Media - Government Interactions and Foreign Policy

A Rational Choice Approach to the Media's Impact on Political Decision -Making and the Paradigm of the Greek - Turkish conflict

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Abstract

The thesis provides a systematic understanding of the media- government relationship in the conduct of foreign policy and a rigorous approach of the media's role and impact on decision – making processes. It particularly covers a deficiency in the existing literature, with regard to the media's potential to influence decision outcomes and cause policy changes. The thesis is a theory-based investigation while a case study is employed for illustration purposes.

The thesis approaches the media within the context of an interaction with the government that reflects a complex interconnection of the media and politicians' decisions and is here explored with the employment of rational choice and game theory. The thesis develops a game - theoretic model, which identifies the media as a purposeful actor rather than a mere instrument in the hands of politicians; and provides a rigorous interpretation of the media - government relationship as one between two profit – maximising actors. It examines the payoffs and costs entailed in their decisions within this interaction, and concentrates on the potential influence that media decisions have on the government's payoffs.

In this model, the media influence is conceptualised as an outcome of their ability to frame information according to their self-interests, which are tied to their organisational structure and lead to the production of audience - driven news stories. With the introduction of framing theory the thesis demonstrates the power inherent in the media's content to affect the recipient's perception of a given situation; and with the aid of prospect theory, it incorporates media frames into the decision-making process and exhibits their potential implications on perceptions of the risk entailed in political decision - making. The model develops a strategic cause – effect relationship between media frames and governmental decisions that is applied to and tested through the press coverage of two Greek – Turkish territorial crises. The investigation of the two events within the game – theoretic framework draws upon the media's power to create conditions of domestic/national cost for the government that can trigger apparently irrational and risky decisions. The findings suggest a strategic media impact on decision-making processes and highlight the media's role as an actor plausible to affect decision outcomes and cause policy changes independent of the policy at hand.

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Introduction

'The media today are indeed part of the policy process... but the government has also become part of the media process' (O'Heffernan, 1991: 82). The observation of Patrick O'Heffernan encapsulates the wider interconnection and interdependence between the media, the government and the political process. The media have admittedly turned into central components in politics in democratic states impinging on both the areas of domestic and foreign affairs. This thesis is primarily concerned with the latter and reflects an attempt to provide a better understanding of the media's power to generate effects on policymaking processes. The thesis approaches the media within the context of their relationship with the government and seeks to highlight their influence and significance in foreign policymaking processes by exhibiting the weight that governments themselves accord to the media when planning policies. Although this observation has already been discussed in the literature, the present thesis provides a more systematic demonstration of the media's involvement in the governmental decision-making.

The search for a systematic framework, within which to locate and explore the media's behaviour and influence in relation to foreign policy, is driven by a primary deficiency with regard to their role in the process of foreign policymaking, as opposed to the process of domestic politics. There is a certain degree of dissimilarity between the media-government interaction in the areas of domestic and foreign affairs that can result in different media effects and is where the thesis places the emphasis on. There is actually a degree of uncertainty in the reporting of foreign affairs that concerns both the officials and the media. On the one hand, an example offered by Leon Sigal is that international politics complicates the tactical use of the media by officials. Officials in one government might rely on the media as a source of information, which might make officials in another government use the news as a medium to transmit information to them. But at the same time, the media might also be used as channels of 'disinformation' and for misleading purposes, which would ultimately increase the uncertainty inherent in the media's use as channels and sources of information (Sigal, 1973: 151). On the other hand, journalists are also faced with more complicated newsgathering procedures for the coverage of foreign affairs. The fewer available sources, the lack of knowledge about specific international events and therefore the greater complexity in producing in depth analyses would ultimately add to the uncertainty in their job as well. With both officials and the media acknowledging this uncertainty, their interaction becomes more complex

and less straightforward than the dynamic relationship and interdependence they share in the domain of domestic politics. In the coverage of foreign affairs both officials and the media need to adjust their roles to circumstances and parameters that affect their stakes but have been left largely unexplored. For the officials, such parameters involve the coordination of the national and international interests and the risk that governments run in a foreign policy case; and for the journalists, it is the interrelation of the media's economic interests and motivations with their roles as guardians of the country's national interest that defines their action and impact on the making of foreign policy.

These are dynamics that increase the complexity in understanding the media – politicians' interaction and the degree of media influence on governmental decisions; yet, they have received insufficient consideration so far. The objective of the thesis lies in identifying a different dimension of the media- politicians' interaction by closely looking into the forces that shape this interaction in the arena of foreign policy and how they result in a more radical media role and impact than the one identified in the literature so far.

The media-foreign policy relationship

Patrick O'Heffernan has focused on the daily, complex, multilevel transactions that occur between the media and politicians as an aspect of the media's behaviour that needs to be comprehended in order to analyse today's media-foreign policy relationship (1991: 82). His 'insider model' incorporates the significance of the media's own motivations and interests that have turned the media-politicians' relationship into a co-evolution. In this, the media develop as actors whose role expands much further than their mere tactical use by politicians. O'Heffernan highlighted these motivations as a driving force in the media's role as independent entities that resembled policy agencies in the sense that news production was the outcome of a number of interactions among individuals and institutions, which aimed at meeting self-interests (1991: 82). He therefore drew upon the media's purposeful action creating scope for the present thesis to elaborate on this action and on how it shapes the media-politicians' relationship in the domain of foreign policy; more importantly, how the relationship itself grows to be significantly more complicated than the existing literature suggests.

The main research gap that the thesis aims at covering lies in the actual media role in and impact on the foreign policy process. Despite the attention given to the media's potential to affect foreign policy decisions, their involvement is still confined to a largely instrumental role and more importantly, one that influences the process of decision-making, rather than the decision outcomes. The study of the media in the conduct of diplomacy (Gilboa, 2002; Cohen, 1986; Davison, 1974), in conflict situations (Wolfsfeld, 1997; Seib, 1992; Hallin, 1986) and humanitarian interventions (Gilboa, 2002; Robinson, 2001; Livingston, 1997) demonstrates fully the media's participation in the making of foreign policy but leaves an obvious deficit of evidence with regard to their ability to influence political outcomes. Hence, a primary objective of this thesis is to uncover the media's power to influence the making of foreign policy to the extent of affecting decision outcomes and even causing policy changes. And for the achievement of this end, a better understanding of the media – government interaction is required in order to shed light on the complexities that the media's relationship with politicians incorporates and to ultimately define their impact on decision outcomes.

An additional deficiency in the existing literature lies in the absence of a 'compound' media role and impact, one that recognises dimensions of the media's role as an actor that is constantly present and is constantly likely to affect decision-making processes, independent of the contextual factors that are adjacent to a given situation. The existing literature provides a framework that identifies the media's role in the foreign policy process as a conditional one that is tied to and dependent on specific parameters. These parameters can function as a starting point for the setting of hypotheses, which the present thesis will attempt to test, verify or disprove; and based on which it will create a more accurate profile of the media's role in its interaction with the government in the conduct of foreign policy.

Such parameters are firstly related to geographical limitations, which are reflected in the respective political systems as well. With the largest part of the research having focused on the US media, a question that emerges is to what extent the media's potential to influence decision – making processes, depends on the geographical and political context within which a media organisation operates. In response to this question, the thesis employs a different example, the conflict between two traditional enemies, Greece and Turkey. The conflict unravels within a geographical, political and social context that

differs from the cases studied so far; and it features two media- government interactions different from the relations between the US media and the respective administration. It therefore aims at identifying the existence of elements that the specific example embodies and that permit or prohibit a potential media impact on the policies of the two countries. And most important, it is essential to identify a) whether the Greek – Turkish case reproduces the same conditions that permit - or prevent - media effects as in the cases the existing literature features, b) whether it invokes new circumstances on which the media influence decision outcomes and if so c) whether these new circumstances are characteristic solely of the Greek – Turkish conflict or can apply to other cases as well.

Secondly, the existing literature suggests that media effects depend on conditions related to official policies and governmental decisiveness. The CNN Effect debate recognises policy uncertainty as a pre-requisite for media effects to take place; while in situations of conflict Hallin (1986) and Wolfsfeld (1997) rule out any media influence in circumstances of elite consensus and governmental agreement on a single political frame, with regard to the conflict at hand. The example of the Greek-Turkish conflict will be investigated in two individual crises that occurred within a span of nine years and offer two diverse policy contexts within which the respective media operated. The two crises can therefore provide scope for the study of the media within policy variations in the same two countries. These variations will allow for comparisons that may offer a more accurate identification of whether specific policy conditions are required for media effects to occur and if so, what the nature of these conditions is. Moreover, the crises would also reflect the changes and developments that occurred in the media-government relations in Greece and Turkey within those nine years. A possible correlation of different media systems with different media effects will also contribute in identifying whether a media impact can only take within specified contextual conditions or not.

Thirdly, the media's influence on the making of foreign policy has been largely explored and demonstrated through interviewing foreign policy officials, while in relatively few cases has the foreign policy process been investigated closely with the media content. The thesis seeks to identify the media's potential to produce effects on decision

outcomes through an examination of their content and particularly the frames they employ in pursuit of their self-interests and motivations.

Hence, in relation to the existing literature and in response to the limitations mentioned here, the present thesis firstly seeks to offer a better understanding of the complexities embodied in the media- politicians interaction, in the domain of foreign policy. Secondly, it seeks to explore and demonstrate the media's profile as an actor that operates based on own motivations and self-interests and becomes integrated in the decision-making processes independent of contextual parameters. These are the two main objectives that will be tackled with the development of a new theoretical framework that locates the media in the domain of foreign policy and particularly in situations of conflict as a strategic actor. Within this framework, the thesis sets new hypotheses that will guide the investigation.

Theoretical objectives and questions

The inquiry of the thesis is primarily a theoretical one and its contribution lies in providing a detailed and as rigorous as possible an explanation of the media-government interaction. The thesis seeks to develop a new media-government interaction theoretical model that offers insight into the complexities embodied in this interaction and highlights some new dimensions of the media's potential to influence decision outcomes. The thesis employs the paradigm of the Greek – Turkish conflict as a case study that serves illustration purposes and functions as a foundation for the application and evaluation of the theory.

A more detailed and thorough analysis of the media-government interaction in the area of foreign policy is attained firstly by locating and examining the media in a rigorous political context of decision-making. Such a context can be introduced with the process of bargaining and negotiations in conflict situations. Precisely, it is the process of bargaining that offers a new ground for the examination of media roles and the investigation of their effects on political outcomes. With the exchange of information being a vital process of bargaining situations, the media's role as sources of information automatically acquires a new dimension. Lockhart describes the root of bargaining as a series of three processes: information interpretation, decision-making among constraints and search for a satisfactory strategy (1979:86). These processes can ultimately set the

basis for the development of a rigorous and consistent theoretical framework that will bring out different aspects of the media roles and will highlight what I describe in this thesis as a 'strategic' impact in the conduct of foreign policy. The assumption here is that the media cannot only supply information to the involved parties, but they can also frame it in ways that reduce or increase uncertainty, modify belief systems and even manipulate information.

The 'novelty' of such a framework and the idea of the strategic impact lies in the 'borrowing' of a theory rooted traditionally in Economics, namely Rational Choice and Game Theory. Game theory in particular, has been selected for providing an analytical tool for the investigation of interactions among players and is therefore expected to offer a thorough explanation of the interaction between the media and the government. The employment of the theory aims at overcoming the existing gap with regards to the media's power to affect decisions and political outcomes. It does so by exploring their behaviour as a domestic constituent that interacts with other 'players' and behaves according to own motivations and interests; and particularly by placing the media in the decision-making process and in a strategic interaction with the government in which both actors are after the maximisation of their own profit.

The model focuses on media and politicians' decisions as the outcomes of strategic planning and of their desire to maximise their benefit. The objective is to define a) the extent to which the media frame situations according to profit maximisation and more importantly, b) the way in which this affects the government, which also aims to maximise its own payoff. Approaching the media-government interaction as one that evolves around profit-maximisation helps in identifying points at which the decisions of one player may affect the payoff of the other; and in this context the media's impact on the government's decisions could be hidden in a subtle, unseen influence that a decision made by the media can have on the government's payoff. Therefore, through this interaction, the aim is to investigate a) if and to what extent the government's decisions can be associated with and affected by the media frames, b) if and to what extent it is sensible to expect that the government will ultimately respond to the media by adjusting its decisions to their frames and c) if and to what extent the model itself provides a realistic explanation of the media's role and influence on decision-making processes. Consequently, the model should be able to demonstrate whether the media can be

perceived as strategic actors in theory and whether the game-theoretic approach can explain the media-government interaction in a realistic manner.

Once the above theoretical questions are answered, a profile of the media as an actor in decision-making processes will be created, addressing their power to involve in and affect political decision-making processes. This profile is completed with two complementary theories, framing theory and prospect theory. The two theories are associated with the power embedded in the media content to affect policy decisions, which as mentioned earlier, has not received much attention so far. The assumption made here is that the media's strategic role and impact on the making of foreign policy is largely a resultant of their ability to convey news and information through specific frames, which journalists define according to their own motivations; and a resultant of the implications that such frames have on the perceptions of individuals about a given situation, i.e. an international conflict.

The power the media's content can enclose is therefore examined through the theory of frames, focusing on the media's control over a process of selection that concerns not just the stories that become news but also the aspects of the story that journalists choose to elevate in salience. This power is associated with the implications that the process of framing information in general may have on the perception of the receiver about a given situation, particularly in terms of decision-making processes. The thesis demonstrates how similar implications can stem from media frames as well, by linking the process of media framing with the psychological aspect of framing and its impact on perceptions and decision-making. For this purpose, the thesis introduces prospect theory in an effort to identify the stages in the decision-making process in which media frames could transform into sources of influence on individuals. The objective is to identify a mechanism of media influence on perceptions of risk in particular and how this can cause decision changes. The main idea is to understand a) the extent to which the selection of frames in the shaping and crafting of news relates to an alleged media power to influence perceptions and b) the impact that media content is likely to have particularly on the perceptions of the public, which comprises a key component in the process through which the media may affect politicians. Although this is not the first time that the media-audience relationship has been tackled, here the objective is to provide a

cause-effect relationship that is supported by a valid theoretical framework, provided by prospect theory.

A logical question to follow is concerned with the way in which governments also perceive the media frames and the extent to which frames could equally influence their perception and their policy decisions. If prospect theory can help justify the impact of media framing on individuals' perception of a given political situation, would that automatically justify an equally decisive impact on politician's perception as well? The thesis suggests that media frames do not have to alter officials' perceptions to influence their decisions. Their effect on audiences alone provides a powerful component for the development of a theoretical model that highlights the power inherent in the media's content. The cause-effect relationship of media frames and recipients of these frames will then be located in the game-theoretic model that will provide a clear and accurate view of the government's understanding of and reaction to the media content. The game-theoretic approach will help conduct an analysis that does not simply investigate the reaction of governments to frames but also their conception of frames as part of a multifaceted media behaviour shaped by their motivations and interests and of course by their interaction with the audience as well. As a result of the above, the model will define the role of the media as a strategic actor and the process through which the interactions that develop among the different components of this model can bring about media effects and policy changes.

The validity of the model will be tested empirically with its application on the press coverage of the two Greek-Turkish territorial crises and the investigation of the media-government interaction through the prism of the respective countries and crises. The two crises represent suitable bargaining examples, ideal for decision-making analysis since they offer scope for investigation and evaluation of decisions with reference to the players' stakes, expected gains and risks. They are therefore expected to provide an apt case for the investigation of the relevance of the media coverage in the governmental decisions, based on the hypotheses developed in the theoretical chapters.

This empirical material, which consists of the game-theoretic analysis of the two crises and the content analysis of the press coverage, is put together and analysed through a correlation between the media framing the crises received and the moves and decisions

the two governments made. The objective is to identify whether the two elements are interconnected in a way that corresponds to the media-government interaction described in the theoretical part. On the basis of this empirical data, the thesis interprets the media-politicians' interaction developed in the two crises based on the game-theoretic framework. It also addresses the media's power to affect decision-making in a strategic manner and the degree in which the game- theoretic model represents a realistic approach to the media's role in foreign policy and conflict situations. As the findings suggest, the game theoretic approach sheds light on the dimensions of the media's action as purposeful players and on the subtle effect this action has on their interaction with the government. Their framing procedure is systematically analysed as part of the decision-making process bringing to light their power to impose a domestic, or else, audience cost on the government by forcing them into strategically 'irrational' decisions. The approach ultimately demonstrates their capacity to influence not just the policy process but the policy outcomes as well.

Overview of the thesis

The discussion over the media-foreign policy relationship begins with a literature review of existing theories and debates with regard to the media's role in the making of foreign policy. Chapter one presents a model of the media-politicians relationship, which reflects a systematisation of the various elements that compose and explain the function of this relationship. The relationship is discussed basically in the context of domestic politics; and of foreign policy but from a rather general standpoint at first. The chapter continues with examining specific areas of foreign policy in order to identify the degree in which the model of the media-politicians relationship is being reproduced. The main objective of the chapter is to provide a theoretical background of the media's role in the domain of foreign policy, which locates the thesis within a broader framework of the literature. It also identifies the deficiencies in the existing theories, with regard to the media's impact on the making of foreign policy that the thesis will seek to overcome.

Chapter two introduces a more specific discussion of the media's roles, focusing particularly on their role as a political actor. The example of the political institution serves in providing one of the most detailed descriptions of the media's active role in the policymaking process. The discussion draws upon the degree of media independence from the state and the impact it has on the selection and crafting of news stories, as an

indicator of the media's power to define what news is and the implications of this process on political decision-making. It is particularly this process of media selectivity the chapter tackles and introduces the theory of frames as a more efficient way to explain the shaping of news frames and their implications on the recipient. Framing theory is explained in relation to prospect theory, which emphasises the implications of frames particularly on decision-making processes.

Prospect theory is discussed mainly within the context of politics and international relations and with reference to historical examples that have demonstrated the crucial role of framing in decision-making processes. By connecting these two approaches, the chapter aims to offer a methodical interpretation of the impact that frames can exert on recipients, especially during processes of decision-making. The concept of public opinion is also introduced as a linking point between media frames and decision-makers that helps in creating a cause-effect relationship between the media and politicians. The chapter reflects the first stage in the formulation of the wider theoretical model of the strategic media-government interaction that is completed in chapter three.

Chapter three introduces the leading theories in this thesis, *Rational Choice and Game Theory*; and offers a justification for the selection of the specific theories stressing the advantages for the investigation of the media-government interaction within the context of a conflict situation. It proceeds with explaining the function of political interactions, i.e. conflicts, as games and employs the example of the Cuban Missiles Crisis as a demonstration of the political game. One of the chapter's purposes is to introduce the concepts, terminology and procedures that will be employed in the development of the game-theoretic model and the investigation of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The introduction of the concept of games in multiple arenas and the merging with the concepts discussed in chapter two leads to the formulation of a 'nested game' that represents the media-government interaction and embodies the media's strategic role and impact in decision – making processes.

Chapter four continues with the analysis of the research design and the methodology the thesis will employ for the investigation of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Having already discussed and demonstrated the theoretical part in chapters two and three, chapter four introduces the method of case study as an instrument for combining and applying the

theory to the empirical cases as well as the process through which research questions are formed and answered and hypotheses are proved or disproved.

Following the description of the research design and methodology, chapter five introduces the historical background of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The chapter describes the political, social and cultural context within which the two territorial crises were escalated and resolved; as well as the position that the media hold in the Greek and Turkish socio-political environment, focusing on the relationship that journalists and government share in the two countries. It also presents a chronology of the events and the coverage they attracted by the Greek- Turkish press. Chapter five provides the information that shapes the foundation on which the game-theoretic analysis of the crises and the press coverage will be built and prepares the ground for the strategic analysis of the media-government relationship in the two Greek-Turkish crises. Chapter six reflects an attempt to put the theory into practice and demonstrates how the strategic media role becomes a reality, through the press coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Chapter six is followed by a discussion and final remarks on the strategic nature of the media-government relationship and the media's power to shape official decisions in the making of foreign policy. The thesis concludes emphasising the contribution of this research in the understanding of the relationship between media and the government and the media's strategic input in the making of foreign policy.

1 Media - Government Relationships and the Reporting of Foreign Policy

1.1 Introduction

'The making of foreign policy begins with the gathering and interpreting of information about international affairs - with the media having an obvious function' (Cohen, 1986: 9).

The statement of Yoel Cohen indicates the indispensable role of information and communication in the shaping of foreign policy that would ultimately render the media's function equally vital. The objective of the present chapter is to provide a critical discussion of the dominant theories and approaches of the media's function in the domain of foreign policy. This will assist in providing a clearer identification and understanding of the goals the thesis aims to achieve and the research gaps it aims to overcome.

The reporting of politics and the influence it can exert on political outcomes can be understood as a resultant of a relationship the media develop with the government. The significance of the relationship lies in the exchange of information that occurs between the two sides and that serves their publicity interests, and in the 'competition' between media and politicians over the construction of news and the selection of the political problems and issues to be promoted publicly (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Within this context, the media's power to influence the political process depends on the government's dependency on the media for the achievement of publicity. It is therefore understandable that the discussion of the media's function in foreign policy in the literature unravels within the framework of the media's interaction with officials, which ultimately defines the degree of influence the media exert on the shaping of foreign policy. Within this framework, the media's role is examined in terms of its employment and use as a political instrument; in terms of it's increasing power due to the constant development of communications technologies and through its relation to and impact on the public's perception of foreign affairs. The different approaches indicate the development of competing hypotheses with regard to the media's impact on the foreign policy process and create scope for further investigation.

The present chapter is organised in two parts. The first part presents the three models available in the literature with regard to the nature of the relationship between the media and the government. The discussion serves in providing an introduction of the constituents that tie the media with politicians in the reporting of politics and which help in the understanding of the development of the media's function in the political process. It will describe the media-politicians relationship manifested as a symbiotic, an adversarial and a dynamic one, explain their advantages and weaknesses and reach the conclusion that to conceptualise the media-politicians relationship as a complex one that involves cooperation and conflict appears to be the most realistic approach.

Aspects of this relationship will then be reflected in the second part and the discussion of the media's role in foreign policy putting together the media's profile as a player in the shaping of foreign policy. The discussion will start off with some general theories of the construction of foreign news as an outcome of the media's interaction with politicians and the way in which this interaction defines the media's role as a participant in the making of foreign policy. The studies of Bernard Cohen and Robert Berry of the gathering and reporting of foreign news provide in this case some general observations about the media's interaction with officials in the conduct of foreign policy; while Patrick O'Heffernan provides a more systematic model of this interaction and brings in the media's own interests and motivations as a fundamental factor in their relationship with officials and in the construction and dissemination of news. The relationship between the media and politicians is here a starting point to present the way it develops in the area of foreign policy. It is through this relationship that the media's influence on foreign policy emerges.

The discussion will proceed with more specific examples and aspects of foreign policy in which the media's impact has been studied. Section 1.3.2 presents the concept of media diplomacy highlighting the media's role as a diplomatic instrument and its contribution to the conduct of diplomacy. Particular attention is paid to the role of advanced communication technologies and the drastic changes they have brought in foreign policy decision-making. In section 1.3.3 the discussion draws upon the study of the media particularly in conflict situations as another aspect of the diplomatic process. The section explains the media's potential to produce policy changes, defined within their relationship with the government and in relation to the degree of political control in the

hands of politicians during a crisis. The last section presents the media coverage of humanitarian crises as a more exclusive form of conflict situations. The section introduces the CNN Effect debate and underlines the significant changes brought about by real-time coverage in the reporting of crises, as well as the media's power to cause policy changes under the pressure imposed on politicians through the exposure of the public to humanitarian crises. The chapter will close with an attempt to identify the deficiencies of the discussed approaches, which the thesis will seek to overcome.

1.2 Media and Politicians

The relationship between the media and politicians becomes important for the reason that it reflects a media-source balance that helps conceptualise the role of the media in the process of policy formation and their impact on political outcomes. In this section, I will present three available models of the media-politicians interaction: the adversary model, the exchange or symbiosis model and the dynamic relationship model. The third model will be discussed with reference to Blumler & Gurevitch's (1995) expanded framework. The processes, objectives and interactions encompassed in the relationship as reflected in these models determine the various dimensions of the media's role in the political process and more specifically in the making of foreign policy.

The adversarial relationship between politicians and journalists is rooted in the opposing objectives the two parties pursue within the political communication realm. On the one hand, politicians aim at maximising their voters and would therefore want to influence the information disseminated by the media in order to promote desirable situations and definitions. On the other hand, journalists aim at maximising their audience by pursuing newsworthy stories that attract the public's attention. As Doris Graber notes, 'This often means prying into conflict, controversy or ordinary wheeling and dealing –matters that government officials would like to keep quiet' (2002: 272). Within this framework, the media acquire the role of the watchdog protecting the public from governmental manipulation and keeping politicians accountable. However, as Blumler and Gurevitch argue, the adversarial model is narrow and fails to provide a normative guide to journalists' behaviour towards their sources. It actually appears to include no regulations for instances about the access rights of government spokespersons and critics or willingness to offer praise where it is appropriate. It also fails to acknowledge the amount of cooperation between the media and the government. Moreover, given that to produce

political messages a collaborative interaction is essential, it is impossible for mutually adversarial positions to maintain (1995: 28-29).

The exchange model appears to overcome the above weaknesses focusing on precisely that interdependence, which is built upon the common interests of journalists and politicians in the construction of the news and the advantage that each side expects to gain through the cooperation with the other. The model draws upon the mutual benefits the two sides gain from political reporting. Also, as Blumler and Gurevitch state, 'the model seems more sensitive to the fluid nuances of the political advocate-professional communicator relationship' (1995: 30). It manages to explain the variations in the degree of cooperation between the two sides, which increases or declines according to the respective benefits inherent. However, for Blumler and Gurevitch, the exchange model suffers from weaknesses as well since it appears to overstress the personal and informal relationship between media and politicians neglecting the regularities and structure it embodies and therefore rendering the relationship unpredictable. At the same time, it fails to mention the rules, which define what is acceptable and what is not in this exchange relationship (1995: 30-31).

The assertion takes us to the third model that describes the media-politicians relationship as a dynamic one. This model has been discussed by Dan Berkowitz (1992), who suggests that role theory can provide a more accurate approach of the relationship. The focal point in this case is a common culture the two parties share, formed basically by their social environment. On the one hand, the roles of the media are largely defined by forces, such as the norms of the journalistic profession or the media organisation (1992:93). On the other hand policymakers too are influenced by political parties they belong to, or by ideological functions (1992:94), based on which they develop respective roles. With defending the role theory, Berkowitz does not negate the cooperative or adversarial nature of the media-politicians relationship. He suggests a rather dynamic relationship that can be both cooperative and adversarial always depending on specific conditions of the interaction.

Berkowitz's suggestion is more explicitly explained through Blumler and Gurevitch's 'expanded framework' (1995). The authors suggest an interaction between two sets of mutually dependent actors that pursue opposing, yet overlapping objectives. Both sides

aim at realising certain objectives vis-à-vis the audience, for which a certain degree of cooperation and adaptation to each other's ways is required, without excluding some tension as well. The relationship of the two parties is also role regulated. On the one hand journalists gather and report news through specified daily routines. On the other hand, politicians operate within a government or department of state representing its interests and responding to the expectations of colleagues. At the same time, both actors are expected to behave according to certain roles towards each other and their behaviour is shaped by expectations of how each will behave towards the other. A vital consequence is that the authority of these roles not only does define the interaction and the degree of exchange between the two parties, but it also renders the relationship predictable.

This ultimately gives rise to a shared culture that defines how the two parties should behave towards each other. This culture may include criteria of objectivity and fairness in the coverage of politicians and political parties, as well as a number of news values that define what issues should be treated as newsworthy. It is also important to note that a shared culture often emerges through a process in which the two sides try to influence one another for their own benefit and also through controversies that might rise between the two actors.

The grounds of this shared culture are also open to conflicting interpretations that may give rise to agenda setting questions regarding who should determine which definition of political problems the public should think about; and responsibility questions with regard to the failure of political communication.[1] Conflicting interpretations entail potential disruption that is controlled by mechanisms of conflict management. These mechanisms may include hierarchically structured procedures for dealing with complaints about the violation of rules, forums for reviewing existing rules or even the establishment of institutions that would socialise the members of one party to the needs of the other (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995: 32-42).

[1] 'The process of political communication includes two sets of institutions- political and media organizations- which are involved in the course of message preparation in much 'horizontal' interaction with each other, while on a 'vertical' axis, they are separately and jointly engaged in disseminating and processing information and ideas to and from the mass citizenry'
Blumler & Gurevitch, (1995:12).

The dynamic relationship, and more specifically the expanded framework represent the most detailed and explicit approach to the media-politicians interaction. It encompasses the principle ideas of the exchange and adversarial model and draws upon the various interconnected constituents that tie the media with their sources in the reporting of politics. More precisely, the expanded framework reflects a media-government interaction that involves cooperation, conflict, mutual exploitation and mutual influence between the two actors. More importantly, it is a relationship that is constantly evolving and fluctuating according to a given situation, which creates scope for further investigation and identification of its implications in the wider political environment and political decision-making processes including the domain of foreign affairs. The media's role in the conduct of foreign policy has been studied within a similar framework and the existing theories represent aspects of this dynamic relationship between media and politicians. The studies discussed in the following sections offer an overview of the media's function in the making of foreign policy that demonstrates the various dimensions of the media-politicians interaction as described above. The studies are organised in terms of different foreign policy sections with each section providing a different viewpoint of this relationship.

1.3 Media and Foreign Policy

1.3.1 The Media- Politicians' Interaction in the domain of foreign policy

In this first section it is important to obtain an understanding of how the dynamic relationship between media and politicians as described above, manifests itself in the area of foreign policy. At this stage one might query whether and to what extent the media-politicians relationship develops differently in the domain of foreign policy than in the domain of domestic affairs. The specific question has been tackled by Nicholas Berry (1990), who emphasises the difficulties in accessing information sources and the limited knowledge of journalists about particular international events. This results in the greater dependency of journalists on what officials do and say and therefore in a limited effect of the media on the making of foreign policy. On this respect, Berry's argument contradicts the idea of the dynamic relationship described above and highlights the governmental use of the media for its own purposes. His observation lies in the press' inability to interpret and evaluate foreign policy initiatives in their early stages as it focuses mainly on getting the story and turning it into news. He claims that contrary to the reporting of domestic politics, in the coverage of foreign policy the press' task is to inform the public

and it becomes critical only when the foreign policy is at the stage when the outcome is known and is a failure. This is also the only case when the administration will seek to manage the news in an attempt to play down the loss and reduce the domestic cost (1990: xiii).

In order to support his hypothesis, Berry conducted a research of the American press coverage of the US policy actions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lebanon; and it is through a comparative analysis with Linksy's (1986) findings of the press coverage of domestic policy issues that he demonstrates the differences in the reporting of domestic and foreign affairs, and through which he highlights the media's dependency on officials. He calls the policymaking process a 'formulation stage' and in that media influences are diminished as the reporting remains in line with the official policy. Conversely, in what he describes as the 'outcome stage' reporters are in the position to evaluate the success or failure of policies abroad, they can produce more in depth analysis and provide opinions from opposition sources that could generate more critical and hostile coverage (1990: 140).

Berry's main argument lies in the fact that the press will become critical and question policies that appear uncertain because - within the role relationships it develops with the government - it expects some coherence from the administration in order to report foreign affairs. He cites the example of the media coverage of the Vietnam War stressing that when journalists reported on the failing U.S policy they did not aim at undermining the government's power or the soldiers' moral. The reporting was merely reflecting the divided officials and uncertain policies (1990: xiv-xv). He ultimately recognises a limited impact of the media in the foreign policymaking process as in all instances the press will await and accept the presidential decision. Its independent role in the foreign policymaking process is therefore minimal.

Berry's argument is however contradicted by one of the early and pioneering studies in the literature of the media and foreign policy that is Bernard Cohen's 'The Press and Foreign Policy'. Cohen draws upon a so-called 'symbiosis' between the media and their sources, a term that is primarily in line with the exchange model described in the previous section; and he addresses the question about 'the consequences for the foreign policy making environment, of the way the press defines and performs its job and

the way that its output is assimilated by the participants in the process' (Cohen, 1993: 4). The study tackles the issue of the role the media play in foreign policymaking and administration and identifies three media roles within the framework of their symbiosis with politicians: *the observer, the participant and the catalyst.* The argument Cohen makes is that the three roles define what the press does in the foreign policy-making process and help understand the implications of a press behaviour that the press is often unaware of (1993: 5).

This becomes most obvious in the explanation of the press' interaction with policymakers that develops on a give and take basis and renders the press a participant in the foreign policymaking process. Cohen describes the officials' contributions to the press through processes such as 'handouts' and formal statements, informal channels that keep the reporters informed about what is happening in crucial areas or even feeding information to newspapers about particular issues. He recognises that the incentive behind such contributions lies in achieving policy and personal promotion or even in testing the reaction to certain policy suggestions. However, in this discourse between officials and correspondents, 'the initiative often rests with the reporter; the official has to make the best of his opportunities to achieve the 'mix' of interests that seems reasonable to him' (1993: 206). This in combination with the information interpretation and analysis that officials can extract from the press turns the press into more than an observer in the foreign policymaking process. As Cohen puts it, drawing on the press' usefulness to foreign officials, it is also a political actor of tremendous consequence (1993: 268).

Cohen's analysis of the press' role in the foreign policymaking process is a rigorous one that addresses the determinants that shape the foreign policy coverage and the mechanisms through which this coverage is used by policymakers and ultimately has an impact on the processes of policymaking. However, he attributes the media's role as 'actors' mainly to their helpful cooperative role in a symbiosis with officials that looks reasonable given the minimal public interest in foreign policy at that time (O'Heffernan, 1991: 81); but this is an idea that refers to a rather instrumental role and provides no compelling understanding of the media's active participation in the foreign policy process.

The studies of Cohen and Berry proceed with analysis of the media's role in the process of foreign policymaking in terms of a media-government interaction that draws upon the efforts made by both actors to do their jobs. However, they represent two relatively contradictory and incoherent approaches to the media's role and impact on the process of foreign policy. On one hand, contrary to Cohen's argument about an actor of tremendous consequence, Berry does not recognise a media impact on the process of foreign policy. At the same time, even if Cohen himself refers to the media's role as a political actor, he does not provide sufficient evidence of an active and independent media role. In other words, both studies draw upon a media- politicians interaction that entails a certain degree of media dependency on the government and a rather limited impact on the making of foreign policy.

A third study that offers a systematic approach of the interaction between media and politicians in the domain of foreign policy is Patrick O' Heffernan's insider model of the media's role in American foreign policy (1991). O'Heffernan provides a model of the media-government relationship focusing on the roles the media play in the shaping of foreign policy as an outcome of this relationship. Particular emphasis is placed on the media's role and impact on the process of foreign policy as resultants of the media's own objectives and motivations. His theoretical framework manages to capture the media's integration in policy formation and their relationship with officials, as one that goes beyond the symbiotic, exchange or adversarial models and develops on the same lines as the expanded framework described in the previous section.

O'Heffernan's conception of the media- government relationship in the domain of foreign policy is one of co-evolution. This derives from the co-development of the worldwide US foreign policy and the global media industry that requires understanding the effect of various complex transactions and that incorporates a mutual exploitation between the two sides. What O'Heffernan aims at is demonstrating how it is not just the media that are part of the policy process but also the government has become part of the media process (1991: 82).

According to the insider model, the media operate inside the foreign policy process as a tool of the involved governmental players and they operate outside, as part of the environment, shaping policy. O'Heffernan refers to Graham Allison's study of foreign

policy process, 'Essence of Decision' and particularly to Allison's observation of the media acting as an observer with what O'Heffernan calls a 'diffused' input (1991:96). He therefore develops his model in contrast to Allison's theory and recognises the media's role both as an input to the shaping of foreign policy and an output that influences decision-making from the outside and according to their own interests.

The model is specified as follows: as an input, the media influence the making of foreign policy through processes such as supplying information, defining acceptable performance, drawing attention to particular goals and setting the pace and time for decision-making (1991: 98-99). In this case, the media operate as sources of information and lend themselves to the various players' uses. Therefore, their impact is mostly the outcome of the intentions of policy makers. As an output, some of the techniques the media operation includes are press conferences, leaks, background meetings, press briefing books etc. Contrary to their role as input, in this case media coverage is not necessarily the result of the policy makers' intentions. 'Media output by government requires the cooperation of a separate set of independent and powerful entities-newspapers, networks and wire services' (1991: 102). The significance of the role of the media as outside players lies in the insertion of their own bias in the final output, which renders the media not just a neutral communication channel. O'Heffernan identifies their influence on the foreign policy process as an outside one because it results from own motivations and is independent of the policies at hand. Most important, these motivations define the frames through which they present an issue; and given that such frames define the way in which the public perceives the issue as well, they ultimately influence policy making by defining the issues that have to be dealt with by governmental players.

The insiders' model integrates the media in the foreign policy process and reflects their interrelation with politicians in a more effective way. Contrary to Berry and Cohen's observations, it appears to identify an influence of the media on the foreign policy process; and it does so as an outcome not just of their employment as political tools but of their own incentives and interests as well. The insiders' model encompasses aspects of Blumler and Gurevitch's expanded framework in the foreign policy domain as it emphasises the mutual exploitation and influences between the two actors as well as the constantly evolving interaction between media and politicians. It also provides a

demonstration of more strategic aspects in the media-politicians interrelation and evidence that officials do take the media into consideration as an information input in their process of decision-making. It could be described as a more accurate and complete representation of the media-politicians' interaction in the foreign policy domain, when compared to Berry and Cohen's concepts. These three studies demonstrate an effort to identify the media's position in the making of foreign policy in relation to their relationship with the government. The following sections will discuss some of the key findings in the literature, and how the study of the media in the different areas of foreign policy develops within this framework of media-politicians interaction.

1.3.2 Media, Diplomacy and International negotiations

A considerable body of the literature is concerned with the media's role in the conduct of diplomacy and international negotiations. The study of the media within the context of diplomacy focuses a) on the instrumental employment of the media by policymakers for the achievement of diplomatic goals, leading to what has been described as media diplomacy (Gilboa, 2002; Cohen, 1986); and b) on the impact that media and communication technologies have on the way foreign policy is shaped. The present section will present an overview of the observations made in the literature with regard to the development of the media's role as a diplomatic instrument and its impact on the conduct of diplomacy and international negotiations.

The Media and the conduct of Diplomacy

The term 'diplomat' refers to foreign policy officers and other agencies concerned with foreign policy (Davison, 1974:175). As Suzanne Keller states, 'diplomats it is generally agreed, must do at least three things; 1) represent their countries in foreign countries; 2) inform their home offices about trends and conditions in countries to which they are assigned; and 3) negotiate international agreements' (1956: 176-177). These are three diplomatic missions that depend greatly on communication and the transmission of messages, impressions and interpretations from one party to the other. The formulation here is that in order to accomplish their missions and gain access to the political situation of a country, diplomats often use the information obtained from the local media. One of the early studies on media roles in the conduct of diplomacy and international negotiations was carried out by Phillips Davison (1974). In his article 'News Media and International Negotiation' he discusses the contribution that the press can make to international agreement, after having conducted a series of interviews with diplomats

and journalists in Washington, New York and Western Europe. Davison argues that the fact that negotiations in democratic countries are semi-public makes it hard to maintain a negative hypothesis about the media's role in such processes (1974: 178). Among the various ways in which the news media can facilitate the diplomatic process, Davison recognises how the media can offer a basis for negotiation among states by being employed by the government to find out whether other governments are interested in negotiating as well as by fostering informal negotiations (1974: 179). He also identifies the media's positive role in keeping agencies within a single government informed of each other's thinking and ensuring that diplomats are informed about the positions of their governments; as well as their function as a linkage between negotiators and the public and a communication channel for the exchange of diplomatic messages between states (1974: 181-184).

Davison does not overlook the negative implications that publicity and the mass media can cause to negotiations processes. He recognises that publicity might harm the diplomat's public image and leaks can similarly damage the trust that is essential for reaching an agreement. However, he does emphasise the contribution of the media in the conduct of successful negotiations, which is also verified given the degree of dependency of foreign policymakers on the news media. He concludes by stating that the way for diplomats to minimise the dysfunctions of the publicity the media provide, is by carefully weighing the positive and negative effects of exposing negotiations in progress and by finding the right balance in the degree of publicity required (1974:190).

Later studies on the media's diplomatic functions have elaborated on the main media roles described in Davison's article. In his book 'Media Diplomacy' Yoel Cohen investigates the role of the British media in the formation of foreign policy and describes the media and diplomacy as two different types of communication, which however overlap at certain points. Cohen recognises that this overlap is partial and identifies issues such as crises, war and peace as the ones that both journalists and diplomats share. He also distinguishes media diplomacy from public diplomacy clarifying that while the latter encompasses all public aspects of foreign policy – speeches, trips, public appearances - the former includes aspects of diplomacy that are not associated with the public, such as governmental use of the media for the exchange of signals (1986: 7).

Cohen explains the concept of media diplomacy through the development of different types of relationships between media and diplomacy. The media can become sources of information to members of diplomatic missions abroad; while, particularly in situations of crisis, the media may even be the only available source. He describes how during the refugee disaster in East Bengal, Pakistan in 1971, the British High Commission in Calcutta relied upon the local press for their information rather than sending any diplomats to the area (1986: 22). Other roles include the media's function as channels of communication among policymakers and they can even be used to gain public support for policy as well.

Cohen particularly examines the media's impact on the shaping of foreign policy in relation to their impact on their audiences - MP's, interest groups and the wider public - and the extent to which governments are responsive to any pressure from them. In this case the media's impact is described as horizontal, connecting groups in a forum of discussion (1986: 66). On a vertical level, he identifies the Parliament as the key means for the media to be influential; it is basically pressure from the government's supporters that can result to policy change (1986: 52). This is an indirect media impact on the shaping of foreign policy, which is more likely to be felt at the planning stage of a policy decision.

'In considering which policy to adopt in a particular situation the likely reaction of the media will be taken into account and it will be in the domestic interest of the government not to decide on a policy which will produce a negative reaction' (1986: 64).

In relation to the media's role as channels of communication, attention has also been drawn on their employment, or even manipulation, by officials for the leaking of information, which can again result in indirect influence on foreign policy shaping. As an example, Seib refers to the advanced skills of President Nixon's National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in using the media for such purposes. He describes how during his Middle East subtle diplomacy Kissinger would report the story from his plane, being the primary and even sole source of information for the media. (1992: 85- 86).

The media's contribution in the conduct of diplomacy has also been examined by Eytan Gilboa who defines media diplomacy as follows:

'It refers to uses of the media by leaders to express interest in negotiation, to build confidence and to mobilise public support for agreements. Media diplomacy is pursued through various routine and special media activities including press conferences, interviews and leaks, visit by heads of state and mediators in rival countries, and spectacular media events organised to usher in a new era' (2002b: 741).

Gilboa refers to Kissinger as well to whom he attributes the initiation of media diplomacy, in his effort to achieve an agreement between Israel, Egypt and Syria (2002a: 195). He describes how Kissinger developed an intimate relationship with the American correspondents giving them information 'mostly intended to amplify his positions in the negotiations' (2002a: 195). The specific example serves in demonstrating the extent to which leaders use the media as a significant instrument to advance negotiation with other states and strengthen their influence over certain decisions. Gilboa refers to the media's employment for signalling purposes as well, especially when states are unsure how another state might react to proposals for negotiation or conflict resolution, and when no other adequate communication channel is available (2002b: 741).

In relation to the media's use by officials, Dyan and Katz explain how diplomats often intend to exploit the publicity and drama offered to a certain issue to gain public support and create a favourable climate for a given decision. Media events can prove particularly effective in such situations since live coverage of certain issues can attract large audience attention. Such media events can often trivialise the role of ambassadors, break diplomatic deadlocks and create a climate conductive to negotiations (1992: 204-205). The involvement of the media in the diplomatic process as described above, signifies a relationship with politicians that includes elements of interdependence and mutual exploitation. Of course, one might argue that it is basically officials that employ the media for their own objectives. However, politicians also have to face new circumstances created by the media in the conduct of diplomacy. The following section describes the new reality the media have forced diplomats in, as a resultant of advanced communications technologies.

The role of communications technologies in the diplomatic process

The media's diplomatic function has been studied in relation to the advanced communication technologies that have led to the allocation of a more far- reaching role to the media in the conduct of diplomacy. Cohen identifies the importance of technology in this media role stating, 'portable cameras and satellites enable the viewer to watch an event as it is happening...giving it an added dimension in the form of public pressure.

The new diplomacy has replaced the old diplomacy' (1986: 6). At the same time, Gilboa (2002c) associates the impact of media technologies with the emergence of a 'new diplomacy'. He claims that the new media diplomacy stems not just from the employment of the media as communication channels and the exposure of diplomatic processes, but also from the faster pace of diplomatic exchanges and the additional drama brought in by global television systems. The role of the development of mass communications and communication technologies is obvious especially with regard to the public's exposure to related news events. This observation is further enhanced by the conceptualisation of the media and global communications as what Gergen calls a 'perceived constraint', that is the belief of US officials that 'successful policies must first and foremost please the Great God of public opinion' (Gilboa, 2002c: 93). According to Gilboa, the development of global communication technologies have turned the media into just a constraining actor in the sense that while global news coverage may disrupt the routine policy making process, politicians do not feel forced to follow a particular policy implied by the media. Their impact is basically reflected in the high speed of transmitting information (2002b: 736).

The power inherent in the visual images to move public opinion and through this, government policy as well, has been discussed by Entman too (2000: 23). He particularly identifies the end of the Cold War as a departure point for the transformation in communications technologies and empowerment of the media; and also the emergence of a less trusting and more hostile public, that has enhanced the media's power on policy, in the name of 'public opinion' (2000: 22). On a similar basis, Nacos, Shapiro & Isernia refer to the 'Vietnam Syndrome' or the 'CNN Effect' as examples that reflect the power inherent in the television images and networks to 'involve' in foreign policy decision-making; that is mainly due to the increased impact on the public's views of certain problems and issues, that is then translated into pressure exerted on officials (2000:2).

The contribution of communication technologies in diplomatic processes has been studied by Robert Kruz who describes how the increased public availability of technology to acquire and disseminate information has weakened the officials' ability to monopolise information (1991: 75). He refers particularly to the media's impact in USA policy and focuses on the shift of the power balance between the President and the Congress on

foreign policy issues. But, what is significant in this case is how such shifts result from the increasing media power. The contribution of the media technologies lies also in the amount of time available to politicians to evaluate and reflect on certain issues before a decision is made, and as Kurz claims, ultimately the media have altered the terms of policy debate. He refers to the Cuban Missiles Crisis as an example of a case where the absence of today's satellite communications would allow the President to control and manage the crisis before it was put in the public domain (1991: 76).

The study of the media as diplomatic actors as a result of the power allocated to them with the arrival of advanced communication technologies has not been without criticism. Neuman argues the media technologies have not changed the power equation between media and politicians. They have rather transformed diplomacy by providing officials with new tools to employ for the achievement of their own objectives. (Gilboa, 2002c: 104). As for the alleged pressure that the media can generate by exposing diplomatic processes to the public, Nacos, Shapiro and Insemia recognise the emergence of further complexities in the new world order, that increase the degree of public opinion manipulation by the world leaders (Nacos, Shapiro, Insemia 2000: 3). On a similar basis, Zaller and Chiu (2000) argue that, especially in times of crisis, the media show a tendency to support government foreign policy, therefore acknowledging difficulties in the media's effort to 'escape' the governmental news control and report critically. Referring to the American media, Zaller and Chiu suggest that despite their tendency to become more independent of Congress and the President, especially since the end of the Cold War, the media remain generally dependent on government officials (2000: 61). This is an inference the two scholars have drawn from a study of forty-two foreign policy cases, from the Soviet takeover of Poland in 1945 to the Kosovo conflict 1999.

