

**DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL SURVIVAL:
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF
THAI NO-CONFIDENCE DEBATES**

**by
Savitri Gadavanij**

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the aggressive and informal style of discourse used in Thai parliamentary debates is a product of the Thai political sphere, serving clear functions in its context. Adopting the approach of Critical Discourse Analysis, the thesis presents discourse as socially constituted as well as socially constitutive. The research employs a two level analysis to explore this hypothesis. At the macro level, Critical Discourse Analysis and the Sociocognitive Approach are operationalised to investigate the socio-political conditions that prompt this ‘unparliamentary’ mode of parliamentary discourse. At the micro level, politeness theory and pragmatics are employed to investigate the potential functions that small linguistic features may serve under such social conditions. Five sample accusatory speeches and two sample respondent speeches from recent debates are selected for close textual analysis using this approach.

It is argued that the unparliamentary style of the debates’ discourse is the result of discursive strategies used in politicians’ speeches. These strategies are textual evidence of sociocultural practice and discourse practice. They reflect the speakers’ attempts to subvert three competing conjunctures in the Thai political domain: the debate’s formal and actual purposes, its Code of Behaviour, and its multiple audiences. Debaters need to balance three contending purposes: the desire of highly partisan participants to cause maximum damage to the opposing side, their attempts to seek public support (including the maintenance of face), and their need to stay within the parliamentary Code of Behaviour.

This thesis identifies a number of strategies that potentially serve these conflicting purposes, for example, intertextuality, enthymeme and prolepsis/disclaimer. These findings lead to the conclusion that an unparliamentary debating style, constituted of small, seemingly insignificant linguistic features, carries larger social implications. Despite being a reflection of social conditions, this debating style has the potential to redefine these conditions. Thai no-confidence debates offer an accomplished parliamentary speaker the opportunity to achieve apparently contradictory political and linguistic ends, within the same tightly-crafted speech.

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|--|
| CA | Conversational Analysis |
| CDA | Critical Discourse Analysis |
| CL | Critical Linguistics |
| CPP | Chart Pattana Party |
| CTP | Chart Thai Party |
| DP | Democrat Party |
| FTA | Face threatening act |
| H | Hearer |
| IFIDs | Illocutionary force indicating devices |
| KP | Kitsangkhom Party |
| MP | Member of the Parliament |
| MP | Muanchon Party |
| NAP | New Aspiration Party |
| NF | Negative face |
| PCP | Puangchon Chaothai Party |
| PDP | Palang Dharma Party |
| PF | Positive face |
| PN FTA | Public negative face threatening act |
| PNF | Public negative face |
| PP FTA | Public positive face threatening act |
| PPF | Public positive face |
| PTP | Prachakorn Thai Party |
| Q-A | Question-Answer |
| RP | Ratsadorn Party |
| S | Speaker |
| SAP | Social Action Party |
| SCA | Sociocognitive Approach |
| SP | Solidarity Party |
| SRP | Seritham Party |
| STP | Samakkhi Tham Party |

University of Leeds Romanisation Tables for Thai

All Thai words are transcribed into English using Leeds University Romanisation system, except Thai proper names which I adopt the form the person used.

Vowels and Diphthongs

| <i>Vernacular</i> | <i>Romanisation</i> | <i>Vernacular</i> | <i>Romanisation</i> |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| อะ, อ | a | อ๊ะ | ua |
| อา | a | อ้าว, าว | ua |
| อ๋า | am | ไอ, ไอ, อัย, ไอย | ai |
| อิ | i | อาย | ai |
| อี | i | เอา | ao |
| อุ | u | อาว | ao |
| อู | u | ออย | ui |
| อุ | u | ไอย | oi |
| เอะ, เอ็ | e | ออย | oi |
| เอ | e | เอย | oei |
| แอะ, แอ็ | ae | เอ็อย | uai |
| แอ | ae | อวย | uai |
| โอะ, อ | o | อิว | iu |
| โอ | o | เอ็ว | eo |
| เออะ | o | เอว | eo |
| ออ | o | แเอา | aeo |
| เออะ | oe | เอ็ยว | ieo |
| เออ, เอ็ | oe | ฤ | ru |
| เอ็ยะ | ia | ฤ | ri |
| เอ็ย | ia | ฤ | roe |
| เอ็อะ | ua | ฤา | ru |
| เอ็อ | eua | ฤ | lu |
| | | ฤา | lu |

Consonants

| | <i>Romanisation when initial and medial</i> | <i>Romanisation when final</i> |
|------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| ก | k | k |
| ข, ข, ก, ค, ฆ | kh | k |
| ง | ng | ng |
| จ | j | t |
| ฉ, ช, ฌ, ฌ | ch | t |
| ญ | y | n |
| ด, ฎ, ฏ | d | t |
| ต, ฏ | t | t |
| ถ, ฐ, ฑ, ฒ, ฒ, ฒ | th | th |
| น, ณ | n | n |
| บ | b | p |
| ป | p | p |
| ผ, พ, ภ | ph | p |
| ฝ, ฟ | f | p |
| ม | m | m |
| ย | y | - |
| ร | r | m |
| ล, ฬ | l | n |
| ว | w | - |
| ซ, ฌร, ฌ, ฌ, ฌ | s | t |
| อ | - | - |
| ฮ, ฮ | h | - |

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.0 Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the dialectical relationship between political practice and political discourse. It has chosen parliamentary no-confidence debates as data because they represent the distinguishing features of Thai political discourse 'at its best'. The focus is on the accusatory speeches of the opposition, although respondent speeches are also analysed. The analysis takes the Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) standpoint that discourse is socially constituted as well as socially constitutive. Adopting this hypothesis means accepting that society manifests itself in discourse and that discourse serves certain social functions as part of social practices. Not only does discourse reflect society, it also has reproductive power over the society. Discourse is capable of reproducing changes in the social world. Discursive features, even the seemingly most trivial ones, may in fact carry much larger social implications. Being aware of the potential of discourse in the social world, CDA attempts to uncover the manipulation of discourse, which aims to gain power in society. CDA believes that, by disclosing the dialectical relationship between discourse and society, it can raise public awareness of the power of discourse. From this point of departure it can be said that the study of parliamentary discourse in Thailand is the reflexive study of Thai politics and the study of reproductivity of discourse. Discourse reflects the surrounding political conditions as well as how discourse, as part of the practices, serves social and political functions in those given conditions. Thus, this thesis is inherently multidisciplinary. It primarily involves the study of Thai political culture and Thai parliamentary politics which create the preconditions for the debate and the study of the debates' texts.

1.1 Research Rationale

Politicians 'do politics' through their discourse. This thesis explores how politicians use their discourse to 'do politics' in the no-confidence debates. It looks at various levels of linguistics from lexis to pragmatics in order to find out *why* and *how* such choices are used in certain social and political terms. With the question of *why* and *how* in mind, such discursive features fit in the context, the analysis must take into consideration both politics and discourse. It is, therefore, the aim of this thesis to keep a balance between linguistic analysis and political analysis so that the two questions can be answered.

Between 1980s and 1990s, no-confidence debates become a regular practice in the parliament.¹ They are held once every parliamentary ordinary session or twice a year,² which is the maximum

¹ During this period, Thailand was under 1991 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand BE 2534. After the promulgation of 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand BE 2540, Thai political context has changed

frequency allowed by the Constitution. The debate is a crucial political opportunity for the opposition to promote itself and inflict damage on the government, while the government has to maintain its image and stability. It is make or break time for both sides. With political status as well as political interest at stake, the debate is highly goal-oriented. The no-confidence debate discourse in Thailand stands out from other parliamentary discourse for four reasons:

- a. It features what might be termed ‘unparliamentary’ discourse involving a departure from moderation, informal discourse and offensive remarks from both sides. In terms of content, the debates do not raise only policy or administrative issues but also personal ones.
- b. The debates are held frequently. It has become a traditional twice-yearly event. The frequency is considered outstanding in comparison with the situation in other democratic countries such as the UK, where no-confidence debates are almost non-existent.³
- c. The debates are broadcast and televised parliamentary events. Its popularity is made evident in the viewing figures for the broadcast, which even surpass that of the most popular prime time soap, the programme which normally tops the ratings in Thai television.
- d. The debates usually succeed in inflicting political changes, be it the cabinet reshuffle, coalition realignment or the dissolution of the parliament. Of all the 47 debates’ motion to date, none of them has culminated in the vote of no-confidence. It is not the voting at the end of the debate that brings about the changes, but the debate discourse itself that provokes the changes.

It is intriguing to figure out how the discourse of the ‘popular’, as opposed to the institutionalised genre, can be adopted in an institutionalised domain like parliament, and succeeds in bringing about formal changes in such an institution. These problematic traits in the text and discourse practice give rise to our three research questions:

Question 1:

Why is discourse of the popular genre with an informal register employed in parliamentary discourse? What role does it have in the institutionalised discourse?

and the change affects the practice of no-confidence debate. However, since this thesis uses the debates in 1995 and 1996 as data, it will discuss Thai political context during that period, not the current one.

² According to Article 133 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand BE 2534, there shall be two parliamentary ordinary sessions in one calendar year.

³ There was a lengthy parliamentary investigation about the Scottish First Minister, Henry McLeish in November 2001. The investigation did not develop into a proper no-confidence debate motion. This incident is the closest the UK has come to a no-confidence debate in decade.

Question 2:

How is such discourse accepted in this institutionalised discourse when it violates the parliamentary Code of Behaviour, whose primary aim is to prevent any language that does not adhere to ‘moderation’?

Question 3:

What is the social/political implication of the presence of such genre in the parliamentary discourse?

In order to answer these three questions, this thesis is designed to achieve these two objectives:

Objective 1:

To study the structure (macrostructure) and discursive strategies and features (micro events) of the debate to see whether they reveal anything about the interaction between the debate and its political context. If they do, I should be able to explain how such text interacts with the context; in what way it is the product of the context and what function it has in that context. The research will look at various modes of discourse used in the debate, whether normally considered parliamentary or unparliamentary, to see their function as image-building or image-destroying according to how the speaker (henceforth S) uses it. Moreover the political impact of personal issues raised in the debate will be examined to unveil their paradoxical implication.

Objective 2:

The second objective turns to the implication of the debate in the larger context of Thai society. As the no-confidence vote has never been passed in any of the 47 debates, it can be said that any political changes are not brought about inside parliament but by the forces ‘outside’ parliament. These forces are public opinion, mediated by the role of the media. This thesis attempts to investigate what kind of discursive features are used to earn media attention and attain public support and how these features are achieved. This involves analysing the Thai audience, taking into account the culture that shapes their perspective.

1.2 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework can be divided into two levels: macrostructure and micro events. I adopt this two-level analysis from CDA (Fairclough 1992, 1995) because, unlike the two-level analysis of the Sociocognitive Approach (henceforth SCA) (van Dijk 1988), CDA allows movement between the two levels, thus making the framework more dynamic. The overarching framework consists of the incorporation of two critical linguistic approaches: CDA and the SCA. This overarching framework is employed to verify the hypothesis that the sociocultural practice shapes

the discourse practice and the evidence of its influence can be seen in the text itself. Hence, this thesis has two levels of relationship: one between sociocultural practice and discourse practice and another between discourse practice and text. The study considers that the incorporation of the two approaches can form a more complete analytical framework to explore the two relationships connecting discourse and society. It starts by adopting the SCA's concept of *context* (van Dijk 2001a) to distinguish elements that make up what CDA calls sociocultural practice and discourse practice. Context provides a systematic analysis of the first level of the relationship: the analysis of relevant social practices - how and through which mechanisms it manifests itself in the discourse practice. While SCA stops short at the investigation of the role of context in discourse practice, CDA investigates further. It accentuates the interface between discourse practice and how context configured within the discursive practice becomes apparent in the text (Fairclough 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). The intertextual analysis proves to be useful in analysing the second level of relationship.

The analysis of micro events looks at the minor traits of discourse. Its aim is to prove that even the most trivial discursive features have social functions, carry social implications and have the potential to reproduce social changes. At this level, it focuses on discursive strategies, especially Face Threatening Acts (henceforth FTAs), strategies such as metaphor, humour and sarcasm (Brown and Levinson 1987; Harris 2001; de Ayala 2001). It is the aim of this thesis to uncover how these strategies can be a useful tool, especially in the face of competing context categories. They are capable of constituting heterogeneity and ambivalence of text, which are desirable properties of effective discourse.

1.3 Data and Methods

The hypothesis of this thesis is that social practices shape discourse practices and the evidence of their impact can be found in the text itself. In order to prove/disprove this hypothesis, three parties have to be investigated: social practice, discourse practice and text. In the analysis of social practice, the study draws upon literature on Thai political culture and Thai politics as well as periodicals at the time of the debates. Information from these sources provides the idea of Thai social and political practice within which the no-confidence debate is situated. The analysis of discourse practice discusses the discrepancy between the ideal practice set out by the parliamentary Code of Behaviour and the pragmatic one. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand BE 2534 and the House of Representative Rules of Procedure form the Code of Behaviour that prescribes ideal practice. This is then set against actual practice which is formulated not only by the Code but also by other factors within this communicative event. The

analysis of the debate's actual practice leads to the establishment of the debate's schemata and the its general properties. Since the transcription of the debate will be used as the primary source of the debate's text analysis, the production of the transcription is also examined as part of the discourse practice analysis. All the factors investigated at these two levels of analysis form the *context* of the no-confidence debate.

The thesis will mainly use the transcription of the debates as our *text*. The transcription is considered as the debates themselves, while recognising that it may not be verbatim and may be subject to 'off-record' minor alteration,⁴ because it is the most complete and reliable source of what was uttered during the debates. Having laid out our purpose to investigate the effect of social practice in discursive practice and subsequently in the text, our research will focus on these three issues: social practice (Thai political practice), discursive practice (the debates) and the text (the speeches).

1.4 The Major Contributions

The main focus of this thesis is on political discourse. This has two definitions. The more general sense of the term refers to any discourse that denotes issues of power and control. The second and more limited sense is the discourse communicated in the political context by political actors in a political environment with the aim of achieving a political goal (Wilson 2001: 398). This thesis is primarily concerned with the political discourse in the second sense.

The study of political discourse began around the same time as the emergence of politics with the works of Cicero to Aristotle. However, it was in the 1980s and 1990s that political discourse was integrated into a linguistic discipline (Ibid: 399). In the past few decades, there has been a burgeoning of linguistic research into political discourse. Some of these take a primary pragmatic approach. The most central one in this group is probably Wilson's *Politically Speaking* (Wilson 1990). Critical linguistics is marked by the work of precursors such as Roger Fowler's *Language and Control* (1979) and Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress's *Language as Ideology* (1979). It is a linguistic paradigm that is social and critical, unlike other dominant paradigms (van Dijk 2001: 352). Critical linguistic analysis balances both the linguistic and social aspects of political discourse. This area developed with the emergence of many approaches, for example, CDA and SCA. Many researchers turn to these frameworks as efficient tools for political discourse analysis.

⁴ The transcription is the work of three offices and might be subjected to addition or deletion during the process of production (see chapter 3) even though any alteration of the transcription is not 'theoretically' allowed.

In Thailand the study of political discourse is still in its infancy. Research on this topic is limited. Most of it is conducted by political scientists who are more interested in the political context surrounding the discourse. Discourse is seen as a product of political practices. The reflexive aspect and generative power of discourse are under-investigated. Most of the research on discourse is conducted according to the discipline of political science, therefore the social and cognitive aspects of discourse are excluded from the framework. In his research on Thai no-confidence debates, Sombat Chanthornwong, a renowned Thai political scientist, seeks to explain the debate's content and argument pattern by looking at the Thai political context (Sombat et al 2001). Sombat, however, does not look at other linguistic features, which may also carry social and political implications. Similar to that of Sombat, McCargo's analysis of politics and political news in Thailand concentrates on how the political situation affects the content and presentation of a particular political issue in the press (McCargo 2000). Manas Khomoltha's work on the debate's discourse leans towards linguistic discipline (Manas, ongoing PhD thesis). Manas uses theories of coherence, relevance and logic to look for the truth in the debate. His framework is a quest for different *sets of reality* presented by the opposition, government and the media. He looks at the reality presented through argument patterns in discourse, not the discursive features themselves. Thus, the three works do not investigate the relationship between sociocultural practice-discourse practice-text as this thesis does. Therefore, they do not provide an explanation of why and how the problematic traits in the debate discourse occur.

This thesis is the first to employ the combination of CDA and SCA (context) to analyse political discourse in Thailand. It looks at the sociocultural practice surrounding the discourse, the practice of discourse and the discursive strategies that are traces of society found in the text. It aims at scrutinising the dialectical relationship between the three. Its findings can contribute not only to the field of linguistics but also to political science, sociology and communication.

1.4.1 The Discourse of Political Questions/ Allegations

No-confidence debates are occasions where competing context categories are most salient. Since it has proved impossible to bring down the government through parliamentary devices, the opposition needs public support to pressure the government. All they have available to win public support is their words and a limited share of the debate. Both the government and the opposition are compelled to produce the most effective discourse within those constraints. The debate can be divided into two categories: accusatory speeches of the opposition and the respondent speeches of the government. Our analysis focuses on the accusatory speeches of the opposition for two reasons. Firstly, it aims to fulfil the field of political discourse analysis. Political discourse is

almost synonymous with political answers, be it the answers given in political interviews or in Prime Minister's question time. Literature on political discourse usually focuses on the 'answer' more than on the questions or allegations (see Gruber 1993; Bull and Mayer 1993; Wilson 1981, 1989, 1990; Beard 2000; Sombat et al 2001). There are few studies dedicated to political accusatory speeches or political questions (Harris 1986, 1989, 2001). Although they operate within the same context and bear no less social and political implications, the political questions and allegations have somehow been given less attention. This thesis is an attempt to complete the picture of political discourse by making a contribution to the analysis of political allegations and political questions. Secondly, the Thai political context generates more limited conditions within which the opposition must function in comparison with the government. The opposition has to operate in the face of three strictly competing conjunctures⁵: the debate's purpose to cause maximum damage to the government, the need to win public support and the Code of Behaviour that guarantees that the debate is conducted in a formal manner. This means that the opposition is obliged to threaten the government's *face* in order to destroy its image. However, an FTA may pose a threat to H's face- especially the public face- as much as it does to S's (Brown and Levinson 1987) thus the opposition is obliged to conduct FTAs while ensuring that the action will not backfire. Not only does the opposition have to maintain its face, it also has to promote it as well. At the same time, they also have to ensure that their typically offensive speech will not be ruled as such by the Code of Behaviour. The government, on the other hand, operates in a relatively less difficult context. They are expected to clarify themselves and thereby win back their face. The process of winning back face involves the use of polite 'parliamentary' language to promote their image as 'professional parliamentarians' and to attract public sympathy. This genre and register corresponds well with the Code of Behaviour. The government's discourse, therefore, does not need to mitigate any competing conjunctures unlike the opposition's. With more competing context categories, the opposition's speeches reveal more about the strategies discourse producers use in order to operate within that given constraint.

1.4.2 Insights on the Discourse of No-Confidence Debates

No-confidence debates have been one of the most popular political events in Thailand and they evoke as much an interest as a general election. Much research has been done on the debates. However, most of these are concentrated on the issues raised in the debate and how they instigate political changes (see Udomsak 1995). Their emphasis is on *what* 'stories' or scandals are raised in

⁵ Chouliaraki and Fairclough use the term conjuncture to refer to 'a specification of the configuration of practices which the discourse in focus is located within' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 61). This thesis uses the term to refer to the condition that derives from the specific configuration of the context categories within a communicative event. (see chapter 2)

the debates and *how* they can lead the government to its downfall. This thesis, however, shows a shift towards the analysis of the debate's discourse. Its emphasis is on *how* such stories or scandals are presented, *why* they are presented in such a way and *whether* the way they are presented bolsters the credibility of the argument. It does not confine itself to content analysis but takes into account other discursive features: styles, genres and discourses of the debate. The thesis emerges from the hypothesis that the Thai public are interested in the style of the debate no less than they are in the content. This is supported by the fact that certain politicians whose 'entertaining' speech is proven to be fabricated in its content still get unwavering attention from the public.⁶ Such entertaining speech is what might be termed unparliamentary discourse. This thesis is an attempt to explain the social implication of such 'unparliamentary' discourse: how it attracts the majority of the Thai audience.

1.4.3 Reflexive Study of Thai Politics and the Thai Public Sphere

CDA proposes that discourse is constituted by society. In looking at the discourse, one should be able to see the reflection of the society (see Bourdieu and Waquant 1992). Thus, our study on the no-confidence debate discourse should be able to generate some insights into Thai political practices.

Unparliamentary discourse may be common in parliamentary debates in many countries (see Harris 2001). Yet it is more significantly pronounced in the Thai parliament, and is used almost exclusively in the no-confidence debate. This problematic discursive trait has its origin in the Thai political domain. Literature on Thai politics suggest that it is an area full of complexity. The tension grows out of the contestation between traditional polity and democracy. Democracy expects the debate to be a rational argument between the government and the opposition, with the public participating as a politically active audience. The remnant of traditional Thai polity nonetheless poses a contradictory condition. Traditional Thai polity is headed by 'good' and 'benevolent' rulers. The hierarchical society is joined by personal relationships. The tension between democracy and traditional polity grows out of the tension between the two: while democracy requires people to be autonomous, anonymous and equal before the law, Thai polity cherishes symbiotic, interpersonal relationships. The formal parliamentary language may be able to attend to the democratic expectation but it fails to promote the interpersonal relationships needed in Thai society. As a result, the discourse of Thai no-confidence debates sees the manifestation of ambivalence of discourse through the manipulation of *intertextuality*. This thesis

⁶ Samak Sundaravej, for example, is notorious of making up figures to support his argument. Still people like listening to him.

adopts Chouliaraki and Fairclough's concept of intertextuality (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). The term refers to the changing articulation of genre and the use of reported speech. In the practice of the no-confidence debate, the genre changing between parliamentary and unparliamentary discourse tries to appeal to both of the competing values underlying the debate.

The unparliamentary discourse of the debates is there to satisfy the requirement of the traditional polity in which the importance of interpersonal relationship surpasses rationality and ideology. Not only does it carry a social/political function in bringing the MPs closer to their constituents, it also has other social/political implications. On the positive side, it brings the Thais closer to politics. It makes political issues easier to understand and even entertaining to listen to. On the negative side, it can be seen as having a paradoxical impact on the public. It brings the public closer to politics but at the same time, makes them shrink from political participation. The unparliamentary style threatens people's faith in politics. The fact that any issue can be brought up and any kind of language can be used as long as it is capable of doing damage to the government openly shows the downside of Thai democracy. It may lead people to think that all politicians are similarly corrupt in one way or another. Public despair can reduce the no-confidence debates to just an entertaining performance that people like to watch but no one bothers to participate in or to take seriously.

1.5 The Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter Two This chapter provides a review of literature that forms our analytical framework. It starts by looking at discourse through the eyes of Critical Linguistics (henceforth CL). Its aim is to elaborate the rationale behind CL in order to explain why this branch of discourse analysis is chosen as the hypothetical ground to build our study upon. From CL, I then introduce two major CL approaches employed in our analysis: CDA and SCA. I explain how the two approaches complement each other and how together they form the most effective tool to tackle the issue of discourse and society. The latter part of the chapter is the discussion of politeness theory. This theory is the strategic analysis used in the micro events analysis. I review the theory as a universal theory before applying it to the Thai context. I propose that politeness theory should bring cultural factors into consideration in order to uncover this discourse phenomena precisely. This part demonstrates that discursive strategies, such as FTA strategies, *are* the traces of society that are found in the text. They are there because of the mitigated social context and they have their function in that context.

Chapter Three The methodology is discussed in this chapter. It introduces the two level analytical framework. The macro analysis is the combination of SCA and CDA. It investigates the relationship between society and text. It is argued that when there are conflicting context categories resulting in a condition called competing conjunctures, text needs to compromise between the two (or more) categories. To be able to reconcile the conflict, strategies are used to create double meaning: what is uttered (literal meaning) and what is meant (non-literal meaning). At the micro level, the analysis looks into the discursive features in the text. Since the ambivalence of text is created by the use of strategies, a strategic analysis has to be employed to detect their use and their functions. At this level, Politeness Theory and the pragmatic and humour approach are drawn upon

Chapter Four Chapter four and Chapter five are the analysis of relevant social practices and of discourse practice. As mentioned earlier, the analysis of the relationship between the two draws mainly upon SCA's *context* analysis. This chapter provides an analysis of the macro level categories of *context*, namely the Thai political domain, the global actions within this domain and its institutional actors (van Dijk 2001). The Thai political domain is presented as an area of contention where two political ideologies run in parallel: the Thai political culture and the notion of Democracy. The contention has influence on the global actions defining what and how social and political actions should be done.

Chapter Five This chapter investigates the relationship between the debate's practice and the general characteristics of the debate's text. It features the combination of CDA's conjuncture analysis and SCA's analysis of the micro categories of context, namely setting, local actions, participants and cognition. Conjunctures are presented as the bridge linking macro categories of context (relevant social practices) with the micro categories (discourse practice). It starts with the discussion of the first conjuncture which is the rationale of the debate. This conjuncture is posed by the Thai political domain. It affects the global action of the institutional actors, such as the no-confidence debate's practice of MPs. Then it moves on to discuss the debate's audience which as the second conjuncture posed by the global actions of parliamentarians (criticising the government, engaging in opposition and promoting oneself). The micro categories of context are introduced later as conjunctures within the discourse practice. Together, this thesis establishes three major competing conjunctures within which the debate has to operate. With the conjunctures established, the chapter proceeds to examine their influence in the text. The examination reveals the common traits of the debate: its structure, nature and prominent features. The detailed text analysis will be conducted in the following three chapters.

Chapter Six This chapter and the next two are the analyses of the debate's text. They investigate the discursive strategies in relation to the context; how they spring from the context and the roles they play in that context. They study the political situation at the time, evaluating the stability of the government in comparison with the strength of the opposition. The assessment of the political situation is followed by a personal profile of each politician. The two studies form the collective *cognition* of the opposition as well as the individual cognition. This chapter looks at the accusatory speeches made during the 1995 no-confidence debate. I have chosen the speech of Chalerm Yubumrung and Samak Sundaravej as our data. Both politicians share the same characteristic as a 'tough guy' or *nak leng*. Their speeches are good examples of highly informal discourse. They show how the use of discursive strategies, especially metaphor, word play and intertextuality succeed in rendering the speech more effective by demonstrating what these strategies *can* do in such a context.

Chapter Seven I investigate the accusatory speeches made by Chuan Leekpai, Trairong Suwannakiri and Sunai Julapongsathorn in 1996. They represent three political characters: Chuan as a member of the elite, Trairong as an outspoken technocrat and Sunai as an MP who struggles to find his place in Thai politics. Similarly to chapter six, it starts with the political condition and a personal profile of each MP that form the conjuncture of this particular debate. Then it looks for the discursive features that may be employed to get round these conjunctures. This chapter shows that differences in political condition and the variation of personal style may also trigger differences in the genres, styles and discourses. Moreover, they may also result in structural changes in the discourse.

Chapter Eight Here, I examine two respondent speeches: Suthep Thuaksuban's speech in 1995 and Kanjana Silpa-archa's speech in 1996. This is the comparative part of the study. Its purpose is to test whether the competing conjunctures are the factors that trigger discursive strategies. It explains the conjunctures of the respondent speeches and how these conjunctures affect the text. It gives special attention to comparing the relationship between the conjunctures and strategies of the accusatory speech and those of the respondent speech.

Chapter Nine This chapter provides a taxonomy of the discursive strategies found in the analysis. It divides them into ten categories. The potential functions of each strategy is outlined. The strategic functions are then analysed in parallel with the analysis of the debate's speech. Its purpose is to discuss how these strategies enhance the effectiveness of the speech in the context of accusatory speeches as well as of respondent ones. After that, the chapter turns to analyse the

general and individual use of strategies. It summarises and compares the seven speeches to find out whose speech can achieve most functions by way of using strategies.

Chapter Ten This last chapter discusses the socio-political implication of the discursive strategies found in the debate. This concluding chapter looks at the summary of the findings in order to explain the dialectical relationship the strategic discourse of the no-confidence debate have with the context of Thai politics and the Thai society. This chapter also evaluates the contribution of the research, its limitations and the further work that might be develop to support findings of the current study.

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Approach

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the theories which this research will draw upon during the process of analysis will be introduced. It is divided into five sections, the first of which will start by defining the notion of discourse. The definition discussed here is drawn not only from linguistics but also from sociology and politics. The next section then gives an overview of approaches to discourse analysis, categorising them into two major groups: non-critical linguistics and critical linguistics. The following two sections discuss each of these categories while providing a brief discussion of some of their theories. The fifth section concerns the theoretical framework of this thesis.

The framework discussed in this final section is divided into two levels: macro analysis and micro analysis. The macro level concerns the use of language in its socio-cultural setting using van Dijk's Sociocognitive Approach (henceforth SCA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA). These two theories are part of critical linguistics. They aim to analyse language in its social situation and the power derived from its manipulation. Then the discussion turns to a micro level analysis, considering genre and strategies used in the discourse. Politeness Theory is in the vanguard of this level of analysis. Pragmatics will also be employed to explain the use, the meaning and the implication of the strategies found in the data. The use of a two level analysis should enable a delicate examination of the discourse in a particular institutionalised socio-cultural setting, such as no-confidence debates in the Thai parliament. The macro analysis should be able to establish the mechanism and rationality of that particular context (conjunctures) while the micro analysis will unravel the strategies used to concoct 'appropriate' discourse to suit that context.

2.1 Discourse

Discourse is a term which is variously defined. According to Schiffrin et al, its various definitions can be classified into three main groups: 'anything beyond a sentence, language use and a broader range of social practice including non-linguistic and non-specific instances of language' (Schiffrin et al 2001: 1). This chapter takes the first, which is also the most general definition, as its point of departure: discourse is any linguistic sequence more extended than a sentence (Saussure 1959 quoted in Laclau 1993: 432). At this level, language is not defined solely by grammatical rules. Instead of looking at its grammaticality, discourse is observed by its functional aspects as part of the communicative event (van Dijk 1997: 2). Discourse is then seen as an 'open system' (Laclau 1993: 433; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 19) that draws upon semiotic resources such as text and grammatical rules as well as other resources in its context. This point of departure presupposes

two aspects of discourse: its form, which is derived from grammatical rules and its function, which is not necessarily defined by grammatical rules. Discourse studies are devoted to the investigation of the relationship between the form and function of language communication, with the issue of meaning at the centre (Renkema 1993: 1). Instead of looking at the abstract or ideal language system or the form, it sets out to explore the actual language use or the ‘function’ of language (de Beaugrande 1991: 265). The study of what language is and how it functions, by looking at the ‘possibility of perception, thought and action, depends on the structuration of a certain meaningful field which pre-exists any factual immediacy’ (Laclau 1993: 431). The studies propose that discourse has three dimensions: language use, communication of belief and interaction in society (van Dijk 1997: 2). This three dimensional analysis reconnects language with contextual reality, perceiving the latter as the precondition of discourse constitution (Ibid). Hence the hypothesis of discourse theory emerges: discourse is constituted by its society and, at the same time, is socially constitutive. Since discourse has its origin in society, it is not possible to analyse discourse without taking its context¹ into account. Discourse theory, therefore, examines the larger structures of discourse, bringing into consideration the social life in which the discourse takes place and the social practices which are related to it. Discourse theory examines the relationship between the two in order to explain how the society has influence on discourse and vice versa.

Considering discourse as an ‘open system’ implies that there are many elements relevant to the analysis of discourse. For that reason, discourse analysis emerges as a broad area consisting of many approaches which look at discourse from various angles, namely, *pragmatics* which studies the ‘acts’ of signs (discourse); *psycholinguistics* which is dedicated to the exploration of people’s cognitive processing; or *sociolinguistics* which finds correlations between social characteristics and discourse. It is not the aim nor is it within the scope of this thesis to go into the detail of every discourse analytic approach. As this thesis will employ two frameworks which belong to the critical discourse analysis approach, this chapter will focus on the review literature concerning that particular branch of discourse analysis.

2.1.1 Elements, Moments and Articulation: Discourse as Socially Constituted

Having set a hypothesis that discourse is both socially constituted and socially constitutive, discourse analysis aims to explore the dialectical relationship between discourse and society (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). This makes the study of discourse closely related to, and

¹ The concept of context is variously defined. Here I am using the term in the broadest and least technical sense as ‘the surrounding condition’ of the discourse. A more technical definition of context will be further investigated in the following section on van Dijk’s Sociocognitive approach.

overlapped with, the area of social science in the sense that both disciplines essentially involve the study of society. CL starts with the idea that social life is made up of social practices. The concept of social practices enables the analysis to connect social structures with the analysis of social interaction which, in this case, is discourse (Fairclough 2000a: 167). It starts by figuring out factors that play their part in the production and interpretation of discourse. Social life is considered as being constituted of elements which can be divided into four major categories: physical elements, sociological elements, cultural/psychological elements and text (Fairclough 2000a: 168). All these elements are meaningful. They are combined and configured to make up social practice. Discourse practice is one of many social practices. Therefore, these elements also play their part in discourse construction and interpretation. However, though discourse is made up of these elements, it cannot be reduced to any of them (Fairclough 1995, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Laclau 1993; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; van Dijk 1988, 2001b) because there is no connection between the element of the *signified* and the discourse or the *signifier* (Laclau 1993: 431). There are a 'series of contingent signifying elements available in a discursive field' to describe any *signified* (Howarth et al 2000: 7). *McDonald's*, for example, may represent convenience food to consumers in general, an unhealthy diet to doctors and a symbol of the capitalist regime to anti-capitalists. Since there is no one-to-one correlation between the signifier and the signified, what then defines the meaning of discourse?

Discursive practice, similar to other social practices, is the product of the combination and configuration of elements of social life. This combination and process of configuration also determines the discourse. It is in this process of configuration that human *social cognition* (Condor and Antaki 1997) comes into play by processing the information about the social world, describing and representing it in a discourse accordingly. *Cognitive processes* therefore can be seen as the factors that mediate discourse (signified) and society (signifier). Elements are configured and reconfigured at many levels of processing. The process through which different elements of life are brought together in specific local form and relation to constitute a practice is called the *moment of practice* (Harvey 1996). In a Saussurean sense, discourse 'is a system with elements dependent on one another' (Saussure 1959 quoted in Laclau 1993: 431). Elements have a relationship with each other and their relationship is constantly shifting. Only when they are *articulated* together as moments can they be relatively permanent (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). With every changing articulation and/or combination, elements are further transformed. It can be said that it is the process of articulation that composes discourse (Fairclough 2000a: 167). One social practice is constituted of more than one moment; the elements are further transformed when one moment *internalises* another (Harvey 1996 quoted in Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). It is the work

of the human cognitive process to decide which elements should be brought into that particular context and how they should be articulated together. Consequently, discourse is produced according to its context interpreted by the cognitive process of discourse users. The configuration of social practice is summed up in the following diagram.




Fig. 1

Configuration of Social Practice

The above diagram shows the configuration of social practice in general. To apply this diagram to explain the configuration of discourse practice, there are certain technical terms for the categories shown. Networks of social practices in particular areas of life are called *fields* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) or *orders of discourse*, for example, politics or a therapeutic field. *Genre* is 'how text figures in relation to other moments within a work' (Fairclough 2000a: 169). Each genre is associated with the production of a particular text type (Ibid: 169). *Style* is 'how text figures in relation to other moments in the identification of the people involved in the practice' (Ibid: 169). *Discourse* is how text figures in relation to other moments in how people represent the world, themselves and their practices (Ibid: 169). Because of the shifting relationship of elements and the fact that they are transformed in the process of configuration, be it in the genre, the style or the discourse level, it can be said that discourse is defined by the configuration of elements and mechanisms as much as by its elements.

2.1.2 Reflexive Aspect and Generative Power: Discourse as Socially Constitutive

Based on the hypothesis of discourse theory that discourse is not only constituted by society but also constitutes society, this section investigates the view of discourse as socially constitutive. Fundamentally, a number of social scientists agree that social practices have a *reflexive element* (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1991, 1993). Reflexive elements of practice refer to the ‘constant generation of representation’; ‘people never simply act’, they produce the representations of their action as well (Fairclough 2000a: 168). Identities, identification and social relations are constructed by social practices (Bhaskar 1986). If practices are reflexive in the sense that their actions simultaneously produce representations of such actions in that particular context, it means that all practices inherently possess meaningful semiotic elements that can be categorised as discursive elements. Consequently, discourse analysis treats both linguistic and non-linguistic data as discursive forms or *texts* (in a Derridean sense: ‘there is nothing outside text’ (Derrida 1974: 158)). Michel Foucault sees discourse as practices that form the very object which the discourse is about (Foucault 1972: 49). An example may help to elaborate how discourse constitutes identities, identification and social relations: when one speaks, one represents social life in a semiotic form. That is the identification of social life. One must also, perhaps by means of pronoun choice, identify oneself in relation to the identity of others, which means the discourse now constitutes the subject’s and object’s identities. By defining the identities, the social relation between the subject and object is outlined. Hence, while discourse is constituted by the articulation of elements of social life, social life itself is also seen as ‘textually-mediated’ (Fairclough 2000a: 165). Discourse is seen as ‘systems’ of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects (Howarth et al 2000: 3). Since every object acquires its significance in discourse, discourse can be said to be an agent of social construction. At the same time, discourse is also seen as constituted by empirical data or signifying practices. Fairclough adopts Halliday’s view of three meta-functions of language (Halliday 1994) to summarise the reflexive construction of discourse as follows:

- a. Ideational – text as representation and recontextualisation conveying a particular ideology.
- b. Interpersonal – text as a construction of S/ H identity, status and roles.
- c. Textual - the construction of relationship between S/ H

2.2 Critical vs. Non-Critical Linguistics

The notion of discourse is employed across disciplines and it takes on definitions which vary from one field to another, for example the word ‘discourse’ used in political philosophy may not mean entirely the same thing as ‘discourse’ used in psychology. This thesis will not go into detail about the definition of discourse in other disciplines. It will limit the scope only to the definition of

discourse in the linguistic sphere. Robert et al (1992) summarises definitions of discourse among linguistic perspectives into five categories:

- a. Language in its social context (Brown and Yule 1983)
 - b. Cohesion and coherence (Halliday and Hasan 1976)
 - c. Strategies for interpreting interactive signs and conventions (Gumperz 1982)
 - d. Linguistic unit larger than the level of sentence (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975)
 - e. Language as a means for social, political and economic values (Foucault 1972)
- (Robert et al 1992: 70)

The heterogeneity of discourse definitions has arisen from diverse discursive approaches. These theories can be categorised into two groups: non-critical and critical approaches. According to Fairclough, the difference between the two groups lies in the scope of their analysis. Non-critical approaches aim at studying various aspects of language as social interaction, critical approaches look further to uncover power and the ideological effects that discourse has on society (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Returning to Robert et al's summary, it can be seen that a.-d. belong to non-critical approaches while e. represents the critical approach. Note that a.-d. are also incorporated into critical theory. In the following section, non-critical approaches namely Pragmatics, Conversation Analysis, Speech Act will be discussed. These non-critical approaches will be integrated in our 'critical' theoretical framework which will be discussed in detail later in 2.5.

2.3 Non-Critical Linguistics

Discourse analysis approaches which study discourse in interaction without attending to the manipulation of discourse in order to gain control and power domination can be categorised as non-critical approaches. In this section, three major non-critical approaches will be discussed in order to provide an overview and some idea of non-critical linguistics. These approaches provide a basis for the critical linguistic approaches which will be elaborated in section 2.4. Several notions and concepts introduced by these three approaches will also be employed in our analysis.

2.3.1 Pragmatics

Pragmatics is the study of language from the point of view of language users,² language used in social interaction and the effect it has on other participants. Pragmatics does not solely focus on the utterance but also on the interaction between the utterance and society, that is 'how utterances acquire meaning in contexts' (Ross 1998: 39). Pragmatics is different from semantics. Whilst

² The concept of language users refers to two parties conducting communicative event. The language producer will be referred to as S and the language receiver will be referred to as H in this thesis.

semantics looks at the lexical meaning of words or the literal meaning of sentences, pragmatics, on the other hand, looks at the ‘meaning in use’ or ‘meaning in context’ of the discourse (Thomas 1995: 9). Thomas’s summary of the issue of meaning is that:

making a meaning is a dynamic process involving the negotiation of meaning between speaker and hearer, context of utterance (physical, social and linguistic) and the meaning potential of an utterance (Thomas 1995: 22)

In order to see how pragmatics can unravel the issue of meaning in discourse, two sister theories should be brought into consideration: syntax and semantics. Syntax, semantics and pragmatics see language as a system of signs or semiotics. These signs can be interpreted by looking at the ‘relationship between form and function in verbal communication’ (Renkema 1993: 21) The three theories were established by two American philosophers, Charles Peirce and Charles Morris (Morris 1938). Morris defines the relationship between the three areas as follows:

1. syntax, the relationship between signs within a sign system;
2. semantics, the relationship between signs and the objects they refer to;
3. pragmatics is concerned with questions as why an individual uses a specific sign, which circumstances call for the use of specific sign and how we interpret signs (Ibid: 21)

Pragmatics primarily views discourse users as arriving at a certain meaning by drawing on their social and cultural knowledge. Thus the theory is able to give an explanation for pragmatic phenomena where there is a discrepancy between content and form. That is when the meaning of certain discourse cannot be drawn literally from its form, for example, when the question ‘Would you like to open the door for me?’ is asked by someone whose hands are busy and standing awkwardly at the door, the question is not taken as a question (thus cannot be answered yes/no) but as a request.

2.3.2 Grice’s Theory of Meaning-nn and Conversational Implicature

The philosopher Paul Grice, is one of the most prominent contributors in the field of pragmatics. He introduced two concepts which seek to explain the issue of an utterance’s meaning. His theory of meaning-nn is an attempt to establish a broad definition of meaning covering the content which is not shown semantically. Grice (1957) distinguishes meaning into two categories: natural meaning and non-natural meaning or meaning-nn. Natural meaning refers to causally linked events, for example, smoke and fire or spots and measles. Therefore they are non-arbitrary in the Saussurean sense. Meaning-nn is concerned with meanings which are not constrained in this way. It refers to the meaning that S intends to convey and therefore it is also called speaker-meaning. According to Grice, it is the speaker’s intention that generates this type of meaning.

S meant-nn z by uttering U if and only if:

- (i) S intended U to cause some effect z in recipient H
 - (ii) S intended (i) to be achieved simply by H recognizing that intention (i)
- (Levinson 1983: 16)

According to the equation, meaning-nn can only be arrived at when S's intention is recognised by H. Thus, the interpretation of meaning-nn requires mutual knowledge between S and H that S knows that H knows that S knows (Ibid). This allows for a distinction between what is said (sentence meaning) and what is meant (speaker meaning), and thus provides an explanation for pragmatic phenomena such as irony, metaphor and implication whose meaning cannot be drawn solely from its semantic form.

Grice also proposed the concept of the *Cooperative Principle* and the four *Maxims of Conversation* as the basic assumptions for communicative interaction.

Cooperative Principle

Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are

(Grice 1975: 45)

The Cooperative Principle consists of four conversational Maxims:

- a. The maxim of *Quality*: try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
 - (i) do not say what you believe to be false
 - (ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
- b. The maxim of *Quantity*
 - (i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange
 - (ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required
- c. The maxim of *Relevance*
Make your contribution relevant
- d. The maxim of *Manner*
Be perspicuous, and specifically:
 - (i) avoid obscurity
 - (ii) avoid ambiguity
 - (iii) be brief
 - (iv) be orderly

According to Grice, during any interaction, it is assumed that the Cooperative Principle and the four maxims are observed, therefore language users can interpret more than literal meaning from an utterance. If the Cooperative Principle is not apparently observed, then H will seek an alternative meaning which does observe the Cooperative Principle. Thus a conversational implicature is triggered (Grice 1975, 1978). Implicatures are one mechanism for observing the Cooperative Principle, and this can be seen as part of Grice's attempt to find the logic behind conversation. The concepts are proposed in an effort to bridge the gap between 'saying and meaning, saying and implicating, and conventional and non-conventional meaning' (Davies 2000: 23). The underlying

assumption of his two concepts is that language users aim to conduct communication which is 'rational'. If the utterance does not appear rational (does not orient to Cooperative Principle), H is obliged to look for another possible meaning that does makes sense. Davies elaborates on this idea behind the Cooperative Principle and the conversational implicature as follows:

Hearers assume that an utterance addressed to them is intended to be meaningful, therefore if the utterance doesn't have an appropriate conventional meaning, they will look for a more useful (and non-conventional) interpretation. As far as the Hearer is concerned, the Speaker providing an uninterpretable (meaningless) utterance would be pointless, and therefore irrational.

(Davies 2000: 18)

For example, when I say to my housemate 'I am not deaf you know!' when the television is left on very loudly in the room, my housemate can infer that what I am saying is not an assertion because I know that she knows the fact that I am not deaf (thus it would be irrational for me to make that assertion). Since the surface meaning is not appropriate here, she is obliged to look for another meaning that makes sense. Assuming that the Cooperative Principle is at work she will be able to infer that I am asking her to turn down the volume of the television and not the radio that is also on in another room unless I specifically state that I want her to turn the volume of the radio down. This means that both myself and my housemate observe the maxims of relevance and quantity. Firstly, she recognises that my utterance is a request not an assertion. Secondly, she knows that the television in the room is relevant to my request. Thirdly, she also knows that if I would like her to turn the volume of the radio in another room down, I would specifically say that. Therefore, the communication between us succeeds effectively and efficiently with only a short utterance. Such triggerings of implicatures are known as *flouts* or *exploitations* of the Cooperative Principle.

Figures of speech are also good examples of *flouts*. Metaphors such as 'you are my guiding light' exploit the maxim of Quality; you are human being therefore you cannot *be* a light. This obliges the listeners to look for other possible implications of that utterance. Assuming that S's utterance is relevant (observation of relevance maxim), H has to look for a common quality between you and 'light'. Since light is an important thing that can guide the way, S may be saying that you are an important person who gives guidance to him. Thus the meaning of the metaphor is achieved. In contrast, the violation of a maxim refers to the 'unostentatious non observance of a maxim' (Thomas 1995: 72). Speakers that violate a maxim 'will be liable to mislead' (Grice 1975: 49). For example, if I said 'I am going home; there is a party at my house tonight', H is led to believe that I would go home in order to join the party. If it is found out later that I was at home watching TV in my bedroom rather than taking part in the party, it means that what I said is true but the implicature (that I went home in order to attend the party) is false.

2.3.3 Presupposition

Presupposition is a shared assumption underlying an utterance. It is another way that a speaker can mean more than what is said. For example, the phrase ‘manage to’ presupposes an act of attempting to do something as in ‘John manages to come back in time for Christmas’. Presupposition has two characteristics. First it can survive negation (Levinson 1983: 178). Therefore when I say ‘John did not manage to come back in time for Christmas’, the presupposition that he *did* try to so is still intact. Second, unlike entailments, presuppositions are defeasible (Grundy 2000: 136). For example, ‘save the earth’ presupposes that the earth needs to be saved. By adding, ‘not that the earth needs to be saved’ after the sentence, that presupposition can be denied. Although the presupposition can be denied, the fact that presupposition can survive negation makes it difficult to do so. Because presupposition is not part of what is said, it is another good way to smuggle in an extra meaning.

2.3.4 Speech Act Theory

Speech Act Theory sees discourse as a form of action (Levinson 1983: 21). Speech Act Theory derives from the assumption of the philosopher, J.L. Austin, that utterance is not only an act of speech but also a communicative activity in itself. He argues that utterances do not only record or impart information about facts, they also prescribe or conduct certain actions (Austin 1962). Austin categorises utterance into three groups: *constative utterances* refer to statements about information which can be either true or false such as ‘this pen is green’; *ethical propositions* are utterances that prescribe or influence a certain condition in the society such as ‘lock the door’ ; and *performatives* are utterance that actually performing action such as ‘I name this ship...’.

By introducing three categories of utterance, Speech Act Theory proposes that not all utterances are constative. Austin then argues that in producing an utterance a speaker may perform three acts simultaneously:

- a. locutionary act – an act of saying something in the full sense of ‘say’.
- b. illocutionary act – an act performed in saying something.
- c. perlocutionary act – an act performed by or as a result of saying. This refers to the effects produced through the locutionary and illocutionary act.

(Coulthard 1985: 18)

For example, when challenged into a bet, A says ‘you are on’, A’s utterance performs three acts simultaneously. First it involves A’s articulation of the utterance using his vocal organs. Thus, it performs a locutionary act. Second, it performs an illocutionary act because A has now committed

himself in a bet. Third, the utterance also performs a perlocutionary act because as A says 'You are on', the betting starts. Without A saying this, the bet cannot begin.

The concept of *Felicity conditions* is integral in studying speech as action. They have two major functions in communication: determining the success of the speech act and providing cues to convey H to the intended meaning of the act. Austin proposes that felicity conditions determine the success of performative utterances (Austin 1962). Performative acts have to be conducted correctly and completely according to the conventional procedures and by the appropriate person in order for the action to be fulfilled (Levinson 1983: 229). For example, one cannot be anointed a lady by anyone else 'apart from the reigning monarch. Therefore, if someone says 'I dub you Lady...', the performative act of the utterance cannot be fulfilled because it is not said by the appropriate person, hence it is called a misfire. Despite failing the felicity conditions, such an utterance may be stated deliberately for another purpose such as creating playful humour. Austin's concept of felicity conditions is further investigated and systematised by his student, John Searle. It is Searle who adds that felicity conditions not only determine whether the utterance is valid or not, they also constitute various illocutionary forces (Searle 1969). He introduces the notion of illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs) or essential conditions to help determine the intended illocutionary force. These IFIDs can conclude, for instance, word order and intonation which may facilitate the understanding of a message.

Speech acts can be divided into two categories: direct and indirect speech acts. An utterance is categorised as a direct speech act when its grammatical form corresponds with its illocutionary force. For example, 'Could you please close the window?' is a direct speech act because it has a form of a request and it has an illocutionary force as such. However, to request someone to close a window, one may say 'It is cold in here'. While it has the form of a constative utterance, it is intended to be an request. This indirect utterance then has two acts: the direct act as an assertion and the indirect act as a request. H needs to draw upon felicity conditions and other contextual clues to decide which act is intended by S.

2.3.5 Conversation Analysis (CA)

Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA) provides systematic analysis of a form of human interaction- a conversation - that is called 'talk-in-interaction' (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998: 13). This theory proposes that conversation is an organised and ordered phenomenon (Ibid). The organised and ordered structure of conversation, however, does not derive from its grammatical structure. Therefore, conversational analysts do not look at the grammatical structure of the

interaction. They believe that the structure of interaction is governed by other social principles, and it is these that govern patterns of interaction. It can be said that the principle of CA emerges from sociology more than linguistics. Instead of looking at 'verbal interaction as manifestation of linguistic order', CA sees it as 'instances of situated social order' (Montgomery 1995: 51). CA has proposed many patterns of talk-in-interaction such as the organisation of turn-taking and the organisation of repairs. This thesis will focus on the pattern of adjacency pairs because this is more pertinent to the data under analysis.

2.3.5.1 Adjacency Pairs

The notion of adjacency pairs refers to a pattern of utterances that are ordered in pairs such as a question is usually followed by an answer. The first part of such utterances requires the second part of the same pair to make a complete and meaningful utterance. This notion presupposes the difference between the first part and the second part of the pair. Upon hearing the first part of any pair, language users can recognise it, and thus can complete it by producing the second part of the same pair (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 295). Accepting that there is mutual recognition of adjacency pairs does not mean that this notion is prescriptive. Adjacency pairs only make the production of utterances predictive, yet the model accepts that language users do not always produce the 'right' pair. Assuming that mutual recognition is still in place, the production of the 'wrong' second pair part is seen as a deliberate communication of a certain message for certain purposes. The deliberate flouting of understanding and mutual recognition can be used to produce humorous effect (incongruity between what is universally expected and what is said), for instance. Note that there may be more than one second part of any pair, for example:

Question- Answer (direct answer, rhetorical answer or acknowledge the question but refuse to answer)

Invitation- response (acceptance or declination)

Accusation- response (acceptance or denial)

Offer- response (acceptance or refusal)

Though there can be more than one second part for any first part, one response is preferable to another. An example of the preferred action turn is that an invitation prefers to have acceptance as a response. This notion of preferred and dispreferred has much to do with the interpersonal relationship between S and H. The preferred action turn signals agreement between H and S while the dispreferred turn signals disagreement (Pomerantz 1984: 64). As a result, a dispreferred action turn may pose a threat to S's face such as when H blatantly refuses to answer S's question. This face-threatening aspect of dispreferred adjacency pair is discussed in more detail by Brown and

Levinson (1987). This thesis will look at this aspect along with other Face Threatening Acts in section 2.5.2.1 which concerns Politeness Theory.

2.4 Critical Linguistics³

This thesis draws mainly upon two of the critical linguistic approaches. Therefore it is the aim of this section to introduce the basic idea of critical linguistics. CL came into being in the 1970s as a revolt against ‘uncritical and asocial’ (van Dijk 2001b: 352) paradigms such as structural grammar. Though the precursors of CL may be found in the Frankfurt School in the prewar era, the theory formulates its main thesis in the work of Roger Fowler (Fowler et al) and Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress (Kress and Hodge 1979, Hodge and Kress 1988, 1993). This critical theory of language is developed from social science theories that look at the issue of power-ideology-social construction namely that of Michel Foucault (1972), Jurgen Habermas (1979b, 1984), Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1991) and Antonio Gramsci (1971). It mainly argues that ‘discourse is part of and influenced by social structure and produced in social interaction’ (Ibid: 352). As part of the social structure, CL proposes that discourse, that is text and talk may be used to reproduce or resist power abuse, dominance and inequality in society (Ibid: 352). The aim is to promote public awareness about this potential of discourse so that discourse users understand, and thus are able to resist the social inequality produced by text and talk (Ibid: 352).

According to the review in the previous sections, a hypothesis can be formulated: discourse and society do have a dialectical relationship with one another, with the speaker’s cognitive processes mediating between them. Elements that constitute discourse come from social life but they are transformed in the process of articulation by the speaker’s cognitive processes. Hence the end product of discourse is not merely a ‘compilation of elements’ but the ‘combined and transformed elements’ that are not necessarily the same as the original elements.

³ The theory that analyses discourse critically is known by many different names such as critical language awareness, critical discourse analysis, critical language studies and critical linguistics. This thesis will call the theory critical linguistics to differentiate it from Fairclough’s CDA.




Fig. 2
Cognitive-Mediated Discourse Practice

This thesis will focus on those works which are relevant or those which provide the basis for the two critical discourse analysis frameworks used here, namely van Dijk's SCA and Fairclough's CDA. They will be discussed in more detail shortly. CDA and SCA are chosen because (when used together) they give a systematic analytical framework that may best fit the data and scope of this thesis, attending to both social and cognitive aspects of discourse. By doing this, they potentially provide a systematic explanation of the discourse-society relationship as well as how this relationship can be manipulated. Accordingly, these two are suitable to use as the over-arching framework of this analysis.

Thus far, I have suggested that discourse is 'a system integrated with speakers' knowledge of the world' and that the system should be described 'in linguistic, cognitive and social terms, along with the conditions under which speakers use it' (de Beaugrande 1997: 40). This is the elemental basis of CL. This approach claims that it is not simply a method, but an autonomous domain with its own characteristic objects, phenomena, theories, principle and methods (van Dijk 1997: 32). Fundamentally, it believes that language has more than one dimension. To analyse discourse, its three dimensional aspects must be taken into consideration: language use, communication of belief and interaction in sociocultural contexts (van Dijk 1997: 2) The study of discourse is situated at the junction of these three dimensions, as it provides an integrated description of them. Thus, it can be said that the study of discourse is, by its nature, multidisciplinary.

At the centre of this study lies the issue of the meaning of discourse. This abstract meaning is referred to as *semantic representations* (van Dijk 1997: 8). The notion signifies less concern for the rigid order and form of language and more for its meaning. In other words, according to the discourse approach to grammar, 'the well-formedness or grammaticalness of a sentence is relative'

(van Dijk 1997: 8). So long as discourse is fast and efficient in achieving mutual understanding, it is considered successful in communicating and interacting, which are its major purposes. Therefore an utterance can be ungrammatical as a sentence, but well-formed as a piece of discourse.

If the grammaticality and well-formedness of discourse is relative and its meaning is not determined by them, what then constitutes semantic representations? Generally speaking, discourse analysts refer to social context and cognitive process in discourse production and interpretation. 'Discourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules' (Howarth et al 2000: 2). Since the properties of text and talk, that is the characteristic of social situations or communicative events of the discourse, are meaningful components, they should be taken into account in the analysis. These properties are generally known as 'context', or in a more technical term as a 'speech event'. This can be elaborated using Dell Hymes's ethnolinguist SPEAKING model as consisting of Setting and scene, Participants, Ends, Act sequences, Keys or tone, Instrumentalities, Norms and Genres (Hymes 1972).

Although discourse studies, to a certain extent, denounce the rigid rules of grammar, it still argues that the actual discourse, featuring breaches of the normative rules of appropriate discourse, does have some shared rules and strategies (van Dijk 1997: 31). Based on this assumption of discourse study's belief that meaning is something 'assigned' to it by discourse users, this, then, presupposes that there is a shared starting point that people use in making sense in communication (van Dijk 1997: 8). The approach proposes that in order to understand and interpret discourse, the mental component of discourse needs to be taken into consideration. Language users draw upon certain cognitive processes and representations when they communicate (see Condor and Antaki 1997). The process and representations can be unique to each individual; this constitutes *personal variation* in language use. Meanwhile as member of a society, each language user has to draw upon some shared cognitive rules, values and norms, which enable mutual understanding. Therefore successful communication is assumed to involve both *individual cognition* and also *sociocultural cognition* (van Dijk 1997:17).

It is believed that there must be some sort of shared or known information in forging successful communication. This idea is used in explaining the structure of discourse meaning (Condor and Antaki 1997: 323). According to discourse analysis, meaning can be divided into two levels: *micro level* and *macro level* (van Dijk 1988). The micro level refers to the relations of meaning between propositions. These relations comply with many *coherence conditions*. The discourse starts with

very general information, which is, presumably 'known' to people so that it is easily understood. Then it gradually turns to more specific information. This way the reader/listener can comprehend by referring back to the more general information mentioned earlier. The linear relation between propositions is called *local coherence*. The macro level refers to the overall idea of the discourse (van Dijk 1988). Coming in the form of a topic or theme (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983; van Dijk 1988), these global meanings help define the macro coherence of discourse. The meaning at this level is very important in communication.

In sum, the study of the properties of discourse takes into account complex, higher-level properties such as coherence relations between sentences, overall topics and schematic forms as well as stylistic and rhetorical dimensions. Apart from structure, it suggests that one needs to look at the complex communicative event that embodies a social context, featuring participants as well as production and reception processes in order to see the actual roles of discourse as social interaction.

2.4.1 Political Discourse: Hegemony and Social Antagonism

In 2.4, the role of human social cognitive processes in the production of discourse has been discussed. This means that fundamentally, discourse users are more or less conscious of the production because discourse is produced in line with the context *interpreted* by human social cognition. The point that discourse is produced according to the context, such as the speaker's social position, situation or aim, presupposes an assumption that discourse is goal-oriented; discourse users aim to produce discourse which is the most effective in pursuing their aim in that particular context. The generative power of discourse is now not only an inherent potential, it is also (consciously or unconsciously) 'manoeuvred' as a tool to pursue the goal of the discourse. It is then seen more or less like a cultural resource which can be used for personal gain. For that reason, it has become an area of contention: people are struggling to use discourse to represent their identities, identification or social relationships in pursuit of power. This area is a junction where discourse theory and social science meet politics. As mentioned earlier, there is no one-to-one correlation between the *signified* and the *signifier*, thus discourse is a system that can never be totally closed. Discourse users can then attempt to partially fix a *signified* and any of the possible *signifiers* available, whichever is most desirable to them. This partial fixing relation between the *signified* and *signifier* is called *hegemony* (Laclau 1993: 21). Hegemony is the central interest of CL; the notion was originally coined by Gramsci (Gramsci 1971). It refers to the situation where the power of dominant groups is integrated in laws, norms or habits by the use of discourse. Hegemony occurs when the signified can only present itself through what is classified as a

‘floating signifier’ or an ‘empty signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985 quoted in Howarth et al 2000: 8). Words such as ‘politics’, ‘democracy’ or ‘justice’ fall into this category. They provide a fertile ground for hegemonic discourse.

According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the contention in discourse springs from an assumption that there is *social antagonism*. Social antagonism is the blockage of identity that occurs when people have competing identities. The identity of one prevents another from developing their identity to the full (Howarth et al 2000: 10). As discourse users adopt competing identities that are in conflict with one another, the discourse, which is the representation of their identity, is in conflict and competing as well. As a result, the construction and experience of social antagonism are at the centre of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This section discusses the theories that this thesis will primarily draw upon. Taking Fairclough’s two-level analysis, this thesis will analyse discourse at two levels: macro structure and micro events. The theoretical discussion will therefore be divided into two parts according to the two levels of analysis: macro analysis and micro analysis.

The first part of this section discusses two theories which investigate the dialectical relationship between discourse and its social context: SCA and CDA. These two theories are essentially multidisciplinary. Their acknowledgement of the dialectical relationship between discourse and society presupposes their recognition that:

- a. discourse is context sensitive
- b. discourse has the power to reproduce a social world

Taking that viewpoint, the theories, despite being linguistic approaches, are employed to embark on social issues which derive from the use of discourse. The issues in focus are social inequality as well as the reproduction of ideology in discourse. They are applied to the analysis of media and political discourse because they are considered to have the potential for an impact upon society. These frameworks now primarily focus on political discourse, for example, van Dijk’s study of racism in European parliamentary discourse (Wodak and van Dijk 2001) and Fairclough’s study of the discourse of New Labour (Fairclough 2000b).

This section starts with CDA, a proclaimed transdisciplinary approach aiming to tackle unequal power relations. Then van Dijk’s SCA, which emphasises the role of world knowledge and cognitive processing in discourse processing, will be discussed. CDA provides a framework capable of indicating traces of the society ‘in’ the text itself while van Dijk’s approach looks for

societal traits in the discursive process. The two theoretical frameworks therefore complement each other. Van Dijk's notion of *context* gives Fairclough's intertextual analysis greater clarity during the analysis of conjunctures and discourse practice. When applied together, they create a framework which will be able to explain these following points:

- a. the influence the social world has on discourse practice
- b. the role of individual variation during discourse practice (text production)
- c. how discourse practice, then, shapes discourse
- d. the traces of social world and discourse practices in the discourse
- e. how the discourse affects discourse practice (text consumption)
- f. the influence discourse practice has on the social world

Van Dijk's, as well as Fairclough's framework, succeeds in explaining point a, c, d and f. Nonetheless, van Dijk's framework is much less explicit than Fairclough's in explaining what are the traces of social world and discourse practice in the discourse (point d). SCA has much to gain from utilising CDA's intertextual analysis. On the other hand, Fairclough's framework, despite being able to explain point d. exceptionally well using his intertextual analysis, only superficially explains individual variation in the text. Therefore, the two analyses can be seen to complement each other. Fairclough's explanation seems to bypass the role of the cognitive process, which makes it difficult to explain the fact that when different people are put in the same situation under the same conjunctures (in Fairclough's term), they may react differently. In fact, it can almost be inferred from Fairclough's framework (which says that conjunctures shape discourse production and consequently text itself) that people are 'expected' to react similarly. Since Fairclough does not attend to the individual's cognitive process, point e. about text consumption is, again, under explored. For that reason, van Dijk's framework is used to address the limitations of Fairclough's. With his framework stemming from psycholinguistic research (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983), it can explain the issue of the cognitive processes of text production (point b. and c.) and text consumption (point e.) satisfactorily. In fact, it brings discourse practice to the forefront of the analysis. With a combination of SCA and CDA as the overarching theory, the six levels of interaction between discourse and society can be explained.

However, neither of the frameworks provides details for a micro analysis of text that sufficiently explain point d.- traces of social world and social practice in the text. This is where strategic analysis comes in. The strategic analysis provides a bridge linking discourse to its context. Strategies, in this case, discursive strategies, are believed to be the textual properties that bear the trace of social world and social practice. Strategies are goal-oriented; they appear to negotiate the aim of the text producers and the sociocultural constraints surrounding them. This thesis employs

Politeness Theory for strategic analysis because it is believed to suit our data from no-confidence debate discourse where Face Threatening Acts abound. After using Politeness Theory to indicate where the strategies are and what are the normal functions of such strategies, the two overarching frameworks will then be activated to explain the social significance and implication of such usage.

2.5.1 Macro Analysis

2.5.1.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

The theoretical assumptions of CDA are:

- a. verbal interaction presupposes structure in our knowledge base, for example, social structures, situational types, language codes
- b. actions can also reproduce structure

From the assumptions it is apparent that the relationship between language and social structure is essentially dialectic. Texts are socioculturally shaped as well as socioculturally constitutive (Fairclough 1995: 34). The essence of this theoretical framework is presumably able to render understanding to the processes of ‘naturalisation’. According to the assumptions, the processes can be summed up as follows:

- a. ideologies can become, more or less, naturalised and be seen as commonsensical rather than the interests of certain groups
- b. those naturalised ideologies then become the ‘knowledge base’ and orderliness that interaction depends upon
- c. the orderliness of micro events is dependent upon the higher orderliness of ideological consensus

According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), in order to conduct CDA research, there are eight principles of theory which have to be borne in mind:

1. CDA addresses social problems

The main focus of CDA is not the language itself or the use of it but the partially linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271). In other words, CDA is interested in social issues, which are, to various degrees, the results or the impacts of discourse. It aims to develop critical awareness of discursive strategies to the general public so that language will no longer be a tool manipulated by a powerful group of people to seek more power.

2. Power relations are discursive

CDA deals with the issue of language and power. It looks at how power relations are exercised and negotiated in discourse (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 27). Apart from the issue of power in discourse, it also looks at the issue of power over discourse. CDA believes that the ability to control and change the rules of discursive practice as well as the structures of the order of discourse can be seen as a means to gain power.

3. Discourse constitutes society and culture

The relations between discourse and society/culture are dialectical. Discourse constitutes society and culture and is also being constituted by them. According to this hypothesis, society is divided into three broad domains so that the impact of discourse can apparently be seen: representations of the world, social relations between people and people's social and personal identities (Fairclough, 1992).

4. Discourse does ideological work

By ideologies, CDA refers to particular ways of representing and constructing society. This produces unequal relations of power, domination and exploitation. A critical awareness emphasises the need to determine whether a particular type of discursive event does ideological work. In order to do so, the analysis of texts, how they are interpreted and received, and what social effects they have must be taken into account.

5. Discourse as historical

Discourse is inseparable from its context. The concept of context here also includes intertextuality and sociocultural knowledge. By stating discourse as historical, CDA points out the connections discourses have with one another. They are connected to those produced earlier as well as those produced synchronically and subsequently.

6. The link between text and society is mediated

CDA is an attempt to make connections between social/cultural structures and processes on the one hand, and properties of text on the other. These connections are complex and therefore mediated. This is because the link between text and society is mediated by the order of discourse.

7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory

CDA suggests that the process of understanding takes place against the background of emotions, attitudes and knowledge. In the process, text is deconstructed and embedded in its social conditions (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 227). That is when text is linked to the issue of ideologies and power. In order to detect this discrete process, CDA relies on scientific procedures

to 'denaturalise' it. It then concludes that interpretations and explanations are something dynamic and open to new context and information.

8. Discourse is a form of social action

CDA is a socially committed scientific paradigm. Its principal aim is to uncover opaqueness and power relationships (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 279). It perceives discourse as a social action, which has been produced through the process of social cognition. The critical analysis of discourse patterns is claimed to lead to a guideline for different behaviour patterns.

CDA analysis is divided into two levels: verbal events or micro events and macrostructures such as society. CDA sees the latter as both the conditions for and the product of the former. CDA, unlike other approaches such as SCA, rejects rigid barriers between the study of the micro, of which the study of discourse is a part, and the study of macro (Fairclough 1995a: 28). CDA proposes *intertextual analysis* as a crucial mediator between the micro and the macro: the text and its context (Fairclough 1997:189). Intertextuality is situated at the borderline between discourse practice and text. The notion allows oscillation between the two levels. CDA is interested in the manipulation of discourse. It terms the manipulation of discourse, 'naturalised' ideology. By naturalised ideology, it means that language is used to win acceptance for S by presenting this view in a non-ideological way so that it is seen as a 'common sense' or as given. The process of revealing the mechanism of manipulation is, therefore, called 'denaturalisation'. 'The process shows how social structures determine properties of discourse and how discourse determines social structures' (Fairclough 1995a: 26).

In order to unravel the discrete process of discourse manipulation, Fairclough suggests a framework that helps in indicating the impact of discourse in society and vice versa. The framework consists of three components: text, text production/consumption and sociocultural practice. The three components are defined as follows:

Text may be written or oral, and oral texts may be just spoken (radio) or spoken and visual (television). By 'discourse practice' I mean the processes of text production and text consumption. And by 'sociocultural practice' I mean the social and cultural goings-on, which the communicative event is a part of (Fairclough 1995a: 57).




Fig. 3
A framework for critical discourse analysis of a communicative event
(Fairclough 1995a: 59)

According to the framework, discourse practice mediates between the textual and sociocultural practices. ‘Sociocultural practice indirectly shapes text by way of shaping the discourse practice’ (Fairclough 1995b: 60). Therefore the three main categories of meta-function of text, that is, ideational, interpersonal and textual are the indirect product of the sociocultural practice. Fairclough emphasises the interface between text and discourse practice (the dotted line). He believes that the traces of discourse practice and sociocultural practice in the form of *intertextuality* can be found there. In looking at the interface between text and discourse practice, Fairclough introduces intertextual analysis.

Intertextuality and Intertextual Analysis

According to philosophers and critical linguists such as, M.M. Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes, discourse does not have a self-contained meaning (Fairclough 1995; Allen 2000). It takes on meaning in its own context. The meaning of discourse has historical as well as sociocultural qualities built into it. Language acquires its meaning in relation to outside forces and factors: context, previous texts and culture (Allen 2000: 44). The inter-relational quality of discourse prevents it from being interpreted literally. Some linguists and language philosophers term this dependency relationship between meaning of discourse and its history and context ‘intertextuality’.

In this case, intertextual analysis is an attempt to find the traces society has in discourse and how discourse is designed to interact with society.

However, intertextuality is a critical term which is variously defined (Allen 2000: 2). Definitions vary according to what aspect of discourse theorists find related to the society, for example, intertextuality is most commonly understood to mean the dependency of a discourse's meaning on a text which has been produced earlier. However, this thesis adopts Fairclough's definition of intertextuality (Fairclough 1995, 2000a, 2000b; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).

For Fairclough, intertextuality is largely responsible for the heterogeneity of texts. The notion 'entails a mode of analysis which highlights the diverse and often contradictory elements and threads which go to make up a text' (Fairclough 1992: 102). The heterogeneity or the ambivalence of text refers to the presence of various meanings co-existing in any particular text. The coexistence makes it difficult to point out which one is the meaning intended by S. 'Intertextuality is perceived as the source of much of the heterogeneity/ambivalence of texts' (Ibid: 105) because it refers to the inclusion of various other texts such as the speech of others.

Intertextuality can be understood on two levels:

1. 'It is the combination in discourse of different genres or different discourses' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 49).
2. It is the presence in my discourse of the specific words of the other mixed with my words as for instance reported speech' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 49).

Fairclough primarily defines level one intertextuality as the changing articulation of *genres*. For Fairclough, society not only manifests itself in the meaning of discourse, but also through the form of discourse such as its genre. Genre is a kind of text configured by text type which has been developed and conventionalised (Fairclough 1995). Genre is the production of social life, as well as of the society within which the social interaction takes place (Fairclough 2000a). He believes that text does not directly initiate genre; text can manifest complex mixed genres. The recurring pattern of complex mixed genres occurs in the same *order of discourse* (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 59). These ordered sets of discursive practices are associated with particular social domains of institutions. The particular domain within which discourse takes place is termed its *field of discourse* (Bernstein 1990, 1996). This existence of different genres in the same discourse is intertextuality. Intertextual analysis aims to describe the intertextual configuration of text: uncovering how several text types may be drawn upon and combined simultaneously and what social purposes that formulae of mixed genre may serve.

Parliamentary discourse is a field of discourse where there is evidence of intertextuality. It is one of the fields where the demarcation of the order of discourse becomes blurred. No-confidence debate discourse is not always tightly controlled in terms of political relevance. This loose topical control is typical of informal conversation. It features varieties associated with quite different sorts of context and purpose. Thus there is mixture of a formal parliamentary genre and a casual conversational genre in the debate's text. The boundaries between the varieties in the sociolinguistic order are complex; they merge and overlap.

The no-confidence debate discourse shows evidence of intertextuality at both levels. It draws upon reported speech (level two) and employs a variety of genres (level one) demonstrated by the use of different discourse-type choices. The choices indicate different genres, for example, a choice indicating a conversational genre appears in the form of reported speech. Therefore it is justified to say that a Thai no-confidence debate has *mixed intertextuality* which means that even a single clause may be *multi-generic* (Fairclough 1995b:15). A multi-generic clause means a clause which demonstrates more than one genre.

The proliferation of intertextuality in the no-confidence debate discourse could be seen as a product of the configurations of the discourse in this parliamentary field, more especially in the no-confidence debates. It shows the effort of S to produce discourse in relation to the constraint posed by the competing context categories which Fairclough terms *conjunctures*. By conjuncture, Chouliaraki and Fairclough mean 'a specification of the configuration of practices which the discourse in focus is located within' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 61). This thesis, however, uses the term to refer to the condition derived from the specific configuration of the *context categories* within a communicative event. The form of the no-confidence debate discourse is the product of its context: its rationale, its purpose and the regulations it has to abide by. Intertextuality can be considered a discursive strategy used by S in the context of the no-confidence debate to successfully communicate within the constraints of that particular context.

CDA Analytical Framework

Chouliaraki and Fairclough have sketched out the CDA framework consisting of stages in doing analysis (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 60). This thesis is structured according to this framework though the stages may not be arranged in the same order. It is adapted as an outline of the thesis because it is the latest update of the CDA framework, enabling an analysis of the orders of discourse and of interdiscursivity (Ibid: 59). It provides a practical guide for the application of CDA. The framework is divided into five stages. In the following section, I will give a brief

definition of each stage and signpost where the full analysis of each stage can be found in the thesis.

1. Problem

Problem here refers to the specific problem caused by the discourse. It may be the problem in the *activity* of the social practice itself or the problem in the *reflexive* construction of social practice namely the ideational, interpersonal or textual construction (Ibid: 60). The problem of this thesis lies in the no-confidence debate as one of the social practices, as well as the reflexive construction of Thai politics and politicians the debate produces. The problem in the activity is outlined in chapter 1 and discussed in chapter 4.

2. Obstacles to its being tackled

This stage consists of three minor analyses. The analysis of conjuncture and the analysis of the social practice. This thesis employs van Dijk's *context* categories to help clarify elements of the two following analyses:

a). analysis of conjuncture

This analysis focuses on the configuration of practices within the specific context. 'Conjuncture represents a particular path through the network of social practices which constitutes the social structures' (Ibid: 61).

b). analysis of the practice

(i) relevant practices

(ii) relation of discourse to other moment

Detailed analysis of these two analyses can be found in chapter 4 and 5.

c). analysis of the discourse

(i) structural analysis – analyses discourse in relation to the network of orders of discourse (*field* or *domain*). It specifies how discourse selectively draws upon certain genres, discourses and voices (Ibid: 63). The structural analysis of the debate in general is presented in chapter 5. The analysis of each speech is in chapters 6, 7 and 8.

(ii) interactional analysis – analyses 'how discourse works the resources- how the genres and discourses which are drawn upon are worked together in the textual process of the discourse, and what articulatory work is done in the text'(Ibid: 63). Interactional analysis is found in chapters 6, 7 and 8.

3. Function of the problem in the practice

This stage looks at the function the problematic discourse has in the practice. It involves an explanation of what is problematic in the practice and how the practice is the result of this problematic characteristics. Chapter 9 and 10 provide the discussion of this stage.

4. Possible ways past obstacles

The analysis now looks at the possibility of solving the problem. It focuses on the possible things people can do in the given structural conditions. The thesis will discuss this stage of analysis in chapter 10.

5. Reflexion on the analysis

This stage is the self-criticism of the analysis. It looks at the position and limitations in the analysis. The position and limitation of this thesis are elaborated in chapter 1 and chapter 10.

