduced the art of "news reporting", telling a story in a concise simple manner, as a writing style in their articles, in an effort of reflection on their part on the interests, demands, and abilities of their intended readership (Mahmud Adham, 1985: 14-15). This alone might explain the immediate success this newspaper enjoyed. The Taqlas also distinguished themselves with the complete opposite reaction to the common people than other journalists. *Al-Ahram* was actually the first to introduce the term *ash-sha'b*, the people, with its political connotation into the mainstream Arabic language (Zolondek, 1965: 13-14). This was different from some of the terms previously used like *al-khalq*, the creations, *ar-ra'aya*, the subjects, *al-'amma*, the public, or *al-jumhur*, the crowds, which entail a connotation of aimlessness and sometimes dependency on something greater, whether god or ruler (Zolondek, 1965: 8). The People for the Taqlas had become a conscious entity with rights and opinions, opinions which *al-Ahram* thought will have to eventually weigh more on the government, no matter how despotic it is (Zolondek, 1969: 190). Actually, the only criticism which they advanced against this point was that, in a state where education was lacking, more democracy could be detrimental, not because the people were to blame, but because others might try to take advantage of that, fearing especially Europe, by then obviously the greatest threat (Zolondek, 1969: 194). Furthermore, the Taqla brothers, unlike most of their contemporaries, were very critical of the new educated middle class and its blind adoption in form of all that was European. They saw them as nothing but emulations of the foreigners only in haughtiness and prodigality, refusing to adopt the essence of European superiority, rather sticking to the form, the visible (Zolondek, 1969: 191).

One explanation for this distinctive approach to journalism might be that, unlike all the other journalists discussed so far, the Taqlas were more influenced by the French

rather than the Protestants. Having come from a similar social background to the rest, the Taqlas professed a more profound attachment to the ideas and ideals of the French Revolution, which placed more emphasis on the people and their equality than Protestant bourgeois liberalism which Max Weber so aptly described in *the Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism*. The French also recognized this affection and returned it by protecting the Taqlas and their newspaper from political persecution, especially when they antagonized Khedive Isma'il. This distinction, however, did not seem to generate struggle within the field. This could partly be because the field had not yet fully formed at this period in time, and the internal mechanisms of struggle, the rules of the game, had not yet become clear. But it can also be explained by *al-Ahram*'s pioneering, especially since it was the first Arabic newspaper to use the services of news agencies such as Reuters and Havas, which prompted all other local papers to copy its articles, making *al-Ahram* their own source of information and news ('Abd ar-Rahim Ghalib, 1988: 90-1; Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1951: 77; Ayalon, 1995: 43).

I will return to these comments more in details later, but at this point, I must reiterate that the field of journalism during the early stages when it turned political remained a very introverted field in the social space. This means that, even though it was outward looking, as previously argued, it continued to be socially restricted both in terms of producers and consumers to a close position in the social space; they emanated from the same social class, responded to its wants and needs, communicating with it, and only with it. This was because of an act of mutual rejection between this class and other social classes positioned elsewhere in the social space. They were rejected by their betters and their inferiors, and they equally rejected both their betters and their inferiors.

III. The autonomous field of journalism

In this chapter, it was established that, as soon as it turned "political", the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo gained its autonomy from the field of education to which it was previously very intimately attached. More than anything else, this autonomy changed the outlook of journalists who were no longer willing to play the role of educators, spreading the same type of knowledge that was produced within the institutions of modern education. The interests of the second generation journalists differed greatly from the founders of Arab journalism. Their aims were no longer to

educate the public, but to discuss the developments within the Empire and the affairs of other states as well. Arab journalists had "discovered" the political realm. The biggest problem they faced at this point was that the political realm was completely barred to them. In an empire experiencing increased absolutism, there was little room for a new rising class to integrate the political field, where the social position and capitals required to maneuver or even penetrate into completely excluded the entire social class journalists belonged to, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Political journalism equally did not resonate with the broader public, a public deeply entrenched in a traditional society which could not be reconciled with the modernist project and spirit to which the educated professional class belonged. This estrangement was not necessarily civilizational in nature, even though journalists saw it as such. But, simply put, political journalism offered a commodity which the broader public had no use for. If the political field did not accommodate the educated, it certainly did not have room for the masses. The masses themselves saw no benefit from dwelling on the political and were therefore simply uninterested in political journalism.

The result of this alienation was that the new educated professional social class became the producer, as well as the consumer of political journalism. This could not have materialized better than with the request of journalists from their readers to contribute to their newspapers, thus becoming producers of the commodity themselves. At the same time, it was only this class which generated the recognition journalists sought in their endeavor. Only educated men could recognize the worth of any newspaper, since only educated men could contribute to it. It was an act of mutual recognition between the producers and the consumers of political news, who often happened to be the same group of individuals, in a sense blurring the lines between *champ de production restreinte* and *champ de grande production*. This was mainly because of the inability of the journalists to break away from their own field and their own social position. There was no way they could escape the confines and the limits imposed on them by other social fields, and those they also imposed on themselves. The field of journalism at this point was truly autonomous, maybe even more literally than the way Bourdieu intended when he described a field as such. It was in that sense independent, clearly limited in the social space, not interacting with any other social field around it.

Having said that, it becomes quite apparent that this model of journalism does not fall within the traditional paradigm of media behavior. It was neither liberal as a

popular representative tool, nor did it intend to, or was expected to play this role. In other words, it escaped the liberal paradigm both at the level of *grande production* and *production restreinte*. In terms of representation achieved at the level of *grande production*, it clearly rejected the "mystery of ministry" Bourdieu (1985: 740) wrote about, as journalists consciously refused to represent "people", speak in their name, or even address them. This is primarily why I rejected the idea that the political journalist at this point was a politician, as Bourdieu suggested. The rules of the game of the field of politics did not allow for the inclusion of both the journalist and the public, irrespective of how this public can be defined. The journalist thus did not seek to represent anyone simply because this representation would not grant him anything. There was no capital to be generated by it. As a matter of fact, the journalist did not even seek to represent the social class he was part of. Instead of speaking in the name of this class, the "mystery of ministry", the journalist's main strategy was to invite individuals from this class to speak for themselves. While some might argue that this by itself represents a liberal or democratic bent in the behavior of the Arabic press, they would be completely disregarding the conscious rejection of the common people by and in this press. Not only did journalists refuse to represent the common people, but they equally rejected the right of these people to have access to the public realm. They considered them unworthy of it, or at least of the modern aspects of it. At the same time, this explanation is by itself a rejection of the critical approach and its elite-driven argument, since the journalist at this point was in no way part of the dominant political class, nor did he have the potential to become so. This means that it could not be argued that the media at this point in time served the "powerful", nor that it was driving public opinion because there existed no such things as "public", "opinion", or "public opinion". Similarly, if one would argue that the very framing of the news and news analysis was an act of crafting a particular vision of reality, the fact that news analysis was consumed by actors from the same class as the producers of these analyses reveals a homology which indicates that these analyses would most probably have in any case been shared by the consumers and producers. This indicates that both liberal and critical arguments are not explanatory of the evolution of the field of journalism in its early stages.

On a more normative level, the Arabic press never intended during this stage to profess any "liberal" tendencies. In fact, the ethos within the field was one of conservatism and conformity. As we have seen in this chapter, the values of civility and morality often entailed the connotation of acceptance of the social and political status

quo. Liberal values were, as a result, never part of journalism's platform and raison d'être, nor was it part of the journalist's thinking process. The liberal normative imposition of a particular set of values on the supposed role of media did not even cross the minds of journalists during this period. Even when they advanced a "modern" and "civilizational" agenda, it functioned as an exclusionary tool according to which they could impose a social triage and draw the lines between them, the educated, and the others, mainly uneducated traditional people. This is not to say that they were creating a group identity, but they were rather delineating the field and those who belonged to it, and therefore those who could bestow recognition in it. It was simply a way of designating whose opinions matter and whose do not, who has the right to generate and grant symbolic capital. From this perspective, the traditionally acknowledged normative function of the media cannot stand. The field of journalism was supposed to generate symbolic capital, a recognition of the producers within it, and completely rejected the representative function which the liberal paradigm assumes is the role of the press.

It could even be argued that because of the alienation and exclusion of the producers and consumers of journalism, and the extent to which the field was autonomous, that journalism during its foundational stage was in fact completely independent of the public sphere as traditionally understood in the literature, even though it was seemingly a public endeavor. For many reasons, it is unclear to what extent we can say that it was "journalism for the sake of journalism", in the same way that we say "art for the sake of art". Journalistic production was not restricted to the producers themselves, as is the case with art, even though it was restricted to their class. This is because it did not produce an internal marginality where the rules of the game of the field were challenged, maybe because such rules had not been formulated clearly yet. The struggle within the field was one for recognition by both producers and consumers; it was a struggle over the recognition of the one capital that mattered then, cultural capital. The mere fact that there was no transmission of this capital unto other fields and that there was no interaction or even spillage from or into other social fields could indicate that there was simply no role at the time for the press in the social space, other than constructing itself as a field in its most rudimentary form.

Chapter VI

The journalist revolutionary: the opening-up of the field of politics

This chapter is a historical and sociological reconstruction of the field of politics in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt during a crucial period ranging from 1876 till 1882. During these short years, the field of politics underwent drastic changes that eventually led to its opening up to new actors and the major events that took place then illustrate these changes perfectly. This short period witnessed the deposition and installment of two sultans and a khedive, a people-backed military revolution, and the occupation of Egypt by Britain. In form, these events were not entirely out of the ordinary, since the use of physical violence as a means of governing or making political gains is quite a regular occurrence in the history of empires. Dynasty change, loss of land, and military uprisings, were quite the norm in the history of the Middle East in general, and Islamic and Turkic empires in particular. In fact, they were so common that they inspired the first ever philosophy of history found in Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddima*, in which he argued that history was in fact cyclical with one tribe rising up to become an empire, only to fall in the face of the next tribe to possess stronger *'asabiyya*, or social cohesion and esprit de corps (Ibn Khaldun, 1967: 94-108).

These changes, however, were not only changes in form. They brought along changes in the political and social order, which will be examined in the rest of this chapter. To do so, I will examine who the actors and would-be actors in the field were. What were the forms of capital needed to integrate the field, challenge the dominant classes in it, or change its rules? And, most importantly, how was political participation legitimized socially and in the eyes of the actors themselves. The last point becomes increasingly important when we contextualize the attempt of journalists to integrate into the field of politics. The first such attempt took place in Egypt during this period when journalists, for the first time, decided to use their public voices to advance a political project, and a revolutionary one at that. This chapter will conclude on an examination of this episode to show how journalism tried to play a new role, challenging the established political order, and how the habitus of the Arab journalist also evolved accordingly.

It is important to note that this chapter will not present the reader with a comprehensive examination of the political field, as it only seeks to address relations and

changes in the field which had a direct impact on the field of journalism. From that perspective, some elements of the field of politics, like palace politics, or regional politics, even though very important on their own, will not be included here, for they impacted other areas of the social space that had no effect on journalism in Beirut and Cairo.

I. Evolving field of politics and new actors

Theoretically, the Ottoman sultan was the ultimate ruler over the Ottoman Empire. He was the master of his subjects and they, his slaves; he was their protector and the guardian of their religions and traditions; he was the owner of the land; he was the *hunkar*, the emperor; he was the caliph, the ultimate interpreter of faith; he was the *khan*, the *ghazi*, the leader of armies and conqueror of lands (Shaw, 1976: 164-5). The sultan embodied the nation and the nation came to be through him. This institutional authority grants the individual who embodies it with the political capital to rule. But to accede to this role, the individual needed two things: first, the social capital that was derived from belonging to the house of Osman; second, the recognition of this capital by the military and high dignitaries of the Empire through the process of *bay'a*, or allegiance oath. Both these requirements were symbolically represented in the accession ceremony during which the new sultan was girded with the Sword of Osman, the namesake of the Ottoman dynasty, in the mosque of Ayyub (Hasluck, 1929: 604).

The institution of the sultanate therefore provided the sultan with the legitimacy to rule as an absolute monarch. In this case, however, legitimacy did not imply authority and the position of the sultan did not always in practice imply an actual absolute power to rule. First and foremost, it was because the institutions of the empire were by no means governed by rigid laws, but rather by tradition and custom. One major example is that of the rules of succession which did not guarantee any clear successor, and, for the better part of the history of the Empire meant that the position of the sultan was contended among brothers, sons, and uncles, the choice ultimately falling to the other institutions of power, usually the military. The individual who could get the most support would eventually accede to the throne. This makes the idea of the representation of the nation much more concrete than the one symbolically imbued through the institution of the sultanate. This means that the sultan must in fact really represent a power base which is willing to back him to get his position. If the political strength of an individual, in

this case the sultan, is as strong as the group it represents, then we can understand the importance of the role of the army in the process of acknowledgment of power in the field of politics, a point I will return to in a bit. It is not simply an institutional framework, like primogeniture in feudal Europe, but rather a process of negotiations and compromises among the different political actors which is eventually symbolically recognized through institutional norms and categorizations.

The first major contention to this political structure only came with the rise of Muhammad 'Ali to power. With his military campaign that aimed to conquer Syria and, after that, Anatolia, he sought to replace the social capital of the house of Osman with that of the house of Muhammad 'Ali. His goal was a dynasty change, but nothing indicates that he wanted to change anything else about the imperial nature of the state. On the contrary, his authoritarian nature was very well recorded, as seen in Chapter IV. This challenge, however, remained a characteristic of the relations between the khedives of Egypt and the sultans of Istanbul. 'Ali Pasha, a famous Ottoman grand vizier, wrote in the early 1860s that even though they detested one another, the Egyptian princes all worked toward the realization of the ultimate dream, the "grande idée" of one day ruling over the throne of Constantinople, which they saw as the right of the descendants of Muhammad 'Ali (as quoted by al-Sayyid Marsot, 1975: 92).

This struggle was mitigated by the introduction of two different actors into the political field. The first actor was European great powers, most notably France and Britain. Competition between empires for land was by far not a new phenomenon. Russia had gone to war with the Ottomans over the Crimea and lands around the Black Sea, even occupying Beirut in 1773 (Du Quenoy, 2014). France had occupied Tunisia in 1881, supported Muhammad Ali's military ambitions, and intervened militarily in Mount-Lebanon to protect Maronite Christians during the civil war of 1860 (Spagnolo, 1971). European powers had been dealing with the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe" for a while, trying to maintain a weak, yet surviving Empire on the southern borders of Russia. This was a step in the direction of cutting access for the Russians to the warm waters of the Mediterranean, which would have shaken the status quo of the fragile balance in European geopolitics of the time (Anderson, 1966; Millman, 1979).

Becoming a player in the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire, however, required to some extent a different approach than the traditional military one. France and Britain introduced a new significant capital into the field of politics, economic capital.

Since 1854, the Ottoman Empire had been accumulating debts, which eventually led to its bankruptcy in 1875. Egypt followed a similar line, accruing debts starting in 1858. The larger share of these debts was owed to foreign banks and governments, most notably the French and the British (Clay, 2001; Issawi, 1961). The economic capital was in fact at the roots of the woes of the Ottoman Empire. The whole end goal of the modernizing policies of the nineteenth century revolved around the upgrade of the Ottoman and Egyptian armies, a process requiring financing and new technology, both of which were not to be found in the Ottoman Empire. This discrepancy between the two entities, the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe has been studied extensively by social and economic historians. Samir Amin (1993: 253-5) argued that the Ottoman Empire was a tributary system where the ownership of land, rather than capital accumulation, was the source of wealth generation. Faced with its needs in a world where industry and capitalist production had become the dominant mode of production, the Ottoman Empire was unable to produce enough output to contend with its global rivals. This is when these rivals stepped in and fed the Ottoman and Egyptian governments the loans they needed to modernize.

When both governments defaulted, the French and British governments sent representatives as part of the loan renegotiations to administer the finances and reforms of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. These "advisors" ended up being the effective administrators of the Ottoman and Egyptian states. Therefore, through the introduction of economic capital into the political field in the form of loans, Britain and France guaranteed themselves a permanent position as powerful actors within that field.

The final actor during this early period to integrate the field of politics was the Egyptian military, and specifically a group of Arab officers who managed to begin a revolt against khedive Isma'il, depose him, and rule the country for almost three years. Again, the involvement of the military in the political life of empires was not a new phenomenon. Muhammad 'Ali himself got to power by climbing the echelons of the military establishment before becoming the governor of Egypt. The reasons for and results of the 'Urabi revolt, however, are important to examine. First, part of the reason why the military in Egypt decided to revolt was internal to the field of the army itself. As a subfield of the state, the army had internal struggles among its different actors, one of them being the frictions between the Arab and Turkish officers over dominance within the field (McGregor, 2006: 163-5). Arab officers were being passed down on promotions

by the rules which favored Turkish-speaking and Turkish born officers; they did not possess the social and cultural capitals necessary to accede to the position of dominance within the field. In addition to that, budget cuts caused by the austerity measures the government needed to take to repay its debts greatly affected the Egyptian military.

The 'Urabi revolt specifically targeted these issues at first. The demands were for enough money to sustain the army and equality among personnel irrespective of ethnicity ('Abd ar-Rahman ar-Rafi'i, 1983: 90, 102, 126; Cole, 1993: 235). The method through which the army managed to voice its demands and practice politics emanated not from within, but rather from the loosening up of the field. From the moment the effective authority of the khedive began to erode when he acquiesced British and French control over government, the image of the absolute sovereign began to crack. Half a century prior, Muhammad 'Ali dismissed his subject with his famous saying "it is I who govern" (as quoted by Hourani, 1983: 52). But when 'Urabi marched with his troops to the khedive's palace to hand him his demands, the khedive answered him: "I am the khedive of this country and I do as I please"; 'Urabi retorted: "we are not slaves nor are we to be inherited after today" (as quoted by 'Abd ar-Rahman ar-Rafi'i, 1983: 126). The image of the absolute monarch was no more.

'Urabi had publically deprived the khedive of his power to represent. As stated before, the strength of a political idea, in this case that of the khedive of an absolute monarch, is relative to the strength of the group it represents. Depriving Isma'il of his representative role meant depriving him of his authority. I have also previously discussed the heavy reliance the Ottoman and Muhammad 'Ali dynasties placed on the army, in what can best be described as a symbiotic relationship. When Isma'il agreed to the terms of the British and French advisors and cut down the funding for his military, he broke this relationship and thus alienated his power base.

This change lasted for only a little while and the army returned to its institutional function after the British invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882. But the importance of this episode cannot be stressed enough. The 'Urabi revolt was a prelude to an even more important such military takeover, that of the Young Turk revolution in 1908. In Egypt, the revolt ushered an era of colonial occupation which lasted until 1952. And, more importantly, it destroyed the idea of the autocratic sovereign who rules while excluding all others. Indeed, Isma'il was deposed and when his successor, Tawfiq, also tried to deal with the rebels with a heavy hand, they tried to depose him as well. The legitimacy of

having a political opinion had spread beyond the circle of the ruler and his close associates. The 'Urabi revolution spread from the army to include other groups who had previously shied away from politics, like the new educated class, merchants, artisans, and the clergy (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 85; Cole, 1993: 235). Reid (1998: 217) argued that it was a true revolution because of the social depth of the actors who partake in it. The revolution also provided these different elements the chance to take part in the "political events", to participate in politics. It created an interest in politics, not just in terms of observation, but even more importantly in terms of participation and practice. It offered a platform where people had a legitimate right to political expression. It should come as no surprise that it was during these turbulent times that journalists first engaged in political action.

II. Journalists and the revolution, a changing role and an evolving habitus

        With the opening up of the political field to new actors, the modern educated class acted in a way it had not done before. While the previous era was characterized by a strict support of the government and the ruler, intellectuals in the late 1870s in Egypt overwhelmingly placed their lot with the army against Isma'il and Tawfiq. Journalists decided to no longer be observers, as they appropriated the right to legitimately profess political opinions. I will argue in this section that this came as a reaction to the loss of authority on the part of the ruler and also the loss of his representative status. Journalists during the years of the 'Urabi revolution discovered the "mystery of ministry". This change came to a large extent because of the new ideas which affected journalists in Egypt, mainly through a new network which formed around one man whose call for resistance against European encroachment resonated from India to Egypt, France, Istanbul, and Persia. This man was none other than the great Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, a notorious and pragmatic revolutionary who was the first intellectual during the Arab Nahda to advocate freedom from both the traditional chains of autocratic rule as well as the reinforced control of Europe. The network that this man created, especially in Egypt, became the nucleus of Arab journalism that would usher in the struggle between the press and the dominant political class in Egypt, as well as struggles within the field of journalism itself. The opening up of the political field and the legitimization of the practice of political expression and participation constituted a conducive context for the development of such a brand of journalism, but it is highly unlikely that without the

intellectual and political guidance of al-Afghani that journalists would have so readily taken this route, one which ended as bad for them as for the revolution itself.

A. Radicalizing journalists

The process of radicalizing journalists followed the establishment of a political press in Beirut and Cairo. It began on the periphery of al-Azhar, where an unofficial teacher gathered around him a circle of young men including Muhammad 'Abdu, Sa'd Zaghlul, Adib Ishaq, 'Abdallah Nadim, Salim Taqla, Salim an-Naqqash, and Ya'qub bin Sannu' (Hourani, 1983: 109; 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 44-5; Reid, 1998: 223). All these individuals would, by the end of the 1870s at the latest, have established newspapers or worked as journalists. Muhammad 'Abdu would later become mufti of Egypt; Sa'd Zaghlul the leader of the Egyptian nationalist movement during the 1910s and 1920s. All of them kept close contact with their teacher, even after his exile from Egypt in 1879, some of them following him to Paris when he went there.

A radical himself, he taught his students what he conceived to be the true teachings of Islam, based on rational thought and philosophy. But the core of his teachings revolved around the political realm. He warned them of the danger that is Europe and stressed the need for the unity of Muslims and the reform of the political system to be less autocratic. He encouraged them to write, publish newspapers, and "form a public opinion" (Hourani, 1983: 109). His life was a testament that the realm of politics was not restricted to the ruler and that radical change can come if one forces it. He worked behind the scenes as conspirator and diplomat, roused popular revolutions, and ended the rule of kings. Even while under house arrest in Istanbul, he is rumored to have orchestrated the assassination of Nasir ad-Din Shah Qajar of Iran; when pulling the trigger, the Shah's assassin told him: "take that from the hand of Jamal ad-Din" (Hourani, 1983: 112).

Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's contribution to the radicalization of politics and the changes in the perception of what the political was in the region could not be understated. First, not unlike what al-Bustani did in Beirut, al-Afghani's students were of different confessions and religions. Even though he taught at al-Azhar, he welcomed Christians like Adib Ishaq and Salim Taqla, as well as Jews like Ya'qub bin Sannu'. This was very peculiar of a Muslim intellectual preaching the rebirth of Islam, except that al-Afghani was not your typical next door cleric. His Islamic nation was defined according to

civilizational characteristics rather than religious ones, as attested by some of his writings, most notably his "Réponse à Renan" in which he completely lashes out against religion in general, "one of the heaviest and most humiliating yokes" (al-Afghani, 1968: 182). Religion, like despotic rule, restricted human reason, the only prerequisite for the masses to develop and advance (Kenny, 1966: 20). Needless to say, these teachings presented a new approach to politics. The people no longer became the object of rule, but a tool of progress. The educated elite was no longer a mere employee of the state, but a shaping force in it.

This call for inclusion was not simply an intellectual exercise, since al-Afghani actively sought to create the mechanisms through which the educated modern elite could penetrate the political realm and was relatively successful at that. He tried to subvert the Egyptian freemasons lodge to further political agitation, and when they rejected any political involvement, he and his students who had joined him formed their own national lodge, one of the first such secret societies that sought to influence politics in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt before World War I (Kudsi-Zadeh, 1972: 25). These same students established newspapers that would agitate the Egyptian street for more than two years until the British occupation of Egypt, when they all had to close door and many of them went into exile. The press became the other mechanism through which he sought to influence politics, and it is obviously the one we are interested in here. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that his immediate impact on the realm of politics culminated with the 'Urabi revolution, as he was one of the major reasons why the movement took a nationalist bend.

But in the end, we must remember that this process of radicalization was not one of a simple intellectual dialogue between a group of students and their teacher. First and foremost, it was a reflection on the social position of these journalists, one of socio-political alienation. As discussed in the previous chapters, journalists belonged to a class which was socially marginal, rejected by other classes, and refused to address other constituents of the social space. From this position of exclusion, al-Afghani offered his students a new attitude toward the political, a position-taking through which they found a new function that allowed them to express political opinions legitimately. They had found a way to break the ostracism they suffered from.

It is from this perspective that we must understand the "radicalism" of the journalists of that epoch. Today, having a political opinion would hardly qualify as a

radical act, but back then, this novelty was as revolutionary as the military uprising itself. The new vision of the political that al-Afghani instilled in his students allowed them to perceive what is allowed and what is not in a very different way than the one that previous generations of journalists professed. In an article of *al-Ahram*, the Taqla brothers accused the Khedive of having spent a hundred thousand pounds from the blood of the peasant, at a time when Isma'il was rumored to be poisoning people for less grave an insult ('Abd al-Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 36; Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 5). Such a statement, let alone thinking in these terms, would have been unthinkable only a couple of years before. In this new version of the political realm, journalists possessed the political capital necessary to voice political opinions.

B. Journalists and journalism during the revolution

The climax of this radicalization took place over a period of three years, when al-Afghani's students began each publishing his own newspaper which offered for their better part a new experience of Arab journalism. Between the middle of the year 1877 and the middle of the year 1882, Filib di Tarrazi accounts for the appearance of seven different political newspapers. Four of these were either owned or controlled by a disciple of al-Afghani. Two others followed the same nationalist anti-European political line. Only one newspaper, *az-Zaman*, published by the Armenian Aliksan Sarrafyan in 1882, opposed it and was quickly closed down by the Egyptian authorities even prior to the revolution. These were in addition to *al-Ahram*, and *at-Takbit wat-Tankit* (mockery and joking) founded by 'Abdallah Nadim in 1881. The date of 1877 is not random though. Due to the tension between Isma'il and the Ottoman sultan, newspapers in Egypt were given more freedom to comment on the ongoing Turko-Russian War. The hope was that they would draw support away from the sultan, as most, if not all of the journalists in Egypt at this time were Syrians who left their homes to find better lives in Egypt ('Abd al-Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 33-4). Little did he know the extent to which this measure would backfire.

Ya'qub as-Sannu' founded a very successful, yet short lived, satirical paper entitled *Abu Nadhdhara Zarqa'* (the man with blue eyeglasses) in 1877. It was to appear fifteen times before Isma'il suspended it and ordered the assassination of its owner who managed to escape to Paris with the assistance of the Italian consul (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 8-9). As an example of one of his most wounding articles, he addressed the rumor that if the Khedive was displeased with someone, he would invite them over and offer

them coffee that was laced with poison. Sannu' created a fictional dialogue between himself and other characters where they invite him for a drink. When asked if he preferred beer or coffee, he rejected the offer for coffee because it was a very dangerous beverage to drink during those times (as quoted by 'Abd al-Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 60-61).

His paper, alongside Nadim's *at-Takbit wat-Tankit*, were watersheds in Arab journalism for many reasons, the most important being that they managed to communicate with the common man at a level never previously achieved. This was because they usually dropped the *fusha* Arabic in favor of the vernacular, making their language more accessible to people. They also added pictures and photographs which made their papers easier to read even for people with lower levels of literacy. Furthermore, Sannu' derived much of his inspiration from the letters he received from his readers, therefore literally addressing the concerns of people (Kendall, 2006: 15). Nadim equally reached a broader audience by supplementing his newspaper with public speeches, as he was an unusually gifted orator (Goldsmith, 2000: 146).

Adib Ishaq founded *Misr* in 1877 and it became a sort of front for the teachings of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani who even contributed to its pages with two famous articles, "al-hukumat ash-sharqiyya wa anwa'uha" (Eastern governments and their types) and "ruh al-bayan fi al-inkiliz wal-afghan" (the spirit of the statement on the English and the Afghans) (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 13). This was highly unusual because al-Afghani rarely published anything under his own name and we are left today with very few writings of his. This, coupled with Adib Ishaq's famous prose writing made of *Misr* a great success, that is until it was suspended during the early days of Tawfiq's rule.

Haqiqat al-Akhbar (the truth of the news), a pro-Ottoman newspaper founded in 1877 by Anis Khallat at-Tarabulsi, featured Muhammad 'Abduh and 'Abdallah Nadim among their most prominent writers (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 9). Even *Mir'at ash-Sharq*, which Salim 'Anhuri founded in 1879 to support Isma'il, was bought by Amin Nasif who appointed Muhammad 'Abduh as its editor in chief. He used it as a mouthpiece of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and became from then on a mouthpiece of the nationalist movement (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 16).

Al-Watan (the nation) founded by the Copt Mikha'il 'Abd as-Sayyid late in 1877 and *al-Mufid* (the beneficial) founded in late 1881 by Mustafa Thaqib and Hasan ash-

Shamsi also supported the nationalists during this period. *Al-Watan*'s nationalist line only changed when it was sold in 1900, a point which will be addressed later in this chapter. *Al-Mufid* was so vehement in its support for the nationalists and its opposition to the British that it was shut down even before the revolution. Its owners simply changed the name of the newspaper to *an-Najah* (success) and published it. It was quickly shut down again; it changed its name to *as-Safir* (the ambassador) and appeared again (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 21).

When we look at the mentioned individuals, the first thing to notice is that they did not socially differ from the previous generation of journalists in any perceivable way.[7] Adib Ishaq was the child of a small Damascene notable family who was sent to missionary schools before his family moved to Beirut (Goldsmith, 2000: 89). Ya'qub bin Sannu' was born in Cairo into a Jewish family. He went to Livorno to study under the patronage of a nephew of Muhammad 'Ali and then came back to Egypt to work as a teacher and a playwright (Goldsmith, 2000: 181). 'Abdallah an-Nadim began his life with a traditional Islamic education. He quickly lost interest in his studies in favor of literature, which forced his father to make him choose between continuing his studies and losing his financial support. The result of his choice was that he had to work at odd jobs for a while (Goldsmith, 2000: 146). Muhammad 'Abduh also came from a humble background and received a traditional religious education, ending up at al-Azhar (Von Kugelgen). There was nothing about these individuals which, in terms of biographical context, differed them from Sarkis and Qabbani. They shared the same social position as the second generation.

They differed, however, in their position-taking, as mentioned before. They no longer accepted the role of spectators of the political field and, given the changing context brought about by the revolution and the opening up of the field to new actors, capitals, and practices, they decided to reposition themselves so as to be journalists and revolutionaries at the same time. They were in many ways the spearhead of the nationalist aspect of the revolution, representing the nation of Egyptians and Ottomans against foreign influence and all the ills it brought onto Egypt. This new position-taking in the field of politics can only be traced to the teachings of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani. His political capital came from the imagining of the nation which came to be through the rhetoric of liberation he advanced. Public discontent with the poor management of the

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[7] Access to biographical information on the mentioned individuals who were not students of al-Afghani proved impossible to find in reliable sources.

affairs of the country became possible to categorize under the political project of national liberation, and the spokespeople for national liberation became the new representatives of the nation. The network that al-Afghani created was not an institutional one, nor was it a recognized network to produce social capital. It was, however, a way through which a political message spread. It was through this network that the idea of anti-colonial struggle materialized and was disseminated throughout Egypt.

C. An evolving habitus

I have discussed how the changes affecting the field of journalism emanated from the changes in the political context within which journalism operated. The opening up of the political field due to the challenges the dominant class faced during this period "[destroyed] the consensus among the ruling elite over the shape of legitimate discourse", opening the room for a change in the form of public communication (Cole, 1993: 233). Political journalism during these turbulent years tried to integrate the political field as part of the changing rules of the game within that field. The field of journalism therefore witnessed and internal metamorphosis because of this new experience.

One of the most important of these changes was that the main target audience of the new form of political journalism became the masses, the common people, thus breaking with the previous alienation from the common man. This was in many ways a two way change. In the same way that an-Nadim and Sannu' actively sought to interact with and broaden their audiences, addressing the common man as much as the educated intellectual, people began identifying with the different political messages in the press. Historical accounts tell us that the more the press spoke of European control over the government and impending European invasion, the more people supported the army and those who opposed the khedive and the elements of his government who were seen to support European encroachment (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 87). It is difficult, however, to make a distinction whether the press was simply following popular feelings or if it acted in any way as an opinion shaper. What can be said for certain is that people definitely reacted to what was being said in the newspapers. When *al-Ahram* opposed the 'Urabi revolution, the Taqla borthers were attacked and their printing press was destroyed by 'Urabist crowds, prompting them to escape back to Syria for a short while, returning as soon as the 'Urabi revolution ended (Goldsmith, 2000: 207). Even the political establishment recognized this change and the potential danger it might create. Out of the

nine newspapers mentioned in this section, six were suspended by the Egyptian authorities for their opposition. They were *Abu Nadhdhara Zarqa'*, *Misr*, *Mir'at ash-Sharq*, *al-Mufid*, *al-Ahram*, and *az-Zaman*.

The second most important change was in the journalists' perception of the field of politics. It was no longer the warded off realm of the ruling class which they could only observe. It had become accessible to them because the taboo of participating in politics had been broken. As previously mentioned, the "legitimate" discourse the press allowed itself had been completely altered because of the changes to the political field itself. This was an experience which journalists would not easily let go of. They had discovered at the same historical moment both the power of shaping public opinion as advanced by the critical approach to the role of media in politics, and the power of popular representation, as advanced by the liberal approach. The "mystery of ministry" came to be not at all as a mystery, but as a conscious realization of the many facets of the power of "ministry" and its social implications. The only problem facing these journalists, however, was that the 'Urabi revolution was but a fleeting moment in the history of the region and that the field of politics was not to change as much in the years after.

III. The 'Urabi Revolution, a revolution in the "public"

The fate of the 'Urabi Revolution itself was sealed with the first shot of a British canon off the coast of Alexandria. Fearing the changes that such a revolution would bring to their interests, the British and French set their traditional imperialist rivalry aside, endorsing a British invasion of Egypt to "restore order there". It took apparently more than seventy years for this order to come and the British stayed in Egypt until 1954. True to imperialist form, the British brought with them the rhetoric of the "mission civilisatrice" characteristic of the "White Man's Burden", promising an age of freedom and socio-economic reforms. True to imperialist nature, the priority was for Britain's interests while indigenous interests either fell in line or were inconsequential (Tignor, 1963: 148).

The brief experience of the opening up of the political field to the active participation of different social actors had ended with a reverting back to the old practice of absolute rule, except that, after 1882, the absolute ruler was no longer the khedive, but the British consul-general in Egypt. As a result, the political field returned to being

exclusionary to some extent. But as will be seen in the next chapter, there remained enough room for public political communication. This was because the taboo over the right over the expression of political opinion had been broken. From this perspective, we can see how the habitus and positions of different actors within the political field and the field of journalism evolved and changed during these few years.

The dominant classes or actors within the field of politics changed, but the relations within the field remained to a large extent unchanged from before 1879; the new dominant actors simply replaced the old ones and continued governing the same way, a sort of elite revolution that never changes the political system. The bigger change, however, was that new actors experienced the political during these short years, and they had by then realized that they could participate in politics; some of them believed that they even should participate in politics. Journalists were of the latter category. But that does not mean that they were the only group who professed such interests. Other groups like lawyers and notables were also to become key political actors, not only in Egypt, but also across the whole Ottoman Empire. The legitimate right to produce a political opinion was no longer monopolized. Not only that, but the legitimate right to political participation had spread across all social groups. Professionals, journalists, military, clergy, peasants, artisans, and common folks of all social, political, and economic standing had participated in the revolution. For a short while, an all-inclusive public sphere came to exist in Egypt.

Chapter VII

The journalist politician: journalism as a sub-field in the field of politics

The events of the 'Urabi Revolution, mirrored to some extent in the Ottoman Empire with the deposition of two sultans in one year, changed the political landscape for the remainder of the existence of the empire. The British, having gained authority in Egypt, never possessed the legitimacy to rule. Abdul Hamid II, while being the legitimate ruler of the Ottoman Empire, always feared he might lose his authority the same way his brother and uncle did. In this context of political insecurity, journalists saw the potential of penetrating the political field as actors. Naturally, the dominant class in the political field would have none of that. Whether it was because of the authoritarian nature of the rulers or as a strategy to preserve their position of dominance, they tried to control the field of journalism which had proven to be a major nuisance during the 'Urabi Revolution and even during the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War when the Ottoman Empire lost most of its territory in the Balkans.

In this chapter, I will examine this two-way attempted encroachment. On the one side, the political authorities tried to dominate the field of journalism by introducing new capitals that they possessed to act as a dominant capital in that field and by also supporting some journalists whose position-taking in the field of politics coincided with theirs. On the other side, journalists continued to challenge the legitimacy of the absolute ruler, publicizing their resistance, and claiming an increased representative status. During these turbulent times, journalists tried to capitalize on every opening up in the field of politics to become relevant actors in it. I will argue that this ended up incorporating the field of journalism into the field of politics where it became a sub-field, with journalists becoming also political actors who possess a legitimate right to produce a political opinion through which they represent the "people".

I. Politics and journalism, an uneasy coexistence

One of the first measures of the British was to supposedly restore freedom of the press and allow it to criticize its measures as much as it wanted. It was for the British occupation, represented by the figure of Lord Cromer, a safety valve which decreased the

pressure of the Egyptian street, while portraying themselves as the promoters of freedom and progress in Egypt (Taysir abu 'Arja, 1997: 12). Lord Cromer even considered himself to be successful in this endeavor, writing in a 1903 report that the Egyptian press had "no history" for the past twenty years ('Abd al-Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 65). Abdul Hamid, on the other hand, could not care less about the freedom of the press. Having become sultan due to the loss of authority brought about by the two successive coups and the internal palace politics which favored other elements inside the government, such as the Young Ottomans, his immediate concern was to consolidate his own authority. In the first few years of his reign, a parliament and a constitution were promulgated and his efforts turned toward curbing these liberal advances which "clearly contradicted Ottoman traditions of statecraft" (Akarli, 2002: 266). Achieving absolute command over the affairs of the Empire passed through the route of controlling the press, which Abdul Hamid did skillfully (Boyar, 2006). Both rulers therefore adopted a similar stance toward the press. Wanting to control it rather than abolish it, they adopted a slow pace in their attempts. Therefore, for the better part of the 1880s, authorities and journalists were involved in a polite sparring duel, in which the former tried to control the latter, while the latter resisted, both using the capitals available to them within their own respective fields to do so.

A. The myth of the liberal empire, a search for legitimacy and authority

As stated before, the new regimes in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt got to power in extremely unconventional circumstances. The British conquered Egypt and Abdul Hamid became sultan after a coup that deposed his brother. Both faced challenges, the British to the legitimacy of their rule and the sultan to his actual authority as a ruler. These insecurities clearly materialized in their behavior and policies.

From the moment he was appointed consul-general in Egypt, Lord Cromer made sure that no other force could oppose him, not even symbolically. When 'Abbas II succeeded his father at the age of eighteen in 1892 and seemed unwilling to politely get in line and accommodate British wishes, Lord Cromer made it a point to publically humiliate him by removing him from official public ceremonies and threatening to depose him at will, forcing him to apologize and promise that he would not make any future decisions without consulting the British representative and getting his stamp of approval (Tignor, 1963: 150; Daly, 1998: 241). Even when the colonial authorities bestowed democracy on the Egyptian people and granted them an elected parliament,

Lord Cromer completely disregarded representatives and refused to grant them any power, in an equal display of humiliation than that shown toward the Khedive.

Tignor (1963: 152, 158) argued that it was the personality of Lord Cromer, having been corrupted by power, that established such an authoritarian system, blocking locals' access to decision making in their own country. This agential approach, however, completely disregards the structure of the colonial administration of Egypt which could only function as such. As an executive practice, it was supported by the same physical force that had put it in place to begin with. But this monopoly over physical violence never imbued British rule with any legitimacy. Such recognition had to be created to justify this rule both for the British and the locals. As an act of self-legitimacy, the colonial power constructed an image of the Egyptian "Other" that was characterized by "ignorance [that] was too widespread, despotism [that] was too ingrained, the religious influence [that was] too reactionary [...] [and that] respected only superior force and could be governed only by instilling in [it] fear of established authority" (Tignor, 1963: 148, 152). As an act of showcasing a legitimate rule, the British advocated an image of their spirit of enlightened liberalism, seeking only to reform Egypt, never to rule it. This was made easier by Lord Cromer's own political convictions. A staunch liberal himself, his official and private messages back home indicate that he promoted this image both in Egypt and back in Britain (Mowat, 1973). Incidentally, it was only a few years later that Kipling wrote:

> Take up the White Man's burden, Send forth the best ye breed
> Go bind your sons to exile, to serve your captives' need

The myth of the liberal imperialist resonated with many contemporaries and even by some historians, especially as it pertained to the freedom the press enjoyed under British rule (Ayalon, 1995: 50). Shibli Shumayyil, one of the key intellectuals of the Nahda period, a strong supporter of Darwinism and positivism, an internationalist, and a regular contributor to many newspapers, supported British rule over Egypt. According to him, British rule was enlightened and offered much freedom in comparison with the Ottoman government's censorship back home in Syria (Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 47-8). This did not mean that he was oblivious of the nature of colonialism, as he argued that the British only cared to reform the sectors that would financially remunerate their own coffers, but his personal scale of priorities favored freedom of expression and, under British rule freedom was such that "jail cell doors opened on their own" (as quoted by

Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 49). *Al-Ahram* also believed, at least for the first year of the occupation, that the British were indeed proponents of freedom and selfless reformers, an attitude which quickly changed afterwards.

Appearances might support this view at face value. The British indeed allowed the press to operate in relative freedom. But, as will be shown later, authorities tried as much as possible to control the press through different mechanisms: bribery, access to information, censorship, suspensions, legal proceedings, threats, etc. Freedom of the press was therefore granted to newspapers and journalists who supported British rule, while the nationalist press that resisted it suffered as much censorship and repression as the one that fell under Abdul Hamid's rule. The question as a result is to what extent can this qualify as freedom. The straightforward answer is that it does not. Freedom only existed as a rhetoric in the myth of the liberal imperialist which hid the truth that access to politics had become restricted to the British colonial authorities.

Abdul Hamid's approach to establishing his authority did not greatly differ from the British. As soon as he succeeded to the throne in 1876, he agreed to the establishment of a parliament, the promulgation of a constitution, and kept the liberal Young Ottomans in positions of power within the government (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 174-5). He spent the next few years dismantling the institutions which limited his authority, showing through a series of relatively successful measures how a strong and central leadership was preferable to the squabbles of democratic liberals who could not keep up with the many crises which hit the Empire (Akarli, 2002: 266).

He approached journalism with equal patience, unlike what most secondary sources tend to conclude about him.[8] It was not until 1888 that he produced, for the first time, his own legal decree on printing in the Ottoman Empire, the *Matbaalar Nizamnamesi*, or the Printing Houses Regulation (Boyar, 2006: 422). Its effects were only felt in Beirut a year later (Cioeta, 1979: 173). Abdul Hamid reflected on his relationship with the press in his memoirs, reflections which admittedly must be taken with a grain of salt. He wrote:

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[8] Most secondary sources base their arguments on primary material produced mainly by Abdul Hamid's detractors, his political opponents, and Turkish nationalists who were behind his deposition and the eventual replacement of the Ottoman Empire by the Republic of Turkey. Even Western contemporary sources sought to delegitimize Abdul Hamid's regime by stressing his autocratic character. This image still persists today in a lot of the secondary sources (Boyar, 2006: 417-9).

If I were an enemy to writers, I would not have endured Akram Bey and Abu ad-Diya Bey's arrogance. And if I were an enemy to writers, I would not have paid Abdul Haq Hamid Bey's debts which appeared every now and then despite the excellent salary I gave him. If I were an enemy to writers and the art of history, I would not have endured Murad Bey's impudence when he worked against my crown and my throne and I would not have let him remain at the service of the state and with a decent salary until the last day of my reign.

[...] If I were an enemy of writers and editors, I had men who could then kill them in the middle of the street. ('Abd al-Hamid, 1991: 64-5)

While such a statement would today sound quite surreal, using such violent measures was back then a legitimate, normal, and legal response that the sultan could have chosen to take but did not. And even though this statement must be taken with a pinch of salt, evidence suggest that 'Abdul Hamid was relatively lenient with journalists and did not opt to use violent means with them, means that he had at his disposal. When he was deposed, one of his famous remarks was: "if I were to go back to Yildiz palace, I would put all newspaper editors in a sulfur furnace" (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 42). The clear implication is that he did not do that but deeply regretted it. This tends to corroborate that his approach to the press was not as tyrannical as traditional historians would like us to believe.