The study of the media in the conduct of diplomacy develops within the framework of the media-politicians relationship, which in this case focuses on the mutual exploitation that prevails in this interaction. Although it appears that the media are primarily used by governments to promote their goals, this form of exploitation provides journalists with information that assists in the pursuit of their own objectives as well, while officials are also compelled to adapt to the speed that new communication technologies have added to diplomatic processes. There is a degree of collaboration that serves the objectives of both sides. Moreover, it becomes obvious from the present discussion that the media's

role in the diplomatic realm involves regular references to the media's role in international negotiations during times of conflict; which offers the incentive to look into the media's role in situations of crisis more closely.

1.3.3 Media and conflict

A considerable part of the literature, which investigates the media's function in diplomatic processes, focuses on conflict situations and international crises. Philip Seib (1992) has conducted a study of the media coverage of a number of international crises from the American-Spanish war in the close of the nineteenth century until the Persian Gulf War and the US intervention in Somalia where he examined the interaction between the American government, the media and the public. Seib draws upon issues of national security and the public's right to know in an attempt to explore and offer insight into the incompatible jobs of policymakers and journalists and the way they shape the media's role and degree of influence on policy decisions. He recognises the fact that 'by revealing - or sometimes not revealing - what is going on in distant places, journalists help to shape public opinion which in turn helps to shape policymakers' behaviour'; which explains the media being among those factors that affect foreign policy decisions (1992: 139). He concludes that the degree of this media influence on American foreign policy depends on the competence of political leadership stressing that the more realistic and focused an administration's foreign policy is, the more minimised the media's impact is as well. On the contrary, a tenuous foreign policy is more likely to lead to greater reliance of the public on the media's version of events (1992: xix).

The media's role in situations of international conflict has been viewed and studied by Gadi Wolfsfeld more specifically within the context of the media's relationship with their sources. Within this framework, Wolfsfeld has developed his *political contest model* arguing that 'the best way to understand the role of the news media in politics is to view the competition over the news media as part of...a contest among political antagonists for political control' (1997: 3). The idea he promotes is that the media's impact on political conflicts depends on the governmental control over the political environment and associates this control with the promotion of a single official frame of the conflict that is available to be adopted by journalists. In contrast, the availability of multiple frames that differ from one another is more likely to be perceived by journalists as lack of a carefully planned policy and control over a given situation.

Wolfsfeld explains that the power of the media to influence the political process during situations of conflict is tied to the degree of independence from their sources. He identifies their independence as the media's willingness and ability to make genuine choices about how to collect, process and distribute information; but he also recognises that during unequal crises between what he calls *authorities* and *challengers*, the authorities are more likely to have the control of the press (1997: 59-60).

An interesting argument that Wolfsfeld raises is that during situations of conflict, the level of political control changes and can instigate media influences on the progress of the crisis and the decision-making processes. This can occur in situations when the media manage to raise the political standing of the challengers, that is the weaker side, and bring third parties into the conflict in their support. Similarly, the media can also lower the political standing of the authorities and therefore change the balance of power. On this basis, the media play the most independent role in international conflicts where they become 'advocates of the underdog by amplifying the claims of challengers against the authorities' (1997: 69). He therefore explains that when the weaker party in the conflict receives a significant amount of space and time in major news media, this can work as an indicator of the media's influence on the progress of international crises and the altering of the balance of power (1997: 72). However, after conducting a study of the media coverage of the Gulf War, the Palestinian Intifada and the Oslo Accords, Wolfsfeld concludes that despite the power often attributed to the media during times of international crises, journalists mostly reflect and respond to the political decisions and events created by political actors, rather than initiate them.

Daniel Hallin's 'The Uncensored War' provides another example of the media's position in international crises and the degree in which media coverage is affected by the government's existing or non-existing control over the political environment. Contrary to President Nixon's allegations of the media being responsible for the 'serious demoralisation of the home front' (1986: 3), Hallin provides evidence that the administration's problems with the media resulted mostly from the domestic political divisions. He explains that despite the lack of censorship and restrictions of access, the administration had still managed to control the news, even when the public had started to react strongly against the government's foreign policy (1986: 163). On that basis, he states, 'the collapse of America's will to fight in Vietnam resulted from a political process

of which the media were only one part' (1986:213). The fact that America was involved in an unsuccessful limited war was the real root of the deep division caused to the country.

With regard to the media's role in political conflicts, Hallin concludes that the way the media report the news is strictly related to the degree of elite consensus. The media tend to 'become more active when the administration fails to maintain the initiative on a major public issue' (1986: 169). This inference is consistent with both Seib's observation and Wolfsfeld's political contest model that also relate the media's power to affect the progress of conflicts with the lack of a realistic and focused official policy as well as the lack of a single, common official frame being available for the media to adopt. When the frame begins to break down, the coverage becomes progressively critical and more difficult to be controlled.

1.3.4 Media and Humanitarian Crises: The CNN Effect

A third aspect of the foreign policy realm where study of the media has focused is that of their ability to instigate interventions of the world powers in crises taking place in third countries. Seib attributes the initiation of the phenomenon to the media's search for newsworthy stories that will attract the public's attention and that leads journalists to the selection of dramatic stories, hoping that the information will also be useful. He explains how sometimes a cause-and-effect relationship can be actually seen between such news stories and urging governments to do something. This is largely related to the exposure of the public to humanitarian crises and the creation of emotional responses that forces governments to relief efforts (1992: 89-90). A commonly quoted example is the response of the Clinton administration to the media coverage of the attack on a Sarajevo market in February 1994.

News coverage of humanitarian crises has been investigated within the context of the CNN Effect debate, what Gilboa calls the 'controlling actor theory' (2002b) that aims at highlighting the impact of new global, real-time media on the conduct of US foreign policy. The primary objective of the related research is to establish the degree of media influence on policy makers when they are considering intervention during a humanitarian crisis. The media's power derives to a large extent from the impact of advanced communications technologies on the flow of information and the 'ability of the first truly

global television network to inform the public instantly and continuously of news from anywhere in the world' (Nacos, Shapiro, Insemia 2000: 2). The most extreme version of the theory implies that policymakers do not make decisions on the basis of interests but of public sentiments stimulated by television pictures (Gilboa, 2002: 100). The CNN Effect concerns mainly situations of media influence on third-party humanitarian interventions in distant crises and has focused on military operations conducted by USA and NATO for the resolution of crises that have arisen abroad and have attracted media attention.

In an attempt to clarify whether the CNN Effect actually exists, Steve Livingston identifies three different approaches. The first one defines the media as a political agenda-setting agent, which argues that 'the choices and selections of national interests are too heavily weighted in favour of what happens to be covered by CNN and other media' (1997:6). The second approach is that of the media as an accelerant that emphasises the shortening of response time for decision -making as an effect of global real-time media coverage (1997:2). The last approach identifies the media as an impediment that is related both to the effects of emotional coverage, operating through the impact of public opinion; and to the power of global real-time media to jeopardise operational security (1997: 4). Livingston clarifies that these three effects are associated with different types of policy while each different policy has different objectives, costs and operational requirements. He concludes that media effects are therefore conditional and vary accordingly, raising questions about the actual existence of the CNN Effect.

Piers Robinson identifies two US interventions – in northern Iraq and Somalia - as the point of departure for a major debate over the media 'intrusion' in the policy process (2002: 10). This was a debate that continued throughout the 1990s and was revisited by Freedman (2000) and Wheeler (2000) who offered a more careful evaluation of the media power. Although they recognised the limits of the theory, they maintained that the media do play a significant role in facilitating intervention (Robinson, 2002: 11-12). After a reconsideration of the cases in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, Robinson defines policy uncertainty and empathy-framed media coverage as those principle conditions for the CNN Effect to take place. He states that evidence is confined to the use of airpower and not the deployment of ground troops (2002: 128). Ultimately, the media's power in this case lies in facilitating Western responses to war, which however

are limited to humanitarian objectives, rather than attempts to resolve a conflict (Robinson, 2001: 189). On a similar basis, Fachot argues that even if television images force governments to consider a possible intervention, it is the perceived threats and expected risks that will drive the decision to intervene (2001: 52). On the whole, studies on the CNN Effect present mixed and contradictory results. Although Shaw (1994) and Cohen (1994) conclude that media coverage did force US policy makers to the intervention in Northern Iraq in 1991 in order to save the Kurds, as well as to the 1992 intervention in Somalia, Gowing (1994) argues that CNN coverage might draw attention to crises but policy makers would mostly resist the pressure to act only in response to media coverage.

Gilboa argues that the theory was basically developed by officials being haunted by the Vietnam syndrome (2002c: 101). He explains how the war in Vietnam has been the reason why since then and despite evidence to the contrary, many have viewed the media as enemies to the governmental policies, but he expresses doubts about the degree in which humanitarian interventions are actually initiated by the media coverage of atrocities. (2002b: 735). Gilboa concludes that the theory suffers from a research gap. Although it has been defined very broadly, to test it the researcher must apply it in a very narrow way; and when this is done, it becomes easier to disprove many of its claims and implications. This would ultimately make it not a valid theory of the media-government relations and the media influences in foreign policy (2002c: 102).

The study of the media in situations of crisis and humanitarian interventions demonstrates that the degree of political control available to politicians during times of crisis is determined within the context of certain roles that governments act out, which would ultimately affect their relationship with the media. The way the media operate in situations of conflict is therefore to a large extent determined by their relationship with the government, as explained in the expanded framework. In the examples described above, officials' political control is related to expectations the media have of the government, according to which journalists define their role and response as well. When the media develop a critical stance, they act according to a role that is tied to the government's action and to the expectations the public has of the media as well. The critical coverage would ultimately add to the development and shaping of the shared

culture, as another component of the relationship within which media and politicians operate.

1.4 Conclusion

The existing theories demonstrate a media-government relationship that incorporates the media's role in the shaping of foreign policy. This role varies according to the situation at hand and the relationship can be understandably described through O'Heffernan's definition of co-evolution between the two parties, which resembles Blumler and Gurevitch's expanded framework but focuses particularly on the dedication of the two sides to create and promote their own version of reality around the world and their inclination to support, manipulate or attack the other for their own purposes (1991: 82). The paradigms of media diplomacy, and the media's role in international crises and humanitarian interventions provide the context to justify the emergence of such a relationship.

The question that arises next is, within the framework of this relationship, when media effects on the foreign policy process occur, how do they manifest themselves and under what circumstance do they emerge? As the present chapter has demonstrated, the literature provides mixed evidence. Bernard Cohen identifies their participation and influence on policymakers as an outcome of their input in terms of information, analysis and interpretation as well as being the primary source of information and knowledge for the public. In media diplomacy, their impact is embedded in their instrumental use and in facilitating the diplomatic process, mainly as a communication channel, but also through imposing time constraints to and altering decision-making processes. In the case of conflict situations their power to influence policy making is associated with the loss of political control on behalf of the government that yields critical coverage, yet without solid evidence that such criticism can lead to policy changes. While in humanitarian crises and interventions, the CNN effect does not appear to provide a convincing argument of the media's potential to drive policy. Lastly, although O'Heffeman's model provides a systematic account of the media role and identifies their influence as an outcome not just of their employment as diplomatic tools but of their own incentives and interests, the insiders' model does not provide evidence of an actual impact of the media on policy decision outcomes.

The above observations lead to the identification of three main deficiencies in the existing theories. Firstly, the media's impact on foreign policy is mostly recognised in terms of the policymaking process rather than on policy outcomes. Their role lies in either facilitating or constraining the making of foreign policy, which although signifies an active media role, it demonstrates no mechanism through which policy decisions are shaped. The media are therefore seen mostly as technological devices that carry messages with the focus being placed on the process of transmission and the element of speed and drama embodied in them. Although the impact of their content has also been considered with regard to the criticism they disseminate and the pressure this can generate, it occurs on the basis of the government's failure to provide a solid and coherent political frame of a given situation; while even in that case, there is scarce evidence that the criticism might lead to policy changes. This all indicates the need for more analytical, detailed and in depth study and evaluation of the media content and the way it is perceived by officials. A more rigorous study can offer insight into more subtle media influences produced by a strategic media-government interaction in the making of foreign policy and is what the present thesis endeavours to achieve.

In order for this objective to materialise, a second deficiency of the existing theoretical framework needs to be overcome, this time in relation to the geographical boundaries within which the study of foreign policy and the media has been confined. The paradigms described earlier unveil the lack of a meticulous study of the media's relationship with governments other than in USA, where a large part of the research has focused so far. The relationship of the American media with the respective administration constitutes a single example of media - government relationships in democratic states and consequently, of the potential impact that the media may have on governmental decision-making processes. The absence of a more diversified framework suggests that a variety of parameters that could assist in the extraction of more accurate conclusions are left unexplored. It is therefore essential that the media be studied in foreign policies pursued by governments outside the United States, which will provide not just a diverse geographical context, but a methodological one as well.

A third and final remark to be made, in relation to the observation made above, regards a particular area of foreign policy where study of the media has focused and which is of interest in the present thesis as well. Looking at the media's role in conflict situations as

presented in the existing literature one observes that the crises investigated in relation to the media, are ones of unequal nature. This is again related with the research having focused on the American media and the coverage of US operations in the form of intervention in crises between third countries significantly less powerful than the former. The suggestion made here is that to examine the media's role in the escalation and resolution of conflicts among states that fight over issues of national sovereignty without military interventions from third actors, should add to the diversified framework in which the media should be studied. A significant contribution in this case can also be made by the study of the media coverage and potential media influence on both sides of the interaction, unlike the existing cases and theories that are built on one-sided media investigations.

To conclude, the overview of the existing literature that examines the media in the making of foreign policy, demonstrates the necessity for a more in depth investigation of the media content as a product of specific media motivations and incentives that officials are also aware of. Focus on media interests as a force that shapes their content and coverage of foreign policy, can lead to the detection of frames that reduce or increase uncertainty, modify belief systems and even manipulate information for the media's benefit. Such inferences can then assist in the detection and systematisation of media influences on the making of foreign policy.

2 Media Roles in Political Decision-Making. The Contribution of Framing Theory

2.1 Introduction

The present chapter comprises the first stage in the development of the theoretical model that will integrate the media in foreign policy decision-making as a strategic actor. The understanding of the media as an active player in the political process is not new, of course. In this perspective, the first section presents the concept of the media as a political institution, a theory that approaches the media as an active political player systematically. Although in principle it deals with the media's domestic political action through the practices of the news construction, it serves as a 'passage' to the conceptualisation of the media as international, strategic actors too.

The starting point for the investigation of the strategic role is the introduction of framing theory, which is here portrayed both as a process of decision-making and as a process of media selectivity and news construction. The contribution of frames is approached more extensively through the norms of prospect theory. Prospect theory examines closely the importance of framing information in decision-making processes. The employment of prospect theory for the analysis of past political cases has provided a consistent understanding of the role that framing has on decisions. It therefore provides grounds to integrate media frames in the political decision-making and identify dimensions that introduce a more systematic understanding of their impact on official decisions and their role as political actors. The position of the media in the political domain as conveyors of frames is strengthened with the introduction of public opinion. The dependence of the public's views, about foreign policy issues, on framed information creates conditions for a media shaped public opinion; which increases the competence of media frames to shape official decisions as well.

The last section is an attempt to define theoretically the dimension of the frame in the media coverage of a certain political issue and conceptualise it as the instrument with which the media play their part in the political decision-making. It is also an attempt to formulate a methodological pattern for content analysis to apply to the press coverage of the Greek-Turkish crisis that serves as a case study. The chapter serves in offering

insight into the key components, which are incorporated in the media coverage of foreign policy issues and comprise the core in the media's strategic action in the political game.

2.2 Media Roles in the Political Process: the Political Actor

Journalists' political roles have been discussed in the literature with Bernard Cohen (1986) being among the first scholars who developed a framework of media roles and separated the 'neutral' role from the 'participant' role. In terms of the former, the media primarily inform the government, they interpret information and disseminate judgements as well as they lend themselves to the hands of the government. As for the latter, the media are involved in an active interaction with the government, they act as representatives of the public, as critics of the government and advocates of policy. Cohen's typology of media role concludes with identifying the media as a policy maker, an actor that tries to influence both the public and the government (1986: 19-39).

Other roles attributed to the media include that of a communication channel, what O'Heffernan also refers to a diplomatic signal system (1991:53). Officials in this case employ the media as communication devices to negotiate with governments, send influential messages to people and agencies and of course receive signals back from them. The media have also been suggested to act as interpreters, disseminators and adversaries by David Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit (1986), while Morris Janowitz (1975) has proposed roles including that of the gatekeeper, the watchdog and advocate.

On a similar basis, Patterson suggests a two-dimension typology of the media roles in the political process: the *passivo-activo* dimension and the *neutral-advocate* dimension. The former is developed based on the media's autonomy as a political actor according to which the media are passive when they act as instruments in the hands of politicians; and they are active when they become participants shaping, interpreting or investigating political subjects. The latter dimension is based on the media's positioning as a political actor. As a neutral actor the media take no sides in the political scene of a country and as an advocate they take sides – they may be the advocates of a particular ideology - and they do so in a consistent and substantial way.

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Patterson identifies four combinations that derive from these dimensions and that encompass virtually all media role conceptions. Therefore, the media can be *passive-neutral* and act as observers, neutral reporters, mirrors of reality or messengers; they can be *passive – advocate*, which would include hack reporters or the partisan press; they may be *active - neutral* and in this case behave as critics, adversaries and watchdogs or they could be *active –advocates*, which in this case would translate into missionaries or interpreters (1998: 27- 28).

All the above suggest that it would be rather a cliché to say that the media no longer constitute mere observers but they proceed with constructing meanings of reality and contemporary society. Brian McNair describes them as political actors based on their predisposition to perform not just cognitive functions of information dissemination, but also interpretative functions of analysis and comment (1995: 67). This form of political action is mainly associated with the degree of freedom and independence the media enjoy in their reporting and interpreting of the political world. This independence, which is attached to their organisational structure and the relationship of journalists with media owners, advertisers or the government, becomes the main source of their political power.

The media's independence in the reporting of politics is traditionally associated with the degree of freedom that media organisations enjoy from respective governments and their function as an independent source of knowledge that informs and protects the public from governmental manipulation. McNair explains that when Edmund Burke first described the media of the late eighteenth century as the 'Fourth Estate', he was acknowledging their role and importance in the function of democracy (2003: 48). This is a role the media can achieve only when they are free from any political interference. We could therefore argue that, given that state ownership of the media has become less significant in democratic states, the media are now more independent and powerful to actively involve in the political process than ever before.

Nevertheless, the concentration of media ownership in a limited number of conglomerates raises the question as to what extent this pattern of ownership can actually guarantee the existence of independent media. As Ciaran McCullagh puts it,

'The political economy perspective most clearly articulates the view that the system of ownership is central to understanding of media content and ...media power. It argues that private ownership on this scale leads to a media that is limited in scope and diversity' (2002:77).

McCullagh explains that ownership is translated into control that automatically diminishes the degree of media autonomy. This control is imposed by the industry in which there is concentrated ownership, by the advertisers on which the media depend on for their profits, and by the political and corporate sources on which they depend for information (2002: 77). Hence, a reported problem is that there is no simple way to measure the degree of independence of media systems. Denis McQuail argues,

'There are too many variable features for this to be possible. Differences of tradition and convention often defy outside interpretation. Different expectations concerning freedom often attach to different kinds of publication and types of content. The sources and kinds of pressure are too variable to be captured by standard indicators...media freedom cannot be established by constitutional or legal decree, but has to be constantly developed and re-affirmed in daily practice' (1999: 110-111).

A possible way to demonstrate the media's autonomy is through certain features of the news construction that also justify their establishment as political actors. An important part of their political power stems from the way the media select and report information. The process of selectivity can occur on two levels. The first one is described as the 'agenda-setting' model introduced by McCombs & Shaw (1972) who argued that people learn two things from the media. On the one hand they receive factual information; and on the other they learn how to attach importance to certain issues through the extensive coverage that certain events attract. One aspect of the significance of the agenda-setting issue is that it underscores the media's power to define what is important and what is not through a process of selection among the various issues that are worth the public attention. McCombs describes the agenda-setting process as a zero-sum game, highlighting the intense competition among issues for attention by the media and the public (2004: 38). Within this context of competition, the media's process of selectivity enhances their power in defining the degree of importance innate in a given news story.

The second level of media selectivity is inherent in the interpretative frameworks through which the media portray a given issue; or in other words, the aspects of each perceived reality that the media choose to emphasise. This is because, 'when covering a news event, journalists decide which elements to include or exclude in a story' (Chyi, McCombs, 2004:24). Framing is a fundamental element when it comes to media power and will be further investigated later in this chapter. It serves as an indicator of media power and autonomy in the sense that through its process journalists exercise the

freedom and the power to be selective in the events they cover and consequently to represent the world in ways that reflect their own motivations (McCullagh, 2002).

The media's independent performance refers in this case to the ability of editorial decision-makers to implement conscious choices and decisions in the crafting of news, on the basis of their own ideological preferences. Yet, once again the element of independence becomes questionable when one considers the sources, which those frames stem from. Such sources are in principle embodied in the procedure of news construction and can reflect both the ideological inclinations and the organisational structure of the media. The former case reflects both the personal ideological orientations of the journalists as individuals and of the media organisation for which they work. It is especially the newspapers in most countries that are identified with a particular political ideology, while broadcast and television organisations are allegedly less influenced. It needs to be clarified of course that given their professional and organisational commitments, journalists rarely have the capacity to 'channel' their own ideologies into the news (McCullagh, 2002).

It is also these organisational commitments and pressures that constraint the degree of journalists' personal autonomy and of the media independence as a whole. Apart from the ownership controls and advertising and public relations pressures mentioned earlier, the media's organisational structure also presupposes practices such as reliance on routine sources and agency-made news stories, which indicate lack of diversity and originality and consequently lack of an independent line of reporting; and which would ultimately result in bias and in a limited journalistic autonomy (McQuail, 1999). As McQuail puts it, even if an important aspect of the media's independence concerns their relationship with powerful outside interests, their heavy reliance on powerful sources entails a reduced freedom (1999: 130).

Therefore, even if framing indicates a degree of autonomy in the selection of the aspects of a news story that journalists emphasise, this autonomy becomes relative when considered within a wider organisational context of news construction. The present section suggests however that the media's description as political institutions provides a

consistent approach to the media's autonomy as a resultant of their organisational structure. It is a concept that systematises the media's action as political players and provides a basis on which to build a more detailed model.

2.2.1 The Political Institution

The conceptualisation of the media as political institutions identifies the qualities that underline the media's social and political status as independent players in their ability to report and frame events autonomously (Sparrow, 1999; Cook, 1998). The concept of the media roles as institutions focuses on their function within society and, more precisely, within the structure of domestic politics. North (1981) defines institutions as a framework through which human beings interact. Within this framework, institutions establish the cooperative and competitive relationships, which set up society and economic order (Sparrow, 1999:9). On this basis, Sparrow suggests that the production of news media provide a regular framework by which and within which political actors operate (1999:10).

Cook (1998) defines the media firstly as a social institution. Their role in this case is a resultant of their organisational status in principle and of their function as information sources and communications channels for officials and the public. In the former case, the news construction relies upon a series of routines/practices that journalists follow. Sparrow refers to these practices as the micro foundations of a macro political understanding of the media as an institution (1999: 10). This, in combination with the media's operation as large-scale conglomerates that pursue economic profit, enhances the organisational structure of the media. At the same time, the reliance of both officials and the public on the media for the conduct of the social function of communication renders them integral parts in structuring the actions of social and political constituents. In other words, their organisational nature and their impact on other social actors, render the media social institutions. It is particularly the former that enhances their status as independent players through the increasing competition that it can generate. According to Entman (1985),

> Competition a) enhances the quality of newspaper meaning...more in depth news and editorials, b) provides more diversity of views on public issues, c) encourages more fairness or balance in presentation of political controversies and d) stimulates greater responsiveness to the interests of citizens – providing stories and editorial that help encourage enlightened and rationally participant citizens (McQuail, 1999: 114).

For Cook, their political utility is inherent in the recurring negotiations between journalists and official sources. The idea of the media as a political player lies in the fact that even if it is officials that provide an arena for certain important events to occur and attract media coverage, the final crafting and colouring of the news is decided by journalists. He argues that the media production values might direct the news towards the creation of good stories that are not necessarily translated into good political outcomes. He therefore stresses the degree of autonomy in the media's framing of political events and the degree of power to establish authority for certain politics and political actors (Cook, 1998: 87-97). Sparrow adds to their authoritative nature by describing them as 'attack dogs' that employ negative reporting in order to maintain a constant position that protects them from the machination of politicians and allows them to signal to the mass audience about what is really going on in the political domain (1999:49-50). The view of the media acting as a watchdog and a critic to the government or any form of political authority is perhaps the most central requirement for the understanding of the media as independent political players, both from government and ownership, that defend the interest of citizens despite governmental and commercial pressures (Cohen, 1986; Curran 1991; McQuail, 1999).

Their independent profile is also embedded in the pursuit of commercial incentives vis-à-vis the audience that is often approached as potential consumers. This has led to the description of the news content as an outcome of a set of rational decisions made by a unitary actor that aims at maximising his preferences (Sigal, 1973: 1980). Cook concludes that due to the strategic incentives implicit in the process of news construction, the media develop into a political institution that resembles the function of actors such as the political parties and interest groups. The three of them share an at least partial independence of government and the pursuit of political goals, either explicitly or implicitly (1999: 109).

The concept of the political institution highlights the media's relevant autonomy in the crafting of news stories, their power to establish authority and their organisational and strategic incentives as the main components in the news production process that establish them as a political actor. Cook describes their action as one that occurs both inside and outside the government; an observation inherent in O'Heffernan's (1991) insider's model as well. In O'Heffernan's paradigm, as inside players the media supply

officials with fast and useful information. The outside action is reflected in the shape that the media give to their stories as an outcome of their own motivations and incentives. Both examples focus on the organisational structure and the pursuit of own incentives as a source of the media's authority.

To sum up, the view of the media as a political institution recognises a significant degree of power in their practices that may constraint the choice sets of other political actors through the dissemination of information, criticism or even threats. It identifies the media as a political player through the cooperation of a set of individual components such as networks of journalists and politicians. Each of them pursues incentives, which they accomplish through the development of a mutual interrelation. Within this context, the news production practices become integral to the political process, rendering the media a political output.

Part of their political power derives from 'authored' forms of political intervention- i.e. editorials, columns or featured articles- that permit the reporting of news and opinions independent of organisational and structural constraints (McNair, 1995: 69-72). George Reedy argues that the significant impact of the news content on the government lies not only in its critical reflections, but also in its ability to tell officials what there are doing as seen through other eyes. The main idea is that the news content reaches the government without previously being shaped by people whose intentions might oppose the government's interests (Sigal, 1973: 186). At the same time, as O'Heffernan claims, the media frame issues so that the face of an issue seen by the government becomes also the face of the issue that the public perceives and has to be dealt with by all the government players (1991: 109).

The idea of the political institution underlines the media's power particularly within the context of their interaction with policymakers and in terms of the constrains that journalistic practices may impose on the choice sets of other political actors. It also underlines the media's power to exert pressure by becoming critical towards politicians but it does not explain how this pressure affects political activities and official decisions. The contribution of the political institution as a media role is that it provides a systematic explanation of the media's power as political actors; and a departure point for this thesis to go beyond that role and demonstrate how the media, having developed in an

institution that functions within the structure of domestic politics, proceed with a framing process that renders them strategic actors that influence foreign policy decisions. Framing is identified as the key element in what this thesis will attempt to demonstrate as a strategic action of the media. It is therefore deemed essential to present some fundamental theories and aspects of framing before we proceed with the media approach.

2.3 Introducing the theory of frames

Over the years a number of definitions of frames or framing have been offered either in relation to the media or more generally as a cognitive information process for the understanding of the social world (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Minsky, 1975; Tuchman, 1978). In the development of numerous definitions Goffman's formative work has been a reference point for many of them. In his widely cited book he defines frames as 'schemata of interpretation' that enable individuals to understand certain events and 'to locate, perceive, identify and label' occurrences. He calls these schemata primary frameworks because 'they turn what should be a meaningless aspect of a scene into something meaningful' (1974: 21-22). Goffman distinguishes between natural and social frameworks in an effort to differentiate between the understandings of events as outcomes of natural determinants on the one hand and outcomes of the motives and intents of human beings on the other.

What is interesting about the social frameworks is that they provide an arena for the individual to decide what is going on according to their interests, cultural and social environments. Most importantly, decisions are perceived as the outcome of the exploitation of natural constraints and the causality of events in terms of the motives and incentives of the agent (Goffman, 1974: 22-26). Goffman proceeds to show how our based on reason knowledge performs its constructive role in our everyday life and how the respective schemata of interpretation are 'acted out'. Following this tradition, framing analysis is concerned with how social actors act in order to generate organised ways of understanding the world (Pan & Kosicki, 2003: 38). The process of framing as examined by Goffman presupposes a cognitive processing of information, which is done on the basis of the actors' belief systems, interests and culture. This means that actors are

involved in an interpersonal understanding of the world, which at the same time influences their action as well.

The implications of the framing process on the action of individuals and on the process of decision making will be discussed in the following section within the framework of prospect theory. The theory locates the importance of framing in decision-making processes and 'elevates' its cognitive underpinnings as determinants of the information processing and the evaluation of a given situation by the agent before a decision is made. Prospect theory is here introduced as a systematic approach to the potential impact that framing analysis may have on action and decision-making.

2.3.1 Frames in the decision-making process: the prospect theory

Prospect theory is an alternative account of decision making under risk as examined by rational choice theory, and focuses on clarifying the influence, that information has on individual decision making, when portrayed through certain frames. It offers powerful insights into political decision-making and can facilitate the identification of news frames as a means for the media to ascertain their influence in the decision-making process. Prospect theory has been employed for the analysis of decision-making processes in international politics as an attempt to challenge the aptness of rational choice theory to provide a more convincing account (Farnham, 1992:205). However, this thesis suggests both theories can offer propositions for the understanding of the media's power to influence political decisions as conveyors of framed information. The introduction of prospect theory at this point serves in identifying those framing dimensions that rationalise media frames as a fundamental component of the media's role as political actors.

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1984) developed prospect theory in terms of a critique of utility theory.[2] Their aim was to investigate decision-making under risk

[2] The main concept of utility theory suggests that the risky choices of rational decision makers are defined by their preferences among the potential outcomes. The theory was first developed by Daniel Bernoulli (1738) who suggested that the values of things to an individual are not just equivalent to their monetary worth. On this basis, decisions are shaped by the worth of the outcomes to the individual rather than by their cash value. The theory was rehabilitated by Von Neuman and Morgestern in a way that assigned utilities to non-monetary outcomes as well. They contributed in the development of modern utility theory, which enables numerical utilities, corresponding to degrees of preferences, to be assigned in games with qualitative outcomes. Although Von Neuman and Morgestern's utility theory provides a convincing method solving

concentrating on cognitive and psychophysical determinants of choice. Especially in terms of money related decisions, Kahneman and Tversky showed how certain psychological factors can invalidate utility theory. One major contribution of the theory lies in demonstrating the power of frames to cause alterations to the action people take in order to deal with a problem or situation, by calling attention to particular aspects of this specific situation. In particular, the two analysts claim that all analyses of rational choice incorporate two main principles namely these of invariance and dominance. On the one hand, invariance presupposes that the description of individual options should have no influence on the preference. Two prospects should be recognised to be equivalent either when they are shown together or separately. On the other hand, according to the principle of dominance if one option is better than another in one aspect and at least as good as the other in all other aspects, then it is the dominant option that should be chosen.

What Kahneman and Tversly demonstrated in a widely cited study was that these two requirements could often be violated as a result of the framing effects. Based on responses to two identical problems the outcomes of which were presented in different ways, they proved that simple word changes could produce significant differences in the choices people make. In particular, prospect theory implies that people's attitude towards a risky decision depends on whether the outcomes are presented as gains or losses, always relative to a reference point, such as the status quo. The implication of the frames lies in the shifts made in the way the reference point of a problem is presented. Such shifts evoked by the frames can have predictable effects on the ranking of an individual's preferences. In brief, the same problem can be framed in different ways and lead to different decisions on behalf of the recipients. As McDermott states, choice can be influenced by relatively trivial manipulations in the framing of options, for instance what is costly and what is not (1992).

Kahneman and Tversky (1986) came to the conclusion that rational choice and utility theory do not represent individual decision-making accurately. Decision makers due to certain phenomena such as the framing effects systematically violate the basic principles

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games of change involving great risk, it has not solved all problems related to the assignment of numerical utilities to the outcomes of games.
Colman(1982), p.18-19

of the specific theories. They proved that variations in the framing of options (E.g. framing an outcome as a gain or a loss) yield different preferences. The outcome being that information portrayed through certain frames can ultimately influence the process of decision-making and the final choice made by the decision maker. The findings of Kahneman and Tversky offer a useful tool for the understanding of decision-making processes in every day life with regard to the impact that frames may have on action. However, as this thesis suggests, when investigating frames produced by the media and received by politicians, their impact on the process of political decision-making is subject to various parameters that render the media-politicians' interaction a complex one. The argument here is that prospect theory provides a practical instrument for the investigation and understanding of media framing effects, but basically when employed as part of a wider theoretical framework, which is built on the norms of rationality.

Let us now examine how the framing theory is incorporated into the decision-making process, always based on the norms of prospect theory. Prospect theory recognises two phases in the decision-making process. The first one is the phase of framing and editing. This is a preliminary analysis of the choice problem and the alternatives offered to the decision maker. This is the phase where the actor frames the alternative options and the potential outcomes before proceeding with a decision. This process consists of the reformulation of the alternative options in order to facilitate the final decision. In this process, the actor is likely to code the outcomes of a decision problem either as gains or losses in relation to a reference point. The formulation of the reference point as well as the way in which the actor frames the above information depends largely on the manner in which the decision problem is portrayed. In the second phase of the process, the decision maker evaluates the framed information and the alternative options, selecting the most highly evaluated option. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).

The importance of framing is basically concentrated in the first phase of the decision-making process, as suggested by prospect theory. The decision maker processes and analyses information before he/she decides upon a certain action. At this stage the actor is likely to encounter the principles of invariance and dominance. Whether these principles will be violated depends on the manner in which they will frame the available options, which also depends on how the specific decision problem is presented to them or even perceived by them.

2.3.2 Prospect theory in international politics

Prospect theory has been employed for the analysis and understanding of decision-making processes in international relations, with emphasis on framing gains and losses and particularly on the impact of loss aversion on political decisions. Levy (1992) refers to numerous examples in which states select a risk-seeking move as an outcome of the way alternative choices have been framed. The essence of framing in this case lies in preventing a political actor from recognising the degree of risk embodied in a certain decision; or exaggerating the degree of cost a situation entails to such an extent that, in order to avert the costly outcome, the actor would be willing to engage in a riskier decision than might be predicted by a probability of calculus (Levy, 1992: 287). On those terms, as Jervis puts it, prospect theory leads us to expect people to persist in risky and losing actions much longer than standard rationality would (1992: 191).

Barbara Farnham (1992) employed the norms of prospect theory to provide an interpretation of President Roosevelt's decision-making during the Munich crisis, focusing on the correspondence between the decision framing and preference reversal. Her inquiry dealt with Roosevelt's reaction to the crisis between Hitler's Germany and Czechoslovakia during World War II. Particularly, Farnham examined the policy change of the American President from maintaining a neutral position to seeing the possibility of a European war as of immediate concern for USA that led to his intervention. Using Tvesrky and Kahneman's hypothesis that the way a decision is framed affects how people see the consequences of their decisions, she attributed Roosevelt's policy change to the way he framed the situation to himself. She explains that framing the decision problem posed by the European crisis so that the outcome would seem as a loss for the United States could have changed the way in which he experienced the implications of non-intervention, which ultimately altered his evaluation of the crisis (1992: 226). In other words, Farnham attributes Roosevelt's decision not to a gradual process of a logical re-evaluation but to a change of mood that was caused by his communication with Europe and that led to a shift in his preferences.

A similar analysis was conducted by Rose McDermott (1992) in an attempt to justify President Carter's risky and failed rescue mission of the American hostages in Iran, in April 1980. McDermott investigated the framing of Carter's four alternative options and his decision to take up the one that entailed the greatest risk. She concluded that the

framing process resulted in Carter placing himself in the domain of losses. In this case, the actor's framing and evaluation led to the perception that he had little to lose in taking up a risky decision and everything to gain if that decision succeeded. It is an observation that is consistent with the norms of prospect theory and the hypothesis that people tend to become risk seeking when framing the outcome of a decision in terms of losses.

The input of prospect theory, as seen through its application to decision-making situations in international politics, is inherent in the influence of framing on decisions and political outcomes. Prospect theory promotes the concept of framing as a vital stage of the decision-making process and of the analysis of a given choice problem. It therefore paves the way for a systematic introduction of the media frames in political decision-making.

2.4 Framing in the media

In the beginning of this chapter, it was stressed how the media power is inherent in the selectivity embodied in the media decisions about what to cover and how to cover it or else the aspects of the story that the media choose to emphasise on and elevate in salience. As Durham puts it, 'being able to designate salience reflects the social power of journalism, which lies in the inclusion of certain voices in normative social discourse and the exclusion of others' (2003: 125). Entman (1993) describes the process of framing as the selection of some aspects of a perceived reality in order to make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition. Selection and salience are therefore fundamental in the process of framing information. The argument developed in the present section is that the framing process can actually 'elevate' the media's role as political actors. This is by revealing the strategic impact that media content is liable to exert on political decision-making.

There is actually a list of commonly cited definitions of news frames, which illustrates the difficulty in creating a single definition (Schwartz, 2004). Gitlin has defined news frames as 'persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, presentation, selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse' (1980). Gamson & Modigliani (1989) refer to frames as 'a set of packages that give meaning to an issue. A package has an internal structure. At its core is a central organising idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue. It has also been

suggested by McCombs, Shaw and Weaver that framing is in fact an extension of agenda setting. They defined framing as a second-level agenda setting to describe the impact of the salience of characteristics of media coverage on the interpretation of news stories by audiences (Sceufele, 1999: 103). Yet, this is an observation that contrasts Entman's argument, that framing is more than agenda setting. He points out that,

> 'Frames define problems- determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes-identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgements-evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies-offer and justify treatments for the problem and predict their likely effects' (Entman, 1993).

The framing function might not necessarily exist as an extension of agenda setting; but it can co-exist with it and in this case it adds to the potential role that the media can play in the political process. Entman's definition is actually the most detailed; and it also demonstrates the media's power to engage in a coverage that expands further than just a description of occurring events. This is because, by engaging in a process of problem definition the media ultimately proceed with analysis and interpretation of a certain issue that is placed on the media agenda. This is an initiative that the media take independent of whether or not the specific issue has been placed on the agenda by officials; and it can reinforce the role of the media turning them into actors whose influence in the political process lies beyond their function as a source of information or a communications channel.

As Entman states, frames *define problems, diagnose causes* and *suggest remedies.* The use of frames for the dissemination of information and portrayal of certain issues by the media adds a new dimension to the role of the media as source of information and highlights the power inherent in their content. Because their autonomous role as political actors is not a mere reflection of their news gathering systems, organisational incentives and decisions. It is also a reflection of their capacity to involve in a more profound and extensive analysis of the collected information offering interpretations that are perhaps different from the official ones. They can disseminate criticism or support for a decision and a policy option, becoming more than just a source of information. Their power lies in the fact that as soon as this criticism becomes public, it also becomes dangerous to officials and governmental decision-makers. The media cannot restrict themselves to a neutral depiction of a given reality but they frame it by selecting, emphasising, analysing

and interpreting certain aspects of it. This frame 'can stimulate support or opposition to the sides in a political conflict' (Entman, 2003:417). This is an observation that also clarifies how this thesis perceives the cost that a political actor is likely to bear due to a decision/ move that is critically covered by the media. It offers basis to argue that the media take initiatives that can turn them into actors regardless of the extent to which they ultimately lead officials to a reassessment of a policy decision.

In terms of this dimension their role as a communication channel can also be examined from a different perspective. One cannot deny the employment of the media for signalling purposes on behalf of political actors. Yet, the frames through which certain signals and messages are portrayed render the media more than a mere communication channel. By emphasising a given aspect of a reality and therefore framing a message or a signal, the media slip from the official's control. Whether, the signal conveyed works for or against a certain policy option, what matters is that the media do not always operate as tools exploited by politicians to do their job.

One could argue that the essence of framing theory in relation to the media influences on decision-making lies in the manifestation of a looser relationship between the media and governmental control (Entman, 2003). A question that arises here is to what extent this slack relationship signifies automatic influence from this domestic political constituent over politicians and their decisions. That is to say, the more the media proceed with independent framing and analysis of information they receive from officials, the more influential this information becomes. One possible way to conceptualise this influence is as from a cognitive perspective. Entman states that the analysis of frames clarifies the exact way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by a transfer of information from one location, such as a news report, to that consciousness (1993: 51-52). This observation implies the media's function as a cognitive device in the encoding, interpreting and retrieving of information (Pan & Kosicki, 1993: 57), which would ultimately influence the interpersonal processing of the receiver.

Media frames as carriers of cognitive influence can 'enter' decision-making processes on the basis of the correlation of framing with the process of decision-making in international politics. This triggers the suggestion that media framing may be equally fundamental in decision-making processes.



Figure 2.1: The cognitive impact of media frames on decision-making

A political situation approached based on the norms of prospect theory, is seen as a choice-problem divided into the framing phase and the editing phase. The focus of attention is the former, which represents the preliminary stage in which the political actors assess the given situation before proceeding with the decision. By locating the media in this stage, the frame of the problem in question is then controlled by the way the choice-problem is perceived both by the political actor and the media. The media's capacity to engage into a framing process that resembles the evaluation conducted by political actors increases their potential impact on official choices. The media's role is further enhanced when considering that framing is vital in the communication between political actors. 'Successful political communication requires the framing of events, issues and actors in ways that promote perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering another' (Entman, 2003:417).

In this case, the media frames may exert a direct influence on political decisions that is conceptualised as a change caused to the framing of the political actor, by the media (Figure 2.1). The diagram depicts a direct and circular interaction between the political and the media frame. In that, a given choice problem is framed by the decision-maker. The same choice problem is received by the media either simultaneously from other sources or through the decision-maker's political frame. The media then proceed with their own frame that changes the perception of the decision-maker about the choice

problem through a cognitive process. According to prospect theory, the frames through which a choice problem is presented are often responsible for the violation of the axioms of rational choice and utility theory and the change of preference of the decision-maker. Hence, media frames change the policymaker's perception of the given situation eliminating the degree of rationality in their decision. The examples of the Munich Crisis and the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission also demonstrate how the framing of the options available to the two political actors caused psychological implications that would ultimately determine their decision.

The possibility for a direct, cognitive media influence on the decision-maker is rather problematic and difficult to verify. It appears to be a simplistic approach, when journalism is considered as an inherently rationalising practice that organises certain social meanings into frames while excluding other meanings from the dominant discourse (Duncan, 2003: 128). Duncan identifies the rationality in the media framing as a practice of including and excluding meanings in ways that establish power relations within a social and political context. This rationality can also be identified in relation to the commercial objectives that media organisations pursue and according to which they frame the news. When these objectives concentrate on creating meanings with powerful effects on the targeted audience, then the media influence acquires a different dimension, with the introduction of the public as an additional 'player' at which the media frames are targeted. The argument that this chapter seeks to make is that the influence of media frames are more likely to develop in the form of domestic pressure on policymakers; this pressure is not exerted in a direct and cognitive manner but rather in an indirect way and through the concept of public opinion. In the case of foreign policy decisions, O'Heffernan suggests that the media's power lies in sustaining domestic pressures about certain policies (1991: 62-64). The next sections will attempt to analyse this domestic pressure as an interaction between media frames, policymakers and the public. The interaction embodied in this triangle is of course not now. The objective is however to investigate it in a way that reveals a more rational, systematic and strategic influence of the media in the decision-making process.

2.4.1 Media and public opinion as a source of domestic pressure

The public views are here conceptualised as composing one of the domestic factors that influence the international behaviour of states and the objective of the present section is

to explain how the concept of public opinion can result in the fabrication of domestic pressure by the media. Admittedly, the linkage between the media, public opinion and policymakers is a complex one with no theory adequately clarifying on the one hand, a profound media influence on the public's views and on the other, the impact of such views on policy making. Shapiro and Jacobs (2000) have reported the existence of congruence occurring between opinion changes and subsequent policy changes, especially in the area foreign policy. On the other hand, Entman (2004) argues that research offers very little insight into whether and how officials find out what the public is thinking. There are, however, certain findings that provide grounds to consider public opinion as a key component in the media's strategic action.

A reported key issue is the lack of knowledge of the public, which is enhanced by the often abstract and obscure nature of foreign policy issues. At the same time, the lack of direct experience of the public with regard to the effectiveness of certain foreign policy decisions is another reason why it becomes less likely to be affected by them in the same way it would be affected by economic or health care changes (Manheim, 1997; Kennamer, 1992). From a first point of view, this observation might render the possibility of a public pressure on policymakers merely unrealistic, especially in foreign affairs. However, it also explains the public's dependence on the media for information on foreign policy decisions and understanding of particular situations. Framing becomes central here since the public's interpretations are rarely automatically deduced from the reporting of an event itself; on the contrary, it is mostly the media frames that will determine which problem definition, cause and policy response gain widespread adherence (Entman, 2004: 124). Taking into consideration that governing elites are aware of this media-public linkage, the focal point is the perception of policymakers about the public and most importantly their perception of the media's potential in shaping the public's views of foreign policy issues.

The impact of such a perception on a given political action can be summarised in the concept of the third person effect, developed by Davison (1983) based on the human tendency to see media effects as greater on others than on oneself (Lasorsa, 1992: 165). The idea is that media coverage of an issue might lead to an official decision not because of its direct impact on the public's beliefs but because of politicians' perception that it will have such an impact on the public. This is an observation that could explain

the impact of public opinion on policymaking through the prism of the perceived public opinion. This reflects the perception of political elites about where the majority of the public stands with regard to a given issue, while such perceptions are largely developed from dominant media frames (Entman, 2004:127).

Entman refers to a 'putative' public opinion the media promote, which although barely represents the true mood of the public towards certain policies, it does increase the media's influence on policymakers. He introduces the concept of 'perceived' public opinion as a convenient fiction for both journalists and politicians to refer to the comprehensive preferences of a majority of citizens (2000:21), which is related to the politicians' need to associate their activities with public approval (2004: 125). Entman implies the construction of public opinion by journalists and politicians that will ultimately work as a guide for the shaping of governmental behaviour. This proposition is however rejected by Page who suggests that retrospective judgements and latent or anticipated opinion play a crucial role in foreign policy and policymakers' evaluation of certain decisions (2000: 87).

Anticipated public opinion is here approached in terms of the expectation of a public opposition that would generate a domestic cost for policymakers. It is perhaps this facet of the public's views that encompasses the substance of the domestic pressure that the whole concept of public opinion can exert on policymaking. Its essence lies in the anticipation of a strong domestic opposition and its potent impact on policymaking. Ultimately, the unknown future direction of public opinion can become a constraint for policymakers. As Entman states, the anticipation of a majority opposition to the continued involvement and losses in Somalia in 1993 led President Clinton to withdraw the US forces soon after the battle of Mogadishu (2004: 127). Similarly, President Johnson led the country to a war with the communist guerrillas in Vietnam based on the speculation of a public refutation in case he failed to present a communist victory (Zaller, 1994: 250). In the latter case, anticipated public opinion is conceptualised in the form of domestic reputation for toughness in dealing with foreign adversaries (Ibid, 271). This can explain why the Nixon administration used polling data to avoid taking unpopular positions in the area of foreign policy (Shapiro & Jacobs, 2000: 232-233). It can also justify Eisenhower's willingness to allow France to be defeated in Indochina and

Kennedy's tough and risky responses to Khrushchev's provocations as instances where anticipated public opinion posed as a threat to the leaders' domestic reputation.