Like other theories, CDA has been subjected to some challenges and criticisms. Most criticism points out the ambitious aim of CDA to attain a balance between sociological theory and linguistic theory in the analysis, which results in a confusion within the framework (Widdowson 1995). The attempt to combine two traditions in one framework has resulted in a lack of a unified methodology and research. The lack of explicit rules and systematic methodology has become the most vulnerable point of CDA (see Gallagher 1998). Since CDA has been developed from social theory as well as linguistics, some of the terms incorporated into the framework are abstract and unfamiliar such as *social practices* (Althusser and Balibar 1970), *framing* (Bernstein 1990). Others are coined by Fairclough himself, showing an orientation towards sociology more than linguistics. These terms such as *conjunctures*, can be found, at best, vague. This is especially true of 'conjuncture' whose meaning seems similar to the concept of 'context' found in linguistic literature, and it is not clear what distinction Fairclough intends to draw by using the alternative term.

These criticisms are addressed in the book *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Here, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) reassert the standpoint and rationale of CDA. Instead of going along with the call for a unified framework, they highlight the transdisciplinary stance of CDA. By that they mean that CDA encourages the use of more than one theory, for example, social science and linguistics within one framework. The combined theoretical framework is believed to be the most effective one in achieving CDA's aim to unravel the issue of language-power-ideology. Also the book lays out the five stage analytical framework discussed above which explains what CDA research is looking for and how it can be achieved (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 60). This book is written out of the awareness of criticism. It

brings the CDA framework down to a more concrete and practical level. In an attempt to clarify the CDA framework and its practice, Fairclough has also written a paper called 'Discourse, Social Theory and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform' (Fairclough 2000a). This paper starts by defining the terms used in CDA. He traces back the origin of the terms adopted from social theories and defines their meaning in the CDA framework, then an example of CDA analysis is provided. However, neither the sample research presented in this paper nor the five stage analytical framework presented in the book should be considered prescriptive. Fairclough's sample research only presents *a way* to do CDA, not *the way*. The five stage analytical framework provides only the guidelines while the researcher still has the freedom to design the analysis at each stage. This may be considered as the recurring 'ununified and unsystematic' traits of CDA methodology. Yet for critical discourse analysts, this spells out a dynamism that distinguishes CDA from other frameworks.

2.5.1.2 The Sociocognitive Approach (SCA)

This critical discourse analysis approach, developed by Teun A. van Dijk, introduces the notion of *context* versus *text*. His context analysis offers a systematic and detailed study of the relevant social practices. Hence it will be used to clarify and complement the second step of Fairclough's CDA analytical framework.

Similar to CDA, van Dijk still focuses on the issue of discourse and controlling power. However, SCA proposes that discourse exercises its power by influencing people's minds and the mind subsequently controls people's action (van Dijk 2001b: 355). SCA, therefore, shifts the attention to the human cognitive process. It regards the relationship between society and discourse as a dialectical one, with the mental model working as its pivot. Having this as a pivot between discourse and society, the approach then gives special attention to the process of discourse practice within which the mental model operates (text production-text consumption). According to van Dijk, it is during this practice that the trace of society (in Fairclough's term 'social practice') manifests itself. Thus, the focus of discourse analysis should be dedicated to this level of practice in order to achieve its purpose in explaining the relationship between text and sociocultural practice.

Taking a similar communicative framework as Fairclough (see Fig.3), van Dijk's lays its emphasis on discourse practice (the shaded area) while Fairclough's emphasis is on the interface between text and discourse practice (the dotted line). The mental model, which is the central point of this approach is different from the notion of model used in psycholinguistics or cognitive psychology.

Van Dijk's model is the product of both the social world and cognitive processes, hence the name 'sociocognitive'. The model incorporates information about sociocultural practice within the cognitive process making it an inherent part of that process (van Dijk 2001a). As a result, the approach succeeds in explaining the role of society within discourse by making it an indispensable part of the discourse production as well as discourse comprehension. This perspective is multidisciplinary in nature and it entails seven basic assumptions concerning discourse practice (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983: 4-10):

- a. Constructivist assumption: discourse processing involves the construction of mental representation
- b. Propositional assumption: cognitive information about general knowledge is used in discourse processing
- c. Strategic assumption: overall goal of discourse is to be as effective as possible
- d. Functionality assumption: discourse should be understandable in the wider sociocultural context
- e. Pragmatic assumption: discourse consists of speech acts
- f. Interactionist assumption: discourse is interpreted within the whole interactional process
- g. Situational assumption: discourse is part of social interaction

Having looked at the seven assumptions, it is apparent that van Dijk has attempted to synthesise many linguistic disciplines, namely cognitive psychology, psycholinguistics, pragmatics and sociolinguistics, to formulate his framework. Knowledge from these disciplines makes it 'general and flexible enough to be applied to a broader verbal interaction within the sociocultural practice' (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983: 9). They enable the sociocognitive approach to explain certain discursive traits that some other critical discourse analysis frameworks cannot. For example, as discussed previously, CDA's disregard of the individual cognitive process means that it is unable to give a systematic explanation of individual variation in discourse processing. Because of the broad array of fields that the sociocognitive approach touches upon and because it can overcome the limitations of CDA, SCA will be employed as the second main theory of my analysis.

In the following section, the general idea of the sociocognitive approach will be discussed. Its concept of macro and micro level of context will be detailed, because it gives a more systematic framework than CDA.

Knowledge and Context

Society has influence on discourse in the form of knowledge. World knowledge plays its part in discourse processing by forming the basis of the mental model (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) which is essential in the production and comprehension of text (van Dijk 2002). Van Dijk terms this world knowledge *context*. His concept of context is developed from the early work of Dell Hymes's SPEAKING model and other ethnographic studies. Context is 'a mental representation or model, constructed by the speech of participants or about such a situation' (van Dijk 2001a: 11). Context here acquires its specific definition which is different from what it is generally known. It refers to a mental construct of discourse users 'inside' their cognition. Context is dynamic; it is 'constructed, updated and reconstructed' all the time as the new information comes in (van Dijk 2001a: 12). At this stage, society present itself in the form of knowledge that constitutes context in the discourse users' mind. Context plays an essential part in discourse processing. To explain how knowledge affects discourse practice, van Dijk starts by dividing knowledge into three layers:

1. *common ground*- basis of the whole culture
2. *ideological basis of group knowledge*- basis of the group representations (ideologically based)
3. *personal mental/context model*- personal deviation from the group subject to individual's opinion and interpretation (individual variation)

Van Dijk presumes that discourse is goal-oriented. An effective discourse is one that can communicate as fast as possible and can help the producers to achieve their goals. With this assumption, knowledge then plays its role in assuring these goals. During discourse production, three layers of knowledge are drawn upon to form context. Context then assigns strategies that generate the *macro proposition*, *macro structure* and *macro topic* of the discourse. This can be done by way of lexicalisation or macrostrategies leading to the macro proposition, the thematic structure. The macro proposition, macro structure and macro topic are perceived as the most important knowledge or theme of discourse which will activate expectation, establish relevant information and activate a hypothesis about the likely continuation based on coherence of what the discourse is all about (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). Thus it can be said that knowledge plays an important role in the production of discourse.

Knowledge at the first two levels - common ground and group knowledge - are socially shared within group culture or between group's cultures. Without them, social interaction cannot be accomplished, for psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology have shown that people have to start a communication with known and general information before developing to new or particular information (see Graesser et al 1997; Kintsch and van Dijk 1978; van Dijk and Kintsch 1983).

Without common ground as a mental step for the new information to build upon, comprehension cannot be achieved (for detail about psycholinguistics and cognition see Condor and Antaki 1997 and Graesser et al 1997). Group knowledge is ideologically-based information that discourse users embed during text production. By ideology van Dijk means ‘the foundation of the shared social representations of social groups’ (van Dijk 1998). Hence, the ideologically-biased information of the group knowledge refers to the shared social representation of that group which may be biased by its interest or ideology. The third level of knowledge is the personal mental/context model. This level of knowledge again is biased because it is based on personal experience, opinion and interpretation which are not necessarily shared by others. Van Dijk claims that during discourse processing, people access three layers of knowledge simultaneously to produce context. While the common ground makes the discourse production/comprehension possible, group knowledge and personal mental/context model control and regulate the production of the macro proposition, macro structure and macro topics. These later prompt a certain interpretation. Because context is constituted of both ideological and non-ideological knowledge and there is no clear demarcation between the two, the production of text may be done in a way that facilitates the communication of such ideology. The ideologically-based and non-ideologically based knowledge should be made observable in discourse otherwise the producers may use discourse to pass on group ideology to the receivers. Receivers may confuse ideologically based knowledge and non-ideological knowledge. Thus they may activate relevant knowledge and build mental models accordingly, and therefore take in that ideology in the process.




Fig. 4

Non-Ideological based and Ideological based Knowledge and Their Role

Based on the hypothesis that discourse practice is governed by context which is shaped by three layers of knowledge, it can be said that a text represents general knowledge, culturally shared

knowledge, group knowledge as well as individual knowledge simultaneously. With the idea that context is the mental construct inside the human mind rather than the outside surrounding situation as generally defined, the approach is able to attend to the role of the human cognitive process. Context is not actually the knowledge of the world but the personal interpretation of it (van Dijk 2001a: 11). For van Dijk, knowledge is essential in building the mental model because knowledge is indispensable for discourse comprehension. Thus it is important to make ideologically-based knowledge visible as such as much as possible to prevent people from unknowingly building their mental model according to that ideology.

Macro Level Categories and Micro Level Categories of Context

Developed from the notion of context proposed by other ethnographic studies, van Dijk proposes his analytical framework for context, which is explicit and systematic. He breaks down context into seven categories. These categories are then divided into two levels: macro categories and micro level categories with a gradual demarcation between the two levels.

Macro Level Categories:

a. Domain

The concept of domain, similar to Bourdieu's *field*⁴ adopted in CDA framework, refers to the social realm that presupposes a social role and social interaction within that realm. Each domain presupposes certain social roles, professions, power relations and social interaction (van Dijk 2001: 17). Discourse producers are aware of the domain and will assume their role accordingly. Politicians are in the politics domain and they are 'doing politics', engineers are involved in the construction domain while doctors are in the domain of the health care service, for instance. However, a domain is not always related to the profession of such a person, for example, farmers are in the agricultural domain by their profession but when a group of farmers form a group to pressurise the government, they are now engaged in the political domain. Thus it means that farmers are doing *domain crossing* from agriculture to politics. Not only can there be domain crossing, one domain can also overlap with another such as MPs being in the political domain as they are the people's representatives while simultaneously belong to the legal domain because they are also legislators.

⁴ Field is 'a network of positions by a particular distribution of capital which endows that field with its own specific practical logic: the way people who occupy these positions act within the space depends upon the

b. Global Actions

The role presupposed by the social domain entails certain global actions. Politician may be involved in legislation and other political acts, engineers may construct buildings and doctor may treat patients. Performing political acts, constructing buildings and treating patients involve a series of minor actions, for example examining patients, prescribing medicine and doing operations constitute the global action of treating patients. These minor actions will be discussed under the topic of Local Actions.

c. Institutional Actors

People are institutional actors in their domain. This means that they do things as part of that institution. They do not act as an individual, for example, when an opposition MP opposes the government's decision, he/she does so as part of the opposition rather than as an individual. Their action is intended to be interpreted as an action against the government as an institution, not against the individuals that constitute that government.

Micro level Categories:

a. Setting

Setting refers to the time and space of the interaction such as a parliamentary debate for MPs, a surgery for a doctor or a lesson for a teacher. The setting for interaction varies from one domain to another. Some may have a more explicit setting than another (van Dijk 2001: 19). A parliamentary debate has a fixed setting in the sense that it will be held in the parliament (space) with the speaker standing up in his designated place and speaking for a limited period of time allowed by the House Speaker. In comparison with a debate, a teacher's lesson may have a less fixed setting in the sense that teachers may give a lesson outside the class and teachers are allowed to walk around the room while teaching, for instance. However, the time of both a parliamentary debate and a lesson are similarly limited.

b. Local Actions

As mentioned earlier, local actions are minor actions that constitute global actions. Van Dijk suggests that the notions of global vs. local are gradual, because actions can be broken down into many levels of small acts. For example, teachers are involved in a global act of educating students. In order to educate them, teachers may give lessons and provide examinations. In giving a lessons, teachers explain the lesson to the students, ask questions and answer queries. All the actions of explaining, asking and answering are local actions that constitute the global action of educating

quantity and composition of the capital they are endowed with- composition in the sense of in what proportion different types of capital are combined' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 101).

students. All of these have an educational function which contribute to the teacher's role in the educational domain.

c. Participants

By participants, van Dijk refers to the speaker and the recipient of the interaction. This category emphasises the speaker/recipient's role in an interaction (van Dijk 2001: 22). Van Dijk categorises the roles into three groups: communicative, interactional and social roles. Communicative roles refer to the membership of a certain social group such as an MP being affiliated with a particular political party. Interactional roles mean the role of a speaker in relation to the recipient such as being a friend or an enemy of the recipient. Social roles are the roles that stem from being a member of a certain social group according to the speaker's 'gender, class, ethnicity and profession' (Ibid). During an interaction, speakers are conducting three categories of roles simultaneously.

d. Cognition

Cognition refers to the aims and intentions which are situated in the mental model of the speaker. This plays an important part in language production and comprehension. It provides the rationale and condition for the practice of discourse. For example, if the opposition MPs have an aim to attack the government's policy, this affects the way the MPs describe the policy. Hence it can be said that the discourse is also designed to effectively serve the aim of the speaker.

2.5.2 Micro Analysis

This level of analysis draws upon pragmatics in particular, two aspects of this field: politeness theory and the pragmatics of humour.

2.5.2.1 Politeness Theory

Politeness Theory is a strategic analysis which will be applied to analyse the micro events or textual events of the no-confidence debate discourse. Brown and Levinson (1987) will be used as the core of the theory. According to Brown and Levinson, politeness theory is constructed, based on the assumption that language users, as part of the society, have 'face'. The notion of face refers to the public self-image of every social member. People are aware of their self-image and those of others and also expect others to recognise theirs. Public self image here can be defined as 'certain rational capacities, consistent modes of reasoning from ends to the means that will achieve those ends' (Brown and Levinson 1987: 64). The notion of face refers to a kind of self-image with which members of a society prefer to be associated.

Fundamentally, face can be divided into two categories: negative face and positive face. Brown and Levinson (1987) and Goffman (1967) propose that during social interactions, verbal or non-verbal, language users (social members) develop notions of public self-image at two levels: positive face and negative face. Positive face (henceforth PF) refers to the public self-image which is positive and consistent. It also crucially includes the kind of image found desirable by others. This includes the fact that the person's idea is seen as desirable by others (Brown and Levinson 1987: 62). On the other hand, negative face (henceforth NF) means the 'basic claim of territories, personal preserves rights to non-distraction' (Brown and Levinson 1987: 62). In its essence, NF is freedom to act as one of the competent members of the society without being impeded by others.

Helmut Gruber (1993) and S.P. de Ayala (2001) further develop the notion of face along the same lines by proposing that when an interaction is made public and there is a third party, that is an audience, involved to witness the interaction, language users will develop their *public face*. Public face, again, can be divided into two levels: public positive face (henceforth PPF), and public negative face (henceforth PNF). The PPF and the PNF are the self-images which social members prefer to be associated with in public. PPF means the consistent image of him/herself as a rational and trustworthy person whose political ideas and actions are objective. His/her ideas or actions are conducted with primary concerns for the general public and more importantly that he is more in touch with the wants and demands of his people than his opponents (Gruber 1993: 3). PNF is 'the right not to suffer impositions in the political sphere, political life' (de Ayala 2001: 145). PNF therefore means the independent and sovereign self, mainly in the political area.

In daily interaction, many actions may pose a threat to the PF or NF of others or even S's own. This kind of acts are called Face Threatening Acts (henceforth FTAs). Brown and Levinson (1987) and Goffman (1967) focus on the strategies used by language users use to avoid FTAs.⁵ They argue that in order to conduct pleasant interactions and to avoid unnecessary conflict which may eventually interrupt the communication, one or preferably both levels of face, should be observed. As a result, it is crucial that an interaction be conducted with the notion of face in mind. However, the main purpose of all social interactions is not simply to please one another. The all-important purpose of social interaction is to communicate, that is to convey messages, intentions or ideology to another party. Messages, intentions or ideologies, unfortunately, are not neutral and are often threatening (Brown and Levinson 1987). In order to reconcile these two competing goals, Brown and Levinson suggest that language users use certain linguistic strategies to soften the 'threatening' act.

⁵ The opposite of FTA is then a Face-Enhancing Acts.

Before the interaction takes place, language users have two options: whether or not to engage in an FTA. If the users choose to avoid an FTA completely, no strategies will be needed but the users will consequently lose the chance to communicate their message at all. If language users choose to employ the FTA, they will have, again, two options: to go off record, or to go on record. To do an FTA off record means that the users choose to be intentionally ambiguous, that is the users may use one of these strategies:

- a. Give hints
- b. Presuppose
- c. Use metaphor
- d. Use irony
- e. Use rhetorical question
- f. Use understatement

As a result, it is not possible to attribute one clear intention to their act (Brown and Levinson 1987: 211), for example, when a man says to his friend 'Oh, I left my wallet at home' when they are about to pay for a meal, the utterance is an off-record request to borrow money. There are some advantages to doing an FTA off record. First, an off-record FTA can satisfy negative face to a greater degree than negative politeness strategies (which will be discussed later). Second, an off-record FTA can avoid inescapable accountability and responsibility for the FTA. Third, since it is ambiguous, the meaning of an off record FTA is always negotiable. Language users will always have an open opportunity to dissociate themselves from the message. Examples of off-record FTAs are the four main groups of indirect language: evasion, circumlocution, innuendo and metaphor (Obeng 1997).

An on record FTA, on the other hand, does not provide such a safety exit; S is committed to that future act which entails the FTA he/she is engaging in. However, it is better than an off-record FTA in the sense that it has a higher degree of clarity and perspicacity. It is also demonstrable and non-manipulative (Brown and Levinson 1987: 95). On record FTAs can be divided into two categories: on record without redressive action and on record with redressive action. The on record without redressive action or bald on record is the most direct form of FTA. It risks retribution from the addressee but it is the most clear and direct way of communicating the FTA. On record FTAs with redressive action can also be divided into two categories: positive politeness and negative politeness. Positive politeness strategies aim to satisfy H's PF. By satisfying H's PF, it basically means that S shows that S wants what H wants, that H is part of the same group and that S likes H. The redressive action normally functions to help communicate that one's own wants are in some respect similar to the addressee's wants (Brown and Levinson 1987: 103). Positive politeness can

be considered the core of familiar and joking behaviour. In sum, the purpose of this strategy can be divided into three categories:

1. *Claim common ground*
 - 1.1 *convey 'X is admirable interesting' by*
 - a. *notice, attend to H's interests, wants, needs, goods*
 - b. *exaggerate interest, approval sympathy with H*
 - c. *intensify interest to H*
 - 1.2 *claim in-group membership with H by*
 - d. *use in-group identity markers*
 - 1.3 *claim common point of view, opinions, attitudes, knowledge, empathy by*
 - e. *seek agreement*
 - f. *avoid disagreement*
 - g. *presuppose/ raise/ assert/ common ground*
 - h. *joke*
2. *Convey that S and H are cooperators*
 - 2.1 *indicate S know H's wants and is taking them into account by*
 - i. *assert or presuppose S's knowledge of and concern for H's wants*
 - 2.2 *claim reflexivity (if H wants then S wants, if S wants then H wants) by*
 - j. *offer, promise*
 - k. *be optimistic*
 - l. *include both S and H in the activity*
 - m. *give or ask for reasons*
 - 2.3 *claim reciprocity by*
 - n. *assume or assert reciprocity*
3. *Fulfil H's want by*
 - o. *give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)*

(Brown and Levinson 1987: 102)

The italicised strategies mentioned are those that can be found in Thai no-confidence debate discourse.

Negative politeness, on the other hand, aims to satisfy the addressee's NF. Satisfying NF means the strategies used are avoidance-based and hedge the illocutionary forces in order not to impede H's wants and ideas. This is the heart of respectful behaviour.

It corresponds to Durkheim's 'negative rites', ritual of avoidance. Where positive politeness is free-ranging, negative politeness is specific and focused; it performs the function of minimising the particular imposition that the FTA unavoidably effects (Brown and Levinson 1987: 129)

In other words, negative politeness is associated with social-distancing: creating proper distance between S and H. In some cases such as when H has much more power over S or is higher in rank than S, negative politeness can even be socially demanded. Negative politeness strategies can be categorised by their self-effacement and formality. As above, the strategies which appear in the no-confidence debates are italicised. Negative politeness strategies can be divided into two categories:

1. bald on record
 - 1.1 be direct by
 - a. be direct or be conventionally indirect
2. with redress to H's want to be unimpinged upon
 - 2.1 *don't presume/ assume; make minimal assumption by*
 - b. *question, hedge*
 - 2.2 don't coerce H; give H option not to do act
 - c. be conventionally indirect
 - d. *question, hedge*
 - e. be pessimistic
 - 2.3 communicate S's wants to not impinge on H by
 - f. apologize
 - or *dissociate S, H from the particular infringement by*
 - g. *impersonalize S and H*
 - h. *state the FTA as a general rule*
 - i. *nominalize*
 - 2.4 redress other wants of H's derivative from negative face
 - j. go on record

(Brown and Levinson 1987: 131)

From the review of positive politeness and negative politeness strategies, the strategies in italics are those that can be found in the discourse of no-confidence debates. These strategies have social implications; they reflect the relationship between S and H and have the potential to construct or reconstruct the identity of the speaker such as his/her PPF and PNF. The construction of PPF and PNF is considered very important in the political context, given that politicians are under a democratic system and need their PPF and PNF to win the popular mandate. However, this is used not only to win people's votes, in many cases, it is compulsory. Since parliamentary debates are regulated by the parliamentary code of behaviour which is there to guarantee the minimum use of FTAs, the use of FTA strategies is essential to maximise the chance to get messages across without them being protested against or interrupted.

Each FTA strategy has its own function in a particular context. In order to analyse what a particular strategy can do and what the language users can achieve with that particular strategy, a strategic analysis is needed. First, the criteria used in selecting a strategy must be taken into consideration. In choosing a strategy to be employed in certain interactions, Brown and Levinson propose three social variables that influence the choice of strategy:

1. the 'social distance' (D) of S and H (a symmetric relation)
2. the relative 'power' (P) of S and H (an asymmetric relation)
3. the absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture

(Brown and Levinson 1987: 74)

Language users need to evaluate their degree of P, D and R in relation to those of their addressee in order to choose proper FTA strategies. The greater value of P, D and R taken together, the greater the weightiness and seriousness an FTA has. The seriousness or weightiness of a particular

FTA varies in line with the amount of risk to S's face and H's face. The amount of risk in proportion to the nature of the FTA can be summed up in the following diagram:




Fig. 5

Estimation of risk of face loss poses by particular FTA

According to the diagram, an off record FTA poses the least risk to face loss while an on record without redress FTA poses the greatest risk. Brown and Levinson stated that the weightiness and seriousness of FTA x is compounded of risk of face loss, both on the side of S and H (Brown and Levinson 1987: 76). While the off record FTA is the least serious, the on record without redressive FTA is the most serious one. With regards to the three social variables Brown and Levinson provide an equation to calculate the weightiness of FTA x

$$W_x = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + R_x$$

When:

W_x is the *value* of weightiness

D is the *value* that measure the social distance between S and H

P is the measure of power H has over S

R_x is the *value* that measures the degree to which FTA x is rated as an imposition in that culture

Despite the claimed universality of their theory, Brown and Levinson also leave some space for cultural variables to play a part in politeness theory. According to the function's definition, it can be seen that the degrees of W , D and R are defined by the social values of the society in which the interaction takes place. In other words, the three aspects of the relationship between S and H are defined by their social value and these aspects of the relationship then define the language to be used in that context.

Grundy (2000) suggests that societies can be divided into two major types: hierarchical and egalitarian. He proposes that these two major groups differ in their hierarchy and organisation. In the former, people acquire status by birth (hierarchical society) and in the latter people acquire it by merit (egalitarian society). The two groups of societies have different criteria in assigning P, D and R. Grundy gives an instance of the different use of strategies, that in a hierarchical society, the use of negative politeness could be found more frequently in the language of lower class people than in an egalitarian society (Grundy 2000:162).

Thai society can be categorised as a hierarchical society, but it is a dynamic one. Thai society is highly stratified in terms of social divisions. Every Thai person has his/her own place in society. His/Her position is more or less unique; it can be either higher or lower than others. There are no two persons with exactly equal status. This is because the position of each person is defined by various personal traits, for example, birth, gender, education, financial situation, profession and age. According to Kummer (1992: 327), 'Thai society can be explained as an elaborate system of grading interpersonal factors'. The fact that there are many factors defining a person's status means that in the society the hierarchical organisation in Thailand is much less absolute in comparison with the caste system in India. Though there are factors which are acquired by birth, there are also those that can be acquired through a person's actions. Therefore it can be said that Thai society has some egalitarian traits. In Thailand, even if a person belongs to a lower class by birth, he/she can aspire to a higher position through education, profession, monk hood or marriage, for instance. Hence, Thai society can be categorised as a hierarchical society; but it is a much less absolute one. A less absolute hierarchy, it means that the hierarchy is allowed to change as a factor changes. Thai hierarchical status is therefore dynamic.

Since social practices, including language, are defined largely by culture, the Politeness Theory proposed by Brown and Levinson is arguably universal. This is because discourse in different societies will vary according to culture. Discourse which is considered 'appropriate' and 'expected' in one society may not be considered so in another, for there are certain amount of cultural factors involved. Politeness theory provides a reasonably systematic and well-defined framework of what is 'polite', but it leaves some cultural factors under examined. There have been a number of criticisms of the universality of politeness theory particularly from the point of view of East Asian cultures. Gu proposes a politeness theory based on a Chinese concept of politeness (Gu 1990, 1993). Gu argues that in the Chinese context the notion of face is regarded as social norms or social wants, rather than the individual's psychological wants (Eelen 2001: 10). Face is then threatened when one fails to live up to the social norms. Ide argues from a Japanese perspective that politeness is determined by social conventions (Ide 1989). In Japanese and other

languages with an elaborate honorifics system, politeness is an inherent part of the language. There is no neutral form, thus one always has to choose between the honorific and non-honorific form (Ibid: 11). This thesis then proposes that in order to analyse politeness phenomena in a certain society, politeness theory needs to be applied along with some awareness of specific cultural factors to enable the a more sensitive analysis.

In a highly hierarchical society like Thailand, S and H's relative social position must be put into perspective, because it plays a significant part in every social interaction including communicative events. This is because Thai also has a rather elaborate honorific system.⁶ Thai society has dyadic system of communication which is applied to any interaction that takes place within the society.

As a rule, Thai expressives – verbal or nonverbal – are directed towards a communication partner in a dyadic system. The use of words is dependent on a network of relationships which must be tentatively explored during the first sequences of conversation if the partners meet for the first time. Thai focuses on forms that express volition, impositions, interrogations and many degrees of social and emotional signals which must be chosen according to the characteristics of the partners. Therefore a Thai person must be aware of his/her position in relation to that of his/her communicative partner (Kummer 1992: 327).

According to Kummer (1992) position is an indispensable social factor in conducting 'appropriate' interactions in Thai society. Kummer's 'position' can be compared to Brown and Levinson's absolute rank (R). Social distance (D) and power (P) are often the direct variant of R. In other words, the higher the R generally means the higher D and P, for example, people who are higher in rank by birth, education and/or profession usually are those who have more power in the society. To communicate in Thai society, S and H need to know his or her position in relation to another first in order to be able to produce an appropriate discourse. As a result, R can be seen as a prerequisite of the production of polite discourse in Thai; not knowing one's rank makes it almost impossible to produce discourse with pronoun choice, verbs and noun appropriate in that particular context. The flouting of these social norms (opting to be impolite) can also be used as a strategy to create certain social implications. Therefore, in order to conduct a strategic analysis of no-confidence debate discourse in Thailand, this thesis has to take into account this sociocultural aspect of Thai society and Thai social norms.

This aspect of politeness theory points out the interrelated aspect of language and society. It reveals, apart from avoiding face-threatening acts, whether or not FTA strategies have any other social implications. One point stated by Brown and Levinson will be further investigated:

⁶ However, unlike Japanese, Thai has a form of language which is socially neutral. Most of these neutral forms have a formal register and are used in formal settings. For example, the pronoun *khun* is a neutral second person pronoun which can be used to refer to males as well females

Language usages are tied to strategies rather than directly to relationships, although relationships will be characterised by the continued use of certain strategies (Brown and Levinson 1987: 286).

From the above statement, if language usage is indirectly related to relationships and the relationships are shown in the strategies, strategic analysis may well uncover the relationship between S and H.

Strategic analysis, including politeness theory, aims primarily at the 'form' of language usage, while 'content' will be attended to only as a supplement in analysing form. However this thesis will take a considerable amount of content into account. Thus it differs from other forms of strategic analysis. This is because it is looking at the usage form of language in the bigger, linear context of Thai politics. There is not a clear-cut boundary between 'content' and 'form'. Content as well as context must be taken into account in order to identify discourse's form and interpret it.

After identifying the form of the language usage, or what S could do by using that form will be analysed, for example, whether the form can overcome particular social constraints such as rule violations, exceptions and breaches (Brown and Levinson 1987: 282).

Therefore, form is not entirely arbitrary because it is also shaped by certain rules; in turn, it also aims to breach or violate those rules.

| |
|---|
| <p>Form = strategic choices + coherence of styles Or Form = rules + personal styles</p> |
|---|

Politeness theory will be used as a strategic analysis in this thesis to analyse the micro events (textual events) of the discourse of no-confidence debates in order to uncover how the form of text reflects its process of discourse practice and how text and discourse practice interact with the society. In the next section, humour will be discussed. Humour is presumed to be a desirable effect of FTA strategies. It claims common ground between S and H and marks collaboration between S and H. When it takes the form of a joke, it can also be seen as a redressive positive politeness strategy.

2.5.2.2 Pragmatics and Humour

The fundamental requirements for humour are elements of incongruity and ambiguity (Ross 1998). Adopting Weiner's assumption that 'members of a speech community share a representation of some subset of world knowledge which is fundamental to verbal communication' (Weiner 1997: 139), incongruity is created when a discourse violates the common knowledge of these pragmatic

rules. Weiner categorises these pragmatic rules into four categories: salience, accessibility, parallelism and sublanguage (see Weiner 1997). This thesis will focus on humour created by the violation of salience, parallelism and the constraints within sublanguage. Salience refers to the most essential piece of information or the most prominent predicate of objects or words. For example, the salient feature of a giant is size. Parallelism refers to a correspondence in the construction of successive clauses or sentences. For example:

- a. What is black and white and /red/ all over?
- b. A newspaper

This incongruity is created by the violation of parallelism. Adjectives ‘black’ and ‘white’ lead H to believe that ‘red’ is also an adjective, assuming that the rule of parallelism is in use. When red turns out to be a verb, ‘read’, parallelism is violated. The result is potentially humorous. Sublanguage refers to the stylistic variants of language used in different settings. When the discourse violates the constraints of the sublanguage, it creates incongruity. This is potentially humorous.

This thesis would like to categorise Weiner’s violation of constraints of sublanguage as part of level one intertextuality for two reasons. Firstly the term ‘sublanguage’ used by Weiner can be seen as politically incorrect in a sense that it denigrates a ‘type’ of language as less than a language as suggested by the prefix ‘sub’. Secondly, her definition of sublanguage as ‘stylistic variants of language used in different setting appears to overlap with that of genre. The two terms then are interchangeable. The term genre is preferred in this thesis because it is more widely used and is seen to be more politically correct. Moreover, I would like to define what Weiner categorised as the violation of the constraints of sublanguage (or genre) as an appearance of one genre in another. This is because genre is characterised by a certain style (for example, direct-indirect) and register (formal-informal). When a discourse producer violates the constraints of one genre, it is likely that he/she does it with an intent to articulate another genre altogether. The articulation of one genre in another creates incongruity. According to Weiner this incongruity can be potentially humorous.

In addition to Weiner’s four categories of common pragmatic rules, there are also Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the four maxims. The flouting of a maxim to create a superficial breakage of Cooperative Principle (see 2.3.2 for detail on Grice’s Theory of Implicature) can create incongruity. The Cooperative Principle suggests that interlocutors observe the principle of these maxims, as mutual agreement. If the course of interaction deviates from this agreement, the hearer has to assume that the Cooperative Principle is still in use. So, they are obliged to draw inferences accordingly. For example, if someone comes up and asks me out today, I would say ‘I have to do my essay’. The answer seems to be irrelevant to the question but with the Cooperative Principle and the 4 maxims in use, the hearer has to assume that somehow my answer is relevant to

the question. He/She therefore has to draw the inference that as I have to do my essay, I don't have time to go out. This inference is equal to 'no' to the original question. This is an example of flouting the maxim of relation. Another example is the flouting of a maxim of quantity. The speaker is believed to be as informative and helpful as possible. When somebody says that s/he has two brothers, it is assumed that he or she has two brothers, no more, no less. He/She cannot come up and say 'actually I have three'. Thus Grice's theory can be used to analyse the kind of misunderstanding which may consequently result in an incongruity.

Humour not only brings laughter, it also has social functions and social implications. In the following section the functions of humour will be discussed.

Functions of Humour

Collective laughter triggers a premeditated unison. This could refer to the shared knowledge or attitude or some trait of like-mindedness. To be able to provoke laughter or to laugh with a group signifies a sudden joint understanding and thereby signals that people belong to the same group. As Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca puts it: 'Laughter is a way of testifying to the fact that one knows what one has to know to belong to the group' (Olbrechts-Tyteca 1968: 398). Laughter or joke-telling therefore can be used to test an individual's sense of belonging. If the joke is understood, it creates an ephemeral unison and confirms a shared understanding. However, there is also a risk. If the joke is not taken up it signals a potential rejection or even a threat (Gutwirth 1993:39). Apart from missing the goal, the teller can be excluded from the feeling of union altogether.

Based on this approach, substantial functions of humour emerge:

- a. Humour as social control of deviance: people doing unpopular things can become the butt of a joke criticising deviant activity. The most popular topics are stinginess and stupidity. For example, the butt of a Thai joke for stupidity is a Laotian while for the French it is a Belgian.
- b. Humour as a way to express various complaints: While complaints or grievances expressed straightforwardly are an expression of individual experience, humour makes it more of a collective experience. This is because it has the potential to transform a personal experience into one that can be shared, by collective laughter (Palmer 1994:59). It can be used as a mild reproof. For example, it can be used by the person of higher rank to reprimand the lower rank in order to relieve tension between hierarchies and while sounding less authoritative.
- c. Humour defuses the tension of anxiety or friction among people of the same status.
- d. Humour allows people to mention taboo topics.

From the four functions above, two general theories of humour can be formulated.

- a. Humour provides a 'safety valve' for anti-social impulses. It provides a way for people to be released from the strict customs and norms of society. It is when an inappropriate thing can be mentioned and laughed at relatively freely.
- b. Humour provides a way to introduce taboo subjects into everyday discourse so that they can be dealt with seriously (Palmer 1994: 60). Humour is the occasion where discourse users mutually set aside the guidelines of what should or should not be spoken of. It is then that banned topics can be introduced via jokes and then followed up seriously. However, the mutual agreement to take up the joke as a joke (and not offensiveness) can not be predetermined. If a joke is not considered as such, the topic might not proceed seriously due to the offensive appearance which is supposed to be hidden under a funny façade. In the Thai political context, there are frequent uses of humour aimed at achieving this purpose. Informal accusations without substantial evidence are made via humour. Most of the time it succeeds in drawing public and media attention towards the issue. The official accusation can be made later on when the substantial evidence is unearthed, normally by the media.

Humour and Persuasiveness

The relationship between humour and persuasiveness is rather doubtful. It is suspected that humour can help maximise persuasiveness in discourse. This study stems from the use of humour that successfully helps in advertising discourse to achieve its goal. Gruner (1996) compiled and reviewed experiments conducted on humour and persuasiveness. None of the research shows that humour can help boost persuasiveness in general discourse. It may succeed in persuading people to buy something but it is less likely to persuade people to believe in certain controversial social issues.

Gruner later moves to investigate a form akin to humour: satire. This seems to have more potential for persuasion. He starts off by pointing out the innate difference between humour and satire. While humour is formulated only to provoke laughter, satire is formulated to convey some agenda. Its purpose is toned down by laughter.

As noted earlier, satire is actually intended as a form of propaganda by the satirist. Satire is a form of wit; and wit differs from humour in much the same way as the rhetoric differs from poetic. (Gruner 1996: 293)

Gruner notes that satire will be effectively persuasive if and only if the audience perceive the persuasive intent. He points out that the potential pitfall of satire is when the audience fails to see its serious agenda and misinterprets it as pure humour. On the contrary, if the serious point of satire is understood, it seems to have persuasive value. In Thai politics, sarcasm and irony are often used to satirise the vice and folly of adversaries. Investigating the use of satire and its impact on people can help prove the persuasive value suggested in this theory. Gruner also states that the

speaker who uses *apt* and *appealing* humour is likely to improve his/ her image with the audience. Though the hypothesis sounds convincing the definition of ‘apt and appealing’ humour is yet to be defined. These notions are certainly socially based.

Politics is a domain where persuasion, negotiation and the threatening of another’s face while maintaining one’s own face are the order of the day. Humour is used widely as an effective strategy to perform these tasks especially to do FTAs. According to the study of humour as strategy by Zadjman (1995), the functions of humour used in the politics domain can be categorised into four types:

a. signals political notability

He suggests that the insulting content of the FTA is not taken literally, but more as a facet of that politician’s notability (Zadjman 1995: 326).

b. works as positive politeness techniques to minimise threat to PF

It needs the shared knowledge and values of S and H to create humour. Thus humour can produce a feeling of unison (Zadjman 1995: 327).

c. liberates from social rules of behaviour, the so-called ‘good-manners’.

‘Etiquette is supposed to restrict human spontaneous behaviour (Martin 1983), whereas one of humour’s major functions is to liberate’ (Mindess 1971).

d. creates psychological distance

Though humour creates a feeling of unison within the group, it prevents the feeling of intimacy. Humour can function as defense mechanism for S (Zadjman 1995: 328).

From Zadjman’s and other’s findings on the functions of humour, the potential of humour as an effective strategy in the no-confidence debate emerges. Humorous FTAs have four paradoxical functions: they signal the political notability of H while attacking H’s notability and they create unity within the group while maintaining distance between S and H. These paradoxical functions can be very helpful when it comes to creating text’s heterogeneity/ ambivalence. The paradoxical effects mean that the text can be interpreted both ways depending on H. A satire can be employed to signal close interpersonal relationship between S [Trairong] and H [Banham] so much so that S can jokingly talk about H in public. Alternatively S can also be seen as distancing himself from H by making H the butt of a joke. The joke itself can be seen as the mark of H’s reputation as a popular public figure, or as an attack on his reputation, depending on how people view it.⁷ This ambivalence of text is desirable for S because it provides him/her with a safety exit while doing

⁷ This is an example from Trairong Suwannakiri’s speech. For detailed discussion of his speech see chapter 7.

FTA. This research aims to find these functions of humour in the no-confidence debates and investigate how the functions work in the context.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter reviews the literature on discourse analysis. It starts by defining the term discourse. Then it discusses the two major branches of discourse analysis: non-critical and critical linguistics. The theories reviewed in each group provide the basis for the theories that form the theoretical framework.

The theoretical framework consists of two levels: macro and micro. Two approaches of CL, namely SCA and CDA form the macro level analysis. The two are based on CL's proposition that the context is an inherent part of discourse. As a result, discourse cannot be analysed solely according to its grammatical form, context is required to be taken into account. This thesis makes it possible to explain 'linguistic phenomena' in language interaction. It reconnects language with its context by taking into account the characteristics of social situations and communicative events of discourse. Language is seen as three dimensional: language use, communication of belief and interaction in society. It also studies the structure of discourse, not only limited to grammatical structure but structure at various levels. The SCA analyses discourse production and discourse comprehension with emphasis on processes of the social cognition process. It argues that ideologies projected in the discourse are a product of mental and social processes which are collectively coined as context. Societal structures do not directly relate to discourse structure. They are mediated by the human cognitive process. The SCA aims to examine the abuse of power and reproduction of inequality through ideologies. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed from certain perceived constraints of early versions of SCA (van Dijk 1977, 1988). It places greater emphasis on the dialectical relationship between language and society by using intertextual analysis as a crucial mediator between text and social context.

The micro level analysis consists of politeness theory and the pragmatics of humour. Politeness theory is used to provide strategic analysis, one can understand how discourse is manipulated through the use of various discursive strategies. Humour is studied as one of the FTA strategies as well as the desirable effect of FTA strategies. The framework proposed should be able to uncover the strategies the speaker uses to produce the language of politics and the language of humour in the context of Thai parliament. The analysis should be able to detect people's exploitation of language; what strategies they use to achieve their goal; and whether the use of humour intensifies the effect and/or makes the exploitation of language more difficult to detect.

Chapter 3 Methodology

3.0 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to present the data and the methodology of the thesis. It starts by introducing the data, which is the Thai no-confidence debate transcription. Then it looks at the linguistic traits that are of particular interest in the data: discursive strategies. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that discursive strategies are the traces of the society that appear in the text. They have a dialectical relationship with the society. I use Laclau and Mouffe's theory of Social Antagonism (1985) to explain the adversarial relationship between the government and the opposition. I propose it is this social antagonism that prompts face threatening discourse. Since within the Thai parliament there is a Code of Behaviour that should prevent FTAs, speakers need to use strategies to conduct FTAs in order to reduce the risk of being ruled out. Therefore, it can be said that the use of strategies is constituted by certain conditions in the society and their function in the society. In order to uncover this dialectical relationship between the debate's strategies and the context of Thai politics, I have introduced a two level analysis. A framework which is a combination of CDA and SCA has the potential to give a finer and more systematic analysis of how certain conjunctures in the society have an influence on the production of discourse, how that influence is reflected in the use of certain discursive strategies and what function these strategies have in that context.

3.1 Data

The main corpus of this thesis is the transcription of several no-confidence debates provided by the Thai Parliament. The production process of the transcriptions will be briefly examined. There are three offices involved in the production of debate transcriptions:

a. The Shorthand and Typing Centre;

The Centre is responsible for taking notes of the debate word by word. This Centre is not responsible for the validity of the transcription. If anyone would like to protest against the content of the transcription, the Centre does not have to go through any legislative process.

b. The Secretariat Commission;

The commission is responsible for proof reading the transcription sent to it by the Shorthand and Typing Centre. Only after it has been approved by the commission can the transcription be publicly displayed.

c. House Proceedings Section, Secretariat;

This section supervises the debate sessions and provides other services for members of the parliament. Also it is responsible for the arrangement of the House before the debate. This is the section that produces a complete copy of the transcription which will be proposed for the Commission's consideration, keeps the transcriptions and issues it for the general public upon request. This section also provides copies of the transcription to the parliamentary library. Apart from hard copies of transcriptions, this section also processes soft copies which can be downloaded from the parliamentary network.

The transcriptions of the debate are a product of the three offices. They are supposed to be an unabridged, verbatim record of each debate. However, the transcription does not contain conversational marks such as pauses, hesitations or any paralinguistic features. Since it is simply a record of the debate, rather than a word-level linguistic transcription, it does have some limitations. Despite that, the transcriptions are the most complete and reliable corpus available for the analysis of no-confidence debates.

This thesis analyses transcription of five accusatory speeches and two respondent speeches. These speeches are taken from the debates in 1995 and 1996. The accusatory speeches analysed are that of Chalerm Yubumrung and Samak Sundaravej from the 1995 no-confidence debate and Chuan Leekpai, Sunai Julaphongsathorn and Trairong Suwannakiri from 1996. The two respondent speeches are that of Suthep Thuaksuban from the 1995 and Kanjana Silpa-archa from the 1996 debate. The 1995 no-confidence debate was held after evidence of malpractice in a land reform project called *so po ko 4-01* had been disclosed. The Democrats, who were the coalition leaders, declared the aim of the project as being to help the poor and landless agriculturists by distributing them title deeds. However, there were a number of the Democrats' cronies who received the *so po ko 4-01* title deeds. Since both the Minister and Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives had resigned prior to the debate, it was the Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai who became the target of this debate. During the debate, the CTP (main party in the opposition) led a team of speakers to investigate the issue of the *so po ko 4-01* and the DP's cronyism. The debate ended with the dissolution of parliament. However, the tables were turned in the 1996 debate. It was now the CTP who were the leaders of the coalition and the DP who found themselves in the opposition. The main target of this debate was the Prime Minister, Banharn Silpa-archa. The issues under discussion were his practice of cronyism, inefficiency in office and his lack of sophistication and personal integrity. It was suggested that Banharn's lack of experience led the Thai economy downhill. Chuan Leekpai, the Prime Minister in the 1995 debate, as the leader of the opposition led the debate against the 1995 leader of the opposition, Banharn, who was now the Prime Minister. It is worth noting that the issues presented in the 1996 debate are more personal in nature

than those in the 1996 debate. This debate ended with the Prime Minister winning the vote but he was forced by his coalition partners to promise that he would step down within seven days.

The transcription of the two debates shows interesting features in the speech discourse. Firstly, the speeches are not as formal as one would expect institutionalised discourse to be. Apart from discourse that is categorised as being in an informal register, the data also reveals evidence of discursive strategies. The use of sarcasm, metaphor and other types of indirect discourse are prolific. The aim of this thesis is to explain the relationship between the strategies in the text and the sociocultural practices within which the debate take place. It is necessary to state that this thesis assumes that most of these discursive strategies used during parliamentary debates are goal-oriented and that language users *need* to employ linguistic strategies to help achieve their goals. This is because, according to Brown and Levinson (1987), the intentions are often threatening so they are not, theoretically, permitted to be expressed directly in society. Strategies are there as tools to help language users overcome social constraints, norms and rules and finally to put their message across (details of the debate's conjunctures will be discussed in chapter 5).

The use of linguistic strategies to achieve goals in communication reveals two actual relationships between language and society:

1. Strategies are used in language because without them the content and message are unable to communicate due to the social constraints mentioned. Therefore, to a certain extent, the form of discourse is constituted by the society that frames it.
2. The goal of using linguistic strategies is to conveying a message in the most effective way possible, so that the message can change or reconstruct the society according to the desire of language users. Language, therefore, is designed to be socially constitutive.

3.2 Social Antagonism and An Adversarial Relationship between the Government and the Opposition

In 2.4.1, Laclau and Mouffe's theory of Hegemony and Social Antagonism is discussed. Laclau and Mouffe propose that the generative power of discourse may be manoeuvred as a tool to pursue personal gain. According to them, people always encounter an undesirable situation which they term 'social antagonism' in society. Social antagonism means the situation where the identity of one person is prevented from developing to the full because it is in conflict with another's.

Looking at the discourse of no-confidence debates through Laclau and Mouffe's perspective, the social antagonism in the identity and goals of the government and the opposition can be summarised in the following table.

| OFFICIAL STATUS | IDENTITY | GOAL |
|-------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <i>GOVERNMENT</i> | GOVERNMENT | BE IN OFFICE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE |
| <i>OPPOSITION</i> | GOVERNMENT IN WAITING | END THIS 'TRANSIENT' STATUS AS OPPOSITION AND 'BECOME' THE GOVERNMENT |

Table 1
Social Antagonism in Thai Parliament

Theoretically, there should be no social antagonism in parliament. The government should assume their identity and role as the administrative power and the opposition is supposed to provide the mechanism that counterbalances the power of the government. In other words, the government and the opposition should assume opposite identities. Hence, as an 'outsider', the opposition role should not be in conflict with that of the government. Although they are on opposite sides, the government and the opposition are expected to have a mutual goal in ensuring that the country is governed in the most effective and accountable fashion for the sustainable benefit of the public in general. No-confidence debates provide a platform for the opposition to do their duty in monitoring the government, making sure that the public interest is in good hands. In reality, no-confidence debates are a stage for political 'adversarial' discourse: an opportunity to display social antagonism in an overt manner. This adversarial atmosphere may stem from the representation of self-identity on the part of the government and the opposition. Considering that being in office is generally perceived as a 'field of opportunity' (Mulder 1996: 168; for further discussion see chapter 4) politicians have their sights set on getting into office and staying there for as long as possible. Being in the opposition is seen as a transient state, a period in 'purgatory', when they are preparing themselves and paving their way to move on to the more desirable state of being the government.¹ Since the opposition's self-identity is that of a government-in-waiting, it poses a threat to the identity of the government. The opposition's goal of taking over the office also challenges the goal of the government (to be in office for as long as possible). In this light, the representations of identities are intrinsically contested. This conflicting condition gives rise to adversarial discourse. The contested identities stem from the desire of one to usurp another primarily for their own benefit.

¹ The possible ways for the opposition to become the government will be discussed in section 5.1.1.

The social antagonism between the government and the opposition gives rise to the ‘face-threatening communicative intention’. This corresponds to Brown and Levinson’s description that communicative intentions are potentially face-threatening (Brown and Levinson 1987). With the face-threatening communication in mind, the language users - in this case, the government and opposition members – have the aim to produce discourse whose content is face-threatening. This face-threatening discourse is used as a tool for both sides to contend with one another in developing their identity to the full. It does not come as a surprise, then, that the discourse of the debates diverge from what it should be theoretically, which is conformed to the parliamentary Code of Behaviour, because its context is far different from what has been ideally laid down. The actual discourse is concocted with the actual identity (as government-in-waiting) in mind and the official status (as opposition) is made less relevant. However, communication of such an identity is bound to have bumpy side because it is open to a direct identity clash, which may lead to the disruption of communication. This jeopardises the effectiveness of the communication. In the case of a no-confidence debate, which is part of institutional discourse; there are also rules to be observed. Such adversarial discourse violates the parliamentary Code of Behaviour hence it also risks being ruled out by the Speaker. In order to avoid failure in communication, the face threatening content should be glossed over by some ‘conventional’ form. By conventional, I mean the form that is socially acceptable: conforming to the social norms and parliamentary Code of Behaviour as an ‘appropriate’ parliamentary debate discourse. The form, which is designed and manipulated to accommodate the communication of certain content for social and political purposes may be considered as a ‘linguistic strategy’. In order to examine these strategies, the thesis needs approaches that attend to the social aspect of discourse.

3.3 The Two-Level Framework

The theoretical framework of this thesis can be divided into two levels: macro analysis and micro analysis. The macro analysis aims to investigate the conjunctures posed by the context of the discourse and how the macro structure of discourse interacts with such conjunctures. The micro analysis looks at the micro categories of discourse such as lexical choices that form discursive strategies. The theories that form this two-level framework and its rationale have already been discussed in chapter 2. In this chapter, I will examine the way in which these theories are combined and how efficient the combination is in analysing data from no-confidence debate discourse.

3.3.1 Macro Analysis

The analysis at this level is a combination of the CDA and SCA's framework. Hypothetically, it is believed that discourse is context sensitive and that evidence of the society can be found in the text. At the same time, this thesis's framework accepts that social practice may not have a direct dialectical relationship with the discourse. The relationship is mediated by van Dijk's notion of context. This thesis perceives that the cognitive representation of the social world in the form of context shapes the discourse practice and that the effect of context in discourse practice manifests itself in the text. Thus in order to explain the society-discourse relationship, both CDA and SCA should be employed.

CDA presents a framework which can systematically link the text with social practices. According to the CDA framework, there are three levels of communicative event: sociocultural practice, discourse practice and text (Fairclough 1995a). The process of using and recognising strategies takes place at the level of discourse practice which consists of text production and text consumption. SCA focuses mainly on the process of text production and consumption while CDA is interested in the interface between the text and its discourse practice. This research, however, is interested in both. It adopts Fairclough's idea that it is in the text that one can locate linguistic strategies. It then investigates the strategies used in the text: what they could do and what S could do by using them. It will employ intertextual analysis to interpret what is in the text as well as what is omitted from the text. This framework will show the traces of interaction social practices have in the text, and that text or language is after all one of the elements of social practice (Fairclough 2000b: 159).

3.3.1.1 Defining Sociocultural Practice and Discourse Practice as 'Context'

Before proceeding to the discussion of our application of CDA's intertextual analysis, I would like to start by defining two levels of Fairclough's communicative event: sociocultural practice and discourse practice. Though the CDA framework suggests in its *conjuncture analysis* and *analysis of the practice* that the two levels of communicative event should be examined, it does not prescribe elements in the practices that should be looked at. Therefore, I would like to propose the SCA's context as a suitable notion that provides for a systematic investigation into the two practices. Apart from dividing elements systematically into categories, SCA's context also attends to an element which CDA has overlooked: human cognition. SCA's notion of context allows individual cognition not only to be in the picture but also considers it as the most prominent agent of discourse production and comprehension. Cognition works as a central control unit assessing all the 'relevant' information of social practices during discourse processing. The products of the

cognition process are the aims and intentions of the speaker. By acknowledging the individual's cognitive process, the framework will be flexible and dynamic, and therefore sufficient to explain discursive phenomena that spring from personal variation. For example, why Chuan and Trairong, who were both Democrats' MPs representing Southern constituents and both of whom gave speeches of no-confidence against Banharn's government in the 1996 no-confidence debate, came up with different discursive strategies and style. One may argue that Fairclough's conjuncture analysis may be enough to distinguish between the position of Chuan and Trairong in Thai politics, thus creating different conjunctures and therefore inducing different speeches. But I would argue that Fairclough's acknowledgment of the individual cognitive role is at best superficial. It can only be inferred that it could play its part during the process of articulation where elements are brought together. Despite the due attention he gives to the articulation process, what determines articulation is left in the background. Van Dijk's framework can supply this missing link in CDA. With van Dijk's explicit and detailed categorisation of context, this thesis can give cognition all the attention it deserves. The analysis can generate explanations of the dialectical relationship between speeches and relevant social practices in a more systematic way, attending to the crucial role of people's cognition in the relationship.

3.3.1.2 Macro Level Categories and Micro Level Categories of No-Confidence Debates' Context

No-confidence debate discourse belongs to the political **domain**. The concept of domain, similar to Bourdieu's *field*² adopted in the CDA framework, refers to the social realm that presupposes a social role and social interaction within that realm. Discourse producers, in this case MPs, are aware of the realm in which they are operating; they are aware that they are 'doing politics' or, in Thai parlance, 'playing politics' [*len kan muang*]. Discourse recipients who are MPs and the general public are also aware that they are watching people doing/playing politics, and thus acknowledge the domain. Both parties draw upon their concept of the political domain in the production and comprehension of discourse. Though the concepts of politics are similar in their essence that it is about 'doing politics', yet the question of 'what does it mean by doing politics' and 'how do people do politics' may vary from one culture to another. To use van Dijk's theory to explain this, the concept of politics activates a common knowledge of the word as well as the more specific group knowledge and personal knowledge of it. In this light, politics is not only a universally common knowledge, it is also culturally concentrated and closely linked to the political

² Field is 'a network of positions by a particular distribution of capital which endows that field with its own specific practical logic: the way people who occupy these positions act within the space depends upon the quantity and composition of the capital they are endowed with- composition in the sense of in what proportion different types of capital are combined' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 101).

culture of that community. In this case, the concept of ‘Thai politics’ indicates what is relevant and what is not. Thai politics, despite being under the democratic system like most countries, bears certain idiosyncratic traits: the predominant aspiration of being in control of public resources and administrative power, as the government dominates all practices in Thai political domain, for example. The analysis of the Thai political domain will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.

The domain is typified by its **global actions** (van Dijk 2001a: 18). Van Dijk classifies the global actions of politics into two groups: the typical political acts and more general social acts. The typical political acts are:

- a. Representing their constituents
- b. Governing the country
- c. Criticizing the government
- d. Engaging in opposition
- e. Implementing party programs
- f. Making policy

(Ibid)

The more general social acts are:

- a. Making Decisions
- b. Promoting oneself
- c. Reproducing (anti) racism³
- d. Making money

(Ibid)

Politics in every community involves these basic acts, but the degree to which each of them is emphasised may be different, for instance, Thai politics lays less emphasis on policy-making and more on money-making. In other words, if politics is typified by the global actions above, the cultural variation in the concept of the political domain may have arisen from the emphasis on different acts. The underlined acts are those highlighted in the Thai political domain. It can be said that the predominant goal of the Thai political actor is to have access to governmental power and national resources. It is often about making money from the power and resources directly or indirectly, for example, by trading their administrative power for money (bribery) with the entrepreneur or pocketing an extra sum from government bidding. ‘Relevant’ to this preponderant act is promoting oneself. By promoting themselves, MPs can improve their popularity which can be a great asset when the next election arrives. Vote base and popularity can be traded for money as Thailand is not only notorious for vote-buying but for MP-buying as well. A popular MP can be bought with many million baht to join another party campaign because Thai voters vote for an individual, not the party. By boosting their value, these MPs will be sought after by a high-profile party and therefore they will have more power to negotiate their desired governmental position.

³ Van Dijk’s research on parliamentary discourse addresses racial issues.

Self-promotion usually entails the defamation of those who are classified as ‘others’; the opposition may criticise the government and vice versa. MPs from one party criticise those from another, MPs from one clique in the same party may well criticise those from another clique and an MP from the same clique may well defame another. Thus, in addition to van Dijk’s ‘universal’ global actions in the political domain, I would like to add that politics in Thailand is not only about ‘criticising the government’. It could also be the reverse and the criticism between two (or more) opposing sides can occur at many levels: government versus opposition, party versus party, clique versus clique and individual MP versus individual MP. In this light, the implication of ‘engaging in the opposition’ in Thai politics domain may well be only part of ‘criticising others’ acts. ‘Engaging in opposition’ in general implies an underlying cooperation between the opposition and the government in ameliorating the administration for the sustainable interest of the public by way of counterbalancing the administrative system. In the Thai no-confidence debate, which is supposed to be the stage dedicated especially to this act, this ‘general’ implication is markedly played down. The Thai concept of ‘doing politics’ makes cooperation rather irrelevant since the aim of doing politics is to have access to power and resources by ‘being’ the government. Thus, ‘cooperation’ and ‘public interest’ are reduced to mere rhetoric, not having much real effect. The logic behind this act can be explained by looking at MPs as institutional actors (van Dijk 2001a: 19). MPs are not only members of parliament or representatives of their constituents, they are also part of the government/opposition, their clique and their party. Their roles in an institution like parliament are predetermined by their membership in those groups, not as an individual (van Dijk 2001a: 19). Their decisions and actions are collective and therefore are seen as that of the institution to which they are affiliated. This concept suggests that MPs are divided into two camps: either they belong to the government or the opposition. Hence the idea of institutional actors makes the confrontation between the government and the opposition predictable or even expectable as an intrinsic part of institutional practice (Ibid).

The production and comprehension of no-confidence debate discourse is not only shaped by macro level categories of context, namely domain, global actions and institutional actors, discourse users also attend to the micro level categories of its context: setting, local actions, participants and cognition process. The **setting** is the time and space of the discourse. The time of the no-confidence debates, as any other institutional discourse is designated within the parliamentary session permitted for this special issue prior to the actual debate. Usually the debate is allowed two or three days with the voting on the day after the debate ends (details of the debate’s Code of Behaviour and its practice will be discussed in chapter 5). Once the time of the debate is approved, it cannot be extended. Therefore the time is fixed. Moreover, each opposition speaker has a time

slot allotted to them, so it is not their right to decide when they want to speak. The speech will be closely monitored by the House Speaker to ensure that the parliamentary time is used effectively. The House Speaker can ask any speaker to stop should he/she judge that the speech is becoming irrelevant or repetitive. Since no-confidence debates are part of parliamentary debates, they are regulated by an explicit set of rules (van Dijk 1999) which is called the Code of Behaviour. The effect of the fixed time and the parliamentary Code of Behaviour on no-confidence debate discourse is apparent. Many speakers repeatedly affirm that the issues they raise are relevant to the motion, for fear of being told to stop by the House Speaker. Some of them beg for more time from the Speaker by saying that they are about to raise a very important issue or conclusive evidence. Apart from the limited time, the fact that the debate is practiced under a strict Code of Behaviour also generates the discourse: the debate can only be addressed to the House Speaker, for example.

The debate is a 'higher level complex discursive notion' (van Dijk 2001a: 20). It can be broken down into a series of discursive acts which van Dijk terms **local actions**. Local actions are the sequences of speeches, questions, answers, Speaker interruptions and challenges from the floor, for instance. All these locutionary acts constitute one or more global actions. Thus the aim of this analysis is to locate the political function of these actions. Questions posed by the opposition may primarily work to criticise the government while promoting the image of the opposition as someone who can outwit the supposedly bad and corrupt government and protect the interest of the public which is equal to representing the people. This is how questions (as local actions) typically work in Thai no-confidence debates.

The micro level context of **participants** involves an analysis of the discourse users of the debate. This means not only MPs that are participants of this parliamentary event but also the media and the general public outside, since it is televised. The concept of participants is different from that concept of institutional actors because this concept takes into account both discourse producers - the MPs - and discourse recipients - the MPs, media and the public. It looks on all the parties concerned as an individual member of the larger unit of society, not necessarily as members of their political domain. However since this thesis is analysing the production of the debate and the debate discourse, the role of MPs will be foregrounded as they are the discourse producers. The media and the public's presence are considered as the conditions for the debate. During the debate, discourse producers perform three kinds of role simultaneously: communicative roles (producer/recipient), interaction roles (friend/enemy, for example) and social roles (woman/man, white/black, for example) (van Dijk 2001a: 22). When Thai MPs give speeches (producing discourse), they speak as a representative of their party on that particular issue. For example, in 1996 Dr. Trairong Suwannakiri (DP) made a speech of no-confidence on economic issues against

the CTP led government. In this case, Trairong did not speak as himself but as the representative of the opposition whips and his party whip to cover this issue. He contributed his expertise in economics to strengthen the opposition's argument that the government had handled the economic crisis badly. As an MP or 'people's representative', Trairong was also expected to speak for them. His status as a representative makes the public audience's presence directly relevant to the debate and should be taken into account. Having considered the significance of the public, Trairong's speech aimed to elaborate the extent to which the government jeopardised the nation's economic position and how this crisis would affect people at large. Note that van Dijk claims that a speaker is 'barely expressing his own opinions' (van Dijk 2001a: 22). This does not necessarily hold true in Thai parliamentary debate where 'own opinion' is often discreetly and implicitly expressed using discourse strategies such as intertextuality and metaphor (see chapter 9). The interactive role of Trairong's speech is to attack the government. That is, he presents himself as an enemy of the government and the friend of the opposition. Even though he called Banharn, the Prime Minister, *phi* (elder brother) Banharn, it can be seen that it is only a rhetorical move to say that even though he has a friendly relationship with Banharn and also respects Banharn (as suggested by the social deixis *phi*), he could no longer support Banharn. An honorific that shows intimacy (or kinship) like *phi* is used to produce counter effects that, even when all things are considered, the government led by Banharn needs to go. Apart from speaking as a representative of the opposition and the people and the enemy of the government, Trairong is also a member of other social groups. His speech also identifies with these groups to a certain extent. Firstly, he identifies himself with the group of technocrats who have expertise and authority in economic issues. Secondly he identifies himself (to a lesser extent) with the group of Southerners because he himself is one and he represents Songkhla, one of the Southern provinces. Trairong's speech's association with Southern style can be perceived from the frequent mentioning of the places in the south, lexical choice and his direct and daunting speech style. The style can be seen as a typical Southern style (see chapter 8). The identification with certain social groups can help promote the interpersonal relation between him and members of that group because it shows that Trairong is 'one of them'.


The last of the micro level context categories is the aims and the intentions of the speaker which van Dijk terms **cognition**. Van Dijk claims that this category has never before been included in context, because context has always been seen as the social situation outside cognition (van Dijk 2001a: 23). He sees context from another angle. If context is to be something that controls discourse production and discourse interpretation, it should include cognition. This is because all other categories of context are controlled cognitively by mental models during the production and interpretation process. The act of 'thinking' what knowledge is relevant in that particular situation

is crucial. That is the role of cognition. It was mentioned earlier that discourse is goal-oriented. It also holds true for the case of no-confidence debate discourse. The debate has its aims and purposes and they may vary from one MP to another. For the opposition speaker, the aim may be to dissuade other MPs and the people from trusting the government and perhaps persuading them to put their trust in him/her instead. The government's aim, on the other hand, is to defend itself and to win back public confidence. The aims of both sides involve a high degree of persuasion. In order to do this, speakers have to assess the cognition of their audience; they have to find out what are the opinions or beliefs of other MPs and the audience so they can attend to it during their speech. They need to find out the three layers of knowledge of the audience: common ground, group knowledge and personal knowledge of that particular issue. This is then used as common ground to design persuasive strategies and used as the basis of their argument. The opposition speakers are aware that the audience find it usual for them to attack the government; they know that the audience presume that being in the opposition means that they must oppose whatever the government does. Being aware of that preconception which undermines their supposedly rational argument against the government, the speakers use prolepsis such as apparent denial to lead their argument, such as 'I have nothing personal against Mr.... but what he did was unacceptable'. The use of prolepsis is one of the strategies used to acknowledge knowledge of the audience as common ground.

3.3.1.3 Intertextual Analysis

The CDA's intertextual analysis is an effective framework to analyse the interface between discourse practice and text to see what trace the former has left in the latter (Fairclough 1995a: 61). Intertextual analysis will be able to show the 'form' of discourse and locate the strategies used. The three focuses in the intertextual analysis of Fairclough, namely styles, discourses and genres, are supposedly the traits in the text which can be linked to social life. While styles are concerned with identities and values, discourses are concerned with the representation of social life. According to Fairclough, genres present how language figures as the means of speaker (Fairclough 2000a: 14).

Styles, discourses and genres are the three focuses of analysis situated in the text. However, in order to analyse these three focuses, they need to be put into context. Social practices involve the construction of social identities and representations of social life, in this context, by way of language. The identities and representations are reflected in the form of work and identification. Since social practices refer to the construction of social identities and representations of social life, they are inevitably associated with positions of people: their identities and their social relations.



In constructing social identities and representations of social life, social practices bring together four major categories of elements of life: physical, sociological, cultural/psychological and text. 'Moments' of certain social practice are when these elements are brought together. In bringing these elements together to constitute a moment, certain elements are articulated. Hence, the process of articulation means how elements are brought together. During the process of articulation, elements are transformed; each moment internalises the others. 'In this sense, text is physical activity, is power, is knowledge and desire etc. yet at the same time something different from all of them' (Fairclough 2000b: 168).

Social practices function as a network. Networks articulate different forms of work, identifications and representations corresponding to the different practices they combine. Different practices in each particular area of social life or *field* such as the political field have their relative permanence in terms of their pattern of articulations within a moment of text. This relative permanence in articulation is called 'order of discourse'.

Even though CDA claims that text is part of the social practices, it nonetheless argues that text is not equivalent to social practice. Text is a pseudo-reality created by language. It is the dichotomy between rhetoric (text) and reality (social practices) which is the main focus CDA uses to uncover language manipulation. As a result, CDA is not only concerned with the macro structure of text but also with analysis at the level of micro events. CDA proposes that in order to analyse the dichotomy between text and social practices or rhetoric and reality, textual analysis is indispensable. In analysing text and textual events in tandem with its social practices, the dichotomy between rhetoric and reality can be uncovered. By dichotomy between rhetoric and reality, Fairclough means:

- a. the dichotomy between language as a part of action and other parts of the action

- b. the dichotomy between style and substance, that is, a speaker's constructed identity and his/her real identity

These two aspects of dichotomies will be used to make a distinction between language and reality to see whether language is in any way manipulated. In brief, CDA explains the macro structure of text that text constructs social identities and representations of the world by way of organising the four elements mentioned. Different articulation of elements can lead to different interpretations.

Fairclough thoroughly elaborates in his numerous empirical analyses on how genre, style and discourse perform three aspects of function: ideational, interpersonal and textual. Despite his acknowledgement of the significance of genres, styles and discourses, Fairclough's definition of these concepts is at a purely theoretical and abstract level: that genres spell out 'means of production and resources of texturing', that styles signify identity and that discourses show people's representation of the world (Fairclough 2000a: 169-170). He stops short of clarifying these concepts any further. To be able to put these concepts into practice, a scheme that links these abstract concepts with the text itself must be laid out.

3.3.1.4 From Abstract Concept to Concrete Empiricism

The use of strategic analysis connects the discursive features with the social world. Context categories can sometimes contradict one another, for example, the Code of Behaviour of parliament designating that the debate be a formal parliamentary genre is in conflict with the aims (cognition) of the no-confidence debate to produce a speech most damaging to the government. In this case, the debates need to feature at least two conflicting genres: a parliamentary genre characterised by moderation and an unparliamentary genre characterised by extreme language. If the presence of the media and public as participants is taken into account, the debate discourse is likely to include popular media genres. In the face of conflicting context categories which result in the condition where there are competing conjunctures, the most effective discourse is one that can operate in between the two or more forces. To produce such a discourse capable of compromising two or more competing forces usually signifies the use of indirect language. This indirectness creates a double meaning: what is uttered and what is meant. The literal meaning and the non-literal meaning are the product of the different context categories. The double meaning thus allows the speaker to attend to both competing conjunctures. It also provides a practical way to attack others without having to be held responsible. The double meaning can then be considered a tactical move to overcome the limitation posed by contexts; it gives a safety exit for the speaker to take should H decide to take offence. Its ambiguous nature is also a convenient way to accuse someone without having to be explicit, for example, in 1996, MP Trairong accused Prime Minister Banharn

of persistently interfering with the work of the Finance Minister, Surakiat Sathirathai. It was only when Banharn realised that he had caused seriously entangled financial affairs that he allowed the minister to take the helm. The ‘serious entangled financial affairs’ were explained using an idiom ‘having fire burning their (the government’s) arse while their head was about to bleed’. By using an idiom, Trairong could vividly make his point that the government had caused serious problems to the country without having to say exactly what kind of problem it was. Since the nature of the problem was not stated, the government did not have the chance to clarify itself on this particular point.

The use of discursive strategies as a tactical move is the main interest of this thesis. Discursive strategies tell us about the attempt of the speaker to operate within the competing context categories. By starting with an analysis of context in parallel with the strategic analysis, the thesis will be able to systematically unravel the traces of context in the text as well as how these traces potentially affect the context. The parallel analysis of context and strategy may also yield further clarification of Fairclough’s conceptual interpretation of genres, styles and discourses by linking strategies with particular genres, for instance. By doing so, Fairclough’s theoretical concepts can be brought down to a more practical level.

3.3.2 Micro Events Analysis

After using intertextual analysis to uncover forms of discourse, politeness theory and FTA strategies will be brought in to categorise and interpret the strategies used. Politeness theory, a strategic analysis, could provide the link between the macro structure of language (its discourse practice and sociocognitive practice) and its microstructure (the text). While Fairclough elaborates the political discourse by showing how discourses are woven together through relations of equivalence, antithesis and entailment, this thesis proposes that strategic analysis could be a potential complementary element to help CDA explain the dialectic of rhetoric and reality. I propose strategic analysis because the no-confidence debates, which form corpus of the data, are a sub genre of parliamentary discourse with a distinctively adversarial nature. The name of the game is to perform character assassination by way of words.

This thesis assumes that the political actors involved in no-confidence debates want not only to perform character assassination by way of words but also to do it in a way that still preserves his/her PF, NF, PPF and PNF. The construction of world representations and identities associated with the preferred self-image most crucially underlies all political discourse. The notion of face is very important in the political context. The preservation of face is supposedly guaranteed by the parliament’s Code of Behaviour. Failing to observe the Code not only breaks the rule which

subsequently leads to a failure in conveying the message but also compromises the speaker's overall image as a good, objective and rule-abiding politician. FTA strategies that help to achieve these contested aims will be of particular interest.

Since the debates are not a one-way propaganda campaign and contain a considerable amount of verbal confrontation in the form of mock dialogue, I believe strategic analysis is a suitable system of examination for this verbal interaction and complements the CDA framework. Politeness theory helps analyse text beyond its three aspects of genres, discourses and styles. It could interpret what constitutes that particular genre, discourse and style and whether or not these constituents are truthful to the social practices of which the text is a part. Politeness theory sets out to analyse the form of text, which is separate from content. The form might or might not have a surface meaning. The theory uncovers the dichotomy between the literal and non-literal meaning and by doing that, it is able to figure out the style of the discourse and categorise it into an appropriate genre. In other words, politeness theory will be used to analyse the prerequisites of the CDA framework.

The analysis will first use politeness theory to detect strategies. It will look into the text to see whether there are any linguistic entities capable of functioning as a discursive strategy. Second, it will examine them in relation to the society by using strategic analysis to see how their discourse practice and sociocultural practice of communicative event shapes the discourse. Third, it will put the analysed strategies back into their context, sociocultural practice and discourse practice and consider what these function and implication these strategies may have. After categorising them into appropriate groups of strategies, these properties will be studied:

- a. their potential functions.
- b. the social implication of their usage in that particular context.

Linguistic traits which can be found in text include the following:

| | |
|----------------|-------------------------|
| Sarcasm | Ambiguity |
| Presupposition | Contradiction |
| Understatement | Rhetorical question |
| Overstatement | Overgeneralisation |
| Wordplay | Hedges |
| Irony | Conventionally indirect |
| Metaphor | |

According to the list of linguistic traits provided, it can be seen that all of them can potentially be used as strategies. Some of them have the potential to fall into more than one category. When one of these traits is found in the text, it will be organised into one (or more) strategy. Its potential capability in that particular context will then be analysed. Fundamentally, it could be assumed that the FTA strategy is used to minimise the seriousness of FTA, promote PF and NF of S and H and convey the message across. However, when FTA is performed in a political context, it is not only the function of FTA strategies that matter but also the all-important purpose of any political discourse. In political discourse, politicians propose their version of reality conveying their ideological values and want them to be accepted (Negroni et al 2001: 12). This is not an easy task given that political actors are required to compete among themselves to impose their own version of reality. Therefore, each of them has to come up with the best and most believable version. FTA strategies are there to help them produce political discourse which meets this standard. The discourse not only produces the best version of reality but is also capable of convincing the electorate that the speaker has the best PPF and PNF and therefore should be trusted. Jokes or humour are one FTA strategy. Almost every linguistic trait mentioned has the potential to produce humorous effects. Though jokes are theoretically categorised by Brown and Levinson as positive politeness strategies, closer examination suggests that off record and negative politeness strategies may well produce a joke so long as they possess the incongruity which is the most important element of humour (Ross 1998; Weiner 1997).

This two-level analysis is supposed to be applied in parallel, that is, one should look at both the macro and micro level at the same time while analysing any particular piece of discourse. This is because the relationship between the two levels is actually gradual. There is no definite demarcation between the two. The micro elements simply constitute the macro elements. Therefore after the use of strategic analysis, CDA will then be brought in for the purpose of summarising the textual analysis and connecting the text (rhetoric) with reality. Strategies used within the text will constitute genres, discourses and styles of a text. Being able to identify these three aspects of text, will mean that the framework will be able to further analyse the dichotomy between rhetoric and reality according to the CDA procedure.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter argues that there is evidence of discursive strategies in no-confidence debate discourse and these strategies have a dialectical relationship with society. They are traces of sociocultural practices that manifest themselves in the text and at the same time they have functions in their context. They are used to provide more efficiency to the discourse originated in a context where there is social antagonism. That is, the form of discourse is tactically designed to detract from face-threatening content which may otherwise be interrupted. The premeditated

design of form to serve such social and political purposes can be seen as linguistic strategies. These are at the centre of the thesis's interest.

In order to study the dialectical relationship between text and context, I operationalise a two level analytical framework: a combination of CDA and SCA. The macro analysis investigates the relationship between society and text. This analysis draws mainly upon the CDA framework. Dividing communicative events into three levels: sociocognitive practice, discourse practice and text, I adopt the SCA's notion of context to analyse the first two levels. Context categories provide a methodical evaluation of the two practices. It is proposed that when there are conflicting context categories, text needs to make a compromise between the two (or more) categories. To be able to negotiate the conflict, strategies are used to create double meaning: what is uttered (literal meaning) and what is meant (non-literal meaning). The possibility of more than one interpretation which is termed the *ambivalence of text* is a tactical move to overcome the limitations posed by the context.

At the micro level, the analysis looks into the discursive features in the text. Since the ambivalence of text is created by the use of strategies, strategic analysis has to be employed to investigate how these strategies function. At this level, Politeness Theory and pragmatic and humour approach are drawn upon. General pragmatics is interested in an interaction between politeness phenomena and the use of indirectness (Leech 1983). It regards discourse as consisting of two parts: literal meaning and non-literal meaning. When there is a dichotomy between literal meaning and non-literal meaning, it is called linguistic phenomena. When the dichotomy is created by politeness strategies, it is called politeness phenomena. Pragmatics as well as politeness theory argue that the convergence which has irrational usages at the face level does have a highly rational and maximally efficient mode of communication in particular divergences. These theories can uncover underlying motives in language interaction as well as the principles out of which social relationships and interaction aspects are constructed.

