

**The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh
1982-1990**

A Study of Political Sociology

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of the
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
School of Sociology and Social Policy

January, 2006

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Dr Paul Bagguley of the University of Leeds, Great Britain, for his scholarly supervision of this thesis. Throughout my studies, he has provided me endless encouragement and constant constructive criticism. I also pay my sincere thanks to Dr Ian Law, my second supervisor, who has provided valuable comments on various draft of the thesis. It gives me great pleasure to be able to offer thanks to my wise teacher Professor Rangalal Sen of the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh for his unbounded affection and untainted academic support during my fieldwork in Bangladesh. It is also a pleasure to offer sincere respects to my favourite teachers, the late Professor Syed Ahmed Khan and Professor Ishrat Shamim for their training in social research methodology while I was an undergraduate student at the Department of Sociology, University of Dhaka. In this connection, I wish to tender my best thanks to the ISS staff of the University of Leeds who have taught me SPSS, the framework for my empirical findings. For this, I am also indebted to Mr. Abdur Rahman (Manik)—a computer student at Leeds Metropolitan University and Mr. CH Pramod Kumar, a Electrical Engineering Student at Leeds University, who also helped me to understand the rigorous process of data analysis.

I must put forward my unbounded gratitude to the leaders of political parties, student organisations, intellectual and professional bodies and trade unions—the leaders of the mass upsurge that ousted the military dictatorship of General Ershad in 1990—of four divisional cities in Bangladesh who agreed to be interviewed for this thesis. I am grateful to the support staff of the University of Leeds, particularly to those of the SDDU, where I participated in several valuable workshops, and of Brotherton and Edward Boyle libraries, particularly to those of Special Collection and Inter-Library Loan sections for providing important materials utilised in this study. In this connection, it would be a failure of duty if I do not convey my good wishes to Rajib Rana Das and Shajib—students at the University of Dhaka who took endless trouble to send me many recently published books, articles and documents which were not available in England during my stay at Leeds. I also pay my best thanks to Md. Arafat, Iqbal Hasan, Belal Hossain, Shonjib Shaha, Shondip Sarker, Jony Das, Shishir Gosh and Debashish Kundu who worked as my research assistants in different stages of the interview process across the divisional cities during my field work in Bangladesh

It would be remiss of me to fail to mention support of further staff of my academic Department at Leeds—especially my postgraduate tutors Dr Kirk Mann.

Dr Sarah Irwin and Professor Malcolm Harrison, and also the post-graduate secretary, Mrs. Debbie Westmoreland who provided a bed-rock of support from the first to the final day of my studies. Above all, I wish to record my great indebtedness to the University of Dhaka for their financial assistance by awarding me the *Bangabandhu Overseas Scholarship for Dhaka University Teachers* in order to pursue my higher studies abroad. Further funding was obtained from the UK for which I am indebted to the Department of Sociology & Social Policy and the Student Union of the University of Leeds, the Sidney Perry Foundation, the Charles Wallace (Bangladesh) Trust, the Richard Stapley Educational Trust, the Guildchrist Educational Trust, the Churches Commission for Overseas Students, the Leche Trust and the Professional Classes Aid Councils. I am also grateful to the HF Guggenheim Foundation, USA that assisted with some funding in lieu of some editing work on their book—‘Exporting Democracy’.

No words can adequately communicate my heartfelt complements to my wife Tasu and my child son Mohammed Bellal (Taj)—who were away from me for most of the period of study—for their love and moral support given to me throughout the period of this research from February 2002 to January 2006. During this time, I must recognise the moral support from my brothers and sisters, relatives, departmental colleagues and friends in Bangladesh who have been waiting for the moment when I shall be able to return home successfully.

In conclusion, I want to dedicate this thesis to my mom—who did not have the opportunity to see my success as she is no more on this earth and to my very old dad—who has been very anxious for me since I have been in the UK, and to those who gave sacrifice for democracy in Bangladesh.

Abstract

The late twentieth century saw a major wave of democratisation against the unjust military seizure of state power in many countries around the world. In Bangladesh, General Hussain Muhammad Ershad seized power in March 1982 ousting the then democratic government through a military coup and continued up to December 1990 until he was forced, by a mass revolution, to relinquish power to the interim Caretaker Government of the country. The dominance of the military intrigue over the state and political elites has resulted in sharp inter-group conflict in the society that deflected the normal democratic values: liberty, impunity, equality and freedom. A military committed to a professional rather than a political role is critical to the success of democracy. The military dictatorship of General Ershad in Bangladesh, is therefore, regarded as the aggression by the state on her own people. The movement for restoration of democracy was thus the attempt to change the military dictatorship. The movement included sporadic protests, strikes, riots, rebellions, violence and more continuous activities of organised political parties and interest groups of the society. The mainstream opposition political parties and their alliances, along with different socio-cultural forces i.e. students, laborers, intellectuals and professionals of Bangladesh society organised the movement. The middle class took the lead while the involvement of the lower class of the society ensured huge participation. A number of protesters were killed; many others injured and jailed in the course of various repressive measures taken by the military administration. This gave birth to counter violence in the opposition democratic forces. This research, with both qualitative and quantitative approaches, investigates the social origins of the movement for democracy in Bangladesh that brought about a significant social change in the social structure for the development of capitalist democracy. This research confirms that the military dictatorship of General Ershad had negative consequences in every respect—spreading corruption, plundering the economy, damage to constitutional rule and political institutions, and a complete ruin of the electoral process of the country. Finally, the research substantiates the power and strength of the people in making the revolution, which is always invincible—the most worthy spirit needful for the success of democracy, and this was exactly what happened in the final stage of the movement for the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh in the overthrow of the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

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Abbreviations

- ADC—Additional District Commissioner
AL—(Bangladesh) Awami League
ALGS—Awami League General Secretary
ALWC—Awami League Working Committee
APSU—All Party Student Union
BBC—British Broadcasting Corporation
BCL—Bangladesh *Chattra* League (Bangladesh Student League)
BCS—Bangladesh Civil Service
BDP—Bangladesh Democratic Party
BDR—Bangladesh Rifles
BFUJ—Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists
BICS—Bangladesh *Islami Chatra Shibir*
BKSAL—Bangladesh *Krishak* (Peasants) *Shramik* (Labourers) Awami League
BMA—Bangladesh Medical Association
BNP—Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BSD—Bangladesh *Samajtantrik Dal* (Bangladesh Socialist Party)
BSU—Bangladesh Student Union
C.N.C.—Commander in Chief
C.O— Commanding Officers
CIA—Central Intelligence of America
CCA—Combined Cultural Alliance
CI—Corporate Interest (of the Armed Forces)
CIOAF—Corporate Interest of the Armed Forces
CMLA—Chief Martial Law Administrator
COG—Combined Opposition Group
CPB—Communist Party of Bangladesh
CSAC—Central Students Actions Committee (*Kendryo Chatra Sangram Parishad*)
DC—District Commissioner
DDSA—Dhaka District Sports Auditorium
DG—Director General
DGFI—Defence General Forces of Intelligence
DIG—Deputy Inspector General (Police)
DL—Democratic League
DMCH—Dhaka Medical College Hospital
DS—Deputy Secretary
DUCSU—Dhaka University Central Students Union
DUJ—Dhaka Union of Journalists
EC—Election Commission (er)
FEER—Far Eastern Economic Review
GDP—Gross National Product
GS—General Secretary
HBCOP—Hindu *Buddhya* and Christian *Oikkya Parishad* (Hindu Buddhist and Christian Unity Council)
IDL—Islamic Democratic League
IGP—Inspector General of Police

I—Intellectuals
IPO—International Political Order
JCD—*Jatyotabadi Chattra Dal* (Nationalist Student Party)
JD—Jano Dal (People's Party)
JIB—*Jamat-I-Islami* Bangladesh
JP—*Jatyo* Party (National Party)
JRB—Jatyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Security Forces)
JSD—*Jatyo Samajtantrik Dal* (National Socialist Party)
JS—*Jatyo Sangshad* (National Parliament)
KSP—*Krishak*(Peasants) *Sramik* (Labourers) *Party*
ML—(Bangladesh) Muslim League
MOE—Ministry of Education
MOFA—Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOH—Ministry of Home
MP—Member of the Parliament
MRD—Movement for Restoration of Democracy
MRD—Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
NAP—National Awami Party
NFTUS—National Federation of Trade Unions
NPG—Non Participatory Groups
NUF—National United Front
OSD—Officer on Special Duty
PCFE—People's Commission for Free Elections
PGR-DG— President Guard Regiment- Director General
PP—Political Parties
P—Professionals
PROKRICHI—*Prokoushali* (Engineers) *Krishibid* (Agriculturalists) and *Chikisshak*
PSO— Principal Staff Officer
RCP—Revolutionary Communist Party
RO—Repatriated Officers
SAA—Student Alliance for Actions (*Sangrami Chatra Jote*)
SCBA—Supreme Court Bar Association
SKOP—*Shramik Karmachari Oikhya Parishad* (Labourers Employees Unity Council)
SP—Superintend of Police
S—Students
TSC—Teachers Student Center
TU—Trade Union
UCA—United Cultural Alliance
UNF—United National Front
UP—Union Parishad (Union Council)
UPP—United Peoples Party
UP—Union Parishad (Union Council)
VC—Vice-Chancellor
VDP—Village Defence Party
WPB—Workers Party of Bangladesh
WVO—War Veteran Officers

Preface

Democracy has ‘an enormous appeal’ and indeed ‘an ideal that billions of people in all parts of the globe revere and aspire to’ⁱ. The movement for democracy in nations around the world is thus a universal objective to the freedom of mankind. In the late twentieth century numerous states of Asia, Africa and Latin America saw a major wave of the consolidation of democratic transition—mostly by movements, revolutions and mass upsurges against the authoritarian military dictatorships. People of these regions had been struggling for long periods to restore human rights and liberty that led them to organise mass resistance against the military autocracy in order to establish democracy. Bangladesh was ruled by authoritarian military regimes for most of the time since her birth in 1971. The most unprecedented damage to both of its democracy and nation building was made by the military dictatorship of General Ershad that was toppled by a historic pro-democracy mass uprising in December 1990. It was transformed into a heroic civil revolution against the rule of the criminals of the barrack—monstrous enemies of democracy, which was marked as the victory of the democratic forces against the power greedy military of the country.

The transition to democracy in Bangladesh resulted from a convergence of dynamic socio-political forces where mass electoral politics was damaged mostly by military dictatorship of General Ershad. This was only because the budding strength of military institution in the post independent years posed a threat to the political institutions of the country. In this milieu, a host of powerful variables—the diplomatic efforts of the international democratic order including super powers, the UNO and the Commonwealth, the community of transnational non-governmental organizations, and the immense indigenous pro-democracy movements—have speeded up the process of transition to democracy and shaping its trajectory peacefully. In this event, the democratic transition in Bangladesh was able to provide a complete new ideal—the Caretaker Government—an interim constitutional authority to supervise a free and fair elections. The negative consequence of this whole process was that the military gangsters were able to survive the punishment for their crimes that left the rooms to reversal of autocracy in future or at least, put at risk of the development of post—dictatorship democratic institutions in the country.

For nearly a decade, the democratic forces of the country including political parties and many socio-cultural forces spilled their blood—sacrificed a number of lives in the streets against the autocratic and wild regime of the army demons under General Ershad. This movement included the non-violent sit-in, strike, hunger-

strike, human-chain, petition march, public gathering protest etc.—although these always turned to violent on the wake of police atrocities—and violent sporadic protests, riots, rebellions and more continuous activities of organised political parties and interest groups of the society. This research investigates the nature of the conflict under the military dictatorship of General Ershad—the various actions of the opposition forces and the social origins of the democracy movement that brought about a significant social change to the contemporary social structure of Bangladesh society.

The research project required extensive field work. The field work was planned for six months to operate a social survey among the leaders of various socio-cultural and political forces who took the lead in the mass upsurge of 1990 that overthrew the military dictator. The field work collected data from 10 years of national dailies and weeklies and archives, presentation of seminars and audio interviews of the key political leaders of the movement. The field work was started in October 2002 and finished in May, 2003. It was nearly 12 years after the fall of the military junta and for a third term a democratic civilian government under BNP-led alliance was in power. Unfortunately, the then government had to employ the Army to help with the control of the law and order situation of the country at that time. A number of leaders of different socio-cultural and political organisations were arrested and the rest were hiding, which disrupted the normal situation in the operation of the survey. The survey questionnaire included some significant questions on the military interventions of General Ershad. As a result, many leaders were found to be in fear to answer the questions regarding military rule, but they at last agreed to answer the questions when it was ensured that their names would not be disclosed. As a researcher, I always felt myself insecure while working under the intense observation of different intelligence agencies all the time of the field work period. I had to carry a conflict in me—fought between the threat to life and eternal courage in me for democracy. Although the spirit for democracy and an aspiration in me for the freedom of mankind has won at the end, however, has left a life long threat to my own survival, which I believe would never be able to defeat my honest wisdom for the survival of democracy in Bangladesh society.

In carrying out this study I have made use of the works of other scholars, and in particular, the academic works of my teacher Professor Rangalal Sen—an eminent political sociologist of contemporary South Asia who was influenced with the philosophy of his teacher British sociologist Professor Tom Bottomore—has broadly influenced me with the articulation of thoughts in the secondary base of this research, especially his academic excellence to analyze the social structure of Bangladesh has helped me to explore the formation of social base of the movement

for restoration of Democracy. Most significantly, the empirical outlook of Dr Paul Bagguley—my supervisor at Leeds to analyze the actions of contemporary political movements has led my research to incorporate a dynamics of a rare combination of primary and empirical understanding with secondary sources. In this regard, I also owe my debts to late Professor Syed Ahmed Khan and Professor Ishrat Shamim—my methodology teachers at the Department of Sociology, University of Dhaka who gave me elementary training on the use of quantitative methods in sociological research. However, this joint endeavours of qualitative and quantitative approaches have followed the analysis of all the propositions of this research.

In this thesis I shall endeavor to understand three propositions: how the military dictatorship of General Ershad destroyed the constitutional democracy of Bangladesh; how the movement of opposition democratic forces was able to restore democracy in the country; and how both of these events were related to the contemporary social structure of Bangladesh. In chapter one I provide a more detailed summery of the central arguments of the thesis that include the clarification of the concepts such as the ‘military dictatorship of General Ershad’, ‘movement’, and ‘restoration of democracy’ and how this study relates political sociology. In chapter two I provide a detailed theoretical framework of this research which is able to consider most of the contemporary critics on social and political movements and their relation with Bangladesh movement and able to focus the central arguments of the propositions for empirical observation. This chapter is divided into two dimensions: micro theories and macro theories. Micro theories examine all types of means used in the movement, i.e. the actions of the movement: protest march, strike, seize, non-cooperation and violence and repressive measures used by the military dictator. On the other hand, macro theories relate the Bangladesh movement with world perspective. In chapter three I have detailed the methodology of this research.

In chapter four I am keen to focus on the rise of military dictatorship in Bangladesh that has followed an empirical analysis of four dimensions of the Ershad regime: immediate views on the military intervention of General Ershad; causes of the military seizure of power; consequences of this military dictatorship and the repressive measures used by his military administration to surpass the opposition movement. All of these dimensions under a number of factors are able to resolve the central arguments of the proposition regarding the military seizure of power by General Ershad. In chapter five and six I argue that to understand the formation of the social base and the development of democratic forces for the movement for restoration of democracy. These describe all the socio-economic factors pertinent to

the movement: socio-economic issues, pattern of the transformation of the agriculture into the non-agricultural sectors and various dimensions of different socio-political forces of the country: political parties and alliance, different interest and pressure groups: student forces, professionals, intellectuals, trade unions, and non-participatory groups such as business community, NGOs, religious groups and eminent personalities and witnesses of the important actions. This focuses on what scale of change of all these are related to the birth of a new social formation, in which a more powerful democratic forces grew up and organised a successful movement against military dictatorship.

. In Chapter seven and eight I have elaborated the detailed wave of the movements by dates and different pattern and their effectiveness of all actions organised by the opposition democratic forces. The chapter seven describes the movement actions of the opposition democratic forces in detail from the date of assumption of power by the military dictator until he was toppled in December 1990. What was happened during these nine years of the military autocracy—the events, actions and consequences, their progress, repressions and killings—are illustrated by dates and time. Many memories are included here from the evidences of audio interviews of the key leaders of the movement. The chapter eight focuses on the various types of actions organised in the movement with huge examples such as non-violent protest marches, petition marches, mass gatherings, demonstrations, sit-ins, *hartals* (strikes), hunger strikes, non-cooperation or civil disobedience, human chains, seizures, and elections. It also entails violent attacks, barricades, blockades, riots, rebellions, clashes, destroying public transports, guerrilla fights resulting in harassing bombing, firings, killings of the government forces and officials etc. A unique comparison between the four major actions—protest marches, *hartal*, public meeting and violence—by years in graphical presentation have been illustrated that collected by dates from major local dailies from 1982 to 1990 along with a views on the effectiveness of the actions by different movement forces membership have also resolved the arguments on the ability of opposition forces to organise a credible movement against the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

The argument about the leaderships is a very crucial phenomenon in the analysis of any movement that I have tried to raise in chapter nine. This focuses on the different types and layers of the movement leaderships that consider the leadership of political parties, student bodies, intellectual and professional organisations and trade unions from the central, regional and periphery branches of the country under two dimensions of the command: vertical and horizontal leadership of the movement. An empirical analysis on the political leadership has been incorporated in this chapter along with an exclusive comparison between key

movement leaders: Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia on the basis of different leaderships' criteria. Chapter ten has resolved the arguments on some critical issues of the movement that developed huge debates and controversies mainly on the basis of empirical analysis. Among others, the debates on the participation and non-participation in the general elections of 1986, the failure of the formation of the united platform of the movement, the level of sacrifice of different movement forces and the role of the different diplomatic missions in the movement are worth mentioning in this regard. The concluding chapter gives a final answer to the problems of the project. This generates an overall discussion which helps us to understand how the military institution in Bangladesh was a barrier on the process of democratisation and how this problem would be resolved. In this connection, this tries to raise the future problems and prospects of the movement for democratisation in the country.

Finally I conclude that the military of Bangladesh was found to be betray an interest in every respect in the process of democratisation under the authoritarian military dictatorship of General Ershad. The strength and power of the people in making a revolution proved enough to deracinate the last root of this kind of unconstitutional military dictatorship. For the continuation of the process of democratisation, a national reconciliation between all civilian political forces and civic quarters has been an incessant event of popular demand to uproot this military intrigue from the last edge of power politics.

PART I
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1. Preamble

This thesis generates significant new knowledge about the political process of Bangladesh¹ concerned with the movement for restoration of democracy from 1982 to 1990 against the fascist military dictatorship of General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (here after Ershad). The Late twentieth century saw a major wave of transitions to democracy in many countries around the world. This process of democratisation was curbed in the 1970s to 1980s in those countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America where authoritarian regimes were established, in most cases, as a consequence of military seizure of state power. The people of these regions had been struggling for a long period of time to restore human rights and liberty, and endeavoured to organise movements against the military autocracy in order to establish democracy. Bangladesh was ruled by authoritarian military regimes for most of the time since it was born in December 1971. It was the first country in the world following the Second World War to have achieved her independence as a consequence of traumatic civil war against the ruling civil-military clique of Pakistan. Immediately after independence, parliamentary democracy was established by the supreme leader of the liberation war, the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman², although a one-party socialist reform was introduced following the Fourth Constitutional Amendment later on in January 1975. The reign of Sheikh Mujib was toppled with the beginning of an unconstitutional practice of a change of power in the state apparatus of this newly born country. The fatal attack came first from an unexpected quarter, following a military coup in August 1975, in which Sheikh Mujib and almost all of his family members were assassinated by a group of young army officers, most of whom were repatriated from the Pakistan Army immediately after the liberation of the country. General Ziaur Rahman³ assumed political power on the tail end of a clutch of coups in the country by the first week of November 1975. He had attempted to civilianise his military regime through the presidential election in 1978, in which he was made President, and in the JS election of 1979, his BNP was returned with the absolute majority with allegations of voting frauds. In the administration, despite the appearance of parliament and politicians, the central decision making process was still under the firm control of military officers with the clandestine support of civil bureaucracy. However, President Ziaur Rahman was murdered in May, 1981 by a rebel group of army officers during a visit in Chittagong, a divisional and port city of the south-western part of the country. The civilian Vice-President, Justice Abdus

Satter took over as acting President⁴ and elected President following a presidential election in November 1981.

After Zia's death the Army was far too divided and discredited to attempt to seize power from the civilian government, but no sooner had it sorted out its immediate quarrels than the Chief of the Army, General Ershad "demanded the creation of a 'National Security Council' consisting of the three defence chiefs which would have powers of veto over the decisions of the cabinet" (Gowher Rizvi in Clapham and Philip ed. 1985:223). In the struggle that ensuing the outcome was inevitable. General Ershad dismissed the President and cabinet and seized power announcing Martial Law on March 24, 1982⁵. The country's political development had returned to where it had started after the death of Sheikh Mujib in 1975. The authoritarian military dictatorship of General Ershad continued up to 6th December 1990 when he, due to a mass revolution against his regime, was compelled to handover power to the Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, the chief of the Caretaker Government, according to the constitutional provision of the country. Through the general elections held on 27th February, 1991 under the Caretaker Government⁶ power was transferred to the elected representative of the *Jatya Sangshad* (JS) [National Parliament]. Finally, the civilian political supremacy was established over military in the country and created a passage to free and democratic society.

1. 2. The Movement for Democracy: Related Issues

The words 'movement for restoration of democracy' in this research have focused on the struggle of the people of Bangladesh society, as a popular notion, to end the repressions in socio-political life in the wake of an illegal and autocratic military fascism—the dictatorship of General Ershad as well as the meaningful introduction of representative government that is primarily administered under a free and fair application of adult franchise in which the democratic and political forces are able to participate without any apprehension. This aim towards the reinstatement of democratic rule is familiar in the contemporary trends of democratisation process around the world. With this objective, the nature of various local components and existing democratic institutions must be considered as how far these were damaged under the junta regime. In addition, the nature of integration and reconciliation of the democratic forces outside the metaphor of the dictatorship is considered as an inevitable factor, which is able to define the pattern of democratic transition. This issue needs to be addressed to spell out the justification of the movement articulating the central definitions—the sense of restoration of democracy, pattern of actions and involved democratic forces and their interactions with socio-economic changes—the concern of political sociology.

1.2.1. Why this Movement?

The 'Armed Forces'—gently accentuated in military literature now a days, which is, in fact, a militia institution under the republic, had participated in 'an illegal seizure of the state power'⁷ beyond the rules and regulations, and norms and values designed for it in the constitution. Later a one man dictatorship—a genuine military fascism that had a 'divine repugnance for being crystallized into a State' leading to a 'fascist State', which is, 'more than a State, a dynamo'⁸—was established in all spheres of political process of the country. In this connection, the dictator was found to be very blunt that he had shared all of his actions with the top rank Generals vis-à-vis high officials of the civil administration.⁹ For eight years, he 'maintained a firm grip over the 115 million inhabitants' and 'ascended to the presidency in controversial elections, in which major opposition parties refused to participate' as the 'confidence of electoral process had been eroded by serious and repeated complaints of partiality in the administration of elections, violence at the polls, and the intimidating environment in which elections were held'.¹⁰ The increasing dominance of the civil-military clique over political elites and the resulting sharp inter group political conflicts deflected the normal course of democratic values: liberty, equality and freedom in all spheres of the society. The military ruler used repressive measures to sustain his power with countless killings, injuries, arrests, harassment, etc in the wake of conflicts and riots during the actions of democratic forces. The violation of constitutional orders, the destruction of the political process, the establishment of one man rule and killing of hundreds of political workers for the interest of the continuation of his rule had made him an unprecedented despotic and fascist military dictator in the history of the country. Thus the removal of this dictatorial military rule of General Ershad by means of a vigorous movement was inevitable and earned support from all corners of Bangladesh society.

1.2.2. What is meant by 'Restoration' of Democracy?

The vital argument may be raised with the word 'restoration' in this research. Did democracy exist meaningfully in Bangladesh society at that moment so that it was lost by the introduction of military seizure of power that needed to be restored? The nation achieved both its independence and rule of democracy with the triumph of the liberation war in 1971 that ended colonial military rule of Pakistan. It is fact that a '*child tree*' of democracy in the post independent years, which was still in the watering stage and struggled for breath and broaching for stability and consistency, had been forced to death with the introduction of military rule in the country. But the term—movement for the restoration of democracy—seems to have some uncertainty regarding the application of its starting period, which ought to be resolved here. First, since the removal of the civilian AL regime in a military coup in 1975 that turned

the country into an undemocratic one—the absence of any attempt for trial of the involved military gangsters—moreover found stopping the trial by changing the constitution¹¹—the popular sense is in favour of the term to be in effect since the killing of *Bangabandhu* in 1975. Second, considering contemporary third world political legacies¹², the military regime of General Zia—all activities since the August coup 1975 that were absorbed in the constitution by the Fifth Amendment in 1979 and legalised all of the ‘illegal military orders and misdeeds of the military administration’¹³—which, however, restarted a continuation of constitutional rule in the country. The presidential election of 1981 in which Justice Satter was made President had followed the constitutional process and hence, the Government of the BNP under Justice Satter was constitutionally legal. Under the threat of evolving military fascism, the democracy lay in the constitution rather than in function. In the aggression of military fascism in the state power under the command of General Ershad, the democracy had lost its ongoing constitutional base that removed all hope for the development of democratic liberties and institutions in the society. In this sense, one may consider the term to be function since 1982—on and after the military takeover. However, this research has limited the notion of the term to be used for second argument—the period of democracy movement under military dictatorship of General Ershad.

1.2.3. The Instrumental Forces of the Movement

The movement for restoration of democracy was made possible by the peoples’ aspirations leading to a mass revolution with continuous actions organised mainly by political parties and their allies, and different socio-cultural forces of Bangladesh Society. The forces of the movement made a determined attempt to change the military regime of General Ershad, which followed different types of actions and initiatives: individual resistance, actions of political forces, struggles for implementation of the demands of interest and pressure groups, instances of joint endeavours, and above all, unity of the opposition forces in the observance of all actions. In the hallmark of this process, the political parties and their allies of socio-cultural forces—interest (pressure) groups including the students, intellectuals, professionals and labourers were likely to plan and perform the joint actions and programmes irrespective of national and local interests. Hence, the research looks upon the frequencies, participations and effectiveness of different actions of the opposition democratic forces for the cause of democracy.

The nature and characteristics of the opposition forces have been crucial in the analysis of the movement. The opposition to the military dictator were divided into three categories: political parties and alliances, interest (pressure) groups and non-participatory groups and supporters of the movement. First, the number of existed political parties in the country was nearly one hundred.¹⁴ The major opposition

political parties included the Bangladesh Awami League (AL), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), National Socialist Party (JSD)¹⁵, Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), Bangladesher Workers Party (BWP), Muslim League (ML) and Jamaat-I-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) etc. The research has followed five categories for all of these parties following their ideological stands: first, the AL, linked with a combination of semi-bourgeoisie and pro socialist ideology; second, the BNP known as rightwing pro capitalist and pro religious; third, leftist-1 for pro-Moscow leftists (Marxist-Leninist) primarily the CPB; fourth, leftist-2 for pro-China radical leftists primarily the JSD and BWP, and the fifth, the JIB, the collaborator political forces with Pakistan Army during the liberation war of the country that stands for pro Moududi religious fundamentalism and other Islamic Parties (IPs) including different parts of the ML and *Islami Oikya Jote* (IOJ) etc.. These categories of political forces were also considered as two distinct groups: the AL, CPB, JSD and BWP are considered to be 'pro-liberation forces'¹⁶ and the JIB and the ML as 'anti-liberation fundamentalist forces'.¹⁷ The BNP maintains a clever balance between the two with a slightly closer link to the latter.

These political parties were united under two major alliances to employ their united efforts in the movement for democracy: the 15-Party alliance under the leadership of AL and its leader Sheikh Hasina and the 7-Party alliance under the leadership of BNP and its leader Begum Khaleda Zia. There was a small alliance of Islamic parties as IOJ other than the JIB. The development of 'interest or pressure groups'¹⁸ in the post-independent periods, especially those, who had a wider political role in the national level, did not have any typical difference. The interest or pressure groups that participated in the movement were divided into four categories: students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions of the working class labourers. All of these groups had their home agenda and demands in their own interest that transferred as the icon of pressures groups while they used to join with the political forces for the national cause—the movement for restoration of democracy. The political forces also included their demands in the central charter of demands of the movement turning them into auxiliary forces of the movement as well as transforming them, in a suitable space of time and location, into pressure groups against military administration for the implementation of their own agenda. Among them the intellectuals and professionals including the teachers of colleges and universities, poets, authors, artists, doctors, engineers and government and non-government officials acted as an important part of 'civil society'¹⁹, which was more effective in the formation of democratic norms and values in socio-cultural sphere of the society. This also resembles the notion of a 'public sphere' used by German social scientist Habermas.²⁰

The students' forces in Bangladesh worked as the affiliated bodies of political parties.²¹ The main student forces of the movement included BCL, JCD, JSD, BSU, BSF, BCM and BICS. In the beginning of the military regime, the CSAC was formed by 14 student bodies of the pro capitalist and pro leftist progressive groups under the leadership of the BCL²² and a few years later under the leadership of JCD²³, the SAA was formed by 7 rightist student groups. In final stage of the movement in 1990, the APSU was formed by all rightist and leftist student groups consisting of 22 student bodies including the rival BCL and JCD that had the pioneering role in organising the mass uprising that ended the military dictatorship. The trade unions of workers and labourers included the associations of all of the fourth to lower grades working class employees of the industrial set ups, government and non-government and semi-government offices under their national organisation SKOP. The Non-Participatory Group (NPG) of the movement does mean those who had the cognisant supports for the movement but did not take part directly in the actions. These groups included high level religious personalities, NGOs officials, business magnets, individual witness of movement for long period and the *Persona the Greta* of the society—a salient component of the civil society, who were respected by almost all of the society. However, the research focuses on the process of the development of these groups as movement forces and investigates the pattern of the inter relationship between the memberships of different movement forces and their views on many factors and issues related to the movement, which make it possible to understand the nature and scale of how they interact within and between the groups in the process of democratisation.

1.2.4. How does this study relate to Political Sociology?

The movement for the restoration of democracy in any country is a veritable subject matter of political sociology which 'is concerned with power in its social context',²⁴. By power is meant here the ability of an organised social or political group to pursue a course of action to reach the desired goal.²⁵ It is also concerned with power in its political context that these organised groups have a desire to compete for political position in any stage of the state mechanism, from central to periphery. This is only possible when they conquer the economic set backs around them and brings a favourable social sphere for the change in the ruling power structure. The economic change in its way fetches the changes in social classes providing with a new shape, status and power, which carry a social value in their aspiration in organising the movement. The question has automatically come across the different views if the necessary components are already developed in the movement forces parallel to their counter group so that they have the ability to overthrow the existing power elites. These components include mostly the economic transformation resulting in the development of intellectuals and civic quarters,

science and technology, infrastructure, and communications etc of the existing social structure. The relations of these socio-economic changes build up a necessary new class for the movement for restoration of democracy, and how and in what extent these components were able to reach the stage of maturity in accordance with the fall of the authoritarian military dictatorship, which is the concern of political sociology. In brief, it concerns how far the socio-economic changes in the post independent Bangladesh are related to the movement for restoration of democracy. In more categorical form, the process of democratisation involves the crisis of the development of industrial and entrepreneurial capitalist society and how far the Bangladesh society in 1990 was able to fulfil this condition. The British established agro-based industries until 1947, growth of mercantile capital during the colonial rule of Pakistan and development of farming and cottage industries along with service sectors up to 1990 in the post-independent periods and a considerable operation of the NGOs, especially in rural Bangladesh, were among other hubs of the economic developments that made this society suitable for the process of democratisation. The concerns of how and in what level these changes have initiated the formation of a suitable force for the success of the movement for the restoration of democracy—the key arguments of the study of political sociology.

1.3. Plan of the Thesis

In this thesis I am concerned with three propositions: i) the military dictatorship of General Ershad had enormous consequences on the society that destroyed the space for the practice of democracy in state power; ii) the successful movement with a range of actions of the opposition democratic forces was able to restore the democratic rule; and finally, iii) the movement for restoration of democracy was related to the changing social structure of Bangladesh society that is concerned with the central issue of political sociology. These arguments based on different subsequent factors are illustrated through chapter two to nine with the application of secondary sources information along with a complementary quantitative analysis, generated from the closed questionnaire interview of 206 research samples from the different movement forces memberships of the four divisional cities of Bangladesh. The structure of the survey samples consists of political parties (46), students (25) intellectuals (30), professionals (30), trade unions (30) and non-participatory groups (45) (See chapter 3 for details methodology of this research). The survey with extensive statistical analysis tries to resolve the major arguments of the central propositions of the research. A comparison between the frequencies of four major actions: protest march, public meeting, *hartal* and use of violence have needed to understand the density and dimension of the actions used in the movement. There are also some audio interviews with the key leaderships of the

movement and military leader to answer some critical debates on different turning points of the movement. A detailed literature review has been conducted on the military intervention and the process of democratisation around the world in which the characteristics of military regime of General Ershad—causes and consequences and pattern has to be detailed; the development of a necessary democratic forces and their detailed actions through which a chronology of the movement events for the whole period of the military rule were based need to be analysed; the development of leadership which was also a very crucial element has to be examined; some conflicts of issues that happened beyond a general expectation have to be addressed; and finally, the social aspects—the situation of detailed socio-economic variables towards the construction of pro-movement social formation has required to be concentrated.

At the micro level, the sociological analysis has set off an investigation between the relationships on the views of the memberships of different opposition democratic socio-political forces regarding the issues on military aggression into the state power and since then onward, how the formative political and social forces responded against them in the process of democratisation. Hence the main focus to investigate is how the interaction of these opposition forces made the movement successful against the military dictatorship, which is linked to all three propositions of the research. The social origins of the event have come across with the views of movement forces memberships that argue how Bangladesh had gradually changed inside the social structure in order to accept democratic values in her society. Accordingly, at this juncture, I am merely able to illustrate these principal arguments and findings of more general work, leaving the detailed discussion of where these relate to my own for the chapters below.

Firstly, there have been a range of studies concerned with the political sociology related to the power struggle and political movement and participatory class relations of the society. These have usually focused on the evolution of socio-political background of the different locations and period around the world as Marx considered the transformation of social evolutions into political revolution (1847[1963]:177) or the democracy movement by the incorporation of middle class participation (Tocqueville, 1861), which however later was considered under two broad categories such as ‘social movement’ and ‘organised political formations’ that were reflected in i) the democratic and labour movement in Europe, ii) women’s suffrage movement and independence movement in colonial countries, and iii) the present day movements in autocratic states provide effective means for expressing grievances and seeking to bring about political changes (Bottomore, 1979:41-58). Sen (1994:64) has considered the above third category was more relevant to the Bangladesh perspective. However, the detail of these studies is examined in chapter

six where the development of democratic forces for the Bangladesh movement is illustrated.

Secondly, there are numerous studies on the causes and consequences of the military aggression into the state power distracting the democratic rule, freedom and human rights in many countries around the world. The military dictatorship of General Ershad employed repressive measures to suppress the opposition movement. In connection of the studies on military rule, home and abroad, Moris Janowitz (1964), L Loyd (1971), E. Schmitter (1971), S.E. Finer (1975), Decalo (1976), Thomas (1976), E.A. Nordinger (1977), Claphan and Philip ed. (1984), Emaj Uddin Ahmed (1988), Thomson (1993) and Modud Ahmed (1995) were notably found among many other important literatures that was used in this research in addition to the facts from local sources. In chapter four, I have examined details relevant to their arguments on the pattern, causes, consequences and repressions of the military dictatorship of General Ershad in accordance with the application of survey analysis.

Thirdly, there is plenty of literature on the democratisation process under authoritarian regimes relating the different socio-political constituents in analytical precinct—either in peaceful or violent transition, third world legacy, exporting democracy reflecting the prescription of the leading nations, elite configuration, class relation, structure of actions and violence, leadership of democratisation etc which has occupied most of the space of the theoretical framework of this study in chapter two. The whole literary experiment has involved two distinct types of theories: micro and macro, to the discourse of related variables of transition to democracy that has of much relevance to Bangladesh case. In the macro perspective, I have employed more than ten dimensions to see the literatures involving the various components of democracy movement under authoritarian regimes: first, for military seizure of state power, a resourceful literature has been summed up, in which the observation of Moris Janowitz (1964), L Loyd (1971), E. Schmitter (1971), S.E. Finer (1975), Decalo (1976), Thomas (1976), E.A. Nordinger (1977), Claphan and Philip ed. (1984), Emaj Uddin Ahmed (1988), Thomson (1993) and Modud Ahmed (1995) include the causes and consequences of the takeover and cleavages between political elites and militia forces, Huntington (1991) for exit privilege for the dictators in peaceful transition etc; second, the literature of Marx (1849, 1963), Engels (1889), Draper (1978), Bottomore (1979, 1993) and Rangalal Sen (1994) include the classical debates on movements, revolution and reform; third, the world view of historical three route to democratisation of Barrington Moore (1973); fourth, the involvement of colonial civic and political institutions and economic infrastructure in the democratisation process in the post-colonial period is concerned with the literature of Emersion (1960), Smith (1978), Killigray (1986), Weiner (1987) and Axel Hadenius (1994); fifth, the third wave democratisation of

Huntington (1991); sixth, the relation of capitalism and capitalist control of center forces on the peripheral societies in the process of democratisation has been detailed in the studies of Alavi and Shanin (1982), Chirot (1977), Moore (1973), Thomas and others (1979), Thomas (1988), Gilbert and Gugler (1989), Rueschemeyer et al (1992), Francis Fukuyama (1992) and Sen (1994); seventh, for relation of class configuration and necessary development of middle class for the fostering of democracy has been revealed in the studies of Seymour Martin Lipset (1963a), Bottomore (1993) and Kivisto (1998); eighth, the universalism in defining the modern democracy is illustrated in the observation of Lively (1975) Huntington (1991), Hadenius (1992), Holden (, 1988, 1994), Beetham (1994) and Wilson (1996); ninth, the relation of industrialisation and urbanisation in the development of the democratic society is shown in the literature of Alan B. Mountjoy (1978), S.A.Khan (1991), Kamal Siddiqui (1990) and Gilbert and Gugler (1989); tenth, the legitimacy crisis resulted in political instability in a society has been found in the studies of Habermas (1976), Bottomore (1979, 1984) and Rangalal Sen (1994), eleventh, the actions of the movement that related to a forceful transition to democracy has been detailed in the study of Neil Smelser (1962), David Aberle (1966), Blumer (1969), Roy Wallis (1984), Snow and Oliver (1995) and McAdam and Snow (1997) and finally the notion of symbolic constructivist paradigm of Jocelyn Linnekin(2004) for democratic transition has been incorporated.

