

THE IDEA OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
PERSONAL, SOCIAL AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT (PSME) IN EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

The Idea of Personal Development with Special Reference to Personal, Social and Moral Development (PSME) in Education

The notion of Personal Development is situated in the domain of values, especially moral values. Moral values are concerned with what is right alongside what is good in its several aspects. For curriculum purposes, Personal Development finds its sense largely within the content provided by the terms 'moral' and 'social' in PSME. 'Personal' is not an independent category. But there is a certain overlap between Personal Development and Self-Development, where the latter term refers to an individual's generic human development. A person's individuality is not in a confluence of differently combined qualities and attributes. An individual is strongly a person in those values that he appropriates or endorses as his own. Values connect a person strongly with his unity and continuity as an individual over time. Our worth as persons attaches to our reciprocal relationships with each other and to ourselves for ourselves insofar as we maintain integrity in our own projects. To this extent values have an objective reference.

I want to show the manner in which a person is attached to the values that confront him in a pluralist society. It is not just that values are realized in a person's life; it is the relation he has to those values. Those values are expressed in the constituents of Personal Development - namely, those personal qualities and attributes thought desirable - and will be 'strongly' or 'thinly' present in that person. In respect of these qualities and attributes he will be strongly or thinly attached to his human world. This is a question about the manner of our residence in our own being and about the relation that our being has to the 'ways of being persons' in the human world.

A person is culturally emergent, although some versions of self-realization give the impression that the individual is prior to culture. There is a certain circularity in what we might call absolute or intrinsic values, especially moral ones. For example, we may want to say that we acquire virtues in order to flourish in life. But what constitutes flourishing will be captured in 'contested' value-terms and will therefore shape what we take virtues to be.

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1 Personal Development, PSE, PSME, PSMHE	8
CHAPTER 2 Relevance, Needs: the Content or Supports for Education?	43
CHAPTER 3 Needs in the Language of Curriculum Recommendations	73
CHAPTER 4 Essentially Contested Concepts, Normative Terms and Justification	106
CHAPTER 5 Personal Development, Self-Development and Self-Realization	121
CHAPTER 6 Persons, Personal Development and Values	152
CHAPTER 7 The Realization of Values in the Human Setting	168
CHAPTER 8 Persons and their Relationships to Values	177
CHAPTER 9 Values and the Constitution of Persons	216
CHAPTER 10 Conclusion	269
BIBLIOGRAPHY	274

open society. But what are our criteria of justifiable diversity in acceptable ways to be persons? The notion of absolute value might make its appearance here. A substantial literature has been built on Wittgenstein's distinction between relative and absolute value. However, the ways to be persons is the substance of culture. It is from meaning and value that our identities are constituted. Our identities express possible, but not always acceptable, ways to be persons.

Education in the shape of personal development draws its content and inspiration from culture. If our culture is not all of a piece, and given that personal development is intimately connected with the formation of personal identities through the initiation into culture, we should expect disagreement about desirable ways to be persons. There might be sufficient general shared values to withstand the excesses of disagreement. Yet some people would still want to assess further such tolerant live and let live values. Personal development as a way of thinking about the proper constitution of persons will have to address such difficulties.

I hint, suggest and stress throughout my discussion that the notion of personal development as a curriculum aim is not a subject like other subjects. This is not to say that it is not supervenient upon other subjects. However, the use of the expression (personal development) in educational literature, especially the official literature of government and educational departments and so forth, ranges from the portentous through the pretentious to the merely residual. On the one hand the highest 'pro' words point to ideals of properly constituted personal identities. On the other, less grandly, personal development is tagged on to curriculum suggestions as residual afterthoughts. We find strongly idealistic language urging moral responsibility and weakly utilitarian language encouraging survival skills. Perhaps behind both is the thought that personal development has replaced moral education as the preparation of a person for his life as a moral being. We might develop this last thought and say that 'moral being' is internal to the idea of personhood.

This idea of the constitutive link between possessing the capacity to form a moral identity and the capacity to become a person is not simply to be put to the service of marking human beings off from the rest of Creation. We assess each other in terms of these realized capacities. This is not just a verbal point to help classify reality in the right way. If we fail to develop these capacities we have no proper hold on ourselves as human beings. It is to be without an identity according to our own kind. If personal development is connected with the idea of the

proper constitution of persons and if the transmission of culture is generative of personal identities and if the main contours of culture are found in what we might call Ethics, then personal development must be a reflection on and absorption of the values that ethics addresses.

What I have in mind in using the term ethics is captured by Wittgenstein in his 'Lecture on Ethics' (1965 pp 4-5). Instead of saying what ethics consist in, he presents a Galtonian Churchillian facial analogy. The characteristic features held in common by ethics are:

Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable

Ethics is the enquiry into what is really important

Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life

Ethics is the enquiry into what makes life worth living

Ethics is the enquiry into the right way of living

As reflection personal development is to think about how values enter our lives for good or ill. As practice personal development, in its supervision on other things, is concerned with the constitution of persons. What teachers are as persons, so they need to be as teachers (with the necessary adjustments to their demeanour for the age of the children). The danger in personal development is that we may let ourselves as persons intrude in the wrong way into our engagement with pupils and students. At worst we subsume under the expression 'personal development' all those things that we should like people to be as a reflection of our self-serving hang-ups.

A further danger is that the language of personal development can easily become a rhetoric in the service of ends external to educational values. A vocabulary can be put to the service of anything. 'The Devil can cite scripture for his purpose'. In rhetoric we do not lie as such, in the sense of offering falsity for truth in the depiction of things. As long as the display succeeds and is seen in the right light in public space, it is enough. For example, I want you to see me as someone who cares, who sacrifices for the good of the school, who willingly attends meetings and rehearses the current buzz words, especially those in the emerging vocabulary of personal development. This is the heart of much that I want to say. There is a need to find a context for what is taken as a vocabulary of personal development - a context other than one in which one rehearses high sounding 'pro' words, whether these be in D.E.S. publications or curriculum development meetings. If there is a serious language of personal development, the problem is to find a discursive context for it, in the first instance.

The language of values is our language but we need to know how to reflect on it and use it. It is not only in the obvious sense that rhetoric displaces truth.

A danger also exists in annexing a language of personal development to the requirements of what has been called the New Vocationalism. On one interpretation the New Vocationalism is attempting to industrialize education. In earlier times wisdom was thought to be collapsing into knowledge and knowledge in its turn into information. So now, it is thought that education is reduced to training and training in its turn to the notion of preparation for work or enforced leisure in a technological society. Intrinsic values internal to education are lost in the instrumental and utilitarian demands of the immediate needs of life. Man's environment is one of work or the regret that one has not got it. On such a view we are in the process of losing the concept of leisure, which is not just the absence of work and a pick-me-up for more work. This again is not to say that work does not release our creative energies and the products of which do not embody our humanity. (It is not obvious that work has ever embodied our humanity in its processes or products as some modern Hegelians would suggest, at least for the majority of people.) Leisure is nevertheless a positive freedom from necessity, which is a condition for the cultivation of man's distinctive characteristics. Leisure liberates man so that he can find himself in the best that our culture has created. We might remind ourselves that the Greek skole and the Latin scola from which the English 'school' is derived means leisure, that is freedom from necessity, a release from servile pursuits into the freedom of the liberal arts. The idea of school points to a freedom from the fetters of work or, if one prefers, labour. If the New Vocationalism is a danger, it is equally a danger to forget that we do have to earn our living. We have to beware of too easy oppositions. We must, however, as educationalists, resist the fashionable direct route from 'learning to earning'.

We might, then, reflect on some of the obvious fatuities of an emerging caste of mind. Vocation lists turn things of internal worth into external utility with a surrealistic twist. For example, religious education is justified (or is it excused?) in vocational terms. A pass in G.C.S.E. might be valuable for young people who consider careers as organists, stained glass window designers, mortuary attendants or being a nurse. Biology may be 'some use for' the Women's Royal Air Force, Chemistry 'some use for' window cleaning, English 'some help' towards being a traffic warden, Geography 'useful for being' a bus driver or

taxi driver. If these examples are humorous, they do point to a tendency wherein people fail to have any other than an external relationship to what enters into their lives. I have chosen these examples at random and they are not all of a piece. Many young people would settle for the intrinsic satisfactions of musicianship or nursing. The more serious point is that what is external is either out of reach of many young people or soul destroying in its meaninglessness. Would that there were a wealth of vocations and a just distribution of them. Vocations must be central if people are to find meaning and purpose in their lives. How splendid to become a stained glass window designer!

There is an exchange in the play 'A Man for all Seasons' by Robert Bolt (1963) that may help to make my point. Thomas More, knowing his man, tells Richard Rich that he will not sponsor Rich's preferment for a career at Court. Rather he suggests that Rich should become a teacher. Rich wonders what there could be in such a career for a clever and ambitious young man. More tries to impart some wisdom to Rich. If Rich becomes a teacher and teaches well, More says:

'You will know it, your pupils will know it, and God will know it'. We might interpret 'and God will know it' as 'doing what one does for the good of it' or, to put it in the form of a question to which a reply is precluded if the question is taken in the right spirit, 'what could be more important?' or 'what else would you want to do with your life anyway?' Above I alluded to T.S. Eliot when I spoke about information being mistaken for wisdom. The meaning of wisdom that More had in mind is something like a true perception of the best ends in life. Educationalists, even if they do not share More's elevated conception of their profession, must have some appreciation of the subjects they teach, or the attitudes and assumptions they try to instil, as having intrinsic worth.

In Bolt's play More himself is called upon to say who he is. It is in his deepest values that More locates his self. Perhaps contrary to the real Sir Thomas, More in the play is presented as a kind of Existentialist hero. More says that it is not a matter whether the Pope's Supremacy is true but that he (More) had committed his deepest self to it. More says that: 'What matters to me is not whether it's true or not, but that I believe it to be true, or rather not that I believe it, but that I believe it'. Bolt in the Preface to the play says that More had 'an adamant sense of his own self. He knew where he began and left off ...'. He was executed because he was asked and refused to 'retreat from that final area where he located

himself'. He could not give in 'for that's myself: only God is love right through, and that's myself.' More fears a kind of biforcated spilling of the self. (Later I shall argue that such splitting of the self can be redescribed in terms of kinds and degrees of worth.)

'When a man takes an oath, he's holding his own self in his own hands'. As with water, if a man 'opens his fingers then he needn't hope to find himself again'. In the play More exhibits those modern ideals of toleration, autonomy in ultimate matters of value, authenticity and respect for sincerity. The innermost self should be inviolate. I continue this discussion of the play because I want to illustrate, albeit in an extreme form, my claim that a person is in his values - he is his values. Values are realized in his life and he can be related to them in a variety of ways.

I would interpret More's relation to his values in the following way. A certain view of integrity is central to More's moral stand. He could not conceive of whom he might be were he to detach himself from his values. Since his notion of goodness is part of what it is for him to be a person, to relinquish the whole of this goodness in his life would be to lose his sense of his personhood. And to be a person is the highest status in his or our self-interpretation. This self-interpretation goes 'right through' and one might put it right down. This is what I mean when I say that there is a constitutive tie between what a person is and what his moral identity is.

A further point important to my thesis about personal development is that More, the character in the play (and More in life too) is not one-dimensional - a moral paragon. He is a man at ease with his family, friends, acquaintances and servants; he is at home in his professions and callings; finds things of worth and amusement in the variety of circumstances and settings of his life; and of course he is a shrewd observer of the strengths and weaknesses in men. He is a man of 'splendid social adjustment' as Bolt says. He is a man at home in the world in spite of enemies he has the measure of. Now this picture might be an ideal of a developed person.

Both positively and negatively a knowledge of the social and cultural conditions that form the background to an individual's personal development will indicate what is thought to be required features of it. More is presented as a mature man, even though he develops in the play. One might reflect though on what went into his becoming who and what he is. Novels of 'personal formation' known in German as Bildungsroman describe what goes into person-making.

Wisdom is a term that appears frequently in much of the literature on what personal development might consist in. Thomas More has a perception of what man's true ends might be. He also has the practical wisdom to bring these ends about. He knows how to act well in marriage and friendship and, of course, he knows what a proper ordering of these ends might be. He knows too what can be bought and sold and what cannot. And many things can be bought at too high a cost.

In my discussion I want to suggest that the notion of personal development is best situated in the domain of values, if we are to give it a context in which to reflect on it. This must be prior to attempting to make personal development a curriculum aim.

On the Introduction page of Personal and Social Education in the Curriculum (1984) by Richard Pring there appears a letter from a Principal of an American High School to his teachers.

Dear Teacher

I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man should witness:

Gas chambers built by learned engineers.
Children poisoned by educated physicians.
Infants killed by trained nurses.
Women and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates.

So, I am suspicious of education.

My request is: Help your students become human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths, educated Eichmans.

Reading, writing, arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our children more human.

Those who are concerned with Personal Development should reflect on this letter, but not in a glow of self-righteousness such that one knows already who may lead pupils and students astray. And importantly students must not lead themselves and each other astray. An integral part of being a well constituted human being is that one is also an individual. What shape individuality takes is also the responsibility of the individual and the tension between individual difference and human decency is partially resolved by each individual himself. This is not to say that individual difference does not express itself in human decency, perhaps of an uncommon kind. But the undistinguished too can be of an uncommon kind.

CHAPTER 1

Personal Development, PSE, PSME, PSMHE

In matters of the curriculum the term personal development may or may not be the highest or the most general term of commendation but it is one of the most widely used. The utility of the expression is in its indeterminacy. If all else in teaching appears doubtful, unobtainable, specialized, narrow, abstract or, to use the most general term of disapproval, boring, the aim of personal development can give the air of being at once the most comprehensive and yet the most intimate good that can be done to or achieved by a human being. Also, to characterize a human being as a person is, it is felt, to bring him or her under the highest term of assessment. (These kinds of flourish can take their cue from such judgements as that health is the highest assessment of a person's bodily condition whilst happiness is the highest assessment of a person's total condition.)

An inspection of the 'subject' area to which the term personal development refers presents a complication at the outset. As the subject area expands so does the heading which is meant to capture its sense. Many schools and colleges do indeed use the term personal development to designate such a separate sphere of the curriculum. This does not necessarily mean that this area has a separate slot in the curriculum, though it mostly does. Personal development might rather inform the ethos of the whole school or college. However, in many other schools and colleges and of course in the literature and documents that now proliferate in this subject area, personal development has several cognates and extensions. One comes across the terms self-realization, self-discovery, self-fulfilment and self-direction as either parallel terms or as constituent elements within personal development. Also personal development becomes PSE (Personal and Social Education or Development), PSME (Personal Social and Moral Education or Development) or PSMHE (Personal Social Moral and Health Education or Development). Often 'moral' in these extensions of the general headings begins to include spiritual aspects of a person's total development. The terms used to characterize the general end of this total development begin to proliferate too. Such words as wellbeing are introduced to describe the overall condition which is aimed at.

I am not saying that personal development was the first expression

in this field and that increasingly more comprehensive terms were introduced to capture what goes on in the curriculum when informed by what is included in the extensions to the original term. Personal, Social and Moral matters were together at the start. However, the single term is used frequently in schools and colleges and in the accompanying literature and documents. For the time being I shall use the term personal development in a fairly indeterminate sense simply because of its ubiquitous use.

Apart from its use in the institutional framework of formal education, the term personal development is also used widely in industry, commerce, the professions and the service sectors of the economy. Obviously there is a certain reciprocal exchange between its use in education and the 'wealth producing' parts of society. The acquisition of personal qualities and attributes is thought to be as economically relevant as specialized skills and knowledge. A salesman is more likely to sell a product if he can sell himself as well, it is claimed. Certain properties of personhood are now thought to be part of the 'marketing package'. Personhood in this sense is a 'sign', as semiotics puts it, similar to a brand name, a logo, the design and packaging of a product. Personhood is an enveloping enticement as is any seductive appearance which is meant to enhance a non-descript product. Also in an age of differentiated consumption reflecting non-standardized products and services, we are told there is more scope for individual difference, independence and expression. Consumers and producers are more individuated, even if there is a dark side to this trend. This individual difference somehow gets turned into de-individuated and desensitized aggregative menace. Instances are football hooliganism and mass picketing and policing. Another image of how the personalized and individualized erupts into mass menace is the spectacle of lager and champagne louts with their 'hair down'. Individualized initiative at personalized computer terminals provides the wherewithal for people to express themselves in mock Tudor taverns - and all this part of a self-chosen life-style. The claim that there is no such thing as society may license such talk. We have the 'personalized' individual on the one hand and mere aggregates of people on the other.

An example of a personal development guru from industry is the millionaire Robin Fielder. In the Sunday Correspondent Magazine (16 December 1989) we find Fielder billed as The Great Communicator. He was 'once a people-failure', though now he has 'the flickering aura of Success Mental Health'. He had accumulated 'all this education

at school' but no one had ever told him 'how to sell me'. Fielder runs courses on personal development. We are told that if one is an effective person one is an effective salesman. 'All social intercourse is a negotiation'. A human being in his most intimate contacts is a salesman. Its all about persistence and cheerfulness. He says 'we all conform to our environments. If you spend too much of your time with too many laid back, woolly, unambitious people, you tend to conform to that environment'. One should get away from those who are negatively critical and moaning. This is it then! Personal development is to avoid a mismatch between personality and environment. And, we must say, this leaves everything unsaid.

It is interesting too that one can have a personal development holiday. One can pick up a brochure in travel agents' shops in which one is urged to escape to a humanly fit environment in the Greek Islands where one can realize one's dormant potentialities. The setting will bring out 'what one has got it in one to become'. Eudaimonia and arete are the preferred personal goods. All the paraphernalia of the The Human Potential Movement is put to the service of realizing chosen excellencies of character and personality. The metaphor of growth is exploited. But it only selects certain aspects of the growth figure. What is emphasized is the fullness of an ephemeral state. One will blossom. This blossoming is attained in 'peak experiences' and with luck the consciousness change will illuminate the rest of one's life. In short one will find one's telos - some completion or fulfilment, some epiphany in peak experiences. The important question for educationalists is how much of the wider society and its current crazes is now influencing education in our schools and colleges.

The term personal development has found its way into the language of human fulfilment. It is not on the lips of everyone but the term is not uncommon amongst people at large. How the term has found its way into our common language is an interesting question. Its use is of course pervasive on the West Coast of the U.S.A. where leisure counsellors offer programmes of 'life-style enhancement' to the disaffected in a disenchanted world. It is no surprise to learn that the word 'enhancement' is now used widely in the second order talk of curriculum development. The term personal development is then now used in every day speech, alongside such terms as personal fulfilment and self-expression.

One important context of its use is when people reflect on the constraints that frustrate the possibility of fuller and higher satis-

factions in their lives. These people express a desire for a breathing space in which to find themselves. The way one might capture this expressed lack in people's lives is in the contrast between negative and positive freedom. Negative freedom picks out those external restraints and obstacles that fence people in. They are locked into jobs, relationships, roles and demands, the absence of which would give them a taste of liberty. Positive freedom points to those perceived or discerned resonances and possibilities that if made real in their lives would provide people with richer and more fulfilled existences. In this sense of personal development then people feel that their lives are unduly circumscribed. They feel that their lives are truncated and stultified. And they realize that they have potentialities for some renewal and enhancement in their lives. People can get it wrong though. One might find people saying that they now have space in their lives but do not know what to do with it. Also the fulfilment to be found in what was thought to stifle them might have been what was truly fulfilling. So called self-actualization might be bought at too high a cost for them as well as others.

I am not saying that when educationalists use the term personal development in the context of a school or college, they are drawing on all the many threads or strands that give the term its pervasive use. Nevertheless we do find traces of its wider uses.

A Language of Personal Development

One might ask whether personal development and its extensions is something or nothing - that is whether there is a reasonably determinate area which one picks out as that of personal development. It might be nothing because there is nothing to pick out, either because the elements are too far flung and disparate or because anything that gets said is largely covered in other and more established areas of the curriculum. Or more strongly one might say there is confusion or incoherence in the very idea. On the other hand one might enquire whether there is a sufficiently distinctive language of personal development. We might split this language into two parts. We speak a first order language - a language that one naturally uses to characterize the process of a person's growing up in the required sense. We have such a language. We think of it largely as the ordinary language used in the ordinary world. It is pre-theoretical, belongs to the common understanding and is the currency of every day experience.

We find such language in the details of success and failure in

living as a person amongst other people, in the 'folk talk' of whether people are equipped to meet the demands of the various human settings in which they live their lives, in those moments of collapse in which people lose interest in life because it is not they who live it, in those situations in which people find themselves in worthwhile activities and in the speech about lives lived well or badly in the course and conduct of life. So provisionally we have some kind of language of personal development. Personal development as a curriculum subject draws on this language. This is not to say that there might not be confusion and worse at times in this language but this first order language is the test by which we assess other languages.

It is not always easy to distinguish between orders of language in this sense. Certainly one tries to impose some order on the detail of personal development. One also tries to fashion general pictures or ideas to see how much of the detail can be caught in these pictures and ideas. These ordering principles or ideas then become part of the general language of personal development. In this way certain suggestive ideas or themes enter the subject area of personal development. So too do other themes and ideas. These tend to multiply by verbal similarities and by what is thought relevant to what already features in this subject area. We might call some of this the 'flavour of the month' approach to personal development. I must say from my experience that these flavour of the month themes often coincide with the emergence of teachers who themselves might fit into this favoured category. Furthermore such areas as personal development are both colonized by other academic interests or they themselves colonize other independent aspects of the curriculum.

Big insights into the nature of man or rediscovered notions about the needs of society or industry are introduced into personal development. As I have already suggested, inspiring ideas from popular gurus or 'philosophies of life' begin to enter this area of the curriculum.

An important distinction in philosophy is between word and thing. There is something to be spoken about. It is obvious in one sense that personal development is not a thing. But people claim that it is something. We have some kind of concept. But what goes into giving this concept shape? At the outset we tend to make the distinction between the something to be spoken about and what we say about it. In the case of personal development the emphasis is on what we say about it. In fact personal development may well exist in what we say about it. As I have pointed out the area is expanding all the time. Additional

words are incorporated into the general heading. But more than this. The detail itself proliferates and it becomes increasingly difficult to get a purchase on what might have been the original notion.

There is another sense in which personal development might be nothing rather than something. The term might approximate to those pure value terms beloved by politicians. In a similar way the term personal development might be a high sounding value term such that each person is invited to fill in the content for himself. Personal development might be nothing because it lacks a sufficiently determinate substance. The term is too capacious to be serviceable. But the term might signify nothing in the way that Utilitarianism has been said to signify nothing. It is confused or factitious and radically distorts what it is meant to be a theory of. Such a theory as Utilitarianism builds on a central insight or important element in our moral vocabulary and then attempts to reconstruct the whole of moral life in terms of the insight or element. What is done in its name might be either beneficial or pernicious depending on one's view. But in essence there is something conceptually suspicious about it. I mention Utilitarianism because this moral view is thought to inform large areas of personal development. To this extent personal development gets most of its content from interests outside of education. I think Utilitarianism is something. The question is whether one agrees with its central claim and whether one wants to give it wide scope in our moral life. Similarly I think personal development is something but it is best considered in its detail.

There will nevertheless be attempts to alternate between the detail, complexity, particular injunctions, the concrete plurality of the content and some general description or ordering picture. As I have suggested the difficulties start when fragments of other first order or second order languages begin to appear as the first order language of personal development. Other obvious sources of such languages are psychology, sociology, political theory and psychotherapy in its many guises. When we speak of these areas, we find ourselves considering what might go wrong in people's lives and what remedies put them right. For example terms from psychotherapy begin to make their appearance in the language of personal development.

It might help to present one such general idea of personal development as a guiding ideal. It is said that teachers should foster in their pupils and students the desire to lead a well balanced life in a well balanced society. Implicit in this ideal are thoughts about what

might prevent, interfere or distort its realization in the lives of these young people. Society itself might be at fault and this is a serious limitation on what teachers can do. Again young people may be diagnosed as maladjusted, disturbed, imperfectly socialized and so on. The remedies for such defects might be discerned in political engagement, psychotherapy or community projects. My point is that fragments are ferreted out from areas ranging from psychotherapy to Critical Theory in the hope of contributing to the theory and practice of the well balanced life.

I take one example at random. It is fairly representative of what I have found in several schools and colleges. The Daily Mail (Nov.16 1988) reports that included in the personal development scheme at Oldfield Girls School in Bath are 'stress classes' for teenagers who cannot cope with the unrealized expectations of the glamorous life in their own lives. Television soaps such as East Enders, Neighbours and Grange Hill encourage in adolescents the desire for an adult life when they are too emotionally immature to cope with all its implications. Educationalists have brought into the School psychologists to run stress management and relaxation techniques. Spokespeople from the School and Avon County Council justify the experiment on the grounds that stress and anxiety are built up outside the School and interfere with what goes on in it. Of course what goes on in the School now includes this aspect of an individual's personal development. It is not only soaps which are the trouble. The Deputy Headteacher says 'There are also pressures from advertisers and magazines, telling teenagers what they should be like and how glamorous their lives should be'. The scheme then shows teenagers how to recognize stress and teaches them the use of Yoga and slow breathing techniques to relax. Grange Hill for example shows exciting lives, against which the lives of the young people seem 'boring'. Also in seminars the young people are encouraged to discuss anxieties about boyfriends, families and social life.

I have myself heard, in personal development seminars, teachers express opinions about the strain adolescents face in attempting to give personal shape to the new and changing pre-personal processes in their bodies and how such issues can be valid concerns of girls' magazines. The magazines are then recruited for personal development purposes. Teachers are concerned too about the way adolescent energy is exploited by those industries catering for the teenage market. This energy is then deflected from more authentic educational concerns.

This then is one language of personal development. In contrast we

might put alongside this scheme, a letter that Simone Weil wrote to one of her pupils. (M.O'C. Drury 1973 pp 38-40)

I have talked enough about myself, let's talk about you. Your letter alarms me. If you persist in your intention of experiencing all possible sensations - although as a transitory state of mind that is quite normal at your age - you will never attain to much. I was much happier when you said that you wished to be in contact with all that was real in life. You may think that they both amount to the same thing, on the contrary they are diametrically opposed. There are people who live only for sensations and by means of sensations; Andre Gide for example. Such people are in reality deceived by life, and as they come to feel this in a confused manner, they have only one refuge, to conceal the truth from themselves by miserable lies. The life which is truly real is not one that consists in experiencing sensations, but in activity, I mean activity both in thought and in deed. Those who live for sensations are parasites in the material and moral sense of the word compared with those who labour and create; these are the true human beings. I would add too that those who do not run after sensations are rewarded in the end by much that is more alive, deeper, truer, less artificial, than anything the sensation seekers experience. To sum up, to seek after sensations implies a selfishness that revolts me, that is my considered opinion. It obviously does not prevent love, but it does imply that those whom one loves are no more than objects of one's own pleasure or pain, it overlooks completely that they exist as people in their own right. Such a person passes his life among shadows. He is a dreamer, not one who is fully alive.

Weil speaks about 'real life'. She presupposes that the realization of any good in life demands a knowledge of reality and a truthful relation to it. Those in pursuit of sensation (in its extreme form the pursuit by the libertine) lose a grip on themselves, the reality of their situation and much in life 'that is more alive, deeper, truer, less artificial ...'. To realize ourselves most truly is to recognize the reality of other people. The letter then continues.

About love itself I have no wisdom to give you, but I have at least a warning to make. Love is such a serious affair, it often means involving for ever your own life and that of another. Indeed it must always involve this, unless one of the two lovers treats the other as a plaything; in that case, one that is only too common, love has changed into something odious. You see, the essential thing about love is that it consists in a vital need that one human being feels for another, a need which may be reciprocated or not, enduring or not, as the case may be. Because of this the problem is to reconcile this need with the equally imperious need for freedom; this is a problem that men have wrestled with since time immemorial. Thus it is that the idea of seeking after love in order to find out what it is like, just to bring a little excitement into life which was becoming tedious, etc., this seems to me

dangerous, and more than that, puerile. I can tell you that when I was your age, and again when I was older, I too felt the temptation to find out what love was like, I turned it aside by telling myself that it was of greater importance for me not to risk involving myself in a way whose eventual outcome I could not possibly foresee, and before too I had attained to any mature idea of what I wanted my life to be and what I hoped for from it. I am not saying all this as a piece of instruction; each one of us has to develop in our own way. But you may find something here to ponder over. I will add that love seems to me to carry with it an even more serious risk than just a blind pledging of one's own being; it is the risk of becoming the destiny of another person's life, for that is what happens if the other comes to love you deeply. My conclusion (and I give you this solely as a piece of information) is not that one should shun love, but that one should not go out of one's way to try and find it, and especially so when you are very young. I believe at that age it is much better not to meet with it

I think you are the sort of person who will have to suffer all through your life. Indeed I am sure of it. You have so much enthusiasm, you are so impetuous, that you will never be able to fit into the social life of our times. But you are not alone in that respect. As to suffering, that is not too serious a matter so long as you also experience the intense joy of being alive. What is important is that you don't let your life be a waste of time. That means you must exercise self-discipline.

I am so sorry that you are not allowed to take part in sports: that is exactly what you need. Try once more to persuade your parents to let you do this. I hope at least that happy days hiking in the mountains is not forbidden. Give those mountains of yours my greetings.

I quote this letter at length because it contains many thoughts about the proper ends of life and what kind of person one might become in pursuit of them. The letter is an invitation to her pupil to reflect on her life and engage in activities that would 'build her up' into one kind of person rather than another. To this extent it is not unlike the scheme of personal development in the Girls' School in Bath. Whether such reflection as is found in Simone Weil's letter could give a new dimension to what is contained in the scheme at the Girls' School depends on what wisdom and what level of maturity is brought to it by the participants, not least of which what is brought by the teachers or the surrogate teachers.

If Simone Weil speaks one language of personal development then Simone de Beauvoir speaks another. It is interesting that both

writers were the pupils of Alain whom de Beauvoir mentions. This is what de Beauvoir writes after she had returned to the intoxicating freedom of Paris:

... I kept on good terms with my parents, but they no longer had any real hold over me. Sartre had never known his father, and neither his mother nor his grandmother had ever represented authority in his eyes. In a sense we both lacked a real family, and we had elevated this contingency into a principle. Here we were encouraged by Cartesian rationalism, which we had picked up from Alain There were no scruples, no feelings of respect or loyal affection that would stop us from making up our minds by the pure light of reason - and of our own desires ... we believed ourselves to consist of pure reason and pure will.

(de Beauvoir, 1973 p 15)

In this passage there is an implicit reference to an individual's personal development as distinguished from an individual's intellectual development. These elements in an individual's development are used as descriptive categories. One develops as a person of a certain sort both independently of and together with intellectual development. Roughly, the direct experience of the stuff of life is distinguished from the abstract categories that might interpret this experience of life. Personal development as a curriculum aim picks up its prescriptive language from sources like these. I might say that Sartre later in life wondered however he came to entertain the 'Cartesian' idea that one's completely foundationless choices could bring the moral world into existence and at the same time meet the demands of the moral complexities of life. Also he wondered how he could have believed that one could 'bracket out' the direct influences on one's life in reaching one's considered moral principles.

These examples of what it is to have a perspective or view on the complexity of moral life points up the difficulty of what it is to have a perspective or view on what is meant by personal development, PSE, PSME, or PSMHE. Morality is something and despite Sartre's theoretical view that uninhibited choice is central to the moral life, he testifies to the falsity of this view when he elaborates his examples of moral dilemmas. The different demands of the pieties of family life and the duties to one's country in time of war are the stuff of our moral life. Sartre's foundationless choices turn out to be within what is recognizably moral. Some writers would indeed argue that there is an unambiguous core to our moral life or that the term moral is not infinitely contestable. However, my point is that some writers feel

that a perspective on what is moral helps to determine what it is and the sources of this perspective are not wholly constrained by some core meaning to the term. Again just what latitude in such perspectives has to be argued about.

If then the word moral is just one of the elements in the variety of Headings of personal development, there is much more scope for creativity in what we try to get said about these Headings.

One way into the details of the various headings is to make one of the terms central as a category of interpretation. 'Personal' or 'moral' may be the chosen terms, especially when they are given broad meanings. The term social may be too broad and in need of tightening up. For the moment I should like to consider the idea that health may provide the key to the sense of an inclusive heading.

In an article in the TES (Tones 1989 pp B9-B10) Keith Tones argues that the general heading for this area of the curriculum should be PSHE. The PSE part would take care of what he calls the positive health task. He takes this idea from what the World Health Organization says about the complimentary aspects of health - namely, wellbeing and the absence of disease. Tones says:

The school's health education role is first of all concerned to promote the mental, physical and social wellbeing of its students. It should try to ensure that each student's potential for mental, physical and social fulfilment is achieved both while they are at school and when they become adult.

Health as wellbeing then is what holds together the different aims of PSE. Health as the absence of disease and disability is what health brings to the general heading of PSHE. Tones acknowledges that sometimes PSE is subsumed under health education and at other times health becomes the subordinate term. But for him health as wellbeing is the key idea. He says that PSE seeks to 'enhance pupils' self-esteem and equip them with assertiveness skills ...'. He then summarizes his main point thus: 'Without a social and life skills dimension, health education is a sterile academic subject.' His point seems to be that PSE provides the awareness and the motivation to do something about those things which cause disease and disability. PSE fosters 'general decision-making skills in the context of life skills teaching whereas health education employs more specific "health skills" - for instance, the application of assertiveness skills to refusing the offer of an illicit drug or unwanted sex.'

Wellbeing is the overall end of PSHE. What needs to be sorted out is what is included in this comprehensive term of health as wellbeing. It has to include the healthy condition to be achieved, whether this be mental or physical. Social wellbeing on the other hand seems to be a different notion. We might want to say that a certain kind of social context is a precondition for mental and physical wellbeing. Good housing and the absence of coercion might be a start. These then refer to the conditions for health. It is true that Tones does say that PSHE does help individuals achieve healthy lifestyles and 'seeks to remove barriers to informed choice'. These barriers are not simply personal ignorance. They are social, political and economic obstructions. The student has to learn to intervene in both his own life and in these general social areas. He has to be more skilled at self-intervention and participative group intervention, even in comparatively small things. The insidiousness of the hidden curriculum in the guise of the school tuck shop and canteen is something the pupil has to be aware of. What is taught about health as the prevention of disease and disability in biology and home economics has to be complemented by health as wellbeing in PSE. Better still the hidden danger of a diet of refined carbohydrate and saturated fats and the sources of such disease-inducing ingredients should be brought together in the aforementioned subject areas.

At this stage I do not want to comment on whether wellbeing serves as an organizing idea for the whole of PSHE. Nor do I wish to discuss the moral issues involved. Moral issues are implicit in Tones' article without the word actually being incorporated in the general heading. For example, the pursuit of ones own wellbeing might interfere with that of others, unless in Aristotelian fashion we build a regard for others into what it is for a person to flourish. Does this imply that the word moral should be in the general heading and perhaps that it is the word that gives some unity to what one is after in the whole area?

The Meaning of Personal

Drury says of Simone Weil's letter to her pupil that it contains a deeply personal and individual message. (Drury 1973 p 41) What he means by these words, I suggest, is that the moral and spiritual sentiments expressed in it have been hewn from lived-through experiences of suffering and emotional arrest, of joy and sorrow, of the beauty and fulfilment in what it is to labour and create and of the love that

aches for its proper object. The letter is personal and individual because it is the deepest expression of a particular sensibility and temperament. But it is also an immediate, though considered, response of one distinct individual to another. The language then must be adequate to its object - in this case a person. Such language has to be fine-grained and spun. Although the language is an expression of the thoughts and feelings of Weil, such language has to be focused on the person to whom it is addressed. One cannot be consumed with what the experiences mean to oneself. One suspends one's preoccupation with oneself and in a spirit of humility and sympathy attend to the uncircumscribed reality of another person. In such responses we help to create and recreate each other and this public space in which we identify ourselves then constitutes what it is possible and acceptable to be as a person. One of the extreme forms of turning in on oneself in relation to other people is a certain construal of sentimentality. We enjoy our own feelings for the sake of the pleasure we get from them rather than the feelings being part of a just appreciation of the person who is the object of the feelings.

In contrast to this language of sympathetic understanding of the reality of another person is the language of the expert, which in the present context might be the expert in academic psychology. The most inadequate language for our self-understanding is that of certain kinds of learning theory, the worst examples of which is based on rats in mazes. The language of specialized knowledge, therapeutic techniques, detached observation and the abstract categories of scientific investigation are out of place in such personal and individual messages as we find in Simone Weil. Too much of the formalized language of objectifying discourse can make an individual a stranger to herself. In one of its uses the word personal refers to how we are disclosed to ourselves and each other in such words that we find in Weil's letter. One of course may say, perhaps with more confidence, that it is in the language of Shakespeare, Tolstoy or George Eliot that we find language at its most fine-grained. But we often surprise ourselves at the fineness of our own language in our more expressive moments. The stock of common language is extremely rich and we draw on it and extend it all the time.

The kind of language we find in Weil and the exemplars of our language is to be contrasted with the confining language of another kind. But this is not to say that this other language is out of place in our commerce with one another. It is then not the language

of scientific observation and classification but the language of social typifications. We might consider the following passage. Seeing persons as persons:

... requires us to abstract from socially-given abstractions, namely definitions, typifications, categories or labels, which typecast them and thereby limit the possibilities of our understanding them. Seeing them as persons requires us precisely to regard them not merely as the bearers of certain titles, the players of certain roles or the occupiers of certain social positions, or as the means to given ends, but as concrete persons who - for one reason or another - bear those titles, play those roles, occupy those social positions, or serve those ends. It does not, however, require us to see them as having fixed and universal human attributes - given wants, purposes, interests, needs - that have their source and can be characterized independently of their social contexts.

(Lukes 1973 pp 146-147)

Lukes then says that the contrary is the case. What we need is a point of view on the person that tells us what it is like for him to be the person he is. Lukes continues to say that we owe each person:

... what Bernard Williams calls 'an effort at identification', so that 'he should not be regarded as the surface to which a certain label can be applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from his point of view.' And that point of view will, of course, be socially determinate and located, and only characterizable in socially specific terms. (p 147)

An important way into the meaning of the word personal is found in what it is contrasted with. More strongly we might say that its meaning exists in its explicit or implicit contrasts. To be personal in this sense is to be outside more general or abstract categories. These are roles, ranks, social aggregates and typifications, offices and formal structures, generalized demands and so on. Often the contrasts are defined in spatial metaphors of distance. This is not to say that the 'personal' focuses on some fixed and determinate essence which captures once and for all who and what the person is. In fact one might say that it is against what it is contrasted with that the 'personal' emerges as a reality in its own right.

The numerically distinct individual emerges into a person as he learns to use language in which personal is contrasted with what is not personal. And there is a multiplicity of distinctions in language which facilitates the process. 'My own' and 'mine' and the case and possessive variations on these terms, depending on the inter-

locutary context, are crucial to this process. As I will show later assertiveness training in some personal development schemes for young children encourages pupils to say 'no' when unwanted and suspect intimacies intrude on them. (A little different from the days when the confident 'yes' to the universe of expressive child-centred education, now that innocence is often blighted by predatory experience.) However, it is thought that children need to learn to put up barriers so that later they can bring them down voluntarily. A young child needs to be taught that there is a private space as well as a public one and that the relevant boundaries have to be drawn. The child has to be instructed into a knowledge of what is proper in these separate spheres. In drawing these boundaries children begin to have a life of their own, begin to be someone in their own right and begin to develop in their own way.

This initial attempt at linguistic phenomenology is of course the first item under 'personal' in the dictionary. This initial contrast between personal and roles finds its expression in those situations where public figures make their personal lives separate from their official ones. We find newspaper headlines inviting us to read about personal lives that lie behind institutional ones. Also a member of the Royal Family might make a personal visit rather than an official one. Here a by-stander might make a personal remark after seeing the distinguished visitor in person. These examples may seem fairly bland uses of the contrast. In addition many contrasts of this kind are redundant or superfluous, imparting little of importance. Again sometimes no contrast is implied. The presence of personal or personally may be there for emphasis. But something of significance may emerge from such apparently bland uses of the contrast. People may sacrifice or fulfil themselves in their offices and roles and find little of satisfaction in their personal lives. They might on the other hand have a rich interior life that is not easily reconcilable with public duties.

After this initial dictionary contrast, we begin to see a multiplicity of other contrasts. It is clear that much linguistic refinement has gone into the initial contrast but whatever the order of priority further contrasts are suggested. All words undergo change. It is even happening now. The term personal is certainly much more widely used at present. The word, nevertheless, lives in its use. But sometimes we need to arrest the flow of a word's sense, simply to get our bearings. This is artificial of course because there are

innumerable ways in which one might go with the flow in tracing the meaning we are after. We might then attempt to get some purchase on the word personal by teasing out its family resemblances. Wittgenstein coined this expression to describe the way in which words overlap and criss-cross with their neighbours in a multiplicity of patterns and contexts and therein evade any designs we might have on their essences. Wittgenstein's example is that of games. There is no essence in what it is to be a game. Games hang together under the word 'game' because they all share, in their different ways, in an uncircumscribed number of properties. Some games have nothing in common with others but the connections are made through others which share some properties with both. Fine spun threads interweave through pattern and context. It is difficult then to talk in terms of fixed senses of the contrasted terms or, to use the language of post-structuralism, in terms of binary oppositions. But we do not need to chase terms into the sand. Nor trace them indefinitely until the terms loop back on themselves. Inventiveness through endless linguistic play may make us inarticulate about anything.

After the first contrast, then, further contrasts are suggested. The close relatives of the word personal have been thought to be such expressions as intimate, idiosyncratic, expressive, having a stake in, being involved in, direct, spontaneous, exclusive (and inclusive depending on context), voluntary, private, ones own and so on. We turn to these words and expressions hoping to illuminate what we mean or hope to mean by the word personal. But the more general expressions with which personal is contrasted suggest neighbouring words and expressions. In roles, offices, aggregates, formal structures and so on people might experience such psychological states as boredom, frustration, anxiety, emptiness, discontent, loneliness, insecurity and even misery and alienation. This might be because of the instrumental, detached, distant, routine, impersonal, anonymous and faceless nature of the roles, functions and standardized behaviour patterns in which people have to live their lives. If one puts the best construction on personal and the worst on contrasting terms, people may feel at home, fulfilled, at ease, alive and vital in the personal and the reverse in typifications and restraining hierarchies. People may find meaning, happiness and even blessedness in what is direct and spontaneous in contrast with the absence of these in what is remote and abstractly mediated. Some religious enthusiasts may feel one can meet God in passion and direct experience rather than have His nature mediated by

formal rituals and theological categories. There are spiritualities of the heart as well as doctrines of the intellect. Again what is natural and unconstrained is opposed to what is role-governed, rule-bound and alienating. The idiosyncratic and expressive is in opposition to academic and boring. Pupils, it is said, are better motivated when they are personally involved. What is relevant to their current interests and their lives in general is more stimulating than what is subject-constrained and imposed. What is perceived as needed, wanted or desired is more inviting than what is spoon-fed. We know ourselves best when we are engaged in the stuff of ongoing life rather than in passively absorbing inert facts.

Other contrasts are suggested when the individual is in opposition to society. We find very general distinctions between subjective and objective, inner and outer, expressive and instrumental, relative and objective, self-regarding and other regarding, agent centred and agent neutral and self-concern and impartiality. The individual can be overwhelmed by a one-sided diet of unrelieved common measures, universal standards, abstract constraints, general requirements and imposed roles and regulations. What is in a person's life then may be close or remote. In these respects a person can be in touch or out of contact with what is in his life. One example is the elaborate techniques that so-called New Age human resources experts try to use to liberate suppressed energies in would-be successful managers. Amongst other things these managers have to get in touch with is their feelings. These feelings are thought to be the most personal things in us but they have become foreign to us.

When the term personal is used, all these considerations become relevant although not all at once. If personal is defined in situ, certain strands and traces suggest that things are less than neat. As I have said what is picked out by personal depends on all the interlocking patterns and contexts in which the word is used. Words in one context are likely to have an unexpected contrast in a different context. I might have simplified the personal development programmes above when I suggested that connections tend to go in one direction. What is personal tends to collect all the pro words and what is role or rule-governed tends to finish up with all the con words. It hardly needs saying that this tendency is strongly resisted and of course reality itself constrains such tendencies.

For example, returning to the obvious candidates in our search for words that give some guidance in this search for the meaning of personal, we may characterize a relationship between people as intimate

or idiosyncratic yet at the same time as impersonal, because of the quality of the motivation. Teachers and doctors in their different ways can respond to their pupils and patients intimately and idiosyncratically (their hearts as well as their minds are in what they are doing) but they need not be personally involved. We have heard of cases where the proper balance is disturbed and a teacher or a doctor has found himself without a job. In 'talking cures' intimate details are revealed but they do not provide the occasion for emotional involvement. In another context though an intense emotional attachment might be the test of whether the relationship is personal. But such a relationship may not involve the idiosyncratic personalities of the individual people themselves. Also we hear that in highly structured professions and occupations, formal relations between people are alleviated by informal exchanges and relationships. Certainly in some of these professions an individual's personal development is measured on a separate scale in his total assessment. Whether he can get on with other people outside the formal constraints of his profession is thought to be important. However, personal relationships do not need to have an invariant content. One needs to know what is permitted or ruled out in the whole context of an individual's work. What is personal then is identified in being outside easily discerned constraints within the relevant surroundings. For example, in police headquarters personal relationships are probably unlike those in a family, a friendship or a neighbourhood. Outside the roles and functions of the police work itself, personal relationships may be at the level of civilities and pleasantries. On the other hand they may centre on the weaknesses or foibles of the people who occupy the official positions. Individuals may or may not get on as people and one can guess what might be unleashed when official constraints are relaxed.

The police are familiar enough with those gangland murders where the boss says that there is nothing personal in the killing as he despatches his victim. The victim is a representative figure of some kind. What the killer means is that he has no feelings one way or the other about the victim. There is nothing personal because he is not treated as a person. He is not seen in his generic humanity let alone as a particular person. He is as faceless as the killer is to him.

In our example of the police headquarters, personal relationships point to the contrast between formal and informal contact between

people, without the term referring to the actual quality of the personal relationships themselves. The people may not have a stake in the relationships as they would have in their relationships with a wife or children. An individual gets something importantly self-regarding out of the latter relationships, not without of course putting a lot in of a self-effacing kind. The meaning of the personal relationships involved are partly shaped by the contrast intended. However, as I have previously suggested, a person may feel more secure in roles and functions with their stable expectations and lower risks than in the intimate detail of personal relationships, no matter the quality or intensity of the relatively unconstrained nature of the latter relationships. Anyone who has brought up a child knows that in the role of parent one is fully implicated in the relationship that is intensely personal but one is also relieved that in some respects the barriers are not down - cannot be down if one wants to retain what is proper in the relationship. These change with age of course. Teachers must not forget this too.

I might say then that when we do treat someone as a person this might imply that we do not treat him as the individual he is. To be treated as a person might be too broad. Such a person is recognized as having the generic qualities of personhood but these are not interpreted in terms of the fine-grain of his personality. At least some writers use the word person in this way. They might concede that in the generic sense we treat them as types or sorts of people. A parallel but more lofty example is when religious believers talk of God as being a personal god. He is personal when He is attributed with generic personal characteristics but he may also be personal when an individual can enter into an intimate relationship with him, as many mystics might claim. But at this point a feminist theologian may say She in the latter usage.

Sometimes the word personal may appear too weak to capture what we are after. This might reflect the word's increasingly pedestrian use. A stronger sense is shown in such observations, for example, as in the case of Borodin who would have despaired had he been deprived of his music or chemistry. He would have been harmed in his very being. In such cases when we say that something is peculiar to the person we seem to miss what is essential. And that is the importance of the objects of the pursuits. Of course Borodin's style may have been peculiar to himself but we or rather he focuses on the objects of his pursuits. Furthermore such expressions as too personal or merely or

purely personal will suggest in some contexts that one wants to get the idiosyncractic personality out of the way altogether. It is to put the personality into its proper place relative to something more objective. It is true we do use 'too personal' when we want to discourage people from trying to capture an experience in too crude categories or to keep certain people at arm's length or a proper distance. In Borodin's case however it does not mean that he was not fully implicated in his music or chemistry. In fact he lost himself in them. It does mean though that the objects of his concern were not refracted through a distorting personality. A personality in a general sense of course is a precondition for the existence of music or chemistry.

A similar example might be the contemplation of natural beauty. When we see nature under the aspect of beauty, we withdraw our personality and declare that the object be simply there. That it is rather than what it is captures our imagination. The object of our desire is what is beautiful in nature but the desire is for it to simply exist, without any intrusion from us. The desire is part of our personality and to this extent we may say it is personal. But we want nothing personal for ourselves in a narrow sense. In this strong sense of personal, the word has something like an inclusive use. It comprehends whole aspects of an individual's personality and it is bound up with what it is to have a self. We need though to distinguish this comprehensive meaning from the notion of a total personality. There can be aspects of ourselves that we do not know about or do not want to know about. We might also disown parts of ourselves. We disavow certain aspects of ourselves that we take to be unworthy of us. These disavowals may involve bad faith. At this point in the discussion we may begin to introduce the terms authenticity and autonomy. I shall return to these notions later. If we can use personal in this stronger sense then we begin to talk about an individual's identity. When people are deprived of what is part of their identity they can go to pieces. When they conceive themselves in terms of their identity, life can be quite unimaginable without their being in contact with what their identity requires.

The violation of an individual's identity in this respect would undermine his sense of who he is. A person's emotions, feelings and visceral processes are involved. In a settled life we are often unaware of what is part of our identities and what we need to be in contact with to retain our integrity. It is only when we are deprived of these contacts that we understand. There is something that is 'us'

then that makes things personal. The personal is one way of characterizing the nature of our attachments. This implies that not all our attachments are personal.

We do find cases where the personal in an individual's life is systematically reduced. Vaclav Havel, the Czechoslovakian playwright, presents an example of this. When he was in prison, he was forbidden to write about anything other than what was personal. Of course less and less became personal. The prison food and conditions were cut as were his ailments because they may have been caused by prison food and conditions. In extreme cases life in such institutions is reduced to bodily functions but even these cannot be spoken about because of their implied causes. A person in situations like these can become a stranger to himself as I have said previously. And that is the intention. People can be fortified against such deprivations where a strong belief is part of their identity. What Havel said reminded me of the story told by Bruno Bettelheim where such a stranger awakens to herself:

Once, a group of naked prisoners about to enter the gas chamber stood lined up in front of it. In some way the commanding SS officer learned that one of the women prisoners had been a dancer. So he ordered her to dance for him. She did, and as she danced, she approached him, seized his gun, and shot him down. She too was immediately shot to death.

But isn't it probable that despite the grotesque setting in which she danced, dancing made her once again a person? Dancing, she was singled out as an individual, asked to perform in what had once been her chosen vocation. No longer was she a number, a nameless, depersonalized prisoner, but the dancer she used to be. Transformed, however momentarily, she responded like her old self, destroying the enemy bent on her destruction, even if she had to die in the process. (Bettelheim 1970 pp 239-240)

As I have said any contrast involving the word personal will imply qualification, reservation, elaboration and complication. Any suggested synonym or elucidating word or phrase will invite counter examples to show that the terms cannot be used interchangeably and in some cases the terms may contradict each other. We must accept a certain open-endedness in our terms then. The words we focus on in our brief attempt at linguistic phenomenology will not converge onto the simple dichotomies we require. Nor as I have said does the word personal take its sense from some pre-existent sense of personal identity. Rather it is in saying what we do say in such words as personal that there begins to emerge a person who then begins to be a

centre of thought and action in his own right.

In a wide ranging discussion on the experience of childhood Richard N. Coe cites Michel Leiris' own reminiscences of his early years. Coe writes the following:

Leiris is virtually unique among French poets in that, like Thomas Traherne, albeit with a very different metaphysical substructure, his ultimate conception of the paradis perdu of childhood is of the pre-linguistic state: literally, a blessed state in which the infant lived on terms of equality with the as yet unclassified immediacies of the world around him, 'like our First Parents among the beasts and the plants'. The force which drives him out of this earthly Eden is the need to establish his own identity - 'the cruel conquest of the Self' - for a self by definition is what everything else is not. To be conscious of the self is to be conscious of one's separateness from everything else; everything else must be perceived as not-self, and this is precisely the function of language: the use of words to give names to things, thereby establishing their identity as something distinct, both from the rest of the totality, and from the self bestowing the names. (Coe 1984 p 40)

Coe sees a certain loss in this process of establishing individuality. In Wordsworthian fashion he sees virtue in pre-natal bliss. We may find something approaching this bliss in a Buddhist obliteration of the distinction between self and non-self. Whether this could be an ideal of personal development is something that would need to be argued for. And to show how difficult personal development becomes when we refer to such ideals, we can easily imagine an ideal that would be the contrary of this one. Coe does not argue for it nor did he intend to do so.

I might return briefly to the idea that much we wish to say about the notion of the personal can be elucidated by treating personal as a spacial metaphor. An individual stands out or withdraws. He can be there to another person or not. He can be present in his thoughts and actions or absent. He can be close, near or distant from other people. He can be attached or detached, lose touch with or be remote from what ought to concern him. There are then kinds and degrees of closeness and distance in the relationships amongst people. On television chat shows one hears celebrities talking in terms of having very close personal friendships with each other or when these friendships pall they say that they become total strangers to each other. Kinds and degrees of intimacy become difficult to gauge. As I imply one test would be the extent to which friendship endures. These very

close personal friendships are the stuff of serial marriages. What they lack in duration they make up for in intensity, so it is said. Degrees of closeness to oneself can take odd forms. Recently I heard a stage and screen actress on one such talk show say that she would not go physically to South Africa but her 'shadow' might. Physically might be interchangeable with personally here but there may be nuances to be heard. If part of our notion of what it is to be a person comes from the Greek idea of a mask, there is a sense in which her mask goes to South Africa. But it is not mere physicality that is left at home. The important question is what is the moral relation between person and mask or shadow here?

The Meaning and Content of Personal in Personal Development

I have suggested that a pursuit of essences is suspect in the present intellectual climate. If we do use this term, we would say that the essence of anything is a set of characteristics that revisable language usage lays down at any one time. Yet if there are no constraints issuing from the thing in question, language as it is used imposes its own constraints. We cannot just say anything. My discussion then has raised questions about the conceptual limits to what the word personal can mean, what educationalists think it means or what they want it to mean and what perhaps it ought to mean in an educational context. Parallel to these questions about the word personal are the same questions about the term personal development. Are there any conceptual constraints on its use, what in fact is its content for the most part and what ought it to mean educationally?

One important question about the word personal is: Personal in relation to what? There are two terms in a relation. In our case it is the individual and what he is personally related to. Further to this point is the question of the nature of the relation. What makes something personal in personal development? It is this question that rivets teachers and educationalists in working parties, meetings and seminars on personal development. Teachers try to tease out the meaning of personal. If one could find meaning in the word, this meaning would provide the criteria for what an individual's higher, fuller or more mature state might consist in. A paradigm case might be held in mind. A perfectly sound use of personal is in personal project as is found in all varieties of General Studies. A pupil or student chooses an area of private enquiry. In the process, it is hoped that the young person would pick up certain qualities and attri-

butes such as self-reliance and independence of mind. One might ask why the attempt at meaning might not stop here. It does not and the enquiry goes on.

The word personal defines boundaries, attributes ownership, provides motivation and sets content. It tells us where the person leaves off and something else begins. It tells us whose it is - mine, yours, or its; that is, who or what belongs to whom. It indicates what motives are decisive in what people think and do. And it provides the content for what is pursued or thought worthwhile. It is not what concerns the individual in general but what is of concern to him. It is not merely that it pertains to him but is pertinent to him. Personal obviously picks out what happens to a person or what he undergoes. We have a personal history because we can pick it out from a background of what it is for anything to have a history. Throughout our lives we are partly built up through habituation. It is ours because we have lived through and absorbed it. In this sense we experience it as ours. But we also make things happen. Our own motivation orientates us to experience. Such involvement is in our reasons, choices, needs, wants, desires, feelings and so on. To this extent we are in our reasons etc. Everything depends on just what our individuality is expressed in here. It might be feelings rather than reasons. It might be both at different times and places. We have to be in something already to be related to something else. There is something odd in asking how we are related to our reasons. We are then related to other things through what is ours in this sense. Our reasons and feelings can, though, cease to be reasons and feelings for us. What we think are our most constitutive properties can be objectified and then stand over against us. There is a disorientating description of this objectification in Musil. I borrow the following quotation from a volume of essays on the category of person:

In earlier times one could be an individual with a better conscience than one can today. People used to be like the stalks of corn in the field. They were probably more violently flung to and fro by God, hail, fire, pestilence and war than they are today, but it was collectively, in terms of towns, of countrysides, the field as a whole; and whatever was left to the individual stalk in the way of personal movement was something that could be answered for and was clearly defined. Today, on the other hand, responsibility's point of gravity lies not in the individual but in the relations between things. Has one not noticed that experiences have made themselves independent of man? They have gone on to the stage, into books, into the reports of scientific institutions and expeditions, into communities based on religious or other conviction, which develop certain

kinds of experience at the cost of all the others as in a social experiment; and in so far as experiences are not merely to be found in work, they are simply in the air. Who today can still say that his anger is really his own anger, with so many people butting in and knowing so much more than he does? There has arisen a world of qualities without a man to them, of experiences without anyone to experience them, and it almost looks as though under ideal conditions man would no longer experience anything at all privately and the comforting weight of personal responsibility would dissolve into a system of formulae for potential meanings. It is probably that the dissolution of the anthropocentric attitude (an attitude that, after so long seeing man as the centre of the universe, has been dissolving for some centuries now) has finally begun to affect the personality itself; for the belief that the most important thing about experience is the experiencing of it, and about the deeds the doing of them, is beginning to strike most people as naive. Doubtless there are still people who experience things quite personally, saying 'we were at So-and-So's yesterday' or 'we'll do this or that today' and enjoying it without its needing to have any further content or significance. They like everything at their fingers touch, and are persons as purely private as is possible. The world becomes a private world as soon as it comes into contact with them, and shines like a rainbow. Perhaps they are very happy; but this kind of people usually appears absurd to the others, although it is as yet by no means established why. (Carrithers et al 1985 pp 295-296)

This was said by Musil's hero, Ulrich. Above I asked the question: Personal in relation to what? What I mean by this question is that what is personal is best seen in how we orientate ourselves to things. So the question becomes: Personal in relation to what in terms of what? There has to be something in terms of which we are orientated to things, such as our motives, commitments and even our likes and dislikes. But our contribution as persons is how we stand in relation to things. A man without qualities has no centre out of which he thinks or acts. What could be his reasons and desires are objectified and depersonalized. He is himself depersonalized too, unless in intellectual forgetfulness he can return to his backgammon. We are related to whatever it is through our reasons, desires, feelings and so on. But the content is given by the surroundings in which we find ourselves. So briefly, at present, the use of personal in the wider Headings mentioned earlier (PSE, PSME, PSMHE) takes its sense from the other terms in the heading - that is, personal in relation to the social, moral and health aspects of our lives.

I want then to pick out two main uses of personal. The first is about our individual motives, orientations, springs of action etc.

The second is about the range of possible content for these. Personal is about the person as an individual centre of thought and action and about the content of what it is to be a person amongst other persons. There is then an urge, pressure or thrust to individuality and a content that provides the proper boundaries of this individuality. This drive to individuality, whether the prompting is within the individual himself or comes from outside him, will be expressed in the various areas of life. Our main focus is on those areas mentioned in the broader headings of personal development. A person will define his individuality, whether this be comprehensively or narrowly characterized, in terms of or against a setting in which social, moral, health or even spiritual issues confront him.

Isaiah Berlin provides one model of what it is for motivation to be a person's own:

The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.

