

British Media Coverage of the Kosovo Conflict

by

Marc Lynton Latham

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For the Latham family: Delyth, Shane, Mary, Stefan, Calum and Catrin

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Abstract

New Labour presented Nato's Kosovo campaign in 1999 as Britain's first war fought for purely humanitarian reasons, and this framing of the Nato campaign seemed to become the dominant image of the conflict in the British media. This study uses a framing conceptual framework to analyse the British media's coverage of the Kosovo Conflict, and tries to identify hegemonic influences on that media coverage; the analysis therefore works on a cultural and political level. The study uses framing as it has been used in previous social-political studies, as a tool for analysing whether Nato's framing of their campaign dominated the media discourse, in line with the hegemonic model. The objectives of the study are to analyse whether the media were sufficiently independent from the Nato perspective to provide the public with a balanced and informed view of Nato's Kosovo campaign; whether the humanitarian aspect of the Nato campaign brought a change in the traditional reporting of Britain at war in the UK media; whether the reorganisation of the Nato media operation brought an improved coverage for Nato in the second half of their campaign, and whether a newspaper being editorially anti-war affected the rest of its content to any noticeable degree. A triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research methods has led to the conclusion that the British media over-relied on Nato sources, and usually reported from a Nato perspective, in line with the hegemonic model, but provided a certain level of plurality in their opinions, and reporting of events, with Nato collateral damage receiving an especially prominent coverage. These findings seem to be in line with most recent research on the US and UK media when their nation is at war, although conclusions made by researchers with different expectations and interpretations, using different samples and methodologies, often lead to contrasting opinions on the performance of the media.

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Abbreviations

APCS	Armoured Personnel Carriers
EU	European Union
FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
FT	Financial Times
GMG	Guardian Media Group
GUMG	Glasgow University Media Group
IoS	Independent on Sunday
ITN	Independent Television News
KLA	Kosova Liberation Army
LM	Le Monde
MOC	Media Operations Centre
MoD	Ministry of Defence
Nato	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NI	News International
NYT	New York Times
Saceur	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
SNYT	Sunday New York Times
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

1. Introduction

Introduction

From March 24th to June 10th, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) conducted a military air campaign which was presented by the Nato countries as a campaign to protect ethnic-Albanian civilians from the Serb military in Kosovo; in the United Kingdom (UK) New Labour portrayed it as a new kind of war, one fought for humanitarian reasons rather than strategic. The main focus of this thesis is to analyse how the British media framed Nato's Kosovo campaign. Although the media face several influences on their news reporting, this study will focus on how much the media professionals were influenced by the Nato political and military information, and whether there was evidence of ideology in their reporting; either a traditional ideology or one in transition.

Nato was set up in 1949 to defend Western interests during the Cold War, and in 1999 was an alliance of nineteen countries; the Kosovo Conflict was the first co-ordinated operation between all members in their fifty years history. Nato was led during the campaign by Secretary General, Javier Solana, although the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, was in charge of the military forces. The British military campaign was organised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD was led by the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson. During the Kosovo Conflict, the MoD and Nato provided daily press briefings that tried to build and maintain support for the Nato air campaign. The conferences undertaken in April will be used in this study to try and identify the Nato framing of the conflict, and then to examine how those frames influenced the media coverage of the conflict. Framing refers to the way the conflict was defined and constructed by the competing factions, and then by the media. For the British media,

the MoD and Nato conferences offered both opportunities and dilemmas; the opportunity was that the quick and easy information was provided by reputable people, while the dilemma was that it was often uncorroborated and repetitive.

Some work has already been done on the Kosovo Conflict using a similar framework to this study, but it has not been on the scale of this study, or focused on the British media. Some of these studies will be discussed later in the theory section, but Denis McQuail offered a brief summary of how he saw the Nato framing of Kosovo when he wrote that Nato aimed from the start of the air attack on Yugoslavia to define the event as a necessary and ‘humanitarian’ war against Serbian ‘genocide’ of the ethnic-Albanians, with the Serbian leadership and military identified as serial aggressors, and compared to the Nazis in World War Two. McQuail wrote that the purpose was to raise and keep support in public opinion, and to combat alternative frames that suggested the Nato campaign was illegal, excessively brutal or an inappropriate way to deal with an internal ethnic conflict. McQuail thought the Nato media operation was generally successful.¹

1.2. The American and British governments

During the Kosovo conflict there were centre-left governments in power in the UK and United States (US), and as a major part of this study involves the UK and US media’s use of government information, this section contains brief outlines of the governments in power during the Kosovo conflict. As the US’s Democrat government was in power before the UK’s New Labour government, and the Democrat style and strategy influenced New Labour, the Democrats are featured first.

¹ D. McQuail., *Mass Communication Theory (4th edition)*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 344.

1.2.1. The US government

In the US, the Democrats were in power, under the leadership of Bill Clinton, after they had ended twelve years of Republican administrations in the 1992 election, and then been re-elected with a relatively small majority in 1996. Clinton and his vice-president, Albert Gore, were both in their forties when first elected, and represented a new generation in American political leadership. They had taken the Democrats to the political centre with their 'third-way' politics, and had invested large amounts of time and money in their communications strategy.

Clinton was reluctant to send US ground troops into action for peace-keeping missions after significant losses in Somalia in 1993,² but he did help bring the Bosnian war to a close in 1995 by sanctioning bombing missions by US planes against the Serbs. In 1998, Clinton's presidency was damaged as a result of sexual relations with a female White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, and he became only the second US president to be impeached by the House of Representatives. He was tried in the Senate in January and February, 1999, but was found not guilty of the charges brought against him. He apologised to the nation for his actions, and continued to enjoy good approval ratings for his job as president. Clinton was going to have to stand down at the next election in 2000, after his two terms in office, but wanted to provide a foundation for Al Gore to win the presidency, and retain Democrat hegemony.

1.2.2. The UK government

In the UK, New Labour was elected in 1997 with a huge House of Commons majority of 180 seats, in what has been described as Labour's greatest ever electoral victory; it

² J. Rentoul., *Tony Blair: Prime Minister* (London: Time Warner, 2001), p. 514.

also ended eighteen years of Conservative government. The New Labour victory was largely attributed to the policy changes that had revolutionised the party after their 1992 election defeat, and brought the party more towards the centre. Tony Blair, the New Labour prime minister, and Alistair Campbell, his press secretary since 1994, were leading figures in the transformation of Labour to 'New Labour', and they also became integral to Nato's campaign in Kosovo. Andrew Rawnsley considers the major upheaval in the party philosophy was not only undertaken to win the next election, but to change the whole British cultural and political structure, and make the Conservative party and their ideology redundant; the New Labour strategy to acquire hegemony was to re-educate the country 'into a nation which would embrace progressive values in the twenty-first [century],' and that Blair had publicly revealed his desire to be remembered as having destroyed the Conservative Party.³

With regard to foreign policy, 'Old Labour' had been isolationist in Bosnia during the early 1990s, but New Labour was more interventionist, and this was one of the reasons why foreign secretary, Jack Cunningham, a pragmatist, was replaced by Robin Cook, an international idealist.⁴ However, when Cook announced he intended following an 'ethical foreign policy', after the election victory, it was quickly criticised from within the party. This was mainly because Jonathan Powell, a former diplomat and then Blair's Chief of Staff, who was regarded as the most influential voice on foreign affairs, was infuriated at what he saw as Cook's 'naïve and simplistic' approach. Powell argued the best way to deal with big powers who abused human rights was to speak softly and carry not a large stick, but a carrot. The

³ A. Rawnsley., *Servants of the People: The Inside Story of New Labour*, (London: Penguin, 2000), p. xiii-xiv.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 509.

pressures from Powell and his allies meant that after just six months in office ‘Ethics man [Cook] had joined the realpolitikers.’⁵

In place of the ethical foreign policy, Cook declared they would ensure there was a moral contribution to foreign policy, and Blair stated New Labour was pursuing a ‘third way’ in foreign affairs, a course that was distinct from those taken by Labour and Conservative governments in the past.⁶ In 1998, Blair formed the Foreign Policy Centre, an independent think-tank designed to help construct foreign policy from outside the formal mechanisms and control of the Foreign Office. This provided senior figures in government with an alternative source of policy to that from the Foreign Office researchers. Blair was patron of the new centre, while Cook was its president.⁷ When the Kosovo conflict developed, the third way strategy saw New Labour reluctant to send British military forces into action at first, but once the campaign had started Blair became the Nato ‘hawk’. In the middle of the Nato campaign he proposed a new international doctrine, supporting intervention by the international community when a sovereign nation was inflicting a humanitarian crisis on its people.

The UK and US governments therefore had very similar ideologies during Nato’s campaign in Kosovo, with the Democrat party having influenced New Labour’s election strategy and media operation, and its policies in government. However, their situations were very different: New Labour was less than half way through its term of office, and had a very large parliamentary majority, while the Democrats were

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 169-73.

⁶ M. Wickham-Jones., ‘Labour’s trajectory in Foreign Affairs: The Moral Crusade of a Pivotal Power?’, in R. Little and M. Wickham-Jones., *New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 3-13, p. 3-4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12-13.

defending a slender majority, had Clinton emerging from a scandal, and an election due in the following year. These differences in situation might have been the reason why Blair emerged as the resolute Nato hawk during the Kosovo conflict, to applause by most of the British and American media, while Clinton appeared weak and indecisive, and was criticised by many in the media.

1.3. A profile of the UK press, and comparison with the US press

1.3.1. The UK press

As the government of the UK moved to the centre, there was a similar occurrence in the UK media, with a press that was historically partisan along political lines moving toward a more apolitical reporting. James Curran wrote that the character of the British press changed through the twentieth century, as the papers became more loosely connected to the political parties they traditionally supported.⁸ This decline in newspaper partisanship increased in the 1990s, as many Conservative papers grew disillusioned with the Conservative government under John Major. Colin Seymour-Ure wrote that for most of the twentieth century the Conservative press had been disproportionately strong, both in number of titles and size of circulation, but in 1997 there was a massive shift to support for the Labour party, and six papers turned away from the Conservatives.⁹ Brian McNair also referred to this change in political allegiance by the press, and wrote that in 1997 the *Guardian*, *Independent*, *Financial Times (FT)*, *Sun*, *Mirror* and *Star* supported Labour in the election; the *Mail*, *Express* and *Telegraph* supported the Tories; while *The Times* was neutral.¹⁰ Seymour-Ure

⁸ J. Curran, *Media and Power*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 67.

⁹ C. Seymour-Ure., Are the Broadsheds becoming Unhinged?, in J. Seaton, (ed)., *Politics and the Media: Harlots and Prerogatives at the Turn of the Millennium*, (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 43-52, p. 48.

¹⁰ B. McNair., *The Sociology of Journalism*, (London: Arnold, 1998), p. 107. The source of the information was the Audit Bureau of Circulation.

wrote that what made the shift in support for Labour look so extraordinary was that in the fourteen general elections from 1945 to 1992 they had only once had the support of three national dailies. Moreover, during that time there had only been one unqualified U-turn by a paper in support of one of the major parties, when the *Sun* switched from Labour to Conservative in 1974. If every paper had changed at every election, there could in theory have been 150 changes.¹¹

As well as the newspapers becoming less politically partisan, David Walker believes that journalistic loyalty to papers based on their political leanings has also diminished, and they are more likely to take jobs for the amount of money on offer than the political views of the paper, leading to ‘a growing sameness’ in British journalism.¹² Moreover, this trend towards less partisanship has also been reflected in the readership, and by 1979 over a third of national daily newspaper readers bought papers with political allegiances different from their own.¹³

Another change in the British newspaper industry from the 1980s was the convergence of newspaper ownership into a small group of large organisations, and during Nato’s Kosovo campaign, the British press had just five groups controlling over four-fifths of national newspaper circulation.¹⁴ Although this private ownership included two transnational corporations based in Australia and Canada, Curran and Leys believe ‘The British press routinely makes the assumption that its readers are British; that they are mainly interested in what happens in Britain; and that they identify with other British people; global media ownership should not be equated with

¹¹ C. Seymour-Ure., *op.cit*, p. 48.

¹² D. Walker., *Newspaper Power: A Practitioner’s Account*, in H. Tumber., *Media Power, Professionals and Policies*, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 236-246, p. 244-5.

¹³ J. Curran, *Media and Power*, *op.cit*, p. 67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

internationalism.’¹⁵ The details of ownership at the time of the Nato campaign are dealt with in more depth in the table below, which is based on audited circulation figures for April 1999,¹⁶ and in the sample section of the methodology chapter.

Newspaper	Parent company	Circulation	% of total circulation	Prominent shareholder
The Sun	News International (NI)	3,746,376		Rupert Murdoch
Times	NI	744,490		
Sunday Times	NI	1,402,210		
News of the World	NI	4,176,409		
	<i>Total</i>	10,069,485	37.53%	
Daily Mirror	Trinity Mirror	2,331,101		Sir Victor Blank
Sunday Mirror	Trinity Mirror	1,964,659		
The People	Trinity Mirror	1,645,822		
Daily Record	Trinity Mirror	654,556		
	<i>Total</i>	6,596,138	24.58%	
Daily Mail	Associated Newspapers	2,336,587		Harmsworth Family
Mail on Sunday	Associated Newspapers	2,336,587		
	<i>Total</i>	4,555,812	16.98%	
The Express	United News and Media/MAI	1,099,830		Lord Hollick
Express on Sunday	United News and Media/MAI	988,720		
	<i>Total</i>	2,088,550	7.79%	
Daily Telegraph	Hollinger	1,046,813		Conrad Black
Sunday Telegraph	Hollinger	825,678		
	<i>Total</i>	1,872,491	6.96%	
The Guardian	Guardian Media Group (GMG)	402,182		
The Observer	GMG	402,484		
	<i>Total</i>	804,666	3.00%	
Independent		224,494		Tony O'Reilly
Independent on Sunday		251,409		
	<i>Total</i>	475,903	1.78%	

¹⁵J. Curran, and C. Leys., Media and the decline of liberal corporatism in Britain, in J. Curran, and P. Myung-Jin., *De-Westernising Media Studies*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 221-236, p. 233.

¹⁶ Table from P. Manning., *News and News Sources: a Critical Introduction*, (London: Sage, 2001), p. 91. Roy Greenslade updated the competitive situation in the British press in the *Media Guardian* article *Murdoch versus Murdoch*, on Monday, February 7th, 2005, <http://media.guardian.co.uk/mediaguardian/story/0,7558,1407111,00.html>.

Financial Times	Pearson	368,384	1.38%	
Total daily and Sunday circulation		26,831,429		

Figure 1.1. Circulation figures for UK newspapers in April, 1999.

1.3.2. The UK press compared with the American press

John Lloyd, an *FT* journalist, considers the American media to be unique in the world, in relation to the amount of significance they apportion to fulfilling a democratic role in their society.¹⁷ However, some studies have found the British press to be more critical of the establishment than the American press, despite the American media traditionally priding itself on being a balancing counterweight for the public against elite power. For example, Thomas Patterson's comparative study of journalism in five nations, including the US and UK, found that American journalists had the most freedoms but they also made the 'narrowest range of choices about how they would cover various hypothetical news situations.'¹⁸ This narrow objectivism is widely acknowledged as a trademark of American reporting, and differentiates it from most European countries, which have a tradition of more partisan reporting in line with political parties. Research by Weaver and Wilhout also seems to back up this view of the American media, as their research found that only seventeen percent of the American journalists they interviewed felt their role should be an adversarial one.¹⁹ Dorman and Farhang consider the modern American media do not live up to the watchdog ethic because of the difference in society between when it was articulated, in the 1700s, and the modern business orientated US: 'The framers of the First Amendment could not guess or imagine that the press would someday become

¹⁷ J. Lloyd., *What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics*, (London: Constable, 2004), p. 141.

¹⁸ W. L. Bennett., *News: The Politics of Illusion* (5th edition), (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 30 and 163. Patterson's study was published in 1993, and the other countries in the study were Germany, Italy and Sweden.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

profitable. The mythos surrounding the press, in short, was born before the media became big business...The result is that the journalistic watchdog, which was to be a check on the excesses of government, rarely leaves the kennel on matters of foreign affairs.²⁰

Jeremy Tunstall considers the American reliance on objectivity as a guiding principle has hindered their watchdog ethic, and this has meant the British newspaper industry is more intrusive and polemical than their American counterparts.²¹ Quoting Tunstall, Gaunt argues that the British media is freer from legislation than almost any other country, and that a voluntary restraint dependent on consensus has been far more effective than legislation and compulsion in ensuring good journalistic practise.²² This 'voluntary restraint dependent on consensus' sounds hegemonic, and in line with indexing, but the British media seemed to have become increasingly critical of politicians during the 1990s. John Lloyd believes the British press has become too critical of politicians, and puts it down to competition from their close proximity to each other: 'British press and TV news are at least as cynical as their US equivalents. They trash politicians at least as much. More so, for the structure of the British press is much more competitive than that of the US – indeed, it is more competitive than anywhere else in the world'²³

²⁰ W.A. Dorman, and M. Farhang., *The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference*, (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1987), p. 223.

²¹ J. Tunstall., *Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 352.

²² P. Gaunt., *Choosing the News: The Profit Factor in News Selection*, (New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 22-5.

²³ J. Lloyd., *op.cit*, p. 101.

1.3.3. The UK and US press reporting conflicts involving their military

Michael Nicholson, who has reported sixteen wars for Independent Television News (ITN), considers the media to be ‘one of the four cornerstones of democracy. It stands to reason. If we weren’t here making public some of the misdemeanours of government...and all the other rottennesses in society, who would know about it....but underlying all that is a belief that your pen, camera...your writing can help change the way the world is. By making it public, by showing suffering, by showing war...you’re going to help change it...’²⁴ However, most media researchers have found that the bright idealism journalists set out with is dimmed when they cover their own country’s military at war, by a combination of censorship and a national perspective; this view was emphasised by Zaller and Chiu: ‘It is a truism that journalists find it difficult to report critically on government activity during foreign policy crises. They must contend not only with officials who strain to control the news but also with the fear that tough reporting will undermine the government’s ability to deal with the crisis. As a result, journalists often simply ‘rally “round the flag” and whatever policy the government favours.’²⁵ This section offers evidence to show how the initial enthusiasm of journalists to report the facts about conflicts involving their military is often compromised by military controls, their own feelings as they bond with the military, and editors at home that do not think their reports would be welcomed by their readers and viewers.

²⁴ G. McLaughlin., *The War Correspondent*, (London and Sterling Virginia: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 14.

²⁵ J. Zaller, and D. Chiu., Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1946-1999, in B. L. Nacos, R. Y. Shapiro, and P. Isernia., *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, (Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 61-84, p. 61.

Daniel Hallin considers the style of war reporting developed by the US and UK media combines strategic reporting heavily dependent on official sources, viewing the world from the centralised perspective of those who managed the global war apparatus, with a populist perspective which concentrated on and often glorified the ‘GI’ or the ‘Tommy’ and the ordinary family on the ‘home front.’ Hallin considers the present age of US and UK ‘limited war’ reporting is still influenced by the ‘total wars’ seen earlier in the century, with the initial stages presented to the public as replays of the Second World War: ‘many of the conflicts over wartime communication arise from the clash between expectations based in the culture of total war and the political reality of limited war.’²⁶ Like Hallin, Stephen Badsey also believes that disagreements between the military and the media during conflicts usually revolve around how much censorship the military should be able to invoke in limited military operations that do not pose a threat to national security.²⁷

In the Korean war (1950-3), the World War Two total war influence still seems to have been strong, as American journalists did not want to be left to censor themselves, as they believed competition between themselves might lead them to disclose information that could compromise their military. McLaughlin explained that in Korea ‘journalists expressed uneasiness with the trust General MacArthur was prepared to invest in them to report ‘responsibly’, and to censor and regulate themselves...’²⁸ Just a few years later, the biggest break-down in the British government/military-media relationship during a twentieth century British military operation occurred, when several papers opposed British involvement in a military

²⁶ D.C. Hallin., *The Media and War*, in J. Corner., P. Schlesinger., and R. Silverstone., *International Media Research: A Critical Survey*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 206-231, p. 209.

²⁷ S. Badsey., *The Media, the Military and Public Opinion*, in S. Badsey., (ed)., *The Media and International Security*, (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 238-252, p. 241.

²⁸ G. McLaughlin., *op.cit*, p. 68-72.

operation against General Nasser of Egypt in the Suez canal during 1956. Tony Shaw considered the ‘damage which papers like the *Manchester Guardian*, *Observer*, *Daily Mirror* and *Daily Herald* inflicted on the government’s claim of acting in the national and free world’s interest was considerable.’²⁹ However, Shaw did also point out that the British media were excluded from the war zone during the military operation (Musketeer Revise),³⁰ and the overall media coverage was consistently more supportive of the government policy than public opinion. Shaw therefore did not think the media coverage had influenced the premature ending of the operation, and Suez was ‘as much an illustration of the innate weakness of the British press, its structure and *modus operandi*, as it is a celebration of its in-built strength.’³¹

The US’s next major overseas conflict after Korea was in Vietnam, and their defeat in that war was blamed by members of the American government and military on the negative media coverage they believed their military campaign had received in the US, after there was little control or censorship on journalistic movement and reporting, and some journalists had used their relative freedom to question the administration’s version of their campaign. However, like Shaw’s analysis of the media coverage of Suez, most research on the media coverage of Vietnam has found that it was not as critical or unpatriotic as made out by those who accused the media of losing the US the war, and most critical reports sent by journalists from Vietnam never even made it into the news, let alone the front pages. McLaughlin considers the inquest into the American media’s coverage of Vietnam, and the negative verdict, influenced the military’s relationship with the media in future US and UK conflicts, starting with the

²⁹ T. Shaw., *Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis*, (London and New York: Taurus, 1996), p. 94.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 78-9.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 92-4.

UK's Falklands campaign.³² However, as Shaw emphasised on Suez, and Howard Tumber has pointed out on World War Two,³³ the British government and military had imposed similar restrictions on the media in its conflicts prior to the American war in Vietnam.

The British media was generally more supportive of the Falklands campaign than they had been of Suez, and only the *Morning Star* newspaper opposed the war, while others gave broad support to the government, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm.³⁴ However, this did not prevent the British government and military introducing strict controls on the access of journalists to the war zone, and as the journalists also faced delays in despatching their copy, this meant their ability to report the war was severely impeded. Moreover, David Morrison and Howard Tumber wrote that journalists who had sailed and gone to battle with the British military in the Falklands felt their balance and impartiality went out the window because they were with the troops, and were more a part of the operation than observers; the writers considered that values 'which serve an occupation well in peacetime or amid the pain of someone else's wars do not necessarily serve the individual journalist well in the midst of his war.'³⁵ Max Hastings, who was with the first wave of British troops to enter the Falklands capital, Port Stanley, seemed to confirm Morrison and Tumber's view when he later said that being at war with troops from your own country meant 'the bond is like nothing else.'³⁶

³² G. McLaughlin., op.cit, p. 71-2.

³³ H. Tumber., Prisoners of News Values? Journalists, professionalism, and identification in times of war, in S. Allan., and B. Zelizer., *Reporting War: Journalism in wartime*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 190-205, p. 190.

³⁴ D. Mercer., The Media on the Battlefield, in D. Mercer., G. Mungham, and K. Williams., *The Fog of War: the Media on the Battlefield*, (London: Heinemann, 1987), pp. 1-16, p. 7.

³⁵ D.E. Morrison and H. Tumber., *Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting during the Falklands Conflict*, (London, Newbury Park, Beverly Hills and New Delhi: Sage, 1988), p. 99-104.

³⁶ Max Hastings., *BBC 1 breakfast news*, 5/4/02.

The American government and military seem to have concluded from the experiences and outcomes of the Vietnam and Falklands wars that they needed to control the media more rigidly than they had done in previous conflicts, as they brought in much tougher restrictions on media access to the war zone for their campaigns in Grenada and Panama during the 1980s, with much tighter restrictions on the media than had been imposed during Vietnam. In the American military's Urgent Fury invasion of Grenada in 1983, the media were kept out of the war zone completely until hostilities had finished, while in Panama in 1989 the American military used a pooling system for journalists similar to that introduced by the British military for their Falklands campaign. However, A.T. Thrall has vigorously countered the 'conventional wisdom' that the American military introduced more restrictions on the media in response to Vietnam, as he argued that Vietnam 'did not prompt innovation or change in military public affairs policies,' and the military did not have a pre-conceived media policy for their Grenada operation. Thrall argued that changes, such as the pool system that was used in Panama, were brought in after the Grenada 'media-lockout' angered the American media, and led to them using information from critical sources.³⁷

The pool system was again used in the Gulf War, which Thrall considers 'was both the most widely covered war in history and the one in which the US government imposed the greatest restrictions on the press short of outright censorship.'³⁸ John Fialka, who reported on the ground during the war for the *Wall Street Journal*, agreed with Thrall's verdict on the media's freedom: 'We were not just going to write history; we were about to make history....Was this a rosy moment in military-media relations? Hardly. We were an indigestible lump being fed into a military press-handling system

³⁷ A.T. Thrall., *War in the Media Age*, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc, 2000), pages 77-161, summarised on pages 232-236.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

that was woefully short of resources and teetering on the verge of collapse. The Pentagon had insisted that in this war reporters must be accompanied by military escorts, but it had not provided enough seasoned public affairs escorts and vehicles to do the job.’³⁹ Peter Braestrup thought American journalists in the Gulf War wanted the same kind of freedoms as in Vietnam, which represented a golden age to them, but this was denied them by the military pool system, which had been initiated by the British military during the Falklands War. Braestrup also explained that the Gulf was a very different conflict to Vietnam, which had been a low-intensity conflict against a foe who could not easily exploit inadvertent breaches of security, and there had seldom been more than forty American journalists out in the field on a given day.⁴⁰ In contrast, as noted by John Fialka, the Gulf War was a ‘Big League buildup’, the foe seemed equipped to exploit any revelations, the distances were vast compared to Vietnam, the strain on communications and logistics across the desert was considerable, and there were hundreds of journalist who wanted to cover the conflict. Fialka noted that the number of journalists who see ‘action’ in American wars has always been small anyway, and most report the conflict from a safe distance.⁴¹ Braestrup also considered that as many journalists were victims of their ignorance of military affairs as manipulation by the military, as many journalists who had no experience of covering wars were sent to report from the battle zone, and military language was like a foreign language to them.⁴²

David Morrison concluded the UK had just a little more censorship and reporting restrictions than the US during the Gulf War, but American journalists were angrier

³⁹ J.J. Fialka., *Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War*, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1992), p. 4-5.

⁴⁰ Peter Braestrup, foreword in *Ibid.*, pp. ix-xiv, p. xii.

⁴¹ J.J. Fialka., *op.cit.*, p. 55-6.

⁴² Peter Braestrup., *op.cit.*, p. xii.

about the restrictions than the British journalists.⁴³ Sean McKnight believed the British media was less critical than the American media about the Gulf War restrictions, partly because the MoD provided the British journalists with better communications facilities to relay their reports to their editors, and partly because of the 'greater cynicism of British journalists, who expect governments to be secretive and manipulative and do not believe - in contrast to their American colleagues - that they have a special constitutional status.'⁴⁴

During the Kosovo Conflict, the Serbs largely did the job of keeping journalists out of the war-zone for Nato, when they expelled all but a few, who were allowed to stay in Belgrade, and were only allowed out under Serb escort. This situation, with the Serbs controlling access to the war zone, even brought Alistair Campbell to ask journalists why they were not entering Kosovo to get the real story, as news of Nato 'collateral damage' incidents threatened to lose Nato the media war. However, at the same time, Campbell was also working to control the journalists' perceptions of the Nato military campaign, so they reported Nato's version of events. Philip Knightley wrote that there were over 2500 correspondents present at the end of the Kosovo Conflict, compared to a peak of 500 in the Vietnam War, and although correspondents never had so many sources as in the Kosovo conflict, in the end the public 'drowned in wave after wave of images that added up to nothing.'⁴⁵ Writing after Nato's Kosovo campaign, Mirjana Skoco and William Woodger also considered Nato to have controlled the Western media coverage, concluding that the 'military have been learning the lessons of how to deal with the media, and the media have been coming

⁴³ D.E. Morrison., *Television and the Gulf War*, (London, Paris, and Rome: John Libbey, 1992), p. 72-3.

⁴⁴ S. McKnight., *Media Perceptions of Other Forces: Iraq and the 1991 Gulf War*, in S. Badsey., *The Media and International Security*, (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 91-113, p. 93. J.J. Fialka also wrote how the British journalists had better access to communications in the Gulf War than American journalists. J.J. Fialka., *op.cit*, p. 63.

to terms with selling the 'positive' side of military exploits. In tacit acknowledgement of past mistakes, military personnel are now under orders to provide information, and not to lie or grandstand. The new 'openness' has been widely welcomed by the media, though ultimately, for all the rhetoric, it is the same as usual, with restrictions, misinformation and manipulation. This should come as no surprise, since the aim of the military is to present the case for prosecuting war effectively, not to question whether war is the solution.⁴⁶ Changes in the military's attitude to media relations were confirmed by a military source, Lieutenant Colonel Angus Tanner, who wrote: 'It is therefore understood that it is better to break adverse news early than to try and cover things up. When information is not forthcoming, speculation will often take its place. This can be just as damaging, if not more so. The military has recognised that the media, like nature, abhors a vacuum. It is better that stories should be released as fully and swiftly as the situation allows than to stay silent and hope that events will move on.... Truth is the most important of these principles. The temptation to deceive, evade or even lie is, on occasions, very powerful. This has to be resisted. Any short-term gain will be swiftly overtaken by the longer term disadvantage of loss of integrity, damaged relationships and, as likely as not, hostile media coverage.'⁴⁷

To conclude this look at the British and American media-military relationship between World War Two and Nato's Kosovo campaign, it should be stressed that the general consensus amongst media researchers is that advances in communications technology have not allowed the media to become more independent of the military

⁴⁵ P. Knightley., *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo*, (London: Prion, 2000), (2nd ed), p. 502-4.

⁴⁶ M. Skoco., and W. Woodger., *The Military and the Media*, in P. Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds): *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis*, (London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 79-87, p. 86.

⁴⁷ Lt. Col. Angus Tanner., *Learning the Lessons of the 20th Century: The Evolution in British Military Attitude to the Media on Operations and in War*, in M. Connolly and D. Welch., *War and the Media:*

during conflicts since the American military campaign in Vietnam. Although the evidence suggests there have usually been tight controls on media access to war zones, with Vietnam being an exception to the twentieth century norm, to counter better communications equipment available to journalists, the military have brought in even tougher restrictions on media access to the war-zone. On the evidence of recent conflicts, it is therefore a victory for military restrictions on free movement over advances in communications technology.⁴⁸ However, as well as bringing in greater restrictions on the movement of the media, the military have also recognised a need to react to the changing media situation, and that it is now necessary for the military to provide the media with fast and accurate information in a way that may not have been so important before the dawn of the twenty-four hour news age. This is because the media have shown they will look to the enemy for information, or criticise the military operation themselves, if there is a lack of credible information being presented by their military. So, far from the UK and US media being compliant members of the national military effort when their nations go to war, the military have learnt from previous conflicts that if they do not provide the media with fast and accurate information they face the prospect of the enemy gaining more media time for their information and frames.

Therefore, as stated in the introduction, and supported by the above evidence, UK and US journalists face several obstacles when they file news reports from war-zones where their country's military is involved. This begins with the military's attitude to

Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-2003, (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005), pp. 264-274, p. 271-2.

⁴⁸ For a recent article on the media-state relations during military conflicts, which agrees with this view of the media-military relationship, and also draws on Hallin's spheres of media dialogue theory, see Piers Robinson., *Researching US media-state relations and twenty-first century wars*, in S. Allan and B. Zelizer., *op.cit.*, pp. 96-112.

the media, and how much freedom of movement they allow the journalists; then the emotions of the journalists, as they have to report on men they have probably bonded with, and who are fighting for their country; and finally the decisions of the owners and editors of their media organisation, who may not think that their readers want to hear critical news about their nation's military. The following model shows how this system is likely to function, with influences that might cause informative and unbiased reporting on the top, and influences that may result in a relaying of the official line or biased reporting on the bottom. The table works left to right, from the military, who are the subjects of the news, through the journalists and media organisations who report the news, to the audience that reads and analyses the news; as it was thought this was the usual direction for information from the war zone to reach the public at home, via the news media.

	Try to show the reality of war.	Try to show the reality of war.	
	Pride in work.	Pride in work.	
	Public service spirit.	Public service spirit.	
	Antagonism towards government/military.	Antagonism towards government/military.	
Belief in democracy and freedom of speech.	Belief in democracy and freedom of speech.	Belief in democracy and freedom of speech.	Receive an informed and balanced coverage
MILITARY →	JOURNALISTS →	ORGANISATION →	AUDIENCE
Protecting themselves.	Protecting soldiers.	Protecting soldiers.	Receive a limited and biased coverage
Protecting operations.	Protecting operations.	Protecting operations.	
Belief that war goals override press freedom.	Belief that war goals override press freedom.	Belief that war goals override press freedom.	
Distrust of journalists	Patriotism	Patriotism	
Believe journalists are a hindrance	Bonding with military.	Concerns over sales/advertisers.	

Figure 1.2. Influences on journalistic reporting of military operations involving their nation.

1.4. The Kosovo Conflict

Although Nato's military campaign in Kosovo started in 1999, its origins can be traced back to the earlier wars in the Balkans between 1991-95. The Serbo-Croat War (1991-2) and Bosnian War (1992-95) were initially framed in most Western countries as conflicts between equally aggrieved ethnic groups, but as the Serbs used their superior armoury to gain ascendancy, and were involved in major humanitarian abuses, such as the Srebrenica massacre, they were blamed more for the continuing violence by the British and American media. The status of Kosovo was left out of the Dayton peace deal that ended those wars, and internal unrest developed through the 1990s, after the Serbian government led by Slobodan Milosevic took autonomy away from Kosovo, whose population was predominately Muslim. This erupted into civil war in 1998, and although the international community tried to negotiate a peace settlement during 1998 and early 1999, by March 1999 the Nato countries agreed that military intervention was necessary. This section provides an overview of the sequence of events that led to the Nato campaign, and then what happened during and after it.

1.4.1. The build up to the Nato air campaign

In February 1998, Robert Geldard, the US special envoy to the Balkans, praised Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic's adherence to the Dayton accords that ended the previous Balkans wars, and denounced the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) as 'without any question a terrorist organisation.' Within days, the Serbs attacked two suspected KLA villages, Cirez and Likosane, killing twenty-six villagers.⁴⁹ Two days later, Serb police killed fifty-eight ethnic-Albanian members of one family, the

⁴⁹ W. Shawcross., *Deliver us from Evil: Warlords and Peace-keepers in a World of Endless Conflict*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), p. 327.

Jasharis; some of whom were suspected of being KLA members. When Robin Cook went to visit Milosevic, in an attempt to broker a cease-fire, Milosevic upset Cook by not keeping their appointment, and then denied his forces had over-reacted in their response to the KLA attacks.⁵⁰ These events can be seen as the beginning of the cycle of violence and failed diplomacy that culminated in the start of the Nato air campaign.

The KLA ranks grew as a result of the Serb crackdown, and this led to an escalation in the conflict, with the Serbs increasing their military activity over the summer of 1998. In September, the Nato countries, led by the US, threatened the Serbs with military action unless they stopped their offensive against the KLA. Milosevic agreed to the Nato demands in October, and pulled his forces back to avert the threat of military action by Nato.⁵¹ The Kosovo conflict all but disappeared from the British media for three months, despite the fact that the cease-fire the West had hoped for never really took place; Wesley Clark wrote that the KLA ignored 'entreaties by the international observers,' while the Serbs 'hadn't followed through with the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the police, as they had promised.'⁵²

It was only after Serb forces killed forty-five ethnic-Albanians in the village of Racak on January 15th, 1999, that the British news organisations again considered Kosovo to be headline news. Following the Racak killings, the international community set up peace talks to be held in Rambouillet, France, and warned the Serbs and ethnic-Albanians that it was their last chance to find a peaceful solution. Despite this, both parties refused to comply with Western demands. A second meeting then took place

⁵⁰ T. Judah., *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 140.

⁵¹ W. Bartlett., 'Simply the right thing to do': Labour goes to war, in R. Little and M. Wickham-Jones., *op.cit.*, pp. 131-46, p. 133-5.

⁵² W. Clark., *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 158.

in Paris, and after persuasion from Madelaine Albright and James Rubin of the US state department, Hasim Thaci signed the Rambouillet Accords for the ethnic-Albanians. However, the Serbs still refused, claiming a late appendix allowing Nato forces free access to all of Yugoslavia made signing impossible for them; although some analysts believe the Serbs did not have any inclination to sign, as they thought that agreeing to let the ethnic-Albanians have autonomy in Kosovo would eventually lead to Kosovo becoming independent from Serbia.⁵³ The ethnic-Albanians' signing of the accord, and the Serb refusal, meant that Nato was given a clear mandate to use military force against the Serbs.

1.4.2. Nato's air campaign

The Nato air campaign began at 1900 Greenwich Mean Time on March 24th, 1999, and continued for seventy-eight days; 38,004 sorties were flown, with 1,618 of these undertaken by British planes. Out of the above sorties, 10,484 were strike sorties, with 1,008 by British planes. 829 aircraft from fourteen countries were used.⁵⁴ Peter Gowan wrote that 'The Nato air war was overwhelmingly a US effort. The US flew over 80 per cent of the strike sorties, over 90 per cent of the electronic warfare missions, fired over 80 per cent of the guided air weapons and launched over 95 per cent of the Cruise missiles.'⁵⁵

Nato were frustrated at the start of their campaign, as weather limited the effectiveness of their aircraft, and Milosevic refused to capitulate. Daalder and O'Hanlon, who believe Nato did the right thing, but in the wrong way, wrote that

⁵³ For example, J. Eyal., Kosovo: killing the myths after the killing has subsided, in *Rusi Journal*, Volume 145, Part 1, 2000, pp. 20-7, p. 21.

⁵⁴ G. Robertson., *Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis*, (MoD: 1999), p. 10.

⁵⁵ P. Gowan., *The War and its Aftermath*, in P. Hammond., and E.S. Herman., *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis*, (London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 39-55, p. 39.

‘Operation Allied Force was in its early weeks a textbook case of how not to wage a war. The blindness of NATO’s major members to the possibility that the war might not end quickly was astounding.’⁵⁶ Evidence of Nato’s lack of preparation for a long campaign has also come from a number of other sources, including high ranking Nato officers. For example, General Wesley Clark became one of the biggest critics of the early Nato campaign; Clark asserted: ‘Any first-year military student could point to the more obvious inconsistencies between our efforts and the requirements posed by the Principles of War. The air campaign began with one objective – drive the Serbs back to the negotiations at Rambouillet – and quickly moved toward other aims, such as halting the ethnic cleansing, and then, after the NATO summit, the five conditions endorsed by the G-8 foreign ministers – a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all Serb forces, the return of all refugees and displaced persons, the presence of a NATO-led international force, and subsequent participation in a political settlement.’⁵⁷ Admiral James Ellis, Commander of Nato’s southern forces during the war, also admitted they had got it wrong at the start, with no coherent campaign plan, target set or even the staff to formulate a detailed plan when Milosevic failed to capitulate. General Klaus Naumann, who was head of Nato’s Military Committee for part of the Nato campaign, also criticised the Nato political leaders for only being prepared for an operation, not a war.⁵⁸

To add to Nato’s disarray at the start of their campaign, the air bombardment was the catalyst for a massive offensive by Serb forces on the ground in Kosovo. The Serb offensive and Nato air campaign led to thousands of civilians fleeing their homes, and

⁵⁶ I.H. Daalder., and M.E. O’ Hanlon., *Winning Ugly: Nato’s War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2000), p. 19.

⁵⁷ W. Clark., *op.cit*, p. 427.

⁵⁸ I.H. Daalder and M.E. O’ Hanlon., *op. cit*, p. 104-5.

ethnic-Albanian refugees citing Serb atrocities became the main focus for the British media in the first weeks of Nato's air campaign. The refugee exodus led to allegations of Serb 'ethnic cleansing' by New Labour and Nato, while the Serbs claimed the refugees were fleeing the Nato air campaign. Wesley Clark considered the 'Serb ethnic cleansing of Pristina in the early days of April...[to have been]...one of Milosevic's greatest strategic blunders. It fully engaged Western opinion, and while it continued, made a strong impression. It was a key factor in sustaining the air campaign during the early weeks before the NATO summit.'⁵⁹

The Nato attack on an ethnic-Albanian refugee convoy on April 14th exacerbated the early difficulties Nato faced, as the pictures of dead and injured refugees, together with Nato's contradictory explanations to the media, led to widespread criticism of Nato's strategy of only flying above 15,000 feet when over Yugoslavian air space. There was also a growing disquiet in the UK government about Nato's refusal to send in ground troops; and in this regard the UK government seemed to have followed the majority of UK newspaper opinion. However, the Nato leadership did not change its strategy, and instead intensified the air attack with more aircraft, sorties and a wider range of targets. Rawnsley believes that after the Washington summit in late April, Blair felt he was isolated in his calls for ground troops, and by May, 'The British politicians had surrendered virtually all control over the air campaign....The conflict had switched to American auto-pilot.'⁶⁰ In early May, there were several Nato collateral damage incidents, including the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; but Blair reacted to the resulting media coverage by accusing the British

⁵⁹ W. Clark., *op.cit*, p. 447.

⁶⁰ A. Rawnsley., *op. cit*, p. 277-8.

media of showing ‘refugee fatigue,’⁶¹ while his personal assistant, Anji Hunter, called on journalists to show some patriotism.

Although the intensified Nato campaign was causing more ‘collateral damage’ incidents, it was also starting to enjoy greater success in its campaign, and a large force of Nato ground troops were also being assembled on the borders of Kosovo towards the end of May, after Wesley Clark had convinced Clinton a credible ground force should be deployed for a possible invasion. This escalation in the Nato campaign increased the pressure on Milosevic; as did his indictment for war crimes by the Hague in the same period, and diplomatic efforts were increased by the G8 nations.⁶² Milosevic was given an ultimatum after some initial negotiations, and in early June he agreed to most of the Nato demands, including a Serb military withdrawal from Kosovo; the Nato air campaign then ended on June 10th. The increasing ferocity of the Nato air campaign, the threat of Nato ground troops, Serb anti-war protests, his indictment, and the loss of Russian support⁶³ are thought to be the main factors in Milosevic’s decision to sign the peace deal, although Nato also gave some concessions to the Serbs.⁶⁴

1.4.3. After the Nato campaign

Nato had come through a difficult campaign, and as the Serb military left Kosovo, and the ethnic-Albanian refugees returned, the Nato leaders declared their campaign a

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 280. Blair accused the media of ‘refugee fatigue’ at a speech to the *Newspaper Society* on May 10th.

⁶² W. Clark., *op.cit*, p. 295.

⁶³ It is thought that Milosevic had hoped the Russians would support him more, and at first they did, with Yeltsin threatening to deploy several war-fighting vessels to the Mediterranean, and warning that the West risked starting World War Three.

⁶⁴ These were the United Nations (UN) being given a central role in the administration of Kosovo, Russia being given a role in the peace-keeping force, and Nato forces not having free access throughout the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). A. Roberts., Nato’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo, in *Survival*, 41 (3), Autumn, 1999, pp. 102-23., p. 117.

success. However, the conflict was not over for those on the ground in Kosovo, because as the Nato troops went in to Kosovo, the Serb military left, along with many Serb civilians who had lived there. They feared revenge from the ethnic-Albanians, and those fears were realised in the first year after the war, with ‘revenge’ attacks on Serbs leading to the Serb population in Kosovo dropping from at least 200,000 to no more than 100,000. Most of the Serbs who stayed in Kosovo moved up to the north, between the town of Mitroviza and the Serb border. This meant that Kosovo was largely ethnically divided between a small pocket of Serbs in the north, and the rest of Kosovo in the hands of the ethnic-Albanian majority.⁶⁵

During the Nato campaign, about 3,000 ethnic-Albanians are thought to have been killed, and 600 Serbs, although the exact number is still not known. Nato had claimed they had destroyed 120 tanks, 220 armoured personnel carriers (APCS), and 450 artillery and mortar weapons during the campaign, but the real figures turned out to be fourteen tanks, nineteen APCS and twenty artillery and mortar pieces.⁶⁶ A House of Commons Defence Committee report after the war criticised Nato for not being ready for the humanitarian catastrophe, and not starting the campaign with greater force: ‘all the evidence suggests that the air campaign accelerated the pace of the disaster. So by the end of the campaign, its central purpose was said to be that of dissuading Milosevic and his henchmen from directing this brutality and coercing them to negotiate a settlement. This aim required quite different tactics, and that confusion of purpose dogged the campaign.’ However, paradoxically, it did acknowledge that ‘an

⁶⁵ I. H. Daalder and M.E. O’ Hanlon., *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁶⁶ J. Kampfner., *Blair’s wars*, (London: Free, 2003), p. 58.

all-out air attack against Serbia on 24 March would have destroyed the cohesion of the Alliance.⁶⁷

George Robertson conceded there had been tragic incidents caused by Nato in the conflict, where civilians were killed, but he also claimed that by keeping collateral damage to a minimum the campaign had been successful in an unprecedented way.⁶⁸

Daalder and O' Hanlon agreed with Robertson, stating the Kosovo death toll was ten times less than that from the Bosnian civil war, and so it must be considered a limited success.⁶⁹ Nicholas Jones believed the clarity of Blair and New Labour's message was instrumental in maintaining support for the Nato campaign in the UK, and also for convincing the British public the campaign was a success,⁷⁰ while Rawnsley believed Clinton had shown himself to be too obsessed with opinion polls and focus groups.⁷¹

1.5. The MoD, Nato and Serb information

This section looks at the organisation and strategy of the British and Nato information providers during the Nato campaign, before also detailing some of the content of the Serb information that was used in response. This contest for positive media coverage was vital to the Nato campaign, as Alistair Campbell pointed out after the conflict: 'Our enemy, as spokesmen, was Milosevic's media machine, but our judge and jury was the Western media. Their editorial decisions over which pictures to run, whether

⁶⁷ B. George., The House of Commons Defence Committee Report, Lessons of Kosovo, in *Rusi Journal*, December 2000, Volume 145, Number 6, pp. 12-14, p. 12-13.

⁶⁸ G. Robertson., *op.cit*, p. 11.

⁶⁹ I.H. Daalder and M.E. O' Hanlon; *op. cit*, p. 195.

⁷⁰ N. Jones., *The Control Freaks: How New Labour Gets Its Own Way*, (London: Politicos, 2002), p. 210-11.

⁷¹ A. Rawnsley., *op. cit*, p. 278-89.

to run them, and how prominently, were of considerable influence.’⁷² Peter Goff wrote that journalists were disappointed with the Nato information during the conflict, as they ‘felt the briefings over-simplified the situation to present a “Good Nato; Bad Serbia” picture,’⁷³ although Mark Laity, a *BBC* journalist at the Nato conferences thought that the ‘challenge for journalists is not to get all worked up because somebody has spun you; the challenge is to spot the spin and take it out.’⁷⁴ Laity’s opinion was reflected by those journalists interviewed for this study, as they also expected Nato to spin their campaign positively.

1.5.1. The Nato conferences

During the campaign in Kosovo, Nato conducted a similar media operation to the allied forces’ media operation during the Gulf War. During the Kosovo campaign, the main Nato conferences were held in Brussels, and journalists received a communique at 9.30 in the morning, with an update on the military operation, before a 10.30 off-camera briefing with Nato spokesperson, Jamie Shea, which was quotable by correspondents. There was then the main briefing at 1500, usually with Shea and a military spokesperson presenting it.⁷⁵ For the first few weeks, Wesley Clark’s representative, British air commander David Wilby, presented with Shea, but Clark wrote that Solana demanded Wilby was replaced after Nato had bombed the Serb television studios, because Clark and Wilby had not succeeded in a ‘public explanation of the military value of the [Serb television] transmitters...’ Clark thought it was the most ‘intense and determined’ he had seen Solana, and this was an

⁷² A. Campbell., Communications lessons for NATO, the military and media, in *Rusi Journal*, August 1999, pp. 31-6, p. 36.

⁷³ P. Goff., *The Kosovo News and Propaganda War*, (Vienna: The International Press Institute, 1999), p. 17.

⁷⁴ G. McLaughlin., *op.cit*, p. 120.

⁷⁵ E. Brivio., Soundbites and Irony: Nato information is made in London, in P. Goff., *op.cit*, pp. 514-22, p. 517-8.

indication of 'just how critical the public information operation was.'⁷⁶ Wilby was followed for two weeks by Italian general Giuseppe Marani, and then, in May, German general Walter Jertz accompanied Shea. Italian commander, Fabrizio Maltinti, was also sent on now and again, to report on Nato's humanitarian mission.⁷⁷

During the muddled Nato explanation for the Djakovica convoy bombing, it became apparent there was not enough personnel involved with the Nato media operation, and this led to Alistair Campbell being sent out to restructure the Nato media operation.⁷⁸

Rawnsley wrote that under Campbell's authority, a clone of New Labour's 1997 election machine room was created by knocking through the wall between two rooms, so that there would be faster and more coordinated information provided to the spokespeople.⁷⁹ The Media Operations Centre (MOC) was staffed by communications experts from America and Europe, but the biggest contingent was British. Civil servants were drafted in from Downing Street, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and even the Scottish office.⁸⁰ Brivio thought the conferences were dominated by a strong Anglo-American model of communications policy, and they changed after Campbell was sent out to Brussels to re-organise the strategy and presentation, with a more coordinated one message a day released from harmonised press conferences in London, Brussels and Washington.⁸¹ Brivio thought it worked well in the UK and US, but was questioned in countries such as Italy, Greece, Germany and Belgium.⁸²

⁷⁶ W. Clark., *op.cit*, p. 252.

⁷⁷ E. Brivio., *op.cit*, p. 521.

⁷⁸ P. Goff., *op.cit*, p. 543.

⁷⁹ P. Knightley., *op.cit*, p, 512-3.

⁸⁰ A. Rawnsley., *op.cit*, p. 266.

⁸¹ E. Brivio., *op.cit*, p. 515.

⁸² *Ibid.*

Robin Brown believes New Labour's media operation became vital for Nato during the campaign, because although they had at first studied the Democrat public relations system, they had produced a model that in some ways exceeded the US model, and this was what Nato relied on during their Kosovo campaign. Brown wrote that the 'successful prosecution of the war was partly dependent on the orchestrated presentation of the war. Indeed the political opposition to the war was deflected via presentation and successful presentation sustained the coalition....The organisation to execute this was the imposition of a centralised organisation in which the only permitted communication was that in line with the approved line - that was "on message."'”⁸³

Shea later described how the MOC was organised in the television documentary, *Correspondent: How the War was Spun*. Shea said that a team of twenty-five worked to Campbell's blueprint under Solana: there was a strategy team who directed overall policy under the Secretary General, with representatives that spoke on conference calls every day; a team working on Grid (planning conferences and speeches around important dates or events, and responding to Tanjug); Drafters of articles (for leaders to use/opinion pieces in newspapers); Talking heads (monitoring what experts had been saying about Nato); Media monitoring (what and how things were said); Drafting of lines/messages (Shea said that sometimes he used them, sometimes he didn't); and someone analysing Milosevic and the Yugoslav media.⁸⁴ Philip Knightley observed that in the 'comparatively short history of media management in

⁸³ R. Brown., *Campbell over Kosovo: Mobilization and Media Management in British Foreign Policy*, (British International Studies Association conference paper, Manchester, December 1999), p. 6-10.

⁸⁴ Correspondent., *How the War was Spun*, (BBC2: 16/10/1999).

wartime there can have been no system so skilfully designed to win the propaganda war. Nothing was left to chance.’⁸⁵

Campbell thought the Nato media operation improved in the second half of the campaign, writing that Nato had made the mistake of thinking aloud before the facts were known after the Djakovica convoy attack, but after his arrival they ‘demanded the facts from the military, got them and stuck to them.’ Campbell believed the coordination had improved by the time Nato bombed the Chinese embassy on May 5th, and that event therefore reverberated for several days less as a news story than the convoy incident.⁸⁶

Shea also thought Campbell’s arrival had made the difference, as they had been struggling before that, with no coordinated message.⁸⁷ Shea explained that by the time Nato had their thirteenth ‘blunder’ at the end of May, hitting a block of flats in a little town on the Montenegrin border, he did not wait for journalists to ask him a question because he had all the information to hand, and afterwards he was not asked a single question about it; this was in contrast to the overwhelming journalistic interest in the earlier Djakovica convoy attack, which had become ‘the single dominant issue.’ McLaughlin thought journalists that covered the Nato campaign will not be pleased to hear Shea gloating about how the Nato media operation had tamed them during the second half of the conflict,⁸⁸ while Patrick Bishop of the *Telegraph* also wrote that Nato’s ‘parsimony with the truth’ meant that if it ‘goes to war again, the media will examine its claims from an initial standpoint of disbelief.’⁸⁹

⁸⁵ P. Knightley., *op. cit*, p. 512-3.

⁸⁶ A. Campbell., *op.cit*, p. 33.

⁸⁷ N. Jones., *Sultans of Spin*, (London: Orion, 1999), p. 306.

⁸⁸ G. McLaughlin., *op.cit*, p. 121.

⁸⁹ P. Bishop., untitled article, in P. Goff., *op.cit*, pp. 431-3, p. 433.

1.5.2. The MoD conferences

The centrepiece of the UK communications effort during the Nato campaign was an 11.30 morning press conference held at the MoD; but before that the UK war cabinet would meet at 0900, and then Campbell would brief lobby journalists at 1100.⁹⁰ The usual format for the MoD conference was for a minister (on twenty-six occasions George Robertson and on sixteen Robin Cook) and either the Chief of Defence Staff or one of his deputies to brief the media. Robin Brown thought the content of the press conferences was highly repetitive, although there were some attempts to vary the presentation.⁹¹

Jonathan Eyal wrote that the MoD decided their press conferences should be at 11.30 so that its information would be useful to as many media sources as possible, and act as a ‘centrepiece’ of the day; at 11.30 the conferences would be at the right time to provide news for lunchtime broadcast media at home, and the breakfast television news in the US. Eyal explained that: ‘The aim of the MoD’s media operation was to grind down Milosevic’s determination by persuading him that the British government, as part of a coalition, was determined to pursue the offensive until NATO’s objectives were met, and to maintain Alliance cohesion.’ The conferences had to address friendly, neutral and enemy audiences, and also had to be co-ordinated with other government departments, with Nato’s own media operation and with Alliance governments. Eyal wrote that at times when there was little news, the MoD sometimes had doubts about the value of the daily conferences, but it was thought that Milosevic could have taken advantage of a lack of MoD information if conferences were cancelled, and that he might then have started ‘dictating the public debate in the West.’ Eyal believes the journalists were happy with the division between the

⁹⁰ J. Rentoul., *op. cit.*, p. 522-3.

military and political presentations at the MoD's daily press conferences, and that the MoD conferences usually compared favourably with those of Nato.⁹²

George Robertson thought the media operation had been a 'considerable challenge,' as 'throughout the campaign, NATO's actions were subject to intense and real-time media scrutiny,' but the UK had 'played a leading role in informing and supporting the Alliance media operations.'⁹³ Oona Muirhead, who was the MoD Director of Information Strategy and News during the war, thought it had been vital during the conflict to play down collateral damage incidents, and to get the media to focus on the humanitarian catastrophe that Nato was trying to stop and reverse. Muirhead explained that when the media focused on Nato blunders they tried to get them back focusing on the important issue, the refugees, and when they were successful they knew they were making a contribution to winning the campaign. Like the New Labour leadership, Muirhead thought the UK media should have been more pro-Nato during the campaign, and not helped Milosevic with reports that dwelt on Nato collateral damage incidents.⁹⁴

1.5.3. The Serbian information

As Nato tried to build and maintain support for their campaign around the world, the Serbs had the advantage of controlling access to the battlefield, and could therefore take journalists to events they thought would provide good publicity for themselves, while keeping the media away from areas they wanted to hide from the world.

Wesley Clark referred to this when he wrote that Nato knew from the outset the Serbs would do all they could to portray the Nato strikes as targeting civilians, rather than

⁹¹ R. Brown., *op.cit*, p. 10.

⁹² J. Eyal., *The Media and the Military*, *op.cit*, p. 38-9.

⁹³ G. Robertson., *op.cit*, p. 25.

the Serb military and police, and that the Serbs had the advantage of controlling the war zone.⁹⁵ The difficulty Nato faced in the propaganda war was also referred to by Nicholas Jones, who wrote that: 'In taking on President Milosevic, NATO was up against a master propagandist, whose state-run television service had long fostered and strengthened Serbian nationalism.'⁹⁶ The Serb media operation revolved around three issues: their sovereignty and Nato's imperialism; the war on the ground being a reaction to Nato financed KLA terrorism, and that the Nato bombing was responsible for the civilian casualties and refugees seen in the media.

Some examples of the Serb rhetoric came on the first day of the attacks, when Vladislav Jovanovic, in a speech at the UN, said talks should be talks, not threats; that all the Serb wars had been defensive; that they were a sovereign country and therefore should not be attacked, and that their strength was moral and political, rather than military. Moreover, on Yugoslav television, Milosevic said they could not let Nato put troops on their soil, as the land was for the people, and it was a question of freedom; while Miloslav Paic denied the Nato campaign was a reaction to a humanitarian catastrophe, and that Nato were just claiming that to justify their actions.⁹⁷ A few days later, Paic said their ground war was a reaction to large scale attacks by terrorists financed by the Nato countries, and that they would probably stop their operations if Nato told the KLA to stop their atrocities. Paic compared the situation to that in Bosnia Srpska, where he claimed Muslims and Croats were used as

⁹⁴ O. Muirhead., 'My job: At the Sharp End of the Media Operation', in *Rusi Journal*, (Volume 144, No 4, August 1999), pp. 37-43, p. 39-41.

⁹⁵ W. Clark., *op.cit*, p. 447.

⁹⁶ N. Jones., *op.cit*, p. 302.

⁹⁷ *BBC World.*, 24/3/1999.

a ground force by Nato to remove the Serbs; and also accused the KLA of setting fire to their own houses, so that Nato would send in ground troops.⁹⁸

The Serbs also claimed the Nato bombing had caused the humanitarian catastrophe that was developing, and tried to convince the media of this. For example, Jovanovic claimed they were only acting against terrorists, and that reports of Serb atrocities were Nato black propaganda.⁹⁹ Similarly, Marko Gasic blamed the refugees on the Nato 'murder machine', and said reports of Serb atrocities were uncorroborated, and that maybe one in a thousand were true. Gasic criticised Western journalists for believing stories from people who gained an advantage from lying to them.¹⁰⁰

When Nato planes caused civilian damage or deaths it played into the hands of the Serbian Ministry of Information, and they used them as evidence to back up their claims, and also to make new ones. For example, Paic blamed Nato for causing an ecological disaster after they hit a pharmaceutical factory, and also claimed they had purposely targeted schools, hospitals and private houses.¹⁰¹ The Serbs also claimed to have shot down eighty Nato planes,¹⁰² but they only offered evidence of a few downed planes, and this suggested the other claims were false. The eagerness of some Western analysts to believe the Serb claims also called into question their credibility as experts.

1.6. The importance of the study

The study of the relationship between the government, military and media seems especially important in times when the country is at war; as war can lead to the

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27/3/1999.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 26/3/1999.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 28/3/1999.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 27/3/1999.

¹⁰² P. Goff., *op.cit*, p. 534-6.

unnecessary loss of life, damage to infrastructure and wasted money. This study aims to show how the British government and Nato military set about persuading the media and public that their Kosovo campaign was justified, and evaluate how the media responded to the Nato media operation. Ideally, the government and military ought to present the media with accurate and comprehensive information, as long as it does not inhibit their operations, and the media should act as a watchdog for the public by making sure there are no inaccuracies in that information.

Although it has been found in previous research that most British people do not want to know any news that may compromise the British military when they go to war,¹⁰³ it is still important for people to receive enough information to form an opinion on such issues as whether we should enter the conflict, whether the cause is just, and whether the government and military are acting in a correct manner. To enable the public to make informed judgements on the above issues, it is important that the military provide the public with information on why the British military are being sent to war, what risks they face, what are the objectives, and what is the exit strategy; and this information is usually relayed to the public through the media. The media therefore play a crucial role in the democratic process when their military is at war, and analysing their independence from the government and military, while evaluating their ability to inform the public, is vital for democracy, as Brian McNair emphasised: 'journalism is a key resource in supporting our role as citizens in societies which claim to value the democratic process. If that is true we clearly have an interest in

¹⁰³ See D.E. Morrison., *Television and the Gulf War*, *op.cit.* Entman also refers to evidence suggesting 'members of the public seek to avoid dissonance by refusing to confront the implications of journalists' criticism' of military censorship during conflicts involving their nation's military, and that 'polls suggest, time after time, public hostility to complaints from news organisations about restrictions on their ability to cover the military action.' R. Entman., *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 71. Entman cites J.R. MacArthur., *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992).

understanding how it works, in being able to read it intelligently and to criticise it when necessary....but I and many others would not study and write about journalism if we did not believe it to be an important and powerful cultural force.'¹⁰⁴ McNair considers that the processes of journalistic production can be empirically observed and analysed, and are then rendered visible, and open to democratic scrutiny.¹⁰⁵ The empirical results and conclusions contained in this study will therefore be an addition to the current knowledge on the relationship between the country's leaders and the media, and will be a resource for those interested in studying how the relationship worked during Nato's Kosovo campaign.