On the other hand, the micro theories have involved another set of dimensions of the home and domestic components in the resurrection process: first, the re-enactment and reinforcing of political parties and alliances—the fundamental domestic constituent of democratisation in any society, have been disclosed in the studies of Ashraf and Sharma (1983) and Duverger (1966); second, in the discussion of different interest (pressure) groups, the socio-cultural opposition to military regime has been divulged in the literature of Sen (1994) and Alam (1991) for trade union and professional groups, Karl Marx (1849), Lipset and Dobson (1972), Draper (1978), Eyerman and Jamison (1991) for intellectual groups, Engels (1889) and Huntington (1991) for students community, and Karl Mannheim(1928, 1952) and Margaret Mead (1970) for the growth of structural resemblance of the generational groups and dissident youths in taking the socio cultural and political leadership; third, the literature of Frederick D Miller (1983, 1999) has unveiled details of the measures: repression, co-optation, success and failures that were used by the military administration to suppress the opposition movement; fourth, to understand the pattern of the use of tools and aftermaths of the actions and violence, has been discussed by many contemporary authors such as Barnes et al. (1979) for the citizen's political repertoire' from the 1960s, DeNardo (1985) for logic and power of the numbers of the participants, Tilly (1986, 2003) for the modern repertoire of

collective action and violence, Dalton (1988) for chronological layers of the actions. Tarrow (1994) for the sequences of intensified interactions between challengers and authorities, Dellaporta and Diani (1999) for the understanding of the influence of public opinion and the like.

Fourthly, the detailed socio-economic variables related to the pro-democratisation social formation including the pattern of the growth of pro capitalist industrial and non-agricultural sectors, influence of social factors—situation in poverty, literacy, inequalities, communal stability, informal money lending, landlessness, components of backward close systems (caste) and the situation of the rise of the fundamentalism etc, and class structure of the participants of actions have been accounted to establish a social connection of the boosting up the movement for democracy on the basis of secondary information and statistical documentation, and side by side, a further statistical rationale has been applied in terms of the opinions of the movement forces membership to measure the level of their acceptance. For the use of statistics on these variables, extensive numerical resources have been considered from the Statistical year Book of Bangladesh (1981, 1991) and Annual Report of the ADB (1999). The literature of Dickenson (1987), Mountjoy (1979), Abraham Guiller (1966), Bromley and Gerry (1979), Gilbert and Gugler (1989) and Sirajul Islam (1990) etc have gone through the dimensions and characteristics of urban components favourable for the enhancement of violent or non violent path of democratisation movement. In the same way, as an inevitable outcome of the socio-economic and political crisis in the society, the relation of social classes and income inequalities to the development of challenging leadership, participants and supporters of democracy movement have been investigated in the studies of Habermas (1976), Bottomore (1979), Ranglal Sen (1994) and M Rahman (1988).

Fifthly, the most significant part of this research is the chronological description and critical analyses of the movement events through out the whole period of the military dictatorship, which is detailed in chapter seven. This has included the frauds and repressions in the continuation of huge killings and injuries and arrests, warrant and lawsuits to suppress the opposition to grasp power for indefinite periods, a for ever dream and secret desire in the junta side, contrasting an invincible spirit and stubborn instinct in the movement forces for freedom, liberty and equity—an ever-desired self-shaped spontaneous struggle, has been developed as a result of counter production to the repression of the dictator in the incessant mode of oppositions' actions. This chapter illustrates the description and analysis of the actions events—detailed with time, date and location that happened in the nine years period of military dictatorship from the summary of the local and international—daily and weekly newspapers.

Sixth, there were numerous forms of actions—violent and non violent, which were organised by the opposition democratic forces as the effective tools to strike at the root of the dictatorship that generated the process for the resurrection of democracy. Chapter eight is therefore designed to include the understanding to making clear of these various types of actions. In brief, the non-violent protest march, public or mass gatherings, petition march, signing petition, human chain, long march, ride, demonstration, election etc; semi-violent non-cooperation, civil disobedience, student strike, sit-in, *gherao* (siege), *hartal* (general strike), setting fire on effigies etc and finally, violent actions attacks, barricades, blockades, riots, damaging vehicles and transport, guerrilla fights resulting harassing, bombing, setting fires, killing of forces and government officials etc. The detail of these actions is illustrated with examples as well as a statistical analysis of how far these were effective in the operation to uproot the military dictatorship. Side by side, a statistical and graphical presentation has also been subsumed to explore the different dimensions of the frequencies for nine years collected by date on the four major actions: protest march, public meeting, *hartal* and use of violence so that the ups and downs of the movement would be clearly demarcated.

Seventh, the leadership—central to periphery or vertical to horizontal—is the soul of any movement, which was also a vital issue in the analysis of the process of democratisation in Bangladesh as it was experienced, in popular verdict, an absence of single and supreme leadership, or in more suitable version, the presence of a dichotomous leadership of the two converse opposition currents in the opposition forces. The different types and characteristics of these leaderships and their conflicts, socio-economic background, success and failure, have been discussed in the chapter nine. A range of principal leaderships of the movement has been examined with survey statistics in terms of some criteria—personality, leadership, experience, stand on issues, popular decision and non-cooperation with regime—to explore the role differentiation of the key political leaders of the movement.

Eighth, the issues of conflicts, debates and disunity of the opposition forces—mostly responsible for disrupting and misleading the movement—have to be considered for ample discussion, which is incorporated in the chapter ten. These debates delimited on many critical issues such as the link of political parties to bring the military in power, the role of civil-military bureaucracy, the failure of opposition in the formation of a united platform, the issue of participation or non-participation in the elections under military regime, the credibility of the formation of the caretaker government, formation of the APSU as a instinct force for the movement, failure of the Dhaka siege actions, the different sacrificing role of the individual movement forces and the latent role of the diplomatic missions, if any, in restoring a democratic government in the country. The underlying questions

regarding the conflict on these issues have been analysed mostly with the survey statistics and graphical presentation originated from the interviews of the movement forces memberships.

In conclusion, the problems and prospects of the process of democratisation in Bangladesh as the outcome of the research findings—from secondary analysis and survey have been waged details in conjunction with some identical similarities and dissimilarities being found in contemporary research on democratisation process around the world.

1.4. The Significance of the Study

This research is a milestone in understanding the development of the political process in Bangladesh and in the third world countries as well as having implications for theories of democratisation, how democracy is restored and how it can be maintained elsewhere. It presents significant new knowledge to the current of the democratisation research all over the world. At home, the research outcome will benefit mostly the democracy as well as the people of Bangladesh society, who have been struggling to establish a democratic essence—freedom, security, impunity, civil rights and liberty since the liberation of the country in 1971. It will also generate an important discussion for politicians, civil society, academic, interest (pressure) groups, and gender bodies to understand the process of democratisation under the military dictatorship of General Ershad. It must be able to show the policy makers of the state how the role of the democratic, political and military institutions is distinctive in the rule of democracy. The research aims to disseminate wisdom mostly for political and state elites and the military services under the republic to understand their interaction in fostering democratic society, where it tends to be a beam of light reflecting the enlightened instances of democratic movements among the repressive nations around the world.

1.5. Conclusion

The departure of the military dictatorship of General Ershad in the face of peoples' revolution was the most important event in the history of political development in the post-independent Bangladesh. The consequences of the junta regime—damages and repressions, formation of the democratic forces, events of actions and violence, social perspectives, leadership patterns, unresolved critical issues and the like are the major concerns of this research. The struggle of the people for democracy—the sacred wisdom for liberty, equity and freedom of the human self, and its society—is an eternal phenomenon irrespective of nations to nationalisms and space to species, races and ethnicities around the world. In all considerations, the democracy is either innovated or renovated or conquered in nations as an indication to the beginning of more civilised humanity. The

understanding of this research is leading the issues of the movement for conquering democracy in Bangladesh related to the instinct of this definite socio-political venture in the current of democratisation process around the world.

Notes

¹ The People's Republic of Bangladesh was born in 1971 by a traumatic civil war against Pakistan. It is a low-lying riverine country located in South Asia. The country contains the confluence of the Ganges (Padma), Brahmaputra (Jamuna), and Meghna Rivers and their tributaries which empty into the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh is bordered by India to the east, north, and west and shares a short border with Myanmar (Burma) in the southeast. With a population of approximately 133 million, Bangladesh is the most densely populated agricultural country in the world. Since achieving independence in 1971, Bangladesh has made progress toward establishing a sustainable form of democratic government. The country has experienced military intervention, the assassination of key political leaders and an authoritarian style of political leadership, which marred its first 20 years of nationhood. In 1990, a quasi-military regime came to an end, a caretaker government was established, and in early 1991, national elections were held. Elected government has since transferred power for three times under a normal democratic process from one party to another. Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy, with broad powers exercised by the Prime Minister. Many formal institutions of democracy exist (parliament, an active opposition, a free and vigorous print media, the judiciary, competitive elections, and free speech), however they often function with limited transparency, accountability, and openness to public input. Human rights are guaranteed by law, but not always in practice.

² Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the supreme leader of Bangladesh Liberation war. His party AL won the absolute majority in the parliamentary election of 1970. The refusal to hand over the power to him by the then ruling military elite of Pakistan had led the Bangladesh, the eastern wing of Pakistan, to a liberation war in 1971. He declared the independence of Bangladesh on March 26, 1971 before he was arrested by Pakistan Army in Dhaka. After the independence, nation had recognised him constitutionally with the title "Father of the Nation". He was also conferred the title "Bangabandhu" (friend of Bengal) after had released from the historic Agartala Conspiracy case, in a huge gathering of students in April, 1968 at the Paltan Maidan, Dhaka. See for this, Abdul Wadud Bhuiya (1982, p.119). He was born on 17 March 1920 and has assassinated in 15 August 1975 by a military coup followed by a first time military intervention in Bangladesh.

³ Major Ziaur Rahman was one of the popular sector commanders of the Bangladesh Liberation war in 1971. He was promoted to Major General and honoured as *BirBikram* along with many other officers—the second highest state recognition for his great contribution in the liberation of the country and at the same time, was placed as the Deputy Chief of Army Staff under the post-Independence AL regime. Following the consequences of the killing of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 that removed the AL from power, he became the most popular officer in the Bangladesh Army. In November 03, 1975 there was an unsuccessful coup attempt, which had made Ziaur Rahman the Army Chief and in 1976 he capture the state power leading Bangladesh under a full pledged military regime. In 1979, he tried to civilianise his military regime by a parliamentary election, in which his party BNP was declared winner with the two third majorities. Clearly this verdict of parliamentary election was imperative to legalise his military regime by Fifth Amendment of the constitution. He was also assassinated by another military coup in 31st May 1981 following—after a short period of civilian government of Justice Satter—the military intervention of General Ershad in March 1982.

⁴ Justice Abdus Satter, as the Vice President assumed the office of the President of Bangladesh under the provision of Article 55(1) of constitution till the new President was elected according to the provision of Article 48(1) of the constitution of the country. However, it would be worth mentioning here that Justice Abdus Satter was the most trusted person of President Zia in his government. He was serious lyill and was admitted in hospital at the time of Zia's death. According to most sources, he was unwilling to take the charge of acting President. But, General Ershad, the Army chief of Staff, was desperate to choose Justice Satter to position to avoid their participation in the immediate quarrel for power that could expose his connection with the killing of Zia. For details, see Moudud Ahmed, *Democracy and the Challenge of Development* UPL, Dhaka, 1995, Chapter-6.

⁵ See Rangalal Sen, *The Political Elite of Bangladesh*, UPL, Dhaka, 1986, p.323. The Army Chief Lieutenant General H.M. Ershad explained the causes of his capturing power and announced over the Radio and Television that he came into power for launching "a crusade against rampant

corruption, which termed the number one enemy of the nation. And by promulgating martial-law he saved the country from catastrophe.”

⁶ The formation of Caretaker Government was the consequence of the long standing demand of opposition democratic forces that compelled the dictator to quit from power. The design and activities of the Caretaker Government was reflection of the political wisdom of all socio-democratic forces of the country those who involve in the movement for restoration of democracy through out the nine years regime of the military dictator. The demand of holding the parliamentary election under non-partisan and neutral Caretaker Government was first included in the 5-point movement charter of the opposition forces including 15-party alliance and 7-party alliance in the early 1983. In the peak of the movement by which Gen. Ershad was removed, it was Sheikh Hasina, the eight-party alliance chief in a highly attended meeting in the ‘‘Panth Path’’ of Dhaka city on November 06, explicitly stated the constitutional provisions of the Caretaker Government. On November 19, the three main political alliance published the historic joint Declaration (see the leaflet of 21.11.90 issued by 8-party, 7-party and 5-party alliance) in which the outlines of the removal of autocratic Ershad Government, holding of the Sovereign Parliamentary Elections under the interim government and the established of elected representative government in the country were clearly delineated.

⁷ On 10 October 1984, the ex President Justice Sattar in a statement said, ‘‘the power was snatched away in the darkness of night when we all were discharging government responsibilities in a healthy political atmosphere after I was elected President of the country through an impartial election.’’ For details of his statement see *The Bangladesh Observer*, 11 October 1984

⁸ Camillo Pellzzi, *Problemi e realita del Fascismo* (Florence: 1924), pp. 103, 164. Quoted in Adrian Lyttelton, ‘‘Italy: The Second Wave’’ in *The Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.1. No.1, 1966, p.77

⁹ The dictator in an interview with eminent journalist Abdul Gaffer Choudhury at the Hilton Hotel in London where he was asked if would have felt any threat to his life from the Army as happened for Sheikh Mujib and Zia. He frankly replied negative and explained the cause behind that he always used to consult every thing with the top-rank Generals, even if anybody of the Army would like to capture power for which he had been always ready to accept the proposal without any bloodshed and losing his son and wife. This fact was published in a national news paper *Daily Azker Kagoj* June 1991. For more details, see also, Nasima Khatoon, *Bangladesher Rajniti 1982-1990* (The Politics of Bangladesh 1982-1990), M. Phil. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1995, p.46

¹⁰ See the Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections February 27,1991, A Post Election Report by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) Washington, USA, p.2

¹¹ The leader of the August Coup, Khondoker Mostaque Ahmed proclaimed a law to give legal protection of the coup maker military officers debarring any trial for the criminal charges for killing Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others in August Coup 1975. This law was popularly known as the Indemnity Ordinance 1975. This was again included in the Fifth Amendment of the constitution that rectified all martial law orders of General Ziaur Rahman.

¹² The fate of democracy under the military and authoritarian regimes of the third world nations around the world became a taboo to hold fake elections, capture polls results in favour of the dictators, legalised their all repressions under the cover of unrepresentative parliament and in this way, continued in power until another military coup occurred or assassination or accident that ended the dictatorships in these countries. This legacy was also applicable to what happened in Bangladesh after the killing of the country’s father of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975.

¹³ See the report on ‘‘5th Amendment Illegal: HC—Govt of Mostaque, Sayem and Zia Unconstitutional’’ *The New Age*, a English Daily in Bangladesh, 30th August 2005, p.1. The report published the historic verdict of Honourable High Court bench of Justice A B M Khairul Huq and Justice A T M Fazle Kabir on 29th August 2005. In their verdict of a case of Moon cinema—legality of the government act on abandoned property, the Honourable High Court in their 22-point observation declared illegal the Fifth Amendment to the constitution made by martial law proclamation. According to the report, ‘‘ Proclaiming martial law is unconstitutional and those who have proclaimed martial law so far are liable to sedition charges----the court observed that usurpation of the state power through martial law proclamations, particularly by Khondoker Moshtaque Ahmed, Justice Abu Sadaat Mohammad Sayem and Major General Ziaur Rahman was unconstitutional. Proclaiming martial law is unconstitutional and those who have proclaimed martial law so far are liable to sedition charges, the court said in its 22-point observation. ‘Taking over the powers of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh with effect from the morning of August 15, 1975 by Khondoker Moshtaque Ahmed, the usurper, placing Bangladesh under Martial Law and his (Moshtaque) assumption of the office of the President of Bangladesh by Proclamation of August 20.

1975 were, in clear violation of the Constitution and as such illegal without lawful authority, and without jurisdiction,' the court observed. 'Consequently, all his subsequent actions as the President of Bangladesh were illegitimate and void.' The judgement also observed that '...by taking over the office of the President of Bangladesh and such entering into the office on November 6, 1975 by Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem and his assumption of the powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator and appointment of Deputy Martial Law Administrator and the proclamation on November 8, 1975 were all in violation of the Constitution, and consequently all such functions, actions as President or CMLA were illegal. 'The handing over of office of Martial Law authority to Maj Gen Ziaur Rahman, by Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem by third proclamation on November 29, 1976, enabling Ziaur Rahman to exercise all powers of the CMLA, being beyond the ambit of the Constitution was illegal, without lawful authority and without jurisdiction and consequently all his subsequent functions and actions as CMLA were illegal.' The court also referred to the takeover of the presidency by General Zia on April 21, 1977, and observed that it was also 'beyond the ambit of the Constitution and as such illegal.' About the referendum of 1977 on General Zia's presidency during the martial law, the court termed it was 'unknown to the Constitution'. The judges said 'the violation of the Constitution was a grave legal wrong and remains so for all time to come. It cannot be legitimised.'"

¹⁴ According to the statistics of the Bangladesh Election Commission Secretariat 2003-04, the number of political parties that attended the JS elections of the 1991 was 75. There were also some small political parties functioning which were not able to give candidates in the elections.

¹⁵ The name of the party in Bengali is *Jatyo Samajtantrik Dal* (JSD), which in English is National Socialist Party. However, this party is popularly known as the JSD.

¹⁶ Under the leadership of the AL, these parties fought in the war of liberation against the aggressor Pakistan Army in 1971. Among these, the AL was pioneer party that led the Bangladesh Government-in-Exile and led the liberation of the country. They were united in the movement for restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad under the banner of 15-party alliance. They are known as progressive bourgeoisie, secular and leftist political forces of the country. They were in favour of the government on the basis of original constitution of the country that started in 1972.

¹⁷ The collaborator parties those who associated the aggressor Pakistan Army in the liberation war of country are known as anti-liberation forces. These parties included the ML, JIB, and Nejame Islami Bangladesh and the like. These parties were banned under post-independent AL regime. But the Political Parties (Amendment) Regulation, 1976 [MLR No.XXV of 1976 (August 4 1976)] of General Zia had revived these parties to function in the country in the post-1975 political development of the country. Since then, the development of these political forces in and outside the military regimes of General Zia and Ershad were known as anti-liberation forces. All military regimes and these anti-liberation forces in the post-independent years were patronized by each other in establishing their interest in national politics.

¹⁸ An interest (pressure) group is an organisation whose purpose is to influence the distribution and use of political power in society. In definition, Interest groups differ sharply from political parties, whose primary goal is to place members in positions of political authority rather than to influence those already in power. In Bangladesh case, the interest or pressure groups always aligned with the opposition democratic forces in support of their own demands as well as for the broader national cause of the restoration of democracy. For details of the definition of the interest (pressure) groups, see Allan G. Johnson, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, a User's Guide to Sociological Language*. Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996, pp.144-145.

¹⁹ According to Karl Marx, civil society is a fragmented capitalist world organised around 'individualism' and materialistic competition of all against all. The modern state became necessary to regulate and contain the resulting conflict and misery. More recently, Antonio Gramsci has argued that the core of civil society is not only the individual and individualism, but also private organisations such as corporations. Gramsci also argued that the state and civil society overlap and merge with each other to such a degree that it is hard to tell where one leaves off and the other begins. For details of the concepts of the civil society of Marx and Gramsci, see Karl Marx, "Critiques of Hegel's philosophy of rights." In *Writings of the young Marx on philosophy and society*, edited and translated by D Easton and K Guddat. New York: Doubleday 1967[1843] and C. Mouffe edited *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

²⁰ This resembles the position of German social scientist Habermas (1970). He argues that democracy must be seen first and foremost as a process that results when a certain kind of social interaction prevails. More specially, democracy should be seen as a particular way by which citizens make collective and rational decisions, "a way that (such decisions) can be made dependent on a consensus

arrived at through discussion free from domination'' (Habermas 1970:10). If democracy is about free and open dialogue, where does such discussion take place and under what condition? Where is the space in which democracy is nurtured? Habermas (1989a) in response to these queries has referred to this space as the public sphere, a term that resembles another concept that is currently receiving considerable attention: 'civil society' (Calhoun 1993, Kumar 1993).

²¹ For this, see The PPR, 1976. MLR No. XXV of 1976, August 4, 1976.

²² The Bangladesh *Chattra* League (BCL) is the student wing of the AL, one of the two mainstream opposition parties of the country

²³ The *Jatyotabadi Chattra Dal* (JCD) is the student wing of the BNP—one of the two mainstream opposition parties

²⁴ Tom Bottomore, *Political Sociology*, New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1979, p.7.

²⁵ Rangalal Sen, 'The Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 1982-90: A Theoretical Framework and Social Background' in S.R.Chakravarti. edited *Society, Polity, and Economy of Bangladesh*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1994, p.63.

Chapter Two

The Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 1982-1990: The Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

The theoretical framework of this study is divided into two principal phases: macro theory and micro theory.¹ Macro theories are concerned with how the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh is related to the classical theories of democratisation in the twentieth century all over the world. It also covers the literature relating the nature and characteristics of military dictatorship and the social origin of the movement for democracy. Micro theories of this study relate to the contents of conflict between the opposition democratic forces and the military dictatorship of General Ershad, which focuses on the formative roles of opposition political parties and alliances, interest groups: student, intellectual, professionals and trade unions and the like. They also include the forms of collective actions: non-violent and violent², and the various repressive measures of military administration to decline the movement entailed harassing, false law suits, arrest, jailing, killing, co-optation, leaving partial success and strategies to oppositions' failure to weaken the opposition forces. The micro approach also incorporates with the different dimensions of the movements: urban-rural, class composition of the participants, leadership pattern, religious and ethnic factions, causes of disintegration and preconditions of unity of the opposition forces and above all, the pattern of success of the movement.

2.2. Macro Theories of the Study

2.2.1. The Cleavages between Political Elites and the Armed Forces

The movement against this military dictatorship of General Ershad could be seen as an indivisible part of political sociology, which 'is concerned with power in its social context' (Bottomore, 1993:1). The power is defined here as the ability of an organised social or political group to pursue a course of action to reach the desired goal (Sen, 1994). The political elites of the country—the mainstream opposition political alliances and different socio-cultural interest groups i.e. students, labourers, intellectuals, and professionals of Bangladesh society who organised the movement to achieve this goal to establish the democracy in the country—fell into an ensuing struggle with the Armed Forces.

In fact, 'Bangladesh was born in a war so was its army'.³ In terms of sharing the state power, the cleavages between political elites and civil-military cliques dismantled the political process of the country. Consequently, the military as a unified and organised group won in the course of conflict and captured the state power. It was not very easy for political elites in Bangladesh to achieve the ability of

pursuing such kind of organised course of actions against the military of the country in the resurrection of democratic rule. Because:

“The military maintains the state, and the state maintains the military. A military coup is, *prima facie*, the capture of control over the state by its own employees: that is why it is so easy. and been inherently opposed to any measure which would threaten the state's control over the resources which it needs to maintain itself” (Clapham and Philip ed., 1985:4)

Moreover, it was found that military seizure of state power was introduced, as was frequently argued, in consequence of the failure of a civilian government that was not functioning satisfactorily. In fact, the military seizure was welcomed by the desire of civil-military intrigues with the support of a faction of unrepresentative bourgeoisie politicians to establish control over the economy and state power. Because, ‘any attempt to institutionalise must, under the military dispensation, ensure the exclusion of ‘representative politicians’ by creating a patronage network capable of shoring up support for the regime.’ (Clapham and Philip ed., 1985: 201).

The historical development of the Bangladesh Army and civil bureaucracy might be quite relevant in this respect. The Army was highly politicised and badly divided since its formation with rival factions—pro liberation and anti-liberation—‘most of their formative experience had been under the Ayub-Yahya martial law regimes’⁴ of Pakistan. The pro-liberation faction were divided again into two group: first, the *Mukti Bahinee*⁵ who were born as new soldiers purely under the command of the Bangladesh Liberation Forces (BLF) and second, a part of former Bengali officers and soldiers who left the Pakistan Army and joined the liberation war of Bangladesh. After the liberation, the both—freedom fighters excluding *Mukti Bahinee* and anti-liberation repatriated factions—used this formative experience to capture the state power of Bangladesh.⁶ In the factional power struggle of the Army, it was found that there developed a unity between the freedom fighters and repatriated factions on the basis of their former service experience under Pakistan Army against the *Mukti Bahinee* faction which led thousands of killings of the later after the August coup 1975.⁷ The second unsuccessful military coup in May, 1981 that killed President Zia, was made by the freedom fighters faction of the army, which ultimately helped the repatriated faction under the leadership of General Ershad to assume the power. Hence, it is clearly argued that the event of military seizure of power in Bangladesh had been exported from the Pakistan Military who had been pioneering military rule for more or less whole period since the independence of their country in 1947. It is also argued that there had been developed some factional cleavages in the civilian government of the AL in the wake of introduction of a one party socialist system in the post independence period that attached the military with the power structure which has been considered as to develop a grim political crisis in the power elites and had weakened the legitimacy

of the government. This also made the way for military to seize the power as Smelser has pointed out:

“A recent history has demonstrated the political behaviour of the military poses a special problem for nations weak in legitimacy. Only the military have the internal organisation, the sense of group loyalty, the authority, and most important, the means to overturn the government quickly whenever they find its acts repugnant. The strength of the norms governing civil-military relations are, therefore, of crucial importance in any consideration of the factors making for political stability” (1973:408).

In developing countries, three views may be found from the literature on military aggression in domestic politics: power of the military as organisation (Janovitz 1964), weak political institutions (Finer 1975) and corporate interest of the military service men (Nordinger 1975).⁸ The military seizure of power in Bangladesh might have some relations—not so strong to the creation of reactionary rebellion—with all these views. Although the Bangladesh Army was divided into different factions since her liberation, every government in the post independent period had strengthened the Armed Forces in respect to their growth in number and equipment—a dragon military net—willingly or unwillingly—considering the India as a monolithic enemy. This has resulted in a large and organised Army under a unified command, which was found visible in the full support for the decade military regime of General Ershad. In many third world countries, national liberation movements which failed to create effective political parties were either taken over by military elites or else the governments which they formed were overthrown by the military coups (L Loyd 1971).⁹ Bangladesh was born with the strong development of political party institutions as the liberation war directed completely under the command of the AL government in exile. It may, however, be related to some extent to the sufferings of splitting and instability of political parties in the 1970s and early 1980s. Regarding the interest of the Army, it was believed that the Bangladesh Army had been in an uncertain position due to the creation of *Jatyio Rakhi Bahini*¹⁰ under Mujib’s regime. In the following regime, Zia’s collaboration with repatriated faction inside the armed forces led him to kill the thousands of freedom fighters in the name of Court Martial.¹¹ These steps had been considered as the threat to the corporate interest of the Armed Forces, which in fact, in their word, led them to capture the state power. The civilianization of the military regime has been an important but a rare event in the politics of developing nations. The end of military regime in the third world nations was also equally of crucial importance. It was found rare that the military leaders were punished brutally by the pro democratic revolutionary masses of the society. Because, in foremost cases, military leaders almost invariably posited two conditions or ‘exit guarantees’ for their withdrawal from power, which was seemed to have much relevance to Bangladesh:

“First: there would be no prosecution, punishment or other retaliation against military officers for any acts they may have committed when they were in power. Second, the institutional roles and autonomy of the military establishment would be respected,

including its overall responsibility for national security, its leadership of the government ministries concerned with security, and often its control of arms industries and other economic enterprises traditionally under military aegis. The ability of the withdrawing military to secure agreement of civilian political leaders to these conditions depended on their relative power.....” (Huntington 1991: 116)

It was believed that Gen. Ershad and his followers, high rank army officers, had arrived at secret understandings—‘exit guarantees’ with the mainstream opposition political leaders that they would not be subject any trial, sentence or other vengeance for any other acts they have committed when they were in power. It was found to be anticipated with the resignation of Ershad that he was simply placed under house arrest and transferred to a residential house in the city, which, however, was declared a sub-jail. The other top rank officers had not at all any problems with the change of power as much as expected by the masses of the movement, although some civilian associates of the dictator were sent to jail. The secret of the avoidance for not to be serious for the trial of corrupt and fascist associates of the dictator might be considered as the strategy of the movement leaders to diminish the risk of infuriating the militia forces as a whole, which could be a threat to smooth democratic transition of the country at that time.

2.2.2. Bangladesh Democratisation Debates: Movement, Revolution and Reform

This research uses two significant concepts of political sociology: ‘movement’ as an independent variable and ‘democracy’ as dependant one. Sociologically speaking, movement itself can not be an independent variable, as Sen (1994) argues, since it has its own social background and the appraisal of the mass movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh from 1982 to 1990 may be sociological only when it is related to the contemporary social structure of Bangladesh society.

The movement for democracy in Bangladesh included various ‘political actions ranging from sporadic protests, riots or rebellions or coup d’etat to more continuous activities of the organised political parties, pressure groups, or politicised military officers....but most of the phenomena can be subsumed under two broad categories such as social movement and organised political formation’ (Bottomore 1979:41-58). This movement ‘is broadly defined as a collective endeavour to promote or resist change in the society’ (Bottomore 1979:41). This might also be seen as the outcome of insoluble conflicts between political elites overthrown by military intervention and civil-military bureaucracy. As Marx (1849) explained: “the development of insoluble contradictions within the society prepares the way for social crises, which burst out in political revolutions.”¹² and also “the outcome is a revolution involving the transference of political power to a new class; and these change in ruling class tends to entail a basic change in the social system (mode of

production). It is this kind of revolution which is most properly called a social revolution'' (Draper 1978:19).

According to Marx's theory, it is 'a political revolution with a social soul.'¹³ In this perspective, the movement against the military dictatorship in Bangladesh might be considered as the direction of a societal revolution, regardless the period of when changes in the social system actually begin to take place. It had been done by establishing a new constellation of socio-political forces in Bangladesh in the very early of 1990s, with new historic potentialities. The movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh was the realisation of these potentialities. "Every real revolution" wrote Engels, "is a social one, in that it brings a new class to power and allows it to remodel society in its own image."¹⁴ Therefore, one could hardly be able to see the difference between the successful mass upsurge against the military dictatorship in Bangladesh from the social revolution in the sense of Marx and Engels. It could be seen more clearly in the latter arguments of Marx, in which he succinctly said:

"Do not say that social movement excludes political movements. There is never a political movement which at the same time social. It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions"(Karl Marx, 1847,1963, :177).

The movement reached its climax due to the illegitimacy and repression of the militias under the Ershad regime. In this period, all classes inside the democratic political forces were centred on the middle class of the society and the demolition of class antagonism led the mass movement into an urban based political revolution in the Marxian sense. Marx distinguished, initially in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' (1843-44) between "a partial, merely political revolution which leaves the pillars of the building standing", and a social revolution; thereby changing the whole concept of revolution, as Max Adler later argued, from the merely political idea of the transformation of the state, into the social concept of an economic change in the bases of society" (Bottomore and Patric Goode eds. 1978:136-146 and Sen 1994:5). The mass movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh from 1982 to 1990, as Sen (1994) argued, was never a social revolution and "it may be regarded at best as a partial political reform in a Marxian sense, but for Bangladesh which lacked in democracy for quite a long period of her history, the overthrow of an autocratic regime of Ershad through mass upsurge might smack of a kind of urban revolution which took place in the metropolitan cities of Bangladesh where the anti-Ershad movement reached its climax"(Sen, 1994:5). In short, the dynamics of Bangladesh society in the 1980s reached at the stage of an accepted level of socio-economic change, at which a new trend in urban social structure was established and therefore was quite competent to build up a mass revolution. In this sense, it might be said that the movement for restoration of the democracy in

Bangladesh in the 1980s must be considered to be nearly a social revolution in accordance with a political mass movement.

2.2.3. The Process of Democratisation: Globalisation and Bangladesh

Barrington Moore Jr. (1973) endeavoured to discern three main historical routes of democracy:

“... the bourgeois revolution, a route that England, France, United States entered at the succeeding points at time with profoundly different societies at the starting point. The Second path also is a capitalist one, but, in the absence of a strong revolutionary surge, it passed through reactionary political forms to culminate in fascism... in Germany and Japan. The third is communist one. In Russia and China, revolution, having their main but no exclusive origins among the peasants, made possible the communist variant. Finally, in the middle of the 1960's, Indiahad experienced neither a bourgeois revolution, nor a conservative revolution from above, nor so far a communist one.” (Moore 1973:413)

There were various complex conditions that allowed the institutional legacy of post-colonial democracy to survive. Especially in the sub-continent, Indian leaders were to face cruel choices between effective democracy and the necessity of development and have been nourishing democracy from the very beginning of its independence. The INC which led the freedom movement had taken socialism in their party manifesto. Moreover, the CPI had also a strong support base among the working class people and within two and half decades since the independence, the CPI systematically won the provincial power of West Bengal. On the other hand, the Eastern part of Pakistan, normally known as East Bengal, now Bangladesh, under the same cultural and language heritage bordering with West Bengal of India, had been struggling for socio-economic equity against the new colonial Pakistan ruling elites. In this movement, the political parties of the then East Pakistan, especially the AL and Communist Party had chosen socialism in their party manifesto. The liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 was mostly considered to be guided by the socialist spirit. More or less, all the political components of liberation war were highly influenced by socialist spirit of the 1960s around the world. The introduction of the one-party socialist government of *Bangabandhu* in Bangladesh in 1975 was the culmination of these spirits of, more or less, all the then political parties of newly born Bangladesh. So the total scenario of Bengal—East and West had seen the same consequences of socialism within twenty five years after the British had left the subcontinent. Bangladesh became a socialist state in 1975 and the socialism had been established in West Bengal in the beginning of 1970s under a moderate federal democracy brought up by India. The reasons for socialism to be established first in Bengal rather than other part of India might have originated from the changing industrialisation and economic policy¹⁵ of British rule in India in the end of nineteenth century which increased the industrialisation in Bengal that developed a reservoir of working class added to agricultural peasants leading to the socialism in West Bengal and Bangladesh in the 1970s. Thus it might be relevant to suggest here that the rise

of socialism, the first stage of communism in West Bengal and Bangladesh could be seen as an example of Moore's thesis of the transformation of agrarian society into communism.

In Bangladesh anti-liberation forces under the umbrella of pro-capitalist ideology returned in the state apparatus after the killing of socialist *Bangabandhu* and the socialist path was abandoned and various socio-political and cultural organisations related to this doctrine were destroyed, absorbed or banned by the succeeding military dictatorships. In this connection, the dynamics inside the working class could be explicated in various ways. One section of this class took the opportunity of large scale privatisation and manufacture based industrialisation introduced by the military regime which made them the owners of small capital and gradually turned them into an urban middle class. The characteristics of this urban middle class were very ambiguous. As an owner of capital, they were marked as petty bourgeois, but they could not leave their socialist values, which ultimately led them into a rational secular and progressive spirit of thoughts. Another section of this class took the opportunity to join the ruling elites, which with the time, developed a segment of pressure group inside the military government in favour of change the regime to democracy. A large section of this class still remained as the workers and supporters of political parties, interest and pressure groups and other group formations. The support base of the AL was consisted of urban progressive middle and working class and peasants of rural society, which had been struggling for democracy under the period of both military regimes of Gen. Zia and Gen. Ershad. By contrast, the BNP was able to gather supports from all corners of bourgeois components of Bangladesh society. The support base of this party was mainly the urban higher middle class backed by anti liberation forces inside and outside the country on the one hand and a major religious support base in the grass root people on the other. The introduction of a free economy by Gen. Zia went mainly in favour of his party workers, and the privatisation and industrialisation programmes benefited his party leaders. They became financially established in the society, which in turn, has made them as dominating force in the urban middle class. Both of these two parties—the AL and the BNP and all of their wings and allies, were in the front position of the movement. Thus it might be argued that the path to the transition to democracy by industrial capitalism discerned by Barrington Moore could be moderately applicable to the prevailing status of urban middle class, who led a movement successfully against a military dictatorship to establish democracy in Bangladesh started in the beginning of 1980s and ended in the end of 1990

Axel Hadenius (1994)) has described some institutional factors of the colonial background that made easy of the establishment of democracy in the post colonial societies. The conventional wisdom holds that a British heritage is

an advantage from a democratic viewpoint. According to Hadenius (in Beetham ed.1994:75) the main arguments run as follows:

“Earlier and to a greater degree than other colonial powers (France, Portugal, Spain etc), Britain established organs of representation in its territories. However, limited in competence, these institutions made the native population (or at least the elite strata) familiar with the pluralistic form of government, and set a tradition of representation through free and fair elections which in several places be maintained after independence. Furthermore, the British have been hailed for developing a well functioning administrative system, particularly a judiciary, in the colonies. At the same time, the local population was—through the policy of so-called indirect rule—to a significant degree incorporated in the administrative process. Thus it has been claimed, the people of the former British colonies became socialized into an administrative culture, which has served to counter balance tendencies to arbitrary and despotic use of power.”

The British regime in India in the mid-eighteenth century was started from Calcutta, which was considered as the then capital of Bengal. As a result, all British administrative activities had been centred in Bengal from the very beginning of their rule, and it might be quite related here, according to Hadenius, that the Bengal was the major beneficiary of the institutional and administrative development of British rule in India. After the ending of British rule in India in 1947, Bengal was divided in East and West parts. Including Calcutta, West Bengal was attached with India and the East Bengal, now Bangladesh, which was included with Pakistan, was geographically distant with nearly two thousand Kilometres from the main land of Pakistan and later, was born as an independent state in 1971. So it could be easily argued that Bangladesh was much influenced by the British heritage of political and administrative institutions in her society—as frequently considered for the instrumental and political base in forging the strong nationalist and independence movement of Bengali nation against the military autocracy of Pakistan—which had some importance in the process of democratisation in the 1980s.

