Genocide and Modernity

A Comparative Study of Bosnia, Rwanda and the Holocaust

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ABSTRACT:

The thesis "Genocide and Modernity: A Comparative Study of Bosnia, Rwanda and the Holocaust" attempts to address a gap in understanding within genocide studies. Within this field, which is dominated by case studies of the Holocaust as an embodiment of modernity, genocidal contexts such as Rwanda and Bosnia are excluded from the category of modern genocide, as a result of which the comparative method has been largely overlooked, negatively affecting the complexity of the scholarly debates. In order to resolve this, I have conducted a comparative study of three genocidal contexts in order to test each for the presence of indicators of modernity. Through the use of Critical theory and other theoretical standpoints, I have compared the genocidal contexts of Rwanda, Bosnia and the Holocaust along the lines of: organic nationalism, scientific racism, instrumental rationality, utopianism, obedience, efficiency, numbing and Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft social ties, in order to create a complex understanding of the relationship between modernity and genocide. As a result of this analysis, my findings have proven that in relation to the execution of genocide, all three cases fit within the category of modern genocide and are not a result of ancient hatreds. However, in each of the contexts, I have also found a rejection of modernity, particularly obvious in the regressive organic-nationalist ideology of genocide. In fact, genocide itself seems to be a result of a disillusionment with the modern project as seen through the difficulties brought on by the age of industrialisation, but also as the project of Western hegemony, as the perpetrator states seem to be those that are both, at the time of genocide, excluded from the main circle of power, but also have a difficult history of foreign rule, which has made the transition towards the nation state difficult, particularly in terms of confusing identity categories.

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1. Introduction

In the beginning of the 1990s two horrific genocides took place: one, in 1992, the Bosnian genocide, the worst massacre in Europe since WWII and the other, in 1994, the genocide in Rwanda, where 800.000 people were murdered over the course of only three months. As the first association the European public made, looking at the footage of starved Bosnian men in Serb concentration camps was the idea of Holocaust, while the efficiency and the virulent racism of the Hutu power regime reminded all too much of National Socialism, the need to compare the different contexts became obvious and the field of comparative genocide finally began to take shape. However, various tendencies within the field of genocide made this progress difficult (Shaw, 2007).

The field of genocide studies has, since the 1950s been completely dominated by case studies of the Holocaust. Some research was also done on the Armenian genocide and some on settlers' genocides, but more than 70 percent of all literature on genocide was written on the topic of the Holocaust, while "little research has been done on other genocides per se, and virtually no systematic historical or comparative research has been done on genocide in general" (Rummel, 1994, Rosenbaum, 2008 Chorbajian, 1999: XXI). The reason for this was the supposed uniqueness of the Holocaust, an idea which partially came about as a result of the constant debate Holocaust researchers have had to endure with deniers and trivializers, making the category rigid and impenetrable - therefore incomparable. Holocaust as sui generis was propagated by various scholars and criteria for the claimed uniqueness differed. For some, particularly theologians and philosophers, like Rabbi Emil Fackenheim, Rabbi Richard Rubinstein, Elie Wiesel and Prof. Franklin Littel, the Holocaust possesses a unique and mystical essence incomparable to any other. Others, such as Steven Katz argue that only the Holocaust fits the narrow definition of genocide, as his definition implies an actualization of the intent, successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any group, meaning that an attempt to annihilate, if not supported by the numbers, would not be enough to constitute genocide (Katz, 1994:131). Paradoxically, Katz's supporters can be found within the field of comparative genocide as well, as shown in the work of Yehuda Bauer, who acknowledges a wide range of other genocides in the 20th century, while at the same time placing them in a different category than that of the Holocaust against the Jews due to "the global and total character of the extermination of the Jews, the central, bureaucratic coordination of the Nazi genocide and purely ideological nature of the assault, lacking a priori pragmatic elements" (According to Bauer, cases such as Rwanda can, despite the brutality and the savagery involved, never be defined as genocide since both the Hutu and the Tutsi people survive (Bauer in Chorbajian, 1999:24). According to others, such as Goldhagen, it is the nature of Anti-

Semitism that makes the Holocaust unique. All of these criteria, along with the dominance of the uniqueness proponents within the field of genocide resulted in: 1) researchers who wanted to analyse Rwanda or Bosnia practically having no theory to rely on and 2) an inability to understand Holocaust in historical perspective, as the comparative aspect was significantly overlooked.

Furthermore, not only was the field of genocide research dominated by the discussions on the uniqueness of the Holocaust, but the definition of genocide itself, used in international law came into existence as a direct product of WWII, making the categories of genocide and the Holocaust legally inseparable. This, of course could have grave legal consequences for any genocide candidate that differed from the Holocaust in ideology or execution and particularly if it failed to match the vastness or the numbers. A direct consequence of this is the fact that in the ICTY trial of Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro, genocide was shown as an isolated incident, solely in Srebrenica, while the newly introduced term ethnic cleansing was used to categorize the context. Due to the fact that the numbers of the victims in Bosnia could not in any way be compared to those of the Holocaust and that Serbia managed to disguise its influence more profoundly in comparison to the very open nature of Nazi war waging, Serbia was exonerated and no retribution or real moral satisfaction was ever offered to the victims of the crimes. Indeed, the consequences of the insistence on the Holocaust's uniqueness has not only had consequences in relation to research and legal treatment of genocide cases that took place after the Holocaust, but is also detrimental to the research of non-Jewish victims of the Holocaust, such as Roma or Gypsies, whom the uniqueness theories exclude.

Finally, the unfair distribution of resources within the field of genocide and the intense focus on one case alone has also been supported by other, more recent theories, which gained prominence in the 80s. While treating the Holocaust as an embodiment of modernity, capitalism and rational thinking, authors such as Browning, Aly and Heim and Bauman present views essentially opposed to the idea of uniqueness, while downplaying anti-Semitism and accentuating more general modern tendencies, such as bureaucracy or instrumental rationality, but they too have failed to incorporate comparative aspects, thereby contributing to the view of the Holocaust as the only modern genocide. Unfortunately, in this way, the theories of the Holocaust's modernity have become a part of a dichotomy which characterizes the field of genocide studies today, as they exist in a mutually reinforcing correlation with scholarly works that deny the right to modernity of the more recent cases. The field of genocide studies thus becomes polarized between the modernity of the Holocaust and its binary opposite, the supposed tribalism of other contexts, like Rwanda and Bosnia, which has been accentuated in the

media, political speeches of key government figures like Clinton and Mitterrand who referred to tribal resentments and brutal killings as a usual practice among Africans, but also in academic research. The theory of Gemeinschaft and Gesselchaft (premodern community versus modern society) is used by Andersen and Taylor to show how it is the pre-modern (Gemeinschaft) societies that are particularly prone to violent conflicts, since these groups can be more intolerant of others, like Hutu and Tutsi, while one of Canada's research universities, University of Lethbridge offers a course on "Nationalism and Language", which deems Yugoslavia and Rwanda, tribal, Gemeinschaft conflicts (Andersen and Taylor, 2007:131). Other academic works that treat Rwanda as tribal include Elisabeth Neuffer's "The key to my neighbour's house", which focuses on the concept of blood feuds as crucial within her study of Rwanda (Neuffer, 2002), Smeullers and Hoex (2010) "Studying the microdynamics of the Rwandan genocide in 20th century Europe" and Brook's "Civil War or Peace in Rwanda" (2010). Media images of "age old hatreds" "aberrant nature and "tribal violence" were used to justify non-interference of international forces and international indifference in relation to the massive killings in Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999: 624). In relation to Yugoslavia and Bosnia, there are numerous examples of preoccupation with tribalism among scholars, who have attempted to naturalize the genocide, by constructing the motive through "age old hatreds" and "spontaneous outbursts of popular rage" (Milanović, 2006, Banac, 1988, Bataković 1996 and Kaplan, 1993).

1.1. Focus of research

As we have seen the field of genocide is plagued by a number of difficulties as understood by the lack of comparative method which 1) Denies other genocides the right to be included in the category dominated by the Holocaust 2) Denies other genocides the right to be included in the category of modernity, thus naturalizing the violence and justifying lack of intervention in cases such as Bosnia and Rwanda. These difficulties can be successfully addressed through an analysis of the following question:

- Can the Holocaust, defined primarily as the modern National Socialist' attempt to annihilate the Jews, be compared with other, seemingly pre-modern genocides like Bosnia and Rwanda on an equal level?

In order to provide an answer, working questions have been proposed in order to break down the main questions into several, easily accomplished tasks:

1. Is the Holocaust comparable to other contexts and what parallels can be drawn?
2. Can the theory of the modernity of genocide, as characterized by theorists like Bauman, Arendt, Adorno and others be applied to the contexts of Rwanda and Bosnia?
3. What is the role of modernity in genocide?
4. Can the concept of "ancient hatreds" or "tribal violence" be used to describe the motive of any of the genocides?
5. Is genocide an embodiment of modernity?

These questions will be answered by first providing an overview of the field of literature which establishes a link between modernity and genocide. Once the main elements that relate modernity to genocide have been established, each of the three contexts: The Holocaust, Bosnia and Rwanda will be carefully analysed, while still leaving the focus open to detect elements of pre-modernity/traditionality/anti-modernity. The contexts will be compared in relation to both execution of genocide and genocidal ideology, while an eclectic overview of the historical context will also be provided as to analyse the contexts for existence of "ancient hatreds" or "tribal violence". Modernity can certainly be understood in various ways, but here it will be treated as both a time-frame and a set of values. As a time-frame, I see modernity as a period that comes as a consequence of Enlightenment, Industrial revolution and the process of nation state formation, primarily in Europe but also in the colonies and results in overpopulation, unemployment, scramble for Africa and totalitarianism, as in this thesis I will demonstrate that modernity in terms of ideology and world-views can also be imported instead of simply produced and that colonial and post-colonial routes function as important distributors of modern ideas across the world. Within this definition, I see modernity as opposed to the pre-modern scholastic middle ages, feudal systems and monarchical rule. On the other hand modernity can be seen primarily as a set of values related to Enlightenment and with focus on: emancipation of minorities, human rights, equality of all human beings, liberalism, individuality, replacement of God with science etc. As modernity seen as a time-frame would be the opposite of the pre-modern, traditional, primitive or pagan respectively, modernity as a set of values would be opposed to anti-modernity: totalitarian values, authoritarianism, uniformity, rule of the few etc. In other words, what on the one hand can be seen as modern because it takes place within modernity as a time-frame, such as for example totalitarianism, on the other hand could be seen as non-modern in terms of values, as totalitarian values are, indeed, opposed to the liberal values of Enlightenment. In this respect, this thesis will question the idea of linear progress of human beings, stating that the idea

of progression without the idea of regression is in fact meaningless, as the human societies do not necessarily move from primitive to complex forms of rule, or from authoritarian to liberal, but also the other way around.

In terms of original contribution to the field, this study will attempt to provide primarily a contribution to the fledgling field of comparative genocide, in which, a study that for the first time compares the genocidal contexts of Germany, Bosnia and Rwanda through the prism of modernity, will certainly be a most relevant contribution. Studies that attempted to give an overview of different genocides, such as Mann's "Dark side of Democracy" or Kiernan's "Blood and Soil" have definitely provided detailed insights into different genocides and their ideologies, but neither has attempted to offer explicit comparisons, particularly in all the segments of genocide, including the history, execution and ideology as this study will aim to accomplish. Indeed, the comparative aspects of genocide studies are mostly restricted to brief articles with rigid focus, rather than in depth studies. In addition, studies attempting to apply the theory of the modernity of genocide onto supposedly pre-modern contexts such as Rwanda have largely been missing. I am only aware of one article from 2010 by Constance Boydell with a similar idea, albeit with an exclusive focus on Bauman's theory and only in relation to limited aspects of genocide, such as: bureaucracy, rationalization and technology. In this study, modernity is treated much more broadly through various authors, while providing a unique account of the various paths of convergence and divergence between modernity and genocide. The ultimate aim of this study is thus to open up the field of genocide research to the overlooked comparative method, with the aim to finally situate the Holocaust within its historical context, not by denying its uniqueness, but by recognizing that the fact that each case within a category possesses particular qualities and specificities should not stand in the way of enriching the knowledge of the category by making valid comparisons. In fact, the category itself becomes useless if it only comprises one case and we will have serious difficulties developing genocide prevention mechanisms, if we overlook the similarities between the cases.

In short, the originality and the necessity of this study lie in:

1. An understanding of the ways in which modernity influences and/or initializes genocide and a unique way of framing the data.

2. An application of the theory of modernity on to supposedly pre-modern contexts such as Rwanda and Bosnia.

3. A contribution to the fledgling field of comparative genocide literature, with three cases of genocide that have not been compared before.

4. An identification of similar characteristics of different genocides and the conditions needed for their emergence, which can then be used to create a useful model for genocide prevention.

5. Construction of a portrait of modern genocide as a unique historical category with relatively permanent characteristics, as each case serves as an inspiration for the others

1.2. Method

Reasons for employing a comparative perspective within genocide studies are numerous. According to Scherrer, interdisciplinary comparative research is the sine qua non for the effective prevention of the crime of genocide, as "wanton sadism and unplumbable inhumanity are not a peculiarly Rwandan, German, Turkish or Cambodian characteristic, they are a hallmark of all forms of totalitarian rule" (Scherrer, 2002:116, Blalock, 1968). Key literature (Fein, Gallately, Kiernan, Bauer and Bartov) suggests the need to discover common denominators of genocide so that more efficient models of genocide prevention could be proposed, which can only be achieved via the comparative approach. On the website of the Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, University of Minnesota some of the reasons for employing the comparative method when researching genocide are stated as: 1) Using other genocidal events does not necessarily detract from the uniqueness of the Holocaust as an interpretation. Other genocides may show similarities or differences, 2) Study of genocide allows for analysis of non-European civilisations and suggests the universality of the potential of genocide, but most of all: 3) Acceptance of the word genocide allows an academic and legal comparison of similar events. Finally, the comparative approach is free from the narrow perspective of a single case study, but also escapes the dangers of being too philosophical and removed from the actual contexts, which is why it provides the most appropriate approach for this kind of subject, as it is only in comparison that we can come to valuable conclusions about each case in particular (Ragin, 1989, Przeworski, 1982).

One of the general issues comparative genocide studies are facing is related to the problem of exactly what to compare, i.e. how to defragment the concept of genocide in such a way that cases can be compared along similar lines (Huttenbach in Totten, 2004: 242). In this study, the cases will be compared along the lines of modernity, modernity being the proposed common denominator, and thus

the independent variable, where each case will be examined for the presence of elements which theoretical literature has deemed characteristic for modern genocide, such as: ethno-nationalism, societal problems related to the age of modernity such as overpopulation and unemployment, the authority of technology, totalitarianism, majoritarian democracies, utopianism, scientific racism and eugenicism as indicators of the modern gardening state, numbing as a modern strategy for preparing the perpetrators for killings, instrumental rationality, Gesellschaft society ties based on occupation rather than descent etc. In other words, this thesis is examining the relationship between modernity (x) as an independent variable or the proposed input or cause of genocide and (y) as a dependent variable, proposed output or result of x (Ragin, 1994).

Due to the abstract nature of the subject at hand and a relatively small number of cases, a qualitative approach presents itself as a logical solution (Ragin, 1994: 2, Tomasson, 1983:67). According to Ragin, the qualitative comparative analysis is both intensive (addressing many aspects of the case) and integrative (examines how they fit together contextually and historically). Within the field of comparative genocide, the qualitative method is much preferred due to the vast nature of the event, the need for in-depth detailed and complex conclusions and the fact that genocide is still a rare enough occurrence that there simply aren't enough cases to justify the quantitative method, which is why quantitative comparativists often use the concept of genocide in combination with other, similar categories. Furthermore, finding representative and unbiased data on genocide can be very difficult, so many studies present information or evidence without being able to carry out statistical analysis. This is not necessarily a defect as statistical analysis is inherently limited in the degree of detail it can provide, while non-statistical approaches may be able to reach a significantly deeper level of understanding (Straus, 2010:172).

In most comparative studies, much like with case studies, as we will demonstrate in the literature review, states are usually treated as units of analysis. While some researchers conduct comparisons of a handful of countries, others engage in research of dozen or more countries, while a small number of researchers, like Helen Fein, treat genocide as a quantifiable dependent variable and use statistical methods to test hypotheses (Straus, 2010:169). The representatives of the qualitative comparative analysis are Kuper (1981), Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) Melson (1992), Semelin (2009), Mann (2005), Kiernan (2007) and Midlarsky (2005) although many of these rely on comparisons with other categories, such as politicide (Midlarsky) or ethnic cleansing (Semelin and Mann). Melson's use of a focused comparison of a small number of cases is the methodological choice in important works by historian Eric Weitz, psychologist Erwin Staub and sociologist Michael Mann and will be used in this study as well, as the focus on modernity dictates in-depth observations and complex understandings.

Also, as the comparative approach attempts to establish controls over the conditions and causes of variation[1], only an in depth approach to the cases is able to give a detailed picture of the possible causal relations, even though it is often during the analysis itself that the researcher is able to tell whether the chosen cases are in fact comparable and to what degree (Ragin, 1994:113, Kohn, 1989: 27). Causal–comparative research therefore suggests rather than proves a relationship between the variables. However, the real causes can never be found in the data-set as variables are mere manifestations of real causes. Therefore, the knowledge about the causes is a) grounded in theoretical frameworks b) subject to revision with new evidence (Blalock, 1967:157).

In relation to sources, both primary and secondary sources will be used in order to reach conclusions, but as a consequence of the breadth of the study and the amount of necessary data, secondary sources will be widely used due to several reasons: 1) In comparative genocide, collecting primary data is hardly realistic taking into account limited time and resources, 2) In regards to the necessity of historical observations, secondary data can allow a new study to adequately capture past change or developments, 3)Time saved, that would otherwise be spent on collecting data can be used on attaining knowledge on complex issues and 4) The wealth of background work conducted by other researchers means that data have a pre-established degree of validity and reliability which need not be re-examined by the researcher who is using this data (Bishop, 2007). Problems exist within this approach as well: primarily the fact that interpreting data that was already interpreted could mean removing yourself even further from the source of objectivity, as numerous opportunities for confusion and misunderstanding exist. This is why, in relation to secondary sources only the theoretical works of highest quality were used, written by significant and reliable scholars. In fact, the initial idea of the author was to reach conclusions relevant for this study based on significant written sources of importance for instigating the genocide, such as propaganda newspapers and academic documents from each case, but this research fundament proved to be too narrow in scope in order to validate conclusions in relation to different segments of genocide such as historical context and execution, where theoretical literature was necessary. Primary sources were mostly used in the analysis of genocidal ideology within each context and in order to understand the motives behind genocide. For the analysis of stereotypes of otherness at the end of each chapter, a brief qualitative discourse analysis of the media was conducted to analyse German Der Stürmer, Serbian Večernje Novosti and Rwandan Kangura, each a regime propaganda paper with highest circulation in each country respectively, proximity to the positions of power and decisive societal influence in terms of

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[1] According to Ragin and Cronquest, comparative analysis is driven by a causal relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable, where the first influences the latter. It differs from experimental research in that the researcher does not have complete control over the independent variable.

the specific use of genocide inducing propaganda[2] (Thompson 2007, Thompson, 1994), while primary scientific racist and ethno-nationalist sources were used to understand the ideological convictions in each context through authors such as: Karadžić and Njegoš in the context of Serbia, Speke and Seligman in the context of Rwanda and Rosenberg and Grant in the context of Nazi Germany. Other primary sources include documents explaining genocidal motives or stipulating eugenic measures such as the Serbian Academy of Sciences (SANU) memorandum in Serbia, The Hutu Manifesto in Rwanda and Nuremberg laws in Nazi Germany. Reliable secondary sources were thus widely used in this study, such as: Des Forges "Leave none to tell the story", a deep and profound study of the Rwandan genocide based on the data gathered on location by a team of people from Human Rights Watch, Mann's "Dark side of democracy", a significant overview of many different cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, including Nazi Germany, Bosnia and Rwanda and the way they were shaped by modernity and Kiernan's "Blood and Soil", an overview of different genocidal ideologies (Kiernan includes politicide in his definition of genocide as well). In terms of research design, this thesis is closely comparable to Mann's and Kiernan's, as they both analyse different contexts for common elements and themes, apart from the fact that this study, as opposed to the previously mentioned has an explicitly comparative agenda.

However, the comparative approach also entails certain problems. Firstly, set in a wider frame, and considering the relationships between the chosen cases and others in their group, it quickly becomes clear that the causal relationship between modernity and genocide is a complex one. According to many comparativists, the presence of a factor x (modernity) in a series of cases with a y outcome (genocide), suggests that x positively contributes to y, but may not necessarily be the cause of it, since other factors have to be taken into consideration[3]. (Skocpol, 1979, Ragin, 1994, Sayer 1992). Seeing the cases in a broader context of countries which are characterized by the elements of modernity, but nevertheless do not produce genocide, we conclude that other influences should also be present in order for genocide to happen. The literature indicates that a totalitarian state structure and an economic crisis may be important in this respect (Arendt, 1962, Kiernan, 2007, Bartov, 2002, Weitz, 2003). In addition, in spite of the fact that the age of modernity has been characterized by a decline in the number of minorities due to assimilation and murderous cleansing and that the processes of imperialism and colonisation, also related to modernity, have arguably brought about the first known genocides, it is still not safe to assume that modernity necessarily will result in genocide. In the case of France, for example, the so called cradle of modernity, genocide hasn't been known to occur on its territory which highlights the fact that in the qualitative comparative studies, the analysis of the cases

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[2] The sample obtained contains all issues of Der Stürmer, for the relevant period between 1939 and 1944, all issues of Kangura, between 1990 and 1994 and all issues of Večernje Novosti between 1987 and 1992.

[3] There can be many variables affecting the phenomenon of interest, and it is often quite impossible to summarize them in a theoretically meaningful manner (Przeworski, 1982:20).

of non-genocide or negative cases haven't been given virtually any attention. In addition, as this study reaches conclusions on both genocide and modernity, we can establish that the fact that modernity can but does not always result in genocide means that it also possesses other characteristics apart from genocide promoting elements. In accordance with this, and echoing the main principles of the comparative approach in a case oriented study, the goal of appreciating complexity is ultimately given precedence over the goal of achieving generality (Ragin, 1994).

Secondly, the question of validity is another relevant topic in the discussions on comparative analysis as the tendency to generalize represents one of the main issues that the comparative approach has been criticized for, as is often the case when natural scientific methods are applied to social sciences (Suchman, 1964:10). Certainly a crude generalization is always a danger, but as most comparative studies must make place for compromise in the attempt to balance between the quality and the quantity of the cases, in a case oriented study appreciating complexity is always given precedence over the goal of achieving generality. In other words, one should never underestimate the fact that the phenomena are finite and societies changeable. Thirdly, the problem with both quantitative and qualitative genocide studies is that the cases treated as similar are in fact very different as well (Straus, 2010: 172). A valid piece of research will therefore still have to nurture awareness of the differences between the cases, meaning that the understanding of each specific context is particularly important in this case and narrowness of the data base collected could seriously impact the validity of results, again highlighting the need for as broad as possible range of sources. This is why, a common outcome of a comparative approach is a realization that cases previously categorized as same are differentiated, and the goal of the research is often to establish how this diversity is patterned (Suchman, 1964, Skocpol, 1979, Ragin, 1994).

In order for the cases to fulfil the basic criteria for a case oriented comparative analysis they have to be viewed in a wider context with the aim of "identifying order in complexity" (Willer, 1967:20). To successfully accomplish this, one must begin with a solid definition of the dependent variable. Modern genocide, in our case, is seen as a crime with strong attachments to the European process of nation state building. Ideologically, this crime is a consequence of rigid and primordial group identification processes, which entail a focus on national, racial and linguistic belongingness, but also a utopian desire to create a perfect society, purified of outside elements of contamination (Bartov, 2002, Carter, 2008, Fein, 1993). In terms of execution, modern genocide is a crime dependent on the organisational and propagandistic resources of the nation state; it is characterized by a bureaucratic state apparatus and the instrumental rationality, which constitutes its philosophical essence, while ideological media campaigns and state surveillance methods are used to prepare the annihilation

quests (Arendt, 1962, Adorno, 1972, Bauman, 1989, Bauer, 1978). To the contrary of many contemporary genocide definitions which are so inclusive that the term itself seems to have lost all meaning, I will here stick to a more conservative understanding of the concept. Concretely, ethnic/religious or racial groups are here seen as the main potential victims of genocidal quests (Papazian, 2001), while groups constituted regardless of the "idea of origins", will be excluded from this category, as is the case with the United Nation Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide from 1948. Delimiting the category is by no means an easy task, albeit of great significance.

In this study, the category of politicide is distinguished from the category of genocide for the simple reason that as, Helen Fein points out: "everything is seen as genocide today, apart from genocide itself" (Fein, 1993). Although, I recognize that cases such as the Holodomor could probably also be shown to possess an ethnic dimension, the rule of the proletariat is prone to politicide or classicide rather than genocide and the targeted group in Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China is the class of wealthy peasants rather than the ethnic or racial other. Similarly in Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, ethnic minorities were indeed targeted, such as the Chinese and Vietnamese, but the ethnic aspect is still a minor subcategory within the much larger aims of politicide and classicide. Indeed, similarities between the categories of genocide and politicide are in many ways striking in terms of their causes, organisation and motives, but the differences are significant as well (Fein: 1993, 12). Also, I will distinguish between early modern and modern genocides, where early modern genocides are seen primarily as colonial settler genocides, which take place outside of the mother state and are often not even committed by the state. In other words, they lack the organisational aspect of modern genocides, which are always committed by the state and are a part of the modern process of internal cleansing, thus they take place within the state (but can also stretch outside of primary borders in relation to expansion). In the case of Yugoslavia, although Bosnia was already recognized as an independent country when the genocide began, the conflict can only be seen as a result of the internal struggles within Yugoslavia, and is therefore also a case of internal cleansing. The annihilation quest of Namibia's Herero and Nama tribes, which exists somewhere on the border line between early modern and modern genocide, and is by some considered the first modern genocide due to its strong racial dimension, clearly has a strong attachment to the group of colonial-settler genocides (much like the French conquest of Algeria or genocides of indigenous peoples of America and Australia), rather than modern national-chauvinist regime genocides[4].

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[4] Modern genocide is seen as perpetrated by national chauvinist dictatorships (after 1910) that had seized control of tottering, shrinking or new empires aiming to reverse real or perceived territorial losses or conquer new regions from established powers (Kiernan, 2007)

The category of modern genocide thus comprises five cases: Armenian genocide (1915), The Holocaust (1939), The Bosnian genocide (1992), The Rwandan genocide (1994) and Darfur genocide (2003). As we see, the group is both timely and quantitatively a limited one and constitutes 5 different cases, which share most basic similarities regardless of the differences between spatiotemporal parameters.

Some of the common features of these genocides are:

1. Execution by totalitarian nation states or during the process of national cohesion[5] (Arendt, 1962, Bartov, 2002, Bauman, 1989, Adorno, 1972)

2. Strong racial undertones (Carter, 2008, Kiernan, 2007)

3. The role of media and state surveillance mechanisms in preparation and justification (Arendt, 1962, Bartov, 2002, Weitz, 2003, Fleming, 2003)

4. Mass participation of civilian volunteers in executions (Arendt, 1962, Weitz, 2003)

5. Utopian desire to create a perfect society by processes of purification (Bartov, 2002, Bauer, 1978, Kiernan, 2007)

Specifically in relation to modernity, all of these are examples of modern cleansing, all committed by the state, well organised and bureaucratized. They share other similar characteristics in terms of modern values, which were transported from Europe to the colonies as the colonized peoples have learned from their aggressors about violence and genocide (Arendt, 1962). Historically all the contexts share an experience of foreign rule, either in relation to imperialism or colonialism, and have therefore had difficulties developing later into stable nation states; a heritage of imperialism left a deep scar on populations of Germanic lands, Armenia and the West Balkans. Napoleonic reforms resulted in a sharp increase in inequality and violence between groups in German speaking states, while the Ottoman rule in Armenia and Serbia/Bosnia left untranscendable inter-group divisions. Consequences of colonisation in Darfur and Rwanda were similar. Modern scientific racist categories, used by these regimes in accordance with similarly modern ideologies of ethno-nationalism created real danger zones in fragile nation states with significant ethnic minorities. Indeed, monarchies, as pre-modern forms of rule, were more tolerant of "others", as it is the period of the solidification of the

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[5] Much evidence indicates that genocide can often serve as a tool for constructing a nation state. This is one of the reasons why modern genocide should never be viewed as isolated from the phenomenon of nation building.

nation state[6] (which in some places still goes on) that the quest for securing "nation's place under the sun", as illustrated by the scramble for Europe and Africa, brings forth more death in the shape of highly efficient and organised genocides by racist regimes that employ the strategies of extermination camps and paramilitaries in order to create utopian societies by reviving long lost, ethnically clean, ancient kingdoms (modern genocidal regimes attempt a revival of: the rule of Genghis Khan, the kingdom of Charlemagne, Dušan's Empire, medieval Hutu kingdoms and ancient Arab civilizations respectively)[7]. A desire for emancipation and equality of second class citizens, also encouraged by modernity, contributes to further destabilizing of these states.

Furthermore, the genocides analysed in this thesis are chosen on purpose in order to reach valid conclusions about modernity. In spite of the obviously modern elements that these contexts share, some are by the media, policy makers and academic literature shown as ultra-modern (Holocaust) and some as tribal (Bosnia and Rwanda). Ideally, of course, all five contexts could be compared with more resources, but the ones chosen are sufficient to examine the group for existence of the modern-primitive dichotomy. As all cases will be examined for signs of modernity, conclusions will be made in relation to the nature of the link between genocide and modernity. The Armenian genocide was strategically excluded due to the fact that it shares much the same context as Bosnia in terms of the Ottoman rule and the religious overtones of the ethnic conflict and in addition is the only other case that was occasionally compared to the Holocaust, thus usually examined on its own premise and not often given the label of "primitivism". Darfur on the other hand is also relatively similar to Rwanda in terms of the history of significantly modern medieval kingdoms which prospered and were free from ethnic conflicts prior to the advent of the colonisers. Rwanda serves in this case as a straightforward example of a case that is in many ways extremely similar to the Holocaust, but is often categorized as tribal simply due to its geographical location and the post-colonial tendencies that characterize the European context today. The three chosen contexts are thus chosen to demonstrate variety within the group. As the group of modern genocide, according to the working definition, consists of 5 cases, which share many of the same characteristics, the chosen three, in fact, make out a significant portion of the overall group. Also, the fact that the category of modern genocide is in itself a category with relatively few cases and that the concept of genocide itself is incredibly complex, the decision to adopt a relatively small group of cases to compare is justifiable.

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[6] European national state projects are seen as a result of new capitalist tendencies in Europe, based on the need to invest excess capital overseas and maintain the political power to protect it. The national cohesions, which arise as a consequence, take place around the idea of linguistic, religious and racial unity, but primarily emerge around the phenomenon of capitalist print using the language of the common man. (Anderson, 2006, Hobsbawm, 1992, Gellner, 2009)

[7] Notice that the Ottoman Empire never committed genocide, until it evolved into the nationalist Young Turk regime. Before this, the Ottoman Empire guaranteed freedom of religion to all its minorities, as seen in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Finally, as the importance of the historical contexts has been acknowledged not only in the general sense, but also in regards to its significance for the later emergence of genocide, the path dependent approach seems appropriate in this study, as comparative-historical research is characterised by an analysis of sequences and patterns (Mahoney, 2004). In relation to the role the colonial/imperial rule has had on the emergence of identities which were later difficult to incorporate into modern ethno-nationalist frames, it can be argued that the role of colonial institutions, which in the case of Rwanda and Yugoslavia is particularly important, as it maintained the role of violent exclusion through colonial bureaucracies that were built to pacify and the production of advantaged groups. In addition, the balance of powers in Europe, which resulted directly from the fact that Britain became the leader of the Industrial revolution can be seen as contingency, an accidental interaction of circumstances, but has, nevertheless had a significant impact on the processes of colonisation and the fact that the countries that industrialised later had a lot of catching up to do and had to do it fairly quickly, which is explained as one of the reasons for the emergence of genocide in the German West Africa. However, the danger of the path-dependent approach certainly lies in the possibility of determinism, but the method overcomes this through the employment of non-linear causal relations, different definitions of contingency and deviant case-studies, as it recognizes that in-spite of a careful employment of comparisons, the emergence of predictability in a wider context will often remain absent.

1.3. Organisation of the study

This study is organised into 8 chapters. In the Methodology chapter, I introduce the topic, describe what I see as problems within the field of genocide studies and discuss the use and the advantages of the comparative aspect in order to improve this situation. The main question will attempt to target what I see as two difficulties within the field, the first one the fact that a large number of theorists insist that the Holocaust is a sui generis genocide, which ultimately obstructs the development of the comparative method and secondly, the dichotomy within the field that views the Holocaust as modern, while labelling other genocides such as Bosnia and Rwanda as tribal and primitive. By comparing the supposedly ultra-modern Holocaust with the supposedly tribal Bosnia and Rwanda, we will see if the privileged position the Holocaust has within the field is justified and whether Bosnian and Rwandan genocide should indeed be seen through the lens of "spontaneous outbursts of primal rage".

The second chapter presents a broad overview of the relevant literature that establishes links between modernity and genocide, particularly in relation to the nation state and ideologies of nationalism and

scientific racism, while chapter three attempts to discuss these links in greater depth. Here, relevant theory on modern genocide is discussed and key elements that link genocide to modernity are identified, so that each context could then be tested for the presence of these. Relevant elements are: overpopulation, unemployment changing societal roles and lack of resources, organic nationalism, social Darwinism, scientific racism and eugenics, the authority of technology, utopianism, gardening state mentality, instrumental rationality, obedience, bureaucratic mentality, free-floating responsibility, totalitarianism, expansionism, majoritarian democracy, efficiency, numbing, total war and Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft society ties.

Chapters four, five and six deal with each of our cases of modern genocide respectively in chronological order: The Holocaust, Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The chapters have the same sub-headings, as they are intentionally created in similar fashion to examine the cases for presence of the same elements. Each chapter is divided into three main parts: historical overview, emergence and execution of genocide and genocidal ideology, where each context is tested for existence of key elements established in the previous chapter. In spite of the fact that these chapters are organised in the same manner, there will unavoidably be some differences in the presentations of each context due to a difference in the type of available sources and the uniqueness of each context particularly in relation to the historical dimension. I have decided early on not to introduce the comparative dimension already in these chapters in order to avoid confusion and maintain some sort of overview. The comparative dimension is instead employed in the discussion chapter seven, where differences and similarities between contexts are made explicit, while main conclusions related to the relationship between modernity and genocide are summarized in the conclusion (chapter 8).

2. Literature review

2.1. Introduction

The term genocide was coined by a Polish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin, as a direct reaction to the horrors of the Second World War and genocide against the Jewish population of Europe. His definition was later, with certain adjustments, used as a fundament for a legal concept within International Law, and a basis for a 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which has, up to now, been the main legal tool for recognizing and punishing genocide[8].

The processes which resulted in the birth of the concept, have also laid the foundation for the entire field of genocide studies, largely in terms of research focus. Firstly, Holocaust was established as by far the most researched topic within the field, which also contributed to the role it played in the construction of European collective memory, and secondly, by placing Holocaust at the centre of all genocide research, it also came to be used as an explanation for larger social phenomena regarding the spirit of our time, such as modernity. As a result, the main part of the literature on genocide is either explicitly focusing on modern genocide, or carries with it an assumption that the reader is already aware of the modern framework the text is written in. On the other hand, even the extremely rare literature that actually focuses on case studies of ancient genocides treats modernity and traditionality as binary opposites, making its case in contrast to that which is perceived as modern. Theoretically speaking, both literature on genocide and literature on modernity often have difficulties escaping these stereotypical understandings of the concepts, where modernity and traditionality are defined rigidly, as black and white time frames, rather than values or tendencies within a certain period.[9] Often, modernity is understood as positive, progressive and humane, while genocide and other mass crimes can be labelled as a regression to barbaric and traditional behaviours that need to be overcome. On the opposite end however, we find theorists who explicitly blame modern technologies and behaviours for horrors of our era. Such theories define genocide as the ultimate realization of the

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[8] In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

[9] An example of such a dichotomy can be found in Giddens's "Consequences of Modernity" (1999), in which he presents a table of different characteristics of modern and premodern societies, thus promoting a rather simplified definitional frame based on binary opposites.

modern mindset, while the romantic myth of the noble savage is often hidden somewhere between the lines.

It is thus evident that the ability to distance oneself from the general conceptualizations of one's time is nearly an impossible task. However, regardless of the different biases which can be found in the literature on modern genocide, it is only logical that the most important works on the phenomenon in question can be found in the volumes of contemporaries; people who have either witnessed genocide or have, indirectly, been influenced by it. Similarly, it can be said, that the greatest number of volumes on genocide was, indeed, inspired by the Holocaust, and shows, undoubtedly, the degree in which the horror of the extermination has influenced European science and culture, so that we today, without hesitation, speak of it as the most important event of the 20th Century.

The school of thought which is said to offer a detailed portrayal of the links between genocide and modernity is the school of Critical theory, a circle of Marxist scholars, many of whom have had a direct experience of the Holocaust and the 'dark side of modernity', which is why the modern sceptics represent a significant theoretical influence within this field (Outhwaite, 2012). A more contemporary modernist approach, on the other hand, seems, to a large degree, focused on recent Western experiences, often disregarding the atrocities committed in the spirit of the age. Notable contemporary theorists of modernity and globalisation such as Giddens or Beck have, more often than not, downplayed the horrors of the age, greatly idealizing the freedom, individuality and cosmopolitanism of the globalised mindset, all the while forgetting the important conclusions of earlier generations: that modernity can also mean uniformity, inequality, obedience to authority, state surveillance and manipulation strategies, and an increasing potential for discrimination, atrocities and conflict. In spite of the fact that terrorism in terms of globalised networks can be seen as a particularly modern phenomenon, in "Runaway world" Giddens links fundamentalism with traditionality and modernity with liberal values and democracy, a somewhat questionable point of view. (Giddens, 2000) Even the very recent literature concerning the work of ICTY and ICTR[10] (such as Eve la Haye's "War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts, 2010), is not as critical or as independent as one would hope. In this spirit, the attitude towards mainstream modernity theorists that will be adopted in this thesis will be that of a sceptic.

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[10] International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively.

Finally, this literature review will prioritize breadth of opinions to the complexity of the debate, as the main themes related to the relationship between genocide and modernity will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. On the following pages I will, thus, present a broad overview of theoretical works which identify multiple tendencies related to key terminology and show various ways in which cardinal concepts interact in order to demonstrate the characteristics of the field.

2.2. Genocide and Modernity

As we mentioned earlier, the term genocide is deeply connected to modernity. In various definitions of genocide, concepts of nation, ethnicity, race and state are used, showing that the very terminology of the field stems from the modern period[11]. Lemkin's definition (Lemkin, 1944) as well as Nuremberg Indictments (Count 3 of the indictment of the 24 Nazi leaders at the Nuremberg Trials, 1945), and numerous other theorists (Katz, 1994), speak of ethnic, national and religious groups. In various other definitions, genocide is considered a crime of the state (Drost in Jones, 2006, Horowitz in Jones, 2006, Kuper 1981, Fein in Kieser, 2001, Harff and Gurr in Jones, 2006, Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, Bartov, 2003, Bauman, 1989, Svaldi 1989, Levene, 2005, Ternon, 1995), government (Porter in Jones, 2006, Wallimann and Dobkowski in Jones, 2006, Rummel, 1994) or bureaucratic apparatus (Barta, 1987). However, modernity has been related to genocide in different manners. Theorists who have been influential in the field, can be seen as belonging to one of the three following categories: Those who consider genocide a typically modern phenomenon, or even an embodiment of modern reasoning (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972, Bauman, 1989, Arendt, 1962, Bartov,2002, Weitz, 2003, Fleming, 2003, Fein, 1993, Keegan, 1994, Prunier, 1995, Mann, 2005), those who consider genocide a barbaric act essentially in contradiction to modern spirit (Lemkin, 1944, Habermas, 1987, Dahrendorf, 1967, Elias, 1998), and those who believe that human species are biologically prone to violence regardless of the time frame in question (Crassly in Gellately and Kiernan, 2003, Bourke, 1999, Keegan, 1994). Within the first category, we find that different theorists have related genocide to different elements of modernity, such as the philosophy of enlightenment, instrumental rationality, colonialism and the emergence of the nation state.

In "The Dialectic of Enlightenment" (1972), Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer describe the Holocaust as the fulfilment of instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment. This work of major

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[11] The most common criteria for defining genocide is either through defining the perpetrator or the victim. There is however a lot of disagreement among genocide scholars in regards to both. While State, Government, Authority, Bureaucracy or even individuals are the most common suggestions for perpetrator group, the victims are usually defined through ethnicity, nationality, religion or political belonging.

significance for the school of Critical Theory relates the rise of National Socialism, state capitalism, and mass culture to, what they call "the failure of the Enlightenment". The Frankfurt scholars adopt a pessimistic concept of the modern spirit, which, according to their view, defeats itself. While trying to abolish superstition and myths by 'foundationalist' philosophy, the Enlightenment ignores its own 'mythical' basis[12]. Its strivings towards totality and certainty led to an increasing instrumentalization of reason.

This, extremely controversial, but outstanding scholarly achievement, contains an ambivalent understanding of modernity. On the one hand, we have the view of Enlightenment as falsely modern, somehow, posing to be rational and progressive, while it, in reality, is based on myths and mimetic regressions to the dark passages of the subconscious[13]. On the other hand, however, we have the idea that mass atrocities are a necessary product of those same tendencies. It is as if there is confusion between two opposite concepts of modernity: one defined through its promise of reason and clarity, and the other defined through its barbaric outcome. However, Adorno and Horkheimer are not the only ones who dared to criticize the project of Enlightenment. In 1952, Jacob Talmon has found the phenomenon to be the essence of totalitarian democracy, while Yehuda Elkana (2000) speaks of the need to purge the modern spirit of dogmatic Enlightenment traditions, defined as: the belief in total power of science (Enlightenment fundamentalism), the quest for universal theories, the quest for context-free absolute truth, fierce anti-relativism, non-dialectical approach to episteme, non-admittance of metic thinking into the world of knowledge, sharp distinctions between private- public, mind-body, religious-secular, masculine-feminine, Western-Other, theory-praxis, local-universal, "man as such", "culture as such", "nature as such", i. e. all essentialisms.

In discussions on Enlightenment, the concept of instrumental rationality is of key importance, as arguably the main form of modern reasoning. This term, widely used in literature on modernity is adopted from Max Weber, who in his "Economy and Society" (1922) defines four types of social action: 1) Instrumentally rational (Zweckrational), where the environment is used as means for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends; 2) Value-rational (Wertrational) – a belief in the value for its own sake, independently of its prospects of success; 3) Affectual (especially emotional) – determined by the actor's specific affects or emotional states and 4) Traditional or determined by ingrained habituation. According to Weber, instrumental rationality is a product of Calvinist logic and profit oriented capitalist societies and as such is a typical characteristic

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[12] For Adorno and Horkheimer, the myth of Odysseus is an allegory of Enlightenment, as the main hero is a prototype of the bourgeois individual.

[13] The Dialectic of Enlightenment offers many parallels to the work of Freud, such as the analysis of the myth of Oedipus.

of modernity. (Weber, 1922) Indeed, perhaps best defined through a modern military motto: "you cannot make an omelette without breaking the eggs", instrumental rationality concerns itself only with the goal, but is indifferent to the extent of the collateral and can therefore easily function as an ideological basis for state violence (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972), which is why it has been blamed for most of the 20th century massacres.

The idea of voluntary servitude, which stems from a Renaissance philosopher Etienne Boetie, has had a significant influence on contemporary scholars such as Browning, who argue that obedience which is related to instrumental rationality is one of the main pre-conditions for genocide. The perpetrator is therefore an ordinary man, driven not by fanatical zeal or primal hatred but simply a willingness to obey authority without questioning the morality of the goal (Browning, 1998). This idea is inspired by the well-known experiments carried out by Stanley Milgram (1974) in which he demonstrated that when placed in a situation requiring obedience to a legitimate authority, agents may very well carry out the worst forms of barbarism, administering electric shocks to victims without there being the slightest form of satisfaction of an aggressive impulse, sadism or cruelty (Milgram, 1974, Browning, 1998). Indeed, as mass mobilization is key to realization of modern genocides, numerous theorists from many disciplines like Freud, Arendt, Marcuse, Bauman, Nietzsche, Fein, Fleming, Milgram and others, have attempted to understand the phenomenon of obedience as an important aspect of the modern spirit. The Frankfurt school has since used Milgram's experiments to argue that this is the reason why modern societies result in violence and sometimes genocide (Bauman, 1989, Arendt, 1962).

Indeed, according to Habermas, the concept of instrumental rationality represents the kind of rationality, which prioritizes the efficiency and practicality of the means to an end, without actually reflecting the value of the goal in question. While communicative rationality critically evaluates actions, instrumental rationality is concerned with how to do things most cost-effectively, rather than why they should be done. This type of rationality is often seen as a logical consequence of a capitalist/consumerist lifestyle and is embodied in bureaucracy – the organizational form of modernity (Jackall, 1995). The work that probably gives the most detailed insight in the concept of instrumental rationality is Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1964), in which she portrays one of the most vicious criminals of the Holocaust as a petty bureaucrat, who was simply following orders, completely devoid of guilt. In other words, instrumental rationality is said to free individuals of personal responsibility, through the division of labour, extended chain of command and legitimization of moral claims through science (Arendt, 1964, Marcuse, 1964, Habermas, 1989, Bauman 1989). Just as distancing the individual from responsibility in bureaucratic structures relieves perpetrators of guilt, a physical distance from the victim, made possible by advanced technologies of total war, reduces killing to a sheer physical activity through the process of "numbing" (Bartov, 2002, Bourke, 1999).

According to Bartov, instrumental rationality makes killing the enemy without actually hating him, possible. Killing is thus reduced to just another business - "a stockyard in Chicago" (Bartov, 2002).

As we now see, genocide in our epoch is often seen as dependent on various modernity traits, all to a significant extent related to the emergence of the modern nation state and the 19th and 20th century nationalism, particularly organic nationalism in which the state derives its legitimacy based on a "natural" and primordial national unity (linguistic, racial, religious) of those it governs (Barnett, 2003, Sells, 1998, Kiernan, 2007). As we have witnessed in Europe, the processes of modern nation state formation have resulted in vast killings and assimilation strategies which wiped out entire languages and groups (Mann, 2005). The creation of these "imagined" social units (Anderson, 2006) should be seen as one of the key characteristics of modernity, as the sole purpose of the nation state, according to leading scholars of nationalism, is the protection of resources within capitalism, thereby prioritizing materialist goals in relation to human life (Gellner, 2009, Hobsbawm, 1992). Along similar lines, Arendt argues that origins of colonialist imperialism and violence that came with it, can be traced to the need of 19th century national states to invest excess capital overseas, thus necessitating an increase in both inside and outside political control to protect these investments (Arendt, 1962). In "Mirrors of Destruction" (2002), Omer Bartov offers a detailed analysis of simultaneous processes of economic descent and national identity construction, which have shaken Europe to the core from the second half of the 19th Century onwards. The spirit and the ideology of this period seem to have strongly influenced the atmosphere which created the conditions necessary for the Holocaust (Bartov, 2002). In particular, Bartov focuses on the modern state apparatus, which is used to create nationalist propaganda, as an instrument of annihilatory potential. Indeed, the creation of national unity would be impossible without the power of modern print capitalism, but it is this power in particular that reproduces the exclusionary strategies of European nation states (Anderson, 2006). In Jackall's "Propaganda" the writer becomes involved in a discussion on how the modern state shapes public opinion, by analysing the ideas of mass society, capitalism, bureaucracy and mass communications, such as those used by the Third Reich (Jackall, 1995).

Another key element that seems to be associated with modern genocide is the colonial aspect of the killings. Many theorists have shown the link between the development of modern ways of life and the colonial expansion of Europe (Gellately and Kiernan, 2003, Elkana, 2000, Bartov, 2002, Wildenthal, 2005, Shepard, 2006, Ranger, 1994). Furthermore, it has also been shown, that European romantic-nationalist ideas of race, nation and territory, propelled by the new scientific discoveries of 18th and 19th century, played a significant role in the construction of genocidal ideologies in many European colonies (Lemarchand, 1970, Arendt, 1962, Chretien, 2006, Destexhe, 1994). In fact, as Arendt's

"Origins of Totalitarianism" demonstrates, both the tools of genocide execution (bureaucracy) as well as genocidal ideologies (racism) were practised in the colonies as they represented "main weapons of imperialism". The unlimited expansion, demonstrated in the colonies was also applied on the continent in the shape of "continental imperialism", racist expansionist movements such as pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, which gradually managed to institutionalize anti-Semitism and other types of racism (Arendt, 1962). In "Race: A Theological Account", from 2008, Carter explains how it was not until the racialization of Christianity, that the criteria for the white man's supremacy were finally established. In fact, by becoming racialized, Christianity became the cultural property of the West, the religious ground of white supremacy and global hegemony (Carter, 2008), while the myths derived from the Bible, such as the Hamitic myth, introduced in quasi scientific works (Speke, 1868, Seligman 1930) provided a basis for exclusionary "divide et impera" colonial ideologies applied in Africa by European colonizers (Lemarchand, 1970, Prunier, 1995, Mamdani, 2001). In fact, the very contact with the "savage otherness" filled the colonizers with dread and fear of inadequacy so new categories needed to be constructed in order to reassure the white man and convince him of his superiority (Hall, 1997). In his analysis of indigenous genocides Elazar Barkan (2003) argues that there could be no room for savages in a modern world; they had to be exterminated. Genocide of the indigenous peoples of the Americas and Australia are good examples of rational strategies for cleansing the territories in order to secure space and resources for capitalist development. As the new world was built on bloody ruins of indigenous societies (Brown, 1991, Chretien, 2006, Destexhe, 1994, Hitchcock, 2008), we see that genocide and modernity are indeed compatible, to say the least.

Continuing our discussion on the centrality of the nation state in debates on modern genocide, we notice that a number of significant theorists like Horowitz (1980), Talmon (1952), Nolte (1966), Cohn (1967) and Mann (2005) were inspired by the previously mentioned, influential work of Hannah Arendt, "The Origins of Totalitarianism" (1962), in which the author analyses the utopian character of the modern state, its ideological background, surveillance methods, and the potential to mobilize entire populations for its goals. As the nation state's apparatus became sustainable, and the state gained control over social identities, any real possibility of a valid political opposition faded (Arendt, 1962). According to Bauman, not only are the organisation and technology of the nation state the perfect tools for accomplishment of such a vast endeavour as genocide, but it is the bureaucracy as the administrative consequence of the modern instrumental rationality that produces indifferent desk killers, while the modern shift in human self-understanding from God to human beings as the creators of the grand design of the world, ensures the utopian aspect of the genocidal state. (Bauman, 1989)

Indeed, there are numerous reasons why a state can be a willing executioner of genocide. Its bureaucratic apparatus provides a frame and a tool for the killings, the utopian attitude and the making of the perfect man serves as a fundament for a genocidal ideology, and a modern surveillance system controls and mobilizes the populations in numbers that were unheard of in earlier times. One could even postulate that the drive for purification is inherent in modern societies (Bartov, 2002, Bauman, 1989). The modern state is therefore one of the key factors involved in the execution of modern genocide, if for no other reason than because of the vastness and totality that can be accomplished only by an organization of such magnitude (Bartov,2002, Weitz, 2003, Hull, 2003, Fleming, 2003, Svaldi 1989). According to Bartov and Arendt a totalitarian state, along with annihilatory energy of modern war, necessitate and devise final solutions (Bartov, 2002, Arendt, 1962).

However, it is not only the 20th century's totalitarianisms, such as Hitler's or Stalin's that can be related to violence and genocide. Modern democracies have certainly been accused of the same. In 1952 Jacob Talmon coins the term Totalitarian democracy[14], which refers to a system in which citizens legally elect their representatives, but in reality have little or no influence on the decision-making process of the government, but it is Mann's "Dark side of democracy" that definitely demonstrates a link between majoritarian democracies and violence in ethnically mixed areas, where ethnic nationalism creates a rigid variant of "we the people" thus expelling all those that cannot be integrated into the ethnic "Us". (Mann, 2005) As Herbert Marcuse puts it, in his critique of democracy: "Free election of the masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves" (Marcuse, 1964).

Commenting on the violence and mass killings of the 20th century, the French philosopher Michel Foucault spoke of the ultimate fulfilment of the biopolitics and surveillance that define modernity. In "The will to knowledge" he defines the term biopower as a practice of modern states to regulate their subjects. According to Foucault, Nazism is in fact the outcome of developments of such mechanisms being pushed to their high point (Foucault, 1998). The term "genocidal state" is employed in the analysis of scholars like Leo Kuper (1990) and Pierre Van den Berghe (1990), but the most tantalizingly detailed description of the role a state apparatus can play in the execution of genocide, can be found in Zygmunt Bauman's "Modernity and the Holocaust" (1989), a work that shows the organizational sophistication and efficiency a modern state can employ in order to wipe out the unwanted. Bauman's famous metaphor for a control obsessed modern state is a gardening society, which needs to be continuously cleansed of weeds ('others'). It seems that the modern society, finally finding the way to fully submit nature to its use becomes increasingly obsessed with control and order,

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[14] Theorists like Charny and Hirsch, have postulated that genocide is the very opposite of democracy, while others, like Mann, have regarded the two as inter-dependent.

attempting to eradicate all that interferes with this scheme (Habermas, 1989). The modern society is thus described as a utopian structure of perfect order, and great safety, where nature does not disrupt anything (Bartov, 2002, Arendt 1962, Weitz, 2003). Another of Bauman's works "Modernity and Ambivalence" explores the concept of stranger as the very "weed" that disrupts the social order, threatening to evoke chaos (Bauman, 1991)[15]. However, the pollutants described here play a key role in constructing national identities. Carl Schmitt's neo-conservatism theory, which explains the importance of enemy images in the construction of national groupness is relevant in this context regardless of author's questionable moral convictions (Schmitt, 1996). Furthermore, it has been argued that modern genocide is in fact one of the most important tools for creating national unity, as national cohesion is seen as a logical consequence of both victim and perpetrator identities (Bauman, 1989). Indeed, one of the key reasons behind the genocide in Rwanda was to create cohesion of the disunited Hutu population, which could not have been achieved without the image of an outside, Tutsi, enemy (Des Forges, 1999, Prunier, 1995).

Finally, scientific racism is said to be a typically modern progeny, which can be related to genocide in various ways. As romantic nationalism played a key role in the processes of national unification and construction of nation states, it also necessarily included a vivid debate on language and race as elements of unification. The debates on race were strongly influenced by contemporary discussions on Darwin and the origins of species, so romantic-nationalist ideas soon became placed in a rigid biological frame. The concept of race is traced back to European Enlightenment philosophers, such as Fichte[16] and Hegel, but was set in action mainly by European explorers of the new colonies, who categorized different races by using bizarre strategies such as measuring body parts of different peoples, and often using religion and myth to explain their origins (Weitz, 2003, Friedlander, 1993, Bartov, 1996, 2000, Arendt, 1962, Flemming, 1984). In fact, as the pre-modern anti-Judaism became biologized thereby evolving into anti-Semitism, the adoption of minorities into majority became impossible as the conversion to majority religion no longer made any difference in the context of race. (Bauer, 1982, Carter, 2008) As an integrated part of scientific racism, eugenic theories were developed, primarily by Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin, but later by many others, with focus on the purity of the race and strategies to improve breeding, like those employed by the Third Reich. The subject was even taught in schools throughout Germany, but practised (i.e. phrenology) on the colonial subjects like the Rwandan Hutu (Prunier, 1995). According to Seidelman (1999), it is the scientific rationale that ultimately led to Holocaust. In this category of literature, it is worth to mention primary sources such as Arthur De Gobineau's 1855: An Essay on the Inequality of the

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[15] In "Purity and Danger", Mary Douglas follows a similar line of thought when she claims that culture is always disturbed by things out of place (Douglas, 1966).
[16] Fichte is seen as the creator of the infamous term Volk, which would later become a key concept in Nazi ideology. Along with similar concepts employed by Hegel, this kind of terminology represents the very foundation of the definition of modern state (Kelly, 1968)

Human Races (2010), probably one of the first and most influential scientific racist works, Madison Grant's "The Passing of The Great Race (1916), which argues for cleansing the Nordic gene pool from undesirable traits and the selected works of Alfred Rosenberg (1970), the key Nazi ideologist and the creator of "human racial ladder" which placed Jews and Blacks at the very bottom. Even though Serbian mythology is, to some degree, less scientifically and more religiously oriented in its attempts to create a genocidal platform, the myth of origins, partially inspired by its Germanic predecessors, finds its form in the movement of Christoslavism, which presupposes that all Slavs are Christians by nature, thus excluding the Slavic Muslims from the realm of "Us" and stereotyping them as traitors. This bizarre mixture of religion and race is thus the main trait of Serb nationalist mythology (Sells, 1998, Popović in Srbi o Srbima, 2001, Judah, 1997, Carter, 2008).

However, not all theorists have seen modernity as an embodiment of the horrors of the age. Some have chosen a much more optimistic approach to the subject, seeing the phenomenon as an inherently positive and constructive quality. While contemporary theorists like Giddens and Beck can be blamed for having a Western-centric view, based on the experiences from wealthy environments, where people are rarely bothered by such nuisances as poverty and war, but rather enjoy global and individual identities, others, with a broader approach, like Habermas, (1988), Girard, (1977) and Elias, [17](1998), have seen each modern war as a regression to premodern stages and the Holocaust Germany as a failed modernity project. Habermas argued that Germany's troubles began because it was not able to follow Britain and France in maintaining the balance between particularistic and universalistic elements of national identity. Along these lines, and sharing his confidence in modernity, Ralf Dahrendorf makes a similar comparison between faulted Germany and successful Britain (Dahrendorf, 1967), while Detlev Peukert argues that the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the subsequent establishment of the Nazi regime must be understood within the context of German society's failure to adjust to the rapid context of modernization (Peukert, 1991). According to these beliefs, there is a process of social evolution taking place in spite of all the horrors of the age. Humans should therefore strive to become more modern[18] and more cosmopolitan, in order to avoid future genocides, while genocide is understood as a hangover from the past.

Within this category, it makes sense to look at genocidal ideologies, as they are often the ones where pre-modern elements are most obvious. In fact, the mythology used in order to create the propaganda necessary to mobilize populations stems largely from a romantic-nationalist timeframe. The destruction of age old multinational empires and the creation of new national identity projects brought

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[17] In "Germans" (1998), Norbert Elias defines modernity as civilization, and civilization through restraint.
[18] Habermas speaks of an unfinished modernity project (D'Entreves, 1997).

about deeply rooted social anxieties and a nostalgia for older and "happier" times, which resulted in attempts to revive the past in the form of folklore values such as fairy tales, epic tales, folk songs, national songs and sayings, as the process of national cohesion goes hand in hand with the construction of the national language[19] (Bartov, 2002). In other words even though nationalism as an ideology is, indeed, modern, the values inherent in, romantic nationalism in particular, are in fact deeply traditionalist with focus on agrarianism, soil and mystical qualities of the land, as the new man searches for a lost, pre-industrial paradise (Kiernan, 2007) Through language, the myths of the past, often tailored to suit the purpose of national cohesion, become the spirit of the present (Hirsch, 1995, Friedlander, 1993).

Indeed a view of modernity as plagued by mythology - a premodern way of accessing the truth, is recognizable in many sources. Mircea Eliade, speaks of several "modern myths", including the one of the noble savage (Eliade, 1957). Adorno and Horkheimer are famous for their idea that Enlightenment can be traced back to the myth of Odysseus (1972). The influence of Deists on Enlightenment thinking is also well documented and Elkana talks of demythologization of the Enlightenment process (2000).

On the other hand, in relation to collective memory, many theorists have shown how the essence of war-memory, which is usually torn between history and fantasy through generalization, exaggeration and misrepresentation of facts, becomes increasingly mythologized, as myth is seen as a necessary component of war. Indeed, it is through stereotypes about knighthood and chivalry that the soldiers are provided with a sense of justification and morality (Hirsch, 1995, Friedlander, 1993, Sells, 1998). In Bosnia, the usage of black masks would allow the perpetrators to distance themselves from the victims they knew intimately, and become symbolically transformed into mythical warriors, defenders of nation and patria (Sells, 1998). In this way, myth gives meaning to catastrophe (Friedlander, 1993, Bartov, 2002, Sells, 1998, Bourke, 1999, Hirsch, 1995), but most importantly, in times of crisis, myth serves as a basis for creating and sustaining a coherent national identity (Bartov, 2002).

Indeed, mythology is used extensively to prepare the population for genocide, and the theme of return to lost Eden is common in this respect (Bartov, 2002). In other words, the idea of a future, earthly paradise, cleansed of all intruders, as an aim of genocidal societies, is predicated on the imagery of paradise lost, which is why the quest for origins is at the very core of all nationalist projects (Bartov, 2002, Cohn, 1967). As several theorists have shown, the recollections of mythical past are typical for

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[19] In most parts of Europe, romantic nationalism was characterized by linguistic reforms, in which the language of high culture was adapted to the language and the needs of the common man.

utopian, totalitarian societies. Bartov (2002) explains how, contrary to the main communist agenda, even Stalin recalled holy Russia's medieval wars against the Teutonic order to give power to the Bolshevik idea of building a new world. Eliade (1984), however, speaks of Nazi pseudo-pagan mysticism based on ancient Germanic religion on one, and Marx's pseudo-Judaeo-Christian mythology on the other hand. According to this view, utopian visions necessarily combine hopes for idyllic future with recollections of a mythical past. As the very image of Paradise lost is a very Christian paradigm, we can with certainty conclude that there is a clear link between religion and genocide worth exploring here. According to Bauman (1989), the role of Christianity in the emergence of European anti-Semitism is crucial, while, in his 1993 work on modernity and myth, Friedlander noticed that Hitler loathed Christianity, but still used the religious imagery to make his speeches more appealing to the public.

Other notable theorists such as Adorno, Kuper and Bauer have also discussed the role of monotheistic religions in war/violence and genocide. Indeed, the very idea of the sacred is of utmost importance for the ideology and the execution of violence (Jurgensmeyer, 1992) In Serb mythology, images of Prince Lazar depicted as Christ having dinner with his disciples were widely used to create the idea of Serbs as "a heavenly people" (Sells, 1998), while a Biblical theme lies at the very core of the Hamitic myth (Lemarchand, 1999), and was a key element in establishing inter-group animosities in Rwanda and creating the conditions for genocide. The sacred symbols used to legitimize and justify genocidal ventures, are always connected to an idea of glorious past and heroic ancestors For example, Cohn (1967) describes how Nazism was inspired by age old symbols from ancient religions, such as the Nordic runes.

Another important position some scholars have taken in relation to modernity and genocide downplays the impact of modernity, arguing that war and genocide have been present throughout history, the only difference between modern and premodern genocide being sheer impact and scale (Crassly in Gellately and Kiernan, 2003). Keegan's "History of warfare" (1994) gives an overview of different war encounters throughout history, arguing that the need to wage war can be evolutionary explained as a result of the primal instinct to control territory. According to Keegan, as the number of humans on the planet grows, the need to "cleanse the territory", and create more living space, becomes an increasingly important issue (Keegan, 1994). Adam Jones explains, in his book "Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction", that people throughout history have always had the ability to see other groups as alien and inferior. Jones sees modernity as a concept groups would use in order to stigmatize and target the others as pagans, savages, or even animals (Jones, 2006). Quoting Eric Margolis, Jones observes that in the 13th century the Mongol horsemen

of Temüjin Genghis Khan were genocidal killers (*génocidaires*) who were known to destroy groups, leaving nothing, as in the case of annihilation of Tata Mongols. In Chalk and Jonassohn's, "The History and Sociology of Genocide" a wide ranging selection of historical events of genocide is provided dating back to antiquity, such as the destruction of Melos by Athens in 5th century BC. Much like Chalk and Jonassohn, Kiernan in his Blood and Soil provides accounts of genocide from Sparta to Darfur, labelling the destruction of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War (149-146 BC) – The First Genocide (Kiernan, 2007). In Tooley and Vardi's 2003 book "Ethnic cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe" numerous accounts of pre-modern genocide are mentioned (Tooley and Vardi, 2003). However in the account of the annihilation of the Huron by the Iroquois in mid 17th century North America, we must still insist on the influence of modernity, as it was the colonial influence of the French, who donated modern weaponry to their allies, the Iroquois, that provided a motive for further conflict and an escalation in intensity of wars of indigenous populations. Another scholar who sees genocide as a generally human affair is the historian, Joanna Bourke, who provides a feminist perspective on the subject, arguing that going to war is an act of rites of passage, as war to men is as childbirth is to women, an event in which a person becomes ultimately gendered, and therefore, a valid citizen (Bourke, 1999). Similarly, many a war theorist has also considered genocide a universal society trait (Garlan, 1975). In this view, war and genocide are also shown as eternally present and inherently human, while modernity as a quality is not given considerable importance.

Finally, there are those who have presented more balanced accounts of modernity. Friedlander (1993) argues that modernity has both positive and negative implications, and should not be placed in rigid frames. This ambivalence implies both views: modernity can facilitate genocide, but at the same time, it carries with it a belief in democracy as a social structure built on humanity and tolerance. It despises the crimes it has made possible. This is the same puzzle that we see in other works. The Dialectic of Enlightenment also offers a rather dualistic view of modernity. At the same time, it is defined as myth based, and a logical frame for bloodshed. On the other hand the crimes are considered a regression to the premodern, and as such opposite to what modernity should represent[20]. Implicitly one could suggest that modernity has failed to produce what it has promised, or in other words, it has produced that which it did not promise.

Fein has a solution for this puzzle. She suggests that modernity should not be confused with modernization. According to "Genocide: A sociological perspective" (1993), modernity implies individuation and tolerance, while modernization implies discontinuity and comparisons often leading to intolerance, group resentment and competition. However, in an analysis that assumes a connection

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[20] Dialectic of Enlightenment reflects popular intellectual themes of the time, mainly the subject of the decline of the West.

between mythology and modern genocide, and which recognizes the mentioned ambivalence within modernity, it is, most logical to turn to more liberal theories, such as those of Walby (2009), Eisenstadt (2002) or Delanty (2007), which talk of multiple, contested or plural modernities, so that rather than viewing the concept as a period in time, we see it as a tendency within a certain period. Weitz (2003), Bartov (2002). Friedlander (1993) and others have recognized the ability of modern frame to incorporate elements of premodern within its frame, specially focusing on rituals and performances which are connected with the drive for purity. As Friedlander saw it: "Nazism is both about anti-Semitism and about science; both anti-modernist and informed by modernizing trends" (Friedlander, 1993). In "Violence and the Sacred" René Girard explains the importance of sacrificial rituals for human beings, in which he is followed by Jurgensmeyer (1992) and others, but he also notices the ambivalence of modernity. For example: while empathy for victims manifests progress in the moral consciousness of society, it nonetheless also takes the form of a competition among victims that threatens an escalation of violence (Girard, 1977). Additionally, Hannah Arendt was also known for her idea that modernity is about both progress and doom at the same time (Arendt, 1962)[21]. More recent literature, such as Maffesoli's "The time of the tribes" has shown how modern social existence is conducted through fragmented tribal groupings which revolve around consumer labels and brands, but in reality function much like traditional group identities (Maffesoli, 1996). Others, as Hirsch (1995), Eliade (1957), Bartov (2002), Friedlander (1993) and Cohn (1967), have been able to show that myth is not only an incorporated part of modernity, but an essential element of its logic, as Bartov explains modern genocide as a mixture of industry and mythological and archaic imagery. (Bartov, 2002) Indeed, in order to gain a more detailed view of what modernity actually entails one certainly needs to open up the concept, liberalizing its definitions.

2.3. Conclusion

As we have seen, a significant number of theoretical works mentioned here acknowledge the importance of modernity for the study of genocide. However, we find that some of the cases which appear to be premodern as they pertain to indigenous populations, such as the case of the Huron annihilation by the Iroquois, still contain a hidden influence of modernity as this genocide probably would not have happened if it wasn't for the modern military influence of the French. Indeed, positions vary and we can establish three different scholarly opinions which are relevant for this study. The first group of scholarly contributions sees genocide as a fulfilment of modernity and this link is established through the study of concepts such as: enlightenment, instrumental rationality, obedience,

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[21] In "Origins of Totalitarianism", Arendt views Pan Movements (Pan-Slav and Pan-German in particular) as tribal.

numbing, utopia and scientific racism. Within this group the role of the state is given utmost centrality in the study of modernity and genocide and we see how the organisation of the state in terms of bureaucracy, nationalism as modern ideology, capitalism, colonialism, imperialism and totalitarianism are of key importance for understanding of modern genocide. Within this category, Critical theory is particularly influential; especially Adorno, Bauman and Arendt, but others have also followed a similar line of thought, like Weitz, Bartov, Fein, Mann and Prunier. Another point of view, important for this thesis is the idea of modern war as a regression into the pre-modern. Most of the works of this persuasion use the Holocaust to depict Germany as a failed modernity project and it is, in particular through the study of ideology that elements of the premodern can be noticed in the past-oriented utopianism and ethno-nationalism which focuses on the mystical qualities of the soil and the traditionality of the family unit. This group is represented by scholars such as Dahrendorf, Peukert, Hirsch, Friedlander, Kiernan and Eliade. The third type of scholarly works here allows modernity to contain contradictory elements and sees it as ambivalent as it can be about both progress and doom at the same time.

Finally, this review demonstrates undeniably that the study of genocide in relation to modernity much like the study of genocide in general, relies solely on the analysis of the Holocaust, which is rarely compared to any other genocide. Authors like Prunier and Des Forges in relation to Rwanda and Sells in relation to Bosnia are rare because they allow non-Holocaust contexts of genocide within the category of modernity. Indeed, it would seem, based on the characteristics of the field, that the study of Bosnia or Rwanda in respect to modernity is seen as useless by the academic community. On the other hand, works that entail an implicit comparative perspective, such as the ones by Mann and Kiernan look at a vast number of cases and are therefore unable to devote themselves to a parallel study of a concept such as modernity. This thesis will therefore, through the study of a relatively small number of cases, attempt to remedy these inconsistencies within the field and provide a detailed comparison of the Holocaust, Rwanda and Bosnia as seen through the prism of modernity.

3. Genocide and modernity

This chapter falls into two main parts. The first part attempts to define genocide and its positioning in relation to other key theoretical concepts, primarily ethnic cleansing, politicide, classicide and others, while it also aims to debate problems with the standard definition, the use of the Holocaust as a template, intentionality as a criterion and the lack of coordination between the legal and sociological approaches, finally proposing a solid and independent definition, delimited in relation to other theoretical opinions and defining a range of preconditions that may result in genocide. In the second part, I discuss the theoretical links between genocide and modernity specifically, in a broader, more complex, sense in relation to the literature review, in order to identify elements and themes relevant for modernity, that each particular context (Nazi Germany, Yugoslavia and Rwanda) will later be examined for. For this reason, four main themes are identified as crucial to understanding the relationship between genocide and modernity, all centred around the modern nation state as a utopian and often totalitarian unit which possesses a monopoly on violence. The first two themes are here related mainly to genocide promoting ideologies: 1) nationalism and ethno-nationalism in particular as a reactionary state ideology which aims to achieve an organic unity, by excluding minorities, thus providing a basis and an incentive for extermination 2) Modern racism as an institutionalized state policy with scientific justifications, while the other two themes are more related to the nature of modern violence mentality including its societal expressions and executions: 3) Instrumental rationality, a ruthless capitalist goal oriented mentality which promotes violence as means to an end through bureaucracy - an organisational form of this mindframe. Key elements within these themes will then be identified so that in the later chapters, the theory might be tested on actual cases to see which of the mentioned aspects of modernity can be found in the Holocaust, Bosnian and Rwandan genocide, respectively. As the main part of the scholarly thought that identifies a relationship between modernity and genocide has been based on the study of Holocaust, it will be interesting to see how this theory applies to the supposedly barbaric cases, one of them even as far as Africa, and what similarities, if any, can be found between them.

3.1. Towards a definition

Genocide is a difficult concept to define, and a lively debate on its nature is ever present in the discussions of scholars. The crime itself is said to have existed since the begining of mankind, although this is difficult to prove, but the term has only been used since the second world war and the Nuremberg trials, and its usage in International law is a direct consequence of that experience (Charny, 1991). Previous genocides, such as the Young Turk genocide of Armenians (1915-1918), or the

colonial settler genocides have thus been conceptualized in retrospect, beeing viewed through the prism of the Third Reich, much like all the attrocities that took place after WWII. Indeed, as the Holocaust has served as somewhat of a template for the concept of genocide in general, and, due to the vastness and particularity of the operation itself, it has since been enormously difficult to define anything else as genocide. Old-school genocide theorists are Holocaust-centric. As Barbara Harff puts it, "the Jewish Holocaust... is employed as the yardstick, the ultimate criterion for assessing the scope, methods, targets, and victims of [other] genocides" (Harff, 1986).