Chapter 4 Contextualising No-Confidence Debates

4.0 Introduction

No-confidence debates in Thailand have two distinctive characteristics. First, during the period prior to 2001,¹ they were a regular twice-yearly event. In other words, there was a no-confidence debate every parliamentary session, the maximum frequency allowed by the Constitution. Second, the discourse of no-confidence debates has been described as ‘unprofessional and unparliamentary’ (Bunrak 1994: 208), featuring personal issues and informal discourse ranging from sarcasm to sheer insults.

This chapter attempts to look for an explanation for the debates’ frequency and their ‘unparliamentary’ discourse by placing them back into the context of Thai politics. It problematises the social practices relevant to the no-confidence debate, which are the practice in Thai political domain. Thai politics features a symbiotic patron-client relationship and money-intensive electioneering produces MPs that are not parliamentarians² and are prone to corruption. Moreover, Thai culture³ and Buddhism groom Thais to be tolerant to such malpractice. The tendency to dishonesty on the part of the government provides a recurring reason for the opposition to propose a no-confidence debate motion. The debate’s discourse is designed to work in such a political context where the emphasis is on informal relationships and where all MPs compete to be in the government. The unparliamentary discourse of the debate can be seen as the result of the fact that the majority of MPs are professional electioneers. They seek to be in control of state resources by being in office. The debates’ frequency and their discourse are the product of

¹ No-confidence debate practice is largely influenced by the Constitution (see chapter 5). The 1995 and 1996 debates that form the data of this thesis was governed by the 1991 Constitution BE 2534. In 1997, new Constitution BE 2540 was promulgated and operationalised. The new Constitution and the new political situation generated by it changed the debates’ practice markedly. However, this thesis will focus on the practice of the debate prior to the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution because that is the period when the debates under analysis took place.

² By this, I mean Thai politicians are not in the spirit of parliamentarian. They are not into real politics nor are they concerned about public interest. They are concentrated on being elected (see Surin and McCargo 1997). Therefore it can be said that Thai politicians are professional ‘electioneers’ rather than professional parliamentarians.

³ This thesis uses the term ‘Thai culture’ to mean the worldview and norm shared by Thai people. It primarily concerns the way of life of the people living in Thailand including their religion which constitutes a major part of Thai life. My argument about Thai culture is based on anthropological literature and sociolinguistics (Girling 1981; Mulder 1996; Suwanna and Nuangnoi 1999). Thai culture is different from ‘Thai identity’ which was constructed in the Nationalist era under Field Marshall Phibun. While ‘Thai identity’ is tied to the nationalist movement and can be considered as political top-down propaganda, Thai culture reflects more of how ordinary people actually behave and think. Since this thesis is exploring the Thai way of life and worldview, Phibun’s constructed ‘Thai identity’ is irrelevant to my argument.

these problematic features in Thai political practices. To understand the characteristics of no-confidence debates, knowledge about Thai politics is required.

This chapter will discuss the nature of the Thai political system and the cultural concepts that undermine democratic values. These factors form a context within which the no-confidence debates are supposed to operate. This chapter starts by locating no-confidence debates in their political context. The second section problematises the Thai political practices concerning the Thai public sphere and the national authority. Its aim is to give a general view of the ‘problematic’ features in political practices in Thailand. The third section attempts to understand such deviant practices by looking for possible explanations in Thai political culture and worldviews. The fourth section presents two of the most problematic political practices - voting behaviour and the practices of vote buying, corruption and bribery, as products of the discrepancy between Thai political culture and Western notions of democracy. These two problematic practices which are seen as the mainspring and the conditions behind no-confidence debates.

4.1 Locating No-Confidence Debates

The Thai National Assembly consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Assembly has three major duties (www.parliament.go.th):

- a. Law promulgation- The National Assembly promulgates laws that govern the nation, namely the Constitution, Acts of Legislation, the Law Codes and Royal Decrees.
- b. Check and balance the administration of State affairs: This can be done in two ways. Firstly, the National Assembly can submit a written interpellation to Ministers or Prime Ministers or the leader of the opposition. The interpellation shall be replied to in the Government Gazette. Secondly the House of Representatives⁴ can initiate a motion for a general debate for passing the vote of no-confidence in the Prime Minister or Ministers.
- c. Give approval for important issues- National Assembly has power to address important issues such as the declaration of war or the appointment of a Regent.

Initiate a no-confidence debate motion is one of the House of Representative’s duties in checking and balancing the government administration. Hence, this thesis will concern itself with the House of Representatives and not the Senate.

⁴ According to the Constitution of the The Kingdom of Thailand BE 2534 (1991) which was in use during the 1995 and 1996 debates, the Senate can have no part in the no-confidence debate. However, the new Constitution BE 2540 (1997) allows three-fifth of the Senate to call for Ministers to present information on the issues that relate to the Senate’s administration in a general debate (Constitution 1997, Article 197).

No-confidence debates are part of the parliamentary ordinary proceedings. These proceedings are among many communicative practices within the context of Thai parliamentary system. The system, which is the social practice where the no-confidence debate is located, creates conditions for the debate and constraints within which the debate has to abide. Being shaped to a certain extent by its social practice, the debate itself is designed by S⁵ to effectively redefine its context to be in a desirable condition.




Fig. 7
No-Confidence Debates in Context

To understand the debates, one needs to understand the meaningful context within which the debate takes place. It is the aim of this chapter to elaborate on the background to the debates' context, that is, Thai political culture. This perspective should enable readers to understand the distinctive form of parliamentary system that operates in Thailand. This perception will be very helpful when analysing the dialectical relationship between the debate and its context in the following chapter.

4.2 Problematizing Thai Political Practice

Thai politics has been branded a 'fledgling' form of democracy (Anek 1996). For over seventy years Thailand has been under a nominally democratic order. The system is yet to be developed and reformed because there are certain elements in Thai politics, which are idiosyncratic. Some of these characteristics clearly obstruct the path to fully-fledged parliamentary democracy. This section will discuss such characteristics of the political sphere of the electorate and of the politicians and political parties.

⁵ S refers to the message sender. In the case of a no-confidence debate, it means the speaker. The opposite of S is H which refers to the hearer or message receiver. In this context it means two parties: the government and opposition in the parliament and the public outside.

4.2.1 The Thai Public Sphere: Electorate, Elections and Voting Behaviour

Some Thai political scholars divide the Thai electorate into two groups: urban and rural (Anek 1996; Suchit 1999). The two groups form the Thai public sphere. The different living conditions and different worldview of the urban and rural dwellers result in markedly different sets of voting motivations. Anek observes that while higher-educated urban voters are more oriented to the ideology and policy issues of the candidates, their rural counterparts tend to vote for those who make frequent visits to them, address their immediate grievances effectively and bring public works to their community (Anek 1996: 202). In other words, these people are likely to vote for candidates who give them immediate benefits, whether or not their individual or group's interests compromise the nation's interest. Suchit adds that for the majority of the electorate, policy issues do not have any influence on their voting behaviour (Suchit 1999: 56).

The voting behaviour of the rural people is of main concern for political scientists because the overwhelming majority of the electorate lives in rural areas. The majority, Suchit argues, do not see the significance of an election as an occasion where they can exercise their power and political efficacy to shape the government and its policy. For them, an election is the only time when they can choose representatives to voice their demands and grievances. People do not vote because of their public awareness. They do so simply because they think they are duty-bound (Suchit and Pornsak 1984: 231). Since public awareness is yet to emerge, voting and elections can easily be mobilised and open to manipulation (Suchit 1999: 55).

The mobilisation of votes and the manipulation of elections is reflected in the strategically organised fashion of the typical Thai electioneering process. According to Anek's study of Thai elections, the electioneering process in the rural area is carried out at two levels simultaneously: the candidates and their canvassers. Vote canvassers or vote chiefs are part and parcel of village life. The people who can be vote canvassers or vote chiefs are those who are powerful, influential and/or respected in the area, such as village headmen or teachers. Usually the 'powerful and respectable' people are bureaucrats.⁶ Their duty is to provide all sorts of service to the locality, from giving legal advice to securing hospital admission. In most cases, canvassers also play the role of intermediary in the process of vote buying. Canvassers may assume an even more important role according to Callahan. He proposes that the practice of vote-buying is but a tip of the iceberg of the patron-client relationship between politician-canvasser-electorate. Through

⁶ Suchit makes a remark that people who have a political position and civil servants are seen as being powerful and influential. Ordinary people usually respect and obey them (Suchit 1999: 69).

canvassers, the politicians provide patronage to the villagers mostly in the form of aid. As it is the canvassers with whom people come in direct contact, Callahan found that the villagers often vote for canvassers more than the candidates (Callahan 2000: 130). This can spell further trouble because it means any candidate who, by any means, recruits the most influential canvasser is likely to win. In this case, money is but a means to confirm this form of patronage (Ananya 1992 cited in Callahan 2000: 130).

Anek's model of 'two cities' seems to offer a satisfying explanation to why the vote of rural voters are more likely to be mobilised. However, Anek's claim that the urban dwellers are more concerned about policy and ideological issues can be problematised. Research show that urban dwellers are just as inclined to see a political event like a no-confidence debate primarily as entertainment (Wilasinee 2001: fieldwork notes). This indicates that members of Anek's 'two cities' do share some perception towards politics. Anek's argument that urban dwellers are more 'policy focussed' might be overstated.

4.2.2 State Authority

By state authority, I adopt Habermas's concept which refers to the executor of the public sphere but is not part of the public sphere (Habermas 1979: 198). In this section, two factors constituting the characteristics of Thai state authority will be discussed.

4.2.2.1 Members of the Parliament

The pervasive personal and/or community interest-based motivation in voting has resulted in a large number of MPs with the same motivation in running the country. MPs from provincial areas do not usually have a vision of the national long-term interest. This is because only a small group of the electorate give importance to policy issues at a national level during an election campaign. The voters are far more likely to choose individuals rather than policies (Girling 1981; Suchit 1999). This personalistic voting behaviour is another reason for Thailand's static politics, given that rural dwellers are the majority of the voters. Girling describes the weak point of provincial MPs which eventually affects national politics as follows:

As a result, not only are they distanced from the mass of their village constituents, but they cannot stand up to the power, the prestige and the authority of the more affluent educated, sophisticated metropolitan bureaucrats they are supposed to control (Girling 1981: 158).

According to Girling, the provincial MPs are in an uneasy situation where they are isolated by those who elected them as well as by those with whom they are supposed to work. Moreover, they

are also sharply differentiated from Bangkok MPs. Most of those supported by the middle class have an image of sophisticated technocrats. These MPs usually aim to secure their electorate's share of prosperity by bringing shady businesses into the constituency. Apart from focusing at local level, being unable to collaborate with both their subordinates and their peers could be another explanation why they do not contribute as much at the national level.

The ultimate example of a provincial MP who rose to Premiership is Banharn Silpa-archa.⁷ Banharn, a former contractor from Suphanburi province, has been widely loved and respected by his electorate who live more or less under his 'patronage'. He has brought infrastructure into the province. As a prominent MP of the province for many years, he has been able to allocate a large slice of national budget to his constituency. Many development projects have come to Suphanburi, a province which now has a 16-lane motorway and is well-lit by streetlights which cost more than those in the capital. Numerous schools and municipal buildings are named 'Banharn-Jamsai' after the MP and his wife because they have sponsored them.

Banharn started of as an ordinary member of the Chart Thai Party (CTP) founded by a group of Thai aristocrats called the *ratchakhru* clique. After being elected as Suphanburi MP for many years and becoming increasingly powerful, he took over the party and became its leader. This incident symbolically indicated the decline of the old elite and the rise of provincial politicians in politics, which became apparent in 1989. The old elite was forced to share their control in politics with the financially powerful provincial politicians, who provided the financial support necessary for the expansion of the party. With the influx of these capitalists, politics became increasingly money-oriented with a proliferation of vote-buying (Suchit 1999: 152).

Despite his provincial fame, Banharn was not able to cope well with his position as Prime Minister. After he was appointed in 1995, he had to tolerate the people's discontent. They disapproved of the fact that he 'bought his way' to the Premiership. Middle class people, especially in Bangkok, found him too 'unrefined' and 'unsophisticated' to be the Prime Minister of the country. He was far from successful in administration, even though he had appointed technocrats as his Ministers. He had to fight against his own limitations in order to win public acceptance, which later proved to be in vain. Banharn's case is an example of a typical provincial MPs facing the pitfalls predicted by Girling. After 15 months in office, he was forced to resign

⁷ Banharn was in office from 13 July, 1995 to 27 September, 1996.

after a no-confidence debate.⁸ This event proved that though he was very successful at the provincial level, this provincial popularity could not guarantee success at the national level. The premiership required a lot more than he could possibly offer, such as vision and image. Robertson observes the rise of rural politician represented by Banharn as follows:

This intense localism particularly troubles the Bangkok elites-businessmen-technocrats in the Anand Panyarachun mold as well as military leaders- and speaks contempt for Banharn and his compatriots who are perceived as provincial fixers not up to the task of governing Thailand (Robertson 1996: 929).

Banharn is a classic case of a provincial MP catapulted into the national sphere by money politics which by itself corrupts the democratic polity. Once they are in office, their perspective of localism and rather limited vision prevent them from contributing to what the nation deserves. In addition to that, their image of 'provincial' MPs holds them back from being accepted by the middle class public. The influence of this discontented vociferous section usually succeeds in putting the government out of office (McCargo 2002a: 2).⁹ This recurring phenomenon underlies the common view that, 'it is the rural electorate who pick the government and it is the job of the urban electorate to dismiss it'.

Given this pitfall awaiting provincial MPs, a group that appears to be increasing in number, all hopes for a more stable democracy turns to a group of MPs who are popular among the urban middle class voters. They have a higher educational background and generally are more public-oriented. Some of them are technocrats with a vision and an ideology for the long-term prosperity of the nation, such as Chuan Leekpai, Jaturon Chaisaeng and Abhisit Vejjajiva. Nonetheless, this group of MPs are tiny in comparison with the large contingent of MPs from rural Thailand. It is easy for them to be caught up in the web of 'money politics' in one way or another, usually at the party level. Therefore, even though the ideology-oriented politicians do exist, they are outnumbered by the 'typical' Thai politicians, in the same way as the urban middle class electorate are outnumbered by their rural counterparts.

⁸ Other coalition parties (except the PTP) gave Banharn a proposal that they would vote in his favour on the condition that Banharn had to publicly announce that he would step down within seven days. Banharn agreed to do so in a televised press conference at the parliament before the voting and he won the vote by 207-180 (*Arthit* 27 September-3 October 1996). However, after given his coalition partners five days to form a revised coalition, Banharn announced the dissolution of the House (King 1997: 161).

⁹ Prime Ministers unseated are Suchinda Kraprayoon in May 1992, Chuan Leekpai in May 1995, Banharn Silpa-archa in October 1996 and Chaowalit Yongchaiyudh in November 1997.

4.2.2.2 Views of Thai Political Parties

Thai politicians do not act independently. Their actions, what they should and should not do, are controlled, primarily, by the clique with which they are affiliated. The second most influential factor is the party that their clique is part of. Political parties are influential organisations that greatly shape the behaviour of state authority in general. Studies of Thai political parties reveal that Thai political parties are peer-based, interest-based, show a lack of integrity and are likely to abuse power (Surin 1992; Surin and McCargo 1997; Somsakdi 1987; Chai-anan 1995; Suchit 1999). They do not emphasise the importance of policy or ideology. Benefit sharing within the clique is their priority. These traits can be seen as the result of, as well as conditions for, the electorate's voting behaviour. In any case, they certainly obstruct democratic development.

Thai political parties are goal-oriented. They regulate the voice of politicians under their control in order to facilitate the achievement of their goal. The party is also carefully structured to serve two purposes: theoretical and pragmatic. Within the party operate two sets of hierarchical orders which help to underpin the two purposes. Superficially, parties have two major posts: the party leader and the secretary general. According to the formal hierarchical order, the party leader is theoretically the most powerful and influential person. In practice, most of the time, it is the secretary general who can dictate the fate of every member, sometimes including the leader himself. The secretary general is the person who manages the party. It is crucial that he is a good coordinator. He should have charisma [*barami*] and power to control the party's members while being able to forge connections with both legal and illegal outside groups. The secretary is also the person who is responsible for the party's fund-raising. It goes without saying that he is the one every member has to rely on. The party leader, on the other hand, must have a good public image that people can have faith in. He is the one who provides the presumably honest and clean 'front' for the party while the secretary general takes care of the party's 'real' business.

According to McCargo, Thai political parties are more like cliques of people sharing the same goal than as political institutions (McCargo 1997: 118). The party is, therefore, a complicated and well-structured organisation designed to ensure goal achievement. The goal mentioned here has little to do with policy. Despite being a part of the ritual in founding a new party, policy has no further significance. McCargo argues that the policies of Thai political parties are astoundingly similar. The parties' primary goal is mutual benefit among their clique rather than among the general public.




Fig.8
 Authority Relationships in Thai Political Parties
 (Thak 1979: 62)

As the party relies more on personal contacts than systematic institutional ones,¹⁰ each individual can hardly maintain the same degree of contact with every member. According to Fig.8, the authority and relationship between party leader and member attenuates when they reach the second level members (B1, B2). Though the leader (A) can successfully maintain personal contact with B1 and B2, he/she is likely to completely lose direct contact with the third level (C1, C2, C3). The relationship between him and C1, C2, C3 is only an indirect one. However, this diagram can be criticised since party members are linked together not only by hierarchical bonds but also by personal bonds. In the case where, for example, C1 has a personal connection with A prior to membership, he/she might well have direct contact with the party leader. Though the diagram does not provide a complete picture, it still illustrates that no one, not even the leader, can have equally direct personal contact with all the members.

Since the party is established without any clear ideology or principles in the list of priorities, and the fact that it has loose organisational structure, it is difficult to develop horizontal and vertical linkages. Given the fact that the party is based on 'cliques' joined by acquaintances, the result is a lack of discipline (McCargo 1997). Within the party, members are again divided into factions with yet a stronger sense of group. The loose structure of political parties, the fact that they are divided into cliques and their interest-based stance, makes the party prone to conflicts of interest. Conflicts within the party eventually affect the parliamentary system. 'Party affiliations and unity shift continuously as the political interests of individuals change' (Thak 1979: 62). The lack of unity at party level can result in what Kulick and Wilson called a 'chameleonlike' parliament. (Kulick and Wilson 1992: 76).

¹⁰ There are number of politicians joining the party because of friendship or personal connection with party member(s).

Apart from a lack of policy, and the peer-based and interest-based aspects of the political parties, Surin Maisrikrod argues that the weakness of the Thai party system also derives from the number of parties (Surin 1992: 5). Thailand has many political parties. Some of them survive for only one parliament, such as the Samakkhi Tham Party (STP) (Surin 1992: 6). This is again because a political party's purpose is based on a group's personal interests. As a result, when any conflict between factions erupts, members resign, either to join another party or to form a new party. Too many parties compromise the stability of parliament because they mean too much heterogeneity and fragmentation.

From the above argument, it can be seen that the circumstances both on the side of the Thai public sphere and the party system produce an unhealthy environment for democracy and fosters 'money politics'. Since the electorate seems to prefer money-intensive methods of electioneering, it is the candidate's duty to provide them with funds in exchange for votes. This situation drives politicians to rely on all sources of funding, legal or illegal. Once in office, these politicians are likely to reap benefit from national resources as a turnover of their investment. This situation results in what Surin and McCargo called, an 'iron triangle' or 'vicious triangle' consisting of three forces that dominate Thai politics: veteran politicians, bureaucrats and provincial business people. 'Their co-operation is focussed on this symbiotic relationship. The business people give funding to the politician, expecting to receive political protection in return, while bureaucrats give their bureaucratic power in monitoring elections to politicians in exchange for political incumbency' (Surin and McCargo 1997: 145).

4.2.2.3 The Government

The Thai party system embodies a number of small political parties. Parliamentary seats are distributed among different parties. Under the 1991 Constitution, it is impossible for any one party to have the majority in the House. Thus in such a political situation, single-party government is inconceivable. In order to form a government, the party who has won the most seats and the party who won the second most seats vie with each other to form a government. The formation of a government is a pivotal process. It involves up to a week of lobbying other political parties, preferably those with a substantial number of seats to join the coalition. This is when deals such as which party earns which Ministry are made. The party that succeeds in gathering the majority of seats first declares itself head of the coalition. The party that loses this 'number game' becomes the head of the opposition.

To reach a majority, the coalition usually needs to gather over four political parties. According to McCargo, too many parties produce unstable coalitions (McCargo 1997: 115). The more parties involved in the coalition means that it is more prone to internal and external conflicts of interest. For example, the Chuan government that was subjected to no-confidence debate in 1995 was in a volatile situation even before the debate took place. This is because the coalition had only a marginal majority of 185 seats in the 360 seats parliament from the very beginning. Right after the election on September 13, the angelic parties¹¹ formed a coalition. DP won 79 seats, NAP 51 seats, PDP 47 seats, and SP 8 seats. This margin of ten seats left the coalition fragile. The attempt to maintain the coalition's unity was far from smooth. It began with the SAP, a pro-military party being brought in to make up the number to a 205 majority. The coalition is still volatile for two reasons. Firstly, there was an ongoing competition between the DP and the PDP. Secondly, the SAP was constantly causing problems. The party was later expelled from the coalition because it merged with an opposition party. The SRP was called upon to replace the SAP, leaving the total number of the coalition's seats at 193. With such a small majority, the coalition was subjected to constant threats of defection. The survival of the coalition had become an immediate concern of the government. The inter and intra party conflict was between the DP and the NAP against PDP over the issue of constitutional amendment and decentralisation. The conflicts led to the religious faction of the PDP threatening to withdraw from the government. The relationship within the coalition was laden with tension and uneasiness (Kusuma 1995: 195). However, it was the NAP who finally defected from the coalition (King 1996: 135). By the time Chuan's coalition faced the May 1995 no-confidence debate, the coalition could not afford to lose any more seats. The survival of the coalition was hanging in the balance. It is enough for the opposition to hammer a wedge into this highly unstable coalition knowing that once any party walked out, the coalition was doomed.

From the above discussion about Thai political elements, two idiosyncratic features are apparent. All the parties concerned put emphasis on persons and personal relationships, and the symbiotic relationship. These two traits do not support a democratic ideology because they work against the

¹¹ The division of political parties into the angelic and the devilish was triggered after the a political uprising in 1992 called 'Black May'. It was one of the worst political incidents in Thailand. A group of pro-democracy middle class supported by the PDP, NAP, DP and SP took to the streets demanding the resignation of the military-backed Prime Minister, General Suchinda Kraprayoon and the amendment of the constitution to rule out non-elected MPs from the premiership (Suchit 1993: 220). The demonstrator were quashed by the army who decided to go in for a crack-down. This event drove the military's popularity to an all time low. While the parties that supported the people were dubbed 'angelic' parties, the pro-military ones were known as the 'devilish' parties.

idea of equality in the public area where the populace is supposed to be anonymous. These competing characteristics curtail the supremacy of political institutions and democratic regulations. In the next section, the overall political features will be analysed in further detail.

4.3 Understanding Thai-Style Democracy: Where Thai Practices meet Western Model

In the previous section, I analysed Thai party politics by looking at both the parties concerned: the Thai electorate and the members of state authority and the kind of government it produced. The analysis concludes with the emergence of two prominent features of Thai politics. First, Thai democracy emphasises personal relationships. Personal symbiotic relationships can be found between the electorate and politicians, electorate and vote canvassers and among politicians themselves. In the electorate-politician relationship, the electorate gives votes in exchange for certain benefits and political protection from their MP or from the canvasser of the MP. Among politicians, a politician provides service or financial aid to his/her party in exchange for party protection and benefit earned by the organisation. Second, Thai democracy puts emphasis on a person more than on the party's ideology. This section will seek to find explanation for these two features in the Thai context. It argues that they are the residues of Thai traditional polity presenting itself in the form of Thai interpretation of democratic polities. There are three factors that constitute difficulties in conceiving this new polity. First, democracy entails essentially Western ideologies of equality, populism and civil rights. These values conflict with certain cultural features. Thai traditional ideas emphasise personal relationships, typically symbiotic ones. Thais believe in a social hierarchy where one's rights are subject to one's position in society. As a result it is inherently difficult to understand. Moreover, it argues that the concept of democracy has never been taught properly to the people (Nidhi 1995; Mulder 1996). Since Thais do not have a clear idea of what democracy is in the first place, democracy appears multivalent. This ambiguity gives way to manipulation. The discourse of democracy, more often than not, is exploited to gain legitimacy for the then ruler to do what he likes, no matter how undemocratic the action may be.¹² Moreover, despite the difficulties in conceiving the idea under the democratic system, the Thai administration does not change from its traditional polity. People are unable to stand on their own two feet and still have to look for assistance from the central government (Callahan 2000: 130).

¹² During the Black May demonstration in 1992, people took to the street in large numbers to expel the military dictator General Suchinda Kraprayoon. In retaliation, Suchinda ordered the shooting of pro-democracy protestors in a bid to crack down on the movement that 'posed a threat' to democracy.

This idea of the government as an inexhaustible source of support accommodates people's interpretation of the government as the old-fashion patron.

Political culture in Thailand evolves around this worldview which is still intact. This view perceives politics as being a closed and exclusive realm. Accordingly, when the absolute monarchy, typifying the traditional polity, was replaced by democracy seventy years ago, the Thai public was forced to look for an interpretation of this strange political system. From the above impediments, it does not come as a surprise that the Thai people 'fuse' the foreign idea with the existing Thai view of the world (Mulder 1996: 165). The fitting of the new concept into their mental model of political culture produces a democracy which is more or less unique, characterised by two prominent features. Since Thai politics is a combination of procedural democracy coupled with the Thai worldview, to understand 'Thai democracy', one must also look at Thai perceptions of social life and wider society. Such a perception emerges from many centuries of cultural evolution of the people.

4.3.1 Thai Society and Culture: Continuity and Gradual Development

Thai political culture is part of the Thai culture and world view. Thus, the concept of Thai polity would be difficult to grasp without taking into account the way of life of the people. Thai is the name given to people who live in Thailand, most of whom are of Tai ethnicity. The Tai and Thai's staple diet is rice. Thai communities and culture evolved around the process of rice cultivation and rice consumption.

The first Thai capital was founded as far as thirteen century¹³ (Girling 1981). The capital, Sukhothai, was a kingdom. From then on Thailand was governed by an absolute monarchy until it was replaced by a constitutional monarchy in 1932. Thailand stands out from other countries in the region for the fact that it is the only country that has never been officially colonised. According to Craig J. Reynolds, Thailand has never encountered either radical social revolution or colonial oppression (Reynolds 1987: 9). This point provides a two-tiered impact. It gives Thais something to be proud of and enhances the uninterrupted development of Thai culture in terms of society as well as politics. As a result, Thai political history is characterised by, 'its gradual development taking place in the context of continuity from the past' (Somsakdi 1987: xi). Thai development in

¹³ There are many theories about the origin of the Thai community. Some do not consider Sukhothai as the first capital due to the significantly different cultures between the Sukhothai era and the Ayutthaya era. Sukhothai is mentioned here because its view of patriarchal kingship, which had no place in Ayutthaya's, *devaraja*, sacral kingship, is still significant in the modern Thai attitude towards rulers.

terms of society and politics is represented by a tension between two competing ideologies: traditional and modern (western). Reynolds observes that:

The dyad of Buddhism and sacral kingship still serves in the late twentieth century to legitimate the civil-military order that rules. Even after the Enlightenment constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy, and European socialism entered Thai consciousness through Westward-looking and Western-educated minds, the resulting aspirations for political, social and, economic change never achieved their iconoclastic and personal and epochal objectives (Reynolds 1987: 9).

On the other hand, because ties between the past and present have never been severed by radical social change, traditional concepts and polity - Buddhism and the importance of social -hierarchy are still pervasive in modern times. They are manipulated by the modern ruling class to legitimise its power. Used as a tool for legitimacy, these traditional concepts are less likely to be cast aside. Reynolds (1987) and Chai-anan (1987) agree that Thailand can be considered a 'conservative' state or 'traditional' state because a traditional ideology and polity have always been the underlying force beneath the official parliamentary democracy. According to their research on political history in Thailand, it is essential to study the origins and history of Thai polity in order to acquire a complete understanding of modern Thai politics. Benedict Anderson wrote that, 'residues of previous cultural modes can always be expected from a society whose cultures are dominated by religious or secular rationalism' (Anderson 1990: 77). This is especially true in the case of conservative/traditional states like Thailand.

Traditional Thai ideas have also had a negative impact on modern Thai politics. Apart from promoting a sense of nationalism to the point that Thai people see themselves as outstanding in comparison with any other countries in the region, the prevailing traditional ideology and concepts make it exceptionally hard to implement western models such as parliamentary democracy in the Thai context. Even though Thailand has generally been under formal parliamentary democratic structures since the non-violent overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932,¹⁴ it can hardly be said that Thailand is a successful democracy judged by the standard of western democratic models. Given the large number of constitutions that have been drafted,¹⁵ the number of military coups,¹⁶ the MPs who are not the 'real' representatives of people in their constituency and the large scale of

¹⁴ The self-proclaimed People Party, consisting of European-educated technocrats, abolished the long-established absolute monarchy and replaced it with a constitutional monarchy. This not only affected the polity in Thailand but also the social system since the absolute monarchy was not only a political institution but also a social institution.

¹⁵ So far there have been seventeen constitutions in Thailand.

¹⁶ There have been seventeen coups d'état, eight of which failed.

endemic corruption, it cannot be said that western democratic ideology has successfully been adopted (Chai-anan 1987: 33). Chai-anan concludes Thai political history by observing that:

Western-style constitutional government in Thailand has been highly unstable and ineffectual. While the democratic pattern remains formalistic and has suffered enormous discontinuities, traditional pattern autocratic traits have remained pervasive. The legacies of the traditional pattern of authority have worked against effective institutionalization of the formally adopted democratic system of government, and autocratic tendencies still dominate in the attitudes and the behaviour of the new Thai elite, and of the mass (Chai-anan 1987: 33).

According to Chai-anan, it is the legacy of traditional autocratic traits that are working against the democratic development of Thai politics, resulting in an unstable and ineffectual system characterised by the two idiosyncratic features of Thai democracy.

4.3.2 Sukhothai, Ayutthaya and Rattanakosin: Evolution of Thai Political Culture

In the previous section I mentioned Sukhothai as the first capital of Thailand. This section will take the readers through the three eras of history, each of them named after their capital city,¹⁷ starting from Sukhothai onwards. The purpose of this section is to explain the linear evolution of Thai polity spanning a thousand years of Thai history. The gradual development of polity for a period of over a millennium is rooted deeply in Thai culture and has formed part of the Thai world view.

Thailand was familiar with absolute monarchy as early as the first capital. The role and characteristics of the king, however, have evolved from the context of one era to another in order to suit changes in the kingdom. Sukhothai was a relatively small capital. With a small number of peasants, it was possible for the king to govern directly. The distinctive characteristic of this era lay in the intimate and informal interpersonal relationship between the king and his peasants. The king was considered the ‘father of the nation’. He ruled with mercy and benevolence. This concept known in Thai as *pho pok khrong luk* (father oversees children) still exists in modern days. The Sukhothai’s criteria of good governance have been applied to rulers throughout various phases of Thai history.

Ayutthaya, a port city that fought its way to supremacy while Sukhothai’s power gradually declined in 1350 embraced a new concept of kingship. Ayutthaya’s power derived from its wealth in successful mercantile business (Baker 2002). The maritime trade brought in people from various

¹⁷ *rattanakosin*, however, is only the name of the era. The capital of the *rattanakosin* era is *krungthep* or internationally known as Bangkok.

countries, Chinese, Persian and Portuguese, for example. At the same time, the prosperity also attracted people from the hinterland. The result was a thriving multiethnic community (Srisak 1991). Such a populated kingdom required a stronger and more organised political system. In order to maintain order in the kingdom, Ayutthaya adopted Khmer-style political organisations and the Indic legal system. The new system elevated the status of the king to that of a god, thus the new concept was called the 'cult of god king' [*devaraja*]. The king was regarded as a god and had to be addressed as such by using a different system of language, for example. Placing the king at the apex of the social hierarchy far away from normal peasants allowed him to have an aura of sacral power to be exercised over his subjects. Such absolute power was crucial in maintaining peace and order in the kingdom.

As Ayutthaya expanded, in the fifteenth century, King Trailok reorganised the bureaucracy in a more systematic and hierarchical fashion. The society underwent a complex and thorough restructuring. He structured the entire kingdom, grading ranks, duties and privileges of every official in minute detail (Girling 1981: 21-22). The expansion of the kingdom, which resulted in this more systematic and hierarchical structure, naturally widened the gap between the king and his peasants. He was no longer the nation's 'caring father'. He was now seen as a 'the lord of life and the owner of land'. The gap between the peasants and king was filled by the *sakdina* system. *sakdina* means 'power over land'. According to the system, the king governed the country by allocating 'packages' of duties and privileges to people hierarchically (Pasuk and Baker 1998: 11). This system was based on plots of paddy fields, the basic need in an agrarian society like Thailand. The king distributed plots to bureaucrats known as *nai*. The higher the rank, the more land he obtained. Together with the plots, *nai* received administrative responsibilities, military service, resplendent titles and a share in the control over people residing on that land (Pasuk and Baker 1998: 11). Technically the more land he owned, the more power he acquires. The residents of the land known as *phrai* were directly under the *nai*'s control. 'A high *sakdina* rank indicated the *nai*'s right to command large numbers of people to maintain his status and carry out his official role', added Pasuk and Baker (Ibid: 12).

Though Sukhothai's idea of a patriarchal king who ruled with power and benevolence was no longer practical in the Ayutthaya context, this paternalistic and benevolent concept still applied to the people's immediate ruler class, the *nai*. The *nai* and *phrai* system emphasised the symbiotic patron-client relationship. This means that, while the client is at the beck and call of the patron in

order to benefit from his advancement, the patron has to display his generosity and protection in exchange for the client's loyalty, which eventually enhances his influence and power. So, the relationship is actually an exchange of benefits but to an unequal degree (Girling 1981: 39). The system is 'loose' as it is based primarily on free will. That is, clients can change from one patron to another as advantage and opportunity offer. According to Girling, 'The very ambiguity of the relationship between shifting personal choice and enduring restraints of power has caused much controversy about the 'loose structure' of Thai society' (Girling 1981: 40). From the politics and administration of two early eras of Thai history, interpersonal relationships and mutual benefits are prominent features. Thai people believe that they have never been and can never be ruled solely by power. The ideal image of the ruler has to consist of both power and benevolence.

4.3.3 Thai Hierarchical Society

Thai polity especially from the Ayutthaya period onwards gives rise to a highly stratified hierarchic society, which can be summed up as in the following figure.




Fig. 9
Thai Social Structure
(adapted from Suwana and Nuangnoi 1999)

The society is divided into four hierarchies; king, *jaonai*, *phuyai* (or *nai*) and *phunoi* (or *phrai*). By *jaonai*, I mean the relatives of the king or local ruling class. The highest two hierarchies, king and *jaonai*, acquire their social status by birth. Their status is fixed, for example, they use a title indicating their rank instead of a normal title like Mrs. or Mr. This title will remain unchanged

throughout their life. On the other hand the two lower hierarchies, *phuyai* and *phunoi* are dynamic. These are acquired by birth, wealth and/or other social indicators such as career. When a *phuyai* is out of work or has lost his/her wealth, his/her status as a *phuyai* is also lost. There are idioms that satirise *phuyai* or *phudi* falling from grace such as *phudi tok yak* [*phudi* in trouble] and *phudi paet saraek* [*phudi* with eight dignitaries]. In contrast, *phunoi* or *phrai* who take up respectable careers such as being a doctor, being ordained as a monk or becoming wealthy can redeem him/herself and become *phudi* or *phuyai*.

The organisation of society is a product of the Thai linear social and political development described in the previous section. The structure, however, is stabilised and underpinned by Thai idea and belief (Suwanna and Nuangnoi 1999). While social development generates the pattern of society, ideology and belief regulate interpersonal relationships between people within the same social class and of different classes. The regulated interpersonal relationship is the factor that holds this 'loosely-structured' yet highly hierarchic society together (Suwanna and Nuangnoi 1999). The prevailing concepts that underpin symbiotic personal relationship and social hierarchy are the Thai interpretations of Buddhism and Thai belief in animism.

4.3.4 Phuttha and Saiya: Beliefs Underlying Thai Culture

O'Connor claims that Buddhism revolutionised the Tai state and shaped Tai polity (O'Connor 1996: 82). This is a reasonable viewpoint since Thai culture can be seen as a combination of the Thai way of life and their interpretation of Buddhism. Since the religion spread into the Siam peninsula, it has blended with the people's way of life and beliefs, that is animism and Brahmanism. These beliefs collectively are called *phutta-saiya*, forming the basis of Thai culture and ideology. *Phuttha* and *Saiya* are highly influential in terms of how Thai people perceive themselves in relation to others in society. It affects their perception of rulers, be it the Kings in the past or, though to a lesser degree, modern day rulers such as MPs and the government.

4.3.4.1 Thai Interpretations of Buddhism and Political Culture

The principal Buddhist belief that the universe is in a state of constant change and impermanence constitutes the fundamental perspective of the Thai people. According to Buddhism, all living things are inescapably entangled in the unending cycle of *karma* (Girling 1981: 33). *Karma* means action. Every action produces a certain effect. Good and meritorious actions produce good results while bad and sinful ones produce bad results. One cannot predict when result of ones karma, good or bad, is going to strike. The force of *karma* is not within a human's control. It is invisible,

impermanent and invincible [*mong mai hen, mai khong thi lae mai samat oao chana dai*] (Sombat 1997: 27). Human's life is propelled by one's karma.

Furthermore, the Lord Buddha believed that life is characterised by suffering. Suffering is an experience that cannot be totally avoided. That is because there is ultimately nothing 'real' to hold on to, not even oneself. The universe itself is in ceaseless change. As a result, attachment to anything will lead to disappointment and despair. Buddhism suggests the way to escape from this cycle of *karma* or suffering, and achieve nirvana (extinction). Only through 'the selfless renunciation of greed, anger and illusion' (Girling 1981: 32) can one rid oneself of all suffering and attain eternal bliss. Since total renunciation is hard to achieve, Thai laymen are advised only to comply with the five precepts and learn to let go. As often as someone says *mai pen rai* (never mind), the Thai will say *plong*. The same as 'never mind' *plong* means accepting or the process of accepting the situation or condition as it is. This means putting aside, or trying to put aside any issues that are on their minds (Pattaya 1999; Chai 1999). The notion of *plong* or 'letting go' is a corroded form of total renunciation. The idea of *plong* reflects Buddhism's ultimate goal of extinguishing worldly attachments in Thai daily life. It is essential to accept that objects and persons are transitory. A wise man should learn to let go when things seem to be out of hand. However, a significant number of Thai people-especially the uneducated - take this notion to the extreme. They prefer to ignore things that do not directly relate to them. They accept life as it is. This includes the acceptance of social inequality of all types.

The concept of *karma* coupled with the acceptance that it acts as a higher controlling power cultivates an individualistic viewpoint among Thai people. Since one's life is shaped by one's actions, one only has oneself to rely on in order to shape the present and future in this insecure and impermanent world. *Karma* also provides the explanation for certain areas of society that are beyond ones' control, such as why people are born unequal or why some attempts fail. It explains that one's birth and life depend on *karma* the person accumulated over past reincarnations. When a person is of noble birth and is wealthy, and thus is leading a more comfortable life, it is considered that the person deserves that kind of life because of the good *karma* done in the past. People who are born poor should not have antipathy towards the rich because it is their own doing in some past reincarnation that has put them in such a difficult position in this life. In this light, hierarchical society is legitimised and sustained. The notion of '*plong*' and the belief in *karma* makes Thais rather passive when it comes to political participation. They are not eager to rectify what they

found wrong in the government. This is bad for democratic values which encourage the electorate to be more politically active.

However, social position, as another thing in life, is impermanence [*anicca*]. Since the world is in constant change, according to the Lord Buddha, people's life are subject to change as well. The king can lose his throne the same way as a sinner can redeem him/herself. Buddhism does not believe in equality in every issue but it believes that everyone is equal in the face of *karma*. Everyone, no matter how high his status, is subject to the law of *karma* (Pricha 1997: 23). Those who are born to high rank can fall from grace if he/she has used up his/her good *karma*. This occurs when the person does not continue to do good deeds in this lifetime. The reverse also applies: one who is born *phrai* can rise to a higher position by doing good deeds.

The Thai considers that the legitimacy of the rulers lies in the person's *punna* (good *karma*) or *barami* (good *karma* that puts one in a high and powerful social position). These two indicators can be seen in the person's birth. As a result, it is easy for others to misread Thai culture and think that rank acquired by birth is the only source of legitimacy in the Thai perspective. On closer examination, however, it is in fact the *punna* and *barami* that propelled the person to be born in that rank which is the real source of legitimacy. The misinterpretation has led to a misunderstanding that Thai people succumb to any ruler that comes from on high, which clearly contradicts historical accounts. Thai history has witnessed many rebellions. Many of the rebels claimed that they are '*phu mi bun*' (who has *punna*) who came to rescue the country from sinful rulers. Some of the rebel leaders are local influential persons, another are *jaonai*, for example, *kabot phi bun* led by a local leader and *kabot boaworadet* led by Royal Prince Boaworadej in the Northeastern part of Thailand. The Thai people consider that their rulers have legitimacy so long as they are benevolent to their subjects, pious and practice certain dharma. If he does so, 'whatever he utters or orders deserved to be obeyed' [*mae wa than wa klao sing dai ko di lae bangkhap bancha thien yom chop duai song tham thuk prakan lae*] (Traiphumphraruang, quoted in Sombat 1997: 322). O'Connor reinforces this idea. He makes a remark, drawing on the context of the Thai agrarian society saying that the king enjoys his legitimacy as long as he abides by the Buddhist rules that the peasant knows (O'Connor 1996: 82). Pricha further elaborated that the King can even claim to be *Devaraja* or the god king on condition that he is pious. If he is not, it is legitimate for another person to overthrow and usurp him (Pricha 1997: 137). Therefore, the most important source of legitimacy is the ruler's morale and piety: that of being a *khon di*, 'good person'.

4.3.4.2 *Saiya*: Symbiotic Relationship between Human and Supernatural Forces

Buddhism portrays a world of impermanence, instability and insecurity for the Thai. *Saiya* or animism shares this worldview but it provides another explanation for such a world. The belief and practice of animism still lurks behind the Buddhist façade. In many cases, it is inseparable from Buddhist practice. As a result, a full understanding of Thai culture cannot be conceived without a knowledge of the belief that runs in parallel with Buddhism.

Buddhism preaches that one can acquire a better position in life by doing good deeds. Animism offers a domesticated force in the form of *saksit* objects which have the power to grant people's wishes in exchange for respect and/or offerings. These *saksit* objects are not part of Buddhist belief even though they include Buddhist relics and amulets. They come in many forms such as carved wooden dolls known as *rak yom*, or various Buddhist or Hindu relics. To invoke benevolent attention, one needs to initiate a businesslike transaction by making offerings and paying respect. Then he/she offers a contract by saying what he/she will come back to offer if the wish is fulfilled (Mulder 1996: 45). The relationship between the two is then symbiotic in the sense that the human gives respect and offerings that the *saksit* objects need, in return he/she receives what is asked for. It is also equal to bribery in a sense that there is a payment made to the one who has power, in this case *saksit* objects, to get something done. This insight on animism makes Thai's tolerance to bribery comprehensible. Symbiotic relationships including bribery are part of Thai life and not necessarily relate to negative thing.

4.4 Perpetual Discrepancy: Democracy vs. Thai Political Practice

Thus far, I have elaborated the idea that there are problematic features in Thai culture that hinder the meaningful improvement of democracy. Such drawbacks prescribe what is the most important thing in politics, what kind of MPs are elected and what kind of discourse these people will engage in. In this section, the problematic features of Thai politics are laid out to be analysed, using the Thai worldview and the concepts underlying it, as discussed in the previous section.

4.4.1 Voting Behaviour and the Practice of Vote Buying

This section will concentrate on the rural electorate's voting behaviour that affects the political practices in Thailand. The problem lies in three areas: lack of public awareness, personalistic voting behaviour and emphasis on immediate benefits such as money in exchange for a vote. To a certain extent, the urban electorate shares these characteristics but not to that degree. The origin of these characteristics can be traced in the Thai conception of community and the wider society.

Educated urban voters are 'modernised' in a western fashion through education which makes them more public-oriented than their rural counterparts.

Thais have never had a concept of a public world where everyone is equal (Mulder 1996: 166). The hierarchical society spells out social positions that are tailor-made for each individual. There are no two persons whose social position are exactly equal. Therefore equality, which is the basic concept of the public world, does not exist. Because social positions are essentially unequal, the interaction between any two or more individuals is truly exclusive to that relationship. Such relationships are personal and are often symbiotic. The symbiotic trait is also a by-product of the hierarchical society. Thai culture expects those with more power and higher status [*phuyai, phudi, nai*] to be a benevolent 'patron': they are expected to give protection and support to those lower in rank. At the same time, the less powerful [*phunoi, phrai*] expect to find patronage in exchange for their labour and services (Akin 1999: 281). Though Thailand has developed and modernised in many ways, the spectre of the patron-client relationship still lurks in the background. It can be found in almost every relationship such as between bureaucrats/people and politicians/businessmen. However, the concept has been somewhat altered and has taken on a new life. In the old days, such a patron-client relationship involved long-term commitment between the more powerful and the less powerful. The patronage refers more to protection than material things. Still based on symbiosis, the current patron-client relationship usually refers to short-term volatile loyalty or service which is paid off by money or other material objects. It is no longer limited to the relationship between the powerful and the powerless. It can be a relationship between two parties who have different means of power, for example between a businessman who has financial power and a politician who has bureaucratic power. One offers one's form of power in exchange for that of another. One of the most prominent kinds of symbiosis that hinders democratisation is vote-buying.

There is evidence of vote-buying and other forms of bribery as early as the first Thai election in 1933 (Yuwadee 2002). Once introduced, vote-buying and bribery were easily accepted by the people because it fitted comfortably with their model of the 'benevolent' ruler. It became more wide-spread when capitalists, most of them Sino-Thai, entered politics with the aim of seeking business protection.¹⁸ Big business in Thailand, for example banks and financial institutions, are in one way or another related to politics (Girling 1996: 36). They have either direct or indirect roles

¹⁸ This produces another symbiotic relationship between politician that gives protection and services to business people who provide source of funding.

in Thai politics. Some of the businesses regularly give financial support to certain or every political party in exchange for business protection, others have their men 'playing politics' [*len kanmuang*] to protect their interests. Generally, such people expect that politics will yield huge payoffs. Being aware of the voting behaviour of rural people, these new political actors usually run for a provincial constituency. They bring with them a strategy to secure votes and seats in the parliament. They are ready to invest money in electioneering, including vote-buying and network of vote-canvassers (*rabop hua kanaen*) (Girling 1996: 37). The network of vote-canvassers is extensive. One politician can have many canvassers working in different areas.

The vote-canvasser system is the commercialised form of the patron-client relationship based primarily on fast mutual benefit. The concept's substantive nature has been replaced by aid and straight cash. The vote-canvassers system is run according to the basic patron-client idea with the business-backed politicians, some of them local wealthy entrepreneurs, as 'patrons' and vote canvassers who are local influential people such as village headman as direct 'clients'. The canvassers earn money, protection and some privilege from a politician. In return they serve as middle-men between the politician and the local electorate. The canvassers pass financial support and some services from the politician to the electorate on his behalf and also keep the politician informed about opportunities such as weddings or cremations where he can make his presence felt in the constituency (Girling 1996: 38). Though usually volatile in nature, this network of patronage is not ad hoc. It lasts well beyond election day (Callahan 2000:130).

The system manipulates traditional concepts of the patron-client relationship. It exploits the Thai perception of the good ruler who is expected to be benevolent to his subjects. The whole process clearly reiterates the patron-client concept applied in the money-oriented context of Thai politics. The relationship between the two is characterised by commercial transaction. The network of this modern day patron-client relationship has become more and more sophisticated, covering almost all the rural constituencies. These networks enable wealthy provincial businessmen to take a leading part in the country's politics. On account of this successful vote-buying system, the Thai parliament houses many politicians whose financial power derives from shady businesses and whose honesty is rather doubtful.

4.4.2 Corruption and Bribery

Thais are notorious for corruption and bribery. People are aware of the magic of bribery in getting things done. As a result, they are prepared to bribe their way to what they want. Bribery can be in

the form of money or objects. Presented as gifts, people do not feel that they are encouraging any sinister practices. Considering the long-standing practice of 'bribing' even supernatural forces, mentioned in section 4.3.4.2, it becomes clear that bribery is simply a part of life. While people are ready to give bribes, those in power - such as bureaucratic power - expect this little incentive to lubricate their service. The practice of corruption appears at every level. This section will only concern itself with political corruption. Politicians, once in office, usually cream benefits from the public resources that the office controls. Most Thai politicians are known to pocket some of the national budget allocated to their office. The Ministries considered to be most profitable such as the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Transport are the ones that are allocated a large portion of the budget annually. The control of these Ministries is sought after by any political party. On top of the benefit from the national budget, these Ministries can also offer an opportunity for the Minister and his team to earn extra money from the private sector they work with. Take the Ministry of Interior for example. As the authority in law enforcement, the Minister and his officials may receive payment for turning a blind eye to certain illegal issues. The more important the issue, the more money there is. With every signature on the contract, there is money involved.

The readiness of people to give bribes and the expectation of politicians to receive them constitutes corruption. The proliferation of corruption is attributed to two conditions. Firstly, it can be seen as the predictable result of money-intensive politics, namely the buying of old MPs into the party, the buying of influential vote canvassers and the buying of votes (Callahan 2000). Since every step of electioneering involves money, it is mandatory that the MPs and the party expect to return a profit once they are elected. Where else could they find it except from the office? Such an anticipation is an incentive for them to splash out money in a bid to be in office, which later necessitates the committing of corruption. What really makes people see the 'public sphere' as a field of opportunity? The explanation lies largely in Thai cultural norms. In section 4.3.4.1, I explained the concept of *punna* and *barami* as the sources of the ruler's legitimacy. With *punna* and *barami*, one does not only acquire power but also wealth. Wealth is seen as an attribute of power. It is just part and parcel of the good *karma* of the powerful. In this light, the realm of the rulers can easily be seen as a field of opportunity where 'the high and mighty claim their "rights"' (Mulder 1996:168) Examples of this are seen in all sorts of monopolies and privileges owned by the *nai* (Akin 2000: 149). Traditionally a *nai* had a legitimate right to give his monopoly or his rights to anybody in exchange for some 'favour'. This idea is assumed to be the source of the tradition of corruption and bribery which still persists (Akin 2000; Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994: 3). People's resentment towards the malpractice of the ruling class was suppressed by the notion of *plong*. People see

corruption as the order of the day and bribery as a tradition (Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994). The concept of corruption as a negative phenomenon is not originally Thai. That is probably why there is no word for corruption in Thai. The closest concept is *cho rat bang luang* literally meaning 'cheating people (and) swindling the King'.

4.5 Conclusion

The frequency of the no-confidence debate and its unparliamentary discourse are a reflection of the 'fledgling' Thai democracy. The practice of democracy is slightly too unorthodox. In voting, elections and parliament, the government follows the form of democratic ideology but its practices are surprisingly 'Thai'. Thailand, therefore, concocts itself a form of 'Thai democracy', which takes in the worst of both worlds (Sulak Sivaraksa quoted in Callahan 1993: 156).

'Thai democracy' derives from two competing traditional ideas: hierarchical society and personal symbiotic relationships. Traditional Thai polity produces a hierarchical society with the ruler, the King, at the top. Each Thai has an unequal social position. The relationship between them is personal and based on symbiosis in the form of the 'patron-client' relationship. The hierarchical society is underpinned by the Thai religion, and the Thai interpretation of Buddhism and animism. Buddhism provides reasons for people's inequality and dictates one's duty in society. According to Buddhism, the ruler is expected to be a virtuous and benevolent 'patron' protecting his subjects while the subjects are supposed to behave as a loyal 'client' and should not be discontent with their lower position. They are advised to continue doing good deeds and providing service for the patron in order to aspire in the society in the future. Given such a worldview, it is difficult for Thais to suddenly conceive of a formal businesslike relationship or a society in which people remain mutually anonymous, morally autonomous and equal before the law. This concept of non-partisan relationship based solely on the person's idea and merit is essential for the democratic process. Nonetheless, it is challenging to figure out how the idea can fit with the Thai traditional view of the world. The new concept contradicts the very foundation of Thai ideas emerging around hierarchical society.

The remnants of traditional worldviews undermine democratic ideas. The traditional political culture gives prospects for manipulation. The 'patron and client' relationship is a concept that gravely undermines democracy. The Thai electorate is in favour of candidates who project themselves as benevolent patrons either by giving aid or money to them because it fits with their view of a 'good ruler'. The patron-client relationship feeds on extensive sums of money. Thus, it is a reason for money-oriented elections. Such political conditions attract hopeful candidates who are

usually capitalists with shady businesses. These financially powerful people see political position as a means to protect their business benefits and as an opportunity to earn more. They are willing and able to splash out money to secure their seat in parliament, being aware that the national resources which will be in their control can generate manyfold benefit for their 'investment'. The commercialised patron-client relationship materialises in the form of vote-buying: the symbiosis characterised by the exchange of vote with straight cash. This practice is especially pervasive in rural areas. The money-intensive elections in provincial areas are likely to produce MPs with corruption in mind. The idea is to reap benefit from national resources and distribute part of it to one's constituency in the form of community projects with the goal of securing one's seat in the next election. Thus, for the electorate, their concern for their locality is more prominent than for the nation in general. MPs' performance in national administration is not the main interest of the public. The ignorance of civic rights and duties reduce the Thai electorate to 'masses' whose mandate can be easily manipulated. For the candidate, the goal is to win the election, as this gain access to resources; it is not to be part of a successful administration. On both side, public awareness is nowhere to be found.

Vote buying, corruption and bribery generate negative effects on Thai political practices. They prescribe MPs who are professional electioneers rather than public oriented parliamentarians. All these create regular causes for no-confidence debate's motion and preconditions for no-confidence debate discourse. With electioneering in mind, it does not come as a surprise that the no-confidence debate is but another platform where politicians can enhance their own popularity and denigrate other MPs. It is not an occasion for the government and the opposition to cooperate in conducting rational debate to improve government administration. The debate motion simply provides an opportune moment for the opposition to destabilise the coalition and create for themselves a chance to have their share of resources as part of the government. For that reason, administrative issues are made rather irrelevant because they are neither the main concerns of the MPs nor the public. Since MPs are elected because of their personal image, presumably as a 'virtuous and benevolent patron', the way to put them out of office is to destroy it. Hence scandals, political or personal, can be brought up as long as they are potentially destructive to the person's image as a 'good person' or 'good ruler'. With the aim of causing maximum destruction to the political adversary, the discourse of the debate is by no means adheres to moderation, the key word for 'parliamentary' discourse. Instead, the debate's discourse is emotionally potent, sometimes featuring oversimplifications. This kind of discourse is believed to have most effect on the electorate at large (Reinhold Niebuhr, quoted in Chomsky 1993: 17).

Chapter 5 Context and General Characteristics of Text

5.0 Introduction

Chapter four problematises the context of no-confidence debates. It laid out the background and the features of Thai political practices which lead to its particular discourse type. This chapter presents the second stage of CDA analysis. It looks at the three competing conjunctures of the debate, how these are the product of relevant practices and how they affect the macro structure and general features of the debate's text. By conjunctures I am referring primarily to the specific configuration of all the context categories in a particular practice, in our case the no-confidence debate practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 61). This chapter attempts to investigate all elements in the context, at both the levels of sociocultural practice and discourse practice, that may form the conjunctures of the debate's text. Conjunctures are presented as a bridge, linking macro categories of context (relevant social practices) with the micro categories (discourse practice).

This chapter is divided into three main sections according to CDA's three elements of a communicative event. It starts with the conjunctures in the sociocultural practice of no-confidence debates. Then it explores the discourse practice of the debates. This section mainly discusses the Code of Behaviour of the debate (setting) and the speeches of the debate (local action). Finally, it looks at the schemata of the text and its general features.

5.1 Sociocultural Practice of No-Confidence Debates

5.1.1 The Rationale of No-Confidence Debates

In Thai politics, the no-confidence debate is one mechanism for checking a government's power. The opposition is given this channel to debate with the government concerning issues they believe the government has administered inappropriately. It is also an opportunity to reveal a government's wrong-doings, such as corruption, to the public. The mechanism of checks and balances has the purpose of preventing the well-being of the majority from falling into the potentially corrupt hands of an unrepresentative elite.

Nonetheless, this idealistic purpose has been somewhat distorted. The rationality behind the debate has been overlooked and a Thai no-confidence debate is generally nothing more than a weapon with which the opposition can wound and ideally bring down the government. The purpose of the attack is predominantly for the opposition parties to create for themselves a chance to become part

of the government or to usurp the government. The 'benefit of the majority' is used simply as a rhetorical basis for this pragmatic end.

'Benefit for themselves, their clique and their party' is a more precise definition of the ultimate goal of the opposing side. To be part of the government means being in control of public resources and the party responsible for a given ministry can reap benefits from those resources. The chance to be part of a government can result from one of the three following options:

- a. A cabinet reshuffle
- b. A reshuffle of the coalition parties
- c. The dissolution of parliament

Since maximising benefits is a priority, opposition parties prefer the option that guarantees the fastest and greatest benefits. The first option is generally considered most preferable because the gaining of position is instantaneous: the opposition party simply replaces the retiring coalition party, and typically takes over the ministries for which that former coalition party was responsible. For the latter two options, politicians have to go through the money-intensive electioneering processes (Surin and McCargo 1997: 137) while having to run the risk of eventually losing their seats or not joining the coalition if elected. However, the last option, the dissolution of parliament, is preferable in certain circumstances: firstly, if a government has only a short time left until the end of their four-year term; secondly, if the coalition party they are about to replace is responsible for a low-profile ministry that yields less benefit, such as the Ministry of Labour and Public Welfare, without having control over any sought-after ministry, such as that of the Interior.

Even though the rationale behind a no-confidence debate is predominantly to get the opposition their share of economic benefits- which lie in the control of state resources- some researchers argue that there is more logic behind the debates. Paul Handley optimistically saw these debates as a very important check on the abuse of power underpinned by a free press (Handley 1996). Handley argued that it was this mechanism of scrutiny that the notoriously corrupt police and justice system could no longer handle. He considered no-confidence debates to be an attempt to apply the rule of law to the rulers. In a country such as Thailand, where many officials are prone to trade justice for money, it is not surprising that rulers or anybody with money or power can be above the law.

5.1.2 The Debate's Multiple Audiences

A no-confidence debate is the only type of parliamentary discourse that is broadcast in its entirety. It has emerged as a form of parliamentary debate that enjoys overwhelming media and public attention in Thailand. The first debate was broadcast in 1989 during the government led by Major General Chatichai Chunchawan. Chatichai was the first elected Prime Minister of Thailand followed the short-lived governments of M.R. Kukrit and M.R. Seni Pramoj (Weatherbee 1990: 337). The broadcasting of the debate can be optimistically seen as an attempt to 'open up and democratise the political process under an elected government' (Weatherbee 1990: 343). Since then it has been a tradition that the debate, which later became a twice yearly event, was broadcast.

The 1989 broadcast was the first time that the public gained access to actual parliamentary discourse. The debate has thus become a public space where people can see their MPs at work in parliament. Public involvement has had a major impact on the discourse. Broadcast debate has brought in the public as a third party into the formerly two-sided parliamentary discourse. Before this point, there were only MPs and a handful of media people witnessing the process. The discourse was then mainly designed for the audience of politicians in parliament. However, as soon as the debate was made public, S¹ had to take into account the audience *outside* parliament.

Since the debate is broadcast nationwide, the audience includes various groups of people with different background knowledge. It is important for S to attend to the interests and preferences of the widest possible audience because the audience also holds the mandate. In a representative democracy where every vote counts, MPs need all the public support they can get. Moreover, the no-confidence debates are one of the few occasions where people manage to see their MP's performance. They then need to make the most of this opportunity in showing that they are capable of performing their parliamentary duties. On top of that, the media debate provides an opportunity to electioneer should the Prime Minister choose to dissolve parliament after the debate. Since the run up to the election period can be relatively short in Thailand, the earlier the campaign starts the better. The no-confidence debate is likely to be the only chance for MPs to give televised speeches without having to pay for airtime. Therefore, they have to make the most of this chance by designing their speech to serve these purposes as well as the 'official' intention of the debate.

To cater for such a wide audience and for these various goals, S must first endeavor to maintain the attention of his/her audience throughout his/her speech. This is because, no matter how good

¹ S refers to the message sender, in this case, the speaker.

his/her argument is, if the audience does not listen, the speech will not produce any substantial impact. Since the audience is not made up of professional politicians, they may not know about or be interested in many of the technical details about administration. The debate therefore should be delivered in an entertaining and interesting manner to maintain public attention. Generally speaking, what the audience expects to see most from a no-confidence debate are some witty arguments, verbal performances and verbal confrontations. The substance of an allegation can be of secondary interest compared to the way allegations are put forward. The audience expects to see some witty exchanges displayed in the verbal battle.

Not only does the public become another party in the debate, it is potentially the most influential one involved. As discussed in conjuncture one, it is unlikely that the coalition will collapse due to the passing of a no-confidence vote. Since the coalition holds the majority of seats in the parliament, the odds are that the vote will not be passed. Being aware that the opposition is the minority and is normally bound to lose the vote, the opposition parties feel the need to conduct the most effective and convincing debate that they can, not so much for the purpose of passing the vote but because the debate is their only chance to attack the government. The debate therefore more or less takes the form of a ‘character assassination’. The opposition tries to argue that the coalition is either corrupt, inept or inefficient while they themselves are more fit to be in office. By doing so, the public is being put in the position of a jury judging who is more suitable to be their representative. Given this mechanism, public opinion can be the only real weapon the opposition has to pressure the government.

5.2 Discourse Practice of No-Confidence Debates

5.2.1 No-Confidence Debate’s Procedures

The no-confidence debate is one mechanism for checking a government’s power by the opposition parties. Generally there is an official leader of the opposition, who has an office in the parliament. His duty is to be the leader scrutinising the government’s administration. Unlike other countries, Thailand does not have ‘shadow cabinet’ system. However, a government’s administration are scrutinised by parliamentary committees. These committees can be categorised into two groups: one is the House standing committees and another is the special committees. The duty of following and monitoring the administration falls mainly on the House standing committees (Thongthong 1995). Since there are 31 committees and only 14 ministries, the relationship between committees and ministries is not necessarily one to one, for example, the economic development committee

and the treasury, banking and financial institutions committee both oversee the Ministry of Finance.

The committees can be chaired by both members of the government and members of the opposition. Committees are likely to be chaired by members of the coalition or parties with more seats in the House. Generally speaking, the quota of each party in acquiring the chairmanships of committees varies in accordance with the party's seats in parliament (Thongthong 1995), for example, if party A has 50% of the seats in the House, it will have a quota to chair 50% of the 31 committees. That means the party can chair approximately 16 committees. Since the core party of the coalition has most seats in the House, it automatically chairs more committees. Moreover, the party with the majority in the House, hence the majority in the committees' chairmanships, will have the right to choose the committees they would like to chair first.² As a result, the party with more seats in the House is likely to take control of more committees, especially the important ones. This means that the direction of the committees are likely to be in line with the government because they are controlled by the same group of people.

When parliamentary debates, including no-confidence debates, are set in motion, the House standing committees are responsible for searching for information to be presented in the House. However, during the no-confidence debate, it is not necessarily the chairman of a committee who gives a speech on the issue for which the committee is responsible for. The criteria in selecting the speaker is to choose the person who has expertise in the policy issue or corruption under investigation within that particular ministry. The only direct duty of the committee and its chairman is to monitor the ministry's administration and to provide the information needed for the debate.³

Once the no-confidence debate is set in motion, both the government and the opposition have to prepare the information and speakers for the debate. First, each party will have a meeting and send one member as its representative to join a group of 'whips' or the co-ordinating committee for the debate. There will be two whips, one from the government and another from the opposition. Both will collaborate in producing the tentative schedule for the debate. If the collaboration between them is strong, the debate will proceed according to schedule. Members under both whips are divided into teams, for example, an economic team or an agricultural team according to their expertise. Together, the team will prepare the script for the debate and gather all the information

² Interview with Naruemon Thabchumphon, lecturer at the Department of Government, Chulalongkorn University, 26 June 2001.

³ Interview with Chamni Sakdiset, deputy leader of the Democrat party, 24 January 2001.

and evidence for or against the allegations. Moreover, the government whips and opposition whips have a duty to make a prior agreement about their resolution for the debate. The agreement of each side can be achieved by gathering the decision of each party within the side. When the agreement is made, members of every party in the side have to vote accordingly. The vote of members of each party will be controlled yet again by party whips. Therefore, whips not only arrange the schedule of the debate but also a pre vote for that particular debate. If the whips are strong, they will be able to control both the schedule and ensure that the vote goes according to plan.

After preparing the information, the team of the opposition whip will nominate one member of parliament to be the speaker on the issue. The team of the government whips is there to prepare information for the minister who has to be the one who speaks.⁴ The arrangement of speakers depends on who the speaker is and the topic on which he/she is going to speak. Speakers are skilled in presenting the issue and those who are to speak about an issue that people are interested in will be selected to speak during prime time, that is after the news at eight p.m. This is the time when the debate will reach the largest audience. Speakers on less interesting issues and less able speakers are assigned slots to speak during the daytime.

During the debate, if a given ministry faces criticism, its minister is entitled to stand up and clear the allegation by himself. No one else can speak on his behalf except his deputies. However, it is possible to have someone to play supporting roles even during the debate, for example, to remind him/her of the topics that should be raised.

5.2.2 Code of Behaviour: Parliamentary Debates Regulations

Thai parliamentary debate discourse is controlled by a Code of Behaviour published in two sources: the Constitution BE 2534 (1991) and the House of Representatives rules of procedure (1991). The Constitution provides the major rules of the National Assembly which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The regulations are stated in the Constitution under the chapter 'National Assembly'. These regulations form the pattern of what is considered 'parliamentary' discourse in Thailand.

5.2.2.1 Ordinary House of Representatives Proceeding: The Rules of Procedure

An ordinary session of the National assembly lasts one hundred and twenty days, although the Assembly may propose that the session be prolonged prior to the end of that period (Constitution

⁴ Interview with Sanchai Sinthuwong, parliament's solicitor, 13 December 2000.

1991 Article 160, 161). The Constitution states that the president⁵ of the House of Representatives, who is automatically the president of the National Assembly (Constitution 1991 Article. 91), has powers and duties to conduct the proceeding in accordance with the rules of procedure (Constitution 1991 Article 153). The president shall have two vice-presidents who shall have these powers and duties as entrusted by the president when the president is not available or unable to perform these duties (Constitution 1991 Article 153). The sitting of the House of Representatives requires no less than one-half of the total number of existing members (Constitution 1991 Article 155) and the resolution of any issue shall be made by a majority vote (Constitution 1991 Article 156).

In expressing opinions or facts in the House, members have to address the House president in a respectful manner. During the sitting, members of the House have absolute privileges to express words or to give statements of fact or opinions or to cast their votes. No charge or action in any manner shall be brought against such a member (Constitution 1991 Article 157). This privilege extends to the publishers of the minutes of sittings in accordance with the rules of procedure (Constitution 1991 Article 158). However, this parliamentary privilege does not extend to words expressed at a sitting which are broadcast through radio or television and such words constitute a criminal offence or wrongful act against any other person who is not a Minister or a member of the House (Constitution 1991 Article 157). In other words, members of parliament can enjoy their parliamentary privilege of not being legally liable for any act so long as the session is private which means not being broadcast through radio or television. Since the no-confidence debates are broadcast, they do not enjoy parliamentary immunity.

In accordance with parliamentary privilege, no member of the House shall be arrested, detained or summoned by a warrant for inquiry as suspect in a criminal case during a session without the permission of the House (Constitution 1991 Article 165). Also the court shall not try a case during a session without the House's permission unless it is the case against organic law on the election of members of the House (Constitution 1991 Article 166). As a result, unless violating organic law, members of the parliament will not have to undergo any legal procedure throughout the parliamentary session.

⁵ In the thesis, I will call the person who presides over the proceedings 'House Speaker' instead of 'House President' as stated in the Constitution in order to avoid any confusion that the word president may cause. The word 'president' will be used only when I refer to the exact article in the Constitution.

5.2.2.2 No-Confidence Debate Proceedings: The Rules of Procedure

A no-confidence debate has to be conducted in accordance with the rules of the ordinary proceedings. However, there are certain rules especially for such debates laid down in the Constitution. Some of the rules for the no-confidence debate are stated in the House of Representative's rules of procedure.

According to the Constitution BE 2534 (1991) Part 5, Article 185, Members of the House of Representatives of not less than two-fifths of the total number of existing members have the right to submit a motion for a general debate for the purpose of passing a vote of no-confidence in the Prime Minister and not less than one-fifth of the total number of members in case of submitting a motion for general debate for passing a vote of no-confidence in an individual Minister (Article 186).⁶ The rules of procedure additionally state that members who wish to submit the motion according to the Constitution shall present a written proposal for a general debate for the purpose of a vote of no-confidence to the House President. The proposal shall state the Prime Minister or Minister in whom a vote of no-confidence will be passed. It also has to state the topic with which the debate will be concerned. The proposal will be passed on to the Prime Minister and will be considered urgently (House of Representatives rules of procedure No.129).

The debate has to conform to the topic proposed. It must avoid verbal extravagance, repetition or overlapping with the speech of other members. The unnecessary exposition or reading of any material is prohibited. Any evidence to be shown in the House has to be approved by the House President. Verbal and non-verbal action to accuse or sardonically abuse others is also prohibited. It is strictly prohibited to mention the monarchy or other people unnecessarily (House of Representatives rules of procedure No. 56). In order to make a speech, a member of the House has to raise his/her hand above his/her head to call the president's attention. Once the President's permission has been granted, that member shall stand up and begin his/her speech. The House President has the power to tell members to stop speaking should he/she consider that the members have spoken enough (House of Representatives rules of procedure No. 57). Each time the president stands up or knocks his hammer, the member who is speaking has to stop speaking and sit down immediately. If the speech of any member has a foreseeable direct or indirect negative impact on other people, the president has the power to warn, ask for a retraction, prohibit the topic under

⁶ According to the new Constitution that came into effect early in the year 2000, any such motion must nominate a suitable person to be the next Prime Minister. Moreover, once the motion has been submitted, the dissolution of the House of Representatives shall not be permitted, except that the motion is withdrawn or the resolution is passed without being supported by the vote (Article 185).

discussion, ask for an apology or expel the member speaking from the premise for a limited or unlimited amount of time within the day of that debate (House of Representatives rules of procedure No.134). The President's power to expel members is unarguable. Other members of the House also have the right to protest⁷ should they see any violation of the regulations. They shall explain the nature of the violation to the President of the House. The ruling of the case is entirely up to the President's consideration and his ruling is considered absolute (House of Representative rules of procedure No. 58).

Only ministers have the right to answer the opposition's charges. However, if the debate concerns personal issues concerning another member who is not a Minister and if the debate affects his/her reputation, he/she has the right to protest (House of Representatives rules of procedure No. 58). The debate is concluded when either there are no further speeches, the House votes for a conclusion of the debate or the House raises other issues. The no-confidence vote shall not take place on the date of the conclusion of the debate. The vote must be passed by more than one-half of the total number of the existing members of the House of Representatives. If the vote of no-confidence is passed by not more than one-half of the total number of members, the vote will fail, and the members of the House of Representatives who submitted the motion shall not have the right to submit another no-confidence motion throughout the session (Constitution 1991 Article 185). If the vote of no-confidence is passed by one-half, the Ministers or Prime Minister will be removed from office but will stay in charge until new Ministers or a new Prime Minister is appointed.⁸

5.2.3 Code of Behaviour and the Practices of No-Confidence Debates

The Code of Behaviour is laid down for the purpose of keeping parliamentary debate as refined and formal as possible. The code helps minimise the chance of emotional confrontation between members by prohibiting potential Face Threatening Acts (henceforth FTAs) so that order can be maintained in the House.

According to the Code of Behaviour, there are many sections that help avoid provocative arguments that may occur, for example, the rule that prohibits verbal and non-verbal accusation which can be considered extreme FTAs. In order to solicit as much information as possible the

⁷ I choose to use the word 'challenge' in our thesis instead of 'protest' which is a direct translation of the word stated in the Constitution because I believe that the word challenge represents the act better.

⁸ Under the new Constitution, the name of the person nominated in the proposal will be submitted by President of the House to the King for further appointment (Constitution BE 2540 (1997) Article 185).

code gives members of the House the privilege to express words, give statements or vote freely without being charged, even though parliamentary privilege only covers those debates which are not made public by broadcasting. However the code encourages fair play by giving the member under accusation a chance to speak up for him/herself. Moreover, the Code gives the Speaker of the House the absolute power to conduct the debate according to the Code of Behaviour and they have the unarguable right to expel from the premises any member who violates the rules.

By setting up a strict Code of Behaviour and giving full power to the 'code keeper' - the Speaker of the House - theoretically the rules should be strictly adhered to. There should not be any offensive words or provocative accusations or threats expressed in the House. The debate should proceed in the most orderly and formal way possible according to the purpose of the code. However, in reality this is not always the case. In practice, words that are not only unparliamentary but also unacceptable in educated, respectable society are uttered during the debates. There is an obvious discrepancy between the actual debate discourse and the parliamentary discourse defined by the Code of Behaviour.

Despite these rules to maintain order in the House, there is one fundamental rule which goes against the rest of the rules. It is the rule about the passing of the vote: if the no-confidence vote is not passed, the members of parliament who submit the motion shall not have the right to submit another no-confidence motion during that ordinary session. The opposition members then aim to do their best in each debate to inflict maximum damage on the government. Being aware that they are the minority and are normally bound to lose the vote, the opposition parties feel the necessity to conduct the most effective and convincing debate, not so much for the purpose of passing the vote but because the debate is their only chance to attack the government and this chance only comes once a session.

The discourse of no-confidence debates has to mitigate the Code of Behaviour. It has to be practiced in the face of two conflicting forces: the need to cause the Government maximum damage and thereby satisfy the audience's thirst for confrontation and to do so within the frame of the Code of Behaviour, or to flout the rules. Therefore, the no-confidence debate discourse which may be considered most effective and most powerful here is that which, in breaching the code, causes more damage yet goes unchallenged by the Speaker of the House, the code keeper.

In looking at no-confidence debate discourse, there is evidence of breaches of the Code of Behaviour using various strategies. Some breaches go undetected, while some are interrupted by

either the president or other members of the House. The effectiveness of these breaches depends partly on the strategies employed and personal styles of speaking. The breaches and the formulae of strategies employed reflect the ability and wit of each member in getting around established regulations. These breaches regularly occur and are known as part of the 'parliamentary game' (*Arthit*, June 21-27 1996). This game can be particularly obvious during no-confidence debates when the adversarial atmosphere is intense and emotions are running high. One example of the parliamentary game is that, according to the Code of Behaviour, an MP can exonerate himself only when the speaker clearly identifies which member is being accused. As a result, in order to be able to launch an allegation unchallenged, the opposition resorts to indirect language. The opposition speaker will be careful not to mention the name of the one he has accused, but hints who it is. A talented speaker can give hints which can effectively reveal who is being referred to. Since the member's name is not explicitly pronounced, the victim does not have the cue to speak to clear his/her name. It is then the job of the coalition members to wind up the speaker and induce him to declare the name, so that the accused can stand up and vindicate him/herself. Also by stating the name, the speaker has to face the chance of being sued for libel, if that particular debate is being broadcast.⁹

The parliamentary game generally involves the manipulation of regulations which often leads to the manipulation of language. This can take place at the level of semantics. Some of the words are used in their own dictionary sense, while some of them have their meaning altered to suit the rhetoric of the speaker. The no-confidence debate is so notorious for its manipulating word-meaning that some magazines or newspapers such as *Arthit* (12-18 May 1995) publish columns before the debate featuring the vocabulary used in debates with its traditional meaning and the meaning assigned to it by politicians. Moreover, there is also a manipulation of language at the pragmatic level, such as how the speaker produces an utterance which can acquire the desired meaning and significance in context. In this case it is how the speaker formulates an utterance which by its content, is violating the Code of Behaviour, yet can go unchallenged. Language manipulation at this level is the main interest of this research.