The comparative methodology is also hopefully in line with the trend in research interests, as two of the biggest theoretical influences on this study have recently called for more comparative studies: in 2004, Todd Gitlin wrote: 'comparative studies are long overdue. Why do we have so few?';¹⁰⁶ while Hallin (and Mancini) wrote that comparative analysis was essential if we want to move beyond the limitations of only analysing media systems we are familiar with, and there 'is a need, finally, for more case studies of the interaction of the media with other social actors in the coverage of particular kinds of events or issues....This kind of study is particularly important for exploring issues of power that, we have argued, are very much underexplored given their significance to many of the normative questions that communication researchers often return to in the end: This kind of study would make it possible to explore which points of view are able to enter the public sphere, which actors and institutions are

¹⁰⁴ B. McNair., *The Sociology of Journalism*, *op.cit*, p. 16-7.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁰⁶ T. Gitlin., Reply to Rodney Benson, in *Political Communication*, (Volume 21, Number 3 / July-September 2004), pp. 309-10, p. 309.

able to shape the process of debate, and how these processes are affected by the structural characteristics of media systems.’¹⁰⁷ With further relevance to this study, and its image variable, another important influence on the study, Robert Entman, wrote in 2004 that ‘Research on framing and on news of foreign policy has paid scant attention to the visual dimension of media coverage, even though many scholars suspect it has substantial influence....the danger of somehow misleading readers or distorting the “real” messages or impacts of the visuals seems outweighed by the potential insights generated in plunging ahead – with due caution.’¹⁰⁸

1.7. Limitations of the study

The main focus of this study was to analyse how the British media framed the Kosovo Conflict, and identify what sources they used. The study investigated the influences on the media coverage within a hegemonic framework, but recognises that ideology is just one factor that may influence the way the media frames conflicts. As this was a macro-analysis rather than a micro-analysis; looking at media frames across the whole of the conflict rather than a detailed micro-analysis of the way each sentence was phrased, this meant that many interesting aspects of the war may have been missed or marginalised, but the coding system was designed to provide as comprehensive and accurate a picture of the media coverage as possible. There was also no research undertaken on the effects of the media coverage on the public, or the Nato campaign. Some models, theories and concepts also had to be left out or marginalised, although many seemed relevant and deserving of inclusion.

¹⁰⁷ D.C. Hallin and P. Mancini., *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2004), p. 302-4.

¹⁰⁸ R. Entman., *Projections of Power*, *op.cit*, p. 56.

The results are also only particularly relevant to Nato's Kosovo campaign, as the conflict can only be considered in its time and context. Nato's Kosovo campaign was a conflict against a Serb enemy that the UK and US media had generally framed negatively even when the UK and US militaries were not involved in a conflict against them. Nato's Kosovo campaign also came at the end of a decade of ethnic conflicts that took over the media agenda for international conflicts after the Cold War, and before it all changed again a couple of years later, when the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US brought a return to more conventional wars; with the UK and the US fighting for themselves instead of for ethnic groups. This brought a different UK media coverage for the Iraq war in 2003. Nato's Kosovo campaign was also the last major conflict fought mainly from the air, at the time of writing.

The study will only use nineteen days of MoD and Nato speeches from their press conferences, and government rhetoric, to determine how Nato wanted to frame their Kosovo campaign. Although there were other ways the government and Nato sources could have influenced the media, such as the lobby system and personal conversations, the conferences and political rhetoric should provide the study with sufficient evidence of how the government and Nato framed their campaign, so that the media's coverage can be analysed in comparison to them. Also, only the coverage of eight media sources will be analysed, due both to the time available for the study, and the availability of sources. The omission of television news coverage does mean that it is a limited research project, but newspapers and the Internet are still very important media sources. Moreover, there is likely to be a greater difference in the framing between the eight media sources analysed than there would be between national television and radio sources. If more time had been available, including all the

available days of media coverage of the Nato campaign would have given a more comprehensive analysis; but hopefully enough days were coded to get an adequate view of the particularities of each media source's reporting of the conflict. An analysis of the House of Commons debates, which was going to be used to test the indexing hypothesis, was also given less prominence than at first envisaged, as there was a front-bench consensus in support of Nato for almost all their campaign, and this meant there was little relevant evidence available to judge political influence on the media coverage, as the media had few prominent political challenges to the government policy to index their coverage to.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Introduction

Having introduced the Kosovo Conflict and this study in the previous chapter, the first section of this chapter will explain some of the theories and concepts that will be used in the analysis of the Kosovo media coverage, and also the views of some analysts on what influences the media to report the news in the way they do. Although this study is on the media coverage of a conflict, it is thought important to also include theories and evidence from peace time, because some aspects of media coverage that may seem to be for propagandistic reasons in war are also commonplace in peace time. As Robert Harris, who was working as a journalist for *BBC's Newsnight* programme during the Falklands War concluded on its media coverage: 'The episodes which caused the most disquiet, and which have been described in this book, were not necessarily unique to the Falklands crisis. The instinctive secrecy of the military and the Civil Service; the prostitution and hysteria of sections of the press; the lies, the misinformation, the manipulation of public opinion by the authorities; the political intimidation of broadcasters; the ready connivance of the media at their own distortion...all these occur as much in peace time Britain as in war.'¹⁰⁹

This study will focus on the theories of framing and hegemony as they have been used widely in studies on the relationship between the government, military and media during times of conflict. These two theoretical concepts of hegemony and framing are inter-related in their media terms, through both being concerned with the production of news content, and what influences the decisions of the media professionals to report the news the way they do; the hegemonic influence is usually evident in the use

¹⁰⁹ R. Harris., *Gotcha! : the media the government and the Falklands crisis* (London : Faber, 1983), p. 151. Also quoted in the introduction to Glasgow University Media Group., *War and Peace News*, (Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1985), p. x.

of national government or military sources that control the framing of how an event is reported in the media. If the media concentrate too much on the above official sources for their news, and relay their frames to the public virtually uncontested, they are considered hegemonic.

This section elaborates on some of the above points, and presents some of the evidence that has been gathered on what influences the way news is reported. The picture that emerges from the hegemonic research tradition is one of journalists being constrained by the demands of their profession to keep to news largely provided by official sources; that will be culturally understood by the audience, and be in line with the political outlook of their media organisation. Other relevant theories involved with the politics-media relationship, such as indexing; and metaphorical concepts, such as watch-dog, lap-dog, and attack-dog are also featured in this chapter, as research conducted using those theories and concepts have provided valuable insights for this study; indexing theory is explained in depth in the sources section, while watch-dog refers to an independent media; lap-dog to a subservient media, and attack-dog to a hostile media. The section begins with some of research that has already been done on the Kosovo media coverage.

2.2. Research on the media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict

There have been several articles written about the media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict since the end of the war, and a few of the articles most relevant to this study are discussed here. The book, *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis*, which was edited by Edward Herman, along with Philip Hammond, contains several articles critical of Nato's war in Kosovo and the UK and US media coverage of the Nato campaign; for example, in the qualitative article, *Third Way War: New*

Labour, the British Media and Kosovo, Hammond concluded: ‘Although every British newspaper except the *Independent on Sunday* took a pro-war line in its editorial column, there were, broadly speaking, two types of press support for the Nato attack. Politically conservative newspapers, such as *The Times*, *Telegraph*, *Express* and *Mail*, voiced their customary stout support for the British military. At the same time, however, these papers expressed a certain caution about the wisdom and goals of Nato action, particularly in the early days of the war....By contrast, for the more liberal section of the press, particularly the *Guardian* and *Independent*, to whom a pro-military stance is not such a traditional reflex response, it was Nato’s proclaimed moral mission which captured the imagination.’ Hammond believed the Nato campaign was viewed by some of these liberals as ‘a fulfilment of hopes that had remained frustrated during most of the Bosnian conflict.’¹¹⁰ In Peter Goff’s book, *The Kosovo News and Propaganda War*, Hammond also asserted in his article, *Reporting Kosovo: Journalism vs. Propaganda*, ‘that one casualty of the Kosovo war was British journalism, although some sources maintain it was already long dead. In its place we have propaganda.’¹¹¹

In a qualitative analysis of the German media, Thomas Deichmann came to a similar conclusion to Hammond’s: ‘The new closing of ranks between “modernisers” in politics and the media demonstrated more clearly than ever that those who were the loudest in their demands for the defence of human rights and democracy were the most absolute in their support of a total Nato war and their denunciation of criticism as Serbian propaganda....While in the post-war era German history urged political and military restraint, this was now turned on its head under Red-Green auspices. A

¹¹⁰ P. Hammond., *Third Way War: New Labour, the British Media and Kosovo*, in P. Hammond., and E.S. Herman., *Degraded Capability*, *op.cit*, pp. 123-131, p. 123-26.

paradigm shift, apparent in Germany since the end of the Cold War, was thus sealed in the course of the Nato war against Yugoslavia.’ Deichmann believed that this change in the left/liberal publications undermined German democracy, as the ‘process of forming opinions in a democratic society depends on the multiplicity and reliability of the information made available.’¹¹²

However, several writers have defended the media’s coverage of the Kosovo Conflict. For example, Greg McLaughlin argued that there is not enough evidence to support Hammond’s propaganda theory, and instead the evidence ‘suggests that in the case of the British news media, at any rate, there was real media counterweight to NATO spin...’¹¹³ Donald Trelford, who was formerly the editor of the *Observer*, also considered that Campbell was more ‘right than wrong’ about the British media allowing ‘Nato blunders’ to dominate the news agenda for too long, and quoted Michael Williams from *BBC Radio* and John Sweeney of the *Observer* as being in agreement.¹¹⁴ Richard Keeble found that thirty-three out of ninety-nine prominent columnists opposed military action against Serbia in a survey he conducted, but he also noted that ‘virtually all of Fleet Street backed the action, even calling for the deployment of ground troops (which not even the generals dared adopt as policy).’¹¹⁵

The *European Journal of Communication*’s September, 2000 issue was a special Kosovo edition, featuring several articles that analysed the media coverage of the conflict. Like Deichmann, Eilders and Luter also analysed the German media coverage of Kosovo, but by using a frame analysis that used both qualitative and

¹¹¹ P. Hammond., Reporting Kosovo: Journalism vs. Propaganda, in P. Goff., *The Kosovo News and Propaganda War*, *op.cit*, pp. 62-67, p. 67.

¹¹² T. Deichmann., From ‘Never again War’ to ‘Never again Aushwitz’: Dilemmas of German Media Policy in the War against Yugoslavia, in *Ibid*, pp. 153-63, p. 159-60.

¹¹³ G. McLaughlin., *op.cit*, p. 122-3.

¹¹⁴ D. Trelford., Britain’s Media War, in P. Goff., *op.cit*, pp. 57-60.

quantitative methods. They looked at five newspapers from across the political spectrum to identify a variety of competing diagnostic, prognostic and identity-related interpretations. Their content analysis found the legitimacy of the war was hardly contested, and they considered this supported the basic assumptions of the indexing thesis, as the high degree of consent in the media system reflected the lack of substantial conflict in the German party system.¹¹⁶ However, they did find considerable criticism of the Nato campaign in their analysis, as Nato collateral damage increased during the conflict, and the chances of a successful outcome for the alliance looked less likely. The main difference they found between the right and left wing papers was that the conservative papers were more likely to emphasise the military options, while the liberal papers directed attention to humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. They found that ‘approval of a ground war’ and the ‘unhindered continuation of the war’ were almost exclusively expressed at the right end of the political spectrum. They also found that it was mainly the right-wing papers that concentrated their diagnostic emphasis on ‘human rights violations,’ while the left-wing papers diagnosed the war as ‘uncontrollable dynamics’ or the ‘consequence of diplomatic failure.’ Eilders and Luter also found that although the liberal papers’ editorials were more cautious about supporting the war, they did not question the legitimacy of the war.¹¹⁷

Also using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis, Reiner Grundmann, Dennis Smith and Sue Wright surveyed an establishment newspaper from Germany,

¹¹⁵ R. Keeble., Information Warfare in an Age of Hyper-Militarism, in S. Allan and B. Zelizer., *op.cit.*, pp. 43-58, p. 51.

¹¹⁶ C. Eilders., and A. Luter., Competing Framing Strategies in German Public Discourse, in *European Journal of Communication*, (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage), 15 (3), 2000, pp. 415-428, p. 415.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 424-6.

France and the UK to analyse ‘what their reportage reveals about the political agenda of the various elite readerships and their perceptions of the international order.’ They found the British newspaper they analysed, the *FT*, ‘did not comment in any depth on the possibility that there might be “spin” in the press releases from NATO and its heavily British press team. Like other parts of the British media, the *FT* was content to relay the message that this was a fight against evil.’¹¹⁸ The analysts also concluded that the *FT* tended to ‘take the straight NATO [and British government] line of treating the Milosevic regime as an enemy that needs to be defeated, and while *LM* [*Le Monde*] displays much more sympathy and some support for the Serbian position, *FAZ* [*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*] is more sensitive to the complexities of Serbian culture and politics.’ They also found the French were incensed with the spin put on events after Campbell re-organised the Nato media operation.¹¹⁹

In *Infosuasion in European Newspapers; A Case Study on the War in Kosovo*, Rosella Savarese examined the orientation of the European press during Kosovo by means of the ‘infosuasion’ (persuasive information) and media logic hypotheses; analysing a selection of ten European newspapers to see how the conflict’s participants were presented. A conservative and liberal newspaper was analysed from the UK, France, Italy, Spain and Germany, with the *Times* and *Guardian* chosen from the UK. Savarese found the *Guardian* was similar to the *Times*, in that they were ‘characterised by a balancing of opinions,’ particularly in comparison to the Spanish newspapers, *El Pais* and *ABC*, who Savarese found to be extremely partisan in their support for the Nato campaign. Savarese found there was a strong narrative scheme

¹¹⁸ R. Grundmann., D. Smith., and S. Wright., National Elites and Transnational Discourses in the Balkan War, in *Ibid.*, pp. 299-320, p.315-6.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 310-2.

in the British papers, and that Nato were seen as heroes and the Serbs as anti-heroes, with Nato's main value objects being democracy, equality, liberty, independence and cultural independence, while the latter's were authoritarianism, justice, peace and nationalism. Savarese found that in the non-Spanish newspapers: 'Half the authors of the articles, although not necessarily journalists, declared themselves to be against intervention in as much as they believe that the operation is not (in this order) successful, or rapid, or effective, or necessary, or indispensable,' with the other half in favour of action for the opposite reasons. Savarese thought that those against the action either believed the Serbs were legitimately defending their rights in Kosovo; were worried that Russia and China might enter the war on the Serbs' side, or believed that diplomacy should have been used. Those in favour of the Nato campaign emphasised the fact that human rights had been violated; Milosevic was authoritarian, and that the UN had been blocked from taking action by vetoes. Savarese did not find any distinct differences between the coverage of liberal and conservative newspapers across the different countries,¹²⁰ and there was more difference found between the different countries' coverage.

Stig A. Nohrsetedt, Sophia Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Rene Ottosen and Kristina Riegert looked at the coverage of the first three days of the Nato air strikes in newspapers from four countries: *The Daily Telegraph* from the UK, *Ta Nea* from Greece, *Aftenposten* from Norway, and *Dagens Nyheter* from Sweden. The analysts found the *Telegraph* differed from the other papers because it depicted Tony Blair as the dominant Nato leader, rather than Bill Clinton. *The Telegraph* was also found to have followed Clinton and Blair in personalising the war around Milosevic more than the

¹²⁰ R. Savarese., *Infosuasion in European Newspapers; A Case Study on the War in Kosovo*, in *Ibid.*, pp. 363-81, p. 369-379.

other papers, and blamed him for all the troubles in the Balkans over the previous ten years. The analysts concluded that only *Ta Nea* consistently questioned the Nato discourse. Their research also found that the *Telegraph* did not question the legality of the Nato air strikes as much as the other papers; criticised the bombing most for its lack of efficiency, and discussed whether ground troops were the answer much more than the other three papers.¹²¹

2.3. Frame theory

Frame analysis provides the main conceptual framework for this study; in media analysis, framing is a modern term for the conscious or unconscious way that media workers decide what to include or omit from a news story, and also how to construct that story. Media professionals usually have to work to rigid deadlines, and this limits the amount of time they have to construct a news story around the day's events. This means they have to analyse and process the information they receive in a very short time, and frames offer a quick and convenient way to package news information that will be understandable to the audience. Stephen D. Reese recently suggested a working definition of framing, influenced by definitions from those who have used framing in their research; most of whom are also included in this study. Reese considered that: 'Frames are organising principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world.'¹²²

¹²¹ S. A. Nohrstedt., S. Kaitatzi-Whitlock., Rene Ottosen., and Kristina Riegert., From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo: War Journalism and Propaganda, in *Ibid.*, pp. 383-404, p. 391-401.

¹²² S. D. Reese., Prologue – Framing Public Life: A Bridging Model for Media Research, in S.D. Reese., O.H. Gandy., and A.E. Grant., *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*, (Mahwah, New Jersey and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001), pp. 7-31, p. 11.

2.3.1. The origins and development of frame analysis in media research

Reese wrote that Erving Goffman is often credited with introducing the framing approach, along with the anthropologist-psychologist Gregory Bateson, whom Goffman credited with originating the metaphor.¹²³ Goffman used frame analysis in his examination ‘of the organisation of experience,’ and with regard to the question of what influences the journalism process, Goffman considered that reporters’ understanding of the world precedes the stories they write about, ‘determining which ones reporters will select and how the ones that are selected will be told.’¹²⁴ Goffman later wrote that: ‘When the individual in our Western society recognises a particular event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or more frameworks or schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary... a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful.’¹²⁵

William A. Gamson wrote of Goffman’s legacy, and considered that although Goffman never cited Gramsci in his work, his work on frames is very similar to Gramsci’s hegemony theory. Gamson quoted Goffman’s aim in the use of framing as being ‘to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense of events and to analyse the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject’; a frame ‘allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms.’¹²⁶ Gamson stated that political, economic and organisational factors do not entirely explain media content, and that part of it must be explained at the cultural

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹²⁴ E. Goffman., *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience*, (Middlesex, Victoria and Auckland: Penguin, 1974), p. 14.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹²⁶ W.A. Gamson., Goffman’s legacy to political sociology, in *Theory and Society*, 14 (5), 1985, pp. 605-622, p. 615.

level: 'The frames for a given story are frequently drawn from shared cultural narratives and myths. Some stories resonate with larger cultural themes; this tunes the ears of journalists to their symbolism.'¹²⁷

Todd Gitlin was one of the first to use frame analysis in the study of news coverage, and described frames thus: 'What makes the world beyond direct experience look natural is a media frame....Frames are principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters. Media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organise the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports. Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse, whether verbal or visual....Any analytic approach to journalism - indeed, to the production of any mass-mediated content - must ask: What is the frame here? Why this frame and not another? What patterns are shared by the frames clamped over this event and the frames clamped over that one, by frames in different media in different places at different moments? And how does the news-reporting institution regulate these regularities? And then: What difference do the frames make for the larger world?'¹²⁸

Gadi Wolfsfeld considers Gitlin's to be a 'cogent summary' of framing, and sums up the process of media framing as one in which the news media construct frames for conflicts by attempting to fit the information they are receiving into a package that is professionally useful and culturally familiar; journalists attempt to find a narrative fit

¹²⁷ W.A. Gamson., News as Framing: Comments on Graber. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 33 (2), November/December 1989, pp. 157-166, p. 161.

¹²⁸ T. Gitlin., *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the making and unmaking of the new Left*, (Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1980), p. 6-7.

between incoming information and existing media frames. Wolfsfeld therefore thinks that news is not information driven or frame driven, but is a combination of the two, and there are always alternative frames that can be used.¹²⁹ Wolfsfeld suggested that ‘those who hope to understand variations in the role of the news media must look at the competition among antagonists along two dimensions: one structural and the other cultural.’¹³⁰ Wolfsfeld explained that many political conflicts centre on disputes over frames as each antagonist attempts to market its own package of ideas to the mass media and the public. It is therefore important to examine the level of correspondence between the frames adopted by the media and those offered by each of the political antagonists in order to understand better this competition. Wolfsfeld considers that transactions between antagonists and the news media are more than a business deal, they are a set of cultural interactions in which antagonists promote their own frames of the conflict while the news media attempt to construct a story that can be understood by their audience. Therefore, Wolfsfeld considered that the most useful way for researchers to deal with this aspect of the relationship is to focus on the interpretive frames constructed by the news media about political conflicts,¹³¹ and imagine editors and reporters asking three questions when they first get news of a conflict: How did we cover this conflict in the past? What is the most newsworthy part of the conflict? Who are the good guys?¹³²

According to Robert Entman, who set out to clarify frame theory, framing ‘essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to

¹²⁹ G. Wolfsfeld., *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 33-34.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4-5.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described'. Echoing Goffman's original definition of framing, Entman argues that culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames, and communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgements, guided by their belief system, and that the decisions are then manifested in the text by the presence or absence of keywords, phrases, stereotyped images, sources and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements; Entman also considers that what is omitted from the news is as important as what is included.¹³³ Six years after Entman's article, Dietram Scheufele argued that the fractured framing paradigm Entman had referred to was still fractured, as the numerous approaches to framing developed since Entman's work had meant there was little comparability of empirical results. Scheufele classified previous approaches to framing research along two dimensions: the type of frame examined (media frames or audience frames) and the way frames are operationalised (independent variable or dependent variable).¹³⁴ In the theoretical framework of this study, it is the media frames that are studied rather than the audience frames, and the government and military frames are considered the independent variables, and the media frames are the dependent variables.

Reflecting the still open-ended status of the framing concept, Michael Schudson argued that 'framing' has largely replaced the idea of 'bias' in the social sciences, and this has moved the analysis of news away from the idea of intentional bias: 'That is, to acknowledge that news stories frame reality is also to acknowledge that it would be

¹³³ R. Entman; Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, in *Journal of Communication*, Volume 43 (4), Winter, 1993, pp. 51-8, p. 52.

¹³⁴ D.A. Scheufele., Framing as a Theory of Media Effects, in *Journal of Communication*, 49 (2), Spring 1999, pp. 103-22, p. 115-8.

humanly impossible to avoid framing. Every narrative account of reality necessarily presents some things and not others; consciously or unconsciously, every narrative makes assumptions about how the world works, what is important, what makes sense, and what should be.’¹³⁵ James Tankard considers framing ‘differs from bias in several important ways. First, it is a more sophisticated concept. It goes beyond notions of pro or con, favourable or unfavourable, negative or positive. Framing adds the possibilities of additional, more complex emotional responses and also adds a cognitive dimension (beliefs about objects as well as attitudes). Second, framing recognises the ability of a text – or a media presentation – to define a situation, to define the issues, and to set the terms of a debate....Framing also reflects the richness of media discourse and the subtle differences that are possible when a specific topic is presented in different ways. These fine points are often lost in a crude pro-or-con bias approach.’¹³⁶

Nelson, Clawson and Oxley argue that framing can unlock the process of meaning making in the news process: ‘evidence is steadily accumulating that framing is a powerful concept for explicating the activities of journalists and news organisations. It also provides leverage for understanding the behaviours of public relations specialists, “spin doctors,” and other elites and professionals whose job it is to produce congenial concepts, beliefs, and opinions among the broader public.’¹³⁷

Sanghee Kweon, who used framing in a study on business mergers and acquisitions, agreed, writing that frame theory ‘provides an answer for the question of how news

¹³⁵ M. Schudson., *The Sociology of News*, (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), p. 35-6.

¹³⁶ J.W. Tankard, Jr., *The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing*, in S.D. Reese., O.H. Gandy., and A.E. Grant, *op.cit*, pp. 95-106, p. 96-97

¹³⁷ T. E. Nelson., R. A. Clawson., and Z. M. Oxley., *Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effect on Tolerance*, from *American Political Science Review*, 91 (3), September 1997, pp. 567-83, p. 577.

texts are framed by media style....Furthermore, how does government policy affect news coverage? When news media focus on their own story, how do they cover the news? What kind of news selection value do they have in news media?' Kweon considered frame theory a useful theoretical model to distinguish a news text's various dimensions, and thought that through content analysis it is possible to identify the framing style, format, timing, and nature of news stories. Moreover, Kweon later explained that 'By identifying the dominant frames and, more importantly, the unused or oppositional frames, in coverage of the reality, we can also determine the extent to which journalists succeeded or failed in attempts at objectivity and fairness. Though the information delivered is very often factual, and still fairly unbiased, framing research would question how complete a picture of reality is being conveyed.'¹³⁸

2.3.2. Previous work on framing concepts used in this study

There is a special section on sources after the hegemony section, so they are not included in this review of previous work on the framing concepts used in this study. The other framing concepts are set out in the order they appear in the hypotheses.

Main People

Propagandists have been demonising enemy leaders and militaries for centuries, but the emergence of the practise in the context of the modern mass media can be traced back to World War One, where British propagandists and the media framed the Germans as 'worse than ogres;' Cate Haste wrote that the intention was to create an image which acted as a repository for all the hatred and fear inspired by war. It meant building up the image of national and allied leaders as the embodiment of courage,

¹³⁸ S. Kweon., A Framing Analysis: How Did Three U.S. News Magazines Frame about Mergers or Acquisitions, in *Journal of Media Management*, 2 (3/4), 2000, pp. 165-77, p. 167. Read online at: www.mediajournal.org

heroism, and resolution, while the enemy leaders became the embodiment of evil, and the scapegoats for the war.¹³⁹ Doris Graber provided a social scientific explanation of how the media also demonise enemy leaders, when she wrote that the media use culturally and socially appropriate cues to evoke the audience's schemata to supplement information supplied by the story. As an example, she used the characterisation of a brutal dictator as 'another Hitler', which she believed 'immediately evokes images of persecution, racial discrimination, and genocide in many audiences who need no further reminder about these deeds.'¹⁴⁰

This kind of demonisation of an enemy leader was identified in the British media's reporting of the Gulf War. David Morrison wrote that ninety-three per cent of the military acts shown were directly attributed to Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and twenty-four per cent of items which included Saddam inferred or stated he had the ability to end the war by withdrawing from Kuwait; moreover, Saddam's personal views were contrasted with the moral righteousness of the collective decisions of the nations making up the UN. Morrison thought this helped to personalise the war around Saddam, and make his claims sound unreasonable, as the idea of unreasonableness or madness is usually restricted to an individual and not a state.¹⁴¹

Indirectly agreeing with Morrison, Liebes wrote that the Iraqi people were excised out of the frame during the Gulf War, leaving only a demonised Saddam to represent them all.¹⁴² Robert Lichter, president of the *Centre for Media and Public Affairs* in Washington, admitted they had demonised Milosevic during the Kosovo conflict in a

¹³⁹ C. Haste., *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ D. Graber., Content and Meaning: What's it all About?, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 33 (2), November/December 1989, pp. 144-153, p. 148.

¹⁴¹ D. E. Morrison., *Television and the Gulf War*, *op.cit*, p. 83-7.

¹⁴² T. Liebes., *Reporting the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Hegemony Works*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 70-3.

similar manner to how Saddam had been demonised in the Gulf War: ‘To sell a war in a democracy when you’re not attacked, you have to demonise the leader or show that there are humanitarian reasons for going in....George Bush demonised Saddam Hussein. We did something of the same with Milosevic.’¹⁴³

Position

The position variable was included because previous research has found that readers usually take more notice of news at the front of the paper, with their attention fading as they read the less prominent stories. For example, Doris Graber found this pattern of behaviour when she researched how Americans processed the news: ‘Everything else being equal, the panelists were more likely to say that a story had caught their attention because it appeared on prominent pages of the paper, because it was characterised by prominent headlines or pictures, or because it was given lengthy and often repeated exposure.’¹⁴⁴

The relevance of coding the story’s position in a study using a hegemonic framework was emphasised by Cohen and Young, who reasoned that a hegemonic media does not want to report some events, but they are too big to ignore, as to do so would lose the audience’s credibility, so the media try to minimise their effect on the audience by placing them on inside pages.¹⁴⁵ Daniel Hallin considered this kind of reporting was evident in the *NYT* during the later stages of the Vietnam War, as although ‘the editorials and columns diverged increasingly from the official line, the news columns and especially the front page continued to reflect it – in all its ambiguity – more or

¹⁴³ P. Knightley., *op.cit*, p. 502.

¹⁴⁴ D.A. Graber., *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide*, (New York and London: Longman, 1984), p. 82-3.

¹⁴⁵ S. Cohen., and J. Young., *The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media*, (London: Constable, 1973), p. 103.

less at face value.’¹⁴⁶ A similar editorial practise was found by Robert Entman and Benjamin Page in their research on the American media’s coverage of the Gulf War; their results suggested that over the whole of the newspaper, the *NYT* and *Washington Post* had more critical stories than supportive, but on ‘the more-noticed pages it was equalled by support. More importantly, much of the most relevant, substantive criticism was obscured by its placement in the news.’¹⁴⁷

Focus: diagnosis or prognosis

Media articles often contain judgements on what caused events, and offer opinions on how the issue can be resolved if it is a continuing story: the diagnosis and prognosis. As explained previously, these are two of the main framing elements referred to by Robert Entman. Nelson, Clawson and Oxley agreed with Entman, and asserted that news frames ‘declare the underlying causes and likely consequences of a problem and establish criteria for evaluating potential remedies for the problem.’¹⁴⁸

Some media analysts, such as Timothy Cook, believe that in times of war the liberal media often consider it reasonable to criticise the way a war is being fought through their prognoses, even if they support the reasons for going to war through their diagnoses. Cook wrote this allows journalists to include tension and conflict that would otherwise be absent from their stories, and provides a way for reporters to ‘perform a political ritual that distances them from their sources.’¹⁴⁹ In other words,

¹⁴⁶ D. Hallin., *The Uncensored War*, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

¹⁴⁷ R.M. Entman and B.I. Page., *The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the Limits to Media Independence*, in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, (eds), *Taken by Storm: the Media, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 82-101, p. 87.

¹⁴⁸ T. E. Nelson, R. A. Clawson and Z. M. Oxley., *op.cit.*, p. 567-8.

¹⁴⁹ T. E. Cook., *Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 105-6.

they can consider themselves to be independent of the government and military, and playing the watchdog role, while still supporting their nation's military campaign.

Several of the researchers involved in the hegemonic/indexing tradition have found similar journalistic practices, including Jonathan Mermin in his study of post-Vietnam American military interventions: 'The debate journalists do conduct on their own initiative, although it presents conflicting possibilities vis-à-vis the execution and outcome of U.S. policy and the political fate of the president, creates a powerful sense of inevitability about the policy itself. It frames government policy as if it had been stipulated at the outset, finding conflicting possibilities in its outcome, as opposed to framing government policy as open to critical analysis and debate, the product of choices among conflicting possibilities.'¹⁵⁰ Mermin believed that what this critical angle encourages, in other words, is spectatorship, not deliberative citizenship.'¹⁵¹

Format: episodic or thematic

The most prevalent distinction between formats of news frames is that between episodic and thematic frames. Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon described episodic news coverage as focusing 'on specific events,' while 'thematic coverage is broader in scope and refers to the policy debate, historical background, or possible political consequences...'¹⁵² Iyengar had explained in a previous book that: 'the dominant episodic news frame illustrates what some media scholars and critics have termed the "hegemonic" model of public communication. In this model, the dissemination of information is considered part of an elaborate "code control" process through which existing power structures are maintained. That is, news organisations in general and

¹⁵⁰ J. Mermin., *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 10.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁵² S. Iyengar., and A. Simon., News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion, in *Communication Research*, 20 (3), June 1993, pp. 365-383, p. 371.

television in particular tend to be spokesmen for dominant groups and their ideology.’¹⁵³

Citing Iyengar’s work, W. Lance Bennett has called for more thematic reporting: ‘In an ideal world, the present information system could be replaced with perspectives that were more institutional, analytical, historical and reflectively critical in orientation.’ Bennett sees the main problem with episodic news as being how it fragments events into discrete episodes that confuse larger patterns and trends.

Bennett considered this to have happened in the American media coverage of the Gulf War, with the underlying causes of situations remaining outside the news frame; leading to the coverage being driven by personalised, highly emotional fragments.¹⁵⁴

Indirectly agreeing with Bennett’s views on the Gulf War media coverage, David Morrison found that ‘the event itself – war - appears to swamp the news and did so at the expense of discussion about either the initial invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, or the presentation of a historical perspective on the war.’¹⁵⁵

James Curran also considers that the current media environment undermines intelligent and rational debate, as it tends to generate information that is ‘simplified, personalised, decontextualised, with a stress on action rather than process, visualisation rather than abstraction, stereotypicality rather than human complexity.’ Curran considers this ‘is a by-product of processing information as a commodity.’¹⁵⁶

However, Eve-Ann Prentice of *The Times* suggests it is unrealistic to expect the press to provide more background information on main stories, as to survive a paper has to

¹⁵³ S. Iyengar., *Is Anyone Responsible?: how television frames political issues*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 137.

¹⁵⁴ W. L. Bennett., *News: The Politics of Illusion*, *op.cit.*, p. 53-6.

¹⁵⁵ D.E. Morrison., *op.cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁵⁶ J. Curran., *Media and Power*, *op.cit.*, p. 226.

serve up fresh news; she wrote that they had ‘tried to change the nature of news’ with more thematic content at the *The Sunday Correspondent*, but it had led to a serious decline in sales.

Historical References

With similarities to how journalists have been described as using frames in previous sections, G.H. Jamieson wrote that historical factors ‘bear down upon people, they provide forms or frames of reference which could be termed their ideology. They provide reference points for interpretation; just as in map-making, co-ordinates are necessary for position finding, so ideological co-ordinates provide reference points for social life, the accuracy or otherwise of the co-ordinates is another question.’¹⁵⁷ In line with Jamieson’s idea of historical references providing ideological co-ordinates, Martin Woolacott wrote in the *Guardian* during Nato’s Kosovo campaign: ‘Whenever wars come, the ghosts of other wars are called up and history stands at the elbow of the leaders making the decisions. War is perhaps the most historical thing that nations do...’¹⁵⁸ Peter Arnett, who reported from the front-line during the Vietnam War, also considered that ‘ideological coordinates’ from previous conflicts were important to the military, as he wrote that: ‘...American commanders still analyse Vietnam in terms of World War Two, and the communists analyze the war in terms of the fight to oust the French in the 1950s.’¹⁵⁹ During Nato’s Kosovo campaign, an *NYT* editorial made a similar observation, but this time drew analogies with World War Two and Vietnam: ‘Every war is conducted in the shadow of its predecessors, and the conflict in Kosovo is no exception. The nation is haunted by memories of the Second World

¹⁵⁷ G. H. Jamieson., *Communication and Persuasion*, (London, Sydney, and New Hampshire: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 138.

¹⁵⁸ Martin Woollacott., The not so old alliance, in *Guardian*, 21/05/1999.

¹⁵⁹ P. Arnett., *Live From the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 Years in the World’s War Zones*, (London: Corgi, 1995), p. 244.

War and Vietnam as it considers how intensely to prosecute the war in the Balkans...For every American generation of this century, the power of war analogies has been undeniable, and they have framed debate about every recent American military venture abroad.¹⁶⁰

The use of historical references by politicians and the military has also been noticed by media theorists; for example, Murray Edelman explained that ‘The meanings of current events, actions, and policies are similarly changed by knowledge of history or by illusions respecting history. Advocates of conflicting positions routinely draw on historical references to buttress their positions, so that history becomes manipulable for political purposes.’¹⁶¹ Capella and Jamieson cite the work of Thomas Gilovich as an example of how propagandists can use historical references to prime mental associations; in an experiment he conducted, Gilovich found that out of a study group given texts with either reminders of World War Two or Vietnam inside (phrases like Blitzkrieg invasion and briefings in Winston Churchill Hall for World War Two, and Chinook helicopters and briefings in Dean Rusk Hall for Vietnam), those that had reminders of World War Two favoured intervention in another war more.¹⁶²

Wolfsfeld has also referred to the importance of historical references in journalism, and believes that journalists, like generals, are often fighting the last war;¹⁶³ having established the mode of reporting, journalists then attempt to find historical examples to fit the story, and questions of which historical example offers the most appropriate frame often becomes a matter for public debate.¹⁶⁴ James Sadkovich refers to the use

¹⁶⁰ *NYT* editorial., 18/4/1999.

¹⁶¹ M. Edelman., *The Politics of Misinformation*, (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), p. 58.

¹⁶² J. N. Capella., and K. H. Jamieson., *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 43.

¹⁶³ G. Wolfsfeld., *op.cit*, p. 176.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50-1.

of historical references by journalists as news pegs: ‘When journalists translate reality for the rest of us, they hang their stories on news pegs – familiar facts and symbols. Linking new news to old (a.k.a., history) makes it comprehensible, whether the links are events, symbols, individuals, or story clusters. News pegs simplify the story, but give the illusion of complexity. They assure familiarity by using analogy to make the alien and the exotic comprehensible, and they guarantee an emotional response based on the pegs used. They can also determine a story. News pegs operate within news frames that organise and determine which data will be included and which excluded.’¹⁶⁵

Images

It was also thought important to include an image variable in the coding system, as a dominant image can be important for influencing the audience into perceiving a story in a certain way. G.H. Jamieson considers that photographs are excellent persuasive devices because they look like they have not been manipulated, and are a true representation of the event.¹⁶⁶ Doris Graber also thinks images are powerful, because much more information is processed and retained by the public from images than words, as a ‘greater portion of the verbal information is waste, in part because it represents an overload of information that cannot be processed in the available time and part because the audience is not interested.’ Graber reported that the audience in her research ‘believed that the visuals allowed them to form more complete and accurate impressions of people and events;’ such as being able to see and assess ‘how physically debilitated a group of refugees looked.’¹⁶⁷ Although writing about

¹⁶⁵ J.J. Sadkovich., *The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995*, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1998), p. 83.

¹⁶⁶ G.H. Jamieson., *op.cit*, p. 61.

¹⁶⁷ D. Graber., *Processing the News*, *op.cit*, p. 146-9.

television news research, Graber's views on the importance of including images in frame analysis seem just as relevant to the content analysis of newspapers. Graber explained that although television news is an audiovisual medium, most content research has focused on only the verbal portions of messages; this means that not only do they miss the information contained in the pictures, but also that neglecting the pictures can lead to a failure to interpret the rest of the story properly, as it is modified by its combination with the pictures.¹⁶⁸

The importance of images was also referred to by journalist and writer, Neil Minow, who recollected a talk by a TV journalist who said she had become frustrated with the Hollywoodized 'pretty pictures' approach of the former American President, Ronald Reagan's White House. So she did a story contrasting the images of the president playing with puppies or looking genial with a voice-over describing what she thought the story should have been about. She expected complaints from the White House press office, but they loved it. They pointed out, correctly, that the power of the images was so mesmerizing that it really didn't matter what her voice-over said.'¹⁶⁹

In her study on media images during the Kosovo Conflict, Kimberly L. Bissell supported the above views on the importance of images in the news, when she wrote that media photographs 'play a role in (1) representing the media agenda as an accompaniment to stories and (2) helping with the transferral of salience of particular issues to the public. A single front page could have anywhere from five-to-ten stories....This same front page could also have anywhere from one-to-three images. If the still images represent issues also mentioned in the front-page stories, those

¹⁶⁸ D. Graber., *Content and Meaning*, *op.cit*, p. 145.

¹⁶⁹ Neil Minow in conversation with Sarah Lyall on the *Slate e-magazine*:
<http://slate.msn.com/id/2062971#ContinueArticle>, 12/03/02.

particular issues are receiving even more prominent treatment by the newspaper.

Thereby, the reinforcement of these issues in photographs may help shape viewers' impressions of the most important issue.'¹⁷⁰ Her conclusion on the photographs used during the Kosovo conflict was that the images 'acted in conjunction with newspaper stories to prime audiences to think about certain aspects of the conflict.'¹⁷¹

In her post-Iraq War article, *When War is Reduced to a Photograph*, Barbie Zelizer considers that images featured in the media during wartime often draw connotations with images from previous wars; images that are iconic and culturally significant, and act as 'a visual bridge by which the more recent article could be understood.'¹⁷²

While acknowledging that journalism's images of war can often be disturbingly graphic in their depictions of shattered bodies and broken spirits, Zelizer considers that images are generally used by journalists as 'pegs not to specific events but to stories larger than can be told in a simple news item, journalism's images become a key tool for interpreting the war in ways consonant with long-standing understandings about how war is supposed to be waged – notions about patriotism, sacrifice, humanity, the nation-state, and fairness that come as much from outside journalism as from within. War is presented as often heroic and reflective of broader aims associated with nationhood, clean and at times antiseptic, and involving human sacrifice for a greater good.'¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ K. L. Bissell., *The Crisis in Kosovo: Photographic News of the Conflict and Public Opinion*, in E. Gilboa (ed); *Media and Conflict: Framing Issues, Making Policy and Shaping Opinions*, (New York: Ardsley, 2002), pp. 311-29, p. 326.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

¹⁷² B. Zelizer., *When War is Reduced to a Photograph*, in S. Allan., and B. Zelizer., *op.cit.*, p.130.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 115-116.

2.3.3. Examples of military conflict frames

Gadi Wolfsfeld considers that two competing meta-frames appear regularly in insurgencies and unequal wars: the first is the law and order frame, which is usually used by the most powerful, and promotes the need to maintain social, national or international order, while the second is the injustice/victims frame, which the weaker side usually invokes to oppose the law and order frame.¹⁷⁴ This is quite a good description of the frame contest that took place in the Kosovo Conflict, with Nato invoking the law and order frame and the Serbs the injustice/victims frame.

Wolfsfeld described how the same frame contest evolved in the Gulf War: ‘Once the war broke out, the only genuine frame competition concerned whether the United States and its allies were using excessive force against Iraq. Again the major question for analysis is whether the challenger becomes framed as a victim. The success of the law and order frame depends on the ability of the authorities to keep the moral spotlight squarely focused on the challenger. An alternative story line about the brutality of the powerful is always available from the news shelf and can be quickly taken down and applied when circumstances warrant.’¹⁷⁵ Wolfsfeld considers that the Allies had a good information war during the Gulf War, and this led to the authorities completely dominating the press.¹⁷⁶ This meant the Western news media enthusiastically adopted the law and order frame, and virtually ignored the injustice and defiance frames being promoted by Hussein.¹⁷⁷

According to hegemony theory, the US and UK medias used a Cold War frame to categorise post-World War Two foreign conflicts that affected the West’s interests up to the collapse of the old Soviet bloc in 1991. This meant that when two nations went

¹⁷⁴ G. Wolfsfeld., *op.cit*, p. 141-2.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

to war, the nation or people who were more in line with democratic capitalism were likely to receive the better media coverage, while those who followed a communist political agenda were more likely to receive a more negative coverage. Influenced by the work of Gamson on frame 'depth,'¹⁷⁸ Wolfsfeld proposed that the Cold War frame was on the next level down from the deepest level of framing in the American media's coverage of the Vietnam War, with the deepest being the notion of peace through strength, a longstanding principle that suggests that aggression must be met with force. Wolfsfeld also considered that a more specific frame in Vietnam could be labelled the falling-domino frame: this suggested that American involvement in Southeast Asia was to prevent the spread of communism in that part of the world, and that if Vietnam was lost to Communism it would quickly be followed by other countries in a domino effect. Wolfsfeld suggested the smallest level of framing was that of particular events, such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which was framed as an unprovoked Communist attack on American forces.¹⁷⁹

Elihu Katz wrote that by the time of the Gulf War, the Cold War frame was no longer available, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc; Katz argued that President Bush therefore proposed the World War Two frame for the confrontation with Iraq, and the media followed his lead: 'Iraq had swallowed up a neighbouring country, defying its legitimacy and independence. Iraq was fascist Germany committing genocide against its own minorities.... This was not just a confrontation of ideologies; it was a moral crusade of good against evil.' Katz considers the media love contests, especially when it is 'us' versus 'them', and on the whole they rallied to the president.

¹⁷⁸ S.D. Reese, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁷⁹ G. Wolfsfeld., *op.cit.*, p. 33.

Katz also pointed out that the framing of Iraq as a fascist aggressor for its invasion of Kuwait was very different to its framing by the majority of American politicians and media during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). As there was no intervention likely by the US in that war, the American media set it within a feuding neighbours frame, and it therefore received little interest from the American public; feuding neighbours are only ‘them’ and ‘them’, which is not as interesting as ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Katz thought that if it had not been for Bush’s World War Two rhetoric, followed by the American media, then the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would have been seen by the public in a similar way to the Iran-Iraq war, and it would not have captured the public’s interest.¹⁸⁰

An example of the British government using elements of three conflict frames relevant to this study; Cold War, World War Two and Law and Order; in an attempt to win a positive media coverage, was highlighted by Tony Shaw. Shaw wrote that in the months preceding their military intervention in Suez during 1956, ‘the British government launched an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at capturing the moral high ground in advance of any conflict against Egypt. “Colonel Nasser”, as he would always be referred to by official spokesmen, was presented as a fanatic nationalist, and the autocratic nature of his regime was emphasised. He was a second Hitler whose “plunder” put the world “at his mercy” and who therefore could not be “appeased.” The Suez Canal Company employees, forbidden to leave their employment, were, it was claimed, being treated as virtual hostages....For Arab consumption, great play was made of Nasser’s avowed intention to dominate the Middle East, clearly outlined in his own version of *Mein Kampf*, *The Philosophy of*

¹⁸⁰ E. Katz., *The End of Journalism? Notes on Watching the War*, in M. Scammell and H. Semetko (Eds.), *The Media, Journalism and Democracy*, (Aldershot and Burlington: Dartmouth, 2000), pp. 255-63, p. 256-7.

the Revolution. His unwillingness to consult fellow Arab leaders prior to the nationalisation coup was evidence of his lack of respect and regard, especially for those countries whose healthy development relied upon their oil trade. With the American public particularly in mind, Nasser was portrayed as a Soviet “stooge” whose dangerous antics could threaten US interests in the Middle East and ultimately lead to war in this most unstable, but strategically and economically vital, region. Finally, in addition to all this, Britain and France had to depict themselves as the policemen of the Middle East, as the only powers physically capable of enforcing “international law” in that region.’¹⁸¹

Philip Hammond considered that the UK and US again drew on the law and order frame during the Kosovo Conflict, as part of the moral intervention in ethnic wars frame that developed during the 1990s, as a replacement to the Cold War frame. Hammond wrote that the ‘discourse of humanitarianism and human rights was promoted throughout the 1990s by journalists and commentators as an organising principle for a post-Cold War world order, nowhere more conspicuously than in media coverage of the former Yugoslavia. As they sought to encourage Western intervention in Bosnia, reporters and intellectuals developed the “moral vocabulary” which was later given an official stamp of approval by NATO during the 1999 Kosovo conflict...’ Hammond thought that the ‘moral’ wars promoted in the 1990s allowed the West to override established principles of international law, and that they were driven by the need of Western societies to discover some new moral purpose in the post-Cold War world.¹⁸² After detailing how the Kosovo War could have been

¹⁸¹ T. Shaw., *Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis*, (London and New York: Taurus, 1996), p. 12.

¹⁸² P. Hammond., *Humanizing War: The Balkans and beyond*, in S. Allen., and B. Zelizer, *op.cit*, pp. 174-189, p. 175.

framed differently, from the KLA's part in the failure of the 1998 peace treaty, through the thousands of civilian casualties from Nato bombs, to the ethnic-cleansing of Serbs by the ethnic-Albanians after the war, Hammond wrote that despite 'all the evidence to the contrary, the belief persists that Kosovo was a successful and "moral" war,' and many of those politicians and journalists who opposed the war with Iraq in 2003 were at pains to emphasise that they supported the Nato bombing in Kosovo. Hammond pointed out that the reasons for this were cultural rather than political: 'while the propaganda for war with Iraq was undoubtedly clumsy, it was no more inept than in Kosovo, which also featured bogus diplomacy and dodgy documents. In 1999 the propaganda tended to be taken at face value because many journalists and commentators were predisposed to welcome war. It fitted the "moral" worldview which developed in the 1990s, epitomised by Western perceptions of the former Yugoslavia.'¹⁸³ Hammond thought this view was epitomised by Robin Cook's framing of the Kosovo conflict as a battle between 'two Europes competing for the soul of our continent,' with Yugoslavia representing 'the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists,' while Nato's vision of the future Europe was of 'a continent in which the rights of all its citizens are respected, regardless of their ethnic identity.'¹⁸⁴

2.4. Critical theory, hegemony and other media models

2.4.1. Introduction

Frame theory will be used in this study to analyse whether the media coverage of Kosovo was more in line with the hegemonic or plural models of media and power in society. This use of frame analysis for identifying hegemonic influences and content

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 179-80.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184. Robin Cook quoted from the *Guardian*, May 5th, 1999.

responds to requests for studies combining the two concepts over a long period of time. In 1991, James Tankard, proposed that ‘framing might give quantitative researchers a way to approach ideology....Framing may even give quantitative researchers a means to examine the hypothesis of media hegemony, one that has been difficult to validate empirically. Media hegemony can be viewed as a situation in which one frame is so dominant that people accept it without notice or question.’¹⁸⁵ Then, in 2004, Carragee and Roefs made a similar request, considering that studies integrating framing and hegemony have ‘produced multiple benefits...the media hegemony thesis directly connects the framing process to considerations of power and to examinations of the relationship between the news media and political change. Studying the framing process within the context of the production, distribution, and interpretation of hegemonic meanings enables researchers to chart the relationship between news and the distribution of power in American society....the framing concept, including arguments about the influence of power asymmetries on frame sponsorship and framing contests, has enriched some scholarship on hegemony. It has done so by providing a specific means to examine how the news media construct ideological meanings largely consistent with the interests of powerful elites.’¹⁸⁶ They also suggest that: ‘further integration of framing scholarship with research on hegemony would benefit both traditions. Framing processes are central to both the production of hegemonic meanings and to the development of counterhegemonic ways of seeing.’¹⁸⁷

In studies on the media and power in society, hegemony provides a model of media

¹⁸⁵ J.W. Tankard, Jr., *op.cit*, p. 97.

¹⁸⁶ M. Carragee., and W. Roefs., The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research, in *Journal of Communication*, 54 (2), June 2004, pp. 214-233, p. 222.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 227-8.

performance to compare with the traditional plural media model that the UK media aspires to, with the hegemony model depicting a media that is biased towards the ruling elite in society, such as the politicians, military and business leaders; this bias is evident in source access, opinion and news content. This section will not go into the plural research tradition in great detail, and Gillian Doyle's brief description should suffice for this study: 'Pluralism is generally associated with diversity in the media; the presence of a number of different and independent voices, and of differing political opinions and representations of culture within the media. Citizens expect and need a diversity and plurality of media content and media sources.'¹⁸⁸ Hegemony theory is also distinct from political economy theory, which considers the media to be working in conjunction with the ruling elite to manipulate the masses in a more purely Marxist view of society, and the differences between the two theories are discussed in detail later in this section.

2.4.2. Gramsci, Hegemony and Mass Communications

The Oxford English Dictionary defines hegemony as 'dominance, especially by one state or social group over others,' and writes that it is derived from the Greek word *hegemonia*. Its adaptation to late twentieth century critical analysis was influenced by the work of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian communist, who, in the 1920s and 1930s, developed the work of Marx into a new political theory based on the concept of hegemony.¹⁸⁹ In the Italy of his lifetime, Gramsci thought the possibility of self-elevation had 'been blocked by the confinement of the hegemonic culture to a caste of

¹⁸⁸ G. Doyle., *Media Ownership: The economics and politics of convergence and concentration in the UK and European media*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 2002), p. 11-12.

¹⁸⁹ L. Pellicani., *Gramsci: An Alternative Communism?*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 30-32.

intellectuals, the “people-nation” having been left to contend with fossilized customs and dialects of restricted communication.’¹⁹⁰

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony preceded his reading of Marx, and Dante Germino wrote that ‘Gramsci’s vision of a new politics cannot be described fully with any simplistic label, including that of “Marxist”....In Marx, the lower class, the proletariat, will rise up(ward) to knock over the bourgeoisie. In Gramsci, the dominant emphasis and the original insight is that of the periphery moving in on the centre and dissolving it into itself....I do not want to suggest that they are mutually exclusive. The two models overlap. Both of them aim to destroy the reign of privilege (see figure. 2.1). Gramsci’s model is the philosophically richer and more interesting of the two, however, because it is not so tied to merely economic categories. Because the periphery/centre model is not confined to the economic situation, it is possible for Gramsci to make room for the world of culture – of the mind and spirit – in a way that Marx does not....One could use the centre/periphany model in an unrevolutionary way – to prick the consciences of those at the centre and to call for their gradual inclusion of marginalised individuals and groups in the centre....What makes Gramsci’s model revolutionary is its marrying of his centre/periphery design to Marx’s class struggle symbolism. Just as the lower class must rise up and overthrow the upper one, so the marginalised sectors of society must move in on the centre. By virtue of their having included themselves through their own struggle for recognition, they themselves – the formerly peripheral ones – erase the boundary surrounding the centre.’¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ D. Germino., *Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics*, (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 30.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 56-8.




Fig. 2.1. Dante Germino's representation of the differences between the Gramscian and Marxist models of politics and society.

James Martin wrote that 'In the 1960s, Gramsci's ideas were employed to support arguments within the European Left against liberal political scientists who equated the apparent absence of widespread conflict and social division with a general satisfaction amongst the populations of western capitalist states with the social and political arrangements as they stood....The absence of popular resistance testified not to the recognised validity of capitalist states but to the generation of passive consent achieved through the control of public institutions such as the media and education system by groups inclined to support the status quo.'¹⁹² In the emerging British Cultural Studies field, 'Gramsci's texts were a useful source for the growing interest in ideology throughout the 1970s because of his explicit focus on consciousness and the process of subjective leadership. Whilst traditional Marxist texts had little positive to say on popular culture and forms of consciousness, Gramsci's interest in "common sense" and "folklore" revealed a rare depth of sympathy for the lived experience by subordinate classes of their conditions of domination....Gramsci recognised the diversity of practical experiences and hence forms of belief to which people subscribed: hegemony implied the bringing together of a variety of beliefs and

¹⁹² J. Martin., *Gramsci's Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, (Basingstoke and New York: 1998), p. 119.

values that did not by necessity reflect any class interest....The Gramsci of Cultural Studies, in contrast to that of the earlier state analyses, was a theorist of the dynamics of civil society, of the way in which different ideological currents were combined and contested to promote an ongoing response to economic and social change.’¹⁹³

Raymond Williams was one of the British writers who wrote about Gramsci during the 1970s. Williams considered that although much is still uncertain about how Gramsci conceptualised hegemony, his work is one of the major turning-points in Marxist cultural theory. Williams wrote that the concept of hegemony often resembles Marxist definitions of how ideology functions within society, ‘but it is distinct in its refusal to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system which can be and ordinarily is abstracted as “ideology”....it sees the relations of domination and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living – not only of political and economic activity, nor only of manifest social activity, but of the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense. Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of “ideology”, nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as “manipulation” or “indoctrination”....It is, that is to say, in the strongest sense a “culture”, but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes.’ Williams considered there are two immediate advantages in the use of Gramsci’s hegemony instead of pure Marxist theory. Firstly, it allows analysis beyond the supposition of a ruling class controlling the masses, which is based on much earlier and simpler historical phases, and so can

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 123-4.

be used to study modern electoral democracy;¹⁹⁴ secondly, Williams explained that cultural tradition and practise can be seen as they are, without reduction to other categories of content, and without the characteristic straining to fit them to other and determining manifest economic and political relationships. Therefore, culture is seen as much more than a superstructural expression of its political/economic base.¹⁹⁵

2.4.3. Early Critical Theory in Mass Communications Research

Denis McQuail wrote that early critical theory in mass communications research focused on the relation between media and the power structure of society, and influenced by Marx and Engel's views of a dominant elite controlling the masses, the theorists largely interpreted the media as 'weapons in the hands of the ruling (capitalist) class, employed either to control and guide the masses by propaganda or to narcotise and divert them from effective opposition by escapist fantasies and consumerist dreams.' The most prolific work in this regard was that undertaken by the Frankfurt school theorists, such as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse; who, having observed the use of mass communications by totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy and Russia in the 1930s to persuade and control the masses, considered that the modern media, as part of the culture industry in capitalist societies such as the US, could also be used by the powerful to disempower the citizen, and reduce 'him or her to a cog in the machine run by and for the new "power-elite" of the military-industrial complex.'¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Ivor Crewe recently used hegemony in such a way, asking if New Labour was a new political hegemony after their 1997 and 2001 election victories, and with no sign of a significant threat in the near future. Crewe considered that Blair and New Labour had not only planned to win the 1997 election, but create a new party hegemony. I. Crewe., *A New Political Hegemony?*, in A. King., *Britain at the Polls, 2001*, (New York and London: Chatham House, 2002), pp. 207-232, p. 212.

¹⁹⁵ R. Williams., *Marxism and Literature*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 109-111.

¹⁹⁶ D. McQuail., *McQuail's Reader in Mass Communication Theory*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 2002), p. 8.

Their views were mirrored in the work of C.W. Mills (see figure 2.2.), who wrote in the 1950s that ‘the media, as now organised and operated, are even more than a major cause of the transformation of America into a mass society. They are also among the most important of those increased means of power now at the disposal of elites of wealth and power; moreover, some of the higher agents of these media are themselves either among the elites or very important among their servants.’¹⁹⁷

2.4.4. The emergence of the hegemonic model in critical theory

Although critical theorists invigorated media research with new theories and methods, their initial claims of a media allied with the establishment, and complicit in the manipulation of the masses, did not survive arduous research, as the media was found to be more independent of the establishment than claimed under the manipulative model, and both the media and establishment were also divided themselves.¹⁹⁸

Reviewing the relevance of the original critical theorists, and their manipulative model of the media, James Curran considers they were largely correct about strong elite pressures on the media, and that the media are powerful ideological agents, but they are not puppets of the establishment.¹⁹⁹ As many critical researchers accepted the establishment did not control the media in the way they had initially envisaged, the Marxist manipulative model was considered out-dated,²⁰⁰ and the critical school

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁹⁸ J. Curran; *Media and Power*, *op.cit*, p. 143.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 165. This was highlighted in the 1990s, when the mostly Conservative supporting upmarket newspapers campaigned against the sleaze and corruption of some Conservative members of parliament. Although the press had focused on scandals before, Jeremy Tunstall considered that what ‘was perhaps different in the 1990s was the vigour of the newspaper anti-government campaign,’ and their common urge to sustain their definition of the government as in a state of continuing crisis. Tunstall also argues that far from showing the royal family too much respect, the British media have redefined and reinvented the monarchy as ‘super soap [opera]’ characters. Tunstall considers that these attacks on elite British members of society were evidence of a change in the British media from the 1960s to the 1990s, declaring there ‘are not only fewer lapdogs, but there are also many more watchdogs and fighting dogs.’ J. Tunstall., *Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 312, 338 and 280.

²⁰⁰ J. Curran., *Media and Power*, *op.cit*, p. 141.


divided into different research interests. One of these was the cultural, which had the notion of hegemony at the centre of its theoretical framework. McQuail wrote that Gramsci's notion of a contest for 'hegemony' was helpful in bridging the gap between the two very different forms of mass communications societies that had been put forward by the pluralist and critical theorists.²⁰¹

Figure 2.2.²⁰² shows how the hegemony model combines aspects of both the pluralist and power-elite (manipulative/propaganda) models: whereas the pluralist model depicts a society with unrestricted access to power, and the power-elite model has the elite closed off from the mass, the hegemonic model has the elite differentiated from the mass but with the mass having the possibility of becoming elite. Eric Louw considered plural theorists were naïve in failing to address the fact that elites can and do intentionally work to manipulate and control non-elites, but the power-elite notion that non-elites are necessarily powerless and perpetually manipulated is equally dubious, and so the view of an uneven competition for hegemony is a more accurate explanation for the way society works.²⁰³ In media theory, the hegemonic model is similarly situated between the plural and the manipulative/propaganda media models. While the pluralist media model features fair access to the media for all, and the manipulative/propaganda model has the media consciously manufacturing consent for the power elite, the hegemonic media model considers there is access to the media for all, but due to journalistic routines and ideology, elites are given privileged treatment, and the media therefore usually frames issues in line with elite opinion.


²⁰¹ D. McQuail., *McQuail's Reader in Mass Communication Theory*, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

²⁰² Diagram scanned from E.P. Louw., *The Media and Cultural Production*, (London: Sage, 2001), p. 7.


²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.