With the intense focus on the Nazi atrocities, even more recent cases seem to pale in comparison, and have, often, remained theoretically underdeveloped, leaving the field of comparative genocide equaly impoverished (Shea, 1996). However, as the 20th century, has, not without a reason, often been called „a century of horror", it is difficult to distinguish, which of the many different types of attrocities should or should not be included in the definition of genocide.

In the first legal definition, coined in 1948 after several years of extensive lobbying by a Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, an agreement between member states has been reached, defining genocide as one of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

   a) Killing members of the group;
   b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
   c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
   d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
   e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group"

thus reflecting Lemkin's ideas on biological genocide, but rejecting much of his material on cultural genocide, which didn't promote the focus on the physical annihilation of a people, but rather a destruction of the essential cultural foundations of life of the group, which are of key importance for preservation of the identity of the group (Moses, 2010). The final genocide definition remained unmodified since 1951, and has thus not evolved in accordance with the new theoretical discussions, mostly for political reasons. Attempts to annihilate political groups and classes have, for example both been excluded from the definition, largely due to international pressures from Russia and Western Europe respectively (Harris, 08).

A number of alternative definitions have also been used since 1951, and they differ in relation to the elements which the author considers most important for defining the crime. They range from: the intent of the perpetrator, the type of acts that may be considered genocidal, the nature of the victim groups, and the role of the State as perpetrator (Fein, 1993). On the other hand, the narrowness of the UN definition has resulted in proposals of other categories, which might be used instead, such as 'state-sponsored mass murder', 'ethnocide' (practically the same as genocide), 'ethnic cleansing' (similar to genocide, albeit on a smaller scale), 'politicide' (annihilation of political oponents), fratricide (Stalin's Chistka; purges inside a party), gendercide (annihilation of a particular gender, like potential male combatants in Srebrenica), (Jones, 2006), democide[22] (any murder by governament), classicide (destruction of a social class), eliticide (murder of elites) and urbicide (destruction of cities and urban values) (Harris, 08).

As we see, many of these concepts are either quite similar to the definition of genocide (democide, ethnocide, ethnic cleansing) or they would, in most cases constitute an integrated part of genocide (urbicide, eliticide). Ethnic cleansing is probably the most interesting term here. Forcible relocations have, indeed, been practised for millennia, but as an official policy did not come into being until more recent times. In the Western world, large-scale forcible relocation of a specified "people" was introduced in the early nineteenth century United States, as the official policy of the United State government (Vardy and Tooley, 2003). As a legal category, however, the term ethnic cleansing has only been proposed recently as a result of the ICTY trial of Bosnia and Herzegovina versus Serbia and Montenegro in which it was used to dilute the seriousness of the crimes committed and justify the non-use of the term genocide. The term has since acquired a significant amount of attention, due to its ability to serve as an umbrella term for all those mass crimes, where the actual intent to commit genocide was not sufficiently established, making it a somewhat substitute for the term as well as a euphemism. Indeed, it is difficult to point towards the difference between genocide and ethnic cleansing. As we, on the one hand know that a significant number of people is usually either expelled or leave of their own free will, as a result of genocide, while we are equally aware that mass murders are always an important part of ethnic cleansing[23], we realize that the two terms overlap and the difference between them is ambigous and disputable. The alleged differentiating line between the terms genocide and ethnic cleansing becomes even more blurred when we take into consideration the fact that all genocidal states use the term „cleansing" to describe their agenda, as in accordance with

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[22] Israel Charny (along with Leo Kuper) has presented one of the most inclusive genocide definitions in the history of the field. He defines genocide as all state killings and inter group massacres. Charny draws inspiration from R.J.Rummel, as he talks about democide as a crime committed by non democratic states, like fascist or communist.

[23] German policy in Poland was based on the idea of: one third murdered, one third expelled and one third dispersed.

Bauman's gardening state theory, and the Nazi administration in Germany under Adolf Hitler applied a similar term to their systematic replacement of the Jewish people by deportation to concentration camps and/or murder, as that areas were declared *judenrein* (lit. "Jew Clean"): "cleansed of Jews" (cf. racial hygiene) (Tooley and Vardi, 2003).

These definitional reflections highlight the importance of intent for establishing a crime of genocide, but also the complications this legality causes in other theoretical disciplines. The notion of intentionality is at the heart of the UN Convention, but its usage is problematic in the social sciences, as it leads to "psychologising" its functioning when it would be preferable to analyse a policy and to describe the organizational means put into force to attain it. (Shaw, 2007)

Moreover, the notion of "intention" presupposes a simplistic vision of the descent into massacre. It appears in fact to propose a sequence of thought to action that goes from the project of destroying a collective to its concrete fulfilment; as if it consists in formulating an idea, hatching a plan along these lines and putting it into practice. But such an approach immediately disregards the fact that certain genocides have occurred as a result of a long-term process of radicalization, which evolved in several phases, and which didn't have genocide as their aim to begin with. (Mann, 2005)

On the other hand, as intent is so difficult to prove, many theorists have avoided it by claiming a genocide can be proven only if a large number of people is actually killed. (Mann, 2005). This is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, no legal action can be taken before the crime itself occurs, and also, the idea that the attempt itself should be seen as a punishable crime is completely disregarded. Secondly, this has left the door open for theorists such as Eric Markusen and Jay Lifton to define any huge massacre, such as for example Hiroshima as a case of genocide, regardless of the fact that the extermination of a group was never really an aim.

Mann considers several stages in relation to the ways a nation state negotiates "the problem of national minorities" – ranging from assimilation to extermination. 1. Assimilation, 2. Institutional coercion with segregation and forceful assimilation, 3. Physical violence and selective police repression, 4. Serious, non-controlled physical violence, employment of rape, looting, pogroms, restricting births etc., 5. Mass death by mistake, unintended wiping out of a group (typical for colonialism), 6. Premeditated mass killings with intent, classicide (Khmer Rouge), politicide (Stalin), fraternicide and genocide (Hitler) (Mann, 2005: 24).

As we can see, according to this definition, genocide is a very rare phenomenon indeed, while other modern mass murders are defined as belonging to other alternative categories. In this view, genocide can only be considered if a large number of people is murdered in an attempt to immediately and physicaly annihilate the whole group and all of its members regardless of their gender or teritory they inhabit. Genocide is not seen as overlapping with other categories, such as ethnic cleansing or eliticide, but as exclusive and isolated while other ways of physically endangering the survival of the group, apart from killing are not taken into consideration. Indeed, a genocide is only considered if it can live up to the reputation of the Holocaust. In this thesis, I intend to propose a more inclusive definition of genocide, particularly in one aspect – cultural genocide. As Bartov and others have argued, apart from the physical and practical nature of genocide, this is, more importantly, an identitarian crime, a crime which is about asserting identity, and defining „Us" (as strong, pure), in relation to and as a binary oposite of „Them" (weak, impure) (Bartov, 2000, Semelin, 2003). This is a crime of cleansing, which has deep symbolic and cultural connotations (Bauman, 1989) and as such does not only target the physical existence of the group, but also more subtle, but not less crucial aspects of its being, necessary for its continuing existence. This is why, the quest for purifying the nation is often accompanied by an attack on its memory: extermination of all evidence that the group ever lived on the teritory, including any testimonies of co-existence, and inter-marriage in particular (Friedlander, 1993). Practices with annihilatory intent, which target various identity aspects of group survival include: destruction of religious objects, libraries along with any documents that testify to the group's existence on contested teritory, elimination of persons of significance for spiritual and cultural survival of the group, such as priests, university professors, musicians, writers and poets, obstruction of gender relations and practices through rape in particular, which in traditional contexts ensures that the women are ostracized from society with the result of weakening the social and cultural bonds of a group, and destroying the group's potential for regeneration, along with the woman's role of transfering the societal norms on future generations (Allen, 1996, Stiglmayer, 1994).

In 1994, in the case of Rwandan genocide, rape has, for the first time been internationally recognized as a weapon of genocide, and there is now a growing literature on the subject which is relevant in this context. Rape conducted with the intent of impregnating the women (as in the case of Bosnian Muslims) falls within this category, as women were told that they would give birth to enemy children, who would grow up to kill them and finish the job of extermination initiated by their fathers. Although scholars like Mann do not recognize rape as an indicator of genocide, I will attempt to show in this thesis, pertaining to both Bosnian and Rwandan case, that mass rapes can be an indicator of

profound biological racism and an attempt to genetically outbreed the targeted group, in other words - genocide (Frederick, 2001, Brownmiller, 1993, Bourke, 1999).

On the other hand, it can be stated that creating a genocide definition that is overly inclusive is also a potential danger, as the concept finally loses all meaning as a consequence of such attempts. As Helen Fein argues: "if we aggregated all cases of mass death – from war, genocide, migrations, and slavery together, we would probably reach rather banal and very general conclusions" (Fein, 1993: X). The term genocide, it appears, should still have a recognizable meaning in accordance with its name: Greek genos - race, stock, kin, which therefore implies a murder of a people, defined in terms of ethnicity, race and common descent. I therefore exclude both classicide and politicide from this definition, as they do not pertain to the modern idea of the connection between blood and soil and organic nationalism, so crucial for understanding of genocide (Mann, 2005). Additionally, I find that the notion of intentionality, which the UN definition treats as key for establishing the existence of the crime, is hugely misleading. In standard murder cases, International law distinguishes between first degree or premeditated murder and a second degree, unintentional manslaughter, but these are still two categories of the same crime. Similarly, I find that genocide also can be unintentional, a result of negligence or reckless disregard for human life as was to a significant extent the case with Armenian genocide. Some settler genocides have also been known to possess elements of both intentionality, like in the case of biological warfare, where blankets contaminated with polio and small pox were handed out to the indigenous populations or forced surgical sterilisations of Native American women as well as negligence, such as with how the French arming and modernizing of Iroquois people contributed to the annihilation of the Hurons. The overall result was however a 95 % population decrease of native populations of United States of America (Tooley and Vardi, 2003).

In terms of actors, I find that genocide can solely be understood and defined through the role of the perpetrator, as the victimized community can be any and completely different from the perpetrator as such (as in the cases of indigenous genocides), and does not show anything of the nature of the venture itself. In modernist Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft theories, it is believed, that a genocide can be characterized by the level of society it occurs in (Andersen and Taylor, 2007:131). This presupposes, that the perpetrator and the victim are both a part of the same political environment and is inspired by the very specific case of Shoah. However, we need to take into consideration cases like colonial settler genocides, where the targeted group is not an integrated part of the perpetrator community. The relevance of the discussion on the nature of the perpetrator can particularly be seen if we take into consideration the two basic groups of genocide cases: colonial-settler and nation state genocides, which are created specifically with perpetrator in mind. To learn about these cases we must analyse

the attitudes and strategies of the perpetrator, as it is only through an understanding of the nature of the criminal, that we begin to understand the nature of the crime (Mann, 2005, Bartov, 2000).

Many scholars (Bauman, Bartov, Arendt etc) have pointed to the nation state as the most likely perpetrator of genocide, and this is certainly the case when we look at most 20th century examples. On the other hand, colonial settler genocides also display a certain level of modernity, but are not necessarily committed by the state, even though they often did result in total annihilation. However, even in these cases we don't have to look far to see that the most horrible crimes have, in colonial-settler cases, been committed on territories ruled by the so called liberal democracies, and were, perhaps not always committed or organized by the state, but were certainly at first silently approved of, and then openly supported. As settlers loyal to the Catholic Crown were bound by Vatican and the Catholic faith considering the natives to be uncivilized but human, the protestant democracies embraced nationalist secularism more easily and were less restricted in their treatment of natives, resulting in a much harsher treatment and far more casualties. In 1830, the US congress passed the so called Indian removal act, making genocide the official policy of the state (Vardi and Tooley, 2003, Mann, 2005).

On the other hand, we must maintain an awareness that genocide is, indeed, in no way a modern invention. Although it is often difficult to acquire evidence on the nature of slaughters which took place thousands of years ago the scholars of ancient genocide have been able to agree on a number of cases, such as the complete destruction of the Carthage city state by the Roman Empire, the annihilation of three quarters of the population of Persia by genocidal warlord Genghis Khan or various instances of genocide in classical Antiquity. Indeed, numerous written resources including the Bible talk about wiping out entire peoples, which demonstrates that the idea of genocide was in no way foreign to the pre-modern mind. Furthermore, a number of common themes can be detected that are common to both ancient and recent genocides and they include cults of antiquity and cultivation as the link between blood and soil. Indeed, agriculture and expansion has been a recurring obsession of various times, cultures and customs (Kiernan, 2007).

Finally and based on the previous, genocide might be defined as: intentional or unintentional murder in whole or in part of a social collectivity by a state or another collectivity in a position of power, where both collectivities are defined through an idea of unity based on perceived common roots. Actions that constitute genocide might therefore include: 1. attempting to take the life of individuals

simply on the grounds of their membership in the targeted group 2. Promoting or causing disappearance of entire groups as a consequence of neglect or carelesness 3. Forced removal of the group members from a certain territory claimed by the perpetrator 4. Obstruction of reproductive abilities of the group including the removal of children and rape as a weapon of genocide 5. Obstruction or destruction of identity categories, norms or customs which ensure the cultural persistence of the targeted group 6. Attempts to destroy any evidence of the group's existence in a historical and cultural context.

3.2. Genocide: preconditions and factors of detection

How and why does genocide occur? According to Mann, there are four sources of power that need to be mobilized: ideological power (referring to values, norms, myths and imagination), economic power (there is an economic interest in the annihilation, such as land, resources, military power (careers in violence) and political power (centralized territorial regulation of social life and most importantly rival claims to political sovereignty) (Mann, 2005).

Political preconditions for genocide:

1. Political and economic crisis

In the case of Armenian genocide: Ottoman war with Christianity and indebtedness, societal paranoia of complete disappearance, lost territories of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania were all present. In Germany, loss of WWI and the Versailles treaty, as Germany lost west Prussia and other Prussian provinces to Poland, Alsace and Lorraine to France, northern Schleswig to Denmark, part of upper Silesia to Czechoslovakia, and other European teritories, plus all of its colonies. In the Serbian case the collapse of the Soviet block and the Yugoslavian communist system, loss of teritories that were under Serbian control throughout the 20th century, in the kingdom of Yugoslavia. The economic crisis in the 80s related to the prices of oil, coffee and tea severely influenced both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as numerous IMF loans and reforms, which turned out to be a heavy burden on the economies rather than a way out of the crisis. In the colonial settler cases, the rivalry between the competing colonial nations has been identified as a contributing factor to genocide (Mann, 2005, Tooley and Vardi, 2003).

2. A threatened state:

Discussions on the nature of the genocidal state have been an imporant part of the debate in the field. As some have argued that we are talking about a failed state, others (like Des Forges) have pointed out that the state must be well functioning and have important resources to design, organize and execute such a vast endavour as genocide (Semelin, 2003, Rummel, 1994). It is however apparent that most genocidal states are threatened or extremely weakened states. It seems therefore that the state resorts to massacre in order to overcome its position of weakness, to ensure influence over the people and to extend its own power.

Indeed, both the Ottoman Empire and Yugoslavia (Yugoslavian state structure, bureaucracy, secret services and army was used to accomplish Bosnian genocide) were declining states whose survival was at stake. Rwandan genocide was also set in the context of continious RPF attacks that threatened to overthrow the government along with persistent western pressures to democratize. Historians Philippe Burrin and Christian Gerlach point out that the "Final Solution decision in Nazi Germany is only made after it became apparent that the war with the Soviet Union could not be won and the United States entered the war following the bombing of Pearl Harbour, making predictions increasingly bleak (December 7, 1941) (Geary, 2002: 81). Additionally, Mann shows that it is not necesary to control a whole state in order to accomplish genocide, which is reflected in both the Armenian and the Rwandan case, as a factionalized party state sometimes becomes a perpetrator. Finaly, genocidal states have often been described as totalitarian, claiming that communist and fascist states are more likely to commit mass murders (Rummel, Arendt, Fein, Bartov), which is understandable if we take into consideration the number of people murdered by the communist regimes of China, Cambodia and the Soviet Union. Other scholars have, however disputed this, claiming that states such as Serbia or Rwanda were not totalitarian, but democratic, as there were coalitions and political compromises involved throughout the genocides (Mann, 2005, Fein, 1993, Bartov, 2000, Arendt, 1962).

3. Radicalization of the state into a militarized party state and the role of paramilitary formations and irregular forces:

In modern genocide, a militarized party state is the most common perpetrator: MRND in Rwanda, Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia, and Armenian CUP etc. the Armenian genocide was the first that used criminals, intentionally released from jail in order to join paramilitary forces such as Teskilat-Mahsusa, a CUP guerrilla force. In, Serbia and Rwanda, youth and football hooligans were

recruited to create paramilitaries: Arkan's tigers, White eagles and Interhamwe respectively. In Germany, Freikorps, Wehrverbände, the SA, the SS and Einsatzgruppen were the best known. These regimes have been forced to rely on paramilitaries as regular troops were not always sympathetic to the genocidal idea. In Bosnia this resulted in a strategy, where the military would first bomb a village or a city, and then the paramilitaries would go in, kill, loot and terrorize, as the military refused to do "the dirty work" themselves (Mann, 2005, Sells, 1998).

4. Conflict over land or resources:

Land and resources are the central goal of genocide, to ensure the "living space" for future generations once and for all. The existence of Kosovo Albanians in the Serbian heartland, Armenians in the Turkish heartland, Jews in Germany etc. posed a threat to the survival of the group. In the time of crisis, the heartland must be secured, as the last shelter for the threatened nation. Kiernan explains the importance of the connection between blood and soil, and the cult of agrarianism in the emergence of genocide as primarily related to the territorial ambitions reflected in genocide. Apart from securing the heartland, genocide often consists of a plan to conquer an even bigger territory, to once and for all secure the living space for the nation. The German Lebensraum was supposed to spread deep inside the Soviet Union, while the Greater Serbia was planned along the lines of Karlovac-Karlobag-Virovitica, thus swallowing Bosnia, Macedonia, parts of Croatia and Albania. The leader of Bosnian Serbs – Radovan Karadžić, described the nature of his struggle as "a fight to the finish, a battle for living space". The Rwandan ruling Akazu house, the circle of president Habyarimana's wife's intimate friends and confidants, planned to spread their rule to parts of Uganda and Congo, as these states had significant Hutu populations (Svaldi, 1989, Des Forges, 1999, Kiernan, 2007).

5. Claims to majoritarian democracy:

Genocide and more specifically modern genocide is, paradoxically, often committed in the name of the oppressed. "We, the people", play a major part in this ideal. Holocaust was done in the name of the Volk, Bosnian genocide for "Srpski narod"[24], Rwandan for the Hutu proletariat etc. According to Mann, in multiethnic territories such as ex Yugoslavia democratization can be a problem when a majoritarian group takes the power in an ethno-nationalist context. This is why, genocide has a proletarian ring to it; it is presented as a class struggle - revolution of the people for justice and against slavery. In Rwanda, the Hutus were fighting against what they thought would be a return of feudal Tutsi monarchy, that would enslave them, while Yugoslavian Serbs attempted to prevent the return of

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[24] Serb people

the Ottoman empire as embodied in the rule of higher class Bosnian Muslims. The attempt to overcome this is thus shown as loyalty to modernity and democracy, and unwillingness to go back to a more traditional order of things (Mann, 2005, Shaw, 2003).

6. War:

Many genocides are committed either as a part of a greater war, or in the inter-war period of great turbulences. Scholars like Bartov have argued that modern war possesses annihilatory energy, while Bauman, one of the leading intellectuals in the tradition of Critical Theory, has insisted that once in movement, the modern military machine moves on per automatism making it extremely difficult to stop. He uses examples from the WWII to show how some of the destinations allies bombed in Germany were completely unnecessary, as the outcome of the war was already decided, but the military apparatus was designed to keep finding new targets. He believes that the rationale behind this is that enormous investments into technology and military need to be justified by their practical use, even if they are not by any means necessary. The use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although not genocidal, is a good example of this reasoning (Bauman, 1989, Bartov, 2000, Lifton and Markusen, 1990).

7. Purges and pogroms

Purges are a common phenomenon in a genocide scenario, as the state apparatus and the media are the first to be purified of opposing elements. In other words, politicide and fratricide may often precede genocide. Milošević started his purges of the media in 1986, and was well known for his cruel settling of accounts with oppositionaries. The murder of Ivan Stambolić, Milošević's former mentor and confidant, was a significant stain on the credibility of the regime and the beginning of its downfall. (LeBor, 2004, Heidenrich, 2002) Similarly, pogroms of Kristallnacht were a good indicator that genocide was the next step forward in "finding the final solution" for the Jewish question.

8. International complicity:

Historian Mark Levene argues that for genocide to happen, the International community must be implicated to some degree, or at least passively approve. Mass atrocities against civilian populations should not be thought of as an "aberration" of the trajectory of the nation-state, but rather as a "by-product" of the international system and the global economy. According to American political scientist Manus Midlarsky, large-scale massacres cannot occur without genocidal states benefiting

from the assistance, or at least non-interference, of other states. French complicity in Rwandan genocide, German in Armenian, and Italian in Darfur are good examples of international approval and participation. (Levene, 2005, Midlarsky, 2005)

9. Blending of demos and ethnos:

In an attempt to overcome the crisis, internal differences must be overcome first. This is usually done by applying far right ideologies such as organic nationalism and racism. In other words, in order to create a unified mass movement, needed to accomplish genocide, any stratification within society, including class must be overcome. In genocide, as Mann puts it, ethnicity must trump class. In Rwanda, Hutu nationalism was seen as the only valid political option in response to both the RPF threat, but also the threat of establishing a multiparty system, which the International community tried to impose as a part of the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programme. (Des Forges, 1999) It was the only ideology capable of uniting previously divided people around a common enemy. This organic nationalism is usually cemented with theories of ancestry and racial purity, which are then utilized to fixate the difference between "Us" and "Them", make it natural, eternal and therefore un-transcendable (Des Forges, 1999, Mann, 2005, Smith, 2010).

10. Racism

Racism is one of the main ideological preconditions for genocide. The Serb movement of Christoslavism saw Slavs as primordially Christian, thereby denying the Slavic Muslims the right to ethnic and racial belonging. As in the case of Armenia, race is here closely tied to religion. The Nazis saw themselves as a superior, Nordic race, while the Jews were seen as inferior Oriental race. In Darfur, the racial hatred between the lighter Arabs and the blacks was at the very core of the genocidal quest.

11. Conspiracy myths

Germans identified their local Jewish population with the Bolshevik enemy, while Turks looked at Armenians and saw Russia and Christian Europe. According to Serb propaganda, Bosnian Muslims were the same as the Islamic Ottoman enemy that once ruled them and often referred to them as Turks throughout the 20th century. Hutu nationalists equated their Tutsi neighbours both with the RPF forces from Uganda and the ancient Tutsi monarchy, but also with the hated Anglo-Saxon influence in the region. In fact, projecting a global enemy onto a local group makes the problematic situation seem as

solvable. The results of this are the so called conspiracy myths, very common in genocide. (Svaldi, 1989, Sells, 1998, Judah, 1997)

12. Revisionism:

Genocide is presented as an attempt to right the wrongs of the present by returning to the safety of the past. The revival of a national "golden age", like the "German" Kingdom of Charlemagne or Hutu medieval kingdoms are at the heart of this longing for antiquity and paradise lost. This is accompanied by a utopian dream of creating a perfect society, a sort of "heaven on earth". Here, it is apparent that nationalism draws some of its inspiration from earlier, millennial movements, which prophesize the coming of a kingdom of heaven on earth. (Smith, 1998, Des Forges, 1999)

13. Hate propaganda:

The role of media is crucial in the process of creating an external enemy and internal unity. It will often create feelings of exploitation claiming, for example that Armenians grew rich at the expense of Turks, Bosnian Muslims at the expense of Serbs etc. Newspapers and radio-stations, such as notorious Rwandan RTLM and Kangura, Serbian Politika and Večernje novosti, SRNA in Bosnia, German Völkischer Beobachter, Der Stürmer and numerous others served to disseminate ethnic and racial hatred, and radicalize the political atmosphere further, preparing it for genocide. Additionally, a process called mirroring, in which the population targeted for genocide is accused of planning the very crimes it is about to suffer, thereby turning the future victim into the perpetrator to justify attacks, is a very well known propaganda strategy for enticing genocide. In 2011, the editorial board of the highest circulation daily newspaper in Serbia, Politika, publicly apologized for its role in enticing hatred and inter-ethnic animosities during the wars in Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 (Mann, 2005, Semelin, 2009, Svaldi, 1989).

3.3. Roots of modern violence

In the following, the links between modernity and genocide will be established and discussed in depth, but before this can be done, a comparison between modern and pre-modern societies in relation to practices of violence must be accomplished, so that we can, with certainty decide what it is about modernity that is so conducive to genocide. Indeed, in order to come to valid conclusions about any concept, we must compare it with its antithesis. Without an awareness of the pre-modern, any

discussion on modernity could be quite useless, as it is only in relation to that which is seen as opposite that meaning is created. As the idea of modernity in relation to genocide is necessarily related to the concept of the nation state, an eclectic overview of the evolution of pre-modern monarchies into nation states along with other relevant factors that characterized this difficult period in European history, will be debated here. The roots of modern violence will be searched for in the evolution of the religious into racist, as in re-Christianisation of Europe and processes of imperialism and colonialism, Atlantic slave trade and the diffcult process of nation state formation in Europe.

It has been said that genocide is an ancient practice, yet, a growing number of scholars has shown its increasing use in modern times. (Bartov, 2000, Bauman, 1989, Arendt, 1962, Fein, 1993) According to Mann, seeing ethnic cleansing as primitive offers us comfort because it allows us to see ourselves as civilized (Mann, 2005).

Indeed, the difference between pre-modern and modern societies in relation to violence can be traced back to Tönnies' definition of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft societies, where Gemeinschaft (community), as based on primordial, natural ties such as kinship presents itself as a contradiction to the modern Gesellschaft (society), where the ties are not based on descent but on occupation and rational motives. As Tönnies proposed, in Gemeinschaft societies there is no need for external control, as the control comes from an internal sense of belonging and loyalty that members share, whereas Gesellschaft societies are marked by instrumental bonds as seen through occupation with little intimacy or solidarity. Much like customary law in Gemeinschaft communities (Gewohnheitsrecht), a function of tradition, evolved into modern legislation-law (Gesetzesrecht) which was sanctioned by its purpose outside and even against tradition and was thus monopolized by the state. Violence has also moved from the private into the public sphere, making it that much more sinister and rational as opposed to passionate pre-modern violence. In spite of the fact that Tönnies' definition presented a nostalgic view of the stable and ultimately peaceful bonds of the primary societies, his social categories were also used to demonstrate the particular barbarity of pre-modern violence, as exemplified in Andersen and Taylor's: Sociology: Understanding and Diverse Society (Tönnies, 1931: 272-279, Andersen and Taylor, 2007:131).

"Ancient hatreds" can thus not be used as a justification for atrocities, as genocides have one profoundly modern thing in common, a version of nationalism in which ethnicity trumps class. In pre-modern, multiethnic empires, the population was stratified in so many ways that a modern mass

movement that could potentially lead to genocide could never have taken place. (Dreisziger, 1990, Tooley and Vardi, 2009) Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson emphasize the role of language as one of the main agents of differentiation in the society, arguing that higher classes usually spoke a different language and had a different culture than plebs, while Latin remained the main tool for written communication as well as religious life. It seems, thus, that modern mass movements such as nationalism, which represent a key fuel for ethnic cleansing and genocide can only take place in an era of communication, where they can easily acquire new members and grow (Mann, 2005, Anderson, 2006). Also, the presence of different religions within one pre-modern empire reinforced multi-ethnicity. Mann argues that genocide requires four different types of power, which didn't exist in pre-modern times: 1. Ideological power, which is transmitted mainly through language and print, 2. Economic power (Early economies were small scale, integrating villages within walking distance. No highly integrated economies were present to generate macro-economic solidarities) 3. Military power has created most of the large states in history, however, the army alliances in pre-modern times were to the caste or the lord, rather than state or nation and 4. Political power, which in pre-modern monarchies endorsed local loyalties and identities, but in modern nation states endorses the power of "we" the people (Mann, 2005).

Mann stresses that mass movements of "we the people" evolved in two stages, firstly through the salvation religions, and secondly through secularized democracy, thus pointing out that roots of modern violence can be easily traced to pre-modern times. Monotheism created a community of all classes, where souls were democratized to become ethnicized. (Mann, 2005, Smith, 1976) Christianity was the least tolerant of the monotheistic religions, so Christian states became the defenders of faith, where heretics became the enemies to exterminate, particularly Muslims and Jews who were being portrayed as monsters, killers of Christ or even animals (Mann, 2005). However, although bloodthirsty, religions sought primarily to convert, rather than to exterminate. Salvation religions were the first predisposition for a mass movement, creating mass literacy and solidarity, sharing of culture across classes and regions. Ethnic cleansings often followed religious wars between 15th and 17th century, as the Islamic threat made the situation complicated and tense. Additionally, the Catholic Irish threat was subdued by military and institutional discrimination means of Protestant England. In the first unified Spain, under Ferdinand and Isabella, Jews were forced to leave the country in mass expulsions called Limpieza de Sangre (cleansing of the blood). This, according to Mann, constitutes religious cleansing, but other sources point towards the fact that this was indeed a first case of organised racism in Europe, beginning already from the first racial law in Toledo in 1445. In England, Catholicism became anglicized as the Bible was translated into English, and so, the English national identity began to emerge, even though Englishness didn't become fully institutionalized until 16th century, under Henry VIII (Mann, 2005, Smith, 1976, Anderson, 2006).

The 30 years war between Catholics and Protestants ended in 1648 with the famous treaty of Westphalia, and from then on the religion of the ruler became the religion of the state (Cuius regio eius religio). In effect, this meant that foreign forces could no longer come to aid religious minorities or interfere in internal questions, as was previously custom, meaning that the first fundaments of national sovereignty were established. In this way, states became supreme over religion, which was placed in their service, and the era of the nation state began, as even cleansings eventually became institutionalized (Mann, 2005).

Another direct influence on the nature of modern violence can be found in the age of European imperialism and the new racial categories which came as a result of the conquerings. In "Origins of totalitarianism", Arendt claims that it was the European imperialist expansions, along with the establishment of white settler colonies, that were in part to blame for the development of new European racial and cultural superiority theories and their violent consequences as horrors of modernity (Arendt, 1962). From 15th to 17th century, the so called age of exploration, a periodic bridge between the middle ages and early modern peirod, Europeans have been preoccupied with the notion of discovering new lands. In some cases, these would be merely trade colonies, like Portugal's silk trade with China and Japan, but in others, and later on, settlers wanted to move to new lands, wanting to create a living space for themselves, like in Australia or North America. As modernization in terms of scientific progress and industrialization in Europe brought overpopulation and lack of resources, the need to expand the national teritory became of utmost importance. As Mann shows, the greater the need was to actually move to the new area, and the lesser the need to use the native force in terms of labour, the more prominent the killings became, and the more probable the genocide (Mann, 2005). Scholars have shown that in order to understand the relationship between modernity and mass killings, one only has to look to the peripheries of the European (and other Western) imperialist states of the late nineteenth century. Theorists have also shown a clear link between colonial-settler genocides and the ones that would later be committed by modern nation states (Langbehn and Salama, 2011). It is worth noting that almost all commanding generals in the First World War—Joffre, Falkenhayn, Pershing, and many others had spent at least a part of their careers planning and carrying out colonial wars (Tooley and Vardi, 2009).

In colonies, both liberal and organic ideas of democracy existed, but the settlers soon began to construct their own identities around the idea of "civilization and progress" which they saw as the opposite of the identity of the natives, whom they saw as barbaric and primitive, as modernity became

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a tool of the oppressor. These differences were explained through racial theories, where lower races could, under no circumstances, be included in "we, the people". Many liberal democracies had their dark side in the colonies (Mann, 2005). In "direct rule" colonies, which were pioneered by the English in North America, where settlers came in large numbers, claiming the land for themselves, while the Atlantic slave trade provided the working force, the nationalist movement of "we, the people" didn't need to include natives. It is not probable that any of the states actually planned on exterminating the indigenous peoples, but through deliberate measures as well as oversight, negligence and carelessness, this turned out to be the case. In the 19th century, the US government claimed to have signed a treaty with the Indian nation, but settlers were in the majority of cases left to do what they wanted with no control from the state. In territories under Spanish rule, killings were restricted, as it was believed that natives were barbarians, but still had souls. In Protestant territories, however, the new racial theories were more quickly adopted, focusing on the white man's superiority over the indigenous sub-humans, and providing an endless range of racist metaphors which have come to play a significant part in most genocidal ideologies of the 20th century. Mann points out how Catholic empires were ethnically inclusive, while settlers like Jefferson and Roosevelt were not. On the one hand, the conquistadors primarily wanted gold but were quite amazed by the level of progress they discovered among the civilizations of the Maya and the Aztecs. They were thus willing to convert the natives to their own faith, and even intermarry with them. In Mexico, natives could even use the courts to sue Spaniards.

In Australia, a completely different scenario unfolded. With social Darwinism gaining in popularity, the settlers believed that whites were a completely different species from the natives. Things were additionally complicated by the fact that both groups needed plenty of space, settlers for cattle herding, and natives to maintain their hunter-gatherer life-style. Aboriginal resistance made the whites, encouraged by the lack of state interest, resort to genocide, as ethnicity trumped class. Most settlers committed genocides on their own, and especially, thanks to an absence of a highly functional and institutionalized local state. Both Hitler and Himmler referred to American genocide as an example to be followed. Then, in the late 19th century, more modern colonial quests took place. Russia in Caucasus had a modern army, influenced by notions of systemic definitive warfare, and cleansed the territory of natives. They used the term depopulation to describe ethnic cleansing. The perpetrator was a tsarist state, advised by the military high command. Another example of settler genocide was the role of Germany in West Africa. In the beginning, Germans were drawn to more liberal ideas of civilizing and assimilating the natives. However, due to the weakness of the Kaiser, who commanded the army independently of the Reichstag[25], the military commanders were given de facto free hands to act as they pleased. Provoked by the Herero rebellions and encouraged by new racist theories, the

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[25] The German state was at this point dual with a traditional military authoritarian monarchy and newer representative democracy.

experienced General Von Trotha was given the difficult task of complete annihilation – Vernichtung, using methods such as murders, water poisoning, and even introducing concentration camps. Many scholars have shown a definitive link between German militarism in West Africa and the Nazis (Mann, 2005, Langbehn and Salama, 2011).

In Europe itself, the rise of "national" awareness at the end of the eighteenth century spread across Europe from West to East. By the middle of the century, some nationalist leaders and thinkers were already thinking in terms of an exclusivist doctrine calling for the nation to correspond with the state, that is, to make political borders correspond with ethnic or linguistic borders. Since precise ethnic boundaries hardly existed anywhere in Europe, any planning for such new "nations" necessitated thinking about what to do with individuals from other ethnic groups who were left on the inside of someone else's national state (Smith, 1976). Carrying out such exclusivist ethnic nationalism was approached in a number of ways in various settings, and a number of small states moved toward policies of ethnic exclusion in the nineteenth century. It was on the peripheries of the great European empires (including especially the Ottoman Empire) that a sharp-edged, ethnicity-oriented attitude led to a variety of policies of forced assimilation, expropriation of property, violence, and in several cases, mass killing.

3.3.1. Modern state and genocide

As we have seen previously, the evolution of the pre-modern monarchy into nation state through the evolution of nationalism is directly related to an increase in violence, first in colonies, where modernity becomes the tool of the oppressor, but also in homelands. Indeed, a number of scholars have linked the emergence of the so called "era of genocide" to modernity and the development of the nation state, its structures and ideologies. In other words, a phenomenon as vast as genocide could only be committed by an organization as powerful and sophisticated as the state, its bureaucracy and propaganda machines, its technology and military power. This is why the modern state will be placed at the very centre of our debates which aim at establishing a relationship between genocide and modernity, while each of the following subchapters will present a different theme that makes the state relevant in relation to genocide: 1) Nationalism as an exclusionary state ideology 2) Modern racism as a murderous state policy and 3) Instrumental rationality as state mentality (Bartov, 2000, Fleming, 2003, Weitz, 2003, Hull, 2003, Bauman, 1989), but let us first have a look at the genocidal state.

According to Mann, murderous cleansing is modern, because it represents the dark side of democracy, as this always implies the possibility of majority tyrannizing minority, particularly in the context of organic nationalism. Another scholar, Wimmer, argues that "Modernity is structured by ethnic and nationalist principles, because the institutions of citizenship, democracy and welfare are tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion (Wimmer, 2002). Most cases of mass violence in the 20th century that emerged during the war were associated with the state, encouraged by the state, and in most cases carried out by the state. We will do well, therefore, to link the history of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century to the theoretical work on nationalism by John Breuilly and John Hutchinson, both of whom have emphasized the role of the state in the creation of political nationalism and politicized national groupings since the seventeenth century. Certainly it has been the states, and indeed the most "total" states of Europe, which have engaged in violent population politics on the largest scale (Hutchinson 1987, Breuilly, 1982).

Ever since the Westphalia treaty established the roots of the modern state and its sovereignty, the international policy of non-interfering has guaranteed the state's right to commit genocide. For one state to accuse another of genocide, would thus mean to delegitimize its existence. The policy of non-interference has been the main obstacle to putting a stop to various genocides of the 20th century, as states are often reluctant to endanger diplomatic relationships with other states (Kuper, 1981). Tooley describes how International law has allowed a gray zone in which killings of the innocent became allowed, and which he relates to the emergence of ethnic cleansing. The Geneva convention from 1860, he claims, which was meant to protect civilians also states that persons without uniform who display military behavior can be viewed as enemy. Firstly, this meant that partisans were hiding in the civilian populations so as to go unnoticed, but it also resulted in soldiers being more trigger happy in contact with civilians. Furthermore, this meant that if certain segments of the population had any contact or affiliation (ethnic or other) with a regularly organized enemy army, they could then easily be placed outside the law, by beeing simply redefined as enemy (Tooley, 2009). Also, the state's monopoly on violence (Weber in Parsons, 1964:154.) has been associated with the internal security of the state's population. States have likewise tended to identify as war even the domestic use of state violence. State violence, or the threat of it, is crucial in manipulating specific "domestic" population groups (Vardi and Tooley, 2009). According to Schmitt the political is predicated on a friend and enemy relationship between and within states, the ultimate manifestation of which is the willingness to die and kill in a war against a recognized collective enemy. Without this relationship, argues Schmitt, politics and therefore the state, would remain meaningless (Schmitt in Bartov, 2000).

What is it then that makes a nation state such a fine killing machine? In comparison with earlier forms of governing, e.g. multinational empires, the borders of a nation state are much more rigid, and less inclusive. More importantly, the process of European modernization and the very creation of the nation states was a process marked by murderous cleansing, forced expulsion of hundreds of thousands of people and forced lingual and cultural assimilation, where entire languages such as Cornish and Cumbrian became extinct (Mann, 2005, Anderson, 2006).

As it consolidated its domestic and international status, the nation state was simultaneously beset by visions of decadence and degeneration, chaos and anarchy, disintegration and subversion, invasion and destruction. Europe on the eve of WWI was a society hunted by inarticulate fears and anxieties just as much as it was propelled forward by a fervent faith in progress and science. Domestic unity seemed to facilitate the eternal grandeur of a nation, paradoxically - it also appeared to be in imminent danger of social, political and moral upheaval. A source of confidence and security, the national community, also generated anxieties about its potential dissolution, seemingly under attack from all quarters: organized labour from below, destabilization of traditional gender roles from within, and deterioration of international relations from without. Moreover, confidence in European superiority vis a vis the rest of the world, rooted in the newly conquered vast colonial empires, was undermined by fears of the West's vulnerability to infiltration by other races and civilizations and the alarm about the biological degeneration of the white race.

WWI brought identity clarity, as suddenly everyone knew where they belonged, there were only two sides to choose from, and everyone was forced to identify with the nation state (Bartov, 2000). In fact, it is only after WWI that the full blown era of nation states takes over Europe, and these states are far more lethal than their pre-modern counterparts. Their weapons, transport and administrative technology have escalated the efficiency of mass bureaucratic killings (Bauman, 1989). The kind of genocide typical for a nation state is no longer committed on its periphery in the colonies, against those who are different and opposite of „Us", but takes pleace at the heart of the state itself, and is aimed against an internal, hidden enemy, which resembles us, talks like us, and maybe even is us (Bartov, 2000).

Many scholars have described genocide as a failure of democracy, or even perversion of democracy, which breeds authoritarian and totalitarian states (Arendt, 1962). According to Mann, genocides are committed by modern, technocratic militarized one party states with their ability to blend coercion,

careerism and country, resting on mobilized mass movements (Mann, 2005). The use of educational systems can be mentioned as a good example of this coercion, as schools often taught national history in propagandistic and mythologized versions (especially during conflicts). Wolf Kaiser analyses how states instead of democratic become authoritarian and totalitarian after First World War (Kaiser, 2002). After the fall of the great European dynasties: Romanovs, Habsburgs and Ottomans, many new nation states in Europe came into existence and there was a massive redrawing of borders. The new citizenship laws excluded millions of ethnic minorities from attaining citizenship in the countries where they lived. As a result, the Nansen passport was promoted as a travel document that allowed these refugees to travel to a country that would have them. Additionally, the economic disruption of the war and the end of the Austro-Hungarian customs union created great hardship in many areas. Although many states were set up as democracies after the war, one by one, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, they reverted to some form of authoritarian rule, as most south and east European countries had to face political unrest, dictatorship and fascism in the period between the World Wars (Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, 2008). Additionally, under the guise of WWI, the first modern genocide took place, as a consequence of the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire and its relations with the Christian world (Bloxham, 2005).

The inability of Europe to fully democratize in the aftermath of WWI lies in the fact that this democracy relied on majoritarian representation and the generation of mass movements, as the aftermath of WWI was characterized by the emergence of totalitarianism, a political system where the state recognizes no limits to its authority and strives to regulate every aspect of public and private life wherever feasible. In order to stay in power, single party totalitarian regimes like Nazism or Stalinism used propaganda disseminated through the state-controlled mass media and mass surveillance along with the widespread use of terror to establish total control over the economy and citizens through regulation and restriction of speech. According to Arendt, totalitarian movements drew their inspiration from imperialist biological racism and were propelled into existence by the event of total industrial war, which combined modern science and technology, universal mobilization of soldiers and workers and an elaborate surveillance apparatus with the aim of controlling and moulding the conduct and mind of the public. An unlimited expansionist policy and a quest for purity were both integral parts of this racism, making totalitarianism necessarily opposed to the territorially delimited nation-state, thus always pushing to extend its borders (Arendt, 1962, Geyer and Fitzpatrick, 2008).

However, what differentiates a totalitarian state from an authoritarian one is the use of utopia. Bauman claims that "utopia is born with the advent of modern mentality, with the shift in human self-

understanding from God to human beings as the creator of the grand design of the world", while Fein insists that victims of the 20th century genocides were murdered in order to fulfil the state's design for a new order (Bauman, 1989: 92, Fein, 1993). Similarly, Naimark argues that ethnic cleansing is a product of the most advanced stage of the modern state, reflecting its need for order, transparency and responsiveness (Naimark, 2002). Indeed, utopia can be described as a society of perfect order, where nature does not disrupt anything, as men guard its borders. It is therefore not surprising that utopian states should emerge after wars and long and debilitating crisis, as they promise protection, safety and abundance, the ultimate control over life's unpredictability. Utopian visions such as Hegelian Weltgeist and Giuseppe Mazzini's optimistic fraternity of national liberation movements were directly related to the emergence of nation state (Bauman, 1989:92, Bartov, 2000, Arendt, 1962).

The vision of creating a perfect society has marked the era of the nation state formation, in both communist and ethno-nationalist countries, but unlike certain utopias that do not necessarily contain the idea of end stage, like, for example Nozick's idea of minimal state, which substitutes utopian process for a utopian end state and sees the utopian minimal state as a breeding ground for new, experimental utopias (Nozick, 1974), the modern genocidal utopia operates with a notion of the "final stage", as is typical for European romantic nationalism around the turn of the century (Lowy, 1992). As Bauman argues: genocide arrives as an integral part of the process through which the grand design is implemented: the design gives it the legitimation; state bureaucracy gives it vehicle and the paralysis of society gives it the road clear sign (Bauman 1989:114). Genocide is thus seen, as a success of modernity and rationality in which the sheer act of getting rid of the adversary is not an end in itself, but the perfect society is (Bartov, 2000, Bauman, 1989, Arendt 1962). According to Browning, Holocaust is a case of extermination of the primitive eastern European villager and backward Jewish merchant in the blind fight for progress (Browning, 2000).

The basic idea, behind the notion of final remodelling is that people have to be assisted and guided to become truly human. A man can supposedly only become truly human through the process of civilisation and submerging the animal in him. Morally, unless taught and trained, he will act against his own good will, an attitude well observed in the European behaviour in the colonies. Making people happy means forcing them to abandon their wants, as men are equated with children-animals, thus entirely delegitimizing the authority of the individual. However, the sheer process of attempting to escape the animalistic necessarily involves violence as the animal must be purged. According to Arendt, the human-animal dichotomy is projected onto the superiority-inferiority relations between collectives. Genocide is, thus, about establishing the society of control by purging everything

uncontrollable and unpredictable, nature in particular. The new man will not accept any laws that are not made by him, as he now has become a deity, replacing the lost Christian God (Adorno, 1972).

There are different kinds of utopian ideals, from Plato's Republic to communist and capitalist utopias, but utopias characteristic for genocidal contexts share a romantic nostalgia typical for German romantic nationalism at the turn of the century. As they are a result of a great societal frustration and dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, they seek inspiration in the idea of returning to pre-modern paradise, one that existed before the emergence of racial pollution which is seen as a cause of the difficulties the nation is facing in the present. Recollections of mythical past are, thus, typical for this type of reasoning. Walter Benjamin's vision of utopia, even though it cannot be defined as fascist, but rather a reaction to Nazism in terms of shock and disbelief, shares key utopian elements of its time, as it identifies progress as modernity with doom and advocates a return to a primitive, classless society, as embodied in the image of Angelus Novus (Benjamin, 2009). As a vision of ultimate control, utopia proposes final solutions to perennial questions of human existence and social organization, reflecting the growing predominance of science and technology, mass politics and state control, secularization and alienation. However, there is violence ingrained in the very idea of utopia, as the notion of remaking also implies radical change. In Bauman's words: "Utopias possess a quality of a knife with the edge pressed against the future" (Bauman, 1976:12).

Indeed, the main characteristics of solid modern gardening utopias, where racist genocidal societies are cleansed of their minorities just like gardens are cleansed of weeds, are their finality and their territoriality, a quest for a definitive Lebensraum similar to the Blood and Soil ideology behind the Holocaust. As dreams of heaven after earth perished with the death of God, the new heaven was to be made on earth, as humans became God. Indeed, pre-modern utopias, which Bauman terms "gamekeeping utopias" longed for a paradise, but trusted in God's plan, therefore not interfering in the course of events, much as gamekeepers do not feed the vegetation or the animals, which inhabit the territory entrusted to their care. Remodelling of societies with violence in active pursuit of utopia was a strictly modern endeavour (Bauman in Jacobsen, 2008: 217). One could even say that the sheer notion of the "final solution" is sustained in the very essence of a utopian society and its quest for purification and creation of a new man.

According to Arendt, the goal of totalitarian society is not control, but making control unnecessary by recreating humanity in a manner that would ensure its acceptance of and active participation in the new society. Totalitarianism is a modern utopia brought to its ultimate concrete conclusion: obsessed

with mobilizing mass society and employing the most sophisticated technological means and administrative practices to establish its rule, it simultaneously strives to put an end to history and to prevent any movement beyond what it perceives as the utopian faze. Once it finally purifies everything, thus achieving a paradise on earth, the history will stop; there will be no more linear progress to strive for. Humanity will have achieved its purpose (Arendt, 1962, Woodley, 2009).

3.3.2. Nationalism

Another element that links the modern nation state with genocide is nationalism. Nationalism is a modern secular movement and a central feature of modern social change that emerges in Europe in post-enlightenment era. It is based on an imagined belonging the members share, to a nation as a political entity, and which is based on an idea of common culture and history, particular for the group in question. According to Smith, citizen self-government, a territorial home and a distinctive ethnic history are all fundamental goals of nationalist movements. In the history of Europe, nationalism replaced the need for religious belonging as such, while still providing a belief that transforms fatality into continuity and an imaginary link with ancestors. There can be several types of nationalism, but according to Hobsbawm, the common final aim of any nationalist movement is always sovereignty of a new state where there before was none, so the movement always carries with it a tension related to a conflict of territory[26] (Hobsbawm, 1992). According to Smith, every real nationalist movement must be able to mobilize people from all classes and unite them under a fraternity ideal, trumping all else and presenting itself as the only genuine identity (Smith, 1976). According to Outhwaite, European nationalisms developed in the 19th century and underpinned the mass wars of the 20th century (Outhwaite, 2008: 120). Additionally, nationalism is one of the main, some even say decisive factors in what we call modern genocide. History has seen plenty of massacres, but it is precisely the embittered, organic nationalism of the Armenian genocide, brought on by the fall of the Ottoman Empire that makes it the first, so called, modern genocide. Contrarily to its predecessor, the colonial-settler Herero-Nama genocide, which was also committed by a state in a transitional form between a multinational empire and a modern nation state, the Young Turk regime was characterized by a political mass movement with the ideology of purification (Mann, 2005). In order to unite, Turkey had to transcend class conflicts and ethno-nationalism presented itself as the best solution, as it was believed that multinationalism corrupted and destroyed the empire. But is nationalism truly a modern invention?

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[26] Mazzini, one of the key nationalist thinkers claimed that every nation must have the right to form a sovereign state, but also that all members of this nation should be included in such a state.

The term nationalism was coined by Johann Gottfried Herder (nationalismus) during the late 1770s and its development is closely related to that of the modern state and the push for popular sovereignty that surfaced with the French Revolution and the American Revolution in the late 18th century and culminated with the ethnic/national revolutions of Europe, 1848. The emergence of nationalism can be linked to different phenomena, but the most important are the scientific advances (such as the invention of telescope), which created a disillusionment with the previous religious order and monarchies as state structures legitimized by God and divine rule. In dynasties, everything revolves around the centre, and people are treated as subjects, not citizens, but nationalism in early modern Europe, represented a promise of freedom and rights for all (Mann, 2005, Smith, 1976, Hobsbawm, 1992, Arendt, 1962). Parallel to this, the reduction of privileged access to particular script languages takes place (e.g. Latin), which, along with the emergence of the printing press within the system of print capitalism, forever alters the European way of life. According to Anderson, the book was the first modern style, produced industrial commodity, while as Hegel noticed, as everyone began reading morning newspapers at the same time, a much needed substitute for the ritual of Morning Prayer was provided and a sense of community formed (Arendt, 1962, Anderson, 2006). Anderson emphasizes that nationalism only comes into being as three fundamental cultural conceptions lose their axiomatic grip: a particular script language (Latin), which offers the privileged exclusive access to ontological truth, a monarchical order in which the rulers rule by divine dispensation, while serving as some sort of contact with the divine and finally, temporality in which history and cosmology are indistinguishable, and the origins of world and man identical. Nationalism provided a completely new way of linking fraternity, power and time together (Anderson, 2006).

Language plays a crucial role in the development of nationalism, as print capitalism, reformation and the decline of the imaginary kingdom of Christendom and the development of administrative vernaculars contributed a great deal to the dethronement of Latin, particularly from the point when the Bible was translated into vernaculars. The new nations were created around new vernaculars. Nationalism inspired the processes whereby folk epics, retold legends and even fairy tales, published in existing dialects, were combined with a modern syntax to create a "revived" version of a language. Patriots would then learn that language and raise their children speaking it, as part of a general program to establish a unique national identity, which was facilitated by the role of populist education. "Landsmål", which is the foundation of modern Norwegian, is the first language to follow this program, and it was joined by modern Czech, Slovak, and Finnish and later by Hebrew as nationalizing languages. As Anderson explains, nationalism emerged around the rise of the

vernaculars as means of communication which enabled the nationalist massage to spread with speed formerly unheard of. It took 3 centuries for vernaculars to be established, but when this happened, it has given humans a direct access to history and ancestors, providing a basis for the antiquity of nationalism (Anderson, 2006, Smith, 2004). As Seton-Watson explains, the 19th century was in Europe and its peripheries a golden age of vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists and litterateurs. This intellectual activity, along with the progress of schools and universities was central to the shaping of European nationalisms. However, in this process, a linguistic cleansing took place, as numerous languages disappeared or were squeezed out by others, like Gaelic by English in Ireland. Through imperialist education, European nationalism also quickly travelled to colonies, as subjects were separated from their own religions and customs and adopted into the culture and nationalism of the ruler (Andersen, 2006, Seton Watson, 1962, Hobsbawm, 1992).

Culturally, the aim of nationalism is to create a new man, vigorous and free. This is why the ideology of nationalism combines two seemingly contradictory elements in its essence. One the one hand there is the new spirit of fascination by technological advances, and at the same time angst caused by a loss of naiveté that progress brought with it, but at the same time, nationalism comprises a populist, Rousseauan nostalgia for the simplicity and sturdiness of traditional, agricultural life, uncontaminated by urban luxury and corruption along with a scholarly component which provides it with history and legitimacy (Kiernan, 2009). Initially, modern European nationalism draws its inspiration from the pre-modern democratic ideals of the polis, like that of Sparta and Rome. From this tradition, it draws its fascination with simplicity, stoicism, purity and heroism, along with the ideals of loyalty and sacrifice in the name of community, thereby adopting neo-classicism as its political framework. As patria becomes the sublime ideal that heroic landsmen fight and die for, mottoes like "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori" (It is sweet and honourable to die for the fatherland) from Horace, Odes III, 2, 13 became widely used (Arendt, 1962, Smith, 1976).

Along with the civic neo-classicism and the new scientific scepticism as themes of the enlightened age and its focus on modern rationality, the emergence of nationalism is also influenced by another major cultural trend, that of historicist romanticism, which proved significant for the rise of nationalism, firstly due to its emphasis on historical origins, and secondly due to its admiration for genius and the concept of sublime, which is why it provided important ideological elements for utopian, totalitarian societies (Smith, 1976, Hobsbawm, 1992). Although these two nationalist trends are often regarded as opposite: neo-classicist focus on reason and the bureaucratic man as opposed to the romantic focus on emotion and origins, they have, in fact often complemented each other and can

both be found not only in early Europan nationalisms, but also in most genocidal ideologies. Indeed, it was the neo-classicist ideal of the heroic citizen and warring expansionist community of Sparta, along with romantic ideal of revival of paradise lost that provided a basis for modern genocide propaganda.

According to Smith, nationalism draws inspiration from several pre-modern European trends. The cult of millennialism, from the Middle Ages, which propagated the second coming of Christ and the arrival of a new golden age: a heaven on earth. Millennialism presupposes a linear conception of time, a revolutionary leap from the corrupt past into perfect future and terrestrial salvation which is limited to a chosen group of people. With nationalism, millennialism shares a new kind of morality, an ideal of terrestrial social justice and a universal ethic of cosmic love and revolutionary fraternity in a struggle for the poor. However, as opposed to the nationalism which attempts to resurrect the past, millennialism turns its back on it. Smith also talks about neo-traditionalism, in which a modernist, secular, nationalist ideology takes on an atavistic, even fundamentalist religious being. Egyptian Muslim brotherhood and Japanese 1868 revival of Shinto are used as examples of contexts in which nationalism has had to adapt to a more traditional consciousness of the people. Reformism, or a movement of religious reform, is another source of inspiration for nationalism. Leaders of both movements are often drawn from the same constituencies, and both movements can be said to represent some sort of reaction to modernisation. In Germany, a revival of emotional Christianity of Schleiermacher and Fichte in 1800, pantheist and deist Christianity, created a climate for return to the organic Gothic past, which stimulated both romantic nationalism and racial nationalism of völkisch writers. After 1850, an emotionalized and Germanized Christianity became increasingly identified with Edic and Nordic religion and pre-Christian German tribes, while Slavophile conservatives in Russia adapted their Orthodox religion to romantic and Hegelian revolutionary ideas. The reformist movement has much in common with nationalism, particularly an evolutionary framework and an optimistic outlook with the aim of creating a new man, self-reliant and free. Finally, from the neo-classical, secular ideal of assimilation, nationalism drew its concept of popular sovereignty and citizenship within a recognized territorial homeland (Smith, 1979).

Smith emphasizes three main elements that nationalist movements create their commonality around: History and historicism is particularly important as a unifying element in independence struggles. This element is often politically manipulated or completely invented in the form of myth. Language and culture are the second key element here as cultural traits are used to differentiate a group from its neighbours. According to Fichte and Hegel, language is an essential criterion for nationhood, as secession movements are often linguistic. Finally, secularisation is a precondition for the already mentioned elements. However, religion does often play an important part in nationalism, like in the

Balkans, as a distinguishing line between the groups that share common language and culture. Smith recognizes a paradox in the very essence of the nationalist ideal, as it exists in an imaginary fairytale world of heroes and dragons, while at the same time aiming for some very rationalist goals. Indeed, the nationalist mythology was needed to substitute religious mythology and symbolism, thereby making nationalism a modern frame for a pre-modern content. This dichotomy presents a danger in the world of nationalism. In fact, as the movement has to become transformed from the mythological battleground to the normal world of ordinary citizens, a danger to the movement presents itself. In order to survive, nationalism must preserve some kind of inner conflict, thereby making it a potential fundament for projects of mass expulsions or murder (Smith, 1979, Hobsbawm, 1992).

However, it is important to underline that nationalism didn't take the same form in whole of Europe. The "state-driven" theories of the origin of nation-states tend to emphasise a few specific states, such as France and its rival England. These states expanded from core regions, and developed a national consciousness and sense of national identity as a consequence ("Frenchness" and "Englishness"), while both assimilated peripheral regions (Wales, Brittany, Aquitaine and Occitania).

The French Revolution is said to have paved the way for the modern nation-state, as intellectuals began questioning the old monarchical order and encouraged the development of a popular nationalism committed to re-drawing the political map of the continent. The French Revolution, by destroying the traditional structures of power in France and territories conquered by Napoleon, was the instrument for the political transformation of Europe. Revolutionary armies carried the slogan of "liberty, equality and brotherhood" and ideas of liberalism and national self-determinism, as the first call to defend the patria were made. The national project also grew out of an intellectual reaction to the Enlightenment that emphasized national identity and developed a romantic view of cultural self-expression through nationhood (Hibbert, 2001).

However, as Hobsbawm argues, the French state actually preceded the formation of the French people, as French nationalism only emerged at the end of the 19th century. At the time of the 1789 French Revolution, only half of the French people spoke some French, and between 12% to 13% spoke it "fairly" (Bartov, 2000, Hobsbawm, 1992). The French state promoted the unification of various dialects and languages into the French language, a process quite similar to England, where languages like Cornish and Cumbrian disappeared in the process of unification. Generally speaking,

arguments have been made that French and English nationalist projects were somewhat less problematic than others, as both these countries could, to some extent, assume a common history and culture, and didn't need to overemphasize their distinctiveness.

Other nation-states, such as Germany, came into existence at least partly as a result of political campaigns by nationalists, during the nineteenth century. In both cases, the territory was previously divided among other states, some of them very small. The sense of common identity was at first a cultural movement, such as in the *Völkisch movement* in German-speaking states, which rapidly acquired a political significance. In these cases, the nationalist sentiment and the nationalist movement clearly precede the unification of the German and Italian nation-states (Turner, 2007: 154).

In Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Hungary and Norway, local hostility to alien dynastic authority started to take the form of nationalist agitation. Nationalism came to be seen as the most effective way to create the symbols of resistance and to unite in a common cause. The first national revolution was in Serbia (1804-1817) which created the first nation-state in Central Europe. Success came in Greece where an eight-year war (1821-1829) against Ottoman rule led to an independent Greek state; in 1831 Belgium obtained independence from the Netherlands. Over the next two decades nationalism developed a more powerful voice, spurred by nationalist writers championing the cause of nationalist self-determination. In 1848, revolutions broke out across Europe, sparked by a severe famine and economic crisis and mounting popular demand for political change. In Italy Giuseppe Mazzini used the opportunity to encourage a war for national unity. By this time the ideals of European nationalism had been exported worldwide and were now beginning to threaten the colonial empires still ruled by European nation-states (Law, 2009, Fanon, 1994).

As we can see, different forms of nationalism developed in Europe, as it has spread from West to East. According to Mann, this resulted in two different versions of "we the people": organic and stratified, or ethnic and civic, as some have defined it (Smith, 1976, Mann, 2005). Smith distinguishes between a) Gradualist routes, where the nationalist goal is achieved without major rupture, with England as the prime example, and b) Nationalist routes, where the goal of the nation state was accomplished through revolutionary and violent efforts of nationalist movements (Smith, 1976). If people are diverse and stratified, then the role of the state is to mediate, but if people are ethnic, unified and organic, a fusion of demos and ethnos, then, purity may be maintained by suppression of deviant minorities, and it is

often the latter type that theorists have linked to ethnic cleansing and genocide. Liberalism stresses individualism, and liberal democracies (stratified peoples) were said to protect human rights, but even these were known to commit atrocities, in colonies, however, rather than in homelands. It is, indeed, the exclusive nature of the nationalist project that makes it a potential basis for violence.

In societies characterized by civic nationalism, like the US, the category of "we the people" was also exclusive. The American founding fathers didn't include women, slaves or Native Americans in the definition of the people, while British politicians differentiated between "we", the people, and the populace/crowd. "The people" usually comprised of gentlemen, merchants, manufacturers, artisans and all those who shared a common stake in the nation, thereby excluding on the bases of class rather than ethnicity. People could vote, populace could not (Mann, 2005). According to Mann, institutionalization of class conflict has been the main political accomplishment of the modern west, generating liberal, and then social-democratic states, in which class trumped ethnicity, thus not providing conditions for a violent mass movement that could potentially target minority groups for extinction.

The second variant of "we, the people" is the ethnic/organic ideal that developed in Central and Eastern Europe, later than in the Western, along with the spread of capitalism and industrialism. At this time the democratic ideal was already politically mature, so in these countries, the vote was not limited, but the parliamentary sovereignty was limited instead, as the parliament had to share power with a monarch (German Kaiserreich). In Eastern Europe, the region was dominated by multiethnic, dynastic empires: Habsburgs, Romanovs, and Ottomans, who didn't care for the national ideal. When subordinate classes demanded political representation, this became entwined with imperial versus proletarian ethnic conflict. Contrary to stratified nationalism, the organic type was created around the idea of the struggle for independence, while the colonizers then, in return created their nationalism around this rebellion, placing conflict at the very centre of ethnic nationalism (Germans, Turks, Russians) (Mann, 2005). In 1882, in Austria, 3 young politicians propounded the Linz programme for a new party- Deutsche Volkspartei, a party of German nationalism, universal suffrage and progressive social legislation. Instead of a constitution enshrining the conflict of interest; they wanted a unity for the good of all people, rejecting equally liberalism, laissez faire capitalism and Marxism. Here, the organic version of nationalism was first conceptualized. People came to be seen as a singular essence that transcends class conflict, a nation as a community of people who are of single origin, single physical type, single character, language, customs, culture and goals. Minority communities and political opponents could then easily be excluded from the full membership of the nation. In late 19th century, millions of eastern Europeans fled from the countries where they constituted minorities (i.e.

Slovaks, Croats, Germans, Slovenes, Jews). In order to create an ethnically homogenized state, one of four policies had to be adopted: mass assimilation or conversion by state force, mass expulsion of population or ethnic cleansing, genocide or the creation of an apartheid system which turns non-members of the dominant group into foreigners or a legally inferior underclass of sub citizens. Mass violence has, indeed, quickly become an integrated part of ethno- nationalist movements (Hobsbawm, 1992).

It can be summarized that civic nationalism is exercised in those areas where there exists a civil society, where the society is individualized and stratified into classes and competing interest groups, but both individuals and the nation are subordinate to the state. An individual has the option of choosing which nation she/he wishes to belong to and enjoys legal equality along with the other members of the nation. Civic nationalism is therefore more inclusive and complementary to liberal democracy than the populism of organic nationalism (Mann, 2005, Hobsbawm, 1992).

Ethnic or organic nationalism[27] on the other hand is determined by descent. Attachments are inherited and not chosen, representing the exclusivist element of this type of nationalism. Ethnic nationalism essentially starts out from the point of inferiority, as it is created in response to dominance of western imperialism and radicalizes in order to survive, progress, modernise, and be successful. German long-term attempts to compete with British economy are a useful example in this case. To achieve this and become equals in the new modernity, the people in these regions must unite as groups that would be politically recognised in the form of a nation-state, but in the absence of societal institutions that may unite these people (such as class in civic nationalism), these groups have to turn to internal criteria, like language, race, culture, customs, religion, etc., drawing what they can from the Volk to set them apart from foreigners in order to assert their identity, while they continuously compete with an image of a "political enemy" (Schmitt, 1996).

WWI escalated organic nationalism, finally destroying most multinational states and through mass citizen armies provided military, then paramilitary models of popular collective action in the pursuit of national goals. It cemented the nation states. After the Versailles treaty it was hoped that minorities would go to the countries where they would constitute a majority. Apart from Yugoslavia and

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[27] Organic nationalism if often equated with romantic nationalism, although Smith argues against this, as romantic nationalist elements can be found in all types of European nationalism. For instance, romantic nationalist elements mixed with Enlightenment rationalism can be found in the rhetoric used in British North America, in the colonists' Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution of 1787.

Czechoslovakia, all new states were at least 65% mono-ethnic. People were later forced to migrate as citizenship became equated with ethnicity. As a result, ethnicity trumped class. Mann highlights as dangerous those cases in which majority ethnicity can rule through majoritarian democracy, thus turning elections into ethnic censuses (Mann, 2005).

3.3.3. Racism and scientific racism

Modern racism plays a crucial role in execution of genocide as an institutionalized state policy. However, in spite of many common beliefs, race and racism are not modern inventions. Throughout history, they have played a significant role in helping people make sense of their social and cultural position. Pre-capitalist and pre-modern racism existed in Europe and elsewhere, independently of the European influence. Indeed, in the writings of ancient philosophers and medieval theologians, and scholars, origins of racial thinking can be found. In the naturalised superiority of Hellenic culture in relation to barbarian otherness as well as the fixed differences between Greek citizens and slaves we recognize the derivation of the cultural characteristics of the group from its biological characteristics (Delacampagne in Law, 2009:4). Additionally, the colour symbolism in both Greek and Roman cultures, which reserved superior status for whiteness, while associating blackness with death and underworld have strongly influenced modern ways of thinking. According to Benjamin Isaacs, linking the character of peoples with hierarchies determined by blood ties and lineage, along with the eugenic assumptions that mixed descent would corrupt human qualities, are easily found in classical antiquity. Isaacs makes an important connection between classical imperialism and proto-racism, where identification of subordinate, animal-like groups were used to justify the Roman institution of slavery. Anti-Semitism is another racist trend that can be traced to ancient Rome, as the Jews became objects of demonization and hostility, and were blamed for the death of Jesus Christ, thus targeting them for mass violence by the Crusaders (Poliakov, 1974). Another ancient trend, which has heavily influenced modern racial theories stems from the Hebrew culture, and uses the biblical story of Genesis to trace the lineage of the races. According to popular interpretations of the biblical story, Noah's son Ham and his descendants were cursed to become slaves. The so called Hamitic hypothesis was widely used in medieval and early modern Europe to justify slavery, and has even played a significant part in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Des Forges, 1999).

In Europe, the Islamic threat was clearly identified in racial terms, being equated with inferiority and darker skin. The expulsion of Moors and Jews from Spain, was seen as a significant moment in

determining the modern history of racial thinking in Europe. The targeted populations were set outside of community and subjected to mass violence. A blood test was known to be used to determine the purity of the race in those who were able to "resist" the Moorish invasion. As the Islamic threat became demonized in Europe, the enemy was, again seen as the "killer of Christ" and the occupier of the Holy land, whereas the modern fundaments of racial thinking were becoming established (Said, 1985). According to Norbert Elias, the racial thinking in pre-modern Europe can also be detected in the racialized ideologies of the feudal aristocracy, which considered itself, by blood and lineage, a completely different species from the common people (Elias, 2000). In other words, the links between modern racism and its ancient predecessors are plentiful.

Contrary to Arendt's claim that racial thinking of modern Europe is a direct product of Atlantic slave trade and imperialist quests, we see that racial ideas were common in pre-modern Europe as well, and have also emerged in other areas of the world independently of Europe (like China and Japan). Apart from maybe Sparta, perhaps the only true example of an ancient eugenic state, the difference between modern racism and its earlier counterparts, according to Bernard Lewis, is that the criteria for exclusion, such as: culture, religion or citizenship, could all be transcended, thereby including the barbarian into the Hellenic culture, an unbeliever into our faith or an alien into our citizenship, while modern racism, a far more deterministic type of belief that relies on primordial criteria such as blood and origins, can never be transcended thereby not allowing the victim to become accepted into majority group (Lewis: 4).

Modern racism can, thus, be seen as related to two major European trends: the re-Christianisation of Europe and the modern institutions of slavery, colonization and imperialism, which, paradoxically, developed precisely at the time when European civilization was becoming more and more concerned with such notions as the dignity of man, the freedom of the individual, the rights of the citizen, and similar matters.

The re-Christianization of Europe refers to the end of Reconquista and defeat of the Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula, even after the conversion of the remaining Muslims (Moors) and Sephardic Jews to Christianity, much of the Spanish population still remained sceptical towards the "New Christians", referring to them as Conversos, Marranos or Moriscos (if they were descended from Moors) and treating them as false converts who still practised their old religion in secret. The concept of

cleanliness of blood "Limpieza de sangre", which was introduced in 15th century Spain and lasted well into the 19th century, was thus more focused on ancestry than religion, and resulted in converts being banned from most official positions, so all upward mobile families had to show proof of heritage dating back generations. Knights, in particular had to show the "Limpieza de Sangre" certificate for any woman they wanted to marry, much like SS officers in Nazi Germany. In fact, the converts were the main target of the Spanish and later Portuguese Inquisition, which can be credited for burning thousands of people alive. The elements of racial cleansing are here obvious, as it was the custom for a nobleman to provide proof of his ancestry by holding his arm up, showing the blue veins beneath the pale skin, demonstrating that his blood has not been contaminated by the darker race. On this example, we thus recognize not only that with modernity the nature of stereotyping becomes more rigid and the outcome more violent, but also that racism in Europe is deeply intertwined with Christianity. As Carter explains in "Race: A Theological Account" Christian anti-Judaism became biologized thereby racializing itself, resulting in Christianity becoming the basis for the cultural hegemony and the white hegemony of the West (Carter, 2008).

According to Arendt and more recently Žižek, in an argument similar to that previously presented, it was precisely these Christian, European understandings of "otherness", that were later used to categorize peoples Europeans were confronted with in the colonies. Modern racism was thus a European reaction to the alien reality in Africa (best described in Conrad's "The Heart of Darkness") as well as a justification for the misdeeds of imperialism, pioneered as an ideological ruling device by the Boers of South Africa, and executed despite the obvious contradiction to supposedly universal Enlightenment values of equality and human rights. Race thinking was thus transformed into racism in the context of imperialism becoming a systemic worldview, organizing principle of politics and a scientific fact, which portrayed the colonizers as a super-human species born to dominate the sub-human natives (Arendt 1962: 184, 195, King, 2004:103-4, Traverso, 2003:63).

In relation to Europe's expansion to the American continent, the extermination of "primitive" natives became seen as a natural part of modern progress, and a testament to the superiority of the "white man". According to Law: "The rise of race as a central feature of the modern world system from 1400 onwards has been etched into our memory and understanding of the world by key forms of genocide. These include mass killings of indigenous peoples in the Americas and Australia in the context of the settler colonialism and Atlantic slavery..." (Law, 2010:13). Indeed, the colonial experience served to create a mentality where the use of violence by one race against another was established and accepted as perfectly legitimate (Shorten, 2007:183). Colonial genocides, which were followed by exploitation

of land, minerals and human resources, were of key importance for the development of European capitalism. Through plantation slavery, which developed from the mid-sixteenth century, and involved periods of: implantation (exploration, settlement and conquest), maturity (growth of colonial government institutions, systems of trade and economic production and social hierarchies) and transition (revolution, rebellion and abolition), race became inscribed into the foundations of modern nation state and the establishment of international economy, placing it at the centre of making of modernity (Law, 2010).

According to Arendt: "African colonial possessions became the most fertile soil for the flowering of what later was to become the Nazi elite. Here they had seen with their own eyes how peoples could be converted into races and how, simply by taking the initiative in this process, one might push one's own people into the position of the master race. Here they were cured of the illusion that the historical process is necessarily "progressive"" (Arendt, 1962).