The essence of the discussion is to demonstrate the existence of a certain degree of sensitivity or cautiousness that politicians develop towards a future public opposition. The association of the public sentiments with media frames, which is also acknowledged by policymakers, justifies why the concept of public opinion becomes important in decision-making processes. Given the public's reliance on the media for information, understanding and interpretation of foreign policy issues, the anticipation of a public opposition equals the recognition of the media's central role in generating conditions of domestic pressure. The whole concept of public opinion is an integral component of the framing process and the impact of media frames on policymakers exists, if not as an actuality, as a notion. It carries with it the expectation of a domestic cost that is difficult to ignore. If the public's views about foreign policy issues are shaped by media frames, then by responding to an anticipated or perceived public opinion, policymakers respond to selected interpretations of the public's beliefs as determined by these media frames. This gives media frames a central role in the process of decision-making, the power of which is further enhanced when one considers the critical part that framing plays in decision-making processes as demonstrated by prospect theory.

2.4.2 Media Frames in the decision-making process

Media framing in this case may influence political decisions through an indirect route, this time bringing public opinion into the picture. Prospect theory has made a significant contribution on that front by emphasising the relationship between framing of choices or decision outcomes and situations of loss aversion. In the examples described earlier, Presidents Roosevelt and Carter found themselves in a position of an imminent loss, which they had to recoup; it was their framing of the situation as such, which ultimately led to the selection of a risky decision. The idea of loss aversion becomes further crucial due to its association with future reputation and domestic cost. The role of the public becomes important here since, as Levy (1992) suggests, loss aversion also has an impact on public opinion, not just on policymakers directly. This idea implies that the public itself is involved in a framing procedure; if a situation of loss aversion is produced through the framing of a given problem, this may result in punishing political leaders. The role of public opinion becomes crucial due to the tendency for domestic publics to react

more strongly to strategic losses than to comparable gains and to punish their leaders more for the former than to reward them for the latter (1992: 285).

The media's capacity to influence political choices in this case is through the impact of media frames on the public. Given the emergence of public opinion from framed and mediated information particularly in the domain of foreign policy, the public becomes the filter for the media frames to exert domestic pressure on policymakers. Figure 2.2 depicts the route through which the media frames affect political decision-making, this time with the public as an additional component of the interaction. The idea is that the cognitive impact of the media frame is now exerted on the public, which then converts into the expectation of a domestic opposition in case the decision-maker fails to conform to what the public sentiment dictates.



Figure 2.2: The indirect impact of media frames on decision-making

The difference with the impact depicted in figure 2.1 lies in the type of pressure the media frames exert. In the former case, a possible media opposition to the political frame of the choice problem is translated into pressure that concerns international decisions the actor makes and the respective international cost they may entail. In the latter case, the pressure acquires the dimension of a domestic expected cost and the

damage that a potential failure may cause to his domestic reputation. Any possible influence of the media frame on the framing of the decision-maker is exerted not on his interpersonal processing of information but on his expectation of the public reaction. In other words, it is not the political frame per se that changes, but rather a domestic cost is now attached to it. The cognitive impact on public opinion is incorporated in what I would call a 'rationally' oriented relationship between media influences and foreign policy decisions and will be epitomised in the next chapter with the aid of game theory.

2.4.3 Identification of the media frame

We have therefore identified the importance of framing on decision-making processes and a potential route through which media framing can be equally influential on political decisions. Prospect theory has offered a foundation for the identification of both a direct and indirect potent impact of media frames. The present section attempts to identify the dimensions of the media frames, in the coverage of a foreign policy issue, such as an international crisis. It aims at identifying and formulating the instrument with which the media play their part in decision-making, in theoretical terms. It will also provide the foundation for the analysis of the press coverage in order to test the application of the model to be completed in the next chapter. It is an effort to describe how the media frames should be conceptualised in order to illustrate the media's role as a political actor.

To investigate the media frame of a political situation such as an international crisis, we assume that, similar to the political frame, the media frame is controlled by the manner in which the choice problem is perceived and presented in the media. In this case, the media frame takes the facts and organises them around a central idea. This central idea is constructed by words that compose the frame and at the same time emphasise those aspects of the given situation that the media aim at highlighting.

Research on framing has distinguished two categories of frames, namely those of frames as dependent and as independent variables. In the former case the creation of frames is influenced by several socio-structural or organisational factors. In the latter case, it is the media frames that influence attitudes (1999: 107). The media's function as a political actor may encompass both frame categories. As dependent variables, the media frames are produced through the organisational structure of the media

organisations and the way that this shapes the news construction. The idea refers to the media's roles as a political actor and a political institution that organises the news production around certain practices, which reflect the media's incentives and motivations, be it of commercial or ideological disposition. The latter case creates scope to conceptualise the media as political actors and 'conveyors' of frames that influence political behaviour; and focuses on content as the instrument for the media's political action. The media frames as an independent variable will be the focus of attention in this thesis.

The model for the organisation of the media content within the context of decision-making is found in Entman's definition according to which, *media frames define problems, diagnose causes* and *suggest remedies.* The key idea is firstly the media's initiative to proceed with an analysis and interpretation of a given situation that goes beyond a mere depiction and neutral presentation of an event; and resembles the evaluation process in the framing phase of a choice problem, as suggested by Kahneman & Tversky. When seen through the prism of prospect theory, Entman's definition organises the media content in a frame that allows for the conceptualisation of the media as decision-makers. That is to say, the media offer a way of reasoning for a given matter and also suggest a solution.

Secondly, Kahneman & Tversky defined framing as 'the decision-maker's conception of the acts, outcomes and contingencies associated with a particular choice' (1981: 453). When such acts, outcomes and contingencies involve a given degree of risk, the framing of the decision will render the decision-maker loss averse. In other words, there are certain compelling notions that define the process through which decisions are framed. Therefore, the media proceed with framing a situation by defining a problem, diagnosing a cause and suggesting a remedy based on some further compelling notions, which stem from their own preferences and motivations. This idea refers back to the discussion with regard to the media process of selectivity as an indicator of their power to report independently. Entman's definition of the media framing enhances this concept of media power since it assigns the media with a framing procedure analogous to the decision-making process that prospect theory suggests.

The interesting aspect of this approach lies in the potential impact that such a framing may have on the political frames. Framing a situation in a procedure that resembles the decision-maker's evaluation process, the media increase the possibility for their frame to be noticed and even to be considered by the decision-maker, especially when it is known to interrelate with the public mood. At this stage it is the frames embodied in the news text that become the centre of attention for the decision-maker and represent the preliminary analysis of the choice problem on behalf of the media. They describe attributes of the news itself encouraging a particular understanding of those events the news refers to. What the media do in the framing phase of the choice problem is to construct their own reality and approach of a situation that ultimately leads to a particular solution of the problem at hand. In cases when the subject of the frame becomes a potential loss and considering that a loss will always hurt more than an equal gain will please, it could then become harder for the decision-maker to remain inactive before similar media coverage. It is therefore interesting to examine how the decision-maker would perceive the media framing on these circumstances.

Entman notes that through repetition, placement and reinforcing associations with each other, the words that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible and comprehensible than others (Entman, 1991). His definition of the media frames provides the model according to which the words that compose the media frame may be detected; and a framework within which these words may then be translated into an influential instrument.

This frame can be described as 'diagnostic' and 'prognostic'; it aims at capturing those elements in the press coverage that will appear to compose a preliminary analysis of the choice problem on the same basis as the political framing and the analysis made by the two political actors. The media frame in this case consists of word combinations that,

- Promote a problem definition and a certain degree of seriousness of the situation
- Attribute responsibility
- Promote certain risk, cost and pay-offs for each available option
- Predict the outcome of each combination of the options available to the governmental players
- Suggest remedy

Attention should also be given to the 'time' element in the framing conducted by the press. 'Although conventional wisdom is that the news deals with present happenings, news stories may focus on the past – providing historical background or tracing related event in the past – or the future – making predictions about further developments, proposing actions to be taken, or evaluating the impact of the event in the future' (Chyi & McCombs, 2004: 28)). In this case, the dimension of time is closely related to what is defined as episodic and thematic framing (Iyengar, 1991). When the media tend to portray an event from an episodic approach, they focus on the specific issue itself without providing any further explanations about the history and background of the event. On the contrary, thematic framing places the event in a broader field concentrating on the social forces and institutions on which audiences are expected to put the blame when it comes to the coverage of a certain problem.

In our case it is both the episodic and thematic framing that encompasses all time levels –past, present and future- offering a coverage that includes description of a given situation as well as analysis and assessment. The time levels are embedded in the diagnosis and prognosis in which the analysis of the press coverage will be organised. Ultimately, the prognostic and diagnostic media frame that this thesis seeks to detect can be traced both in the episodic and thematic framing. On the one hand, the description of an event, such as a crisis, per se, even with no reference to background information may still define the problem, attribute responsibility and suggest remedy. At the same time, it may also embody those time dimensions that are likely to provide a profound and rigorous account of the given political choice problem.

The essence of the media diagnosis and prognosis is the indication it gives to the audience about what the causal forces are and what the preferred action should be. The dissemination of prognosis may be particularly important with regard to the impact it may have on what the audience would consider as the best decision to be made by the government. The dissemination of a negative prognosis is likely to create conditions of loss aversion and place the policymakers in the domain of losses, as prospect theory suggests. Yet, what this thesis will seek to demonstrate is that the significance of this occurrence lies first in the impact that this situation is likely to have on the audience and second in the way the government will perceive the audience's involvement too. In other words, the diagnostic and prognostic media frame needs to be investigated within a

wider framework that will include the frame's cognitive impact on the audience and consequently, the impact of this media frame-audience interaction on the government.

Once the information that falls under the above categories is detected, the ultimate objective is to identify to what extent the media frame the current situation in a way similar to the frames employed by the politicians. The political framing is mainly detected through the official statements and moves made by the two governments. A media frame, which appears to be opposing the political frame, is being evaluated in relation to the anticipated public 'punishment' it may instigate and to the official governmental responses.

The element of time becomes important also in terms of the potential changes in both the media and the political frame. The extent, to which both frames tend to change during the progress of each crisis, is a potential indicator of their influence over one another. The detection and examination of such changes is an important step for the investigation of the media-politicians interdependence. Particular attention should be given to the similarities and differences between the risk, cost and pay-offs of each potential outcome of the crisis as framed by the media and the political actors. Any possible changes in the evaluation phase of the choice problem on behalf of the political actors in relation to their initial policy line should also be investigated in terms of media influence.

In brief, the objective of the employment of content analysis in the press coverage of the case study is to identify those text elements that present an attempt of the Greek and Turkish newspapers to frame and analyse a specific choice problem similarly to the political actors. The press coverage will be approached as another actor that frames a given situation but without being in the position to make a direct move in this international game. Its role as an actor concentrates on its power to indirectly participate in the political game by influencing the moves of the political actors and the final decisions they proceed with.

2.5 Summary

The present chapter discussed the media's quality as political actors through the theory of the political institution, in an effort to trigger an examination of a more rigorous and drastic approach of their role as active participants in the decision-making process. Within this context, the chapter introduced framing theory as an illustration of the media's capacity to proceed with evaluation and analysis of information independent of official controls. The media frames may then become a source of drastic impact on the policymakers' perception of a given issue. The importance of framing as a media 'weapon' was further enhanced with the introduction of prospect theory, a paradigm of decision-making that unravelled the strategic predisposition embodied in framing. With the rationalisation and systematic connection of framing with public opinion, prospect theory helped locate the media in the political domain as active participants, focusing on the impact that media framed information has on policymakers.

The objective of this chapter was to build an argument to support the media's strategic role in the political game. It was mentioned earlier that although framing is shown to determine choices that political actors make, it has been conceptualised as a cognitive impact. This thesis recognises the cognitive importance of frames on the emergence of public opinion. By putting together the three individual players and the relationships they develop with one another it needs to produce a schema that will systematically demonstrate how the different components of the media-politicians relationship result in and explain the media's strategic action. The present chapter comprises the first part in the production of this schema. This includes the identification of the media's power as embedded in the framing of news, and the location of the media frames in the decision-making process as a source of influence that may develop into domestic pressure. The remaining part of this model will connect the different components in a game-theoretic interaction that will create the profile of the media as strategic actors.

3 The Media in the Political Game

3.1 Introduction

Having demonstrated the media's quality as political actors and introduced framing theory as a vital 'ingredient' in their ability to develop an independent action, the thesis will now attempt the merging of the observations and inferences made in chapter two, with the theory of games. The present chapter comprises the last stage in the formation of the theoretical model that seeks to illuminate the media's strategic role and influence on foreign policy decision-making processes. Game theory is here presented as a model for the study of decision-making process between rational actors. Given that the aforementioned model reflects an attempt to integrate the media in political decision-making process, game theory has been selected to help in exploring the political process itself through a more systematic and consistent framework. It serves in offering insight into the forces that drive political decisions and in creating entries for the media frames to be systematically incorporated in that process.

Game theory is favoured over prospect theory for the reason that strategic interaction is favoured over cognition as a theory for decision-making analysis. On the one hand, it is essential to clarify that prospect theory would provide the context for the examination of the media-government interaction and the media's influence from a cognitive perspective. Apart from the fact that cognition represents the main approach through which media effects have been largely studied so far, a cognitive impact of the media frames presupposes an impact on the interpersonal information processing of the decision-maker and a change in their perception of a given situation. Such a method would entail a correlation between media frames and political decisions that is rather fluid and abstract and therefore problematic to be studied and verified within the context of a cause-effect relationship. On the other hand, the preference over a strategic approach offered by game theory aims at filling an existing gap in the theory of media and communication with regard to the media-government relationships and in particular the effects of the media on governmental decision-making. The absence of a theoretical framework that examines media effects in terms of a strategic interaction provides the incentive for the production of a model that examines the media's role in political decision-making through an alternative, more systematic approach; which can also

function as a departure point towards the development of a more accurate and methodical theory of media-government relations.

The present chapter will therefore defend the employment of the game theoretic approach first by introducing rational choice theory as the foundation of the political game and of the presentation of some fundamental norms that explain human behaviour consistently. It will pave the way to introduce game theory as a form of two-person interactions, between rational actors. Particular attention is given to the description of conflict situations as games, which serves a two-fold purpose. On the one hand it prepares the reader for the type of game that will be used as a basis for the building of a coherent framework for the media to be integrated too. On the other hand, it draws attention to the national costs that decisions in situations of conflict entail and, which could rise even further due to media frames. The depiction of a conflict situation in the context of a game is made with the employment of the Cuban Missiles crisis as an empirical example.

A media entry is created in the political game by way of the vital role of information in the coordination of the players' moves. Information is here presented as a key component of the media's action in the political game, through which their strategic role is identified. The final stage of the model is the location of the media in the structure of the game, with the aid of theoretical examples that highlight the possibility of multi-level games. Their position is identified as a third actor that develops interactions with the decision-makers. The outcome of these interactions converges the media's strategic impact on the decision-making process.

The thesis argues that the employment of game theory will provide the foundation to identify parameters in how and why people act the way they do. This will allow the drawing of inferences about the forces that drive political decisions and create a framework of decision-making. The main objective in the employment of the theory is to provide a more consistent approach to the media's role as a political actor and, by analysing how politicians also view this role, create their profile as a strategic actor.

3.2 The emergence of Rationality and Game Theory in the social sciences

Before we proceed with a more detailed discussion of game theory and the way the political game is conceptualised, it would be useful to briefly examine the roots of game theory and its emergence in relation to rational choice theory.

Randall Collins (1994) identifies the development of the rational tradition during the 1700s and 1800s under the name 'utilitarianism' and as closely related to economics. John Locke, the ideologue of the Glorious Revolution, was the one who set down many of the ideas of utilitarianism, focusing on the individual as the centre and starting point of social action. Locke understood action to be the outcome of people's physical sensations and of their capacity to shape the circumstances in which they lived; rational individuals built up their ideas based on their own experience and as a resultant of their own sensations (Collins, 1994: 125-126; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 964-965). However, his ideology left unanswered questions with regard to the gap left between explaining what rational individuals ought to do and explaining the way people have actually been behaving. In other words, at that stage utilitarians failed to explain what they regarded as false ideas and disadvantageous behaviour (Collins, 1994: 126). At the same time, Locke's emphasis on people's physical sensations generated the image of a selfish individual that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson tried to avoid by suggesting an instinctive moral sense that enabled people to distinguish what was right to do. However, because such an assumption would lead to a return to religious dogmatism, Collins reports that other empiricists focused on showing how all beliefs are built through individuals' experiences, in order to protect the mind from superstition (1994: 127).

Within this context, Hume suggested that the beliefs and actions of individuals were the outcome of ideas that were built based on habit and the order in which their sensations have occurred to them. Hume's argument was that the way people behaved was because of their habitual experience and not because of what was rational for them to do. He therefore emphasised on thoughtless habits as the forces of individual action, which would also explain why individuals would put up with institutions even if the latter would not really fit their rational interests (Collins, 1994: 127).

Towards the end of the 19th century, the tradition of utilitarianism fades with one of the main reasons being the fact that as Collins states, economics was becoming divorced from common sense and from sociology, which became an independent discipline. Sociologists like Durkheim criticised utilitarianism for prioritising the individual rather than society and tried to shift the emphasis to the moral ties among people as a more significant force than economic/market exchanges. The main philosophic trend was to focus on the use of ethical concepts and ethical language rather than logical explanations of action (Collins, 1994: 132-133).

In the 1950s a new version of utilitarianism started to develop again, this time in sociology, the roots of which appear to be different from the old utilitarian tradition and its economic disposition. Theorists of the new discipline, such as Mead, Weber and Parsons argued in different directions. It was particularly Parsons towards whom Homans launched an attack, starting out the establishment of a new version of utilitarianism. Parsons recognised that individuals behaved according to their roles in the larger social system, which were shaped by culture and the process of socialisation (Collins, 1994: 134). He actually sought to combine the rational and non-rational dimensions of human action by identifying *effort* as the linking point between what he described as social conditions and ends (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998:965).

Homans reacted to Parsons' structural-functionalism describing the whole notion of his social system as abstract and stressing that whatever happens must be closely linked to and caused by the individuals' motivations. Homans' law, which is his most important principle, focuses on the interactions among individuals. He formulated a series of principles of how people behaved leading to what was known as 'exchange theory'. Within this context, Homans shifted sociological theory towards the individual, her/his self interests and the way individuals interacted and made exchanges with each other. Unlike the traditional version of utilitarianism, sociology and exchange theory were concerned with issues of power and how inequality comes about (Collins, 1994: 133-137). The re-establishment of rationality as seen through Homans' effort to crystallise a new version of utilitarianism, is associated with the abstractness of theories of sociology and structural-functionalism - which were difficult to verify by empirical evidence- that rational choice theorists sought to overcome.

Collins goes on to describe how the study of rationality within this sociological context came up against paradoxes and limits of rationality related to the ability of individuals to process information and make rational decisions, as well as to the ability of individuals to form groups and proceed with collective action. It is the latter that is particularly interesting here since it led to the issue of the 'free rider' that was among the problems dealt with by game theory. As Collins describes, Mancur Olson formulated the 'free rider' issue in 1965 explaining how 'the rational individual will not contribute to the costs of providing public goods but will go ahead and enjoy them nevertheless' (1994: 157).

The 'free rider' problem is what has been described as the 'prisoner's dilemma' problem in game theory, which was a method that developed during World War II for the analysis of strategic decisions. The prisoner's dilemma encompasses the problem of the contribution that rational individuals make or don't make to society and the distribution of public goods; and is 'analogous to a social world in which public goods would be valuable to have, but in which individuals would lose something from contributing to the public good as long as other people do not' (Collins, 1994: 158). What makes the situation a dilemma is the fact that interactions between rational selfish individuals leads to no one ever sacrificing anything for the public good.

The prisoner's dilemma issue represents a stage in the development of rationality where the introduction of game theory and in particular of iterated games, according to Collins, have been proposed as a way to overcome the problems of social coordination. This is because when individuals are involved in a series of games with the same patterns, they ultimately develop long-run patterns of behaviour that differ from what happens in a single game (1994: 159). Game theory is here invoked as a solution for understanding social solidarity reflecting some first attempts to develop and employ an economics rooted theory, such as rationality, for the explanation of social behaviour and decision-making processes.

As Andrew Colman (1982) states, traditional theories of social psychology lacked the necessary concepts with which to deal rigorously with interdependent decision-making. This justified the necessity and suitability of a systematic theory, which would analyse interactions and decision outcomes that depended upon the decisions of other people. Colman recognised the need to explain deliberate decisions, which was an area that

existing theoretical models were unable to deal with, since they tended to explain the behaviour of inanimate objects as responses to external forces. He states that most psychologically interesting forms of social behaviour derive from deliberate decisions, some of which are agreeable to game theory analysis (1982: 3-4).

Nevertheless, game theory did not attract much attention until Jon von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern published 'The Theory of Games and Economic behaviour' in 1944. It was their mutual interests in strategic behaviour that joined von Neuman's mathematical expertise with Morgenstern's interest in individual-level analysis in the building of new economics leading to the development of the first social science – centred mathematical innovations. They were both convinced that mathematics provided the appropriate toolbox for researching the complicated social sciences (O'Rand, 1992: 182-183). They focused on interactions among agents governed by a set of rules that specified the possible moves of the participants and a set of outcomes for each possible combination of moves. The idea was that such a theory of games could apply to almost any social interaction where individuals have some understanding of how the outcome for an agent is affected not just by his own action but by the actions of others as well (Heap & Varoufakis, 1995:1-2). It is therefore no surprise that von Neuman and Morgenstern's game-theoretic notions coursed into political science as well.

William H. Riker (1992), who also had a part in the development of the entrance of game theory in politics, explains that the lack of an intellectual centre in political science in the 1950s, with a clear understanding of what the science of politics was all about, rendered the introduction of a more scientific and systematised theory imperative. Riker refers to two features of game theory in particular, that appeared to fit into political science. Firstly, game theory tended to analyse social outcomes in terms of the interaction of participants, each of whom sought to achieve their goals, excluding factors such as instinct, thoughtless habits or unconscious desires that psychological and metaphysical theories would embrace in explaining social behaviour (1992:209).

Secondly, Riker explains that game theory allowed for free choice, recommending that participants could choose their strategies according to their preferences and based on calculations of the opponents' preferences as well. That was contrary to theories of economic and historical determinism that had turned humans into mechanistic agents or

carriers of exogenously determined drives. At the same time, game theory can also guarantee the behaviour regularity that allows generalisation and that is present in the study of politics. Riker therefore argues that what game theory offers is the possibility for both generalisation and free choice in the analysis and understanding of political interactions and outcomes (1992: 210). All in all, the significance of game theory and particularly of its entrance in political science lies in allowing the investigation of political decisions within the context and as outcomes of interactions between participants; and more importantly, it focuses on political outcomes as resultants of decisions that are made consciously, unlike the decisions driven by unconscious desires that social and psychological theories explain.

The brief historical account of the development of rationality as a tradition and the entrance of game theory in the social and political sciences serves as a departure point in demonstrating the advantages of the specific approach in relation to other sociological theories of social action and decision-making. For instance, contrary to the discipline of sociology that depends on largely abstract social systems, rationality and game theory provide a systematic context for the investigation and analysis of social and political action. Instead of focusing on thoughtless habit and instinctive processes of decision-making, game theory places the emphasis on interactions and examines human behaviour as the outcome of such interactions. Action is therefore a complex interactive phenomenon that game theory helps investigate in depth; while the emphasis on the purposive instrumental and calculating orientations of the individuals make the empirical study and analysis of human behaviour possible as well.

3.3 Rational Choice Theory and the political process

Rational choice theory provides the foundation to understand and employ game theory for the analysis of political interactions. The present section introduces the concept of rational decision-making as a foundation of game theory in an effort to identify some fundamental principles in the behaviour of actors that will contribute in the formation of a systematic game model. Given that the theory is often accused of being unrealistic, the present section will attempt to defend it by highlighting its analytical strengths in relation to the purposes of this thesis.

To act rationally presupposes correspondence between means and ends and the development of a behaviour that aims at maximising one's own interests. The process of rational decision-making reflects the selection among a number of given alternatives with certain consequences each; and requires that individuals choose the alternative with the most beneficial outcome, in relation to their preferences and the value assigned to them. Prior to making a choice, rational actors are expected to rank the available alternatives. This ranking will help them in specifying the payoffs and worth of each possible outcome, before they proceed with the selection of strategy. The choice they make ultimately represents the goal they seek to achieve (Elster, 1986; Riker, 1992; Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

Rational choice theory recognises a certain degree of consistency in human behaviour, particularly for the achievement of goals. Elster describes rationality as a 'normative' concept, which indicates what action individuals *should* take in order to achieve their objectives. However, he recognises important non-normative applications in the use of rationality, particularly for explanation, prediction and description of the human behaviour (1986: 83). One of the theory's advantages lies specifically in the fact that, as opposed to psychological and cognitive theories of explanation, the rational choice approach focuses on outcomes of decisions and most importantly, it explains outcomes as deliberate choices (Tsebelis, 1990: 39-40).

To analyse human action based on the outcomes that this action yields, allows for the methodical identification and explanation of all these factors and constraints that lead to a given behaviour. It allows for the connection of the selected action with the actor's motives, preferences, goals, alternatives and consequences in a consistent way that produces a simple and systematic formula of how and why certain actions lead to certain outcomes. The idea is that the production of such formulas takes into account constraints and contextual factors and organises a number of variables in a way that offers adequate justification of non-optimal action not as a mistake but as a resultant of the combination and interaction of those variables. To examine human action as a deliberate one implies that this action is optimal to a certain degree and under certain circumstances. The input of rational choice theory in this case lies in discovering this optimal behaviour through the analysis and investigation of those forces that lead to a given course of action (Tsebelis, 1990).

The argument the present chapter seeks to make is that although rational choice theory is not the only possible approach to politics, it provides the tool for the understanding of interactions, which paves the way for a profound explanation and analysis of political decision-making. This can help discover unseen parameters in the development of specific political behaviours. It allows making more accurate guesses about future consequences of current actions and ultimately builds assumptions that permit prediction of future actions as well.

The theory is however often accused of being too idealistic, as it tends to exaggerate the degree of control that political actors have over their decisions. A popular example of the rational choice approach of an international political interaction was made by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) on the Cuban Missile Crisis. The analysts approach the Soviet and US decisions, to place offensive missiles in Cuba and to proceed with a blockade respectively, as alternatives whose consequences were preferred in terms of the actors' utility function; and they produce a detailed account of how and why each decision was made at a given point of time. They conclude that the specific event cannot be adequately explained through the rational approach due to several complexities and uncertainties that the model fails to take into account.

They actually introduce the concept of bounded rationality in an attempt to acknowledge the importance of knowledge and the limitations in the information processing ability of the rational agent (1999: 20). This is in order to highlight the often-misleading nature of rationality when it comes to analysing an actor's decisions, and the underestimation of information and empirical evidence about an actor's objectives and preferences. The limitations of rational choice theory as a tool for the explanation of goal-oriented human behaviour have also been stressed by Elster who recognises that, apart from the information processing constraints, also Freudian- type emotional factors hinder actors from selecting the most effective strategy to achieve their objectives (1986: 83).

In other words, rational choice theory appears to be highly demanding to the extent that one might wonder whether political actors can ever conform to it. It needs to be clarified that this thesis does not overlook or underrate the theory's deficiencies. It does however defend its effectiveness as an analytical instrument that can serve the purposes of this study. The employment of the theory does not serve to demonstrate that political actors

and institutions such as the media, act rationally in the sense of taking into account all the objective realities of the situation they are faced with. Yet, the argument this thesis makes is that a rational choice approach of the media-politicians interaction in the framework of international events can assist in comprehending why the actors in question behave the way they do. It can produce a model that will illuminate certain parameters in the behaviour of the two parties and reveal a new dimension of the media's role that extends beyond their cognitive impact on decision-making process and is consciously assimilated in governmental policy decisions.

3.4 Games and rational behaviour

In interactions between two or more actors and in situations of conflict many of those factors that define decision-making are not assigned to chance or to the given choice problem but to the opponent of each actor. 'This brings us to the theory of games, where such an opponent is an integral feature of the decision model problem' (Rapoport, 1980:52). Elster defines game theory as 'the theory of rational behaviour by two or more interacting rational individuals, each of them determined to maximise his own interests as specified by his own payoff function' (Elster, 1986: 89). What game theory offers in the analysis of rational behaviour, is a mathematical technique and a systematic character that can help in a more consistent analysis of the political interactions. It can analyse social outcomes in terms of the interaction of participants, each of who calculates to achieve self-defined goals. It also suggests that all estimations actors make about potential outcomes, they make them acknowledging that similar estimations are also made by the adversary (Riker, 1992).

On a general basis, a game can be described as a method for the solving and analysis of problems related to the process of decision-making. In order to solve a problem, it is essential that one assesses and analyses a given situation. When two or more actors, who face one another in their attempt to find a solution that is favourable to them, handle such situations then the situation can be described as a game. Games that are played between two or more actors are classified as games of strategy and they are concerned with situations in which outcomes depend upon the choices that all the involved players make; the outcome of the game is therefore controlled partly by all players (Colman, 1982: 10). Decisions in such games are made under uncertainty due to the fact that actors cannot fully allocate probabilities to one another's moves and they are not

capable of having complete control of the outcomes of the game (Heap & Varoufakis, 1995; Hamburger, 1982; Colman, 1982). One basic attribute of the game is the effort that each participant makes to prevent the adversary from making moves and decisions that will hinder the payoffs of the former. The actors are involved in an analysis and assessment of the given situation; they develop strategic action and make moves that will ultimately maximise their interests.

Games do not describe only interactions between two or more actors but also models of one-person decisions, whose outcomes are influenced by the moves of Nature. Colman refers to this type of decision-making as games of chance (1982: 9). The outcomes of such games result partly from the decisions of the actor and partly from Nature, which represents an invented player and operates as a force that is unpredictable by the decision-maker. It has its own set of actions and rules and can pursue them in a way that interferes with the achievements of the player. Later in this chapter we will encounter both types of games as part of the model under construction.

The contribution of game theory to this thesis is of course analogous to that of rational choice theory. Game theory is introduced here as a process that incorporates rational decision-making in interactions between players. It assumes that players act rationally calculating and following their best strategies. The outcome of the interaction between strategies of rational players is described as equilibrium. Behaviour 'in equilibrium' is a key part of the structure and process of a game and signifies a player's selection of strategy as the best response to the strategies of the opponent. Such a strategy represents the course of action from which none of the players has an incentive to deviate (Dixit & Skeath, 1999; Heap & Varoufakis, 1995; Tsebelis, 1990). Equilibrium arguments help in discovering the optimal behaviours of actors (Tsebelis, 1990:41) and are seen as among the analytical assets the theory offers. When actors do not appear to make an equilibrium decision, the analysis can ultimately lead to the discovery of contextual factors that provide a more accurate and in depth behaviour explanation.

As it was mentioned earlier, game theory is here favoured over prospect theory as an extension of favouring a rational approach over a cognitive one for the analysis of the media's impact on political decision-making. Game theory can organise human behaviour in a consistent and analytical manner and therefore can provide a systematic

explanation of specific events and outcomes that prospect theory cannot. Given the set of rules that control media organisations as well as the interests they pursue, the media appear to bring together features that render their approach as strategic actors feasible. At the same time, their interaction with the government offers for profound analysis as a game. A cognitive analysis of this interaction would assign the potential media impact to the interpersonal processing of the media frame by the decision-maker. On the contrary, a game theoretic approach will highlight the interests that drive the employment of specific frames by the media and integrate them in the analysis as part of the decision-maker's processing and evaluation of a given situation.

Apart from the use of explanation, game theory can be used for purposes of prediction as well. Dixit & Skeath note, 'when looking ahead to situations where multiple decision-makers will interact strategically, we can use game theory to foresee what actions they will take and what outcomes will result' (1999: 34). The construction of a formula, which consistently analyses the forces that drive decisions made both by political and media actors, can help model the interaction in a way that allows its application to future instances. In this case the media could even become considerable tools for the analysis of political outcomes.

3.4.1 Game theory in conflict situations

The thesis seeks to produce a theoretical model, for which there exists no formula in the literature that can be employed as an example. What the literature does include though is examples of the application of game theory on international events and situations of conflict between nation-states. The present section will introduce the Cuban Missiles Crisis as a paradigm that will help understand the structure and process of a political game. This example will also provide the foundation for the type of game in which the media will be integrated as part of our theoretical model. At this stage it is essential to introduce a few basic concepts and presentational conventions that will be encountered in the present and in later chapters as well, with regard to the formulation and development of political games.

A game theoretic analysis involves three fundamental concepts, players, strategies and payoffs. A player represents any individual or composite actor that makes purposeful decisions/moves, which will then represent the player's strategies. The intersection of

the strategies produces outcomes, the evaluation of which is then translated into payoffs for each player, according to the players' preferences among the produced outcomes. These concepts can be organised in two basic forms, -the 'normal form' and the 'extensive form'. The first represents the choice situation as a matrix in which the strategies of one player are represented by rows while the ones of the other player are represented by columns. The combination or intersection of the players' strategies results in their payoffs, which are in the form of numbers depicted in the cells of the matrix. The normal form of the game represents the form of games where the players move simultaneously, contrary to the extensive form that represents games played in sequential moves. In the extensive form of the game, the players' moves are depicted in a decision-tree that shows the sequence in which the two players move and lists their payoffs at the end of each sequence of moves. Trees allow to express a succession of moves with each player knowing the moves and decisions that have taken place up to the time of a particular decision (Hamburger, 1979: 11-12, 26; Scarpf, 1997: 7). The two forms of the game will be introduced in the following section, based on the example of the Chicken game (Figure 3.1).

Rapoport claims that the theory of games can be reasonably defined as a theory of rational decision in conflict situations. The conceptualisation of politics as a manifestation of conflict and the conceptualisation of rationality as a mode of reasoning allow for casting a crisis into a framework of decision under risk (1980:52). While this does not imply that the political actors involved will behave fully rationally, the organisation of a crisis as a game allows for the in depth examination and explanation of political decisions.

A conflict can be described as an interaction between nation states and parties that seek to achieve certain objectives[3]. If when pursuing these objectives, the involved parties develop a strategy plan to confront the adversary, knowing that the adversary is doing the same and knowing that they depend on the adversary's moves as well, then the opposing parties become actors in a political game. In other words, this thesis suggests

[3] Conflict emerges from a particular combination of parties, incompatible positions over an issue, hostile attitudes and certain types of diplomatic and military actions. The parties to an international conflict are normally the governments of nation states...parties seek to achieve certain objectives...Conflict behaviour is likely to result when party A occupies a position that is incompatible with the wishes or interests of party B...the most traditional issue field is territory...' (Holsti, 1992: 348-349).

that any political interaction in the form of a conflict, can be illustrated in the form of a game.

A conflict situation in politics can be best described as a nonzero-sum game. It is difficult to assume that the total loss of an actor will entail the best outcome and greatest payoff for the other. Not to mention that, 'pure conflict, in which the interests of two antagonists are completely opposed, is a special case; it would arise in a war of complete extermination, otherwise not even in war' (Schelling, 1960: 4). Especially in cases where two parties are involved in a conflict about to end up in war, the 'winner' will inevitably bear a certain cost from the outcome. Besides, in most political conflicts actors are involved in bargaining situations. This indicates the element of cooperation that is often allowed in nonzero-sum games, where the involved parties select strategies and make decisions following communication. In this category of games actors are more likely to reach an agreement or compromise and avoid the worst possible outcome. In general, conflict situations are mostly games of mixed conflict and cooperation. One such example could be the case of an international conflict where, although both actors agree they want to avoid war, they disagree in the way in which war will be avoided; and while one actor prefers solution A, the other insists on solution B.

In this thesis, the objective is to obtain a clear picture of the media's role in the decision-making processes, in conflict situations. Therefore, an accurate analysis of the two Greek- Turkish crises employed as a case study becomes vital; and is expected to answer some crucial questions in the escalation and resolution of each crisis as well as create scope to detect the role of the media. Game theory will help understand why the two governments selected certain strategies instead of others; and also, identify whether and to what extent the media coverage was among the factors that defined the interaction between the two governments and the wider context in which decisions were made.

3.4.2 The Cuban Missiles Crisis as a political game

The Cuban Missiles Crisis of 1962 constitutes an example from political and military history that has been used quite widely in terms of game theoretic analysis. It appears that the drama of the episode and the amount of information available to the analysts about the progress of the events renders both the reconstruction of the progress in game

theoretic terms and the drawing of accurate inferences a feasible task. The discussion of the specific example provides also a manifestation of a game theoretic analysis of political decision-making. It also demonstrates the flexibility of the theory in incorporating and organising the subjective specifications of each situation and the potential for an evolutionary development and analysis. The most common perception of the specific crisis is that the two superpowers were about to involve in a nuclear confrontation; and the most appropriate game model to incorporate this is the so-called Chicken, a classical model of two-person games.

Chicken has been applied to the Cuban Missiles crisis by Nigel Howard in his article 'Some developments in the Theory and Application of Metagames (General Systems, XV, 1970). The name derives from various versions of a gruesome pastime that originated among Californian teenagers in the 1930s and became notorious in 1955 through Nicholas Ray's powerful film *Rebel Without a Cause*, starring James Dean (Colman, 1995). The most familiar version of the game is that of the two motorists speeding towards each other. The description of the game can be replaced by the matrix shown in figure 3.1. Therefore each motorist can choose between two strategies; either swerve, which in this case is translated into 'Cooperation', or else 'C'; or drive ahead, which equals 'Defection', or 'D'. More specifically, actor 1 can choose the right or left column while actor 2 can pick the top or bottom row. Their two choices determine a cell of the matrix. If both players choose Cooperation and swerve on time, the outcome of the game is 3, 3 as shown in the top left cell, which equals compromise or else a draw. If on the other hand, actor 1 chooses Defection and drives ahead while actor 2 selects cooperation and swerves, the outcome is 2, 4, as shown in the top right cell, with 2 being the payoff for actor 2, who is the Chicken; and 4 being the payoff for actor 1, who is the winner (The payoff for the row player is shown first). The same outcome occurs if the two actors choose the opposite moves (4, 2), but this time the Chicken is actor 1. In case none of the motorists decides to swerve on time and therefore they both choose to defect, they both get 1 as shown in the bottom right cell, which is the worst possible outcome; and they end up in a head-on collision.

In the application of the Chicken game on the Cuban Missiles crisis Howard set out the following strategies: On the one hand, the Soviet Union could choose either to continue placing missiles in Cuba or to withdraw them. On the other hand the strategies available

to the US government were either to proceed with an invasion in Cuba or to withdraw. The question that Howard attempted to answer was what the best strategy could be for both the Soviet Union and the US government. Using the example of the chicken game, he produced the model shown in figure 3.2.



Figure 3.1 : The Chicken game in its normal and extensive form

In the specific game, Cooperation is the best strategy for both actors. The US government could reach a peaceful settlement and withdraw from invading, provided that the Soviet Union would also agree to withdraw from placing offensive missiles in Cuba. This is an outcome that does not yield the greatest payoff for any of the sides. But it leads to a compromise where none of the actors is 'chicken'. The choice of Defection is the strategy with the greatest payoff but only on the condition that the adversary would choose to cooperate. This is an example that stresses the importance of the players' coordination of their behaviour in order to solve the problem and reach an equilibrium point. Players have to understand each other's sets of moves in order to be able to predict each other's moves and avoid the worst possible outcome of the game.

Howard's example appears rather static when compared to the analysis conducted by Allison & Zelikow for the same crisis. This is because the latter attempt an analysis of sequence. They investigate a series of alternatives available to the two actors and examine in detail the reasons that led to the final decisions. What they take into account is that each side did not make an all-or-nothing choice but considered alternatives, in case the adversary did not respond in an appropriate manner (Brams, 1994: 133).

		USSR	
		C: withdraw missiles	D: proceed with placing missiles
USA	C: withdraw	3, 3 Compromise	2,4 USSR wins
	D: invade	4, 2 USA wins	1, 1 Nuclear War

Figure 3.2: The Cuban Missiles Crises in the form of the Chicken game

The same example has been analysed by Brams (1994) illustrating the incorporation of rational choice in game situations. What is particularly interesting about Brams' analysis is how, contrary to Howard, he interprets the US blockade as a move of cooperation. He claims,

> 'Although in one sense the United States "won" by getting the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, Premier Nikita Khruschev at the same time extracted from President John Kennedy a promise not to invade Cuba which seems to indicate that the eventual outcome was a compromise solution of sorts. Moreover, even though the Soviets responded specifically to the blockade...the fact that the United States held out the possibility of escalating the conflict indicates that the initial blockade decision was not considered final' (1994: 132-133).

Brams' argument is that that the two superpowers were involved in a sequential bargaining game in which they considered further alternatives than the ones listed in Howard's matrix, and kept their options open while the crisis was progressing. In fact, Brams offers the alternative of the crisis being interpreted as other than a chicken game in an attempt to demonstrate the incapability of game theory to offer an accurate interpretation of the situation.[4] However, there is potential for a more flexible and realistic game theoretic analysis of such an international event that systematically incorporates the complexities of a given situation. Dixit & Skeath, who employed the extended form of the game and demonstrated more than one interpretation of the moves made by the two

[4] Brams is actually suggesting the Theory of Moves as a superior and more accurate alternative to classical game theory, which however preserves the fundamental principles of the latter. We could argue that he introduces TOM as a more flexible version of game theory, which represents the progress that is anyway being made in the development of game theory. Brams, (1994).

players, conducted such an analysis. They recognised the uncertainties embedded in the crisis and argued that game theory was adequate to explain the decision-making process, but not as a two-person game. They therefore suggested the interplay of a number of many-person games as a better way to look at the crisis (1999: 445-450).

To sum up, the example of the Cuban Missiles crisis provides a manifestation of a political game, such as a conflict situation, in the normal form of the game depicted in the game matrix. The matrix organises the potential outcomes that result from the combination of the two moves available to each player. What it fails to demonstrate is the sequence in which the two actors moved, which can of course be depicted in an extended form of the game; as well as the background complexities that affected the progress and outcome of the crisis, and which are possible to incorporate in a many-person or a many-arena game. In other words, the normal form of the game represents one of the various ways to analyse a decision-making process. The argument that this section seeks to make is the following: the different interpretations that derive from the various analyses of the Cuban Missiles crisis as a game, in principle with regard to the outcome of the crisis, do not demonstrate the inadequacy of the theory to offer accurate decision analysis. They rather indicate that political decisions should not be evaluated in isolation but within a wider context of complexities and uncertainties. Game theory is capable of consistently integrating this context in the decision-making process and tracing the optimal moves of the players that would justify their action and the outcome of the game. At the same time, to study the decisions of political actors within this wider context creates scope for the integration of the media as an influential component of the political game. This will be demonstrated in the following two sections. On the basis of a political game organised similar to the Cuban Missiles crisis, the remaining part of the chapter will incorporate the media's role as an actor in the decision-making process and illustrate the dimensions of their strategic action.

3.5 Games in multiple arenas

The purpose of the present section is to locate the strategic position that the media tend to occupy in the structure of the political game. It seeks to integrate the concept of the conflict situation as a game interaction between actors and the role of information and communication as a role carried by a third actor. This completes the formation of the

game model that will serve the purposes of this thesis; and it involves breaking the political game into more than one levels.

Among the most effective inputs of the game theory literature is that it creates scope for a systematic integration of socio-political factors such as the media as actors in the political game. The present section will discuss three models that offer a rigorous analysis of political games as outcomes of the systematic integration of more than two parties; and that offer reasons why political games should not be studied in isolation but within a wider socio-political context. Putnam's 'two-level' game (1988), Tsebelis' 'nested' game (1990) and Scharpf's 'composite actor' (1997) will be presented here in an effort to identify some common concepts that will help build a profound understanding of the media's strategic position in political decision-making.

Putnam, who sought to construct a model describing situations of international negotiations with the two involved sides calculating both the domestic and international implications of their actions, introduced the model of the 'two-level game'. In Putnam's metaphor bargainers are involved simultaneously in two arenas of negotiations, one representing the international and the other the domestic arena. In order for the negotiation round to complete successfully, the parties involved are expected to accomplish an international agreement that has also been domestically ratified.

In terms of conflict situations, the international or external level represents the main conflict between the national parties. In this stage the two national adversaries are involved in a bargaining procedure in an effort to find the most satisfactory solution to the conflict and reach an international agreement. The agreement they reach will however remain tentative. Any agreement achieved in this level is subject to ratification by the domestic environment of each national actor. While the bargaining process between the two negotiators takes place, there is a set of separate discussions within the domestic constituents of the two negotiators about whether to ratify this agreement. Domestic statesmen are expected to negotiate on whether to accept or block the proposed agreement. Putnam has called the two different stages as level 1 and level 2 respectively (1988: 435-436).

Putnam's inquiry focuses particularly on cases of international negotiations and the utility of domestic pressures as a bargaining advantage for the achievement of beneficial international agreements. In the example of the Bonn summit conference of 1978 he describes how a comprehensive package deal regarding the enhancement of Western recovery from the first oil shock was achieved between the governments of Germany, Japan and USA. He suggests that the agreement, which appeared to leave all participants happy, 'became possible only because a powerful minority within each government actually favoured on domestic grounds the policy being demanded internationally' (1988: 428). The specific model implies the involvement of domestic constituents in a decision-making process that result in either the ratification or the blockage of the respective international agreement mostly through a parliamentary function. On this respect the model does not apply in the case of the role the media can play as a second-level actor. Yet, it brings in ideas that can help understand and analyse the media's impact as domestic constituents on foreign policy decisions.

A crucial point Putnam makes is that, apart from the impact that domestic rejection of an agreement has on the international decision or strategy, even the expectation of a domestic rejection is an equally potent constraint for the progress of an international negotiation. The element of expectancy becomes crucial as it allows for the media to play the role of the domestic advocate on a second level, through their ability to create conditions of domestic cost for the government. This becomes possible for two reasons. On the one hand, the idea of the expectation cost does not necessitate any formal action at the second level of the interaction and it allows for the media to take the place of one of the domestic constituents as well. On the other hand, this is an observation that corresponds to the idea of the audience cost and punishment that the media are capable of producing; and the impact that this potential or expected punishment can have on governmental decisions.

Putnam stresses how the second-level pressure exerted on international negotiators derives from a small domestic win-set and can explain what he calls 'involuntary defection' (1988: 438). This is again an idea that can incorporate the media in a two-level political game. The media's win set in this case is reflected in their commercial and organisational preferences. If this does not overlap with the government's policy decision, it could produce a negative coverage and a media punishment, the expectation

of which would explain what Putnam calls, involuntary defection on the international board. This is an idea that attempts to clarify the complexity of moves that although seem irrational on one board, they can be justified due to being rational on the second board. To assume that the media can be perceived as the cause of such an involuntary defection provides the grounds to approach and examine their role also as instruments of analysis of political outcomes and international decision-making. That is to say, the media's strategic action, as a source of domestic pressure, can ultimately help justify seemingly irrational decisions.

A similar observation is made in Tsebelis' nested game and the concept of the suboptimal decision. The nested game represents the political game as a whole network of games the actor is involved in (1990: 5-11). The idea is that what appears to be suboptimal or irrational from the perspective of only one game, is actually optimal when the whole network of games is taken into account. Tsebelis explains that the main reason why a given decision is not optimal is because its implications are considered by the observer only in one arena. When the implications of that same decision in other arenas are also considered, then the decision-maker has acted optimally. The essence of this notion is to understand the interconnection of the different arenas in the network through the impact that decisions made in one arena may have on the rest of the arenas too. Tsebelis stresses the importance of the network of games lies in understanding why an actor would proceed with a suboptimal move, as this same move might appear optimal when seen from the perspective of the whole network of games. It is an idea that correlates with Putnam's explanation of the involuntary defection as a move that is being driven to satisfy second-level pressures; only that in Tsebelis' model the suboptimal move appears as only *apparently* irrational and it represents a disagreement between the actor and the observer, rather than the result of domestic pressures. Tsebelis' point is that the latter's perspective is incomplete since he focuses only on the main arena and not on the whole network of games (1990: 9).