It could be suggested here that the major changes in the policies of international power centres made the favourable environment for democracy in other countries, which was functioning in favour of the movement for democracy in Bangladesh. Some changes had occurred all over the world during the period when the “third wave of democratisation”¹⁶ started. Samuel P. Huntington has described briefly these changes as follow:

“There were also the unprecedented global economic growth of 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education and greatly expanded the urban middle class....., the striking changes in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Churches council in 1963-1965..... including in the late 1960s the new attitude of the European Community towards expanding its membership, the major shifts in USA policies beginning in 1974 towards the promotion of human rights and democracy.... and Gorbachev’s dramatic change in the late 1980s in Soviet policy. Snowballing or demonstration effects.....stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at regime change in other countries. (Huntington, 1991: 6)

All these changes in the international economic and political order had greatly stirred the autocratic military rulers in the 1970s and 1980s around the world. The fall of autocratic Marcos in Philippines, the end of military regime in Pakistan and

South Korea or the winning of the election by the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Myanmar and the end of major military regimes in Africa and Latin America—even a motivation was found for change in some socialist regimes in the post cold war period, the blood-spilled oust of the dictatorship of Ceausescu in Rumania and the student movement for democracy at the Tiananmen square in communist China might be considered as the consequences of this new path of international order. This had also compelled Bangladesh military rulers to abscond from the race for state power as well, and enabled the democratic forces of the country to forge a competent movement for democracy. In Bangladesh, however, these socio-political forces were found to be centred on the urban middle class who organised the movement to establish the democracy in the country.

Huntington (1991:113-114) has also categorised the regimes that moved to and toward democracy in the third wave: “they generally fell into three groups: one-party systems, military regimes and personal dictatorships”. And also he has identified four distinct processes to change these regimes to democracy, such as “transformation, transplacement, replacement and intervention”. According to his typologies, transformation occurred when the elites in power took the lead in bringing about democracy; replacement occurred when opposition groups took the lead in bringing about democracy and the authoritarian regime collapsed or was overthrown, and what might be termed transplacement, occurred when democratisation resulted largely from joint action by the government and opposition groups (Huntington, 1991). The Gen. Ershad’s regime in Bangladesh, with no shadow of doubt, was defined first as a comprehensive military regime and finally developed into a regime of personal dictatorship. However, the change of state power by a mass upheaval towards the establishment of democracy in Bangladesh in 1990 could be regarded, in most views, as a replacement of an autocratic military regime. Although at the final stage of the mass revolution, the military ruler left power reluctantly, in his words, to establish democracy peacefully, which could be seen, slightly as transplacement of an autocracy by an interim caretaker government articulated and supported by main stream opposition forces. Huntington (1991) has deliberately given the ‘different interaction of individuals and groups and their roles working in the democratisation process’¹⁷, which was also found to some extent in the democratic transition of the country.

More recently, Jocelyn Linnekin (2004) has offered a symbolic constructivist paradigm for democratic transition which has challenged the prevailing notion—objectivist discourse (Muravchik, 1991)¹⁸—that democracy is a clearly defined entity with fixed and invariant essence and can be transferred across national boundaries retaining an unchanged identity. She applies empirical qualifications and caveats to the self-congratulatory assumptions of conservative thinkers and some

foreign policy architects in different national settings, where institutional implementations responds, in her words, 'to particular contingencies of history, place, culture and political custom'(2004:17). Her idea is the extension of the insights of symbolic and interpretive social science (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966, Geertz 1973). This has been attached with the views of the anthropologists and area specialists to 'lived variations of democracy in specific locations' (Gutmann 2002, Paley 2001, 2002, Schaffer 1998, Wiarda 1997, Linnekin 2004). In this connection, her idea of an 'ethnology of democracy'¹⁹ and 'variable construction of democracy'²⁰ is also unique—close to the sense of democracy in the socio-economic and cultural context of Bangladesh in the 1980s—in which she has tried to conceptualise the meaning and practice of democracy in the comparison between nations—nationality and ethnicity close to the views of Howard Wiarda (1986,1994,1997) that concerned with authoritarian rule, militarism, political instability and pervasive economic inequality. Her approach considers some keen affiliations for the perfect adaptation of democracy in particular setting such as 'identity', 'tradition' 'culture' and even 'the nation' as dynamic symbolic creations rather than primordial legacies (Anderson 1983, Handler and Linnekin 1984, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Linnekin 1983, 1990, 1997, 2004). On the basis of all of these observations, she argues:

“.....democracy cannot be “exported” because.....democracy is an ideational product of the human mind: a symbolic model, a system of values and symbols, a field of malleable representations, as well as an associated institutional apparatus. Because democracy is always implemented in particular cultures and historical contexts, it varies ethnographically and may carry unique and (to an outsider) unpredictable meanings for members of a society.....The term 'symbolic construction' conveys the premise that democracy is not a bounded object passively adopted by people in emerging nations but an idea that is creatively reinterpreted and reconstructed in particular sites. This perspective treats 'democracy' as a relatively open field of possible meanings, which must be discovered--not assumed--in particular settings. Instead of adopting criteria predefined by outsiders, as a cultural anthropologist I seek to *discover* how ordinary citizens beyond the major industrial nations conceptualize democracy.” (2004:6.7)

The pattern of democratic transition in Bangladesh in the wake of mass revolution mostly followed this symbolic constructivist approach. In this historic movement, the opposition democratic forces had been demanding to the junta from the very beginning to transfer power to a non-partisan Caretaker Government, which was completely a local innovation and possibly a unique, well accepted, universal and exceptional constitutional system of election supervising interim government around the world. This constructed the collective spirits of the opposition forces based on the particular pattern of the local problems, which was required mainly to establish the trust on election process of the country that was completely destroyed by a shameless liar military dictatorship—all of his lies became true by the state owned media—similar to the fascist propaganda during the Second World war. Therefore, this system of interim government was inevitable as an important local

variant in the transition of democracy in Bangladesh according to Linnekin's approach.

2.2.4. Capitalism and Democracy: a Bangladesh Perspective

Bangladesh could be characterised as a peripheral capitalism in terms of her socio-economic and political structures of the post colonial period following the ideas of Alavi, where the elites' of the society were found to have western technology and rationality and as a result, became habituated with westernising styles of thought and actions in their daily life.²¹ Eventually they took-over the leadership from 'traditional elites' based mainly on landed upper class of Bangladesh society. According to Alavi, "the problem of identifying the ruling classes and class alignments in peripheral capitalist societies is more complex than in advanced capitalist societies" (Alavi and Shanin, 1982:296). It is because of the fact, as Sen (1994) argues, the elements of primordial loyalties, such as kinship, regional, religious, linguistic and ethnic affiliations and even some vestiges of caste system constantly get involved in the process of class formation in the peripheral capitalist society and Bangladesh must not be excluded from these primordial loyalties which were found as some of the key features in the history of her social evolution. Besides these inherent factors, the external forces also distort the normal development of class structure in such societies, which was also seen as quite relevant with Bangladesh society in the 1980s.

According to the Marxist notion of social structure, although there are two fundamental classes, a class divided society has also some 'auxiliary classes' such as petty producers and traders, professional classes and so on. Moreover, there may be found many different characteristics of a single class, for example, the educated salaried middle class in post- independent Bangladesh. The political role of this middle class in peripheral capitalist societies, is, however of very considerable importance and should not be dismissed so easily, by designating them an 'auxiliary class'. They could play a vital role in the politics of the peripheral capitalist societies, as Alavi argues, "by virtue of their capacity to appropriate an alien language and culture and thereby they would maintain their social distance from the common people of these societies" (1982:297-299). But Bangladesh does not fully fit in this naive schema of class structure since its growing urban educated salaried middle classes had not yet been able to alienate themselves from the rural backgrounds. It might safely be said in this regard that 'the processes have already started in this direction'.²²

Francis Fukuyama (1992) has contended that representative democracy and capitalism have emerged as the uncontested models for political and economic systems in the contemporary world. The emergence of this order of contemporary world system has passed several stages of development in the last few centuries in

which, “world capitalism has been characterised by colonialism, then by capitalist commercial domination and finally by monopoly capitalism” (Gilbert and Gugler, 1989:36). Capitalism as world system had turned into a global system of imperialism after the Second World War, where a highly monopolistic industrial structure created the basis for the emergence of oligopolistic transnational corporations, which now dominate its economy. As a result, there had been found lot of changes in controlling the political power as Thomas argued:

“.... political power was placed firmly in the hands of the economically dominant financial and industrial bourgeoisie. Many people envisaged this period as the time when comparatively small group of countries emerged at the ‘centre’ of the world capitalist system and became its main beneficiaries, while the other much larger group remained on the ‘periphery’. The rhythm of growth and development in the system as a whole are seen to be dictated by the course of accumulation at the ‘centre’. The periphery, by contrast, is wholly dependent on the system because its growth is largely a reflex of developments internationally” (Thomas 1988:37-38).

This new world economic order could be seen perfectly working in regard to Bangladesh as it was completely dependent on the foreign aid of the ‘centre’ capitalist worlds in her post-independent period. The negative impact of advanced ‘core’ countries on the political economy of the dependent, ‘peripheral’ countries would diminish the chances of democracy. “Outside the core, democracy is rarity” (Chirot 1977:22), which was grown as a popular thought in regard to the history of democratisation process of Bangladesh society. Thomas and others (1979) drew the conclusion from several empirical tests that “economic dependence was indeed associated with the political centralism” (Rueschemeyer et al, 1992:18), as Moore (1973) argued that the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries. For Bangladesh in the 1980s, being a third world underdeveloped country, the decisive factor of her political change were also seemed to have been determined by several international core countries like United States, Great Britain, European Union etc.

2.2.5. Democracy and Social Class: a Bangladesh schema

Democracy in Abraham Lincoln’s words: “government of the people, by the people and for the people” (Wilson 1996:12) and is also defined by Schumpeter in terms of “the will of the people” (source) and “the common good” (purpose)(Huntington,1991:6). But that has given us only the general feeling that the people should rule. It could be seen as an etymological route to definition, be called as the “definitional fallacy” (Holden, 1994:6), because, “it is illogical to define democracy by induction from the practice of any one political unit or any one subset of political units” (Beetham ed. 1994:6). In a more promising route he has referred “these to be ‘popular controls’ and ‘political equality’” (ed.1994:7). Hadenius has adopted a similar approach and ‘has arrived at a conception of ‘political democracy’ which holds that public policy ‘is to be governed by the

freely expressed will of the people where by all individuals are to be treated as equals” (1992:7-9). Lively (1975:49-51) ‘pinpoints the norms dictating inclusive citizenship and political equality’, while Holden (1988:6) ‘boils democracy down to popular sovereignty’.

In fact, Bangladesh society in 1980s had tried to restore these representative characters of modern democracy demanding a free and fair election under a non-military neutral caretaker government, by which civil liberties and human rights would be ensured to all citizens and central decision making power would be shared by the minority group of the elected legislators. Seymour Martin Lipset began with the observation that greater economic affluence in a country has long been thought of as a condition favourable for democracy: “all the various aspects of economic development—industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth and education- are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy”(1963:41). It could be simply described as: “the greater economic affluence of a nation, the better prospects of democracy” (Kivisto, 1998:73). Though Bangladesh, in her pre and post independence history, has been developing the agriculture in the economy as their main mode of production, a agro-based industrial development also took place side by side mainly started from the last time of British rule that later reared by Pakistani entrepreneurs before the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. By the end of 1970s, the introduction of a free economy policy resulted in privatisation, industrialisation and urbanisation through out the 1980s, might have transformed the Bangladesh society moderately towards a trend of ‘a well to do economic activities’. This trend empowered the different necessary classes of the society for democracy movements in the subsequent decades, which might have a considerable importance to overturn the military dictatorship of Gen. Ershad.

In the beginning of the *Political Man* (1963a) Lipset quoted approvingly from the passage in Aristotle’s *Politic*, in which the Greek Philosopher made the case that the most stable form of democracy is achieved only when the middle class is sufficiently large to ensure that neither the wealthy elites at the top nor the poor at the bottom come to control political life. Instead of a class structure that can be visually depicted as a triangle with a large base: “the classes in a democracy can be portrayed as a diamond” (Lipset 1963a:5). However, Lipset treated economic development resulting in sizeable, stable and consistent middle class as a necessary but not a sufficient content for democracy. A number of others factors are also crucially important, including an important role of cultural values, which could be cited as follows:

“Democracy relies on a culture that promotes values emphasizing egalitarian ideals, tolerance, a recognition of political opposition and dissent a belief in freedom of speech and assembly and a respect for the rule of law and for fundamental human rights.

Democracy requires a high level of political leadership, vibrant political parties, an informed citizenry and effective political institutions. In short, given these many requisites, it appears that democracy is not easily achieved, and citizen must work unceasingly to sustain the conditions that ensure its survival.' (Bottomore 1993, 71-73)

However, the development of an 'urban middle class' in Bangladesh in the 1980s, included education salaried employees of different government and non-govt organisations i.e. professionals, small manufacturer or petty businessmen, intellectuals, students and youths, who took the leadership role in the intermediate level of different political parties and socio-cultural organisation had played a role of organiser of the movement. In fact, they were steering the whole movement activities making a connection between militant grass root participants and the top level leaders of movements. The opposition forces of the movement culminated from all sections of Bangladesh society was, however, in the stage of maturity in all respects at that time. In spite of suffering from several weaknesses inside the political institutions, political leaders with a great risk at their lives and playing a responsible role, had made the movement successful and the rich cultural heritage, liberal religious groups, professional bodies and intellectuals had made their roles effective towards the increase of consciousness of human rights, freedom and liberty among the people of Bangladesh society.

2.2.6. The Relation of Democracy with Urbanisation and Industrialisation

The trends of urbanisation and industrialisation in any country could be considered as the most important social indicators to analyze the democratisation process in the context of changing the order of society. There have been found various problems regarding the industrial development in the peripheral countries.²³ In spite of these obstacles, and the economic arguments as to whether there should be priority in development for agriculture or industry, or a path of balanced growth, recognition that manufacturing has some place in the economic mix of each country, varying with its resources and stage of development, has led third world countries to encourage industrialisation. After the end of British rule in the sub-continent, Bangladesh was treated as a colony by Pakistan until its independence. Therefore, Bangladesh had lots of deficiencies as an industrialised society. The situation had some developments in the post-independent period. The growth of small manufactures, poultry farming, factories of different local market goods, operation of different multi-national companies etc were found to be established in this period, which might be considered to create an urbanised culture as a whole, which has been compared with the western culture that has been pioneering democracy in those societies. However, "urbanisation is an indication of modernisation, the sign of growth and economic progress. The whole world is moving towards a more urban existence and where as the process is more nearly completed in the small number of

rich industrialised countries, it is only in recent years that marked urbanisation has started to sweep over the less developed countries” (Mountjoy, ed. 1978:102). As a less developed country, Bangladesh in 1970s and 1980s, was seen to move towards urbanisation. But it could not be able to ensure the urban utilities duly that would have been necessary for the growing urban population. The reasons behind this problem is simply compared as follows:

“In the advanced countries alternative employment grew up during a period of change and increasing efficiency in agriculture..... Mass transport, allowing cheap long-distance migration permitted millions to bypass the new industrial towns and cities and to seek a new life overseas..... it was spread over a greater period of time and was not focused solely on the towns. The flood to the towns currently sweeping through the third world no longer bears any relationship to expanding urban economics and opportunities: under employment in village is being exchanged for unemployment in towns. The flood of people to the larger towns in the third world is now at a rate far in excess of the possible provision of jobs in those towns, and this rate of population accretion outpaces the provision of the utilities and services that are the hallmark of an urban community. (Mountjoy ed., 1978: 110).

There was found a significant change in the growth of the urban population in Bangladesh in the 1970s to 1980s in the post independent period. The other relevant characteristics of the population under the over urbanised cities and towns were also found to be developed in the same scale. The urban sex ratio (number of male per 100 female) was 118.1 where the national figure was 106.1 which indicate that the sex ratio of urban population was higher than the national one. The sex ratio of the urban population had come down to 118 in 1991 from 125 in 1981 and this might be due to better coverage of females and more male international migration in the 1991 census. It was found in *Zilla* (district) wise urban population by age that 14.51% were under 10 years and 13.94% were under 15 years of age and 1.59% older population who were dependent on 84.44% working population, and was also found that the age 15-44 years percentage of males was perceptibly higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas. This fact might be attributed to age selective male migration to urban areas for better employment and education. The trend was found noticeable both in 1974, 1981 and 1991.²⁴

These socio-demographic statistics of Bangladesh’s urban population in the 1980s could be seen as positive trend in favour of democracy movement in the country. However, the social structure of Bangladesh urban society was extended to the periphery people as much as possible by different steps taken in the reforms of local government. In 1984, military government had promulgated Local Government Ordinance²⁵ by which the whole country was divided into 64 districts and 464 *Thanas* (police station) were upgraded to *Upazilla* (sub-district) with completely new administrative, judiciary set-up which might be considered as one of most important steps that led Bangladesh to be a one kind of peculiar third world urbanised society.²⁶ This change in the local government structure might be seen in favour of democracy movement as it had been increasing the support-base of the

movement against the military rule. Urban infra structural environment is also favourable to several movement operations. Some socio-demographic factors have also been found important for industrial and urban societies which are also treated very useful for social movements: “the demographic observation reflects an economic reality: the surplus is increasingly produced in the urban sector... It is the urban economy that finances the state apparatus –the state is dependent on urban economy, there are limits to repression in the urban context. Manager, professionals, skilled workers and even semi-skilled workers in great numbers can not be replaced at short noticed (Gilbert and Gugler, 1989:159-160). These have also come to the fact in the rise of movement in urban area as the whole administrative and economic activities of the government were urban-based.

2.2.7. The Political Instability and the Discourse of Democracy

The people of Bangladesh were living through a period of considerable political instability in the post-independent period in which there was a complex ‘crisis of legitimacy’, the term used by Habermas (1976). He examines the manifestations of economic, political and ideological crises in late capitalist societies. The responsibility for dealing with the crisis is assumed by the state, and a crisis of the whole system could only develop if there were a political crisis and an ideological crisis in which the cultural system became incapable of providing the necessary motivations for the maintenance and the reproduction of existing society (Habermas 1976, Bottomore 1984 and Sen 1994). Although Bangladesh is not a late capitalist society, there was still a crisis of legitimacy. However, it was being a peripheral capitalistic society of the third world faced both political and ideological crisis during the rule of Ershad who left no stone unturned to overcome this crisis in order to achieve legitimacy acceptable to her people, which failed. The continuous mass movement from 1982 to 1990 by the opposing political and other socio-cultural forces mainly aimed at the end of the autocratic rule of Ershad so that the ‘legitimacy crises’ could be resolved and democratic rule be returned. It should be noted here that the great political change i.e. the transition from autocracy to democracy which Bangladesh witnessed in 1990 was brought about by the principal political agents such as aggrieved social classes, elites of diverse kinds, generational, ethnic and cultural groups of the society. According to Bottomore, ‘any crisis of any country, whatever its form and character in the twentieth century, can not be fully comprehended unless it is seen in the global political context’ (1979:94). This is also true in the case of the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh which ceases the political crisis of Ershad regime following the violent mass uprising in 1990 since it took place in the favourable international situation of post cold era.

2.2.8. Movement Actions of the Democratic Forces

According to H. Blumer, a ‘social movement’ can be viewed as a collective enterprises to establish a new order of life’ (McLaughlin ed., 1969: 8). As a social movement develops, it takes on the character of a society. It acquires organisation and form, a body of customs and traditions, established leadership, an enduring division of labour, social rules and values—in short, a culture, a social organisation, and a new scheme of life (McLaughlin ed.1969). In fact, the movement for democracy had assumed the characteristics of Bangladesh society—the people of all corners including politicians, students, labourers, intellectuals, professionals, trade union workers, youths, etc were united for a single demand that the military dictator must resign from power and his militias must return to the barrack. However, the term ‘social movement’ has also some conceptual definitions, which include:

“(1) collective and joint action; (2) change-oriented goals; (3) some degree of organisation; (4) some degree of temporal continuity; and (5) some extra-institutional collective action, or at least a mixture of extra-institutional (protesting in the streets) and institutional(political lobbying) activity”(McAdam and Snow,1997: xviii).

All these elements together can define a social movements as “a collectivity acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside of institutional channels for the purpose of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which it is a part” (Snow and Oliver1995: 571, Benford 1992:1880, Turner and Killian 1987:223 and Wilson 1973:9). In the Bangladesh case, the movement for the change of a military state into a free and democratic one had undoubtedly acquired all these conditions set above by McAdam and Snow. They have also described different types of movement found to be of popular acceptance in contemporary societies around the world. They have summarized the movements’ typologies of many scholars, in which Smelser, Roy Wallis, Aberle were found to be of relevance here.

Neil Smelser (1962) has divided social movements into two generic categories: norm-oriented and value oriented.²⁷ Roy Wallis (1984) has also provide a similar dichotomy based on the religious mind: world rejecting and world affirming movement²⁸ The typologies provided by Neil Smelser and Roy Wallis might be familiar in with the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh from 1982 to 1990 by their ‘value-oriented’ and ‘world rejecting’ movement category, which was aimed at a fundamental change of Bangladesh society from military autocracy into democracy. David Aberle (1966:315-33) differentiated “social movements based both on the amount or degree of change and the locus or level of change: The cross classification of these two dimensions has presented four generic types of movements: alternative, redemptive, reformative and transformative movement²⁹ The Bangladesh movement could be explained by the fourth category transformative movement dimension given by Aberle, which in fact, was

concentrating towards a major change in the central power structure associated with an establishment of democratic ideals in the society with a broader perspective.

2.3. Micro Theories of the Study

2.3.1. Political Parties and Alliances: the Political Opposition to Military Dictatorship

The opposition to the military regime comprised a group of political and socio-cultural forces who were the inheritors to previous democratic regimes. For the political forces of the country, it was the first step in April 1983—under the permission of indoor politics by the junta—to re-establish relations between partisan political parties and organisations and the bases of different socio-economic interest groups and at the same time to organise the parties themselves. And the second challenge was to form a unified political opposition and finally, to withstand the dictatorship by opposing its policies and try to end the military regime.

In this regard, it will not be out of place to take the oppositions' party structures into account. Ashraf and Sharma (1983) in their *Political Sociology: A New Grammar of Politics*, have categorised political parties in several ways,³⁰ which could be compared in regard to the Bangladesh society. These are (1) Party based on Ideology and power, (2) party as an organisational structure, (3) parliamentary and extra-parliamentary group, (4) direct vs. indirect structure, (5) cadre vs. mass parties, (6) oligarchy or stratarchy, In Bangladesh, the political parties, mainly the AL and the BNP had been suffering cleavages between their different ideological stands³¹ having an adverse effect in organising a united movement against the military regime that was reflected in a statement of NDI delegation in Bangladesh: the single largest obstacle to ensuring a democratic environment is the hostility between the two major parties that breeds politically motivated disharmony and violence.³² The major parties might have the direct structure, but to win over the election or to organise the united movements, there were found some indirect structures in the form of '*Jote*' (alliance) and '*Okya Parishad*' (coalition) etc³³ Although there is some debate over the Michel's thesis of oligarchical control of party decision making process, it could be seen as an imperative factor in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia, the two chief leaders of both the AL and the BNP had the full control of the decision making inside their parties as well as in the movement against the military dictatorship.

Political parties, pressure groups and interest groups may co-exist and function in a well co-ordinated manner under certain forms of alliances and alignments. This, in fact, happened in regard to the democracy movement of Bangladesh. In this connection, Duverger's statement is of some importance:

“.....alliances between parties vary greatly, in form and degree. Some are ephemeral and unorganized, simply temporary coalitions which take place in order to benefit the

parties concerned in the elections in order to overthrow a government or to support one from time to time; others are lasting and strongly organised. Of all coalitions, the popular front is probably one which has had the greatest effect on public opinion” (Duverger, 1966: 324-326, 331).

According to Duverger, there are three kinds of coalitions of party-based political elites, namely the electoral, the parliamentary and the governmental. All types may co-exist or occur in isolation. Here it can be conceived of another type of coalition which may be called ‘political alliances’³⁴, the motive of which is to launch a movement against the existing ruling cliques. Even the electoral alliance often becomes a part of the ‘political alliance’, when the situation demands. The formation of three main alliances which jointly fought against the dictatorship of General Ershad belonged to the category of political alliances. So far as the class affiliations of these alliances are concerned it may be said that the different middle class strata of Bangladesh society dominated their activities.

2.3.2. Interest and Pressure Groups: the Socio-cultural opposition to military Dictatorship

Beside political parties, various interest groups of Bangladesh society participated in the democracy movement, who were primarily in four categories: trade union workers (non-agricultural labour force), professional, intellectuals and students.

The *workers –the labour force* of Bangladesh society might be regarded as a proletariat in the classical sense, but these people have not yet given up propensity to acquire small business and property.³⁵ Their class consciousness therefore can not take a clear shape. The relationship between the factory owners and workers was apparently non-antagonistic. But sometimes it became hostile. The transport labourers were apt in ensuring their daily income by striking a balance between the owners and management.³⁶ The employers-labourers relationship in the tea gardens, weaving sectors and other establishments also did not have always the character of class conflicts. But these labour forces were well organised under trade unions and linked with different political parties, mainly leftwing parties, of the country. They had their own demands to the dictator and therefore were seemed to be a crucial associative group in activating the all actions of the movement. The white-collared workers who were called employees generally belonged to low income group. They maintained a necessary managerial link between workers and professionals. Although they were employed in different government and semi-government offices, organisations, institutions, trading and commercial houses etc., they often were engaged in small business. In protection of their group interests, they, in most cases, liked to forge unity with the workers. They had a tendency towards attaining the status of professionals. These employees of Bangladesh constituted a well-organised social force that had the ability to bargain for their demands. “The *professionals* of

Bangladesh form that portion of the population who are relatively well established in socio-economic life. Most of them come from the middle class and lower middle classes. They are engaged in the sector of science, technology and knowledge, production and distribution, literature and administration etc. as well as the owners and possessors of land, capital, talent and technological know-how'' (Sen, 1994:14). Despite the fact that they have different styles of life from these workers and employees, the professionals can not live in isolation from the former. They were regarded as a considerable movement force against the military regime as: "no political, economic, social or cultural development can be attained without their united endeavours'' (S. Alam 1991:1-2). The professionals of Bangladesh society includes doctors, engineers, lawyers, bureaucrats, agriculturist, businessmen and the like those who have the expertise in their respective fields.

The *intellectual* interest group was believed to articulate the movement for democracy in Bangladesh. No one is born an intellectual. They are 'formed in the process of social interaction'³⁷ through the carrying out of intellectual activities in particular social contexts: "they may point to certain occupations (like writers or professors) or to certain occupational groups (like professionals or white collar workers), or to certain socio-psychological categories (like scholars or 'thinkers')...." (Draper 1978:481). For Lipset and Dobson (1972) as for many other American sociologists, intellectuals are attributed a special function in modern societies as "producers of cultures". Marxist-inspired analysts have conceptualised intellectuals as shaped by the "relation of production" (Eyerman and Jamison 1991:96). The class they represent has been identified by Marx himself, when he argued:

"According to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the *political and literary representatives* of a class and the class they represent" (Marx: 18th Brum. in ME:SW 1:424)

The intellectuals of Bangladesh society consisted of the teachers of different universities and colleges, poets, authors, novelists, columnists, dramatists, sculpturists, painting artists, television performers, journalists, cultural workers, head of religious institutions etc. They created consciousness among the people against the military regime by their courageous participation in thoughts and actions, which in fact, had awakened the students, youth, and political workers etc. to participate in the movement. The teacher associations of different universities, colleges and secondary schools, National Poetry Council, Combined Cultural forces, Press Club, Journalists Unions and Women Bodies etc. came forward with their all abilities in organising the support base of the movement. They were the political and

literary representative of a class of petty-bourgeois in the Marxian sense determined and guided by the relations of production creating new thoughts for the passage to democracy and might also be treated as “producers of culture” according to American sociologists as they were the precursors to establish democratic culture in the country. They opposed many military ordinances promulgated in different times as these were against the values of a free and democratic society.

It has been found in every society all over the world that “*students* are the universal opposition; they oppose whatever regime exists in their society” (Huntington 1991:144). The students of different universities, colleges and other academic institutions in Bangladesh society have an insurgent revolutionary role from the very beginning of Gen. Ershad had assumed the power. Their role in the movement might be treated as a catalyst in creating the unity of opposition forces. Engels (1889) had some critical observations about the young forces including students regarding their participation in revolutionary movements:

“ The greater part of the young men of all classes, below the capitalist class, was to be found, for a time at least, in the ranks of the insurgent armies, but this rather indiscriminate aggregate of the young men very soon thinned as soon as the aspect of affairs took a somewhat serious turn. The students particularly, those “representatives of the intellect,” as they liked to call themselves, were the first to quit their standards, unless they were retained by the bestowal of officer’s rank, for which they, of course, had very seldom any qualification” (E: Revol. & C.R. Ger., in ME:SW 1:379).

The students of Bangladesh society, mainly of a rural background representing the lower middle class of petty-bourgeoisie, poor farmers or peasants might be incorporated moderately as ‘the insurgent armies’ with the proletariat class of non-agricultural working forces and could be seen as recurring militant participants in the movement. Engels termed further the role of students treating them as the ‘intellectual proletariat’³⁸ that ultimately is true in the Bangladesh case where they had awakened and united the manual lower class workers in the frontier of the democracy movements. The events of killing, torturing, batons charge, and arrest under military regime made victims largely from students, labourers, and workers of the lower and lower middle class of Bangladesh society. However, the students’ forces were integrated under the APSU³⁹ played the central role in unseating the military junta.

Karl Mannheim (1928) has argued that a generation has ‘a certain structural resemblance’ to class position⁴⁰ : “the fact of the belonging to the same class, and that belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristics mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action” (Mannheim, 1952:276-322). Moreover, he has argued that the younger generation is generally used to vigorously

assert its claim to cultural and political leadership. In this context, Margaret Mead (1970) has developed the concept of a 'dissident young' to pioneers who are exploring a new time rather than a new country. The movement for democracy from 1982 to 1990 along with the Language Movement of 1952, the Student Movement of 1962, the Six-Point movement of 1966 and the Mass Upsurge of 1969 in the Pakistan period have been marked by the huge participation of this dissident groups of Bangladesh society.

2.3.3. The Repressive Measures Used by the Military Administration

Frederick D. Miller (1983) has identified four separate broad features that lead to the decline the movement: repression, co-optation, success and failures. Firstly, *repression* occurs when agents of social control use force to prevent movement organisations from functioning or prevent people from joining movement organisation. Miller argued: "Repressive actions may defined as legitimate by the state, for example, when it passes laws banning political parties or suspending civil liberties in emergencies, but they are never legitimate from the perspective of the movement" (Freeman and Johnson ed., 1999:05). In Bangladesh, the military ruler has defined all of his repressive measures for the so-called sake of the nations interest, which took many killings, jailing, harassment, criminal charges, spying to disrupt the opposition and frequent '*latthi peta*'⁴¹ on the processions of students, political parties etc. The 'imprisonment' of political leaders and 'house arrest' of the key movement leaders including Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia; curfew imposed dawn to dusk and political activities banned for indefinite periods, mass arrest of the activists were found, among other, the most usual repressive measures used by the military administration.⁴² The intelligence branch of the military ruler, mainly consisting of army officers designed the repression blue print, which was to be followed by the other 'white dressed'⁴³ intelligence officials of the regular forces. Secondly, it is usually seen that "co-optation strategies are brought into play when individual movement leaders are offered rewards that advance them as individuals while ignoring the collective goals of the movement" (Freeman and Johnson ed., 1999:305). In the case of Bangladesh, it was frequently found that many leaders of opposition political forces were caught and co-opted by the military rulers by rewarding them with a high ranking port-folio in the Ministry or in diplomatic missions, which in fact, demolished the movements sometimes. In this process, the junta also floated a political party—JP, which consisted of opportunist leaders expelled by or co-opted from opposition political forces—an empty effort to give a civilian cover to his military dictatorship.

Thirdly, *success* : "while every movement should seek and be able to enjoy success or victory,in obtaining concessions from the dominant system, movement organisation often have relinquish some portion of their claim to represent an

independent radical opposition” (Miller, 1999:306). The movement in Bangladesh also was in trouble in 1986, when one major faction of the opposition, the AL and its alliance had participated in the election under martial law. This partial success left the military dictator in power and the AL ceased to the demand of resignation of Gen. Ershad. Fourthly, *failure* in the movement in any society is not welcomed at any case, but not uncommon in several histories of the democracy movement around the world, especially in the third world perspectives, where authoritarian military regime prolonged in power. Miller (1983) has pointed to the failure at the organisational level as two major forms: factionalism and encapsulation that prevailed in opposition political forces, which also led Bangladesh movement a failure for several times.⁴⁴

2.3.4. The Movement Actions and Violence

The movement actions against the military regime in Bangladesh were influenced by different contemporary national movement strategies and tactics around the world from the 1960s to the 1980s. First, it was found that a new set of political activities has been added to the citizen’s political repertoire’ from the 1960s (Barnes et al 1979). The research has showed a significant pattern of political participation to protect the democratic rights of the citizen, described as follows:

“According to the research just cited, a long list of new and unconventional forms of political participation including signing petitions, lawful demonstration, boycotts, withholding of rent and tax, occupations, sit-ins, blocking traffic and wildcat strikes, have been added to the more traditional ones such as following politics in news papers, discussing politics with others, working for political parties or their candidates, attending political meetings, contacting public officials or persuading friends and acquaintances to vote in particular ways.” (Barnes et al, 1979: 524)

Second, the marches, boycotts, occupations and other forms of action have been found very effective for the campaigns of the movements and could be all part of a modern repertoire of collective action and the “whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different individuals” (Tilly 1986:2). In Bangladesh, the opposition democratic forces organised many actions that easily incorporated with the typologies of Barnes and Tilly. The protest march of the plethora of thousands of students in different University campuses in Bangladesh was found every day routine protest against *junta* regime. *Hartal*⁴⁵, petition march, *Gerao*, blocking traffic were mostly used actions against the regime. Another effective action against the regime, “Dhaka Seize” in which the supporters of the opposition political forces were called to march towards the capital from the countryside resulting a number of casualties.⁴⁶ Besides these, non-violent actions like the sit-in, human chain, hunger strike, wearing black badge, long march used to reach the movement to masses. The participation of intellectuals, professionals and civil society were mainly limited to signing petitions, lawful demonstrations, human chains, making statement in media, protesting several regimes’ ordinances and the

like. The chronological layers of these actions and participation in the movement could be seen as nicely presented by Dalton:

‘‘The various unconventional forms of participation are ordered along a single continuum from least to the most extreme. This continuum is marked by several thresholds. The first threshold indicates the transition from conventional to unconventional politics. Signing petitions and participating in the lawful demonstrations are...accepted democratic norms. The second threshold represents the shift to direct action techniques, such as boycotts. A third level of political activities involves illegal but non-violent acts. Unofficial strikes or a peaceful occupation of a building typify this step. Finally, a fourth threshold includes violent activities such as personal injuries or physical damage’’ (Dalton, 1988:65).

The actions of the movement could also be diagnosed by these four thresholds: liberal programs including giving statements in the newspapers, signing petitions, sit-in, hunger strike to the gradual change towards extreme and direct actions including boycotting the military rulers in their state activities everywhere, illegal non-violent actions including *hartal* (strike), occupying government education and home offices, and finally violent activities including burning effigies, setting fire to vehicles, militant attacks, bombing and gunfire on police forces and harassment of government officers.⁴⁷ The Bangladesh democracy movement might be significantly characterised by a chronology of movement actions with cycles of protests. Though varying in dimension and duration, protest cycles have had a number of common characteristics in recent history: they coincide with ‘‘a phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilised to less mobilised sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organised and unorganised participation; and sequences of intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution’’(Tarrow 1994:153). In Bangladesh, the student movements of 1983, movements against Upazilla system of 1985, JS election of 1986, and Dhaka Seize of 1987 etc. could be marked as the decline of the cycle of protests due to confusion and disunification of opposition forces, which ultimately collapsed for the time being. However, as the cycle of protest extends, the reaction of the authorities produces simultaneous processes of radicalisation and institutionalisation. The resignation of General Ershad and the end of military regime was the single demand by the opposition democratic forces at the peak stage of the movement in 1990—the year marked to diffuse and broaden the insurgencies of the movement in all sectors of Bangladesh society. The mass upheaval took place from central urban to rural periphery towns within very short period of time and actions were chronologically happened, by which it was shaped as one kind of urban mass revolution as described above by Tarrow, where government offices were attacked, minister’s residential area occupied and burned, associates of military *junta* were mass beaten, arrested, jailed and convicted.

The logic of numbers, to which James DeNardo referred in *Power in Numbers* (1985), underlies numerous forms of protest. Since 'there always seems to be power in numbers' (1985:35), a movement's destiny depends to a great extent on the number of its supporters. As DeNardo notes, the 'size of the dissidents' ... give the regime an indication of how much support the dissidents enjoy' (1985:36) and also the logic underlying such actions is totally coherent with the principles of representative democracy: "an attempt is made to influence public opinion, the main repository of political power" (della Porta and Diani, 1999:175). In Bangladesh, the strength of the opposition political forces was found undoubtedly enough strong as all the political parties, student organisations, professional and intellectual association were absolutely against the military regime. When the students unity like CSAC and SAA⁴⁸ brought out the protest march from the University campus towards the main streets of Dhaka city chanting anti-Martial Law slogans, it seemed to be a wave of thousands of students welcomed by clapping from the mass of people, the number of which, of course, frightened the military administration. When the pro-AL 8-party alliance or pro-BNP 7-party alliance called the public meeting in the *Bangabandhu* Avenue, or *Manik Mia* Avenue or Press club, *Naya Bazar* etc,⁴⁹ lakhs (hundreds of thousand) of supporters, workers and mass people joined these meetings, where crucial political programs were announced by opposition political forces.

The use of violence in the movement could be considered an important means of protest against the regime. Charles Tilly (2003) has identified six types of violence in politics: violent rituals, coordinated destruction, opportunism, brawls, individual aggression, and scattered attacks.⁵⁰ In the Bangladesh movement, more or less, all these types of violence were used both by the opposition political parties and their military counter part. The military leader used several violent measures to wipe out the protests, gatherings, blockade, strikes including organised baton charges, *kadane* gas, shooting out on the protests marches, which produced counter violence mostly scattered attacks.

2.3.5. Conclusion

Theories in this research have covered a range of macro and micro issues. The macro issues try to investigate the differences and similarities of the Bangladesh movement globally comparing with the democratisation process in many nations around the world. The nature of conflict between political elites and military servicemen, patterns of democratic transition, relations of industrialisation, urbanisation and capitalism, necessary class configurations for democracy and the like have been examined in the macro perspective. Similarly, the micro theories have concentrated mainly on the characteristics of movements—the strength and weakness of political institutions, especially the political parties, development of

interest and pressure groups—students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions of labour and working class, demographic issues, social structure, structure of the actions—violent and non-violent and the like, which has laid down the scholarly base of this research. On the whole, the wide range of literature reviewed and examinations of theories has resolved most of the central arguments of the movement for democracy in Bangladesh against the military dictatorship of General Ershad, which is able to find out the differences and targets of the enquiry, and this has provided the strength to continue on the empirical investigation of the issues in a micro perspective.