Finally, the racism developed in the colonies travelled back to the motherland as a "boomerang effect", infecting the political culture with the same mentality and becoming the fundament of racist pan-movements, such as pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism. According to Arendt, this continental imperialism was even more dangerous than the overseas kind as there was no geographic distance between the methods and institutions of colony and of nation. In a way, the Europeans ended up using the methods developed in the colonies in the ways they treated each other and it was precisely this new, tribal pan-Germanic imperialism that gave birth to the Nazi ideas of "Übermenschen" and "Untermenschen" (Arendt, 1962:223).

Science or pseudo-science has, indeed, played a significant role in providing justification and integrity to the racial hierarchies that were adopted by imperialism and therefore lent themselves also to the ideology of Nazism and other genocidal ideologies. Indeed, abolishment of slavery didn't mean the abolishment of race thinking. On the contrary, they increasingly found a backing in the scientific theories of the modern age. From the 17th through the 19th centuries, the merging of folk beliefs about group differences with scientific explanations of those differences produced what one scholar has called an "ideology of race" (Smedley 1999). According to this ideology, races are primordial, natural, enduring and distinct categories. In the 18th century, the differences among human groups became a focus of scientific investigation (Todorov 1993). Initially, scholars focused on cataloguing

and describing "The Natural Varieties of Mankind," as Johann Friedrich Blumenbach entitled his 1775 text (which established the five major divisions of humans still reflected in some racial classifications). In 1800, the French scientist and gene pioneer Georges Cuvier linked race with hierarchies of inferiority and superiority with the white race on top.

Scientific racism can thus be seen as a typically modern phenomenon and is of crucial relevance for understanding modern genocide. These theories were mainly created with the aim of providing justification for imperialist goals and enslavement of the people of the colonies; they quickly became institutionalized and began to dominate many aspects of scientific thought, while primarily serving the purpose of state propaganda and not acquisition of knowledge. Overall, scientific racism can be seen as an umbrella term for a variety of outrageous and mostly ridiculous claims, often supplemented with ideas from religion and ancient mythology while providing an insight into the psyche of the colonial white man and his fantasies. Despite significant opposition by certain brave members of scientific community, mainly Josef Kolman who showed that people in Europe belonged to a mixture of various races, thereby discrediting craniology, Thomas Hunt Morgan, who in 1915 disproved eugenics, or those who publicly fought against the notorious Nazi Nordic theory which argued for the superiority of the so called Nordic race like Carl Wilhelm von Sydow , Franz Boas, Shapiro and Hooton who even stated that the white man's burden was mainly one of hypocrisy and that after there were no more savage worlds to conquer, the white man would turn his vicious argument against his own kind, a prediction that came horrifyingly true", scientific racist theories only became stronger and more numerous, finally culminating in the Nazi Holocaust.

Social Darwinism is here of significant interest in relation to scientific racism, as it was this particular theory that legitimized atrocities in the colonies in the name of "natural selection", and played a crucial role in the dehumanization of colonial subjects, normalizing the murder of the "savage" through anthropological and scientific constructions of racial and cultural hierarchies. The idea of linear progress, according to which, some races (like the Germans) were more evolved than others (like the Jews or the Inuit) was based on a misreading of Darwin, who in fact argued that humans and chimpanzees were equally evolved, placing an emphasis on the processes of adaptation by which one species transforms into another, whereas the scientific racists claimed that the races and their characteristics were fixed and unchangeable. Furthermore, even though Darwin did in fact argue that the modern society was opposed to the principles of natural selection, he never endorsed any kind of eugenic policies, not only because he himself was married to a close relative, but because he was in fact a liberal, who believed that individuals should be free to choose their mates without pressure from

the state. As opposed to Darwinism, social Darwinism, like other scientific racist accounts is a distortion of science, involving a manipulation of research methods.

In the late 19th century, scientific racism, now largely free from the monogenist's obsession with God, became heavily inspired by Graeco-Roman eugenicism. Phrenology, a quasi scientific discipline that attempts to predict a person's character from their physiognomy, craniometric skull and skeleton studies, then, became increasingly used to justify anti-immigrant government programs. Racial taxonomies were now used in different fields, such as history, anthropology and ethnology. For example, using anthropometrics, invented by Francis Galton and Alphonse Bertillon, shapes and sizes of skulls were measured and the results related to group differences in intelligence or other attributes, with whites securely on top. Thus, skulls and skeletons of black people and other indigenous people were displayed between apes and white men. Ota Benga, a Pygmy, was displayed as the "Missing Link" in 1906 in the Bronx Zoo in New York, alongside apes and other animals. Some of the most influential theories included Vacher de Lapouge (1854–1936)'s "anthroposociology" and Herder (1744–1803), who applied "race" to nationalist theory to develop the first conception of ethnic nationalism (Jahoda, 1998: 83).

Also in the late 19th century, scientizing of anti-Jewish prejudice gained in popularity, as Jews became purposefully feminized, through ascribing them male menstruation, pathological hysteria and nymphomania, all generally used to stigmatize women. Another way of fixing the disadvantageous position of "inferior" peoples was the notorious IQ testing, an extremely biased pseudo scientific method that completely overlooked the role of environment and even language skills of the participants, therefore, always concluding in favour of the dominant society group. An American Psychologist Henry H. Goddard, who specialized in "morons", in his 1913 analysis in intelligence of immigrants, came to the conclusion that 83% Jews he tested were feeble-minded, as were 80% Hungarians, 79% of the Italians, and 87% of the Russians. The result was that many immigrants were turned away and sent back to Europe. Shaping public policy in favour of the dominant society group can therefore be seen as the defining trait of scientific racism.

These scientists made three claims about race: first, that races are objective, naturally occurring divisions of humanity; second, that there is a strong relationship between biological races and other human phenomena (such as forms of activity and interpersonal relations and culture, and by extension

the relative material success of cultures), thus biologizing the notion of "race", third, that race is therefore a valid scientific category that can be used to explain and predict individual and group behaviour. Races were distinguished by skin colour, facial type, cranial profile and size, texture and colour of hair. Moreover, races were almost universally considered to reflect group differences in moral character and intelligence. According to Bartov, it is clear that the new models of science and genetics contributed to theories of racial purity, but it is also clear that these new models provided ideological tools for ethnic cleansing and genocide alike. The Herero-Nama genocide, 1904-1907 was known for the intensive use of scientific racist strategies, such as craniometry, where the local populations were used as guinea pigs in order to provide "scientific" basis for new racial theories (Bartov, 2000).

The culmination of scientific racism can be seen in the movement of eugenics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Racial hygiene was historically tied to traditional notions of public health, but with emphasis on heredity — what philosopher and historian Michel Foucault has called "state racism". (Foucault, 1976) In 1869, Francis Galton (1822–1911) proposed the first social measures meant to preserve or enhance biological characteristics, and later coined the term "eugenics". Galton, a statistician and the father of social Darwinism, was also the first to study human differences and inheritance of intelligence with statistical methods. He introduced the use of questionnaires and surveys to collect data on population sets, which he needed for genealogical and biographical works and for anthropometric studies. Improving of human hereditary traits was thus the new preoccupation of modern science, and it could be done by either discouraging the reproduction of the disadvantaged or encouraging reproduction among the advantaged. The idea of making the new man, through controlling human evolution by policies, such as genocide, forced abortions, compulsory sterilisation or racial segregation gained credibility. As the eugenics movement became extremely popular in 19th and 20th century, both in Europe and USA, and was adopted by the states as policy, numerous eugenics strategies were legally practised in the 20th century, the Nazi euthanasia project and various European sterilisation projects, being just some of them. In Japan (as in Nazi Germany), the imperialist expansion became viewed as necessary for natural survival of the race, and a natural outcome due to the martial qualities of the master race (Chesterton, 2009).

In other words, the increasing emphasis during the 19th century, on the ethnic and racial origins of the nation, led to a redefinition of the nation-state in these terms. Racism, which in Boulainvilliers's theories was inherently antipatriotic and antinationalist, joined itself with colonialist imperialism and "continental imperialism", most notably in pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic movements. This relation

between racism and ethnic nationalism reached its height in the fascist and Nazi movements of the 20th century. The specific combination of 'nation' ('people') and 'state' expressed in such terms as the *Völkische Staat* and implemented in laws such as the 1935 Nuremberg laws made fascist states such as early Nazi Germany qualitatively different from non-fascist nation-states. Minorities, who were not admitted as a part of the *Volk*, had no authentic or legitimate role in such a state. In Germany, neither Jews nor the Roma were considered part of the *Volk*, and were thus specifically targeted for persecution, as German nationality law defined 'German' on the basis of German ancestry (Arendt, 1962, Woolf).

3.3.4. Modern rationality and bureaucracy - the path towards the society of control

So far, we have looked at the nation state, its ideologies like nationalism and racism and the ways in which these are linked to phenomena such as genocide. In the following, however, we will take a closer look at the issues related to the execution of modern genocide, the structures through which it is organised and the means by which it is achieved. However in order to understand this, we must first explain the very characteristic modern mentality that shapes the way in which violence is produced in a modern society. Modernity, enlightenment in particular (the age of reason), with its development of scientific thinking, its new found scepticism and its removal from the divine have all contributed to a change in mentality, bringing about a completely new societal trend, referred to as rationalization - a crucial concept in any analysis of modern genocide. The key figure to have presented this concept is the German antipositivist Max Weber. In enlightenment philosophy, the world is seen as a battle of reason and error, where submission to the dictate of reason must be seen as a prerogative. According to Habermas, the rationalization we are talking about here refers to instrumental rationality as a mentality that prioritizes achieving goals and solving problems, while the way this is achieved, and the morality of the actions become overshadowed by the desire for the expected outcome (Schecter, 2010).

Rationalization can therefore be seen as a process in which an increasing number of social actions become based on considerations of teleological efficiency or calculation, rather than on motivations derived from morality, emotion, custom or tradition, making progress and ultimate control over nature and humans the ultimate goals of the society based on instrumental rationalities. In western society, this mentality is regarded as a central aspect of modernity, product of the capitalist market, rational administration of the state, bureaucracy, modern science and expansion of modern technology. The

emotional human being could not be accepted in this vision of the world, as emotions were seen to interfere with efficiency (Bauman, 1989). Critical theorists have argued that instrumental rationality has a negative, even dehumanizing effect on society, as eradicating the emotional aspect of intentions also eradicates empathy which could prevent violence from potentially becoming an aim of the modern society. In other words, a modern society operates with an idea that violence is justified as long as important goals are reached. Indeed, according to Bauman, the rules of instrumental rationality are singularly incapable of preventing phenomena like the Holocaust, as there seems to be nothing in this type of thinking that disqualifies the Holocaust style rules of social engineering as improper. Indeed, many modern mass killings including Stalin's Chistka, Pol Pot's classicides and the Armenian genocide were committed in the name of rapid industrialisation and modernisation at any cost (Bauman, 1989, Mann, 2005).

In order to understand the importance of instrumental rationality for mass violence, one must also understand its institutionalization in the form of state structure itself. Arendt explains how bureaucracies were in fact developed in the colonies with the aim of ruling the people the whites considered their hopeless inferiors and in need of their protection (Arendt, 1962). In addition, bureaucratic despotisms in Europe provided a mould and an instrument for nationalist movements, thereby enabling their existence. By demanding a rational training and utilitarian outlook, by instilling a belief in man's ability to solve his problems unaided, bureaucratic machine and ethos encouraged the trend to secular education conducive to nationalism. The bureaucracy was seen as dependent on the will of absolutist monarch and bureaucratic state as a product of heroic personalities, princes, warriors etc, but its existence weakened and restricted the power of the monarch (Mann, 2005). On the other hand, the superiority of technology required action to moral standards of purposive rationality - raison d'etat. The monarch was already bound by the principles of administrative efficiency and expediency as embodied in his bureaucratic instrument. Bureaucratisation meant restriction of arbitrary use of power, and a promise of equality for all men (Osborn and Gaebler, 1992). According to Weber, bureaucratisation was the key process in the ongoing rationalisation of the western society. It was a result of the growth in complexity of the administrative tasks and the existence of monetary economy as well as the need for a more efficient administrative system, as the societies grew. The development of transportation and communication technologies made this possible, while popular demand for democratization and rationalisation of culture served as engines behind this process. In other words, nationalisation and bureaucratization were deeply entwined and inter-dependent processes.

Scholars like Weber have identified bureaucracy as a threat to individual freedoms in which increasing rationalisation of human life traps individuals in the iron cage of bureaucratic, rule based rational control, as bureaucracy helped implant a purely utilitarian ethos based on welfare-economy. Indeed, as blind progress becomes the main goal of a society based on instrumental rationality, the effectiveness and efficacy of rationalizing ones actions depends on:

a) A language of technical, bureaucratic morality: loyalty, duty and discipline, where superiors are seen as top moral authority
b) The dehumanization of bureaucratic objects, which are reduced to a set of quantitative measures.

In a bureaucracy, moral concerns are of no importance as the utilitarian aspect dictates to merely get the job done with efficiency and excellence. In the famous experiments of Stanley Milgram, the importance of instrumental rationality in a bureaucratic situation is clearly shown, as the motivation of participants who accepted to inflict pain upon innocent subjects under authoritarian supervision and in the name of science was simply to get the job done, and most never questioned the morality of the goal, placing the responsibility elsewhere (Milgram, 1974). Similarly, in his book "Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 1012", Christopher Browning proposes that the men of the Unit 101 killed out of a basic obedience to authority and peer pressure, not blood-lust or primal hatred (Browning, 1998). Arendt (1964) describes the paradigmatic Schreibtischtäter, the so called 'desk murderers' as an embodiment of the modern 'banality of evil, mechanical and dispassionate organizers who never got their hands dirty, and yet were deeply responsible for concentration camps and gas chambers. Her work "Eichmann in Jerusalem", portrays the famous criminal as a petty bureaucrat, neither hateful nor guilt ridden, but a normal person who was just doing his job, with respect and obedience to the hierarchy he was a part of.

In addition Bauman insists that the task of killing in the Holocaust was purely organisational, as the people were not driven by the desire to kill, but by obedience to authority and loyalty to the system. This mentality is seen as typical for a modern society in which instrumental rationality and obedience to authority go hand in hand, as perpetrators act merely as agents of a higher power, which they consider superior and wish to please and impress. The disappearance of the sense of responsibility can therefore be seen as the most far reaching consequence of submission to authority (Milgram, 1974, Arendt, 1964, Bauman, 1989). Motives of conformity and obedience are typical among those implicated in genocide and this is why Critical theorists insist on the idea of "the willing criminal. According to Bauman, it is precisely this popular consent that tyranny rests upon, and that makes mass participation in war and genocide possible. (Bauman, 1989)

As we can see, the dehumanization of subjects seems to be a necessary by-product of bureaucratisation, as human beings get turned into numbers and the processes that refer to them become codified. In a bureaucratic execution of genocide, referring to victims as cargo or packages, or numbers in concentration camps has been noted. Bureaucratic administration is thus said to play a major role in accomplishing genocide, and the reasons for this are far more complex than just the idea that a bureaucratic structure is necessary to accomplish a task of such vastness. Bauman uses the famous gardening state metaphor. "The bureaucratic culture prompts us to view society as an object of administration, as a collection of problems to be solved, nature to be controlled, mastered, improved and remade - a legitimate target of social engineering, and in general a garden to be kept in the planned shape by force" (Bauman, 1989:18). A taxonomic mentality of the gardening process which divides plants into cultured plants and weeds, and encourages a cleansing of the latter, is also responsible for racial categorization of human beings, and, in certain circumstances, the annihilation of those considered subhuman. As Bauman points out, this is in fact the very atmosphere in which the idea of genocide could be conceived. The spirit of instrumental rationality and its modern bureaucratic form of institutionalization had made the holocaust style solutions not only possible, but reasonable and increased the probability of their choice.

According to Arendt, the notions of absolute power accompanied the rise of sovereign European nation state. The main characteristic of bureaucracy as Critical theorists point out is the so called "free floating responsibility" which Bauman explains as a kind of unpinnable responsibility which makes collective perpetuation of cruel acts easier and more likely. Bureaucracy as a structure in fact obliterates responsibility and incapacitates moral authority (Bauman, 1989). Arendt argues that violence is by its nature instrumental, as it requires justification and guidance. In other words, pity and moral inhibitions can only be overcome through disciplined bureaucracy, once these conditions are met: the violence is authorized, actions are routinized by rule governed practices and exact specification of roles, victims are dehumanized by ideolgaical definitions and indoctrinations (Arendt, 1970). The first two conditions are integral parts of Weber's definition of bureaucracy: authorization and routinization. The division of labour helped make possible the moral invisibility of individual acts of murder. Also, mediation of actions, the fact that one person gives orders while, someone else does the deed, makes responsibility in bureaucracy, indeed, difficult to trace. Numerous genocide trials up to now have shown a general lack of responsibility among all involved in the crimes, as the commanding officers claimed they didn't actually commit a murder, while those who did insisted that they didn't order it. Assigning guilt, or what Bauman refers to as "free-floating responsibility", seems therefore to be one of the most interesting, yet typical aspects of modern genocide, problematized further by the fact that whole societies are involved in such mass crimes, as ordinary people and

bystanders also share their part of responsibility and enable, by their implicit consent and cooperation, the annihilation to take place (Bauman, 1989).

As we see, there is a clear link between instrumental rationality and modern war. Many scholars have long argued that capitalism needs to wage war in order to survive. It needs it to expand its geographical reach and to open up new markets. Also, war provides unlimited access to cheap raw materials. The common perception is that war serves to boost the economy. According to this argument, military conflict – and high military spending in preparation for such conflict – generates overall growth and helps reduce unemployment. This feature of military spending turns it into an effective fiscal tool. In years of slack, the government can embark on military Keynesianism, increase its spending on weapons and pull the economy out of recession. (Milward, 1992)

However, war can also have other, political purposes, as it provides an opportunity to placate opposition at home and pacify rebellious populations abroad. In the case of Rwandan genocide, we see how war was the only way to unite the previously disunited Hutus, and thereby legitimize the current government and its stay in power. According to Straus and Schmitt, the friend-enemy dichotomy is essential in the political realm, as it is the only thing that guarantees the persistence of national unity and the nation's positioning on the political scene. Additionally, Schmitt conceptualized the so called "state of exception", an escalation of friend-enemy politics in which common rules of politics no longer matter, as the decisions have to be made quickly and independently of the system, according to the principle "*Der Führer schützt das Recht*" (The leader defends the law), transforming the juridicial system into a death machine and the state into a de facto dictatorship. (Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 1938:34, Nitzan and Bichler, 2009, Schmitt, 1996)

Indeed, instrumental, but also called technological rationality protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination. Science, technology and rationality were generated by capitalism, as humans became transformed into raw capital. Technology, for Anders, renders human kind obsolete. As we make machines that work without our help, we begin making ourselves superfluous; we eliminate ourselves. According to Marx, in a capitalist world, as machines take over, humans become dead weight, a waste of money. Aly and Heim have concluded that the motivation for WWII was the German need to control the food market (Grossraum Wirtschaft) and create one economic sphere in Europe so as to confront Anglo-American domination on the world. (Aly and Heim, 1991). Therefore, dead weight had to be eliminated, and this meant unproductive small Jewish businesses and primitive

eastern European non-industrialized peasants, so that a new and rapid industrialisation and expansion could take place. Additionally, overpopulation, a consequence of industrialization and new technologies which represents a huge economic burden and is said to often lead to wars and conflicts, was thus solved. In this demographical project, Jews were exterminated, Slavs could migrate to the cities and German industry be brought to the countryside. As long as capitalism exists, a door to genocide will remain open (Anders, 2009).

According to Marcuse, the scientific methods which led to the ever more effective domination of nature also came to provide the pure concepts, as well as instrumentalities for the ever more effective domination of man by man. Today, domination perpetuates itself, not only through technology, but as technology, and the latter provides legitimating of the expanding political power which absorbs all spheres of culture. (Marcuse in Luke, 1997: 144) But why is war such a central feature of modernity?

The revolution of technology was especially marked in warfare, as the very substance of violent action is ruled by means end category. The more tools for killing were being made, the more killing was committed. Under the blind ambition of constant dictate of progress, new technologies are being made and used purely to show the superior power of humans. The American, politically completely unnecessary bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, is a prime example of "Because we can", type of thinking. As Bauman clearly shows, once the military technology is in action, it self-perpetuates, and is extremely difficult to stop, all the while looking for new targets for destruction. Independent technology can be understood as a basic Enlightenment view, where truth is independent of its genesis, it is not seen as historically produced, but is objective and eternal. (Bartov, 2000, Bauman, 1989)

The human fascination with science and obsession with using it regardless of the moral implications has been shown in many studies of modern war. Feingold sees Auschwitz as an extension of the modern factory system, with its chimneys and the input of raw material. Scientific experiments done on humans, in Armenian genocide as well as the Holocaust, the very idea of social engineering, in fact, shows how the modern human prioritizes science and power in relation to human life. The genocidal governments, such as the Young Turk one, tended to be technocratic in nature, as engineers, scientists health professionals and other technical experts were in control of the decision making process. (Winter in Gellately and Kiernan, 2003, Mann, 2005)

Modernity and technological development during the past 200 years have had an enormous impact on warfare. As a result of this, the destructive potential of war grew, and an argument for the annihilatory energy of the modern war has often been pointed out. (Bartov, 2000). In the mid-19th Century, "total war" was identified by scholars as a separate class of warfare, characterized by a total state of mobilization of all available resources and population. In a total war, there is less differentiation between combatants and civilians than in other conflicts, and sometimes no such differentiation at all, as nearly every human resource, civilians and soldiers alike, can be considered to be part of the enemy. Total war encompasses all spheres of society as the fronts are everywhere to be seen, the trenches are dug in the towns and streets, villages are fortified, roads are barred, the front line runs through the factories, while ordinary workmen become soldiers through total mobilization. As the line between "Us" and "Them" become increasingly blurred with the notion of enemy increasingly expending, the society of the total war becomes a society of doppelganger, where everyone could become the enemy and everyone has a potential Mr Hyde in them. In other words, in order to eradicate your enemy, you might have to eradicate yourself as the total war is turned inwards and the modern genocide is an intimate affair which starts within the state (Bartov, 2000, Bauman, 1989). The numbing effect of technology driven warfare which often allows great physical distances between the perpetrator and the victim, relieves the soldier of the qualms of conscience.

WWI is widely considered the first case of total war, which was characterized by the instrumental vision of violence as an end in its own right and providing a context for the first modern state genocide (Winter, 2003). Not only this, but with the emergence of WWI a so called culture of war begins to take place, as, from 1914, war becomes glorified in state propaganda through notions of chivalry and knighthood. In an economic crisis war presented itself as only arena in which a common worker, with no education, and poor skills and manners, could become elevated to the highest and most respected positions of the society (Bartov, 2000, Arendt, 2009, Tooley and Vardi 2003). The positive acceptance of violence as a new and creative force is likewise demonstrated by the veterans who returned to Italy, Germany, and Russia to continue lives of violence as Freikorps members and SA men, as squadristi toughs, soldiers in Red or White armies, or as soldiers of fortune in whichever factions of whichever civil war they happened to fall (Tooley, 2003). Indeed, war became the ultimate tool for creating nation states as the society became unified against the common enemy and soldiers became bound together by notions of guilt (Bartov, 2000). According to Bartov, total war did not produce genocide, but it produced the atmosphere in which it could take place. Racial war, biological warfare and ethnic cleansing were present in the political reality of 1918. Without the Great War, and its precedents, Auschwitz would probably be unthinkable.

As we can see, although supposedly rational, the instrumental rationality is in reality in the service of utopia. Modern war and totalitarianism necessitate and devise final solutions in which humanity is perceived as a mass to be moulded, controlled, moved, purged etc as humanity becomes an organism in need of radical surgery (Bartov, 2000, Winter, 2003, Weitz, 2003).

As Adorno and Horkheimer point out, the rational Enlightenment defeats its purpose as it abandons the promise of liberty and equality, and replaces it with a striving towards totality and instrumentalisation of reason. At the very root of the enlightened philosophy, there seems to be an anti dialectical world view, which allows no objectivity in its realm of eternal and universal truths. (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972, Elkana, 2000). For neo-Marxists, rationalisation is closely connected to capitalism and commodity fetishism. Modern food consumption typifies the process of rationalisation. Fast food chain-efficiency is maximized. (Ritzer, 2010) Four integral goals of instrumental rationality can thus be uncovered: 1. Efficiency: the fastest way to get from A to B must be prioritized, 2. Calculability: objectives must be quantifiable: money, profit (Quantity equals quality) 3. Predictability: uniformity and standardisation, the same service and routine everywhere. 4. Control: replacement of human by non human technologies. Human body also becomes the field of achieving the goals of maximising efficiency and perfection, through exercise, dieting and nutrition.

Capitalism, as a typically instrumental, goal oriented lifestyle, is, by some seen as a formal precondition for fascism, but the logic of rational calculation rather than commodification held up the operations of Auschwitz. Capitalism is said to create specialists without spirit and hedonists without heart. In fact, according to Adorno, totalitarian tendencies of the social order are inherent in the spread of commodity form. Totalitarianism for Adorno means subjugation of the totality of social existence to the imperatives of the commodity form. (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972): Late capitalism and totalitarianism are here seen as one and the same. Early capitalist thinking can clearly be recognized in the Holocaust, as Germans believed it was an honour for Poles to fertilize German soil with their corpses, thus portraying humans as raw material in resource-capitalism.

As we can see, the society which attempts to accomplish the goal of perfection must be the society of total control and extensive surveillance. According to Marcuse (1964: 50), by virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For "totalitarian" is not only a terroristic political coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested

interests." The modern State controls everything; the new power establishes itself in patterns of normality, as individual is institutionalized through all sectors: family, uniform system of education, universal skills, military service and a whole array of rewards and punishments within the mass society that reinforce and internalize a tendency toward obedience. In other words, society has conquered the public realm, and the modern human being has no arena in which to negotiate his needs. Labour society is a mass society, based on obedience and uniformity, in which human beings are identified exclusively through their function (Arendt, 1962).

3.4. Conclusion

Finally, we have successfully identified a number of elements that relate modernity to genocide. Indeed, the evolution of the modern nation state runs parallel to an increase in violence, as the pre-modern forms of rule, namely monarchies were stratified to such extent, through population differences in relation to class, religion and language, along with a lack of print capitalism and large scale economies, that a unifying nationalist mass movement seen as a pre-condition for genocide, could not have taken place. At the same time we observe that there is no straight line between pre-modern and modern as the roots of modern violence can be traced to the time of salvation religions, namely to Limpieza de Sangre, project of re-Christianization of Europe and its cleansing of Jews and Moors, which begins in 15th century, but possesses noticeable racist characteristics, while racism and ethno-nationalism have also been shown to possess pre-modern roots.

Generally, we have established that the modern nation state is necessarily at the centre of any debate on modern genocide, even in colonial settler cases where genocide was not in fact executed by the state, but was approved of and supported. The very process of the nation state formation was drenched in violence, as the modern totalitarian and utopian state reserves the right to be the sole utilizer of aggression, its right to genocide guaranteed by the international policy of non-interfering. As state ideologies related to genocide, we have identified nationalism and racism. Nationalism is here crucial because it provides a mass movement necessary to carry out genocide and also because ethno-nationalism in particular excludes minorities and therefore targets them for violence in an adequate situation. Modern racism is seen as an institutionalized state policy developed in the colonies and then applied on the continent, which openly and through the use of science stigmatizes the vulnerable groups targeted for genocide as inferior and sub-human, thereby justifying the genocidal quest. In relation to the modern mentality of the nation state I have shown how instrumental rationality, as

embodied in the institution of bureaucracy promotes dehumanization of human beings, which it gladly sacrifices in order to achieve material goals, while promoting duty and obedience to the totalitarian state. Modern violence, as we have concluded is deeply dependent on the instrumental rational mind-frame, as exemplified by an obsessive use of technology for the sake of progress, a self perpetuating mechanism which promotes total war with its annihilatory potential in order to fulfil the social engineering goals of a utopian state.

4. Origins and execution of the Holocaust

The previous chapter established broadly the links between modernity and violence, more specifically genocide. Key concepts drawn out of this theoretical debate and established as important for our cause will be used to test each of our proposed cases for presence of modernity in genocide. The concepts proposed include, but are not limited to: destabilizing influences of modernity, such as overpopulation, unemployment, a change in societal roles and lack of resources, in relation to genocidal ideology: organic nationalism, social Darwinism, scientific racism and eugenics, in relation to genocidal mentality: the authority of technology, utopianism, gardening state mentality, instrumental rationality, obedience, bureaucratic mentality, free-floating responsibility, in relation to the genocidal state: totalitarianism, expansionism, majoritarian democracy, efficiency, numbing as a modern strategy for preparing the perpetrators for killing, total war and Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft society ties. In terms of theory, this chapter will combine two, seemingly contradictory theoretical stands: the Sonderweg theory, which insists on the distinctive German path towards genocide and the uniqueness of the venture itself, as utilized by Mommsen, Dahrendorf, Poliakov and Shirer and a broader modernist theory which is presented by scholars who believe that it is in fact the encompassing tendencies of modernity that are to be blamed for the Holocaust, which is therefore seen as comparable with annihilation attempts in other contexts. Combining these, allegedly divergent positions into a single theoretical understanding, contributes, thus, to the originality of the argument, as the integration of the two has rarely been seen in the study of genocide, but will, as I will show, contribute to the overall understanding of the matter, creating a more complex and sophisticated picture than any of the approaches have been able to do on their own.

The chapter will be organised in much the same way as the next two cases in three main parts, the first one providing a historical overview of the context of development towards the era of modernity and the path towards independence, the next presenting the economic crisis preceding genocide and the descent into genocide, then describing the execution itself along with the rationality behind the genocidal plan and the motives of the perpetrators. Finally, the last part tackles ideology of genocide, in this case National Socialism, the scientific racism that is an important part of it, the characteristics of the utopian dream and the nature of the way otherness is constructed in this ideology. In relation to the outline of the whole thesis, in spite of the similar organisation of the chapters on Nazi/Serb/Hutu genocides, there will be some differences in the presentations of each context due to 1) a difference in sources available and 2) the uniqueness of the context particularly apparent in the first part outlining the historical process of the nation state formation in each case. Comparisons of the contexts,

particularly related to modernity will not be undertaken in chapters dealing with each context, due to impracticality but will be presented and summarized in chapter 7.

4.1. The path towards independence - a historical overview

In Origins of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt analyses Nazism by relating it to a general modern development in Europe. This is a problem, as we know that the development of different nation states in Europe has taken completely different courses, which is why it is extremely difficult to compare Germany with, for example France or Britain. In fact, in order to understand an event such as genocide, we must indeed analyse the specific context that produced it, along with all of its peculiarities. This chapter, will, therefore begin with an in-depth analysis of the development of German nationalism, searching for trends that might have persisted into the 20th century. According to the Sonderweg[28] hypothesis, along with Mann's and Smith's models of ethnic and civic nationalism, the roots of the German disaster can be traced to earlier times, when a distinct variety of German nationalism has become shaped, not only through a series of wars and other difficult political circumstances, as a consequence of which Prussia, as the leading German speaking country gradually banished its liberals and turned to a blood and iron, organic nationalist approach, but also Germany's own need to follow a unique development path unlike that of its neighbours. Through a possible link between the previous experiences of the militarized Prussian police state and a much later Nazi dictatorship, the country's path towards modernity becomes clear (Evans 2004:8, Hinde 1998:934).

4.1.1. The rise of Prussia and early German nationalism

Already in 1700s, Prussia, then a part of the Holy Roman Empire, has been generally increasing in power and becoming an efficient state with a strong army, which was finally reformed by Frederic William I to defend the country against the Swedes. It was, however, the Napoleonic era that sees a definite rise of German nationalism. Particularly, after the joint battles of Jena-Auerstedt, where the Prussian and Russian armies were finally defeated by Napoleon, Prussia's influence in the German speaking world grows, and a new German patriotism centres around it, considering it the only force that dared to stand up to Napoleon. As the French emperor dissolves the Holy Roman Empire, in the treaty of Pressburg, German nationalism develops as, primarily a reactionary force, under the

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[28] Sonderweg, meaning a special path, and is the name given to a historiographic theory that arises after WWII and emphasizes the uniqueness of the development of German nationalism and German state as main origins of genocide. The school is represented by theorists like Wehler, Shirer, Vermail, Fischer and Mommsen.

hegemony of French empire. Indeed, Napoleon's rule brought with it a series of reforms, which were by no means popular amongst the German speaking population, one of them being the re-introduction of "The Grand Sanhedrin" a Jewish high court from classical and late antiquity, representing a sudden and radical emancipation of the Jews in Europe, who were now considered equal, which received hostile and even violent criticism from Russia, Austria and Lutheran Prussia. In other words, apart from language, which, according to Fichte and early German nationalists is the basis for an organic and natural vision of nationalism, it is precisely this feeling of common suffering, hate and struggle against the invaders that was able to provide a basis for first ideas of modern unification (Sheehan 1989: 434, Walter and Raeff 1996).

In spite of the disastrous defeats of 1806, in the next decade Prussia quickly modernizes, driven by the desire to defeat Napoleon, while at the same time attempting to force progress by integrating liberal French political ideas into its own structure in order to keep up. Reforms began with the program of army reform under Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Following the French model, these reformers called for changes that would increase competition for positions, and open positions up to everyone based on talent, rather than on birth rights. Ideas of Prussian Chancellor Baron Stein, to abolish serfdom and release the potential dynamics of the Prussian people didn't result in ultimate success, but they did lead to lessening of restrictions of opportunity for the lower classes, paving the way for a modern, free-market economy. Under Stein's successor Hardenberg, the state also confiscated church property, gave Jews legal equality, and ended the monopolistic power of guilds. Ideas of constitutional monarchy were also proposed, although unsuccessfully, but it can, without a doubt, be said, that the speed of accepting new reforms was indeed constantly pushed by the fear of ultimate defeat at the hands of Napoleon (Citino 2005:128, Rovan 1999:438).

 Unlike the French, German nationalism was thus coloured by frenzy, not a natural, but a forced progress pushed in order to secure political survival. French liberalizing reforms were mirrored in many ways, but whereas the French made these changes from the "bottom up", in response to a revolution by underprivileged classes, Prussia made similar changes, but from the "top down." The Prussian changes were thus not created with the aim to affirm the dignity of all men, as might be claimed for French liberalization, but to help Prussia improve its military and challenge Napoleon. Prussia's modernization was pragmatically rather than philosophically based. In other words, the disaster of the Napoleonic Wars encouraged Prussia to make liberal reforms, which may not have been motivated by humanistic aims, but did result in a considerable amount of progressive change (Evans 2004:8).

However, the degree to which the French have influenced the Germans did not end with the reforms of institutions. German intellectual and artistic life flourished, based on protest against the entire French intellectual tradition. A new revolution in thought called German romanticism was formed to challenge the dominant tradition of French Enlightenment Rationalism that underlay the entire Napoleonic Empire and its rules. The Enlightenment idea of universal laws that applied to everyone came under attack. Fichte, in particular, is known as the proponent of a closed commercial, centralized state, isolated from the rest of the world and self sufficient in its own experience of Volksgeist, a nation's unique sense of self, which had to be kept pure and isolated from outside influences which could pervert it (Fichte, 1800). In relation to French enlightenment philosophers like Voltaire, who believed that all nations are basically the same, and must follow the same path of progress from barbarity to civilization, German romanticists like Fichte and Herder argued for a unique, special character of the German nation, which is superior to others. However, although emotional, and melodramatic in character, German nationalism of the time was not only influenced by the conservative forces, which continuously focused on the desire to revive a golden past, but also liberal nationalism, a direct heritage of the French revolution, which, interestingly, existed side by side and worked in tandem to oppose Napoleon's rule (Kelly 1968:197, Koselleck, 1975).

Eventually, Napoleon's defeats, particularly his disastrous attempt to invade Russia in 1812 greatly compromised central European economy, getting 125.000 German troops killed in the process, which strongly encouraged resistance and creation of student militias, such as the Lützow Free Corps, radicalizing the political situation further (Esdaile, 2008). As Germans of all classes became united in this need to rid Europe of the French tyrant, the blending of demos and ethnos and an emergence of an organic form of nationalism finally takes place. In the 1813 battle of nations, more than 500.000 armed forces brought a decisive victory for the Coalition of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden and Saxony and finally ended French power, incarcerating Napoleon (Gates 1997:259).

4.1.2.   First steps towards unification

At the Congress of Vienna, in 1814 and 1815, the victors of the Napoleonic era: Russia, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain (and France, who strategically managed to infiltrate the talks), mainly still driven by fear and resolution to avoid any future conflicts and revolutions, decided to establish a new European, political system, based on the balance of power, and return to the pre-war state of things, of 1793, as empires are re-established and the political state of affairs regresses into anti-liberalism. As a result of the reorganization, Prussia is enlarged with Westphalia and Northern Rhineland, while a loose German Confederation is created, instead of the Holy Roman Empire with power given to

Austrian kings at the head of Bundestag. However, the new organisation didn't take into account the growing political and economic influence of Prussia on the world scene, which created a dissatisfaction marking the beginning of a period of rivalry known as the Austro-Prussian dualism (Mazower 2009: 18). However, the dualism was not the only obstacle to a unifying nationalist movement. There was also socio-economic competition among the commercial and merchant interests and the old land-owning and aristocratic interests. Politically, the middle class remained weak and passive, and lacked representation. Decisions were still being made by the old aristocracy, and changes came from top down (Zamoyski 2007:258, Weber 1971:186).

On the other hand, factors promoting nationalism were plenty, as it was clear that only unification could bring the German speaking peoples real power, like that they envied in France. Already in 1818, the nationalist movement was provided with a solid economic basis in the form of the Zollverein, a Prussian customs union, which linked the many Prussian and Hohenzollern territories, while other German states also joined over the next decades (Price, 1949: 9). Rapid industrialization provided steamships, gaslight and telegraph; factories and child labour had been introduced. Interestingly, the emotional and poetic German literature of the period longs for a rural, preindustrial past, as brothers Grimm publish fairy tales and utopian images of the golden age flood the countries in difficult economic transition. The romantic longing is here, indeed, a consequence of a difficult transition from an inherited feudal order to middle-class, commonly referred to as the Industrial Revolution, which in a breath swiped away centuries of tradition and security in norms. A new world was taking place, but under the surface, a civil war was brewing. According to Peukert, agrarian romanticism and hostility to the big cities were responses to genuine problems created by industrialization and modernization (Peukert 1991: 11, Murphy 1991:285).

In the so called Vormärz period, preceding the March 1848 revolution in Austrian and Prussian feudal police states there was a period of vast censorship in response to calls for liberalism, which spread from the upper and middle classes (Mazower 2009:15, Evans 2004: 4). European liberals in the Vormärz sought unification under nationalist principles, promoted the transition to capitalism, the expansion of male suffrage, and replacing the old rulers with a liberal representative government. The economic, social and cultural dislocation of ordinary people, the economic hardship of an economy in transition, the pressures of meteorological disasters and the following food crisis of 1840s, all contributed to growing problems in Central Europe. As the feudal authority still didn't seem to pay much attention to the hardships of the masses, no amount of censorship, fines, imprisonments or banishments could halt the criticism, political and social agitation among the working classes, and the disaffection of the intelligentsia (Leviova in Marx and Engels, 1972:7).

In 1848, finally, as it became clear that the educated Volk could not achieve unification by itself, as it was hoped, a series of German revolutions of 1848–1849 took place, aiming for unification and a single German constitution, a permanent national parliament, and a unified Germany, under the leadership of Prussia, which was the strongest, but also entirely German, as opposed to the multiethnic Austria. However, the time was still not right for creating a nation state. The Prussian king rejected the offer of the throne out of fear of Austrian/Russian invasion, but the local princes also proved reluctant to abandon the sovereignty of their own lands and ultimately their own privileges. It, therefore, became apparent that Germany could only become unified without the rival Austria in its realm, as the final agreement on a Kleindeutsche solution (as opposed to Großdeutsche), a federation of German states excluding Austria, was reached. However, as Austria (allied with Russia) was still a major political player in Europe, the diplomatic pressures from these two countries resulted in re-establishment of German confederation, under Austrian leadership, which prolonged the process of unification not only for Germany, but also for others (Italy) following the same path (Obermann 1985).

4.1.3. Unification under Bismarck

In 1862, the final stage of unification takes places, as crowned King Wilhem I appointed Otto Von Bismarck, a member of old feudal nobility (Junker), loyal to the king, a Minister-President of Prussia in order to solve a dispute over the control of military budget between the king and the parliament. Bismarck was a brilliant diplomat, but didn't hesitate to use Machiavellian strategies to get what he wanted. His instrumental rational approach, known as Realpolitik, relied heavily on "blood and iron" methods, where blood symbolized the sacrifices Germans would have to make in order to unify, and iron symbolized the need for rapid industrialization, so that Germans could become a great European power. Nationalism was at his point greatly needed not only to ensure economic competitiveness, but to crush socialist and liberal dissent, as the Socialists were becoming increasingly stronger, particularly in Prussia, where a large number of artisans who were crushed by the Industrial Revolution joined the proletarian workers in poverty. The more peaceful "Pan-Germanic" liberal nationalism, which characterized 1848, thus shifts to accommodate Bismarck's revolutionary conservatism (Evans 2004:8, Dorpalen 1962:235, Hollyday 1970:16). According to Habermas: "the irrationalist direction taken by German thought in the second half of the nineteenth century can be seen in the social Darwinist reformulation of radical democratic positions, the utilitarian reformulation of liberal positions and the state-metaphysical reformulation of conservative positions" (Outhwaite, 2012: 10).

Finally, the international context also becomes favourable for a German unification with the weakening of Austria, which allows Bismarck not only to win back the German speaking territories, but also to defeat Austria in Austro-Prussian war of 1866 (Evans 2004:6). As a result, the Kleindeutschland solution finally becomes a reality, as Prussia, annexes 22 other, previously independent German speaking states, creating the so called North German Confederation. Finally, after a war with France in 1870 Prussia settles the score once and for all, painfully defeating the French and presenting itself as a one of the dominant players in Europe (Taylor 1969:126).

Finally, the southern states become officially incorporated into a unified Germany, while Prussia assumes the leadership of the new empire with the Treaty of Versailles of 1871 (Evans 2004:6, Sheehan 1989: 900). As The North German Constitution also becomes the constitution of the new Germany, some democratic features are acquired, notably the Imperial Diet, which—in contrast to the parliament of Prussia—gave citizens representation on the basis of elections by direct and equal suffrage of all males who had attained the age of 25. However, Prussia exercised direct influence in the Bundesrat, while also having the executive power vested in the Prussian King as Kaiser, who appointed the federal chancellor. In the Gründerzeit period Bismarck also managed to secure Germany's position as a great nation by forging alliances, isolating France by diplomatic means, and avoiding war. As a result of the Berlin Conference in 1884 the new Germany also claimed several colonies including German East Africa, German South-West Africa, Togo, and Cameroon (Poloni 2004).

However, all was not fine in the unified Germany. In reality, unification only exposed religious, linguistic, social, and cultural differences among the inhabitants of the new nation, as it soon became clear that a key element to creating a nation-state - national culture was simply lacking. Bismarck attempted to change this through deliberate national policy called Kulturkampf (1872–78) and attempted to address, although with not much success, some of the contradictions in German society. In particular, it involved a struggle over language, education, and religion. A policy of Germanization of non-German people, including the Polish and Danish minorities, started with German language, compulsory schooling (Germanization), and the attempted creation of a standardized curriculum for schools to promote and celebrate the idea of a shared past. Finally, it extended to the religion of the new Empire's population (Gross 2004:1, Lamberti 2001:177).

This was all a part of the Sonderweg political solution, which was, at this time, proposed by German conservatives as the "Golden mean" of governance, a unique, middle way between autocracy of Imperial Russia, and, what was seen as fragile and inefficient democratic governments of Britain and

France. Germany, thus, worked towards a distinctive type of authoritarian state, that attempted to impose social reforms from above, rather than waiting to be pressured from below. One of the main reasons for such a development was the fact that after 1848 the German confederation was practically entirely devoid of liberals, who were either exiled or underground. Therefore, the economic modernization in German speaking countries greatly preceded political modernization, which happened slowly and was orchestrated from the top. The power of the unified Germany was still firmly in the hands of the Prussian rural elite, so reactionary traditionalism dominated the political hierarchy of power in Germany, as well as social mentalities and in class relations. It was these same, premodern elites, mainly the east Elbian landowners (the Junkers), upper-level civil servants and the officer corps, who retained great power and influence well into the twentieth century, which ultimately represented an obstacle to democratization and parliamentarianism. Along with the old elites, many traditional and preindustrial norms, ways of thinking and modes of life also survived. Historians like Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Fritz Fischer have even argued that promotion of these authoritarian values by the officer corps, which became more and more influential throughout the 19th century, in fact contributed to both World War I and the disasters of World War II (Mommsen 1980, Evans 2004: 8, Dahrendorf 1967:36).

The liberal Max Weber criticized the "feudalization" of the upper bourgeoisie, which seemed to accept both the disproportional representation of the nobility in politics as well as aristocratic norms and practices instead of striving for power on its own terms or cultivating a distinctly middle-class culture (Kocka, 1990: 283). Lacking the experience of a successful revolution from below, schooled in a long tradition of bureaucratically led reforms from above, and challenged by a growing workers' movement, the German bourgeoisie as a moving force towards greater modernity appeared relatively weak and, compared with the West, almost "unburgeois". The authoritarian state prevented a transformation of subjects into citizens in something Dahrendorf calls an industrial feudal society. This type of society was based on obedience, glorification of militarism and ethnic pride, which immediately turned minorities into enemies of the state, as the ethnic definition of the nation didn't include pluralism (Mann, 2005, Dahrendorf 1967: 52).

The first who were targeted were the Catholics, mainly out of fear that their connection to the papacy might make them less loyal to the nation, including the Poles, and the French minorities in the Alsatian lands. The Laws of 1873 and 1875 brought the appointment of priests under state control, which resulted in shortage of priests and abolishment of seminaries, removing religious protection from the Prussian constitution. The Germanized Jews remained another vulnerable population in the new German nation-state. As Napoleon imposed emancipation of Jews in the territories he conquered,

the reactions against mixing of Christians and Jews after his demise grew, and Jews attempted to look and appear German in dressing, language and customs in the process of Germanization. With use of mythology, it was attempted to achieve assimilation of minorities by idealizing the role of Prussia as a protector and unification as German destiny. As a result of this policy, ethnic minorities declined since the beginning of the Modern Age, as the Polabs, Sorbs[29] and even the once important Low Germans had to assimilate themselves. This marked the transition between Antijudaism, where converted Jews were accepted as full citizens (in theory), to Antisemitism, where Jews were thought to be from a different ethnicity that could never become German. Ethnic conflicts in Prussia, and opposition to unification was also not uncommon, especially with Prussian Poles "We can never be Germans - Prussians, every time" (Helmstadter 1997:19, William 1993:314).

4.2. Pretext for World War I

There are a number of causes for WW1 and they are all related to the very specific context not only Germany but the whole world was a part of. The metaphor, used by historians is "the period of the long fuse", meaning that a number of tendencies, present from the second half of 19th century escalated in the Great war, the first big war after a period of a hundred years relative peace. Here, I look at some of the main causes (Lafore 1971).

This is a period of the so called second industrial revolution, as the western world has already become very advanced, with electricity, improved sanitation, a public water supply, policing, and public transport. New techniques for communication and organization gave rise to the concept of "the masses" as a political and economic force. Rapid medical progress, which insured that a cure was found for a great number of killer diseases, resulted in a great reduction of mortality and a great increase in population of Europe, which doubled between 1800 and 1900. This created a problematic atmosphere in two ways. Firstly, the newly found security and independence from nature, after centuries of difficult living, were now to be preserved at every cost, while the still stronger nationalist movements inspired people to demand the same living standard as those in power and secondly Europe was slowly becoming overcrowded and increasingly difficult to feed, particularly the cities, which experienced an enormous influx of people from the countryside. Large enterprises required large armies of unskilled workers, who worked for low pay, usually by the day or by the job, as labor standards and wages all declined, which would lead to labor unrest and efforts at reform. Additionally, the last decades of the 19th century saw a severe economic crisis, called the long depression, 1873-

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[29] Lechite Slavic ethnic groups who lived along the Elbe River in present East Germany and were largely Germanized with Polabian language becoming extinct.

1896, caused by tight American monetary policy, along with the collapse of Vienna stock exchange and the long term consequences of the Franco-Prussian war, which was extremely hard on European countries (Henig, 2002, Rosenberg 2008:58).

On the other hand, it seems that this period is particularly characterized by a frantic arms race between world's major players. After the Franco-Prussian war, most of the armies in Europe doubled in size, both out of fear of new conflicts and as the quest for territory, both within and outside of Europe required major resources. Crimean war, in particular, created a whole generation of officers, who used their influence on politics to push for war and demand a testing ground for new technologies that proved useful in the colonization of Africa. Within Europe, however, the balance of power was fragile and constantly shifting, as the continent was plagued by a number of serious diplomatic conflicts. With a weakened Britain, Germany becomes industrially, economically and militarily the strongest nation in Europe (Evans 2004:20). However, its rapid industrial growth didn't reflect the size of its territory, as the late unification also meant that the German imperialism developed later in comparison to Britain or France, which is why it was more racial in character (Arendt 1962, Mazower 2009:2). In a continuous quest to remain a serious competitor, and a major power in the world, Germany now began a frantic quest to create a strong navy and colonize as much territory as possible, thereby challenging the British control of the seas. Finding their so called "place in the sun" through the creation of global German empire, as Kaiser Wilhelm announced, for Germans meant the only true indication of achieving nationhood, as the aggressiveness of their conviction made the other powers increasingly afraid. According to historian Jay Winter, Germany grew too rapidly for its political structures which were old, and nobody knew how to change them, short of war (Evans 2004: 18).

Finally, although the de facto casus belli for WW1 was the assassination of Archduke of Austria by Gavrilo Princip, a member of secret Serbian military organisation "Black Hand" which advocated pan-Serbism, the war was at that point already discussed for some time in Europe. Germany, for one had a number of reasons to want a war and its military, in particular the then army chief of staff Moltke, demanded it for several reasons. Firstly, it was believed that Germany would not be able to win the arms race and therefore secure its Lebensraum if they waited too long, as Russia had already began to modernize the military. Secondly, Germany's interests conflicted with the British in a number of areas, but mainly in relation to commercial influence in Africa during the business partition of the continent and following the discovery of diamonds and gold, after which Whitehall determined that German commercial penetration constituted a direct threat to Britain's economic and political

hegemony on the continent (McMeekin, 2010). Others had their own reasons to want a war, as scramble for territory and armaments race became the defining characteristics of this period in European history. On the domestic front, as many of these countries were torn by conflicting interests of conservatives and liberalists, war was seen as an opportunity to unite the states against a common enemy. In other words, the process of the nation state formation in Europe was accomplished through war (Fischer, 1967, Henig, 2002).

In addition, imperialism, as such had a huge influence as a cause for WW1, not only because newly formed nation states, such as Germany, Italy or Serbia competed to win their share of the wealth from nations who already accumulated great wealth in the colonies like United Kingdom or France, as the limits of natural resources in Europe made national industries seek natural resources elsewhere, but because the same strategy was utilized on the continent where every inch of land left over from the fall of the monarchies, such as the Ottoman empire, became a matter of conflicting influences and interest zones, as a new world order based on the institution of the nation state was taking place. At the same time, as Social Darwinism was gaining in popularity, armed struggle between nations, as a way of ensuring the survival of the fittest became seen as the natural order of things in which the stronger defeat the weaker as the weaker perish. As a consequence of all of these characteristics that caused WW1: German attempts to win influence in Europe, armaments race, Imperialism and scramble for colonies, Continental Imperialism as a consequence of the ruin of the old system of empires and Social Darwinism, which contributed to an increasingly militaristic policy in the colonies, particularly in South-West Africa, which was the only German colony deemed inhabitable for white settlers, a ruthless German attempt to extinguish revolts by natives in this region resulted in Herero Namaque genocide, the first genocide of the 20th century, which lasted for three years 1904-1907 and took between 30.000 and 100.000 lives, many of whom died in concentration and extermination camps. This was, by far, the worst outcome of the scramble for Africa in an attempt to create a racially pure African Germany (Soroka 2011:114, Olusoga and Erichsen 2010).

WW1 was the first total war. Technological advancements changed the way war was fought entirely, as new inventions such as machine guns, tanks, chemical weapons, grenades, and military aircraft, modified tactics and strategy revealing a potential for mass annihilation (Bauer 1982:61). After more than four years of trench warfare in Western Europe, and 20 million dead, - During 1915 and 1916, Germany became a mentor to another genocide of Armenians in Turkey, as it itself had an

interest in preserving a stable and strong Turkish state thereby preventing the expansion of Russia, Britain or France (Dadrian 2003:248-300, Bauer 1982:65).

4.3. Post-war crisis

The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were dismantled at the conclusion of the war, and the Russian empire turned into a communist state, marking the final end of the age of empires and the de facto beginning of the period of nation state. In Germany, the coming period proves to be extremely difficult. In November 1918, a German revolution breaks out, and the emperor along with all of German ruling prices abdicates, as Germany is declared a republic. The country is unstable and struggles for power between the radical, communist left and the right wing, become increasingly violent (Mazower 2009: 31, Peukert 1991:73). The right wing promotes the Dolchstoßlegende, or stab-in-the-back myth, claiming that Germany had lost World War I because of those who wanted to overthrow the government (Jews and socialists) (Evans 2004:150, Peukert 1991:4). The ruling social democratic party, which was already strong before the war, neglected to hand the power over to the Soviets, as the Bolsheviks had in Russia, due to political fragmentation and a fear of an all-out civil war provoked by reactionary conservatives. As a result, the old imperial elites, again survived, as they became integrated into the new social democratic system, while the army and the nationalist militias, such as Freikorps still had an influence on politics. In June 1919, the Versailles treaty was signed, demanding of Germany to accept responsibility for causing the war (along with Austria and Hungary), to disarm, to make substantial territorial concessions in Europe and pay heavy reparations to Entente powers. German colonies were divided between the victors, who finally put an end to the GrosseDeutchland idea, by formally forbidding Germany to join with Austria. The total cost of these reparations was assessed at 132 billion, and was so high that it took Germany 92 years to pay it off (Evans 2004: 61).

The Weimar government, established in August 1919 was extremely weak to begin with, and, although democratic (a republic under a parliamentary republic system with the Reichstag elected by proportional representation, with democratic parties obtaining a solid 80% of the vote), it was torn between destructive influences of both radical left, which demanded a communist revolution and radical right, which wanted a return to the authoritarian, imperial past, as well as their paramilitaries. Rampant inflation, massive unemployment and a large drop in living standards made the government severely unpopular, as accusations of betrayal due to signing the Versailles treaty, which forever remained a point of no confidence for the German nation, became more and more public (Evans 2004: 103, Bauer 1982:82). Indeed, the reparations did severely damage the German economy by

discouraging market loans, which forced Weimar to finance its deficit by printing more currency. The loss of pre-war industrial exports, along with 13.3 percent of territory certainly didn't help. Furthermore, as most historians would agree, the German industrial elite was heavily dissatisfied with the republic, which they identified with labour unions and Social Democrats who had established the Versailles concessions of 1918/1919, along with the members of the military who were disillusioned and in mutiny. Between 1919 and 1923, the crisis became increasingly difficult to bear, as political incidents, strikes and unrests forced the army and Freikorps to try and solve things on their own authority (Lentin 2001:236).

Already in 1922, Germany took the first steps that undermined the Treaty of Versailles, by signing the Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union, which allowed Germany to train military personnel in exchange for giving Russia military technology. Russia was a likely ally, as it, also had lost a number of territories, and was, as a result of the 1917 Russian revolution, excluded from League of Nations. Additionally, as the initial attempts to modify the Versailles treaty peacefully had failed, Germany already started thinking of a new war, based on the idea that both countries had a common goal in dividing Poland. In 1923, the already desperate situation became worse as the French and Belgian troops occupied the most productive industrial region –Ruhr, as retaliation against the German inability to pay the reparations. This caused massive, 8 months strikes that further damaged economy (Marks 1978: 231).

From 1923–1929, there was a short period of economic recovery, the so called golden twenties, when a series of Stresemann reforms stabilized the currency and promoted international confidence in German economy, leading to Germany being finally accepted in the League of Nations (Mazower 2009: 38, Evans 2004: 96). However, the sudden rise in economy was mostly a result of a series of loans Germany received from America, as agreed upon in the Dawes plan, which meant that the unemployment was still around 2 million in 1926 and improvements were largely illusory (Peukert 1991:199). But, business with the Americans also meant importing American culture, music and lifestyle with redefining gender roles and adopting consumerism, which caused outrage in the eyes of traditionalists who saw it as corruption. In fact, Peukert blames several aspects of the modernization process for the conflict that followed, such as overpopulation and superfluous youth, technological advances resulting in higher unemployment, loss of older elites' unifying power and the confusion about gender roles (Peukert 1991:179, Browning 1985:15). This is the reason why the great depression of the 30s, caused by the crash of the New York stock market, particularly affected Germany, which was additionally weakened by the inherent instability of the coalitions. All of these elements contributed to the rise of Nazism. Indeed, the atmosphere in the country was such, that Hitler

didn't only get the support of the military and businessmen, but of workers as well. Historians have, in fact, shown that the depression played a major role in the NSDAP's takeover of the government, as, according to Harold James, there is a clear link between economic decline and citizens turning towards extremist policies (Harold 1990:30-57). In fact, from a relatively small party, the number of seats NSDAP had in the parliament jumped in only two years, from 12 in 1928 to 127 in 1930.

4.4. Descent into genocide

On the German political scene, Hitler arrived as an army spy with the task of providing more information on the activities of Völkisch German workers party, but soon found that he agreed with many of its ideas, and joined the party with the permission of his superiors. He was a brilliant orator and a virulent nationalist and anti-Semite with experience in WW1 combat and 1919 army attempts to extinguish the emergence of Bavarian Socialist Republic. His involvement with the GWP also meant the penetration of the party with his military contacts, friends and superiors, thereby securing the party's access to army political funds and making GWP a trampoline for catapulting military goals into the political sphere (Jaman 1956:88, Evans 2004: 157-164, Bauer 1982:87, Mazower 2009:5). Hitler's political persuasions, as seen in the philosophy of National Socialism, which he conceptualized as a compromise between socialism and capitalism, were based on the ideas of workers' rights to equality and fair pay but at the same time these rights were denied to "aliens" such as Jews and communists, who he argues, should have their citizenship taken away. Even though his initial stands included a critique of capitalism, Hitler was in fact quite "flexible" in his convictions and adapted his policies in relation to his audience. In the infamous NSDAP secret pamphlet, Hitler contradicts the main goals of his party by assuring the leading industrialists of the country, that he, in fact, is a proponent of capitalism, which he describes as a Darwinian method of natural selection and survival of the fittest, a contradiction to the 25 points, which NSDAP declared their ultimate goals (Evans 2004: 171, Dahrendorf 1967: 396). The main element of Hitler's politics, however, remained the idea that the Versailles treaty was a shameful and degrading document for the German nation, which should struggle to unite and regain lost territories. In fact, it was this very feeling of victimization that provided a basis for the aggressiveness of the Third Reich, along with the fact that a Judeo-Bolshevik regime stood in the way of Hitler's plans of expansion eastwards and was seen as the power behind autonomy demands of Austro-Hungarian Slavs (Mann, 2005:183, Mazower 2009: 43, Evans 2004: 93).

From the time when Hitler becomes the president of NSDAP in 1921 his rise is unstoppable and by 1923 he already commands a sizable army Sturmabteilung (SA) and organises the unsuccessful beer

hall putsch of 1923 with the help of his colleagues Göring, Ludendorff, Höss and Röhm, all high ranking army personnel. Due to the fact that Hitler, had many sympathizers among the lay judges at his trial he ended up spending only 9 months in jail, despite the fact that he was sentenced for high treason and used the jail time to spread his massage of organic nationalism and write his seminal work Mein Kampf. As Hitler returned from prison, Germany seemed firmly on its way to recovery, and the attraction towards extremist parties declined. In an attempt to adapt, Hitler downplayed the extremism, but was still largely unsuccessful. It was not until the great depression that the situation started to shift, as the crisis provided a new political opportunity and Hitler's party, virtually overnight, became the second largest in Germany, demonstrating, indeed, that the economic crisis is the number one reason behind political extremism and thus eventually genocide (Evans 2004: 233, Peukert 1991: 12, 240, Bauer 1982:92).

By early 30s Hitler's SA consisted of 40.000 people, who committed violence against Jews and communists on regular basis, while he himself used the inefficiency of the coalition government to criticize parliamentary democracy and to reassert his influence among the most vulnerable segments in the society: farmers, veterans and the middle class (Evans 2004: 255). Although the influence of the communist party grew, he was able to use this for his gain, as he threatened that a Bolshevik revolution was about to take place, which, understandably, had a particularly sinister ring to it for industrialists and old imperial elites. It is, indeed, this alliance, that would finally provide Hitler with the much wanted position of the Chancellor, as a group of prominent industrialists demanded his appointment from President Hindenburg (Shirer 1960:184).

In political terms, this moment in history represents the point of no return. Once a chancellor, Hitler ensured enough funds from the industrialists to make his plans come true. The media were already in the hands of NSDAP, while Göring immediately replaced all senior police officers by Nazi supporters (later Gestapo) (Evans 2004: 307). In order to finally get rid of the communists, the Nazi leaders attempted with a number of serious false accusations, but didn't ultimately succeed until an attempt to set Reichstag on fire, in 1933 was, by Göring deemed a communist attempt to overthrow the government (Evans 2004: 329, Bauer 1982:102). As a consequence, and at Hitler's urging, all activities of the communist party were from then on suppressed, and 4000 members arrested. Researchers, including William L. Shirer and Alan Bullock, are of the opinion that the NSDAP in fact itself was responsible for starting the fire. In a new election, in March 1933, the NSDAP had 43, 9 % of the vote, and the largest number of seats in the Parliament, but still didn't manage to acquire an absolute majority and needed a coalition with the DNVP. After these elections, the Nazis began a

systematic takeover of the state governments throughout Germany, ending a centuries-old tradition of local political independence. Armed SA and SS thugs barged into local government offices using the state of emergency decree as a pretext to throw out legitimate office holders and replace them with Nazi Reich commissioners (Shirer 1960 :184, Bullock 1962:262).

In the following days, Hitler's path away from democracy becomes solidified, as he brings the so called "Enabling act" to a vote, with the intent of securing his cabinet full legislative and executive powers for a period of four years (Evans 2004: 351, Bauer 1982: 102). Leaving nothing to chance, the Nazis used the provisions of the Reichstag Fire Decree to keep several Social Democratic deputies from attending (communists were already banned and under arrest), thereby securing the majority vote and transforming Hitler's government into a de-facto dictatorship in a pompous imperialist ceremony attended by old Junker aristocracy and military elite, while tens of thousands of storm troopers marched the streets in order to intimidate the reluctant voters into voting yes. Once firmly in power, a systematic suppression of the remaining opposition took place, as SPD also became banned and all its assets seized, trade union offices around the country abolished, their leaders arrested and sent to concentration camps. By June other parties had "voluntarily" dissolved, and Hitler used SA to pressure his coalition partner Hugenberg into resigning from cabinet, as within a month the Nazi Party was declared the only legal political party in Germany. On the night of long knives, Hitler purged the SA and reduced its independence by having his political adversaries shot (Bauer 1982: 103).

When President Hindenburg died in 1934, Hitler abolished the office of the president, combining its powers with those of the chancellor. In spite of the fact that this law violated the Enabling act as well as the constitution, Adolf Hitler was now effectively, the head of state, as well as the head of government. As Führer und Reichskanzler, he swore to have the Wehrmacht ready for war by 1938, as he purged the military of all those who didn't show sufficient enthusiasm for his rule. In relation to Mann's theory on Nazis as the dark side of democracy (Mann, 2005), we observe that Hitler's path to power is as un-democratic as can be. Not only is he critical of the "degenerate" democracies of the west, but he also doesn't hesitate to use crime, intimidation and blackmail to ensure his position of power. In short, Hitler's Nazis are in no way a product of democracy or a democracy gone perverted, as Mann argues; they are rather an annihilation of democracy, a regression into a more primitive state of governance caused by the economic depression and the disillusionment of the First World War (Rauschning 2004:785).

During the early days of Hitler's rule, the country witnessed a number of improvements, including an improvement of economy, based, among other things on seizing the assets of people arrested as enemies of the State, including Jews. Unemployment fell substantially, from six million in 1932 to one million in 1936. In fact, Hitler was in charge of one of the largest infrastructure improvement campaigns in German history, leading to the construction of dams, autobahns, railroads, and other civil works. Industry was revitalised with a focus on military rearmament. In 1935, Germany reacquired military control of the Saar and in 1936 of the Rhineland, both of which had been lost in the Treaty of Versailles. After the Anschluss in 1938 and invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939, a partition of Poland followed, based on the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact with Russia and Operation Himmler (Mazower 2009: 47).   On 1st of September 1939 the German Wehrmacht launched a blitzkrieg on Poland, which was swiftly occupied by Germany and by the Red Army. The UK and France then declared war on Germany, marking the beginning of World War 2 (Chickering 2003:64).

We have now seen how Hitler came to power and what elements influenced the emergence of extremism in Germany; however, in order to uncover how genocide itself came about and whether it was intended from the beginning, we also have to consider the ongoing historiographical debate between functionalists and intentionalists about the origins of the Holocaust which centers on two main questions 1) Was there a master plan on the part of Adolf Hitler to launch the Holocaust and 2) Did the initiative for the Holocaust come from above with orders from Adolf Hitler or from below within the ranks of the German bureaucracy. Indeed, as it is the intentionalist camp that argues the idea of uniqueness of the Holocaust, we can not only come to valid conclusions about whether comparisons are indeed possible with other cases, but also uncover whether the "final solution" was indeed a rational plan and therefore an expression of modern thinking (Browning, 1985: 343).

 The most radical intentionalist' literature was written in the sixties, and focused mainly on the brutalities and horrors committed. Hitler's words from Mein Kampf have often been used, by theorists like Broszat, to indicate that the passage talking about the murder of 15.000 Jews as redemption of sacrificed German soldiers clearly indicates an intention to commit genocide. The intentionality principle insists that the ultimate goal of the Third Reich was genocide, thereby underlining the regime's uniqueness, totalitarianism, revolutionary character and utopianism, i.e. the all-powerful role of Hitler. Daniel Goldhagen went even further, suggesting that popular opinion in Germany was already sympathetic to a policy of Jewish extermination before the Nazi party came to power and that Germany enthusiastically welcomed the persecution of Jews by the Nazi regime in the period 1933–39 (Browning 1985:16, Goldhagen 1997).

Functionalists, like Schleunes and Browning, on the other hand, point out the anarchic character of the Nazi state, internal rivalries and the chaotic process of decision making, focusing on improvisation and radicalization. In 1970, a number of historians challenged the prevailing interpretations and suggested there was no master plan for the Holocaust. Initially, it is argued, the Nazis aimed to expel all of the Jews from Europe, and only resorted to genocide, as, after 1941, this was no longer an option (Browning 1985: 41).

A synthesis of these opinions, and perhaps the most objective perspective, as presented by Arno J. Mayer, Yehuda Bauer, Ian Kershaw and Michael Marrus, states that Holocaust was, in fact a result of pressures that came from both above and below and that Hitler lacked a master plan, but still asserts that he was the decisive force behind the Holocaust. The phrase 'cumulative radicalization' is used in this context to sum up the way extreme rhetoric and competition among different Nazi agencies produced increasingly extreme policies, as fanatical bureaucratic underlings put into practice what they believed Hitler would approve of, based on his widely disseminated speeches and propaganda (Bauer 1982, Mayer 1988).

Indeed, in our previous analysis of the way Hitler came to power, it seems undeniable that his character was of decisive importance in German politics 1933-1945 and that most Nazis were extremely loyal to him (Hancock 2011:194). It is, however also true, that although a dictator, Hitler often accepted ideas and proposals from even lower rank bureaucrats, whose goal was to quickly climb the social ladder by attempting to predict what Hitler wanted to hear (Mann 2005). Additionally, Hitler's political decisions, as we have previously analysed were often modified in relation to particular circumstances, and his political line of thought shifted a lot through the years. In spite of the fact that Hitler talked about and promoted violence and anti-Semitism since the early days in his career, and that he seemed a strong-willed man, determined to stay true to his beliefs, it seems perhaps more likely that, in the extremely complex sphere of internal and international relations, not everything could in fact be planned, and that Hitler had to make many of his decisions under different pressures from in and outside. It must therefore be mentioned, that Hitler for example, never wanted a war with Britain, which he considered a fellow Aryan country and a potential ally, but was forced into an unexpected conflict, which completely changed the course of the war, and ultimately, due to the Germans fighting on two fronts, caused the final defeat (Mazower 2009:134). Additionally, influences from inside the cabinet also had an important role in his decision making. In the events of June 1934, which culminated in the Night of the long knives, Hitler finally succumbed to the influences by Heydrich and Göring, who presented him with doctored evidence against Ernst Röhm, the head of SA,

and ultimately made him order a murder of one of his closest friends and associates, while undertaking a complete cleansing and reorganisation within the SA and the SS (Evans 2004:30).

In relation to the idea that Hitler had planned the genocide all along, it is perhaps important to clarify that a number of plans for a solution of the so called Jewish question, which was in fact a question of space, existed in the day (Browning 1985:41, Mann 2005). In fact, a memorandum, written by Heinrich Himmler, accepted and praised by Hitler as late as May 1940, deems genocide as an un-German and Bolshevik strategy, and proposes something more along the lines of the Madagascar plan (expulsion to Madagascar was initially one of the main ideas for the final solution), clearly showing that there was no master plan to commit genocide, even at this time. As Browning points out, a clear plan to commit genocide occurred only somewhere around autumn-winter 1941, as the initial winning streak of the Wehrmacht in Russia came to an abrupt end, as the battle of Moscow, due to disastrous weather conditions there, resulted in a longer lasting war and serious food shortages (Browning 1985:22). All this evidence shows, not only several weakness in the intentionalist' arguments, but also that the Holocaust came as a result of a number of unpredicted tendencies which resulted in political improvisations and is indeed not the perfectly organised modernist project of ultimate social control.

But, if we cannot blame the complete stream of events solely on Hitler, what was it then that caused a catastrophe of this magnitude? To begin with, it's important to say, that it was not the Nazis who invented German anti-Semitism. Anti-Judaism and pogroms of the Jews were well known in all of Europe, since the early middle ages. However, according to Mann, before WW1, Germany was no more anti-Semitic than, say, France. It was, indeed, the tragedy of Versailles and the dishonesty of the *Dolchstoßlegende,* a national need for someone to blame, that contributed to a rise in mass discrimination against Jews, who were fully integrated German citizens at the time (Arendt 1962:5). In fact, as early as 1921, the German student union Deutcher Hochschulring barred Jews from membership, including those who had converted to Christianity (an example of how the switch from anti-Judaism to racist anti-Semitism had disastrous consequences for minorities) (Mazower 2009:16), while early boycotts of Jewish businesses became a regular feature of regional German politics.

Even the racist Nuremberg Laws, which deprived Jews of German citizenship and prohibited marriage between Jews and other Germans, as well as preventing the Jews from participating in German civic life, were by no means unique (Bauer 1982:110). In fact, anti-miscegenation laws existed in North America from late 17th century and remained in force in some states until 1967, and also in South Africa during apartheid, while other types of racial laws were common all over Europe.

Italian *leggi razziali,* in particular Regio Decreto 17 Novembre 1938 Nr. 1728., restricted civil rights of Jews, banned their books, and excluded Jews from public office and higher education. In the US, a whole range of racist laws existed from slavery laws 1500-1865, Indian removal act of 1830, segregation Jim Crow laws (1876-1965) to Indian Termination policy (until 1983). The German Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring which allowed for a compulsory sterilization had support in other similar eugenic projects, notably in Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Hungary, England, Poland, US and Japan (Proctor, 1988:96, Lennerhed 1997:156). As Mann points out, organic nationalism of the Volksgemeinschaft, and its blending of demos and ethnos left no space for minorities of any kind (Mann 2005).