The important contribution of the examination of a network of games is that it provides a systematic approach to contextual factors and their influence on the payoffs of the actors and the outcomes of the game. Tsebelis suggests that such contextual factors can be studied as externalities, in the form of the consequences that an interaction between two parties can have on the decisions of a third party (1990: 58-59). If the media's

preferences in the game are approached in terms of their interaction with the government's preferences, the impact of this interaction on the outcome of the international game and the utility of two governments is then seen as an *externality*.

Although both Putnam's and Tsebelis' concepts attempt to demonstrate the weight accorded to 'background' influences on decisions and strategy selections, Tsebelis emphasises the strategic dimension of deciding against one's own preferences, which will not just please the background arenas but will also assure a more preferred final outcome (1990: 3). His observation is clearly illustrated in the example cited regarding the Finnish presidential elections.

'According to the Finnish law, presidential elections are conducted by a three hundred member electoral college. An election may require two rounds if no candidate gains the majority of the votes and the first two ranking candidates compete in a second round...In 1956 there were three candidates that participated in the first round: the agrarian Urho Kekkonen, the Socialist Karl-August Fagerholm and the conservative Juo Kusti Paasikivi. Given that the most challenging opponent for Kekkonen, who was supported by the communist party, was the conservative Paasikivi, one would expect the communists to give all their votes to Kekkonen. Instead, the majority voted for the Socialist candidate' (1990: 2).

Tsebelis' argument in this case is that the communists voted against their preferences in the first round in order to eliminate the more threatening conservative candidate and to promote their most preferred outcome in the second round by voting exclusively for Kekkonen. This is a case of an apparently irrational decision made in the main arena of the game, which however served the objectives of the whole network of arenas.

It could be argued that one of the main differences between Putnam's and Tsebelis' conceptualisation of a game taking place in more than one levels, is the following: in the two-level game the influence of the domestic constituents is perceived as an acceptance or rejection of an international policy and aims at meeting domestic interests. Consequently, the international actors 'will aim at maximising their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures' (Putnam, 1988:434). In the nested game the background arenas represent mostly another level of the main actors' preferences and interests. In this case what might appear an irrational decision is not a resultant of background pressures, but rather a strategic or sophisticated move (as opposed to sincere) in order to obtain a more preferred outcome (Tsebelis, 1990: 3). On this basis, the idea of the nested game represents a better coordination of interests between the different games of the network

than the parties involved in Putnam's two-level game; and it appears to be in line with what Scharph describes as the 'composite actors'.

Schapf's notion implies action on two different levels as well and is organised in an outside-inside or a micro-macro relationship. His inquiry lies in the main actor being perceived both from the outside as a composite one with certain resources he or she employs for strategic action; and from the inside, as an institutional structure within which internal actors interact to produce the strategy of the composite actor (1997: 52). In this case, the game is reflected on one level in the number of internal actors that coordinate their preferences and interests, and on a second level in the strategic action produced by the internal interactions as a whole. The 'macro' version of the composite actor could also be perceived as a nested game, in the sense that the different arenas of the network consist of such composite actors.

The description of the above three models serves in providing a basis to understand the progress of games in more than one level; and based on this narrative, to identify the location of the media in the political game between two national governments. The model that this thesis will employ combines elements from the three paradigms described above. I shall employ the example of the Cuban Missiles crisis game as a reference point for the understanding of the interrelation between the various actors and arenas. In this case, the Cuban Missiles crisis represents a broader, international game played between the two national governments and unfolds in three interconnected interactions that represent the different arenas of the game. The game develops as follows:

- Arena 1: interaction between the two governments, i.e. USA and USSR
- Arena 2: interaction between each government and the American and Soviet media respectively
- Arena 3: interaction between the national media and the respective audience/public

The third interaction between the media and the public is rather one-sided since the public's views are here conceptualised as being shaped by the media frames. However, it is important that we specify the components of this interaction too, since the existence of the public is actually playing a critical role in the impact of the media as a whole.

Therefore, the media's profile as a player in arena 2 derives from their interaction with the public in the sense that the media frames are perceived by the decision-maker as a source of information for the public.

The three arenas represent the network of games that are nested within one another, while the media's impact on the governmental decision-making results from a sequence of influences that occur between the three interactions, starting from arena 3 and moving towards arena 1. More precisely, the interaction between the media and the audience (arena 3) shapes the media coverage of the crisis and therefore their interaction with the government (arena 2), which is then expected to influence the progress and the outcome of the interaction that runs in arena 1. In other words, arena 3 is nested in arena 2, which is nested in arena 1. Given that arena 2, which embodies arena 3, is running in both countries separately, we have an international game in which the interaction between the two national governments is influenced by the outcome of two respective additional arenas, where the national media are located as determinants of the public's views.

At this stage, it is essential that we identify the exact nature of the interaction in arena 2. In game theoretic terms, the media and the government could be approached as two players who employ their strategies toward each other aiming at reaching an agreement and/or maximising their payoff as well. Within this context, their best decision would be decided through a communication procedure in the form of bargaining. However, in this interaction the media's strategic action is embodied in the information they convey as a reaction to specific policy decisions the government makes in the international arena, rather than as a move that aims at 'confronting' the adversary directly.

It is important to note that the media frames, through which this information is disseminated, are employed in accordance with the media's interests and preferences and with a set of norms that define the news construction and framing procedure. Such norms represent ideological inclinations that are often related to the political preferences of the owner of a media organisation. They are also reflected in the specific 'unspoken and uncritically accepted routines, procedures and rules' through which the news is constructed. (Cook, 1998: 75). These routines dictate that the information is packaged into a narrative that will involve the protagonists, conflicts and drama required for the production of a 'newsworthy' story. When combined with the increasing concentration on

ownership and profit-oriented management and the financial reliance on advertisers, the news values and production routines result in the production of further commercialised news (Bennett, 2005; Sparrow, 1999; Cook, 1998). In other words, the media operate and make decisions independent of the governmental decisions and within a specific set of rules that defines their preferences, payoffs and strategies.

The critical attribute of this action is however that the decision maker's payoffs will still be affected by it. The most accurate way to conceptualise this interaction in game theoretic terms is as a one-person game against Nature. In this the government represents the main player in the game while the media stand for Nature. The conception of the media as a so-called 'fictitious' player serves in incorporating their impact in the international political interaction as a set of rules and norms that 'interferes' with the decisions of the government. The outcome of this interaction derives partly from the decisions of the decision-maker and partly from Nature's moves without necessarily one being directed to confront the other.

The outcome of the level 2 - interaction is produced in three interrelated stages that develop as follows:

- Stage 1: the commercial interests and preferences of the media define the frames through which they disseminate information in the form of the news
- Stage 2: the news frames target the public
- Stage 3: through the public's attention and perception, the news frames create conditions of audience cost for the decision-maker, given that the government is aware of both the media frames and what the public knows.

The outcome of the interactions in arena 2 and 3 is here conceptualised as an *externality* (Figure 3.3). The term *externality* is used in the context of Tsebelis' usage and definition and it reflects 'the consequence to third parties from the interaction between two other parties' (1990: 59). In this case, the media's impact on the government's decisions unfolds in the following two externalities:

- Externality 1: *domestic cost* → outcome of the media-audience interaction (arena 3)
- Externality 2: *international cost* → outcome of the media-government interaction (arena 2)

On the one hand it is their interaction with the audience that composes the externality by producing the expectation of media punishment through the audience cost and the expected domestic opposition. This is depicted in the diagram as externality 1 and constitutes information that affects the payoffs of the decision-maker domestically. On the other hand, this type of interaction between the media and the decision-maker is the second externality that affects the decision-maker's international strategy and therefore their payoffs on an international level as well. The level 2 interaction is produced by the coordination on the one hand of the commercial preferences and interests of the media and on the other of the decision maker's interests both vis-à-vis the media and their international adversary. What one can notice here is the role of the audience as a common reference point for both politicians and the media, which is of high importance in the impact the media would ultimately exert on the government's decisions.



Figure 3.3: The Nested Game

It is a coordination that is largely built on the expectation of media punishment and defines the strategy of the government on level 1. This argument is in line with Putnam's observation regarding the critical impact that the expectation of the level 2 interaction alone is likely to have on the decisions made on arena 1, even before any action has taken place on arena 2. Given that any decision that is made by the two national governments on arena 1 is in line with the arena 2 interaction, it should be evaluated in relation to the outcome and payoff it would yield for all actors and on both levels. That is

to say, a seemingly irrational international move should be examined in terms of a sophisticated and not sincere move, according to Tsebelis' definition.

The media's impact is reflected in the sophisticated move of politicians that decide against their international preferences in order to meet domestic objectives, or avoid domestic costs. This observation renders the media's role a 'strategic' one as opposed to the cognitive role that prospect theory would imply. The following sections will attempt to unfold this strategic role and impact the media have on decision-making processes. Because the media are primarily carriers of information, it is the type of information they disseminate and the way they frame it that defines their strategic role to a large extent. Information is a vital component in the progress of a game as well, which provides incentive for a thorough consideration of the media's role in relation to the information they convey.

3.6 Game Theory and the role of Information

Information plays a vital role in the process of decision-making and becomes even more crucial in games where the actors' choices depend on one another's. Information is also the media instrument that this thesis will study in relation to their strategic action in conflict situations from a game-theoretic theoretic approach.

At this point we need to identify two types of information that becomes a component of the political game and that will help theorise the media roles in that. In game theoretic terms, the role of information is of strategic nature. On a general basis, information may be about the structure of the game. In this case, it describes the amount of knowledge that actors have of each other's preferences, payoffs and of the outcomes that the combination between particular decisions have; or it may be information about what other players are choosing to do with that structure (Hamburger, 1979: 179). The distinction between games of complete and incomplete information describes the amount of knowledge the players have about the rules of the game as well as how likely it is that their opponent will be a player of one type or another and vice versa (Heap & Varoufakis, 1995: 29). Information can also indicate the advantage that players can gain in relation to their position towards their adversaries. Rasmusen refers to games of perfect information in order to demonstrate the importance of a game with no

simultaneous moves since each player knows exactly where he/she is in the game (2001: 48-56).

A second type of information may also be described as communication in the form of the passage of information from one party to the other (Hamburger, 1979:179), which can also be the case of a bargaining situation. Political actors involve in an exchange of signals, threats and messages that can be truthful or not and that would ultimately determine their moves towards one another. A general principle in bargaining is that the participants would wish to reveal information selectively according to the response they want to draw for their advantage, creating situations where certain players have different information from others. In this case information can also be distributed symmetrically or asymmetrically indicating the possibility of certain players having an informational advantage over others. Equally important is the amount of information that a player has or doesn't have about the other players' state of information (Hamburger, 1979: 116). Information and beliefs about information can be interrelated in such a complex way rendering the manipulation of information a game for itself, engaging the players in strategies and decisions for the type and amount of information they will reveal (Dixit & Skeath, 1999: 21-22).

3.6.1 Media entries in the political game

Information is a core feature in a game affecting directly the position of each player and defining her or his strategy. It could therefore be argued that the amount of information available to a player can pave the way to rational action, assisting them in approximating as accurate calculations as possible. This central role of information creates scope for the media to be located in the game in an interaction with the decision-maker that attains a 'strategic' quality. The present section will suggest three possible routes through which information disseminated by the media is integrated in the decision-making process in an effort to explain and justify why the media are strategic players in the political game.

The Instrumental Impact

To begin with, the media can function as sources that inform the involved players about the adversary's intentions and as communication channels for sending and receiving signals. This role refers back to the media becoming diplomatic tools in the hands of politicians. I call this an *instrumental* impact in the progress of the game. There is a

certain strategic element in acting as diplomatic instruments since their employment serves the achievement of strategic ends. However, the fact that in this case the media's 'action' is mostly controlled by politicians, who decide upon the media's usage, does not portray the real dimensions of their role as it diminishes the significance of their influence.

The Cognitive Impact

The cognitive dimension of the media frame was discussed in chapter two, within the framework of prospect theory. This role is centred in the media's predisposition to have preferences and make choices in the reporting of information. This explains their inclination to select the elements of the news story that will become more eminent in a given text. The impact of a news frame that promotes a given problem definition and prognosis, would lie in the wording and in the effect that this wording could have on the interpersonal processing of this information by the decision-maker. This process implies a change in the actor's framing and perception of the situation. The idea of the cognitive impact may also be elaborated through the concept of 'cheap talk,' costless signals (Sartori, 2002: 124). The media frames convey messages that have no direct effect on either the sender's or the receiver's payoff (Gibbons, 1992: 212). The significance of such information lies in the possibility that it changes an actor's belief about the adversary and therefore changes his action too. Such a strategy change will ultimately affect the outcome of the game and the players' payoffs as well. Although the effect that such a process may have reveals the crucial role of the media in decision-making processes, the fact that it implies an 'unconscious' impact of the media frames, demonstrates a media role that is not analysed and justified systematically.

The Strategic Impact

The strategic influence the media can have on decision-making processes is the focal point in this thesis and it also demonstrates the input and aptness of the game theoretic approach to this role. Although the key feature is again the media's inclination to make choices in what information to frame and how to frame it, the main distinction with the cognitive dimension lies in focusing on what drives these choices. The strategic approach underlines the purposeful selection of frames and the pursuit of particular organisational and commercial objectives, targeting large audiences and high circulations. The idea is that due to these forces the dissemination of information will

ultimately turn into a process of strategic influence on the decision-maker. This process involves the translation of the media's preferences and choices into costly information for the decision-maker. What the preceding chapter described as an indirect cognitive impact of frames here is approached from a rational perspective. This is done through the impact of the media frames on the public's beliefs, which generates an expected cost from the media's reaction to certain official decisions. The contrast with the cognitive approach is that the framing of the information in terms of a diagnosis and/or prognosis does not directly change the decision-maker's perception of a given situation. To put it differently, the media frame is not acknowledged by the decision-maker just as framed information that reflects ideological dispositions.

On the one hand it is perceived as a product of the media's rationalised preferences and objectives vis-à-vis the audience. At the same time, it is acknowledged as a source and foundation of the public mood regarding a given issue. It is the case that especially in international crises, domestic audiences become likely to 'punish' leaders for unsuccessful policy decisions, such as backing down from a threat (Martin 1993; Schultz 1998). The central impact of the media frames in this case is that they compose a crucial piece of information; which the decision-maker will have to take into account before deciding upon a strategy, in order to avoid the domestic/audience cost. This is the case of a player, such as the decision-maker, having information about what another player, such as the audience, knows, and deciding accordingly. The decision-maker is not affected by the frame directly as the cognitive approach suggests. Yet, it is affected by acknowledging the impact of the frame on the audience and the public mood and the reaction this can generate. This information becomes significant when one considers that 'the greatest fear of a modern politician is to get caught in the middle of a media feeding frenzy over a disastrous policy' (Van Belle, 2004: 21). In this case, the media's impact is by 'coercing' the decision-maker to consider the frame before proceeding with a decision; and most important, the decision is made consciously and after estimating the cost inherent in failing to consider the media coverage.

3.6.2 The Media's Strategic Impact

At this point it is essential to define the nature of the media influence on the governmental decisions. One way is to see it as a coordination of interests between the two arenas. That is to say, the government makes a decision in the international game

that reflects a balance between their interests and preferences on both arenas; and this is in order to avoid the audience cost. In this case, the media's strategic role is conceptualised as entering the calculations of the government with regard to their international action. But, the media influence can be more substantial than that. The interaction between the two arenas of the political game indicates that the official international policy is in fact decided through the progress of this interrelation and most importantly, according to what yields a payoff on both arenas at each given point in time. This assumption implies that, as part of this interrelation between domestic and international interests, a media influence can be exerted independent of the degree of policy certainty at hand. What the game theoretic approach offers here is to enable a diverse interpretation of the correlation between media frames and policy formation as suggested by the CNN Effect theory.

As described in chapter one, the theory conceptualises media influence in the form of a policy change, which becomes possible through the combination of empathy framed coverage on behalf of the media and lack of a firm and settled policy on behalf of the government. Ultimately, any media influence is excluded in the occurrence of policy certainty but this idea becomes void through the game theoretic approach. On a first instance, let us recall the possibility of political action in equilibrium. The concept implies the actors' involvement in a recurring course of action that a) is constantly changing as the options available to the players also change and so do their payoffs and b) when it reaches an equilibrium point, it signifies the selection of a strategy/behaviour and the production of an outcome that none of the players have any incentive to deviate from. The key assumption in this case is that any policy or behaviour change would indicate that the previous behaviour was no longer optimal. On these conditions the policy certainty argument becomes complex and difficult to prove systematically. This is because what the analysis of a mixed-motive game shows is how political actors reach an outcome after having completed a sequence of moves; and how these moves are the resultant of continuous adjustments to one another's preferences and interests as well as to changes produced by third parties. If policies are decided through this process, then no policy can be perceived as settled at the beginning of the interaction since it is bound to undergo changes by the end of it.

Consequently, a different perception of the media's impact on the political decision-making process is established. Their influence is inherent in the information they disseminate through the fames they employ, the expectation of an audience cost that this information generates and the coordination of interests between the media and the government it leads to. This interaction is then likely to generate changes in the ranking of preferences and in what is considered as optimal for the actor. Ultimately, the media's strategic role in the political game acquires a new dimension. It suggests a strategic impact that is unseen from the observer's point of view but which becomes evident through the systematic analysis of the media-politicians interaction that the game-theoretic approach provides.

3.7 Summary

The interaction between media and politicians is here portrayed through what I have called a *strategic* model that entails a *strategic* media impact on the political decision-making process. The term is basically employed to distinguish between the cognitive impact that frames exert on the information processing and ultimately on the perception one has of a given situation and the impact that is exerted on the calculations made by the political actor. The latter aims at emphasising the conscious evaluation of the media's presence by the decision-maker, as part of his strategy selection. The key idea is inherent not only in the information the media convey through the employment of frames, but also in the information that their interaction both with the audience and the decision-maker produces.

The contribution of the model lies in that it identifies the position of the media in the political process in relation to the decision-maker. It is important that although the media frames are not perceived as targeting the government, they are still taken into account; and this model unravels the process by providing a systematic connection between the decision-maker, the public and the media frames and identifying the input of each in the decision-making process.

In the remaining chapters the thesis will attempt the application of the game theoretic model on the media-government interaction in two Greek-Turkish conflict situations. The analysis is built on the hypothesis that the game theoretic approach will provide a rigorous assessment of the political crises that will help identify a correlation between the

strategic moves made by the two governments and the employment of the respective media frames. The application will ultimately serve in demonstrating the effectiveness of the model in practice; and in drawing inferences that could create a consistent framework of those conditions that determine the media's profile as political actors; as well as provide a better understanding of the media-government interaction in foreign policy and conflict situations.

4 Methodology and Design. A Case Study Research

4.1 Introduction

The theoretical model analysed in the previous two chapters, comprises the first part of the inquiry made in this thesis, while the remaining chapters compose the empirical part. The latter serves in providing the context within which we can obtain a better understanding of the function of the game-theoretic model and of the media's role in political decision-making as well. In particular, the empirical part of the study will seek to demonstrate the aptitude of the game - theoretic approach to explain interactions between media and governments; and to provide evidence of the media's potential to strategically influence political decision-making through the examination of the media coverage of two conflict situations. For this purpose, the empirical part of the study will examine two Greek - Turkish territorial crises and the coverage they attracted from the national press within the game-theoretic framework.

The present chapter will therefore describe the research strategy employed for the investigation of the media - government interaction in the specific two cases and for providing answers to the research questions in relation to the media's potential impact on political decision-making. The investigation will be conducted with the employment of a mainly qualitative research method described as 'case study', which in this case includes both the game-theoretic analysis of the two Greek-Turkish case studies and the content analysis of the press coverage of the specific crises. The following sections will offer a detailed description of the combination of these two elements of analysis. It needs to be clarified that the research design will be described relative to the theoretical framework that was built in the chapters two and three. Given that theory represents a key component in the development of a research design, the existing model will serve as a reference point.

4.2 Case study method

Case study is here employed as a qualitative research method that is concerned with the profound study, explanation and interpretation of specific social phenomena. Stake suggests that it is particularly the cause-and-effect relationships that case study seeks to identify, which can be important for the understanding of phenomena (1995: 41). Although as Stake claims, 'case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of

what is to be studied' (2000: 435) case study has become a widely used way of conducting qualitative research.

A case study can be an individual, an organisation, a process or a programme, to name but a few examples. In this thesis, the case study is represented by two territorial crises, two events that embody the interaction among several variables, which in this case require explanation and interpretation. One of the functions that case study method serves in relation to this thesis is to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions (Schramm, 1971 in Yin, 2003: 12). With the focus of the inquiry being placed on decision-making processes and the role of the media in them, case study can provide a practical tool in the analysis and understanding of such situations. It is often argued that case study research can investigate causal processes in the real world rather than artificially created settings (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000:5), which would justify the employment of such a method for the investigation of two real-world conflict situations. Case study also implies the collection of unstructured data and qualitative analysis of this data (Hammersley & Gomm: 2000: 3). This would not only apply to the analysis of a decision-making process but also to the analysis of data in the form of content as disseminated by the press.

For the present thesis, case study is an appropriate method due to its usefulness particularly in terms of theory development and for enabling the investigation of complex phenomena that incorporate complex causal relations (George and Bennett, 2005: 22). The game-theoretic model built in the previous chapter, represents both a process of theory development and a blend of complex causal relations and interactions that the case study method can accommodate. George and Bennett identify three more advantages in the employment of case study. The first advantage concerns the conceptual validity that researchers are able to achieve. Due to the fact that many of the variables that social sciences are concerned with are difficult to measure, case study allows for the rigorous consideration of contextual factors that will ultimately permit the 'measurement' of specific phenomena. A second advantage refers to the potential of case study method to identify new variables and hypotheses during the course of the research –i.e. during interviews or archival research. This is an advantage that statistical methods lack since the use of databases offers no means of identifying left-out variables. A third advantage is that case studies can examine the operation of causal

mechanisms, which the present study is also concerned with. Even within a single case study one can identify a number of intervening variables and if and how they can activate a causal mechanism (2005: 19-21).

Case study is a more suitable instrument also when compared to other types of methodology, such as a history, due to its nature as an explanatory research device that allows for dealing with *explanatory* questions and with *contemporary* events as well as including methods of direct observation of the events being studied (Yin, 2003: 6-8). Yin identifies particularly the direct observation and the study of contemporary events as the main difference between case study and history, although he claims that very often the two methods overlap. There are however further differences between the types of study that these two strategies offer. For instance, the development of a theoretical framework is a key element in the employment of case study but not in history, while the findings of a case study often build theoretical assumptions that aim at being generalised. Yin himself identified Graham Allison's study of the Cuban Missiles Crisis as one of the most successful case studies. The analyst in this case deals with a historical event but aims at an explanatory and not just descriptive study. At the same time, 'the lessons from the case study are intended to be generalisable not only to foreign affairs but more broadly to a whole variety of complex governmental actions' (Yin, 2003: 4).

Another element that makes case study the right method for the inquiry of this thesis is the study of the media, the press in particularly. Although the examination of the content of the press coverage can be easily described as another form of documentary analysis, it is different from the conventional historical document analysis. In this thesis, it is not merely the content of the media that is being studied, but rather the whole process of news-making that urges to view the media as organisations employing strategies and pursuing objectives. In this case, the study of the media takes the form of observation of a participant rather than simply of content analysis. Moreover, the recognition of the media not just as institutions or organisations but specifically as political institutions and the journalists as 'professional politicians' (Tuchman, 1991: 80) enhances the idea of news reflecting something more than just content.

Apart from providing a profound analysis of the decision-making process in the two crises and interpretation of the press coverage, the specific case study is also aimed at extracting some generalisation with regard to the media - government interaction during conflict situations. For this purpose, the case study employed here is best described as an *instrumental* case study (Stake, 2000: 437). Stake described this type of case study as of serving to facilitate our understanding of something else. That is to say, the specific case has been selected not because of interest in itself but because it serves in advancing the understanding of the media roles in political decision-making, which is the main interest in the present research. Stake differentiates this type of study from what he calls the *intrinsic* and *collective* case study. The former represents the case that is undertaken because of the researcher's particular interest in the case study itself while the latter refers to the employment of a number of cases and serves in the study of a more general condition. The selected Greek-Turkish cases could also be seen as a means to provide a better theorising about a wider collection of similar cases. However, it is the particular interest in the media's action, which the selection of the two cases supports, that would best describe the case study as an instrumental one. It needs to be mentioned though that even if the main focus of the inquiry is not in the case study but in the media, the context within which the media action develops remains highly significant. This is because another factor that makes the case study an ideal method for the inquiry of the present thesis is its emphasis on the context within which a specific issue or phenomenon develops; and that is especially when the boundaries between the occurrence of the phenomenon and the context are not clearly apparent (Yin, 2003: 13).

Like most other methods, the case study provides a strategy to examine an empirical issue through a series of procedures that compose the research design of the study. The following section will therefore describe the design of the present study in an effort to provide a better understanding both of the function of the theoretical game model developed earlier; and of the incentive in the selection of the press coverage of the territorial crises for the examination of the main research inquiry.

4.3 Research design

'...The design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions' (Yin, 2003: 20). Yin identifies five components in the development of case study design namely the study's questions,

theoretical propositions and/or hypotheses, unit of analysis and the linking of data to propositions and the criteria for interpretation of findings (2003: 21). Having these components as a guide, I will therefore describe the design for the present study.

4.3.1 Research questions

The questions that the present inquiry aims at answering have already been described in the introductory chapter. The nature of the research questions corresponds to the explanatory disposition of the case study method and aims at identifying the 'if', 'how' and 'why' the media develop a strategic action during times of international crises as well as the impact that this action exerts on decision-making processes.

4.3.2 Hypothesis and theoretical propositions

The setting of a hypothesis and theoretical propositions is a fundamental stage in the investigation of an issue. These provide more specific directions about what needs to be studied in order to answer the defined research questions. A hypothesis and a theoretical proposition represent a statement that will be tested through the research and the investigation of the empirical part of the study. A hypothesis may therefore function as a departure point for the investigation while the assessment of its validity and truth will shape the answers to the research questions (Yin, 2003; Silverman, 2000). It is important to state at this point that although hypotheses are distinguished from theories in the sense that unlike the former, theories cannot de disproved (Silverman, 2000:78), the setting of a hypothesis presupposes the building of a theoretical framework which would also show the researcher where to look for evidence.

On the basis of the theoretical model described in the chapters two and three, the main hypothesis set in the present research suggests that the game theoretic approach of the media-government relationship demonstrates the strategic action of the media that results in influencing decision-making processes as well. As one can notice, this is a proposition that embodies a theoretical and empirical hypothesis. That is to say, the present study aims at testing both the application of the game-theoretic model on media-government relationships and on the basis of that model, test the media's strategic impact on the political process. What one can see in this case is that the case study as a whole involves the building of theoretical model that is anyway a pre-requisite for the testing of the hypothesis. This is an important observation that helps define the type of

case study employed in this thesis, in relation to the role that the theory plays in answering the research questions. Therefore, the case study could be identified as a combination of a *disciplined- configurative study* and a *heuristic case study* (Eckstein, 2000; Mitchell, 2000).

The former type of case study assumes the availability of some 'general laws' of theory that might need supplementing and reconsidering. According to this type of case study, the interpretation of cases may lead to ad hoc additions to existing theories. It is not about building theory but about charging established theories, if they ought to fit it but they don't, and pointing up the need for a new theory, or even supplementing existing theories. The inquiry runs from comparatively tested theory to case interpretation and thence via ad hoc additions to new candidate theories (Eckstein, 2000:134-135). The definition and basic norms of a disciplined-configurative study can be said to partly correspond to the theoretic development in the present thesis too. That is to say, the thesis aims at building a theoretical model but based on already existing theoretical laws; and in response to the relative deficiencies in the existing literature and theoretical framework with regard to the media's role and influence in the political process, and foreign policy in particular. Hence, the case study is tied into theoretical inquiry, but only partially, since it is based on existing theories and general laws. The case study can be described as a disciplined- configurative one when seen within the wider context of the existing theory on media-government relationships and media effects on foreign policymaking.

The latter category is distinguished from the former in that the case study is deliberately selected to build theory (Mitchell, 2000: 173). Heuristic means 'serving to find out' and such case studies are less concerned with overall concrete configurations than with potentially generalisable relations between aspects of them. They are tied into theory building less passively than disciplined configurative study because the potentially generalisable relations do not turn up but they are deliberately sought out (Eckstein, 2000:137). The case study employed in the present thesis is partly heuristic because it considers existing theories with the objective of building a new game-theoretic framework with specifically defined norms. The press coverage of the two crises also serves in the more precise definition of the norms that compose this theoretical framework, which would then be possible to generalise to other similar cases. The

present thesis includes both the examination of existing theories, which are aimed to be supplemented; and the building of a new theoretical model, which can then be generalised further. The reason the present thesis does not entirely fall under the scope of either of these types is that it embodies two tightly intersected processes that correspond to both the disciplined- configurative and heuristic type of case study.

4.3.3 Unit of analysis: the employment of qualitative content analysis and process - tracing method

In the case study method, the unit of analysis reflects what the case actually is. A case study can be an individual, a group, or an event and in this the unit of analysis, and therefore of the case, is related to the way the initial research questions have been defined (Yin, 2003: 23). Following the theoretical propositions defined above, the unit of analysis in the present thesis consists of the strategic analysis of the decision-making process that took place in the two Greek-Turkish crises as well as the press coverage they attracted. The determination of this unit of analysis presupposes a sampling procedure first in relation to the selection of the cases to be investigated. In this study, the sample consists of two Greek-Turkish territorial crises occurred within a time span of nine years, in 1987 and 1996. It is here important to clarify the motivation inherent in the selection first of the Greek-Turkish example as a whole and second of the two specific crises. Therefore, apart from the personal concern and practicality reasons in selecting to investigate the interaction between these two countries, the Greek-Turkish conflict was selected also because it offers a context of an interaction among states that develops on a multilevel basis; not only as a conflict among nation-states but also as a socio-cultural conflict between Greece and Turkey (Gialouridis, 2001).

Hence, the Greek-Turkish conflict provides a wider framework of an interaction that develops involving the media as well. The examination of the press coverage of the two crises within this context becomes particularly important if we consider that both in Greece and Turkey, journalists are a significant constituent of those elite groups that shape public opinion. At the same time, the Greek-Turkish conflict represents an interaction between two states the governmental structure of which results in a different degree of influence that these media elites are expected to exert on decision-making processes. More precisely, the estimated impact of the media on foreign policy issues is less significant in Turkey than it is in Greece; and this of course is an implication of the

more authoritarian and highly centralised Turkish political system as opposed to the openly democratically structured Greek state (Glalouridis, 2001: 18-19).

The selection of the two crises signifies the employment of a so- called 'multi-case study' (Yin, 2003) that will provide grounds for a comparative analysis of the media – government interaction in that. The selection of these two crises among a series of conflicts that the two countries have involved in, is basically deliberate due to offering, if not contrasting, to a certain extent different situations that can serve for the comparative purpose and the extraction of more accurate and representative findings. Moreover, the selection of the two cases has taken place with prior knowledge of their outcomes while the multiple-case study inquiry focuses on why and how the outcomes relate to the media coverage of the each crisis.

Another feature of the case study employed in this research that is significant for its analysis is its embedded nature. Contrary to the so-called 'holistic' design that examines the case study as a single unit, the embedded case study is analysed across a number of individual units that compose the case as a whole. (Yin, 2003: 42). In this study each Greek-Turkish crisis comprises the main unit of the case that unfolds in the press coverage of the event that takes place in two separate countries, while the press coverage in each country unfolds further into the coverage provided by two separate newspapers. As a result of that, each case includes two embedded units. One unit encompasses the press coverage that materialises within the framework of the country and another unit embodies the press coverage within the framework of the newspaper. Figure 4.1 depicts the structure of the embedded multi-case study.

The importance of treating the study as a multi-case and as an embedded one lies in providing scope for comparative analysis on a 2x2x2 basis. Firstly, this allows for a comparison between the press coverage of the two crises as a whole that will help identify the development of the media's action within the period of nine years that intervened between the two events. Secondly, it will permit the conduct of a comparison between the Greek and Turkish press coverage within each of the two crises that will shed light on the way the media's role is shaped within the two political systems.



Figure 4.1: The multi-case embedded case study

Thirdly, comparing the coverage between the newspapers will offer a comprehensive picture of the way in which their organisational structure and political inclination define the media's selection of frames and consequently potential effects on decision-making processes. The information obtained through these comparisons will consequently help identify the media's potential to affect decision-making processes in conflict situations and shape the media's profile as strategic actors. Moreover, the multi-level approach will here serve in obtaining greater generalisability of the findings that the analysis will produce to a wider population. As Perakyla puts it, 'The comparative approach directly tackles the question of generalisability by demonstrating the similarities and differences across a number of settings (1997)' (Silverman, 2000:104). In the present study the mode of generalisation that the two cases can offer may be described as 'analytic generalisation' in which the empirical results of the study will also be compared to a previously developed theoretical framework (Yin, 2003: 32-33).

On the basis of the units embedded in each case, the analysis is organised in two main stages. The first stage comprises the application of a game-theoretic approach to the territorial crises under investigation. This will involve the analysis of the decisions and moves made by the two governments as well as the outcome of each crisis and the payoff and cost it entailed for the two players. The analysis will be conducted within the

context of the theoretical model developed in chapters two and three, according to which each Greek - Turkish crisis is examined as a 'nested game'. The objective of this analysis is to provide a stage for the introduction and investigation of the media's role in the progress of each crisis, while it also serves in providing the first level of the above-mentioned nested game.

The second stage embodies the analysis of the press coverage of the two crises. The analysis of the press coverage presupposes the introduction and employment of qualitative content analysis as a method that involves analysing content. Content analysis is here introduced as a method that is encompassed in the case study as part of the unit of analysis embedded in the overall case study. Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Berelson, 1971; Krippendorff, 2004; Weber, 1990). It is distinguished in quantitative and qualitative and the present thesis will engage with the latter since the main inquiry is proportionally less interested in content itself, but interested in the content as the expression of specific phenomena. It is also concerned with the use of the media content for the extraction of inferences about other properties of the media, such as its behaviour and impact during situations of conflict. The main idea of the procedure of qualitative content analysis is here to preserve the advantages of quantitative content analysis as developed within communication science and to transfer and further develop them to qualitative-interpretative steps of analysis, (Mayring, 2000:1).

The press coverage of the two crises will be examined here in an attempt to interpret its content as the outcome of specific media motivations; this will effectively help translate this content into potential effects on the governmental decision-making. In this case the content analysis of the press coverage will aim at evaluating the so-called 'latent' content of the media. This is in relation to what Becker & Lissmann (1973) have identified as levels of content. The themes and main ideas of the text reflect the primary content while context information is the latent content. Similarly, Hancock claims,

> 'The content can be analysed on two levels. The basic level of analysis is a descriptive account of the data: this is what was actually said with nothing read into it and nothing assumed about it...The higher level of analysis is interpretative: it is concerned with what was meant by the response, what was inferred or implied. It is sometimes called the latent level of analysis' (2002:21).

For the conduct of qualitative content analysis, two basic procedures are required, namely the collection and sampling of the related newspapers as well as the categorisation or coding of the related content. Starting off with the explanation of the sampling procedure, it needs to be mentioned that sampling can be carried out either on a random or a non-random basis. The former represents a selection of data that is determined by chance while the latter, which is also referred to as 'judgemental' or 'purposeful', indicates a deliberate selection of data (Deacon, 1999). The present study has employed a non-random sampling procedure that is also most commonly featured in qualitative research.

For the investigation of the media's role in situations of conflict, and particularly in the two Greek-Turkish crises, as a total range of content the present study looks at the press coverage of the two events. The press was selected here for reasons of practicality and due to time constraints. This is because the investigation of the television coverage in both countries would require additional time, given that the analysis requires translation of the transcripts as well. Moreover, the press coverage provides in depth analysis and thematic framing of the events, as well as opinions and evaluations. These are elements that are difficult to obtain through the speedy and live transmission of information via television networks. One could argue of course that as a medium the press appeals to the public to a significantly less extent than television and radio. However, it is still read by a specific (elitist) group of people who represent or even form a very important part of public opinion (Gialouridis, 2001).

For the analysis of the press coverage four newspapers were selected, two from Greece and two from Turkey. The selection was based on criteria of circulation and criteria of acceptance by the public. The latter becomes important when one considers that elites are also interested in what the public thinks. A newspaper that is read by a large part of a country's population would effectively be more likely to be targeting the government as well. In the selection of the Greek newspapers the political inclination of the papers was also taken into consideration given the degree in which party preferences are reflected in the coverage of a large part of the press; which however is less obvious in the case of Turkey. Although this specification does not help the comparative analysis between the press coverage as conducted in the two countries, it is essential that the press coverage

be evaluated in relation to the respective political context. This is in order to identify the potential impact on the decision-making of the respective government more accurately.

For the analysis of the Greek press coverage, the newspapers 'Eleftherotypia' and 'Eleftheros Typos' were selected. It is interesting that although the names of both papers refer to a similar explanation, that is 'free press', they represent diametrically opposing party inclinations with the former being classified as of centre-left and the later of conservative disposition. Both are amongst the 3-4 newspapers with the highest circulation in Greece (Glalouridis, 2001: 90). In Turkey, 'Hürriyet' that stands for 'Freedom' and Milliyet that stands for 'Nationality' are the newspapers selected for analysis. Hürriyet is the newspaper with the highest circulation in Turkey. It is mainly distinguished for pursuing the coverage of impressive stories illustrated with large pictures. Milliyet is a liberal-conservative newspaper and plays a crucial role in the formation of public opinion due to its famous commentators and political correspondents (Glalouridis, 2001: 92).

With both crises having been escalated and resolved within a period of one week or even shorter, the press coverage of the events will be examined from the first day the two main issues that led to each crisis were reported, until after the crises were resolved. The objective is to examine the content of the press along with the progress of the crisis in order to obtain a complete evaluation of the coverage and framing of the events. It could be said that the sampling time period is actually defined by the crisis itself and given that we are interested in drawing inferences about the media's role in the escalation and resolution of the event, the analysis would ultimately be conducted within the departure and ending point. As for the elements of the press coverage to be examined, the sample will include any form of information disseminated by the press during these days including titles, reportages, editorials and analyses.

A required procedure for the conduct of content analysis is the coding or categorisation of the content. It needs to be clarified at this point that the organisation of the content into categories is done in a more general manner than in quantitative content analysis. It serves not in 'quantifying' the content but rather in identifying data that is informative in a specific way and to sort out the important messages always in relation to themes, concepts and questions that have been determined beforehand. As Mayring puts it,

'classical quantitative content analysis has few answers to the question from where the categories come, how the system of categories is developed'. He explains though that within the framework of qualitative approaches it is of central interest, to develop the aspects of interpretation, the categories, as near as possible to the material, to formulate them in terms of the material; or with prior formulated, theoretical derived aspects of analysis, bringing them in connection with the text. In the former case the development of categories is considered as inductive while the later is described as deductive (2000: 4-5).

In the present thesis, the categorisation of the press content will develop through a deductive procedure. The examined material will be organised into categories that will be defined according to a specific theoretical framework that in this case derives from framing theory and in particular, Robert Entman's definition of media framing, as explained in chapter two. This categorisation aims at capturing certain elements of the press coverage that may match previously defined aspects and dimensions of the media's power to influence decision-making processes. The developed categories do not serve in counting the content of the press but in organising it in a way that elevates important messages for the identification of its impact on the two governments. The organisation of this framing device is explained in chapter six, as part of the main body of the analysis.

When the decision-making process in the two crises has been analysed and the press coverage of the events has been organised in categories, the main part of the case study is then conducted. The objective is to investigate the interaction that takes place between the media and the government in each case and in each country as well; and identify the extent to which this interaction constitutes one of the causes that led to specific decision outcomes. For this purpose, process-tracing (George and Bennett, 2005)[5] is here introduced as a method that will help explain the outcomes of the crises in terms of an interaction not just of the Greek and Turkish governments but of an

[5] The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005). In our case, considering that the media represent the independent variable and the decision-making process equals the dependent variable, the employment of a method such as process-tracing will help investigate the causal mechanism between the two and the extent to which decisions were made due to media influences.

interaction between each government and the respective press as well. Process- tracing will in particular help analyse the outcomes of the two crises as a resultant of potential cause-effect relationships between the media content and the governmental decisions. This way, it can help establish the degree in which the media-government interaction is amongst the forces that produce the outcome of a territorial crisis and if so, under which circumstances. It needs to be clarified of course, that the method is here employed within the context of the game-theoretic analysis of the two crises. What process-tracing will offer mostly is to generate questions and observations from the game-theoretic analysis that will then be linked in a particular way to explain the media's role in the decision-making process. Explaining the media-government interaction and the media's role in the process of decision-making will effectively facilitate the testing of the game-theoretic model as well.

4.3.4 Linking data to propositions and criteria for interpretation of findings

A key contribution of a method such as process-tracing is that it enables the linking of the empirical data to the theoretical predictions developed in the first stages of the research. Given that the objectives and the design of the case study were based on a set of theoretical propositions that also reflected the respective research questions, these same propositions are also the basis for the analysis of the findings the case study produces. Process-tracing is particularly suitable for the objectives of the present research for the reason that, as George and Bennett argue, it is compatible with rational choice approaches (2005: 208). As the two authors claim, it provides scope for the empirical testing that is required for analysing and explaining complex events such as decision-making processes. In this thesis, the game-theoretic model constitutes a framework of decision-making that is built in a deductive way and in a way that implies a specific cause-effect relationship between the media and the government. In this case, the process-tracing method is used to organise the available material with regard to the media-interaction in the two crises and countries and identify the degree of accuracy in the causal mechanisms predicted by the game-theoretic model. The method will combine elements from the strategic analysis of the two crises and the press coverage in order to test whether the observed interaction between the two matches the predictions made by the game-theoretic approach.

The method will include the description of the findings that result from the examination of the press coverage of the two crises as part of a game-theoretic model; which perceives the media as a strategic player in a crisis that is here approached as a 'nested' game. The analysis will be conducted with the employment of an explanation building technique, which as stated by Yin, is mainly relevant to explanatory case studies, and with the use of a logic model (Yin, 2003:120-127). The main objective in this type of case studies is to develop some ideas for further study, which is what the present research endeavours to achieve. The explanation building process will be carried out not as an individual segment of the case study but will commence along with the analysis of the two crises and continue through the examination and analysis of the press coverage. It is during this analytical process that causal links of the findings that each stage of the analysis generates with the predefined theoretical propositions will be set. That is to say, the objective is to identify the connection between what the present case study demonstrates as a media role in conflict situations with the hypothesis of the media acting as an actor that strategically influences foreign policy decision-making. Such causal links would ultimately reflect some critical insights into the foreign policy process and the way it develops with the media having become integrated in the decision-making process.

This critical explanation is likely to result from what Yin describes as a series of iterations (Yin, 2003:121). These include

- Making an initial statement or proposition regarding the media's estimated impact on the decision-making processes during the two Greek-Turkish crises and particularly on the escalation of each crisis
- Comparing the findings of the first case against the theoretical proposition
- Revising the theoretical proposition
- Comparing the revision to the facts of the second case

This is a gradual explanation process that will of course involve embedded comparisons between the press coverage in the two countries as well as between the two newspapers in each country. Yin identifies that a potential problem that might arise with the employment of this technique is that due to the much analytic insight required, the investigator might gradually drift away from the initial topic of interest. The problem can be handled with regular reference to the main purpose of the inquiry and clarification of the objectives the study aims at achieving.

The second technique refers to the employment of logic models that 'consist of matching of empirically observed events to theoretically predicted events' (Yin, 2003: 127). The development of the game-theoretic model described in the previous chapters will in this case serve the purpose of the logic model. As explained in the following chapters, the analysis of the two Greek-Turkish crises as the international levels of a nested game will be followed by the formulation of a media-government interaction template that reflects the second, 'domestic', level of the game. This will serve not only in organising the 'moves' made by the two parties in the model of a strategic interaction, but also in identifying expected outcomes stemming from specific combinations of moves. In other words, the game embodies a theoretically predicted event that will be compared to the findings of the empirical observations made through the analysis of the press coverage.

The linking of the findings to the previously developed theory will ultimately verify the validity of the game-theoretic model by strengthening of weakening the explanations provided by it. This will include identifying the range to which the findings should apply and whether and how the scope conditions of the theory could be expanded or narrowed.

4.3.5 The issue of validity

The issue of validity in the case study and in any form of qualitative research method is a concept that relates to judging the degree of quality or else the degree of 'truth' and accuracy inherent in the findings produced by a given study. The possibility for the validity of an explanation to be doubted generates the necessity for the researcher to ensure the conclusions valid. In explanatory case studies similar to the one employed here where the case study aims to determine a cause-effect relationship between two factors, it is the 'internal' validity that becomes a concern (Yin, 2003: 36). It becomes essential to be able to justify the inferences made regarding the media content as a factor that influences decision-making. In the present study the issue of validity can be tackled through the explanation building process described above and particularly through the employment of the game-theoretic model as a logic model.

The issue of validity can also be satisfied through the comparative procedures employed as part of the study, on a first level between the two crises and on a second level between the embedded data fragments, as it was explained earlier in this chapter.

4.3.6 Reporting the case study

One last remark to be made is in relation to the composition and the reporting of the study and its results, which in this case combines three different structural elements. First, the present thesis follows an overall theory-building logic according to which the structure and sequence of the chapters is organised. Within this structure, and as illustrated in the preceding chapters, the analysis has been organised based on a linear structure, which is the second element, starting with the identification of the issue being studied and a review of the relevant existing literature. The two following chapters are then concerned with the theory-building element, presenting the main theoretical argument that sustains the inquiry. Last, the analysis and evaluation of the two crises and the coverage they attracted, involves a comparative element as well, according to which the game theoretic model is applied twice, each time on a different crisis. The purpose of this 'repetition' is to identify the extent to which the specific model fits each crisis and vice versa. (Yin, 2003: 151-14). The reporting of the case study will be completed with the description of the overall results of the analysis of the two crises in relation to the press coverage. The results will be evaluated in relation to the pre-defined theoretical propositions, including some suggestions for further generalisation of the final observations.

5 The Greek-Turkish Conflict and the Media. A historical account of the two crises and their coverage by the national press

5.1 Introduction

The Greek-Turkish conflict has been on the policy and media agenda for at least three decades. Ever since the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, in 1974, the relationship between the two countries has flared up into a major issue in their foreign policy and the national media has closely followed it too. The two countries have been through armed struggles against one another and this has ultimately determined their relationship and their national identities as well (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000). The impassioned coverage that the relationship has often attracted by the media has played a vital role in preserving a sense of national antagonism between the two peoples; and has also turned this relationship into an attractive news story.

The present chapter attempts to portray some of the most decisive stages in the formulation of the contemporary Greek-Turkish relationship. Two of the most crucial phases in this relationship are the two crises employed as case studies for the purposes of this research. They will be presented in detail including the press coverage they attracted by the Greek and Turkish press. This will help formulate a historical and political background that will then help place the media-government interaction in the two countries, in the context of the nested game.

5.2 Media- State relationships in Turkey and Greece

At this point it would be useful to briefly present the basis on which the media's performance is shaped in the two countries. Particular attention is given to the role that the state holds in the production and construction of news; and the extent to which the commercial profit has become the media's primary incentive.

The way the media-state relationship is formed and the role that the press holds in the two countries is a fundamental aspect in analysing and comprehending the role the media plays in the political world of each country. The intervention of the state in the press reporting is often described by journalists as the 'stick and carrot' policy, reflecting

the treatment that the press receives from the state according to its compliance with the governmental line or not. Apparently, the implementation of the specific tactic differs significantly in the two countries (Tılıç, 2000).