Such an approach to dealing with the press was, however, not the product of an enlightened mind or a kind forgiving heart. Boyar (2006: 424) argued that Abdul Hamid thought the press to be dangerous, yet useful if it was controlled. He went on to show that the relationship between the Turkish press in Istanbul and the sultan was a very symbiotic one, as each relied on the other and mutually benefited from such a relationship. Playing the public through the press became, for Abdul Hamid, a major component of his increasing authority. Although the context and nature of the relationship between the authorities and the Arabic press in the provinces was completely different than the one joining the Turkish press and the sultan in the capital, Boyar's study tends to support the argument that Abdul Hamid's approach to dealing with the press was both prudent and patient, at least for the first fifteen years of his reign. Still, the goal of this enlightened approach was to eventually control the press better by finding the right mechanisms through which he could do so.

B. The post-1882 field of journalism

It must be noted at this point that, even though the political fields in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were split into two separate fields after the British invasion,

journalism in Beirut and Cairo still constituted a single field shaped by the same actors, practices, and capitals. Even the journalistic product remained to a large extent the same across the two cities. First, journalists in Cairo and Beirut were still in their majority Syrians who travelled back and forth between the two cities. The Taqla brothers, Jurji Zaydan, and Shibli Shumayyil are but some of the more famous journalists to do that. Second, because of the practice of reproducing articles from other newspapers, especially those of *al-Ahram* which received its news directly from Reuters and Havas news agencies, Beiruti newspapers were in fact reproducing much of the news and news analysis from Cairo newspapers. The change in attitude there was equally paralleled in Beirut, irrespective of whether it was a question of natural inclination or simply a matter of emulation of content. However, evidence suggests that there was a true identification between journalists in Beirut and those in Cairo. From the year 1881 till 1884, it was very common among all Beiruti newspapers to see their front pages or their biggest coverage focusing on *al-mas'ala al-misriyya*, "the Egyptian question". The political issues of the time were common to all journalists in the two cities.

Similarly, the press in both cities faced a comparable situation whereby the dominant class within the political field kept blocking all access to the field to other possible actors, while trying to integrate and control the field of journalism. The press behaved in a similar way to the challenges posed by both the sultan and the British consul-general. It began to symbolically resist the pressure of the political authorities throughout the 1880s. By the end of the decade, these authorities clearly felt the pressure not only from their failure to adequately control the field of journalism, but also from journalists managing to dispute their power over the field of politics. By this time, journalists had clearly learned two important lessons. First, given the right circumstances, they can have a role in the political field. Second, the masses which they had disdained so much in the past could play a vital role in that. The habitus of the Arab journalist was evolving. As will be shown later in this chapter, the "discovery" of the mystery of ministry allowed journalists to transform the public recognition they received in the field of journalism into political capital they invested in the field of politics both in Beirut and in Cairo.

C. Polite coercion and polite resistance, the shaping of cross-field struggle

Polite coercion was the way in which political authorities decided to face the press during the 1880s. The main tools used were a strengthening of the application of

legal censorship and, more importantly, the introduction of economic capital into the field of journalism in an attempt to counterweigh the dominance of the second generation of journalists in it. This took the form of sponsorship for some newspapers which were created or allowed to exist to be compliant with the authorities, speaking in their name while being "privately owned". I had previously mentioned the example of Muhammad Rashid ad-Dana's *Bayrut*, which his brother, the head of the commercial tribunal in Beirut, and the governor of Beirut urged him to publish. He spent twelve years between 1886 and 1902 working on this paper which simply reported government activities and reproduced official opinions on issues; it was never willingly read or bought, but merchants and officials were forced to subscribe to it because they felt ashamed not to, considering his brother's position and the support he received from the vali (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.2: 38). In Cairo, British authorities allowed many newspapers to reopen their doors after having been shut down by the Egyptian government under the khedive or the revolution leadership. This automatically got them the support of some of these papers, like *az-Zaman* and *al-Ittihad al-Misri*, which were able to witness firsthand the liberalism of the British colonial administration (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 22; Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 13).

I described this behavior as polite since it was still not yet on the offensive in the way it approached the field of journalism. Official newspapers receiving almost no audience, authorities had to find a way to gain a foothold in the field of journalism, no matter how small it was. The sultan had already felt the effect of an unruly press during the Turko-Russian war and the British witnessed how problematic journalists could become given the right circumstances. Unlike during the 1860s and much of the 1870s, authorities could no longer disregard the press as a benign and marginalized educational endeavor. They attempted to impose some sort of control on it by introducing economic capital into the field of journalism as the main support for the authority-friendly press. None of these newspapers, however, was successful in acquiring a sizeable audience and most of them simply failed and faded away. Their effect on the field was minimal at this point as they could not establish themselves as serious competitors in it. They lacked the recognition which the dominant newspapers enjoyed, and financial backing was not about to change that.

The private press also exercised polite resistance to authority during the 1880s. In Cairo, *al-Ahram*'s position was dominant, and no other newspaper rivaled it in

circulation and fame. This was despite the fact that it did not oppose the British during the first two years of their presence in Egypt, as attested by its editorials. In the opening days of the year 1884, the editor wrote against those calling for the immediate evacuation of the British military from Egypt, arguing that the country was in a state of chaos and that the British themselves were not keen on staying, confirmed by many of their politicians' speeches (*al-Ahram*, June 8, 1884). As soon as the newspaper realized that evacuation was not really part of British plans, they shifted their stance and became strong supporters of Egyptian nationalism, and the banner holder of the slogan "Egypt for Egyptians". This was not, however, a statement of Egyptian separatism, as it still considered Egypt to be part of the Ottoman Empire, and the sultan to be the rightful ruler of Egypt with the khedive as his viceroy (*al-Ahram*, August 1, 1889; Zolondek, 1969: 186). Therefore, as soon as it recognized that the British had established their permanent authority over Egypt, the newspaper began to openly oppose the occupation, targeting above all else its hold over symbolic power. In *al-Ahram*'s discourse, the British were not the real authority. The sultan was. Egypt was not a colony of the British Empire, it was a territory of the Ottoman Empire. As the decade neared its end, *al-Ahram*'s stance became more challenging, employing among its ranks journalists, most notably Mustafa Kamil, who would later become the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement ('Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 59).

In Beirut, the process was similar. Starting in the late 1870s and carrying on throughout the 1880s, the Beiruti press, and most notably its two major newspapers at the time, *Lisan al-Hal* and *Thamarat al-Funun*, kept pressuring the central government to give more administrative weight to the city at the expense of Damascus. This was not a new debate, as *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* had covered the issue back in the mid 1860s, arguing that such a move would greatly benefit the merchants in the city (Hanssen, 2005: 44). In 1878, though, *Thamarat al-Funun* was not presenting a request. It was presenting an argument, a countering opinion and evidence that opposed the official rhetoric on the topic. The paper argued that since other areas in the Empire had received an independent administrative status, nothing prevented Beirut from gaining autonomy from Damascus, especially that the port city had become such an important commercial center (Hanssen, 2005: 45-6). In 1887, when news that the central government was considering the possibility to reorganize the administration of Syria, the press took up the subject with renewed zeal. *Lisan al-Hal* warned against forgetting about the city in the capital.

When looking at the government's response to this pressure from the press, Hanssen (2005: 50) revealed that there was absolutely no consideration for it whatsoever. The concerns and calculations of 'Abdul Hamid all revolved around the curtailment of European influence. A strong administrator in Beirut could in fact block European influence inside of Syria, and that was the reason why the province of Beirut was created in February 1888. The press and its opinions still had no role in the realm of politics and policies. Still, the local newspapers upped their rhetoric, and when the first provincial governor was appointed, *Lisan al-Hal* (March 12, 1888) featured an article telling him what he should do when he gets to Beirut, his list of priorities. He should "spread justice and security among the Beirutis, improve education, facilitate trade, revive agriculture, and initiate public works project" in return for the support of the people there (as quoted by Hanssen, 2005: 52). The change in tone is quite clear. The shift very distinct. Newspapers had moved from uncritically reproducing official statements, to dictating policy programs, irrespective of the extent to which they were effective in achieving this. More importantly, this article featured a conditionality which would have been unthinkable only a few years before. The support of the people was presented as being conditional of the application of the policy program offered in the newspaper. It was a renegotiation of the social contract which governed the region, a rejection of the "natural" political order, and the beginning of the erosion of the symbolic power of the state. In many ways, this was a continuation of the spirit of the 'Urabi Revolution; the legitimacy and authority of the state were being put into question.

II. New strategies in fields of struggle

In order to explain behavior within fields, Bourdieu often resorts to the analogy with the game of chess. Each act is both part of a conscious strategy and a reaction to the adversary's strategy. Each move is equally a counter-move. It is from this perspective that we must also read the evolution of the game that pitted journalists on the one side, and the political authorities on the other. The 1880s witnessed the opening moves of both the authorities and journalists. But from 1889 onward, the game turned into full-blown hostilities, each side trying aggressively to assert its authority in the field dominated by the other.

A. The authorities go on the offensive

The year 1889 marks an important turning point. In Beirut, 'Aziz pasha, the new provincial governor appointed Kemal bey as new *mektupcu*. The latter was known to be a harsh censor and entirely ignorant of Arabic. The age of enlightened censorship which qualified the period of Khalil al-Khuri's holding of the post had ended. Between 1889 and 1908, 64 warnings and suspensions were issued in Beirut, twice as many as those given over a period of thirty years before that (Cioeta, 1979: 179). The choice of *mektupcu* in this case was not innocent or uncalculated. His harshness and ignorance of the language made his decisions both unpredictable and impossible to argue against. His decisions were reported to be capricious and absurd (Cioeta, 1979: 173). Journalists were at a loss at what and how to write. Words and expressions were understood randomly by the censor and it became impossible for a journalist to know beforehand what was expected to pass censorship and what was not. Words such as *islahat*, reforms, or even *junun*, madness, would be interpreted, irrespective of context, as targeting Abdul Hamid (Cioeta, 1979: 176-7). This practice was similarly used in Istanbul, where the use of words such as *yildiz bocegi*, firefly, would cause an article to be censored because it could be read as the beetle in Yildiz, an insect in the sultan's palace, which might be construed as alluding to Abdul Hamid himself (Boyar, 2006: 420). This reveals an important change in the state's strategy to counter the press. The state had previously tried to incorporate economic capital into the field of journalism to bolster its position within it and failed. Now, it was trying to deprive its opponent the capital he enjoyed. By making it more difficult for journalists to utilize language effectively, they were depriving them of their ability to appropriately display their cultural capital, the main component of their symbolic capital in the field of journalism. Journalists who once boasted their linguistic prowess on the pages of their newspapers were now lost as to what words they should use for their articles to even appear.

In Cairo, realizing that none of the newspapers that supported the British rivaled *al-Ahram* in its reach and credibility in the eyes of its audience, Lord Cromer resorted to a different strategy. It was the establishment of a strong credible newspaper that would support the British presence while finding a niche in the field of journalism. The answer came in the form of *al-Muqattam*, a newspaper that later came to be known as "the newspaper of the occupation in Egypt" (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 13). With this choice, the consul-general was also moving away from the previous use of economic capital to try and control the field of journalism. The first indicator came in the form of his choice of journalists to establish this newspaper. They were Faris Nimr, Ya'qub as-Sarruf, and

Shahin Makarius, three journalists from the first generation who had previously published a very famous and successful scientific journal in Beirut, *al-Muqtataf*.

The three of them had received their education in the circles of the American missionaries in Beirut and continued working with them until they left for Cairo in 1885. Nimr and Sarruf taught natural sciences at the Syrian Protestant College and then collaborated with Makarius, a master printer in the employ of the missionaries, to publish their scientific journal. *Al-Muqtataf* became one of the most famous periodicals of the time, introducing its readers to some of the most important scientific innovations, reaching a broad audience across the whole of the Arab world. A contemporary Egyptian notable mentioned that their success in Egypt was in fact due to their reputation which they had gained from *al-Muqtataf* they published in Beirut and which had gathered a large audience in Egypt even before its editors moved there (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 22). Lord Cromer was therefore relying on cultural and symbolic capital that already existed in the journalistic field to counter the influence of *al-Ahram*. Furthermore, because these three journalists belonged to the first generation, they had a different habitus that was not as politically engaged as the fourth generation. In fact, and as stated before, their position vis-à-vis political authority was conservative and to some extent submissive, rendering them easier to control by the British consul-general, and less likely to rebel and challenge him.

Furthermore, he was also trying to introduce a new form of social capital into the field of journalism. The increased employment of Syrians in governmental positions and high level administration in Egypt was a process which started under Isma'il and intensified with the advent of the British. Because of the policy of Arabization of the bureaucracy in Egypt in 1870, Isma'il had to rely on the new educated class of Syrians who could speak both Arabic and European languages. They, in turn, were escaping a context of post-civil war and under-employment in Mount-Lebanon and Beirut, and found in Egypt a welcoming atmosphere where they could find employment adequate to their skills. In 1906, when Syrians constituted less than a third of a percent of the overall population in Egypt, they held thirty percent of top rank positions in the Egyptian administration, compared with the twenty-eight percent held by Egyptians (Philipp, 2009: 65-6). With Egyptians' increasing education came an opposition to their obvious exclusion from the bureaucracy, one which sometimes targeted the Syrians as *dukhala'*, or infiltrators. By choosing three Syrians to carry the word of the occupation, the British

were in fact consolidating the rift between the two communities in what is traditionally coined as a "divide and rule" policy (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 25). The fault line was drawn along communal lines. Communal identity therefore became a new social capital that appeared in the field of journalism at this time.

We can, as a result, see that after 1889, the authorities adopted a completely different strategy than the one they previously had used to control the field of journalism. They introduced new forms of struggle within the field, using forms of capital which were already defining it, cultural and social capitals. They were therefore using the internal mechanisms of the field of journalism, which the second generation had constructed and consolidated, to shake their dominant position within it.

B. Journalists parry

Journalists after 1889 also adapted their strategy to counter the challenge posed by the dominant political elite to their own position of dominance in their field. Resistance, at this point, was no longer polite, as the challenge became real. One of the first responses we see is the increased and eventually complete rejection of political authority which materialized in the form of censorship. Cioeta (1979: 178-9) examined the 64 warnings and suspensions issued between 1890 and 1908, comparing them to the 33 issued prior to 1890. Prior to 1890, most of the warnings were for unintentional violations, while after that year, 48 out of 64 warnings were issued for purposeful evasion and intentional defiance of censorship. Purpose and intentionality imply a deliberate choice to defy the censor, with the clear knowledge of the expected results. This was, again, a clear rejection of the symbolic power of the state which authorities sought to mirror onto the field of journalism.

The authorities' attempts to deprive them of their advantageous incorporated cultural capital, embodied in their skillful use of the Arabic language, also did not succeed. This was in part due to the malleability of the Arabic language and the vast lexical and grammatical choices it offers its users. Journalists exploited the idiomatic gifts of the language, countering with their linguistic tricks the ignorance of the *mektupcu*. They would use obscure words, change words slightly after censorship, use synonyms unknown to the censor, add or subtract dots on letters to change them, or substitute sentences after having received the approval of the censor (Cioeta, 1979: 178-9). While

these ploys did not always succeed, they nevertheless proved that it was impossible to effectively block the circulation of incorporated cultural capital in the field of journalism.

As for the introduction of a new social capital, the network revolving around regionalist identity, journalists and even society generally speaking mainly disregarded it and it rarely came to play any significant role in the fields of journalism and politics. Taysir Abu 'Arja (1997: 40-42) reproduced seven different contemporary newspapers' opinions about *al-Muqattam*, out of which only one mentioned the Syrian origins of the owners of the newspaper as being a reason for their opposition of the Egyptian nationalist movement. The other two mentions to that effect were produced in the years 1922 and 1925 (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 39, 51), during a time when the redrawing of state borders had become a reality and the intellectual and political debate had shifted to the formation of new national and state identities, a fact that Abu 'Arja does not take into consideration. This does not mean, however, that there were no frictions among the two communities, as many Egyptians during this period demanded to be included more fairly in state positions and there is even evidence to suggest that communal intermarriages were not very frequent (Philipp, 2009: 66-7). These frictions did not affect the fields of journalism and politics though for two main reasons. First, even though *al-Muqattam* was owned by and employed Syrians, there were also Syrians who were staunchly opposed to the British occupation. Two main examples are the Taqla brothers and Farah Antun whom I will discuss next. They were some of the most prominent anti-occupationist and nationalist voices until the rise of Mustafa Kamil and 'Ali Yusuf in the early 1890s. Second, politics was a domain that was still barred for Egyptians and Syrians alike, and therefore no friction between the two communities could exist there. The introduction of this new social capital had therefore very limited success in challenging the dominant group of journalists. Journalists disregarded it as being simply unimportant and being Syrian did not affect the anti-British position of many among them.

The act of defending both the autonomy of the field and the dominant position of a particular class within it was a continuation of the process of evolving the habitus of the journalists. They were facing new experiences, adapting to them, and incorporating them into their mode of behavior and thinking. This becomes clear in some of the innovative positions and actions they take, always introducing new features of legitimization and recognition, molding the ethos within the field in a way that perpetuated their own position of dominance. In this case, the biggest example is their

enactment of resistance not only as an actual choice of action, but also as a projected image, an illusion of sorts. Cioeta (1979: 176-7) reported that journalists at this point were inventing lists of supposedly banned words they were forbidden to use in their articles lest they be censored. They sometimes bordered the ridiculous, like when Jurji Zaydan claimed that words like *al-baqiyya ta'ti*, "to be continued" at the end of an article, was not permitted. Khalil Sarkis boasted that he had completely fabricated a story that passed censorship (Cioeta, 1979: 177). It was therefore important for them to present and maintain a well-defined image of their position of opposition to the authorities, an image of resistance that was not purely symbolic, but palpable and observable. This can only be explained by their need for their resistance to be publically recognized. It was probably a message to both readers and journalists alike who needed to understand that resistance was possible and under way.

This projected image of resisting authority became such a major component of journalism at that point in time that boasting about it gained the journalist more public recognition. Farah Antun, a Syrian intellectual, novelist, playwright, and journalist who edited many of Cairo's major newspapers, including *al-Balagh al-Misri*, *al-Liwa'*, *Misr al-Fatat*, *Misr*, *al-Watan*, *al-Ahali*, and *al-Mahrusa*, became famous for being the reason why several of them closed their doors due to suspensions. In one case, his articles led to the closure of *al-Ahali*. He directly changed its name to *al-Mahrusa* and it was suspended a month after. When the suspension period of six months ended, *al-Ahali* reappeared and Antun wrote its editorials again; the government closed it down two days later (Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 88-9). This is not to say that his point was to close the newspaper, but he clearly understood this process as a strategy, literally comparing it to military maneuvering. This strategy, however, served a purpose. When he was approached by an official with a warning, he replied: "I am sorry to tell you that I do not see my profession of writer as simply one of subsistence, but I chose this career to write exactly what you are reading. If I shall as a result be banned from writing what my conscience dictates, then I pray to find my livelihood in a profession other than writing", which the official advised him to start looking for (Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 86). He was immediately responsible for closing down three papers in quick succession.

Resistance to the attempts of changing the rules of the game inside the field of journalism was therefore both an action and an act. The image of resistance was as important as resistance itself. But unlike the action of resistance which was a riposte

against the actions of the authorities, resistance as a performance act was directed toward a different actor, the audience. The previous examples show two separate attitudes toward the audience. The first, represented by Jurji Zaydan and Khalil Sarkis, focused on the journalists themselves as the center of resistance. The act of simultaneous boasting and self-victimizing placed emphasis on the person of the journalist. It was Zaydan who could not use the words he wanted and was therefore a victim; it was Sarkis who was brave enough to defy the censor and ridicule him.

The second attitude was that of Antun who placed the emphasis on his audience. In his strategy of maneuvering, he told fellow intellectual Nqula al-Haddad that, even if the authorities closed down his newspaper, he could always "write books, pamphlets, novels, and plays about the inhabitants of the island of Waq Waq, and the people are smart enough to understand" (as quoted by Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 88). This emphasis on the common man was based in his strong belief in socialism, and Farah Antun is reputedly considered the first modern Arab socialist. His whole mission from going into journalism was to influence and benefit the "silent, ignorant, and oppressed people [that lives] at the bottom of the social ladder and does not recognize whether it really exists or not, with misery, suffering, and all the vices known to mankind surrounding it" (Makki Habib al-Mu'min and 'Ali Hujayl Munhil, 1981: 83). This distinction between the two attitudes, as will be demonstrated next, was probably the result of the generational difference between Sarkis and Zaydan, on the one hand, and Antun on the other. They were second-generation journalists, while Antun was part of the fourth generation, a point that will be discussed next; he was situated in a completely different social position.

II. A new journalist for a new audience

The different strategies reveal that the field of journalism during the 1880s was transforming into a field of struggles after it had been a field under construction in the previous decade. These struggles were the result of the attempt to dominate the field by a class that dominated the field of politics, and the challenge therefore came from outside the field of journalism. Having said that, the 1890s produced a different type of struggle, an internal one, which emerged from the adoption of a different strategy by the authorities, that of using capitals from within the field of journalism itself. The response came in the form of distinct position-taking on the part of some journalists. This can be

traced to both the evolving habitus, as well as the shift in the social position these journalists start from. Indeed, while the second generation still dominated journalism in both Beirut and Cairo, and the third generation having been physically removed from the field because of the failure of the political project they adhered to, a fourth generation emerged in the closing years of the 1880s to bring major changes to the field, most notably the first enduring challenge to the dominant political class.

A. A field of position-taking rather than social position

It began with the only largely successful measure taken by the British authorities to curb the influence of the press, the establishment of *al-Muqattam*, named after a mountain on the outskirts of Cairo; it was also the most important challenge established political journalists faced. The three founders of *al-Muqattam* possessed and used all the forms of capital already present in the field of journalism, placing them, in terms of social positioning, close to the political journalists of the time. As previously mentioned, they had received modern education at the hands of the Protestant missionaries in Beirut and worked in their education institutions for a time, before publishing *al-Muqtataf*, the most successful Arabic scientific journal of the time. The three men's unwavering support of liberalism as an ideology, political program, and intellectual framework, made them the best candidates to carry the banner of British rule, especially under the frame of the liberal image the British were trying to construct in Egypt. In fact, it was their wholehearted belief in liberalism which got them to Egypt in the first place. Having fully absorbed the modernist liberal ideology that came along with the Protestant missionaries' education in Beirut, they had to face the bitter fact that the missionaries themselves did not really believe in it. They worked for the better part of their lives to disseminate the liberal values of Western education, but eventually came face to face with the utter unwillingness of the missionaries to accept scientific notions that contradicted their faith, most notably Darwinism (Hanssen, 2005: 167). After the infamous debacle of 1882 at the Syrian Protestant College, when many students and teachers were expelled and fired over their support of Darwinism and its proponents, Nimr, Sarruf, and Makarius, felt that they had to leave, justifying their move in *al-Muqtataf*: "All our high schools in Egypt and Syria boast of such religious freedom except the school which was foremost among them, for it has abandoned this policy... turned away from its original purpose of spreading learning and sought to impose a particular creed on its pupils" (as quoted by Tibawi, 1967: 210). It is ironic that the one major case

of censorship driving journalists from Syria to Egypt during this period in time was the censorship imposed by the same group that ushered the era of the "free" private press in Beirut, and not the Ottoman authorities as many accounts would like us to believe. The result was that Nimr, Sarruf, and Makarius found their holy grail in the liberal rhetoric of the British colonial government of Egypt and were unconditionally supportive of it (Tibawi, 1967: 210; Cioeta, 1979: 179; Hannsen, 2005: 171).