Notes

¹ To understand the difference as well as relationship between micro and macro perspective of sociological theories and issues, see Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S Turner ed. *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*. 4th edition, London: Penguin Books, 2000, pp.204, 224. See also, Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Back to Sociological Theories: The Construction of Social Orders*. London: Macmillan, 1994, p.78.

² The non-violent actions included the protests march, petition march, mass gathering, demonstrations, sit-in, *hartas* (strikes), hunger strikes, non-co-operation or civil disobedience, human chain, seizure, elections etc., on the one hand, the violent actions included attacks, barricade, block, riot, rebellion, clash, destroying public transport, guerrilla fights resulting harassing, bombing, setting fire, killing government forces and officials etc.

³ See Moudud Ahmed, *Democracy and the Challenge of Development: A Study of Politics and Military Interventions in Bangladesh*, UPL, Dhaka, 1995.

⁴ The experiences they had gathered from a 'so much politicised Pakistan Army' led them, later on, to exercise political power in Bangladesh when they were placed in the Bangladesh Armed forces. These repatriated faction of Army could be treated as the core of conflict in every event of military coup in the post-independent Bangladesh.

⁵ Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Liberation Army) was formed in 1971 under the auspices of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile in the border of Bangladesh-India to free the country from occupied Pakistan Army by war. It was mainly consisted of militants students, peasants and youths of Bangladesh society. Indian Government trained up this force in some border provinces of India like West Bengal, Tripura and Assam. They were fighting side by side with Bangladesh Army, the force consisted by mainly the Bengal regiment officers and soldiers of Pakistan Army left the side to join the freedom war of their motherland. The Mukti-Bahini forces were incorporated in Bangladesh Army after the independence of the Country.

⁶ Bangladesh Army launched its formal beginning with a major part of former East Bengal Regiment (EBR) of Pakistan Army and East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), who left the Pakistan side to join in the liberation war in 1971. After the war, the Army was formed from some thirty thousand men who had deserted the members of Bangladesh army in the war together with Mukti Bahini freedom fighters. Another group of 28000 Bengali soldiers repatriated from Pakistan and was included in the Armed Forces. This might be seen as the start of conflict inside the army institution. Because "most of their formative experience had been under the Ayub-Yahya martial law regimes, and had reflected the armed forces' contempt for politicians and a rabid anti-Indian feelings; many, even before their repatriation, thought in terms of a military solution to Bangladesh's problems" (Gowher Rizvi, 1985:224).

⁷ A number of Civil Service officers who returned from Pakistan after the liberation was incorporated in the civilian administration. They were the principal civilian associates of the military to be in power. In Bangladesh, it is evident that the first military coup in August, 1975 took place with the help of repatriated factions of the army collaborating with the same faction of civil bureaucracy

⁸ The three strands for military seizure of power includes: the first is related to the nature of organisation which provides the armed forces with discipline and cohesion, hierarchy and centralised command and unity both at the decision making level and execution. These organisational features enable the army to take over political power promptly with a view to saving the nation from the "misdeeds" of the corrupt and "inept" politicians (Moris Janowitz, 1964) The second strand refers to the weakness of political system such as the fragile political institutions and chronic instability.

lack of consensual leadership and legitimacy, power vacuum and low level of political culture. These weaknesses may provide the justification for intervention (S.E. Finer, 1975). The third one is associated with the corporate interests of the armed forces. Any threat to their corporate interests may propel them to move and capture political power with a lightening speed (E. A. Nordinger, 1977).

⁹ See also Moris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of the New Nations*, Chicago: Philippe, 1964.

¹⁰ *Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini* (National Security Force) was created in 1974 which was considered as a private force of the then government to be a step of establishment of socialism in the state. It was found that this force were well trained and well equipped then the regular force of Bangladesh Army. They were mostly comprised of freedom fighter persons of Bangladesh Liberation Army, formed in 1971.

¹¹ Court Martial normally works to take disciplinary action against army personnel if found them in any anti-army activities. In fact, it was believed that a number of court martial were arranged only to destroy the counter group of Gen. Zia especially the *Mukti Bahinee* faction inside the army, and those who were hanged or killed in firing squad were mainly from freedom fighters group of the Armed Forces. A soldier who escaped such a court martial described later that every morning he used to see the flow of the bloods to the brink of the drains of the central jail while he was prisoner of so called mutiny in the Army.

¹² Karl Marx, bef. Cologne Jury, MEW 6:245, quoted in Hal Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Social Revolution Vol. II, The Politics of Social Classes*, London and New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978, p.19

¹³ KMTR 1, ch.8:123, quoted in Hal Draper, *op. cit*, p.19

¹⁴ Engels: On Soc. Rel. Russ., in ME:SW 2:390, quoted in Hal Draper, *op. cit*, pp.219-221

¹⁵ The change of British industrial policy in India in the nineteenth century could be seen in their creating different amendment and new laws regarding trade and commerce to their colonies. H. De.B Gibbins(1895) in his '*The Industrial History of England*' has given an excellent features, in which British industry was guided by manual labour in manufacturers and mining in sixteenth century, coal-mines in seventeenth century and iron trade and pottery in eighteenth century before the renaissance of industry with the innovation of steam use. Machinery began to displace unaided manual labour. Industry, too, was not organised upon a huge capitalistic basis, though of course capitalist existed; but it would be more correct to say, that hitherto industry had been chiefly carried on by numbers of smaller capitalists who were also manual worker, even when they employed other workman under them. Bank of England (1694) and East India Company (1693) were established to regulate and find out new area of their trade and commerce.. However, the great inventions were all made in a comparative short space of time, and the previous slow growth of industry developed quickly in to a feverish burst of manufacturing production that completely revolutionised the face of Industrial England. The revolution in manufacturer and factories with steam machineries reached the pick in the end of eighteenth century. In the second half of this century, the seven years war resulted from the treaty of Perish(1763) was began between England and France and other European countries led the British policy to increase their trade with colonies. The out break of the Great Continental war (1763-1815) and abolition of slavery (see the British House of Commons Papers,... "Bill for abolition of slavery through out British colonies, for promoting Industry of Manumitted slaves, and compensating owners, 1833(492) IV.183" and " Bill for the extending to the Governors and officers of East India Company the powers given by an Act 5 Geo. 4 to his Majesty's governors and officers for the More Effectual suppression of the importation of slaves in to India...") could be seen as important factors that enhanced England for trade with India. In the mean time, the great achievement of England was the step taken for the beginning of free trade in 1820: " For in that year the London Merchants formulated their famous petition praying that every restrictive regulation of trade, not imposed on account of the revenue, together with all duties of a protective character, might be at once repealed"(Gibbins, p.212) and demands were also raised for the same from different business corners, a committee was appointed in Parliament to investigate the wishes of the petitioners and it brought in a reports thoroughly in agreement with free trade principles of the Merchants. The first measures of commercial reform was proposed in the following year, and one by one the restrictions upon the trade were removed. The most important of the new measures was the gradual alternation of the old navigation laws, finally culminating in their total repeal in 1849 (see, British House of Commons Papers.. "Bills to amend or regulate Trade with British Possessions Abroad 1830-1831, (26) II.377" and "Bills to amend laws for encouragement of British Shipping and Navigation 1847-48 (652).IV.495, 1849 (33). IV. 331). Meanwhile since the war of American Independence, the England had been building up a great colonial empire, and she had the sense of not to attempt again to levy tax upon her unwilling offspring. India was taken over from East India in

1858.(Gibbins, p. 215). Revolution in the means of transit i.e. railway(1830), steamship to New York (1838), telegraph company (1840), and shorten the distance to the east by opening the Suez Canal (1869) etc encouraged the British Merchants to find out the possibility of trade with their colonies in Asia. English manufacturers and capitalists have consistently supported that policy which seemed likely to open up these new markets to their goods. For long time , it was found that they occupied themselves very wisely in obtaining cheap raw materials by passing enactments actuated by free trade principles and removing protective restrictions. Cheap raw material having thus been gained and machinery having now been developed to such an extent as to increase production quite incalculably, England sends her textile and other products all over the world. She seems to find it necessary discover fresh markets every generation or so, in order that her vast output of commodities may be sold. Meanwhile, English manufacturers were complaining of foreign competition in plaintive tones which merely means that where as they thought some years ago that they had a complete monopoly in supplying the requirements of the world, they are now perceiving that they have not a monopoly at all, but only a good start, while other nations are already catching them up in the modern race of wealth. Rail communication was started in 1850 in India between Madraz and Arcot (see House of Commons Papers, "Bills for Considerations an the applicability of Canals and Rail Roads to India; 1831-32" in Appx. 10.735 II , X. Part II.671). The rail network was established all over India by the end of nineteenth century, which could also be found to create opportunity of a large market of the goods of English Manufacturers. Keeping pace with time, when colonial people were becoming habituated with the English goods, the English merchants found it more profitable to establish industrial activities there in India by the end of nineteenth century , which led India, specially Bengal with heavy jute and textile, salt industries, at that time. And several factory acts were amended and created to promote all these industrial development(see British House of Commons Papers, Bill for extension of factory and workshop acts, 1864(55) II.81; 1867 (62) III.1; 1871(194), II.49; 1891(2) IV.151; 1896 (216) III.51. In this connection see also the laws for India, which might be regarded as important document in favour of changing attitudes of British Industrial Policy in India, for example, " Factory Acts Amendment: Act to amend the Indian Factories Acts 1881, being Act, No. XI, of the governor-general in Council; 1890-91 (194) LIX.181 Regulations issued in the several provinces of India, and by the Government of India, under the Indian Factory Act, 1891; 1893-94 (151) LXV. 607; Indian Factory Act; 1896[in C. 8067] XIX. 404; Bill to amend the Indian Railways Act, 1894; 1906 (186) II. 665; Factory Labour Commission 1908: Reports of the Indian Factory Labour Commission; Vol. I Reports and Appendices; 1908[Cd.4292] LXXIV. 545-Vol. II. Evidence; 1909 [Cd.4519] LXIII. 541; Reports on the working of Indian Factory Act, 1881, made to the Government of India, in reply to inquiries recently directed by the Secretary of the State for India; 1889(124) LVIII.463.—Correspondence in continuation of the Reports; 1889 (162) LVIII. 591. Statistical Abstract; from 1889 to 1899 CXII to CXVIII)

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington (1991) in his 'The Third Wave', categorised the establishment of democracy all over the world into three distinct ways. First wave (1828-1926): the countries those successfully established democracy from the beginning of nineteenth century to early twentieth like UK, USA, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland etc. Second wave(1943-1962) of democracy has included the countries those entered into the process of democratization with the beginning of second world war. Allied occupation promoted inauguration of democratic institutions in West Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, Korea and also some countries in Europe and Latin America in the late 1940s and 1950s. He has also presented a reverse wave for both of these two where authoritarian non-democratic environment were returned to some of these countries. His analysis of third wave (1974--) has incorporated some countries of Asia, Europe and Latin America , most of which were ruled by Army Administration. These countries were likely to be Portugal, Greece, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Honduras, Philippines, Taiwan, and Pakistan etc. However, third wave has also included some countries in which there had been a massive change due to fall of socialist antagonism.(p.6) However, according to Huntington thesis, as Bangladesh was ruled by military regime for long period of time and had restored the democracy by mass upheaval which finally reached at the climax of revolution of the vast multitude against the military autocracy. Thus Bangladesh might be worth reckoning of third wave democratisation in the late twentieth century.

¹⁷ According to his view, "three crucial interactions in democratisation processes were those between government and opposition, between reformers and stand-patters in the governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition. In all transitions these three central interactions played some role. The relative importance and the conflictual or co-operative character of these interactions, however, varied with the overall nature of the transition process" (Huntington 1991:123). In Bangladesh, the interactions between government and opposition forces was foremost conflictual in all times of the military regime, although at the end of the regime, there might be a

possibility of division inside the government, the military and civil bureaucracy, who might be treated as reformers for returning to democracy and stand-patters in favour of autocracy to be continue. In the opposition democratic forces, there were mainly two streams: the AL-led 15-Party alliance and BNP-led 7-Party alliance. In the early age of the movements, both of these two opposition groups could be treated as extremists as they were austere in their movements for the resignation of Gen. Ershad. But regarding the participation of the parliamentary election of 1986, AL-led 8-Party alliance could be treated as moderate opposition with participation in the elections on the one hand, and boycotting the election, BNP led 7-Party alliance might be treated widely as extremists on the other, regarding the cessation of military regime. In considering the operations and actions of the movement, the student community of Bangladesh society had foremost an important and non-co-operation role, followed by militant labourer reservoirs of industrial areas to end the military autocracy. On the contrary, divisions inside the ruling elites are also much crucial in this regard: "The emergence of liberalizers and democratizers within an authoritarian system creates a first-order force for political change. It also, however, can have a second-order effect. In military regimes in particular, it divides the ruling group, further politicise the military, and hence leads more officers to believe that 'the military as government' must be ended in order to preserve 'the military as institution'" (Huntington, 1991:129). In Bangladesh, it was found some divisions inside the Armed Forces, as a whole, in the end of 1980s. They were seemed to be in positive attitudes towards the establishment of democracy in the country. The secret of this change was believed that the conflicting factions, the upper rank repatriated army officers were largely decreased due to regular end of service or forced retirement by Gen. Ershad to secure him from further coup attempt. The newly recruited lower rank officers, those were sent abroad as international peace keeping forces, were more interested in their professionalism rather than to be part of an autocracy. This liberal polarisation inside the Armed Forces of Bangladesh led them to exit from the military rule in order to establish a disciplined military institution.

¹⁸ Jocelynn Linnekin, "Why 'Exporting Democracy' Is a Contradiction in Terms" , a paper presented in a conference on *Exporting Democracy* organised by Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, USA, at Ascona, Switzerland, 22-24 April, 2004. pp. 3-6. By "Objectivist discourse," she means a way of talking about democracy as if it were a thing—clearly bounded entity defined by a particular set of characteristics. In her words, Joshua Muravchik (1991) epitomizes this approach when he states that democracy has an "essence" that is present in both presidential and parliamentary systems (p.5). More fundamental than specific institutional arrangements, democracy's essence lies in "those profound and humane ideals on which America was founded" (p.10). Positing an enduring core of characteristics is the hallmark of objectivism, which can be identified with the natural science approach and an overarching philosophical position known as positivism. This paradigm sees democracy as a type within taxonomy of political systems. Like a bird species, democracy is uniquely identifiable according to certain specific criteria. The unabashedly objectivist Muravchik avers that democracy will inevitably triumph because it is "indeed natural" as a system of governance: "democracy has proved itself natural in that it answers something innate in human nature: a longing to be treated with dignity..."(p.1)

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 9-14

²⁰ *Ibid*, pp.14-16, In the aim of variable construction for democracy in nations around the world, in her empirical observations in Dominican Republic Venezuela, Peru,--"one striking finding of the democracy project thus far is that, in every national case, the poor conflate democracy with what we might aptly identify as "human rights." Working class and poor respondents look to 'democracy' to guarantee a list of practical necessities that virtually replicates the United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights. 'Freedom of expression' is most often identified as democracy's primary characteristic, but other rights and liberties rank below such basic needs as access to education, health care, vivienda 'housing,' alimentación 'food,' servicios básicos 'basic services'--in other words, the fundamentals of survival with a modicum of dignity. The simple but comprehensive expression vivir bien 'to live well' eloquently sums up what poor Latin Americans want from democracy. Respeto 'respect' is also frequently cited as something that people expect to gain from a democratic system. The ordinary Latin American citizen living in poverty is well aware of the rights and civil liberties that every human being should enjoy and considers them entitlements."

²¹ See also Rangalal Sen, "The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 1982-1990: A Theoretical Framework and Social Background", presented in a seminar on *Society, Polity and Economy of Bangladesh* held on March 7-8 1994, organised under the auspices of the centre for South, Central, South-East and South-West Pacific Studies of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-100067, India, p. 10

²² *Ibid.*, p.11. Alavi appositely has depicted the social situations prevailing in 1980s in a country like Bangladesh as a peripheral capitalist society. He writes: "we find a tendency for this class (i.e. educated salaried middle class) perpetually to fracture on the basis of ethnic, regional, linguistic, or sectarian loyalties, which on the surface may appear to contradict the traditions of the liberal secular "western" ideologies that they have imbibed. In fact, they inherit more than one cultural domain. Their life style remains "Westernized", especially as expressed in material objects that fetishize western culture" (1982:299).

²³ See Dickenson in Alan B. Mountjoy ed. *The Third World Problems and Perspectives*, 6th edition, London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1978, p.94. He wrote: "Colonial policies served to inhibit industrialisation and though political independence has afforded opportunities for development, progress has been comparatively slow in the face of various obstacles. The resource endowment in general is not an inhibiting factor, given the sustenance that third world raw materials give to first world industries. Nevertheless, individual countries lack particular resources, and resource exploitation is often impeded by infra-structural deficiencies. More important are shortage of educated and skilled labour, and of physical and financial capital. The former may be obtained by education and training programmes and the latter sought from savings, export earnings and foreign investment and aid."

²⁴ The Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, 1991

²⁵ The Military Regime of General Ershad Proclaimed 'Local Government Ordinance, 1985'. This ordinance was protested by all major opposition parties of the country.

²⁶ This has created some opportunities of employment and education, judgement in the sphere of village-level peasants, workers and very lower class strata of Bangladesh, although it might be considered that this step also created lot of political anarchism in the rural towns of Bangladesh society. In fact, the hidden plan of the dictator was to establish military administration in all of these upgraded sub-district towns to establish control over the whole political environment of the country.

²⁷ Norm oriented movements are concerned with producing more limited but specific changes within a social system, particularly with respect to rules of access to and operation within the various institutional arenas of society. For example, anti-child labour movements, anti-drug movements etc. Value-oriented movements, on the other hand, are said to be concerned with more fundamental change, and thus seek to alter basic values and the institutional bedrock on which they rest. The most important examples would be revolutionary movements, such as those that under girded the French, American and Russian revolutions, or broad based struggles such as the civil rights or women's movements (McAdam and Snow, 1997).

²⁸ The world rejecting movements, like Smelser's value oriented movement, condemn the prevailing social order as a whole, both its underlying values and institutional arrangements. The world affirming movements is just similar to the Smelser's norm oriented movement (McAdam and Snow, 1997).

²⁹ According David Aberle (1966:315-33), first, alternative movements seeks partial change in individuals including alcohol, sexual practices, abuse interpersonal relationship etc.; Second, redemptive movements seek the total change in individuals required personal transformation leading to religious movements. Third, reformative movements seek limited change in the social system in which they are embedded and there is no blanket rejection of the present order of things, but an attempt instead to rectify or neutralize specific perceived wrongs or threats. For examples, movement for the protection of environment and finally, transformative movement seek total change in the broader social structure and its associated ideational bedrock but these are commonly referred to as revolutionary."

³⁰ Ashraf and Sharma (1983) has described six types party organisations: First, Ideology and power in which, "a party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power" (Schumpeter, 1950:283) and a political group that contests at elections and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for public office (Sartori, 1976:63). Second, party as an organisational structure, in which a party is... "a collection of communities, a union of small groups dispersed through out of the country (branches, caucuses, local associations etc.) and linked by co-ordinating institutions" (Duverger, 1966:15-17). Third, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary group in which, central decision making power is controlled mainly by electoral group of the party (Duverger, 1966). Fourth, direct vs. indirect structure, in which "its members sign a membership form, pay a monthly subscription and attend local branch meetings more or less regularly" (Duverger, 1966:5-16). Fifth, cadre vs. mass parties, in which the control of the machinery of the party rests large in the hands of an elite influential persons of high repute, experts and financiers in the cadre parties and the mass party, on the other hand, is designed to involved the rank-and-file members in the decision making process of the party (Duverger, 1966). Sixth,

oligarchy or stratarchy, in which all political parties-- indeed all organisation and even the most democratic ones are oligarchical in the sense that they are controlled by a minority of leaders and decision making power lay centred in the top echelon of the leadership(Michels, 1915).

³¹ Opposite ideologies: In fact, the basic ideological stands of these two parties have been raising many debates in the political arena of post-independent Bangladesh. The Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman preserved its ideology in the pre-independence Bangladesh as Bengali Nationalism, secularism, democracy and mix-economy policy. In post-independent periods, the AL has changed its mix economy policy and included "socialism" as the non-capitalist path of development. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, AL was thrown out of power by military intervention; it was found again some ideological sufferings inside the party and was divided in 1983 in to two factions. Main stream of the party under the leading of Sheikh Hasina had again included the mix economy policy instead of the socialist economy. In more recent times, the AL has left its policy of mix- economy policy replacing the pure market economy of capitalist development. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was formed in the wake of Sheikh Mujib's assassination in 1975. The founder of the party General Zia patronised by pro-Islamic and pro-capitalist path of development. Hence, the BNP had changed the two important pillar of the constitution: secularism and socialism. On the first actions in this regard of Zia government was the insertion of Bismillah-ir-Rahman-ar-Rahim (In the name of Allah, the beneficent the merciful) at the beginning of the constitution. Article 8 (1) of the constitution, which declared secularism as one of the fundamental principles of the state policy was amended and in the place of secularism, absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah was inserted. Article 12 which contained the mechanism for implementation of the principles of secularism was totally omitted. Moreover a new clause was added to article 25 declaring the intentions of the state for establishing preserving and strengthening fraternal ties with the Muslim states on the basis of Islamic solidarity. He changed the socialism replacing social justice and Bengali Nationalism in to Bangladeshi Nationalism. This conflict of ideological stands between two parties led the differences to form a united movement against the autocratic military regime of General Ershad.

³² See the Statement of the National Democratic Institute(NDI)/Carter Center Pre-election Delegation to Bangladesh's 2001 Parliamentary Elections, Dhaka, August 4, 2001, p.1

³³ There were found several 'Jotes' (alliances) and 'Okya Prishad' (coalitions) of like minded political, cultural, professional and intellectual organisations during the anti- martial law movements in Bangladesh. The AL leading 15-Party alliance were mainly consisted by pro-leftist political parties; the BNP leading 7-Party alliance were mainly consisted of pro-Islamic political parties; the dissident part of leftist group after 1986 parliamentary elections were named as radical 5-Party alliance; Sammilitta Sangskritic Jote (Combined Cultural Alliance), University Teachers Federation etc. and there were also found some coalition for united participation in the election.

³⁴ Political alliance' in Bangladesh might be defined as the unity of like minded political parties or forces to form united movements against military regime. For example, 15-Party alliance could be treated as pro-leftists and mix-economy ideologies, 7- Party as pro-Islamic and rightist ideologies, and 5-Party as radical leftists in the movements. See Ranglal Sen, *op.cit.* p. 7

³⁵ See Ranglal Sen, *op.cit.* p. 13

³⁶ In Bangladesh, in every industrial set up, the owner and management are completely different term. The owner of the organisation employs another person as he responsible for the over all management of the organisation, which, however, has been used by the western scholar as a similar meaning i.e. there is no basic difference between owner and management.

³⁷ Ron Eyerma & Andrew Jamison, 1991, p. 95

³⁸ As Hal Draper (1978) quoted "only a year before his death, Engels sent a message of cordial greetings to the First International Congress of Socialist Students held in Geneva. Its content is quite striking in terms of what it implies about the role he envisioned for the intellectual labourers in the productive process who are here called the "intellectual proletariat": May your efforts to awaken consciousness among the students succeed, so that out of their ranks will come the intellectual proletariat, who are called on to play an important role in the coming revolution, at the side of and in the midst of their brothers, the manual workers."(E: To Internatl. Cong. Soc. Stud. MEW 22: 415). See, Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Volume II The Politics of Social Classes, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1978.

³⁹ All Parties Student Unity(APSU) was formed on October 10, 1990 to protest against the killing of five persons including some students by police firing during the observances of the programme of 'Secretariat Seize' organised by the main stream opposition democratic forces. It should be pointed out here that it was the students who joined this opposition forces' programme in large numbers who forcibly took away from the hands of the police a dead body of a fellow student named Nazir Hussain

Jehad of Ullapara College, Sirajgonj and held a morning rally on the foot of "APARAJEYA BANGLA" (a sculpture symbolizing invincible Bangla in the Liberation war of 1971) in the premises of the Arts Building of the University of Dhaka, which was attended by national leaders. It was Sheikh Hasina, the chief of 8-Party alliance, who conducted the oath to the students who stood besides the dead body of Jehad that the APSU will not go back home until the quit of Gen. Ershad.

⁴⁰ Rangalal Sen, *op.cit*, p.4

⁴¹ The police forces of the military janta government always took the rapid action against any processions, protest march, demonstration, strike and demolish the any attempt of such programmes null and void by vigorous 'lathi-peta' (baton charge) on the movement participants. It is found a normal course of repressive measures against the movements, and even the national level leaders were found injured during these events.

⁴² Many of the students, labourers, youths, political leaders and members of professional groups were shot dead and thousands of others injured by the armed police during the movement period, among which, the events of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1990 were most notable in the analysis of extreme measures taken by the military regime of General Ershad. The victims of the movements who were killed, injured, arrested and suited trial belonged mainly to the nationalist and leftist political forces of Bangladesh society. *Salim, Delwar, Kanchan, Dipali Shaha, Moijuddin, Titas, Raofun Basunia, Nur Hossain, Fattah, Babul, Zehad, Comrade Tajul, Dr. Milon and many others* killed in the movements were mainly nationalist and leftist orientation of Bangladesh society. The repression of the military dictator had created twofold effects of opposite dimensions: unified the divergent opposition political parties including rightists and leftists and other democratic forces on the one hand and weakened the movement for time being on the other.

⁴³ In fact, during the movement period, all the leaders of the different political parties, student organisation etc. were always in fear of Detective Branch (D.B) police man who were wearied white-coloured uniform carrying heavy arms and ammunitions. These forces were empowered to pick up anybody in anytime without showing any cause. In this way many workers of political party were arrested, imprisoned and even were killed whose dead body could not be terraced. This was planned, guided and taken in action by the army intelligence branch of the military government

⁴⁴ The opposition political parties suffered various factional conflicts under military regime. The inter-party conflict between the AL and the BNP was a very important factor that was used shrewdly by the dictator, which dismantled the unified movement against the regime. It also was found intra-party conflict inside the major political parties that led splitting both the AL and BNP several times under military regime. The leaders and activists of the movement were encapsulated and had to hide in the underground to save arrest and jail when repressive measures reached the peak.

⁴⁵ The country wide *hartal* was called for half day, full day, 48 hours, 54 hours, 72 hours and even for 96 hours to paralyse military administration and during this action hundreds of political workers were arrested, injured, and killed by police atrocities.

⁴⁶ See The Daily Bangladesh Observer, November 11, 1987.

⁴⁷ During the clash between protesters and police lots of police forces were found injured and even were killed. In the pick of several movement occasion, when BDR and military forces were involved tackling the situation, army personnel was killed by the revolted mass participants. For example, see the events of the actions programme of the students in the Dhaka University Campus

⁴⁸ In fact, there were found two alliances of all the student organisations in the anti-autocracy movement in Bangladesh. The *Chatra Sangram Parishad* (Student Action Committee) was consisted of nationalists(Bengali), socialists, pro-leftists and radicalist students organisation, backed by Pro-AL 15-party alliance and *Sangrami Chatra Jote* (Student Alliance for Actions) was consisted of nationalists (Bangladeshi), fundamentalists, religious students organisations, backed by Pro-BNP 7-party alliance.

⁴⁹ These were main large places where the most public meeting were held. When political parties and alliances called for observing new programmes against the regime, it was declared by large public meeting showing the strength of their support for movements. Hundreds of thousands participants were found attending these gathering.

⁵⁰ See Charles Tilly (2003), *The Politics of Collective Violence*, London, Cambridge University Press, pp.14-15

Chapter Three Methodology

3.1. Introduction

This research project has chosen both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect data from primary and secondary sources in order to investigate the social and political issues of the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh against the military regime of General Ershad. It includes both documentary and historical evidence, as well as social survey, content analysis and case study methods. These methods include different techniques of data collection consistent with empirical investigation. The data used in the analyses of the issues are mainly from secondary sources and supported by both quantitative and qualitative primary evidence. However, the methodology of this research has followed some objectives to organise the chapters of the thesis: first, describing the facts; second, giving qualitative and quantitative reasoning; third, making comparison of the opinions from different groups regarding different factors or issues and finally, to reach a conclusion about factors or issues under the principal hypotheses or propositions.

3.2. Qualitative and Quantitative Methods

For secondary sources of data, the qualitative approach has used various techniques of data collection. First, a good number of literatures have been reviewed to examine many theories of the democratisation process and actions of movement all over the world, especially in those countries, where authoritarian military regimes and the process of democratisation were observed. Details of this literature review have been included in chapter two. Second, four major types of sources have been used for documentary and historical data: i. archival data, ii. personal documents (including autobiographies) iii. private documents (diaries, confessions, personal interview etc.) iv. public documents (mass media, literature etc.) Third, this research has also examined many numerical reports on socio-political, demographic and administrative changes in Bangladesh in the post-independent period. Fourth, it has considered the papers on different conferences, workshops and seminars. Fifth, national and international journals have been used to include the latest debates. Together with the electronic resources, sixth, it has scanned the major national dailies and weeklies of Bangladesh to detail the chronology of the movement events. Seventh, this project includes some international weeklies such as Far Eastern Economic Review, Time, and Newsweek and the like focusing on the global views of the movement. Eighth, in quantitative methods, this research used a social survey for the primary sources of data on the movement. Finally, this has also used case study method in making audio interviews with the key leaderships of the movement.

3.3. Focussing the Primary data

For primary data, this research has used three techniques of data collection. First, a quantitative questionnaire (see appendix-1) has been constructed for the interview of 206 leaders (see appendix-4) of the democracy movement. This has been used to analyse many issues of the military regime and democracy movement. Second, a checklist (see appendix-2) has been used to count the actions by dates, drawing on the newspaper archives—the major dailies of Bangladesh from 1982 to 1990—the nine years tenure of the military regime of General Ershad. This data are used to examine the quantities and the dimensions of the four major movement actions: *hartal* (strike), protest march, public gathering and violence. Using the statistical tools, these applications have found the trends and patterns of these actions that happened during Bangladesh democracy movement. Third, a qualitative open questionnaire (see appendix-3) has been used for the audio interview of major six case figures i.e., the military dictator—General Ershad, and the opposition key leaders: Sheikh Hasina (AL), Begum Khaleda Zia (BNP), Hasanul Haque Inu (JSD), Rashed Khan Menon (WPB), Mujahidul Islam Salim of the CPB and an interview with country's prominent sociologist, Professor Rangalal Sen. These interviews have helped to explain the different arguments and critical issues of the movement.

3.4. Sampling for the Social Survey

As my research concerns an event of the recent past in Bangladesh society, a social survey method is used to accumulate quantitative information from a number of veteran leaders of different political parties and interest or pressure groups, which were directly involved in organising and leading the movement. The samples used in the survey have been drawn from the three distinct categories of the population: leaders of political parties (PP), leaders of interest and pressure groups (IG & PG) and leading non-participatory groups and individuals (NPG) of Bangladesh society during the movement for restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. Ultimately, the interest groups and pressure groups participated in the movement under four separate entities: students (S), intellectuals (I), professionals (P) and labourers and workers of trade unions (TU). Hence, it is considered useful to demonstrate the whole sample frame to be distributed for six movement forces memberships: PP, S, I, P, TU and NPG. These six categories of the sample have been considered purposively according to their weights and roles in the movement. Although the sampling frame is purposive, the samples from each category have been chosen randomly as the high ranked leaders—according to the positions in the organisation in all respects. For this, list for all six categories in different divisional cities— as their names were published in the news papers in 1990 as leaders and organisers of the movement and as renowned personalities in their respective fields. Then the samples were chosen randomly by taking highest

ranked leaders in all respects and to some extent, there was also lottery to choose correct sample randomly from the similar quality leaders of different organisations. Although all four divisional cities have been covered, the capital city of Dhaka—the nerve centre of the movement has been given priority. In question to their representative value, it may be argued that all of the samples have been taken from the leaders and organisers of the movement having executive and important positions of their organisations, who were renowned personalities in the society. In general, the sampling design has covered the key leaders of the political parties, students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions, and the leaders of non-participatory groups. In broader perspective, this has incorporated the central personalities of Bangladesh society, which includes political leaders, students, teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers, artists and performers, poets and authors, journalists and agriculturists, bureaucrats, business magnets, NGO leaders, religious figures and non-partisan personalities. In this connection, it would be worth giving some introduction to all of these categories of samples. The samples from the leaders of the political parties have been categorised into five types according to the divergent currents of political forces in the movement: AL, BNP, Leftist-1(L-1, pro-Moscow group), Leftist-2(L-2, pro-china radical) and JIB & IPs. The samples have been chosen from the central and divisional level leaderships of these opposition political currents. The opposition students' organisations of the country were united under their single platform—APSU (All Parties' Students Union) in the final stage of the movement in 1990, which had a pioneer role in ousting the military dictator. Hence, the samples from the leaders of the students have been chosen from the APSU leaderships in four divisional cities. Although the intellectuals have always their individual identity, most of them were also more or less organised under the CCA (Combined Cultural Alliance) and therefore, the priority has been given to choose the samples of the intellectuals attached to this organisation. The samples of the professional groups have been included the leaders of different professional bodies of society, for example, teachers, journalists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, agriculturists and the like. The samples from the TU category have been chosen from the proletarian section of the society—the trade union leaders of the lower and lower middle class workers and labourers of the semi-government, government and industrial settings who were organised under the SKOP. The NPGs were consist of the religious leaders—priests, NGOs leaders, business magnets, very important personality (VIP) of the society along with some persons of specific places who were witness to almost all events of the movement. In this way the sample frame has tried to cover all significant groups to gather their views for this research.

Keeping these entire categories intact, first, I have targeted for 50 cases from five currents of political parties with equally 10 for each of them in four divisional

cities of Bangladesh along with additional 10 in the capital city of Dhaka in which I have been able to reach 46 cases in total in this category. In second category, I have targeted 25 APSU leaders with 5 for each city along with additional 5 for capital city of Dhaka in which all of my target have been filled up. In category three to five, I have targeted 90 cases for the leaders of intellectuals, professionals and trade unions (30 for each) with 5 (for each of them) in each city along with 10 additional (for each of them) for the capital city of Dhaka in which all of my target have been completed although 1 for each of I and P groups has been shorted in Khulna city, which has been covered by taking 1 extra for each of these two groups from the capital. In the last and sixth NPG category, I have targeted 50 samples from the five subgroups with 10 from each divisional city along with additional 10 from the capital city of Dhaka in which I have been able to reach 45 in total. It should be mentioned here that 1 additional VIP sample has been included, as this respondent has been from BICS (Bangladesh Islami *Chattra Shibir*), which was outside of the APSU. This, altogether gives 206 cases in six categories, has been surveyed with a closed questionnaire to complete the empirical investigation on different issues related to the movement for restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. One important point is that although the leaders of political parties are the main actors of the movement, they had always some controversial roles in the movement. Therefore, non-political groups are given priority in the sample frame with a view to achieving an impartial judgement in the critical issues of the movement. (For sample distribution, see the table below)

Table: The distribution of the Samples of the Survey

Sample Categories	Dhaka	Chittagong	Rajshahi	Khulna	Total
<i>Category-1: PP</i>					
AL	04	02	01	02	09
BNP	04	01	02	02	09
Leftist-1 (L-1)	05	01	02	01	09
Leftist-2 (L-2)	05	00	02	02	09
JIB & IPs	04	02	02	02	10
Total-1	22	06	09	09	46
<i>Category-2-5: IG & PG</i>					
Students (S) APSU	10	5	5	5	25
Intellectuals (I)	16	5	5	4	30
Professionals (P)	16	5	5	4	30
Trade Union (TU)	15	5	5	5	30
Total-2	57	20	20	18	115
<i>Category-6: NPG</i>					
Religious groups	03	02	02	02	09
NGOs	04	02	01	02	09
Business Groups	04	00	01	01	06
Important Witness	04	02	02	02	10
VIP	05	02	02	02	11
Total-3	20	08	08	09	45
Grand Total	99	34	37	36	206

3.5. The Analysis of the Data

The analysis and presentation of data which follow statistical applications in this research are primarily social survey and the measurement of the frequency for four major actions. The analysis of data for both of these two has followed the application of SPSS programme. However, the analysis of the survey data follows several stages: *first*, a SPSS data file is prepared for the whole questionnaire following the coding instruction [for coding instruction—value level, see the questionnaire in appendix-2] and the entry of the data for 206 samples has been completed. At this stage, a general description of the all issues under the each of 22 broader questions under questionnaire has been made, which included different dimensions, depths, comparison and substantial description and interpretation of the issues (factors)—in fact, a general and clear shape of the arguments on the issues under a broader question has been focused.

For this, I have followed the ‘analyze’ tool under the SPSS data editor as: ‘analyze’> ‘tables’> ‘tables of frequencies’ (layout: variable labels in ‘down the side’ and statistical labels in ‘across the top’ and statistics: display of percentage). In the *second stage*, the data is recoded according to the recoding instruction [for recoding instruction see the same questionnaire in appendix-2] to change the factors or variables into the dichotomous values [SPSS data editor>transform>recode> into same variable.....]. In this process, I have considered those broader issues or questions which have more than three codes (value labels) to bring them into three value labels. Then I have ignored or deleted the value of the response like ‘don’t know,’ ‘refused to say’ and ‘no answer’ etc from the three value labels which therefore changes into dichotomous value labels for all factors under each broader question. The principal task of this stage is to construct a relationship between the six groups of the samples: the six movement forces’ memberships’ respondents according to the sampling design (the column head of the table included these six groups’ respondents as: PP, S, I, P, TU and NPG along with a ‘total’ view in the beginning; for this see the construction of the tables of the survey statistics on each broader issue in the thesis). The differentiation in their views on each factor under a broader question to find out is crucial. To format a data table in this regard, I have followed the ‘Analyze’ tool under SPSS data editor as: ‘analyze’> ‘tables’> ‘custom tables’ [putting ‘types of movement forces’, as located in the question 1.9a, in the column and all variables/factors/issues under a broader question in the row and then have followed the subsequent instructions required for the characteristics of the table formation]. On the basis of the data in these tables, I have made a statistical reasoning in the analysis of survey data in comparing the views and positions of six groups of the movement forces’ memberships regarding the many issues of the military dictatorship and the opposition movement for the restoration of democracy.

For more clear understanding, I have displayed these statistics in the graphical presentation using the 'Microsoft Excel' programme [Create New file, transfer table statistics into the excel using 'copy & paste' and also typed wherever required. Graphs are created by selecting fields—rows and columns, then chart wizard, chart type, chart sub-type and series are applied, names and chart options are also assigned to create the graphs. Every navigation step has been forwarded by next command buttons. Further improvements according to standard requirements were represented using format axis options such as pattern, scale, font, number and alignment].