In Turkey, under the suffocating regiment that was imposed in 1980, journalists were forbidden to write anything against the military governing. The press owners were forced either to comply with the military line or to close down their newspapers and most of them chose to do the former. The elections that were held in 1983 and were won by the party of Turgut Özal, created better conditions for the performance of the press, which however lasted for a limited period of time. Özal's personal relations with some of the country's newspapers launched a new type of journalism in which the close relationships that journalists developed with the governing circles became a decisive factor in the construction of news. The outcome was that several journalists would simply write whatever those governing elites dictated (Tılıç, 2000: 397). In 1984, the armed fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK,[6] began and along came the new state restrictions on the freedom of press. In general, during the first five-and-a-half years of Özal's governance, 458 publications were seized 39 tons of newspapers, journals and books were burnt and total prison sentences given reached 2000 years (Tanor, 1997: 142). The press gradually became the main target of the state leaders and between 1979 and 1998, more than 40 journalists had been assassinated; while since 1996 Turkey has had the highest number of imprisoned journalists in the world (Tılıç, 1997:365). Most of assassinations occurred in the years 1992 and 1993. In 1994 the

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[6] The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), also known as KADEK and Kongra-Gel, is a paramilitary organization dedicated to creating an independent socialist Kurdish Republic in the Near East. Its ideological foundation is revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism ethnic secessionism using force and threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal. By virtue of the PKK's strategic use of fear-inducing violence in its pursuit of its political objectives, the PKK is characterized as a terrorist organisation by the European Union, the United States, and several other countries (total list of states). Its main objective is the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Kurdistan, a territory that consists of parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran. However its actions have almost exclusively taken place Turkish soil, although it has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in neighbouring states (http://en.wikipedia.org).

number of journalists killed was reduced but the repression against the media maintained (Tılıç, 2000: 401). It needs to be mentioned that during this period it was basically the peripheral media and those journalists that supported the opposition parties and the Kurdish movement that suffered the restrictions. At the same time, the bigger media organisations continued to support the regime totally. (Tılıç, 2000: 404).

Apparently, the media-state relationship in Turkey leaves limited scope for journalists to report 'the truth'; and this is particularly obvious when the news concerns the Greek-Turkish conflict. In a series of interviews Ozgunes and Terzis conducted with Greek and Turkish journalists in order to investigate the role of the media in the Greek-Turkish conflict, one Turkish journalist claimed: 'I am always thinking of our national interests and the interests of my newspaper when I am reporting Greek-Turkish affairs. At the end of the day, I don't want to criticise my government because my 'objective' reporting might be used wrongly by the other side', and she added, 'No foreign correspondent from my country would dare to write anything against the governmental foreign policy, unless there is advice by the headquarters back home' (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000: 405-426).

The situation in Greece is significantly different and the stick policy is rarely implemented and only in cases of national taboos.[7] Other than that, no Greek politician was ever recorded among the biggest enemies of the press. Moreover, since 1974 when democracy was re-established, there were no journalists reported imprisoned. It is true that the media organisations in Greece are related to the political parties; and this relationship occurs within the context of the so-called 'patronage relations' that developed in Greece in the 1980s, when Papandreou's political party promoted its supporters to positions in the public service, in order to secure their support and therefore remain in power (Mitsos, 1994: 444). It is due to this type of media-state relationship that governments assist the media organisations that support them by offering them the carrot.[8]

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[7] Doğan Tılıç reports that on 18th February 1997 a radio station of the Turkish minority in West Thrace was barred from transmitting. The official explanation was that it had secured no permission from the state; but the true reason was thought to be that it broadcasted in the Turkish language, given that the same year a number of Greek stations continued to broadcast without legal permission (2000: 410).

[8] The government's aid to media organisations in the form of the carrot includes the tax-free import of printing equipment or discounts in the phone and postal services (Stangos, 1988: 78).

But generally speaking, the government rarely shows preference to any of the media conveyors and most of the newspapers are actually privileged by the financial support of the government (Tılıç, 2000). Stangos reports that there might be speculations that the financial aid the government offers aims at turning the press into a governmental pawn. However reasonable this\may sound, there seem to be no instances of media organisations that serve and support the government in response to the financial aid they receive. This of course does not imply the absence of those journalists that operate as the government's helpers, facilitating its effort to influence the press. But this sort of mutual exploitation develops through personal relationships rather than in the form of financial aid (Stangos, 1988: 14).

5.2.1 The press legislation in Turkey and Greece

With regard to the existing press legislation in Turkey and Greece, the two countries represent two diametrically different situations. Although, as the Greek journalists claim, there seems to be no legislation that controls the operation of the media in Greece, Turkish journalists complain for being restricted by at least 150 different laws. It is interesting to see that, although the articles 25 and 26 of the 1982 Turkish constitution guarantee freedom of speech, article 26 in particular recites special regulations that effectively restrict this freedom. It therefore states that although censorship is forbidden by the law, the freedom of speech can still be reversed in the name of the domestic and external security of the state. A number of Turkish journalists interviewed by Tılıç, admitted they felt restricted by the legislation, which prevented them from being sincere and reporting the truth (Tılıç, 2000: 424-425).

In Greece, Stangos reports that the picture one has about the press legislation might seem muddled but the truth is that there is no doubt the press is absolutely free of any legislation (1988: 16). Tılıç states though that, when Greek journalists claim the absence of legislation they also explain that they personally feel no legal pressure in their every day practice of journalism by specifically two laws that exist only on paper. The first regulation states that newspapers have no right to publish anything other than news and information, implying the prohibition of any commercial and advertising offers. The second regulation forbids the publication of any announcements carried by terrorist groups. However, as Greek journalists revealed, no one in Greece is really concerned with such laws (Tılıç, 2000: 425).

Apparently, the journalists in Greece have the freedom to do their jobs with no interventions from the government. However, even in Greece there is not much scope for objective reporting. The production and dissemination of news undergoes constraints that derive mainly from the commercialisation of the media, which was the outcome of deregulation of the media sector in the 1990s. In fact, deregulation was not a liberalisation that opened the sector to competitive practices. It was the installation of ready-made commercial media oligopolies and conglomerates; and this was an issue that actually occurred in Turkey as well (Sahin & Aksoy, 1993; Daremas & Terzis, 2000). In the beginning of the 1990s the bigger media organisations shifted from state ownership to the new owners who were mainly involved in economic activities and aimed mostly at making profit. The outcome of this new ownership was the development of interdependent and patronage relationships of the media owners with governments in order for the former to meet economic needs with the aid of the government, i.e. secure loans from state banks (Kaya, 1993: 89).

An ultimate resultant of the privatisation of the media in both countries was the commercialisation of the news itself. For fear of losing the ratings and therefore their jobs as well, journalists in both countries are after the fast and superficial news stories that sell and bring the ratings up. The implications of this phenomenon specifically in the coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict is reflected in the words of a Greek journalist that states, 'We don't report news about Turkey outside crisis periods because our audience is not interested...' (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000: 417). Additional to the issue of commercialisation, another common element in the performance of the media in both countries is the degree of nationalism inherent in the national ideology and media culture, which leaves reporters with little scope about how to report, especially during times of Greek-Turkish tension (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000).

These are some observations that shed light on the arena within which the media perform both in Greece and Turkey, and how the domestic environment where the news is produced and disseminated affects the coverage of the crisis periods. The objective of this section is to offer a general picture of some of the most significant and common constraints that news reporting faces in the two countries, especially in terms of the coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict. These are factors that will help in the investigation of the press coverage of the two case studies and the application of the

game model presented in the previous chapters. This will ultimately help in making better sense of the media's role in the escalation and resolution of the two crises and in political decision-making from a wider perspective.

5.3 The Greek-Turkish relationship

The relationship between Greece and Turkey has developed though a series of conflicts over issues including Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, airspace and minority rights. On 22 October 1951 the two countries signed their membership in NATO confirming their wish for a closer future cooperation. These optimistic speculations however were proved false and the two countries were involved in a continuing tension. Admittedly, Cyprus has played a crucial role in the formation of a foreign policy in both countries. Cyprus became a central problem for the two states not only in their relationship with one another but also with other countries and coalitions including USA, NATO and the European Union. The repercussions of this conflict often ripple through foreign policy circles in Europe as well as the United States, keeping international concern about the conflict alive (Williams, 1997; Kurop, 1998; Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000).

With the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 the relationship deteriorated while the 'declaration' of the 'Turkish Republic of North Cyprus' on 15 November 1983 made the perspective of a Greek-Turkish dialogue even more unlikely. The issue of Cyprus along with other tensions that arose particularly in the Aegean brought the two countries on the verge of war repeatedly after 1974. The tension has escalated again in 1976, 1987 and most recently in 1996. The crisis that occurred in March 1987 was a landmark in the Greek-Turkish relationship that prompted the commencement of a diplomatic communication between Özal and Papandreou who wished to ensure that a future tension similar to the 1987 crisis would be avoided. This initiative led to the Davos Summit where the two governments attempted to redefine the relationship emphasising their objective to solve future potential differences with the employment of peaceful and diplomatic means. Apparently, the new policy line introduced in Davos was not entirely ratified either in Greece or in Turkey and was considered as unsuccessful by domestic circles in both countries. The era that followed the Davos Summit marked the escalation in the tension between the two countries, which climaxed again in 1996 with the Imia-Kardak crisis (Giallouridis, 2001).

From the long-drawn Greek-Turkish conflict, this thesis has chosen the two most recent crises, namely those of 1996 and 1987, to investigate and apply the game-theoretic model to. The next sections will offer a description of each crisis, identifying the main causes that led to the escalation of the tension in each case. The chronicle of those events will be presented along with the press coverage that each crisis attracted in a step-by-step description.

5.4 The oil-drilling crisis 1987

5.4.1 The crisis and its roots

The 1987 oil-drilling crisis has been described as one of the most serious ones in the recent history of both countries, bringing them on the verge of war over the Aegean oil deposits. The planned and firm strategies employed by the two countries confirmed the gravity of the situation and the military preparations on both sides signalled an imminent war. However, it is a noteworthy factor that the actual cause of this crisis was rather a misunderstanding. It seems that the Turkish government's decision to authorise a vessel for oil prospecting in the disputable area, was based on a misapprehension of the Greek real intentions that led to a drastic reaction from the Greek side and the escalation of the tension.

The reason for the initiation of the crisis lies in the NAPC consortium's intention to proceed with further prospecting for new oil deposits in a position east of the island of Thassos and further than the six nautical miles.[9] This decision was against the Bern Agreement, signed by Greece and Turkey (11.11.1986). According to Article 6, 'both countries are obliged to refrain from any initiative or action related to the Aegean shelf that could offend the treatment' (Article 6, Bern Agreement). It has to be mentioned that in 1982 the Greek government proclaimed that they did not recognise the Bern Agreement. The reason was the ineffective negotiation process between Greece and Turkey concerning the shelf, as the Turkish government refused to accept the legal resolution of the issue in The Hague Court (Giallouridis, 2001).

[9] The Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC) comprises a consortium of companies that, along with American and Greek companies, operate the Prinos fields in the Aegean Sea off the coast of Kavala, where Greece's oil production comes from.

1.a. The oil deposit on the east of Thassos. The area is operated by NAPC
Source: http://www.aegeantimes.gr/article.asp?id=2688&type=4

At this point it is useful to explain the role and the importance of the continental shelf of the islands, which is one of the reasons that create further controversies between the two countries. For the Greek views and interests the shelf of the islands is a major issue. Turkey refuses to accept the existence of a shelf around the islands. According to the criteria that define the term 'shelf' more than half of the Aegean Sea is supposed to constitute Turkish shelf. However, given the demand of the Greek side for the recognition and definition of the Greek shelf as well - this concerns the Greek islands situated near Anatolia -, this will inevitably restrict Turkey within a six-mile-narrow. Thus, the main reason of the disagreement concerning the shelf is the fact that any attempts to sort out the specific issue, in the long run it will lead to a legal border line that will define sovereign rights for each country. In other words, defining the shelf for both countries means dividing and distributing the Aegean Sea.
(www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkolis/leaders_akiman.html; Soltaridis, 1988).

In order to prevent the NAPC consortium from proceeding with oil prospecting in the area, the Greek government attempted to buy the majority of the consortium's shareholding but with no success. The anticipation of new oil deposits in the area rendered such a repurchase impossible. Therefore, the Greek government proceeded with a direct negotiation with the Denisson Mines Corporation hoping to buy the company's hold shares. What the government attempted to clarify was that it was not possible for Greece to consent to the oil prospecting beyond the six nautical miles, due to the gravity of the Greek-Turkish relationship. This was the reason why the Greek government attempted to buy the company's shareholding in Greece. The President of the Denisson Mines Corporation was however convinced that once the shareholding was repurchased, the Greek government would proceed with oil prospecting within a month's time. The cause of the crisis was the conviction of the Turkish government that further oil prospecting was imminent while at the same time the Greek opposition party was accusing the government of compliance due to the fact that they were trying to prevent any search for oil in the area. (Giallouridis, 2001; Soltaridis, 1988).

In the meantime, the managing director of NAPC, Parmell, ignoring the decision of Greece to buy Denisson's shareholding out and have share in the consortium, announced that NAPC was about to proceed with oil drilling in the area east of Thassos island. On 4th March 1987 it was reported in the Wall Street Journal that the Aegean oil

was about to escalate a new Greek-Turkish crisis. Turkey immediately sent a boat to conduct oil prospecting in the disputable area. In order to avert this possibility, Greece sent two military ships in response. The speculations of Wall Street Journal were further enhanced with a telegram sent by the Greek embassy in Ankara, stating that an emergency meeting was held by the Greek Ministers of Defence and Foreign affairs in order to deal with the latest developments (Giallouridis, 2001).

5.4.2 The chronicle and progress of the crisis and the press coverage

25 March 1987: the crisis initiates with the decision made by the Turkish National Security Council to authorize the Sismik II, a research vessel escorted by warships, to explore for oil in the disputed continent shelf around the islands of Lesvos, Lemnos and Samothrace. The reason lying behind this decision was the belief of the Turkish government that Greece intended to attempt oil drilling in the disputable area. Such an attempt meant the automatic violation of the Bern agreement on behalf of Greece; and Turkey responded to that by proceeding with a mutual violation. The Turkish move was later interpreted by the Greek government and the media as an effort of the Turkish government to utilize the controversy that arose between NAPC and the Greek government so as to serve its own objectives in the Aegean; and achieve the commencement of a new negotiation round regarding the shelf and the Aegean islands. (Giallouridis, 2001). In order for this possibility to be prevented, the Greek government employed a defence plan stating clearly that in case the Turkish vessel entered the disputable area, there was going to be a war. Let us now examine how the crisis unfolded reaching its peak and the press on both sides also covered how the sequential moves made by the two governments.

The same day, the Turkish National Security Council meets and decides to search for oil beyond the Turkish territorial waters as a response to the Greek violation of the Bern agreement. At the same time, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs informs the ambassadors of the European Union and of NATO that Greece is following an offensive policy. The Turkish government mobilizes armed forces in the area of East Thrace and around the coast of Asia Minor while the Turkish fleet is concentrated in the Marmaras Sea. On the Greek front, the Prime Minister Papandreou, assembles a meeting and decides that Greece will not accept any violation of their sovereign rights, or the response will be drastic and vigorous (Giallouridis, 2001).

The following day the Greek newspapers referred to the new Turkish threat stating, 'the Turkish provocative moves continued yesterday when two Turkish aircraft violated the Greek air space' (Eleftherotypia, 26 March: 5). There is also reference to the Greek domestic crisis that has been created between the government and the church and that absorbs the government. Also the press reports statements of the Turkish Prime Minister Özal saying that 'Özal states that Greece is just putting itself in trouble by violating the Bern agreement. There is no reason for the two countries to fight' (E. Typos, 26 March: 9-11).

In Turkey Milliyet concentrates on the Bern agreement and the possibility of war as well as on Greece being the responsible for the escalation of the crisis. It reports that, 'The minister of foreign affairs warned the countries members of NATO & EU that if Greece does not comply with the Bern agreement, Turkey will take the necessary action to protect their sovereign rights in the Aegean'; 'According to the Bern agreement, Greece cannot drill oil from the region beyond the 6 miles. But if they do so, then we will also do the same'; 'Papandreou is trying to create the tension in order to make the Turkish EU candidacy difficult and benefit from it' (Milliyet, 26 March: 9-15). Also, Hürriyet reports, 'War screams in Athens and possible scenarios for war'; 'The tension increases but some people believe there will be no war. This is because war can only have cost for Greece and will jeopardise the new economic reform that the government is trying to apply' (Hürriyet, 26 March: 8-12).

26 March 1987: the Turkish Security Council sends the research vessel 'Sismik' to explore for oil and at the same time the Greek drilling ship escorted by a cruiser was on its way towards Thassos. The Prime Minister Turgut Özal threatens to attack in case Greece obstructs the prospecting process. The Turkish vessel that is also called 'Hora', arrives and anchors at Canakale port (Giallouridis, 2001; Milliyet, 29 March).

In response, the Greek Prime Minister states that once the Turkish vessel commences the oil prospecting, it will be attacked and scuttled. In particular, the Greek government proceeds with two risky but decisive moves.

1. Prime Minister Papandreou orders that the operation of one of the most crucial, in terms of position, American Military Bases near Athens be suspended, confirming the

crucial nature of the situation. This was a message sent to the USA government attempting to keep them out of the game.

2. Foreign Minster Papoulias goes to Sofia for further negotiations with the Bulgarian government. A potential cooperation between a NATO member like Greece and a country of the Warsaw Pact would be a cause for alarm in the circles of NATO; and would give ground to the threat that in case of a Greek-Turkish crisis, NATO's southeast coalition would collapse, given the positive and supportive response of the Bulgarian government (Giallouridis, 2001).

The following day the Greek press refers to the possibility or war for the first time, with Eleftherotypia stating that 'The Greek armed forces are mobilised'; 'Turkey is provoking a war by sending Hora out'; 'War is in the air' (Eleftherotypia, 27 March: 1-4). There is reference to The Hague Court, in particular 'The Greek government keeps inviting Turkey to refer the shelf issue to The Hague Court and warns that if the Turkish ship proceeds with the oil prospecting, the Greek government will do whatever it takes to protect the Greek sovereign rights' (Eleftherotypia, 27 March: 5-8). There are also questions as to the possibility that this Turkish hostility is related to an encouragement activated by USA. Eleftheros Typos also reports that 'Turkey aims at exploiting the mistakes made by the Greek government in the handing of the situation' and 'The opposition accuses the government of causing national division' (E. Typos, 27 March: 7-9).

In Turkey Milliyet again refers to the violation of the Bern agreement as the justification of the Turkish moves and the promptness of the country for a war. Some statements are, 'Because Greece refuses to comply with the Bern agreement, the Turkish Security Committee allowed the Turkish vessel to start searching for oil in the Aegean'; 'If Hora is attacked, we are ready to take any action against Greece'. The Turkish newspaper also stresses the negotiation process as being the best way to resolve the crisis and the support that the opposition parties are ready to offer the government. It is stated that, 'The Turkish government however believes that the problem can be solved through negotiations. Even the opposition party in Turkey believes that there should be a peaceful solution" and "the Turkish government is fully supported by the opposition parties in the policy they pursue'. Milliyet blames Papandreou of creating the crisis stating 'The crisis has been prepared by Papandreou before hand, who had been

seeking for an excuse to attack Turkey' (Milliyet, 27 March: 10-15); while Hürriyet reports 'Papandreou is crazy' (Hürriyet, 27 March: 1).

27 March 1987: 'Hora' is about to enter the international waters while the exchange of threatening messages between the two countries continues. The general secretary of NATO Lord Carrington requests the two countries to commence negotiations for the resolution of the crisis and offers to play a mediating role. The same day NATO's military committee meets and the Greek representative clarifies that Greece has so far made no attacking moves whatsoever; so the issue in question is 'not Turkey's reaction, but action'.

At the same time, Lord Carrington convinces the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Geoffrey Howe to intercede with the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who happened to be in London. The same evening, Turgut Özal states on BBC that the research vessel 'Hora' is not going to proceed with oil prospecting, unless Greece attempts to commence the prospecting first. This statement is actually the first step towards the resolution of the crisis. He states, 'If they do not sail outside their territorial waters, we will not sail either. But the moment they decide to do so, Turkey will react very strongly'.

The press coverage of the events of that specific day appears to be rather extensive on both fronts. In the Greek press the emphasis is put on the seriousness of the situation and the probability of a war. Some statements are, 'The Greek government is determined to prevent 'Hora' from any prospecting'; 'Since yesterday Greece has been in fighting trim and ready for everything'; 'The US base in Athens was closed at midnight'; 'Hora is expected to reach the crucial point today'; 'Today is the most crucial day of the crisis with the two countries being ready to start a war unless Turkey changes Hora's course in the Aegean. The Greek government has already prepared a strategic plan for that matter' (Eleftherotypia, 28 March: 1-9 & 24, 25).

Moreover Eleftheros Typos stresses the potential cost of the conflict, 'Even if there is no war, this conflict is going to have a great cost for us, due to the huge preparation expenses and the decrease in the number of tourist that will visit our country this summer'; and proceeds with suggestions too, 'At this difficult time Greece has to make use of the benefit to be part of EU. However, the government did not ask for European

help and therefore this is an issue that the opposition has to handle' (E. Typos, 28 Mach: 3-6). The specific newspaper also accuses the government of creating 'National crisis' and being 'isolated from their natural European allies' (E. Typos, 28-29 March: 31-34).

Regarding the Turkish policy, according to the Eleftherotypia, 'It is very likely that the Turkish government is simply making a war of nerves in order to consume all or oil resources'; 'Turkey seems reluctant. It is said that this is in order for the Turkish government to buy time and plan the next diplomatic move'; 'We are not going to war; Turkey is just playing another dirty game' (Eleftherotypia, 28 March: 1-4 & 24, 25).

The Turkish press refers to the possibility of war but only as a result of a Greek attack. Milliyet reports, 'Hands on trigger: the army is alarmed, waiting for the first interference of Greece'; 'The Aegean is about to explode'; 'Athens is mobilising the armed forces'; 'War bells: the whole country is united to face the Greek provocations'; 'If Papandreou tries to stop Hora, there might be a war' (Milliyet, 28 March: 1-7); while Hürriyet states 'Papandreou is ready for war'. But Turkey has no intention of interfering with the Greek vessels. Turkey is just taking some pre-emptive action but will not touch the Greek boats unless Greece makes the first move. We cannot tell if there will be a war but we hope the two countries will find a peaceful solution' (Hürriyet, 28 March: 8-12).

NATO's offer for mediation is also mentioned, 'The general secretary of NATO, Lord Carrington, invited both countries to sit on the table and resolve the conflict' (Milliyet, 28 March: 8). The Turkish press also presents the Greek move to seek for support from the East as unsuccessful stating that, 'The Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias was disappointed by Bulgaria's neutrality'; 'Moscow & Sofia offer no support to Athens' (Milliyet, 28 March: 9). On that day, the announcement that Özal made on BBC is covered only by the Greek press and is described as an unexpected statement

28 March 1987: the crisis is practically resolved. The US ambassador in Ankara informs the Turkish government that Greece is not planning to proceed with oil prospecting in the disputable area. The Turkish research vessel 'Sismik' sails in the Aegean Sea, it remains within the Turkish territorial waters and anchors off the island of Imbros (Giallouridis, 2001; Milliyet, 29 March).

The press coverage following that day focuses on the resolution and the evasion of war, which however is portrayed through different interpretations. The Turkish press states, 'Sensibility was the winner and our determined attitude took Greece back on track'; 'The crisis started to resolve after the Greek government announced that they were not going to proceed with oil prospecting in the area' (Hürriyet, 29 March: 1); 'The crisis freezes as Greece gives up searching for oil' (Milliyet, 29 March: 1). The Turkish newspapers also refer to the way the crisis was perceived by the Western countries and the respective media emphasising on the misinterpretation of the situation by the west. As the Turkish press reports, 'The Western press presents Turkey to be the one that started the crisis and the one that stepped back to avoid the war. This perception is only partly accurate because the Turkish decision to step back was due to the advice of NATO and USA'. There is also some criticism on the Turkish policy, 'The Turkish policy has been unsuccessful making the Western world see the crisis as created by Turkey and ended in favour of Greece' (Milliyet, 29 March: 5-11).

The Turkish press also predicts that Papandreou will create similar crises in the future and reports, 'What happens next? There is no doubt that Papandreou will again try to drill oil in the area but if Turkey's stance is firm, he will not succeed in that. Even now, by sending 'Hora' out in the Aegean Turkey exerted pressure on Greece and made them make concessions too'; 'Even if there was a war it would not last for more than a couple of days. This would benefit Papandreou and this is why this is high possibility' (Milliyet, 29 March: 5-11).

Moreover, the press reports Özal's statements that Papandreou is a good actor and managed to manipulate the public opinion showing that Turkey was the one to violate the Bern agreement. This is something that Turkey failed to do and they did not have the public opinion on their side. There are also comments on the Greek Prime Minster such as 'Papandreou is an insane person who may have a secret agreement with a country (Bulgaria) that will support them in the case of war' (Hürriyet, 29 March: 11-13).

In Greece one can see a lack of consensus when it comes to the presentation and interpretation of the outcome in the press. On the one hand Eleftherotypia refers to a Greek victory that was achieved due to Papandreou's firm policy stating 'The country has achieved one of the biggest diplomatic victories without a single casualty'

(Eleftherotypia, 29, 30 March: 1-7). On the other hand Eleftheros Typos describes the resolution as 'Fraud of the government'. It accuses the Greek government with the following statements, 'The Greek government promised not to proceed with oil prospecting beyond our territorial waters and this is against our interests'; 'The government exploited the tension for domestic purposes and cultivated a climate of war even when the crisis was resolved'; 'They were hiding the key statement made by Özal for 24 hours'; 'Suspending the operation of the American base was a lie' (E. Typos, 29 March: 31-34).

In the aftermath of the crisis, on 29th March, despite the fact that the crisis seems to be resolved, the Greek forces remain alamed and the fleet appears to be ready to attack in case the research vessel 'Sismik' attempts to commence oil prospecting in the area. The same day, the Turkish Prime Minister Özal returns to Turkey where his supporters have prepared a festive welcoming. He states that if Turkey was a member of the European Union, this tension would have never been generated (Giallouridis, 2001; Milliyet, 29 March).

On the media's side, the Greek press offers a more extensive coverage, which again offers two contradictory interpretations of the situation. Eleftherotypia reports 'The Greek government has achieved an important diplomatic victory because they faced Turkey with determination. At the same time the opposition started accusing the government of complying with the Turkish rules. It is very likely that when the Turkish ambassador gave Özal's message to Papandreou –that the vessel would not proceed with prospecting- he also asked if Greece was planning to do anything like that in the future. Would it be a betrayal if the Greek government answered that they did not plan any prospecting? At this crucial time what was most important for Greece was to avoid the war with Turkey without Turkey violating the Greek shelf' (Eleftherotypia, 30 March: 1-7).

Eleftheros Typos offers a different approach of the issue stating that, 'the crisis was presented by the government as bigger than it actually was. The dramatisation of the situation served the domestic objectives of the government'; 'The Greek government has withdrawn form exploiting the oil deposits in the largest part of the Aegean, this part that so far we have claimed it belonged to us'; 'Turkey gained some credits out of the situation because it ensured that Greece would not go beyond the 6 miles and the Greek

territorial waters. But at the same time Turkey put their EU candidacy in jeopardy' (E. Typos, 30 March: 4-6, 9-11 & 22-25).

The coverage of the Turkish press is less extensive with the main topics being the following, 'Papandreou meets Akiman in Athens'; 'A negotiation problem arises as Turkey accepts the offer of Lord Carrington to be the mediator but Greece does not'; 'Crisis management; the crisis broke out of wrong announcements made by the Greek side, regarding possible oil drilling in the area' (Hürriyet, 30 March: 1 & 12).

30 March 1987: the crisis is resolved gradually and under the control of the Greek and Turkish forces, depending on the political progress, the fighting trim and the moves made by the forces of the rival state. The Greek forces return to their initial position only on 24th April 1987. On both sides the press makes scarce references to the issue in the first days of April.

5.4.3 Some general observations

The 1987 oil-drilling crisis was –ostensibly- generated by the Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company that had made plans to prospect for oil right outside Greece's territorial waters. Given the already tense existing situation over the disputed waters in the Aegean, the decision of the Greek government to prevent the consortium from the oil prospecting appeared as a rational move; that was in order to evade further complications in the Greek-Turkish relationships. What looked rather odd though was the ease with which the Turkish government concluded that this specific Greek effort stood for oil drilling on behalf of Greece. This assumption, accompanied with the decision of the Turkish government to send out the research vessel was the reason for the two countries to reveal a set of well-planned strategies. These strategies would ultimately be interpreted in the real objectives that the two governments pursued.

At this point one could actually question how a mere misunderstanding led to a conflict the main attribute of which was the remarkably carefully planned strategies the two sides employed to confront one another. Unless of course this apparent misunderstanding was directed by interior motives of the Turkish government that, as was later said in Greece, saw the controversy that occurred between NAPC and the Greek government as an opportunity to lead Greece in a new negotiation round over the Aegean shelf. Not to

mention that the time of the crisis was particularly favourable for Turkey since it coincided with the improvement of the Turkish-American relationship that could guarantee the USA support. Another coincidence was the domestic crisis in which the Greek government was involved with the Greek Church. It was felt in Greece that had it not been for the internal controversies, the Greek government would not have dramatised the situation to such an extent as a tool to attract the public attention away from the domestic arena. And this is an assumption that could also justify the impressively quick response of the Greek Prime Minster, who confronted the Turkish decision with a drastic plan.

5.5 The 1996 'Imia-Kardak' crisis

5.5.1 The emergence of the crisis

The 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis constitutes the most recent dispute that arose between the two traditional enemies that is Greece and Turkey, which this time were just one step away from war. The causes of the dispute are traced back in December 1995 and the crisis was escalated and resolved in the last days of January 1996. The specific crisis appears to differ from the previous ones in the sense that for the first time Turkey officially raises an issue of territorial claims within the boundaries of the Greek state. In particular, the claim is placed over the islets Imia-Kardak, which are situated 2,5 miles away from the Greek island Kalolimnos and 3 miles away from the Turkish coast. The legal sovereignty of Greece over the two islets is stated in the following treaties. Initially, according to the Lausanne Treaty 1923, Turkey assigned the Dodecanese to Italy. Thus, according to Article 15 of the treaty,

'Turkey renounces, in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos, Tilos, Nisyros, Kalymnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Simi and Kos which are now occupied by Italy and the islets dependent thereon and also over the island of Kastelorizo' (www.ifi.uio.no/~dimitris/Imia?Laussane1923.html).

Due to a disagreement regarding the status of the ownership of the islets lying between the Turkish coasts and the Kastelorizo island, Turkey and Italy signed a supplementary agreement in order to fix the territorial waters between Kastelorizo island and the coasts of Anatolia. The agreement was signed on 28th December 1932 and fixed 37 pairs of reference points among which, the maritime boundary dividing Turkish and Italian territory (which at that time included the Dodecanese islands) was drawn. Of these

points, it is point 30 that states that the maritime frontier north of Kalymnos passes at the median distance between the Imia-Kardak islets (on the Italian side) and Kato island (on the Turkish side). This specific point confirms the Italian sovereignty over the Imia-Kardak rocks.

The Imia- Kardak Islets
The dotted line signifies the border that divides the Greek from the Turkish territorial waters.
Source: http://users.med.auth.gr/~tsikaras/maps/imia.htm

The specific agreement was never registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations and this is what the Turkish government used as an argument in the specific crisis. However, according to the League of Nations, its validity is not at all affected by the fact that it was actually never registered (Giallouridis, 2001: 312).

In 1947 and after the end of World War II, the Paris Treaty is signed between Italy and the Allied Powers. According to this agreement, Italy proceeds with ceding the Dodecanese and the adjacent islets to Greece. Consequently and under international law, the successor state automatically assumes all the rights and obligations that had been established by international agreements between the possessor state and every third party that in this case is Italy and Turkey.

With regard to Turkey's legal assertions, the basic arguments of the Turkish government were firstly based on the fact that the legal procedure of the agreement of December 1932 is not completed and is not registered with the League of Nations. Secondly, according to the Turkish claims, the islets Imia-Kardak do not fall under the category of the islets adjoining the Dodecanese and therefore they were never made over to the Greek state. This statement is another of the arguments the Turkish government employs, claiming that the islets Imia-Kardak constitute Turkish territory. (Giallouridis, 2001;www.tusiadus.org/documents/springtime.pdf;www.int/acad/fellow/9799/keridis.pdf).

The cause for the initiation of the crisis is given on 25th December 1995 when the Turkish cargo boat 'Figen Akat' runs aground the islets Imia-Kardak. The captain of the Turkish cargo boat refuses assistance from the Greek authorities claiming that he is within Turkish territorial waters. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was immediately informed about his reaction that was considered as a suspicious move by the Greek authorities. Later on the escalation of the crisis was attributed to this view. It was felt in Greece that Turkey engineered the specific event in order to lead the two countries to a conflict that would add the 'islet issue' to the long drawn Greek-Turkish controversy (Kourkoulas, 1998; Georgoulis & Soltaridis, 1996).

It is only on 28th December 1995 that the boat is finally freed and towed to the Turkish port Güllük through the aid of a Greek salvage company, and only after a continuous exchange of verbal notes between the Greek and Turkish authorities on who were to

rescue the ship. The towing of the ship by the Greek authorities is described as a 'sovereign' action proving that the Imia-Kardak rocks constitute Greek territory. This move also cleared the suspicion of a created event by Turkey. Apparently the Turkish side would never generate an event that would prove the Greek position to be right (Kourkoulas, 1998).

On 29th December 1995 the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs sends a verbal note to the Greek embassy in Ankara, claiming that the Imia-Kardak islets constitute a part of Turkey's territory; this move made by the Turkish side leads to a new exchange of verbal notes between the two states. Form that day and until a month later the two sides occupy themselves with the exchange of verbal notes regarding the status of the islets. The Greek and Turkish diplomats talk about 'routine notes' and no one seems to believe or even realize that the specific event would prove serious enough to bring the two states at the brink of a war only a month later (Kourkoulas, 1998).

At this point it should also be mentioned that the crisis coincides with a period of domestic problems and difficulties that both countries had to deal with. On the one hand Greece is at that time faced with the serious illness and imminent death of Andreas Papandreou who had been the most prominent leader in the modern history of the country, while a new government is forced to form within a short period of time. On the other hand tension and anxiety is culminating in the political world of Turkey, as Tansu Çiller is unable to form a government. This would enhance the possibility of Necmettin Erbakan coming to power again, which seemed to terrify those elite groups that are indeed handling the foreign affairs of the country. The unstable, at that time, prevalent internal situation in both sides, is said to have influenced and, to some extent, defined the moves made by the two actors (Kourkoulas, 1998).

On Tuesday 23rd January 1996 the newly elected Greek Prime Minister summons a meeting. Although the issue of discussion is not announced, information leaked to the press confirms that a serious national problem is about to arise. The following day media covers the issue extensively for the first time and that is the day that also marks the beginning of the escalation of the crisis.

5.5.2 The chronicle of the crisis

The specific event described above was the main cause of a dispute that broke out. The crisis was escalated and eventually resolved within the last week of January 1996.

25 January 1996: four citizens of the Greek Island Kalimnos go over to the islet and proceed with the raising of the Greek flag (Giallouridis, 2001).

The next day the Greek press reports the imminent threat from Turkey that is likely to spread to the Dodecanese. It is mentioned that according to diplomatic sources the Imia-Kardak islet will cause further complications to the Greek-Turkish relationship. Eleftheros Typos accuses the government of being incapable of dealing with the situation.

In Turkey the issue is mainly covered by Hürriyet, which reports, 'Right after Simitis has become Prime Minister, he is trying his best to create a conflict between Greece and Turkey and has decided that Kardak belongs to Greece' (Hürriyet, 26 January: 8); while Milliyet refers to a 'crisis' that is already 'four days old' (Milliyet, 26 January: 18).

26 January 1996: the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs confirms the exchange of verbal notes between the Greek and Turkish government and the generation of a serious issue. At the same time, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs commences 'mapping' the Aegean islets. After the specific process is completed, the Turkish government announces that they will 'invite' Greece to a new negotiation process regarding the Aegean status. This initiative is taken due to a decree that had been pronounced in Greece with regard to the settlement of the islets at stake (Kourkoulas, 1998; Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996).

The Greek press reports some of the statements made by the Greek Foreign Minister who hoped that the specific issue was only a bureaucracy issue raised in the Turkish Foreign Ministry. He also states that although it is the first time Turkey makes a clear territorial claim, he still believes it was an accidental event that will not create any conflict between the two countries. Moreover, Eleftheros Typos reports 'the territorial claim Turkey made over the islet is just ridiculous' (E. Typos, 27 January: 8). It also openly identifies the Greek government as responsible for the unfounded claims by reporting 'the governmental dispersal gave Turkey the chance to proceed with further

provocations' (E. Typos, 27 January: 9). Eleftherotypia recognises the existence of an issue 'which might create further complications in the relationship with Turkey' (Eleftherotypia, 27 January).[10]

In Turkey Hürriyet focuses on the Greek government being the one that is trying to create a crisis between the two countries; and also reports statements made by the Greek officials with regard to the trivial issue (Hürriyet, 27 January: 15). Milliyet also reports the 'increasing tension between Ankara and Athens due to a rock' (Milliyet, 27 January: 18).

27 January 1996: a helicopter carrying a group of journalists of the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet lands on the islet. The four journalists raise the Turkish flag in place of the Greek one. The incident is recorded and shown on the Turkish TV (Giallouridis, 2001).

The following day the event is covered only by the Turkish press that describes the Greek citizens of Kalymnos island as 'pirates that left their flag on the rock' (Hürriyet, 28 January: 5). This is also the first time that the Turkish press has disseminated information that is said to come from official sources. According to these sources and as reported in Hürriyet, 'The two sides cannot find a solution through the increasing tension but only through negotiations' (Hürriyet, 28 January: 15).

28 January 1996: a Greek warship detects the Turkish flag, which the Greek government orders is lowered immediately. On the same day the Greek government is informed about a Turkish patrol boat that is sailing within the Greek territorial waters near the Imia-Kardak islets and refuses to leave. Later in the evening the Greek armed forces are alerted on the border with Turkey in the north part of the country and the islands while a team of the Greek forces are placed on the islets (Giallouridis, 2001; Kourkoulas 1998, Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996).

On 29th January the coverage of the two previous days appears to be slightly more extended. Eleftherotypia reports the tension that prevailed in the Ministry of Defence and the alert of the armed forces on the Turkish borders. Eleftheros Typos proceeds with severe criticism against the government and comments on the raising of the Turkish flag

[10] http://archive.enet.gr

stating, 'How can Pangalos say there is no issue?', 'We were humiliated by the Turks', 'Shame' and 'The government delays in responding' (E. Typos, 29 January: 8-10) . The opposition's newspaper focuses on the 'weakness of the Greek government that encouraged Turkey to escalate the crisis' and expresses the fear that 'there will be more Turkish provocations in the future' and even 'future rearrangement of the continental shelf' (E. Typos, 29 January: 10). There are also speculations disseminated by Elefthrotypia with regard to the cost that accepting to negotiate will have for the country as well as the anticipation of further Turkish provocations.

In Turkey Hürriyet reports, 'The Greeks are again after creating a crisis'; 'The tension between Ankara and Athens increases as Greek vessels have surrounded the islets while the Turkish flag was lowered'; 'Athens is becoming paranoid' (Hürriyet, 29 January: 15). Milliyet refers to the American worries about a possible war between Greece and Turkey while Ankara is reported as 'remaining calm about the situation'. It is also stated that, 'Although it has been four days since the conflict broke out, the Turkish Foreign Minister has not given any formal response to the media. This is because the official assessment of the situation has not yet been completed'. The same newspaper also reports 'the Greek Minister of Defence has already ordered that the sea forces are ready for war' (Milliyet, 29 January: 18).

29 January 1996: the Turkish government suggests that the two countries should commence the negotiation procedure, not only concerning the specific islets but the Aegean in general; while the Turkish Prime Minister demands that the Greek flag on the islet is lowered. Moreover, this is the day that the State Department makes a first step towards intervention in the crisis and recommends that the two sides remain calm in order for the crisis to be resolved. At the same time the Greek government refuses to involve in any form of negotiation regarding the specific issue, claiming that there is actually nothing to discuss as the islets constitute Greek land. In particular, the Foreign Minister of Greece claims that the specific issue is not crucial enough to justify the commencement of a new negotiation round (Giallouridis, 2001; Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996).

The following day the Greek press reports the official invitation made by the Turkish government for negotiations stating 'Ankara invites Athens for negotiations in order to

change the status quo' (Eleftherotypia, 30 January)[11]. Reference is also made on the warnings made by the Greek Prime Minister mentioning 'Greece would not accept any sort of territorial claims made over the islet' (E. Typos, 30 January: 22). There are comments of the traditional tactic of Turkey to exploit 'accidental events in order to create bilateral disagreements between the two countries' (E. Typos, 30 January: 22). It also refers to the refusal of the Greek Ministry of Defence to involve into any sort of negotiations since there is nothing to negotiate about. Moreover, Eleftherotypia appears to share the government's position and claim that this is actually a non-existent issue since the islets constitute Greek land and the related treaties confirm this. Once again the press disseminates a prognosis about the serious implications 'unless the government resists', expressing the fear that the 'Turley will turn to Thrace next' (Eleftherotypia, 30 January)[12].

The Turkish press reports for the first time the statements made by Prime Minister Çiller, 'We will show them our determination. The flag must be lowered and the soldiers withdrawn. We are determined to resolve the issue through the negotiation route' (Milliyet, 30 January: 17). The crisis is described as 'a dangerous situation' which however 'occurred by chance' (Milliyet, 30 January: 18). Milliyet also suggests, 'This is what Greece always does when the government wants to send a message to the people. They increase the tension but would not go any further' (Milliyet, 30 January: 19).

30 January 1996: the Turkish National Security Council meets and decides to prepare for war. Later in the evening a bigger Turkish frigate is sent out to sail near the islets and is followed by a Greek warship too. Gradually the forces on both sides increase. The two countries proceed with an exchange of threats as Ankara refuses to withdraw unless the Greek flag on the islet is lowered. On the other hand, the Greek government threatens to reconsider their position with regard to the approval of the European Community's financial aid to Turkey, unless Turkey stops making provocative moves (Giallouridis, 2001; Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996).

[11] http://archive.enet.gr
[12] http://archive.enet.gr

In the meantime, and as the fleet forces are increased, the government of the United States try to persuade the two sides to return to the *status quo ante*. The US Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs contact their counterparts in Greece and Turkey asking for the crisis to be resolved, while President Clinton comes in contact with the Greek Prime Minister, recommending calmness and caution. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the Greek Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs commented on the initiative of USA to intervene as an unnecessary move that was never asked for (Giallouridis, 2001; Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996).

The Greek Foreign Minister, Pangalos, makes an official request to the countries of the European Union to respond to the prevalent situation, which does not turn out to be successful. At the same time the NATO members choose to remain silent as well and only the United Nations appear to follow the progress of the situation closely (Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996).

The following day the press in both countries appears to make a particularly extended coverage of the events. In Greece Eleftherotypia describes the situation as 'War is in the air' claming that, 'according to official sources the Turkish armed forces in the area are expected to increase' (Eleftherotypia, 31 January)[13]. It also refers to the discussions that Prime Minister Smitis had with Bill Clinton over the phone. The newspaper explains how none of the two sides accepts to back down leading to the increase of the armed forces on both sides. It also comments on the situation being 'more tense and serious than the crisis in 1987' (Eleftherotypia, 31 January)[14]. Moreover, the statements of both governments are reported proving their refusal to compromise. Regarding the involvement of USA, it is stated 'Ankara cultivates tension with the encouragement of Washington' (Eleftherotypia, 31 January)[15].

Eleftheros Typos reports, 'Despite the Government's assurance that the situation is under control, the crisis appears to remain out of hand'; 'The US government literally degraded the Prime Minister asking him for concessions'; 'The night of the national embarrassment', 'The government sold Imia to Turkey'; 'The armed forces remained

[13] http://archive.enet.gr
[14] http://archive.enet.gr
[15] http://archive.enet.gr

mobilised for...12 hours'; 'Fears for war'; 'War rehearsal in the Aegean. The Turks continue playing their dangerous games' (E. Typos, 31 January: 23-29).

In Turkey Milliyet warns, 'We should not get caught in the trap of Simitis and Pangalos'; 'Hurricane in Kardak but we cannot step back even if it costs us'; 'On the way to war' (Milliyet, 31 January: 4, 5). The specific newspaper also refers to the importance of even a small rock and states, 'If we do not defend this island, this will give Greece the chance to proceed with similar moves against us in the future'. It reports the warnings made by USA and also exerts criticism on Tansu Çiller stating, 'It is high time she started using her brains' (Milliyet, 31 January: 13,14). NATO's silence is mentioned as well while Hürriyet attempts to shed light on the causes of the tension stressing the 'governmental paranoia in Turkey' and 'Pangalos' tendency to create conflicts between the two countries'. It also conveys the conviction that Turkey would benefit from a military confrontation and reports, 'In case of a military conflict, we will definitely beat them'; 'If we attack first, we will win' (Hürriyet, 31 January: 5, 6).

31 January 1996: Turkish commandos land on the second islet while the Greek government appears unable to react. The Turkish parliament meets and decides that it is high time the preparations for a possible war started. Immediately the Turkish army is set on the alert. A Turkish frigate enters the Greek territorial waters while a Turkish helicopter violates the Greek air space. Both the Greek and Turkish fleets are placed in distance of only three miles. Through a message conveyed by Richard Holbrooke, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, threatens to attack unless the Greek fleet withdraws first. As Holbrooke mentioned later, Çiller had given the Greek government a two-hour notice to make the first step to return to the *status quo ante*.

On the same day, in the three-sided telephonic round of negotiations between Washington, Athens and Ankara, the disengagement is agreed to begin later the same morning. Richard Holbrooke, informs the Turkish officials that the Greek forces are about to withdraw, and advises them to do the same. At the time of the negotiations, the Greek helicopter, that had taken off in order to confirm the occupation of the second islet, falls causing death to the three air force officers aboard.

The marines of both sides are pulled out of the island in a 'step-by-step' process, returning to the *status quo ante*. The Turkish side is celebrating the victory against Greece. This was a crisis that confirmed the Turkish position that the Aegean is full of problems that should be dealt with and solved. Not to mention that they managed to end the crisis in a way that did not cause any harm to the Turkish interests. In the Greek front the whole issue is seen as a disastrous loss, since the Turkish claim was not withdrawn, while the Greek government is accused of betraying the country against the traditional enemy (Giallouridis, 2001; Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996).

The specific day marks both the escalation and resolution of the crisis and therefore once again there is extended press coverage of the events. In Greece Eleftherotypia refers to a 'stormy meeting in the parliament' and a 'severe criticism against the Prime Minister for complying with the American and Turkish policies'. The situation is also described as a 'national defeat' and 'national betrayal' (Eleftherotypia, 1 February)[16]. The specific newspaper makes an extended coverage in an attempt to answer the questions generated by the government's delayed reaction to the occupation of the second islet as well as clarify to what extent the Greek side made concessions that serve the Turkish interests. The Greek government is actually described as 'unprepared and unorganised in front of the crisis'. 'We did not think of our next move and once again we found ourselves isolated because we failed to inform the international public opinion about the situation' (Eleftherotypia, 1 February).[17]

Eleftheros Typos maintains the critical stance towards the Greek government and reports the following; 'The government sold our national interests'; 'We were humiliated'; 'The new government is already doddering despite the vote of confidence'; 'The meeting of the Council of Ministers revealed crucial aspects of the behind-the-scenes activities that lead to our humiliation in the Aegean. The Foreign Minister Pangalos admitted having reassured the US government that the Greek flag would be lowered'; 'The opposition party plans to take initiatives in order to improve the country's prestige abroad'; 'The Prime Minister's initiative to publicly thank USA became the cause of great embarrassment in the parliament'; 'While the Greek journalists are not allowed to approach the islet, the Turks are knocking' (E. Typos, 1 February: 10-11 & 22-29).