(a) Dahl's pluralist model



(b) Mills's power-elite model



(c) Hegemonic-dominance model

Figure 2.2. Plural, Power-Elite and Hegemonic models.²⁰⁴

For cultural theorists, hegemony theory placed society and the media in a broader cultural context than the manipulative model had, and Paul Manning considered that hegemony theory offered a step forward from the old theory, because it avoided economic reductionism, and while claiming the powerful had an advantage, accepted that competing perspectives were also included in the media.²⁰⁵ McQuail described

²⁰⁴ Dahl's model taken from R.A. Dahl., *Who Governs?*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961). Mills' model taken from C.W. Mills., *The Power Elite*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).

²⁰⁵ P. Manning., *op.cit.*, p. 39-42.

media hegemony theory as a 'culturalist' correlate of the political-economy theory of control; hegemony refers to 'a loosely interrelated set of ruling ideas permeating a society, but in such a way as to make the established order of power and values appear natural, taken-for-granted and commonsensical. A ruling ideology is not imposed but appears to exist by virtue of an unquestioned consensus. Hegemony tends to define unacceptable opposition to the status quo as dissident and deviant....The mass media do not define reality on their own but give preferential access to the definitions of those in authority.'²⁰⁶ Stuart Allen defined hegemony as a site of ideological struggle over common sense, with subordinate groups encouraged by the ruling group to negotiate reality within what are ostensibly the limits of common sense, when the common sense is consistent with dominant norms, values and belief. Allen considers that the hegemonic approach to media analysis 'enables the researcher to denaturalise the very naturalness of the ideological rules governing news discourse's representation of "what can and should be said" about any aspect of social life.'²⁰⁷

Unlike the manipulative model, which considers journalists are consciously biased in favour of the establishment, hegemony theory locates 'the source of "bias" in the environment external to the journalistic organisations, the culture, so that content is not simply a function of ownership, or of journalistic practices and rituals, but of the interaction between news organisations, the sources of their output, and other social institutions.' Hegemony theorists also propose that journalists are socialised into their own particular newsroom culture, 'where many judgements are taken as "common sense" and rarely questioned,' meaning 'institutional voices tend to enjoy advantaged

²⁰⁶ D. McQuail., *Mass Communication Theory, op.cit*, p. 96-7.

²⁰⁷ S. Allen., *News Culture*, (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999), p. 84-5.

access to the media.’²⁰⁸ This means elite sources have an advantage over the rest of the public in shaping the interpretative frameworks journalists use to construct their stories,²⁰⁹ but other social groups are not excluded, and news organisations are thought to ‘play a strategic role in hegemonic struggle, functioning as “a site of contest between competing social forces rather than as a conduit for ruling class ideas.”’²¹⁰ Anders Hansen et al consider that: ‘Studies working broadly within a hegemony framework have successfully used content analysis techniques to show that public issues are defined in the mass media and for public consumption overwhelmingly by representatives for powerful institutions, agencies and interests in society, and that “alternative” voices critical of the status quo are much less likely to gain a platform in the mainstream media.’²¹¹

2.4.5. Early hegemonic theory media research

Stuart Hall et al’s *Policing the Crisis*, published in 1978, was one of the first Marxist influenced books to propose the Gramscian hegemonic model as a preferential explanation for the media-state relationship to the previously popular manipulative model, which drew on the more conventionally Marxist base-superstructure model. In the book, Hall et al analysed how the crime of mugging was constructed and defined by the media in 1970s Britain, and argued that its elevation to the top of the media agenda allowed the state to introduce a wave of new criminal measures. However, the writers distanced themselves from the manipulative model by stressing they did not think this was due to a state conspiracy involving the media as willing

²⁰⁸ A. Anderson., *Media, Culture and the Environment*, (London: UCL, 1997), p. 18-23.

²⁰⁹ B. McNair., *News and Journalism in the UK*, *op.cit*, p. 66-7.

²¹⁰ J. Curran., The new revisionism in mass communication research: a reappraisal, originally in *European Journal of Communication*, 5 (2/3), June, 1990, pp. 135-64, cited in B. McNair., *News and Journalism in the UK*, *Ibid*, p. 25.

²¹¹ A. Hansen., S. Cottle., R. Negrine., and C. Newbold., *Mass Communication Research Methods*, (London: MacMillan, 1988), p. 108.

accomplices; on the relationship between the media owners, journalists and the public, the writers made clear they did not think the 'fit' between dominant ideas and professional media ideologies and practices was due to the fact that the media are in large part capitalist owned, since that would ignore the day-to-day 'relative autonomy' of the news producers from direct economic control. Instead, Hall et al considered the preferential biases shown by the media towards the establishment were because of professional practises, or structural imperatives, such as objectivity and the use of establishment figures as the main sources on news stories that involved them; Hall et al therefore considered establishment figures to be primary definers, while those with alternative opinions were usually secondary definers. Hall et al wrote that although the different media sources do not use the same language of address, and have different stories to each other, it 'is not the vast pluralistic range of voices which the media are sometimes held to represent, but a range within certain distinct ideological limits;' within a 'consensus of values.'²¹²

Todd Gitlin, whose work was previously cited in the framing section, was one of the first American media analysts to do a similar study to Hall's; bringing Gramsci's concept of hegemony into the study of the media's role in American society. Gitlin worked from 'the assumption that the mass media are, to say the least, a significant social force in the forming and delimiting of public assumptions, attitudes, and moods – of ideology in short.' Gitlin considered that such ideological force was central to the established order, and that it was ideology and not the power of the economic and political capitalist establishment that explained the continuation of society's persistence through the system's deep and enduring conflicts. Gitlin presented

²¹² S. Hall., C. Critcher., T. Jefferson., J. Clarke., and B. Roberts., *Policing the Crisis*, (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 57-61.

Gramsci's hegemony theory as an explanation of the ruling class's domination through ideology; through the shaping of popular consent. Gitlin considered Raymond Williams' recent work utilising hegemony theory had transcended the classic Marxist base-superstructure dichotomy, and also enthusiastically discussed Hall et al's use of hegemony.

With regard to his own views on the media, Gitlin thought that hegemonic influence does not mean that media networks being capitalist corporations will necessarily mean they will frame socialism negatively, but it does 'preclude continuing, emphatic reports that would embrace socialism as the most reasonable framework for the solution of social problems.' Gitlin did not think it was even necessary to accept the Marxist premise that the material base precedes culture, but he agreed with, and retained, Gramsci's core conception that hegemony, which actively works through a complex web of social activities, is secured by those who rule the dominant institutions 'by impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule and, if not usurping the whole of ideological space, still significantly limiting what is thought throughout society.' Gitlin thought the main way ideology entered the news was through journalists' routines, which are 'structured in the ways journalists are socialised from childhood, and then trained, recruited, assigned, edited, rewarded, and promoted on the job; they decisively shape the ways in which news is defined, events are considered newsworthy, and "objectivity" is secured. News is managed routinely, automatically, as reporters import definitions of newsworthiness from editors and institutional beats, as they accept the analytical frameworks of officials even while taking up adversary positions. When reporters make decisions about what to cover and how, rarely do they deliberate about ideological assumptions or political

consequences. Simply by doing their jobs, journalists tend to serve the political and economic elite definitions of reality.’²¹³

In his analysis of the New Left movement’s media coverage during the Vietnam War, Gitlin found the *NYT*’s framing of them became more negative as the New Left became more radicalised, and rejected the core hegemonic principles of the American system, while finding allies in every class and race layer of the society. Gitlin therefore thought the *NYT* took issue with the New Left movement when they became ‘a profound challenge to the core principles which the dominant institutions sustain.’²¹⁴ Gitlin considered this led to the movement being ‘surrounded by a firebreak of discrediting images, images partly but only partly of its own making. The spectre of violence hovered over media representations before it became popular in the movement itself.’²¹⁵ The movement was also depicted as being outside the norms of society, and the leaders caricatured, although Gitlin admits the movement was fragmenting under competing egos and ideologies at the time anyway. After his analysis, Gitlin concluded there were hegemonic constraints on the media coverage of the New Left: ‘But even when there are conflicts of policy between reporters and sources, or reporters and editors, or editors and publishers, these conflicts are played out within a field of terms and premises which does not overstep the hegemonic boundary. Several assumptions about news value serve, for the most part, to secure that boundary: that news involves the novel event, not the underlying, enduring condition; the person, not the group; the visible conflict, not the deep consensus; the fact that “advances the story,” not the one that explains or enlarges it.’²¹⁶

²¹³ T. Gitlin., *The Whole World is Watching*, *op.cit.*, p. 9-12.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

2.4.6. Daniel Hallin's "Uncensored War" study on the Vietnam media coverage

In the US, much of the work on the media's use of sources in military conflicts has been influenced by Daniel Hallin's *The "Uncensored War";* Hallin was tutored by Gitlin at the dissertation stage of the book, and his theory of media-state relations during the Vietnam War could be described as an international-military version of that proposed by Gitlin, in his hegemonic analysis of the media coverage of the domestic American anti-war protest movement.²¹⁷ Hallin's *Uncensored War* developed a line of argument he had first espoused in an article on a critical theory perspective of the American media. Reflecting Gitlin's views in *The Whole World is Watching*, Hallin criticised objective reporting for restricting the boundaries of journalistic criticism of the establishment, but also distanced his views from the Marxist base and superstructure model and political economy theory; Hallin wrote: 'Corporate control of the mass media does not guarantee that the media's cultural products will consistently serve the interests of the capitalist system as a whole, any more than corporate control of energy guarantees against an energy crisis. Certainly no major news organisation is ever likely to become an open critic of capitalism, but the purpose of a news organisation is to make profit, not politics, and there is no reason to

²¹⁷ In the preface to 'The Uncensored War,' Hallin acknowledges Gitlin was on his dissertation committee at the University of California, Berkeley, and that Gitlin's work on the media was 'extremely important' to him. Michael Schudson was also acknowledged as having read and commented on the manuscript. D. Hallin., *The "Uncensored War": the media and Vietnam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. vii. Hallin's Vietnam War findings also have similarities with George Orwell's views on the British media coverage of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. In his essay 'Looking Back on the Spanish Civil War,' Orwell wrote of how the British press had followed Spanish newspapers in reporting battles and victories that had never happened. Also, in line with what would become the Cold War frame, Orwell believed the Western press 'significantly overplayed the extent of Russian involvement on the side of the republican forces, thereby suggesting that the struggle in Spain was not a struggle waged by the toiling masses for their own interests but one in which the Spanish people were being used to further the global political objectives of the USSR. This interpretation, Orwell argued, significantly limited support for the republican forces...' T. Bennett., *Media, 'reality', signification*, in J. Curran., M. Gurevitch., T. Bennett., J. Curran., and J. Woollacott., *Culture, Society and the Media*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1982), pp. 287-308, p.289-90. Orwell's thoughts on the British media coverage of the Spanish War are also discussed in J. Eldridge., *News, truth and power*, in Glasgow University Media Group., *Getting the Message*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 6-7.

assume that the narrow economic interest of the corporation will always coincide with the political interest of the system. If the anarchy of production leaves the capitalist system vulnerable to economic crisis, why should the anarchy of ideological “production” not leave it similarly vulnerable to cultural crisis?...the U.S. journalist is also traditionally cynical about the holders and seekers of power, and that tradition has been reawakened and perhaps deepened by the political conflicts of the 1960s and the drift and ineffectiveness of the 1970s....at the same time she or he clings to an ideology of traditional individualism that predates the corporate era and coexists with it somewhat awkwardly.’²¹⁸

Hallin’s research on the American media coverage of the Vietnam War covered the period from 1960 to 1965 in the *NYT*, and from 1965 to 1973 for three main American television networks. The study was acknowledged by many media analysts as changing the common belief at the time, which was that the liberal media had been strong opponents of the American military in Vietnam, and this had caused the failure of the American campaign. In the book, Hallin proposed a model of the objective journalism he was highly critical of, and Hallin’s use of spheres denoting insiders and outsiders in the model is reminiscent of that used by Germino to depict Gramsci’s view of hegemonic society (see figure 2.1.), with the hegemonic elite in the centre, and the masses on the periphery. Explaining his Spheres of consensus, controversy, and deviance model, Hallin wrote that the sphere of consensus (the centre) denoted times when there was broad agreement within elite circles and the public about what should be done about certain issues, such as in popular military campaigns by their country; at those times, the journalists consider their role is to serve as an advocate or

²¹⁸ D. Hallin., *The American News Media: A Critical Theory Perspective*, in J. Forester., *Critical Theory and Public Life*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 121-146, p. 137-8.

celebrant of consensus values, and do not think they need to balance sources. The sphere of legitimate controversy's limits are defined primarily by the decision-making process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch, with objectivity and balance reigning as the supreme journalistic virtues. The sphere of deviance (the periphery) is the 'realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard,' such as Communists or others who wanted to challenge the political consensus. Hallin explained that the boundaries were not rigid, and which of the various models prevailed depended on the political climate in the country as a whole.²¹⁹ In the Vietnam War, Hallin found that as the war was not as solidly planted in the Sphere of Consensus as World War Two, more negative stories for the American military were included than in World War Two, although the motives for the military campaign were never really challenged.²²⁰

In line with the frame theory explained in the last section, Hallin wrote the language of law and order was common in the American television coverage of the Vietnam War, and whereas the American military were never presumed to have a policy of targeting civilians, attacks on civilians by the North Vietnamese military were routinely assumed to result from a calculated policy of terror. Hallin considered that a wide range of events was bent to fit this view, and this dehumanised the North Vietnamese military and banished them not only from the political sphere, but from human society;²²¹ the media thus considered their opinion unworthy of inclusion in the conflict discourse, and they were banished to the sphere of deviance.²²²

²¹⁹ D. Hallin., *Uncensored War, op.cit*, p. 116-118.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 156-8.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 148.




Fig. 2.3. Hallin's model of the boundaries of American objective journalism.

Hallin found that 'in the early years the media strongly supported American involvement in Vietnam, which they interpreted in a Cold War framework similar to the geopolitical framework of the Second World War.' Hallin thought the most important element in the ideological framing of Vietnam was that it was consistently described as a conflict between a 'Western-backed' regime and 'Communist guerillas', which was essentially true, but it was also a war of peasant revolutionaries against a feudal social order, and a conflict born out of a nationalist struggle against colonial rule. Hallin thought that although all three were relevant, the ideology of the Cold War directed attention almost exclusively to the first of these three factors. Hallin later explained that an ideology defines not only what people see, but also what they do not see, and in the Vietnam coverage they did not see revolution, only aggression. The political dimension was played down, and the war in Vietnam was understood as a 'new kind of aggression,' carried on by 'subversion'; with subversion being the

bridging concept that linked the phenomenon of revolution to the Cold War framework.²²³

Hallin did not argue there was no significant criticism of the American military campaign in the early years, but he contended that it ‘was a conflict over tactics, not principles. It threatened neither the Cold War consensus itself nor the premise that American intervention in Vietnam was a “legitimate part of the global commitment.”’²²⁴ In this respect, Hallin is in line with the view that the media are willing to criticise the policy of their country’s military campaigns through their prognoses, but are reluctant to criticise the premises of the conflict in their diagnoses. In the American media coverage of Vietnam, Hallin seems to consider this was because of Cold-War ideological influences on the journalists, as in Gramsci’s view that there is a constant battle for hegemonic commonsense in society: ‘But the journalists themselves were as deeply steeped in the ideology of the Cold War as those they wrote about. Its images pervaded their language; its assumptions guided their news judgements. Its power can be seen both in the “framing” of the events that were covered and, equally important, in the things that were not covered, that fell through the conceptual gaps of the world view the journalists accepted as common sense.’

Hallin considered that later in the war, after the Tet offensive shook American confidence of a military victory in 1968, the establishment and the nation as a whole were so divided over the continuation of the war that the media followed the political debate in taking a more sceptical and critical view of administration policy. The war therefore entered the sphere of legitimate controversy, as there was a political debate

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 52-4.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

about conduct of the war amongst prominent American politicians, and this meant the administration could no longer benefit from consensus journalism.²²⁵ Hallin wrote that he did not encounter a television story that mentioned World War Two in this period, as the Vietnam military campaign ‘was now cut off from that legitimising connection with tradition.’ Hallin concluded from his research: ‘the media became more critical, though they were at least as much followers as leaders in the process of political change, responding to changes in elite and mass opinion and to the decline of morale among troops in the field after withdrawal began.’

Therefore, Hallin considered the media were failing to fulfil their role as watchdogs of elite policy for the people, because they were mostly following the elite debate and policies, rather than criticising the American strategy independently; instead of initiating independent critical frames, they became a forum for airing differences of opinion amongst politicians: ‘the basic structure of relations between the media and government were not radically different in later years of Vietnam. Early in the war, for example, the journalists relied primarily on two kinds of sources: government officials, particularly in the executive branch, and American soldiers in the field-the latter being particularly important in the case of television. They continued to rely on these same sources throughout the war; but later on these sources became much more divided, and many more of them were critical or unenthusiastic about American policy. The news “reflected” these divisions, to use the mirror analogy....But they also limited that change. The Nixon administration retained a good deal of power to “manage” the news; the journalists continued to be patriots in the sense that they portrayed the Americans as the “good guys”. News coverage in the later years of the

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

war was considerably less positive than in the early years, but not nearly so consistently negative as the conventional wisdom now seems to hold.²²⁶

Hallin considers that the most remarkable feature of the media coverage was that the media went as far with American policy as they did,²²⁷ and as much as the media coverage helped persuade the public to want an end to the war, it also helped the Nixon administration maintain majority support through the last four years of war.²²⁸ However, Hallin considered that a delayed effect of Vietnam was that the American reporting of the Central American wars questioned the Cold War perspective, and there had been discussion of whether the American role in the region was a benevolent or imperialist one.²²⁹

2.4.7. Differences between the hegemonic model and the propaganda model

Although there are many similarities between Hallin's theories in *The Uncensored War*, and Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model in *Manufacturing Consent*, and they are often cited together, the propaganda model is more in line with the base-superstructure model than the hegemonic, as it was formulated under the assumption that the media are a part of the power elite, and act as propagandists in consciously manufacturing consent for the continuation of the capitalist system in the US, and drumming up support for the US's foreign policy.

One of the biggest differences between the work of Hallin and Herman and Chomsky is their views on how and whether the American media have changed over time, and especially since the Vietnam War. While Herman and Chomsky were still declaring

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 213-4.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10-11.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

in 1988 that ‘Some propaganda campaigns are jointly initiated by government and media; all of them require the collaboration of the mass media,’²³⁰ Hallin considered that reporters were questioning official information much more during the civil wars in Central America in the 1980s, and the ‘contrast between Vietnam and El Salvador coverage is dramatic.’ Hallin thought an example of the change was how journalists in the 1980s portrayed the information they received from the Americans and their enemies as a two sided ‘propaganda war’, instead of only talking about enemy propaganda as they had done in Vietnam.²³¹ Michael Schudson also considers Herman and Chomsky have been ahistorical in not taking into account the fact that the American media have been more independent of the government since the Vietnam War and Watergate, and that they are now more negative and cynical in their political reporting than they were prior to those events.²³² The above view of a changing American media that is independent from the power-elite, but often has to endure its control and restrictions when the US is at war, is supported by leading American journalist, H.D.S. Greenaway, who was a foreign correspondent for *Time* magazine, and is today the editorial page editor in *The Boston Globe*: ‘Well, the real legacy of Vietnam is that for the first time reporters and editors began to question the American authorities as they never had before. If you look back, from the Spanish American War through World War I, through World War II, through Korea, people may have complained about censorship and access to the front, but as Jimmy Greenfield, who was foreign editor of the *New York Times*, once said, few expended any ink in Korea debating whether or not we should be there at all. In Vietnam, all these things were

²³⁰ E.S. Herman., and N. Chomsky., *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, (New York:Vintage, 1994), p. 32-3.

²³¹ D. Hallin., *Hegemony: The American News Media from Vietnam to El Salvador, A Study of Ideological Change and Its Limits*, in D.L. Paletz., *Political Communication Research: Approaches, Studies, Assessments*, (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex, 1987), pp. 3-25, p. 7-10.

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 89-92.

questioned and as never before, and that's a lasting legacy -- we don't take things for granted; we don't take things as face value; we don't believe officials, as we did before Vietnam. When you think about it, Vietnam was unique. The same problems that Christiane [Amanpour; the problems related to media independence during American military campaigns] is talking of now were true in previous wars, in World War II and in World War I. Only in Vietnam were the two bugbears of journalism overcome - censorship and access to the action - that the military can impose. Vietnam is really the only war where there was no censorship and you could go anywhere you wanted. That wasn't true in World War II or World War I, and it's never been true since. So Vietnam was really unique in that - to that extent. Oh, they're very much shaped because there were basically three generations of war reporters in Vietnam. The first generation - like David Halberstan - came criticizing perhaps the tactics, but feeling that we were in the right war at the right time in the right place. There came another generation like you and me, Terry [Terence Smith, the television host], that felt, well, maybe this isn't so great, but neither are the Communists, and then there came - the kind of radicalized reporters in the late - in the early 70's - who really felt that the Viet Cong deserved to win. So when we got to El Salvador and Nicaragua, I would try to tell reporters, take everything with a grain of salt, you know, don't trust the briefings that you get from the Americans or the Salvadorians, but don't fall for everything the rebels are telling you either. So, you know, try to be very judicious.'²³³

McNair has also emphasised that we should distinguish between the work of Chomsky and others 'who stress the "propagandistic" nature (if not necessarily always intent) of the media,' and others such as Hallin, who prefer to emphasise the

²³³ Jim Lehrer's Online News Hour., *Covering the War* transcript, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june00/vietnam_4-20.html, 20/04/2000.

media's flexibility and adaptability in the context of a fluid, dynamic system, governed not by a single ruling class but by rotating elites drawn from different parties and factions within parties. In the latter perspective, the adaptability of the media to shifting lines of debate is essential to the retention of their legitimacy as facilitators of political discourse in the public sphere and hence, ultimately, to their "hegemonic" role.²³⁴ Similarly, Phillip Schlesinger wrote that in 'the propaganda model internal contention amongst elites is regarded as trivial given the assumption of an "elite consensus" that can be imposed upon the public as a whole.' Schlesinger also thought that when Herman and Chomsky acknowledged public opinion was not controlled by the state-media manipulation it contradicted the deterministic picture they painted in the propaganda model, and 'formal adherence to a powerful effects model.'²³⁵ Manning also believes the propaganda model is too reductivist, as it does not account for times when journalists helped bring discrepancies by elites to the public's awareness, and because it reduces 'US foreign news coverage simply to the economic and political objectives of corporate capitalism and US imperialism.'²³⁶ Gitlin also criticised the propaganda model for depicting the media as 'not so much social institutions as an unchanging (and singular) black megaphone. Garbage cascades in, garbage cascades out.'²³⁷

The *Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG)* have carried out several studies on the British media from within a hegemonic framework; John Eldridge, a leading member of the group involved in an analysis of the British media's coverage of the

²³⁴ B. McNair., *An Introduction to Political Communication*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 57-60.

²³⁵ P. Schlesinger., *From production to propaganda?*, in P. Scannell., P. Schlesinger., and C. Sparks., *Culture and Power: A Media, Culture and Society Reader*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1992), pp. 293-316, p. 311.

²³⁶ P. Manning., *op.cit*, p. 39.

²³⁷ T. Gitlin., *Reply to Rodney Benson*, *Political Communication*, Volume 21, Number 3, 2004, pp. 309-10, p. 309.

Falklands War, stated they had not found any conspiracy theories between the government, military and media in their research, 'but a set of professional [media] practices, which while valuing the principle of independence, relies heavily on official sources for its news....it does result in tight limits on the amount of dissent that can take place outside those parameters especially in a time of crisis...'²³⁸ Eldridge distanced their findings from Herman and Chomsky's 'deterministic' propaganda model, and instead supported the hegemonic 'contested' model: 'What we learn to recognise here is that power over the media, and in the media, is something which is contested. The very process of negotiation can teach us something about changing power balances. It is not a unidimensional or one-way matter.'²³⁹ Tamar Liebes, who conducted a hegemonic study on the Israeli media coverage of the Arab-Israeli war, considers that news reporting shows 'hegemonic overtones much more subtle than those involved in accepting or resisting censorship. It is obvious by now that any telling involves making choices, adopting perspectives, and constructing narratives,' and that the aim of researchers therefore was 'to point out some of the mechanisms of hegemonic reporting in the framing of news of the conflict' by interpretation, after remembering what democracy requires of journalists, and how the enactment of this role is 'particularly problematic (technically and psychologically) in times of war or in a security crisis.'²⁴⁰

The above sections have hopefully defined why and how hegemonic theory will be used in this thesis. Hegemony theory in this study does not refer to the media as being a servant of the state; rather, the media are seen as being made up of people

²³⁸ J. Eldridge., News, Truth and Power, in Glasgow University Media., Getting the Message, *op.cit*, p. 10.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29-30.

²⁴⁰ T. Liebes., *Reporting the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Hegemony Works*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 50.

who are generally supportive of the liberal-capitalist democratic system, but who have different political outlooks within that higher ideology, and need convincing of the merits of government policy before they support it. In the Kosovo media analysis, a hegemonic UK media will be one that uses Nato sources the vast majority of the time, and lets the Nato perspective dominate the framing of the conflict. This thesis will look for evidence of support and criticism in the British media as New Labour attempted to introduce a new dimension to the use of the British military in international conflicts, by sending forces into action for purely humanitarian reasons; it will therefore analyse how successful New Labour were in convincing the British media of the wisdom in this ‘hegemonic shift’ in foreign policy.

2.5. Right-wing critics of the media

Although the left-wing critical tradition has been the basis for most critical media research in the UK, in the US, conservative politicians and analysts have protested alleged media bias much longer than liberal politicians and analysts. The main criticism the right-wing levels at the media is that there is a much higher percentage of liberal journalists than conservative, although left-wing media analysts respond that the journalists’ political leanings are nullified by the conservative, business orientated media organisations.²⁴¹

Ironically, most of the right-wing criticism in the US is aimed at the most criticised media source in the hegemonic tradition, the *NYT*; along with the *Washington Post*. Kellner wrote that the conservative critics emerged in the late 1970s, accusing the ‘new class’ of liberal journalists of being mouthpieces for ‘Third World and socialist

²⁴¹ For example see Michael Nelson foreword, in B.H. Sparrow., *Uncertain Guardians: The News Media As A Political Institution*, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. ix-x, p. ix-x, and M. Schudson, *op.cit*, p. 42-3.

tyrannies,' and 'exhibiting hostility toward US business, US labour, the US military and US technology.'²⁴² An example of this right-wing criticism of the media was evident in the work of William V. Kennedy, who took the opposite view to Hallin on the media coverage of the Vietnam War; Kennedy argued the media were pressured into opposing it by the powerful *NYT*, and that if the other media resisted 'the ultimate anti-war message' they faced being 'professionally smothered.'²⁴³ As well as attacking the same media sources as the left-wing theorists during the Vietnam War, the right-wing also attacked the media's objective journalism; while Hallin believed the media's objectivity allowed the war to proceed and continue, the right-wing believed the media should have been more partisan and patriotic. For example, Carruthers wrote that American President, Richard Nixon, and the US Government information officer, Barry Zorthian, thought that 'the missing context was an optimistic spin on events, which would encourage readers or viewers to recognise that, even if the pictures looked grim, the war itself was not going badly, as the nature of the task was inevitably protracted.'²⁴⁴

In the UK, there were examples of right-wing criticism of the media during and after the Falklands War, when the government attacked the sections of the media they did not feel were patriotic enough; Morrison and Tumber wrote that during the war, government 'attacks fell on the liberally educated, associated in the minds of the assailants with broadcasting personnel and the readers of the *Guardian*.'²⁴⁵ Bernard

²⁴² D. Kellner., *Television and the Crisis of Democracy*, (Colorado: Westview, 1990), p. 4. A survey of national journalists in the US during 2004 found that 54% thought of themselves as moderates; 34% liberal (up from 22% in 1995), and 7% Conservative (much lower than the amount of citizens that saw themselves as conservative, which was 33%), on Journalism.org., *Annual Journalism Survey*, 2004. http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/journalist_survey_prc.asp

²⁴³ W.V. Kennedy., *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War*, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1993), p. 102.

²⁴⁴ S. L. Carruthers., *The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, (Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 116.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

Ingham, Conservative Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher's press secretary during the war, was still criticising the media a year after the war ended; while addressing the *Guild of British Newspaper Editors* in May 1983, he declared: 'Too often these days the assumption seems to be that Government is either automatically wrong, naturally perverse, chronically up to no good or just plain inept...I can understand and sympathise with the suspicion with which the media regards Government and all its works. It must never cease to be vigilant. But it should not assume, as it so often seems to do, that Government is by definition up to no good...' Ingham reinforced this theme in a speech to the *International Press Institute* in March, 1985: 'Some journalists, at least, believe passionately that another Watergate is lying around just waiting to be uncovered...I believe that the Watergate syndrome...seems to require that any self-respecting reporter should knock seven bells out of symbols of authority, and especially Government. This goes beyond the normal and expected tension between Government and press. Its effect on our democracy is, in my view, corrosive.' Leapman believes Thatcher and Ingham pursued the case so doggedly because they were convinced that the national interest was best served by a press that saw itself as a cheer-leader for democratic governments rather than an inquisitor of them.²⁴⁶

The New Labour government criticised the media in a similar manner to Ingham during Nato's campaign in Kosovo, and then again in the later Iraq war; whether this suggests New Labour are as hostile to an independent media during British military operations as the Tories were during the Falklands War, or that the media have become more antagonistic towards the government since the 1980s, is open to debate.

²⁴⁶ M. Leapman., *Treacherous Estate: The Press after Fleet Street*, (London, Sydney, and Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), p. 245.

Evidence for the latter of the two above options was cited by John Lloyd and Alistair Campbell, in Lloyd's recent book. Lloyd stated he believes the media have now become more powerful than their unelected role justifies, and politicians are now on the defensive in their relationship; Lloyd believes this means politicians are 'constantly ceding ground to the media in what the latter can ask and how they can ask it...'²⁴⁷ Campbell was quoted as being in agreement: 'The scene is one of increasing and ferocious competition. Media are insatiable when there's a frenzy on.... We came to power as a number of trends were becoming more obvious. One was an almost total fusion between reporting and comment – not just in the tabloids, not just in the broadsheets, but even among some of the broadcasters.'²⁴⁸

2.6. W. Lance Bennett's indexing hypothesis

In 1990, W. Lance Bennett set out to provide a guideline for press-government relations that drew on previous left and right wing theories, which Bennett considered had left the field divided. Whereas Hallin and Gitlin had focused their attention on the adversarial history of the American press, Bennett also drew attention to the Federalist Papers, particularly *Federalist* 10, which had originated the 'strong and enduring belief that government ought to be buffered from direct popular accountability in order to protect the political process from the whims and passions of an often ignorant (and unpropertied) mass public.' Bennett approached his study from a political rather than a cultural angle, and warned it would be a 'norm that theorists on the Left may find too conservative and theorists on the Right may find too liberal – reactions that would reflect the enduring tensions between two traditions comprising the guideline.' However, Bennett was essentially defending the media

²⁴⁷ J. Lloyd., *op.cit*, p. 16-17.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 92-93.

against right-wing theories that their content is liberally biased, while also agreeing with Hallin and Gitlin that the media use too many elite sources, but do not usually consciously manipulate the news. Bennett also agreed with Hallin that the media had been too soft on the government and system after Watergate, and left the public to conclude the system works, when millions of people had lost faith in the system.

While observing the media coverage of the El Salvador conflict, Bennett thought the media had largely fallen silent in line with the political debate, when the right-wing government and military's war crimes became the main story in the conflict, as this was negative for American foreign policy. Bennett therefore thought the media had not fulfilled their 'watchdog' role, and foreign policy reporting might be particularly susceptible to the press settling for being a 'keeper of the official record.' Bennett therefore proposed an indexing hypothesis to test the conduct of the press, and wrote that if it was found to be true it would mean the media have embraced 'the first element of our aforementioned cultural ideal (i.e., emphasis on institutions, deemphasis of direct popular expression) while abandoning the important companion principle calling for publicising popular opposition in the face of unrepresentative or irresponsible institutions; evidence supporting the indexing hypothesis would suggest that the news industry had ceded to government the tasks of policing itself and striking the democratic balance.'²⁴⁹

Bennett proposed that an acceptable norm for the news media's use of sources should be that journalists can be expected to give government officials a privileged voice in the news, unless they exclude or marginalise stable majority opinion in society, and unless official actions raise doubts about political propriety; when the news media

²⁴⁹ W. Lance Bennett., Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States, in *Journal of Communication*, 40 (2), Spring, 1990, pp. 103-25, p. 103-111.

have serious suspicions about political behaviour, they should 'foreground other social voices (polls, opposition groups, academics, political analysts) in news stories and editorials as checks against unrepresentative or otherwise irresponsible governments.' Bennett considered that as long as an effective opposition bloc operated in government, the mass media were justified in indexing news content to the range of institutional debate, but when the political opposition collapsed the media should abandon the indexing norm in favour of restoring the democratic balance, and a 'watchdog press' would look to interest groups, opponents in Congress, or opinion polls.

Bennett's consequent study on the American media coverage of the Nicaraguan conflict found that the media's opposition to the American government's position on the war collapsed in line with the political opposition, and therefore the 'journalistic patterns both before and after the shift in congressional policy on Nicaragua are best explained by continued application of the indexing norm, at the expense of the democratic ideal.' Bennett's analysis showed that out of 889 voiced opinions in the news story on Nicaragua, 604 came from members of US governmental institutions. Bennett was also concerned about the *NYT* undermining the legitimacy of public opinion, by omitting several polls showing negative results for the government policy; such as a majority opposing the use of American troops against a sovereign country, in a conflict they thought could turn into another 'Vietnam'. Bennett thought his most dramatic finding was that the *NYT* reflected Congress silence during the funding for Contras votes; an ideal time for the *NYT* to show its watchdog function. Bennett therefore concluded that media liberalism is indexed, and it 'tends to disappear at

precisely those moments when it would be most useful for maintaining the democratic balance in the culture.’²⁵⁰

2.7. Research supporting the indexing hypothesis

Jonathan Mermin considered that Bennett’s indexing hypothesis ‘offered a general formulation of what Hallin described in the Vietnam case,’²⁵¹ and Mermin’s study on American media coverage of post-Vietnam military conflicts involving US forces found evidence supporting Hallin and Bennett’s theories on the state-media relationship. Mermin concluded that despite its critical-liberal outlook, the *NYT* still largely relied on official sources for any criticism of American foreign policy, as Hallin had found in the Vietnam War, and Bennett in the Nicaraguan War. In the eight foreign policy cases Mermin analysed, he found that in the news section of the *NYT* an average of 10.1% of the paragraphs were coded as critical when there was conflict in Washington, while when there was consensus in Washington the figure dropped to just 2%. On the opinion pages, 46% of editorials and columns were critical when there was criticism in Washington, while the figure was 14% for the consensus cases.²⁵² With relevance to the focus section in this thesis, Mermin argued that if there is a consensus in Washington, journalists concentrate not on the wisdom of US policy itself, but in the execution and outcome of US policy, and the possibility of political triumph or disaster for the president. Mermin considers this critical angle, while limited to practice, should dispel the view that evidence supporting the indexing hypothesis means that American journalists are ‘mere propagandists for the state.’

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115-24. Bennett also found there was little difference between source access for the Sandanistas and Contras, the two groups fighting each other in Nicaragua; there was little access for either, and this finding concurs with the results of this study on the use of Serb and ethnic-Albanian sources.

²⁵¹ J. Mermin., *op.cit*, p. 4-5.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

Yet Mermin argued this is still a narrow parameter for critical reporting, and that there should be more analysis of the 'ends and means' of the government policy during times of foreign conflict, so that the public can make an informed decision about whether the use of military force is the best course of action.²⁵³

Entman and Page considered the pre-Gulf War coverage in the *NYT*, *The Washington Post*, and *ABC* news was also in line with indexing theory, as they wrote that it 'varied with the parameters of elite debate,' but 'even in this period of intense elite divisions, administration views got a privileged hearing.' They believed this suggested that 'even at the highest level, all elite sources are not equal.' In line with Mermin's views, they also considered that 'a significant part of the criticism reported was procedural rather than substantive,' and warned that they could not expect the same amount of debate if the elites agreed on a policy. The writers considered that journalists relied on elite sources in this way because 'of the ease of regular access to officials, the dependable supply of news the officials provide, the need to cultivate such sources over time, and the usefulness of citing legitimate, authoritative sources, all of which serve important commercial needs to these for-profit businesses.'²⁵⁴

Using 'watch-dog', 'lap-dog' and 'attack-dog' theories to analyse the American media coverage of the Gulf War, A.T. Thrall's research found qualified support for the lap-dog theory, which is basically in line with hegemony and indexing. He found 'the press did little analysis that raised questions about the need for moving to a military option,' and once fighting began the 'majority of news stories and columns accepted the president's assertions that such action was necessary.' Moreover, 'what

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 9-10.

²⁵⁴ R. M. Entman and B. I. Paige., *The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the limits to Media Independence*, in W. L. Bennett and D. L. Paletz, *op.cit.*, pp. 82-104, p. 96-7.

criticism there was focused almost entirely on the best means to achieve victory, rather than on the need to go to war in the first place.²⁵⁵ Thrall also found the media had an obsession with the use of information from their president,²⁵⁶ and that a compliant media for the administration depends on a political consensus.²⁵⁷ Thrall qualified his critical findings for the media by explaining that during war, the media's options for newsgathering are severely constrained, and they have to go to government officials for information more than at any other time. Thrall therefore concluded that the media were not acting as a subservient 'lap-dog', and more 'an imperfect watch-dog on a very short leash.'²⁵⁸

2.8. Research questioning the indexing hypothesis

While the results in the above section make a good case for the hegemonic and indexing theories, some recent research has called into question how limited the media are in their criticisms of the American military when they go to war. For example, in a study inspired by Bennett's indexing theory, which they considered to be, both theoretically and empirically, one of the most important studies of press dependence on sources; because it had systematically tested and made explicit a theoretical deduction that had long been implicit in the scholarly literature on the press and foreign policy, John Zaller and Dennis Chiu analysed the coverage of forty-two American foreign policy crises from between 1945 and 1999 in *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines. However, unlike Bennett's indexing study, which relied on the *NYT* abstracts for evidence of congressional opinion, they measured congressional opinion independently of media coverage of it. They still found strong evidence that

²⁵⁵ A.T. Thrall., *War in the Media Age*, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton, 2000), p. 250-1.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

reporters do appear to ‘wax hawkish and wane dovish as official sources lead them to do,’ but did not find much evidence supporting the indexing hypothesis after the end of the Cold War, and concluded the media now ‘tend to be more independent of Congress and the president, though not necessarily more independent of government officials generally.’²⁵⁹ They also found that the media reported from extremes when the enemy was communist, either in a hawkish or dovish manner, while they were more balanced when the enemy was not communist.²⁶⁰ Zaller and Chiu’s results were not as supportive for the indexing hypothesis as Mermin’s study, and they put this down to differences in their coding schemes. While Mermin’s study followed Hallin’s view that only negative media coverage ‘that fairly directly challenges the premise of a policy’ was in line with the watchdog role the media should fulfil as a balance to the powers of the administration, Zaller and Chiu included any negative coverage that was likely to lower public support for the government policy in their conclusions, arguing ‘how meaningful is it to say that the media have not challenged a policy if they challenge everything about it except its explicit premises?’²⁶¹

Entman also considers that since the Cold War ended, and the first Gulf War had a problematic ending, the media have shown more cynicism towards leaders than respectful deference. Entman first made this proposition in the article *Declarations of Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War*, and included the media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict as an example of this, as he found Clinton was heavily criticised by the American media during the Nato campaign.²⁶² Like Zaller

²⁵⁹ J. Zaller and D. Chiu., Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1946-1999, in B. L. Nacos., R. Y. Shapiro., and P. Isernia., *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, (Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 61-84, p. 61-64.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80-1.

²⁶² R. M. Entman., *Declarations of Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War*, in B. L. Nacos., R. Y. Shapiro., and P. Isernia., *Ibid.*, pp. 11-26, p. 16-17.

and Chiu, Entman also focused his study on analysing *Time* and *Newsweek* coverage. In 2004, Entman followed up that article with a book that proposed a new media model (see fig. 2.4). Entman suggested a new media model was needed as the American media was now more independent of elite power and influence, and this meant the hegemonic and indexing theories were not as relevant as they had been. In contrast to this study, Entman included Herman and Chomsky's work as an example of the hegemonic model, and Hallin's work as an example of indexing. Entman proposed the new model should be called the Cascading Network Activation Model. Entman wrote that the 'cascade model suggests that the media should provide enough information independent of the executive branch that citizens can construct their own counterframes of issues and events....what citizens need is a counterframe constructed of culturally resonant words and images, one that attains sufficient magnitude to gain wide understanding as a sensible alternative to the White House's interpretation.'²⁶³

Entman looked at controversial American foreign policy incidents and conflicts, and concluded that the 1990s foreign conflicts he had studied 'suggest that news of foreign affairs does not fall into the iron grip of hegemonic elite control, nor does it always provide a straightforward index of elite discussion. Ever since the Cold War began to fade, the news has become messier than either of these approaches lead us to expect – less predictable, less easily categorised and regulated.' Entman argued that elite control over frames in foreign conflicts depends on the administration and the conflict; although the media can look hegemonic in some cases, in others, when the administration does not have a clear ideological frame that suppresses criticism of their policy, 'journalists and other elites who oppose the president can use shared

²⁶³ R. Entman., *Projections of Power*, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

cultural schemas not merely to contest the White House frame but actually to dominate it.'




Figure 2.4. Entman's Cascading Network Activation Model.²⁶⁴

Entman considers that the Clinton administration's weakness and vulnerability to attack during the Kosovo Conflict was one such occasion, and that it 'illustrates the applicability of the cascading network activation model to a post-Cold War environment where the administration, Congress, other elites, journalists, and even

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

indicators of public opinion all jostle for space on the same discursive stage.’ Entman considered the lack of media celebration after the Nato campaign to be another sign of how they were now more independent of the government.²⁶⁵ Entman later wrote that although American journalists might support their country’s military conflicts, they ‘remained vigilant for signs of quagmire even during the massively popular post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and questioned administration officials aggressively when they thought such signs were present...’²⁶⁶ However, Entman considers that the media usually needs elite support to continue calling for a policy that counters the government strategy: ‘By itself, media enterprise may bring useful new information before the public...but without the push from continued, strategically adroit opposition by anti-administration leaders, potential counter-frames receive insufficient magnitude and resonance to yield much learning or questioning by the public.’²⁶⁷

In the last volume of the *Political Communication* journal in 2003, Scott L. Althaus also challenged the indexing hypothesis, through a study on the American television coverage of the Gulf War and its build-up, where he found more media independence of elite influence than the indexing hypothesis predicts.²⁶⁸ Althaus considers the question of press independence from officials is vitally important, as it is the only way the ‘people at large can exercise popular sovereignty over their institutions of government.’ Althaus thought that previous studies had focused too much on ‘overturning the presumption of independence than at providing consistent answers about the extent of the problem,’ and had also been ‘frustrated by inconsistent

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 147-56.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73-4.

methods for analysing news content, conflicting ideas of what “independent” news coverage might look like, and the tendency to study press-state relationships using stand-alone case studies...that obscure common patterns.’ Althaus stated he found more media criticism than most previous studies because he examined ‘the process of news construction at a finer level of detail than previous studies have been able to do. Using full-text content analysis data from every... evening broadcast aired during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis.’²⁶⁹

Althaus observed that previous studies, such as Hallin and Bennett’s, have found a large amount of critical framing of government policy, but because it did not attack the substantive policy, they did not think it was enough to satisfy the expectations of what an independent media should provide. Althaus also drew attention to the fact that many studies had used proxy data in place of the full-text news content, and studies that use full-text stories usually find more media criticism of the government; also, because of the time-consuming work involved in coding full-text content, many studies only cover a short period of time, rather than the whole conflict. Althaus also thought it was important to include foreign sources in the study, as Bennett and Mermin’s studies had only included American voices, and this cut out a large amount of potential sources. Althaus thought this meant there was still no clear picture about how independent news discourse is from the parameters of official debate, as different studies have touched different dimensions of press criticism.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ Althaus and Entman have been working on revising the indexing thesis together since 1994 (see S. Althaus., J. Edy., R. Entman and P. Phalen., Revising the Indexing Hypothesis: Officials, Media and the Libya Crisis, *Political Communication* 13 (4), 1996).

²⁶⁹ S.L. Althaus., When News Norms Collide, Follow the Lead: New Evidence for Press Independence, in *Political Communication*, 20 (4), Oct/Dec, 2003, pp. 381-414, p. 382.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 386-8.

Althaus did not find that media criticism rose or fell in line with American official's opinions, as predicted under indexing theory, and that most of the criticisms of the administration's strategy were not initiated from within government circles. Althaus found the criticisms were limited, and did not question the premises of the war, but also found that journalists were independently generating critical perspectives about issues. Althaus concluded that although the media were 'on balance, still fairly supportive of the government's designs,' and 'would have appeared even more permissive if this study had followed the conventions of previous research,' the press may be more independent of government sources than previously thought: 'The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis had all of the elements that should have undermined press independence: a unified executive, a deferential Congress, a military build-up signalling American intentions for war, and an easy villain in Saddam Hussein. Yet....These findings suggest that the press was much more independent in reporting the Persian Gulf crisis than scholars of political communication usually presume it to be.'²⁷¹

On indexing, Althaus concluded 'Criticism of government in evening news discourse during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis was not triggered by or closely tied to patterns of gatekeeping among elected officials. Instead, the evidence from this case suggests that journalists exercised considerable discretion in locating and airing oppositional voices. This discretion did not tend to produce many bold statements of fundamental criticism within ends discourse, but it would be a mistake to infer from this that strategic criticism was thereby marginalised.' Althaus' findings are therefore similar to Entman's, but he accepted that the likelihood of the media indexing to elite sources depended on the conflict they were covering, and the Nicaraguan conflict where

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 392-402.

Bennett first formulated the indexing hypothesis was a conflict where indexing was more likely, as it was more localised than the Gulf War.²⁷²

2.9. Hegemony, Indexing and Cascade compared

As Althaus has observed, the above findings from the disparate research on American media coverage of international conflicts involving their government are probably quite similar, with an over-reliance on official sources combined with a certain level of critical reporting, but there were differences of opinion about what constitutes media independence from government, and so the resulting conclusions on whether the media were independent watchdogs, or hegemonic, indexing lapdogs varied. This was evident in the different research perspectives of Mermin, who found in favour of indexing but admitted there was a narrow parameter of critical reporting, and Zaller and Chiu, who also found the media were still reliant on politicians, but did not consider indexing to be relevant after the Cold War because they found a certain level of media independence from Congress and the president. Another difficulty in comparing the 1980s studies with recent ones is that while Hallin and Bennett focused on newspapers (and television in Hallin's case), Zaller and Chui, and Entman analysed *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines in their recent studies.

Moreover, while Entman's cascade model differs to Hallin's hegemony and Bennett's indexing in that he believes journalists offer criticisms that precede breakdowns in elite consensus, all believe journalists offer criticisms of elite policymaking, but need elite support to sustain coverage of their alternative agendas in the media. However, there seems little difference between media coverage in the 'post-Cold War' conflicts Entman found evidence to support his cascade model in, and Hallin's findings on the Vietnam War in *Uncensored War*, as Hallin also found evidence of journalists

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 404-5.

vigorously criticising the American military campaign early in the war, and occasionally favouring the North Vietnamese version of events to the US administration, but without support from elites or other media they could not prevent the escalation in the American campaign. Hallin's main criticism of the American media was that they did not criticise the premises of the American military campaign, and there were similar criticisms of the American media over the 'post-Cold War' Gulf, Kosovo and Iraq conflicts.

Therefore, there seems to be a consistency in the results between all the above hegemony/indexing/cascade studies, with the media relying too much on official sources, but covering events relatively plurally; with the positivity of the media coverage for the US government and military dependent on the progress of the military campaign, political opinion, and restrictions on journalistic movement and freedom of information. The main difference between the various studies seems to be, not in a particular transformation in the media profession since the Cold War, but in the theory, samples, methodologies and interpretations of the researchers. So it does not really seem to be fair to proclaim old models or theories redundant when using different media sources. As Althaus pointed out, it seems that more consistency is needed, and these differences in accounts suggest that to declare a model relevant or irrelevant needs a detailed and comprehensive analysis of all available media sources, from all available conflicts, across a wide spectrum of consistent variables and categories, and with common definitions on what constitutes political consensus, and media independence.

2.10. British studies on the media's use of sources

The modern debate about the British media's use of sources owes much to the work of Stuart Hall et al, Philip Schlesinger and Howard Tumber, and although their work at the time did not concern source use in conflicts, their theories were similar to those proposed in the American studies discussed above, and their work is therefore relevant both for continuity from the above sections, and as context for this section on the British media's use of sources. In a critique of the aforementioned *Policing the Crisis*, where Hall et al argued that elite sources could expect to dominate news discourses, because they were used by the media as primary definers for issues that involved them, Schlesinger and Tumber argued that although the 'primary definers' do have an advantage in getting their information into the news, Hall et al underestimated the ability of less powerful groups to get their views into the media. In line with Hallin's hegemony, Schlesinger and Tumber also stressed there is often disagreement between elites, and this can lead to journalists opening up the 'gate' to a more varied use of sources;²⁷³ it was not pre-determined that elite sources become the primary definers of issues, and they 'have to engage in goal-orientated action to achieve access, even though their recognition as "legitimate authorities" is already usually inscribed in the rules of the game.'²⁷⁴ Manning agreed with Schlesinger and Tumber's critique of Hall's primary definers theory, but believes Hall's work was vital in setting out a research agenda for both empirical and theoretical work on the media's use of sources.²⁷⁵

²⁷³ P. Schlesinger., and H. Tumber., *Reporting Crime: The Media Politics of Criminal Justice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), in H. Tumber., *News: A Reader*, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 257-66, p. 260-4. Schlesinger also makes the same arguments in P. Schlesinger., *Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism: Source Strategies and the Limits of Media-Centrism*, in M. M. Ferguson., *Public Communication: The New Imperatives: Future Directions for Media Research*, (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage, 1990), pp. 61-83, p. 64-9.

²⁷⁴ P. Schlesinger., *Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism*, *Ibid.*, p. 76-7.

²⁷⁵ P. Manning., *op.cit*, p. 17.

Writing about the relationship between the British media, military and politicians, Ian Stewart indirectly agreed with the premises of hegemony and indexing when he stressed the importance of the government having a political consensus in support of the military campaign if they wanted to achieve and maintain the media's support:

‘The key, then, to a successful media war from the perspective of the government is to ensure that there is a firm consensus across the political elite....In conclusion, the key component in ensuring that a successful media war is waged alongside the conventional war is the existence of widespread support for the validity of the political goal the military action seeks. If the legacy of Vietnam reminds United States administrations of this fact, the Suez Crisis of 1956 does similarly in the British context.’ Stewart considers that some of the British press went against Britain's Suez campaign because they had access to a ‘section of the political elite able to express those views publicly. In short, this was another example of a divided political elite finding expression in divided press coverage.’ Stewart considers the media did not offer as much criticism of the military during the Falklands and Gulf wars because there was no significant opposition from the mainstream political parties, and when there are only a few mavericks criticising the government policy they are framed in general as irrelevant to the main issues: ‘Journalism is only as good as its sources and can only reflect those sources. In time of a national crisis such as a war those sources are, in the main, the political elite whose views inform parliamentary debate. The opposition character of formal political debate in Britain defines the first balance. What then is a journalist to do when there is no opposition from the opposition....The Opposition system even isolates members of its own party who oppose the war. Such mavericks, though they might get some media exposure, are framed in general as irrelevant to the main issues.’ However, Stewart argued that a united political elite

should not be seen as the ultimate goal of the military's media relations in wartime, and that it should be more important for the military to have an informed and responsible public, and a popular consensus.'²⁷⁶

In line with Hallin's opinion on journalists being limited by their professional restrictions, McNair considers that although objectivity was designed to win audience credibility through removing signs of journalistic bias, it can lead to bias in favour of the powerful because the 'organisational demand for "source credibility" combines with the time pressures imposed by the news production process to favour establishment sources,' as journalists base their choice of sources on cultural assumptions that reflect mainly elite-establishment views.²⁷⁷ McNair suggested the use of official sources by journalists is so widespread in the UK because journalists value authoritative sources' views on issues as one of the three main characteristics of the 'objective journalism' model.²⁷⁸ In a later book, McNair referred to the hegemonic role the British and American medias can play in modern society, and in line with indexing how they can be a battleground between competing interests who try and influence the way issues are framed: 'They [the media] may become a site of dissent, contributing to the breakdown of a previously hegemonic worldview and its replacement by another. When the British establishment lacks unity and coherence the British media, like those of the US in the case of the Vietnam War... reflect that disunity, and become more open. This openness can be further stretched and widened by effective source strategies.'²⁷⁹

²⁷⁶ I. Stewart., *Reporting Conflict: Who Calls the Shots?*, in S. Badsey., *op.cit*, pp. 64-76, p.71.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75-6.

²⁷⁸ B. McNair., *Sociology of Journalism*, *op.cit*, p. 68.

²⁷⁹ B. McNair., *News and Journalism in the UK: a Textbook*, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 78.

Two books were published in 2004 with methodologies and results relevant for this section. Firstly, Tumber and Palmer analysed the UK television and newspaper coverage of the Iraq War, and cited some of the American hegemonic and indexing studies that provide the theoretical framework for this study in their conclusion. Their quantitative analysis found that coalition official spokespeople and representatives of government and the armed forces dominated the dialogue by a large margin in all the media sources analysed (*Sun, Telegraph, Mirror, Guardian, BBC and ITN*).²⁸⁰ Their results also supported the theories that the media would be more critical of the coalition's campaign when there was a breakdown in elite consensus; and that the media would criticise the strategy of the campaign rather than the objectives.²⁸¹

Secondly, Greg Philo and Mike Berry of the *GUMG* undertook a content analysis of British television news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian war, and combined it with a survey of how the coverage related to the understanding, beliefs and attitudes of the television audience. They found the news coverage used more Israeli sources than Palestinian, and also often used American sources who offered pro-Israeli perspectives. They also found that although there were more Palestinian casualties during the time of their analysis, the news coverage made it seem like there were more Israeli. They also argued that a lack of time spent on each report meant there was a lack of context in the news coverage, and that this impacted negatively on the audience's interest in the conflict.²⁸²

²⁸⁰ H. Tumber., and J. Palmer., *Media at War: The Iraq Crisis*, (London, Thousand Oaks and Delhi: Sage, 2004), p. 103.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 162-5.

²⁸² G. Philo., and M. Berry., *Bad News From Israel*, (London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto, 2004), p. 245-59.

2.11. Conclusion

As shown in this section, framing and hegemony have been used in a large body of research over the last three decades, in times of both peace and war. In this study, indexing will be included within the hegemonic media model, as they both refer to a contest for media coverage weighted in favour of national government and military leaders; with the media relying on those official sources for leadership in issue framing. The hegemonic model will provide an alternative view of the media to the plural model, so that judgements on the independence of the media during the Nato campaign can be made. The propaganda model, which like the manipulative model, is more critical of the media than the hegemonic model, is also referenced occasionally; as is the cascade model, which was proposed as an alternative model to hegemony and indexing during the later stages of this study. The cascade model is generally in line with the old plural model, and sometimes they are referred to together, as alternatives to the models that consider the politics-media relationship is heavily weighted in favour of politicians during wars involving their country's military.

As this study focuses on an international conflict involving the military of the media's nation, with a general consensus between political parties and the media on the legitimacy of the campaign, there should be more evidence of hegemony than would be expected in a conflict where there were mainstream political divisions about the justification for the campaign. The fact that it was spun as a 'new' kind of war often made it difficult to draw conclusions on whether the media offered opinions outside the hegemonic boundaries, because the war itself was spun as being a war fought outside the old hegemonic boundaries; for humanitarian reasons rather than economic or territorial. In this way, some of the right-wing media could be seen as more

hegemonic when they criticised the motivation of the Nato campaign, because they did not believe in the 'hegemonic shift' in the country's military being used for humanitarian interventions. However, it was decided to analyse the hegemony of the media with regard to its support for the New Labour and Nato campaign, and how much it followed the Nato framing of their campaign, as that would show how much the media had adapted their coverage to the 'hegemonic shift' in government and foreign policy.

3. Methodology

3.1. Introduction

This study has used a content analysis combining quantitative and qualitative methods, followed by interviews with journalists involved in the reporting of the Kosovo Conflict in the UK. By combining these three aspects of research, this thesis is in line with the ‘multiple research strategies,’ or ‘method triangulation’ methodology often cited by researchers as a means of adding authority to research findings; defining this, and with relevance to this study, Brannen wrote that ‘Method triangulation may be between-methods or within-method....between-methods means using different methods in relation to the same object of study...’²⁸³ Arksey and Knight also wrote there were different types of methodological triangulation, and explained the one used in this study, between-method triangulation, as: ‘where two or more distinct methods...are employed to measure the same phenomenon, but from different angles. The rationale is that cumulatively the weaknesses of one research method are offset by the strengths of the others.’²⁸⁴ Bryman corroborated the above definitions when he wrote that the logic of ‘triangulation’ is that the ‘findings from one type of study can be checked against the findings deriving from the other type. For example, the results of a qualitative investigation might be checked against a quantitative study. The aim is generally to enhance the validity of findings.’²⁸⁵

By first using qualitative research to set up the variables, categories and hypotheses used in the quantitative analysis, and then using the results from the quantitative

²⁸³ J. Brannen., Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: an overview, in J. Brannen (ed)., *Mixing Methods: qualitative and quantitative research*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1992), pp. 3-37, p. 11.

²⁸⁴ H. Arksey., and P. Knight., *Interviewing for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource with Examples*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Sage, 1999), p. 23.

²⁸⁵ A. Bryman., Quantitative and qualitative research: further reflections on their integration, in J. Brannen (ed)., *op.cit.*, pp. 57-78, p. 59-60.

analysis to set up the qualitative content analysis and interviews, this study is in line with the rationale of triangulation as explained by the above writers. The combination of the three aspects of research should therefore bring results which will fulfil the objectives of this study: to identify the content and frames used by the British and American medias in their coverage of the Kosovo conflict; and to compare the media coverage between left and right wing UK media sources, and between the UK media and the *NYT*.

3.2. Content Analysis

Ole R. Holsti defined content analysis as ‘a multipurpose research method developed specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as the basis of inference,’²⁸⁶ and ‘any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. In somewhat more succinct form this definition incorporates the three criteria discussed earlier: content analysis must be objective and systematic, and...it must be undertaken for some theoretical reason.’ Holsti’s definition did not specify quantification because he considered that ‘a rigid qualitative-quantitative distinction seems unwarranted for the purposes of defining the technique...’²⁸⁷

A content analysis is therefore usually improved by a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data; quantitative data can provide hard evidence to support or oppose theories made from qualitative analysis,²⁸⁸ while additional qualitative analysis provides the researcher with examples of what the quantitative analysis has found, and further evidence to add weight to the quantitative findings.

²⁸⁶ O. R. Holsti., *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1969), p. 2.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Denis McQuail has also written about the merits of mixing qualitative and quantitative research when analysing the media: ‘For some purposes, it may be permissible and necessary to depart from the pure form of either “Berelsonian” [quantitative] or “Barthian” [qualitative] analysis, and a number of studies have used combinations of both approaches, despite their divergent assumptions. An example of such a hybrid approach is the work on British television news of the Glasgow Media Group (1976, 1980, 1985), which combined rigorous and detailed quantitative analysis of industrial news with an attempt to “unpack” the deeper cultural meaning of specific news stories.’²⁸⁹

3.2.1. Quantitative content analyses

There are two major quantitative content analyses in this study, and one minor. Firstly, there is an analysis of the New Labour, MoD and Nato information, which it was thought would provide the foundation for the political and media debate on the Nato campaign in the UK. The media coding scheme is the most comprehensive, as the media coverage is the main focus of this study. The media coding scheme was changed slightly for some of the media sources, and the differences are explained below. A quantitative analysis of the House of Commons debates was also undertaken, but there was a front bench consensus for almost all the conflict, and as this meant indexing theory could not be tested, the analysis was kept to a minimum.

3.2.1.1. The Nato Political and Military Information

3.2.1.1.1. The sample

The content analysis of the information provided to the media and public during the Kosovo Conflict draws on three sources in the month of April, 1999: firstly, the Nato

²⁸⁸ J. Fiske., *Introduction to Communication Studies* (2nd edition), (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 190.

press conferences²⁹⁰; secondly, the MoD press conferences; and thirdly, the personal speeches and interviews made by New Labour politicians during the conflict. The Nato conferences were also coded for their political presentations only, as it was thought this would give another angle to the comparisons with the MoD conferences, as the military presentations from the MoD conferences were not always available from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) web-site. Out of the thirty days in April, there were nineteen days where information from all three sources were available, and these days are therefore the ones that have been analysed; they were April 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 25th and 27th. A description of the contents and rationale follows below.