The analysis of the frequencies of four major actions: protest march, public meeting, *hartal* (general strike) and use of violence have also followed two stages process. *First*, a SPSS data file is prepared for the whole 'checklist chart' that used for the collection of frequencies of these actions following the coding instruction [for coding instruction—value labels, see the 'checklist' in the appendix-4]. Here, one thing should be mentioned that separate checklist chart is used for collection of the frequencies on each of the four actions. This does mean that four separate checklist charts are used for the collection of the number of events for four actions. Under SPSS programme, a combined data file is prepared for all frequencies collected for the four actions and the entry of all frequencies for four actions by dates has been completed. *Second*, for the construction of the table of frequencies for actions by date, I have gone through the 'Analyze' tool of SPSS data editor: analyze>descriptive statistics>cross tabs (taking dates/year in row and 'four actions' in column). In this way, a table for the comparison of frequencies of four actions by years have been found. This data later has been transferred simply to the Excel programme that has led a graphical presentation of the whole analysis. In the same way, for the construction of the table for the actions organised by different movement forces—PP, S, I, P and TU categories, the 'Analyze' tool under the SPSS data editor has been taken as: Analyze>tables>custom table (taking 'year' in row and 'five movement forces' in column). For graphical presentation, this table statistics simply is transferred to the Excel programme. Although, frequencies have been collected on many issues: number of actions, organising forces, places, approximate number of participations and the like, due to time and space constraints only a comparison of the frequencies of four actions by years and movement forces—PP, S, I, P and TU have been included in this research.

3.6. Amassing the Data

The findings of the quantitative analyses of the social survey have been synthesised in most chapters of this thesis in accordance with the arguments constructed from the qualitative information of secondary sources from literatures, documents, reports, archives, seminars, and personal audio interviews with key

leaders of the movement as described in the step two and three of this methodology description. And, the analysis and comparison of the four actions by years has been included in chapter eight of the thesis.

one limitation of this research may include the failure to interview one of key leaders of the movement, Begum Khaldea Zia—the present Prime Minister of the country. However, some of her interviews published in the *Weekly Bichitra*—a local weekly during the movement period have been consulted to cover this failure of the researcher. The interview with other five key leaders was able to touch some key issues, but was not reached as expected as there were time constraints for them as they are very busy politicians of the country. The long interview with the military dictator was not satisfactory, as he was always found to ‘singing his own praises’ avoiding answering of the key issues of the opposition movement.

3.7. Conclusion

The methodology of this research was planned to gather the best possible information on the movement for restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. It covers from the general description of the facts by qualitative method to the use of statistical arguments by quantitative analysis of the survey data. Amassing the data gathered from both of the methods—qualitative and quantitative has determined the fate of all arguments set under the propositions of this research. The graphical presentation of the different views of the survey respondents has added an extra dimension understanding the answers of the issues. A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to the sociological analysis of political events is found very useful in this research.

Chapter Four

The Military Seizure of State Power 1982-1990: The Base of Democracy Movement in Bangladesh

4.1. Introduction

The military seizure of state power in many countries around the world originated in the manoeuvring of '*the men on horse back*'¹ or '*the men-in-uniform*'² or '*the men in power with guns on their back*'³ against the political elites of the society. Many scholars and academicians in literary debates, admire them as elites of the society as soon as they are crowned in politics by their seizure of state power. But the painful truth for them is that the military in politics are generally considered as criminals and miscreants in the eyes of the law of a democratic society. The military institution in any country has its role clearly defined in the constitution, which is mainly to defend the country in the wake of external aggression. Hence, the civic and lawful views are that a military takeover in any society is a complete violation of the rules and regulations, norms and values provided for them in the constitution. However, as part of the punishment for the unlawful capture of state power, the authoritarian military rulers in many countries were toppled and sent to trial eventually by the democratic masses of these societies. It is also worthwhile to mention here that the social impact of a military intervention is very traumatic. The soldiers, in a distinct uniform, are given weapons and normally they are to stay in the security of the barrack or cantonment, except at the time of war. But when they move around the masses—from the more civilized zone of urban area to the naïve of rural periphery—they sow the seeds of fear in the innocent civilians. The repressive measures they use and the bulk of arms and ammunitions, and their peculiar appearances that terrorise and militarise the whole public, destroy the honest thoughts and mild instinct of the civic quarters of a possible democratic society.

It was not a new phenomenon for General Ershad, as he sought to replace his predecessor General Ziaur Rahman, who had captured the power following the military coup in 1975 that ended the life and reign of President Bangbandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the country. Afterwards, the military leaders, in many cases, were seen to take the side favourable to the international political order as a tool to seize the state power. In fact, there was no political or civilian ally of international capitalism in the post independent Bangladesh that could be a perfect alternative to the socialist government of a least developed country like Bangladesh. Evidently, the Armed Forces had been considered to be a political representative of this kind of international bourgeoisie. The capture of state power by General Zia was a part of ongoing cold war of the international capitalist bloc against its socialist counterpart all over the world and when he failed to serve the interest of the bloc, he was just removed and General Ershad was set up to

continue the process until either there was a indispensable political ally to be developed or the chapter of the cold war had collapsed. The latter view was more appropriate towards the end of the military dictatorship of General Ershad along with the rise of popular aspiration for democracy in Bangladesh society. The amnesty for these criminal Generals—arranged by local and international agents of the bourgeoisie—destroyed the chances of launching the fundamental objectives of democracy. The instances of their survival in the regular society threw the peaceful transition into the legacies of the repressions—the military autocracy made on general masses—in every pace of institutionalizing democracy. The rises of this kind of military dictator, causes behind their power, the repressive tools of their rule and the consequences of their regime—the damage in the every sphere of socio-economic and political life they made—is the central focus of this chapter.

4.2. General Ershad: The Birth of a ‘Dragon’s⁴ Tyranny’ in Bangladesh

Lt. Col. H M Ershad returned home to Bangladesh as a repatriated officer from Pakistan in 1974, along with thousands of army personnel who had not participated in the liberation war of 1971 and was in service under the Pakistan Army during the whole period of the war. Immediately after the return, his political attitude towards the new government was not satisfactory and the Select Committee of the Army almost decided to give him retirement. However, one of his maternal uncles named Riaz Uddin Ahmed Bhola Mia of Rangpur was an eminent AL leader who convinced Bangabandhu to take him into the Army. In effect, the AL government gave him promotion to Colonel and sent him for training to India.⁵ In the post 1975 coup, Colonel Ershad returned home from training and was able to convince General Zia to give him a double promotion to Major General. After an unsuccessful coup in 1977, General Zia employed his full strength to reorganise the Army in his favour. This brought a great opportunity for General Ershad to be crowned as Army Chief, in which he cleverly caused conflict between Zia and his very close associate, a war veteran officer Maj. General Monzur. Monzur was also in conflict with another freedom fighter officer Maj. Gen. Mir Swakat Ali, Commander of the 9 Infantry Division and later adjoined with the 55 Infantry Division. Although both of them were war veterans and popular in the army, Mir Swakat began to distrust Monzur when he was integrated into the 46 Infantry Division with the Army Headquarter in Dhaka, which he led as the Commander and also was enjoying the position of the Chief of General Staff. Ershad took advantage of this conflict by way of his position being Chief of the Army. In the event, he was able to convince Zia that Monzur and Swakat could have led the coup against him, if they both had continued as commanding officers of the two infantries. He suggested transferring them outside Dhaka. Zia trusted the Army Chief in this regard and asked his ally Maj. Gen. Nurul

Islam Shishu, who also confirmed the opinion of General Ershad. As a result, Zia transferred Monzur to Chittagong as Commanding officer of 24 Infantry Division and Mir Swakat as P.S.O in the secretariat of the C.N.C⁶. In fact, General Monzur became closer to Zia for the ability he demonstrated in organising the Army in post 1975 politics. He was expecting to be the Chief of the Army and that, he believed, was snatched by General Ershad. Even he unveiled his deep concern over this decision and complained to Zia that the new Army Chief was of bad character—a vicious and corrupt person.⁷ In this way, Ershad used the conflict between the war veterans and repatriated factions in the Army and became the Chief of the Defence Forces. Thereafter, it was a complete mockery for the heroes of the liberation war that Ershad, a repatriated officer, became the Chief Patron of the Central Freedom Fighters' Command Council⁸ as the Army Chief.

In this time, the ruling BNP was in massive internal chaos in different parts of the country. In Chittagong, the internal disorder of the party became worse and Zia was due to come to this port city on 29th May 1981 to resolve the crises of his party. However, General Ershad, in an unscheduled visit, went to Chittagong on 26th May, just four days before the visit of Zia. He went straight from the airport to the office of Monzur, the General who disliked Ershad most and was in a closed meeting with him until 1:30 pm.. Immediately after this he left for Dhaka, although the Office of the C.N.C confirmed that the Army Chief was due to visit the Military Academy of Chittagong. However, President Zia waited at the airport for half an hour for Ershad, who was also scheduled to accompany him. Ershad informed Zia over the telephone of his inability to attend. However, since Zia was flying to Chittagong, it was reported that Ershad had established contact with General Monzur by telephone and misguided him with the information that the President disliked his presence at the Airport, which offended Monzur that led him into strong resentment.⁹ However, President Zia was killed in a military coup under the leadership of General Monzur—widely believed to have been designed by Ershad—in Chittagong in the dawn of 30th May 1981. Immediately after this blood-spattered event in Chittagong Circuit House, General Ershad was in a closed meeting with Generals in the Dhaka barracks that reported him to be proposing the proclamation of Martial Law in favour of General Monzur. But the Air Force Chief Sadrudin and some army officers did not agree with the decision of Ershad.¹⁰ Subsequently, the popularity of Zia among the junior officers and general soldiers restrained Ershad from acting. In the afternoon, he issued the ultimatum to the coup officers to surrender. General Monzur was killed in army custody within a couple of hours of his arrest. Although he was appealing to journalists to come to listen to him, in his words, the truth of the coup; but was not allowed to meet any reporter before his handover to the army, when he was first captured by Hathazari Police station, a hilly Thana of

Chittagong.¹¹ However, 12 other freedom fighter officers were hanged later following a Court Martial in connection with this coup.

Moreover, Ershad shrewdly used the killing of General Zia in his favour. He took many steps to convince the general public that he was loyal to General Zia and believed in civilian rule of the country. In this connection, his shedding of tears beside the dead body of Zia and the allocation of a palatial building in the barracks to the widow of the late President are observed by millions on TV. He supported the temporary President Justice Abdus Satter and insisted that the Army was not interested in taking power. However, what he smartly did was to increase the salaries and to create many other opportunities for the members of the Armed Forces with the civilian President, which in turn increased his popularity in the army.¹² Due to being linked with this coup, almost all the freedom fighter officers and war veterans in the Army were either killed or sacked or given forced retirement.¹³ Subsequently, he achieved his full control over the whole Defence Forces within a couple of months—after being completely prepared, a leader of the gang in uniform was in the hunt for a proper chance to seize the state power.

4.3. The Rise of a Military Dictator and the Consolidation of One Man Rule

General Ershad had been planning for a military seizure of power since he was sworn in as the Chief of the Army. In January 1981, Ershad in an article published in the Bangladesh Army Journal, stipulated his demand that the Armed Forces as a national institution should have a role in the development process of the nation.¹⁴ His design, however, took shape after the killing of President Zia. In an interview with Peter Neiswald in August 1981, Ershad clearly reasserted his demand that 'the army (of Bangladesh) should be directly associated with the governance of the country, which might fulfil the ambitions of the army and might not lead to further coups'.¹⁵ After a week, Ershad made a similar comment to the correspondent of the *New York Times* and stated that the military in Bangladesh should be accorded a constitutional role to ensure the protection of political system of the country.¹⁶ A guard of the state was threatening to seize the state! These unlawful arguments in favour of army participation in national politics produced huge discontent and controversy among civilian political elites, and some leaders from the ruling BNP and the opposition AL made their strong apprehension over the issue.¹⁷ 155 lawyers of the BSCBA in a statement in the national dailies questioned the legality of the statements in the media by the Army Chief without the support of the civilian President. However, Ershad had been informed by DGFI, just five weeks before the Presidential election in November 1981 that the opposition AL candidate was running ahead of Justice Satter of the BNP. In this situation, he and the top level Generals did not want to take the risk and proposed to Justice Satter to handover

power to the Army. This proposal was directly rejected by Satter flaming with rage and he threatened them that he would leave the *Bangobhaban* (Presidential Palace), if they were to force him again in this regard.¹⁸ But General Ershad and military leaders did not stop here.¹⁹


No sooner was Justice Abdus Satter crowned as President, the Generals started to undermine the civilian rule. Although they were not satisfied with Zia in the last days of his regime, they felt him to be 'their man' who safeguarded them in the state. But they could not continue their trust in the same way in Justice Satter.²⁰ Consequently, General Ershad came forward very bluntly with the proposal for the political role of the Army after the election. The whole political arena became concerned over this issue and the opinion of the President was strictly in favour of the continuation of a democratic rule in the country. The unhappiness and worries over the issue reached the climax in November 1981, when the President had to explain his position in this regard. He made this comment: "the army has role to protect the sovereignty of the country and I do not think any other role is possible."²¹ By contrast, General Ershad was found unshaken and pursued his recent proposal clarifying in the news media that insisted again a claim of the constitutional safeguard to political role of Bangladesh military.²² In this critical juncture, President Satter felt unsafe to continue his office without the support of the Army and tried to achieve a consensus over the issue. Ershad also continued his pressure on President to form a high profile presidential committee that would examine the constitutional feasibility of the political role of the Army. As a result of discussions with top-level Generals on 1 January 1982, the President formed a 10-member National Security Council of which he was the Chairman while the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Industries Minister, the Home Minister, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff were members.²³ But the Chiefs of the three forces i.e. the Army, the Navy and the Air Forces, met the President in following day and refused to join the new council, where the proportion of civilian members were higher. It was considered an audacious revolt by the Generals against the civilian supremacy in the politics of that time.²⁴

It was found that General Ershad was attacking everybody and continued his unrestrained deliveries to the press like a political leader in favour of constitutional role of the Army hoaxing at the rules and regulation of the Armed Forces. A month later, it became clear that General Ershad was preparing for a military takeover. In this critical situation, President Satter took an epoch-making decision for the sake of democracy in the country. He sacked General Ershad as the Chief of Army on 23 March 1982, which was not implemented.²⁵ On 23 March 1982 at 8:30 pm in the Army Headquarters' conference room, the top-level military officers including

General Rahman, General Nuruddin, Brigadier Mahmudul Hassan (D.M.O), Brigadier Amsha Amin and a smaller number of Battalions and Brigade Commanders from Dhaka and elsewhere were present in an emergency meeting. Ershad first gave an emotional speech about his contribution to the army and informed the officers about the latest development of his dismissal by the President.²⁶ Subsequently, under the leadership of General Ershad they formally decided in this meeting for a military intervention in the country within the next couple of hours. Then in the early hours of 24 March 1982, four months after the swearing in of a civilian President, General Ershad proclaimed Martial Law.²⁷ With this step, the armed employees of the state seized its government and suspended the constitution and arrested the supremacy of the civilian politics in the cantonment that killed the passage to democracy of a newborn country. The military as a national institution lost all its credibility; their images falling into the aggression of the illegal exercise of power became contemptuous of their own service rules and turned them into a corrupt and most hated interest group in Bangladesh society. The tanks and artillery were positioned in the streets of the cities. The crackdown and massacres against the people who were arrested, beaten and killed and emptied the streets—as if it they were the attacks of ‘wild demons’ on a quiet and calm civilized society. The fight between the ‘men with guns on their shoulders’ and ‘men without those’ led only to the odious killings of the innocent latter. If the military felt that there had been any irregularities in civilian politics, they could have chosen to contest the election leaving their uniform and gun behind. That was the only acceptable way to change the power in a peaceful non-antagonistic society. However, the military intervention by General Ershad was not accepted by the people and never did win the acceptance of any corner of Bangladesh society. Although Justice Sattar was brought to the TV station in the evening of 25 March 1982 and made a welcome speech for the military men in power, it was clear later that he had not left power willingly to the Army. The military compelled him—putting guns to his back—to resign. Since General Ershad became the Chief of the Army, his open statements to press in the wake of the assassination of President Zia, killing of General Monzur and Presidential election of Justice Satter, anticipated him with an ambitious character to capture the power. However, many home scholars also considered that it was seen as a trend for the part of the military to seize the power in the wake of August coup of 1975—the beginning of undermining the civilian regime in Bangladesh political history.

The survey statistics in table 4.3.1 show the supports for democratic norms and values as well as a strong reservation of the people about the illegal military aggression that deflected the constitutional order of the country. In the survey, 89.3% respondents think that the people of Bangladesh were not expecting the

military intervention by General Ershad at that time. In addition, 64.1% supports the view that the intervention was in the interests of the Armed Forces as a whole, contrasting with 32% disagreeing with this view. However, 91.3% feels that General Ershad captured the state power to fulfil his own personal ambition. In contrast, 69.9% deny the charge against Justice Satter that he left the power willingly to the military dictator. A sense of balance in the survey is found when a close middle trend of 48.5% favours the anomalous political drift after the killing of *Bangabandhu* in 1975 coup contrasting 38.3% disfavours while 13.1% refuses to provide their opinion.



Graph 4.3.1 General views on the military regime of Gen. Ershad in terms of the relationships of six movement forces membership.

The data in table 4.3.1 and graph 4.3.1 show the relationship between six movement forces memberships and their observations about the general impression on the military intervention of General Ershad. Overall, the expectation of the people for military aggression was least likely views with only 7.3% on the whole in which P for 0% and S for 3% only are found very distinctive. In contrast, 'the personal ambitions of General Ershad to seize the state power' was seen as the most likely observation, in which 90%-93.5% is supported by PP, S, I and NPG except TU for 86.7%. Intellectual and professional groups stand out with many agreeing with 63.3% and 60% respectively and PP, TU and the NPG memberships express moderate support with 43.5%, 53.3% and 50% respectively to accept the Ershad regime as a continuation of the post 1975 coup trend, whilst the S membership supports this distinctively with only 23.3% at the lowest. Generally speaking, the survey statistics show that the I and P memberships were distinctive in this way and launch a same line of opinions. However, the PP and S memberships (84.8% and 83.3% respectively) are also distinctive in disagreeing that the then President Justice Satter left power willingly to the Armed Forces. This survey outcome has revealed

the fact that the general sentiment of the then Bangladesh society in the beginning of 1982 did not expect the military aggression in the state power.

However, many causes may be found military takeover in modern literature, although the patronage of the international capitalist order against the rise of socialism in the state power was seen, among many others, as the most important cause for Bangladesh case.²⁸

4.4. The Consequences of Military Aggression

The military aggression of General Ershad in Bangladesh was marked by the huge repressions on her people. This was the episode in the history of the mankind that darkened the political history of the Bengali people in South Asia. The military terrorists broke their own professional codes and outlawed the constitution—almost killed the social, political and democratic instincts of the society. In consequence, the effects of this aggression on socio-economic and political life of Bangladesh were evident in many ways. *First*, the military aggression destroyed the institution of the military itself being disloyal and betraying their own professional rules and regulations, and norms and values of a conventional army outlined in the constitution.²⁹ Political grievances brought them out of their institutional arena when the military entered into politics. Politics also reached the military institution that followed-on from the corruption in their professional actions. The army became highly politicized when General Ershad tried to give the ‘men-with-guns-on-their backs’ a constitutional right for a share of political power, which was quite absurd and denied by the elite of all non-military civil quarters of Bangladesh society.

Second, the military autocracy discarded the constitutional provision for a change of state power, which threw the peaceful political process into uncertainty and disrupted the continuation of a civilian rule in politics. Since the constitution of Bangladesh outlined, in particular, how its government, cabinet and parliament would be formed, the aggression of General Ershad in power was therefore a constitutional collapse of the rules for the officials of the state.³⁰

Third, the actions of General Ershad damaged mostly the social soul of the political institutions of the country. The military intrigues under his rule sowed the seeds of corruption in politics, which affected the whole political culture: parliament, political parties, the election process and the practice of democracy. The military leaders purchased some political leaders as their civilian associates, mostly known as political touts, who were corrupted and jailed by the military themselves, floated a political party—the JP in support of the military administration.³¹ Under the shadow of the umbrella of the JP, the junta elected these political touts and corrupt people to JS through the electoral malpractices, in which few voters went to the polling centres. The institution of the election process was completely damaged.³² The corrupt election practices produced bogus representatives for a rubber stamp

parliament in support of the military dictator. Bangladesh faced these kinds of fraud by the state in her political and social life under the dictatorship of General Ershad.

Fourth, the military in power expanded ubiquitously in all spheres of the society: the state, government, administration, politics and socio-economic activities. The militarization of the bureaucracy destroyed the moral freedom and democratic values of civil administration. He started with the 5-member Brigadier Enam Commission³³ which was set up to reorganise the posts of the civil administration. In fact, this commission designed the suitable positions for military personnel in the civil administration. Retired military officers were employed as the chiefs of the important government offices including corporations, banks, insurance companies, airlines, hospitals, secretariat, foreign and home services, nationalised industries and national transport etc. They enjoyed both the retirement facilities of the Army and the facilities of the civil administration. A report of the Establishment Secretariat showed that the chief positions of 90 main civilian administrations were occupied by retired military personnel.³⁴ In the President secretariat, the military attaché, assistant secretary, PSO to supreme commander and chief coordinator, four ADC to President, were all military personnel. Furthermore, the transport officer, senior comptroller, comptroller, Asst. comptroller, transport superintendent, women medical officer (Presidential Palace), and C.O. and PGR-cantonment (the guard regiment of President) were all military personnel. In addition, in the President secretariat, Tajgaon, the joint secretary (cabinet division), DG, Natural resources and social development sub section, the chairman, joint and additional directors of the coordination and control of the National security division, all of them were from the military.³⁵ In the Defence Ministry, two joint secretaries were Brigadiers and two DS were Majors and the engineering advisor was a Lieutenant Colonel. The Director of Defence Science Institute was a Group Captain³⁶. In 1987, all types of civilian control over the Ministry of Defence were impounded by the enactment of the first and third articles and other rules of the 'Rules of Business, 1975'³⁷.

Earlier in the military takeover, the military dictator relocated six important divisions of the secretariat under the Presidential Secretariat, which was extended further by the inclusion of Supreme Command Head Quarters Division. In the later stages of the take over, he relocated the EC Secretariat and JS Secretariat under his Office. In this way, the military leader established a military control over the civil activities in all important divisions of the civilian administration and centralized all of the power in his Office of the President vis-à-vis Martial Law Administrator. This was considered to be an unforeseen event in Bangladesh in running the government, which broke the moral spine of the civilian administration. In the Home Ministry, the DS was a Major, and 23 in the rank of Lieutenant to Major were employed in the higher positions, in which 14 were appointed as the DIG, police—nine graduates

and six under graduates. Moreover, they were given two years seniority that made the civilian police officers junior to the new appointees.³⁸ These changes of police administration created much dissatisfaction from the top to bottom of the police force and the then IGP, Police exposed his grievances over the situation that led him to be sacked from his service in an unprecedented way.³⁹ The other divisions in the Home Ministry like the Anser and the VDP, Jail and the BDR etc, the highest key positions were held by military personnel.⁴⁰ In the wake of the mass revolution of December 1990, a secret circular was distributed through out the capital from Police forces that exposed the massive dissatisfaction within this institution.⁴¹

In the MOFA, in addition to the military attaché in the Bangladesh High Commissions in foreign countries, the dictator filled up the senior civilian positions of the High Commissioner, Secretaries and other portfolios with military personnel. In this period, 30 retired army personnel were appointed to this Ministry and they were given the most important appointments in the European and other rich countries. According to a report, Ershad himself and his three allies including R.S. Doha, Humayun Rahid Choudhury and Anisul Islam Mahmood, appointed many extra professional persons illegally that damaged the diplomatic activities abroad and ruined the structure, skills and image of this ministry.⁴² In this period, there were 11 retired Generals and 2 retired Brigadiers in the posts of High Commissioner; protocol chief was a Brigadier and 14 other high officials were Majors. The BBC commented on the situation that the officers in the Foreign Affairs Service cadre were declining in number in their own Ministry as a result of continuous appointment from the other cadres.⁴³ The normal features of this Ministry during 1982-1990 was exposed in a report, which argued that appointments and transfer to this ministry depended on the blessings of Ershad himself. His word was the law in this regard. Once this ministry was marked as a mini cantonment. The professional diplomats became frustrated and General Ershad had done it deliberately to keep one or a group under strict watch over another.⁴⁴ As a result of the militarization of the Defence, Home and Foreign Affairs Ministries from 1982 to 1990, there were severe effects on the rule of law in the country: state and government became dictatorial; broke down the rule of law; the process of autonomy was inactivated; differentiation and specialisation of the application of power occurred; the process of accountability in the government and administration was dented; the military and civilian conflict and bad blood reached a pinnacle that smashed the whole administration.⁴⁵ An additional secretary, who went into voluntary retirement many years before the end of his normal period of service reported his experiences to the same author when asked about the causes of his leaving the service: 'the one man show of military dictator can no longer be tolerated; military leaders destroyed the environment of the service that led him to quit the job.

Table 4.3.1 Survey Statistics on the relationships of six movement forces' memberships regarding the level of acceptance of the military seizure of power by General Ershad

	Types of the movement forces																	
	Total			PP			Students			Intellectuals			TU			NPG		
	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.
Expected by the people	7.3%	89.3%	10.9%	87.0%	3.3%	93.3%	10.0%	86.7%	.0%	100.0%	13.3%	86.7%	5.0%	85.0%				
Interest of Armed Forces	64.1%	32.0%	65.2%	34.8%	56.7%	36.7%	73.3%	26.7%	76.7%	16.7%	60.0%	36.7%	55.0%	37.5%				
Sattar left power willingly	23.3%	69.9%	8.7%	84.8%	10.0%	83.3%	43.3%	53.3%	43.3%	53.3%	36.7%	60.0%	10.0%	75.0%				
Seen as post 1975 trend	48.5%	38.3%	43.5%	50.0%	23.3%	46.7%	63.3%	33.3%	60.0%	36.7%	53.3%	26.7%	50.0%	32.5%				
Personal ambition of Ershad	91.3%	6.8%	93.5%	6.5%	90.0%	6.7%	90.0%	6.7%	93.3%	6.7%	86.7%	13.3%	92.5%	2.5%				

Table 4.4.1 Survey statistics on the relationships of six movement forces' memberships regarding the causes of military seizure of power

	Types of the movement forces																	
	Total			pp			Students			Intellectuals			TU			NPG		
	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.
CIOAF threatened by JRB.	41.3%	47.1%	37.0%	58.7%	30.0%	50.0%	76.7%	20.0%	53.3%	36.7%	13.3%	66.7%	40.0%	45.0%				
CIOAF harmed by killing WVO	42.2%	47.1%	32.6%	63.0%	30.0%	53.3%	86.7%	10.0%	50.0%	43.3%	20.0%	60.0%	40.0%	45.0%				
Conflict: WVO vs. RO	54.9%	36.4%	43.5%	50.0%	36.7%	53.3%	76.7%	13.3%	73.3%	20.0%	56.7%	36.7%	50.0%	37.5%				
Conflict: liberal and radical	55.8%	34.0%	39.1%	54.3%	40.0%	46.7%	76.7%	13.3%	73.3%	20.0%	60.0%	30.0%	55.0%	35.0%				
IPO against rise of socialism	76.7%	19.4%	71.7%	26.1%	80.0%	13.3%	80.0%	16.7%	76.7%	20.0%	76.7%	20.0%	77.5%	17.5%				
Abs. of political culture	64.1%	33.0%	63.0%	37.0%	60.0%	36.7%	83.3%	16.7%	70.0%	26.7%	60.0%	36.7%	52.5%	40.0%				
Illiteracy, poverty & inequality	18.9%	77.2%	15.2%	82.6%	26.7%	70.0%	23.3%	73.3%	16.7%	80.0%	20.0%	80.0%	15.0%	75.0%				
CR: Corruption & inefficiency	68.9%	29.1%	60.9%	39.1%	60.0%	36.7%	80.0%	20.0%	86.7%	10.0%	70.0%	30.0%	62.5%	32.5%				
Divisions in civilian forces	68.9%	27.2%	67.4%	32.6%	56.7%	33.3%	66.7%	30.0%	83.3%	13.3%	70.0%	26.7%	70.0%	25.0%				

CIOAF- Corporate Interest of the Armed Forces, WVO- War Veteran Officer, RO-Repatriate Officer, IPO-International Political Order, CR-Civilian Regime

Table 4.5.1 Survey statistics on the relationships of six movement forces' memberships regarding the consequences of military rule of General Ershad

	Types of the movement forces																	
	Total			P. Parties			Students			Intellectuals			TU			NPG		
	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close	Fairly Close	Not close
Destroyed the CPG	96.1%	3.4%	97.8%	2.2%	96.7%	3.3%	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%	0.0%	93.3%	6.7%	95.0%	2.5%				
Damaged the PI	95.1%	4.9%	97.8%	2.2%	100.0%	0.0%	93.3%	6.7%	90.0%	10.0%	93.3%	6.7%	95.0%	5.0%				
Politicised the Army	89.3%	7.3%	87.0%	10.9%	90.0%	10.0%	96.7%	0.0%	96.7%	3.3%	83.3%	10.0%	85.0%	7.5%				
Corruption & black money	85.9%	13.2%	89.1%	10.9%	73.3%	26.7%	100.0%	0.0%	96.7%	0.0%	73.3%	26.7%	82.5%	15.0%				
Destroyed election process	96.6%	2.4%	97.8%	2.2%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	96.7%	3.3%	87.5%	7.5%				
Underdeveloped. & poverty	86.8%	11.2%	89.1%	10.9%	93.3%	3.3%	82.8%	10.3%	86.7%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	80.0%	20.0%				
Destroyed rule of law	94.1%	4.4%	95.7%	4.3%	100.0%	0.0%	93.1%	6.9%	93.3%	3.3%	93.1%	6.9%	90.0%	5.0%				
Good step: Upazila system	72.2%	24.9%	60.0%	35.6%	76.7%	20.0%	86.7%	13.3%	76.7%	20.0%	63.3%	36.7%	75.0%	20.0%				
Full dependency on EPF	85.4%	9.8%	87.0%	10.9%	90.0%	3.3%	90.0%	6.7%	80.0%	20.0%	89.7%	10.3%	77.5%	7.5%				

CPG-Constitutional Process of the Government, PI-Political Institution, EPF-External Political Forces

A bureaucrat of another ministry claimed: this one man (Ershad) damaged everything! From the purchase of file covers to the medical treatment of an office bearer- all were interfered by him.⁴⁶ The man who protested so much against the militarization of the civil administration was Mr Mohi Uddin Khan Alamgir, the Secretary General of the BCS Administration Association. He was made OSD by the military leaders for a long period of time.⁴⁷ The protest against the militarization of the civil administration reached its zenith in 1988, when Ershad announced that 10% of the jobs of civil administration would be preserved for the retired military personnel.⁴⁸ In this time, a remark of Dr Alamgir in a meeting organised by the Citizen Committee created a reaction among the military leaders in which he argued that the civil servants of the Government were the servicemen of the Republic, not of an individual.⁴⁹ The Action Committee for Civil Rule demanded that all uniform men must be withdrawn from all civil offices including even from Bangladesh Police.⁵⁰

Fifth, the military dictator destroyed the electoral institutions as the means of transferring power to the representatives of the people. The EC turned into an untrustworthy body of the junta and its activities became as a circus and a shambles, in which the people did never participate. The elections from the local government to national level held under this period were marked by an empty participation of voters, riots, killings and injuries, gunfights, seizure of polling centres, illegal ballots, theft of ballot boxes and false voting statistics by local and national level election officers. All these irregularities happened under the supervision of military and police officers in charge of maintaining law and order during the elections. The leading main opposition parties of the country never participated under the military rule, adding an exception of the general election in May 1986. So it was always a voter less farce in the name of an election.⁵¹ *Sixth*, corruption, smuggling and the black economy intensified under the military administration of General Ershad. Some high ranking officers of the civil-military bureaucracy and ruling political leaders of the JP in collusion with each other were involved in these malpractices. A research report published during the regime showed how the officials of the civil bureaucracy were involved in corruption. The research surveyed 68 richest men of Dhaka city. Their annual incomes were ranging from Taka 5 millions to 50 millions. All of them except 4 informed the researcher that they maintained a 'monetary link' with high officials of the government to receive extra facilities in their business.⁵²

Seventh, since the military coup, the high ranking secretaries of the bureaucracy and became partners of military in plundering the billions of taka of assets from the people during the whole period of the regime. The 'G-10'⁵³, a group of high ranking 10 personnel from civil-military bureaucracy controlled the whole administration. They acted as middlemen and broker class between the military junta

and the business magnets. An honest and popular institution of the Civil Service hence changed over night into a slave to circumstance. Moreover, the dictator established his networks everywhere in the intelligence branch, secretariat, cabinet, and government media and even to the post offices of the country, which was compared to the 'Spoil System' of USA.⁵⁴ The direct relation of a general bureaucrat with the dictator and first lady made him powerful even over the secretary. Some secretaries were so powerful that they did not even care the Premier and Vice-President of the military cabinet.⁵⁵ The popularly known weakness of the dictator and military leaders for women destroyed moral spine of his administration. As a result, the chain of command of the civil service was ruined and broken down. Over the years, General Ershad along with his bureaucracy destroyed the social structure of Bangladesh society.⁵⁶ The civic quarter of the society believe, Bangladesh might never overcome this damage to society for some next decades.

Eight, the overall economic deterioration led the country into the development of underdevelopment, where the condition of the general populace declined by means of the converse growth of affluent sections in the society. The intense political disorder in the urban, suburban and semi-urban towns and rural-urban peripheries had ruled out the huge possibility of international, national and local initiatives for non-agricultural small and middle patch industrial activities. An agriculture as the main source of development was not functioning any more. The new class of rural medium range landlords cum political touts became the supporters of the military regime to protect their assets who were elected chairmen and members of the UP by force under the auspices of military administration. They transferred their capital from land to the non agricultural businesses in the towns, especially in the service sectors, mostly not as investors but as customers. The repressive measures both in monetary and administrative levels forced the opposition mid level business out of the production. The foreign aid and grants were disbursed in the name of development projects among the high profile Generals, ruling political groups and civil servants, which, as was believed, benefited this section personally more than their proper use in real development. In addition, the condition of the sharecropper marginal and mid-level farmers became worse due to the increasing cost of cultivation. Also, the costs of their livelihoods became unbearable from the earnings of agriculture that forced them to migrate to the city and towns as lower income class. The military leaders sometimes seemed to have been proud for some infra-structural development ignoring the flood of foodless, cloth less and shelter less uprooted landless people to the high ways to cities and towns that intensified the poverty of the society. The target of GDP growth (in average 7%) was never fulfilled and comparatively, decreased to less than 3% in this period 1982-90 than that of 1972-81(more than 6%) and net income per capita


increased only by 35 taka (less than one dollar).⁵⁷ In agriculture, the average rate of annual growth decreased to less than 2% compared to the target of 6% on average.⁵⁸ In the industrial sector, many jute and textile mills were lost due to the policies of military government. The absence of foreign investment due to extreme political disorder, the drop off ability of local consumers to pay resulted in a demand crisis. Strikes and labourers unrest in the industrial sector meant that only less than 3% annual GDP growth on average in 1982-1990, more than four times lower in comparison with post independent period of 1972-1981 (13.9%).⁵⁹

Ninth, the expenditure for the military in this period was increased many ways. Although, the annual budget always showed the military expenditure a little lower than other sectors, it was, in fact, full of lies. In addition to military budget allocations, the military took the expenditure for their education, health and some other developmental works for communications, city facilities etc, from the central budget allocations of these sectors. As they moved through the whole country, set up many military administrative units and patrolled and controlled civilian life, a major part of the budget allocation for domestic security was spent on them in addition to the military budget. Even, many military officers who were given additional positions in the civil administration were also paid their salaries from public funds rather than the military. This made the total expenditure for military many times greater than other sectors like education, health and development works, which was believed to be, at least, not less than 50% of the total annual budget expenditure of the country.

Tenth, it was no doubt that General Ershad left no stone unturned to establish the military interest in politics and business. In one sense, he established the retired officers and soldiers as the mainstream of the business sector, which was mainly supervised and controlled by the *Sena Kallyaan Sangstha* (The Army Welfare Association) while the retired army personnel were established in politics mainly through his JP. *Eleventh*, the policy of the decentralisation of power of the dictator attracted much attention under which a new layer of local government unit was established by *Upazilla* system, which spread and rooted political touts in the periphery of the country, where it was easier to deal with the military administration to create support base for the regime.⁶⁰ *Twelfth*, the junta was dependent on outside international power by debts and aids to secure its longevity, which derailed the social and political independence of the country.

Primarily, most of these consequences of the military dictatorship are supported by the survey⁶¹ focussing the variations in views of six movement forces membership respondents. Table 4.5.1 and graph 4.5.1 shows the relationship between six groups of respondents and their stance regarding these consequences. Overall, the survey statistics initiates unanimous consensus over the gruesome

sufferings of the people caused by Ershad regime in every sector of Bangladesh. By and large, the damage to the electoral process is seen as the most negative consequence as supported by almost all groups by 96.6%-100% respondents except the NPG with slightly lower supports of 87.5%, in which a distinctive similarity is found between S, I and P with 100%, followed by 'destroyed the CPG' which gains supports from all groups by 93%-100% along with P as distinctive (100% supports).



Graph 4.4.1: The Consequences of military regime of Gen. Ershad in terms of the relationships of six movement forces membership

However, 'damage of PI' earns the supports from all groups by 90%-100% in which S is distinctive giving 100% supports. Although, the UZ system is accepted by all groups by 60%-87% respondents⁶², the PP and TU memberships (39.1% and 36.7% respectively) are found distinctive in disagreeing the initiative. Generally speaking, the survey unveils the all movement forces especially the student, intellectual and professional groups to be very blunt in expressing their views over the consequences of military rule. This survey result reflects the fact that there is no major difference in the views of the six movement forces memberships about the military dictatorship of General Ershad that laid an enduring effect on the way to building the intuitions for the democratic society.