In fact, the "euthanasia decree" (Action T4), signed by Hitler in 1938 a forced eugenics programme, which made it legal for doctors to take lives of those seen as genetically or socially unfit (life not worth living), a radicalization of the previous law on sterilization can also be seen as a result of the continuous initiative of medical personnel in a devastated post-Versailles state to cut the costs, thereby ensuring more money for the "curable", again a proof of Hitler's openness to outside suggestions (Fleming 1986:20). Indeed, even if we do conclude that Hitler's measures were to a certain extent extreme variations of similar European and world tendencies, it still must be insisted that these policies are merely a continuation of what was already normalized in the scientific racist policies of others and therefore can under no circumstances be seen as unique or incomparable with other contexts. In addition, the influence of Hitler himself has in the works of intentionalists been severely exaggerated, not only because he allowed suggestions and opinions of others to influence his policies, but because he himself was a product of already existing European tendencies that precede him, such as: anti-Semitism and scientific racism. According to Mann, there were several forces of radicalization inside the German society that contributed to the escalation of violence and subsequent genocide, worth mentioning. Influences like post WW1 Freikorps and Wehrverbände and later SA, SS, SD and Krimo, who, along with the personnel from concentration and T4 camps, including transnational refugees and radical Austrians, all contributed to radicalizing the regime further (Mann 2005).

The mass killings themselves, however, began to take place only as part of WWII and the genocide itself must be seen as a result of numerous outside tendencies rather than Hitler's will alone. After the September 1939 German invasion of Poland, Nazis were faced with some three million Jews that suddenly came under their control. As Browning argues, up until 1941, the final solution meant exclusively a territorial solution, and a series of plans in relation to the possible destination were presented. Ghettoization was, however, the logical first step, as Polish and western European Jews

were deported to ghettoes in General government (a territory in central and eastern Poland overseen by a German civilian government) and the Warthegau (an area of western Poland annexed to Germany). Although annihilation was still not the final aim, it was, at this point, far from unimaginable, as an ongoing debate between the officials of Government-general of occupied Poland was taking place, mainly in relation to weather the Jews should be used as slave labour or starved to death. This period shows, perhaps better than any other how improvised German policy was at the time, and how many different factors and actors contributed to any decision, as Poland finally became a stage for experiments that was to determine the fate of Jews everywhere (Browning 1985:7). In the first year and a half of German war expansionism in Europe, notorious Einsatzgruppen killed over a million and three hundred thousand European Jews, along with committing an eliticide of Polish intelligentsia (Mazower 2009: 66).

The war with the Soviets changed the course of WWII. The euphoria after initial successes led Hitler to believe that final victory is not far, and that, as with Poland, a huge number of Jews would again end up within German territory (Browning 1985:32). Einsatzgruppen were busy killing Jews everywhere, as the SS and police introduced mobile gas vans. However, a series of misfortunes changed the priorities for the Third Reich, primarily a strong Soviet counteroffensive in Moscow, as well as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, which caused the US to enter the war. Taken aback by this surprise the Nazi officials were now faced with a completely different situation. Firstly, it now seemed that there was a prospect of a long lasting war, and secondly, as food reserves were becoming shorter, new decisions had to be made to avoid starvation. On January the 20th, the postponed Wannsee conference took place, in which it was finally agreed that the Madagascar plan was abandoned and that all Jews must be evacuated to the East, where they would die of natural causes, or, if some should survive, be eliminated. As a part of the so called operation Reinhard, Nazi leaders now started establishing three killing centres in Poland (Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka) with the sole purpose of the mass murder of Jews (Fleming 1986: 90-93, Browning 1985:8).

4.5. Profiles of the perpetrators

We are now beginning to understand the Nazi Holocaust from the perspective of modernity and demonstrate that it is various modern tendencies, such as organic nationalism and modern scientific racism that have had an influence on the emergence of Nazi genocide, thereby confirming that critical theorists were right when they argued against the uniqueness of the Holocaust. In relation to the

bureaucratic killers as typically modern perpetrators, we will now consider whether this same theory provides sufficient explanations.

It is certainly very difficult to say anything general about the profiles of Nazi perpetrators. Instrumental rationality as the main motive for killings was undeniably present with some of the perpetrators. The vast economic crisis made it certain that purely utilitarian motives would in many cases apply as a secure job with a steady pay and the safety of one's family would easily overshadow the morality of the deed one had to perform. In addition, Germany had a history of authoritarianism, so national pride as seen through loyalty and obedience most certainly had an important role to play in the execution of genocide on micro level. Indeed, mass participation as such would never be possible without some degree of conformity. However, it would seem problematic here to focus exclusively on one type of motive typical for obedient desk killers, when it seems only logical that other types would be bound to exist as well, particularly taking into consideration the highly ideological nature of a society such as Nazi Germany. In her book "Eichmann in Jerusalem" the idea of the dispassionate, indifferent killer, who doesn't question, but only obeys orders as a part of a larger, bureaucratic scheme of things in which a subordinate abdicates his will, morality and autonomy, is at the centre (Arendt 2006, Bauman, 1989).

Certainly, Arendt was deeply influenced by Eichmann's trial and shocked by his unwillingness to show remorse, but this was, one could say, a preferred line of defence that most of the accused in Nuremberg trials followed, claiming that a soldier cannot be guilty of following the orders of a superior. The so called Nuremberg defence, in fact, relied on the simple method of blaming the *Führerprinzip* (the leader's command is above law) for all the evils done, thereby, making the guilt impossible to locate, the exact type of free-floating responsibility that Bauman sees as a characteristic of bureaucracy (Bauman 1989:163). Indeed, even though in totalitarian societies the unquestionable supreme role of the leader would account for motives such as obedience and loyalty, significant evidence shows that Eichmann was anything but an ordinary follower of orders. Some of Eichmann's war colleagues even testified that he, in fact had no superior, and was only following his own orders with a blood thirst and a fanatical zeal of a true killer (Cesarani 2005: 197). Eichmann, was, indeed a true Nazi ideologist. From mid 20s, a member of Jungfrontkämpfervereinigung, the youth section of Hitler's fascist and Pan-German veteran's movement, he soon joined the NSDAP as well as the SS. As an SS corporal, his career would start in the Dachau concentration camp. The "little Jew", a nickname given to him by his teasing friends at school because of his dark complexion, was indeed a careerist, but one who advanced through the Nazi hierarchy easily and quickly, because he was

ideologically more than adequate. As Lionel Abel, pointed out, in the Partisan review, no man, who was not a moral monster, could ever boast with at the joy he felt because of killing 5 million people (Abel in Ezra 2007:148). Indeed, Arendt's work was controversial and widely criticised, as particularly sympathetic towards Eichmann, while at the same time harsh towards the victims. Historical distance has, however, taught us, that, Eichmann indeed was not merely an insignificant and commonplace official, but a vital and important part of the genocidal machinery, indeed, a man who personally created the Madagascar plan. As numerous other Nazis like Kurt Becher and even Höss have testified, and as Jacob Robinson points out, Eichmann was an energetic and highly intelligent man, well versed in the arts of cunning and deception, with a single mission, to create a Judenfrei Europe (Robinson 1965:406). He was in fact so fanatical, that even as the war was coming to an end and Himmler ordered a halt of all operations and disguising of evidence, he continued with the killing, in spite of direct orders, because he thought it was a disgrace to abandon things half done. This is in direct contradiction to Arendt's theory. Here, we do not have a man who killed only to obey orders, but one who directly disobeyed orders so that he could kill. Indeed, as Eichmann himself boasted, from his Argentinean hiding place in 1957, his only regret was that he failed to massacre all eleven million Jews.

In relation to other Nazi profiles, and whether or not they can be related to the bureaucratic character, it is important to point out that there was no shortage of racist and radical ideologies in Germany at the time. Ultra-nationalist forces with anti-Semitic goals, like Organisation Consul or Artaman league, which both Himmler and Höss were members of, had an influence on the society. A major source of radicalism and right wing fanaticism was, indeed, the army, constituted by the Junker elite and pregnant with imperial nostalgia. As an army man himself, Hitler greatly benefited from his friendships with his Junker friends from the military, who provided the funds and the security needed for his party to thrive. In fact, he himself can be seen as a product of the great army disillusionment with the outcome of the WW1, and the consequent anger and hatred directed towards the republic (Evans 2004: 218, Browning 1985:5, Bauer 1982:84). Unable or unwilling to adapt to a civilian life, many soldiers joined Freikorps, German volunteer military or paramilitary units, renowned, by nationalists, for their "heroic" role in the Napoleonic wars (Peukert 1991:74). Known for their brutality and fierce anti-Slavic racism, they automatically became members of Hitler's SA and SS, as Freikorps leaders symbolically gave their flags to the Führer in 1933. SA in particular, which was more working class than SS, was fanatically right wing, and even Hitler had problems controlling them. Most Hitler's close friends and collaborators, including Röhm, Himmler and Höss, both participated in WW1, and were later members of Freikorps (Evans 2004: 220, Peukert 1991: 67, Bauer 1982:84). As Ernst von Salamon explains: "We were a band of fighters, drunk with all the passions of the world; full of lust; exultant in action. What we wanted, we did not know. And what we

knew we did not want. War and adventure, excitement and destruction. An indefinable surging force welled up from every part of our being" (Salamon in Bauer 1982:84).

But, it was not only those with military experience who were attracted to Nazi ideology. SA-the biggest Nazi paramilitary organization recruited young, unemployed males, who specialized in violence against the left. It provided shelter, food and purpose for the disillusioned youth. When Hitler was released from prison, he formed SA as his own private army - Sturmabteilung (Storm Section). The SA (also known as storm troopers or brown shirts) were instructed to disrupt the meetings of political opponents and to protect Hitler from revenge attacks (Evans 2004: 221, Mann 2005).

SS, on the other hand, started as Hitler's personal bodyguard, but grew through 1930s. From 1934 on, the SS ran concentration camps, which were characterized by an atmosphere of sadistic anarchy, unlike the refined torture of later military dictatorships in Argentina or Chile (Evans 2004: 346). From 1936 it controlled most of the Reich security police forces. In 1941 it gave orders to Einsatzgruppen, the most violent killing unit in the entire Nazi period. While SA represented early, wild, working class violence, the SS mostly represented "orderly" ideological, middle class violence that accomplished genocide. (Mann 2005:198). SS training manuals spoke of racial purity of Teutonic Aryans, British and French as degenerated Aryans, and emphasized loyalty above all. Most top SS were Catholics from eastern parts. The SS had to be racially pure (show lineage since 1800), be fine specimens of Aryan race, athletic and trained in the art of ideological hate. By 1937, 20.000 strong SS elite were cohesive, all male volunteer elite as new violence units emerged.

According to Mann, the German bureaucracy, indeed, made place for the ideologically adequate. Most perpetrators came from core Nazi constituencies, from the east, lost territories or threatened borders, most were ideological or violent careerists, and most have, before they became "killers", had previous experience in either Hitler's paramilitaries, or concentration or euthanasia camps. Few came from agriculture and industry, where class conflict trumped nationalism. Additionally, Hitler was often advised by people who had previous experience in the art of annihilation, like officers who participated in the Turkish cleansing of Armenians, or Germans who returned from former colonies in South-West Africa, where they were well acquainted with slave labour and forced starvation, as methods of cleansing the territory (Mann 2005:227, Evans 2004: 345). This contradicts Bauman's theory of bureaucracy, which, through authority, routinization and dehumanization entices killing. Moreover, instead of mindless bureaucrats with no will or convictions, we often find thinking and

acting human beings who know and approve of what is going on (Bauman 1989:122, Browning 1985:86).

However, one should not purely dismiss Arendt's idea of a bureaucratic killer. In other totalitarian societies, like the Soviet Russia, we also find the careerist bureaucratic clerks that she describes. However, the Soviet apparatchiks are seen as men of carefully planned details, but not of grand plans, where Eichmann and his colleagues certainly wouldn't fit the description. Additionally, while it is difficult to say anything about the motivations of the ordinary soldier, it can certainly be established, that Nazi bureaucracy was not only based on obedience, which, indeed, was an important characteristic of the German society even from the time of the union, but was unusually flexible and open to individual initiatives, which, often ended up, inspiring Hitler, himself. It is therefore important to point out that German apparatchiks clearly had a choice as to how far they would advance in the society in relation to their moral restrictions. In Browning's analysis of the Ordnungspolizei, Reserve Unit 101, the commander of the unit gave his men the choice to opt out of their killing duty if they found it too unpleasant, as it was often the case in the Nazi hierarchy. However, the great majority of people still chose to proceed with killing, which Browning understands as basic obedience to authority (Browning 1998).

However, if we look closer at the context at hand, we realize that this is not entirely true. We are here looking at a deeply militarized nation, which took great pride in its former victories, and viewed war as a man's and nation's natural path to self-realization. An average Wehrmacht soldier grew up in the time of National Socialism and was therefore already deeply indoctrinated (Bartov 1996: 110). A great number of Germans were drawn to war, and certainly many who did, quickly advanced through the hierarchy, as Himmler, who as a young man was so obsessed with war that he insisted he would leave Germany to fight elsewhere, if Germany didn't soon enter a conflict. Many other Hitler's close associates, like Bormann, Frank, Heydrich, Goebbels, Jodl and Keitel were fascinated by war and had (all expect Goebbels) previous military careers. Killing was a matter of these people's manly duty and responsibility to their country, pride and convictions, perhaps, rather than mindless obedience to authority. In addition, immense resources were invested in propaganda, as extremely racist newspapers like Der Stürmer published already from early 20s. This was a regime ruled by many highly educated men, who knew exactly what they were doing and how public opinion is created (Braunbeck 1997:7, Browning 1985:87).

Therefore, it seems logical that, just as in other genocides, most German soldiers saw killing Jews, as a matter of pure self defence, since this is how it was presented. As far as ordinary people were concerned, they had all possible reasons to believe Hitler, who restored national pride and helped build a new Germany, which is what many wanted. Ordinary Germans worried about the war and food shortages, not about Jews, who were depersonalized, then absent by imprisonment and deportation (Mann 2005: 207). British bombings, also portrayed as caused by Jewish capitalism, radicalized the population further, and Germans were willing to believe anything in order to escape guilt.

4.6. Modernity of the Holocaust

We have now begun discussing the aspects of Holocaust modernity related to rationality. We have recognized that the Holocaust is not just a result of one man's lunacy, but a product of numerous modern tendencies of its time that do not make it unique but comparable with other contexts that share similar characteristics. However, as we have concluded that genocide was, in the case of Nazi genocide not planned from the very beginning as it is argued by intentionalists, but a product of numerous improvisations and different societal factors and pressures, internal as well as external, the idea of rationality behind the plan has come into question. Similarly, in the analysis of the perpetrator profiles we have uncovered that apart from the desk killers with utilitarian and conformist motives there are other incentives related to emotional rather than rational reasons, such as hatred, ideology and national pride, often a result of propaganda and indoctrination. In the following, we will have a closer look at the decision making process behind the Holocaust to see to what extent we can call this a rational endeavour. There is no doubt that Holocaust as a huge, well organised project, which put in action the entire bureaucratic state apparatus to execute the racist and imperialist goals of the nation state utilizes many aspects of modernity. However, there are arguments that show the Holocaust, as not the cold-hearted, strictly planned and perfectly organized super-human plan, that the rational theory presents, but a matter of mass hysteria, loss of control and unstable personalities, which also needs to be examined.

There is no doubt that Hitler was an extremely intelligent man, with a brilliant memory and an obsession with studying everything related to war. However, he simply didn't have the proper schooling and the experience of a military strategist. His military experience from WW1, was that of a soldier, without the ability to command troops or analyse a particular military situation (Braunbeck 1997: 14-18). On the one hand, Hitler believed that the war can be won solely based on will and an awareness of moral superiority of the German race, therefore completely disregarding important

practical things like military supplies, logistics, and sustainment, along with a stubborn refusal to take into account any reports of enemy's superiority. (Braunbeck 1997: 6) On the other hand, however, underneath this overblown self esteem there was a deep anxiety, which made him procrastinate every time an important decision had to be made. These two characteristics combined created a series of important military errors, which finally culminated in the loss of the war (Braunbeck 1997: 20, Mazower 2009:138).

Indeed, many theorists have noticed that Hitler's reasoning was flawed from the very beginning, influenced often by wishful thinking, and sometimes by personal anxieties. In fact, Germany entered the war unprepared without enough tanks, ammunition or supplies, as its political aims were not created in accordance with realistic possibilities. In fact, Germany was technologically inferior to Russia and lacked raw materials for armament (Mazower 2009: 136, Bartov 1996: 19, Hancock 2011: 18).

Additionally, a series of grave diplomatic and military mistakes, caused by Hitler's insufficient ability to view the reality of the situation, would characterize his rule. German-British relations are the first to come to mind, as Hitler, in fact, counted on the British friendship and even alliance and was greatly shocked when Britain kept its publicly made promise to defend Poland if the Germans should attack (Mazower 2009: 63, 102, Braunbeck 1997:12, Bauer 1982: 98). From this perspective, it seems rather difficult to understand how Hitler, who was extremely well acquainted with everything regarding WW1, and participated in it himself, couldn't predict the reaction of Britain to another attempt of German expansionism, which would, unavoidably greatly disturb the fragile European balance of power. It seems however, that Hitler simply demanded expansionism, regardless of the cost, something Gerald Fleming refers to as a growth of an obsession (Fleming, 1986: 1). The allies looked the other way in relation to Rhineland, then Austria and then Sudetenland, thus allowing the incorporation of the so called German lands into one, singular state. However, when Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, and later Poland, in spite of the terrified warnings from his generals, one of whom even resigned, convinced that Hitler was leading Germany to ruin, he was clearly playing with fire and what is even worse, he was unable to stop (Braunbeck 1997:10, Mazower 2009: 54).

In the analysis of Hitler's persona and the less than ideal judgement he displayed during the course of the war, historians focus on the battle of Dunkirk, when Hitler had an opportunity to completely destroy the British army, and thereby ensure his victory against the empire and avoid the whole "fighting on two fronts" curse that cost him the war. Theorists have disagreed on his motivation in this case, with some believing that it was his lifelong fascination with the British Empire that

contributed to this unusual mercy. However, it is more likely that Hitler simply didn't know what to do, refusing to take the lead, and taking a more defensive approach, leaving the Luftwaffe to deal with the situation. Although the case of Dunkirk might today sound like an insignificant matter, in relation to WW2, it was a military disaster (Liddel, 1970:81, Taylor 1974: 255).

Furthermore, Hitler's leadership principles, to hold on to every inch of the conquered territory, have often been questioned. Otherwise known as the "no retreat policy," applying this strategy in every contest of the war meant a basic disregard for the reality of the situation and an eventual tragic outcome of the battle of Stalingrad (Schramm 1999: 154). The so called policy of fanatical resistance was based on a similar situation Hitler experienced in Moscow, when it turned out to be a magnificent victory. However, in Stalingrad, a withdrawal was necessary in order to avoid a complete surrounding of the troops by Soviet army, and when this happened, and as Göring's promise that Luftwaffe could supply the food and ammunition to the sixth army also proved a failure, the results were catastrophic. Hitler's inability to change his mind and rationally view the circumstances, in this case, basically meant the loss of the war. By this time, however, Hitler was seriously addicted to amphetamine, which some historians blame for this radical approach in battle. Generally, in relation to Russia, Hitler made a disastrous underestimation of the enemy's forces and resources, imagining that Russia was ripe for collapse solely because it was ruled by Jews; reality proved to be very different indeed (Hancock 2011:27, Schramm 1999: 113).

Finally, there is the "rationality" of the genocide plan, especially as the consolidation of Lebensraum and solving the Jewish question turned out to be competing rather than complementary goals (Browning 1985:11). Out of all decisions, Hitler and his generals have made over the years; this one is probably the most questionable. Instead of focusing all of his efforts and resources on winning the war, which after 1943 seemed very much at stake, Hitler used much of German resources on mass transportation and killing of Jews. As much as Anti-Semitism made sense in the beginning, politically in relation to national cohesion, and economically, in terms of slave labour, seized property, reduction of unemployment and elimination of small unproductive Jewish businesses, which created more space for industrialists, making the final solution the centrepiece of a difficult war was, however, irrational on several levels. According to Mann, this decision was motivated by the idea that, in spite of losing the war, Germans could gain some of their dignity back by finishing what they started in the name of humanity, which would, later thank Germany for saving it from the Jewish pest (Mann, 2005).

In addition, the idea of the Holocaust as a matter of perfect organisation and total control should also be questioned. As the war drew closer to its end, all of the branches of the Nazi machinery become so radical and self-sufficient, that they were virtually impossible to control. In Lithuania, Einsatzgruppen committed genocide of local Jews in spite of the clear orders from Heydrich to only subtly encourage pogroms among the locals (Fleming, 1986: 76-78). Not only was this case of practical disobedience indicative in itself, but it was also completely contradictory to any notion of cost efficiency and logic, as the ammunition for the shootings cost way too much and the soldiers were severely demoralized by the prospect of killing German city Jews, who looked and acted like themselves (Mazower 2009:175). In general, it can, most certainly, not be said that German killings were cold blooded and devoid of passion. Cases of pregnant women shot in bellies, children beat up before they were murdered, camp guards wives making lamps out of the skin of inmates, the fact that both the SS and the SA were, before the war, better trained in beating than killing people, all show that hatred, was, indeed, a very present motivation among the killers. The example with lamps, shows, particularly that numbing was not at all needed, nor was it wanted in all cases of execution. Certain killers, particularly medical staff, kept trophies of their killings.

Additionally, far from all German soldiers had the luxury of numbing, as the approach to battle was strictly dependent on the situation. Even the Wehrmacht, which was well known for its efficiency and the loyalty and obedience of its soldiers as well as harsh military discipline, a tradition which stems from the Prussian army with its use of corporate punishment, became degraded during the course of the war. In fact, Bartov here speaks of the demodernization of Wehrmacht in Russia, as a result of an increase in allied production and enormous German losses in the war, which caused an end of the Blitzkrieg strategy and a return to primitive, machine-less, trench warfare and face to face combat (Bartov 1991: 16). Additionally, the perpetrators consumed alcohol in enormous quantities, along with amphetamine, which was a legal drug at the time, liberally distributed among the soldiers, making them more resistant and more radical, so the concept of numbing would here perhaps be better used in relation to the opiates, rather than in relation to distancing provided by modern technology, as Bauman would argue (Mann 2005: 242). Furthermore, the impossible conditions in this case resulted in a perversion of discipline, as soldiers under pressure turned not only towards theft, insubordination, embezzlement and rape, but also towards unauthorized murders of civilians (Bartov 1996: 61).

As we now see, the idea of Nazi killing as purely bureaucratic and dispassionate only addresses some aspects of the genocide. Not only was the Nazi bureaucracy not strictly based on rules, but, on the contrary, it was fluid and left plenty of room for individual's initiatives and creativity. In fact, all case studies of Nazi killers in the East emphasize local administration as free from bureaucratic

restrictions, using their own initiative (Browning 1985:32). A characteristic of genocide in general, is that perpetrators usually believe that they are doing something good (sometimes even holy) for the survival of their group, and the Holocaust is certainly no exception, as even the desk killers believed they had good reasons for doing what they were doing. This is why Bauman's theory of instrumental rationality appears to only account for certain aspects of the genocide. According to Mann, instead of Weber's notion of instrumental and technical reason to explain the motivations for the Holocaust, it seems more appropriate to utilize his action of value rationality, in terms of commitment to absolute values. Indeed, modernity's evil has been more ideological and blood-spattered than bureaucratic and dispassionate (Mann 2005: 270).

As we have shown previously, literature that considers the Holocaust an embodiment of modernity is abundant and influential within the field of genocide. Indeed, up to now we have shown that modern tendencies have most definitely played an important part in the conceptualization, organisation and execution of this genocide. However, there are different ways to look at this phenomenon. In relation to organic nationalism, for example, on the one hand we see a clearly modern mass movement, which could never have taken place in the absence of print capitalism, and which is, to a huge extent penetrated by very modern ideas which occur as a justification of imperialism, namely those of eugenics and social Darwinism. Indeed, it is the modern characteristics of the Holocaust that make it comparable with other contexts and argue against the uniqueness theory. On the other hand, however, we see that many of the enlightenment values, normally seen as typical for modernity are rejected within this philosophy, as a heritage of the Napoleonic occupation. Modernization as such is here adopted as means to ensure political independence and not related to a revolution of thought in terms of emancipation and equality of all human beings. Due to its difficult path towards nationhood, Germany enters modernity with limited political reorganisation and a number of traditional norms including traditional elites, which persist throughout the first part of the 20th century, and which we see as some of the actors behind the genocidal project. In general, within the German national project, modernity is to a certain extent rejected as Westernization, first in relation to the hegemony of France and then in relation to Anglo-Saxon market dominance. In addition, modernization has indeed brought with it numerous problems, such as overpopulation and unemployment, which is the reason for the organic nationalism's nostalgia for a more simple time.

An analysis of the profiles of perpetrators shows similar ambiguity as only some of the motives can be ascribed to instrumental rationality, while others include ideology and even passionate hate. The bureaucracy was, indeed based on obedience, not a strict one, as many would think, but a loose, improvising structure, open to initiatives of ideologically adequate. Disorderly Freikorps, SS

ideologists, SA troublesome street fighters and bar brawlers, killers of the Einsatzgruppen and Wehrmacht soldiers turned rapists and thieves, it was not exactly the image of organized, orderly scientific violence that the theory often insists on. Similarly, even though on the one hand, certain rational motives can be found behind the idea of violent restructuring of society, such as the economic viability of war as a solution for the crisis, which Hitler proved by the immediate economic recovery that followed with the boom of military industry, along with the fact that the economy benefited from the disappearance of unproductive small Jewish businesses and that the Nazis, indeed, used their victim's finances to invest further in the war, on the other hand, the fact that genocide was not initially planned, but came about as a result of different circumstances and political improvisation argues against the supposed rationality of the Holocaust. A number of Hitler's decisions demonstrate unpredictability, the lack of experience in military strategy and often even lack of logical reasoning to be called rational. It is perhaps the idea of efficiency rather than rationality that most clearly witnesses of the modernity of the Holocaust project, as the extermination of 2, 5 % of the world's population is, indeed, a striking figure. To conclude, although modernity theorists such as Arendt and Bauman recognize many important characteristics of Holocaust as a modern project, they often fail to take into account the particularities of the German context. A theory that could incorporate aspects of the Sonderweg idea with the main ideas of the critical theory would certainly be superior to both.

4.7. National Socialism: religion and ideology

4.7.1. Fascism as a cult of tradition

As we have so far managed to give an overview of key historical tendencies which influenced the Holocaust and attempted to describe the nature and the motivations behind the project, let us now have a look at ideology. National Socialism is a radical, right wing ideology characterized by extreme nation statism and authoritarian militarism that ruthlessly suppresses any opposition. As other fascist ideologies, Nazism seeks to organise the nation, by submitting it to a strong, totalitarian leadership that wages war. In fact, war is seen as all-important and necessary for recreation of national vitality, which automatically defines fascism as, at its core, a reactionary ideology, particularly as a response to the threat of communism, with which it has a lot in common. Like communism, fascism promotes the ending of class conflict by rejecting individualism and a creation of "we the people" (Mann, 2005:191), but unlike communism, it is based on corporatist economy, in which representatives of capital and labour interest groups work together within sectoral corporations to create harmonious labour relations and maximisation of production in national interest. From the perspective of modernity, the focus of fascism is a state controlled rapid modernisation, but the fascist ideology is

more romantic than instrumental and characterized by a strong imperial revisionism advocating a revival of a golden age (Smith). As Arendt herself mentions, totalitarianism is never utilitarian because it exists to subordinate reality to ideology (Arendt 1962). Furthermore, fascism has an important source of inspiration in antiquity, particularly Sparta and Rome, and can, in general, as we will show in the following, be said to represent a rejection of modernity.

In Umberto Eco's analysis of Ur-fascism or eternal fascism some of these anti-modernist traits are discussed in depth. Firstly, he elaborates on the cult of tradition as a set of eternal truths not to be questioned, a trend deeply opposed to any advancement of learning or discovery. The fascist' obsession with technology can, thus, only be seen as a surface phenomenon, while in fact the Blut und Boden philosophy rejects the modern world, seeing the enlightenment and the age of reason as the beginning of modern depravity (Eco, 1995: 12). In fact, preferring action without reflection, which was seen as emasculating, ur-fascists distrust the intellectual world and other civilizational trends like culture and art, while accusing liberal intelligentsia of betraying traditional values. If we take into account that a respect for the other and a preference for dialogue are important characteristics of the modern world philosophy, the fascist universe, in which any kind of disagreement is seen as a deviation from the norm and ultimately treason to the people, can be seen as retrograde. Additionally, Ur-fascism derives its motivation from a social frustration, which is why there is certain paranoia at the basis of Ur-fascist psychology, an obsession with an international plot and a feeling of betrayal by the rest of the world. (Eco, 1995:13) This is why fascism is, by nature violently exclusionary, and can, as it is seen in the case of Nazism, be extremely racist. The prevailing irrationalism of fascist governments makes them incapable of winning wars, mostly due to their inability to logically asses the strength of the enemy. Eco also points out that there is a cult of death at the very core of the fascist beliefs. While in other types of societies, death is advertised as an unfortunate necessity or a heavenly reward, in fascist societies of permanent warfare, death is presented as an only worthy ending for a heroic life, which every citizen, as the defender of the nation should strive for (Eco, 1995:13). In comparison with democracies, in fascism, Eco talks of qualitative populism, where "the people" can only be seen as theatrical fiction, as no individual rights exist, but only the ideal of the people as a force and their leader as the interpreter of the common will. In comparison to other types of fascism, Nazism is racist, anti-Christian (in comparison to Franco's Catholic Falangism), fundamentally pagan and polytheistic. In his comparison of Hitler and Mussolini, Carl Jung states: "Hitler is a spiritual vessel, a demi-divinity; even better, a myth. … Mussolini is a man" (Goodrick-Clarke, 1993:178).

4.7.2. Scientific racism

As we mentioned earlier, one of the main differences between Nazism and Italian fascism is its obsessive preoccupation with racial cleansing (Mann, 2005:181). This type of racism, was, however not only typical for Germany, but was, indeed a characteristic of the time, as social Darwinism blended with medicine, history, biology and sociology. In the Nazi state, racism was, indeed, a state ideology, based on the idea that the Nordic race was biologically superior to other races, the race of Übermensch. Behind this ideology we find the desire to remake humanity by coercive means (eugenics or social engineering) and the belief that humanity advances through a struggle in which superior groups naturally triumph over inferior ones through natural selection. As Rudolf Hess put it: "National Socialism is nothing but applied biology", indicating the importance of science for ideology and execution of the racial goals of the Third Reich (Lifton, 1986:31).

The Nazi scientific racism was based on different sources, but one of the key figures is certainly Arthur De Gobineau, 19th century fiction writer and racial thinker, who came to believe that race created culture, arguing that distinctions between the three "black", "white", and "yellow" races were natural barriers, and that "race-mixing" breaks those barriers and leads to chaos. In his seminal work, "An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races", De Gobineau took the Bible to be an accurate account of human history, arguing that the white race was superior to other races, as it supposedly represented what was left of ancient civilizations - the Indo-European culture, also known as the Aryan. Later on, this became the Nazi Bible. De Gobineau believed that white race miscegenation was inevitable, explaining the economic turmoil in France as a result of pollution of races. The development of multi-ethnic empires was here seen as ultimately destructive to the "superior races" that created them, since they led to inter-breeding. This he saw as a degenerative process. De Gobineau's idea that the superior white race might parish as a consequence of inter-racial breeding influenced authors like Chemberlain (1899) and Stoddard (1921) which proved very influential for the Nazi ideology and establishment of the German Society for Racial Hygiene (De Gobineau, 2010).

Another influential scientific racist work, which had a profound impact on Nazism was Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great race (1916), one of Hitler's all time favourite reads, based on William Ripley's account of Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean races, with Nordics being viewed as natural leaders and conquerors This work promoted the idea of the "Nordic race", a romantic notion of blond and blue eyed race of adventurers, soldiers and aristocrats, which represented the engine behind

the civilization processes of the world, and whose purity needed to be maintained by different eugenic measures (Lifton, 1986:47).

The concept of "Nordic" would soon become a collective German obsession, an ideal, rather than scientific fact, as society became flooded with debates about Nordic birds, Nordic air, Nordic values etc. As social Darwinism imposed the idea of origins, most of these researchers became very preoccupied by finding long lost kingdoms that the Nordic race supposedly stemmed from, locating them in India, Persia or Ancient Greece. According to Alfred Rosenberg, the key ideologist of the Nazi party, this long lost proto-Germanic paradise was the mystical land of Atlantis. The Nazi archaeology movement is a good example of using science as nationalistic propaganda, as excavations based primarily on Tacitus's Germania as a valid historical source were used to prove that any territory with Germanic artefacts excavated is in fact rightfully German territory (Lund, 1988:240). Nazi attitude towards modernity is indeed, well reflected in their fascination with Germania, as Tacitus describes the Germans as noble savages, the sheer opposite of "moral corruption" that predominated in decadent Rome, as a symbol of modernity and civilization (Tacitus, 2010:62, 73, 116-118, 123).

Indeed, as we have noticed earlier, scientific racism, despite the use of supposedly scientific methods often searched for inspiration in pre-modern myths and religious texts, but most importantly classical antiquity, which provided the fundaments for eugenics. Nazis were very much inspired by an actual classical racist totalitarian state, namely Sparta, which provided key inspiration for dreams of Germanic greatness even before unification, and was the main model Hitler, who was particularly impressed with Spartan discipline, militarism and heroism, used to create the totalitarian Reich. In fact, the Germans did not only imitate Spartans, they thought they were the descendants of Spartans as Karl Otfried Müller, the founding figure of German Laconophilia introduced the theory of northern origins of Spartans, which made a huge impact on the development of the Nordic theory. Indeed, Madison Grant, Hans F. K. Günther and Alfred Rosenberg all agreed that Sparta was particularly Nordic on account of the supposed purity of its Dorian stock, while Athens was viewed as more racially mixed, which, as a result of its "Mediterranean" element, was thought to have contributed to its demise.

There are, indeed, numerous parallels between Spartan and Nazi totalitarianisms. First of all, Sparta was considered the first eugenic state, as infanticide, much like in Rome and Athens, was used as a method of phenotypic selection, to ensure the race would not become contaminated with inferior

elements. Additionally, only the absolute minority, the privileged aristocrats Hekoioi were allowed to procreate, and even them only after gaining full citizenship, as a result of passing rigorous tests around the age of 30. Much like the SS, the Hekoioi had to be able to trace their ancestry all the way to the first inhabitants of the city state. On the opposite end, there were the helots, the subordinate race, consisting of people captured in war, used as slaves, who had no rights whatsoever, and were regularly killed when they became too numerous. Hitler was enormously fascinated by these, as he called them, "wise measures". As in Nazi Germany, the Spartan inferior races were not given citizenship and only the Hekoioi could serve in the military, attain political office or attend meetings of the assembly. Contrary to the opinion of sociologists like Bernard Lewis, who claim that "ideologically rationalized and institutionally structured hostility, discrimination and persecution" was a particularly modern sin, we see that the modern can also have roots in antiquity, where we, indeed, find totalitarian, racialist states built on profound ideologies, carefully organised and obsessed with absolute control.

As we have seen, science in Nazi Germany was to a significant extent in the service of racist propaganda rather than knowledge, as, indeed, even the most daunting Nazi medical experiments on human subjects were often used with the sole purpose of justifying stereotyped views of Jews or Roma, and obtaining popular support for programmes like euthanasia or Lebensborn. The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics utilized anthropometry: the measurement and recording of different physical or mental factors which could then be used to classify people by race or value. Experiments by Eugen Fischer were aimed at proving the dangers of racial mixing, which resulted in the sterilization of the so called "Rhineland Bastards" and providing scientific support for the Nuremberg laws, while the notorious Mengele tested sterilization methods on young girls in Auschwitz, as concentration camps served as a testing ground for various medical experiments (Schmuhl, 2003:109). However much of the Nazi science was not only proper science but is widely used today by doctors and engineers, as advances such as autobahns, cheap and reliable Volkswagen vehicles, KdF computers, the first operational helicopter, jet planes, the automatic rifle, the rotary engine, "night vision devices" magnetic tape recordings, electronic microscope, manned space rockets and, of course, Zyklon B can all be accredited to this deadly regime. In fact, a significant number of German patents were said to be seized and used by the allies after the fall of the 3rd Reich in the so called "Great Patent Heist of 1946". Much of the contemporary knowledge on hypothermia that we still rely on today was also initially acquired by Nazis in notorious 1941 Luftwaffe experiments on human subjects undertaken to aid the German military on the front by developing new weapons and new ways to treat wounds and hypothermia.

4.7.3. Building a racial utopia

As we have seen in the previous, scientific racism was an important part of the Nazi ideology and provided justification for the crimes. However, racism in this case is not only limited to ideology, but a complete and total remodelling of the society in order to create a genetically superior and racially pure paradise on earth. However, as other totalitarian utopian ideologies like communism, fascism defeats itself for if the dream society was ever to become within reach there would be no more use for the fascist ideology, which, therefore only represents a temporary state of affairs in the society's quest towards utopia.

At the very centre of the National Socialist utopia, lays the desire for territory - "Lebensraum". As a fear of being bred out and disappearing altogether as a nation, is the main motivation behind the German need for conquest, the obsession with land becomes a crucial component of the Holocaust equation and can be recognized in many aspects of the ideology. The link between blood and soil is here seen as twofold. On the one hand it represents the connection with the past, as the soldiers would sacrifice their life to reclaim the ancient territory that supposedly belonged to their ancestors, but on the other hand it provides a link with the future through the romantic notion of fertility – as when drenched in blood of the soldiers the earth provides grains to feed the nation and similarly the women give birth to repopulate it with new blood. Here it becomes clear that in spite of being a modern ideology organic nationalism expresses its goals through traditional and tribal metaphors that tie the land with kin, the opposite of the fluid modernity of the present day which is not rooted (Bauman). This can also be seen as the main difference between the ideologies of Bismarck and Hitler, as the iron in "Blood and Iron" became replaced with Soil in "Blut und Boden", thus the emphasis is switched from rapid industrialization to more traditional values of organic nationalist agrarianism.

According to Kiernan, the Nazi focus on Jews was precisely a result of their lack of rootedness in the national soil, which is also why they were, for centuries, forbidden to own land (Kiernan, 2007: 417). The disillusionment with modernity was manifested in the fantasy of reclaiming a once pristine, lost agrarian Germandom of Charlemagne (what Hitler called the 1st Reich), so that: "the new Reich should again set itself on the road of Teutonic knights to obtain by the German sword sod for the German plough and daily bread for the nation" (Koenigsberg, 2007:80). Charlemagne was, indeed well known for his conquests of much of Western and Central Europe, as he expanded the Frankish kingdom and provided new space for resettlement of his own people. Nazis took borders of the

medieval Frankish kingdom to represent a rightfully German living space, thus pledging to reclaim the lost heartland and "take up where they left off 600 years ago" (Hitler, 2004: 654).

Objectively speaking, agrarian nostalgia was, in fact, nothing more than a reaction to negative consequences of rapid urbanization and overcrowding of the cities with their low birth-rates, but as a result, the need to reject urban modernity as false and morally corrupt, emerged. This is best seen in the actions of German minister of agriculture Darre, who argued going back to authentic values of the past, which he saw as a romantic idyll, where the German peasant was universally free, his blood uncontaminated by pollutants, all of which supposedly changed with the advent of Christianity and the feudal system. Hitler shared the view that modernity corroborated tradition, claiming that industrialization was harmful and weakened the peasant class, which was the backbone of the German nation. According to Hitler, German ancestors (Ur-Germanen) were all peasants who came from mystical woods, no hunters among them, making the German romantic nationalist myth a pastoral and agrarian romance (Kiernan, 2007:423). Obsession with horticulture with its rigid distinction between plants and weeds along with Nazi attempts to apply the principles of agriculture to human breeding reflects perfectly Bauman's theory of the gardening state (Bauman, 1989).

The model of SS Wehrbauer, the peasant-soldiers was supposed to make the dream of the Teutonic settlers come true. This type of soldiers was meant to conquer, then settle in the new territory and finally live off the land becoming self-sufficient. The goal of these settlers was not to extend civilization, but to prevent any outside of German territory. The sacred soil of Eastern, Slavic provinces, where Hitler had intended to create the "New Eden", was to be cleansed of native populations, by killing, expulsion and/or assimilation. Funnily, it seems that only advanced, industrial killing and the use of modern tools could give Germany back its primeval past, an important paradox in Nazi ideology (Kiernan, 2007: 432).

In order to fulfil the promise of the "Blood and soil" philosophy, more than just acquisition of new land was required. The return to the values of the Teutonic knights also meant purifying the blood of the race, cleansing it of all the undesirable elements. Hitler believed the nation had become weak, corrupted by the infusion of degenerate elements into its bloodstream. In order to ratify this and create a Volksgemeinschaft, the Nazi intelligentsia came up with these important eugenic strategies:

1. Purifying the race from undesirable traits from within the group
2. Purifying the race of any contamination from outside the group
3. Strengthening the race through controlled breeding within the group
4. Strengthening the race through acquiring new blood from outside the group

Purifying the race involved several different processes. Already from 1933 "Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring" prescribed compulsory sterilisation of people with certain hereditary diseases like schizophrenia, epilepsy, Huntington's chorea and even alcoholism. However, as the war started in 1939, it was decided that all those who represented a social burden would be executed so that there would be more place in the hospitals for the wounded soldiers. In much the same way, the race purified itself by using ethnic cleansing strategies to expel, or concentration camps to eliminate intruders like Jews, Slavs, Roma and homosexuals. Strengthening the race was a somewhat different task as Nazi German marriage laws were very strict and partners had to be tested for presence of any hereditary diseases. For SS officers the rules were even stricter, as the bride had to be free of any Slavic or Semitic blood, and confirm this by documents all the way from 1750 in order for the couple to get Himmler's permission to marry. The most notorious, was, however, the Lebensborn breeding programme from 1935, led by Himmler, which strongly encouraged Nazi soldiers to father children with racially valuable women from occupied countries in order to spawn a new generation of Aryans and make up for low birth-rates and war casualties. In the Lebensborn clinics in Austria, Norway, Denmark, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg the unwed mothers could leave their children, who would then be adopted by Aryan German families. These same homes were used to house young blond and blue eyed Slavic children, kidnapped because of their supposed Nordic origins, in order to become a part of the master race. It is estimated that around 250.000 blond and blue eyed Slavic children, who were selected based on Nordicist anthropometrics, were removed from their families and given German identities.

Finally, and in relation to modernity as a rational project that shuns superstitions, it is worth commenting on the occult aspects of Nazism. Although it is known that Hitler opposed and occasionally even banned mystical organisations, a general occult revival of the late 19th and early 20th century in Germany and Austria influenced the Nazi movement to such a degree that an esoteric ideological system called Ariosophy has been termed a theoretical precursor of the Nazi genocide. In fact, most mystical organisations of the time were heavily invested in the pursuit of the discovery of the ancient Germanic heartland (Atlantis, Thule or Hyperborea), finding a proto-Germanic language (Runosophy), with a focus on racial purity and even eugenics. Already in 1904, Lanz von Liebenfels,

a former monk and a founder of a widely red mystical magazine Ostara, in his book Theozoology, advocates sterilization of the sick and the "lower races" as well as forced labour for "castrated chandals". In other words, as Ariosophy significantly predates the advent of Nazism, the occult can be said to represent an important ideological source of inspiration for the party, as the influence of neo-paganism is not only evident in the efforts of prominent Nazis like Himmler, Rosenberg, Höss and Darré, but is confirmed by the fact that all Nazi insignia was inspired by mystical theories of Aryan antiquity, including Swastika, the SS double sig rune, and others.

In fact, a mystical organisation called The Thule study group for Germanic Antiquity was one of the main sponsors of the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, which later grew into Hitler's NSDAP, an organisation believed to have a significant influence on the society as the owners of the highest circulation German newspaper Völkischer Beobachter. In fact, the occult became such an integrated part of the Nazi ideology that in 1933, Himmler brought Karl Maria Wiligut, an eccentric Austrian ariosophist and a diagnosed schizophrenic to head the Department for Pre- and Early History which was created for him within the SS Race and Settlement Main Office, after which he was involved in various SS pseudo-religious practices.

But, does the pagan influence indicate a complete absence of the Christian doctrine in the Nazi ideology? Superficially, it seems so. The Nazi Party Programme from 1920 endorses the so called Positive Christianity. Theorists like Kathleen Harvill Burton, have, however, argued that the Nazi objective was to make traditional Christianity disappear by transforming it into positive Christianity, as preached by Rosenberg. To begin with, the Bible had to be purged of all its Jewish content, which Paul Lagarde's calls Germanised and "de-judaized" Christianism. According to Rosenberg, the Christian dogmas of hell and original sin were detrimental to the free Nordic spirit. The Old Testament should be completely abandoned to the advantage of old Nordic fables and legends. Within positive Christianity, Jesus was a Nordic and a Nazi who fought against Jews and was killed by them, a theory known from the mystical works of a certain Guido von List.

However, neither the pagan religions, nor positive Christianity were practised religions in the Nazi Germany, with the exception of traditional festivals of Jul and Sommersonnenwende, which mostly served as a veneration of Hitler. Considering the very different religious views of Nazi followers, the movement should, as any nationalism, really, be considered secular as it was able to encompass a huge variety of very different elements. The question is, however, to what extent should Nazism itself be seen as a political religion, in so far as it contains both millenialist, messianic,

gnostic and occult aspects, all testaments of pre-modern pre-nationalist tendencies related to or even predating the age of salvation religions. As Steigmann-Gall believes Nazism owes a lot to Christianity, and it is remarkable to what degree the two were actually compatible. Indeed, in the analysis of anti-Semitism, we shall, undoubtedly see how Christian elements underlie the very core of the Nazi ideology.

4.7.4. Anti-Semitism

One of the most important characteristics of National Socialism is anti-Semitism, a category which differs from anti-Judaism, in as much as religiously based prejudice leaves space for the option of conversion, and thus, the possibility of preservation, while the racial prejudice is fixed to such a degree that it leaves no option for inclusion whatsoever (Lewis, 2006: 25-36). According to Weinberg, modern anti-Semitism, as scientific racism, resorts to science to defend itself, assuming therefore new functional forms and organisational differences. It is based on the myth of the Jewish conspiracy which channels the dissatisfactions of the capitalist system in order to promote a conservative cultural code to fight emancipation and liberalism and consolidate national identity (Weinberg, 2010:18-19). However, as Schweitzer warns, "most scholars ignore the Christian foundation on which the modern antisemitic edifice rests and invoke political antisemitism, cultural antisemitism, racism or racial antisemitism, economic antisemitism and the like" (Schweitzer in Robert, 2005: vii).

In other words, anti-Semitism with both racial and religious connotations is far from a modern phenomenon. Its emergence is not only the result of the eternal Judeo-Christian conflict, but Jewish rootlessness and lack of state protection, as Christian or Muslim minorities in pre-modern Europe could often count on the protection of religious Empires of the same persuasion to aid them in the times of persecution. This is why, the Jewish population of Europe was the most suited to fulfil the purpose of scapegoating, especially in dark times of crisis, which Europe had plenty of, throughout history. During the Black Death epidemics, for instance, Jews were blamed to have deliberately poisoned the food, wells and streams, which caused the largest of all medieval Jewish persecutions, nearly completely eradicating Rhineland Jewry. Indeed, the history of Europe is the history of anti-Semitism, whether we are talking about expulsions, which followed the crusades, pogroms all over Europe, especially in relation to Easter Passion plays and the idea of Jews as Christ-killers, inflammatory hatred of Christian orders of Dominicans and Franciscans, Prussian 18th century laws that limited the number of Jews allowed to live in the country to ten families, the extortion of Austrian Jewish money by Maria Theresa or Jewish banishment from the cities by Catherine the Great. In fact,

there is not one activity that the Nazis have employed in their attempt to "solve" the Jewish question that hasn't been tried before, including ghettos, denied rights to own property, rights of worship and choice of occupation, the right to marry a person of Christian faith or marry at all and of course torture and mass murder both spontaneously like after the Easter Passion Plays or organized by the state, as in Isabella and Ferdinand's Spain. In fact, in spite of the early 19th century European laws that aimed to emancipate the Jews, the traditional discrimination and hostility on religious grounds persisted and were supplemented by scientific racist theories. Furthermore, as Jews urbanized in the 19th century, they adopted secular customs, quickly becoming assimilated and, thus, no longer distinguishable, which made them even more dangerous, especially in the ethno-nationalist states, where they became the ultimate threat to the fragile ideal of common ancestry (Mann, 2005).

Nazi anti-Semitism, however has a number of causes and fulfils a number of emotional needs of the population. Historically, Russian Slavs and the influence they had on all of Eastern Europe represented a threat to German dreams of expansion eastward. After WW1 much of what was left of the Habsburg Empire and a huge chunk of Germany was given to Slav states, where Germans were second class citizens. Jews, on the other hand, as organic nationalism could not have been in their interest, were typically leaders of socialist uprisings, which many influential people, including industrialists, imperialist revisionists and old landowner elites, in an already vaguely socialist Weimar Republic feared would bring Germany permanently under Soviet influence. As Jews were, indeed, among the leaders of the Russian Bolshevik movement, the most significant threat to the survival of an already destabilized Germany, a unitary concept of the enemy arose, combining both anti-Slavic and anti-Semitic elements, finally creating the picture of the so called Judeo-Bolshevik enemy. Within the state, however, Jews were seen as a solution to the growing economic problems. Not only were their businesses small and unproductive, a dead weight on an economy in difficulties, but they were primarily city people. Their expulsion or annihilation could mean the solution to the problem of over-crowding, and their wealth, a welcome addition to the state budget (Programmes like the Lebensborn were financed largely with the money of Jews from Dachau). Politically, as we know from Schmitt's theory, national revitalization and unification can only happen through a struggle against a common enemy, so the anti-Semitic card was the key card Hitler played in order to get and remain in power (Schmitt, 1996, Fleming, 1986). On the other hand, apart from political motives we mentioned, both within the state and internationally, anti-Semitism also provided, once again, the much needed relief, by allowing the population to direct and concretize their anger, caused by the Versailles treaty, onto living, breeding human beings. We shall, now, through an analysis of stereotypes found in Nazi newspapers, key literature and propaganda cinematography analyse more closely the anti-Semitic stereotypes used in the Nazi Germany.

1. Jews as greedy capitalists.

This was one of the most popular ways of stereotyping Jews in Nazi Germany. According to Saul Friedländer, this myth propagated that Jews were the manipulators of world finances and responsible for the poverty in Germany, a myth which can be found in favourite Nazi literature , like "The Protocols of the Elders of the Zion", or propaganda films like "The Eternal Jew"[30] or Cohen's Advertising Scheme. Phillip Hunt calls this a modern sacrifice, as he compares the belief that Jews caused poverty with similar accusations from the middle ages, about a witch causing a bad harvest. (Hunt) Indeed, this is, perhaps one of the oldest ways of stereotyping Jews, and it dates all the way back to the New Testament, where a story about Jesus forcing the Jewish money changers, who turned the temple of God into a market to sell doves and animals, can be found, and is the only story in the Bible where Jesus uses physical force (Mathew, 21:12). According to a report, by the Anti-Defamation league, the teachings about the curse of the greedy Jews penetrated all aspects of Christianity. In the middle ages, however, some Jews became moneylenders, being forbidden to own land, and not subject to the Christian law, according to which usury is a sin. As Christians directed their anger at having to pay back loans and taxes against the Jewish moneylenders and tax collectors, the stereotype became reinforced and extended all the way into modernity. According to Leon Poliakov, economic anti-Semitism should not be viewed as a separate form of anti-Semitism, but merely a manifestation of theological anti-Semitism, as religion functions as a fundament and a cause for the stereotypes (Poliakov, 1965)

According to Viktor Karády, both economic and political anti-Semitism have roots in history, but were strengthened in modern times, through the reaction against Jewish emancipation (Karady, 2004:348). In fact, this reaction against modernization became an integrated part of the Jewish otherness, as Nazis did not view Jews as aggressive barbarians, as it is often true with racial stereotypes, but, on the contrary as the leaders of modernity and change. The economic aspect of the Jewish stereotype emphasizes Jews as city people, morally corrupt capitalists, dressed in suits and carrying briefcases, as opposed to simple, but morally superior German peasants (Der Stürmer, December 1929). In rejecting Jews, as symbols of city life, liberal values and cosmopolitianism, not to mention liquid capital, as opposed to a premodern feudal focus on land, the Nazis, in fact reject modernity as an ideal in its entirety, insisting on traditional, agrarian values (Welch, 2011). While Germans are depicted as honest farmers and workers, Jews are shown as people who live off the sweat of others, while engaging in swindling activities, all deeply related to modernity, like banking or law. Implicit in the idea of Jew as a banker is the underlying thought of the Jewish God being

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[30] In the "Eternal Jew", a Rothschild is shown, putting on dirty clothes and hiding his money to fool the tax collectors.

money (similar to the Christian dogma of Jews as idolaters), a rejection of Christian traditions and morality.

In Der Giftpilz (Poisonous mushroom), one of the notorious Julius Streicher's children's' propaganda books, numerous false citations from the Talmud are presented, claiming that Jews do not engage in manual labour, but only do business and that non-Jews were created to serve Jews. In the same book, communism is portrayed as a movement of betrayal of Germany to Russia, by Jews. Interestingly, many Nazi stereotypes of Jews are quite contradictory, as the Poisonous mushroom in one compact volume combines the ideas of Jews as greedy capitalists and Jews as leaders of treacherous communism. In the anti-Semitic Nazi exhibition in 1941 in occupied Belgrade, posters revealed Jewish weapons as: democracy, capitalism and communism, all indicators of modern change.

2. Jews as Middle Eastern poison

Racial anti-Semitism viewed Jews as a part of the Semitic race, emphasizing their "alien" extra-European (non-Christian) origins and culture. Anthropologists discussed whether the Jews possessed any Arabic-Armenoid, African-Nubian or Asian-Turkic ancestries, making them racially inferior to Germans. Jews were seen as mongrels in the propaganda picture books published by Der Stürmer, and as such were believed to be evil by nature. In Eternal Jew, Jews were shown as oriental barbarians, who have infiltrated the European society, exploiting it parasitically, while concealing themselves behind the mask of the civilised European. The exhibition Eternal Jew also emphasized their alleged Middle Eastern and Asiatic characteristics. Nazi posters, depicting Jews as a cuckoo, a parasite or a virus, all symbolize this hidden invasion by a foreign organism, which ultimately destroys a host.

This stereotype is, in fact, also firmly rooted in an age old tension between white Christianity and the dark Middle Eastern otherness, seen as marked by Judaism or Islam (In Nazi caricatures, Jews are always short and dark, while Germans are tall and blond). In fact, according to J. Kameron Carter, racial anti-Semitism is a direct product of Christian anti-Judaism, which biologized itself so as to racialize itself. As a result, Christianity became the exclusive cultural property of the "secular" West and a fundament for white supremacy and global hegemony (Carter, 2008). Indeed, on the Nazi propaganda posters, Judaism was often shown as a devil threatening the Christian mother Europe.

3. Jews as enemies of God

The idea of Jews as enemies of God is as old as Christianity. This stereotype is reflected in the literature of the late tenth through early twelfth centuries, where Jews were depicted as satanic consorts, devils or simply "incarnation of absolute evil. Such imagery was used centuries later in Nazi propaganda of the 1930s and 1940s. In both his propaganda books for children (Poisonous mushroom) and Der Stürmer, Julius Streicher, who was known for his use of imagery from the Middle Ages portrayed Jews as committing ritual murders, killing children, sacrificing them and drinking their blood, as worshippers of golden calf, then prehistoric monsters, vampires and witches. Nazis, on the other hand were shown as godlike, and divine, a symbolic light on the posters always surrounding the head of Adolf Hitler. Also, the works of a sworn anti-Semite Martin Luther, such as: "The Jews and their lies" have been shown to have influenced anti-Semitism in the centuries between the Reformation and the Holocaust (Wallman 1987: 72-97, Robert 2005:105). In fact, the stereotypical representation of the Jew in Nazi propaganda: grotesque face, sneering expression and hook nose is very similar to the image of the Devil in Christian folklore.

The culmination of this stereotype lies in the idea of Jews as killers of Christ, and Judah as the symbol of ultimate treachery and deceit. In the Nazi teachers guide, the children's song: Judas the Jew betrayed Jesus the German to the Jews", was provided as tools of indoctrination. The verse from the Bible Matthew 27:25, when Jews accept the responsibility for the murder of Christ by saying: "His blood be on us, and on our children", also known as the blood curse, is the most used for anti-Semitic purposes. This verse, along with John 8:44, when Jesus speaks to the Pharisees: "You are of your father the devil, and you want to do the desires of your father. He was a murderer from the beginning, and does not stand in the truth because there is no truth in him", have laid the groundwork for centuries of Christian characterization of Jews as agents of the devil, a characterization which found its way into medieval popular religion and eventually into passion plays and from there into modernity. In fact, Roy Eckardt, an important theorist in the field of Jewish-Christian relations went so far as to assert that the foundation of anti-Semitism and responsibility for the Holocaust lies ultimately in the New Testament. However, such a construction of Jewishness carries with it also a solution. Friedlander talks here of redemptive anti-Semitism. Since Jews are seen as a threat to the Christian God and his order, and interbreeding is shown as the cause of the decline, then the expulsion and murder of Jews can therefore be seen to bring redemption in the eyes of God, thereby making the killing a saintly and divine act.

4.

Rigid gender stereotypes always play an important role in the creation of national identity, as territory is usually seen as female and women become equated with it. Therefore, the image of Jews as corruptors of Nordic women is, indeed, similar to the idea of Jews wishing to steal the German land. Nazi opinions on the gender issues were extremely conservative and focused mainly on the woman's role of a life-giver and caretaker, as women were seen primarily as possessions of their men. In the previously mentioned Teachers guide, as well as in other propaganda materials, Jews are shown as defilers, abusers and violators of German maidens.

Here, we must mention the idea of Jew as a cuckoo, a bird that places her eggs in another bird's nest and then takes off. In a similar fashion Jews were accused of corrupting German blood by ravishing German girls, secretly placing their genes in the German gene pool. In the popular Nazi propaganda film Jud Süß, a story of a Jew who poses as a Christian and a friend of a Duke whom he exploits, and whose wife he rapes, his scheming plots finally killing his benefactor and bringing the Dukedom to the brink of a civil war. This shows us the essence of the Jewish stereotype: he enters the family house (nation), poses as one of us (German/Christian), rapes German women (plants his genes), and brings the country to war, echoing Hitler's words: "Should united Jewry again succeed in provoking a world-war, the blood of not only the nations which have been forced into the war by them, will be shed, but the Jew will have found his end in Europe"

4.8. Conclusion

To begin with, we have shown that German nationalism is, indeed, an organic, reactionary nationalism which emerged as a consequence and in spite of Napoleon's rule in the German speaking lands, making it more violent and hateful towards minorities which were protected and emancipated by Napoleon's will, such as the Jews. Indeed, in spite of the fact that both Prussia first and Germany later insist on modernising, all modern political values, including the values of Enlightenment become rejected by German authors as a heritage of the French hegemony. Indeed an unstable political climate obstructs political progress in Germany, which prevents a thorough change of the society from bottom-up and preserves the traditional elites in power well into the 20th century, thus retaining a traditional mindset and resulting in, what Dahrendorf calls, an "industrial feudal society". An incomplete nationalist project necessitated authoritarian police states to ensure political survival. Additionally, the changes brought on by modernity itself make the situation even more troublesome in

terms of overpopulation and unemployment including a frantic need to find resources in new places, thereby necessitating territorial expansion. In this respect, the Sonderweg theory has shown its advantage over the more recent modernist theories, as authors such as Arendt neglect the uniqueness of the German path towards unification, which is not solely particular due to the specificity of the context and the influences under which the unification takes place but also due to a conscious decision of German thinkers to create a political path different from those chosen by Russia or Western democracies and an isolated state which rejects outside influences.

Indeed, the Nazi Holocaust can be seen both as a result of modern tendencies and as a regression to the pre-modern at the same time. In the debate of intentionalists and functionalists we conclude that the Holocaust is, due to its modernity and in terms of the specific use of scientific racist laws and the ideologies of anti-Semitism and Social Darwinism, which were widely accepted tendencies in all of Europe and in the US, most definitely comparable with other contexts, which successfully answers the first of the research questions in this thesis. The quest for annihilation came about as a result of numerous different tendencies, improvisations of the government and different societal forces of radicalization which might show that the Holocaust was perhaps not such a perfectly organised, modernist plan as thought by Critical theorists. In fact, as we have pointed out, even the Wehrmacht, the embodiment of discipline and technological superiority, degenerated in time to a face to face non-technological warfare, including rape and theft among its soldiers.

Finally, the execution of the genocide itself cannot be seen as anything but a modern endeavour, perpetrated by a nation state, making use of its efficient bureaucracy and its profound propaganda machine with highest productivity and efficiency, confirming Bauman's idea of the genocidal state. However, despite the rational goals behind societal restructuring of the Third Reich, like the economical advantages of the removal of Jews, we find that the genocidal plan in itself comes only as a result of accumulations of various pressures and different radicalizing tendencies, which should not be seen as a spontaneous outburst of anger, but must neither be treated as completely rational. Therefore and in relation to research question number four, the concept of ancient hatreds can, to some extent be used to describe the relationship towards the Jews in the German speaking lands, which was always harsh, yet on occasion more violent than not, but it should, however under no circumstances be seen as the primary motive behind the genocide, which must be looked for in a much wider context, as a consequence of a history of dependence, unfavourable political atmosphere in Europe, the loss of WW1, the inability to modernise politically and, most of all, a devastating economic crisis.

In relation to the profiles of the perpetrators we witness this same dichotomy, as the rational motives account for only some of the motives, while ideological hate and indoctrination also account for a significant number of cases. In relation to the rationality of the genocidal plan, as Mann points out, it would thus make more sense to consider Weber's value rationality concept in terms of a commitment to absolute values when we discuss the Holocaust, rather than instrumental rationality, as, even if the plans of the Third Reich seemed to be instrumental in the beginning, as the situation escalated, a loss of control along with obsession with killing at any cost became apparent.

Therefore, to illuminate the role of modernity in the Holocaust, in relation to research question number 1, we have to insist that this role is ambivalent. Although modernity enables the genocide through the structure of the state, its bureaucracy and its propaganda, the reactionary ideology of ethno-nationalism and scientific racism, at the same time this same genocide is at its very core a rejection of modernity. Indeed, when talking about the Holocaust, the idea of regression into the premodern is of key importance, as the Weimar democracy was most definitely a superior and far more liberal, so therefore also modern form of rule in comparison to Hitler's Volksgemeinschaft, a tribal, organic nationalist societal structure based on the link between blood and soil. Paradoxically, Hitler used modern, industrialized killing to re-create a pre-industrial paradise, as focus on pre-modern past characterizes Nazi organic nationalism. In relation to ideology in particular, we see that utopianism and the obsession with the past, which characterized the entire rule of the Third Reich stems mainly from a disillusionment with modernity as a project of Western hegemony, first in relation to the tyrannical rule of France and then in relation to the domination of the Anglo-Saxon influence on the capitalist markets, but also from a general unwillingness to participate in the future and the desire to retreat into more secure times. In relation to our fifth research question, we conclude that genocide should be seen as a rejection of modernity, not its embodiment, as it stems from a disillusionment with the modern, it sees the modern as the source of inequality, loss of identity and poverty and it attempts to destroy it in the hope of finding the fantasized security of the pre-modern.

5. Origins and Execution of Bosnian genocide

The Serb genocide of Bosnian Muslims is in the literature and the media often presented as very different from the presentations of the Nazi Holocaust, a pre-modern, tribal affair, a result of ancient tensions and an outburst of spontaneous, primitive anger. As Hoare confirms:

"One pernicious myth is that the conflict was essentially a civil war, that the sides were basically equivalent. There was no principle at stake to be fought over; it was all just warring tribes. I would also say that another myth is that the international community was essentially benevolent, and that it wanted to intervene to stop the violence. I think the international community's role in Bosnia was a negative one. It is important to stress that there was a planned programme of aggression and genocide organised by the government in Belgrade; a top down engineered process of mass killing" (Hoare in Stiel, 2011).

As a consequence of such stereotypes, the amount of useful literature written on the fall of Yugoslavia and the subsequent genocide is definitely not as rich as one would hope, taken into account that the event took place in a European context. Particularly in relation to the historical context, the knowledge of the local language proved key in acquiring the necessary insights. A reason for this could be the general lack of scholarly interest in the "barbaric Balkans" or the fact that people targeted for extermination were of Islamic confession, a group generally seen as a "culture disturbing" obstacle in Europe, which has, indeed, repeatedly endeavoured to cleanse itself of its Islamic "others". A number of literary accounts propagating the idea of "ancient hatreds" as the source of genocidal hatred in Yugoslavia also stem from the very region that erupted in violence (Milanović, 2006, Banac, 1988), which is why we can talk about the broader European Islamophobia taking shape in a local context.

Therefore, the aim of this chapter will be to analyse in depth the Bosnian genocide in relation to the same key concepts utilized to discuss the modernity of the other two cases, such as: destabilizing influences of modernity like overpopulation, unemployment, changing societal roles and lack of resources, in relation to genocidal ideology: organic nationalism, social Darwinism, scientific racism and eugenics, in relation to genocidal mentality: the authority of technology, utopianism, gardening state mentality, instrumental rationality, obedience, bureaucratic mentality and free floating responsibility, in relation to the genocidal state: totalitarianism, expansionism, majoritarian democracy, efficiency, numbing as a modern strategy for preparing the perpetrators for killing, total war and Gesellschaft / Gemeinschaft society ties.

The chapter will be organised in much the same way as the other two, in three main parts. The first part will aim to provide an eclectic historical overview of the context, the path towards modernity and the nation state, first of Serbia and then in relation to unification of Yugoslavia. The second will describe the various causes of genocide and the process of radicalization, describing the execution itself along with the rationality behind the genocidal plan and the motives of the perpetrators, all with aim of establishing the presence of modernity in the context. Finally, the last part will tackle ideology of genocide, Serb nationalism and scientific racism which is an important part of it, the characteristics of the utopian dream and the nature of the way otherness is constructed in this ideology, culminating in a pervasive account of the modernity of both the context and the crime itself.

Finally, before we begin, it is important to point out that the Yugoslavian case will here be presented solely through the example of Bosnian Muslims, even though other aspects could easily have been useful, such as the mass murders of Albanian Muslims or even ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by Croats. However, the Serb genocide against Bosnian Muslims is definitely the largest and the key event in the fall of Yugoslavia, with Serbs being the absolute main perpetrators, who utilized the Yugoslavian state apparatus and army to annihilate those who presented an obstacle to an ethnically pure nation state.

5.1. The path towards independence – a historical overview

Much like German nationalism, Serb developed as a result of two tendencies: a broader influence of the French revolution, gradual abolishment of empires and movement towards modern nation states, and, on the other hand, a much needed ideological motivation for a final break with the oppressor, in this case the Ottoman empire, which ruled the territory of the Serbian despotate for four hundred years (Motyl, 2001:470).

Throughout the 18th century, the Ottoman empire was challenged by Austrian and Russian empires, which meant that the region often changed hands, and Serbs had the opportunity to introduce themselves to Austrian military tactics, as they often fought on the Austrian side against the Ottomans, but also because many ethnic Serbs lived on Austrian territory and supported the occupied regions. After the last Austro-Turkish war ended, in 1791, with Belgrade Pashaluk (district) being returned to the Ottoman Empire, the power in Serbia was held by radical military Ottoman forces - Janissaries, who were battle hardened and un-compromising. In an attempt to solve the issue, and

afraid of the Janissaries threat to the central government, the moderate Sultan Selim III proclaimed fermans (decrees) in 1793 and 1796, giving more rights to Serbs, particularly giving more power to local Serbian dukes, who were now the ones to collect taxes, along with the freedom of trade and religion, while, on the other hand expelling the problematic military leaders from the Belgrade Pashaluk (Shaw in Vucinich 1982:72).

Janissaries were in fact a result of a sinister Ottoman practice called blood tax, to take young Christian boys, from their families in occupied territories, and integrate them into the Ottoman society, so that they later would become loyal Islamists, Sultan's personal guard, military troopes, and influential politicians, sometimes used against the very population they came from, a practice which, along with the voluntary conversion of local population to Islam, who then became the ruling elites created tensions in the entire region of the Ottoman Balkans. Occasionally, however, like in this case, Janissaries would be far more radical than the Sultan, as they launched a series of attacks against the Serbian brigands, killing the peace-promoting local Ottoman ruler and dividing the district amongst themselves. Now in complete control of the territory, Janissaries' main goal was to punish the Serbs for their role in the Austro-Turkish war, so as a result, taxes were drastically increased, land was seized and forced labour introduced. When Janissary leaders learned of the Serb attempts to start an uprising, they undertook drastic measures to extinguish any danger of rebellion by killing most important Serbian leaders in an event known as "The slaughter of the Dukes". This move had an effect opposite of what the Dahias[31] intended and led to the first Serbian uprising in 1804 (Shaw in Vucinich 1982:72, Ranke, 2012: 105).

At this stage, the uprising was directed primarily against the local rulers-Dahias, while the Sultan declared his support for the movement. However, after the Dahias were captured and killed by the rebels, no agreement could be reached between the Sultan and the revolutionaries, eventually making the Sultan the main enemy and the ultimate target of the revolt. After a number of battles, in 1805 (Ivankovac), 1806 (Mišar), 1807 (Belgrade), Serb insurgents joined Russia, in the Russo-Turkish war gaining a short period of independence. However, this event was extremely important in terms of Serb nationalism, as in 1805, Serb rebels managed to organise their own government for administering Serbia during the battles with the Ottomans. This became the basis for a modern nation state, as the rule was divided, in order to limit the absolute power of the regent, between People's assembly, Ruling council and the king Karađorđe, the leader of the rebellion himself. As land was returned, the state quickly modernized: forced labour was abolished and taxes reduced, while Belgrade Higher

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[31] Dahias: military leaders of Janissaries

School, the foundation of what later would become the University of Belgrade was established in 1808. As the young state was torn by numerous problems, among other things the unwillingness of the King to share power with the dukes, the Ottoman Empire exploited these circumstances and recaptured Serbia in 1813[32] (Stavrianos, 2000: 248, Krkljuš, 2010:7).

Even though the First Serb uprising proved ultimately unsuccessful, it was only the first stage of Serbian revolutionary wars, which, as Popović claims had a twofold nature, not only a nationalist goal to rid the country of a tyrant, but a social goal to finally end the rule of military-feudalism (Popović in Srbi o Srbima, 2001:30). Two years later, another uprising was planned by the National Council and executed, this time under Miloš Obrenović, who managed to force the Ottoman military out of Serbia. In negotiations between Obrenović and Ottoman governor Maraşlı Ali Paşa, Serbs were given a partial autonomy, the so called suzerainty and Serbian Principality was recognized by the Porte. Although the Principality was still supposed to pay taxes to the Sultan and a garrison of Ottoman troops would remain in Belgrade until 1867, in all other matters Serbia became an independent state (Bennet, 1995: 22, Stavrianos, 2000:249, Ćorović, 2001).

There are a number of reasons for the fact that Serb nationalism was the first successful national movement in the Balkans. Firstly and perhaps most importantly there is the need for an ideological background for a revolutionary movement against the occupier. In this sense, like German nationalism, Serb nationalism is also a reactionary force. Secondly, Serbs had experience with short periods of Austrian rule, along with the influence from fellow Serbs living in Austria. This is why they were well acquainted with ideological movements that helped rid the Germanic lands of Napoleon, as the Napoleonic wars took place in the same time as Serb uprisings. Additionally, the leaders of Serbian uprisings all had experience from fighting in Austrian Freikorps and could count on military support and weapons provided via the Austrian border. Also, Serb national identity had a nucleus preserved in the form of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which remained autonomous and autocephalous throughout the Ottoman rule, although the Church was separated from the state from the point of the de -facto independence. The preservation of the Church also meant preservation of the links with the medieval kingdom of Serbia, the fundament for Serb national awareness to this day. Finally, as a result of Austro-Turkish conflicts, Ottomans never managed to establish a full feudal order in the Belgrade Pashaluk, which meant that most peasants owned their own land (Bennet, 1995:20, Hollins, 2003:14, Katić 2005:147, Jovanović, 1991:513).

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[32] The Serbian revolution was an event of enormous importance for all of the Balkans. Combining patriarchal peasant democracy with modern national goals, it managed to attract thousands of Serb volunteers from across the Balkans and central Europe, becoming a symbol of the nation building process in the Balkans and provoking peasant rebellions in both Greece and Bulgaria.

5.1.1. First steps towards unification

In the period of the de facto independence, Serbian nationalist consciousness develops rapidly. A number of democratic reforms take place, although most of them, like in Prussia, from top down. The first Serbian constitution from 1835 was a result of a major Serb rebellion and the demands of the people to limit the absolute rule of Prince Miloš Obrenović, to decrease the taxes, to allow freedom of movement and trade. The Constitution (Sretenjski Ustav) was inspired by Western European models, particularly the French Constitution of 1791. In Sretenjski Ustav, all of the demands of the people were taken into consideration; the power of the Prince was to be restricted by the People's Assembly and Serbian political independence was asserted (Flag and state emblems). The Constitution also had a set of laws guaranteeing the rights of all Serbs. Unfortunately it was considered too democratic for its time, and thus strictly opposed by Russia, Austria and the Ottoman Empire, who were all afraid of losing their influence in the region (Rabrenović, 2007: 172, Jovičić, 1999). However, in 1838, a new Constitution was created, this time with the blessing of the Porte, which legally established the People's Assembly, whose members were chosen by the Prince, but could not be dismissed without the approval of the Porte. Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finances and Ministry of Internal Affairs were also established in this Constitution. Serfdom as an institution was abolished, taxes were decreased and the right to free trade was guaranteed.