There were no Nato conferences available for the 12th, 22nd, and 26th, and so that meant those days could not be included in the analysis. On the days that were available, and were also available for the other sources, on the 1st, Javier Solana gave the political speech, while General Wesley Clark gave the military speech. On the 2nd, Air Commodore David Wilby presented on his own, after a short introduction by Nato spokesperson, Jamie Shea. From the 3rd to the 7th Shea gave the political speech, while Wilby gave the military presentation. On the 10th and 11th Shea gave the political speech, while Colonel Konrad Freytag gave the military presentation. On the 13th Shea gave the political speech and Clark gave the military presentation. From the 14th to the 20th, Shea was joined by General Giuseppe Marani, who gave the military presentation. On the 21st, Shea and Marani were joined by Commander Fabrizio Maltinti, who briefed the conference on the humanitarian situation. On the 23rd and 25th Shea and Freytag gave the presentations from the Washington summit, while on the 27th Shea and Clark presented at a conference back in Brussels.

²⁸⁹ D. McQuail., *Mass Communications Theory, op.cit*, p. 328.

Unfortunately, only the political presentations were available from many of the MoD conferences on the FCO web-site,²⁹¹ so only they could be coded and analysed on some of the dates below. There were no MoD conferences available on the web-site on April 8th, 24th, 28th and 30th, so those days were left out of the analysis. On April 1st the military presentation was not available, and Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, gave the political presentation. On the 2nd, Dr. Edgar Buckley (MoD Under-Secretary, responsible for operations) gave the political presentation, while Air Marshall Sir John Day (Director of operations in the MoD working under General Charles Guthrie, the Chief of Defence Staff) presented the military up-date. On the 3rd and 4th Doug Henderson (Minister of State for the Armed Forces) presented the political up-date, while Day again presented the military conference (on the 3rd, Major Julian Moir also gave a presentation, but this was not available). On the 5th, Cook gave the political, and Guthrie gave the military presentation, while on the 6th these roles were filled by Robertson and Colonel Moody. On the 7th and 11th, only Cook's presentation was available, while on the 10th it was only Henderson's that was available. On the 13th, only Cook's was available. On the 14th, the presentations by Defence Secretary, George Robertson, and International Development Secretary, Clare Short, were available. On the 16th, Tony Lloyd's (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State) presentation was available, while on the 17th and 18th, Henderson's was. On the 19th, it was Robertson again, and Cook on the 20th. On the 21st, Robertson and Day's presentations were available, along with Paddy Ashdown (leader of the Liberal Democrats political party in the UK at the time)'s via satellite from Skopje. On the 23rd and 25th it was Cook and Robertson from the Washington press conference, while on the 27th Cook's presentation from back at the MoD was available.

²⁹⁰ Nato's Kosovo press conferences were coded from: www.nato.int/docu/speech/sp99.htm

For the government's personal speeches and interviews, there were none available on the FCO web-site for the 9th, 15th, 17th, 29th and 30th, and so those days were left out of the analysis. There were sometimes more than one available, and in those cases there were certain criteria followed for choosing which ones to use. The first was that those chosen were the ones with content aimed most directly at the Kosovo Conflict. The next reason for choosing which would be used was the governmental position of the source, and its relevance to the Kosovo Conflict. In this regard, and out of the politicians used, the Prime Minister Tony Blair took precedence, and he was followed in order by Robin Cook, George Robertson and Clare Short.

On the 1st of April, only Robin Cook's internet message to the Serb people was available. On the 2nd, only an interview by Cook on *BBC Radio* was available. On the 3rd, Blair's interview with *Sky News* was used, while Cook's response to the refugee crisis was not. On the 4th, a Blair interview for the *Sunday Telegraph* newspaper was used, but a Cook interview on *Radio 5 Live* announcing Macedonia have agreed to give sanctuary to the refugees was not. On the 5th, a Blair interview for the *Sun* newspaper was used, but a Blair interview showing his respect to President Djukanovic on Montenegrin television was not. On the 6th, Short reporting to the MoD on her visit to Albania and Macedonia was used, even though it was at the MoD conference, while a Foreign Office reaction to a Belgrade peace proposal was not. On the 7th, only a press conference by Cook and a delegation of Kosovar Albanians was available. On the 10th, only a doorstep speech by Blair, alongside the Spanish President, Jose Maria Aznar, was available. On the 11th, an article by Blair for the *Sunday Mirror* was used, while George Robertson writing in the *Sunday*

²⁹¹ The MoD's Kosovo press briefings, and New Labour politicians' speeches, interviews and articles were coded from: www.fco.gov.uk/search.asp

Business was not. On the 13th, only Blair addressing the House of Commons was available. On the 14th, an interview given by Blair with Kofi Annan was used, while a Cook speech at the *Lord Mayor of the City of London's Easter Banquet on Kosovo and the Modern Europe* was not. On the 16th, only Cook announcing the appointment of David Gowan as Britain's Kosovo War Crimes Coordinator was available. On the 18th, only an interview by Blair for the American television station, *CBS*, at Chequers was available. On the 19th, Cook opening a debate on Kosovo in the House of Commons was used, while Blair speaking at the annual meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London about their help after the fall of Communism was not. On the 20th, only Blair giving a press conference at Nato headquarters after meeting with Nato's military and political leaders on the air campaign was available. On the 21st, Blair's interview for the Russian television station, *NTV*, was used, while Blair and FCO ministers answering questions on Kosovo in the House of Commons was not. On the 23rd, a Blair interview for the *PBS* television show *The Newshour with Jim Lehrer* in America was used, while a Blair interview with another television station, *NBC*, rejecting Milosevic's latest offer, was not. On the 25th, only a television interview given by Robin Cook and Madelaine Albright on *BBC* television's *Breakfast with Frost* from Washington D.C. was available. Finally, on the 27th, a second Internet message to the Serb people from Robin Cook was used, while an announcement that *FCO* Minister of State, Joyce Quinn, would deliver the Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture in Luxembourg that night, entitled *Britain in Europe*, was not.

3.2.1.1.2. The coding of the elite information

Coding units

The coding unit was as much of the conference presentations, speeches, articles or interviews available from each Nato military spokesperson or British politician and military spokesperson. The dialogue of others, such as other politicians or diplomats, interviewers and journalists were not included. Although some interviews were led by the interviewers, and they might go against the New Labour politicians' agenda, it was thought that what the politician said, and how much time he spent on each question, would suggest how much emphasis he wanted to put on each issue.

Coding procedure

The objectives of the content analysis for the Nato and MoD conferences, and the New Labour rhetoric, were primarily to identify how they framed the conflict, to see how similar the content of their presentations were to each other, and to later compare them to the media frames to see how closely they related to each other. The coding system is the same as the media coding system at the start, with codes for the case, date and source. After this it changes, as its objectives differ to that of the media system, and there is no need for the paragraphs/time, format, position and main source variables. Unfortunately, no images were available from the web-sites either, so that variable could not be included, but the images in the conferences usually reflected the topics anyway. Eight variables were therefore included in the coding system.

There were seventy-six units coded and analysed, with nineteen each from the four sources. Each different topic's lines were counted in each unit to get a quantitative impression of what the sources concentrated on in each conference, speech, interview or article. Due to the inevitable restrictions involved in analysing quantitative data, a

comprehensive list of categories was formulated, so that as much evidence as possible would be identifiable.

As only one category was recorded for each variable in the unit of analysis, a lot of the topics that appeared regularly, but did not take up a long time, did not feature prominently in the final results. These included themes like the Serbs expanding the war into neighbouring countries, the KLA being undefeated in the ground war, collateral damage, and how Milosevic's policies had affected the Serbian economy. Although this means the analysis of the conferences is not comprehensive, it was thought that the main features of the Nato and New Labour framing of the conflict would still become apparent from the results.

Also, when more than one category appeared in an article, it was sometimes difficult to choose which should be included, and this was particularly true for the historical references variable. It was decided that the first one mentioned should be included, unless another became much more salient later. Furthermore, some historical references were left out if their allusion was too vague, or if they were references to places where wars had taken place, but there was no reference to the wars that took place; Bosnia was the most common example of this.

3.2.1.2. The House of Commons information

Having analysed the information from the Nato politicians and military, a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Kosovo debates in the House of Commons was then undertaken. Transcripts from the oral questions and debates on Kosovo were available on Hansard from fourteen dates: March 23rd, 24th, 25th, 29th and 31st; April 13th, 19th and 20th; May 10th, 12th, 18th and 26th; and June 8th and 9th. On March 23rd there were twenty-two speakers coded; on March 24th there were twenty-five; on

March 25th there were twenty-five; on March 29th there were twenty-one; on March 31st there were nineteen; on April 13th there were twenty-four; on April 19th there were forty-eight; on April 20th there were seven; on May 10th there were five; on May 12th there were six; on May 18th there were eight; on May 26th there were twenty-three; on June 8th there were twenty-one, and on June 9th there were twenty. This meant a total of 274 political speakers were coded. The speakers were coded into five categories for the quantitative analysis: Positive for the Nato campaign; Positive-Questioning for the Nato campaign; Questioning; Negative-Questioning for the Nato campaign; and Negative for the Nato campaign.

3.2.1.3. The quantitative media analysis

3.2.1.3.1. The sample

Guardian

The *Guardian* started life as the *Manchester Guardian*. The paper was developed by the editorship of C.P. Scott, which started in 1872. Scott also became the principal proprietor in 1907, and remained editor for over fifty-seven years, until 1929. Scott believed that whatever interpretation was made of a story, the facts were sacred, and should be stated as plainly as possible. After Scott's death, the family put the whole of the ordinary shareholding into the *Scott Trust* in 1936, and the Trust remains the holder of all ordinary shares. Increased national standing led to the newspaper being renamed *The Guardian* in 1959, and in 1976 the newspaper relocated its headquarters to London. In 1993 the Group reconstituted itself as *Guardian Media Group plc* and also purchased the *Observer*.²⁹² In line with the wishes of C.P. Scott, all profits are ploughed back into the company, and Simon Jenkins considers that no other paper has gone to such lengths to ensure that its editorial columns remain loyal to the wishes of

²⁹² *Guardian media Group history*., <http://www.gmgplc.co.uk/gmg/history/>, February, 2002.

its original proprietor, and does not think anyone with right-wing views would be appointed to the Trust.²⁹³ Hetherington believes the Scott Trust is worth attention in terms of its journalistic philosophy, because it ‘provides a greater guarantee of editorial freedom than any other and because it aims to maintain journalism with a high standard of accuracy and impartiality, as well as an open-minded approach.’²⁹⁴

The Times

In the early to mid 1800s, *The Times* was the principal paper in terms of circulation and influence, and changed its policy on substantial issues from year to year as its editors sought to identify the needs of their readers. Anthony Smith considers *The Times* ‘wanted to lead and instruct its readers but never stand too far ahead of them or too far behind them...’²⁹⁵ Ken Ward wrote that *The Times* sold four times as many copies as its main rivals together in 1850, as a result of an astute commercial policy and editorial flair, and this gave the paper the confidence to challenge statesmen; for example, it crusaded over the terrible conditions the British military had to suffer in the Crimean War, and this led to improved treatment for the soldiers. However, *The Times*’ reputation and popularity fell later in the century, until it was bought and had its fortunes revived by Lord Northcliffe in 1908.²⁹⁶

Although *The Times* remained popular through the twentieth century, Hetherington considers it has also made some important mistakes, such as supporting the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s,²⁹⁷ and keeping silent about Eden’s Suez

²⁹³ S. Jenkins, *The Market for Glory*, (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 212-13.

²⁹⁴ A. Hetherington., *News, Newspapers and Television*, (London: MacMillan, 1985), p. 24-6.

²⁹⁵ A. Smith., *The Politics of Information: Problems of Policy in Modern Media*, (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1978), p. 147-8.

²⁹⁶ K. Ward., *Mass Communications and the Modern World*, (Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 41-2.

²⁹⁷ A. Hetherington., *op.cit*, p. 24.

preparations despite knowing more than any other news channel.²⁹⁸ However, the *BBC* still considered *The Times* the most reliable newspaper for attaining relevant news when Schlesinger conducted an ethnographic study there in the 1970s,²⁹⁹ and Tunstall wrote that with political columnists such as Lord (William) Rees-Mogg, Simon Jenkins, Peter Riddell and Matthew Parris *The Times* have the best of the British papers.³⁰⁰

Rupert Murdoch, an Australian with American citizenship, bought *The Times* in 1981, and changed its content and style, although he said he would not interfere with the editor on news and opinion.³⁰¹ Jeremy Paxman believes Murdoch's influence has meant *The Times* has dropped its elitist outlook and adopted the techniques of other papers, and this has meant it is not seen as the establishment paper in Britain anymore.³⁰² McNair also believes *The Times* has changed, and Murdoch has included a wide range of viewpoints in the (*Sunday*) *Times* because he knows his youngish, affluent, educated readership would not respond to being patronised from the right alone.³⁰³

Financial Times

The Financial Times Group is one of the world's leading business information companies, and they describe their objective as providing a broad range of business information, analysis and services to an audience of internationally minded business people. It is now printed in twenty-three countries, and Colin Sparks wrote that out of

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁹⁹ P. Schlesinger., *Putting 'reality' together: BBC news*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1987), p. 91.

³⁰⁰ J. Tunstall., *Newspaper Power*, *op.cit*, p. 282-5.

³⁰¹ J. Street., *op.cit*, p. 137.

³⁰² J. Paxman., *Friends in High Places*, (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 324-327.

³⁰³ B. McNair., *Sociology of journalism*, *op.cit*, p. 110.

the *FT*'s 312,723 circulation in the first half of 1997, only 200,000 were sold in the UK.³⁰⁴

The *FT* was founded in 1888, and was printed on its trademark pink paper for the first time in 1893. In 1957 it was taken over by *Pearson*, a company specialising in education; in 1979 its European edition was launched from Frankfurt, and in 1997 the US edition was launched from New York. Richard Lambert was editor during the Kosovo Conflict, but Andrew Gowers took over in 2001.³⁰⁵

Anthony Sampson considers the *FT*, *Economist* and *International Herald Tribune* to be exceptions to the decline in serious foreign news in international broadsheets, although they are primarily business papers; while Tunstall argues the *FT* took over from *The Times* as Britain's leading prestige newspaper in the mid 1970s.³⁰⁶ In the 1992 and 1997 general elections the *FT* supported the Labour party.

The Independent and Independent on Sunday

On their web-site, the *Independent* described themselves thus: '*Independent Newspapers* is a division of *Independent News and Media UK.*, part of a successful global media and communications group with a turnover of 1,341m Euros, which publishes more than 160 newspapers and magazines in five countries - the UK, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. *The Independent* was launched on 7 October, 1986, the first UK national quality newspaper for 131 years. *The Independent on Sunday* followed just over three years later in 1990. Our readership is an advertiser's dream: young, professional and educated adults with high incomes and a propensity to spend money.' *Simon Kelner, Editor-in-Chief, The*

³⁰⁴ C. Sparks., The Press, in J. Stokes., and A. Reading (eds), *The Media in Britain: Current Debates and Developments*, (Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, 1999), pp. 41-60, p. 44.

³⁰⁵ <http://www.pearson.com/about/ft/business.htm>, 22/07/04.

Independent/Independent on Sunday, wrote: ‘Our values remain identical to those of the paper when it launched in 1986: beholden to no one political party, economically and socially liberal.... We are now firmly persuaded, however, that our values unite naturally with the overall goal of at last making Britain, in the fullest sense, a key force in contemporary Europe.’³⁰⁷

When the *Independent* was launched in 1986, Tunstall thought their owners were aiming for a niche between *The Times* and *Daily Telegraph* on the political right and the *Guardian* on the left,³⁰⁸ although he described its political outlook as vaguely Conservative, but not supportive of Thatcher.³⁰⁹ Several journalists left *The Times* to go to the *Independent* at its launch, as they did not approve of Murdoch’s ownership, and hoped the *Independent* could take *The Times*’ place as Britain’s politically unattached newspaper-of-record.³¹⁰ At first, the paper was completely independent, but increasingly poor sales after a good start resulted in *Mirror Group Newspapers* and Ireland’s main press baron Tony O’Reilly acquiring forty-four per cent apiece of the paper; this was against determined opposition from its journalists.³¹¹ In 1998 O’Reilly took complete control, but *Editor in Chief* Simon Kelner insists they are still free from proprietorial control, and O’Reilly is proud the paper is not his political mouthpiece. During the Kosovo Conflict, Kim Fletcher was the editor of the *IoS*, or *Sindy* as it is often called; and as previously mentioned, was the only UK editor to

³⁰⁶ J. Tunstall., *Newspaper Power*, *op.cit.*, p. 340.

³⁰⁷ *Independent News and Media UK.*, 15 October, 2003, at: http://www.independent.co.uk/advertise/media_pack/story.jsp?story=116349

³⁰⁸ J. Tunstall., *op.cit.*, p. 53.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³¹¹ P. J. Humphreys., *Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 109-10.

take an anti-war stance. The *IoS* also took a similarly anti-war view for the Iraq war in 2003.³¹²

Telegraph

The *Daily Telegraph* was launched in 1855, and has been the upmarket leader since 1930. It was bought by Conrad Black, a Canadian, in the 1980s, and he was still the owner during the Kosovo Conflict in 1999. Tunstall explained that being the market leader allows the paper to charge premium advertising rates, and that is why the paper was very profitable in the early 1990s.³¹³ Michael Leapman explained its sales strategy thus: 'The *Telegraph* maintains its position as Britain's largest-selling broadsheet newspaper by aiming down-market of *The Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Independent*. It sells more than twice as many copies as any of them. No other paper competes in its precise market segment. That is true of only two other national papers, the *Financial Times* and *Today*;³¹⁴ *Today* later went out of business. However, *The Times* has since been eroding the *Telegraph*'s circulation lead, through price cutting and aiming for a more populist market.

The *Telegraph* web-site was known as the *Electronic Telegraph* during the Kosovo Conflict, before it later changed its name to *telegraph.co.uk*. The *Electronic Telegraph* was launched in 1994, and was the first major newspaper web-site. It won three consecutive 'Best newspaper on the world wide web' awards (1997, 1998 and 1999). *Hollinger Telegraph New Media Limited* was created in 1999, and is now the

³¹² Media Lens., *No Mea Culpa from the British Media, part 2: The Independent on Sunday - Guardian of Power*, 7th September, 2004, at http://www.medialens.org/alerts/2004/040907_No_Mea_Culpa_2.HTM

³¹³ J. Tunstall., *Newspaper Power*, *op.cit*, p. 16-17.

³¹⁴ M. Leapman., *op.cit*, p. 176.

holding company for *Telegraph Group Limited*'s online and digital activity in the UK and Europe.³¹⁵

New York Times and Sunday New York Times

The *NYT* was first published in 1851, and the New York Times Company now owns nineteen papers besides the main paper.³¹⁶ It is now owned by the Sulzberger family, rather than by a big organisation,³¹⁷ and Benjamin Page believes this will make it more likely the paper's contents will follow a narrow debate influenced by the views of its owners. Page considers the *NYT* is such a prestigious and authoritative publication that its opinions not only influence its readers, which include foreign-policy decision makers, experts and other media editors, but also trickles down through other sources to an even bigger mass audience than its sales show.³¹⁸ Lance Bennett also considers the *NYT* 'continues to set the tone and provide much of the content cues for the nation's other mass media outlets.'³¹⁹ Bennett explained the *NYT* and the *Washington Post* have reputations as critical, liberal papers that are not afraid of exposing government deception, but both heavily rely on official sources.³²⁰

Entman and Page wrote they used the *NYT* and *Washington Post* in their study of the first Gulf War because the papers have 'large foreign news staffs, high prestige and sophistication, and a proven record of willingness to take on the government.'

Moreover, they were also the most likely 'to be particularly scrupulous in reporting the many criticisms of administration policy that were voiced during the periods

³¹⁵ www.telegraph.co.uk, 21/01/04.

³¹⁶ M. Schudson., *op.cit*, p. 121.

³¹⁷ B.I. Page., *Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 110-11.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³¹⁹ W. L. Bennett., The News About Foreign Policy, in W. L. Bennett and D.L. Paletz., *Taken by Storm*, *op.cit*, pp. 12-40, p. 18. Jonathan Mermin also wrote of the *NYT*'s influence in *Debating War and Peace*, *op.cit*, p. 12-13.

³²⁰ W. Lance Bennett., *News: The Politics of Illusion* (5th edition), *op.cit*, p. 124-5.

analysed.’³²¹ The *NYT* was often at the centre of controversy during the Kennedy period, when tensions over Vietnam reporting first began to flare,³²² and in 1971 it led the way in publishing the classified history of the Vietnam War in what were known as the Pentagon Papers, which led to a ‘major constitutional confrontation.’³²³

Although Hallin was critical of the *NYT* coverage of the Vietnam War, he thought it was the best of American journalism,³²⁴ and that coverage of Vietnam in a ‘liberal prestige paper’ like the *NYT* was very different from coverage in a conservative paper like the *Chicago Tribune* or the *San Diego Union*.³²⁵ The *NYT* therefore seems like a good source for comparison with the British media.

3.2.1.3.2. The Media Coding Scheme

The media coding scheme was designed to provide a detailed account of how the British media covered the Kosovo Conflict; with comparisons to be made between different British media sources, and with the *NYT*. The coding scheme was influenced by several others that have used content analysis in their studies, such as the *GUMG*’s hegemonic analysis of the British media’s reporting of the Falklands War in *War and Peace News*, Gadi Wolfsfeld’s frame analysis of the media coverage of the Gulf War and Intifada in *The Media and Political Conflict*, and Eilders and Luter’s frame analysis of German newspapers’ coverage of the Kosovo Conflict. The coding scheme for this study consisted of the variables previously discussed in the theory section, after the case number and date. Lines and articles were also counted for their total and monthly amounts, and sources were counted in separate categories of domestic or international, and positive, neutral or negative. As in the official

³²¹ R. M. Entman., and B. I. Page., *The News Before the Storm*, in W. L. Bennett and D.L. Paletz, *op.cit*, pp. 82-101, p. 84.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³²³ D. Hallin., *Uncensored War*, *op.cit*, p.6.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

sources analysis, there could only be one category chosen for each variable from each unit of analysis, and so the first category was included unless another became much more salient in the article. There now follows a brief description of the variables, and some of the difficulties encountered in the coding.

Main People and evaluation

The main people and evaluation variables should show us who the media focused their coverage on, and what their opinions of them were. At times, a reference was kept out of its most obvious category, as it would have gone against the reasons for the categories inclusion if it was included, and would then have meant the results and interpretations misrepresented the actual media coverage. For example, when ethnic-Albanians from outside Kosovo were featured, they were included in the ethnic-Albanians category if they sympathised with the KLA, and Nato campaign, but were put as *others* if they distanced themselves from the KLA and Nato campaign.

Similarly, the *Serb civilians* category was meant to be for Serbs who were seen positively, as a comparison with the ethnic-Albanian civilians who were almost always framed positively, but some articles went against that. Examples included when Slobodan Milosevic's son Marko was featured, or when a Serb journalist who was a victim of the Serb authorities rather than Nato bombs was the main person featured. In these cases, judgements on whether to count them as Serb civilians was made on whether they were at all relevant to the Serbs being victims of Nato.

Moreover, the arrest of a humanitarian worker, and the use of other humanitarian workers as sources concerning this case, showed that events like this can also influence the data in a manner that was not foreseen when setting up the coding system. It was thought that humanitarian workers would be the sources in stories on

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.11.

refugees, as they were most of the time, but sometimes they were also featured in other stories. Again, decisions were made on whether to count them as *humanitarian workers*, or *others*, in line with their relevance to the reason why the *humanitarian workers* category was included in the analysis. There were also several cases when official sources' quotes were recalled by journalists in articles, but they were only cited to be criticised, and so were not included as references, as it might have made it look as if there were more positive sources than there were. The decision on the article's evaluation of the people or organisation featured was interpretative, and based primarily on the general content of the article, rather than an interpretation of the writers' opinion; if there was no clear evaluation the article was coded as neutral.

Main Source

The main source variable was included because this will answer one of the most important questions of this study: where did the media attain their news information; did they get most of their information from Nato elite sources, or from a variety of sources? When politicians or personalities wrote articles they were categorised under their usual position descriptions, rather than as journalists or writers. If information for the article was taken from another media source, the media source was included as the main source, unless there was a lot of coverage given to another source. Nato employees, such as Michael Jackson and Wesley Clark, were counted as Nato sources rather than British military or American military, and as international rather than domestic. When the location of journalists was not given, they were included as in the UK, unless it was obvious from the text that they were somewhere else.

Diagnosis and Prognosis

The diagnosis and prognosis variables will allow us to see how the media

professionals framed and discussed the Nato campaign as it started and progressed, and what they or their sources thought were the best solutions to Nato's difficulties. It was thought that most previous studies had limited the diagnosis variable too much to the causes of the conflict, and this had led them to find there were more prognoses in the media, in line with the hegemonic model. It was thought that having diagnoses that were relevant throughout the conflict would bring a more balanced view, as the media was not likely to discuss the causes of the conflict or Nato campaign much after the first few days. The variables will also show whether the media were positive or negative towards the Nato campaign in their events coverage and opinions.

Sometimes it was difficult to choose whether to go with what the source was saying or what the journalists' views seemed to be. The issue of ground troops was the best example of this, with the papers often seeming to push for ground troops, but with their articles featuring sources that denied ground troops would be used; as with other categories, each article was interpreted individually on the dominant impression it gave. In the last few days of the Nato campaign, the media sources started to talk about the ground troops that were going in to oversee the peace. Although this was a different context to ground troops going to war, which was what the *Send in ground troops* prognosis category was supposed to identify, they were coded as this category because there was still a possibility that the soldiers would face hostility when they entered Kosovo. However, this factor was taken into consideration when the prognoses data was being analysed.

Although it was usually to be presumed that the newspapers held Milosevic and the Serbs responsible for the refugee situation, if the article did not name them, it was not coded as a diagnosis of *Refugees are Serbs' fault* or *Refugees are Milosevic's fault*. If

the articles were blaming the Serbs for the refugee situation, and Milosevic was mentioned, it was coded as the latter of the two categories above, while if he was not named it was coded as the former.

The *Diplomacy* prognosis category was included as a negative for Nato in the results chapter comparative analyses, as for most of the campaign it would have meant Nato compromising beyond their five key demands, which was not acceptable to Blair and New Labour. However, ideally the category should have been divided into positive, neutral and negative for Nato at the start of the analysis, to avoid relying on a generality.

Format

The operational definition of the episodic format was the latest news, or the latest episode of a recurring issue, while the article was coded as thematic when there was historical context, discussion of an issue, preview of an event, or opinion on the future of the war. There were often difficulties in deciding whether an article was episodic or thematic, and an example of why episodic and thematic can be difficult to define is how articles on the ethnic-Albanian refugees seemed episodic, as they were featured regularly, but similar articles with Serb civilians seemed more thematic, because they did not feature as regularly. Moreover, as some media analysts have previously observed, there are often elements of both categories in an article. An example of this is an article that featured a latest development, but then featured more in-depth analysis of the conflict, and what it meant for the future. The choice was usually made by deciding which category was featured more.

Historical references

It was thought important to include an historical reference variable, because the media's use of historical references can show us how the media professionals envisaged the conflict, and then tried to explain it to the audience; as well as how much they followed the Nato leaders' presentations, and how biased they were in their use. With news content almost definitely influenced by ideology to some extent, the historical setting the journalists invoked for the conflict should provide us with evidence about their ideological thinking.

The coding of historical references was often complicated, but the splitting of the categories into positive, neutral and negative hopefully provided a thorough coding that prevented generalisation as much as possible. For example, after the Serb atrocities in Bosnia, and the Nato countries' peacekeeping role there, in a simple content analysis where there was only the category Bosnia, any reference to Bosnia might be presumed to be positive for Nato and negative for the Serbs. However, this was not always the case, and the thorough content analysis allows distinctions to be made between the different ways Bosnia was referenced. For example, the article might be negative for Nato because the journalist believed the Western countries had not intervened early enough in the Bosnian conflict, or the Bosnian reference might be positive towards the Serbs because the article was warning that Kosovo meant more to Milosevic and the Serbs than Bosnia did. Similarly, the Gulf War was a success for the Nato countries, but it could still be a negative historical reference for Nato, such as when journalists criticised depleted uranium being used in bombs in the Gulf War and Kosovo, or wrote that the Kosovo campaign was not working as efficiently as the Gulf operation had.

Some references were easily coded; for example, the conflict being described as the biggest in Europe since World War Two would be coded as *World War Two neutral*. However, other references were more vague, and decisions had to be made as to the relevance of the reference to the audience; for example, references to Churchill in an article about Nato would be coded as *Nato World War Two positive*, while references to Hitler in an article about Nato would be coded as *Nato World War Two negative*; this was because although Churchill and Hitler do not have any particular relevance to Nato today, their references invoke thoughts of the past which are positive and negative for most British and American people thinking about the Nato countries at war.

Images

Images were included with the article they were closest to, either in topic or position. The topic took precedence, but if there were two articles reporting news on the same topic as an image, the image was included in the coding sheet with the article it was positioned closest to. Although most photos reflected the articles they were with, some photographs that accompanied articles had little to do with them, or even opposed the message in the article; an example of this was a Nato meeting held to show resolve, accompanied by a photo of an anti-war demonstration.

It was thought the *Serb civilians* category would be included as a contrast to the *ethnic-Albanian civilians* category; as Serb images would be of them as victims of collateral damage, as ethnic-Albanian images would be of them suffering from the Serb ethnic cleansing. Although these generalities usually held true, there were some images that showed the people in other roles, such as when Serb civilians were demonstrating against their government. Judgements were made in these cases

whether to code the article in the *Serb civilians* category, or whether to code it as *others*. Like some other categories, these two categories could have been divided into positive and negative. It was for a similar reason that the General Nato military armoury category became the General Nato military armoury in a positive picture, as this factor was noticed in that category early enough; this was because early pictures of the Apache helicopter crash meant the original category would have had more cases than it should have done in respect to its reasons for inclusion: to see how patriotic and supportive of the Nato campaign the different newspapers were, through their use of positive Nato images.

Days coded and total units

For the daily newspapers and *Telegraph* web-site, the days for analysis were picked at random, at two or three day intervals, starting the day after that Nato campaign started, and ending the day after the campaign ended. The weekends were avoided. The coding unit was all relevant articles on Kosovo. The days coded were 25/03, 27/03, 30/03, 31/03, 03/04, 05/04, 07/04, 10/04, 12/04, 14/04, 16/04, 19/04, 21/04, 23/04, 26/04, 28/04, 30/04, 03/05, 05/05, 07/05, 10/05, 12/05, 14/05, 17/05, 19/05, 21/05, 24/05, 26/05, 28/05, 31/05, 03/06, 05/06, 08/06 and 11/06. From the above dates, the following amount of articles were coded: 442 in the *NYT*; 424 in *The Times*; 411 in the *Guardian*; 387 in the *Independent*; 221 in the *FT* and 219 in the *Telegraph*. That meant a total of 2104 daily media articles were coded. In the Sunday papers, beginning the Sunday before the Nato campaign started, and ending the Sunday after, 143 articles were coded in the *IoS* and 121 in the *SNYT*, making 264 in total. That meant that a total of 2368 articles were coded altogether.

Changes to the coding sheet for the NYT analysis

Having coded the British newspapers, it was apparent that some categories should be adjusted for the American media, as their focus would be on American politics and history. Also, having counted official British sources in the British newspapers, just on a positive and negative basis, it was thought that it would be a good idea to also count official domestic and international sources separately, and also include a neutral category with the positive and negative. This was done for the *NYT*, and then the UK sources were re-coded using this system.

Changes to the coding sheet for the Telegraph analysis

The *Telegraph* coding scheme was the same as for the British newspapers, except that two variables were left out because the *Telegraph* data being taken from the Internet meant they were not relevant. The first variable was images, because there were no images on the web-site when the analysis was undertaken; the second was position, as the articles did not seem to have any particular positional order, as was obviously the case with the newspapers.

Changes to the coding sheet for the Independent on Sunday and Sunday New York Times analyses

Having coded the previous media sources, some categories were added for the analyses of the *IoS* and *SNYT*, but the only one that really seemed to register in the final results, and alter the final interpretations, was splitting the *Damage from Nato* image category into positive and negative for Nato.

Omissions

Some material that included information on the Kosovo Conflict was left out of the analysis, as it was considered too insignificant to the objectives of the study. This

was material like letters, updates, timetables, single quotes outside articles and news in brief. Also, articles that focused almost exclusively on other subjects, but mentioned the conflict, were also left out.

Statistical analyses

Having coded the media sources, the data was then entered into SPSS, and frequency and cross-tabulation analyses were undertaken for each variable. For some analyses, SPSS was not needed, and the data was counted. From the resulting data, analytical tables were set up in *Microsoft Word* to compare the results of the different media sources, and those are featured in the results section.

3.3. Media content hypotheses and elite influence research question

Following the qualitative reading and data collecting, it was thought that the hegemonic model was the most relevant of the critical theories for this analysis, and hypotheses were therefore formulated in line with hegemonic theory; if the hypotheses are found to be confirmed by the results then it will suggest the media's coverage of the Kosovo Conflict was hegemonic. However, if the results are not in line with the hypotheses it will suggest the media coverage was more in line with the plural model than the hegemonic, and also the cascade model, with reference to recent developments in American theory. Another analysis was also undertaken to evaluate whether Alistair Campbell's re-organisation of the Nato media operation brought a more positive media coverage for Nato, and negative for the Serbs, in the second half of the Nato campaign. As this was not thought relevant to identifying hegemonic content in the British media coverage, it is featured as a separate research question after the nine hypotheses have been tested. The hypotheses and research question are listed below.

Hypothesis 1. Main People variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will follow the elite lead and focus the vast amount of their coverage on the Nato and Serb leadership and militaries, and the ethnic-Albanian refugees.

Hypothesis 2. Evaluation variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will give the Nato alliance members and allies a positive coverage the vast majority of the time, while depicting the Serb leadership and military negatively.

Hypothesis 3. Source variable.

In line with the hegemonic model, the media will use the British government and Nato military leaders as their sources the vast majority of the time, and there will be little use of sources that are critical of the Nato campaign.

Hypothesis 4. Positioning variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, the front pages will include good coverage for Nato and bad for the Serbs the vast majority of the time, while the vast majority of bad coverage for Nato will be in the inside pages.

Hypothesis 5. Diagnosis variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of the diagnoses will be supportive of the Nato campaign, and critical of the Serbs.

Hypothesis 6. Prognosis variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, the vast amount of prognoses will follow the Nato lead, and will not propose radical changes to the Nato strategy unless there is dissension among British politicians or the Nato countries' political and military elites.

Hypothesis 7. Format variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, the vast majority of media coverage of the Nato

campaign will be episodic rather than thematic.

Hypothesis 8. Historical references variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, the vast majority of historical references will be more positive for Nato than the Serbs.

Hypothesis 9. Images variable.

In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of images will be positive towards Nato and negative towards the Serbs.

Research question. Did the re-organisation of the Nato media operation near the end of the first half of the Nato campaign improve their media coverage in the second half of their campaign?

3.4. Qualitative Analysis

3.4.1. Discussion

Following conclusions being drawn on the quantitative content analysis results, a qualitative analysis was then undertaken for the discussion section. The main reason for this qualitative analysis was to identify whether the results from the quantitative analysis could be backed up with examples from the media coverage, in line with the principles of triangulation. This entailed looking back through notes taken during the coding of the media content for the quantitative analysis, and then going back to the media sources again to follow up initial observations. If sufficient evidence was available to identify a pattern in the coverage, and formulate an argument for discussion, then the relevant information was collected for possible inclusion. The various data collected was then edited for the final version of the discussion section.

3.4.2. Interviews

Following the quantitative and qualitative content analyses, twenty letters requesting

interviews were sent out to journalists involved in the reporting of the Kosovo Conflict for the UK media sources analysed in this study. Eight agreed to be interviewed, and they were then interviewed by telephone, with the interviews lasting from twenty to forty-five minutes. The interviews followed the semi-structured format, as described by Arksey and Knight: 'Semi-structured interviews are perhaps the commonest and most diverse of the three [interview] formats. They fall between the structured and unstructured format, but are more similar to the latter in the sense that they too generate qualitative data. The approach adopted is far less formal than that employed in a structured interview. Having said that, the interviewer does have a specific agenda to follow and will have selected beforehand the relevant topic areas and themes to pursue.'³²⁶

The journalists interviewed held different positions during the Kosovo Conflict; two were present at the Nato conferences; two were in the House of Commons; two were defence and diplomatic editors; one was a columnist, and one was a news reporter. Therefore, questions that were relevant to some journalists were not as relevant to others, and so the questions were adapted to each journalist's main interests, depending on their role during the Kosovo conflict. The interviews were recorded by hand, so the longer quotes are paraphrased, while the shorter sound-bites are verbatim. Following the transcription of the interviews, they were shown to the interviewees, who were asked if they had an objection to any of the material being used. The approved information was then manually cut and pasted into the different categories evident in chapter six; the material narrowed down for inclusion, and typed into the final draft contained in this thesis.

³²⁶ H. Arksey., and P. Knight., *Interviewing for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource with Examples*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1999), p. 7.

4. Results

4.1. The Nato and MoD conferences, and Government information results.

4.1.1. Diagnosis

Including all the sources analysed together, most of the diagnoses focused on the Nato campaign being Milosevic's fault, although the refugees being Milosevic's fault had only one less reference. The former was the main diagnosis in twenty-five, or 32.9%, of the units analysed, while the latter was the main focus of twenty four, or 31.6%. The Nato campaign is working, and the refugees are the Serbs' fault, were other diagnoses that featured quite frequently, and the only other diagnosis that featured was *Nato campaign is Serbs' fault*. The results are presented in the table below.

Diagnosis	Frequency	Percentage
Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault	25	32.9
Refugees are Milosevic's fault	24	31.6
Nato campaign is working	13	17.1
Refugees are Serbs' fault	12	15.8
Nato campaign is Serbs' fault	2	2.6
Total	76	100

Table 4.1. Diagnoses used by official sources.

From these results, it seems clear the conflict was framed as a Nato campaign undertaken because Milosevic's offensive had caused a humanitarian crisis, and his failure to negotiate a peace deal had left them with no choice. At times, Milosevic was not blamed directly, and the fault for the refugee crisis and Nato campaign were apportioned to the Serbs collectively. Stressing the air campaign was working took precedence sometimes, and this seemed to be used both as a form of self-congratulation in times of success, and a rallying call in times of frustration.

Collateral damage and the ground war did not feature enough to register in the final results, although having looked at the sources qualitatively, blame was usually apportioned to Milosevic and the Serbs, as they were blamed for all the problems in

the Balkans, and not negotiating a peace deal in the months before the Nato campaign. Nato also explained collateral damage through accusing the Serbs of using ethnic-Albanians as human shields a few times.

When the data was split up into the different official sources, and a cross-tabulation analysis undertaken, the results showed about twice as many Government politicians outside the MoD conferences used their platforms to blame Milosevic for making Nato launch its air campaign as the Nato conferences did. The Nato conferences did not spend much time apportioning blame for the Nato campaign in their diagnoses, although when they did, they did blame it on Milosevic. The MoD conferences focused even less than the Nato conferences on blaming Milosevic for the Nato campaign in their diagnoses, and the MoD was the only one to put blame on the Serbs collectively. At their conferences, the MoD presentations spent more time blaming Milosevic for the refugee situation, with about twice as many of their conferences offering this diagnosis than the Nato conferences. Government spokespeople outside the conferences were also much more likely to spend time apportioning blame for the refugees on Milosevic than the Nato conferences' political presentations, although it had only one more reference than the full Nato conferences. The Nato conferences were split between blaming the refugees more on Milosevic individually, and the Serbs collectively. The MoD conferences spent more time detailing the achievements of the Nato campaign than the other sources, and stressing that it was working. Government politicians outside the conferences spent much less time proclaiming the campaign to be working, while the Nato conferences had an average amount of references for this category. These results are presented in the table below.

Source	Refugees are Serbs' fault	Refugees are Milosevic's fault	Nato campaign is Serbs' fault	Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault	Nato campaign is working
Full Nato conference	5	5		5	4
MoD political presentations		9	2	3	5
New Labour politicians		6		11	2
Nato conference political only	7	4		6	2

Table 4.2. Individual official sources' use of diagnoses

4.1.2. Prognosis

The prognosis analysis shows clearly how the conferences consistently kept to the same objectives, stressing that Milosevic would have to give in to their demands, that they would continue the air campaign until he did, and that they were doing their best to provide as much humanitarian aid to the refugees as possible. As only one of these themes could be included from each unit they are spread out in the results, but they were usually included together, and were pivotal to the presentations. Continuation of the air campaign was the most stressed feature of half the prognoses, and the three categories together account for over ninety per cent of the prognoses. Bringing war criminals to justice was the only other prognosis that became the main focus more than once. These results are presented in the table below.

Prognosis	Frequency	Percentage
Continue the air campaign	38	50
More humanitarian aid	21	27.6
Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands	10	13.2
War criminals must be brought to justice	3	3.9
Others	4	5.2
Total	76	100

Table 4.3. Prognoses used by official sources.

Government politicians were again more likely to focus on Milosevic in their prognoses, with more than twice as many stressing that Milosevic must give in to their demands as either the Nato or MoD conferences did. The MoD and Government politicians also focused more on bringing Serb war criminals to justice, while the Nato conferences concentrated more on their humanitarian aid operations, and the needs of the refugees. This aspect of the MoD conferences may have been contained more in their military information though, which was not always available. This data is shown in the table below.

Source	Continue the air campaign	More aid	Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands	War Criminals must be brought to justice	Others
Full Nato	12	6	1		
MoD political	10	4	2	2	1
New Labour	10	1	5	1	2
Nato political	6	10	2		1

Table 4.4. Individual official sources' use of prognoses.

4.1.3. Historical references

The historical references analysis shows there were historical references in just under half of the units analysed, with twenty-six historical references in the fifty-seven units; the Nato conferences were counted as one source in this regard. The conflict was mostly framed as a return to the dark days of World War Two, with fourteen references. Most references to World War Two were quite vague, and seemed to refer to a cross between the policies of Hitler and Stalin, with forced deportations the main parallel between the past and the present. The second most cited conflict was the Bosnian war, with eight references, while the Serb-Croat war had one. The Bosnian war was also usually blamed on Milosevic, and was often used together with a World War Two reference. Milosevic was also compared to Pol Pot, who was formerly the genocidal leader of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, while there were a couple of

references to the darkest events of the twentieth century in general. These results are shown in the table below.

Historical references	Frequency
World War Two	14
Bosnian War	8
Serb-Croat War	1
Cambodia	1
Others	2
Total historical references	26
Total units analysed	57

Table 4.5. Historical references used by official sources.

Examination of the sources and historical references breakdown shows that it was the Government politicians outside the MoD conferences that made the World War Two reference the most prominent, with ten of the fourteen citations. The MoD also used it most prominently three times, while Nato only used it once. Nato preferred to draw parallels with the earlier wars in the Balkans, referring to the Serbs' wars in Bosnia most saliently five times, while the MoD and New Labour used it twice and once respectively. These results are shown below.

Source	World War Two	Serb-Croat War	Bosnian War	Cambodia	Others
Full Nato	1		5		
MoD political	3	1	2	1	1
New Labour	10		1		1

Table 4.6. Individual official sources' use of historical references.

4.1.4. Most featured people

The collective Nato military were the most featured people, with the ethnic-Albanian civilians second. Between them they had almost sixty per cent of the main coverage, and this reflects how they dominated the Nato agenda, through the spokespeople's updates on the Nato air campaign, humanitarian aid, and the refugee situation. They were often combined with criticisms of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serb military,

who were easily the third most referenced main people if counted together. When diplomacy or arrangements for humanitarian aid were prominent, politicians and diplomats often became the main people featured. The media featured as the main people in all the sources apart from the full Nato conferences. This was because the Serb media was criticised as propagandistic, and the sources spoke of their efforts to get ‘free’ information to the people in Yugoslavia. There were a couple of minor references to reports in the Western media, but they were not long enough to register in the quantitative analysis. These results are shown in the table below.

Main People	Frequency	Percentage
Collective Nato military	29	38.2
Ethnic-Albanian civilians	16	21.1
Serb military	9	11.8
Other politicians and diplomats	5	6.6
Slobodan Milosevic	4	5.3
British military	3	3.9
Nato hierarchy	3	3.9
The media	3	3.9
British government	2	2.6
Russians negative	1	1.3
Other Serb politicians	1	1.3
Total	76	100

Table 4.7. Main People cited by official sources.

There were not many surprises in the individual analyses, with the Nato conferences concentrating most of their presentations on the collective Nato military. This was also true of the MoD, but they also focused on the British contribution most a couple of times. Government sources from outside the conferences spent a little less time on military matters, and were the only ones to spend the most time focusing on the British government. Nato concentrated much more on the ethnic-Albanian civilians than the Serb military, while the MoD did the opposite, concentrating much more on the Serb military than the ethnic-Albanians. Government sources from outside the conferences were the only ones to concentrate more on Slobodan Milosevic than the

Serb military or ethnic-Albanians, focusing twice as much on Milosevic as the ethnic-Albanians, and four times as much on Milosevic as the Serb military. However, this is not to say that they were unconcerned with the refugee situation, as the usual reason for referring to Milosevic was to warn about the refugee situation and its consequences. The main categories mentioned above are shown below, with other categories left out due to limited space.

Source	Brit govt	Brit military	Nato hierarchy	Nato military	Milosevic	Serb military	Ethnic- Albanians
Full Nato				12		1	5
MoD political		2	2	6		4	2
New Labour	2	1	1	5	4	1	2
Nato political				6		3	7

Table 4.8. Individual official sources' main people references.

4.1.5. Main topics

There was quite a wide range of main topics cited, but the Nato military attacks and Nato helping the humanitarian situation were the most prominent, with fifty per cent of the time spent on them. War crimes by the Serbs had the third highest amount of coverage, followed by diplomacy, the refugee situation and the media. The refugee figures are perhaps lower than they should be because they were usually featured alongside the Nato humanitarian operation, which usually took up a longer time, as details of their past, present and future operations were released to the media. As previously mentioned, the talk about the media was mainly about the Serb media and the battle to get Nato information into the conflict area. The results are shown in the table below.

Topic	Frequency	Percentage
Nato military attacks	22	28.9
Nato helping the humanitarian situation	16	21.1
War crimes by Serbs	13	17.1
Diplomacy	7	9.2
The media	5	6.6
Amount of refugees	3	3.9
British soldiers' humanitarian work	2	2.6
Personal stories of the refugees	2	2.6
Unity of Nato	2	2.6
Others	4	5.2
Total	76	100

Table 4.9. Main topics presented by official sources.

When separated into individual sources, the results show Nato concentrated much more on the humanitarian situation than the Government and MoD, while the Government and MoD focused more on diplomacy than Nato. The main results are featured in the table below.

Source	Nato helping the humanitarian situation	Nato military attacks in general	War crimes by Serbs	Diplomacy	Others
Full Nato	7	8	1	1	2
MoD	1	5	4	3	6
New Labour	1	5	4	3	6
Nato political only	7	4	4	0	4

Table 4.10. Individual sources' main topics.

4.1.6. Conclusion

The results show the biggest difference in the framing of the conflict by the Nato official sources was between the Government politicians and the Nato spokespeople, with the MoD somewhere in between. The Government seemed to personalise the conflict around Milosevic, who had to be defeated and seen to be defeated, while the Nato conferences were more inclined to emphasise the Serb military collectively. New Labour politicians also set the conflict in a World War Two frame more than the

other sources, and combined references to World War Two with making Milosevic the most prominent person of the speech, article or interview. In contrast, Nato used the Bosnian war as a historical reference more, and unlike the references used by the Government, qualitative analysis shows they were used more for discussing practical issues involving Nato forces than for drawing historical parallels. The Government also combined references to Serb war crimes with Milosevic, while the Nato conference was more inclined to refer to the Serb military when talking about war crimes.

4.2. House of Commons debates and summary of media coverage

4.2.1. Introduction

The results in this section have been formulated from a quantitative analysis of the speakers in the House of Commons oral questions and debates on Kosovo, beginning just before the start of the Nato campaign, and ending just before its conclusion.³²⁷

The debates were usually started and led by a member of government, and these government representatives therefore had much more opportunity to speak than any of the other contributors; on 23/03 this was Tony Blair; on 24/03 John Prescott; on 25/03 Robin Cook; on 29/03 Tony Blair; on 31/03 Clare Short; on 13/04 Blair; on 19/04 Cook; on 20/04 Cook; on 10/05 George Robertson; on 12/05 Short; on 18/05 Cook; on 26/05 Robertson; on 08/06 Blair, and on 09/06 Robertson.

The fact that the debates were led by a Labour representative meant that although the number of speakers might have been more negative towards the Nato campaign than positive on some occasions, the amount of spoken time was almost always likely to be more positive towards the Nato campaign than negative. This is shown in the first

³²⁷ House of Commons' Kosovo debates taken from: <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd.htm>

debate of 23/03, which was led by Blair: Although there were four negative speakers to three positive for the Nato campaign, the amount of time they were speaking for, measured in lines of dialogue on the Hansard web-site, were 192 positive (of which 182 were Blair) to 31 negative; so this is over six times the amount of time for positive dialogue for the Nato campaign to negative. There was also a front-bench consensus in support of the Nato campaign for almost all the conflict, with most of the negative speakers on the back-benches.

4.2.2. Results of the quantitative analysis of the House of Commons debates

The results of the quantitative counting of whether each speaker was positive or negative, which included the above leader of the debate as one speaker, show that the majority of the debates were more positive towards the Nato campaign than negative. There were seventy-four positive to fifty-seven negative speakers, and one-hundred and nineteen positive and positive questioning to eighty-two negative and negative questioning. The anomalies in having more negative than positive speakers were the debates on 23/03, 25/03, 13/04 and 19/04. The days that had more negative and negative questioning than positive and positive questioning were 25/03, 19/04 and 18/05. There were also several days when there was the same amount of positivity and negativity towards the Nato campaign. The data from the debates is presented in the table below, and a summary of the media coverage follows.

Date	Positive	Positive-Questioning	Questioning	Negative-Questioning	Negative
23/03	3	6	7	2	4
24/03	13	5	2	0	5
25/03	6	3	3	3	10
29/03	10	3	1	4	3
31/03	6	8	1	0	4
13/04	6	8	2	0	8
19/04	9	5	15	2	17
20/04	1	0	5	1	0
10/05	1	0	3	0	1
12/05	1	0	4	0	1
18/05	1	0	2	4	1
26/05	6	1	9	5	2
08/06	5	2	10	3	1
09/06	6	4	9	1	0
Total	74	45	73	25	57

Table 4.11. Quantitative results of the House of Commons debates.

4.2.3. The media coverage of the House of Commons debates, and the debates' influence on the media coverage

Headlines, articles and editorials were checked in the daily media sources analysed in this study, to see if they corresponded to the amount of positive and negative House of Commons speakers in the debates, but no pattern was found. The only time when the debates looked like they would significantly influence the media coverage was when Conservative foreign affairs spokesperson, Michael Howard, questioned the competence of Nato, and the logic of their strategy, thus threatening to undo the front-bench consensus, after Nato bombed the Chinese embassy in early May. This caused a flurry of interest in some of the papers, and especially *The Times*, but when unity was restored again a day later the media interest waned. The media increasing their interest in the House of Commons when there was front-bench criticism could be interpreted as being supportive of indexing, but the time period was too short to provide a conclusive analysis.

As there was little front-bench criticism of the Nato campaign, or evidence of the political debates influencing the media coverage, indexing theory was not found to be relevant for examining or explaining the British political-media relationship during the Kosovo conflict. However, the lack of prominent political support for ground troops did seem to quieten the media's calls for that policy; until Blair and New Labour started to hint at the possibility they would be introduced after all, in the middle of the campaign. However, Entman does account for that in his cascade critique of indexing, and as it was the politicians changing their policy, the only real u-turn on an issue the government and media disagreed on at the start of the conflict was made by the government.

In contrast to expectations under the propaganda model, the Commons debates were featured most prominently in the media when there was a rift in the Commons, rather than when the debates were largely supportive, and this suggests the reporting was focused on the news values of getting a story rather than acting as a cheerleader for the government. This was especially true when *The Times* and *Telegraph* sensed the opposition were about to end the front-bench consensus in the aforementioned early May rebellion.

4.3. Results of the media analysis

This section contains the results from the quantitative analysis of the media coverage.

Where categories are written in the same way as they were in the analysis, they are put in italics, but if they are changed in any way they are left in the normal font.

Although the *NYT* is included in the analysis, its main relevance is as a comparison to the British media sources, and the hypotheses refer only to the British sources. Points are given for some of the tables in the analysis, with the media source that seems the most hegemonic getting the highest amount of points, and the least hegemonic the lowest amount of points. The points are counted together at the end of each hypothesis evaluation, and evaluation points are given. The evaluation points are counted up at the end of the daily media section, and they should provide a quick reference for the evaluation of which media sources were found to be the most hegemonic in their coverage of the Nato campaign.

4.3.1. Hypothesis 1. In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will follow the elite lead and focus the vast amount of their coverage on the Nato and Serb leadership and militaries, and the ethnic-Albanian refugees.

This first section of the media analysis addresses the issue of who the media focused their coverage on. According to hegemonic theory, the media will follow Nato's framing of their campaign, and this revolved around Nato conducting a humanitarian intervention to save the ethnic-Albanian civilians from the Serb military and leadership. Therefore, for the hypothesis to be confirmed, the media coverage should be concentrated on the Nato leadership and military, the Serb leadership and military, and the ethnic-Albanian civilians.

The section starts by looking at the results from the individual categories as they appeared in three frequency and cross-tabulation analyses: *Main People*; *Source and Main People*, and *Position and Main People*. Then the individual categories are joined together into groups of similar categories for a further two analyses: the first looks at whether the Nato countries' political and military leaders dominated the media coverage; and the second compares the coverage of the ethnic-Albanians and the Serbs. A conclusion on whether the hypothesis was supported by the results then follows.

4.3.1.1. Individual categories

4.3.1.1.1. The Main People analysis results

The most referenced category in the *Main People* variable was *Nato military at war* in all the media sources except the *FT*, which had *Nato hierarchy* as its highest reference. The *FT* had *Nato military at war* as its second most referenced category, while the other five media sources had *ethnic-Albanian civilians*. The *FT* had *ethnic-Albanian civilians* as its third most referenced category; the *Guardian*, *Independent* and *Telegraph* had *Collective Nato hierarchy*; *The Times* had *Serb civilians* and the *NYT* had *Clinton and his administration*. The *FT* having *Nato hierarchy* as its most referenced category seems to highlight its different outlook from the other media sources, and this focus on the hierarchical aspects of the conflict was also evident in other results. *The Times* was the only paper to have *Serb civilians* in their top three references, and they were also the only paper to have more references for *Serb civilians* than a combination of *Milosevic* and the *Serb military*. The *NYT* was the only media source to have their government's leader in the top three most referenced categories.

In fourth and fifth positions, the *FT* had *European politicians* and *other Russian politicians*, and this seems to emphasise how the *FT* focused on international diplomacy. Highlighting the *Guardian's* concentration on the war in Kosovo, they had *Serb civilians* and *Milosevic* as their fourth and fifth highest references. *The Times* had *Blair* and *Nato hierarchy* as their fourth and fifth highest; this was the highest position for Blair in any of the media sources, and this seems to set the tone for *The Times'* other results, with the paper having a higher than average focus on the British contribution to the Nato campaign, and Blair's in particular. *The Independent* had *other Balkans countries* and *Serb military* as their fourth and fifth highest references, while the *Telegraph* had *other Balkans countries* and *Blair*. The *NYT* had *American military at war* and *Serb civilians* joint fourth. The *NYT* therefore had *American military at war* in a higher position than any of the British sources had *British military*, although it should be taken into consideration that there was a lot more American military than British military involved in the Nato campaign. The highest position the *British military* category appeared in any of the British media sources was seventh in *The Times*.

In the *writers themselves* (without sources) category of the *Source and Main people* cross-tabulation analysis, the same pattern emerged in the top position: while the *FT* writers focused on *Nato hierarchy*, all the other media sources' writers had *Nato military at war* as their top reference. The *FT* writers did have *Nato military at war* as their second highest reference, while the *The Times*, *Guardian* and *Independent* writers had *Nato hierarchy* as their second highest. The *Telegraph* writers had *Nato hierarchy* and *Milosevic* with the same amount of references as their second highest references; the high position for *Milosevic* suggests the *Telegraph* writers personalised the Serb campaign around *Milosevic* more than the other papers. The

NYT writers had *Clinton* as the second highest reference; *Milosevic* was third, and *Nato hierarchy* and *American military at war* had the same amount of references in fourth. The *NYT* writers' focus on their head of government, with *Clinton* having double the references of *Nato hierarchy*, again suggests the *NYT* focused on the domestic decision makers in the *Nato* campaign. This is in contrast to the UK writers' focus on the *Nato* hierarchy, and suggests a cultural difference in the two countries' media coverage of the leaders in the *Nato* campaign, although *Clinton* did have much more power over the *Nato* campaign than *Blair*. The writers did not feature *ethnic-Albanian civilians* as highly as the articles with sources did, and they seemed to write more about the military aspects of the *Nato* campaign. On the Serb coverage, the *Independent*, *FT*, *Telegraph* and *NYT* writers had more references for *Milosevic* than all the other Serbs counted together, while the *Guardian* writers had the same amount of references for *Milosevic* as all the other Serbs together. As with the overall analysis, only *The Times* writers had more references for the other Serbs than for *Milosevic*.

4.3.1.1.2. The Position and Main People analysis results

The *Position and Main people* analysis found *The Times*, *Independent* and *NYT* had *Collective Nato military at war* with the most top position references. *Collective Nato hierarchy* had the second highest amount of top position references in *The Times* and *NYT*, while *ethnic-Albanian civilians* had the second highest amount in the *Independent*. In the *NYT*, *Nato military at war* also had the highest amount of position two references, and was followed by *ethnic-Albanians civilians*; *Blair* had the highest amount of position two references in *The Times*, while *ethnic-Albanian civilians* and *Collective Nato hierarchy* had the most position two references in the *Independent*.

The *Guardian* and *FT* both featured *Nato hierarchy* in the top position the most. The *Guardian* had the category with about a third more top position references than *Collective Nato military at war*, which had the second highest amount of references; while the *FT* had it with over four times as many references as several categories that had the second highest amount of references. The *Guardian* and *FT* also both had *Collective Nato military at war* with the most position two references.

4.3.1.2. Collective categories

4.3.1.2.1. Elite representation

When all the British and American Government and Nato categories were included together, *The Times* was found to have featured them 49.9% of the time; the *NYT* 45.3%; the *Telegraph* 43.4%; the *Independent* 42.8%; the *Guardian* 42.7%, while the *FT* used them the least at 40.7%. British and American Government and Nato personnel therefore had between forty and fifty per cent of the media coverage in all the sources, which is quite a high percentage. Although there may have been some criticism of the above parties within that coverage, the focus on those responsible for the Nato campaign is likely to have given the campaign more legitimacy than if there was more focus on those not involved in the campaign; such as the UN, neutral politicians and anti-war demonstrators. Most of the other main people featured were also supportive of the Nato campaign, such as the ethnic-Albanian civilians.

The large amount of coverage given to the Nato war campaign is perhaps best emphasised when comparing it with another group of politicians and diplomats, as in the table below. The grouping of people compared to the Nato leadership is not a proper group in any way or form, but some members of each separate category did help conduct the main diplomatic effort that brought the final negotiated peace deal.

They therefore represent an important body of people that sought the negotiation of a satisfactory peace deal to end the conflict.

Newspaper	Coverage of British and American Government and Nato personnel (including British and American armies) in percentage of total references	Coverage of UN, European politicians and Russian politicians in percentage of total references	Ratio	Points
Times	49.9	7.3	6.8:1	6
Independent	42.8	6.6	6.5:1	5
Guardian	43.1	6.8	6.3:1	4
NYT	41.2	8.1	5:1	3
Telegraph	43.4	8.8	4.9:1	2
FT	40.7	16.8	2.4:1	1
UK sources average	44	9.3	4.7:1	

Table 4.12. Comparison of coverage between Nato and other politicians and diplomats.

The above table shows *The Times* had the highest ratio of coverage in the comparison of Nato leaders with UN, European politicians and Russian politicians, while the *FT* had the lowest ratio. The *FT* seemed to have a particularly small ratio at 2.4:1, and this seems to highlight its much higher interest in diplomacy than the other papers; the *FT*'s ratio also brought the overall UK sources' average down below the *NYT*'s ratio. The *NYT* and *Telegraph* both had quite a high coverage of UN, European politicians and Russian politicians, and this helped give them a medium final ratio.