[16] http://archive.enet.gr
[17] http://archive.enet.gr

In Turkey Milliyet stresses, 'It is now time to forget about Kardak and focus on the Turkish economy' while the crisis is also recognised by the press as 'the first problem on the way to the EU membership'. The press suggests 'the European governments that maintain a good relationship with Turkey must be informed that we are right' (Milliyet, 1 February: 4-7). The same newspaper criticises the decision to occupy the second islet stating that, 'Turkey claimed that Greece had stolen the Turkish sovereign rights from Kardak. Occupying a second islet is certainly not going to give us the sovereign rights back. This was not a sensible move' (Milliyet, 1 February: 13-17).

Also, Hürriyet states 'Ankara is relieved'; 'A victory for Turkey and a defeat for Greece'; 'USA intervention resolved the tension'; 'We did not make any concessions'; 'The importance of peace'. Official statements are also reported with the president Demirel 'congratulating the Prime Minister and the chief of the military forces for their successful dealing with the crisis' (Hürriyet, 1 February: 5-8).

5.5.3 The paradox in the Imia-Kardak crisis and the role of the media in the escalation of the dispute

The chronology of the Imia-Kardak crisis, as shown above, is an attempt to depict the basic facts and events that led to the escalation of the crisis, as seen through literature and the press coverage from both sides as well. In an effort to present the progress of the crisis in the most neutral way possible, the above events have been 'isolated' from the critical tone of the press coverage and the inevitable prejudice that the information, conveyed through the newspapers, contained.

As one can notice, in the specific case, a seemingly unimportant event, the raising of a flag on a rock, flared up a crisis that nearly led the two countries to war. The 'flag war', as it was often called by the media, led to a continuous exchange of threats between the two countries concerning the sovereign rights over a rock that had never preoccupied any of the two sides before. The two countries would have been involved in a military confrontation, had it not been for the intervention of USA that convinced them to return to the *status quo ante*; an outcome that generated a 'political storm' in the domestic arena of Greece and a festive atmosphere in Turkey.

Given the absence of any reference made in the related treaties regarding the sovereign rights over the Imia-Kardak islets, it seems fairly rational to assert that the two rocks were ceded from Italy to Greece as part of the Dodecanese islands. It is also known that the two countries have been traditional enemies and the relationship established between them was based on feelings of mutual hostility and mistrust. Yet, the paradox remains that both the grounding of the Turkish boat and the raising of the Greek flag on the rock, were judged as too trivial as events to bring the two countries on the verge of a war. Initially, the diplomats on both sides were themselves talking about routine exchange of verbal notes between the two embassies. A month later both sides were querying what was the reason that had inflated the issue, especially on the Greek TV.

This query was to a large extent clarified by the revealing interview given to Eleftheortypia by a Turkish journalist named Cesur Sert, on 19th January 1999. Sert was one of the journalists in the Hürriyet team that raised the Turkish flag on the Imia-Kardak islets on 27th January 1996. In the interview he gave to Eleftherotypia's Stratis Mpalaskas, he states, 'it all started when one of Hürriyet's executives asked me and four other journalists to fly to the islet and cover the issue that the Greek citizens from Kalymos had created with the raising of a Greek flag there. We were also given a big Turkish flag and were asked to take pictures of it on the islet. We found a Greek flag there, we replaced it with the Turkish one and we were all photographed individually'; and he adds, ' on the way back to Smyrna, we called the newspaper to inform them. When we mentioned the Greek flag we had taken with us, I could hear one of our colleagues announcing the news and the rest of them screaming and dancing. The following day the newspaper was going to feature a great story on the cover' (archive.enet.gr/1999/01/19/on-line/keimena/politics/poll.htm).

Ever since its resolution, the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis has been largely seen as a 'media war' and the interview of Cesur Sert could only enhance this observation. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to attribute the creation of the crisis to the media solely. Their role appears to be crucial though in 'legitimising the nationalist positions of the governments in both countries' (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000: 409). Ultimately, being in a position to identify media influences in the escalation of this crisis offers a solid basis for the investigation of the role of the press in political decision-making. It is particularly the

comparison between the press coverage of this crisis and the one in 1987 that will lead to more accurate inferences regarding how far the media can go.

5.6 Summary

The present chapter offered an introduction to the Greek-Turkish relationship from a historical perspective as well as in terms of a social and political framework that determines the media action in the two countries. It was an attempt to conceptualise the factors that led to the escalation of the tension between the two countries and at the same time identify some important elements in the media's coverage of this long-drawn conflict.

With the description of the coverage the two crises received by the Greek and Turkish press, this chapter offered a general picture of the line the Greek and Turkish newspapers followed in their reporting of this national issue. It also identified those aspects of the story that the press emphasised in both countries. As a next step the press coverage will be portrayed through the media frame, which will serve as the main instrument of the media's role in these two political games. The media frame will be presented in terms of the domestic game of the game - theoretic model that will be applied to the two crises. This will be addressed in the following chapter along with the investigation of the media – government interactions in the two crises as political nested games.

6 Greek -Turkish Games and the Media as Strategic Actors

6.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the examination of the two Greek-Turkish territorial crises and the coverage they attracted by the respective national press, as described in chapter five, through the game-theoretic model that was developed in chapters two and three. The application of the game theoretic model serves in the systematic and rigorous analysis on the one hand of the two crises and on the other, of the media – government interaction in them, in order to justify the media's role as actors and identify the strategic elements in that. At the same time, the analysis aims at demonstrating the aptness of game theory as an alternative way of examining and explaining media effects in political decision-making. This can lead to a more rigorous understanding of the role the media play and the extent to which they can even function as tools for analysis of decision-making processes.

The chapter is divided in two main parts. The first section of the first part features the application of the norms of game theory to the Greek-Turkish relationship. In the context of the nested game the two crises represent the international arena or the main game. The game theoretic analysis offers a detailed account of the options available to the two players and the ones that were eventually selected. This will also offer as accurate an explanation as possible of the outcome of each game.

The analysis reveals the great similarity in the way the two crises were escalated and resolved, which illustrates the degree to which the two countries have become traditional enemies after being involved in a long drawn and full of tension relationship. This signifies the 'familiarity' the two actors have developed in terms of each other's strategic behaviour. It also facilitates the analysis of the actors' decisions making their calculations more obvious and explainable. In terms of this tradition, the crises between the two countries are related to territorial claims and attempts made for the change of the status quo. Being more powerful on military terms, Turkey is the side that challenges the status quo to a large extent. Among some of the country's traditional tactics is to create *fait accompli* on a diplomatic basis. It is however a rational actor that would not proceed with an attack unless certain that the long term diplomatic and economic payoff will be greater than the cost. (Ifestos & Platias, 1992:186). Turkey sought to change the

status quo in the two crises this thesis examines. This would actually place Greece in the position of the defending player. However, which side challenges the status quo is not always as straightforward; and is also one of the reasons why the two countries found themselves involved in a conflict twice. This is explained by Jervis' statement that 'war and conflicts are more likely when both sides believe they are defending the status quo' (Jervis, 1992: 192).

The strategic analysis of the two crises will be followed by the description of the domestic game, which will model the media - government interaction. The domestic game reflects the organisation of the media's preferences and interests in relation to the governmental strategies as they develop in the international arena. The game serves in identifying the connection between media preferences and governmental strategies in order to understand the strategic nature of the media's action and the conditions on which a media effect on the governmental decisions would occur. The domestic game, which comprises a game that is nested in and runs along the international crisis, will also provide the basis for the examination and evaluation of the press coverage in relation to the progress of each crisis.

The second part of the chapter comprises the actual analysis of the press coverage within the context of the two games/crises, and will therefore merge the two game models. The press coverage and the frames through which the Greek and Turkish newspapers portrayed the two crises are examined as part of a game that is nested within and develops along each crisis. The analysis aims at comparing the progress of both the decision-making process and the press coverage in order to detect correlations between the governmental decisions and media frames that could explain potential media effects. The chapter concludes with an overall evaluation of the press's strategic role in the two crises. Through the identification of the similarities and differences in the progress and coverage of the two crises, it attempts to create the profile of the media as a strategically involved actor and integral part of the decision - making process.

6.2 The Greek-Turkish International games

The two Greek- Turkish crises presented in this section represent the type of game of the status quo. In this, one of the sides is interested in maintaining the status quo and therefore is adopting a defensive policy while the other is the one that 'attacks' first and

aims at changing the existing situation. The main objective of the player who is defending is to repulse or deter any provocative moves that could lead to the change of the existing situation. On the other hand, the attacking player aims at forcing the defending player to back down or to compromise.

In such types of games, it is usually the 'attacking' player that appears to 'have the upper hand' always depending on the amount of force he/she employs. Scarpf claims that there is a maximum level of overt conflict that a relationship can bear and if that level is exhausted unilaterally, then the other side must either give in or initiate war (1997:78). This is the basically the case in games that fall under the category of 'Chicken', which Colman describes as a dangerous game. This is because, by trying to get the maximum payoff for himself, the attacker not only harms the other player but he also exposes both himself and the defender to the risk of a disastrous outcome. In line with Scarpf's argument, Colman explains that such games are of compulsive character, in the sense that it is impossible to avoid playing with someone who is insistent; because a person who has refused to play chicken, has effectively played and lost (1992: 99). Initiating war is therefore the only option a player, who does not intend to give in, has. When such games are played in sequence, then the first mover will win at the expense of the other side (Scarpf, 1997: 78). The reason being that the player who gains an early lead is likely to maintain it given that on the one hand he gains confidence in his ability to get away with the risky strategy; and on the other hand, he makes his opponent more apprehensive of retaliating with the risky strategy (Colman 1982: 100).

However, one should also consider the long-term cost that such solutions may have for the defender of the status quo. The defending player, bearing in mind that a possible withdrawal in a similar crisis could trigger off further withdrawals in the long term, might then become more determined to defect even if this results in a conflict. As Robert Jervis (1982) claims, the 'security dilemma' of a specific country becomes even more crucial when a state that defends the status quo is forced by factors like the national commitments and strategies, to adopt an offensive strategy. If that is the case, even if none of the two sides aim at a territorial expansion, the national strategies are shaped based on the fear and the possibility that there will be drastic redistributions of territory and clout. The possibility of withdrawing is likely to affect future issues and conflicts

between the two sides. Therefore, both players appear to be unwilling to proceed with any compromising that would alter their values and objectives.

A crucial factor in the solution of the two crises is the amount and type of information the two players have at their disposal about one another at the beginning of the game. The two countries have been historical enemies, involved in a long -drawn controversy largely related to territorial claims and issues of sovereignty. Inevitably, the two enemies became familiar with certain strategies the adversary pursued, which could be easily identified after repetition. The repeated crises - games between the two countries resulted in a certain reputation that the two actors acquired in the eyes of the adversary with regard to their traditional objectives in their relationship. Reputation would ultimately add to the amount of information available to the two actors and assist in explaining their selection of strategies.

In general, game theory is known to explain the ranking among the outcomes of a game for each player, but it offers no help in explaining the value that specific outcomes may have for the players. For this reason, the empirical information we have about the two crises and the strategies that the two players are traditionally known to employ, will provide some indication about the preferences of the two players and will help acquire a better understanding of the progress and solution of the games. This information will also assist in the translation of the game theoretic approach into an analysis that will create scope for and shed light on the media's strategic action in their progress and solution.

6.2.1 The 1987 oil-drilling crisis

The 1987 oil-drilling crisis represents a rather complicated version of the chicken game. However, even if Chicken is the nearest of the four game models in the literature to describe it, the specific crisis embodies certain features that produce a game different from the archetypal. The game will first be presented in its normal form in order to obtain a first picture of the moves that are available to the two actors and the outcomes they lead to when combined. The next step will be to present the same game in an extended form with the employment of the decision tree. This will offer a more detailed account of how each move led to the other and ultimately resulted in the resolution of the crisis. The extensive form of the game will also help identify the entries for the media. The media's

influence on the international level derives from the domestic arena and from the impact they have on the decision-making process by acting domestically.

The game matrix is the form of the game that displays the names of the players, the options available to them and the way in which these options may interact and produce certain outcomes. Given that a situation such as the Greek-Turkish crisis requires action and a set of decisions and moves in order to be resolved, the game matrix converges the possible combinations of these decisions in six basic outcomes and represents the summary of important information from which we can then extract the preferred strategies of the players. It is therefore essential that we present the game in its normal form, based on which the strategic analysis of the crisis will be conducted. Figure 6.1 displays the normal game matrix of the 1987 crisis. In this game, Turkey is the player that aims at changing the status quo and moves first by announcing an imminent oil prospecting within the disputable continental shelf. The main objective of the Turkish government is to force the adversary into a negotiation process that will consequently lead to the rearrangement of the continental shelf. On the other hand, Greece represents the 'defender' of the status quo and aims at deterring Turkey from entering the disputable area as well as involve in a negotiation round.

In this game Greece and Turkey can select between two or more strategies. On the one hand Turkey can choose between utilising its threat and proceeding with oil prospecting; and the decision to withdraw. On the other hand, Greece can choose between three alternatives. It can accept to negotiate with Turkey regarding the resolution of the shelf issue, it can attack the Turkish vessel or it can refuse to negotiate without proceeding with any other action.

There are six possible combinations of the actors' decisions that result in four outcomes. Starting from the top two cells of the matrix, it appears that if Greece chooses to negotiate, this would leave Turkey better off, regardless of whether Turkey decides to withdraw from oil prospecting or not. In the former case (A/A) Turkey achieves its most preferred outcome in a more effortless way and gets 4; while the latter option represents a less comfortable strategy since it requires some action on behalf of Turkey to get the adversary to cooperate and therefore gives a payoff of 3,5.

Greece	Turkey: A: withdraw from oil prospecting	Turkey: B: proceed with oil prospecting	
A: accept to negotiate	2, 4	2, 3,5	*(2)*
B: attack the Turkish research vessel	4, 1,5	1, 1	*(2,5)*
C: don't attack and refuse to negotiate	4, 2	3, 3	*(3,5)*
	(2,5)	*(2,5)*	

Figure 6.1: The 'Oil-drilling' game in the normal form

The numbers in brackets indicate the average payoff that each move yields for the two players and on this instance it appears that the average payoff for Greece if it accepts to negotiate is the lowest it can receive *(2)*. Moving to the middle row of the matrix, a possible Greek decision to attack the Turkish vessel can result in the worst possible outcome for both countries, which is war, if Turkey proceeds with the oil prospecting (1, 1). If on the other hand, Turkey withdraws immediately after Greece attempts an attack, then the crisis ends with Greece being better off (4, 1,5). This explains the higher average payoff that this move can yield for Greece *(2,5)*.

The last row of the matrix portrays the potential outcomes of the Greek decision to simply refuse to negotiate in combination with Turkey's decision to either withdraw from or proceed with the oil prospecting. In the former case the outcome reflects the maintenance of the status quo in the Aegean since the two players return to the *status quo ante* without the occurrence of either negotiation or oil prospecting. However, as the matrix displays, the specific outcome leaves Greece better off for the reason that the defence and maintenance of the status quo is valued more by the Greek government. The matrix includes two potential Greek victories both of which result in the status quo. The difference is that the outcome depicted in the middle row involves action in the form of a military attack that forces Turkey to withdraw. The second Greek victory involves no action but is interpreted as such due to meeting the preferences of the Greek

government. The last cell of the matrix displays the outcome of the game when the action is unilateral and only from the Turkish government that proceeds with the oil prospecting; while the adversary remains firm to its decision not to involve in any negotiation but without initiating a military confrontation. This is not the best outcome either for Turkey (3) because it does not achieve the initiation of the negotiation round that it was aiming at; or for Greece (3) that, although refuses to negotiate, also allows the violation of the Greek territorial waters. The outcome represents a compromise that is made by both sides but without signifying an official agreement.

The organisation of the crisis in a game matrix allows for the calculation of the average payoffs the two players get from each decision. The average payoffs are the numbers displayed in brackets and they also indicate the *dominant* strategy for each player. The term *dominant* signifies the strategy that will leave the player better off, independent of what the opponent chooses to do (Tsebelis, 1990: 64). As Scharpf puts it,

> Dominance implies that in choosing between two strategies an actor should always select the one that provides payoffs that are superior or equal to the payoffs provided by the second strategy for all options the other parties might exercise (1997: 103).

As the matrix shows, the dominant strategy for Greece is C. If the Greek government refuses to negotiate, on average it will be better off than in any other case, independent of the Turkish response. On the contrary, the matrix displays equal sum-totals for both Turkish strategies as both the decisions can render the player better or worse off, depending on the response of the adversary. In this case, Turkey's strategies can be described as 'best response' strategies in the sense that what the player does depends on what he expects the adversary to do (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis, 1995: 44). Therefore, for Turkey strategy A is best response for Greece's strategy A, while strategy B is best response for Greece's strategy A and C. On this basis the cell that indicates dominant strategy for both players is located in the bottom right box of the matrix (3, 3). This is the outcome that renders both sides better off than in any other outcome. For a player to select their dominant strategy implies a rational action in the sense that the player calculates the expected outcomes of all combinations and selects the strategy that eliminates the risk in his decision. A mutually rational action would also imply that the game reaches equilibrium. Tsebelis defines as equilibrium solutions the stable and mutually optimal outcomes because no player has an incentive to deviate in strategy if the opponent does not change strategy (1990: 64). Or to put it differently, the players

understand that a unilateral change of strategy at a given point in the game, will not improve their payoff.

As portrayed in the matrix, there is technically one equilibrium point that is located in the right cell of the bottom row (3, 3). What is important in understanding this equilibrium is that the specific game is an iterated one, in the sense that it is played a number of times before the two players reach a solution. In this case, and given that the players' moves may be conditional until the next round, once they reach the specific cell in the matrix, they would be better off staying there than unilaterally switching to another strategy.

The game matrix helps identify the outcomes, which are expected to occur when the specific strategies available to the two players intersect, as well as the strategies that would imply rational action and would lead to a rational solution. Therefore, according to the outcomes of this game as shown in the respective matrix, if Greece and Turkey acted as rational players, they would avoid the combinations that were expected to yield the worst possible outcome. However, one of the prime dynamics in the solution of such games lies in the preferences of the two players, which define the ranking of the outcomes for each of them. Understanding the preferences of the two players is compulsory in order to understand the progress and solution of the game. The ranking of the preferences requires a more in depth and extensive analysis of the crisis as a game, which will be conducted with the aid of the extensive form of the game and the decision tree. A game tree, or else a decision tree, is 'a graphical form representing the structural model of a decision situation' (Singleton & Tyndal, 1974: 20). It constitutes a more extensive description of the game and contains the following information: Whose choice is it at any particular point of time? What alternative actions are available to each player at any particular move? What does each player know about the other person's prior choices? What are each person's preferences over outcomes? (Ordeshook, 1986).

An extensive analysis of the game becomes essential when one considers that a player's relative preferences among outcomes may be based on any factor whatsoever that influence the player's degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the possible outcomes (Colman, 1982: 20-21). This underlines the qualitative nature of outcomes to which players attach a given value that would drive their decisions. In other words, the desirability of an outcome is subjective – and is known as 'utility'; and although modern

utility theory enables numerical utilities corresponding to degrees of preference to be assigned in games with qualitative outcomes (Colman, 1982: 18), the numerical representation of these outcomes and the players' preferences as depicted in the game matrix, do not adequately incorporate factors such as the information each player has about the adversary's prior choices or the number of actions available to each player at each point in the game. Not to mention that, an important contribution of the decision tree in this case is that it demonstrates the sequence in which the two players move and which would ultimately play a crucial role in understanding how and why certain decisions are made. The availability of information regarding the sequence of moves or the time intervals that elapse between moves as well as the occurrence of external interventions provides a more accurate illustration of the players' preferences and the ranking among outcomes.

The game matrix shown above displays the potential outcomes that derive from the possible combinations between the strategies available to the two countries as well as the action required for a rational solution. The matrix serves in providing a compressed and general picture of the ways in which the crisis could be resolved. The extensive analysis will then demonstrate the progress of the crisis through which the final outcome was achieved as well as reasons that led to that specific outcome and the extent to which it corresponded to the players' preferences. The extensive analysis of the crisis will be conducted on the basis of a step-by-step description of the decision tree. This will help analyse the preferences of the actors along the course of the crisis, and identify the ranking of the outcomes as part of the explanation and analysis of the solution of the game. It is also important that we identify the way in which the two players interpreted the action and the preferences of the adversary as this will prove crucial in understanding their ranking among the outcomes. Before the media's role in the solution of the crisis is investigated, we need to understand why the actors chose the decisions they did, whether they chose their dominant strategies and if the game reached equilibrium. This will be an indication of their rationality in relation to which inferences about the media's strategic role will also be extracted.

6.2.2 The analysis of the 1987 oil-drilling game in its extensive form

The 1987 oil-drilling crisis comprises an ideal game for strategic analysis due to the well-planned tactics that both governments employ. This is a crisis in which the two countries confront each other over the status quo in the Aegean. The change and the maintenance of the status quo reflect the two opposing goals in the crisis according to which the preferences of the two players are shaped. With the initiation of the crisis we know that Turkey is the player that aims at changing the status quo and Greece at maintaining it. Therefore the preferences are shaped as follows.

For Turkey, the main objective is to initiate a negotiation round regarding the re-organisation of the continental shelf, which will ultimately lead to a change of the status quo and will entail the minimum possible cost and no military intervention. Turkey would even be satisfied with a mutual compromise between the two countries, as this would signify the departure point of future negotiations regarding the continental issue. This information leads to the assumption that from the outcomes displayed in the game matrix, Turkey's ranking order appears to develop in a logical sequence and according to the payoff each outcome entails. The ideal solution would be the outcome depicted in the top left cell (2,4), which presupposes the acceptance of the Greek government to negotiate. The second preferred outcome is again placed in the top row (2, 3,5), this time with the commencement of oil prospecting on behalf of Turkey as a move that will ultimately force Greece to accept the initiation of a negotiation round. The last two preferred outcomes are the possibility for a compromise (3,3) that could set the conditions for future negotiations; and lastly, war is the least preferred outcome for Turkey, for the reason that changing the status quo at that specific moment would not be worth the risk of a military confrontation.

The Turkish intentions are translated into the creation of a *fait accompli*, an issue to be solved in a diplomatic way and without the legal authorities being involved. [18] The Turkish strategy at this point lies in making use of the disagreement and tension that has

[18] In the Greek-Turkish long drawn-out conflict, the Greek side demands that the main mechanism of solving the specific differences between the two countries is The Hague Court; while Turkey suggests that the two sides should solve any differences through 'bilateral negotiations'. The argumentation of the two sides is obviously different. On the one hand, Greece defends the status quo and therefore becomes stronger in a process that is based on the international law. On the other hand, Turkey attempts to avoid The Hague Court due to their inability to adduce legal reasoning in order to defend their positions.

already been initiated between Greece and NAPC and agree to send the research vessel 'Sismik II'/'Hora' for oil prospecting within the Greek shelf. This move is a threat against the Greek government. Under the pressure of imminent oil prospecting, they aim at forcing the opponent into backing down and accept to resolve the issue through the diplomatic way.

It needs to be mentioned at this stage that the Turkish strategy is based on interpreting the Greek attempt to buy the holding shares of the Denisson Mines Corporation as an intention of commencing oil prospecting within the disputed continental shelf. Such an attempt would ultimately mean the violation of the Bern agreement, which constitutes the grounds for the Turkish government. Their argument is, 'If they violate the Bern agreement, we will do the same'. With the employment of this strategy, Turkey moves based on the expectation that Greece will violate the Bern agreement and places itself in the second column of the game matrix waiting for the Greek response. Turkey appears ready to proceed with oil prospecting unless Greece opens negotiation. Given that the Greek government had made no announcement of imminent oil drilling, Turkey's decision to interpret the Greek intentions as such reflects the creation of a *fait accompli* against which Turkey aims at justifying its action. This can be described as a 'tactical' misperception; and given that Turkey did not really feel threatened by an imminent Greek oil-prospecting, this justifies the fact that Turkey would be satisfied with a compromise.

On the other front, Greece aims at maintaining the status quo and appears to be involved in this crisis due to Turkey's decision to change the existing situation. Maintaining the status quo is priority for the Greek government even if this requires the initiation of war. For Greece, the prestige and determination of the country in terms of their relationship with Turkey, is worth even the risk of involving in a war. This is because a possible compromise or withdrawal could mean the beginning of a series of compromises in case of future conflicts. This is a typical example of a political leader who would rather engage in a risky behaviour only to avoid a retreat from the status quo (Levy, 1992).

On this basis, to deter the Turkish government from commencing oil prospecting, without having to proceed with an attack, is the outcome ranked first for Greece (4,2); while even

what is rationally considered as the worst possible outcome (1, 1) is ranked higher than the possibility of accepting to negotiate or even compromising. Greece's location in the matrix is therefore in the second and third rows, since the government does not appear to consider accepting the negotiation route.

In order to prevent the status quo from changing, Greece has to employ a strategy that will stop Turkey from sending the research vessel in the disputable continental shelf and from forcing the Greek government to involve in a new negotiation round that might change the status quo. Greece is interested in the solution of the continental shelf issue through a legal process, which is exactly the opposite from what Turkey is aiming at.

Let us know examine how the strategies unfold with the aid of the decision tree (Figure 6.2). What one can see in the figure is an interaction commencing between the two players that may or may not result in a war. As it was mentioned earlier, it was the Turkish move to authorise the research vessel that caused the crisis to flare up and the game is officially initiated with the Turkish announcement that oil prospecting is imminent. Greece will then have to either do nothing or respond to the Turkish announcement. At this stage, the Greek government demands that the Turkish vessel does not sail beyond the Turkish territorial waters. Turkey will then have to respond either by accepting to withdraw from the decision to commence oil prospecting or to insist. Turkey responds to the Greek warning with a persistent policy. Not only does it refuse to withdraw from the oil prospecting; but also it carries out the initial plan and orders that the research vessel start sailing in the international waters. The Turkish strategy becomes more risky since it increases the possibility of war. In terms of the game matrix, at this stage the crisis progresses in the bottom right cell (3, 3), since both countries appear unwilling to back down but without a military mobilisation.

Once the Turkish research vessel is authorised to commence oil prospecting in the area, the Greek government responds by adopting the policy of counteroffensive deterrence and warning the adversary that in case the Turkish vessels sails in the disputed area, it will be attacked. What the Greek officials attempt to achieve is to convince the opponent that war is likely and that the cost of involving in a war at that time, would be much greater than the profit. Therefore, it would be wiser for Turkey to act rationally and back down on time.



Figure 6.2: The 'Oil- drilling' game in the extensive form

The Greek government, in other words, raises the cost of a possible attempt to commence oil prospecting within the disputable area, which will certainly result in a war. Greece is counting on the fact that Turkey is after creating a *fait accompli* that will lead to a negotiation process and would not take the risk of war. This constitutes knowledge that one player has obtained about the other through their long - drawn relationship and in this case, Greece is utilising this knowledge and proceeds with a threat that will make Turkey understand there is great chance of commencing a war.

In order to make the threat credible, the Greek government proceeds with two moves. First, they decide to suspend the operation of one of the most crucial, in terms of position, American Bases near Athens, confirming the crucial character/nature of the situation. As it mentioned earlier in the description of the crisis, with this move the Greek government sent a message to the US government that any mediation from their side would be undesirable. This was also a decision that aimed to avert any military interference that the military base would cause during a possible war between the two countries.

Second, the Greek Minster of Foreign Affairs goes to Sofia for further negotiations with the Bulgarian government. With this move (balance of power politics)[19] the Greek Prime Minister aims at creating an alliance with the Bulgarian government; it becomes a cause for alarm in the circles of NATO and gives ground to the threat that in case of a Greek-Turkish crisis, NATO's southeast coalition would collapse, if Bulgaria gives a positive and supportive response. The essence of this decision lies in the supposition that a potential cooperation between a NATO member and a country of the Warsaw Pact could entail the leak of NATO's strategic information on behalf of Greece. This policy is followed up with specific military manoeuvres that mean to show the country is preparing for war. This is clearly defective move that escalates the tension and automatically moves the two countries to the cell that signifies the worst possible outcome on the game matrix (1, 1).

The next move is to be made by Turkey that will respond to the threat either by withdrawing from the decision to explore for oil or by insisting, while the Turkish research

[19] The balance of power politics represents the tactic that aims at 'borrowing power from foreign countries' in order to create supportive alliances.

vessel is sailing towards the international waters. Meanwhile, the General Secretary of NATO Lord Carrington and the British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe has initiated negotiations with the Turkish government in order to prevent any war possibility. The arrow in the left-hand side of the decision tree indicates the time point in which the intervention took place. In response to the Greek threat and the NATO intervention the Turkish government selects a more moderate direction and argues that it will withdraw if Greece guarantees that will not proceed with oil drilling in the disputed area either. The Turkish decision is the resultant of the NATO intervention that raised the cost of a potential military confrontation for Turkey and led to its shift on the game matrix, from the right column and its defective policy, to a policy of cooperation. The crisis officially ends with the last move made by the Greek government that informs the Turkish government, via the US ambassador in Ankara, there is no intention of oil prospecting in the disputed area. The game ends with the return of the Turkish research vessel to its departure point and with the two countries moving to the cell that signifies the placement of the two players in the bottom left box in the game matrix (4, 2).

The outcome of the game leaves the Greek government better off for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most highly ranked outcome for Greece that desired the maintenance of the status quo. Secondly, Turkey's change of policy indicates the selection of an optimal strategy and when Greece was preparing for an attack, withdrawing was a rational move to make. However, it also signifies compromise and a situation in which Turkey is worse off than Greece, since it did not achieve any of its objectives. Although technically the game did not reach an equilibrium point, as demonstrated in the game matrix, the identification and evaluation of the preference order for the two players highlight a rational solution since both players selected mutually optimal strategies.

6.2.3 The 1996 Imia- Kardak crisis

Similar to the previous game, the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis represents a game that embodies elements of the Chicken, but in its normal form it is significantly more complex than the original. What one can see in the game matrix in figure 6.3 is that each player's option to cooperate or defect consists of a combined move that describes two sequential steps. For example, Turkey is considered to defect when it demands that the Greek flag is lowered and, unless this is done, proceeds with an attack/invasion. Turkey defects when both moves are completed. Similarly, Greece's cooperation takes place when the

actor lowers the flag and also accepts to negotiate. Moreover, because of the sequential moves in which the game is played and because Turkey is the player that first makes a threat to attack, the game matrix would correspond to the crisis when the outcomes are examined with Turkey always having moved first.

	Turkey: A: demand the flag is lowered and don't attack	Turkey: B: demand the flag is lowered and invade	
Greece: A: lower the flag and accept to negotiate	2, 5	2, 3,5	*(2)*
Greece: B: refuse to lower the flag or negotiate	5, 2	1, 1	*(3)*
Greece: C: lower the flag and refuse to negotiate	4, 4	3, 3,5	*(3,5)*
	(3,6)	*(2,7)*	

Figure 6.3: The Imia-Kardak game in the normal form

In this game, Turkey is interested in the rearrangement of the sovereign rights in the Aegean, which is translated into forcing Greece into a negotiation round. On the other hand, Greece aims at an official recognition of the Paris Treaty according to which the specific islets were ceded to Greece by Italy along with the Dodecanese. Similar to the 1987 crisis, the action of Turkey is organised in two moves. The first move is to withdraw from the territorial claims once having demanded that the Greek flag is lowered or 'not attack' (A), and the second one is to attack the adversary (B). Greece can choose between three ways to respond to the Turkish moves. It can lower the flag and accept to negotiate (A), refuse to either lower the flag or negotiate (B) and lower the flag but refuse to negotiate (C). The payoffs for the two players are ranked from 1 to 5 as the combinations of their moves result in a greater variation of outcomes than in the first crisis.

If we look at the outcomes that this matrix produces, it appears that the first row renders Turkey better off since a Greek acceptance to commence negotiations pays off independent of whether an attack has preceded. However, when Turkey succeeds in getting Greece to negotiate with strategy B, that is with an attack, Turkey gets a lower payoff of 3,5, contrary to the payoff it gets from strategy A. This is because an attack on Greece could clearly harm Turkey's international reputation. On the contrary, the middle row portrays an overturn in the outcomes since a Greek refusal to lower the flag and negotiate will either result in the worst outcome (1, 1), if Turkey attacks and given that Greece also responds; or it will leave Greece better off since failure of Turkey to respond drastically will signify the establishment of the Greek sovereignty over the islet (5, 2). The outcomes portrayed in the bottom row indicate concessions made by both sides. The bottom left box is best described as a compromise (4, 4) due to the partly cooperative strategy of both players. On the one hand Greece accepts to lower the flag but refuses to commence negotiations. This might not harm Greece's interests but it does signify a compromise that paves the way for future concessions as well. It also signifies an outcome that leaves Turkey in a better position than in the outcome displayed in the middle left box, but it does not entirely meet its interests either since Greece is still refusing to negotiate. The last box (3, 3,5) although results from the same Greek strategy as above, it renders Greece worse off than a compromise due to the fact that it proceeds with the lowering of the flag only after a Turkish attack has preceded. This is an outcome that works better for Turkey that gains the 'upper hand' in the relationship, but still putting Turkey's international reputation at stake.

As shown in the sum-totals of the two players' moves, strategy C is the dominant one for Greece – on average the player will be better off by lowering the flag and refusing to negotiate – and for Turkey the dominant strategy is A, that is to demand the lowering of the flag but without attacking. Consequently, the dominant strategy for the two players is the bottom left box of the matrix (4, 4).

The matrix includes two equilibrium points. The first one is located in the middle left (5, 2) box. This outcome represents the equilibrium point in a one-shot Chicken game where, provided that the adversary does not switch strategies, none of the two players has an incentive to deviate from their choices since such a decision would render them worse off. On the one hand, Greece would risk suffering a loss or getting a compromise;

on the other hand, Turkey would involve in war. The second equilibrium solution is located in the bottom left cell of the matrix (4, 4), which represents the dominant strategy box as well. Similar to the 1987 oil-drilling crisis, this is an equilibrium that results from iteration. If the two players reach that outcome, they will have no incentive to switch to another strategy, which could entail the risk of war.

6.2.4 The analysis of the 1996 Imia-Kardak game in its extensive form

The 1996 crisis provides evidence of the repetition of the games in which Greece and Turkey are involved since it demonstrates great similarity with the first crisis in terms of the two players' interests. Once again Turkey is after creating conditions for the commencement of official negotiations regarding territorial rights in the Aegean. Interestingly, similar to the 1987 crisis, Turkey appears to pursue its interests through an indirect route and by exploiting a specific event that will generate tension and, ideally would force Greece into negotiations. This would generate the following ranking order of the possible outcomes as portrayed in the matrix. To force Greece in the lowering of the flag and into a negotiation process without having to launch an attack is the most preferred outcome for Turkey (2, 5), followed by the same outcome but with the involvement of the attack (2, 3,5). In the first case Turkey achieves its major objective without its interests being affected, while in the second it puts its international reputation at risk. The next preferred outcome is located in the bottom left cell of the matrix (4, 4) which meets the Turkish objective only partly with the Greek agreement to lower the Greek flag, but which still leaves the player better off than when Greece refuses to make any concession whatsoever. A somewhat lower payoff is obtained through the outcome located in the bottom right box (3, 3,5). The involvement of military force here justifies the lower ranking of the specific outcome. As for the outcomes located in the middle row of the matrix, given the determination the Turkish government demonstrates, it would be more willing to attack Greece if the latter refuses to make any compromise than withdraw from its claims, which is the outcome that derives from failure to attack. Therefore, war (1, 1) is in this case ranked higher than withdrawal (5, 2), which is the least preferred outcome for Turkey.

In Greece, the primary interest of the government lies in avoiding any negotiation with Turkey and maintaining the existing situation unchanged. For the Greek government, the status quo is translated into the international recognition of the Paris Treaty, which

establishes the Greek sovereign rights over the islets. It therefore indicates that the maintenance of the status quo serves the Greek interests, which justifies the initial decision of the government to ignore the Turkish moves and demands. On this basis, the most preferred outcome for Greece is located in the middle left box of the matrix (5, 2), which is the outcome that renders Greece better off than any other combination. The outcome located in the bottom left box (4, 4) should be ranked as second because despite the concession regarding the lowering of the flag, Greece would still remain firm to its refusal to negotiate, while Turkey would have also stepped back. The outcome located in the bottom right box (3, 3,5) appears logical to be ranked third for the reason that lowering the flag would follow a Turkish attack. If however, it still refuses to negotiate, this would still pay off more than if it refuses to make any concession, which would lead to war.

So far, the ranking of the outcomes demonstrates a logical sequence that corresponds to the preferences of the player but without entailing great risk. However, the Greek government appears equally determined to protect its territorial rights as Turkey, which leads to the preference of the worst possible outcome (1, 1) over the possibility to cooperate and accept to involve in a negotiation process, with or without being attacked, which would yield a payoff of 2. Although both countries appear determined to rather involve in a war than withdraw from their positions, the matrix displays a number of outcomes that pay off more than war and are mutually optimal, to a certain extent. It is therefore sensible to assume that the two countries considered the possibility of war as the last resort for the solution of the game, which became evident in the official statements made in the beginning of the crisis as well.

The ranking of the outcomes for Greece appears to correspond to the sum- totals of each move. The figures in the brackets indicate that strategy C would payoff more than the other two since both outcomes located in the bottom row are ranked higher while both outcomes located in the top row are ranked lower than war. In the case of Turkey, it appears from the sum totals that not attacking, which is strategy A, is a more beneficial choice.

Figure 6.4 displays the decision tree for this crisis. In this, Turkey is shown to be the player that moves first and demands that the Greek flag is lowered. This verbal move

has actually been preceded by the sending of a Turkish patrol boat in the area which refuses to leave unless the flag is lowered and which increases the cost of defection for Greece, which will then have to choose between accepting to lower the flag and refusing to do so. The Greek government insists on keeping the flag on the rock. The Greek response results in the first sub-game of the decision tree being located in the middle left box of the matrix (5, 2); leaving Greece better off, at least for the time being.

In this sub-game the Greek government is actually 'ignoring' the Turkish demand since the issue is believed to be only a fabrication of the Turkish side and there is nothing to be negotiated. This response of the Greek government may also be interpreted into a lack of consistent and planned strategy since by ignoring the Turkish provocation the player is rather encouraging the adversary to become more persistent and therefore more likely to switch to the defective strategy. However, the specific sub - game demonstrates the way in which the dominance of strategies changes from one stage to the other, when the game is played in sequential moves. That is to say, although in the normal form of the game the Greek decision to ignore the issue appeared to produce a lower sum-total than the decision to lower the flag, the same move becomes dominant at this stage when the Turkish government has not yet proceeded with an attack threat.

At this stage, it would be interesting to see how the information that the Greek government has from previous interactions with Turkey, i.e. the 1987 crisis, might have influenced its decision. This can be explained with the use of a type of reasoning that Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis describe as *backward induction* (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis, 1995: 80). The authors explain how in sequential games, an instrumentally rational player would ask what the adversary's response would be to each of the strategies that the former selected, and calculate the payoff accordingly before acting. In this case, instrumental rationality is guided by information about the adversary's preferences and traditional tactics, that Greece could consider before choosing the most beneficial strategy. Therefore, knowing from past experiences that Turkey would push for negotiations but not involve in war, Greece's assumption would then be 'If I choose strategy B, Turkey will choose A', which would generate the most preferred outcome for Greece.



Figure 6.4: The Imia-Kardak game in the extensive form

The following sub – game as depicted in the diagram begins with a strategy switch for Turkey, from A to B as shown in the matrix, which responds to the Greek defection with a war threat and a gradual preparation of the forces, after a decision was made by the National Security Council in Turkey. With this move, Turkish Prime Minister Çiller selects a largely risky strategy and apparently proves Greece's calculations wrong, at least in the current sub-game. At the same time, she creates a *fait accompli* that serves her interests for the initiation of a negotiation round, which reinforces the defective strategy as a more dominant one. With this move, the two players automatically move to the matrix cell that reflects the worst possible outcome (1, 1), unless Greece switches to another strategy too.

As a next move, the Greek government may now choose between the three strategies as depicted in the matrix as well. By selecting strategy B, Greece threatens to respond to any Turkish attack and places a team of rangers around the islet. With this latest move, Greece accepts to take a great international risk and seriously prepare itself for the possibility of war, a move that appears to be incompatible with their original preferences. This is a suboptimal move that confirms the two players are placed in the box that signifies the worst possible outcome they could get. In other words, although according to the ranking order of the outcomes, the possibility of war appeared as less preferred than half the outcomes produced in the matrix for both players, the two countries found themselves choosing a suboptimal strategy and heading for war.

This action occurs in terms of the second sub-game of the decision tree, which unfolds further than the two escalating moves described above. In fact, Turkey's response to the Greek decision to mobilise the armed forces, is to send warships in the area as well and therefore confirm the predictions that war is imminent. This move is followed by the increase of the Greek armed forces in the area as an attempt to make a credible threat that would force Turkey into backing down. At this point both countries attempt to employ a strategy of deterrence. On the one hand, Turkey attempts to force the adversary in a negotiation process under the threat that a war would be a more costly choice. On the other hand Greece raises the stakes in an effort to convince the Turkish government that the islets are not negotiable. The extended escalation of the tension reinforces the suboptimal or even irrational nature of the selected strategies as the two players remain

in the box representing the technically least preferred outcome and the second least preferred outcome according to their preferences.

The solution to the game is given by the intervention of a third player, the US government that in this case acts as an arbiter. It needs to be mentioned that by the time the two countries have turned a trivial issue into a reason for war, a new status quo is created, the retreat from which would then entail greater cost than war. In this case, the role of the US government is to restore the order of the outcomes and the cost and payoff attached to them. In other words, the US intervention raises the cost of defection for both players and makes cooperation a more attractive option. Therefore, we see a switch in the strategy of the Greek government that agrees to lower the flag but without agreeing to commence negotiations with Turkey. Similarly, the Turkish side is also talked out of attacking the Greek forces. In terms of the game as depicted in the matrix, the two players move from the box that represents the worst possible outcome, to the dominant strategy box (4, 4). The outcome is best described as a mutual compromise due to the fact that it offers no authorisation of one of the two countries' sovereign rights over the islet. This signifies a concession made by Greece by lowering the flag and automatically raising questions regarding the sovereignty over the islet. At the same time, the withdrawal of Turkey raises questions regarding the authenticity of the threats and the value of the islet for Turkey. The game also reached an equilibrium solution, which enhances its nature as a rational outcome since the two players chose a mutually optimal strategy.

The 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis features some key differences compared to the 1987 oil-drilling crisis. Although both games developed on the basis of the same interests and preferences of the two players and were solved with the intervention of an external player that influenced the ranking of their preferences, the way the two crises evolved differs significantly. In 1987 the two countries, Greece in particular, adopted clear-cut strategies that corresponded to their preferences and resulted in a mutually optimal solution of the game. Even if Özal's decision to withdraw appeared as the outcome of Lord Carrington's intervention, given Turkey's preferences it seems that the intervention defined the timing of the withdrawal rather than the decision *per so*.

On the contrary, the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis found the two governments involved in a game instigated by a flag that a group of journalists raised on a deserted islet, which would then cause their traditional preferences and interests towards each other to resurface. Although, from a first point of view, Turkey appeared to be following a strategy similar to the one in 1987, the government's aggressiveness and lack of a solid argumentation led to what seemed as an irrational escalation of the tension. At the same time, Greece's lack of strategic planning generated what was later described as spasmodic moves that resulted in what was referred to by the Greek media as a defeat. In game-theoretic terms, the main difference between the two crises lies in the degree of rationality inherent in the player's decisions and the solution of the game. That is to say, although in 1987 the two countries were engaged in a rather logical sequence of moves, the Imia-Kardak crisis is a demonstration of moves that no rational calculation would predict. It needs to be clarified here that in this thesis the two countries are not viewed as instrumentally rational players. However, given the availability of information regarding their preferences and interests, they are expected to move in a way that can be described, if not as rational, at least predictable. On this basis, their strategies in the 1996 crisis could then be identified as non - predictable, considering the cause of the problem that brought them on the brink of war.

Interestingly, after the 1996 crisis was resolved, it was described by analysts in Greece and Turkey as the 'media crisis', identifying the exaggerated media coverage as the main cause. This is an observation that provides a hypothesis that the game theoretic approach of the crisis and the press coverage is therefore called to justify.

6.3 The domestic game

Chapter three presented the integration of the media in a political decision-making process, such as an international crisis; and explained the different stages through which the effect of the media frames on the government's decisions is produced. The current section approaches the media-government interaction as a domestic game in an attempt to systematise the 'action' of both the media and the government towards one another; and the cost and payoff this action entails for each party. Chapter three identified the interaction between the government and the media as a game the former plays against Nature. It was explained that to identify the media as Nature serves in the more accurate conceptualisation of their interaction. The relationship that the government develops with

the national media during conflict situations such as international crises is here approached not as a confrontation but as an interaction where the interests and preferences of one party affect the decisions of the other.

This interaction could also take the form of a mixed motive game, where the involved players are motivated partly to cooperate and partly to compete with one another (Colman, 1982: 93). However, to conceptualise the media as Nature serves in identifying the dependence of the government's decisions in the international game, on a player that 'moves disinterestedly according to the laws of probability' (Colman, 1982: 6). Obviously, the media coverage of an issue such as an international crisis cannot be described as random move, which is what the concept of Nature as a player is identified with. The concept of probability, with which Nature moves, is here replaced with the given set of rules and motivations based on which the media's reaction to governmental decisions derives, always in the form of news content. Although these are not associated with the decision-making process that evolves in the international arena in the form of an interdependence of choice, they can still affect it, the same way that Nature arranges the deck in a particular order, in a Poker game (Colman, 1982: 6). Nature in this case, does not play a part in the game by making strategic moves, but it does affect the outcome of the game in a certain indirect way. In a similar way, although the media do not move against the governmental moves, they can still influence them and consequently the progress and outcome of the international game too. This influence, which also corresponds to the idea of Tsebelis' *extomality*, can ultimately define the media's strategic impact on the solution of a game such as a crisis.

The domestic game is organised as a strategic game with the aid of the matrix shown in figure 6.5, which could however appear contradictory to the conception of the media as Nature, since the latter does not move strategically. What needs to be clarified is that the media act strategically but they do so towards their competitors rather than the government. The media 'exploit' the governmental moves to produce media coverage that will yield a high payoff in relation to their competitors. It is their strategic action towards competition that drives their response to the government's moves and is therefore expected to produce specific payoffs – gains or losses. These payoffs might be endogenous to the game and predictable to the government, which raises questions as to how accurate the association of the media as Nature could be. What needs to be

understood though is that the media's strategic action is directed to their competitors but the outcomes of this action is also affecting the government. The media act strategically for their competitors but they act like Nature for the government. In this case, the game matrix serves in organising the outcomes that derive from the payoffs they media get in their strategic game against competition and how these outcomes are then translated into payoffs for the government. In other words, the matrix is most effective way to organise both the media's game against their competitors and their game as Nature with the government.

The idea of the domestic game attempts to organise diverse types of media reaction into 'moves' and identify all the possible outcomes that these moves can produce once combined with the policy moves made by the government in the international game. The outcomes of this game will then be evaluated in relation to the outcome of the international game. A central feature of the domestic game is that although the involved actors are not similar in their characteristics or preferences- which is also one of the reasons why the game cannot take the form of a confrontation or a bargaining situation - they could represent two actors whose utility functions are interdependent in such a way that certain acts by one player are likely to increase or decrease the likelihood that the other will act in the same way. This is an observation inherent in the macro-micro link described by Scharpf, according to which the close interrelation between the domestic and international arena increases the possibility of a policy decision that conforms to the media reaction (Scharpf, 1997:53).