(Berlin 1969 p 131)

But it is important to place alongside this quotation what he says later in his discussion of positive freedom and self-realization. It is only after pupils have been initiated into forms of knowledge and skills that some kinds of motivation become truly theirs. Berlin continues:

If I am a schoolboy, all but the simplest truths of mathematics obtrude themselves as obstacles to the free functioning of my mind, as theorems whose necessity I do not understand; they are pronounced to be true by some external authority, and present themselves to me as foreign bodies which I am expected mechanically to absorb

into my system. But when I understand the functions of the symbols, the axioms, the formation and transformation rules - the logic whereby the conclusions are obtained - and grasp that these things cannot be otherwise, because they appear to follow from the laws that govern the processes of my own reason, then mathematical truths no longer obtrude themselves as external entities forced upon me which I must receive whether I want it or not, but as something which I now freely will in the course of the natural functioning of my own rational activity. ... For the musician, after he has assimilated the pattern of the composer's score, and has made the composer's ends his own, the playing of the music is not obedience to external laws, a compulsion and a barrier to liberty, but a free, unimpeded exercise. The player is not bound to the score as an ox to the plough, or a factory worker to the machine. He has absorbed the score into his own system, has, by understanding it, identified it with himself, has changed it from an impediment to free activity into an element in that activity itself. (Berlin 1969 p 141)

We might consider here what has been said about such initiation:

The truly educational subject forces the pupil to understand something which has no immediate bearing on his experience. It teaches him intellectual discipline, by presenting him with problems too remote or too abstract to be comprehended within his own limited world. In other words, it asks him to stand back from his immediate concerns and make a considered judgement of matters which are interesting in themselves, whether or not he can see their relevance. This is part of what is contained in the idea of intellectual discipline, and one of the reasons for believing that education is at war with propaganda. (Cox et al 1984 p 6)

This passage is in the context of what, on educational grounds, might be suspect as pursuits in a school or college. Peace Studies is one area that is out for these writers. But what is important for our purposes at present is that some sources of educational motivation, as defined by these writers, have a certain autonomy. There is no need for the sorts of motivation that might inform child-centred approaches to learning. They do not say it but the writers might have something like intellectual eros in mind. This is to put the best construction on it as far as many pupils are concerned. The stick and carrot method might characterize the springs of motivation more accurately. However, what is not needed is that motivation which springs from its having an immediate bearing on a pupil's experience, or belongs to his own limited world or can be seen as relevant to his immediate concerns. A pupil has to find the motivation

in the intellectual demands of the academic subjects themselves. Pupils and students do, as we know. They find excitement, stimulation or challenge in these academic pursuits as other young people find them in less academic pursuits. Their sense of curiosity and wonder is aroused, again as it is in young people who find satisfaction in non-academic areas of the curriculum. Depending on the subject, a young child is happy says Coe, the writer we previously quoted, when it is engaged in 'what is sensually, intellectually or imaginatively satisfying in the present, or when it is specifically motivated by the idea of a remote but well-defined and ultimately attainable objective - preferably both at the same time. It is unhappy as soon as it begins to suspect that it is wilfully and unreasonably being prevented from doing either.' (Coe 1984 p 17)

That there is something like intellectual eros is suggested in what Lonergan says: 'Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a desire to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain.' (1957 p 4) What is important for the discussion at present is that there are a variety of motivations which an individual can make his own. There might not be any ultimate explanation for such motivations that are disclosed in our intentions and satisfactions. Also we need to bear in mind that we have to learn what it is to have reasons etc. as well as what the reasons might be. That there is a bedrock of intention and satisfaction might be seen from this passage from Glover. He is discussing what it is to discover ourselves in work. He then quotes what a character in the Heart of Darkness says:

'No, I don't like work. I had rather laze about and think of all the fine things that can be done. I don't like work, - no man does - but I like what is in the work, - the chance to find yourself. Your own reality - for yourself, not for others - what no other man can ever know. They can only see the mere show, and never can tell what it really means.'

(Conrad 1973 p 41)

Glover then goes on to say:

The experience of recognizing what suits our own nature was well described by William James, in a letter to his wife: 'A man's character is discernible in the mental or moral attitude in which, when it came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: "This is the real me!"'

(Glover 1988 p 137)

Glover goes on to say later that we do sense in ourselves a natural line of development and that our strong affinities with people and pursuits have to be taken as given. There may be something in our genetic make-up which precipitates us in these directions in life but the need is to leave explanations at the level of intention and satisfaction.

When we reflect on personal development we should bear in mind several organizing ideas. In summary of my discussion up to this point and in anticipation of the discussion to come I should like to bring these ideas together. The key ideas are the meaning of personal development, the criteria for its application, the content, form and direction that goes into an individual's personal development and the source from which the content might come. I want to say then that the most general formulation of what the term personal development means is captured in the distinction between the cultivation of personal individuality and the constitution of a person's generic personhood. The notion of the constitution of a human being incorporates the process of becoming an individual person and the nature of that actually constituted person. Personal development as concept tells us what it is, if it is anything; as content the term tells us what needs to go into what makes the person who and what he is; as process the term tells us what activities and practices (what a person undergoes) are required to bring it about. To this extent we are concerned with an individual's identity. What this identity might be presupposes that we have a conception of what is an acceptably, adequately, or properly constituted identity. I mean by identity that first person perspective on the world with its distinctive dispositions and orientations. Briefly it might be said that this identity is partly constituted by those reflexive powers that persons possess implied in such general terms as self-consciousness, agency and autobiography.

By individuality I mean individual difference, independence and agency. We might have a comprehensive view of individuality, a model of which might be found in those individuals of Renaissance Florence or, nearer to home, in Thomas More. On the other hand we might have a restricted view of individuality, a model of which might be one of those people who show initiative in mounting a bike. Either way individuality is expressed in the detail of life.

The division between properly cultivated individuality and fittingly constituted generic personhood is what personal development amounts to. It is not certain that the concept of person can provide

us with the criteria for the application of the term personal development. Other important 'person' concepts are selves, characters, individuals, souls, figures, agents and, sliding off the edge, ciphers. Each emphasizes different morphological features of personhood and suggests the correlative conditions and settings for the realization of the content contained in each of them. We need to say though that everything depends on the breadth which we give to the word person. There is, to this extent, a connection between person, narrative and action.

When we speak about the contrast between the cultivated individual and the generically constituted person, it might seem as though there are two processes and two products. But an individual person is constituted out of generic human qualities, attributes and properties. These properties will of course be interpreted in the detail of life. An individual might be best considered outside of social typifications such as ranks, status, roles, types and so on. But as I have said this statement needs qualification. A person may discern his differences from other people in all manner of ways but still find his satisfactions in his roles and functions and identify with them. His differences from other people are partly defined in terms of the roles and functions he expresses himself in. The properties of his make-up are a collective achievement, though he will embody them and take responsibility for them in his own way.

The most abstract characteristics of generic personhood such as rationality, purposefulness, and self-consciousness only exist in the detail of language and activity. These general terms are abstracted from the detail of common language and shared activities. An individual is both a product of and a self-created agent within culture. With the necessary qualifications, a unique individual is outside typifications but inside common practices. But as I have said typifications do not in themselves make us foreign to ourselves as individuals. Life is made up of the occupancy of roles and the distancing of ourselves from them. An individual can go with the grain of society against the grain of his own personality or he can go with the grain of his personality against the requirements of society. In life we have to do the one and may do the other depending on whether we or society takes priority. It is how much and in what combinations.

I have been arguing that we use the term personal in two broad senses. The first sense is what is individual to a person - what, we might say, issues from a distinct centre of thought and action. The

second sense is what is person-like - what the features are of generic personhood. The one converges on personal individuality; the other on our common humanity. The individual person is in language, human practices, strong evaluation and so on. His uniqueness is in his individual relation to these properties. Nevertheless we are still tempted to look for the essence of individuality in some magic property.

If we choose the distinction between separateness and togetherness as pointing to such a property, we realize that separateness is not changed into togetherness by physical contiguity. Togetherness exists in the concepts that govern its sense. Love, duty and sympathy characterize what kind of togetherness it is. Separateness, too, is governed by concepts. The word separation just as the word personal implies relationship. It is defined against a background of given social and cultural intelligibility. As I have said a personal life, a personal history and so on are possible because there is something in general we call life and history. I have a personal interest in things against a background of what it is to have interests.

Again when we say that self-knowledge is the disposition to make judgements about oneself, we are interiorizing our participation in a collective achievement. But which generic properties does personal development pick out as its contribution to the total development of the individual? I leave aside at present whether it itself might be interpreted as the most comprehensive aim. Human development might serve as this comprehensive ideal. Certainly, John Stuart Mill uses self-development in this way. What one lives through in 'life', or what one needs to live through in preparation for it, might be the focus of one interpretation. But it is not obvious what we contrast life with. Another way of putting the question is: What does personal development as a curriculum aim have as its objectives? Is it some view of the individual as a fully developed human adult? Less comprehensively, is it some limited view of what it is for an individual to take charge of some aspects of his life? Certainly, all-embracing ideals and attenuated pictures compete with each other as the aims, when we consider personal development. What is common to all approaches to the idea of personal development is some view of individual differences and expressiveness within the parameters of what it is to be person-like.

Furthermore, what is common to all approaches to personal development are the formal characteristics of the content, form and direction of an individual's life. The content implies a source of that content.

I have already suggested that there is a first order language of personal development. We have a common language of success and failure in what it is to grow up, in what it is to be responsible for our own lives and in what it is to have independence of mind and will. The general terms for such powers of the mind and will are self-knowledge and self-control. These are understood against the detail of our collective life. They belong to our collective achievement.

The sources of the content depend on what is emphasized in our individual development. In one important sense, the source of all the content is society and culture. But if we emphasize one strand of thinking about individuality as illustrated in such ideas as self-realization, self-actualization, self-creation and self-fulfilment, then there might be a temptation to talk about an individual's distinctive essence independently of the social and cultural influences on an individual's life. 'What we have it in us to become' might capture the spirit of this enterprise. We each have a unique potentiality for growth. The botanical metaphor requires an horticultural one. 'I have got it in me; you provide the proper external conditions'. But when we look at these flourishes in more detail, we find that an individual is realized or fulfilled in what culture provides. There seems to be no proto-human sentience in the sense required. 'It', we might say, identifies its own essence and then sets about trying to realize it. (We only have to put it in these terms to see how odd it is to speak about self-creation in any fundamental sense.)

To the extent that culture provides the content, we are realized and fulfilled in the content culture furnishes us with and, if we are the best authority on what we are realized and fulfilled in (given guidance depending on age and stage of development), then any subject in the curriculum can provide those satisfactions. The question of who or what is the authority on our development raises the question of justification. What do we appeal to when we (morally?) assess the possibilities in our lives - and that includes when each of us assesses, for and by himself, his life.

The form of an individual's development refers to the presence or absence of integration, coherence or unity amongst our motivations and pursuits. The desiderata of self-realization, if this is what we have in mind when we speak of an individual's development, are a spread of excellences brought into some kind of harmony or pattern in an individual's life. The 'self' in self-realization or self-development refers both to what is realized and the agency which brings it about.

In much of our lives we should be the agent of our own experience and development. At least this is the ideal. With reservations, we might say that the content in our lives is our own (what we make our own out of the cultural possibilities); the form of our lives should be self-created; and the direction of our lives should be self-chosen. It is only in extreme interpretations of self-realization and self-creation that an individual can be the source of everything in his life. What this amounts to is very hard to discern, as I have suggested. We can help to create the content of our lives and impose some pattern on it. We can make things our own and this is what we mean by commitment or resolve. If we disavow such commitments and resolves when the going gets rough we may have not been serious all along.

To conclude I want to return to two points. I have distinguished between two main elements in the word personal; that which is individual and that which is person-like. We recognize differences in ourselves and in our lives and we make these differences our own or cultivate them further. We not only identify differences but we identify with them. As individuals we do not just happen to be a combination of different properties from different general classes of human attributes and qualities. Nor are we variations on common types. We make certain properties our own and we live and act out of them. When we say that such properties are our own, we mean that they help to constitute who we are and enable us to take a stand on things. They are not just there in our lives; second-hand, conformed to, and mindlessly absorbed and rehearsed. If these properties are individual, they are also person-like. They form the stock of what it is to be human.

Above I raised the question whether the concept of person could give us the criteria for what the required sense of development would consist in. I also said I would use the term personal development until a more adequate term might be found. Some writers have used personal to mean the whole range of characteristics that mark off the human from the non-human. This is too wide for our purposes. All that might be left of the non-human is the View from Nowhere of physical science. Even here such a view is the product of human reason. (This does not mean to say that there is nothing outside the human perspective.) Obviously we need to bring the personal back from such uses to something more manageable. I have said that personal should be confined to what is individual and person-like. And person-like would be interpreted as the social and moral dimensions of PSME. The individual is how a person relates to the social and moral

dimensions of his life - in the area we are discussing.

I should say here that some writers on PSME assume that the use of personal in personal value, personal qualities and attributes and personal beliefs picks out a distinct category of the personal in these respects. Richard Pring almost suggests this in his laboured discussion of personal values in his book on personal development. (Pring 1984 p 24) What should be meant by personal in these phrases is that there are values, qualities and attributes and beliefs that pupils and students actually hold as distinct from discursively entertain. One can have ones own beliefs as well as reflect on beliefs in general. It is what one lives by rather than knows about in propositions. Such values, qualities and attributes come from the virtues and character and personality traits and so on.

The second point is that once we have distinguished between the sense of personal as individual difference, however this difference is expressed, and what is person-like, we find that what might be individual is an extremely large class. There seems to be an almost endless multiplication of what might be personal. People seem to have an insatiable appetite to stick the word personal in front of nouns and gerunds. What could be more personal than our likes and dislikes, our desires and preferences and our tastes and inclinations? We might remind ourselves of the personal greed, as a personal virtue-term, of those personally disgraced insider-dealers on the Wall Street Stock Exchange. Could we not argue that personal just means anything that is of concern to the individual no matter how perversely different it is? All we need is something more general, apart, distant or formally structured as a contrast and our associated likes and dislikes. It is a matter of what I consider mine as opposed to yours and what I prefer to do behind closed doors. This is complicated by the variety of contrasts in the required sense. But context helps to determine the contrast. At one time 'domestic' is the personal; at another it is contrasted with it. What is important in our lives might not be personal. The business man, in his role as business man, likes what he is doing and finds his most important satisfactions in it.

But what might we say about the perversely idiosyncratic? The quasi-existentialist hero in 'A Clockwork Orange' by Anthony Burgess has had little socialization and no education. He expresses and finds himself in violence. This is his thing. Even Beethoven's Choral Symphony, especially the hymn 'Ode to Joy', psychs him up for violence. (It is expressive of his violent impulses. We might bear

in mind here what Glover, quoting William James, said about finding oneself self-creatively in ones work.) If one wants to press the point one might say that his development consists in becoming more efficient at what he does best. We might respond by saying his behaviour is impersonal. It is an eruption of a disturbed psyche. His development as a person would consist in bringing such pre-personal energy into what is person-like. My point is that to understand the personal in the sense of individual difference we need a background of intelligibility which we find in the content of what is person-like. We can characterize our existentialist hero because we have this background as our reference. He is defined against it.

In conclusion it is instructive to look at the example of a personal stereo in an individual's life. One comes across young people in schools and colleges narcissistically submerged in them. These stereos are personal in the sense that they are individually owned and privately enjoyed but they are not, in some people's eyes, person-like. They cut young people off from each other and other people and the content of the music might be depersonalizing. One could debate this example, of course, but there are other examples of what is personal but unperson-like. When PSME is considered it is the social and moral which give the dimension to the personal. But each constrains the others, so that the individual is socially and morally constituted but he is sufficiently independent to put his own stamp on his life.

CHAPTER 2

Relevance, Needs: the Content or Supports for Education?

What is relevant, what is needed and quite often what is simply wanted are often put at the centre of an individual's required or demanded education or training. They provide the content for what is thought to be educationally necessary and the motivation which pupils or students might otherwise lack. They can be both the source of an educational content and the source of motivation. We find in needs, wants and relevance what does or might orientate pupils and students to their world or prospective world. They provide the springs of a desire to learn, especially when young people think that what they need fits them for the world which they will inhabit later in life.

Intentionality might be the central idea here. It is a matter of encouraging or guiding a young person's actual directedness towards experience or the world. It is assumed that he is not autistically carapaced in his own world. (As we shall see much depends on how we interpret the word needs. Some people do not grow out of or transform those needs belonging to earlier periods of life. These earlier needs linger on in undeveloped or unconcious forms. Such needs may fail to develop their proper objects in the adult world.)

One way that relevance or needs enter the language and practice of education and especially the language of personal development is in the following way. Educationalists are constantly reminded of the contested status of education and the various components of it in society at present. One way that this contestedness is captured is in the use of the term relevance as a guide to curriculum development. Personal Development as an educational aim is often discussed within a context defined by relevance. For example, if autonomy, personal responsibility, self-esteem or self-discipline are what young people require, then an educational programme would need to be relevant to their acquisition. There is always the danger that educational programmes are designed in vague ways or inherited in an unquestioned manner and then hurriedly justified in terms of what is fashionably relevant. The language of need then becomes useful. Children or young people in their different ways need autonomy, personal responsibility, self-esteem or self-discipline because the possession of these are relevant to the needs of - one then fills in the reference.

Although personal development may be seen as an integral part of all education, reflection about such development appears repeatedly in areas such as Education as a Preparation for Adult Life, Social and Life Skills, Enrichment Studies or Life Styles and Values. The areas covered by these headings are particularly prone to the use of the terms relevance and need. Some writers use personal development in this context as the over-arching concept; other writers make it part of what goes on under these other general headings.

Some educationalists proceed as though the organizing idea behind all these areas is 'relevance'. The variety of knowledge, skills and values are relevant to the needs of pupils or students in the context of their lives within society. Relevance is a relational term. It refers to those considerations which have bearing upon or have connections with the matter in hand. Relevance is not a property of considerations; it is established in our judgements. It is not a matter of fact; but fact interpreted. We make judgements or express opinions about what is relevant to something else, presupposing we can make the proper factual connections. Relevance need not presuppose agreement in judgement or interpretation, even though one may recognize what judgement or interpretation is at issue. For example, in a recent re-broadcast television episode of 'Yes, Prime Minister', Jim Hacker, the Prime Minister, and Sir Humphrey Appleby, his Civil Servant, were engaged in the politics of elevating a churchman to a bishopric. The possible candidates exhibited different degrees of unbelief but Sir Humphrey reminded the Prime Minister that the appointment should be relevant. To which Jim Hacker responded by asking 'Relevant to what, to God?'. Sir Humphrey engagingly corrected him, pointing out that the relevance was to be more in the nature of sociological considerations. The appointment would be relevant but each has his own judgement as to what that might consist in. Of course, as usual, what turns out to be relevant is self-interest as interpreted by each in his own way.

Relevance belongs to the language of means and ends. But again the exercise of judgement as to what is the best means or the least troublesome means to our ends is what concerns us. But we do not need to interpret means as mere means. If good health is our aim, exercise or diet are not merely means. They are enjoyed for their own sakes. Another example is that of playing or listening to music for the enjoyment it brings but also because it is required to pass an examination. We value the music for its own sake as well as for

the sake of something else. One is a condition for the fulfilment of the other. We might also say that there is a certain satisfaction in the preparation for the examination and perhaps in actually sitting it. But this is also instrumental in perhaps getting work in music which would then provide more opportunity for playing or listening to music.

These examples bring out that many means can become ends. We might take the following lines from Louis MacNeice's poem 'Sunday Morning'

Down the road someone is practising scales,
The notes like little fishes vanish with a wink of tails,
Man's heart expands to tonker with his car
for this is Sunday morning, Fate's great bazaar,
Regard these means as ends, ...

(Roberts 1960 p 304)

It is true that MacNeice is celebrating Sunday morning, which is contrasted with 'weekday time. Which deadens and endures.'. But more expansively we might say that for whole stretches of our lives means and ends are mutually implicated. We can think of rich and complex wholes in our lives. Education ought to be one of these.

We have seen in recent times that education, broadly interpreted, has been required to justify its relevance. It can no longer be simply enjoyed for its own sake. One might hear people arguing as follows. If there are deeply antagonistic attitudes and assumptions to the spirit of industrial enterprise in our culture and if these attitudes and assumptions can be correlated with our relative economic decline and if education or training can function as a corrective, then education ought not to remain uninfluenced.

The fact that something is relevant to something else or that something is a means to an end or that something provides the conditions for the existence of something else does not mean that these are grounds of their own justification. That sex education is relevant to more adequate personal relationships, that the use of condoms is a means to safer sexual practice and that the heterosexual family unit is one of the means to an enduring capitalist society are not facts that give automatic reasons for their inclusion in an educational programme. Apart from the facts being disputed, it is thought that such claims need a moral framework for a more adequate understanding of them. We could put this the other way round and say that the facts can have moral implications. Not knowing the facts, a person might find his self-esteem undermined or his relationships with others ruined.

(How we interpret the words self-esteem and ruined or whether we think these words adequate to the experiences, presupposes a moral framework and that raises the question of whose moral framework.) These are typical issues that come up in personal development schemes.

Like the word relevance the word needs has a certain ubiquity in educational discourse. It might be thought that what is claimed to be needed is incomplete until we indicate what a person would lack were his needs not satisfied. To the extent that we fail to give to the indefiniteness of both words a context of use, they easily become catchwords. 'Needs' crops up over and again in H.M.I. Reports, Government White Papers, L.E.A. curricula recommendations, F.E.U. publications, the aims and objectives of courses of study in schools and colleges and so on. We read that the needs of pupils and students should be in line with the needs of industry, that the present and future needs of children should always be born in mind in the classroom, that certain needs require attention if pupils and students are to cope, survive or even flourish in society and that the needs of personal development should not be neglected if these needs do not coincide with the needs required for the world of work. When the needs of man as 'economic man' are no longer appropriate because of 'enforced leisure' the needs of 'cultural man' or Homo Ludens become the focus of concern. Educational needs of children are not so much for 'low-tech as no-tech', at least for the bottom forty per cent of our school leaving population. Needs vary depending on who is speaking.

An official at the Department of Education and Science said recently, interspersing needs with aspirations; 'We are beginning to create aspirations which society cannot match ... When young people ... can't find work which meets their abilities and expectations, then we are only creating frustration with ... disturbing social consequences. We have to ration ... education opportunities so that society can cope with the output of education ... People must be educated once more to know their place'. (Quoted by G.E. Cohen 1986 p 620) In the recent educational troubles in France a spokesman was saying the same thing. When aspirations inspired by education or, more specifically, higher education, outstrip employment opportunities, social unrest results. Therefore, education should be adjusted to social and economic needs and thereby constituting young people differently.

Two Uses of the Term Needs

A distinction that is rarely made in all the literature and

documents about personal development, its cognates and extensions is that between a person's needs that are satisfied in welfare provisions, the blessings of love and care, the benefits of nature's bounty and the nourishment of cultural riches and what a person needs in the shape of personal qualities, attributes, powers, capabilities and knowledge that enables the person to function as a moral, social and economic agent in society. We are reminded all the time, of course, that they are not satisfied in the one case nor acquired in the other. Moreover, it hardly needs saying that people do not function at all, indeed they lose the very desire to function, when they are deprived of adequate food, clothing and shelter. There is a category mistake in the classification of certain capacities and capabilities as needs even if they are needed. Roughly, we might say that capacities and capabilities are exercise-concepts and that the needs for love and care are fulfilment-concepts.

A person will quite properly expect in varying degrees to have his intellectual, emotional and perhaps spiritual needs satisfied. Just as our thirst is slaked by water, our natural or aroused curiosity is satisfied by knowledge and understanding, our yearnings nourished by imaginative literature or religious ritual, our distress relieved by attention and comfort and our failures alleviated by encouragement. Such needs are satisfied in the amelioration of the human condition. Alternatively, a person will need moral and intellectual virtues, character traits, dispositions of good sense and skills of refinement in order to live or work well. We might say, then, that needs either wholly or partly pre-exist their satisfaction but the capacities and capabilities we need are acquired and exercised in the relevant areas of our lives. The need for food or love are satisfied in their proper objects. And we might say they exist prior to their proper satisfaction. Of course, what are their proper objects is the subject of dispute. Capacities and capabilities are satisfied in the exercise of them.

There are complications in trying to make the above distinction between the needs that find satisfaction in their objects and the capacities and capabilities that are needed for us to function. One is that language can mislead us. For example, kindness is a virtue and may be expressed in response to someone's misfortune. There might be a corresponding need in a person's misfortune for such considerateness. The one is a virtue exercised; the other a need gratefully attended to. But a person may say that it pleases him to

act with kindness or considerateness. 'Pleasures' may then be construed as a pleasure satisfied. So there is a need in the Samaritan which is satisfied in acts of kindness. This line of thought makes everything appear egoistic. Whatever we do we do for the satisfaction derived from it. This move can be resisted by pointing out that all 'pleasures' means here is that the action issues from the person and that it is done willingly. A person does not act out of kindness for the satisfaction it gives him, as though the kindness was the occasion for the person's own satisfaction. There should be no suggestion that it is a pleasure satisfied, perhaps, in an appetitive sense. An appetite pre-exists its satisfaction. In the case of kindness the satisfaction is in the considerateness shown. The satisfaction supervenes, just as does happiness, on what is done or in the doing of it and does not exist as an independent state. Moreover, satisfaction should not be heard as self-satisfaction.

Another complication is that we might claim that literacy and numeracy are needs of children and that we are obliged to satisfy them. But they are not needs that pre-exist their satisfaction, that is, we can identify them independently of their being characterized as literacy and numeracy. They are lacks but it is we as teachers who classify them as such. They are, then, acquired intellectual abilities. Yet after their acquisition certain deprivations may prevent or interfere with their exercise. Their exercise may be constrained because of all manner of misfortunes that may befall a person. A life may be impoverished because the right conditions do not exist for the abilities to be expressed. If we say that the need to exercise the abilities are prevented or discouraged, we are referring to the lack of the same conditions that created the abilities in the first place. We might want to say the same for music or religion in this respect. Both create the needs of which the music and religion are the satisfactions. They become needs, and when not satisfied, life can seem worthless. We might bear in mind here what I said about Borodin earlier. Were he deprived of his music and chemistry he would be harmed in his very being.

In this discussion I have wanted to show that there is a distinction between needs that are satisfied in their proper objects or under proper conditions and the need to acquire capacities or capabilities that are exercised in the respective spheres of life. In educational literature we find lists of needs which are merely mentioned without any attempt made to discriminate amongst them.

Although, more often than not, it is just the word needs that is mentioned. More importantly, there is little discussion, if any, on what educational conditions should obtain for needs to be met or capacities and capabilities to be acquired. It is as though once mentioned they occasion their own satisfaction or acquisition. In the case of capacities and capabilities they supervene upon all manner of practices in a school. To become conscientious, autonomous, reliable or disciplined; to possess self-esteem, self-worth, personal responsibility, a person needs to undertake tasks, engage in activities, wrestle with problems and master techniques. Mere lists in a Roget's Thesaurus fashion do little for practising teachers. Unless, of course, these lists are meant to be mildly Machiavellian in that they are designed to create an impression. The trouble is, that once words begin to have currency, each person gets caught up in their exchange and the best a busy teacher can do is to quote the next person as the authority for the use of the words.

It might seem unreasonable and a quibble to make the last point. Lists and catalogues of items are meant to prompt and remind. But in all the areas I have mentioned from PSME to Life Enhancement and Social and Life Skills schemes, a teacher's greatest need is for some coherence in what is listed or catalogued. What teachers require, as I have heard expressed over and over again, are connections and order in what is recommended as curricula aims in these areas. They expect the organizing power of language to give some unity to the listed words and expressions. Such lists do not have the evocative power of metonymic lists in imaginative literature. But it often appears that this is intended, in a much lower key of course. The difficulty is that in the areas I am discussing large claims are made or implied about what a properly constituted individual might consist in. It is true that many items listed in these areas are meant to be hints and wrinkles on how a person might function in discrete areas of life. But momentous issues are suggested when curricula talk turns to ideas about the constitution and transformation of persons. Such add-on knowledge and skills mentioned in hints and wrinkles might too have implications for what kind of people we turn out to be (self-confidence can be developed by learning to read train time-tables) but these can be justified in their detail.

Personal development (to use the term in a wide sense) can be seen at one and the same time as a philosophy of education, a curriculum aim and what goes into making the individual the individual he is.

Personal development as a curriculum aim has a built-in motivation to reflect on its own capacity to give an overarching view of education in its entirety. Such ideals, if they are ideals, as autonomous well-being, can become the overarching aim of education in general. Such ideals result from reflection within personal development and then become objects of it. Now, do not such proposed ideals belie what I have said above about mere lists? The answer is that such ideals are merely mentioned too, without any discussion of them or elucidation of what they might amount to or any answer to the questions: How and When? I shall return to these points later in my discussion.

At present, I want to say that such elevated ideals can metamorphose into needs. They become something we cannot do without as we are launched into life and our living of it. Furthermore, what can become the objects of needs seem limitless. And then such questions as follows suggest themselves: What do I need, How do I recognize them and Who says so? Since some needs are so fundamental to us, depending on who says so, they amount in their satisfaction or lack to the transformation of who we are.

The case of Salman Rushdie is instructive. Fundamental needs are at issue. It is said by one side that Rushdie wants to capture the reality of other people in his narratives. But people of Islamic Faith feel that their faith is inextricably bound up with their self-interpretation as human beings. The truth of their religion is refracted through their identities and an attack on it is an attack on them. Individual identity and integrity is constitutively linked with the integrity of their religion. On the other hand, for some Muslims, Rushdie cannot escape their stories. The liberal intellectual cannot withdraw from the Islamic narrative into which he is born. The constitutive narratives of the lives of people contain fundamental needs.

Elliptical and Non-Elliptical Needs

The word needs characterizes those possible 'lacks' in a person's life that are thought or felt to need satisfying. But over a range of such needs, it is a matter of judgement or discernment whether they are recognized or accepted as such. Or so it is argued. Whereas wants, preferences, desires and likes and dislikes are simply what people have and are disclosed in the immediacy of having them, needs it is claimed, require identification and that presupposes a framework of thought and valuation. For example, Benn and Peters (1959 p 143) say: 'To say that a man wants food is simply to describe his state of mind;

to say that he needs food is to say that he will not measure up to an understood standard unless he gets it'. Although it would be difficult to maintain it, in the distinction just mentioned, it is thought that some kind of gap begins to open up between the immediacy of wants and desires in the one case and needs in the other. There is a recognition of such a gap in Rousseau: 'Give him, not what he wants, but what he needs'. If needs are not a felt presence within a person, how does that person know he has them and how would he recognize an appropriate characterization of them? Wants and desires are somehow resident within a person and need no identification. Needs may not be recognized by the person who is said to be in need but identified by someone who thinks he knows better.

Usually the thought is developed further. Even if people come to accept as their own the needs identified by someone other than themselves, it does not follow that there is an entitlement to the satisfaction of the needs, that is, if they are, indeed, satisfiable. Such needs have been described as 'objective' in that people may be said to have them but may not experience them as such. The drift of these thoughts lead to the type of claim made by Michael Ignatieff in his book *The Needs of Strangers*. He says:

There are few presumptions in human relations more dangerous than the idea that one knows what another human being needs better than they (sic) do themselves (sic). (1984 p 11)

In the concluding section of the same book, Ignatieff goes on to observe:

From birth, our needs for help and welfare, education and employment are defined for us by doctors, social workers, lawyers, public health inspectors, school principals - experts in the administration of needs. (1984 p 136)

Antony Flew writes in a similar vein. His concern is to associate wants with choice and needs with command. Our wants are our choices; our needs are commanded by others. These points have a certain rhetorical force about them and to that extent are in the realm of political polemics. Flew writes:

The main concern (is) to bring out the truth that an emphasis upon needs, as opposed to wants, cannot but appeal to those who would like to see themselves as experts, qualified both to determine what the needs of others are, and to prescribe and enforce the means appropriate to the satisfaction of those needs ... (We) may want what we do not need, and need what we do not want. (1981 p 117)

Flew's polemic is based on the thoughts that a person is usually the best judge of what he wants and that his freedom consists in choosing in accordance with his wants. The presumption of needs creates a distance between the person who is said to have the needs and other people who project the needs on him. The contrast is between the individual who largely knows what he is about and collectivities (or self-appointed spokesmen for them) which know better. There is a long history of the type of distinction Flew is after. The contrasts between the will and the real will, interests and real interests, needs and real needs anticipate Flew's distinction between wants and needs. These contrasts point to those who think they know what is good for themselves and those who presume to know better. The latter group of people, being experts both in the identification of the good and in the determination of the means for its attainment, appear to speak a shared language of the human good. But they do in reality become at once self-proclaimed benefactors and self-serving despots. To get at his opponents, Flew finishes his discussion with the thought:

When Plato was dreaming dreams of his own ideal city, stately as a Dorian temple, he did wonder for one uneasy moment how his guard dogs were to be inhibited from themselves preying upon the sheep. Plato then saw 'the chief safeguard' in their 'being really well educated'. (416 A-B) (Flew: 1981 p 136)

But for Nielsen, Flew's chosen socialist target, the "sole but sufficient guarantee is not strict Platonic education but 'a full commitment to socialist and indeed egalitarian values'". Flew has another opponent in Bernard Williams who says in his paper *The Idea of Equality*: 'It is a matter of logic that particular sorts of needs constitute a reason for receiving particular sorts of good'. Flew acknowledges that Williams qualifies the generality of this claim but he nevertheless goes on to assert that Williams is deceived in his more specific claims. Flew says 'What he does volunteer is treatments of two examples, medicine and education; a pair chosen presumably because he wants to justify state monopoly 'free' services in these areas but not, or not yet, in the supply of - say - food, drink or shelter'. (137) Even if one identifies the need correctly, and it is not a projection on to uninterested or unwilling recipients, education is not 'manna from heaven'. If people need it, or even want it, that is not a sufficient reason for its provision. A need or a want, in this case, does not make a right or an entitlement. So we pay at the

point of consumption and this, presumably, is the whole point of the polemic. Flew's argument is meant to show that wants have priority over needs and that even when both coincide this in itself does not give an automatic entitlement to their fulfilment.

My concern is whether the language of needs sheds light on the notion of personal development. The satisfaction of many needs is a precondition of the development of an individual human being in a multiplicity of ways. Flew has his own ideas of what kind of a person it is desirable to be and what sort of world a person needs to inhabit for its realization. A person has his wants, desires and preferences and a free market economy is a condition of their proper fulfilment, even if this means that some will remain unfulfilled because of deficits or imperfections in the person himself. At least the individual is sovereign over his own wants, desires and preferences and is not the bearer of dubiously ascribed needs. And he can, therefore, take responsibility for his own life. If the market is the proper mechanism for the realization of his wants and so on, the law inhibits any attempted realization of what is legally prohibited. The individual develops within the freedom and restraints of such a system.

But no matter what the system, there will always be intervention in the lives of people. The school and its curriculum (for some writers more importantly the hidden curriculum) intervenes in the lives of its pupils. Such intervention is, perhaps, not as important as other kinds of intervention. Indeed, it is increasingly falling on the school to make children aware of what does intervene in their lives. The immediate question for schools at present is what is the nature, scope and content of that intervention and who ultimately decides. Like 'relevance', 'needs' is thought to give some purchase on what the nature, scope and content is proper to a school's role in the lives of the children in its care.

One does not have to enter the polemics of high politics to take at least one of Flew's points. Most teachers can relate anecdotes about how people in education develop self-serving discourses which create a world of complex non-educational practices to be administered and managed by themselves. The language of needs is well suited to such manipulation and endows those who use the language with a certain authenticity and legitimacy. What could be more important than fulfilling or satisfying the needs of children! This is to say nothing of the way in which any need so described trades on the urgency and inescapability of those biological or basic needs whose satisfaction

are a precondition of the possibility of the existence or satisfaction of other needs. (I would say, here, that I am not concerned with any so-called ascending hierarchy of needs, culminating in peak experiences.) The satisfaction of needs, then, sounds like a self-justifying activity. But the important question, as nearly always, is not what we call something but how clearly we specify what it is. We need to specify in detail what it is we are calling a need. It would be extremely difficult to do without the notion of need as it enables us to articulate important ways of thinking about human beings. Nevertheless, one may want to bracket the notion temporarily and then specify what it is that is called a need and what it is that is thought to be needed.

As Flew and other writers have said, one may begin by asking of needs 'what for?'. 'X needs Y' is said to be elliptical for 'X' needs Y to reach the goal of Z' or 'X needs Y in order to Z'. Y becomes a condition for the existence or realization of Z. To function as Z, X needs Y. Needs have to be fulfilled, if people are to live up to their potential; if they are to live anything like a full human existence; if they are to function as full members of society; and if they are to measure up to what is expected of them. But we still need more detail. If needs are relative to ends, what more specifically are the ends? We need food, clothing and shelter to survive. One of the cognates of the word need is the word necessity and in saying that survival is our end, we are answering the question: 'Food, clothing and shelter are a necessity for what?'. Apart from what we might call natural needs which may be characterized as intrinsic to our nature, there are those needs that are socially defined. They are conventional as distinct from natural. These needs are relative to our culture and the ends to be realized are defined within that culture. Unless we are to live on the margins of our society, we need access to the means of communication such as newspapers, television, transport and so on. As citizens we need literacy and numeracy if we are to be participants in democratic institutions and commercial and industrial enterprises. As members of society, we need education, culture, a home, medical care and sufficient income and resources. Just as there are things which we need but do not lack, there are things we lack but might need. Most people in our society do not lack food but they need it, even if they are disabling themselves by eating it. I have already mentioned the hidden curriculum in the shape of the school tuck shop and canteen. Again, there might be things we need but cannot authentically have. If there are demons-

trable needs for community and belonging, these might not be possible in a modern society. We might entertain metaphysical hopes but such 'meanings' are not possible in a disenchanted world. The longings for community and religious consolation might be as remote as a nostalgic return to the Gemeinschaft of local communities. Because we are empty inside in these respects, it does not mean that there are the proper objects to fulfil (fill full) us.

It has been said that if all needs-claims are elliptical, they are positive statements rather than normative judgements. If the goal is survival or flourishing, one requires food and a lot more besides. The need is viewed under the aspect of means to an end. They are empirically verifiable. These are the means required and this is the end satisfied. A normative judgement presupposes a standard to be attained and involves words with value implications. The force of this observation is meant to shift the emphasis from a judgement or assumption of value to a statement of fact. This force is best illustrated in an instrumental need. The claim that 'I need a cricket bat' is elliptical for 'I need a cricket bat in order to play cricket'. Or one could simply say more neutrally 'I require a bat etc.'. One is the condition for the possibility of the other. I require the bat because I want to play cricket; but not much may hang on this relative end. I know that cricket is a serious business and, even where a livelihood may not depend upon it, a person's self-image might. However, if I have insufficient money for a bat I could hardly say it is a need. The bat is instrumental to the end of playing cricket but cricket itself could hardly be said to be a need. It might be a passion, though.

On the other hand, were I to say I need a home, it is not helpful to unpack the claim into an instrumental assertion of the above kind. A home is not a means to an end; it is constitutive of what it is to live a decent life. I need a home to live anything like a meaningful existence in society as it is presently constituted. All my hopes are caught up in expectations of this sort. It is no consolation to know that many people in our society (to say nothing of the misery suffered throughout the world) live lives well below standards implicit in such expectations. We have our expectations that are bound up with our identities and these are expressed in normative judgements about needs. Moreover, it is in these judgements that we reveal where we stand.

I said above that we are not consoled in the thought that people

are much worse off than we are. The further thought is that we care about their needs, too. Normative judgements containing the word needs express our conceptions of what we cannot get on without, the way our lives would fall to pieces in the non-satisfaction of the needs and the way our perceptions of who we are are shattered in our deprivations. Joel Feinberg is to the point in his book *Social Philosophy*: 'In a general sense to say that S needs X is to say simply that if he does not X he will be harmed'. (Feinberg 1973 p 111) Harm is an interesting word because it is said to be one of those essentially contested concepts. I shall pick up this thought later.

At this point I should like to make two observations about the notion of want. Firstly, G.E. Anscombe writes as follows: 'To say that (an organism) needs that environment is not to say, e.g. that you want it to have that environment, but that it won't flourish unless it has it. Certainly, it all depends whether you want it to flourish! as Hume would say. But ... (it) 'all depends' on whether you want it to flourish ... whether the fact that it needs that environment, or won't flourish without it, has the slightest influence on your actions.' (Anscombe 1958 p 7) Want, here, is a kind of moral perception. One recognizes the need and one cares about it. To one who does not want a person (say) to thrive, it could properly be said of him that he ought to want the person to thrive and that he should care about such things. What it means to come to see more sensitively or to see what effects moral imperatives have on people are difficult questions. What I want to bring out is that to want in the above example is not minimally descriptive like a minor taste. The wanting says something about the people who have them and their worth can be the subject of assessment. When I want something I may not want it for myself. I may want things for other people and what I want may depend on my perception of their needs.

My second point is that wants have a history; they come from somewhere. A person may come to realize that his wants are impoverished and were induced in a life that he imperfectly understood. In a straightforward phenomenological sense, we can come to see that our wants were falsely our own. From the 'inside' we feel cheated and wonder how we could have been taken in by such wants. Furthermore, our perceptions of ourselves may fit us for subordinate positions in society and what we want from our lives are adjusted to such perceptions. Our self-depreciatory images are reflected in what fulfils us.

If we wish to talk about wants directed at the accumulation of

commodities, we might say that our wants were artificially induced by advertising. Commodities can become 'fetishized' in a non-Marxist sense. They become, to quote Charles Taylor: 'endowed magically with the properties of the life they subserve: as though a car might actually make my family life more intense and harmonious!' (Taylor 1985 p 281) John Berger has listed many such dreams that shape our aspirations to own commodities and live the good life. He subsumes the dreams under the dream of later tonight, the skin dream and the dream of far away places. All our dreams will come true as anticipation turns into reality. Our jet plane is drawn to the exotic and nostalgic attraction of the Mediterranean and we are invited to drive off in our new car with a happy family for ever satisfied. This is to say nothing of the induced wants for electric toothbrushes and the fiftieth television channel, the latter no doubt controlled from an easy chair by a channel selector. Who would scorn the claim that 'You want what you are going to get'?

We have to be careful we do not make too much of the distinction between imputed needs and induced wants; both can be equally insidious. The difficulty is what kind of tests do we have for our discriminations of worth. Can we have true and false wants and genuine and spurious needs? What Ignatieff says about needs can also be said about wants. He writes that politics can be a dangerous business because in the mobilization for change we 'raise expectations and create needs which lead beyond the confines of existing reality'. When we extend and increase needs, we must take care 'not to conjure up the fierce and bitter emotions of disillusionment'. Ignatieff says that Rousseau 'rewrote the history of human needs as tragedy, as the story of how man had mastered nature only to enslave himself to the upward spiral of his own needs'. (Ignatieff 1984 p 22) Are these observations also not true of wants? We only need to substitute commerce and industry for politics.

If needs in general are not infinitely contestable, some appear to be. Ignatieff observes: 'We are the only species with needs that exceed our grasp, the only species to ask questions about the purposes of our existence which reason is unable to answer. In the realm of metaphysical meaning, we are 'utterly unreconciled to the limitations of our ignorance. (p 19) But that many people need the assurance of ultimate meaning must be disputable. Ignatieff does in fact recognize this. He shows that Hume was without the need of religious consolation, even on his death bed.

I will pursue these thoughts a little further by referring to Simone Weil. In her book *Need for Roots* she writes about the needs of the soul. The metaphor of roots in the title of the book is important. Above I spoke briefly about the metaphor of growth. If we want to exploit the metaphor taken from natural history, we might find it helpful to recognize that trees have roots. The tree needs good roots in fertile soil if it is to thrive. Just as a tree gains its sustenance from the soil, a human being finds his nourishment in a human world saturated with tradition. Deprived of such a world, and the cultural inheritance that defines it, a human being is harmed just as surely as if he were physically injured. A human being's plight is desperate when he is culturally rootless. Simone Weil writes:

The first thing to be investigated is what are those needs which are for the life of the soul what the needs in the way of food, sleep and warmth are for the life of the body. We must try to enumerate and define them.

They must never be confused with desires, whims, fancies and vices. We must also distinguish between what is fundamental and what is fortuitous. Man requires, not rice or potatoes, but food; not wood or coal, but heating. In the same way, for the needs of the soul, we must recognize the different, but equivalent, sorts of satisfaction which cater for the same requirements. We must also distinguish between the soul's foods and poisons which, for a time, can give the impression of occupying the place of the former. (1952 p 9)

She then enumerates the needs of the soul: we need order, liberty and obedience; responsibility, equality and hierarchism; honour, punishment and freedom of opinion; security, risk and private property; collective property and truth. I shall comment on such needs later in my argument. Here, I want to mention that needs of this kind are contestable. They are contested in two ways: first, that many are not considered to be needs and second that the content of the needs can be interpreted differently. Yet, having said this, the needs may turn out to be the most profound of our needs. The problem is, of course, how we know we have such needs and who is to be the authority in the identification of them. If we do come to recognize the needs as our own, their satisfaction is inseparable from an understanding of who we are. It does not seem helpful to ask of the needs 'what for?'. An answer is quite simply we are the people we are. We could be different but the question 'what for?' might be similarly inappropriate.

When we try to elucidate educational practice in the language of needs, we must make our distinctions in detailed specifications of what

it is we are calling needs. Such specifications will almost necessarily involve a context of thought and judgement. In an article about Preparation for Life courses, Richard Pring(1986 p 36) says that any interpretation of such phrases as Preparation for Life 'must be against a background of ideas and values, and ultimately against a philosophical view of human nature and of quality of life, which are themselves rooted in different traditions'. We might say the same of needs insofar as they are used to interpret a curriculum adequate to the requirements of our pupils and students, especially if this curriculum is meant to serve personal development. I said above that the word relevant does not refer to a property of a consideration. Relevance does not stand in the same kind of relationship to such a consideration as does that of weight to a solid object. If a so-called transferable skill is relevant to the job market, it is educationalists amongs others, who judge it to be so. They may be wrong. But they can always plead that they said relevant rather than it would lead to a job. They may also advise that the skill is relevant in order to create a motive in reluctant students but by the time that the enablers and the facilitators are to be brought to account, a new generaation of students will be in place. (I might mention, here, that if students can be induced to want transferable skills, motivation will be built into the want. Needs and felt needs are similarly motivating. Furthermore, as we know all too well, there are many skills that have no relevance to anything, least of all to the self-respect that they once occasioned in those who possessed them.

Again, to bring out the point that relevance is intepreted in a context of judgement, we might decide that certain developments in science ought not be relevant to anything, save that the only thing about the developments that is relevant is that we ought not to have anything to do with them. We can always find some relevance in the morally obscene, if we want. We might remind ourselves, too, of the fact that skin colour and gender are still thought relevant as grounds for discrimination. I know that some people will interpret this last remark both negatively and positively. However, in the case of skin pigmentation relevance disappears when we become 'colour-blind'. I hope I have shown, too, that needs require a context of interpretation, even though certain needs seem to have a self-evidence about them. The needs do not identify themselves in a wide range of cases. Think of the interpretation of needs in a Marxist framework of thought. We are reminded of our really human needs, our essential human needs and

our truly human needs that are 'expressive of the human essence'. The needs of a 'species being', it may be anticipated, will be realized in 'an association in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all'. (Marx 1975) Think, too, of the most famous formulation of the human condition in the communist society of the future: 'From each according to his ability; to each according to his need'.

To pick up Ignatieff's thoughts again, he goes so far as to say that a context for the interpretation of needs may be absent altogether; for there may exist no adequate language for the expression of needs. Under such conditions, needs 'do not simply pass out of speech: they may cease to be felt'. (p 138) A claim of this sort would need to be backed up, because we do feel vague rumblings of unarticulated longings and feel dissatisfied until we give some shape to them. Ignatieff may respond by saying that intimations of the needs are still within the resources of language. He does not so respond and the difficult question remains. But we might say in anticipation of the discussion later that 'nature' might be a source of self-expressive possibilities for the individual but if this is so it needs arguing for.

Needs as a Language of Personal Development

I wish to ask now whether the idea of needs can provide a framework for understanding what personal development, PSME and all the other varieties of Social and Life Skills programmes might be after. Can 'what is relevant to needs' or 'what needs are relevant' give us an organizing idea to bring together much of what is central to the rather indeterminate areas of learning that we are discussing? An affirmative answer does not mean that we shall then have some determinate content. It means that we possess a framework for addressing what the content of the needs might be. I have already said that the additional terms 'social' and 'moral' constrain what 'personal' means in the general headings of PSE, PSME etc. But in the other areas I have mentioned, Life Enhancement Studies, Values and Lifestyles and so on, it is difficult to know what would constitute a constraint on the possibilities. These areas collect more items than an organizing idea can cope with, except that they all address 'life'. But even here we can see a multiplication of possibilities. If we are concerned with life, we should also face the reality of death. Bereavement 'skills' and counselling now form part of what falls under these general headings. We need mourning and grieving skills as a preparation for what brings life to an end.

It is true that there has always been children who need special counselling when misfortune hits them. Pastoral Care has usually met these needs. In spite of the multiplication of items in all those PSME, Social and Life Skills etc. areas of the curriculum, it still might be said that there is always a moral dimension to much of these areas. We cannot consider what it is to mourn and grieve without indicating what it is appropriate to think and feel about the dead and what a proper relation to 'them' might be when they are dead. Bereavement skills, then, can be and are taught across all the boundaries, however we define them, between PSME and its cognates on the one hand and Enhancement Studies and Social and Life Skills on the other. It might take a life-time, of course, and we still might be deficient in a mature response in these matters.

But it must be said that all these areas cover more than what might be construed as moral even on a broad understanding of the term. More maverick approaches to such areas create a certain centrifugal tendency. If something is perceived as relevant or needed, it should be included so the reasoning has it. Many schemes are made up of disparate detail and discrete items of concern. 'Life' then becomes the general constraint and that could take us anywhere, with the rider of course that whatever is undertaken should not physically or morally endanger the pupils or students. We have ample evidence in fact that many students are endangered on vocational schemes. And there are some odd notions of what constitutes 'moral'.

A very general characterization of what is relevantly needed in all the areas I have mentioned (from PSME to Life Enhancement Studies) might be what serves as a preparation for adult life. The concern is with what an individual needs to survive, adjust, cope, function, succeed or perhaps even flourish in life. Now, in one sense, this would include as many qualities, attributes and properties of human beings as they generically possess, subject to the constraint of what they should legitimately possess. We need all manner of major and minor capacities and capabilities to survive, cope or succeed in life. We need a lot more to flourish.

Education in general fosters the acquisition of such generic dispositions and they are intended to serve young people in the conduct of their lives. This includes what is learnt for the intrinsic worth and pleasure of it. As I said earlier, music and literature may be what are needed for a job but they also can be constitutive of satisfying complex wholes in our lives such as I mentioned when I spoke about

the ways in which means and ends are mutually implicated in each other. They become needs, without the satisfaction of which our lives become poorer or even meaningless. We are transformed for the worse as persons. And what it is to be transformed for the better is a pivotal idea in personal development in some writers.

These points about its being education's job, right across the curriculum, to foster dispositions of knowledge, understanding and character are often made when PSE, Social and Life Skills etc. are mentioned. It is argued that these latter areas provide watered-down versions, for the bottom forty per cent, of what goes on in subject-centred learning. There are serious educational deficiencies in young people, so they need to be topped up with what might help them to cope more effectively in life. This might be thought of as the deficit model of PSE or Social and Life Skills. The recipients of such education or training have to be decently socialized and made occupationally functional. Such approaches to the education and training of these young people is ad hoc. One might say that it has to be ad hoc because it is not as though there are well established vocations and trades that await them. Just as it might be said that some of the materials in such areas of learning are watered-down academic subjects, it might be said that some of the material is watered-down material from what were vocations and trades in earlier times. Added to which are discrete bits and pieces from all walks of life in the adult world.

But when we look at official documents, the literature in general and the practices in schools and colleges, Personal Development, PSE (and insofar as Social and Life Skills, Enhancement and Enrichment Studies and so on can be delimited sufficiently to parallel PSE etc.) tend to be meant for all pupils and students. We might then try to get some order into what is recommended, when the terms relevance and needs are used as curriculum guidelines, by attempting to construct a framework of interpretation or model. With a little ingenuity one might be able to tease out a central core that is concerned with conduct in our relationships with each other. Almost antiquely, we could say that this core is concerned with morals and manners. It is difficult to use the term moral on its own, as even the most broad characterization will not be quite sufficient. This is not to say that what is moral is not a major condition on anything else we do.

There are five interrelated points about what is relevantly needed for a person to be adequate to the demands made on him in the areas of morality and manners. We are, then, not talking about unsatisfied

states when we talk about needs but capacities and abilities we do not possess, or only imperfectly possess, yet need to have if we are to tolerably function with our fellow men and women. When we asked the question what we need them for, this is not to ask what is needed to satisfy pre-existing states but what the needed capacities and capabilities are for.

A summary of such a framework or model is as follows. 1. We have to know what the relevant capacities and capabilities are for. They are needed it is suggested so that an individual can live (survive or cope) with other people within a value-mediated human setting. 2. These capacities and capabilities fall under general terms of human personality (in the generic sense) such as character and sensibility. These are then finessed in terms of virtues and character traits and so on. 3. Such personality systems express themselves in systems of conduct. 'System' is too compartmentalized a term but it is used simply for analytical purposes. 4. The human personality with its qualities and attributes needs a human setting. These settings are the final reference for what capacities and capabilities are needed, for they provide the sense of what is needed and the conditions for their realization. 5. The capacities and capabilities are needed to help satisfy our needs, amongst other things. Once acquired, of course, the capacities and capabilities become needs to be satisfied too - not states but dispositions.

1. The personal (that is, what focuses on the individual person) is constrained and given intelligibility by the terms moral and manners. The concern is with what an individual needs to survive, adjust, cope, function, succeed or flourish in the social, interpersonal and moral dimensions of life. The needs are concerned with what is required in an individual's life with other people. It is our embroilment with our own kind rather than with the material world. It does include work insofar as we engage with other people. In work we may need poise, charm and politeness, especially in what might be called the people-intensive areas of employment. Furthermore, young people themselves often talk about the skills they require to be able to socialize with their peers. What is needed then are capacities and capabilities to be reasonably at home in the human world.

The concern is with what is needed to survive or flourish in the value-mediated human relationships that people find themselves in. The talk then is about life values - moral, aesthetic, political,

social and spiritual values. These terms need interpreting of course. These values pervade all our conduct in life.

2. What is needed in this respect has to be relevant to an individual's engagement with or preparation for life lived with others in the various circumstances and conditions of life. What an individual needs becomes constitutive of his make-up - his character, personality, sensibility, temperament, disposition, structures of feeling and emotions and so on. These general characterizations of what goes into an adequately or appropriately constituted individual are then broken down into what is needed by way of moral virtues, character and personality traits, individual moral and aesthetic dispositions. The details are a matter of morality and style. Some writers speak of 'mind-sets' here and break them down into reified 'selves'. Cognitive, conative and affective mind-sets express themselves in 'bodily selves', 'sexual selves', 'moral selves', 'parental and familial selves', 'civic and citizen selves' and 'political selves' and, in fact, as many selves as can be correlated with separately identifiable contours of culture and society as one might discern. I am not sure what hangs on this way of talking except that there may be an unspoken assumption that what we do and say may owe more to the circumstances and conditions of our fragmented lives than to enduring dispositions of a unified personality. On this view we are not self-present to ourselves in any coherent way. However, these different selves, if we want to use this language, mediate our relationships with each other. With these reservations, we are constituted as more or less enduring systems of habits, impulses, responses, intentions and dispositions and it is in terms of these that we inhabit a common human world.

3. Another way into the question of what is needed in respect of morals and manners is in fact to look at all those systems of conduct that we need to be able to express ourselves in. These dimensions of our lives are concerned with morality, manners, etiquette, graces, codes of honour and cultural norms and values in general. Our virtues, character and personality traits will be partly constituted out of the detailed dispositions of personality implied in these areas of conduct. For example, we might exhibit independence of mind and spirit in obedience to the demands of the pieties and duties in our lives. To be courteous and considerate is not to be servile; to be accommodating is not to be bidable; to be civil and solicitous is not to be obsequious;

to be needed is not to be putty in the hands of those who are dear to us.

4. But everything depends on the individual in relation to his human setting. What a knight needs to function as a knight in medieval codes of honour is not what a muscular Christian gentleman or priest needs for them to function in their ambience. I have often thought that personal development is the democratic version of the well defined requirements of 'character types' of the past. The personally developed human being is the vague analogue of the complete human being of past myths. What constitutes the fully-integrated adult will depend on what the human setting expects or permits. Of course, we may possess no such concept as the fully integrated adult in a rich sense. Or rather, we might possess such a concept but not know what it is to be realized. On the other hand, the more limited the expectations of a code the more an individual might meet the required standard. As we know all too well, there are limiting cases of attenuated human lives in restrictive human settings. George Orwell presents one such fictional picture. The Thought Police finally reduce personal differences to nothing in a completely dehumanized setting. More expansively, we might ask whether an ethic of courage, self-discipline, self-reliance, initiative, work, common sense, loyalty and fidelity has ever been exemplified fully in an individual. In contrast we might think of those anti-heroes of Tom Gunn's poetry who don 'impersonal' personalities and manufacture identities out of leather uniforms and the impersonal energy of motor-bikes.

What we need to cope or flourish, then, will take its sense from what it is to be a person in relation to a human setting. The social correlatives of an individual who wishes to maximize his consumption of utilities will be different from that of the individual who wishes to maximize his powers of mind and body. The one setting will approximate to a hyper-market; the other (dare I say it in a time of the pervasiveness of enterprise) a school or university. It can work both ways; the setting may be too rich for us or we too rich for it.

5. It is difficult to draw the distinction between what I have called exercise-concepts and fulfilment-concepts. I have distinguished what we need by way of capacities and capabilities to do or act from what needs require satisfaction or fulfilment. We need to learn how to talk and walk and we just need food to survive. But we would not survive for long if we did not learn to talk and walk, or at least if

we did it would only be in an attenuated sense. Needless to say, nothing is implied here about those resourceful people who manage to exhibit the most remarkable human characteristics in disablement. In the one case then the satisfaction is in the talking and walking (if we were deprived of these acquired capacities, it would be just as much a lack as in other unsatisfied needs); in the other it is not necessarily in the eating but in the hunger satisfied. It is like the distinction between means and ends in the latter case; means can become satisfying ends. One way of making the distinction between the different senses of needs is to say that we can use it either as a verb or a noun. What we need is something we must acquire; we must be able to do or act in certain ways to get on with living. Some of these acquired capacities and capabilities may become needs to be satisfied or fulfilled alongside other established needs. Again, dispositions can be frustrated and this can lead to misery in extreme cases. In other cases one simply becomes less of a human being.

Charles Darwin says in his autobiography that his pursuit of natural history atrophied his capacity for friendship and his love of the arts and literature. At times he found it difficult to return love when it was given. Darwin, then, acquired what was needed to become a good natural historian but in the process certain needs withered. On one occasion after one of his children had died he found himself quite involuntarily interpreting the death in terms of natural selection. He stopped himself as it obviously caused his wife great pain, and himself too when he collected himself. This is not to say that Darwin's decency declined. He also needed qualities of character to live with other people but certain lacks in his life were not unfulfilled needs. He could objectively observe that certain previously felt needs no longer entered into his experience.

The framework of interpretation or the model I have just presented is meant to be a framework or model of morals and manners. These morals and manners are needed to live in some kind of reciprocity with our own kind. We might formulate this model as follows: X is an item in Personal Development etc. if X is perceived as needed or is relevantly needed for an individual's engagement or prospective engagement with the conditions and circumstances of life insofar as these have implications for how we comport ourselves in morals and manners. Or we might put it: P needs X Y Z etc. to survive, cope, flourish etc. in life in these respects.

It will be obvious from an inspection of the detail and implied

detail in this attempt at delimiting what can be an item X in PSME etc. that morals and manners is too narrow. As I have said, some kind of constraint as to what it is to develop as a person can be extracted from the terms social and moral in PSME. But when we find 'life' in the general headings as the governing idea it becomes difficult to hold the items in some kind of unity. But social on its own is too wide also, unless we have in mind the Oakshottian distinction between socialization and education.

But, it might be argued, why seek a unity in the disparate items? Is it not enough, when needs are mentioned, to assume that there is a relevant background of intelligibility? Life is a code word for those sectors and departments of life that an individual will find himself embroiled in. The needed capacities and capabilities take their utility from the sector or department in question. Some of the capacities and capabilities may also be transferable from one sector or department to others. When we ask what capacities and capabilities are needed in an established subject, the nature of the subject tells us. If one wants to be a good physicist or economist, specific conceptual capacities and skills as well as more general intellectual virtues are needed. The form of the need-statements are: If subject X then needs Y.

In response one might say that life is a very big project indeed and other things are departments of it. The needs of a physicist or economist as physicist or economist are circumscribed by the disciplines. They need a lot more moral and intellectual virtues when they step outside their respective disciplines. What we do or wish to do within the disciplines of physics or economics are determined by the disciplines themselves, even though these disciplines develop in unexpected ways. The question 'What for?' in respect of the needs internal to subjects is rather pointless. This is not the case when one is dealing with areas that may include extremely controversial items of concern and where there may be no obvious connection between what is learned and the application of it. There is, then, a need to have a conception of what one is doing and to be able to justify it. Morality is something and we collectively need it, although an individual tough guy might think he does not. Whether morality can be taught and to what ages it may, with conscience, be taught is a matter of dispute. But we do know what it is. And, importantly, it is a condition on all the other things we do.

One of the controversial areas is that of politics. And what is said in it has important implications for how we are expected to behave.

It is argued that many needs may remain unsatisfied unless certain needed capacities and capabilities are acquired. To possess these is to help provide oneself with the means of satisfying them. Some might go further and argue, and perhaps Flew is one of them, that if one does not acquire these capacities and capabilities one does not deserve to have ones needs satisfied. The argument continues that if the Welfare State satisfies too many needs, this may disable people and thereby frustrate the possibility of their acquiring the needed capacities and capabilities. One becomes dependent on the State and one thereby loses the will and the motivation to acquire what is needed for oneself.

Some writers on personal development etc. emphasize the necessity of people to take charge of their own lives - to be self-propelling agents who can get up and go. The personal is, then, the political in that we should learn to make our own choices and take our own decisions. Increasingly we should learn to take responsibility for more and more in the particularities of our lives. Such sovereignty in the detail of our lives sends currents throughout the economic and political systems. Rights should be less, and personal responsibility more, prominent in our lives.

But we cannot escape the fact that the political is the personal too. We can take more responsibility for our personal health and hygiene but things happen at the macro level in society that we find difficult to take responsibility for. As one junior health minister found to her cost, the assumptions of perfect knowledge and mobility in a perfect market belong to economic textbooks. It is in the newly emerging curriculum area of Active Citizenship that such issues are considered. But everything depends on just what is discussed and practised that is the concern. The important point is just what conceptions we are working with and how we might justify them. And this is why we need some ideas of the respect in which something is personal.