4.3.1.2.2. Ethnic-Albanians and Serbs

While ethnic-Albanian civilians were featured much higher than the ethnic-Albanian politicians and KLA in all papers, only *The Times* had more coverage of Serb civilians than Serb politicians and military. The *Telegraph* had the highest ratio of politicians and military to civilians for both the Serbs and ethnic-Albanians. The *NYT* had the biggest ratio for ethnic-Albanian civilians in comparison to their politicians

and military. The *FT* had quite a high percentage of civilian coverage in both analyses, and this was quite surprising considering their focus on international politics and diplomacy. Overall, if the media's coverage of politicians and military are counted together, and compared to the civilian coverage, the evidence suggests the conflict on the ground in Kosovo was depicted mostly as Serb politicians and military against ethnic-Albanian civilians. This is shown in the tables below.

Newspaper	Coverage of Serb politicians and military in percentage of total references	Coverage of Serb civilians in percentage of total references	Ratio	Points
Telegraph	12.7	2.7	4.7:1	6
Independent	9.6	3.1	3:1	5
Financial Times	7.8	2.7	2.9:1	4
NYT	10.4	6.1	1.7:1	3
Guardian	9.3	6.6	1.4:1	2
Times	5.9	6.1	1:1	1

Table 4.13. Coverage of the Serbs.

Newspaper	Coverage of ethnic-Albanian civilians	Coverage of ethnic-Albanian politicians and military	Ratio	Points
NYT	13.6	1.8	7.5:1	6
Times	11.1	1.7	6.5:1	5
Independent	16.8	2.9	5.8:1	4
Financial Times	9.0	2.3	3.9:1	3
Guardian	13.6	3.7	3.7:1	2
Telegraph	12.8	4.6	2.8:1	1

Table 4.14. Coverage of the ethnic-Albanians.

Conclusion for hypothesis 1.

Taking the amount of coverage as the judgemental factor, the results confirm the first hypothesis, as the papers did largely follow the elite lead, and focus on the Nato leadership, ethnic-Albanian civilians, and the Serb leadership and military. All the papers focused on the UK and US governments and Nato personnel for nearly half their coverage, and the majority of the rest of the coverage was also positive for Nato,

with ethnic-Albanian victims of Serb repression accounting for a large percentage of it. All the papers also focused a high percentage of their ethnic-Albanian coverage on the civilian population, and largely ignored their political leadership and KLA. In contrast, only *The Times* gave the Serb civilians more coverage than the Serb politicians and military, and this was only by one reference. Those involved with the peace initiatives got little coverage in comparison with the Nato leaders, with only the *FT* giving them quite a large percentage of its news space. The *Position and Main People* cross-tabulation also provided some further evidence to support the hypothesis, with the Nato hierarchy and military receiving much more top position coverage than the other participants in the conflict.

Looking at the individual media sources, and counting the three tables' points together, the *Independent* had the most points, and so their coverage of the main people was the most hegemonic according to the results; the *Independent* was the most hegemonic because it gave the least coverage to the UN, European politicians and Russian politicians, had the highest coverage of ethnic-Albanian civilians, and had an above average coverage of Serb politicians and military, combined with a below average coverage of Serb civilians. The *NYT* was as hegemonic as its UK namesake *The Times*, and they were more hegemonic than the majority of the other UK media. They were followed by the *Telegraph*; and it being below average in the final table was a rarity, as will be shown by the later analyses. Then the least hegemonic media sources in this analysis were the *Guardian* and *FT*; the *Guardian* was the joint least hegemonic because it had the highest percentage of Serb civilian coverage, and the second highest amount of coverage of ethnic-Albanian politicians and military, while the *FT* was joint least mainly because it had the lowest ratio for coverage of British and American governments and Nato when compared to UN,

European politicians and Russian politicians. The results are summarised in the following table.

Media source	Table 4.12.	Table 4.13.	Table 4.14.	Total	Evaluation points
Independent	5	5	4	14	6
Times	6	1	5	12	4.5
NYT	3	3	6	12	4.5
Telegraph	2	6	1	9	3
FT	1	4	3	8	1.5
Guardian	4	2	2	8	1.5

Table 4.15. Evaluation points for analysis 1.

4.3.2. Hypothesis 2. In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will give the Nato alliance members and allies a positive coverage the vast majority of the time, while depicting the Serb leadership and military negatively.

Having addressed the question of how much emphasis the media sources gave the people involved in the Kosovo conflict in the last section, this section takes the analysis a step further by evaluating whether that coverage was positive or negative for the main people featured in the articles. This section works in the opposite way to the last section, because it starts with the collective categories analysis, and then goes on to the individual categories analysis. The collective categories analysis first looks at how the Nato politicians and military were evaluated, before going on to focus solely on the Nato personnel. The individual categories analysis then compares the media's evaluation of Blair and Clinton, and Milosevic and the KLA, before there is a conclusion on whether the hypothesis was supported by the evidence.

4.3.2.1. Collective categories

4.3.2.1.1. The media's evaluations of the Nato politicians and military

Although most of the evidence seemed to fulfil the criteria of the hypothesis, because the media sources did largely focus their coverage on the Nato and Serb leaderships

and the ethnic-Albanian civilians, an analysis of the media sources' evaluation of the British and American governments and Nato personnel brings a different view of the media coverage; as the combined UK media's evaluation of them only had a positive to negative ratio of 1.3:1. The *NYT*'s positive to negative ratio was a little higher at 2:1. In the UK, only the *Telegraph* had a higher ratio than the *NYT*. *The Times*, *FT* and *Independent* had a more positive evaluation than negative, but the *Guardian*'s was more negative than positive. These details are shown in the following table.

Media source	Coverage of British and American governments and Nato personnel (including British and American armies)		Points
Telegraph	Positive-negative 38-17	Ratio: 2.2:1	6
NYT	Positive-negative 56-28	Ratio: 2:1	5
Times	Positive-negative 82-47	Ratio: 1.7:1	4
Financial Times	Positive-negative 27-19	Ratio: 1.4:1	3
Independent	Positive-negative 54-41	Ratio: 1.3:1	2
Guardian	Positive-negative 38-55	Ratio: 1:1.4	1
Combined UK sources	Positive-negative 239-179	Ratio: 1.3:1	

Table 4.16. Evaluation of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel coverage.

4.3.2.1.2. The media's evaluations of the Nato military

Continuing the above theme, when the evaluations are confined to the Nato military personnel, *The Times* surprisingly joins the *Guardian* in being more negative than positive, while the *FT* has an equal ratio. The *Independent* is a little more positive than in the previous analysis, while the *NYT* and *Telegraph* again have relatively high positive to negative ratios. When all the media sources are combined together, the overall ratio was slightly more negative than positive, and the negative ratio is slightly higher for the UK media sources on their own. The *Guardian*'s high amount of

negative references for Nato is the main reason for the overall ratios being more negative than positive. This is shown in the following table.

Newspaper	Positive-negative coverage of Nato hierarchy, military and media operation in amount of references.		Points
Telegraph	Positive-negative 25-12	ratio: 2.1:1	6
NYT	Positive-negative 20-11	ratio:1.8:1	5
Independent	Positive-negative 35-34	ratio: 1.01:1	4
FT	Equal 16-16	ratio: 1:1	3
Times	Positive-negative 33-36	ratio: 1:1.1	2
Guardian	Positive-negative 24-45	ratio: 1:1.9	1
Combined UK sources	Positive-negative 133-143	ratio: 1:1.1	

Table 4.17. Coverage of the Nato hierarchy, military and media.

4.3.2.2. Individual categories

4.3.2.2.1. The media's evaluation of the UK and US militaries and leadership

The individual category results also give mixed results. For example, only two media sources, the *Guardian* and *The Times*, were more negative than positive about the Nato hierarchy, but only two sources, the *Telegraph* and the *NYT*, were more positive than negative about the Nato military at war. The *Guardian* had over twice as many negative references for the Nato military at war as they did positive, and this was probably because they did not approve of Nato's reliance on bombing from high altitude. The American military also had mixed evaluations in the British media, with *The Times* more positive about them, the *Independent* neutral, and the *Guardian* negative; the *Telegraph* and *FT* did not feature them. The British military did not feature in the *NYT* results, but the *NYT* had a positive coverage of the American military. All the media sources were therefore more positive than negative about their

own military, and this leads nicely on to the next analysis; of the media coverage of the UK and US political leaders. In the media coverage of the two leaders, Blair was viewed as more positive than negative by all the media sources. *The Times* was the most supportive, with sixteen positive references to two negative. The *FT* and *Guardian* also had clear positive to negative ratios in favour of Blair. In contrast, although Clinton was a little more positive than negative in the *Independent* and *NYT*, his coverage was more negative in the other media sources. Although all the papers' results for Clinton only had a difference of one reference, as leader of the dominant country in the Nato alliance he should have been in a good position to receive a positive coverage. The above results are shown in the following table.

Newspaper	Blair	Clinton	Total	Points
Times	Positive 16-2	Negative 3-4	19-6	6
Financial Times	Positive 8-1	Negative 0-1	8-2	5
Independent	Positive 5-3	Positive 4-3	9-6	4
Guardian	Positive 4-1	Negative 0-1	4-2	2.5
NYT	Positive 1-0	Positive 11-10	12-10	2.5
Telegraph	Positive 4-2	Negative 0-1	4-3	1

Table 4.18. Coverage of Blair and Clinton.

4.3.2.2.2. The media's evaluation of Milosevic and the KLA

While Milosevic received an overwhelmingly negative coverage from all the media sources; the KLA, who seemed to become the unofficial leaders of the ethnic-Albanians during the Nato campaign, enjoyed a positive coverage in all the sources apart from the *NYT*, which had an equal amount of positive and negative articles. The above results are shown in the following table.

Newspaper	Milosevic	KLA	Total	Points
Guardian	Negative-positive 19-0	Positive-negative 7-0	26-0	6
Independent	Neg-pos 12-0	Pos-neg 5-1	17-1	4.5
NYT	Neg-pos 17-1	Pos-neg 2-2	19-3	4.5
Telegraph	Neg-pos 9-0	Pos-neg 6-2	15-2	3
Times	Neg-pos 8-0	Pos-neg 3-1	11-1	2
FT	Neg-pos 7-0	Pos-neg 1-0	8-0	1

Table 4.19. Comparison of the coverage of Milosevic and the KLA.

Although Milosevic received an overwhelmingly negative coverage, the other Serb politicians were not featured very negatively, and the Serb civilians were featured positively; this suggests the media personalised the blame for the conflict around Milosevic. The *NYT* and *Guardian* had especially positive coverage of the Serb civilians, with the *NYT* having eighteen positive references to one negative, while the *Guardian* had sixteen positive to no negative. All the media sources were also very positive about the ethnic-Albanian civilians.

Conclusion for hypothesis 2.

Most of the results supported hypothesis 2, but overall there is probably enough conflicting evidence to bring the hypothesis into question; and the lack of consistency among the papers means their coverage cannot really be considered hegemonic when taken as a whole. In support of the hypothesis, the British media seemed hegemonic in their coverage of the Serb military and Milosevic as compared to the KLA, most were positive towards Nato, and all were positive towards the British military.

However, two of the British media sources also had more negative than positive references for Nato, and Nato had slightly more negative references than positive overall; this was mainly due to the *Guardian's* particularly negative coverage of Nato. Clinton also had a more negative than positive coverage in four of the British media sources. There was also little evidence of the media positioning stories to either

highlight or hide information in support of the Nato campaign, and all the papers gave both the ethnic-Albanian civilians and the Serb civilians a good coverage.

Looking at the individual media sources, and counting the points from the four tables, the *NYT* had the most points, and according to the rationale behind these tables they therefore had a more hegemonic evaluation of the main people in the conflict than the UK media. The *Telegraph* was the most hegemonic in the UK, followed by the *Independent*, and then *The Times*. The *FT* and *Guardian* were again the two least hegemonic, but this time the *Guardian* was the least hegemonic outright.

Media source	Table 4.16	Table 4.17	Table 4.18	Table 4.19	Total	Evaluation points
NYT	5	5	2.5	4.5	17	6
Telegraph	6	6	1	3	16	5
Independent	2	4	4	4.5	14.5	4
Times	4	2	6	2	14	3
FT	3	3	5	1	12	2
Guardian	1	1	2.5	6	10.5	1

Table 4.20. Evaluation points for analysis 2.

4.3.3. Hypothesis 3. In line with the hegemonic model, the media will use the British government and Nato military leaders as their sources the vast majority of the time, and there will be little use of sources that are critical of the Nato campaign.

This question is one of the most important for evaluating how hegemonic the media coverage of the Kosovo conflict was, as previous research into media hegemony has often focused on whether the media use a variety of sources to provide the audience with an informed and balanced view of the news topic. Therefore, this section includes a large amount of data and analyses, and it is hoped it will bring together a comprehensive view of what sources were used, and what elite criticism of the Nato campaign the media featured. Due to the limitations of space, an analysis of whether

the media showed any direct evidence of influence from their most used source was left out. The results were mixed, and there was little evidence supporting direct influence on the media content from their main sources' information, and it was therefore thought that the analysis did not provide relevant enough information for inclusion in the study.

As there is a lot of content in this section it is split up into two parts. To begin with, the first sub-section looks at the amount of sources used, and focuses on how many domestic and international sources were used, and whether they were positive, neutral or negative for Nato; ratios are given for each media source, and then they are compared. The second sub-section takes a closer look at the sources, and compares the use of official Western sources by the different media sources, and also compares the use of official Western sources with the use of Serb sources, and then the use of Serb sources with ethnic-Albanian sources.

4.3.3.1. Amounts and ratios of domestic and international source use

4.3.3.1.1. Domestic and international official sources

The two tables below contain data showing the media sources' use of official sources during Nato's Kosovo campaign. The first table below shows the amount of international and domestic sources used, while the second shows the international to domestic ratios through the months, and at the end. Under hegemonic theory, the media will usually use more domestic official sources, and points are given in the second table to later evaluate each media source's hegemony with regard to this.

Newspaper	International sources	Domestic sources	Total
NYT	280	250	530
Telegraph	171	102	273
Times	198	126	324
Guardian	258	147	405
Independent	211	102	313
FT	186	64	250

Table 4.21. Amount of international and domestic sources.

Newspaper	March int-dom ratio	April int-dom ratio	May int-dom ratio	June int-dom ratio	Total int-dom ratio	Points
NYT	1.3:1	1:1.4	1.3:1	1.1:1	1.1:1	6
Telegraph	1.3:1	1.9:1	1.6:1	1.7:1	1.7:1	5
Times	1.7:1	1.9:1	1.6:1	2.1:1	1.8:1	4
Guardian	1.2:1	2.1:1	2.7:1	3.3:1	2.2:1	3
Independent	2.8:1	1.9:1	2.5:1	3.9:1	2.4:1	2
FT	1.9:1	3:1	4.9:1	9.7:1	3.3:1	1

Table 4.22. Ratios of international to domestic use of sources.

The *NYT* was shown to use the most domestic sources compared to international, and only just used more international; this suggests they routinely index their reporting to the US government, and this finding is in line with some previous studies on the *NYT* coverage of US international conflicts, which have found it to be hegemonic in its source use. The *Telegraph* and *The Times* had the lowest ratio of international to domestic sources use among the British media sources, while the *FT* had the highest.

4.3.3.1.2. The use of domestic positive, neutral and negative sources by the media.

For this section, a quantitative analysis of the positive, neutral and negative opinions of the elite domestic and international sources was undertaken. This involved counting each use of an elite source in an article, and interpreting whether the views were positive, neutral or negative for the Nato campaign. The section starts with an

analysis of the use of domestic sources, then goes on to international, and then ends with an analysis of the domestic and international source use combined.

Media source	March	April	May	June	Total
Times	P-Neu-Neg: 27-0-2 Total: 29 Ratio p-neg: 13.5:1	P-Neu-Neg: 42-4-6 Total: 52 Ratio p-neg: 7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 34-1-2 Total: 37 Ratio p-neg: 17:1	P-Neu-Neg: 13-0-0 Total: 13 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neg: 116-10 Ratio p-neg: 11.6:1
Telegraph	P-Neu-Neg: 19-2-1 Total: 22 Ratio p-neg: 19-1	P-Neu-Neg: 36-1-5 Total: 42 Ratio p-neg: 7.2:1	P-Neu-Neg: 19-5-2 Total: 26 Ratio p-neg: 9.5-1	P-Neu-Neg: 12-0-0 Total: 12 Ratio p-neg: N/A	Total: 86-8-8 Total: 102 Ratio p-neg: 10.8-1
Independent	P-Neu-Neg: 24-0-1 Total: 25 Ratio p-neg: 24:1	P-Neu-Neg: 33-2-7 Total: 42 Ratio p-neg: 4.7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 27-0-3 Total: 30 Ratio p-neg: 9:1	P-Neu-Neg: 7-0-0 Total: 7 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neg: 91-11 Ratio p-neg: 8.3:1
Guardian	P-Neu-Neg: 26-1-9 Total: 36 Ratio p-neg: 2.9:1	P-Neu-Neg: 49-4-6 Total: 59 Ratio p-neg: 8.2:1	P-Neu-Neg: 34-0-7 Total: 41 Ratio p-neg: 4.9:1	P-Neu-Neg: 16-0-0 Total: 16 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neg: 125-22 Ratio p-neg: 5.7:1
NYT	P-Neu-Neg: 40-4-6 Total: 50 Ratio p-neg: 6.7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 106-19-23 Total: 148 Ratio p-neg: 4.6:1	P-Neu-Neg: 56-6-8 Total: 70 Ratio p-neg: 7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 29-4-12 Total: 45 Ratio p-neg: 2.4:1	P-Neg: 231-49 Ratio p-neg: 4.7:1
FT	P-Neu-Neg: 11-0-7 Total: 18 Ratio p-neg: 1.6:1	P-Neu-Neg: 23-9-7 Total: 39 Ratio p-neg: 3.3:1	P-Neu-Neg: 13-0-0 Total: 13 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neu-Neg: 3-0-0 Total: 3 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neg: 50-14 Ratio p-neg: 3.6:1

Table 4.23. Domestic positive, neutral and negative source amounts, and ratio of positive to negative. P-Neu-Neg stands for Positive-Neutral-Negative. p-neg stands for positive-negative. N/A stands for not available.

The above table shows *The Times* had the highest positive to negative ratio at 11.6:1, and was followed closely by the *Telegraph*. The other media sources also had ratios that were quite high. The *NYT* had the second lowest ratio, after the *FT*. As this is one of the key areas where evidence of a hegemonic media is tested, the evidence suggests most of the British media were more hegemonic than the *NYT* in this regard,

as the *NYT* ratio was much lower than the average for the British media sources. The findings are summarised in the table below.

Media source	Ratio
Times	11.6:1
Telegraph	10.8:1
Independent	8.3:1
Guardian	5.7:1
NYT	4.7:1
FT	3.6:1
Average of British media sources	8:1

Table 4.24. Table of domestic positive-negative ratio in highest to lowest order.

4.3.3.1.3. The use of international positive, neutral and negative sources.

Tables 4.25 and 4.26 below show the *Independent* had the highest ratio of international sources' positive to negative references; it was closely followed by the other media sources, and they generally had much lower positive-negative ratios than for their use of domestic sources. The *NYT* again had the second lowest ratio, but this time it was not much lower than the average for the British media sources. *The Times* had the lowest ratio, after having the highest for the domestic source use. The ratios for each media source's total positive and negative source references from tables 4.23 and 4.25 are then combined in table 4.27.

Source	March	April	May	June	Total
Indy	P-Neu-Neg: 38-13-19 Ratio p-neg: 2:1	P-Neu-Neg: 64-12-5 Ratio p-neg: 12.8:1	P-Neu-Neg: 51-14-11 Ratio p-neg: 4.6:1	P-Neu-Neg: 18-4-5 Ratio p-neg: 3.6:1	P-Neg: 171-40 Ratio p-neg: 4.3:1
FT	P-Neu-Neg: 20-6-8 Ratio p-neg: 2.5:1	P-Neu-Neg: 70-30- 17 Ratio p-neg: 4.1:1	P-Neu-Neg: 34-16-13 Ratio p-neg: 2.6:1	P-Neu-Neg: 19-5-5 Ratio p-neg: 3.8:1	P-Neg: 143-43 Ratio p-neg: 3.3:1
Guardian	P-Neu-Neg: 26-3-15 Ratio p-neg: 1.7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 73-31- 22 Ratio p-neg: 3.3:1	P-Neu-Neg: 61-28-21 Ratio p-neg: 2.9:1	P-Neu-Neg: 27-12-13 Ratio p-neg: 2.1:1	P-Neg: 187-71 Ratio p-neg: 2.6:1

Telegraph	P-Neu-Neg: 20-1-8 Ratio p-neg: 2.5:1	P-Neu-Neg: 53-12-16 Ratio p-neg: 3.3:1	P-Neu-Neg: 20-10-11 Ratio p-neg: 1.8:1	P-Neu-Neg: 11-4-5 Ratio p-neg: 2.2:1	P-Neg 104-40 Ratio p-neg: 2.6:1
NYT	P-Neu-Neg: 39-7-21 Ratio p-neg: 1.9:1	P-Neu-Neg: 61-17- 29 Ratio p-neg: 2.1:1	P-Neu-Neg: 45-31-17 Ratio p-neg: 2.7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 29-10-9 Ratio p-neg: 3.2:1	P-Neg: 174-76 Ratio p-neg: 2.3:1
Times	P-Neu-Neg: 30-7-11 Ratio p-neg: 2.7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 63-9- 26 Ratio p-neg: 2.4:1	P-Neu-Neg: 31-13-16 Ratio p-neg: 1.9:1	P-Neu-Neg: 13-6-8 Ratio p-neg: 1.6:1	P-Neg: 137-61 Ratio p-neg: 2.3:1

Table 4.25. International positive, neutral and negative sources amounts, and ratio of positive to negative.

Newspaper	Ratio
Independent	4.3:1
FT	3.3:1
Guardian	2.63:1
Telegraph	2.6:1
NYT	2.29:1
Times	2.25:1
Average of British media sources	3:1

Table 4.26. Table of international positive-negative ratios in highest to lowest order.

Newspaper	Ratio	Points
Independent	5.1:1	6
Telegraph	4:1	5
Times	3.6:1	4
FT	3.38:1	3
Guardian	3.35:1	2
NYT	3.2:1	1
Average of British media	3.9:1	

Table 4.27. Table of total positive-negative ratios in highest to lowest order.

4.3.3.2. The use of Nato, Serb and ethnic-Albanian sources

4.3.3.2.1. Source frequency results

In the *Main Source* frequency analysis, all the media sources had *Writers themselves* as the highest category. After the writers, the *Guardian*, *Times* and *Independent* used *other British Government* the most, while the *FT* and *NYT* had *other American Government*, and the *Telegraph* had *Nato spokesperson no conference* cited. The *FT* would have had *Nato spokespeople* as their second highest reference, behind the

writers, if all Nato sources were counted together, rather than conferences cited or not cited counted separately.

The *Guardian* had *ethnic-Albanian civilians* as their third most referenced source, and then *Humanitarian workers* level with the *Nato hierarchy* after that; this seems to again highlight its concern for the civilian population. The *FT* had *European politicians* after *American Government*, followed by *Nato hierarchy*, and this again seems to highlight their focus on international aspects of the conflict, and the diplomacy that was taking place. *The Times* had *Humanitarian workers* as their third highest reference, and then *ethnic-Albanian civilians*, which was similar to the *Guardian*. Considering their reputation as an elite newspaper, it seems quite surprising that *The Times* used more humanitarian workers as sources than official sources like Nato spokespeople. The *Independent* had *Humanitarian workers* as their third highest source, and they were followed by *Nato spokespeople without conferences cited*. The Nato spokespeople would have been the third highest if they were included together, instead of separate as conferences cited and not cited. The *Telegraph* had *other British Government* as their third highest referenced source, and then *ethnic-Albanian civilians*; while the *NYT* had *other Nato spokesperson no conference cited*, followed by *ethnic-Albanian civilians*.

Looking at the access gained by the UK and US leaders in their home media, *Blair* was sixth in *The Times* and *Telegraph*; seventh in the *Independent*; eighth in the *FT* and ninth in the *Guardian*, while *Clinton* was fifth in the *NYT*. *Clinton* being used more in the *NYT* than *Blair* in any of the British media sources suggests the *NYT* indexes to the leader of government more than the UK papers; although it must also be remembered that the vast majority of military forces used in the Nato campaign

were American, and Clinton therefore had more power and responsibility during the conflict than Blair.

4.3.3.2.2. The use of Government sources

When combining similar categories together into groups, the British newspaper coverage of all the British Government sources together, and the *NYT*'s coverage of all the American Government sources together, showed the *NYT* used a higher percentage of government sources than the British media. This again suggests the *NYT* indexed more to their government than the British papers did to theirs. The *Telegraph* used the most Government sources out of the British media, and this was a little surprising considering the *Telegraph* traditionally supports the Conservative party; from that evidence it seems as if they put their traditional support of the British military at war above their traditional support of political parties. The *FT* was the lowest percentage user of their government, and this seems to fit in with their general focus on international affairs. These results are shown in the table below; there are five tables in this section that go towards the final evaluation points.

Media source	The use of Government sources	Points
NYT	19%	6
Telegraph	17.3%	5
Times	15.8%	4
Guardian	14.6%	3
Independent	12.9%	2
FT	10%	1

Table 4.28. UK papers' use of New Labour sources, and the *NYT*'s use of Democrat sources.

4.3.3.2.3. The media sources' use of Government and Nato sources

When Government and Nato sources were included together, the *Telegraph* was the highest percentage user of the Nato elite, with the *NYT* in second place. The *FT* jumped from being the lowest user of British Government sources to being the third

highest user of the combined sources. The *Guardian* and *Independent* stayed in the same position, but *The Times* swapped position with the *FT*, and went from being the third highest percentage user of British Government sources to the lowest user of the combined sources; this swap in places seems to again highlight their different outlooks on the conflict, with *The Times* more focused on the domestic situation, and the *FT* more on the international.

Media source	The media sources' use of Government and Nato sources	Points
Telegraph	37%	6
NYT	34.2%	5
FT	31.7%	4
Guardian	29.4%	3
Independent	28.7%	2
Times	25.7%	1

Table 4.29. Media sources' use of New Labour, Democrat and Nato sources.

4.3.3.2.4. Nato and Serb source use comparison

The above table is now adapted to compare the media sources' use of the three main groups in the Nato campaign; the British and American governments and Nato, with the media's use of official Serb sources.

Newspaper	British and American Government, and Nato sources	Official Serb sources	Ratio	Points
Times	109	6	18.2:1	6
Guardian	121	8	15.1:1	5
NYT	151	17	8.9:1	4
Independent	111	14	7.9:1	3
Telegraph	81	11	7.4:1	2
FT	70	10	7:1	1
Total for UK sources	492	66	7.5:1	

Table 4.30. The media sources' use of Nato and Serb sources.

The above table shows that although *The Times* had the lowest percentage of government and Nato sources it still had the highest ratio of the Nato sources' use in

comparison to the use of official Serb sources. The main reason for the low percentages of both sets of sources seems to be mainly due to *The Times* having the highest percentage of articles without any sources. So although *The Times* might seem to be hegemonic with their high ratio of Nato to Serb official sources, in another way they are going against the hegemonic model, as they are relying on their own writers rather than official sources. The high ratio therefore seems to be down to the newspaper's style more than its ideology, although it did have the lowest percentage of official Serb source use; however, remembering the *Main People* analysis, it was the only media source to have more references for Serb civilians than government and military, and this was viewed as a positive feature of their coverage for that analysis.

The fact that the *Guardian*, which is traditionally independent of the establishment, has the second highest ratio, and a much higher ratio than the other four sources, also brings up the question of hegemony, and whether the government and Nato humanitarianism had influenced the *Guardian*; however, it seems more likely that it was because of a reluctance to use official Serb sources because of the brutality of their military campaign, rather than a hegemonic over-use of Nato official sources, as it had the second lowest percentage of official Serb source use, and only the fourth highest percentage of Nato source use. The *NYT* had the third highest ratio, but they and the other three sources all have quite similar ratios.

Although the above results make the coverage seem largely hegemonic, it must be remembered that the ethnic-Albanians received a similar coverage to the Serbs, with their official sources receiving a little less access than the Serbs, but their civilians getting much more. This can be clarified in the following tables, which are used to test the hegemony of each media source in their coverage of the ethnic-Albanian

‘allies’ and the Serb ‘enemies’. In the first table, the Serb sources are therefore structured with the paper with the lowest percentage of sources in first position, and then descending down to the paper with the most use of Serb sources. In the second table, the ethnic-Albanian source usage is presented in the opposite order, with the media source with the highest percentage of ethnic-Albanian source usage at the top, descending down to the media source with the lowest percentage of use at the bottom.

Newspaper	Official Serb sources	Civilian Serb sources	All Serb sources	Points
Guardian	2.0	4.4	6.4	5.5
FT	4.6	1.8	6.4	5.5
Independent	3.7	3.1	6.8	4
Times	1.5	5.7	7.2	3
Telegraph	5.0	2.3	7.3	2
NYT	3.9	5.2	9.1	1

Table 4.31. The media’s use of Serb sources.

Newspaper	Civilian ethnic-Albanian sources	Official ethnic-Albanian sources	All-ethnic-Albanian sources	Points
Telegraph	9.1	3.7	12.8	6
NYT	8.6	1.3	9.9	5
Independent	7.2	2.4	9.6	4
Guardian	7.1	1.7	8.8	3
Times	5.9	0.9	6.8	2
FT	2.7	0.9	3.6	1

Table 4.32. The media’s use of ethnic-Albanian sources.

Having compared ethnic-Albanian and Serb sources in the above tables, there does not seem to be any paper that used a particularly low amount of Serb sources together with a disproportionately high amount of ethnic-Albanian sources. However, if we compare the points from the two tables, the *Guardian* had the most difference in their use of the two sides’ sources, after using the joint least percentage of Serb sources, and the fourth highest percentage of ethnic-Albanian sources. That left them with eight and a half points from the two tables. This concurs with the paper having a high

ratio of Nato to Serb official sources, and seems to emphasise their reluctance to use official Serb sources.

The *Independent* and the *Telegraph* were the media sources with the next highest use of ethnic-Albanian sources compared to the Serbs, as they had eight points each from the two tables. The *Independent* used the third lowest percentage of Serb sources, and the third highest percentage of ethnic-Albanians, which meant it was above average in both tables. The *Telegraph* had the highest percentage of ethnic-Albanian source use, but also had the second highest percentage of Serb use, and so was above average in the use of both sets of sources.

The *FT* was the next highest with six and a half points, and so was a little below average in its use of ethnic-Albanian sources compared to Serbs. The *FT* had the joint least percentage of Serb source usage, and also the lowest percentage of ethnic-Albanian source usage, which again seems to emphasise that the paper did not cover the actual conflict in Kosovo as much as the other media sources, and instead focused on international diplomacy. The *NYT* was the next highest, and was only half a point behind the *FT*. In contrast to the *FT*, it had the highest percentage of Serb source use, and was also the second highest percentage user of ethnic-Albanian sources, making it a big user of both sources. *The Times* had the lowest amount of points from the two tables, with five. It therefore had the most balanced use of the two opposing sets of sources. They were similar to the *FT* in their coverage, as they were low users of both sets of sources; they were the fourth highest percentage user of Serb sources, and the fifth highest of ethnic-Albanian sources. The combined points from this analysis are shown in the table below, but the points used in the individual analyses are used for the final evaluation.

Newspaper	Serb table points	Ethnic-Albanian table points	Total
Guardian	5.5	3	8.5
Independent	4	4	8
Telegraph	2	6	8
Financial Times	5	1	6.5
NYT	1	5	6
Times	3	2	5

Table 4.33. Combined points for Serb and ethnic-Albanian source use.

When all five of the tables where points were given in this sub-section are combined together they reach the following findings.

Newspaper	Table 4.28	Table 4.29	Table 4.30	Table 4.31	Table 4.32.	Total	Points
NYT	6	5	4	1	5	21	5.5
Telegraph	5	6	2	2	6	21	5.5
Guardian	3	3	5	5.5	3	19.5	4
Times	4	1	6	3	2	16	3
Indy	2	2	3	4	4	15	2
FT	1	4	1	5.5	1	12.5	1

Table 4.34. Points for 4.3.3.2.

Conclusion for hypothesis 3.

The results from the final two tables from the sub-sections; 4.27 and 4.34, are brought together in the following table, and evaluation points given for each media source.

The *Telegraph* was the most hegemonic overall, followed by the *Independent* and *The Times*. The *NYT* was just below average, and just above the *Guardian*, while the *FT* was comfortably the least hegemonic.

Media Source	Points for 4.3.3.1.	Points for 4.3.3.2.	Total points	Evaluation points
Telegraph	5	5.5	10.5	6
Independent	6	2	8	5
Times	4	3	7	4
NYT	1	5.5	6.5	3
Guardian	2	4	6	2
FT	3	1	4	1

Table 4.35. Evaluation points for the sources variable.

The overall results support the hypothesis, as the media sources used Nato sources a vast majority of the time, and the official sources used were much more positive

towards the Nato campaign than negative. For example, the first sub-section showed the ratio of positive to negative official source use by the British media for the Nato campaign was 3.9:1, while the second section showed the ratio of Nato source use to Serb source use was 7.5:1. Other non-Nato sources were also neglected, including ethnic-Albanian official sources, and so it seems as if the media were acting more hegemonically than propagandistically. Some aspects of the results did not support the hypothesis, but they only made up a small amount of the evidence in comparison.

4.3.4. Hypothesis 4. In line with hegemonic theory, the front pages will include good coverage for Nato and bad for the Serbs the vast majority of the time, while the vast majority of bad coverage for Nato will be in the inside pages.

There were usually between one and four Kosovo articles on each page, and one or two on the front page; there were usually between ten and twenty articles in each newspaper. Therefore, the framework for this analysis considers the prominent stories as those going down to position five. This study does not differentiate between news and opinion articles, and accepts that an opinion article in position fifteen might be more influential than a news article in position one or two. The *Position and Main people*, and *Position and Format* analyses are featured in the *Main People* and *Format* sections, as they seem more important for those hypotheses than this one. The *Telegraph* is not included in this section, as the articles were not in any particular positional order on the Internet.

4.3.4.1. Position and Source

The *Position and Source* cross-tabulation analysis showed Nato leaders and spokespeople took the majority of prominent positions in all the media sources, so this was supportive of the hypothesis. The *Guardian* and *FT* used *American Democrats*

and Pentagon sources as their most referenced top position source. The *FT* had *Nato spokespeople* next, and so did the *Guardian* if *Nato* spokespersons from the conference and conference not cited categories were included together; otherwise *Nato spokespeople conferences not cited* was level with *other Russian politicians*. The *FT* had *European politicians* as their third most referenced source.

In the *Independent*, *Nato spokespeople conferences not cited* had the most top positions with nine references, followed by *ethnic-Albanian civilians* with six, and *Writers themselves* with five. *American Democrats and Pentagon spokespeople* had the highest amount of position two references, followed by *Nato spokespeople* and *ethnic-Albanian civilians*. *Nato spokespeople* featured in the higher positions more than the lower, while *American Democrats and Pentagon spokespeople* got a more prominent coverage than *Blair*. The *ethnic-Albanian refugees* also featured highly. *Milosevic* was the only Serb to appear in the top position, and he appeared only once.

The Times was the only British media source to have domestic sources as their top source, as they had *Other Labour* in the most top positions; moreover, *Blair* had the second highest amount of references. *Other Labour* also had the most second positions, and was again followed by *Blair*. *Blair* featured in the highest two positions much more than the lower ones, while *other Labour* were spread out over the top eight positions. Perhaps surprisingly for *The Times*, *European politicians* had the third highest amount of top position references. The *NYT* had a similar result to *The Times* from an American perspective, as they had *other American Democrats* as the source with the highest amount of top position references, and *Clinton* had the second highest amount of references in the top position. The other sources with the most top position references were *other Nato spokespeople conferences not cited*,

Wesley Clark and *other Serb* politicians. Apart from *Serb politicians*, the top positions were dominated by Nato spokespeople and American Democrat politicians.

Points are given below based on the above evidence, and they will be used for later evaluation at the end. There was not much to choose between the sources, as Nato dominated the top positions, but *other Serb politicians* were in the top three most referenced top sources in the *NYT*, and so the paper was considered the least hegemonic in this analysis. The *Guardian* had *other Russian politicians* in their top three and so they were considered the second least hegemonic. The *FT* and *Times* had *European politicians* in their top three, while the *Independent* had *writers themselves*, so they were considered to be at about the same level of hegemony, and were given the same points.

Newspaper	Points
Independent	4
FT	4
Times	4
Guardian	2
NYT	1

Table 4.36. Position and Source points.

4.3.4.2. Position and Diagnosis

The *Position and Diagnosis* results were also mostly supportive of the hypothesis, with three of the five newspapers having positive diagnoses more in the top positions, and negative diagnoses more in the lower positions. For example, in the *Guardian*, the *Nato campaign is working* diagnosis had more than twice as many articles in the first position as any other category, and had eighteen of its twenty-five references in the top three positions. In comparison, the *Nato campaign is not working* category only had five of its eighteen references in the top three positions, and only one in the

first position. In the lower positions there were three *Nato campaign is working* references to twenty *Nato campaign is not working*.

Also in line with the hypothesis, and with a similar coverage to the *Guardian*, the *FT* also seemed to have a much higher proportion of *Nato campaign is working* to *Nato campaign is not working* in the higher positions. Despite *Nato campaign is not working* having three more references overall, there were nine *Nato campaign is working* references in the top position compared with one *Nato campaign is not working*. The more positive positioning of the *Nato campaign is working* to *Nato campaign is not working* references is emphasised further by the top three positions having eighteen *Nato campaign is working* to five *Nato campaign is not working*, while in the lower seven positions it was seven *Nato campaign is working* to thirteen *Nato campaign is not working*. However, there was also some evidence that went against the hypothesis, with *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* more in the top positions than the lower ones: it had more references in the first position than in any other position, and also had its second highest amount of references in position two.

The *Independent* had similar findings to the *Guardian* and the *FT* on the question of whether the Nato campaign was working, with *Nato campaign is working* having a much higher percentage of references in the top six positions than *Nato campaign is not working*: out of twenty-six *Nato campaign is working* references, twenty were in the first six positions, while out of seventeen *Nato campaign is not working* references, only five were in the top six positions. Also supporting the hypothesis, *Refugees are the Serbs' fault* had the most references in the top two positions. *Nato campaign is working* was tied as the second highest top position reference with *Collateral damage is Nato's fault*, so they balanced each other out as a positive and negative for the

hypothesis. *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* was also the second most referenced category in position two.

The Times and *NYT* results showed balance in their positioning of articles, and so their results did not support the hypothesis. Individually, there was not much difference between the media sources that supported the hypothesis, or between the media sources that did not support the hypothesis, and so the points for later evaluation featured in the table below were divided evenly between the individual media sources in each group.

Newspaper	Points
Guardian	4
FT	4
Independent	4
Times	1.5
NYT	1.5

Table 4.37. Position and Diagnosis points.

4.3.4.3. Position and Prognosis

The results were more balanced in the *Position and Prognosis* cross-tabulation analysis than in the previous analyses, and there was therefore not much support for the hypothesis. However, most of the evidence seemed to support the hypothesis in the *Guardian*. For example, *Continue the bombing* had the most top position references, and also had sixteen of its thirty-three references in the top four positions. Also, *Stop the bombing* seemed to be more in the lower positions, with only two of its eighteen references in the top six positions. However, there was also some evidence that went against the hypothesis, as the most prominent category in the top positions was *Diplomacy*, with twenty of its thirty-five references in the top five positions.

Most of the evidence seemed to go against the hypothesis in the *FT* and *Independent*, with *Diplomacy* prominent in the former, and *Send in ground troops* in the latter. The

results in *The Times* were quite mixed for the hypothesis; in support of the hypothesis, *Continue the bombing* was the most referenced in the top position, but going against the hypothesis, *Change the bombing strategy* and *Diplomacy* had the second highest amount of top position references. There were also mixed results in the *NYT*, as *Continue the bombing* and *Diplomacy* had the most top position references, with six each. Points were given in accordance with the above conclusions, with the *Guardian* seen as the most positive for Nato; *The Times* and *NYT* with their mixed results next, and the *Independent* and *FT* the joint least hegemonic with their negative results for the hypothesis.

Newspaper	Points
Guardian	5
Times	3.5
NYT	3.5
Independent	1.5
Financial Times	1.5

Table 4.38. Position and Prognosis points.

4.3.4.4. Position and historical reference

There were also mixed results for the hypothesis in the *Position and Historical References* cross-tabulation. The *Independent* seemed to be the most in line with the hypothesis, with *World War Two Serbs negative* having the most references in position one; followed by *Bosnian War Serbs negative* and *Gulf Nato positive*. However, there were also several references for those categories in the lower positions as well, so they did not seem to be prominently placed for hegemonic reasons. There was little negative for Nato, or positive for the Serbs, in the top positions.

There were mixed results in *The Times*. In line with the hypothesis, *Bosnian War Serbs negative* was the most referenced top position category with four references,

and *World War Two Serbs negative* was quite prominently placed, with eight references in the top four positions, but both categories also had quite a lot of references in the lower positions as well. Going against the hypothesis, *World War Two Nato negative* was also quite prominently placed, although it also had references in lower positions as well. Of those categories that seemed to be in disproportionately lower positions, one was positive for the Serbs, *World War Two Serbs positive*, and the other negative, *Serbo-Croat war Serbs negative*.

In the *Guardian*, nothing really stood out as particularly prominently placed, but *World War Two Serbs negative* had the joint highest amount of references in the top position, along with *Gulf war neutral*. *World War Two Nato negative* and *Vietnam Nato negative* being quite lowly placed was also in line with the hypothesis. Going against the hypothesis, *Bosnian War Serbs negative*, *Bosnian War Nato positive*, and *Gulf Nato positive* had most of their references in quite low positions. In the *FT*, there were no significant patterns of coverage, although *Gulf Nato positive* was the only category to get a top position reference.

The *NYT* results were also largely inconclusive. *World War Two Nato negative*, *World War Two neutral*, *Gulf Nato positive*, and *Bosnian War neutral* had the most top position references, and this mixture of negative and positive for the Nato campaign did not support the hypothesis. *World War Two Serbs negative*, *World War Two Nato negative*, *Gulf War Nato negative*, *Bosnian War Serbs negative* and *World War Two Nato positive* were all quite prominent in the top positions, but also quite spread out as well, so the mixed message again did not really support the hypothesis. Probably the most supportive evidence for the hypothesis was that all eight *Vietnam Nato negative* references were at position nine and below. Taking the above findings

into consideration, the *Independent* was judged to be the most hegemonic in this analysis, and *The Times* second. The other three newspapers were considered equally hegemonic.

Newspaper	Points
Independent	5
Times	4
Financial Times	2
Guardian	2
New York Times	2

Table 4.39. Position and Historical reference points.

4.3.4.5. Position and image

In the *Position and Image* cross-tabulation analysis, all the British newspaper sources had ethnic-Albanians as their most referenced image in position one, while the *NYT* had *Damage from Nato*. This suggests there might have been a cultural difference in the UK and US framing of the Nato campaign in this regard, with the British papers more hegemonic in their coverage, as their top image was more in line with the Nato framing of the conflict.

In the *Independent*, *ethnic-Albanian civilians* easily had the most position one references with fourteen. *Damage from Nato* and *other American Democrats* had the next highest amounts with two each. No category really seemed to be in a disproportionately high or low position, although *British soldiers in a positive picture* had all eight of its references in the top seven positions. The *Guardian*, *FT* and *The Times* had mixed results; in the *Guardian*, although *ethnic-Albanian civilians*, a positive image for Nato, was the most referenced position one category, it only had one more reference than *Damage from Nato*. Similarly, in line with the hypothesis, only two of the ten *Serb civilians* references were in the top three positions, but against the hypothesis, *Damage from Serbs* only had one reference, and this was in a

low position. The only disproportionate positioning that supported the hypothesis was that the *Serb military* was disproportionately high, with four of their five references in the top three positions, while the *KLA* was disproportionately low, with none of their five references in the top three positions; these could be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis, because Nato wanted to focus on the Serb military and ethnic-Albanian civilians most of the time. The *FT* also had *ethnic-Albanian civilians* the most in the top position, with five references, and then *Damage from Nato* and *other American Democrat politicians* were tied with the next highest amount of position one references with two each. Similarly, in *The Times*, *ethnic-Albanian civilians* was again the most referenced in the top position, with seven references, and *Damage from Nato* was joint second on three references, this time with *Maps*. None of the categories seemed to have more references in a disproportionately high or low position in the latter two media sources.

In the *NYT*, *Damage from Nato* was the most prominent image the highest amount of times, with five references, followed by *ethnic-Albanian civilians* with four; this was despite *ethnic-Albanian civilians* having over four times as many references overall. However, in line with the hypothesis, two positive categories for Nato, *American soldiers in a positive picture* and *Milosevic*, were tied with the third highest amount of top position references with just one less than *ethnic-Albanian civilians*, and two less than *Damage from Nato*. No categories were in a disproportionately high or low position.

With regard to which media source looked the most hegemonic, the *NYT* clearly seemed to have the least hegemonic coverage, as they had *Damage from Nato* as their most referenced image, and all the British papers had that category behind ethnic-

Albanian civilians as their most referenced category. As there were no other negative images for Nato in the top three references, the other points were given out on the basis of how much difference there was between their use of *Damage from Nato* and *ethnic-Albanian civilians*. The *Independent* had a difference of twelve references, so they were considered the most hegemonic. *The Times* had a difference of four, so they were considered the next most hegemonic, followed by the *FT* on three. The *Guardian* only had a difference of one, and so they were considered the least hegemonic after the *NYT*.

Newspaper	Points
Independent	5
Times	4
Financial Times	3
Guardian	2
NYT	1

Table 4.40. Position and Image.

Conclusion for hypothesis 4.

The majority of evidence in the British media does seem to show enough positivity towards Nato in the prominent positions to confirm the hypothesis, and this seems to have been because the newspapers often had the latest news from a Nato perspective on the front page. The *Position and Main People*, and *Position and Source* analyses produced evidence that seemed clearly supportive of the hypothesis, with the top positions dominated by Nato leaders and allies. The *Source* positioning seemed to make sure the *Diagnosis* positioning would also be positive for Nato, and in the *Position and Diagnosis* analysis only *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* offered any regular interruption to the positive diagnoses for Nato in three of the four British papers and the *NYT*.

The *Position and Historical References* evidence was mixed, although most of it supported the hypothesis, with three of the British papers offering largely supportive evidence, while the *FT* and *NYT* were balanced. The *Position and Image* analysis also had mixed results, as although *ethnic-Albanian civilians* was the top reference in all the British papers, *Damage from Nato* also had a lot of references in the top position, and there was little sign of any disproportion in the placement of any of the categories.

It was only in the *Position and Prognosis* analysis that there were some negative findings for the hypothesis, with only one of the sources' prognoses supporting the hypothesis. However, this is partly expected under hegemonic theory, as previous studies have found that the media often criticise its country's military strategy rather than its rationale for war, as this allows them to appear independent of their government and military. Therefore, despite some evidence that was critical of the Nato campaign in the top positions, and which therefore called the hypothesis into question, there does seem to be enough evidence that the front pages were largely supportive of Nato, and this seems to validate the hypothesis. Evaluation points are given in the table below; the *NYT* having easily the lowest amount of points seems to be the most significant finding.

Newspaper	4.36	4.37	4.38	4.39	4.40	Total	Evaluation points
Independent	4	4	1.5	5	5	19.5	5
Times	4	1.5	3.5	4	4	17	4
Guardian	2	4	5	2	2	15	3
FT	4	4	1.5	2	3	14.5	2
NYT	1	1.5	3.5	2	1	9	1

Table 4.41. Evaluation points for hypothesis 4.

4.3.5. Hypothesis 5. In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of the diagnoses will be supportive of the Nato campaign, and critical of the Serbs.

The diagnosis analysis starts with the individual categories frequency analysis, and

this includes a focus on the diagnoses contained in the articles without sources (*Writers themselves* category); it is hoped that this analysis will offer an insight into how the writers were thinking when their articles were not being directly influenced by sources, and whether their diagnoses differed much from the articles that did use sources. The section then continues with collective diagnoses analyses.

4.3.5.1. Individual Diagnosis references

The *Telegraph* had the most positive results for Nato, with their three most referenced diagnoses positive for Nato: *Refugees are Serbs' fault* was the highest, and it was followed in amount of references by *Ground war is Serb aggression* and *Nato campaign is working*. The highest negative references for Nato, *Nato campaign is Nato's fault* and *Nato campaign is not working*, were in joint fifth position along with two positive diagnoses. *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* was only the ninth highest reference. In the *Writers themselves* category, the highest referenced diagnosis was a tie between *Ground war is Milosevic's fault*, *Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault*, *Nato campaign is working* and *Nato campaign is not working*; the first three were therefore positive for Nato, and there seemed to be more of a personalisation of the Serb blame around Milosevic than where sources were used; this pattern is also evident in the other media sources' analyses.

The Times had mixed results for Nato, but was mainly positive. The two highest referenced categories were positive for the Nato campaign; *Refugees are Serbs' fault* and *Refugees are Milosevic's fault*. However, the third highest was negative, as it was *Collateral damage is Nato's fault*; moreover, *Nato campaign is not working* had more references than *Nato campaign is working*. In the *Writers themselves* category there was a tie on nine references for the most referenced diagnosis between two

diagnoses that were positive for the Nato campaign: *Ground war is Milosevic's fault* and *Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault*, and one that was negative: *Nato campaign is not working*. *Nato campaign is working* only had three references.

The *Independent* again had mixed results for Nato, but was mainly positive. *Refugees are Serbs' fault* was the highest reference by a high majority, and was followed by *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* and *Refugees are Milosevic's fault*. *Nato campaign is working* was fourth highest, while *Nato campaign is not working* was seventh. In the *Writers themselves* category, the two highest diagnoses were very negative for Nato, with *Nato campaign is not working* the highest category, followed by *Collateral damage is Nato's fault*; this was probably because of Robert Fisk's reporting, as he was usually very negative towards Nato. However, the three categories with the next highest amount of references were positive for Nato: *Ground war is Milosevic's fault*; *Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault*, and *Refugees are Serbs' fault*. *Nato campaign is working* had just under half as many references as *Nato campaign is not working*.

The *Guardian's* diagnoses also had mixed results for the Nato campaign, and although the highest reference was positive for Nato, the next two were negative: the highest was *Refugees are Serbs' fault*, but it was followed by *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* and *Nato campaign is not working*. The latter had three references more than *Nato campaign is working*, which was the fourth most referenced category. The *Writers themselves* category also had mixed results, as *Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault* was the highest reference, followed by *Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy* and *Nato campaign is not working* joint second. They only had one reference for *Nato campaign is working*.

The *FT* had similar results to the *Guardian*, with two of the three highest references negative for Nato, although the highest was positive: *Nato campaign is working* was the highest reference, but this was closely followed by *Nato campaign is not working* and *Collateral damage is Nato's fault*. These were followed by *Refugees are Serbs' fault*, which was positive. In the *Writers themselves* category, the *Nato campaign is not working* was the highest reference, but was followed closely by the *Nato campaign is working*. *Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault* was the third highest reference.

The *NYT* results were also mixed, with the first two references positive for Nato, but the third negative: *Refugees are Serbs' fault* was the most referenced, followed by *Refugees are Milosevic's fault*; *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* was third. *Nato campaign is not working* was the sixth highest reference, while the *Nato campaign is working* was the ninth. In the *Writers themselves* category, *Refugees are Milosevic's fault* was the highest reference, and was followed by *Ground war is Milosevic's fault*. The *Refugees are Serbs' fault* and *Nato campaign is not working* categories were tied as the third highest reference. There were no references for *Nato campaign is working*. The above results therefore show that most papers had quite a mixed highest diagnosis results.

4.3.5.2. Combined categories results

Most of the media sources' individual category results produced mixed results for Nato and the hypothesis, so the separate categories were combined in a collective analysis. Negative references for the opposing groups, Milosevic and the Serbs against Nato and the KLA, were compared in each media source, with some of the categories that had distinguished between Milosevic and the Serbs combined: the

negative categories for the Serbs were *Ground war is Serb aggression/Milosevic's fault*, *Collateral damage is Serbs' fault/Milosevic's fault*, *Refugees are Serbs' fault/Milosevic's fault*, *Nato campaign is Serbs' fault/Milosevic's fault*, *Nato campaign is working*. The negative references for Nato and the KLA were: *Ground war is KLA's fault*, *Collateral damage is Nato's fault*, *Nato campaign is KLA's fault*, *Nato campaign is Nato's fault* and *Nato campaign is not working*. There were therefore five diagnoses for each opposing side. Diagnoses counted as neutral and left out of the analysis were *Ground war is unavoidable civil war* and *Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy*. *Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy* would probably be critical of the Nato leaders, but it was thought to be too ambiguous to include as a negative reference for Nato. The results of the analysis are presented in the table below.

Newspaper	Negative Serbs- Negative Nato	Ratio	Evaluation points
Telegraph	104-27	3.9:1	6
Independent	174-59	3.1:1	5
NYT	188-68	2.8:1	4
Times	138-56	2.5:1	3
Guardian	127-74	1.7:1	2
Financial Times	63-39	1.6:1	1
Average of UK media	606-255	2.4:1	

Table 4.42. Negative Serbs to negative Nato ratios and diagnosis evaluation points.

Conclusion for hypothesis 5.

The overall results suggest the coverage was not positive enough for Nato to confirm the hypothesis, with the *Telegraph* being the only exception, as it was the most positive towards Nato by quite a margin. As the UK average for negative Serbs coverage to negative Nato coverage was 2.4:1, the combined British media can be seen as providing a plurality of diagnoses that did not depend on the Nato framing for

its view of the causes of the Nato campaign, its continuation and the bombing of civilian targets. The UK media's ratio was also below the *NYT* ratio.

4.3.6. Hypothesis 6. In line with hegemonic theory, the prognoses will follow the elite lead, and will not propose radical changes to the Nato strategy unless there is dissension among British politicians or the Nato countries' political and military elites.

Like the diagnosis section, this begins by looking at the most referenced prognoses of each media source and their writers without sources, before independent prognosis categories are then combined into opposed groups of positive and negative for Nato, and conclusions drawn on the hegemony of the media as a whole, and each individual media source.

4.3.6.1. Individual Prognosis Categories

The *Guardian's* most referenced prognosis seemed to show their concern with the humanitarian situation, as it was *More humanitarian aid*. It was followed by *Diplomacy* and *Continue the bombing*. The next three were all quite negative towards the Nato strategy: *Send in ground troops*, *Change the bombing strategy* and *Stop the bombing*. The *FT*, *Telegraph* and *NYT* also had the same three highest prognoses as the *Guardian*, but had *Diplomacy* first, followed by *Continue the bombing* and *More humanitarian aid*. With regard to the negative references for Nato's strategy, the *FT* had *Send in ground troops* as its fourth highest category, *Change the bombing strategy* was the seventh highest, while *Stop the bombing* only had two references. The *NYT* had *Change the bombing strategy* at fourth, *Stop the bombing* at joint fifth, and *Send in ground troops* at eighth. *Continue the bombing* had over double the references of *Stop the bombing*. The *Telegraph* had *Continue the bombing* first, *More*

humanitarian aid second and *Diplomacy* third. The *Telegraph*'s highest critical category for Nato was *Stop the bombing* at fourth; *Send in ground troops* was fifth, and *Change the bombing strategy* was sixth.

Like the *Guardian*, *The Times* had *More humanitarian aid* first, and then had *Continue the bombing* second. *Change the bombing strategy* was the third most referenced category, and this seems to show *The Times* writers' doubts about the Nato campaign. With regard to the other negative prognoses for the Nato strategy, *Send in ground troops* was fifth, and *Stop the bombing* was eighth. The *Independent* also had *More humanitarian aid* first, and the writers then showed their impatience with the Nato campaign by having *Send in ground troops* second. *Diplomacy* was the third most referenced category, and the other negative references for the Nato strategy, *Change the bombing strategy* and *Stop the bombing*, were the fourth and eighth most referenced.

In the *Writers themselves category*, the *Independent*, *FT*, *Guardian*, and *Telegraph* writers had *Send in ground troops* as their most referenced category; as the writers seemed to blame Milosevic more on their own in the diagnosis analysis, *Send in ground troops* being the most referenced seems to suggest the writers were more escalationist on their own than when they used sources. The *Independent* writers only had a couple of references for *Stop the bombing*, and the *Telegraph* writers only had one. In the *Guardian*, *Continue the bombing* and *Stop the bombing* were joint third, after *Diplomacy*. The *FT* writers did not have any references for *Stop the bombing*. *The Times* and *NYT* writers both mostly focused on *Diplomacy*; *The Times* then had *Humanitarian aid*, *Send in ground troops* and *Continue the bombing*. There were two references for *Stop the bombing*. The *NYT* had *Change the bombing strategy* with the

next highest amount of references, and then *Continue the bombing*. *Stop the bombing* did not have any references.

4.3.6.2. Combined prognosis categories

As the diagnoses were combined into groups of positive and negative for Nato, a similar study was undertaken for the prognoses. The prognosis categories grouped together as positive for Nato were *Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands*, *No ground troops*, *Continue the bombing*, *Divide the Serbs*, and *War Criminals must be brought to justice*. Negative prognoses for Nato were *Nato should negotiate with Milosevic now*, *Send in ground troops*, *Change the bombing strategy*, *Stop the bombing* and *Diplomacy*. That meant there were five negative prognoses for each side. Prognoses that were counted as neutral, and therefore left out of the analysis, were *Arm the KLA*, *Beware of the KLA*, *Nato must remain united*, *Sanctions*, *More humanitarian aid* and *Partition*. The findings are summarised in the table below, and evaluation points are allocated to each of the media sources. As the results all brought negative ratios for Nato, the media sources with the lowest ratios are placed at the top, as they had the most positive collective prognosis results for Nato. As most of the results are close together, none of them were rounded up to the hundredth.

Media Source	Negative-Positive totals for Nato	Negative-Positive Ratio for Nato	Evaluation points
Telegraph	53-52	1.01:1	6
FT	49-44	1.11:1	5
Times	105-91	1.16:1	4
Independent	96-78	1.23:1	3
NYT	117-94	1.24:1	2
Guardian	103-69	1.49:1	1
UK media sources' average	523-428	1.2:1	

Table 4.43. Negative-Positive prognosis ratios for Nato.

Conclusion for hypothesis 6.

Looking at the results from the prognosis analyses, there are mixed messages for the hypothesis, with *diplomacy* being counted as a negative category meaning there were more negative prognoses for the Nato campaign than positive when the combined prognoses were counted together. However, *Continue the bombing* had more references in all the media sources than *Stop the bombing*, and out of the negative references for the Nato campaign there were much more references for an escalation than a cessation. However, escalationist references were still against the Nato ‘message’, and therefore are not considered hegemonic in this study, and this means the hypothesis cannot be considered confirmed. Individually, the *Telegraph* was again the most hegemonic, while the *NYT* was the second least hegemonic after the *Guardian*; however, there was little difference in any of the media sources’ ratios, although the *Guardian* was noticeably less hegemonic than the others.

4.3.7. Hypothesis 7. In line with hegemonic theory, most of the media coverage of the Nato campaign will be episodic rather than thematic.

This section sets out to determine how the different media sources reported the Nato campaign, and also where they focused their coverage. It is only a short section, as there are just two analyses, and then a table provides a summary of some of the information, before it is judged whether the hypothesis was confirmed. The *Telegraph* is not included in the *Position and Format* cross-tabulation analysis.

4.3.7.1. Position and Format results

The *Position and Format* cross-tabulation results showed that all the papers had episodic formats for the majority of their first two stories, and then had thematic stories later. The *Guardian*, *FT* and *The Times* had more thematic stories than

episodic from position three; the *Independent* from position four, while the *NYT* did not have them until position nine. In this regard, the *NYT* seemed more hegemonic than the British papers, as under the hegemonic model episodic news is more favourable for the establishment.

4.3.7.2. The format and location of the reporting

The five newspapers had *Thematic in Yugoslavia* as their top format and location, while the *Telegraph* web-site had *Episodic in Yugoslavia* as their highest reference. *The Times*, *NYT* and *Independent* all had *Episodic in Yugoslavia* second, and the fact that their top two references were in Yugoslavia seems to suggest they were focused on the war in Yugoslavia. Both *The Times* and *Independent* had *Episodic in the UK* third, while the *NYT* had *Episodic elsewhere* third.

The *Guardian* had *Thematic in the UK* as their second most referenced category, and it was the only media source to have their top two references thematic. *Episodic in Yugoslavia* was third, and having two of the top three references in Yugoslavia seems to show their focus on the conflict in Kosovo, although having *Thematic in the UK* second suggests they also provided a lot of analysis and interviews from home. The *FT* had *Episodic elsewhere* second, and *Thematic elsewhere* third; the prominence of the elsewhere locations fits in with their emphasis on international coverage. The *Telegraph* had *Episodic in the UK* as their second highest reference, and having two episodic formats as their highest references suggests their coverage concentrated more on daily news rather than interpretation and analysis. However, *Thematic in Yugoslavia* was their third highest reference. The *FT* and the *NYT* were the only media sources not to have any home news categories in their three most referenced, and this suggests they did not focus on home news as much as the other media sources.