5.3 Text

5.3.1 No-Confidence Speech Schemata

No-confidence speeches can be divided by their content into four phases:

⁹ Interview Mr. Sanchai Sinthuwong, parliament solicitor, 13 December 2000.

1. Ritual Beginning
2. Preface to the allegations
3. Allegations
4. Conclusion

The speech begins with a ritual beginning. By ritual I mean that the fixed pattern of speech organisation which generally consists of self-introduction, discourse that develops good understanding between the speaker and the audience and the discourse that legitimises his/her speech. Each ritual beginning can consist of only one or all of the three categories. However, the self-introduction is made compulsory by the Code of Behaviour. The discourse in this phase displays formal register. This is because its content is regulated strictly by the Code.

The second phase has to give the audience the background to the allegations and appeal to the audience intellectually or emotionally. Its duty is to capture the audience's attention. The speaker may choose to get the audience emotionally involved in the case. This can be done by presenting the case in such a way that provokes public antipathy towards the government's action. Alternatively, the speaker may choose to invite the audience to use their own reasoning to judge the government's action or opinion towards the case. A preface to the allegation usually presents the background evidence leading up to the allegations.

For the accusatory speeches, the speaker usually puts much effort in presenting this phase. The opposition member is usually seen as the one who always opposes the government. Being seen as a typical opposition member may reduce his/her credibility. The speaker him/herself may also lose his/her PF as an objective member of society. To prevent that, the speaker has to imply that he/she is not a typical opposition member; and that he/she is not prejudiced. To do that, they have to suggest that they agree with some of the government's actions. Some of the speeches even start with a commendation. These are attempts to make the audience see them as an unbiased member of the society with whom they can agree. The structure of the preface followed by the allegation of the no-confidence accusatory speech can be compared to that of complaint (Lockyer and Pickering, 2000) in the sense that they aim to present negative points and that the points are preceded by an initial commendation. S in both discourses does not state the point simply and straightforwardly. On the contrary, the points are circumscribed by S's positive stance towards the person/institution that is the target of the comments. This sort of statement functions as a form of immunity for S, who may otherwise be seen as an intolerant adversary. This 'preface' also presents the discourse of complaints and it functions in a similar way as to the preface of the allegations.

Lockyer and Pickering suggest that the condemnation is facilitated by this initial commendation. It sets the stage for what is to come (Lockyer and Pickering 2000).

The third phase features the allegations. These are presented in detail. They are backed up by any evidence the speaker can find to support his/her argument. Evidence of discursive strategies are mostly found at this phase. This is also the phase where the attack on the government takes place.

The concluding phase is where the points, which are considered the most serious, are revisited. The concluding part is the last chance the speaker has to destroy the government's PF and PPF. Thus, this is where the speaker makes an emotional appeal to the audience, inside and outside the House. The speaker will whip up public antipathy towards the government so that they can use the public opinion as a tool to destabilise the coalition. Members of the coalition may feel compelled to drop out in order to distance themselves from the allegedly corrupt pact, for example. By doing so, the opposition has created for itself a chance to have its share in the government either by replacing the coalition member that drops out, or by going through an election should the coalition collapse. Therefore the concluding phase should be designed in a way that can secure public opinion on the opposition's side.

5.3.2 Nature of No- Confidence Debate Discourse

No-confidence debates have been designed to serve the goal of bringing down the government. They aim to hammer a wedge into the coalition, causing a fracture within the government. This instability will lead to a coalition reshuffle where some coalition party withdraws or drops out. After that, one or more of the opposition parties may have a chance to be invited to join the government. In 1990, after a no-confidence debate, the Democrat Party decided to withdraw from the coalition government led by Chart Thai Party leader, Prime Minister Chatichai Chunchawan. His coalition was later joined by the invited Solidarity Party (SP) (Tan Lian Choo, 1991: 284). In a case like this where a coalition reshuffle is a feasible option, the behaviour of the opposition parties in the debate can take two forms: one conducts an active debate and another is virtually muted. These different behaviours signal different aims for the immediate future. Generally, those opposition parties that are hoping to join the government will be muted in their criticisms or become particularly economical with words, while others are trying to bring down the government.

In some cases, a coalition reshuffle might not be a feasible solution: the only solution is the dissolution of parliament. When the opposition succeeds in cornering the government and the government becomes aware of this dead end, the debate offers a platform for everybody to speak

ill of others and put themselves in a more favourable position. In other words, the debate is transformed into a pre-election campaign, with the main goal of injuring political rivals in every possible way.

One of the most popular ways of injuring political rivals is what is called 'political retaliation'. In this process, each party brings the wrongdoings of others to public attention, regardless of their status. Virtually every party, government or opposition alike, has the possibility of being accused. The strategy can easily cause confusion, unrest and even despair among the general public. This is because, ultimately, people see that politicians appear to be corrupt or deficient in one way or another.

5.3.3 Structural Analysis of the No-Confidence Debates

The structural analysis of no-confidence debates see the debates in the politics *domain* (or *field* or *order of discourse*). I categorised the debates as political discourse for three reasons. First, it takes place in the parliament which is a political institution. Second, it is produced by politicians who are political actors. More importantly, the debate's functions are to do politics; the opposition aims to attack the government while the government tries to defend themselves. Despite its political domain, the debate does not conform to a parliamentary genre which essentially entails a formal institutionalised register. The alternate presentation of 'popular' informal/casual genre can be seen throughout the speech, except in the ritual beginning where a formal institutionalised genre is made obligatory by the Code of Behaviour as part of the debate's *schemata* (van Dijk 1988). Together with the alternate informal genre, the MP does not solely represent the voice of the 'ruler' or 'politician', but also the voice of 'one of us' (ordinary people). The 'one of us' voice is an effective way to strengthen the interpersonal relationship between S and H. This can prove to be useful in persuasion and negotiation which are the major roles of the debate. It can be summarised as the tactical discursive moves found in structural analysis are the alternative use of the strategic informal genre of the 'one of us' voice and the formal genre of the politician's voice assigned by the domain and the setting of the discourse. While the formal voice of the politician puts S in a position which is high and authorised enough to impose power on others, it also distances S from H (interpersonal construction). The informal genre can help to maintain an apparent closeness between S and H.

5.3.4 Strategies of No-Confidence Debates: The Case of Chuan Leekpai

The Thai no-confidence debates are essentially wars of words, and in these battles, there is no mercy. To win them, exceptional skill in manipulating language is a significant requirement. Chuan Leekpai is well suited to the task. Branded the ‘honey-coated razor’,¹⁰ Chuan is one of the best speakers in parliament. His ability helped him when he was the leader of the opposition party proposing no-confidence motions. From the debate in September 1996 when Chuan attacked the government led by Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa and finally succeeded in forcing Banharn to resign, two strategies are apparent:

- a. His rhetoric in apportioning blame, and his ability to employ sarcasm and irony to make his rivals feel ashamed and sometimes guilty. He can also skilfully provoke his victim to lose his/her temper. This compromises the victim’s ability to respond calmly and rationally.
- b. His experience and expertise in law, enhanced by his ability in exploiting every possible legal and political weak point for his own benefit and his keen mastery of parliamentary regulations are astutely used to attack others.

In this sense, a no-confidence debate is like a game where right and wrong or rationality are not as essential as the participants’ ability to be patient and calm in tense situations. The name of the game is that the one who loses his/her temper first, loses his/her face.

Even though these strategies do not appear to make much sense, on closer scrutiny, they are very logical in the Thai context, a context where the opposition is usually bound to lose the actual vote and where a government is very unlikely to be brought down. Moreover, this strategy works in attacking ‘image’, which is the most important thing in Thai politics. In Thailand, poor ‘image’ provides an excuse and condition for political change.

In sum, no-confidence debate discourse in Thailand in general bears these characteristics:

- a. Significant use of personal issues

The ultimate goal of a no-confidence debate is to bring down the government. Therefore, virtually any strategy that can achieve this goal is acceptable. As discussed earlier, Thai politics places more emphasis on image and reputation than on administration and policy. So, any allegation that

¹⁰ Chuan has been described as a ‘honey coated razor’. This metaphor which has become synonymous with his name is known and used not only domestically but internationally. However, there is no record of who invented this identity and when it was invented (Roengsak (1998) quoted in Phisit 2000: 46).

guarantees the maximum destruction of a politician's or government's reputation can be employed. This means that allegations concerning personal issues are also permitted. Although personal issues are seen as irrelevant in many countries' politics, they are highly relevant in Thailand.

In a country where the borderline between personal and business life is astoundingly blurred, it is not surprising that people easily confuse the two, since Thai politics is based primarily on the 'person' more than the 'policy' and its political campaigns involve selling and promoting politicians' image. Therefore when it comes to no-confidence debates, any issue concerning the victim can become the point of attack, if it has potential to jeopardise the target's political career or to bring down the government. This naturally includes personal issues, which often prove a more effective strategic weapon than policy issues. The effectiveness of personal issues is due to the fact that they attract more public attention. Moreover, they are less complicated than policy issues, which means that people find them more understandable. Since they can reach the general public, more people become convinced about the politicians' lack of fitness even though the issue is by no means relevant to the person's job as part of the government. During the no-confidence debate in 1995, for example, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai was challenged to show his marriage certificate to parliament because the opposition 'doubted' his real marital status.

Moreover, personal issues can imply how 'bad' a person is. In the Thai bi-polar universe of good and bad, to be branded a 'bad person' is a very negative experience and almost irredeemable for Thai people (Mulder 1996: 153). Take for example, the no-confidence debates during the Banharn administration. Banharn faced two no-confidence debates, one targeted at the ineffective administration of his cabinet and another at his position as Prime Minister. Despite a ferocious debate, Banharn survived the first no-confidence debate by reshuffling his cabinet. He, however, could not survive the second no-confidence debate that attacked him on personal issues because, firstly, it directly censured the Prime Minister so he could not resort to a cabinet reshuffle, and secondly by using personal issues, the debate severely damaged his reputation. A number of allegations concerning him implied that Banharn was innately bad and lacked integrity. He did not have the potential to be a good person, let alone to be Prime Minister. Being good is an indispensable quality of a Thai ruler, more necessary than being competent (see 4.3.4.1). To be 'bad' in the Thai context, on the other hand, is far worse than being inept, because being bad is an intrinsic quality, and therefore a bad person is deemed unable to improve.

There is a tendency in Thai discourse to generalise about a politician's bad deeds and label him/her as 'bad person'. The notions of 'good person' and 'bad person' in the Thai context are rather obscure and have no defined boundaries. If a person is labelled 'bad', it basically means that he/she is bad regardless of what situation he/she is in because it is an intrinsic trait. Raising personal allegations is a useful way to attack a politician's reputation and have him/her labelled 'bad' by the public. This is enough to undermine the very essence of a Thai politician: his image.

b. Style of language: informal–offensive is acceptable

During no-confidence debates, almost any style of language can be employed as long as it helps convey the essential message from the opposition to the government: 'You are not fit to be in office'. The tone of discourse ranges from the merely unfriendly to showing pure hatred and even disgust. The degree of aggressiveness varies from one person to another. Some politicians choose offensive words or colloquialisms to help them convey the message more clearly. Therefore the formality of parliamentary discourse can be compromised.

c. War of words

No-confidence debates can be seen as a war of words. Even though documents or other hard evidence are an essential element in convincing fellow politicians and the people, the most important weapon is an outstanding ability to be eloquent, the ability to persuade people to agree with one's arguments.

To be successful in a no-confidence debate, one needs to be in control of one's temper so that one can deliver the message calmly and confidently. One should also be eloquent even when under pressure. Based on the September 1996 no-confidence debate, Prime Minister Banharn's moderate skill in speaking coupled with fourteen months of public unease about this 'uncouth' Prime Minister culminated in his being forced out of office. During the no-confidence debate, although he could provide the documents needed in order to clear himself from the allegations, he could not survive the debate. Being discredited by the public, the situation was worsened by his stuttering speech. His real documents and valid explanations turned out to be nothing more than lame excuses in the eyes of the Thai majority, in comparison with 'questionable' documents accompanied by the skilfully crafted speeches of the DP's MPs, who were then on the opposition benches. This incident proved how powerful image and words can be in Thai politics and how high the cost may be of failing to use them masterfully.

5.4 Conclusion

The discourse of no-confidence debates is the product of the Thai political system. In this chapter, I used the CDA framework of a communicative event (Fairclough 1995a: 59), that divides communicative event into three levels, to explain the dialectic relationship between the discourse and the context of Thai politics. In the previous chapter I discussed Thai politics and society. The focus of this chapter is narrowed down to one political communicative event, the no-confidence debate. It argues that the debate's discourse has its own rationale and function. It is designed to suit the rationale posed by the overall configuration of its context. From the analysis at the level of sociocultural practice and discourse practice, three major *conjunctures* of the debate emerge: the rationale for the debate, the debate's audiences and the Code of Behaviour. The three *conjunctures* greatly influence the debate's text. It assigns the debate's structure, for example, the ritual beginning is assigned by the Code of Behaviour, the preface to the allegation that is made compulsory by the presence of multiple audiences.

The style of the debate is also a direct product of the three competing *conjunctures*. While formal parliamentary discourse is theoretically a compulsory style of the debate, the departure from such formality is pragmatically an obligation. Being aware that there is a difference between the style of debate expected by its audience and the one regulated by the Code of Behaviour, S has to produce a discourse which is a compromise between two entirely different expectations. It was discussed earlier that the no-confidence debate cannot directly cause the collapse of the government because the opposition's voices are in the minority. The opposition has to indirectly destabilise the coalition by getting public opinion on their side. The general tone will in turn pressure the coalition members to decide whether to stay in the coalition or distance themselves from the coalition. Since the mandate is in the hands of the public in a democratic system, it is likely that the political parties will go along with the general tone to win public support. Therefore, once the core party of the coalition shows a sign that it is losing its grasp, the other coalition parties are almost always prepared to leave it. So it can be said that the public is the most important weapon the opposition has to destroy the coalition. Any strategies appearing in the debate are there to enable S to attack the government and maximise his/her chance to bring down the government and promote his/her PPF and PF generally by way of winning public support. The discursive strategies in the debate are used to serve these social and political purposes of the debate. In the next two chapters, five accusatory speeches will be analysed in an attempt to find strategies that serve these tasks.

Chapter 6 An Analysis of the 1995 Accusatory Speeches

6.0 Introduction

Chapter 6 and the following two chapters are the analysis of the no-confidence speeches. This chapter analyses two accusatory speeches from the 1995 debate. The purpose of this chapter is to seek traces of sociocultural practices and discourse practices in the text that have been discussed in chapter 5. These traces are found in the form of discursive strategies. The aim here is to explore the dialectic relationship between context and discourse shown through the use of discursive strategies. It is an attempt to study how context and the conjunctures - which I define as the specific conditions posed by the configuration of context categories - determine choices of discursive strategies and how discursive strategies render more effectiveness to the discourse in the given context and conjunctures.

This chapter begins with the political situation at the time of the debate. The first section describes the specific political practices relevant to the debate. The second section is the analysis of discourse. This first section consists of two analyses: an analysis of Chalerm Yubumrung's speech and an analysis of Samak Sundaravej's. Each analysis begins with the political profile of the speaker. The profile enables us to understand the context categories of each speaker better, especially his cognition. Then the analysis looks at the debate's content - what are the macropropositions of the speakers? After that the strategies used in the debate will be looked at. The focus is on how these strategies help the speaker in delivering the potentially confrontational content more effectively.

The speeches selected for analysis are those of the secretary general of the Kitsangkhom Party (KP), Chalerm Yubumrung¹ and the Prachakornthai Party (PTP) leader, Samak Sundaravej. These two were the 'lethal weapons' of the opposition in this debate. The two politicians have their own distinctive speaking styles. Chalerm and Samak were said to be the '*rak kap yom*'² of the parliament; any proceedings in which these two speak are never boring (Sathit 1996: 233). The speeches of Chalerm and Samak have been taken as the corpus for this analysis because they showed the speakers' use of various discursive strategies. They both were effective no-confidence speeches because they managed to maintain people's attention whilst also being able to destroy the

¹ Chalerm had been the leader of Muanchon Party (MP) since the establishment of the party in 1985. When MP merged with the KP in 1995, Chalerm became its secretary (Sathit 1996: 237).

² *Rak yom* is one of Thai sacred, *saksit* objects. It consists of two tiny dolls of a boy carved out of *rak* and *yom* wood soaked in oil. The Chalerm-Samak duo is metaphorically referred to as *rak yom* because both are believed to be at its owner's disposal, should that person treat them in the right way.

coalition's credibility. They are good examples of how politicians discursive strategies to create the most effective no-confidence debate speech within the context and in the face of the conflicting conjunctures.

6.1 Background

In May 1995, the ruling Democrat Party was under public scrutiny concerning an alleged abuse of power. The Democrat-run Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives was accused of conspiring in corruption and wrong-doings over a land reform project. The project is known as *so po ko 4-01*.³ The purpose of this project was to distribute land which was categorised as 'degraded forest' to 'poor and needy' agriculturists. In addition, the government also increased the rights associated with *so po ko* title deeds to make them almost equal to the *no so 3*.⁴ Irregularities occurred in the *so po ko 4-01* project in many provinces, but especially in Phuket.

The scandal first emerged in November 1994 when *Matichon*, one of Thailand's leading newspapers, raised the alarm when more than ten of the beneficiaries designated to obtain the *so po ko* title deeds in Phuket belonged to wealthy business-based families. With *so po ko* title deeds, these people were entitled to a huge piece of land in Phuket, a popular tourist city in the South of Thailand. This went directly against the principle of the project which was to help the poor. To add insult to injury, some of these people had close ties with leading Democrat MPs. For example, one of them was the brother of Suthep Thuaksuban, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives and another was the husband of Phuket MP and the Minister's secretary, Anchali Vanich Thepabutr.

When the issue was made public in 1994, some months before this no-confidence debate took place,⁵ the Democrat Party tried to appease the public outcry and restore the 'honest' image of the party. The deputy Minister, Suthep Thuaksuban was the first to resign, saying that he did so because he understood that the public was confused and 'did not know the truth'. He did not admit that he was guilty, only said that whatever he did was within the law (Sathit 1996: 132). Two days

³ *So po ko* was the abbreviation of The Office of Land Reform for Agricultural Purposes. *So po ko 4-01* was the land reform project.

⁴ *No so 3* or *nang su raprong kan tham prayot* is a kind of title deed. The deed allows its holder to use this piece of land as an asset for bank mortgage, for example (www.dol.go.th). Before the amendments, the *so po ko* holders were not entitled to this right.

⁵ There had been a movement for a no-confidence debate in 1994 concerning this issue but the debate did not take place. It only resulted in the realignment of the coalition. At that time, the targets of the debate were to be the Minister and Deputy Minister of Agriculture. However, immediately before the debate took place, both the Minister and Deputy Minister resigned. Moreover, the New Aspiration Party (NAP) withdrew from the coalition after voting in favour of the opposition concerning constitutional amendments forcing the coalition to look for a new alliance. The coalition then took in the Chart Pattana Party (CPP). In general, despite the resignations and withdrawal, the coalition was still reasonably strong.

before the no-confidence debate took place in 1994, Niphon Phromphan, the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, resigned, causing the debate to be cancelled (Sathit 1996: 133). The resignations were supposed to project the image of Democrat members as 'honourable and responsible' for resigning about a scandal in which they were not involved. Unfortunately, the resignation proved not only fruitless but was also interpreted as the act of a coward who did not dare to face public investigation.

However, it was the rhetoric of the Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democrat party that was considered to be the last straw for the opposition and the public. Prime Minister Chuan compared the beneficiaries of *so po ko* title deeds with students who obtain government scholarships. By comparing the poverty-based qualification of *so po ko* beneficiaries with the academic performance-based qualification of government scholars, the Prime Minister had made a catastrophic error of judgement (Udomsak 1996: 103). His speech revealed his blind support for his fellow party members and that he was trying to find an excuse to cover up the alleged corruption. He was considered biased; he cared about the benefit to his party enough to compromise his moral sense. The statement tarnished his reputation for integrity.

When this no-confidence debate took place months later after the scandal broke out, the target of the debate was not only those MPs who were related to the *so po ko* beneficiaries but also the Prime Minister and the entire cabinet for a conspiracy of silence. The coalition at the time of the debate consisted of four parties: the Democrats (DP), Chart Pattana (CPP), Palang Dharma (PDP) and Seritham (SRP). The aim of the debate, apart from launching allegations against the Democrat Party, was to pressure the CPP and PDP to isolate the Democrats in the hope that the coalition would collapse. By splitting the coalition, the opposition had given themselves a chance to take their turn as a government.

It is worth noting that the DP has an image of integrity. The party's image was forged over 50 years as it is the oldest political party in Thailand. Moreover, every generation of politicians has tried to maintain the party's reputation of being professional, public-oriented and honest. This positive image was fortified during the political crisis in 1992 when the party turned its back on the authoritarian regime led by the Samakkhi Tham Party (STP), a front for the army Generals who had staged a coup a year earlier. The DP was known as one of the 'angelic' parties.⁶ During

⁶ The alignment of the 1992 government split the Thai political parties into two sides. The parties joining the coup leader General Suchinda were branded the devil parties. They are STP, CTP, SAP, PTP and RP. The NAP, DP, PDP, SP, PCP and MP who were the opposition were known as the 'angels' (Khien 1997). However, the distinction between angelic and devilish parties faded rapidly thereafter.

this no-confidence debate, the first one after the May 1992 incident, the opposition was given a challenging task to disillusion the public while maintaining their PPF and PNF.

6.2 Analysis of Discourse

This section analyses the speeches of Chalerm Yubumrung and Samak Sundaravej. The analysis begins with the personal profile of the speaker in order to understand the roles (*participant*) as well as the aim and intention (*cognition*) of that particular speaker in relation to other context categories in this communicative event. Then it looks at the organisation of its content and the discursive strategies used in the debate that facilitate the speaker in achieving his aim and intention.

6.2.1 Police Lieutenant Chalerm Yubumrung's Speech (17 May 1995)

Chalerm Yubumrung is a 'star' of the parliament. He is popular for his outspokenness and his talent in giving speeches. At the time, he was a member of the Kitsangkhom Party (KP), which was part of the opposition. His reputation in making speeches and his image as a 'tough guy' [*nak leng*]⁷ who speaks his mind made him one of the most popular (or notorious) MPs. Chalerm entered the political arena as a member of the *Young Turks* coup d'état to overthrow the government led by General Prem Tinasulanond in 1981. The coup attempt failed and Chalerm was expelled from the police corps. In 1983, Chalerm ran in a by-election under the Democrat banner and he was elected as a Bangkok MP. He was appointed as a deputy secretary to the Prime Minister responsible for political issues immediately afterwards (Sathit 1996: 223).

In 1985, Chalerm left the Democrat Party to found his own political party, Muanchon (MP). MP took part in the opposition after the election in 1986. His performance in a no-confidence debate during General Prem's administration was outstanding. His in-depth allegation was clear, supported with documentary evidence, charts and diagrams. His speech style is one of 'exposing and threatening' (Sathit 1996: 223). Chalerm's threat to expose Prem's sexual orientation prompted the eight-year Prime Minister to step down. Chalerm was then brought into the successive coalition led by Chatichai Chunchawan. Chatichai used Chalerm as a mouthpiece to voice criticism that he did not want to be associated with. Before long, Chalerm got carried away. He was in conflict with the *Thai Rath* newspaper columnists as well as the 'class five' military clique that ousted Chatichai government in a 1991 military coup and who formed the core of the

⁷ Suwanna and Nuangnoi describe *nak leng* as a person who is decisive and determined to pursue what he/she believes in. To be *nak leng* also means that the person is not afraid of confrontation and is fond of challenging tasks (Suwanna and Nuangnoi 1999: 29). According to Sombat, *nak leng* can also refer to a person who is knowledgeable or preoccupied about something (Sombat 2000: 54). The necessary qualities of *nak leng* are to possess the virtues of manliness, daring, courage and honesty. These qualities make the *nak leng* different from an ordinary 'tough guy'.

1992 government. The alignment of the 1992 coalition saw MP in the opposition. Hence it is one of the angelic parties. It was as an opposition member that Chalerm gained his popularity. Chalerm himself has been known as a daring and straightforward speaker since then.

During this 1995 no-confidence debate, Chalerm's straight-forwardness secured him a slot during prime time where the debate reaches a maximum amount of viewers. His speech lasted two hours. The transcript is 47-pages long, not including his interaction with other MPs and the House Speaker.

6.2.1.1 Organisation of Content

The main purpose of a no-confidence debate speech is to convince the audience, both inside and outside the parliament, that the government is in one way or another untrustworthy and therefore unfit to stay in office. This can be achieved by providing evidence to support the allegations and convincing people verbally of the allegations.

Chalerm's speech is characterised by tightly-knit arguments. His allegations are presented and argued one by one. The argument of each allegation begins with the core allegation followed by evidence supporting the allegation and ended by restating the allegation. This pattern of argument is apparent especially in the third part of his speech where he launches his allegations and introduces to people the 'suspicious' nature of the circumstances surrounding them.

Chalerm's evidence supports three allegations he raised:

- a. Suthep Thauksuban is a brother of one of the *so po ko 4-01* beneficiaries.
- b. Anchali Vanich Thepabutr, Democrat MP from Phuket, is married to a man who received *so po ko* title deeds.
- c. Jurin Laksanawisit lied about the *so po ko* officials.

Having established a convincing explanation for the relationship between certain beneficiaries and prominent Democrats MPs, Chalerm had yet to prove that those Democrats MPs were involved in the scam. Unfortunately his allegation that Suthep, Anchali and the Democrat Party abused their power and conspired to give out free land to their cronies was not easily proven. The nature of the allegation was more complex. Corruption at a high level of government like this hardly leaves any trace. In order for Chalerm to convince people of this allegation, he had to draw upon his rhetoric and persuasive ability to lead people to the logical conclusion that the government did abuse its power. This the point where discursive strategies can be useful.

In the fourth part of his speech which is the conclusion, Chalerm sends out messages appealing to the other two coalition parties, Chart Pattana (CPP) and Palang Dharma Party (PDP). It is an appeal on moral grounds which generally suggested that it was about time to leave the Democrats and the scandal that the party had got themselves into. He also tries to pressurise the two parties by implicitly warning them of being seen as conspirators unless they leave the Democrat coalition. Chalerm actively appeals to Major General Chamlong Srimuang, leader of PDP because he can see the likelihood of PDP abandoning Democrat coalition. PDP is a party considered to have strong moral principles. Its principle is suggested in the name of the party which means 'righteous force'. According to their principles, the party is likely to dissociate itself from the scandal. To stay in alliance with the allegedly corrupt Democrat coalition could be seen as a collapse of PDP's principles and ideology. Therefore, by appealing to the PDP, Chalerm puts pressure on the PDP and especially on its leader.

Chalerm also appeals to the CPP to pull out of the coalition. However, he uses a different type of pressure. While he pressurises the PDP on moral grounds, Chalerm pressurises the CPP by urging them to stop being two-faced and deceitful. The CPP had been member of the opposition before joining the coalition and replacing the NAP when this party left after the scandal had broken out. The relationship between the DP and the CPP was far from smooth. There was a conflict over the *so po ko* case, signaling that there was no trust between the two parties (Sathit 1996: 134). Chalerm sees this uneasy relationship, so he tries to cause damage to this fragile alliance by suggesting that the CPP joined the coalition only in pursuit of benefit. He says that at the early stage of the case when the party was in the opposition, the CPP was active in investigating the case and strongly condemned the Democrats of 'robbing the country'. Shortly before the party defected to join the coalition, and after they were part of the coalition, the CPP ignored the case. The abrupt change of behaviour of the CPP confirmed the party's bad reputation for its benefit-oriented action. The leader of the CPP, General Chatichai Chunhawan, was known as 'the eel' [*pla lai*], a metaphor which implies his slippery and shameless way of pursuing his interests, even though it meant he had to take back his words.

Chalerm's appeal to the CPP is like hammering a wedge into the fragile and rather uncomfortable relationship between the Democrats and an unreliable coalition party whose honesty and dignity had never been its strong point. Chalerm talks about the enthusiastic reaction of the CPP when they were part of the opposition and how its behaviour dramatically changed to an inert one when the party joined the coalition. The public disclosure of the ever-changing stance of the CPP destroyed the CPP's PPF and had a deleterious effect on the sceptical collaboration between the CPP and the Democrats. Not only did the disclosure confirm the Democrats' worst fear that the

CPP cannot be trusted, it also put pressure on the CPP to restore their image - possibly by dissociating itself from the coalition - and thereby leaving behind the resources which its ministry⁸ controlled.

6.2.1.2 Strategic Analysis

This section analyses the use of discursive strategies in the speech. It is divided into four sections according to the four stages of the speech's schemata

Ritual Beginning

Chalerm clearly states that he does not have any emotional involvement in the case. He specifically states that he does not have any 'vengeance, anger, grudge or any prejudice' towards the people in the south⁹ or the government. By articulating clearly the words with strong negative connotation like 'vengeance', 'anger', 'grudge' and 'prejudice', he shows his honesty in speaking his mind. By clearly making his statement, despite the negative connotation at the beginning and thereby clearing the water, he appears more trustworthy and mature. The discourse indicates a positive characteristic of the *nak leng* as being honest.

Chalerm's *nak leng* image is reflected not only in his choice of words but also in the content, though to a lesser extent. In most of his initial discourse, he rationalises his action in debating against the government. He explains that it was his duty as a member of the opposition to monitor the government's administration and protect the public interest. The logic of his beginning is that the government had failed to attend to the public interest. As an opposition member, he had to step in and put the matter right:

The government knows as much as I do. I do not know anything more than they do. (But) The opposition is a watchdog that is here to tell the truth [*sunak fao ban oao khwam jing ma bok*], Mr. Speaker, and to let the people know (what is going on). The government did answer but they did not tell the truth. They are just being evasive. [*ratthaban dai tae top tae wa top mai trong kap khwam pen jing top liang pai liang ma*] (line 52-54)

The logic behind his style and content promotes his PPF as an objective politician who is concerned for the wants and demands of his people more than the Democrats are. Here Chalerm is accusing the government of being evasive and not informing the people of what is going on. In a sense, he suggests that the government has lost touch with the public. Moreover, he also accuses

⁸ The DP gave the CPP the post of Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives after the party joined the coalition. The controversial position was taken over Prajuap Chaiyasan. Yet Chuan did not give the CPP autonomy in the Ministry. He sent his *mue khwa* or 'right hand', Jurin Laksanawisit, to monitor the administration as a Deputy Minister.

⁹ The DP has its stronghold in the South. Some see the DP as the regional party of the South (*Thai Rath*, 9 April 1995) Suthep Thuaksuban is one of the MPs most popular among these Southern voters.

the government of not being honest with the people. By saying that, 'they [the government] did not tell the truth', Chalerm implies that the government was telling a lie. Because the government has lost touch with the public and because they told a lie, Chalerm claims that it is his duty as an opposition MP to be here to inform the people of what is going on. This argument legitimises his action.

Chalerm also uses the 'straw man' technique to attack the virtuous DP (McCargo 2000: 148). Initially, he plays along with the DP's hyperbole about its public-oriented policy, its idealistic intention to liberate people from poverty and its pro-democracy stance suggested by its highly cherished image of an angelic party. After the flimsy picture of the party is built, Chalerm then presents the DP's collusive malfeasance in the *so po ko 4-01* project which underlies its superficially positive image. The idea of this technique is to build up a straw man ready to be thrown into a bonfire. It is an act of 'damning with faint praise'. The initial commendation, apart from magnifying the negative effect on the victim in the end, can help maintaining Chalerm's PPF as an objective person who sees both sides of the DP.

Apart from legitimising his action, Chalerm then has to convince the public that he is not only virtuous but is also as astute in legal and administrative matters as the Democrats. Throughout the ritual beginning and the whole speech, Chalerm tries to display his ability in interpreting legal matters by doing just that and by advertising what he is capable of, for example, 'I can analyse legal matters. I understand the law' [*phom an kotmai ru phom du kotmai pen*] (line 46-47).

Preface to the Allegations

The proclamation of his ability in law takes centre stage in this part. Here he presents an argument comparing the definition of the 'poor and needy agriculturist' used by the Democrats and the definition stated originally in the Royal Gazette to show that the party manipulated the substance of the words. He illustrates his argument by presenting the real meaning of the words in comparison with the 'manipulated' definition used by the Democrats. By referring to the official criteria in categorising 'poor and needy people', Chalerm presents himself as an authority whose words are systematically supported by a reliable source. The image not only enables him to gain more credit from the public, he can also gain an opportunity to say that the Democrats were wrong, whether or not the error was intentional.

At the same time, he tries to demolish the trustworthy image of the Democrats by suggesting that their actions in the *so po ko 4-01* case are entirely irrational. Here he is talking about how Suthep received a request from Anchali, a Phuket MP and claimed that it was the Phuket residents who

needed *so po ko 4-01*. He uses phrases which suggests ad hoc action such as ‘out of the blue’ [*yu ma wan di khun di*] and ‘jumped in and claimed’ [*thuk thak*]. The phrases have connotations that the actions were not well thought out and have not been carried out according to procedure, thereby suggesting some sort of suspicious haste.

Now, one day, out of the blue [*yu ma wan di khun di*], the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and his secretary jumped in and claimed [*thuk thak*] that they had received a request from brothers and sisters, Phuket residents that there should be a land reform project in the province. (line 61-62)

The sentence in this example can be divided into two clauses: main clause, ‘Now, one day, out of the blue [*yu ma wan di khun di*], the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and his secretary jumped in and claimed [*thuk thak*]’ and subordinate clause, ‘that they had received a request from the Phuket residents that there should be a land reform project in the province’. The phrase used in the first clause has a casual register. ‘One day, out of the blue’ or ‘*yu ma wan di khun di*’ in Thai by itself represents both levels of intertextuality. First, it is an idiom which means that this phrase has been uttered time and time before. It has acquired its meaning in the context. The meaning is not self-contained; it cannot be interpreted as its surface meaning. Even though *yu ma wan di khun di* literally means ‘until the good day good night’, its meaning is closer to the English idiom, ‘one day, out of the blue’. This phrase suggests that something suddenly occurs unexpectedly. Second, this idiom signifies casual register. By itself, it signals casual reasoning (or the lack of it) that something just happens without an apparent reason. The phrase *thuk thak* or ‘jumped in and claimed’, even though not an idiom, also belongs to the casual conversation genre. Again, it implies that someone makes a claim without any substantial grounds. Therefore it can be said that the main clause of this sentence has a casual register shown in the use of the idiom *yu ma wan di khun di* and the phrase *thuk thak*. The subordinate clause of this sentence, however, appears to be formal because the words used there are uttered in proper form or in full: request [*kham riak rong*], brothers and sisters, Phuket residents [*phi nong prachachon khon Phuket*] and the operation of land reform project [*tham kan patirup thidin*]. The words are official ones such as ‘request’ and ‘residents’ signifying that the discourse conforms to parliamentary discourse.

Chalerm also attacks the Democrats for their changed behaviour when they came in office. His criticism is presented in the form of sarcasm. It is a safe strategy because it provides a safety exit (Leech 1983: 81). Sarcasm is a practical strategy to use when making an offensive point because it allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point by him/herself by way of implicature (Leech 1983: 82). The intended meaning can be arrived at inferentially if the audience share common knowledge with the speaker and assume that Grice’s Cooperative Principle is still at work. Here,

by using sarcasm, Chalerm can avoid specifying the person under attack but for the people who followed political news and the MPs, the context clearly suggests who is identified by the sarcasm;

Mr. Speaker, that's the good part. I was in that government. I am not someone who walked out of Chatichai's government and ran him down behind his back. For whatever good things he did, he deserves praise.

[*than prathan nan pen khwam di suan khwam di phom ruam yu nai ratthaban chut nan phom mai chai phu thi doen ok jak ratthaban nayok Chatichai laeo ma da lap lang arai thi tham di tong chun chom kan*] (line 85-86)

The common knowledge here is that the 'person' in this criticism is the Democrat Party who, after leaving the CPP-led coalition, blamed the party for corruption and of being out of touch with Thailand's interests (*Arthit* 17-23 February 1995). This remark is relevant to the debate, whose target is in fact the DP. The statement further induces scepticism on both sides; it helps destabilise the already weak coalition by hammering a wedge into the wary relationship between the DP and the CPP. His biting criticism is sometimes constructed by the way he unfolds the story. He criticises the Democrats' suspicious action in the case of *so po ko* by having himself as a first person narrator and narrating the story from his own viewpoint. He starts by overstating the DP's 'praiseworthy and virtuous' policy in giving out *so po ko 4-01* land rights to poor people. Chalerm appears to go along with the DP's rhetoric here. However, as his story unfolds, a series of the DP's dubious practices in the project begin to appear. The stark difference between the overstated virtue that prompts his expectations at the beginning and the way the DP actually turned out to be suggests that the DP has let him down. The overstatement of the party leader's virtue, which will be subverted later by counter evidence, aggravates the seriousness of the party's malpractice.

I was glad that Chuan still hung on to his principles just as he did when he was just a novice politician. He sent the Deputy Minister, *khun* Suthep to supervise [the project]. Sent *khun* Niphon (Minister) to supervise [the project]. I was sitting there and smile, appreciating that the Democrats would be serious about solving people's problem. I did not have any objection. I just sat there waiting to see the outcome. (line 90-93)

By expressing this over-optimistic and rather naïve expectation using informal language (level one intertextuality) such as 'sit and smile', he projects himself as one of the people who knew nothing more than them. By being part of the public, his disappointment in the end could then be shared by them. His naïve impression functions as a sarcastic criticism that the Democrats raised false expectations. They did not live up to their principles or to people's expectations.

In the following example, Chalerm criticises the then Minister of Agriculture, Suthep Thuaksuban, Democrat MP's land reform project in Surat Thani, Suthep's own constituency. He points out that the way Suthep suddenly took away land from people to include it in the *so po ko* project is a clear act of malpractice. It is also a daring and defiant one. Instead of condemning the party directly, he

chooses an indirect way to say it. He employs level two intertextuality to figuratively describes its defiant nature using a Chinese proverb. By saying that this is how a Chinese movie ‘would’ describe the situation, not he saying it, Chalerm can distance himself from this negative comment:

I’d say it could be compared to what a character in a Chinese movie might say, describing someone as ‘wearing red shirt, having bell hanging round his neck and pick pocketing in broad day light’.

[*phom bok upama upamai yang ni nang jin khao bok wa wing rao klang wan sai sua daeng khwaen krading*] (line 102-103)

The proverb suggests the daring nature of the crime: pick-pocketing. By mentioning this proverb, Chalerm compares the similar nature of the two crimes: the pick-pocketing in the proverb and the DP’s act of taking away land from its legitimate dwellers. The similar trait here is the ridiculously obvious and daring nature of the two actions. It is explained figuratively in the proverb. The pickpocket is wearing a red shirt; the colour which normally attracts more attention than any other colour. He also has bells hanging around his neck so that when he runs not only would people see him, they would also hear the bells ringing as well. In addition to that, he commits the crime in broad daylight when there are bound to be people around and it is easier for him to be recognised. The daring and defiant nature of this pickpocket metaphorically parallels the action done by the DP, and suggests that they are of the same nature.

At the end, he reminds the government not to retaliate against his accusation by telling him off. His warning is direct, provocative and belittling and is addressed directly to the cabinet.

So I want to warn all you Ministers [*teuan ratthamontri thang lai*] that when I ask you something, give me direct answer. Don’t just insult me back. No, it does not work that way. Whatever they question us about, we respond so people can come to their own conclusions. The opposition say this, the coalition say that. The outcome is that if the opposition’s information is proved to be just crap (*chai mai dai heng suai*), people won’t vote for them again (line 108-111).

Here his remark, again, presupposes that ministers are typically evasive. Therefore he warns them more forthcoming. In fact, such a direct address to other MPs as in ‘I want to warn all you ministers’ is prohibited by the Code of Behaviour. Moreover, he also uses such a word as *heng suai* in his speech. *Heng suai* is a colloquial term which means ‘crap’. It has a casual register and certainly does not belong to formal parliamentary discourse. Its appearance then shows evidence of the changing articulation of genres from formal parliamentary to a casual one. However, this case of direct assault and using words with strong meaning goes uninterrupted.

The Allegations

This part of his debate mostly tells the stories which support his allegations. It is the longest part of the whole speech and contains a lot of details. Chalerm has to convince people that an ‘angelic’ party like the Democrats has deceived people. This is a complicated task given that the crime does not leave many traces which can directly lead to the one who committed it. Despite the lack of several stepping stones leading to the conclusive allegations, his speech is an attack upon many people’s beliefs. Even though the DP’s popularity has plunged since the scandal erupted, some people still find it hard to believe that the Democrats could commit such a crime. By going against the flow of people’s opinion, Chalerm runs the risk of being loathed by the people. As a politician he certainly cannot afford to lose his PPF and be hated by his electorate.

In taking on this risky task, Chalerm comes up with some strategies which help convince people of the story he tells. First of all, he has to make sure that he can capture people’s attention from the beginning to the end of his speech. His first strategy is shown in the way he narrates his story. Instead of using the speech genre, which is primarily a monologue, his speech more closely resembles to a casual narrative story telling. This is not entirely a monologue. During the course of the narration, at times the speaker stops and asks the audience a question. These questions, which are sometimes addressed to the Speaker or just the audience in general, help to check whether the audience is following his argument. Therefore he is using an adjacency pair: question and answer, in a rhetorical way in order to make his proposal.

What does this mean? Is it a corruption conspiracy? Mr. Speaker please let me elaborate a bit. (line 230-231)

[ni mai khwam wa yang rai wang phaen chochon mai than prathan tam phom ma ik nit]

Could this really be done in time? But Phuket’s Land Reform Office could do it and has already done it. (line 248)

[tham than mai khrap tae wa so po ko Phuket tham dai lae tham laeo]

Mr. Speaker, look at this (forest). Is it so ‘degraded’? It’s so green and lush. (line 446-447)

[than prathan du si khrap seuam som mak ru yang rai khiao cha-um phum sawai]

Is this a robbery? Is it or is it not a robbery? Mr. Speaker. If Mr. Speaker still cannot quite make up his mind, I’ll take Mr. Speaker (to investigate) further (line 518-519).

[yang ni plon mai khrap plon ru mai plon than prathan than prathan yang tat sin jai mai dai phom ja pha than prathan pai to]

His questions discreetly lead the audience to the intended conclusion, in this case the allegation that the Democrats have abused their power. Moreover, when the question is specifically addressed to someone (except the Speaker) such as Major General Chamlong, leader of the PDP, it

functions as a hook to attract the person's attention. It implicitly suggests that the story about to be told is necessary for that person's decision.

During his speech, Chalerm uses both formal and informal registers. However, most of his speech can be categorised as informal and offensive. Some of the words he uses seem to be out of place in parliamentary discourse. Some of them do not belong to parliamentary discourse because of their strong connotation and provocative nature. These words mark the use of level one intertextuality.

You traitors to your own mother land. (line 319)
[*ai phuak chochon phaendin*]

Khun Suthep is dead in terms of his political career. The man has died. Why should I kill him once again? It would be like shooting a corpse.(line 336-338)
[*khun Suthep tai pai laeo thang kan muang khon tai pai laeo phom ja pai kha sam song tham mai thao kap phom pai ying sop*]

People who have a background in law know that it cannot be interpreted otherwise unless they want to distort the meaning that they do not know [*wen tae ja tabaeng ja klaeng mai ru*], to protect their own clique, to use their character in being rhetorical to attract people's attention. (line 349- 352)

What is this? Reform everything without thinking. (line 488)
[*ni man arai kan patirup mot mai dai du ha du sip mai dai du ta ma ta rua¹⁰*]

I have never thought that this person, who is the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, who is still young would dare tell a lie to the whole House, would dare tell a lie to his fellow countrymen. [*ja kla kohok to sapha thang sapha ja kla kohok to phi nong prachachon thua prathet*] (line 562-563)

Some of the words used are not provocative but they are too casual to be used in a no-confidence debate. These words with informal register can be used to appeal to a less educated audience.

The people do not know this. My grandad Si, grandad Sa, aunty Mi, granny Maen didn't know so they sold their rights. (line 132-133)
[*chao ban mai ru ni khrap ta Sa ta Si pa Mi yai Maen khong phom mai ru ko khai sit*]

The use of honorifics that show kinship such as granddad, grandma and aunty in front of people's names is used widely in provincial and suburban local communities. They show the closeness and respect of the addresser towards the addressee. This feeling of closeness provokes sympathy for a naïve older generation. This tactic tends to invoke a reciprocal feeling for S as well.

Holy Moly! [*mae khun thun hua*] (line 614)

This Land Reform official acted as if he was "Rambo"... He is not a bad chap [*mo ni*]. We must give him credit for that. (line 621-622)

¹⁰ *Mai dai du ha du sip* literally means 'without looking to see if it is a five or a ten'. *Mai dai du ta ma ta rua* literally means without looking to see if it is an eye of a horse or of a boat. Both idioms means that the action has been done without looking at its nature and without thinking.

This example shows the use of his lexical choice ‘chap’ [*mo ni*] instead of ‘man’ [*khon ni*]. By opting for the more informal and rather colloquial lexical choice, his speech has become more like a conversation. Therefore, it accentuates the interpersonal relationship between him and his audience.

Moreover, his speech shows the changing articulation of genres or level one intertextuality. He constantly changes from formal parliamentary discourse to casual and, at times, potentially offensive conversational discourse. The change provides an element of unexpectedness to the speech. The fact that the audience cannot anticipate what genre will be articulated next keeps them listening. Sometimes the abrupt change of genre also creates incongruity. As a result, it is potentially humorous - as in the following example.

Your Honour the Speaker, how great do you [*mung*] think you [*mung*] are. (line 173)
 [*than prathan thi khao rop ni mung keng kan ma jak nai*]

In this example, Chalerm uses the word *mung* as a second person pronoun to refer to the people involved in the project. Thai language has a complex deference system which is reflected in the variety of words used for ‘I’ and ‘you’. Of all the seven pairs of words used between equals for I-you, *ku-mung* is the most informal one. To use the word *mung* which has a very informal register right after the word Your Honour the Speaker [*than prathan thi khao rop*], signals intentional change of genre to create incongruity, and the resulting intertextuality is humorous.

The questions, casual words and genre changing show his attempt to maintain people’s interest until the end of his long speech. Had the speech been monologous and entirely formal, it might not have been able to keep people listening for so long. As an MP, Chalerm not only has to keep people’s attention and convince them, he also has to find the strategy to launch serious allegations and cause maximum damage to the government. On top of that, he has to do it without jeopardising his own PPF. Chalerm starts by legitimising his action then moves on to talk about the positive points of the Democrats to show that he is not biased. When it comes to the allegation, he has to accuse the Democrats of wrongdoing and at the same time maintain his own PPF. Chalerm’s straw man technique allows him to do both.

Chalerm employs sarcasm in delivering his allegations. This creates ambivalence in the text, it carries two possible meanings one is the surface meaning and another is the sarcastic one. The two possible meanings allow him a safety exit; should any of them be found offensive, he can always resort to another.

Do I dare explain the word agriculturist to the Prime Minister? No I do not. He [should] know much better than I do because when he declared his policy to distribute government

budget to the rural areas, to promote the income of agriculturists, back then [why did] he [appear] to know what agriculturist means. (And) A moment ago, Jurin claimed that the *so po ko* office did not know what the word meant. (line 280-284)

All the Democrats are so brave; the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers [all of them] enthusiastically gave interviews. ...If you are positive that you are innocent why did you have to run away [resign]? (line 323-324)

Conclusion

In this part Chalerm restates his points and his allegations. At the same time, this part is the last opportunity for him to convince people and the MPs of the things he says earlier. This is also a time for him to use his rhetoric to urge the CPP and the PDP to reconsider their stance whether it is worth staying on with the government. There are criticisms in the form of analogy.

I am doing my duty as an opposition MP who has always been insulted and sneered at by the government who said that we would not be able to obtain any information for the debate. The opposition is bad and has its own festering wounds all over, they said [ai phuak fai khan man phlae woewa]. Mr. Speaker, if a guy like me had wounds on my back I would most certainly have had iodine poured down my wounds long ago [khon yang phom tha lang pen phlae thuk thingjoe rat pai nan laeo]. No. (line 822-824)

This example shows Chalerm's use of level one intertextuality. It displays informal lexical choices in the analogy such as 'ai phuak' [the opposition people] or 'festering wounds'. *Ai* or *ai phuak* is an informal honorific that indicates disrespect. The word 'festering' is rather casual in register. It is not a word one expects to hear in a parliamentary debate. His speech here implicitly suggests that he is aware that he is not as popular as the Democrats, and that he is not admired by the people the way the Democrats are. Despite all that, he has to be here and make his speech because it is his duty. By suggesting this, he has shown his PPF as an objective politician who works without having any emotional involvement.

The largest part of the conclusion is the appeal he makes to the leaders of the CPP and the PDP. The two appeals have a different tone. The one for the CPP can be categorised as an impeachment more than a persuasion. He contrasts the stance of the CPP when they were in the opposition with the party's stance as a coalition party. The change suggests that Chatichai is not a man of his word. He and his party are hypocritical. They are ready to cast aside their principles in pursuit of interest as opportunity offered. What Chalerm is trying to do is to tell the public of the untrustworthiness of the CPP, making them feel compelled to do something to restore their image. Chalerm not only uses simple narrative strategies to put pressure on the CPP, he uses direct verbal assaults as well. The assaults aims to intimidate the leader of the party, General Chatichai Chunchawan.

I still insist that no matter what uncle Chart [refers to Chatichai] does, I will not be angry with him. I love him too much. And the Ministers from CPP who are sitting there, do you still remember that you once supported me, you signed that petition with me stating that

they (the Democrats) had deceived our motherland. Or has all that changed now just because you are in the coalition. You have power and prosperity. You have a motorcycle escort wherever you go. You give interviews everyday saying that you do not know anything. You were not involved but you volunteer to step forward and speak for them. That's all right, Mr. Speaker. If that's the case, you can vote in favour of the government for the world to see, for the parliament to record that these people when they were in the opposition, they said they [the Democrats] were corrupt. When they were in the opposition they said they [the Democrats] robbed our country, in the opposition they said they [the Democrats] deceived the country and they did not do anything about it. When the time came, we turned out to have been the tools of the CPP. We have been raising the issue all the time. (line 858-867)

I'm going to send this message to General Chatichai. You go back and think before you go to bed tonight. You are seventy-five. I am forty-eight. You'd better end your political career gracefully. Don't end it having people cursing behind your back. (line 869-871)

While the appeal to the CPP sounds forceful and at times threatening, the appeal to the PDP is the opposite. Apart from trying to point out that a virtuous party like PDP does not belong to a 'corrupt' government like this, he also tries to stir up conflict between the PDP and the Democrats. While he tells the CPP that they should be ashamed of defecting to the coalition, he suggests that the PDP are too good to be associated with this coalition. He praises Major General Chamlong Srimuang, leader of the PDP for the good and virtuous deeds he did, especially during the Black May events in 1992, as well as his saintly image. His speech implies that Chalerm sympathises with the PDP for being unfortunate enough to be in the same boat as the corrupt Democrats. He is saying that the Democrats were simply opportunists who always take advantage of them. This point is elaborated by referring to the Black May events when Chamlong and Chuan stood by the people against an authoritarian government. Chamlong's good deeds were hijacked by Chuan after the events. Chalerm is now reminding Chamlong how Chuan snatched his reputation merely because Chuan was a better speaker. By saying this, Chalerm is hammering a wedge into the delicate relationship between the DP and the PDP.

You risked your life alone but you do not know how to use rhetoric. Chuan is skilled at rhetoric. He snatched your credit and turned on you accusing you of leading people to die.¹¹ (line 882-883)

You are too pure, [and] too sincere. That's why you are in this situation. You were a brilliant student. I do not have a better brain than yours but I do have the right to warn you that the reason why you succeeded in becoming a popular politician today was because you were sneered at and insulted by the Democrats. You were born in politics because you

¹¹ Chamlong was the key leader in the pro-democracy demonstrations of May 1992. The demonstration faced with a brutal crackdown by the military which resulted in approximately 50 demonstrators being killed and similar number of them unaccounted for (McCargo 1997a: 260). Chamlong was arrested in the middle of the crackdown. However, after the events the DP implicitly blamed Chamlong for not adhering to parliamentary system. His role in the street demonstration was portrayed as a rebellion against parliamentary system and traditional ideas of respecting authority (Ibid: 266).

were flattened by the Democrats, [who denigrated you] as goods from a sidewalk stall with no brand.¹² (line 888-892)

It can be said that Chalerm's speech starts by creating a straw man of an idealistic DP before destroying it later on. Since Chalerm has to operate in the face of three competing conjunctures; it is necessary that he employs discursive strategies in attacking the DP. The strategies employed are connotation, level one and two intertextuality, sarcasm, overstatement, Q-A and social deixis. These strategies allow him to attack the government without being caught in breach of the Code and while maintaining his PPF and PNF.

6.2.2 Samak Sundaravej's Speech (17 May 1995)

Samak Sundaravej is another 'star of the parliament'. He is the leader of the Prachakorn Thai Party (PTP). Samak was born into an aristocratic Thai family. He first graduated with a Diploma in Commerce from the A.C.C. and started his career as a company accountant. Later, Samak went to Chicago to take a course at the Bryan and Stratton Institute where he obtained another Diploma in Accounting and Business Administration before coming back to Thailand to do his Bachelor's degree in Law at Thammasat. At Thammasat, his talent in speaking shone. He was the president of the debating society. He was first publicly known as 'a charismatic school boy, title-holder of a quiz show genre' (Dunfee 1988 quoted in McCargo 1997a: 213) when he was the winner of the televised quiz show called 'Tick Tack Toe' for eighteen months running (Ibid: 213).

After his graduation, he signed for membership of the Democrat Party. His first political position was as a member of the Bangkok Municipal Council for which he was elected in 1971. He was appointed a member of the National Forum [*samatcha haeng chat*] in 1973. He was also a member of the National Legislative Assembly [*sapha nitibanyat haeng chat*] in the same year. Samak has a conservative standpoint; he is a royalist and a prominent rightist. In 1974, he went on a broadcast debate about the Constitution, criticising the students' movement and the Minister of Health. The issue of students was widely and hotly debated at the time and Samak's speech was a controversial one. That debate pushed him into the spotlight (Samak 1978). In 1975, he was elected for the first time as an MP representing the Dusit district in Bangkok. He had been a representative for the district for five terms. During that time, he held many significant political positions. He was Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives in 1975, Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1976, Minister of the Interior in 1976-1977, Minister of Transport in 1983-1986 and again in

¹² During his gubernatorial election campaign in 1985, Chamlong ran as an independent candidate. He gathered an overwhelming support from Bangkok people. The then Democrat Party leader, Bhichai Rattakul denounced Chamlong as 'an unknown quantity like a product bought from street vendors' (quoted in McCargo 1997a:114). This remark made Chamlong even more popular among ordinary Bangkok people and of course the street vendors who came out in force to support him (Ibid: 114).

1990-1991. Samak also served as a Deputy Prime Minister under General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the distasteful military-supported Prime Minister who bypassed the general election in 1992 - the very government that the May 1992 demonstrations sought to overthrow.

Samak had served as a Bangkok MP for nearly thirty years from 1971 before he finally stepped down to run in the Bangkok gubernatorial election in 2000, an election which he won with a landslide victory. Like Chalerm, he is a controversial character. He was a very popular MP as well as a very popular radio presenter; at the same time, there are people who dislike him. The cause of controversy lies mainly in his outspoken style of speaking. He can also be considered another *nak leng*.¹³ This similarity has made Samak and Chalerm to be known as the *rak yom* duo. Samak is both loved and hated by people for that reason. However, whenever he speaks he manages to catch the attention of those who hate him and those who love him alike. Instead of using a clear, claim and support argument like Chalerm, Samak's arguments have a less clear arrangement. The fact that the narrative he uses to support his point is rather long, can make it difficult for the audience to make any connection between the support and the claim. His rambling speech style in this particular debate can be understood when his political profile is taken into consideration. His association with the 1992 government that instigated the Black May incident and who is undeniably responsible for the death of the pro-democracy demonstrators makes it hard for Samak to revisit those political events as Chalerm did in his speech. Who he is and what he has done does not allow him to use the same straw man technique of building the DP up from the 1992 event in order to squash it later. He has to use other techniques.

6.2.2.1 Organisation of Content

The debate speech can be characterised by its narrative style: stream of consciousness. He uses a rambling style of speaking, discussing many issues and using many stories, to elaborate his points. Because he touches on many different points, Samak's speech does not appear to have any systematic organisation of content. It is like a series of narratives. He tells one story and stops when he comes to each detail. He then discusses the item before continuing to narrate the story until he arrives at another point where he stops again and discusses it. His speech is built around three main subjects:

- a. The Democrats have always been electioneering and defaming the opposition in the process.
- b. The Democrats are too arrogant to back down even when they are wrong.

¹³ However Samak is a *nak leng* in a more abstract sense of the word. Samak may indulge in verbal violence like Chalerm but he never shows any sign of physical violence as Chalerm does.

- c. Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democrat party is swollen with pride in his rhetorical ability and that he is always eager to show his wit.

Since there does not appear to be any systematic organisation, there were occasions where, perhaps intentionally, repetition occurs. He states more than once the idea that the Democrats are arrogant and ignorant, a repetition which arguably helps in emphasising the point. He mentions the case of the title deed given to Anchali's husband more than three times in the course of the speech. However, not once does he present the entire story. He simply uses the case as a classic example of the Democrats' irregularities without bothering to finish the story.

Overall, Samak's speech looks like a compilation of allegations woven together in a form of stream-of-consciousness narration. His allegations are supported by evidence which are mainly figures and statistics. Some of them are supported by maps and documents as well. However his arguments, the organisation of claim and evidence, are not as systematic and conclusive as those of Chalerm.

Samak's speech also revisits the points raised by other opposition speakers, articulates them and sometimes legitimises them. He overtly supports them and explains why he does so. The example of speeches he refers to are one by General Chaowalit Yongchaiyudh (NAP) and one by Montri Phongphanich (SAP).

6.2.2.2 Strategic Analysis

Ritual Beginning

Samak's ritual beginning goes straight to the point in a kind of sudden opening. After self-introduction, he swiftly moves in to stir up the audience's emotion towards the case. The fact that he mentions the word 'feeling' [*khwam ru suk*] or 'feel' [*ru suk*] six times in the first 23 lines of this part implies that Samak is making an emotional appeal rather than a logical one.

Mr. Speaker must have felt the same way as I do...(line 3)

They said they had resigned to satisfy popular demand [*krasae*]. What can you make of this? It means that the pressure was powerful. It means that the issue was too overwhelming for people's feelings to bear. The feelings people had, how did they feel? They felt that the government had shared Thai soil among their cronies (line 19-22).

His strategy is to stir up people's feelings so as to draw their attention to the case in point (the *so po ko* scandal) which he is about to discuss in detail. In this part, Samak has shown three of the strategies he employs in his argument throughout his speech. First, he uses a Q&A pattern to present his arguments. He asks the public a question to call their attention to the point he is going

to make, then he expresses his point in a form of an answer, for instance, in the second example above, his point is that, ‘the Thai people felt that the government has shared out Thai soil among their cronies’. Here the point is made in the form of an adjacency pair: question (How did they feel?) and answer (They felt that the government has shared Thai soil among their cronies). By stating his position as an answer to the question which is addressed to the people, he can distance himself from it. It sounds as though it is the public’s view not his. His argument also sounds less authoritative because he is not imposing his proposal but only suggests a ‘probable’ and ‘logical’ answer to the question.

Second, he employs figurative language in his speech. Samak has a tendency to use indirect language in the form of figure of speech rather than a more straightforward construction. He uses a metaphor comparing the political situation with a simple thing which has similar traits in order to make the political situation more understandable for people. Sometimes the metaphor used is mainly to accentuate the point he would like to make. Therefore it could sound fairly remote from the situation it was supposed to be compared to. This sort of metaphor in the form of word play is particularly apparent in Samak’s speech.

When we cook *yam* (Thai spicy salad), whichever kind of *yam* it may be, *yam lek yam yai* once it’s cooked, we have to place it on the table and eat immediately. But here we have left it (to stand) for five months. We should have discussed on the 14 of December. Now it’s 17 of May. (line 4-6)

In this example, Samak compares the scandal to *yam* [Thai spicy salad]. The two things are very different. The only similarity which is accentuated here is that the two things should not be left to stand. They should be dealt with immediately. The fact that he compares an important political issue to a kind of food signifies the changing articulation from formal parliamentary genre to casual one. This is level one intertextuality.

Third, Samak plays with words. He slightly changes catchphrases and therefore produces a brand new catchphrase which is a total contrast to the original one. The incongruity between the original phrase and the new ones can be potentially humorous.

...and I would apologise immediately (saying) that it has never dawned on me that the project which had been promoted as a *bo daeng* (red bow) project for the last two years could turn out to be a *bo dam* (black bow) in the end (line 11-12).

In Thai *bo daeng* is a phrase which means an outstanding piece of work. By slightly changing *bo daeng* to *bo dam*, red bow to black bow, Samak has invented a brand new phrase which has the

opposite meaning to the original one.¹⁴ The new phrase aptly put by Samak instantly became popular. It was repeated in newspapers and people's conversations.

Preface to the Allegations

The main purpose of this part is to draw people's attention to the case in point which is the irregularities in the *so po ko* project. Despite statistics used to illustrate the large amount of land being distributed in the form of the *so po ko* land right, it appears that his speech still focuses on stirring up people's emotions more than giving facts about the case. There are sarcastic remarks as well as criticism in the form of adjacency pairs, made to provoke scepticism and emotional response.

Mr. Speaker must have seen from the figures that the government could have been in some strange sort of hurry. (line 30)

[laeo than prathan khong du tualek na khrap thi ratthaban chut ni ja duai khwam rip ron phikon yang rai mai sap dai]

This sarcastic remark implicitly provokes scepticism about the government's 'suspiciously speedy' administration in the case. The scepticism is used as a first block for him to build his argument upon. Moreover, Samak also employs a sarcastic tone in a Q&A form. He uses sarcastic questions to present the Democrat's claims while the answers are his points which argue that the Democrat's claims are wrong. Postulated accusations like this can also be used to create sarcastic effect.

I'd like to ask whether during the period between 1973 to 1992, 18 years in total, [poor and needy] people had received only 3.3 millions square rai of land? It [3.3 millions square rai] was considered too little. It was considered not the way to do it or that there was still so much Thai soil left. (line 34-37)

Here Samak criticises the Democrat's claim that their land reform project is aiming to help needy people, that they are more in tune with people's wants (PPF). However, Samak seeks to suggest that the scale of the project undertaken by the Democrats is way over the top and is actually too much. The excessive land distribution was implicitly suggested in the sarcasm: '...that there was still so much Thai soil left'. Samak then implies that it is the government that thinks that land reform in Thailand covers too small an area. Then he implies that it wants to distribute all the remaining forest land to people under the banner of *so po ko*. This implied accusation appears as sarcasm because it contradicts our basic judgement that no government would be foolish enough to proclaim that they would distribute every last piece of land to the people.

Samak also criticises the Prime Minister's reaction by using sarcasm. He speaks of what is considered a positive quality of the Prime Minister, for which he is widely popular, his rhetoric.

¹⁴ Red bow is used like 'gold star' in English while black bow is used like 'black mark'.

However, the tone and the context indirectly suggests negativity. As a result, he succeeds in making a negative comment about the Prime Minister without having to utter any negative words.

The Prime Minister was asked this question and he answered by drawing upon his expertise. That is he certainly answered the question using rhetoric, a figurative speech.
[Than nayok thuk tham kham tham ni lae than ko top yang khwam chamnan khong than khu nai kan thi ja top kham tham thi nae jai dai wa pen kham khom pen khan upama upamai] (line 68-70)

Before he goes on to criticise the simile used by the Prime Minister, Samak makes a remark using hedges to tone down his criticism. However, his criticism can also be seen as another form of sarcasm when he says that the whole scandal could have stemmed from the Prime Minister's obliviousness. Hence it is not intentional. This was apparently unlikely for anyone especially in bureaucratic circles,¹⁵ let alone the Prime Minister, not to know that there are many types of scholarships.

The Honourable Prime Minister could have forgotten that there are many kinds of scholarships. (line 72)

He uses a modal 'may have' to hedge his point, making it less judgemental. At the same time the word 'forgotten' makes the Prime Minister's notorious comparison sound less intentional when people know only too well that his comparison is actually anything but unintentional. By blaming the Prime Minister indirectly, Samak seemingly maintains his PPF as an objective man while reprimanding the prime minister.

One interesting strategy of Samak is how he presents his point in the form of a claim-plus-support argument. He presents his hypothesised point as a claim and supports it with a known fact. By presenting an argument which is half truth and half hypothesis, his point sounds more plausible because it is not an idea stated in isolation but as a reasonable explanation of a known fact.

Mr. Speaker should have been sceptical. We do not know what kind of relationship members of that old and prestigious party has and how they care for each other, afraid of each other or do not want to bother each other. This Deputy Minister here, the Prime Minister might be... of because otherwise he would not have jumped up and taken the blame like this without giving it any thought.

[than tong na ja sadut jai rao ko mai sap wa khon nai phak kan muang kaokae yai to nan khao mi khwam phuk phan kring kring ru kring jai arai kan yang rai ratthamontri chuai than nayok ratthamontri khong ja tong kring jai phroe michanan ja ok rap pai than thi doi mi dai khrai khruan arai loei] (line 77-80)

¹⁵ Most of scholarships in Thailand are granted by the government so it was unlikely that the head of the government would not know this.

There is also evidence of categorisation by using social deixis in Samak's speech. He uses the collective pronoun 'they' [*khao*]¹⁶ to refer to the government and 'we' [*rao*]¹⁷ to refer to himself, the opposition and the Thai people. The pronoun 'they', which refers to the government, isolates it from the rest of the people. It has become 'someone else' who does not belong to the same group as the people. At the same time, the pronoun 'we' helps consolidate the sense of group between the speaker, the opposition and the people. It promotes a sense of group which indirectly builds an antagonistic feeling towards those who did not belong to the group. In this case, the target is the government. This evidence of categorisation can be found in the example above.

One characteristic trait of Samak's speech is the use of phrases that rhyme. The rhyming phrase consists of two words, one has meaning and another does not. Words without meaning are added simply to create poetic rhythm within the phrase. This kind of literary phrase is widely used in the spoken language, especially among the older generation of Thais. Samak's background is that of a traditional aristocratic Thai family so these rhyming phrases could come quite naturally for him. His 'traditional' form of speaking could be found appealing to the group of older citizens and those with a traditional Thai background. In other words, his accommodation to a particular speech style identifies with a particular speech group, in this case, the older generation Thais. This group forms Samak's political support base. The examples of these rhyming phrases are below. Some of them were discussed in detail earlier.

Yam lek yam yai (line 5)

Yam lek [small salad] does not have meaning. *Yam yai* [big salad] is the name of a kind of Thai spicy salad. He could be saying *yam lek* because *lek* which means small is an antonym of *yai* which means big.

Bo daeng bo dam (line 11-12)

Bo daeng or red bow means an outstanding piece of work while *bo dam* or black bow does not have any special meaning. However, by placing *bo dam* right after *bo daeng*, *bo dam* acquired its meaning in the context. *Dam* [black] is considered an opposite color of *daeng* [red]. *Bo dam* therefore acquired the opposite meaning of *bo daeng*. As a result since *bo daeng* means a gold star, *bo dam* referred to a black mark in the government's administration.

Khao tha khao thi (line 37)

¹⁶ *Khao* is a third person pronoun in Thai. It can be singular as well as plural, that is it can be the counterpart of he/she or they in English.

¹⁷ *Rao* is a first person pronoun in Thai. Like *khao*, it can be both singular and plural. It can be used as the counterpart of the English pronoun I or we.

Khao tha means looking good, similar to *khao thi*. Normally the words ‘*tha*’ and ‘*thi*’ are used together to refer to gesture. It can be said that *tha* and *thi* have quite similar meaning

Phrutikan phrutikam (line 39)

Phrutikan and *phrutikam* mean behaviour. The repetition of two words with the same meaning is to create rhythmic effect.

Yak dai khrai di (line 56)

Yak dai means to want. *Khrai di* means desire to aspire. Together it means to be ambitious.

These rhythmic phrases and word plays can be considered as an indication of an informal genre. Therefore they are also evidence of level one intertextuality.

Allegations

Samak’s allegations are launched in the form of a narrative story telling. He opens his allegation by stating that the Democrats are suspiciously fond of the Ministry of Agriculture. He interprets this as the Democrats having an intention or purpose of doing ‘something’ within the Ministry. This point is made into a form of argument. As mentioned in the previous part, the point he proposed is presented as a claim followed by a support, which is apparently the truth.

Claim (his hypothesis, proposition):

When the irregularities were practised and there was public scrutiny then it was known that oh the government, the core of this government liked the Ministry of Agriculture. (line 88-89)

In hindsight, this cabinet, the Democrat party, likes the Ministry of Agriculture, likes to supervise the Ministry of Agriculture. (109-110)

Support (the apparent truth):

When there was a new general election, the Democrats chose to administer the Ministry of Agriculture once again. Do not forget that before this, they had asked to administer the Ministry of Agriculture once before. They had proceeded with activities in the Ministry and had managed to close down the forest area. (line 94-97)

After convincing people that the Democrats have always had some unknown ‘incentive’ in the Ministry of Agriculture, Samak goes on to make another point. He refers to the speech of General Chaowalit Yongchaiyudh, leader of the NAP who said that though he has chaired the meeting on the 4 May, he didn’t know any details of the case. He was asked by the Democrats simply to chair the meeting. Samak borrows the voice of General Chaowalit to make his point that it was only the Democrats who were actively involved in this case. Therefore the party should be the only one responsible for the scandal.

The allegations made by Samak are casual in tone due to the spoken language he uses. In his speech, there are not many changes in the articulation of genre. The whole discourse seems to be casual and similar to an oral narrative. The casual discourse bears many traits that are prohibited from the Code of Behaviour:

a. Rhyme phrases

Rhyme phrases consist of two meaningful clauses that share one or more similar words. Discourse which falls into this category is in violation of the code which prohibit 'verbal extravagance' because in order to create the rhyme, Samak uses a repetition of words with a similar meaning that could otherwise be omitted:

lai khrang lai hon (line 112)
[time and time again].

pai yang nan, pai yang ni, pai yang ni, pai yang nan (line 257-258)
[going this way, going that way, going this way, going that way].

These rhyme phrases are characteristics of informal language. Their appearance in formal discourse like no-confidence debates displays level one intertextuality.

b. Metaphor

I acknowledge that not all uses of metaphor can be categorised as casual register. Casual style is not signalled by the use of metaphor as much as by the content and the lexical choices featured in those metaphors. Samak's metaphors are informal in their content and lexical choices as well as the manner they are presented, hence it is level one intertextuality. Formal speech is expected to be a monologue. It is not supposed to overtly address anyone. According to the Code of Behaviour, if a parliamentary speech has to address anybody at all, it must be the House Speaker. However, not all speeches are monologues. Many of them lean towards a dialogic form, either by overtly addressing another party or using some conversational particles. These particles in Thai do not have any meaning on their own. They are added only to show casual intimacy between S and H. By doing so, these particles can be categorised as belonging to a casual conversational register. The following example also shows the use of conversational particles in the metaphor which make it sound casual

They said metaphorically, it's like giving the whole pig and telling them to butcher it [*kha cham lae*] and say if there was any sirloin [*laeo ta gon bok wai duai tha joe mu nueua daeng la go trong nueua kan wai hai duai na*]. If there was, [as if I] told them to keep it for me. Give the whole pig and tell them to keep any part but shout out if they find any sirloin and put that aside. Is there anybody who if they had been given this would not carve out the whole loin part? One pig has only 10 kg. of loin The person who is naïve

enough not to carve out the loin is silly, having been given the whole pig [*khrai chuen laeo mai chuen hai tit nueua daeng wai la go man go ngo si khrap*]. (line 174-180)

The underlined words in the above example are conversational particles which tell us that Samak is speaking in a casual way here. The particles signal that Samak is conducting a dialogue with himself as S and audience as hearer (henceforth H). Moreover, this example is casual not only because of the use of conversational particles but also with the use of metaphor as well. Here Samak compares the action of the Ministry of Agriculture in giving out the whole forest and expecting the beneficiaries to return the non-degraded area, to giving out the whole pig and expecting the receiver to give back the sirloin. To compare a governmental land reform policy with a less complicated and more familiar case of sirloin pork, he makes the policy sound more understandable and more tangible for ordinary people. By comparing good forest to sirloin, it is easier for the audience to perceive the absurdity of a policy that expects this good part to be returned. The metaphorical explanation can be seen as an understandable way to explain the policy to people as well as to describe how absurd the government's policy has been.

In the next example he metaphorically suggests that the reason why the Democrats saved the *so po ko* project in Phuket to be one of the last of such projects was because the Democrats had a deceitful plan in mind. To engage in corruption in almost the last project made it easy for it to go unnoticed. They saved this corrupt plan until they were about to wrap up the whole scheme. He compares this action to the act of jumping off the last stair which means it was about to finish.

Doing this (*so po ko*) project for this particular area. This area is the 68th, meaning that they' have jumped off the last stair.¹⁸ [*kradot bandai khan sutthai pai laeo*] (line 213-214)

c. Personification

[The government was] Cutting down forest with one hand and asking people to make merit by planting forest with the other. (line 186)

By this he personifies the government giving it two hands. He then says that one hand of the government is cutting down the forest and the other is planting it.

d. Casual lexical choices

Mia [Wife] verified *phua* [husband]'s qualifications (line 205).

Thai language has many words that refer to 'wife' and 'husband'. In the same way as most words in Thai, each of them has a different register. *Mia* means 'wife'. It has a casual register compared to *phanraya* which is its formal counterpart. *Phua* means 'husband'. It has a casual register and is always used with *mia*, as in '*phua mia*' which can also mean 'couple'. *Phua*'s counterpart is *sami*.

¹⁸ By using this idiom, Samak suggests that by saving the Phuket *so po ko* 4-01 to the last, the Democrats were trying to cover up the irregularities.

Sami appears with *phanraya*. *Sami phanraya* has the same meaning as *phuam i*. The wife and husband discussed here are Anchalee Vanich Thepabutr, secretary of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and her husband Thotsaporn Thepabutr. Anchalee is a member of the committee that verified the beneficiaries' qualifications. The committee concluded that Thotsaporn, who came from the Thepabutr family, one of the richest families in Phuket, to qualify for *so po ko 4-01* title deed. This clearly suggested cronyism.

Many problems are left unsolved, a long queue of them. Let's talk about how many Ministers, how many Ministries we have discussed about. Each of them sucks. They were hopeless. All of them were protecting the business sector for raising the price. It just does not sound right. (line 505-508)

[*panha ko yang kae khai mai dai mak mai kai kong pen thaeo loei khrap long thalok kan ma wan ni ki krasuang ki krasuang ko yae thang nan luan tae mai mi fi mu than nan loei luan tae ok rap thaen pho ka thi khun rakha sinkha luan tae mai khao tha thang nan*]

The underlined words have a casual register. First *mak mai kai kong* means 'many'. In fact to say *mak mai* is enough but *kai kong* is added for rhythmic effect. Second, *pen thaeo loei* has casual conversational register. It is used to say metaphorically that there were many problems waiting to be solved. Third, *thalok* literally means 'to lift up something' or 'to open'. It is a colloquial word and has casual register. It is unsurprisingly not the word normally used to describe the discussion or revelation of governmental matters. Fourth, *yae* means 'not good' or 'inept'. It has a casual register so it can be translated as 'suck' in English. Finally, *mai khao tha* is a casual way of saying that something was not right or properly done.

I was thinking what's the business of that newspaper sticking its nose into other people's business [*suak*]. Others were fighting [*fat kan*] this country. They printed news approving this government. (line 529-531)

Suak was the word used by Samak. The word is considered offensive and very provocative in the Thai context. It means 'nosy'. To say that someone was *suak* could be a recipe for a fight. *Fat kan* also has a casual register. It has a colloquial meaning: 'to fight'. Here *suak* means being 'nosy' or interfering in other people's business. It has a very casual register. *Fat kan* also has an informal register. It gives a more graphic and more aggressive meaning than he probably means, which is 'hotly debated'.

e. Onomatopoeia:

These words do not have a proper meanings. They only imitate sounds associated with certain action.

Oh!

Or!

The Minister went *ngaeng ngaeng*. (line 335)

Ngaeng ngaeng imitates a dog ready to attack or a dog gnawing.

When the resolution came out *pang [bang]*. (line 367)

Pang described the action of the resolution which suddenly came out.