To say that something is relevant or needed is to imply that there exists a reason for it. A skill is relevant to something I want, perhaps. I need love to fulfil me as the person I am. But in both cases it is possible that someone else says something is relevant for me or something is needed by me. And then the question of whose reason it is arises. Industry might need human resources but the people who might be classified as these resources do not see why what is needed by industry should become what they need. I understand

that theology is now the most oversubscribed degree course in Oxford. The powers of the mind and the impulses of the heart that are needed for its proper pursuit may have no relevance at all to the needs of the economy and may be foreign to the enterprise culture. Its desired pursuit may be a reaction against what is relevant to or needed by the enterprise culture. The qualities of mind that led to the desire to read theology and the qualities of mind fostered by its pursuit may be part of needs that cannot be satisfied in such a culture. But if we are talking about what qualities of mind are needed to cope or succeed in life, students may well have their own ideas about what it is to cope or succeed in life.

This is the difficulty when we discuss what is relevant and what is needed in life. In one way or another, the complete stock of possibilities in a culture or society can enter into relevance or needs-statements. And it is from this stock of human possibilities that we draw upon when we help to shape what is considered to be a well-constituted person. The exercise-needs and the satisfaction-needs are just some of these total possibilities. Furthermore, what is relevant to something else can change as our perceived needs change. What is relevant to something else is a wider notion than needs, unless needs itself is used as a general utility word. But it is the term needs that I now focus on.

In more reflective moments, a person may ask himself how he has become constituted as he is and what he might do to change it in a desired direction. He can have second-order desires to be constituted as having desires other than the ones he now has. He can also desire that he cease to have the needs he does have or have those he does not have. This can occur when he has needs that it would be better if he did not have, or when he needs abilities that he has failed to acquire, or when he considers that his life might have been more fulfilled if certain needs had been nurtured. He could regret their absence in the last case, even though he knows that to have had them may have led to sorrow. At least he would have lived. Marriage and children create needs that only they can satisfy but as they are hostages to fortune, they may be the cause of terrible lacks in our lives. Salman Rushdie has said, for example, that there is a great 'God-hole' in his life but would it have been better had he not been exposed to religion in the first place? It might have been better if his tormentors had not been so exposed. Such a statement assumes that religious needs are not somehow resident in us completely independent of our

nurture. Apart from our basic biological needs (and even these are culturally shaped) most of our needs are conventional. We absorb them from life and later discover that they are ours. What other people think we need to live life well enter our natures before we begin to ask 'what for?', when it is said that certain capacities and capabilities are needed. The question 'what for?' when asked from a first person perspective already presupposes that this perspective exists. Each one of us does not ask 'what for?' ex nihilo. Culture, in the shape of those people who are responsible for our nurture, has already constituted us in some ways rather than in others. 'What for?' implies that something is already held stable in our make-up for the question to be intelligible. A great deal of habituation needs to have taken place before we are ready to ask what something additional might be for. Some of the stock of possibilities has already entered into the constitution of who and what we are.

For many needs there is an internal connection between how the person is constituted and what he cannot do without. But needs may have once been mere whims or desires. The most obvious example is that of drug dependency. Personal development in schools addresses such issues as addictions. Our more human needs may also be too painful at times. A lover may have come to need another person when that person ceases to need him or her. The source of the fulfilment may be external to the person but the need is so deeply seated within a person that the need is interpreted in terms of that source. A neglected grandmother may say she needs to be needed when other people no longer need such needs. This is a difficulty when love and care help to constitute who we are. Again a person may have come to yearn greatly for religious consolation when no religion is able to satisfy him. The intellect takes a person one way and his heart the other. There are many such cases of the dissociation of the sensibility. This is to be contrasted with the case of an evangelist from the Bible Belt in America who tells us that we need religion so that he then can be the source of its satisfaction - to the great cost of our pockets too. What we needed to function in society would then be at his disposal. Again, it is a different thing to say that we need moral virtues to succeed in life than to say that we have been nurtured to care about other people no matter what we need. Some writers speak about the need for moral virtues in much the same way as other people talk about functional skills.

Furthermore, we might ask whether we ourselves want to come to

experience certain proffered needs as our needs. As parents we ask this of our children too. Here we might reflect on the list of needs that Simone Weil presents. Do we want to come to experience some or all of these needs as our needs? We might need some of them to function in society but we may not want them as our needs. Some people are always wanting their favoured needs to become ours, just as they want their desires, preferences, intentions, reasons and so on to become ours too. Muriel Spark's Jean Brodie wants her pupils, who are the 'creme de la creme', to make their own those favoured dispositions of hers.

Does, then, a language of needs provide us with a language of personal development? As I have said, if certain needs are not cultivated in us, we will not measure up to what it is to be a well constituted person. But there is no agreement about which fulfilment-needs should be nurtured in children. The question is do we need certain needs? There is much dispute about religion as a part of the curriculum, or rather what it might consist in if it is. What exercise-needs do we require? We need all manner of capacities and capabilities to function in the various sectors and departments of life.

I have said that we have normative needs that are constitutive of who we are. We need to be loved as part of our thriving. These needs are non-elliptical. They are not instrumental for bringing about something else such as petrol is needed to get the car going. A child needs to be cherished otherwise it would fail in its humanity in important ways. Our identities are formed by such loving and cherishing. We then need to be in contact with what confirms and is expressive of who we have become. At times in my life I may feel that I need to climb mountains and contemplate natural beauty. These are not as peremptory as the needs for love and food in young children but they are sufficiently part of who I am for me to be poorer as a person if they are not satisfied.

Other needs are elliptical and instrumental. I might need to socialize for its own sake but also to refresh me for other pursuits. To this extent I need skills to help me to get on to terms with other people. I need these other people to confirm who I am and to help meet my need for companionship. But I also need to equip myself with many capabilities to function with other people in different aspects of life.

Having made these points, we need as teachers to reflect on what goodness, desirability and worthwhileness there is in things and what

is worthy of our pursuits. But if it is inappropriate to ask the question 'what for?' of constitutive needs, it seems singularly inappropriate to ask of obligations, duties, fidelities, love, trust and so on whether we need to nurture them. We might have doubts about some particularities in these broad areas but these human capacities are needed to keep us human. By the time we ask 'what for?', if things go well, we will already be constituted as persons of certain kinds. We will then ask this question from a decently constituted centre. This does not mean that we will not need to ask, or that somebody on our behalf needs to ask, what capacities and capabilities we need in the various sectors and departments of our lives. As I have said, morality is a condition on many of our pursuits but it is not so pervasive in our lives that we always need to look at the moral underpinning of many capacities and capabilities. We just need functional know-how to get on with living.

CHAPTER 3

Needs in the Language of Curriculum Recommendations

As is the case with all education, Personal Development, PSME, Social and Life Skills etc. take as their object an incomplete individual who needs to be finished according to some conception of what it is to be educated or trained in the required sense. But it is also the individual as a person who is the object of our educational endeavours. We should not overlook, of course, the fact that the very young have to be nurtured into being persons. This observation reminds us that our 'person-making' endeavours should always have a proper conception of the nature of the individual who is the object of our concern. Often in the literature of personal development etc. scant attention is given to the ages and stages of development of the young people for whom the educational schemes are designed. For example, it has been said that the care of the very young in some creches and schools fails to respond to the young according to their needs as persons. They are not introduced soon enough, or are introduced too late, to important formative experiences. Education, then, is the process whereby the individual is brought into a human inheritance. He acquires, and needs to acquire, beliefs, values, desires, feelings and intentions that are informed by the relevant standards of appropriateness to their objects. As soon as we introduce such traits of personality, we imply that there might be different conceptions of the completed person of which these beliefs, values etc. are constituent parts. Once we begin to think in these terms, the temptation might arise to put our own slant on what is needed to complete the person. And the temptation is greater when we are reflecting on what might be needed for a person to get on to terms with life.

Some writers talk as if personal development etc. were promoting an egalitarian version of what goes on in expensive finishing schools - something to be added on at the end of an individual's normal education. Other writers feel that these areas should principally be a pervasive part of a school's ethos. Yet others feel that the whole project is misconceived for 'academic' young people and should be reserved for the so-called bottom forty per cent who are incomplete in their special ways. Yet, again, others argue that if personal development is concerned in part, or perhaps largely, with moral education, then all pupils and

students should have it as part of their curriculum. For example, a musician may be complete by the standards of musicianship but still be incomplete as a person. We say of people that they measure up to the standards of what it is to be a good musician or mathematician but they fail to measure up to what it is to be a person. We use person in this context as a moral or quasi-moral category.

As I have said, some educationalists feel that we have entered into disputed areas when we mention moral and similar terms. However, personal development, PSME etc. have their various specifications of what is needed to transform the incomplete person into what is conceived as a relatively complete person. When the word needs is mentioned, it is assumed that an incomplete person is the object of what is needed to remedy this incompleteness.

When the word needs is used, then, two contexts are implied. The first is the background to a person's life. The most pervasive background is life itself. As we have seen, in the curriculum areas we are discussing, the criteria for what a person needs are drawn from the social and moral dimensions of life and life itself. What we need for the various departments of our lives is finessed from what is thus drawn. Secondly, the most pervasive good of an individual's total condition is wellbeing or happiness. We need what contributes to this wellbeing. (That wellbeing is the most pervasive good is questioned of course.) But the prospects for an individual may only approximate to wellbeing and when it does there is a shift to what is needed to survive, cope or function. An important question here is who makes such assumptions about a person's prospects? However, in all cases, individuals need to be constituted in certain ways (and will be constituted with or without educational intervention in their lives, for better or worse) such that they have a chance to get on to terms with life as it presents itself to them.

If one inspects lists of recommendations for what might be included in Personal Development, PSME, Social and Life Skills schemes of work, the word needs features prominently. Needs precedes such expression as; 'to be able to ...', 'to acquire the capacity to ...', 'to develop the ability ...', 'to be capable of ...' etc. To this extent needs is a utility word which comprehends all those satisfactions and fulfilments, qualities and attributes, and capacities and capabilities that might or should feature in an individual's make-up. All these are either thought to be a part of a person's overall good or support some limited good in his life. It could be said here that we tend to give the word

needs too much work to do.

Nevertheless, the word needs is used in this context to mean that either an individual will cease to survive, cope or flourish without what is needed or he will not start to do so unless he acquires what is needed. He needs all those human characteristics that contribute to his surviving, coping or flourishing and all those objects external to him that match these characteristics. The individual needs to be decently constituted in respect of needs, desires, intentions and so on and he needs the proper objects of these characteristics. Whether he acquires the characteristics and comes into contact with their proper objects is another matter.

The important question is what does personal development etc. pick out from our generic qualities and attributes that is distinctive of their approach to what is needed by the incomplete individual? I wish to present what I think is a reasonably representative picture of these contributions from the literature in the areas we have been discussing. Whether a distinctive picture emerges is another matter. Before I present the detail I am tempted to ask just what percentage of the material, including whole books, is simply a matter of lists or disguised lists of items that take 'social', 'moral' and 'life' as their references. There are exceptions, of course, but they are rare.

In what follows I tend to use personal development in a more or less inclusive sense, though some writers intersperse PSE with personal development. I use personal development because the writers themselves tend to use the term and because, as I have argued, personal development does not mean anything on its own. The term implies that a reference to social, moral and so on is required for the term to have sense. For example, self-knowledge and self-control keep cropping up but these reflexive powers of the mind and will require that there is some content to the self that is the object of these powers. We examine ourselves in respect of our ability or lack of it in academic subjects as well as in our dealings with each other. The self that is examined or understood has what is academic, social or moral as its content. Because I have mentioned these reflexive powers here I tend to exclude them from my selections below. Where there are more substantial efforts to say what these areas might be about, I make some observations myself.

A Mere Catalogue?

If one explores a wide variety of sources in which personal develop-

ment is mentioned one notices a fairly predictable rehearsal of the same qualities and attributes to be acquired by or instilled in pupils and students. Look in any D.E.S., F.E.U. publications and Local Authority curriculum guidelines and so forth and we find roughly the same desired qualities and attributes. I now wish to mention them myself in a general way, perhaps duplicating the rehearsal. In addition, though, I look at more reasoned contributions.

Richard Pring in his paper Personal Development (1985: p 130) presents us with the widest possible entry into personal development. He states that: 'Education is about the development of persons'. We find in his paper that we need to: develop initiative, self-reliance, self-confidence, intellectual curiosity, perseverance, determination to achieve high standards, confidence and courage, cooperation, honesty and integrity. We are told that the young person needs to develop self-esteem, personal values and a sense of fundamental purpose. Pring in his book Personal and Social Education in the Curriculum (1984 p.4) presents a list culled from a variety of publications. The list of what is needed is: 'an acceptable set of personal values', 'moral attributes', 'capacity to participate actively within society and to contribute responsibly to it', 'social competence', 'skills of good personal relationships', 'spiritual awareness', 'career guidance', 'self-esteem and self-confidence', 'respect for animals', 'appropriate attitudes towards sex, parenthood, smoking, drink and exercise' and so forth. It will be noted that many of these expressions need a great deal more content before one knows what to do with them, apart from simply exchanging them with other curriculum leaders and so on.

The Inner London Education Authority in its Improving Secondary Schools (1984: p 2) stresses; 'The capacity to communicate with others in face-to-face relationships; the ability to cooperate with others in the interests of the group as well as the individual; initiative, self-reliance and the ability to work alone without close supervision; and the skills of leadership'. The Report continues: '... achievement involves motivation and commitment; the willingness to accept failure without destructive consequences; the readiness to persevere; the self-confidence to learn in spite of the difficulty of the task'. In the White Paper Better Schools (1985: p 2) we learn that the best secondary schools'... turn out young people with self-confidence, self-respect and respect for others, who are enterprising, adaptable, and eager and well equipped to face the adult world'.

Kenneth Baker in a Proposed Curriculum (1986) for his City

Technical Colleges says that such colleges '... will offer a broad curriculum with a strong technical and practical element which is essential preparation for the changing demands of adult working life in an advanced industrial society. Personal development in such colleges will '... seek to develop the qualities of enterprise, self-reliance and responsibility which young people need for adult life and work and citizenship'. The Proposal continues: 'Self-discipline and positive attitudes (will be) strongly emphasized (and combined with) business understanding, moral and health education'. For Baker personal development is strongly connected with business studies and enterprise education.

Personal development is often integrated in more general aspects of the curriculum. A sample of such aspects would be as follows:

The Domestic Sphere, including the practical, financial and aesthetic aspects.

The World of Work covering the whole range of work that people do.

Leisure - opportunities for recreational and creative activity outside work.

Continuing education research/exploration, either for defined practical ends or open exploration into unknown fields.

Neighbourhood and Community: our local social, political, legal, economic and physical environments.

Our wider social, political, legal, economic and physical environments including regional, national and international contexts.

Family.

Personal relations in other contexts, formal and informal.

Self personal reflection, the spiritual dimension.

To be more specific in the book *The Preparation for Life Curriculum* Brian Wilcox et al (1984: pp 40-41) we find the following breakdown of what constitutes a curriculum in four Sheffield schools. The contents are on page 78 overleaf. In similar fashion, we find in the T.E.S. (1988 p 17) a PSE scheme of work from the London Borough of Croydon: see page 79.

But probably the most comprehensive catalogue of items is in *Curriculum Matters 14* in the HMI Series. In the preface we are presented with a framework which PSE as well as other curriculum studies should take into account. Maintained Schools should provide 'a balanced and broadly based curriculum that:

1. Pre-employment aspects	2. Aspects of employment/adult life	3. Aspects of industry/commerce	4. Aspects of economics/politics	5. General personal issues	6. Social/community issues
Self appraisal	Adapting to life at work	Structure and location of industry	Basic economic concepts	Adult relationships	Population
Personal decision making	Leisure and work	Commercial services (banking, insurance etc.)	Private and public sector	Home management	Conservation (e.g. food, energy, environment)
Local job opportunities	Trade unions and industrial relations	Wholesale and retail distribution	Local and national government	Personal hygiene and health	Pollution
Further education and training opportunities	Unemployment		Decision making and democracy	Abuses of the body (e.g. drugs, alcohol, smoking)	Protecting the community (police etc)
Knowledge of specific jobs	Self employment	Manufacturing industry		Aspects of sexual behaviour (contraception, abortion etc.)	Impact of technology
Finding and applying for jobs	Money management and budgeting	Organisation of companies/firms		Personal safety (at home, work, leisure etc.)	Health and welfare services
Preparation for interviews	personal life-style - expectations of adult life			Mental health	Youth and youth culture
Communication skills				Consumer education	Sex discrimination and stereotyping
Changing world of work				Child development	Racial discrimination and stereotyping
Sources of help and guidance (e.g. careers service)				Parentcraft*	Mass media
					The family and other social groups
					The handicapped
					The elderly and sick

Personal and social education

Age 7

- 1 Recognizes that choice is available when decisions have to be made.
- 2 Knows that every action has a consequence.
- 3 Recognizes the links between different groups in the community.
- 4 Describes the work of people who care for them.
- 5 Values the local environment and its upkeep.
- 6 Knows the value of sharing and giving.
- 7 Recognizes that relationships exist among family and friends.
- 8 Keeps healthy.
- 9 Recognizes the difference between fact and fantasy, and what keeps you safe.
- 10 Shows consideration to all living creatures.

Age 11

- 1 Thinks carefully before choosing a course of action.
- 2 Recognizes that actions may affect others.
- 3 Describes how different members of the community have different needs.
- 4 Describes the work of various occupations.
- 5 Takes responsibility for own actions in the local environment.
- 6 Is capable of understanding other people's feelings.
- 7 Evaluates the motives of friends and the media.
- 8 Knows how actions now can affect health in the future.
- 9 Takes responsibility for own safety.
- 10 Knows of other religions and cultures.

Age 14

- 1 Takes responsibility for decisions and actions taken.
- 2 Is involved in a community project.
- 3 Has a personal development plan.
- 4 Recognizes how environment might affect social behaviour.
- 5 Shows respect, compassion and honesty within relationships.
- 6 Shows maturity towards other people.
- 7 Takes responsibility for maintaining a healthy lifestyle.
- 8 Appreciates the need for rules that ensure the safety of others.
- 9 Recognizes that religious beliefs shape attitudes and behaviour.

- a. promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of society; and
- b. prepares such pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life'.

(1989 p iv)

After which, we are presented with an overview of what PSE consists of.

Personal and social education is concerned with qualities and attitudes, knowledge and understanding, abilities and skills in relation to oneself and others, social responsibilities and morality. It helps pupils be considerate and enterprising in the present, while it prepares them for an informed and active involvement in family, social, economic and civil life. It plays an important part in bringing relevance, breadth and balance to the curriculum.

(1989 p 1)

Thereafter lists of items are introduced in the barest linguistic settings.

PES should promote 'a sense of achievement, confidence and competence, by focussing as appropriate on particular relevant issues'. What is needed are: 'Mutual trust and a sense of shared purpose'; pupils have to be encouraged 'to come to terms with their own emotions and behave with consideration to others' needs'; pupils should learn better from a teacher who is 'concerned to explore his or her own self-understanding' in that the pupil will develop 'self-esteem', when they are taught by such teachers. Pupils should have the 'opportunity to experience leadership as well as membership of groups'. All subjects should promote the personal qualities of 'independence of mind, respect for truth, persistence, flexibility and imaginativeness'. One is then invited to inspect a list of desirable personal qualities: 'self-confidence and consideration for others, self-reliance, self-discipline'.

An interim conclusion states that PSE courses should be 'flexible and responsive to the needs and interests of pupils, and take account of changing social and educational priorities'. (1989 p 10) But as one would expect the distinction is made between what are proper requirements for social living and with what can be an individual's own concern. The Report continues: 'However, it is always easy in practice to try and establish an unnecessary degree of social conformity, and to neglect the need of individuals to develop, within reasonable limits, in their own way'. Presumably, teachers themselves have to attempt to adjust external demands to private projects.

The final section (pp 13-15) is divided into three broad areas. The first is that in which we find lists of those personal qualities

and attributes that are needed by all pupils. At the risk of duplication, we might enumerate some of these qualities and attributes thus: independence of mind, self-reliance, self-discipline and self-respect: an enterprising and persistent approach to tasks and challenges; consideration for others; a sense of fairness, together with respect for the processes of law and for the legal rights of others: respect for ways of life, opinions and ideas different from one's own, provided they are based on consideration for others: a commitment to promoting the well being of the community through democratic means; and concern for conservation of the natural world and the physical, including the built, environment.


The second area enumerates what knowledge and understanding is required for appreciating just what kinds of people we are in relation to each other and in relation to the surroundings that people find themselves in. I put it this way because it is not clear what this area is really after. Nor, is it obvious how we distinguish between what are called personal qualities and attributes and what is called knowledge and understanding. However, here is a selection of what is mentioned; students should gain knowledge and understanding of: their own personality, needs, abilities and interests, together with a growing awareness of their particular strengths and weaknesses; human growth, together with some awareness of the nature of emotional, psychological and social development; similarities and differences between themselves and others in biological needs, physical characteristics and cultural background; together with awareness that these differences have implications for the way people relate to, and treat, each other; the nature of relationships in families, peer groups, friendships and work; and how to react if they are bullied or abused.

The third area of concern is with social responsibility; but again these responsibilities have already been covered to some extent in the preceding areas. There is no distinction, either, between what knowledge the individual needs as a precondition for responsibility and the dispositions of responsibilities themselves. Some of the listed items are: the nature of rules, why they exist and how they differ from law; sources of legal information and advice; the legal and moral aspects of sexual relationships and marriage; the nature of work, involving understanding of career opportunities, and how these relate to personal aspirations; ways in which social groups are structured economically, politically and socially; the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; and decision-making in a democratic

society.

An explicit attempt to incorporate all the items in PSE schemes into a needs-model is to be found in Lang.(1988 pp 17) This model focusses on two continua. One continuum is from what he calls positive developmental needs to what the writer terms crisis-orientated needs. The other continuum stretches from utilitarian needs to higher order needs. He suggests further that other continua may be introduced as more needs begin to be thought relevant to PSE. These might range from 'quasi-psychological' concerns such as 'drug misuse or child abuse' to concern about an individual's self-image such as we find in terms like 'self-esteem'. Another continuum might include at one end what promotes 'effective study and cognitive development' and at the other end what promotes 'affective' development. The basic model is presented thus:

A model of the range of needs which underpin personal and social education



This model is an attempt at classifying needs and indicating the context in which they might find their expression. It is difficult to know whether the model is adequate to the detail and complexity of what is required by an individual in his life. And the question for whom he requires it arises. We collectively require capacities and capabilities and these may not always have a justification for each of us as separate individuals. What I need may not be to the advantage of everyone else, or anyone else. Once again it is difficult to know why certain items feature in the quadrant just where they do. For example, crises appear in all aspects of life. Employment, and certainly unemployment, can be sources of crises in an individual's life. Personal autonomy and the ability to empathize are dispositions that find their expression in a multiplicity of contexts in life. It is important to realize that we cannot compartmentalize most of our qualities and attributes that are needed in life. We need a fitting setting for their proper expression. Again, some might want to query the whole idea of having a continuum with higher order needs at one end and utilitarian needs at the other. This may entail a false dichotomy, depending on how one interprets the needs concerned. If the higher order needs are disguised utilitarian needs, the continuum is faulty.

One might just as well simply list the needs and see what they amount to in each instance. It is not obvious that Maslow's hierarchy of needs should come at the higher order end of the continuum. It has been argued that there is too much 'selfism' in his characterization of needs. It is not the fact that one might list needs in the way Maslow does but rather what one might say about the character of them. As a matter of fact pupils and students do react against a language of needs when the focus is on the needs of each individual himself. They appear too self-serving. I have seen students recoil from the 'me, me, me' of some Social and Life Skills schemes on these grounds.

I might present such a 'module' from a college of my acquaintance. Students are encouraged to reflect on their needs after a process of self-examination, guided by certain categories that are thought to be central to an individual's make-up. The idea of the self is recruited to stimulate a student's responses. The objective self is revealed in the self-descriptions in the listed categories. The subjective self is in the tone of the 'I-experience'. The other self is what students believe others think of them and the ideal self is a projection of an ideal that students might try to reach. As I have said, some students

tend to react against the 'me, me, me' implied in such exercises. Here is the list of categories then:

1. Physique: 'I'm tall'; 'My skin is poor'; 'I'm fatter than you'.
2. Skills: These are motor, cognitive, social and integrative. Examples are, 'I'm good at sport'; 'I can't learn quickly'; 'I get on well with people'; 'I can manage my problems myself'.
3. Feelings: 'I get angry very easily'; 'I'm usually happy'.
4. Traits: 'I'm reasonably co-operative'.
5. Attitudes: 'I'm easily biased against foreigners'.
6. Interests: 'I'm interested in reading and gardening'.
7. Values: 'I'd regard myself as an honest person'.
8. Motives: 'I want to do well at work'.
9. Philosophy of Life: 'I'm the kind of person who's thought about the great problems that face men - suffering, good and evil and so on.'

Some of the needs that are thought to arise from such self-scrutiny are assertiveness, though not aggression, confidence, self-worth, responsiveness, self-expression and honesty. Now, of course, what such self-scrutiny might achieve is the opposite of what is expected. Much damage may be done to the self-images (this word is part of the same package) of the students concerned. Teachers have to be sensitive to a degree that the conditions in schools and colleges may not allow.

Richard Pring presents his own recommendations for a PSE curriculum (1984 pp 114-115) which I present on page 85.

In a much quoted book by K. David, Personal and Social Education in Secondary Schools (1983 p 18) we find the much quoted definition of PSE. David says:

Personal and social education includes the teaching and informal activities which are planned to enhance the development of knowledge, understanding, attitudes and behaviour, concerned with: oneself and others; social institutions, structures and organization; and social and moral issues.

This view of PSE has surely influenced a great deal that has come later. But we might say that it is more or less a neutral overview of what PSE tries to promote. In the following passage we begin to see a more committed view, although it is presented in general terms. We might see it then as an introduction to what I present below. Braun and Torkington write as follows: 'The emphasis in personal, social and moral education is on enabling pupils to acknowledge and fully under-

Cognitive capacity <i>Note a</i>	Facts to be known	Attitudes, feelings, dispositions	Practical application <i>Note b</i>
<p>A General considerations</p> <p>(i) Being a person (including the capacity for entering into personal relations) <i>Note c</i></p>			
<p>(ii) Moral perspective</p>			
<p>(iii) Ideals (including religious and other styles of life) <i>Note d</i></p>			
<p>B Specific application</p> <p>(i) Moral rules, behaviours and so on</p>			
<p>(ii) Social issues (a) race (b) sexism (c) nuclear war (d) environment (for example, pollution) <i>Note e</i></p>			
<p>(iii) Politics (a) citizenship or membership of the state (b) community participation (c) the rule of the law</p>			
<p>(iv) Place within society (a) occupation (b) status and class (c) economic and social needs</p>			
<p>(v) Health (a) physical (b) mental</p>			

Notes

- (a) **Cognitive capacity** – this includes reasoning ability, understanding, acquisition of relevant concepts.
- (b) **Practical application** – how a person actually behaves, plus habits and skills required to behave appropriately. These are distinguishable sub-categories that could appear as such if one did not mind a very complicated matrix.
- (c) **Being a person** – this includes general social growth, social awareness, and so on, since, if my analysis in chapters 2 and 3 is correct, development as a person is inseparable from coming to see oneself in relation to others, coming to see things from another's point of view, and developing some sense of reciprocity and community.
- (d) **Ideals** – too often personal growth is seen from a purely psychological point of view and moral growth is seen in the context of principles and duty. But the place of ideals in development, going beyond what is obligatory, needs to be explored. In a secular education, religion might be seen as one way of providing ideals that transcend the needs of everyday transactions.
- (e) **Social issues** – these will no doubt change from society to society, but in our society the ones listed seem to be issues in which respect for persons, social awareness, and moral ideals have current significance. Different schools might wish to add other issues to the list.

stand their own value position in relation to the values of society, and of other pupils in the class'. (Brown et al 1986 p 188)

More Committed Views of Needs in Personal Development

As I have indicated, personal development in the context of Social and Life Skills and Preparation for Life is a concern into which everyone wants to 'chip'. In much that is said, even if it is only in lists of desirable qualities and attributes, one can detect more general social and political outlooks and proposals for action. We might consider the following statement in Hopson and Scally:

Self-empowerment begins with oneself and spreads to others; but self-empowered behaviour is most effectively developed in systems that are structured to encourage, reinforce, and teach it. 'Social action or self-empowerment' is a false dichotomy. People can become more self-empowered by learning lifeskills, by teachers modelling growth-oriented values, and helping students become more aware of their internal and external worths, by giving them information, by helping them develop goals and commitments, but also by working to change our schools and other institutions into empowering rather than depowering places to live and work. (1981 p 79)

In this passage personal development is a species of self-empowerment. Certain qualities and attributes are valued and in self-empowerment one is encouraged 'to increasingly take greater charge of oneself and ones life'. Self-creation is suggested too in that we need to be self-empowered to develop what we have it within ourselves to become. The implied liberal/radical stance would concentrate the mind of neo-conservative educationalists - and other educationalists for that matter.

Caroline St John-Brooks in her paper 'English: A Curriculum for Personal Development' (1983 pp 38, 57) says that: 'From a rationalist perspective, education is training for work and schools are responsible for equipping children with skills to sell in the market place. Romanticism sees education as personal development.' In the notes to her paper she continues: 'I distinguish between a rationality, which represents detachment, clarity of thought and analytic powers, and rationalism which is, rather, an uncritical assent to the hierarchic structure and demands of society outside the individual. Rationalism can be seen as a debased form of rationality. Romanticism ... is a mixture of individualism and social idealism perhaps best defined by T.E. Hulme'. She then quotes the almost obligatory passage from Hulme in Speculations:

Here is the root of all romanticism: that man, the individual, is an infinite reservoir of possibilities; and if you can so rearrange society by the destruction of oppressive order then these possibilities will have a chance and you will get Progress.
(Hulme 1960 p 116)

What she fails to say is that Hulme discloses the root of Romanticism to condemn it. We might consider the next paragraph:

One can define the classical quite clearly as the exact opposite to this. Man is an extraordinarily fixed and limited animal whose nature is absolutely constant. It is only by tradition and organisation that anything decent can be got out of him.
(Hulme 1960 p 116)

For Hulme, Romanticism is 'spilt religion'. We retreat into it when we have lost genuine religion. St John-Brooks does say the following but neglects to elaborate on it and it may, in fact, take her where she does not want to go. She says: 'The root conflict is between the individual and society, which is itself a Romantic construct'. (1983 p 57)

However one interprets the conflicts between the individual and society, there is a tension in New Right thinking in this respect. Graham and Clarke in *The New Enlightenment* (1986 pp 86-87) quote Irving Kristol to point up the conflict between the individualism of an enterprise culture and the hierarchical stability of traditional institutions and pieties. Capitalism does not produce the morality needed to sustain it. 'Neo-conservatives adopt an attitude that is not 'economic'.' 'We are not bourgeois' says Kristol. He continues: 'It is bourgeois society that produces the kinds of people who make a free market work and who make capitalism acceptable. ... The first job of a civilization is to produce a certain kind of person'. Graham and Clarke then quote Kristol more fully:

What we are looking for is an intellectual way of connecting the free market with an attitude towards life that is not economic but derived from religion or at least from traditional values. ... A free market, in and of itself, doesn't tell you what kind of person to produce. A free market involves only the exercise of self-interest within a limited sphere, namely the economy. But you need an ethos that tells you how to raise your children, whether you should marry or stay married, whether you should be loyal to your friends or to your government. I don't like the contradiction between individualism and collectivism. In fact, most Americans are both individualist and communal, rather than collectivist. We all belong to communities of some kind, religious, fraternal, professional. These play an important part in our lives.

I might mention here that the Hillgate Group in *Whose Schools?* (1986 pp 1-4) are concerned with the kind of people needed for their envisaged society. The scene is set by showing what the writers are against. They quote A.H. Halsey who said in 1965 (rather a long time ago one would have thought) that '... some people, and I am one, want to use education as an instrument in the pursuit of an egalitarian society ...'. They attack child-centred learning and relevance, as opposed to subject-centred learning. Personal development would centre on 'lore and the literature of our country'. The manifesto includes a recognition that 'Children need a firm moral and spiritual basis, which will engender the values on which their future happiness depends: honesty, industry, charity, respect for others and the law. Children need to be instructed in religious doctrine, in accordance with the wishes and faith of their parents.' In part such a curriculum would replace the present 'politicization of the curriculum'. Their fashionable enemies are 'anti-racism, anti-sexism, peace education (which usually means C.N.D. propaganda) and anti-hetrosexism (meaning the preaching of homosexuality combined with an attack on the belief that hetrosexuality is normal)'.

Kristol, as we have seen, is concerned with the way in which children become persons of the sort who honour certain pieties and fidelities. But, I need to mention here, there is a perspective on personal development which is concerned with how children acquire sufficient cultural resources before they begin a journey into the human world. I have discussed this issue throughout the above pages but here is a passage from David Armstrong in *New Directions in Pastoral Care*. He says:

The aim of such research (taking up a role) would be to understand the processes through which children learn to take up the pupil role and own it for themselves. The underlying hypothesis is that children who can do this are better able to manage themselves in school, to take responsibility for their learning, to make choices, and to maintain working relationships with adults as teachers or tutors. An important corollary is that these young people will be better able to manage themselves outside school, even under far from favourable circumstances.

(1985 p 97)

We may have seen often enough, in the literature of personal development, the desire to slough off roles to reveal some truer self. The aim here is to absorb enough 'social clothing' to function in society at all.

In a short section on what is needed for personal development, R.S. Peters (1972 pp 511-515) distinguishes between such essential social clothing and what he calls human excellences or ideals of personal development. What I have referred to as the minimum 'social clothing' for a person to function in society at all, Peters calls a 'kind of L.C.M.'. The way that Peters describes this 'kind of L.C.M.' is as a kind of minimum general understanding. Peters is more concerned though with what he calls a 'kind of H.C.F. of personal development, to use a facon de parler, which cuts across the distinct modes of experiences'. Peters acknowledges that different traditions of thought will have their own human excellences. For Freud an ideal of man would be 'a cautious egoist, a prudent devotee of the nicely calculated more or less in the realm of satisfactions'. A more Greek type of approach would single out human excellences that evoke admiration rather than approval. An example from our time might be a sneaking admiration for the Great Train Robbers. No doubt they developed certain excellences to a high degree in those universities of crime we call prisons. All of us can think of our own 'real' men. Peters enumerates some ideals of human excellence but stresses they need not be normative - that is, they may be objects of admiration rather than objects of emulation.

An example of an ideal would be '... thinking critically, being creative and autonomous: displaying foresight, strength of character and integrity. To clarify his point he says that: 'In the moral sphere we approve of straightforward virtues such as courage, fairness, benevolence and the like. But we admire people who display higher-order traits such as strength of will in persisting in some virtue like honesty in the face of temptation and ridicule. We might also admire people for their integrity when they are impervious to corruption and double-mindedness, for their autonomy in proceeding with a course of action in the face of social pressure'. Peters continues 'Being a person ... (is to have) an assertive point of view with evaluation, decision and choice and with being ... an individual who determines his own destiny by his choices'. Human excellence for Peters is to develop ordinary human capacities to a considerably high degree. He says that 'Critical thought is a development of evaluation, autonomy of choice, creativity of the attempt to launch out on one's own and to impose one's stamp on a product; integrity is shown in sticking to one's principles in the face of temptations and strength of will in holding fast to a policy that has been adopted as one's own.

If we want a picture of Peters' own philosophy of life we might turn to R.K. Elliott who says that Peters':

... (P)hilosophy of life is founded on the Stoic precept that one should remedy such ills as can be remedied and accept without complaint those that cannot. More than this, his work is pervaded by Stoic moods, attitudes and values: individualism, for example, universalism, faith in truth and reason, respect for autonomy, distrust of Utopianism, a keen sense of the human predicament, compassionate detachment, the advocacy and practice of self-control, reverence for the world and for the individual experiencing it. What in Peters we superficially take to be Kantian is often more profoundly attributable to a temperament of the same general kind as Kant's, and to a mind which was nourished directly by the classical past.
(Elliott 1986 p 46)

If education is a concern about the whole man, then we might say that an educated man is a man with a point of view from which he takes in the whole world. From his perspective he aspires to grasp things in their totality. (See J. Pieper 1952 p 45) Peters as the Stoic occupies such a perspective. If personal development is a concern about what values enter a person's life, we might say that those values come together in such a perspective as that of the Stoic. But this is not the only perspective. We need only think of the Christian, the Marxist, the Christian or atheistic Existentialist and so forth. Some writers see personal development being just such an initiation into these types of perspective.

We might contrast this with a 'thin' idea of personal development in which the person should have sufficient private space to be, or to do, his own thing. In that private space a person might fashion himself into a Stoic or Christian Existentialist. How these turn out as ways of being persons in the world is another matter.

However, it is one thing to list desirable qualities and attributes and present pictures of the developed person; it is quite another to know how to give them an actual individual shape. For example, if we accept that a Stoical philosophy of life makes sense as both a coherent set of beliefs and values and a view that can actually be applied to life, we still need to know what it can amount to in a person's life and, prior to that, how we might begin to get it into the individual person, if that is the task we set ourselves as teachers. Of course, it might be part of our philosophy that we are disinclined to get anything into anybody without his reasoned consent. It hardly needs saying that this last condition cannot be met in small children, for reason itself has to

find a way into them.

We might come down to earth by looking at what a sample of respondents had to say about personal development in their working lives. In *Contrasting Values in Western Europe*, Harding, Phillips and Fogarty (1986 pp155-159) analysed fifteen job characteristics for their relative weightings in an individual's working life. Their table lists three categories - personal development (intrinsic worth), pleasantness (extrinsic worth) and security and reward (extrinsic worth). The respondents assessed each work value for its intrinsic and relative importance on these three scales. The table appears overleaf on page 92.

The researchers draw several conclusions from the full data. Qualities associated with personal development are given greater weight by non-manual workers than they are by professional and managerial workers. Semi- and unskilled workers are more concerned with extrinsic qualities. Those who have spent longest in education, especially higher education, are significantly more likely to give personal development priority. Both men and women in general give priority to security and reward aspects of work. Women in part-time work still put security and reward top of their ratings but pleasantness of the work comes close behind. The researchers rehearse many other obvious conclusions. As one would expect we find correlations between home background, income, wealth and culture and such conceptions of personal development as feature in the table. The researchers tend to fall back on the platitude that lower order needs have to be satisfied before higher order needs assume relevance as motivators in people's lives. We need to ask many questions about their whole enterprise. Why do we want to call 'an opportunity to use one's initiative', 'a job you can feel you can achieve something' and a 'responsible job' personal development? What interpretation do we put on such qualities of jobs? What do they entail and how do people perceive them in practice? Moreover, we cannot choose personal development as a characteristic of jobs if the possibility of personal development is not an aspect of the jobs. It all comes down to what is meant by personal development in the context of the research. The researchers do not say. We might intuitively construe its meaning as that some intrinsic sense is given to what one is doing and there is some opportunity to exercise one's characteristic human attributes. There is present in the respondents some aspirations to give expression to those qualities and attributes exhibiting those essential characteristics of human beings catalogued by Quinton. We value some things higher than others when we are given proper choices and those things

TABLE 5.2 Work values: factor analysis of 15 job characteristics

Percentage Rating 'Important'	Job Characteristic	F1 Personal Development (Intrinsic)	F2 Pleasantness (Extrinsic)	F3 Security and Reward (Extrinsic)
29	1. A job respected by people in general	0.42	0.39	0.11
43	2. An opportunity to use initiative	0.69	0.11	0.05
35	3. A useful job for society	0.55	0.32	-0.08
41	4. Meeting people	0.54	0.36	-0.10
46	5. A job you feel you can achieve something	0.66	0.02	0.19
38	6. A responsible job	0.65	0.06	0.20
57	7. A job that is interesting	0.57	0.12	0.20
49	8. A job that meets one's abilities	0.57	0.19	0.14
62	9. Pleasant people to work with	0.34	0.44	0.01
25	10. Not too much pressure	0.13	0.73	0.08
39	11. Good hours	0.07	0.67	0.33
26	12. Generous holidays	0.12	0.67	0.33
64	13. Good pay	0.00	0.20	0.74
59	14. Good job security	0.18	0.14	0.66
33	15. Good chances for promotion	0.44	0.10	0.54

Type of Rotation: Varimax.
Variance accounted for: 46%.

are exhibited in our humanization of anything. Of course, we know what shape 'an opportunity to use one's initiative' takes in most jobs. What is more important is what it could mean.

Everyone in a sense is for personal development. It is one of those 'pro' expressions that is questioned only on the condition that it is overridden by a higher order 'pro' word or expression. But interpretation is important here. We might say that everyone (or almost everyone) is for honesty, personal values, spiritual awareness, self-esteem and so forth but what are the 'cash values' of those qualities and attributes? Several people might share honesty as a personal value but might want to know what its content is in the lives of people differently related to political power or the dealings in the City of London. I am not arguing for a 'relativism' in all things but there can be genuine disagreements about the content of 'fairness' for example. I have said that interpretation is important. What I mean by this is that people hold different values and give them a different interpretation. The interpretation in its turn will be in terms of further values. I wish to situate personal development in the domain of values because the argument is about the sorts of people we can and ought to be and that where there are differences these differences will be constituted by a vocabulary of values. We not only hold values but put values on different things. The values we hold are, of course, bound up with what we value. We find both ways of putting it in our attachments to certain intellectual virtues, practical competencies, contours of personalities, moral beliefs and virtues, character traits and personal values.

It is no revelation to know that some people put more emphasis on the development of character than on the development of intellectual virtues. Again, personality may be valued over character, although one may need character to persevere with one's personality development. (This is the case if there is a mature choice. In connection with some super stars, it has been said of them that they have developed personality before they become persons.) One may value character because not to have character is to be easily led, weak and to respond to the immediacies of pleasure. To have no personality is to be a shrinking violet. Today, of course, in schools the language is that of wets and whimps. Character, on the other hand, is a matter of the will. It is exhibited in control, perseverance and consistency in seekings to realize long-term ends, amongst other things. Character-building involves training in sticking at things in the face of every

impulse to do otherwise. Personality-building is said to be a more 'cosmetic art', more aesthetic in contrast with the morally sterner stuff of character. But both character and personality refer to the more persistent and enduring fabric of our desires, tastes, inclinations, aversions, sentiments, values and habits which constitute the core of the individual. Character is what the person actually has; personality is what is witnessed in public display. I mention this contrast in some detail because when much of the vocabulary of personal development is translated into practice it is with the 'cosmetic' that it is concerned. We may value such developments but we need to be clear in respect of what they are.

R.S. Peters (1974 pp 400-401) presents a brief typology of character and personality traits. He says that character traits are regarded as virtues or vices. As virtues they have an executive role in that they are exercised in the face of undesirable inclinations. But we may mention in this context that certain features of our temperaments are neither the product of our wills nor manipulable features of our personalities. They tend to be part of the structure of our selves. Because they are not a product of, nor easily controllable by, the will, this does not mean that they are not morally assessable. To have a placid disposition might be a blessing in certain circumstances that are forever precipitating conflict. It can be a blessing for the person who is placid as well as the more irascible in the situations of conflict. Peters mentions too, those underlying motivations in our make-up which determine our goals in life.

Personality traits such as 'friendliness, cheerfulness, shyness, awkwardness, alertness ...' develop or flower rather than result from 'decisions or by the internalization of rules'. We could say here that cheerfulness might be a temperamental disposition and not something cosmetic. However, Peters summarizes his position as follows:

For, whereas our character bears witness to the choices which we have made and suggests some sort of personal effort to make something of ourselves, our personality is very much the mask or appearance which we present to us. A man with a strong character is a man who has made efforts with himself and who exhibits virtues such as courage and integrity that are connected with the will. But we do not naturally speak of a man having a strong personality. Rather we speak of personality being forceful, dynamic and hypnotic. These terms draw attention to his influence on others.

(1974 p 401)

I mention these points briefly because a language of needs has to cope with such complexities of character, personality and so on if such

a language of needs is to be any use.

It can also be said that we are strongly or weakly related to ourselves and to our human setting. If we are only 'accidentally' attached to 'our' qualities and attributes as is Musil's Man Without Qualities, we have no solidity on which to build our personal, social and cultural bonds. We might be free but in what does our freedom consist? If the fit between personality and environment is too tight, the individual may be closely identified with his qualities and attributes but he would have no room to breathe. In the latter case, what does it matter if he is happy? That depends on whether happiness is our highest value and upon what the happiness supervenes. Again would we sacrifice truth for happiness? In the interest of personal harmony or social solidarity, some thinkers would want to instill certain beliefs and values in the population at large, although they themselves would decline such attachments. To conclude I want to bring out these points in a little more detail.

Some conservative thinkers want to introduce moral and religious dogma into the school curriculum in an attempt to produce identities of a certain sort. In specific areas, foregone conclusions are acceptable because to question them is to bring in dubious liberal and democratic ideas from the start. The liberal appears to be the real enemy. Roger Scruton in The Times (Nov 11, 1986) asserts that 'The liberal argues that all values are inherently unjustifiable and therefore that none have a right to prevail'. There are no intrinsic values for the liberal because each person chooses his own values. Majority values (presumably these do have intrinsic worth) are 'inherently unjustifiable because oppressive'. The liberal, leftists and egalitarians are run together and are the collective enemies of the 'elitist culture that has been entrusted to us'. These people enter their natural home, which is the state educational system, and 'constantly seek new ways of breaking down the distinctions by which our society is governed'. Scruton wants people to absorb values according to their station and duties and become people with certain sorts of identity so that an elitist, hierarchical and authoritarian society can flourish. As we have seen the Hillgate Group want the lore and literature of our country in the curriculum. Presumably this lore and literature already has receded into the mists of time and gained certain sanctity thereby.

One may not wish to look too closely at such 'institutions' for fear they will not bear the weight put on them. What is old was once

new and it is unlikely that it was as we should like it to have been. One is reminded of what that archetypal 'white hat', John Wayne, said about American Western lore. 'If that was not how it was then that is how it ought to have been.' How it ought to have been is captured in John Ford Westerns. I might say that Wayne had condemned the film High Noon as unAmerican because it perhaps did say how it was. One, therefore, develops an identity or social self that proclaims the 'truth' of the 'myth'. As in most things, the image may well not match the reality of one's life.

Scruton's targets, whoever they are, are portrayed as people who want to shatter the scheme of things entire and shape and reshape things, themselves included, nearer to the heart's desire. The heart, on this reading, if it has reasons of its own, is a spurious semblance of desire, appetite and inclination - all abstractions fabricated by the liberal cast of mind. The emancipated urban intellectual sets the pace. Our fulfilment they tell us is to satisfy as many choices as short time permits. Self-fulfilment is the free satisfaction of desire. The liberal is detached from all unchosen aspects of himself. But freedom, for the liberal, isolates man from all those inherited traditions and institutions that give one substance such that one's choices repose on something that makes choice other than arbitrary.

One example of this something is 'natural piety' which gives the individual the core of his moral identity. In piety we recognize the transcendental significance of filial bonds - transcendental because they are not contracted. One does not have to be a neo-conservative to accept this. It is what is done with it and other things like it that is the difficulty. However, Scruton tells us that our joy and happiness is to be found in the inherited laws and customs of our homeland. In The Times (December 16, 1986) Scruton attacks the triumph of the half-educated, who have infiltrated all the major institutions of our society. These again are presented as the true enemies of his brand of what is the Right Wing. By 'Right Wing' Scruton means 'the appreciation of true achievements, obedience to authority and to be firm against obstreperous demands for 'equality' and 'liberation'.'

In a similar vein Scruton and his colleagues (1985 pp 45-46) argue that both established morality and religion are needed as ingredients in an individual's happiness. Morality and religion are characterized, once again, as 'foregone conclusions' - that is they are not arrived at by argument or critical reasoning. These foregone conclusions are contrasted with those that are not legitimate and have a political intent.

Liberals and the radical left want to indoctrinate their pupils and students with educationally suspect foregone conclusions. We have, then, to accept morality and religion as given and absorb them as part of our inheritance. They are, these writers claim, articles of faith. Aristotle is recruited to give his stamp of approval. Scruton and his colleagues say: 'Children ... enter the palace of reason through the courtyard of habit, and in morality and religion it is habit, not the reason, which counts'. Morality and religion are presented as needs without which children would fail to thrive.

The question is, for whom are the foregone conclusions intended? It is true that we have to be built up as persons before we can begin to reason about morality and religion. But at what point in our education should we begin to develop critical powers in these areas? Scruton and his colleagues give the impression, at times, that these foregone conclusions are foregone for the rest of an individual's life - at least for many people in society. Hyper-intellectuals bear a heavy burden in knowing more than the rest of us can cope with. They have insights into the truth of our condition. The world as an entity independent of our ways of perceiving it is a world without meaning. Meaning resides in the human world interpreted as a veil of Maya - that is our cultural Lebenswelt.' (Scruton 1987 p 616) This is the world we have to inhabit to remain human. It is a world of meanings and value and not of causes. The human world, then, is a 'reflection of ourselves, but a reflection made objective'. There is a certain justice in saying of Scruton that he is a Romantic Nihilist. I shall return to these points later in the discussion.

Scruton's charge against liberals and the left is one that has a long pedigree. The pedigree is that what you value has its conditions. If you undermine those conditions, you lose what you have and what you value, although what you value, if you are a liberal or a leftist, is only imperfectly understood and is always underdescribed. Freedom has its conditions. Joy and happiness have theirs too. The liberal and his close allies abstract from what we have, then set these abstractions up as criteria for the better life. The charge is that it is all self-defeating. This is the best construction that one can put on Scruton. The worst is that one can make the consequences of non-compliance with the favoured institutions of society so bad that prudence would make it advisable to honour whatever is handed down as 'transcendentally obligatory'. Strong attachments pay.

Neo-conservatives argue then for a strong communitarianism of an

extremely authoritarian kind. The individual, whose development should take a clearly defined direction, is the product of society not its premise. If society creates him, there is a dubiety about his having rights against it. But why should one accept this reasoning? One can accept that the individual is not a natural creation but still resists the neo-conservative solution to our problems. Why cannot the potentialities of the community, given its different spheres as Walzer (1983) argues, enlarge the possibilities for the individual? Walzer's kind of communitarianism is more generous in its implications for personal development and identity creation. People can have attachments to socially defined qualities and attributes and a strong attachment to their community and have an enlarged conception of freedom.

A communitarianism of a more egalitarian character would expect persons of a different sort to emerge. Participatory democracy enables people to develop self-esteem and encourages them to grow towards a fuller expression of their personalities. There is a certain self-developmental process in participatory democracy. Such democracy is not so much a means to an end but an intrinsically worthwhile activity in which people are agents in their own development. Actually participating in self-government creates citizens with the individual qualities and psychological attitudes to make such participation possible. A participatory system becomes self-maintaining because the qualities and attributes essential to its support are brought into being in the act of participation. Those educationalists who stress political literacy as a chief component in personal development hope that a school or college can become the type of community in which participation and the acquisition of desired qualities and attributes reinforce each other. They may have in mind Sandel's constitutive conception of community. (Sandel 1981) In such a community people are in harmony with themselves and this is reflected in the right kind of harmony in the community. This is not incompatible with disagreement, however. There is no loss of self-esteem if one loses an argument or a vote. Anyway this is how it is seen.

It is clear that certain qualities and attributes of character and personality are suited to some social arrangements more than others. It is equally clear that these social arrangements are constituted in part by those qualities and attributes that are possessed by people. We might not want to go as far as Schumacher in *Small is Beautiful* (1974 p 24) when he says that: 'The modern economy is propelled by a frenzy of greed and envy, and these are not accidental features but

the very causes of its expansionist success'. But we need to identify those motives that drive people in a society that sanctions behaviour that can so readily be described as greedy and envious. Greed and envy in themselves cannot hold a person together, although greed has been used as a virtue-term by our more success orientated 'non-members' of our society. A person with these vices as motives, so this line of thinking continues, would simply be precipitated into inchoate action. He would scarcely have an identity to which he could be attached. Or rather he would scarcely be a 'he' in an identity structure. The 'he' is not contingently related to the identity. I could equally have said 'she' but some writers might want to resist this identity 'mark' and use 'subject' whatever minimal specification it has. A person with a minimal identity structure would barely hold together as a person and he would have little to bind him to other people. Greed and envy then are expressed in the dimension of a person. Such a person may have all the qualities and attributes fitted for success in a modern Western society. It is these qualities and attributes that mediate his relations with other people. Robert E. Lane in *Capitalist Man, Socialist Man* (1979 p69) has enumerated some of those traits that 'seem to be a product of Western type education'. They are:

- (1) the capacity for innovative thinking, implying cognitive complexity and the ability to imagine conditions contrary to fact;
- (2) an evaluative support of novelty and change implied, for example, in disagreement with the standard personality measurement question, 'If you try to change things very much, you will usually make them worse;'
- (3) characterological autonomy such that one is not at the mercy of either conventional authority or public opinion, that is, lack of conformism or an obedience orientation;
- (4) tolerance of ambiguity, of heterodoxy, and a willingness to entertain and 'play along with' a discrepant idea, and
- (5) to make these capacities and attitudes and values effective, a belief in the effectiveness of one's own actions, the absence of powerlessness/helplessness syndrome. (1979 p 69)

If Schumacher is right, greed and envy would have these traits as their instruments. But these qualities would be accompanied by other qualities which together constitute the person. Just what qualities and what kind of society they serve, and in their turn are served by, is what we need to be clear about in personal development. Societies will be on a continuum from strongly communitarian to thinly or weakly instrumental. People will be well suited or ill suited to the demands that they need to or ought to make on themselves and to the demands that issue from the social arrangements which constitute their lives together.

The qualities and attributes that Lane lists cannot be detached from the practices and institutions of certain kinds of society. This is true of all the values, qualities and attributes I have discussed above. Whatever shape personal development takes it will reflect those values that interpret, or are associated with, those personal qualities and attributes that we think desirable in people. The strength or weakness of the relation of those qualities and attributes to the person himself and, through those qualities and attributes, the relation of the person to the kinds of community in which he lives will be the subject matter of any description of how a person engages with society. The question of how we justify a particular programme of personal development will depend upon the values to which we appeal. Many values will not be justifiable ultimately. It is in those values that we discover the criteria for what we feel to be in need of justification. It might not be satisfactory but perhaps the most we can do is lay bare just what our values are. What we recommend as the content of a personal development programme will be closely related to our values. These values, however, do not preclude, or ought not to preclude, an appreciation that others may have different values from ourselves. Many of the values in a pluralist society will be values that encourage a recognition of difference. We will no doubt have to take a stand on the kind of society we desire, what we consider to be the good life and what qualities and attributes serve that society and good life and how these in turn provide the conditions for the qualities and attributes that are needed for that society and its constituent good life. The terms strong and weak need not be wholly value-words, although they need to be embedded in contested pictures of what it is to be properly constituted persons within desirable human settings. They describe the nature and limits of our attachments to our qualities and attributes and through them to the possibilities in the communities in which we live and the aspirations which we have for those communities. If communities are on a continuum from strong to weak, the sorts of people who flourish or perhaps merely survive in them will display those values that are desired, tolerated or condemned, depending on the perspective from which they are viewed.

Concluding Remarks about Needs-Statement

All the above listed items in the various areas of personal development can be made objects of needs-statements. Such needs-statements

imply a background of intelligibility and a sense of what goods are to be satisfied or achieved. At their most comprehensive, such lists of needs focus on what is required to bring an individual into his full humanity. What this might consist in is disputed. Taking a Roget's Thesaurus view of the ascending importance of words that enter into the definition of our human condition, we might say that at the top of the ascending scale are those moral and religious words that are crucial in our self-interpretations. Such self-interpretations, if not infinitely contested, are at least contested. Needs-statements might, then, have as their reference a picture of what a certain fullness of being could be. They might, on the other hand, have as their reference what is needed just to carry on in life. If we are speaking of a fulfilled life, it has its conditions. What we need to cope in certain departments of life may provide the conditions for a more fulfilled life in general. It might be a matter of just surviving or coping across all dimensions of an individual's life. We need to get on to terms with one department of life to create greater possibilities in others. Social and Life Skills may well focus on certain elementary functioning skills that are necessary, though not sufficient, for a fuller life in general. In this case the background and the goods are narrowly conceived. But it does not mean that a person's life as a whole is attenuated. On the other hand it might.

If needs-statements are definitive of what is required by people to get onto terms with life, no matter what degree of fullness or attenuatedness, then we need to give a proper account of them. At one extreme are those states of our nature that have an urgency about them if they remain unsatisfied. They are bound up with our physical well-being. But there are many culturally defined needs that have a pressing tone about them. We cannot easily do without our higher-order moral and religious satisfactions. If they are not exactly urgent, they are persistent aspects of our second nature as it were. There are those areas, then, in which we need to think about how what it is to be a person is bound up with our physical nature.

Very broadly, we should also distinguish between what we need for ourselves as each individual and what we need for our collective living - that is, we need to distinguish between what serves our needs and interests as individuals and what serves our needs and interests as members of communities and collectivities. This contrast between the individual and society is one of the permanent themes in personal and social education. These needs and interests that belong to us as

social beings are not to be conceived as disguised conditions for our individual well-being.

In addition we need many capacities and capabilities to actively engage in life. Our lives should not approximate to the passivity of lotus eaters, or at least as educationalists, we cannot recommend such a condition to our pupils and students. We need to get on to terms with other people in the rich complexity of human reciprocity and on to terms with the stuff of material reality. Also, our lives are mediated by institutions in our organized living. We need social and cultural equipment to find our way about in such departments of life. We need, then, capacities and capabilities to be on terms with all the contours of our physical, social and cultural settings.

We not only need to know about the world but we need to form attachments to it. We explore the world and our human setting with our intellects; we also become attached to both in various ways. Our sensibility attaches us to other people and objects in the external world. In both these respects we become constituted as persons such that there is an internal connection between who we are and the people and external objects we need to be in contact with to remain unimpaired. We are undermined as people if we lose contact with them. The question 'what for?' in respect of needs is redundant here. But there are other needs-states and needs-capabilities where the question 'what for?' is not redundant. For example, we need mental and physical skills at our disposal and these may not be central to who we are and they may not be obviously needed. We could be without them and not much hang on it. The point here is that needs-statements require different kinds of justification. Some might argue, of course, that we are better off without many of the things that are said to be needed. Many of our satisfaction-needs, so it may be argued, are only artificially induced and, not only would we not notice were these not developed, but we should be better off in that they tend to deflect us from more authentic living. Such might be the message from those influenced by Rousseau. Often the more frivolous our needs, the more urgent the desire to satisfy them. We should, then, stick to our uncontaminated natures and abjure artificial needs.

If we use the word needs in this encompassing way, it is difficult to know what the word does not cover. When it is used in this encompassing way, it does not give us a separate language to interpret what personal development etc. might consist in as contrasted with something it is not. Often the words needs and desires are contrasted so that

We can get some purchase on what each might mean. But on the above interpretation, what we need may include properly constituted desires. For example, Roger Scruton in his book *Sexual Desire* (1986) has written about sexual desire and arousal and has argued that they need to be given a proper shape if we are to live our lives at their fullest. His whole argument is that we need to establish the proper nature of what something is, and then create the conditions for its realization. In this particular case, it is sexual desire. The upshot of Scruton's argument is that we know ourselves best when sexuality is expressed between two people of the opposite sex in a stable marital relationship and when each partner perceives the other as a proper intentional subject. Our highest fulfilment, in this respect, is when each person is present to the other in fully aroused flesh. The conclusion is that we need to realize this ideal of sexual fulfilment as part of our highest fulfilment as persons. So desire needs to be educated as part of our expressive fulfilment. There is no simple dichotomy on this interpretation between expression and repression. It is not a matter of liberating what is repressed; it is a matter of shaping desire into a proper human end.

Although we had desires, wants, preferences and inclinations long before they had been given an appropriate human shape, it may be said that they are not just given a human shape by the accidents of convention but need to be given such a shape if we are to realize our highest possibilities. To use need in this sense is to express a judgement of value. It is not simply to say that certain satisfaction-needs are given; it is to say that certain desires need to be constituted in appropriate ways. But in another sense the proper shape of these desires may come to be given, if we can arrange our culture so that alternatives are automatically ruled out. This is, in fact, the aim of many Romantic neo-conservatives such as Scruton himself. They would like to create an enveloping veil of maya - a seamless Lebenswelt - in which everything is given its proper place and appropriate shape.

When we speak about satisfaction-needs and exercise-needs we often disclose or implicitly suggest interpretive value-categories. As I suggested above, certain constitutive needs are part of what we conceive to be our humanity. And this is, in a sense, to say that in an important way we are not as persons interpretation all the way down. We assume that there is a certain boney structure to our humanity, without the expression and fulfilment of which we lose this humanity. But putting it in such a way is to suggest that there are competing

interpretations of what constitutes our human good. A boney structure in this sense does not necessarily mean that it is uniquely descriptive. Thus some of our needs-statements, used in a broad sense, are explicit or disguised value-assessments. Also, what is said to be our needs, or said to be what is needed, are subject to value appraisal. We raise, here, the issue of the extent to which needs can be the foundation of some of our values. And, as I have already said, we raise the question of the extent to which needs themselves are open to evaluation.

Given the possibility of the contested interpretations of which satisfaction-needs are worthy of our pursuit, and of which exercise-needs should be developed, we enter the realm of values. We ask of satisfaction-needs which ones are indefeasible and which ones are contested. Similarly we ask of exercise-needs which ones are indisputably required and which ones are disputed. In raising this question of which ones, we raise the questions of who says so and what is the basis of the authority for saying so. In a range of uses of the words needs and relevance, judgements of value are implicated. Since, over a range of some of our values, we do not agree, then what it means to be a well-constituted person will be disputed.