Al-Muqattam proved to be a mighty challenge to its competitors. Even *al-Ahram* was not able to contend with it and its growing influence (Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1945: 152). This was partly due to the relative moderation of *al-Ahram*, the incompetence of other nationalist newspapers like *al-Watan*, and the practices of *al-Muqattam* and the support it obtained from the authorities. For example, it became public knowledge that *al-Muqattam* received much of its income from subscriptions by state officials who were forced to accept the paper because the fees were automatically deducted from their salaries (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 40). Ibrahim 'Abduh (1945: 152) rightly argued that Cromer's policy of "fighting journalism with journalism" was succeeding.

On December 1, 1889, however, a young man named 'Ali Yusuf received the financial and political backing of some nationalist figures and published *al-Mu'ayyad* (the supported one), the newspaper which will become the banner holder of the nationalist movement in Egypt for more than a decade and the most successful newspaper in Cairo before World War I. When *al-Muqattam* appeared on February 14, 1889, its mission statement read:

> It is our belief that the most esteemed function the press ought to achieve is to bring together both the rulers and the ruled, so that both could walk the simplest and shortest path. [...] The ruler of these lands, his highness the great Khedive, his most important vizier, the rest of the stately ministers, and other state officials have these lands' best interest at heart and seek its wellbeing. [...] It is therefore the object of this paper to convey the intentions of the rulers to the ruled, portraying their goodwill, as well as relaying the hopes and wishes of the ruled. [...] The paper will follow a creed of moderation and respect of laws and manners.

Their call of submission to authority was answered in a much simpler manner by *al-Mu'ayyad* (December 1, 1889), which claimed that its goal was to "fight the occupation and *al-Muqattam*". The newspaper's priorities were clear, its language held very little

ambiguity, its message resonated greatly. By 1897, it had become Egypt's most sold newspaper according to the confession of an editor from *al-Ahram* (Ryad, 2009: 38).

'Ali Yusuf (1863-1913), the founder of *al-Mu'ayyad*, came from a very peculiar background. He was born into a rural peasant family and was orphaned at an early age. It is unclear under these circumstances how he managed to receive even a basic religious education, yet he even advanced to join the ranks of al-Azhar. Unsurprisingly, he was bored with religious education and decided to shift his attention to literature and history. It was probably around that time that he came under the influence of the teachings of al-Afghani (Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1945: 152; Kelidar, 1981: 14). He worked for a bit as a journalist, editing a literary magazine, *al-Adab* (humanities) for a few years before he was chosen by a group of nationalists to head the newspaper that was to oppose *al-Muqattam* (Goldsmith, 2000: 230-1; Kelidar, 1981: 11). His low reputation and lack of political experience led many to believe that he was only a front for the nationalists who truly controlled the newspaper; the fact that their articles filled its pages reinforced this belief (Kelidar, 1981: 11). 'Ali Yusuf's distinctive style was, however, the eventual reason why the paper succeeded. 'Abbas Hilmi II (r.1892-1914) attributed this success to his humble origins which allowed him to better understand the common Egyptian man and to be able to better communicate with him ('Abbas Hilmi II, 1993: 112). Indeed, his complete lack of knowledge of European languages made him quite an exception to the general notion of the journalist of that age (Sulayman Salih, 1990: 19). His career still shone as he climbed the social ladder, becoming a close associate and friend of khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II whose interests he represented in his paper from the moment the young man acceded to Egypt's nominal throne in 1892 till the moment Yusuf retired from public life in 1912.

This background, however, was not characteristic of a class which followed similar political choices or career interests. *An-Nil* appeared on December 17, 1891, and was published by Hasan Husni at-Tuwayrani, a journalist who had previously edited *al-Insan*, an Arabic newspaper in Istanbul. His new endeavor quickly failed for two reasons. First, as Filib di Tarrazi (1913, vol.3: 44) claimed, Tuwayrani chose to adopt a position similar to *al-Muqattam*, which proved to be disappointing for the public who shied away from the paper. He also quoted a contemporary commentator who had a very interesting remark that emphasizes one of the key arguments of this chapter:

the failure of the paper was because it did not fulfill its role like *al-Muqattam*, for even if they had the same position, one failed and the other succeeded. [...] The owners of *al-Muqattam* were raised in the most prominent Western school in the East, the Syrian Protestant College, learned at the hands of the most brilliant Western scholars, and were therefore trained in modern civility, sciences, liberty, all of which were fundamental to them. The owner of *an-Nil* was, on the other hand, a product of a system of emulation and memorization, an old system which produced great writers, but fanatics all the same (as quoted by Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 45).

Traditional Islamic education might partially account for why the style of Tuwayrani did not encourage readers to pick up his newspaper. We must remember, however, that Yusuf received similar education, and it was exactly his style that earned him his fame as a journalist. This difference might be explained by the position-taking of Yusuf which resonated with his public who are readers and consumers of news in the field of journalism, but also have their views and opinions in the field of politics, no matter how marginal they are. This, as a result, explains how a traditional style would greatly resonate among an audience that shared a similar position from British occupation.

This was equally the case with Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and his newspaper, *al-Manar*. Rida received his education in a *kuttab* school in Tripoli and, fascinated by copies of *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa*, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's newspaper published in Paris and young Rida found among his father's papers, he left Syria for Cairo to pursue a career as journalist (Ryad, 2009: 33). He continued his education in al-Azhar, becoming Muhammad 'Abduh's chief disciple (Goldsmith, 2000: 166). In 1898, he established *al-Manar* with the support of his master who bolstered the reputation and circulation of the newspaper by featuring in it his explanations of the Quran. 'Abduh by then had become a major figure and authority as an Islamic scholar. *Al-Manar* became known as a major flagship of Islamic journalism, featuring subjects such as mystical reflections, explanation of doctrine, a famous commentary on the Quran, fatwas, and Rida's views on political developments (Ryad, 2009: 28). The success of the newspaper was achieved despite the old traditional writing style that characterized it. Even a quarter of a century after it was founded, *al-Manar*'s style had not evolved to become more easily readable. For example, in one of the newspaper's most famous articles, the reader has to wait till the fourth page to encounter the first full stop (*al-Manar*, 1924: 310-314). This is not surprising, considering that traditional Arabic does not use punctuation, but this practice had been dropped during the early days of Arabic printing in the nineteenth century. As a result,

even though Rida tried to find a broad audience among notables and government officials, his only success remained within the class of jurists (Ryad, 2009: 44). The success of such an endeavor can therefore be only attributed to the particular audience it targeted, its niche in the field, and therefore the homology between Rida as a producer of information and news, and his audience as its consumers.

The importance of position-taking at this point is further highlighted by the experience of Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908). The son of an army officer of the new military order, he was educated at government schools and the French Law School in Cairo. He then went to Toulouse to obtain a law degree and then returned to Cairo to become one of the most recognized, respected, and successful voices of the nationalist movement there (Goldsmith, 2000: 101-2). Kamil mixed a career of journalist, public orator, and street agitator. He personally headed a mob that assaulted the offices of *al-Muqattam* in January 1893, right around the time he began writing for *al-Ahram* (Ayalon, 1995: 55, 57). Having gained notice with the khedive, he entered his close circles and also began writing for *al-Mu'ayyad*. In 1900, he chose to establish his own newspaper, *al-Liwa'* (the standard). This is generally attributed to the competition between Kamil and 'Ali Yusuf over the graces of and influence over the khedive (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 59). Four years later, when the French and the British agreed on their spheres of influence in the colonial world with their "entente cordiale", the khedive, and consequently Yusuf, decided to tune down their rhetoric since there was no longer any possible assistance Egypt could expect from any European power to counter Britain's dominance and thus conceded to the reality of their powerlessness. Mustafa Kamil was therefore left alone as the main nationalist journalist in Egypt, his rhetoric inflaming the readers. He was known to be the first secular Muslim reformer to use the term "*ash-sha'b*", "the people" in the modern political sense of the word to refer to the common Egyptians who refused to be ruled by the British (Zolondek, 1965: 1).

Mustafa Kamil's social background therefore differed from 'Ali Yusuf, even though they shared a relatively similar outlook on the political field. It equally differed from that of the second generation journalists, in that they received their European education from missionary schools and the educational system they had established, while Kamil received his education from the new government schools established around the European model, but which remained largely secular. It was during this period that we see a rise in the number of people who received their education at secular

government schools and who chose to pursue a career in journalism, which had never been the case before, since government schools usually graduated individuals who found waiting employment in the state bureaucracy, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter. One explanation for this change in the choice of a prospective career might have to do with the fact that government schools in 1900s Egypt, and particularly Law School, had begun to overproduce graduates who were no longer able to find employment (Reid, 1977: 367). It was equally during this same period that lawyers began to increasingly be involved in politics. Reid (1977: 362) counted four lawyers in the six-man 1908 cabinet in Egypt; the first lawyer to become a minister two years before was Sa'd Zaghlul. This indicates that other professionals were equally trying to integrate the field of politics and that journalists were not a unique group who saw the period as one of opportunity.

Kamil thus shared a similar background with Farah Antun and Dawud Barakat (1870-1933). Barakat received his education at a very famous government school in Beirut (Rizk, 2003). He then moved to Egypt where he worked as a teacher for four years, until he made a career change and began writing for *al-Mahrusa*. He then helped Yusuf al-Khazin to establish *al-Akhbar*, before becoming an editor in *al-Ahram* in 1899. He took over the position of editor-in-chief of the paper when its founder Bishara Taqla died suddenly in 1901. Barakat, unlike his other two contemporaries, chose not to conflate politics and political journalism, which might have been the reason why *al-Ahram* was seen to be not radical enough during this period, even though it still espoused a nationalist line in its editorials. He was the one journalist who sought to make of journalism a "professional" vocation, trying to convene journalists on many occasions to try and define what a "journalist" was, and even tried to establish a syndicate before World War I (Rizk, 2003). These attempts largely failed because no one at this point was interested in the "professionalization" of journalism. It was such a failure that there does not seem to be any evidence of it, not even in *al-Ahram* itself. I could not find a mention of a journalists syndicate prior to World War I, nor is it mentioned in the very lengthy and detailed content analysis of the newspaper presented by Ibrahim 'Abduh (1951).

Barakat's views on how journalism ought to be had, however, an entirely different result which still lives on even today. While he did not manage to professionalize journalism as a practice, he did succeed in promoting a spirit of professionalism and institutionalization into the newspaper he managed. He is one of the main people who are credited with promoting practices that made *al-Ahram* transcend

its contemporary competitors and become an institutional endeavor rather than the materialization of the efforts of a single individual, as almost all other newspapers were. Some argued that it was because of the style adopted by the newspaper, that of investigative journalism and news reporting, which professionalized the journalists and reporters working for the newspaper, while creating a pool of dedicated readers who gathered around it (Mahmud Adham, 1985: 14-16).

If we examine the pages of *al-Ahram*, though, we can easily notice that the professionalization of the position of journalist and reporter who worked for it had begun prior to Barakat's appointment as editor-in-chief. When it turned from a weekly to a daily, *al-Ahram* declared on its first page that some improvements to the paper were needed, and that it will start following the journalistic methods used in the West to do so (*al-Ahram*, January 3, 1881). The first step, according to the editor, was to drop the use of the long lists of titles newspapers usually used to refer to different officials, to be replaced by the short official title that such people held. Ibrahim 'Abduh (1951: 58-9) noticed that there was also a shift in the writing style of the newspaper at the same time. When it was a weekly paper, *al-Ahram* could afford the time to care for an eloquent form of writing known as *saj'*. But when it became a daily, this style had to be dropped for the more direct, simple, and quick style known as *mursal*, the style which came to define journalism later on. To showcase his point, he compared the two styles. In the first, the journal was reporting on the weather: "the face of our skies has cleared and there appeared the light in its glory after the clouds had blocked it from us for a few days"; in *mursal*, a reporter wrote about the first usage of a telephone in the city: "at nine in the morning, the telephone was tested in our city. The event was witnessed by the governor, the police chief, and other notables. Tomorrow's issue will cover more details of the event". From August to October 1881, Bishara Taqla also introduced the Arabic newspapers to the art of interviewing, as he published a series of interviews he had with European politicians during his European tour. When the Dinshawi incident took place, *al-Ahram* was the only newspaper to actually send a team to investigate and report on the events on the spot (*al-Ahram*, July 13, 1906; July 16, 1906). I could not find any explanation on the pages of the newspaper as to why its editors decided to pursue this particular style of journalism, except that they often claimed that they sought the "truth" or that this was how Western newspapers operated.

The result, however, was this process of professionalization which Dawud Barakat pushed forward. What made him such a key figure was that he acted as a caretaker for the newspaper until Taqla's only remaining descendant, his son Gabriel, came of age and acquired his education so that he could manage the business of running the newspaper. By carrying on the style of journalism that the Taqla brothers decided to adopt, and then passing on the paper to Gabriel, Barakat must have created a sense of continuation for both the paper and its readers. At the same time, operating and writing in the paper became dominated by a detached style which permitted its professionalization. It was the first newspaper which was not driven by the fire of a political project or a zealous mission. Journalism for *al-Ahram*, its writers, editors, and owners, was a job and a profession. Many saw this as the height of the representation of Arabic objective journalism and reporting (Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1951; Mahmud Adham, 1985; Kitchen, 1950). Taha Hussein would later describe *al-Ahram*: "it is the record of our modern existence, a keeper of the minutes of Egyptian life" (Taha Husayn, 1951: 1-4). *Al-Ahram* was the closest journal to advance the notion of journalistic neutrality in its news reporting. It clearly differentiated between that and polemic editorials which were an entirely different matter.

Examining these different individuals, their social backgrounds, and their different choices in the field of journalism, clearly indicates that the field was radically changing during the 1890s. It opened up to actors who came from different social backgrounds, breaking the second generation's hegemony over the field of journalism. The new actors came mainly from the new government educational system, a more or less secular system which was a hybrid between indigenous and European. While it advanced the use of European sciences and techniques, the cultural normative values it promoted were still to some extent native. This is what Sharabi (1970: 87) labeled the "intellectual polarity" of the Muslim seculars for whom secularism never reached the point of becoming dogma and were therefore stranded between an acceptance and a rejection of modernity, or at least different facets of it. What Sharabi conveniently dismisses, however, is the fact that this class was comprised of both Muslims and Christians, as shown above. This clearly indicates that position-taking had come to take priority over homology in the field, especially due to the newfound diversity in the producers, consumers, and challengers inside the field.

We see that during this period, social position started becoming less important than position-taking in determining the success of a newspaper, whether financially or in terms of audience. With the second generation, acquiring an audience was partly a product of the homology between the producer and the consumer of news. They were both part of the same class, shared similar positions, and had similar interests. With the fourth generation of journalists, emphasis was placed on position-taking in the field of politics, which producers and their respective consumers shared, even if we could still see homology playing a smaller role, as journalists still attracted segments of their own class to their newspaper. Claiming that position-taking became more important simply comes from the comparison of 'Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil who came from two very different backgrounds but ended up sharing the same views on politics and the same audience for their publications.

B. Social capital as the new dominant capital

One thing that further brought them together, though, was the social capital they shared from belonging to the close circle of the khedive. Social capital during this time became much more pronounced as an operating capital in the field of journalism. Being close to the khedive meant more prestige and exposure for both Yusuf and Kamil. Yusuf invested this capital both in the field of journalism, as well as to try and improve his position in the social order. All sources agree that his humble social background haunted him for the rest of his life, and being so close to the most prestigious position in Egypt, that of the khedive, was one means for him to try and turn the page on this past (Kelidar, 1981: 12-3). He also tried to further his ambitions by marrying up into an aristocratic family, but the father of the bride took him to court and had the marriage annulled on the basis that someone from the *'awam*, the common folk, could not marry into the *ashraf*, the nobles, and, furthermore, he accused Yusuf of being a journalist as a further proof of his lowly status (Kelidar, 1981: 18; Ayalon, 1992: 266). The intervention of the khedive eventually led the father of the bride to accept Yusuf who even ended up succeeding him as the head of the Sufi order his father-in-law once lead.

In the field of journalism, his social capital translated into access to information. One of the first ways in which Lord Cromer tried to curb the growing influence of *al-Mu'ayyad* was to bar its access to officials and news, issuing a decree that forbade officials and government bureaus from giving the newspaper any information or news (Sulayman Salih, 1990: 75). The palace, however, was a constant source of such

information, especially at the time when it was at the center of the nationalist movement, that is between 1892 and 1904 (Kelidar, 1981: 12). Yusuf also used his contacts to receive information in more original and unconventional ways. In 1896, when the British sent their expedition to the Sudan, access to information was restricted to *al-Muqattam* which would only feature the official version of events. In July of that year, *al-Mu'ayyad* began publishing the complete telegraphs sent from the army in Sudan, which told that they were suffering from an outbreak in cholera, a fact which the British administration was trying hard to cover. 'Ali Yusuf had apparently convinced a telegraph employee to supply him with copies of the telegraphs. Both Yusuf and the employee were dragged to court where Yusuf, in a very interesting twist, refused to admit that it was the employee who supplied him with information, claiming that it would contradict *usul al-mihna*, the "ethics of the profession" (Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 79). He was acquitted to public acclaim for his victory over the British administration. This is very interesting because, at that time, there was nothing even resembling a professional ethic for journalists, a point which a couple of contemporary journalists actually lamented over (Ayalon, 1992: 262, 267-8). He would never refer to such ethics again, nor would any other journalist during this period, which leads me to believe that it was only a practice and a notion used in Europe he had heard of and used to circumvent the British accusations without it meaning anything for him nor anyone else at that time.[9]

As for the social capital and its use in the field of journalism, we can see that it applied not only to the case of 'Ali Yusuf, but to others as well. It was mentioned on many occasions here that its closeness to the British administration gave *al-Muqattam* steady and sometimes privileged access to official information and also generated economic capital, as discussed before. From this perspective, it was a different social capital than the one the British intended to incorporate into the field of journalism, as the social capital which came to influence the field was the division of recognized networks which were to a large extent institutionalized - the colonial administration on the one hand, and the palace and the nationalists on the other. These two networks, while seemingly simple political groups, operated in different fields differently, but often in as struggling factions within each field, whether the political field, the field of the state (*champ étatique*), the

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[9] Ibrahim 'Abduh (1951: 344) mentioned that *al-Ahram* used the same reason to refuse identifying one of its own writers whom Sa'd Zaghlul had accused of slander. 'Abduh, however, does not give a date for when this happened, nor does he quote or cite the source of his information, even though he is very thorough in the rest of his book. Also, I could not find any evidence on the pages of *al-Ahram* to corroborate this story, which makes me doubt its authenticity.

economic field, etc. In the field of journalism, they served each class within them differently. For the journalists, the networks were primarily a source of information, but also of a certain legitimacy, as was the case of Yusuf 'Ali for example.

But others, like the British administration and the khedive, were equally investing this social capital in the field of journalism, influencing the position-taking of its actors, even if not always successfully. A most striking example is given in khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II's autobiography. Discussing Mustafa Kamil, he claimed that the young journalist "said things in my name I could not say myself" ('Abbas Hilmi II, 1993: 117). There is no evidence, however, that there was any kind of active cooperation in terms of rhetoric between the khedive and Mustafa Kamil, and the khedive's statement might have been more a matter of posterior reflection on what was most probably a matter of convergence of opinions rather than anything else. Again, we see the issue of position-taking coming to the front, for it tells us more about the investment of social capital in the field of journalism on the part of different political actors. And in the same way as 'Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil could through their rhetoric identify with the interests of the khedive and the nationalist forces, Nimr, Sarruf, and Makarius identified with the British administration and thus promoted its interests within the field (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 37).

Social capital thus became the dominant form of capital in the field of journalism at this point, and the networks to which the journalists belonged came to qualify much of their work as journalists. These networks were the starting point for these journalists. 'Ali Yusuf, Mustafa Kamil, Faris Nirm, Ya'qub as-Sarruf, and Shahin Makarius, all had their preferences, positions, and the will to go into political journalism to begin with, but they also wanted or received the backing of either the palace or the British administration. This backing materialized in the form of public exposure, legitimacy by association, and in more concrete ways, such as financial benefits and access to information. Sometimes, some of these elements were combined. For example, sources tell us that many people were forced to receive *al-Muqattam* simply because its subscription fees were automatically deducted from their salaries. They do not tell us, however, how many people chose to read the paper knowing that it was the most reliable publication of official information. With the change in the form of the dominant capital, however, the shape of the field also changed, especially that, in this case, the source of the new dominant capital came from outside the field. It was not generated by the journalists

themselves, but by the social groups who were trying to dislodge these journalists from their dominant position in the field. It was the start of a process which will completely change the relationship between the fields of journalism and politics.

III. From political journalist to journalist politician

The previous section revealed that as soon as journalists tried to escape their social seclusion in which they existed in prior to the early 1880s, the field of journalism became a field of struggle, not only among journalists themselves, but between journalists and the dominant political class. The struggle took place mainly within the field of journalism where the dominant position of the journalists of the second generation was being challenged. The reaction of the journalists, however, initiated a different process through which the symbolic power of the authorities was being challenged. With the introduction of a new form of social capital into the field of journalism, these two opposing tendencies began to diverge into a single form of struggle. The literature traditionally understands this struggle as one between authority and opposition, and most historical accounts of the press in Beirut and Cairo during the closing years before World War I argue that it was playing a role of increasing resistance to authorities (Ayalon, 1995: 60; 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 97; Tauber, 1990; Tauber, 2006). These accounts, however, disregard the presence of newspapers that strongly supported authorities, like *al-Muqattam* and *al-Watan*, as well as a few newspapers which stayed out of the political debate like *al-Ahram*, *al-Manar*, and *al-Fallah*. The Arabic press was far from being homogeneous. This is the starting point from which we can conceive these camps acting as forces of status-quo and forces of change within the field of journalism and in an inverted role in the field of politics.