Throughout this time, the modernisation in terms of democratic reforms was articulated by a group called "Ustavobranitelji"- the defenders of the Constitution, a small group of Serb bourgeoisie whose main goal was to build a successful national programme, which would enforce the Constitution and limit the power of the King. Ustavobranitelji had an important impact on the politics of the young nation, and often organised rebellions, staged coups and elevated different regents to power. In the period characterized by the rule of this group: 1842-1858, Serbia industrializes, with roads and railroads being built, and also witnesses a creation of a modern bureaucratic state apparatus. However, even Ustavobranitelji believed the people to be a mindless mass, and the appropriation of capital during this time was very much at the expense of poor peasants, who had to pay high taxes to the authoritarian government (Stranjaković, 1932: 266, Pavlović, 1989:103, Kunibert 1988:63).

During this time, there was an ongoing battle between two royal Serbian dynasties: Karađorđevići and Obrenovići, but when absolutist Mihailo Obrenović was reinstalled on the throne in 1860, the final

stage of Serbian struggle for independency takes place. During his reign, Obrenović managed to get diplomatic support which resulted in the expulsion of all remaining Turks from Serbian cities and reinstallation of Serb control of all territory. The price to pay, for such a great accomplishment was however high, as during his authoritarian rule, Obrenović practically abolishes democracy and reduces People's Assembly to merely a consulting body, due to which he is severely criticized by a number of notable Serb authors. After Obrenović's murder in 1868, probably by the rival Karađorđević dynasty, the new Constitution was created, which guaranteed that only a quarter of Assembly members would be proposed by the Prince, while all other would be voted by the people (Krkljuš 2002:53). The Assembly was now given all of the power, and would have to confirm any decision made by the Prince, in order for this to become executed. The right to vote was given to all tax payers. In 1876, Serbia declared the final war on the Ottoman Empire, at the same time proclaiming its unification with Bosnia, the primary aim for its territorial expansion and the proposed basis for a common south-Slavic state. However, at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which marked the end of the Russo-Turkish war, while the formal independence was internationally recognized, unification was prohibited as Bismarck's diplomatic achievements placed Bosnia under Austro-Hungarian occupation, leaving Russia and Serbia disappointed and angry. Two years later, however, Serbia became elevated to the status of Kingdom of Serbia (Antić, 1998).

Serb nationalism in the period between the de facto and de jure independence revolved around the idea that Serbia, like Prussia in relation to pan-Germanism, should become the centre of a south Slavic unification. However, there were significant disagreements on how this unification should be accomplished. On the one hand there was the idea of an expansionist Greater Serbia, which would encompass a number of other territories, Bosnia and Albania in particular, within it, while, on the other hand, moderates and liberals advocated a creation of a Balkan Federation, where each state would have equal rights. At the time, most Serb scholars were drawn to Vienna. Here, they not only became exposed to Pan-German theories, but also to other south-Slav concepts propagated by Russia. Indeed, at the time Vienna was a very important centre for advocates of pan-Slavism, which deeply influenced all Serb nationalist theories of 19th century. Unfortunately, the liberal and democratic attitudes of the time were successfully suppressed and most Serbian intellectuals have accepted the greater Serbian idea, including all leaders such as Prince Alexander Karađorđević, Prince Mihailo Obrenović and Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, along with all political parties, except for the Social Democrats (Banac 1988:110). Much like the German ethno-nationalist unification, Serb would also centre on language, rather than religion, and would attempt to expand the kingdom to all areas inhabited by Serbs. The Serb "sacred historical right" to a state was seen as founded on a medieval

period when Serbia encompassed the largest amount of territory in history, the so called Serb Kingdom of Mighty Prince Dušan from the 14th century (Banac, 1988:110, Anzulović, 1999:110).

Inspired by these ideas, in 1844, Serb expansionist plans were summarized in Foreign Minister's Ilija Garašanin's "Načertanije" (Draft). Garašanin proposed a gradual re-conquering of Ottoman territories, as the Turkish Empire was obviously and inevitably heading for disaster, so that the medieval Serbian Kingdom could be rebuilt. Načertanije, a secret document, became the official programme of two Serb governments, but remained influential throughout the 20th century. As a close advisor and personal friend of Regent Mihailo Obrenović, Garašanin advocated the role of Serbia as the Prussia of South Slavs, or, as the Prince himself used to call it "Serbian Piedmont" (Srbi o Srbima, 2001:309). The Foreign Minister also managed to establish contacts with representatives of Yugoslav and Illyrian movements in the Habsburg kingdom, as well as the Bulgarian revolutionary organisations. According to his plan, Serbia was supposed to encompass all territories of Bosnia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Albania and Bulgaria[33] (Bennet, 1995: 22, Cohen and Riesman, 1996, Anzulović, 1999).

As a part of this project, propaganda activities were undertaken in order to get the Orthodox population in Bosnia to identify on the basis of religion with Serbs, so, in 1862, The Association for the Promotion of Serbian name was established in Sarajevo. The Serb Matrix (Matica Srpska), a typical Slavic institution which served as a model for establishment of Czech, Polish and other Matrix institutions, dedicated to promoting unified Serb cultural and linguistic identity was also moved from Budapest to Novi Sad (Serbia) two years later (Greenberg, 2004:79). Another literary work of enormous importance for Serb nationalism was Vuk Karadžić's "Srbi, svi i svuda" (Serbs, all and everywhere). Karadžić, a famous linguist who was a close friend and colleague of German linguists, Goethe and the brothers Grimm, proposed that all of the South Slavic peoples who had a common dialect with the Serbs (Shtokavian) were in fact ethnic Serbs, regardless of their religion, tradition or regional characteristics. This work, published in Vienna in 1849 is by some considered the first important work of greater Serbian ideology, as it asserted that most inhabitants of Croatia and Bosnia were in fact Serbs. Unlike his mentor, Dositej Obradović, the founder of Belgrade University and a key figure of the Serb Enlightenment, who was known for his rationalist, utilitarian philosophy, Karadžić and many of his contemporaries were more influenced by German romanticism, as organic ethno-nationalism became the main unification model amongst Serbs. Karadžić became famous for collecting folk poems from all over the South Slavic territories, glorifying the peasant spirit and the mystical nature of Serbdom (Bennet, 1995:22, Perišić, 2010:35, Fischer, 2001).

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[33] According to Garašanin's plans Bulgarians would be allowed to share power with the Serbs, while others would be subjected and assimilated (Albanians and Bosnian Muslims were already at that time considered Islamized Serbs).

Serb expansionist plans were however opposed by many world powers, especially after the defeat of Napoleon, who was a supporter of Serbian expansionist politics. Not only did the Porte have a problem with Serbia annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, as this meant a spread of Russian influence in the region, but Austria opposed it as well, wanting Bosnia for itself. During the Russo-Turkish war (1877-1888), Serb military provided assistance to the Christian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina to shake off the Ottoman rule. After the 1878 Austrian occupation of Bosnia, Serb expansionist plans become a grave obstacle to Austrian rule in the region. Inability to expand to the West, Serbia compensated by attempting to expand to the East, which meant a 1885 war with Bulgaria. In the beginning of the 20th century, a number of paramilitary formations, with the sole cause of uniting other South Slav territories with the Kingdom of Serbia, are created, like Crna Ruka (The black hand), the secret association of officers which had an important influence on the decisions of the Kingdom, Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), a revolutionary youth organisation which worked against occupation of Bosnia by Austro-Hungary, and its unification with Serbia and Narodna Odbrana (Peoples Defence), which sent Četnik[34] brigades to Bosnia in order to aid the struggle against Austria (Albertini, 1953: 22, Bennet, 1995:22, Jelavich, 1991:135).

However, Serbia was not the only country in the region with expansionist aims. Bulgaria, which had recently united with Rumelia, had similar agendas. Just as in Western Europe, the fall of great Empires created a scramble for territories in Eastern Europe as well, and the countries which gained their independence earlier had a clear advantage. In the struggle for Macedonia, newly formed Balkan states: Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria fought to gain territories, which, after the Berlin Congress, remained within the Ottoman Empire. As a result, all three states created numerous propaganda activities to strengthen Serb/Greek/Bulgarian nationalist feelings among the native population, opening educational facilities, and carrying out Serbisation, Bulgarisation and Hellenisation respectively, while at the same time sending military support to fight against the Turks. Serbs considered Macedonia historically theirs, as it had once been a part of the Mighty Dušan's Empire in the 14th century (Anastasopulos and Kolovos, 2007, Poulton, 2000:148) Bosnia, on the other hand, with its multi confessional population, became by the end of the 19th century, an intersection where several influences met and clashed. Not only did Serbs attempt to impose identification models, which hoped to get the Orthodox population to identify with the Serbian state, but the Croatian politics were similarly directed towards the Bosnian Catholics. Under these influences, both Bosnian Catholics and Bosnian Orthodox population abandon the common identity term Bosniak, used in the Ottoman Empire to refer to the entire population regardless of confession, leaving Muslim Slavs in a

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[34] The name Četnik (Chetnik) refers to a nationalist and monarchist paramilitary groups in the first half of 20th century, formed as a resistance against the Ottoman Empire and known for their attrocities.

particularly vulnerable position, torn between territorial interests of their neighbours. Now seen as traitors, who abandoned their previous Christian affiliation for the religion of the occupier, Slavic Muslims (referred to, discriminatory as Turkifiers) become targets of mass revenge against, at this point already absent, Ottoman colonizer (Bojić, 2001: 168, Pejanović, 2006: 23, Balorda, 2009:95, Bennet, 1995:23).

Finally, in the Balkan wars, Serbia was given an opportunity for serious territorial advantages, and gained control over numerous non-Serb populations: Albanians, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Turks, Bosniaks and others. Although, some of the territory was again taken away (Albania) with the London treaty of 1913, Macedonia, Sandžak and Kosovo remained a part of the Serbian Kingdom. During battles for Kosovo, the pressures to acquire new territory and to secure a lasting living space for the nation, resulted in an ethnic cleansing, where atrocities against the Albanian population of Kosovo, were justified by popular racial theories of the early 20th century which treated Albanians as underdeveloped in civilizational terms, in relation to Serbs, demonstrating that the Balkans was also a stage on which both continental imperialism and scientific racism greatly influenced historical events.

In the Balkan wars greater Serbian ideology crashed with greater Bulgarian ideology, mainly in relation to Macedonia, which led to the Second Balkan war in 1913 and the Bulgarian loss of much of its Ottoman territories to Serbia, Greece and Rumania. Additionally, the outcome of the Second Balkan war meant that Russia finally withdrew its support from Bulgaria, leaving Serbia its only ally in the Balkans (Erickson, 2003:40, Malcolm, 1994, Tucović, 1950:56).

5.1.2. Unification under Pašić

Serb expansionism was, however, not the only version of South Slavic pan-Slavism. Already in 1830s, the concept of Yugoslavism, with the establishment of the Illyrian movement, was created with a philosophical fundament in the legacy of the French Revolution. In contrast to Serb nationalism, this movement begins among Croatian writers and aims to free Croats from Hungarian rule. According to Ljudevit Gaj, one of the major thinkers of Yugoslavism, Croats and Serbs were two major groups of south Slavic-Illyrian nationality, along with Slovenes, Bosnians, Macedonians and Bulgarians (Despalatović, 1975). However, Yugoslav ideas at this time appealed mostly to a Croatian upper class, as the circulation of print media in the first half of the 19th century, was still limited in the region. In spite of this, the linguistic reforms of Vuk Karadžić, who created the first South Slavic alphabet, based on the language of the people, manage to facilitate linguistic unity of the territory (Cohen,

1995:4). In the second half of the 19th century, the Yugoslavism of Croat clergymen Strossmayer and Rački conceptualize Yugoslavism as a supranational ideology, aimed at erasing ethnic, religious and cultural differences between the South Slavic peoples created by centuries of oppression by different rulers: Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. It becomes increasingly evident, that, in order to finally rid the region from its occupiers (particularly from the Croatian perspective), the peoples of the region would have to unite and cooperate in order to undertake common military efforts. In 1860, for the first time, Croatian bishop Strossmayer and Serb foreign Minister Garašanin agree to cooperate in order to free their nations from Austria and Turkey respectively. The main obstacle at that time, as well as throughout the 20th century was the question of Bosnia and how to divide it, which is precisely why these first negotiations failed. Additionally, having a quasi-independent state since 1917, Serbs viewed Yugoslavism only as a secondary tool, with their influential military sceptical of the ideas of Yugoslav federalism (Cohen, 1995: 6, Bennet, 1995:24).

Croatian and Serbian goals were thus different from the beginning. While Croats and Slovenes sought to gradually restructure the Habsburg Empire, Serbs mainly wanted to rule in a highly centralized Serb dominated state. In the early 20th century, however, with the expansion of higher and secondary education in the Balkans, the ideas of south Slavic unity reach more and more people, bringing into focus Slavic solidarity particularly in ethnically mixed regions, like Dalmatia. At the same time, the Austrian leaders become worried about the South Slav unification process and a number of trials for treason are conducted, as it became clear that more and more Croats hoped that Serbia would play the key role in the process of South Slav unification (Grigorieva, 2009:13, Bennet, 1995:24, Cohen, 1995: 8). As Austria attempts to tighten its grip, in the face of a growing nationalism of subjected peoples, and finally annexes Bosnia in 1908, it is becoming increasingly clear that the monarchy was hardly about to recognize minority rights. Additionally, it becomes evident for both Croats and Slovenes that the Serb military was necessary in order to rid the territory of the occupier. Youth, in particular, impressed by Serbian success in the Balkan wars, in which many Yugoslavs for the first time fought on the same side, becomes a proponent of the idea of a common, Yugoslav nation. As independent Serbs now become more politically aggressive, the culmination of the Serbo-Austrian animosity and struggle for the dominance in the region takes place in the form of assassination of the Austrian Arch Duke by the member of Serb organisation Mlada Bosna, in Sarajevo on the 28th of June 1914, which effectively meant the beginning of WW1 (Albertini, 1953:22, Henig, 2002, Lieven, 1983).

In the war, South Slavic peoples again found each other on opposite sides, as Austro-Hungary used its Croatian and Slovene subjects for anti-Serb hostilities, thereby hoping to put a stop to the dreams of unification. However, the movement was by this time significantly strong and the Yugoslav

Committee, led by Croat Ante Trumbić finally found a willing negotiator in the Serbian Premier Nikola Pašić. In 1917, after many disagreements, they finally came to a compromise in the form of the Corfu Declaration, endorsing the creation of a South Slav state, although the question of federal versus centralized state structure was still left unsettled (Cohen, 1996:11). By the end of the war, and with the final destruction of Austria-Hungary, along with a growing threat of a subsequent invasion by Italy, Croats and Slovenes become even more desperate for help from the Serbs. Additionally, by affiliating themselves with Serbia they hoped to escape the stigma of participation on the side of the central powers and become one of the victors. As a result, Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats was formed in 1918, from the territories of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire (including Bosnia and Herzegovina), which merged with the Kingdom of Serbia, while Kingdom of Montenegro also united with Serbia days later. The kingdom, which 11 years later was formally renamed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was led by the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty, with Pašić retaining his function of Prime Minister (Kamusella, 2008:228, Tucker, 2005:1189).

The constitution of 1921 outlines the will of a single Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian people speaking a single language, and who are to be represented by a single ethnic alliance. However, it soon becomes obvious that the state is, in fact, a centralized, Serb dominated, unitary kingdom, which ignores initiatives by its Croatian or Slovene leaders to organize the state along federal lines, finally alienating the popular Croatian peasant party, which, as a result, refuses to participate in the work of the Constituent Assembly. Also, Croats, relying on their previous experiences within Austro-Hungary as key to their "Europeanness", are eager to avoid becoming over dependent on the Balkans, which they consider merely an extension of Asia, and see themselves in charge of the Europeanisation of the Peninsula. Pašić, on the other hand refuses to divide Serbs into numerous federal units, this being in complete contrast with a hundred years of Serb nationalist ideology. As a result of the opposing tendencies, the first Yugoslavian state was conflicted and corrupt, failing to develop significantly in relation to politics or economy (Lampe, 2000:112, Gligorijević, 1979, Cohen, 1996:13). As a direct result of the unification, instead of becoming closer, different ethnic groups became more distant, with Slavic Muslims, the unfortunate leftover from the Ottoman days, completely overlooked, claimed by the stronger players and forced to declare themselves as Serbs or Croats. In 1918, a member of People's Radical Party, the main political influence in Serbia and Yugoslavia, whose leader was the Prime Minister Pašić, in a heated Assembly debate, in the National Assembly attempted to assassinate several members of Croatian Peasant Party, killing Stjepan Radić. This terrifying incident causes mass demonstrations in Zagreb, while King Alexander Karađorđević, in an attempt to solve the difficult situation abolishes the People's Assembly completely, outlaws the activities of all political parties, divides the country into regions unrelated to ethnic, religious or historical boundaries (6 out of 9 of

these regions still had a Serb majority), and imposes dictatorship (Bojić, 2001:168, Crnobrnja, 1996:59).

However, in spite of the Crown being strengthened and ethnic organisations outlawed (as well as the country renamed as Yugoslavia), the regime was incapable of transcending ethnic loyalties. In 1934, as the Nazi movement was gaining strength in Croatia, under the mentorship of Benito Mussolini, who hoped to destroy the kingdom of Yugoslavia and thereby gain additional territories, King Alexander was assassinated by joint efforts of Pavelić' [35] confidants and members of IMRO, a Macedonian terrorist organisation, advocating Bulgarian rights to Macedonian territory. Indeed, the Yugoslav regime did not only suffer from internal tensions, but was challenged and opposed by territorial ambitions of several other European countries (Marković, 2003:21, Moll, 2012:72).

During the second part of the 30s, the kingdom interestingly, managed to achieve some stability, but the opposing goals of a centralized state versus federal, remained at the core of the problem and prevented any real improvement. Finally, in 1939, when a new Serb Prime Minister Dragoljub Cvetković met with the leader of Croatian peasant Party Vladko Maček, the famous Cvetković-Maček agreement was created, in which, finally, Croatia was substantially enlarged and recognized as a separate "national" unit within a liberalized and federalized Yugoslavia, with Bosnia divided between the two. However, this agreement is a culmination of a period that did, in spite of all obstacles, manage to provide a broad feeling of a South Slavic commonness, a feeling that Dvorniković describes as the recognition of "our man", as a supranational category, which transcends ethnic divisions, and the regime of king Alexander did have its sympathizers in Croatia, just as Maček enjoyed significant popularity in Belgrade. However, the difficult colonial heritage of all south Slavic peoples including the continuous unfavourable influences of powerful European forces, along with a shortsightedness of Yugoslav politicians who focus only on differences and not common interests, thus failing to come up with politics of Yugoslavisation, result in an inability to create a long-term solid and stable Yugoslavian state (Dvorniković in Cohen, 1996:19).

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[35] Ante Pavelić, Croatian leader of Nazi Ustasha movement, and later a dictator in the Nazi puppet state of Croatia.

5.2. Crisis under Titoism

In 1941, Hitler started applying pressure on Yugoslavia in the hope that the kingdom would join the Tripartite pact. The then Serbian regent, Prince Paul, succumbed to the idea, but due to the immense unpopularity of the Axis powers among the Serbian military and public, a coup d'état was launched by military officers, and the Regent was replaced on the throne by King Peter II of Yugoslavia. Immensely angered by this unexpected development, Hitler, on April the 6th 1941, invaded Yugoslavia, as a result of which the Royal Yugoslav army, being ill equipped in relation to Wehrmacht, was forced to surrender unconditionally after only 11 days. The Croats, on the other hand, saw in this unexpected turn of events their chance for a strong independent state under Nazi tutelage, hence, the Nazi puppet state of Croatia was formed, under Italian "protection", swallowing Bosnia and parts of modern Serbia within its borders. Another Nazi collaborationist state, which operated from the 29th of August 1941 to October 1944, was created in Serbia under the government of royalist Milan Nedić. Yugoslavia, thus, became partitioned between Italy, Germany and Hungary. Encouraged by Hitler's racial theories, which viewed Slavs as subhuman, a large scale genocide was committed by the Croatian Ustaša regime, primarily against the Serbs and along the lines of "one third killed, one third expelled and one third assimilated" Nazi policy (Williams, 2003:28, Shirer, 1960:824, Tomasevich, 2001:52).

Two major Serb political fractions participated in WWII on the side of the Allies, but were in conflict with each other. The first one was the Chetniks, or what was left of the Yugoslav King's personal guards who fought for Greater Serbia and retention of the monarchy, in the process committing ethnic cleansing of all non-Serbs in "historically Serbian territories", while the other was Tito's Partisans, a communist reactive force, fighting for a Communist Yugoslavia and attempting to mobilize all ethnic groups in the struggle for liberation. As the country descended into complete chaos, and the Yugoslav government in London became entirely removed from any events in the region while the Serb militias provoked by the persecutions of the Nazi Ustasha genocidal regime, became increasingly more violent, murdering Croats and Muslims, the Partisans, as a unitary, anti-fascist force, became the only realistic opportunity for liberation, as Croats from Italian occupied Dalmatia and Bosnian Muslims started joining in larger numbers (Tomasevich, 1975:125, Fisher, 2006:27).

Tito's politics promoted socio-economic progress and ethnic equality within a united Federal Yugoslavian state, where each major ethnic group would be given an appropriate republican unit

(Cohen, 1996:22). The communist leadership was progressive at the time; they were fighting against occupation forces and the so called "domestic traitors" alike, and benefited from a young and capable military core, with experience from Spanish Civil war. In 1944, as the movement grew, the allied powers discontinued their support for the Chetniks and started helping the Partisans, finally ensuring their victory (Bennet, 1995:46).

However, Tito's Socialist Federative Yugoslavia, from the beginning failed to satisfy the territorial ambitions of ethnic groups. Croats were dissatisfied with losing a big part of Bosnia, which was given them in the Cvetković-Maček agreement. They also lost Srem to Serb Vojvodina and Boka Kotorska to Montenegro. Albanians, on the other hand, even though a majority in Kosovo, were still forced to remain a Serbian province. Ethnically mixed regions were also problematic, as Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Baranja and Slavonia had large Serb populations, which suffered immensely under the Nazi Independent Croatia. Serbia demanded that this region become autonomous, but due to the strange shape of the territory and mixed population, this was rejected by the Communist authorities. On the other hand, the territorial losses were somewhat compensated, as Croatia enlarged its territory for Istria, along with the cities of Zadar and Rijeka, which were captured from Italians, while Serbs and Montenegrins divided the previously distinct Sandžak region. Indeed, the Partisan victory, nearly unaided by the Allies, resulted in Tito's regime's reputation as respectable and useful as a buffer zone between Europe and USSR which is why, after Tito, who was initially an ally of Stalin, refused to make Yugoslavia a satellite of Russia, his decision was respected and supported by the West, leaving Tito a sole ruler in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia from 1963). Yugoslavia, which, as a result was expelled from the Cominform, was accused of following a nationalist communist path, which was in opposition to that of the Soviet Union. While Stalin interfered in Tito's plans to enlarge the state further by joining with Bulgaria, he also persecuted any follower of the so called secessionist Titoism in other states of the Warsaw Pact (Roberts, 1987:312, Cohen, 1996:24, 25, Bennet, 1995:50).

As Tito's position was under constant threat by Stalin's spies and repeated attempts on his life, a purge of pro-Stalin members of the Yugoslav Communist Party took place, in perhaps the most devastating event in the history of the country, with hundreds of thousands of political prisoners incarcerated in Gulag like concentration camps such as "Goli Otok" (Naked Island) or other political prisons throughout the country (Schindler in Vary and Tooley, 2003:221, Crnobrnja, 1994:70).

Tito's Yugoslavia went through a number of different phases throughout its existence. From the end of the war, up to early fifties, this was a strictly centralized regime closest to that of the Soviet Union, with political power invested in rapid industrialization and a transfer of funds from more to less developed regions, in the hope that economic prosperity would eliminate ethnic loyalties. The post war period was also characterized by a very harsh treatment of Nazi sympathizers, with many Slovenes killed or imprisoned in concentration camps and an ethnic cleansing of local ethnic German, Hungarian and Italian communities. An all-Yugoslav consciousness was proposed as a replacement for ethnic group identities, in a Bolshevik type hierarchical federalism, with republics having relatively little influence on state decisions and any expression of nationalistic fervour harshly suppressed. During the next decade, the regime still struggled to survive the split with Stalin, so Tito was forced to relax the totalitarian grip through a moderate decentralisation, a more subtle model of replacement of old ethnic bonds with "socialist Yugoslavism" and an enhanced local government authority, to make sure that the country would survive the political crisis. Up to the beginning of the seventies, we see a further decentralization and regionalization of the single party system with a final recognition that ethnic and regional loyalties and even conflicts to some extent were normal and long term phenomena, within the political system best defined as "pluralist socialism" (Garde, 2000:91, Cohen, 1996: 26, Crnobrnja, 1994:76).

Undoubtedly, this Socialist South Slavic state was moving towards democracy, with major economic reforms, annual GDP growth per capita of over 6 percent, free medical care and a literacy rate of 91 percent, all achieved before 1980 (Miacek, 2010). However, it suffered from many of the same problems as the former Yugoslav states, as the issues of centralisation (mainly advocated by Serbs) versus federalisation advocated by Croats and Slovenes) were continuously on the agenda. In spite of the promise of brotherhood and unity, the state was largely Serb dominated, which was well reflected in the fact that most army officers, military intelligence and secret police were ethnic Serbs. As one of leading Serb nationalists Dobrica Ćosić, framed in 1961: "Yugoslavism, for many Serbs was a form of Serb nationalism, and, in spite of the fact that most other ethnic groups were supposed to become assimilated under this common term, Serbs should never forget that their Serbianness comes before any other political tie" (Ćosić in Cohen, 1996:29). Additionally, the policy of Aleksandar Ranković, Tito's friend and confidant, who served as both Minister of Interior, head of military intelligence OZNA and secret police UDBA, was strictly aimed at preserving Serb unity and Serb dominance in the region, which resulted in a very harsh treatment of Kosovo Albanians and the power in the province becoming placed exclusively in Serb hands (Sekulić, 1979).

From the beginning of the 70s, national movements demanding more autonomy gained recognition. Ranković's eventual fall from power, due to his spying on the president's quarters, had as a consequence a strengthening of nationalist and separatist movements like Croatian Spring, which were largely dissatisfied with the fact that much Croatian resources were directed towards Serbia. This tension, although at first attempted to be resolved by purges of liberal political forces, often with the use of military, finally resulted in a significant decentralisation and democratization. In the famous 1974 Constitution, Bosnian Muslims, who, up to that point were forced to declare themselves as either Serbs or Croats, were given equal status to the other major groups, leading to the eventual renaissance of Muslim art and literature in the Socialist Yugoslavia, while Kosovo and Vojvodina, formerly Serbian provinces, became recognized as autonomous and given a vote in the presidency, as all republics, in general, were given more independence along with a political basis for statehood. The office of president was effectively replaced by a Yugoslav presidency, finally abolishing totalitarianism, and introducing one year long presidencies, where each president of 8 respective republics and provinces would rule the state on a rotational basis. In practice, this meant that Tito was becoming increasingly more influenced by the Croatian vision of Yugoslavia, and that Serbs were slowly losing influence in the presidency, a move which they saw as: the division of Serbia (Dyker and Vejvoda, 1996:15, Bringa, 1995:22, Bennet, 1995:15).

However despite the apparent liberalization of the regime and the country's reputation as a bastion of liberal communism, there were still numerous obstacles to democracy, mainly the retention of a single party system and the influence of Tito's secret police and military, especially against intellectual dissent. The economy, on the other hand, which in the 50s and the 60s was based on the idea of rapid industrialization and which transformed the country from an underdeveloped agrarian society into a moderately developed industrial country, began to decline in the 70s, due to the oil crisis in 1973, the influence of Western trade barriers which dramatically reduced economic growth and a number of IMF packages the country was forced to sign in order to maintain the illusion of socialist self-governance with total employment. The decentralization, it must be said, also had a less than desirable influence on the economy. Primarily, the division of power between six republics and two autonomous provinces, created six independent economies, in which the western oriented Croatia and Slovenia had significantly better trade options, and hence economic development, than the more isolated parts of Bosnia and Serbia, making leaders of the more prosperous regions reluctant to share resources with the backward parts, again knowing that these would often anyhow end up in pockets of the already corrupt communist elites. Increasing economic difficulties with international debts piling up and skyrocketing inflation, along with a growing administrative apparatus, ageing communist leadership, escalating ethnic tensions and huge unemployment rates were now beginning to seriously endanger the stability of the country (Woodward, 1995:28, Cohen, 1996: 38, Crnobrnja, 1994:83).

With Tito's death, things only got worse. Not only did the regime lose legitimacy due to the disappearance of the leader personality cult, around which the whole communist ideology was built, but as a consequence young people became increasingly less interested in membership in the League of Communists, previously an all-powerful organ of control. As the federal system seems increasingly outdated, particularly with the end of the cold war and the fall of the Soviet Union, the system must now evolve from an authoritarian, although relatively mild, dictatorship, into a democratic, power sharing capitalist national community, modelled on other European countries, which proves to be extremely difficult. Additionally, the revolutionary ideology behind the concept of Yugoslavia seems to have exhausted itself, as Yugoslavia's role of a cold war buffer is now no longer needed. According to Cohen, it was precisely the all-encompassing economic crisis that was the number one cause of the burgeoning ethno-regional nationalism, in the beginning in Kosovo, probably the least developed region in the state, and later in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. Increasingly, leaders of each autonomous republic manipulated the Federal system to gain more benefits for their own region and became increasingly reluctant to implement decisions on the federal level, with new and young communist leadership heavily relying on support of their fellow ethnic members (Cohen, 1996:47, Magaš, 1993:80).

5.3. Descent into genocide

The rise of Slobodan Milošević to power took place at a time when ethnic tensions were already apparent in Yugoslavia and particularly in Kosovo, the economically most depressed part of the country. He was elected president of the Serbian branch of the Yugoslav League of Communists in 1986 and quickly became known for his ideas that Serbia is being economically exploited by other republics and his support for Serbs in Kosovo, who claimed they were being oppressed by the Albanian authorities (Bokovoy, 1997:307).

From the very beginning of his rule, Milošević strove towards a totalitarian, Stalinist type society. Already in 1986, the purge of the media was begun, as journalists with moderate views were replaced by those loyal to the new regime, some even killed. Political adversaries were removed from positions, imprisoned or fled into political exile, as moderate urban elites increasingly began to leave the country and a cross regional alliance of ethnic Serbs was created. Charismatic and a passionate orator, Milošević appealed to a significant number of people across classes and of different political backgrounds, as he was able to present himself as both communist and ethno-nationalist at the same

time; an advocate of an open market and foreign investments at one point, only to, seconds later, claim that the regime must remain socialist with practically no private ownership. He encouraged violence by creating rallies where he encouraged mass hysteria and instructed people to demand what they want outright on the streets, and not through proper bureaucratic channels. The so called "street democracy" in the media was presented as government's respect for the rights of the people, while the more developed western republics Croatia and Slovenia were criticized for being capitalistic and indifferent to the opinion of the people. However, instead of an illusion of modernity and democracy, Serbia was regressing towards a kind of totalitarianism, which makes Tito's Yugoslavia seem benign, as, once again, a mass movement successfully trumped class (Cohen, 1996:55, Bennet, 1995:95, Mann, 2005).

By the end of the eighties, Milošević has succesfully abolished any kind of democratic principle in Serbia. His opponents were banished from the Parliament, including his former close friend and mentor Ivan Stambolić. Free press was kept to a degree, as a proof of democracy to be presented in communication with the West, but their work was seriously obstructed by government induced paper shortages, electricity blackouts at times of anti-Milošević demonstrations in Belgrade etc.. Starting in 1988, a series of so called anti-bureaucratic revolutions were organized by Milošević, effectively meaning that he was now taking power over all of Yugoslavia. He claimed that communist politics which, in 1964, introduced year long presidencies were proving disastrous for the country, as they resulted in an absence of any coherent long term policy in the state. This was presented as a political motive behind a series of staged revolutions, led by Milošević's people, which finally resulted in resignations of local governaments in Vojvodina and Montenegro and their replacement by Milošević's allies. Although anti-bureaucratic revolutions were presented by Milošević's supporters and the media as spontaneous and authentic grass root movements, they were in fact staged in their entirety and aimed at arming Milošević with total power (Vladisavljević, 2008: 2).

Next, an amended Serbian Constitution was submitted to the governaments of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Serbia, re-centralizing Serbia and greatly reducing the level of independence in each. In an event much like the Reichstag's vote for Hitler's enabling act, the Kosovo assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of the amendments, as they were being carefully watched by the newly imported Serbian specialist police forces. De facto, this returned to Serbia the control of the province's police, courts, national defence and foreign affairs, while on the state level (particularly as Albanians after this largely boycotted the Provincial Parliament, and were thus replaced by Milošević's people), these events provided Serbia with control over four out of eight autonomous state entities in the Yugoslav Federation. On 28th of June 1989, in Kosovo, where a day long event was organized shortly after the

abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, to mark the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje, which spelled the defeat of the medieval Christian Serbian kingdom at the hands of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, Milošević speaks of new battles, Serbia recovering its dignity, honour and state, internal betrayal of Serbs at the Kosovo Polje which caused 500 years of bad blood, the eternal Serbian task of defending Europe and Christianity (from Islamic warriors, implicit) etc., all a slightly modified version of the 19th century Serb romantic nationalist myth (Pejanović, 2006:47, Kearns, 1999: 70, Bennet, 1996:95, 96).

However, instead of resulting in a compact centralized state, which Milošević was hoping to obtain with his undemocratic methods, further protests followed. An anti-bureaucratic revolution was going to be attempted in Slovenia as well as in other republics, but the Slovenian government banned the gathering with the help of Croat police, marking the beginning of a direct opposition to Milošević's expansionist policies (Todorov, 2003:8). At this stage, however, Yugoslavia still exists, albeit significantly weakened and without any real interest of the republics in its survival. Milošević's strategies were still limited to manipulation of democracy rather than an outright use of force.

In January 1990, during the 14th Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists, two of the more affluent, western oriented republics Croatia and Slovenia were openly demanding a looser federation due to dissatisfaction with the country's centralized economic policies, but also due to a fear of growing Serb nationalism. However, as the Serb delegation insisted on "one person one vote" policy, all attempts to push through reforms were voted down, resulting in Croatian and Slovenian delegates leaving the Congress. As we see, the attitude of Slobodan Milošević towards democracy was an ambivalent one, which is best shown in one of his private statements: "We Serbs will act in the interest of Serbia, whether we do it in compliance with the constitution or not, whether we do it in compliance with the law or not, whether we do it in compliance with party statutes or not" (Ramet, 2006: 598, Mann, 2005, Cohen, 1996:59).

Indeed, Milošević should be seen as a major factor in the process of radicalization of ethnic sentiments in the region, but he was not the one to introduce or impose ethno-nationalism on the populace, the main reasons for which were the growing economic crisis and the end of the cold war which marked the end of communism. He was merely able to tap into already existing extreme nationalist feelings present at the time and exploit them in order to promote himself, personally. In relation to the conflict between intentionalists and functionalists, which is relevant for any genocidal context, in spite of his threats of "armed battles" it is very difficult to prove that Milošević in fact

wanted a war, much less genocide from the very beginning. On the contrary, there was a gradual process of increasing radicalization that took place throughout the 80s (Mann, 2005:371). In fact, the same year that he came to power, the notorious SANU memorandum was published by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which describes Serbs as victims of 1974 Constitution, which is said to have resulted in political and economic marginalization of the Serb people. Serbs were also portrayed as victims of other Yugoslavian ethnicities, who were supposedly attempting to assimilate them. In particular, the memorandum claimed that genocide of Serbs was being committed by Albanian Muslims in Kosovo and Croats in Croatia, in an attempt to re-awaken the painful memories of the atrocities committed against Serbs by Croat-Muslim Nazi leadership of WWII. The memorandum, which echoes the 19th century Serb nationalist documents like Garašanin's "Načertanije" and Karadžić's „Srbi svi i svuda", postulates that the borders of Serbia are not in accordance with its ethnic composition, and must therefore be revised with fast and swift action, providing a fundament for Serb expansionist politics of the late 20th century (Bennet, 1995:92, Magaš, 1993:66, Woodward, 1995:70).

In this respect intentionalists speak of the centuries old history of Serb nationalism, continuous ethnic cleansings of Bosnian Muslims and attempts to assimilate ethnic minorities and the 19th century literature propagating greater Serbia, which is revived and again becomes the center of Serb nationalist propaganda in the late 20th century. However, proponents of this position tend to forget that Serbs successfully coexisted in a multi-ethnic communist state, in which ethnic identities were not seen as particularly relevant and ethnic conflicts were, more often than not, particularly from 60s onward, successfully communicated. One of the consequences of the Yugoslav wars and atrocities committed was, however, a new set of stereotypes, this time viewing Serbs as a genocidal people, so the intentionalist stance can be said to be quite strong, particularly among Bosnian Muslims, some of whom still recall the ethnic cleansing committed by Chetniks in WWII. The favourite intentionalist argument, is, indeed, the infamous speech Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić gave, on October 14th 1991, in Bosnian Parliament, in which he explains what will happen if Bosnia declares independence: "Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war – How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina?" (Judah, 1997, Burg and Shoup, 1999:78).

However, in many cases of ethnic and national conflicts, or even just tensions it is not difficult to find similar threats. If genocide hadn't in fact happened, we would not even pay attention to them. However, when atrocities are committed, these words are suddenly infused with mystical and

prophetic meaning, making genocide seem like it was the ultimate goal from the very beginning. As, in the case of Hitler's Germany, these kinds of threats do not in fact indicate that a solid plan to commit genocide existed from the beginning. Additionally, leaders rarely go to war unless they feel that they absolutely have to, and in the case of Milošević the threat of losing all territories and the demands of ethnic Serbs to live in the same country as the rest of their people, certainly greatly influenced his decisions by radicalizing the situation further (Mann, 2005:373, Doder and Branson, 1999).

According to Mann, we can thus not speak of premeditated murder, but must take a different path towards understanding. As we have seen, in the beginning, Milošević simply wanted a more centralized Socialist Yugoslavian state, with Serb leadership (himself) in power. In order to secure the majority vote in the Federation he cleverly mobilized core constituencies of greater Serb nationalism, mostly people from threatened areas, like Serbs living in border regions or refugees from Kosovo, along with the rural population that lived mostly in poverty. Throughout his career Milošević used this tactic of staging supposedly spontaneous, democratic rallies which, in fact, he himself had organized. His main asset was the fact that he was able to keep all state power and a bureaucratic apparatus he inherited from Tito, but he also appealed to most underprivileged or threatened Serbs and particularly because Serbs were, at this time, very much used to authoritarian rule, so many of them saw in Milošević a resurrection of Tito, an image which he himself liked to accentuate. At the time of anti-bureaucratic revolutions, Milošević had most army officers, police and security service on his side, but his methods were still restricted to cunning, rather than violence, as he basically thought that this strategy would suffice in his attempt to acquire all the power in the state (Mann, 2005:371, Pejanović, 2006:47).

In the 1990s, however, the situation will quickly radicalize, as the process of democratization was imposed by the IMF and international community and multi-party elections were introduced, presenting a significant danger to Milošević's regime. As he adapted to the new rules, Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS, was, at this time, still advocating moderate nationalism and a compact federation with all Serbs in one state, as he severely exploited the unfair advantage of the communist state apparatus, police and state media, to win the elections. However, when nationalists also overwhelmingly won in other republics, and particularly when the new Croatian president, the leader of Croatian Democratic Assembly, a radically nationalist party, changed the status of local Serbs from Constitutional people (on the same level with Croats) to a minority, Belgrade promised support to enraged Croatian Serbs, thereby effectively radicalizing Milošević's plans from "centralized federation" to redrawing of republic borders, so that territories with ethnic Serbs would still remain

within Serbia. This was supposed to be accomplished by creating autonomous regions, the so called statelets in Croatia and later in Bosnia (Republika Srpska), which would assert their own independence, form independent legislation and thus remain with Serbia, while undermining the territorial integrity of newly formed ethnic states. When first statelet Serb Krajina was formed in 1990, in Croatia, president Tudjman sent helicopters to put down the rebellion. They were, however, intercepted by Yugoslav army helicopters, indicating the beginning of a violent conflict in the region (Mann, 2005: 394, Pejanović, 2006:52, Bennet, 1995:152).

By the end of the year, republics began to organize referendums for independence and secession, as a result of which Milošević radicalizes further. The first one to go through with it was Slovenia, with an overwhelming majority voting for independence, after which Milošević, frightened that Yugoslavia was on the road to total disintegration, leaving Serbs with smallest territory since 19th century, demanded, at a meeting of the Yugoslav presidency with the head of army Veljko Kadijević, to declare a state of emergency and send the army to take control by force. This was, however, voted down due to an unexpected no from the Bosnian representative Bogićević. Although nationalists had won in Bosnia as well, installing a republic presidency ruled by a Muslim president, Milošević was counting on this vote, particularly because Bogićević himself was an ethnic Serb. According to the Yugoslav army general Aleksandar Vasiljević, former head of military intelligence, by February 1992, Milošević managed to obtain complete control of the army, by cleansing it of all those not in favour of his rule and thereby turning it into a lethal weapon of Serb nationalism. In June 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia, which managed to arm itself in the meantime, declare independence, marking the official beginning of a horrible war, which would last until 1995 in Croatia and Bosnia, and until 1999 in Kosovo (Mann, 2005: 395, Woodward, 1995:200, Lukić and Lynch, 1996:209).

Another question, also related to the intentionalist-functionalist debate centres on the idea of leader's totalitarianism contra a more diluted version of power. Although, clearly totalitarian, there was more negotiation in the case of Milošević, in contrast to Hitler's totalitarianism, as Serb parliamentary base was a shifting coalition of parties. However, in the first supposedly democratic elections in Serbia, when Milošević was elected, it became clear that other parties all shared the idea of all Serbs in one state, as they appealed to socially threatened groups, which were in abundance in Serbia at the time. In fact, many leaders of other parties were loyal to Milošević and became leaders of his paramilitaries (Arkan). At one point Milošević had to ally himself with another strong Serbian nationalist Šešelj, leader of Serb Radicals, whom he had to debate several matters with, as they didn't necessarily agree on everything. In conclusion, the political platform in Serbia which produced the Bosnian genocide

appears more democratic, power sharing and bureaucratic than that of Nazi Germany (Mann, 2005:392, Michas, 2002: 22).

5.4. Profiles of the perpetrators

Among Serb perpetrators one finds a variety of perpetrator profiles. People close to Milošević were often of strong ideological persuasions. Indeed, the propaganda apparatus in Milošević's Serbia was so strong, with the revival of 19th century greater Serbian literature, like Njegoš' "Mountain Wreath", that most ordinary people had a very good insight into nationalistic versions of Serbian past and Serbian "historical rights". Particularly, in relation to Kosovo, the cradle of the nation, the *Achilles' heel* of Serb national pride, and the alpha and omega of Serb expansionist wars, most ordinary Serbs were introduced to the fairy tale of a betrayed Serbian hero Miloš Obilić, who fights the Turks at the battle of Kosovo. For many Serbs, ethnic wars of the 90s were in fact a revival and a continuation of that epic Serb led battle of Christians against Muslims (firstly in Kosovo and later in Bosnia). Additionally, Serbia had a long history of militarism, in terms of the role of the army in society and its influence on politics, even during the communist era, when the police and the army were truly all-powerful. Indeed, these were the constituencies where Serb nationalism was always the dominant ideology (Mann, 2005:419, Magaš, 1993, Dyker and Vejvoda, 1996:78).

However, many important Serb nationalists started off their careers as Tito's loyal communists, and some were even close to Tito himself. One might argue that a number of them harboured secret nationalistic goals, which they were not allowed to express publicly, particularly, after Tito's fallout with Ranković. Indeed, we have already concluded that Serbs remained loyal to the idea of Greater Serbia throughout their history since independence, and even saw Socialist Yugoslavia as an extension of the Serbian kingdom. Indeed, in spite of the fact that many of the key figures of the Serb genocide were in fact members of the communist party in their early years, many of them like Šešelj and Drašković, also became dissidents, and some even spent time in Yugoslav jails for their anti-communist agendas. People like Borisav Jović, a close friend and confidant of Milošević and the brain behind the strategy of autonomous Serb statelets and the idea that the Yugoslav people's army should remain in Bosnia under the emblems of Republika Srpska, making it seem like a civil war, until this very day refused to show any remorse for the crimes their politics have resulted in. Indeed, a number of high ranking nationalist leaders chose to remain true to their goals, even during the ICTY trials in Hague, where they, like Šešelj and Karadžić, remained defiant, repeatedly questioning the authority of

the court and claiming it was an extension of western imperialism. Obviously, the motives of these perpetrators were purely ideological, and can in no way be explained as obedience or instrumental rationality but only as value rationality in terms of commitment to absolute values (Magaš, 1993:322).

On the other hand, the dying Communist state produced a huge, dysfunctional bureaucratic apparatus, and, much like in Nazi Germany, many people saw in the shift in ideology an opportunity to advance and quickly climb the social ladder, particularly as there was an empty space left, with a vast number of urban middle class citizens fleeing the country in horror, leaving behind the opportunistic and the radicals. In fact, the argument Milošević used to justify the staged anti-bureaucratic revolutions was indeed not far from the truth, as it was impossible to locate responsibility in such a huge bureaucracy. This is why, Bauman's idea of free-floating responsibility (Bauman, 1989:161) fits perfectly with Serbia, a country with decades of experience with a state apparatus dominated by obedient apparatchiks. Indeed, even Milošević was by many seen as this type of careerist, who was only executing orders of powerful functionaries. According to Bela Hamvas, the bureaucratic apparatus (as the one in Yugoslavia) was a shelter for nobodies and scoundrels, a place where dictators are made (Kovač in Srbi o Srbima, 2001:179).

However, Milošević was not a typical dictator. Although totalitarian, in relation to Hitler's and Stalin's total control, Milošević's regime tolerated disagreement, even dissent to a degree. Many Serb leaders openly disagreed with Milošević, and some even wanted to get rid of him completely (Drašković), while Šešelj, for example, was at first amicable and helped orchestrate the mass layoffs of journalists in 1992, but later on distanced himself from the president due to various disagreements. All of them, however, shared the vision of all Serbs in one state and supported wholeheartedly the genocidal project. Drašković, for example, together with Šešelj, formed a paramilitary unit called the Serbian Guard, Šešelj, later the leader of Serb Radical party, formed the notorious White Eagles and Šešelj's volunteers, Arkan's Tigers were founded, armed and financed by the Serbian secret service, while Scorpions were also organized by the Serbian Ministry of internal Affairs. Indeed, the execution of genocide was not as centralized or totalitarian, as in the case of the Nazis (Mann, 2005:392).

Furthermore, the key perpetrators, either in relation to command responsibility, or ideological enticing of genocide were, indeed, well educated, many of them, international experts in their field, which disproves the idea of the Yugoslav genocide as a result of a spontaneous outbursts of tribal rage. The notorious Radovan Karadžić, leader of Bosnian Serbs was a psychiatrist and a poet, educated in

Naestved Denmark, who also spent a couple of years at Columbia University. Vojislav Šešelj was known as the youngest PhD candidate in Yugoslavia with a thesis written on "Political Essence of Militarism and Fascism" and later became a University professor. Biljana Plavšić, the so called Serb Empress, President of the Serb Republic and a member of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska was a Fulbright Scholar, who taught biology at the University of Sarajevo, spent two years at Boyce-Thompson institute at Cornell University in New York as a research fellow, specialized in electron microscopy in London, and plant virology in Prague and Bari, Dobrica Ćosić was a writer and a member of Serbian Academy of Sciences, who helped raise Radovan Karadžić to the position of the leader of Bosnian Serbs, while Jovan Rašković was a University professor with a PhD in psychiatry. It is therefore not a coincidence that the most important document for enticing genocide was created by Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences already in 1986, as this not only shows that the Serb nationalist agenda was extremely strong among intellectuals, but also because it shows that the genocide was a project conceptualized by intellectuals and organized by the state and therefore not an outburst of pre-modern rage (Ramet, 1999:152, Crnobrnja, 1994:97).

Many of the Serb perpetrators of lower as well as higher rank also came from ethnically mixed regions, where Serbs felt threatened by local majority populations. Biljana Plavšić, for instance, from mostly Croat/Muslim Tuzla is a good example of this trend, but also Drašković (grew up in Herzegovina), Krajišnik (born in Sarajevo), Šešelj (born in Sarajevo), Rašković (Knin, Croatia). (These Serb scholars, who spent most of their lives as parts of a communist establishment, believed that a Western capitalist plot is behind the fall of Yugoslavia. Additionally, some of the Serb leaders and intellectuals, like Karadžić had family members who fought on the side of the Chetniks, the Serb nationalist army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's government-in-exile in WWII, which was known to engage in killings of Muslims and Croats, or like Jovan Rašković, the leader of Croatian Serbs, who, as a child witnessed Croat Ustasha pogroms of his relatives, after which he was forced to flee. This certainly contributed to their radical opinions. Indeed, much like in Nazi Germany, although not of sole importance for the outbreak of genocide, previous conflicts in the region and inter-ethnic attitudes of groups had their impact on the emergence of atrocities (Mann, 2005: 419).

In general, Serbs used different strategies to create nationalism so strong, as to culminate in genocide. In order to form paramilitaries, people were recruited from two main sources: prisons and football hooligans. For example, Serb war criminal Željko Ražnatović Arkan was asked, by members of Serb secret service to recruit members for his paramilitary unit "Arkan's tigers", from extremely nationalistic football hooligan supporters of Belgrade club Red Star. The Serbian guard, on the other

hand, organized by Šešelj and Drašković, was led by former criminals such as Đorđe "Giška" Božović and Branislav "Beli" Matić. On the other hand, many radical and violent nationalists were found in the army or the police forces. According to Mann, there are different categories of Serb perpetrators: people from "threatened" or border areas, along with refugees, People who were already involved in professions which enticed violence, like former army officers, operatives of the police or criminals, People with Chetnik or Ustasha family history, People with utilitarian motives like weekend Chetniks, who came, from Montenegro to Bosnia to loot and plunder, as well as some desk killers led by instrumental reasoning. Finally, there was a considerable amount of force involved in people going along with the killings. Numerous Bosnian Serbs were forcibly mobilized in Serbia and sent back to the front, even if they escaped a number of times. Also a refusal to kill could very often mean the end of one's own life. Numerous stories of local Serbs helping the persecuted population can be found and people in Sarajevo certainly remember grenades with explosives removed and with "We're not all the same" written on the surface (Vasić in Dyker and Vejvoda, 1996: 134-135, Judah, 2000:217, Mann, 2005:422).

Comparatively, a relatively small amount of people actually killed. In fact, Serb propaganda was so strong, that most ordinary Serbs didn't even know what was going on. Goebbels propaganda strategy of "mirroring", which argues that the victim should be blamed for the crime committed against her, was constantly used by the Serb media, and whenever a report would come out with evidence of Serb crimes, Serb TV would run the exact same news, but with Muslims or Croats as the lead perpetrators. This is why Browning's theory of the ordinary German's silent participation cannot be collectively applied on the Serbs. Granted, many Bosnian Serbs were informed of what was about to happen, but these were often people loyal to the Serb cause, and even so many of these fled before the war actually began (Mann, 2005:424).

5.5. Modernity of the Bosnian genocide

In relation to the organisation of Milošević's genocide, as we soon shall see, the theory of Gemeinschaft genocide as a contrast to modern Nazi Gesellschaft genocide, portraying Bosnian genocide as tribal and based on inter-community hatreds misses the target. One of the main reasons for this was that Milošević was an experienced propagandist, who knew how to present the conflict as a civil war in order to avoid international responsibility. In both Croatia and Bosnia the beginning of war was marked by occupation by Yugoslav People's army, effectively controlled by Milošević, in

spite of the fact that both republics have declared independence and were at this point internationally recognized states. However, as soon as Serb autonomous provinces were created in Croatia and Bosnia, members of the Yugoslav army adopted the emblems of local Serb secessionists (Republika Srpska), while keeping the weapons and resources to fight the war. In fact, what on the outside, from the moment when Yugoslav people's army supposedly withdrew (only a couple of months after the beginning of war), appeared as a civil war, was in fact a well-organized attempt by Slobodan Milošević and Yugoslav army soldiers in Bosnia, who throughout the war, as well as the members of paramilitaries, remained on Belgrade payroll, to, forcefully realize the policy of all Serbs in one state. In addition, the characteristics of the context including the fact that society ties were based on occupation rather than descent and that genocide was a rational plan, committed by a modern, bureaucratic and democratic nation state all witness that this genocide is, indeed a modern, Gesellschaft endeavour (Balorda, 2007:130, Mann, 2005:396, Pejanović, 2006:86).

Indeed, Milošević's plan was rational. Knowing that, after the newly independent ex Yugoslavian states were internationally recognized and he could no longer count on realizing the former plan of ensuring the living space along the lines of Karlovac-Karlobag-Virovitica, turning what once was Yugoslavia into greater Serbia, Milošević attempted to create ethnicaly cleansed areas in each republic with significant Serb populations, with independent Serb leaders, which later could re-attach with Serbia, thus ensuring the goal of all Serbs in one state and thereby addressing the grievances of local Serbs who were about to become minorities on their own land, reflecting Mann's concern in relation to majoritarian democracies. Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians were thus merely standing in the way of these plans and therefore had to be disposed of.

Another evidence of the rationality of the plan is the fact that Yugoslav genocide is a result of a series of political agreements. In fact, not only was the genocidal execution dependent on a political platphorm of shifting party coalitions in Serbia, but the plan to divide Bosnia as well was carefully analysed and discussed by Serbian president Milošević and Croatian president Tuđman, who, despite the fact that the two states were de facto at war with each other, still had certain territorial goals in common. It could therefore, perhaps be claimed that the Serb genocide is to some extent more democratic and less totalitarian in nature than the Nazi genocide. Indeed, Hitler's plans were far more grand, as he attempted to occupy territories which sometimes didn't have any German inhabitants at all and knew he wanted war from the begining, while Milošević attempted to avoid war and focused only on areas which housed large Serb populations throughout history, making his plan perhaps somewhat less unrealistic.

War efforts were, indeed, well organized and carefully planned, as Milošević was in control of a powerful bureaucratic apparatus, and an army which was considered one of the strongest in the world, again contrary to the idea of a spontaneous, passionate outburst of violence and in accordance with Bauman's vision of genocidal state (Bauman, 1989). After autonomous Serb statelets were organized and armed by Yugoslav People's Army in Croatia and Bosnia, and YPA formally withdrew, paramilitary leaders were brought under army control. However, very much like in the case of Nazi Germany, the influence of paramilitaries undermined the organization of the army and the rationality of the plans, as they were often difficult to control and practised extremely violent methods. In fact, contrary to what some Bosnians believe, the army, which was used to more disciplined and well organized military strategies, with certain noble ideas of brotherhood and unity remaining from the communist era, was greatly disillusioned by Milošević's military goals and refused to hurt the civilians. As a result of this Milošević had to change military tactics, so that, on all fronts, in Croatia as well as in Bosnia, the army would not use infantry, but only artillery, so that later the paramilitaries would enter the cities and finish the job. At the time, it is estimated that, by 1993, around 70.000 paramilitaries were operating on the front, half the size of the Yugoslavian army (Mann, 2005:394, Cohen, 1995: 132).

As the paramilitaries entered the occupied areas, concentration camps would be set up, where people would be tortured and killed, and women mass raped, so that they could no longer serve the reproductive purpose of national rejuvenation, as Serbs counted on the rapes destroying their potential for successfully marrying and thus having offspring. Serb genocide was characterized by a particular organisation. Like in Nazi Germany, there were two kinds of camps: killing camps, such as Omarska, Brčko-Luka and Sušica, where a person would be murdered soon after arriving and there were detention camps, such as Manjača, Trnopolje and Batković, where the primary aim was torture. However, in cases where Serbs were unsure about their dominance, but were desperate to acquire the territory, killing centres were established in local schools or warehouses, where people were gathered for immediate execution. Eastern Bosnia was typical for such scenarios and these were the places where the word genocide was first used in international context. Indeed, the existence of these various institutions reveals a sense of profound organisation (Sells, 1996: 18-19).

Indeed, Serb perpetrators were acting according to an exact territorial plan, and focused on the areas closer to the Serbian border, like Northern and Eastern Bosnia. The first ones to be killed were always the intellectual, religious and cultural elite, or generally persons of significance to the ethnic identity of the victim, along with people from mixed marriages, who served as an example of inter-ethnic love and coexistence. Additionally, all religious and cultural monuments relevant for the group were

destroyed in an attempt to erase every memory that the group ever existed in these parts. The occupied cities would then become renamed to something that resonated with the Serb nationalist cause, with churches built where mosques were destroyed. Mass killings would take place in warehouses and schools, with bodies thrown in mass graves. These actions required a significant effort by state bureaucracy in form of desk killers as well as a huge logistical support, particularly as many of these graves were later redug, bodies distributed in secondary or tertiary graves in an attempt to better hide the bodies (Sells, 1996:20, Čekić, 2004:238, Balorda, 2007: 142).

Notorious concentration camps like Omarska or Trnopolje were, by the UN persecutor in Hague, compared to the Nazi concentration camps, although it must be said that Serbs never attempted or came anywhere near the Nazi scale of mass killings, and were much more selective in their targets, mostly sparing women and children. Although methods of killing, could, in some instances be considered particularly barbaric (cutting throats), this was still rare, and not necessarily a sign of an innate barbarity of the Serb people, as Milošević organized camps, in which members of paramilitary formations were taught to use this method of murder, by practising on pigs (Arkan's tigers). The military had the luxury of "numbing", particularly in the cases of long shelling of besieged cities, but, many of the other killings were face to face, so the Serb leaders provided huge gallons of strong local alcohol to follow the troopes everywhere, thus making the killing easier to bear. Indeed, the state attempted to plan almost every aspect of the war, also indoctrinating, preparing and arming the local Serb populations in threatened regions, whenever possible (Mann, 2005:394, Sells, 1996:143).

However, as much as genocidal plans might seem rational, partially they are always a product of delusions of grandeur. Milošević gravely underestimated the opposition, including the international political attitudes which were pro-secession. Although his military intelligence provided information on Croats and Bosnians arming themselves, he completely underestimated the power of the opponents, which could perhaps indicate a substitution of rational thinking by grandiose dreams of a revival of the ancient Serbian medieval kingdom. Again, we see that value rationality in terms of a commitment to absolute values fits this case better than the concept of instrumental rationality (Parsons, 1947). Indeed, Milošević thought that Sarajevo would fall within a couple of days, but Muslims, supported by the US, managed to keep the city and survive a three year long siege with constant shelling and continuous blockage of the roads by Serb military, which prevented food from entering the city. In Srebrenica, perhaps the gravest mistake Milošević made, murders took place, in the form of Einsatzgruppen style executions by coordinated efforts of Drina army corps, security, police and paramilitaries. Although carefully planned, and carried through, along with such details as the usage of uniforms of Dutch peace keepers in order to fool the Muslims into believing they were

the representatives of the international community, an open display of violence of that degree for all the world to see, caused such horror and outrage in the West that it finally resulted in the NATO bombing of the Serb forces and, eventually, the end of the war in Bosnia and Croatia. Indeed, as a consequence of the war, not only has Serbia 'lost' Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia, but also subsequently the traditionally loyal Montenegro, Macedonia and most recently Kosovo, leaving it with the most modest territory it has had since the beginning of the 20th century and marking the final ending of the Serbian empire and dreams of expansion (Mann, 2005:396, Malcolm, 1994:231).

Finally, as we see, the modernity of the Yugoslav genocide and the context that produced it is indisputable, in spite of the fact that we can certainly find evidence of previous ethnic conflicts, as embodied in the horrific bloodshed during WWII. However, as socialist Yugoslavia develops throughout its nearly fifty years of peaceful existence, it becomes less centralized and more democratic, which is why the "ancient ethnic hatreds" should not be seen as a primary cause of genocide, particularly as they were to a significant extent a result of the Nazi rule in the area. Rather, they should be seen as a potential for conflict which can be mobilized and utilized by propaganda in order to serve as incentive for genocide. Indeed, there are a number of factors that influenced the emergence of genocide, some of which are: the problematic colonial heritage as reflected in local identities by defining classes according to religious affiliation, which subsequently become turned into ethnic groups as a result of organic nationalism, territorial ambitions of groups as a result of continental imperialism, the difficulty of communism's continuing existence in ethno-nationalist surroundings, particularly after the end of the cold war and the fall of the Berlin wall, lack of motives for continuing a common state in relation to capitalist economies and particularly from the perspective of more affluent, western oriented republics, difficulties of majoritarian democracies to properly address the questions of minorities, history of authoritarianism and obedience, totalitarianism and finally the vast economic crisis, most of which are directly related to modernity. Indeed, a political philosophy that relies on the principle of inter-ethnic solidarity, as socialist Yugoslavia did, would necessarily have numerous difficulties adapting to a capitalist mind frame which promotes the survival of the fittest, the direct reason behind the need for independence of the more affluent republics. Modernization, in terms of democratization has in this case resulted in a less favourable economic atmosphere in which the republics were no longer willing to share. In addition, the oil crisis of the 70s, western trade barriers and IMF market reforms which imposed immediate market liberalisation all contributed to the economic collapse, the main pre-condition for ethnic violence, but also a reflection of inequalities in a modern, globalized world. Furthermore, Mann's thesis of majoritarian democracies as a pre-condition for genocide is directly applicable to the Yugoslavian context, as not only was it the division of multiethnic Yugoslavia into smaller ethnically pure units

that proposed the question of ethnic minorities, but the genocide itself was a result of democratic dialogue and negotiations between political parties and leaders of the new states.

The genocide itself can be said to possess both characteristics of modernity and non-modernity. On the one hand, the organisation, preparation in terms of propaganda and execution of genocide were modern, as the genocide in its entirety was planned and executed by the state just as the ICTY trials faced difficulties due to the bureaucratic free-floating responsibility of the perpetrations, and is therefore in no way a product of spontaneous outbursts of primal rage. However, the genocidal plan, although to an extent rational can also be viewed as a result of delusions of grandeur, making the term value rationality, in this case, more appropriate than instrumental rationality. Also, the execution was to a significant extent characterized by action of paramilitaries who were wild and extremely violent, difficult to control and often consisted of ex-prisoners, criminals and football hooligans. An important consequence of propaganda was indeed, that ideological hate was an equally important motive for perpetrators as utilitarian motives, like those we see in the case of apparatchiks and weekend Chetniks. Overall, as the second phase of socialist governing was far more democratic and tolerant and endorsed dialogue, although this did not necessarily have the desired effect on the economy, in relation to the organic-nationalist totalitarian rule of Milošević, the genocide certainly seems to be a regression to a more simple and primitive form of rule, caused by the vastness of the economic crisis and hostility of the international environment.

5.6. Serb nationalist ideology: race and religion

5.6.1. From Communism to Fascism

How to characterize Milošević's regime? According to Professor Richard Bosworth "In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, authoritarian former Communists, seeking new bases for their power and legitimacy came together with dissident nationalist opponents of the Titoist order to produce regimes that were arguably, to a greater or lesser degree fascist or semi fascist. Above all, the regime of Slobodan Milošević was fascist in practice if not in self-identification" (Bosworth, 2010).

According to Konstantinović: "The mysticism of Serb Nazism (theistic mysticism) is a mysticism of warriors, crusaders in terms of the defence of Christ from the Marxist anti-Christ, but this type of

mysticism is not nearly as important as the mysticism of the eternally tribal, "racial", which is at the very root of the Serb Nazism" This racial mysticism, which belongs to the realm of "the provincial" and thus the "pre-modern" is directed towards the tautology of the "eternal self-sufficiency" and therefore closes its borders to all around it, all which is foreign and at the same time threatening (Konstantinović in Srbi o Srbima 2001:69).

Indeed, this totalitarian Serb regime had a good deal in common with a number of fascist dictators. Like Mussolini, and other earlier fascists or proto fascists like Georges Sorel, Milošević started off as a radical socialist, only to later turn nationalist, as, after the end of the cold war this presented itself as a more logical weapon against class struggle and internationalism. Unlike Mussolini, and much like Hitler, on the other hand, Milošević's regime was extremely radicalized, its main ideological premise based on the idea that Muslims, who were thought to have been out-breeding the Serbs, were the main reason behind the fall of the Serb dominated Yugoslav regime. There are a number of important structural similarities between the regime of Slobodan Milošević and other fascist regimes, such as: a radical subversion of the constitutional order, gutting of working class and liberal-democratic resistance, total mobilization by the state around a chauvinist ideology that includes a mythologized view of the past, militarism and permanent warfare against domestic and foreign enemies, who are presented as a seamless unity, a yearning for a reordering of the international order on a reactionary basis (Magaš, 1993). In fact, as Bosworth concludes, at the height of his power, Milošević's grip over the country was probably greater than that of Mussolini, whose power was restrained by the king and the church (Bosworth, 2010).

In relation to the Nazi ideology, in particular, there are numerous similarities with Serb nationalism. To begin with, they are both dogmatic and insist on a set of truths, which is not to be questioned or critically analysed. This is why Milošević's Serbia suffered a huge outflow of intellectuals, who couldn't stand the single-mindedness of the regime. The cult of tradition, infused with ideas of expansionism, propagated the revival of the Empire of Dušan the Mighty, and a romanticization of agrarian life. The glorification of peasantry, important in both cases, as this was the key constituency for recruitment of soldiers needed for expansion of Lebensraum, along with a hatred of city life, were indeed prominent. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić could very well have been citing a Nazi manual, when he was arguing that the authentic Serb spirit can only be found in the villages, while in the cities, the mixing with Muslims and others, contributed to a weakening of this spirit. Additionally, the Serb nationalist literature of the time focused greatly on epic Serb folk poems about national

heroes, their cunning and success in the battles against Turks, as well as promotion of traditional Serb village customs and rituals, Serb traditional instruments (gusle) etc. (Sells, 1996:50).

But, how did a communist ideology, so strictly based on anti-fascism, as Tito's regime has been, so suddenly turn into its very opposite? The fact is that these two political systems, although seemingly opposite, have many more similarities than differences. Totalitarianism, in its core is a ruthless, brutal, and, thanks to modern technology, extremely efficient form of political tyranny with strong militaristic culture and grandiose ambitions for world domination. As both communism and fascism create mass movements, they rely heavily on propaganda, necessarily involve violence (as they overthrow previous governments in the form of revolutions or coups d'état), crush opposition and undertake complete reconstruction of the societies they displace (utopia). Mass movements are typically exclusionary, and ruthless to minorities, but for the fascists, the target minorities are ethnic groups, while Communists persecute any anti-proletarian opposition, as in the case of Stalin's rich peasants, who were perceived as a threat to the proletarian order. As creation of mass movements and pressure of war and expansionism, particularly in the case of continental pan-movements, necessarily involve mass hysteria, irrationality can be said to represent a defining characteristic of totalitarianism (Arendt, 1962:221).

Obsession with death, which we discussed in our Nazi chapter is perhaps more common for fascism than for communism, although communism also celebrates a heroic death as the highest social achievement possible. However, Serb nationalism in the 90s greatly revived this cult, particularly relating it to expansionist elements of nationalism, as Serb territories were defined, not as regions where Serbs lived, but as any place where Serb graves could be found. Serb nationalist obsession with death can also be seen in the focus on the battle of Kosovo Polje, where the Serb nation symbolically died (lost to Ottomans) in order to become resurrected in the form of a heavenly people, the idea of national sacrifice and resurrection being quite typical for fascism in general (David in Srbi o Srbima, 2001:65). According to David, the Serb nationalist cult of death, the war mentality, the cult of sacrifice, mass collectivism at the expense of individuality, the cult of the omnipotent leader, militarism, major themes of Serb organic nationalism are all characteristics of fascism as well (David in Srbi o Srbima, 2001:65).

Another typical element of the Serb genocidal regime, which is of key importance in any discussion on genocide, is the obsession with an international plot. Although Titoism itself was Western oriented, the later regime of Milošević became obsessed with the idea that Yugoslavian Croats and Muslims are traitors of Serbs, who sold them out to the West, so the West (America and Europe), in this nationalist plot, became merged with these two ethnic profiles of Croats and Muslims, thereby projecting a global threat onto a local target. According to Konstantinović, it is in this particular idea of Serbia hated by the entire world that the paranoia of fascism becomes obvious in Serb nationalist thought (Konstantinović in Srbi o Srbima, 2001:143). Finally, as mass totalitarian movements reject individualism completely, substituting it for tribal collectivism, they necessarily represent a rejection of modernity. In fact, it is the aspect of determinism, which pan-ideologies share that represents an ultimate denial of modernity, as they are determined by a superstitious idea that the pan-group has a purpose or rather a destiny, it is bound to fulfill. This is the reason why organic nationalism often relies on ancient prophetic texts, which promise a revival of the golden age and an achievement of utopia (Arendt, 1962:233).

National Socialism in particular and Serb nationalism are similar to an important degree, as they both stem from pan-movements (Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism), which evolved simultaneously, side by side and in opposition to one another. Indeed, the unity propagated in pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic movements is a tribal unity based on blood as a mystical origin of life, and is thus, as its ultimate goal is in fact imperialist and also racist in its core. The ideology of the pan movements is not only anti-modern because it reverts to myth rather than science, but effectively, represents the end of two illusions: democratically ruled countries in general and of European party system in particular, as contempt for parliamentary government, and for people in general is essential to both these movements. The universalism of Enlightenment, which propagates the common in all human beings and its ideas of empowerment of the individual through education and the use of reason and senses, the idea of common participation in a civic society, are all buried in ethno-nationalism with the aim of creating an army of mindless subjects. As Arendt shows, it is precisely the onset of terrible insecurity, brought on by the changing national borders and political liaisons, that brings about, logically, one might add, the need to withdraw from the public space and seek comfort in the traditional frame of one's family and clan/tribe (Arendt, 1962: 227, 230). This is why pan-movements, as a result of a time fuelled by fear, are in their essence misanthropic, and obsessed with differences between people, rather than commonalities, as healthy tolerance becomes replaced by a lust for exotic and abnormal. As a conclusion to this debate, and in relation to the fact that the same kind of insecurity brought about two very similar genocides in two very different times, we must admit that the idea of linear

progression of human beings, is indeed, nothing but an illusion, as even the very idea of progress, without the opposite idea of regress, simply makes no sense.

However, the influence of Nazism on Serb organic nationalism in not only limited to the history of the pan-movements, but is also very direct in the shape of the Orthodox Church, one of the key factors in development of Serb organic nationalism and racism. In the 80s, with the fast emerging death of Communism, the Serb Orthodox Church returns to the political scene, driven by feelings of vengeance against communists which obstructed its influence and dominated by a Saint Sava nationalism, the so called Saint Savism, an openly Nazi Orthodox branch, with roots in the early 20th century. The founder of this movement bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, an obscure character who spent time in the Nazi concentration camp Dachau, but in spite of this adopted the Nazi politics, considered Serbs a part of the Aryan race, which is why he was made saint in 2003.In his 1935 treatise on Saint Sava, he endorses Hitler's strategies and the idea of Serbs as master race by claiming that Hitler merely came to the idea that Saint Sava realized many centuries before (Maksimović, 1996:36).

In the early nineties, the Saint Savism of Nikolaj Velimirović and his desciple Dimitrije Ljotić, the leader of Nazi paramilitary organisations during WWII, shape the politics of the Serb Orthodox Church, under the leadership of Nikolaj's nephew Jovan Velimirović and greatly influence Serb nationalism. Anti-Semitism of this movement, although seemingly irrelevant in relation to the number of Jews actually living on Serb teritory, still proved quite useful in describing the Jewish fault for the growing atheism in the world, advent of both godless capitalism and Bolshevism and the destruction of great civilizations. Additionally, the church takes it upon itself to propagate a completely homogeneous Serb Orthodox society without alien elements, and activly endorses hatred of Slavic Muslims and even genocide. In verious clerical texts, a genocide against Sarajevo Serbs is claimed, the fall of Yugoslavia predicted as resulting in homelesness of 3 million people, whereas other texts speak of Muslims as the „evil seed of Muhammad", stressing the racial, rather than religious background for the hatred (Đorđević, 1999, Anzulović, 1999:25).