This is surprising for the *NYT*, as from the results of previous studies it was expected to focus more on domestic issues than international.

For the evaluation points, it was decided to give them on the basis of their episodic and thematic coverage, as these were the most relevant categories for the hegemonic model. *The Times* and *FT* ratios were so close in the episodic-thematic analysis that their ratios are left to the hundredth, as it was relevant for their evaluation points, while the other results were rounded up to the nearest tenth.

Media source	UK or US	Yugo-slav	Else-where	Episodic	Thematic	Ratio	Evaluation points
Telegraph	30	49	21	65	35	1.9:1	6
NYT	24	50	26	60	40	1.5:1	5
Times	19	60	21	45.1	54.9	1:1.22	4
FT	20	37	43	44.3	54.7	1:1.23	3
Indy	24	58	18	44	56	1:1.3	2
Guardian	22	56	22	33	67	1:2	1

Table 4.44. The formats and locations for the reporting of the Nato campaign.

Conclusion for hypothesis 7.

The hypothesis was not confirmed, as most of the media sources had a more thematic and international coverage than episodic and national. Overall, as the above table shows, the *Telegraph* had the most episodic coverage, and the *NYT* was the only other media source to be more episodic than thematic. The *Guardian* was the most thematic overall. Also going against the hypothesis, none of the British sources had the majority of their coverage from the UK; the *NYT* also did not have the majority of their coverage from the US. Apart from the *FT*, all the other media sources had the majority of their coverage from Yugoslavia. *The Times* had the lowest percentage of articles from domestic writers out of all the media sources, while the *Telegraph* had

the highest. *The Times*' results were surprising, as they had the most coverage of Blair and New Labour in the *Main People* analysis.

4.3.8. Hypothesis 8. In line with hegemonic theory, the vast majority of historical references will be more positive for Nato than the Serbs.

This section starts by detailing the most referenced previous conflicts by each media source. Then, the results of the frequency analysis are discussed in terms of the positivity for Nato of the most referenced historical references; firstly in terms of which ones each media source used most, and then which ones the writers without sources used the most. The historical references categories are then divided into positive and negative combinations for Nato and the Serbs, and comparisons made to analyse if Nato had a more positive historical references coverage than the Serbs. Ratios of the findings are then set out, and evaluation points given, before a conclusion is reached on the hypothesis.

4.3.8.1. Most referenced conflicts

When the historical references are separated into the different conflicts, World War Two and the Balkans wars were the most referenced in all the media sources. *The Times* had more World War Two references than any other category, and also had the highest ratio of World War Two references compared to Balkans wars references in the six media sources analysed. It had fifty-eight World War Two references, while there were twenty-seven Bosnian War references and eleven Serbo-Croat war references, meaning the Balkans wars combined had thirty-eight references. The *Guardian* also had World War Two as the highest individual reference, and also had it with more references than the Balkans wars counted together; while World War Two had fifty-five references, the Bosnian War had thirty-eight, and the Serbo-Croat war

had thirteen, meaning the Balkans wars included together totalled fifty-one. World War Two also had the most individual category references in the *FT*, with sixteen. The Bosnian war had the second highest amount with thirteen, and as the Serbo-Croat war had three references, that meant the Balkans wars together also had sixteen references. Therefore, unlike *The Times* and the *Guardian*, the Balkans wars included together had the same amount of references as World War Two in the *FT*.

The other three media sources also had World War Two with the most references for a single category, but had the Balkans wars counted together with more references.

The *NYT* had fifty-four World War Two references, but Bosnia had fifty and the Serbo-Croat war had eleven, so together the Balkans wars had sixty-one references.

In the *Telegraph*, World War Two had twelve references, followed by Bosnia with eleven, and the Serbo-Croat war and Gulf War with ten; the Balkans wars included together therefore had twenty-one references. The *Independent* had World War Two with forty-eight references, followed by the Bosnian war with forty-two. The Serbo-Croat war had thirteen references, and so the Balkans wars counted together had fifty-five references.

For clarification of the above, the World War Two and Balkans wars references by each media source are set out in a table below, and ratios given for comparison. The table is set out in ratio order, with those having the highest World War Two to Balkans wars ratio at the top, and then descending down in amount of World War Two references compared to Balkans wars references. As the *NYT* and *Independent* would both be on the same ratio if shortened to the tenth, their ratios are left to the hundredth. The *NYT* was about in the middle, and had more of a focus on the Balkans

wars than World War Two, while the UK sources as a whole had a slight majority of World War Two references to Balkans wars.

Media source	World War Two	Balkans wars	WW2-Balkans ratio
Times	58	38	1.5:1
Guardian	55	51	1.1:1
FT	16	16	1:1
NYT	54	61	1:1.13
Independent	48	55	1:1.15
Telegraph	12	21	1:1.8
UK totals and ratio	189	181	1.04:1

Table 4.45. References and ratios of World War Two compared to Balkans.

4.3.8.2. The individual media sources' use of historical references

When analysing the most referenced historical references of each media source, the *NYT* had the most positive coverage for Nato, as it was the only media source to have two positive historical references in the three most referenced without having a negative as well. It had most references for *Bosnian War Serbs negative*, followed by *World War Two Serbs negative* as the second most referenced, and *Bosnian War neutral* the third; their first two references were therefore positive for Nato, and the third neutral.

Apart from the *FT*, which did not have any positive for Nato in their three most referenced, the British media sources all had a similar coverage to each other in their most referenced historical references, with some having more positives but also a negative, while others had more neutrals. The *Guardian* featured *Bosnian War Serbs negative* the most, followed by *World War Two Nato negative* and *Serbs World War Two negative* third. The *Telegraph* had *Serbo-Croat war Serbs negative* as their highest reference, with *Gulf neutral* second and *Bosnian War neutral* third. The *Times* had *World War Two Serbs negative* as their highest reference, followed by *World War Two neutral* and *Bosnian War Serbs negative*. The *Independent* had

World War Two Serbs negative the highest, followed by *Bosnian War Serbs negative* and *Gulf Nato positive*. In the *FT*, *Bosnian War neutral* and *World War Two Nato negative* were the joint most referenced categories, and were followed by *Gulf neutral*.

4.3.8.3. Writers without sources' use of historical references

The *NYT* writers' top references were the same as the overall paper, but with the first two in a different order: *World War Two Serbs negative* had the most, then *Bosnian War Serbs negative*, before *Bosnian war neutral* was again the third most referenced. The *Telegraph* and *Independent* writers also gave Nato a very positive coverage, and did not have any negative historical references in their three most referenced categories. The *Telegraph* writers did not have many references, but *Cold War Nato positive*, *Serbo-Croat war Serbs negative*, *Gulf neutral* and *Bosnia neutral* were the most referenced with two references each. The *Independent* writers had *World War Two Serbs negative* the most, with eight references, and then had the following categories with five references: *Gulf Nato positive*, *World War Two neutral* and *Bosnian war neutral*.

Both *The Times* and *Guardian* writers' results were mixed in their positivity for Nato. *The Times*' writers had four references each for *World War Two neutral* and *Cold War neutral*, and three each for *World War Two Nato positive*, *Vietnam Nato negative*, *Falklands neutral*, and *Bosnian war Serbs negative*. The *Guardian* writers had *Bosnian war Serbs negative* as their most referenced category, with five references. *Gulf Nato positive* and *Vietnam Nato negative* were the next two highest categories, with three references each. The *Guardian* and *The Times*' *Vietnam Nato negative* references were the only negative references in the top three references for any of the media sources' writers. The *FT* writers only had two categories with more than one

reference, and these were *Gulf neutral* with three references, and *Bosnian war neutral* with two, so no conclusions could really be drawn from these results.

The frequency analysis was therefore supportive of the hypothesis, as when the three most referenced categories from all the sources were counted together, there were ten positive for Nato, seven neutral and two negative. The *writers themselves* analysis was similarly supportive of the hypothesis, as there were ten positive for Nato, ten neutral and two negative.

4.3.8.4. Combined historical references categories

Although most of the above results seem to support the hypothesis, counting the categories together into separate groups of Nato positive and negative, and Serbs positive and negative, and then comparing their negative to positive ratios provides a clearer overall picture of the media sources' use of historical references. The results of the comparison are presented in the first table below, and then the results are drawn together to compare each media source, and allocate evaluation points.

Newspaper	Nato negative	Nato positive	Ratio neg-pos	Serb negative	Serb positive	Ratio neg-pos
Guardian	48	24	2:1	48	4	12:1
Telegraph	11	6	1.8:1	20	2	10:1
Times	35	19	1.8:1	51	6	8.5:1
NYT	41	23	1.8:1	56	9	6.2:1
FT	17	8	2.1:1	7	1	7:1
Independent	34	23	1.5:1	60	13	4.6:1

Table 4.46. Nato and Serb negative and positive historical references.

Newspaper	Ratio comparing the Serb negative-positive ratio to the equivalent Nato ratio in Table 4.46.	Evaluation points
Guardian	6:1	6
Telegraph	5.5:1	5
Times	4.7:1	4
NYT	3.4:1	3
FT	3.3:1	2
Independent	3.1:1	1
UK media average	3.8:1	

Table 4.47. Negative Serbs to negative Nato historical reference ratios.

Conclusion for hypothesis 8.

Table 4.47 shows that all the media sources did have a lot more positive historical references for Nato than they did for the Serbs, although as the previous table shows, all the media sources also had a more negative than positive coverage for Nato as well.

This was surprising, and suggests the media are more likely to use historical references for negative aspects of conflicts than positive. While both Nato and the Serbs' ratios were more negative than positive, the Serbs' negative to positive ratio was much higher than Nato in every media source, and the lowest negative to positive Serb ratio was much higher than the highest negative to positive Nato ratio: Nato negative to positive ratios were between the *Independent's* 1.5:1 and the *FT's* 2.1:1, while the Serb ratios were between the *Independent's* 4.6:1 and the *Guardian's* 12:1. Table 4.47 also shows the average of overall negativity for the Serbs in comparison to Nato was 3.8:1 in the British sources, and the ratios of Serb to Nato negativity are therefore considered high enough to confirm the hypothesis.

4.3.9. Hypothesis 9. In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of images will be positive towards Nato and negative towards the Serbs.

This final section of results starts by looking at the most referenced categories in the *Image* frequency results for each media source. Then, some image categories are

grouped together into positive for Nato and positive for the Serbs, and a ratio made for comparison; the results of those two analyses are then evaluated to decide if there was enough evidence to support the hypothesis. The *Telegraph* is not included in this section, as there were no images available when the data was collected.

4.3.9.1. Individual image categories

All five papers had *ethnic-Albanian civilians* as their most referenced image, and this was supportive for the hypothesis because Nato wanted to focus the media's attention on the ethnic-Albanian refugee crisis. The *FT* and *NYT* had *Maps* as their second highest, while the *Guardian*, *Independent* and *The Times* had its own writers. All the papers then had *Damage from Nato* as their third most referenced category, and this went against the hypothesis. Further evidence against the hypothesis was that the *Guardian* had *Serb civilians* as their joint fourth most used image category, along with *Nato military armoury in a positive picture*. The *NYT* also had *Serb civilians* as their fourth highest reference. The other papers were more in line with the Nato message, as *The Times* and *FT* had *Nato military armoury in a positive picture* as their fourth highest reference, while the *Independent* had *Milosevic*.

4.3.9.2. Combined image categories

The above findings are quite ambiguous, so the categories were included together into positive and negative groupings for Nato. As there were no positive categories for the Serbs that could be compared to the Nato soldiers and armoury in positive pictures, the collective analysis was confined to just two categories each: *ethnic-Albanian civilians* and *Damage from Serbs* were counted as positive for Nato, while *Serb civilians* and *Damage from Nato* were counted as negative for Nato. The results are

set out in table 4.48, and ratios and evaluation points allocated for each media source; a conclusion on the findings then follows, and ends the daily media results section.

Newspaper	Positive for Nato	Positive for Serbs	Ratio	Evaluation points
Independent	69	22	3.1:1	5
NYT	67	27	2.5:1	4
FT	16	7	2.3:1	3
Guardian	44	32	1.4:1	2
Times	43	32	1.3:1	1
UK sources' totals and ratio	172	93	1.8:1	

Table 4.48. The amounts and ratio for positive Nato and Serb historical references.

Conclusion for hypothesis 9.

The image results in the above analyses have produced findings that can be interpreted to support or contradict the hypothesis, although overall the results do not seem positive enough to confirm the hypothesis. In support of the hypothesis, all the British papers had *ethnic-Albanian civilians* as their most referenced image, and as this was what the Nato leaders wanted the media to focus on, it was in line with the hypothesis. However, going against the hypothesis, the next most referenced image category that was relevant to either side was *Damage from Nato* in all the papers. Moreover, the ratios of Nato positive to Serb positive images in the combined categories analysis were not high enough to confirm the hypothesis either, and an average ratio of 1.8:1 for the British newspapers seems compatible with the requirements of a plural media under the circumstances. There is therefore probably enough conflicting evidence to leave the hypothesis unconfirmed.

4.3.10. Results Conclusion

This conclusion starts with two tables containing the totals for the evaluation points from the nine analyses. There are two tables because the *Telegraph* was not included

in analyses 4 and 9, as it did not have any positioning or images on its web-site when the research was undertaken. The first table is the main evaluation for the five newspapers, while the second table provides a comparison with the *Telegraph*. After the tables, there is then a two dimensional concluding analysis on the UK and US media coverage of the Kosovo conflict. The first part looks at each individual media source's coverage, by looking through the different analyses undertaken; while the second part looks at how much evidence there was to support the hegemonic model.

4.3.10.1. Individual media sources

Media source	1	2	3	5	6	7	8	Total	Average
Telegraph	3	5	6	6	6	6	5	37	5.3
NYT	4.5	6	3	4	2	5	3	27.5	3.9
Times	4.5	3	4	3	4	4	4	26.5	3.8
Independent	6	4	5	5	3	2	1	26	3.7
FT	1.5	2	1	1	5	3	2	15.5	2.2
Guardian	1.5	1	2	2	1	1	6	14.5	2.1

Table 4.49. Evaluation points not including tables 4 and 9.

Media source	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total	Average
Independent	5	4	5	5	5	3	2	1	5	35	3.9
NYT	3.5	5	3	1	4	2	5	3	4	30.5	3.4
Times	3.5	3	4	4	3	4	4	4	1	30.5	3.4
FT	1.5	2	1	2	1	5	3	2	3	20.5	2.5
Guardian	1.5	1	2	3	2	1	1	5	2	18.5	1.9

Table 4.50. Evaluation points including tables 4 and 9.

The *Telegraph* had easily the highest average in the table it was included in, table 4.50, and this suggests it was the most hegemonic in its support for the Nato campaign out of the media sources analysed. This result was what might have been expected for the reporting of a traditional war involving Britain, but it is quite surprising for the circumstances of the Kosovo conflict, with a Labour government in power, and the conflict portrayed as the first fought for purely humanitarian reasons.

The next three media sources had a similar coverage, and switched positions in the two tables. The *Independent* was the most positive media source towards Nato in table 4.50; although it was lower than the *NYT* and *The Times* in table 4.49. The *Independent* was varied in its scoring, being high in some categories, average in others, and low in a couple. The *NYT* was below the *Independent* in table 4.50, but above it in table 4.49, and so was the second most hegemonic in both tables; it shared the second place with *The Times* in table 4.50. As well as being behind the *Independent* and level with the *NYT* in table 4.50, *The Times* was the third highest in table 4.49, and so was a little above average in both tables.

After the *Telegraph* was clearly the most hegemonic, and the next three media sources were moderately hegemonic in a similar way, the *Guardian* and *FT* were clearly the least hegemonic. The *Guardian* looked the least hegemonic despite its stout support for Nato, and calls for an escalation in the Nato campaign for most of the conflict; this was because it was often very critical of the Nato campaign as well, and had a varied coverage. The *FT* did not appear hegemonic because it focused a lot of its coverage on diplomacy, and this was often undertaken by non-Nato politicians and diplomats.

Conclusion

The fact that the evaluation points show the *Telegraph* was the most supportive of the Nato campaign, and the *Guardian* the most negative, suggests the portrayal of the Nato campaign as one fought for purely humanitarian reasons did not alter the traditional reporting positions of the left and right wing media sources to any great degree; the right-wing press were still the most supportive, while the left-wing press was still the most critical. There were signs of changes, such as the *Guardian* being the most escalationist, but over the many different features of the media coverage, and

over the whole campaign, the *Telegraph* was still the most hegemonic and the *Guardian* the least.

4.3.10.2. The collective British Media: hegemonic or plural

Having looked at the individual media sources above, the results are brought together here to evaluate whether the different analyses show the British media sources to have been more in line with the hegemonic or plural models.

The hegemonic evidence

There were four analyses that brought results more in line with the hegemonic model, and these were main people, use of sources, positioning of news, and historical references. In the main people analysis, the media sources focused most of their coverage on the Nato and Serb leaderships and ethnic-Albanian civilians, and this was in line with the Nato media strategy. The KLA and Serb civilians were not given the same kind of prominent coverage, and only *The Times* gave the Serb civilians more coverage than the Serb politicians and military. Only the *FT* gave a coverage that concentrated on the wider issues of the conflict, and the diplomacy that was taking place. In the use of sources, the results showed Nato sources and ethnic-Albanian civilians were used the vast majority of the time, and this was positive for the Nato campaign. In the position analysis, the results showed the front pages contained Nato leaders and allies as the main people and sources, along with positive news for Nato, in the majority of the media sources. In the historical references analysis, the results showed that although the media had more negative historical references for Nato than positive, there were much more negative references for the Serbs, and the ratio of negative historical references for the Serbs to negative for Nato was large enough to consider the hypothesis confirmed.

The plural evidence

There were four analyses with results more in line with the plural model, and these were diagnoses, prognoses, format, and images. In the diagnoses analysis, apart from the *Telegraph*, the other media sources all had a negative diagnosis in the highest three diagnoses, and the *FT* and *Guardian* had two, which seems quite plural; this was mainly because there was quite a lot of coverage of Nato collateral damage, along with articles with the view that the Nato campaign was not working. The *Guardian* and *The Times* had more references for the Nato campaign not working than working. In the prognoses analysis, the results showed there were quite a lot of negative prognoses for Nato, although many were for diplomacy, or preferred an escalation of the Nato campaign to a cessation. In the format analysis, the results showed there was more thematic coverage than episodic, with more inquiry, analysis and opinion articles than the reporting of daily news events. The *Telegraph* was the most hegemonic in format and location, and the *Guardian* the least, so this was in line with other hegemonic and plural results, and suggests the theory is relevant. In the images analysis, although they were more positive images than negative for Nato, there were prominent Nato collateral damage images shown on a regular basis, and this meant there was not a high enough positive-negative ratio to consider the hypothesis confirmed.

The mixed evidence

There was one analysis that had results too mixed to consider them either more hegemonic or plural, and this was the evaluation of the main people. Although the Nato leaders and Nato military were evaluated more positively than negatively in most of the media sources, Nato's ratio was more negative than positive overall, and the *Guardian* coverage was particularly negative. Clinton also received a more

negative than positive evaluation in four of the UK media sources. In support of the hegemonic model, the evaluations of the Serb military and Milosevic compared to the KLA seemed hegemonic, as the KLA received a much more positive coverage than Milosevic and the Serb military.

Conclusion

The above results seem to suggest the Kosovo media coverage was in the middle of the hegemonic and plural models. This is in line with the theory that both critical and plural media analysts are correct in different ways, or depending on the analysis, and the UK and US medias often show elements from both models in their coverage. The main way the media looked hegemonic was in giving the Nato leaders the most prominent coverage, and using them more as the main sources; this led to the Nato campaign being reported from a largely Nato perspective. These are two of the main aspects of the hegemonic model, which argues that the UK and US media give too much preference to official sources, such as government and military leaders. This could be said to be a part of their 'natural' way of thinking and working, in that they consider the people who have power in their country to be the most authoritative sources to fulfil their professional values, and interest the audience.

However, although the above evidence suggests the people in authority have the advantage, that does not mean they control the news, or will always be given positive coverage. As the negative hypothesis analyses showed, if the media do not consider the political and military leaders are doing a good job, they will feature news and opinion that is negative for them. The diagnosis and image analyses showed that most of the media sources analysed did not try and ignore Nato's collateral damage incidents; the diagnosis *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* was one of the most

referenced categories, and *Damage by Nato* was also one of the most used images. Two of the UK sources also had more articles that gave the impression the Nato campaign was not working than it was working in the diagnosis analysis. The prognosis results also showed that the media sources were not willing to support the Nato strategy without offering criticisms and alternative opinions, and there were regular articles calling for diplomacy, the bombing to be stopped, or for changes in the campaign strategy.

4.4. Research question. Did the re-organisation of the Nato media operation near the end of the first half of their campaign improve their media coverage in the second half of their campaign?

Introduction

After the Nato media operation was criticised for reacting slowly and incoherently to the Djakovica convoy attack in the middle of April, Alistair Campbell and some other British and American public relations experts went out to Brussels to reorganise the Nato media operation. This investigation into whether there were any significant signs of Nato political and military influence on the British media coverage of Kosovo, divides the Nato campaign in half and looks for differences in the media coverage in the two halves. This is because the MOC began their work in late April, and although it cannot be known exactly when their work started to take effect, it is presumed their influence would have been evident by the beginning of May, which was roughly half way through the Nato campaign. This section therefore compares the media coverage of the Nato campaign in the two halves, with seventeen days in each half; the first half runs from March 24th to April 30th and the second half from May 1st to the June 10th.

To begin with, the difference in the amount of coverage in each half are set out, as the second half of the Nato campaign generally had much less coverage than the first, and this meant there was likely to be much less evidence of some of the categories in the second half than the first. The lines and articles were counted at first, but then the article amounts seemed to be the best guide, as they were the unit of analysis, and there was one variable category included for each article, so the lines were left out. The *NYT* is also included in this analysis, even though the main interest is in

evaluating whether the Nato political and military leaders influenced the British media coverage. After the differences in first and second half content are detailed, evidence from the *Date and Source*, *Date and Diagnosis*, *Date and Historical Reference*, *Date and Image*, and *Date and Prognosis* cross-tabulation results are then analysed to see if there were any disproportionate differences in the two halves' coverage.

4.4.1. The difference in the media sources' first and second half coverage of the Kosovo Conflict

For clarity, the amount of first and second half articles, and the percentage of second half articles in comparison to the first are set out in the following table. The percentages and ratios are shortened to the tenth unless the media sources have similar coverage to each other, and then they are kept to the hundredth to differentiate between media sources. A short summary of the findings then follows the tables.

Newspaper	First half-second half amount of articles.	Second half's percentage of first half's coverage
Telegraph	138-81	58.6%
Times	267-157	58.8%
NYT	258-184	71%
Independent	224-162	72%
Guardian	237-173	73%
FT	123-98	80%
Total and average for UK media sources	989-671	68%

Table 4.51. The percentages of second half coverage compared to the first, and the ratios of first half to second half coverage.

Summary of the tables' findings

The tables show *The Times* and *Telegraph* had almost identical drops in article amounts in the second half coverage as compared to the first, with only between fifty-eight and fifty-nine per cent of articles in the second half as compared to the first.

This nearly halving of content in the second half of the Nato campaign means they

can therefore be expected to show the biggest fall in category amounts from the first half to the second in the later analyses in this section. The *Independent*, *Guardian* and *NYT* had the next biggest falls in coverage, and the decline was very similar in the three media sources, at about thirteen per cent less decline than *The Times* and *Telegraph*. The *FT* had the lowest fall in second half coverage, at about eight per cent less decline than the *Independent*, *Guardian* and *NYT*, and twenty-one per cent less than *The Times* and *Telegraph*. The *NYT*'s decline in second half coverage was a little less than the UK average.

4.4.2. Date and Source

To analyse the date and source data, each of the media sources' *Date and Source* results were split into a first and second half of the Nato campaign, and the references for the following categories or groups of categories were counted together in each separate half of seventeen days: all the British Government; all the Nato categories; American Government; UK and US opposition parties; all Serbs, except the free media; all ethnic-Albanians, except the free media; and finally, Diplomats, Russian politicians, the UN and European politicians were included together in a last group. Identifying whether there was an increase or decrease in the above sources' use should offer an insight into the success of Campbell's reorganisation of the Nato media operation. The results for each media source, and then for each of the above groups of source categories are presented below.

4.4.2.1. Each media source's Date and Source data

The six media sources' first and second half main source use comparison are set out in the following six tables, with the percentage of increase or decrease in the second

half from the first given for each media source. The media source's decline in second half articles is also included at the top of the table.

Independent	Decline in second half articles: 28%		
Sources	First half references	Second half references	Percentage increase or decrease in halves
British government	34	16	-53%
Nato	19	17	-11%
American government	14	11	-21%
Opposition parties	3	0	N/A
Serbs	17	9	-47%
Ethnic-Albanians	22	15	-32%
Diplomats/Neutrals	8	7	-12%

Table 4.52. *Independent's* use of sources in the two halves.

The most notable difference between the two halves in the *Independent*, which had a 28% drop in second half articles, was that British Government sources had the biggest drop in use: down 53% on the first half. The Serbs had the second biggest drop at 47%. All the sources saw a drop in second half access, but Nato had the smallest decline, with 11% less than the first half; just less than the diplomats and neutral politicians at 12%.

FT	Decline in second half articles: 20%		
Sources	First half references	Second half references	Percentage increase or decrease in halves
British government	14	8	-43%
Nato	15	10	-34%
American government	14	9	-36%
Opposition parties	2	0	N/A
Serbs	13	1	-92%
Ethnic-Albanians	3	5	+67%
Diplomats/Neutrals	14	16	+12%

Table 4.53. *FT's* use of sources in the two halves.

In the *FT*, which had a 20% decline in second half coverage compared to the first, the Serbs had the biggest drop in source access from the first half to the second, at 92%. This was in contrast to the ethnic-Albanians, who had the biggest increase in coverage from the second half to the first, with a 67% increase. Although this seems a big

increase, it was only going up from three first half references to five in the second half.

The diplomats and neutral politicians had a small increase in coverage in the second half, while the British and American governments, and the Democrats all saw big decreases.

Guardian	Decline in second half articles: 27%		
Sources	First half references	Second half references	Percentage increase or decrease in halves
British government	38	22	-42%
Nato	19	18	-5%
American government	13	11	-15%
Opposition parties	2	3	+33%
Serbs	15	11	-27%
Ethnic-Albanians	21	15	-29%
Diplomats/Neutrals	21	15	-29%

Table 4.54. *Guardian's* use of sources in the two halves.

In the *Guardian*, which had a 27% fall in second half coverage as compared to the first, the opposition parties were the only ones to have more second half source access than the first, with a 33% increase in their second half use; although this was only up from two references to three. Nato had the smallest decrease in coverage, with just a 5% fall. The British government had the biggest decrease: down 42%. The Serbs and ethnic-Albanians were both down 29%.

Times	Decline in second half articles: 41.2%		
Sources	First half references	Second half references	Percentage increase or decrease in halves
British government	43	24	-44%
Nato	16	7	-56%
American government	10	9	-10%
Opposition parties	2	4	+100%
Serbs	24	7	-71%
Ethnic-Albanians	22	7	-68%
Diplomats/Neutrals	12	11	-8%

Table 4.55. *Times's* use of sources in the two halves.

In *The Times*, which had a second half decline in coverage of 41.2% compared to the first, opposition parties were again the only category to show an increase in second

half access. Their references were up 100% in the second half, although this was only from two references to four. Apart from the diplomats and neutral politicians only being down 8%, and the American Government down 10%, all the others had quite big decreases, with the Serbs the biggest at 71%.

Telegraph	Decline in second half articles: 41.4%		
Sources	First half references	Second half references	Percentage increase or decrease in halves
British government	21	17	-19%
Nato	19	10	-47%
American government	11	3	-73%
Opposition parties	3	1	-67%
Serbs	10	8	-20%
Ethnic-Albanians	20	8	-60%
Diplomats/Neutrals	9	9	No change

Table 4.56. Telegraph's use of sources in the two halves.

In the *Telegraph*, which had a second half decline in coverage of 41.4% compared to the first, there were no second half increases in source usage, although the diplomats and neutrals had no change. The British Government saw the smallest decrease at 19%, just ahead of the Serbs at 20%. The Democrats had the highest fall at 73%, and this might have been because the *Telegraph* did not agree with their strategy on ground troops, and chose to marginalise them; although evidence from the *Date and Prognosis* results suggests the *Telegraph* supported the introduction of ground troops more in the first half of the Nato campaign than the second.

NYT	Decline in second half articles: 29%		
Sources	First half references	Second half references	Percentage increase or decrease in halves
British Government	6	3	-50%
Nato	29	19	-34%
American Government	54	35	-35%
Opposition parties	8	5	-37%
Serbs	24	20	-17%
Ethnic-Albanians	25	19	-24%
Diplomats/Neutrals	13	14	+7%

Table 4.57. NYT's use of sources in the two halves.

In the *NYT*, which had a 29% fall in second half coverage, only the diplomats and neutrals saw an increase in second half source access, as they were up 7%. The Serbs had the lowest decrease at 17%, just less than the ethnic-Albanians at 19%. The British Government had the highest decrease at 50%, and this might have been for a similar reason as the Democrats having the biggest fall in the *Telegraph*; the media sources supporting their government's strategy, and marginalising that of the other government.

Altogether, there was a 31.1% drop in coverage in the second half to the first in all the media sources. However, there were some very different changes in source access for the different groups between the different media sources. For example, the British Government only fell 19% in the *Telegraph*, but they declined by over 40% in all the other media sources, and by 53% in the *Independent*. Nato's second half decline ranged from just 5% in the *Guardian*, and 11% in the *Independent*, to 56% in *The Times*, and 47% in the *Telegraph*; those divisions seem to indicate continued support from the left-wing media, and disillusionment from the right-wing media, in the second half of the Nato campaign. The American Governments' lowest second half decline was 10% in *The Times*, while their highest was 73% in the *Telegraph*. Opposition parties' access grew 33% during the second half in the *Guardian*, but did not have any second half references in the *FT* or *Independent*. The Serbs' lowest decline was 17% in the *NYT*, while their highest was 92% in the *FT*. The ethnic-Albanians' biggest decline was 68% in *The Times*, while they had a 67% increase in the *FT*. Finally, Diplomats and Neutral politicians ranged from a 29% decline in the *Guardian* to a 7% increase in the *NYT*.

4.4.2.2. The difference in the sources' use in each half of the Nato campaign

The results for each group of sources are summarised in a table below, with the results given for all the media sources in the first two columns, and a percentage of their decrease in the third column; while the next three columns do the same in an analysis of the UK media.

Source	All media 1 st half	All media 2 nd half	Percentage decrease	UK media 1 st half	UK media 2 nd half	Percentage decrease
British government	156	90	-42%	122	74	-39%
Nato	117	81	-31%	88	62	-30%
American government	116	78	-33%	62	43	-31%
Opposition	20	13	-35%	12	8	-33%
Serbs	103	56	-46%	79	36	-55%
Ethnic-Albanians	113	69	-39%	88	50	-43%
Diplomats/Neutral politicians	77	72	-6%	64	58	-9%
Total and overall percentage	702	459	-33%	515	331	-34%

Table 4.58. Sources' first and second half access to the media.

The above table shows the Serbs had the highest decrease in source access in the second half of the Nato campaign, dropping 46% in all the media sources, and 55% in the UK media; this was compared to the drop in the overall source use of about 33-34%. This can be seen as something of a success for the MOC, although the ethnic-Albanians saw the second biggest decrease, so that might suggest the decline in Serb sources was more to do with the media moving the focus of their coverage away from the ground war than it was to do with the work of the MOC. This view is also supported by the fact that the group of categories including Russian and European politicians, Diplomats and the UN saw the smallest decrease in second half access, with the second half seeing their use as sources drop only 6% in all media, and 9% in

the UK media. When it is taken into consideration there was an overall decrease in second half articles of over 30% compared to the first, those decreases look like comparative increases. Nato had the second lowest decline in source use in the second half of the campaign with about 30-31%, which was a little below the average; this suggests the MOC was a partial success in this analysis, and especially when the Serbs' decline is taken into consideration.

4.4.3. Date and Historical Reference

The amount of historical references fell in the second half of the conflict, and this section focuses on the most significant changes for the Nato campaign in the two halves; after an account of the individual frequency results, the historical references categories are therefore combined into positive and negative for Nato, and positive and negative for the Serbs, to see if the ratios changed much in the two halves of the conflict, and whether the second half was more or less positive for Nato than the first.

4.4.3.1. Significant historical reference frequency changes during the Nato campaign

In the *Independent*, in line with the hypothesis, the second half of the campaign saw *Vietnam Nato negative* and *Cold War Nato negative* references largely drop out of the framing, after there were a few of each in the first half of the campaign. Also positive for the MOC in the second half of the campaign, *Serb-Croat war Serbs positive* and *Bosnian war Serbs positive* had their only references in the first half of the campaign, while *Serb-Croat war Serbs negative* had more references in the second half of the campaign to the first. The only disproportionate evidence in the *Guardian* also seemed to be in line with the hypothesis, as eight of the nine *Vietnam Nato negative*

references, and four out of the five *Cold War Nato negative* references were in the first half of the Nato campaign.

In contrast to the *Independent* and *Guardian*, the most notable evidence went against the hypothesis in the *FT*, as *Bosnian war Nato negative* only had references in the last few days of the campaign, while *Bosnian war Serbs negative* only had references in the first half of the Nato campaign. *The Times*, *Telegraph* and *NYT* had a mostly balanced coverage over the two halves, with little of significance for the hypothesis, although a lack of improvement goes against the MOC improving the Nato media operation.

4.4.3.2. Combined historical references categories

For a clearer idea of the overall historical references coverage in the two halves of the Nato campaign, all the positive and negative historical references for Nato and the Serbs were combined together and separated into the two halves. The data is set out in the following two tables.

Media source	Nato positive 1st half	Nato negative 1 st half	Pos-Neg ratio	Nato positive 2 nd half	Nato negative 2 nd half	Pos-Neg ratio
Independent	18	24	1:1.3	5	10	1:2
NYT	16	27	1:1.7	7	14	1:2
Times	14	25	1:1.8	5	10	1:2
Guardian	16	36	1:2.3	8	15	1:1.8
FT	6	14	1:2.3	2	3	1:1.5
Telegraph	3	8	1:2.7	3	3	1:1
Total	73	134	1:1.8	30	55	1:1.8
UK sources	56	107	1:1.9	23	41	1:1.8

Table 4.59. The first and second half historical references for Nato.

Newspaper	Serbs positive 1st half	Serbs negative 1 st half	Pos-Neg ratio	Serbs positive 2 nd half	Serbs negative 2 nd half	Pos-Neg ratio
Independent	10	32	1:3.2	3	28	1:9.3
Telegraph	0	10	N/A	2	10	1:5
Times	6	37	1:6.2	0	14	N/A
Guardian	3	32	1:10.7	1	16	1:16
FT	1	5	1:5	0	2	N/A
NYT	8	40	1:5	1	16	1:16
Total	28	156	1:5.6	7	86	1:12.3
UK sources	20	116	1:5.8	6	70	1:11.7

Table 4.60. The first and second half historical references for the Serbs.

The overall results show all media sources' historical references were negative for both sides in both halves, apart from the *Telegraph's* second half ratio for Nato, which was even. Combining the results for all the papers, they show the two halves of the Nato campaign had very similar results for Nato's positive-negative ratio, as it remained at a negative to positive 1.8:1. The Serbs' ratio became more negative in the second half: rising from a negative to positive 5.6:1 in the first half to 12.3:1 in the second half. The UK media sources had similar findings, with the Nato references improving a little in the second half, from a negative-positive ratio of 1.9:1 to 1.8:1; while the Serbs' references declined from 5.8:1 to 11.7:1.

Looking at the individual media sources' coverage of Nato, they were split down the middle in their coverage of the two halves, with the *Telegraph*, *Guardian* and *FT* having an improved ratio for Nato in the second half of the conflict, while the *Independent*, *Times* and *NYT* had a worse second half coverage for Nato. All the media sources had similar ratios for Nato in both halves, and only the *Telegraph*, *Guardian* and *FT* had a negative to positive ratio of over 2:1 against Nato in either half; in support of the MOC, this was during the first half of the conflict. The largest swing between the two halves for Nato was in the *Telegraph*, which changed from a first half negative to positive ratio of 2.7:1 to an even ratio in the second.

The *Guardian* was the most negative towards the Serbs, and their 10.7:1 negative to positive ratio in the first half rose to 16:1 in the second. There were no ratios available for the analysis of the Serb coverage in the *Telegraph* in the first half, and *The Times* and *FT* in the second, as there were no positive references for the Serbs. All the ratios that were available for analysis deteriorated for the Serbs in the second half of the conflict, and where there were no ratios available the second half looked at least as bad as the first for the Serbs. So, although the Nato ratios remained stable over the two halves of the conflict, the Serb ratios can be interpreted as possible evidence that the MOC improved the media coverage for Nato in the second half of the conflict by increasing the media's negativity towards the Serbs.

4.4.4. A comparison of the Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanian civilians image references in the two halves of the Nato campaign

This analysis evaluates how the images used by the newspapers changed over the course of the Nato campaign. It was thought that the best way to evaluate the impact of the MOC would be to compare a positive image for Nato with a negative one, and as the MOC was trying to focus the media's attention on *ethnic-Albanian civilians*, it was used as a positive reference for Nato, and as Nato was trying to avoid media coverage of their collateral damage incidents, *Damage from Nato* was chosen as the negative image.

4.4.4.1. The results

The following table compares the above categories, and their use in the two halves is compared to the general difference in coverage between the two halves in amount of articles and overall images.

Media Source	2 nd half per cent of first half articles	2 nd half per cent of first half images	2 nd half per cent of first half ethnic-Albanian civilian images	2 nd half per cent of first half Damage by Nato images	Ratio of per cent decline: Nato damage to E-A civilian images in 2 nd half
Times	58	49	53	10	5.3:1
Indy	72	56	54	27	2:1
Guardian	72	56	59	37	1.6:1
NYT	71	70	80	50	1.6:1
FT	79	86	23	6-0	N/A

Table 4.61. Differences in positive and negative images for Nato in the two halves.

The above table shows how the media's use of *Damage by Nato* images declined disproportionately in the second half of the campaign in all the media sources, and especially *The Times* and *FT*. As the media would probably explain the decrease as being because the Nato collateral damage was not the news it had been at the start of the campaign, it was also compared to the coverage of the ethnic-Albanian civilians, as Blair complained the media were showing 'refugee fatigue' in the second half of the conflict because they were not giving them enough coverage. While *The Times* maintained over fifty per-cent of its *ethnic-Albanian civilian* pictures in the second half as compared to the first, it cut its *Damage by Nato* images down to ten per cent of their first half amount. However, a qualitative analysis later found that *The Times* featured several images of Chinese protestors after the embassy bombing, rather than the damage to the embassy, so this might have influenced the results to look more positive for the MOC than they really were. The *Independent* and *Guardian* also kept their ethnic-Albanian civilian images up above fifty per cent of their first half amounts, but the *Independent* cut their *Damage by Nato* images to twenty-seven per cent of the first half amount, while the *Guardian's* *Damage by Nato* images decreased to thirty-seven per cent of their first half amount. The *NYT* kept a higher percentage of both types of images, and ended with the same ratio as the *Guardian*. The *FT*

cannot be compared through percentages or ratios as it did not have any Nato collateral damage images in the second half of the analysis, but that meant it was in line with the other media sources analysed, in that it cut its *Damage by Nato* second half images. It also cut its ethnic-Albanian civilians images by seventy-seven per cent as well though. Nevertheless, the above results seem to provide good evidence to support the view that the MOC brought an improved media coverage for Nato in the second half of the campaign.

4.4.5. Date and Diagnosis

This analysis will concentrate on four diagnosis categories that seem to offer the best way to judge if the media coverage improved for Nato in the second half of the conflict. It will start by looking at the *Collateral Damage is Nato's fault* and *ethnic-Albanian refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault* categories, and then go on to look at the *Nato campaign is working* and *Nato campaign is not working* categories.

4.4.5.1. A comparison of the decrease in second half Collateral damage is Nato's fault to ethnic-Albanian refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault diagnosis references.

The Analysis

Although the *Date and Image* analysis provided good evidence to support an improved media coverage of collateral damage for Nato in the second half of the campaign, qualitative analysis suggested media coverage of Nato collateral damage did not decrease as much as the above comparison between the *Damage from Nato* and *ethnic-Albanian refugees* images suggested, and it was thought that the decrease in second half *Damage by Nato* images was partly because there was more coverage of the Nato bombing campaign in the first few days after it started, and some of those

images were positive for the Nato campaign. Therefore, a quantitative comparison was made between the two halves for the amount of *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* and refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault diagnosis references, and the results are shown in the table below, and analysed afterwards.

Media Source	2nd half percent age of first half articles	2nd half percentage of first half collateral damage is Nato's fault diagnoses	2nd half percentage of first half ethnic-Albanian refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault diagnoses	Ratio of percentage decline in 2nd half: E-A refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault to collateral damage is Nato's fault
Telegraph	59	50	65	1:1.3
Indy	72	113	70	1.6:1
FT	79	114	65	1.8:1
Times	58	85	43	1.98:1
Guardian	72	88	44	2:1
NYT	71	270	54	5:1

Table 4.62. Comparison between Nato collateral damage and Serbs causing refugees diagnoses in the two halves.

4.4.5.1.2. The results

The above table suggests only the *Telegraph* diagnoses fitted in with the theory that the Nato media operation improved in the second half of the conflict, as its ratio of ethnic-Albanian refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault increased in comparison to Nato collateral damage is Nato's fault in the second half of the conflict, while the other media sources' coverage declined, and therefore went against the theory. After an additional analysis of the material, it was found that a reason for the disparity between the image and diagnosis results was probably that they reported the Chinese Embassy bombing in the second half of the conflict negatively, but showed images of the protests, rather than the actual damage from the Nato bombs; as there were quite a few articles and images about that event, it influenced the results in the above manner.

The British papers had a much lower increase in *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* diagnoses references than the *NYT*, which saw a massive 270% increase in the second half; this was in line with it also having less of a decrease in *Damage by Nato* images in the second half compared to the British media. It could therefore be argued that the *NYT's* coverage was more representative of the conflict situation, as six out of the nine biggest Nato collateral damage incidents detailed by Amnesty International were in the second half of the campaign. Therefore, Campbell and Shea's belief in an improved media coverage for Nato collateral damage incidents in the second half of the campaign could be correct in terms of the British media if the amount of Nato collateral damage is taken into consideration, as the coverage of Nato collateral damage in the British media did not increase in line with its occurrence.

4.4.5.2. Nato campaign is working or Nato campaign is not working?

In five of the media sources there was an improved coverage for Nato in the second half when compared with the first. For example, in the *FT*, there were seven references for *Nato campaign is working* in the first half, and eighteen in the second half; moreover, in the first half there were thirteen references for *Nato campaign is not working*, but only five in the second half. The second half coverage had therefore improved for Nato in both categories, and there was a similar transformation in four of the other media sources.

In the first of these, the *Guardian*, there were seven references for *Nato campaign is working* in the first half of the conflict and fifteen in the second half, and there were seventeen references for *Nato campaign is not working* in the first half and only eight in the second half. This was mirrored in the *Independent*, where *Nato campaign is working* had ten references in the first half and sixteen in the second half, while *Nato*

campaign is not working had eleven references in the first half and only six in the second. In the *Telegraph* there was an even bigger difference in the first and second halves: for *Nato campaign is working* there were two references in the first half and fifteen in the second half, while the *Nato campaign is not working* category had seven references in the first half and only three in the second half. The *NYT* also had similar results to the British media sources: the first half had four *Nato campaign is working* references, while there were seven in the second half, while the *Nato campaign is not working* had fourteen in the first half and only one in the second.

The only media source where the *Nato campaign is or is not working* diagnoses did not improve in the second half was *The Times*, where it stayed roughly the same: there were five references for *Nato campaign is working* in the first half and six in the second, and nine references for *Nato campaign is not working* in the first half, and ten in the second.

4.4.6. The Date and Prognosis analysis

This analysis focuses on trying to identify whether the prognoses improved for *Nato* in the second half of the conflict, with prognoses like *Continue the bombing*, *Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands*, *War criminals must be brought to justice* and *No ground troops* considered positive for *Nato*, and prognoses like *Stop the bombing*, *Change the bombing strategy*, *Send in ground troops* and *Diplomacy* considered negative for *Nato*. The analysis starts with the British media sources, and then the *NYT* analysis follows at the end.

4.4.6.1. Results

In line with the hypothesis, the evidence from the *Date and Prognosis* analysis suggests the *Guardian* dug its heels in for victory in the second half of the conflict,

and became more supportive of the Nato campaign. For example, fifteen of its eighteen *Stop the bombing* articles were in the first half of the conflict, and the disproportionate fall in second half references suggests their resolve for the Nato bombing increased in the second half of the conflict. Although the *Continue the bombing* references also decreased in the second half of the conflict, the drop was more in line with the general decrease in coverage, and was not at the same rate as *Stop the bombing*. Also supporting the hypothesis, and going against the second half decrease in coverage, all six of the *Nato must remain united* references were in the second half.

The main evidence from the *Telegraph* also seems to be in line with the hypothesis, as it seemed to change from calling for Nato ground troops to be introduced in the first half of the conflict to opposing their use in the second. However, possibly going against the hypothesis, the only other category to show a significant increase in second half references was *Diplomacy*, which doubled from seven references in the first half to fourteen in the second. There was a mixture of positive and negative findings for the hypothesis in the *Independent* analysis, and the most noticeable feature was that the paper seemed to become more hawkish in the second half of the conflict. The *FT* results showed the two most significant differences in the first and second half coverage were negative for the hypothesis, with more diplomacy and ground troops references in the second half of the campaign.

The Times also had more evidence that went against the hypothesis than supported it in the analysis. For example, they seemed to increase their use of the prognosis *Send in ground troops* in the second half of the conflict, with eighteen of the twenty-six references in May and June; although *No ground troops* also rose a little as well, from

two in the first half to four in the second. There were also mixed results in the *NYT*, although most were positive for the theory that the MOC improved the coverage for Nato in the second half. For example, in support of the hypothesis, *Stop the bombing* fell from fifteen first half references to five in the second; there were eleven references for *Send in ground troops* in the first half of the conflict, but only one in the second half until the final day, when troops were ready to go in to oversee the peace deal, and there were then three references; there were twenty-four references in the first half of the conflict for *Change the bombing strategy* and only four in the second, and *War criminals must be brought to justice* and *Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands* went against the downward trend in second half articles and had more references. Going against the hypothesis in the *NYT*, *Continue the bombing* references fell from thirty-two in the first half to seventeen in the second, and *Diplomacy* references increased markedly in the second half of the campaign, from nineteen to thirty-three.

4.4.7. Conclusion

Most of the above results did therefore show signs of improvement for the media coverage of the Nato campaign in the second half, although whether it was down to the MOC or an improving Nato campaign cannot be decided from this analysis. The *Date and Source* analysis suggested the MOC had been successful to a certain extent, and especially in comparison to the Serbs, with Nato's second half source access decline below average, while the Serbs' was much higher than average. The historical references comparison also showed an improvement for Nato in the second half of their campaign, as Nato's positive-negative ratio stayed virtually the same, while the Serbs' declined markedly. The prognoses results were mixed, but the images analysis also showed an improvement for Nato, although maybe it is not as

much as the comparison suggests, due to the *Damage by Nato* category not being separated into positive and negative, and the Chinese embassy coverage focusing more on the resulting protests against the Nato bombing than the damage by Nato. In the *Date and Diagnosis* analysis, the Nato campaign was considered to be working much more by the media in the second half to the first, although Nato was blamed for collateral damage more, so those results look to be down to events more than the MOC's work. However, the British sources focused much less on collateral damage than the *NYT* in the second half, and this might be evidence that the British character of the MOC meant it had more of an influence on the British media than the American.

Although the MoD included new forms of systematic assessment, including the evaluation of the UK print media, in their analysis of their media operation in the Iraq war, they still concluded that 'Measurement of the success of an effects-based operation such as an information campaign is important, but difficult to achieve...'³²⁸

It is likewise difficult for this study to draw a conclusion on the effects of the Nato media operation on the British media, with presumably much more limited resources; but if the media operation was meant to save rather than win Nato's Kosovo campaign, in the face of mounting collateral damage incidents, then there does seem enough evidence to suggest the MOC re-organisation was a success.

³²⁸ MoD., *Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future*, at http://www.mod.uk/publications/iraq_futurelessons/chap10.htm, last updated November, 2003.

4.5. Sunday papers

Having analysed six media sources that were all editorially pro-war, it was thought that a comparison between the *Sunday New York Times (SNYT)*, which was also editorially pro-war, and the only editorially anti-war British newspaper, the *Independent on Sunday (IoS)*, would offer evidence of whether a paper being editorially anti-war would be reflected in the quantitative data; this should offer clues as to how much influence a paper's editorial support for a war involving their military has on the paper's content. Analyses were also undertaken to see if there was any positioning of news articles and images that favoured Nato, and if the MOC had affected the second half coverage, but little evidence was found for either, and they were then left out because of word limit restrictions.

4.5.1. Main People

4.5.1.1. Individual Categories

The *IoS* had most references for *Nato military at war*, then *Nato hierarchy*, and then *ethnic-Albanian civilians* third. The *SNYT* also had *Nato military at war* with the most references, then *ethnic-Albanian civilians* were second, and *Serb civilians* were third. The *IoS* seemed to focus more on their national leader, as *Blair* was its fourth highest category with 9.1% of the references, while *Clinton* was only joint sixth in the *SNYT* with 4.9%. However, the *SNYT* focused more on their military, as *American military* was their fourth most referenced with 8.1%, while the *British military* only had 1.4% of the references in the *IoS*.

4.5.1.2. Collective Categories

4.5.1.2.1. Politicians and the military

The table below shows the *IoS* had a much higher percentage coverage of British and

American government and Nato personnel than the *SNYT*, and also a lower percentage of UN, European politicians and Russian politicians. Therefore, the *IoS*'s ratio of the former to the latter was over four times that of the *SNYT*; this was unexpected considering the *IoS* was editorially anti-war and the *SNYT* pro-war, and goes against the hegemonic theory belief that the media only use official sources because they support them.

Newspaper	Coverage of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel (including British and American armies) in percentage of total references	Coverage of UN, European politicians and Russian politicians in percentage of total references	Ratio	Points
IoS	53.2	4.9	10.9:1	2
SNYT	22.7	9.0	2.5:1	1

Table 4.63. Coverage of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel.

4.5.1.2.2. Serbs and ethnic-Albanians

The tables below show the two papers had a similar coverage of the ethnic-Albanians, but there was a different coverage of the Serbs, with the *IoS* having more coverage of Serb politicians and military than *Serb civilians*, while the *SNYT* had more coverage of *Serb civilians* than Serb politicians and military; this again went against the expectations of the *IoS* having a less positive coverage for Nato than the *SNYT* because of it being editorially anti-war.

Newspaper	Coverage of Serb politicians and military in percentage of total references	Coverage of Serb civilians in percentage of total references	Ratio	Points
IoS	8.4	5.6	1.5:1	2
SNYT	8.1	8.9	1:1.1	1

Table 4.64. Coverage of Serb politicians, military and civilians.

Newspaper	Coverage of ethnic-Albanian civilians	Coverage of ethnic-Albanian politicians and military	Ratio	Points
SNYT	12.2	3.2	3.8:1	2
IoS	10.5	2.8	3.75:1	1

Table 4.65. Coverage of ethnic-Albanian civilians, politicians and the military.

4.5.2. Main People Evaluations

The *Main People Evaluation* analysis gives a different picture to the media coverage of Nato leaders and personnel than that in the *Main People* analysis above. Although the *SNYT* had *Clinton* and the Nato hierarchy as more negative than positive, there was little difference in the amount of positive and negative references. In contrast, the *IoS* had *Blair* with seven negative references to one positive, while *Nato military at war* had nineteen negative references to two positive. The overall results for the evaluations of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel are presented in the table below.

Newspaper	Coverage of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel (including British and American armies)	
SNYT	Positive-negative: 13-11	Ratio: 1.2:1
IoS	Positive-negative: 9-39	Ratio: 1:4.3

Table 4.66. Evaluations of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel.

4.5.3. Sources

4.5.3.1. Use of positive and negative sources

The *SNYT* used a lot more sources in its content than the *IoS*, and also had a slightly higher ratio of international to domestic sources, as shown in the table below.

Newspaper	International sources	Domestic sources	Total	Int-dom ratio
SNYT	92	37	129	2.5:1
IoS	32	19	51	1.7:1

Table 4.67. Use of international and domestic sources.

In the tables below are firstly, the domestic positive, neutral and negative use of sources for the Nato campaign; secondly, the international positive, neutral and negative use of sources; and thirdly, the combined domestic and international use of sources, split into positive and negative, with a ratio.

Newspaper	March	April ratio	May ratio	June ratio	Total ratio
SNYT	P-Neu-Neg: 7-0-0 Total: 7 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neu-Neg: 12-2-1 Total: 15 Ratio p-neg: 12-1	P-Neu-Neg: 6-2-0 Total: 8 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neu-Neg: 7-0-0 Total:7 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neg 32-1 Total: 37 Ratio p-neg: 32:1
IoS	P-Neu-Neg: 3-0-0 Total: 3 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neu-Neg: 7-0-0 Total:7 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neu-Neg: 6-0-0 Total: 6 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neu-Neg: 3-0-0 Total: 3 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neg 19:0 Total: 19 Ratio p-neg: N/A

Table 4.68. Domestic positive, neutral and negative source amounts, and ratio of positive to negative.

Newspaper	March	April ratio	May ratio	June ratio	Total ratio
SNYT	P-Neu-Neg: 7-3-1 Total: 11 Ratio p-neg: 7-1	P-Neu-Neg: 21-4-10 Total: 35 Ratio p-neg: 2.1-1	P-Neu-Neg: 18-7-9 Total: 34 Ratio p-neg: 2:1	P-Neu-Neg: 9-1-3 Total:13 Ratio p-neg: 3:1	P-Neg 55-23 Total: 78 Ratio p-neg: 2.4:1
IoS	P-Neu-Neg: 1-0-0 Total: 1 Ratio p-neg: N/A	P-Neu-Neg: 10-1-2 Total:13 Ratio p-neg: 5:1	P-Neu-Neg: 8-1-3 Total: 12 Ratio p-neg: 2.7:1	P-Neu-Neg: 4-1-1 Total: 6 Ratio p-neg: 4:1	P-Neg 23-6 Total: 19 Ratio p-neg: 3.8:1

Table 4.69. International positive, neutral and negative source amounts, and ratio of positive to negative.

Newspaper	Positive	Negative	Ratio
IoS	42	6	7:1
SNYT	87	24	3.6:1

Table 4.70. Combined domestic and international source use.

The above table shows the *IoS* had almost double the positive to negative ratio of

source use when compared to the *SNYT*. The *IoS* did not use any negative domestic sources, and also had a higher international positive to negative ratio than the *SNYT*.

4.5.3.2. Frequencies of official sources use

The *IoS* only used *Blair* as a main source once, while the *SNYT* used *Clinton* four times. The *IoS* had four references for other British Government politicians, making all British Government sources 3.5% of the total source use. The *SNYT* had eighteen references for other American Government politicians, making all Democrats 17.1% of the total. The *SNYT* also used more Nato sources: 15.4% of the total; while the *IoS* used Nato sources for only 7% of the total. Although those differences might be down to the papers being pro and anti war, it also seems as if it is influenced by the *IoS* only using sources in 52% of their articles, while the *SNYT* used sources in 82% of their articles. The use of Serb and ethnic-Albanian sources was similar to that found in the main analysis, and there were no real differences between the Sunday papers.

4.5.4. Diagnosis

The *IoS* showed its disillusionment with the Nato campaign by having *Nato campaign is not working* as its most referenced diagnosis, and *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* as its second highest reference. *Refugees are the Serbs' fault* was third, and *Refugees are Milosevic's fault* was fourth. This contrasted with the *SNYT*, which had *Refugees are Serbs' fault* as the most referenced, and *Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault* third. *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* was the second most referenced.

The above results were largely reflected in the *Writers themselves* category; the *IoS* had *Nato campaign is not working* as the clear top reference with eighteen, and then *Collateral Damage is Nato's fault* was the second most referenced category with

seven. Third was *Refugees are Milosevic's fault* with four references. In contrast, the *SNYT* writers without sources were very positive for the Nato campaign, as *Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault* was the most referenced category; *Ground war is Milosevic's fault* was the second most referenced, and *Refugees are Serbs' fault* was the third. *Nato campaign is not working* and *Collateral damage is Nato's fault* only had one reference between them.

4.5.5. Prognosis

The *IoS* had *More humanitarian aid* as its most referenced prognosis, and this was followed by *Diplomacy*; this seems to reflect its perspective on the conflict, as it thought war was the wrong way to deal with the humanitarian crisis. Surprisingly, *Send in ground troops* was the next highest category, before *Continue the bombing* and *Change the bombing strategy*. *Stop the bombing* was next, along with *War criminals must be brought to justice*. In contrast, the *SNYT* was more critical in its prognoses, with *Stop the bombing* and *Continue the bombing* the joint most referenced categories. *Stop the bombing's* high position was probably because there were more articles with the Serbs as sources in the *SNYT* (8.1%) than in the *IoS* (4.2%). *Change the bombing strategy* was the third most referenced category, then *Diplomacy* was the fourth, and *More humanitarian aid* the fifth. There were similar findings in the *Writers themselves* analysis; the *IoS* had *Diplomacy* as the most referenced category, *Ground troops* second, and *More humanitarian aid* third. *Stop the bombing* and *Continue the bombing* were next with two references each. In the *SNYT*, *Continue the bombing* and *Change the bombing strategy* had the most references, and were followed by *Diplomacy*.

4.5.6. Format

The *IoS*'s vast majority of articles were in line with the *Thematic in the UK* category, as 45.5% of articles had this result. *Thematic elsewhere* and *Episodic in Yugoslavia* were the next highest, with 12.6% each. The *SNYT* had a similar result, with *Thematic in the US* the most referenced category, although with only 30.1% of the articles. *Episodic in Yugoslavia* was second with 25.2% of articles, and *Episodic in the US* was third with 14.6%.

4.5.7. Historical References

The *IoS* had *World War Two Nato Negative* and *World War Two Neutral* as its joint most referenced historical references, with *World War Two Serbs Negative* third. Altogether, there were four positive references for the Serbs and ten negative (1:2.5), and eight positive for Nato and eighteen negative (1:2.25), so they were roughly similar, with Nato a little more positive. In the *SNYT*, *Bosnia Serbs Negative* was the most referenced category with eight references, and this was followed by *Gulf Neutral* and *World War Two Nato Negative* with six references each. Altogether, there was one positive for the Serbs and twelve negative (1:12) and five positive for Nato and sixteen negative (1:3.2), so that meant the *SNYT*'s historical references were much more positive for Nato than the Serbs overall, and also much more positive for Nato than the *IoS*.

In the *IoS*, World War Two had the most references, with twenty, followed by the Bosnian and Gulf wars with eight references each. The Serb-Croat war had six references, so that meant the Balkans wars together had fourteen references; six less than World War Two. In the *SNYT*, Bosnia had the most references with thirteen, and including the Serbo-Croat references, the Balkans wars had sixteen. World War Two

had twelve, and the Gulf nine. This means the *SNYT* focused more on the Balkans wars, as the *NYT* did, while the *IoS* focused on World War Two, which was in line with the UK average, but in contrast to the *Independent*.

4.5.8. Images

In the *IoS*, *ethnic-Albanian civilians* had the most images with sixteen, followed by *Writers in the UK*. *British soldiers in positive images*, *Serb civilians* and *Damage from Nato Negative* were the next categories with the most images, with six each. *Ethnic-Albanian civilians* also had the most images in the *SNYT*, with seventeen. *Maps* were the second most referenced, and were followed by seven categories with four references: *US soldiers positive*, *US armoury positive*, *Nato hierarchy*, *Nato soldiers in a positive picture*, *Milosevic*, *Anti-war demos* and *Damage from Nato negative*. The two papers therefore had similar results, with *ethnic-Albanian civilians* the most referenced, and *Damage from Nato negative* the joint third most referenced.

Replicating the analysis in hypothesis 9 (see pages 192-3), by including *Ethnic-Albanian civilians* and *Damage from Serbs* together, and contrasting them with *Serb civilians* and *Damage from Nato*, the *IoS* had eighteen for the latter and twelve for the former (1.5:1), while the *SNYT* had seventeen for the latter and seven for the former (2.4:1). The *SNYT* therefore had a more positive coverage for Nato in the analysis than the *IoS*, whereas the *Independent* had a more positive coverage for Nato than the *NYT* in the same analysis.