The final major transformation to the field of journalism before World War I once again came from changes within the field of politics. Two events shook the fields of politics in Beirut and Cairo. They occurred almost simultaneously and had similar effects in both cities. The first was the resignation of Lord Cromer in 1907 from his position as consul-general after the Dinshaway incident. The summary execution of four innocent Egyptian peasants accused of killing a British soldier galvanized Egyptian nationalists and ended the political career of Lord Cromer who was succeeded by Eldon Gorst. In the spirit of the liberal mission of the British occupation, he began promoting self-government and

a reconciliation with the khedive (Daly, 1998: 243).The second event was the Young Turk revolution which deposed Abdul Hamid II and reinstated the Ottoman constitution and parliament in 1908. Both these events opened up to some extent the political field in a similar way as the events of 1879 did. From the perspective of their evolving habitus, and having experienced such changes in the past with the 'Urabi Revolution, journalists recognized the opportunity and jumped at the occasion.

A. New politics for a new journalism

The very instant the political field supposedly opened up, journalists introduced a new vehicle through which they and their newspapers could enter the political arena: political parties. By 1907, 'Ali Yusuf had founded Hizb al-Islah (reform party) with *al-Mu'ayyad* as its mouthpiece. Mustafa Kamil founded al-Hizb al-Watani (the national party) represented by *al-Liwa'* . *Al-Muqattam* became the organ of al-Hizb al-Watani al-Hurr (the free national party). Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid founded Hizb al-Umma (the party of the nation) and the newspaper *al-Jarida* (the newspaper) simultaneously (Ayalon, 1995: 60; Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 71; 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 84). In Beirut, the process was somehow similar, except that the vehicle of political integration was different. Politics there turned into a competition between the notables of the nineteenth century and the *zu'ama'*, the old traditional feudal leadership. Parties and political associations revolved around these individuals, and the press attached itself to them, some journalists becoming part of their political movements and even ran with them in the elections (Hanssen, 2005: 72-6). This was a phenomenon worth noting, according to 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza ([1958-1961]: 84), since it shows that politics was born out of the press, a comment I will return to later.

Journalists took their newfound role very seriously. It was the culmination of decades during which they danced around the field of politics without being able to become actors within it, except for that brief moment during the 'Urabi revolution. At the same time, it became a trend that if anyone had anything to say in the realm of politics, they would simply create a newspaper and say it. During those years, Ayalon (1995: 60) claims that 250 newspapers were founded in Cairo alone, most of them with names such as al-Jihad ("Holy War"), *al-Hurriyya* (liberty), *al-Nahda* (renaissance), *al-Istiqlal* (independence), *al-Indhar* (the warning), and *al-Ahrar* (the liberals). To these we can add many Beiruti newspapers which also bore similar names, such as *al-Haqiqa* (truth), *al-Islah* (reformation), and *Lisan al-'Arab* (the voice of the Arabs). They truly believed they

were free and that the dawn of liberty had come, for both those who consistently supported the government as well as those who opposed it.

The newspapers' discourse changed accordingly, as journalists unleashed what can only be described as pent-up frustration that had been building up for a while, and with the new transformations to the political field, they could now say whatever they wanted. This was reflected by a score of publications which were nothing more than handwritten student newsletters, showing that their aim had little to do with circulation and more with political expression (Ayalon, 1995: 63). Ayalon further stressed that such a fast rate of growth in the number of publications after 1908 could hardly be supported by the still relatively low numbers of possible readers, many of whom were already used to reading the more established newspapers, further showing that the act of producing a political discourse was more important for some than its circulation. The more radical rhetoric of some of the new periodicals, however, earned them an audience in the fast changing political landscape, and newspapers quickly became a "vehicle to spread national ideas" (Tauber, 1990).

Doing otherwise proved to be fatal to some newspapers. When the constitution was reinstated, *Thamarat al-Funun* praised the new age, describing it as a test according to which the people's maturity and worth is judged (*Thamarat al-Funun*, August 3, 1908). In the same issue, Rafiq al-'Azm, a respected shaykh, wrote that the new age was all about forgetting the past and working toward reforms undertaken by the most qualified, a moderate and reasonable call. It was not, however, a time for moderation. Only three months later, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani wrote the editorial of the last issue of the newspaper, claiming that no one was reading it, even after thirty-four years of being the most prominent Muslim newspaper in Beirut, and that since there were now others like it, his newspaper became less useful than it was before (*Thamarat al-Funun*, November 2, 1908). Another example of this can be found in *al-Haqiqa*, founded by Ahmad 'Abbas al-Azhari and with Hasan an-Natur as editor-in-chief. In its opening article, it accused previous Ottoman administrators and officials of being criminals, promising them retribution now that the constitution had been promulgated again. Such accusations were now permitted because "the sword of injustice was now sick and the jail door opened" (*al-Haqiqa*, February 6, 1909). These attacks soon subsided for a more moderate and conciliatory position from the government often calling for a less radical approach to reforms; that was until 1913 when the Young Turks began their policy of Turkification of

the Arab provinces. Still, moderation once again proved a bad choice for someone trying to gather an audience or spread his message. *Al-Haqiqa* gained such little attention that when its founder died, a lengthy obituary in the Islamic *al-Manar* (1926: 386) never mentioned his periodical once.

Other more radical publications like *al-Mufid* gained wide readership extremely fast. Founded by 1909, it became one of Beirut's most read newspapers before the war. 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, the newspaper's co-editor and its most famous polemicist, had become one of the most followed advocate of Arab nationalism (Khalidi, 1981: 43). Throughout 35 issues Khalidi (1981: 47) chose to study, nationalist themes with titles such as "the Arab youth and his general duty", "nationality and language", "how to reinforce the Arab nationality", and "how the Arabs can rise", made up 25 of their editorials. 'Uraysi was even more vehemently anti-European. In Egypt, the political debate heated up even more than before. Taysir Abu 'Arja (1997: 80) quotes a "dialogue" between *al-Muqattam* and *al-Liwa'*, in which the first says: "the only ones opposing the extension of the Canal's concessions are *al-Liwa'* and its people, but *al-Liwa'* and its followers are worthless", to which *al-Liwa'* answers: "a mercenary has no dignity; let *al-Muqattam* shut up".

Political opinions had become the backbone of political journalism in Beirut and Cairo, and the more radical these opinions were, the more successful the journal was. This was not just for opposition newspapers. *Al-Muqattam* during this period was still growing strong, as its wrath became more focused with the establishment of political parties in Egypt and the adoption of clear opinions in the Beirut press. In an article about the political parties in Egypt written by an unnamed "major intellectual and famous imam", opposition parties were berated and ridiculed. They were accused of fostering discord, promoting the self-interests of their leaders, and not caring about the national interest of Egypt (*al-Muqattam*, January 30, 1908). In 1911, they attacked the Ottomanist newspaper *at-Tanin* for being clueless about Syrian patriotism, as the Damascene paper had accused the local press of promoting Arab nationalism which, for an Ottoman subject, amounted to treason. *Al-Muqattam* defended the Syrian press, making different and sometimes contradictory claims. At one point this press was innocent of such accusations, at others it admitted that Arab nationalism was a claim of the press in Syria, but that this did not constitute treason, and finally that this press was right in calling for a break from the backward Ottoman authorities (*al-Muqattam*, April 28, 1911; April 29,

1911; May 6, 1911; 26 May 1911; July 1, 1911). At a time of political turmoil, consistency seemed to matter very little for newspapers, correctness even less.

Another example of such behavior can be found in *al-watan*, one of the most nationalist papers in Cairo before it was sold to Jundi Ibrahim in 1900. Ibrahim sought to become the most prominent Coptic figure in Egypt, and adopted a strategy of scorning and vilifying other Coptic leaders to do so. Under his supervision, *al-Watan* became a staunch opponent to the nationalist movement, claiming that Egypt deserved neither constitution nor independence, and resorting to slander and personal attacks to promote its owner's position within his own community. Ibrahim's strategy seems to have backfired, as he often found himself dragged to court on accounts of defamation of character and slander, and he never became the Coptic representative he wanted to be (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 11-12).

B. Journalism as a vehicle

In the same way as journalists attempted to become politicians through their periodicals, aspiring politicians found in the press a ready and willing vehicle to spread their ideas. I have previously mentioned Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid (1872-1963) who founded the Party of the Nation and the newspaper *al-Jarida* in 1907. Coming from a family of landowners, he received his education at the Cairo Law School from which he graduated in 1894. He worked until 1907 as a lawyer, first as a prosecutor and then as in private practice (Goldsmith, 2000: 183). As-Sayyid then got together with a small number of notables and decided to found a newspaper that was truly "free, and that spoke for Egypt and Egypt alone, without having to support Turkey, the executive, or the real power in the country, a paper that was owned by the notables" (Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, 2013: 22). The newspaper introduced itself to its readers in its first issue:

> This is an Egyptian newspaper. Its slogan is moderation and honesty and it seeks to guide the Egyptian nation toward the proper path of evolution, advise the government and the nation as to the priorities and benefits to consider, and to criticize both individuals and government with full freedom [...]. Politics is the bringing together of people's opinions, for this is what a public opinion means [...]. But people in newly developed country still do not think about the public good and are rather taken by their private needs, that is until the newspapers reminds them daily that there is a public existence beyond the individual [...] (*al-Jarida*, March 9, 1907).

This is one more case of moderation gone wrong. Even though Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid was generally well respected and he had close contacts with many high ranking officials, his political ambitions and career came to naught. His autobiography is an account of one failure after another in trying to implement anything in politics, and it seems that the only thing he managed to do successfully was write what he wanted in his newspaper. He suggested the adoption of an Egyptian flag; the British politely declined. He, along with Dawud Barakat, helped found a journalists syndicate in 1912 in which he was voted co-deputy; the efforts did not go beyond that and the syndicate was abandoned. He ran for election in 1913; he failed (Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, 2013: 81-86). This string of failures led him to eventually despair from politics altogether and even stop his work as a journalist (Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, 2013: 99-100). Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid's experience is a perfect example how cultural and social capitals during this period had taken a backseat to position-taking in the field of politics. It did not matter how educated one was, or whom in the government he personally knew. If he did not find a niche for his political opinion, the previous capitals could not become political capital and his involvement in politics would come to naught.

Others chose a less conciliatory path, as the burgeoning secret societies began taking over newspapers to propagate their messages and project an image that went beyond their relative strength as a political group (Tauber, 1990: 167). A prominent member of *jam'iyyat an-nahda al-lubnaniyya*, the Lebanese Renaissance society, a secret society promoting independence for a Lebanese state along the lines of the mutasarrifiyya, Rizqallah Arqash managed to place members of the society at the head of most of Beirut and Lebanon's newspapers, including *al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani*, *al-Ahwal*, *an-Nasir*, *at-Thabat*, *al-Arz*, *Lisan al-Hal*, and *al-Mir'at* (Tauber, 1990: 165). The Decentralization Party and the Reform Party also found their niches in their respective newspapers. The Decentralization Party, the most prominent Arab nationalist party at the time managed to gain support across the Arab world, and was therefore equally present in Cairo as it was in Beirut, represented there on the pages of *al-Ahram*, *al-Miqdam*, *al-Mahrusa*, *al-Manar*, *al-Mu'ayyad*, and *al-Muqattam* (Tauber, 1990: 166). Why these political groups chose to invest their political capital in journalism and why they saw the press as the appropriate vehicle for their ideas is a very important indicator as to what the role of journalism had become, a point which will be discussed next.

IV. An autonomous field no more

All these changes put together brought about the complete transformation of the field of journalism from an autonomous field to a sub-field of the political field. The first signs of this came when the dominant political class tried to challenge the rules within the field of journalism, until they were able to do so with the introduction of new forms of capital, social capital revolving around networks with this dominant class at their center. The social capital, being foreign to the field, i.e. generated within a different field and then invested in the field of journalism, was the first and most important element of this transition. At the same time, this process was accompanied by a clear challenge to the symbolic power of the state and its representative, the absolute ruler. This, in practice, was a result of the investment of symbolic capital on the behalf of journalists in the field of politics and specifically in what can be perceived as the sub-field of the state. In this case, it is conceivable to conflate the two since the shape of the political game, which can be labeled as absolute despotism, meant that the state was but a materialization of the authority and power of the ruler, especially when we consider the role and impact of the institutions of the state, and most notably the army, in consolidating a rule both in terms of authority and legitimacy.

The result is that, like stated before, the relationship between the two fields involved the production of a particular form of capital in one, and its investment on the part of the field's dominant class in the other field, hoping to change the relations of domination there. Since this was a two-way process, this meant that each dominant class was also trying to preserve its position of dominance within its own field. The authorities had quite an advantage in this regard. They had ample supplies of different forms of capitals and they could also use a key tool in their hand, the symbolic power of the state taking in this case the form of the ultimate authority of the ruler, the legal framework of censorship, but also access to official information which they were its source. Journalists, on the other hand, only had their symbolic capital, the recognition they received from the product they placed on the market. Their production process served them more in this regard, as they managed through it to subvert the authorities attempts to infiltrate into the field.

Eventually, what allowed journalists to go on the offensive was first the transformation of the political field, allowing them access. And, more importantly, journalists managed at this point to combine their symbolic capital with a weakness they

had suffered from before, their political exclusion and alienation. Since they shared this exclusion with *ash-sha'b*, the people, the common man, they were able to claim representative status over this people by voicing opinions in its name. 'Abd al-Latif Hamza ([1958-1961]: 97) considered that the press during those years fulfilled its "true role of opinion journalism". His assessment reveals that opinions and position-taking were the most important components which allowed journalists to entirely assimilate the "mystery of ministry", the power of representation of a group which comes to exist because of this representation. In this case, the creation of opinions was combined with a position-taking that placed the journalists in the field of politics with people who came to be Arabs, Ottomans, Lebanese, or Egyptians, group identities which were represented by their respective press outlets by journalists who therefore spoke in their names. This mystery of ministry and the power of representation were therefore the ultimate demonstration that the symbolic capital generated by journalists within the field of journalism was being invested as political capital in the field of politics.

This transformation affected all the elements of the field of journalism. The journalist who was once deemed worthy to read based on his education or the intellectual circles he belonged to was no more. During the closing years before the Great War, the journalist who attracted an audience was the one with better connections to political circles, and who could therefore gain better access to information and present more valuable opinions, as reflected by the success of newspapers that were by then focusing on "opinion journalism" rather than political analysis, as was the case with the second generation. The determining capital therefore shifted from the cultural to the social capital which became the most important component of the symbolic capital within the field. This symbolic capital, coupled with the power of representation, allowed journalists to present themselves as the legitimate speakers in the name of their communities. This act of representation only had value in the political field where the liberalization of the system was seemingly introducing the model of the modern Europeanized system of governance. As shown throughout this chapter, the apparent liberalization of the political system seemed for journalists to be the stash of leprechaun gold at the end of the rainbow they had been chasing ever since the threat or promise of Europe had revealed to them the superiority of this foreign system which they sought since so hard to emulate.

The bigger implication here is that the goal from journalistic production had become the generating of political capital. It was the main objective of acquiring the mystery of ministry; and it was the main reason why political actor with little political capital, like secret societies, chose to pursue representation via journalistic production. Tauber (1990: 167) argued that, by using the press, these societies were in fact seeking to present themselves as more powerful and representative than they really are. The mechanisms which allowed this revolved around this newfound role of journalism. But most importantly, the generation of political capital from journalistic production meant that journalism could no longer be counted as an independent field. Journalistic production had become a process that was internal to the field of politics, operating based on capitals which were generated in the field of politics, with actors who saw themselves first and foremost as actors in the field of politics, and generated a capital which only served as an investment in the field of politics. Journalism had become a sub-field inside the field of politics.

Chapter VIII

The role of the Arabic press, a path to a social theory of media

The aim of this chapter is to examine the evolving roles that the Arabic press played throughout this period. I argue that the current theories that fall under the liberal paradigm do not explain any of these roles, as they impose a particular teleological and decontextualized reading on the role of media. In this case, it distorted the explanations offered in the literature about the roles the press played in Beirut and Cairo. It has been presented as a liberal and liberating force in society, whereas evidence shows that journalism was mostly a tool of political conservatism, accepting and participating in the game of elite politics, while it played at the social level the role of a mechanism through which journalists could climb the social ladder and gain recognition for it. The chapter will conclude with some notes and reflections on Bourdieu's theory, how it helped properly understand this case study and address the shortcomings of the current theories, as well as the obstacles it raised.

I. The role of the Arabic press

The question of what is the role of the Arabic press in the politics of the time is a very misleading question. It connotes that the press played a single role in politics, a trap in which the literature always fell, promoting a teleological analysis of that role. The usual story is that the Arabic press was a promoter of a vibrant bourgeois liberal democracy which was fought and nipped in the bud by tyrants, both homegrown or foreign, depending on the origins of the historian and the particular axe he has to grind. Filib di Tarrazi (1913), composing the first ever encyclopedic account of the Arabic press in the world, wrote his four volume book at the heyday of the first wave of Arab nationalism, and at a time when anti-Hamidian and anti-Turkish feelings were also at their height. His short analyses of some journalistic trends were often tainted by these feelings and he was one of the first to spread the myth that journalists escaped Beirut for Cairo during the late 1870s early 1880s because of censorship. 'Abd al-Latif Hamza ([1958-61]) read the history of the press as a step toward the liberation of the Arab world from European dominance. He wrote his book during the years when Nasser had united Egypt and Syria,

and the Nasserite Arab nationalist project was spearheading the national liberation movements in the region and even globally. Ami Ayalon (1992; 1995) wrote about a press that was desperately looking for its political freedom which it was achieving had it not been for the dictatorial Arab regimes that stifled it. He concluded his book, the only book in English dedicated to the history of the Arab press, with a note on Lebanese exceptionalism in the field of the press (Ayalon, 1995: 246). Lebanese exceptionalism was a topic of great interest to Israeli intellectuals who have been trying since the 1950s to argue that their newly created state was not a regional anomaly at the social and political levels. The sociological reading of the history of the press in Beirut and Cairo, which I have advanced throughout this dissertation, allows us to escape this teleological trend that imposes conclusions based on the initial assumptions of the researcher, and answer the real question of what are the *roles* of *what* press in *which* context, thus bringing to the forefront the context within which that press operated.

A. A press with no social role

The first generation of journalists had accumulated cultural capital from the new educational institutions and needed an outlet where this capital could be invested. Some served as low-level administrators in the bureaucracy of the state, others as translators for European merchants and diplomats, and the rest remained teachers in the field of education. The prospective careers of this new educated class of professionals were very limited. Furthermore, their newly acquired knowledge was to a large extent socially useless. What good would it do to the village doctor to learn anatomy and pathology if all he needed to know to cast a leg or cure constipation was already available to him in traditional medicine. What would physics mean to the peasant whose only relationship to the moon and stars was dictated by the agricultural calendar. Knowledge learned in the missionary institutions had therefore no meaningful social value. This signified that journalists, and more broadly the new educated class of professionals, were also socially marginalized. They possessed a type of cultural capital which could not be identified by society, as they could not communicate with their surrounding in a meaningful way.

Newspapers, a tool which could only be used if the consumer had the same cultural capital as the producer, was therefore a tool for propagating this newfound knowledge among the constituents of the same class. This could not have been represented better than by the invitations on the pages of the different newspapers of the time for readers to contribute their thoughts and knowledge; at the same time, it

was for these same readers to judge the value and quality of their contributions ,
bestowing recognition on those who were deemed worthy and whose cultural capital
was recognized as symbolic capital. Journalists and contributors gained famed by
exhibiting their cultural capital on the pages of newspapers, which was the professed
interest of the founders of the earliest Arabic newspapers, whether it was Rizqallah
Hassun al-Halabi who jubilated when someone paid him enough attention by ordering his
death, or Khalil al-Khuri who promised his writers fame and recognition. The first
generation of journalists was therefore looking for recognition of cultural capital among
peers; they were looking to be first among equals, going beyond what their education
offered them in terms of possible careers.

A dozen years passed before a change in outlook hit the nascent field of
journalism. The succession of crises which shook the Ottoman Empire during the 1860s
raised the need for a different kind of information, a type of information which was less
devoted to scientific and literary innovation and more concerned with the developments
of the state of affairs of the empire. As a result, journalism during this stage became
divided between magazines and journals on the one hand, covering the same issues that
the first generation of journalists were interested in, and newspapers on the other hand,
covering a new topic, politics. Starting in 1870, but picking up more quickly in 1874,
political newspapers began to appear. This was quite an innovative step, considering that
even the word "political" held very little meaning at the time.[10] It took more than a few
years for the journalists themselves to formulate what the "political" meant and entailed,
but were unable to present a consensus on that point. Traditionally, the political realm
was warded off as the domain of the ruler and the ruler alone. Whether it was Islamic or
imperial tradition, people had no say in the administration and politics of the realm. In
practice, this meant that journalists were writing about a topic they knew very little
about, prompting some to include issues like a familial dispute between a man and his
wife in the political events section of their paper. It also meant that journalists were at
the same time molding the public's conception of the political. They were shaping the
demand for their product simply by defining it.

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[10] In Arabic the word *siyasa*, politics, traditionally held two major idiomatic meanings. In 1791, Az-Zubaydi defined the first as the act of governing, and the person practicing the verb as the ruler. The second meant the taming and humiliation of beasts. This might indicate to some extent the type of governing that was meant in the first definition. See Faysal al-Hafyan, 2002.

But even with this shift in interest, journalists of the second generation could not transcend the social exclusion which had plagued the earlier generation. There was no room for them among the social and political elites. The political field was completely barred to those who did not already belong to the ruling elite, and even more so to people from the provinces. The social field was also restricted to them by the feudal-like social divisions to which they were but lowly newcomers. Similarly, the journalists as a class thought of themselves as better than the common man, completely rejecting the notion of belonging to the masses and did not even want to address the plebs whom they thought were uneducated ruffians who did not deserve the treasures of sciences and modern life. They had ascended in the social hierarchy high enough to no longer be reducible to members of the crowd, but not high enough to be accepted as an elite. This social seclusion allowed them to focus on their field, shaping the modus operandi of a journalist's behavior and the ethics that governed his writings. It was a period when the field of journalism was truly taking shape, but it was as marginal as the class which produced and consumed the journalistic product itself.

B. The journalist as a political actor

We could only start talking about a role of the press in the public sphere during the turbulent times of the 'Urabi Revolution in Egypt, when newspapers, for the first time, became engaged with their social surroundings. This is not to say that newspapers before that date did not address the social realities of their producers, since they clearly engaged the social issues of the day; we cannot forget Butrus al-Bustani's pamphlet, *Nafir Surya*, the clarion of Syria, in which he preached moving away from social action based on religious belonging in what many have described as the first call for secularism in Syria (Seikaly, 2002; Makdisi; 2002). But newspapers were rather detached in the sense that they only addressed a narrow audience consisting of the same social class that the journalists belonged to. They were to a large extent talking to themselves. But during the 'Urabi Revolution, something changed in the behavior of journalists and in the way the perceived their social surroundings. It was a combination of the complete shattering of the authority and legitimacy of the ruler, khedive Isma'il, as well as a new and revolutionary conceptualization of the political brought about by the teachings of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, that opened up the political field for journalists to express political opinions for the first time (Hourani, 1983: 195).