The main slogan of Saint-Savism is: "One race, of one faith in one state", indicating the deeply racial and nationalist nature of the ideology, while its main characteristics could be summarized as following: Serbdom, including an endorsement of medieval values of God's grace and knighthood, the Orthodox faith, a deeply chauvinistic nationalism, which propagates hatred against Albanian and Bosnian Muslims, including Croats and others, monarchy, imperial revisionism (return of the Serb royal dynasty Karađorđevići to the throne, promotion of religious education, promotion of a greater

Serbia, which spreads deep into Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Croatia, militarism, industrialism (mainly in relation to military industry and war as a way of life), clericalism, a decisive influence of the Church on cultural and social life, a rejection of democracy and republican values, anti-liberalism, rejection of human rights and liberties, pluralism and individuality, anti-Western ideology including a rejection of European integrations, anti-ecumenism, insistence on the locality of the Serb Orthodox Church and a refusal to participate in any International Orthodox Council, anti-Communism, including a rejection of anti-fascism and left wing or central ideologies, anti-Semitism as the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy and Jews as killers of Christ, victimization, the denial of crimes committed by Serbs, but insistence on crimes committed by others, Xenophobia, a hatred for anything alien or difficult to understand and homophobia, a hatred for homosexuals and sexual minorities in general (Đorđević, 1999).

5.6.2. Scientific Racism

As we mentioned earlier, pan-ideologies are characterized by an exclusivity which rejects intermingling of group identities, and insists on a religious, ethnic or other "organic" essence, which supposedly naturally ties the members of the pan-group together. In contrast to pan-Turkism or pan-Arabism, where this essence is defined through ethnicity, pan-Islam, where it is defined through religion, or pan-Africanism, through territory, both pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism revolve around a concept of race. Serb nationalism revolves to a great extent around the idea of alien blood infiltrating the blood stream of the superior race, which is responsible for the demise of the great Serbian empire. Only genocide, as a final purification of blood, can thus bring relief and an opportunity for racial renaissance. In Serb nationalist thought religion as a precondition for race, plays a major role in actualization of "Us" and "Them", as Muslims, much like Jews become threatening to a rigid idea of Christian Europe, and both Serbs and Germans present their ideas of superiority through mythical images of medieval Christian knights, making modern genocide an echo of medieval Christian crusades (Arendt, 1962).

One such myth, more than any other, is of key significance to the understanding of Serb racism and demonstrates the basic need of Serb organic nationalism to search for justification in remote history and antiquity. The battle of Kosovo Polje took place in 1389, where the Serb army fought against the attacking Ottoman Empire. Although the battle didn't have a concrete outcome, and both rulers were

killed, it is said to have opened the way for further advancements of the Turkish army, which finally in the 15th century resulted in the fall of Serbia and Bosnia alike. This legend, in spite of the fact that key details are mythological and not historical fact was used from 17th century and onwards as a key text for development of Serb organic nationalist consciousness (Sells, 1996:31, Fein, 1993:409). The legend of Kosovo along with other works focusing on the victimization of Serbian people, were given legitimacy by historians such as Radovan Samardžić and Vasilije Krestić. According to Domanović, in the shadow of the notorious SANU memorandum, a historiography evolves, which is close to fiction rather than historical truths and this is how a movement is formed which, in numerous documents is expressed as the movement for "greater Serbia" (Domanović in Srbi o Srbima, 2001:324).

Serb nationalist consciousness is thus revisionist, as is often the case in ethno-nationalism, emphasizing a certain point in history, while completely disregarding others. For Serb nationalists, the cultural high point came in the 14th century, at the time of the rule of Dušan the mighty, who ruled as emperor of Serbs and Greeks, conquering a large part of South-East Europe, practically all Byzantine territories in the western Balkans, with, as some sources claim, the ultimate goal to conquer Constantinople and replace the declining Byzantine Empire with a united Orthodox Greco-Serbian Empire, making him one of the most powerful monarchs of the time. Apart from the territorial advantages (the Serb kingdom was never larger than at this time), Dušan also raised the Serbian autocephalous church from the status of Archbishopric to the status of Patriarchate, making him the second most important person for Serb nationalist history, right after Saint Sava, who was the first archbishop of the Serbian church and was given autocephaly (Hupchick, 1995:141).

After Dušan's death, however, the region slowly starts to fall under the Ottoman influence, until the 1389 battle of Kosovo Polje, where Serb Prince Lazar was defending the country from the Ottoman Sultan Murat and his army. This battle, which will forever remain engraved on Serb national consciousness, was far from only a battle of empires. In fact, it was, along with other similar battles of its time, an attempt to stop the spread of Islam in Europe, so Serb national consciousness still to this day revolves around this idea of defending Europe and Christianity against the conquering, violent Islam, as was evident in Milošević's speech in 1989 in Kosovo. In Serb mythology, the battle of Kosovo Polje represents the ultimate misfortune of the nation, as the end of Serb independence and the final fall of Serb empire take place. This is the reason why, when Serb ethno-nationalists focus on the revival of Dušan's empire, they are not only wishing to reacquire the lost territories of the time, but they are attempting to erase the complete four hundred years of Ottoman rule, including all its

consequences, primarily, the spread of Islam in the region and the emergence of the population of Slavic Muslims (Sells, 1996:31).

The way the battle of Kosovo is told and retold today has little historical validity. The final version, the one most influential for the modern revival of Serb ethno-nationalism was published by Vuk Karadžić and depicts a Serb hero knight Miloš Obilić, killing Sultan Murat to avenge the death of Prince Lazar. In the myth, the death of Prince Lazar is blamed on treason by a Serb, Vuk Branković, who, according to legend, sold valuable Serb war documents to the Ottomans, thus becoming, from that point on, the eternal symbol of the treacherous nature of Slavic Muslims and their influence on the fall of the Serb empire. In several versions of this myth Prince Lazar is depicted as Jesus, Muslims are presented as the evil and doomed alien seed, while Kosovo is the Serb Golgotha. The betrayal of Lazar by Branković is shown on paintings with the motif of the last supper, where Lazar is the kind Christ and Branković the plotting Judas. As the killer of Sultan Murat, Miloš Obilić becomes the symbol of revenge against Muslims and a national role model for all Serbs, making genocide a holy and desirable act. The cathartic moment in the myth, when Prince Lazar dies, is, as it is in fact equated with the death of Christ, shown as the death of the entire Serb people, who in this moment of ultimate sacrifice become the people of God, or, as Serb nationalist discourse insists, "the heavenly people". Seen from a nationalist Serb perspective, the nation cannot become resurrected until all descendants of Lazar's (Christ) killers are erased from the Serb nation, again making that decisive tie between genocide and patriotism, so crucial for this case (Sells, 1996:44, Anzulović, 1999:12).

As Karadžić's Kosovo curse (allegedly words of Prince Lazar himself) states:

Whoever is a Serb and of Serb birth,

And of Serb blood and heritage,
And comes not to the Battle of Kosovo,
May he never have the progeny his heart desires,
Neither son nor daughter!
May nothing grow that his hand sows,
Neither red wine nor white wheat!
And let him be cursed from all ages to all ages!

(Karadžić in Greenawalt, 2001)

Similarly, in Njegoš' 1847 Mountain Wreath, one of the central pieces of Serb nationalism and Serb literature in general, a vengeful blood bath of Slavic Muslims is shown as a sacred and glorious act, a blood baptism, after which Serbs go to church to receive communion, without previously having to confess, as if the act of genocide itself is purifying and resulting in a state of grace. Much like in the myth of the battle of Kosovo, the Muslims are here exterminated at Christmas, portraying the symbolic resurrection of the Serbian people.

In this literary work, we reach the essence of Serb racism. In "Mountain Wreath", Njegoš uses the term Turkifiers, a common term used in the Balkans by Christians to describe Slavic Muslims, and also used by Serb military commanders in the nineties. The word Turkifier (Poturica) is here of great interest, as it refers to the process of conversion of local Christian populations to Islam, but instead of the word Muslim, the word Turkifier or Turk is used and the process of conversion not islamisation but turkification, symbolizing that the person had in fact not only changed religion but race, adopting Turkish language, manners and customs. In this way, the person has lost the right not only to the faith of his/her ancestors, also to her Slavic roots, which she betrayed in order to assimilate with the enemy.

In one of numerous scientific racist justifications for cleansing of Muslims, Bosnian Serb University Professor in biology Biljana Plavšić states: "The truth is that Muslims are in fact turkified Serbs, but they are genetically deformed material. Now, with every generation, this deformation increases in concentration and become worse, thereby determining their thinking and behaviour, typical only for them and rooted deeply in their genes" (Bartov, 2001:189).

Slavic Muslims are, therefore, in this discourse presented as stuck in a vacuum between two worlds, their faith becoming an obstacle for participating as valid members of their ethnic groups, the loss of racial identity representing the loss of right to territory. On the other hand, the idea that Slavic Muslims are in fact Serbs, absurd of course as national identities did not exist at the time of islamisation of Bosnia, comes again from the legend of Kosovo Polje and the disastrous betrayal of Serbs by their own people (Branković). We see here how national mythology acquired scientific justification to become the fundament for genocidal conquest.

These ideas are the essence of a racist Balkan movement called Christo-Slavism, which asserts that all Slavs are Christian by nature, while a conversion to a non-Christian religion would, thus, mean the complete loss of "ancestral faith", roots and ultimately race. The idea of a primordial connection between Slavs and Christianity is, of course, nonsense, as Slavs themselves used to be polytheists

before they were converted to Christianity, but this image of a group identity, which loses a racial fundation in one group, but never becomes adopted in another (Turkish), effectively means a complete deletion of the group's identity, a denial of their right to territory and, ultimately, as a consequence, necessitates their physical disappearance (Bartov and Muck, 2001:17, Sells, 2003: 355).

By the end of the 90s, the idea that Bosnia could be ruled by Slavic Muslims, as the majority group, evoked in the minds of Serb nationalists the return of the Turks. In the words of Arkan, the notorious Serb paramilitary leader: "Muslims can look for a state somewhere else, if Iraq or Iran give them a piece of their territory so they can execute Jihad there if they want. They have nothing to look for in Europe" ("Interview", 13.11.1992). In his travels across the Serb dominated territories, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić would sit with soldiers, drinking local alcohol and singing: "Serb brothers, wherever you are, with the help from God, for the cross and the Christian faith, and our royal fatherland, I invite you to go fight at the battle of Kosovo". Bosnian Serb commander and war criminal Ratko Mladić also used symbolism to raise the moral of his troops. Before going to battle, he would evoke the images of the First Serb uprising and the rebellion against the Ottoman military leaders Janissaries (Anzulović, 1999:109, Sells, 1996: 50).

As we mentioned earlier, Serb racist propaganda was given justification by science and many Serb nationalist leaders and propagandists were highly educated people who used their knowledge in the service of propaganda. Institutions like the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences was probably among the most notorious institutions for production of false knowledge ever to exist in the world, and many of its members, like Dobrica Ćosić, the so called father of Serb nationalism, were openly supporting Milošević and even propagating genocide. Ridiculous theories were thus presented by the intellectual elite as scientific and trustworthy. Jovan Rašković, psychiatrist and mentor of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, claimed that Muslims are a "psychoanalytically anal people". President of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavšić, a biologist and a botanist by profession, was known as an important contributor to such theories (Anzulović, 1999:17, 130). In a particularly social Darwinist statement, made during the Bosnian war, she establishes a connection between racial belonging and mentality whilst defining Serbs and Muslims as different species:

"The Serbs in Bosnia, particularly in the border areas, have developed a keen ability to sense danger to the whole nation and have developed a defence mechanism. In my family they used to say that the Serbs in Bosnia were much better than Serbs in Serbia [...] and remember, the defence mechanism was not created through a short period of time; it takes decades, centuries [...] I am a biologist and I know: most capable of adapting and surviving are those species that live close to other species by whom they are endangered". The superiority of the Serbs was, of course also confirmed by biological

accounts: "Biologically, we are the strongest nation; we have the most intelligent authors and the best soldiers" (Drašković in Srbi o Srbima, 2001:305).

On another occasion, in 1994, Plavšić stated that she and other Serbian nationalists were unable to negotiate with the Bosnian Muslims due to genetics, a theory popular among Serb intellectuals of the time. She pointed out that the deformed Muslim genes became aggressive over time and were now attempting to invade the healthy ethnic tissue (Serb), much like cancer, giving scientific justification to the theory that the downfall of the Serb nation will be caused by inter-breeding with Muslims. Dragoš Kalajić, Serbian painter and essayist took this idea even further, claiming that this inferior gene was passed on by the Ottomans, but which in fact stems from African Arabs, in an attempt to place the fair skinned Slavic Muslims into the category of "dark otherness" (Sells, 1996:50). Scientific racism was also used in primary schools to propagate false historic theories which insisted on Serb ethnic superiority (Bosnia was in fact originally a Serb country and before the war Serbs owned 64% of Bosnian land), Serb innocence (the Serb role in all conflicts was that of a just victim, but never that of a perpetrator), and Serb racial purity (Muslims were immigrants or traitors who sold the faith of their ancestors for a piece of bread).

5.6.3. Building a racial utopia

Serb nationalist obsession with securing a living space for the coming generations is based on a fear of vanishing completely as a nation. This fear of disappearing is portrayed in the famous book written by Serb nationalist Miodrag Pavić, about the Khazar people, who disappear from the face of the earth because they no longer share the same faith and thus become converted to Islam, Catholicism and Judaism. It is therefore clear that the occupation by the Islamic Ottoman Empire has left a deeply traumatic imprint on the Serb national consciousness, which is why religion plays an important role in the quest for national revival. The SANU memorandum explicitly states that genocide is taking place against the Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo, while Croatia and Slovenia are taking control over the Serbian economy. In fact, prior to the 90s war, Albanian Muslims in particular, had significantly higher birth-rates than the Serbs, who were slowly overcrowding the cities, making the fear of being bred out the focus of Serb nationalist outbursts. According to theorist Mirko Đorđević, hundreds of memorandums were written in order to solve the question of Kosovo, but regardless of whether they were communist, state or church, they all had one thing in common: Solve the Kosovo question so that Albanians are no longer there (Anzulović, 1999:111, Lampe, 2000:347, Đorđević, 2005, Banac, 1988:306).

In order to reclaim the golden age when Serbs possessed a huge part of the south-eastern European territories, the national heartland and the cradle of Serbdom – Kosovo needed to be reclaimed first. However, Kosovo was now inhabited by a majority Albanian Muslim population. In a TV interview, which the Serb Bosnian leader Radovan Karadžić gave during the war in Bosnia, he claimed that the main idea of Serb nationalists was to create a new Serb matrix in Bosnia. He argued much like Biljana Plavšić, that Bosnian Serbs were more pure and more authentic than those in Serbia, who were more mixed and corrupt. Therefore, by securing the dominance in Serb territories in Bosnia, new origins of healthy Serb blood and pure Serb spirit would emerge, thus purifying Serbia and other "Serb" territories as well. In order to accomplish this, Serb nationalists undertook a series of measures:

1. Purifying the race from undesirable traits

Purifying the race, in this case, includes a number of strategies. Throughout the history of Muslim populations in Serb states, assimilation was the preferred state strategy for reaching homogeneity. In Communist Yugoslavia, prior to the Constitution of 1974, Muslims had been forced to declare themselves as Serbs or Croats, while intellectuals belonging to both these groups found "solid" evidence why Muslims were in fact originally members of one of the two dominant groups prior to their conversion. However, during the reign of Tito's close collaborator Ranković, the notorious Serb head of military intelligence and secret police, Albanian and South Slavic Muslims in Yugoslavia were specifically racially targeted, as they were encouraged to declare themselves as Turks and immigrate to Turkey, having been symbolically expelled from racial membership in the family of Slavs (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000:35). In the overture to the great genocide of the 90s, many Serb nationalist political leaders, like Vuk Drašković, echoed this idea, calling on the Muslims to move to their "homeland" Turkey (Sells, 1996:50, Bojić, 2001:249).

During the war, assimilation was no longer an option, and only the harshest measures were taken, to, once and for all, solve the Muslim question. Shelling of cities, while previously warning the Serb population to flee or protect themselves, ethnic cleansing and murder of all non-Serb population, including Muslims, Croats, Roma and others, erasing all evidence of racial contamination from the territories traditionally shared with others, and destruction of any evidence that "others" lived in a specific area, like the destruction of mosques, shelling of libraries containing ancient Jewish and Islamic texts and manuscripts, including murder of Serbs involved in or born of racially mixed marriages, were all strategies used to create the Serb Lebensraum (Čekić, 2004:238, Sells, 1996).

2. Strengthening the race

Serb nationalists employed several methods of race strengthening. To begin with, they used successful propaganda campaigns to encourage women to give birth, and several laws were introduced to financially aid women who have more children. Propaganda posters, very likely copied from the Nazi propaganda masters, were heavily used, one of them portraying a very blond pregnant woman with an armed and equally blond (Serbs are in fact rarely blond) warrior husband with a caption saying: "Her job is to give birth, while his is to defend". Additionally, certain commanders of paramilitary formations were involved in humanitarian projects financially aiding mothers with more children. In addition reports have been published of children stolen by Serb soldiers from Bosnia and brought to Serbia where they were put up for adoption by Serb parents, although the actual extent of this strategy is not known. However, the most important strategy for strengthening of the race was, for Serbs, the use of systematic mass rapes, which were so extensively used that rape as a category first became constructed as a war crime, as a consequence of Foča rape camps in Bosnia (Stiglmeyer in Gutman, 1994: 85, 86, 198).

According to a predetermined scenario, Muslim women would be raped numerous times by many different Serb soldiers until they got pregnant. Once pregnant, a woman would get special treatment and doctor's help, but would still be kept in custody until it was too late for her to have an abortion. As the rapists explained to their victims, the purpose of these atrocities was to pass on the dominant Serb gene on to the offspring, which, as was believed by the perpetrators, would produce a new race of Serb warriors, who would end the genocidal task begun by their fathers by killing their mothers and other Muslims (Weitsman, 2008:561).

As Weitsman points out, the desire to impregnate these women with little "Chetniks" (Serb warriors) was paramount for the perpetrators, while the statement made by Milan Paroški in Monitor, on July 12th 1996 illustrates that we are here talking about a profound case of scientific racism and belief that the superior Serb genes will outbreed the inferior Muslim genes, even as the scholarly theory on Bosnian rapes has largely overlooked this dimension of the genocide:

"In Bosnia, we shall cleanse Muslims by locking up Muslim women in Serb houses, so Serbs, who are well known for their potency, will impregnate them with numerous Serb children, thereby exterminating the Muslims" (Paroški, Monitor, 1996).

In order to counteract the influence of this genocidal strategy, the Bosnian Islamic community published a Fetva, encouraging all women who became pregnant during the wartime rapes, to keep the children and raise them in a spirit of deep Islamic faith, which could help the women to racially reclaim their progeny. The attitudes of Serb soldiers towards the raped women were probably among the most radical cases of employment of scientific racist theories by average people that the world has ever seen (Stiglmeyer, 1994:85, Ramet, 2002:240, Weitsman, 2008:561).

5.6.4. Islamophobia

There are many similarities between the position of Jews in Nazi Germany and the position of Slavic Muslims in the Balkans. In much the same way these two groups have been traditionally categorized, oppressed and victimized. Although the process of Muslim victimization in the Balkans starts much later, with the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire in late 19th century, it has its roots in the Limpieza de Sangre European cleansing process from mid 15th century, where Jews and Muslims constituted a common anti-Christian otherness. Later, however, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Europe again cleanses itself of Muslims, as Greece, Bulgaria and other ex-Ottoman lands persecute, expel and kill ethnic Turks and local converts. Yugoslavian Muslims have suffered assimilation, as they have traditionally been forced to declare themselves as Croats or Serbs, the dominant groups exploiting the confusion around the fact that the term "Muslim", although referring to an ethnic group, which considers itself distinct from others, is in fact a religious term. In "Short history of Bosnia", Malcolm presents the idea that the Muslim identity in the Socialist regime suffered twofold, firstly because it was interpreted as a religion and a social praxis simultaneously, and second because it was considered foreign and primitive (Malcolm, 1994). Historically, Yugoslavian Muslims suffered mass murders, pogroms and acts of vengeance in the period after the final end of the Ottoman rule, but also later in the world wars, as the group became a target for the venting of socially undesirable feelings in times of crisis, as they, after the fall of the Ottoman empire, no longer had a state to protect them. Indeed both in the kingdom of Yugoslavia and in socialist Yugoslavia Muslims were second rate citizens and depended on coexistence and cooperation with others. However, when the multinational Yugoslavia was about to disintegrate into smaller, organic units, Muslims became a serious obstacle in the process of the creation of ethno-national states. Most importantly, in the analysis of this categorized group, we see how, even though secular, Europe never became completely removed from the idea of Christianity as a basic characteristic of the superiority of White Westerners, treating non-Christian groups as foreigners and alien elements, which should be expelled in order to achieve symbolic purity (Anzulović, 1999:109, Balorda, 2009:117).

In the context of Serb genocide against Slavic Muslims, we find a number of stereotyping mechanisms, all, as we shall see, very similar to those we have discovered in the analysis of the position of Jews in Nazi Germany.

Traditionally, the main stereotype used for Jews and Slavic Muslims alike is greed. In the case of Slavic Muslims, the Ottoman Empire created this group out of the local, Christian population, through voluntary or forced conversion, often giving them important positions and lands that Christian serfs would work on. Of course, most Muslims were not in, fact, aristocracy, but peasants, but this small elite influenced the way all other members of this group were categorized. In fact, according to Serb and Croat mythology in the Balkans, Slavic Muslims betrayed their Christian faith for money, making them traitors and cowards. Muslims, contrary to European Jews, were once in fact one of us, but they chose to exclude themselves for the benefit of the Oriental gold, making it an absolute necessity for "Us" to make sure we never allow them to become a part of the in-group again. A traditional Serb saying about Slavic Muslims asserts: "They sold their faith for dinner", insisting on the banality of reasons for the betrayal of the Christo-Slavic race. The most important writer of the Yugoslav era, Nobel award winner, Ivo Andrić also presents the conversion of Christians to Islam as a cowardly conversion to the Turkish race (Sells, 1996:31, 45, Balorda, 2007:120).

In relation to modernity, the idea of Muslims as corrupt city people and Serbs as traditionally loyal and honest, free spirited peasants, translates into the fear of capitalism. This paranoid anxiety caused by the fall of the Soviet Union, a traditional Serb ally, and the fall of Berlin wall, both events of key importance for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and descent into genocide, only confirmed the idea that western oriented Bosnian Muslims were money mad and traitors of the Slavic organic unity. As the Serb father of the nation Dobrica Ćosić says in his laments on the Albanian people:

"This social, political and moral scum of the tribal, barbaric Balkans (Muslims), takes as its ally America and the European Union, in the struggle against the most democratic, most civilized and most enlightened people in the Balkans - the Serb people" (Popović in Srbi o Srbima 2001).

 In this case, it seems that Ćosić is angry because the "barbaric" Muslims have not accepted their subordinate position, but instead ally themselves with the "civilized" West, which makes them the

carriers of change and modernity, symbols of capitalism and city life and simultaneously traitors of village authenticity, agrarianism, pure spirit of Serbdom and Slavic roots. The images of barbaric "other" and the ultramodern "other" both participate equally in the consciousness of the super-human race, creating confusion and contradiction (Kiernan, 2007, Sells, 1996:50).

Furthermore, the fact that the Slavic Muslims in all things appear like "Us", but are not "Us", thus they are invisible and impossible to recognize as different and distinct, which came with modernity, made things even more problematic, as they now became secret intruders, who could infiltrate "Us" when they wanted. This then becomes the reason for the second key stereotypical image related to Slavic Muslims: intruder as a cuckoo, who plants his seeds in our nest without our awareness. This stereotype is usually invoked in the categorizations of Muslims as city people, where they often mixed with Serbs, giving birth to mixed offspring. Additionally, as a result of a heavy categorization, even in the age of the Socialist Yugoslavia, Muslims often tended to give their children ethnically natural or Christian names, making the Serb fear of conspiracy and the invisibility of the enemy and his attempt to spread his genes even more pronounced (Bringa, 1995, Balorda, 2007:107).

The idea of sexual infiltration, precisely what Serbs attempted in the act of systematic mass rapes, correlates with the fear of being bred out by the Orient. Not only were the Muslims, thus, presented as breeding machines, taking the necessary resources away from Serbs, but other, even more aggressive images penetrated the Serb nationalist consciousness. During the war, the idea that Muslims were only pretending to be secular citizens, while in fact they were plotting, in the privacy of their homes to breed the Serb race out by creating harems, where Serb women would be continuously raped, was common. The ancient Serb idea of the ongoing battle between naturally Christian Europeanness and the attacking wild, alien Islam, along with the images of Serbs as crusader knights were often used in Serb and Croat nationalist texts and other kinds of propaganda (Said, 2007). In a famous speech made by president Tuđman, in which he echoes the words of other Croat politicians from the time of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, he speaks of the contamination of Europe by the Orient and states that Croatia accepts the task of Europeanization of Bosnian Muslims (Sells, 1996:95). This stereotype, involving the idea that all members of non-Christian religions are alien to Europe, has, in modern times received another dimension. Famous Serb writer Miodrag Pavić, spoke of Slavic Muslims as defenders of militant Jihadist Islam. In a 1990 speech in the US, on Capitol Hill, Serb ideologist Dobrica Ćosić manipulates modern fears of aggressive Islam, when he says:

"In the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnic and political majorization of Serbs and Croats by Muslims, who are increasingly under the influence of a militant Arabic Islam, has caused a depression, a feeling of inequality and migrations of Christians, mostly Orthodox Serbs, towards whom a part of the Muslim population is traditionally antagonistic. We cannot fail to notice the aggressiveness of Islam, in the past decades on the Yugoslav territories, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serb Sandžak. This cunning and meticulously organized aggressive islamisation causes inter-religious tensions and conflicts in ethnically mixed regions and results in the suppression of Christian culture in this part of Europe" (NIN, 1990:13).

Finally, the images of Muslims as killers of Christ, a typical European stereotype apparently used to categorize all significant non-Christian groups in Europe is all-powerful in Serb nationalist literature and media. Key literary works as Mountain Wreath and various depictions of battle of Kosovo, along with different Church texts all use the image of Muslims as the seed of Satan. Miodrag Popović explains how the process of demonization of the Turks as a mythical enemy existed in Church texts long before it was ever used in folk poetry. In the church tradition, the image of the Sultan Murat as mythical evil and a comparison of the enemy with mythical fire snakes, children of the beast or dragon, children of Satan etc. were very popular (Popović in Anzulović, 1999:59). The church has, in this context served as a disseminator of ancient superstitions and is responsible for their survival in the modern times. In fact, theorists have often characterized the Serb Orthodox church as an institution, which, to a large degree kept many ancient pagan Slavic beliefs, only formally adapting them to Christian customs. An important example of this phenomenon could be the famous Vidovdan, or the day of Saint Vitus in Christian tradition. However, although seemingly Christian, this deity stems from a pagan Slavic god of war Vid, which is why, symbolically the battle of Kosovo is said to take place on this day, as well as the creation of various Serb Constitutions and other important national events. In his work: "Serbia, from myth to genocide", Branimir Anzulović argues for the non-Christian character of the famous Serb nationalist epic poem mountain Wreath, in which, although religious ceremonies are given importance, the essence of the plot relies on an ancient cult of revenge, very dominant in the old tribal societies of mountain Dinara, which was present in a certain kind of folk poetry which became revived in the 18th and 19th century. In this way, preserved in the literature, pagan customs could become resurrected in modern times, when a need for tribal unity again presented itself (Anzulović, 1999:61).

5.7. Conclusion

In relation to the research questions presented in the methodology chapter, the Yugoslav context offered a number of illuminations. To begin with, we have discovered that the Holocaust has a number of common traits with the genocide of Bosnian Muslims and the two are, indeed, comparable, which provides an answer to the first research question. In fact, the evolution of Serb national consciousness models itself to a great extent on the German and in dialogue with German authors. The history of dependence resulted in the nationalist project being more reactionary and violent as its purpose was to rid the region of the occupier, while the bumpy road to independence along with the heritage of foreign rule, necessitated authoritarian and   militarized states in both cases. Bosnian Muslims, like German Jews were despised as it was precisely the influence of the occupier that attempted to elevate them to a higher status. Indeed, in terms of unification, Serbia follows the German model, becoming the Prussia of south-Slavic unification. In relation to genocide, we find that, like the Holocaust, the Bosnian genocide was committed by efficient and bureaucratic nation states according to an exact territorial plan with pan-German and pan-Slavic racist ideologies respectively, and a Gesellschaft society structure. In addition, both genocides can be explained exclusively through a functionalist perspective, as results of a gradual radicalization and a number of failed plans, as Mann confirms.

Therefore, and in relation to research question number 4, it is not possible to use the paradigm of ancient hatreds in order to fully explain the Bosnian genocide. Indeed, we find here a history of ethnic animosities, but there is nothing remotely spontaneous in how these animosities were organised, manipulated and directed by the Serbian state apparatus and Serb intellectuals in order to fulfil the goal of all Serbs in one state. Also, the Serbs spent half a century living peacefully with others and it took a very concentrated effort by the state and a propaganda that lasted for a decade before the population was prepared for war.

Indeed, in relation to research question number two, we conclude that Critical theory can most definitely be applied to other contexts, such as the Serbian/Yugoslavian. Arendt's theory on continental imperialism is useful in illuminating the historical specificities of both Germany and Serbia in terms of the political pressures to conquer one's place in the sun and catch up with the dominant West that result in expansionist politics of both contexts and are directly linked to modernity. Other points worth mentioning would be in relation to the annihilatory character of the

Serbian/Yugoslavian state, which reflects extremely well Bauman's ideas of the genocidal state, instrumental rationality, which we find present among the various profiles of the perpetrators, mainly apparatchiks, weekend Chetniks and others with utilitarian motives, sophisticated organisation and efficient execution of the genocide by the state bureaucracy including the surprising effectiveness of the genocidal propaganda. Bauman's free floating responsibility is particularly accurate in the case of Yugoslavia as, like in Nazi Germany, it became impossible to decide, who was to be persecuted in such vast bureaucracies. This theory is, however supplemented by other works, like Michael Mann's, which provides an explanation for other types of perpetrator profiles, namely the passionate and ideological.

Furthermore, in regards to the genocidal plans, in both Nazi Germany and Yugoslavia, we find that Weber's concept of value rationality as dedication to absolute values fits better with the nature of the cases than instrumental rationality. Even though the initial goal of the removal of minorities might be to some extent rational, the genocide itself, especially as it progresses, is here seen as a product of irrational delusions of grandeur and an obsession with killing rather than any clear thinking plan. This is why, the role of modernity in genocide, as an answer to research question number 3 is seen as ambivalent. On the one hand, we clearly see the various influences of modernity in the structure of the state in state ideologies and the execution of genocide. It is apparent, particularly in the case of Yugoslavia that the origins of the conflict can be traced back to the "awakenings" of Serb and Croat nations who use propaganda to get the previously nationally unaware Orthodox and Catholic populations in Bosnia to declare their national belonging in accordance with their religious affiliation, thereby clearly demonstrating the dangerous nature of nationalism as an ideology, which creates ethnic rifts where there were none and practically divides states. However, a rejection of modernity is also relevant for this case as colonial heritage and the difficult political situation in Europe necessitate a rejection of liberal modernity values not only in relation to the structure of the early Yugoslavian state, but also in relation to general nationalist philosophy, which in Serbia rejects enlightenment and individualism in favour of rigid organic nationalism, which is in itself, as Arendt demonstrates to a significant extent tribal and traditional in nature. Indeed, like in the Nazi Germany, Serb nationalism views modernity as a heritage of the colonizers, who have long been undermining the independence of the nation, not only through creating differences and pitting the groups against each other, but also through the various trade barriers and IMF programmes of the 70s and 80s. In addition, in relation to Tito's rule, which, particularly in the late seventies and eighties becomes liberalised, the rule of Milošević is a clear regression to a more rigid and simple type of rule, rejecting all liberal values of democracy in favour of authoritarianism. Therefore, and in relation to question number five, genocide can, not be seen as an embodiment of modernity, but rather its rejection or even annihilation.

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6. Origins and execution of Rwandan genocide

While the Holocaust is often portrayed as the archetype modern genocide, with Rwanda, much like Bosnia, it's the opposite. In spite of what is known about the context, massacres and killings were put down to barbarism, age-old hatreds, ancient fears and tribal wars (Destexhe, 1995: 9, Des Forges, 1999). This type of prejudice is mostly found in the media, although even academic literature often reproduces the stereotypes, like Neuffer's "The key to my neighbour's house which operates with the notion of blood feuds or Andersen and Taylor's " Understanding a Diverse Society" which places the Rwandan genocide in the category of tribal, Gemeinschaft affairs (Neuffer, 2002, Andersen and Taylor, 2007). But, crimes against humanity and large scale massacres in this century have rarely been perpetrated by barbarians. Much like the Nazis, the radical Hutus were not spontaneous primitives, but rather clear-thinking, determined criminals. To call them barbarians is, to an extent, to dehumanise them, almost to absolve them from responsibility (Destexhe 1994: 12, Des Forges, 1999). According to Lemarchand, there is nothing in the historical record to suggest "a kind of tribal meltdown rooted in deep seated antagonisms" or long standing atavistic hatreds. Nor is there any evidence to support a spontaneous action from below thesis" (Lemarchand in Totten, 2008:405). In this chapter, we will, therefore look at the different layers of Rwandan genocide: the specific context, the execution and the ideology, through the prism of modernity in order to assess whether this really is a modern venture, or, indeed a spontaneous outburst of tribal hatreds, as it has so often been characterized.

Again, the Hutu genocide will be analysed in relation to the same concepts that were identified in the literature as links between modernity and genocide, such as: the destabilizing influences of modernity, in relation to genocidal ideology: organic nationalism, social Darwinism, scientific racism and eugenics, in relation to genocidal mentality: the authority of technology, utopianism, gardening state mentality, instrumental rationality, obedience, bureaucratic mentality and free floating responsibility, in relation to genocidal state: totalitarianism, expansionism, majoritarian democracy, efficiency, numbing, total war and Gesellschaft / Gemeinschaft society ties. The chapter will be organised in much the same way as the other two in three main parts. The first part will aim to provide an eclectic historical overview of the path towards modernity and a nation state in Rwanda. Unlike the other two contexts, Rwanda did not attempt unification with the surrounding states, like Burundi, as the colonial differences proved too difficult to overcome. The second will describe the various causes of genocide and the process of radicalization, describing the execution itself along with the rationality behind the genocidal plan and the motives of the perpetrators, all with aim of establishing the presence of modernity in the context. Finally, the last part will tackle ideology of genocide, Hutu power

nationalism and scientific racism, the characteristics of the utopian dream and the nature of the way otherness is constructed in this ideology, culminating in a pervasive account of the modernity in relation to both the context and the crime itself.

6.1. The path towards independence

6.1.2. Structure of pre-colonial Rwanda

One of the reasons why it took such a long time for colonialism to be properly condemned is due to the intense propaganda and scientific racism presenting black Africans as primitive, tribal peoples, so backward in relation to superior Europeans, that colonizing them, in fact, meant civilizing them into "proper beings". This scenario rarely had anything to do with the reality of things, but in Rwanda, this was even more so. When white settlers came, Rwanda was a meticulously organized state, a monarchy with a division of labour along functional lines and a corresponding role differentiation, which is why we speak of an already bureaucratized rule (Lemarchand, 1970:119). According to Lucy Mair, the chiefs were bureaucrats since they did not claim their position by right or inheritance, or by virtue of any prior connection with the area to which they were appointed, but solely from the Mwami's will (Lemarchand, 1970, 27, Mamdani, 2001:15). Indeed the power was distributed through a threefold hierarchy running from province to district to hill. In fact, the king ruled the country through a network of chiefs of which there were three different types: the chief of landholdings, in charge of the land division, taxes and agricultural production, chief of men (responsible for recruiting fighters) and chief of the pastures (responsible for grazing lands), all of whom would be appointed by a superior chief. According to Prunier, this type of fragmentation of power was atypical, even for 18th century feudal societies in Europe. As the country was divided into regions, where each chief would compete for dominance against rival chiefs, the system was described by a German resident as a system of intertwined fingers, alluding to the network of interlocking roles (Lemarchand, 1970:36).

Also, the ubwiru – ritual code of the monarchy, which extended far beyond the sphere of ritualized knowledge, was interpreted by the authoritative institution of "biru", who were also qualified to interpret the wishes of the diseased king, thereby acting very much like a constitutional court (Lemarchand, 1970:32). As Maquet observes: "That traditional body was not unlike a constitution in a modern state and the biru institution can be said to have had a role similar to that of a supreme court, judging whether a new rule is compatible with the fundamental charter of the country" (Maquet, 1961). Indeed, when the first explorers arrived, they were, in fact, stunned by the degree of social

control and efficiency exercised by the state, which was a product of the very high population density together with the richness of the land and the productivity of its people (Prunier, 1995:3).

At the time of the white man's arrival, around 1890, Rwanda was a kingdom expanding for already about two hundred years, since the Banyinginya dynasty (Mamdani, 2001:18). The transition from statelessness to kingship was achieved through amalgamation of a few autonomous chieftaincies into a small nuclear kingdom, under the leadership of the king (Mwami) (Lemarchand, 1970: 19). The formative period of the state, or in other words the period of its distinctive development is associated with a series of wars that, beginning with the rule of Rujugira (1756), which spanned several reigns, mainly aimed at incorporating smaller surrounding states (Mamdani, 2001:12). Lemarchand refers to this as Rwanda's quest for Lebensraum, referring to the need to secure the living space in an extremely overpopulated region (Lemarchand, 1970:21). Three distinct groups lived in the kingdom: Tutsi, the pastoralists who represented the ruling elite, Hutu, agriculturalists who worked the fields of their Tutsi patrons and Twa, the smallest of the groups which occupied the lowest place on the societal ladder. Although the White settlers saw these groups as tribes, and a lot of important scholarly literature did the same (Lemarchand, 1970), key contemporary studies have largely abandoned this. Indeed, the very concept of tribe is heavily loaded and in itself implies Western superiority over the African primitiveness, thereby making it unsuitable for use in science (Makunike, 2008). According to Lowe, the term tribe "has no consistent meaning. It carries misleading historical and cultural assumptions; it blocks accurate views of African realities. At best, any interpretation of African events that relies on the idea of tribe contributes no understanding of specific issues in specific countries. At worst, it perpetuates the idea that African identities and conflicts are in some way more "primitive" than those in other parts of the world. Such misunderstanding may lead to disastrously inappropriate policies" (Lowe, 1997).

The social structure of the Rwandan kingdom was both rigid and flexible. The religious myths showed the Tutsi as God's favourites and Hutu as born to serve, thereby fixing the differences between groups. However, there was a number of ways in which the Hutus were allowed to become integrated into the ruling elite. In fact, as the Tutsi group was defined primarily through cattle ownership, a member of the Hutu group, could, through acquiring cattle, become adopted into the ruling elite, just as an impoverished Tutsi would become seen as fallen i.e. Hutuized. Although a minority among the chiefs in general, the position of the chief of land in control of the farmers generally belonged to a Hutu, as they were the ones who worked the land (Mamdani, 2001:28). Additionally, the structure of the Mwami's court was created in such a way that the power of the King was restricted by Abiiru ritualists, who were thought (like Hutus in general) to have supernatural

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power, but in fact served as a kind of advisers to the king. Through the Abiiru structure, which was mainly possessed by Hutu, the generally subordinate group was given access to real power (Mamdani, 2001:13). Indeed, the flexibility of the structure implies, as discussed by both Prunier and des Forges, that we are here not talking about tribes, ethnic groups or races, as the Europeans would later insist, but classes, in the sociological sense of the word (Prunier, 1995:14, Des Forges, 1999, De Lacger, 1939:59-60).

According to most researchers, the state structure in Rwanda can only be described as feudal, in which everyone was both a client and a patron to somebody – hence the idea of the intertwined fingers (Mamdani, 2001:13). The so called cattle contract, that the feudal system relied on, involved a periodic gift of cattle from client lineages to patron, who in turn would provide regular protection not only for the client himself, but his entire family. In fact, when we talk about Rwandan clans, these do not, imply a family relationship or a common ancestor, but mixed Tutsi and Hutu groups revolving around a Tutsi patron and his clients, who became a unified structure and would often move together. Therefore, they were groups held together by means of production rather than family ties, indicating a non traditional, Gesellschaft society structure (Mamdani, 2001:8). According to D'Hertefelt (1971) and Mamdani, Hutu and Tutsi can only be seen as changing political identities, reproduced primarily through the state (Mamdani, 2001:10). "The Rwandan state was a powerful political engine that restructured social relations wherever its tentacles took hold. The tendency was for social relations to follow, rather than to precede or accompany the spread of political authority" (Mamdani, 2001:9).

In fact, Hutu identity in particular emerged as a transethnic identity which unified all subjects of the state of Rwanda, as it was associated with subjugation. Indeed, some groups only came to be seen as Hutu in the last quarter of the 19th century, like Kinyaga in southwestern Rwanda, while others, like Bakiga (the mountain people) had completely different identities before they became incorporated in the Rwandan kingdom (Mamdani, 2001:16-18). In the same way, people in the occupied areas who were sympathetic to the political aims of the Rwandan kingdom, would automatically be regarded as Tutsi, again indicating politically produced and not primordial identities. Indeed, as relationships within society were not primarily based on descent, along with the phenomenon of early state bureaucratization and fragmentation of power, this can be argued to represent first elements of modernity, as existing already in pre-colonial Rwanda (Prunier, 1995).

Also, Rwanda started to centralize before the Europeans came, and was already heavily centralized by the 19th century. Newbury links the expansion in the size of the clans to the process of state formation. Gradually, along with the centralization and an increase in state capacity which was a result of both horizontal and vertical growth, a polarization took place as Hutu became degraded to the level of the serfs (Mamdani, 2001:14). To begin with, the power of the King became more and more centralized. During the era of Misingi, the Abiiru ritualists were marginalized in an attempt to remove restrictions from the power of the King. Also a shift was made from the feudal system of umuheto to ubuhake, polarizing the groups and concentrating even more power in the hands of the king, along with a marked decline in the status of the Hutu population as seen already in the first half of 19th century, before the Europeans arrived. Indeed the rising inequality could be said to be a consequence of expansion and centralization, thus modernization of the state (Mamdani 2001:18). According to Prunier, the modern society in Rwanda begins to emerge from about 1860, some 30 years before the arrival of the Europeans (Prunier, 1995: 21). However, in spite of the marked decline in the status of the Hutu population, the structure is, at this time, still flexible enough so that people are able to transcend their class and become accepted into the wealthy category. As Prunier explains: "The main conflict at this time is not a conflict between the classes, but rather a tension between the centre and periphery (Prunier, 1995:22).

6.1.3. The age of colonization

Although becoming increasingly more authoritarian and centralized, the kingdom of Rwanda still had many aspects in which differences became erased and vulnerable people offered protection. First, there was the strong military, developed during the reign of Rujugira (1756-1765), which typically included all people regardless of class and represented the backbone of the state whose history was one of expansionist wars of annexation. Indeed, the military became a cohesive force for the Rwandan people, while the rule of monarchy was less absolute in practice than in theory. In fact, the King's power didn't extend equally and was much stronger in the centre, but weaker in the north and the newly occupied territories, with local particularities in different regions. Also, the existence of parallel hierarchies meant that a peasant could easily find a protector. If he had problems with one of the chiefs, he could simply seek protection from another.

When the Germans arrived, in 1890, they were very few. The whole territory of Rwanda was administered by around 90 people. There was no power strong enough to simply subjugate the

kingdom but there were mutual interests on both sides, so a kind of symbiosis developed in those early years of colonization. As the Rwandan Mwamiship was in a state of crisis at the time of the arrival of the Germans, with internal struggles for power, Germans helped facilitate the power of the fraction which was sympathetic to German rule, installing the Mwami Masinga to power, in spite of the decades of organized anti-colonial resistance movement Nyabingi, led mostly by impoverished Tutsis (Lemarchand, 1970: 70, Mamdani, 2001:17, Prunier, 1995:25). The new Mwami recognized that with the help of the newcomers he could easily subjugate the remaining independent Hutu principalities in the North. This made the kings power greater and the country far more centralized than before, with authoritarian forms of control. This evolution accompanied and often supported by European colonizers, can be seen as a departure from the situation in early 19th century. Central political control became more homogeneous, local particularism vanished; state structure became fine-grained and encompassing picture of what resembled a modern state (Prunier, 1995:20).

In general, two main things are important to say about the period of the German rule. The first is the matter of indirect rule, not unlike the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, which meant leaving the day-to-day government and administration of colonies both small and large in the hands of traditional rulers, who gained prestige and the stability and protection, which would prove to be one of the most devastating consequences of the colonial rule that had a disastrous impact on Rwandan identities, deepening the social cleavage between groups. Germans found that it was, due to their lack of manpower, far easier to rule through the already existing elite than to attempt a direct declaration of power. In Tutsi aristocracy, Germans recognized their own Junker elite, projecting experiences from their own, recently united country onto an African context they didn't quite understand (Lemarchand, 1970:49). Also, another European obsession was imposed onto the identities of the natives when racial categories were introduced. Europeans were, indeed, very impressed with the complex and efficient kingdom they found in Africa and refused to believe that civilization could have sprung from a context so unlike Europe. Therefore, they invented various historical and scientific theories proving that what they saw as a tall, refined, polite and detached Tutsi aristocrat, was in fact a descendant of ancient Europeans who brought civilization to the African continent, but changed skin colour due to the mixing with natives. This "missing link" between the white and the black race was in fact a matter of much debate, as it was concluded that civilization was a product of only one race – the white race, defining Tutsi as the black Aryans. This theory was then used to justify and fix the "lazy, childlike" Bantu in the role of the serf and "rational", "refined" Tutsi in the role of the natural leader (Des Forges, 1999:36, Destexhe, 1995:38, Robbins in Allyn and Bacon, 1999:270).

"So it was the German and later Belgian colonizers developed a system of categories for different 'tribes' that was largely a function of aesthetic impressions. Individuals were categorized as Hutu or Tutsi according to their degree of beauty, pride, intelligence and political organization. The colonizers established distinction between those who did not correspond to the stereotype of a Negro (the Tutsi) and those who did (Hutu)" (Destexhe, 1995:38). In fact, through creating racial justifications for the inequality between classes, the colonisers were able to transform them into ethnic groups, as their position of authority meant that they were able to create knowledge and influence the native groups to such an extent until they, themselves came to believe in the racial categorisations. Indeed, as Weber asserts, ethnic groups are nothing more than a social construct in the first place, as the criteria for the definition of belonging is, in fact, a common belief in the existence of the group (Weber in Banton, 2007).

On the other hand, Germans didn't desire to make many changes in the structure of the state itself, as they had neither the motive nor the means or manpower to do so, so one can argue that this early colonization period didn't see much concrete change. Attempts to convert the population to Christianity were also largely abandoned due to internal disagreements between German residents and local Catholic French missionaries, who were deeply distrustful of the residents' motives, along with the fact that it was mostly Hutu who were interested in Christianity due to its potential to elevate their status. However, in spite of this many things changed. First, the monetary system was introduced, positioning the country within the capitalist space. Both that and the new system of head taxation by the Europeans, contributed to the fact that the Hutu population became less entangled in the co-dependency relationship with their patrons, and more oriented towards money as a replacement for cattle, marking the beginning of the end of the feudal system (Mamdani, 2001:35).

After German defeat in WW1, Belgium took over colonial control of Rwanda, intensifying the split between Hutu and Tutsi further by institutionalizing racist doctrines and installing a harsh regime, resulting in huge flow of people into British colonies. Between 1926 and 1931 Belgians introduced the notorious "Les reformes Voisin", a series of reforms in which, out of fear of the spread of hated European communism and taught by their bad experiences in Congo, where they replaced local chiefs with their own, resulting in disastrous consequences for both Africans and Europeans, the power of the Tutsi group got promoted on all fronts: by facilitating territorial expansion of their political hegemony, by a rigorous control of educational opportunities and by the introduction of judicial machinery designed to perpetuate the subjection of the Hutu class (Lemarchand, 1970: 65, 73). One of the major changes within the new system was the amalgamation of the functions of chief of landholdings, chief of men and chief of the grazing lands into one function, which, not only resulted

in a final replacement of the remaining Hutu chiefs with Tutsi, but also made the peasants much more vulnerable to abuse, as a huge part of bureaucracy was now missing (Prunier, 1995:27). In particular, the removal of army chiefs, whose function included the tasks similar to those of the public defender, led to pure chaos (Lemarchand, 1970:72). As a result of "Les reformes Voisin", the gap between the groups widened drastically and the roles became simplified and exaggerated, as the former feudal system of intertwined fingers where almost everyone was both a client and patron of somebody became extinguished. Furthermore, a new capitalist system turned Ibikingi into privately owned land, where old client-patron relations, which sometimes even took the form of charity if the economic situation was bad, were completely lost, and a harsh new modern reality was imposed, where all the land was subsequently given to Tutsis, even in the Northern areas of former independent Hutu kingdoms, where it always belonged exclusively to Hutus. Finally a new and previously unheard of system of forced labour was imposed, taking up almost 60 per cent of workers time. Whereas the traditional feudal system allowed only one man to represent the family in the client patron obligation system, according to the new rules, slave labour was to be the obligation of all people (Harvard National Model UN, 2010:7).

The new government was increasingly authoritarian and the Belgians removed a stubborn and difficult Mwami Musinga from power, who attempted to organize protests against the new colonizers, only to replace him with his less authoritative pro-European son, who converted to Christianity. Contrary to the policy of German colonizers, Belgians were much more interested and successful in spreading Christianity, and had no problems finding a common language with Catholic missionaries already inhabiting the area, as their Tutsi protégés became increasingly aware that if they wanted to hold on to their elite status and remain close to the centre of power they would have to convert. Christianity, thus, becomes an important and powerful tool in the construction of new Rwanda, whose inhabitants are now ruled with strict moralistic streak and emphasis on hard work and discipline, as a result becoming, "if not truly virtuous, than at least conventionally hypocritical", as the European norms become a part of the African context, and Rwanda became rwandafied on white man's terms (Prunier, 1995:31-33).

Probably the most damaging measure the Belgian colonizers have undertaken, and with the most far reaching consequences is the introduction of identity cards, the same ones, which will later be used in the 1994 genocide to distinguish between victims and killers. A category of ethnicity which was displayed on these cards defined a person as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, thereby finalizing transformation of class into ethnicity and making groups far more rigid than they had ever been before the arrival of colonizers. According to some studies, the criteria for categorizing a person as belonging to one of the

groups were quite arbitrary, as, basically anyone who owned more than 10 cattle was considered Tutsi (Osborn, 2010:7). Additionally, the stereotypes were reproduced through the educational system which was mostly open to Tutsis, as the Tutsi bonded around their superiority and Hutu, becoming increasingly introduced to the emancipatory aspects of Christianity in seminars, which were the only places that offered education to Hutu, experienced solidarity of the oppressed (Robbins in Allyn and Bacon, 1999:270, Lemarchand, 1970:74, Mamdani, 2001:36) It is, however, a prejudice that all Tutsis were privileged during the Belgian era. In fact, as is often the case with drastically authoritarian regimes, only small elite was truly privileged, while most other people were in fact subjugated. This is why, there was also a lot of competition within the Tutsi group, as the so called petite Tutsi were often just as poor as the Hutu (Osborn, 2010:7).

Prunier talks about a new atmosphere of individualization and privatization, as a consequence of the penetration of western capitalism into the collective folds of a traditional society (Prunier, 1995:28). In fact: "The Belgian reforms of 1926-31 had created 'modern' Rwanda: centralized, efficient, neo-traditionalist and Catholic, but also brutal" (Prunier, 1995:35). Christianity reinforced hegemony through the so called Hamitic myth, which identified the Tutsi group with the progeny of Noah's son Ham, and it was on the basis of this ideology that the society was modernised, simplified and ossified (Prunier, 1995:36). An increase in taxes and brutal beating of forced labourers contributed to building a society based on discipline and fear. In comparison with Germans, Belgian methods were far more radical, a consequence of the second partition of Africa based on capitalist interests, as they intended to make a serious profit from the colony.

6.2. Revolution and independence

After WWII, new tendencies started to emerge on the international level. The world was shocked by the extent of the horrors suffered by all and new ideologies of peace and tolerance and a democratisation of institutions including the Churches, emerged as a result (Mamdani, 2001:36). Africa witnessed a strong evolution of the pan-African movement, which preached independence and unity of African states, as a wave of revolutions shook the continent (Destexhe, 1995:43). In regards to Rwanda, the mandated territories became a trusteeship under the UN, which in practice meant a significant change in Belgian policies, a deliberate modernization and a final ending of the feudal system, which, previously, was not one of the colonizer's goals and, ultimately, a movement towards independence of the Rwandan state. The Belgians were not too happy about this turn of events and

proceeded with reforms half-heartedly, as Rwanda was a profit making colony, but the Trusteeship's council's visiting missions, including constant criticism of Belgium in the UN and other pressures, which will be discussed later in this chapter, played a part in pressuring the Belgian authorities towards finding faster solutions, as well as hastening the political awakening of indigenous populations. However, the UN's insistence on economic progress, moral uplift of indigenous populations and democratization of political institutions was largely ignored by the Belgian authorities, until they were confronted with irresistible popular pressure for change (Lemarchand, 1970, 79).

Between 1951 and 1959, first, seemingly democratic reforms were undertaken, resulting in the introduction of advisory councils at each level of the administrative hierarchy and the introduction of political parties in 1957. However, people elected into these councils were chosen from a fairly small group, mostly consisting of already influential chiefs, as the reforms were not really intended to change much in the society, but more to create an illusion of progress. On the state level, in Rwanda's Conseil Supérieur du Pays, Tutsis still controlled around 90 per cent of the seats. The introduction of universal suffrage in 1956 didn't change the situation dramatically as the number of educated Hutus was still relatively small (Lemarchand, 1970: 83).

However, the changes Rwanda went through during this time are not all from top down. In the minds of the Hutu, the new institutions were understood in the perspective of a democratic system of representation, and the type of democracy they envisioned, was majoritarian. In the face of possible change, a wave of popular anger spread through the country from three sources. Firstly, as Mamdani emphasizes, there were peasants: a core constituency of the Hutu revolution, abused clients, fed up with the injustice of the Belgian feudal system and their Tutsi lords, who were responsible for the extremely rural underpinnings of the revolution seen as rural radicalism (Lemarchand, 1970:93). Secondly, there was the first group of educated Hutus. The Catholic Church played a decisive role for this group, as the seminars were the only places a Hutu could get an education. After finishing their schooling, these well-read young men were completely rejected by the Tutsi dominated structure and unable to get a job, making them frustrated (Mamdani, 2001:36, Destexhe, 1995: 42). This group of Hutu intellectuals stood behind the Hutu Manifesto, the first written public protest of the Hutu, which characterized Rwandan problems as racial rather than class, thereby adopting colonial terminology (Prunier, 1995:46). This important document, which set the tone for the Hutu nationalist movement, called for a double liberation of the Hutu people, first from the race of white colonials, and second from the race of Hamitic oppressors, the Tutsi. Thirdly, there were the Northern Hutu. This group consisted of descendants from old Hutu kingdoms, that were the last to become incorporated in the

kingdom of Rwanda and whose land was stolen during the Belgian reforms. Contrary to central and southern Hutu, who were an integrated part of the kingdom for much longer, and whose motives were more democratic in nature, as they had memories of peaceful inter-group coexistence, the northern Hutu wanted a revival of their pre-colonial kingdoms and privileges, adding the motive of imperial revisionism to the revolutionary ideology.

Lemarchand argues that the revolution in central Rwanda was a social revolution developed from social inequities, due to the already existent spread of universalistic egalitarian values; whereas the North was influenced by the ancient Nyabingi cult, which was once before crucial in the Rwandan resistance to the colonizers (Lemarchand, 1970:103). As a result, we can say that the Hutu revolution was uneven and motivated by different ideals, progressive and regressive at the same time. However, these different groups managed to unite around a common goal, which, at first was solely to expel the colonizers, but which quickly grew into a struggle against monarchy and the Tutsis, who, as a result of decades of concentrated Belgian propaganda were seen as invaders and colonizers who should be expelled along with the Bazungu (the white fathers). Finally, the failure of the Belgian government to initiate proper reforms, which resulted in the supposedly democratic institutions being converted into modern arenas for the expression of Tutsi supremacy, angered the Hutu population further. "It is against this background of disillusion and bitterness over the failure of constitutional reforms to meet expected changes, that one must seek the origins of the Rwandan revolution" (Lemarchand, 1970:83).

Other accelerators were also present. The Hutu group was well aware that if they didn't act fast and do something before independence came, the power would remain in the hands of the Tutsi, and the possibility for change would be lost. Their main ally in their revolutionary aim was the Catholic Church. The new category of missionaries who came from Belgium were of relatively humble origins and had personal experience of social and political repression in the French speaking province of Wallonia, in contrast to early church leaders, who were upper class Flemish conservative men, which meant that the new le petit clerge greatly sympathized with Hutu plight for justice (Destexhe, 1995:42, Prunier, 1995: 50, Lemarchand, 1970:107, Mamdani, 2001:36). This group of left wing Christians with a democratic commitment provided the space and the means for the Hutu to express their grievances not only in a local, but also in an international context, which made the emerging Hutu counter elite acquainted with the world and well connected. Belgian left wing media and pro Catholic cultural organizations in Belgium provided assistance for the Hutu cause. The church also helped with the appeal letters to UN and sponsored Kimanyateka, the only significant newspaper in vernacular that gave coverage to Hutu grievances (Mamdani, 2001:36, Lemarchand, 1970:107).

In relation to modernity, we clearly see how the new tendencies influence this society in different ways, both providing pressure that results in violence, but also introducing progressive and egalitarian values and changes. As a consequence of modernity, the Belgian version of indirect rule imposed upon the chiefs new standards of performance, seen through the norms of efficiency, rationality and capitalist greed. Along with the Christian ethics of discipline and hard work, Rwanda became a society of control and stress, bureaucratic standards and more rigorous and harassing surveillance, where negligence and laziness were punished with fines taken out of one's salary (Lemarchand, 1970:121). According to Lemarchand, as a result: "The civilizing presence of the Belgian authorities made the rule of the chiefs a singularly uncivilized one" (Lemarchand, 1970:123) and bureaucratization of chieftaincy has contributed to the creation of revolt among the peasantry. On the other hand, this revolt was a part of a wider demand for full participation in the institutions which control the destinies of Africans, an idea of man as master of his own destiny that can be traced to Enlightenment (Lemarchand, 1970:126). Even though the clientage system worked against modernity, imposing obligations and squashing the need for individual rights, the monetary system, spread of Christian ethics and internalization of egalitarian values, meant that a reversal of traditional roles was achieved, while the social system became more fluid and stratified so that new social groups were allowed to emerge and status became dissociated from authority and associated with personal achievement (Lemarchand, 1970:127). As new professions emerged outside of the clientage system: clerks, catechists, carpenters, innkeepers, traders, the old system cracked. Gradual erosion of socio-political ties engendered by the spread of new metaphysical beliefs, new types of economic activity, new patterns of mobility created a significant progress in the kingdom of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1970: 132).

The question is, of course, how come the revolution in Rwanda didn't unite both groups in the struggle for freedom, but remained an ethno nationalist Hutu agenda. Generally speaking, decolonization in Africa unfolded along two different trajectories: one typical for settler colonies, in which decolonization meant that the natives could physically confront the colonizers and attempt to create a strong national identity, while in colonies without settlers, the colonial force had a larger margin of manoeuvre (Mamdani, 2001:32). However, as Mamdani correctly notices, Rwanda is specific in this respect because, even though it was not a settler colony, its path of decolonization was as such, since Hutu and Tutsi have under colonialism become identified with native majority and alien minority, placing the Tutsi in the position of settlers and colonizer, a substitute and a target for the revenge against the white man (Mamdani, 2001:33).

Therefore, the answer to this question should not be looked for in the pre-colonial inter group relationships, but stem solely from racial stereotypes and group solidarities forged in modern, colonial times. In fact, petite Tutsi had, just as many motives as the majority of the Hutu to hate their colonial masters, while certain younger Tutsi politicians propagated socialist ideals and equality. However, the colonial influence prevented the groups from finding any common ground. It was indeed the confusing colonial heritage and different colonial policies in different territories that didn't allow pan-Africanism to restructure the borders of African states. The idea of Rwanda and Burundi merging into one state was indeed very popular at the time and was given the approval of the UN. However, as the Belgian policies in both territories were different, resulting in ethnic strife in Rwanda and a more homogeneous society in Burundi, which didn't produce a bloody revolution on the path towards the nation state, the leaders of both countries agreed that the differences were too big for one nation to emerge (Lemarchand, 1970:87).

Between 1959 and 1962, a period of accelerated democratization takes place, which leads to the establishment of popularly elected organs of government both at the local and central levels (Prunier, 1995:50). The very strong divisions of the society, a colonial heritage, and unfavourable influences of the colonizers prevented nationalism from becoming a force of cohesion and remained on the level of ethno-nationalism. Since the publishing of the Hutu manifesto, the Belgians were confronted with a choice to either support what they thought was going to be a popular Hutu revolution, by switching alliances and thereby remaining influential in the region, or to remain loyal to the Tutsis, who were increasingly hostile, some of them demanding a return of power to the monarchy. Also, supporting the Tutsi, who were in increasing numbers influenced by socialist ideas of the West, like Tutsi political party UNAR (political parties were introduced in 1957), particularly young and well educated progressives, could mean a spread of communism in Africa and was therefore out of the question. The break between the Belgian authorities and their long coddled Tutsi elite had come about only because the colonial administration felt betrayed by their erstwhile protégés, whom they now considered a mixture of backward traditionalists and revolutionary communists (Prunier, 1995: 50). De facto, the Belgian authorities faced with a threat of popular vengeance of the Hutu distanced themselves from accountability by allying with the victims, thereby blaming the injustices of the system on their Tutsi representatives, whom they now refered to as: Feudal colonists. This strategy proved to be most effective, as Rwandan Tutsis, especially after continuous attacks of anti-monarchical Hutus, began to be seen as immigrants and 1959 revolutionaries called for the return to Ethiopia of Tutsi colonizers, making Hutu effectively the only real natives in Rwanda and thereby the only legitimate carriers of Rwandan nationalism (Destexhe, 1995: 43).

Hutu ethno-nationalism was, indeed, far more appealing to the Belgian government and it is for this reason indeed and the Belgian meddling in the Rwandan revolution, that political groups from both Hutu and Tutsi side were never really able to find the common ground even though they often had similar ideas [36] (Mamdani, 2001:33, Destexhe, 1995: 42, Lemarchand, 1970:160). In fact, the Rwandan revolution, which Lemarchand compares to French revolution as it had elements of camaraderie, egalitarianism, as well as the fact that it started off as a series of minor explosions and had a rural riot at its centre, could easily have become a total revolution which would remould the society in its entirety, but the Belgian interference made it more violent, brief and incomplete, as many society groups, like Hutus who remained loyal to their Tutsi masters, were still left outside of the revolutionary vigour (Lemarchand, 1970:168, 184). The Belgian administration helped Hutu score a maximum success and create an illegal seizure of power from above, when the Gitarama coup took place in January 28 1961, and Rwanda became a de-facto republic, before general elections ever took place. As a consequence, violence spread like wildfire, with Tutsi chiefs either killed or arrested and Tutsi refugees staging guerilla attacks along the border with Uganda (Prunier, 1995:51, Lemarchand, 1970:332).

With respect to the Rwandan revolution, the question theorists have disagreed on is to what extent it can be seen as a spontaneous uprising and to which it has been organized and manipulated by Belgian authorities. According to Lemarchand, Belgian influence was decisive in this respect and the revolution might not have even succeeded without Belgian help, while Mamdani sees the revolution as an implosion and decolonization as a direct outgrowth of an internal social movement that empowered the majority constructed as indigenous against the minority constructed as alien (Mamdani, 2001:32).

That fact is that both these theories are probably accurate to an extent and the revolution has elements of both determinism and spontaneity. Belgians have certainly done everything to promote the revolution, neutralize UN interference and radicalise the rebellion from bellow by preventing Tutsi countermeasures and gradually eliminating Tutsi from many powerful positions, which they began already in early 1960 (Prunier, 1995:50, Lemarchand, 1970: 110). According to Prunier, the very beginning of the Hutu revolution was administratively made unavoidable by the colonial system, as the government insisted on replacing a majority of Tutsi chiefs with often poorly educated Hutus (Prunier, 1995:52).

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[36] Even Parmehutu, the party that would later go on and commit genocide in the 90s, started off with a much softer rhetoric and a vision of democracy, while the Bahutu Manifesto also promoted egalitarian and democratic ideals.

On the other hand, the initiative for the revolution clearly came from the Hutu intellectuals, whose primary goal from the mid-fifties was to "transform the soul of a Hutu from that of a serf into a soul of a free man" and who successfully managed to create ties with rural Rwanda. In fact, as Mamdani points out, the main constituency of revolutionaries were peasants, meaning that the revolution mainly took place on "hill level" and was, indeed a spontaneous outburst of popular rage (Mamdani, 2001:35). It is difficult to say whether the grip of the authoritarian state preceded the popular demand for the republic, but it is most likely that a fusion of different tendencies resulted in the revolution, as both Hutus and pro-Hutu actors were obsessed with same ideas of modernity and majoritarian democracy, and the UN pushed for abolition of feudalism, while a general consensus about the need for the "rise of the oppressed" meant that revolution had a number of important sympathizers and supporters. The local communal elections in 1960 were a trigger for the drama that took place later on, although violence was already happening in many places. Parmehutu scored most and shared power with Aprosoma, their closest ally. The newly elected burgomasters were, thus, given virtually unlimited control over local affairs (Lemarchand, 1970:183).

However, the elections were to an extent manipulated and the revolution had not penetrated all the pores of the society. UN suggested a cooling off period before general elections, but Parmehutu pushed forward, not trusting anyone, not even the Belgians, who hesitated to hand over the power immediately. The fact that the Hutu were not yet united, in spite of the attempts to create cohesion on the grounds of opposition to Tutsi guerrilla raids, meant that the power had to be seized quickly, resulting in a coup of Gitarama, which, started from a Hutu revolt against a false news that a UNAR (Tutsi) militant had killed a Parmehutu leader and, with Belgian assistance, evolved into a coup, followed by a proclamation of republic and the installation of a new provisional Hutu government and an assembly (Mamdani, 2001:41). Effectively, instead of a complete abandonment of the feudal system, the coup meant a mere replacement of one racial dictatorship with another as the newly elected Hutu burgomasters (equivalent of former chiefs) often began to exploit the population in much the same way as Tutsi patrons used to, creating their own Hutu tutelage (Prunier, 1995:52, Lemarchand, 1970:189, 194). All of this contributed to a further deterioration of the Hutu Tutsi relationship and killings in spite of every modern means of control. Lemarchand here argues that to speak of electoral fraud would almost be a euphemism due to the massive violence committed by the burgomasters.

To summarize, a deep understanding of the Rwandan revolution is necessary for numerous reasons. One is that this is the period when Rwanda becomes a nation and the context in which this nationalism developed could very well have influenced the latter genocide. Secondly the idea of this revolution was evoked very vividly by the initiators of the 1994 genocide, who saw the genocide as a completion of what the revolutionaries had started. Indeed, this is the first time in history that Rwanda sees ethnic strife and mass murders and is therefore of crucial importance to analyse the causes of this violence. Lastly, it is this period of a rapid transfer from traditionalism to modernity that influences the way a society develops later on, particularly if the type of change is, as we have seen in Rwanda uneven and differs in different parts of the country.

In relation to the emergence of violence, there are two factors necessary to mention. One is colonialism, as from this point it is impossible to talk about Rwandan history without taking into account the disastrous influence of the Belgian colonizers, in particular. A comparison of the overview of the pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda clearly shows that the deeply inflexible and rigid social categories, without possibility of permeation from one group to the other are typical for the colonial era. From the perspective of modernity, it needs to be emphasized that it was the modern racial categories and scientific racism in particular, which we will have a closer look at in later parts of this chapter, that turned class into race thereby fixing the categories and polarizing the society. Secondly, it is the radical change from traditionalism to modernity, including the terrible living conditions of the serfs, imposed by the colonial power that contributed to a huge need for immediate change. As Lemarchand points out: In Rwanda, the forcible reversal of traditional role relationships set the stage for violent ethnic strife because of abandonment of indirect rule (Lemarchand, 1970:89). The tension between traditional monarchical structures and forces of change and modernization created pressure. In fact the Belgian support for the revolution, not only took away from its legitimacy but created more confusion by expediting things to such a degree that social anxiety was greatly increased creating a basis for violence. We can never know what would have happened had the Belgians not interfered in the revolution, but we should not exclude the possibility that a lesser pressure would have allowed more space and time for the different political fractions to find a common ground and for a revolution to be a more cohesive force. On top of this, already difficult situation, we have an international pressure to democratize, to destroy all leftovers from the old system, which, finally, only adds to the already existing social hysteria.

In relation to modernity in particular, as Arendt states, revolution, as associated with modernity is a significant, violent social change with inspiration from egalitarian democratic ideals and freedom as the ultimate goal, and just as the Jacobins represent this tendency in Europe, the Hutu demand for

majoritarian democracy is the embodiment of this idea in Africa (Mamdani, 2001). However, throughout our analysis of the Rwandan context we see modernity as a value being hijacked by the dominant social groups. From the time of the first European settlers it was the white man's unwillingness to accept the idea of civilization in Africa that presents a need for racial theories which show the progressive traits of Rwandan kingdom as brought by elegant Hamitic warriors from "native" Europe. In their revolutionary zeal, the Hutu majority has two ideals, based on the idea of progress from traditionalism to modernity. One is the abolition of the kingdom and introduction of a republic, while the other is the principle of egalitarianism within majoritarian democracy, both modern Western ideas. Unfortunately, the heritage of the colonizers was too strong and the native population is unable to evolve beyond the colonial categories, which is why nationalism remains on the level of ethno-nationalism. The popular nationalism of the Hutu is, necessarily based on subaltern agitation and creates cohesion around the idea of subjecthood (Prunier, 1995:38).

As we see here, modernity can, paradoxically, in relation to Rwanda be seen both as a problem and a solution to the problem. On the one hand it brings authoritarianism, centralizes the government and creates racial categories that polarize the society into a small group of rich elite and the rest of the population living in poverty. On the other hand, it spreads the ideals of democracy, liberation and egalitarianism. The victory of the Hutu, can, therefore, in spite of the violence, be seen as a victory of modernity. Not only because modernity prepared them for the revolution, first with the introduction of western education and Christian socialism, along with the liberating effects of the money economy and individuality that came with it, but also because the victory of the majority and the victory of the Republic, meant a final abolition of traditional monarchical structures.

6.3. Post-revolutionary crisis

The new republic of Rwanda was plagued by problems from the very beginning. The main issue, a leftover from the revolution which would play a huge role in the later genocide, was the Tutsi refugees, who had organised and started to attack Rwandan borders. In December 1963, an invasion was staged from Burundi into Bugesera and the president Kayibanda, the leader of the Hutu emancipation movement and the founder of Parmehutu (Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu) decided to take on a wave of repression, where 10.000 Tutsis were slaughtered and all the surviving Tutsi politicians were killed and their parties banned (Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 63, Prunier, 1995:57).

In spite of the fact that Hutu constituencies were fragmented even before the revolution, and were only finally united through the help of the Belgians, who represented Tutsi political parties as if they solely wanted hegemony, whereas some of the parties actually hoped to transcend ethnic cleavages, the Tutsi attacks created a permanently stronger cohesion of the Hutu population, and thereby also the power of the president Kayibanda (Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 61). Even though Rwanda was now supposedly a republic, Kayibanda soon became known as the Mwami of the Hutu, adopting a remote, secretive and authoritarian style of governance, which fused old monarchic patterns (narrow circle of leadership recruitment, regionalism, lineage competition, favouritism, corruption) with those derived from a democratic revolution: social equality, justice, progress, and moralism (Prunier, 1995:58). In fact, according to Lemarchand, who quotes De Tocqueville, revolutions, even the French revolution, often only change the person in power but adopt much from the old system in the form of customs, conventions and modes of thought (Lemarchand, 1970:264). The organisation of prefectures approximates that of the old provinces, the prefects, much like the army chiefs were appointed by central government and their powers are in theory circumscribed by those of the burgomasters whose position in the system might be compared to that of the district chiefs. Overall, Kayibanda builds a centralized regime of oppression with the army still in the central role (Lemarchand, 1970:273,274, Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:63).