4.5. The Repressive Measures of the Military Administration

The military dictator was keen to adopt many repressive measures to subdue the opposition movement that led the society into a permanent war situation. There were unlimited abuses of prisoners and indescribable tortures that took many lives. In a word, Bangladesh under the military rule of General Ershad was a kingdom of 'terrorists in uniform'. However, the repressive measures of the dictator could be evaluated in many ways. *First*, the normal course of repressive measures against the

actions of opposition democratic forces included *lathi* (baton) charges, use of tear gas, rubber bullets and a hose of hot steam and dirty sewer water on the anti-autocracy processions, marches and demonstrations to disperse the participants. The use of direct shooting on these actions was also a normal event during the clash between the furious movement and junta forces. In addition, the forces were deployed with a barricade of an iron fence in the public thoroughfare in the way of the destination of the protest marches and rallies that were already cordoned by riot police and intelligence forces. The thousands of opposition participants, from the capital to periphery of Bangladesh society were harassed by false lawsuits following the warrants of arrest, which created enormous problems in social life.⁶³

Second, the secondary level measures on associative individuals, groups and organisations were marked by colossal repression by the dictator. The substantial harassment of the individual serviceman of the civil administration reached an intolerable level. The union leaders and influential officers of the various civil service administrations were forced either to join the side of the dictator or lose their jobs, or be transferred to a remote location for their alleged connection with the opposition movement. In some events, some of them were sent to jail in false law suits. It was even alleged that the crucial leaders of the civil administration were arrested in the wake of military aggression and were threatened with the army torture cell along with political prisoners, if they would show any negligence to work together with military leaders. Under the special military act, the military leaders imposed restrictions on the all national and regional printing medias: dailies and weeklies and took the control of national TV and Radio, which debarred to publish or print anything without the prior scrutiny by responsible military division until the end of the military dictatorship. The intellectuals, professionals and business magnates were cautioned first by the secret service men about the dissatisfaction of the regime and eventually picked up by the intelligence forces. If he or she posed a considerable threat to the autocracy, a demoralisation process from mental to physical torture began. The eminent intellectuals and professionals of civil society realised this painful measures of the regime. In this way, the dictator stopped the intellectual development and freedom of thoughts in the society. In some cases, the military leaders offered alluring positions such as ministership, ambassadorship, directors and chairmen of corporations and bank etc to the potential opposition leaders to co-opt them in the military administration.

Third, a crackdown of the forces and a brutal massacre used to derail the mass upsurge by heavy *lathi* (baton) and tear gas charges and opening fire on rallies resulted in a number of casualties. This was marked by pools of blood, broken glasses and discarded shoes spreading across the city streets. Charred body parts of the participants of the opposition democratic forces spread across the meeting places

and even birds killed by gun fire lay scattered across the rallies' area. The huge cries of thousands of wounded with affected families filled up the hospitals of the cities. Thousands of opposition participants became limbless by losing their hands or legs or many other parts of the body that led them to be permanently unable to work. Along with this direct massacre, the dictator operated the mass arrest of the movement participants; banned political activities; placed the top-level leaders under house arrest; declared curfew dawn to dusk to stop peoples' movements outside; closed down the all higher level academic institutions including universities, colleges and to some extent, also the secondary schools of the country. Issuing warrants by filing false law suits against participants in the opposition forces from the capital to periphery was a normal practice to suppress the mass uprising that happened many times in the decade long duration of the dictatorship.

Fourth, abuse of political prisoners that suppressed their universal human rights included the extreme mistreatments and humiliations through extensive psychological and physical coercive interrogations under military tutelage in their clandestine operation. According to the testimony of some detainees' experiences, the top level leaders to the workers of the opposition democratic forces, told nightmarish tales of the tortures beyond imagination during their days in the military torture centre. The relatives of the victims could not even find out where these detainees were held for a long time or if they were still alive. The cases interviewed were reluctant to disclose their sufferings and avoided details of the events that had happened. However, they agreed to describe some techniques of tortures that were: yelling, hands and legs chained up for all time, tied up blind folded or head covered for all the time, standing for 12-48 hours in a stress position, using individual phobias, attacking and insulting the ego of the leaders, complete isolation, sitting in electrified chair, put into hanging position on a boiling oil tank with legs tied up on moving *copikal*, compelled to stand on boxes in blind fold with electrified wires attached in hands, stripped and kicked with random beatings on bones, hot eggs pushed into the anus, pulling out the nails of legs and hands in the name of interrogation, removal of all privileges and items of comfort, removal of clothing and being left naked for long periods, compelled to drink their own urine, torture on the genital organs that tied up with heavy stone or brick, connecting electric wires for shock to the genitals causing the infertility and loss of manhood, sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and heat that used the flow of hot stream on head and nose and disrobed standing in the tank of cold water for long hours and the like.


Fifth, surveillance of intelligence agencies, in fact, made the whole country into a prison. Freedom of movement, liberty of speech and the equality of implying rights were seized by the network of intelligence agencies—SB, DSB, and NSI

under the supreme command of the DGFI.—the military intelligence. The involvement of the intelligence agencies in civil dress was ranging from military itself, secretariat, opposition political forces, and educational institutions to the post office of the rural Bangladesh. They were engaged in all operations and could arrest the target, and in some cases, were involved with the assassination of selected leaders and workers of the opposition. In a word, they were the architects of running the military administration.⁶⁴

Sixth, since the early hours of the martial law, as its part of heinous repressive measures, the military junta started to arrest of the mainline opposition political leaders, and veteran students and trade union workers, who were considered a possible threat to the regime.⁶⁵ The most barbaric acts they carried out on the innocent non-political civic masses in the name of Islam that swelled anger and terrorism up from the bottom of the society were to compel the boys and youths to shorten the hair and smeared tar over the 'uncovered parts of the body of the women' who were brought up within a very rich Bengali culture along with Muslim norms and values, although there was nothing indecent or anti-religious in their dress.⁶⁶ These kind of activities produced serious encounters with the progressive women forces of the country.

In general, in the survey statistics in table 4.5.1 all these repressive measures were found more or less effective to establish control of the opposition rebellion,⁶⁷ along with a wide range of variations in the views of six groups of the respondents. The same table and graph 4.5.1 presents the relationships between the six movement forces memberships and their views about the effectiveness of these repressive measures. Broadly speaking, the measures used in the normal course were likely to be more effective than the measures on associative groups and individuals. The repressive measures under normal course category like baton charges, use of tear gases and firing of rubber bullet on the marches and rallies are found as highest effective measures, which are supported by 70% around respondents.

In the second stage, more than 60% respondents think that the measures like 'blocking the marches', 'police cordoning of the rallies' and 'false law suits' under normal course, 'restrictions on the media', 'harassment in job' under individuals and group course, and 'ban on political activities' and 'house arrest of key opposition leaders' under peak movement course are considered as more effective measures to tackle the opposition movement. In the third stage, 50%-60% have considered the rest measures under both of second and third categories to be effective in the same uses for opposing the movement for democracy.



Graph 4.5.1: The effectiveness of the repressive measures used by the military administration in terms of the views between six movement forces memberships

In the relationship of the views of movement forces' membership, baton charge, use of tear gas have earned more than 70% supports as effective measures from the PP, S and NPG while restrictions on the news media finds the same supports from TU in addition to the above three memberships. The students (more than 70%) have been found distinctive to consider majority of these measures to be effective including baton charge, use of tear gas and firing, police cordoning of the procession, restrictions on news media, harassment in service, ban on political activities, targeted shooting resulting killings and injuries and house arrest of key leaders in the peak of the movement and nearly 70% for 'closing down the universities and colleges' and 'issuing the warrant of arrest'. The TU membership is also found distinctive to consider the false law suits as most effective with 80% supports. Generally speaking, the NPG followed by the student forces' memberships are distinctive in finding all repressive measures as effective as they have rendered their higher supports while the professionals are also distinctive to turn down their support to lower proportion for all count of the measures. The relationship shows a strong coherence between all movement forces regarding their difference and supports for the use of normal course and peak time measures as the means of suppressing the opposition movement in which the normal course category has been found more effective than all other measures. The statistics in the same table shows that there is no major difference in the views of these six groups of respondents regarding the effectiveness of the repressive measures used by the regime to suppress the opposition movement and were more or less effective and these tools of the repression increased the sufferings of the people of Bangladesh society

Table 4.6.1 Survey statistics on the views of six forces' memberships regarding the effectiveness of the repressive measures of military administration

	Types of the movement forces													
	Total		PP		Students		Intellectuals		Professionals		TU		NPG	
	Effecti ve	Non Effecti ve	Effecti ve	Non Effecti ve	Effecti ve	Non Effecti ve	Effecti ve	Non Effecti ve	Effecti ve	Non Effecti ve	Effecti ve	Non Effecti ve	Effecti ve	Non Effecti ve
Lathi (baton) Charge	69.9%	29.1%	71.7%	26.1%	76.7%	23.3%	63.3%	33.3%	60.0%	40.0%	66.7%	33.3%	77.5%	22.5%
Block the protest marches	63.6%	35.0%	65.2%	32.6%	66.7%	33.3%	56.7%	40.0%	60.0%	40.0%	60.0%	40.0%	70.0%	27.5%
Use of T. gas rubber bullet	70.9%	28.2%	71.7%	26.1%	76.7%	23.3%	63.3%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	77.5%	22.5%
Police cordon on procession	61.2%	36.4%	58.7%	37.0%	70.0%	26.7%	60.0%	36.7%	53.3%	46.7%	60.0%	40.0%	65.0%	32.5%
False Law suit	63.9%	34.1%	67.4%	30.4%	69.0%	27.6%	53.3%	43.3%	40.0%	60.0%	80.0%	20.0%	70.0%	27.5%
Restrictions on News media	68.4%	29.6%	76.1%	21.7%	73.3%	20.0%	60.0%	36.7%	46.7%	53.3%	70.0%	30.0%	77.5%	22.5%
Harassment: transfer& dismissal	63.6%	35.0%	67.4%	30.4%	73.3%	23.3%	63.3%	33.3%	36.7%	63.3%	66.7%	33.3%	70.0%	30.0%
Individual threats	55.8%	42.2%	60.9%	37.0%	53.3%	43.3%	60.0%	36.7%	40.0%	60.0%	60.0%	40.0%	57.5%	40.0%
Co-optation of oppos. leaders	52.4%	39.3%	52.2%	34.8%	56.7%	33.3%	53.3%	43.3%	33.3%	53.3%	56.7%	40.0%	60.0%	35.0%
Mass arrest of the Participants	59.2%	37.4%	63.0%	32.6%	66.7%	30.0%	56.7%	40.0%	43.3%	56.7%	56.7%	36.7%	65.0%	32.5%
Ban on political activities	60.2%	36.9%	60.9%	37.0%	76.7%	23.3%	56.7%	40.0%	43.3%	56.7%	56.7%	36.7%	65.0%	30.0%
Heavy use of lathi-firing- T. gas	63.1%	33.0%	67.4%	28.3%	70.0%	26.7%	60.0%	36.7%	46.7%	50.0%	60.0%	33.3%	70.0%	27.5%
House arrest of key leaders	60.2%	36.4%	63.0%	30.4%	70.0%	23.3%	53.3%	43.3%	50.0%	46.7%	56.7%	43.3%	65.0%	35.0%
Declare curfew dawn to dusk	58.5%	36.1%	60.9%	30.4%	62.1%	31.0%	56.7%	40.0%	46.7%	46.7%	56.7%	43.3%	65.0%	30.0%
Closing academic Institutions	56.9%	38.7%	58.7%	37.0%	69.0%	24.1%	56.7%	40.0%	43.3%	50.0%	53.3%	46.7%	59.0%	35.9%
Issuing false warrant of arrest	60.0%	34.6%	56.5%	34.8%	69.0%	24.1%	56.7%	40.0%	50.0%	43.3%	66.7%	30.0%	62.5%	35.0%

4.6. Conclusion

A number of scholars—strongly believed to be under the auspices of the super powers—were keen to provide an academic cover for the military intervention in nations around the world from the very beginning of cold war epoch as an agent of modernisation—a development model for the developing countries. In their endeavour, they suppressed the nationalist-democratic or nationalist-socialist movements of the time. In what range of measures—either lawful or moral spirit, it would be useful to consider an ‘inexperienced’⁶⁸ military—a soldier to be a model to rule the mankind, human being, nation or his country who is primarily given training to fight the war—to kill human being, just similar to him—to attack on the human and nature vicinity—the range of all instincts of the existence of human civilisation. It was true in some cases that the military became popular and came out as a strong part of the state apparatus in the post-second world war, which is sometimes argued for the right of their invasion in power. It was practised where there was war—there the military was to be stronger in the government administration. The rise of the cold war made this variable more important to the super powers—a competition around the world was fabricated to capture the support of the governments in their favour. Immediately after the second world war, many countries those who fought side by side with their big allies were found to have strong nationalist movements for their independence—that was due to turn to either democratic or socialist form of government, which would not be favourable to anyone of the superpowers. This, in fact, made the military a variable—a part of conspiracy network to keep their ‘man of choice’ in power, which ultimately made a ‘disciplined war institution’ into a ‘disciplined group of robbers’ prone to state power.

Some have also argued about the power of corporate interest of the military—purely to be seen as the power of their guns. In capturing the whole state mechanism—the media, administration, educational institutions and everything, their robbery was always found straight and blunt—guns pointed to people of the civilised society in voicing the spurious words— for ‘national interest!’ they take the power—basically a deception of looting the wealth of the state. No sooner had this barbaric event happened had it been supported by the concerned international power(s) that was responsible to kill millions of human being in the last century around the world in the movement for the restoration of peoples’ rule—the democracy. As a part of this trend, General Ershad—a military tyranny amid the prowlers of the barracks—the looters of the military institution in Bangladesh brought to hostage of the liberty, freedom, security, impunity and equalities—the universal values of democracy—for nearly a decade. The movement for the restoration of democracy, therefore, was inevitable to return these values of democracy to the people of Bangladesh society.

Notes

¹ S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, Penguin Books, 1975

² Emajuddin Ahmad, *Military Rule and the Myth of Democracy*, University Press Limited, Dhaka 1988, p. 19

³ In Bangladesh perspective, the researcher feels free to use this terminology more suitable as the designee for the coup makers.

⁴ Bilal Hashimi, "Dragon Seed: Military in the State" in *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship-The Political Economy of a Praetorian State* edited by Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, London: Zed Press, Chapter-5, p.148.

⁵ In Bengali, Elahi Neowaz Khan ed., *Ershader Uthaa Patan* (The Rise and Fall of Ershad), Oasis Books, Dhaka 1991, p.4

⁶ In Bengali, Major Rafiqul Islam, in Bengali, *Shairo Shashaner Noy Bachar* (Nine Years of the Autocratic Regime), UPL, Dhaka 1991, p.36

⁷ In Bengali, Ruhul Amin, *Shairature Birodhi Andolon abong Mooldhara Netritta* (Anti-autocracy Movement and Mainstream Leadership), Hira Book Mart, Dhaka, 1993, p.13

⁸ The Bengali term of this national level popular freedom fighters' organisation is *Kendrio Muktijoddha Sangshad*, which has branches all over the country at Thana level.

⁹ In Bengali, Ruhul Amin, *Ibid*, p.17

¹⁰ In Bengali, Major Rafiqul Islam, *Ibid*, p.317

¹¹ The political analyst believed that General Monzur was killed following the order of the highest body of the Army, so that the entire blueprint of the coup could not be exposed. Although the Army Headquarter briefed later that he was killed following a gunfight between two rivalry group of soldiers on the way of his bringing back to the cantonment after his handover to army by Hathazari Police station. However, younger brother of General Monzur believed that his brother was killed following an order from the Chief of Army General Ershad. After the fall of Ershad regime, a lawsuit was filed following the accusation of killing of General Monzur, in which Ershad was the main accused.

¹² In Bengali, Faez Uddin Ahmed, *Pach Dashaker Shriti Katha* (Memories of Five Decades), Parama Prokashani, 1993, p.9

¹³ On 11 November 1981, Ershad recommended 19 war veteran officers for forced retirement that was in effect after the approval of President Satter. Later on, more than hundred officers of the same faction were also forced to resign. In this way, the repatriated officers established their full control over the Army. General Ershad was supposed to be the main architect of these vicious changes and only President Satter drew these to an end.

¹⁴ In Bengali, Emaz Uddin Ahmad, *Bangladeshe Ganotantrer Sangkot* (Problems of Democracy in Bangladesh, Publisher Sheikh Mohammad Ismail Hossain, Dhaka 1991, p.57

¹⁵ See the *International Herald Tribune*, 27 August 1981; See also, *The Guardian*, (London), 7 October, 1981

¹⁶ Quoted from *The New York Times*, 14 October 1981, by Emaj Uddin Ahmad, *op.cit*, p.133

¹⁷ In Bengali, Yusuf Muhammad edited. *Album: Gono Andolon 1982-1990* (Album: Mass Movement 1982-1990), First Part, Tolpal, Chittagong, 1993, p.5. In an Interview with the BBC, the opposition AL leader Sheikh Hasina clearly stated that the Army had been unconstitutionally used in attaining the ambition of the capture of power since the killing of Bangabandhu in August 1975. Hence the illegal demand for sharing power on their part became a usual event, but the access of the armed men to politics must not be acceptable in any democratic society

¹⁸ In Bengali, Emaz Uddin Ahmad, *Bangladeshe Ganotantrer Sangkot* (Problems of Democracy in Bangladesh, Publisher Sheikh Mohammad Ismail Hossain, Dhaka 1991, p.59

¹⁹ Michael T. Kaufman, "Sattar Reportedly Thwarted Plan for Military Takeover", *International Herald Tribune*, 18 November 1981; See also, Emaj Uddin Ahmad, *Military Rule and Myth of Democracy*, UPL, Dhaka, 1988, p. 132, in which he quoted from Kaufman: "nevertheless they had no other alternative than to support Justice Satter at that moment. They dissuaded themselves from taking a pre-emptive bid only when they found out that Satter was running well ahead of all other candidates from a secret nationwide poll conducted by one of the military intelligence agencies." In this milieu, General Ershad and the whole army supported the candidature of Justice Satter for similar reasons. First, the opposition AL policy was not in favour of the Army. Second, the older Satter, who even did not have a strong political base in his BNP, could be easier to deal with their plans to safeguard the future political position of the Army.

²⁰ See the interview of General Ershad with Peter Neiswald, *The Holiday*, 18 October 1981

²¹ *The Bangladesh Observer*, 15 November 1981: See also, Dr Sen, "Bangla Army Chief Insists on Role in Government," *The Hindustan Times*, 22 November 1981: See also, Emaj Uddin Ahmad, *Ibid.* p.134

²² *The Bangladesh Observer*, 29 November 1981, *The Holiday*, 6 December, 1981. The political elites of the society considered it as the dared insolence beyond his limit when he uttered: "Inshallah (God willing), there will be no coups, but what you must do is to find constitutional solutions so that coups and killings do not take place a year later or ten years later or ever again.... Our military is an efficient, well disciplined, and most honest body of truly dedicated and organised national force. Potentials of such excellent force... can be effectively utilized for productive and nation-building purposes in addition to its role of national defence."

²³ *The Bangladesh Observer*, 2 January 1982

²⁴ In this situation, the number of the members of the council was reduced to six, where the three chiefs of the defence forces were included. However, the function of the Council was to advise and assist the Government in all matters related to national security as a whole. The leader of the AL parliamentary party argued in the JS that the new Council seemed to act as Supra Government that was evading JS.

²⁵ President sacked General Ershad as Army Chief on 23rd March 1982 and appointed Major General Shamsuzzaman as the new Chief with effect from 24 March 1982 and asked Information Minister Shamsul Huda Choudhury to broadcast the news on the National TV. But Shamsul Huda Choudhury betrayed the President and informed Ershad about this development.

²⁶ In Bengali, see for details, Major Rofiqul Islam, *op.cit.* p.61

²⁷ *The Bangladesh Observer* 25 March 1982, See also "Martial Law Proclamation Order", Registered No. DA-1, *Bangladesh Gazette*, Extraordinary Published by Authority, Wednesday 24 March 1982. The following is the text of the proclamation of Martial Law:

Whereas a situation has arisen in the country in which the economic life has come to a position of collapse, the civil Administration has become unable to effectively function wanton corruption at all levels has become permissible part of life causing unbearable sufferings to the people, Law and Order situation has deteriorated to an alarming state, seriously threatening peace, tranquility, stability and life with dignity and bickering for power among the members of the ruling party ignoring the duty to the state jeopardizing national security and sovereignty,

And

Whereas the people of the country have been plunged into a state of extreme frustration despair and uncertainty.

And

Whereas in the greater national interest and also in the interest of national security it has become necessary to place our hard-earned country under Martial Law and responsibility has fallen for the same upon the Armed Forces of the country as a part of their obligation towards the people and the country. Now therefore, I Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad with the help and mercy of Almighty Allah and blessing of our great patriotic people do here by take over the assume all and full powers of the Government of peoples Republic with immediate effect from Wednesday, 24th March, 1982 as Chief Martial Law Administrator of the People's Republic Of Bangladesh and do hereby declare that the whole of Bangladesh shall be under Martial Law with immediate effect. Along with assumption of powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator I do hereby assume the full command and control of all the Armed Forces of Bangladesh.

In exercise of all powers enabling me in this behalf I Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad do hereby further declare that:

A. I have assumed and entered upon the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator with effect from Wednesday 24th March 1982.

B. I may nominate any person as president of the country at any time and who shall enter upon office of the President after taking oath before the Chief Justice of Bangladesh or any judge of the Supreme Court designated by me. I may rescind or cancel such from a time to time and nominate any other as the president of Bangladesh. The President so nominated by me shall be the head of the state and act on and incorporate with my advise as CMLA and perform such functions as assigned to him by me.

I may make from time to time Martial Law Regulations orders and instructions among others providing for setting up of Special Military Courts, Tribunals and summary Military courts for the trial and punishment of any office under Martial Law regulations or orders or contravention thereof and of offence under any other law.

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- (2). Prescribing penalties for offence under such regulations or order or for contravention thereof and special penalties for offences under any other law.
- (3). Empowering any court or tribunal to try and punish and offence under such regulation or order or the contravention thereof.
- (4). Barring the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal from trying and offence specified in such Martial Law regulations and orders
and
- (5). On any other subject or in respect of any other matter including any subject or matter specified in or regulated by or provided in any other law.
- I may rescind the declaration of Martial Law made by this proclamation at any time either in respect of whole of Bangladesh or any part thereof under Martial Law by a fresh declaration.
- E. This proclamation and Martial Law regulations and orders and other orders and instructions made by me in pursuance thereof shall have the effect notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force.
- X. The Constitution of Peoples Republic of Bangladesh shall stand suspended with immediate effect
- G. All Acts, Ordinances, President's orders and other orders, proclamations, rules, regulations, by-laws, notifications and other legal instruments in force on the morning of Wednesday 24March, 1982 shall continue to remain unforced until repealed, revoked or amendment. The Judge of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice, Attorney General, Chief election Commissioner, Election commissioners, Chairman and the members of the Public Service Commission, the Controller and Auditor General and others in the service of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh will continue to function. All proceedings, arising out of and in connection with Writ Petitions under article 102 of the suspended constitution shall abate.
- H. No court, including the Supreme Court or tribunal or authority shall have any power to call in question in any manner whatsoever or declare legal or void this proclamation or any Martial Law regulations or order or the order made by me in pursuance thereof or any declaration made by or under this proclamation to have been made or anything done or any action taken by or under this proclamation to have been done or taken or anything done or any action taken by or under any Martial Law regulation or order or other order made me in pursuance of this proclamation.
- J. Subject to the provisions aforesaid all courts including Supreme court in existence immediately before this proclamation shall continue to function but subject to the provisions o Martial Law regulation orders or other orders made by me.
- K. The Martial Law regulations and orders and other orders and instructions shall be made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
- I. There shall be a council of ministers, to aid and advice the Chief Martial Law Administrator in the exercise of his functions. The advisors shall be appointed by the CMLA and they shall hold the office during his pleasure. An advisor may resign his office under his band addressed to the CMLA. The Chief Martial Law Administrator shall be the Chief Executive and head of the Government.
- M. The persons holding office as president, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of state, Deputy Ministers, Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chief Whip and Whips immediately before this proclamation shall be deemed to have been ceased to hold the office with immediate effect. The council of the ministers the and parliament which existed before this proclamation shall be deemed to have been ceased to hold office with immediate effect. The council of ministers and the parliament which existed before this proclamation shall stand dissolved with immediate effect.
- N. The Chief Martial Law Administrator may appoint Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zonal Chief Martial Law Administrator, Sub-zonal Chief Martial Law Administrator, District Chief Martial Law Administrator for effective enforcement of

Martial Law. However The Chief Martial Law Administrator may delegate his power of appointing of sub-zonal and district martial law administrator to the zonal martial law administrators. They shall exercise such power and perform such function which may be assigned to them by me from time to time.

I do hereby appoint:- A.P. No.-3 Rear Admiral Mahbub Ali Khan, Chief of Naval Staff and B. BD|4295 Air Vice Sultan Mahmud BU, Chief of Air Staff as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator.

I do hereby divide whole of Bangladesh into five Martial Law Zones in the following manner:- Zone 'A' Civil District of: Dacca, Dacca Metropolitan City, Mymenshingh, Tangail and Jamalpur.

'B': Bogra, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Rajshahi and Pabna.

'C': Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Bandarban.

'D': Comilla, Noakhali and Sylhet.

'E': Jessore, Khulna, Kustia, Barishal, Patuakhali and Faridpur.

And appoint zonal Martial Law Administrator as follows:

Zone 'A': BA-121 Major General Mohammed Abdur Rahman General Officer Commanding, 9 Infantry Division.

Zone 'B': BA-119 Major General Mohammad Abdur Rahman, General Officer Commanding, 11 Infantry Division.

Zone 'C': BA-112 Major General Abdul Mannaf, General Officer RYT Division, Commanding, 24M SFA.

Zone 'D': BA-132 Major General Muhammad Abdus Samad, General Officer Commanding, 33 Infantry Division.

Zone 'E': BA-183 Brigadier K.M. Abdul Wahed, Officiating Commander, 55 Infantry Division.

They shall hold the office during the pleasure of chief Martial law administrator and shall be responsible for the effective enforcement of Martial Laws and maintenances of law and order in their respective area. I hereby delegate to them the authority to appective areas I hereby delegate Martial Law Administrator within their respective zones

This proclamation Martial Law regulations orders and other orders instructions made by me during their continuance shall be the supreme law of the country and if any other law is inconsistent with them that other law shall to the extent of inconsistency be void.

I may by order be notified in the official Gazette amend this proclamation. Lieutenant General Commander in Chief Bangladesh Armed Forces and Chief Martial Law Administrator (Hussain Muhammed Ershad).

²⁸ There are numerous causes for the military takeover in nations around the world. First, a threat to the 'corporate interest' (Emajuddin 1988) of military service men 'concerned with the position and resource standing' (Thomson 1973), 'lack of adequate budgetary allocation (Nordlinger 1977) or 'civilian interferences in their internal autonomy' (Stephen 1977, Vatiokitis 1961) and 'creation of a functional rival' (Bebler 1973, Rizvi 1976) by a civilian regime. Some considered this corporate interest as 'inextricably bound with their self-image as the selfless and dedicated guardian of the nations' interest' (Nordlinger 1970). All of these views were seen as quite irrelevant in the Bangladesh case, as General Zia increased the income and strength of the army, which was increased further by the civilian regime of Justice Satter. However, a factor like personal interests of the military service men, for example, 'desire for promotion, political ambition and fear of dismissal' (Decalo, 1976) might have some connection. It was clear that only the political ambition—an act of treason and sedition—of General Ershad and top rank officers led to the coup in Bangladesh in 1982. Second, the internal rivalry and factional cleavages were also responsible for the military to be in power. There were several factional rivalries in the post-independent Bangladesh military: (i) *war veteran freedom fighters vs. repatriated non participants of war*, (ii) *BDR (former EPR) vs. regular forces (former EBR)*, (iii) *ideological cleavages, i.e. conservatives vs. liberals vs. radical groups*, (iv) *members of Mujib Bahinee vs. members of regular forces of Bangladesh Liberation Army* (v) *pro-*

Indian support group vs. anti-Indian attitudes in the defence forces' members, (vi) officers vs. soldiers conflict, (vii) supporters of military professionalism vs. inclination to military in politics. Third, the international political order in the 1960s to 70s was in favour of military aggression in the state power in order to destroy the rise of socialism in Bangladesh. In this dimension, the socialist Bangabandhu government was toppled by military aggression in August 1975. The takeover of General Zia was just a more suitable follow up in this regard while General Ershad continued the same process. Fourth, the institutional set up of political culture and the level of their practice was also a precondition for the stability of the civilian administration that was lacked in Bangladesh in the post independent years. Fifth, the nature of agrarian economy of Bangladesh was consistent with the rise of an authoritarian regime. Sixth, corruption of the civilian BNP regime; Seventh, sharp conflicts in the opposition civilian politics—intra-party and inter parties' conflict; Eighth, indemnity act to protect the military coup makers. In general, most of these causes for military seizure of state power in the post-independent Bangladesh is found relevant in the survey, although there is range of difference of views in six membership groups of respondents. The survey statistics in table 3.4.1, shows that 76.7% respondents (in which 38.8% supports strongly) present the highest single cause behind the military rule in Bangladesh as 'the international political order', in particular, the US - British led western capitalist allies were in favour of military seize to wipe out the chances of the rise of socialism in the state power. This factor together with several other domestic issues is seen as explaining the aggression of military on the people. In domestic issues, the sharp conflict and divisions among the civilian political forces (68.9%, in which 23.8% supports strongly); corruption, inefficiency and autocracy of the civilian political leaders (68.9%, in which 25.7% carries strong views); absence of stable political institution and culture (64.1%, including 27.2% strong views), conflict inside the armed forces between freedom fighter factions and repatriated factions (54.9% including 26.2% strongly supports while 8.7% declined to answer) and ideological conflict inside Army between liberal and radical faction (55.8% including 23.8% strong views, while 10.2% declined to answer) are some most important causes of the military seizure of power according to the survey. By contrast, a significant part of the respondents also refute the conflict inside the Armed Forces that led the military interventions (36.4% for conflict between freedom fighters and repatriated factions, and 34% for the ideological conflicts). Although a major part (47.1%) of the respondents does not concur any threat to corporate interest of the military to be responsible for military seize, such as the creating of the JRB under AL regime (supported by 41.3%) and large scale killing of freedom fighters' soldiers and officers under Zia regime (supported by 42.2%) while it was important to note that 11.7% and 10.7% respectively declined to express their views in this regard. But it surely produces the arguments that the presence of this kind of dissatisfaction in the Armed Forces might had some influence to the military seize of the people of Bangladesh. The views of these different movement forces' membership do not differ widely. Overall 'literacy, poverty and inequality' is least likely to be seen as a cause with 18.9% in general, in which PP, S, I and TU support for 20%-27%, and P and NPG for 15%-17%. In contrast, the IPO desire to destroy the rise of socialism in Bangladesh was seen as the most likely reason behind the military seizure of power with 76.7% on the whole, in which S and I are found distinctive to be most likely group with 80% supporting this view. I and P movement forces stand out with many agreeing that the 'JRB threat to the CIOAF' (76.7% and 53.3% respectively), 'the killing of WVO threat to the CIOAF' (86.7% and 50%) and 'the conflict between WVO and RO' (76.7% and 73.3%) are important causes, whilst most of the supporters of other movement forces did not. Generally speaking, the results show that the supporters of I and P memberships are distinctive in this way. PP supporters are also distinctive in disagreeing (54.3%) that 'liberal-radical conflict in the Army' caused the military aggression. The relationship between the respondents of six forces' memberships have accepted a close majority of the causes of the military aggression in the state power including 'IPO against the rise of socialism', 'absence of political culture', 'literacy, poverty and inequality in the society', 'divisions in the civilian forces' and 'corruption and inefficiency of the civilian regime' without significance although the later is found close to have very lower significance (.08). This reflects the fact that there is no major difference in the views of the six groups of respondents regarding above causes of the military intervention. However, the relationship between the memberships regarding the rest of the causes including 'CIOAF threatened by JRB', 'CIOAF harmed by killing WVO', 'conflict between liberal and radical faction inside the Army' and 'conflict between WVO and RO' are accepted with high significance (.000), and however, the later is found close to .001 significance level. This test result reproduces the fact that all of these causes, although they might have different level of acceptance to the different group of memberships, had also influenced the military seizure of the state of Bangladesh

²⁹ Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. *The Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh* Dhaka 1973.

³⁰ *Ibid*

³¹ Although General Ershad assured the nation during the aggression that he would not stay in politics, he encountered all his opposition politically and formed the Jatiya Party (JP) in January 1986. The party stalwarts were mainly from the former BNP cabinet, most of who were charged with several corruptions allegations under Martial Law Courts and were in jail in the beginning of military take over. However, in July 1984, his party started as *Jano Dal* (People's Party) and a National Front was established in support of junta that consisted of the JD, BNP (Shah), ML (Siddiquee), UPP and BDP, which had no real base of support in Bangladesh society. This National Front became the JP in January 1986. Mr Moudud Ahmed and many others, who were mainly known as politicians participating all government. They are always known as the member of ruling party. However, in a rally on 12 January 1986 at the premise of the BM mosque, Ershad announced his formal involvement in this party.

³² The British introduced election system is very popular in rural Bangladesh society and the villagers consider the election as the reflection of all political activities by which they elects their leader. This also reflects the attitude of civil society in democratic practice. The military state damaged this very accepted institution of Bangladesh society. The election under Ershad regime was a farce and became a laughing stock. The maximum cases of election scenario of Bangladesh society under military regime of General Ershad, from Presidential and Parliamentary election to lower stage local government Union Parishad election, were painful and full of cheatings with the people. What happened in this regard is that the military and police of authority guarded the polling centres and some of their terrorists political supporters carrying illegal arms and bombs came to seal up the ballots in favour of their planned candidate. The military back election commission declared an arranged statistics of electoral participation usually more than 50%, which in practice; however, was not more than 1%.

³³ See the documents, Government of Bangladesh, Tables of Organisation and Equipment: Ministries, Constitutional Bodies, and Commissions etc. Dhaka, 1982

³⁴ See the annual report of Establishment Ministry of the Government of Bangladesh, 1990

³⁵ Hassanuzzaman, *Bangladesh: Rastra and Sarkerer Shamarikikaran*, (Bangladesh: the Militarization of the State and Government), UPL, Dhaka, 1991, p.101

³⁶ *Ibid*, p.102

³⁷ See the *Weekly Ekota*, the spokes news paper of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, 15 August, 1989

³⁸ Hassanuzzaman, *Shamarik Rajnitir Chalchitra: Bangladesh Pariprekhita* (The Background of Military Politics: Bangladesh Perspective), Ahmad Publishing House, Dhaka, 1993, pp. 23-29

³⁹ It was heard that the Chief Martial Law Administrator called on the IG, Police in his Office. The military leader grumbled on the Police Chief and came out from his seat and himself put off the badge of IG, Police and shouted with 'you are dismissed'. In a moment the military dictator signed the removal of the Chief the Police Forces.

⁴⁰ The DG of the Anser and the VDP was a Major General and the rest eight positions were filled up by Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major and Captain of the Army. The DG of the Fire Service was a Brigadier and two positions were held by two Majors and the chief of the Jail Division was a Colonel. See Hassanuzzaman, *Ibid*, pp. 34-37.

⁴¹ Translated from the *Secret Circular No-1*, This circular was distributed among the people of Dhaka capital on 3 December 1990. In regard to the militarization of the police forces, the secret circular said that many corrupt military personnel were employed illegally in the superior positions of the Police during the last eight years and 23 SPs of the department at that time were from military personnel. Besides, the general police officers had to depend on the blessings of the military leaders to be appointed in many other positions in their department, and according to this circular this very important part of civil administration had lost its independent role and credibility.

⁴² Translated from the Article, " *Pararastro Mantralalayer Anek Ajana Kahini*" (Many Un kwon Stories of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) published in the Bengali *Daily Sangbad*, 3 January, 1991

⁴³ See *The Weekly Ekota*, 8 May, 1987

⁴⁴ See *The Weekly Purvavus*, Dhaka, year 16, No. 3, 25 December, 1990

⁴⁵ Translated from Hassanuzzaman, *op.cit*, p.69

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.118

⁴⁷ Muntasir Mamun and Joyanta Kumer Roy, in Bengali, *Bangladeshe Civil Samaj Protisthar Sangram*, (The Struggle to Establish Civil Society in Bangladesh), Abashar Prokashana Sangstha, Dhaka, 1995, p. 143

⁴⁸ See the *Weekly Ekota*, 5 October, 1988. Many BCS cadre service associations including administration, police, foreign affairs, doctors, engineers and agriculturists etc protested against this announcement by the military authority. They made it clear to the dictator that this type of decision would destroy the structure and integrity of different service cadres and would lead to severe discontent among the regular service men of the administration.