There's no reason. Just one *juk*. (line 164)

The word *juk* was used to describe the impulsive dismissal of the permanent secretary of the Forestry Department right after the Democrats took over the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

f. Words which give visual images

The *so po ko* bill would have been dragged back to return for sure. (line 324)

[*so po ko tong thuk lak ma khun nae non*]

Strangling the Royal Asset Bureau for their land. Strangle them to get it. (line 354)

[*pai khen kho oao thi din ratcha patsadu pai khen kho khao ik ja oao hai dai*]

g. Idioms

Lup na pa jamuk. (line 313)

This idiom means 'to slacken in order to avoid an impact on the other'.

Wan mu. (line 283)

This idiom means 'an easy task' or 'easy'. It is equal to the English idiom 'a piece of cake'.

h. Insulting title which show disrespect.

Ai Puak fai kan. (line 473, 479)

This phrase refers to 'the opposition'. *Ai* is a honorific to be put in front of any noun or pronoun that the speaker wants to talk about with contempt. Therefore, in this case the (im)politeness honorific used is '*ai puak*'.

Point a-h are linguistics features with an informal register. They create level one intertextuality.

Samak's speech features registers from the casual to the downright offensive. It can be argued that some relatively rude words he uses are original Thai words and therefore innately belong to Samak's traditional rhetorical style. Other words which are offensive but go uninterrupted can be explained by impoliteness theory (Culpeper 1996: 352). According Culpeper, language which is extremely offensive but uttered in a rather formal atmosphere can be accepted more easily than language which is less rude. The fact that the very impolite clause would be at odds with the

context in which it is uttered leads people to think that it is not serious, that the speaker is just kidding or joking. As a result it is likely to be interpreted as mock impoliteness.

Samak also makes fun of the government, especially the Democrat's past behaviour. Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democrats is known to be very strict with his party members when it comes to voting time. Everyone has to be present in the parliament, no matter what is happening to that person at that time. The action which was being ridiculed was known among members of parliament. Therefore Samak does not have to indicate who he is talking about.

Do not worry about the voting. In the end we will never get 181 votes to put the government out of office. So we'll be happy with whatever we get. You don't have to bring in people who have recently undergone an operation to vote. You don't have to bring in pregnant woman about to deliver [*phuying thong ja ok*] to vote like last time. It's disgraceful. It's a shameful thing to do just in order for the party to have the honour of united. Pregnant lady about to gave birth [*phuying thong ja ok luk*] must be brought in to vote. No. Don't do that. Just take it easy. (line 565-569)

This sarcastic remark succeeds, although it does not indicate who is doing such a ridiculous thing, as it implicitly suggests how far the Democrat are prepared to go simply to win the vote. It tells the people how important winning is for the Democrats. He also makes a sarcastic suggestion to the Democrat should they decide to stay in power.

If we have presented the case like this and the government can bear to stay in office, I don't mind. (They) Have to put up with it. If it's so bad they have to cover their head with a pail or not [*ja thung oao pip khlum hua ru mai nan*], it could be heavy and uncomfortable [*ko khong ja keka man nak*]. Or perhaps they can use something else for cover. They can also use sunglasses but they certainly cannot look at anybody else in the eyes. (line 514-515)

The sarcastic and potentially humorous criticisms make the government become the butt of a joke. The government had become someone else who does not belong to the group, as suggested by the deixis 'they', and as a result may be treated with contempt.

Conclusion

In his conclusion, instead of restating the points he makes, Samak seeks to encourage the people to make their own judgement. After he has acknowledged the limited capacity of the opposition to win the vote of no-confidence, he emphasises the importance of public opinion. He returns to inciting public antipathy towards the government's alleged corruption in this project by postulating what the public would say about this scandal. This level two intertextuality distances himself from the point made, which makes him sounds less judgemental:

But the people sitting in their homes who were the owners of this country, who own a piece of this country as well, they must have thought how was it possible to take away 44 millions rai¹⁹ of Thai soil only to distribute it to other people through the paper called *so po ko* right who already had rates for sale [of the land]. (line 572-575)

After stating this postulated opinion of the people, he moves on to send a message directly to the public asking them to figure out this issue.

I would like to leave this issue for everyone who owns this country's consideration. (line 581-582)

[phom kho rian fak thuk khon thi pen jao khong phaen din thai hai chuai winitchai ruang ni duai]

Then he again passes a direct message to the government without overtly stating who he is talking to.

Claim or prove anything you like. You might well not be doing anything. We have another one ready to talk. (line 582-583)

[ja ang ja phisut yang rai ko wa ma thoe khrap tae ja mai wa ko dai rao ko mi khon thi ja phut to pai]

Samak's speech can be considered an emotional appeal to the public. He seeks to stir up the public's emotional involvement towards the irregularities. This makes Samak's speech different from Chalerm which attempts to convince the public logically. Samak uses level one intertextuality, Q-A pattern, sarcasm, hedges and social deixis to make his point that it is time for the public to make up their mind whether they can still trust the Democrats.

6.3 Discussion

All the no-confidence debate's speakers are working in the same context of Thai politics and in the face of the same three competing conjunctures. However, each speech also bears the characteristics shaped by the specific condition of the political practice at that time. The two speeches analysed here are designed in relation to the situation in 1995 when the virtuous reputation of the DP was shaken by the *so po ko 4-01* scandal. It is the scandal that has become the main issue of the debate.

While the general context and the conjunctures require the speaker to employ discursive strategies, the personal profile displays the speaker's communicative, interactional and social roles that constitute the speaker's cognition, and thus determine the speaker's individual's choices of strategies. Therefore, in analysing the use of strategies, personal profile must also be considered. Both Chalerm and Samak may be a *rak yom*, for they share certain similarities in their personal

¹⁹ *Rai* is Thai unit of measure. 1 *rai* approximately equals to 2/5 acre or 1600 square metres.

characteristics. They are not afraid of confrontation, courageous and are readily to take on risky business. These are characteristics of the *nak leng*. They are known to be sharp-tongued and direct. As a result, offensiveness can be expected in their speech. However, as institutional actors (members of parliament), they operate in an institutional setting, and they should not be caught in breach of the parliamentary Code of Behaviour. As people's representatives, they are not supposed to lose their PPF and PNF. Not only that, they are members of parliament and representatives of the people, as well as being members of the opposition. Their role in the no-confidence debate is to inflict the greatest possible damage on the government. Therefore, what they are required to do as institutional actors conflicts with what they are required to do as participants. They need some discursive strategies to operate in the face of these competing context categories. Their choices of discursive strategies are determined not only by their common characteristics as *nak leng* but also their political position, political roles (participant) that constitute their cognition. These context categories are individual.

Chalerm is given the task of investigating the malpractice in the project. His clear arguments are supported by conclusive evidence which are the fruit of his perseverance. The efficiency of his speech is due to the presentation of reasoned steps leading to the allegations. It is fuelled by Chalerm's personal talent in public speaking. The most prominent discourse strategy Chalerm uses is both levels of *intertextuality*. The strategy is used to create a kind of discourse which is the most effective within the three given conjunctures of the debate (Savitri 2002: 88). The changing articulation of genres or the appearance of one genre within another creates incongruity between what the audience expects to hear and what is actually spoken, for example, in the parliamentary discourse, the phrase 'one day out of the blue' *wan di khuen di*, 'dead' *tai* and 'corpse' *sop* are not expected. The incongruity triggered by these phrases' appearance is potentially humorous. The incongruity keeps the audience wanting to hear more of what will be uttered next. Reported speech, on the other hand, is used to make postulated accusations. By using other people's voices, Chalerm cannot be held responsible for what he says, for example, he accuses the government of comparing the opposition to 'a scummy dog' (Savitri 2002: 86). It is difficult to find evidence for such accusations. By borrowing another person's voice, Chalerm can safely accuse the government while also maintaining his PPF. Chalerm has the tendency to use lexical choices which have strong and aggressive connotations but there is no evidence of word play in his speech.

Samak, by contrast, uses various kinds of word play as in *yum yai and yum lek, bo daeng and bo dam, yak dai khrai di* or *pai yang nan pai yang ni*. His word plays are used for different purposes,

for example, to emphasise the meaning (*yak dai khrai di*), to show his wit in creating a new phrase (*bo dam*) or to appeal to the older generation audience who likes rhyme phrases. Samak's word play can be seen as an example of level one intertextuality. Rhyme phrases signal repetition, a trait which is actually proscribed by the Code. Therefore it is not considered parliamentary. It also signals a casual conversational register since rhyme phrases are found mainly in casual conversation, usually among the older generation of Thais. It can be said that while humour is created by changing articulation of genre in Chalerm's lexical choices, it is created by changing articulation of puns in Samak's speech. We laugh at Chalerm's speech because of his brave use of words but we laugh at Samak's speech because we admire his talent in playing with words.

In terms of content, both speeches present insightful information leading to the conclusion that the DP is corrupt. However, the two speeches have different styles of argument. While Chalerm uses a clear and explicit claim and support arrangement to argue that there is malpractice in the *so po ko 4-01* project, Samak adopts an unclear and implicit argumentation to elaborate the same point. In his speech, Chalerm proposes that there is a manipulation of the criteria of people entitled to the title deeds and this manipulation makes way for the DP cronies to acquire the deeds. Then Chalerm reveals that the DP's MP, Anchali Vanich-Thepabutr's husband received the deeds. After that, as more evidence, Chalerm reads out the name of other *so po ko* beneficiaries who have links with the DP. In the end, he states the conclusion that the DP is corrupt. Instead of presenting his argument in a clear arrangement like this, Samak chooses to offer various sorts of evidence that the DP is fond of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives and, that the DP amends the law, for example. This evidence points at the DP without clearly claiming anything. The audience was then asked to figure out the conclusion for themselves. Therefore, in comparison with Chalerm, even though he seems to be candid in his discursive style, Samak is rather implicit when it comes to the arrangement of his argument. He chooses to be discursively indirect.

In the conclusion, Chalerm in order to appeal to the audience both inside and outside the House, first appeals to the general audience by showing his honesty. Then he moves in to make an extensive appeal to the leader of each coalition parties one by one. His rhetoric is used to urge coalition members to protect the public benefit by isolating the DP. While the length of this discourse shows that Chalerm is trying to gather power from the inside to destroy the stability of the coalition, Samak's appeal is more general. Samak's rhetoric is asking 'those sitting at home who are also the owners of Thai soil' (line 572) to express their power and protect their own right.

6.4 Conclusion

In 1995, Chalerm and Samak were chosen as army leaders [*khun phol ek*] in the no-confidence battle (Sathit 1996: 237). The discourse of Chalerm and Samak's speech displays an efficient command of discursive strategies. Chalerm and Samak are both actors belonging to the same institution, working in the same political domain, doing the same global action - engaging in the opposition - by giving speeches of no-confidence within the same setting. These context categories oblige them to use discursive strategies in order to produce the most effective discourse. However, the analysis shows that despite the shared context categories, each speaker has different choices of discursive strategies to serve their different speech techniques.

Chalerm uses connotation, both levels of intertextuality, sarcasm, overstatement, Q-A pattern and honorifics to logically convince the audience that the DP are not as good as they appear to be. Chalerm uses these discursive strategies in attacking the idealised straw man of the Democrats without being caught in breach of the Code and while maintaining his own PPF and PF. However, Samak's emphasis is making emotional, rather than logical appeal to the public. He also tries to make his speech entertaining in order to maintain the audience's attention. His attempt is shown in the frequency of level one intertextuality in his speech, using different linguistic devices such as rhyme phrase, word plays and metaphors. The constant change in the articulation of genre from parliamentary to casual promotes an interpersonal relationship between him and the electorate. Apart from the level one intertextuality, Samak also uses the Q-A pattern, sarcasm, hedges and social deixis but to a lesser degree. The different emphasis and the different choices of discursive strategies between the two speakers can be the result of the speaker's different roles (participant) and different aim and intention (cognition).

Chalerm was leader of the Muanchon Party in 1992. He led his party to join the opposition against the authoritarian government led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon. Therefore, Chalerm is associated with the angels. Samak, on the other hand was a leader of the PTP who joined that government. He was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of that regime. Hence, he was apparently one of the devils. His alliance with the 'wrong' side puts him in a more vulnerable position than Chalerm. Being aware that the public is not in favour of him, concerning his political move in 1992, it will not be wise for him to revisit that event in his speech as Chalerm did. Without the 1992 events as the point of departure, it will be difficult for Samak to dissuade people from the DP's flimsy picture. Moreover, Samak has to be cautious that his allegation against the DP, one of the angels, will not backfire on him. The different political position and roles of Chalerm and

Samak clearly constitute different aims and intentions. While Chalerm aims to convince people logically that under their virtuous façade, the DP is corrupt, Samak, unable to do that, resorts to making an emotional appeal to the public instead. The difference in the speakers' roles and cognition trigger different sets of discursive strategies in the two speeches.

Chapter 7 An Analysis of the 1996 Accusatory Speeches

7.0 Introduction

This chapter analyses three accusatory speeches from the 1996 no-confidence debate. The purpose of this chapter is, similar to chapter 6, to explore the dialectic relationship between context and discourse shown in the use of discursive strategies. The political context of these speeches is different from the 1995 debate. During this no-confidence debate, Chuan Leekpai and the DP are the opposition and the CTP is the leader of the coalition. The analysis of the speech discourse of the 1995 and 1996 debate will be able to answer if and how political situation can affect the speaker's choice of discursive strategies. Also the speeches from different speakers should provide some understanding to how the person's political roles and his aim and intention determine his choices of strategies.

This chapter has a similar structure to the previous one. It begins with the description of the political situation in 1996 highlighting people's scepticism towards Banharn's administration. The following section presents the analysis of the speech of three speakers: Chuan Leekpai, Sunai Julaphongsathorn and Trairong Suwanakiri. The analysis of each speech starts by sketching the speaker's political position and his role. Then it investigates the macropropositions of the speech (organisation of content). After this discursive strategies will be analysed.

7.1 Background

After the dissolution of parliament in May 1995, followed by a general election in July, Banharn Silpa-archa led his Chart Thai Party (CTP) to become the core of a five-party coalition. The coalition consisted of Chart Thai (CTP), New Aspiration (NAP), Social Action (SAP), Prachakorn Thai (PTP) and Muanchon Party (MP). Banharn, a provincial businessman-cum-politician, became the Prime Minister despite the scepticism of the urban middle class. His coalition exemplified the political approach of provincial businessmen which was found less than satisfying by the Thai elite and the typically pro-Democrat middle class. This group of urban people was cynical about Banharn's administrative abilities and doubtful about his honesty. Soon after Banharn formed his cabinet, there were allegations in the press concerning irregularities in contracts for business associations, political manipulation of state enterprise boards and bidding committees (King 1997: 160). The cabinet was accused of being under-qualified to administer the country. Moreover, its members were accused of corruption and benefit sharing amongst their cronies. Ten of Banharn's cabinet ministers first faced such allegations in a no-confidence debate in May 1996 (Suphawadi et al 1998). The government won the vote and there was an overhaul of the cabinet. Unfortunately,

the government's attempt to restore its image and build public credibility did not succeed. The relentless public unrest coupled with people's mounting scepticism further inflamed the issue and culminated in a no-confidence debate held in mid-September 1996.

This debate focused on Banharn himself. The opposition, led by the sharp-tongued former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, gained overwhelming support from the people of Bangkok and the Thai elite. The Democrats, who were renowned for their rhetorical ability, provided the core speakers of the debate. Being aware of their strong public support, the opposition launched allegations, some of them concerning the Prime Minister and his cabinet's administration, but many others related to the Prime Minister's personal life, for example, questions about his father's Thai nationality, the alleged falsification of his birth date, the alleged plagiarism of his MA thesis in law (King 1997: 161) and his daughter's alleged tax evasion. All these issues seemed to suggest that Banharn and his family lacked integrity. This level of emphasis on personal issues is not common in Thai no-confidence debates. These personal allegations launched in such an overt manner are a distinctive characteristic of this debate. Since the Democrats had been badly defeated in a no-confidence debate led by Banharn's party a year earlier over the issue of *so po ko 4-01*, their vehement attacks bore the hallmarks of a revenge mission.

7.2 Analysis of Discourse

In this section, the speeches given by three opposition members, namely Chuan Leekpai, Sunai Julaphongsathorn and Trairong Suwannakiri, will be analysed.

7.2.1 The Leader of the Opposition, Chuan Leekpai's Speech (18 September 1996)

Chuan Leekpai is another star of the parliament. He is the leader of one of the oldest and most prestigious political parties, the Democrats. He is the symbol of the provincial lower class people, '*luk mae kha*' (son of a street vendor) who aspired to become a Prime Minister through hard work, education and honesty. He was born in 1938 in Trang (Sathit 1996: 68), a small province in the south of Thailand. Despite his provincial background, he received a good education. He graduated with a Bachelor of Law degree from Thammasat University, one of the two most prestigious universities in Thailand. He also qualified as a barrister. His original career before becoming Thailand's first professional politician¹ was as a lawyer.

¹ Chuan is unusual in that he makes his living by being a politician. He lives on his salary as an MP while other MPs have another occupation such as owning business.

His rhetorical talent began to shine during his first term as Trang MP under the government led by the ‘innocent Prime Minister’ [*nayok khon su*]², military dictator, Field Marshall Thanom Kittikajorn. This government was notorious for corruption and cronyism. Chuan was given a slot to speak in one proceeding and he spoke in a distinguished way, criticising a more or less untouchable regime. While other MPs spoke vociferously, Chuan adopted a smooth style with a sarcastic edge that kept people listening. During that debate, Chuan observed that, ‘It is better for a country to be ruled by a fool who does not commit corruption than it to be ruled by an innocent who lets their cronies commit corruption’ [*ban muang rao nan tha pok khrong doi khon ngo thi mai ru jak kong kin di kwa pok khrong doi khon su thi ploi hai khon rop khang kong kin*] (Roengsak 1992: 76). This remark directly attacked the Prime Minister because it implied that Thanom, as a Prime Minister, must take responsibility for any wrongdoings made by members of his government. When Thanom finally realised that he had been criticised, he protested. However, the Speaker could not ask Chuan to take back his words because Chuan did not mention anyone’s name (Roengsak 1992: 76). Since then he has been popular for his rhetoric, most of which is sarcastic in tone. He has been branded a ‘honey-coated razor’, the title which hints at his ability to use sweet words and indirectness to make a strong sarcastic remarks.

In September 1992, Chuan became the twentieth Prime Minister of Thailand. He was the first Prime Minister who rose solely from public mandate without any support from the army (Sathit 1996: 37). He is one of the few civilian Prime Ministers who has not had any link with the military or the police.³ During the run up to the election, Chuan and the Democrats were not leading in the poll. The turning point was when he gave a speech at the National Stadium which was broadcast nationwide. It was a very good speech that helped precipitate the ‘Chuan Fever’ phenomenon’ (Sathit 1996: 38). The Democrats were elected as a majority in the House (Sathit 1996: 38-39). This is another occasion where Chuan’s talent shone. Chuan marked the rise of professional politicians. This signaled the end of the ‘essential’ close link between the government and the army. Though his term was cut short by the 1995 no-confidence debate, he managed to come back for a second term in 1997.

During the September 1996 no-confidence debate, Chuan, as the leader of the opposition, made an opening statement to the debate. His statement, especially the introduction of the issues of the debate, clearly foreshadowed the aggressive and offensive nature of the forthcoming debate.

² *Nayok khon su* or the innocent Prime Minister is the phrase Thanom used to describe himself. It is his way to dissociate himself from the alleged corruption and cronyism in his government.

³ Ever since Thailand changed from absolute monarchy to democracy, most of the Prime Ministers and the key persons in the government have had close links with either the army or the police corps. The persons who succeeded in major office were always those whom the army supported.

7.2.1.1 Organisation of Content

The duty of Chuan's keynote speech is to set the stage for this no-confidence debate. The macropropositions of his speech are:

- a. The irregularities in the government's administration need to be addressed urgently. He states the reasons behind this no-confidence debate motion. Since this debate was held only five months after the opposition's previous no-confidence debate in May, Chuan's speech has to justify this urgency.
- b. To give a preview of the allegations that this debate will touch on.

He starts with a rhetorical explanation of why the opposition felt obliged to initiate this debate, and in the process, sarcastically criticises the Prime Minister's inability and unfit mentality. Almost half of the speech can be categorised as a ritual beginning and preface to the allegations, because what it mainly does is justify the opposition's action. In the third part of his speech, containing the allegations, Chuan does not actually make detailed allegations. Instead he does what the opening speech should do, which is to give a preview of the allegations and an outline of what the debate would touch on. At the end of this part, Chuan returns to legitimise his and the opposition's actions once again. He later concludes his speech in the fourth part alluding to a quotation he found in a journal of the National Defence College on National Strategy. He uses this quotation to make his point that the opposition set the no-confidence debate motion only for the benefit of the Thai people.

7.2.1.2 Strategic Analysis

Ritual Beginning

Chuan begins the first part of his debate in a rather more formal and official manner. First he introduces himself using a first person pronoun which has formal/official register *kraphom* instead of *phom*. In fact, both *kraphom* and *phom* are formal pronouns but *kraphom* is more formal and signals a more ritualised situation than *phom*. However, later on in his speech he alternately uses both *kraphom* and *phom* to refer to himself. His formality is also reflected in the use of the word *krap rian* instead of the more commonly used word *rian*. *Rian* is a word with formal register which roughly means 'to inform'. When adding *krap* - which means the act of paying respect - before *rian*, the combined effect is an increased level of respect toward the addressee. As a result it has become more formal and more polite. These words which show extra politeness and formality could be considered characteristic of Chuan's speech.

Instead of generally legitimising his action, Chuan starts by referring to the Constitutional clause which legitimises the opposition's actions in a no-confidence debate.

Your Honour the Speaker. I am Chuan Leekpai, member of the House of Representatives from Trang province. As leader of the opposition and on behalf of the opposition, I would like to propose a debate to pass the vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa according to article 156 of the Amended Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2534 (5th version) B.E. 2538. (line 1-7)

[than prathan thi khao rop kraphom nai Chuan Leekpai samachik sapha phuthaen ratsadon jangwat trang phak prachathipat nai thana phunam fai khan kraphom kho sanoe yatti kho poet ahiprai mai wai wang jai nai Banharn Silpa-archa nayokratthamontri tam ratthathanun haeng ratcha anajak thai phutthasakkarat 2534 kaekhai phoemtoem doi ratthathanun haeng ratcha anajak thai kaekhai phoemtoem (chabap thi 5) phutthasakkarat 2538 matra 156]

By referring to the Constitution, Chuan can transfer the inviolability of the Constitution to his argument and thereby develop credibility for his case. This style of making reference to other sources while making his point, as in academic writing or borrowing another's voice can be seen as his rhetorical characteristic, and it will be seen again later on in his speech.

He clearly states the reason why the opposition feel obliged to call for a no-confidence debate in the second paragraph (line 8-20). He starts with a broad generalisation saying:

As it has been generally acknowledged that Banharn Silpa-archa, the Prime Minister has ... (line 8-9)

[Duai prakot pen thi sap thua pai wa nai Banharn Silpa-archa nayokratthamontri dai...]

Here Chuan makes a claim using the voice of 'many others' instead of his own voice. By saying that 'it has been generally acknowledged', he presents his allegations that follow as *given*. By employing overgeneralisation, he almost reduces it to the level of common sense; something that 'everybody' thinks, something obvious. In doing that, his claim has become less debatable. In fact it is likely to be taken as 'general truth', *common ground knowledge* that people can accept without much challenging. By opening his claim in the form of a general truth, he runs less risk of being challenged. It is then easier for Chuan to state his claim in a relatively more provocative manner. Indeed the whole first paragraph consists of accusations why Banharn is 'generally acknowledged' as unfit to be in office.

As it has been generally acknowledged that Banharn Silpa-archa, the Prime Minister has been administering the country without knowledge or ability, without efficiency or success, without vision or awareness, morality or ethics. He does not have a sense of leadership. He has deceitful behaviour. He avoids responsibility and is dishonoured. He conspired with the cabinet and his cronies to abuse his office and power in search of an unlawful benefit. He ignores corruption. (He) Is concerned more with his own survival rather than that of the country. There are also illegal actions and he does not conform to the policy declared to the parliament. (He) Intentionally takes away public right to have access to information (by) forcing the media to present one-sided news in order to cover up his personal vices and the vices of the coalition. The behaviours mentioned have caused

tremendous damage to the country in its administration, foreign affairs, politics, economics and morale. (line 8- 20)

[Duai prakot pen thi sap thua pai wa nai Banharn Silpa-archa nayok ratthamontri dai borihan ratchakan phaendin doi khat khwamru khwamsamat rai prasithiphap rai prasithiphon khatwisai that khat wijaranayan khat khunatham khat jaryatham khat phawa khwam pen phunam mi phrutikam chochon hengaetua pat khwamrapphitchop raisaksi somkhop kap ratthamontri ruamratthaban lae phakphuak chai tamnaengnathi itthiphon sawaengha phonprayot doi michop ployplalaloei haimikan choratbangluang khamnung thung khwamyurotsuanton makwa kwamyurot khong prathetchat doi ruam thang mi kan kratham phit kotmai mai patibat tam nayobai thi thalaeng wai toe ratthasapha jongjai litron sitthi seriphap nai kan rapru khaosan khong prachachon bip bangkhap susanmuanchon hai nen kan sanoe khao dan dieao doi jetana pokpit khwam chuarai thang khong suan ton lae ratthaban sung phrutikam kan borihan ratchakan phaendin dungklao dai ko haikoet khwamsiahai yangyailuang kae banmuang thang thangdan kanborihan kantangprathet kanmuang sethakit sangkhom lae jaryatham]

Some of the allegations here are bald on record FTAs without redress. The outright insults and provocative accusations mentioned in the ritual beginning clearly attack the Prime Minister's PPF, according to Brown and Levinson's definition. The fact that a no-confidence debate attacks the Prime Minister's PPF makes this no-confidence debate discourse different from, say, Prime Minister's question time in Britain. The British Prime Minister's question time can be considered a counterpart of Thai no-confidence debates in the sense that it is when the leader of government is under scrutiny by the opposition. According to Harris's work on British Prime Minister's question time, she finds that threats to the positive face of the Prime Minister are also frequent and intensive (Harris 2001: 469). However, the British opposition mainly attacks the administrative ability of the Prime Minister. This is a threat to the Prime Minister's PPF. However, they never emphasise the personal characteristics of the Prime Minister at the same level as Thai debate does. FTAs in Thai no-confidence debate may be threatening to the Prime Minister's personal character. This is made apparent in the following example:

...(The Prime Minister) behaves deceitfully, is selfish, avoids responsibility and is dishonoured. (line 11-12)

[mi phrutikam chochon henkaetua pat khwamrapphitchop raisaksi]

The underlined negative remark is concerned more with the Prime Minister's personal character than with his administrative ability. It would not have been argued had it not been in line with public opinion. The claim that the Prime Minister is 'dishonoured' is precisely what the people consider his foremost defect, despite the fact that it has very little to do with his administration.

Chuan does not use hedges in this section. Moreover he states his claim in the most absolute and straightforward manner. This absoluteness can be used to show the extent to which the opposition thought the Prime Minister was unfit to stay in office.

Mr. Banharn Silpa-archa has entirely lost his legitimacy to be the Prime Minister and if we let him stay on in office, it will bring a tremendous and endless damage to the country. (line 22-24)

[nai Banharn Silpa-archa mot khwamchoptham nai kan damrong tamnaeng nayok ratthamontri doi sinchoeng]

He also uses overstatement to emphasise that the opposition has done its best to give the government a chance to prove themselves, but the government has not made the best of this opportunity. The idea that the government has failed to grasp the opportunity they are offered seems to suggest that to propose a no-confidence motion is the only choice the opposition has in order to protect the public interest from whatever harm that the coalition may intentionally or unintentionally inflict.

We had given the most chances we possibly could to this government. (line 130)

[rao dai hai okat ratthaban yang mak jon thung thi sut]

It has been suggested earlier that one of the allegations was about the unsophisticated mentality of the Prime Minister. At that time, many people believed that the Prime Minister was not only unsophisticated, but in fact dull-witted. It would sound unfair to blame someone for his/her stupidity, since the accuser might be regarded as someone who attacked his/her opponent's personal flaws. However, stupidity could be ridiculed indirectly. Chuan picks on the Prime Minister's (lack of) intelligence by using sarcasm. That way, he gives himself a safety exit while he is still able to attack this 'personal flaw'. Not only has he found a safe way to attack a taboo trait, he can also show his wit in the process.

This issue (can be said that it) does not need any interpretation at all because the Constitution article 172 and article 173 states (cover this issue) clearly and I do not wish to waste my time reviewing the paper of Sukhothai Thammathirat University's lecturer who kindly gave his opinion in the newspaper (on the issue) but I would like to present it to you one more time for fear of misunderstanding especially for those who do not have expertise in law to express that this is not a confusing matter at all. It can be considered a fundamental legal knowledge which can be read and understood. (line 42- 48)

[ruang ni keup ja phut dai wa mai tong ti khwam arai loei phro kotmai ratthathanun matra 172 matra 173 ja banyat oau wai chat jen lae kraphom eng ko mai prasong thi ja sia wela thopthuan botkhwam khong ajan jak mahawitthayalai sukhothai thammathirat thi dai karuna hai khwam hen wai nai nangsuephim tae wa yak ja nam ma krap rian ik khrang nung phro wa ja khao jai phit doi chapho khon thi mai dai mi khwam ru thang kot mai phro ruang ni mai dai pen pan ha thi sap son kuap ja phut dai wa pen khwam ru buangton thang kotmai thi samat an lae khao jai dai]

The law is not misleading at all here. It states clearly (about the issue) but the Prime Minister used his common sense (to interpret the issue) and said that if the leader of the team is out, the rest will also be out. Then this means a vote of no-confidence for the whole cabinet, no, this cannot be. Please do not take it that way because it would surely be misleading for freshmen and sophomore law students. (line 66-69)

[trong ni kotmai mai sapson loei khrap kotmai banyat wai chat jen tae than nayok ja chai saman samnuk wa huana thim phon luk thim koe phon pai duai phro chanan thu wa]

aphiprai thang khana an ni mai dai khrap karuna ya khaojai yang nan phro wa ja tham hai nak-rian kotmai pi nung pi song ja sapson nae tha pen yang ni]

This sarcasm can be explained as deductive logic in the form of an *enthymeme*. Enthymeme is a kind of argument which requires dialectical interaction between speaker and listener to complete its logic. (van Eemeren et al 1997: 213). The term refers to an argument whose logic has to be completed by an audience.

Premise 1: The issue is not misleading; ordinary people should be able to understand.

Premise 2: The Prime Minister (despite being a law graduate) interpreted it wrongly.

Conclusion: The Prime Minister's intelligence is below average.

The issue mentioned here concerns the precise scope of the no-confidence debate's motion which supported the passing of a vote of no-confidence in the Prime Minister. While Banharn, the Prime Minister, interpreted it as a vote of no-confidence in the whole cabinet, Chuan here demolishes down Banharn's interpretation, insisting that it is not the right one. Chuan, a law graduate who is renowned for his expertise in legal matters, continues to ridicule the Prime Minister who has just graduated with a Bachelor degree in law in his fifties from an open university, Sukhothai Thammathirat. He implicitly suggests that the interpretative error made by Banharn is in fact so simple that anyone should be able to understand. He belittles Banharn with the implication that a law graduate like Banharn has made an error, which even an ordinary person would not.

From line 72 to 96, Chuan gives an extensive explanation of parliamentary democracy and the auditing mechanisms within the system with occasional reference to the Constitution. This explanation shows off his knowledge of law and regulations, the strategy he often uses to accentuate his proficiency in the field. Placing this self-promotion right after an argument suggesting that Banharn is far from skilful, highlights the contrast between Banharn and himself. After 24 lines of explanation, he makes his point that this no-confidence debate is simply the duty of MPs who have the people's mandate. This auditing duty is allowed or even encouraged by the Constitution. As a result, his point, which is to legitimise his action and the opposition's action, is made in a more formal way. He does not just state his legitimacy. Instead his statement is supported by the Constitution. Consequently, his statement sounds more convincing.

Towards the end of the ritual beginning, he indirectly accuses the government of using 'dirty tricks' to limit the opposition's right to speak. He begins with a sarcastic remark saying that the reason why he has to explain himself is to prevent the police from misunderstanding him. By saying this, he hints that the opposition's actions are being watched closely by a group of policemen. The subordinate clause 'so that the police will not have to follow me' presupposes that the police *will* follow him if the action in the main clause is not done (to urge the Speaker to

understand him). This remark is an indirect accusation of the government's abuse of power; that the police are ordered by their superiors, in this case, politicians to monitor the opposition's action, for example, to follow opposition members or tap their telephone conversations. In general, Chuan is implicitly saying that there are many illegal forces threatening the opposition, thus preventing them from finding information, or saying anything against the coalition.

Mr. Speaker I'd urge you to understand our mission here (so that) the policemen will not have to follow me. So the search for confidential issues by tapping the telephone line which threatens not only politicians but also government officials and ordinary people will not happen. Whoever initiated these, whoever conducted these, we may never find the receipt to establish evidence against him/her. But I think something that should not happen has happened. I have encountered it myself. (line 140-146)

[than prathan khrap phom yak ja hai khao jai pharakit khong rao trong ni santiban ja mai tong tam phuak phom kan suep ha khwam lap doi kan chai withi banthuek siang thorasap sung tham hai koet khwam wat phawa mai chaphoe nai mu nakkamuang tae nai mu kharatchakan lae prachachon thua pai ja dai mai koet khuen khrai ja pen tua kan tham koe tam rao mai at thi ja oao bai set ma yuen yan dai tae phom kit wa bang sing bang yang mai khuan koet khuen laeo phom prasop duai tua eng]

The point he wishes to make is in the presupposition of what he said, not what he actually utters. The word 'so that' shows that the subordinate clause is the reason for his action in the main clause.

Utterance: I speak up so that the police will not take action against me.

Presupposition: If I do not speak up, the police will take action against me.

The presupposition is an indirect accusation that the police will be commanded by 'someone' to obstruct the opposition's investigation into the government's malpractice. The prime suspect behind the police action is certainly the person who will be threatened by Chuan's action that is the government themselves. Even though this issue involved serious illegal actions and is against basic human rights, Chuan manages to give it a hook by adding humour to his sarcastic remark.

...saying that there are two policemen arrived here before you and (they) asked to join the audience in order to report what they heard to the *phuyai* (higher rank official, elderly, master or a person in authority). I believed that the *phuyai* here did not mean *phuyai ban* (village headman) or *kamnan* (sub-district warden) but rather means their superior. (line 150-151)

This example shows the *violation of salience* (Weiner 1997: 142) to create incongruity. Here Chuan creates humour by playing with the word *phuyai*, a word which has several meanings depending on the context. It may refer to an elderly person, village headman [*phuyai ban*], higher ranking official, master or a person in authority. Here the pun is created from this word. The use of puns signals an informal register. Thus, Chuan also creates level one intertextuality here. Chuan uses a pun to suggest that by *phuyai*, the policemen mean their superior and not other meanings of the word. It can be expected that Thai language users know which meaning of the word is intended. Moreover, they are also aware of the policemen's intention to be vague by using a word

that has several meanings like *phuyai*. Therefore when Chuan mentions a meaning such as *phuyai ban* which is not salient in this context, audience are led to think that he is only being sarcastic. After that he compares the situation he finds at the moment with that under the authoritarian regime some twenty years ago. By alluding to authoritarian behaviour, he implicitly suggests that the government at that time, though under a democratic system, is behaving in an authoritarian manner.

I have been followed since my university days because I was against authoritarianism during Field Marshal Sarit's regime but I thought it was well and truly over long ago. It should not have happened in this era. (line 155- 157).

Preface to the Allegations

In this part, Chuan makes his arguments in a claim and support arrangement. The explanation given can be in the form of definition of the word mentioned, a reason for his statement or an example of the thing he mentions. There are three arguments made according to this structure;

Argument 1

Claim: For the outcome that occurred, we gave justice to the government. (line 168-169)

Support: Justice here means...(line 169- 174)

Argument 2

Claim: But at the same time we'd have to take into account the general standard, not this government's standard. (line 174- 175)

Support: Because if we take this government's standard... (line 175- 178)

Argument 3

Claim: ... it appeared that neither the friends that they have asked for information from nor does information sought from other sources seem very relevant. (line 181- 183)

Support: for example, the case that had economic impact... (line 183- 188)

The systematic structure of the argument consisting of a claim backed up by logical support in the form of a definition (argument 1), reason (argument 2) or example (argument 3) makes the argument sound convincing. This clear pattern of argument makes it less debatable. In other words, Chuan's explanation clarifies any point which might be argued. It can be said that his systematic structure of argument helps cover his back and as a result closes any opportunity that the government might have to dispute his claims.

The clarity and strength of his arguments in this part play a crucial role for the rest of the speech. This preface to the allegations' duty is to set the stage for the allegations. This part, therefore, is supposed to give a convincing introduction to the more controversial aspects of the allegations. The more convincing this part is, the easier it will be for the speaker to steer the audience's attention to the allegations in the next section of the speech.

The Allegations

Chuan's opening speech for this no-confidence debate does not discuss details of the arguments. What he does is give the audience an outline or an overview of allegations to be presented later on in the debate by other speakers. There are four allegations presented here. His speech prepares the audience for the upcoming debate and, more importantly, helps justify the opposition's speech as a whole.

Being aware of the major role of his speech, Chuan's arguments are structured in a way that not only convey his point but also claim public opinion as well. By claiming the public voice, Chuan can present the negative points of the government while still maintaining his PPF as someone who is objective because he does not speak for himself but on behalf of the people. He claims to be in tune with public antipathy towards the government but he also shows his attempt to acknowledge the good points of the government as well. His arguments can be categorised linguistically into four prototypical form of arguments:

a. claim + support

Example:

The government gives priority to the political benefit and conveniences, seeks benefit for their cronies in the 5000 millions bahts that is supposed to be distributed to offices which have been established unnecessarily. This is like putting another load on the standing weighty load. What is the load, Mr. Speaker? The load is the government's untrustworthiness.(line 254-258)

[trong ni koe muan nueng sing thi pai thapthom namnak doem thi mi yu laeo hai man nak khao ma ik namnak nan khu arai khrap than prathan? Namnaknan khu namnak khong khwam mai chua thu thi mi to ratthaban] (line 256-258)

Here Chuan gives a definition of what he terms 'the load'. By providing a definition, he justifies his new terminology while presenting another negative characteristic of the government, that is the government is not trustworthy. This untrustworthiness is presented here through presupposition, it is then seen as a given information, common knowledge shared by all the people, when in fact it is another point entirely independent from the present argument. Whether or not the government is trustworthy is another point which requires explanation.

b. Prolepsis

Prolepsis is an argument in denial of the claim that is to be made or an attempt to dissociate him/herself from the claim. 'It allows S to express their prejudice or negative comments while denying such articulation' (Lockyer and Pickering 2001: 639). Prolepsis is a rhetorical device that offers two advantages. First it prevents S from threatening his/her own face while making negative comments; it makes the comment sounds unprejudiced and therefore S can maintain his/her PF and

PPF as a rational and objective person. Second, seen as a 'rational and objective' remark, his/her criticism appear to be common ground knowledge, not ideological. Chuan's prolepsis can be categorised into three patterns:

Pattern 1: I understand that (probable government's explanation/excuse)+ but + allegation

Chuan starts his argument with a proposition which has a positive element such as 'I understand that' or 'I will not blame you for'. These propositions express his empathy for the Prime Minister. It works as a prolepsis suggesting that he is not just a typical opposition member who was only there to oppose all the government's actions. Also this prolepsis leads the audience to believe that the Prime Minister will not be reprimanded or criticised. However, the word 'but' is used as the nodal point (Ibid) signaling that the discourse is turning into yet another accusation.

Example:

To force the Prime Minister to choose a keen person from other party, I understand that it was not feasible [*phom khao jai khrap wa man tham mai dai*]. Telling this party to select this person and that party to select that person is something that could be asked but it is entirely the right of that particular coalition party to have the last word in choosing anyone they see fit. Therefore this point cannot be considered the Prime Minister's fault but [*tae*] for the part which is under your control because like within your own party's quota or the part that the Chart Thai Party asked you to select. Your party member even stepped down from the contest to give you more freedom of choosing any capable person to handle such an important responsibility as economic portfolio. I did not see you appointed any MP which means that members of your party gave their consent for you to select even a non MP. It means that you have an opportunity to choose from even the non MPs who are capable of solving an economic problem. (line 198-207)⁴

Chuan's speech acknowledges what will probably be the government's explanation or excuse for the allegation he is about to make. In this example, the probable excuse is that the Prime Minister cannot control the entire selection process. After acknowledging the part that is not under the Prime Minister's control, he goes on to limit his accusation only to the part which is apparently under the Prime Minister's control. By blocking any exit the Prime Minister may have, Chuan's accusation against the Prime Minister has become more concrete.

Pattern 2: I am not/ do not (negativity)+ but + allegation

Example:

I will not blame you of [*phom mai tamni na khrap wa*] the persons you chose are not keen, are not good but [*tae*] I am saying that we have criticised this from the very beginning saying that he/she might not fit that particular portfolio. The person you chose is not suitable for that office. He/She might be capable of being put in another, more suitable position and therefore should be put in the right place. (line 207- 210)

⁴ This is an argument leading up to the allegation that the Prime Minister chose inefficient and unfit persons to join his administration.

This is another form of prolepsis. By saying in the beginning that he ‘will not blame...’, he implicitly suggests that he is simply coming here on a mission to blame the government for whatever they have done. Instead he shows his attempt to look for something positive to say about a seemingly negative issue. As a result, he has promoted his PPF as an unprejudiced social member. In this example, the positive point he makes is that the person the Prime Minister chose is not entirely inefficient but is only unfortunate because he/she is put in a job that he/she is not good at. Having said that, the person appointed is now relieved of the responsibility, leaving only the Prime Minister to blame, because he is the one who incompetently placed the person. Therefore, on closer examination, the positive point made here does not put the Prime Minister in any better position. In fact, Chuan mentions the positive points in order to rule out other people who can possibly share the blame leaving Banharn, the Prime Minister, on trial alone.

Pattern 3: You⁵ are not/ do not (negativity)+ but + allegation

Or

This is not (negativity)+ but + allegation

Example:

In fact, to be fair, we can say that your administration does not cause damage to the entire population of the country [*khwam jing tha phut kan kan yang yuttitham kan borihan khong than koe mai chai wa ja tham hai khon thang prathet sia hai*]. There are some people who benefit from it. (but) [*tae*] they are those within your circle. They are businessmen within your business circle who are doing business with you, your relatives. (line 295- 298)

In this example, Chuan begins with an apparently positive statement saying that Banharn’s administration is not entirely a disaster. While the audience is expecting to hear something positive about Banharn’s administration after this statement, they hear something which is actually worse than ‘disastrous’. Chuan says that the people who benefit from this administration do exist but they are Banharn’s cronies. In other words, he uses the prolepsis as a slipway to make yet another allegation about Banharn’s cronyism saying that Banharn is corrupt and abuses his power for the benefit of his alliances (Lockyer and Pickering 2001: 637). Chuan’s utterance that there are some people benefiting from Banharn’s administration presupposes something positive (people benefiting from his administration). Then the presupposition which is a good one, is cancelled and the meaning intended is suggested instead. The people that benefit from his administration are revealed to be his cronies, thus indicating the cronyism in Banharn’s administration. By setting up a presupposition that is cancelled, Chuan also creates incongruity between the audience’s expectations (presupposition) and what has actually been said.

⁵ ‘You’ here refers to the government.

Apart from the two argument strategies, Chuan's speech is also distinctive in the prolific use of direct insult mostly attacking the Prime Minister for his alleged inability.

You use your own standard. Can your standard be considered as a standard? Is it good enough to measure up to that sort of standard? (line 212-213)

[*than oao matrathan khong than ma wat matrathan than wat dai ru khrap? man pho thi ja wat ru khrap matrathan yang nan?*]

In this example, the sarcasm is an indirect insult to the Prime Minister suggesting that Banharn's standard is not good enough to be used as a standard. By saying that, he threatens Banharn's PF and PPF; he indicates that Banharn is wrong (Brown and Levinson 1987: 66).

In the third part of his speech, there is an increasing use of hedges. The shift from absoluteness seen in the first part signals that he does not want to clash with the government head-on. Instead he uses his rhetorical talent to emphasise his argument in a persuasive and circumstantial way. By doing it this way, he can maintain his 'clean' image. Chuan Leekpai, though he is known as a sharp-tongued politician, is not seen as aggressive.

I am afraid that this sort of idea might not be the idea internationally accepted concerning the stock market. (line 232- 233)⁶

[*phom kreng wa khwam kit yang ni man ja mai pen khwam kit thi sakon nai ruang khong talat laksap*]

Generally speaking, this part of his speech is structured in a relatively more cautious manner compared to the first two parts. He has become much more indirect. He makes his points in a more cautious way, pre-empting every possible counter argument the government might have. However, he is still very much concerned with his PPF and the public's opinion towards the opposition. Therefore towards the end of the section which he outlines, he returns to legitimise his and the opposition's obligation to conduct this debate. Also he tries to develop an understanding with the people in Suphanburi province, Banharn's constituency. The Suphanburi people have come to gather in the *lan phra rup*, a square next to the parliament, during the debate in order to support their long term MP who appears to be under attack by the adversarial Democrats. Here, Chuan is trying to reconcile himself with the Suphanburi people.

It turned out to be a question of to fight or not to fight [*su ru mai su*] until the Prime Minister had to come out and said that the Suphanburi people is afraid of no one [*chao suphanburi mai klua khrai*]. Mr. Speaker I'd like to humbly clarify [*krap rian*] this point that this debate is not against the people of Suphanburi. I respect sisters and brothers of Suphanburi. I have learned history. I know that Suphanburi people are fighter [*nak su*]. Suphanburi, in the curriculum, we remember that it was a western border town. Suphanburi people and all the Thais fought to protect our land so we have our country to live in until these days. (line 343- 350)

⁶ His argument concerning the Prime Minister's speech says that the stock market could be made to go up or down at will. Therefore the fact that the market was down at that time was not an important issue.

His speech, acknowledging the important and the heroic deeds of the Suphanburi people in the past, functions as a counter argument against the government's attempt to accuse the opposition of trying to humiliate the people of Suphanburi by way of humiliating their MP, Banharn.

Conclusion

Chuan employs one discursive strategy throughout the speech, that is, the use of other people's voice to make his point: level two intertextuality. For the conclusion, Chuan refers to a quotation he came across in a journal.

These days people have lost faith in the government they have elected because they perceive not only that the government lacks ability and expertise in administering the country, on top of that it has become the source of social and national problems, for example, the problem of government instability, problem of the legitimacy of the past election, problem of economic downturn, the plunge in stock market, the increase in crime, the government's lack of vision. Moreover, the most worrying issue is the public lack of trust in the government, which may lead to a lack of faith in the parliamentary democracy because the people may think that the system is the source of government that causes problem rather than solves problems. (line 392- 401)

[thuk wan ni prachachon dai khat khwam leuam sai sattha to ratthaban thi khao mi suan luak tang kun ma duai hen wa nok jak ratthaban ja kat fimai fimu nai kan borihan prathet hai koet khwam jaroen rungreuang nai dan tang tang laeo ratthaban yang klap pen fai sang panha hai kap sangkhom lae prathetchat doiruam ik duai chen panha kan khat sathiraphap khong ratthaban panha khwam thuktong choptham kieukap kan luaktang thi phanma panha setthakit sopsao huntok atchayakam phoem ratthaban khat wisai that penton ying kwanan sing thi na pen huang yang ying koe ku kan khat khwam sattha toe ratthaban yang kwang khwang ni at nam paisu kan khat khwam sattha to rabop prachathipatai doi prachachon at khit wa rabop kan pokkhrong ni pen thi ma khong ratthaban thi sang panha makkwa kae panha khong sangkhom]

He summarises the allegations and repeats them again in the conclusion. He states what harm this government might do to the country if they were left in office. He uses presupposed damage to legitimise the opposition's no-confidence motion. By referring to this quotation, Chuan implicitly suggests that it is not only him and the opposition who think that the government is incapable and unfit to be in office, there are also other people who agree with him. He uses 'people's' voice to make his claim, for example, 'people have lost faith' or 'public lack of trust in the government'. By borrowing other people's voices, he transfers the mandate of the people to support his own argument. The claim is presented in a form of common ground knowledge because it is a claim of the general public. Chuan can be seen as an objective person who delivers his speech entirely on behalf of the people.

7.2.2 Sunai Julaphongsathorn's Speech (18 September 1996)

Sunai Julaphongsathorn is a first term Chart Pattana Party MP for Nakornsawan province. He was born in 1951. He graduated as a Bachelor of Law from Chulalongkorn University. He was a

businessman before becoming a politician in 1994. His first political position was as an advisor to the Minister of Finance. He was elected as Nakorn Sawan MP in the general election of 1995.

7.2.2.1 Organisation of Content

The macropropositions of Sunai's speech are:

- a. Banharn's age does not make him wiser.
- b. The land purchased by the BOT in fact belongs to Banharn's wife, *khunying* Jamsai.
- c. Sunai has nothing against the Suphanburi people.

Sunai's speech can be considered the least organised speech among the five speeches being analysed. Even though his speech is rich with mostly conclusive evidence, it is poorly structured. The lack of structure undermines the quality of his evidence. Despite the fact that his speech focuses on only one major allegation - the irregularities in the BOT land purchase - the lack of structure makes his speech sound more complicated than it should be.

Sunai's speech begins with a couple of lines of ritual beginning. Then it moves on to give the background to the allegation. Giving background to the allegation is categorised as a preface to the allegation. After that, he returns to legitimise himself and develop understanding with his audience again. Self-legitimising and developing understanding with the audience are features of the ritual beginning. Therefore, it can be said that he returns to continue his ritual beginning again.

He mentions many other sources and uses many reasons to justify his speech. As a result, his ritual beginning becomes very long, spanning thirteen pages. Moreover, some of his reasons seem only remotely related to the topic. During this part, he is interrupted three times by the Speaker and protested against seven times, one of which is a protest about the Speaker's verdict, two of which are about Sunai's mentioning of people outside the parliament.

Apart from the lack of structure, Sunai tends to mention many sorts of evidence in order to support his claim. The evidence he uses can be categorised as follows: documentary evidence, evidence from secondary sources such as newspapers or magazines and his first-hand experience. Most of his evidence is convincing but sometimes there is a problem with his argument. Instead of using a claim and support structure to make his points one by one, he generally uses extensive support consisting of more than one piece of evidence to justify his claim. Some of the evidence he uses is conclusive, some of it is inconclusive, some of it sounds only remotely relevant to his claim and some of it is simply not a logical support of his claim. The more evidence he uses to reinforce his claim, the more probable it is that he will be using an illogical support. The non-logical support

among other logical support reduces the worthiness of his argument. Also, the loose structure of his argumentation gives an opportunity for other MPs, from the coalition side to challenge him. However, some of these interruptions can also be seen as intentionally solicited in order to draw attention. During the allegation part, he is interrupted five times and protested against seven times.

7.2.2.2 Strategic Analysis

Ritual Beginning

The ritual beginning of Sunai's speech is divided into two parts; the initial part consists of the first seven lines and the second part consists of 158 lines starting from line 42 to 200. In the first part, he introduces himself and then he challenges the government personally

Your Honour the Speaker. I am Sunai Julaphongsathorn. Nakorn Sawan MP. from Chart Pattana Party. People living along Chao Phraya river bank are afraid of no one, Mr. Speaker. I am from the river source. (line 1-3)

He uses deductive argumentation to make his point:

Premise 1:

People living along Chao Phraya River bank are afraid of no one. (a is x)

Premise 2:

I am from the source of Chao Phraya River. (I am a)

Conclusion:

I am afraid of no one. (I am x)

The way he puts forward his challenge using an *enthymeme* implicitly suggests that he is afraid of no one. He starts by claiming that he, as one of the people living along Chao Phraya River, is afraid of no one (line 3). His claim implies that there are people threatening him if he talks. What he says suggests that he is ready for whatever harm those people might do. To say that, 'I am afraid of no one' functions as an uptake for a threat in the Thai context. This phrase alone exemplifies what his speech is going to be about. The fact that Sunai begins his speech by challenging the government personally suggests the ongoing adversarial atmosphere between the two sides. The adversarial emotion is further emphasised in his next point. He uses metaphor to make a comment on what he sees as an untimely interruption by the Prime Minister. The figure of speech allows him to make this point which could have otherwise been interrupted, because it is an FTA by nature.

I was just like a plane ready to take off. Suddenly, the Prime Minister jumped in and blocked the runway. If I hadn't stamped on the brake, he would have been run over. (line 4-7)

In this quotation, not only does he criticise the Prime Minister's move, he also signals that the Prime Minister could get himself hurt (being run over) as a result. By that, he presents the Prime

Minister as someone who does not know what he is doing while Sunai himself is more knowledgeable and more wary, as represented by the captain of the plane in this metaphor. The interpersonal relationship between him and the Prime Minister is that of someone who is intellectually superior to the latter.

In the second part of the ritual beginning, Sunai is trying to legitimise his standpoint as well as his speech. He tries to make people understand that he is objective and that he has to debate against Banharn solely because he sees that the public welfare is at risk. Moreover, he says that the evidence he is using in his speech has been meticulously chosen and prepared. He starts this part by directly urging the other MPs not to protest against him. After that he uses self-legitimation to present reasons why they should not do so.

For the first aim of developing understanding between himself and his audience, Sunai starts by projecting himself as a modest MP. He claims inferiority and heightens Banharn's superiority. He suggests that he knows what he should do before an 'honourable' Prime Minister. At face value, he seems to be aware of his inferior position and is trying to act appropriately. However, given the situation of the no-confidence debate and what he speaks before and after the quotation, this can only be taken as sarcasm.

Actually, I do not wish to start here. It seems inappropriate. Talking to *phu yai*⁷ like the Prime Minister, I should have started with a eulogy. I should have asked Mr Speaker to grant permission. (line 42-44)

From this quotation, it can be seen that Sunai's sarcasm is constructed by acknowledging the social norm 'be polite to an elder person' before deliberately violating it by not giving him due respect. Sarcasm is created from the contradiction of what he says he should do and the message he is sending that Banharn is not a respectable elder (*phuyai*) and therefore does not deserve to be treated like one.

Apart from highlighting the Prime Minister's respectable position, Sunai also picks on the Prime Minister's age. By putting him in a high and respectable position, the seriousness of the allegations are aggravated. In other words, Sunai tries to emphasise Banharn's honourable position and maturity in order to create a sarcastic effect. He implicitly argues that despite the fact that Banharn is 63 years of age which means that he should have quite a lot of experience, Banharn is not as wise as a person of his age should be. To achieve this effect, he either simply picks on the figure for Banharn's age or compares Banharn's activity at a certain age with his own at the same age.

⁷ As mentioned earlier, *phuyai* has many definitions. Despite this, all of them connote respectability. In any case, the concept signifies the respectable quality of a person. (Suwanna and Nuangnoi 1999).

...I have it [document] bound into a book from volume 1,2,3,4,5 up to 63 volumes 125 pages altogether. The number 63 here is not intentional. It happens to fall on the number 63. The number is accidentally the same as the Prime Minister's age. (line 71- 73)
 I have fought for democracy since my head was just the size of my fist. Since I was younger than the Prime Minister. (line 84- 85)
[phom su ruang prachathippatai ma tang tae hua thao kampan tae ayu noi kwa than nayok]

In the first quotation, Sunai only picks on the Prime Minister's age saying that the number of his volumes coincides with his age. This coincidence is mentioned as a way to proceed to the topic of Banharn's age. His argument is to say that Banharn is old but he is not as wise as he should be. In the second quotation, Sunai uses an idiom to make his point that he has actively fought for democracy since he was young. The idiom 'since my head was just a size of my fist' *[tang tae hua thao kampan]* means since the person was very young. His argument is confirmed again when he says, 'Since I was younger than the Prime Minister'. Here he implicitly argues that he has been aware of the importance of democracy since he was young while Banharn, despite his old age, is ignorant. He is not aware of democracy nor does he treasure it. His argument composed of these two quotations can be written in following way:

Premise 1:

I am young and I fought for democracy.

Premise 2:

Banharn is old but he has never done such a thing.

Conclusion:

Despite his old age, Banharn has never fought for people as I have.

This arrangement can be categorised as an enthymeme because the conclusion is left for the audience to infer. This argument was an attempt to elevate himself and knock Banharn down. By overtly comparing himself with Banharn in the hope of making the point that Banharn is worse than him, Sunai runs the risk of his speech backfiring. To compare himself to Banharn means that he has to be certain that he is really better than Banharn otherwise he will be seen as being vain and arrogant.

Apart from arguing that Banharn is unwise and ignorant, he further accuses him of being corrupt and bad by nature. Since the point means to say that Banharn is corrupt and generally bad, I do not categorise this point as a preface to the allegations simply because it has nothing to do with the allegations. It is still part of the ritual beginning because it legitimises the speech. By saying that Banharn is innately bad, his rather offensive attack on him is legitimised. Sunai says this in the hope that he will destroy Banharn's credentials and legitimise his own action in debating against this 'bad' person. Sunai uses metaphor in making this point.

It's like a *toi to* [jigsaw]. Not a *toi to* [wasp] *toi taen* [hornet] that stings. It is like piecing bits of a picture together. It is called in English, excuse me, a jigsaw. A hundred-piece and

thousand-piece jigsaw. If we want to know, we have to slowly piece them together. If we want to know whether it's a picture of a tiger or a picture of a lion or a buffalo or a rhino we have to patiently piece them together. We do not yet to know so we have to piece them together first. Until the picture is complete, we can not tell right away that this is a picture of a tiger and a tiger cub. (line 51-56)

In this quotation, a tiger and a tiger cub refer to Banharn and his daughter, Kanjana. He compares the tedious task of piecing together a jigsaw puzzle to the task of collecting evidence. The two tasks are similar in the way they are done. When finished they will reveal the real picture or the real situation. However, the way he compares Banharn and his daughter to a tiger does signal a negative connotation. Tigers are animals known for their ferocity and a tendency to cause harm to people. Comparing the Prime Minister and his daughter to tigers implies that they both have caused damage to or had a negative impact on people. Not only does Sunai legitimise his speech by discrediting the Prime Minister, he also implicitly increases his own profile, which can be seen as putting himself up to justify that he is up to the job. However, he is aware of the risk of being seen as arrogant. He uses hedging and a disclaimer to make his speech sound less arrogant.

A man like Sunai is not adept but diligent in finding documents because I used to be a lawyer. I was a lawyer [graduated] from Chula. [I] Graduated in political science but I am able to conduct a case. Not many political science graduates can do that. I am from a rather decent class. (line 47-50)

[khon yang sunai mai chai khon keng rok khrap tae pen khon khayay ha ekasan ruapruam phroe pen thanai kao pen nak kotmai jak chula jop ratthasat tae wa khwam dai pen run pho som khuan]

From the quotation, it can be seen that Sunai is using a disclaimer 'I am not adept' to make his argument sounds less arrogant. In fact, his point is to say that he is good and that he can be trusted so that he will have the legitimacy to evaluate the government's administration. Considering the fact that he is a fresh-faced politician, this kind of argument was essential. However, to say that he is clever would be seen as haughty, he needs to begin his argument with a disclaimer followed by a word that can secure his legitimacy without an arrogant connotation: diligent. His argument can be displayed in this pattern:

I am not + positive + but + positive

This pattern of argument suggests that at least he is aware of his downside by saying that he is not clever. He knows a lot only because he learns it by using his industry and perseverance. The disclaimer also suggests that he is imperfect, just like any of us. There are certain qualities that he does not possess. He also uses the hedge 'rather' when saying that his class is 'decent' towards the end. The hedging is employed to show his humbleness.

Towards the end of his ritual beginning, he moves to develop an understanding between himself and his audience. He attends to the attitude of the audience outside the parliament, who are

ordinary people, more than the MPs inside. He tries to address the people of Suphanburi, Banharn's constituency, to gain their understanding. After that he suddenly turns to address people from another part of the country presenting them with the evidence that around a hundred years ago, there was a treason case in Suphanburi. He uses an extensive quotation from the memoir of Prince Damrong, a renowned Thai historian, as proof of the incident. The quotation is very long and the use of it sounds rather out of place here. The point of whether or not there was such an incident a hundred years ago, is remote in relevance to the topic of the no-confidence debate here. As a result, Sunai is interrupted twice and protested against four times (However, only one protester protested against Sunai's speech. Three of them protested against the Speaker's verdict, so in fact he was defended by some of his MPs). It is not only the tedious length of his 'irrelevant' quotation that diminishes the credibility of his argument. By accusing the people of Suphanburi of treason right after his attempt to develop an understanding with them only jeopardises the good relationship towards the people that he was trying to develop.

Preface to the Allegations

The preface to the allegations is again divided into two parts. Throughout, he signals this unequal interpersonal relationship between himself and the Prime Minister. He tries to emphasise his point that the Prime Minister is intellectually inferior to him by using different strategies. In many cases, he compares the Prime Minister's idea or behaviour to his in an attempt to show that despite the older age and higher position of the Prime Minister, he is still inferior intellectually in comparison with Sunai.

...at that time the parliamentary document stated that Banharn Silpa-archa was the Minister of Finance but [he said] he does not know anything. I only have a little *vasana*⁸ I happened to be only the advisor of the Minister of Finance [but I know]. (line 11-15)

Sunai implicitly states in this sarcastic remark that even if he had been only the minister's advisor, he knew more than Banharn who was then the minister. This argument is also in a form of enthymeme:

Premise 1:

Banharn was the Minister of Finance and knew nothing.

Premise 2:

Sunai was the advisor to the Minister and he knew [about the land purchase].

Possible Conclusions:

1. Banharn is inefficient.
2. Banharn is lying.

⁸ The result of good karma accumulated from the past incarnation that enables us to achieve good things in this life (Phramethithammaporn, 1999: 116).

This enthymeme leads to two possible conclusions. Either of them can taint Banharn's reputation. The audience is left to figure out for themselves which one is the most probable. It is worth noting that Sunai uses hedging to keep his PPF as an objective person, for example, when he is making positive comments about himself, ' I only have a little *vasana*. I happened to be only the advisor...'. 'Only', '*vasana*' and 'happened to' serve to emphasise the Buddhist fatalistic belief; that he did not intend to contend with the Prime Minister but it is because of his fate (*karma*) that he had been put in that position. By doing this, he can achieve two aims: he can be seen as a modest person who knows his position, thereby promoting his PPF (Gruber 1993: 22) and he can aggravate his reproach for the Prime Minister. By showing his modest position against the flimsy image of Banharn as a 'respectable' Prime Minister makes the Prime Minister's failure to live up to Sunai's 'modest' standard sound even more serious.

When I was young, I thought so. I had the same impression [as the Prime Minister]. But then we were in different positions. I was an ordinary MP while you are the former Minister of Finance. (line 31-33)

In this quotation, Sunai is talking about the Prime Minister's remark questioning the Royal Mint's decision to stop producing *satang*⁹ coins. He sarcastically reproaches the fact that Banharn who used to be the Minister of Finance did not know why. The level of insult in this sarcasm is increased when he compares Banharn's thought and his own when he was young. It is normal for a child not to know about the financial system, but for a man at Banharn's age who used to be the Minister of Finance not to understand the system is odd. This implies that Banharn's intellectual level is only equal to that of Sunai when he was young. He later emphasises this point using a direct insult.

You are the Prime Minister. You are a former Minister of Finance. How could you say that you did not know? (line 41-42)

Allegations

The allegations launched by Sunai surround the irregularities in the BOT land purchasing transaction. He is trying to show that there is significant evidence proving that:

- a. It is Banharn's family who sold the land to the BOT.
- b. Banharn has his men in the BOT to help in arranging the transaction in his favour.

He spends the first 551 lines trying to prove his first point, and spends 323 lines for the second point. His argument can be divided into 3 patterns:

- a. adjacency pair: Q-A

⁹ Thai currency is the baht. One baht equals to 100 satang.

He invites the audience to use their reason to judge Banharn's story as to whether it is truthful or not. Sunai presents his point in a form of an answer to a question he himself poses. By putting questions, he can draw people's attention to the interesting, sometimes suspicious aspect of the point he is about to present. The question generally works as an invitation for the audience to look at the point critically. He normally begins by sharing his perspective towards a certain event. Then he poses a question about why he thinks this way. After this he proposes the hypothetical answer to the question and thereby legitimises his opinion. The question can be simple a 'how?' or 'why?' to provoke the audience's curiosity in a certain area that they might not have considered before so that he can lead them to his desired conclusion. Presenting his point in the form of an answer enables him to justify his comment.

The fourth plot of land is different from others. How is it different? It is only one rai something and it is a blind plot¹⁰ [*thi tabot*]. (line 225-226)

In this quotation, he tries to draw the audience's attention to the imperfection in the plot of land purchased. However, he does not call it an 'imperfection'. He only says that it is 'different'. His description of what he means by 'different' leads the audience to see the imperfection of the land. Firstly it is a small plot of land. Secondly it is a blind plot which means that the plot has no exit. It is surrounded by other people's plots. The question is also posed in order to invite the audience to look at a particular aspect of the behaviour of the accused in a rational way. This is an attempt to show the audience the suspicious aspect of an action without having to state this point directly. His audience is led to the point by their own rational judgement.

I am surprised, why [they] have to come back to buy this plot? I later learnt when they have bought 75 rai which coincides with the specification required by the BOT. (line 234-236)

In this second quotation, his question invites audience to see the suspicious nature of the story. By asking 'why does Kanjana have to do it that way?', he invites the audience to see the suspense in this story and to look at it in a critical way. Moreover, he has given himself a speaking slot to present his own hypothetical explanation for that suspense. However, he does not present his explanation directly. Instead of saying that there is a leak of information about land specification and then accusing Kanjana of unfair play, he only skirts the point. He uses hedging to say that the amount of land Kanjana purchased 'mysteriously' and 'accidentally' coincides with the BOT specification. The audience is left to work out for themselves whether such a coincidence is a likely explanation to this 'suspicious' event or not. Hence, the audience is led to the point indirectly.

¹⁰ A blind plot is the literal translation of *thi tabot*. It refers to an enclosed plot of land.

Mr. Speaker, do we dare? My fellow MPs, do you dare to let someone carry 9,7000,000 baht in cash to buy a cashier cheque? He/She will just run off with the money [*choet*], if we let the motorcycle messenger [take the money], he/she will run off and 9,700,000 baht, where can we find it in this lifetime? So can I presume who the person might be? Who would carry the money? After some investigation, it must be his confidante. He has signed in document number 25 line 2 for the receipt of the cashier cheque. (line 405-410)

In this quotation, Sunai asks his audience to rationalise certain points in his story. Here he asks people to think whether it is likely for anyone to let a normal messenger carry a large amount of money. He uses the question to make his point that it must have been Banharn's confidante that carried the money to buy a cashier cheque for him. The evidence for his point is the confidante's signature on the receipt.

However, there are times when his questions do not necessarily lead to the same hypothetical answer that he has in mind. This is the case where there is fallacy in his Q-A pattern of argument.

I admit that they [Banharn's family] are a lovely family but it is apparent that Kanjana Silpa-archa is not married. She still lives with her parents. How could she acquire hundreds of millions bahts to buy anything? She does not have a family of her own yet, she does not live separately. Excuse me, she is not married yet. For that matter, in 1990, how could she earn money. This means that she eats with her parents and this money is her parents'. (line 264- 269)

According to this quotation, Sunai is arguing that Kanjana cannot earn that much money because she is not married. He begins his argument asking how can she earn that much money while she is still single. Though it is less likely for a single woman to earn millions of baht all by herself, yet we have to admit that single woman can do business or work. Then she might well earn money by herself from her own business. Being single and living with parents does not mean she does not work. And by working she can earn money. From the sample quotations above, we can see that Sunai does not use adjacency pair (Q-A) to make an argument, he only uses it as his narrative tool linking one point to the next. The audience is then led towards the conclusion he desires.

b. Prolepsis:

An argument in this category is used by S to make FTAs such as negative comments while maintaining his/her own PPF as an objective person. This kind of argument allows the speaker to show his sympathy, whether or not it is genuine. Then he presents himself as an unprejudiced man who puts public interest before his own feelings. He later shows that he feels obliged to do his duty, that is to attack the accused. As a result, the speaker can maintain his PPF as an objective person who adheres to fair play, yet he can legitimately attack the accused in the end. Sunai's prolepsis comes in four different patterns:

Pattern 1: I do not want to... + but +...

Example

In this case, if it was only the case of buying cheap and selling dear, I would not mind because it is a common practice in a capitalist country but [they] happen to buy cheap and sell dear to the government office. (line 241- 242)

In this example, Sunai tries to say that he does not like to blame the transaction yet the fact that they were making a profit from the government compels him to act for the people's benefit.

Pattern 2: It could be understood if...+ but +...

Example

I think that [if] the tax evader was an ordinary person, I would be able to understand. Poor people might not have money but the case of the Prime Minister, he has so many assets. (line 525-526)

In this example, Sunai explains that he does not mind tax evasion if the person does not have the money to pay it. By that, he presents himself as being open-minded and understanding. However, the Prime Minister's wealth makes it impossible for him to forgive his tax evasion.

Pattern 3: If you... I do not mind + but +...

Example

If it is not true and you said so and clarified your position, then I would not mind but this, any person in their right mind would ask why the project had to be moved there [Nakorn Chaisri]. (line 895-896)

Here he says that the fact that Banharn does not explain why the project was moved to Nakorn Chaisri where his plots of land were situated aggravates the suspense in this project. The lack of transparency here, again, compels him to question this transaction.

c. extensive support + sudden claim

Before he states his claim, Sunai presents extensive evidence first. His support comes from many sources and lasts many pages. Then he suddenly states his claim either indirectly or using hedging. He is protested against many times for saying things irrelevant to the topic. Though the protest interrupted his speech, it also indicates that other MPs are listening to him. Therefore, his style of argument which leaves him exposed to protest can be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be the result of his inexperience in giving speeches. Second, Sunai uses this kind of argument as a tactical move. Knowing that it is liable to be protested against, he intentionally uses it in order to provoke other MPs. In that case, he can be sure that they are listening to his speech. An example of extensive support + sudden claim is when he argues that Banharn evades tax payment. His support lasts 84 lines before cutting to the claim which states that, 'Why can't you make a sacrifice and give something back to the general public in the form of tax? Is this action graceful and dignified enough to be Prime Ministerial?'. This utterance presupposes that Banharn did not pay the tax. After stating this claim, he returns to present his support once again for 135 lines. His support

proves step by step what the approximate price of land might be, how much the owner should have paid in tax and compared to the amount of actual tax paid.

Apart from stating his claim indirectly, he also call the bluff of the Prime Minister, his wife and his daughter. He does this by giving them the impression that he knows everything and is ready to disclose this tax evasion. They are then threatened that they had better confess now or their reputation and popularity could be more at risk. For example, he says to *khunying* Jamsai, ‘if you think it’s a common practice, you’d better admit it now so I can move on to another point’ (line 321-322). By saying this he implies that if *khunying* Jamsai does not confess, he may have to elaborate this scandal even further. He also calls Kanjana’s bluff by presenting himself as a wiser person who is giving her good advice about what she should do:

That’s why I humbly tell *khun* Kanjana that she should not involve herself in this matter. We are close to each other; we are on the same youth committee. I can see that *khun* Kanjana still has a bright future and I don’t want you to become involved in this matter because if you do, there will be some hard feelings. It’s okay in her father’s case; there can be as much conflict as there should be. She didn’t tell me [but] I know that it’s a feeling of gratitude; she wants to help her father. I sympathise with her for that because gratitude is one of the paths in Buddhist teaching towards happiness. But gratitude for parents, gratitude as a politician must be a practice that is in line with the public interest. (line 354-361)

Here Sunai bluffs Kanjana into thinking that he knows the fact that Kanjana is not the one who is responsible for the transaction. He therefore, suggests that she should walk away now before she gets hurt. In this quotation, we can also see that Sunai tries to express his sympathy, even admiration towards Kanjana’s act of gratitude. But then he says that concern for the public interest is still his first priority. By arguing this way, he can maintain his PPF as an objective person while justifying his attack.

In terms of presentation, Sunai’s speech articulates a casual style, sometimes in the form of a conversation. By conversation, I mean that Sunai creates a dialogue with his audience by addressing them directly or by using reported speech. This style is categorised by casual language being addressed directly to his audience, for example, ‘please remember the year a little [*jam pi nit nung*] because it can tell right away what is what’ (line 214), ‘To put it simply’ [*put ngai ngai*] (line 229), ‘Aye!, there must be records for things like this’ [*mun tong mi si yang ni*] (line 378).

Many people said grinning that no matter how hard you try, you cannot find the truth. I said, ‘oh ho, this is just a piece of cake’. [*lai khon grayim yim yong wa mung suep yang rai go suep mai ok ruang ni phom bok rueng khae ni ruang lek khrap*¹¹] (line 545- 547)

¹¹ *Khrap* is a Thai conversational particle used by male speakers. It does not have any meaning on its own. It is added at the end of a sentence to indicate politeness.

In this particular example, we can see that it is not only informal language that is used but also offensive language. *Mung* is a colloquial second person pronoun not normally considered appropriate for parliamentary discourse. *Grayim yim yong* is an idiom meaning ‘to grin’. The action is normally triggered because of the cunning intention in the mind of the person described.

The informal language is also reflected in the use of colloquial words in the following examples:

But the BOT is so persistent [*ngo*]. Persistent [*ngo*] to buy this plot of land. (line 593-594)

Ngo means to be persistent and patient for an emotional reason. Therefore it is used exclusively in an informal-intimate context describing the behaviour of lovers. The fact that Sunai uses a word with such an emotional connotation in conjunction with the BOT sounds rather odd and incongruous. It also suggests that the BOT does not handle the case professionally.

So in the end we cannot find anyone to sniff hands. [*jap mu khrai dom mai dai*] (line 710)

The informal style in this example is reflected in the use of the idiom, ‘cannot find anyone to sniff hands’ or *jap mu khrai dom mai dai*. This idiom means the situation where the person to be blamed cannot be found. Another idiom is also used in the following examples.

We are members of parliament seeing this poking into our eyes [*hen tum ta*] like this and are you not allowing me to say so? How could you prevent me from asking? (line 1030-1031)

The idiom, *hen tum ta* or ‘poking into someone’s eye’ refers to a situation where the evidence seems so apparent that it is impossible to deny.

When he heard this his hands and feet become soft and weary. [*dai yin khao mu on tin¹² on loei*] (line 1049)

‘Hands and feet become soft and weary’ or *mu on tin on* is an idiom meaning a state when one is surprised to the point of shock. It is normally used to describe the effect caused by an unpleasant surprise.

Apart from idioms, he also uses metaphors to illustrate his point. The use of figurative language signals casual register especially when the metaphor compares official matters with something less than conventional.

Ai¹³ do it this way everybody knows. It’s an ugly contest keeping only the ugliest queens. [*khat nang ngam khi re thang nan ma ruam kan*](line 948- 949)

¹² *Tin* is a very informal word which means foot or feet. The word with such casual register is inappropriate in parliamentary discourse. Thai has a more appropriate word for foot or feet which is *thao*. However, the idiom used here feature this particular casual word.

¹³ *Ai* can be categorised as an honorific. It precedes a noun, a pronoun or a name. It does not have any particular meaning in itself. It is used to indicate insult or contempt.

He uses metaphor ‘ugly contest’ to describe the bids for selling land to the BOT. By ‘ugly contest’, he means that the bids keeps only the owners of overpriced land bidding to sell. The ugly contest and the high price bid are the opposite of what they are supposed to be. It is normal to have a beauty contest and a bid to choose the lowest price. The contest and bids that are reversed from their natural order can only be seen as satire because they are incongruous to our general knowledge. However, according to his evidence, it is likely to be a real life satire.

His casual style is also reflected in the use of colloquial words:

Finally I have to use my knowledge as a lawyer in interrogation again. Interrogate this interrogate that and [he] breaks [taek] again. Breaks [taek] again *khrap*. (line 677- 678)

Here Sunai uses the word *taek*, which literally means ‘to break’, to explain when the person under interrogation contradicts himself/herself. The self-contradiction gives himself/herself away, and shows that he/she is lying.

The appearance of informal style, marked by frequent use of spoken language, casual-offensive lexical choice, idiom, metaphor or colloquialism, within the context of parliamentary discourse creates incongruity and intertextuality. Despite the proliferation of informal language, Sunai begins his speech with a formal self-introduction because the formality in this phase is made compulsory by the Code of Behaviour. The formal discourse prescribed by the Code of Behaviour and his informal language that characterise his speech creates a stark change in genre articulation. This level one intertextuality (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) creates incongruity which is potentially humorous.