Conclusion

The Sunday papers differed to the daily papers in that they were much more thematic; relying more on opinion and less on recent news than the daily papers; this also seems to have meant that the Sunday papers' coverage did not decline in the second half of

the conflict as significantly as in the daily papers, as they were less reliant on new events to update their Kosovo coverage. The reading of a combination of editorially pro and anti war papers, with much more context than news, did seem to provide a much more balanced and in-depth view of the Kosovo Conflict.

The results showed that in several of the analyses the *IoS*'s anti-war stance seemed to be apparent in the data results. The first real evidence was in the evaluations of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel, where the *SNYT* was more positive than negative towards them, but the *IoS* was more negative towards them by a ratio of 4.3:1. This difference in evaluation was most evident in the coverage of the US and UK leaders, with Clinton receiving a balanced coverage in the *SNYT*, while Blair had a negative to positive ratio of 7:1 in the *IoS*. There was also evidence in other analyses that seemed to show the *IoS*'s anti-war stance; for example, the two highest *IoS* diagnoses were both negative for Nato, while the *SNYT*'s top reference was positive for Nato; and the *SNYT*'s historical references and images were more positive for Nato than those of the *IoS*.

However, in some analyses the *IoS*'s anti-war stance did not materialise into a more negative coverage for Nato. For example, both papers still used a majority of Nato sources as their main article source, although that did not mean it was always positive news for Nato. As the *IoS* was anti-war and still often gave Nato sources priority of position, this seems to suggest it was out of practicality rather than bias. Moreover, the *IoS*'s official sources positive to negative ratio for the Nato campaign was almost double that of the *SNYT*. The other results that went against expectations under the hegemonic model were that the *SNYT* had nearly double the percentage of coverage for 'neutral' main people than the *IoS*, featured half as many Nato personnel as main

people, and unlike the IoS, featured more Serb civilians than politicians and military. The *SNYT* also had *Stop the bombing* as their joint most referenced prognosis, a much higher position than the *IoS* did.

5. Discussion

Robert Entman has previously written that if ‘limited solely to quantitative information...social science can miss some of the reality of...journalism. In studying the news media, genuine empirical accuracy demands going beyond the numbers to qualitative data and informed speculation.’³²⁹ As recommended in the above quotation, some examples of what was found in the quantitative analysis are provided in this discussion, along with some theories about why the media chose to frame the Kosovo Conflict the way they did. This will hopefully provide readers with some examples to supplement the quantitative analysis results, and go beyond numbers and basic variables and categories. The section begins with some of the historical references used by the media, and some theories on why certain historical references were more prevalent than others, before going on to assess which media theories the Kosovo media coverage most supported.

5.1 Historical References

5.1.1. World War Two

As the quantitative data suggests, both Nato and the Serbs tried to use World War Two to frame the conflict, and the justification for each case was compared by Fisk in the *IoS* on April 4th; Fisk wrote the Serbs compare the Nato bombing to the Nazis, but the scenes on the borders have greater similarity to the atrocities of Nazi Germany. Deciding whether to use Nato or Serb historical references was not the only decision facing the media editors, as they also had to decide whether to include references straight from official sources, or independently from journalists. Examples of all the above variables; positive or negative for Nato or the Serbs, and official sources or

³²⁹ R.M. Entman., *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. viii.

independent journalistic references; appeared in the *Independent* on March 25th, with John Prescott being cited comparing the Serb behaviour in Kosovo to that of the Nazis before World War Two, while a later article had a journalist reporting the Luftwaffe were back at war after fifty-four years. The references were also used by the media sources to describe different aspects of the conflict over time, and actions by the Serbs and Nato; an example is how the *Telegraph* accused the Serbs of bringing a 'Return to terror of concentration camps' on April 1st, while describing how Yugoslavia had been 'bombed back to 1945' on June 7th.

5.1.2. Balkans Wars

As with the above World War Two frames, the Balkans Wars were also used to recall both positive and negative aspects for Nato and the Serbs, although most references were used to draw analogies with the Serb ethnic-cleansing in those wars during the early 1990s. An example of this was the *Independent* on March 27th, as it compared the Serb behaviour in Kosovo to that of the Serbs in the Bosnian war on the front page, and had a profile inside of the notorious Serb commander during that conflict, Arkan. There were also similar examples in the *Independent* on March 30th and 31st, and April 3rd, and other papers also featured the story; for example, on March 29th *The Times* had an article under the headline 'Bosnia terror chief directs Kosovo killers', and the *Telegraph* had an article under the headline 'Ethnic cleanser Arkan is spotted near Pristina.' However, in response to the original story, and in an example of how Bosnia could be negative for Nato, in the *Independent* on March 30th, Fisk criticised George Robertson for claiming Arkan was in Kosovo when there was no evidence. The previous Balkans wars were still being referred to near the end of the conflict, but then it was more Milosevic's character and guilt for the Balkans wars that was being discussed, rather than the refugee situation. For example, the *Telegraph* profiled

Milosevic as a liar from his behaviour in the previous Balkans wars in articles under the headlines ‘Record of lies may mean the crisis is not over yet’ (June 4th), and ‘Rise to power littered with broken promises’ (June 8th); while the *Independent* editorial on June 8th had the headline ‘History shows that Milosevic will only respond to force.’

5.1.3. Cold War

On April 10th, there was the biggest opportunity for the Cold War frame to emerge, after Yeltsin was reported to have turned Russian guns back towards the West the previous day; however, even then the Cold War frame did not really appear. The *Independent* had a small story on page one about the above development, under the headline ‘Nato dismisses Yeltsin’s threats,’ with the article reporting the US had said it expected Russia to honour its pledge not to become involved in the war. Although a bigger story on page three warned of the possibility of World War Three, an accompanying article by Rupert Cornwell discounted the threat posed by Russia under the headline ‘the Bear roars but it will not bite’. Similarly, the *Guardian* front page had the headline ‘Yeltsin’s threat raises stakes in war’, and said Russia threatened intervention if Nato launched a ground war, but Martin Woollacott agreed with Cornwell that ‘Russia may be bluffing’.

As well as Russia’s relative weakness at the time of the Nato campaign, it seems another reason for there being little evidence of Cold War framing was that Russia was considered neutral or an ally for most of the conflict. This was probably due to Yeltsin being in power in Russia, as he was steering Russia in a Western democratic direction. This generally positive framing of Yeltsin and Russia was more apparent in the *NYT* than the UK media, and an early example of the *NYT*’s positive image of Russia was when the editorial on April 13th argued that Moscow was the best hope for

diplomacy, as they had grown impatient with Mr. Milosevic's truculence in recent years, and recognised that Russian and Serb interests do not always coincide. This positive *NYT* framing of Yeltsin was confirmed in an editorial near the end of the Nato campaign, on June 4th, which stated there had been constructive peacemaking by Russia, and Yeltsin was courageous to align with the West despite opposition at home.

5.2. Evidence supporting previous media theories

This discussion of the evidence presented in this thesis now continues with a look at which of the media models described in the theory section best describes the British media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict from the quantitative results, and the qualitative analysis that followed it. The old debate about biases in the media surfaced again during the Kosovo Conflict, with the British Government taking the view previously espoused by the Conservatives in the Falklands War, and the New Right in the US; criticising the media for paying too much attention to enemy propaganda, and being too critical of Nato 'news management'; while on the other hand, critical theorists in line with the propaganda model claimed the media were mere propagandists for Nato. The results from the quantitative analysis suggested the media was more in the centre of the above two extremes, and showed a mixture of hegemony and pluralism; this section largely confirms that view.

5.2.1. Evidence of Plurality; the Propaganda model countered

This section includes evidence from journalistic reviews of the Nato media operation, and the media's coverage of Nato collateral damage and Serb atrocity stories. The evidence suggests the media sources were not generally acting in coercion with Nato, or acting under their influence. In contrast, they were aware of Nato attempts to

influence their coverage of the conflict, and tried to provide a balanced coverage in line with their views on the Nato campaign.

5.2.1.1. The Media Relationship with Politicians and the Military

Referring to the American media, Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model suggested the media are willing accomplices to elites during foreign conflicts involving their country's military, but McNair has argued that broadsheet newspapers are likely to be sceptical of attempts to manipulate the news agenda.³³⁰ This section features evidence from throughout Nato's Kosovo campaign that supports McNair's view, and suggests broadsheet journalists were generally aware of Nato attempts to influence them through spin and propaganda, and could thus resist most media management techniques used by the Nato politicians and military. Although they still often agreed with Nato policy, it seems to have been mostly through judgement rather than elite manipulation, and the biggest change in direction during the Nato campaign was by politicians rather than the media, as many politicians changed from opposing the sending of Nato ground troops into combat to supporting the policy.

Early examples of journalistic resistance to propaganda were provided by Fisk, who accused Nato and the Western media of lying on March 27th, and the Serbs on March 31st; before criticising the Nato press conferences as more and more propagandistic on April 7th. Also in the *Independent*, on April 7th, Anne McElvoy wrote that the Nato conferences have always been very boring. On April 16th, *The Times* showed its awareness of propaganda when it featured an article about how the Serbs had conducted a good propaganda campaign, but Nato had also done well to now, by retorting Serb propaganda, demonising Milosevic, and owning up to errors while relating their apologies and regrets to a wider context in which the Yugoslavian leader

is ultimately to blame for every death and injury; as most people would not believe Milosevic when he said Nato targeted civilians.

On April 28th, the *Independent* showed its awareness of the new Nato media strategy when it accredited Campbell with having introduced a 'tougher, more aggressive media strategy against Serbian propaganda from the Nato headquarters.' On May 3rd, after the Luzane bus bombing, the *Independent* again cited an improvement in the Nato media operation, when an article observed that after the furore over muddled Nato explanations for Djakovica 'the alliance has changed its media strategy and admitted responsibility quickly.'

On May 15th, in a *Guardian* article under the headline 'The spin doctors hit back', Martin Walker also emphasised the improvements in the Nato media operation since Djakovica: 'Nato's reinforced team of spin doctors reacted quickly yesterday to reports of yet another disastrous attack on civilians in Kosovo....Some of the photographs had been screened by Nato before....its timing was classic counter-propaganda....Nato's once amateurish media operation was reinforced with experts after last month's mistaken strike on the refugee convoy....The results have been striking...' However, in the *Telegraph* on June 6th, John Keegan showed he had not been impressed by the Nato media operation, when he wrote that it should have showed 'much less indulgence of media disbelief, a much stronger display of confidence, a much fuller presentation of the facts. Full and frank disclosure of damage done does not compromise intelligence when the enemy cannot strike back and when one's own side is winning.'

³³⁰ B. McNair., *Sociology of Journalism, op. cit*, p. 156.

5.2.1.2. Examples of plural media coverage

Having ascertained in the section above that the broadsheet media were not unquestioning puppets of the Nato political and military elite, this section provides examples of some of the media content that was more negative than positive for Nato. This was most apparent in the media's focus on Nato collateral damage, with articles on it usually more prominently placed than positive articles for Nato, such as their reports of Serb atrocities. There were also more images of damage from Nato bombs than images of damage done by the Serb military, and the vast majority of Nato damage images were negative. Although this is probably because the newspapers had more access to images of damage done by Nato than damage done by the Serbs, it still goes against the propaganda model, because the newspapers would ignore most images of Nato collateral damage under the propaganda model. This suggests the propaganda model is not relevant to the British media's coverage of Nato's Kosovo campaign, and evidence to support this conclusion is provided below; the analysis starts on April 7th, the day after the first big Nato collateral damage incident, and continues until June 2nd; just after the last large Nato collateral damage incident.

5.2.1.2.1. Aleksinac-Djakovica, April 7th - 22nd.

On April 6th, Nato had their first big collateral damage incident when they hit residential homes in Aleksinac, killing several people. The *FT* had Aleksinac as their second story on page one, under the headline 'Homes hit as bombs miss targets', while *The Times* had the story on page six under the ironic headline "'Surgical Strike' kills 12 civilians'; it had a photo of an injured Serb woman and son in bed. The *Independent* reported that Nato bombs had killed five civilians and wounded thirty in an article on page five, under the headline 'Nato "sorry" for the damage'. It also featured a photo of a Serb in Aleksinac, in front of a bombed car and house. The *NYT*

had Aleksinac as a front page story, under the title 'Small Serbian town is Stricken by a Deadly "Accident of War"'; the two front-page photos were both of the damage.

There was further coverage inside on page ten, with a photo of a boy in hospital.

The *Independent* also featured quite a critical coverage of Nato the next day on pages one and two, with Robert Fisk reporting that eleven bombs had been targeted at the centre of Pristina. On the front page, Fisk questioned whether it was a deliberate attack on a civilian Serb area in revenge for the Serb persecution of the ethnic-Albanians, while on page two there was a photo of a man searching the rubble of a house in the centre of Pristina. This prominent and polemical coverage of the Nato collateral damage was also placed higher than articles on Nato investigating fresh reports of forty-nine alleged Serb atrocities and three mass graves, which only made it on to page three, and Blair setting out Nato's terms for ending the campaign, which only made it on to page four. On April 10th, the *Independent* again showed their plurality with a big Fisk story on page one, under the headline: 'In Serbia, too, the ordinary people feel the suffering and agony of war'; the article was accompanied by a photo of a Serb woman in front of ruined houses. On page two, another article featured Nato apologising for getting their facts wrong yesterday about the bombing, and admitting one of three bombs aimed at the main telephone exchange hit a residential area, after they'd previously denied it.

On April 13th, the *Independent*, *Guardian* and *The Times* had the Nato bombing of the civilian train on the Grdelica railroad bridge on the front page, with big photos. On April 14th, *The Times* had Nato's explanation for Grdelica on page five with four photos, and also had Tom Walker in Belgrade reporting on Serb casualties of Nato collateral damage; in contrast, a good propaganda story for Nato, Cook's claim of the

Serbs running a rape camp, only made it on to page six. The *Guardian*'s front page that day contained a big picture of a refugee mother and child dominating the front page with the headline 'Day 21: more bombs, more death, more despair'. The *NYT*'s only photo on the front page that day was of the Grdelica train wreck; the article on Grdelica was also on the front page, under the headline 'At sites of two Nato attacks, Scent of Death, Sound of Fury'. It featured a Serb source before Shea.

On April 15th, the day after the Djakovica convoy attack, *The Times* had a large gruesome picture of an old woman who looked charred and dead on the front page, but was said to be still alive, and then had a variety of accounts about what happened. The other UK papers also had Djakovica as the main story on the front page; the *FT* had the headline 'Serbs claim Nato killed seventy refugees', while the *Independent* asked who takes the blame. The *Independent* article was accompanied by a photo of a refugee boy in the midst of rubble, while on page two a Fisk article had the headline 'Nato stained with blood of civilians'.

On April 16th, the *Guardian* front page stated the blame for Djakovica seemed to lie increasingly with Nato, and it had another image of the bomb's aftermath. On page three, it tried to piece together what had happened, with a map and another image. On the same day, *The Times* had a big photo of an injured child on the front page under the headline 'Nato admits bombing convoy'; on pages four and five they criticised Nato's strategy of not flying below 15,000 feet, arguing that 'laser systems were no substitute for low flying.' It also had a big photo of the Grdelica train bombing on page twenty-one, along with the diary of a British woman who is married to a Serb. The *Independent* also had Djakovica on the front page again, with a Fisk article having the headline 'This is a horror story. There is no other way to describe it.' The

article was accompanied by a photo, and inside Fisk described Djakovica as a 'series of massacres...Nato appears to be responsible for an atrocity.' There was more on Djakovica on page three, while a story on war crimes investigators in the Hague having been given evidence of at least fifteen mass graves inside Kosovo only made it to page four. The *FT* also had Djakovica on the front page again, with Nato apologising, but declaring the bombing would go on. The *NYT* had a Nato admission of the mistaken bombing of citizens as the front page main story, and there was more on it inside, including a Steve Erlanger article under the title 'Blackened Bodies and a Half-Eaten Meal'.

In the *Independent* on April 17th, a massive Fisk article criticising Nato over Djakovica took over the front page under the headline 'This atrocity is still a mystery to Nato. Perhaps I can help...' The criticism of Nato continued on page two, with an article under the headline 'Military suppress massacre video'. News that a Serbian air base and bridge had been hit in successful Nato attacks, with a photo and map, only made it to page five. On April 19th, on page two, the *Guardian* reported that Nato had changed its story on Djakovica again as rifts emerge among its members. On April 20th, the *Guardian* front page had Nato admitting unintentional harm on the Djakovica convoy, with a photo, and on page three it had the Nato explanation with two photos. The *Independent* also had the Nato explanation on the front page, under the headline 'The Convoy Massacre: Nato offers its evidence'; it also had a transcript of the Nato briefing on page two. The *NYT* had the Nato explanation on the front page and page twelve, but reckoned the Nato account still left a good number of questions unanswered. An article about ethnic-Albanian refugees' tales of rape and killings by the Serbs only made it to page thirteen.

5.2.1.2.2. Serb TV Station-Chinese embassy, April 23rd - May 14th.

On April 23rd, the *Guardian* had Nato's bombing of the Serb television station on the front page and page two; the *NYT* also had it on the front page. It was also on page three the next day in the *Guardian*, and the editorial said it was wrong to target television and power stations. Also on the 24th, Fisk criticised Nato for targeting the Serb television station on pages one and three in the *Independent*; both pages also featured a photo of the damage. On April 29th, the *Independent* had a big Fisk article on page three about two homes hit by Nato bombs in Surdilica under the headline 'Families blasted in "just another mistake"'; it was accompanied by a photo of a damaged house and rescue operation.

On May 1st, the *Guardian* had a critical article of Nato increasing their use of 'dumb' unguided bombs above what was a good propaganda story for Nato; *Medecins sans Frontieres'* evidence of how the Serbs had planned ethnic cleansing and atrocities.

On the same day, the *Independent* had a close-up photo of a bloodied dead body under a mangled bridge, with the caption saying 'This is what happens when a Nato missile hits a bus in Kosovo'. On page two of the *FT* on May 1st/2nd, a photo of a Belgrade resident in front of a bombed house accompanied an article on Nato vowing to intensify the air strikes as weather improves; there was also a small article on three civilians killed in a Nato attack on the same page. On May 3rd, the *FT* had an article titled 'Nato regrets bus bombing' on page two; inside, it reported that 'Nato's admission came as it stepped up its attacks...' On the same day, in their first two articles of the paper, the *Independent* reported that Nato had admitted the Luzane bombing; the first article described it as the 'darkest blot' on the day, while in the second, Fisk argued that 'Even the word Nato is becoming a lie.'

On May 4th in *The Times*, what looked like a good propaganda story for Nato, the video admission of Serb massacres by Private Shefko Terkovic, a Serb captured by the KLA, only made fourth story on page twelve, and was below one on ethnic-Albanian prostitution rape gangs in refugee camps. In the *Independent*, an article on Nato killing twenty in a second bus bombing was the third story on page one, and it was accompanied by a photo of the damage on page two; while the Terkovic story was only on page two, and did not have a photo. Also on the same day, Steve Erlanger in the *NYT* had an article under the balanced headline of ‘Fleeing Kosovars Dread Dangers of Nato Above and Serb Below’ as a front page story; it was continued on page eighteen, with a photo of a mother and baby standing near vehicles the Serbs claimed were destroyed by Nato.

On May 5th in *The Times*, Nato denials about the previous day’s collateral damage claims were only featured within a bigger article that was negative for them on page fourteen; General Naumann’s criticisms of the Nato politicians for restricting the effectiveness of the Nato campaign through their caution over targeting; the headline of the article was ‘Nato faults have prolonged war, says top general’. In the *FT*, Naumann’s views on Nato’s ‘strategy shortcomings’ was the main Kosovo story, while Blair’s vow to defeat ‘hideous genocide’ was a much smaller one. In the *Independent*, Naumann’s criticisms were on pages one and four, while ethnic-Albanian reports of 100 men executed by the Serbs, and Nato denying the bus bombing, were only on page five.

On May 8th, the *Guardian* had Nato’s bombing of the Chinese embassy as its main story on the front page, and on page two the main story with a big photo was ‘Nato cluster bombs “kill 15” in hospital and crowded market’; the article explained that

Nato had accepted it was highly probable one of their bombs went astray, and described Nato reports of rape hotels in Pec and other atrocities as Nato attempts to 'deflect criticism'. *The Times* and *FT* also had the Chinese embassy bombing as the main story on the front page, and the *FT* also had the Nis collateral damage on page four, under the headline 'Nato admits cluster bomb went astray'. The *Independent* had the Nis market bombing as the second story on the front page, under the headline 'Nato strike "killed 13 near hospital"'; on page two there was a bigger story on it, and a photo of a crying man outside his wrecked house.

On May 10th, the *Guardian* had the Chinese embassy bombing as their main story, including a Nato admission of error; on page two, another article on the bombing began: 'It was a mistake which even Nato's spokesman Jamie Shea found difficult to explain.' On May 11th, contradicting propaganda theorists who claim the media include hidden cultural messages that are supportive of their military's campaign, *The Times* featured an article on the American air-force that was accompanied by an image with negative connotations for Nato: an airbrush artist painting a Nato plane with a grim reaper releasing bombs, with the word Apocalypse written on it. On May 12th, Jonathan Freedland claimed the Nato campaign was now indefensible in the *Guardian*; while on May 13th, Fisk argued the Nato campaign should be wound up due to the 'folly' of the 'catastrophe' in the *Independent*. The same day, the *Telegraph* looked back on 'The first 50 days of lost opportunities', with the article ending: 'However the conflict in Kosovo ends, few people will argue that the first 50 days went as well as Nato had hoped.' Similarly, the *Independent* gave all of page three over to opinions on the Nato campaign, under the headline: 'Fifty days of bombing in Europe, and the voices of doubt grow even louder'.

5.2.1.2.3. Korisa-Surdulica, May 15th - June 2nd.

On May 15th, the *Guardian* had a big front page story and photo on Korisa, reporting that Nato was accused of killing more than eighty civilians and injuring sixty. Nato sources were said to be reviewing the incident, and the article also had Russian and Tanjug (official Yugoslav media) sources. On page two, it had an article on how the Chinese embassy 'Blunder' was jeopardising Nato unity, while on page three there were two more collateral damage photos, along with a chronology of Nato collateral damage. The *FT* also had Korisa on the front page, under the headline 'Yugoslavia says Nato raid killed 100 ethnic-Albanians'. It reported that Nato was still pressing ahead undeterred by Yugoslav allegations, after what could be their worst blunder; although it did also feature the KLA claiming the Serbs were using ethnic-Albanians as human shields, and Nato saying Korisa could have been shelled by the Serbs. The *Independent* had a big Korisa article on the front page, with a photo of a crying boy and 'charred tractors'; it had local witnesses as sources and then Shea. A Fisk article underneath had the ironic headline: 'It all went very well....Another effective Day'. Within the article, Fisk called Shea and Jertz's explanation for the bombing 'theatre of the obscene', and described Shea as launching 'into his usual denunciations of Serb atrocities, exhuming some old pictures of mass graves and some (slightly) newer ones of burnt villages.' On page two, another article on Korisa had the headlines 'Waking to a nightmare of slaughter' and 'Massacre'; next to it was a list of six previous Nato collateral damage incidents with three photos. *The Times*' main story on the front page was 'Nato jets dump bombs off Venice', and this was also negative towards the Nato campaign. Korisa only appeared on page nineteen, under the headline 'Nato air raid "kills 100 Albanians"'. The article only had Serbs and ethnic-Albanians as sources, and it also had a map of 'Nato bombing blunders' with dates. In the *NYT* on

the same day, Korisa was the main story with a photo, with the Serbs blaming Nato in what was described as being possibly the ‘Worst Misdirected Hit’ yet, as sixty civilians were reported dead. There was another photo and map on page eight, along with the continuation of the article. By May 17th, the media seemed to have accepted the Nato explanation that the Serbs were to blame for the civilian casualties at Korisa because they had used human shields.³³¹

On May 19th, *The Times*’ William Rees Mogg wrote that the Nato policy of dropping cluster bombs from 15,000 feet on parachutes, which can be carried by the wind, can be expected to kill civilians, and Nato’s claim that Milosevic intends to kill civilians but they don’t is not so convincing now that the ‘accidents’ are happening so quickly. On May 21st, *The Times* featured the MoD admitting: ‘Serb army in Kosovo as strong as ever’ as the main story on the front page. On the same day, the *FT* had an article on Nato killing three people in a Belgrade hospital, and hitting the Swedish embassy during the heaviest bombing of Belgrade since the Chinese embassy attack; it added there had now been nine significant errors by Nato. On May 22nd, the *Independent* had a big story on page fifteen about fresh concerns over the accuracy of the Nato bombing, after Nato bombs had killed nineteen in a Serb prison and hit the Swiss ambassadors’ residence. The *NYT* featured the same news, with a photo and a map.

³³¹ Although the media seemed confused about what happened at Korisa, this is not surprising really, as *Amnesty International* was still struggling to find the truth about the incident a year later, as recorded in a report on Nato collateral damage incidents during their campaign: ‘It also remains unclear on the basis of current information whether or not civilians were being used as human shields in Koriša. If they were, this would constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law by FRY forces, but would not relieve NATO of the responsibility of ensuring their protection. NATO has said that it had no knowledge of the presence of ethnic Albanian civilians at Koriša.’ Amnesty International., *NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: “COLLATERAL DAMAGE” OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force*, at: http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/nato_all.pdf (June 2000). If the fact that *Amnesty International* cannot ascertain the truth about the incident with the benefit of a year of investigation, then it suggests the media did as good a job as possible under the circumstances, as they were caught between a Nato media operation spinning the conflict on the one hand, and a Serbian government that closely controlled access to the conflict environment on the other.

In contrast, a good propaganda story for Nato on May 26th only had a small amount of coverage: the story of how the 'UN says it has evidence of "massive" war crimes' only made it to page eighteen in the *Independent*, and was only a small story with no photo or other sources in the *Guardian*.

Nato collateral damage continued to make news even at the end of May, and into June. On May 31st, the *Guardian* reported that eleven civilians had been killed by Nato missiles on the front page; the main victims were said to be families going to market across the Varvarin bridge. The article reported that Nato had acknowledged four of their aircraft attacked it, but had claimed it was a legitimate target, and they didn't intentionally attack civilians. The front page also featured the news that Western journalists had been injured by Nato bombs. On page five it had another article on Varvarin under the headline 'Planes buzzed overhead –and then death came'; it only featured Serb sources. The *Independent* also had Varvarin as the main story on the front page, under the headline: 'Nato kills civilians on bridge in another deadly blunder'; Fisk wrote: 'Nato was accused of committing another deadly blunder...refused initially to be drawn on whether the attack at Varvarin was another disastrous error...' The story was continued on page nine, with a big photo of the destroyed bridge, and a caption explaining nine had been killed and forty wounded. *The Times* had a front page story on how their reporter, Eve-Ann Prentice, had been injured in the aforementioned Nato attack; it also reported that eleven people had died in a Nato attack near Krusevac.

On June 1st, the *Guardian* had an article on the second Nato collateral damage incident in Surdulica on page five, under the headline 'Nato bombs kill 17 in sanatorium'; it also reported that the Yugoslav media had said another ten civilians

had died in Novi Pazar, and that meant Nato's collateral damage death toll was over fifty in two days, but Shea had justified them as legitimate targets. The *FT* had the same story and statistics under the headline: 'Civilian death toll rising'. The *Independent* had Fisk in a big front page story stating 'Nato calls the bombing of a hospital collateral damage. I call it a tragedy.' Accompanying the article was a photo of undertakers loading the corpses of civilians killed when the sanatorium and retirement home were hit in Surdulica. In comparison, the Serbs' offer to settle on G8 terms only made it to page twelve, and a refugee's story on Serb 'Troops "butcher entire families"' only made it to page thirteen. The *NYT* had a similar coverage to the UK media on page twelve, under the headline 'Dozens of civilians are Killed as Nato Air Strikes Go Awry'; the article was accompanied by a photo of damage from Nato bombs.

On June 2nd, the *Guardian* had the Nato admission of the limited effects their bombing had had on the Serb military on page four, and on page five had the story: 'Albanians condemn Nato's bombing blunders', after Nato bombed four defensive bunkers in Albania. The *Independent* also had the Nato bombing of Albanians as a prominent story, and started with the sentence: 'Given the long list of Nato's errors during the Kosovo air campaign perhaps we should not have been surprised.'

5.2.2. Hegemonic evidence; the Government and New-Right criticisms countered

Although, the above evidence makes it seem as if Blair and Campbell were right to criticise the media coverage of the Nato campaign, the quantitative data showed that the vast majority of the media coverage was much more positive towards Nato than the Serbs. This is more difficult to show qualitatively than the plural evidence, as it is more to do with quantity over time, than specific cases; however, this section will try

and provide some examples of hegemonic content to show how the media was usually supportive of the Nato campaign, despite occasional criticisms.

5.2.2.1. Front pages

The *Position* variable analyses showed the front pages were often dominated by news from a Nato perspective, with Nato politicians and military spokespeople therefore having an advantage in controlling the framing of the Nato campaign. The articles would often be reports of the previous night's attacks, but could also be news of Nato's rejection of Serb peace proposals, Nato evidence of Serb atrocities, Nato's humanitarian role, Nato's apologies for collateral damage, or Nato's plans for their campaign. This was evident from the start of the Nato campaign, and this section focuses on that period, although the practise continued throughout the Nato campaign.

A good early example of this reporting was apparent in the *IoS* on March 21st, a few days before the Nato campaign started. The *IoS* was editorially anti-war, but seemed to have a more negative attitude to the Serbs than the daily newspapers in their last edition before the Nato campaign, with their main front page story having the headline: 'SERBS MOVE IN FOR THE KILL IN KOSOVO AS THREAT OF NATO AIR STRIKES GROWS'; the article was also accompanied by an image of a balaclava wearing Serb in a tank, which reflected and emphasised the headline's ominous message. The article described how 'The Serbs mounted spectacular acts of violent defiance yesterday', and talked of a 'ferocious attack...forcing thousands of civilians to flee'. Cook was the first source, and then an ethnic-Albanian civilian. On page two, Blair was given space to make an impassioned defence of air strikes, under the headline "'Barbaric" Milosevic must take the blame'; it was alongside an article under the headline 'Clinton acts to avert a "catastrophe,"' which gave sympathetic

coverage to the American arm of the Nato political leadership, as Nato prepared to launch its campaign.

There was more evidence of the media reporting the war from a Nato perspective on March 25th, the day after the Nato campaign began. The *Independent* had Blair declaring ‘We must end vile oppression’ in their first article, and also featured Clinton, Robertson and Germany’s foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, as prominent sources; the article also talked of Nato’s ‘forensic accuracy’ in its bombing. *The Times* had several stories on the Nato bombing from a British perspective on the first day, such as ‘RAF and Navy in onslaught on Serbs’, ‘RAF Harrier missions “ran on rails”’, and ‘Allies on full alert for retaliation’; there were also a couple on the American military: ‘Stealth bomber’s chance to prove its worth’ and ‘American airmen proud of their role’. The Guardian’s main article featured William Cohen, Blair and Clinton as the first three sources. There were similar articles throughout the Nato campaign, including *The Times* having one with the headline ‘Cluster-bombing ends frustration of Harrier pilots’ on April 7th, the day after Aleksinac, and one on the front page of *The Times* on May 10th containing a warm discussion with American B2 pilots alongside an article on the bombing of the Chinese embassy.

Although the *Telegraph* did not have a front page on the web-site, it often had prominent articles with similarly hegemonic headlines for the Nato campaign. On the first day, the *Telegraph* had several headlines that suggested they were viewing the war from the Nato perspective, such as: ‘Nato bombers pound Serb targets’, ‘Leaders fear war engulfing Balkans’ and ‘British soldiers ready to deal with revenge attacks’. The reporting of Nato’s collateral damage in the bombing of Aleksinac seems to be a further example, as it was within an article under the title ‘Harriers go in with cluster

bombs', and had MoD and Nato spokespeople as the main sources. It was one of several in the *Telegraph* that framed the previous night as a successful night's bombing, with other articles having headlines like 'Pilots relieved to have accomplished their mission' and 'Nato replies to Milosevic peace ploy with new wave of air raids'.

5.2.2.2. Editorials

Apart from the *IoS*, the other papers' editorials kept supporting the Nato campaign even when they seemed unsure of its strategy or outcome; and setbacks to the campaign usually brought calls for an escalation in the campaign rather than a cessation. For example, the day after the Nato campaign started, on March 25th, the *Independent* editorial declared it was a deadly gamble, but 'we are right to strike at Milosevic.' The editorial did not believe it would be a quick and bloodless victory, as it thought there are never any simple solutions in the Balkans. This mixture of uncertainty and support was apparent in the *Independent* again on April 11th, when the editorial declared: 'Foolish as Nato's actions have hitherto been, however, it is in no one's interests that Nato should be defeated.' The editorial offered the argument that although Nato had started without clear aims, they could not lose to a semi-dictator.

On April 17th, *The Times* editorial showed its continued support for the Nato campaign after the Djakovica convoy attack, and deflected its blame onto the Serbs when it stated: 'That tragic accident, one waiting to happen in the mayhem that the Serbs have unleashed, should not deflect Nato from intensifying the air war.'

Similarly, on May 10th, the day after the Chinese embassy bombing, *The Times* editorial argued the peace deal Clinton had proposed that week came close to undermining the very rationale for Nato's actions, and that Nato should intensify the

bombing so that Belgrade needs peace more than anyone. The *Independent* editorial on May 12th was equally resilient to Chinese protests, and declared Nato should stand firm in the face of Chinese pressure.

On May 15th, after Korisa, the *Guardian* editorial's first heading was 'Nato errs again', but the second was 'But its cause remains valid'; the content called on Clinton to act decisively and escalate the Nato campaign. On May 17th, the *Independent* editorial criticised those members of Nato that wanted a campaign of 'immaculate coercion', and expected no mistakes and civilian casualties, and argued: '...better to fight a just war with both hands tied behind the back than not at all.' On May 18th, the *Guardian* editorial again focused on trying to guide Nato policy, when it called on Europe to unite in supporting the introduction of ground troops, as it would convince American politicians and the public about the merits of the policy, and make it easier for Clinton to commit US ground troops.

The *NYT* had a similar outlook on the Nato campaign in its editorials: on April 7th, the editorial considered the Aleksinac casualties unfortunate, but argued that Nato have used precision munitions to keep casualties to a minimum, while the Serb forces have deliberately targeted civilians in their brutal march across Kosovo. On April 16th, after Djakovica, the editorial headline called it a 'Grisly Accident in Kosovo', and said it should not stop the Nato campaign. On April 29th, the editorial seemed very hegemonic when it stated that Clinton was right to tell Congress he should seek consent to send ground troops, as that would avoid the divisions and political unrest that developed in Vietnam; in other words, the *NYT* wanted national unity rather than a disunity that would probably bring it more sales and revenue. On May 10th, after

the Chinese embassy bombing, the *NYT* editorial argued it was not reason enough to suspend the air war, which Washington ‘has correctly decided to continue.’

Even the *IoS* editorials, which were anti-war throughout the Nato campaign, did not want Nato to settle for anything less than a victory. This was evident on April 11th, when the editorial declared that Nato should not capitulate, and needed something they could call victory. Moreover, on April 18th, after the Djakovica convoy attack, the editorial headline was ‘Accidents happen in the fog and fury of war’, and it opened with the sentence: ‘The bombing of the refugees was appalling but it was not deliberately evil; pilot error is not.’ So even the *IoS* showed signs of hegemony, and wanted a Nato ‘victory’, despite being opposed to the use of military force.

5.2.2.3. National leaders

As well as supporting the Nato campaign, most of the British media sources also seemed to focus on Blair out of the Nato political leaders, with *The Times* giving him a particularly comprehensive and positive coverage. This seemed to be particularly true at the end of April, when Blair was encouraging Clinton to consider sending ground troops into Kosovo, and seemed to be taking the lead in trying to escalate the Nato campaign. For example, on April 19th, *The Times* editorial seemed to take a similar line to that of the *NYT* on Clinton and Congress, when it suggested Labour will face a tougher challenge in the House of Commons today, and decisive leadership is essential. Then, on the front page of April 21st, *The Times*’ main headline was ‘Blair says defeat of Milosevic is moral imperative for Nato’; on April 22nd, the main story on the front page was Blair on the possibility of a ground invasion; on April 23rd, the headline on the front page was ‘Hawk Blair stiffens US resolve’, while ‘Blair convinced Milosevic will fall in wake of Apache assault’ was a headline on page 16;

the editorial headline on April 24th was ‘Blair in America’, while ‘Blair defends strategy as 10 die in TV centre attack’ was a headline on page fifteen. However, on April 27th, the article ‘No 10 denies Clinton clipped Blair’s wings’ seemed to signal the end of Blair’s attempt to pressure Clinton into sending in ground troops, and the *Times*’ coverage of Blair then went back to normal.

5.2.2.4. The conflict on the ground

The *Main People* variable analysis found the *Telegraph* gave the ethnic-Albanians the most positive coverage in comparison to the Serbs, while *The Times* gave the most balanced coverage; this suggests it was not down to right and left differences, as they were the two most right-wing media sources in the study. Examples of the seemingly different outlooks of the papers can be seen at the start of the campaign: whereas on *The Times*’ March 25th front page it stated the campaign was the first military offensive against a sovereign state in Nato’s history, the next day the *Telegraph*’s Patrick Bishop wrote: ‘All over the former Yugoslavia yesterday, as the drone of bomber engines faded, hundreds of thousands of Muslims, Croats and Albanians were thinking the same, warming thought. At long last, they were saying to each other, Slobodan Milosevic has had a taste of his own bitter medicine.’³³²

The KLA usually had a much more positive coverage than the Serb military in the media sources analysed, and a good comparison to show how there seemed to be some selective reporting was in the coverage of Arkan and Mladic, Serbians who had been involved in ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the Balkans wars, but who probably weren’t in Kosovo, and Agim Ceku, a KLA leader who had been involved in ‘ethnic cleansing’ Serbs from the Krajina during the Serbo-Croat war, and who was definitely in Kosovo.

On March 29th, a *Telegraph* article under the headline ‘Ethnic cleanser Arkan is spotted near Pristina’ began with the paragraph ‘A NOTORIOUS Serbian paramilitary commander accused of massacres in Croatia and Bosnia has been spotted in Kosovo, George Robertson, the Defence Secretary, said yesterday.’ A couple of weeks later, on April 15th, another *Telegraph* article titled ‘Bosnian killer “back in action”’, featured George Robertson’s claims that Mladic was also in Kosovo. In contrast, on May 13th, the *Guardian* reported that Agim Ceku was the new KLA chief of staff, and mentioned he commanded Croatian forces in the Krajina; but instead of describing him as having been involved in ethnic cleansing during ‘Operation Storm’, it was termed driving out: ‘...Operation Storm in which the Croats drove the Serbs out of Krajina...’ So there is a bit of a difference between the terms ethnic cleansing and driving out, although it was a similar process. The *FT* also had a small story on Ceku on May 4th, with no ethnic cleansing mentioned. However, on June 5th, near the end of the Nato campaign, and after Milosevic had agreed to withdraw the Serb military from Kosovo, the *Independent*’s Fisk was predicting the infamous Agim Ceku, who cleansed 170,000 Serbs in the Krajina, will cleanse the remaining Serbs from Kosovo.

The ‘revelation’ of Ceku’s past in the last week of the Nato campaign is one example of how negative aspects of the KLA seemed to be largely left off the media agenda until the last week of the Nato campaign, when several columnists predicted they would take revenge on the Serb population left in Kosovo. The dominant image of the KLA during most of the Nato campaign was one of heroic freedom fighters, with article headlines such as ‘KLA mountain men take fight back to Serbs’, ‘Song in the

³³² Patrick Bishop., *Milosevic has a taste of his own medicine*, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1999/03/26/wkose26.html>, Friday, March 26th, 1999.

mists that drove the enemy away' (both *Telegraph*, April 19th), and 'Amateur army learns on the job' (*Guardian*, May 12th) typifying their coverage. This seemed to change in the last week of the Nato campaign, when the conflict was nearing the end, and there were warnings of a new wave of killing by the KLA, and the purging of the Serb population from Kosovo; examples of this were the *Telegraph* articles 'KLA threatens new wave of killing' (June 4th) and 'The Serbs will blame us – and they'll have a point' (June 9th). However, media professionals would probably argue that the KLA threat to Serb civilians was not relevant news until near the end of the Nato campaign, when it became apparent the KLA would be able to return to a Kosovo emptied of the Serb military and police.

5.2.2.5. Falling Domino

Although Steve Crawshaw, writing in the *IoS* on May 2nd, was proved correct when he wrote 'Mr. Milosevic does not like to fight on two fronts at the same time,' the 'falling domino' frame was regularly used by Nato and the media whenever there was any conflict between the Serbs and their neighbours. This may be an example of the media following the Nato line too much, although sometimes it was the Serbs' Balkans neighbours who were expressing their concerns, rather than the Nato spokespeople. The media's use of this frame may also have been a reaction to events rather than hegemonic reporting, or simply to offer their audience a new angle on the conflict when the other news was becoming too repetitive. Some of the examples of the falling domino frame in the UK media were: *The Times* on the Serb threat to Albania and Macedonia (March 27th); the *Guardian* on Montenegrin fears (April 3rd); the *Guardian* and *Independent* on a Serb incursion into Albania (April 14th), and the *FT* on a Serb incursion into Montenegro (April 21st). The falling domino frame was also evident in the *NYT*, with the editorial on May 5th an example of this; as it accused

Milosevic of using the war to sabotage his 'most formidable political rival,' Milo Djukanovic, the Montenegrin president. In the event, the only significant widening of conflict in the Balkans resulting from the Kosovo Conflict was the remnants of the KLA taking their struggle for ethnic-Albanian civil rights into Macedonia.

Conclusion

The concepts of the hegemonic and plural media have therefore been helpful in providing guiding principles for this analysis, and the results suggest the two models can exist together. This is because on a higher, or unconscious level, hegemonic ideology seemed to influence the media to frame the Nato campaign in line with the Nato perspective; while on a lower, or conscious level, the media professionals tried to supply news in line with the plural model, as they included bad news for Nato, such as collateral damage, and tried to provide as balanced a coverage as their ideology and culture would allow them. Therefore, the media did not seem to be trying to be propagandists for Nato as alleged by propaganda theorists, or to be unnecessarily critical of the Nato military operations as alleged by the British Government; they were just trying to provide a plural coverage within hegemonic constraints. While their professionalism urged them to provide a balanced account of the Kosovo Conflict, their ideology and culture limited how objective the news coverage appeared in the published copy.

6. Interviews

Having analysed the quantitative results, it was thought useful to put some of the main points brought up by the analysis to the journalists that had been involved in the reporting of Nato's Kosovo campaign, to see whether the journalists thought the results accurately reflected how they experienced and observed the Nato campaign, and the media's relationship with Nato and those involved. Interviews were therefore conducted with eight British journalists involved in the Kosovo campaign; with the questions focusing on issues brought up by the theory and results previously discussed in this study. This chapter is split into three main sections, and several sub-sections; the three main sections focus on the reporting of the Kosovo Conflict, the media's reporting of conflicts involving their country's military, and news culture. There were four journalists interviewed from *The Times* (Michael Binyon, Charles Bremner, Simon Jenkins and Matthew Parris), two from the *Guardian* (Stephen Bates and Richard Norton-Taylor), one from the *Independent* (Thomas Sutcliffe), and one from the *IoS* (Rachel Sylvester). Hereafter, the journalists are referred to by their surnames. Bremner and Bates were at the Nato conferences in Brussels; Parris and Sutcliffe were in the House of Commons; Binyon was a diplomatic editor; Norton-Taylor was a defence editor; Jenkins was a columnist, while Sylvester was a news reporter.

6.1. Reporting the Kosovo Conflict

6.1.1. Nato conferences and spin

Those journalists who had been in contact with Nato leaders and spokespeople during the Nato campaign were asked about their experiences, to try and identify how their relationship had developed, and whether they felt empathy with them because of their nationality, or if they maintained an unattached independence; this has relevance for

the question of how significant hegemonic influence is on source use by journalists reporting conflicts involving their own military.

There was a general feeling amongst the journalists interviewed that Nato and New Labour had been spinning the war; but it was to be expected, and the journalists were prepared for it. Bates and Bremner, who were at the Nato conferences in Brussels for the *Guardian* and *The Times*, seemed to have a good opinion of the Nato spokespeople, and Bates' working for the *Guardian* did not seem to have heightened his cynicism of the Nato media operation. Bates, who acknowledged he is not a defence or international affairs correspondent, seemed to reminisce fondly of 'a surreal experience, going to a big hangar each day for the briefings;' and seemed to excuse Nato's spin when saying they had been 'as open and honest as they could have been under the circumstances,' and that 'they had a difficult job keeping to the media's deadlines.' Bremner, who said he had covered several wars in the past, considered the Nato conferences to have 'become a very British affair after Campbell went out to Brussels,' and seemed to show pride in the fact that 'the British have a reputation for being the best communicators in Europe.' Bremner acknowledged Nato had been very hospitable to the journalists, and there was a certain amount of socialising with the Nato spokespeople. Bremner considered that 'Nato had wildly exaggerated the accuracy of their bombing,' but defended *The Times*' reporting of it by emphasising they 'had not reported it as fact; only as Nato reports.' Recollecting Braestrup's view that most journalists attending the allied conferences in the Gulf War were inexperienced, Bremner had the same opinion on the journalists at Nato's Kosovo conferences, as he said Nato 'had a captive audience. Most of the journalists there were not war journalists; they were just covering a beat.'

The journalists covering the Nato campaign in the UK were also aware of spin and propaganda in the New Labour and Nato information, but defended their use of it by saying they had to use the information, as the public want to hear the government and Nato leaders' opinions. For example, Sylvester said that 'Campbell used to feed journalists regular stories of Serb atrocities in Kosovo, and the tabloids completely took the Nato line, reporting it on the front pages, but the quality press were more cautious, and reported it as uncorroborated if there was no proof.' Norton-Taylor was more critical of the Nato media operation, and especially of Campbell's spinning of intelligence information, which he saw as a precursor to Campbell's use of the weapons of mass destruction dossier that led the UK into the Iraq War in 2003; Norton-Taylor considered the Nato spin-doctors had 'grossly exaggerated how much Serb armour they'd hit,' 'milked the refugee situation,' and 'focused on how bad Milosevic was, while keeping cluster bombs and civilian casualties quiet.' Jenkins, who as a columnist did not attend New Labour and Nato conferences, but had his own 'expert' sources, said he 'was aware the government had a particular agenda; hyping the situation on the ground to get the Americans to send ground troops in;' this suggests Jenkins considered that Blair and New Labour wanted ground troops from early in the Nato campaign, and this would mean the media calling for ground troops was not necessarily against the New Labour strategy, and therefore could have been hegemonic rather than unhegemonic. When Parris was asked if he thought Kosovo would be remembered as the war of spin, as the New Labour spin doctors were at the peak of their powers at the time of their takeover of the Nato media operation, Parris said 'no, because governments always spin; spin is like a virus, always developing new strains, as resistance to it in one form grows. Therefore, spin doctors like Campbell have a limited shelf-life.'

6.1.2. Influences on the media's view of the Kosovo conflict

When asked what historic conflict they thought influenced the media's reporting of the Nato campaign, and remembering that World War Two had more references than the Balkans wars in the historical references quantitative analysis, which was conducted to identify cultural influences on the journalists' reporting, Parris and Bremner did not seem to think World War Two had been a relevant parallel, as the Serbs had been Britain's allies during that war. Parris did not think 'the media were influenced in their coverage by World War Two, because Britain was allied with the Serbs during that war.' Parris thought 'the media saw the Kosovo conflict as a clear story of good and evil, and Milosevic was so out of order the Albanians had to be the heroes, as there cannot be any ambivalence in the media.' Similarly, Bremner said: 'the reason Nato had a positive media coverage in the UK was because there was a general consensus that the Albanians were being beaten up by the Serbs.'

Parris, Bremner, Bates and Binyon all had the view that the West had not intervened early enough in the previous Balkans wars, and this had influenced the way they viewed the Kosovo conflict. Parris said 'those journalists who had not criticised the Serbs early enough in the previous Balkans wars felt they had lost a little authority after the truth came out from Bosnia;' Bates said 'journalists felt something should have been done earlier in the previous Balkans wars;' Bremner said 'Kosovo was a bit of a relief, because journalists had felt impotent in the earlier wars,' and Binyon said 'journalists thought all sorts were going on in Kosovo because of the earlier Balkans wars.' Binyon also added that 'the emotional hangover felt by journalists from the previous Balkans wars left them more open to influence by anti-Serb propaganda, and this meant there was some bad reporting in assuming from a couple of massacres that thousands were being killed. The Serbs were therefore demonised for much more

than what was going on in Kosovo, and after the end of the Kosovo Conflict the Macedonian ethnic-Albanians took advantage by rising up and demanding more civil rights.'

Some of the journalists were then questioned about whether (1) historical reasons, (2) the way the Kosovo Conflict had been spun inaccurately, or (3) the circumstances of the conflicts, were the biggest influence on there being more UK media criticism of the Iraq war in 2003 than the Kosovo conflict. There was a general consensus across the political spectrum that it was the circumstances of the conflicts, and this suggests that the inaccuracies of the Nato information during the Kosovo campaign had not had a lasting effect on the journalists' opinion. Jenkins, who opposed both wars, said he thought 'Kosovo was a sub-set of Bosnia, and the difference in coverage with the Iraq war was because of the refugee situation in Kosovo;' Sylvester also thought 'it was more that the context for going to war was completely different;' while Bates said 'the influences on the media coverage were a mixture of journalistic, cultural and political. Kosovo was more clear-cut than Iraq; morally and politically, and there was no doubts about whether Nato had provoked it.' Bates added that 'the general view of Nato's Kosovo campaign was that Milosevic and his cronies were a nasty opportunistic bunch, and they were set on oppressing large numbers of people.' Sutcliffe also thought 'it was the difference in the conflict situations that influenced the media coverage,' but also stressed outside influences on the media 'as public and political support for Nato's Kosovo campaign was more unanimous than for the Iraq war.'

Despite the results and discussion showing *The Times* was the most supportive of Blair in his efforts to influence the Americans on ground troops, their writers seemed to accept the US was the alliance's leader, and therefore did not over-estimate the

UK's power and influence; Bremner said the 'British are usually more willing to back the US in military campaigns than other European countries for all kinds of historical reasons;' while Parris emphasised the American influence on the *Times*' world-view when he said that 'because of their instinctual pro-Americanism, *The Times*' views of state and sovereignty have changed since Kosovo, and they are more accepting of a disregard for national sovereignty, and even the UN, if they think intervention is justified.' Jenkins considered 'the British government and military were keen to play a leading role in Nato's campaign because it was a natural British instinct from our imperialist past; when we see a bad man we think we should help, while most other countries do not have that urge.'

Sylvester also thought Blair's attitude was 'modern imperialism,' and thought the Kosovo media coverage was driven by 'Blair's belief in using the military to solve international crises, as seen in the parallels with the New Labour rhetoric on the Iraq war; Blair saw both as moral wars between good and evil.' Sylvester also considered the British media's focus on refugees was influenced by Blair and the New Labour media operation, as Nato used images of the refugees to 'emphasise the effects of evil; showing the refugees made it a clear moral issue.'

6.1.3. Was the Nato campaign a success?

When asked if they thought the Nato military campaign had been a success, there was mixed opinions, and the journalists did not seem to have changed their views since the Nato campaign. Bates, Sylvester and Bremner thought the Nato campaign was generally a success, but were quite elusive about it, as they said they had not really followed it since the Nato campaign, and this seems evidence of how journalists who do not have a continuing interest in a conflict soon lose track of the situation.

Bremner, who is now the Paris correspondent for *The Times*, acknowledged that ‘some people have said the Serbs had a hard time afterwards, and were ethnically-cleansed,’ but he still considered the Nato campaign to have been a success because of its immediate impact in 1999: ‘it seemed to have achieved what it set out to do.’

Bates, who is now a religious affairs correspondent for the *Guardian*, limited his opinion to the objectives of the Nato campaign, as he considered it a success in that it ‘stopped the persecution and ethnic-cleansing of the ethnic-Albanians.’ In contrast, Sylvester, who is now a columnist for the *Telegraph*, took into consideration the long-term effect of the Nato campaign, and said she had heard ‘Kosovo is a better place now, from people who had been there.’ Sutcliffe also considered the long-term effects of the Nato campaign, and admitted he does ‘not really know if Nato’s campaign was a success, as it was not on the media agenda now;’ agreeing with Iyengar et al on the limitations of episodic reporting, he added that ‘the attention span of the news media, and how ambiguous conflicts are not covered, are issues needing investigation.’

Parris and Jenkins had not changed their opinions since Nato’s campaign, which they opposed, and did not think the Nato intervention had been a success; Parris thought ‘the Nato campaign was the start of a long and expensive peace-keeping mission that is going to end in partition; a solution that would have been possible without completely humiliating the Serbs.’ Jenkins thought that as well as the Nato campaign being the start of an expensive peace-keeping mission, ‘it legitimised a disparate separatist movement, split up what was left of Yugoslavia, and stopped one population movement but started another.’

6.2. Journalistic reporting of conflicts involving their nation's military

6.2.1. The media's use of sources

When asking journalists about the media's relationship with politicians during conflicts involving their own military, and putting to them the findings from previous hegemonic studies; that the media rely too much on elite government and military sources, most of the journalists acknowledged there were deficiencies in the media's source use, but cited practical limitations on their work as the reason, rather than it being a part of a conspiracy, or influenced by national biases.

After Hallin's Vietnam War findings were cited in the interview with Bremner, as an example of how hegemonic theorists believe the media have relied too much on government sources in past conflicts, Bremner disagreed with Hallin's version of events; while evoking memories of watching the Australian media coverage of the Vietnam War. Bremner said he 'remembered journalists criticising US policy before the breakdown in the political consensus.' On the UK media, he said 'papers do take crusading lines against the government and military, as the *Guardian*, *Independent* and *Mirror* have done over the Iraq war, although he acknowledged there had also been a lot of public and political opinion against the Iraq war, and so it was unclear whether the above media sources had acted independently.' Binyon also defended the journalistic use of official sources when he said 'it was difficult to balance sources in any war, and access to Serbia was the main problem in balancing sources during the Kosovo conflict, as the costs and dangers involved were too much for most media organisations.'

Sutcliffe also pointed out that 'the British media did not only report from the Nato perspective in Kosovo, and in Iraq there has been even more criticism of the

government.’ Sutcliffe defended the journalistic reliance on official sources as being because of ‘the difficulties journalists have in finding credible sources;’ he thought ‘the *GUMG* lose sight of the realities and hardships journalists face when reporting conflicts; journalists have to judge issues while being fed propaganda, that they have deadlines they often struggle to meet, and that it is usually dangerous and time consuming to check facts during war-time.’ Sutcliffe added that it ‘therefore should not be a surprise that journalists go to sources that are credible and available during conflicts; during the Kosovo conflict the war-zone had been cleared of independent journalists by the Serbs, and Nato sources were considered more reliable than the Serbs.’ Norton-Taylor was quite opposed to the use of independent sources in military situations, as he said ‘experts’ had got him ‘into trouble during the Afghanistan war in 2001, with inaccurate predictions.’ He believes ‘it is very difficult to get knowledgeable sources in military conflicts, and that independent “experts” can only give an overview, as they don’t know any more than journalists.’ When asked about using members of the public as sources, he seemed shocked at the thought, and said ‘that wouldn’t be very professional would it?’

However, some journalists offered hope for a wider use of sources, with Parris acknowledging ‘it is easier to get alternative sources now than in the past.’ Parris agreed there ‘is always an uncomfortable dependence on official government and military sources during conflicts, and the modern media are aware of this, and they do try and let the audience know they are subjected to censorship and uncorroborated information.’ Sylvester said there was a ‘feeling in the media that more independent sources are needed,’ although like Norton-Taylor, she said ‘you have to be careful, as they might not be accurate;’ she believes ‘the *BBC* recommended using more independent sources in their reporting after a recent review.’ Bates also agreed that

‘journalists should use as wide a variety of sources as possible, as long as the audience is told who has said what, and in what context, so they can then make an informed judgement on what to believe.’

On the use of domestic anti-war political sources, there was a general consensus that the media used sources to reflect the political and public view on the war. Although hegemony and indexing studies have criticised the media for relying too much on prominent politicians, and not featuring enough alternative opinions, the journalists clearly did not think they were obliged to report all back-bench criticism, and did not consider the expected anti-war politicians to be particularly newsworthy. In this regard, they reflect Ian Stewart’s view that back-bench anti-war politicians are treated as mavericks even by their own parties, and are therefore also marginalised by the media. For example, Norton-Taylor emphasised ‘a lack of emphasis on anti-war sources is not a conspiracy, it was just that the usual anti-war politicians are not considered news.’ This was supported by Sutcliffe and Parris; Sutcliffe said ‘it was news when Michael Howard broke cross-party front bench unity, and it would be news if Benn had supported Blair, but Benn being anti-war is expected, and therefore not news.’ Parris thinks ‘political opinion is only headline news if the Commons is split, and it is inappropriate if it becomes the story otherwise.’ Parris thought ‘the anti-war left stopped some of the more mainstream politicians being more critical of the Nato campaign, as it was a case of whether you were on the loony left or not.’ Parris also considered ‘the media overdid the collateral damage coverage in Kosovo, and that might have distracted attention from the issue of the failure of the original war aims;’ this supports the theory that the media concentrate their criticisms too much on aspects of the continuing military campaign, while neglecting to reflect on

the question of the justification and success of the campaign in relation to its original rationale and objectives.

6.2.2. Patriotism

The general view was that editorials and opinion were often influenced by patriotism, but news reporting should be objective, and therefore not show signs of patriotism. However, there were differences of opinion within those broad generalisations. For example, Parris thought hegemonic influence should be expected at *The Times*, because 'it sees itself as the national voice, and the presumption of the editor is therefore to support the country at war, unless there is an overwhelming reason not to.' Bates, who is with the left-wing *Guardian*, also seemed to think some hegemonic influence could be expected in journalistic reporting of your nation's military, as he acknowledged that 'journalists are members of a society, and you want your side to win to a certain extent, but that does not mean you accept everything your side tells you, and negative news should be reported as accurately as possible.' Binyon also acknowledged that 'patriotism influences opinion and comment, because views are being expressed, and the views of the journalists are influenced by their background and culture;' however, he considered that 'reporting should be objective', and 'there is no room for patriotism in it, the media cannot do a government propaganda job during conflicts involving their military.' Jenkins also emphasised that 'journalists have an obligation to tell the truth.'

On the particular difficulties involved in reporting from the war-zone, Bremner, who has reported from Central American and Middle Eastern war-zones, admitted he felt he 'could report more objectively when not reporting on the British military;' although he also said journalists were 'completely obliged to report negative news for

their military, as long as it did not endanger lives and operations, so there is a thin line between what journalists should and should not report, and journalists do what their instinct tells them.’ Against the notion of a particular hegemonic influence on journalistic reporting from war-zones, Sutcliffe considered that journalists are ‘likely to develop empathy with whoever they are with in a war-zone, whether they are embedded with their country’s troops or with the enemy.’

There was also a feeling that the media could be too critical of the British government and military because they are the most noticeable and easily attacked, and this concurs with the results and discussion sections of this study; although Nato were the focus of most articles, that did not mean they always had a positive coverage, as their evaluations were often negative. This goes against the Propaganda model view of the media, which considers the media to be subservient lap-dogs of the government-military elites. For example, Sylvester thought the *IoS*’s anti-war stance during Nato’s Kosovo campaign was legitimate because ‘that was how the editors genuinely felt at the time, but the *BBC* went too far on Iraq, in distorting information to undermine the government.’ Norton-Taylor also thought ‘there is a danger we put our own troops under more of a microscope, and this can mean the news is sometimes slanted against the British military.’ Bremner also cited ‘regular friction between the military and the media in the UK as a sign that the military-media relationship is not always a comfortable one, and that the media are often too independent for the military’s liking.’

6.2.3. Historical references

A couple of the interviewees also offered insights into why historical references were used by journalists when they report military conflicts, and these concurred with those featured in the theory section, such as Wolfsfeld's view that 'having established the mode of reporting, journalists then attempt to find historical examples to fit the story, and questions of which historical example offers the most appropriate frame often becomes a matter for public debate.'³³³ For example, Binyon said it is important for 'journalists to be aware of the public's collective memories and consciousness when they are writing,' and this often leads to them 'drawing parallels with the past;' while Sutcliffe explained that: 'journalists are usually working under pressure, and look for narrative short-cuts to give shape to their reports; if they are in a trench they think of World War One.' These views emphasise the fact that journalists are just like other members of the public, and they have to draw on their cultural and historical knowledge to make sense of new information; they then have to re-produce the new information in a coherent form which will interest their audience, and this often means drawing historical parallels with previous conflicts they think their readers will connect with, as an explanatory short-cut.