⁴⁹ He added that cadre services must be given the opportunity to work independently and promotion be given indifferently. He clearly mentioned that none from the outside should be employed in the 30 cadres of the BCS and the age of the service must be restricted to 57, which were welcomed by the civil society of Bangladesh. For more details, see Mohammad Khusbu, in Bengali, *Bangladesher Chatra Andoloner Itihaash (Ershader Shamaykal)* (The History of Student Movement in Bangladesh (the Ershad Period), Student Ways, Dhaka, 1991, p.119

⁵⁰ The Action Committee for Civil Rule, in Bengali, *Sharazantrer Biruddhe Oikya badha Haoun* (Unite Against Conspiracy), a leaflet distributed in Dhaka city on 27 October, 1990

⁵¹ General Ershad held one referendum, two parliamentary elections and one presidential election to achieve national and international acceptance for his military government. Besides, there were also held some local government elections including several Union *Parishad*, municipalities and *Upazilla* elections under the military regime. The referendum of March 1985 asked the people to vote 'yes or no' for General Ershad as President, which was boycotted by the all opposition alliances and parties of the country. The EC of the junta made a false claim of 94.14% voting 'yes' for the dictator, although all national and foreign media found that not more than 4%-5% voters were present in the polling centres (Golam Hossain ed. 1992:108) The *Times* representative reported that Bangladesh learned yesterday (22 March 1985) how to tolerate the lies and it was false to recognise the autocratic military dictator as a democrat (*The Times*, London, 23 March 1985). A frustrated officer from a polling centre in the capital Dhaka, informed the *Times* election observer that less than 16 voters came to this centre and they had to come as they were government employees (*The Times*, London, 23 March 1985). It was interesting to note a remark of the ex-premier of the military cabinet, Aaur Rahman Khan in this regard. He wrote that he inspected 10/12 polling centres in his constituency, the *Dhamrai* area near the capital and he saw the same situation of few voters. After his inspection when he was tired and taking a rest, some of his supporters came to him and informed him that they had cast thousands of votes. He became outraged and asked how it had been possible. They told him that it was very easy: there was no one as opposition or competitor; so they filled up the ballot boxes (Aaur Rahman Khan 1984:146). He also wrote that Britain's resident Bengali community informed him that the press in London also published the report of a 4%-5% turnout of voters in the poll (Khan, 146). In the third parliamentary election on 7 May 1986, the election fights were between the JP, the party of the dictator and the opposition AL, the members of AL alliance including CPB, NAP (Mujaffar), BAKSAL, WPB, JSD (Rob), JSD (Shajahan Siraj); BML, JIB and some other Islamic and minority parties, a total of 27 opposition parties, while other main opposition BNP alliance boycotted the election. From the very beginning, the military leader did not care of the election rules and regulations as his military allies Major General Mohobbatjan Choudhury and Major General Shamsul Haque were on the list of candidates for the JP. Both of them were members of the military cabinet of the CMLA and both were in active service in the Army. It should be mentioned here that a person in active service of the government was not allowed to be member of any political party and was not allowed to participate as a candidate in the election according to the rules and regulations of the EC (*The Weekly Ekota*, 21 March, 1986). On 6 May 1986, the pre election reports of Eric Silver and John Elliot, the reporters from the *Guardian* (London) and *Financial Times* (London) respectively told that all the arrangements for the ballot rigging was completed to make the victory of the ruling JP candidates (*The Weekly Bichitra*, 14 May 1986). However, it was reported that the ruling JP had practised massive rigging in this election to ensure their victory. In most cases, the voters found that their votes had been cast earlier before they reached the polling centre; the polling was completed by 11 am in the morning and they did not need to go to polling centres (Ruhul Amin, 1993:173). There were people's commission to observe this election. The commission invited two members of the British Parliament and one reporter from the BBC as observers of the election. In a joint statement published in the local dailies, they told that their observance of the poll might vary, but their decision was clear that armed hooligans destroyed the election process in the afternoon in favour of the ruling JP and that they were mainly responsible for the rigging in the poll. They commented that the election, which could be or might have been a historical event for Bangladesh to return to democracy, was turned in to a tragedy by the ruling JP. According to their report, (1) there were no parliamentary seats won by the JP without massive terror activities and ballot rigging; (2) In the history of elections in Bangladesh, the army had never been seen in the polling centres, which was found in this election; (3) Since the afternoon of Thursday, the way in which the changes of

election results were announced by the government controlled radio and TV and a sudden halt to the announcements of the results after 6 pm, created a massive speculation that there was an administrative coup against the EC (*The Ekota*, 9 May 1986). The full results of the election were announced on 9 May 1986, in which it was shown that the ruling JP got an absolute majority with 153 seats following the AL to 76. The opposition AL rejected the results in a press conference accusing the dictatorship of a media coup that robbed the real verdict of the people and presented enormous fraud in the poll while the ruling JP secretary general brought the same accusation against the AL in a press conference in the same day. So, it was clear that both of the parties, the AL and the JP recognised the reality of massive malpractice in the election (*The Times*, London, 8 May 1986). Regarding the irregularities of this election, the ex-premier of the military cabinet wrote that one of the government high officials informed him about a record of the election. It was about the seat of a Minister in the military cabinet. As part of his election duties, the officer went around 8/10 polling centres and he found no presence of voters. The presiding and polling officers sat in silence and there were no people voting. At about 11 am, he found a UP chairman with some of his supporters coming along the road to the centre and they informed him that they had sealed up 80% ballots in favour of JP Minister. What a surprise it was! And it might be a real record of massive fraud in the poll (Khan, 1984:171-74). The third presidential election on 15 October 1986 was basically a voter less election as all opposition parties boycotted the poll. Although the military dictator set a range of dummy candidates against himself, there was no participation of people in this election. Moreover, on the Election Day, all opposition parties called a dawn to dusk *hartal*, in order that, the high ways to streets, bazaars and shops, and transports through out the country were empty. It was found that less than 1% of voters cast their votes in this election. In his book, a local journalist described his experiences of the massive frauds in the polls. He wrote that one of his friends, who was a teacher at a famous private college in Dhaka, was appointed presiding officer of a polling centre in the capital city. His friend found that just 1 vote was cast until 11 am. He and other polling officers were nodding off to sleep. Suddenly, an army convoy stopped in front of the centre from which a middle rank officer and some soldiers came out and rushed into the centre; asked the presiding officer how many votes had been cast till then. In response, he informed the army officer that one vote had been cast. The officer became exasperated and ordered him to cast 60% votes, in which 96% must be cast for *Langol* (plough), the election symbol of Ershad. It was surprising that the army officer being present scrambled the presiding and polling officers to seal up the ballot boxes as ordered (Ruhul Amin, 1993:196-97). On 16 October 1986, in a press conference, the dictator vowed that he was able to hold the election although all oppositions threatened to stop it. In response to the legality of the election raised by the foreign reporters, the dictator replied without hesitation that he was elected President arguing that even if it was true that the turn out of votes was 3, in which the majority of them had been cast in favour of him (*The Guardian*, London, 17 October 1986). The fourth parliamentary election on 3rd March 1988 was again a voter less malpractice of the dictator. In 1987, as the mass movement reached its peak, the dictator was forced to set aside the parliament and arranged a further election according to the provision of the constitution, which was boycotted by all opposition forces in the country including the three alliances and the IPs accusing that the military leader was playing a trick on polls. The Election Day was observed by a 36 hour *hartal* called by three major opposition alliances and the other IPs. The opposition forces brought out mass processions, rallies and demonstrations through out the country, but nothing restrained the dictator. 18 candidates of the ruling JP were elected without any opposition, an unprecedented event in the history of Bangladesh. All the international press condemned this and exposed the fact that 40.8 millions voters expressed their hatred towards the election held on 3 March 1988 by a massive boycott of the polls (*The Guardian*, London, 17 October 1986). In this way, the military dictator destroyed the election as a national institution during the period of his unconstitutional reign. The same thing was practiced in all local government elections: UP, municipalities and Upazilla. Immediately after the capture of power, General Ershad took the initiative to establish his control over all the local government units. The UP elections in December 1983 and 1988 and the municipality elections in January 1984 were marked by many killings and injuries resulting from terror activities, vote rigging and frauds in the direct backing of the military administration, in which the Junta elected the members of his choice. The same election drama was played in the Upazilla elections on 16 and 20 May 1985 and 1990 resulting many deaths and injuries. It should be worth mentioning here that all these local government elections were boycotted by all of the opposition political and democratic forces of the country. At this stage, the terrorist activities and *mastanism* (musclemen) became an additional part of the polls. This terrorist activity was used not only as an instrument of political rivalry, but also as the means of total exclusion of the general mass from participation in political activities (Hossain Zillur Rahman, *Bangladesh Unnyan Samikkha*, 1397.

part-8). The overall scenario of these local elections was published in a national daily as: (1) there were massive terrorist activities in these elections including gunfights, bomb blasts and stabbing the rivals etc.; (2) there was massive rigging and fraud in the polls in which the ruling groups filled up ballot boxes in their favour without the participation of real voters; (3) The direct and indirect participation of 'musclemen groups' backed by the military administration influenced the elections; (4) The police and all levels of the election authority including presiding and polling officers participated in this illegal process: sometimes voluntarily and sometimes by force; (5) There also took place many fatal events in the polls like murders, injuries and kidnapping of rival groups and threatening the voters to cast the votes in one's favour or not to come to polling centre; (6) In some cases, the presiding officers ran away in fear of their own security (*The Daily Ajker Kagoj*, 24 February 1991). The people of Bangladesh became fed up with the massive election fraud of military autocracy. At this stage, a slogan became very popular from the top to grass roots: "Amar Vote Ami Debo, Jake Khushi Take Debo" (I will cast my vote whomever I like) (*The Daily Ajker Kagoj*, 3 February, 1993). After the removal of military junta in 1990, immediately after the vote in the fifth parliamentary election on 27 February, 1991, the opposition AL chief Sheikh Hasina expressed her happiness that she had cast her vote after a decade, when she had voted last in the presidential election of 1981. For this, she accused the junta regime and said that she could not go to polling centre during this period due to the massive terror attacks on the polls by JP musclemen (*The Daily Ajker Kagoj*, 3 February, 1993).

⁵² Matiur Rahman and Syed Azizul Haque, in Bengali, 'Dhanik Ghustthir Lootpater Kahinee' (The Stories of Plunder of the Rich Class), *Shoochana*, Dhaka, 1987 cited from a research report on third world urban sociology: 'The Richest People of Dhaka City' by Kamal Siddiquee, Syeda Rowshan Kadir, Sitara Alamgir, and Saidul Haque, which was published later in the form of book as *The Social Formation in Dhaka City*, UPL Dhaka 1990.

⁵³ Hassanuzzaman, in Bengali, *Bangladesh: Rashtra and Sarkerer Samarikikaran*, (Bangladesh: The Militarization of State and Government), Dhaka, p.122

⁵⁴ A famous journalist and columnist, Najim Uddin Mostan, in an article in Bengali, 'Proboor Sange Bidaye: Bangladeshe Spoil Systemer Provarttak Ershad' (Good Bye with the Master: Ershad, the Instigator of Spoil System in Bangladesh). *The Weekly Khabarer Kagoj*, Dhaka. 20 December, 1990, p. 21. He used the government and semi-government officials in this way so that many of them, those who were the chiefs of the important industrial and monetary institutions, became as 'a slave to master'.

⁵⁵ Mahmud Shafique, in a report published in a Bengali weekly, 'Middlemen Amlatantrer Bister' (The Spread of Middlemen bureaucracy), *The Weekly Bichitra*, Dhaka, 21 August, *

⁵⁶ This included the suppression of the opposition democratic movement following many killings, injuries, arrests and unlawful lawsuits against political and socio-cultural activists; played the election drama and circus of media coup and frauds in polls; plundered billions of taka from hundreds of sources and removed these moneys to foreign countries; created a bigger wealthy class over night; expended millions of taka to personal aggrandisement; organised rallies with hired people; and forced the youth and students of the society to ruin, first, by closing down the academic institutions for years and second, spreading terrorism by supplying illegal fire arms to them.

⁵⁷ *The Daily Sangbad*, in an article in Bengali, 'Ershad Sarkerer Shath Bachar,' (The Seven Years Rule of Ershad Government), Dhaka, 25 March 1989

⁵⁸ *Ibid*,

⁵⁹ *The Weekly Bichitra*, 16 year, No. 29, Dhaka, 8 December, 1987

⁶⁰ The UZ chairman would hold office for a five year term and they were given the status of a deputy secretary of government. Furthermore, they were given wide powers and responsibilities at the UZ level. Bertocci points out, "dependent on government funds for their activities, these local level officials will, on the one hand, be inclined toward regime loyalty, while, on the other, their considerable resources will endow them with significant patronage potential for consolidating their own power bases and, by extension, that of the ruling regime." See Syed Serajul Islam, *Bangladesh: State and Economic Strategy*, Dhaka: UPL, 1988, p.176. See also, Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladesh in 1985: Resolute against the Storms," *Asian Survey* Vol. 26, No.2 (February, 1986), p.230.

⁶¹ The Table 3.5.1 presents a general views about the consequences of the military dictatorship of General Ershad on the socio-economic and political life of Bangladesh society. Overall, 96.1% of the survey respondents (in which 81.1% supports very closely) have brought it delight that the dictator had shattered the constitutional process of the change of government in the country while the extent of negative influence on political institutions is supported by 95.1% (in which 60.7% supports very closely) who believe that the military rule has damaged the political institutions and political culture of the society patronizing a loyal group in every sphere of socio-political life. The dictator destroyed

the political party, election procedures, parliament, democratic tolerances and all other components of democracy. However, 96.6% of respondents (in which 67% supports very closely) believe that the military rule ruined completely the electoral process of the country. In this connection, the survey reflects that the military rule has the drawbacks on its own institutional professionalism that is supported by 89.3% (in which 49.5% supports very closely) who believe that the dictator has politicised the Armed Forces, and destroyed the Army as a professional institution. The absence of elected legislature under a military oligarchy lessened the form of accountability in economic activities. A vicious circle consisting of the retired or sacked military service men linked to the civil and military bureaucracy and their loyal political allies controlled the central activities of the economy, which stimulated corruptions in the ingredient of administration and patronized the black economy. This is unveiled by 85.9% respondents (in which 59.2% supports very closely) who think that the regime has spread and rooted corruptions and black economy, smugglings, etc through out country suffocating the drained political atmosphere. The dictatorship of General Ershad was also marked by acute poverty and underdevelopment steering for foreign aid that led to political dependence on the centre countries of the new international political order, which has come across the views of 86.8% respondents (in which 43.7% supports very closely), who make the regime responsible for acute poverty and underdevelopment in the country while 85.4% (in which 40.3% supports very closely) considers that it had made the country dependent on international political forces—as treated in another sense that the dictator was sustained in power with the support of international political forces. The domestic law and order and human rights situation were ever worse under the reign of Ershad. The survey reveals the issue with support of 94.1% (in which 51% supports very closely) respondents, who consider that the regime destroyed the rule of law in the country. Many people were killed and injured in the anti-Upazilla movement during 1984-85, however, 72.3% respondents (including 35% very closely) supports this local government reforms of the military administration.

⁶² The survey has been conducted in 2003, which is nearly two decades later of the event (anti-Upazilla system) happened under the military regime of General Ershad. However, this local government reform established a new layer of local power exercised directly by elected representatives at thana (local government layer based on police station) level between District council and *Union Parishad*, the lowest unit of local government. At that time, political analyst as well as countries leading opposition parties explained this step of the dictator as a successful measure to build his support in the grass root of the country.

⁶³ The absence of the earning members stopped the income of many families, which destroyed the domestic economy; broke down the family ties; undermined the traditional family values and created an over all social disaster in the community.

⁶⁴ Especially, they had sources and informers in all opposition political parties, student organisations, trade union, professional and intellectual bodies in the higher ranks, from which they could easily collect information in advance about the programmes and actions of the movement forces.

⁶⁵ *The Bangladesh Observer* 25 March 1982, See also ‘‘Martial Law Proclamation Order’’, Registered No. DA-1, *Bangladesh Gazette*, Extraordinary Published by Authority, Wednesday 24 March 1982. The martial law orders and regulations forced to shut down all educational institutions for indefinite period and imposed censorship on the press. All kind of political activities were strictly prohibited for the following year under the measures announced by the military authority.

⁶⁶ The general Muslim women of Bangladesh society, in accordance with their culture and heritage and ethnic origin, use to wear *Sari* and blouse. The blouse is used to cover their top (a part that starts below the head and ends before the belly) and the *Sari* is used to cover the whole body that starts mainly over the blouse part down to the leg. Sometimes it also covers up to the head leaving the face open. In this pattern of dressing, sometimes the parts lower the ribs or the part of belly side or necks or heads are used to leave open...the barbaric soldiers smeared tar to black out over these parts that sometimes went beyond the limit of civilised norms and values. In fact, with these heinous activities, they wanted to capture the supports from fundamentalist preach or Imams of the Muslims communities. These activities of the soldiers under military rule in Bangladesh were the serious misconducts and violations of human rights that are most fundamental to preserve by any means.

⁶⁷ There are two distinct views in the survey. One group of respondents believe that the repressive measures were effective to denounce the opposition movement for the time being, and this group expressed their opinion according to the planned theme of the questions. By contrast, with radical wisdom, another group of respondents believe that the repressive measures were non-effective or a little effective as these were counter productive generating more violent actions in the movement. These measures might have been considered with different level of effectiveness to suppress the opposition movement. Considering these differences above, *for the use of normal course of*

repressive techniques, the survey shows that using tear gas and rubber bullet (70.9% with 24.9% for most effective opinion) *lathi* charge (69.9% with 24.3% for most effective opinion) were effective to wreck the procession, marches or demonstration of the opposition forces. However, 29.1% and 28.2% respectively feel these as non-effective carrying the sense of exploring the counter movement. Among other measures, barricade (block) to stop procession or march by deploying forces (63.6%), police cordon or guard on procession (61.2%) and false law suits against the movement leaders and organisers (63.9% with 22.3% for most effective opinion) were considered as effective to keep the opposition actions under control. By contrast, 35%, 36.4% and 34.1% respectively believe that these measures were no longer effective to abstain the participants from their actions. In the second stage, among the *repressive measures against associative groups and individuals*, restrictions imposed on news media (68.4% with 17.1% most effective opinion), individual harassment in service i.e. sacking, transfer, demotion etc (63.6% with 12.7% most effective opinion), individual life threat (55.8% with 7.2 most effective opinion) and co-optation of movement leaders (52.4% with 8.8% most effective opinion) have been considered as effective measures used by the military administration. However, supporting the 'counter productive' sense, 29.6%, 35%, 42% and 39.3% respectively prop up these measures as 'no effective' on the movement for democracy. In the third stage, amid the *measures used in the pinnacle of the mass movement*, mass arrest of the movement participants (59.2% with 24.9% most effective opinion), ban on political activities (60.2% with 22.7% most effective opinion), use of heavy baton-tear gas and firing on marches and gatherings (63.1% with 21% most effective opinion), house arrest of key leaders (60.2% with 20.4% most effective opinion), declare curfew for indefinite period (58.5% with 18.8% most effective opinion), closing down the educational institutions (56.9% with 24.9% most effective opinion) and issuing warrant against the leaders and organisers of the actions with false law suits (60% with 21% most effective opinion) have been considered as effective to tackle the opposition movement when it reached the peak. By contrast, considering the 'counter productive' sense, 37.4%, 36.9%, 33%, 36.4%, 36.1%, 38.7% and 34.6% respondents respectively believe that these hard line measures were no longer effective to derail the mass upheaval rather than increasing casualties.

⁶⁸ The audio interview of the military dictator with researcher during his fieldwork in Bangladesh in March 2003. In his interview, General Ershad told 'since three months earlier of the takeover I have deliberated several times that we are not experienced people. We do not know how to run a country, but the things were going such way and that led us to takeover.'

PART II

THE SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE MOVEMENT

Chapter Five

The Formation of the Social Base of the Movement for Democracy

5.1. Introduction

The movement for the restoration of democracy against the military regime of General Ershad originated in a social base that was formed in the wake of social change in the post independent Bangladesh society. In fact, the analysis of the trends of social change of the last several hundred years' social history of Bangladesh easily gives a glance of the aspiration for freedom, equality and liberty of the people, which has evolved in the process of the ethnic and social formation of the Bengali nation.¹ In brief, the history of social change of this nation functions from the pre-Mughal period where the cities and towns were developed gradually in the bank of the water ways of canals, rivers and seas on the basis of commerce and business.² The development of a systematic institutional framework in the socio-economic life of the Bengal was the main contribution of the Muslim and Mughal period (1200-1759), which was mainly run through these port cities in the process of revenue collection³, central management of the irrigation system⁴, building the gigantic structure for administrative and military purposes⁵, development of road communications⁶, the trend of individual accumulation of capital through the development of interest bearing users capital along with its twin merchant capital in fourteenth and fifteenth century Bengal⁷, the development of commerce and monetary system⁸, the development of the education, cultures and economic activities with the combination of local and more enriched Mughal heritage.⁹

The elementary form of the modern capitalist economy based on business and commerce was present in Bengal from the end of seventeenth century before the establishment of British rule in India.¹⁰ The social changes under the British period (1759-1947) were mainly two fold. First, the more systematic and institutional development in the social life under the initiatives of land reforms—the formal development of private property¹¹, further expansion of irrigation¹², the huge communications network by rail, road, water and telegraph¹³, making an 'associate class' of the British ruling elites—might be considered as the formal creation of a middle class—by building huge institutions in the combination of local and western education, finance and culture¹⁴, development of the institutional framework of the administration and judiciary¹⁵ and getting the touch of industrial development¹⁶ that flourished by the industrial revolution (1750-1880) in the British main land. Although, these contributions happened, according to most evidence and argument of the academicians, for the interest of British rule itself, however, these brought a significant change in socio-economic life and in the

development of post colonial social formation of the South Asian nations including present day Bangladesh.

Second, these contributions to social life gradually rooted and changed into the political aspiration of the people and caused the birth of nationalist and freedom movements—violent and non-violent, revolutionary and non-revolutionary peaceful forms—for the liberty, equality and freedom of these nations that led a peaceful solution in the independences of the India and Pakistan in 1947. This second development of this kind of political movement was advanced under the neo-colonial Pakistan period (1947-1971) in the form of the struggle for social and economic liberty of the Bengali nation that developed from the ‘policies of disparities’¹⁷ by the central civil-military intrigues of Pakistan for their then Eastern wing—Bangladesh. This period was marked by huge protests, riots, rebellions, killings and movements for social and political emancipation, which ended with the traumatic and blood-spattered civil war that resulted in the brutal genocide of three millions lives and the atrocities of the rape of two hundred and fifty thousands Bengali women of East Bengal by the barbaric Pakistan Army. The social formation of this Bengali civil war originated in the development of an educated Muslim middle class that was mainly centred on the British established Dhaka University in 1921 and many colleges in the region.¹⁸ There also developed a bourgeoisie based on kolkata—majority non-Muslim and some Muslims but non-Bengali or a lower proportion of Bengali origin—since the beginning of the twentieth century, which slowly increased first by Muslim majority based on Pakistan after the British left India in 1947. Under Pakistan, the proportion of Muslim bourgeoisie slowly increased among those who were in touch with the ruling ML and military government of Pakistan and their allies of ML elites in East Bengal. Although a middle class came into power under the provincial government of the UF in East Bengal from the progressive Bengali origin for some time (1954-56), they were kicked out from power before their transformation into a bourgeoisie. However, the proportion of this Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie increased in the wake of the India-Pakistan war in 1965 when a majority of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie of East Bengal left for India and replaced mostly by a local Muslim peti-bourgeoisie. In the end of 1960s, this new bourgeoisie seemed to have been defeated in the competition with non-Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie patronised by the central civil-military government of Pakistan in all sectors of economy, which led them to support the Bengali nationalist movement for the independence of East Bengal.¹⁹ So it is clear that Bangladesh was born in and with the history of fertile and breeding field of civil unrest, protests and movements in her social and political formation, which must be considered in the analysis of the social formation for the movement for restoration of democracy against the military

dictatorship of General Ershad. The social history also unveiled the truth of this nation that they were ruled by the repressive and coercive military oligarchy under all periods of the Mughal, British and Pakistani reign so as to the development of political movements in the region.

In the post Pakistan colonial period the pro socialist objective of *Bangabandhu* government until 1975 aimed at the development of the society from the base.²⁰ The problem with this attempt in the social formation was that the kind of working class and proletariat army was needful for this kind of speedy social change was not shaped fully with the liberation war of Bangladesh and even in any stage of the development of post independence ruling class. The inevitable consequences were that these socialist steps of *Bangabandhu* divided his own party leaders who were born and brought up in the well rich upper middle class of the society. These divisions in the ruling class led to the downfall of the socialist *Bangabandhu* regime by military coup in August 1975 in the interest of vested ruling faction as well as national and international bourgeoisie forces in the background. However, the social change returned to its old track towards the reestablishment of bourgeoisie order under the new post-Mujib military administrations of General Zia and General Ershad.

This social change initiated a transformation of class configuration and economic independence as well as social disparities that developed differences, conflicts and an objective for self emancipation of the people in their social milieu.²¹ For Bangladesh society, this involves first the changes in how its landed class and capital shifted to the non-agricultural class, and the commercialisation of this capital restructured the relation of productions and the 'social choice of individuals for social well-being'.²² In both new set ups—urban non-agricultural sectors and rural land, 'social capital'²³ changed as well, which was a considerable element in the change of social structure of the 1980s. The network of the flow of this non-agricultural social capital included the urban centred development—business and employment generation, denationalised agro-based industrial sectors, private investments including local, national, international and joint venture, factories and firming—based on small capital, development of export-oriented garments sector, new local initiatives from government through banks and financial organisations for the development of small industries, housing, super markets; development of service sectors including banks, insurances and hospitals, foreign exchange from repatriated Bengali communities especially those were working in the oil rich middle east countries, illegal capital from smuggling and bribe in the internal economy, NGO operations in the grass root communities. A significant mobility of social capital has been functioning between the agricultural communities—big land owners, medium and marginal farmers, leasers, share-

croppers on the basis of landed production due to the 'land reforms'²⁴ in the post independent period. This social change was spontaneous being disrupted by the post-independent military regimes on the way of its flight to full swing economic boom.

An effective democracy movement always originated in a developed industrial society in the sense of academicians of the west, which include a kind of social conflict that initiates a competition over the capital flow as well as develops a freedom in thoughts and actions for the well being of a stable society. Bangladesh as a less developed agrarian society, therefore, needs to examine how an alternative way of capital flow was ensured in the absence of industrial capital in western sense that gave birth of a critical and completely different social relation for the democracy movement. The question is that to what extent this social change had an effect on the success of the movement for democracy. Bangladesh in the 1980s was an over populated country, but led the entire developing world in the terms of income generated (GDP) per square kilometre of land area.²⁵ The scale of necessary social change for the development of active movement for any change in the society does not require bringing the whole masses to the spotlight. A standard part of this population needs to be covered by a minimum limit of major indicators of the development for the success of the movement. According to the history of many freedom movements and democratisation processes around the world, the socio-economic development, literacy and class configuration of these nations were important in allowing such events of change in their societies.²⁶ The growth of these indicators for building a suitable social formation for the success of the movement for democracy was visible in the 1980s Bangladesh society. The situation of this changing mode of economic life, socio-economic status and related demographic factors, social differentiation and class participation are empirically examined by the survey that is also able to demonstrate the state of social formation for the movement for democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

5.2. Bangladesh Society in the 1980s

Understanding the movement for restoration of democracy requires an analysis of the Bangladesh society in the 1980s in terms of its socio-economic development and class composition of the movement forces that were opposed to the military dictatorship. It is also evident to relate here that, many authors have stressed the close cultural linkages between market capitalism and democracy.²⁷

In order to understand the socio-economic development of Bangladesh under the period of the movement for democracy, the structure of its population, income and employment—the essential elements of any social change have to be analysed. The total population of Bangladesh was about 114 million (1990 population census

report) of which 52.6% grown adults (15-64 yrs.), 44.3% children (0-14 yrs.) and 3.1% adolescents.²⁸ There are 17.3 million teenagers; 48 per cent of the total population of the country are female which figures at 53.75 million. The number of tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and elsewhere in the country are 1.3 million. In 1990, 29.4% GDP came from agriculture which was 41.2% in 1980. The GDP from industry, trade and commerce and service sectors were 70.6% in which industry, trade and commerce was 20.9% and 49.7% from service sectors. In the industrial sectors, 12.7% came from manufacturing and the rest came from trade and commerce.²⁹ The industrial labour force employed in the mills and factories, transport industry, tea gardens, weaving and other industrial units along with agricultural labour force numbers of about 30 millions. Agricultural labour forms the largest group of this category i.e. about 20 million. These 30 million people constitute the working class in Bangladesh. The nature of their work mainly involves physical labour. The number of white collared employees in the government, semi-government, autonomous and non-government institution, agencies and offices, shops, trading houses, commercial organisations and factories stands at 5.6 million. Their work is clerical and semi-clerical in nature. The number of professionals comes about 9 million.³⁰ About 18 million adults are unemployed. Their number was fast increasing both among literate and illiterate sections of adult population. The age of the majority of this group ranges from 18 to 25 years. These people do get occasional and temporary jobs. But these do not bring them enough money for their livelihood. That makes them by and large dependent on the earnings of the other members of the family (S.A.Khan, 1991). In fact, the growing unemployment problem of the youths posed a serious threat to the socio-political life of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh being a predominantly agrarian country of peripheral capitalism its general social structure was gradually becoming more marked by income inequality, especially in its rural sector (Sen, 1994). On the economy, the impact of capitalism, foreign dependency and poverty—all existed together.³¹ The distribution of income was largely influenced by structural factors. On the other hand, economic growth, even fuelled by resource growth, technical and structural changes can not occur evenly in all economic activities and social strata. Consequently wealth and power were concentrated in a few hands. Rural society in Bangladesh was highly differentiated and its population displays a complex structure of big landowners and tenants; big merchants and salesman; rich moneylenders and poor peasants, artisans and landless labourers etc. This structural pattern forms the basic and fundamental layer of intra-social class disparity in earning and welfare. The most important factor causing high inequality in income distribution was the uneven distribution of land ownership and related assets. Agriculture was the main source of income and

possession of agricultural lands was the prerequisite for possession of economic as well as socio-political power which, in turn, helped to enter into development efforts and decision making process. The influential elites by virtue of their economic and political power got free access to rural resources nexus and derive benefits from all development processes while the poorer sections scarcely get any access to them and thus they were deprived of the benefits accrued from the development efforts of the country. This state of affairs which has been prevailing in Bangladesh was confirmed by a survey conducted in 1984 during the rule of Ershad.³² Thus the rural power structure, commercialization of rural society, and agrarian social relations were primarily responsible for the process of polarization which was deepening the inequality in the rural society of Bangladesh during the autocratic regime of Ershad. The proper functioning of the market economy—maintaining the law and order, ensuring property rights, keeping the high ways and ports operational in the face of indiscriminate political programmes, which raises basic concern of the human rights and security, had been posing slow steps in the beginning of 1980s and started to function after the JS election of 1986 and withdrawal of Martial Law—still in the face of socio-economic setbacks.³³

5.3. Urbanisation and Industrialisation

The trends of urbanisation and industrialisation in any country could be considered as the most important social indicators to analyze the democratisation process in the context of changing the order of society. Many problems have been found regarding the industrial development in the peripheral countries.³⁴ In spite of these problems, and the economic arguments as to whether there should be priority in development for agriculture or industry, or a path of balanced growth, recognition that manufacturing has some place in the economic mix of each country, varying with its resources and stage of development, has led third world countries to encourage industrialisation. After the end of British rule in the sub-continent, Bangladesh was treated as a colony by Pakistan until her independence, which left many deficiencies for this country. The various initiatives were taken for rapid economic development in the first three years—the period before the introduction of the one party socialist system in January 1975—of the *Banghabandhu* regime towards the development of capitalism under the state auspices, however, the free economy policy of Zia regime had changed the situation towards an urban base for industrialisation in the 1980s—small manufactures, poultry farming, factories of different local market goods, operation of different multi-national and joint venture companies etc were found to be established in this period³⁵, which might be considered to create an urbanised culture as a whole. This urbanised culture, comparatively, was close to that stage of western culture in which they had been pioneering democracy in their societies. As the urbanisation is an indication of

modernisation—the sign of growth and economic progress, the whole world is moving towards a more urban existence and where as the process is more nearly completed in the small number of rich industrialised countries, it is only in recent years that marked urbanisation has started to sweep over the less developed countries.³⁶ As a less developed country, Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s was seen to move towards urbanisation, although she could not be able to ensure the ‘urban opportunities necessary for the growing urban population’.³⁷

The wide gap in living conditions separating the labouring masses from local elites, foreign advisors and tourists is less taken for granted. The time and again potentially powerful sectors of the labour force are induced to behave as vested interest groups, concerned to pressure and improve their privileges rather than to express solidarity with the great numbers of less privileged workers.³⁸ This kind of significant change had been found in the growth of ‘urban’³⁹ population in Bangladesh in the 1980s during the democracy movements. It was found that the proportion of urban population of Bangladesh had increased relatively quickly during 1961-1974(137.6%), 1974-81(115.8%) and 1981-91(65.89%). The area expansion was the principal reason for population growth in urban area. According to 1991 census total area occupied by urban areas are 9576.90 sq.-km. In 1981 this figure was 5230.15 sq. km., which shows, inter-censual urban areas’ increase by 83.11% in 1981-91.⁴⁰ The literacy rate for Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi were 54.8%(male:61.1% and female:46.6%), 52.6%(male:65.1% and female:34.9%), 53.9%(male:60.4% and female:46.1%) and 44.8%(male:50.9% and 37.9%) respectively⁴¹, which was also in suitable level for movement for democracy.

Since the democratic movement against the dictatorship of General Ershad, was mainly confined to the metropolitan cities of Bangladesh, the analysis of urban social structure becomes imperative. The social structure of the capital city of Dhaka—the nerve-centre of the movement had a significant development in two decades in the post-independent period that was confirmed in an empirical study⁴² in which the researcher pointed out a significant social change related to the movement for democracy. On the other hand, the poor people belonging to the both formal and informal sectors in the city of Dhaka make the floating population who mainly come from the lower middle class.⁴³ They participated in all actions of the movement in significant numbers. In the same trend, it is also noteworthy that, between the census years of 1980 and 1990, it was the semi-urban areas rather than the urban municipal area that experienced the highest growth of population.⁴⁴—where a process at work in the development of ‘compact townships, habitation centres or rural growth centres’⁴⁵ in which the rural settlements grew in conglomerations around these rural towns that promoted various non-firm activities—catered to urban like and income elastic consumer demand. According to some recent studies, these are the kind of

activities that have shown more dynamism within the rural non-firm sectors in terms of production growth associated with improved technologies and higher labour productivity.⁴⁶

These socio-demographic statistics of the Bangladesh urban population in the 1980s unveiled a suitable social formation trend in favour of a democracy movement in the country. Moreover, this urban society was further extended to the rural people as much as possible by different steps taken by the local government reforms. Under the 'Local Government Ordinance 1984'⁴⁷ the whole country was divided into 64 districts and 464 upgraded *Upazilla* (sub-district) with completely a new administrative and judiciary set-up which might be considered as one of most important steps that led Bangladesh to be a one kind of peculiar third world urbanised society that developed some opportunities of employment, education and judiciary in the sphere of village-level peasants, workers and very lower class strata of the society. Although it might be considered that this step also created much political disorder in these rural towns. In fact, starting from the grassroots, the secret plan of the junta was to establish military administration in all of these upgraded sub-district towns to set control over the whole political environment of the country. These rural towns, however, slowly changed into the new fronts for movement of the opposition forces as 'the urban infra structural environment is always favourable to several movement operations'.⁴⁸ The 'socio-demographic characteristics'⁴⁹ of these urban population were strategically considered useful for the development of social movements against the military dictatorship.

5.4. Empirical Observations on Socio-economic Indicators


The socio-economic instability in any society is regarded as the fertile land of political instability: movement, protest, strikes and violence. The data in table 5.4.1 reveals the perceptions of this situation of socio-economic structure of Bangladesh during the period of General Ershad. The statistics reflected the views of the most unpleasant features of the socio-economic life, which might have an overall influence on the democracy movement. In general, the survey supports the presence of extreme backward situation in the development of poverty level, illiteracy, population growth, unemployment, social differentiation, corruption, landlessness, dependency on foreign aid and debts, and the absence of efficient leadership in civilian politics.⁵⁰ Table 5.4.1 and graph 5.4.1 presents the statistics on the relationship between the six movement forces memberships and their views on these indicators, which is pertinent with the social context of the democracy movement. Broadly speaking, the survey results show a presence of social change in the 1980s. Overall, 'the absence of communal harmony' is least likely to be seen, which might have an effect on the movement or on military regime except a distinctive support by intellectual membership (63.3%). In contrast, the dependency of foreign aid was

the highest agreed factor, in which I and P are found distinctive for their absolute support with 96.7%. This fact is further unveiled while the 'presence of the acute poverty' is supported by the all movement forces membership in which, again the side of I and P (96.7% and 93.3% respectively) are very distinctive.


They also stand out with many agreeing that the illiteracy (100% and 93.3%), high population growth (80% and 93.3%), unemployment of the educated youth (93.3% and 100%), corruption in all sectors(100% and 93.3%), increase of landlessness (83.3% and 80%) and rise of fundamentalism (83.3% and 73.3%) were very important factors that influenced both the rise of the dictatorship and movement for restoration of democracy, whilst the memberships of PP, S and TU groups, in comparison, are found to be less identical in the survey. Generally speaking, the results reveal the fact that the respondents of I and P memberships are very distinctive in this way. The membership of S, however, also is distinctive in agreeing less all these factors, as most of them believe these could hardly influence either the rise of military dictator or the movement for restoration of democracy.

5.5. Empirical Views on the Evolution of the Mode of Economic Life

The modes of economic life in the post independent Bangladesh are considered in five distinct dimensions: first, the Bangladesh economy was led mostly by agriculture in 1970s and industries in operation were mainly agro-based; second, the mode of economic life was still agriculture, however, found increases of small batch industrial activities in the early 1980s; third, agriculture was still leading, but a huge non-agricultural activities was found increased mostly in urban areas in the mid-1980s; fourth, higher increase of industrial activities in early 1990s along with agriculture as main mode of economic activities; fifth, NGO as an additional mode of economic life mostly in rural society that influenced the agricultural and non-agricultural economic activities. Primarily, the presence of all of these modes of economic life is supported by the survey statistics in table 5.5.1⁵¹ focussing the variations in views of the six groups of the respondents. In the relationship between their views (see also graph 5.5.1) overall, a mandatory verdict from all forces' memberships along with the distinctive positions of S and I (100% each) is found for 'agriculture and agro based industries to be the main mode of economy in the 1970s'. These agro-based industries—although in a smaller quantity in the beginning—established a route of transforming the landlord and land labourers into urban based non-agricultural enterprises as private investors and non-landed labourers.



Graph 5.4.1: The situation of socio-economic indicators in the 1980s Bangladesh in terms of the relationship of six movement forces memberships.



Graph 5.5.1: The mode of economic life of the people of Bangladesh in the 1980s in terms of the relationships of six movement forces memberships

This also slowly initiated the transfer of capital from land to commercial activities, which by years was transformed into industrial capital that invested in farming, textiles and services sectors etc in the major urban areas. The statistics supports exactly this trend of change in the mode of economy in the 1980s in the views of all forces' memberships in which PP, S and I are found distinctive to provide more than 90% who supports the development of 'urban based farming and small industries in the 1980s'. This was further accelerated by the increase of a sizeable service sector, i.e. bank, insurance, housing, transport etc in the mid-1980s, which is supported by almost all memberships with distinctive response from P (96.7%) followed by I and TU (93.3% each). In the early 1990s, the country was about to a take off for the development of an industrial and entrepreneur boost, mostly joint venture initiatives by national and international private investors or between government and private entrepreneur from local, national and international auspices while the traditional agricultural production, in the new shape, mostly became in the control of farmers, sharecroppers rather than owner of the land. Most of the owners of land had shifted to the urban area at this stage. This fact is revealed by 82.5% memberships and widely supported by I and S (86.7% each). The role of the NGOs in transforming the rural economy in a positive way making the poorer people self sufficient by the micro financing at the base is also accepted by the most of the memberships. Although, the level of acceptance is lower in comparison to other modes of economy, their initiative receives more than 60% supports from NPG, I and P memberships. By contrast, the S and TU memberships (53.3% and 50% respectively) are also found slightly distinctive in opposing the role of them in the same cause.