In the domestic game, the actions of the media are purposeful in the sense that their moves are interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal and the fulfilment of specific interests (Ordeshook, 1986). This will also provide incentive to identify their preferences as they develop in this context. If the media are conceptualised as a socio-political institution, then to put it in Scharpf's words, their interests can be described as related to the production function of social institutions. For actors like the media, the self-interests could be identified with the conditions of organisational survival, autonomy and growth (1997: 64); or they may reflect a given ideology or even the incentive to maintain a cooperative relationship with the government at all costs. Obviously, such interests would appear to cancel out one another, since to pursue an organisational and commercial interest could signify the production of news that follow a profitable rather

than an ideological line. Or to put it differently, a media organisation that remains firm to a certain ideology that appeals to only a segment of the audience, will inevitably sacrifice part of the economic benefit.

In reality, the interests and preferences of media organisations comprise an interrelation of the above, which would make it hard to discern what preferences drive their decisions on news construction and coverage of specific issues at each time. For reasons of simplicity the thesis focuses on potential media preferences in times of international crises. The hypothesis in this case is that when the government is involved in a controversy with a rival state, the media preference that prevails is the one over a drastic governmental action and confrontation of the adversary, rather than the option of compromise or de-escalation. In cases of national prestige, the media's function as guardians of the national and public interest is intensified. By employing their 'mission' of watchdogs, the media are therefore likely to challenge the government suggesting radical policy solutions.

At the same time, the media are likely to approach the issue as an attractive news story, subject to their commercial incentives. The editorial values and required drama inherent in the construction of news justifies why a form of controversy such as an international crisis could produce a story that meets the media's circulation needs. In other words and as a re-interpretation of Scharpf's words, the media's interests are here defined in a 'quasi- objective' way since we are not associating the concept with the full range of concepts that enter into the preferences that determines the media's action (1997: 64).

As far as the government's preferences are concerned, always in relation to their interaction with the media, what is particularly important here is the fact that the requirements associated with the interests of the media are transparent to the government and so is the connection of the media with the public. This would ultimate make the media's moves less random than how the moves of Nature would be perceived but it would also facilitate the detection of the media's strategic impact, as an integral part of the governmental calculations. On this basis, it is reasonable to assume the government would prefer to walk through the crisis enjoying the media, and as an extension, the public support. This is also supported by the media-government dynamic relationship described in chapter one, which clarifies the government's effort and desire

to 'instrumentalise' the media in order to meet its own ends. This would make any media opposition highly undesirable and strategically dangerous. Hence, the domestic game can systematise the conditions on which the likelihood for the government's decision to be affected by the media coverage increases. In the matrix below the preferences of the two parties are organised into moves, the combinations of which result in four outcomes regarding the possibility of a media effect on governmental decisions. What needs to be clarified is that the government is here presented as 'playing' with the same moves as in the international game; that is to say, it is expected to select between confronting the adversary and de-escalating the crisis. Subsequently, the media's moves are considered as a response to the above governmental decisions. The media can therefore choose between supporting and opposing a given decision.

A clarification is here needed with regard to the support/oppose divide that defines the media's options in the game. Within the structure of the domestic game the media's decision to choose a 'strategy' reflects their response to governmental policy decisions; and is shaped according to whether or not a policy decision corresponds to the media's organisational and economic interests. This means that the frames employed by the media towards the governmental handling of the two crises are not expected to derive from any form of media bias or partisanship, but rather from their desire and pursuit of newsworthy stories and nationalistic predispositions related to the Greek-Turkish relationship. However, considering on the one hand the inclination of many Greek newspapers to support preferences and goals of one party or another and on the other hand the improbability of the Turkish press to proceed with harsh coverage - given the respective media-state relationship - to assume that the support/oppose divide results only from organisational and economic interests leads to the formulation of another hypothesis; that is, in situations of international crises the media act and decide primarily as profit-making organisations. It remains to find out to what extent the Greek and Turkish media coverage verify this hypothesis, as this would provide sound indication of their autonomy from the government and would enhance their potential to influence the government strategically.

On this basis and as a resultant of their interests, the media's behaviour is shaped according to their preference for confrontation rather than withdrawal; and according to their pursuit of an autonomous role in the process of political communication. Given that

the media would favour a drastic governmental action against the adversary, one would then expect them to support a move of confrontation and oppose a move of de-escalation. As shown in the matrix, the first combination yields the highest payoff (4) since it secures the desired news story. In the latter they gain the second higher (3) for the reason that by opposing a decision for de-escalation the media maintain their role as advocates but lack the attractive news story that a confrontation could produce. Looking at the remaining two combinations, it appears that to oppose the official policy would pay off for the media even when the government chooses to confront the adversary (4). In this case, along with the desired news story, the media enhance their position as a defender of the public interest towards the risk of war.

		Media		
		Support	Oppose	
Government	De-escalate	4, 1	1, 3	*(2,5)*
	Confront	4, 4	3, 4	*(3,5)*
		(2,5)	*(3,5)*	

Figure 6.5: The media- government interaction in the domestic game

On the contrary, to support a decision for de-escalation yields the lowest payoff (1) since it portrays the media as followers of the official policies and it generates no controversial news story. Based on the matrix and the outcomes it produces, it appears that the dominant strategy for the media in situations of international crises is to oppose the official decisions, the average payoff of which *(3,5)* is higher than to support either of the governmental decisions *(2,5)*.

The hypothesis made here is that the media's dominant strategy is transparent to the government and is also expected to affect the ranking of the preferences of the latter. The media's impact would lie in rendering the confrontation of the adversary as the *dominant* strategy for the government, by creating public expectations and conditions of domestic/audience cost if the government failed to meet these expectations. In case the

media choose to support the decision, the government receives the public support as well and protects its prestige, which is translated into the highest payoff (4); while even if the media choose to criticise this policy, the payoff for the government is still higher (3) than if it de-escalates the crisis (1). In the former case the media criticism is expected to be milder than in the latter, since the media would prefer the confrontation. To de-escalate the crisis pays off for the government only if the media supports the decision (4). The average payoff of the de-escalation as a strategy is lower *(2,5)* than that of confrontation *(3,5)*, which justifies confrontation as a *dominant* strategy for the government.

The matrix of the domestic game comprises a demonstration of the way in which the analysis of the interactions between the media, the public and the government in chapter three is translated into what we called a 'suboptimal' decision for the government. The domestic game represents that level of the crisis on which the government has an incentive to choose confrontation as its dominant strategy that pays off and secures the media and public support. The organisation of the media-politicians interaction in the game matrix concentrates the effect of the media and the cost they attach to a given official decision in the government's dominant strategy, on the domestic front, to proceed with a confrontation.

The observation that confronting the adversary is the government's dominant strategy, once the media are involved, is enhanced by the iterated nature of the domestic game. In a situation such as an international crisis, the game between media and government is played a number of times from the day the crisis initiates until it is resolved. If the game is organised in rounds, the repetition enables the players to condition what they do in one round on what the opponent has done in previous rounds. Players learn things about their opponents from their past behaviour (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis, 1995: 187-194). On that basis, the game itself becomes a learning process for the government that may move around all four cells of the matrix and will experience both the support and the criticism of the media before it reaches the outcome from which it will have no incentive to deviate. In other words, through the repeated play, the government is not only aware of the media's preferences and interests but also of the implications of these preferences and interests on the government's domestic reputation. As Rasmussen claims, in picking her/his action, a player looks ahead to its implications for the future

periods; it is therefore easier to act by understanding the end of the specific game (2001: 110). If the government is in the position to utilise the knowledge gained from the iteration in order to look ahead in the cost that specific media coverage may entail, then it becomes unproblematic to justify why confronting the adversary in the international game is the dominant strategy.

6.4 Strategic analysis of the media coverage

The international games/crises and the domestic game described above represent the two arenas of nested game model, as it was analysed in chapter three. Each crisis is perceived to be progressing in both arenas simultaneously in both countries. A domestic game as the one described previously is therefore 'nested' in the crisis both in Greece and Turkey. The objective of the present section is to demonstrate the media's strategic role in the progress and solution of each crisis through the analysis of the press coverage on the basis of the interaction between the international and domestic arena. It is also to identify the conditions under which we can evaluate the media frame through which the crisis was portrayed, according to its impact on the governmental decisions and the progress of the crisis.

Based on the game matrix that represents the domestic interaction between the government and the media, a potential media impact on the progress of the international arena is perceived as the selection of a strategy by the government that meets the media's interests and the domestic payoff that derives from them. In order for this governmental strategy to be regarded as the resultant of a media effect it will have to represent a change from an initial policy that did not serve the media's interests, to a policy that does and is therefore supported by the media. This impact is then most likely to derive from the media's opposition to a cooperative official policy that aims at de-escalating the tension. On these terms, we would consequently expect that a strategic media impact would take place only on the occasion of a policy change.

This observation is problematic for the reason that, as the game theoretic approach also demonstrates, policy change signifies change in the ranking of a player's preferences as well as in what he or she considers to generate cost of payoff. There may be a number of factors that force a government to a policy change and the adaptation of a more beneficial strategy during the course of a crisis, which suggests that the occurrence of a

change in the government's strategy *per se*, will be difficult to be evaluated as an indication of media impact. However, there might be some particular parameters of a policy change that provide an indication of whether the media have been amongst those factors to cause such a change. Considering the media's ability to generate an audience cost for the government, then a policy change that has been the result of media impact could embody:

- An apparently suboptimal strategy
- A strategy that is apparently incompatible with the government's original preferences

According to the concept of the nested game, a decision that does not look optimal to the observer might prove optimal when the interests of the player in the background arenas are examined. This should give incentive to examine whether whenever the government 'commits' a seemingly irrational decision, this corresponds to the prevailing domestic conditions created by the media frames. A hypothesis and a departure point for the detection of the media's strategic role could be that a media impact would lie in raising the cost of de-escalation and giving the government incentive to proceed with a defective decision in the international arena, in order to avoid the domestic cost of de-escalation. The game theoretic approach will in this case allow the evaluation of each official policy in relation to the domestic cost and payoff it yields; which would also be associated with the importance of public opinion and the impact of the public expectations, as created by the media frames, on the government.

The analysis will be based on a comparison of the governmental international preferences with the media's preferences, as shaped by the domestic game. A potential discrepancy between the preferences of the two sides as shaped in the beginning of the game provides the basis to investigate the occurrence of a government's movement during the course of the international game that appears to be analogous to the media's preferences. Consequently, the occurrence or not of the government's movement around the cells of the international game matrix will function as a departure point for the investigation of a connection between this movement and the domestic payoffs. The findings will then guide the investigation of the media frames in relation to the government's moves.

6.4.1 The media frame

The media frame will be organised and examined in terms of whether the media support or oppose a given official policy such as de-escalation or confrontation. The main way to distinguish the frame from the rest of the news is by its capacity to stimulate support of or opposition to certain policy decisions (Entman, 2003). To capture the degree of support or opposition employed by the media during the two crises, their content is organised according to four framing categories that are initiated from Entman's definition of media framing. The main idea is to evaluate the media's content in terms of the indirect support or opposition towards a given policy. The diagnostic and prognostic frame helps detect the type of pressure the media exert on the government and identify when and how this pressure transforms into domestic cost. For instance, to publicly disseminate a prognosis of the international cost that a given policy decision is likely to have, is expected to create public expectations for a certain type of official action and consequently, conditions for domestic punishment as well.

The information that composes the frame in question consists of those word combinations that describe what the problem is and how serious it is; who the responsible for the tension is; the options available to the two actors; the expected risk, cost and pay-off for each outcome of the game; the best solution for the crisis. The frame is organised in two main categories, the diagnostic and prognostic frame. The former is further organised in the problem definition and causal responsibility as Entman's definition of the frame underlines. In the definition of the given problem, the frame consists of this information and statements that describe how serious the issue that has just arisen is. The causal responsibility frame concentrates the information that indicates who the responsible for the crisis is (E.g. the adversary or the government); and what those factors that have led to the escalation of the crisis are. In several occasions though, the statements that the press conveys include information that incorporate both the definition of the problem and the causal responsibility. Or, they can simply be interpreted in terms of both the subcategories.

The prognostic category compresses what the press considers to be the strategic alternatives available to the two actors and the risk and cost entailed in each of them. The strategic alternatives are coded in terms of the course of action that the government should follow. This information is not as direct and clear as the remedy suggestion; yet,

by stressing the risk and cost entailed in each alternative the press indirectly indicates which decision is preferred. This is also in terms of the general prognosis that the media attempt and adds to the pressure exerted on the government, when it is not aligned with the government's position. As for the payoffs, these refer particularly to the option of war, as the most crucial outcome in the game. The objective is to collect the information that evaluates the choice to defect even if that leads to war; and investigate how risky this option is considered by the press, particularly in comparison to the politician's preferences. The last subcategory in the prognostic frame is the remedy suggestion and indicates what the press regards the best possible solution for the game. Appendix presents the media frame for the two crises, organised based on the coverage of the two Greek and two Turkish newspapers.

Therefore, the media frame and the diagnostic and prognostic categories in which the information is organised, compose the main instrument that the press employs in order to meet its objectives. It has already been discussed that in the coverage of an issue and the information disseminated by the media, one can actually recognise the interests of the media as conglomerates and the objectives they pursue. 'Journalists do go through some strategic thinking in deciding how to frame their stories...' (Entman, 2003: 422). The media frame also reflects the contextual background of the domestic game, to a certain extent. It composes a set of information that reflects the media's public ratification of any decision that the government makes; and, given that politicians do care about the media's critical coverage, the calculations that the press makes with regard to the escalation and resolution of the crisis are then expected to impinge on the governmental calculations. At this stage, it is essential to point up the particularly critical role of the Greek and the Turkish public opinion. This is because the long and 'turbulent' relationship that has developed between the two countries has inevitably produced stereotypes and nationalistic attitudes of the two peoples towards each other. These were basically transferred from elitist groups to the public opinion through institutions like the media (Giallouridis, 2001: 24); and have generated a highly 'sensitised' public sentiment in relation to the 'traditional' adversary. Consequently, both the government and the media become even more likely to consider the reaction of an already pre-empted public opinion, such as the Greek and Turkish, when deciding upon a strategy towards the traditional adversary.

Before we proceed with the analysis of the media – government interactions in the two crises, it is essential that we begin with a more specified hypothesis. It was theorised earlier that in situations of international crises the frames employed by the media are driven primarily by organisational and economic interests. Through their impact on the public's perception of the given situation, this framing is then likely to result in the generation of certain expectations and in a strategic impact on the government. As it was explained in chapter five, the privatisation and commercialisation of the media organisations in Greece and Turkey occurred in the 1990s that is after the oil-drilling crisis had already taken place. On this basis, the hypothesis here is that the press becomes less likely to employ highly controversial and over dramatised audience – driven frames in 1987. A media strategic impact of this nature is therefore less expected in the oil-drilling crisis.

6.5 The 1987 'oil-drilling' crisis

The analysis of the coverage the specific crisis attracted from the Turkish and Greek newspapers will be conducted on the basis of the description of the domestic interaction between the media and the government and with the aid of the respective game matrix. The government's moves of 'de-escalation' and 'confrontation' will be replaced with the actual moves of each government in the specific crisis. The idea is to examine the government's movement in the matrix in relation to the press coverage. As it was explained in chapter three, the media are in this case approached as Nature and their coverage of the government's decisions is perceived as a series of 'random' moves in the sense that it is done in accordance to own objectives and interests and not as a confrontation to the government. Therefore, their strategic role will be evaluated as a result of the impact that these random moves have on the governmental decisions and of the extent to which the government is considering the media coverage when calculating its moves. The analysis will begin with the evaluation of the Turkish press coverage; and once the press coverage in both countries is complete, the analysis will conclude with some comparative final remarks regarding the media's strategic role in this crisis.

6.5.1 The press coverage in Turkey

To start with, we will need to identify the preferences of the two parties in the specific crisis with the aid of the matrix shown in figure 6.6. This is a replication of the domestic

game as described earlier in this chapter, which has been adjusted to the international strategies available to Turkey for this crisis. It needs to be mentioned at this point that during the 1980s the Turkish media were largely subordinated and strictly controlled by the state, which would make opposition to the governmental decision not a preferred option. In this case, the media's payoff is depending entirely on the government's move and it will be evaluated accordingly. Within the context of the specific crisis and under the specific regime, the media would be better off supporting the government. They would therefore prefer that Turkey selects strategy B and proceeds with the oil prospecting since this is expected to produce a more controversial news story and a higher payoff whether they choose to support or oppose the decision.

In case the press chooses to oppose the decision, although it risks getting the 'stick' from the government, it would still be better off than if the government chooses to withdraw from its claims (Strategy A). It needs to be reminded that the media's payoffs are estimated according to their interest in audience-driven news stories, independent of their relationship with the government. In other words, the most preferred outcome for the media is B/A with B/B the second best. The government's preferences remain stable, as specified in the description of the domestic game. Even if in the specific example, Turkey should not expect to receive opposition from the press, it would still hurt more to be criticised for remaining inactive and choosing strategy A, than proceeding with strategy B.

This would render strategy B as the dominant one, but perhaps the most accurate way to identify the government's preferences in this interaction, given the small probability that the press would oppose, would be to consider both strategies as yielding equal payoffs. Considering that Turkey does not have a dominant strategy in the international game either, it would be interesting to see how the media frame is formed on this respect. Moreover, under this specific regime, it would be meaningless to expect a media opposition, which consequently makes the outcome of this interaction predictable and the media's impact unlikely. However, it would be still interesting to see the frame through which the media portray the crisis and the governmental action and identify the extent to which it reproduces the political frame in accordance with the media's interests. The frame of the Turkish newspaper could produce some useful information and inferences that can be carried over for the analysis of the second crisis.

	Media		
	A: Support	B: Oppose	
Turkey			
A: Withdraw from Oil-prospecting	4,1	1, 3	*(2, 5)*
B: Proceed with Oil- prospecting	4, 4	3, 4	*(3,5)*
	(2, 5)	*(3,5)*	

Figure 6.6: The 1987 media – government interaction in Turkey

The Turkish government is the player that makes the first move in this interaction with preparing to send the research vessel in the Aegean. On 25th March, the Turkish government mobilises armed forces in the area of East Thrace and around the coast of Asia Minor while the Turkish fleet is concentrated in the Marmaras Sea. This move places Turkey in the B strategy row, which would produce a high payoff in the domestic game, if the press supports this decision. What needs to be reminded at this stage is Turkey's objective in this crisis. The reason why Prime Minister Özal announces an imminent oil prospecting is based on the argument that Greece is about to violate the Bern agreement. It is therefore interesting to see that on 26th March, the press disseminates a diagnosis that on the one hand, appears rather exaggerating developing war scenarios; and on the other, it attributes responsibility to Papandreou for trying 'to create tension...in order to jeopardise the Turkish EU candidacy' (Milliyet, 26/3). This is a frame that even contradicts Özal's statements, who claims both countries are in need of peace and would not risk a war; and the political frame regarding the cause for the Turkish announcement to commence oil- prospecting in the disputed area.

Although the frame is apparently supportive of the government, it also encourages a defective strategy by providing a diagnostic frame that identifies one additional reason why Turkey should respond promptly. It also shifts Turkey's position to the domain of losses and frames it as being the defender. The frame does not explicitly signify a

domestic cost for the government, but if we consider that the public is also watching, it does create a diverse impression of what the reason for the Turkish decision is as well as the seriousness of the situation at this stage. It could therefore result in the public expectation for a confrontation of the adversary by all means. Not to mention that, as the Turkish press prognoses, 'war can only have a cost for Greece, since it will jeopardise the new economic reform that the Greek government is planning to apply' (Milliyet, 26/3). It could be that the specific newspaper attempts to predict a possible Greek bluff and *fait accompli*, implying that the Greek government aims at deterring Turkey with the war threat, which however will never happen. In other words, the Turkish press, even without opposing the governmental handling of the case, conveys a message that encourages a more drastic action, even if that has to be a war, that could be translated into a domestic expectation for a firm and uncompromising stance so that Özal will not be caught in Papandreou's bluff. The specific frame can be interpreted as an incentive for the government to remain firm to their strategy and carry out their warning. This is also a frame that fits the media interests as defined in the domestic game and it produces a high payoff for both the government and the media (4, 4).

On 26th March before Greece has made a move, Turkey sends out Sismik II to explore for oil and Özal, who had previously stated he was after a peaceful solution, threatens to attack Greece in case it obstructs the prospecting process. Özal remains firm to a strategy that pays off domestically, even after Greece has employed its counteroffensive strategy that places the two countries in the box with the worst possible outcome (1, 1) of the international game. The press maintains its support to a confronting strategy and on 27th March it diagnoses, 'Papandreou is crazy' (Hürriyet), 'Greece refuses to comply with the Bern agreement' (Milliyet), 'The crisis has been prepared by Papandreou who was seeking for an excuse to attack Turkey' (Hürriyet), 'Papandreou is believed to have created the crisis to serve domestic interests' (Milliyet). Also, Hürriyet speculates that 'If Hora is attacked we are ready to take any action'. Once again, apart from framing the official justification regarding the alleged imminent Greek violation of the Bern agreement, the press is offering three different explanations of why the tension is increasing.

Considering that the Turkish government has no dominant strategy in either the international or the domestic interaction, the specific media frame and the impact it is

expected to have on the public gives the government incentive to remain longer in the B strategy box, even when Greece responds with an equally defective move leading the two countries on the verge of war. Although, as mentioned above, there was a minor possibility that the Turkish newspapers would disseminate critical coverage, the frame the press conveys, which continues to offer a diagnosis that differs from Özal's statements, and the dimensions it gives to the seriousness of the issue turn confrontation into a dominant strategy for Turkey.

Therefore, we see Turkey proceeding with what would be described as an irrational move, given its preferences over the rearrangement of the continental shelf through the negotiation process and its disinterest in a military confrontation. The atmosphere that emerged in Turkey out of the national media appears as a logical explanation of why the government felt confident to take the adversary to the verge of war before stepping back, despite the international cost that such an outcome would generate. This of course does not imply that Özal overlooked the international cost embodied in the possibility of war, especially since this was the least preferred outcome. Turkey's preferences and interests in this game rendered the possibility of war a very costly outcome for Turkey, which is traditionally known as a rational player. However, the domestic payoff can be interpreted as an incentive the media gave to Özal to stay in the same defective strategy longer (26th and 27th March) and even reach on the brink of war before he finally stepped back. It is at this stage that we can claim the potential impact of the media frames in Turkey is inherent in what appears to be a suboptimal decision for Turkey's government, which proceeds with a strategy that was described as incompatible with its original preferences.

The Turkish government decides to switch to strategy A only after the intervention of Lord Carrington and British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe, who apparently gave Turgut Özal incentive to leave strategy B by reducing its expected payoff. Özal's decision to withdraw does not correspond to the intense emergency climate reflected in the media. It is again an optimal move, which would anyway occur but the external intervention defined the timing of this strategy switch. Once the Turkish government has made its last move in this game, the Turkish press maintains the 'alarming' framing and reports 'Hands on trigger: the army is alarmed', 'The Aegean is ready to explode' and 'If Papandreou tries to stop Hora, there might be a war' (Milliyet, 28/3). A logical way to

explain the continuation of this same frame is of course the desire of the media to remain in the cell of the matrix that yields the highest payoff. Given that the government has chosen to de-escalate the tension, which is a move that does not meet the media's objectives, this is an attempt of the media to prolong their payoff. This observation enhances the media's pursuit of audience – driven news stories, even at a time when they had not yet turned into profit-making organisations.

In this crisis, the Turkish government made only one move in the game matrix, switching from a suboptimal move that could lead to a Greek-Turkish war to a rational decision that corresponded to its original preferences. The short duration of the crisis, the clear-cut objectives of the Turkish governments and the reduced probability of the press to proceed with a critical coverage lead to the inference that what appeared as a suboptimal move of the Turkish government was a tactical decision and a bluff until that ended with the intervention of Lord Carrington. That is to say, there is not enough evidence to support the hypothesis that the government's suboptimal strategy B was a result of calculating the domestic cost that the opposite strategy would have. There is however enough evidence inherent in the exceptionally alarming diagnosis and prognosis conveyed by the press that could explain why Turgut Özal followed the same strategy and escalated the tension to a dangerous stage, before an external intervention raised the cost and led to the strategy change.

6.5.2 The press coverage in Greece

Looking at the overall coverage of the crisis by the Greek press, a first remark that needs to be made is that there appears to be a lack of consensus in the coverage, particularly after the tension has been resolved. This lack of a common line in the framing and analysis of the situation by the press is ultimately interpreted as the absence of a joint domestic pressure deriving from the media. This implies that we should look for media influence in a diverse form. The second noteworthy point in the press coverage is the relatively moderate frame that becomes more intense only after the crisis has been resolved. This is another factor that raises questions as to the degree in which the media frame had a strategic impact on the governmental decisions.

In the Greek domestic interaction, the preferences of the two players are as follows. For the media, these are shaped according to the domestic game template as described

earlier. Therefore, the Greek press will be better off to oppose the governmental policy at any time and strategy B is the dominant one. As for the government, given that the media –state relationship in Greece develops differently than in Turkey, with the media maintaining the right to be critical and the power to exert pressure on the government, the dominant strategy for the government is then strategy B. Strategy B here reflects a defective move and an act of confrontation, which will render the government better off independent of how the media respond to it.

	Media		
Greece	A: Support	B: Oppose	
A: accept to negotiate	4, 1	1, 4	*(2,5)*
B: attack the Turkish research vessel	4, 4	3, 4	*(3,5)*
C: don't attack and refuse to negotiate	4, 2	2, 4	*(3)*
	(2,3)	*(4)*	

Figure 6.7: The 1987 media – government interaction in Greece

Similar to the respective interaction in Turkey, the player that moves first is the government, demanding that Turkey does not send the research vessel out. This move is obviously leaving the media better off and this is also confirmed with the press coverage that follows. On the first day of the press coverage both newspapers appear to be reproducing the political frame, with regard to the diagnosis of the problem and the causal responsibility reporting, 'The Turks are threatening again; the Turkish provocative moves continued yesterday when two Turkish aircrafts violated the Greek air space' (E.Typos, 26/3); and 'There is a need for national vigilance' (Eleftherotypia, 26/3). The information the press disseminates and the frame through which it is presented underlines the seriousness of the situation and also coincides with the political frame. On the one hand, the reproduction of the political frame may be understood as an overlap between the media and governmental interests, since the political frame gave the media no incentive to oppose the strategy. On this basis, the government and the media reach a mutually optimal outcome. On the other hand, and given that the specific game is a

repetitive one, by reproducing the political problem definition the media also give the government incentive to maintain the same strategy. Along with 'ratifying' the decision, the media create a certain degree of expectation for the government to maintain its firm position. Given that the government has created an alarmed atmosphere with the official warning made to the Turkish side, the media frame in this case enhances the expected audience and national cost in case Papandreou fails to successfully carry out the threat.

The media diagnostic frame is followed by the Turkish persistence and the employment of the Greek deterrence strategy. The Greek Prime Minister decides upon the closure of the American basis in the evening of 26th March while on that same day the Greek Foreign Minister goes to Sofia for negotiations with the Bulgarian government. The government therefore remains in the defection box and so do the media. On 27th March Eleftherotypia reports 'The Greek armed forces are mobilised', 'War is in the air' and E. Typos also reports, 'War challenge from Turkey', 'The tension increases as Turkey decides to send Sismik II to the Aegean'. Both newspapers convey a similar diagnosis regarding the seriousness of the situation, which as mentioned earlier, overlaps with the governmental frame. Given that the specific strategy also corresponds to the government and the media's preferences, it is then translated into a mutually optimal decision. At this point, it would be useful to focus on the frame E. Typos conveys. The opposition's paper attributes part of the responsibility for the crisis to the Greek government itself and states 'Turkey aims at exploiting the mistakes made by the Greek government in the handling of the situation' and 'The government is leading the country to a national division' (27/3). It therefore moves to strategy B for the media, which entails a domestic cost for the government. The diagnosis conveyed by the opposition's newspaper appears problematic in the sense that although it diagnoses a serious situation implying that the government has to do something, it also accuses the government of being the initiator of the problem.

What we see here is a frame that on the one hand reproduces the political framing of the problem, which obviously serves the media's interests for a controversial story; and on the other hand, a frame that attacks the government generating further controversy, this time between the media and the press. The combination of the two frames conveyed by the specific newspaper can only provide the government with further incentive to remain firm to strategy B so as to 'rectify' its mistake. The position of the specific newspaper

towards the government is apparently instigated by ideological and partisanship inclinations that demonstrate another aspect of the incentives inherent in the media's selection of frames. However, the important aspect of this frame remains that it attaches more weight to the defective strategy that the government is already pursuing by emphasising the 'damage' this same strategy has caused; and the need for an action with which the government will carry out the threat successfully in order to avoid not just the international cost but the domestic cost that failure to do so might generate. This cost would be the dissatisfaction of the public that would at this stage expect the government to successfully deter the adversary.

On 27th March, Turkey switches strategies but the Greek government is still in position for war. On 28th March, the press still refers to the increasing tension and what is worth noting at this stage is the speculation made by Eleftheros Typos that 'Even if there is no war, this crisis will have a great cost for Greece due to the huge preparation expenses and the decrease in the number of tourists' (28/3). The specific frame attempts a shift in a certain reference point that is the cost of war. It produces a context within which the governmental decisions are costly with or without a war; and it works as a challenge to the Prime Minister to defect and act firmly in order to make this costly conflict worthwhile for the prestige of the country. It creates the impression that the international cost cannot be avoided; but if Papandreou cooperates with Turkey, this will lead to an even greater reputation cost. According to our game - theoretic model an existing international cost is transformed into an expectation for a domestic cost; but what is particularly interesting here is that the specific newspaper creates both the international and the domestic cost.

On that same day the Greek government switches to strategy C, the dominant strategy in the international game, which corresponds to its original preferences and interests. As for the outcome that the same strategy yields in the domestic arena, this is divided into two different cells. Eleftherotypia remains in the strategy A cell and describes the handling of the crisis as a victory while E. Typos considers the outcome a 'sale of the Greek national interests in the Aegean' (30/3). The different frame conveyed by the two newspapers reflects their conflicting interests, in relation to their ideological inclinations and to their party preferences. This framing can be evaluated as being instigated by political ideologies rather than commercial interests, without however underrating the market - oriented motivations of the specific newspaper. According to the media

preferences over a controversial issue that would generate a newsworthy story, the crisis the two countries generated would have paid off for the media by meeting their interests and therefore the discrepancy between the frames conveyed by the two papers is a resultant of the different ideology.

Similar to Turkey, the Greek government remained firm to its initial strategy and stepped back only after the adversary had made the first move to de-escalate the tension. Considering the preferences of Greece as defined in the beginning of the game, the government moved rationally, independent of the critical coverage it received from one of the newspapers. Besides, the selection of strategies at all points in the game appeared to generate high payoffs in both arenas even with some opposition from E. Typos. The examination of the press coverage in relation to the stable governmental moves, or to put it differently, with the absence of irrational/suboptimal governmental moves demonstrates no obvious strategic influence on behalf of the media, mainly due to an overlap between the interests and preferences of the two parties. Looking at the domestic game matrix, one can see that for the most part of the crisis, the two parties were located in the B/A and B/B boxes that generated equally beneficial outcomes, while the second could also be described as equilibrium. Given that the specific outcomes implied that none of the players had incentive to switch to another strategy, a possible way to describe the media government interaction in this crisis, for the Greek side, is as a coordination of interests. This could imply a strategic action on behalf of the media, even without having led to a policy change.

6.5.3 Summary of the media's strategic role in the 1987 oil-drilling crisis

In the section explaining the function of the domestic interaction between the media and the government, we defined some preconditions that could signify a potential media impact on the governmental strategies and the overall progress of the crisis. Having examined the preferences of the two governments and the action they adopted, one can notice that there is no obvious deviation in their strategies, from the expectations generated through their motivations and preferred outcomes that could lead to suboptimal decisions. This would ultimately signify the absence of those conditions that would produce a media impact from a first point of view. However, looking at the way the press covered the story, the main inference to make is that the press on both sides moved according to own motivations, which may have led to a subtle media impact. As it

will be explained in the following paragraphs, it is possible that the media on both sides took part in the escalation of the tension by strongly supporting confrontation, which as shown in the international game, was a preferred strategy for Greece but not for Turkey.

In Turkey, it is Özal's decision to maintain a risky strategy despite the fact that it was known he would not involve in a war. His extended preference over a strategy that, given Greece's reaction, was close to generating the worst possible outcome could be related to the domestic media frame. Interestingly, the Turkish press did not simply reproduce the political frame; but instead it conveyed its own explanation making the Greek provocation loom larger than in Özal's statements. The impact of this lies in the frame effect on the public, which would then expect drastic action for these Greek 'provocations', therefore explaining Özal's stay in the defection box for longer. This impact can be explained particularly in relation to the causal attribution it disseminated. By framing Papandreou as 'mad' the Turkish press promoted a picture of the Greek politician as an irrational player. The frame refers to one of the peculiarities of the Chicken game that resolves around what has been called the political uses of madness. That is to say, if a player is seen by his opponent as irrational or mad, he/she gains paradoxical advantage in the game, given that people tend to stay well away from a madman (Colman, 1982: 100).

Judging from Özal's response who did not appear to be intimidated by Papandreou's alleged 'madness', the Turkish media might not have exactly given the Greek Prime Minister an advantage; but they could have very well disseminated a causal responsibility that provided warnings and new explanations why war was imminent, providing Özal with incentive to recognise in the media coverage an 'obligation' to prolong its warning. The specific example also serves in demonstrating the difference between a cognitive media impact on the Turkish government and a strategic one. A potential cognitive impact of the causal responsibility disseminated by the Turkish press would have affected the Özal's perception of the adversary's level of irrationality in a way compatible to the effect of the political use of madness, as described above. However, Özal's response is closer to what we could describe as a 'strategic' perception of the frame in the sense that he appears to calculate the implications that failure to respond to the Greek provocations could have on his domestic reputation and hence, he acts accordingly.

In Greece, the government appears to follow a clear-cut strategy. It remains firm to its preferences and moves out of its defective strategy only after Turkey has stepped back while the media largely reproduce the political frame. Given that both parties moved according to their preferences this indicates an agreement in their interests but it remains unclear whether it also indicated a strategic action on behalf of the media. The critical coverage of the opposition's paper demonstrates another aspect of the media motivations, which derive from party preferences as well.

Based on the domestic game structure, the absence of suboptimal moves on behalf of the government and the relatively common line between the political and media framing could be explained as a coordination of the two sides' interests, since the strategies of the two governments provided the newspapers with frames that would meet their interests. In needs to be clarified though that these interests were mainly of a nationalistic nature stemming from national taboos that the media in both countries developed towards the adversary. The issue of national identity proves to be another significant factor in the coverage of such crises, and as Wodsfeld states, whatever the beliefs about the needs of objectivity, when it comes to internal disputes journalists interpret the world from a national – or even nationalistic- perspective, especially when they cover conflicts involving their own country (1997: 40). Besides, in 1987 the press was under the state's control in Turkey while newspapers in Greece maintained 'patronage' relationships with the government and other political parties that would also determine their ideological line. Although this should not exclude a potential media impact, the possibility of a media tactical action instigated by financial motivation is here eliminated, as it was also theorised earlier. This of course could raise the question as to how differently this media-government interaction would have developed in the case of a clash of interests between media and the government. In relation to this question, the analysis of the press coverage of the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis provides some interesting findings.

6.6 The 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis

The 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis has been described in the Greek literature as a 'media war'[20] (Gialouridis, 2001; Georgoulis & Soltaridis 1996), implying the fabrication of the crisis by the press. This is an observation that reinforces our hypothesis for a strategic media role in it and provides the grounds to systematically examine if and to what extent the press escalated the tension between the two countries. The specific crisis features two remarkably important characteristics that pave the way for the justification of our hypothesis. Firstly, the revealing interview of the Hürriyet journalist, Cesur Sert, is an unquestionable indication of a press coverage that is driven by journalistic practices that serve primarily financial interests. It therefore clarifies the media's preference over a governmental strategy of confrontation and the press's intention of diagnosing a crisis at such an early stage. Secondly, prior to the first official demand made by the Turkish government, which marked the escalation of the tension and the commencement of an overt confrontation between the two countries, the two governments were involved in a bargaining process. This process included the exchange of some verbal notes regarding the sovereignty over the islets, which none of the two sides considered as too serious, and a media diagnosis about a serious national problem and even a 'crisis' that was about to flare up between the two countries.

This press coverage is particularly important considering that it actually initiates an overt interaction between the government and the media, or else it initiates the domestic game, before the two countries proceed with their overt moves towards one another. This is ultimately translated into one additional move/option for the government in the game matrix of the domestic game that derives from the media diagnosis of a serious national problem and the first response of the government to that. The two domestic games are examined below starting with the coverage of the crisis by the Turkish newspapers.

6.6.1 The press coverage in Turkey

The first step in the analysis of the coverage of the 1996 crisis and the strategic role of the press is to identify the preferences for both the actors, government and media in the two countries, as the tension begins to escalate. At this point it is essential to start off

[20] The press in both countries played a leading part in nationalistic exaltation, creating what was described as a fabricated war atmosphere. This would ultimately bring the two governments before a *fait accompli*, leading to rash decisions.

with the media preferences and interests, which determined the way the Turkish press framed the issue. As mentioned above, the coverage of the flag replacement by Hürriyet in Turkey is the main evidence of the media's intention of meeting financial interests. In addition to that and given that the media-government interaction is also a sequential one, watching the press 'moving' first and diagnosing a crisis before any governmental statement has been made, reinforces the employment of a strategy in pursuit of own incentives. The interview of the Turkish journalist provides a confirmation of the media's preferences as demonstrated in the matrix of the domestic game, described earlier. It also provides evidence of the ongoing changes that the media-government relationship undergoes in Turkey.

As for the government's preferences, these are shaped by its international interests. As it was explained in the analysis of the international game, they are placed in the 'not attack' strategy, which is also its dominant strategy. Yet, considering the outcomes that the same strategies yield in the domestic matrix, it appears that the government's preferences do not pay off as they do in the international arena. There is apparently a discrepancy between the government's preferences in the international arena and the way they are interpreted in the domestic interaction with the media. This provides a basis to investigate how these preferences are shaped the government's action and whether the course of the game produces an overlap.

The interaction between the Turkish government and the respective media can be summarised in the following matrix. Given the early press coverage and media diagnosis of the crisis, Turkey will first have to decide between choosing to 'do nothing' as strategy 0 or do something, which represents moves A and B. Looking back at the international game matrix (figure 6.3) one can see that the Turkish government moved to three different boxes, starting from the one producing the outcome 5, 2 for Greece. Given that the frame of the Turkish press had preceded the Turkish warning to Greece about lowering the flag, this Turkish move needs to be evaluated as a response both to the government's international preferences and to the media frame and the domestic cost or payoff it entailed.

Turkey	Media: A: Support	Media: B: Oppose	
0: do nothing	4, 1	1, 3	*(2,5)*
A: demand the flag is lowered and don't attack	4, 2	2, 4	*(3)*
B: demand the flag is lowered and invade	4, 4	3, 4	*(3,5)*
	(2,3)	*(3,6)*	

Figure 6.8: The 1996 media – government interaction in Turkey

The Turkish government completed its first move by officially demanding that the Greek flag is lowered on 29th January. On the previous and on the same day, the Turkish press diagnosed a 'Flag war in the Aegean' (Hürriyet, 28/1) an 'increasing tension between Ankara and Athens due to a rock' (Milliyet, 29/1) and 'a crisis being four days old' (Milliyet, 29/1). Most important, on 26th January Hürriyet identifies the new Prime Minister of Greece as 'doing his best to create a conflict between Greece and Turkey' while the following day, the same newspaper reports that 'the Greek government has managed to create a crisis immediately after coming to power'. These are some of the statements reported by the Turkish press, which have been identified as a diagnostic frame.

The Turkish newspapers in this case diagnose an existing crisis and identify the Greek government as the main responsible for its generation. The specific frame can be translated as an alarm to the government about a serious situation that has emerged in the Aegean due to the traditional enemy that is Greece. In relation to the domestic game matrix, this diagnostic frame would be best located in the top right box (1, 3), which would entail a domestic cost for the government. At this early stage of the crisis, the Turkish press creates a status quo, which, as framed by the newspapers, Greece aims at changing with the generation of a conflict. Although the frame refers to the international cost that a governmental inaction may have, the press is converting it into a domestic cost too. This is because the implication of such a diagnosis would be the creation of a public expectation for a defensive move in order for Turkey's sovereign

rights to be preserved, which would generate an audience cost if the government failed to respond. The decision of the Turkish government demonstrates its adjustment to strategy A, which is the dominant one in the international arena. Although this move is not dominant in the domestic arena, it domestically leaves the government better off than strategy 0, which would mean ignoring the media frame altogether. The important aspect of the media-government interaction at this early stage of the crisis is the fact that the government makes its first move against Greece only after the press has diagnosed the crisis.

A question that arises at this point is whether Turkey would have acted at all had it not known the crisis diagnosis conducted by the press. Given that the media move first and the government second, the governmental move could be regarded as a response instigated by the media frame; and even if it does not entirely conform to the domestic payoff, it can still be considered as the first step of a confrontation strategy and of a strategic media effect. With Greece not having moved yet, the Turkish government could also choose to do nothing but instead it chooses to initiate the international game by demanding that the Greek flag is lowered. The Turkish move could be the outcome of Tansu Çiller realising that the generation of such an issue could serve her domestic interests but at the same time, it could be a response to what the government expected the media to do as a second move.

This could be explained again by the concept of *backward induction* (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis, 1997) according to which the actor calculates the payoff of her/his moves based on the estimation of the adversary's next move. Given the government's awareness of the media's interests, its decision to act may be explained as a strategy that has predicted the next media move and that consequently derives from calculating the domestic payoff. As it was explained earlier, the Turkish strategies are combined moves that are completed in two stages. In this case, by making the official demand, Turkey completes the first stage of the move and as mentioned above, it chooses to react rather than stay inactive. The main idea here is that when the media-government interaction is examined as a sequential one, Turkey's move appears optimal on both arenas and produces an outcome that serves the interests of both the government and the media.

After the response of the Greek government that refuses to lower the flag, we see a more drastic reaction from Turkey that threatens to attack and moves to strategy B and the box with the worst possible outcome. At this stage the Turkish government begins to act 'irrationally' as this signifies what we described earlier as a move that deviates from the original preferences of the government. This move appears sensible if we consider the media frame that preceded. The media diagnosis of a serious situation that is ready to lead to war maintains and on 30th January Milliyet reports 'the tension is increasing', 'it is a dangerous situation' and Hürriyet states 'Athens is becoming paranoid'. Moreover, the attribution of responsibility for the escalation of the tension is still on Greece while there is an agreement in the recommended solution for the crisis between media and government. On 29th and 30th January the Turkish press suggests that the two countries should find a solution through the negotiation process, which represents the main interest of Turkey. At this stage, the media frame in combination with the threat the Turkish government disseminated to Greece places the government in the box with the highest payoff for the domestic game (4, 4); and interestingly, this is a move that serves the media's interests as well.

This time, the international move of the government basically represents a confirmation of the assumption made above, regarding the media frame having instigated the government's reaction to what the press framed as crisis. The international cost that strategy B entailed for Turkey is here translated into a domestic payoff as the government enjoys the support of the media and, as an extension, the public approval as well. The media's strategic influence in the game can be reinforced with the government's persistence to remain firm to the same suboptimal strategy and consequently the same domestic payoff, for a second day. This is the effect of the repetitive game between the media and the government in the sense that the government starts off with a suboptimal move in domestic terms, through which it learns what media coverage to expect; and once the game is played for a second time, it reaches the outcome that pays off more and stays there.

The government's persistence to that specific strategy, despite the international risk and cost it entails, indicates the selection of a suboptimal decision and can be more convincingly explained as instigated by domestic preferences related to the media coverage, if we consider the very strong prognostic media frame the press disseminates

at this stage. On 31st January Milliyet emphasises the anticipated cost in case Turkey steps back by reporting 'we cannot step back, even if it costs us' and 'if we do not defend this islet, we will give Greece reason to come back again'. Hürriyet also conveys the conviction that Turkey would benefit from a military confrontation and reports, 'In case of a military conflict, we will definitely beat them'; 'if we attack first, we will win'. All in all, the Turkish press overplays the international cost that stepping back would have for Turkey and it even justifies the solution of war for the protection of the sovereign rights over the islets. Considering the impact that such a frame would have on the public mood, which would now be prepared for a drastic governmental action, the international outcome produced by a Turkish withdrawal transforms into a domestic cost that justifies Turkey's preference over a strategy that is suboptimal on the international front but is domestically 'ratified'.

In the last stage of the game we see Turkey moving again in the international board, this time back to its dominant strategy A. It was said in previous sections of the chapter that the final decision of both countries is best explained as a resultant of the US intervention that gave the two countries incentive to leave the 1, 1 box by rendering the cost of war higher than the domestic cost that a cooperative move could yield. What makes Turkey's decision to move back to its dominant strategy an optimal decision on both the international and domestic board, is the estimation that under the US influence, war would cost more than a potential media punishment at this stage. It is a rational decision because it reflects a joint calculation of both the international and domestic impact it could have and in this case, it proved dominant on both fronts. Besides, as it is shown in the press coverage of this last stage of the crisis, the rationality in the government's decision is confirmed by the at least partial approval by the press.

To a large extent the government is praised for showing determination and the solution of the game is treated as a victory. This appraisal is combined with some critical comments that describe certain moves of the government, such as the occupation of a second islet, as irrational decisions; and recognise an exaggerated amount of time and effort that was put in this issue while there were more important problems to deal with, i.e. 'The government must forget about Kardak and focus on the economy problems' (Milliyet, 1/2). The press coverage at this stage of the game reflects a combination of support and opposition to the governmental decision and could be placed between the

middle row boxes of the domestic game matrix, as the outcome of this nested game does not prove harmful for the government at any point.

The Turkish government switched strategies twice in this crisis, moving from an internationally optimal option to a suboptimal one, to go back to its dominant strategy again before the end of the game. This shift appears to conform to domestic interests as shaped by the outcomes of the government's interaction with the media, which explain the selection of what appeared to be an irrational move against Greece. The media coverage in this case functions also as a tool of analysis of Turkey's decision-making process during the crisis. This process reveals a coordination of the government's interests between the international and the domestic arena; and demonstrates the government's consideration of the media coverage and the impact this could have on the public perception of the situation when deciding upon a strategy.

6.6.2 The press coverage in Greece

Similar to the analysis of the Turkish domestic interaction and press coverage of the crisis, we will here identify the preferences of the two players with the aid of the game matrix of their interaction depicted in Figure 6.9.

The preferences of the media develop on a basis similar to the preferences of the Turkish press. The Greek newspapers are after the fulfilment of economic interests that would render strategy B a preferred strategy since it could produce the desired newsworthy stories. The preference over strategy B is enhanced by the party preferences, at least for E. Typos that is once again expected to criticise the governmental policies. The outcomes B/A, B/B, A/B and C/B are obviously preferred since they provide the highest payoff for the media. This contradicts the government's preferences in the international game, given that Greece is interested neither in war nor in negotiating. We also need to clarify that the added strategy 0 differs from strategy B.

The former is the case in which the government ignores the media coverage but this does not signify defection against the adversary since Turkey has not yet made its first move. The latter is a strategy that addresses Turkey and ignores its demand for the lowering of the flag. Therefore, while strategy B is the dominant one for the government here, strategy 0 pays off as low as strategy A that equals de-escalation. Moreover, the

matrix reveals a discrepancy between the preferences of the Greek government in the domestic and in the international game. In its interaction against Turkey, the dominant strategy for Greece is C, which however appears to be the second best in the domestic game.

Greece	Media: A: Support	Media: B: Oppose	
0: Do nothing	4,1	1,3	*(2,5)*
A: lower the flag and accept to negotiate	4,1	1,4	*(2,5)*
B: refuse to lower the flag or negotiate	4,4	3,4	*(3,5)*
C: lower the flag and refuse to negotiate	4,2	2,4	*(3)*
	(2)	*(3,75)*	

Figure 6.9: The 1996 media – government interaction in Greece

Similar to the press in Turkey, the Greek newspapers covered the before- the- crisis bargaining process reporting the territorial claims made in the verbal notes. On 27th January E.Typos reports 'the territorial claim Turkey made over the islet is just ridiculous'. It also openly identifies the Greek government as responsible for the unfounded claims by reporting 'the governmental dispersal gave Turkey the chance to proceed with further provocations'. Comparing to the Turkish press coverage this is a subtler frame, which however implies an issue that needs consideration. However, the government decides to ignore both the territorial claims and the press coverage, which equals strategy 0, and places itself in the top right box of the domestic game matrix (1, 3). At this stage the government acts rationally and decides according to its original preferences.