Intertextuality is not the only source of incongruity in his speech. Another type of incongruity appears within a sentence. It is where Sunai speaks of something, which contradicts our common sense. In other words, he speaks of something which is contradictory to our knowledge of the world, or he describes something in a novel way. He uses personification to make an object act the way humans do. This can give rise to a double incongruity: an object should not be able to act and personification is an unlikely hypothesis to explain certain suspicious circumstances.

But then, out of the blue, how could it [the printing plant project] walk to *phuttha monthon*? ¹⁴Near the waxworks museum *khrap*. The project didn’t have any legs to walk there. (line 819-820)

Here he personifies the project saying that it can walk to *phuttha monthon*, the place where *khunying* Jamsai’s land is situated. Clearly, a project cannot actually walk. This creates the first

¹⁴ *Phuttha Monthon* is the name of a place established for Buddhist religious practices. It covers vast area of land in Nakorn Pathom, a province near Bangkok.

incongruity. Moreover, it is also unlikely that the project moves itself there, by walking or otherwise. To our mind, there must be someone behind the moving of this project's site. To say that the project moves there of its own will is absurd because it is illogical. The apparent incongruity of this hypothesis can then produce a sarcastic effect.

To achieve the goal of the no-confidence debate, not only does Sunai have to make his speech interesting using the strategies mentioned above, he also has to isolate the party under attack, in this case the CTP, by hammering a wedge into the coalition and stirring up public enmity against the party. He tries to do this by sometimes directly addressing the leader of the number two party in the coalition, Major General Chaowalit Yongchaiyudh. He invites Chaowalit to look at a document that might prove Banharn guilty, such as that showing that Banharn is a major shareholder of a construction company that bought a cashier cheque to buy this plots of land. He says:

Look, honourable leader Chaowalit, look at document number 3. (line 441)

He also asks for Chaowalit's opinion on the matter, after he has finished presenting his conclusive evidence pointing out that Banharn is behind the transaction.

Is it appropriate [to act] like this, General Chaowalit? I am asking Mr. Speaker to pass on my question. Is it appropriate? (line 641- 642)

Directly addressing anyone in the House is actually prohibited by the Code of Behaviour. Every speaker has to make a monological speech addressing only the Speaker, if he/she has to address anyone. However, many speakers including Sunai, are tempted to address someone who has power on a par with the party under attack. If S succeeds in convincing him to be on his side, there is some hope that the coalition would collapse. Here, Chaowalit's New Aspiration Party is the second biggest in the coalition. Knowing that the coalition could not afford to lose this large party, Sunai tries to persuade it to side with him so that the coalition is left vulnerable.

Not only does he try to take the Coalition party on board, but he also attempts to convince people that the government has lost touch with the public interest. As a result, he can stir up feelings of enmity towards the government and, in the process, he projects himself as someone who cares for the public interest more than the government does.

We are the rulers. Today we are the rulers. The people are poor. We have never lowered the paddy field tax. Why did you refuse to pay 10-20 millions bahts of tax like this? (line 645-646)

He shows his PPF in this quotation by raising the topic that the government has never lowered tax for the poor farmer. The topic presents his concerns for the poor and needy people. Then he

implicitly says that not only has the government ignored the poor farmer's grievances because of having to shoulder high taxation, but the leader of the government, despite his wealth, has refused to pay tax. The double standard presented can make the poor people think that they are suffering unfair treatment and might develop enmity towards the government.

Conclusion

Sunai's conclusion is a fairly unconventional one. He does not restate his points nor does he try to convince people. In fact he concludes his speech by comparing Banharn's case to Suchart Tanjaroen's (DP). Suchart had been convicted of malpractice a couple of years before this debate take place. Sunai only concludes that if Suchart were found guilty, Banharn should be found guilty as well. However, he does not mention which aspects of the two cases are similar to each other. He only says that they are similar, taking for granted that people know what the similarities are. He suggests that if Suchart was removed from office immediately, then Banharn should also be treated that way.

After the comparison, he raises another accusation that Banharn has threatened him and that he has decided to give a speech despite the pressure of being under threat. By raising another provocative point again towards the end of his speech, he is interrupted three times and loses his opportunity to restate his points. In other words, he loses his chance to conclude his speech.

7.2.3 Trairong Suwanakiri' s Speech (18 September 1996)

Trairong Suwanakiri is another popular Democrat MP from the south. He graduated with a PhD in Economics from Hawaii. He was a university lecturer before entering politics as a senator in 1981. He remained a senator until 1986. In 1986, he was elected as an MP for Songkla (a province in the South of Thailand). He had been Songkla MP for five terms. Trairong was chosen to be Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1988, Deputy Minister of Finance in 1992 and Minister of Industry in 1994 (Parliamentary Secretariat 1995).

His knowledge and his characteristically strong Southern accent constitute his fame. His outspokenness and humour coupled with the distinctive accent make his speech interesting. Like many other Southerners, Trairong is a good oral narrator. His style of narrative and argument with an occasional hook is entertaining for the audience.

7.2.3.1 Organisation of Content

The debate of Trairong Suwanakiri is characterised by a claim-and-support arrangement of arguments. He claims a kind of 'academic' credibility for his arguments. Trairong makes his point

by stating it as a claim and then supports his claim with explanation, reference, examples or personal experiences. Most of his arguments are distinctive because they are equipped with extensive support; some of which are directly relevant to the claim, others are not. The arguments are woven together to form a narrative moving from one point to another without clearly separating them from one another. Trairong touches on three allegations:

- a. Banharn Silpa-archa's unfitness to be Prime Minister
- b. The Prime Minister's failure to put the right man in the right job
- c. An economic mismanagement

The allegation most highlighted is the first one: Banharn is unfit to be Prime Minister. The other two allegations are stated as subordinate allegations in support of the first one. In other words, Trairong presents the second and the third allegations as evidence that Banharn had failed to do a Prime Ministerial job in forming an efficient and trustworthy cabinet. The speech of Trairong can be seen as an attempt to isolate Banharn, the Prime Minister, from the rest of his cabinet so that he can be attacked individually. This attempt complies with the topic of this no-confidence debate to pass the vote against the Prime Minister.

Apart from accusing Banharn of failure in forming an efficient and trust-worthy cabinet, Trairong attacks Banharn personally on moral grounds. His argument suggesting that Banharn has a shady background and doubtful honesty is made in a form of premeditated and organised argument. The point of the argument is not stated but implied and presupposed. He alludes to extensive references to many texts and philosophers' teachings. Moreover, he also mentions the cases of many other leaders in an attempt to compare Banharn's leadership with them. The unstated point of his entire argument is that Banharn is not only unfit for office in terms of his ability, but he is also a poor leader. In other words, Trairong's speech is a caustic satire of Banharn's administration and of him as an individual. Despite its provocative nature, the debate was not taken to be as offensive as its content seemed to suggest. The fact that Trairong keeps mentioning a good personal relationship between himself and Banharn adds ambivalence to the text. It works as a factor in toning down the adversarial and offensive nature of the debate. The audience is left undecided whether the accusations come from Trairong as a well-wishing friend of Banharn or as his cold-blooded enemy.

7.2.3.2 Strategic Analysis

Ritual Beginning

Trairong begins his speech with a self-introduction. Then instead of moving on to legitimise his contribution, he abruptly changes the topic. He mentions the speeches of the opposition MP, Sunai Julaphongsathorn and coalition MP, Kanjana Silpa-archa, daughter of the Prime Minister. He praises the two speeches for being objective. This objectivity, he says, is a good sign that the MPs, both serving their first term,¹⁵ are destined to be aspiring politicians. After that he moves back to say that it is time for the audience to listen to a 6-term politician like himself. So, the admiring words about Sunai and Kanjana's speeches are uttered in order to put himself in a better position. By saying that one-term politicians can give objective speeches and then moving on to state that he is a 6-term politician, Trairong is using an enthymeme to imply that the audience is about to listen to something even better than those speeches he praises. In this case the pattern of the enthymeme is:

Premise 1:

A one-term politician's speech is good and objective.

Possible conclusion:

A six-term politician's speech is even better.

His point here can be categorised as self-legitimising by using enthymeme. Trairong's speech has hooks which can attract the audience's attention. Hooks can come in a form of *violation of parallelism* (Weiner 1997: 142). The parallelism exploited here is a parallelism of genre. Below is a good example of a flout of parallelism of genre. The result is level one intertextuality.

Khun Kanjana has spoken without emotional involvement, with supporting evidence, reasonable and lovely. (line 6)

There are four phrases describing Kanjana's manner, three of which are relevant logical supports describing how good her speech was according to parliamentary standards. The fourth support, however, stands out from the rest because 'lovely' is not considered to be a standard requirement for a good parliamentary speech. Here Trairong creates incongruity by exploiting parallelism. It is considered to be intertextuality in the sense that there is a shift of genre from formal parliamentary talk articulated by the first three supports to an informal talk articulated by the fourth support, 'lovely'. Trairong also provides a hook by sometimes presenting an absurd reason to support his

¹⁵ 'Term' in Thai politics seems to have a unique meaning. Term here does not actually refer to the parliamentary period of four-years since the Thai coalition government usually collapses before completing its parliamentary term. As a result, when Thai people talks about a term, they refer to the number of times that politician is elected in a general election, for example, here Trairong was saying that Sunai and Kanjana were elected for the first time.

claim. The unlikely reason presented looks out of place in the argument and therefore creates incongruity.

...if I, the Prime Minister, as my old friend, would at least listen to me because the Prime Minister knows well that a person like me would not have malice against him because we have never fought, never fought not to mention fighting for a girl. We have never done that, no. We would not get involved in that sort of thing. (line 40-43)

[*tha phom phut khun ma bang than nayokratthamontri nai thana thi pen phak phuak kao kae kan khong ja tong fang phom bang phro mai khoei thalo kan mai khoei thalo kan ya wa tae ruang arai yaeng ying koe mai khoei yaeng kan*]

‘Fight for a girl’ is the unlikely example of a kind of fight Trairong claims has never happened between him and Banharn. The extreme and unlikely nature of the fight sounds absurd and is thereby potentially humorous. The argument is then likely to be taken as humorous rather than serious. Despite its humorous effect, the argument serves as a direct and a rather extreme way to say that there has never been a personal conflict between Trairong and the Prime Minister.

In legitimising his speech, Trairong uses a pattern of argument which allows him to say that he does not have a personal or emotional involvement and therefore is entirely objective.

Argument pattern:

I do not want to debate...

+ because

1. He wants to give an opportunity to new faces.
2. He has a long and good relationship with the Prime Minister.

+ but

1. He thinks the Prime Minister should at least listen to him.
2. He can no longer support the Prime Minister.

(line 13- 35)

He says that he does not want to make a speech and gives reasons why he does not. The reasons suggest that he is not willing to make a speech, or at least, he has reservations about this action. However, after the word ‘but’ he gives reasons which compel him to take part in the debate, the implication being that it is against his wishes. Apart from legitimising his debate by using prolepsis in a form of ‘claim + because + but’ arrangement, he also mentions the personal relationship he has with the Prime Minister. By suggesting that the two of them have a good relationship, he can defend himself from the accusation that his speech against the Prime Minister has personal motives. As a result he can maintain his PPF.

Mr. Speaker the Prime Minister remembers the time we met while I was in the coalition and he was in the opposition, I asked him, ‘Brother, when will you become Prime Minister. I will support you. I’m willing to. I support you.’ But after I saw your 13-month administration, I have to honestly tell you that it’s enough. (line 50-52)

His speech is easy-going and casual both in style and content. He is quite candid in his speaking. The honesty and straight-forwardness of his speech helps strengthen the interpersonal relationship between him and his audience. He sounds like he knows everyone personally, both the audience and those he speaks about.

Casual content:

I don't quite like the atmosphere when there is protest or violence. It's not fun (enjoyable) [*sanuk*]. We have to enjoy our job. This is our job so we must not be irritated. (line 7-9)

It is rather out of place to urge for a joyful and playful atmosphere in a very formal place like the parliament. The parliament has never been a place where people come for entertainment [*khwam sanuk*]. However, Trairong is right that people should enjoy their work yet to call for *khwam sanuk* in a broadcast parliamentary ordinary proceeding that is supposed to be an institutionalised discourse is quite odd and incongruous in its domain and setting. Nonetheless, *khwam sanuk* is not irrelevant when we consider the participants of the debate. The media and the public do enjoy the debate that is *sanuk*, 'entertaining to listen to'. Most of the MPs attend to this interest while delivering a speech but none of them would admit to this publicly.

Informal style:

Now it's time to listen to a 6-term MP. 6-term means I have been an MP for five terms plus one more for the next term. In fact for today's speech, I really mean it Mr. Speaker [*phom phut jing jing na than prathan*], I kinda don't like to speak today [*phom mai khow yak phut rok wan ni*]. I have never thought of giving a speech because I thought many people would like to speak [*ko nuk wa khon khao yak phut yoe*]. (line 11- 13)

The underlined sentences displays in an informal style. The style is shown through lexical choices and sentence formation. The latter resists translation because it involves Thai synonymy, each synonym having different registers. First, he says that, 'I really mean it Mr. Speaker' or *phom phut jing jing na than prathan*. The informal style is shown more clearly in the Thai version. *Jing* is a Thai word 'honestly' or 'really'. The repetition of the word, *jing jing*, is used only spoken language such as casual conversation. *Na* is a conversational particle; it does not have meaning by itself. Second, *mai khow* means 'not really'. It is used mainly in a casual conversational register. *Yak* means 'want' but to say 'want' in a formal register, Thai usually uses the word *tong kan* instead. So *mai khow yak* clearly signals an informal register. Third, *ko* is also a conversational particle. *Nuk* is a word meaning 'think' which has a casual register. *Yoe* means 'many/a lot'. It also has a casual register and is used only in casual conversation.

...but now the fact of the matter is [*tae thi ni reuang khong reuang ko khu wa*] ... (line 34)

This is an example of casual register and redundancy. The underlined phrase is casual and can be omitted since the sentence was only saying 'but'. Yet this verbal extravagance goes uninterrupted.

He also uses a metaphor to elaborate his proposal that he and the Prime Minister have a long standing good relationship. Here he is talking about the time when he was the deputy minister of Interior while Banharn was the minister. He says that Banharn and himself have worked together well; that Banharn has been good to him and he is grateful for that.

A deputy minister has no power according to the law. The power belongs solely to the minister according to Thai law. The minister is a fixed star, the deputy minister is a planet. Unless the minister shines on the deputy, the deputy will be in the dark. (line 24-26)

Preface to the Allegations

In this part, Trairong refers to the situation leading up to the current economic crisis. The main point in this part is to elaborate the point that the government has been given many warnings from at least three sources but they do not listen. Trairong says that this speech is the fourth time he has warned the government about their policy. To add more credibility to his warning, he mentions another two institutions that have also warned the government about the same matter: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Trairong later elaborates his claim that there is a flaw in the economic policy. His explanation involves some technical knowledge about economic structure and the monetary system. Since the topic can be found rather complicated for ordinary people, Trairong employs metaphors to explain technical jargon. He explains that the government's solution in tackling inflation by raising interest rates would eventually produce a negative impact on the country's economy. First he figuratively describes the situation at that time using metaphor.

I have shown that the government's solution has caused trouble to the private sector because the government tightened its belt just to make its own belly bloated. [*ratthaban pai rat khemkhat phak ekachon phiang phua ja hai ratthaban phung pong*](line 76-77)

'Tighten the private sector's belt' here refers to the increase in interest rates which put the private sector in an uneasy and uncomfortable position because its money flow was somewhat constricted. 'The government's belly bloated' means the increasing income the government earned from the rise in interest rates. However, the increased income is not necessarily good. Trairong uses the word 'bloated belly', which has an unhealthy connotation. As a result, he implicitly suggests that the policy is not good in the long run. The phrase 'tighten one's belt' is a standard expression. Here Trairong mixes the standard expression with the one he creates himself using unusual terms like 'bloated belly'. As a result, there is an intertextuality within what he said: the mixture of standard and non-standard expression and the mixture of formal and casual terms.

He further explains that the policy would cause an economic 'crash landing'. This term is used as economic jargon meaning a sudden economic recession. Because the term is in English and might

not be clearly understood by ordinary people, Trairong translates it into Thai as ‘*thim* landing’. *Thim* is an informal, spoken word which means to thrust downward. He uses the word *thim* instead of ‘crash’ to make people see the extent of the economic downturn he is talking about. The fact that *thim* is not normally used to describe the action of a plane, it sounds rather awkward when joined with the word landing. As a result, Trairong violates the word’s normal collocation and creates incongruity.

He also uses a metaphor to show how important the Minister of Finance is to the country. He compares the minister to the army leader and economic crisis to a war. So the resolution of the economic crisis is as crucial for our country’s survival as winning a war.

It is necessary for us to find a courageous army leader [*mae thap*] to fight an economic war [*songkhram kap setthakit*] for our survival. I propose a rearrangement of the whole army. (line 95-97)

Allegations

In a similar way to the two previous parts, Trairong delivers his allegations using informal language. Informal language is not only easier for ordinary people to understand but also more interesting and fun to listen to. It has to be said that Trairong, a southerner, has a significant southern accent. The accent distinguishes his speech from others. It is seen as his trademark and is always featured in political caricatures of him. The casual style coupled with his accent makes him look more like a ‘real’ individual than an honourable and out-of-reach stereotypical politician.

There are many characteristics of informal language featured in his speech. They can be categorised as followed:

a. Lexical choice: casual register

The Thai language has more than one word referring to each personal pronoun. These words show different level of respect towards the interlocutor. People choose words to use in each situation in accordance with S and H’s social status. Thai has many pronouns, each signifies a different register. In the following example, Trairong uses reported speech to narrate how the economic downturn caused by Banharn’s government has affected the real estate business. He chooses to use informal pronouns in a form of reported speech to narrate the story.

When *man* builds a property development project, *man* would hire a contractor saying that *mung* would build *ku* a hundred houses. [He] talks like this because every time they repeat the project, they can sell all the houses. People would pay the down payment and pay a monthly mortgage for it. Money would keep coming in. *Man* would sign a contract with a contractor saying that *ku* would pay 6 months in advance for the amount of 10 millions for the building cost. But when interest rates increase like this, when we have a financial

policy like this, it was not meant to *ai nan*¹⁶ (that). [So] *ai nan* (that property developer) would be as extravagant as usual but money was so tight. The interest rates shot up to 16-17%; which monkey would take out a mortgage for a house? (line 173-180)

In this example, Trairong uses *ku* as a first person pronoun, *mung* as second person pronoun and *man* as third person pronouns. *Ku*, *mung* and *man* are pronouns which can be categorised as very casual ones.¹⁷ The reason why he uses *man* and *ku* to refer to the property developer and *mung* for the contractor instead of more formal counterparts is probably because he wants his story to be told in the way that it would have been told among acquaintances, to be narrated in reported speech. Moreover, his narrative is also casual in terms of his lexical choices. He opts for language at a level similar to the one this group of people in the construction business are most likely to use. *Man*, *ku* and *mung* are words normally used among people within the construction business and other labour-oriented fields where most of the personnel are men. The way he tells the story using these words sounds more realistic and more convincing. The word ‘monkey’ used at the end of the quotation casually implies that not even a monkey, not to mention a person, would mortgage a house while the interest rates were as high as this. The use of the word ‘monkey’ to explain that no one in his/her right mind would do something is a feature of spoken language. Thus the entire quotation told in casual language is rather incongruous with the fact that it is uttered in a parliamentary debate which is supposed to be rather more formal. However, a story told in this manner is more likely to hold the audience’s attention. It gives detail in a conversational manner. It keeps the audience interested even though the role-play between property developer and contractor is only remotely relevant to the government’s economic mismanagement under discussion. This excerpt is an example of intertextuality at both levels: changing articulation of genres and the use of reported speech.

b. Metaphors

Trairong proceeds with his speech in an informal manner. Apart from the use of pronouns with a casual register, he employs a few different strategies to make his discourse sound less formal and less technical so that it can appeal to a wider audience. He uses metaphors to help clarify some technical points such as an economic mechanism and economic policy.

The ADB had warned. They had to install an economic suspension system [*khao ja tong tit tang choke up khong rabop setthakit*]. (line 129)

Trairong uses the word ‘suspension system’ to signify an economic policy which would be safeguarded from a sudden economic crash. He implicitly suggests that during a period of

¹⁶ *Ai nan* is a third person pronoun which can be used to refer to either an object or a person. It has an informal register. Its meaning and register are similar to *man*, which is also a third person pronoun.

¹⁷ Thai has a complex deference system which is reflected in the variety of words used for ‘I’ and ‘you’. Of all the pairs of words used between equals for I-you, *ku-mung* is probably the most informal one.

inflation, the government should arrange a kind of economic policy that gives flexibility and absorbs pressure should the economy take a turn for the worse. This kind of policy serves the same function to the economy as the suspension system does for a vehicle.

Excuse me for using this term. It really is a jargon word widely used among economists, not just me. They called this kind of policy, 'a dog chasing its own tail' [*ma gut hang tua eng*]. (line 305)

Here Trairong compares the Banharn-led government's financial policy to 'a dog chasing its own tail'. 'A dog chasing its own tail' is used to convey the idea that the government's policy only causes a cycle of economic problems. The government's solution simply leads to another problem which needs to be solved.

It is fairly extreme to compare the government policy to the act of an animal regarded as lowly by Thais such as a dog. Not only that, the government's policy is compared to a dog behaving rather foolishly by 'chasing its own tail'. However, Trairong manages to get his figurative comment across uninterrupted, no matter how insulting it may sound. Even if he is interrupted, he can always point out that it is not him who says this but it is the words of 'economists'. Thus this example can be categorised as having both levels of intertextuality. It presents the changing articulation of genre from a formal to an informal one portrayed by the metaphor 'dog biting its own tail'. Then it also shows pseudo-reported speech from unidentified economists. The pseudo-reported speech helps him to present the informal and rather offensive metaphor uninterrupted. By safely getting his comparison across, he has given himself a starting point to attack the government further, as follows:

And that the BOT injected money into the system which they first sucked out but they had sucked more than they should and so they are sitting there injecting it back in. What they are doing is sitting there biting their own tail. [*thi tham yu ni nang gat hang tua eng*] (line 312- 314)

Trairong explains the government's handling of financial issues before concluding that what the government is doing now is 'biting its own tail'. It appears that Trairong has moved one step further from the economists comment while still using the same comparison. While the economists commented on government policy, Trairong now uses his own voice to comment on Banharn's government itself that it is now biting its tail [*thi tham yu ni nang gat hang tua eng*]. His comment can be taken as a direct insult. However, since he uses the same metaphor as the economists, he runs less risk of being seen as the one to be blamed.

I am just skimming through these allegations because I am not an executioner today. (line 350)

By saying this, Trairong suggests that he is not going to launch any cutthroat and unarguable allegations which might lead to Banharn's personality assassination. So 'executioner' here means executing Banharn's image in his political career, rather than actually taking his life.

c. Figurative words

He uses words which not only convey meaning but also create a vivid image in the audience's mind. One could term these 'figurative words'.

The exchange rate has to ripple [*kra-pheuam*] more than that. (line 144)

The word ripple vividly suggests movement, normally of liquid. The word is not generally used in Thai to describe the state of things other than liquid. When used with the exchange rate, the audience can clearly see that his point is to give the rate space to fluctuate a little. Therefore, apart from the word's efficiency in explaining the economic system for ordinary people to understand, it also creates incongruity in the process because the word is not normally seen in this context. This is also the case for the following quotations.

...as a result, the short term investment kept flowing in [*lai khao ma*] causing problems. (line 149)

The BOT, then, injected money into the system. First they had sucked [*pai dut*] (private sector's) money out but they had sucked [*dut*] out far too much they had to inject it in once more. (line 312- 313)

d. Idioms

Trairong uses idioms to elaborate his point. Idioms, like much other figurative language, are not conventionally accepted as formal language. They belong to spoken language. Some of the idioms are used to describe the degree of seriousness of his point, for example, he uses idioms to describe how the government kept interfering in the Ministry of Finance's affairs. The Minister Amnuay Wirawan did not have full authority until recently. As a result, the economic problems were left unsolved until it was almost too late. This accuses the Prime Minister of interfering in the Ministry's affairs without having the knowledge to do so.

They just gave authority to Amnuay Wirawan a few months ago after having fire burning their arse and their head was about to bleed [*lang jak fai lon kon laeo leuad ja ok hua laeo*]. (line 204-205)

Normally the idiom used to describe the state of panic when a deadline is fast approaching is to 'have fire burning one's arse'. This is a standard expression in Thai. To describe that state of panic the government was in is even more serious than that, Trairong adds 'their head was about to bleed' to show the extreme seriousness of it. By taking the standard idiom further by adding his own expression, Trairong brings this sense of urgency to another level.

This is the government's excuse, mucky water [*nam khun khun*]. (line 353)

'Mucky water' or *nam khun khun* excuse means a lame excuse. So here Trairong is directly offending the government without using any redress.

e. Personal experience

Trairong tells stories from his personal experience in order to develop his points, for example, he claims that he knows best about Malaysia. Then, he tells a story about his trips to Malaysia in order to support the fact that he indeed has firsthand experience of the country and that he has a close personal liaison with this neighbouring country.

I know Malaysia best because my constituencies are in the Thai-Malay border region: Sadao, Nathawee, Sabayoi, all the way. When I go back to my constituencies, I will have a meal at Alostar because it is just 3 minutes drive. I will go to have Alostar roast duck and come back. I will cross the border at Sadao. I go to Alostar regularly. Saiburi was a colonial of my *phraya Suwanakiri*. I often go there so I know many people. There are many Thais who speak Thai just like us. There are many temples. One of my relatives is an abbot there. (line 409- 415)

This whole story about his frequent visits to Malaysia is told in order to support his claim that he knows Malaysia best. The use of a rather long personal experience to support his claim is a characteristic of Trairong's speech. It reflects his egocentric bragging style which is rather understandable in a debate where everybody is trying to put him/herself up and knock others down. Sometimes his story is directly related to the claim as its logical support. Sometimes it is unnecessarily detailed. It is rather anecdotal and irrelevant to the point. This is an example of his anecdotal underpinning.

I am concerned about our country. I went to survey the atmosphere of our rival country. I went with the mayor of Satul. We went in a tiny boat, 3-4 of us. We sailed over waves on stormy sea. I thought we'd be shipwrecked that day. I was afraid the mayor would not make it whereas I was good at swimming...(line 441-444)

Here, he is talking about his trip to Langawi, a Malaysian island designated by the Malaysian government as a rival of Phuket. Though the trip clearly supports his claim that he is concerned about Thailand's interest so much that he has to go there and see the competing rival for himself, his story is far too detailed and anecdotal. Some of it is irrelevant to the point. In the following example, Trairong mentions his conversation with his friends who are politicians in Malaysia. He uses this conversation to display that he has an in-depth insight into the politics of this neighbouring country.

[On Malaysian politics]

I asked how much *mung* spent in the latest election. *Man* counted it for me. It was 300,000 in Thai baht. 300,000 baht! You will not even make it in the election for village headman. (line 427- 428)

This story is told to support his point that Malaysian politicians are more honest than their Thai counterparts. He mentions the expense needed for a village head's election in comparison with mainstream politics in Malaysia to emphasise his point that Thai politics is far more money-oriented than Malaysian's. The fact that he uses the smallest scale of election like that of the village headman in the Thai system to compare with another country's general election violates parallelism. The audience expects to see a comparison at the same level. Therefore, there is an incongruity between audience expectation and what is said.

The use of personal experience, whether relevant or not, can effectively bolster an interpersonal relationship in a way that personalises the speaker. This sort of discourse brings him closer to the people because it shows the 'plain folk' aspect of him. The content of the story about Malaysia, makes this appeal appear more regional. It is directed at Southerners because it relates more to their region. By so doing, he projects himself not so much as an untouchable politician but a tangible individual who shares a similar experience with all Southerners.

Apart from using his personal experience to support his point, he often mentions his positive qualities such as what he is capable of or what he is good at. In other words, while he is trying to knock the government down, he is also trying to build himself up. Unlike Sunai, Trairong opts for both directness and indirectness, depending on what issue he is talking about. While he suggests that the government is incapable of handling serious issues like economic management, he explains in detail how the economic system actually works. By doing that he projects himself as an authority who knows thoroughly about economics and therefore deserves more trust than the government. However, this message is not stated but implied. In economics, it is rather risky to state that one is a master of it. This could be taken as boastful. It is safer to be indirect. However in a trivial issue, he runs less risk of being branded boastful. Instead it can be seen as an act that shows intimacy; that he sincerely bares his personal side to the public while in fact what he does is boast.

This I was told by the private sector. I knew many people. I have a wide network. I have many acquaintances. I don't normally sleep at home because I often have meals and socialise with my pals so they give me figures. (line 270-271)

...because I am good at swimming. (line 444)

(The research done by) Dr. Sangsith from Chula surveyed the other day. Don't be cross about him. He was my student. (line 590)

His casual and candid style is also reflected in his criticism. He sometimes directly criticises points where he thinks the government has made a bad decision. His straightforwardness in parliamentary debate does not correspond to the commonly accepted sublanguage variant of parliamentary

discourse. Parliamentary discourse is commonly expected to be indirect. FTA strategies are almost expected. The key feature of the discourse is moderation which is a result of two constraints. First, the discourse is regulated by the parliamentary code of behaviour. The code is there to prevent direct confrontation. Second, the politicians opt to be indirect in order to maintain their PPF and PNF.

However, moderation does not feature anywhere in Trairong's speech. Sometimes he chooses to be direct. His direct criticism shows his objection and emotion.

...finally you changed. You took my Dr. Surakiat to Hong Kong and binned him there. I had not suggested to remove him so abruptly. That was very cruel and cold-blooded [jai dam mak]. You used him and then disposed of him when you no longer needed him. You have no empathy [mai mi nam jai]. (line 97-100)

...how could the Prime Minister still stand there smiling. [than nayok yun lang trong yim yu dai yang rai] (line 196)

It was so weird [plaek pralat mak]. [the government have] no direction whatsoever. They did not know who's the boss. (line 208-209)

As can be seen in these examples, Trairong uses bold on record FTAs without any redress. It creates incongruity between the audience's expectation of the parliamentary genre and what is actually said. The parliamentary genre should show moderation and a certain degree of indirectness is expected. Trairong's violation of parliamentary genre creates incongruity. Therefore this debate of Trairong can be seen as interesting simply because it is different from other formal and stereotypical parliamentary discourse. However, the speaker is not protected by parliamentary privilege during a no-confidence debate, Trairong still has to be cautious in accusing and criticising people. There are times when he launches ferocious comments but withholds the name of who was under attack. However, the context he mentions helps to clarify who the person was.

...and the solution to the rising cost of food is not to recommend people to eat chicken ribs [si khrong kai]. That is not the right solution. And I urge you not to eat chicken ribs because apparently we see that the person who eats chicken ribs behaves like an amphetamine addict [khon mao ya ma]: scolding everyone in the country day in day out. So never ever eat it because if you do, you will have that symptom. A few days ago, the Prime Minister himself appeared to be a bit aggressive. I don't know whether he had eaten chicken ribs or not. No don't eat it. Don't believe him (man). This is the solution this government has. Their solution is so absurd. (line 297- 303)

It was the deputy Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej who suggested earlier that people should eat chicken ribs to ease their financial problems. His suggestion was broadcast nationwide so the chicken ribs idea was clearly associated with him. Here, Trairong strongly criticises 'the person' who suggested this alternative. The fact that Trairong does not mention Samak's name prevents him from being sued for libel for saying that Samak behaves like an amphetamine addict.

Like many other politicians, Trairong resorts to sarcasm. However, compared to other politicians, he uses much less.

I know that contractors or persons who used to be contractors will do anything to get their work done. They might have paid their way. They might have joined in tendering a bid and sharing the profit among themselves. They do not mind. But once they entered politics, people doubt whether they will chuck out their habit. (line 566-567)

This sarcasm clearly attacks the Prime Minister who had been a contractor before starting a political career. This sarcasm over-generalises that all contractors are not very concerned with integrity. The overgeneralisation makes such a practice of contractors appear as given, common ground knowledge that everyone has agreed upon, while in fact it is not. Hence, it sounds justified to blame the former contractor as the Prime Minister for being dishonest because, according to his sarcastic argument, dishonesty is part and parcel of being a contractor.

Conclusion

In this part he restates his point that the Prime Minister is unfit for office and legitimises his claim. First, he claims that people want the Prime Minister to step down and supports his claim with one of Buddha's teachings about how to be a 'good' person. This reference is only to say that Banharn is not a good person according to Buddhist standards.

Towards the end of his debate, he reaffirms his point but this time tries to legitimise himself and promote his PPF in the process.

I do sympathise that you are very industrious and hard working. But that will not do. [Even if] you look for a capable person to be minister of Finance, no one would come. As a result, we are now facing a major problem. That's why I was talking to Mr. Banharn very politely the other day. I asked him 'Phi [elder brother] Banharn. Phi to resign now and come back again in the future because right now we need a person who can tackle economic problems'. (line 649- 653)

Here, he shows his sympathy as well as explaining that he still considers Banharn as his brother. By so doing, he appears to be unprejudiced. His brotherhood is reflected in the use of the title/pronoun *phi* when he describes his conversation with Banharn. Nevertheless, he still insists that Banharn must go. After expressing his sympathy, he ends his debate with a threat, telling Banharn what he will face in the form of metaphor.

I am the softest speaker for today because I am not the executioner. I am here only to do a sword dance for *Phi* Banharn's entertainment. That's all. There are executioners waiting backstage. After I step down, the sword will be placed at your throat. So from now on, let the executioners enjoy their pleasure. Good luck Mr. Prime Minister. Thank you. (line 655- 658)

7.3 Discussion

In this chapter I have analysed three accusatory speeches by Chuan, Sunai and Trairong. Just like the two speeches analysed in the previous chapter, these speeches operate within the same conjunctures. Nonetheless, their context is different. Politics in 1996 sees the opposition having an edge over the government. This is because the public are not in favour of the government led by Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa. Banharn is seen as being too unsophisticated to govern Thailand. His shady background decreases his credit even further. The opposition led by the DP are seen to be in a more favourable position despite the fact that the party was defeated on the grounds of corruption and cronyism in a no-confidence debate a year earlier. Therefore, the opposition speakers in the 1996 debate are in a more comfortable position than those in 1995. The importance of the two conjunctures, the Code of Behaviour and the multiple audiences can be played down to give way to a more damaging discourse. The different political position determines their choices of strategies. It allows them to deliver allegations and declare their adversarial role towards the government more blatantly. This is evident in the frequent use of direct allegations in the three speeches. Chuan and Trairong even use an overstatement strategy to strengthen their allegations. The use of direct allegation and overstatement signals their confidence in public support. Their confidence is also shown in the common use of prolepsis/disclaimer, a strategy that is employed in neither of the 1995 speeches. The prolepsis/disclaimer consists of two clauses starting with a clause that puts the speaker in an ethically correct position before conveying a negative message in the second clause that follows the nodal point 'but'. The prolepsis/disclaimer allows S to do 'damning with faint praise'.

It is not only the political context that determines the speakers' use of strategies, the individual's micro context categories, namely participant and cognition, also play a major part. While the political context creates a shared condition that generates the common usage of strategies discussed, the individual context categories prompt a personal variation in the three speeches. The speech of Chuan displays his confidence in his overwhelming public support. He is a much-loved politician. When Banharn's administration started going downhill, Chuan's popularity soared. He was seen as the only alternative politician who could lead Thailand back from the brink of disaster. None of the coalition leaders was considered good enough to take on this task. His popularity manifested itself when Chuan resumed his premiership in 1998.¹⁸ Chuan is aware that he has an edge over the government. He can overstate his allegation towards it knowing that his PPF will not

¹⁸ After Banharn broke an agreement to resign from the premiership after this no-confidence debate, he dissolved parliament and called for a general election. After the 1996 election Chaowalit Yongchaiyudh, the leader of NAP took office.

be affected by such an outright FTA. Since he had public opinion on his side, his duty is to emphasise the public belief that Banharn and his government are dishonest and inefficient. This is seen in the way he presents allegations as 'given', as something that everyone knew and agreed upon, by using overgeneralisation. Chuan uses FTAs without redress on many occasions. This emphasises how confident Chuan is of his public support. His arguments are clear, using a claim and support arrangement. However, there is always a danger of overdoing FTA on record without redress and losing touch with the public in the process. Being aware of this danger, Chuan also uses discursive strategies to help him attend to the other two conjunctures, Code of Behaviour and the multiple audiences, as well. Towards the end of his speech, though there is evidence of hedging, direct style is still the predominant characteristic. As for accusations that are not yet known and agreed by the public, Chuan approaches them cautiously using indirect language. An example from line 140-146 shows Chuan accusing the government of the abuse of power. Since he cannot provide evidence that the government is behind the telephone-tapping and threats, he omits the agent of these actions. As this issue is brought up in a no-confidence debate where the usual target is the government, it is quite clear who is being singled out.

Sunai is a representative from the CPP. The party defected from the opposition led by the CTP to join the Democrat-led coalition before the 1995 debate. Since then, the DP and the CPP's relationship has been fragile. During this debate, still maintaining the same pact with the DP, the CPP has yet to prove their loyalty to the DP, should they want to receive their fair share from this pact. Sunai, as a representative of the CPP, has to prove himself useful in the debate. As a CPP member he has to prove his party's loyalty to the DP coalition. As a first term MP he needs to show that he and his party have the potential to cause the CTP-led government some damage. To achieve this, he has to deliver an aggressive speech. As a result, Sunai is challenged and interrupted many times. However, it at least proves that Sunai's speech has some impact. Despite being in his first term, Sunai's speech at least succeeds in keeping other MPs listening. So the fact that Sunai's speech is interrupted and challenged is not because Sunai does not understand the Code. In fact, it may be part of his strategy to maintain audience attention. Sunai, unlike Chuan or Trairong, is not a renowned and established politician. His name alone will not hold people's attention like the two prominent politicians. He needs to disregard one of the conjunctures to make his name as an offensive speaker. Of all the three conjunctures, the violation of the Code could cause the least damage. To be interrupted or challenged hardly does any harm to S. The worst the House Speaker can do is ask for a retraction. Yet by the time the words are retracted, the message has already been put across. The most serious verdict is to be expelled from the House. However in the past ten years, there is only one record of an MP being expelled from the House. This

signals the rarity of any MP being given that verdict. The audience and the need to cause damage to the government, on the other hand, are something that Sunai cannot overlook.

His contribution is a series of Code violations. It does not accord with moderation. Some of the violation of the Code can be seen as deliberate. These deliberate provocative remarks are seen in the offensive content of his speech. He is interrupted and challenged not only for his provocative style but also for verbal extravagance, for example, he mentions irrelevant evidence like the mutiny in Suphanburi a hundred years ago. This is clearly counter-productive for his argument to convince the people of Suphanburi not to see this debate as adversarial. Despite the number of challenges and interventions, he does not back down. His reaction to the challenges and interventions suggests that the violation of the Code (Rules of procedure No. 56: verbal extravagance and unnecessary exposition of any materials are prohibited) is far from being unintentional. It may be inferred that he is trying to provoke a response from the floor so that he can interact with them.

Challenges and interventions are also solicited unintentionally by the disorganised structure of his speech. The failure to make his points in order and the failure to make a step by step claim and support argument leaves his speech vulnerable. The disorderly manner of his argument makes it sound confusing and sometimes irrelevant. There are also times that he repeats himself. These flaws, therefore, create an opportunity and legitimacy for other MPs to protest. Not only that, his speech is also interrupted many times by the Speaker because of this.

Whether or not the challenges and interventions are premeditated, it can be argued that interaction like this can do Sunai more good than harm. Even though his speech is far from being the 'ideal type', in a sense it is effective. It is very rare that any MP is punished for violating the rules. Moreover, given the fact that public opinion is probably the most powerful force to bring down the government, opting for the style that the public enjoys may be his best bet. Interaction makes the speech sound more 'inclusive' in a sense that others can participate in it. The deliberate flouting of rules can be seen as part of his attempt to attract public attention. We must bear in mind that Sunai is a first term MP and his name certainly does not catch people's eyes. He does not yet have an established speech style like Chuan or Trairong, for example. Sunai has to find a distinctive feature, 'an edge', to attract public attention. Hostile remarks, although they provoke challenges, may do the work. Besides it is very unlikely that he will be punished by the Speaker for that. As a result, the interaction between Sunai and other MPs goes on. It makes the speech more confrontational like a boxing match which people find more interesting than a virtuoso monologue.

The combination of Chuan's formality and Sunai's informal style can be found in Trairong's speech. Trairong is one of the most popular politicians. He is one of the Democrats who likes to think of himself as a technocrat. He is an expert in economics who is not shy to show himself as an authority in the field. The fact that he is in the public's favorite party, the DP and that he is an established political figure means that he does not have to struggle like Sunai. He can give a speech using his own style. Trairong's speech is known to be informative and at the same time entertaining. He employs various strategies in this oration to make it interesting. One of them is level one intertextuality that is generated from various devices such as informal metaphor and social deixis. The level one intertextuality also cover the potentially humorous incongruity created by the *violation of parallelism* and *violation of parliamentary genre*. The latter type is more prolific in this particular speech. Though Trairong is talking about macro-economics which is his area of expertise, he manages to do so in an entertaining way. He explains this complicated technical issue by using lexical choices with informal register. By so doing he creates an incongruity; he talks about a technical issue using non-technical terms. This can be potentially humorous. Also it creates level one intertextuality because there is a constant genre changing between a parliamentary genre and informal one. This discursive feature serves two functions. First of all, the informal lexical choices make people think that he is not talking over their heads. As a result, they do not turn away from the issue. Secondly, he uses examples to illustrate his point. The story is told using casual narrative. Its use of example and the familiar informal narrative style makes it easier for people to understand. Finally, the mixture of formality in the content and casualness in the form creates incongruity. It is potentially humorous.

The three speeches each have their own way of creating comic effects to attract public attention. We laugh at Chuan's speech because he has his witty way in making his point. We laugh not because we find what he says is humorous as much as we admire his wit. It is a laugh born out of admiration. Trairong's speech, on the other hand, is humorous. The incongruity is created by his constant change of genres. The informal genre violates the constraints of parliamentary discourse. The genre-changing signified by the different sets of lexical choices defies our expectation of what is to be heard next. It can be said that humour in Chuan's speech is intended to show off his wit, while Trairong's is intended to create incongruities to make the speech more interesting. The speech of Sunai is different. He is busy attacking the Prime Minister, usually with sarcasm. He tries to put himself up and knock Banharn down. It is possible to use sarcasm to create a comic effect. We see many examples in Chuan's speech. Unfortunately, Sunai's sarcasm does not always make us smile like Chuan's. Sarcasm is saying something but meaning another. Sarcasm will be found humorous when the audience knows what the speaker means; and when they, to a certain

extent, share the same idea with the speaker. For Sunai, even though the audience knows what he means, they do not always agree with him. The fact that he criticises the Prime Minister's lack of intelligence despite his old age is hard for any Thais to agree with, though he uses a discursive strategy like sarcasm. It is rather awkward for a young and inexperienced politician to put himself on par with a politician as renowned as Banharn. Sunai's sarcasm not only fails to create humour, it also provokes public antipathy towards him. He may be seen as an arrogant brat.

In terms of content, Chuan's opening speech sets the stage for the upcoming speeches. It previews the degree of seriousness of this year's accusatory speeches. Chuan presents allegations as pressing issues that must be discussed immediately. He criticises Banharn's ability and credibility as well as his personal characteristics. This argument helps legitimise the debate as a whole. Sunai's speech launches an allegation about the Prime Minister's tax evasion while Trairong's speech, on the other hand, presents an allegation that Banharn's administration has put Thailand's economics in jeopardy. Trairong's speech is mostly concerned with Banharn's administration. Unlike the first two speeches, it mostly features official matter like economics.

Chuan and Trairong's speeches can be seen as exemplary. They are both informative and entertaining to listen to. These two speeches display the speakers' rhetorical talents. They are effective in the sense that they achieve the goal of the debate in causing damage to the government. Chuan's use of FTA without redress and Trairong's bragging that aims to belittle the Prime Minister can be seen as characteristics of Thai Southerners. Thai scholar, Ekawit Na Thalang states that the Southerners are dynamic in language usage, talkative and argumentative (Ekawit 1997). Akhom further argues that language ability, especially spoken language, is one of the people's regional traits. Akhom argues that Southerners are not very friendly or outgoing. They are strong-headed and always involved in hot arguments. They are straightforward and usually speak without consideration for others' feeling (Akhom 2000: 56). Chuan and Trairong come from the South and therefore they share this putative regional speaking style. Since the two are popular Southern MPs, it is also possible to look at style as part of their attempt to appeal to their voters, many of them are also from the South.

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the political context in 1996 and the speakers' political position and roles in the context in order to explain the dialectical relationship between context and text.

Similar to the 1995's speakers, Chuan, Sunai and Trairong are actors in the parliamentary institution. They are engaging in opposition by giving a speech of no-confidence in the

parliamentary setting. However, the political situation has changed since 1995. In 1996, the opposition led by Chuan Leekpai are in a more advantageous position than the 1995 opposition. This is because the public are in favour of them. The different political position of the speakers affects their discourse. The 1996 speeches are generally more offensive than that of the 1995. There is evidence of on record FTA without redress. On record FTAs are especially pronounced in the speech of the opposition leader, Chuan Leekpai. This is probably because the public see him as their only hope when their nation is on the brink of an economic crisis that Banharn's administration allegedly caused. There is also evidence of overstatement, a strategy that strengthen the degree of the speaker's claim but leaves him liable to be accused of offensiveness. All the three speeches feature prolepsis/disclaimer, a strategy that is non-existent in 1995 speeches. The prolepsis/disclaimer is a structure that provides a slipway for the speaker to make negative criticism while seemingly remaining on the moral high ground. Apart from the common pattern of discursive style, each speaker comes up with a different combination of strategies. This confirms the finding of chapter 5 that the difference in the speaker's roles and cognition generate different sets of discursive strategies.

Chuan is in a stable political position. With the public joining him on the opposite side to Banharn, his PPF is not likely to be threatened by criticising Banharn. What he says can easily be taken as public opinion. Therefore he can afford to make formal and direct allegations. Overgeneralisation and level two intertextuality are employed to signal that there are other people who are sharing his point of view. He also uses prolepsis to make his claim. Enthymeme, sarcasm and presupposition are used when he chooses to be indirect. Sometimes the offensiveness of his point is toned down by hedges. Like many other speakers, Chuan employs also level one intertextuality to make his speech more interesting.

Sunai is a new politician. His speech is an opportunity for him to prove himself useful to his party as well as proving his party, the CPP's loyalty to the DP by inflicting most damage on the coalition. His speech is offensive and at times provocative. He compromises two of the debate's conjunctures: the Code of Behaviour and the multiple audiences for a more aggressive speech. His technique is to compare the veteran politician like Banharn with himself, who is only a novice politician. The point he would like to make is that age and experience do not make Banharn any wiser or better than him. This point put his own face at risk as much as it does Banharn's, even though he uses strategies to convey it. He puts himself on the opposite side of Banharn and let the audience choose who they will support. This technique is proven not to be a good idea given the fact that Sunai is just an unknown MP while Banharn has been around for a long time and is already a household name. Sunai uses enthymeme and metaphor to suggest that Banharn is, despite

his age, not wiser in comparison with himself who is much younger. The disclaimer and hedges are used when he makes a positive point about himself. Q-A arrangement is used to attract people's attention to the issue under investigation. Prolepsis and sarcasm are used when he is making a negative criticism about the issue. Intertextuality is also employed by Sunai to create potentially humorous incongruity in his speech. The level one intertextuality is created by the use of informal social deixis and word with informal connotation.

Similar to Chuan, Trairong is one of the most popular DP MPs. Therefore he is in a comfortable political position. Unlike Chuan and Sunai, Trairong does not present himself as Banharn's enemy. In fact he strategically projects himself as a well-wishing friend of Banharn. This is suggested by his use of social deixis such as '*phi* Banharn', for example. By appearing to be a 'friend' he can legitimately criticise Banharn on the grounds that he is doing this out of good will. Trairong's speech is characterised by its informal style. His speech emphasises the interpersonal relationship between him and the audience by using level one intertextuality and sharing with them his personal experience. He uses metaphor, personal pronouns, figurative word and idiom to create level one intertextuality. His main argument is that the Prime Minister and his economic team are causing economic problems. The nature of his allegation obliges him to talk about economic issues which he explains in detail to show his expertise in the field. Metaphor is again employed as a tool to explain complicated economic issue in a non-technical way, thus making it more understandable for ordinary people. Moreover, it is potentially humorous because it creates incongruity. He is not shy to praise himself directly or sometimes using enthymeme. Level two intertextuality, metaphor, prolepsis, overstatement and overgeneralisation are employed when making criticism.

The analysis found that the political context as well as the speaker's political position and his role in the debate constitute his aim in making the speech. It is this aim that determines the set of strategies used. The calculated functions of strategies enhance the efficiency of the speech in achieving its aim.

Chapter 8 Analysis of the Respondent Speeches

8.0 Introduction

No-confidence debate discourse consists of two major parts: accusatory speeches made by opposition members and respondent speeches made by coalition members under accusation of misdeeds. The accusatory speeches aim to launch allegations, discredit the person facing allegations and win public support. In chapter 6 and 7, I have explored the dialectic relationship between context and accusatory speech discourse that is shown in the use of discursive strategies by putting the debate back into its context. The analysis of five opposition speakers suggests that every context category and the conjunctures potentially determine the choices of discursive strategies. In return, they make the discourse more effective in the given context and conjunctures. This chapter moves on to investigate the equivalent dialectic relationship between respondent speech discourse and its context and conjunctures. It is an attempt to examine if the different context categories of respondent speech generate different conjunctures and how the two affect the use of strategies in the discourse.

This chapter begins with a background to respondent speeches in order to define the rules that the respondent speakers have to abide by (setting) and the general aim (cognition) of a respondent speech. Then the next section looks at the speech's schemata and the common macropropositions of the speech. The third section analyses the speeches discourse. Each analysis begins with the political profile of the speaker. The profile enables us to understand the context categories of the individual speaker better, especially the speaker's aim and intention (cognition) that derives from his/her political position and roles (participant). Then the analysis looks at the strategies used so that the speech can achieve its aim within the given context and conjunctures.

This chapter uses two respondent speeches as data for the analysis. The speech of Suthep Thuaksuban, former Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives, is used as a sample of the 1995 debate while the speech of Kanjana Silpa-archa illustrates the 1996 debate. These two debates are chosen because both Suthep and Kanjana faced serious allegations, yet they came up with very different styles of discourse.

8.1 Background

This section will analyse the constraints posed by the Code of Behaviour, the rules governing communicative events in the parliamentary setting. Like accusatory speeches, the speaking slot and the discourse style of respondent speeches are regulated by the parliamentary Code of Behaviour. Unlike accusatory speeches, not everyone in the coalition is allowed to make a

respondent speech. According to the parliamentary Code of Behaviour, only the member of a cabinet whose ministry is facing allegations is entitled to answer the opposition's charges. However, the rules of procedure No. 51 also allow a person who is not a member of the cabinet to defend themselves if the debate affects his/her reputation. This kind of defence speech must be concise. The Code of Behaviour only allows issues which directly affect the MPs to be raised. The right of an ordinary MP to defend themselves is called *sithi phatphing*, the right to speak up when he/she is mentioned negatively.

Rule 51

Any MP who is of the opinion that a rule has been violated may stand up and make a show of hand in order to protest. The House President must give him an opportunity to explain, and the House Officer shall decide whether the Rule has or has not been violated as protested. The decision of the House President shall be final.

Paragraph one shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the person against whom the debate is on his personal or other matter thereby causing him injury.

(House of Representatives Rules of Procedure, Chapter 3, Part 2)

The speaking slot each coalition member is given depends on the agreement of the coalition and opposition whips prior to the debate. Generally, there are two options to choose from. Firstly, the coalition members are allowed to give a speech after all the opposition speakers have spoken. The second option is that the coalition member speaks immediately after an opposition member has spoken. Either option is allowable according to the Parliamentary Debate Regulations:

Article 130 Only members of the Coalition are allowed to give respondent speeches. Member of the Coalition can speak after each accusatory speech individually or more than one of them can wait to answer the allegations together

(Parliamentary Debate Regulations, Section 7: 34).

Normally a decision is taken by the whips before the beginning of the debate.

The basic aim of a respondent speech is to win back public support. It is about presenting a more convincing version of reality and undermining the others' credentials by way of undermining the others' versions of reality. In this case, it means undermining the story told by the opposition members. The respondent speech aims to convince the public that the opposition has made ungrounded allegations. Primarily, the person under allegation has to find a way to lead people to believe that he/she is innocent. This means they will have to convey this in at least one of these macropropositions:

- a. S is innocent or that S is not the only culprit in the mismanagement.
- b. The opposition has bad intentions. S is only the victim of the opposition's desire to usurp the government.

The macropropositions can be expressed using one of these arguments:

- a. He/she is not involved in the activity under allegation, and therefore is innocent.

- b. He/she is involved in the project in the allegations but did not know of the alleged mismanagement
or
- c. He/she is innocent. S explains that the 'dubious' aspect of the story that the opposition used as an indication of mismanagement was in fact not dubious.

Secondly, the speech may suggest that the person under allegation is not the sole culprit of the alleged action. There are many other people involved. Hence, if the person is found guilty, others must have their share of responsibility as well. The respondent speech aims to win back S's credentials and public support as well as retaliating against the opposition in one way or another. This retaliation can be achieved by proving that the opposition's investigation into the matter is invalid or untrue; by showing that the opposition does not have a thorough knowledge of the matter, and thus has made a mistake or by S managing to discredit the opposition. Sometimes, a respondent speech has to perform the third function which is claiming that a 'false' allegation has been intentionally created in an attempt to destroy the government. By suggesting that certain accusations have been made by the opposition with the cunning intention of seeking advantage for themselves, their seriousness can be undermined. Speculating on the motive of the opposition encourages public scepticism with regard to the truth of their assertions.

Not only does a respondent speech have to perform the three functions above, but it also has to counter against the opposition's speeches. Its fourth function is to make an emotional appeal in order to win public sympathy. The idea is to argue that the government are victims of the situation; that he/she is not responsible for the malpractice, should the malpractice exist at all. They are supposed to turn the allegation against the opposition, suggesting that they are picked on and defamed only because the latter wants to replace them. Though this accusation seems to have an element of truth since politicians prefer to be part of the coalition than to be in the opposition, this 'hidden agenda' is not meant to be disclosed in public. As a public figure, a politician is obliged to maintain his/her PPF. He/She should be seen as an objective person who cares about the public interest more than his/her own. Their personal goals are not expected to be overtly manifest. The politicians' desire to be in the coalition must be hidden otherwise it can jeopardise their PPF as an objective politician. By implicitly suggesting that this is the desire of the opposition, the coalition member can succeed in turning the accusation round. It is now the opposition members who are concerned about their own interests.

During the debate each side will try to gain as much speaking time as possible so that the opposing side has less time to speak or retaliate. Not only do both sides care about how long their speeches may continue, but also they care about the time at which they will be scheduled. The most sought-after slot is 'prime time', approximately 8.30 p.m. after the main evening news. This is the most

desirable moment because this is when the audience figures for the debate will be at their highest, as most people will be at home. The greater the audience speakers have, the better chance they have to gain more public support. As a result, both sides try to manoeuvre their slots into prime time. The manoeuvring for the best speaking slot for respondent speakers has to be carefully planned. The idea is to employ the ‘parliamentary game’: the manipulation of parliamentary regulations in order to hinder or to restrict the opposition’s speech so that it will end before prime time. Then the coalition member facing allegations will ask for the Speaker’s permission to speak. Generally, while the accusatory speaker has to overcome only one challenge - to end the opposing speech before prime time, the respondent speaker has to overcome two challenges before gaining their preferred speaking slot: to end the accusatory speech *and* to be given permission by the House Speaker.

8.2 Schemata and Content of the Respondent Speeches

Respondent speeches can also be classified into four phases:

1. Ritual beginning
2. Preface to the defence
3. Defence
4. Conclusion

Even though the number of phases is similar to those of the accusatory speeches, the emphasis falls on a different phase. While the second phase of the accusatory speakers can be very long because the speakers put a lot of effort into legitimising their speech, the respondent speakers do not put any emphasis on this. It is because delivering a respondent speech does not threaten S’s PPF like the accusatory speech does. It is the speaker’s right to clarify his/her position therefore, he/she does not need to justify his/her action. The first part of the first phase, *ritual beginning*, is almost identical to that of an accusatory speech both in terms of its style and content. This consists of a self-introduction which is strictly controlled by the Code of Behaviour. It expresses S’s gratitude to the Speaker of the House for giving him/her a chance to speak for him/herself. This expression of gratitude does not normally appear in an accusatory speech because, in theory, every MP is allowed to give an accusatory speech. Besides, the list of accusatory speakers is approved prior to the debate. While every accusatory speaker has already secured his/her speaking slot, a respondent speaker has to be ‘allowed’ their slot during the debate according to the Speaker’s decision. Then this phase begins to feature discourse which tries to develop an understanding between S and the audience. Sometimes, this part also includes some emotional appeals for public sympathy as well, for example, in the latter part of Kanjana’s ritual beginning.

According to the analysis, respondent speeches place less emphasis on the preface phase than accusatory ones. This phase covers less than 20 lines in Suthep's speech while none of Kanjana's speech can be categorised as a preface to the defence at all. Accusatory speeches, on the other hand, tend to take their time in gradually developing audience understanding and provoking public emotion at this phase. Respondent speeches do not. In accusatory speeches, the preface to the allegation involves persuasive rhetoric. This kind of rhetoric, however, appears in the defence and conclusion phases in respondent ones. In these phases, S discusses the allegations in general and what he/she thinks or feels about the assertions. The discourse in these phases can be categorised as relatively emotive because it displays personal feelings and appeals to people's sympathy.

The defence phase is where S tries to clear his/her name and prove that they are not guilty, by providing some evidence. In this phase, different styles emerge. Some members of the coalitions have a conventional and systematic style in defending themselves. They answer allegations one by one. The speakers who come up with this clear-cut and straight-to-the-point style tend to produce more formal speeches than other speakers. An example of such a speech is Kanjana's. Other members opt to be more discursive and detailed. Another group of speeches is represented by Suthep's. This group often bombards the audience with lengthy background detail, for example, in order to explain the rationality of the project under allegation. However, these speakers tend to fall short when it comes to the clarification of their alleged corruption. After giving explicit details of the circumstances- which are mostly irrelevant to the accusation - they often fail to answer the allegation itself. Surprisingly, these members often seem to succeed in this strategy by diverting the audience's attention to other points. They may try to suggest that the other people involved in the project should take the blame. Shifting the blame like this can usually be achieved fairly easily since there must be government officials involved in all state projects. These officials are convenient scapegoats because they are the direct subordinates of Ministers under scrutiny, and therefore they will not dare to contradict their superiors.

Not only do the speakers attempt to put the blame on scapegoats, they also try to divert public attention to the opposition. This is what is called political retaliation. These members of the coalition may also accuse the opposition of malpractice in the hope that the public will forget about the original allegation. This latter type of speech is usually delivered in an informal manner. The informality is reflected in loose topical control, discourse type and lexical choices. These traits are evident in Suthep's speech.

After the respondent phase which forms the longest section of the debate, S summarises his/her points in the conclusion. As in accusatory speeches, the conclusion of the respondent side not only revisits the points made, but also features persuasive rhetoric. S uses this rhetoric to invite people's sympathy. Firstly, this part repeats the expression of gratitude for the Speaker of the House in

granting him/her permission to speak. Secondly, it appeals for public sympathy mainly by saying that he/she is an innocent being defamed by the opposition. This typical content helps rebuild their PPF. By expressing his/her gratitude, S is projecting themselves as a humble person. By proving that he/she is innocent, S is threatening the opposition's PPF in the sense that they are shown to be intentionally abusing S in order to benefit themselves. Some speakers do not point out that the false allegation is intentional. Instead, they can also discredit the opposition not by attacking the opposition's NF by showing that they are incompetent, that they are unable to conduct a valid investigation.

The analysis shows that the respondent speeches not only answer the allegations, they retaliate against them as well. The respondent side has to answer the charges in order to prove that he/she is innocent in one way or another. In addition, the defence also tries to fend the opposition off by implicitly suggesting that they are no better than him/her. By discrediting the opposition, their imputations can then be further undermined.

8.3 Analysis of Discourse

This section will analyse the speeches of Suthep and Kanjana separately. This is an attempt to show the variety of styles presented by the two speeches. I will begin with Suthep's speech as representative of an informal and discursive style of defence followed by Kanjana's as typical of a formal systematic one.

8.3.1 Suthep Thuaksuban's Speech¹ (17 May 1995)

Suthep Thuaksuban is a Democrat MP from Surat Thani province. He graduated with a Master's degree in Political Science from Tennessee. Before he entered parliament, he was in local politics as *kamnan* (sub-district headman) in Thasathon, Phunphin, Surat Thani province.

In 1995, Suthep was a deputy secretary general of the Democrat Party, a fairly powerful position. In addition, he had been a member of parliament for seven terms. He had been overseeing Agriculture and Cooperatives affairs for three terms: as a deputy minister in 1986, chairman of the parliamentary Agriculture and Cooperatives committee in 1990, and again as Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 1992.

¹ Suthep Thuaksuban gave two respondent speeches during this debate. The speech under analysis is the first one. It is less aggressive than the second one which involves a verbal confrontation with Chalerm Yubumrung. I have chosen this speech because it shows his increasing inclination towards an aggressive and confrontational style.

Suthep was the deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives during the time of the allegedly corrupt *so po ko 4-01* land reform project. Suthep along with the Minister Niphon Phromphan (also a Democrat MP) was accused of manipulating power for the benefit of his cronies. The list of beneficiaries was disclosed first in the *Matichon* newspaper (Sathit 1996: 134), followed by the opposition's and media's zealous investigation into the matter. It appears that 20% of the *so po ko* land in Phuket was given to wealthy beneficiaries (Sathit 1996: 117). On top of that, some of these also had close links with the Democrat Party (DP), one was actually the husband of DP's Phuket MP and secretary of the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Anchali Vanich Thepabutr. It was claimed that the Democrats had orchestrated the distribution of land to their vote canvassers and people who worked for the party under the banner of *so po ko 4-01*. The opposition accused the Democrats of manipulating the purposes of the land reform project by distributing land intended for poor and needy agriculturists purely for the benefit of their cronies.

In 1994, there had been a no-confidence debate concerning this issue. The target of that no-confidence debate was the Minister and Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Suthep Thuaksuban and Niphon Phromphan. Being aware of the increasingly ferocious public outcry, Suthep grudgingly resigned. His resignation was followed by that of the Minister two days before the no-confidence debate. As a result, the debate was aborted. However the Democrats' attempt to appease the public proved fruitless. In the May 1995 no-confidence debate the opposition revived the case by pointing out the 'peculiar' and 'doubtful' nature of the project. The Democrats were in an even worse situation than ever before. Since the debate's Code of Behaviour only permits serving ministers to give proper respondent speeches, Suthep, though bombarded by a series of allegations directing at him, theoretically was not permitted to give a proper speech to clear his name. Suthep's resignation in 1994 appeared to be not only fruitless but also put him into a very awkward position. He was allowed only to give a short speech about the allegations affecting him. In theory he was not allowed to explain the rationality of the *so po ko 4-01* project, the point which was being widely debated. The fact that he was no longer a Deputy Minister and therefore was not entitled to give a proper speech is used by the opposition members to challenge him many times during his rather prolonged speech.

8.3.1.1 Analysis of Suthep's Discourse

Suthep's image is that of a tough-talking, daredevil character. He is hot-tempered. His aggressive behaviour is shown both linguistically and para-linguistically. He could be seen as the epitome of Southerner MPs in a sense that he can at times be assertive to the point of being offensive (Ekawit 1997).

When making an attacking speech, being aggressive is encouraged. Now that he is in a respondent position, Suthep attempts to tone down his aggressiveness. Being aware that one of the main missions of the respondent side is to win public sympathy, Suthep allows his characteristic aggression to be curtailed. His attempt to be polite and even humble, is shown mostly in the first part of his debate. In the following example, he acknowledges his inferior position in relation to that of the Speaker. He recognises the Speaker's power over him in the parliament by expressing his gratitude towards the Speaker for allowing him the floor to speak. This action signifies that the Speaker has the power to decide who speaks and when. The fact that the Speaker has allowed him a chance to speak is something Suthep must be grateful for. Nevertheless, towards the end, he manages to voice his disapproval of the fact that the opposition members have been attacking him all day.

I would like to thank Mr. Speaker, for giving me an opportunity to clarify the issues that my fellow MPs have been debating about me from this morning until the last one [who has just finished] a moment ago. (line 3-5)

Apart from expressing his recognition of the Speaker's power, he also manages to make an emotional appeal to gain public sympathy by articulating his feelings of distress towards the allegations. By showing what he feels about the serious allegations with which he is being bombarded, he reveals his weak points. In this situation, showing emotion does not compromise his PPF because it only confirms common human qualities: that he can be sorry or hurt just like anyone else. By projecting himself as another common person, he seeks to make his audience identify and sympathise with him.

Today there have been members of the opposition who have stood up and given speeches implying that the Democrat Party with which I am affiliated has been conspiring systematically to swindle the public in various ways... This accusation must be considered the most serious charge with which one party can possibly accuse another fellow party of. (line 14-23).

Mr. Speaker, this accusation is very harsh against me. (line 266).

However, it is not too long before Suthep shows his more usual style. His growing aggression is seen as his speech goes on. His impatience is first apparent in line 104.

Would Mr. Speaker please listen to me before giving a verdict? (Suthep, line 104)

Here he starts to tell the Speaker what he should do. Nevertheless, he still does not forget to do it in a respectful manner. The politeness is shown in the word 'please' which signifies that he is not ordering the Speaker, rather he is asking for the Speaker's favour. Suthep's attempt to be tactful and to recognise the regulations that constrain him is also shown in the next examples.

Your Honour the Speaker, there is evidence in the House of Representatives report. I will try not to be lengthy here. [*phom ja mai klao yoen yoe*] (line 118-119)

I will not read this because it will take up too much time but I would like to assure everyone, every party in the House or the majority of the House that we want the land reform project to solve these grievances once and for all. (line 166-167).

In these two examples, Suthep reassures the Speaker that he will be brief. His reassurance seems to reflect his respect for the Code of Behaviour which urges S to be concise. However, this respect and recognition of the Speaker's power disappears completely later in the next example. Suthep has been challenged once by an opposition MP and interrupted three times by the Speaker at this stage. After two consecutive interventions by the Speaker, he says:

There has never been a single no-confidence debate of the entire coalition but they have been slagged me off all day long [*nang da phom thang wan*] therefore, Mr.Speaker must give me a chance. (line 350)

Mr. Speaker must give me some sympathy (line 357)

In this example, it appears that Suthep has reached boiling point and that he is having an emotional outburst. The fact that he is supposed to maintain his PPF by not showing his anger has been forgotten. The word *please* is no longer used. He makes it clear that he does not ask for the Speaker's favour. Instead he is commanding the Speaker to give him permission to speak. The modal auxiliary *must* reflects the authority attached to his utterance (Hodge and Kress 1996: 122). It also encodes the relationship between S and H (Ibid: 126). In this case, while Suthep still appears to be asking for the Speaker's permission, an act which shows his inferiority in relation to the latter, he commands the Speaker to grant him permission by way of using the word *must*. As a result, even though he acknowledges the Speaker's power by asking permission, he nevertheless gives the Speaker no other choice but to grant it. This action displays some degree of authority imposed on the Speaker. This example suggests that Suthep remains somewhat defiant. Even though he resumes his 'polite and humble' style again on and off, his offensiveness can still be seen in the greater part of his speech. Not only does it show in his lexical choice and his discursive strategies, but it is also apparent in the argument itself. Suthep does not answer the allegations straightforwardly. Even when he appears to directly answer a particular charge, he comes up with a prolepsis which partly accepts the accusation and then moves on to another point that he can use to gain public support.

I do...+ but +...

The first part of the prolepsis seems to suggest that he accepts the opposition's censure. It states his admission that he did what he was accused of. However, after the nodal point 'but', he argues that he did it for a good cause. Thus, he refuses to go along with the opposition's argument. The idea is to show that he has an overwhelming reason to justify his actions, mostly his concerns for the public interest. The aim is to argue that he cares for legitimate concerns enough to circumvent red

tape, as in the two following examples about the allegations that the Democrats conspired to use the land reform project to seek their own benefit:

In fact the Democrats did conspire [*wang phaen*] but it was a conspiracy [*kan wang phaen kan*] to help around ten million of our brothers and sisters, one million families which are in trouble and grievances. (line 24-26)

We have tried to make this project especially compact [*rat kum*] but the reason why we have to hasten is because we are aware that the government has only a limited time. (line 194-195)

Most of the time, Suthep's respondent arguments appear to border on a confrontational style. They not only answer the allegations but also deflect the criticism in one way or another. For the arguments that directly oppose the opposition's allegation, he uses hedging to make them sound less confrontational. In the following example, *bang oen wa* or 'it so happens' is used when he suggests that he and the Democrats had been involved in the project from the very beginning. To suggest that he is an authority because he had been involved in the project from the very beginning can be interpreted as being arrogant. Arrogance is not a desirable characteristic. Using hedging makes this statement sound less intentional and therefore less arrogant. It suggests that he had been involved in the project from the start almost by chance and that this fact is not introduced with the idea of putting himself in a good light.

Certainly, Mr. Speaker, our opinions about the project which we initiated for the benefit of the majority of people are different. Each group of MPs, each party has a different viewpoint. It so happens [*bang oen wa*] that I have been involved in this land reform project from the very beginning. (line 8-12)

The next example features hedges *tae bang oen* 'happen to'. It is used to tone down his argument against the opposition's accusation that the Democrats used their power to manipulate the parliamentary resolution concerning the land reform project. Here he says that everybody has the right to have a different idea. The reason why the Democrat's idea was chosen is because it corresponds with the views of the majority, and that it 'happens to be' the norm that the majority's preference is chosen. This idea counters the opposition's accusation. As a result, hedging is used here to make the opposing idea sounds less aggressive:

I think many of the MPs in this House have that idea [against the land reform project] but we happen to [*tae bang oen*] go along with the voice of the majority here. (line 242-243)

Generally Suthep's respondent arguments can be categorised into three sets. The arguments in the first two groups appear to have a two-tiered function. The first set of arguments overgeneralise the action under censure. By doing so, he can argue that the action is carried out by many people and therefore he should not be blamed. It has become common practice. In the following example, Suthep is trying to answer the allegation that, during the election campaign, the Democrat offered

land to people in exchange for their votes. Suthep argues that the offer of land was a party policy. This was simply the Democrats' way of declaring their policy. Since every party announces its policy during the campaign, the Democrats should not be blamed for announcing theirs, no matter how they do so.

When we were on the podium, we always promised the people that if we were elected, if our party was elected, we would solve the problem of people living in the forest reserve area and those who were living on the government land to received their land's right. Mr. Speaker, the Democrats have said the same thing because we are a political party. Our mission is to ease people's problems and those of our country. (line 31-36)

When we are on campaign, we have to tell people clearly what our policy is like. We have to say what our political ideology is and how will we achieve it. And if people have faith in the idea and elect [us] it is not a bad thing (line 563-566)

The second group of arguments starts by clearing him of responsibility then passing the blame to others and/or sharing his blame with others. The first two examples show his argument in a form of enthymeme (van Eemeren et al 1997: 213). This term refers to an argument whose logic has to be completed by an audience. The first example shows his answer to an allegation that the land reform law was passed by the Democrats with a corrupt hidden motive. Here, Suthep does not state whether the Democrats did have a hidden agenda or not. Instead he argues that the CTP merely proposed the law, leading the audience to the conclusion that if the Democrat were corrupt, the CTP were too.

I also proposed a law. The CTP also proposed a law. (line 126)

The second enthymeme appears while he is answering the charge that he is responsible for the land distribution process. He is accused of knowing and approving of malpractices in the distribution process. Again Suthep does not say whether he approves of what was going on or not. He only says that there was a committee to see to the measure. This means that whether the process was corrupt or not, 'the committee' must also be responsible for the wrong-doings that happened.

The government also has a committee to consider a measure to help people who have illegally invaded forest reserve areas. (line 143)

The third example is slightly different from the first two in a way that, instead of sharing or passing the blame to other people, he completely denies any involvement in the process. Even though he states that he believes that the officials are honest, his argument early on seems to suggest otherwise. The entire enthymeme can lead to only one conclusion: the opposition falsely accused 'honest' officials. Since the issue of politicians intervening or defaming officials does happen in Thailand, suggesting that the opposition is doing that potentially damages the image of the opposition. At the same time, since he states up front that he believes in the officials' honesty, he has put himself in on the opposite side to oppositions' argument, safe from having his own image tainted.

There is a sub-committee at the district level with a district chief officer as a chairman, with a sub-warden, a village headman, whose village has farmer representatives, as members of the committee to verify which agriculturist deserves the *so po ko* 4-01 bill. (line 222-225)

I believe in the honesty of every member of every district sub-committee in Thailand. I believe in the honesty of the land reform committee of every province in Thailand. (line 253-255)

Your Honour the Speaker, during the process [of this project], no matter what charge I am accused of [*mai wa ja mi kan klao ha phom yang ngai koe tam*], I have never put the blame on those government officials working for the project. (line 258-260)

I have never been to the area before nor have I surveyed the place myself because, being a minister, we do not have to do that. It is not humanly possible to do that. We do not have enough time. (line 285-287)

In the third set of arguments, Suthep clarifies allegations while implicitly retaliating against the opposition. The first example shows how he develops an argument that turns the opposition's allegation against themselves. In the following example, he answers the accusation that he led the meeting to his desired resolution because he chaired the meeting. Suthep then argues that just because he did so did not mean that he could dictate the committee's resolution. Then, he argues that whoever believes that the committee can be led underestimates the intellect of the committee members. In this case, his argument can only conclude that, by launching this criticism, the opposition underestimated the intelligence of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, our fellow MP said that I chaired the meeting, therefore I could have led [*chi nam*] the meeting [to any resolution I liked]. Do not underestimate the intelligence of the committee (line 553-554).

... if we discriminate, if we are prejudiced against well-to-do people and do not allow them to receive the *so po ko* 4-01 and only process the bill for the poor who have never owned land before, who work only as agriculturists, I think we will cause a big problem in the country. (line 312-315)

The second example is Suthep's answer to the charge that the Democrats did give land to wealthy people, and not only to the 'poor and needy' as stated in the law. Suthep translates the rationale of the law to distribute land only to the 'poor and needy' to be some sort of a discrimination against the rich. 'Discrimination' is a word which comes with a negative connotation. He knows that by using this particular word, the opposition's adherence to the law can probably be projected in a rather negative light. By saying that the government does not want to discriminate or be prejudiced against the rich, he picks up the potential discrimination issue to argue a rather 'unarguable' accusation. He calls the project which is exclusively for the 'poor and needy' a discrimination against the rich. As a result the negative connotation of the word *discrimination* potentially undermines the opposition's allegation, no matter how absurd Suthep's argument may sound.

The next example also shows his use of lexical choice to implicitly present the opposition in a negative way.

...but in critical times [*wela na siu na khwan*] like that, when there was a violent propagation of the news [*mi kan krapu khao yang run raeng*] that I have distributed abundant forest to the people. (line 328-329)

‘*Wela na siu na kwan*’² means a critical and potentially dangerous time. This idiom is used to describe the time when danger looms. Here it refers to the time when, presumably, the opposition ‘propagates the news violently’. As a result, the danger here is the opposition. He suggests that the opposition was going to harm the coalition by ‘propagating the news violently’. It must be noted that the verb ‘to propagate the news’ (*krapu khao*) is normally used with propaganda, rather than actual news. By saying that the opposition is propagating this news about the *so po ko 4-01*, Suthep implicitly says that there was no truth in any of the allegation.

No matter how hostile his arguments may sound, he can still look positively at at least one of the charges.

A moment ago *khun* Muk Sulaiman kindly explained my family tree which will be very useful during my campaign for the next election (line 509-511)

Towards the end of his speech, Suthep mentions Muk Sulaiman’s speech. Muk had described Suthep’s family tree in an attempt to prove that Suthep was related to Damrong Thuaksuban. By doing so, he can legitimately claim that Suthep did give land to his cronies. However, Suthep pointed out the brighter side of Muk’s speech. Instead of considering it as a threat, he sees Muk’s sketch of his family as something which will be useful during an election campaign. This is because some people do vote for their kin. So he says he may get some more votes thanks to Muk’s revelation of his whole clan. By interpreted Muk’s attempt to prove Suthep’s cronyism as something positive, Suthep creates a potentially humorous incongruity.