Over a range of the uses of the words needs and values, there appears to be a certain mutual translation. We can translate some of the language of needs into the language of values. When we say we need something, we often imply that we value it highly. But it works in reverse too. We value what we need. But often what we need is already interpreted in value-terms. We value love, in its many forms, highly. Some people might say it is the one absolute in the surrounding dross. Once love, though, becomes a vital part of who we are, it is then a need without the fulfilment of which we are impoverished as persons. Yet, as we have seen, needs are of different kinds. So too are our values. What is of worth, what is esteemed, what is thought desirable and good vary depending on what dimensions of experience and departments of life we have in mind. Value attaches to many different aspects of experience and properties of objects. We value things on moral, aesthetic, religious and economic grounds. Some needs are valued on the grounds of biological necessity. But if these latter needs are satisfied easily, as a matter of course, we fail to value them highly or sufficiently seriously. We certainly may have insufficient respect for the world that sustains us. The thought that God looked upon created things and saw that they were good is a thought we may not be able to do without, not simply on the grounds of utility,

although that is important enough, but on the grounds that our decency as persons is dependent upon having a proper respect for things. The Ancient Mariner found his humanity when he blessed the water snakes unawares. But we, again, raise the question of which needs and values and whose authority.

In what I have said in this concluding section, and in the rest of the above discussion when I have not directly referred to the various personal development curriculum recommendations, I take it to be read that I have been drawing on material in the itemized topics within such personal development recommendations. I have implicitly referred to what might fall under religion, moral, sex, sexuality, environmental and work components of personal development schemes. I have wanted to discuss these items in situ as it were. What I also hope has emerged is that much of the material might be classified as practical knowledge, understanding and reason. Teachers should foster, so it is proposed, the acquisition of relevant practical knowledge, understanding and reason. An individual should learn how to act, respond and feel in the appropriate ways in the various departments of life. Not all the appropriate ways of behaving and feeling are moral; so the moral has to be seen as a condition on other forms of practical knowledge, understanding and reason. Personal development in schools and colleges is seen by some as a replacement for what used to take place within the chapel or the home. Young people have to learn how to love, feel, respond, work and conduct themselves in the appropriate ways. If moral values are a condition on other values and practices, does this mean that moral values have always to be seen as placing conditions on what other values and practices are learnt in the various areas of personal development? If the answer is 'Yes', it is no more so than in all the other areas of the curriculum. We need, then, to look at what we mean by values and how these enter into what it is to be a decently constituted person, or more strongly, what it is to be a person per se. But first I want to look at the idea of essentially contested concepts.

CHAPTER 4

Essentially Contested Concepts, Normative Terms and Justification

What I have said in the preceding pages is meant to point to the question of how values and our relation to them set the parameters of personal development. Within these parameters we can discuss the limits on the direction that personal development can and ought to take. At this point I need to return to two concepts that I left mainly undiscussed - the notions of the essentially contested nature of certain central words in educational language and of the justification of the use of these words in our reflection on and in our determination of the school curriculum.

The question of which of our educational concepts are essentially contested arises from the claim that the meanings of many important words in our educational vocabulary, including the word education itself, have become so stretched that the conditions for the application of the words are irreconcilably disputed. The words are interpreted in such ways that they apply to the realization, or the longed for realization of, the aims and ideals embodied in them. For example, if the word education is interpreted in one way rather than another, it will pick out some ranges or contours of the world of educational thought and practice rather than others. If the interpretation of the word varies, so will the conditions for the word's correct application. When the meaning or the interpretation of a word is essentially contested, the application of the word is also inherently a matter of dispute. Think of the words democracy, freedom and equality. The interpretation of these words is meant to fit often very different political realities. Yet there must be sufficient distilled meaning in the words for them to be recognized as the same words.

The essentially contested nature of certain words is not like the situation in 'Alice in Wonderland' when Alice says to Humpty Dumpty "But 'Glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument'". Humpty Dumpty replied, "When I use a word ... it means what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less". To which Alice replies, "The question is ... whether you can make words mean so many different things". Even in this case, sufficient meanings of words are held stable to allow Humpty Dumpty to speak meaningfully to Alice. How could he make the point about his proprietary right over the meaning of words unless enough words were mutually understood? In the case of essentially contested

concepts, it is groups of people, with shared understanding and common aims and ideals, which compete for the different interpretations of words and not the individual in his private spaces. In addition, for groups to compete for the interpretation of a word implies that it is sufficiently the same word for the competition to make sense. Some writers argue that when the meanings of a word (for example, 'freedom') diverge significantly, it is better to say that two or more concepts are present within the one word. Even here there are enough recognizable connections in the uses of the word and the uses of its partners and cognates in more or less acknowledged situations that it is not misleading to say that it is the same word, unlike the word 'bank' with its many different meanings and with no obvious connections amongst them. Homonyms are simply separate words that happen to be identical in form. The word freedom is not a disguised homonym.

A concept is essentially or interminably contested when there is no likelihood of a settled interpretation of a word's meaning. Different groups of people want the proprietorship of the word with their own construction put upon it. Features of life thought desirable would be in the word's construal and when those features are mentioned or realized these would be what the word referred to or meant. These essentially contested concepts are usually such that they imply value-assumptions. For example, if something is called education, democracy or freedom, it is assumed that it must be the sort of thing we want, need or is good for us. That a practice or an institution is named by any of these words makes its acceptance easier. Difficulties return, however, when we ask what is the nature of that to which we want to apply the word education or democracy or freedom. We then might want to say 'If that is what you call education, democracy or freedom, you are fooling yourself and trying to fool us into the bargain.'

It may be said that in my summary up to now there has been an illegitimate sliding from concept to word and from concept to term. Concepts do not have uses but words do. Concepts do not have different ranges of meaning but words do. How can a concept be contested when it has only one meaning? Furthermore, if words have different ranges of meaning, how can we contest ranges of meaning? A contest is over something. Concepts, words and meanings are not the sorts of thing one can contest. An attention to distinctions undermines the idea of a contest. A concept is nothing apart from its meaning; meaning attaches to words; and the meaning of words is in the words' uses. It might be concluded that all one is after is a certain clarity in the

use of those words that tend to be ambiguous or open-textured because of the change in context of their use or because of their being embedded in different traditions of thought and practice. It is not then that a single concept, word or meaning is being fought over in the way that one might fight over a possession but rather that words have different ranges of meaning and that one has to be clear as possible about this fact. (I have been helped in my thoughts here by Wilson 1986 pp 41-59.)

All this might seem a quibble. What the idea of an essentially contested concept stresses is that words can take on different ranges of meaning through their multifarious uses and that people want to give favoured prominence to one or more ranges of meaning rather than others. The competition is amongst people who want to wrest words from one another for their own purposes. People select from existing ranges of meaning of words or build into the words their own ideals or ideological commitments. If the meanings of words are stretched too far, an acknowledgement of this fact would be reflected in the use of 'real' or 'true' to qualify the word in question. Education, democracy or freedom become 'real' or 'true' education, democracy or freedom. We might say that true or real education is education as a preparation for life or for the needs of industry. Of course, the attachment of the words 'real' or 'true' to the words 'education', 'democracy', or 'freedom' might signal that these latter words are becoming so stretched that they run into other words and in consequence cover realities that cannot prima facie be covered by these words. So-called persuasive definitions of justice or freedom may run into meanings more properly attached to or covered by equality. The motive behind such persuasive definitions is to ease people into transferring the value of one thing to the reality of another. Justice and freedom sound good and are more likely to command adherence than equality. If the words justice and freedom can be partially redefined in terms of meanings that properly fall under the word equality, the value traces of the former are attached to the reality of the latter. We call something justice or freedom when its reality is more nearly that of equality. On the other hand, one might want to denigrate the fact of something by subsuming it under one category-heading rather than another.

On a recent B.B.C. Radio News programme a reporter said that Monsignor Bruce Kent, as he was at the time, had resolved the tension between being a priest in the Catholic Church and being a spokesman for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament by resigning his priesthood in favour of his political role. The reporter presented the conflict as

one between being a man in the service of God and being a 'politician'. The category-heading of politician had the effect of casting a certain slur on the quality of his decision. That Bruce Kent may be equally or more truthful to his religious or moral convictions in working for nuclear disarmament is made dubious or even ruled out by calling his decision 'political'. The fact that his decision may have been religious or moral is lost by using the category-heading of political to describe his decision. All these words - 'political', 'religious', and 'moral' - are contested but the reporter chose the word 'political' under which to subsume a range of meanings and in doing so gave the meanings an unfavourable ring. This is not to say that the word political always has this ring. The context helps to determine the whiff that certain words have, as it does the meanings of the words that are contested. Most of the time moral or religious reasons are more substantial, more important or more sincere motives for doing something.

I have already discussed the notion of needs. 'Needs' is one of those words which carry sufficient normative force such that if one called something a need one implies that a person with that need has a prima facie claim to its satisfaction. Moreover, any social arrangements that are necessary conditions for the satisfaction of the need have a prima facie justification. It is similarly the case with interests. Unlike 'mere' wants, desires and preferences which are 'subjective', interests like needs are 'objective' and again prima facie demand satisfaction. Wants, desires and preferences are subjective because it makes little sense to say that people have them but do not know they have them; whereas needs and interests are objective because it makes a certain sense to say that people have them but are unaware that they have. If the words 'needs' and 'interests' are contested, it is in respect of what are said to be needs rather than in the meaning of the words. There might be agreement about what the words 'needs' and 'interest' mean but not about what are called needs and interests. However, all the words I have mentioned are normative and it is in their normativeness that some writers see the stable part of their meaning. A constant evaluative or commendatory 'meaning' is co-present with a variable descriptive 'meaning' within the one word. The word education, for example, is normative in that its non-inverted commas use prescribes practice, regulates conduct and connotes what is desirable and worthwhile. Yet just what is prescribed, what conduct is regulated and what is thought desirable and worthwhile is contested.

I think too much can be made of the claim that two types of separable meaning are contained within the one word. It is enough that we know the direction of our valuations and the nature of that on which we take our stand. We need to know also just what our words can mean, which determines what we want them to mean, and what realities or hoped-for realities we want to assent to. In all these matters we confuse ourselves if we stretch the meaning of words beyond what they can bear.

Essentially contested words, with their normative implications, enter into descriptions of who or what we are as persons and imply at the same time the shape of our personal, inter-personal and impersonal relationships. This is true, of course, of all our value words. Some writers, it must be said, would resist at the outset the thought that certain contested words have normative implications, if these words are taken to be descriptive of factual states of affairs; though this is not to say that they would challenge the claim that the normative helps define who or what we are and how we stand in relation to other people. (There is a difficulty here of whether it is only words involving value-assumptions that are essentially contested. Descriptive words having purely factual application might be thought not to be essentially contested. They have an appropriate factual use or not.) It is further said that if the evaluative is somehow present within such words it is an abstractable layer of additional meaning. These points raise questions about the fact/value distinction. But fact and value is often fused in the one word - a so-called thicker value word. If the normative is not strictly derivable from the factual or the descriptive, the normative and the factual in our daily commerce tend to be strongly connected. To say that the connection is conventional and not logical or conceptual does not speak of a flimsy connection that is broken by personal choice or decision just as the attachment is formed in the first place by an equally improbable choice or decision. (It might be remarked here that this whole way of speaking about the conventional or logical connection between the content and value within the same word is misconceived.)

We might bring out the force, or lack of it, of what is being said by an example. In the film 'The Elephant Man', John Merrick, the grotesquely disfigured and brutally maltreated Victorian side-show attraction, whose external appearance gives the title to the film, gradually exhibits many fine human qualities. An intelligent and sensitive spirit is entombed in a shape that prompts disgust and inhuman

responses. On one occasion in the film the surgeon, Frederick Treves, who takes on Merrick's rehabilitation, attempts to persuade his superior at the hospital of Merrick's rationality and refined sensibility. Both men are ultimately convinced of Merrick's remarkable human qualities and attributes. The recognition that he is a person with a high degree of intelligence and sensitivity leads to a warmth of human response. One of the most poignant incidents in the film is when he is hounded into a public convenience by a mob after accidentally knocking over a child in an attempt to escape from other inquisitive and tormenting children. In his struggles he loses his protective head sacking and reveals his hideous abnormalities. He is easy game and is cornered. In desperation his piteous voice cries that he is a human being. He is transfigured, as he is on the first occasion when beautiful accents come from what has to be taken for a mouth.

In this brief account of John Merrick and his tribulations, I have used words that may be construed as descriptive and normative. Merrick displays reason, feels wounded, wishes things were otherwise, expresses gratitude, accepts the inevitable, exercises choice and hints at self-respect. As he says, he is a human being. In his qualities and attributes are exhibited the most general categories distinctive of the nature of persons: rationality, agency, freedom, responsibility, intention, purpose, choice, affect and the capacity for self-improvement. But these general terms are implicit in the details of the more finely-grained language.

Anthony Quinton (1973 p 103) captures a certain idea of normative neutrality when he writes of a nature exhibiting such distinctive features enumerated here. He writes 'The nature of man is a set of defining characteristics in virtue of having which things are identified as being men. These characteristics are in fact empirical and so no conclusion about what men ought to be allowed to do can be extricated from the concept itself'. We might add to what men 'ought to be allowed to do', a moral disposition such as 'responding with sympathy' and a moral reaction such as 'expressing love and care'. Quinton is characterizing a view which would reject the claim that many listed distinctive human characteristics have normative import. The normative may presuppose the existence of persons so defined. To that extent the notion of person and the distinctive features definitive of that notion enter into the constitution of the normative. But personhood and its distinguishing characteristics are background conditions for the meaningful application of moral and normative language. If

men were not rational, responsible and free and so on, a moral and normative vocabulary would have no conditions for its proper application. John Merrick then is recognized as a being to whom a set of human defining characteristics can be ascribed but this fact is a condition for the correct application of moral and normative terms and not a fact that in itself enjoins or prohibits certain responses.

Quinton is stating that the concept of human nature is captured in a catalogue of distinctive features and that no moral or normative implications flow from such a concept and its definition. However, words are meant to be used, or rather words have no sense other than in their use. And this goes for concepts, which have their life in the use of words. The words and descriptions distinctive of human beings are found to be applicable to John Merrick when he begins to exhibit typical human traits. The words and descriptions are not, of course, separate from their identified application. Merrick becomes the proper subject for the instantiation of the concept of a person and for the ascription of distinctive human predicates. Underlying the recognition that certain words have application is the reality which justifies the application of the words. The question is how do the normative aspects of words (if we grant that words can be said to have normative aspects) or simply the normative words themselves enter into the lives of human beings? In the case of John Merrick, as soon as certain descriptions were recognized as applicable to him, even when one description (that he was a human being) initially came out of his own mouth, some types of response become appropriate. These responses, it must be said, are under descriptions - such as sympathy, warmth and understanding - and indicate, no matter how 'primitive' in the scale of human reactions the responses are, that they are what they are because human beings are socially embodied. Merrick was brought into the community of human beings, from which he had been excluded by people who scarcely qualified as human beings themselves.

It hardly needs saying that Merrick was not a Cartesian man solely responsible for his own refined sensibility. As he grew older he was increasingly marginalized into a freak. What was the cause, then, of the change in response in Treves, and more radically in his superior, to Merrick's plight? It must have been in the recognition that he was a human being of a particularly rare kind. The properties that Merrick displayed as a person prompted a compassionate response. But these properties were rationality, agency, sensibility and purpose. There seems to be little wrong in calling these properties normative because

their instantiation in a person urge, prompt or at the very least nudge people into an adequate response.

But what about the many 'normal' but dispossessed people in Victorian society? Why the selective response to John Merrick? Why does the presence of rationality, agency, choice and purpose count in the case of Merrick but not in the case of all those other Victorian dispossessed people? Several answers suggest themselves. Perhaps there is not enough goodness or resources to go round or that Merrick exhibited more distinctive qualities in a more developed form. But was it more likely to be Victorian sentimentality? We have come to recognize that sentimentality is very close to cruelty. As I have said previously, the focus of sentimentality is the person's own feelings not the assumed object of those feelings. The sentimentalist entertains his own feelings and in so doing is responsive so long as the feelings last. The object, in this case a person, is not seen as an end in himself but the occasion for wallowing in the glow of one's own emotions. We know the consequences of the instability of emotions. The sentimental easily tips over into the cruel and both can exist alongside each other. This is the hidden reality of Victorian values. I am not saying that Treves was not genuine in his response. He does reflect on his motives for helping Merrick and asks of himself, at a traumatic point in the film, whether he is a good man or a bad man. It may be that the film itself treats the subject sentimentally.

We might reflect here on the way that national politicians compete for who feels most distressed in national tragedies. We often wait in vain for them to say something about the folk whom the tragedy has hit. We are all too aware of the fabrication of images by these people. What may be genuine feeling is readily seen as so much grist to the mill. Perhaps it is all unfair but this is the climate of the times.

Do these thoughts tell against the view that the distinctive categorical terms applicable to human beings are normative? We have seen that to recognize someone as a rational and sensitive agent is to occasion a human response. The recognition is under a description and the description prompts conduct. The only question is how does a description occasion conduct, if the descriptive is not implicated in normative values? The mistake is to think that words stand on their own and can be singularly separated into a descriptive and an evaluative element in each word, if it is one of those thicker evaluative words. But words in use is prior to such a dissection. We can suspend the background for certain purposes but we have to recognize that this is just what we

have done. Both descriptive and evaluative terms are implicated in a skein of language. It is a matter of what connections we make within language and between language and the world. Our forms of life and cultural settings may be restrictive or expansive in respect of those people who are included or excluded from skeins of discourse in which descriptive and evaluative terms flow into one another.

There is then an intimate connection between description and evaluation. This is not to say that values are always omnipresent. In certain contexts it would seem to be nearly so. C.B. MacPherson says, in the context an explication of what can be correctly said of man as such, that "the very structure of our thoughts and language puts an evaluative content into our descriptive statements about 'man'".(1973 p 53) Such language enters into our self-interpretations and these interpretations mediate our relationships one to another. What we say about one another and ourselves will have implications for our interpersonal conduct. Terry Eagleton in his 'Literary Theory' gives a much stronger account of the omnipresence of values. He writes:

Statements of fact are after all statements, which presumes a number of questionable judgements: that those statements are worth making, perhaps more worth making than certain others, that I am the sort of person entitled to make them and perhaps able to guarantee their truth, that you are the kind of person worth making them to, that something useful is accomplished by making them, and so on. ... All our descriptive statements move within an often invisible network of value-categories, and indeed without such categories we would have nothing to say to each other at all ... (W)ithout particular interests we would have no knowledge at all, because we would not see the point of bothering to get to know anything. Interests are constitutive of our knowledge, not merely prejudices which imperil it. The claim that knowledge should be 'value-free' is itself a value-judgement.
(1983 p 14)

Eagleton writes as a Marxist and sees value, no matter how circuitously established, as reflective of material interests. Our interests and concerns are materially founded. Value is in the material basis of things. The point I want to bring out is that description and evaluation are part of the same skein of language, even though we may make purely descriptive statements that are faithful to the facts. We might choose the words 'description' and 'evaluation' rather than 'fact' and 'value' because it may be useful to suggest that facts are concept-dependent. Facts do not identify themselves as though the world could be the source of its own descriptions. Eagleton is right to say that 'statements of fact are after all statements'. It is human beings who

make them. And it must be in respect of something that they make them. So it does not mean we have no notion of the world as existing independently of human beings. The world is 'out there', so to speak, but sense, meaning and significance are internal to language, although it is human beings that give sense, meaning and significance to words. Facts are the mode in which the world is represented. But representation is not the only nor indeed the primary function of language. I want to conclude that the human perspective is indeed a perspective.

This though is not to be confused with a more extreme post-structuralist one, which argues that nothing is given to provide a foundation for language practices. 'Everything', so the argument goes, is encapsulated in language and since all meaning is internal to language and language is in a constantly shifting relation to itself, 'things' have a different sense as they are encapsulated in language differently. For example, the sense we give to sexuality is in a shifting relation to itself within the changing possibilities in language. What is given then is given in language and since language is in an unstable relation to itself what is given in language changes with language. This view finds its expression in the deconstruction of 'realities' that are only 'realities' insofar as they are encapsulated in subvertible language practices. As I have just said, sexuality is not something in itself, especially as confined to established sexual identities, it is what it is as it is deconstructed and reconstructed into new manifestations. Whatever is said seems to leave open what the 'it' is. Is it 'desire'? But what is desire? 'Deconstruction' and 'reconstruction' are words that suggest building and building in turn suggests materials and foundations. If language is decisive in what something is, does this imply that there is nothing to which language attaches, except the merest 'material' and physical promptings? If sexuality is a crucial determinant of the ways to be persons, and if sexuality is a product of the meanings internal to language, save for the merest organic promptings, sexual identities are not just contestable but greatly variable.

The essence of what kinds of things are possible in the language of post-structuralism is seen in the de-mystified sexual contact between Man as Enterprise and Woman as Deconstructivist in David Lodge's comic novel 'Nice Work'. Robyn Penrose has been seconded to a local firm as her university's contribution to Industry Year of 1986. When she and Vic Wilcox, the boss of the firm, eventually find themselves in bed together, Robyn, in response to Vic's declaration of love, says that

she has shed such notions. Once she had allowed herself to be 'constructed by the discourse of romantic love ...' but now she is simply a body with physical needs that are not extensions of an 'individual essence prior to language'. All the stuff about 'two unique individual selves who need each other and only each other and cannot be happy without each other for ever and ever' is the rhetoric of a discourse centred on the 'bourgeois fallacy'. (Lodge 1989 pp 292-293)

There is nothing 'out there', in this case, but biological urgencies and their satisfaction - the rest is language and 'we' are inscribed in them. We are what the discourse says we are. There are different discourses and codes that encapsulate these minimal realities. Even a factory chimney is not a practical utility but a projection of the predatory male psyche. This is yet another code that has to be interpreted. The world we inhabit is a projection of such sub-terranean pushes and pulls. All our ordinary language can be shown to be constructed out of hidden drives and impulses to domination. As is language, so are we. But there is no end to the play of language, so there is no end to the ways to be persons. Our development as persons (if we have not already deconstructed the category of person that helps to interpret our reality and substituted for it the word 'subject') can be expressed in whatever discourses can be invented once we have deconstructed the ones we have. This was all part of their personal development as conceived by each in Industry Year. I must say here that during Industry Year, in the college in which I taught, the teaching staff were encouraged to help students become people as enterprise.

It is also worth pointing out that this language has found its way into personal development programmes in education - personal development as a by-product of certain relevant studies. I just quote one example from current curricula development literature. It is that of Women's Studies. Germaine Greer quotes, rather appropriately, Robyn Rowlands, an Australian Feminist, who says that the purpose of Women's Studies is 'to find, reclaim and rename ourselves; to consider all issues and knowledge with women reintroduced; to create women-centred knowledge; to understand power and its relation to gender; to search for the origins of women's oppression and therefore to develop strategies for changing that oppression'. I do not know what goes on under such curricula pronouncements but certainly what we have discussed here from Lodge will not be too far out. It is also worth pointing out that such pronouncements filter down into personal development schemes in schools and colleges. What I say here, I hope, will be taken in the same

spirit as the one in Lodge's novel.

My discussion of essentially contested concepts is meant to anticipate my claim that personal development is situated within the domain of values. That the interpretation of words distinctive of human beings are contested and that the words tend to involve value-assumptions (often not recognized or at least not made explicit) must bear on what we can meaningfully say about persons, what we want to say, what we ought to say, how we select from what can be said and how we think about the background which gives us our criteria of relevance. The further we move away from stable meanings, because of incommensurate and incompatible values; because of disagreement over the interpretation of so-called essentially contested concepts; because of true or untrue theories about the nature of man, the language men use and the way that language is thought to attach to people and the world - then the more difficult it is to pronounce on the adequacy of our conceptions of the ways it is possible to be persons. The idea of personal development is unintelligible outside conceptions of what kinds of person it is possible to be, even if we want to draw a distinction between being a kind of person and being the person who is oneself. The ways it is possible to be persons is inseparable from the ways that persons stand in relation to one another. One could put it the other way round, of course, and say that our relations shape the ways it is possible to be persons.

Eagleton tends to give value-categories a certain omnipresence. There is a suggestion too of how language, saturated as it is in value, enters the world. It is brought into the world like other things of human productive endeavour. In Marxist theory man is essentially a being who produces things. Marx says that men 'begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence'. He continues, 'As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production'. (1973 p 237 ff) To trace value-saturated language to material foundations, let alone material foundations construed in a theoretical way, is fraught with extreme difficulties.

In Dennis Potter's 'The Singing Detective', to which I shall return later, we are presented with an image of how value-categories enter into the lives of children born into a world already interpreted in value-categories. This image of how values, or corrupted versions of them, come into the lives of the children is a variation on the theme of The Fall. A knowledge of Good and Evil gives us the freedom

to choose; thereafter there are no limits to what we can get up to. Nevertheless, the Good still provides us with a check on what it is permissible for us to get up to. But the trouble with theories of value or language which neither serve reality nor respect truth is that the notion of limit is unknown to them. I spoke earlier of the parameters which set limits on what can be said intelligibly about persons and their development. Certain view on the nature of value, language and persons considerably expand those parameters. As educationalists we need to address whether these parameters provide genuine possibilities for ways to be persons or whether it is a kind of play acting or striking of attitudes.

If all is unstable as some writers suggest, justification becomes impossible. Justification appeals to something independent but there has to be something relevantly independent. The process of justification demands that firstly we give an adequate account of the meaning of what is said to be in need of justification and that secondly we provide a specification of what is relevantly independent in terms of which the justification is undertaken. We say that something is a justification of something else when that which is the justification is more important or more significant. That which is in need of justification is given additional significance or sense. Education is often thought to be in need of justification but what could be more important or more significant than education that it could justify education?

I said earlier that because 'education' is a normative term, the term is expressive of value-assumptions. As we also saw, it is one of those terms whose interpretation is essentially contested. If different practices are called education and there is no agreement about the range of practices to be included in education, or the value of them, justification is then thought to be necessary. For example, we might want to say that education is justified if it leads to personal development. This may not be the end of the story; for personal development itself may need to be justified as an aim in the curriculum of schools and colleges. In addition to this receding or deepening attempt to justify something, we need to recognize that the justification is relevantly independent. Not just anything that is independent of that in need of justification will do.

I recall the attempts to justify punishment as imprisonment when I worked as a teacher in a prison education department. If there was agreement on the meanings of deterrence, prevention, retribution and rehabilitation as the grounds of justification and agreement on the

meaning of punishment as that which is in need of justification, the problem was still unresolved about the relevant independence of those considerations which were to do the justifying. For example, if punishment is interpreted as the deprivations resulting from imprisonment, how can rehabilitation stand in a proper relation to the punishment? If rehabilitation is what is important and imprisonment an impediment to it, how does rehabilitation justify this type of punishment? The most that can be said is that the deprivations are ameliorated by such benefits as education and so on.

That we feel that education is in need of justification says something about how education is viewed in a particular society. One would have thought that education is one of those benefits that requires of the alternatives that they be justified if they are competitive with education. The problems of meanings and justification are central in education at present and the question of value is inseparable from both.

Lying behind the thought that concepts or words can or cannot be irresolvably contested is the further thought that different ways of life, moral practices, ways to be persons, views about the nature of man and perspectives on the world can be in conflict. The claims we make for and about them may be contested too. Since our claims are in words and our words can be interpreted differently and can carry different value-implications, this leads to questions about what words have to mean as opposed to what we might wish them to mean. The idea of the essentially contested nature of certain concepts, if this is how the issue is presented, is about what it is possible to mean and about what it is intelligible to say.

There is always the possibility that both parties to a dispute wish to use words with their own construction put upon them. In many of our disputes, and not all of them and that is the trouble, we might be after a truth-status to our claims that certain pursuits and ways to be persons are intrinsically worthy of us as human beings. But people can disagree fundamentally.

The Islamic Fundamentalist possesses a different language from Salman Rushdie and even when both parties to the life and death struggle start to use key words such as religion, there is no agreement about the content and the values put upon the content. Rushdie may feel that there is a 'God-hole' in his life - a certain spiritual emptiness - but what might fill the hole, if anything, would not be the content internal to at least one interpretation of what it is to hold religious beliefs.

It is, then, not so much what individual words mean, extracted from the contexts in which they are used, but rather that words are descriptive of different orientations to the world.

We might present as an example the idea of self-realization. I know that there are difficulties with this expression because it does not seem to have a natural home in ordinary language. However, be that as it may, what it is to attain a certain perfectability according to our own kind or according to the nature of each of us is fundamentally contested. And it is not only about what values need to be made real in our lives: it is also about whether there is sense in talking about such perfectability and what it is to reach our highest good. Furthermore, there is the question of the status of self-realization in relation to other human pursuits and requirements. Kant, for example, gives prior claim to moral duty. Self-realization is not something that can be categorically commanded as can moral obligations. Kant says: 'There are in humanity capacities of greater perfection which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject; to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end'. (1949 p 47)

For Kant it is not a matter of whether needs, wants, wishes and hopes spring from our natures and whether it is these that our greater perfectability is to be founded in. It is a matter of what is categorically enjoined in the sphere of moral duty. We may, of course, argue that it is in what is categorically required that we find our greater realization and fulfilment. But this would go against what Kant says about happiness crowning our lives as a whole in the fullness of things.

CHAPTER 5

Personal Development, Self-Development and Self-Realization

In Chapter 1, I wanted to argue that there are two aspects to what it is to develop as a person. As I said, I did not want to suggest that there are two processes and two products. The person, at least in this respect, is indivisible. He grows into the possibilities in the different dimensions of experience and in the different departments of life. He may, too, grow into having a perspective on the world as a whole. Such perspectives are the stuff of religion and ideologies. On the other hand, he can grow into deeper friendships; on the other, he can see himself within grand narratives or redemptive life-styles. The two aspects, then, are some construal of what it is to be an individual and some interpretation of what it is to be person-like. It is about what an individual comes to appropriate as his own, what he sees as belonging to himself, what he has made his own and what is internal to his orientations to the world and the various departments of it. It is, too, about what the content of what it is to be a person and is thus part of him.

In that chapter, I wished to argue that on any view of personal development, its cognates and extensions, both aspects of an individual's development have to be addressed. When we think of these two aspects, we might be reminded of John Stuart Mill's ideal of an individual's pursuing his own good in his own way. Mill, in fact, used the term self-development to characterize this individual project. But, even if only in an attenuated form, an individual will develop in some respects and in his own way. We might contrast Mill's ideal of self-development with this attenuated view of an individual's progress through life. Much, as I said above, will depend on the prevailing setting in which the individual matures. There are limiting cases: on the one hand, our development may approximate to pure egoism; on the other, to some notion of strong communitarianism. At this stage in my discussion, I will not comment on whether self-development is better linked with the limiting case of pure egoism or the limiting case of strong communitarianism. Individual development, then, must be in accordance with some person-like qualities and attributes, even if these tend to be against what many people think are our most person-like properties. As I have indicated, an individual may fall outside any conception we may have of what constitutes what is person-like.

A limiting case in this respect is that of the complete psychopath.

An individual, then, grows into the various dimensions of experience and into the various requirements within the departments of life. What is person-like is internal to these dimensions of experience and departments of life. For example, if moral experience is a condition on other forms of practical understanding and reason, we should expect this experience to be part of most departments of life. And, as I have said, practical understanding and reason cover a great deal of what falls under personal development.

When the term personal development is used on its own - that is, without the benefit of the terms social, moral and so forth in the more general headings spoken about above - it is difficult to know just what content is peculiar to it as distinct from what it might be contrasted with. It is true that some of the other terms in the general headings are too wide to tell us what we should exactly be engaged in within these curricula practices. Nevertheless, there is some limit on what personal development itself might be. Even within the general headings, though, personal development might refer to something separate from social and moral development rather than something complementary to, or something dependent upon, what is contained within the terms social, moral or health etc.

Personal development, as a separate term, might take its sense from the various traditions that emphasize self-realization, self-fulfilment, self-creation or self-discovery. These various terms refer to those disclosed or imperfectly disclosed individual potentialities that needs to be actualized if a person is to be the individual he truly or really is or to be what he should become according to his own nature. It is to become what we might call a beautiful person and to be such a person might be in conflict with what is morally or socially required. Such a contrast is caught in the distinction between individual and society. The individual wants to go one way and society requires that he go another.

Personal development might, then, mean what these other terms mean. It is merely an alternative expression for what form, direction and content and individual's life should be expressive of, as are disclosed within these other terms. Obviously, we are concerned with what conceptual possibilities reside within such terms as self-realization and so forth - that is, with what it is intelligible to be as a person. I say conceptual possibilities because what is intelligible should impose some constraint on what a person can become. What

is intelligible, of course, might not be what is acceptable. It is not just that self-interest might give personal development an unacceptable twist; it is also that certain motivations that are continuous with self-interest such as malice might shape an individual's response to other people. Certain types of evil that have been perpetrated in the name of self-realization may be beyond belief but they are not beyond human possibility. I am not thinking just of the Marquis de Sade here. I am rather thinking of someone like Charles Manson, who may be in some respects rather like de Sade. Some might find a certain perverted intelligibility in what Manson and his followers perpetrated. (I might say in this context that I once team-taught a Crime and Punishment module in General Studies - General Studies might in some ways be seen as a forerunner to Personal Development - and the question arose, when we needed to refer to such incidents as the Manson crimes, whether we might be morally harming our students.)

We need to distinguish, then, between what is intelligible and what is appropriate for human beings. When we reflect on personal development, we need to determine what is conceptually possible, what is humanly possible and what is morally appropriate. The question is, then, do we interpret personal development as something separate from social and moral development, but constrained by what is deemed appropriate by reference to the terms social and moral or do we interpret personal development as something conceptually dependent on such terms? Is personal development socially or morally constrained or conceptually constrained - a matter of decency or sense? Now, in an important way, personal development, taken as individual development, is not conceptually, naturally or historically prior to social, moral or cultural development. Our individual development has its social, moral and cultural conditions. Even though we have our Charles Mansons, they are deviations from what we take to be well constituted personhood. We should even say that they are wicked deviations. We is a little word that has enormous implications. It is not just a matter of counting heads as it were. We have to consider it as humanity speaking through us. It has to be considered inconceivable that Manson's notion of self-realization or self-fulfilment, or however we put it, is an acceptable possibility for human beings. How one makes such a claim good is another matter. In an important sense, we have to accept that it is our values that are our reasons rather than reasons providing the foundations of our values.

If we look at personal development on its own, as it were, we

will find that the criteria of what it covers is far wider than we can entertain on educational grounds. I take it that the term is used sometimes as a cognate of self-realization. And it is, after all, its meaning and criteria on educational grounds that we are considering. Personal development on its own has to have a meaning and have criteria for its application. I have mentioned that an individual's development implies that there is a form, direction and content to it. I equally need to mention that one needs to consider the source of all three constitutive aspects of a person's development. This is a question of who is the agent of the development. On educational grounds, the source of the form, direction and content of an individual's development cannot be wholly his own. He has to be initiated into various forms of knowledge and life. For example, no matter how much a teacher values and draws upon experiences children bring with them to school, there will be educational limits on what is acceptably extracted from these experiences for educational purposes. This is not to say that home and background has not already limited what are acceptable possibilities in a child's development. In fact, as we know, depending upon strength of voice and commitments, parents often want a say in what is taught in the more controversial aspects of the curriculum. And this is not to forget that what is considered controversial is disputed. Without drawing on examples near to home, we need only think about what limitations are demanded on what is taught in schools in the Bible Belt in America.

However, as I said much earlier in my discussion, some wilder notions of personal development may find their way, tangentially, of course, in personal development schemes in schools and colleges. So, we might say, education has its own criteria of what is appropriate in those areas that personal development and so on cover. This is another way of saying that no matter what criteria self-realization may provide for the possibilities of personal development, education puts additional constraints on what normally might morally constrain what is acceptable in an individual's self-realization.

The question still remains whether personal development as a separate term receives its criteria from the other terms in the general headings or whether personal development provides some additional criteria of its own. Two questions are implied here. The first is what do PSE, PSME, PSMHE etc pick out as distinctive in their contribution to what is educationally worthwhile? The second is what does personal development on its own pick out? At this point I want to make two preliminary observations. Firstly, education will not remain

uninfluenced by what exists or develops outside education, especially in our chosen areas of discussion. What is thought personally, morally or socially important outside education will begin to influence the curriculum. It is platitudinous to say it at a time when the needs of industry and what is relevant to the economy are meant to guide curriculum practices. We have had examples earlier to illustrate this point. Secondly, the notion of personal development within education has a history. I am not saying that it has only one history but I am saying that part of its history is that what it covered in schools and colleges had to be enlarged or modified. It had to be enlarged or modified because it covered certain things only too well or it failed to cover other things adequately. In short, personal development was thought to be too self-serving. Personal development centred on what I previously referred to as 'Me, me, me'. The dimensions of social and moral experience had to be introduced into personal development - hence PSE, PSME etc. - because young people had to realize that they were social and moral beings as well as self-interested agents. One can see the changes as personal development becomes 'enriched' by 'personal relationships' in certain schemes in schools and colleges.

I do not intend this second point to be taken as a claim about a general chronological development from personal development to PSE or PSME. There was not personal development first and then social and moral development following to offset a one-sided development. One found in some schools and colleges that personal development was conceptually and practically restricted and that more social and moral content needed to be added. Some would argue, rightly, that in many MSC schemes and such like, personal development is still conceptually and practically impoverished. It is a matter of inducing young people to shape their self-concept to a restricted opportunity structure in the economy. The taunt at such schemes, is that they dignify with high-sounding headings curriculum practices that are meant to provide fodder for industry and for the skivvying jobs in the service sector. It is, then, a matter of young people adjusting their self-interpretations to an attenuated human setting. It is also argued about such schemes that even when they try to be more expansive they get it wrong. They either promote self-empowerment which misses the reality of the lives of the young people or promote identity development and self-expression in terms of the young people's current values which fail to appreciate that these values may be insufficiently rich to be the basis of such identity formations and self-expression.

I might summarize these immediate points as follows. PSE, PSME and PSMHE pick out what the terms other than personal cover as their contribution to what is educationally worthy of pursuit. What is personal needs to draw its content from the terms social, moral and health. If the term personal draws its content from what is wider than what these terms cover, there is a requirement to indicate what areas of human thought and action is providing the content. As I have said, the term social can be extremely elastic in what it might cover. All manner of practical understanding and functional skills are caught in its net. The needs of industry and the economy are easily embraced. But if the term social is elastic, it will be said that the term personal is elastic too. What is person-like is pretty protean in its scope. I said above that the Human Potential Movement has been drawn on to provide content for what might feature in an individual's personal development. Nevertheless I would maintain that the terms social, moral and health are the relevant constraints on what is personal in the educational curriculum.

When the term personal is used in such headings as PSME etc. we need to note carefully just what content is implied, if it is not made explicit. What is person-like, then, is too wide to furnish the content for PSME etc., because everything else in the curriculum would be encompassed by the term. But the important point is that we do not smuggle into PSME etc. what is less than person-like. When I said that the personal is not a category like the terms social and moral, I meant that it is these latter terms that are person-like in the relevant sense. When personal refers to what is individual in a person's life, we need to know in what content area the individual finds its expression. When our thoughts rest on the individual person, we are not concerned with numerical individuality but with person-like individuality.

Personal development is constrained by and takes its content from whatever additional items are included in the general headings of PSME etc. Am I treating such a suggestion as a hypothesis, a conceptual remark or a recommendation? If the suggestion is a hypothesis, then all items in PSME etc. lists should, in fact, display social, moral and health content, without remainder - without, that is, personal adding something of its own. This may be too strict, of course, but there needs to be some limits on what is included in such curriculum areas. I think, to all intents and purposes, the items do. I know personal qualities such as independence of mind and will and self-reliance appear in a monotonous regularity in the lists but I would suggest,

though, that these so-called personal qualities are given sense by the content-areas they are expressed in. In physics or economics, independence of mind will be encouraged when students have begun to grasp what the subjects are about. They will be able to think for themselves within these areas of the curriculum. Similarly, independence of mind and self-reliance will be interpreted within the content areas marked by social, moral and health. We might call these general powers of the mind general but they do not exist independently of the areas in which they are expressed. I have in fact mentioned these points previously.

The difficulty with treating the claim as a conceptual remark is that we might simply be making a verbal point. Things may be in or out by stipulative fiat. We might simply say that, if a person says that such and such is personal development, then we are not prepared to do so. If the stuff in MSC schemes is supposed to be personal development then good luck to them or rather bad luck on the 'placements'. But we should be saying more here. We imply that such stuff is not worthy of human pursuit. It is not sufficiently person-like to be classed as personal development. The claim would be that the young people concerned are simply being prepared for dehumanized or depersonalized forms of work or life, though it may be the case that we find the wherewithal for richer forms of life in instrumental occupations.

If the claim is treated as a recommendation, it is connected with the conceptual remark. I would, in fact, argue that if PSME etc. make a distinctive contribution to the school or college curriculum, it is in the moral dimensions of experience. I would want to give moral a broad meaning but it is in the moral that personal development is to be crucially found. This is not to take anything away from what social, health and so on contribute. Personal development is filled out by what is social but I would suggest that it is in the moral that PSME etc. is grounded. But personal development as moral development need not simply be an additional subject in the time-table. On my view of what constitutes moral, other subjects and the whole school ethos would make their contributions. The moral is a dimension of experience that cannot be omitted in our lives. This is a conceptual remark. It can be done badly, of course.

The Self and Degrees and Kinds of Worth

There is a tradition of thought, or rather several traditions of thought, that emphasize that there are higher, fuller or more developed

states of individual being inherent within the make-up of each individual. There is the possibility of progress from potentiality to actuality in a process of becoming what a person truly or really is. A person can become what he is not at present and this becoming is towards a personally higher or fuller condition. Now, such a characterization does not take us far in itself. It is a fact of life that under most cultural conditions most human beings mature into better examples of what they were at earlier stages of their individual development. Implied in the varieties of self-realization is the idea that there is the possibility for each individual of a better fit between what the individual is in his essence and what he might become as he moves through life. This essence may not be realized - that is, made real - in his life through various internal and external impediments. He may be deflected from becoming what he truly is as a distinct person. These may be psychological deficiencies or social and cultural shortcomings.

It is difficult to give a neutral account of what self-realization consists in, because there are several different traditions which interpret the term in their own ways. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that there are several cognates of the term self-realization. Often self-development, self-fulfilment, self-actualization, individuation, self-creation and personal development are used more or less interchangeably with self-realization and each other. I say more or less because each expression may bring its own nuance to the general idea.

The question is not, then, what makes the individual the individual he is or to what an individual owes his individuality. It is rather what conditions are necessary for an individual's true self or real self to be made actual. In conditions of diverse cultural possibilities, an individual will achieve individual difference but this difference may be a very attenuated version of what he could become. Apart from which there might be a query against mere difference. What merit is there in the fact of individual difference, if the difference is not of inherent significance? Not much hangs on mere difference. Much individual difference is not even captured significantly in language and where it is it is the minor differences of an impoverished narcissism. It might be said that such minor differences are celebrated in and exploited by certain interests that make the idea of personal development serve their purposes. In most versions of self-realization, personal individuality is taken as a datum. The question is, what is required to make the individual the individual he truly is? He is essentially something and this something is good and it needs to be brought out, so

the argument has it. We find these thoughts expressed in such formulations as follows: A person should live his life according to his own nature; A person should be encouraged to bring out in himself what he has it in him to become; A person should develop his own pattern in his own way.

Underlying most of this talk is the idea that a person has resident within him an ideal of his own selfhood that would complete him in its realization. It is a question about the source of what should be the self-directed form and content of a person's life. Now, such an individualistic account needs modifying immediately, for there are those theorists who wish to make self-realization a collective achievement. Each individual realizes himself within a communal human inheritance. This inheritance can be interpreted in different ways. For example, it can be given a Romantic conservative interpretation or a Marxist revolutionary one. And these are not the only possibilities. I have already commented on these interpretations in Chapter 3.

The crucial question here is that although I may impose some measure of some form and direction on my life, I seem unlikely to be the source of the content of my life. What, in fact, is the source of all those possibilities I can become? Just what can the disencumbered individual be the source of? Descartes thought that he was the source of his own self-presence, self-possession and self-clarity. It is true that he ultimately thought that he was not the source of his own existence. After rummaging through the contents of his own consciousness, he found the idea of God for whom he could not be the source of. We find this idea of an individual's being the source of his own self-identity recurring in various writers. That quintessential individual, Kierkegaard, claimed that 'Subjectivity is the truth'. (1941 Ch II p 182) Such subjectivity includes everything that each individual locates as immediately his own. (I have said that this immediacy is one aspect of what we mean by personal.) It consists of all those Cartesian thought-contents of 'doubting, understanding, conceiving, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining and feeling'. (1954 Meditation II) But for Kierkegaard the ultimate content of a person's consciousness is God whose proper recognition by the individual is the foundation of individual fulfilment. It is the proper proximity to God that gives each person his maximum self-recognition and his eternal blessedness. Gerard Manley Hopkins, too, captures this fact of self-presence as follows:

... When I consider myself being, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above

and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself: What must it be to be someone else?). Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable pitch stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. (1976 p 139)

Hopkins elsewhere uses a disguised Cartesian argument to show that this thisness, this haecceitas, points to a divine ground of it. An individual is not the ultimate source of this haecceitas of his own being. He experiences his self-identity in its immediacy but the fact of it is created by God. The fact of self-identifying consciousness has its conditions ultimately in God. There is nothing in the material universe, nor in the spiritual universe if we mean by this man's self-consciousness, that can account for personal being, except God.

We might derive an idea of personal development from this intuitive understanding of the self which is disclosed in self-reflective presence. The development would consist in progressively disencumbering oneself of those accumulated false accretions that blind oneself to one's own haecceitas and the divine ground of it. It is a reciprocal process. The more one understands oneself, the more one understands God and vice versa. There is not meant to be blasphemy in such a statement, for God is much greater than we can conceive. The consequences of this process is that proper self-knowledge presupposes a knowledge of God and one's proper relationship with Him. Central to this relationship is the recognition that one is totally dependent on God and that one is essentially a sinner. This would be Kierkegaard's line of reasoning. Such a characterization of Christianity suggested to Kierkegaard that the rest of Christendom was in a state of self-misunderstanding. However, such a refined conception of selfhood would not be broad enough to encompass the fact that a person is a person only amongst his own kind. What is person-like is wider than a self-disclosed proximity to God. Yet such an achieved proximity would be a crucial determinant in the case of Kierkegaard of an individual's orientation to the rest of human experience. It would be a way, perhaps the way, of getting everything else in to a proper perspective.

Pure individuality or pure self-presence is a kind of achievement. The assumed insight is that this pure individuality can know itself when it is empty of all other content. In Descartes the thought is about the status of the content. Until God is established, there is no guarantee that a posteriori knowledge is safe from doubt. But what,

in fact, does such a self-identifying consciousness amount to without its being intentionally directed on to some content, even if this content is etherial as God? (It might be said that God is not etherial if he is the God of Abraham and Isaac and so forth. It is the God of the philosophers who is unperson-like.) However, I am not concerned here with the Wittgensteinian treatment of the notion of logical privacy attributed to Descartes. Such a logical privacy is incoherent for Wittgenstein. For the sake of argument I assume that the idea of self-identifying consciousness - the idea of a first-person present contentless 'I-experience' - is possible. It is a limiting case of pure self-presence. My point is that such an essentially contentless 'I-experience' needs some content to be that of a person - that is, to be person-like - as the word person is understood within language. It is empty until some content is received from beyond itself. For Wittgenstein, until there is some publically defined content, and that includes the very idea of 'I-experience' the class of personhood is void. My point is simply that we need to fix the term person-like so that we have criteria for what it is to develop as a person.

My questions were, then, from whence does the self receive the content that forms its substance and what is that, out of which the self is made real when one is thinking of self-realization? If the self is all but a tabula rasa at birth and if experience is the ultimate source of what is the content of ourselves, must the impulse to self-realization search the world of experience for its content? Some writers have spoken about going deep into the self for what would be the content of one's self-realization. There are two versions of this idea. One is scarcely intelligible, for it suggests that it is in the depth that we find the content, without, as it were, a reference to the public world of our collective cultural achievement. The other version is that we go deep to find our most authentic impulses and then search for a phenomenal form of experience or life in which we can give this depth expression. There are obvious difficulties in the distinction between the 'deep self', if the idea is interpreted thus, and the phenomenal self. Is not the phenomenal self all there is? There might be aspects of it that an individual finds truer to himself but such a way of putting it might suggest a metaphysical true or real self. I will return to this point shortly.

I will just say at present that Mozart did not create his beautifully original music in a cultural vacuum. And presumably, insofar as he was realized as a human being, he was realized in his music.

His music was a significant value in his life and he found part of his fulfilment in it. Certainly, Gerard Manley Hopkins found meaning and fulfilment in a kind of 'enchanted' natural beauty, at least until his vitality failed him in his dark period. ('There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;') This last qualification does not add much, for we all cease to find meaning and fulfilment in nature and in human artifacts when we are too ill to respond to them.

We might take some of the mystery out of self-realization by reinterpreting the terms real and true when they are applied to the self or properties of the self. I would suggest that we can redescribe what is meant by 'real' and 'true' in terms of degrees and kinds of distinctions of worth or as qualitative distinctions of worth as Charles Taylor puts it. (1985 p 9) If the terms real and true trade on the metaphor of depth, we need to stress that depth means that some values are more important or significant than others in our lives. Some values have a categoric or unconditional importance for us and these are our fixed points of reference in how we measure other things.

For example, in the novel *Odd Man Out* by F.L. Green the mortally wounded IRA gunman reflects on his life and realizes that a false self has overlaid his more authentic self. There was a time in his life when there was afforded to him the possibility of a complete expression of his intellect and spirit. We might also say that his early Catholic upbringing had some influence on the kind of person he was. Green writes:

He saw himself as he had been in the days of his boyhood and youth and early manhood, beyond an intervening gulf pre-occupied with foolish, material ideals that had no connection with the wonderful forces which had always excited his soul.

'Oh!' he lamented in himself, 'I have squandered years upon foolish fancies! I have wasted my life! I have never given my real strength to anything worthwhile!'

But he knew, too, that he had done only as the rest of mankind had done.

'We are all alike,' he thought. 'There are beautiful forces in us, truly glorious things, but we lack faith in ourselves to accomplish the full expression of those things. Indeed, we squander our power in trivial affairs, trivial and bitter pursuits.'

Then his soul regretted its lost opportunities, and he tried to find the strength wherewith to tell the three men in the room of the miraculous, abundant powers that resided in their souls and bodies and which could be rendered to exquisite purposes if they would only have sufficient faith in themselves. (1945 p 230)

These powers of the mind and soul, of course, would need a content for their expression. Similar thoughts to these occur several pages later. The gunman had been pursued by the police and he was now cornered. He is proud, defiant, fearless in his soul:

His shout was loud, clear, a cry of triumph over all the baseless fears that had ever beset him and influenced his life and rendered it small and viscious and stupid. It sundered the bonds that had constrained his emotional spirit, casting away the foulness of them and releasing him at last, so that he saw the sordid garments and felt a strange pity for his futile life. The pity was contrition; and his heart held it until it faded as the echo of his shouts soon faded. (p 255)

His reflections on the wasted years is again interrupted by the police closing in. The narrator continues:

From the last ripples of his life as a renegade in conflict with governments and the Police, the old impulses of self-defiance moved him. The cunning, the sly ruses, the bluffing and threats, all impelled him. But now, for the first time and the last time, he was without the strength to obey them.

He knew it. He knew that this was the end. Another hour at most would have sufficed for the little flame of his life to sink and expire in peace. He knew that, too. And with immeasurable regret he realized that his death was to be characteristic of his violent life. (p 255)

I would suggest that when we use the terms 'real' and 'true' to characterize what is real and true in us, as opposed to what is merely apparent even though we attach ourselves to self-delusory appearances, what we are doing is making qualitative distinctions of worth. If we are required to say what we mean, we should redescribe such words as real and true, when they are used in the above constructions, in terms of what is properly worthy of our pursuit. Of course, earlier in the novel, the gunman spoke about the discipline and honour in his life as an opponent of the government and the Police. (It needs to be said that the incidents in the novel took place long before the current troubles in Ireland.) He contrasts this discipline and honour in his own life with the values that his lover lives by. It needs to be said that this woman who loves him also dies with him at the end of the novel. However, for him, his lover is a beautiful and sensuous woman, who is pledged to her own sensuality. In her sensual nature there is no room for his conceptions of discipline and honour. Whereas his identity is bound up with what he requires to be a patriotic fighter,

her identity is bound up with her sensuality. He comes to realize that he is wrong about his own deepest impulses and he is wrong, whether he realizes it or not, about his lover's impulses and feelings. What makes it wrong in both cases is that he misidentifies what values are and should be operative in both their lives. We might say that such novels have large elements of anti-Bildungsroman formative experiences in them. The question is whether, after all the tribulations of the gunman, there is a certain human fullness in the denouement of the novel. My point is that when we speak about real or true selves, we are talking about what values are the touchstones in people's lives and how people measure themselves, too, in terms of them. Such values are bound up with our self-knowledge, because the measure of us is how we stand in relation to the values we genuinely hold, even when these values are hidden from us in self-deception. It may be years before we are self-clairvoyant about the values we hold.

Personal Development and Self-Realization

As a bold statement I would say that we realize ourselves in what we value. But we need to interpret value as what is good rather than what we simply desire or prefer. We do, of course, desire and prefer what is good as well as, perhaps, what is not. It is what is good that orientates, or perhaps what ought to orientate, our desires and preferences. I would argue that it is in the different degrees and kinds of worth in which our values reside. If 'betterness' is the fundamental insight, our values are on a scale from better to worse and are in what is intrinsically better. As I say this is a bold statement and I shall return to give a fuller account of it. But it is clear that we fulfil ourselves in what is of value. So when we talk about what content is furnished by our real selfhood or true personhood for us to achieve our fuller and higher realized states, we talk about those qualitative distinctions of worth that are internal to our values.

When the gunman in the novel *Odd Man Out* locates himself, if only briefly, in what he thinks to be his true nature, he returns to values with which he identified in the earlier years of his life. Under threat, though, he found himself attempting to respond in terms of a self, that is, a configuration of survival responses, that were fashioned when he took on new commitments. The disposition to respond in terms of 'cunning, sly ruses, the bluffing and threats' failed him. It must be said, to return to my earlier discussion, that for some people this

is what surviving or coping amounts to in the ordinary world of experience. As teachers we are perhaps helpless when it comes to an individual's personal development as a whole, especially when moral and educational values go against the grain of a whole way of life. We might say here that personal development does not occur significantly if a person is not moving onward and upward in accordance with certain standards. We may here simply be making a verbal point.

We begin at this point to ask a series of questions about the nature of self-realization and its close relatives. Which values do I realize or actualize myself in? How do I tell whether I am realized or actualized? These questions are about what it is to be realized and about how we know. We ask further questions: what is the nature of the self that is made real?; and what is the nature of that which realizes it? I have said that a publically unconstituted self cannot provide the content for its own realization. In self-creation we do not create ourselves as though we bring ourselves into existence. We do not bring ourselves exnihilo into existence nor do we create our exact doubles. To put the worst construction on it, it is not as though we are our own Dr Frankensteins. As ongoing projects, though, we are self-creative. We must take self-creation to mean that we constitute ourselves, as developing persons, by trying to live in accordance with what we identify as our affinities. We create, realize or actualize ourselves by attempting to fulfil ourselves, to find meaning in, to be at home in and to find ourselves in those dimensions of experience and departments of life that strike cords within us - we might say, educated cords within us. We flourish, if we are fortunate, in those values in which we find affinities. The self and what it finds fulfilment in are strongly connected. I have not forgotten that the term values is often difficult to handle. Some pursuits are worthy of us and others not and other values might be overriding. I have already said that what we consider to be moral values are a condition on other values.

We also use other expressions when we try to capture what our fuller or higher satisfactions might consist in. We say we know ourselves best when we actively pursue what we consider to be intrinsically worthwhile or we feel most alive and real when we are nourished by our cultural artifacts or when we are engrossed in our work or vocations. David Wiggins captures some of the spirit of these points when he argues that it is in metaethics that we find the best way for us to understand ourselves better. He means by the statement that it is in

this second order discourse that we can best elucidate what are those values that fulfil us best. We understand who we are most fruitfully when we find meaning in those activities that are intrinsically worthwhile. Furthermore, what we say about these activities have a truth-status, that is, we can say of those intrinsically worthwhile activities that they have an objective status. Wiggins says that the 'questions of truth and the meaning of life really are the central questions of moral philosophy'. (1976 p 331) He does consider what he calls the 'casuistry of emergencies' - the question of 'What shall we do?' - but it is in the meaning of life and the truth-claims we can make about this meaning that our good is to be found. (pp.331-2) Although Wiggins queries the certainty of purpose that attached to human projects in ages when certainties could be held with better conscience than today, he does indicate what we mean by truth and the meaning of life. He quotes from two letters sent by Mozart to respectively Padre Martini and his father:

We live in this world to compel ourselves industriously to enlighten one another by means of reasoning and to apply ourselves always to carrying forward the sciences and the arts. (p 332)

I wish you as many years as are needed to have nothing left to do in music. (p332)

It is a question, then, of how we know ourselves best in what values and how we discriminate amongst these values.

Often the expressions personal development, self-realization, self-actualization, self-creation and self-development are run together. It is not certain what they independently pick out as those values that should be developed, realized and so forth in our lives. However, if the source of the content we realized or fulfilled in does not come from within ourselves in any fundamental sense but comes from culture, we still need to consider what ranges of cultural experience is appropriate for our realization or fulfilment. When I said above that there are natural affinities between us and what we are realized or fulfilled in, it might be thought that these are a source within ourselves after all - namely the source of our uninhibited response to what is outside us. I would wish to say here that at this level our affinities are intuitive. By intuitive I mean that we have reached some ultimate responsive orientation to what is valued and that this orientation does not owe its justification to anything more ultimate.

It might be that an individual can be shown that his fulfilment does not lie where he thinks it does but corrections cannot go on for ever. It is hard to believe that Mozart's fulfilment in music could be corrected. There might though be a conflict between his absorption in music and his responsibilities and affection to his family. Some people might argue here that morality is not a condition on the pursuit of excellence in music. We need only think of Gauguin. However, my point here is that there may be an explanation of our intuitive responses to what is good at other levels in our natures but at the surface level, as it were, there are no further justifications for these responses. Another example is that we may feel that there is an ultimacy in the meaning and value of the thought that God looked upon the great whales and saw that they were good. It is in such meaning and value that we find our good.

If self-realization and its cognates, (and, as I have said, I take personal development in some of its uses to parallel self-realization) mean that each one of us is enjoined to become the person one potentially or truly is, the person needs to consider what such a realization might be expressed in. John Stuart Mill, of course, had no transcendental sanction to make good his claim that one should pursue higher pleasures. He simply characterized as higher those pleasures that were experienced as better in the light of a full and complete experience of these as compared with those pleasures that were then classed as lower. Puskin is better than pushpin, because those who have experienced both assent to the former as higher.

Each thinker will pick out those goods that he thinks we are realized in and which are expressive of our higher humanity. But when each thinker is pressed he will deny that he can identify our best good in the latency state. It is only after we are realized that we can say wherein our self-realization consists. The 'hidden' potential is retrospectively said to have been the individual's true self, when the individual is now in his realized state. Carl Jung, for example, no matter what he said about his inner precipitations towards his vocation and therefore towards his individuation, can only say retrospectively that he realized his 'self'. This is not to say that an individual does not feel frustrations and arrested development in his efforts to realize himself when he has some understanding where he thinks his fulfilment lies. I am speaking about those conceptions which use the metaphor of the self's being like the finished sculpture already present in the block of stone.

But what about all those people whose lives may have gone one way rather than another because of inner or outer obstacles. It is true that they may have found something in their lives to be glad about. Yet what may they have achieved if things had gone otherwise? The point is they may not know, or at least they are not presented with two pictures before their minds - the picture of what they could have become juxtaposed against the picture of what they are. Is the test of the realized condition that we now judge that we feel fulfilled in what we now judge to be our good? The Marxist will respond immediately and remind us that there is such a thing as false consciousness. We are capable of conniving at our own impoverished condition and fail to identify our real interests. It is at this point, too, that Antony Flew will argue that interests are like needs; others can claim that they know better than we do where our interests lie.

In the last few pages I have indicated how some writers would give content to the idea of self-realization. Most writers on this subject state that there is a preferred setting for what they conceive to be the good life. Those who do not state it imply it. As human beings we occupy different 'environments' and hope to find fulfilment in them. I include those 'metaphysical' environments in which religious writers try to locate our highest or final good. We know or feel ourselves best, so the thought proceeds, in certain social or cultural settings rather than others or when our lives fall under rich self-interpretations rather than those thought to be less rich. A multiple reference is made to what values are judged to fulfil a person, to a setting in which these values can be realized and to ideas about what may go wrong or what has gone wrong to prevent these values being realized in an individual's life. We are speaking then about what a person essentially is and about what setting he properly belongs to. I have redescribed such talk in terms of what values are worthy of our pursuit and in what settings they are brought to fruition. What is really or truly ourselves is interpreted in those values. In the immediate pages that follow and in the following chapters I assume that something like this frame of reference is at work in those writers and thinkers that to whom I refer. I should now like to look at five traditions of thought that incorporate self-realization as an organizing idea. These five traditions are in no way exhaustive of the interpretation of self-realization but they indicate the general drift of how we might interpret the term.