The essence in identifying this early stage of the media-government interaction as part of the specific game lies in the expectation that the government should have of the media

coverage that is about to follow. That is to say, considering the media's preferences and intentions especially in situations of Greek- Turkish tension, the Greek government should be prepared for extensive media coverage of the issue with intense nationalistic approach. Besides, this game the media and the government play is repetitive not just in terms of the specific crisis but within the context of at least one decade, given that it was nine years earlier when the two actors were involved in a similar situation, in the 1987 oil-drilling crisis. By ignoring the coverage and refusing to recognise the existence of the problem, 'which might create further complications in the relationship with Turkey' (Eleftherotypia, 27/1), the government might make a rational move against Turkey, but in domestic terms it is a rather risky move, the outcome of which is confirmed in the next stage of the crisis and with the following move of Turkey.

On 28th January Greece proceeds with the mobilisation of armed forces on the border with Turkey. The decision is made after the detection of a patrol boat in the Greek territorial waters and reflects a defensive move that is independent of the media frame. The Greek government is still acting rationally in the sense that it appears to respond to the situation according to its international interests. However, the specific decision provides incentive for a further intensified media frame both on a diagnostic and prognostic basis. On 29th January Eleftherotypia reports 'The government is very close to a general mobilisation' and E. Typos queries 'how can Pangalos say there is no issue'? On the same day E. Typos emphasises 'the weakness the government showed in handling the initial Turkish provocation gave Ankara the green light to escalate the crisis' and expresses the fear that 'there will be more Turkish provocations in the future' and even 'future rearrangement of the continental shelf'. Moreover, the Greek press emphasises the need for the government to resist and follow an intransigent policy (Eleftherotypia, 29/1). Given that the frame is disseminated the same day as the Turkish demand, it is sensible to assume that it reinforces the international cost of inaction and formulates a domestic context in which any strategy other than direct confrontation would be immensely costly.

On 30th January the Greek government responds by adopting strategy B, which is enhanced with the increase of forces in the Aegean, following Turkey's preparations for war. It therefore moves to the middle row boxes in the international game matrix, which is the dominant strategy as shown in the domestic matrix, but is a suboptimal one when

considered within the context of the government's international preferences. What is interesting to note though is that the same strategy does not yet pay off either internationally or domestically. The press maintains its opposing and critical stance. On the same day, apart from diagnosing an imminent war, the Greek press continues to predict further deterioration of the existing situation unless the government resists. E. Typos speculates 'the government will lead the country to national defeat and humiliation' and 'Turkey will turn to Thrace next', while Eleftherotypia conveys the prognosis, 'Greece will be forced to commence negotiations not only for the islet but the whole region'. This is a frame that obviously serves the media's interests and has generated an alarming climate in the country. Therefore the specific combination of moves places Greece in the 1, 1 box in the international game, since Turkey continues to defect as well; and the 3, 4 box in the domestic game, which demonstrates the payoff the media get from disseminating this prognosis.

At this stage of the crisis the Greek government is faced with the option to prepare for war, which is diametrically opposed to its original preferences; and the option to step back, which even without accepting to negotiate, would be costly given the tense atmosphere that prevailed in Greece that time. When the government decides to prepare the fleet for a military confrontation on 31st January, it signalled an attempt to meet the domestic expectations for a drastic move in order to avoid the verification of the speculation regarding Turkey's future attempts for claims over the Aegean. What is here seen as an irrational Greek decision – it was described as a spasmodic move even by the media - that opposes the government's preferences and does not appear to guarantee a payoff in either of the two arenas, signifies an effort to respond to a new status quo created in Greece, which the media frame had reinforced. Within this new situation any decision other than confrontation, even in the form of a war, would be perceived as compromise and stigmatise the new government's handling of the country's foreign affairs. This was a lesson the Greek government had learnt from the past and remaining firm to the defective strategy was the best response to the situation.

It is interesting to see though that at this stage in the game, the Greek government is engaged in a strategy that although pays off more domestically than internationally, it is still not an optimal move since the media continue to criticise. This might even explain the immediate strategy change once the US government intervened. The government

switches to its dominant strategy C, as shown in the matrix of the international game (figure 6.3), under the same US pressure and conditions as Turkey, even if that signified a media 'punishment' and domestic payoff 2 against 4 for the media. Although the specific decision corresponds to the government's dominant strategy and produces an equilibrium solution in the international game, it is a decision that reflects a reduced value of the domestic cost. It is however a strategy that aims at avoiding a greater cost that has been imposed by the US government, and even at escaping the suffocating ring that the media had created in Greece. What makes the Greek decision to comply with the US intervention optimal is also the fact that at that specific stage in the game and under the prevailing atmosphere in Greece, the government's sole option was to go to war against Turkey. The US government offered an optimal opportunity for Greece to avoid the worst possible outcome, which turned into more costly with the US intervention.

Similar to Turkey, Greece decides to compromise after a calculation of both the international and domestic cost that a confronting strategy would have under the new conditions imposed by the US government. However, and this is contrary to the case of Turkey, the press continues to oppose the governmental strategy with a highly critical frame, reporting 'It is a national defeat', 'The government sold our national interests', 'We were humiliated' (E.Typos, 1/2), 'It is a fact that the government was not at all prepared to deal with such a crucial crisis and remained isolated from the international diplomatic circles' (Eleftherotypia, 1/2). Although, similar to the 1987 crisis, it is E.Typos that disseminates more severe criticism, in this crisis both newspapers disapproved of the government's handling of the situation. This is another piece of evidence, analogous to the interview of Cesur Sert, of the media's interests in disseminating critical and opposing frames and their pursuit of controversy in their reporting, independent of ideological inclinations. This type of coverage that takes place after the conclusion of the crisis can be identified as a 'blame frame', which reflects the process of attribution of responsibility after a failure or a crisis (Samaras, 2002: 8). Although blame frames are mostly associated with the post coverage of armed conflicts, even in our example this blame frame projects the image of media that are powerful enough to impose costs on governmental decisions.

Similar to the Turkish action, Greece moved around the game matrices until it reached the strategy from which it no longer had incentive to deviate. This move represents an attempt for the coordination of its interests on both the international arena, against Turkey, and the domestic arena against the 'random' moves made by the media.

6.6.3 Summary of the media's strategic role in the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis and comparison to the 1987 oil-drilling crisis

The second Greek- Turkish crisis features certain characteristics in relation both to the action of the two governments and the press coverage that provide evidence of the model's validity and the media's strategic impact on the progress of the action.

With regard to the action taken by the two governments contrary to the first crisis, in 1996 they proceeded with what we earlier described as a seemingly suboptimal decision and one that contradicted their preferences in the international game. That is to say, the two governments escalated the tension in a manner that seemed unreasonable. They came closer to war than they had in 1987 and the absence of a concrete argumentation added to the inherent irrationality, since the two players failed to justify their actions to the public. Therefore, the detection of what appeared as suboptimal decision-making in the international arena by both governments provides incentive to look for a linkage between the international strategies and the media frames.

The press coverage of the crisis also provides evidence of a media involvement in the handling of the issue by the two governments. Cesur Sert's testimony constitutes the confirmation of the media's pursuit of controversial issues and their incentives in maintaining a critical approach to foreign policy decisions with a view to meeting their interests. The former journalist of Hürriyet revealed the extent to which, media organisations that are considerably controlled by the state such as in Turkey can go in order to reach their objectives. At the same time, the severe media criticism the Greek government had to undergo once the crisis was resolved, not only does reinforce the above observation; it also demonstrates their power to convey public punishment. Although the inferences these observations lead to, with regard to the media's potential in the coverage of political interactions, have already been proved and discussed in the literature, the specific examples also verify the organisation of the media's interests and preferences in the context of a strategic action, as shown in the domestic game matrix.

As for the domestic games that were produced for the specific crisis, the first indication of strategic influence they feature is inherent in the media diagnosis of a crisis before the two governments have proceeded with an official move. This transformed the bargaining game that had initiated a month earlier and that remained tacit to a large extent, into an overt crisis. As shown in the respective domestic game matrices, the first Turkish move to 'do something', which marked the escalation of the crisis, followed an intense media diagnostic frame. In Greece, the government chose to ignore the press' calls for some action and the criticism it received as a consequence, demonstrates the media and public expectations that this initial coverage of the issue had generated.

In the second stage of the crisis one can notice a dramatic escalation of the tension with the two governments choosing suboptimal strategies that were later on described as spasmodic and that opposed their original preferences. The solution to the game was given by an external intervention that created a new status quo, according to which withdrawing appeared as a better option to defecting. This new situation came to take the place of another status quo that was previously created by the media and that turned war into the only solution to the game. The endorsement with which the two countries welcomed the US intervention is an indication of their escape from a situation that appeared to be rather imposed to than decided on by them.

Perhaps the way to get the full picture of the media's strategic impact in the progress of this crisis is by comparing its effect with that of the US intervention. The US government developed a separate interaction with each government, which included a warning regarding the implications that confrontation and a war would have in each country's relationship with USA. This was an initiative that clearly defined the outcome of the game. Before the intervention took place, another interaction developed this time between each country and the national press, which included both a direct warning regarding the implication that *not* confronting the adversary would have on the relationship between the two countries; and an indirect warning regarding the implications that the same type of action, or better lack of action, would have on the public's perception of the governmental handing of the traditional adversary. The idea is that from the moment the media can directly or indirectly impose costs on the government, they are causing strategic implications. The media's diagnostic/ prognostic frame provides some similarities with the US warning. On the one hand, the US

government warns about the harm that action can cause to the relationship of each of the two countries with USA. On the other hand, the media warn about the harm that non-action can cause to the relationship of each of the two countries with the respective audiences. The media impose a cost that until the US intervention took place – by imposing an even greater cost – appeared to have guided the reaction of the two governments. Having identified specific instances in the 1996 crisis when the government could have considered the costs imposed by press coverage before acting enhances the above observation and highlights the strategic impact that derives from this media action.

The dimensions of the media's strategic impact could be made more explicit through a comparison between the press coverage of the two crises. A significant inference derives from comparing the frames employed by the Turkish newspapers in 1987 and in 1996. The difference in the Turkish press coverage from one crisis to the other indicates a change in the degree of state control over the media; and the replacement with a new form of control since from 1995 the Turkish media have been in the hands of new 'rulers' that were primarily interested in profit. Doğan Tılıç describes how within this new regime readers could notice the press coverage switching from supporting to criticising the government and vice versa. This interchange in the frames towards the government was apparently instigated by the satisfaction or the dissatisfaction of the media owners due to the government's lack of response to their commercial needs (Tılıç, 2000:143). In general, the 1987 press coverage embodied a certain degree of exaggeration in both countries, regarding the possibility of war, which could have affected the evaluation of the governmental decisions, but which derived from interests more of an ideological than commercial disposition. This becomes obvious also from the fact that the discrepancy between the coverage of the two Greek newspapers in 1987 is replaced by a relatively unanimous frame in the 1996 crisis. In the latter case the difference between the frames of the two newspapers was lying mostly in the intensity rather than the dissemination of the criticism *per se*.

Following the privatisation and commercialisation of media organisations first in Greece and then in Turkey, the media proceed with a purposeful employment of certain frames; which, in connection with the impact on the public, affect the governmental strategy too. The largely common frame that both the media and the government followed in 1987

provides evidence of a much lesser strategic media impact. What it does provide is confirmation of the way in which the new regime in 1996 might have also affected the expectations the government had from the media; and it could justify the reasons that although the Greek government did not seem to be affected by the critical coverage of the opposition's newspaper in 1987, but was in 1996. This is ultimately an outcome not just of the consensus in the media criticism but also of the governmental expectations of implications that such a media frame would have.

The analysis of the media – government interaction in the two crises and the two countries reveals the media action and impact as it was theorised in the beginning of the analysis. The game – theoretic approach presupposed a certain degree of organisational media structure and the pursuit of primarily economic interests for a strategic media impact to take place. On this basis, the strategic action and impact that was expected in the 1996 crisis was confirmed, contrary to the 1987 case where a similar effect was not anticipated and was not encountered either. This observation confirms the hypothesis that a media strategic impact is more likely to occur when the media convey economic oriented and audience- driven frames. Moreover, the investigation of the press coverage particularly of the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis supports the hypothesis of the media acting as an *externality*. Their interaction with the government produced a diagnosis and prognosis that transformed an international decision into a domestic cost. This influenced the way the government would originally evaluate the impact of the same decision and ultimately influenced the outcome of the game as well.

Discussion and Conclusions

There are two main objectives that the conduct of the current research aimed at fulfilling. Firstly, in pursuit of a more systematic analysis of the media-government interaction, it sought to develop a game-theoretic model that would explain the media behaviour in foreign policy and conflict situations systematically and how this behaviour could result in media effects in policy outcomes. Secondly, the inquiry included the testing of the validity of the model by applying it to the Greek-Turkish territorial crises. Within the framework of theory development and testing, the thesis theorised and sought to demonstrate the media's strategic role and strategic impact on the progress of the two Greek- Turkish crises; and to draw some general conclusions of the media's strategic 'performance' and influence on decision-making processes during situations of conflict. It is therefore a process that would ultimately clarify whether the model can accurately explain media-government interactions and whether the findings allow for further use of the model for the analysis of media effects in a variation of cases.

The present chapter attempts to condense the findings of this research into an evaluation of the extent to which the above objectives were met. It is an attempt for an overall assessment of the media's role in foreign policy decision-making processes as it develops from both the theoretical and empirical findings of the research; and for the identification of the contribution that these findings make in the wider theory of communications and foreign policy.

The Contribution of Game Theory

How functional and realistic has the game-theoretic model proved in the investigation of the media-government interaction and the pursuit of a unified media role in decision-making processes, in the domain of foreign policy? The employment of game theory for the analysis of the media-government interaction in the Greek - Turkish conflict has indeed illuminated certain aspects of the interaction that justify the utility and input of the specific approach. Its contribution lies primarily in providing a very rigorous analysis of the media- government interaction, incorporating and highlighting the power inherent in the media frames in a systematic manner as well.

On a first theoretical level, the approach of the press coverage in terms of a strategic interaction between the media, the government and the public in the context of a 'nested

game', allowed for a detailed structure of the governmental moves in relation to the impact they would have or, to put it differently, with the payoff they would yield a) against the international adversary and b) towards the public and with the media being its source of information. It approximated the decision-making process on two separate but interrelated levels and captured those key factors that would explain the governmental decisions and the media's involvement in them as well. In particular, with the aid of prospect theory, the analysis permitted the estimation of the impact that the media diagnostic and prognostic frame was expected to have on the public's perception with regard to the risk entailed in the government's decisions. In fact, the game- theoretic model helped translate the media frames into indicators of risk for the two governments; while their alleged impact on the public's perception of the situation and the risk entailed in it, transformed the media into sources of domestic cost and helped explain the governmental decisions in relevance to this cost. Moreover, by approaching the government as a player that seeks profit maximisation, the game-theoretic model highlighted the weight the governments would accord to the domestic cost and consequently, it highlighted the importance of the media as an integral part in the decision-making process and as an actor of strategic relevance for the government.

To become even more precise, the game-theoretic model underscored the way in which the media's diagnostic and prognostic frames and their appeal to the public could generate expectations for a specific governmental reaction to the situation at hand. These expectations organised a new status quo that differed from the status quo generated by the moves, decisions and statements of the two governments; the reason was that it would embody the domestic cost the government would suffer if it followed a course of action the media frames had opposed to. The game- theoretic approach drew the attention to the government's response to this new status quo as one that would ultimately explain any risky and apparently irrational moves. The conscious response of the government to this status quo would equal a conscious response to the media frames and would demonstrate the strategic impact of the media. That is to say, the media frames did not have to change the perception the government had of the risk entailed in a given decision; but they would 'force' the government into calculating the media's domestic impact before deciding upon an action.

On an empirical level and with its application on the Greek-Turkish crises, the game – theoretic approach provided the basis for a correlation and comparison of the media diagnostic and prognostic frame with the official decisions made by the Greek and Turkish government. This analysis managed to detect in the decision-making of the two governments what the model had described as 'suboptimal' decisions, and to identify a logical connection between the making of such decisions and the media diagnosis and prognosis. Critical and often dramatic media frames would in fact precede those apparently spasmodic governmental decisions, which risked jeopardising the countries' national interest. The significance of the media frame lies in the fact that, what appeared as spasmodic or irrational on the basis of the political framing of the situations and the governmental preferences shaped by that, begun to make sense when examined in the framework of the nested game and in accordance to the risk and cost the media had imposed. The game-theoretic analysis traced a process through which the government's risky decisions were explained and justified when the media frames and their implications on the public were also considered; and it did so by locating a 'hidden' payoff for the government in the media frames and their impact on the public's perception of the situation at hand.

The game-theoretic model has in other words provided a closer and more systematic look into the complexities that shape the media-government interaction in the domain of foreign policy and particularly in conflict situations. And these complexities have revealed what the thesis defines as a 'strategic' media impact on a theoretical basis. This strategic nature of the media effects on the decision-making process has also been proved empirically through the investigation of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Chapter six concluded with the observation that a strategic media impact did indeed take place in the 1996 crisis; while the same impact was lesser in the one in 1987. The conclusion confirmed the expectations for a strategic media action and impact developed as part of the game – model; and also confirmed the description of the Imia-Kardak crisis as a 'media war', since scholars and journalists in Greece and Turkey considered the media responsible for creating *fait accompli* and leading the two governments to hasty moves. The game-theoretic analysis of the media – government interaction has in this case unfolded a rather complex interaction that shed light on the media's power to strategically influence decisions and policy outcomes; and it drew the attention to certain

different conditions observed in the press coverage of the two crises. In fact, the context of the Imia- Kardak crisis demonstrates the contribution of the game-theoretic approach.

The 1996 Imia-Kardak 'media crisis'

Within the framework of game theory, the analysis of the media-government interaction in the 1996 crisis justifies the media being amongst those forces that led to the escalation of the tension between the two countries. There are three stages in which the media could have turned the 'trivial' issue that marked the beginning of the tension into a crisis.

- Stage 1: while the two governments refer to the running aground of the Turkish boat as an unimportant incident, the Greek and Turkish press diagnose a crisis, speculate the future implications unless the respective government reacts drastically and suggest a radical solution, without excluding the possibility of war.
- Stage 2: the frame is of course conveyed to the public, which, as it has already been explained, relies on the press for information about the country's foreign affairs. It is at this stage that prospect theory proves useful in explaining the implication that such a media frame could have on the public's psychology and perception of the situation, given the absence of other information sources. The impact of the media frame is inherent in promoting a certain problem definition and a cost for the government in its relationship with the adversary, unless the former acts drastically. According to the norms of prospect theory, the power of the frame lies in making this specific problem and the expected cost loom larger than it actually is, in the eyes of the public. On this condition, the public would then be expected to become risk acceptant. This would translate into becoming willing to accept a risk believing that failing to do so would result in certain losses. Ultimately, the public would expect the government to act accordingly. It is this expectation that on the one hand the government is aware of and on the other hand translates into what I have called a domestic cost for the government.
- Stage 3: the government faces a new status quo, one that differs from the situation generated by the running aground of the Turkish boat. The new status quo represents conditions according to which, accepting a limited defeat – such as, failing to show response to the ongoing 'media crisis' – will amount to punishment at the polls. At this stage, the government's decision to defect and further escalate the tension equals a decision to accept a greater international loss for a chance of no loss at all; and from the

standpoint of the country's national interest, it equals an irrational move. However, what matters at this stage is that the same decision becomes rational when seen from the standpoint of a power-seeking government.

It is the last stage of this sequence of the media impacts that encompasses the whole concept of the nested game. It clearly demonstrates the media's role as an *externality* that develops an interaction with the audience and the government. The outcome of this interaction would then influence the progress of a separate interaction, between Greece and Turkey. Most important, the impact of this *externality* is portrayed in the readiness of the two governments to take an international risk that would minimise the domestic loss. The conscious decision of the government to purposely respond to the new status quo the media had created, illustrates the government's adjustment to conditions generated by the media frames, which equals a strategic impact of the media.

The examination of the press coverage of the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis proves the hypothesis set in chapter six with regard to the media's participation in the escalation of the crisis. But the contribution of the game theoretic approach is further enhanced when one considers the analysis of the media-government interaction in the 1987 crisis as well. Chapter six set the hypothesis that the media's strategic impact defined by the game-theoretic approach was expected to take place on the condition that the media frames were produced to serve economic purposes; this would also increase the possibility of media opposition to governmental policies and dramatisation of the events during situations of international crisis and subsequently the amount of pressure exerted on the government. It is the comparison between the two crises that actually validates this hypothesis, as it reveals the correlation between critical coverage and the shift in the media ownership and preferences in the two countries. In Greece, the divided coverage of the 1987 crisis was replaced with a unanimously critical reporting that the government received in 1996. A partisan press was apparently replaced by a still partisan but also by an economically and commercially shaped coverage that would employ an alarming frame, which would secure the attention of the public. The observation derives mainly from the coverage of the newspaper Eleftherotypia that, although was relatively well disposed towards the government in power at that time, it did disapprove of the official moves and along with the rest of the media, it intensified the domestic tense atmosphere. In Turkey, apart from the obvious motivations of the Turkish press, which

admittedly fabricated a 'flag war' for economic purposes, the 1996 coverage features a certain degree of criticism towards the government that was absent in 1987 and can also enhance economic forces that shaped both the coverage and its impact on the escalation of the Imia-Kardak crisis.

Given the state ownership of the media that prevailed in 1987 and the structure of the game-theoretic model that was based on the media's organisational function, the expectation for a strategic media impact occurring in the 1987 crisis was automatically diminished. On the contrary, the highly commercialised interests of the media in 1996 in both countries and their pursuit of dramatic and audience - driven coverage, rendered a media strategic impact more plausible. Hence, both the strategic impact detected in the 1996 crisis and the smaller media impact that the analysis identified in the 1987 oil-drilling crisis are in line with the theoretical hypothesis set within the game-theoretic framework. Interestingly, the detection of a possible impact that the exaggerated 1987 media frame could also have had on Özal's protracted preference over a strategy that appeared to jeopardise the country's national interest, could add to the reliability of the game-theoretic model as a way of understanding the media-government relationship.

Game theory has in this case pointed to two fundamental factors with regard to the media's strategic action and impact. The first one is the importance of the domestic or national cost for the government and the second one is the organisational structure of the media, which is of course associated with the economic interests and objectives reflected in the coverage of a given news story. These two factors represent standard and universally acknowledged dynamics in democratic states. On the one hand, all governments in democratic states are concerned with issues of national interest and domestic cost, independent of international power and reputation. On the other hand, the increasingly commercialised news media nowadays constitutes an open secret. The power inherent in media frames to affect the risk, payoff or cost entailed in given governmental decisions in association with their economic and organisational status compose the media's profile as a strategic actor and their relationship with the government as one that evolves on the basis of profit maximisation. On this basis the media are integrated in the foreign policy process and are constantly on the point of affecting policy decisions. This could therefore render the existence of a media role that is cohesive and operates in all cases, plausible.

This is an inference drawn from a comparison made between the two crises. The employment of the Greek-Turkish conflict has also permitted a comparison between the media-government interactions as they developed in the two countries and a comparison between the coverage of the two newspapers within each country. The example of the Greek-Turkish conflict could ultimately offer a more complete picture of the contribution of the specific case study, also with regard to the deficiencies in the existing literature.

The contribution of the Greek-Turkish paradigm

The game-theoretic approach of the media-government interaction in the Greek-Turkish conflict offered insight into the significance of the organisational and economic factor in the news construction and the implication this could have on the government's perception of risk in decision- making. At the same time, the two territorial crises revealed how the economic preferences and interests of the media developed within a specific political and social context, which would define the relationship of the media in each country with the respective government. There are certain features in the coverage of the two cases that are characteristic of the specific socio-political environment within which the media operate. Comparing the coverage of the two crises, one may notice that the largely supportive frame of the Turkish press towards the government maintained in both cases and the possibility of a highly critical coverage in Turkey remained small. A few critical comments were identified in the reporting of the second crisis, but the press would mainly approve of the governmental decisions. While in Greece, it was the element of partisanship that was present in both crises, reflecting a 'practice' to which the media in Greece would still stick on.

The position and role of the media in the two countries is obviously shaped according to norms that stem from the respective regime and political context and that would ultimately determine the media's behaviour. On this respect, it is obvious that the geographical context within which a media-government develops is associated with certain political, social and cultural conditions that would effectively define the scope of influence of the media on decision-making processes. Furthermore, the investigation of the two Greek-Turkish crises underlines the importance of national sovereignty, the sensitivity of the two players over territorial rights and their inclination to military operations as a way of resolving their differences. The relationship of the two countries is dominated by an obvious and intense nationalistic element that is apparently reflected

in the coverage of both crises and in both countries as well. It is logical that it would have ultimately intensified the pressure exerted by the media for a drastic action and solution. It is particularly the weight of the national cost that the Greek – Turkish conflict draws attention to, the media framing of which could significantly affect the public's perception and consequently, the government's decision to respond or not to the domestic expectations.

The contextual factors on which the media's role is conditioned would also include issues of ideology and political preferences of the media organisations as well, and of course the news frames that such preferences produce. The element of partisanship that prevails in Greece in both crises, underlines the importance of the ideological inclinations of the media and the degree in which the media's strategic impact is dependent on such inclinations as well. The difference in the party preferences the two newspapers adhere to, resulted in the production of diametrically opposing frames, especially in the 1987 crisis where there was no media impact the investigation of the crisis could detect. The coverage of the 1996 crisis reveals the shift the commercialisation of the news media has brought, which is reflected in the production of a still partisanship, yet more unanimous media frame. It is especially the comparison of the Greek media system with the one in Turkey that confirms the importance of the ideological preferences in the understanding of the media's role as conditional to specific contextual factors. The largely undifferentiated line the two Turkish newspapers followed throughout each crisis and the impact this is likely to have generated in both cases could at this point be an indication of the more compelling effect a unanimous coverage could become, in contrast to a partisan press.

These observations signify how the media action and their potential for strategic impact should be investigated within the given socio-political context in which the media-government interaction develops. In this case, the media's intentions and purposeful action is subject to a number of variables and dynamics that relate to the respective political and social environment, to the media's relationship with the respective government and the structure that the respective media system acquires in this environment. The examination of the two Greek- Turkish crises has of course highlighted the purposeful media behaviour, the conditions of national cost that this can generate and have specified a causal mechanism showing why and how a given set of actors and

factors could produce the media's strategic impact; but they have done so within a fairly specified context.

This would therefore underscore how the norms under which media organisations operate, will vary with time and place. This observation is in line with the theories that suggest a constantly evolving and fluctuating relationship between the media and the government given the fact that the relationship itself is subject to the specific political, social and cultural environment within which it grows. The Greek – Turkish crises have come to demonstrate how the relationship between the two countries is also defining the relationship between the media and each of the two governments, and consequently the context within which the media form preferences and make decisions.

The media as strategic actors: benefits and limitations

The game-theoretic approach has drawn upon the conditions of domestic cost that the organisational structure of the media and the implications of this structure on the shaping of media frames could generate. With the empirical verification of this assumption through the analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict, the model has provided an underlying principle why the media should be regarded as an unwavering actor and factor in decision-making processes in the domain of foreign policy. At the same time, the investigation of the Greek-Turkish paradigm has confirmed the significance of contextual factors in the strategic action of the media in the making of foreign policy.

But even if the media's impact cannot be perceived without reference to the geographical and political context in which the media operate, the most vital contribution of this investigation lies in demonstrating how the media's impact can still occur independent of the policy context at hand. It is particularly the cause-effect relationship between media framing and governmental decision-making that offered insight into an interconnection between media frames and political frames that fluctuated throughout the crisis. The approach of media frames as conveyors of risk and domestic cost in a strategic interaction with the government revealed the fluctuation and often the unpredictability of risks, gains and costs for both the media and the government and the way in which both players would adjust their moves and frames accordingly in an attempt to maximise their profit. In this context, the interaction between the media frames and the moves of the two governments demonstrated the speed at which the

stakes in a conflict situation can change and can lead to successive policy changes. This would effectively raise questions with regard to the importance of policy certainty in preventing media effects to occur.

Let us be more precise. The issue of policy certainty is basically raised by the CNN effect debate as a prerequisite for the media effects to take place. As Robinson claims, after having revisited the US interventions in Kosovo, Rwanda and Iraq, despite the existence of critical press coverage, the media were unable to alter the executive policy. The finding supported the hypothesis that media influence is implausible when policy certainty exists (2001:119). If the same hypothesis were applied to the media's role in the Greek-Turkish conflict, according to the theory of the CNN Effect the media's impact would occur only in the 1996 crisis and only in Greece, where both newspapers clearly opposed the official handling of the situation. Moreover, considering the so- called 'spasmodic' decisions made by the Greek government, the media's impact would in this case be explained as an outcome both of the critical framing and of the lack of a settled policy as well. On this basis, the lack of an equally strong impact in the 1987 crisis would be attributed to the more carefully planned governmental strategies. Such an explanation would however overlook the significance of the diagnosis and prognosis conveyed by the media and the way that these diagnostic and prognostic frames transformed into risk indicators and cost generators for the government, through their implications on the public's perception of the situation.

Even if we theorise that the smaller strategic media impact that was detected in the 1987 crisis, compared to the impact in 1996, was due to the existence of greater policy certainty, there are two arguments that could disprove this theory. Firstly, during the 1987 crisis in Turkey, Özal's insistence in a policy,[21] which on the one hand contradicted his own initial framing of the situation and on the other agreed with the media frames, is in line with the concept of the strategic media impact. Despite his settled policy, the maintenance of a risky and irrational decision draws attention to the domestic benefit he would gain from that. Secondly, the intervention made by NATO is of key importance here. It explicates the promptness in which situations change, or to put it differently, in

[21] It was explained in chapter six that Özal initially supported a peaceful handing of the incident; but changed his approach and became more aggressive at a time when the Turkish press was strongly supporting a drastic response to Greece and a radical solution to the crisis.

which the players' stakes change and more important, the way in which players tend to adjust their decisions and policies to the new situations. On this basis, Özal's shift from a risky strategy to a compromise was a resultant of NATO's intervention and the cost that this intervention attached to his previous strategy. That shift itself reveals the unsoundness of the settled policy argument. The argument remains invalid even in the case of the Greek government's policy, as there are more sound reasons that explain the absence of a media impact in 1987. None of the two newspapers suggested a policy different than the one adopted by the government; while the criticism conveyed by the opposition's newspaper was anticipated and came mostly in the aftermath of the crisis.

The 'setting' is of course similar and perhaps more compelling in the 1996 case where the two governments 'swayed' between three different situations from their original framing of the incident and respective preferences, to the status quo the media generated and finally to the new circumstances that the US government created. Each time there was a new force that gave the government incentive to deviate from its previous strategy. What is particularly interesting to note is that in each case the governmental decision, which appeared irrational from the standpoint of the old situation, was rational from the standpoint of the new one. The game - theoretic analysis showed in this case how the constant succession of risks, gains and costs could make apparently irrational decisions look sensible. More importantly, it explained why and how the media are amongst the forces that may cause similar changes and give players incentive to deviate from their strategies fostering their ability to strategically influence the outcome of a crisis.

By resolving the issue of policy certainty, the game-theoretic model provides a solid argument with regard to the media continuous presence and plausibility of impact on decision-making processes in the domain of foreign policy, independent of the policy at hand. Moreover, by demonstrating the media's potential to be among the factors that can cause policy shifts, the model provides evidence of the media's potential to affect not just the process of foreign policymaking, but decisions and policy outcomes as well. It therefore makes a step further than existing theories that emphasise a rather instrumental and tactical use of the media by politicians for the achievement of diplomatic goals. It also overcomes the constraints of elite consensus and of a single, consistent political frame that Hallin (1986) and Wolfsfeld (1997) have put forward as

conditions that prevent media effects from occurring in conflict situations. And of course, it invalidates the issue of policy certainty as impediment in the ability of the media frames to cause policy changes. The game-theoretic model has 'erased' specific contextual conditions introduced by previous theories that outlawed the plausibility of media effects in the making of foreign policy, creating scope for the formulation of a compound profile of the media as a strategic actor.

The game-theoretic approach of the media-government interaction could be best described as an attempt to expand O'Heffernan's 'insider model' (1991) and his theory of the co-evolution between the media and the government on a more general level. Given that O'Heffernan has drawn upon the media's economic and commercial motivations as a driving force in their selection and shaping of news stories and as a decisive factor in their autonomy from the government, the present thesis demonstrates how these motivations do not just render the media independent actors but they also translate in impact on policy outcomes. The specific approach can even prove useful for the analysis and understanding of political outcomes, when the media are involved. For instance, the close and rigorous investigation of the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis media coverage shed light on the motivations that led to that 'irrational war'. In this case, the media do not just influence the political environment, but they can also create it.

Nonetheless, it also needs to be clarified that by focusing on the media's purposeful and economically oriented media action, the present model has in essence limited its scope in situations where the media are expected to operate under a strictly organisational structure and within a competitive environment. The specific model presupposes the government's interaction with profit-seeking journalists and has focused primarily on the media's pursuit of 'exploitation' of and 'opposition' towards the government, rather than 'cooperation' with it. This is also one of the reasons the specific model could function more efficiently in situations of conflict, which incorporate specifications that could encourage media frames that are critical and oppose the governmental decisions. The functionality of the model for the investigation of media effects primarily in situations of conflict is also due to the association of the media's impact with expectations of domestic/national cost for the government. This is a variable the significance of which is reasonable to increase in times of crisis and in cases where the national interest is at risk.

Moreover, rational choice and game theory compose a highly demanding approach that requires accurate knowledge and calculation of the decision-making process under investigation. This is also a reason why the specific model cannot surpass contextual factors that relate to the geographical and political environment within which a given media-government interaction evolves. Therefore, the media's strategic role is inevitably dependent on the relevant socio-political background, which should be fully comprehended and thoroughly analysed.

This specification of the media's behaviour with regard to the given political, social and cultural environment does not of course limit the potential of the game-theoretic model for further application to additional cases. That is to say, the model has highlighted the media's importance as generators of conditions for domestic cost; a dynamic, the importance of which is common to all governmental actors. Considering that all governments are after maximising their own payoff, they become more likely to carefully consider the media coverage before acting. The findings of this investigation can enable the reconsideration and re-evaluation of the media's role in previously investigated international crises- for instance, in humanitarian interventions- and the investigation of still unexplored cases. It is an initiative that could bring additional and until now unseen media effects on the surface; and may ultimately offer a more accurate conceptualisation of the media-government relationship in foreign policy altogether displaying the media's power in its true dimensions.

The 1987 oil-drilling crisis

The Turkish diagnostic media frame-
Milliyet & Hürriyet
26 March – 1 April

The Greek diagnostic frame –
Eleftherotypia & Eleftheros Typos
26 March – 31 March

Problem definition

26 March	• War screams in Athens • Scenarios for war (Milliyet, pages 10-12; Hürriyet, pages 1 & 14)	• The Aegean crisis reaches its peak but the Greek government is in conflict with the church • The Turks are threatening again: the Turkish provocative moves continued yesterday when two Turkish aircrafts violated the Greek air space (E. Typos, pages 11-12)
27 March	• Greece refuses to comply with the Bern agreement • If "Hora" is attacked, we are ready to take action against Greece • Papandreou is crazy • Smell of war • The Aegean is 'under arrest' (Milliyet, pages 10-11; Hürriyet, pages 1 & 12-13)	• The Greek armed forces are being mobilised • The opposition accuses the government of causing national division • War is in the air • War challenge from Turkey • The tension increases as Turkey decides to send Sismik to the Aegean (Eleftherotypia, Pages 8 & 44-45; E. Typos, Pages 8-9)
28 March	• Hands on trigger • War bells • If Papandreou tries to stop Hora, there might be a war • A small mistake is a cause for a war • Athens is mobilising the armed forces • The Turkish and Greek armies are on the alert • The Aegean Sea is about to explode (Miliyet, pages 1 & 5-6; Hürriyet pages 1 & 9-12)	• Today is the most crucial day of the crisis with the two countries being ready to start a war unless Turkey changes Sismik's course in the Aegean • Since yesterday Greece has been in fighting trim and ready for everything • National crisis (Eleftherotypia, pages 2-8 & 24)

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Causal Responsibility

26 March	• Papandreou is trying to create tension between the two countries in order to jeopardise the Turkish EU candidacy and benefit from it (Milliyet, pages 10-12; Hürriyet, 1 & 14)	• The Turks are threatening again: the Turkish provocative moves continued yesterday when two Turkish aircrafts violated the Greek air space (E. Typos, pages 11-12)
27 March	• Papandreou is believed to have created the crisis for domestic purposes • The crisis has been prepared by Papandreou before hand, who had been seeking for an excuse to attack (Milliyet, pages 10-11; Hürriyet, pages 1 & 12-13)	• The question is to what extent this Turkish hostility is related to an encouragement activated by USA. • The Turks are sending Sismik to the Aegean and they threaten us in case we interfere. • Turkey aims at exploiting the mistakes made by the Greek government in the handing of the situation • The government is leading the country to a national division (Eleftherotypia, Pages 8 & 44-45; E. Typos, Pages 8-9)
28 March	N/A	• It is very likely that the Turkish government is simply making a war of nerves in order to consume all our oil resources • The government was isolated from their natural European allies (Eleftherotypia, pages 2-8 & 24)

The Turkish prognostic frame

The Greek prognostic frame

Strategic alternatives

28 March	N/A	• It is very likely that the Turkish government is simply making a war of nerves in order to consume all or oil resources • The government was isolated from their natural European allies (Eleftherotypia, pages 2-8 & 24)

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Anticipated risk & cost

26 March	• Possible Scenarios for war • War can only have cost for Greece and will jeopardise the new economic reform that the government is trying to apply (Milliyet, pages 10-12; Hürriyet, 1 & 14)	N/A
27 March	N/A	• This is a situation where anything is possible (Eleftherotypia, Pages 8 & 44-45; E. Typos, Pages 8-9)
28-29 March	• If there is a war, it will not last for more than two days and will mainly benefit Greece (Milliyet, pages 1 & 5-6; Hürriyet pages 1 & 9-12)	• Turkey is playing a dirty game but we are not going to war • Even if there is no war, this conflict is going to have a great cost for us, due to the huge preparation expenses and the decrease in the number of tourist that will visit our country this summer. • The country is isolated from the European allies (Eleftherotypia, pages 2-8 & 24; E.Typos pages 4-6 & 32-33))

Remedy/Solution

26 March	N/A	• The solution should be given in The Hague Court • There is need for national vigilance (E. Typos, pages 11-12)
27 March	• The Turkish government believes that the problem can be solved through negotiations. Even the opposition party in Turkey believes that there should be a peaceful solution (Milliyet, pages 10-11; Hürriyet, pages 1 & 12-13)	N/A
28 March	• We cannot tell if there will be a war but we hope the two countries will fine a peaceful solution (Milliyet, pages 1 & 5-6; Hürriyet pages 1 & 9-12)	• At this difficult time Greece has to make use of the benefit to be part of EU (Eleftherotypia, pages 2-8 & 24)

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The aftermath

29 March	• The Western press presents Turkey to be the one that started the crisis and the one that stepped back to avoid the war • The Turkish policy has failed to make the Western world see the crisis as created by Turkey and ended in favour of Greece • Greece wanted to make the Aegean a Greek Sea but they would not dare a war • A possible war would damage the Turkish image and Greece would suffer too • If there is a war, it is likely that the Turkish position will be finally accepted: that is for Papandreou to resign from Prime Minister of Greece • If there was a war, that would be limited in the air and sea • The only way out is a dialogue/negotiations (Milliyet, pages 1 & 5-11; Hürriyet, pages 11-13)	N/A
30 March	• Papandreou meets the Turkish ambassador in Athens in an unexpected meeting • Greece withdraws and the crisis freezes • Negotiation problem as Turkey accepts the offer of Lord Carrington to be the mediator but Greece does not • The crisis broke out of wrong announcements made by the Greek side, regarding possible oil drilling in the area (Hürriyet, page 12)	Eleftheros Typos (pages 4-11 & 20-22): • The Greek government has withdrawn form the exploitation of the oil deposits the largest part of the Aegean, this part that so far we have claimed it belonged to us • The crisis was presented by the government as bigger than it actually was. • The dramatisation of the situation served the domestic objectives of the government • Closing down the American base was a mere lie • Fraud of the government • Turkey is now going to exert more pressure in the future Eleftherotypia (pages 4-6): • Greece has won as Turkey withdraws • The country has achieved an important political and diplomatic victory and that without a single casualty. This is because the government no longer believes that we should not mess with Turkey
31 March	• Papandreou meets the Turkish ambassador in Athens in an unexpected meeting	Eleftheros Typos (pages 4-11): • In every crisis Papandreou...sells our national interests

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	• Greece withdraws and the crisis freezes • Negotiation problem as Turkey accepts the offer of Lord Carrington to be the mediator but Greece does not • The crisis broke out of wrong announcements made by the Greek side, regarding possible oil drilling in the area (Hürriyet, pages 10-14)	• The government has turned the Aegean into Turkish sea Eleftherotypia (page 47): • The Turkish policy changes and now Özal accepts to go to the Hague Court
1 April	• The spring has come in the Aegean • Turkey's glory • Papandreou's propaganda was successful since he managed to have the public on his side (Hürriyet, page 14)	N/A

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The 1996 Imia – Kardak crisis

The Turkish diagnostic media frame-
Milliyet & Hürriyet
26 January- 1 February

The Greek diagnostic frame –
Eleftherotypia & Eleftheros Typos,
27 January – 1 February

Problem definition

26 January	• Abandoned island crisis in the Aegean (Hürriyet, page 8)	N/A
27 January	• A rock has alarmed Athens • The Greek media created a storm out of a trivial event (Hürriyet page 15)	• The territorial claim Turkey made over the islet is just ridiculous (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, page 9)
28 January	• 'Flag war' in the Aegean • The Greeks have behaved like pirates leaving a flag on the island • Increasing tension between Ankara and Athens due to a rock (Hürriyet page 5)	N/A
29 January	• The tension between Ankara and Athens increases as Greek vessels surround the islets • The Greeks have tried to create an issue by putting some goats on the island • Athens is becoming paranoid • It has been four days since the crisis has broken out (Milliyet, page 18; Hürriyet, page 15)	• The Ministry of Defence is alarmed • The government is very close to a general mobilisation • How can Pangalos say there is no issue? (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, pages 8-10)
30 January	• It is a dangerous situation • The tension is increasing • It is a legislation problem • Athens is becoming paranoid (Milliyet, pages 18-19)	• War is in the air in the Aegean – Ready for war • Ankara invites Athens for a negotiation round in order to change the status quo in the Aegean • Ankara wants to 'erase' all the existing regulations regardin the Aegean since 1974 • There is no issue whatsoever since the islets are Greek (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)

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31 January	• Hurricane in Kardak • A storm was created out of a trivial event • War games in Kardak (Milliyet, pages 2-5 & 13-17; Hürriyet, pages 5-6)	• The incident is not accidental despite the official statements • The crisis is going beyond the limits despite the official assurance that everything is under control • We are about to be in a war/ War is in the air • The situation is more serious than in 1987 (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, pages 22-28)

Causal Responsibility

26 January	• After Simitis became the new Prime Minister, he is doing his best to create a conflict between Greece and Turkey (Hürriyet, page 8)	N/A
27 January	• The new Greek government has managed to create crisis immediately after coming to power • Athens has started a war of 'notes' due to a ship that needed to be rescued (Hürriyet page 15)	• The governmental dispersal gave Turkey the chance to proceed with new territorial claims (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, page 9)
29 January	• The Greeks are again after creating a conflict in the Aegean • The Greeks have tried to create an issue by putting some goats on the islet (Milliyet, page 18; Hürriyet, page 15)	• The weakness that the government showed in handling the initial Turkish provocation, gave Ankara the green light to escalate the crisis (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, pages 8-10)
30 January	• The crisis was created by chance out of a trivial issue • It is an issue created by the Greek government • The media in Greece are working for the government and create events that increase the tension between the two countries (Milliyet, pages 18-19)	• The Turkish provocation against Greece is confirmed. • They are using as an excuse the incident in the islet asking for negotiations in order to solve the problem (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)
31 January	• Pangalos has a tendency to create conflicts between the two countries • Because of the government's paranoia in Turkey, it was too late to avoid the crisis, when they decided to take the necessary action • Greece believes that the Aegean consists of only	• Ankara 'cultivates' the tension in the Aegean with the encouragement of USA • The Turks want to reorganise the Aegean • The Turkish government is following their usual provocative tactic

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	Greek islands • Greece wants to spread their sovereignty all over the Aegean, with the EU support (Milliyet, pages 2-5 & 13-17; Hürriyet, pages 5-6)	• The Turks continue to play dangerous games (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, pages 22-28)

The Turkish prognostic frame

The Greek prognostic frame

Strategic alternatives

29 January – 1 February*	• Negotiate • Step back only in they withdraw first • If they attack, respond to their attack	• There cannot be any negotiations for an issue that does not exist • There has to be either a war or we must ensure the USA agrees we are right

Anticipated risk and cost

27 January	NA	• The issue is expected to cause further complications in the Greek –Turkish relationship (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, page 9)
29 January	N/A	• If we accept negotiate about the status quo in the Aegean, this will have future consequences for Athens • There will be more Turkish provocations in the future • There is fear for future rearrangement of the shelf (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, pages 8-10)
30 January	N/A	• Turkey will turn to Thrace next • Unless the government resists, the future holds even worse • The government will lead the country to national defeat and humiliation • Greece will be forced to commence negotiations not only for the islet but for the whole region (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr)

* The specific strategic alternatives are being reproduced by the four newspapers throughout the crisis

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31 January	• We cannot step back even if it costs us • The sovereign rights are important even for a small piece of land • If we do not defend this islet, we will give reasons for • Greece to come back again (Milliyet, pages 2-5 & 13-17; Hürriyet, pages 5-6)	N/A

Payoffs from war

31 January	• We have to maintain our sovereign rights • In case of a military conflict we will definitely beat them • If we attack first we will win (Milliyet, pages 2-5 & 13-17; Hürriyet, pages 5-6)	N/A

Remedy/ Solution

28 January	• Both countries should come to the table and negotiate (Hürriyet page 5)	N/A
29-30 January	• The two sides can only find a solution through the negotiation process • The problem has to be solved in a peaceful way. • We have to negotiate (Milliyet, page 18 & 18-19; Hürriyet, page 15)	• The government needs an intransigent policy • There should be no negotiation with Turkey • The government has to provide evidence and argumentatio about the status of the islets • They have to resist (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, pages 8-10)
31 January	• We should not get caught in Simitis' trap • If they do not withdraw then we will do whatever it takes (Milliyet, pages 2-5 & 13-17; Hürriyet, pages 5-6)	• One of the two sides has to withdraw or there will be a war • We have to make them step back without engaging into a war (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr; E. Typos, pages 22-28)

APPENDIX

The aftermath

1 February	• Victory for Turkey and vicious defeat for Greece • The determination of the government and the good preparation of the armed forces led to the resolution of the crisis • Now the government must forget about Kardak and focus on the economy problems • Occupying the second islet was not a rational decision • The Kardak crisis is the first problem on our way to the EU membership (Miliyet, page 3-5)	• It is a national defeat • The government sold our national interests • The traitors should quit • We were humiliated • The government led the country to a national defeat • It is a fact that the government was not at all prepared to deal with such a crucial crisis and remained isolated from the international diplomatic circles (Eleftherotypia, http://archive.enet.gr, E. Typos, page 7)

APPENDIX

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