Suthep’s speech is an example of an experienced MP’s speech who sometimes choose to dare rather than to conform. Suthep is outspoken. He tries to be humble and polite in the beginning. His humility and politeness are reflected in his respect for the rules of procedure and the power of the House Speaker. Later, he becomes more assertive and at times offensive. He flouts and thereby challenges the parliamentary Code of Behaviour. By doing so, he displays his power not only within his own territories but also outside. By claiming his power in an area to which he has no right, that is the parliamentary territories, he is seen as being presumptuous. Not only does he challenge the Speaker’s power, he also by implication retaliates against the opposition. As a result he is interrupted and challenged many times because of this. However, on closer examination,

² *Wela na siu na khwan* is an idiom literally means ‘the time when [we are] faced with the chisel and the axe’.

Suthep does not answer any allegations made against him. He is simply being discursive, claiming that he is an authority who knows more about the project, but he does not talk about the mismanagement of the project. The only time he mentions mismanagement is when he implicitly suggests that if there is any, he is not the only one to be blamed. Therefore it can be said that Suthep's speech does not deny or clear himself of the allegations. The speech serves to put himself up as a person who knows the project better than the opposition and thereby curtails the credibility of the opposition's speech.

8.3.2 Kanjana Silpa-archa's Speech (18 September 1996)

Kanjana Silpa-archa is the daughter of the then prime minister, Banharn Silpa-archa. She is an MBA graduate from Wisconsin and was a businesswoman before becoming a politician (House of Representatives Secretariat 1995). She first entered the political arena by standing for election as MP in Suphanburi province during the general election in 1995. Even though this was her first candidacy, Kanjana won the election and has become one of Suphanburi's MPs alongside her father. From the very beginning, it was difficult to separate Kanjana's success in the election from her father's long-term dedication to the province

Suphanburi has been widely dubbed 'Banharn city' or *Banharnburi* because Banharn has been elected as one of its representatives for a number of years. He is admired by the people because he has brought many public facilities and projects into the province. The evidence of his dedication to the province is shown in the form of eight-lane highways, roadside *sala*,³ schools and hospitals that bear his and his wife's name, 'Banharn-Jamsai'. To top them all is 'Banharn Tower', a majestic edifice situated right in the middle of the city.

Banharn's style as a benevolent local leadership has earned him public popularity in the province. The aura shines on the whole Silpa-archa family which is apparent from the fact that three out of the five MPs for Suphanburi are Silpa-archa⁴ (Sombat 2002: 217). This strong support in Suphanburi undermines Kanjana's ability and legitimacy as an MP. She is seen as Banharn's protégé who has risen purely because of Banharn's credit. Her identity in the parliament is attached to that of her father. The opposition has been trying to magnify her dependence on her father. This dependency discredits her NF as an independent 'competent adult member of the society whose action is unimpeded' (Brown and Levinson 1987: 62). The opposition knew that discrediting her would certainly affect her father via the ripple effect. On top of that, by projecting her as Banharn's protégé, they imply Banharn's cronyism in a sense that he has introduced his

³ *Sala* is a Thai word meaning a small Thai style hut. It serves as a bus stop or a place where people can shelter out of the sun.

⁴ Banharn, Banharn's brother Chumphol and Banharn's daughter, Kanjana.

daughter to increase the number of MPs from Banharn's clan. Many people thought she was keeping the seat warm for his son.

During this no-confidence debate, the opposition was again on the same mission. They were trying to suggest that Kanjana, with inside information from her father, succeeded in selling land to the Bank of Thailand at an extraordinarily high price and that she had evaded paying tax. In the end, it was suggested that it was in fact Banharn and his wife, *khunying* Jamsai who were behind all these malpractices. Since the target of this no-confidence debate is the prime minister, Kanjana, though facing serious allegations herself, was used as a tool to attack Banharn and his wife. Kanjana is aware that she is not the main target of the allegation. The opposition only uses her case to make their point about Banharn's cronyism. Therefore her aim (cognition) is not only to clear her name, more importantly she has to clear that of her parents as well.

8.3.2.1 Analysis of Kanjana's Discourse

Kanjana Silpa-archa faced these allegations during her very first term as an MP. People know her as the daughter of the Prime Minister. Personally, she is a meek woman. In 1996, she was a hesitant and nervous new MP. Unfortunately, her unassuming appearance and her dependence on Banharn, her father, seemed to confirm that Kanjana really was nothing more than her father's protégé.

Kanjana has withstood public scepticism about her ability and legitimacy as an MP since she came into office, she officially went under public scrutiny during the no-confidence debate. It is obvious that she has found it hard to cope with this adversarial atmosphere. Her anxiety and distress showed in her respondent speech. It is apparent in her speech that she has tried to conform to the Code of Behaviour. It is understandable that she is trying hard to act within the rules, given the fact that she has been blamed for whatever she did since she entered politics. In a way, her respect for the Code paid off because she was not once challenged or interrupted. Her respondent speech was polite. She asked for permission for everything she did. This is in fact what every MP is required to do but, in reality, not many do.

I would like to ask permission to use the right to explain myself.
[*dichan kho anuyat chai sitthi phatphing*] (line 3)

May I show the receipt.
[*dichan kho anuyat sadaeng bai set*] (line 241)

I would like to ask permission to explain a bit further about the payment.
[*dichan kho anuyat rien athibai ik nit nung thung kan chamra*](line 252)

Similar to Suthep's speech, she also expresses her gratitude to the Speaker for being allowed the floor.

I would like to thank Mr. Speaker for giving me an opportunity to explain. (line 5-6)
After she has asked for permission, she proceeds to answer the accusations straightforwardly. First she states what allegation she is to answer.

I have always said that I would like to use the prestigious House as a stage, as a place to answer all the allegations concerning this piece of land, myself, my father, Banharn Silpa-archa and my mother, *khunying* Jamsai Silpa-archa which have been [repeatedly and widely discussed] all the while. (line 6-10)

Then she clarifies the suspicious points the opposition raised by going through each point one by one. Here is an example of her clarification about the plot of land she had bought and later sold to BOT. The opposition said that they could not see why she would buy a 'blind' plot of land with no exit [*thi tabot*]⁵. She answered that she bought this plot with no exit because she wanted to add it to her existing plot, so it will be a perfect rectangle.

I would like to say that the land with no exit [*thi tabot*] that you have been talking about, may I show the map once again, the land that you doubt [anyone would buy] is situated here. The reason why I bought it is because I would like the whole piece of land to have one side adjacent to the road and to be a perfectly complete rectangle. There is no hidden motive here at all. (line 36-39)

Once she explains the reason for buying this land, the 'suspicious' point no longer appears to be so. After that, she moves on to answer the allegation that she bought this land knowing that she could certainly sell it to the BOT because of her father's power. Here she uses words that connote her suffering due to the uncertainty that she might not be able to sell the land: the uncertainty that every property developer suffers. These lexical choices implicitly suggest that she did not have any privilege in the bidding.

...since I could not sell the land promptly [as I had expected] because the real estate business was unfortunate. [It] faced recession due to the effects of the Gulf War (line 119-121).

I almost lost hope and the owners of the adjacent land were almost in despair as well (line 150-151).

Apart from answering allegations straightforwardly, Kanjana also makes much of her appeal for public sympathy. Most of the appeal features the good and caring behaviour her parents show to her and her gratitude for that. These appeals are not a direct answer to any allegation, but they can be found moving and appealing by the public. Having heard her parents being attacked violently, what Kanjana seems to be doing here is protesting that her parents are not as bad as the opposition said. The first appeal answers the allegation that *khunying* Jamsai bought that piece of land and

⁵ *Tabot* means blind.

sold it at a high price to make a profit for herself. Here Kanjana is trying to say that Khunying Jamsai only helped her get the loan, as any mother would do for her child.

Even though I had been working for a while it [the working period] was not long enough [for me] to develop good credit with commercial banks. Therefore I asked my mother to help me with this [loan]... I am very sorry that her good intention and mercy for me who is her daughter would backfire and brought her ill effects [*thot phai*]⁶ today (line 97-101).

The example also shows her lexical choices which highlights the discrepancy between *khunying* Jamsai's expectations and the outcome. The underlined words, 'good intentions and kindness' show a mother's understandable desire to help her daughter, though it was interpreted otherwise, presumably by the opposition, and the distorted interpretation brought down on her undeserved ill-effects instead. The words 'backfire' and 'ill-effects' also connote the suffering that her mother has to endure. In the following example, Kanjana appeals for public sympathy not for herself, but for her father. This appeal on Banharn's behalf might not seem convincing. But on closer examination it makes sense. Since the prime target of this no-confidence debate is Banharn - allegations against Kanjana are designed to undermine him - helping Banharn clear his name might be the right thing to do. It is also the act of a 'good person' - a 'good daughter'.

I am also sorry that my livelihood [*kan prakop achip*] has been brought up as a political issue and brought troubles to my father who is currently prime minister. My father has brought me up and he has always been devoted to me since I was little. No matter whether they were poor or rich [*yak di mi jon*]⁷, he has never let me suffer or be picked on by anyone. This time is the same, Mr. Speaker. Though he is well aware that he is a target of an execution [*pao prahan*] in this debate, he still would like to deal with this issue on my behalf. This time I cannot let him because it would simply mean that I am such an ungrateful daughter to a father who has always been a 'giver' to me for all my life. Thank you. (line 325-333)

In the above example, Kanjana tries to project Banharn as another normal human being who loves and cares for his child. He tries to protect his child as any other father would. Given that Banharn has been viciously attacked verbally to the point of being dehumanised, this could be a useful approach to emphasise his essential humanity. Projecting him in this light enables any father to identify with Banharn and perhaps understand Banharn better. At the same time, any daughter, able to identify with Kanjana, might be able to understand her and the choices that she has to make.

Unlike Suthep, she does not spend much time on retaliating against the opposition. There are only two occasions where she seems to attack the opposition even indirectly.

I believe that Mr. Speaker would not set the intellect and honesty of these members of the committee I have mentioned too low. [And] I am not arrogant enough to takes liberties to say who is related to whom as some of Your Honours did. (line 205-208)

⁶ *Thot phai* literally would mean 'punishment-danger'.

⁷ *Yak di mi jon* is an idiom which literally means 'difficult-good-rich-poor'.

I would like to inform Mr. Speaker that I do not dare to insult the intellect and honesty of all the committee that the BOT appointed. (line 271-273)

In these two examples, she uses a similar pattern of argument as Suthep by interpreting the opposition's allegation as an insult to the other people concerned. She states that the committee members cannot be led. She implies that to say that they can be led is equivalent to insulting their intellect.

Kanjana's speech is an example of a first-term female MP who chooses to conform rather than to dare. She shows her respect for the rules of procedure as well as the Speaker. This is probably because she is a woman working in a political domain that is still largely dominated by men. As a minority, she cannot afford not to play by the rules. Her speech is straight-to-the-point. It seeks to answer allegations one by one. She also presents evidence and charts which help explain her points. Kanjana's speech has one characteristic which is often perceived by the public at large as being emotive (Hiatt 1977: 45).⁸ She dedicates a big part of her speech to public appeal asking for people's sympathy. This can be seen as a manipulation of her femininity. The use of feminine discourse is premeditated. She knows that by highlighting the fact that she is but a 'powerless' female MP besieged in a men's world, she may earn more sympathy from the public. Here Kanjana's manipulation of her social role as a woman can be seen. This is because Thai culture expects women to be meek and polite. Besides, Thai people will readily condemn any man who picks on the weaker sex. Therefore, by projecting herself as a 'victim' in the 'male chauvinistic world' of politics, she can threaten the PPF of Sunai who launched the allegations against her. Kanjana's speech implores people to see her and her family as 'one of them'. While Suthep is trying to put himself above the opposition in order to win public trust, Kanjana simply bypasses the opposition and appeals directly to the public.

8.4 Discussion

The respondent speech of the no-confidence debate aims to achieve the following tasks:

- a. answering
- b. appealing
- c. retaliating

The analysis of Suthep's and Kanjana's speech has shown that both speakers are trying to fulfil these tasks. Each MP may emphasise a different task, for example, Suthep stresses retaliation more

⁸ Early work on gender and language (Lakoff 1975; Hiatt 1977; Spender 1985) seemed to support this assumption. Later developments in this field (see Talbot 1998 for useful recent summary) challenge this viewpoint. However, it can be argued that the layperson's view has not changed so much in the intervening time, particularly in a more traditional culture as Thailand, and it is this viewpoint with which I am concerned here.

than Kanjana. This different emphasis can be seen as the product of the different roles and position (participant) in the Thai political context. For example, as a new MP who is also a woman, Kanjana is expected to be more self-effacing than Suthep who is an experienced MP. Therefore, Kanjana's role (as a 'new' 'woman' MP) does not permit her to be aggressive. Therefore she is obliged to place less emphasis on retaliation. Moreover, the difference in the individual context categories also mean that each speaker will perform these tasks using different sets of strategies.

Suthep has seven years experience in politics. Suthep's roles make it difficult for him to simply to comply with what the opposition urges him to do. Holding two powerful positions means that Suthep cannot easily answer the allegations, otherwise his NF and PNF will be threatened. As a Southern man, Suthep is also expected by his electorate, most of them from the same social group, to be argumentative and assertive (Ekawit 1997: 37). Suthep's speech therefore concentrates on retaliating against the opposition's allegations. Even though early in his speech, he tries to be unassuming and polite by showing his recognition and respect towards the Speaker and the Code of Behaviour, Suthep's assertiveness and offensiveness cannot be suppressed for long. Suthep turns to attack the opposition and even tries to exert his power over the Speaker by ordering him to return the verdict according to his request (Suthep, line 357). His rather aggressive and active respondent speech is the reflection of Suthep's characteristics. He is a tough-talking, daring man with a rather domineering and defiant attitude.

By being combative, Suthep projects himself as an independent individual. To a certain extent, his defiant action promotes his NF. Brown and Levinson define NF as:

The basic claim of territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction- i.e. freedom of imposition (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61).

The want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others (Ibid: 62).

Since he is a politician, a public figure, by doing so, he is also promoting his PNF, 'the right not to suffer impositions in the political sphere in political life' (Gruber 1993: 3). Here he challenges the Code of Behaviour which impedes him, by evading answering the allegations and challenging the Speaker, the code keeper. As a result, he can be seen as a determined and confident MP.

In a sense, he has exerted his territorial claim to the point that it is threatening the parliament domain, the area ruled by the Code and the Speaker (line 357). Therefore, by exercising his PNF, he simultaneously challenges the parliamentary Code of Behaviour as well as the Speaker. Since he has been trying to claim rightly on an area outside his legitimate territories, he has been interrupted several times. Not only does he promote his PNF by threatening the House and the Speaker's PPF and PNF, Suthep also threatens the opposition's and the officials' PPF as well. He argues that the oppositions and officials involved are no better than him by, for example,

suggesting that they are benefit-oriented or are not objective (line 312-315, 328-329). According to Gruber (1993), this type of act is a rather common practice in political argument. Mediated political argument naturally involves threatening each other's PPF in order to maintain one's own PPF. Gruber asserts that:

...on the one hand PPF is part of the 'person' proper and on the other hand - because of its very nature - permanently threatened by the other publicly acting individuals, losing one's PPF is associated with the public image of being 'loser' and maintaining one's PPF while succeeding in threatening the other's PPF is associated with being a 'winner' in the political arena.

(Gruber 1993: 4)

In order to avoid being seen as a loser, Suthep then retaliates by threatening the opposition's PPF in return. By deflecting public attention to the opposition's PPF, he can maintain his own. As a result, Suthep's speech does not conform to the Code of Behaviour as much as it should. He chooses to pursue his retaliation. He does not spend much time in answering the charges. He does not actually say whether he is innocent or not. Instead, his general strategy is to suggest that he is not the only one who is involved, implying that whether or not he is corrupt, there are also other people to share his blame. By being evasive in answering allegations and being offensive in retaliation, Suthep clearly does not give much importance to public sympathy.

On the other hand, Kanjana's speech is built around the second task, that of winning public sympathy. She manipulates her role as a woman to achieve this end. She puts emphasis on what can be seen as feminine discourse, featuring an emotive style. The style is also typical of political language (Wilson 1990: 11). Kanjana is a woman and she also produces a discourse which can be categorised as feminine. She projects herself as a 'meek and pitiful female'.⁹ Her feminine image has more to do with her speech genre than her biological sex (Talbot 1998: 11). Her speech can be categorised as feminised discourse not only because Kanjana is a woman but also because it features element that can be classified as a type of feminised discourse. Firstly, her sentences are long with sub-ordinate and co-ordinate clauses. According to Mary Hiatt, these clauses are disposable. The use of non-essential materials is one characteristic of feminised discourse (Hiatt 1977: 45). Secondly, many of the verbs Kanjana uses are concerned with emotions and feelings especially in the conclusion. The use of these verbs signifies an emotive quality which is considered to be another trait of feminised discourse. Thirdly, her speech, as discussed earlier, is neither assertive nor authoritative. The non-assertive style can indicate a type of femininity. Talbot as well as Hiatt argues that women use less authoritative or assertive style than men (Talbot 1998:

⁹ The fact that she is a woman has become quite an issue here in this debate. Since all of the MPs who delivered accusatory speeches were men, it seems rather awkward for them to launch serious allegations at Kanjana, and to do so without leading people to think that they are picking on a woman. Kanjana appears to be a particularly sensitive woman. She even broke down in tears when her father was the subject of the debate.

127). Consistent with their findings, Kanjana's speech is also less assertive and more moderate and consistent in comparison to that of Suthep. Hiatt explains that this is because 'women are a minority group, more likely to conform than to dare...' (Hiatt 1977: 136). In Kanjana's case, she is in a minority not only because she is a woman but also because she is part of the 6% of female MPs in the Thai parliament¹⁰. On top of that, she is one of a very few first-term MP who has to speak in the debate. This may explain why she is cautious in choosing the content of her speech and in delivering it. Kanjana's speech emphasises a particular type of femininity. The feminised discourse used here projects her image as a vulnerable woman in the men's world of parliament. The idea of attacking a 'vulnerable' female MP can discourage other male MP from launching allegations against her. Debating against her is, to a certain extent, seen as picking on the weaker sex. This is because Kanjana projects herself as such through her use of language. While the manipulation of femininity has the potential to discredit the opposition speakers' PPF, it also has certain drawbacks. By being too emotional, Kanjana is seen as less of an MP. She might be able to win public sympathy from some groups of people, but she is not seen as an independent and capable individual, let alone an MP. Talbot states that women who have authority but not are not assertive will be found 'weak, indecisive and incompetent' (Talbot 1998: 127). By using feminine discourse as a discursive strategy, Kanjana gets herself into a political *cul de sac* because being dependent and emotional is exactly what the opposition criticised her for. Instead of arguing the reverse - that she is confident and capable - she resorts to emotional appeal. By not showing her confidence and assertiveness to prove herself an independent MP, her discourse only confirms that the opposition's comments have substance.

However, it can also be argued that her speech style is the result of her characteristics since Kanjana herself appears to be a rather meek person. Also this image can be seen as a result of the accusatory speech she has been attacked by. The reason why the respondent speeches given by Suthep and Kanjana are very different is not only because of their different natures. It is also because they are answering entirely different accusatory speeches. While Suthep is debated about mostly on factual matters, Kanjana faced an extreme personal attack. The accusatory speech made by the Democrat-led opposition does not feature evidence as much as that of the CTP-led opposition in 1995. The 1996 one is emotionally loaded and mainly attacks Banharn and his family members including Kanjana as a person, rather than as an MP. The stark difference between the 1995 and 1996 speeches is apparent even in the proposals for the no-confidence debate motions.

Since the opposition has threatened her NF, PF, PNF and PPF, Kanjana's quality as an individual human being is threatened to the core. She has first to build her image as an individual all over

¹⁰ After the 2 July 1995 election, 391 MPs were elected, 24 of which were women (House of Representatives Secretariat, 1995: 264).

again, before being able to promote her PPF as an MP. She sets out to restore the most basic quality of humanity by projecting herself as 'just one of you'. She tries to convince the public that she is only another person, that she is not particularly bad. She is only going about doing her business as any other person does, on top of that, she does not enjoy any privilege when conducting her business with the BOT. Her emphasis is on explaining the 'suspicious' points raised by the opposition. She chooses to be straightforward in order to say that she is innocent, while Suthep emphasises that others are no better than he is.

On closer examination, Kanjana does not have many other choices but to adopt this straightforward and humble strategy. She is not in a position to threaten anyone as Suthep does. Both her PNF and NF are shattered, while in Suthep's case only his PPF is attacked. The opposition suggested that she is not even a 'competent adult member' because she was assisted by her family in whatever she did. Also they suggested that she acquired her political career as an MP with the help of her father from the very beginning. She needs to restore her NF and PNF first before offensive retaliation becomes a viable option for her. Given this circumstance, an emotional appeal for public sympathy can be seen as not only optional, but the only strategy she has to launch her defence.

Her speech can be considered a model in terms of its respect for the Code of Behaviour. She adheres strictly to the Code; she is clear and straight to the point and she asks for example, for permission for everything she does. Her total deference to the Code suggests that she is still wary about the procedure in the House, given that this is her first term. In another respect, it can be seen as a normal defence mechanism. As she has been attacked vigorously from the first day that she entered politics, it is fairly natural that she is very careful of whatever she does. Therefore she chooses to be cautious. Compared to Suthep, she does not appear to be particularly confident in her duty as an MP or even as an individual.

The two speeches being analysed represent two extremes of speech style. Suthep's is categorised as assertive, offensive and at times authoritative while Kanjana's is more conforming and submits to the regulations. Suthep's style clearly signals that he is confident and competent. These two qualities are essential to maintain his PPF. However, Suthep's speech is sometimes so assertive that it enters other people's territory, such as that of the Speaker, on the occasion when he forces the latter to grant him permission to speak, for example. His claim to other's territory leads to him being challenged and interrupted quite a few times. His defiance and offensiveness cause a rupture between him and the public. Suthep may be able to maintain his PPF in the sense that he is still seen as a competent individual but he fails to project himself as an objective one. His speech is seen as nothing more than an excuse to cover up his malpractice in order to protect his profit. In the eyes of the public he is a villain. No one actually believes that he is innocent. He is disliked

because the public see him as someone who would do anything to deny his crime. Kanjana, on the other hand, appears to be very subservient. She answers the allegations straightforwardly and strictly adheres to the House regulations. While her speech should be seen as exemplary, in reality it does not prove to be a very effective respondent speech. Her absence of assertiveness is interpreted as a lack of confidence and competence, the essential qualities for an MP. Being deficient in these essential qualities undermines her PPF as a competent MP. Her emotive appeal, though it may win some public sympathy, further exacerbates her PPF. Her image has become that of a helpless woman who cannot fend for herself. She needs support from her family. Kanjana may be able to clear the allegations but she fails to maintain her PPF. This finding sheds some light on the issue of what is an effective discursive strategy. According to the analyses, it can be postulated that an effective respondent speech is the balance between both extremes: the assertiveness and the humility. It should be assertive enough to prove that the speaker is confident in what he/she is doing or speaking while it needs to have some degree of respect for the Parliamentary Regulations and the other members of the parliament. It should also take on board public opinion by way of public appeal.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter looks at another part of the no-confidence debate as a communicative event. It has analysed the context and conjunctures as well as the discourse of Suthep Thuaksuban and Kanjana Silpa-archa's respondent speeches. It finds that, similar to accusatory speeches, the aim (cognition) of the speaker and the macroproposition of the speech are the product of other context categories. Together they determine the speech's use of strategies. It proposes that there are two possible macropropositions of a respondent speech:

- a. S is innocent or that S is not the only culprit in the mismanagement.
- b. The opposition has bad intentions. S is only the victim of the opposition's desire to usurp the government.

Macroproposition **b.** is an FTA whereas **a.** is not. The speaker can choose to convey both macropropositions or only one of them. Since it is optional to do FTAs, some speaker may choose not to use them, and therefore will not need to use discursive strategies. The different context and conjuncture of respondent speech enable the speaker to use less discursive strategies. Kanjana's speech, for example, does not convey **b.** As a result she uses only one discursive strategy (connotation). Kanjana only argues that she and her parents are innocent without making any accusation about the opposition's 'hidden' intentions. She chooses to answer the allegation directly by clarifying each point raised by the opposition. She also tries to seek public sympathy using words with emotional connotations such as 'unfortunate' or 'lost hope'. The use of these words

can be seen as a feature of a feminised discourse. The manipulation of her role as a woman MP by using this type of feminised discourse can be said to be her technique in projecting herself as a tragic victim. This can help her win more support from the Thai public than by being aggressive. However, at the same time, it compromises her position in the political domain as a competent and independent MP.

Suthep, on the other hand, does not play the sympathy game. His role as an experienced and renowned MP, coupled with his characteristics as a Southerner prompt his assertive and aggressive discourse. He has to fight back to show that his political action will not be impeded by the opposition's speech. Suthep conveys both macropropositions, therefore he has to use more discursive strategies than Kanjana. He uses prolepsis and hedges when making his arguments against the opposition's allegation. These two strategies help reduce the degree of confrontation. Words with negative connotation are used to implicitly criticise the opposition's standpoint. Enthymeme and overgeneralisation help transfer the blame to other people by suggesting that he is not the only one involved in the malpractice. Suthep's speech is one example of a respondent speech which is more accusatory in nature. Kanjana's speech, on the other hand, represents a form of speech which is designated by the Code of Behaviour. The result is a respondent speech which is deferential, polite and to the point. The difference in style proves that differences in the individual context categories and conjuncture contribute to the different style of discourse.

Chapter 9 Taxonomy of Discursive Strategies

9.0 Introduction

Based on the hypothesis that discursive strategies are the traces of sociocultural practice and discourse practice found in the text, this chapter focuses on the strategies found in the debate. This is an attempt to find how the debate discourse interacts with its context. This chapter classifies the discursive strategies, illustrates each of them and elaborates the potential functions of a strategy within the social and political context. It is the aim of this chapter to show how discursive strategies operate on the borderline between text and discourse practice; how they mark S's recognition of the context and how they are the textual evidence of the way S works within the context.

This chapter starts with the discussion of the two types of no-confidence debate speeches: accusatory and respondent. The first section outlines the general context of each group of the speeches, their conjunctures and the functions that the speeches are expected to perform within those conjunctures. The aim of this section is to argue that there are conflicting conjunctures in the context of both speech types. To overcome these conjunctures, discursive strategies are required. The second section discusses thirteen discursive strategies found in the analysis. It classifies these categories into two groups according to their structure. Then it defines each strategy and describes its structure and potential functions. The third section discusses and summarises the properties, functions and usage of the strategies.

9.1 Two Groups of No-Confidence Debate Speeches

The discourse of the no-confidence debates can be divided into two types: accusatory speeches and respondent speeches. These operate within a different context. The accusatory speech's conjunctures aim to cause maximum damage to the government while maintaining public attention and support and additionally to achieve these aims without being accused of being in breach of the parliamentary Code of Behaviour. The actions the opposition are obliged to undertake are intrinsic FTAs - making allegations or accusations, for example - threatening the face of S as well as H. Thus, S will have to carefully engage in FTAs, trying to ensure they will not backfire. This can be achieved by using FTA strategies (Brown and Levinson 1987). In addition, strategies have to be employed in order to circumvent the competing conjunctures of the discourse. The allegation should involve the least mitigation in order to create the utmost impact on the government. It is supposed to be launched in an aggressive and abrasive manner in order to inflict maximum damage. However, the aggression has to be compromised in the face of the Code of Behaviour, which is set up to prevent such direct and aggressive FTAs. S has to design FTA strategies which

attenuate the hostility of his/her FTA at the surface meaning while maintaining the aggressiveness of the implied meaning.

The conjunctures of the respondent speech, on the other hand, are less contested. The aim of the respondent speech is to rebut the allegations and win back public confidence and to do so within the frame of the same Code of Behaviour. To rebut the allegations and win back public support does not presuppose any act that blatantly violates the Code of Behaviour such as impoliteness or aggressive discourse.¹ In theory, therefore, there are no apparent competing conjunctures. Without these, the S of the respondent speech only has to attend to their own face. To give excuses or to apologise for what they have done can threaten S's own negative face. Unlike the case of accusatory speeches, the S of the respondent speech has the option whether or not to do the FTA. According to one study of Thai respondent speeches in no-confidence debates, politicians have eight options in the way they deal with allegations. Making an excuse or apologising is only one of these options and not many politicians choose to do this (Sombat et al 2001). According to the analysis in the chapter 8, S has two options: not to give an excuse or apologise at all or to do so via strategies. Suthep chose the second option in 1995 (see 8.3.1.1). Suthep is evasive; he neither admits nor rejects the allegation. At the same time, he rhetorically attacks the opposition by using discursive strategies. The first option is to answer the allegations directly and clarify their position, as Kanjana did in 1996 (see 8.3.2.1).

To answer the allegations, S runs the risk of having his/her NF (S allows his action to be subjected to the scrutiny of others: his action is impeded by others) and his PNF (suffers an imposition in the political domain) is threatened. Worse still, if he/she confesses or apologises for his/her action, his/her PF will also be threatened. However, this option may gain S the benefit of showing his/her honesty which will enhance his/her PPF. If S opts not to answer the allegation, he/she may be able to maintain his/her NF (not allow his/her action to be impeded by others), PNF as well as his/her PF. Nonetheless, if the allegation is strong and convincing and S is still not able to answer it, he/she may have his/her PPF threatened even more severely. In a circumstance where one or more categories of face are bound to be threatened, S has to carefully calculate the severity of possible face loss that each optional response may cause and opt for the one that poses minimal threat to S's face.

However, no-confidence speeches are not entirely about doing FTAs. Thus not all the strategies found can be considered FTA ones. One of the aims of both accusatory and respondent speeches is to convince the audience of a particular argument as well as to promote oneself. Discursive

¹ This thesis does not suggest that the respondent speech is always polite. It is only saying that the impoliteness and abrasiveness in the respondent speech are not prescribed by its context. Still, the impolite and aggressive language can be employed as a result of individual style and are not generated at the outset.

strategies that are used to assist these tasks function by making the speech more interesting or promoting S's interpersonal relationship with the addressees. Strategies that have one of these functions are non-FTA strategies.

9.1.1 Context and Functions of the Accusatory Speeches

Opposition members are engaged in producing accusatory speeches in order to persuade the House of Representatives to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. The target can be the Prime Minister or certain Ministers according to the proposal of the debate. To destroy the House's and the public's confidence in the target of the debate, the opposition has to demonstrate that the target is either inefficient, unscrupulous, is generally a 'bad' person or some combination of the above. Therefore, the target does not deserve to be trusted. Hence, the accusatory speeches are intrinsic FTAs; their most important duty is to threaten the face of the target by expressing criticism and disagreement with the target's acts (this spells threat to the positive face of the target). Usually, the allegations are followed by a conditional threat to the public that if the accused is allowed to stay in office any longer, the interests of the public will be more at risk. By so doing, the opposition demonstrates a sense of urgency in order to persuade the House to take action at once for the national benefit. Hence, the *macroproposition* (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) of the accusatory speech is to show that:

- a. The target is being unscrupulous and/or generally bad because they are not concerned with public interest; they are only concerned with their own interest and that of their clique.
- b. The target is being incompetent, ignorant and/or not witty therefore does not have the ability needed to administer the country.

Both of the macropropositions involve competing conjunctures. Either or both the macropropositions need to be conveyed in order for the accusatory speech to be successful. Macroproposition a. mainly attacks the target's PPF as 'a politician who is rational and trustworthy and whose ideas are objective' (Gruber 1993: 3). I shall call these public positive face threatening acts (henceforth PP FTAs). On the other hand, b. attacks the PNF of the target because it suggests that the target needs to be delegitimised because of their inability to administer the country independently. Since b. threatens the sovereign self of the target in the political arena (Gruber 1993; de Ayala 2001), I shall call such instances public negative face threatening acts (PN FTAs). According to the analysis, the macroproposition of the 1995 debate attacking Chuan's government over the *so po ko 4-01* scandal is a. Suthep Thuaksuban, Anchali Vanich-Thepabutr and other DP members are accused of conspiring to swindle the public for the benefit of their cronies. The Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai himself is accused of being unscrupulously partisan. The 1996 debate, on the other hand, displays both macroproposition a. and b. Banharn along with

his family, are accused of being generally bad and dishonourable. In addition to that, he is deemed incapable of administering the country. Accordingly, it can be said that the macroproposition of the 1995 debate is a PP FTA while the 1996's is both PP FTA and PN FTA.

Since a vote of no-confidence has never been passed in the history of Thai parliamentary democracy, the opposition needs to aim for another way to bring about the collapse of the government. The purpose of the FTAs in no-confidence debates is to attack the government in order to inflict one of these three changes: cabinet reshuffle, reshuffle of the coalition party or the dissolution of the government. For this reason, the opposition needs to gather power from every source in order to ensure one of these political changes. Two possible sources of power for no-confidence debates are its *participants*: the MPs inside the parliament and the public outside. Thus in performing the FTAs, S needs to attend to the opinion of other MPs and the public towards the issue as well. Both the 1995 and the 1996 debates see the confrontation between the DP and the CTP. As discussed previously in 6.1 and 7.1, the DP has a better image in Thai politics, it is one of the 'angelic' parties while the CTP is one of the 'evil' parties. The DP is the oldest political party in Thailand, with an honest and trustworthy image while the CTP is associated with provincial blackguards. The difference in the public sentiment and other context categories determines the style of the speech and this shows in the choice of strategies used.

9.1.2 Context and Functions of the Respondent Speeches

The cabinet members who are facing allegations are allowed to give a respondent speech. The most important aim of the respondent speech is for S to retrieve his/her PPF and public confidence. This can be done by rebutting the allegation, often by undermining the opposition's charges. The *macroproposition* of the respondent speech is to show that:

- a. S is innocent or that S is not the only culprit in the mismanagement.
- b. The opposition has bad intentions. S is only the victim of the opposition's desire to usurp the government.

Macroproposition a. is not an FTA. Therefore, it does not violate the Code of Behaviour that prohibits offensive language. Without conflicting conjunctures between the cognition (aim) and the setting (Code of Behaviour), macroproposition a. can be conveyed without the need to use FTA strategies. Yet S may choose to use discursive strategies to assist in other functions. One of the functions of macroproposition a. is generally to promote S's face (PF and PPF). This involves some degree of persuasion. Strategies may be used to enhance the persuasiveness of the speech making it sound more convincing. Macroproposition b., however, is an intrinsic FTA. Basically, it accuses the opposition of making an allegation against the government with the only aim of becoming the government themselves. This allegation overturns the opposition's typical claim that morally, they are forced to initiate a no-confidence debate for the sake of the public interest.

Macroproposition **b.**, therefore, puts the opposition's face at risk by threatening their PPF as a rational and trustworthy organisation whose political ideas and actions are objective. Hence, it can be considered a PP FTA. Being an FTA, macroproposition **b.** of the respondent speech requires FTA strategies to be communicated. However, unlike the FTA in accusatory speech's macropropositions, **b.** is not compulsory. In other words, the speaker of the respondent speech can choose not to communicate **b.** without jeopardising the whole point of the speech. If the speaker opts not to do **b.**, he/she can eliminate these competing conjunctures (attack H without losing S's PPF). The discursive strategies used to communicate **a.** and the FTA strategies used to communicate **b.** aim to win public trust and support. In such a political climate, the public is probably the most powerful agent for any political changes in Thailand.

9.2 Classification of Discursive Strategies

Before I start investigating strategies, I would like to state that by the term 'discursive strategies', I mean the discursive features capable of enhancing the functions of the speeches within their competing conjunctures. This thesis defines discursive strategy as these features capable of enhancing the effectiveness of the discourse in that particular context, discussed in 9.1. Thus, they are first and foremost goal-oriented; they are deployed to achieve certain purposes.

This section compiles the strategies found in the analysis. Strategies are divided into thirteen categories. They can be classified by structure into two groups: those that operate at the intra sentence level and those that operate at sentence level or above. This section is divided into two parts according to the two groups of strategies. In each part, each strategy in the group will be presented. The analysis of each category begins with the definition of the strategy. Then it discusses its structure and pattern before sketching the possible functions of the strategy.

9.2.1 Sentence Structure Level or Above

Strategies in this group are those capable of constituting the sentence structure of the speech or a larger structure, such as constituting an argument pattern. Nine strategies fall into this group. At some level, these larger structure strategies may be able to operate at intra-sentence level as well, or they may consist of strategies that are classified as those of intra sentence level. However, those that are classified as intra sentence strategies cannot operate at the higher level of structure.

9.2.1.1 Intertextuality Level One: The Combination in Discourse of Different Genres or Different Discourses.

This kind of strategy usually consists of the articulation of a formal parliamentary genre and an informal genre. The articulation of the formal one can be seen as the result of the genre of debate, which is of an institutional parliamentary genre. The debate is more or less assigned as such by the Code of Behaviour. However, S has to bear in mind that it is televised. Therefore, the participants

of the debate are not only MPs but the general public as well. Public opinion is, in fact, an essential power capable of bringing about changes in the parliament. Pragmatically, it is crucial that the speech is able to maintain the attention of this group of participants. Maintaining the formality throughout may result in a monotonous speech. S, therefore, needs to bring in informal language for three reasons. Firstly, it can lighten a supposedly dull speech. The fact that the audience are aware that there will be constant changes in genre creates an element of surprise because they do not know which word choice will be employed next. The fact that words from different genres are articulated together in one discourse creates incongruity. This is potentially humorous. This kind of humour is not equivalent to a joke *per se*, but it is able to perform certain functions of humour: it generates a feeling of friendship and familiarity (Zadjman 1995: 327). It presupposes that S and H share the same knowledge of genre, thus they can recognise the change in it through discursive traits. It is this kind of ‘humour’ that partly constitutes the debate’s idiosyncrasy. It is reflected in the speech of the popular debaters such as Chalerm, Samak and Trairong. Secondly, the change from the formal parliamentary one to embracing an informal genre narrows the social distance between S and H. It promotes the interpersonal relationship between S and H.

Thirdly, to make an argument using language with casual register instead of formal parliamentary register produces a speech that sounds less technical. Language with a casual register, as used in ordinary people’s daily life, can prove to be easier to understand. It can make people believe that what politicians say is understandable and relevant to them. Intertextuality at this level can be shown within one clause or in different stages of discourse. Intertextuality within a single clause is termed *mixed intertextuality*, while intertextuality at different stages of discourse is termed *sequential intertextuality*. The appearance of one genre within another is termed *embedded intertextuality*. Thus intertextuality by itself can operate at both intra and extra sentential level. Any evidence of informal language can be seen as level one intertextuality because of the fact that it is uttered in the formal parliamentary genre of no-confidence debate discourse. No-confidence debates display all three categories of intertextuality. The marking of genre and the changing articulation of it is shown through the utilisation of the following discourse entities:

a. Idioms

Now, one day out of the blue [*yu ma wan di khuen di*] the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and his secretary jumped in and claimed [*thuk thak*] that [they] had received a request from brothers and sisters, Phuket residents that there should be a land reform project in the province (Chalerm, line 61- 62).

Mr. Speaker, that’s the good part. I was in that government. I am not someone who walked out of Chatichai’s government and ran him down behind his back [*da lap lang*]. For whatever good things he did, he deserved praise (Chalerm, line 85- 86).

This is the government’s excuse, mucky water [*nam khun khun*]. (Trairong, line 353)

b. Word play

When we cook *yam* (Thai spicy salad), whichever kind of yam it may be, *yam lek yam yai* once it's cooked, we have to place it on the table and eat it immediately. But here we have left it (to stand) for 5 months. We should have discussed on the 14 of December. Now it's 17 of May (Samak, line 4-6).

...and I would apologise immediately (saying) that it has never dawned on me that the project which had been promoted as a *bo daeng* (red bow) project for the last two years could turn out to be a *bo dam* (black bow) in the end. (Samak, line 11-12)

c. Lexical Choices (informal-offensive)

You traitors to your own mother land. (Chalerm, line 319).
[*ai phuak chochon phaendin*]

Khun Suthep is dead in terms of his political career. The man has died. Why should I kill him once again? It would be like shooting a corpse (Chalerm, line 336-338).
[*khun Suthep tai pai laeo thang kan muang khon tai pai laeo phom ja pai kha sam song tham mai thao kap phom pai ying sop*]

But the BOT is so persistent [*ngo*]. Persistent [*ngo*] to buy this plot of land. (Sunai, line 593-594)

Khun Kanjana has spoken without emotional involvement, with supporting evidence, reasonable and lovely. (Trairong, line 6)

d. Colloquialism

This land reform official acted as if he was "Rambo"... This is not a bad chap [*mo ni*]. We have to give him credit for that. (Chalerm, line 621-622).

Finally I have to use my knowledge as a lawyer in interrogation again. Interrogate this interrogate that and [he] breaks [*taek*] again. Breaks [*taek*] again *khrap*. (Sunai, line 677-678)

e. Figurative Words

The exchange rate has to ripple [*kra-pheuam*] more than that. (Trairong, line 144)

The BOT, then, injected money into the system. First they had sucked [*pai dut*] (private sector's) money out but they had sucked [*dut*] out far too much they had to inject it in once more. (Trairong, line 312- 313)

f. Onomatopoeia

The Minister went *ngaeng ngaeng* (Samak, line 335)

When the resolution came out *pang* [bang] (line 367).

g. Informal Metaphor

The ADB had warned. They had to install an economic suspension system [*khao ja tong tit tang choke up khong rabop setthakit*]. (Trairong, line 129)

h. Rhyme Phrases

lai khrang lai hon (Samak, line 112)
[time and time again].

pai yang nan, pai yang ni, pai yang ni, pai yang nan (Samak, line 257-258)
[going this way, going that way, going this way, going that way].

i. Insulting title

Ai phuak fai kan (Samak, line 473, 479)
[those opposition people]

Apart from signifying an informal genre via one of the mechanisms described above, some of the excerpts can be categorised as informal by their content. In 1996, Trairong uses a story from his personal experience to support his points. By its content, the story is considered informal because; it is not directly relevant to the point. As a result, it is in fact supposed to be ruled out by the Code. However, Trairong is allowed to use this personal experience to illustrate his point (that he knows best about Malaysia, the archrival of Thailand in terms of economic growth). Even though his illustration is far too detailed, it manages to capture the audience's attention more than if he limits his discussion to economic issues. Thus, it can be said that personal experience serves the same purpose as other informal discursive traits.

I am concerned about our country. I went to survey the atmosphere of our rival country. I went with the mayor of Satul. We went in a tiny boat, 3-4 of us. We sailed over waves on a stormy sea. I thought we'd be shipwrecked that day. I was afraid the mayor would not make it, whereas I was good at swimming. (Trairong, line 441-444)

9.2.1.2 Intertextuality Level Two: The Presence in my Discourse of the Specific Words of the Other Mixed with my Words as for instance Reported Speech.

Level two intertextuality has a different function from level one. While level one aims to maintain audience attention and promote the interpersonal relationship between S and H, level two intertextuality serves to provide a safety exit for S. S can avoid personal responsibility for the truth or validity of what is said. To use other people's words means using another person's voice. Another people's voice is employed for two purposes. Firstly, it is used to make negative comments. Being in opposition is seen as being on the opposite side to the government. When they make negative comments about the government, they run the risk of being seen as a 'typical' opposition. If their comment is perceived as biased, the comment itself may lose its strength and their PF and PPF as an objective person can be threatened. Level two intertextuality allows S to make negative comments while maintaining his/her objective standpoint because the comment voiced is not his/hers. Secondly, this level of intertextuality allows S to manipulate the words of others in order to facilitate S's own remarks. Based on the theory of discourse study discussed in 2.2.1, discourse only makes sense when elements are articulated together at a moment of practice (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2000a). In the case of

intertextuality, the words of others can be considered an element. This may acquire a certain meaning in its context, that is when it is articulated with other words at that particular moment of discourse. When the element is incorporated into another's discourse, it undergoes a process of rearticulation within another moment of discourse. The process of rearticulation allows S to manipulate that element. Thus, it may acquire a meaning different from what it had at the previous moment of discourse. Despite the rearticulation, S still enjoys the advantage that the words used are not his/hers and therefore S should not be held responsible should any action be brought against him/her regarding the words. Thus, this level of intertextuality can serve these roles:

a. Makes Negative Comments

I'd say it could be compared to what a character in a Chinese movie might say, describing someone as 'wearing a red shirt, having a bell hanging round his neck and pick pocketing in broad day light'.

[*phom bok upama upamai yang ni nang jin khao bok wa wing rao klang wan sai sua daeng khwaen krading*] (Chalerm, line 102-103)

b. Works as Slipway for S to make Negative Comments

Excuse me for using this term. It really is a jargon word widely used among economists, not just me. They called this kind of policy, 'a dog biting its own tail'. [*laeo khu nak sethasat khao put kan mai chai phom put khao riak wa nayobai ma gut hang tua eng*] (Trairong, line 305)

And that the BOT injected money into the system which they first sucked out but they had sucked more than they should and so they are sitting there injecting it back in. What they are doing is sitting there biting their own tail [*thi tham yu ni nang gut hang tua eng*] (Trairong, line 312- 314)

c. Postulated Accusation

I am doing my duty as an opposition MP who has always been insulted and sneered at by the government who said that we would not be able to obtain any information for the debate. The opposition is bad and has its own festering wounds all over, they said [*ai phuak fai khan man phlae woewa*]. Mr. Speaker, if a guy like me had wounds on my back I would most certainly have had iodine poured down my wounds long ago [*khon yang phom tha lang pen phlae thuk thingjoe rat pai nan laeo*]. No. (line 822-824)

These three roles allow S to distance him/herself from the claim because technically S is only repeating what is said by another person: a character in Chinese movie, economists and the government. Therefore S does not have to take responsibility for the truth value of the claim, nor for the offence it may cause.

d. Narrative Tools

When *man* builds a property development project, *man* would hire a contractor saying that *mung* would build *ku* a hundred houses. [He] talks like this because every time they repeat the project, they can sell all the houses. People would pay the down payment and pay a monthly mortgage for it. Money would keep coming in. *Man* would sign a contract with a contractor saying that *ku* would pay 6 months in advance for the amount of 10 millions for the building cost. But when interest rates increase like this, when we have a financial

policy like this, it was not meant to *ai nan*² (that). [So] *ai nan* (that property developer) would be as extravagant as usual but money was so tight. The interest rates shot up to 16-17%; which monkey would take out a mortgage for a house? (line 173-180)

The use of mock dialogue here rather than a monologue has the potential to lighten up the story. It makes the story of how economic depression affects people in the construction business sound more real and tangible.

9.2.1.3 Prolepsis and Disclaimer

Both the prolepsis and the disclaimer function to prevent threats to S's face. The prolepsis and the disclaimer are in many ways similar; both of them are rhetorical devices that dissociate S from the claim he/she makes. They prevent S from being seen as prejudiced because to be so is equal to being irrational (Lockyer and Pickering 2001: 639). To behave irrationally threatens S's PPF. Both the prolepsis and the disclaimer consist of two clauses separated by the word 'but' which acts as the nodal point of the whole argument. They start with a clause that conveys a positive message. The first clause puts S on the ethically correct side of the negative attribute that follows. The real point S would like to make is conveyed in the second clause which comes after 'but'. The pattern makes comments sound unprejudiced, and as a result allows S to maintain his/her PPF as an objective and rational person. This pattern is also employed in respondent speeches to clarify an action by admitting performing the alleged action and after 'but' legitimising the action, for example. This thesis, however, has separated prolepsis from disclaimer according to their pattern and its function. While the prolepsis shows that S is not biased against the target, usually the government, the disclaimer shows that S is not biased in favour of him/herself or his/her own side. Prolepsis is deployed when making negative comments in order that S does not appear to be a 'typical' opposition who is always hostile to every act of the government. Prolepsis can therefore be categorised as a positive politeness strategy because it shows S's attempt to attend to the interest of the person mentioned, to comprehend that person's position and to approve his/her actions even though what is said after 'but' suggests otherwise. Since the attempt of S to attend to the face of the person under discussion is shown, this strategy can be used to preserve S's PPF among the public as an objective person. The seemingly sympathetic standpoint may enhance the effectiveness of the argument in winning public support. Patterns of prolepsis found in our analysis are:

- a. I understand that (probable the government's explanation/excuse) + but + allegation

To force the Prime Minister to choose a keen person from other party, I understand that it was not feasible [*phom khao jai khrap wa man tham mai dai*]. Telling this party to select this person and that party to select that person is something that could be asked but it is entirely the right of that particular coalition party to have the last word in choosing anyone

² *Ai nan* is a third person pronoun which can be used to refer to either object or person. It has informal register. Its meaning and register are similar to *man*, which is also a third person pronoun.

they see fit. Therefore this point cannot be considered the Prime Minister's fault but [tae] for the part which is under your control because like within your own party's quota or the part that the Chart Thai Party asked you to select. Your party member even stepped down from the contest to give you more freedom of choosing any capable person to handle such an important responsibility as economic portfolio. I did not see you appointed any MP which means that members of your party gave their consent for you to select even a non MP. It means that you have an opportunity to choose from even the non MPs who are capable of solving an economic problem (Chuan, line 198-207).

b. I am not/do not (negativity) + but + allegation

I will not blame you of [phom mai tamni na khrap wa] the persons you chose are not keen, are not good but [tae] I am saying that we have criticised this from the very beginning saying that he/she might not fit that particular portfolio. The person you chose is not suitable for that office. He/She might be capable of being put in another, more suitable position and therefore should be put in the right place (Chuan, line 207- 210).

c. Your act is not (negativity) + but + allegation

In fact, to be fair, we can say that your administration does not cause damage to the entire population of the country [khwam jing tha phut kan yang yuttitham kan borihan khong than koe mai chai wa ja tham hai khon thang prathet sia hai]. There are some people who benefit from it. (but) [tae] They are those within your circle. They are businessmen within your business circle who are doing business with you, your relatives (Chuan, line 295-298).

d. I do not want to (negativity) + but + ...

In this case, if it was only the case of buying cheap and selling dear, I would not mind because it is a common practice in a capitalist country but [they] happen to buy cheap and sell dear to the government office. (Sunai, line 241- 242)

e. It could be understood if...+ but + ...

I think that [if] the tax evader was an ordinary person, I would be able to understand. Poor people might not have money but the case of the Prime Minister, he has so many assets. (Sunai, line 525-526)

f. I do:... + but...

In fact the Democrats did conspire [wang phaen] but it was a conspiracy [kan wang phaen kan] to help around ten million of our brothers and sisters, one million families which are in trouble and grievances (Suthep, line 24-26)

The disclaimer can also be categorised as a positive politeness strategy. It is deployed when S is making a statement to promote him/herself. It makes S appear modest and renders the statement less arrogant. The pattern of disclaimer found is:

g. I am not + positive + but + positive

A man like Sunai is not adept but diligent in finding documents because I used to be a lawyer. I was a lawyer [graduated] from Chula. [I] Graduated political science but I am

able to conduct a case. Not many political science graduates can do that. I am from a rather decent class. (Sunai, line 47-50).

[khon yang sunai mai chai khon keng rok khrap tae pen khon khayam ha ekasan ruapruam phro pen thanai kao pen nak kotmai jak chula jop ratthasat tae wa khwam dai pen run pho som`khuam]

9.2.1.4 Enthymeme

Enthymeme is a pattern of argument which requires dialectic work between speaker and listener to complete its logic. (van Eemeren et al 1997: 213). The term refers to an argument whose logic is to be completed by an audience. Enthymeme can be an effective strategy to make an offensive and provocative criticism because it provides an inbuilt safety exit for S. S does not have to actually utter the provocative statement, be it the one that threatens H's face such as direct allegation or the one that threaten S's own PPF such as praising him/herself. S only uses this pattern of argument to 'lead' the audience towards the point by themselves by way of logic. The mechanism of enthymeme is only to lead the audience to the intended meaning without actually saying it. Therefore it can help S to communicate offensive allegations without tarnishing his/her own PPF as an objective person as well as to promote him/herself without running the risk of being seen as boastful and thereby tainting their PPF. Examples of enthymeme are:

...at that time the parliamentary document stated that Banharn Silpa-archa was the Minister of Finance but [he said] he does not know anything. I only have a little *vasana*. I happened to be only the advisor of the Minister of Finance [but I know]. (Sunai, line 11-15)

which can be written as:

Premise 1:

Banharn was the Minister of Finance and knew nothing

Premise 2:

Sunai was the advisor to the Minister and he knew [about the land purchase]

Possible Conclusions:

1. Banharn is inefficient.
2. Banharn is lying.

'You have listened to the speeches of one-term politicians' (Trairong, line 2-5). 'Now it's time to listen to 6-term MP'. (Trairong, line 11)

which can be written as:

Premise 1:

A one-term politician's speech is good and objective

Premise 2:

A six-term politician is more experienced.

Possible Conclusion:

A six-term politician's speech is better.

(Trairong, Ritual Beginning)

The law is not misleading at all here. It states clearly (about the issue) but the Prime Minister used his commonsense (to interpret the issue) and said that if the leader of the

team is out, the rest will also be out. Then this means vote of no-confidence for the whole cabinet, no, this cannot be. Please do not take it that way because it would surely be misleading for freshmen and sophomore law students (Chuan, line 66-69).

which can be written as:

Premise 1:

The issue is not misleading; ordinary people should be able to understand.

Premise 2:

The Prime Minister (despite being a law graduate) interpreted it wrongly.

Possible Conclusion:

The Prime Minister's intelligence is below average.

9.2.1.5 Adjacency Pair: Q-A Arrangement

Adjacency pairs are a concept from Conversation Analysis (see 2.3.5). They refer, to a sequence of utterances that are ordered in pairs. The first part of the utterance is expected to be completed by a second part of the same pair in order to make up a meaningful utterance. The notion of adjacency pairs is not a prescriptive concept. It only outlines the language users' mutual recognition of this pattern of utterance. For example, after hearing a question, some sort of answer is expected to follow. To use adjacency pairs as a strategy means manipulating this mutual recognition. The pair that is found in the analysis is question and answer. Q-A arrangement can perform many possible functions.

Firstly, Q-A may be used as a narrative tool to attract the audience's attention. Being aware that the second part of the pair is anticipated upon hearing the first part, S introduces the issue he/she would like to raise in the form of question with the intention of creating that anticipation. The question form, then, triggers the audience's anticipation of hearing the answer, which will clarify that question. This two-part pattern is used to lead the audience step-by-step through S's argument. S creates suspense by raising the 'suspicious' point in the target's activity in the form of question. By so doing, S puts that point under the spotlight. Subsequently, S provides an answer to the question which shows that the suspicious point in question reveals more dubious actions which lead the audience to believe that the target is untrustworthy.

I am surprised, why [they] have to come back to buy this plot? I later learnt when they have bought 75 *rai* which coincides with the specification required by the BOT (Sunai, line 234-236).

It can be seen in this quotation that Sunai is trying to make the point that Banharn and his cronies in the BOT designed the specification of a plot of land to be purchased by the BOT to fit his daughter's. In so doing, she can pocket thousands of millions of baht from the sale. To make this argument, Sunai directs the audience's attention to the land owned by Kanjana by asking why the BOT has to come back to buy this particular piece. Then he answers the question saying that they bought it because the specification of this piece of land corresponded with that released by the

BOT. This argument implicitly suggests that the BOT and Banharn sketched out the specification of land with Kanjana's plot in mind.

Sometimes the adjacency pair is not clearly presented as question and answer. For example, Chalerm often poses questions in his speech. The answers to his questions, however, are not marked out. When a question is not directly followed by an answer, the audience's anticipation for an answer is not satisfied. They are then left to figure out an answer to these questions from the content of his speech by themselves. The question posed stimulates the audience to pay more attention to what he says.

What does this mean? Is it a corruption conspiracy? Mr. Speaker, please let me elaborate a bit. (Chalerm, line 230-231)

Secondly, adjacency pairs are also used to distance S from the point made. A controversial point can be made in a form of Q-A. For example in 1995, Samak said:

What can you make of this? It means that the movement was powerful. It means that the movement was too overwhelming for people's feelings to bear. The feeling people had, how did they feel? They felt that the government had shared Thai soil among their cronies. (Samak, line 19-20)

By posing question to 'you' and 'they', the answers are thought to derived from 'you' and 'them'. We know that the answers presented after the two questions are Samak's assumption of what 'you' and 'they' might say. Thus, the answers are practically his. Yet the fact that these accusations are presented in a form of an answer to a question posed to someone else, the offensiveness of the answer is partially transferred to that 'someone'. As a result, Samak manages to distance himself from it.

9.2.1.6 Overstatement

Using an overstatement is to say something in a way that makes the matter appear better/worse or bigger/smaller than it really is. Overstatements can be goal-oriented, that is, one may overstate to achieve certain ends, for example, a patient overstates his symptoms to obtain medical attention faster. Therefore, it can be considered one of the discursive strategies.

In the context of a no-confidence debate, the opposition needs to convince the other MPs and the public that the government cannot be trusted and that they should take action to remove the government now before jeopardising public interest any further. To make the MPs and the public see the urgency and the seriousness of the matter, overstatement can be an effective strategy.

We had given the most chance we possibly could to this government (Chuan, line 130).

Chuan uses overstatement saying that he (the opposition) has given the government all the opportunity they needed to redeem themselves but the government did not take it. By saying that

he had given ‘all he possibly could’, he suggests that there is nothing else to do to improve the government’s administration; they need to be removed.

Overstatement can also be employed in the process of ‘damning with faint praise’ to increase the effect of the argument. However, it cannot be categorised as an FTA strategy because it does not redress the utterance but in fact does the opposite. Let’s look at this example:

I was glad that Chuan still hung on to his principles just as he did when he was just a novice politician. He sent the Deputy Minister, *khun* Suthep to supervise [the project]. Sent *khun* Niphon (Minister) to supervise [the project]. I was sitting there and smile, appreciating that the Democrats would be serious about solving people’s problem. I did not have any objection. I just sat there waiting to see the outcome (line 90-93).

Here Chalerm overstates the virtue of Chuan and his Democrat party. He seems to go along with the DP’s rhetoric of the party’s ‘virtuous’ policy to address the grievances of the poor and landless people by organising the *so po ko 4-01* project. This idealistic image of the DP is presented only as a weapon against the party. It is the construction of a ‘strawman’, the idealistic DP, which will be demolished in the end by several of pieces of evidence that prove the party to be otherwise. The negative aspects and dubious practices lead H to believe that Chuan and the DP are actually the opposite of what their façade superficially suggests. The overstatement of their virtue is used only to magnify the destructive effect of Chalerm’s argument against the DP.

9.2.1.7 Overgeneralisation

Overgeneralisation means to argue more widely than is justified (New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). By overgeneralisation, this thesis refers to the claim that a group’s opinion is public opinion. This is, in a sense, a kind of overstatement because it claims a part as the whole. Overgeneralisation also produces the same effect as overstatement, that is, it increases the weightiness of that point of view. Overgeneralisation is not an FTA strategy because it does not work to refute of the utterance. On the contrary, they are used to amplify the content of the utterance.

This next example shows the use of overgeneralisation:

It has been generally acknowledged that Banharn Silpa-archa, the Prime Minister has been administering the country without knowledge or ability, without efficiency or success, without vision or awareness, morale or ethic. He does not have any sense of leadership. (Chuan, line 8-10)

Chuan overgeneralises by saying that ‘it has been generally acknowledged’. This means that everyone in the land acknowledges that Banharn is inept and bad. In fact, it is not likely that everybody shares this idea. This statement of broad generalisation prompts the people of Suphanburi to exert themselves as ‘someone’ who see Banharn quite differently. Their existence overturns Chuan’s universal claim. Overgeneralisation is also an effective strategy to win public

support. As mentioned in 4.3, Thai people are familiar with consensus politics, that is Thais are likely to go with the majority view. Thus, when Chuan claims that everyone finds Banharn bad, his claim of consensus may be able to convince some undecided people to jump on this political bandwagon against Banharn.

Overgeneralisation proves useful in respondent speeches as well. While the accusatory speech uses overgeneralisation to suggest that everyone is ‘sharing’ the same idea, the respondent speech uses the strategy to suggest that everyone is ‘doing’ the action they are blamed of. This includes categorising the action under investigation as another generally accepted act. In the following example, Suthep generalises the Democrat’s action of promising the electorate the *so po ko 4-01* title deeds as a propagation of the party’s policy. Since every party has its own way of promoting its policy, the Democrat’s way of doing it should also be acceptable.

When we were on the podium, we always promised the people that if we were elected, if our party was elected, we would solve the problem of people living in the forest reserve area and those who were living on the government land to receive their land’s right. Mr. Speaker, the Democrats have said the same thing because we are a political party. Our mission is to ease people’s problems and those of our country. (line 31-36)

When we are on campaign, we have to tell people clearly what our policy is like. We have to say what our political ideology is and how will we achieve it. And if people have faith in the idea and elect [us] it is not a bad thing (Suthep, line 563-566)

9.2.1.8 Presupposition

Presupposition is a way of expressing more than what is uttered, for example when I say ‘Turn out the light’, my utterance presupposes that the light is on at the time of speaking and that there is another person in the room who is capable of turning the light off for me. The presupposition can be triggered by either a lexical item or a logical account (Thomas and Wareing 1999: 28). Since presuppositions allow S to attach to messages more than what is said in them, it becomes an effective strategy for S to convey a message that he/she does not want to be associated with, such as negative comments or ungrounded accusations. The fact that the most salient point is not actually uttered provides S with a safety exit. In 1996, Chuan Leekpai accuses the government of violating his privacy by sending policemen to spy on him. Either Chuan does not have evidence to support his claim or he does not want to go into detail about this shady practice of the government, so Chuan brings this issue up using presupposition:

Mr. Speaker I’d urge you to understand our mission here (so that) the policemen will not have to follow me. (Chuan, 140-141)

His speech can be written as:

Utterance: I speak up so that the police will not take action against me.

Presupposition: If I do not speak up, the police will take action against me.

The word 'so that' in the utterance shows the conditional relationship between the first and the second clause of the utterance; the second clause is the reason for his action in the first clause. 'So that the police will not take action against me', presupposes that the police *will* proceed with their action if Chuan does otherwise. Therefore, Chuan's utterance presents the presupposition that the police will take action against him if he does not speak up. By not blatantly accusing the government, Chuan does not need to provide any further evidence to support the accusation. Furthermore, if this proves not to be the case, he can always back down saying that such an accusation was never actually stated.

9.2.1.9 Sarcasm

Sarcasm means expressing something other than or the opposite of what is meant. It is more aggressive than irony because it has clear cue and clear target. Sarcasm can be categorised as another linguistic phenomenon (Attardo 2000: 795). The audience, being aware of the impossibility of what is said either because such a thing cannot happen or because it contradicts S's opinion; are obliged to figure out what S actually meant by themselves by looking at the salience in the context. Therefore, H is led to arrive at the intended meaning by themselves. The distinction between enthymeme and sarcasm lies in the fact that the sarcastic meaning is arrived at inferentially, assuming that Grice's Cooperative Principle is at work (Ibid: 813). Enthymemes, on the other hand, leads the audience to the intended meaning by way of logic. Sarcasm is prolifically used in the no-confidence debate because, as with any other indirect language, it creates ambivalence of text. Sarcasm essentially entails two messages: the literal message and the ironic one. In the no-confidence debate discourse, this two-tiered meaning may serve three functions. First, it allows S to say a positive thing while actually meaning the opposite. Thus it parallels a politeness strategy: be indirect. This thesis found that this sort of sarcasm usually states the improbable. The improbability of what is said signals that it is not what S meant. Audience are therefore invited to look for the sarcastic meaning instead, which is more probable. In the following example, the sarcastic meaning is arrived at because it is improbable that the head of the government does not know that there are many kinds of government scholarship.

The honourable Prime Minister could have forgotten that there are many kinds of scholarships (Samak, line 72)

Secondly, if the sarcastic meaning is arrived at, it means that S and H share the same knowledge salient in that particular context. This helps strengthen the interpersonal relationship between them. In the example below it can be seen that Sunai sarcastically criticises Banharn's seniority; being *phuyai*. The sarcastic meaning is that Banharn is old but he does not really behave in a respectable way. Thus he does not deserve to be treated with respect. This sarcastic meaning can be arrived at only when the audience share the same meaning that Banharn does not behave in a respectable way. If the audience shares this salience, his sarcasm may be taken with a grin of approval but if

they do not and the message is taken literally, Sunai still runs less risk of being seen as arrogant because what he literally said shows a positive intention.

Actually I do not wish to start here. It seems inappropriate. Talking to *phuyai* like the Prime Minister, I should have started with a eulogy. I should have asked Mr. Speaker to grant permission (Sunai, 42-44)

Thirdly, the incongruity between what is said and what is meant can bring about humorous effects. The following example shows a remark which at the surface level sounds positive: praise of the Prime Minister's talent. However, considering the fact that the Prime Minister is using his rhetorical skill whilst the public is in need of a direct explanation, this remark appears to convey a negative meaning. This sarcasm can be humorous considering that Chuan's rhetorical ability has always been seen as one of the qualities of which he and his party are proud.

The Prime Minister was asked this question and he answered by drawing upon his expertise. That is he certainly answered the question using rhetoric, figurative speech.
 [*Than nayok thuk tham kham tham ni lae than ko top yang khwam chamnan khong than khu nai kan thi ja top kham tham thi nae jai dai wa pen kham khom pen khan upama upamai*] (line 68-70)

The impossibility of what is said can also be signaled by using figures of speech, in this case personification.

But then, out of the blue, how could it [the printing plant project] walk to *phuttha monthon*? Near the waxworks museum *khrap*. (Sunai, line 819-820)

The impossibility of a project walking to *phuttha monthon* shows that Sunai is only being sarcastic. The sarcasm is used to accuse the government of moving the project to the place where Kanjana's land is situated.

9.2.1.10 Metaphor

A metaphor is a figure of speech. As such, it allows the text to acquire *ambivalence*. It conveys at least two possible meanings: the literal and the metaphorical meaning. According to Searle (1979), metaphor occurs when a speaker says that S is P but means that S is R (Searle 1979 discussed in Wilson 1990: 105). The audience is signalled to look for metaphorical meaning when the sentence meaning of S is P is defective (Wilson 1990: 105). They, consequently, look for the possible values of R and choose one that makes sense with the sentence. According to our findings, metaphor has many functions. Firstly, it provides another way for the opposition to attack the government indirectly. Here Sunai uses metaphor to condemn the Prime Minister for an untimely interruption.

I was just like a plane ready to take off. Suddenly, the Prime Minister jumped in and blocked the runway. If I hadn't stamped on the brake, he would have been run over. (Sunai, line 4-7)

Secondly, metaphor is used to illustrate certain issues, usually political and economic ones, making them more understandable to the general public. Here Samak explains how impractical government policy is in giving away the land and letting the Office of Land Reform choose freely which piece of land they want. He metaphorically compares this practice to giving away the whole pig, assuming that the best part will be returned.

They said metaphorically, it's like giving the whole pig and telling them to butcher it [*kha cham lae*] and say if there was any sirloin [*laeo ta gon bok wai duai tha joe mu nueua daeng la go trong nueua kan wai hai duai na*]. If there was, [as if I] told them to keep it for me. Give the whole pig and tell them to keep any part but shout out if they find any sirloin and put that aside. Is there anybody who if they had been given this would not carve out the whole loin part? One pig has only 10 kg. of loin The person who is naïve enough not to carve out the loin is silly, having been given the whole pig [*khrai chuen laeo mai chuen hai tit nueua daeng wai la go man go ngo si khrap*] (line 174-180).

Thirdly, the use of informal metaphor to illustrate formal issues in a formal setting like the parliamentary no-confidence debate can create a changing articulation of genre (level one intertextuality). This sudden change of genre is potentially humorous. The previous example can best illustrate this function. This function of metaphor has already been discussed in point g. in 9.2.1.1

9.2.2 Intra Sentence Structure Level

This group of strategies works at the level below sentence structure. They may involve the use of particular words such as hedges or social deixis, for example. Four strategies fall into this group.

9.2.2.1 Hedges

According to his Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics, Crystal says that hedges are particle words that 'express a notion of imprecision or qualification' (Crystal 1997: 182). Hedges such as *sort of, quite, could and might*, are used to make S's comment 'safely' vague. It is an FTA strategy which can be used for both positive and negative politeness. Hedges found in the analysis, however, perform positive politeness mitigation. When acting as a positive politeness strategy, hedges make S not seem to be directly disagreeing with H. It is part of S's attempt to avoid disagreement. In 1996, Chuan makes the criticism that Banharn's standard is not up to that usually accepted. This criticism would have damaged Banharn's PF more severely had Chuan not used hedges like 'afraid', 'this sort of' and 'might' to tone it down.

I am afraid that this sort of idea might not be the idea internationally accepted concerning the stock market. (Chuan, line 232- 233)

The hedges make this criticism sounds less judgemental on this sensitive issue. To say that Banharn's standard is lower than the usual criteria can be taken as an insult to his personal intelligence. Though this is one of the targets of this debate, it will be safer for Chuan's PPF to approach this point with care. Apart from providing the safety of vagueness, hedges may also

promote cooperation between S and H (Brown and Levinson 1987). Its vagueness prompts H to use common knowledge to interpret S's intended meaning. From the above example, the audience can infer that Chuan is being sarcastic here. He is not reluctant at all to disapprove Banharn's standard because he thinks it does not qualify as such. The implication derived from cooperation between the two parties promotes the feeling of unity between them. Hedges are also found as strategies in respondent speeches. They are used in the speaker's counterarguments making the speech sound less confrontational. Therefore S does not put himself directly against the opposition.

It so happens [*bang oen wa*] that I have been involved in this land reform project from the very beginning. (Suthep, line 11-12)

In the above example, Suthep uses the hedge 'happens to be' to tone down the offensiveness of his claim that he has been involved in the project from the beginning and therefore knows better about the project.

9.2.2.2 Social Deixis

Social deictics are linguistic entities that signal social distinctions between the communicative participants. In the no-confidence debate's communicative event, these deixis encode the social identity of the speaker (as a member of the opposition or coalition), other MPs (opposition and coalition members) and the public audience. Hence, it can be said that the most salient identity of all the three parties is as an *institutional actor* not as an individual. Their identity is categorised as that of the coalition, opposition or the public.

Social deixis can also indicate the interpersonal relationship between the three parties. They can be used to strengthen the relationship, promoting the feeling of alliance among participants or can isolate a certain participant from the group. Social deixis in Thai can be categorised into two groups: pronouns and honorifics. The use of pronouns we-they is prolific in the discourse. 'We' is employed to promote in-group sentiment among the participants it designates while the participants referred to as 'they' are isolated from the group. 'We' is used to refer to the speaker and the public while 'they' is used to indicate outsiders. The pronoun 'we' signals that the speaker and the public are in the same group. As a result, 'they' is portrayed as an enemy of the speaker as well as the public. In the following example, Samak uses 'we' to put himself, the House Speaker and the Thai public in the same group. The Democrats, as 'they', are presented as the party hostile to the well-being of 'we':

Mr. Speaker should have been sceptical. We do not know what kind of relationship members of that old and prestigious party have and how they care for each other, afraid of each other or do not want to bother each other. This Deputy Minister here, the Prime Minister might be... of because otherwise he would not have jumped up and taken the blame like this without giving it any thought.

[*than tong na ja sadut jai rao ko mai sap wa khon nai phak kan muang kaokae yai to nan khao mi khwam phuk phan kring kring ru kring jai arai kan yang rai ratthamontri chuai*]

than nayok rathamontri khong ja tong kreng jai phroe michanan ja ok rap pai than thi doi mi dai khrai khruan arai loei (line 77-80)

Honorifics, according to the Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics, means the ‘syntactic or morphological distinctions used to express levels of politeness or respect to the social status of the participants’ (Crystal 1997: 186). When applying this notion to the Thai language, I would like to add that honorifics in Thai can also express a level of impoliteness and disrespect to the social status of the participants as well. Honorifics found in the analysis express three aspects of interpersonal relationship among participants. Firstly they express respect and politeness for the person mentioned, for example, the honorific *khun* as in *khun* Suthep. However, considering the context, *khun* in the following example must have been used for sarcastic effect.

I was glad that Chuan still hung on to his principles just as he did when he was just a novice politician. He sent the Deputy Minister, *khun* Suthep to supervise [the project]. Sent *khun* Niphon (Minister) to supervise [the project]. I was sitting there and smile, appreciating that the Democrats would be serious about solving people’s problem. I did not have any objection. I just sat there waiting to see the outcome (line 90-93).

Secondly, honorifics may express amity and acquaintance between participants. Honorifics that creates this effect includes those that indicate kinship for example:

The people do not know this. Now my grandad Si, grandad Sa, aunty Mi, granny Maen didn’t know so they sold their rights (Chalerm, line 132-133).

[chao ban mai ru ni khrap ta Sa ta Si pa Mi yai Maen khong phom mai ru ko khai sit]

This example show Chalerm’s use of honorifics to strengthen the bond between him and the electorate. By calling them *granddad*, *aunty* and *granny*, it sounds like Chalerm is a down-to-earth politician who cares for his electorate as he does his relatives. Moreover, the words *granddad*, *aunty* and *granny* also show a certain degree of respect towards the elder member of the electorate as well.

Thirdly, honorifics can also express disrespect and sometimes an insult. In the following example, Chalerm accuses the government of insulting the opposition by calling them *ai phuak fai khan* [*ai* opposition].

The opposition is bad and having their own festering wounds all over, they said (Chalerm, line 823).

The claim that the government squarely insulted the opposition taints its PPF.

9.2.2.3 Connotations

Connotation is an implicated association or idea suggested by a word. It is not the primary meaning of the word. Some words may have the same meaning but convey different connotations for example, *economical*, *thrifty* and *miserly*. Though all three words mean being careful of resources, it the first word, *economical* that has positive connotations. The latter two convey rather

negative ones. The use of words with negative connotations allows S to convey a negative meaning without explicitly committing himself to this negative aspect, for example:

... if we discriminate, if we are prejudiced against well-to-do people and do not allow them to receive *so po ko* 4-01 and only process the bill for the poor who have never owned a land before; who work only as agriculturist, I think we will cause a big problem in the country. (Suthep, line 312-315)

‘Discriminate’ and ‘prejudice against’ both have a negative connotation. Suthep knows that by using these words to attack the opposition’s rightful call for justice for ‘poor and needy’ people, he may be able to invoke negative sentiment towards the opposition.

Words with a particular type of connotation can also be used to win public sympathy. In her respondent speech in 1996, Kanjana uses words such as ‘unfortunate’ and ‘lost hope’ to describe her situation when the recession hit the real estate business. The words connote misery and cheerlessness. They show that Kanjana did not enjoy any privilege; she suffered from the recession no less than others in the business. Hence she deserves sympathy as much as others.

This section has divided strategies into two groups according to their structure. The definition, mechanism and potential functions of each strategy have also been laid out. In the next section, their functions will be discussed, and additionally, each speaker’s use of strategies will be considered further in an attempt to find out which speech is the most effective in terms of its use of strategies.

9.3 Discussion

This chapter have reviewed thirteen discursive strategies found in no-confidence debate discourse. Each strategy serves certain functions that can be useful in the debate’s context and their functions should enable the speech to rise above its conjunctures. The conjunctures of the accusatory speech are: to be able to launch an attack which is comprehensive and aggressive enough to dissuade the audience from putting trust in the government. At the same time, the attack should not sound too confrontational or else it will threaten S’s PPF as well as running the risk of being ruled out by the Code of Behaviour. If S would like to launch a hostile attack, S should do it in such a way that he/she can distance him/herself from such an attack and thus preserve his/her PPF.

The conjunctures of the respondent speech are: to be able to retrieve public confidence by suggesting that S is innocent or that S is no worse than others and thereby winning back his/her PPF. Moreover, S has to rebut the allegation by suggesting that the opposition only uses the no-confidence debate as a tool to get themselves into the office. However, the attack on the opposition should show that the opposition is biased against them. This argument will weaken the validity of the opposition’s allegation (as the aim of respondent speech is to rebut the allegation and win back public confidence (section 9.1)).