1. Romantic Self-Discovery is the tradition that emphasizes what the individual's true self consists in. This tradition would repudiate any attempt to characterize the good for the individual in general terms. The individual is unique and falls outside any universal characterization. An innate pattern belongs to each individual and he is driven to go within himself to discover it. I use the metaphor above about the completed piece of sculpture as already being present within the stone to present a picture of what the ideal is in this conception of self-realization. Each person is his own piece of sculpture. The individual is not self-created or self-constituted in the sense that he explores the external world for his good. He explores what is within himself and attempts to reveal its contours. There is some kind of distinctive telos inside that awaits realization. Each person is special and a 'real me' awaits each individual in his future, provided the appropriate nursery is identified for the realization of what is within. An extreme type of individualism would suggest that the nursery is also within the nature of the individual himself. On the other hand, a headmaster in his brochure for his newly 'opted-out' school would say it is his school which is the proper nursery.

There is a strong affective aspect to this tradition. We do not know ourselves best in reason or choice but in feeling. Feeling directs us to what we are realized in and tells us when we have got there. The Human Potential Movement, that epitomizes the Me-generation, has carried on this tradition to some extent insofar as people are encouraged to reflect on their hopes, fears, joys, anger, frustrations, pain, trust, mistrust, guilt, sexual promptings, sexual phobias and so forth. By thus dwelling on and scrutinizing them, people come to recognize, differentiate, appropriate and own the ones that go with the grain of who they think they basically are. There is less emphasis on disavowing these inner urges, feelings and so on. The philosophy is let it all hang out. I can recall examples of such self-discovery sessions within education. A self-discovery component was part of a personal development programme at a college of education. One person came to 'recognize' his true sexual self and 'appropriated' it. It led to the break-up of his family and a sex change. It hardly needs saying, again, that such notions filter down in one form or another into personal development programmes in schools and colleges.

What Schleiermacher said is often quoted to characterize the idea of romantic self-discovery. I take the quotation from Lukes:

(I)t became clear to me that each man ought to represent humanity in himself in his own different way, by his own special blending of its elements, so that it should reveal itself in each special manner, and, in the fulness of space and time, should become everything that can emerge as something individual out of the depths of itself. (1973 p 68)

It is interesting in this passage, that the writer speaks about the individual's representing humanity in himself and blending its elements in him. I take it that the depths are in humanity, in the generic features of what is person-like, rather than in the pre-human individual.

It is obvious that I will come back to my claim that no matter how much this tradition emphasizes the uniquely inscribed pattern and telos within each individual, it is in terms of the content of the public world that individual difference finds its realization. It can take odd forms though. We might say that theorizing about self-discovery, including educational theorizing, helps to create the phenomenon of self-discovery that it seeks to characterize.

2. Expressivism is characterized by Charles Taylor in the following manner:

The conception of human life which I call 'expressivist' ... is part of a reaction to (associationist psychology, utilitarian ethics, atomistic politics of social engineering, and ultimately a mechanistic science of man). It is a rejection of the view of human life as a mere external association of elements without intrinsic connection ... Expressivism returns to the sense of the intrinsic value of certain actions or modes of life ... and these actions or modes of life are seen as wholes, as either true expressions, or distortions of what we authentically are. (1975 p 539)

The idea is that there is an internal connection between what we express and the vehicle of its expression. There is a pull towards the harmony between inner feeling and outward expression. An impulse may exist within me to express something in words or paint but I progressively know that the nature of what I have the impulse to express will be in the expressing of it. As an individual writer or painter, or simply as a language user in the everyday world, I make manifest what I want to say in the chosen vehicle of its expression. There are not two processes though - one finished in the mind and the other made to match it. I partly come to know what I want to express only by means of the medium of its expression. The individual is firmly resident in the

modes of expression and forms of life that are expressive of who he is.

Some writers want to argue for a strong version of expressivism. F.H. Bradley, the English Idealist philosopher, argues that the community is the only proper vehicle of the individual's expressive behaviour. There is an internal expressive relation between the individual and the social institutions that regulate his moral life. For all of us, it is in our station and duties that we find out who we are. Everything hangs on just what the vehicle is of our expressive behaviour. An individual artist is expressively active in his chosen medium. Except in those extreme forms of self-expressive activity where an attachment to standards within a tradition of art is explicitly rejected, an individual artist or thinker will consciously draw on the resources within a tradition. Where an artist or thinker does not, he defines what he creates against this or that tradition. Dada is an example of a movement in art that consciously defines itself against all previous art forms and against all those values that were supposed to define our humanity but yet precipitated us into the horror of the First World War.

But where an individual draws on a tradition it does not mean that he is engulfed by that tradition. We might say that in Bradley's interpretation of tradition the individual is engulfed within it and that is a merit. The community, and the State for that matter, is that in which the individual is who he is. In this sense the individual has no independent access to alternatives to that tradition. Where he appears to have such an alternative, he is either under a misapprehension or it would be better if the alternative were absent. His mode of access to his human setting is what the human setting provides for that access. The expressive relation between him and his community is strongly communitarian.

Expressivism is a reaction against the disenchanting, atomistic world of instrumental rationality. The main charge against expressivism in its strong form is that there is a pull towards authoritarianism or even totalitarianism. The self and the community is in expressive congruence but the cost is freedom and individual inventiveness. The self in an atomized and instrumental society may not be underwritten by a world that reflects back to him his own image but he lives authentically, truthfully and freely in such a disenchanting world. Furthermore, if this is how reality is, we cannot without massive self-deception or political manipulation pretend that the world or our part of it is enchanted. We might discover separate expressive media in

which we find a measure of expressive reciprocity but these media are not themselves expressive of the nature of things.

We can readily see that expressivism is far removed from what is called child-centred self-expression. The latter notion is more akin to romantic self-discovery. Within this self-expressive educational movement expressive activity is meant to be independent of what tradition imposes. But expressivism centres on what traditions or communities we are expressive within. And to this extent an individual may not know what he wants to express until he is within a tradition that provides him with the means of expression. He is on a voyage of self-discovery but he discovers himself in an independently existing cultural content. An example would be one in which an individual tries to capture the nuance of an unarticulated feeling. He needs an interlocutory context in which to bring it to expression. A new situation with unfamiliar people may prompt undefined responses. It may only be later that he comes to know what he felt when other people help him to identify these feelings. Was the unease embarrassment, fear, admiration or something else?

Education is both personal exploration and the initiation into an unknown intellectual or artistic territory. We do not necessarily mean totally unknown. There are connections between ordinary experience and academic or formal learning. However, it is still debated at what stage in an individual's development a constitutionally programmed pattern of intellectual or artistic response begins to be effectively informed by cultural traditions of different kinds. It is difficult to talk about what is constitutionally programmed, whether it be in terms of biology or genetics, because it is not easy to know what and individual owes to his nature and what he owes to his nurture. Some writers speak about our collective nature in contrast to our collectively achieved culture. I mention this anthropological debate only to return to my point that self-expression means little if we do not begin to express what is absorbed from culture. But, as I have also repeated, individual exploration counts for something. In our culture, at least, individual difference is constitutive of what it is to be a person.

Having said this, I want to return to expressivism because it leads into the idea of personal development within the tradition of the Bildungsroman novel. Isaiah Berlin captures what expressivism is after in the following passage about Vico, the Neapolitan writer of the Eighteenth Century. Vico saw that human history:

(D)id not consist merely of things and events and their consequences and sequences (including those of human organisms viewed as natural objects) as the external world did; it was the story of human activities, of what men did and thought and suffered, of what they strove for, aimed at, rejected, conceived, imagined, of what their feelings were directed at. It was concerned, therefore, with motives, purposes, hopes, fears, loves and hatreds, jealousies, ambitions, outlooks and visions of reality; with the ways of seeing, and ways of acting and creating, of individuals and groups. These activities we knew directly, because we were involved in them as actors, not spectators. There was a sense, therefore, in which we knew more about ourselves than we knew about the external world ...

(1980 p 95)

The important point to notice is that Vico is writing about what I previously called the Lebenswelt. There is then an internal connection between Lebenswelt and what it is to be a person. '(T)hings and events and their consequences and sequences' belong to the natural world and this world is not habitable by persons. If our lives approximate to one-thing-after-another, without any significance attaching to what happens, we lose a sense of ourselves. A handshake or a kiss can be expressive of love, friendship, affection, camaraderie, or the bonds of honour or honour betrayed in the Mafia. Without culture there can be no such expressive behaviour. I mention the last expressive behaviour because it would be better for many people were such behaviour not culturally extant. This is a moral judgement and these judgements have no place within nature. Language, of course, is the supreme expressive medium.

But we are shaped as persons by such expressive behaviour. The Bildungsroman novel is about what we need to undergo if we are to grow up. The word Bildung captures both what we need to undergo culturally in order to grow up and what kind of individuals we grow into. We need to be reared into our prejudices as Burke would say. Our mode of access to the human world is to take on the properties of the human world. Without these prejudices we should be the inhabitants of a world of events and causal sequences. But we need to ask which properties and which prejudices?

The term Bildungsroman applies to those novels about the formation of an individual's personality. It is exemplified above all in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship. In English, Tom Jones would be an example of the Bildungsroman novel. In its ideal form the novel tells a story of an individual's gradual initiation into his cultural inheritance. The initiation is meant to bring about a con-

gruance between his inmost self and outside reality. The central figure passes through the years of adolescence and early manhood in a variety of situations that are meant to enhance, heighten and transform his make-up so that he can reside in his human world as a mature adult. He proceeds to adulthood through inner effort and guided outside influence. The novel is developmental in the sense that the individual takes on the qualities and attributes of his culture and then finds expressive fulfilment in what culturally matches these qualities and attributes.

The tradition owes much to the ideas we find in the religious quest or vocation. Christian soteriology is about the ideal at the end of time, about universal judgement. There are secular versions of this idea of salvation. Marxism posits a unitary line to a utopian conclusion. However, in the Bildungsroman novel the end tends to be adulthood. An individual has been shaped to get the most out of his historical situation as possible. Fulfilment is imminent in culture and not transcendent in Heaven. Our hero/pilgrim does not progress to a world outside this one. The virtues he acquires are part of what he needs to live well in his human world and not to help him strive to leave the rake behind, at least not in a theological sense, as he moves onwards and upwards. It might be argued though that the Bildungsroman novel is dependent on the theological concepts of status viatoris and status comprehensoris. The individual is on his way to his fulfilment in the Beatific Vision. (See Pieper 1986 pp 11-21) Perhaps it is no coincidence that the word Bildung is said to have its roots in German mystical literature in which the image of God in man is to be made real in actual men.

The following is an extract from a Thomas Mann lecture on the Bildungsroman tradition. The quotation is in Louis Dumont's Essays on Individualism:

The finest characteristic of the typical German, the best-known and also the most flattering to his self-esteem, is his inwardness. It is no accident that it was the Germans who give to the world the intellectually stimulating and very humane literary form which we call the novel of personal cultivation and development. Western Europe has its novel of social criticism to which the Germans regard this other type as their own special counterpart; it is at the same time an autobiography, a confession. The inwardness, the culture (Bildung) of a German implies introspectiveness; an individualistic cultural conscience, consideration for the careful tending, the shaping, deepening and perfecting of one's own personality or, in religious terms, for the salvation and justification of one's own life; subjectivism in the things

of the mind, therefore, a type of culture that might be called pietistic, given to autobiographical confession and deeply personal, one in which the world of the objective, the political world, is felt to be profane and is thrust aside with indifference, "because," as Luther says, "this external order is of no consequence." What I mean by all this is that the idea of a republic meets with resistance in Germany chiefly because the ordinary middle-class man here, if he ever thought about culture, never considered politics to be part of it, and still does not do so today. To ask him to transfer his allegiance from inwardness to the objective, to politics, to what the peoples of Europe call freedom, would seem to him to amount to a demand that he should do violence to his own nature, and in fact give up his sense of national identity. (1986 pp 138-139)

Mann came to see that there were many dangers in setting German culture against civilization, community against contractual society, hierarchy against equality and liberal democracy, the soil against reason and the absorption into prejudice against the responsibility of choice. Mann works these ideas out in his own Bildungsroman novel, *The Magic Mountain*, but there is no easy transition to the adult world in which the individual finds his harmonious destiny. Hans is precipitated onto the battle-fields in the First World War, after a very uneven education.

The important point is that there is no obvious world in which we can find that inner peace that reflects our harmony with external reality. We are just as likely to find our fulfilment within the institutions of democratic politics as in the certainties of the inwardness of German culture.

Lying behind a great deal of what is implied in expressivism is the thought that some things are more expressive of our natures than others. Atomistic, disenchanted and disengaged liberal society robs us of our belongingness, so it is thought. And it is presupposed that belongingness is superior to disengagement.

3. Autonomous Self-Development singles out choice as the important organizing concept in self-realization. In its Existentialist version, we create ourselves by our choices. We are not truly anything until we exercise our capacity to choose. Choice is fundamental and in the Sartrean view of Existentialism there is no attempt to elaborate a bridge between volition and rationality.

Here I am not so much concerned with choice in this sense as I am with John Stuart Mill's idea of self-development. Mill gives choice

a prominence in his notion of self-development but choice is not groundless. Human beings have natural faculties that can be cultivated and unfolded. But these faculties are embedded in traditions of thought and practice. It is a matter of human beings realizing their human endowment in conditions of opportunity and choice. Mill says, drawing on Wilhelm von Humboldt, that:

"(T)he end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;" that, therefore, the object "towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;" that for this there are two requisites, "freedom, and variety of situations;" and that from the union of these arise "individual vigour and manifold diversity," which combine themselves in "originality."
(1972 pp 115-116)

It can be seen that reason is important in self-development. But man's endowment, for Mill, is more than reason in a narrow sense. Self-development demands that individuals have the right to pursue their own good in their own way. There are a stock of possibilities in society that an individual can draw on for his self-development. It is interesting that Mill in his concern for the cultivation of the best that is found in human reason, feeling and imagination should find a place for those impulses that are the foundation of religion. Mill's *Essays on Religion*, which appeared posthumously, brought this response from Halevy: 'There are hints in Stuart Mill of an original nature which was sentimental and almost religious, and which was not made for the purely intellectual and abstract system imposed on it since childhood'. I take this quotation from J.O. Urmson (1967 p 272).

The emphasis on autonomous self-development is on the freely chosen development of individuality based on how generic humanity works its chemistry on us. If we interpret personal development as self-development, in the Milleian sense, all aspects of the school curriculum are part of personal development. We are enjoined, given the opportunity, to develop our powers in manifold ways.

4. Rational Eudaimonia stresses that man is essentially a rational being. Eudainonism has been resurrected in recent times as a kind of self-realization in a general sense, similar to Mill's notion of self-

development. It has been taken up as a quasi-moral, quasi-aesthetic and intellectual ideal of human development. Here I want to stress the rational nature of man in the Aristotelian tradition, because for some contemporary writers it is reason which is the distinguishing feature of man's make-up that gives him his unique distinctiveness. Man is endowed with a specific nature, a distinctive ergon, a proper telos to which he naturally progresses. Man's highest achievement, his summum bonum, is to realize his rational faculties. Aristotle argued that there are two aspects to reason. One is theoria, the faculty of rational contemplation, the highest object of which is God. Theoria is concerned with abstract, intellectual knowledge. In Plato it is developed to its highest degree when we achieve the intuitive grasp of the 'intelligible, eternal Forms'. A charge against Aristotle is that he makes all endeavours converge on the dominant aim of theoria, that is, the contemplation and apprehension of God. It leaves all other human pursuits in a subordinate position.

But reason also guides action and feeling. We share many non-rational features with animals but it is in reason that we achieve our fullest being. Reason, then, can be practical. It interprets all else in our make-up. To realize the best possible life, reason should order human goods into proper relationships with each other. Some are superior and some are subordinate. Bentham, for example, gave pleasures no particular order. They had no meaningful relationship to each other. But reason should be used to impose coherence on an individual's life. Reason, then, is the key idea in this version of self-realization. But reason tends to be universal and it detracts from the uniqueness of individuals as conceived by romantic self-discovery.

5. Homo Faber - Man-the-Maker highlights the fact that man is a producer above all else. He finds himself in his labour. In Marx, man's 'species being' is grounded in his capacity to produce artefacts. He makes himself in his productive activities and consciousness itself is produced thereby. We know ourselves best when we create, invent and produce. There is a should in Marx. Men should produce those artefacts that reflect back at him his own nature. He should not produce all goods for exchange and in the process become alienated from his best nature. Marx was, in these respects, at one with the Utopian Socialists such as William Morris. In other respects, though, he thought these socialists to be mere pamphleteers and sermonizers.

However, in the respect of work, Marx agreed with them that men should produce beautiful objects for their own sake, that is, for the sake of creativity.

Labour should not, therefore, be seen as a cost of production, a disutility that makes men external to themselves. Labour should be seen as expressive of men's essential nature. It should be an expressive externalization of his creative impulses. My point, here, is to present a picture of that tradition of self-realization that emphasizes work as distinctive of man. Man is a tool-maker and makes himself in the process of making tools. He makes himself also in what the tools create. Reason and choice are located in the wider context of man's embroilment with the stuff of the material world.

Self-realization and the terms that tend to be used interchangeably with it stress that individuals have potentialities and capacities that tend not to be made real in many conditions of life. It is obvious that we cannot realize what we have not the potentialities and capacities to realize. So self-realization refers to what we can in fact realize in our lives if we create the conditions that makes such self-realization possible. It goes without saying that we should not realize nor encourage others to realize those possibilities for ill. I know when I say this that some will say that I beg many questions, because what we conceive ill to be may well be contested. However, when we reflect on self-realization, self-development and so forth, we might bear in mind pictures of the unrealized state of men. I quote the following from a book of essays by Stuart Hampshire. This is what Schiller says in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. In the sixth letter he wrote:

With us moderns the image of the race is scattered ... in a fragmentary way, so that you have to go the rounds from individual to individual in order to gather the totality of the race. With us, one may be inclined to assert, the mental faculties show themselves detached in operation, as psychology separates them in idea, and we see not merely individual persons, but whole classes of human beings, developing only a part of their capacities, while the rest of them, like a stunted plant, show only a feeble vestige of their nature. ... It was culture itself that inflicted this wound upon modern humanity. As soon as enlarged experience and more precise speculation made necessary a sharper division of the sciences on the one hand, and, on the other, the more intricate machinery of states made necessary a more rigorous dissociation of ranks and occupations, the essential bond of human nature was torn about, and a ruinous conflict set its harmonious powers at variance. ... Man (now) never develops the harmony of his

being, and instead of imprinting humanity upon his nature, he becomes merely the imprint of his occupation, of his science. ... And so gradually individual concrete life is extinguished, in order that the abstract life of the whole may prolong its sorry existence. (1969 pp 190-191)

Hampshire rightly says that Schiller did not confine himself to the denunciation of the way that our lives are fragmented under certain social and economic circumstances. Hampshire, then, continues to quote Schiller:

Partiality in the exercise of powers, it is true, inevitably leads the individual into error, but the race to truth.
(1969 p 191)

I am reminded here that Edmund Burke said that the specimen is foolish but the species is wise. This wisdom for Burke was embodied in our political and social institutions. He meant that when men attempted to order their affairs by appealing to the abstract principles of equality, liberty, justice and so forth without reference to the accumulated wisdom in their institutions, they would cause social, economic and political chaos.

But since Schiller's time, cognitive growth and its technological spin-off has been huge. Humanity has gained by much of this knowledge and technology but our moral wisdom may not have kept pace with such developments. Goethe has said, for example, that 'Truth is what it befits a man to know'. When the first atomic bomb was exploded in New Mexico in 1945, one of the scientists remarked, when he saw what power had been released by the bomb, that he had beheld Evil for the first time in his life. When I speak of moral knowledge I mean that knowledge that enters into our self-interpretations - that knowledge of ourselves which says who we are.

If we move along in years and place alongside the quotation from Schiller the following passage from H.G. Wells' novel, *The First Men in the Moon*, we shall see one possible picture of what the outcome could be of fragmented knowledge and lives. I am recalled to this passage by Mary Midgley, who uses the quotation to make her own observations about wisdom. Midgley says, 'that the human explorer (to the moon) finds that the native lunar creatures vary greatly among themselves in shape, size, gifts, character, and appearance. Though they all belong to a single ant-like species, each one has been modified to fit its place in life exactly'. Midgley continues and leads into Wells, 'in each, some single organ is enlarged at the expense of all

the others:

'Machine hands' indeed some of them are in actual nature - it is no figure of speech, the single tentacle of the mooncalf-herd is profoundly modified for clawing, lifting, guiding, the rest of them no more than necessary subordinate appendages to these more important parts. ... The making of these various sorts of operative must be a very curious and interesting process. ... Quite recently I came upon a number of young Selenites confined in jars from which only the forelimbs protruded, who were being compressed to become machine minders of a special sort. The extended 'hand' in this highly developed system of technical education stimulated by irritants and nourished by injection, while the rest of the body is starved. ... It is quite unreasonable, I know, but such glimpses of the educational methods of these beings affect me disagreeably. I hope, however that may pass off, and I may be able to see more of this aspect of their wonderful social order. That wretched-looking hand-tentacle sticking out of its jar seemed to have a sort of limp appeal for lost possibilities; it haunts me still, although of course it is really in the end a far more humane proceeding than our earthly method of leaving children to grow into human beings and then making machines of them. (1989 pp 3-4)

Self-realization, self-development and indeed personal development have been a persistent protest against such diminutions of men. All writers in the traditions of self-realization and so forth have assumed as a background to their writing the fact that people have fallen well below, or have never had the chance to realize, their potentials for intellectual, moral, emotional, aesthetic and imaginative development. These writers have different pictures of what this development might consist in. But Wells captures in one picture what a limiting case of non-self-realization might be.

I want to conclude this section with four points about self-realization and its cognates.

1. When we speak about self-realization, the self refers to the individual human being whose powers and potentialities are to be realized. He will be developed, realized, actualized and so on to the extent that he seizes what opportunities there are for his intellectual, moral, emotional, aesthetic and imaginative development.
2. The self needs to be an agent in its own transformation. The individual proceeds to develop in accordance with his reason, choices and interests. He expresses and finds himself in his natural affinities and affections.
3. There are many different values that an individual can find his fulfilment in. He might find his well-being, amongst other things, in music, friendship, the ordinary life of the family, religious con-

templation, meaningful work and so on. He can come to appreciate beauty as well as create it. It is, then, those things in which he finds himself, fulfils himself, expresses himself etc. that his self-realization consists in.

4. We not only realize ourselves in what is of value but we also realize ourselves in our own eyes. Midgley needed to bring out not only that our lives, when things go badly, can approximate to the condition of those Selenites in Wells' novel but also that our self-interpretations can match this impoverished state. We neither want science to shape us for limited functions nor give us the picture of ourselves. Cognitive growth gives us greater understanding of the natural world and can be part of our self-development in the Millian sense, for example, but such cognitive growth could give us false pictures of ourselves. Self-realization is also concerned with self-interpretation and self-identity. To live well we need a sense of who we are. Some would say that we are the children of God. Such a statement is not simply a statement of fact. It is meant to be part of our self-interpretations. This is how we see ourselves and we live in accordance with it. What kind of a picture does science throw back at us such that we can say in its terms who we are? We need, then, to be confirmed by our own kind in the richness of our self-interpretations.

Michelangelo, for example, was wonderfully fulfilled in his art but there was a shift in his self-understanding when he rounded on the Pope and said that he himself was an artist whereas the Pope was merely a pope. Michelangelo was saying that he was someone and that he had intrinsic worth as an artist and a man and was not merely the servant of the Pope. This is the way to hubris, of course, but the point is that we fulfil ourselves in what is of value and realize ourselves in our self-interpretations. They go hand in hand, it needs to be said.

CHAPTER 6

Persons, Personal Development and Values

In what follows I continue to use the word personal in the expression personal development in a wide sense. I said above that the word personal in the sense individual needs its meaning completing by reference to what is person-like in the relevant sense. In PSMHE etc. the meaning of personal is completed by the content supplied by the words social, moral and health. In my subsequent discussion, I said that what is person-like can have a much wider meaning than is covered by the educational content in such headings as PSMHE. But the sense of the words social, moral and health are thought by some to be too open-ended to constrain the word personal in an educationally acceptable way. But can it be the other way round? Is it what is educationally acceptable that constrains the content of the words social, moral and health? It is obvious that there will be mutual constraint. And, again, it is the details of PSMHE that are authoritative. The most authoritative of all in this area of the curriculum is what is moral. It is true that we do look for more general formulations in this area to guide us. But here we return to that oscillation between general idea and the confirming or disconfirming particular instances.

Our case is a little like the problem that Peter Winch mentions when he argues that it is not human nature that determines what we can or cannot make sense of. It is rather what we can or cannot make sense of that determines what we can ascribe to human nature. (1972 p 84) Similarly I would suggest that it is what moral sense we can ascribe to what is person-like that makes it a guide to the educational practices in PSMHE etc. This is not to overlook the contributions that the other words in the general headings make in giving meaning to PSMHE. Nor is it to overlook those other areas of the curriculum that are deeply implicated in what is person-like in their various ways.

Just as the concept of human nature has often been appealed to as a touchstone for the explanation and justification of how we do and might organize human affairs, so the concept of person has tended to be cited as the basis for what personal development might consist in. We are concerned, then, with the connection between what it is to be a person and what an individual's development might amount to. The features of personhood and what it is to be person-like are the refer-

ences of personal development. We need to say that included in what it is to be a person is what it is to be socially and morally properly constituted. What else might we be talking about in personal development? I am very much aware, too, that it is not enough to ask in what personal development might consist. We have to look and see how the term stands up to its application in particular cases. But in all cases, we are asking what kind of a reality a person is; we are asking too what the logical limits are to this reality and how we tell in the fine-grained texture of life what this reality amounts to.

It is considered by many writers that personhood is a moral status in itself. There are disputes, many in dubious contexts, whether certain human beings belong to the class of persons and, if at all, at what point they enter or fall out of the class. An example to illustrate the point is one where the human being is intact but because of brain damage the person is irrecoverable. For some this distinction has moral import and it still may not be permissible to switch off the life support machine. To give a further example, I once recall hearing an elderly man who was made redundant before his time lament that he himself had built-in-obsolescence. The mechanistic metaphor, if humorous, points to a self-interpretation, the significance of which is that of falling out of a class or to be no longer in a certain category. In this case, that of a person. One still functions as a human being though. In this context there is also the sinister connotation in the idea of a 'useful life' being over.

There is a difficulty in drawing the distinction between an individual's being both a human being and a person. What would it be to dispossess an individual of all the properties of his personhood to reveal pure human beingness? Is personhood the most pervasive phase sortal term applied to a human being? Many phase sortal terms apply to a human being, or person in this context, at different times in his life. A person has not always been an engineer, for example, and in the case of the redundant worker he ceases to be one. But when a phase sortal term ceases to apply to a person he does not lose his personhood thereby. Many properties remain, unless we have in mind the vegetable on the life support machine. But we might say here that he is scarcely a human being if we wish. He might still be an object of neurophysiological enquiry but this is at the level of events and causal sequences until, if at all, these sub-personal processes begin to show 'life' again. I would suggest that it is

false to say that such a distinction between the term human being and the term person is a distinction without a difference.

Whatever the range 'person' covers, persons are thought to possess an unearned and morally undisputed standing in a human setting and to have an infeasible right to marks of respect. They should not be used as a means to an end, except benignly. The utility of the term personal development also covers the search for what is a relevant education for present and prospective needs of pupils and students. There is a danger, of course, in the employment of the term personal development in that its vagueness can readily become a catch phrase.

One might make, as I have suggested, some kind of beginning by stating that the term personal development is situated in the domain of values. Applied to human beings, the terms personal and development are strongly moral (involving distinctions of worth) or normative (setting and meeting standards) and the extent to which human beings disagree about values, controversy will be involved from the start. Even if all values are not contentious or sufficiently important to warrant conflict, people disagree sharply in the values they hold, though for the most part they manage to live together. Values, therefore, characterize our divisions and fashion our bonds. Whose divisions and whose bonds are questions central to this thesis. People, then, are constantly viewing the world differently, exhibiting different orientations in what is considered living well or badly, assessing people or situations one way or another and evaluating motives and actions this way and not that. Values enter into our judgement, shape our aspirations, constitute our conduct, reveal our preferences, inform our choices and commitments, and find expression in our likes and dislikes.

A person is, then, in his values and deeds. Though a person is a member of a group, part of a community and shares in a life with others, he nevertheless sees things differently from other people, and to the degree that this is true, the direction of his development will be his own. Care has to be taken in making this last point and has to be earned, for there are many difficulties in the nature of the relationship between the individual with his personal beliefs and values and his human neighbourhood which is the source of these beliefs and values. That the beliefs and values issue from the individual is not the same as to say that he is the ultimate source of them. Personhood, then, enters into the reality of the individual human being. He embodies values as a person and gives expression to them as an agent.

Values are pervasive in our lives. They are the element in which we move. This is not to suggest that we do not inhabit a material world with its own necessities and which cannot be identified independently of our concerns. Nor does it mean, for analytical purposes, we cannot separate out facts about people and their situation from what evaluative constructions we put on them. If we describe this distinction as consisting of two realms - that of fact and values - we then face the problem of the nature of the relationship between these two realms. Is there always a gap between facts and values such that the gap has to be bridged by sentiments, prescriptions, choices or preferences? Do we respond to this world of facts and give a human shape to it in these very responses? Is there a further gap between these personal responses and more objective standards for the evaluation of these responses? Alternatively, are facts always evaluatively interpreted? Do these facts provide the light of their own moral illumination? Put simply and contentiously, as an example, the fact that people have different intellectual endowments and realized abilities is related to the fact of different levels of material wellbeing. This connection, and it is one of many, is justified or more correctly, for some people, excused on the grounds that intellectual effort and realized ability must be rewarded. The further move is that this is right and proper. But even for the most achievement-inspired people, it does not follow that it is right and proper no matter what the circumstances. It is, nevertheless, right and proper and not just expedient that effort and achieved ability is rewarded. The facts, then, have evaluative consequences. We might even say, in this example, that there is something natural about the ability rewarded and the rightness of it. We might, though, see things differently.

It is not so much that facts generate values but rather that values give the facts a different significance. We find our reasons in our values and not reasons in the facts. Were cooperation and welfare to inspire our perspective on human affairs, achievement and ability may be perceived as gifts to be put to the general good more generously. According to this picture, it would be seen as right and proper by the people who possess the gifts to give of themselves in this spirit and not, it may be stressed, because they had been seduced into compliant service by the weak and the poor in spirit in a Nietzschean fashion.

I wish to take up again the difficult question of how an individual is related to what I call his human neighbourhood. It is difficult because an individual absorbs his human characteristics from the human

world but he is not thereby absorbed into it. He has a life of his own, if things go well, and can take up a stance against this human world, but not all at one go. The ideas of living an individual human life and living the life of a human being in a human world go together. The individual does not build up a human conception of himself, of who and what he is, by his unaided resources. He is not a Cartesian man. Such a conception of man is one of an autonomous, rational, dimensionless consciousness, said to be truly revealed when the inessential is stripped away. The inessential is absorbed from the individual's human neighbourhood. Since his actions, desires and convictions fall under cultural and social descriptions, he needs to disencumber himself of these to disclose his real self to himself. Obviously this picture of a disengaged ego when pressed to this kind of limit can appear as a caricature. This limiting case, though, does capture a certain kind of picture of man in relations to or in isolation from his culture and society and it contrasts with the one where man and his human world are intimately bound up together.

To elaborate my point I shall quote from Peter Winch's *Understanding a Primitive Society*:

Unlike beasts, men do not merely live but also have a conception of life. This is not something that is simply added to their life, rather, it changes the very sense which the word 'life' has, when applied to men. It is no longer equivalent to 'animate existence'. When we are speaking of the life of man, we can ask questions about what is the right way to live, what things are most important in life, whether life has any significance, and if so, what. (1972 p 44)

According to Winch it is men who have such a conception and not the individual man. The meaningful possibilities for the individual and what it is for the individual to find himself within his own perspective on the world, come from a shared form of life. Winch would then argue that this shared form of life is constituted by language. In his paper *Moral Integrity*, Winch makes his point more explicitly. He agrees with Jean-Paul Sartre that the moral agent is not someone who simply deliberates, finds his reasons and then acts, if there is no failure of nerve. When a man comes to "deliberate - to consider reasons for and against doing something - 'les jeux sont faits' (the chips are down)". In considering a situation which has moral implications, he already occupies a perspective on the situation. Winch goes further and says that 'the agent is this perspective'. This

entails that two men may confront the same situation and disagree about what reasons are relevant for its moral assessment. More importantly, they may disagree about the very description of the situation. (The extent to which we are then talking about the same situation raises difficult conceptual problems.) Winch says 'For one man, for instance, a situation will raise a moral issue; for another it will not.'

The important move for my purposes is when Winch continues:

I think he (Sartre) is lead badly astray by his failure to see clearly that the possibility of there being a certain perspective on a situation cannot be lead back to any agent's choice. It depends rather on the language which is available, a language which is not any individual's invention - though again Sartre often talks as if it is.
(1972 p 178)

In the light of Existentialist freedom, of course, the agent's choice would be criterionless. The idea that a solitary agent could make a criterionless choice is in the same family of ideas as that of the Cartesian solitary consciousness. Both ideas are foreign to the view that an intelligible conception of an agent with his ideas and choices must necessarily start from an already established public world. In passing we may observe that beasts, to use Winch's term, would be untroubled by any of these problems. Whether they are satisfied we need not trouble to ask.

That we have beasts around to give us the contrast to sharpen up a conception of ourselves might seem yet another example of their convenient presence. Such a contrast may point to truths about ourselves and beasts but, since we are addressing personal development, one might extend comparisons and argue that human beings have something to learn of a moral nature from beasts. What the status of such a claim amounts to, given my assumptions about the logical priority of the human world in individual self-understanding and development, must makes us pause. I have not argued that there is no non-anthropocentric truths about the world. I would maintain that the sense of the human world is not derived from the sense of an independently existing material world nor from the sense (if it has sense) of the isolated Cartesian consciousness. The human world is our world and much that we would give independent existence is comprehended within our categories. As I have said, the case of animals is a difficult one because we realize that much we say about them is a projection of our own categories. Yet we resist the idea that their reality is totally comprehended within

that of ours, and it is, perhaps, only within philosophical polemics and scientific excess that we find such extreme suggestions. I will, nevertheless, exploit the contrast between man and beast to bring out a point that seems both factually and intuitively obvious.

We hear stories of the odd child raised by animals in the wild. Whether the accounts of the feral child are true or apocryphal, a thought experiment could devise similar accounts. The child, although recognizably human, lacks personhood and given the background details of his 'upbringing', and the absence of human contact in a human setting being critical in this respect, the child must therefore become what he is through his own native resources or through that of the animals. Neither could be educative in the required sense. If language is characteristically human and its presence a precondition of personhood, the feral child is not in possession of what is needed to be a person, except, and this could not be more important, we extend the category of person to the extremely young and the senile. Even though such a child develops it would not be personal development. We might put it that a person is culturally and socially emergent.

A deeper way of showing that the individual person in an alien setting is not the source of his own human identity is to show that it is not only factually or empirically implausible but logically or conceptually incoherent. The Cartesian account of human self-identity begins by deconstructing the inessential and once the essential is found in self-identifying consciousness this consciousness proceeds to reconstruct the world. The objection to this account is that the so-called inessential is hidden in unacknowledged presuppositions. The public or human world provides the criteria for our self-understanding. If what it is to be rational, autonomous, a centre of consciousness distinct from other senses of consciousness and a being able to identify thoughts of its own, if these are first dependent upon being an individual member of a human form of life, the central personal attributes mentioned here cannot have conceptual priority in the constitution of a person amongst other persons.

This argument takes nothing away from the claim that the concept of a person is primitive in the sense that there is nothing logically more fundamental in terms of which this concept is to be explained. Whatever view we take of the material world, which includes our bodies, and whatever science may find out about behaviour and underlying explanations to it, persons, that is beings to whom the concept of person can properly be applied, are irreducible realities in the world.

The view I have presented is that a person is a cultural and social being emergent from a previously established human world. Persons are persons because they have been nurtured by their own kind.

It is often an important move in philosophical reflections to notice where the conditions for the proper use of a concept has been implicitly denied and when a concept has been reintroduced in a disguised form. A Cartesian view neglects the conditions for the proper use of the word person and therefore cannot account for the reality of personhood. In addition, the concept of person is reintroduced in the guise of the cogito and consequently assumes what has to be made good.

Some time ago, in a religion education broadcast, a scientist giving a personal testament to his religious belief thought that time, space and causality were categories not relevant to an understanding of God's creative presence in the universe. It was not necessary for a belief in God that He did or did not, as he quaintly put it, 'light some celestial blue touch paper' to get the whole thing going. He is not a God of the gaps in our scientific understanding. Having nothing to do with these categories, he went on to talk about God sustaining and upholding the universe in his ever present creativeness. Normally, to sustain or uphold something is to do something which involves space, time and causation. The fundamental categories had been denied to be reinvoked in a disguised form. But it might be said in the scientist's defence that the words sustain and uphold were used metaphorically. His thought cannot be captured literally. In that case, what is the nature of the thought that evades literal expression? How did he know that it was the thought he thought it was? We are concerned here, with nothing less than the issue of what it is for a thought to disclose meaning and how this meaning approaches reality. In our example the thought hides in language and may not have the sense we thought. It is not that the thought is mischaracterized because of the inadequate resources of language. Rather it should be said that the language suggests the thought and the thought cannot be identified independently of the language in which it is inscribed.

William James cites an example of a deaf mute who, having acquired language late in life, said that he was then able to give expression to thoughts of God which were present before his acquisition of language. But how did he know they were thoughts of God or indeed the same thoughts as before, or for that matter thoughts at all?

I introduce the last discussion in order to bring out further the difficulties in using basic categories of thought. It is instructive,

too, in that it points up the problem of whether religious education should be confessional or critical. It is relevant, also, because it is contended that personal development be pursued in the context of religious education. I shall return to these issue in the course of the thesis.

Gathering up my thoughts presented so far, I have said that the phrase personal development is situated in the domain of values and the values themselves are constitutive of a form of life. I suggested that values are not on the same level. We distinguish between moral values and (mere) preferences. Although the terms are difficult to use, we might say that moral values are in some sense 'objective' whilst preferences are 'subjective'. The repudiation of one's former shameful action is not on the same level as the taste for one flavour of ice-cream over another. The one enters into the very conception of who we are; the other exhibits a preference and nothing more. I further showed that values need not be all of one piece and different perspectives on life involve different configurations of value. Also the individual person is not the ultimate source of his values but neither does he lack a certain personal authority in holding and expressing these values. If he is not the source of value in the required sense, he is himself of ultimate value insofar as he is a person. I have argued that a certain picture of man does not work because it envisages him as a rational, autonomous and essentially isolated centre of consciousness and that this picture belongs to the same family as the one which presents man as the focus of criterionless choices.

Whether this picture works logically or not, it still might identify an individual mode of thought distinctive of modern Western culture, which embodies Cartesian and, for that matter, Kantian language. In quoting from Steven Lukes' concluding essay in the volume 'The Category of the Person', I hope to bring out the implications of this individualist mode of modern thought. It may also 'show up', according to some people's taste, my repeated use of masculine personal pronouns.

Central to this mode of thought is a distinctive picture of the individual in relation to his role and to his aims or purposes. To the former he exhibits role distance: confronting all possible roles, he may in principle adopt, perform or abandon any at will (though not all, and probably not even many, at once). Over the latter he exercises choice: as sovereign chooser, he decides between actions, conceptions of the good, plans of life, indeed what sort of a person to be. The will, choice, decision, evaluation and calculation are central to this picture; and the individual to whom these features are essential thinks and acts as an autonomous, self-directing independent agent who relates to others as no less

autonomous agents. Other men, that is: for the individual, in this picture is exclusively (or virtually so) male. For, as Mary Midgley has well said, the 'whole idea of a free, independent, enquiring choosing individual, an idea central to European thought, has always been essentially the idea of a male ... taking for granted the love and service of non-autonomous females (and indeed often of the less enlightened males as well)'. (1985 p 299)

This account of modern consciousness does not undermine my argument that the Cartesian picture is incoherent. That such a life can be lived might show true independence or bad faith but not incoherence. My point is that a person can emerge from a protective and beneficent society and having once absorbed sufficient for 'maturity' he can be a person who exhibits what are called the distinctive marks of modern Western culture. My argument is that once the world had been dismantled in Cartesian fashion, no resources would remain to reconstitute it. There is no way back from an unburdened world and disencumbered self to the world or, more to the point, the human world. The one is a thesis in logic; the other is descriptive of a form of life.

Lukes distinguishes between the individual in relation to his roles and in relation to his aims and purposes. He distances himself from the former and exercises choice over the latter. The individual is not disencumbered in the Cartesian sense. He may, though, be in some such relation as irony to his roles and choices. He knows what the possibilities are but he is detached. Such thoughts give rise to the idea of a bare self, shorn of enough attributes and qualities to give the necessary detachment but retaining sufficient for some notion of self-identity, with some measure of consciousness, agency and autobiography.

Certain uses of 'person' and 'self' in philosophical literature suggest that although the individual human being is a person or self, he is also a being to whom these words are applied. The individual person is not inscribed within discourse but the word person is ascribed to him. That the person or self is the moral identity of the individual may suggest that there is something left over which can be a perspective on this identity. Such a distancing may find its ground in the latin term persona which refers to a mask worn by an actor. The visual presentation or face is put on or taken off just as is the grease paint of a modern actor. We speak also of a poet in the guise of his persona. The same distancing is found in the usage of 'legal person' in Roman Law or in our idea of a 'social self'. We seem, then, to be

able to view ourselves under the aspect of such descriptions but not absorbed into them. Too much of this stepping back is, of course, play acting. It is like those people who sometimes profess to be 'beyond good and evil'.

Having located the term personal development in the context of values and suggested that values are contested, I am committed to the implication that the term personal development is contested. That certain central concepts in educational discourse are essentially contested is a familiar claim that I have already discussed. But first I wish to consider again the terms personal and development.

The use of the term personal, as I have stressed throughout my discussion, is so diffuse that little would be gained in the search for a definition. Its use is associated with such terms as private and intimate and to give emphasis to the idiosyncratic. It contrasts with the public, the impersonal and the functional. Schools and colleges offer personal services such as counselling and profiling and matching personal qualities with job requirements alongside the more public and impersonal standard curriculum. It is used as a term of intimate emphasis in the pride and assurance or excitability of personal friendship. We do find suspect or deviant uses which trade on the clearness of their normal ones. 'Personal' is often used and assumed in contexts where manipulation defines the real relationship. At times most counsellors, social workers, career officers and teachers may easily find to their own disgust that confidential discussions in an atmosphere of friendship are being manipulative. Banks and other impersonal institutions use personal in an attempt to re-personalize indifferent relationships. Such personal services thinly disguise the fact that people are units in commercial transactions. The human face is a kind of rhetoric. The impression management is a device of accommodation. The Listening Bank is very selective in its listening. Hopefully the central uses of 'personal' retain their innocence.

Personal development assumes that the person as such develops. Above, I spoke of the individual person emerging to maturity from his human world. Mature, like adult, is a normative word. It presupposes standards of assessment. To be mature or adult is to meet criteria of a fairly indeterminate kind. We speak of a person as being mature or adult but if we withdraw these descriptions, the person would still remain the subject of other descriptions. It looks on this showing as if 'person' is a sortal term. A sortal or classificatory term picks out a distinct entity. This 'count noun', another expression

for sortal term, identifies something that can be counted. The something has a real and independent existence and cannot be broken into further parts without irreducible loss. A dog or a tree cannot be separated into distinct parts to be counted and then reassembled into its former unity. We may say that the dog or tree is an organic whole. Other natural phenonema such as a river or forest can be demarcated in different ways, producing two or more different rivers or forests, if it suits human purposes. An animal, though, remains the same animal throughout change. An animal is a living thing that reproduces its own kind, merely exists or flourishes and grows old and dies. A human being is, too, a natural kind. It is disputed whether person is a sortal or count noun and consequently a word of a natural kind.

In referring briefly to the history of the term person, I said that persona was a mask. By extension we speak of a theatrical character. A character is assumed by an actor for his performance. After the performance he clears his mind of his part and wipes off the grease paint. We refer, also, to a person of good or bad character. Obviously, there are degrees of attachment or detachment in the relation of a person to his parts or descriptions correctly applied to him. I said further that in Roman Law 'person' was a legal entity, a collection of rights and duties attached to the individuals in a court of law. The individual was distinct from his 'person'. For us, however, person seems to capture our identity. We are persons and the reality of it is irremovable. Or so we think until we are reminded of what can happen to human beings, even in not so extreme conditions. People are stripped of their external identities and begin to have a precarious hold of who they are for themselves.

It is, in fact, argued that 'person' is not a sortal or count noun, which would imply that we cannot ask 'how many' when referring to the number of persons in a count. Such a state of affairs would seem counter-intuitive, especially when Russian landowners seemed to have no difficulty in referring to their serfs as 'souls'. Bernard Williams in his book *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* puts it as follows:

The category of person ... is a poor foundation for ethical thought, in particular because it looks like a sortal or classificatory notion while in fact it signals characteristics that almost all come in degrees - responsibility, self-consciousness, capacity for reflection, and so on. It thus makes it seem as if we were dealing with a certain class or type of creature, when in fact we are vaguely considering

those human beings who pass some mark on a scale. To make matters worse, the pass mark for some purposes is unsuitable for others. If person implies something called 'full moral responsibility', the lowest age for entry to the class that has traditionally been entertained is seven, but anyone who has lived with a six year old or a two year old, has vivid reasons for thinking of them as persons. (1985 p 114-115)

Williams has written this in the context of resisting an argument to the effect that 'if duties are owed just to persons' and if we define certain human beings as falling outside this favoured class nothing need stand in the way of our getting used to the idea of infanticide. The definitional problem is who belongs to what class. The moral problem is one of differential duties. To give 'person' this foundational status in moral decision making does not work for Williams, because the category of person is a generic expression, under which is subsumed those distinctive human characteristics which when instantiated in a human being come in different combinations and degrees. This characterization of 'person' is reminiscent of Gilbert Ryle's concept of mind as of a different categorial kind from that of body. The mind is not picked out as is that of the body. The mind's analogue is that of Oxford University. The University is not an additional identifiable building or institution amongst other buildings and institutions. It consists rather in just those colleges and institutions that fall under the description of Oxford University. The mind in a parallel way is just all those dispositions that find their expression in certain bodily behaviour, that is under the aspect of speech and actions. Mind is a generic term for all such expressive behaviour.

(One hears echoes of Hume's Bundle Theory in this account, where a person just is those discreet inner impressions lacking no more cohesion than remembered contiguity and succession. The contentless Cartesian self-identifying consciousness collapses into an absent self paradoxically replete with impressions and sensations. If 'person' is such a generic term, it is presumably, an attribute of a human being. Whatever Hume failed to detect in his search for an impression of self, he hardly convinces us that we have no sense of self. The difficult thought is not so much in our distinctions of a 'sense of self', 'person' and 'human being' but in that person in some way seems detachable from a sense of self and both are somehow resident within or pervasive throughout the human being. The problem will remain.

We need the distinctions, though, for the purposes of our discussion.)

To bring out Williams' claim quickly for the moment consider what Julia confides to Charles on two separate occasions in Evelyn Waugh's *Brideshead Revisited*:

"You know Father Mowbray hit on the truth about Rex at once, that it took me a year of marriage to see. He simply wasn't all there. He wasn't a complete human being at all. He was a tiny bit of one, unnaturally developed; something in a bottle, an organ kept alive in a laboratory. I thought he was a sort of primitive savage, but he was something absolutely modern and up-to-date that only this ghastly age could produce. A tiny bit of a man pretending he was the whole." ...

"Rex has never been unkind to me unintentionally," she said. "It is just that he isn't a real person at all; he is just a few faculties of a man highly developed; the rest simply isn't there. He couldn't imagine why it hurt me to find two months after we came back to London from our honeymoon, that he was still keeping up with Brenda Champion." (1986 p 293)

Even though Rex Motram has the good qualities of 'geniality and impetuosity' at least for Charles, he is, I would suggest, a fixer with no sense of transcendental bonds between people. He could fix the Pope or even God given the right angle on Them. He is a man who calculates finely, even if at times naively when confronted with a moral universe foreign to him. Contract mediates his relations with people, save where the immediacy of mutual attraction sustain such relations. However, he has a few highly developed faculties, even if he is a fragment of a man. If the pass mark is high on a scale of these faculties he would pass no doubt with flying colours. But he is not a real person, we are told. He would seem on this account a poor specimen, just as some writers feel would be true of the whole bunch of characters in the novel. I recently heard a member of the intellectual New Right in British political thought dismiss the lot as decadent and parasitic. Their betters were the bourgeois middle classes whose enterprise culture and self-improvement ethic ought to be our example. To say that some people are poor specimens, that they are not real, is to bring them under a moral description. It is to blame them for their shortcomings. Or if it is not, it is to say something about the society that produced them, as Julia said about the absolutely modern and ghastly age in which they lived. Nevertheless, they are still persons and treated as such. Yet it is to recognize that something is missing or only exists in an insufficiently human degree. No limb is atrophied or missing. What is missing is a

moral dimension we have a right to expect if our relationships have pretensions to be one kind rather than another. What would be proper in the relationships would be proper according to its kind. One could have a functional relationship with Motram, based perhaps on the convenience of shared property as is the case at Brideshead. But such a relationship may, too, be subject to moral assessment.

Rex Motram like the rest of us emerges into or becomes a person per se and exhibits the most general categories applicable to a human being: self-consciousness, agency, autobiography, intentionality, purposiveness and so on. He develops into a person of a particular kind as demonstrated in the passages from Brideshead Revisited. He also becomes the person he actually is in himself. Whether Julia, or Lady Marchmain for that matter, approach the reality of Motram is a matter of judgement and not necessarily theirs. It might be that their own reality is more easily comprehended within Motram's perspective than that of his in theirs. They can be seen as part of his story as he is part of theirs. They tell us as much, if not more about themselves in what they say about Motram than what they do about him. When I make the distinctions between personhood per se, the kind of person one is and the unique person one actually is in oneself I would not want too much to hang on a construal of these distinctions as a process of evolving individuality. Insofar as the distinctions are meaningful, I use them, at least initially, as analytic distinctions. The notion of development in personal development will need to encompass these distinctions.

'Development' as used in the phrase personal development has normative or valuational force. In some of its central uses it has the same structure as the word progress. Change is implied in both words but change for the better or to a higher degree. We have our standards and they may or may not be met. Would it were so easy! That people change and this change is evaluated is commonplace. People change imperceptibly over time but enchantingly so. They may change dramatically into parodies of their former selves. They can be unrecognizable after wars; or virtually the same after a lifetime of peace and security. Equally commonplace is that few would predict outcomes, no matter what is known of formative or present conditions and experiences.

My claim has been that personal development is situated in the domain of values. It follows, therefore, that the nature of that development will be interpreted in terms of those values that can

properly centre on persons. To put it so boldly makes it difficult to know what to exclude. One might make a Wittgensteinian move, here, and not say what personal development and the values appropriate to its interpretation consists in. We do not attempt to say what the development is. Rather we attempt to show it in its context of use. In addition, the employment of such indefinite concepts as personal development are brought down to earth if we try to say that personal development has taken place insofar such and such has been achieved or in respect of so and so being brought about. And, of course, we have to say in terms of examples. This is difficult as so much of curriculum development makes use of the Roget's Thesaurus approach. So many words and phrases sound good and are mentioned in lists but never used in informative propositions.

CHAPTER 7

The Realization of Values in the Human Setting

I have said that if sense is to be made of personal development, that sense would be found in the domain of values. Another way of putting it is that the expression personal development finds its sense within a skein of language constituted by value words. I would maintain that the fact, if it is a fact, of personal development supervenes upon the development of qualities and attributes of persons in a human setting or, with qualifications, in a non-human setting. Personal development must be development in respect of something and that something is in those distinctive human characteristics of reason, of informed or disciplined independence of mind, of a perspective on the world as a whole and so on. If these characteristics are at the ideal end, laughter at jokes and cooking food might be at the other end. A fuller understanding of these latter possibilities would mention that appraisal enters into them and that appraisal involves reason. These considerations would equally be true of emotion and feeling. For example, we see the point of jokes, acknowledge the skills of cooking and recognize the appropriateness of emotions. Jokes depend on how we see and receive the incongruities in the circumstances of life; cookery on techniques that meet standards of taste and nutrition; emotions on the cognitive adequacy of their intentional objects. Thought is inseparable from all three of these human characteristics. At this stage I do not want anything to hang on my examples; nor on the apparently implied hierarchy of importance. Work might be put at the centre of human endeavour. It is in labour that our distinctiveness finds expression and it is through labour that our humanity is transformed.

Whatever sense can be given to it, some educationalists talk as though personal development could be direct. Just as it is thought that a person could be the source of his own personal identity, it is thought that personal development could somehow give birth to its own actuality. There is a certain spontaneity or originating creativity within the constitution of the person himself. That a person has potentialities as the conditions of development hardly needs mentioning. But they do not occasion their own realization. Spontaneity and creativity have their conditions too. The words spontaneity and creativity are essentially adverbial in force and indicate the manner

in which something is done. Moreover, what is done is done by a person and the doing of anything is an action which belongs to the human order in contrast with a happening which belongs to the causal order. It is difficult, indeed impossible, to believe that an unschooled or untutored individual in the shape of someone approaching the condition of the feral child could exhibit spontaneity and creativity, both of which are dependent upon being able to do things like tell jokes or cook. The life of our envisaged feral child is that of an animal and in consequence is unschooled and untutored. To this extent the life approaches that of a happening rather than that of an action. Spontaneity and creativity and therefore the presence of these in people are not the beginning of anything in a foundational sense. A person is not built up from any such precipitating conditions. Personal development supervenes upon the development of ordinary and perhaps extraordinary human qualities and attributes and these in their turn are given sense in a human form of life.

What a person learns, undergoes, experiences and lives through will help shape his developing awareness, sensitivity, emotional responsiveness and volitional control. In his commerce with other people, he will acquire habits of mind and character, develop virtues that regulate his conduct and find unexpected resources within himself to deal with emergencies. Whatever a person acquires, develops or finds within himself depends on a variety of learning situations and experiences in a human setting or if not in a human setting then in a non-human one plus what the person carries about with him derived from such a setting. Nor is a person passive in his experiences. Once the process of learning has begun, a person, to a greater or lesser extent, becomes an agent in his own development or perhaps more dramatically in his transformation.

It is an interesting thought that Robinson Crusoe has been described as the first bourgeois man and may be celebrated as an agent in his own development or transformation. Yet who or what he becomes on his desert island is intimately bound up with who or what he became as a citizen of York. This is not to deny his special blend of self-reliance, strength of character and self-possession. His virtues of patience, industry, fortitude, prudence, courage, faith and hope may, as the cliché has it, be an inspiration to us all in attempts to create or refurbish an enterprise culture. Nor is it to deny that he is a paradigm example of self-help in its most solitary exemplification. It is to deny, though, that he is some kind of originating source of

these virtues. All his virtues were acquired in their exercise amongst his fellows in York. (I say nothing of the imperfections of their development in Crusoe or his fellow citizens, nor of the obstacles to their proper exercise in his society, nor of the relative weight of some over others in men's daily dealings.) One would need to think, too, of all those useful artefacts salvaged from the wreckage and the knowledge and skills necessary for an adequate employment of them.

If Crusoe develops and not degenerates on his island, it is in terms of what he already is as a person. Terrible suffering can be educative, if not exactly redemptive as some people might claim. Truths about oneself are disclosed in one's reactions and responses to normally taken-for-granted natural phenomena. Self-knowledge may develop from a greater understanding of the Bible, reinterpreted in the light of the extremities of one's condition. The conditions may, too, disclose meanings normally hidden in the routine of daily life. If one may be allowed a little fantasy to make a point, had Crusoe a sample of any of those works by Dostoevsky or Beckett at hand or in addition to his Bible, he might find his virtues tested differently or developing unexpectedly. In such writers we find a discrepancy between how one might like the world to be and how it actually is. The question is how much of one's confidence is sapped in the recognition of such a discrepancy?

If sub specie aeternitatis there is no sense in the nature of things, independently of what men put there, Crusoe may approach the absurdity of it all with irony, defiance or heroism. Given that Robinson Crusoe, the book, is a celebration of self-made independence despite all the ills that befall a man, the world of Crusoe would meet Crusoe's expectations of meaning and that is why his world is perhaps different from ours. What I have said, here, is to repeat again that a person is culturally and socially emergent. Nevertheless, personal development, if that is what it is, is genuinely individual and can be a person's own. An interesting and additional question to ask is what does a person owe the world that has nurtured him, even when he forgets in the flush of success, that he would be nothing without a world shared with others. (Of course, we could read Defoe's novel as a picture of society itself as a desert island or, if it is one's taste, a wasteland.)

In reflecting upon this discussion, one might consider Sir Keith Joseph's eulogy on the virtues a modern man might make his own. In his Introduction to Samuel Smiles' *Self-Help*, (1986), Joseph evokes a scene in Leeds during the Victorian era. Smiles had built his book on

a series of talks given to about one hundred young 'artisans who had formed in Leeds an evening school for mutual improvement'. Little was expected of government at this time but much expected of individuals. Smiles himself said that 'The spirit of self-help is the route of all genuine growth in the individual; and exhibited in the lives of the many, it constitutes the true source of national vigour and strength. Help from without is often enfeebling in its effect, but help from within invariably invigorates.' Joseph's curriculum for personal development gathers pace. He says "What Smiles hymned was not so much success itself as the moral character which lies behind it; in tune with the religious professions of the age, he celebrated patience, courage, endeavour, and the perseverance with which worthy objectives were pursued". Individualism was a "path to independence and to self-fulfilment. 'It is not ease but difficulty - not facility - that makes men,' he wrote." Smiles was not so much concerned with money or social status but with the "fullest use by each individual of every quality, skill and talent he possessed". Self-help, self-improvement and self-cultivation were ideals that have nothing to do with snobbery or social climbing. Smiles always took, says Joseph, the "side of the moral against the narrowly 'social' values". Smiles "gave the 'crown and glory of life' to character - the idea of the gentleman - attainable by all regardless of birth or means; to independence, integrity and dignity". The lesson for us all, especially educationalists, is that given that "our low average productivity is one of the realities behind our high contemporary unemployment" we ought to recognize "our own failure to exhibit those qualities of effective industriousness, perseverance and self-discipline that Smiles celebrated". We have our own desert spaces and the deliverance is sought in the development of our personal qualities.

That certain experiences might more properly be described as happenings point to an arrest in development. A person remains the same in spite of what happens to him. We might distinguish experiences from happenings by saying that the former affect how a person understands the world, himself and his life. On this view experience has learning built in to it. Happenings leave the person much as he was before. Raymond Williams uses the expression "structure of feeling" to characterize a person's general orientation to the world and hence as a way of responding to subsequent experience. Such a response may be imprisoned within a stable structure of feeling, and experience may approach that of a happening.

Some years ago I saw a television interview in which several winners of the football pools were gathered together to relate how their big wins had altered their lives. Vivian Nicholson with her husband had won a big dividend. In the programme she said that on winning the money she had decided to "spend, spend, spend". If she had been irresponsible it was because she had been young and had had plenty of life in her unlike the rest of the gathered company who were staid in their middle-age. Their lives had not changed much nor would they. Safe investment of their winnings coupled with a quiet satisfaction in their good fortune was some kind of good life. Their lives did not speak of the feeling that 'Most lives are lived in quiet desperation' or that wives are often 'pushed to the side of their own lives'. Vivian thought she knew better. Jack Rosenthal in his play for television aptly called 'Spend, Spend, Spend' chronicled the 'progress' of her life. It was a life enclosed within a structure of feeling conditioned by early poverty, sex and violence. The implication in the play was that no subsequent 'experience', no matter how many foreign holidays were 'taken in', appetites indulged, new houses or cars bought and so on, occasioned any change in who she or her husband were. New consumer goods and clothes were dispensed with as soon as the glow of 'feeling good' in the possession of them diminished. More are needed with stylish variations to cheer them up. The same abusive language accompanied every falling short of expected happiness. Old family rows and mutual recriminations were lived over again. What they needed to get 'off their chests' was repeated endlessly. Old scores were never settled but remembered in the same old language.

Denis Donoghue took up this theme in his 'Ferocious Alphabets'. (1981 pp 17-18) No matter what happened to Vivian, the same meanings were disclosed. She was a 'product of her subjectivity and her environment' ... (and) 'locked in her feeling as in her language'. Donoghue goes on to assert that 'The test of an experience is that it alters the structure of feeling' and as such it contrasts with a happening or a circumstance. In this context he referred to the happenings that men lived through in the trenches in the First World War. The soldiers were numb and their lives were more of a drift. There was an arrest, then, in Vivian's life because of an inability to live through an experience. Donoghue, later in his book, felt he had been wrong to assimilate the quality of a man's experience with a man's style. Sensibility is not necessarily reflected in a man's language. Previously, he had in mind Gadamer's notion of intentionality as a perspec-

tive on the definition of an experience. Donoghue does not spell out the meaning of intentionality.

Since I have mentioned the notion of intentionality earlier, and since I will need to come back to it again, I will give a general outline of its meaning. When experience takes on the aspect of a happening or an occurrence, no meaning goes out to meet it. Intentional mental states and actions are directed towards some real or imagined object of consciousness. So purposive actions, beliefs, emotions and desires are intentional in that they are the modes in which experiences are captured. What we make of what we are involved in implies an act of consciousness focussed on events. As I mentioned above, Donoghue felt he had misjudged Vivian's life by confining it within a view of sensibility in which the 'words we speak testify to the quality of the feelings that provoke them'. If we accept this point, it makes it difficult to know whether we are reading a person's sensibility properly. If we are careless, what we say might testify to a certain hubris on our part.