An inclusive, anticolonial nationalism was in Rwanda out of the question, as Belgian involvement in the revolution has made them seem like liberators, rather than oppressors and therefore the colonially imposed ethnic categories remained in place. Religion played a huge part in everyday life and Kayibanda's Rwanda became a poor, but highly moral state, in which work was the highest value and was used as a replacement of politics, while asceticism, morals and social regeneration of the people were the main goal (Lemarchand, 1970:270). Authoritarianism, derived from the former system created a society of unquestioning obedience, which, coupled with modern values of the free market, such as efficiency, created the republic of Rwanda. On the one hand, as Prunier suggests, the regime was based on a model of a citizen leading a Spartan lifestyle, moral, modest and simplistic, stoically bearing the burden of hard work without complaints and could be compared with regimes such as Vichy's France. On the other hand, the Republic became increasingly isolated, fearing the Congolese rebellions, refugee attacks and the Tutsi regime in Burundi, adding an element of paranoia to an already stressful climate. Ethnic nationalism served as a basis for a democratic ideal which advertised the rule of majority, incorporating the ideal of Tutsis as the outside invaders (Prunier, 1995:59). However, it is important to highlight that there is a direct link between the heritage of the colonizers,

particularly in relation to identity categories and the necessity for a militaristic rule and an organic nationalism. As national independence was not won naturally, but was achieved with the help of the Belgian patrons, the new republic would struggle to achieve stability.

The stifling atmosphere soon became too much to bear even for Hutu elites in the Rwandan republic, as the single party started devouring its own insiders and the northern Hutu became increasingly isolated, as inter-group regional animosities resurfaced (Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:64). The ethnic factor was not natural, and had to be reinforced by various means, in particular by reviving the outside threat. As the president's power started to slip in the early 70s, he used a turbulent political situation in Burundi, where Tutsis killed Hutus in order to stay in power, to establish vigilante committees to ensure that the ethnic quota was being enforced, but in reality to create a sense of fear and urgency. These strategies came unfortunately too late, as the dissatisfaction among the people, unrelated to ethnicity, was already overwhelming and a bloodless coup led by General Juvenal Habyarimana and his abakonde supporters was staged in 1973 (Prunier, 1995:60).

Contrary to what might have been expected, given that Habyarimana's regime resulted in the 1994 genocide, the dictatorship, at least in the beginning could perhaps better be described as a benevolent one. The safety of Tutsi was guaranteed and in spite of the fact that the ethnic quota policy was loosely enforced and there were no Tutsi officers or burgomasters, in some areas like universities, church and private businesses, they thrived. Some Tutsi businessmen were even able to become very rich and were on very good terms with the regime. Indeed, the economy was not ethnically divided and ethnic inequalities did not trump class (Mann, 2005:434, Prunier, 1995:75). Habyarimana brought peace and stability to the country, but at a price of a tight dictatorship where all political parties were banned apart from Habyarimana's MRND which was formed in 1974 and became the all-powerful, all present all-consuming instrument of power, making Rwanda a true surveillance society in accordance with the theories of Hannah Arendt. People spied on each other willingly as Rwanda became the opposite of the perceived image of tropical confusion, a perfectly organized society where everyone's place of residence was written on their ID cards and people needed to present a justified cause and get an approval from the authorities in order to be allowed to move address. According to Prunier, administrative control was in Rwanda perhaps the tightest in the world among the non-communist countries. Habyarimana's Entwicklungsdiktatur (developmental dictatorship), propagated a virtuous and hard working world and a poor clean and serious Rwanda, where community work (Umuganda) was highly prioritized and sometimes even forced (Des Forges, 1999:95, Prunier, 1995:77).

However, Rwanda's economy actually greatly improved between 1963 and 1983 with a GNP like that of China and it became a definitive leader of the region. The country modernised further as agriculture, which accounted for 80 per cent of the GNP, fell to 48 with services rising from 12 to 31 per cent, mortality down, education improving along with hygiene and medical care and the number of children in schools up to 61 %. Habyarimana constructed an impressive infrastructure of roads and phone and electrical services. Rwanda managed to open itself up to the Francophone sphere by becoming the key member of the economic community of the great lakes and to the Anglophone sphere by entering the Kagera river basin organisation, which secured hydroelectric development and new transport links (Des Forges, 1999:46, Prunier, 1995:79). However, the reliance on the foreign aid also increased between 70s and 80s from 5% in 1973 to 22 % GNP in 1991, which was made possible as the country became a model developing society, clean and orderly.

The racial categories, the heritage of colonialism, however, remained intact. But, in a modern society, the racist theories that presented the Tutsi as foreign invaders and Hutu as indigenous population meant on the one hand a de-facto majoritarian democracy, but on the other presented a crisis of citizenship, as Tutsi refugees were denied the right to return home, making Hutu the only legitimate inhabitants of the country (Mann, 2004: 434, Prunier, 1995:80).

By the mid-eighties, Rwanda was plunged deeply into crisis. On the one hand coffee and tin (two main exports) prices fell drastically in 1984 and on the other hand it was increasingly difficult to feed the overly populated country where a few rich people owned almost half of the land (Mann, 2004:440, Des Forges, 1999:50). In spite of the deeply rooted ethnic prejudices that were inherited from the colonial rule, the country was living in relative peace as long as the financial situation was bearable. However, as soon as the country was no longer economically stable, political stability also came into question (Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:66).

6.4. Descent into genocide

In 1989, as the budget was reduced by forty per cent, enraging the peasants, the economic crisis became unbearable. The state radicalized accordingly. Being a self-made man Habyarimana lacked networks and contacts which would allow him to spy on the population. His wife Agathe Kazinga,

however, came from a well-known and respected dynasty of Hutu kings which ruled independent principalities well into the 20th century. As a consequence, Akazu, the little house, president's wife's circle of family and confidants, including her three brothers, cousins and the key figure of genocide – Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, grows in importance and in power, and she, herself, earns the nickname of Kanjogera after the ruthless mother of king Muysinga, indicating that she was seen as the real influence behind the throne, making the moderate president a prisoner of their interests in a radical competition for control of a radically shrinking economy (Prunier, 1995:85, 87).

The projects adopted by the World Bank proved to be an utter disaster and significantly worsened the situation, as the forests, a primary growth source for Rwanda, were cleared in order to raise exotic cattle while profits were shared by the regime and corrupt World Bank expatriates. In this neo-liberalist scheme, peasants no longer had free access to land. The International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Program froze government salaries and devalued the Rwandan Franc, proving a fatal influence on the economy, a deliberate post-colonial influence much like in so many other African countries. Further pressure to democratize and adopt a multi-party system was pursued by the international community and French president Mitterrand in particular. At the same time, seeing the crisis as an opportunity, the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched an attack on 1st of October 1990, which spurred the opposition significantly. Along with the fact that the political prisoners were released from prisons on the insistence of the Pope and the increasing international pressures to democratize, the atmosphere was about to reach its boiling point and the country descended into a de-facto civil war (Mann, 2004:439, Des Forges, 1999:46, Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:66).

The attack of the RPF, an organization created by Tutsi refugees in 1987 in Uganda, which consolidated and grew stronger as they came out of the Ugandan war as winners and supporters of president Museveni, contributed greatly to the crisis. Their attack on 1st of October 1990 was counteracted largely by France and Zaire who sent weapons and even aided the Hutu with military aid on the ground, infantry and air-force. It is debatable when the Akazu exactly agreed on the final solution. However, some facts might point towards this particular time as key in this decision making process. (Des Forges, 1999:122). Not only has the Rwandan government been under severe economic stress and international pressure to abruptly alter the style of governing, but the fact that the Tutsi refugees had become trained and organised in the neighbouring Uganda with the aim to return to an already extremely overpopulated Rwanda, meant that something drastic had to be done. Indeed, after the RPF attack was thrown off by the help of the French, the Rwandan government did everything in its power to gain civilian support needed for genocide. Only three days after the RPF attack, the

government staged a fake attack in Kigali with gun fire and explosions in order to gain popular support and to accomplish a much needed Hutu cohesion, as the first government killings in Tutsi populated areas were presented as a consequence of popular rage (Des Forges, 1999:50).

Additionally, a couple of months after the attack, the notorious Kangura started publishing and from the very beginning using the most radical anti-Tutsi propaganda, which has played a huge part in ensuring a massive participation in the1994 genocide. In one of the first numbers, Hutu Ten Commandments were published, a set of laws that forbid marriage, business relationship or even friendship with a Tutsi, equating the Tutsi refugees with the Tutsi still living in the country and evoking the spirit of the 1963 revolution. Furthermore, at this time, the Rwandan army starts to train and arm civilian militias known as Interhamwe, (Those who stand together) as calls for Tutsi to "return" to Ethiopia by intellectuals such as Dr Leon Mugesera, become a part of the everyday discourse (Berry and Berry, 1999:113-115, Des Forges, 1999:97).

The democratic pressures resulted in a number of changes in 1991, as the government accepted peace talks and seemingly softened its approach to the RPF, while the army prepared for war (Des Forges, 1999:97). At this time, the country is on the verge of bankruptcy and it is therefore necessary to ensure that cooperation with international actors seems genuine, so that the money from the donors would keep coming in. However, behind closed curtains, the military, unhappy with the proposed changes as they would mean the incorporation of the RPF into existing military structure and therefore a loss of jobs, mutinies and contributes to the further radicalization of the state (Des Forges, 1999:124, 134).

In June, a new constitution permitted the creation of political parties, but this process was just a way for Habyarimana to stay in power and at the same time to show the world the "progress" of Rwandan democracy. Seven smaller parties were actually created by Habyarimana himself, some so radical (CDR), so that Habyarimana's MRND would come to appear moderate (Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:67, 69). Additionally, government agents infiltrated opposition parties in an attempt to dilute their influence. The ground was thus prepared for the institutionalisation of extremism through the use of propaganda, politicisation of ethnicity and the militarization of politics. The new parties didn't just divide the country along ethnic lines, but, again, along the regional lines as well. The regime was placed under an extreme amount of pressure, and when in 1992 Habyariamana was forced to accept a coalition government, in which MRND and RPF

got five posts each, while the major opposition party MDR got four posts including the Office of the Prime Minister, Habyarimana sought to restructure the national administration, by putting extremists, who advocated genocide, in positions of authority.

For Habyarimana, this was a race against time and the only way a national homogenization of the fragmented Hutu population could have been accomplished was around a common, Tutsi, enemy. This is indeed the time (September 21st 1992) when a top secret military memorandum, describing, not only the RPF, but also the civilian Tutsi living in Rwanda as the enemy and all Hutu who associate with them as their accomplices, indicating that the genocide was soon to be set in motion, is sent by Colonel Déogratias Nsabimana, chief of staff to his commanders (Kotze and Swart in Mpofu, 2011:216, Mann, 2004: 444, Des Forges, 1999:97).

At the same time government officials started distributing weapons and grenades, as people were encouraged to arm themselves. By 1993, a number of genocidal measures were undertaken. The Tutsi arranged murder of the first Hutu president in Burundi, Nddadaye, was used to radicalise the situation further through the propaganda machinery of the RTLM radio. In fact, it is said that Hutu power coalition of extremist Hutu parties was built upon the corpse of Ndadaye (Des Forges, 1999:144). MRND had also managed to replace burgomasters in 1 out of 3 communes with loyalists. In addition, Interhamwe, the youth group was transformed into a real militia receiving military training and arms, and the young men were, along with the Impuzamugambi, of CDR, trained by the Presidential guard. Training camps were created for civilian recruits, as the RTLM became a major propaganda tool for the conversion of the civilians into the 4th column (Des Forges, 1999:180). The same year, the Rwandan census was followed by a slaughter of Tutsi in the northern area of the country, the long term Hutu stronghold; which would prove to be a dress rehearsal for the genocide of 1994 (Des Forges, 1999).

Habyarimana used different manipulations and strategies, including frequent murders of members of opposition parties in order to stay in power. In 1994, the genocidal plans are no longer attempted hidden and on March 28th 1994, the leading ideologist of Hutu power, Ferdinand Nahimana sends out his elite call for "final solution" in a letter, where he describes the threat of the Hima (Tutsi) Empire being established on Hutu land. Just a few days later, on April 4th, Colonel Bagosora, at the national day of Senegal, talks about the elimination of Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999:60).

The most important thing to say in this context is thus, that the Rwandan violence didn't just occur, but was, rather, developed, both in intensity and extent (Des Forges, 1999:95). In other words, the hatred for Tutsi, even though it has its roots in earlier periods, cannot be said to have caused the genocide. On the contrary, it is a unique combination of internal and external pressures that have culminated in a situation of such severity that the government felt forced to take extreme measures as to avoid implementing Arusha accords[37] and thereby prevent Tutsi access to political power and, through an idea of a common enemy and it's extermination, unify the Hutu masses and bring about national cohesion, as the perpetrators take share in the common guilt (Des Forges, 1999:50). Annihilation of the Tutsi seemed, therefore, a logical solution to an impossible situation, which is why the Rwandan genocide, like our other two cases, should not be seen through an intentionalist point of view, but rather in terms of cumulative radicalization. According to Mann, there are no documents proving genocidal intent before April 7th 1994 and genocide, is indeed, not solely a top down affair, but a result of different forces of radicalization: radical elites running the party-state, violent paramilitary bands and core constituencies providing popular support. Mann cites Romeo Dallaire to demonstrate that the initial plan in Rwanda was in fact a politicide, an extermination of the opposition, not genocide (Mann, 2007: 451, 473).

According to Zarembo: "Colonial regimes taught Africans bad lessons in government. First, people came to believe that political power is the only source of wealth. The state dictates who prospers. Second, political entrepreneurs learned that manipulating ethnic identity is an effective way to stay in control" (Zarembo in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:74).

Indeed, there are a number of elements which have had to come together in order to produce the Rwandan genocide. Despite the fact that the genocide itself certainly presents a rational, deliberate choice of modern elites to do whatever it takes in order to remain in power, this choice is, as we have seen, also a result of a series of radicalizations that took place from the mid-eighties. Even though occasional massacres were known to happen in Rwanda even before the genocide and especially in the early 60s when Kayibanda's rule was unable to deal with the revolutionary heritage, Habyarimana's rule was largely peaceful and if the economic crisis had never taken place, it is not unreasonable to assume that the genocide might not have happened either. Additionally we see that

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[37] Arusha accords were peace negotiations which took place in Tanzania in 1992 and 1993, were initiated by the US, France and the Organisation of African Unity and signed by the government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front and which established a broad-based Transitional Government (BBTG) in Rwanda, including the insurgent Rwandese Patriotic Front and the five political parties that had composed a temporary government since April 1992.

the ethnic categories, even though they are deeply rooted in the history of the country, still in many ways appear as unnatural to the population and had to be politically constructed and strengthened through intense propaganda in order to create the desired effect. Apart from the financial crisis, elements such as culture of obedience, society of surveillance and control, a dictatorship which idealizes the ruler as the father, military as an additional source of radicalization and constant attacks of the RPF with intentions to repopulate a country that is already heavily overpopulated, have resulted in tense and dangerous circumstances. International pressures on the country to democratise and therefore modernise further, have most certainly added oil to the fire, creating a counter effect.

6.5. Profiles of the perpetrators

The specificity of the Rwandan genocide is, indeed the unprecedented mass participation of ordinary citizens in the genocide. According to some estimates, 40-60 per cent of all Hutu farmers participated in the killings, along with 60-80 per cent of higher professionals and almost 100 per cent of civil servants. (Scherrer, 2002: 126) According to Des Forges, the speed and devastation of the killings were interpreted by some as an aberrant force of nature, a people gone mad or just another cycle of tribal violence. On the following pages we will show that the killings were far from spontaneous and we will demonstrate the diversity of the killers' motives (Des Forges (1999:1).

Scherrer explains the occurrence of such enormous participation of this "nation of murderers" via a number of motivations, but the idea that Rwandans are a murderous or simply backward people cannot be used as an explanation (Scherrer, 2002:115, Mann, 2005). In, fact, the reason for the necessity of such mass participation was the fact that the army was busy at the front, so even though army weapons were distributed by radical officers and army equipment was used, it was the paramilitary formations and the "civil defence" that were most often used for the killing (Mann, 2004:461).

To begin with, it is of significant importance to emphasise the fact that non-participation in the killings often meant certain death, which is why we can assume that if the participation was left to the individual alone, it probably wouldn't be so vast. There is certainly a difference here from the willing Nazi killers, who often, in spite of being allowed to refuse killing, still went ahead with it. When talking about Rwandans, we should, thus, not only be talking about ordinary conformists in line with

Milgram's arguments, nor willing executioners, in accordance with the theories of Daniel Goldhagen, but of actions often forced by the use of blackmail and threats. Seventy per cent of perpetrators said they were afraid to refuse the killings-for their life or career, but in spite of this many rebelled and in certain communes burgomasters started arresting assailants. In villages, people were assembled and given lists with the names of the targets. They were told they would be killed if they refused to participate (Mann, 2004: 468). In fact, as Scherrer points out: Under threat of the gravest consequences in case of disobedience, hundreds of thousands of simple, god-fearing farmers were turned into murderers during the one hundred day genocide" (Scherrer, 2002:115, Mann, 2004:460).

However, mass obedience must also be taken into consideration when analysing the motives of the perpetrators. Rwanda clearly has a history of obedience and nearly blind respect for authority, so traditional practices involving loyalty and dedication to the state promoted values such as hard work, which were used in order to secure mass participation. The phenomenon of "Umuganda", a relatively benign practice of unpaid community work, which was practised in Rwanda since the monarchy, was transformed into mechanisms for executing, as community work became a euphemism for killing. In this way, the state organised genocide was executed by the military with the help of ordinary killers (Des Forges, 1999). In fact, ordinary people were trained by the army and given weapons in order to create the so called civil defence. Additionally, the fact that the highly trusted and respected Rwandan intellectuals were key figures in construction and dissemination of virulent genocidal propaganda shows also the impact of authoritarian traditions on these horrific events. Compliant history professors, like Jean Berchmans Nshimyumuremyi or the notorious Ferdinand Nahimana who founded the propaganda radio RTLM, that continuously and publicly encouraged killings, gave the genocidal regime legitimacy, by tracing its lineage back to pre-colonial Hutu kingships. (Hintjens, 2008:99) In fact, the killings were urged on by the entire government, radio and most local social elites as a patriotic duty. In one commune, people refused to kill, but when their burgomaster was replaced with a Hutu power one, they did, indicating that obedience might have played an important role in the execution of Rwandan genocide (Mann, 1999:422, 466). In other words:

"The sociological profile of the killers reflects the diversity of their social and institutional ties. Especially noteworthy is, however, the number of intellectuals and professional people who participated in the slaughter. Despite many exceptions to the rule, one cannot fail to notice the number of journalists, medical doctors, agronomists, teachers, university lecturers, and even priests who were identified by survivors as accomplices in the massacres of innocent civilians. At the other end of the social spectrum, were the hundreds and thousands of landless Hutu peasants and unemployed city

youth whose prime motivation for the killing was stealing their victim's property" (Lemarchand in Totten, 2008:409).

According to Mann the motives of perpetrators were often mundane. Personal and material goals were important as looting and pillaging were encouraged in this incredibly poor and hungry country. Instrumental motives were primarily typical in the paramilitaries where poor Hutus enjoyed taking revenge of Tutsis. The idea of impunity and reward, but more than anything else the desire to secure a normal life for oneself once the killing is over, played a significant role in the motivations of the low class perpetrators. The government agreed to start paying salaries for cell heads and communal youth organizers (Des Forges, 2009:266). Within the state class, however, economic motives were represented as well (Scherrer, 2002:118).

However, many people were also under a deep conviction that genocide, in the case of Rwanda, was in fact as righteous, even a godly thing. A story about the vision of Virgin Mary, who allegedly appeared in Rwanda pointing towards a bloody path, was common knowledge. Additionally, a sense of justice and vengeance was common among the perpetrators, who, all grew up with a long tradition of racist indoctrination (Des Forges, 1999, Mann, 2004:422). In Mann's opinion, local officials and elites complied mostly out of ideology (Mann, 2004:460). Proletarian motives were also common, as any rich person would easily have been denounced as Tutsi, which again testifies of the class struggle at the basis of the group conflict. In terms of constituencies that provided most perpetrators, embittered refugees from Burundi and ex-soldiers were overrepresented, the military being one of the main forces of radicalization, along with other men with previous experience of violence (Mann, 2004:422). As in the Rwandan revolution, descendants from the traditionally independent Hutu kingdoms were overrepresented, not only among the low profile perpetrators, but also in the government, where the "Akazu" favoured the northern provinces of Ginsenyi and Rusengeri, making people from the North overrepresented in the government, army and the educational sector. However, most perpetrators were not marginal to the society, but were drawn from all classes and are themselves stratified. The higher status people gave orders and the lower did the killings, but most Hutus stood aside and looked away (Mann, 2004:466).

Apart from the military and the police, the sources of radicalization were: The Akazu (the radical clique behind Agathe Habyarimana), other Hutu power political fractions entering the post-coup regime (like CDR or MDR), cooperating Hutu officials and Hutu paramilitaries: Interhamwe and

Impuzamugambi, with most of these forming the various levels of party state (Mann, 2004:449). Militias, belonging to the various political parties like MRND and CDR, were not independent from the state, but were authorized by the government and trained by the army which they would follow and take orders from (Des Forges, 1999: 229). Apart from the paramilitaries which proved to be of decisive influence and the middle man between the army and the populace, local businessmen were also heavily involved in the genocide, as most coffee and tea producing companies were state owned, but businessman held licences and monopolies through patronage (Mann, 2004:459). According to Mann, pressures that resulted in genocide, did not simply come from a top down bureaucracy, but from superiors above, paramilitaries and officials alongside as well as subordinates bellow, again demonstrating a functionalist view of the genocide. Bureaucracy produced ideological killers and obedient performers, but was also influenced by the willing perpetrators from bellow (Mann, 2004:460). According to Des Forges, primacy depended more on commitment to killing that on formal position, so that sub-prefects could eclipse prefects and lieutenants could ignore a colonel's orders, while civilians obtained military support and gained positions on the basis of their willingness to attack Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999:222).

6.6. Modernity of the Rwandan genocide

By now, we have noticed that the key scholars in the field of genocide agree that the Rwandan genocide can only be seen as a modern endeavour (Robbins, 1999), pp. 269-274, Mann, 2004, Des Forges, 1999:1, Lemarchand in Totten, 2008:405, Destexhe: 1995:36). According to Mann, instead of talking about ancient rivalries, we should rather be talking about a series of modern escalations over the control of the state (Mann, 2004). Indeed, even though, genocide can be seen as an explosion of sorts, it is important to underline that we are not talking about explosions of primeval passions, as some authors like Andersen and Taylor have struggled to prove. According to Des Forges, the main authority on the Rwandan genocide, and the key witness in the ICTR trials, genocide in Rwanda cannot be seen as an outburst of rage, but is a deliberate choice of modern elites to foster hatred in order to stay in power. Extermination was used in order to restore Hutu solidarity, while state machinery and authority was used in order to carry out the slaughter (Des Forges, 1999:1).

In fact the analysis shows that the genocide of Tutsis was not due to spontaneous outbursts of Hutu anger because of the assassination of the President Habyarimana J., but was the result of a focused training. It was carried out at different levels, involving extremist circles associated with the regime

and the top of the Rwandan army. By spring of 1994, in Rwanda there was a structure for mass mobilization of the Hutu to carry out the genocide of Tutsis. This system consisted of both legal and illegal or informal elements and included senior centres, trained executioners and well-established mechanisms for the transfer of orders from the top down (Krivushin, 2012:88). The ultimate evidence, showing that Rwandan genocide was not a result of spontaneous rage is a fax, sent to United Nations and the United States, by a high ranking Hutu power politician with a guilty conscience, detailing where, against whom and with exactly what materials the genocide would be carried out (Munkler, 2005). The killing started immediately after the crash of a plane carrying president Habyarimana, which was shot down by the Akazu, firstly to avoid having to comply with the pressures of democratisation and secondly so the death of the "beloved papa" which was blamed on the RPF would serve as a powerful enough trigger to start the massacres (Des Forges, 1999).

Let us look at the main elements characterizing this event as a modern venture:

Rwandan genocide was carried out exclusively through the state apparatus. According to Des Forges, the organisation was carried down to the level of the cell, echoing the division and the tasks in the army, with G1, G2, G3, G4 and G5 branches in charge of: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and finances respectively (Des Forges, 1999:280).

However, the state structure used for genocide was not created with the intent of annihilation, but was already there as a part of a modern bureaucratic state. Rwanda has been bureaucratized even before the colonialists arrived, but in the 90s, this so called "Switzerland of Africa" had a most efficient administration known for executing orders promptly and fully, from the cabinet through 11 regional prefects, sub-prefects and their 145 commune mayors (burgomasters), to the councillors and police forces of each commune. In a densely settled country with good main roads, this provided a tight network of control, entwining with civil society institutions, churches, rural cooperatives, credit associations and NGO's (Des Forges, 1999:232, Mann, 2004:453). Supervisory committees operated on the national, prefectural, communal and sectorial levels, overseeing genocide and cooperation between administrative, military and political party authorities (Des Forges, 1999:280). Communal policemen and former soldiers trained both the young recruits and the population in general how to dig trenches, gather intelligence and obtain necessary supplies, while organisations of football clubs were merged with a youth public works program to generate a youth movement for low level violence (Mann, 2004:441). According to Des Forges, the theory of Rwanda as a failed state, presented by

some scholars doesn't hold water, particularly because this is a state that was able to execute one of the most sophisticated and well planned genocides in the history of genocide, making it profoundly efficient, rather than failed (Des Forges, 1999: 25). The implication of the state in the genocide is best illustrated by the fact that participation was obligatory; the fact that all men were to work at barriers was a national directive that couldn't be refused and anyone who refused to participate would instantly be seen as an enemy (Des Forges, 1999:366). Additionally a 1995 essay written by Colonel Bagosora, the chief executor of the genocide, discusses the entire mechanism for execution as it was used, from how the communal police forces are used to train the militias and the organization of propaganda to removal of unsatisfactory burgomasters, the creation of civilian "self-defence", distribution of weapons and involvement of civilians in police function (Des Forges, 1999: 110).

The weapons used in the Rwandan genocide are another point that the "tribalism" scholars focus on, because in radical contrast with the industrial Nazi holocaust, this genocide was, to a large extent committed by the use of traditional weapons, such as machetes. However, this is not necessarily an indicator of the primitivism of the genocide or its spontaneity as such. In fact, the machetes are not a traditional Rwandan weapon, but were solely bought for their extremely low price, due to the country being practically bankrupt. Locals needed to be trained how to use them in communal training exercises and programs for patriotic civilians led by senior army members (Des Forges, 1999:91, Mann, 2004: 444). The army and the police were, however heavily armed and the government distributed AK-47 rifles and grenades, for which no paperwork was required.

Also, a number of mechanisms were used in order to achieve emotional detachment from the victims in order to enable the perpetrators to go through with the killings. The institution of Umuganda (community work) was used as a mechanism of execution, so genocide became a patriotic responsibility rather than a morally repulsive act. The genocide was, by administrators, broken down into a series of minor tasks: labour, planning, civilian defence etc. so that the linguistic definitions substituted the horrors of reality. Euphemisms such as "clearing the bush", "cleaning the weeds", "pulling out the roots", "separating the grass from the millet" and " pulling out the poison ivy" were used in order to create an illusion of the sub-humanity of the enemy and provide a perfect illustration for Bauman's metaphor of the gardening state (Bauman, 1989, 1991, Kiernan, 2007:566). Additionally, defence was used instead of attack, work instead of kill and meat instead of people. Special funds were created to provide money for alcohol and drugs in order to achieve "numbing" and make the killings easier on the assailants (Des Forges, 1999: 244). The state prepared the population gradually.

The vast Rwandan bureaucracy can be seen as another indicator of modernity and it is precisely this element which so clearly illustrates the way in which modern structures were introduced in this part of the continent. Arendt's claim that bureaucracy was shaped during the colonial expansions into the non-European world is highly relevant in the study of Rwandan genocide, as the colonial bureaucracy was created in order to be able to maintain the ability to pacify the indigenous populations, and as such was a perfect instrument for execution of genocide. Indeed, it was the Belgians, who caused a decimation of peaceful Congo population from about 30 million to 8 (Uvin, 1998:95, Arendt in Mamdani, 2001:19).

Indeed, when talking about Rwanda, the term control society comes promptly to mind. Instead of popular rage and uncontrolled anger of the masses, we are here rather talking about an intentional and controlled militarization of an entire population, which was carried out to an extreme (Prunier, 1995:77, Des Forges, 1999:230). Control was carried out through the mechanism of the party state, through sectors and cells with cell heads. In fact, the control of the killings was so rigid, that the massacres could be stopped by a policeman's whistle blow. In January 1993, the burgomasters halted attack due to the visit of The International Commission, and resumed instantly once they left (Des Forges, 1999:90).

 Even at local level bureaucratisation was apparent. At barriers, the personnel had to sign written agreements on proper conduct. The victims were chosen carefully, as the burgomaster checked the ethnicity of each citizen several generations back. Even before the genocide administrative officials recorded every change in the population carefully and these same modern administration archives were used in order to target the enemy. Burgomasters issued papers for assailants to move freely, while Tutsis were legally prevented from moving. Some victims were intentionally sent to their home communes to be killed there, giving an administrative region the role of a concentration camp. Even pillages were supervised by communal authorities. ID cards, a heritage from the Belgian colonial administration were used as a proof of ethnicity, and are another illustration of how colonial bureaucracy was successfully used in order to execute genocide (Des Forges, 1999: 230). The fact that around one million people were exterminated over the course of 100 days is proof enough of the incredible efficiency of this genocidal state apparatus.

Another element that testifies to the modernity of the Rwandan genocide is the propaganda used to develop the hatred and prepare ground for violence. Des Forges concludes her seminal "Leave none to tell the story" by stating that for three and a half years, elites worked on the transformation of the population of Rwanda into accomplices of the regime (Des Forges, 1999). The regime radio station RTLM and the newspaper Kangura were used as weapons of most sophisticated propaganda strategies, practised by Lenin and Goebbels. Strategies such as accusations in the mirror, where the victim population is first falsely accused of genocide so that this can serve as a trigger for staging real massacres, or staging fake events, such as the fake RPF attack staged by Habyarimana in October 1990, were used liberally by the regime (Kiernan, 2007:569). The very heights of the Rwandan propagandist activity is, however, illustrated by the murder of the president Habyarimana, which the media blamed on the RPF, but was, most likely committed by his own elites, the Akazu clique close to his wife. The Akazu was prepared to go so far as to assassinate its own president in order to achieve its two goals: first - the national cohesion of the fragmented Hutu population and second: secure a valid reason to move from hateful propaganda into the phase of actual genocide execution. In fact, the Hutu extremist propaganda was not only active and efficient within the country. The Hutu elites successfully manipulated the foreign press, by intentionally evoking the images of tribal killings so as to portray the genocide as a consequence of spontaneous popular rage and therefore something that was not controllable and that they themselves could not be held responsible for. Delegations were sent abroad in order to justify the killings, and the western ideal of tribal Africa proved an ideal justification (Des Forges, 1999:91).

Interestingly, and contrary to the idea of the tribal killings, Rwandan genocide was committed in the name of modernity and more precisely democracy. The Tutsi enemy was accused of wanting to reinstall the feudal system and a monarchy, something that was seen as a return to pre-modern times. The Hutu motivations were focused on the need for a simple, majoritarian democracy, which, when placed in context of European ethno-nationalisms, didn't seem like a whole lot to ask. The propaganda texts of one of the key Hutu power intellectuals Emmanuel Ntezimana presented the genocide as a continuation of the Hutu revolution, a courageous struggle of the indigenous Hutu proletariat against invading Tutsi aristocracy, a choice of words that could easily have come out of Marx's "Das Kapital" (Des Forges, 1999:42). Even the songs of radical militias, such as Interhamwe, contained the word democracy in them. Hutus were the inventors of the republic; they saw themselves as modernisers.

But, in spite of the fact that the democratisation process could be held responsible for adding fuel to fire of an already stressful and increasingly difficult Rwandan situation, the genocide itself was an

explicit rejection of democracy. After Habyarimana's plane was shot down, the person struggling to come out of the shadow of the President for years, the creator of militias and the self-defence program and the favourite of the Akazu came forward. Colonel Bagosora, the man, who general Dallaire described as the devil himself in his book:"Shaking hands with the devil" was also a member of two secret societies: the notorious Amasasu and the military society Zero network[38], whose goal was to reduce the number of Tutsis in Rwanda to zero. Bagosora was allegedly also behind a written threat to president Habyarimana, claiming that he would lose his life if he signed the Arusha accords. Unable to carry out a coup immediately after the plane crash, due to a hesitant stand by some of the officers, Bagosora was aided by the Akazu, commanding the presidential guardsmen, elite battalions and paramilitaries along with the police to murder most of his opponents, all heads of the opposition and the prime-minister. On the seventh day, after the plane crash, the moderates have been overcome and Bagosora had no obstacles to creating a civilian government (Mann, 2004:452). This seemingly democratic government was in fact made out of Bagosora's own men: 12 MRND radicals and 8 other Hutu power radicals from other parties and mostly from the south in an attempt to broaden the base of the regime (Mann, 2004:452). The new president, Sindikubwabo was a puppet, an ageing paediatrician, often described as a man with no personality. Democracy was no more than pretence in order to win the sympathies and secure the funds of the "democratic" West.

6.7. Hutu power ideology of genocide

6.7.1. Habyarimanism: between communism and fascism

According to Mann, unlike in Europe, there has been no long term trend toward genocide on the African continent, but the building blocks of African politics are all ethnic. Apart from the fact that the post-colonial state is in itself weak, the major restraining factor has, in fact been the extent of multi-ethnicity, due to which coalitions with others were necessary in order for a political party to become important (Mann, 2004: 429). Before the 1990s African ethnic conflict was less severe than that of other continents. Rwanda however is in many ways unlike other African countries.

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[38] Amasasu, alliance of soldiers irritated by the ancient underhanded acts of the members of the UNAR party is a military association with the primary aim of preventing the infiltration of RPF into the army ranks and organizing civilian groups to support the army in dealing with them, while Network Zero is also a military organization propagating zero Tutsis in Rwanda. Both were close to the Akazu and they both accomplished and organized a large part of the killings themselves.

Habyarimana's regime was a strict, totalitarian regime, based on a strong personality cult with pictures of Habyarimana on portraits, pins, in houses and places of business, much like in Tito's Yugoslavia; the regionalism favouring people from the president's region being even more dominant than the ethnic quota which discriminated against Tutsi. According to Prunier, his National revolutionary movement for development party (MRND) exhibited the tightest level of control among non-communist countries (Prunier, 1995: 76-77). Indeed, this, Entwicklungsdiktatur (developmental dictatorship) built a closed off, isolated and wary of outside influences regime based on exclusion and paranoia in order to maintain the fragile national identity. Endogenous development was therefore seen as exclusively a matter of own values and own resources, primarily agriculture (Verwimp, 2001:8). The political economy was, thus, as in other developmental dictatorships, premised on the belief that political security was a prerequisite for economic growth, which is why it drew sustenance from critical clusters of power, such as the army and the police. In fact, both Habyarimana and his successor Bagosora were top military figures. Indeed, the idea that the entire nation should be mobilized and act as one person explains the high number of ordinary perpetrators in Rwandan genocide and even civilian institutions such as Umuganda successfully introduced the theme of militant mobilization with a strong nationalist connotation in the population (Guichaoua, 1991:564, Verwimp, 2001:10).

Building a modern national mass movement, for Habyarimana, as for other totalitarians meant a complete eradication of individualism and individual will with an aim to create an organic unity of the people, which, in itself is a rejection of important Enlightenment values. In one of his speeches, he clarifies this: "Our movement is a popular movement, and it requires unconditional adhesion, in other words, the people and the society as a whole speak with one mouth, resulting in a unity of vision, harmony, cohesion, from the cell up to the top of the pyramid of the movement, in other words-the entire nation." No individual or group can escape the control of the "Social body" in motion" (Verwimp, 2001: 9).

According to the regime's main ideologist Ferdinand Nahimana, the Rwandan system was neither capitalist nor communist, but unique and specific for the country alone. However, like other totalitarian regimes, Habyarimanism can be said to contain both elements of communism and fascism.

Between 1975 and 1991, the MRND was the only legal political party in the country. It was modelled loosely on the Communist parties in China and North Korea, with institutional structures that

paralleled the government structures at each level, down to the sector and cell. Habyarimana was the president of the party, and as such was the only candidate for the president of the Republic. The peasant ideology was the absolute key focus of Habyarimana's Rwanda and this is certainly typical for both communism and fascism, but, in spite of the fact that Habyarimana didn't nurture particularly close relations with other communist countries, apart from China which provided the weapons for genocide, the phrasing of his speeches is often reminiscent of Stalin, while the political and ideological practices of MRND resemble those of the Cambodian CPK (Kiernan, 2007:564). The term Umuturage used to describe the entire nation is the best example of this. Umuturage is traditionally a pejorative word, referring to the simple, uneducated agricultural population of Rwanda, but Habyarimana ennobled it, elevating the status of the peasants and at the same time implying that the people of Rwanda are a result of a revolution based on class conflict. Much like in Stalin's USSR and Mao's China, the cult of the peasant only existed on the surface, while underneath the peasants were treated as slave labour. According to Uvin, Rwanda is a prime example of state run, state-controlled top-down development (Uvin, 1998, Newbury in Kiernan, 2007).

On the other hand, the struggle between feudalism and bourgeoisie is not solely a class struggle in the words of Habyarimana, but has ethnic connotations as well, since aristocracy is here synonymous with Tutsi rule, thanks to the colonial equation of class with ethnicity. Despite the fact that regionalism might have been an even greater focus of divisions than ethnicity, racism is undeniably a characteristic of Habyarimana's regime, a trait that could be said to be more typical for fascist regimes and Rwanda has been often compared to Nazi Germany in this respect (Scherrer, 2002:107). Furthermore, Habyarimana built his career as the head of the army during the Kayibanda years, but at the time the sole purpose of the army was to defend the state from Tutsi attacks. In the book Romantic and mythical history of Rwanda", the president is shown as a child of God and at the same time, a Bahutu of pure blood (Verwimp, 2001:24). The motives of class conflict and ethnic conflict certainly to some degree overlap, but in the 90s with intense propaganda, the movement of "we the people" becomes an exclusively ethno-nationalist one, as all the differences and fragmentations within society merge into one. Indeed, Habyarimana was known to be a sympathizer of some fascist regimes and Rwanda between early seventies and nineties could be said to most closely have resembled right wing, clericalist regimes like Salazar's Portugal. In the 90s, however, as the situation radicalised and openly fascist parties, such as CDR were gaining in power, along with Akazu and Colonel Bagosora's secret military societies, the ruthlessness and the utter contempt for all liberal values of the interim regime can be said to strongly resemble fascism, along with the paranoia and the imperial revisionism that characterized the regime. According to Scherrer, similarities with the fascist models are to be found in every organisational aspect of the genocide, including the regime's ethno-fascist policy (Scherrer, 2002:107. 122).

In relation to modernity, in spite of apparent modernisation in many areas of life, modernity has, for Rwandans remained something that was related to their experience of colonization and therefore something that should be largely avoided. Industrialisation remained relatively marginalized and the idea that the whole society should be supported by the agricultural work of the peasants can be said to represent a somewhat rejection of modernity (Verwimp, 2001:17). Indeed, the peasant is, in the world of Habyarimanism seen as a product of his soil, and the soil is given an important, almost mythical quality (Verwimp, 2001:24). At the same time, the power of the nation is seen through numbers, so even though Habyarimana recognizes that overpopulation is a problem, family planning is never given a time of the day. Interestingly, while modernity was used as a main motto for justification of both majoritarian democracy and the public contempt for the Tutsi monarchy and the feudalist system, on the other hand it was seen as the white man's heritage, which is unfortunate, since, as we have seen earlier the Rwandan monarchy demonstrated various signs of modernity and had a clear identity way before the colonisers arrived.

6.7.2. Scientific racism

The racist theories relevant for the understanding of Rwandan genocide were introduced to the country by the colonialists. Becoming acquainted with a thoroughly different kind of civilisation led to an almost obsessive preoccupation with race in the late 19th century, which led to much theorizing, romanticizing and even fantasizing (Prunier, 1995:5). Germans introduced scientific methods, such as craniometry and anthropology, which were used to create a scientific justification for the European fascination with Tutsi, who were viewed as tall and polite with a phlegmatic refinement of feelings. In accordance with Speke's 19th century theory of conquest of inferior by superior races, the Europeans theorized that Rwandan monarchic institutions stem from the time of arrival of foreign, racially superior ancestors of Tutsi-Galla from southern Ethiopia. The lighter complexion of some Tutsis was enough to persuade the racial theorists of the European ancestry of Tutsi, who were admired for their Caucasian skulls, beautiful Greek profiles, Semitic or even Jewish features (Prunier, 1995:8, Kiernan, 2007:567). The "Elegant golden red beauties" with long thin noses, wide brow and fine lips, were stereotyped as separate from Bantu agriculturalists, who were deemed inferior and ape-like. The supposed Tutsi love of money also indicated a Semitic origin and an innate proneness to capitalism. As the quest for origins was at the very core of the European racial theories, Tutsi were seen, together with Maasai, as descendants of the primordial red race, and therefore distinct from inferior Negros.

"Scientists" entertained the ideas that they might have come from India or Garden of Eden, or it was even hypothesized that they could have been survivors of Atlantis (Semi and Parfitt, 2005:14).

These pseudo-scientific theories, however ridiculous they might sound today, became the governing lines for the political decisions made by Rwandan colonisers. Because they had serious implications, the natives took them seriously, so as a consequence the Tutsi cultural ego became inflated, crushing the Hutu sentiments and polarizing the society radically according to the always applicable divide et impera rule (Prunier, 1995:16).

According to Mann, the attempt to racialize classes in Rwanda was common, particularly in the francophone world, where the idea that class differences are natural and racial in essence was common among aristocracy, making race an attempt to biologize and naturalize class difference. French noblemen believed that the difference between them and the bourgeoisie was racial; they saw themselves as the descendants of Germanic Franks and the third estate of the native Gallo-Romans. In Mamdani's words: "To identify the link between biology and culture, between the language of race and that of civilization is to fill in the shaded transition from Republicanism at home to a full bodied imperialism abroad" (Mamdani, 2001:19). Indeed, modern imperialism was the context in which race spread from a marginal to a main stream doctrine, as race moved from being a preoccupation of the rapidly declining aristocracy to being a fascination of an increasingly bourgeois Europe and this is of ultimate importance for all three contexts analysed in this thesis. The bipolar division of humanity into super humans and sub-humans provided the rationale for the elimination of entire peoples (Mamdani, 2001).

In the 19th century, as an application of scientific racism, the "Hamitic race" became a sub-group of the Caucasian race, alongside the Semitic race, grouping the non-Semitic populations native to North Africa, the Horn of Africa and South Arabia, including the Ancient Egyptians. The Hamitic theory suggested that this "Hamitic race" was superior to or more advanced than Negroid populations of Sub-Saharan Africa (Sanders, 1969:521).

The Curse of Ham is a biblical story about Ham, Noah's son, and father of Canaan who sees his father naked in a drunken stupor and is therefore punished by being made slave to his relatives. Even though the Bible itself makes no mention of race or dark skin, the narrative was interpreted, because of an

etymological misunderstanding, by some Jews, Christians and Muslims to mean that the punishment came in the form of the black skin of Ham's descendants (Goldenberg, 2003:1-14). The curse of Ham, at first becomes a justification for serfdom in Europe, but later, set in an African context, becomes an assumed biblical justification for imposing eternal slavery upon black people (Whitford, 2009:173).

The theory illustrates again the non-scientific nature of scientific racism, as early anthropological writers linked the stories in the Bible of Ham's sons to actual ancient migrations of a supposed Middle-Eastern sub-group of the Caucasian race (Sanders, 1969:521). Three authors are key to understanding the Hamitic curse. The theory that this group migrated further south was introduced by British explorer John Hanning Speke, in his publications on his search for the source of the Nile (1863). Speke argued that he had discovered an evolutionary link between "civilized" North Africa and "barbaric" central Africa. According to Speke, the pastoralist Hamitic race (Tutsi) emigrated from the north (Ethiopia), bringing civilization to the inferior Bantu race, with whom they've assimilated, losing their original language (Gourevitch, 1998:368). According to Sergi and his book "The Mediteranian Race" (1901) northern Hamites (Berbers, Toubou, Fulani and the Guanches) and Eastern Hamites (Egyptians, Nubians, Ethiopians, Oromo, Somali, and Tutsis) were a part of the Mediterranean race, which was the greatest race in the world and a source of all superior civilizations. The original European peoples were, according to Sergi, "Eurafricans" (Sergi, 1901: 41).

In its most extreme form, in the writings of C. G. Seligman (1930), it is asserted that all significant achievements in African history were the work of "Hamites", pastoral Europeans who migrated into central Africa bringing technologies and civilising skills with them. In contrast with the Negro race, which was seen as agricultural and static, the Hamites were quicker witted and better armed and had introduced most of the advanced features found in central African cultures, such as: metal working, irrigation and complex social structures (Seligman, 1922:141). Scientific racism was thus primarily used to justify the European conquest of Africa as something that has happened in waves throughout history, and was therefore not to be seen as problematic, but a part of a natural evolutionary subjugation of inferior civilisations by the superiors.

The quasi scientific Hamitic theory became the cornerstone of policies of European imperial powers in the twentieth century and the reason for Belgian preferential treatment of Tutsis in Rwanda, which polarised the society and created animosities that were unheard of before (Gourevitch, 1998:54).

Belgian officials introduced scientific methods of measuring Rwandans to define traits among the various ethnic groups and created policies according to their findings (African Rights, 1995:8). The idea that the Tutsis were colonisers who came from outside, while the Hutu were indigenous agricultural population became so engrained into the very fabric of the Rwandan society that, with the advent of the post-colonial state Tutsis who fled were denied citizenship, while the Hutu became the democratic majority, demonstrating Mann's idea of majoritarian democracy presenting a precondition for genocide, much like with the fall of Yugoslavia. The idea of Tutsi as foreign invaders was later used as a justification for the 1994 genocide (Mamdani, 2002:34). Additionally, the state structure left by the Belgian colonizers was created in such a way as to enable the domination of one ethnic group over the other. In the post-colonial state the oppressor and the oppressed merely became reversed. A future completely outside of the colonial norms became impossible (African Rights, 1995:8).

The language of scientific racism was highly represented in the Hutu power publications before and during the genocide. In the main Hutu power publication "Kangura" of March 1993 the reason for cleansing the races is explained through a metaphor: A Cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly, a cockroach can only give birth to another cockroach, thereby fixing the difference between the groups as the difference between species, a language that strongly resembles European scientific racism of 19th and 20th century (Steuter and Wills, 2009:55, Kiernan, 2007:558). In this article, genetic science is used to show how supposedly Tutsi mental traits, such as immorality, treachery and wickedness have been passed on from old generations to new (Kangura, 1993, nr.40). Additionally, in most Kangura publications, Tutsis are referred to as Hamites or "Nilotic minority", which is characterized by "contingent barbarism", clearly reflecting the combination of colonial terminology with modern scientific vocabulary (Kangura, May 1992:4). In a November 1992 radio broadcast Leon Mugesera, Hutu ideologist proposed sending Tutsi back to Ethiopia by killing them and casting their bodies into Rwanda's north flowing Nile tributary, the Nyabarongo River (Kiernan, 2007:555).

Another example of how the language of Belgian scientific racism is expressed in the language of indigenous populations, used in the genocide, can be found in a speech written by a leading perpetrator of the genocide, General Theoneste Bagosora: "Before the arrival of Tutsis, Rwanda had been a peaceful Hutu realm. In ancient times, the Hutus of the great Bantu family and the Twa or pygmies of the smaller ethnic group were living harmoniously since as early as 9th century." Then, in the 16th century, intruding on this arcadia, came a race of northern interlopers, whom Bagosora called "these Nilotic Hamitic Tutsis from Abyssinia". Other examples of how colonial racism was used in the genocide can also be found in a number of publications and particularly in the broadcastings of

Hutu power radio RTLM. In a Kangura article from 1992, the Tutsi were accused of intentionally trying to breed out the Hutu: "You belong to an important ethnicity of Bantu group. Know that a proud and bloodthirsty minority mixed with you in order to dilute you, divide you, dominate you and massacre you (Chretien, 1995:110)

6.7.3. Building a racial utopia

The Hutu racial utopia, as is often the case with genocides is mainly traditionalist, with elements of nostalgia and imperial revisionism, which constitute an important part of the Hutu power ideology. The key Hutu ideologist Ferdinand Nahimana, an influential historian and a founder of the radical RTLM propaganda radio station, which was used to entice the genocide, argued that before the arrival and expansion of Tutsi power in the region, the Hutu population had organized itself into important family groups which evolved into states. His research was based on 19 interviews with "direct descendants" of the last Hutu princes who reigned over these independent territories (Kiernan, 2007: 560). A total of 9 early Hutu monarchies were allegedly proven to have existed, some of which have survived well into the 20th century and resisted the occupation of the Tutsi monarchy, making this one of the most astonishing pieces of scientific racism in our time. These northwest principalities were used as a model for Hutu antiquity and a golden age, while the Hutu were seen through the lens of Abashiru warriors, brave and strong heroes, who resisted both the Tutsi and the white man (Kiernan, 2007:561).

Indeed, Nahimana's influence in Habyarimana's Rwanda cannot be overestimated. In 1990, he was made director of the national Office of information and was even commissioned to prepare lessons on civic and psychological preparation for soldiers in Rwandan military forces including a syllabus for each army battalion outlining history classes, critical of the Tutsi monarchy. However, his most influential role was as a founding director of RTLM radio, owned by Akazu leaders, where he insisted that the rebel Inyenzi and other Tutsi in Rwanda, were one and the same thing (Kiernan, 2007:562).

Nahimana, like Habyarimana, also emphasized the agricultural aspect of Hutu power ideology, based primarily on the soil. The term Umuhinza, which Nahimana explained as the title of Prince of autonomous Hutu provinces, was to be translated as "farmer per excellence governing the people of

cultivators" or "president of crops", whereas Tutsis were mostly seen as city dwellers and cattle herders. According to Phillip Verwimp the romanticization of agriculture was a stepping stone on a more general idealist pathway. Indeed, in the predominant Rwandan ideology, man was seen as a product of the soil, while cities were seen as places of immorality, theft and prostitution. The urban corruption and cosmopolitanism (modernity in general) were seen as the greatest threats to the strictly moral and disciplined Rwandan peasant society (Kiernan, 2007:565). Resembling the Nazi ideal of warrior peasants, the Rwandan cultivators were also encouraged to do their work while carrying a gun. After killing the enemy, one could resume the all-important work of cultivation, it was suggested (Kiernan, 2007:566). The nostalgia for the lost agrarian ur-state can be seen in statements such as those by the prefect of Kigali, Tharcisse Renzaho talking about past Tutsi attacks on agrarian Hutu paradise (Kiernan, 2007:567).

According to Kiernan, the obsession with soil should, indeed, be seen as a preoccupation with territory, but in Rwandan case he emphasizes that this is reflected in both internal and external expansionism. In relation to internal expansionism Prunier illustrates how the small extremist clique of Northern Hutu in Habyarimana's Rwanda, gathered around the supposed Bushiru princess Agathe Habyarimana and her Akazu confidants to conquer the rest of the country, in particular areas dominated by moderate Hutus from the south, who were, during the genocide killed along with the Tutsi (Prunier, 1986:187). The external Hutu power ambitions are best presented in Nahimana's academic publication from 1979, in which he explains how, in spite of the fact that Hutu regions in surrounding states, like eastern Congo and Southern Uganda are under Tutsi influence, they still have legitimate Hutu rulers and local royal courts. With support, he believed, these regions would be able to resist Tutsi hegemony as the regions had a history of anti-Tutsi resistance in common and a potential for anti-Tutsi alliance transcending Rwanda's frontiers existed (Nahimana in Kiernan, 2007:568). Additionally, in 1987, Nahimana claimed that Rwanda, in fact, had historical rights to these regions, by blaming the British and the Belgian colonialists for "amputating" parts of Rwanda in order to enlarge their colonies. In accordance with these writings, and by the time of the fall of Hutu power in July 1994, traditional Hutu claims to the northwest extended beyond the rest of Rwanda and spread outside its borders, as Interhamwe took its genocidal violence into neighbouring countries, attacking Tutsi populations there, particularly in eastern Congo, attempting to gain support among Banyamasisi Hutu to eliminate Banyamasisi Tutsi as a part of what Wood calls a Rwandan Lebensraum plan (Wood, 2000, Kiernan, 2007:568).

The Rwandan racial utopia of pure and uncontaminated Hutu living space was going to be achieved with the use of several strategies, all rational and meticulously planned. Purifying the race from undesirable traits was achieved by eliminating mixed Hutu-Tutsi population and killing those who were married to a person from the enemy group. Purifying the race from any contamination from outside was began already in 1990, when Hutu ten commandments were published, echoing the Nuremberg laws and preventing marriage, friendship and business partnerships with Tutsi (Berry and Berry, 1999:113). In the genocide, itself, apart from the killings, racial purity was accomplished through genocidal rapes. Rapes as a strategy of warfare, committed with the intent of spreading AIDS were common in Rwanda, as between 200000 and 500000 women are estimated raped during the genocide. The infection of Tutsi women with AIDS was expected to further spread the disease to any future partners the woman might have, ensuring that genocide would go on even after the outright killing stops. Additionally, if the rape resulted in pregnancy, the child was considered Hutu, according to the identity of the father, which would contribute further to the genocidal aim. It is important to emphasize that these rapes were an instrument of war and therefore ordered, organized and controlled, rather than passionate or spontaneous (Ka Hon Chu and De Brower, 2009:16). Tutsi women were also targeted with the intent of destroying their reproductive capabilities by sexual mutilation with the aim of annihilating the entire Tutsi population (Human Rights Watch, 1997). Lastly, the strategy for race strengthening which was used the longest and throughout Habyarimana's reign was uncontrolled breeding, as power was usually identified with the numbers, which was believed would ultimately secure the victory against the Tutsi imposters (Verwimp, 2001:24).

Finally, the Hutu racial utopia was attempted with help of religion. No occult or satanic influences can be found here, as Rwanda was strictly Catholic, although religion in Rwanda can be seen as a fusion of the pre-colonial monotheism and Catholicism, as God in the radical Kangura is often called Imana (traditional Rwandan deity). Christianity was widely used to promote the genocidal propaganda. In fact, it was, allegedly, a Marian apparition- Virgin Mary who materialized in front of three college students, showing them that the future holds a blood bath and calling for prayer and repentance. Furthermore, religion was used as propaganda even before the genocide, and Habyarimana, himself was advertised as a child of God (Cook, 2006:24). The most detailed discussion of the role of religion in the Rwandan genocide is Timothy Longman's Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda, which shows that both Catholic and Protestant churches helped make the genocide possible by giving moral sanction to the killing (Longman, 2010). In spite of the fact that religion was used in order to entice genocide, most leaders were pragmatic and used it as a tool, rather than something they actually believed in. Numerous examples in Kangura illustrate this.

6.7.4. The Hamitic myth

The Hamitic myth cannot be said to be as global or as widely used as anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, but it has, nevertheless, had quite a disastrous impact in Africa. According to Zachernuk, in places like Nigeria, much like Rwanda (1962-1994) the nationalist historiography emerged as a reaction to the imperialist Hamitic Hypothesis, as African historiography emerged in a form of an interaction between western educated African scholars and European ideas. In other words, these ideas were re-worked into distinctive Hamitic hypotheses suited to each particular African context. West Africans, for example, first identified themselves not as victims of Hamitic invasion but as the degenerate heirs of classical civilisations, to establish their potential to create a modern, Christian society. At the turn of the century various authors argued for past development within West Africa rather than mere degeneration (Zachernuk, 2009:427). The Hamitic hypothesis was also relevant in East Africa, for example in relation to the origin myth of the Iraqw of Tanzania. According to this version of the myth, the Iraqw population is a race of Hamitic nomads, who came from Iraq (Mesopotamia) in Asia, crossing the sea in canoes (Rekdal, 1998:19). In general, the Hamitic myth has had devastating effects on Africa, as the practice of elevating one group to assist in the governance of the colony was common to all colonial governments in Africa; for example, in South Africa, the Zulus were elevated to semi-European status; in Nigeria, the Ibos were elevated to quasi-European rank, and in Liberia the re-settled American slaves received the status of "African-Aryans".

According to Rana, the Hamitic myth, in spite of the fact that it is in fact a departure from the original biblical scripture and basically a modern phenomenon, can only be seen in the light of the ways in which Christian Europe constructed otherness. In fact, the hostility and the suspicion with which Christian Europe viewed its two significant non-Christian others –the Muslims and the Jews, can be seen as a rehearsal for racial formation. The emergence of modern conceptions of race does not occur until the rise of Europe and the arrivals of Europeans in the Americas, when the indigenous civilisations become viewed through the stereotypes commonly used to stigmatize religious minorities in Europe. It was, in fact, the European understanding of the religious other that became the lens for understanding racial difference in the new world, as the primary relationship between Christianity and indigenous heathenry became biologized into modern racism. Through war and reconquest for consolidation of the Spanish nation state, the dark skin of ethnically cleansed Islamic Moors became merged with their religious otherness; hence indigenous heathens in Americas became identified with dark skinned heathens in Europe. Here, the antecedents of the Semitic-Hamitic hypothesis are evident in defining Muslim groups through racial mixture and notions of Blackness, providing the

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classifications of Semites, Hamites and Negroids, as all three categories became associated with the notion of Muslim-ness (Rana, 2007).

Biologically, American Indians were described as descended from North African Muslims, as the Indian stereotype became focused on the same alleged traits as the Muslim stereotype: barbarism, depravity, immorality, sexual deviance and uncontrollability, emotional immaturity, vengefulness, sodomy and religious superstition (Puar and Rai, 2002:117). Through slavery, the "Negro" then merely took the place originally occupied by Jews, Muslims and Indians, while the Hamitic hypothesis re-emerged in the 19th and 20th century narratives of Black Muslims in the US and, indeed, the forced migration of African Muslims to the Americas.

Let us see how Tutsi otherness is portrayed in the Rwandan media:

One of the most widely used stereotypes of Tutsis in the Kangura are certainly those which portray the enemy as greedy capitalists: In most Rwandan publications from before the revolution to the genocide itself the Tutsi are shown as aristocracy, corrupt city dwellers and businessmen who have no sense for morals but merely focus on money, as opposed to the honest and hardworking Hutu (Kangura, 1992:16). This is why the Tutsi enemy becomes an embodiment of Western values and mentality along with corruption of morals, which need to be rejected by the Hutu as well as the modernity they represent. Here we see, as in other cases, that modernity is identified with Western hegemony, which indeed, greatly contributed to destabilising the country through disastrous IMF reforms and World Bank projects.

Paradoxically, the Tutsi are also portrayed as savages. In Kangura of May 1992, Tutsis are shown as barbarians who are fighting for the reestablishment of pre-modern, feudal, Tutsi monarchy. In the speeches of Leon Mugesera, one of the key minds behind the genocide, there is a diabolical plan prepared by Tutsi to systematically target Bantu so that a Nilotic empire from Ethiopia and Donala to Gabon and Lesotho would take place, based on the model of Aryan race and swastika as a symbol (Des Forges, 1999:80). The ruthless Tutsi conquerors are epitomized by such figures as the Roman emperor Nero and the Tutsi queen mother Konjogora, who, to get up, leaned on two swords planted in the shoulders of two Hutu children (Des Forges, 1999:74). Reflecting the global dichotomies between white superiority and black inadequacy, the Tutsi royalists are accused of wishing to institutionalise

Hutu slavery. In the song of Hutu nationalist singer Simon Bikindi, Hutu, the descendants of Sebahinzi (father of cultivators) will not be slaves for Tutsi any more. Additionally, the RTLM Hutu hate radio falsely reported that president had been tortured and castrated (in pre-colonial times some Tutsi kings castrated defeated enemy rulers). Furthermore, through Goebbels' famous "accusations in the mirror" propaganda strategy, the blood thirsty and power hungry Tutsi are accused of wanting to commit genocide against the Hutu. In reversing the Hamitic myth, the Hutu then become the carriers of democracy, republicanism and the will of the people, which is associated with modernity, showing that modernity, in fact is not solid, but a concept that changes shape in relation to contextual hegemony, thus being always on the side of the more powerful – the modern West along with Tutsis as its agents, or Hutu as the republican cariers of democracy and change (Kangura, 1992:16). It should thus also be noted that Rwanda in itself and in relation to the genocide belonged to the Francophone sphere, in a region where the Francophone and the Anglophone interests have collided, which is another reason for seeing the Anglophone West as the enemy. As a consequence of genocide, and the victory of the RPF, Rwanda has now officially switched alliances, becoming the first member of the Commonwealth never to have been a British colony.

Other stereotypes are also present and particularly in relation to religion, which is such a central element of Rwandan spiritual life. The images of Tutsis as the enemies of God show that religion was used to justify what was being done, but also that Rwandan churches were indeed, supporters of genocide. In Kangura, January issue of 1991, Habyarimana is shown as a priest. Another political cartoon from the same issue shows Christ as a child with Mary and Joseph. Mary asks Christ to save the Hutu of Burundi and Christ tells them to love each other, but Joseph disagrees. He says: "No, instead tell Hutu of the world to unite"! In Kangura, God was often shown as helping the perpetrators commit their crimes and the genocide as a holy, even divine act (Kangura, 1991).

Much like with our other two cases, in Rwanda we also find the image of the targeted group as imposter, reflecting the modern fear that assimilated minorities are even more dangerous than those who are visually recognizable. Inverting the Hamitic myth, the Hutu power propaganda often shows Tutsis as Ethiopids and Nilotics, who therefore have no right to inhabit central Africa. However the fear of the Tutsi blood infiltrating the Hutu genetics becomes a threat to the rigid organic national unity of the Hutus. In Kangura it is asserted: "You are Bantu (again in reference to the Hamitic myth), nation is artificial, ethnic group is natural", thus again demonstrating the overwhelming presence of ethno-nationalism, a European invention, brought to Africa by the colonizers. Tutsi women are seen as pistols, seductive and irresistible demon-like women who pass on their genes through naïve Hutu

husbands. It is also emphasized that Tutsis often changed their identity in order to infiltrate all pores of society, particularly places reserved for Hutu according to the ethnic quota, as the invisible enemy is so similar to the majority that a purge of the society in fact becomes akin to national suicide. Additionally, Tutsi men are often presented as gypsies in reference to their "homelessness" and their lack of right to the territory (Des Forges, 1999:80).

Gender stereotypes in general were a very important part of the genocidal propaganda. The very patriarchal and discriminatory ideal of a woman as a man's tool can be found in the "Hutu Ten Commandments" (1990), where four commandments portray Tutsi women as tools of the Tutsi people and as sexual weapons to weaken and ultimately destroy the Hutu men (De Brower, 2005:13). Gender-based propaganda also included cartoons printed in newspapers depicting Tutsi women as sex objects. Examples of gender-based hate propaganda were used to incite war rape.

6.8. Conclusion

This chapter, as demonstrated, has provided us with answers to all of our five research questions. Indeed, in relation to the first question, much like with the previous context, we have been able to show that the Rwandan genocide is also comparable to the Holocaust and, along several lines, some of which are: organic nationalism with a very isolationist state perspective, the history of dependence and the role of a foreign power in the construction of local identities along with an unusually high level of state control and surveillance, a high reaching bureaucracy, including an impeccable organisation and total mobilisation of the society. The two aspects where the Rwandan genocide particularly reminds one of the Holocaust are: the virulent state racism and the incredible efficiency of the genocidal acts. It is thus apparent that the Holocaust is not only not unique, but that a comparative perspective in genocide studies must be seen a highly useful and necessary tool.

In relation to the second research question, the theory of the modernity of genocide can by all means be applied in relation to Rwanda. Indeed, Rwanda was a Gesellschaft society and has been one even before the arrival of the colonisers as the groups are held together by means of production not family ties, while group identities are produced by the state and therefore precede social relations. In addition, it is known for its efficient bureaucracy, its pervasive surveillance and its tight network of control,

which not only confirms the notion of the all powerful genocidal state, as shown by Bauman, which can easily be applied to the Rwandan context, but also fits Arendt's model of the surveillance state. Indeed, the Rwandan genocide implies a mobilisation of all state organs, bureaucracy and the entire society to, through a sophisticated fragmentation of power, which copies the roles in the army, accomplish the task of complete annihilation. Furthermore, the metaphors used to entice the genocidal killing in Rwanda immediately evoke Bauman's idea of the modern, gardening state, where the unwanted needs to be regularly cleansed. However contrary to Bauman's vision of the technological genocidal state, the Rwandan genocide shows that a modern genocide can also be accomplished with primitive weapons, but still retain markers of modernity.

In relation to the third question, the role of modernity in genocide, the role of modernity in the creation of ethno-national identities is that it is used as a political weapon in the process of subjugation of the inferior groups. The Rwandan state showed signs of modernity before the arrival of the colonisers but modernity is only categorised as such with the arrival of the indirect rule. This is why the experience of the colonisation and the experience of modernity are one and the same in the case of Rwanda. Indeed, the revolution of 1959-62 can be seen as a Hutu attempt to reclaim power by identifying with modernity, just as the genocide can be seen as an attempt to reclaim modernity. Here, modernity goes hand in hand with violence, both symbolic and physical. At the same time, this is also a reason why modernity is rejected, not only because the confusing colonial heritage necessitates a rejection of liberal values and demands an authoritarian state, but also because the role of the West in independent Rwanda remains a post-colonial one, mainly through the influence of the IMF and the World Bank, as the genocide can here not be seen as an embodiment of modernity, as related to our research question number five.

Finally and in relation to question number four, even though the genocide cannot be seen as a direct consequence of ancient hatreds, as there are so many other factors involved, including the vast economic crisis, pressures by the West, attacks by the RPF etc, the genocide is here, clearly seen as a regression to a more primitive form of rule. In fact, on this example, we see that Habyarimana's Rwanda was doing quite well and has achieved some impressive goals, before the situation radicalised. Also the genocide was by no means a spontaneous outburst of popular rage, but a planned attempt by the radical elites to stay in power, as the violence was developed gradually. Indeed, years of propaganda and an assassination of the moderate president had to take place in order for the violence to replace dialogue. It is this very attempt by the Hutu power nationalists to present the genocide as a

tribal affair that shows to what extent Africans are aware of the European prejudice and how they can even manipulate them to attain their goals.

7. Nazi Germany, Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Comparisons

Finally, the numerous observations made in previous chapters in relation to the respective case studies, will be compared and summarized in the following discussion. The chapter is organised according to the main themes which emerged as key in relation to each context. Firstly, I will look at the history of dependence as a significant common theme of the analysed contexts, and then I will focus on the characteristics of modern genocidal states and the execution of genocide itself to conclude with a comparison of genocidal ideologies. Throughout the chapter, the themes of genocide as a fulfilment of modernity and genocide as its rejection will interact, as we show the nature of the modern project as intimately linked to a global hegemony of the West and contains within it disillusionment with modernity.

Overall, this chapter will attempt to challenge the domination of the Holocaust in the field of genocide studies and argue against its uniqueness by providing a sophisticated comparison of three genocidal contexts in relation to modernity, which constitutes an original contribution to knowledge. Various paths of convergence and divergence between genocide and modernity will be shown. The merger of the functionalist and intentionalist approaches will demonstrate that a comparison of contexts does not stand in the way of recognising the particularities of each. Furthermore, an inclusion of Rwanda and Bosnia in the field of modern genocide and a presentation of modernist theory as key to an understanding of these two supposedly tribal contexts will provide a useful theoretical tool for the scholars who will attempt to analyse these contexts in the future and demonstrate the importance of the comparative method for a complex understanding of genocide.

7.1. The history of dependence and harmful external influences

There are a number of elements which make our three genocidal contexts thoroughly modern. The first one we will be looking at is related to the specific ways in which early modernisation of the West has contributed to its dominance in the global context, while forcing the states which developed later, didn't acquire colonies or were under foreign rule themselves to try and catch up with the most powerful and overcome the difficult heritage of dependence. In relation to the path-dependent approach, we conclude that a reactive sequence argument is useful in explaining the power-relations

in Europe which make certain contexts conducive to genocide, while not others. According to Goldstone, three causal sequences of events led to the development of the first steam engine in Britain, a main conjectural event, which will bring about a fast industrialisation of Britain, solidifying, as a consequence, its position as the leading colonial power in the world. In fact, as Luebbert points out, a new class structure emerged as a result of industrialisation, as in Britain, France and Switzerland, middle classes emerged early on, establishing political dominance prior to WWI allowing a strong liberal-labour coalition, while in those countries that industrialised later, like Germany, Yugoslavia, Italy and Spain, pre-industrial cleavages such as rural-urban and religious tensions prevented liberal communities from partnering up with the workers undergoing mobilization between 20s and 30s. In other words, "Socialists were able to make a red-green coalition with middle peasants wherever the agrarian proletariat had first been mobilized by other groups, leading to Social Democracy in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Otherwise, socialists were tempted to mobilize the agrarian proletariat themselves for their own, more radical ends, thereby alienating the middle peasants and leading to a "brown-green" coalition and fascism as happened in Germany, Italy and Spain" (Luebbert in Bennet, 2006:3).

There are, indeed, important similarities in the ways in which Germany, Serbia and Rwanda became nation states. In comparison with Great Britain which evolved from a monarchy into a nation state without too many complications and was able to consolidate the country under Protestantism allowing it to embrace scientific development sooner than the Catholic countries, in our three cases, the road to independence was a lot more difficult and the national projects came significantly later in relation to relevant others. The main similarity we can think of here is that the nationalist projects in mentioned states came into being as a reaction to an occupying force and were therefore more aggressive than they otherwise might have been. In German lands, early nationalism is formed under the threat and in reaction to Napoleon's imperialism, the struggle against which resulted in great many deaths in Germanic lands. In fact, the first modern constitution in German lands was imposed by Napoleon in a French vassal state, Westphalia, along with liberation of the serfs and emancipation of the Jews, which explains to a significant extent not only why the French revolutionary heritage in terms of Enlightenment values and modernity in general were rejected as valid frames for development but also why the Jewish minority was seen as a symbol of foreign rule. In Serbia and Yugoslavia, the nationalist project was a part of the struggle against hundreds of years of Ottoman/Habsburg rule in which thousands lost their lives. In other words, ethno-nationalism goes hand in hand with physical violence. Indeed, modernity is in our contexts introduced through force and subjugation, so in spite of the fact that in relation to the values of Enlightenment it promises equality, emancipation and universal values, it delivers the exact opposite, causing disillusionment and rejection.

In fact, in all three cases we could argue that the experience of imperialism and or colonisation changes the balance between groups in society forever. Napoleon's defeat leaves in German lands the Jewish population as a symbol of foreign rule and unwanted reforms, while in Serbia and in Rwanda, massacres take place as a part of the revenge against the already absent foreign rulers. In fact, genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, but not Germany where Anti-Semitism preceded Napoleonic reforms, can be seen to a significant extent as a direct result of imperialist-colonialist heritage and the inter-group animosities which it created. Indeed, a valuable lesson here, as seen in Arendt, is that genocide was in fact taught in the colonies. As a result of losing its territories in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, now in pursuit of a modern nationalist state led by the Young Turks, committed genocide against Armenians, while the German colonial experience of Herero-Nama genocide defined its politics against the "other" for many years to come. Indeed it is not only directly through projects of colonialism and imperialism, as key characteristics of the modern project, that we discover links between modernity and genocide, but also through capitalism, one of their significant consequences which ensures faster development of the colonial empires, thereby solidifying inequalities on the global level.

In comparison of these three contexts, it must be recognized that Rwanda as a context displays characteristics of an identity mostly determined from the outside. The colonial influence in Rwanda differs therefore from that in Serbia, in spite of the fact that the Serbs spent almost four hundred years under Turkish rule. However, the nucleus of Serb national pride persisted in the form of the autonomous and autocephalous Serb Orthodox church throughout the Ottoman rule, as opposed to Rwandans whose religion was entirely imposed by the colonizers. An important similarity between Serbia and Rwanda, on the other hand, which is not shared by Germany, is the experience of indirect rule and a transformation of classes into ethnic groups, one of the most disastrous consequences of the colonial rule which represents a strong basis for inter-group conflict. The Ottoman Empire in Bosnia and Serbia, much like the Belgians in Rwanda chose to rule through native elite who accepted this role for different reasons, but often to preserve their status in the society. On the other hand, the lower classes in both contexts were, during the colonial era, kept in the roles of the serfs, working on the field owned by their more powerful kinsmen. It is, in fact, these ruling classes, who, were never able to escape the idea of their alliance with the enemy and who, defined through the subsequent nationalist framework, became fixed as ethnic groups (Rwandan Tutsi and Bosnian Muslims) and became targets for genocidal attacks in the late 20th century. We see here how through modern categories and systems of rule groups, previously living in peace become permanently pitted against

each other, creating antagonism, which, later, plays a key role in genocide. Employing a path dependent approach, we might observe that the arrival of colonialism to a certain area might be seen as contingent, as it is a product of numerous influences, some of them coincidental, but once the colonial rule has become established in relation to institutions and identity categories, it will, indeed, greatly increase the likelihood of the emergence of genocide later on. As colonially invented group animosities became an integrated part of colonial bureaucracies, they would then reinforce themselves as a result of a self-reinforcing sequence even after the colonial bureaucracy has made significant changes.