Discursive strategies come in to assist the speech to attend to more than one of its conjunctures at the same time, which cannot be achieved otherwise. For example, some strategies may enable the speech to launch an abrasive attack without sounding too confrontational and provocative, others may allow S to make a claim without having to commit to that claim. The functions of the discursive strategies can be classified into six categories; these are summarised in the following figure.

| Strategies | Functions | Make the speech more interesting (potentially humorous) | Dissociate S from the claim | Promote/ demote interpersonal relationship | Weaken degree of an affront | Make the argument more comprehensible | Strengthen degree of the claim |
|-------------------------|-----------|---|-----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| INTERTEXTUALITY LEVEL 1 | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| INTERTEXTUALITY LEVEL 2 | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | ✓ |
| PROLEPSIS/DISCLAIMER | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| ENTHYMEME | | | ✓ | | | | |
| ADJACENCY PAIR Q-A | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | |
| OVERSTATEMENT | | | | | | | ✓ |
| OVERGENERALISATION | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| PRESUPPOSITION | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| SARCASM | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| METAPHOR | | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ | |
| HEDGES | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| SOCIAL DEIXIS | | | | ✓ | | | |
| CONNOTATION | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |

Table 2
Summary of the Functions of Discursive Strategies

This table presents a summary of discursive strategies and their functions. The strategies which are shaded can be found both in accusatory and respondent speeches. Those that are unshaded are found only in accusatory ones. No strategies were found solely in the respondent speeches. According to the table, it is apparent that most discursive strategies serve more than one category with the exception of enthymeme, overstatement and social deixis. The two levels of

intertextuality, sarcasm and metaphor have three functions and the rest have two functions. The function that is shared by the most strategies is that of dissociating S from the claim. Seven out of thirteen strategies found in the debate's discourse serve this function. The safety exit provided by these strategies is essential in performing FTAs in an institutional setting which is regulated by a Code of Behaviour. Moreover, the exit can help preserve S's face while making negative comments.

The second most common function is to make the speech more interesting, to promote/demote the interpersonal relationship between S and the audience and to weaken the degree of affront. Each of these will be considered in turn. Making the speech more interesting is essential in the process of persuasion. If the debate is not found appealing by the audience, they may not listen to it and S will lose the chance to communicate with them altogether. Therefore, making sure that the debate is interesting enough to maintain audience attention until the end means more chances to convince the audience.

Strategies that perform the second function [interpersonal relationship] indicate that S (opposition member or coalition member) is on the same side as the public. They work by either signalling amity between S and the public by the use of social deixis or casual language or by alluding to the knowledge which is 'common' between them. The group knowledge triggered during discourse processing can strengthen their interpersonal relationship. This function is very useful considering the political context in Thailand, where public opinion is one of the most powerful agents for political change. To be able to persuade the public usually means securing political advantage. Also, social deixis which belongs to this group can also be employed to isolate S's political opponent from him/herself and the public. This is apparent in the use of the word 'they' that indicates that the persons mentioned are not part of the group.

Thirdly, 'weakening the degree of affront' is also an essential task. According to the conjunctures, it is apparent that both accusatory and respondent speech's discourse can be FTAs. They can involve verbal attack on another's face. However, while having FTAs in an accusatory speech is a prerequisite, it is optional in a respondent speech. FTAs can be threatening to S's PPF as an 'objective and rational' person. For an accusatory speech to be effective, S should launch an attack while making sure that he/she will not be seen as prejudiced against the government because to be prejudiced means being irrational (Lockyer and Pickering 2001: 639). S may then run the risk of being seen as a 'typical' opposition who always opposes the government's practice. This will result in S's argument being undermined. Respondent speech speakers cannot afford to have their PPF threatened any further; their verbal attack should not appear to be too confrontational. Thus, for both speech groups, it is wise to weaken the degree of an affront. This can be done by showing that S is tolerant and open-minded by using prolepsis/disclaimer, by indirectly conveying an

offensive message using metaphor, presupposition or connotation or by simply employing hedges as a form of redress.

Functions served by two strategies 'indirectly strengthen the degree of the claim' and 'make an argument more comprehensible'. The first function is useful when S wants to make sure the attack has the utmost impact on the target. It can be done indirectly by rearticulating other people's speech in S's speech, as in level two intertextuality. By so doing, S can strengthen the claim knowing that he/she can always distance him/herself from the claim because it is not 'technically' his/her voice. If S uses overstatement or overgeneralisation, he/she will not be given such a safety exit. Yet the chance that the overstatement or overgeneralisation can effectively persuade the public to go along with S's argument may make it worth the risk. The second function is also useful in the process of persuasion since comprehension is a prerequisite for persuasion. S can achieve this by making an argument at a language level people are familiar with, that is, language with casual register (level one intertextuality). When S argues about a technical issue, S may use metaphor to compare the technical issue under investigation with something that the public are familiar with. By alluding to something that the public has an understanding of the alien concept can be conceived more easily.

When it comes to the application of strategies, the analysis found that almost every speaker uses more than one to enhance the efficiency of his/her speech. The following summary table shows that Trairong uses eleven discursive strategies, Chalerm uses ten, Chuan and Sunai use nine while Samak and Suthep use six. Kanjana is the speaker who uses the least: only one. Kanjana's respondent speech directly answers the allegations one by one without retaliating. She chooses to conform to the Code of Behaviour rather than to challenge it. She does not need the help of strategies as much as others do, because her speech does not feature any FTA. Presupposition/connotation which is the only strategy she uses can only help her win public sympathy.

The next table summarises the strategies used by each speaker:

| Speakers | <i>Chalerm Yubumrung</i> | <i>Samak Sundaravej</i> | <i>Chuan Leekpai</i> | <i>Sunai Julaphongsathorn</i> | <i>Trairong Suwannakiri</i> | <i>Suthep Thuaksuban</i> | <i>Kanjana Silpa-archa</i> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| INTERTEXTUALITY LEVEL 1 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| INTERTEXTUALITY LEVEL 2 | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| PROLEPSIS/DISCLAIMER | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| ENTHYMEME | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| ADJACENCY PAIR Q-A | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | |
| OVERSTATEMENT | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| OVERGENERALISATION | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | |
| PRESUPPOSITION | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | |
| SARCASM | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| METAPHOR | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| HEDGES | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| SOCIAL DEIXIS | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| CONNOTATION | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Table 3
Summary of Speakers' Usage of Discursive Strategies

This table shows the accusatory speech speakers in plain columns and the speakers of respondent speeches in shaded columns. According to the table, it can be seen that the strategy used by most speakers is level one intertextuality. Six out of seven speakers used it in their speech. Note that intertextuality is also one of the strategies that has the most functions (three functions). The second most popular strategies are enthymeme, sarcasm, hedges and connotation. They are used by five speakers. Prolepsis/disclaimer, metaphor and social deixis are the third most popular with four users. Level two intertextuality, Q-A, overstatement and overgeneralisation appear in three speeches. Presupposition, however, is employed by only two speakers.

The calculated total functions of strategies are worked together to create the most effective discourse in that particular context. With more variety of strategies, S's discourse is able to perform more functions. The key to rising above the conjunctures in the context is to create the combination of strategies that can perform all the functions. In other words, it is the functions of the strategies that count. The more functions the discourse can perform, the more effective that discourse can be. The choice of strategies and their combination are the product of each speaker's individual context. They can reflect the speaker's position in Thai politics at that moment, his/her aims in the speech as well as his/her personal style. The functions achieved by each speech are displayed in the following table.

| Speeches | Functions | Make the speech more interesting (potentially humorous) | Dissociate S from the claim | Promote/demote interpersonal relationship | Weaken degree of affront | Make the arrangement more comprehensible | Strengthen degree of the claim |
|------------|-----------|---|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| CHALERM'S | | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ |
| SAMAK'S | | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | |
| CHUAN'S | | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ |
| SUNAI'S | | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | |
| TRAIRONG'S | | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ |
| SUTHEP'S | | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ | ☺ |
| KANJANA'S | | | ☺ | | ☺ | | |

Table 4
Summary of the Speeches' Strategic Functions

This table presents the functions that each speech achieved *through the use of* discursive strategies. These functions can also be achieved through other means. Hence functions that are not shown to be achieved by a certain speech do not necessarily mean that the speech fails to perform it. The speech may arrive at that function by other means, apart from discursive strategies. By not using

strategies, however, S can only attend to one conjuncture at a time. According to the table, four speeches achieved all the six functions using strategies: Chalerm's, Chuan's, Trairong's and Suthep's. The speeches of Samak and Sunai do not use discursive strategies to strengthen the degree of the claim. Kanjana's speech only uses a strategy that has the potential to dissociate her from the claim and weaken the degree of affront.

9.4 Conclusion

This chapter argues that it is the competing conjunctures in the debate's context that cause the prolific discursive strategies. It restates that competing conjunctures can be found both in the accusatory speeches and respondent speeches. However, the speakers of the respondent speech can choose not to use FTAs, thereby avoid the competing conjunctures, while the speaker of the accusatory speech cannot. FTAs are intrinsic and compulsory in accusatory speeches, therefore discursive strategies are essential to accusatory speeches. Discursive strategies allow S to attend to more than one conjuncture at the same time. In the face of competing conjunctures, they enable S to attend to one conjuncture without being in conflict with another.

Thirteen discursive strategies were found in the analysis. Each of them has its functions in negotiating competing conjunctures and enhancing the speech's effectiveness. The potential functions of strategies are categorised into six groups. These functions can determine the success of the debate. This thesis discovered that most speakers use a combination of strategies to achieve a greater variety of functions. It can be said that the use of strategies in the debate discourse is rather complex. The combination of strategies can be found at the level of the whole speech, the sentence and down to the level of clauses, phrases and words. In other words, one clause may employ more than one strategy in order to achieve more than one function. A speech that is considered a success strategically is one that can achieve all of the six functions. Therefore the speeches made by Chalerm Yubumrung, Chuan Leekpai, Trairong Suwannakiri and Suthep Thuaksuban would seem to be the most successful ones in the data. Speeches by Samak and Sunai are second most successful in this respect, achieving five functions. These functions can also be achieved without employing strategies. However, it means S may have to choose to attend to only one conjuncture at a time while forsaking others. This means that certain undesirable effects may occur, for example, not attenuating the degree of a (negative) claim may cause S to lose his/her PPF and public popularity. Kanjana's direct answers also display the risk of not using strategies; her speech may be able to prove her innocence but she also lost her PNF as a result. In such a precarious context as that of the no-confidence debate, discursive strategies enhance the effectiveness of the speeches. They help the speech to arrive at its goal, while contriving to strengthen any positive effects and limit any negative ones.

Chapter 10 Conclusion

10.0 Introduction

This thesis has operationalised a two level analytical framework consisting of macro analysis and micro analysis. The macro analysis, which looks at the general context in the sociocultural practice and discourse practice of the debate, is presented in chapters 4 and 5. The analysis of the individual context and the debate's text is presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8. These three chapters constitute the analysis at the micro level. The analysis carried out in chapters 6, 7 and 8 has examined the discursive strategies in no-confidence debate discourse both in accusatory speeches and respondent speeches. The thirteen strategies have been classified into two types and their potential functions in the context are discussed in chapter 9.

This final chapter looks at the findings in an attempt to answer the three research questions posed in chapter 1: what roles do informal discourse have in such an institutionalised discourse; how is such discourse accepted; and what are the political and social implications of such a genre. This chapter has three sections. The first section summarises the findings with respect to our two level analytical framework and answer the three research questions. The second section evaluates the contributions and the limitations of this work. Aspects of this work that deserve further research will be discussed in the third section.

10.1 Summary of the Findings: Dialectical Relationship between the Debate's Text and its Context.

Discourse strategies are the traces of sociocultural practice and discourse practice found in the text. They are product of the condition in the society and at the same time they have their roles in the social context. This thesis has argued that the combination and configuration of seven context categories (van Dijk 2001a) generate a condition in the communicative event. This condition is called a conjuncture. In the case of the accusatory speeches in a no-confidence debate, there are three conjunctures within which the speaker has to operate: the debate's rationale, the parliamentary Code of Behaviour and the multiple audiences. It is the presence of these conjunctures which are intrinsically contested that necessitate S to employ discursive strategies to overcome these constraints in the communicative event. Thus, it can be said that they display a dialectical relationship between text and discourse.

According to the analysis presented here, it has been found that discursive strategies are employed prolifically in no-confidence debate discourse. The use of discursive strategies can be found in both accusatory speeches and respondent speeches. Since the discourse of accusatory speeches displays more frequent use of various discursive strategies, it will be the main focus of the discussion here.

The purpose of an accusatory speech is not to improve the government's administration but to create a chance for the opposition to supersede it. Therefore, it is prescribed by its context, especially the cognition category, to be adversarial. The context is reflected in the first conjuncture of the debate: its rationale to inflict maximum damage to the adversary. The debate discourse is thus designed to be destructive rather than constructive as the speakers aim to destroy each other's reputations, the debate is likely to feature FTAs while doing dissuasion and persuasion. Constructive and critical debate, though expected in principle, is made irrelevant in such a context. Evidence of FTAs is indicated by the proliferation of discursive strategies, which can be categorised as politeness strategies. The use of politeness strategies in the debate reflect the second conjuncture, the parliamentary Code of Behaviour. Since the Code of Behaviour specifies that parliamentary discourse should adhere to moderation, this second conjuncture is in direct conflict with the first. To make FTAs fit within the framework of the Code of Behaviour, politeness strategies must be employed to compromise these conflicting conjunctures. Examples of politeness strategies are hedges, sarcasm and metaphor. The analysis of accusatory speeches also show an emphasis on self-legitimising discourse. The presence of such discourse signals S's awareness of the third conjuncture which is the debate's audience. The speaker is aware of the FTAs that they are about to produce and the threat that such actions may pose to their own face.

According to Brown and Levinson (1987), FTAs may threaten primarily either the speaker's or listener's face. In a mediated political event like no-confidence debates, S must not allow the loss of his own face. In this case, doing bald on record FTAs is a dangerous strategy. It can put the speaker's face at risk because he can be seen as 'not an objective social member' (PF) and not a 'respectable' politician (PPF) in the eyes of the electorate. Therefore not only does S have to attend to the rationale of the debate and the Code of Behaviour which are in conflict, he/she must also attend to the third conjuncture simultaneously while doing FTAs. The discourse of self-legitimacy works to prevent S's PF and PPF from being at risk while doing FTAs. This means that every politician is able to threaten his/her political rival's PPF to the maximum while keeping his/her own PPF. At this point, it should be noted that while the study of political adversarial discourse in Western context shows the threat posed to positive face (Harris 2001: 468), in Thai discourse, there is also evidence of the threat posed to PNF and NF as seen in the analysis of Sunai/Kanjana's discourse.

Discursive strategies that can be categorised as FTA strategies are those that have one of these functions:

1. Dissociate S from the claim
2. Weaken degree of affront

These functions prevent S's face from being at risk or make the debate seemingly adhere to the Code of Behaviour. This is done by creating ambivalence of text; a kind of safety exit that S can either deny responsibility for the utterance or remain ambiguous about his/her interactional role

(friend/enemy) in the debate. Strategies that fall into this categories are level two intertextuality: prolepsis/disclaimer, enthymeme, presupposition and connotation. These can be found in both accusatory speeches and respondent speeches.

On the opposite side of the debate, there is the respondent speech. The basic mission of a respondent speech is to retrieve S's PPF and PNF which have been threatened by the FTAs in the accusatory speech. Therefore doing FTAs is not prescribed by the context as in the case of an accusatory speech. S of the respondent speech can choose to comply with what the opposition asks him/her to do - answer the allegations, or he/she can choose not to do so. If he/she choose to answer the allegation directly, he/she will not be faced with conflicting conjunctures. As a result, politeness strategies will not be needed. However, according to Sombat et al (2001), politicians usually choose not to answer straightforwardly. This can be explained by drawing upon politeness theory. Although answering allegations can clear their name, it also means complying with the opposition's proposal. This may pose threat to S's PNF because it can be interpreted as letting the opposition control his/her actions. When he/she chooses not to give in to the opposition, FTAs are then employed to rebut the allegation. In that case S of the respondent speech will find him/herself in the same conflicting conjunctures as S of the accusatory speech. This is when politeness strategies are required to overcome the conflict.

Threatening the face of the political adversaries by doing FTAs is not the only aim of no-confidence debate discourse. No-confidence speeches need to maintain the public interest as well. Not only are discursive strategies employed to tone down FTAs, they are also used to produce a discourse which appeals to the maximum number of voters with different political viewpoints in one communicative act. In a mediated televised political event, politicians have to bring the outside audience into the equation. Attending to public preference means compromising the kind of discourse prescribed by the Code of Behaviour. To be able to take the public 'on board', politicians use discursive strategies to perform one of these functions:

1. Make the speech more interesting
2. Promote interpersonal relationships

In order to keep people listening, the speech has to be found interesting by the audience. A Thai audience likes to hear witty exchanges and discourse that is not too formal or too technical to understand. That type of discourse is in conflict with the Code of Behaviour which expects the debate to be formal. Moreover, politicians should also promote their interpersonal relationship with the public. The aim is to project themselves as 'a member of the public'. In the Thai political context, where personal relationships are important, it is wise for a politician to try and narrow social distance (D) between themselves and the electorate by promoting their social roles as the member of certain social groups at every opportunity. This is also difficult to achieve within the Code of Behaviour. The kind of discourse advised by the Code - a monologue with formal register - does not allow S to promote interpersonal relationships. Therefore, politicians have to use

discursive strategies in order to appear to be conforming to the Code whilst also being able to promote this interpersonal relationship with the electorate. The latter is very important and has the potential to determine one's career in Thai politics. Strategies that can perform one of these functions are level one and level two intertextuality, sarcasm, metaphor, Q-A arrangement, overgeneralisation, hedges and social deixis.

Another task of no-confidence debate discourse is to convince the public. This is also a challenging task because the audience is not only divided into those inside the parliament and those outside the parliament, but also the public outside is heterogeneous in itself. It can be categorised in terms of politics into three groups: S's supporters, supporters of S's rival and non-aligned groups. In order to win public opinion in general, S has to manage three kinds of discourse at the same time: assurance for S's existing supporters, dissuasion for the rival's supporters and persuasion for the nonaligned group. To address an audience with differing worldviews and political viewpoints is not an easy task. A no-confidence debate is a situation when one has to take the side of either the government or the opposition. To persuade a heterogeneous audience to be on the same side as the speaker is even harder. As a result, S has to produce a kind of discourse which acquires its meaning by the audience. The 'textual vagueness' (Gruber 1993: 6), which is an exploitation of the message's form and meaning using discursive strategies, provides the most effective form of discourse in this context. Textual vagueness refers to a discourse which provides 'as many people as possible with interpretive cues for one's communicative acts which fit into their world view as well as in one's own political program' (Gruber 1993: 6). All of the discursive strategies found in the debate, with the exception of overstatement, can produce textual vagueness because they display an *ambivalence of text*. Of the data discussed here, Trairong's accusatory speech (see 7.2.3) is potentially the best representative of discourse with textual vagueness. He manages not to reveal his interactional role in relation to Banharn by his usage of lexical choices and his speech organisation. It is not until the end of the speech that it becomes clear whether he is a friend for foe of Banharn. This covert political stance enables him to address Banharn's supporters and those who dislike Banharn at the same time. It can be said that Trairong's speech provides interpretive cues for both groups in the audience to interpret to their liking.

However, according to the data, not all speakers choose to leave their interactional role ambiguous by being intentionally vague. Chalerm and Samak, with their image as *nak leng*, declare their stance from the beginning. They make it clear that they are against the management of a government that ignores the people's grievances, even though stating that they are against the government and threatening the government's PPF poses threat to their own PPF as well. However, they also gain PPF as politicians who are more concerned with the people's interest than their own. Clarifying S's stance against the government can also yield certain benefit. Therefore choosing whether to adopt an ambiguous or a clear standpoint depends on how the speaker would like to project him/herself and what social group he/she would like to appeal to. While Trairong's subtle and moderate style may be found more appealing by the elite and the middle class,

Chalerm's direct and vociferous style may be found more appealing to some of the audience. This style of discourse can cause more damage to the government.

There are various discursive strategies in the data which generate vagueness. This vagueness is then exploited to achieve political interest. The use of enthymeme makes the audience come to an offensive conclusion by themselves. The use of intertextuality makes less obvious S's adversarial stance towards the government. The use of sarcasm and metaphor disguises offensive comments as light-hearted remarks. All these discursive strategies are employed by politicians with a set of mutual - sometimes conflicting - goals: to make implicit the offensive nature of the debate, to detract from ferocious infighting amongst politicians who are in pursuit of political interest and to maintain as well as promote their PPF and PNF in the eyes of the public. The vagueness or the ambivalence of text produced by the use of discursive strategies allows S to be able to attend to more than one conflicting conjunctures or do more than one task in one communicative event.

It has been found that most speakers use more than one discursive strategy to achieve these multiple tasks within these competing conjunctures. According to the taxonomy of strategies in chapter 9, it can be seen that each strategy has one or more potential function and these function attend to different conjunctures to different degrees. The more variety of discursive strategies used, the more tasks S can undertake in their speech. The finding also shows that each speaker comes up with different set of discursive strategies. This is because not only is there a general context and general conjunctures within which no-confidence debate has to operate, each speaker is also subjected to his/her individual context determined by participants and cognition context categories. These categories of context are accountable to speaker's political position, his/her role in the debate and his aim in making the speech. It is the speaker's cognition category that assesses all other context categories. The aim and intention of the overall speech as well as its macropropositions determine which of the three conjunctures that he/she will emphasise and that, in turn, prescribes the set of strategies used. The calculated functions of strategies enhance the efficiency of the speech in achieving its aims.

The use of a set of discursive strategies to overcome the conjunctures posed by the no-confidence debate context produces a kind of discourse that is called 'unparliamentary'. This kind of discourse is the product of S's attempt to compromise the Code of Behaviour in order to attend to the other two conjunctures which are more significant in the Thai political context. Unparliamentary discourse is characterised by discourse with an informal register and a degree of offensiveness. While the former reflects S's recognition of the preference of the debate's multiple audiences, the latter reflects his/her attention to the debate's rationale. Therefore, it can be said that informal discourse is an inherent product of the no-confidence debate communicative event. It is the need to attend to, not only the Code of Behaviour, but also the actual rationale and the multiple audiences, which between them have more power to determine the success of the debate. In such a context, informal discourse is more relevant to the debate than a more formal genre. Informal discourse

makes the no-confidence debate discourse stand out from other parliamentary discourse. It features a kind of discourse that people find more interesting, more *sanuk* 'fun' to listen to. Thus this type of discourse can satisfy both politicians and the electorate. It helps speakers to keep the audience listening and thereby maximise their chance to communicate their viewpoints. At the same time, it is enjoyed by Thai electorate who expect a no-confidence debate to be an opportunity to see some verbal confrontation and get 'close and personal' to their MPs in action. The informal characteristic of no-confidence debate discourse reflects the incongruity in Thai political domain: the incongruity between the debate's formal rationale and the actual one. The formal objective of the debate is to counterbalance the government administration by way of engaging in a constructive and critical debate. However, the constructive and critical debate is irrelevant to the actual objective of the debate to supersede the government, with help of public pressure. This war of words and casual language are therefore evidence of social antagonism and the tensions in Thai politics. Since discourse is not only socially constituted but also has generative power, this type of discourse potentially deepens these very problems because it nurtures social antagonism between government and opposition thus further emphasising the discrepancy between formal and informal political practices.

10.2 Evaluation

The aim of this research is to study how the discourse structure of Thai no-confidence debate and discursive strategies featured in it interact with the Thai social and political context. In order to carry out such an investigation, this thesis operationalises a two level analytical framework which is a combination of CDA, SCA, politeness theory and pragmatics. The proposed framework is an alternative way of conducting a critical linguistic analysis. By complementing critical linguistic approaches as CDA and SCA with non-critical approaches, the thesis succeeds in overcoming the constraints of both areas.

The major shortcoming of CL approaches is their ambitious aim to balance social research and linguistic research: this can often result in a confusing framework. CDA, for example is criticised for being confusing and vague (Widdowson 1995). However, I have argued that at the theoretical level, CDA offers an inclusive framework that has potential to uncover the textual evidence of sociocultural practice and discourse practice. However, the value of this framework is undermined by its vagueness and abstraction generated by Fairclough's terminologies and concepts. I therefore suggest another CL approach, the SCA, with its concept of context to clarify Fairclough's 'sociocultural practice' and 'discursive practice'. By integrating context analysis in CDA, this research is able to systematically define what factors in sociocultural practice and discourse practice should be attended to in a communicative event. This integration strengthens and systematises CDA's analysis of social aspects that influence discourse.

However, both CDA and SCA suffer from the same drawback as most CL's approaches. Their aim to tackle social issues generates limitations for their linguistic analysis. The analysis of the 'traces of society' in small linguistic features and discourse structure at intra-sentential or extra-sentential level needs further clarification. The lack of organised linguistic analysis weakens the validity of their claim that even the most seemingly insignificant discursive features have social functions and bear social implication. To overcome this constraint, I propose that a micro analysis of CDA framework should be complemented with non-critical linguistic approaches such as politeness theory and general pragmatics. The non-critical linguistic approaches with their focus on discursive features can produce a fruitful linguistic analysis, providing a strong foundation for CDA and SCA to base their social analysis upon.

At this micro level, the notion of politeness strategy is employed in order to explore the issue of power and discourse. This study has argued that the use of politeness strategies to redress FTAs, especially in a communicative event where 'doing FTAs' is imperative, can also enhance the power of discourse. The use of FTA strategies in no-confidence debate speeches is proven to maximise the chance of communicating the face threatening macropropositions. This finding contributes to the study of politeness and power.

The two level analytical framework proposed in this thesis succeeds in generating both a social and linguistic analysis of Thai no-confidence debate discourse. It is able to explain the dialectical relationship between the debate's discourse and its context, with linguistic evidence to support the argument. The context analysis provides an insight into the condition in the society in which the discourse operates. The use of politeness theory and pragmatics which form the micro analysis demonstrate the potential functions of small discursive features. The intertextual analysis links the social analysis with the linguistic analysis at micro level. It presents the condition in the society in the form of conjunctures and then probes the relationship these conjunctures may have with the small discursive features, bringing into consideration their functions that potentially serve these conjunctures. The result of this two level framework is a set of rich findings concerning social aspects and social implications of discourse based on the empirical evidence of an organised linguistic analysis. The efficiency of the proposed framework calls for more cooperation between critical and non-critical linguistics. The unified framework is an example of an integrated approach to the analysis of 'discourse in interaction'.

Nonetheless, this research has some limitations. First there is the limitation posed by the framework. The two level analytical framework is inclusive enough to balance sociocultural analysis on one hand and discourse analysis on the other. The analysis of context categories that this study adopts from SCA provides a systematic analysis of elements that constitute communicative practice. This study has attempted to equally attend to every category before focussing on how all the categories configure to form the speech's conjuncture. The fact that this research aims to see how the combination and configuration of them affects the discourse in the

form of conjunctures does not allow it to go in to detail of each category as much as it could. For example, the gender aspect, which derives from the speaker's social role as male or female, (participants category) is explained briefly only in Kanjana's speech (see 8.3.2.1). Comparative analysis focussing on how gender affects discourse practice and text of male and female speaker would yield interesting insights into the dialectal relationship of discourse and its context. Nonetheless, this is not within the scope of the present study.

Secondly, there are two limitations posed by the data. Firstly, the data collected are the parliamentary debate transcriptions. As discussed in section 3.1 it is the product of three offices in the parliament. They are supposed to be an unabridged, verbatim record of the debate. However, the transcription can be subjected to minor alterations in the process of production. Therefore it does have some limitations. Despite that, the transcriptions are the most complete and reliable corpus available for the analysis of no-confidence debates. Secondly, the transcriptions are in Thai. They were translated into English for the analysis. Even though the utmost effort has been made to keep the meaning, register and genre of the English translation similar to the original as much as possible, some deficit is bound to occur. Some of the translation may not convey its register as pronouncedly as it may be in Thai. This is because Thai is a language with a more explicit hierarchic deference system than English. As a result the data, especially on level one intertextuality, may not come out in English as clearly as it could have been in Thai.

10.3 Further Work

Several aspects of this work require further investigation. Firstly, as suggested in the previous section, it would be interesting to look at the gender aspects of the speech's discourse. This thesis has analysed the context that the speaker has operated within by seeing the speakers primarily as institutional actors (MPs, member of certain political party and member of the government/opposition). Their social roles as a male or female member of society are only marginally attended to. As shown in Kanjana's speech in comparison with other speeches made by male speakers, gender has the potential to influence the style of discourse the speakers produce. This corresponds with literature on language and gender (see Talbot 1998: 191). To answer if and how gender affects no-confidence debate discourse; how the gender identity presented in the discourse affects its context and if it can enhance the speaker's status in political domain, more data from female MPs would be needed for analysis. This study would contribute to gender studies, critical linguistics, as well as Thai political studies.

Moreover, the analyses of Chalerm, Samak and Suthep's speeches shows masculinity in their discourse through the enactments of violence (Talbot 1998: 192). They display different kinds of violent masculinity in Thai politics. While Chalerm represents an image of *nak leng* who may readily involve himself in physical violence as well as verbal, Samak represents an image of abstract *nak leng* who may be involved in verbal but not physical violence. Suthep, on the other

hand, may be seen as a violent ‘tough guy’ but not *nak leng* because he appears to lack many of *nak leng*’s qualities. The analysis of more speeches of male MPs concentrating on gender issues may be able to shed light on the role of types of masculinity in the Thai political domain.

Secondly, it would be useful to replicate this study using a different set of data from non-broadcast debate such as a budget debates. Such a study would be able to empirically test my hypothesis that no-confidence debate discourse stands out from other parliamentary discourse in Thailand. The result of the study using alternative data would strengthen my finding that the third conjuncture - the multiple audience – is most accountable for the style of Thai no-confidence debate discourse. In the long term, I would like to extend the study to different types of political discourse. The broader research will bring about more understanding of political discourse for example how discourse is designed to produce certain impact in different settings within Thai political domain.

10.4 Note on the Future of No-Confidence Debates: Amidst the Changing Context

The speeches analysed were delivered under the condition of the Constitution BE 2534 (1991). However, the two debates took place in the middle of a political reform movement which was set in motion after the Black May event in 1992. The movement aims to develop a horizontally based civil society (Prawase 2002: 21). Public and private organisations such as the Democracy Development Committee (DDC) and PollWatch burgeoned in 1990s, to promote political participation and develop the public interpretation of democracy. The goals of these organisations can be divided into two levels. At the practical level, the organisations attempt to change people’s voting behaviour so that they elect policy rather than person. They encourage people not to vote for candidates who buy votes or exploit their power and to steer clear of the parties which are inclined to corruption. At the ideological level, the organisations inform the public about their rights and obligations as voters. While tutoring voters not to vote for ‘corrupt’ candidates in exchange for personal or local gain, these organisations arrange civic education to create people’s awareness of the national level. This means making people see the importance of policy issues, and helping them recognise that they actually affect their livelihood. This public awareness of the area larger than their immediate community is perceived as something that the rural Thai electorate are lacking in. Its promotion is expected to lead to the acquisition of MPs with better vision for the national level. Once candidates can no longer confine their interest to the constituency, vote-buying will be no longer feasible and irrelevant. Thus public awareness may help lessen money-oriented electioneering. The less financial investment that is needed for the election process, the more likely it is that people with capacity and calibre will no longer be discouraged to run for election. Thus politics is hoped to attract more honest democrats. Once politics is made less money-oriented, corruption on the part of government and speculation of interest on the part of opposition may also be reduced. Thailand may then have less reason to set no-confidence debates in motion.

The milestone of 'political reform' in Thailand is the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution BE 2540 which has been dubbed the 'People's Constitution'. It is the first time that the general public have been able to participate in the drafting process, through public consultation and through provincial representatives called the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) (McCargo 2002b: 9). Although it was still the politicians who had the final say in choosing representatives (Ockey 1997: 313-315), this can be considered a big leap towards participatory democracy. The new 'context' generated by the new Constitution and other political reform movements produce a new condition for no-confidence debates. Firstly, the 1997 Constitution states that it requires no less than two thirds (instead of one third as stated in the 1991 Constitution BE 2534) of the total number of MPs to table a no-confidence debate motion against the Prime Minister. For a no-confidence debate against Ministers, one fifth of MPs are required, similar to the 1991 Constitution. Therefore, the Prime Minister is nearly impossible to be attacked through this mechanism. The 1997 Constitution also provides a mechanism to bring corrupt politician to justice, a process which seems to be underway, following the latest no-confidence debate in 22-23 May 2002. Accusations of wrongdoings will be followed by a motion of impeachment and must be proven by hard evidence. This provides new conditions for both parties. The government must be more prudent because the new mechanism can account for their wayward practices. The debate will no longer be only a 'paper tiger'. With a follow-up impeachment, this paper tiger can now 'bite'. If they are found guilty by the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), the NCCC may enforce a ban on their participation in politics for up to five years. Their political career will be determined by the senate who will give the verdict whether they should be barred or not. With a mechanism that allows rogue politicians to be brought to justice, the opposition will not be obliged as much to resort to war of words in order to invoke the power of public opinion. However, it would be over optimistic to say that unparliamentary discourse will be made completely irrelevant. After all, none of the system in Thailand proved to be immune to corruption. It is less likely that this will be the exception. Thailand's problems lie largely in people's perspective. While the public ascribes more importance to the personality of MPs rather than policy issues, this practice of personality assassination will continue.

10.5 Conclusion

It can be concluded that the proliferating use of discursive strategies in the 1995 and 1996 no-confidence debate discourse is a direct product of problems in Thai political context at that time. The first problem lies in the Thai political domain. The Thai electorate has no incentive to vote for ideology and politicians aim to seek personal and clique's power and interest. Once politics is driven by the politician's inclination to pursue personal and clique's interest, being part of the government becomes every politician's ultimate goal. Members of the government and members of the opposition assume conflicting identities of a 'government' and 'government-in-waiting', respectively. This condition nurtures what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) called Social Antagonism between the government and the opposition. Social Antagonism makes Thai politics highly

unstable. As the polarity of political interests shift, government coalition tends to fall apart. Being aware of the rickety status of the political alliances, politicians have to seek political interest while they can in order to use this in the next election. Money and a power base can be used to bargain for political position. No-confidence debate's discourse, as one of the communicative events in political practices, is a reflection of a political institution with such mechanisms. Foregrounded by clique's and personal interest, the debates acquire the identity of a 'negotiation', the 'bargaining of interest'. The virtue of rational-critical discourse has somewhat been curtailed. The discourse is neither rational nor is it critical because logic and ideology are hardly relevant in the Thai political context. The most effective discourse in such a context must be offensive.

The second problem lies within a parliamentary system that does not give opposition actual power to counterbalance the government. Even if members of the coalition are proven guilty of mismanagement in a no-confidence debate, it is unlikely that they will be brought to justice. Any action taken by the House must come from the House resolution and the resolution is made in accordance with the voice of the majority in the House. In this circumstance, the occasion when the House resolution is made in line with the opposition who are always the minority is extremely rare. The debate has to rely on the power of the public outside the parliament to pressure the institutional actors inside the parliament to trigger any political changes. This means that the audience of the debate emerges as the most important agent determining the success of the debate. The debate discourse, therefore, has to be designed with the audience's preferences in mind. Politicians performing in the debate aim to capture the audience's attention and to solicit their agreement. They have to create an image that they think will satisfy their electorate. The public prefers discourse which is informal, entertaining and sensational, therefore MPs need to produce discourse according to this preference in order to ensure their intended addressee's attention.

The heterogeneous audience of the debate coupled with the discrepancy between the politician's formal and hidden agenda give rise to a kind of discourse which compromises these competing goals. In other words, the discrepancy between idealistic political practices set out in the Constitution and the actual practices can only be resolved with the help of discursive strategies. Performed in the parliament, the debate is supposed proceed in line with the Parliamentary Code of Behaviour. It is apparent in the analysis that the no-confidence debates are greatly influenced by the desire to achieve political interest, and, with the help of mass media, to win public support. The speech has to perform more than one function in a communicative event: to appear to be addressing the House while appealing to the electorates outside, for example. The discourse produced, in return, interacts with its context. With the right style of discourse, politicians can make the most of this twice-a-year opportunity. They may be able to destabilise the coalition, dissuade coalition supporters and campaign for the upcoming election, all in one communicative event.

These two problems produce three competing conjunctures for the discourse: its rationale to cause maximum damage to the government; the parliamentary Code of Behaviour; and the debate's multiple audiences. In order to compromise these conjunctures and survive in such a political context, discursive strategies are required to resolve this uneasy situation. This thesis has found thirteen discursive strategies in the data with the potential to achieve this end, namely: intertextuality levels one and two, prolepsis/disclaimer, enthymeme, sarcasm, metaphor, adjacency pair Q-A, overstatement, overgeneralisation, hedges, social deixis, presupposition and connotation. These strategies function at either extra-sentential or intra-sentential level. The strategies perform at least one of these political/social functions:

- a. Make the speech more interesting
- b. Dissociate S from the claim
- c. Promote/demote interpersonal relationship
- d. Weaken degree of affront
- e. Make the argument more comprehensible
- f. Strengthen degree of the claim

The use of strategies constitutes a kind of discourse which is different from the discourse expected by the Code of Behaviour. It is branded an unparliamentary genre because it departs from moderation, which is the key to parliamentary discourse and it features constant changes between formal and informal registers, for instance. Once the discourse acquires such a genre and style, it reflexively deepens the problems in the relevant practices. The fact that no-confidence debates emphasise attractive and offensive speech styles rather than rational critical content potentially reduces it to only an occasion to manipulate public opinion. It may well be seen as an entertainment. The informal register and the sensational style associated with the discourse of entertainment, makes the no-confidence debate lose its political identification. It is reduced from a crucial parliamentary device to acquiring an identification more akin to an entertaining performance, on par with a soap opera (see Wilasinee 2001). As a result, it loses its political significance. The fact that most politicians, either from the government coalition or the opposition, aim at attacking the 'face' of one another creates the impression among the people that MPs are equally corrupt in one way or another. This provokes a public feeling of despair towards politics. The problematic feature in the discourse which is the product of the problem in Thai politics nurtures and potentially deepens the problem it feeds on.

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APPENDIX 1 TRANSCRIPTION OF ACCUSATORY SPEECHES

Police Lieutenant Chalerm Yubumrung's speech, Wednesday 17 May 1995.¹(Chapter 5)

1. Ritual beginning
 - Line 1-3 introduces himself
 - Line 3-25 develops understanding between him and the audience
 - Line 26-57 legitimises his action; that he will give speech mainly for the benefit of the Thai public. His motive in doing this is entirely objective. He does not have any negative emotional motive towards the government.
2. Preface to the allegations
 - Line 57-60 gives definition of the phrase 'the people with lower income'
 - Line 61-64 describes how the government abused the definition for their own benefit.
 - Line 65-104 gives allegations and the summary of reasons and evidences supporting his allegations.
 - Line 105-111 restates his duty as member of the opposition to monitor the government.
3. The Allegations
 - Line 112-141 explains the 'suspicious' manipulation of the criteria of people who were entitled to the land title deeds.
 - Line 142-163 presents the case of Anchali Vanich Thepabutr, Phuket MP.
 - Line 164-230 describes the action of the deputy minister, Suthep Theuksuban, and the Forestry Department towards the case.
 - Line 230 states the allegation (that both Suthep and Anchali are corrupted).
 - Line 231-248 presents the action of *so po ko* officials in Phuket.
 - Line 249-264 gives the names and the businesses of *so po ko* beneficiaries.
 - Line 265-309 gives definition of the word 'agriculturist' and the evidence that *so po ko* is aware of the definition of it.²
 - Line 310-416 states the allegation (that Jurin lied).
 - Line 320-416 verbally attacks the Democrat Party focussing on Chuan and Suthep.
 - Line 417-454 gives evidence concerning the case of Akhom Engchuan, another Democrat MP.
 - Line 455-461 develops understanding with the Southerners by telling them that he loves the Southerners as much as he does other Thais.³
 - Line 462-486 gives more evidence.
 - Line 487-490 states the allegation (that Akhom is corrupt).
 - Line 491-523 discusses about Suthep's abuse of power.
 - Line 524-545 gives evidence supporting his allegation.
 - Line 553-559 states his allegation
 - Line 560-567 states his allegation that Jurin intentionally lied to protect his fellow party members.
 - Line 567-600 gives further evidence
 - Line 601-603 restates his allegation that Jurin lied.
 - Line 603-647 gives allegation and supporting evidence against Suthep.
 - Line 643-647 restates his allegation against Suthep.
 - Line 651-705 mentions about Jurin's speech that *so po ko* does not involved in this case.

¹ During Chalerm's speech, the deputy Speaker, Chalermphol Sanitwongchai (NAP) was chairing the session. The House Speaker, Marut Bunnag (DP) resumed the chair from line 650 onwards.

² This argument aims at retaliating the newly appointed minister of Agriculture, Jurin Pitsuwan (DP)'s speech stating that *So po ko* does not know what 'agriculturist' means.

³ Good understanding with the Southerners is very important in the debate because the South is mostly Democrat-based constituencies. During the debate, the Democrats tried to stirred up the idea that other parties launch the debate because they hate the Democrats and the Southerners.

Line 709-820 states allegation against the whole Democrat party

4. Conclusion

Line 821-826 appeals to the people

Line 827-873 appeals to the Chart Pattana Party (by addressing the leader of the party, General Chatichai Chunchawan).

Line 874-898 appeals to Palang Dharma Party (by addressing the leader of the party General Chamlong Srimuang).

Line 898-902 blames Chart Pattana Party for being deceitful.

Line 903-end states the point of the whole speech; that he can no longer trust the government.

• **Samak Sundaravej's speech, Wednesday 17 May 1995.⁴ (Chapter 5)**

1. Ritual beginning

Line 1-2 introduces himself

Line 3-6 speaks metaphorically of how the government has been biding their time for 5 months before having a debate.

Line 6-15 mentions what the government should have done.

Line 15-16 mentions what the government did.

Line 17-23 states the point that the government's action is suspicious.

2. Preface to the allegations

Line 24-30 gives figure of the land that has been distributing under Democrat government in comparison with the figure of entire forest that Thailand has.

Line 30-34 uses Q & A to attack Democrat's speech that they are the first who care about needy agriculturists.

Line 34-38 uses sarcasm in the form of question to criticise the Democrat's rush in the project.

Line 38-58 explains Montri Pongpanich (Ayudhaya MP, leader of Kijasangkhom Party (KP)) action in swearing that the Democrat did ask for the Ministry of Agriculture saying that Montri had to do to prevent the Democrats from saying otherwise.

Line 58-68 explains how the story of *so po ko 4-01* broke out by a newspaper.

Line 68-77 refers to the Prime Minister's comment on the case comparing the *so po ko* to government scholarship.

Line 77-81 gives his hypothesised reason behind the Prime Minister's action.

Line 82-86 talks about the opposition's action after the scandal broke out.

3. Allegations

Line 87-102 gives evidence that the Democrat party 'unusually' favoured Ministry of Agriculture.

Line 102-107 explains the benefit and power of Minister of Agriculture.

Line 107-120 describes the unusual rush of the *so po ko 4-01* case in Phuket

Line 120-129 refers to the speech of General Chaowalit Yongchaiyudh, leader of the New Aspiration Party (NAP), that he was invited only to chair the meeting held on the 4th May 1993⁵.

Line 129-134 criticises the legitimacy of 4th May meeting's resolution.

Line 135-152 talks about the rush in distributing land's right.

Line 152-157 states the value of land's right acquired by a Democrat MP from Phuket, Anchali's husband.

⁴ During Samak's speech, the first Deputy Speaker, Chalermphon Sanitwongchai (NAP) was serving as the Speaker.

⁵ The meeting on the 4th May 1993 passed a resolution approving amendments in the governmental declaration and order concerning the criteria of people who would be granted title deeds. The amendments were considered to be done in order to make way for abuse.

- Line 158-180 discusses the procedure that the Democrat replaced the Director General of the Forestry Department with a new man who was allegedly one of their men.
- Line 180-184 summarises the points asking who should be the one to be blamed.
- Line 184-193 accuses the government of using the forest planting project as a façade while distributing forest among their cronies.
- Line 194-203 gives the reasons why Phuket should not have *so po ko 4-01* project in the first place.
- Line 203-214 discusses procedure used by the *so po ko* to verify *so po ko 4-01*'s right of the beneficiaries.
- Line 215-219 refers to the phrase in the law concerning land's right.
- Line 219-226 explains the 'suspicious' action of the government in changing the criteria.
- Line 226-231 uses the case of Anchali's husband as an example of irregularities.
- Line 231-238 gives his argument accusing the government of land laundering.
- Line 239-262 accuses the Prime Minister and the government of intentionally manipulating the wording of law.
- Line 263-273 explains how they manipulate it.
- Line 274-277 states that the project in Phuket is not the only one which bears irregularities.
- Line 278-304 explains how the process of distributing *so po ko*'s right has inherent flaw which encourages corruption.
- Line 305-317 suggests what the Democrat should have done to solve the problem.
- Line 318-333 accuses the Minister of Agriculture of conspiracy which gives way to corruption.
- Line 334-336 accuses the Democrat of being arrogant and ignorant.
- Line 336-350 illustrates that the land's right distributed is too much.
- Line 351-354 explains the uneven distribution of land's right.
- Line 355-361 gives evidence that there are other people who oppose the project.
- Line 361-365 legitimises his action saying that it is a totally objective act with supporting evidence.
- Line 365-394 uses the case of Anchali's husband as an example that the distribution of right organised by the Democrat led Ministry of Agriculture is against the project's intention stated in the Royal Decree.
- Line 394-397 criticises the simile used by the Prime Minister saying that *so po ko* land's right is like governmental scholarship.
- Line 397-409 accuses the Prime Minister of telling lies to the King.
- Line 409-414 assures the House Speaker that he has spoken the truth and that he has evidence to support it.
- Line 415-434 (use map to) elaborates that the government chose only good piece of land in the *so po ko* project.
- Line 435-456 elaborates that the government knew of the irregularities but ignored them.
- Line 456-459 talks about the schedule of the debate in general.
- Line 460-464 legitimises his speech saying that he has to oppose the government malpractice as it's the duty of being an opposition.
- Line 464-468 gives the figure of amount of forest land distributed by this government.
- Line 468-472 accuses the government of electioneering and giving out propaganda in everything they did, that is, closure of forest and distribution of land's right.
- Line 473-481 accuses the government of defaming the opposition.
- Line 481-491 accuses the government of running away from the scandal and public scrutiny.
- Line 491-500 suggests what the government should have done right after the scandal broke out.

- Line 501-519 direct challenge to the government.
 (*Challenge 1: Triphon Jojit, Nakorn Srithammarat MP (DP), protests against Samak's phrase that 'take away Thai land only to give it to cronies'*)
- Line 520- 562 criticises Thai government of being untouchable.
 Line 563- 565 legitimises his action in debating against the government today.
 Line 566- 569 sarcastically criticises the government.
4. Conclusion
 Line 569- 583 asks the audience to decide for themselves.

• **Chuan Leekpai's opening speech, Wednesday 18 September 1996. (Chapter 6)**

1. Ritual beginning
 Line 1-7 formal opening of the debate
 Line 8-20 states the issues and allegations to be discussed in this debate (cause)
 Line 22-25 what the opposition thinks and feels obliged to do (effect)
 Line 26-37 explains how the Prime Minister misunderstood the issue
 Line 37-48 explains how the misunderstanding should not have happened
 Line 49-67 explains the simplicity of the clause of law which he claims that Banharn wrongly interpreted
 Line 67-71 explains the misunderstanding of the Prime Minister and how misleading law student might find.
 Line 72-97 extensive explanation of the parliamentary system in government audit
 Line 97-113 justifies himself and the opposition affirming that they are objective
 Line 113-129 shows how the government has been given enough opportunity
 Line 129-140 explains that it is about time for the opposition to do their duty
 Line 140-165 illustrates how the government violated freedom of speech
2. Preface to the allegations
 Line 166-174 shows how the opposition give the government justice in forming their allegations
 Line 174-188 describes the standard the opposition use in forming allegations
3. Allegations
 Line 189-191 gives overview of the allegations
 Line 191-218 the first allegation; the cabinet appointment
 Line 219-248 the second allegation; the plunge in the stock market
 Line 248-261 the third allegation; the 1997 budget
 Line 261-288 the fourth allegation; criticism from the international financial institutions as well as international media
 Line 288-298 formulates an argument how all the four allegations relate to the Prime Minister
 Line 298-305 states that the detail of the allegations will be dealt with by other opposition MPs
 Line 306-314 mentions the degree of violence in the issue
 Line 314-336 argues that though the issue are offensive and provocative in nature but it will be provided with truthful evidence
 Line 337-353 says that the opposition does not come to fight with the Prime Minister or the people of Suphanburi province
 Line 353-356 states that the opposition is doing its duty
 Line 357-367 rhetoric persuading people to believe in the parliamentary system
 Line 367-375 points out that the inability of the Prime Minister is the main reason of this debate
 Line 375-382 gives general overview and schedule of the debate
4. Conclusion
 Line 383-392 gives preface to the quotation
 Line 392-401 reads the quotation

Line 401-423 makes his point in questioning the Prime Minister of not working entirely for the benefit of the people and the country

• **Sunai Julapongsathorn's speech, Wednesday 18 September, 1996 (Chapter 6)**

1. Ritual beginning
 - Line 1-2 self-introduction
 - Line 3 personally challenges the government
 - Line 3-7 refers to MP Julin's speech as a point of departure for his speech
2. Preface to the allegations
 - Line 7-41 mentions the reasons why the BOT have the need to print more banknotes.
1. Ritual beginning
 - Line 42-44 mentions that he should have begun his speech by a eulogy to the Prime Minister
 - Line 45-57 informs the Speaker (and the audience) about the material he will be using in his speech in order to prevent misunderstandings
 - Line 58-68 asks the government MPs not to protest and give him a chance to speak to the Prime Minister
 - Line 69-76 says that he has prepared his document meticulously into 63 appendixes
 - Line 76-88 states that he has to give speech for the public benefit
 - Line 88-104 indirectly accuses the Prime Minister of orchestrating a demonstration supporting the government
 - Line 104-114 urges the people of Suphanburi province to understand that the no-confidence debate is part of the democratic system
 - Line 114-119 put the alleged corruption of the Prime Minister as an example asking whether people can tolerate such malpractice
 - (House Speaker[Thamrong Thaimongkhon (SAP)]'s intervention 1: asking him to go to the point)*
 - Line 120-124 expresses his concerns towards Suphanburi people's attitude towards the debate
 - Line 124-148 refers to the manuscript of Prince Damrong and quotes the manuscript about the mutiny in Suphanburi a hundred years ago.
 - (House Speaker[Thamrong Thaimongkhon (SAP)]'s intervention 2: asking him not to read unnecessary documents)*
 - Line 149-162 continues the quotation
 - (House Speaker[Thamrong Thaimongkhon (SAP)]'s intervention 3: asking Sunai to state the points he would like to make and debate only on those points)*
 - (Challenge 1: Vichai Chaijitvanichkul (NAP) protests that Sunai keep circling the point and does not tell the audience how and why the Prime Minister has done wrong)*
 - (Challenge 2: Sophon Petchsawang (CPP) protests the Speaker's verdict saying that it is now still premature to give any verdict)*
 - (Challenge 3: Niphon Bunyamani (DP) protests the Speaker saying that the Speaker gives the coalition privilege)*
 - (Challenge 4: Phaijit Srivorakhan (NAP) protests the other challenges saying that the Speaker is neutral and that he is doing his duty well)*
 - Line 163-167 asks for the protester's retraction
 - (The 1st challenger [Vichai Chaijitvanichkul] uses the right to clarify himself)*
 - Line 168-170 says that he does not mind being protested
 - Line 170-173 concludes his point from the quotation
 - Line 174-181 justifies his speech that the quotation is not irrelevant
 - (Challenge 5: Vichai Chaijitvanichkul consults the Speaker asking whether Sunai has signed in the document he handed the Speaker earlier)*
 - Line 182-187 says that none of his document is confidential or personal

- Line 188-197 uses metaphor to clarify himself for the accusation that his speech intends to attack woman, MP Kanjana Silpa-archa, the Prime Minister's daughter verbally
- Line 198-200 urges the Prime Minister to admit now that he owns the land so that his daughter will not be accused
- (Challenge 6: Kanjana Silpa-archa (CTP) uses the right to clarify her position)*
2. Preface to the allegations
- Line 201-209 says that he does not want to hurt a woman but he has to prove who actually owns the land
3. Allegations
- Line 209-225 shows that the document says that Kanjana bought the four plots of land
- Line 225-238 points out the potential irregularity in the purchasing by the Bank of Thailand (henceforth BOT)
- Line 239-247 accuses Kanjana of reaping benefit from doing business with governmental office (BOT)
- Line 247-249 says that he had difficulty getting this document
- Line 249-262 points out that the document suggesting that the company that sold the land belongs to *khunying* Jamsai, Banharn's wife
- Line 262-269 says that Kanjana is less likely to have that much money to buy the land in the first place
- Line 269-288 states that he has evidence that *khunying* Jamsai was the one who negotiated the sale with the BOT
- Line 288-312 shows the BOT's magazine featuring *khunying* Jamsai's picture in the inauguration ceremony for the construction of the new printing plant
- (Challenge 7: Sombun Wanchaithanawong (CTP) protests Sunai implicitly saying that he is using informal words and acting impolitely)*
- Line 313-319 retaliates the protester
- Line 319-327 returns to the magazine showing that *khunying* Jamsai is involved and says that *khunying* Jamsai has never said otherwise nor clarified herself
- Line 327-354 brings out another evidence, which is an interview with Kanjana from *Matichon* newspaper
- Line 354-365 for the sake of their personal relationship, warns Kanjana to stay out of this issue
- Line 365-423 reveals circumstantial evidence that Banharn had his close and trusted man bought a cashier cheque which later was paid for the land purchase
- (Challenge 8: Suphasit Techatanont (CTP) consults the Speaker whether Sunai is violating the regulation clause which says that people outside the parliament should not be mentioned. He also suggests that Sunai still does not go to the point.)*
- Line 424-431 legitimises evidence mentioned in his speech
- Line 431-449 proves that the BS company who was the purchaser of the plots of land was owned by Banharn at the time of transaction
- Line 449-496 proves that the company only used Kanjana's credit to secure easier bank loan
- Line 496-499 insists on the importance of honest and graceful quality of Prime Minister
- Line 500-514 recounts his interview with a bank worker pointing that the person who asked for the loan was in fact *khunying* Jamsai
- Line 514-523 argues that *khunying* Jamsai's loan is equal to Banharn's loan because they are married couple
- Line 523-546 says that he has to investigate whether the Prime Minister has paid tax or not. He legitimises his investigation saying that it will be unacceptable for a wealthy Prime Minister not to do so.
- Line 546-574 shows the market price of land in the area, in reference with quotes from many newspapers
- Line 574-576 estimates the price of these plots of land in question

- Line 576-584 calculates how much the tax would have been
 Line 585-587 acknowledges the probable explanation of Banharn for not paying the tax
 Line 587-605 argues against the speculative explanation Banharn could have said
 Line 605-609 indirectly accuses Banharn of tax evasion
 Line 609-612 hints the alleged irregularities within the BOT
 Line 612-616 warns Banharn and Kanjana not to further oppose his allegation
 Line 616-632 presents the evidences that Kanjana contradicted herself in an interview
 Line 632-634 states his allegations that Banharn sought profit illegally and committed perjury
 Line 634-636 says that he did not press charge Banharn yet because he had no personal conflict with him
 Line 637-645 says that it was inappropriate for the Prime Minister to abuse his power in this way
 Line 645-650 says that the government has never lowered paddy field tax for poor farmer while the Prime Minister himself evade tax paying
 Line 650-672 gives analysis of tax collecting system and how the tax officer should have recorded the tax paid by the Prime Minister but he did not.
 Line 672-678 emphasises the suspicious points in the issue
 Line 679-708 gives evidence that the tax officer lied that he had a record of Prime Minister tax payment
 Line 709-722 gives more evidences and states hypothetically concludes that all the evidences mentioned pointed out that the Prime Minister did evade tax paying
 (*Challenge 9: Chaisak Thakrairach (CTP) protests that Sunai is being repetitive and not speaking about Banharn who he said is the main target of his speech*)
 Line 723-726 says that he did not mean to name Banharn
 Line 727-742 explains that what the Prime Minister did clearly signified that he intend to evade tax payment
 (*House Speaker [Thamrong Thamongkhol (SAP)]'s intervention 3: pressing Sunai to speak without tax document*)
 Line 743-744 says that he is afraid of being blamed of not having evidence to support his point
 (*Challenge 10: Sophon Petchsawang (CPP) protests the Speaker's verdict. He says that Sunai is not violating any regulation*)
 Line 745 tells the Speaker that there is another MP would like to challenge him.
 (*Challenge 11: Vichai Chaijitvanichkul (NAP) protests Sunai blaming him of wrongly accuse the Prime Minister of tax evasion. Also he is suggesting that Sunai himself has committed this evasion as well*)⁶
 (*Challenge 12: Thavon Kasomsan (DP) protests Vichai. He says that Vichai did not state which clause in the regulation that Sunai was violating*)
 (*Challenge 13: Sophon Petchsawang (CPP) protests Vichai that his challenge is not allowed by the regulation*)
 Line 746-752⁷ says that the political retaliation (in the 11th protest) is not unexpected for him
 Line 753-758 says that he brought with him documents supporting his allegation so that Kanjana can clarify her point if she wants to
 Line 758-760 restates his point that the Prime Minister should be honest and graceful
 Line 761-770 implicitly accuses the Prime Minister of causing irregularities in the Bank of Thailand

⁶ This protest is against Sunai's speech accusing the Prime Minister of tax evasion. The protester, Vichai Chaijitwanichkul (NAP) attacks Sunai, implicitly accusing him of the same charge (tax evasion). It is a clear example of political retaliation.

⁷ Line 743-745 are discourse that Sunai addresses to the House Speaker informing him of protests. They are irrelevant to the analysis and therefore are not taken into consideration.

- Line 770-793 explains the fundamental reason of the BOT in building new printing plant
- Line 793-795 indirectly accuses the Prime Minister of abuse of power in denying public access to information concerning the case
- Line 795-815 says that the original plan is to build the new plant in Bangpli
- Line 815-825 says that the plan was changed when Banharn became Minister of Interior
- Line 825-831 compares the almost undetectable trait of Banharn's suspicious business with that of drug smuggler
- Line 831-900 presents the documentary evidence linking Banharn's family with a couple of companies in property development business. One of the companies sold plots of land to the BOT.
- Line 900-902 says that he still respects *khunying* Jamsai and does not have personal conflict with her
- Line 903-912 presents evidence that *khunying* Jamsai is president of one of the company's project and she is also the person who sold plots of land to the Bank of Thailand
- Line 912-926 presents evidence that it was Banharn's idea to move the printing plant project to Nakorn Pathom
- Line 927-932 expresses his sympathy towards Thai ordinary people who has never known where the public project may be and therefore cannot buy land for speculation
- Line 932-986 presents evidence pointing that there was no transparency in the bidding and infer that the Prime Minister was behind this irregularities
- Line 987-1031 says that the BOT has bought land both in Bangpli and in Nakorn Pathom
(*Challenge 14: Suphasit Techatanont (CTP) protests the Speaker's verdict which has given Sunai to speak for over 2 hours without any substantial points*)
- Line 1034-1039 retaliates the protester and tries to continue his speech
(*House Speaker[Krit Kongpetch (NAP)]'s intervention 5: pressing him to go to the point*)
- Line 1040-1057 presents evidence that the owners of land sold to the BOT are friends of *khunying* Jamsai
- Line 1058-1079 presents the in detail the evidence that there were lower offers in the bidding but the BOT did not chose them
(*House Speaker[Krit Kongpetch (NAP)]'s intervention 6: insists Sunai to wrap up*)
- Line 1080-1084 continues his evidence about the existence of lower offers in the bidding
- Line 1084-1098 says that Banharn has appointed his men to run the BOT
4. Conclusion
- Line 1098-1105 compares Banharn's case with Suchart Tanjaroen's case: if Suchart is guilty, Banharn should be found guilty as well
- Line 1106-1116 legitimises his action saying that he has to do this despite the fact that he was threatened
(*House Speaker[Krit Kongpetch (NAP)]'s intervention 7: says that there is no threat*)
- Line 1117-1128 directly accuses the Prime Minister of using his power to threat him
- Line 1128-1131 expresses that he does not have any personal conflict with the Prime Minister
- Line 1131-1133 says that he is afraid of no one
(*House Speaker's intervention 8: asks Sunai not to challenge anyone*)
- Line 1134-1136 insists the point
(*House Speaker[Krit Kongpetch (NAP)]'s intervention 9: presses Sunai to finish his speech*)
- Line 1137-1139 describe how the Prime Minister threatened him
- Line 1140-1145 challenges the Prime Minister

● **Trairong Suwannakiri's speech, Wednesday 18 September 1996. (Chapter 6)**

1. Ritual beginning
Line 1-2 introduces himself

- Line 3-11 mentions MP Sunai Julapongsathorn's speech
 Line 11-14 says that he does not want to give speech today
 Line 14-15 says that he wants the starlet MP to speak
 Line 15-34 mentions about his good relationship with Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa.
- Line 34-40 explains why he has to speak up; because he thinks the Prime Minister has prejudice against the opposition. He might be the one the Prime Minister would listen to.
- Line 41-43 describes how the Prime Minister and him have never had any personal conflict.
- Line 43-49 states his objective standpoint.
 Line 50-52 states that he used to support the Prime Minister but now he can no longer support him.
- Line 53-58 concludes that his speech today will explain why he can no longer support the Prime Minister.
- Line 58-62 says that he has read many books when he prepared today's speech.
2. Preface to the allegations
 Line 62-86 says that he has been warning the government many times of the economic problems.
 Line 86-93 says that, not only him but also the economists, IMF and ADB have warned the government of the economic downturn.
 Line 93-97 says that he has warned the government to look for a capable man to lead the Ministry of Finance.
3. Allegations
 Line 98-105 explains how the government has removed the minister of Finance from office and replaces him with a new man who is no better than the old one.
 Line 105-126 explains how the new man is still unfit to be the minister of Finance.
 Line 105-203 explains the economic mismanagement of the Government.
 Line 203-208 accuses the government of appointing incapable people to a high responsibility office.
 Line 208-220 accuses the government of lacking vision and has neither clear direction nor unity within the administration.
 Line 220-222 mentions Dr. Supachai Panichpakdi's speech.
 Line 223-255 explains why he thinks Thailand is now having economic recession.
 Line 255-260 says that this government destroyed the upward economic trend which started since 1987.
 Line 260-264 states that the economic growth rate predicted by the government appears to be higher than the reality.
 Line 264-288 explains the negative impact the false prediction caused to the economy.
 Line 288-297 acknowledges the attempt of the Prime Minister to solve economic problems and criticises that what he does is not the solution to the problems.
 Line 297-302 sarcastically and implicitly criticises the advice of Samak Sundaravej, a coalition member, that the people should eat chicken ribs instead of other meat whose price is on the rise.
 Line 302-350 criticises the government's economic policy, branding it 'dog biting its tail'.
 Line 351-354 criticises the government's comment about the stock market which says that stock markets are plunging all over the world.
 Line 354-396 extensively explains the mechanism of stock market.
 Line 396-402 states that the government's lack of unity prevents the government from successfully resolve this economic problem because the investor does not believe in the stability of the government.
 Line 402-464 criticises the Prime Minister's remark that Thai opposition is subjective and would like to harm the government unlike that of Malaysia.

- Line 464-284 extensively explains the term 'crisis of trust' to the Prime Minister. (because the Prime Minister said earlier that he did not know what it meant).
- Line 485-560 gives three principles which might have led to the downfall of Mr. Banharn. Gives examples of leaders to illustrate his theory.
- Line 559-564 returns to attack Mr. Banharn, the Prime Minister, that he does not have what it takes to gain people's trust.
- Line 564-572 says that the Prime Minister former work as a contractor makes people's feel sceptic about his honesty.
- Line 572-590 states that the first image of the cabinet failed to gain people's trust because people doubt their honesty.
- Line 590-606 refers to a research conducted on corruption.
4. Conclusion
- Line 607-617 refers to the Buddha's teaching about seven things that good man should be aware of.
- Line 617-646 gives Major General Prem Tinasulanond, former Prime Minister and statesman, as an example of a good man.
- Line 646-653 urges the Prime Minister to be aware of the extent of the crisis and suggests him to step down for his own good.
- Line 653-658 warns the Prime Minister of the possible outcome if he decides to ignore the crisis of trust and threatens him of what he will face later on in the debate.
- Line 658 wishes him luck.

APPENDIX 2 TRANSCRIPTION OF RESPONDENT SPEECHES

- **Suthep Thuaksuban's speech, Wednesday 17 May 1995 (Chapter 7)**

1. Ritual Beginning
 - Line 1-3 self- introduction
 - Line 3-5 acknowledges House Speaker's mercy to give him a speaking slot
2. Preface to the defence
 - Line 5-11 acknowledges different ideas
 - Line 11-14 claims that he has already been involved with land reform project
 - Line 14-22 repeats the allegations in general
 - Line 22-23 expresses his feeling about the allegations
3. Defence
 - Line 23-44 admits that he was involved in the project, but with good intention: to solve people's problem
 - Line 44-92 gives history of land reform in Thailand dating back to Major General Prem Tinnasulanond's administration
(Challenge 1: Pratuang Vijarnpricha (CTP) asks Suthep to limit his speech only to the clarification his allegations [to conform to 'sithi patping' only])
 - Line 93-101 appeals that he should be able to defend his reputation after being bombarded by allegations.
(House Speaker [Chalermphol Sanitwongchai (NAP)]'s intervention: asks him to limit his defence only to the points through which he has been defamed)
 - Line 102-106 legitimises everything he said arguing that he has been defamed in every allegation
 - Line 107- 118 admits that he proposed the project and clarifies the purpose of the land reform he proposed
 - Line 118-119 legitimises his speech that he will try to be precise
 - Line 119-146 continues to clarify the land reform project's rationale
 - Line 147-149 concludes that the resolution (to put forward the project) is made by consensus of the parliament
 - Line 150-153 says that he will now clarify an accusation that he manipulated power for the benefit of his cronies
 - Line 153-157 says that it is not possible for him to manoeuvre this project alone
 - Line 157-171 explains that he has received support from many people
 - Line 171-176 makes emotional appeal that now there's only him who comes to defend this project [while there were many people supported this project when it was implemented]
 - Line 177-185 defends his action saying that he did not favour his cronies
 - Line 185-192 says that he will now clarify an accusation that he rushed to distribute land
 - Line 192-214 says that he rushed because he on had limited time in office
 - Line 214-219 says that he has no intention to insult Royal sovereignty [Samak implicitly accused him earlier of *lese majeste*]
 - Line 219-236 says he was not responsible for the distribution of *so po ko*. There was a committee to make these decisions.
 - Line 236-253 explains why the project gave out *so po ko* instead of *no so 3*⁸ document
 - Line 253-258 expresses his sympathy for and his belief in the committee
 - Line 258-262 says that he has never blamed the officials and that he believes nobody is perfect
 - Line 263-269 emotionally appeals for permission to clarify himself

⁸ *No so 3* and *so po ko* are both official documents given to people who were rehabilitated in the designated degraded forest area. They show the right over the land. The difference between *no so 3* and *so po ko* is that *no so 3* holder can sell their right of land while *so po ko* holder cannot.

- Line 270-291 says that he was not responsible for surveying the area because it's the work of the officials therefore he did not know who actually benefited from the project
- Line 292-308 gives his definition of the words 'agriculturists' and 'poor and needy'
- Line 308-322 says that he defined the words with public interest as his first priority and explains how his definition of the words can help more people
- Line 322-341 distances himself from the case saying that the land had been divided among the people before the project started
(House Speaker [Chalermphol Sanitwongchai (NAP)]'s intervention 2: pressing him to conclude)
- Line 342-346 emotionally appeals for the Speaker's sympathy
(House Speaker [Chalermphol Sanitwongchai (NAP)]'s intervention continues)
- Line 347-361 aggressively argues against the Speaker's verdict saying that he has legitimacy to speak
(Challenge 2: Chingchai Mongkoltham (NAP) protests that Suthep no longer has legitimacy to speak now that he is no longer minister)
(House Speaker [Chalermphol Sanitwongchai (NAP)]'s intervention: asks him to be precise)
- Line 362-370 asks the Speaker's permission to answer each accusation starting with an accusation from Banharn
- Line 371-376 repeats the allegation that he lured Major General Chaowalit to sign the project
- Line 376-382 argues that the project is useful because it can solve many people's problem of being deprived of their land in order to preserve the forest
- Line 382-397 accuses the previous government of attempting to withdraw the forest preservation area, to make it a *no so 3* area
(Challenge 3: Seksan Saenphum (CTP) protests that Suthep has no right to give speech)
(Challenge 4: Pinit Jantasurin (CTP) same point)
(Challenge 5: Sawai Pattano (DP) protests against the Speaker's verdict saying that Suthep should be able to speak)
(Challenge 6: Banharn Silpa-archa (CTP) suggests that Suthep should answer many allegations at a time in order to save time)
(Challenge 7: Pichet Panwichatkun (DP) requests MPs to give Suthep a chance to speak for himself)
- Line 400-401 says that he will obey whatever the Speaker says
(Challenge 8: Santi Chaiwirattana (SP) argues on Suthep's behalf)
- Line 402-406 says that he is trying his best to be precise
- Line 407-410 acknowledges the Speaker's mercy in allowing him to speak
- Line 410-411 repeats the allegation that he manipulated his power for the benefit of his cronies
- Line 412-437 explains that there are many people in the committee so the decision came from the entire committee, not just himself
- Line 437-440 says that it was the decision of the ministry to have MPs in the committee
(Challenge 9: Thirawat Siriwanasan (SAP) asking for the list of committee members)
- Line 441-447 continues to explain that the resolution came from the entire committee
(Challenge 10: Thirawat Siriwanasan (SAP) asking whether there is SAP MP on the committee)
- Line 448-451 in response to the challenge, saying that he will provide documentary evidence later on
- Line 452-458 explains that in order to verify qualification for *so po ko 4-01*, the beneficiary has to provide official documents
(Challenge 11: Thirawat Siriwanasan (SAP) accuses Suthep of telling a lie when he said that every party is involved in the committee)
- Line 459-464 says that Pairat Nuchit is one of the committee from SAP
(Challenge 12: Pairat Nuchit (SAP) says that he has never received any written appointment to be in the committee)

- Line 465-470 says that Pairat does not know of the appointment because there has been no verification for the committee to do yet
- Line 470-476 continues to explain what he means by official document
(Challenge 13: Pairat Nuchit (SAP) argues that if he was really appointed, he should have received a written appointment)
- Line 477-479 says that whether the person is entitled to *so po ko* is a decision of the entire committee
- Line 479-488 says that the minister's resolution is actually well thought out and therefore not a rush
- Line 489-490 repeats the allegation that he forced the Department of Land to distribute *so po ko*
- Line 491-498 says that he did not force them and that the project has operated according to procedure
- Line 498-506 says that he did not favour his cronies
- Line 507-528 explains that the fact that Damrong Thuaksuban, his cousin got the *so po ko* had nothing to do with him and says that in fact many people in the province are all relatives
- Line 529-532 says that he became involved in the project through a good intention of helping people regardless of whether or not they were his relatives
- Line 533-541 explains that the committee has their own free will and he could not lead them to do whatever he liked
- Line 542-546 uses a case of durian farmer to elaborate that he had had to change the period of occupation to help these farmers
- Line 546-553 says that the committee comes from many Ministries
- Line 553-557 says that the opposition should not insult the committee's judgement
- Line 557-561 repeats an allegation that the Democrats used the land reform project to campaign for the leader of their party, Chuan, to be the prime minister
- Line 561-566 argues that it is a normal practice that, during a campaign, a party would declare its policy
- Line 566-572 acknowledges the grievances of Surathani people who have had their land taken away
- Line 572-576 says that his party aims to solve people's problem
- Line 576-581 accusing Ministry of Finance and Treasury Department of being indifferent of the people's grievances
- Line 581-586 says that the resolution is based on reason and that the committee cannot be lobbied
- Line 586-604 says that Damrong Thuaksuban is indeed his relative but he has nothing to do with Damrong's qualifying for *so po ko*
- Line 605-635 adds that the area where Damrong has *so po ko* will not become *no so 3* anyway
- Line 635-666 clarifies himself that he did not help his cronies because he did not even know who actually entitled to *so po ko* in the first place
- Line 666-670 explains that the project is administered with careful consideration
- Line 671-676 says that we should sympathise with the officials who are responsible for this project because no one has any intention to commit corruption
4. Conclusion
- Line 676-683 expresses his intention to conform to the code of behaviour and that he is concerned for other people therefore he will end here even though there are still many allegations he would like to refute

● **Kanjana Silpa-archa's speech, Wednesday 18 September 1996. (Chapter 7)**

1. Ritual beginning
Line 1-2 self-introduction

- Line 2 asks for permission to speak
- Line 5-10 reasons why she is grateful for the Speaker's permission
2. Defence
- Line 10-12 introduces the map of her land
- Line 12-22 reasons why she purchased the land
- Line 22-23 clarifies that she was working at the time of purchase.
- Line 27-32 describes the purchasing process according to chronological order
- Line 32-39 describes the aspect of the land she bought
- Line 40-54 explains that she had bought the land before Banharn became the minister of finance
- Line 54-62 says that it was the condition before the purchase that the seller would pay tax
- Line 62-82 says that she has no intention of reporting the false value of the land
- Line 82-94 explains why she didn't clarify the accusation earlier
- Line 95-102 explains why *khunying* Jamsai had to act as a purchaser
- Line 102-108 explains why there was no contract for her loan
- Line 109-118 gives the exact amount of her loan and states that there was a contract
- Line 118-137 explains that she sold the land to the BOT because there were no other prospective buyers and emphasises that Banharn was not the minister then
- Line 137-144 explains why she sold her land with other land owners
- Line 144-153 expresses her worries then that the BOT might not buy her land
- Line 153-170 says that she had problems repaying her loan
- Line 170-187 explains that the reason why *khunying* Jamsai went to the BOT is because she had to negotiate with other owners to lower their asking price
- Line 188-208 says that it is not as easy as the opposition suggested to manipulate the committee because it consisted of many respectable people
- Line 208-216 names the external auditors who were also involved in the BOT purchase
- Line 216-230 explains why the BOT paid her first payment with many cheques
- Line 230-240 explains the method of payment of the remaining balance
- Line 241-245 explains why tax was paid with three cheques
- Line 245-251 says that she paid business tax on time
- Line 252-258 explains why she paid her tax at Bangplad district
- Line 259-269 says that she used one of the payment cheques to buy a cashier cheque to pay for her income tax
- Line 269-275 says that her land was not overpriced
- Line 275-295 restates the amount of money she got from the sale and the amount of her net profit
- Line 296-298 says that the net profit is not considered a good payoff compared to other businesses
- Line 298-305 retaliates with the fact that it was then the Democrats who were responsible for the Ministry of Finance
- Line 305-320 explains why she said earlier that the land belonged to her mother, *khunying* Jamsai
3. Conclusion
- Line 320-327 says that she was only doing business but got defamed by the opposition for political purposes to attack her father, Banharn Silpa-archa
- Line 327- 333 says that Banharn has offered to defend this issue on her behalf but she could not let him do it

APPENDIX 3

House of Representatives

4 January 1995

Issue Proposal for a debate to pass the vote of no-confidence in the Coalition
The House Speaker

As it has been apparent that the Government led by H.E. Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai has administered the country ineffectively, lack of knowledge, reflecting faculty and righteousness causing damage to the public administration. Therefore the Government should no longer be in office.

I, whose names attached at the end of this letter, see that letting the Government stay in office would bring the country devastation and would destroy public faith in the Democratic system. Consequently, being aware of our duty and responsibility as MPs that the public entrusted in us, we would like to claim our right according to article 150 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand BE 2534 propose a motion in passing the vote of no-confidence against the entire Coalition.

Rationale and other details will be declared and explained during the session.

We would like to ask for the Speaker's mercy to please proceed with the motion according to the procedure stated in the Constitution.

Your Grateful
Banharn Silpa-archa
Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives
Leader of Chart Thai Party

APPENDIX 4

House of Representatives
Uthong Nai Road Dusit BKK. 10300

20 August 1996

Issue Proposal for a debate to pass the vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand BE. 2534

The House Speaker

As it has been generally acknowledge that the Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa has administered the country with lack of knowledge, ability, efficiency, productivity, vision, reflecting faculty, moral, ethics, leadership, having dwindling and selfish behaviour, refuse responsibility, dishonoured, conspiring with Ministers and cronies to exploit offices and power in search of unlawful benefits, ignoring corruption, concerning about his own living than that of the country, committing illegal practices, not complying with the policy declared to the House, intentionally limiting people's access to information, forcing the media to write one-sided news in order to cover up his wickedness and that of the Government. The behaviour mentioned causes devastating damage to the country both in the country's administration, foreign affairs, politics, economics, society and ethics.

According to the above reasons, we, whose name attached at the end of this proposal, agreed that Banharn has completely lost his legitimacy to be a Prime Minister and if he is allowed to stay in office, there will be an enormous damage to the country perpetually especially damage caused to our democratic system.

Your Grateful
Chuan Leekpai
Leader of the Opposition Parties
Leader of the Democrat Party