What follows from this discussion of Vivian Nicholson is that we have the notion that a life can be arrested, even if it is untrue of Vivian's life. I deliberately use the word arrested because that may not be the end of the story. A certain wisdom may begin to inform a life that at one time was in ruins. That we want to call such intimations of a sense of disclosed meaning 'personal development' may be a travesty of what is understood in such experiences. Sense can be found when nothing seems to remain in a person's life. Even if we are unconvinced by Gadamer's theory of intentionality, something similar can be seen in ordinary, or perhaps extraordinary, experience.

Frankl in his book *The Doctor and the Soul* (1965 pp 12-13) reminds people of meaningful possibilities in the direst circumstances of their lives. Frankl survived Auschwitz and Dachau and was later a practising psychotherapist in the United States. Even when all is lost, or so it seems, one can go out to meet situations in life. 'Men can give meaning to their lives by realizing what I call creative values, by achieving tasks' he writes. He has in mind what can be meaningfully done in the most extreme circumstances - that of carving bits of wood in a concentration camp. He also talks of realizing experiential values, 'by experiencing the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, or by knowing one single human being in all his uniqueness. And to experience one human being as unique means to love him.'

Even in great distress, an individual can give his life meaning

by the way he faces his fate. Although Frankl does not say it, this can be difficult in unexpected ways. One can go through life thinking that one's own fate is different from that of others. The greater the distance between oneself and other people makes it so much easier. However, granted a little grace one may realize what Frankl calls attitudinal values. He says 'The right kind of suffering - facing your fate without flinching - is the highest achievement that has been granted to man'. He gives an example of a nurse who became terminally ill and who was in despair because she could no longer work. He reminded her that she had spent her life administering to people who had been in the same condition that she now experienced. She had tried to develop in them attitudinal values and her work was meaningful when these were realized in them. Her patients did not exist for the realization of values in her life, although that might be part of it too, but only as a consequence of how she was able to help them. She must now be like them. It hardly needs saying that Frankl is not recommending extreme situations so that one can realize extraordinary values. That would be absurd: he also catalogues the hideous waste and despair in the lives of people. He is concerned with a reorientation in perspectives, when other values can find no expression.

A difficulty for educationalists, and for the rest of us also, is how what has been learned can find expression in our society. Educational literature is full of examples of mismatches between the sorts of knowledge, skills and attitudes acquired in schools and colleges and the opportunities for a proper expression of them. Some writers have seen hope in personal development as a curriculum aim in that it might help bring pupils and students into a more acceptable agreement with the shape of society as it is at present. Again, the literature is quite properly strewn with examples taken from the world of work. I wish to take an example from a less urgently economic area of concern. We may reject the use of the term mismatch and simply say that society fails young people. Many young people who get caught up in dubious religious sects or groups do so because they want to demonstrate their Christian convictions in such a way that there could be no misunderstanding about the sincerity in the way in which they express their values. This has always been a problem, even for saintly people; for poverty may hide pride. Eileen Barker in her contribution to the collection of essays entitled 'Reductionism in Academic Disciplines' gives a portrait of the sort of people who are converted to the Unification Church, the Moonies;

They were not the drifters, but the 'doers' - idealistic young people (at an average age of 23 and with well above average educational achievement) who wanted to achieve something, not just for themselves, but for others. They had frequently been brought up in happy families where value was placed on the concepts of responsibility, service and duty. (1985 pp 58-75)

They tended to find answers to problems in religion rather than politics. But their society did not afford the opportunity for them to 'fulfil many of the values it had instilled into them'. The Unification Church provided a context for the life of the spirit and good works denied by 'A modern, bureaucratized welfare state (which) tends to make it difficult for your people to contribute or give of themselves'. Given that the fathers of the young people were 'more likely to be medics or in the Colonial Service', the young people were lucky not to need a welfare state but that does not alter their disenchantment. The attributes and qualities of the young people were absorbed from society and then became their own (even though their Christian denomination was different from that of their distressed parents) but society found it difficult to provide the conditions for an adequate expression of them. Whether we consider the Unification Church as properly belonging to that society, it 'offered them a chance to be of value, a chance to sacrifice themselves for a worthwhile goal - the building of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth'. Although there are more tragedies in society than conversion to the Moonies, that fact does not console distressed parents or loved ones. Yet it may be one more example of what Michael Ignatieff has characterized as 'a tragic gulf between what human beings need and what their collective wisdom is able to provide'.

I have tried to indicate what personal development might mean when we entertain thoughts about what it might mean to be a 'developed person' in the circumstances of life. It is only in the business of living that sense can be given to conceptions of the developed, mature or adult person and his meeting or falling short of the demands such living makes upon him. I am not thinking of some 'end state' consequent upon a developmental process when I use 'developed person'. In this sense a person is not a natural kind like an oak tree or a butterfly. He is, of course, a natural kind in other respects. He learns and may be a different person as a result of what he learns. I have wanted to show that personal development, if the expression is adequate to the often elusive changes in people and their lives, is supervenient upon the growth of those distinctive properties constitutive of persons.

'Personal development' need not be a general term for the singular development in those distinctive properties. We do not develop in respect of just this quality or just that attribute. We may discern a growing unity in our lives, or grope for a sense of our lives as a whole, or begin to have a conception of the world as a whole and our place in it. Personal development supervenes upon the growth of our distinctive human characteristics but may consist also in a greater unity amongst those characteristics. Nevertheless, our greater conceptions or wider visions are to be found in our reason, our imagination and perhaps in our feelings. Our values will enter into the descriptions of all such development and our varying perspectives on them. There will be disagreements over the interpretation of these values and over whether some values merit the name. It is such considerations that make much in the curriculum controversial or, for those of a more belligerent disposition, make the curriculum a battle-ground. I now want to begin a discussion of how personal development enters into educational discourse and becomes an aim of educational practice. I might add that our guide will not be Sir Keith Joseph who, when Secretary of State for Education, seemed to be preoccupied with a Robinson Crusoe model of personal development. The implications for those other than the protagonist ought not to be lost on us. Joseph said, in speaking of the headteacher's job, that it 'is demanding and often lonely and one that requires rare qualities of resourcefulness, tact, vision, dedication and stamina'. (This was said on a BBC Radio News broadcast after the programme Desert Island Discs.)

CHAPTER 8

Persons and their Relationships to Values

I need now to be a little more explicit about what it means to situate personal development within the domain of values. The expression personal development is value-loaded and its use implies that values are instantiated or realized in a person's life. What we value we value in different ways. We value things about or in a person. We appraise what a person is like, what he does and what he entertains. How we are appraised by others enters into how we appraise ourselves. Personal development is a general assessment which gathers up the several ways in which values attach to what we are, what we do and what we entertain.

The word development is normative and when combined with the word personal indicates the kind of standards we attain or fall short of. The criteria for the kind of development at issue derives from what construction we put on the notion of personal. 'Personal' qualifies the kind of development in question. Whatever criteria reside in the term personal, these criteria come together in the concept of a person. And as I have said, some people say that this concept is the highest category in our self-understanding. Distinctions of value and worth are pervasive in our lives and our lives are those of persons. We come up to or fall short of the mark in as many ways as it is possible to display distinctive human characteristics. Changes in a person in respect of qualities, attributes, sensitivities and awareness may remain superficial or go deep in a person's make-up. In the values of what we possess and in the values we hold, and the manner in which we possess or hold them, is our mode of existence in the world. The several changes in a person may not be simply additive but amount to a change in a person as a whole. The language of value in respect of persons is one of multiple layers of appraisal.

The appraisals we make of each other and the situations that define our existence are constituted by words that confer value and worth. Human beings do not merely engage in actions, do deeds, claim the means of life and entertain thoughts and feelings. Appraisals of the fittingness of such human properties enter into an understanding of them. Values attach to the qualities and attributes of people, to the way that people conduct themselves in relation to one another and to the states of affairs in which they place or find themselves. What

is thought to be worthy of human endeavour or pursuit will find its ground in moral, religious, political or aesthetic realms of meaning. What it means to be a person and what worth attaches to the development of human qualities and attributes will be characterized in the appreciative and critical language of values.

We may remind ourselves of how values are inseparable from our lives by some familiar examples. Firstly, it is not sufficient for their exercise that people possess personal attributes and qualities. We need to know the grounds for their proper exercise. It is not hard to find examples of the misuse of knowledge and skills. That we possess knowledge and skills can give us greater facility in deception. Think of the sophistication with which we can be 'economical with the truth'. But knowledge and skills also ameliorate the human estate. People put their knowledge and skills to the common good and that obviously says something about them as people. Secondly, we are familiar with the way in which people gain, hold, use and lose power. But we distinguish factual accounts of the possession and use of power from the conditions of its legitimate exercise. Thirdly, developments in medical and biotechnological research give us greater command over the processes of life. Yet we are concerned over the permissible limits to intervention in such processes. Fourthly, sexual impulses are shared by us all and are the stuff of tragedy and farce. But no more pressing than today is the need to reflect on the conditions for the proper expression of sexual desire. Finally, work is necessary for the creation of the means of life but we cannot avoid an interpretation of such commonplaces as a 'fair day's work for a fair day's pay'. Is 'the consumer always right' in the first or last instance and if in the last instance is this because his wants need interpreting by experts? We also reflect on the acceptable conditions of employment in the production of wealth and the appropriate principles for how the resulting wealth is shared out.

It is, then in our exercise of judgement, our sensitivity to the needs of others, our appreciation of the limits on our behaviour and what we owe to other people as well as what we can reasonably expect from them that we find indices of personal development. We develop qualities and attributes but part of their development is an understanding of the context of their desirable and rightful employment. We develop in what we learn or acquire but also in how we conduct ourselves. Although virtues can turn into vices and the virtues themselves be not recognized as such, normally approval attaches to virtues

non-contingently. Intellectual powers may be admired in themselves but their completion is in the worthwhile life of a person. The thoughts and feelings we entertain may be informed by fantasy and thus diminish us, and perhaps other people, in our own eyes. The gift of imagination may subserve trivial pursuits and therefore require redirection by a disciplined mind. We will, then, assess and be assessed, not least by ourselves, in all these matters. What kind of people we emerge as in our entanglements with other people will inform judgements about what direction personal development has taken and might take in our lives.

We have other modes of existence apart from our entanglements with other people. We engage more or less directly with the world in our work and vocations. We have our labours of love in our leisure time too. Fulfilment is found in the life of the mind, body or spirit. We develop as craftsmen, artists, workmen and sportsmen and may not remain unaltered as persons as involvement in our trades, arts and skills help to shape our perceptions of ourselves. As I have said previously, the development of personal qualities and attributes supervene on our embroilment in these activities and pursuits. On the other hand, we may develop our talents and remain uninfluenced as persons.

Again, a limited detachment from other people may be a condition of development of certain kinds. We may retreat from the world to live a life of renunciation and contemplation and hope to leave behind what is normally thought to be part of our personhood. But in solitude the world may not be habitable in the way we thought. Consider the words of the Trappist monk, Thomas Merton: 'Do not go into the desert to get away from the world or you may find yourself living with a legion of devils but take the world with you into the desert and pray for it'. (1956 p 49) Once again, we may be consumed by some ideal of physical achievement or endurance, which involves other people only as embodiments of statistics to give us our measure. This does not mean that we do not delight in the isolation of the mountains or gain in self-knowledge in the wilderness.

In these respects, then, value attaches to our gifts, talents and skills but they also attach to the products of these gifts, talents and skills. We value human creativeness and endeavour and also human creations and achievements. We find joy in our powers and meaning in the abiding presence of our works. Nature too is seen under the aspect of value. We may become better people as we learn to appreciate the beauty of the natural world. In these several areas of individual

involvement, we may feel that development takes place to some degree. A more appropriate description might be individual development rather than personal development. Even if we want to resist such general characterizations in the changes in people and settle for more singular descriptions of what people attain and achieve, we still need to say that our various modes of human life are infused with value. As we live our lives we may come to appreciate new values or deepen the ones we already hold. To the extent that these changes inform our lives, we become different persons.

That values are pervasive in our lives is impossible to deny. If there are problems it is in the status of the values and how the values attach to a world that can be described independently of value-categories. What would a world, and our lives in it, look like if it were bereft of values? The various sciences may give us some kinds of picture. However, this is not what I have in mind. I want to present a picture of our world but without values and attempt to see how values might make an entry into it. We need to distinguish between the question of how values enter the world and our lives as a whole and the question of how values enter our individual lives. As I have said before, we are born into a human world and we absorb our values as we learn to be human beings. People are born into different worlds and the values they hold will, to a greater or lesser extent, be a reflection of the value possibilities in those worlds. There are all manner of value possibilities in the lives of people. We hold inconsistent values, values that override other values and values that are reserved for special categories of person. Certain values may be suppressed or distorted in our lives. We may hold values ambivalently or corruptly. In some societies, or in certain circumstances in our own society, elaborate manoeuvres may be made to strip people of their values and then, perhaps, efforts made to induce new ones into them. Values enter our lives individually and together but that they do presupposes their prior existence in a human world, no matter how impoverished in values that world may be. How the values come to be in this world in the first place is a question that philosophers have addressed for a long time.

Earlier I quoted Peter Winch to help with the thought that men, unlike beasts, have conceptions of life and that these conceptions are constituted by values. Men do not confront a world bereft of values and then each one in his own way gives the world a transfusion of value significance. A view, or more properly a cluster of views, begins

from such a position of how values enter the world. Non-cognitivism is the thesis that there is no cognition or knowledge of values. Values are always cognitively non-determined. Judgements of value lack truth status and can make no claims about intrinsic values. Such a theoretical account of the status of values is associated with the liberal-individualist idea of freedom as the condition in which people cannot order one another about - people may have the power but the power would be without authority unless each person gave his stamp of approval by a choice firmed up by commitment.

An objection to such a thesis is argued by David Wiggins in his 1976 British Academy Lecture, 'Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life'. Wiggins wants to show that phenomenologically - or from the subjective side, 'from the inner point of view' - we cannot inhabit a world without objective values. A non-cognitivist position may be advanced intellectually but a theorist in such matters cannot 'put his mind where his mouth is' (he cannot really think what he says) because a human being 'picks and chooses, deliberates, weighs concerns. (He) craves objective reasons; and often (he) could not go forward unless (he) thought he had them.' Wiggins illustrates his argument by citing the life of Sisyphus who meaninglessly rolled stones up a hill without end. No matter what positive impulses, attitudes, sentiments and so on he may have, meaning would not thereby emerge in his life. Wiggins goes on to present a picture of what life would be like in a world without intrinsic value of sense. Wiggins had been watching one of those 'appalling documentary films about creatures fathoms down on the ocean-bottom'. The creatures spent their lives eating one another in a world without rest. He writes:

The thought the film leads to is this. If we can project upon a form of life nothing but the pursuit of life itself, if we find there no non-instrumental concerns and no interest in the world considered as lasting longer than the animal in question will need the world to last to sustain the animal's own life: then the form of life must be to some considerable extent alien to us. Any adequate description of the point we can attach to our form of life must do more than treat our appetitive states in would-be isolation from their relation to the things they are directed at.' (1976 pp 344-345)

If there are no lasting ends in an objective world, we are imprisoned in our own subjectivity. We cannot construct a habitable world from our own appetitive or attitudinal states. The thought does cross our minds that some lives do seem to approach such a condition.

I am not so much thinking of the fictional account of a state of nature given by Hobbes where life is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. But I am thinking rather of an account of consumer society where the connections between the acquisition of commodities and the achievement of happiness in a situation where things have some lasting significance is uncertain. One may, of course, say that Hobbes was merely projecting into a state of nature what he found to be endemic in his own society and that we are the heirs to such a society. I have already addressed such a world when I discussed Rosenthal's play about Vivian Nicholson. In the play Vivian and her husband, Keith, had bought all that money could buy but they were not happy. In one of the scenes when they were throwing recriminations at each other Keith shouts "Why aren't you happy?" Vivian shouts back, "Why aren't you?"

Wiggins argues that there is the possibility of a life that is intrinsically worthwhile and we possess a vocabulary that captures such a possibility. There is a class of evaluative propositions of which it is false or senseless to deny that they refer to aspects of an objective world. The propositions have the form of X is Y. They are verdicts with no restrictions on the category of X. He lists what he has in mind - 'X is good', 'bad', 'beautiful', 'ugly', 'ignoble', 'brave', 'just', 'mischievous', 'malicious', 'worthy', 'honest', 'corrupt', 'disgusting', 'amusing', 'diverting', 'boring', etc. He contrasts these evaluative propositions with practical judgements and general judgements of a strongly deprecatory or commendatory kind which do not quite measure up to full truth-status. They are cognitively under-determined. Wiggins has in mind judgements such as 'I ought to do Z', 'I must Z' and those judgements about virtues and vices of the form 'such actions are ignoble or inhuman or unspeakably wicked. (1976 pp 338-339)

The words embodied in evaluative propositions have been described as 'thicker' or more specific ethical notions. Value words like ignoble, brave, courageous and rude are said to contain a unity of fact and value. The use of these words is determined by what the world is like yet at the same time the words evaluate states of affairs, people and their actions. Charles Taylor says of these types of word that they are 'strongly evaluative' and that they define an inter-personal life in an objectively existing public space. For Wiggins the fact/value distinction is erroneous but the is/ought distinction is not. Practical judgements (he also calls them directives or deliberative

judgements) are cognitively under-determined and allow sufficient logical space for invention in judgements of value.

The picture that Wiggins presents of the world as bereft of value is a limiting case and it is, of course, alien to us. But I have wanted to make the point that we can envisage lives approximating to it. We might also think of those inhuman worlds that Marx tried to capture in his notion of 'alienation' and Durkheim in 'anomie'. Marx says of the alienated condition that it 'perfects the worker and degrades the man'. '(The) relationship of the worker to the product of labour (is) an alien object which dominates him'. The more he expends himself in his work the more his inner life is impoverished. The work itself and the product of the work are external to the worker. Man is alienated from 'his own body, external nature, his mental life and his human life'. He is alienated from other men whose natures are reified productive roles. Man in such a world 'does not fulfil himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than wellbeing, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased. The worker, therefore, feels himself at home only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless. His work is not voluntary but imposed forced labour. It is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs ...'. (Marx 1961 176 ff)

Durkheim's picture of the anomic condition is reminiscent of that of Hobbes. Durkheim says 'that each individual finds himself in a state of war with every other'. When the individual's life is not regulated by society he suffers from the 'malady of infinite aspirations' and his 'unregulated emotions are adjusted neither to one another nor to the conditions they are supposed to meet'. A man's life is lived in 'weariness', 'disillusionment', 'disturbance, agitation and discontent', 'anger' and 'irritated disgust with life'. Durkheim goes on to say that 'Those who have only empty space above them are almost invariably lost in it'. When 'appetites have become freed of any limiting authority' and where 'from top to bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold' nothing can calm life in such a world. (Giddings 1972 173ff) In their own ways both Marx and Durkheim identify the remedy for such conditions; but the above descriptions are descriptive of a falling short.

It is relevant here to mention that Marx distinguishes between moral and non-moral values. Marx tends to pooh pooh moral values,

although he displays enraged indignation against Capitalism. Socialism is not derived from the concept of justice. Concepts such as justice are irretrievably compromised in Capitalist society. Kant's foundational ideas that each individual is infinitely valuable and should never be treated as mere means to other people's ends are for Marx at best Utopian in a perjorative sense and at worst a screen of cliches hiding greed and self-interest.

To simplify, Marx's position is three-fold. Firstly, we can identify the ills that befall men in a Capitalist society independently of moral categories. Health for example is a non-moral value. When we are attacked by disease, no injustice is perpetrated on us nor are our rights violated. We would be better without the disease and the non-moral value of health would be realized. Capitalism is an economic and social disease that severely incapacitates us as human beings. Secondly, Marx had the remedy in socialism which inevitably follows from the collapse of Capitalism. We are offered an explanation of how we got here and where we are going from here. The cause of the non-moral ills is diagnosed as a Frankenstein monster out of control. The Capitalist system is an accumulation of unintended consequences of the actions of men and is thus an arrangement of affairs that has turned against its own creators. Thirdly, the condition of health in a Socialist society is also a condition of freedom. Non-moral values cannot be realized fully in Capitalism. It is not just the economic and social conditions that prevent the realization of non-moral values. It is also the condition of alienated consciousness. We are in a state of false-consciousness and to this extent we blind ourselves to a remedy for our ills. We take what is alterable as natural. I have wanted to bring out the distinction between moral and non-moral values and to suggest how they might be present in our lives.

Wiggins does not write as a Marxist and would not see values as a smokescreen hiding class interests. Values exist out there, as it were, and the principal enemy is the non-cognitivist who hides behind his own screen of projected appetites and attitudes. Nevertheless, many values making for the good life are not, or are only imperfectly realized, in people's lives. I want to consider another case where things do not go well and where values are suppressed or screened-out. But first I set it against a background in which things appear to go better.

I have said already that the notion of personhood is a moral status

in itself. Value attaches to a person in respect of being a person. This is apart from his holding values and being in possession of qualities and attributes that are valued. He is also entitled to social goods that are valued in use. But equally important these goods are valued because they signal membership of society. Michael Walzer states in his book 'Spheres of Justice' (1983 pp 7-10) that material goods as well as others 'have a moral and cultural shape ... The arguments for a minimal state have never recommended themselves to any significant portion of mankind'. Material goods are encapsulated in moral and social values and have claims to a greater or lesser extent written into them. Walzer, of course, is speaking about what one would hope are 'normal' conditions. But where are they realized? He has in his sights, when speaking of the minimal state, someone like Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia who argues for less state help for the deprived. Walzer claims that people have conceptions of the good as it is thought to exist in the different spheres of life and that the principles for the expression of this good are imminent in those conceptions. People have ideas of what it is to participate in a common good and they find the tests of a better order within the as yet unrealized notion of justice present in the different spheres of life.

People enter into each others lives for better or worse and their relationships are mediated by different degrees of concern and indifference. It is in this setting that I discussed the notion of need earlier. I spoke about the commerce amongst people based on the expression and acknowledgement of needs. These needs may be embodied in the shared expectations that reside in social roles and institutions. Some writers, like Ivan Illich, are sceptical of the presumed bonds expressed in social roles and institutions and feel that more care would be shown if people dealt with one another face to face, unmediated by expectations built into roles and institutions. Of course, everything depends upon the kind of social roles and institutions one has in mind. Ignatieff in 'The Needs of Strangers' presents a picture of a situation where a structure of decency, in which need and entitlement are bound together, is absent from the lives of people. We have a world in which human beings with power face those without it. 'The nightmare of the powerless is that one day they will make their claims, and the powerful will demand a reason, one day the look of entreaty will be met with the unknowing stare of force.' Such a world would be scarcely human. Values do not mediate relationships in that world.

We find an example of a world without human bonds in a 'culture of silence' described by Brian Wren in Education for Justice:

A peasant in Allende's Chile was once asked why he hadn't learned to read or write before the government's land reform. "Before the agrarian reform, my friend," he replied, "I didn't even think. Neither did my friends." "Why?" he was asked. "Because it wasn't possible. We lived under orders. We only had to carry out orders. We had nothing to say." This peasant had lived under an authority so oppressive that his capacity for critical consciousness had been silenced. He had literally been forbidden to think for himself. Other people, his landowner in particular, would do his thinking for him. In the closed world of the feudal landholding (latifundium) he had grown up utterly dependent on his master, and had absorbed the attitudes of submission, passivity and self-depreciation imposed by that culture - a culture dating back hundreds of years to Spanish colonial times. To emerge from this state of mental slavery was like a rebirth. His emergence was made possible by a combination of political change (land reform) and an educational programme aimed at developing not only literacy but critical consciousness and self-respect ...

...(W)hen the Chilean peasant emerged from his enforced silence we could say that he became more of a man, more fully human than he was before. From being the object of his master's decisions, he became a subject. He found his voice, and discovered that he had something to say. (1986 pp 5-6)

It hardly needs saying that we find such political, moral and economic conditions duplicated throughout the world in one type of system or another. There is a tenuous hold on what it is to be a person and on the rights that a person needs to bear simply in respect of being a person. We are familiar with the slick responses to people who claim that they are human beings or persons after all and have rights to certain decencies: 'Who says you are a human being etc? You were nothing until I raised you from the gutter etc' - the stuff of the fate of 'reclaimed' prostitutes in Victorian literature. By and large in such situations people have no chance to develop 'recognized' personal qualities and attributes. Of course, people hold values but their expression is confined to the extreme privacy, if they have any, of immediate face to face relationships within the family or within groups of people of their own kind.

If a 'culture of silence' suppresses or screens out the possession and expression of many distinctive human values, we also find a withdrawal of values from or a refusal to extend them to people who are or become our enemies. Part of any military training involves attempts to dehumanize our real or potential enemies in the eyes of the soldiers.

The enemy become 'gooks' and so on. The categorial and the moral get mixed up. If there is a certain slippage in the human status of people, the unthinkable becomes thinkable. We comprehend the reality of the enemy in categories appropriate to their nature as gooks or niggers. It is almost indecent to discuss extreme examples of intended dehumanization where the inconceivable becomes reality. Indoctrination in these cases strips the intended objects of their typical human sympathies and creates in them a blank gaze or worse in their confrontation with the enemy. In the current education debate, indoctrination is not envisaged to take on these proportions but the language in which the debate is conducted may suggest that fears are inspired by such pictures.

A person may be related to values and actions ambiguously, ambivalently, inconsistently or corruptly. I have already said that some years ago I was a full time lecturer in a prison education department for prisoners. What I want to bring out is the moral 'schizophrenia' that is generated in a prison environment. Teaching is probably the most difficult job in this environment because one is compromised immediately in having to be all things to all men. To be familiar with prisoners is suspect and alienates the uniformed staff. To be too accommodating to the 'establishment' is to distance oneself from prisoners. Next to a 'nonce' or a 'grass' one is respectable enough but perhaps a little untrustworthy. I use the term 'schizophrenia' loosely to describe the ways that one's mind is constantly split between one set of values and role-expectations and another. It is true that one can get caught up in certain kinds of evil but not those dramatically portrayed by Simone Weil in Gravity and Grace:

The apparatus of penal justice has been so contaminated with evil, after all the centuries during which it has, without any compensatory purification, been in contact with evil-doers, that a condemnation is very often a transference of evil from the penal apparatus itself to the condemned man; and that is possible even when he is guilty and the punishment is not out of proportion. Hardened criminals are the only people to whom the penal apparatus can do no harm. It does terrible harm to the innocent. (1952 p 65)

There may be some of this but it is only in moments of desperation that one feels it. What I have in mind is a pervasive double-mindedness or much worse endemic corruption. Every prisoner entertains the thought of release, even those who know in their hearts that their recommended

sentences are extremely long. Rehabilitation is permanently in the atmosphere and the prospect of release as a result of perceived rehabilitation shapes inmate behaviour. Prisoners are reminded by professional rehabilitators that prison handbooks and rules contain phrases about the 'good and useful life' to be prepared for in conditions of 'human containment' and that prisoners are expected to 'live better lives on release' than those they lived before imprisonment. Some kind of personal development is promised in conditions approaching that of squalor. Admidst this everyone is told that convicted people are sent to prison 'as a punishment not for punishment'. The deprivations of liberty and the other deprivations that follow from the loss of liberty are the punishment. The splits in the mind continue.

The serious difficulties for the teacher are that he is part of an educational service and part of a penal system. In addition to teaching he attends Long Term Training Boards where the prison careers of prisoners are discussed. He learns of their prospective fates based on details of their offences and their observed behaviour in prison. Often knowing the worst, knowing that many of them will not see the light of day for years if at all, no matter what rehabilitation programme has been completed, he then has to motivate the prisoners to undertake their studies. One equivocates and misleads. This is only the beginning of the intolerable 'tolerance of ambiguities' - a nice phrase from the language of personal development. All intrinsic values are turned into instrumental ones. The goods internal to education are as much a matter of calculation as the impression management of the rehabilitators - chaplains, social workers, probation officers and educationalists - on the one hand and prisoners on the other. Prisoners want to get out; staff have to get from one day to the next. All, or mostly all, is mutual manipulation. It would be interesting to know what social and life skills and personal qualities and attributes are acquired in conditions that foster yet one more quality, namely 'tolerance of ambiguity'. Just as tolerance is assumed to be dependent on meeting contradictions and ambiguities with equanimity, so other personal qualities and attributes are meant to arise from facing deprivations with resignation. In spite of what I have said some good does emerge, even if one would never dare to predict outcomes.

It might be instructive to mention again that one of Simone Weil's needs of the soul is punishment. She writes:

(T)he most indispensable punishment for the soul is that inflicted for crime. By committing crime, a man places himself, of his own accord, outside the chain of external obligations which bind every human being to every other one. Punishment alone can weld him back again; fully so, if accompanied by consent on his part; otherwise only partially so. Just as the only way of showing respect for somebody suffering from hunger is to give him something to eat, so the only way of showing respect for somebody who has placed himself outside the law is to reinstate him inside the law by subjecting him to the punishment ordained by the law Punishment must be an honour. It must not only wipe out the stigma of the crime, but must be regarded as a supplementary form of education, compelling a higher devotion to the public good Just as the musician awakens the sense of beauty in us by sounds, so the penal system should know how to awaken the sense of justice in the criminal by the infliction of pain, or even, if need be, of death. And in the same way we can say of the apprentice who injures himself at his trade, that is the trade which is getting into him, so punishment is a method for getting justice into the soul of the criminal by bodily suffering. (1952 pp 20-21)

The obvious question to ask is under what conditions and when? Even more important is that such purity can occasion its own special types of corruption. Simone Weil, it must be said, is against any kind of revenge and against punishment which is not motivated by purity of intention. But that may not be good enough. She says elsewhere 'The art of punishment is the art of awakening in the criminal ... the desire for pure good' and the purpose of punishment is to 'procure good for a man'. We have heard these or similar words before. Who is to decide what is the good for man? An inquisitor may be one such benefactor in his concern for our eternal souls. If his theological principles are suspect, his motives may even be more so. The words 'good' and 'needs' can have the same ring about them, especially when used by people less compassionate than Simone Weil. The passages are interesting in that odd phrases may serve curricula aims and objects. Punishment may well be regarded again as a 'supplementary form of education'. We may think too of the unfortunate Manpower Service Commission's 'placement' who is injured in the process of getting a trade into him - if it can go by the name of the trade.

Punishment can also precede an offence. A moral educator might hold a child responsible before he is responsible in order for him to become responsible. It is not only children who are punished before they understand the nature of their offence. Many indigenous peoples in the Colonies were brought to 'voluntary' responsibility with the gun

and the Bible. If these people failed to acquire the necessary personal or group respect for private property they were slaughtered. They were punished for taking items of 'property' until they latched on to the notion of 'theft'. They were to be re-socialized into a voluntary acceptance of the rules of private property. Nietzsche observed 'Men were treated as 'free' so that they might become guilty'.

This thought anticipates what Michael Foucault has said about the formation of modern personal identity. The boundaries of self are socially defined and the unity of the subject is artificially constructed. Ideas that people have of themselves and their world are a complex of devices for the domination of people in the service of amorphous power. Language is infused with power and shapes possible ways of being persons in its own image. A sense of self, whether it be a sexual sense of self or any other, is socially constructed. The individual person is not some monad, 'a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom', whose boundary and unity is naturally constructive. The individual is 'one of the prime effects of power (and) certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals'. Discourse and institutions are repressive and find their most infamous expression in total institutions such as prisons and asylums. Steven Lukes says that:

For Michel Foucault, the modern conception of the individual is an artificially constructed unity, naturally associated with the language of morality and law, with notions of sovereignty, rights, rationality, responsibility, sanity and sexuality. In his genealogies of epistemes, medicalisation, madness, punishment and sexuality, Foucault deconstructs the modern subject by investigating the institutions and norms that have formed it, which include apparatuses of discipline and control, of confinement, treatment, rehabilitation and therapy. The autonomous, rational and normal self is sustained by how society deals with unreason, madness, delinquency and perversity ... (1985 p 294)

By separating people into those who are free and responsible and those who are defective, 'new identities' crystalize into self-contained, atomized agents on the one hand and into inadequate, indeterminate inmates on the other. The persistence of these identities is sustained by Panopticon-like institutions of surveillance. Society generates roles whose occupancy is arranged by anonymous power. In a society informed by devices of surveillance, such values as there are distort self-understanding. Personal identities, defined in terms of autonomy, rationality and responsibility and different degrees of their absence,

are artifices and are, therefore, effects and not data of social organization. Whatever we make of the thesis that everything is artifice in the service of power, we still need our distinctions to reflect on how we face each other in personal and social relationships.

When I was discussing my own experiences in a Foucaultian institution of domination, I spoke of the 'spirits' occasioned by role conflicts and tensions attendant upon deception. Another cause of stress is in the uncertain mix of what P.F. Strawson has called objective and participant attitudes in one's dealings with other people. In his paper 'Freedom and Resentment', (1974 pp 1-26) Strawson draws the contrast between those attitudes in which we express praise, blame, resentment or forgiveness and those detached attitudes in which we see another person 'as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something ... to be managed, or handled or cared or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided ... If your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him'. Those attitudes in which we make demands on and have mutual expectations of each other within an agreed moral framework, Strawson calls participant attitudes. Such attitudes may be inhibited by another person's abnormality, immaturity or deficiency of moral sense. We might also mention the role distances defined by official expectations within a total institution. To be so inhibited is to perceive another person as 'posing problems simply of intellectual understanding, management, treatment and control'.

At times we can adopt detached or objective attitudes even towards people with whom we normally participate unself-consciously. 'We have this resource and can sometimes use it: as a refuge, say, from the strains of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity. Being human, we cannot, in the normal case, do this for long, or altogether.' Strawson concludes for my purposes: 'But what is above all interesting is the tension there is, in us, between the participant attitude and the objective attitude. One is tempted to say: between our humanity and our intelligence. But to say this would be to distort both notions.' The difficulty for the teacher in a prison is that one is in and out of these two attitudes all the time.

What I have wanted to do is to show the different ways in which

we are related to values. Such relations to values are expressed in our relationships with other people. I have suggested that we are related to values, and, through them, to our fellow human beings, indifferently, uncaringly, ambiguously, ambivalently, falsely, opportunistically, corruptly and so on. But this is only to say that when a person treats another person brutally he brutalizes him, when he treats him inhumanely he dehumanizes him, when he treats him deceitfully he makes him cynical and when he treats him with ambivalence he confuses him. If we want examples of relationships that go well with people, we remind ourselves of the reverse of what is described here. What kind of people we are is expressed in our values and in our varying attachments to them and is revealed in our encounters with other people.

Often, of course, it is not easy to understand the nature of our attachments to values. We need only reflect on the intricacies of our self-understanding or self-misunderstanding and the intimate ambiguities in our relationships with other people. Recently one of my students told me that she was a sinner but she knew that the Lord Jesus cared for her in spite of this. It is difficult to deal with declarations of this kind without indelicacy either at the time of its utterance or in a discussion of it. I was uncertain whether she was making a theological statement about man's fallen condition that she had picked up at an evangelical meeting or whether she was presenting herself with a picture that gave embodiment to values that she had fallen short of. These are not independent of each other, in any case, for many people.

I recall here what Wittgenstein said about his representing his life under the aspect of the Last Judgement. It was not a state that he and the rest of us would reach in the fullness of time. It was not a forecast of an event in so many years time when a resurrected Wittgenstein would meet his Maker. The Day of Judgement was a picture, embodying values, that was a constant reminder of his falling short. It was a way of interpreting his life that was imminent in that life and not transcendent of it. If my student had fallen short it is difficult to believe that sin was appropriate to characterize it. She did not talk or behave as though she were a sinner. What the nature of the transgressions was I have no idea but the vocabulary seemed out of place.

My point is that it is often difficult to know what we want to say about ourselves. A certain vocabulary may suggest rather than capture

what is an adequate way of talking about ourselves and this, of course, raises the question of what is a test of such adequacy. Ultimately, it might not be a decisive distinction but our factual way of comprehending the world may seem firmer than our evaluative way of assessing it. The objective world stays in place even when our values shift. The thought here is that certain vocabularies in human self-interpretation may become marginal or even disappear. If the test of a vocabulary's adequacy is not in a world out there, so to speak, but in a continuing conversation amongst people, what is the status of that vocabulary when the conversation begins to flag? Above I tried to show that we can stand in different degrees of imperfection to our values. But we can also be in the process of losing a certain vocabulary of values. Indeed, we may have lost it to all intents and purposes. Such a vocabulary may be one constituted by words such as sin. It is in situations such as the one described above between teacher and student that we feel that we are irreclaimably talking past one another. We do share other vocabularies but perhaps ones which do not go deep with us.

This talking past one another can be interpreted in two ways. One is that we do not share beliefs about the nature of the universe or, ontologically speaking, we disagree about what there is. The other is that there is irreducible conflict in our value commitments. This is probably an artificial separation anyway. Beliefs, if they do not reduce to values, have very strong value implications. What I want to look at is the claim that there has been a great moral transformation in our inter-personal moral universe. Alistair McIntyre in 'After Virtue' (1981 pp11-14) asserts that we have been witness to a gradual disintegration or degeneration of our moral vocabulary. This degeneration or 'scheme of moral decline' is exhibited in the triumph of emotivism - the view that all judgements of value are merely expressions of personal preference. Emotivism is not the official morality of our society but it captures the nature of our moral condition. Values pretend to have an objective sanction but are really disguised personal preferences. Our values have no coherence and are mere fragments from disintegrated larger totalities of theory and practice. There are two parts to the thesis. The first is that surviving ethics cannot be underwritten by any unified picture of the nature of things and second that any occupancy of such ethics is based, whether one recognizes it or not, on personal choice. The degeneration consists not simply in the inability to settle moral disputes but in the use of the fragmented survivals of older moralities to mask the pursuit of self-interest and

private gain. We cannot settle the competing claims of the Sermon on the Mount and an ethic of manly conduct. We cannot resolve disputes about the rights and wrongs of abortion, about whether modern wars can be just, about whether justice implies greater or lesser government intervention in the distribution of the community's wealth and so on. If reason, sentiment or whatever other human resources we have, are helpless here, what prevents a decline in our moral vocabulary? To live in a shared world in which it is possible to settle disputes we must have 'objective' points of reference.

McIntyre tries to repair our moral vocabulary by a return to Aristotelian virtues. At this stage in my discussion I do not want to argue whether McIntyre has been successful or not. I want to raise the issue of whether it is helpful to talk about a degeneration in our moral vocabulary. Lying behind McIntyre's characterization of the state of our moral resources is Max Weber. Weber writes: 'The ultimately possible attitudes to life are irreconcilable and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion'. (1961 p 152) He continues: 'According to our ultimate standpoint the one is the Devil and the other God and the individual has to decide which is God for him and which the Devil. And so it goes throughout all orders of life'. Our fate is 'characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and above all the 'disenchantment of the world'. Weber says again: 'precisely the ultimate and sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental world of the mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations'. (1961 p 155) The realm of the private is the last refuge of our undisfigured values. The bleak images of our condition are added to in the notion of instrumental rationality. Rationality only attaches to means; our ends are individually chosen and cannot be rationally grounded. We live in a depersonalized and mechanized public world and even our thought becomes, to quote Arnold, 'mechanized and external'. The picture that remains in our mind is painted by Weber in these words:

It is horrible to think that the world will one day be filled with nothing but these little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs, and striving towards bigger ones ... it is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if men were deliberately to become men who need order and nothing but order, who become nervous and cowardly if for one moment this wavers, and helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporation in it. (Quoted in Lewis 1975 p 87)

Weber says that our integrity will be met '"in the demands of the day", in human relations as well as in our vocation' but: 'To the person who cannot bear the fate of the time like a man one must say: may he rather return silently to the bosom of the church'. (1961 p 156) But just as Weber says that our fate is the 'Polar night of icy darkness and hardness' McIntyre says similarly that our is the 'new dark ages which are already upon us'. Our protection is 'the construction of local forms of community within which civility and intellectual and moral life can be sustained'. (1981 p 245)

My immediate concern is to see what happens to a person's self-understanding in the setting of a degenerated moral vocabulary. McIntyre argues that in a society where there is no strong sense of a telos for man, where a person cannot 'confront the world as a member of this family, this household, this clan, this tribe, this city, this nation, this kingdom ...' that person's sense of self becomes 'abstract and ghostly'. There is no 'I' apart from its 'social embodiments' in the social formations just described. In our world, McIntyre argues, 'the identification of individual interests is prior to, and independent of, the construction of any moral or social bonds between them'. The 'emotive self' is a rootless, role-playing entity without essential identity. This self is manipulative in its relations with others and has no conception of other people as ends in themselves. Ours is essentially a managerial society in which the central figures consume or use other people in pursuit of their arbitrarily chosen ends. Reason cannot pronounce on ends. A kind of Kierkegaardian appetitive aestheticism is abroad and our contacts with other people are of an episodic experimentalism. Our values are thinly disguised appetites, desires and preferences and if we identify ourselves with these 'values' we perceive ourselves to be persons of a certain kind. When we pile image upon image in this way our human condition looks desperate indeed.

What I have wanted to present is a certain idea of the degeneration in our understanding of our own value categories and I have attempted this in the context of a general discussion of how things go wrong in our relations with other people, mediated through the values in our lives. I do not underestimate a charge that a different interpretation could be put upon how the people and the events in their lives have been presented in the writers quoted and my observations on what they have said. There is, of course, disagreement about the facts; and as McIntyre has said there is interminable dispute about values. Reason has been expected not just to settle disputes about values but to be

the source of these values. McIntyre says that it has failed. Disagreement is endemic in both what ought to be done and how to start to decide what ought to be done. McIntyre has tried to repair our moral vocabulary in a modified Aristotelianism; but it is difficult to know how such a retrieval can withstand a Weberian quizzical gaze. From where we stand we have to choose between Aristotle and Weber. Presumably there are no independent grounds to falsify a choice one way or the other.

Above I referred to the 'thicker' moral notions such as 'brutal' and 'rude'. Even though these words fuse fact and value and although we can identify their correct evaluative use in factual situations, it is still an open question whether we accept these words as part of our moral vocabulary. That fact and value are fused and that we can identify the conditions for their proper use is not to say that we want to own these ways of talking. I have already mentioned the notion of sin. This word might be considered a 'thicker' moral term; but because the word might presuppose a theological context, it might be intermediate between 'brutal', 'rude', 'courageous' and so forth on the one hand and 'alienation', 'anomie' and 'disenchantment' on the other. My point is that people may say they do not wish to use certain 'thicker' moral terms. That need not be the end of the matter. We might want to say of a person who says that 'sin' is not part of his repertoire that he is irredeemably wicked. Similarly of a person who wishes to do without the words, 'brutal', 'unjust', 'trust' and 'fidelity' we would say he is callous. In this too, he would not have the last word on whether he was callous, although he may be indifferent to whether he has or has not. He simply might not care. The question then might be a categorial one - he is morally autistic or psychopathic.

It is much more difficult with the terms, 'alienation', 'anomie' and 'disenchantment', though perhaps not with 'dehumanization' or even less with 'health'. (Although some people seem to have trouble with 'health'. I recall President Nixon, as he was then, saying to newsmen on leaving hospital that his health was O.K. "The doctors say I feel fine", he went on. By this time his personal development was equally in the minds of other people.) Alienation, anomie and disenchantment do not identify themselves. They are identified within frameworks of thought, involving assumptions about human nature, findings about the empirical nature of man and speculations and research about the conditions for the proper expression of this nature.

Fact and value are, then, fused in the terms 'alienation', 'anomie' and 'disenchantment'. But more, these terms are applied to reality through theories about man's fallen, disintegrated or impoverished condition and about the possible remedies for its alleviation. Some writers might add that if these theories are genuine, they should in principle be falsifiable. If they are, they could then be refuted. Even here there are difficulties. If an M.S.C. 'graduate' is contented in his job packing shelves in a supermarket is he unalienated or more alienated because he does not recognize his connivance at his own estrangement from his true or real self? Confirmation or refutation is dependent upon a correct identification of the conditions of the work and psychological state of the young person. Such identification is not independent of a particular framework of thought. How do we tell just by looking? This is difficult in any case because we often inhabit different universes of moral thought. But we usually share enough 'thicker' moral notions to recognize the good and ill in our normal transactions together in society. The 'graduate', then, may be happy or miserable in his shelf packing, absorbing the requisite qualities and attributes for life in an enterprise culture, but we do not need a theory to recognize which of the two is a better description of his condition, although we may need more than a superficial understanding of the person's life.

An example of where we do not wait on the facts, even in defence or rejection of postulated correlations between initial experience and subsequent behaviour is that of pornography. We do not wait for evidence about the corrupting effects of the pornographic material. We condemn it because it presents a degrading picture of women or children, and we identify the degradation in non-theoretical terms. In any case, there is more often than not a non-accidental connection between the subjection to degrading material and its influence for ill in a person's life. I have already mentioned this when I said that brutal behaviour brutalizes people. Experience tells us this much without sociological or psychological speculative correlations.

I have discussed, then, the way that the categorial and the moral are hard to separate in circumstances where dehumanization is traditionally endemic in society, where confusion is deliberately engineered and where institutionally defined relationships are superimposed on what may usually pass for normal. For example, do soldiers temporarily lose their moral sense in conditions of military training and psycho-

logical re-education and subsequently of war? The moral sense is selectively transformed in that certain categories or sub-categories of people take on the aspect of gooks etc. But it is not simply that the enemy is objectively redefined and then falls under a category other than human or under a sub-category other than 'civilized' or 'pure'. It is in the process of stripping the enemy or aliens of moral attributes that they begin to fall under a different category or sub-category. (They are less than human, not human or even animals. They do not feel or behave as you and I.) In a less dramatic way but nevertheless just as real, racial minorities in our own society may begin to appear less human because of circulated stories about the way they live, eat or play. In the case of soldiers or host populations, it may be all self-deception brought on by fear - the fear of reprisals by senior military personnel or a threatened way of life or unemployment in 'one's own country'. I have also discussed objective and participant ways of responding to other people in my reference to Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment'.

In addition I have introduced the notion of psychopathy. To witness signs of its presumed presence in a person causes yet more 'splits' in thought and response in the sense outlined above in my discussion of prison education. I have myself had intimate dealings with prisoners labelled as psychopathic. However, if there are 'signs' in their behaviour it does not necessarily mean that they are signs of that. It is enough, nevertheless, that one 'knows' and that one learns to 'recognize' the signs. And the crucial question is 'signs' of what? In a context such as this I have heard the word mad used to describe such people and their behaviour. Whatever the suggestions made or the words used the people have been redefined. The thoughts begin to crowd in: what kinds of contortions are involved in reconciling the intimacy of a so-called pastoral and educational tutorial with an arms-length distancing from a 'suitable case for treatment'?; and in reconciling a discussion of fine moral distinctions in character and situation in literature with the 'objective' understanding when one is confronted with a person who is supposed to be devoid of moral sense? Is the person simply getting the right words in the right order in a mechanical fashion?

When one says of someone that he is a psychopath or that he is mad, one may simply be abusing him. It is not that he is unfit to plead because of diminished responsibility or that his insanity disqualifies him from normal human exchange. It is rather that one

wants to show strong disapproval or that one wants to provoke a response so that one can then retaliate. I recall that I once said of Iago that he was perfectly rational in the instrumental sense but mad nevertheless. He could calculate and contrive the downfall of Othello with brilliant inventiveness and ingenuity. I said this in a class of adult students and one of the women, in a moment of illumination and obvious bitterness, said that her husband was just like that! We did not try to disentangle what was said. Whatever one wants to say about these examples, objective and participant attitudes intermesh with each other and with categorial and moral distinctions.

When I was discussing the claim that 'person' is not a sortal or 'count-noun', I cited the case of Rex Motram who was thought by Julia to be a fragment of a man. After a relationship involving strong emotions, Julia could not treat him as a redefined natural kind. He was not an object that had somehow been misclassified. He had not fallen out of the class of person. Yet one has to adjust in such cases. He was not worthy of her love but such a recognition is no consolation for the broken-hearted. It may help in one's recovery though. Wittgenstein said something to the effect that love is not a feeling because love is put to the test. Whether or not Wittgenstein was right about its not being a feeling, he was right about it being put to the test. The fault, though, may not all be in the object of one's love. One may be in love with love, with an idea, with the mystery attached to a person such as Motram, with devotion or with an awakening sensuality. This may, then, be to mischaracterize the supposed object of one's love.

However, if Julia was not merely telling herself a story about Motram's ambiguous human status to cope with the 'let down' or his continued infidelity, she would have been in that indeterminate state of mind between objective and participant attitudes based on an ambivalence between categorial and moral judgements. But in the thick of an emotional crisis one would not have the distance to be so clear headed. Later one would have to create a distance for reflection and in the case of Julia it would have to be in these terms.

Rex Motram is not a psychopath, although for some he may exhibit psychopathic traits. Whether he is less morally sane than the rest of the characters in the novel may depend on the moral or religious perspective through which one views him. He is described as a semi-imbecile and an idiot child because prayer, the catechism and the

nature and works of God mean nothing to him and because he is prepared to enter the Church just by 'signing on the dotted line' and to entertain mildly ridiculous beliefs about the Catholic faith. In the case of spiritual values, it is not so much how Rex relates to them but rather that the values do not feature in his value universe. All the other main characters have a relation to such values because the values define a universe of thought and belief that helps to define them, no matter how defective the characters are in their response to those values. If various universes of value do not meet, the characters do insofar as they understand these universes. They share this world, if not the next one. In saying this I am not ignoring the thought that spiritual values illuminate or give significance to things of this world.

Although Rex has no understanding of traditional pieties and fidelities, he is made use of by the Flytes to run errands or to fix things in his greater knowledge of the ways of the modern world, only the like of which could produce him, so we are told. It is interesting that if Rex is placed outside the religious and moral universe of the Flytes, he too knows who is excluded from his. One of the reasons why Rex wants to be received into the Catholic faith is that he desires an ostentatious wedding, which is precluded if he remains a Protestant. Talk of a 'mixed' marriage alerts him to such a preclusion. Before he understands what is meant by 'mixed', he protests that he is not a 'nigger or anything'. Rex has his values but it is not so much that he relates to those values but that he is an embodiment of such values. Or rather the character who is Rex is a cluster of values, alien to a world in which Grace subordinates relative ends to Divine Purpose. His world is a world of shadows; it is the Cave. It is a loveless world and love is the highest value. Although Charles Ryder says "to know and love one other human being is the root of all wisdom", this love, as Charles ultimately recognizes, is a Dantean love, though, of course, he does not say it. The profane is a channel for the sacred. The fullest maturation (the fullest personal development) is in an acceptance of Grace. Rex is the furthestest point from this. This explains the sub-human imagery, of which Julia is the main vehicle.

Ortega y Gasset in 'The Revolt of the Masses' (1951 p 51) says this of modern man: 'He wishes to have opinions but is unwilling to accept the conditions and presuppositions that underly opinions. Hence his ideas are in effect nothing more than appetites in words, something like musical romanzas'. If Waugh had this passage in mind, and I have no reason to believe he had, when he was creating Rex Mottram,

so MacIntyre may too have used it as an epigraph to his 'After Virtue'. Something of this is caught when Father Mowbray says of modern education typified by Rex:

"The trouble with modern education is you never know how ignorant people are. With anyone over fifty you can be fairly confident what's been taught and what's been left out. But these young people have such an intelligent, knowledgeable surface, and then the crust suddenly breaks and you look down into the depths of confusion you didn't know existed." (1986 p 222)

Rex calculates and uses what resources are adequate to the task. But he has no cohesion in his life which might be brought by a religious tradition. Mowbray asked Motram what he meant by prayer. The answer: "I don't mean anything. You tell me." A few words from Mowbray and that was "so much for prayer". In answer to a question about whether Our Lord had more than one nature, Rex said: "Just as many as you say, Father." If the Pope said it was going to rain and it did not, Motram had learnt enough casuistry to say: "I suppose it would be sort of raining spiritually, only we were too sinful to see it." When Rex was troubled by doubts they were about the Pope who made one of his horses into a Cardinal and about the sacred monkeys in the Vatican. He had been duped into entertaining these beliefs by Cordelia who exclaimed when Mowbray had related these details: "What a chump! Oh, Mummy what a glorious chump!" Lady Marchmain responded, "Poor Rex ... You know, I think it makes him rather loveable. You must treat him like an idiot child, Father Mowbray."

A less engaging and banal man who is perhaps ultimately more dangerous is Hooper, Charles Ryder's platoon-commander. He observes the universe through a 'general, enveloping fog' and through the efficiency of a modest commercial experience. But for Ryder, the madmen in the municipal lunatic asylum near the army camp, who sauntered and skipped among the trim gravel walks and pleasantly planted lawns, were "happy collaborationists who had given up the unequal struggle, all doubts resolved, all duty done, the undisputed heirs-at-law of a century of progress, enjoying the heritage at their ease". Hooper, however, begrudged them their "life of privilege", says Ryder. But Hooper speaks for himself: "Hitler would put them in a gas chamber ... I reckon we can learn a thing or two from him". If we suspend the thought that these characters are players in a metaphysical drama and consider them as people in the quotidian world, we may find that we do not possess categories to resolve the tension between the categorial

and moral dimensions of our human relationships.

The problems are these. What something is has implications for how we respond to it in moral or value categories. But equally our moral and value categories shape the aspect under which we perceive things. That someone is a psychopath, an idiot child or mad will influence how we respond to him but, allowing that we need to protect ourselves and other people, our response may be that of pity, care or love instead of their opposites. If the madmen are sufficiently redefined for Hooper that he finds Hitler's solution acceptable, we would want to condemn him morally for his pitiless response to them. In the case of Motram, is his lack of many distinctively human qualities and attributes something for which he can be blamed or does the lack of these qualities and attributes diminish his responsibility for the inadequate moral outlook he occupies? After all, Julia did say, if we accept her judgement in such matters, that Rex was "something absolutely modern and up-to-date that only this ghastly world could produce". If per impossibile Rex had been born in another age, he would have been different and not culpable in the same way. Given that Rex is the product of a faithless, utilitarian world, how responsible is he for what he is? Since he has not fallen out of the class of persons clinically - if 'clinically' is not a pseudo-category in this context - he has choice and some resources in terms of which the choice can be made. But what resources? Julia seems to have doubts about his resources.

A much debated forerunner of a character, at once under-developed and over-developed, like Rex Motram is Gerald Crich in *Women in Love*. We might think of him in the context of Max Weber's metaphor of men as cogs in a machine. Gerald is a distorted person in whom all attributes and qualities are subservient to the will. His car pushes through a "solid mass of human beings ... who were all subordinant to him ... (T)hey were his instruments. He was the God of the machine ... His vision was suddenly crystalized. Suddenly he had conceived the pure instrumentality of mankind. There had been so much humanitarianism, so much talk of suffering and feeling ... The sufferings and feelings of individuals do not matter in the least. They were conditions like the weather. What mattered was the pure instrumentality of the individual. As a man as of a knife: does it cut well? Nothing else mattered. Everything in the world has its function, and is good or not good insofar as it fulfils this function more or less perfectly.

Was a miner a good miner? Then he was complete. Was a manager a good manager? That was enough. Gerald himself, who was responsible for all this industry, was he a good director? If he were he had fulfilled his life. The rest was by-play." Gerald is a more complex character than is suggested in this passage. He is a type nonetheless, just as Rex Motram is a type. Both are one-sided characters but are recognizable types because of the social settings which give some kind of authentication to their identities.

As we have seen, it is said of Motram that he is modern and up-to-date and a product of the ghastly age which provides him with a setting for the expression of what he is. Lawrence describes the setting which legitimizes Crich's mode of existence. Industrialism is both an economic system and an attitude of mind. "The industrial problem arises from the base forcing of all human energy into a competition of mere acquisition". The urge to possess consumes people in such a society. All reduces to "something I've got: something that embellishes me", save for intimations of beauty in the colliers. In the midst of ugliness which "betrayed the spirit of man in the Nineteenth Century", colliers display a "real awareness of the presence of beauty". Ugliness distorts everything. Men live in "meanness and formless and ugly surroundings, ugly ideals, ugly religion, ugly hope, ugly love, ugly clothes, ugly furniture, ugly houses, ugly relationships between workers and employers". Then Lawrence declares: "The human soul needs actual beauty even more than bread".

Crich embodies energy directed at acquisition - the acquisition of more instruments in the service of further instruments. He lacks a conception of true ends. That includes human beings as ends in themselves and whatever we can contemplate as beautiful. Crich would be at an extreme distance from Lawrence who says "that no man shall try to determine the being of another man, or any other woman". Crich is all determination. Gudrun says of him that "Certainly, he's got go ... In fact I've never seen a man that showed signs of so much. The unfortunate thing is, where does his go go to, what becomes of it?" Ursula responds "Oh I know ... It goes in applying the latest appliances." The important question is that if we begin to see ourselves in these terms either because a vision crystalizes in us or because someone else's crystalized vision is projected onto us and we accept it, do certain moral categories lose their hold on our moral imagination and hence re-fashion our moral self-interpretation?

I have said that Rex Motram is not a psychopath. He would appear

to have cognitive, emotional and volitional impairments in the sense that he has an immaturity that is peculiarly modern. His impairments are of deficiency or excess in how he thinks, feels or wills. A psychopath is typically not cognitively or volitionally impaired. One has to be careful not to equivocate in the use of cognitive. Rex's cognitive impairment is that he does not see the moral or religious world as others see it. He lacks any real attachment to intrinsic values. If we want a hard case of psychopathy, that is one that is 'clincical' and not one based on circular reasoning from observed wrong-doing back to observed wrong-doing, we must enumerate the distinctive characteristics of the condition of psychopathy. A person in this condition is said to be morally dead. He is 'incapable of kindness and consideration for the rights of others and he is lacking in gratitude, affection or compassion'. He does not register humiliation or remorse, though he may express regret that he is in the position of an inmate incarcerated in an institution. Santavana said that "perhaps the true dignity of man is in an ability to despise himself". The psychopath in this sense would be without dignity. He has no delusions in the way that a psychotic may have them. He has no guilt or shame but because he has no cognitive nor volitional impairments he may deceive people through a semblance of them. He has no conscience but may talk as though he has one.

An image of a generalized psychopathic condition is that of a Hobbesian state of nature, to which I referred earlier. Having no sense of justice or other moral sentiments, men in such a condition would not possess the personal characteristics to effect the transition from a state of nature to civil society. If we grant a knowledge of contract, such a knowledge would not be enough. Such knowledge would be mere knowledge. Karl Jaspers, living in Nazi Germany, thought himself to be in such a society, or rather state of nature. To do yet another disservice to animals, Jaspers responded towards the psychopaths who were running Germany at the time as though they were animals. "To me there seemed nothing left beyond at least being at all times clear about what I was doing and intending to do, and to act accordingly. What we had to do was to act naively, to pretend no interest in the affairs of the world, to preserve a natural dignity ... and if need be to live without scruples. For beasts in possession of an absolute power to destroy must be treated with cunning and not as men and rational beings". (Quoted by Scott 1969 p 58)

If we keep Rex at arm's length it is not in this sense. The

difficult thought is how we encompass psychopaths or those approaching such a condition in our moral scheme of things such that ours is a correct, objective perspective on not just how things are but how they have to be. When we are on top, so to speak, psychopaths have claims only in the sense that any sentient beings have claims. If we exclude the insane as described by Charles Ryder, and those human beings who are not currently persons - potential or former persons, such as infants and the senile - psychopaths seem to be the hardest cases of those who fall outside the category of persons with all that that implies about the moral status of persons as such. But we may go too far; the hard case may be a limiting case. If so, we can never fully escape the ambivalence in response between the categorial and the moral.

The difficulty then is how the values in a plural society pronounce on a person and his life when those values are not his own? I have said already that this is not a question of how a person relates to what might reasonably be said to be his values. It is a question of how values which cannot be construed as his values or cannot be said to capture his moral residence in the world can pronounce on him or his life. There seem to be values that we cannot escape without forfeiting what it means to be a person or fully human. I have discussed the phenomenon of psychopathy in respect of this. Kant may have the last word on a life bereft of values in which no worth or dignity attaches to persons as such: "No man is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in capacity for it he would be morally dead. And if ... the moral life-force could no longer excite this feeling, then humanity would dissolve ... into mere animality and be mixed irrevocably with the mass of other natural beings". (Quoted in Ezorsky 1972 p 117) Both Winch and Wiggins owe something to this thought.

But what about truth, which seems universal enough, as one of those values we cannot escape without violating our humanity? Even here we can stand in different relations to the truth. For example, a person may speak the truth, or if one prefers, give the facts, but he may be falsely related to both. Gossip may be amusing and have some socially cohesive function but it may be motivated by meanness or malice. There is the additional difficulty too that the bare facts may only approximate to the truth. So one may tell the truth as far as possible or give the facts as far as one knows them but still be related to both deviously. Anthony Blanche has a good nose for the truth and not just the facts. He knows that Charles Ryder's work is

false in that he paints imitations of illusions. "My dear" he says "let us not expose your little imposture before these good plain people ... We know you and I that this is all t-t-terrible t-t-tripe." He also tells the truth about the character and personality of Sebastian but does so with jealousy and malice and that he does is an objective fact about him. Whether we have the moral right to say it, though we recognize it, is another matter. The last remark should not be taken as a universal plea for tolerance.