6.3. News culture

6.3.1. The journalists' views on management, political and public influence

When I asked Michael Binyon about criticisms that the British media's coverage of the Nato campaign was either too propagandistic, according to left-wing critical theorists, or too open to Serb sources according to New Labour, he said 'Well, that makes me think we got it about right.' This view was mirrored by his *Times*

³³³ G. Wolfsfeld., *op.cit*, p. 50-51.

colleague Charles Bremner, who was shocked to hear evidence had been found of the media relying too much on government and Nato sources, and responded in an e-mail follow-up to his telephone interview: 'the British media do a fairly good job at distancing themselves from the Government and official line, though all sorts of influences make this an imperfect process. The ideal reporter positions him/herself as a reasonable witness who applies common sense to the events they observe.

Inevitably, to make it into the paper or onto the air the story has to be told with an angle that attracts attention. This usually conforms to the culture prevailing over the viewers, listeners and readers. So it's difficult to say how much the media lead and shape opinion and how much they reflect the establishment outlook.'

This view of a relatively independent media environment, with the journalists interacting with politicians and public opinion in a circle of influence, was supported by most of the other journalists, and their views of the media environment are more in line with cascade theory than hegemony or indexing. They also stressed that the amount of independence from editorial control, and freedom of opinion, depended on the position of the journalist. For example, Sylvester said 'there are no controls on columnists, and my opinions often disagree with the editorials.' Jenkins and Binyon also emphasised that news reporters are expected to write objectively, while columnists are free to give their independent opinions. Jenkins thought those who have criticised the media about this 'have grossly over-emphasised management controls; I have occasionally seen extreme pressure used, but not regularly;' he thought 'the editorial team conforms to editorial opinion, and there is usually an angle to news, but columnists are independent.' Binyon generally agreed with Jenkins, and also acknowledged news usually has an angle, which seems to be the journalistic term for a frame: 'columnists have latitude; newspaper analysts are supposed to provide a

fair representation of the facts, while news stories are supposed to be objective and balanced, but often have an angle.’ Binyon also pointed out that ‘newspapers are first of all businesses, and journalists collectively hunt around in packs, looking for different angles on the same story.’ In contrast to the hegemonic and indexing theories, which stress a top-down influence on journalistic output, and in line with cascade theory, Binyon said journalists wrote with more awareness of public opinion than political opinion; newspapers lead and follow public opinion. Parris’ views were also in line with cascade theory, as he stressed ‘journalists often think their own opinions are those of their audience, and politicians mistake newspapers’ opinions for public opinion.’ Binyon and Jenkins’ views also reflect Anthony Smith’s view that *The Times* does not want to stand too far ahead or behind its readers.

Although Sutcliffe also thought public opinion was an important influence on the media, he said politicians could sometimes be more influential because ‘you are going to have them phoning you, so they have a more direct influence than public opinion.’ Therefore, Sutcliffe considers ‘it’s true that politicians can usually set the agenda, but it’s hard to see how journalists can go against the big picture; as newsrooms are in the grip of a ‘tidal news flow’, and other news organisations are going to be reporting the same story.’ Sutcliffe’s views are therefore more in line with hegemony and indexing theories than cascade theory.

6.3.2. Changes in the politics-media relationship

In opposition to the theory that politicians and the media enjoy a static, unified relationship, several journalists talked of the break-down in trust and sympathy between politicians and the media in modern Britain, and how the relationship now

seems to be one of competition and distrust, rather than cooperation and trust. This is in line with the right-wing view of the media, which considers the media have become too powerful; it is also more in line with cascade theory than hegemony theory, as hegemony theory considers the media subservient to the government. An example of this view was espoused by Sutcliffe, who explained ‘there is now distrust between politicians and the media, because politicians think the media will misinterpret them, and so they spin their information, and then the spin makes the media more suspicious and negative towards politicians, which makes the politicians more wary of the journalists.’

Parris also thought there had been a turn-around in the media-political relationship, with the media ‘now more self- confident, and with most politicians not seeming to have a clear direction.’ Sylvester considers ‘the media-political relationship changes with the standing of the politicians and government; New Labour was followed by most of the media when it was elected, because it was seen as positive and strong, but then spin became the story, and the balance has now shifted to a stronger media; which is more independent and sceptical of the New Labour government.’ Binyon agreed with John Lloyd’s view that ‘the media have become too powerful in comparison to politicians,’ but did not think the media influenced Blair on ground troops during the Kosovo conflict; instead, he thought ‘Blair knew what he wanted from the start, and was using the media to create a “climate of opinion”.’ Sylvester, who said the move from the *IoS* to the *Telegraph* had not changed her left-wing political opinion, still considers ‘there can be too much media cynicism, and that it can become unnecessarily destructive if taken to extremes.’

As well as a change in the power relationship between the media and politics. Jenkins has also noticed ‘a change in both politics and the media towards the political centre,’ and Parris considers this has meant ‘there is a certain amount of confusion about who to support at *The Times*, rather than any real deep change in political beliefs.’ Binyon explained that *The Times* is traditionally centre-right, and usually supports the Tories, but there had been a great shift in politics, and they were now supporting Labour at the moment because they think Blair gets his policies right most of the time.

However, Binyon believed the biggest change in the media is that the press have been marginalised, and influence and authority in the media has moved to television.

6.3.3. UK and US journalism

Asked whether they thought UK journalism had a similar watchdog ethic to the US, there was a difference of opinion on UK journalism, but an almost unanimously critical view of the American journalistic tradition in respect to their watchdog ideal. With reference to the UK media, Sylvester thought ‘the best UK journalists do have a similar watchdog ethic, such as in the broadsheets,’ and said she had a similar ethic, as she had ‘entered journalism with the aim of reporting the truth.’ Sutcliffe also thought that serious journalists in the UK ‘believe they have a constitutional function; a questioning role to play in society, and there is more of a tradition for healthy dissent to the government in the UK media than the US.’ Both Jenkins and Bates thought the UK media gets its plurality from the broad spectrum of titles and political views, while Binyon thought ‘*The Times* was more flexible, quicker to the story, braver and livelier than the *NYT*.’ Bremner and Parris both thought the UK broadsheets have become more like watchdogs recently; Parris thought ‘the UK has followed the US,’ while Bremner thought ‘the UK media had been more gossipy and

informal before, with more of a 'rock n' roll ethic than watchdog.' Similarly, Jenkins thought 'the UK media tradition is more ratfink than watchdog.'

Concerning the US media's image of being watchdogs for the public, Parris thought 'the *NYT* do have the ideal, but not the rest of the US media.' Sylvester thought 'the US media are much more patriotic in their reporting than the UK,' while Sutcliffe thought 'it is harder to distinguish patriotism and slavish following of government information in the US media than the UK,' and cited *Fox news*' reporting as an example. Jenkins thought 'the US media could be very pompous in the way they view themselves,' and this was evident in their post-Iraq war apology for not strenuously analysing and criticising the US government information prior to the war. Norton-Taylor also thought 'the *NYT* should have reported Iraq better, as they have the resources,' and in line with hegemonic theory's view that the American media react to events rather than criticise them before, he also thought the *NYT* criticisms of the government were 'all mea culpa,' and that they should have been more sceptical before, as the *Guardian* was. Binyon also thought the *NYT* is 'very pompous, in thinking it is the voice of the US, when in reality it is predictable and slow.' Binyon also criticised 'their supposed objectivity,' as he believed it 'does not go beyond the framework of the American view.' Bremner also thought 'the US media takes itself too seriously,' while Parris thought 'the US media is very parochial.'

An American Perspective on the difference between UK and US journalism

The less serious and self-important, but more opinionated, image British journalists seem to have of themselves, and their profession, in comparison to the American media, and particularly the *NYT*, seems to have been confirmed by Sarah Lyall, the London correspondent of the *NYT*, although she disagreed with those interviewees

who claimed news reporting was objective, and opinion was left to the columnists. Her view of the British press seems to support the interviewees' opinion of their plurality through the spectrum of opinion, and also suggests they are less hegemonic than the American media.

Lyall observed that: 'British newspapers have always taken a point of view; this makes them fun as well as infuriating. Because their readers are more fickle and demanding than in the past, the papers have to work doubly hard to distinguish themselves from one another, to sparkle at the newsstand, to take a point of view, to draw consumers in. This smorgasbord of coverage is one reason that I read as many papers as I can each day....Unfortunately, all of this reading brings you no closer to any objective truth. With so many points of view, so much spinning, and so much news-page editorializing (British papers don't tend to make the same distinction between news and editorial pages that American papers do, considering everything part of the same agenda-pursuing whole), it can seem impossible to answer the simplest of questions: What happened yesterday? For a newspaper-loving person, living in a country with so many perspectives to choose from can be a real liberation. And while the levity and sometime immaturity of the British press can be maddening, it can also, at times, be a welcome change. When American journalists—with their high-minded principles, their snooty self-regard, their First Amendment—confront Britons about the lack of seriousness in their papers, Britons generally counter with complaints about the paint-drying tedium of the American press. Most British journalists would rather be locked in a broom closet with no food than convey the

appearance of taking their profession seriously—even when they do take it seriously. And sometimes you start to see their point.’³³⁴

Lyall also described her attendance at the British newspaper awards, and seemed to be surprised at the competition and animosity between the different journalists and organisations: ‘The British Press Awards have been called "the Academy Awards of British journalism," Britain's answer to the Pulitzers. But last night's ceremony... was not a mutually respectful celebration of the British newspaper industry fuelled by camaraderie and bonhomie. It was more like a soccer match attended by a club of misanthropic inebriates. The losers were not happy for the winners.... The rule seemed to be that you were allowed to cheer only for awards won by a) someone at your own paper; or b) someone at a paper owned by your proprietor (e.g., Rupert Murdoch). Otherwise, the etiquette was either to mutter disapprovingly or to drown out the winner's acceptance speech by chattering as raucously as possible.’³³⁵ Lyall also explained why she believes there is more competition and sensationalism in the UK press than in the US the next day, and this again corroborated the interviewees’ opinions: ‘British national newspapers, scrapping for readers in one of the toughest newspaper markets in the world, make much less money from advertising than their American counterparts and depend much more heavily on newsstand sales. With so many papers to choose from, readers can be fickle, selecting one paper over the other because of an enticing headline.’³³⁶

6.4. Conclusion

The interviews with the journalists suggested the majority felt empathy towards the government and Nato, and believed Nato were doing the right thing in going to war in

³³⁴ Sarah Lyall., *An American Perspective on the British Press*, on the Slate e-magazine, at <http://slate.msn.com/id/2114852>, 18/03/05.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, 16/03/05.

defence of the ethnic-Albanian refugees. However, despite the interviews taking place five years after the Nato campaign ended, those journalists who had opposed the Nato campaign when it happened had not changed their opinions on whether it had been justified and successful.

The journalists at the conferences knew the Nato spokespeople were spinning the war, and the journalists in the UK knew the politicians were distorting the reality of the campaign; but it was evident that they expected it, thought it was necessary for Nato to spin as they were involved in a propaganda battle, and that it was their job to report what they thought was relevant, while warning their readers when it was uncorroborated information. The journalists thought that as long as they warned the audience it was Nato information they were justified in using it, as there was often a lack of alternative sources because the Serbs had closed off Kosovo to independent journalists. At times, this attitude resigned the journalists to following the Nato media operation's version of events, as they did not consider there was much alternative, and this was in line with hegemonic theory and indexing. The journalists did stress frequent tensions in the military-media relationship though, and consider this to be evidence of their independence from state control.

The journalists' general opinion of the relationship between politicians and journalists was more in line with cascade theory, as they said the media, politicians and public opinion all shape each other in a circle of influence similar to that proposed by plural theorists.³³⁷ The interviewees' opinions on what was expected of them also differed to hegemonic/propaganda theorists' expectations, as they did not think they were under any obligation to balance source use equally during the conflict, domestically or

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, 17/03/05.

³³⁷ See figure 2.1.

internationally, and were more concerned with reflecting the political and public climate in the UK. As Richard Norton-Taylor of the *Guardian*, who has previously undertaken investigatory journalism to expose elite corruption, seemed much more hostile to the idea of a wider use of sources than Matthew Parris of *The Times*, journalistic opinion on the use of sources does not seem to be divided between a libertarian left-wing and an establishment supporting right-wing. However, Michael Binyon does consider *The Times* thinks of itself as a national voice, and so the paper is likely to appear hegemonic.

Most interviewees considered the relationship between politicians and the media changes with administrations and events, and they have plurality in the UK media through both independent opinions and the spectrum of political views. Several journalists admitted news was usually angled (framed) towards a particular view. Most of the journalists were also quite open about the limitations of the British media, and these often corresponded to criticisms previously advanced in communications studies, such as journalists at conferences lacking expert knowledge, the simplification of conflicts to bipolar contests between good and evil, the lack of depth in reporting, a focus on continuing events rather than the original objectives, and the short attention span of the media. Their criticisms of the American media's image of themselves as watchdogs also reflected criticisms espoused by the American media analysts featured in the theory section of this study, such as the limits of the American media's objectivity to the American world-view, slavish patriotism, and criticising government policy *mea culpa*; after the event rather than before. Sarah Lyall's views from an American perspective generally confirmed the British journalist interviewees' opinions on the differences between UK and US journalism.

7. Conclusion

7.1. Models and Theories

Nato's Kosovo campaign was a unique operation, and the findings of this study are particular to that war, although as the previous sections in this thesis have highlighted, most of the news reporting was similar to the reporting of previous British and American conflicts during the twentieth century. This is the first comprehensive study of the quality British press' coverage of Britain at war based largely on the American hegemony/indexing/cascade research tradition; with a comprehensive research scheme that incorporates quantitative and qualitative research methods. Past studies have shown that the journalistic tradition of objective reporting has opened it up to criticisms from the left and right, and the evidence from this study has shown why this is likely to be the case, with critics from either side of the political spectrum considering the media had not reported Nato's campaign properly. Before this first section of the conclusion focuses on evaluating how accurate the hegemonic, indexing and cascade models' expectations are in regard to the Kosovo media coverage, it will first explain why the more extreme theories on the right and left were thought to be inaccurate descriptions of the UK and US media coverage of Nato's Kosovo campaign, and thus were not included as a prominent part of the research framework.

7.1.1. The Propaganda Model

Although Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model was initiated before the end of the Cold War, they did recently defend its premises in a *Political Communication* debate with the Langs.³³⁸ However, the results of this study are often at odds with Herman and Chomsky's expectations under the propaganda model, and their

predictions of what the news content would be were often found to be inaccurate. For example, Herman and Chomsky wrote: 'Using a propaganda model...we would also expect the news stories about worthy and unworthy victims (or enemy and friendly states) to differ in quality. That is, we would expect official sources of the United States and its client states to be used heavily – and uncritically – in connection with one's own abuses and those of friendly governments, while refugees and other dissident sources will be used in dealing with enemies.' The results showed that although the ethnic-Albanian civilians did get much more coverage than the Serb civilians; the Serb civilians did receive a qualitatively similar coverage, with regular articles emphasising their suffering under the Nato bombing campaign. The reporting of the Nato collateral damage also usually led with reports from sources at the scene, the local media or Yugoslav official sources. Moreover, while Nato official sources were used heavily to explain their collateral damage incidents, they were also criticised heavily most of the time.

Herman and Chomsky also expected that the media would accept 'one's own state' tells the truth; but the discussion section showed the media openly commented on the 'propaganda' being released by Nato in a two-way propaganda battle, and warned it was often unverified. Herman and Chomsky also: 'expect great investigatory zeal in the search for enemy villainy...but diminished enterprise in examining such matters in connection with one's own and friendly states;' but the results and discussion section showed the media spent as much time investigating the Nato collateral damage incidents as the reports of Serb war crimes, and this was especially true of the *NYT* after the Chinese embassy bombing. Although reports of Serb war crimes

³³⁸ See *Political Communication*, 21 (1), January-March, 2004.

initially seemed to be judged very newsworthy by most media sources, they soon faded off the front pages as the campaign wore on, and the reports became repetitive.

Herman and Chomsky also expected the 'quality of coverage should also be displayed more directly and crudely in placement, headlining, word usage, and other modes of mobilising interest and outrage. In the opinion columns, we would anticipate sharp restraints on the range of opinion allowed expression;³³⁹ however, the results and discussion sections showed that loaded words critical of the Nato campaign were often used in headlines on the front pages, while the opinion columns were often more negative towards Nato than positive. Herman and Chomsky seem to have failed to observe the changes in the American media since Korea, as most other American media analysts have, and noticed there is enough criticism of the Administration, and questioning of their information, to make propaganda an inaccurate description of the news content.

Philip Hammond also argued that the humanitarian dimension to Nato's Kosovo campaign meant the left-wing media in the UK had relinquished their role as watchdogs, and so the British media during the Kosovo conflict was basically a propaganda arm of Nato. Firstly, although the left-wing British media did support the Nato campaign, they also supported British military involvement in the Falklands and Gulf wars, so there is not as much of a historical change in the media coverage as Hammond tries to make out. Moreover, this study found there was quite a high level of criticism of the Nato campaign in the British media, and therefore it was not in line with the propaganda model. Although the humanitarian dimension to the war did make the left-wing media desperate for a Nato victory, it also made it highly critical of the Nato policy of only flying above 15,000 feet, as it felt it was doing little to ease

the humanitarian crisis for much of the campaign, and was also causing civilian casualties. Far from being propagandistic towards Nato, the media's coverage of Nato bombs going astray and causing civilian casualties was prominent and consistent, and this led to complaints about the media coverage by New Labour leaders.

7.1.2. Right-wing theory

Right-wing theorists who claim the media were not patriotic enough, or gave too much access to enemy sources, were also found to be unrealistic and inaccurate, and their 'flak' came as a result of the media being too accurate and truthful in their reporting of a faltering Nato campaign in April and early May. All the media sources apart from the *IoS* supported the war, and reported the Kosovo conflict from the Nato perspective; even the *IoS* stated it still wanted a Nato victory, and all the papers tried to 'guide' Nato towards a conclusion they could call victory. Nato sources gained the vast majority of access, and were largely able to frame their campaign in the media as a law and order operation to save the ethnic-Albanian refugees from Serb brutality. Serb government and military sources were given little access, although this was also true for the equivalent ethnic-Albanians. So wasn't the coverage propagandistic then? No, the reporting was in line with the values of objective news reporting, as it is for other non-conflict international news stories, and so was more cultural than propagandistic. If the media had reported the war in the way some British government politicians and supporters requested, it would have been in line with the 'propaganda model,' and would have risked both a loss of credibility, and the disillusionment of their readers.

7.1.3. Hegemony, Indexing and Cascade theories: the NYT findings

So, if the propaganda model and right-wing theory are thought to be too extreme in

³³⁹ E.S. Herman and N. Chomsky., *op.cit*, p. 34-5.

their predictions and analyses for the media coverage of Nato's Kosovo campaign, how accurate were the more moderate theories that provided the framework for this study. As the section on the differences between the UK and US media explained in the introduction, the American media have often found it more difficult to accept restrictions on their freedom to report, as they consider press freedom a constitutional right, while the British press is generally considered more critical of government because of the competition they face from each newspaper being in close geographical proximity to each other. The *NYT* was primarily included in this study because it provides an international comparison for the UK media, and it is probably the media source that has had the most hegemonic/indexing analyses conducted on it. Most of those studies have found that although it is a liberal paper, it still relies heavily on American government and military sources, and those sources are therefore able to construct media frames that show their campaign positively; the journalists usually retain their 'independence' from government through criticising the military tactics rather than the premises of the conflict.

However, using the *NYT* to judge the British media's hegemony was difficult, because none of the studies that have found the *NYT* hegemonic conducted research on its Kosovo coverage; moreover, Entman considers the American media coverage of Nato's Kosovo campaign was an example of how they have become less hegemonic since the end of the Cold War, although he analysed magazines. Therefore, whether the *NYT* was as reliant on government sources during the Kosovo conflict as it was in the previous American conflicts analysed in hegemonic/indexing studies was unclear when this analysis took place. Consequently, this study had to judge the hegemony of the *NYT*'s coverage along with the hegemony of the British media, rather than just comparing the British media to a definitely hegemonic *NYT*.

This study proposes that the *NYT*'s Kosovo coverage was similar both to their coverage of the Vietnam War and Central American wars, as set out by Hallin and Bennett, and the more 'plural' views of the media coverage set out in recent studies by Zaller and Chiu, Althaus and Entman, whose revisions of Hallin's hegemony and Bennett's indexing are arguably more about differences in samples, expectations, methodologies and interpretations than the actual media content. In line with hegemonic theory, the content analysis found the *NYT* was generally supportive of Clinton and the Nato campaign, predominantly used US government and Nato sources and few American anti-war sources, reported the conflict from the US government and Nato perspective in line with the moral humanitarian intervention frame, did not offer any sustained criticism of Nato which challenged their framing, and was more positive in its evaluations of Nato than any of the British media sources. When we look back at Hallin's Vietnam War study, there does not seem to be much difference in the conclusions he made, and the conclusions from the evidence of the Kosovo Conflict in this study. The premises of Nato's Kosovo campaign basically always stayed in the sphere of consensus, as the Vietnam War did for most of its duration, and it was only the tactics that were deemed to be within the sphere of legitimate controversy, and thus open to criticism. The law and order frame dominated again, and the KLA's part in fuelling the civil war prior to the Nato campaign was largely omitted from the narrative; civilian casualties caused by Nato were also ultimately accepted as necessary accidents, while the Serb politicians and military were framed as being intent on causing wanton death and destruction, and so were placed firmly in the sphere of deviance.

The negative news for Nato in the *NYT* coverage did not seem to exceed that found by Hallin in the Vietnam War coverage; there was questioning of Nato information, but

no concerted effort to challenge the view that the system was working. There were criticisms of the Nato campaign, and regular images of the civilian casualties and destruction caused by Nato bombs, but as Hallin pointed out in the Vietnam coverage, the critical reporting was mostly about tactics, or individual issues, rather than of the government-military system, and the decision to use war instead of dialogue. These *NYT* criticisms could be interpreted as being supportive of the cascade model, in contrast to the Indexing hypothesis, although it was difficult to analyse how independent the media were of politicians in their criticisms, because there was also consistent political criticism of the Nato campaign from the start. The *NYT* criticisms certainly did not seem any more virulent than in the Vietnam War, or any more hostile to the administration than the political criticism; on the contrary, the editorials often offered the Nato leadership ‘guidance’ on how to endure and win the campaign.

7.1.4. The UK media findings

So, with the *NYT*'s Kosovo coverage found to be generally similar to that found in previous American studies on its reporting of the US at war, and with it being hegemonically high to medium in comparison to the British media sources, what does that mean for the British media in consideration to previous theory? The quantitative evaluation suggested the *NYT* coverage was most similar to *The Times* and *Independent* coverage in Kosovo. The *Telegraph* was more hegemonic than the *NYT*, while the *Guardian* and *FT* seemed to be much less hegemonic. The *Independent* has also taken up a much more critical stance since the Kosovo Conflict, and along with the *Guardian* editorially opposed the Iraq war; this suggests the UK media has more plurality than the US media, because at least two quality UK newspapers seem more likely to offer criticism of government than one of the most liberal US newspapers.

The media did report the conflict from all sides to a certain extent, and included prominent and regular criticisms of Nato when their campaign was faltering, or their bombs went astray. Where evidence of a disproportion in representation was found, such as in the focus on people and use of sources, it did not seem to be for propaganda reasons, as the evaluations of the Nato leaders were often negative, and this would not have been the case if the media were being propagandistic. As found in previous studies on journalists covering their military at war, it seemed to be more of a 'natural' taking of sides for their country in a war the reporters considered justified; the use of we when talking about Nato forces; the relief when Nato military personnel returned unscathed from sorties, and the advice for victory and the fear of defeat. Rather than metaphorical watch-dogs, attack-dogs or lap-dogs, the media seemed to show most similarity to guide-dogs;³⁴⁰ they knew they were not in control of the task, or if they would reach the goal, but they thought they could see the direction they should take better.

Moreover, one of the main criticisms Hallin and Bennett had of the American media is that they did not publicise popular opposition in the face of unrepresentative or irresponsible institutions; in terms of their Kosovo coverage, the American and British media could argue they had not needed to do this, because as some of the journalists interviewed made clear, their coverage was quite reflective of public and political opinion, and in their view the government had not acted in an unrepresentative and irresponsible manner; so a more vigorous media criticism of the government and Nato campaign would have been unjustified. Although Bennett's democratic ideal expects

³⁴⁰ In their analysis of the UK/US media coverage of the Iraq War, read during the final stages of this thesis, Nick Couldry and John Downey came to a similar conclusion about *The Times'* coverage of the coalition military campaign, as they wrote it often appeared 'to see itself as coach of a somewhat disorganised team.' N. Couldry., and J. Downey., War or peace?: legitimisation, dissent, and rhetorical

the media to fill a vacuum when there is elite consensus, can the media really be expected to provide a balanced coverage when their military is at war, most of the political and public opinion supports the campaign, and most journalists and editors do too?

Although reading an editorially pro and anti war paper during the Sunday papers analysis did seem to provide a more balanced and informed view of the Nato campaign, making sure this happens in the future would mean controlling the editorial and journalistic opinion of the free press, which goes against the liberal democratic tradition; as Althaus pointed out: 'If the press is truly independent, it must logically have the option to agree as well as oppose.'³⁴¹ Although there was prominent political opposition to the Iraq war in 2003, the fact that the *Guardian* and *Independent* editorially opposed the British involvement in the war suggests their support or opposition for wars is through choice rather than elite pressure or slavish patriotism. The question could be asked: Should editors and journalists be expected to support views they do not agree with, or use sources they do not believe? Although some critical theorists would argue they already do this, in serving their organisation or country.

However, if hegemony is accepted as the media being unconsciously influenced by their ideology to use official sources supportive of the government policy, and to report the news in a way that benefits the government, then there is a good case for considering the British media coverage of Kosovo hegemonic, as the media mainly relied on government and Nato official sources for their news, with little use of independent sources, anti-war campaigners, or even opposition politicians. This

closure in press coverage of the Iraq war build-up, in S. Allan., and B. Zelizer., *op.cit*, pp. 266-282, p. 269.

meant they generally reported from the Nato perspective. Criticism was also generally kept to the tactics used by Nato, and not the fundamental justification for launching the bombing, which was a central theme of Hallin's criticisms of the American media in Vietnam. The UK media's Kosovo coverage therefore did not fundamentally differ to the *NYT*'s Vietnam War coverage, and even the coverage of the *IoS*, which was editorially anti-war, only really seemed to differ from the other sources in its editorials and opinion columns. Tumber and Palmer also found a similar coverage in the *Guardian* during the Iraq War, with the paper being editorially anti-war not changing the generally positive framing of the war for the coalition in the papers, as UK and US sources dominated the contested discourse. In Gramscian terms, the UK and US were still controlling the media 'commonsense,' even if the outcome of their actions was often beyond the boundaries of what anybody would call sane in a civilised society. The results therefore concurred with other analyses on British conflict reporting which found the media relied heavily on official sources, and reported from their country's perspective, while occasionally criticising aspects of the military campaign, and offering the enemy's opinion. For example, in this regard the findings are not dissimilar to those of the *GUMG* in their Falklands War analysis, where Eldridge stated they had found journalists had 'a set of professional [media] practices, which while valuing the principle of independence, relies heavily on official sources for its news....it does result in tight limits on the amount of dissent that can take place outside those parameters especially in a time of crisis...' ³⁴²

In addition to the quantitative analysis results, the interviews seemed to confirm the accuracy of this description of the media's relationship with politicians and the military, as the interviewees were aware they relied on Nato sources, but did not think

³⁴¹ S. Althaus., *op.cit*, p. 402.

they had much option, as they did not consider reliable sources to be in abundance. Paradoxically, they were also aware that the Nato sources were trying to manipulate and deceive them. Within their ideological work values of objectivity, balance and accurateness, the journalists thought that as long as they attributed the information to their sources, and criticised Nato when relevant, there was nothing wrong with using a majority of government sources. Moreover, some journalists thought the usual anti-war 'mavericks' were not really worthy of regular prominent access anyway, as their opinions were expected, and therefore not 'news'. So the journalists' views are almost completely at odds with those of theorists like Hallin and Bennett, who think the media should be using a wide variety of sources in a conflict, and offering a balanced perspective for all sides. This therefore suggests the hegemonic and indexing findings are correct about the media's limited source use, but that the journalists do not agree with the basis of the criticisms, and consider their system of reporting what the main players in the conflict are saying is the best available. A couple of journalists did admit this was not ideal, but saw little alternative.

Newspapers can create an interest in an issue and should provide a certain amount of balance and context, but they are not monthly magazines or documentary films, and therefore cannot be expected to provide complete backgrounds and context on new conflicts, and their participants, each issue; providing new and interesting information to their readers is a necessity for their survival in a competitive industry, and that means they often have to rely on using uncorroborated information and speculative analysis. While this leaves them open to manipulation by propagandists, as long as they inform the readers that the information is not necessarily true and factual, can we expect more from them? These factors should be taken into consideration for future

³⁴² J. Eldridge., *News, Truth and Power*, *op.cit*, p. 10.

analyses of the media covering their military at war, before the media are accused of being propagandists on the one hand, or unpatriotic on the other. However, that does not mean that any departure by the news media from a commitment to establishing a truthful account of conflicts should be accepted, or the research spotlight on media performance dimmed; if the media want to consider themselves working within the liberal democratic tradition, then they should make sure they provide the public with accurate information on why their military is sent to war, and informed opinion on whether the campaign is justified.

7.2. Framing

Remembering Goffman's original definition of framing; that reporters' understanding of the world precedes the stories they write about, 'determining which ones reporters will select and how the ones that are selected will be told,'³⁴³ it was obvious that most British journalists had a particular framework of understanding for Nato's Kosovo campaign when it started; this basically revolved around symbolism from Britain's good history in World War Two and the Serbs' bad history from the earlier Balkans wars in the 1990s. Once the media accepted the 'Moral War' frame, they almost seemed to have felt obliged to continue supporting the Nato campaign, even though many journalists and writers considered their campaign to have made the situation worse, and wondered if it would succeed. Milosevic and the Serb military had been evaluated as being the cause, and were thus ultimately responsible for the escalating humanitarian crisis and death toll. The fact that the *Guardian* and *Independent* later editorially opposed the Iraq War, which was a more traditional ground war, and had less of an immediate humanitarian rationale, suggests those papers could have been influenced by the 'hegemonic shift' in the use of British military forces for

humanitarian reasons during Nato's Kosovo campaign, and that is why they editorially supported Nato's intervention.

Recollecting Wolfsfeld's unequal wars meta-frames, the British media consistently framed the Nato campaign as a necessary humanitarian intervention in line with the law and order frame, in reaction to the ethnic-cleansing of a weaker people by a powerful aggressor with superior military capabilities. The opposite frame the Serbs tried to promote, including the injustice of the Nato campaign, and how they were victims as they had been in World War Two, did not receive much attention, and a competitive Serb counter-frame to Nato's did not become established in the UK media and *NYT*. Although there were regular articles sympathising with the Serb civilians, the blame for their plight was still usually attributed to Milosevic anyway, within the Nato framing of the conflict: Nato were fighting a humanitarian war for the majority in Kosovo; Milosevic had started the conflict, and had the opportunity to stop their campaign, and he was therefore responsible for Serb casualties. There was not much change in any of the media sources' perspectives as the Nato campaign continued, whether they were pro or anti war. Concerning the Nato media operation, and remembering Wolfsfeld's assertion that the 'success of the law and order frame depends on the ability of the authorities to keep the moral spotlight squarely on the challenger. An alternative story line about the brutality of the powerful is always available from the news shelf...';³⁴⁴ it must be considered a success in the media sources analysed, because through the repeated juxtaposition of references and images of Milosevic, the Serb military and the ethnic-Albanian civilians, it limited the effects of increasing collateral damage on media and public opinion in the second half of the

³⁴³ E. Goffman., *op.cit*, p. 14.

³⁴⁴ G. Wolfsfeld., *op.cit*, p. 141-2, and 185.

conflict, and kept the ‘moral spotlight’ for the humanitarian crisis on Milosevic and the Serb military.

Those UK journalists and writers opposed to the Nato campaign, or worried about its effectiveness, invoked the Vietnam War more than Suez, perhaps suggesting that in this regard the length and intensity of Vietnam, together with it being a media war taking place in most journalists’ lives, meant it had a higher cognitive significance for most journalists than the shorter Suez conflict, which had taken place before most journalists and the modern media were born, even though Suez was a national conflict and Vietnam was not.³⁴⁵ However, it could also have been that the journalists thought their readers would recall Vietnam more than Suez, due to it being the subject of many Hollywood films, and therefore a more powerful cognitive tool.

7.3. Contribution to methodology

7.3.1. Introduction

This thesis can be defended by stressing the main research was a comprehensive quantitative analysis containing several media sources, variables, categories, hypotheses and analyses; and it was backed up by a qualitative content analysis and interviews. This triangulation does not mean that the findings are irrefutable, but it does provide a solid basis for defence of the thesis and interpretations. The benefit of a multiple quantitative analysis investigation were confirmed when it prevented some conclusions being made that might have led to a different view of the media coverage than the one reached at the end of the study. By using a multiple investigation open to analysing all aspects of the media coverage that might bring a negative reaction from

³⁴⁵ This would be in line with arguments made by Hallin and Gitlin, who believe that a conflict needs to be of a certain length and significance to become a part of the national psyche. See D.C. Hallin., and T. Gitlin., *The Gulf War as Popular Culture and Television Drama*, in W. L. Bennett., and D. L. Paletz., *op.cit*, pp. 149-166.

the audience, this study's methodology and interpretive framework is more in line with recent studies by Zaller and Chui, Entman, and Althaus, who have used a wider research perspective to identify media criticism of their government and military's decisions during conflicts involving their nations' military, than that used in previous studies by Hallin, Bennett and Mermin, who focused their methodology and interpretations on the media's use of sources, and whether there were criticisms of the whole military campaign.

The coding scheme became more intricate as aspects of the media coverage that had not been evident at the start of the research affected theoretical views and assumptions. Some of these factors became apparent early in the research, and were included in the daily media analysis, while others did not become apparent until later, and were only included in the research on the Sunday papers, or the additional analysis that is included as appendix five. Below are some observations on the value of the different variables that should be of some benefit to future communications researchers.

7.3.2. Variable contributions to the thesis

Main People and Evaluation

The *Main People* variable provided evidence of what people and organisations the media focused their attention on, and in line with hegemonic theory showed that most of the media sources focused the vast majority of their coverage on the Nato leaders and ethnic-Albanian civilians; this focus generally supported Nato's framing of the conflict as a humanitarian intervention. However, adding an *Evaluation* variable to the analysis showed the *Main People* analysis would have been misleading without looking at whether the people's coverage was positive or negative; because although the media sources frequently featured Nato elites and the military, their evaluations

were often negative. This suggests the coverage of the main people by the media was for professional and ideological reasons rather than propaganda.

Main Source

The source variable provided several good analyses that helped to provide a comprehensive account of the sources used by the media during the Nato campaign. This is one of the most important aspects of the hegemonic media model, and the findings supported previous research that has found the media rely too much on their government and military as sources during military conflicts involving their nation's military, and this often allowed the Nato sources to control the framing of the main articles on the front pages. The official sources used were also found to be overwhelmingly positive towards the Nato campaign. Out of all the aspects of the media analysed in this study, a wider variety of source use would probably be the most recommended improvement, as this would provide the audience with a more balanced view of the conflict, and the opportunity to evaluate the conflict from outside the national frame promoted by the government and military.

Focus: Diagnoses and Prognoses

Including diagnoses from throughout the Nato campaign seemed to make the variable more useful, and also balanced its results out against the prognosis variable in terms of its use; as after the early part of the conflict the media are more likely to look for solutions to the conflict than analyse its causes, and if an analysis investigates quite a long conflict, there is likely to be much more prognoses than diagnoses in the media coverage. Also, looking at the diagnoses and prognoses of the writers' articles that did not include sources allowed the analysis to identify the views of those writing without direct influence from sources. This showed there was little difference between articles with or without sources, and if anything the articles without sources

were less hegemonic in that they were more escalationist; this suggests the writers were not overly influenced by official sources in their support for the Nato campaign, and goes against the hegemonic model and indexing theory presumption that journalistic support for conflicts is heavily influenced by official sources.

However, although both variables proved useful, their categories could also have been made more precise. For example, a differentiation could have been made between whether all diagnoses and prognoses were those of the writer, or the overall message contained in the article, as this was not always clear. The *diplomacy* category was also too vague, and should really have been split into positive and negative diplomacy articles and opinions for Nato, as this would have made the comparative analysis between positive and negative categories more accurate.

Format: Episodic or Thematic

The findings from this analysis were that most of the newspaper content was thematic rather than episodic, and the articles reported the news from a variety of locations, rather than focusing on the national agenda. Previous work on episodic and thematic reporting has argued that episodic coverage is more likely to result in hegemonic coverage, but this study found that whether it was episodic or thematic did not have much relevance, and it was the content of the articles that was important. Articles on Nato collateral damage were a good example of this, as they were usually episodic, but were also very negative for Nato; although a more thematic analysis of the causes might have had some relevance, it is difficult to see how they could have had more impact and influence than the episodic articles, with their graphic descriptions and images of the dead and injured.

Historical References

Splitting the historical references variable into positive, negative and neutral for Nato

and the Serbs helped to make the results more accurate for assessing the hypothesis, as the interpretations did not have to rely on generalisations about whether the previous conflict was positive or negative for the people referred to in the article. Including Nato and the Serbs in the analysis also meant the findings looked more balanced than they might have done if only the Serb references had been analysed, as although the Serbs' references were very negative, the Nato references were also more negative than positive; the latter was not expected, and prevented the historical references looking propagandistic. The cross-tabulation analysis with the *Main Source* variable also showed which references were the writers' own historical references, and this allowed an insight into their thought processes and ideology. However, a more precise analysis could have identified exactly which historical references were those of the writer, and which were from sources, as this was not clear in this analysis; because as long as there was a source in the article it meant the cross-tabulation analysis identified the historical reference with that source even if the main source had not used it.

Images

Although the images were generally more positive towards Nato than the Serbs, it did not seem to be done for propaganda reasons, as there were regular images of Nato collateral damage incidents on the front pages, and some of them were disturbingly graphic; this cast doubt on the arguments of those theorists who consider the images used by the media during war are mainly to depict heroism and promote patriotism. The *Damage by Nato* category was split up into positive and negative for Nato in the Sunday papers analysis, and it is unfortunate that this separation was not thought of until after the daily media analysis had been completed, as had been done for the *Nato military personnel* and *Nato armoury* categories, where only the positive references

were included.³⁴⁶ Other image categories, such as *ethnic-Albanian civilians* and *Serb civilians*, could also have been divided into positive and negative, as their use did not always concur with their reason for inclusion in the coding system.

Furthermore, the *Damage by Nato* category could also have been divided into six categories: Nato damage intended positive, neutral and negative, and Nato damage unintended positive, neutral and negative; to separate Nato hits and misses, and whether they were reported positively, neutrally or negatively for the Nato campaign. This is because some of their hits, such as the pharmaceutical factory, were sometimes reported negatively, because of the effect they had on the surrounding area; while some of their misses, such as Korisa, were sometimes reported positively, because the newspapers believed the Serbs had used human shields. Those images that were connected to the Nato bombing, such as the protests after the Chinese embassy bombing, could also be taken into consideration when assessing how the newspapers covered the damage caused by Nato bombs, because their omission might lead to the conclusion that the ‘story’ did not run for as long as it did, even if the news reporting moved on to a related aspect. Moreover, without interviewing those who made the decisions on what photographs to include, we cannot determine conclusively why the photographs were included: whether they were just the best photographs to sell papers; or if they were included to call for an end to the war, or the introduction of ground troops.

Position and Date

The position and date variables made possible several analyses that brought additional insights into the main variables discussed above. The position variable crossed with

³⁴⁶ An analysis in line with the above recommendations was made on the *Guardian* and *Times* ethnic-Albanian and Damage by Nato images from across the Nato campaign, and the results are included in appendix 5.

other variables helped identify if Nato were able to control the front page coverage, or if the media featured negative articles and images for Nato prominently. The date variable crossed with other variables showed how the media coverage changed over the two halves of the Nato campaign. The counting of lines and articles also provided accurate evidence about the depth of the reporting, and how it changed over the different halves of the campaign.

7.3.3. The Sample: Media Sources

The eight media sources analysed gave a good breadth of perspectives for analysis and comparison. The five daily media sources from the UK provided a combination of perspectives for analysis: some were more conservative, traditional and right-wing, while others were more liberal, critical and left wing; some had a more domestic focus, and others more international. It was rewarding to see how the different concerns of each media source became apparent in the content analysis, and their individual perspectives and distinctiveness were revealed.

While all the daily media sources were editorially supportive of the Nato campaign, all also had elements of reporting that supported the plural model: the *Independent* and *NYT* had journalists like Fisk and Erlanger giving voice to the Serb perspective on the front pages, and exposing Nato collateral damage very critically; *The Times* had mostly anti-war columnists; the *FT* had an international outlook, and the coverage of the *Guardian* and *Telegraph*, which are the most diverse media sources in their traditional political support, often showed similarities in their criticism of the Nato strategy. The two Sunday papers provided an additional perspective, focusing on whether an editorially anti-war newspaper would be more in line with critical media theory's view of an ideal newspaper.

Appendices**Appendix 1: Nato, MoD and British Government information coding sheet**

Number	Variable	Categories
1	Case number	1-76
2	Date	01/04 – 27/04
3	Subject	(1) Nato conference
		(2) Nato conference political only
		(3) MoD conference
		(4) Statement made outside conferences by a British politician
4	Historical reference	(1) World War One
		(2) World War Two
		(3) Vietnam
		(4) Gulf War
		(5) Serb-Croat war
		(6) Bosnian War
		(7) Russian-Chechnyan war
		(8) Rwandan war
		(9) Israel-Palestinian war
		(10) Turkey-Kurds war
		(11) Cambodia
		(12) Others
5	Diagnosis	(1) Ground war is Serb aggression
		(2) Ground war is an unavoidable civil war
		(3) Ground war is Milosevic's fault
		(4) Ground war is the KLA's fault
		(5) Collateral damage is Serbs' fault
		(6) Collateral damage is Milosevic's fault
		(7) Collateral damage is Nato's fault
		(8) Refugees are Serbs' fault
		(9) Refugees are Nato's fault
		(10) Refugees are KLA's fault
		(11) Refugees are Milosevic's fault
		(12) Nato campaign is Serbs' fault
		(13) Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault
		(14) Nato campaign is KLA's fault
		(15) Nato campaign is Nato's fault
		(16) Nato campaign is unavoidable
		(17) Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy
		(18) Nato campaign is working
		(19) Nato campaign is not working
		(20) Others
6	Prognosis	(1) Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands
		(2) Nato should negotiate with Milosevic now
		(3) Send in ground troops
		(4) Continue the air campaign

		(5) War criminals must be brought to justice
		(6) Arm the KLA
		(7) Nato must remain united
		(8) Divide the Serbs
		(9) Stop the bombing
		(10) More humanitarian aid
		(11) More diplomacy
		(12) No ground troops
		(13) Embargo
		(14) Others
7	Main People featured	(1) British government
		(2) British military
		(3) American government
		(4) American military
		(5) Nato hierarchy
		(6) Collective Nato military
		(7) Russians positive
		(8) Russians negative
		(9) Slobodan Milosevic
		(10) Other Serb politicians
		(11) Serb military
		(12) Serb civilians
		(13) Ibrahim Rugova
		(14) KLA
		(15) Kosovar Albanian civilians
		(16) The media
		(17) Other politicians and diplomats
		(18) Others
8	Main topic	(1) Nato helping the humanitarian situation
		(2) Relief agencies helping the humanitarian situation
		(3) Work of neighbouring countries helping the humanitarian situation
		(4) British soldiers involvement in helping the humanitarian situation
		(5) Personal stories of the refugees
		(6) Amount of refugees
		(7) Nato military attacks in general
		(8) British involvement in military attacks
		(9) Unity of Nato
		(10) War crimes by Serbs
		(11) Bringing the Serbs to justice
		(12) War crimes by the KLA
		(13) The economic ramifications
		(14) Diplomacy
		(15) The media
		(16) Public opinion
		(17) Political opinion
		(18) Collateral damage
		(19) The ground war

		(20) Russian threat
		(21) Russian co-operation
		(22) Whether Nato ground troops should be sent in
		(23) Others
	Missing value	(99)

Appendix 2: The media coding sheet

These are the variables and categories included in the daily media analysis, which was greatly expanded from the official sources analysis. As explained in the methodology section, some small changes were made for the analysis of the *NYT*, *Telegraph*, and Sunday papers.

Number	Variable	Categories
1	Case number	1-2500
2	Date	25/3 – 11/6
3	Media source	(1) Financial Times
		(2) Guardian
		(3) Independent
		(4) The Times
		(5) Telegraph
		(6) New York Times
		(7) Independent on Sunday
		(8) Sunday New York Times
4	Lines	1-1000
5	Format of Presentation	(1) Episodic: writer in UK
		(2) Episodic: writer in Yugoslavia and borders
		(3) Episodic: writer elsewhere
		(4) Thematic: writer in UK
		(5) Thematic: writer in Yugoslavia and borders
		(6) Thematic: writer elsewhere
6	Position of story	1-40
7	Image	(1) Tony Blair
		(2) Other Government politician/MoD spokesperson/Foreign Office
		(3) Conservative politician
		(4) Other British politician
		(5) British soldiers in positive picture
		(6) British military armoury in positive picture
		(7) Jamie Shea
		(8) Other Nato spokesperson or hierarchy
		(9) General Nato soldiers in positive picture
		(10) General Nato military armoury in positive picture

		(11) Bill Clinton
		(12) Other American Democrat politician
		(13) American Republican politician
		(14) Slobodan Milosevic
		(15) Other Serb politician
		(16) Serb military
		(17) Serb civilians
		(18) Russian military
		(19) Boris Yeltsin
		(20) Other Russian politician
		(21) Ibrahim Rugova
		(22) KLA
		(23) Kosovar Albanian civilians
		(24) Humanitarian workers
		(25) European politicians
		(26) Kofi Annan
		(27) Writers in UK
		(28) Writers in Yugoslavia
		(29) Writers elsewhere
		(30) Damage from Nato
		(31) Damage from Serbs
		(32) Damage from ethnic-Albanians
		(33) Damage from unnamed source
		(34) Map
		(35) Others
8	Historical reference	(1) World War One Serbs positive
		(2) World War One Serbs negative
		(3) World War One Nato positive
		(4) World War One Nato negative
		(5) World War One neutral
		(6) World War Two Serbs positive
		(7) World War Two Serbs negative
		(8) World War Two ethnic-Albanians positive
		(9) World War Two ethnic-Albanians negative
		(10) World War Two Nato positive
		(11) World War Two Nato negative
		(12) World War Two neutral
		(13) Suez Nato positive
		(14) Suez Nato negative
		(15) Suez Serbs positive
		(16) Suez Serbs negative
		(17) Suez neutral
		(18) Vietnam Nato positive
		(19) Vietnam Nato negative
		(20) Vietnam Serbs positive
		(21) Vietnam Serbs negative
		(22) Vietnam neutral

	(23) Cold War Nato positive
	(24) Cold War Nato negative
	(25) Cold War Serbs positive
	(26) Cold War Serbs negative
	(27) Cold War neutral
	(28) Falklands War Nato positive
	(29) Falklands War Nato negative
	(30) Falklands War Serbs positive
	(31) Falklands War Serbs negative
	(32) Falklands neutral
	(33) Gulf War Nato positive
	(34) Gulf War Nato negative
	(35) Gulf War Serbs positive
	(36) Gulf War Serbs negative
	(37) Gulf War neutral
	(38) Desert Fox Nato positive
	(39) Desert Fox Nato negative
	(40) Desert Fox Serbs positive
	(41) Desert Fox Serbs negative
	(42) Desert Fox neutral
	(43) Serb-Croatia war Nato positive
	(44) Serb-Croatia war Nato negative
	(45) Serb-Croatia war Serbs positive
	(46) Serb-Croatia war Serbs negative
	(47) Serb-Croatia war neutral
	(48) Bosnian war Nato positive
	(49) Bosnian war Nato negative
	(50) Bosnian war Serbs positive
	(51) Bosnian war Serbs negative
	(52) Bosnian war Bosnian Serbs positive
	(53) Bosnian war Bosnian Serbs negative
	(54) Bosnian war ethnic-Albanians positive
	(55) Bosnian war ethnic-Albanians negative
	(56) Bosnian war neutral
	(57) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Nato positive
	(58) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Nato negative
	(59) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Serbs positive
	(60) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Serbs negative
	(61) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war neutral
	(62) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Nato positive
	(63) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Nato negative
	(64) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Serbs positive
	(65) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Serbs negative
	(66) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars neutral
	(67) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Nato positive
	(68) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Nato negative
	(69) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Serbs positive
	(70) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Serbs negative

		(71) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions neutral
		(72) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Nato positive
		(73) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Nato negative
		(74) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Serbs positive
		(75) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Serbs negative
		(76) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions neutral
		(77) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Nato positive
		(78) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Nato negative
		(79) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Serbs positive
		(80) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Serbs negative
		(81) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions neutral
		(82) Others
9	Main source cited	(1) Tony Blair
		(2) Other Government politician, Whitehall, Foreign Office or British spokesperson: conference cited
		(3) Other Government politician, Whitehall, Foreign Office or British spokesperson: conference not cited
		(4) British non-affiliated expert
		(5) Nato spokesperson or hierarchy from press conference
		(6) Nato spokesperson or hierarchy, press conference not cited
		(7) Conservative politician
		(8) American Democrat politician or Pentagon spokesperson
		(9) American Republican politician
		(10) American non-affiliated expert
		(11) Slobodan Milosevic
		(12) Other Serb politician
		(13) Serb military
		(14) Serb civilians
		(15) Russian military
		(16) Boris Yeltsin
		(17) Other Russian politician
		(18) Ibrahim Rugova
		(19) KLA
		(20) Kosovar Albanian civilians
		(21) Humanitarian workers
		(22) European politicians
		(23) Writer themselves
		(24) Other British media
		(25) American media
		(26) Other Nato countries' media
		(27) Tanjug/official Serb media
		(28) Free Yugoslav media
		(29) Neutral media
		(30) Humanitarian workers (put in as 21)
		(31) European politicians (put in as 22)
		(32) Other British politician
		(33) Opinion polls
		(34) Others

10	Diagnosis	(1) Ground war is Serb aggression
		(2) Ground war is an unavoidable civil war
Issues:		(3) Ground war is Milosevic's fault
1-4 Ground war		(4) Ground war is the KLA's fault
5-8 Collateral Damage		(5) Collateral damage is Serbs' fault
9-12 Refugees		(6) Collateral damage is Milosevic's fault
13-18 Nato campaign		(7) Collateral damage is Nato's fault
19-20 Working or not?		(8) Collateral damage is KLA's fault
		(9) Refugees are Serbs' fault
		(10) Refugees are Nato's fault
		(11) Refugees are KLA's fault
		(12) Refugees are Milosevic's fault
		(13) Nato campaign is Serbs' fault
		(14) Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault
		(15) Nato campaign is KLA's fault
		(16) Nato campaign is Nato's fault
		(17) Nato campaign is unavoidable
		(18) Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy
		(19) Nato campaign is working
		(20) Nato campaign is not working
11	Prognosis	(1) Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands
		(2) Nato should negotiate with Milosevic now
		(3) Send in ground troops
		(4) No ground troops
		(5) Continue the bombing
		(6) Change the bombing strategy
		(7) Stop the bombing
		(8) Divide the Serbs
		(9) Arm the KLA
		(10) Beware of the KLA
		(11) Diplomacy
		(12) Nato must remain united
		(13) Sanctions
		(14) War criminals must be brought to justice
		(15) More humanitarian aid
12	Main people featured	(1) Tony Blair
		(2) Other Government politicians
		(3) Conservative politicians
		(4) Other British opposition politicians
		(5) Collective British politicians
		(6) British military at war
		(7) British military doing humanitarian work
		(8) Bill Clinton
		(9) Other American democrat
		(10) American Republican
		(11) American military at war
		(12) American military doing humanitarian work

		(13) Collective Nato hierarchy	
		(14) Collective Nato military at war	
		(15) Collective Nato military doing humanitarian work	
		(16) Nato/MoD media operation	
		(17) Slobodan Milosevic	
		(18) Other Serb politicians	
		(19) Serb military	
		(20) Serb civilians	
		(21) Boris Yeltsin	
		(22) Other Russian politician	
		(23) Russian military	
		(24) Ibrahim Rugova	
		(25) KLA	
		(26) Kosovar Albanian civilians	
		(27) Humanitarian workers	
		(28) European politicians	
		(29) Kofi Annan/United Nations	
		(30) Environmental groups	
		(31) Financial groups	
		(32) Anti-war groups	
		(33) Balkans countries	
		(34) British civilians	
		(35) American civilians	
		(36) British media	
		(37) American media	
		(38) Other Nato countries' media	
		(39) Serb media	
		(40) Free Yugoslav media	
		(41) Neutral media	
		(42) Others	
	Missing value	(99)	
13	Evaluation of people or organisation	(1) Positive	
		(2) Neutral	
		(3) Negative	
14	Number of positive British political, Whitehall, Foreign Office and MoD sources		1-20
	Number of negative British political, Whitehall, Foreign Office and MoD sources		1-20
	Number of neutral British political, Whitehall, Foreign Office and MoD sources		1-20
	Number of positive international official sources		1-20
	Number of negative international official sources		1-20
	Number of neutral international official sources		1-20

Appendix 3: Letter to request interviews with journalists on the Kosovo Conflict media coverage

Date

Name and Address of recipient

Dear Recipient

I am a doctarate student at the University of Leeds, researching the British media coverage of Nato's Kosovo Conflict campaign. I have compared the coverage of the (in alphabetical order) Financial Times, Guardian, Independent, Telegraph and The Times; and have also included the New York Times to provide an additional comparison between the UK and US media.

Having conducted my desk research on the media, I would now like to conduct interviews with prominent journalists involved in the Kosovo Conflict to receive their opinions on the Nato campaign, and media coverage. The information gained from these interviews will hopefully allow me to provide an informed overall representation of the British media coverage of Nato's campaign, and to take into account professional realities, and the difficulties media professionals face in reporting wars involving their country's military.

I would therefore like to meet you for an interview, or conduct an interview by telephone if it is more convenient for you, in the next few weeks. I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours Sincerely,

Marc Latham
Institute of Communications Studies
University of Leeds
LS2 9JT
icsml1@leeds.ac.uk

Appendix 4: Interview questions

These are some of the questions the journalists were asked; as they were semi-structured interviews the questions varied with each interviewee.

Nato conferences and spin

How did you view the information provided: did New Labour and the Democrats' reputation for spin make journalists more wary of accepting it?

Did you become more sceptical or trusting during the campaign?

Did you think Campbell's media operation improved the Nato presentations?

What was the atmosphere like at the presentations; was there much hospitality?

Shea said afterwards he thought they had tamed the media in the second half of the conflict, did you see the relationship as adversarial?

Do you think Kosovo will be remembered as the war of spin?

Do you think Kosovo increased media cynicism for recent wars?

Influences on the media's view of the Kosovo Conflict

Other countries saw the conflict differently; why do you think the UK saw it the way it did?

How much did previous wars influence your view of the Kosovo Conflict?

Did the humanitarian aspect make you view it differently?

How do you view the Nato campaign now; was it a success?

News Culture: The media relationship with management, politicians and the public

How much pressure is there for you to conform to the management/political outlook of your paper?

New Labour called for patriotism from the media during the Nato campaign; do you

think journalists can balance their nationality and professionalism in times when their military is at war?

How much coverage of opposition information and negative news do you think the media are obliged to provide to the public?

Do you feel you have any obligation to the public, to balance the power of government, like the watchdog role in America, and how do you think British broadsheets compare to the American, like the *NYT*?

How important is front-bench opposition for the media to be critical of their military at war?

How important is public opinion to your reporting?

How much does ideology (history, culture and background) influence reporting?

Why are historical references used by journalists?

Appendix 5: Results of the analysis of Guardian and Times images using an improved coding system.

These are the results of a secondary analysis on the *Guardian* and *Times* images during the Nato campaign, including all the dates between March 25th and June 10th, 1999. Only ethnic-Albanians that looked positive for the Nato campaign were included (one photo that was omitted was of two ethnic-Albanians changing money on a city street), and only actual damage from Nato images were included (there were a few images of Chinese protests after the embassy bombing that were left out).

For the research, firstly, the totals for *ethnic-Albanian civilians*; and total, positive and negative *Damage by Nato* images were counted up, before two analyses were conducted; by first splitting the amounts up into the two halves, as in the main analysis, and then into before and after the reorganisation of the Nato media operation and end of the Djakovica convoy coverage, which was identified as April 20th. The percentages of each categories' second time section coverage in comparison to the first were then worked out, and a ratio calculated of the amount of coverage between *ethnic-Albanian civilians* and *Damage by Nato* images total, positive and negative, in the second time section as compared to the first. The results are featured in the tables below, starting with the two *Guardian* tables, and then the two *Times* tables. Those four tables are then followed by one comparing the two media sources' coverage. A short summary of the findings then follows.

Guardian	Ethnic Albanians	Total damage	Positive	Negative	Ratio EA-Total	Ratio EA-neg
Total	64	54	20	39	1.19:1	1.64:1
First half	37	34	10	24	1.08:1	1.54:1
Second half	27	20	5	15	1.35:1	1.8:1
2nd half Percentage of 1st half	73%	59%	50%	63%	1.24:1	1.15:1

Table A.1. Amount of images for ethnic-Albanians as compared to Damage by Nato in the second half of the conflict in comparison with the first

Guardian	Ethnic Albanians	Total damage	Pos	Neg	Ratio EA-Total Nato damage	Ratio EA-Nato damage Negative
Total	64	54	15	35	1.19:1	1.83:1
Pre-MOC reorganisation	27	28	8	20	1:1.03	1.35:1
Post-MOC reorganisation	37	26	7	19	1.68:1	2.46:1
Percentage and ratios after MOC reorganisation	137%	79%	88%	75%	1.73:1	1.83:1

Table A.2. Amount of images for Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanians after the Nato explanations for Djakovica had ended on April 20th

Times	Ethnic Albanians	Total damage	Positive	Negative	Ratio EA-Total	Ratio EA-neg
Total	88	38	18	20	2.32:1	4.4:1
First half	68	33	16	17	2.06:1	4:1
Second half	20	5	2	3	4:1	6.67:1
2nd half Percentage of 1st half	29%	15%	13%	18%	1.93:1	1.61:1

Table A.3. Amount of images for Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanians in the second half of the conflict in comparison with the first

Times	Ethnic Albanians	Total damage	Positive	Negative	Ratio EA-Total	Ratio EA-neg
Total	88	38	18	20	2.32:1	4.4:1
Pre-MOC reorganisation	53	27	12	15	1.96:1	3.53:1
Post-MOC reorganisation	35	11	6	5	3.18:1	7:1
Percentage and ratios after MOC reorganisation	66%	41%	50%	33%	1.61:1	2:1

Table A.4. Amount of images for Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanians after the Nato explanations for Djakovica had ended on April 20th

Media Source	Nato damage to E-A drop in 2 nd half images	Nato damage to E-A drop in post- Djakovica period	Nato damage negative to EA drop in 2 nd half images	Nato damage negative to E-A drop in post- Djakovica period
Guardian	1.24:1	1.73:1	1.15:1	1.83:1
Times	1.93:1	1.61:1	1.61:1	2:1

Table A.5. Ratios of second section coverage as compared to the first

The results show there did seem to be an improvement for Nato in the second half as compared to the first, and in the post re-organisation of the Nato media operation period when compared to the pre re-organisation period. It had been hoped that splitting *Damage by Nato* into positive and negative would have solved the problem of ambiguity, and brought one-hundred per-cent clarity, but this was not found to be the case once the analysis was underway, as there were some images that were ambiguous in whether they were positive for Nato or not, and whether the targets had been intended to be hit by Nato or not; an example is the pharmaceutical factory that caused an environmental crisis; as it may have been an intended target, but was generally given a negative coverage. In contrast, unintended damage, such as the Korisa collateral damage incident, could receive a positive coverage when the media believed the Nato assertions that the Serbs had used human shields.

In this analysis, images were simply included as positive if they had economic relevance, and negative if they did not, but if future analyses want to be more accurate, the category could be split up further, with the choice of categories expanded to: Damage by Nato intended positive; Damage by Nato intended negative; Damage by Nato intended neutral; Damage by Nato unintended positive; Damage by Nato unintended neutral and Damage by Nato unintended negative. This would not only allow the researcher to compare how the accurate and inaccurate bombing, and intended and unintended targets were reported, but also to get a more accurate idea about how often Nato collateral damage was critically reported in comparison to other categories. However, this would still leave images covering the consequences of Nato collateral damage, such as protests, outside the analysis, and they should also be taken into account in any analysis that is specifically analysing the coverage of collateral damage in comparison to another category. So, although this is a more precise coding system to that included in the main analysis, it could still have been made more specific for a more accurate analysis.

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