But the change was not restricted to the shift of discourse from political analysis to political opinion, for this change required a perception of the legitimacy to produce political opinion which the journalists were only able to get by acquiring a representative status. They achieved this by shifting their audience from themselves, the educated class of professionals, to the "people", the common folk whom they had previously haughtily dismissed as inconsequential and inept. This shift took many forms. The Taqla brothers used for the first time the notion of *ash-sha'b*, the people, in its modern political connotation in their writings (Zolondek, 1965). Ya'qub as-Sannu' wrote in the vernacular that everyone understood rather than the grammatically correct *fusha* that few could fully follow (Kendall, 2006: 14-5; Fahmy, 2010). Others acted as street agitators, rousing the mobs to support the military in their takeover. By doing that, journalists galvanized people by giving them a voice, while people gave power to the opinion of the journalists who now came to represent them. The mystery of ministry had been discovered by the Arab journalist. His habitus evolved. He understood that he could play an actual role in politics if he could become the minister of the people, their representative, the one who could speak in their name, and the one who could, through his opinions, transform the rabble into a politically valuable force. He was now predisposed to carry this mantle if the legitimacy of the politically dominant class was threatened, as was the case during the 'Urabi Revolution.

The importance of this episode for the field of journalism cannot be stressed enough. For the first time, journalists played a truly public role in that they engaged with other social and even political groups. They became political actors themselves when their opinions, which they propagated through newspapers, turned the symbolic capital they generated in the field of journalism into political capital in the field of politics. They were investing in the political field the benefits of the recognition they received as journalists worth reading. During the early days of journalism, the consumption of the journalistic product by a small class of educated people the journalists belonged to served to give shape and form to the newspaper and to journalistic practice. But once the journalist managed to gain an audience which went beyond his immediate circle or class, the consumption of the journalistic product came to define the very role newspapers played in politics. This role was the introduction of the journalist as a political actor who could, given the right circumstances, garner enough political capital to affect the struggle within the field of politics. In a way, this was the ultimate desire of journalists who suffered social and political exclusion and marginality, but wished to be recognized above

the crowd, to "become famous", "more famous than fire on a banner" (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 55, 57).

But once it had opened up to the field of politics, journalism no longer belonged to the journalists. Political authorities, having noticed the harm that the press could do in case of trouble, and recognizing the possible value it held if reigned, tirelessly worked toward bringing the private press under control. They did so by introducing new capitals into the field of journalism. Networks revolving around the main political figures of the time became synonymous with access to information. The palace of the sultan, that of the khedive, or the headquarters of the British consul-general became recognized political circles where journalists could gather to receive information, protection, and to a lesser extent, money. This new social capital came in parallel with measures that authorities took to shackle the ability journalists had to exhibit their cultural capital, which till then had been the backbone of their symbolic capital in the field of journalism. Censorship greatly restricted their ability to use words and language as freely as they did before. By the end of the 1880s, there came to be a struggle for dominance within the field of journalism, not among journalists themselves, but between some journalists and the politically dominant class which was trying to extend its domination into the field of journalism as well.

Journalists used the arsenal of strategies at their disposal to counter this threat. The Arabic language, which constituted the core of their cultural capital, was malleable enough for them to escape censorship. Sometimes, they chose not to even do that, accepting or even calling for sanctions. This was for them a public act of resistance that legitimized their positions within the field as uncompromising journalists. The theatricals of resistance were for many of them as important as resistance itself, as many boasted of their exploits that resulted in the derision of the censor. For others, though, the focus was on acts of public resistance. Their words were meant to rouse the people rather than gain them notoriety. The difference between the two attitudes can be clearly attributed to whether the journalist belonged to the second or fourth generation of journalists. The second generation still focused on the importance of the journalist himself, a person who stands above the rest of society and who was still looking for public acknowledgment of that fact. The fourth generation, carrying the tradition of the third generation that calmly disappeared in exile after the failure of the 'Urabi Revolution, focused more on its social

surroundings, and most notably the common people whom it perceived to be at the core of the political value of the journalist.

Acts of resistance, however, did not only target the political authorities' attempts to infringe on the journalists' dominant position in the field of journalism. It also targeted the position of dominance of the political elite in the political field itself. By resisting the absolute power of the ruler, which in this case materialized in his attempt to control the press, journalists were in fact challenging the legitimacy of the ruler's right to absolute governing. This came at a time when the ruler of Egypt was facing a crisis of legitimacy and the ruler of the Ottoman Empire was facing a crisis of authority, which meant that the field of politics was a field of struggle among different competing elites such as the sultan, the khedive, the British consul-general, and the Egyptian and Ottoman militaries. Journalists were necessarily drawn to this struggle since their position-taking in the field of politics coincided with the interests of one political actor or another. They conglomerated based on this position-taking, forming publically recognized circles and networks, thus providing journalists with information and protection, a social capital which became dominant in their own field. At that point, the dominant capital that drove the field of journalism became generated in the field of politics. The symbolic capital in the field of journalism was invested in the field of politics in the struggle for legitimacy, power, and authority, and was therefore transformed into political capital. Also, journalists began to see themselves as political actors and journalism became a vehicle for many marginal and aspiring political actors to spread their political ideas beyond their group strength. The field of journalism had become completely absorbed into the field of politics.

The functions of the press shifted accordingly. For the producers of the journalistic product, the press was their ticket into becoming politically relevant. They supplied their audiences with political opinions. These opinions allowed the journalist to present himself as the face of the crowd, the embodiment of an audience, the "people", and therefore provided him with political capital, allowing him to maneuver the political field. This journalist who was once destined to work as a school teacher for the rest of his life now saw himself as deciding how the nation should be governed and where its future lay. The fact that this was little more than an illusion does not negate that many actually saw the press as a vehicle through which journalists also became politicians. The illusion, however, was that journalists believed that they had more political value than they

actually did. They really believed that politics was an act of public communication and they were undertaking this very particular form of political practice.

C. The innovation of political communication

This belief was reinforced by the fact that the suppliers of social capital, the political elites, also saw the press as a tool that changed the traditional practice of politics. In their struggle for legitimacy and authority, political actors saw newspapers as a new generator of political capital. It was the only tool which could effectively change the balance of power in the field of politics and through it, they could gain legitimacy and authority while depriving their opponents of theirs. Here, we must take a closer look at how we examined the field of politics because the sociological approach dismisses a simple and crude reality. In an imperial system like in the Ottoman Empire or the British dominions, political capital, legitimacy, laws, public perception, and many other such concepts hide the simple fact that true authority and power reside in the military capabilities of the political actor. This is why, for example, the British consul-general did not possess any legitimacy in Egypt, but had all the authority and power to govern. It is the same reason why Abdul Hamid had all the legitimacy he needed at the beginning of his reign, but had to slowly build his authority by increasing his control over the state bureaucracies, including the army. And while this fact remained hidden from the journalists back then, the major political actors clearly understood it and engaged with the press accordingly.

The khedive could not challenge the consul-general's authority because British military power was vastly superior to his. The British consul-general, on the other hand, could not take away from the legitimacy of the khedive because nothing but military conquest justified his authority in Egypt. The sultan' power was also greatly restricted by the weakness of his armies, as he was unable to take back Egypt or defend the Balkans, thus greatly limiting his authority and legitimacy as the *ghazi*. The military, whether 'Urabi at first, or the Young Turks who eventually overthrew Abdul Hamid, had no legitimate ground for their actions, but still managed to overthrow the absolute ruler and govern in his stead. All these political actors recognized that military power effectively granted political authority and power, and that whoever possessed more military power could not be realistically challenged. But, at the same time, military power by itself lacked legitimacy, a legitimacy which could not be gained because it always asserted itself on the ground at the expense of the legitimate ruler. Given this, the press offered political

actors a new and original tool which they could use, each to pursue what he lacks in the political field. It brought forward a new level at which politics could be played: the public.

This change of venue from the politics of the palace to the politics of the public did not, however, translate into a change in the political field. The laymen still had no place in politics as there were no mechanisms through which people could participate in any way in decision-making, or even influence decision-makers. This is reflected in the way common people sometimes acted when faced with a political issue. They reverted to the mentality of the mob, either sacking the offices of newspapers they disagreed with, like what happened with *al-Muqattam*, or cheering for things they knew nothing about except that they were told that it was something to be happy about, like what happened when the Ottoman constitution was promulgated for the second time in 1908. This was a perfect instance that illustrates the level of public participation in politics.

> "Men and women in a common wave of enthusiasm moved on, radiating something extraordinary, laughing, weeping in such intense emotion that human deficiency and ugliness were for the time completely obliterated..." But what were they shouting for ? "Tell us what constitution means," shouted the crowd. "Constitution is such a great thing that those who do not know it are donkeys," answered a speaker (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 272).

This is not a reflection on the lack of political education that the Ottoman populace exhibited during those years, for it is doubtful that many among the elites knew better, but rather on the relation that the public had with politics. They simply reflected the sentiments of the political elites and had absolutely no impact on policies and decision-making in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Public opinion was still worthless in the political field.

Why then were the elites interested in moving the venue of their struggle from the palace to the street? Why did they choose to include the press as part of their struggle within the field of politics? The answer lies in the impossibility of changing the status quo in the field of politics using traditional methods, especially when military capabilities are clear for everyone to judge and compare. About three-quarters of a century before, Muhammad 'Ali could gamble and pit his army against the Ottomans. But by the turn of the century, the discrepancy in military power between the different political actors simply made such games impossible. The public, which the different political actors could reach through the press, became an alternative framework for

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political struggle among the elites. This process involved both politicians and journalists, and an exchange of capitals between them. The politician invested his person and position within the field of politics as social capital that the journalist took to the field of journalism. In turn, the journalist, having acquired political capital through the appropriation of representation, uses this capital to back the same politician, delegating this status of representative to him. This is best illustrated by khedive 'Abbas Hilmi who explained in his autobiography how his relationship to 'Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil worked. They said what he would have wanted to say ('Abbas Hilmi II, 1993, 112-3: 117) and he was at the center of the nationalist project they preached for in their editorials.

From this angle, the press can be seen not only as a field that produced a particular cultural product, but also as an alternative institution from which legitimacy was derived. The institution which had previously served this purpose was neither strong nor obedient enough to fulfill this function. An unruly military was actually the reason why the khedive lost his power in Egypt and the sultan lost his in the Ottoman Empire. Needless to say, not even the strongest of militaries could imbue legitimacy on the British occupation of Egypt. The old system of institutional legitimization, the *bay'a*, was therefore replaced by a more subtle form that allowed political players to present themselves as legitimate contenders in the field of politics. It was legitimacy via ministry and it was through the press that this ministry was achieved. This clearly materialized in the position-taking of journalists in the field of politics. Some journalists like 'Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil opposed the British and therefore supported the khedive and the notables who stood behind him. Others like Faris Nimr and Ya'qub as-Sarruf sided with the British with whom they shared an ideological worldview, and therefore opposed the khedive and the sultan. Khalil Sarkis consistently supported the sultan, making his allegiance known on many public occasions (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 133). It was not simply a matter of political opinions which these journalists shared with politicians. The closeness in the field of politics was more importantly dictated by the social capital which bound these journalists to the political elites, granting them access to information, protection, and, more importantly, the perceived image of closeness to the political field. By holding claims to representation, political elites sought to showcase their legitimate position within the field, no matter how little authority or power they had. The press therefore provided political actors with a new institution-like base for promoting and strengthening their claims for legitimacy, while negating their opponents' at the same time.

The role of the press from this perspective was to play the game of political legitimization by bestowing the image of public representation to the respective political actors who shared the position-taking of the journalist in the field of politics. The political inclusion of the journalist cannot be therefore seen as a process resulting from opening up of the political field in absolute terms. This opening up was indeed allowed by the main political players as much as it was sought after by journalists. It allowed journalists to be recognized as socially pertinent, while it provided a new venue for political contestation among the elites. Let us not forget that the political elites could have struck journalists down in the streets had they not really wanted their inclusion into the political field. Even at a time when we see different groups in Egyptian and Ottoman societies coming to the forefront of the political scene, groups like lawyers and provincial notables, they still participated in elite politics; they never truly managed to escape choosing one political figure or another to support. The only notable exception came with the rise of the different forms of local nationalisms in the Levant after the CUP began its open campaign of Turkification in 1913. But even then, it could be argued that it was still elite politics at play, since this ideological, intellectual, and political transformation in the rhetoric and discourse of the press came as a result of the breaking up of the old imperial system. The new elite, the Young Turks, was undertaking a project of flattening out identity differences across the Empire, which had been at the core of the social structure of the old system. The nationalist movements of the last years before World War I could, from this perspective, be read as powers of the status quo that the Young Turk revolution had shaken.

But, in the final analysis, the heart of the issue remains the extent to which the press really represented a public defined as a conscious, informed, and interested group, or multiple groups of people, who truly consumed the news and political opinions on the pages of the different newspapers and who felt compelled or convinced to take the same position as the journalist in the political field. This form of public representation is simply assumed in the Western secondary literature because there is the possibility to actually assess it in empirical terms. But in a situation such as turn of the century Beirut and Cairo, to what extent can we really claim that the mystery of ministry reflected any true ministry, and not just only a mystery? Circulation numbers indicate that the press was consumed by a relatively very small number of individuals, mostly residing in urban areas. Can we therefore claim that it was a bourgeois or middle class representation? These questions are difficult to empirically answer because the very answer lies in the object of

study itself. The press, as Taha Husayn (1951: 4) described it, is the "record of modern life". In fact, it is the only truly complete record we have of a public life in Beirut and Cairo. This necessarily gives journalism a much more important and magnified role than it might have possibly had because of simple historiographical necessity. The lack of alternative evidence for daily public behavior leaves us with almost no other view on social reality back then than the one provided by the contemporary press. In simpler terms, the literature accepts the assessment on the importance of this class based on how this class described itself and its own vision of self-importance, which, as we have seen throughout this thesis, was a central socio-psychological issue for journalists.

D. The value of political communication in an imperial context

By May 6, 1916, Jamal pasha, commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army, and later nicknamed *al-jazzar*, the butcher, had executed most of the Arab nationalists in Syria, and imprisoned and deported others. Many among them were journalists, including 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, Ahmad Tabbara, Filib al-Khazin, Farid al-Khazin, and Sa'id 'Aql. Also among the executed were 'Abd al-Hamid Zahrawi, Shukri al-'Asali, Rushdi ash-Sham'a, and Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad al-'Azm, all of whom were either senators or members of parliament and many of whom were regular contributors to the press (Tauber, 2013: 45-54; Antonius, 1938: 188-190). Jamal pasha also made the courts pass death sentences on activists outside of the reach of the empire, many of whom were journalists working in Egypt and parliamentarians who had realized this eventuality and escaped with their lives. In Cairo, as soon as the British felt that the opening up of the political field to other actors might endanger their dominance, they re-imposed censorship, dissolved the assembly, declared martial law, declared Egypt a protectorate, and deposed Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi, installing his malleable uncle Husayn Kamil as sultan (Daly, 1998: 246).

In both cases, we can notice how the previously advanced argument applies perfectly. The truth that political elites recognized and the reason for why they chose to bring their political struggle to the realm of the public was that it was impossible to conduct political struggle in an imperial system without the possession of enough capacity for physical violence. This was one aspect of the political field which journalists did not recognize in their bid for becoming actors in the political field themselves. It was one card in the hands of the governing elites to play whenever they felt that they needed to revert back to the old style of absolute rule at a time when legitimacy was no longer a very sought after goal. In fact, the British closed down newspapers in Egypt to prevent

the Ottoman sultan from using his legitimacy as the ultimate ruler of all Muslims and causing them trouble in the opening years of the war. They no longer needed to promote their own legitimacy given wartime exigencies. The same applied for the Turkish military who saw in the Arab nationalist project a problem for their presence in the Arab provinces of the Empire. This means that practicing politics as an act of communication was an interesting new experience in the Arab world prior to World War I, but that, at the same time, this communicative level was very far from being actually effective in terms of practical rule which still relied on the possession of the means for physical violence.

This means that, at the level of communication, the press played a seemingly important role. It was the loud cry of a modern educated class that permitted it to voice opinions, share their worldview, and even participate to some extent in the process of shaping social reality by crafting said reality in the eyes of anyone who could read their product and therefore examine the politics of the day on the pages of their newspapers. This might seem very important if we do not recognize that politics in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt was not a discursive practice, but one of violence and counter-violence. The political elites who welcomed journalists in their midst understood this fact. They played the game of politics accordingly. But the journalists, born from the bosom of a different worldview, a liberal and modernist ideology of progress and liberation, had very little experience of the political. Their only experience, in fact, was at a time when the political field in the Ottoman Empire was experiencing crises and uncertainty with an external threat. The only political violence that journalists therefore experienced was one which pitted the Empire against foreign powers, and never that of an empire establishing power internally. Politics was a multi-layered realm where legitimacy, authority, and power, were never truly sought simultaneously and journalists could hardly acknowledge this fact, since the social reality they were themselves shaped by was completely detached from that of the local population, as acknowledged in the literature in the dichotomy between modern and traditional and the different shades that occupy the space between these two archetypal views.

It is also important to acknowledge these shades, not only because revisionist historiography challenges the absolute dichotomy between modern and traditional, but more importantly because they help explain the different predispositions of certain actors in the field of journalism and the way they perceived their social milieu. For how

else could we explain the ideological differences between the second generation of journalists who received its education in missionary educational institutions, and the journalists who inflamed their readers right before the war and who received their education at government professional schools. Each learned of a different modernity, or more precisely a different path to modernity. At the same time, each had a different history with modernity. Sharabi makes a plausible case with his psycho-sociological reading of the Arab intellectual of what he calls the first phase, in which he argued that Christian intellectuals in Syria had a more profound attachment to the European liberal values, whereas their Muslim secular counterparts represented the "focal point of intellectual polarity of this period" (Sharabi, 1970: 3, 87). But irrespective of this divide, all journalists had a particular perspective of the type of politics they wanted to be involved in and the type of politics they practiced before World War I. It was a politics of communication, where discourse translated into the political capital necessary to practice politics in the sense of policy-making, mainly under the different titles of reforms, identity, representation, rights, etc. But simply because they saw the world of politics that way did not magically transform it to be so. Politics at its most liberal stage in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt followed Frederick the Great's saying: "my people and I have come to an agreement that satisfies us both. They are to say what they please, and I am to do what I please" (Knowles, 1999: 324).

II. The Arabic press, pluralist or elite-driven?

In this section, I will examine how the case study of the rise of the private Arabic press can shed light on the debate between the liberal and critical interpretations of the role of media in society and more precisely politics. This will reveal that the dichotomy between the two archetypal categories is both empirically and theoretically irrelevant to a context that differed from the experience of modern Europe, and that the assumptions that underline both arguments do not apply because they rely heavily on the model of the Western liberal capitalist society.

A. Pluralist neither in practice nor function

The pluralist argument can be broadly divided between two major themes. The first revolves around the function of the press in informing its audience of political developments for this audience to politically act based on an informed decision (Keane,

1992; Lazarsfeld et.al., 1968; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). In the context of Beirut and Cairo prior to World War I, this argument is simply meaningless on many levels. First, most information during this period was still spread through traditional methods of communication rather than modern media outlets. If someone wanted to know about general developments, the mosque, market, or church were the places to go. The physical space was a very important medium for the travel of information, as it was more easily accessible both in terms of physical presence, as well as in the format of the information found there. It was orally transmitted and the language of information was the spoken everyday vernacular, instead of the formal literary writing style that was found in the newspaper. The high illiteracy rates and difficult economic conditions of the great majority of the population made newspapers highly inaccessible. Furthermore, newspapers offered a subject of great disinterest to the local population. As discussed throughout this dissertation, this was the result of the intellectual and social alienation of the journalists for the first three decades under study here. Even when newspapers still qualified as an educational cultural product, covering scientific and literary topics, the knowledge produced on their pages had very little value in the lives of the locals.

It is even more difficult to conceive that newspapers became more relevant once they turned "political". The "political" was a foreign realm that people, whether peasants or educated professionals, had nothing at all to do with. It was the realm of the ruler, and they were nothing but the ruled. The very base concept of *siyasa*, "politics", had to be invented. Once it did, the informational element which used to qualify newspapers was replaced by the production of political opinions. Journalism was no longer about informing a public, irrespective of who that public was, but about propagating political views. Not only that, but newspapers like *al-Ahram* that mainly, but not exclusively, focused on producing information rather than opinions, introducing the art of investigative journalism and news reporting into journalistic practice, had to take a backseat to the more politically committed newspapers, as attested by their distribution numbers (Ayalon, 1995: 148; Ryad, 2009: 38). The few people who read newspapers had no appetite for information.

The second theme of the pluralist argument is that media reflects public opinion. It is a representative tool or institution (Katz et.al., 1973; Chowdhury, 2004). This theme is highly relevant to this case, since this representative status is exactly what journalists relied on to garner political capital and give weight and worth to their political ideas and

opinions. The big question here, however, is to what extent was this representativeness actually representative? The way in which journalists acquired their representative status, and that Bourdieu aptly qualified as "mystery", is nothing more than an assumed role we bestow on the producer of the journalistic product because of the assumption that, if people read their newspapers, then they must identify with their ideas. The question in this case, however, is that this assumption presents a leap from identification to representation. This leap deprives the audience of its agency to actually reject, rather than accept, this representation. In relation to this case study, there was no alternative institution which could justify the claim of the validity of the representative status. In liberal Europe, opinion polls and elections might be an indicator that the ministry was actually there. It is this process of audience feedback which allows an individual who speaks in the name of the group to actually prove and justify his representative status. There is a way to assess the strength of the group and that the group in fact identifies with its minister. In Beirut and Egypt, there was no such feedback process, whether institutional or otherwise. In fact, if people's reaction to journalists is evidence of anything, it is that the journalists did not really create a group by qualifying it as such and speaking in its name. A striking fact that corroborates this argument is to be found in the gloomy accounts of the executions of journalists by order of Jamal Pasha. In the lengthy accounts of these events, not once is there mention of any popular reaction to the executions (Tauber, 2013: 47-52). Even politically active individuals, whom we can count as the constituents of the politically active journalists and the group whom they shaped and represented, were merely counted in the dozens. In fact, the first account to give prominence to these events was produced as late as 1955 (Volk, 2010: 42), one more indicator that journalists truly held very little representative status at the time their ideas were supposedly shaping public consciousness. This, however, does not mean that the journalist did not perceive himself and politically act and speak as if representing a group, a point which will be addressed in the next section of this chapter.