The question has now to be raised of the authority by which we speak when we appraise another person's life with values that are not that person's own nor can properly be said to constitute a moral world that he would recognize as applicable to him. This is complicated further when we may relate to our values with less than moral scrupulousness yet feel nevertheless that our values can be extended to the appraisal of another person and his life. Rex Motram is outside the Catholic tradition even though there is a pretence at some kind of relation to it in his willingness to undertake instruction in the Faith. He did so with the falseness of the opportunist. If one was to say that Motram was related to the inessentials of the Faith or that he was related superstitiously or related hypocritically, would this entitle a Catholic to pronounce on him and his life from within the Catholic framework of thought and belief? There is always a short way with closed systems of thought, if this is a proper characterization of Catholicism. Non-believers are fools, knaves or lapsed believers because of weakness. The same has been said of Marxism and Freudianism. Anyone who rejects the system of thought is comprehended within the system as a victim of the very condition that the system diagnoses. Those who reject the system are a mere sympton and therefore confirm the system of thought. I am not concerned with such short ways with dissenters. It is rather that in a plural society such as ours, where we do genuinely understand opposing ways of thought and belief, how do we pronounce on one another's lives with authority? Perhaps as educationalists we can only be aware of the question, when the question is meant seriously.

I have just been speaking about telling the truth and giving the facts and that means that there are truths to tell and facts to give. There are some truths or facts about the human condition that are inescapable. Winch in 'Understanding a Primivite Society' says "that the very conception of human life involves certain fundamental notions - which I should call 'limiting notions' - which have an obvious

ethical dimension, and which indeed in a sense determines the 'ethical space', within which the possibilities of good and evil in human life can be exercised ... The specific forms which these conceptions (notions) take, the particular institutions in which they are expressed, vary considerably from one society to another...". T.S. Eliot's trinity of "birth, copulation and death" is what Winch has in mind. These facts about our condition are saturated with values. As matters of fact our births were the results of sexual relations and our death is the inevitable end of all things. But these facts are surrounded with moral truths.

In an Anglican Report on 'The Family in Contemporary Society', (1966 pp 340-381) we find a discussion of the moral conditions of sexual relations. The Report says that 'coitus, considered in itself, comes within the category of indifferent acts, such as walking and eating and is therefore morally neutral'. But before anyone gets the wrong idea, the Report makes it clear that coitus can never be seen under the aspect of a morally neutral act. It always has its moral conditions. '(T)he morality of an act are its object, its circumstances and the agent's intention'. As one would expect 'coitus must occur within a context of a certain kind of responsible sexual relationship, which may be defined theologically as the common life of one-flesh and institutionally as 'marriage' ...'. People who do not agree with a Christian perspective on coitus, to use the Report's term, would have their own interdictions on certain sorts of sexual conduct. Some may use 'harm' as the limiting moral category. Some may think that the 'thicker' moral categories of disloyalty and infidelity are the constraining notions. Most people feel that coitus is an intimacy for selected people and a departure from this intimacy would be a violation of something sacred.

It is not difficult to think of people for whom coitus is an indifferent act, at least in the hours of business. But one hopes that other people would feel a certain sadness that this is the case. It might be more useful though to employ the expression indifferent act not as an ineliminable given upon which we place moral interpretation but rather as a condition to which society is moving. An interesting thought is that our society is increasingly beset by indifferent acts and unimportant moments. Many occupations are constituted by indifferent acts; and the waste in commuting to them are so many unimportant moments. When leisure and consumption are an escape from such meaningless acts and moments, we might picture society as losing its

fitness for human habitation. If we include meaning in our moral categories, we could argue that even Winch's 'limiting notions' are losing the fullness of their ethical dimension. So too, then, we may shield ourselves from the reality of death and lose a sense of the preciousness of birth. If we use spiritual categories, we would talk about the mystery and sacredness of both. In doing so we rule out certain ways of behaving in respect of these, even taking into account that people have perpetrated wickedness in the name of mystery and sacredness. Insofar as we want to talk about the 'limiting notions' in terms of truth and the realities that truth is about, such talk may cease to evoke an adequate response in us.

A writer who explores the indeterminate religious and moral landscape in which modern man tries to recapture some measure of spiritual significance is the television playwright, Dennis Potter. When a world descends into so many indifferent acts and unimportant moments and a spiritual vocabulary declines into the trivial language of an Information Society, it is hard to find resources for a disclosure of spiritual insight to match our spiritual yearnings, or at least the expectation of something better. But because our resources are inadequate, there is a corresponding distortion in the quality of our yearnings and expectations too. We are not sure about our yearnings nor about the spiritual disclosures which would meet them.

In 'Pennies from Heaven', Potter uses the resources of Tin Pan Alley as vehicles in a degraded spiritual quest. Our longings for a better place are met in the lyrics of the popular music of the Thirties. An attachment to the sentiments in popular songs takes its revenge upon us. We might betray not only other people but also ourselves and have no resources left to recover either a lost innocence or a sense of a proper care of our souls. It may be unrealistic to think that this is possible or even that such a recovery makes sense. However, we can dream our dreams.

It needs to be said that Potter is a religious dramatist, although, as he himself has said, he may not mention God. He is concerned with Grace and Salvation in a world that appears to be bereft of religious meaning. Many of the characters in his plays seek absolute good in the surrounding dross of the world and their lives. The majority of us have no authentic spiritual categories to interpret our residence in the world, so we have to make do with what may provide intimations of such categories. In the lyrics of the songs in 'Pennies from

Heaven' there may be a language of some kind that aspires to go beyond what that language in fact expresses. There is a yearning to find a language that expresses a correspondence between what we feel and what lies beyond what we feel. We long for both joy and what might correspond with that joy in reality. There is a human dream for conceptions of perfection, Eden or the Golden City.

As we would expect, there is ambiguity in the lyrics of the popular songs in 'Pennies from Heaven'. Do the lyrics hint at a more adequate human setting, no matter how distant from us, or do they create the reality they express? In Potter's play, there are suggestions that we do apprehend higher spiritual states that we could be in but are not. As I say, we have intimations of a better place somewhere else that would illuminate this place, as it were, but these intimations are redirected into what popular songs express. But in spite of this redirection, Arthur, the song-sheet salesman, still insists that the words in the songs refer to somewhere where the songs are true. At the same time, the music and lyrics appear to transfigure Arthur's daily world but only as long as the gramophone record lasts. He pays the price when he returns to the reality of his life. The trite language of the lyrics is the only 'religious' language available to him in his search for a good that would give him the meaning for the rest in his life.

In the epilogues to both the television play and the novel of 'Pennies from Heaven' the two dead lovers are mysteriously resurrected into a world of popular music. We are told not to switch off the music. "The world would go even crazier than it already is if we stopped the music altogether. 'There must be somewhere where the songs is for real'." Perhaps the only place where the sun is always shining is in one's head, or so it is said on several occasions in the novel. We might dwell on the craziness of an Information Society in the spectacle of a Prime Minister delivering up one of the most beautiful Christian prayers to journalists and, of course, the television cameras in the street. Potter makes a passing reference to the incongruity of this spectacle in his preface to 'Waiting for the Boat'.

(Were it not serious it would be entertaining to linger on the spectacles we are treated to by public figures. Think of the way in which private lives become display in public space. The intimacies of personal relationships are so much grist to the rhetoric of public image making. One politician's personal history is brought into the public domain in an attempt to out-hype the public visibility of

another politician's private virtues. This is not to forget that private lives are impoverished by taking their significance from compromised public requirements. Nor is it to forget that both private and public lives drift in an indistinct region between reality and unreality as in the case of at least one public figure. This is what the Information Society has become for many people.)

The idea of betrayal is an important leitmotif running through Potter's latest six-part television serial, 'The Singing Detective'. We betray people through an attachment to the wrong values or through a marred orientation to the right ones.' The problem is in what new attachments (or a recovery or rediscovery of old ones) or in what re-orientations can we be brought into a more truthful relationship with ourselves.

Philip Marlow, the boy, is betrayed and he betrays in turn. He witnesses his mother's adultery with the father of a boy in his class at school and takes his revenge by falsely accusing the boy of an indecency, perpetrated by himself, on the school mistress' table. As an adult, Marlow is haunted by this betrayal and a succession of others. He is haunted as he lies trapped in a hospital bed and in his own sick body. The starkest description I know of Marlow's imprisonment in his sick body is in Proust. 'It is in moments of illness that we are compelled to recognize that we live not alone but chained to a creature of a different kingdom, whole worlds apart, who has no knowledge of us and by whom it is impossible to make ourselves understood; our body.' (quoted by Hepburn 1984 pp 155-156)

We are not only caught up in the body's compulsions and necessities but also in the thought that the fate of the body is our fate too. Marlow gains some measure of release from the body's betrayal and at the same time some promise of renewal. There is a certain irony in the air, though, as he leaves the hospital, for we hear the sound of Vera Lynn sweetly promising 'We'll meet again'.

On several occasions I have referred to a natural condition or our natural condition bereft of value. I also introduced Winch's 'limiting notions' of the natural circumstances of our lives to show that being born, loving and dying demand a recognition in any human form of life. We do not live our lives in the irreducible animal parts, or functions, of our nature. Nor are we precipitated from birth through copulation to death without having a perspective on ourselves which includes an acknowledgement of these facts about our condition. Values are not superimposed on nature as an afterthought as

it were. The natural comes to us already permeated with values. This, of course, does not stop us recognizing the natural as natural. Nor does it preclude us from abstracting from such a full description to a partial one for scientific purposes.

Philip, the young boy, with the rest of the class, is frightened as the old school mistress stares at them "almost choking with rage and disgust". She speaks:

'One of you, one nasty dirty wicked little boy - for I cannot believe it was one of the girls, no, not for a moment! - One of you boys waited until the end of school, waited, then sneaked back in and did this horrible - horrible-filthy-disgusting thing! Right in the middle of this table. My table! And I will tell you this. I will tell you here and now, he won't get away with it, whoever it is! I'll make sure of that! Ab-so-lute-ly sure!" (1986 p 137)

She accuses one child after another with the offence and then continues:

"Cows do it in the fields, and know no better. Dogs do it on the road, and know no better. Pigs do it in their sties, and know no better. They can't speak. They can't reason. They know not the difference between right and wrong. They are animals! But - ! ...
... But we are not animals. God has given us all a sense of good and of bad. God has allowed us to tell the difference between the clean and the dirty. And God is going to help me now find out who did this thing! ...
... All of you. In a moment you are going to close your eyes and place your hands together. We are going to say a prayer. (in an awful voice) We are going to ask Almighty God Himself. We are going to beseech Almighty God Himself. He is going to point His Holy Finger. Almighty God will tell us who did this wicked deed. And then we shall know. (A beat) Let us pray."
(1986 pp 138-139)

The old school mistress enlists God as her secret agent and demands of Him that He suspend all His actions that order and uphold the universe until He has pointed His finger at the guilty one. Under the old woman's gaze in his attitude of prayer Philip betrays himself and is made to stand at the front of the class until he reveals the culprit. He then falsely accuses the hapless Mark Binney of the offence.

These extracts illustrate how values overlay and give significance to what is without value or significance in a humanly uninterpreted world. These extracts are not thoughts on the theme of dirt being matter in the wrong place, nor on the natural kingdom as one without distinctions of etiquette. The passages are about how values that

sanction behaviour can be the instruments of duplicity. We can be open or deceitful in our relation to values. The old school mistress uses a certain superstitious conception of God to terrify the school children. Potter is conscious of how certain childhood-given or chapel-given images of God can be corrosive of adult struggles to develop adequate attitudes to what faces adults in life. The old school mistress presents God as though He were an object amongst objects in the world and had the omniscience of a Big Brother. He could be coaxed into service by the wiles of a Big Sister. The prayers too were meant to trap the 'criminal' rather than petition for forgiveness, express remorse or contemplate the glories of God. The prayers were for a visitation of retribution not for a spiritual awakening. In such an atmosphere the children are betrayed into false beliefs and unwholesome values in a process that should be one of initiation into expansive values of trust, openness and confidence. Values orient children to each other, to other people and to the world for good or ill.

Philip is caught up in betrayal and learns that he can hide behind values as well as reveal himself in them. It is not just that he has been harmed by acts of betrayal, albeit in some cases unintentionally. It is also that the knowledge of betrayal can then feature in his relations with other people. He can betray intentionally and disguise it. His fellow pupil vicariously suffers for what he sees as his mother's betrayal of him and the 'father' he loves. Philip also intended to disgust and offend the school mistress without detection; he intended to betray without the consequences. There were many unintended consequences of his actions, though, just as there were many later cruelties because of his mother's adultery. But an acknowledgment of the nature of our deeds and the consequences of our actions may give us insight into the nature of responsibility. Marlow, the adult, is not without his lessons but his relation to them is ambiguous. We have here, then, the ingredients of our decline, or development, as persons and if personal development means anything it is found in the domain of values such as I have introduced in the previous pages.

We have seen that values are not necessarily commensurate with each other. Sets or configurations of values fail to meet or even fail to contradict one another. We can stand in different relations to our values - in truth or in falsity. Values help or hinder an appreciation of who or what we are. They reveal or distort our sense of ourselves. Values distance people as much as they bind people

together. We may think that our values capture the reality of other people but we find that they blind us to the fact that other people exist in a dimension of values of their own. We may believe that our values speak with such an authority that the lives of other people cannot help but be comprehended within them. A greater understanding would show us that it is not just that our values have not the universality we thought they had but that the thinking so puts us into a false relation to those values. This is apart from the fact that we may have a certain duplicity in relation to our values.

No matter what the range of values we hold we still may fail to recognize the full reality of other people. It may have been such a thought that led Simone Weil to write: "Among human beings, only the existence of those we love is fully recognized." The next thought on the page is: "Belief in the existence of other human beings as such is love." (1952 p 56) Iris Murdoch owes a great deal to Simone Weil and we can see this in the following thought: "Seeing the reality of another human being is a work of love, justice and pity." (1976 p 23) Love has different meanings in our language. Simone Weil puts a certain Christian construction on the word. Love in this sense is an ever-receding perspective away from our egoistic concerns. Goodness too for Simone Weil would give us such a perspective on the world and on the reality of other people, as we move away from our selfish concerns.

Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch share the view that goodness is the capacity to see things as they truly are. It is the generously disinterested awareness of the world outside, and this includes people, the distortions of a self-protecting and self-aggrandizing ego. The chief enemy of morality is the fat relentless ego; or, it might be better put, that when we get the ego out of the way there is little left for a morality to do. But a difficulty in Murdoch is that she says that morality is pointless, not in the sense that it is without meaning but in the sense that it does not serve anything beyond itself. Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that Murdoch has 'Quite inadvertently made a case out for the pointlessness of morality, not, as our modern Neoplatonists maintain, in the sense of a high-minded disclaiming of any this-worldly telos, any form of social life as the good life for man, but in a way which makes morality appear to be in the end no more than an aesthetically engaging and compelling phenomenon'. (1982 pp 6-15) I think that Murdoch would say in response to MacIntyre that goodness does not serve anything beyond itself. It is the light in terms of

which other things are seen as they are and this would include the aesthetic.

Power and ambition screen us from other people with cliches. Van Gogh too had such an immense love of things that power and ambition were inimical to him. "I admire the bull, the eagle, and man with such an adoration, that it will certainly prevent me from ever becoming an ambitious person". (Quoted by Berger 1982) Reality is such a difficult word to use that one is reluctant to introduce it into a discussion; but just as Simone Weil wants to meet the reality of other people, Van Gogh wants to engage with reality as such. Simone Weil wants to do so too in the rest of her work. For both the writer and the painter reality lies beyond selfish fantasy. We can begin to approach reality in love and begin to see the goodness of it.

If what I have said is true of the limiting case of the psychopath, we might wonder what relevance love has for such a being. Love in respect of a psychopath may be expressed as pity; but what would be the status of such a response? It would be more an objective than a participant attitude but it is just this construal that Nietzsche would condemn as manipulative, although in the case of the psychopath it would have little influence on him were he on top. But pity is not about consequences, even though it has them. One feels pity for someone cut off from a life of reciprocal human responses. Love or pity for such a human being is that he is not treated badly; and thus he is able to manipulate other people. His world is a world of moral non-compliance and has the shape of a Hobbesian state of nature, in which for him other people are more malleable because they are morally compliant. What he can get away with he does. The rest of us keep our humanity by encompassing him within our moral world; and that means we do not have a licence to do with him what we will. Given that we have to protect ourselves, we extend to him what he would not extend to us. However, when we come across people in power approximating to the condition of the psychopath we try to keep our distance.

There is, of course, the possibility that psychopathy came into existence with a language that gave certain people with power the means of 'making up' such human beings. It has been said that positional goods which licence the exercise of power or coercion are not unknown to give asylum to people who, were they not in possession of the positional goods, would easily fit the category of psychopath - that is the psychopathic traits are disguised in the sanctioned ruthlessness of enterprise and the demands of the job. And certainly such people

existed before the diagnostic category of psychopathy. But it was not one of the ways for people to be. What we can be is intimately connected with our human descriptions. If people absorb descriptions of themselves, they become those kinds of people. We may recall Foucault who spoke about the 'constitution of subject'. That people can be 'made up' changes the possibilities for personhood and, of course, our way of describing a falling short of these possibilities. Animals are indifferent to our description of them, unless the description entails greater interference in their lives on our part. Even then they would not know that it was our description that brought about a change in their condition. How we label people adds to the understanding of who they are, most crucially for themselves. The appalling result of Philip Marlow's betrayal of the 'backward' Mark Binney was that he later became a 'nutter' in a loony bin. Philip sat at his desk as a 'perjurer and a charlatan' and watched as the rest of the class corroborated his story, equally bearing false witness. The old teacher beat an admission out of Mark Binney and together with the general betrayal of the class made him believe in his guilt. He was labelled and eventually wheeled off to the funny farm, as the play has it. 'Labelling Theory' has been incorporated into educational sociology for some time to capture the self-confirming nature of the use of 'under-achiever' and the rest. This is a kind of 'making up' of people.

CHAPTER 9

Values and the Constitution of Persons

I have wanted to argue that personal development consists in an individual's taking on the properties of what is of the nature of persons and his being implicated in what is of the nature of persons in his own way. There are generic features of what it is to be a person and there is the individual who assumes these features in his person. A dialectical relationship exists between our becoming constituted as persons and bringing this constitution under our own power. Personal development refers to that process in which an individual is introduced to what is relevantly person-like in certain areas of human experience and in which the individual is encouraged to build that experience into his personality and to take responsibility for it. As an individual's make-up develops, so that individual can become more implicated in what it is to be a person and will find that more of what is person-like will be refracted through his individual personality.

We are talking, then, in the area of personal development of what it is for an individual to find himself, in his own way, in those features of generic personhood that pre-exist him but are the resources that constitute him. There is a content, form and direction to an individual's personal development and, to a greater or lesser extent, he can be a source of, or implicated in, these features of his 'personal' nature. Our development, in this respect, is how we perceive, desire or wish it. But it is development and what is internal to development is what is person-like. I have also wanted to suggest that the content and form of the self, and the direction in which it proceeds to become a fuller reality of its own kind and of itself, - what it is to be a rational agent and a unitary personal being - is essentially moral.

In the process of developing, an individual begins to have his own educated wants, wishes, needs, reasons, choices, tastes and inclinations. The content of these wants, wishes and so forth is the content we find in the different dimensions of human experience. Some broad dimensions of such experience are economic and occupational life, moral and spiritual conduct and social and cultural concerns. To the extent that an individual is implicated in these dimensions of experience, he develops intellectually, emotionally, imaginatively, morally, spiritually and so on, and as he develops he appropriates, and owns in his own person, what belongs to these types of development.

The individual begins to know what fulfils him, what he finds meaning in and what values he wishes to realize in his life. It is obvious that many conditions have to be satisfied before he can begin to express himself in such ways. One of the important lessons in life is to know what the conditions are for our 'higher' fulfilment. If we are lucky we will find our fulfilments in our work and perhaps in our functions and civic responsibilities. Whether we do or not, these are, nevertheless, necessary conditions for much else that we wish to find our fulfilment in. We often forget just what conditions have to be satisfied before other possibilities can become realities in our lives. Without health and a certain amount of wealth, our fulfilments in other respects will suffer. Also we might think of all those macro economic and political conditions that need to be satisfied for us to live our individual lives at the micro level. So, it might be said, we must be careful not to be too sniffy about preparing young people to find employment, even if this employment is in itself less than fulfilling. Such employment, of course, is at the micro level just as our fulfilments are. We must not, though, pretend we are preparing young people for work when we are not. Furthermore, as part of our development, we need to be aware of what conditions other people are satisfying for us to live anything like a decent life.

However, as educationalists, we want our pupils and students to pursue what is worthy of human pursuit and to be fulfilled in what is of genuine value. We wish to help to enhance what is best in our pupils and students already and foster what will be best for them in the future. We wish, too, to encourage our pupils and students not only to have their own motivations but also to have those motivations that are worthy of them. Yet, as I have said, we need to be realistic about what shape their lives will take in the given social and economic conditions of their lives. This is the problem in the areas that personal development covers. We wish young people to develop their individuality but in terms of what is of the nature of persons in a full sense. By the same token we wish to resist an attenuated version of what is person-like. We, also, want our pupils and students to be persons in their own right, pursue their own good in their own way and find life plans and projects in which they can be fulfilled and authentically implicated. Personal development implies that the development is the person's own, that it is sufficiently person-like and that it is genuinely development. The individual should be transformed as a person but the content of the transformation should be richly person-like.

When a person comes to perceive his development as his own, he begins also to have a stake in it. He himself is someone in what he comes to value. He does not merely represent himself to himself, as is suggested in some interpretations of what it is for a person to have a conception of himself. On such a view our 'self-image' is conceived on the model of our looking at ourselves in a mirror. A richer view of being someone for ourselves is one where our self-conceptions has standards built into it. We measure ourselves in terms of these standards. Things matter and have significance for us in our individual lives. And, as I have wished to argue, the things that matter and have significance for us are to be located in what it is for things to have value. The important point, here, is that the individual begins to have a reflexive relationship with himself. Values are the standards we live by and they are what we reflexively apply to ourselves as self-aware agents. They help to define who we are and it is in the definition of who we are that we find our identity. To have an identity is to know what a thing is. In the case of a human being, it is to know what kind of reality a person is and how this knowledge enters into how a person interprets himself. If he views himself as one of the children of God, he is a different reality from what he would be if he viewed himself as essentially a precipitation of 'matter in motion'. What it is to live well, or fall short of such living well, will be different in the two cases.

There are three aspects to personal development as I have described it here. First, an individual absorbs values that are internal to which is person-like. He begins to have knowledge of good and bad, what is better and worse and what is worthy of human pursuit and what is not. He begins to perceive what values are possible, what are acceptable and what are mandatory. Second, the individual begins to make some of these values his own and identifies with them. It is a question, as I have argued, of how we relate to values and whether they are our values. Third, a person begins to transcend the 'facticity' in life by locating himself in a range of self-descriptions that help to define who he is. He becomes an object of his own self-awareness and knows what it is to live up to, or fall below, the standards he has appropriated as his own. Individual difference, then, is best seen not as a confluence of different properties of personhood but as what an individual endorses as his own amongst those properties - that is, what he appropriates as his own and in terms of which he either measures up, or fails to measure up, to what is proper in respect of them.

Conditions of Personhood

I want to argue that personal development is about the development of an individual's moral identity. There is a strong connection between moral values and what it is to be a person. Because of this strong connection, personal development needs to be located in the sphere of moral values. We might say, then, that the content of the self is essentially moral. I have given a broad picture of what I mean by the term value in my discussion in the preceding chapters. Before I discuss value (including moral value) more schematically, I should like to look at the conditions of personhood again.

I have presented an impressionistic view of the conditions of personhood in my discussions so far. As in the case of value, I want to be a little less impressionistic. I need to say first that when people discuss what personal development might consist in they tend to focus on the concept of person. Educationalists in the area of personal development, PSME etc. fall back on such a scrutiny of the concept of person, when they seem to be at a loss to find the content of personal development etc. elsewhere. By trying to say what it is to be a person they hope to extract from this enquiry the criteria which could give personal development its content. If we can say what a person is, we can say what it is to develop in terms of it. But difficulties are present at the outset. Writers and teachers concerned with personal development wish to distinguish between an individual's developing into and as a person from his developing certain detachable skills. For example, it is said that intellectual, moral, emotional and imaginative development cannot help but be a development of the person. But, on the other hand, it is said that an individual can develop skills and know-how but remain much the same as a person. Yet to develop skills and know-how is to develop in terms of human characteristics. Manual dexterity, reason and intentionality are centrally involved. Are some types of development a difference in kind then? I think what is meant by the distinction is that an individual can develop person-like properties but his self remains untouched. This raises the question of how we might distinguish between person and self. There are not two separate entities nor two separate configurations of properties. I shall return to this point shortly.

I have already remarked that the term person is not a sortal or count noun. The term sortal is said to designate those qualities and attributes that attach to human beings not in respect of their bodies, although people cannot help but be in their bodies, but in respect of

their 'minds'. These qualities and attributes come in different degrees and combinations and form some kind of enduring personality. The qualities and attributes are individuated in a human body and the identity of the person is just the complex of qualities and attributes centred on a sense of one's unity and continuity. It must, therefore, be in respect of these qualities and attributes that personal development has its meaning. But someone might want to press the point and ask the question qualities and attributes of what? Of persons?

As a way into this question, we might want to say that a 'person is someone we meet' or that a person just is the individual human being we knock around with or bump into in our daily business. For example, we do not teach a bundle of qualities and attributes. Nor do we simply encounter a body. (Sometimes we may think we do and pressures may make it a survival technique to treat children and students as though they were bodies. It is not uncommon to hear children and students referred to depreciatively if humourously as bodies.) At least we like to think that we address persons with their individual and discriminable characteristics. A person is, then, amongst other things a chunk of stuff which exhibits characteristic traits, dispositions and behaviour, interpreted in categories appropriate to its kind. To say this may sound circular but this is all we can say finally, since a person is not reducible to something not its kind. Persons are irreducible realities and to think and behave as though they were not is to invite self-interpretations that may confirm such an attempted reduction.

If a person is someone we meet, a person is also someone each one of us is. Whatever may be said of a person in formal definitions, said from a third person perspective or simply said because we are someone for other people, people also have that peculiarity that they are someone for themselves. This is not to say that we are someone for ourselves from the start, that is if you like from birth. We become someone for ourselves as we develop a reflexive response to 'our' distinguishable and distinctive existence. From a third person point-of-view people have typical human characteristics; from a first person point-of-view these characteristics are gathered up into self-consciousness, agency and autobiography. What is personal for other people is the same as what is personal for ourselves. But we live it in our individual ways. We have no difficulty in saying that a human being grows into or becomes a person. Persons are emergent beings. They emerge from flesh and blood and whatever other bits and pieces form their

physical and mental constitution and emerge from a characteristically human world whose imprint is inscribed upon that constitution. With this difference: we have the capacity, which itself is 'grown', of a reflexive relation to this imprint.

Some people will always see a certain mystery in what it is to grow or be grown into a person. If we are bits and pieces, we are wonderful bits and pieces. Philip Larkin despairs of our ultimate condition but finds a beautifully celebratory image about our coming into the world and coming into the fullness of a being for itself. In his poem 'The Old Fools' he says:

At death, you break up: the bits that were you
Start speeding away from each other for ever
With no one to see. It's only oblivion, true:
We had it before, but then it was going to end,
And was all the time merging with a unique endeavour
To bring to bloom the million-petalled flower
Of being here. (1974 p 19)

As I said, we have little trouble in saying that a human being develops into or becomes a person. And being able to say it is bound up with being able to recognize it. Anyone who has brought up a child, if things go well or at least not badly, recognizes those barely perceptible changes that gather up into a being with an identity of its own. (We know people are 'dragged up' and 'knocked from pillar to post' with the almost inevitable ill fortune for themselves as well as the rest of us. It is easy, of course, to be simple minded and smug about such things. More revealingly, it is easy to be wrong.) However, one notices the little idiosyncracies and suggestions of independence that proclaim an emerging personality. Those distinctive characteristics of human beings begin to show themselves. Obviously, developing into a person and developing as a person go together. It is a matter of different degrees and combinations of those distinctive qualities and attributes.

As Lady Bracknell says of Cecily in the Importance of Being Ernest she, that is Cecily, has '... really solid qualities, ... qualities that last and improve with time'. She then goes on to say 'The two weak points of our age are its want of principle and its want of profile. The chin a little higher ... style largely depends on the way that the chin is worn. These are worn very high, just at present.' Here is an early example of the presentation of self in one's impression management in everyday life. Such qualities and their changing significance are acquired through the efforts of others and later through the efforts

of ourselves and we improve in respect of them. In the process of developing into and as persons, we also become persons of certain sorts and, of course, the persons we individually are. The extent to which these facets of ourselves can be disentangled is one of those persisting difficulties, in our reflective understanding of ourselves.

If persons are those whom we meet, we are also persons who do the meeting. Boldly, we may say that persons have a unique first person perspective on the world, which it should be said, includes other persons. Yet we recognize too that we are the other persons in the first person perspectives of those other persons. We are persons for other persons just as they are persons for us. They are persons for themselves just as we are persons for ourselves. In *The Nature of Things*, (1973 pp 103-105) Anthony Quinton says:

We think of ourselves as primarily and essentially persons and only rather contingently as material objects, mammals, carnivores, husbands and so forth. Of all the contents of the world it is persons to whom we are connected by the strongest bonds of interest and concern. They are the proper objects of love and moral consideration. 'We' and 'I' after all, are personal pronouns.

We could stress 'meet' as much as 'persons', because it is in their mutual recognition that persons are said to meet.

My expression, with its slight variations, 'Persons are those whom we meet' has its origin in Anthony Flew (1965 p 10) who used the sentence 'People are what you meet' to undermine the idea that people are really their souls', interpreted in the Cartesian tradition. (I might emphasize it by saying it again that using Flew's expression is not without its difficulties. How do we meet the first person perspectives of other people? How do we meet what a person is for himself? Yet without having met we should not have that first person perspective on the world.)

'People are what you meet' amounts to saying that persons are those with whom one has social relations. As I said previously this is not an accidental property of persons; we are what we are, namely persons, because we engage in social relations. We might extend this idea and say that 'Education is the meeting of persons'. What is meant by this is that being is more important than having. It is what people are rather than what they possess (including knowledge and skills) that is crucial in what is absorbed in educational experience. If we only come into contact with people with an attenuated sense of their identity in our educational encounters, we are much less likely

to develop a 'sentiment of being' of our own. It might be noted here that we do describe a person as a whole. Think, for example, of how we describe people as ladies, gentlemen, cads and bounders. Perhaps all these terms are a little quaint nowadays.

Lionel Trilling has said the following about such a sense of one's integrity involved in 'sentiment of being':

The sentiment of being is the sentiment of being strong, which is not to say, powerful. Rousseau, Schiller and Wordsworth are not concerned with energy directed outwards upon the world in aggression and dominance, but rather with such energy as contrives that the centre shall hold and that the circumference of the self keep unbroken, that the person be an integer, impenetrable, perdurable and autonomous in being if not in action. (1972 p 99)

The idea that education is the meeting of persons would find support in what Michael Oakshott has written of his own formation as a person. He writes:

And if you were to ask me the circumstances in which patience, accuracy, economy, elegance and style first dawned upon me, I would have to say that I did not come to recognise them in literature, in argument or in geometrical proof until I had first recognised them elsewhere; and that I owed this recognition to a Sergeant gymnastics instructor who lived long before the days of 'physical education' and for whom gymnastics was an intellectual art - and I owed it to him, not on account of anything he ever said, but because he was a man of patience, accuracy, economy, elegance and style. (1967 p 176)

As a way into personal development we might find less rewarding places to start than in reflecting on such passages. Making the necessary changes, we might also say that these passages are not just illustrative of what we mean by personal development but what we might begin to do in relating to children in terms of it. The ways it is possible to be a person is, then, not uninfluenced by those with whom we come into contact.

For our purposes then we might resolve the difficulty of saying that the word person is not a sortal or count noun and at the same time paradoxically of saying that a person is someone we meet by stating that when we talk about a person - or rather it is in talking about and with a human being that he becomes a person - we do so in terms of qualities and attributes that come in different degrees and combinations. No matter how subtle in its individuating properties, language will always seem abstract in comparison with the person we meet, even though

it is in the concepts and categories of language that we identify the persons we meet as persons. Whether we like it or not reality will tend to have the boundaries that language describes it as having. Contours of reality, which obviously includes persons, will be contours in language. In the case of persons, their reality and the language that describes it are inextricably bound together. With a certain rough and readiness, we may say that persons together create their own reality as persons. We must recall though what I said previously that each individual absorbs his humanity from the surrounding human world and that this human world pre-exists his individual entry into it. He does not make himself from scratch. Yet once started as a project, he can become the agent of that project and even devise his own.

The fit between himself and the surrounding world is, then, not isomorphic. Our lives are not the ones lived in a Brave New World or aspired to in Nineteen Eighty Four, though it is not only in fiction that such 'experiments' in living are entertained. However, we might think again of some of those New Conservatives, as distinct from the New Libertarians, who want to return to earlier experiments in communal living or emphasize those practices imminent in selectively chosen practices in existing society which bring the community and the individual into a certain rigid harmony. I am thinking of those references to moral majorities or model minorities which exhibit respect for established and properly constituted authority hierarchically structured, attachment to the inherited pieties of family and church, a suspicion of collectivist solutions to problems, a commitment to the disciplines of the market overseen by a powerfully centralized state, an attachment to the nation and a selective history of it, involving as it does a narrow idea of kith and kin and a willingness to be free and responsible in respect of certain aspects of one's personal life. All these desired commitments of the individual have their embodiment in strong institutional form. We find ourselves not in 'selves' in a detached liberal sense but in transcendently objectified 'mind'. I shall say a little more later about such a picture. Let it suffice to say that some of those who say these things are hypersophisticates, to use a self-description of such writers, and do not believe what they say in the way that they present it. The mystification is not of themselves but those who need authoritarian guidance.

External practices and institutions in society and the inner psychological states of persons do not cohere, in spite of the myth-making of some writers. Nevertheless, a person's human resources are

not in any fundamental sense his own, though he can make them so. Once the person is launched, as it were, he can self-consciously set about being the agent in his own history. To the extent that what I have said here is true, persons are in their language and the language is that of characteristic qualities and attributes. We may allude here to Occam's Razor - a device for keeping entities to a minimum. We need to resist multiplying entities beyond what is necessary or required. Persons do not exist as extra entities above individual human beings. The individual human being exhibits all those characteristics which come in different degrees and combinations. Language picks them out and gives them a shape. Person then does not stand for an additional entity within the individual human being. A person just is all those performances we are able to identify and speak of as exhibiting reason, sentience, agency, autobiography and so forth, centring on the individual human being.

We might recall what I said of the shape that 'talk' would take in certain post-structuralist writings. The person is decentred and dispersed throughout 'impersonal' attributes and qualities - dissipated, more precisely, throughout what can be said within centreless discourses. The 'metaphysics of presence', whether that presence be man or God, is the expression for the fact that we are captives of the idea that the person is present to himself in a moment of Cartesian introspective scrutiny. Rather the person just is a nodal point to which talk attaches. Probably a less extreme expression of this general view in that a person loses himself in his dispersal throughout a social life modelled on the theatre. Our 'selves' are dispersed throughout a complex of roles that we learn to play. In almost Goffmanesque terms there is no 'self' that is safe from sociology. The self is always a 'second self', socially constructed, or more strongly, subjectivity is a play, or in the play, of language.

Certain feminist writers would resist the charge that they are doing violence to their natures in rejecting all the normal attributes and qualities of womanhood. Identities are cultivated, not given, because there are no 'natures' as such. Fresh identities are constructed out of the possibilities within discourses that are in constantly shifting relations to themselves. But can they do violence to a 'second' nature? It is true that second natures are just as persistent as 'first' natures. (Another example is from Lord Young when he recently said, if somewhat confusingly, that enterprise is in our first natures and is socialized out in our personal development in

many schools at present.) Even if persons are 'artifices' it is difficult to know how we refashion them, since what the artifice is is us. But to know this is to find other ways to be 'subjects' - this term is less loaded than 'women' or 'men', so it is argued. My saying all this, perhaps in far too rough and ready a way, is meant to suggest a certain way of looking at the constitution of persons and to suggest that ways to be persons is now bound up with the construal of personal development in feminist ways. Just as personal development is subsumed under Social and Life Skills and Education as a Preparation for Life, so it is subsumed under Women's Studies and Gender Education.

Of course personal development needs its setting. In an important sense there have to be boundaries for the self as there have to be boundaries of the self. What constraints limit private space is partly a moral question. It is a perennial moral question just what and how much private space one can claim for its own sake or for private indulgences without infringements by other people or the institutions of society. If high fences make good neighbours, we have to give content to 'high fences'. If the word personal is some kind of cognate of private, the realm of the private can be part of the conditions for personal development and the circumstances of its expression.

It might be remarked here that the personal-cum-private presents one picture of a so-called developed person. Personal development implies conceptions of the developed person, though such conceptions may be provisional in that a person is someone who retains the potential for further development and is able to transcend limited conceptions of the developed person. One powerful symbol of the personal is the private motor-car. Identities are formed and sustained in the ownership of private cars. Different assessments of people, for example, are associated with having a company car. Furthermore, whether they are just myths beloved of advertising men, the myths are nevertheless potent ones. Associated with the private car, especially the more prestigious ones, are images of self-esteem, independence, macho self-command - a whole complex of identity-sustaining, self-interpreting pictures of a possible way to be a human being. Such pictures may be false and in clearer moments a person may see that there is a self-defeat in trying to realize such pictures.

I have already referred to the notion of a 'positional good'. I used it to denote a person's occupancy of a scarce status position in a hierarchical organization. Such a good is desired on the condition that other people are precluded from the possession of it. If all

have it, it is not valued, at least as a positional good. (See Hollis 1987 pp 43-58) It may be valued as an instrumental good which is then a condition for the realization of intrinsic goods in our lives. But certain goods have now been stripped of their identity-forming symbolic value. As has been said, a washing machine is a washing machine is a washing machine ... However, in the case of a private car, there may be increasing signals that it is personally self-defeating. Like many things in large industrial cities, one needs to be richer to remain poor. The cost of something becomes too high for what one gets out of it or what it does for one. If everyone stands on his tiptoes at a crowded football match, everyone is painfully worse off, even taking into account the small benefit of seeing something on one's tiptoes rather than seeing nothing as one remains steadfastly flat-footed. In the case of the private car, and the car may be taken as representative of many other features of modern life, the personal-cum-private may be deceptively enchancing for the individual person. The small benefit to one's 'self-image' is overridden by things of more importance. But, as I have said, we may need a car to remain poor but not as poor as we would be without the car.

Throughout my discussion of personal development I have referred to those very general features of persons that enter into an account of what it is to be a person as such. It is not a matter of a person's being the locus of these general features and then acquiring more individuating characteristics. The general features are present within whatever one acquires by way of personal qualities and attributes. We also may say if we wish that these are the boundaries of the person or the self. (To put the self in a context we need to talk too about the boundaries for a proper acquisition of those features and a setting for their proper expression.) Anthony Quinton (1973 pp 103-105) in the book already referred to - *The Nature of Things* - picks out what he thinks is a definitive list of those general features of persons. As I have said, whatever the chemistry of the individual person or, to change the image whatever the texture of his individual life, those general features will inform the more individuating descriptions that are true of the person.

Quinton asserts that there are two conceptions of personality. He is using personality as I am using person. It is not used as a contrast with character (say) as would be the case when we judge that a person has plenty of personality but little character. Quinton

writes 'The first of these (conceptions) is the complete personality of an adult, sane, human being; the second is the restricted personality of a young child, a mental defective, a higher mammal - to take only actual cases.'. I think we must say, as I have said often enough in the text, that there are limiting cases of human personality. We may want to quarrel whether actual human beings can be instances of these limiting cases. A psychopath, clinically or morally defined, may not be so much a restricted or defective instance of a human being but scarcely a human being at all. We may also recall my earlier point that certain human beings may have irretrievably lost their personality altogether. The comatose and the vegetative may be examples here.

However, Quinton goes on to enumerate five characteristics that are found in both the complete and restricted personalities and each characteristic is susceptible to a strong and weak interpretation. The five characteristics are interrelated in various ways and some presuppose others. We might also want to say that there is mutual implications amongst some of them. For example, self-consciousness, rationality and agency are mutually implicated in each other. Quinton lists his five characteristics as consciousness and the closely related self-consciousness, rationality, will, moral status and capacity for personal relations. Although he mentions love in the context of personal relations, Quinton's five characteristics may have been a more complete general survey of human personality had he added the emotions.

Lists are always difficult and to a greater extent incomplete. If the emotions cannot be absorbed into the five characteristics he lists, it might equally be said that the range of the 'affective' is wider than that of the emotions. What is 'felt of' may include the aesthetic too. I think Quinton would perhaps answer that the felt of can be included within his five characteristics. Emotions, moods and feelings are informed by rationality in the sense that they fall under descriptions that we can get right or wrong and that they have objects that are either appropriate or not. It may be recalled that I pointed out earlier that the emotions are a species of appraisal. Certainly some of what is felt of belongs to the realm of the moral such as remorse or shame. For example, we may want to say that there are moral emotions. And for Hume what is felt of is the foundation of morality. Reason slavishly follows the passions. The passions are original existences and are the basis of our moral language.

Of the five characteristics consciousness or self-consciousness

is the first on Quinton's list. A being that is aware of itself as a continuing identity through time is in this respect a complete personality. Possessing mere sentience would be characteristic of restricted personality. The latter personality would have at best an imperfect grasp that it is 'analagous to but distinct from other selves'.

Rationality, the second characteristic, is strongly present in a person when there is a capacity for abstract reasoning, expressing itself in generalization, explanation and prediction ...(and) a mastery of language'. A complete personality in this regard would also have a conception of reality when it was absent. A restricted personality on the other hand can match means to ends but this is no less than animals can do 'in those well-judged sequences of ... actions ... based on learning from experience'. One might say here that there is a continuum from strong to weak in the possession of rationality. How rationality is exhibited or not exhibited may be revealing too. We might think here of the complete rationality of the scholars' being instructed in the use of practical sense by the street lad. The lorry is stuck under the bridge and the lad tells the assembled scholars to let the tyres down.

In discussing the will, his third characteristic, Quinton says, 'A being is an agent in a restricted sense ... to the extent that its behaviour is motivated, the outcome of desire and not wholly determined by non-mental causal influences'. Such agency does not meet the criterion of strong volition in which choice follows deliberation. Quinton reminds us of what Kant said about deliberated choice. Kant wrote that a rational being is one that 'has the power to act in accordance with the ideas of law - that is, in accordance with principle - and only so has he a will'. I might add here that if Hume said that morality is felt of, Kant argued that it was reasoned of. However, bearing in mind what he had said previously, Quinton writes that 'Full self-consciousness of one's own identity as well as will or agency in this strong sense, are preconditions of moral responsibility.'.

Moral status, the fourth characteristic, refers to both moral agents and moral patients. Of moral principles, Quinton says that 'they enjoin conduct by all moral agents ...(and) they enjoin it for all moral patients'. The former are those to whom 'moral injunctions are addressed and who can properly be held responsible for moral lapses ...'. The latter are those restricted or defective beings whose 'interests should be taken into consideration in the formulation of moral principles'. Quinton makes the important point that I have

stressed on and off in my discussion of how we are related to our own and other people's values. He says that 'although all moral agents are part of the total moral constituency, the converse is not true'. He wants to argue that mere sentience, that is the capacity to suffer is a 'sufficient condition for moral consideration' yet is not a 'sufficient condition for responsibility as a moral agent'. Those who are proper objects of moral concern are not necessarily proper objects of moral praise and blame. The distinction between moral agents and moral patients is not a distinction meant to furnish reasons for a return to selective Victorian paternalism. It is obvious that the total moral constituency includes infants, defectives, animals and so forth. For some writers, 'patients' will include an expanding circle of sentient creatures, and perhaps even beyond.

The final characteristic is the capacity for personal relations. Quinton's example is love between people. To love someone in a personal way is 'to identify oneself with the interests of the object of love'. We might recall what Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have said about the close connection between love and the recognition of the reality of those who are loved. Before stating what genuinely reciprocal love involves, Quinton writes that 'only those beings that literally have interests, in other words persons in the restricted sense, can be loved'. But, we need to say, those who are loved may not be capable of returning it. To love we must have a sense of the other as being analgous to ourselves. Such a statement would require qualification because there are persons in the restricted or defective sense who do see others as themselves but their view of themselves is not generous enough for us to accept that as a model of other people. Unlike infants and animals, these people cannot even like very much, as distinct from loving, though as I have said previously they may simulate liking very much to manipulate others for their better advantage. Quinton concludes his reflections on his fifth characteristic as follows; 'Genuinely reciprocal love can exist only between complete personalities. Similarly only complete personalities can enter into genuine relations of cooperation ... (and) communication ...'. By way of summary Quinton concludes his thoughts on personality with these words:

All five of these personifying characteristics are to be found, then, in a stronger and a weaker form: consciousness may be of one's continuing identity or merely of one's sensations, rationality may be abstract and linguistic or concrete and practical, agency may be deliberate or merely appetitive, moral status may be responsible agency or propriety as an

object of moral concern, one's capacity for personal relations may be active or passive, a capacity to return love or merely to receive and be pleased by it. Where the characteristics are present in their stronger form there is a complete personality, where in their weaker form a restricted one. In either case the essence of personality does not lie in the style of its embodiment.

It is not criticism of Quinton to say that these general features of personality may cohere in the individual human being but that in him there is still scope for personal development. The fact that they are the essence of personality betrays the level of abstraction of these characteristics. These characteristics, then, are essential to personal development but not exhaustive of it. All we want to say about a person will imply the presence of these general features in an individual but the finer grain will be missing. This finer grain may include the style of each characteristic's embodiment in the individual but again style added to the general features will not be exhaustive of personal development, unless, that is, style refers to all those properties of persons that display those general features. For Quinton's purposes, however, (and they are completely adequate for those purposes) the complete personality exhibits each characteristic in a strong sense. The strong is the complete in each realization of the characteristic. Likewise in the case of the restricted personality whose characteristics are realized in an incomplete degree and, perhaps even kind, the weak comprehends the nature of that personality. These general properties or powers of the mind are meant to pick out the distinctive nature of human beings from the natures of the rest of the furniture of the universe. Personal being is distinct from mammalian being although it includes it; it is distinct from botanical being and does not include it. Personal being includes everything that can be said properly of persons, tautologous as it may sound.

When we speak of the conditions of personhood we mean that without their being satisfied a human being would not be a person. These conditions need to be satisfied in a strong sense for an individual to be a member of the class of persons and not simply a token member. But these conditions have their conditions too. The most obvious condition is that of a public world in which people can identify themselves in contrast with others. The reciprocity in a public world is the condition of our emerging into personhood. Furthermore, the actual nature of each constituent condition of personhood may not be what we

think it is. For example, if self-consciousness - that capacity in which we and our thoughts can become the subjects of further thoughts - is a product of the public world and not a spontaneous disclosure in self-presence and self-clarity, then we need to determine what the process is of our becoming conscious of and for ourselves. I have already discussed Gerard Manley Hopkins' account of his own self-disclosure. Similarly the infant Husserl records his own self-disclosed 'I-experience' in the 'Eureka! I'm a self'. (Harre: 1987 p 100) I take it that such an experience is not unfamiliar to all of us. We might say, then, that the condition of this 'I-experience' is a public world and the nature of this 'I-experience' is not an empirical discovery as we think but in a sense is a structural imposition. I know there are many difficulties in trying to capture the reality of this nature in experience. Do I discover I am a self? Do I become a self? Or have I always been a self?

My point is that the conditions of personhood and the nature of these conditions are bound up with the conditions of their 'growth', if that world captures the nature of their acquisition. But these features of personhood are mutually implicated, as I have said before. These features are developed together. That I can use language, that I can reason, that I am, along with others, a subject of intentional ascription, that I can enter into reciprocal relations with others are all implicated in what it is for me to be self-conscious. I not only use my powers as a reflective being but I use them as a reflexive one. Self-consciousness and self-knowledge go together and to be conscious and knowledgeable in this sense is to be conscious of and have knowledge of a self that is both conscious and knowing.

The question is what is presupposed in what? If rational agency has its conditions, does our moral nature have its basis in rational agency? It is a question of what we need to develop in order to develop further. I wish to situate personal development, in a strong sense, in the domain of values, and more specifically in moral values. If we want to give an account of moral values we might need to draw on the other features of personhood. Reason, for Kant, is morality in an important sense. People might disagree about this of course. But reason is not only displayed in moral thought. Reason is implicated in most things we are engaged in as rational agents. A further question is what is imposed on what? For some writers certain central categories in our interpretation of the world and in our interpretation of ourselves are imposed rather than discovered. Self-presence, and

the self itself for that matter, are imposed on life by false metaphysics or bio power, if Foucault is our authority. (Foucault is against something, of course. Individualism is repressive because it presents us with a picture of ourselves that serve the interests of other people. If I cannot make my way in the world, I blame myself.)

It is not only the categories of 'cause' and 'thing', then, that are imposed but also what we considered to be beyond interpretation or imposition. The self, and for my purposes the moral self, are said by some writers to be texts that are interpreted in situ - that is, dispositions become different selves depending on the different circumstances of life. There is no fixed self nor fixed moral self. Both are conditioned by what is external to them. And what is external is in constant flux.

For my purposes I need to make the correct distinctions within what can be taken as given in what we say about ourselves. We do interpret ourselves and our lives in moral categories and we do distinguish these categories from others. What we extract from the features of personhood is too wide for personal development. We might wish to say, though, that what we extract from personhood is the basis of self-development in the way that John Stuart Mill would use the term. People should be given the opportunity to develop their manifold human endowment as far as this is possible, given the limitations of ability, time and energy. But education has won this battle in principle. (I realize of course that some people use the term personal development as a term of protest against the failure of education in practice to promote the self-development of pupils and students.)

Mill and other writers pursuing the same theme were protesting against the absence of the freedom and the opportunity for each individual to develop his abilities and talents in his own way. Education now embodies this ideal. All the features that are characteristic of human beings are meant to find their expression in the educational enterprise. Self-development might be serviceable enough to capture this ideal. I wish to use personal development to capture the development of the moral self. These are not two separate processes and products. We are not compartmentalized beings. The moral adds a different dimension to our reality as persons. This does not mean that the other features of personhood are not implicated in this dimension. It might mean though that a person can be morally deficient but still functional in other respects. Much depends on the scope we wish to give the term moral. I wish now to look at two constituent

aspects of personal development as I have suggested it should be used.

Reflexivity

Rom Harre in *Personal Being* (1983 pp 265-268) says that 'Reflexivity is the magic ingredient by which persons are created as self-conscious, self-controlling and autobiographically aware beings'. He distinguishes between 'powers to do' and 'powers to be'. The first distinction refers to the power to act in a world that is often unyielding in its givingness. In our individual development we acquire a range of skills, abilities, capabilities and capacities so that we can be competent agents in a world of other agents. The second distinction refers to one's reflexive or second-order powers, the object of which is oneself. Self-knowledge and self-control are reflexive 'powers to be'. We turn back on ourselves and cultivate character traits that give us greater command over ourselves as we are embodied in our skills, abilities and so forth.

One example is the strength of character to keep ourselves at certain tasks, if we are to have greater proficiency in them. Another example is the power to do something about failure of the will. Such a weakness of will (something for our reflexive powers to work on) might be shown in what is called 'perseveration', a variety of procrastination - that is, working at a preliminary but easy task and never actually getting on with the job in hand. We need second-order powers to toughen up our resolve. (Of course, perseveration may be a ploy to deceive others rather than ourselves.) Harre discusses the example of 'mere body-building as an end in itself ...' which is thought by many people '... to be as grotesque as the torsoes it produces ...' (p 269) But if one's reflexive powers of self-understanding and self-discipline '... grow and are exercised this, in itself, is regarded as moral advancement in the moralities of everyday life'. Harre's whole argument is that an important dimension of moral experience is neglected in much moral philosophy. Endeavour is a crucial second-order power that is necessary for one's self-transformation. If we are to make something of ourselves and pursue our own good we need 'powers to be' as well as 'powers to do'. Of course, 'powers to be' give us greater 'powers to do'. It is clear then that personal development is not a mere passive accumulation of qualities and attributes. We need to be active in their acquisition and need to develop reflexive powers for the transformation of ourselves. The transformation of ourselves could be of a quietist kind. We focus our efforts on our impulses in

order to subdue them. We transform ourselves into fatalistic 'patients' rather than into active agents. We withdraw from the world rather than attempt to change it.

Reflexivity can be linked with self-cultivation. It is a matter of a person shaping himself and the course of his life. If the person is an object of his own reflexive powers, he also needs both sufficient public and private space for his powers to be a reality. I am talking about 'normal' times and not about those extremities of deprivation that demand special strengths just to survive or rather not just to survive but survive with some humanity intact. Our development, then, needs the fulfilment of other conditions. One must have autonomy, public space and a certain freedom from interference in one's private space. Autonomy here means a good measure of self-direction. A person's thoughts and actions need to be his own.

It should be obvious that I do not mean a complete licence to do anything one wants. Self-regarding impulses will always need to be balanced by some measure of other-regarding sentiments, if we are to live together in some kind of harmony. Of course, this relationship between the two may be of a calculated kind and not a spontaneous moral part of our second nature. For example, a libertine has precious little regard for the autonomy of other people, although in his case he may not be autonomous himself. He is not self-governing but rather a victim of appetites that he has lost control of. He needs self-knowledge and self-mastery.

We have seen a breakdown of a person's reflexive powers in those television warnings about drug abuse. The victim of the abuse only manages to tell himself stories about feeling under the weather because of the symptoms of oncoming common colds and so on. He has self-awareness of some kind but he is no longer part of a moral order that gives him standards for more effective self-knowledge and self-awareness. Such problems are not the least part of personal development, PSME etc. in schools and colleges.

In Harre reflexivity is meant to resolve a theoretical problem as well as provide us with an insight into our moral nature. He is concerned with what it is for an individual to conceive himself as the unitary self of self-presence. Harre does not use this language himself but nevertheless for him it is in reflexivity that our unity lies. Our reality in this sense is not discovered empirically. We construct ourselves, as it were, from the resources from which culture grows persons. The self, as distinct from the person, is that sense of unity

and continuity that an individual has of himself. 'It is that which is "kept burning" behind our many roles'. (1983 p 38) A person is the publically defined and publically visible entity that meets, and is met by, other people. The self is that unity and continuity that I take myself to be as I emerge from culture.

For Harre the self is not a thing but a structure. It is a unity imposed on a flux of sensation and sense impressions. It is what Hume looked for but could not find because he looked in the wrong place. It is introjected public personhood. We might think, here, of what Kierkegaard said about a self that is aesthetically dispersed because it lacked selfhood in this sense. Kierkegaard, of course, would have wanted to say that the self is more than a construct. 'That Individual' can come to self-presence when in contact with a moral order or critically when in proximity to God. In a sense though the self has always been present to itself in Kierkegaard.

The self, then, is a reflexive agent that knows itself in self-knowledge and moves itself in self-mastery. The knower and the known combine in one self. There can be self-deception though, when a person is divided against himself. Also an individual, as we know since Freud, is not as transparent to himself as Cartesian self-presence might suggest. I do not quite know myself, for example, in a moment of self-clarity and self-distinctness. But I have reflexive powers which give me a perspective on myself in terms of a moral order. I know myself in my history, in my self-intervention, in strong evaluation and in my self-examination within a moral order.

I have referred to the distinction between the self and the person. It is obvious that there is a distinction to be made but the language of the distinction is not uniform. It hardly needs saying that not the least difficulty in discussing the whole area of personal development etc. is the problem of the use of language. Self, person and identity are all used differently by different writers. Harre for example uses personal development and self-development interchangeably and uses them to mean the process of becoming a personal being, that is, developing psychological individuality. It is about how the self comes to birth. What it is that applies the construct of the self to the 'self' is a difficult thought. However, what I am after is the idea that reflexivity is constitutive of the self and the way that reflexivity is bound up with the capacity to have second-order states, that is, beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires.

Identity Development

In identity development, I have to be aware of what or who I am. The what of selfhood is the form that humanity takes in me. I belong to late Twentieth Century Britain and I cannot therefore be a Don Quixote - that is not the sort of person I can be. Nor can I be the sort of person that goes on a Christian Crusade to the Holy Lands. Of course, there is no limit to the antics that people can get up to. But they are only antics. The who of selfhood is the sameness which is me with my idiosyncratic content. The what and the who of selfhood are inseparable. The form of who I am are those general characteristics of personhood detailed by Quinton. But they are instantiated in me. Those general characteristics are exhibited in what it is to be a person in the culture of the times. But they are gathered up in me. To have a personal identity is to know who we are. There is always some set of self-interpretations that form personal identity.

There are a host of expressions that try to capture what it is to have an identity. Sometimes 'self-image' is used to denote the impression that a person has of himself. At other times it is 'self-concept' that is employed to refer to the beliefs that one has about oneself. Although a person may capture himself under the aspect of self-image or self-concept, he may be wrong about the 'objective' standing of the content he ascribes to himself. A person can be corrected in respect of the truth of what he feels or thinks about himself. Such a correction may lead to a crisis in a person's identity. Our self-image can be threatened, disrupted or destroyed. Those beliefs we have about ourselves and about our place in the nature of things, may be undermined and result in our disorientation. It is clear that much which is subsumed under personal development, as the term is used and mentioned in practice, documents etc., is concerned with identity development and the fear of identity-malformation. Nevertheless, in all this, a person knows that no one else is who he is. If things go well the person will have a set of reflexive attitudes which have an integrative function of holding him together. And, of course, as teachers we anticipate that things in this respect will go well. Or at least, we act as though we anticipate it.

We might say then that our identity is what we are attached to. Our identity or sense of self may be attached to impressions, beliefs, reason, to narratives about ourselves, or to a community and so forth.

I might expand what I mean here by referring first of all to an entirely different use of 'self'. Self in this usage would be contrasted with identity. The self is that dangerous, sub-terranean 'volcanic' core that is universal, closed and threateningly stable. It is always precipitating us into anti-social behaviour. The identity, on the other hand, is open and is that which grows and brings forth the individuated individual. The identity is the individuated individual. It is culture which encourages developing identities in pursuit of their own development. Yet, there is always Peters' 'volcanic core' beneath the identity.

I take the term 'volcanic core' from R.S. Peters who pictures our extra-human world as consisting of a non-personal human nature and a non-personal external world. 'Our' values are constitutive of the meanings that define our personal natures and they infuse the natural world with human sense and significance. To this extent 'Men sail a boundless and bottomless sea ...' as Oakeshott says (1956 p 15) and it is the Lebenswelt that keeps us afloat. Peters speaks of '... the awesome spectacle of human beings trying to make some sort of sense of the world and trying to sustain and cultivate a crust of civilisation over the volcanic core of atavistic emotions'. (1972 p 87) Assuming that children are reclaimed from nature, Peters says of them that they 'start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates'. (1967 p 43) For some writers, who draw on such imagery, science or its pseudo offsprings, may encourage us to give back to nature some of our achieved humanity. We might say that an excessive concentration on the 'mechanics' of anything, especially sexuality, may be to give some of our achieved artifice back to the indifference of nature. In our self-interpretations we may lose some of our established humanity in an excessive respect for science in its interpretation of what we consist in. We can anticipate the drift of Oakeshott's and Peters' argument. We need not follow it to appreciate the picture it presents of our fate. My point is that values and the meanings in which they are inscribed give us our distinctive human point of view. It is in our values that we are persons.

Imaginative literature is full of examples of the dangerous 'self'. A story might go as follows. Our 'senses' are stirred or enchanted by desirable people. What we call the 'heart' gives way. But the identity, in the guise of 'reason', prohibits a response to a desired person. The 'will' must retain the person's integrity. We are speaking here, of course, of Peters' 'passions' and an example would be

misdirected love in whatever form it takes. Identity in this case would be attached to reason. Reason says who we are because it enables us to stand back in judgement on those precipitating wants, desires, inclinations and appetites, that can only properly be called our own when they are integrated into our moral identity. This is not to say that reason need be thought to be the foundation of morality. We need not give reason this over-arching status in the constitution of morality. However, we still might want to situate the identity of the person in those decisive or critically strong evaluations that Charles Taylor speaks of throughout his work to be referred to shortly. Reverting to the more individuated construal of 'self', we might say that for Taylor the self is the moral identity of the actor. The self in this sense gains an identity for itself in its attachment to strong evaluations of worth.

Taylor in his paper *Legitimation Crisis?* (1985 pp 252-269) wants to characterize modern identity. Putting it rather schematically, the modern self is the '... sense we have of ourselves as free, self-defining subjects, whose understanding of their own essence or of their paradigm purposes is drawn from 'within', and no longer from a supposed cosmic order in which they are set'. The modern 'I' is a natural being, characterized by a '... set of inner drives, or goals, or desires and aspirations'. Knowing who I am is to get clear about these. 'The horizon of identity is an inner horizon.' (p 258) This is not a return to the once familiar introspectabilia in the Empiricist tradition. We are not self-sufficient monads. Taylor argues for the situated self rather than the unencumbered one. The self is defined in community with others.

This would be in contrast with Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* (1971 pp 3-4) who writes: 'The self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it: even a dominant end must be chosen from amongst numerous possibilities.' Identity for Taylor would be defined as what a person must be in '... contact with in order to function fully as a human agent, and specifically to be able to judge and discriminate and recognize what is really of worth or importance'. To say that something is part of a person's identity is '... to say that without it (that person) should be at a loss in making those discriminations which are characteristically human'. That person would not know where he '... stood, would lose the sense of what constituted beauty, what constituted nobility, what was truly worthwhile fulfilment ...'. (p 258) To say that modern man is situated 'within' is to say that his identity cannot

be confirmed or underwritten by a meaningful universe. We might find such an underwriting in a medieval weltanschauung in which a cohesive world view confirms the person's identity. It is rather what modern man finds within himself that constitutes his world. What is within is also connected with ordinary life, the life of home-making, work and leisure. But it is men together who find themselves 'within', although Individualism as a weltanschauung falsely assumes that the individual man is prior to all what we should normally take as constituting him.