Overall, we can say that the nationalist project in Germany although plagued by difficulties was the one, out of our three cases, that was most likely to succeed in that it, in spite of the Austro-Prussian dualism, had least opposition from outside and significant international cooperation. Serbia also had an incredibly important ally in Russia, but a number of other important European countries opposed the south-Slavic unification, primarily Austria and Germany, which is why the first kingdom of Yugoslavia does not emerge until 1918. Finally, when looking at Rwanda, we can only guess whether a nationalist project free of the colonising influence would also manage to incorporate surrounding kingdoms, like Uganda and Burundi, who, at the time of colonisation were similar monarchies speaking the same language and with a similar class distinction into Tutsi ruling elite and Hutu peasants. Certainly, at the time of the arrival of the first colonisers, Rwanda had been expanding for a significant amount of time. In other words, where pan Germanism and pan-Slavism ultimately succeed, although pan-Slavism only temporarily, pan-Africanism never does, as the post-colonial heritage is in this case too much of an obstacle for unification.

Interestingly, if we look at these three contexts in the second half of the 19th century, we find that all three states are feudal monarchies with developed bureaucracies but strong absolutist tendencies, looking to expand and incorporate as many surrounding territories into their realms as possible. However, the confusing colonial influence makes the nationalist projects difficult to unfold and necessitates not only ethno-nationalism as the only valid model of ensuring political survival but also centralized and militarized states with most reforms accomplished from top down. These societies are therefore characterised by old, pre-modern elites in power, a weak middle class, generally seen as a guarantee for a stable modern society and an overall slower political modernisation. In relation to Germany, Dahrendorf is here right when he talks about an "industrial feudal society" due to the old feudal Junkers elite staying in power even in the 20th century as well as the exile of middle class as a result of the 1848 revolution. In Rwanda, the Tutsi elite remained in charge due to the interests of the

German and Belgian colonizers, who made sure that the middle class was virtually non-existent. There were only the elites and the workers, as colonialism presents an obstacle to the political modernization of the state. Only with the extension of education to the oppressed did the revolution become a possibility, but a strong middle class never became a characteristic of Rwanda. In Serbia, the Christian nobility became Ottoman spahis and converted to Islam in order to stay in power, while many of the influential elites were forcibly converted as children and brought up in Istanbul as Janissaries. Many of these were killed or fled in the revolutionary period, while the rest of the population consisted largely of peasants. Serbia did have an important intellectual elite in the second half of the 19th century, but the middle class was extremely weak and generally concentrated in the bigger cities, while the rest of the country was largely rural.

However, the arguments focusing on the slow political modernisation and arrival of nationalism, weak middle class and a persistence of traditional elites are not enough to demonstrate that the source of genocide was in fact a lack of modernity, as it is argued by Sonderweg theorists. After all, as we have seen the history of foreign rule has been one of the major factors that contributed to inequality and animosity within societies, not only as native groups become linked to the occupiers but also because the colonialist/imperialist forces did everything in their power to obstruct the development of independent nations. Indeed, the progressive 1835 Serbian Constitution was banned by the Porte, whereas the German and later the Belgian influence in Rwanda halted the development altogether, intentionally obstructing any unifying nationalist tendency within the society and retaining serfdom long after it has been abolished in their home country, while at the same time stripping the country of resources. The Rwandan revolution, which presented an opportunity for a complete national cohesion was interrupted and hijacked by the Belgian coloniser ruining its potential to give birth to a stable nation.

However, the abolition of monarchy meant different things in different contexts. In Germany this is a time after WW1 and the Versailles treaty, in Yugoslavia, it means WW2 and the arrival of communism and in Rwanda an independent Hutu republic in the post WW2 context. However, in all three cases, the modern states were created in difficult circumstances characterized by strong tensions between different forces both internally and externally. Various factors contributed to the processes of the formation of nation state being troublesome in each case. German unification was difficult to accomplish and in spite of the shared language and history, it only exposed religious, social, and cultural differences that represented a grave difficulty in creation of a national culture. In Yugoslavia there were some significant differences as well, as parts of the country, notably Croatia and Slovenia

used to be a part of the Austro-Hungary, while Serbia and Bosnia were under the Ottomans, resulting in various cultural differences and outlooks. Sadly, Rwanda is perhaps the only one of the contexts where the differences are completely imaginary, as the people share the same language, the same religion and the same social and historical heritage. However, it goes to show how devastating a colonial experience can be for the future of a nation.

Another important factor that contributed to the destabilisation of all three states was the global tension between communism and capitalism as the weapon of Western hegemony. The Nazi genocide can, to a significant extent be seen as an attempt to reject Western rule, in relation to global capitalism as seen through the domination of Western economy, allied occupation of the Ruhr, which had a disastrous effect on the economy, but also through US loans and the penetration of US music and culture. In Rwanda, the sudden and radical shift in the politics of the Belgian coloniser from supporting the Tutsi elite to facilitating the Hutu revolution was, first and foremost a consequence of an overwhelming fear of the spread of communism, which was already taking hold of huge parts of the African continent and threatening to put an end to colonial interests, while facilitating national unifications and creation of stable states in Africa. Indeed, a very harsh treatment of Rwandans by the Belgians was a result of the capitalist focus on maximising profit and it is certainly apparent that the IMF and the World Bank, as weapons of global capitalism greatly contributed to the descent into economic disaster, which we identify as the main precondition for genocide. In relation to Socialist Yugoslavia, one of the reasons for the breakup of the state was that the end of the cold war meant that there was no longer a need for a buffer state between Europe and the Soviet Union, but capitalism also played a direct part in the dissolution of the state as the capitalist economy prioritised trade with Western republics, thereby creating inequality and animosity between republics.

The IMF played a similar role in Yugoslavia as in Rwanda, as the transition to a capitalist economy was the main condition for the financial support needed due to a vast economic crisis caused in part by Western trade barriers. Indeed, as a consequence of the war and Bosnia in particular becoming a de facto protectorate of the US, a rapid privatisation was undertaken, stripping the country of all resources and preventing economic growth. Indeed, it was imperialist and colonialist projects of Western Europe that provided the resources for capitalism and the industrial revolution in Europe, which established the West as the more dominant player, but what once was acquired through sheer physical force and subjugation of the weaker states, today is accomplished through institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, which again function as an extended arm of the West. Interestingly, the global hegemony was not only established through direct influences on states and their economy, but

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also and perhaps more sinisterly through the production of racist knowledge and a long lasting animosity between the native groups, a heritage that seems to play an important part in genocide.

These characteristics of modernity, including the scramble for Africa and scramble for Europe, which now also take place within a capitalist framework, have here not only acted as additional stressors in the formation of all three of the states but as a direct obstacle to coherent national cohesions and creation of politically mature states. Inequality, indeed, seems to be at the very heart of the modern project and one of the main reasons it becomes rejected by nations as the heritage of the colonisers and Western hegemony. Indeed, all three of our contexts, although to varying degrees, belong to the nations who start their quest towards nationhood from a position of weakness, a low placement on the ladder of global hegemony, a world in which the West has already hijacked most of the resources and whose political survival is therefore, immediately at stake.

Finally, although modernity also offers some useful concepts, such as the Enlightenment views of liberalism, emancipation, equality of all human beings and so on, it is, in other contexts, such as the German, seen as a Western project and therefore also a symbol of Western hegemony. Indeed, in spite of its promises, the Enlightenment itself incorporates reductionist terminology and, contrary to its supposed universalism, reproduces stereotypes particularly in relation to races, through its continuous use of binary opposites. Its idea of linear progress is proven wrong by the fact that its heritage is rejected through the emergence of counter-enlightenment as the focus on reason is replaced by Romanticism' focus on emotion.

7.2. Modern genocidal state

Let us here look more closely at the type of state that commits genocide. At the time of genocide all three countries compared were without doubt modern nation states, created, as we have seen, with roots in modern nationalist movements, with relationships within society not based on descent but occupation and obvious state bureaucratization and fragmentation of power, functional parliaments, monetary system and an education for all, meaning that the notion of Gemeinschaft (pre-modern) society cannot be applied to any of the discussed cases, particularly as we have demonstrated how a construction of ethnic identities was a carefully planned political project in each of the contexts. A

specific characteristic of analysed genocidal states, and also one that can be related to modernity is extreme orderliness, organisation and Spartan minimalist ethic based primarily on work as the highest moral achievement, illustrating that Bauman's theory of the modern genocidal state can be applied to all three cases. Additionally, centralisation of power and authoritarian rule, as characteristics of early modern nation states exist in each case and indeed we see how they centralised and modernised simultaneously. Modernity in fact necessitates territorial expansion as it becomes increasingly difficult to feed the growing populations which results in the search for new resources. It is, in fact, the frenzy of the 19th and 20th century modernity, the process of the formation of nation states which includes a process of annihilation of peoples and languages, the invention of new technologies which forever radically changes the society, the loss of God and faith in the predetermined, destabilisation of gender roles and above all the ruthless competition between states to acquire as much territory as possible in an increasingly overpopulated Europe, that contributed to destabilisation of identities and, especially in states with an ethno-nationalist mind frame, to genocide.

Furthermore, another similarity that our chosen genocidal states share is the totalitarian regimes, where we see an underlying similarity between communist and fascist regimes, not only in structure, but also in ideology, as mass movements in which ethnicity which trumps class were successfully created, thereby establishing a precondition for genocide by excluding those elements that do not belong within "we the people". Additionally, although communism presents itself as proletarian, it often contains elements of ethno-nationalism, as is the case with Holodomor, or, their systematic suppression during communism could make their re-emergence drastic, once the dictator dies, as we see in Yugoslavia, which, in spite of being a benign despotism under Tito, was in fact a society dominated by ethnic Serbs with Muslims stereotyped as backward and non-European. Totalitarianism, as seen in our examples, features a culture of fear and obedience, discipline, militarism, strong work ethic and reflects in its essence, despite of being a modern form of rule, a focus on traditional values, a system that undermines individualism and a warrior mentality. Here, again it becomes clear that a totalitarian rule, in spite of the fact that it is considered modern, also contains within it a rejection of that modernity, as totalitarian regimes are always an attempt to isolate the country from the hegemonic influences of western capitalism, much like an organic version of nationalism is used to create a cohesion which wasn't originally there. A totalitarian society is, indeed, a result of disillusionment with modernity.

In fact, in order to create a fake cohesion between various contradictory social forces, to a significant extent a heritage of the foreign rule, but also maintained by harmful imperialist international

influences, each of these societies has been forced to turn to an authoritarian type of rule based on obedience and persecutions, all well-established risk factors for genocide, in order to ensure political survival. This is why all three leaders who led the countries on their path towards genocide (Hitler, Tito, and Habyarimana) had military experience. Hitler certainly arrived on the political scene as a military spy and kept his close ties with the military up to the very end, while Tito and Habyarimana were both generals who came to power due to their crucial role in WW2 and the Rwandan revolution respectively, creating as a consequence states in which a strong military was of utmost importance and influenced politics to a high degree. Indeed, the military played a crucial role in the German rejection of socialism and the Versailles treaty, while the deeply ideological Serb dominated Yugoslav army paved the path towards genocide. In Rwanda, after Habyarimana's execution, it was Colonel Bagosora's connections in the highest army ranks that made the genocide possible. The genocidal states are in our cases isolated states. Burdened by numerous internal and external difficulties the leaders of these states have decided to withdraw as much as possible and not depend on the threatening environment. The history of the German state from Bismarck to Hitler has been characterized by a rejection of the so called "weak" principles of Western democracies and on the idea of self-sufficiency, exactly like Habyarimana's regime which distanced all the neighbouring states out of fear of the Congolese rebellions, refugee attacks and Tutsi regime in Burundi. Indeed, these were regimes that saw modernity as identical to Western hegemony and resorted to isolation in order to avoid it. The utopian aspect of totalitarian regimes, in particular demonstrates the need to retreat from modernity into the supposed stability of the pre-modern, which portrays genocide through the prism of disillusionment with modernity. Indeed, in spite of modernity's promise of equality, emancipation and the rule of reason, its result is the exact opposite, the rule of inequality and the madness of war as modernity seems to be a set of contradictory values, thereby defeating itself.

Furthermore, it is valid to argue that although ethno-nationalism might have seemed like a good solution in these diverse and torn countries in order to create cohesion, it was in fact, as Mann insists, a disastrous choice that very much facilitated genocide. In the Yugoslavian case, in particular we see that in spite of being both rigid and exclusionary, socialism prevented conflicts as it prevented ethnicity trumping class. Also, as Africa is a colonial context, an identity created around proletarian struggle is only logical for the people of the continent to create their independent states regardless of ethnicity. Unfortunately, socialism was in decline, and liberal capitalism paradoxically resulted in an increase in ethno-nationalist identities on the global stage (Mann, 1995: 440). This is why the analysed contexts share a burning issue of minorities. The idea of majoritarian democracy, which the Hutu were fighting for and the disintegration of Yugoslavia into small ethno-nationalist states, both resulted in a crisis of citizenship, as those who did not fit the majoritarian profile needed to be

expelled. Indeed, the concept of majoritarian democracy is not about equality, as there is always a danger of majority tyrannizing minorities, According to Outhwaite, Nazism was to a significant degree an enterprise aimed at aiding German minorities in other states or taking over those states to protect them, while cleansing the society of non-Germans and creating settler colonies in Russia (Outhwaite, 2008: 73).

On the other hand, the genocidal state cannot be seen solely as a product of tendencies and factors that preceded it for the simple reason that we are, in all three cases talking about hijacked states. In other words, genocide was not simply a logical continuation of the previous tendencies or a result of the will of the people. Hitler most certainly did not ascend to power through a democratic process, but through a series of illegal, manipulative, cunning moves, from setting Reichstag on fire, which enabled him to blame and later ban the opposition to using the state of emergency decree to replace legitimate office holders with Nazis, as well as all army officers and the notorious Enabling act, which was passed with storm troopers outside marching to intimidate. Indeed, this was an illegal step by step process aimed at completely abolishing democracy and installing dictatorship, which he accomplished. The exact same scenarios we find in a series of anti-bureaucratic revolutions which Milošević staged in order to replace the governments of provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo as well as the republic of Montenegro with his people, allowing him to vote down any proposition made by Croatia and Slovenia for more autonomy. In Rwanda, we see how the Akazu house undertook a whole range of moves, including replacing burgomasters with loyalists and even murdering the president Habyarimana in order to stay in power. The clique around the president's wife had hijacked the state. In fact, we could say that in all three examples we are here talking about threatened states that were in danger of disintegrating and in all three cases we are talking about political elites, which were ready to do whatever it takes in order to prevent this from happening and stay in power. Additionally, mechanisms used in order to execute the genocide tell us, that, this is indeed a state crime which would be impossible to commit without the state apparatus and bureaucracy, state military power, state issued propaganda, technology, state authority, paramilitaries created by state (SA, SS, Interhamwe, Arkanovi Tigrovi, Beli Orlovi) etc, but it is also an assassination of the principles of liberal rule and democracy, which are seen as threatening to the survival of the nations, as modernity, indeed, contains within it a rejection of its own ideas.

As we see, there are, indeed, a number of reasons to think that elements of modernity have played a role in genocide. State bureaucracy, technology and propaganda, which allow for total war, the concept of the gardening state and the utopian ideal of making a new man are certainly present in each case, but also Peukert's ideas of overpopulation and superfluous youth, technological advances

resulting in higher unemployment, loss of older elites' unifying power and the confusion about gender roles and identity in general, which are all a direct result of modernity. Furthermore, it could be argued that some of these states, like Germany grew too rapidly for their political structures which would be difficult to replace by any means short of war, implying exactly that violence is at the very essence of modernity, which is certainly supported by the fact that the modernisation of Europe goes hand in hand with an increase in violence. Certainly we see that modernisation brings centralization and a more ruthless, authoritarian state, while the projects of colonialism and imperialism, which mark the arrival of modernity, have meant an introduction of violence on a large scale on the global scene, including genocide. Additionally, the reforms undertaken by primarily Rwanda and Yugoslavia, by receiving loans from the IMF, which can be defined as an integrated part of the processes of globalisation, and attempting to restructure the state accordingly, brought disastrous results, putting an even bigger burden on the economy and indicating that modernity, as embodied in the global financial institutions is based on inequality between the West and the rest and can therefore only bring misery to those outside of the circle of power. Scientific racism, also a disgraceful progeny of modernity had a huge impact and contributed significantly to all three genocides we concern ourselves with, finding "scientific" justification for oppression of Jews in Germany, Muslims in Yugoslavia and Hutus in Rwanda (later Tutsis).

Indeed, the evolution of clerical anti-Judaism in Europe into racist anti-Semitism shows a radicalization in categories brought in by modernity that no longer allows the minorities to save themselves simply by converting to the dominant faith. It is exactly for this reason that a citizenship crisis as seen in all three of our contexts should be understood as a crisis of modernity. Nuremberg laws as well as the Hutu Ten Commandments took away the citizen rights of minorities, who, in the case of the Tutsi RPF demanded a return to their native country by force, while the declaration of independence of former Yugoslav Republics Croatia and Slovenia meant a lowering in the status of the Serb population from a Constitutional people to a minority. As Mann implies, it is the very idea of majoritarian democracy that proves problematic in ethnically mixed regions and this explains the harmful influence of modernity in areas with mixed population. The modern systems of ethno-nationalist rule are not suited for diversity and can cause a whole range of problems. The idea of giving power to the masses exists only so that that power can be exploited by the elites to gain more power, lands and resources (Mann, 2005).

Furthermore, as the genocidal state is, as we have seen a state of surveillance and a society of control, these characteristics are, as explained by Arendt, seen as typical for modern societies, which concern

themselves with grand designs, but this is also a consequence of a continuously paranoid state typical for modern societies and best exemplified in the anti-terrorist US state, which exists in a constant state of alarm. Similarly, in a society of paranoia fear makes everyone a spy, hence the unusually strong intelligence in all three of our contexts.   Just like the criteria for recognizing a terrorist have practically become reduced to being a member of the Islamic faith, in pre-genocide Yugoslavia western ideas or liberal interests could easily mean a sentence of political imprisonment. In Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Nazi Germany, the existence of a surveillance state meant extremely harsh punishments for dissidents. As practically everyone was in danger, revealing another as a spy would demonstrate loyalty to the system and ensure freedom from persecution.

 In relation to pressures to modernise, which are also relevant here, we see that the international pressures by the supposedly democratic West again contribute to the destabilisation of the states and their paths towards genocide, demonstrating again that inequality and Western hegemony is at the heart of modernity. All three states were supposed to make sudden and drastic change from one type of society to another. Rwanda was expected to evolve from a feudal monarchy into a liberal democracy, an extremely high expectation that resulted in an increased stress of an already economically fragile state. Yugoslavia was pressured to evolve from a totalitarian one-party communist society into a modern western capitalist state, a process that would normally take decades. Finally, post-Versailles Germany suddenly moves from a Parliamentary Monarchy to a socialist Weimar state, a leap that was more than the country could bear. This is the reason why democracy, as related to modernity, is so obviously rejected in all three contexts, because it was being introduced through international pressures and IMF blackmails, in other words, by force. Indeed, modernity seems to be typically introduced by force, from emancipatory measures of Napoleon introduced through imperialism to modernisation of Bosnia by Austro-Hungary and Rwanda by the Belgians, including the treatment of the Balkans and Africa by the hegemonic West. Modernity, in all three of these contexts is established through oppression, tyranny and physical violence.

 As a result of the continuous pressures by the West to democratise, Habyarimana creates smaller political parties, supposedly independent, some of which more radical than himself. Government agents infiltrate opposition parties to dilute their influence and extremists are put in positions of authority in all three cases. Milošević's answer to the pressures by the International community to introduce multi-party elections was a series of staged anti-bureaucratic revolutions, which were supposed to be a fundament of a new, totalitarian state. Therefore, and as expected, instead of going forward, the state regresses in an attempt to retreat to the supposed safety of the pre-modern which is

indeed illustrated in the imperial revisionist ideology and the obsession with the golden past present in all three genocidal regimes.

In the early 1990s, Serbs reverted to 19th century nationalism, which had lain dormant for almost fifty years, while Rwandan genocide was hailed as an attempt to finally complete the Rwandan revolution of the fifties. Additionally, the Weimar republic, although far from ideal was superior in terms of liberties and pluralism to the totalitarian, genocide state that Hitler built – a state constructed with the aim of going to war. In Yugoslavia, the second half of Tito's rule was characterized by numerous liberalisations, loosening and democratizing of the totalitarian state which seems benign in relation to Milošević's war machine, while in Rwanda, before the drop in the prices of coffee and tea the state was doing fairly well and didn't suffer from ethnic conflicts, all indicating that the genocidal state is a state that attempts to remove itself from modernity or in other words uses the tools of modernity in terms of the bureaucratic state apparatus and modern technology to destroy the modern world and recreate a pre-modern paradise by going back to the time before it all went wrong. In other words, the disillusionment with modernity is at the very core of the genocidal quest, but let us look at this more closely in the following.

7.3. Modernity of genocide

In relation to motives, certainly, we see that the theory of "age old hatreds" in fact has some truth to it in the cases of Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Nazi Germany. Volumes and volumes have been written on the history and the consequences of German anti-Semitism, focusing on events such as the pogroms in the Middle Ages, when Jews were blamed for causing the plague and hundreds of Jewish communities were destroyed and Jews massacred in places like Stuttgart, Dresden and Mainz to 19th century Hep-Hep riots, a violent populist reaction to Napoleon's emancipatory measures. In the Balkan context, we also see a history of hatred. As the Ottoman Empire retreated, Slavic Muslims were killed in many parts of what was later to become Yugoslavia, their mosques burned and their cemeteries destroyed, a clear link between the colonialism/imperialism and violence against minorities. During WWII the Nazi puppet Croatian state engulfed Bosnia killing hundreds of thousands of Serbs, which some have defined as genocide. In the history of the region we find that Bosnia has been a territorial ambition of both Serbs and Croats for a very long time. In Rwanda, on the other hand the age old hatreds are a bit more difficult to find, which is interesting as this is the context where such theories are used to explain the genocide more often, while it is not often deemed

relevant in the discussions on the Holocaust. In fact, there were no ethnic conflicts or hatreds in Rwanda in pre-colonial/pre-modern times. The country was peaceful and the ethnic element, which proved cardinal in the emergence of genocide, didn't even exist.

Can pre-modern violence then be seen as a sole cause of genocide? The answer is no. In Germany, the polls have shown that as soon as the disastrous post-Versailles economic situation seemed to be improving after the Stresemann reforms, the populous support for National Socialists greatly declined, showing that it was indeed the crisis that made the crucial difference in terms of leadership profile. In Yugoslavia, there was a long period of peace, democratisation and finally in 1974 a new, liberal Constitution that acknowledges the status of Muslims as an independent ethnic group and gives autonomous status to neglected regions. It is only after a drop in oil prices and a serious economic crisis that emerged from this, the struggle for survival and competition between the developed and less developed part of the country provides a real reason for genocide. The dormant hatreds were just simply a useful tool to manipulate by the Serb leadership who desired to stay in power, but they had to be intentionally directed in the propaganda that was utilised for a decade before the population was prepared for genocide. Similarly, in Rwanda, the Habyarimana years had brought a number of improvements, industrialisation, participation in international economic projects, and a significant loosening of ethnic quota rules. The regime radicalized only as the financial troubles increased. In all three cases this indicates that the genocide can only be seen as a regression to a more primitive, rigid and violent form of rule, as we see evidence of more liberal relations in decades prior to the violence. In general and in relation to the path-dependent approach, we see that genocide, as it is both a result of predictable societal influences and unpredictable influences of individuals, such as Hitler's or Milošević's role in hijacking their respective states, should be seen as a contingent event, but in spite of the difficulties this might cause in predicting the genocides of the future, we can still conclude that a history of foreign rule and its role in reproducing group animosities through bureaucratic institutions, a vast economic crisis and a general exclusion from the Western circle of power are clear risk factors in the emergence of genocide, which can then act as a starting point for another sequence of self reinforcing events.

In addition, in all contexts the genocide also had a rational motivation, to reduce the burden on the economy. Not only is a war often seen as a solution for the crisis as it solves unemployment, employs the military industry and solves the problem of overpopulation in one go, but we also see evidence for this in each individual case. In Nazi Germany, small and unproductive Jewish businesses were a real burden on the economy and additionally a number of important Nazi projects were funded by goods

stolen from robbed Jewish houses. In Bosnia, looting was an important part of genocide with the so called "weekend Chetniks" arriving from Montenegro when free from their every day jobs to loot and plunder. Bosnian Muslims were, although this was far from always the case, seen as a well off ethnic group, while Rwandan Tutsi, in spite of the reversal of ethnic power that came with the revolution still owned a fair part of the land and were overrepresented in the business sector. This shows that the vast economic crisis is the primary reason for instrumental motives of some perpetrators, and it is, itself, mostly a product of difficulties related to modern capitalist markets and intentional harmful influences of Western hegemons. Bauman's theory of instrumental rationality as modern reasoning, which, as we see is a useful tool in the analysis of Bosnia and Rwanda, is here supported by Helen Fein, who claims that "genocide is preventable, because it is usually a rational act. That is, the perpetrators calculate the likelihood of success given their values and objectives" (Fein, 1994:5).

Indeed, the idea to remove the "problematic" minorities was to an extent rational in all three cases, but the idea of genocide as a completely rational endeavour has some deep flaws to it, as well. In relation to Nazi Germany, certainly anti-Semitism made a lot of sense in the beginning both politically in terms of national cohesion, but also economically in terms of slave labour, seized property, reduction of unemployment and elimination of small, unproductive Jewish businesses, but as the war progressed, grave military and diplomatic mistakes have been made, flaws became evident and the extermination of Jews at any cost became an obsession rather than a rational plan, primarily because it removed focus and necessary resources from winning the war. In this respect, Fleming's theory about "growth of an obsession", particularly in relation to no retreat policies and the final solution, proves to carry a lot of weight. Similarly to other cases, Nazi Germany attempted to realise a number of plans for removal of the Jews, Madagascar plan being of particular interest and, as we have learned the idea of the final solution is not seriously discussed until the war starts going wrong. In this sense genocide should not be seen as a product of rational calculation but a last resort brought about by an impossible situation and a number of radicalising forces completely out of control. Milošević's idea of keeping all Yugoslav republics within one state was initially rational as well. Croatia and Slovenia were, already integrated in the new neo-liberal market, economically doing much better than Serbia, while the principle of Federation demanded a redistribution of resources that Serbia benefited from. Additionally, losing territory meant a forced division of the Serbian people leaving Serbia as a matrix weakened and "polluted" by foreigners, but Srebrenica, as perhaps the least rational decision of the Serb military leadership and a culmination of the war mass hysteria only came about as a consequence of losing the war. In Rwanda hunger and overpopulation in addition to the continuous attacks by the RPF meant that something drastic had to be done. However, Habyarimana was willing to negotiate with the ex-patriots until the sources of radicalization as embodied by the Akazu had gotten out of

hand. Indeed, we see here clearly how the modern promise of reason defeats itself by becoming transformed into the madness of war and genocide.

In fact, these arguments confirm Mann's thesis that genocide is rarely planned in advance but comes about as a result of a series of escalations that end up radicalising every sector of society, which defeats the theory of genocide as the primary plan and the omnipotent power of the dictator, proposed by intentionalists. As we have witnessed in each case, a number of radicalising forces were at play in each of the analysed contexts, many of which are intimately related to the modern ideology of nationalism, due to which members of what is seen as the same ethnic groups found themselves in different nation states and the crisis of markets, which seems to be permanently at the core of capitalism. In Nazi Germany, apart from the economic crisis we have: the traditionalist Junker elites, who craved the return of lost territories, military and Freikorps full of disillusioned WWI veterans and ideologically indoctrinated anti-Slavic warriors known for their racist passion and killing zeal, SS, also virulently racist, trained and handpicked ideological killer units under whose control the notorious Einsatzgruppen committed thousands of voluntary and un-authorized killings, SA, the early wild, working class violence, transnational refugees, radical Austrians etc. all contributed to a descent into chaos, not only of the war itself, but also the previously well organised and controlled military who degenerated into looters and thieves. In pre-war Yugoslavia, again, apart from the devastating economic crisis, the main source of radicalization was the unstable Kosovo province, where Albanian dissidents had been creating problems for decades. Croatian and Slovenian desire for independence was threatening to seriously destabilise the country. The manoeuvres of the Croatian president Tuđman, in particular, contributed to the escalating atmosphere as the status of Serbs in Croatia was reduced from a Constitutional people, whose rights were thus legally guaranteed to a minority of which nobody really knew what it entailed, a consequence of the modern concept of majoritarian democracy, fatal in all three contexts. Milošević was, in this sense, about to lose territories that had belonged to Serbia for almost the entire twentieth century. On top of this, dissatisfied native Serb populations in threatened, ethnically mixed regions of Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia applied constant pressure on Milošević's presidency. Finally in Rwanda, the severe economic distress and an overpopulation of epic measures along with the attacks by the RPF, demonstrating a modern crisis of citizenship, provided a source of continuous distress and instability. As a response to these, the state radicalised in several ways, primarily: Akazu, the political clique around the president's wife represents the key source of radicalization, many of the newly formed political parties, such as the extremely radical CDR and MDR including their paramilitaries Interhamwe and Impuzamugambi, but also poor and dissatisfied Hutu farmers. In all three contexts, the drive for drastic measures that finally resulted in genocide cannot be said to have only come from above but was also a result of

continuous pressures by dissatisfied, hungry and threatened individuals and groups of individuals which demanded instant changes.

We see that even though the motives for radical changes in the given contexts were sometimes rational, some of the forces that radicalized the contexts were in fact driven by passionate and emotional reasons and they too had a distinct impact on the outcome of these difficult circumstances. A look into the motives of the perpetrators can also provide us with additional evidence on the supposedly rational nature of genocide. In our previous chapters we have seen that instrumental rationality can only account for one aspect of the motives of perpetrators. As far as the killers are concerned, we can attest to the fact that complicated bureaucracies were found in all three contexts, which is why the difficulty of allocating free-floating responsibilities was such a problematic issue in the respective genocide trials. The profile of a desk killer as a perpetrator of genocide with instrumental motives, thus, makes sense to significant degree, none the less because in all three cases we see a profound culture of obedience and control.

Additionally, many of the killings in all three contexts were a result of an explicit or implicit threat of death in the case of disobedience. Contexts are similar in that there was a mass participation in genocide with killers drawn from all classes and parts of society. Indeed all three contexts are known for the role of bureaucracies in genocide. In Rwanda, an efficient and controlled bureaucracy was said to execute all orders from above and was the main actor in the execution of genocide, along with the fact that the involvement of businessmen and elites was also instrumentally motivated. In Yugoslavia, a Soviet type system of rule meant a hyper-production of apparatchiks, a bleak, but profit oriented kind of employee, while in all three contexts it is clear that the economic destabilisation provided a strong incentive for financially oriented crimes and the possessions of the killed Jews/Tutsis/Bosnian Muslims were certainly used efficiently to either finance the war further or to accommodate members of the attacking group. However, this is only a part of the story in relation to the respective bureaucracies. Bauman's theory, thus, is correct in identifying one kind of potential perpetrator, but overlooks the fact not only that bureaucracies in question adapted to the radicalised atmosphere in such a way that they allowed the ideologically adequate personalities to quickly climb the social ladder, but also that we are talking about contexts where ideological indoctrination was very extreme and penetrated all spheres of society. Indeed, the influence of modernity on the global contexts did not result in rationality and the rule of reason, but on the contrary it created a frenzy and mass hysteria from the difficulties to feed the ageing populations, disastrous projects of colonialism, imperialism and slavery, the destabilisation of various identity roles, instability of capitalist markets etc.

In fact, a closer look at the motives of the perpetrators has provided us with some very important clues as to the rationality of genocide. In the case of Nazi Holocaust, most perpetrators came from core Nazi constituencies like the East and lost territories, while many had previous experience in concentration or euthanasia camps. Furthermore, all Hitler's close collaborators were individualists with grand ideological convictions, not simply obeying apparatchiks. In Milošević's Serbia, we find similar circumstances. Instrumental rationality is certainly present, as demonstrated in the case of weekend Chetniks and desk killers who had to orchestrate the enormous task of transporting the victims, organising the killings, burying and reburying the victims in secondary and tertiary graves which required profound organisation and coordination given the number of victims. In some constituencies, however, like the military and the Orthodox Church, Serb nationalism was always the dominant ideology. In fact, as the economic situation in Yugoslavia became worse much of the middle class and moderate intellectuals fled, while the ones who stayed were either working class who had nowhere else to go, or radicals who thrived in the situation of absolutism. It was these radicals who were then given the power to advance in the bureaucracy, who replaced moderates on all levels from accountants to journalists and intellectuals.

Like in Rwanda, people who led the paramilitaries were often criminals freed from prisons. On top of this, main ideologists and leaders of genocide, including Milošević's close colleagues and leaders of political parties that created the paramilitaries were not obeying apparatchiks, but intelligent, highly educated and dangerous personalities who not only followed the lead of Milošević, but pursued their own ideological convictions (Drašković, Šešelj). The obsession of the leaders of the Serbian genocide is demonstrated in the ICTY trials, where unlike the Nuremberg defence where Nazis on trial blamed the "Führerprinzip" for the crimes committed, Serb order givers denied the legality of the trial and the international court itself, calling it western propaganda and continuing to blame the victims for everything that has happened.

In Rwanda, like in the previous contexts, we find instrumental along with other motives of the perpetrators. Obedience was, perhaps, crucial in this context, as the killings were presented as a part of the traditional institution of "Umuganda" – community work, but genocide was constructed as work in other contexts as well, showing the discipline and the motivation of the totalitarian subject. Community work was very common in Yugoslavia where post WWII the country was rebuilt by state organized youth, so when these same channels and identity modes were used by the Serb led army to

execute genocide, they found minimal resistance, while in Nazi Germany the work ethic as seen through obedience and embodied in the portrayal of the hard working and honest Aryan opposite of the lazy and manipulative Jew was all pervasive. In addition, the reason for the mass participation in the context of Rwanda is a rational decision of the state due to the fact that the army was occupied at the front and there was certainly no lack of instrumental motives among the heavily involved businessmen, unemployed youth or poor farmers. However, other motives were also present to a significant extent. Embittered refugees from Burundi along with ex soldiers and descendants from traditional Hutu kingdoms in the North were motivated by passionate goals such as the pursuit of justice, while local officials and elites complied out of ideology. Indeed, the propaganda and deliberate indoctrination were so strong in all three contexts, along with justified grievances of a number of different society groups, that ideology and passionate killings must be taken into consideration in all three contexts. In relation to genocide, the ideological and passionate killings, which we find characterise to a significant extent all three contexts, again testify to a rejection of modern values, as modernity contributes to an escalation of passions in relation to the fantasized validity and historical origins of the nation state as a form of rule in particular.

Other characteristics can attest to the modernity of these genocides, efficiency for one. All of these genocides accomplished a vast number of murders in a relatively short period of time. The forces of the Serbian military and the army of Republika Srpska killed about 100.000 people in Bosnia alone over the course of three years. As we know, Hitler managed to exterminate two thirds of European Jews, while the Hutu Power annihilated about a million souls in less than three months. From this angle, all three projects were extremely efficient. Nazis were close to accomplishing a Judenfrei Europe. Serbs were able through ethnic cleansing, to create a corridor in Bosnia, entitling them to about half of the total Bosnian territory, while Hutus exterminated nearly all Rwandan Tutsis. Ultimately, all projects were also unsuccessful overall, as Hitler's empire was crushed resulting in the bombings of Germany, division of the country, mass rapes of German women by Soviet soldiers and reparations which were only completed recently. Serbs subsequently lost territories in Croatia, but later also Macedonia, Montenegro and even Kosovo declared autonomy. Rwanda was finally overtaken by the RPF, which in fact meant a return of the Tutsi dominated government (which is exactly what was fought against), exit from the francophone speaking political sphere and a new attachment to the Commonwealth. Indeed, genocide is here, as we have discussed before, a thoroughly modern affair, but contains within it a rejection of modernity, just as the initially rational genocidal quest disintegrates into a descent into madness.

Apart from efficiency other elements related to modernity can be found in the respective contexts. Numbing for example demonstrates that the killers were not primal barbarians, but had to be prepared in various ways for the killings. Apart from the propaganda which made the killings seem justified and even godly, perpetrators in Bosnia were given masks, thereby symbolically assuming the identities of sacred Christian warriors defending the cradle of nationhood from the barbaric imposters. Technological advances were also used in all three contexts. The Yugoslavian and the German contexts are usually seen as more militarized than the Rwandan. However, this is not entirely true, as the Serb army, much like Wehrmacht not long after the beginning of the wars showed distaste for the killings of civilians, which is why violent paramilitaries had to be used to a more significant degree. Also, as the war progressed, even the supposed embodiment of the Nazi modernity: Wehrmacht regressed into primitive, machineless face to face trench combat.

On top of this, numbing was accomplished with liberal quantities of alcohol and drugs. Trucks carrying barrels with rakija followed the Serb army everywhere they went, similarly to Rwanda, while amphetamines, legal at the time, were regularly sent to the German troops on the front. Additionally, in accordance with Bauman's gardening theory, which he uncovers as a clear sign of modernity, gardening metaphors were used to make the killings appear natural, so the Hutu perpetrators: "cleared the bushes", "cleaned the weeds" and "pulled out the roots". Rwanda, indeed, in several aspects, both in terms of the profound organisation of genocide, allpowerful role of the state and frightening efficiency of the genocide but also in relation to the gardening state mentality that aims at perfecting itself is a prime example of Bauman's work and shows that the ideas which the critical theory defined in relation to the Holocaust can, indeed, be applied to other contexts as well. Certainly, the initial organization of all three genocides was impeccable and all-encompassing, with perfectionism and a degree of control that can certainly be related only to modernity. Organisation in Rwanda was carried out through the state apparatus down to the level of the cell, echoing the divisions and the tasks in the army with branches in charge of: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and finances respectively with orders from the cabinet being passed through 11 regional prefects, sub-prefects and 145 commune mayors to the councillors and police forces in each commune. While carrying out a total genocide they deliberately manipulated the western media with images of uncontrolled tribal violence, thereby avoiding interference. The level of control was, indeed unprecedented, as the killings could be stopped with a blow of a whistle, while perpetrators signed contracts of proper conduct with even pillages being supervised, making Rwanda unique in this respect. Milošević was also known for his tricks in international relations, particularly with managing to present an aggression of the Serb led Yugoslav army on the then already internationally recognized independent Bosnian state as a civil war, an image that still pervades the media as well as the court rooms. The

Bosnian genocide was organized through the activities of the radical Serb Democratic Party (SDS), which prepared the population and distributed the weapons through channels formerly used by the Yugoslavian People's Army, which had a third of the entire population of Yugoslavia in its reserve. As the army of the Republika Srpska was the de facto Yugoslav People's Army with replaced emblems, we are here looking at one of the strongest and most tightly disciplined armies in the world. Also, nationalist Serbs were acting according to an exact territorial plan; the idea of a looming Muslim attack was used to justify the massacres as self-defence, which many Serbs believe to this day, and the attacked Muslim population was purged in such a way that the intellectual and religious elites were the first ones to go, mosques destroyed and religious texts burned, so that even those who survived would in time forget who they were and assimilate. Indeed, Serbs were operating from a sophisticated identity based approach to annihilation, undeniably rational and also demonstrated in the mass rapes. The Holocaust is perhaps best remembered for concentration camps and the gas chambers indicating that the vastness of the project will perhaps always remain its defining characteristic.

To summarise, we have, indeed, been able to attest to the fact that motives of instrumental rationality were indeed present in all three contexts, according to the Bauman's ideas of modernity and they do explain the motivation for the genocidal plan as well as the actual killings, but only to an extent. In spite of the fact that the idea of removing the minority might initially seem rational, it is actually a result of a series of escalations and radicalizations of different inside and outside societal forces which end up exploding. This explosion should, however, not be seen as an explosion of primeval passions or spontaneous outbursts of anger, as it is sometimes shown, but an explosion of different modern tendencies that cumulate in a planned and organised violence which ends up deteriorating into pre-modern forms of war. Genocide is, in this sense not a result of the pre-modern, but an attempt to re-create the pre-modern. This is also reflected in the fact that, even though all the analysed contexts are clearly Gesellschaft societies where alliances to the state or citizenship are key to the execution of genocide, the organic nationalist ideology, which is at the core of this quest promotes a traditional connection between blood and soil, typical for Gemeinschaft communities. Furthermore, the idea of the dictator as the ultimate father figure, in a totalitarian system in which modernity as individualism is rejected shows both that modernity indeed can include the pre-modern within its frame, but also that the existence of the pre-modern in this case indicates the need to destroy modernity as a whole and retreat to an imagined safety of the traditionalist past.

 It is important to distinguish that the contexts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda were more characterized by neighbour vs. neighbour killings than Nazi Germany, in which the murders were to a significant

extent removed from the core society. However, in Yugoslavia and Rwanda the killings were most definitely organised by the state and did not represent spontaneous outbursts of primal rage, as the violence was deliberately prepared and developed by the relevant state agencies, while Nazi Germany, in spite of the fact that killings were removed was also characterized by an inner society conflict as neighbours willingly notified the authorities about whereabouts of Jews and other targeted populations as is customary in the society of doppelgänger.

Additionally, we have seen that although Bauman's work has previously been related solely to the Holocaust, it can serve, just as well, as a background theory for the contexts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Rwanda in particular is a prime example of Bauman's theory of the gardening state as well as the reason for why the bureaucracy of the so called Switzerland of Africa was able to carry out such a perfectionist crime with an almost absolute control, and as such, along with the fact that there were no pre-colonial ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, is least appropriate for the use of the "ancient hatreds theory". However, in relation to the rationality of the genocidal crimes, the theory of instrumental rationality is not sufficient to explain the evolution of the genocidal plan or the motives of the perpetrators. As Mann suggests, perhaps Weber's term value rationality would be better used here in terms of a commitment to absolute values, as the genocidal plan itself, although perhaps partially driven by certain rational considerations, cannot in reality be seen as anything else but a descent into madness. A commitment to absolute values, absolute hatred, and absolute annihilation can be considered an unreasonable rationality. After all, in all three cases, killings went on as long as absolutely possible, in Nazi Germany and Rwanda at the cost of losing the war, while Serb perpetrators were somewhat less ambitious. The Nazi killing machine was difficult to stop even when the war was lost. In Rwanda, the USA's calls for military officers and Bagosora to halt the killings didn't have an outcome, as the killings continued even as the peace talks were in progress and the women who were previously spared were finally slaughtered during the last days. The Bosnian genocide ended with Srebrenica, the biggest European massacre since WWII, where 8000 people were slaughtered in the course of three days, all demonstrating the very modern, yet extremely irrational nature of the 20th century genocide.

7.4. Ideology of modern genocide

As we have demonstrated, genocide, as seen through the prism of the modern nation state and the very execution of massacres by this state undoubtedly has many elements of modernity. However, with genocidal ideology the rejection of modernity which we have concluded is an integrated part of the modern emerges as a key theme. In relation to totalitarianism, the ideologies attached to the respective systems have been called ideologies of social frustration, reactionary ideologies that come as a result of an overwhelming societal threat. The very essence of fascist and communist ideologies is a grave danger they each represent to each other. In fact, both communism and fascism are ideologies that came as a consequence of difficult and turbulent times in European history, which accounts for their disillusionment with the modern world, their main similarity being the promises to end class conflict by creating a mass movement through excluding "otherness" and shunning modern individualism. In the case of Yugoslavia in particular, the similarities between the two ideological systems become clear as it is shown how a communist structure can in fact turn into fascism practically overnight.

Apart from Nazism, which defined itself early on as fascist, Serbian and Rwandan totalitarian regimes have elements of both communism and fascism, although, as we have argued, by the time the regimes were preparing for drastic measures, they were all predominantly fascist. Nazism, an ideology and religion at the same time is a cult of tradition, an authoritarian, militarist ideology which justifies its war mentality with the need to defend the society from perceived inside and outside threats, making it irrational, obsessive and paranoid – essentially anti-modern. The Nazi obsession is, therefore, directed towards the Judeo-Slavic enemy as a consequence of various elements: 1) communist Russia led by prominent Jews served as an obstacle to German expansion, 2) the fact that the various Slavic states were enlarged by German lands as a consequence of the Versailles treaty 3) Small Jewish businesses presented a burden on the German economy. In the case of Serbia, however, the Ustasha-Jihadist plot consists of two elements 1) The Ustasha element refers to the Croatian Nazi puppet state which committed genocide against Serbs and 2) the Muslim plot to outbreed the Serbs from within and the memory of the 500 year long occupation by the Ottomans. In the case of Rwanda, the atmosphere of paranoia stems not only from the fact that the regime was the result of a coup, but the despised Tutsi minority, as in other contexts presents an infiltration of an international enemy, English speaking RPF, the Tutsis with the protection of Uganda and the Anglo-Saxon world, as opposed to the French protected Hutu regime. Indeed, one thing common to all three of our genocidal regimes is a strong anti-Western stand. Nazi Germany rejects modernity as seen through global Americanisation and the dominance of the post WWI allied influence in Europe. A dependence on American loans along with

an infiltration of German culture by American cultural values meant a loss of authenticity and a victimisation by Western hegemony. In Serbia, both during Tito's Yugoslavia as well as during Milošević's era anti-Western politics were very prominent, partially due to an awareness of the fact that American neo-liberal values would corrupt the society and make the country a victim of Western supremacy, as we see today has actually become the case with all of the Balkans. Habyarimana's Rwanda also nurtured politics of isolationism as the devil of the economic demise indeed comes in the guise of the institutions of Western hegemony: IMF and the World Bank.

Although the focus of fascism is rapid modernisation in terms of technology, its ideology is romantic, not instrumental as it longs for a revival of ancient kingdoms and seeks its inspiration in classical antiquity (Sparta, Rome). As such, fascism represents a rejection of modernity as it perceives the values of enlightenment and the age of reason as the beginning of modern depravity, but also carries a true misanthropic hatred for important civilizational values of intellectualism, culture and art. These elements are also found in the other two contexts. The revival of ancient kingdoms and a resurrection of a golden past are, indeed, a focus of our genocidal regimes and confirm Giddens's theory that traditionality is preoccupied with the past. Hitler aims to revive the kingdom of Charlemagne and the Teutonic knights, the so called 1ˢᵗ Reich, when Germany was the biggest it ever was. Similarly, Serbs are looking to revive the golden age of Dušan's Empire, while Serbia was a significant European power, before the Ottomans started attacking and everything was lost. In Rwanda, Nahimana's stories about the ancient Hutu kingdoms supported the idea that Agathe Habyarimana was a Hutu princess, a legitimate pre-colonial ruler of the Northern Hutu, who supposedly always provided both resistance to the white man, and were also the last to fall under his rule. Indeed, it was the troubled history of dependency that makes each of these contexts seek a refuge from the troublesome modernity in a supposedly happier time before the introduction of the foreign rule. A disillusionment with modernity is most definitely at the heart of totalitarianist utopias.

Virulent racism is another common characteristic of these three contexts and many types of fascism in general. However, it is scientific racism in particular that is said to be a progeny of modernity. Supposedly scientific strategies such as craniometry were used all over Europe and in the colonies to prove the superiority of European peoples in relation to conquered others as it is a modern, European ideology that becomes applied in all three of the discussed contexts. Indeed, the scientific racism, which was used to justify the "Nordic Nonsense" and other similar theories easily reached Eastern Europe as well, which is recognisable in the ways Albanian Muslims are, by Serb scientists in the first half of the 20ᵗʰ century classified as inferior and ape-like; social-Darwinism put to practical use. In

fact, as Arendt demonstrates, pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism were similar, racist movements, which developed simultaneously, both advocating security within tribes and a withdrawal from the public space as a consequence of the turbulent European atmosphere, scramble for territory, changes of national borders and shifting political liaisons.

Christo-Slavism, the racist Slavic movement that defines Slavs as Christian by nature, thereby excluding all Slavic Muslims as traitors of ancestral blood and faith and symbolically converts to the Turkish race is not that much different from Nazi anti-Semitism, which even though not explicitly religious still has its roots in the pre-nationalist European need to deny non-Christians the right to belonging. In spite of the fact that it is modern racism that places minorities in an impossible position denying them the right to assimilate through conversion, it is the values of white Christianity and white Christianity alone that are at the very fundament of the exclusions which led to genocide, as we see that the modern contains within it numerous elements of the premodern. Indeed, as perpetrators see themselves as people of God and crusaders, genocide is also in all three cases seen as an act of redemption for the sins of polluting the race.

Indeed, it was the religious prejudice that Europeans nurtured against the dark skinned European Moors, which subsequently became applied against the Native Americans and finally Africans. After all, 19th century scientific racism is full of religious images and quotes from the Bible while the Hamitic myth, which was used to scientifically justify conquering and dividing Africa, was in fact based on one of the key biblical stories about Noah's brother Ham. Of course, as we see in the case of Serbia, the scientific racist stereotypes used to prepare for genocide are a product of their specific time, so religious elements became replaced by theories of inferior genes and Serbs as an endangered species, as presented by the Western educated biologist Biljana Plavšić. But in essence, the entire Serb nationalist mythology relies on the same texts and images as it did in the 19th century and it is rooted in an even earlier European disdain for Islamic minorities, as the modern is deeply connected to its pre-modern origins. Similarly, the scientific theories used in Rwanda, stem from the exact same 19th century European context when craniometry was in fact practised by German colonizers on Rwandans. As Arendt correctly points out: "African colonial possessions became the most fertile soil for the flowering of what later was to become the Nazi elite. Here they had seen with their own eyes how peoples could be converted into races and how, simply by taking the initiative in this process, one might push one's own people into the position of the master race. Here they were cured of the illusion that the historical process is necessarily progressive" (Arendt, 1975).

The colonial Hamitic theory identifying the Tutsi class with the superior pastoral proto-European race of conquerors was a product of this same interaction between Europe and the colonies while categorising the Hutu class as inferior and ape-like. In the context of genocide it became adapted to modern ideals of majoritarian democracy and reversed to define the Hutu as indigenous majority and Tutsis as alien imposters with no rights to citizenship. The Rwandan use of scientific racism in the genocidal propaganda supports the idea of Hutu and Tutsi as genetically separate species, as in all contexts social Darwinism is used to describe mental characteristics of "otherness" as lazy, evil and treacherous. In other words, the European scientific racism was so virulent and influential, that it remained relevant in the ways the groups saw each other at the end of the 20th century,

Building a racial utopia is another thing that is common in all three contexts, as both communism and fascism aim at restructuring the societies completely and creating a whole new man, but this is also demonstrated by the fact that the idea of the final solution is inherent in genocide itself. It is, indeed, a general characteristic of European modernity utopia to seek a revival of a supposed golden age. According to Bauman, "utopia is born with the advent of modern mentality, with the shift in human self-understanding from God to human beings as the creator of the grand design of the world" (Bauman in Jacobsen, 2008:217). In order to build this perfect state, eugenic methods were used. In Nazi Germany, cleansing the race from inside pollution by Jews and other inferior blood, in Yugoslavia, cleansing the blood of Christian Slavs from contamination by the Orients as embodied in imagined inferior Turkish/Arabic genes, in Rwanda, the contamination by the supposedly Ethiopian/Abyssinian Tutsi cattle herders and enslavers of the Hutu majority, called for immediate cleansing, which was enforced by the use of AIDS. The race was also attempted strengthened through various strategies. The Nazi Lebensborn programme controlled breeding between Aryans in an attempt to produce perfect children, while Aryan looking Slavic children were stolen from their families and placed with German parents. The Serb master plan involved mass rapes of women, who were believed to get pregnant with male children who would be ethnic Serbs, kill their mothers and finish the genocide, thereby, like cuckoos, planting their "superior" genes in the inferior group, and increasing reproduction within own group, but restricting reproduction within enemy group, as raped women would often be rejected by men of same ethnicity, while in Rwanda anti-abortion laws aimed at increasing the number of racially pure children. In all three groups, reproducing with the enemy was strictly forbidden, in Germany through the Nuremberg laws, in Rwanda through Hutu Ten Commandments, while in Bosnia people from ethnically mixed marriages were the first ones to be executed by the Serb army.

Ensuring a Lebensraum was another precondition for creating a racially pure, utopian state. The Nazi dream was not only to re-conquer their territories in central and Eastern Europe, but also to carve out of Russia a new Nazi paradise. The goal of Serb nationalists was the triangle Karlovac-Karlobag-Virovitica, incorporating large parts of Bosnia and Croatia, while Rwandan theorists were planning an expansion towards Congo and Uganda, once the motherland had been purified. In accordance with this ideal of territorial expansion, the respective genocidal ideologies focus mainly on the soil as the precondition for realisation of the state, again demonstrating the key role of the pre-modern in the construction of modern ideologies. Nazi politics of blood and soil is based on the idea of the holy earth, which becomes fertile when drenched in blood. According to various mythological theories, proto Germans were peasant warriors who came out of the mystical woods, which corresponds closely with Rwandan propaganda massages that the Hutu farmers should be armed while cultivating. In all three contexts, it is argued that cities are places of immorality, prostitution and theft, while the authentic national spirit is only found in the villages. This is the reason why the idea of the gardening state is the perfect metaphor for any of the respective genocidal states and why the genocidal act has in all three contexts been euphemistically described as: "cleansing the weeds" and "pulling out the roots".

However, it is the ancient, mystical and tribal obsession with the past and territorial origins that is at the basis of this idea, which demonstrates that modernity often incorporates traditional modes of thinking. In fact, the very reason for disgust at the urban environment as morally perverted reflects a rejection of modernity and everything modernity stands for: liberal values. It is, indeed, the consequences of modernity that to an extent created the societal mess that was attempted solved by genocide, as the cities became the places of severe overpopulation and the boundaries between groups became blurred so that the enemy was no longer visible, which made him that much more dangerous. The gardening state reflects therefore a desire to return to a pre-industrial paradise, an agrarian ur-state, an idealised context which supposedly existed before the modern pollution became a problem. Indeed, the Serb, Nazi and Rwandan attempts to revive ancient empires can only be seen as regressive – a departure from the modern, both in intent and in the nature of the contents. Paradoxically, it appears that the purpose of modern industrialised killing is to provide the man with a way of resurrecting an ancient, pre-industrial paradise. Indeed, inspiration for genocidal utopias is sought in classical antiquity, particularly Sparta, presumably the first eugenic state, where phenotypical breeding and infanticide were used to ensure that the race remains pure of inferior elements, as this classical garden state became the source of Nazi Laconophilia. It certainly seems not only that much

of what we today consider modern, including democracy was to some extent already defined and used in classical antiquity, but that it is the nature of modernity to recycle old ideas in order to give them a new shape, as it appears to have no particular contents of its own.

Finally, in relation to stereotypes found in the propaganda materials aimed at preparing the respective populations for genocide we find numerous similarities between the contexts and at the same time numerous references to modernity. Indeed, the hated otherness is portrayed through modernity and a denial of modernity at the same time. The image of greedy capitalist as applied to define the group targeted for genocide is key for understanding the role of modernity in genocide. On the other hand, we also discover images of "others" as barbarians and wildlings, which reflects the ways how ethnic identities are created in relation to otherness and how modernity is always used to characterize the more powerful.

In the case of Nazis and Serb nationalists the enemy also comes in the shape of oriental barbarians, as best illustrated by Serb nationalist delusion that the secular European Slavic Muslims were going to breed them out by stealing Serb women and taking them to their "harems", while in Rwanda's Kangura we find the portrayal of the savage Tutsi monarchy. This duality represents dual norms in relation to modernity, of socially frustrated totalitarian contexts. On the one hand, in all contexts modernity is rejected. Nazis have deemed Western democracies as weak and inefficient, the Serb nationalist propaganda insisted on the plot by the capitalist West to destroy Yugoslavia and in Kangura modernity is rejected through the values of the colonizer, but the colonizer is not only understood as the German and the Belgian imperialists, but also as the capitalist tools that came with globalisation, such as the IMF and the World Bank, a new kind of imperialism. Through rejecting the "others" as greedy capitalists, these contexts are in fact rejecting the values of the hegemonic West. On the other hand, paradoxically, modernity is seen as positive as it is used as a radical opposition to the barbarity and the savagery of the "other". It is both adopted as a general European civilizational value and rejected as a tool of Western hegemony.

The paradox of defining the enemy as both barbarian and modern stems, in fact, from an ambivalent relationship to modernity in general. In order to accomplish a national cohesion through defining a weaker society group as a target for genocide, modernity will be used to show "Us" as more powerful than them, who will be defined as barbarians, but when we compare ourselves with the bigger, international threat, which we attempt to escape, such as Western hegemony, we recognise the power

of the opponent by allowing him the ownership of modernity, which we then define in negative terms, as modernity seems to always mark the position of power and the genocidaires will both intentionally identify with it, in spite of the oppressive Western hegemon who denies the natives' right to progress and civilisation, but at the same time reject it as it has, indeed, only resulted in inequality and violence. Modern genocide is therefore here seen as both an attempt to reclaim the denied modernity by the oppressed society groups and at the same time a desire to reject it as the very source of this inequality. Genocide is, indeed, the result of modernity's ambivalence.

Another image related to modernity depicts the hated group of "others" as cuckoos, imposters who infiltrated their genes becoming invisible in the group. When looking at pre-modern periods, for example, the middle ages, Jews/Tutsi/Slavic Muslims were dressed in certain way and were thus recognizable, but it is only with the advent of modernity that they assimilate, which potentially makes them more dangerous. As in the context of ethno-nationalist genocidal societies they are not seen as a part of the "in-group"; they are seen as outsiders without the right to territory and therefore without the right to protection. Even though Slavic Muslims are an indigenous Slavic group, they are in genocidal propaganda seen as genetically corrupt, according to some because it is only the genetically inferior population that converted to Islam or, according to others, because they in fact are a result of interbreeding with the Turkish colonizer. It is similar with the Rwandan Tutsi, who, according to the Hamitic myth came from Ethiopia and should therefore, as Hutu power advocates demanded, go back there. The image of the cuckoo is here, really a metaphor for modernity, which comes unannounced but ends up bringing about the final disappearance of the known world and therefore ourselves. It is this general feeling of doom, so different from the enthusiasm shown by some enlightenment scholars, that is also at the heart of modernity and that acts like a trigger for the genocidal projects.

Finally, the way modernity has been used in the propaganda that attempted to hide the fact that genocide was taking place, we see that the images of tribal conflicts and ancient hatreds can be cunningly used by the perpetrators to justify their non-interference. Rwandan general Bagosora, the main man behind the execution of genocide, called ethnic divides in Rwanda ancestral, while the Rwandan ambassador to the UN explained the massacre as one that emerged from "the age old history of the nation" based on hatreds "forged over 4 centuries of cruel and ruthless domination of the Hutu majority by the haughty and domineering Tutsi minority (Kiernan, 2009: 562) Indeed, as Hegel argued, the slave is always in a position of power as he follows his master closely and knows his every thought, while the master is lazy and disinterested in the slave. The illusion of African tribalness, which the subordinated Rwandan population knows has a central place in the white interpretations of the world, is used here intentionally to hide the actions of genocide. However, by

placing himself in the position intended for him by the "white fathers", the African man in fact fulfils the prophecy of tribalism, identifying himself with the fantasized image of spontaneous anger and ancient hatreds and thereby satisfying the colonial gaze.

7.5. Conclusion

After examining our three cases, it becomes apparent that genocide is, indeed, a highly appropriate context for the study of modernity and Critical Theory, a relevant scholarly contribution. Both Adorno in Critique of Enlightenment and Bauman in Ambivalence and Modernity speak about disillusionment with modernity and in our case it seems that genocide is exactly that. Not only does this stem from the need to reject modernity as the heritage of Western hegemons, but it is also a disillusionment with modernity's promise, which focused on equality, wealth and emancipation but brought only overpopulation, hunger and war instead. Finally we see genocide, paradoxically, on the one hand as a fulfilment of modernity, as it is a result of modern tendencies, which bring about overpopulation, unemployment, destabilisation of identity categories and norms and the scramble for territory and resources, while it is also executed with modern tools, like the nation state apparatus, bureaucracy, propaganda, technology, scientific racism and nationalism.

On the other hand, however, modern genocide is an attempt to achieve goals which are thoroughly pre-modern, a tribal, pre-industrial paradise of peasants, where society bonds are created through family ties and not through professional occupation, a Gesellschaft attempt to revert to primordial, Gemeinschaft bonds. Genocide is therefore also a result of a deep disillusionment with modernity, which becomes in praxis something very different from how it was initially conceptualised and is, in fact not only a departure from this modernity, but also an attempt to destroy it altogether. This disillusionment is therefore not only typical for genocidal contexts, but is a general disappointment of the 20th century, which not only suffered the biggest human losses in history, but has also become the victim of liberal capitalism in which massively depressed human beings are only valued according to their spending power and in which new totalitarianisms create mindless followers out of consumers.

Finally, an analysis of genocide has shown that modernity is exclusively seen by the genocidaires as a weapon of Western hegemony and is utilised to mark a position of power in different contexts. Paradoxically, genocide is therefore both an attempt to reclaim modernity, which has been historically denied the oppressed participants in the global hegemony and at the same time to annihilate it in order

to accomplish a regression into the pre-modern and thereby escape its reality. At the core of the modern project, we therefore find a disillusionment with itself, a disappointment in its own promises. In a number of ways, modernity defeats itself as it is a product of contradictions which have not been properly integrated. It therefore seeks to recycle concepts from classical antiquity in order to disguise the fact that it, in itself is empty of meaning.

8. Conclusion

As we have seen, the three chosen contexts are indeed comparable on many levels, but particularly in relation to broader modernity tendencies, which are reflected in each case. There are, indeed, a number of elements that relate genocide directly to modernity. The advent of imperialism and colonialism in particular have brought with them not only sporadic violence but settler genocides as well. In fact, as Arendt states, genocide was taught in colonies (Arendt in Mamdani, 2001:19). In addition, the rule of the colonisers was particularly disruptive to indigenous populations due to creation and naturalisation of inequalities between groups and thus establishment of a foundation for future violence. In Bosnia and Rwanda, the transformation of classes into ethnic groups took place as a result of the colonising influence and scientific racism which replaced less violent religious stereotyping. Indeed, modernity comes hand in hand with violence. The process of nation state formation in Europe brought with it a decline of ethnic minorities and resulted in annihilation of groups and languages, through assimilation, but also killing.

From the time when Islamophobia and anti-Judaism are modified in Isabella and Ferdinand's Spain by attaching the idea of darkness to the notion of otherness, thereby making it fixed and untranscendable through conversion, cleansing begins to take place. In relation to the difficult process of nation state formation and the problems which modernity resulted in, mainly overpopulation and lack of resources, new territories must be acquired through scrambles for Africa and Europe. Indeed, the pressures to acquire as much territory as possible, thereby securing the nation's place in the sun, resulted in panic and destabilization, especially for those nations that were formed relatively late. For these countries, like Germany, Serbia and Rwanda, unifications were problematic with too many differences between groups resulting from foreign occupation. Ethno-nationalism was in such contexts adopted as a logical choice, in an attempt to force a unity through rigid and authoritarian rule and organic identity models, but this has proven itself to be counter-productive as modernity's invisible minorities became even more dangerous and threatening. Indeed, ethno-nationalism, a modern invention, is often related to violence against minorities, which is also reflected in the citizenship crisis characteristic for all three genocides. This crisis of citizenship is to some degree a crisis of modernity as well, an inherent problem of majoritarian democracies, which have difficulties allowing others within the category of "we the people". Other characteristics of modernity also contribute to destabilisation of states. Industrialisation, technological advances and medical improvements also meant a loss of God, traditional structures and old elites' unifying power, which finally resulted in a weakening of identities and thus society in general. Other tensions, like for

example between communism and capitalism exasperated the already fragile stability of vulnerable nation states.

In relation to genocide itself, the analysed genocides were, undoubtedly committed by modern nation states, with roots in modern nationalist movements, relationships within society based on occupation, not descent, state bureaucratisation and fragmentation of power, functional parliaments, monetary systems and a heritage of enlightenment: education for all, Gesellschaft societies in all aspects. In addition, centralisation and authoritarianism found in genocidal states, along with orderliness, organisation, discipline, high work ethic, surveillance, control and efficiency, all indicative of modernity of the context. Indeed, the discussed genocides can in no way be defined as Gemeinschaft as identities are not based on ancestral ties, but are a result of carefully planned ethno-nationalist political projects. In order to accomplish genocide, the power of a modern state was utilised, state apparatus, bureaucracy, state military power, including technology, state authority, state organised para-militaries and state issued propaganda, all reflecting a top-down execution as the analysed genocides should in no way be seen as a result of ancient tribal rivalries or spontaneous outbursts of primal rage.

Other evidence, however, indicates that modernity is rejected by the genocidal contexts, as it was introduced by force and brought with it inequality and the hegemony of the West. In Germany, the unwelcome Napoleon's emancipatory reforms became a new source of hatred towards the native Jews and the values of Enlightenment became despised simply because the philosophy that gave birth to them was the philosophy of the aggressor, while in Rwanda an introduction of white man's modernity meant an introduction of slave labour and a horrific decline in the status of the agricultural classes, demonstrating that modernity has in these contexts been primarily about violence and inequality. In fact the genocidal states, as we have seen from our examples, are primarily states which were formed relatively late due to their struggle to overthrow foreign rule, like in the cases of Germany or Yugoslavia, they stepped into the global context from a position of vulnerability not only because this meant entering an arena characterized by an almost absolute dominance of the Westerns states, particularly Britain and France, which have already divided the colonies and resources between them, but also because their own experience of foreign rule created numerous difficulties in the subsequent processes of unification in terms of state structure and difficult and often contradictory group identities. Modernity was for these contexts about an inability to challenge this position of inferiority.

Indeed, genocidal ideology is in fact an ideology of social frustration, an attempt to reverse the global position of weakness maintained not only through direct experience of foreign rule in the past, but also more recent post-colonial influences of IMF and World Bank, agents of global capitalism which play the key role in underdevelopment of those which they keep in the position dependency. Indeed, a rejection of modernity can be found in all contexts we have examined: rejection of modernity as weak western democracies, rejection of modernity as western capitalism, rejection of modernity as Americanisation: the domination of western culture and customs and rejection of modernity as colonialism or post-colonialism in regards to the harmful economic policies of the World Bank, IMF etc. Indeed, implicit in each context there is a critique of modernity as Western hegemony and inequality that comes with it, which we also see today in relation to globalisation. Modernity is also rejected as democratisation, which is imposed by force and pressure by the International community and only contributed to a further destabilization of the contexts. An unfavourable political environment and less than noble influences of parasitical West contributed to these contexts becoming isolated, authoritarian societies in order to secure political survival and avoid harmful interferences from the outside.

Modern genocide is therefore about frustrated and radicalized states which attempt to overcome their position of global inferiority by retreating into an ethno-nationalist tribal consciousness due to the intensity of stressors, which then only confirms the Western illusion of their barbarity. In this respect the vast economic crisis, a result of the instability of modern capitalist markets and the threat of the disintegration of the nation state, but not the age-old hatreds as it is sometimes claimed, must be mentioned as the main pre-condition for genocide. It could thus be said that modernity to a significant extent defeats its initial promises of enlightenment, liberty and equality and instead of progress causes the stress that results in a state regression into more primitive and conservative forms of rule.

The idea of linear progress is here challenged. After all, Enlightenment is followed by Counter-Enlightenment as the enlightened age of reason is followed by romanticism's focus on emotion. Totalitarianism, a supposedly modern type of rule, rejects liberal principles of modernity and individuality. It is only modern in terms of the timeframe that produces it, but should not be seen as modern in relation to the values it supports, particularly a commitment to absolute values and a creation of uniform society opposed to individualism as genocide can only be seen as a result of value rationality rather than instrumental rationality. Similarly in relation to ethno-nationalism, the question is how can an ideology with focus on pre-modern, pagan values and superstitions, warrior mentality, an obsession with soil and an irrational, mystical, death oriented cult of tradition, as is typical for pan-movements, be considered modern? Imperial revisionism and the need to look to the past for answers

about the future is surely traditional. As the immediate past is seen as cursed and contaminated, a search for an ancient paradise lost is a characteristic of all three genocides and classical antiquity is used as a model for modern gardening states. Indeed, all this evidence shows that genocide is an attempt to recreate a pre-modern state of affairs through the use of modern tools. Even at the core of scientific racism, this typical child of modernity, we see pre-modern values of White Christianity.

Important things have been learned about modernity. The idea of human civilisation as necessarily progressive does not seem to be supported by this comparative analysis of genocidal contexts. Indeed, the very idea of progress makes little sense without the idea of regression. Modernity, seen as a time frame seems to incorporate elements of pre-modern or anti-modern, as any objective line between the periods or tendencies is impossible to find as modernity becomes questionable in terms of its scientific usefulness. Modernity, thus, carries with it its antithesis. In general, in spite of the fact that the tools of modernity have made genocide realistic, a deeper rooted rejection of modern values as values of western hegemony characterizes our contexts. Indeed, modernity seems to serve not only as an identity frame which maintains the global hegemony of the West, but is generally adopted to construct symbolic violence, as the perpetrators of genocide use it to identify themselves as superior contrary to the "barbaric otherness" of their enemy, and this is a type of binary opposites that are typical both for romantic nationalism, but also for the supposedly rational enlightenment.

Indeed, there are many plausible links between modernity as it is generally understood and genocide, but the question is whether this category which contains within it a rigid dichotomy between a progress of some and barbarism of others is useful in academic research. Symbolic violence is essential to how modernity is understood today and how it is hijacked by the West and used to reproduce inequality. Interestingly, our analysis has shown that in supposedly tribal contexts, this idea of primitivism is used to manipulate the Western media. Although on the one hand this can be seen as a rebellion against the supposedly modern but tyrannical West, on the other hand it is also, much like genocide in general an adoption and imitation of violent strategies invented by the tyrannical West. Through superficially adopting the image of barbarity, the de facto oppressed, genocidal contexts symbolically become one with the image that the dominant white fathers have imposed on them in the first place. Through imitating the strategies of the hegemonic West, the subalterns attempt to satisfy the European gaze and become what is in fact requested of them.

In fact, at the very core of the idea of modernity lies the false assumption that some cultures are more developed than others. Indeed there is only a slight difference between the idea of higher culture and the idea of supreme race, which we have learned to reject, while we still reproduce the notions of barbarity. However, the higher/lower culture dichotomy has characterized other contexts than our own. The very term barbarian is of Greek origin and points towards a person who doesn't speak the language, implying that it refers to an outsider, excluded from the higher culture marked by the superior language. This demonstrates that the idea of modernity is used to define the identities of the in and out-groups, excluding those who do not belong, an idea which was as relevant in the construction of pre-modern identities as it is relevant in the construction of national identities of the present day. It implies the tension between the powerful centre and the subordinated periphery, where the periphery is necessarily the victim of imperialist projections of barbarism and tribal hatreds, as this is what maintains the very structure of power.

In relation to genocide, modernity is therefore not about agency, but about construction and reproduction of modes of oppression through various capitalist colonialist and post-colonialist strategies, about production of racist knowledge and economic inequality, which can, under extreme circumstances and particularly in countries which have a history of foreign rule result in genocide. A dichotomy between the supposedly developed West and the undeveloped others, seems to be at the very heart of the modern project, which cannot be understood without an appropriate understanding of Atlantic slavery, colonialism and capitalist inequalities, a constellation of forces in which post-colonial Africa is set to remain a heart of darkness instead of the cradle of civilization, as the fantasy of it is needed in order to maintain the illusions of Western progress, supremacist identity and even relieve the white guilt through aid projects, which, in fact, also contribute to the maintenance of underdevelopment, along with the actions of global agents of capitalism – the IMF and the World Bank.

Indeed, much like race or gender, modernity is nothing but a social construct. In genocidal contexts, it was introduced through violence and presented as the weapon of the occupier, making it both desirable as a status symbol, identity mechanism and access to power but also hated as a weapon of the oppressor. As a result of both symbolic and physical violence which establishes the categories of the civilised and the non-civilised, modern genocide should therefore be seen as an attempt to get rid of this paralysing influence and regain some sort of independence which is why the identification of modernity with Western hegemony characterizes all genocidal contexts. The idea of modernity which we find in academic literature must be criticized not only because it is characterized by a bizarre mix of contradictory values which make it meaningless, but even more so because it reproduces the

stereotypical notion of the West as higher culture in relation to underdeveloped others, making it scientifically useless. What is however useful is that the study of genocidal contexts and opinions on micro level clearly reveal the way modernity is perceived and how it is used in the production of knowledge by the powerful, which relates it exclusively to an unfair distribution of power and resources and Western exploitation of the rest of the world, Africa in particular. Genocide in the age of nation state, should therefore be seen as directly related to this misbalance of power and is an attempt to restore internal balance of states by rejecting outside influences, destroying the heritage of modernity in order to retreat to the fantasized safety of the golden past.

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