Finally, I want to address the possibility of considering a sort of relative pluralism and understand the role of the press in the Arab world as pluralist *in context*, which means that the press played as much a pluralist role as the political and social context permitted. It was, after all, an intellectual platform where ideas, such as the redefinition of the political as a field that included the opinions of other elements than the ruling elites, were formulated. It was also a mechanism through which individuals acquired political capital that allowed them to become political actors in a field which was

previously exclusive of their class. On this point, we cannot disregard neither the content of the political messages across the different political newspapers, nor the function that the press played for the political elites. The position-taking of journalists, which placed them close to political actors within the field of politics, as well as the exchange in capitals between these groups, meant that the political messages promoted through the press really functioned as a rallying cry for different political elites who represented different political ideas. Furthermore, elites used the press as a legitimizing mechanism through which they scored legitimacy points against one another. This interpretation of the role of the press clearly shows that it was attached to the same political actors of the pre-opening up period, and that it merely substituted an old mode of institutional legitimization with a new "modern" one, but that, in essence, it participated in the same elite politics that had always existed in the Empire. The inclusion of a new class into the field of politics was therefore not truly an act of liberalization of politics, inasmuch as it was a shift in the platform where elite politics was played. Even during the Great War, when journalists came to completely reject the standing political elites in the Arab East, they still waited for the advent of a new representative of the old elite, Husyan, the *sharif* of Mecca, to provide them with an acceptable alternative to the Young Turks and their failing sultanate. Even in relative terms, journalism in the Arab world was still playing the game of elite politics; journalists just wanted to get closer to those elites.

B. Elite-driven, minus the elite

The critical argument also revolves around multiple themes. The "follow the money" argument is core to the critical approach, and it promotes the idea that media behaves according to the financial interests of its owners (Murdock, 1982; Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Curran and Seaton, 2003). In this case, this argument can be very quickly dismissed since it was clearly demonstrated that economic capital played almost no role in the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo. Journalists were not interested in money, the establishment of newspapers was not an expensive endeavor, and most journalists made a conscious choice of not being involved in mercantile enterprises, even though the *nahda* intellectual, as Zachs (2012) pointed out, was closely affiliated with a new class of urban merchants, a career which have definitely made more economic sense. Even though some journalists did make a fortune from their careers as journalists and newspaper owners, the general image that a journalist used to bring in the minds of his contemporaries was one of poverty.

I must mention an exception here, *Lisan al-Hal*, one of the most enduring Arabic newspapers. All evidence tends to indicate that *Lisan al-Hal* started and was run as a financial enterprise. Its owner, Khalil Sarkis, as well as his successors, made a fortune from this business. It must be noted, however, that the newspaper was but a fraction of Sarkis' business, as he was the most prominent printer and publisher in Beirut (Ayalon, 2008). It is very doubtful that *Lisan al-Hal* constituted his major source of revenue. This indicates that, like the rest of the second generation of journalists, the newspaper was, for him, a way to gain recognition. He accepted too many awards and medals throughout his life to simply disregard this because of his management style. Again, economic capital was in no way a decisive capital in the field of journalism, and it did not during this period dictate the journalists' practice.

The other theme in the critical approach to the role of media is that of the propaganda approach. Media is seen to be serving elite interests by promoting their worldviews and opinions, thus framing the public's perspective of the political world, as well as setting the political agenda. Media therefore serves as a tool for population control (Chomsky, 2002; Baudrillard, 1982; Marcuse, 1964). Much evidence displayed in this dissertation points toward this argument as a possible explanation for the role of media in Beirut and Cairo prior to World War I. First and foremost, the networks that journalists created around particular camps in the political field generated the social capital necessary to produce their political opinions and analyses; it was the defining capital during the last stage of the development of journalism before the war. At face value, the journalists were representing the views of political elites, but a close examination of the production of these opinions revealed that they were simply a question of position-taking in the field, based on which political elites and journalists came to create these networks. With the exception of *al-Muqattam*, the different political elites did not initiate the formation of any newspaper, nor the formulation of any journalist's opinion. Journalists themselves chose when and if they wanted to be associated with a main political actor. Mustafa Kamil's story is but the most striking example. Unwavering in his position as an anti-colonial nationalist, he chose to end his relationship with the khedive and the palace nationalists when they opted for a more conciliatory tone toward the British. Journalists were generally more free to make their own choices and have their own preferences. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence of dictating or manipulating journalists' opinions on the part of the political elites. On the contrary, the position of many among them to oppose political authorities,

the political elite that had power, reinforces the argument that any coming together between journalists and elites was the result of a conscious choice of the journalist. The political elites could therefore enable or limit journalists' potential, but their sway over the field of journalism, and more specifically over the production process, was very shallow.

But can we say the same of the relationship between the producer and the consumer of the journalistic product? Was the journalist not inculcating his audience with his political opinions? The most simple answer, in this case, is the value of journalism for the broad public in Beirut and Cairo which, as previously argued, amounted to very little. I must go back to the episode of the journalists' execution and the lack of public outcry to point out that, even when newspapers boasted about their daily circulation that amounted to the hundreds and thousands, the effect that they had on their readers was far from being described as socio-political control. Also, understanding journalism within the context in which it evolved revealed that one of the most prominent features that characterized its development was that the political field was completely barred to actors outside of the politically dominant class. The people had no weight in the political process. They had no function in the political field. Ownership of the layman, which Bourdieu (1981: 13) qualified as the ultimate function and goal of political communication, was to a large extent irrelevant in the case of pre-WWI Beirut and Cairo. This ownership generated no capital whatsoever, which makes us question whether it was at all a goal of journalists. The image of this ownership might have mattered, since the assumption that journalists represented a political group was at the heart of the generating of political capital. But effective representation was inconsequential. It did not matter if people were unaffected by a political opinion, as long as the journalist presented himself as their representative through such opinion. There was no need and no value for such a control.

We must equally question to what extent was the journalist part of an "elite", a point which has been constantly addressed throughout this dissertation. Initially, the social marginality of the journalists was partly caused by their rejection by social elites. Socially, this remained the case across the period under study. Even when journalists managed to enter the field of politics and become recognized as a socially relevant class, they were still looked down on by the social elites, the case of 'Ali Yusuf's annulled marriage being a major example of this. Furthermore, as their role in the field of politics

attests, they remained to a large extent very marginal as political actors. They allowed the major political actors to promote an image of legitimacy by appropriating the mystery of ministry, but never played any actual role themselves. They saw themselves as politicians, they established political parties, and they ran for parliamentary elections in both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. But all this involvement in the field of politics was inconsequential. Politics was still a field of inter-elite and intra-elite struggles and the only true measure of a class' ability to dominate in the field remained its ability to effectively use physical violence. Journalists did not even recognize this. They were not part of the elite, nor did they have the chance to be so. From this perspective, it is difficult to argue for a type of elite-control through the press, since journalists never managed to become an elite, a class that was either dominant or vying for dominance in the political field.

C. The liberal paradigm, or the failure of decontextualized assumptions

One of the core findings of this dissertation was that, not only did journalism in the Arab East not play a role that promoted liberal democracy, but it also did not even seek to play such role. Many historical accounts, both in Arabic and English, fell in the mistake of simply assuming that journalists wanted to "mobiliz[e] public opinion and [...] increas[e] public involvement in political affairs" (Ayalon, 1992: 269). All the evidence produced in this dissertation suggests the opposite trend. Even when journalists spoke for the "people", their ultimate goal was to create an image of representation that would generate the political capital necessary to navigate the field of politics. This was not necessarily the product of a conscious and vicious attempt at population control, but rather the result of a political context in which people had a particular viewpoint of what the "political" entailed. Indeed, it was generally perceived that the political realm was the exclusive domain of the ruler. This meant that people did not think that they had the legitimate right to produce a political opinion and have no role in the realm of politics. The structure of the field of politics, represented by the actors operating in it, the relevant capitals they possessed, and the relations of domination within it, created a context where journalists and, more broadly, intellectuals in the Arab East were restricted in the scope through which they could perceive their public role.

This materialized mostly in the way journalists formulated the ethics of their field. Being polite in demeanor and language, as well as promoting proper social values came to define the way a journalist should behave. Deference to authority, with the long

eulogies that preceded any mention of the ruler and the constant delegation of failure and responsibility onto his subordinates, was a strong sign that journalists constructed their role around very conservative socio-political values that revolved around respect of authority and the standing social order. Even when they came to challenge authorities, journalists could not escape this, which translated in the way they addressed one another and bickered over particular issues. The topic and arguments always came second to the personal insults in which journalists sought to present their opponents as morally debased and corrupt. Conformity, whether presented under the guise of politeness, authenticity, or morality, defined to a large extent the way these journalists perceived the limits of their social maneuverability.

The evidence for this argument is not a new discovery. Most accounts of the history of the Arabic press during this period present very clear confirmation to this effect. Ayalon (1992, 267-8) quoted Butrus al-Bustani who did not want the press to "violate ... the right principles", which Ayalon correctly read as a "euphemism for political compliance". He noted that Khalil al-Khuri never deviated from the official bulletins which he reproduced on the pages of his newspaper (Ayalon, 1995: 32). Still, he went on to conclude that journalists wanted to transform political realities and, if they did not try, it meant that they were exercising caution (Ayalon, 1992: 269; 1995: 32). The problem, which the interpretation presented in this dissertation solves, is the imposition of the normative role that media *should* play instead of answering what role it *did* play. It is the socio-political decontextualization of media and the consequent imposition of a foreign interpretation of its supposed role, therefore clouding a possible grounded understanding of this role.

This is one of the major shortcomings of the critical theories of media. They all try to impose this same normative teleological understanding of what role media *should* play, as a solution to the supposed lacking role it actually plays (Habermas, 1989; Bourdieu, 1996). As a result, all these theories begin with the assumption that there is a particular goal toward which our understanding of media ought to take us. This greatly distorts our understanding of the evolution of said media, as is the case with all the accounts on the history of the Arab press. Contextualization, as presented in this dissertation, offers a solution to this problem and allows for a clearer, more precise, and empirically correct interpretation of the role of media, an interpretation which escapes the imposition of normative judgments that unconsciously dictates conclusions. The case

of the development of the Arab press in Beirut and Cairo indeed demonstrated that the entire liberal paradigm, as presented by both pluralist and critical camps, could not explain the role that journalism played in the two cities.

III. Revisiting Bourdieu's theory, toward new ways to understand media's role

Bourdieu's theory has become increasingly en vogue in the different disciplines studying media. Some criticize it, others use it like a bible, but it seems that engaging with the theory of fields has become a necessary step of sorts for different sociologists. Nick Couldry (2003), a professor of media studies, chastises Bourdieu for not going far enough and identifying a "media meta-capital". Critical Discourse Analysis theorists Norman Fairclough and Lilie Chouliariaki (1999) argued that Bourdieu's theories simplify the role of language and conflate discourse with social reality. They call for the consideration of a "linguistic capital". These calls for the elaboration of a more complex and diverse theory are in contrast with the position of most French sociologists who adopt Bourdieu's theory to the letter (Champagne, 2000; 2005; 2006; 2011; Marchetti, 2002a; 2002b; Benson and Neveu, 2005). In this thesis, I have shown that Bourdieu's theory can help us better understand the role of media because it allows for a contextualized and multi-layered analysis of that role. Still, it did not come without some challenges and shortcomings that will be addressed here to try and point the way toward a theoretical conceptualization of the role of media in politics.

A. Bourdieu and the field of journalism

One of the main reasons for having adopted Bourdieu's theory of fields in this thesis was that it allows for a simultaneous analysis at the structural and agential levels, which most other theories consider to be an irrevocable antagonism. But the macro and micro-levels were not the only layers that Bourdieu's theory allowed me to develop. Indeed, the social space, as Bourdieu understood it, was the collection of the different social fields that constituted social life. These fields, like education, even though they are not part of the macro-level structure, i.e. the economy, an ideological zeitgeist, etc., act as elements structuring the psyche and social position of actors, therefore determining their predispositions, shaping their habitus in more concrete ways than a structuralist analysis would permit. His theory therefore offers three distinct, yet complementary levels of analysis, the macro, meso, and micro levels. It was therefore possible to lay

together the three spheres in which journalists, readers, and investors in the field of journalism were formed as actors, and practiced their roles in the field.

The macro-level, which is denoted by the "social space" connotation, but which I chose to examine in less theoretical terms, revealed the impact of the changing economic order in the Middle East, a change which brought with it a major intellectual challenge represented by the ideology of modernity and modernism. Within this broad sphere encompassing both materialist and idealist contexts, I looked at the fields within which journalism was born, and was later absorbed: the fields of education and politics, respectively. Linking these fields, the capitals which determined and delineated them, and the struggles within them, to different social classes, here understood from Bourdieu's (1985: 725) definition of a social class as "sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances", allowed me to reconstruct the meso-level of analysis, a level which was structured by the social structures, but structured the social actors themselves. Finally, at the micro-level, Bourdieu's theory allowed for a psycho-sociological understanding of the different actors in the examined fields. Practice, ethics, beliefs, language, and the perception of the social world could then be presented from a historicist perspective, thus contextualizing thought and action without imposing on the actor a de-historicized version of what they were doing and thinking.

Aside from these three levels of analysis, Bourdieu's conceptualization of a field of cultural production, like the field of journalism, in terms that are similar to economic production allowed for a differentiation of the actors and classes of actors in the field. Investor, producer, or consumer, each actor had a different attitude toward the press, each saw its role differently, and each used it in a different way from one another. Not only that, but the journalism had a different function for each of these actors at the different levels of analysis. In the search for an answer to a question as broad as what are the roles of which media in which context, Bourdieu's theory offered us with an analytic plan that, if crudely drawn, can be best described as chessboard, where each case constitutes the intersecting point between the level of analysis and the particular social layer, here understood as a vertical line dividing different social classes. The answer was therefore position-specific. The press fulfilled a particular function for certain journalists

as individuals, and another function that they fulfilled at the structural level, for example. Similarly, it had different functions for the different political elites, etc... Including the variable of time to show how these roles evolve historically as a reaction to changing social contexts, which I have presented as changes in adjoining fields, added one more dimension that demonstrates the extent to which Bourdieu's social theory allows for an all-encompassing analysis of jouranlism.

The closest thing in the literature to come close to such a complete understanding of the role of media in society comes from the discipline of critical social history of media, with a few historical accounts that manage to cover most, but not all of the multiple aspects which Bourdieu's theory sheds light on (for example, see Conboy, 2004; Briggs and Burke, 2009). Others within the discipline approach more narrow aspects of the topic, like the ethics of journalism or the communicative process, but successfully adopt a similar approach that combines the big picture with the small details, the sociological with the historical, to produce a contextualized account both at the social and intellectual levels (Thompson, 1995; Ward, 2004). Bourdieu's theory appears to be the only theoretical framework which could offer the possibility to combine disciplines which have so far remained detached from one another, media history on the one hand, and the sociology of media on the other, in a way that offers a consistent prism through which each discipline might complement the other.

This, as shown throughout this thesis, is a necessary step which the different disciplines that are interested in understanding the social role of media within the broad spectrum of media studies need to take. The historical and historicist approaches are the ultimate key to answering this question. First, the historical approach is needed to properly contextualize the development of media in relation to the developing social world around it. It is therefore the first step to escaping the teleological analyses that currently pervade the literature. Second, the historicist approach, which even critical social historians sometime miss, remains the ultimate tool to escaping the imposing of normative values, assumptions, and expectations on the development of media in a particular context. This has traditionally been the criticism advanced against scholars such as Jurgen Habermas (1989), who imposed not only his own norms and values on the past, but even his own interpretation of what the views of journalists from the past were, a point which I have argued is also characteristic of Ayalon's (1995) account of the Arabic press. But the most notable of such impositions remains that of the image of journalism

and media as supposed promoters of democracy, liberal or otherwise, a theme which slices across the great majority of the current literature (Curran, 2002; Habermas, 1989; Bourdieu, 1996; Chomsky, 2002).

Bourdieu's theory, in which he emphasizes a historical reading of the past, i.e. a reading of the past from the viewpoint of its contemporaries, a point which I have further methodologically developed by incorporating the thought of Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School of intellectual history, advances a very important solution to this normative burden. This approach promotes a truly contextualized understanding of the thought process of the actors studied. It is not, for example, for us academics to impose our vision of the political onto journalists, whether those from the past, or currently operating in non-Westphalian and non-liberal contexts, those who think differently and conceptualize the world differently than the academics who study them and are overwhelmingly Western or Western-based. This is why I searched for their understanding of the "political" both linguistically and thematically, in order to see how they understood this social activity, which, as shown before, was completely different than the one which has been imposed on them in the literature.

It is thus that we must understand Bourdieu's theory and its importance to the study of medias, their different roles in different societies, how they operate, how they are perceived by different social actors, etc... It is a multi-layered approach that contextualizes media on different levels at which analysis is undertaken, therefore offering a very important critical alternative to the current theories on the roles that media play. This is not to say, however, that the theory of fields did not need some tweaking to better address this particular case study and the specific aim of this research project.

B. Some notes on the obstacles facing the theory

In this research, I did not find a need to come up with any alternative "meta-capital", as suggested by Bourdieu's critics. And even though I sympathize with their recommendations, for it is normal that they consider their fields, and consequently their lives' work, important and complex enough to deserve a meta-capital of their own, Bourdieu's theory provided all the tools necessary for a complete understanding of this case study without having to resort to further complications and needless complexities. In fact, one of the key issues that I had to deal with was that I sometimes needed to

further simplify his theory, or at least disregard some aspects of it, to advance the relevant argument. The main obstacles that truly faced the use of the theory of fields in this research were mainly that I was employing it in a context that was completely different from the one Bourdieu usually conducts his studies on, and it therefore needed to be adjusted accordingly. It is important to note here that Bourdieu (1981; 2000b) himself acknowledges this shortcoming when he clearly states that what he is looking at in terms of empirical evidence is mainly coming from liberal parliamentary democracies, while he conceived of his theory as being critical of, and transcending, liberal social views.

a. A non-Western case-study

This issue first materialized when I had to disregard geographical boundaries and divisions in a way as to make the state as a national entity irrelevant. This was because the Ottoman Empire was not a Westphalian state. It was, as its name suggest, an empire. Its territory was never clearly delineated, nor did it ever accept a demarcated and fixed border; the logic of a border was a very fluid one, even internally, and sovereignty over the realm was negotiated differently at different times. The most important facet of this argument is that we cannot, in such case, divide populations and societies in geopolitical terms. It does not matter that Cairo and Beirut were two cities in different provinces, and eventually in different states, if people moved from one city to the next as if they were one, and, more importantly for our case study, if the literary elite was the same in the two cities.

Second, being a non-Western state, and more specifically an Eastern empire, meant that the culture of governing was different from the contemporary European state. Autocratic rule and the use of physical violence was the norm. This is not to say that Western states do not use violence in the same, if not in a more vicious way. But in the empires of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, the use of violence was the legitimate and unquestionable right of the ruler. This aspect of social behavior is completely absent from Bourdieu's theory, most probably because the use of physical violence in such cases is not really a question of interest for sociological analysis. A realist, albeit cynical, understanding of politics would suffice in such cases. In fact, it was the ultimate component which explained the true limitations journalists faced in this context, but were completely unaware of, a fact which brought about their untimely and gruesome demise. I must note here that this aspect of politics persisted well into the

future, and some might say till the present, even when the region fell under the "benevolent" rule of the mandatory great powers, France and Britain.

b. Politics of non-communication

Baudrillard (1982; 1985) advanced a theory of non-communication. He based this argument on a philosophical understanding of what media is; if communication is understood to be an exchange, a dialogue, "a reciprocal space of speech and response," then media can no longer fit within the category of communication because it simply represents a medium of a one way flow of information, and therefore non-communication. The issue of non-communication for the purposes of this thesis was never related to media. In fact, journalism in the Arab world was a prime example for the possibility of media to play the role of a platform for dialogue, as exemplified by the participation of the readers in producing analyses and opinions on the pages of the different newspapers.

Non-communication in the case of the political and journalistic fields in Beirut and Cairo took place at the level of politics. All of Bourdieu's definitions of the "political" and the political field revolved around the process of communication, mainly because, as mentioned before, he based his observations on the case of the political system in Europe, and mostly France. He understood politics as a communicative process through which the politician seeks to control the non-politician through representation. In this case, the political process was a completely different one, for the control over the non-politician, absolute rule, was enshrined in the culture and laws of the empire. Furthermore, unlike the modern European experience of politics, the question of what to do with this control over the layman in the field of politics was necessary to address. The findings of this study were that this control only imbued its owner with legitimacy, a legitimacy that was to a large extent useless, since it translated into neither authority nor power in the political field. It was therefore necessary to understand the political field in different terms. Still, even though Bourdieu's understanding of what the political field entailed was not valid to this case, his broader theory still applied and allowed me to reconstruct how different political actors behaved in relation to one another and how they perceived their struggles for dominance over the field.

c. The historical narrative and the sociological approach

The final note is about the approach to the presentation of the study which I have adopted in this thesis. At many points, the historical narrative took precedence over the sociological interpretation, most notably in Chapter IV, where I have presented the social space from a historical rather than a sociological perspective. This was the result of a personal choice emanating from a preference to simplify whatever analysis that did not need over-examination. This is in fact a criticism I have of some of Bourdieu's work, most notably some which were directly related to Chapter IV, and in which he described the economic field and cross-contextual understanding of intellectual production. In his article on the economic field, he analyzed the economy in a traditional Marxian way, except that he did so using the terminology of his own theory (Bourdieu, 1997). The same goes for his understanding of the circulation of ideas, in which he promoted a contextualized reading of intellectual production in the same way Skinner had done more than two decades before, except that, again, Bourdieu used his own terminology to do so (Bourdieu, 2002; Skinner 1978). Using historical narrative in such cases did not, as a result, present a theoretical inconsistency, but rather demonstrated a point in a clearer and more accessible way without having to overcomplicate the argument.