Strong evaluation for Taylor is a property of public space. We can stand back from ourselves and become a partial object of our own assessment. But we are attached to objective values that provide the criteria of assessment. The self is the moral identity of the actor, because this self is constituted by standards external to the self's de facto desires, appetites and so on. We can ask ourselves if we want to be those sorts of people who give in to precipitating desires, appetites and inclinations. In asking this of ourselves we have standards of worth outside of these 'inner' pushes and pulls. We can also be motivated by second-order wants - namely, we can want not to want what is unworthy of us. We are the sorts of being who can bring our de facto desires and inclinations into the human order. Taylor says that: 'The mere fulfilment of desire could never be a value sufficient to ground our moral categories. It could never be the basis of moral admiration ... or of indignation.' (p 261) We might reflect here on Huxley's Brave New World in which the beings simply have de facto desires implanted in them but give no moral significance to their lives. They cannot say whether their lives are worthy or unworthy, wise or foolish, or admirable or degraded. Taylor wants to argue that it is next to impossible for human beings quite to do without some conception of intrinsic worth in their moral reflections. He also uses the term 'spiritual' to '... designate the goals and aspirations which we recognize as not only our de facto, but as having an intrinsic worth in our lives'.(p 268)

This use of spiritual is apposite, for it might help us understand how it is to be taken when it appears in H.M.I. Reports and so on. To use Taylor's own term, people are often less than 'self-clairvoyant' in their use of their central terms in describing man and his situation. In a more important sense Taylor needs this term to throw light on the way that 'fallen' modern man is less than transparent to himself. In many respects modern man has lost, or is in the process of losing, a sense of intrinsic worth over whole stretches of his life. To take an

example: were we sufficiently clairvoyant about the role of rationality in our lives, we would see that rationality is a virtue-term and not a neutral one. Utilitarians fail to see that rationality should be a virtue-term for them. To be rational is to be the sorts of people who take pride in this human capacity. If the universe does not underwrite our existence, we can still look upon 'disenchantment' and 'objectification' as human achievements. 'One wins through thereby, through austerity and courage, to autonomy, contact with reality, and hence efficacy.' (p 270) This efficacy needs to be combined with respect for nature, which is absent in the less than clairvoyant instrumental rationality of modern industry, for example.

The difficulty for Taylor is that if modern man has not 'fallen' from the Grace of an underwritten life, he has lost touch with a human setting that confirms his identity. The difficulty is how much of that strong evaluation is constitutive of modern identity? Modern man has been bribed with private affluence and may well be quite without some conception of intrinsic worth. It is true that modern man attaches his identity to his private space - his home, family, efficacy in the shape of his private car, affinity with those close to him and so forth; but he may have compromised himself too much for his consumer affluence. The humanization of work seems to be off the agenda, for example, entailing as it does the absence of the exercise of many of those essential human characteristics.

In general terms we might say that the contours of our identity - that is, who we are - are defined for us by the history we are part of, the social roles and positions we fill and the moral narratives in which we are inscribed. How we are attached to these is another question. We might recall that having shown modern 'emotive' man to be essentially manipulative, MacIntyre then proposes in its place a narrative conception of the self - a self constituted by a life story with a certain telos, or point. The unity of the self is a unity of a life in a narrative quest. The self is situated in inherited historical forms. Of course, MacIntyre's argument is that modernity is the story of non-situated man and argues for an Aristotelian return. MacIntyre paints a picture of the leading identities of our time. They are socially constructed characters. MacIntyre's picture is as follows. (1981 pp 26-30) The Rich Aesthete is essentially appetitive. He both consumes and is consumed by other persons. The Manager and the Therapist know no distinction between rational and non-rational discourse. They are concerned to transform means into ends (and the

means, amongst other things, are human beings) and has lost any distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative modes of thought and action. For the Therapist '... truth has been displaced as a value and been replaced by psychological effectiveness'. Of course, not all modern identities are caught in the identities of these characters. But for MacIntyre, they are so central that the rest of us define our identities partly in reference to them.

I have said that our identities are defined in terms of what we are attached to. But we may not be attached to anything, except in a self-consciously distancing sort of way. If the identity is not essentially linked to anything, what is the nature of such a disencumbered self? On the 'liberal' view, the self is prior to its ends, roles and dispositions. The self is the capacity to choose. On this interpretation of the self, shorn of its acquired accretions, it is not so much that the self disencumbers itself of accretions but rather that it is that the self is always in a relation of irony to whatever it is attached. Even what Taylor calls strong evaluation, on this liberal account, is chosen, and because of this, choice can be unchosen. But we need not read this as a logical thesis such that we have created ourselves from scratch by our choices. It is rather that we are related to everything through choice - that is, we see every attachment under the aspect of choice.

We can see then that personal identity is bound up with strong or weak conceptions of the relationship between persons and their human setting. Yet it is not only that a person has a strong or weak relation to his society; it is that he has a strong or weak relation to himself. The 'liberal' is portrayed by a communitarian conception of a person's relation to his social setting as being detached from what he seems to be implicated in. Choice is the foundation of his relation to the human world and to whatever personal qualities and attributes he possesses. Choice can always make things otherwise. The weakness of his relation to society and to his personal properties are connected. If his qualities and attributes are absorbed from society and he has learnt an ironically detached relation to them, liberal man once detached in this way has nothing left to bind him to society of a strongly evaluative nature. But what is the loss if our identities are not situated in the strong evaluations of a community but rather in those immediacies of inclination and desire? This might be to put it too schematically. It is not a matter, in reality, of these two extremes. The liberal is not a disguised libertine. He is just as

likely to be attached to those strong evaluations as is Taylor but his attachments are mediated by choice. If our identities are in our attachments, it must be said that the liberal is ultimately in his choices. But, as this way of putting it implies, he is not clairvoyantly choosing every minute of his life.

Taylor, and I choose him as he is as representative as any of the critics of atomistic liberalism, has said that he can scarcely conceive a human being quite without some conception of intrinsic worth. The implication is that the liberal has no conception of intrinsic worth. But if choice is the foundation of his identity and he is self-clairvoyantly attached to it, is he not the hero of a world vacated by God and is therefore an inhabitant of a world that cannot be under-written? But choices to be choices must have their criteria. Choices without criteria are nothing but a lucky or unlucky dip and are therefore not choices but arbitrary pin-sticking. Yet may we not attach ourselves to our drives, desires and inclinations? As we have seen in the case of Kierkegaardian aesthetic man, this seems to be neither logically nor psychologically impossible. It is humanly impossible it might be said. Such an aesthetic experimentalism is inhuman and parasitic. This charge against the liberal is not that his identity is in aesthetic attachments but he has no protection against being consumed by them. Also, since society is not in many of its important contours atomistic, the liberal is parasitic on the taken-for-granted communitarian lineaments of society. If there is no strong citizenship in his conception of things, there is enough of it in reality for him to be the recipient of communal goods.

I might mention in parenthesis that there is another way with 'liberalism' as outlined here. Irony is not the last resting place but the last but one. We can be self-consciously attached to our roles and masks. We often use them in a calculating and deceitful manner. Even so we might feel that we are not a confluence of 'persons' and masks. In large part we have a self-clairvoyant relation to them. These roles, personas and masks are the stuff of personal and social transactions. But we find intimations within ourselves of a disenchantment with such dispensable encumbrances. Of course, we may become extremely vulnerable in a 'demasked' social existence. Without pretences and such social clothing, we may find it difficult to function, let alone survive, in a world shaped by roles, personas and masks. Yet we might feel a pull in ourselves to have more honest and truthful relations with our loved ones and neighbours. If these intimations of

the possibility of more 'spirituality' in our lives are not social conventions and utility in a disguised form our identities might then be in such value attachments.

I have wanted in this discussion to lead up to the idea that persons have a strong or weak relation to their human setting and a strong or weak relation to their own qualities and attributes. We need to address personal development in the context of strong or weak relations of the person to his human setting and to himself. The question of what binds me together with other people, whether dear and near or impersonal and far, is bound up with what holds me together as an individual person.

Michael J. Sandel in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (1982 pp 147 ff) has presented a model in which he distinguishes three conceptions of community - the instrumental, the sentimental and the constitutive. The first conceives community as little more than an aggregative association '... wherein individuals regard social arrangements as a necessary burden and cooperate only for the sake of pursuing their private ends'. This union need not be a Hobbesian state of nature. If we put the best construction on such a society (which may be our own society) it could be, as Charles Taylor admits, a society in which '... restless ambition, the search for new fields to conquer, brings continued vitality and creativity ... (in which) ... concentration and mobility widen our horizons ... (in which) ... a society of vital, striving, ambitious, mobile people is an exciting and creative place in which to live'. (p 252) In a sense this is why those who deplore such societies in their writing cannot get to such centres of high activity fast enough. Sandel's second community - the sentimental conception - presupposes '... the antecedent individuation of the subjects of cooperation, whose actual motivation may include benevolent aims as well as selfish ones'. If values and sentiments are shared, they are shared in the sense that each individual has a variety of other-regarding and self-regarding impulses in his own breast. As Hume has said: 'Some particle of the dove is kneaded into our frame together with the elements of the wolf and the serpent'. (Quoted by Benn and Peters 1959 p 42) I take it that this is the kind of thing that Sandel has in mind. The third conception of community is a constitutive or strong sense of community. It denies that the individual is antecedent to the community. The individual is in part constituted by the kind of community within which he was shaped and now participates. Sandel says that 'on this strong view,

to say that the members of a society are bound by a sense of community is not to say that a great many of them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their identity - the subject and not just the object of their feelings and aspirations - as defined to some extent by the community of which they are part'. I would want to say that this threefold distinction of types of community and the identities appropriate to them are points of reference on a continuum from weak to strong in the way that subjects are related to their human settings. In any society there are ingredients of all types. It is a matter of emphasis and commitment.

But schools too are communities and they emphasize different configurations of values and practices. It is true that pupils, students and staff bring to these institutions what they have absorbed from other institutions and society at large. A useful distinction amongst various 'ethics' within a school is elaborated by Rex Gibson in *Structuralism and Education*. (1984 pp 68-75) He distinguishes the achievement ethic from those of social welfare and spontaneity. Gibson asserts that the achievement ethic is '... at once obvious, pervasive and dominant'. It is importantly concerned with work, busyness, occupation, getting on, success and effort. Achievement is essentially individual achievement. Individualism is at its core and '... each pupil comes to terms with his or her own personal success or failure in school work. The commitment of individual achievement is independence; a concern with self-reliance, individual responsibility and resourcefulness ... (and) ... 'standing on your own two feet'.' The whole process is informed by rationality which insists upon '... order, discipline, restraint, caution, codification, classification, a concern for logicality and clarity, a distrust of ambiguity'. Achievement implies ambition, getting on, getting out of lower social status groups and so forth. It further implies a concern not simply to be in control of one's own life but to have power and influence over that of others. In short we pursue our private ends and this approximates schools to Sandel's instrumental community. One response to this picture would be that it misconceives the nature of the 'competition'. It is not a matter of one pupil against others, but rather the pupil trying to master the study he has undertaken. If there is competition it is competition of the student or the pupil against himself. A response to this line of reasoning would be that it is not a matter of what we should like it to be but rather the way that it is.

A social welfare ethic softens the harshness of the pursuit of

one's own interest. Achievement is about difference, hierarchy and inequality. Social welfare stresses '... similarity, sharedness, equality and community'. The language of social welfare is well-being, pastoral care, caring and concern. It speaks of the 'whole child' rather than that of fragmented cognitive achievement. If achievement speaks of one type of identity, social welfare speaks of another. I have said that personal identity is in what we are attached to. But I have also quoted Hume to show that different attachments can compete in our own breasts. If we can speak of social welfare as a distinct and distinguishable configuration of values that finds expression in a school it would be constituted out of elements from Sandel's second and third conceptions of community.

Gibson's idea of spontaneity, as a structure of feeling, emphasizes 'fun', the gang seeking 'kicks' and the peer group 'having a laugh'. It is essentially concerned with enjoyment, hedonism and humour. Pleasure seeking will have nothing to do with the Protestant Ethic of work and delayed satisfactions. It is about the immediacies of the present moment. Gibson implies that we no longer speak of the 'old hat' of 'let it all hang out', 'don't think of the future' and, we might add, 'live now and pay later'. Whether such expressions are old hat is a little off the point. Many educationalists have such attitudes in mind when they speak of the 'New Hedonism'. If we use my term and say that these three 'configurations of values' exist within the school there is unlikely to be harmony in an institution where they actively compete with each other.

Superimposed on these three ethics is the competition amongst staff, and within each person for that matter, between a configuration of values centred on 'learning' and one centred on 'management'. Management is in the ascendancy and is more likely to find its justification if it presents a school or college as threatened by spontaneity, especially if spontaneity is interpreted in terms of Peters' volcanic core of passions only just below the surface in the best of people. I do not only mean pupils and students. I mean teachers also. And, it must be said, it is in managements' interests to do just that. Management, of course, may simply be superior force. If not, it needs to convince those whom it manages that its legitimacy consists in its effectiveness. Management then becomes a normative term because it defines the proper relationship between people. But it needs to be said that its effectiveness just is its ability to persuade

people that it is effective. It then becomes effective because people act as though it were. We willingly accept that we, including our wayward passions, are in need of constraint. (We might recall that trades union activity has often been presented in these terms.) A further point is that the notion of effectiveness attaches to means and ignores ends. It is concerned with image, display and gesture, keeping ends at an ever-receding distance. Having said all this, it may still be a matter of superior force. Self-management too is increasingly lost in disguised force. Personal development then reposes on the conditions of its practice.

Values or Aspects of the Good

I have stated that the term personal development finds its sense in the domain of values and that a human individual's personal development is in his social and moral development, especially in his moral development. I am after a strong connection between personal development and moral development and a strong connection between what it is to be a person and what it is to have a moral identity. We might say that personal integrity and moral integrity go together. An 'enlarged' self as opposed to a 'minimal' self is a moral self. As an individual comes to more generous conceptions of the good, so he develops in terms of them. I am not saying that morality starts in the head though. Our conceptions of the good are inseparable from our habituated moral dispositions. In many ways a person is a combination of moral conceptions and habits and impulses in these respects. As we know, some people are stronger on habits and impulses than on conceptions. We do not need to have read Kohlberg to know that there are different 'stages' of moral development and that the form and content internal to these stages express our moral sensibility one way rather than another.

One of the difficulties in speaking about values is that the term itself seems to be far removed from the things that actually have value and the responses that express our evaluations. It may seem that if we linger over the term value we might latch on to what it means. At certain levels of abstraction, some writers give the impression that value is a kind of amorphous membrane through which things appear to have value. Or again, at certain levels of generality, other writers seem to suggest that what we say has value is the ground of the value, as though value spreads its diffuse self around. Again when others speak of value it is as though justice, mercy, pity, peace and love are glimpsed through the interstices of a meaningless materiality or a

world in which life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Others again see values as part of the fabric of a Lebenswelt that overlays a world of dead materiality. The one intuits value in the depths and the other on the surface of things, as it were. It is interesting here that Simone Weil thinks of the apprehension of value as something deep. The beauty of Gregorian chanting gives us a glimpse of goodness. She thinks that those who thirst for Gregorian chanting could not be perverted nor perpetrate wrongful acts. 'Seeing' or hearing is strongly connected with acting or not acting. (1965 p 138)

However, we need to look at what we value and at the evaluations we attach to what we value. The domain of values is extremely broad. Not all values are moral values. And the scope of the moral, for some people, is either too wide or too narrow. As I have said, whatever the scope, moral values are thought to be a condition on other values. Although we might not want to accept the whole package which suggests that moral values are autonomous, prescriptive, universalizable and overriding, we still might wish to say that moral values do in fact override other values. But they do not become moral values because they possess this overridingness. Aesthetic values in the Bloomsbury sense are not moral values because they are given overridingness in areas in which they are not normally given. They may still be overriding for the persons concerned but they are not moral because of that.

We do not, then, only assess people, things, situations and states on social and moral grounds. We assess them on religious, aesthetic and economic grounds as well as others. In the various dimensions of experience and departments of life, people can be holy, beautiful or occupationally successful. But if people are assessed in these terms, the terms themselves and thus the objects to which the terms are attached can be further assessed. The objects of assessment can be ranked differently depending on different scales of values. Holy men may count for little where a certain kind of success ethic is predominant. Life, too, in its various manifestations can be seen under different aspects. I am thinking of seeing the world under the aspect of the sacred and the profane, the just and the unjust and the tragic and the marvellous. We do then speak of what is morally, religiously or politically good, worthy, desirable, excellent and so on.

As I have indicated, we speak in terms of degrees and kinds of worth and importance. For example, people attach great importance to certain experiences, as did Wittgenstein in his Ethics Lecture. Absolute value is different in kind from relative value. The latter

is a species of fact. It is a matter of the realization of one thing's being conditional on the realization of another. Such relative judgments of value are of the form If ... then. In contrast Wittgenstein characterized his experience of wonder at the existence of the world and his feeling of being absolutely safe no matter what the conditions in one's life as possessing absolute value. Such experiences feature in what it is for life to have meaning.

Absolute value does not derive its value from its relation to something else. There is a finality about such value, as there is not in our desires and inclinations. Desires, inclinations and preferences tend to be defined narrowly in such contexts. They are simply our own, without reference to what is of objective value. We can, of course, desire what is of objective value. Also some people might want to say that what is of objective value can be disclosed in our preferences. However, objectivity and self-existence attach to absolute value. It is a matter of what is 'out there' and not subjectively within, as it were. Godfrey Vesey says of absolute value, or absolute goodness, that we recognize or encounter it by the 'light it itself provides'. (1978 p XIV) Such values can be encountered also in a person's self-effacing and generous response to another's misfortune. The Good Samaritan did not respond to the man in need with half an eye on his own moral improvement. There was no double-mindedness in his response. So when we think of absolute value we need not be just thinking of Wittgenstein's 'numinous' experiences.

There can be pre-eminent values in our lives but we might not wish to characterize them as absolute in value. But they can lend a colour to all things or, to change the metaphor, they can animate a whole culture. Whether self-reliance - that repeatedly stressed virtue in personal development, PSME etc. documents - is an absolute value or not may be contested. We might say it is a pre-eminent value, though, because it is the key organizing value in a culture and because it rests on the supreme value of the individual. Self-reliance is said to animate American culture. Some people think that it is sufficiently important that it ought to animate British society. Others might think it is neither pre-eminent nor absolute. It is simply 'political'. The important point is that we do in fact assess things on scales and rank things relative to each other. But we also give certain things a value of a different kind.

I have already mentioned a range of things that are the objects of our assessments and distinctions of worth. Actions, their consequences,

motives and whole modes of life are assessed as worthy or unworthy, noble or base, better or worse or higher or lower. We single out for assessment the person as a whole as well as his qualities and attributes. We are concerned too about the nature of our moral motivations. Do our values issue from reason, a sense of duty, love, feelings, will, interests or needs? For example, reason may be the object of assessment or the final arbiter of assessment. But it is not only a matter of our values issuing from a construal of these powers of the mind and will or these sentiments. We also value some above the others. We might find our way about the world, including the moral world, in the light of reason but we might attach greater importance to love or our aesthetic feelings. Some people think that there is a kind of redemptive appeal in perceiving the world through sentiments, feelings and emotional intuitions.

An important division in our assessments of human achievements and pursuits is that between our personal qualities and attributes and those goods at which we ultimately aim. In the history of man's reflections on himself and on what would be a proper setting for his life, there has been a recurrent desire to specify the ideals of personal excellence and those ultimate goals and goods worth having. At various times and places men have wished to cultivate virtues, mastery of passions and the development of reason. They have also sought public esteem, social and economic success, purity and immortality, happiness, pleasure and emotional wellbeing.

The items in our lists, more often than not, do not live together in harmony. But when they are not in conflict or are not inconsistent with each other, we rank them on scales according to the importance we give to them. For some writers, it is in their scaling that they gain their value. Some are given priority over others. The value of each depends on its place on a hierarchically arranged scale. We perceive things as better or worse, as higher or lower and so forth in relation to each other. Some thinkers would not give any of these items foundational status. As we have seen, post-structuralist thought rejects central truths and fixed values. For example, there is no God nor pristine Cartesian selves to which we can trace back fixed values. There might be temporary resting places in our value-responses to things but what we value and how we value are in flux.

As I have said, we assess a person as a whole as well as his qualities and attributes. Some of these qualities and attributes can attach to a person so closely that to assess them is to assess him. This is particularly the case with moral qualities and attributes.

When we assess an individual's technical or occupational capabilities - that is, when we say of him that he does things well or badly, correctly or incompetently or accurately or inaccurately - we may not be assessing the individual as such. We may not identify the individual with his capabilities; he may not identify with them either. If the individual does identify with them, he may feel crushed when the market cruelly pays no heed to this fact. If he does not identify, nor need not identify, with them, and if he treats them instrumentally, not much may hang on the fact as far as his conceptions of who or what he is as a person is concerned. His properties in these respects are so many detachable skills and so much serviceable know-how, which he treats as assets. Such non-constitutive ties between a person and his properties can, as we know, lead to alienation in all its forms. We find alienation in many of those service sectors of the economy, which run personal development courses for their employees. The employees are told to really 'lay on a smile' in their presentation of self to customers. Their capacity to smile is then considered an external asset which they begin to treat as an instrumental property. 'Personal development' in this sense treats many personal intimate properties of this kind as marketable assets. We might consider Eugene Kamenka's words, here, when he says that we have become bad actors in our society in that we are people who are 'capable of assuming the externals of any personality' because we have none of our own. (1980 p 19) We need then an internal connection with values, with our capacity to smile, to remain with this example, if we are to become the sorts of people who have substance and, therefore, something to lose.

I realize that I raise the question of how far we can move from our personal standpoints and occupy increasingly distanced perspectives on ourselves. Life is not lived in a view from nowhere. Such a drive to objectivity (and in the case of the smile 'objectivization') is as Thomas Nagel puts it, a 'departure from a specifically human or even mammalian viewpoint'. (1979 Ch 14) Such conceptions of reality would be representations of the nature of things in the absence of human beings and their peculiar perspectives on the world. According to this picture the subject is detached from the significance that things have for him from his subjective point of view. But this distancing from limited to more general perspectives is also found in Kant when he attaches the goodwill to a sense of duty. We need to abstract from our empirical concerns to a point of view that increasingly takes all points of view into account at the same time.

At a general level, perhaps the most abstract level of assessment, the term value is equivalent to the terms goodness, desirability, worthwhileness and excellence. These terms, along with the terms right and wrong, might be considered 'pure' value terms because the content implied in them in the various contexts of use is variable. For example, if the word good is essentially illocutionary in its import, its commendatory function can attach to widely different contents. On an extreme interpretation such illocutionary force can become foundational without its sense being fixed by any determinate content. This is why on certain views choice and decision can be said to be criterionless when they are refined and elaborated as foundational in ethical thought. (The term 'pure' can of course be used to mean uncontaminated by grosser materiality. Goodness, Truth and Beauty may be considered ethereally distanced from our corporeal existence.) A pure term like good can be used as though it were possible to occupy ever-receding perspectives on what we wish to bestow value. Again, 'importance' can be used as a moveable label that signals ever more refined perspectives on what is 'lower'.

At rarefied levels we might oppose happiness to truth. We can of course explore these general notions in the details of plays and novels. Ibsen in his concern with 'life lies' is always setting one such general notion against another. Should one pursue freedom if it leads to unhappiness or truth if it ruins people's lives? As we know, truth spoken by certain people can amount to lies. They calculate with the truth. In my mentioning the detail in Ibsen's plays, we should recall those thicker terms of value and valuation such as brutal and generous. To mention brutal here is to introduce the term disvalue as distinct from value.

The term value needs to be distinguished from valuation. If we attribute value to people, objects, situations and so forth, we also respond to value in terms of valuations. Valuations characterize our responses and reactions to whatever is of value or disvalue. J.N. Findlay, from whom I take the term valuation, lists a sample of valuations as follows: 'cherishing', 'setting store by', 'esteeming', 'prizing' and 'having a pro-attitude towards'. (1970 p 6) He makes the point that value is 'correlated in principle' with valuation. What is of value is the object of our valuations. We might say further, which Findlay does not, that an example would be that we love what is good and what is beautiful. We might go further and say that we ought to love what is good and what is beautiful.

The word ought nowadays might be thought to be another one of those pure moral terms, because no determinate content attaches to it. The important point is that such terms as 'ought' belong to the sphere of action. They are concerned with what one is required to do or what it is for something to be done out of duty or obligation. I do not want to enter into the debate about the status of the right in relation to the status of the good but if one reflects, again, on the thought that God looked upon the great whales and saw that they were good, it seems obvious that we ought to respect and preserve them. The thought here is that would it were that something is the case rather than not. These whales have intrinsic worth and we ought to cherish them. They do not have value in that we cherish them. Rather we cherish them because they have value. Love does not create value in the object. As Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have said love and attention disclose the worth of things. We might consider here what Findlay says about feeling in general:

To feel about something may in certain privileged cases be the last, most penetrating way of knowing what the thing is, and what stands before us as the 'objective correlate' of such feelings may be in truth the very 'nucleus' of the things themselves. (1970 p 81)

We might say then that it is only in love, and perhaps other feelings, that we have access to what is of value, that is, the reality of things. (It might also be said that when we come to know or understand the nature of something we come to love it. To come to understand the holy is to come to love it. We may not come to know by our unaided intellects though. We might have in mind here Newman's illative sense in which we arrive at beliefs and commitments via accumulated experience and the sensitive responses to things in life. The grace that might come with joy or peace may open our hearts to the truth in love.) Moreover, when we begin to love and see the worth in things we also begin to invest ourselves in them. There is also a return from them and therein might lie our emotional and spiritual wellbeing.

The unconditional worth of things, especially people, can be disclosed in experiences other than love. Love might follow from the disclosures though. Iris Murdoch says of Sartre:

The value of the person is detected by Sartre, not in any patient study of the complexity of human relations, but simply in his experience of the pain of defeat and loss. In cool moments the individual is mercilessly analysed; his preciousness is apprehended only in the emotional obscurity of a hope-

less mourning. ('No human victory can efface this absolute of suffering.') It is as if only one certainty remained: that human beings are irreducibly valuable, without any notion of why or how they are valuable or how the value can be defended. (1967 pp 81-82)

Other people might discover the irreducible value of people in an overwhelming feeling of compassion when the fate of these people are seen to be at the mercy of stupid material processes, as Nietzsche might say. But such a down-grading of material processes might, for some people, be too dismissive of nature. Nature itself, under a certain aspect, can be a value-term. Nature is not a completely devalourized background to our own invented meanings, as it were. It is not seen under the aspect of staleness as in Hamlet, nor under the aspect of the absurd as in certain Existentialist writers, nor under the aspect of evil as in certain Manichean sects. Nature is seen rather as organic, vital and uncorrupted. It is contrasted with the artificiality and vanity of urban society.

Nature, or certain aspects of it, can be seen as an object of wonder. We can marvel at it. Mary Midgley has said of stars, rocks or nematode worms that we can see them under the aspect of beauty and wonder. We marvel at the 'suchness' of them. 'But to wonder involves love. It is an essential element in wonder that we recognize what we see as something we did not make, cannot fully understand, and acknowledge as containing something greater than ourselves.' We drink in the glory. She continues: 'knowledge here is not just power; it is a loving union ...' (1989 p 41) We come to value very highly such experiences. Meaning and value are intimately connected in such disclosures. We come to understand something and then capture it in words that already exhude values. 'Wonder' and 'love' have value-tones about them. But we might also want to say that such disclosures make life meaningful and therefore they are irreducibly important for us.

In other writers we find disclosures about our ultimate condition in a tragic sense of life. We have in such experiences an insight into the human condition and in consequence have an appropriate response to it. In his discussion of tragedy Anthony Quinton (1982 pp 105-106) quotes I.A. Richards in the context of Quinton's characterization of tragedy's central theme: the contingency of value. There is no value in the world apart from the efforts of men. The universe does not underwrite anything that is of value for us. Richards says that:

'Tragedy is still the form under which the mind may most clearly and freely contemplate the human situation, its issues unclouded its possibilities revealed. To this its value is due and the supreme position among the arts which it has occupied in historical times and still occupies ... (It) is too great an exercise of the spirit to be classed among amusements or even delights, or to be regarded as a vehicle for the inculcation of such crude valuations as may be codified in a moral. (1982 p 105)

The value of tragedy is that it is the form that gives us our best insight into the human situation. It is indispensable for the developed life. Although I have not seen the tragic sense of life recommended as a constitutive part of personal development schemes, and therefore a hoped for part of the fully developed person, I have seen documents in which all the other terms discussed here have been recommended. For instance, wonder is recommended. We are not so much urged to nurture a sense of wonder in our pupils and students but rather foster the 'skill of wonder' in them.

We do of course attribute value or disvalue to whole perspectives on the world. A whole Weltanschauung may be thought to be true or false, in the sense that it represents or misrepresents what we conceive our lives to be about. When we occupy such perspectives, it is not just the perspectives that are thought to be worthy or unworthy or noble or ignoble, we too, since they are our moral frames of reference, will be thought worthy or unworthy or noble or ignoble to the extent that we are truthful to these perspectives. We are at once truthful to them and truthful to ourselves. Such general conceptions of, or perspectives on, the world and our place in it, entailing as they do a system of beliefs, norms, values, virtues, conceptions of the right and the good, all woven together to give meaning to life, may be subject to evaluation from perspectives outside them. An ethic of Christian agape or a revolutionary creed like Marxism will each have a perspective on the other. Again, from within the Bushido Code, British prisoners of war were objects of contempt because they had surrendered. This is not the end of the matter. Cultures as well as individual people can 'get stuck' at different 'stages' of moral development. They might be thought to be 'arrested' in Kohlberg's 'earlier' stages of moral development.

In the film *The Bridge on the River Kwai* different moral codes or stages of development were set in opposition to each other. The values internal to one code were explored to see what kind of perspective they

have on values within other codes. For example, the British Commanding Officer in the film lived by rigid military rules that in the circumstances of Japanese captivity, were put to the service of maintaining morale amongst British prisoners. From a perspective outside his code, his actions were madness. His lack of any superior moral vision betrayed him into becoming an unwitting accomplice in the Japanese war effort. It is true that at the end of the film certain self-reactive attitudes did break through and the officer felt guilt perhaps. We can, then, feel guilt, remorse, base, ignoble etc. both from within our code and, if we can achieve it, from a perspective outside it.

As I have indicated, values can come in configurations or gestalts. It is not, then, a matter of surveying the world and picking out discrete facts or objects then projecting a pro or con attitude on them. Something's being poisonous might approximate to this model. But even here what is poisonous is picked out in a fairly obvious way. It reposes on clear human concerns and interests.

When values are in configurations or gestalts they mutually support one another. But in such configurations one or more values might be given foundational status. Utility, absence of harm, freedom, choices, equality, love, reason, happiness, fidelity, rational agency, the will, the good will, duty, the moral law and so on have all been pride of place in one gestalt or another. It is obvious that the values enumerated here will not be compatible with each other and, of course, they will not all feature in one gestalt. Importantly, when one or more values are pressed too far they become imperialistic and suppress the worth of other values. If happiness is given too much weight, whether in such formulations as the greatest happiness of the greatest number or not, it can distort our moral sensibility. Duty, if pressed too far, can become mean and ungenerous. In our saying in what duty might consist, we might forget that it has to be used in our moral exchanges. A Wittgensteinian response might be made here. Instead of asking what duty might consist in, we might rather require it to be applied to the details of our moral life. It is in the particular cases that we begin to see what we can use the term to do. The complexity of actual cases become authoritative in that the general idea cannot do justice to what is obvious in our moral life. (There is a lesson in this for personal development. But right at the start we find difficulties, for it is not clear whether the term personal development has a sufficiently clear ordinary use such that we can build on it and say what it consists in. The word duty is clear enough until

we start to refine it and attempt to reconstitute the whole of morality in terms of it. In the case of personal development the difficulty is where to find the rough ground.)

Although it might be a mistake and a distortion to pick out as central certain moral or quasi-moral notions and then refine and elaborate them to make them foundational, it is still the case, given the diversity of value-notions in our lives, that we try in a rough and ready way to impose some order on them. As individuals we usually absorb the order as we absorb the values. Contractarian morality, utilitarianism or Kantian formalism may be too confining as definitive accounts of our moral life but each points to certain central concerns in that moral life. There are then many distinctions and divisions in the domain of values. I wish to pick out the following broad classifications.

1. Moral and Non-Moral Values We assess our lives and concerns according to which sub-divisions within the domain of values we are focussing on at the time. Our grounds might be moral, aesthetic, religious, economic or political. But within each sub-division there are further divisions. In the history of art certain schools and traditions emphasize different ranges of subject matter and certain formal features. The Dada Movement rejected all those values that were supposed to underpin civilization but which, in fact, were implicated in the slaughter on the battlefields in the First World War. Honour, patriotism, family, art, religion and morality did not for the Dadaists answer human needs. The formal characteristics of their 'art' emphasized the rejection of these values. In different schools of economics, certain analytical tools and foundational ideas such as general welfare or laissez-faire market freedom are emphasized at the expense of others. As I have said, within morality different concepts are emphasized, down-graded or ignored.

2. Moral and Quasi Moral Divisions On a broad interpretation of morality, we order our lives in terms of obligations, duties, rights, freedom from coercion, welfare, utility, perfectionist ends and goals, privacy, community, emotional and spiritual wellbeing, dignity and the pursuit and completion of our projects. Obligations may rest on pieties or contracts. Rights and welfare may be defined narrowly or broadly. Our perfectionist ends may be in general undertakings like the construc-

tion of Chartres Cathedral or personal commitments like a pursuit of a specialism within natural history. Even here the divisions overlap and mutually support one another.

3. Moral Gestalts Our values are often organized into whole perspectives on our lives. I have given many examples throughout my discussion of what these consist in and what it is to live in accordance with them for ourselves and other people who share or do not share them. In a plural society we have to live with each other and there have to be attempts to find some values that are sufficiently shared to at least prevent ruinous conflict. Are justice and rationality always somebody's justice and reality and, more specifically, always somebody's in particular? All we can do is explore and develop what is internal to a perspective and see how far we can go. Conceptions of the good life are not reconcilable. This raises the question of whether the State should be neutral between different conceptions of the good life. I should like to give a sketch of three such gestalts. What I say can be linked to what I have said about each writer earlier in my discussion. It should also be remembered that in discussing these pictures of personal development I have drawn on the language of personal development found in practice and in official documents etc. I am placing the language in situ as it were.

a. Marxist Emancipation What many Nineteenth Century thinkers had in common was the desire to encompass the humanity of the person, however defined, in the educational process rather than accommodate a person to the functions of the wage earner. Marx wanted to liberate the individual from his alienated condition and to assert the individual's essence against the physically crushing and dehumanising implications of his productive role. Marx says that one's 'own self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a need'. (1963 p 165) The conditions for this realization are the shedding of false images that the worker has of himself and the humanization of the production process. But if we try to foster a view of education based on such a view of self-realization, what is the nature of the self that is brought to reality or actuality? Is such an education a means towards a realization of a 'second nature' entailing perhaps a correction of original inclinations? If a person is an 'achievement', what are the raw materials of this achievement? As I have said previously, there is something suspicious about the idea of a natural law of development, whose direction it is the teacher's function to serve. Marx is, however, somewhat ambivalent

about the idea of human nature. Sometimes he talks as though man had an essence that is fulfilled or damaged in his embroilment with his production of the means of life. At other times he talks as though human nature were an historical achievement. If there is no pre-social nature, then this nature must be an achievement. (This point raises the question of whether we are interpretation all the way down. There is no human nature as it were that supports our self-interpretations.) But if it is an achievement, whence our criteria for an identification of alienation and dehumanization? If we talk about the 'best' that has been achieved in human history as the touchstone for self-realization, is this 'best' relative to history and not to some constitutional human essence? The nature of the self may be sedimentary layers deposited by history or, to change the image, an ensemble of social relations. Gramsci has said that self-understanding is an historical achievement. 'The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.' (1975 p 85) If self-realization is an 'inner necessity, a need', it would seem not to be founded on 'original existences'.

b. Lawrence: Recovery of Primal Instinct In his essay 'Democracy' (1950 pp 79-85) D.H. Lawrence says that there is a 'quick of self' that is the essence of each man. It is all too easy to 'fall from spontaneous reality into dead or material reality. And all education should be guarding against this fall.' Earlier in the essay Lawrence said '... you needn't go on trying to save the living soul of your neighbour. It's hands off. Do you think you are such a God-Almighty bird of paradise that you can grow your neighbour's goose-quills for him on your own loving house-sparrow wings? Every bird must grow his own feathers ...'. These quotations might give the flavour of child or student centred learning. They do not amount to the same thing of course. We may detect in much of the writing in general a continuum from a strong communitarianism to an extreme egoism. For example, what are we to make of individual development as a spontaneous outflow of the 'quick of self'? In contrast Marx says of individual development that 'Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions ...' (1963 p 168)

Lawrence contrasts the individual with the person. He writes 'An individual is that which is not divided or not dividable. A being we

shall not attempt to define, because it is indefinable.' The person or the personality on the other hand is a 'human being as he appears to others, and personality is that which is transmitted from the person to his audience: the transmissible effect of a man'. Lawrence, to make his point, takes some words from an American novel. They are: 'My ego had played a trick on me, and made me think I wanted babies when I only wanted the man'. Lawrence asks what is the difference between the 'authoress' ego and her me'. The ego is her second self which she carries with her. The second self is 'very pernicious, dictating to her issues which are quite false to her true, deeper, spontaneous self, her creative identity'. The second self is a 'horrible incubus' beneath which the spontaneous self tries to gain release. Lawrence advises us never to trust anyone who has an 'unmistakable personality'.

Lawrence is obviously concerned with an extreme form of individual development but not egoistic development in the ordinary sense, although there is the chance we will not be able to tell the difference. The ego is a false semblance, developed in the interests of social utility. I have mentioned already Lawrence's novel Women in Love in which Lawrence expresses his ideas most clearly through Birkin. Two people who are in love with each other should leave their egos behind 'so that that which is perfectly ourselves may take place within us'. He also makes the point that the person is a human being as he appears to others. This view of individual development would rule out all the Goffmanesque stuff of learning to manage one's impressions for a better presentation of oneself for work in those service industries that need 'personality'. But if the development of the individual is concerned to prevent 'stunting', 'warping' or 'clogging with weeds' of the natural 'growth' or 'blossoming of the individual', we need empirical data about the fruits of such attempted development both for the individual and for the setting in which the individual lives his life.

Anthony Quinton says of Lawrence that in his writing we find a 'message about the healing character of primal instinct and of the destructiveness of rational foresight, cautious calculation, the stifling armour of bourgeois prudence.' (1982 p 31)

c. Weil: A Sacrament of Self-Obliteration Personal development might be seen to have evolved as an aspiration at the same time as there has been a pull from the impersonal to the personal. But the impersonal need not need be a species of indifference. Personal development might be towards the impersonal. Simone Weil views the individual as something like an accretion of attributes centred on a

'child-like belief that good and not evil will be done to him or her'. This belief is the impersonal part of the soul. It is not concerned with the idiosyncracies of personality. Truth, Goodness and Beauty are impersonal in this sense. They are essentially concerned with the absence of the ego - of getting one's self out of the way. The impersonal is crucially about seeing other people as irreducibly important. The unquenchable desire for good is at the heart of the individual and that is impersonal. The personal can easily be inhuman. Weil says in Human Personality (1981 p 21) '(A) modern factory reaches perhaps almost the limit of horror. Everybody in it is constantly harassed and kept on edge by the interference of extraneous wills while the soul is left in cold and desolate misery. What man needs is silence and warmth; what he is given is an icy pandemonium.' (my emphasis) These thoughts call to mind the use of personal development as a protest to the effect that the individual person is a victim of constraints which inhibit the development of what are thought to be essential human characteristics. Simone Weil's very being protested for herself and others that she was a being which thinks, the denial of which was imminent in the conditions of factory life. In general she also wanted to say that she was a being born for a fellowship in love not hate.

In moral gestalts various strands are woven together: a vision of the nature of reality and our place in it, caught perhaps under the aspect of wonder or tragedy; a set of interpersonal values that display some order; a view of what our good consists in, found in our proximity to God or in our creative labour, for instance; and an array of self-reactive attitudes which place us higher or lower in relation to a moral order, captured in such terms as honest or dishonest.

4. Other Regarding and Self-Regarding The important division between what it is right to do in respect of other people and what it is good to pursue for ourselves is at the centre of moral thought. I have mentioned rights, welfare, utility, dignity, justice etc. that define our collective moral framework. Each person owes and is owed something in our organized lives together. But the value-space we occupy is individual too. We want our lives to add up to something for ourselves. We want our lives to be worthwhile and meaningful. In these respects our own dignity and worth is attached to the worth and meaning we find in our pursuits and projects. We might find these in those perfectionist ideals or in those self-conceived and self-executed projects

that give fulfilment to our lives. We are, to this extent, fulfilled in what is of value to us. But because what we pursue is agent-centred, it does not mean that its worth is exhausted in our inclinations or preferences. There is often an objective reference in them. If we find fulfilment in our pursuits and projects, our worth too is measured in terms of them. To pursue a vocation or cultivate a friendship is to invite an objective appraisal of our success or failure. It is also to assess ourselves in self-reactive attitudes. Obviously, we aim to get something important out of our vocations and friendships but our aims cannot focus on what we get out of them. We have to genuinely care about the objects of our pursuits. In love we find our fulfilment in the 'perfections and the felicity of the beloved', (1898 p 422) as Leibniz has put it.

Our love for others may go well beyond the specifications that caused the love. We want the good for the beloved no matter what prompted our hearts originally. But even in those pursuits and projects that do not immediately involve the interests of other people, they do not simply address our de facto inclinations. We invest ourselves in them and we can then fail by the standards we have implicitly endorsed. We are not 'punctual' selves that last only so long as what precipitates us at the moment. We are not spasms of impulse that go their own way because of the absence of principle as one might paraphrase Kant - although some of us may approximate to the condition of Don Giovanni. Even in this case it is thought by some that Giovanni provoked a certain independence of spirit in the women he seduced.

5. Intrinsic and Relative Value

Of all the distinctions amongst and within values this one is crucial. What I am after is a characterization of values which differs in kind from values that are relative, extrinsic and instrumental. We might speak of values that are absolute, intrinsic, categoric or inherent. We are after things which are good in themselves, have a finality about them and do not depend on what is external to them for their reality. They are the values that are constitutive of our profounder qualitative distinctions of worth. They provide us with our orientations in life; they define the space in which our lives have worth and meaning. We are not contingently attached to such values. They are the frames in which we locate our identities and from which we direct our lives. These values are of many varieties. They are central to what it is right to do and what

it is good to be.

Absolute or intrinsic values are central to gestalts. Some writers speak poetically about such values. For these writers such values give a 'metaphysical' shape to a world that extends from the past into the future in terms of things, events, causes and sequences. At best our organizational values help us to survive or cope in the vital order of nature. Life is more effectively endured if we organize things better. In a world without absolute values man approximates to a thing in a Hobbesian state of nature. In this world we try to match efficient means to fleeting ends. But there are values that do in fact differ by a whole world. If things go well for us we cherish beauty, know the truth, do the good and worship the holy. These values ingress into time and can, with a certain poetic license, be characterized as timeless. (See Kohak 1984 pp 18-22) I have given enough examples of those things in which we find beauty, truth, goodness and holiness. However we characterize them they have intrinsic worth and we orientate ourselves and our lives in terms of them.

Some writers, not enough one may say, see education principally as the care of the soul by means of the nourishment that absolute and intrinsic values provide. Roy Holland says that we need to put before our children, and the younger the better, 'the very best and most beautiful things we know, and as far as possible only these things'. (1980 p 72) We do a violence to children if we do not attempt to make them into beings with something to lose. The following words have been quoted often enough in contexts such as these but they bear repeating: 'Whatsoever things are true, ... honest, ... just, ... pure, ... lovely, ... of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.' It is what becomes part of us that tells us who we are.

It is said then that if we perceive that things can be done or simply contemplated for their own sake, we become persons of a certain kind. We are diminished as person if we do not see any magic in the web of things. An image which has often been used by writers on education is the one from Yate's poem Among School Children. The image is in the last stanza:

O Chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom, or the bole?
O body swayed to music, o brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the chance?

(1967 p 127)

Such words have a richness that defy any one interpretation but they have been read as displaying an ideal of how the mind might be related to what it grasps, of how work and the worker come together into a union of fulfilment and how meaning and experience unite to secure us against alienation or anomie. Roger Scruton interprets the stanza as an individual's absorption into his Lebenswelt. (1987 p 617) Experience is so imbued with meaning that the individual is not detached from the rich content of the concepts that lock him into his form of life. Instrumental calculation and utilitarian disenchantment displace the sense of concepts under which we intend them. An example, which Scruton does not discuss, might be those theologians who demythologize their Faith such that religious language cannot mean what we intend it to mean. Another kind of disenchantment is one where our subjective appropriation of a certain fullness of meaning is denied us. We might consider Kierkegaard in this respect who wrote:

The law for the development of the self with respect to knowledge is this, that the increasing degree of knowledge corresponds with the degree of self-knowledge, that the more the self knows, the more it knows itself. If this does not occur, then the more knowledge increases, the more it becomes a kind of inhuman knowing for the production of which man's self is squandered, pretty much as men were squandered for the building of the pyramids, or as men were squandered in the Russian hornbands to produce one note, neither more nor less. (1968 p 167)

The enemies of absolute and intrinsic values are a technical or instrumental view of education and the 'superficially opposed but actually complementary and equally uneducated view of education as self-expression and the consequent over valuing of authenticity, commitment and spontaneity', so says Kamenka. (1980 p 19) Everything depends on what is meant by 'overvalue'. As I have said, some writers give these terms foundational status and therein make them essentially criterionless and contentless. We overvalue them if this is what is meant.

But the important thing is to 'build up' pupils and students so that self-expression, authenticity, commitment and spontaneity are given the correct weight in our educational endeavours. The danger is that we may start in the wrong place. In this respect 'Values Clarification' may be suspect. The individual clarifies, expresses and develops his own values. The danger of values clarification, for some writers, is that the basic value is the freedom to choose,

presupposing, perhaps, that since there is no objective basis for asserting that some values are better than others, we are left ultimately with criterionless choices. On an extreme interpretation of values clarification, one finds such recommendations as '... schools must not be allowed to continue fostering the immorality of morality'. This was written in the context of not '... drying up students' sense of their own sexual identity'. I have often heard such expressions used in personal development seminars.

At the best, in values clarification, one would have to be sensitive to the stage that the young people were at. What may be appropriate at one stage may not be so at another. It is obvious that in the case of children, one would need to look at those who are to clarify values. Would it be the children themselves, unaided by suggestions from their teachers? Or would it be the teachers who tease out responses? The direction of the clarification cannot but be influenced by the teacher's presence. In some versions of values clarification, teachers are recommended to avoid moralizing, criticizing or presenting their own values. Teachers should rather concentrate on simply helping (helping?) children clarify their own values. Critics have drawn attention to possible abuses here. The first is that children are in no position to take responsibility for their own value acquisition and clarification. The second is that the mere presence of a 'disinterested' teacher, prompting with 'self-revelatory' techniques, create some kind of moral climate. This second objection could be expanded to accuse value clarifiers of not so much creating an atmosphere in which a child could breathe purer moral air but rather creating a vacuum in which no moral self can survive.

To illustrate difficulties in such self-awareness on the part of children, I refer to a recent development in the self-distancing of children from the possible dangers of close personal relationships. I quote from a Guardian newspaper report. (1987) 'Techniques (of kid-scape) are based on the premise that children have a right to say no, even to someone they love, if they do not want to be touched or kissed'. Now nobody would want to underestimate the extent of child abuse. But an indiscriminating scepticism, implied in such techniques, can lead to a certain corruption in young children. If we begin to question all the love and care that makes us human, before we have become someone of substance, there is a great danger we will grow up suspicious and lacking trust and affection.

In the official literature of personal development we find such

'building up' expressions as 'habits of diligence', 'precision', 'poise', 'ability to concentrate on specific subjects', 'an effort to learn physical self-discipline and self-control', 'a process of adaptation' and so forth. If one wants an image of the polar opposite of tradition, discipline, restraint and so on, one might contemplate the following passage from *The Shock of the New* by Robert Hughes. The setting is something like a 'theme park' in which one is bombarbed with 'information' - meaning by this any amount of random, unordered data.

One institution which opened in Philadelphia in 1976, the Living History Center, was conceived as a clicking, strobing temple of McLuhanist 'information' - a shrine of bombardment, a parody of the Pop museum of the future, where no visitor could be assumed to have an attention span of more than 2.9 seconds and every fact is subordinated to the sludge of 'pattern recognition'. There, children have what is conventionally called a non-elitist, multi-dimensional learning experience, looking at automatic index wheels full of period bus-tickets and fruit labels, and listening to snatches of the Declaration of Independence on the phone. The medium is the message here, and it turns the brain to cornflakes.
(1980 p 362)

If one thinks that this educational experience with its emphasis on 'pattern recognition', whatever that amounts to, is the stuff of insanity, I can reveal that some such 'multi-dimensional learning experience' has not only been entertained but imitated in certain Lifestyle Enhancement Courses.

'Building up' then does not place the emphasis on equipping young people with instrumental skills and knowledge, or turning constitutive personal qualities into detachable assets or encouraging free expression before a person has become someone with something to express. It rather places the emphasis on the kind of understanding that grasps that things can be done for the good of them, that discerns that certain values exist for their own sake and that recognizes that the good of somethings have a finality about them. This kind of understanding is for personal formation or, as I have said previously, for self-formation (Bildung). It is not a matter of understanding for survival or coping in an instrumental sense. It is a matter rather of 'edification'. We need to develop an aesthetic response to things - that is, see things under the aspect of contemplative respect. 'Respect' does in fact derive from 'look'. Absolute or intrinsic values exist 'out there' and we become what such values mean to us. Read (1986) and Dunlop (1986) are concerned with the idea of how we are 'built up' as persons.

Reflexivity, Identity and Value

I have wanted to show that reflexivity and identity are the two essential constituents of our personhood - what it is to be person-like - and that both are strongly connected with absolute or intrinsic value - that is, those values that have a worth in themselves or those values we pursue for the good of them. Our valuations focus on values. We treasure those people who are near and dear to us. We respect people in general insofar as we honour their rights, provide for their welfare and recognize their dignity. And we attach ourselves to assorted objects in the extra-human world. We belong, to pick up Strawson's idea (1974), to a structure of moral sentiments and feelings - non-detached participatory, objective and self-reactive attitudes and responses - and to a world of medium-sized objects that tend to embody meanings and values which throw back images of who we are as persons. We belong crucially to language. And it is in our conversations amongst ourselves and about the objects in our common human world that we enlarge meaning (what gives worth to our lives) and value. People and things matter to us. We are constitutively in orders of rightness, frames of significance and stretches of deeds, actions and transactions that are interpreted in categories of meaning. Meaning in a general sense is about how one thing is connected with another. It is in perceiving and making connections that meaning exists. Meaning both furnishes us with our values and, in another sense, is that in which we find the worth of things.

Values provide us with the terms of our self-interpretations. We display self-knowledge and self-mastery in relation to values and we maintain our identities in values that matter and have significance for us. As I have said, we are not punctual selves but enlarged selves. We exist across time as the same persons - we are unified and continuous entities - largely because what matters and has importance for us has mattered in the past, matters in the present and will matter in the future. We take pride in our past achievements, feel remorse for our failures, continue to accept our responsibilities and intend to keep our promises. For memory to be memory, we must remember where our values lie and where we stand. What matters for us and what values we endorse are what we are measured in terms of - most critically how we measure ourselves.

To make use of Charles Taylor's words again: values are what one needs to be in 'contact with in order to function fully as a human agent, and specifically to be able to judge and discriminate and

recognize what is really of worth and importance'. (1985 p 258) In our pursuit of what is of value and in our discriminative valuations, we need a certain amount of self-awareness, self-knowledge and self-control. To know who we are - that is, to have moral identity and integrity - is more than to be able to answer to our name or figure in a genealogy. (Some children are denied these things of course. Recently a young child in a court case only answered to 'Oi!'. Children need more than a name, as I have said. They need to have special relationships with people who value them above others but who expect more from them because of this.) We need, then, to belong to a moral order in which we know how to locate ourselves.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

Personal development, as we have seen, can cover far more than might be educationally intended within the general headings of PSME, PSMHE etc. I have wanted to argue that 'personal' is crucially constrained by what is meant by 'social', 'moral' etc. in the general headings. Of course, some educationalists say that if one wished for an example of an educational concern that is opposite of subject-based education it is the frontierless concerns of personal development, PSME etc. In this respect personal development, PSME and so on would be run together with all those other 'factitious' areas of the curriculum - Social and Life Skills, Human Enhancement Studies, Integrated Studies and so on. They are all cobbled together with bits and pieces from subject-based education, general knowledge, hints and wrinkles on how to cope with life, fragments from once secure trades and vocations and morsels of know-how from new-tech industries. The list can go on. Essentially such factitious schemes of work have their design on the bottom layers of the educational system.

I have wished to argue that personal development within PSME etc. focuses on the moral development of the human individual. In spite of the so-called factitious elements within these areas there is a strong pull towards a concern with the proper ways to be persons. Moral identities have to be built up in preparation for an individual's life as a moral agent. I have said that when we reflect on personal development, PSME, or whatever, we should ask: personal in respect of what?; development towards what?; and personal development in relation to what? The most general answer is that it is personal in respect of an individual's taking on the properties of what is of the nature of persons. Such an answer suggests that personal development, as the educational objective of PSME, is the sovereign idea in education; it is the overarching objective that is resident in whatever else is undertaken in education. In this respect it is like self-development, in the Millian sense, in which the individual is encouraged to appropriate his generic human endowment. It is the education of the whole person, insofar as this is an educational ideal. Such an education would be contrasted with the training of an attenuated person, insofar as the individual is not meant to be built up into a whole person.

Self-development is not selfish development, although as we have seen it might be perverted into this on certain interpretations of self-realization. Self-development could include, for example, the cultivation of friendship which is not a selfish pursuit. However, I have said that personal development in PSME is more determinate in that personal development takes its sense from the terms moral and social. (I know that 'social' is often interpreted as a weasel word.) I have stressed the word moral even though it may not appear in the general heading, as in PSE. If one looks at the educational recommendations in PSE or PSHE the moral component is prominent and sometimes predominant, although the word is not mentioned. Health as wellbeing is, of course, a moral notion. I would further suggest that morality is central because it is our moral natures that is often focussed on and because morality is at least a determinate enough area of concern, unlike the factitious components in such areas. And since we have to justify what is done under our various headings on educational grounds, morality can be justified. How one 'does' morality is another matter. One would expect it to be done in all areas of the curriculum, although it should not be omnipresent.

As far as schools are concerned, we are not speaking about morality as a second-order discipline - the kind of theoretical reflection that goes on in universities. Even in universities, it is thought that too much theory can produce students who become morally impotent in the conduct of life. Too many sides to moral issues are seen because one tradition speaks in one voice and another in a different voice. Relativism leads to scepticism. In schools one has to be more cautious, especially as one goes down the age scale.

As we have seen, outside education in a formal sense, personal development tends to be used interchangeably with self-realization, self-fulfilment and so forth. Personal development in this sense asks the question: under what conditions is life lived at its best? Some writers suggest that my life is lived best when I know what it is for a human being to live his life at his best. For example, our natures are rational and we know ourselves best in the use of our reason. In the exercise of our reason we are in that state of vital spiritual wellbeing known as eudaimonia. Other writers say we live best when we live authentically in full and in intense contact with those boundary conditions in life - those inescapable psychological states and the correlative structural conditions of our lives such as our own death, dread, suffering, anguish, responsibility and, for the

more cheerful, wonder. The most crucial boundary condition for some, like Kierkegaard, is that acute sense of one's own self-presence. I want to know myself best and not in any universal property such as reason. But even here, individuality is enhanced when it is in contact with what promotes its knowing itself best - namely to be in contact with God. Marx would say that we understand ourselves best in community with others. Our essential properties are publicly defined properties. On any interpretation of self-realization, a person has to be in contact with something for him to realize himself.

What is taken into education from such flights into notions of our best or ultimate good is best left to each educationalist to discern for himself. Nevertheless, I have tended to use the term moral in a broad sense to include not only what it is considered right to do but also what it is considered good to be. I have been concerned with what we need to be in contact to be person-like in a full sense.

Our moral natures are expressed in our appropriate responses to what we are and what we need to be in contact with to live well. We need a first-person perspective on the world that orientates us in terms of properly constituted actions, feelings, motives and volitions. But formal education does not bring that first-person perspective on the world into existence. Our personal being, that is, our psychological individuality, is a product of our upbringing in general. Formal education should enhance it though. Wittgenstein defined ethics broadly to incorporate not only how we should live rightly in respect of other people but also fully in respect of the worth and meaning we find in or give to our individual lives in relation to things of intrinsic worth. Some of his aperçus may not be to everyone's taste, though, when he says, for example, something to the effect that we are not here to enjoy ourselves.

Personal development, that is, individual development within PSME etc., is more a perspective than a delimited subject area. It should be concerned with what promotes the development of our moral natures in a broad sense. It needs to foster those values in which we find life worth living as well as those in which we give proper regard to other people. We are, of course, intimately bound up with other people, even though we may forget it at times. I use the word should above and this might be seen as an intrusive judgement of value. But what something might pretend to be on grounds of logic, what something is said to be empirically and what something ought to be are not separable in an easy way. In education we constantly see things

under the aspect of should. What should be the case cannot with ease be derived from what is the case. And we know it. Leading figures in the Conservative Party know this too and that is why they invoke morality against what actually goes on in the market-place.

Personal development merges into self-development in a Millian sense. Both are concerned with the fullest development of the whole person. But as I have said in respect of PSME etc. individual development has to be in relation to some content; and there is also the manner of the individual's relation to it. He endorses values as his values. He finds meaning in and fulfils himself in values that are found in work, love, religion, politics and leisure pursuits. In his values he has a reflexive relationship to himself as well as a relationship to what is of value. He endorses his values and, in the measure that he does, he also brings his own life under the aspect of these values. An individual's particularity, as it were, exists in his endorsements, his life plans, his life ideals and his specific projects. He exists in his own right and pursues his own good. But he needs to be in relation to some content to be able to put his stamp on things. Personal development is development in relation to the content that 'moral' and 'social' specify. And, as I have said, much of what might get done under the heading of personal development within PSME might equally get done under self-development. It is the spirit which informs our educational endeavours which is important.

Certain unit ideas or ideals recur in personal development, PSME etc. I have indicated what the content centrally is. The important question is how much individual difference and independence of mind is acceptable within the various dimensions of experience and departments of life. In economic life how much unrestrained market liberty is tolerable? In religion can we do without intermediaries altogether? In morality choice cannot be foundational; but to what extent can a person define his morality against prevailing morality? I should add here that when we speak of independence of mind and self-reliance we need to ask in relation to what are these developed and exercised? We find these notions often recommended as curriculum pursuits in PSME but are we talking about these 'virtues' in relation to what is contained in the social and moral dimensions of life? One cannot, for example, express independence of mind within economics without knowing a good deal of economics. We need to know what it is to back up a claim with reasons or evidence.

We value non-interference in certain aspects of our lives. We

wish to pursue our own good in our own way in conditions of freedom. To what extent this is a comprehensive ideal is another matter. As a limited ideal it is expressed in those personal projects that pupils and students undertake in areas such as General Studies. It is thereby hoped that a sense of responsibility emerges out of such individual efforts. Non-interference is connected through responsibility with autonomy and authenticity. We develop as individuals as we act on our own behalf, do things in our own right and pursue things in our own way. We also see the world from our own perspective. Furthermore, other people cannot stand in our places. We have to do our own living and loving; we have to bear our own suffering and experience our own grieving. It should be obvious that I am not being solipsistic about this. We live authentically to the extent that we are true to our values - those that we have endorsed - and to the extent that we remain firm on the ground where we have taken a stand.

In self-knowledge we have some understanding of the springs of our motivation and some grasp of our situation relative to how other people see it. We should begin to know, in self-knowledge, our temperaments, limitations and where our values lie, as we attempt to live our lives in terms of our decisions and commitments. We need to learn self-control as we discern discontinuities between what we want and desire and what are the proper demands on us. All these considerations enter into our self-interpretations. We are different sorts of human being as we interpret ourselves differently. The terms of our self-interpretations are diverse. We might think of those massive self-misunderstandings and self-misinterpretations of those East European leaders who have not only failed by their own professed standards but also by the standards of Capitalist man who they were supposed to have left behind. To what extent these people were bewitched by figures in hagiology, caught up in ideas such as a person's character is his destiny or deceived by cynicism, I will not comment further. They might lamely refer to Ivan Broesky who believes that greed is a virtue-term. One can feel good about greed. What it means for a person to be fulfilled in these values might be thought to be scarcely intelligible. But these 'values' enter into their self-interpretations.

The last unit idea or ideal I mention is dignity or self-worth, or whatever other variations on the concept are found in PSME etc. We need to learn to claim this value ideal for ourselves and grant it to other people. It is said that part of personal development is to learn that we have it. But we need to cultivate those qualities and attributes that underwrite it, so that we can claim it with confidence.

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