Chapter IX

Conclusion

This research project started as a realization that the debate between the pluralist and the critical theorists of the role of media in politics presented two layers. The first layer could be observed when the literature is read at face value. It is a debate between those who believe that media play a positive role in promoting liberal values in society, and those who believe that it is a tool in the hands of elites who try to control the population by inculcating it with their own worldviews, ideologies, and opinions. The second layer, however, is not as easily discernible. It lies in the normative assumptions exhibited by the many scholars and academics who have examined the relation between media and politics, and which have largely dictated the direction of their findings. Pluralists do not need to hide these particular assumptions, since they claim that media is, in effect, playing a liberal and democratic role. It was, however, more interesting to notice that critical theorists all share a common argument that, even though media play a subversive propaganda role that serves elite interests, the role it should be playing is a liberal and democratic one. The second-tier analysis of the literature reveals, as a result, a common underlying assumption among all theorists, which is that the role of media in politics ought to be a pluralist liberal one. As I argued in Chapter II, the pluralist/critical debate hides a consistent and coherent acceptance of the liberal paradigm at the normative level; the dispute is simply on whether or not media actually fulfill this supposed function.

The question that arose from this realization specifically addressed the value-laden assumption. What if media is not supposed to play such a liberal role to begin with? If our understanding of media behavior has been distorted by a preconceived notion that set a path of expectations from what media did, is doing, and is supposed to do, how can we then really lay claim to a true and truthful knowledge of media and its role in society? What made this question even more pertinent is the fact that all of the theories on media were born from within and dealt with the Western European and North American experiences, and therefore provided only a Eurocentric model for media behavior.

To answer this question, I utilized, as explained in Chapter III, Bourdieu's theory of fields. Bourdieu constructed this theory based on a non-liberal and non-Western case study, that of the tribes in Kabyle, and tailored it to escape the "presuppositions inherent in the position of an outside observer" (Bourdieu, 1977a: 2). Not only that, but it also offers a unique approach to sociology in which some of the major dichotomies, like structure and agency, and material and ideational, are efficiently combined to produce a theory that allows its users to inspect the different levels and layers that could affect the object of their study. This was essential to this thesis because of the nature of the question it is trying to solve. It is a question about the socio-political order inasmuch as it is about the production and consumption of news. Bourdieu's theory presented an approach through which I could therefore observe broad social transformations as structuring structures, while at the same time look at the individual actors and see them as agents who behave according to predispositions generated by their social position and evolving experiences, while choosing from a spectrum of possible behaviors. Bourdieu also proposed a set of conceptual tools which knit together the different elements of the case-study at hand to provide a dynamic image of its contextualized evolution.

The choice of the case-study fell on the rise and evolution of the Arabic private press in Beirut and Cairo. First, it was because this presented a case where a local group of people embarked on an original and innovative endeavor, the publication of newspapers. Since the journalistic press was a foreign invention, the field of journalism had to be constructed from scratch, with producers, consumers, and observers slowly coming to grips with what exactly a newspaper was, what it contained, and what was its social function. The study was therefore a reconstruction of the formation of a field of journalism in a non-Western part of the world, where non-Western values and socio-political norms prevailed. Also, this case remains till the present undeservingly understudied, with only one book written about it in the English language, Ami Ayalon's *the Press in the Arab Middle East* (1995), in addition to a few and very specialized historical accounts that disregard the social function that the Arabic press played before World War I. There was therefore a complete absence of a sociological reading of the role that the Arabic press played in the political sphere during those early years of its formation.

In Chapter IV, I have examined how private journalism came to be in Beirut, as a result of major social, economic, and political changes that affected the region ever since

it became integrated into the global capitalist economy in which the Ottoman Empire could not efficiently compete. This gave rise to the ideology of modernism. The Ottoman sultan and the governor of Egypt embarked on separate but simultaneous attempts at modernizing their armies and their bureaucracies, which required a new breed of state employees. This meant that the old educational system had to be replaced with a new one that promoted modern sciences and the skills relevant to the modern age. The new educational institutions, both governmental and missionary ones, began to produce a new type of knowledge which served a very particular social function. Graduates enrolled in the army and the state bureaucracy, they worked as translators for European diplomats and merchants, and as school teachers in rural areas.

For this new rising educated class, social prospects were bleak. Employment, even though almost guaranteed at this point in time, held very little promise in comparison with the wealth of knowledge that these individuals have come to acquire. The problem was that this knowledge had no social value outside of the modern institutions of the state. It could not be invested anywhere else in society. Modern sciences were still useless in a predominantly rural and traditional society. This was the context in which some individuals decided to use this knowledge of theirs in an attempt to find an elevated status that would have otherwise been denied to them. In 1858, Khalil al-Khuri began to publish the first private newspaper in Beirut, *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*. While it featured headlines concerning official declarations, its main interest lay in the realms of modern sciences, literature, and the promotion of social development. It was, as its owner-editor-writer professed on the first page of its first issue, a platform on which journalists were to exhibit their cultural capital, the knowledge they had acquired in the modern educational system, for their peers to judge and recognize. This was, from the beginning of the foundation of private journalism, the main aim of its producers: recognition as first among equals.

This trend became more pronounced with the second generation of journalists, whose political newspapers began to appear in the early years of the 1870s. They claimed that their readers demanded political news and these journalists dedicated their papers to that. The only limitation they faced was that they had no clear picture as to what constituted the "political". Prior to that, politics had been the exclusive realm of the ruler, and people, especially in the provinces, had no say in government. Not having the legitimate right to speak of political matters meant that people in the provincial cities of

Beirut and Cairo did not know what "politics" exactly meant. It was a period of trial and error, as a definition of politics was being formulated on the pages of these newspapers. Editorials containing political analysis began to appear on the front pages.

But, as I have argued in Chapter V, the social seclusion of the class to which the journalists belonged remained unbroken. The social elites rejected these social newcomers and the profession of journalism was looked down on. The journalists looked in the same way at the common man, whom they perceived to be inferior and unworthy of the knowledge they were propagating. The cultural capital they were exhibiting was only to be digested and judged by men of great taste, those same men who were supposed to contribute to the newspaper. This social seclusion gave the producers of the journalistic product the opportunity to develop the field internally, to consolidate the practices and develop the ethos of the journalist. The second generation continued on the footsteps of their predecessors on both accounts. Exhibiting cultural capital remained the cornerstone of the symbolic recognition within the field. This was done by continually showcasing the abilities of the journalists as translators and men of letters. As for the ethos of the journalist, it mainly revolved around socio-political conservative values, promoting conformity and obedience to authority. The journalist had evolved from being an educator to being a spectator.

Then came the 'Urabi Revolution. This military coup, unlike the two coups in Istanbul which replaced two sultans in one year in 1876 and which were to a large extent palace coups, had the backing of many different social groups and classes. It was supported by the army, the notables, the peasants, professionals, and artisans. What 'Urabi did was not only to dethrone khedive Isma'il, but he also shattered the legitimacy of the absolute ruler in the eyes of both the ruler's competitors in the political field and the broad public, the laymen. Journalists played an important role in these events, transposing this revolution onto their field as well. Influenced by the teachings of the revolutionary cleric, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, journalists in Cairo, who were still in their great majority Syrians, began to conceive of the political field and their role in it differently.

First, their role was no longer restricted to spectating. They actively participated in the revolution, inciting the public and supporting the 'Urabists. Their product was no longer political analysis, but political opinion (Hourani, 1983: 195). Second, and more importantly, the journalist discovered the "people". The aversion to the common man

disappeared from the lexicon and the behavior of the third generation of journalists. They began to address the broad audience with a language that the less educated could understand. Some journalists even adopted the vernacular as their writing style, which proved to be a major success in terms of circulation. Others began to speak in the name of the *sha'b*, the people. The mere use of this idiom, instead of other previously used terminology that denoted the aimlessness and subservice of the masses, reflected this change in attitude on the part of the journalists. They had discovered and consciously adopted the "mystery of ministry", the power of representation that came with speaking in the name of the group. The journalist of that period was a revolutionary both on the streets and in the field of journalism.

The third generation met a sad end with its exile and the failure of the 'Urabi revolution that came to an end when the British invaded and occupied Egypt. The British adopted a patient yet firm policy toward the press, an attitude which was paralleled by that of the Ottoman sultan, Abdul Hamid II. This attitude was dictated by the realization that the old methods of political competition in an imperial context, i.e. military power and physical violence, could no longer change the political status quo. This competition had to be moved to a different arena, one where the stakes were different but competition possible. All the dominant political actors recognized that the press could play the role of the platform where such a competition could take place, as demonstrated in Chapter VII.

The press resisted this encroachment from political actors for a while, and this resistance took two forms. *Public acts* of resistance focused on the journalist himself as the victim of political infringement on the press and the hero who sacrificed his position and career to counter it. This approach qualified the second generation of journalists who were still enshrined in their own practices that revolved around the symbolic recognition of the journalist. Acts of *public resistance* relegated the act of resistance onto the readers. It was the approach that the fourth generation of journalists adopted. They were influenced by the third generation and had adopted much of their innovations, most notably their identification with the broader public.

Eventually, political actors capitalized on this division, and used the nascent differences within the field of journalism to create camps within it. Second generation journalists like Faris Nimr and Ya'qub as-Sarruf were sponsored by British authorities in Egypt and they established their newspaper, *al-Muqattam*, to counter the resistance that

the press was showing toward the occupying authorities. The fourth generation retaliated by becoming more aggressive in its rhetoric. This struggle took many forms, and the competition was pitting not only journalists among each other, but also political actors as well. The politicians, needing to shift political competition to the realm of the public, supported the different camps based on their position-taking in the field of politics. They supplied them with social capital that took the form of access to information, protection, and sometimes also prestige. In return, journalists, who had acquired a legitimacy to create political opinions ever since the image of the absolute ruler was shattered in the late 1870s, would delegate the ministry that came to be through their speaking in the name of the group to the respective politician they conglomerated around.

For journalists, this constituted the epitome of their desired accomplishments. Their role had achieved them symbolic recognition across all of society. In addition to their peers, they were now recognized by the broader public through the "mystery of ministry", and by the political elites who now associated with them. They had by then become political actors, shapers of political opinions. Their ministry, however, hid an important fact. It was an assumed representativeness. The question of whether or not they truly represented the people, as discussed throughout this thesis, is of great importance when the role of the press in politics needs to be assessed. All evidence tends to indicate that, by the turn of the century, even though the press enjoyed a relatively larger public resonance than it did when the second generation dominated the field, it remained a marginal social endeavor. By the closing years before World War I, not many people in and around Beirut and Cairo knew how to read, and even fewer cared about journalism and politics, a field which was still till then exclusionary.

Journalists, however, did not recognize this fact, nor did they really understand how the political field, in which they were investing the symbolic capital they generated in the field of journalism, operated. They tried to play an increasing role in politics. They formed political parties and secret societies, ran for parliament, and challenged the legitimacy of the authorities. The journalist had become a politician. But he was faced with a major limitation. While politicians had understood that power in the field of politics came from the military capabilities of the political actor, his ability to effectively use physical violence, journalists believed that they could gain power through representation. The result of this mistaken view of the field of politics, the relevant

capitals within it, the rules of the political game, and the difference between legitimacy, authority, and power in an imperial context, cost the journalists very steeply. In Beirut, they were summarily executed. In Egypt, the printing presses were closed down, paper supply was cut, and newspapers were censored. Physical violence remained the most important tool in the hands of the dominant political class.

The results of this historical examination of the rise of the press and its evolution over a period of six decades from 1858 till 1916 indicate that the Arabic press presents us with a model of media that does not fit neither the pluralist argument, nor the critical argument. Also, the second-tier aspect of the pluralist-critical debate, the overarching liberal paradigm which presents a normative liberal function to the media, does not apply in this case. As seen in Chapter VIII, the press in Beirut and Cairo never played the roles of a watchdog or a representative of public opinion, nor did it even want to play this role. Informing the public was impossible in form and in function since the press produced political opinion rather than political news and analyses, and the public also had no function in the political field, which renders the rationale of media as a watchdog irrelevant. Also, the representativeness of the journalist, which was at the basis of his apparent role in the political field, was largely assumed with no actual basis. Talking in the name of a "people" did not mean that this "people" was reading newspapers. In fact, all the way up to World War I, the newspapers audience remained to a large extent the same class that the journalist belonged to: people who were educated enough to be able to read and who had enough material wealth to afford the cost of a paper and the luxury of leisure time to read it. These are the same prerequisites that Bourdieu (1981, 4) argued the professional politician, the one seeking to represent others, needed to possess. In relation to the people of their own class, who constituted the great majority of their readers, the journalist had no relative advantage that would allow him to represent. His readers, who were of the same social status and who shared the same social position, would not have accepted that their persona be reduced to that of a simple anonymous individual in the crowd. This, incidentally, was the same reason some among them decided to pursue their careers in journalism to begin with. It was a one-sided claim to representativeness.

The critical arguments equally do not apply. Money was never a major motivator and it did not come to define much of the journalists' behavior prior to the war. The image of the vagrant and poor journalist even remained ingrained in people's minds till

after the war. Economic capital, as previously discussed, was never a capital which defined the field of journalism. As for the propaganda argument, elites never had a role in the production of opinions, as they had very little sway over journalists' thoughts. As for the relationship between the producer and the consumer of news, evidence showed that journalism had relatively very little impact on society and that people did not react strongly to the journalistic message. If any sort of public opinion was forming, it was unrelated to the press, or at least not generated by it. Finally, journalists did not constitute an elite, at least not in the political sense. They remained on the fringes of the political field, and there was no possibility of them ever becoming a dominant actor in that field.

More importantly, the findings of this thesis show that the normative values underlying the liberal paradigm, which, as previously explained, overshadows the whole literature on the role of media, completely distort our understanding of this role. The liberal paradigm imposes a decontextualized and anachronistic analysis of the behavior of media and of the practice of journalism, which even gets to the point of misrepresenting facts to fit its dogmatic rhetoric. In this case, this can be easily observed in the writings of Ami Ayalon and how he imposed a particular interpretation on the evidence, even though it completely contradicted it. A genuine historical approach revealed that the concept of "politics" was completely different in the eyes and minds of the journalists, politicians, and the general public in Beirut and Cairo prior to World War I, and that this generated a particular mode of behavior which ran contrary to liberal values at the normative level. Journalism was mainly a tool of conservative politics, and the only change it brought was to provide enough political capital for journalists to integrate the field of politics as marginal players.

On this note, it is important to point out several of the shortcomings of Ami Ayalon's account of the history of the Arabic press if only because, twenty years after its publication, it remains the only English book so far to focus on the topic. These points, which I address in this thesis, are threefold. First, their root cause lies squarely within the same phenomenon I sought to address in this project, the pervading liberal paradigm that I critique and criticize. Ayalon's *the Press in the Arab Middle East* could be read as a prime example of the liberal paradigm at play. Indeed, Ayalon went out of his way to try and find liberal trends in the work of the press, distorting evidence and imposing anachronistic and erroneous interpretations. He could not conceive of a different

function of the press, not because there was no other function, which this thesis clearly proves existed, but rather because he was still restricted by the Eurocentric expectations of how media ought to behave.

In his account, the liberal paradigm clearly materializes in the second shortcoming – the one I address when using Quentin Skinner's method of study of intellectual production -, his misinterpretation based on the imposition of intent that is alien to the historical subject, and reflective of the mindset of the historian himself. This anachronism stems from methodological pitfalls as much as from the ontological assumptions that drive his work. Methodologically, the imposing of intent generates many cases of misinterpretation that does not stand in the face of careful and critical assessment. One case that illustrates this claim is how Ayalon consistently claims that Khalil al-Khuri wanted to write one thing in his paper but did not, either because of fear from the authorities or to preserve his financial interests. The fact that there is no evidence to support his claim puts in question his explanatory narrative. Assuming intent in the stead of the historical actor is, in this case, a methodological flaw that distorts the whole interpretation, especially that it is repeated throughout the book. Ayalon often saw intent where there was none.

But that is not all of the methodological problems that Ayalon's history suffers from. The third issue with his account is that he often disregards evidence that does not comply with his version of events, a version which often emanates from his ahistorical interpretation of history. Sometimes, he even contradicts evidence he himself presents. For example, he provides his reader with ample evidence that the producers of newspapers in Beirut and Cairo were financially well off, or at least received sizeable subsidies, but goes on to argue that competition between newspapers was the main reason some of them went bankrupt and were forced to shut down. This is equally despite the fact that there were alternative explanations in the literature Ayalon was familiar with and cited extensively (like Filib di Tarrazi), but which he chose to disregard. Another more flagrant example targets his argument that newspapers in the Arab world were a force of liberal change and political liberation from oppressive authorities, except that many of the largest newspapers were either supporters of the governments in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, or were neutral in the political struggles of the times. This is not to mention some of the logical lapses that plague his account, like claiming that effects precede causes (Ayalon, 1995: 34).

Having gone through the different limitations of Ayalon's history, it becomes clear that this thesis offers a major reinterpretation or the rise and development of the Arabic press in Beirut and Cairo. It addresses each of the different methodological, conceptual, and normative problems Ayalon faces to produce a completely different understanding of the different roles that this press played at different times prior to World War I.

From an empirical perspective, this study showed that the experience of Arab journalism, a non-Western media, could not be explained by the traditional theories of the media. Mass communication in a social, political, and cultural context that was different from Europe developed to perform different functions, and operated according to a different ethos than its European counterpart. This tells us that there is a true need for an alternative media theory that accounts for these contextual differences. Such theory specifically needs to reject wholesale the liberal paradigm, since it has so far been the major impediment in the face of a proper understanding of non-Western media and their social role. It is not enough to simply call for a "de-Westernizing" of media theory, like Curran and Park (2000) did, but still look at non-Western media and pass judgment according to Western values (Sreberny, 2000). Alternative and radical approaches to media seem to present an excellent starting point toward the formulation of such a theory, and I must repeat here a point I made in Chapter II. This research project must be read as part of the radical and alternative trends because of both the initial criticism to the applicability of a Eurocentric view to non-Western media, and also because of the conclusion reached that media behavior, ethos, and function cannot be properly assessed outside their proper context, or more precisely the context proper to their socio-historical experience.

This is not to say that any such alternative theory should be formulated from a cultural-relativist perspective, as it might seem to the reader that the proposed solution to oppose Eurocentrism would be to rely on quasi-disciplines such as area studies. The whole aim of critiquing the liberal paradigm was to show that the behavior of media is not restricted in scope to a single scope of assessment and, therefore, not restricted to the pluralist-critical duality. I have shown throughout this thesis that media can in fact play *multiple* roles, all of which do not perform a liberal or propaganda function. This raises a major question that the current literature needs to answer. By restricting the debate to the dichotomy generated by the liberal paradigm, how many functions of

media and practices of journalists have theorists missed? I do not claim to possess an answer to this question, but I do, however, stress that they definitely could have only produced partial knowledge about media, even in Western societies, because they were unwilling to look at a broader spectrum of possibilities. In the case of the first few decades of the evolution of the Arab press in two Arab cities, I have identified four different roles that journalists played at different times. They were educators, spectators, revolutionaries, and then low-impact politicians. The press, more broadly speaking, was a tool used by these journalists to rise in the social ranks and be recognized. It also served to define a new type of politics in the Empire, one which was by no means more inclusive than previous imperial politics. I could only imagine what a similar analysis of the evolution of Western media could yield in this regard. This takes me back to the point that the development of a new theory of media cannot be limited by a culturalist perspective. It needs to address media in all societies, but take into account the particular social context of each, a context which would have arisen from a particular historical evolution and experience.

As shown in this dissertation, Bourdieu's theory of fields is an excellent starting point for such a theory. It allows for a reconstruction of the social space within which a particular field, in this case the field of media, operates. This approach properly situates the particular media under study within its proper contexts. I use the plural here because it is not just one context that affects the evolution of media. By virtue of it being a platform of social communication, media is logically affected by different factors. Culture, the economy, the intellectual sphere, politics, technology, etc., can all affect media in one way or another. More importantly, each can affect media separately. Bourdieu's conceptualization of the social space as the space where different social fields exist facilitates the examination of such factors and how they can each affect media; each of these factors can be studied as a separate field affecting the field of media in their own way. I have shown the importance of this approach in this study, when I have focused on the different fields which have each affected the development of media, be it the field of education, the field of politics, or the field of the state. I will not go through all the useful aspects of the theory of fields which I have already explained in Chapter III. It was enough to point out here the value of a theory that does not focus exclusively on the production and consumption of the mediated message, nor on one aspect of the broad social context.

In addition to that, I must stress the need to adopt a historical analysis of the evolution of media to properly understand its role in a particular society at a certain point. As seen in this thesis, the role of the journalist and of the press more broadly speaking developed across time, as an internal evolutionary process and also as a reaction to outside influences from other social fields. What is more relevant here is not that these roles changed, but the way in which they changed. Here, the concept of *habitus* is primordial in understanding this evolution because it shows, and rightly so, that past experiences within a field accumulate and present the actor within that field with an array of action choices and possibilities that emanate from these particular experiences. The habitus of an actor within the field of media, whether the journalist or the audience, the politician or the owner, is therefore not simply the perceived or conscious available choices at his disposal, which we can observe from a momentary observation, a still, or a snapshot of practice and action within a field, but the sum of past experiences of himself and his class which we, as observers, can only come to grasp when we look at the historical evolution of this actor. Furthermore, and also as shown throughout this thesis, the field of media evolves in reaction to outside forces and changes. This means that the evolution of other fields which affect the field of media must be examined from a historical perspective so see where particular changes might induce parallel transformation in media behavior and function. Just consider the enduring impact of the 'Urabi Revolution on the field of journalism. It presented the journalist with an opportunity to produce political opinions, and to connect with an audience he had previously shunned, an equal revolution in the field of journalism and the habitus of the journalist.

By combining historical depth with sociological understanding, I have in fact tried to unite two separate disciplines which I believe would work much better together than apart, a point which James Curran (2002: 3) shared when he lamented: "despite this auspicious beginning, media history has since become marginalized. It is now the neglected grandparent of media studies: isolated, ignored, rarely visited by her offspring". In fact, arguments from the discipline of critical media history have repeatedly supported some of the assumptions of this thesis. Conboy (2004: 2-3) writes that his account: "seeks to recapture something of the overall chronology of journalism's development while rejecting any naive celebration of a triumph of the political freedom of our news media. [...] There is not and never has been a single unifying activity to be thought of as journalism". Historical insight is therefore not simply a question of luxury

which the sociologist of media might want to choose to indulge in or disregard if it proves too taxing. This is especially the case when this sociologist wants to impose a particular worldview on media, its behavior, and its social function.

It is therefore through a combination of Bourdieu's theory of fields and critical historical analysis that a proper sociological theory of media could take shape. Not only would such a theory, or at the very least such an approach, answer the call of radical and alternative media scholars to escape Eurocentrism within media studies, but it would also allow Western perceptions of Western media to remove the veil of the liberal paradigm from their eyes and look at media with no particular expectations and preconceived notions that dictate the course of their often teleological analyses. Such a theory will have to resolve a very specific question that requires an immense answer: what are the roles of what media in what context? Only then would we be able to achieve true knowledge of the state of media and its role in society.

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