The statistics reveals that the mode of economic change shifted to a kind of locally accepted trend of capitalist development, which, although was far behind the western pattern, was enough to bring the changes in the class structure that was

apposite for the launch of a distinctive pattern of third world democracy. This change in the economic life has reshaped the character of the middle class and gave birth to an urban based new middle class, who organised and led the movement. This also sharpened the difference between privileged classes in the power structure and the newly transformed classes—all stages of the lower to the middle class. This new pattern of the conflict in class structure—the desire of middle class to extend their present capital, where they felt the privileged class a hindrance—have speeded up the movement against the dictatorship of General Ershad. The middle class characteristics of intellectuals and professionals, mostly urban base, became close while the root of students was rural middle class—ideally more close to trade union workers and labourers of the lower and lower middle class, but in practice, had a tendency to have an upward vision to be accommodated into the middle class or upper middle class due to their additional educational qualifications. In this way, the class relation of various intellectuals, professionals, students and trade union groups were coordinated and class conflict and class interest of these groups had been resolved eventually by accommodating their characteristic demands in the central agenda of the movement.

The statistics in table 5.5.1 show that the relationship of the respondents of the six movement forces has supported the small scale agro based industrial presence in the post independent periods while the development of the urban farming and small industries through out the 1980s, development of the service sectors in the mid-1980s, the extension of joint venture industries in the early in the early 1990s and the micro financing of the NGOs towards the self sufficiency of rural people are also supported. In general, although the agriculture was main mode of economy, the non-agricultural sector with all variables of macro and micro economy was boosting towards a locally fitted level of entrepreneurial development that had reshaped a necessary characteristic of the class relation suitable for the movement for restoration of democracy.


5.6. Socio-economic Differentiation in the 1980s Bangladesh

The level of social differentiation in Bangladesh society was significantly higher under military regime of General Ershad in the 1980s. A highly differentiated society is normally considered ripe for civil unrest. Any kind of deprivation of an individual or groups could lead to a social and political disorder in the society. A large-scale difference, division and disparity could even be transformed into a movement that changes the existing social and political order. This was what happened in Bangladesh in the 1980s under the military dictatorship of General Ershad. The social differentiations during this period were found mainly by level of income, religion, caste system, gender, age group and urban-rural life styles, most of which are primarily supported by the survey statistics in table 5.6.1. This shows that

94.2% respondents (with 40.8% strongly agree) agree that Bangladesh society was highly differentiated by income groups demarcated by social classes and their conflicts. It is thought that a more affluent class—civil-military bureaucracy and their civilian allies—expanded at a fast pace under the military dictatorship. They controlled the state machinery and earned huge illegal incomes by looting the wealth of the state. This small affluent class was exploiting the middle class and deprived the poverty prone large lower class of the society. The higher their exploitation, the bigger the unrest and protest against military dictator in different forms that brought more consolidation of the middle and lower class in the movement. Although 57.3% (with 18% strongly disagreeing) feel that there was no religious differentiation, it was significant that 42.7% support the existence of religious unrest in an absolute Muslim majority state (where a major minority are the Hindus), which envisages an incessant rise of fundamentalism in Bangladesh society in the interest of military dictatorship. Although 61.2 % (with 11.2% strongly disagree) of the respondents consider that there was no presence of closed caste system inside the major religious community, it was significant that 35.4% agree that there was the existence of differentiation by caste system in the society. It is worth mentioning that the Muslim community in Bangladesh is segregated by different caste components i.e. *Sheikh, Syed, Talukder, Choudhury*, etc., which has an effect on any attempt to group formation and social and political leadership. In the same manner, the closed caste system controls the social and political life of the Hindu community. The gender exploitation is a very important issue to consider the socio-political context of third world societies. In this connection, 69.4% (with 40.8% strongly agree) supports the existence of gender differentiation under military regime. This does mean that men dominate over women in every respect of socio-economic and political life. In the socio-economic perspective, female are mainly engaged in non-profited household activities, which is treated economically as a non-working force. Although the leadership of the major political parties—the AL and BNP, are female, the participation of women in national politics was still insignificant. By contrast, 29.6% does not believe in any existence of gender exploitation in the society rather the existence of lack of consciousness due to the illiteracy and religious values among them. This is reflected in the movement as several women's bodies came out and forged unity with the mainline democratic forces. They believed that the religious fanaticism initiated by the dictator was halting the advancement of the women in society.

The age group differentiation of the population is another major socio-economic setback leading to higher dependency ratio that has caused an enormous socio-economic crisis which is found to be an important factor behind social unrest. This is supported by 64.6% respondents (with 15.5% strongly agree). This unlocks

the view that a large youth age group of the population was suffering with the pressure to increase their income, while the rate of unemployment under military regime was very high—a crucial factor behind the socio-economic havoc in the society. The developments in the post independent Bangladesh is merely seen in the urban areas. The expansion of the city area, modern communication network, high-rise structures and expanding the administrative and academic opportunities for citizens were however the most conspicuous developments in the major cities of Bangladesh. It was evident for illegal military regimes that they initiated more opportunities and utilities in towns rather than rural areas—as the cities and towns were the centres of movement. This, however, had transformed the citizens into more cognisant forces of the movement against military dictators. This is unveiled in the survey with the supports of 81.6% respondents (with 45.6% strongly agree) finding the military dictatorship to have created differentiations by giving the priority of urban area than that of rural area in its development policies. This was the attempt of the military leaders to show the eye-catching development—high rise and lucrative infrastructure—to the donors and foreign aid agencies as they need the money for their survival, and to some extent, it was in the interest of fashionable lifestyle of the new parasitic class of civil-military bureaucracy and their civilian collaborators. In fact, the eye-catching possessions of the ruling class led to an eye-catching differentiation and distance between them and the middle and lower class factions of the society that developed the reunification and consolidation of the later—a strong unity between them in these cities and in vein, these cities and towns came apart as the centre of actions—burst out in a mass upsurge that eventually compelled the dictator to stepped down.



Graph 5.6.1: Factors related to social differentiation in terms of the relationship of six movement forces membership


Table 5.6.1 and the graph 5.6.1 show the relationship between six movement forces memberships and their views on the level of existence of socio-economic disparities in Bangladesh society under the period of Ershad regime. The views of these different memberships on the existence of socio-economic differentiations do not differ widely. Overall, the 'differentiation by caste system' was the least likely factor in which S are the lowest 16.7% and I are the highest 53.3% are found distinctive followed by the 'religious differentiation', under which the position of S and I does not change (23.3% and 66.7% respectively). Both of these factors behind the social differentiation are found to have lower influence on the movement. In contrast, the 'differentiation by income groups' was accepted as the most likely socio-economic factor by all memberships under which P and TU are sharp to consider this issue with entire 100% whilst the views of other forces (86%-97%) are not far from them to be seen as a principal cause of the movement. The views of I and P stand out with the supports of almost all respondents that the 'difference in providing the urban-rural utilities' (93.3% and 100% respectively) was another important factor, which limited the movement in the urban areas, whilst the S considers this factor comparatively as the lowest 63.3% along with an up to mark views from other forces membership. Generally speaking, the results show that the respondents of I and S memberships are always inversely distinctive in expressing their views. However, the views of the NPG are close to overall statistics, which has identified them as a stable and distinctive group. The statistics has however, established the fact that the existence of differentiation by income group, gender, age-group and use of utilities in the cities and towns are found to determine the rise of the movement.

The statistics shows that the relationships of the six movement forces' memberships have supported the social differentiation by income groups, caste system, gender and age group than that of the differentiation by religion and urban-rural utilities. These influenced the country's political system as well as the movement for democracy against the military dictator. The statistics also supports their views that the social differentiation by 'religion' and 'closed caste system' has lower influence on the movement.

5.7. The Movement Constituents: Class, Gender, Religion, Age, Area and Interest /Pressure Groups

The various socio-demographic constituents were inclined directly and indirectly with the movement for the restoration of democracy. The level of their involvement in the movement was different. These constituents include the conflicts in social classes, gender groups, religious groups, youth age groups, interest and pressure groups and political forces. The survey statistics provide primarily a clear account of their presence in the movement.⁵² The statistics in Table 5.7.1 and graph

5.7.1 also present the relationships between six movement forces' memberships and their stances on how far the movement involved the different constituents of the society. The social conflicts generated from these constituents have mainly considered about the possibility of the rise of class struggle, gender discrimination and religious conflict under military regime.



Graph 5.7.1: Major socio-demographic issues in the 1980s movement in terms of the relationships of six movement forces memberships.

Overall, none of the first three factors was found involved in a major proportion in the movement. However, the class conflict is found to have some supports in which the views of I and P (56.7% and 40%) are distinctive. The statistics of these groups reveals the fact that the connection of the lower range of class conflict was present, mostly in latent form, however, is more manifested in TU groups, which was able to determine the magnitude of the movement. In comparison, the presence of religious conflict (12.1%) and gender conflict (11.7) are seen as least likely variables that might have no influence on the movement. The views of S and TU are more distinctive (90% and 93.3% respectively) in disagreeing the presence of any type of religious conflict. Their views on the presence of gender conflict remain unchanged along with professionals (86.7%) as the highest disagreeing group. The participant constituents—age, area, interest or pressure groups and political parties—are seen as more identical in the survey. Here the age is focused with youth; the area with urban-rural or center-periphery; interest or pressure groups include the students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions and political parties with the opposition democratic forces. However, the statistics on the relationship between almost all movement forces membership supports (95%-98%) that these constituents were the main participants of the movement. However, the TU is found distinctive in agreeing all of these four constituents lending their


supports for 100% whilst the students are found distinctive in agreeing all of the last three constituents (100%) followed by the NPG and professionals for middle two constituents in the same range of their supports. The statistics for all memberships has highlighted in the views about highest participation of the youth, urban base of actions, involvement of interest and pressure groups and leading role of political parties in the movement.

5.8. The Class Structure of the Movement Participants

The formation of suitable participant classes plays an important role in any change in the society. In a pre-industrial society like Bangladesh in the 1980s, the participation of different classes in the movement has reflected the realism of the class structure in capitalist transition of a third world agrarian society. In the Bangladesh case, the classes have been categorised into six different dimensions on the basis of their incomes marked by their occupations and livelihood: higher, upper middle, middle, lower middle, lower and the distress class at the lowest stage of the society.⁵³ The survey statistics in Table 5.8.1 reveals this, 91.7% respondents feel that there was very little participation of higher class in which 29.1% denies this class to have any kind of participation in the movement. The role of the upper middle class in the movement is discernible. The survey shows a perception of substantial participation of this class by 58.8% (with 50.5% fairly participated) in the movement. This class was either in the second and third level leadership of different political and socio-cultural organisations or were used in most cases as of financier and their intellectual and professional capabilities in the movement.

The middle class is always crucial in any large-scale social change of a society. In the Bangladesh case, an urban petty-bourgeoisie middle class developed through out the 1980s, which played a decisive role in organising the movement. This class was in the intermediate and leading positions of different political and socio-cultural organisation, interest groups and pressure groups and led comparatively the lower units and branches of district level processions in all actions of the movement. This class maintained a link with upper middle class and higher class, and had a close and intimate connection with lower classes as they were brought up from these base classes. They had also relatives in the administration of the military regime. All types of smaller and middle range processions or gatherings in the urban to rural periphery were led by this middle class and had been able to organise mammoth mass rallies through out the whole period of the movement. In the end, there was significant participation of urban middle class in the actions organised by the opposition democratic forces, which was ultimately able to throw out the military dictator. The survey reveals the massive participation of urban middle class with 90.8% support (with 58.3% greatly) for their significant role in the movement. The lower middle class could be treated as a directive force behind the

middle class. For example, a middle rank class-I employee in any type of administration and business organisation is regarded as a representative of middle class and other clerical or semi-clerical employees under him are the members of lower middle class who are responsible to manage the whole office. In the opposite way, this class is also organised under the middle class leadership—the striking force of the movement. The survey strongly recognises the huge participation of this lower middle class by 91.2% of respondents supporting their role (in which 65% supports as greatly participated) in the movement. The lower class ensured the huge participation of the movement. They joined the gatherings and the actions of the movement. They were involved in all the clashes with police resulting in many killings and injuries. Although they were not in a leadership role, they were, in fact, the main fighting force at operation that made successful of all actions of the movement, which is supported by 76.7% respondents (with 43.2% great participation) while the involvement of the distressed class participants is supported by 58.7% (with 18.4% great participation).



Graph 5.8.1: The class structure of the movement participants in terms of the relationship of six movement forces membership.

The statistics in Table 5.8.1 and graph 5.8.1 presents the relationship of six movement forces memberships on the trends of participation of different classes in the movement for democracy. Overall, the participation of lower middle class and middle class are seen as most likely to have ‘fairly participated’ categories followed by lower class. The participation of distress class and upper middle class are moderate as fair participant classes while the participation of higher class is contrasted far and wide as the lowest group. In the relationships of memberships, the participation of lower middle class achieves more than 90% supports from PP, I, TU and NPG movement memberships along with distinctive 100% supports from I.

In the same way, the middle class has earned the same supports from I, TU and NPG memberships with distinctive 100% supports from TU. Generally speaking the participation of lower middle class and middle class are widely accepted by all forces' memberships. It is found distinctive that I render more weight to the participation of all classes ranging from middle class to distress class (93.3%, 100%, 90% and 80% respectively as fairly participated class) in comparison to other forces' membership. The students' membership is also distinctive in disagreeing the participation of higher class and distress class (0% and 36.7% respectively as fairly participation). The relationship reveals the important role and highest participation of the middle to lower class in the movement along with a moderate involvement of the upper middle class. The overall statistics express the insignificant participation of the higher class in the movement.

Table 5.4.1 Survey Statistics on the relationships between six movement forces memberships on the situation of socio-economic issues in the 1980s Bangladesh

Socio-economic Issues	Types of the Movement Forces																				
	Total			PP			Student			Intellectual			Professional			TU			NPG		
	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	
Acute poverty	77.2%	18.9%	78.3%	17.4%	56.7%	33.3%	96.7%	.0%	93.3%	3.3%	73.3%	26.7%	67.5%	30.0%							
High illiteracy	78.6%	17.5%	76.1%	17.4%	53.3%	36.7%	100.0%	.0%	93.3%	3.3%	76.7%	23.3%	75.0%	22.5%							
Sharp inequality	65.0%	23.8%	60.9%	26.1%	46.7%	33.3%	86.7%	10.0%	66.7%	26.7%	70.0%	13.3%	62.5%	30.0%							
Abs. of coml. harmony	45.1%	51.0%	56.5%	41.3%	26.7%	70.0%	63.3%	36.7%	43.3%	53.3%	33.3%	60.0%	42.5%	50.0%							
High population growth	75.7%	20.9%	73.9%	21.7%	60.0%	36.7%	80.0%	16.7%	93.3%	6.7%	76.7%	20.0%	72.5%	22.5%							
Unemployment youth	78.2%	19.4%	78.3%	19.6%	56.7%	40.0%	93.3%	3.3%	100.0%	.0%	70.0%	30.0%	72.5%	22.5%							
Corruption in all sectors	74.8%	21.4%	71.7%	23.9%	56.7%	36.7%	100.0%	.0%	93.3%	3.3%	63.3%	33.3%	67.5%	27.5%							
Abs. of right leadership	64.1%	29.1%	60.9%	30.4%	43.3%	40.0%	83.3%	16.7%	66.7%	30.0%	66.7%	26.7%	65.0%	30.0%							
Absence of democracy	66.0%	26.7%	67.4%	21.7%	43.3%	40.0%	86.7%	13.3%	80.0%	13.3%	60.0%	33.3%	60.0%	37.5%							
Increase of landlessness	67.0%	19.9%	63.0%	15.2%	36.7%	36.7%	83.3%	13.3%	80.0%	10.0%	73.3%	23.3%	67.5%	22.5%							
Dependency. of F. aid	81.6%	15.0%	82.6%	15.2%	66.7%	26.7%	96.7%	.0%	96.7%	3.3%	76.7%	20.0%	72.5%	22.5%							
Informal money lending	53.4%	18.4%	56.5%	15.2%	26.7%	33.3%	80.0%	16.7%	60.0%	13.3%	53.3%	16.7%	45.0%	17.5%							
Rise of fundamentalism	56.3%	31.1%	45.7%	39.1%	30.0%	46.7%	83.3%	6.7%	73.3%	20.0%	60.0%	33.3%	52.5%	35.0%							

PPs-Political Parties, TU-Trade Unions, NPG-Non Participatory Groups

Table 5.5.1 Survey Statistics on the relationships between the respondents of six forces memberships on the growth of Non-agricultural sectors in the 1980s Bangladesh

Non agricultural sectors	Types of the movement forces																				
	Total			PPs			Student			Intellectuals			Professionals			TU			NPG		
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
1970-90: agro- industries	95.6%	2.4%	95.7%	4.3%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	96.7%	.0%	86.7%	10.0%	95.0%	.0%							
1980s: farming & smal indust.	87.9%	8.7%	95.7%	4.3%	93.3%	6.7%	90.0%	3.3%	86.7%	10.0%	80.0%	13.3%	80.0%	15.0%							
Mid-1980s: dev. Servc. sector	91.3%	5.8%	91.3%	6.5%	90.0%	6.7%	93.3%	3.3%	96.7%	.0%	93.3%	6.7%	85.0%	10.0%							
Early 1990s: exten. industries	82.5%	14.6%	80.4%	17.4%	86.7%	6.7%	86.7%	13.3%	76.7%	20.0%	83.3%	16.7%	82.5%	12.5%							
1980s: Rural NGO ceon.	56.8%	39.8%	58.7%	39.1%	43.3%	53.3%	63.3%	36.7%	60.0%	33.3%	46.7%	50.0%	65.0%	30.0%							

PPs-Political Parties, TU-Trade Unions, NPG-Non Participatory Groups

Table 5.6.1 Survey Statistics on the relationships between the respondents of six movement forces on the presence of social differentiations in the 1980s Bangladesh

Presence of Social differentiations	Types of Movement Forces																	
	Total			PPs			Students			Professionals			TU			NPG		
	Agree	Dis.		Agree	Dis.		Agree	Dis.		Agree	Dis.		Agree	Dis.		Agree	Dis.	
by income level	94.2%	5.8%		93.5%	6.5%		86.7%	13.3%		96.7%	3.3%		100.0%	.0%		100.0%	.0%	
by religion	42.7%	57.3%		43.5%	56.5%		23.3%	76.7%		66.7%	33.3%		46.7%	53.3%		40.0%	60.0%	
by caste system	35.4%	61.2%		34.8%	63.0%		16.7%	76.7%		53.3%	46.7%		36.7%	56.7%		30.0%	66.7%	
by gender	69.4%	29.6%		69.6%	30.4%		73.3%	26.7%		80.0%	20.0%		53.3%	43.3%		70.0%	30.0%	
by age group	64.6%	28.6%		63.0%	28.3%		63.3%	26.7%		66.7%	26.7%		60.0%	36.7%		66.7%	30.0%	
by urban-rural utilities	81.6%	18.4%		76.1%	23.9%		63.3%	36.7%		93.3%	6.7%		100.0%	.0%		76.7%	23.3%	

PPs-Political Parties, NPG-Non-Participatory Groups

Table 5.7.1 Survey Statistics on the relationships between the six movements forces on the presence of majors socio-demographic factors behind the movement in the 1980s

	Types of the movement forces																				
	Total			PPs			Students			Intellectuals			Professionals			TU			NPG		
	Accept	Reject		Accept	Reject		Accept	Reject		Accept	Reject		Accept	Reject		Accept	Reject		Accept	Reject	
Conflict in social class	36.9%	57.3%		30.4%	60.9%		33.3%	63.3%		56.7%	43.3%		40.0%	53.3%		30.0%	66.7%		35.0%	55.0%	
Religious conflict	12.1%	85.0%		19.6%	76.1%		.0%	90.0%		16.7%	83.3%		13.3%	86.7%		3.3%	93.3%		15.0%	85.0%	
Gender discrimination	11.7%	77.7%		13.0%	71.7%		3.3%	83.3%		23.3%	73.3%		13.3%	86.7%		3.3%	83.3%		12.5%	72.5%	
High partici. of youth	95.6%	3.4%		95.7%	2.2%		96.7%	.0%		90.0%	10.0%		96.7%	3.3%		100.0%	.0%		95.0%	5.0%	
More Urn. participation	98.1%	1.5%		97.8%	.0%		100.0%	.0%		90.0%	10.0%		100.0%	.0%		100.0%	.0%		100.0%	.0%	
IGs/PGs participation	98.1%	1.5%		93.5%	4.3%		100.0%	.0%		96.7%	3.3%		100.0%	.0%		100.0%	.0%		100.0%	.0%	
Led by political forces	97.1%	2.4%		97.8%	.0%		100.0%	.0%		93.3%	6.7%		93.3%	6.7%		100.0%	.0%		97.5%	2.5%	

PPs-Political Parties, TU-Trade Unions, NPG-Non Participatory Groups

Table 5.8.1 Survey statistics on the relationships of six movement forces' memberships on the class participation in the movement in the 1980s Bangladesh

	Types of the movement forces																				
	Total			PPs			Students			Intellectuals			Professionals			TU			NPG		
	FP	VLP		FP	VLP		FP	VLP		FP	VLP		FP	VLP		FP	VLP		FP	VLP	
Higher class	7.8%	91.7%		4.3%	95.7%		.0%	96.7%		3.3%	96.7%		13.3%	86.7%		6.7%	93.3%		17.5%	82.5%	
U. middle class	58.7%	40.8%		54.3%	45.7%		46.7%	53.3%		56.7%	40.0%		50.0%	50.0%		70.0%	30.0%		72.5%	27.5%	
Middle class	90.8%	9.2%		84.8%	15.2%		83.3%	16.7%		93.3%	6.7%		86.7%	13.3%		100.0%	.0%		97.5%	2.5%	
L. middle class	91.3%	8.7%		91.3%	8.7%		86.7%	13.3%		100.0%	.0%		86.7%	13.3%		93.3%	6.7%		90.0%	10.0%	
Lower class	76.7%	22.8%		84.8%	15.2%		63.3%	36.7%		90.0%	10.0%		76.7%	20.0%		76.7%	23.3%		67.5%	32.5%	
Distressed class	58.7%	39.8%		60.9%	39.1%		36.7%	63.3%		80.0%	16.7%		66.7%	26.7%		56.7%	43.3%		52.5%	47.5%	

FP-Fairly participated, VLP-Very Little Participated, PPs-Political Parties, TU-Trade Unions, NPG-Non Participatory Groups.

5.9. Conclusion

The social structure of the post independence Bangladesh society was mainly pro movement, which reached a more suitable shape in the anti-Ershad movement in the 1980s. This social formation was pertinent in the process of democratisation through a necessary class configuration—the transfer of landed capital to the non-agricultural, commercial and industrial sectors, which initiated an urban base new petty-bourgeoisie class. This class was developed on the base of existing denationalised sectors and process of privatisation especially in the development of service sector—local, national, international and joint venture organisations—trade and business, foreign exchange from the export of manpower, development of small industries on the local raw materials, farming, housing, pharmaceuticals, textiles and above all the growth of illegal capital—smuggling and bribe. This process of change in the social structure was spontaneous. Moreover, the invention of using the small credit by an enormous NGO movement for the development of marginal and poorer section of rural Bangladesh, which started to work in the end of 1970s, was regarded as a revolution in the trend of social change. This contributed to take the huge rural masses in the line of urban-rural edge in the development of pro democratic socio-economic formation. Although the size of the change in all socio-economic indicators—literacy level, scale of poverty, growth of the GDP, per capita income, dependency ratio, changes in the class formation towards the growth of middle class, rate of unemployment, development of industrial, commercial and service sectors, trade and business etc were not in the stage of statistically sufficient level, in a western sense, for the development of democratic norms and values in consideration to the whole population, the overall frequencies of these changes in all indicators were enough for the growth of the movement, especially in the urban agglomeration of Bangladesh society in the 1980s. Full democracy may require maintaining an overall socio-economic change of the society while the elimination of an autocratic military dictatorship does not require reaching such limit.⁵⁴ The main factor was to consider that there was a presence of necessary limit to the social change in the social structure to depose the dictatorship. In fact, all cities and towns including the capital city of Dhaka reached such capacity in the change of these indicators in quantity rather than overall percentage, which were adequate for the development of the movement to overthrow of the military dictatorship. There were two diverging and competitive trends of social change in this regard. First, in an average 30% to 50% population of the urban areas—more than five hundred cities and towns had reached the limit of the development indicators necessary for the movement. The major part of this population was completely new middle and lower middle class who were competing with the ruling higher and upper middle class in all sectors. As there was limited opportunity for their own development under ruling military interest, and a very small part of their

civilian allies, these classes took the side of the opposition political forces and trade unions in all sectors. In a very short period, they became a potential force for the security of their own business and employments. In opposition, the vast population of the urban and urban-rural edge under the limit of development indicators grew as proletarian elements in the form of providing the participants of the movement. In all considerations, the higher the competition between the higher, middle and lower middle classes of the ruling and opposition forces, the more growth of the urban proletarians—lower and distressed class, which grew more larger size in the wake of rural-urban migration for landlessness and limitation of work in the rural area, and evolved a necessary structural change of the society that ignited an urban revolution and a huge mass uprising ousting the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

Notes

¹ For details of the ethnic origins and social formation of the Bengali nation under present day Bangladesh, see Kamaruddin Ahmad, *The Social History of East Pakistan*, Dhaka: Crescent Book Centre and Pioneer Press, 1967, pp. i-xlix.

² There was developed a wealthy trader class in the riverine towns of the Bengal since sixth century who were known as 'Sresti'(superior or pre-eminent). For details, see DD Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India in Historical Outline*, (London, 1965), p.100. Kosambi wrote: "the trader had become so wealthy that the most important person in an eastern town was generally 'Sresti'. The term not known earlier, is derived from the word for 'superior' or 'pre-eminent'. The 'Sresti' was actually a financier or banker, sometimes a head of trade guild. Even absolute despotic Kings treated this 'Srestis' with respect, though they had no direct voice in politics."

³ See Rangalal Sen, in Bengali, *Somajkathamo: Poojibad o Somajtantra* (Social Structure: Capitalism and Socialism) Dhaka: New Age Publications, 1997, pp. 42-44. See also, Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mughal Empire*, New Delhi, 1972, footnote 131. See also, F.D. Ascoli, *Early Revenue History of Bengal and the Fifth Report*, Oxford, 1917, pp.25-26; See also Kamaruddin Ahmad, *op.cit*, p. xxxiii. For subsequent impact of the revenue system under Mogul Period, See also, Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy—Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1967, pp. 324-327. See also, Tapan Ray Chaudhury and Irfan Habib, ed. *The Cambridge Economic History of India 1200-1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 1, 1982 pp. 60-82.

⁴ Tapan Ray Chaudhury and Irfan Habib, *op.cit*, pp.48-50. See also, Karl Marx, *The British Rule of India*, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works Vol.1*. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, p. 347.

⁵ Karl Marx, *The Capital*, Vol. 1, 1861

⁶ Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven, Conn : Yale University Press, 1957, p.37.

⁷ Irfan Habib, "Usury in Medieval India," in *The Journal of Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. VII, 1964-5, pp. 393-419.

⁸ Tapan Ray Chaudhury and Irfan Habib, *op.ct*. p. 82-86, 382-433, 360-81

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 181-85.

¹⁰ See Rangalal Sen, *op.cit*. pp.45, 49-51; See also, Sir Jadunath Sarker, *Mughal Administration*, Third revised edition, Calcutta, 1935, p.135.

¹¹ The main contribution of the British in this regard included: 'The Permanent Settlement Act of 1793', 'The Rent Act of 1859' and 'The Bengal Proja Satta Act of 1885', which were connect to the birth and evolution of the private property in land. For detail impact of the land reform on Indian society under British rule, see Barrington Moore, *op.cit*, pp.345-70. In the development of private property in land, Marx argued: "the legal views itself only means that the land owner can do with the land what every owner of commodities can do with his commodities. And this view, this legal view of free private ownership of land arises in the ancient world only with the dissolution of the organic order of society, and in the modern world only with the development of capitalist production. It has been imported by Europeans to Asia here and there." For details, see Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol. III, Moscow, 1971, p.616.

¹² For expansion of irrigation relating the agrarian economy under British Rule, see Elezabeth Whitcombe, "Irrigation" in Tapan Ray Chaudhury and Irfan Habib, *op.cit*, Chapter VII(1).

¹³ For railway, water and road communication development, see, *Ibid*, Chapter VII(1-2), pp. 703 & 739.

¹⁴ See Rangalal Sen, *op.cit.* pp. 61-64. See also, Sir Eric. Asby, *Universities: British, Indian, African*. London, 1966, pp. 48-52; See also, Macauley's Minutes of 2 February, 1835, in H. Sharp, *Selections From Educational Records, Part-1*, (1920), p.116; See also, Sir Charles Woods Educational Despatch to India, dated 19 July 1854, Part-4; See also, Aparna Basu, *The Growth of Education and Political Development in India 1898-1920*, Delhi, 1974, pp.100-102, See also, Kamaruddin Ahmad, *op.cit.*, pp. xlv-xlviii.

¹⁵ See, David Beetham ed. *Defining and Measuring Democracy*, SAGE Modern Politics Series, Vol. 36 sponsored by European Consortium for Political Research/ECPR, London: SAGE publications, 1994. p. 75.

¹⁶ Morris D Morris and Henry R. Luce, "The Growth of Large Scale Industry to 1947.." in Tapan Ray Chaudhury and Irfan Habib, *The Cambridge Economic History of India, 1757-1947*. For the development of jute, cotton, and iron and steel factory in Bengal from 1850-1947, there were four stages of industrial development under this period: first boost of industrial development from 1850-1914, secondly, development of industries to fulfil the military demand 1914-1918 and inter war period 1918-1939 and finally end stage of British rule and second world war 1939-1947. For details statistics of industrial development in all these four stages see, pp.602-52. See also, Vera Anstey, *The Economic Development of India*, 4th edition, London, 1952 (first published 1929); for impact of the British industrial development on Indian economy and polity, see also, Barrington Moore, *op.cit.* pp. 370-71.

¹⁷ The speedy developed high educated Muslim middle class engaged in the direct competition with the existing bourgeoisie established in economic and political higher position of the society of East Bengal. The development of this strong and influential middle class consisting of eminent lawyers, doctors, engineers and businessmen and the like different professional groups were the significant event in the socio-political situation of Pakistan. The policies of disparities between two wings of Pakistan—East and West—had ignited serious discontents and dissatisfactions in this Muslim middle class of the East Bengal. For example, in April 1952, all of 13 Secretaries of Central Secretariat were West Pakistanis—none from Bengali, Out of 16 Joint Secretaries and 59 Deputy Secretaries, the number of Bengalis were 1 and 4 respectively. In 1955, the number of employees in the Central Government for West Pakistanis were 42 thousands while 2 thousands and 9 hundreds from East Bengal only—for which the salaries for West Pakistanis were 11 crores 40 lacs Rs in comparison to Bengalis, 60 lacs Rs only. In 1954, the allocation of Defence budget for West Pakistan was 46 crores 50 lacs Rs in comparison to East Bengal 10 crores only. Until 1955, the development expenditure for the West Pakistanis was 790.67 crores Rs in comparison to East Bengal 42.66 crores only. These disparities led a election victory of the UF—a coalition against ruling ML, in Provincial election of 1954, which, in fact, was the reflection of the trend of loosing trust of the people of East Pakistan on the then Central ML government of Pakistan. In the wake of these disparities in the socio-political life, the births of the EPCP and EPSL in 1948, EPMAL in 1949, language movement of 1952, the election victory of UF in 1954, the development of EPNAP in 1957, the vigorous student movement in 1962 against Justice Hamidur Rahman Education Commission Report, the six-points freedom charter of EPAL in 1966, the 11-point movement of the students in 1968-69, the absolute victory of EPAL in the general election of 1970 and the liberation war of the Bengali nation in 1970 were the most spurious events in the history of socio-political formation of Bengali Muslim middle class in the Bengali nationalist movement. For details, see Rangalal Sen, *op.cit.* pp. 114-122.

¹⁸ The university is the principal centre for the development of high educated middle class in every society around the world. A few of Bengali Muslim who, as like as the higher caste Hindus, were financially sound could establish in higher position of the society. But a huge faction of the Muslim population of East Bengal had no sound ability to go to Kolkata for higher education. For this reason, according to the report of the Simon Commission—'to provide further facilities for higher education for Muslim population who form the majority in East Bengal'—Dhaka University was established in 1921. As a result, there were speedy increase of Muslim students in the University and colleges of East Bengal from 8.9% in 1917 to 14.2% in 1927. For details, See Indian Statutory Commission (Simon Commission), Interim Reports, September 1929, p.188.

¹⁹ There were developed a Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie class in the social structure of the 1960s, which mainly began its journey in the beginning of twentieth century. At that time, in the wake of first world war, the increase of the price of jute of Bengal in the international market that brought huge economic fortunes for the high level Bengali Muslims, which in fact sew the seeds of the Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie class—most affluent form of agrarian bourgeoisie. During the reign of coalition of the Krishak Proja Party and Muslim League in Bengal (1937-1947) in whic Sher-e-Bangla A.K. Fazlul Haque was the Chief Minister and the famine of 1943, a huge Muslim business class became more rich even in the rural area of Bengal. The policy of British Government for food supply and relating system

established a kind of black economy—with smuggling and storage of food grains that killed more than 5 million people in Bengal, a section of rural businessmen became the owner of huge fortunes from the earnings of black money (For details, see Fazlul Haque, *Bengal Today*, 1944, pp. 2-95). After the independence in 1947, the war between the Korea Inlands, increased again the price of jute in the international market, which had created for Bengali middle class to be educated more in number—as they earned huge money from selling and export of jute. However, after the independence of Pakistan, the central government started to patronise the non-Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie bluntly—for example, Adamjee, Bowani, Karim, Doud and the like who controlled the large 54 industries and companies and a monopoly control almost in all sectors of the national economy. In the wake of the war between 1965 between India and Pakistan, some Hindus and marwari business men left the East Bengal which were replaced by Bengali rich families. However, in the end of 1960s, the number of industries and companies under the control of local Bengalis reached to 30. This new Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie would never win over the non Bengali Muslim Bourgeoisie directly patronised by the central civil-military elites of Pakistan. Consequently, they were compelled, beyond their desire, to support the Bengali nationalist and liberation movement, which ultimately got success in 1971.

²⁰ The major reforms were the establishment of a ceiling on land ownership, nationalisation of major economic intuitions including industries and banks, control over political and social institutions following the popular means of social change of that time around the world on the basis of socialist and leftist movement grounded in Marxism.

²¹ In the post-1975 period, the introduction of the free market capitalist economy introduced several new dimensions—in both of positive and negative in the socio-economic situation of Bangladesh society. Some people became rich over the nights while the unemployment and landless rates increased quickly to the significant number. In March 1975, the number of people holding more than 10 million Taka was only 2, which shifted to 12 in 1977, 64 in 1979, 60 in 1985 and more than 1000 in 1990 (See the *Bangladesh Bank Bulletin*, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1985, 1990). In the same period, the total unemployed population was 13 million in 1981 and 20 million in 1990 in which the number of educated unemployed was 1 million. These feature of socio-economic life had diverse effect on the existing movement for democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

²² Wahiduddin Mahmud, “Sen On Social Choice,” published in Bangladesh Economic Association, *Honouring Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen*. Dhaka, 1998; also published in the local English newspaper, *The Daily Star*, 18 December, 1998. In brief, a significant part of Amartya Sen’s contribution to the economic theory is in the social choice theory. As part of welfare economics, the theory deals with the problem of how to aggregate individual performances into social choice in a logically consistent and reasonable way. The formal constructs of the theory are highly technical and abstract, full of paradoxes and brain teasers; but Sen’s motivation in engaging in these discourses was very much to do with deriving meaningful insights into the ideas of individual and social well-being.

²³ For Social resources as Social capital, see Nan Lin, *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 43-45. The author argues: “we define social resources, or social capital, as those resources accessible through social connections. Social capital contains resources (e.g., wealth, power, and reputation, as well as social networks) of other individual actors to whom an individual actor can gain access through direct and indirect social ties. They are resources embedded in the ties of one’s network. Like personal resources, social resources may include material goods such as land, houses, car, and money and symbolic goods such as education, memberships in clubs, horrific degrees, nobility or organisational titles, family name, reputation or fame.” In the explanation in the footnote, the author also has differentiated the difference between two types of social resources: social capital and cultural capital. Social capital is resources captured through social network and social connections, where as cultural capital is resources captured through social identification and reciprocal recognition. For the definition of the ‘social networks’ see also p.43, foot note. 4.

²⁴ For land reform under the military administration of General Ershad, see Land Reform Ordinance 1984, Act No.10, Bangladesh *Rin Salishi Ain* 1989, Act No.15, Land Reform Board Ordinance 1989, Act No.23, Land Appeal Board *Ain*, 1989, Act. 24.

²⁵ There is unique aspect of Bangladesh development perspective that is seldom noticed. In spite of her very low per capita income, Bangladesh virtually leads the entire developing world in terms of income generated per square kilometre of land area (barring one or two relatively small countries). In fact, among all countries with population above 10 million, only three countries outside the industrial western Europe—the USA, Japan and South Korea—have higher GNP per square kilometre of surface area compared to Bangladesh, as can be estimated from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for any recent year. This high ‘physical density’ of economic activities is the result of an extremely high population density, which is more than twice than that of its nearest rival, South Korea (excepting

the city state of Singapore). However, this trend of change in economic activities began from the end of 1980s. For details, See the article, "GDP per Square Kilometre in Bangladesh: Implications for Sustainable Development," published in an English daily, *The Financial Express*, Dhaka, 21 June, 2001.

²⁶ This change could be evaluated in the analysis of key indicators of the developments of the society including the growth of labour forces, GDP by industrial origin, production of agricultural, mining and manufacture sectors, energy consumption, monetary and banking activities, external trade, government finance in public welfare, exports and imports trends, balance of payments, international reserves and exchange rates, literacy and poverty alleviations. Give the example from Philippines, Nepal, Panama, Myanmar, Thailand, India 1947, and Pakistan in 1989-90---

²⁷ J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: Allen and Unwin), 1943, quoted in Wahiduddin Mahmud, "Bangladesh Economy into the 21st Century," a keynote paper for the 13th Biennial Conference of the Bangladesh Economic Association, Dhaka, 10-12 August, 2000; also published in *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 11 August, 2000.

²⁸ The Key indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, *Report of the Asian Development Bank*, 1999.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ The relatively well-off groups of co-operative farmers, other land owning farmers, agronomists, diploma agriculturists, engineers, diploma engineers, physicians, rural doctors, teachers, lawyers, journalists, artists, litterateurs, cultural activists, writers, social workers, shopkeepers, small and medium businessmen, commercial executives, factory owners, executive of government and non-government organisations, officers and members of the village defence force, *Ansers*, police, BDR and Armed forces form a large body of professionals in Bangladesh. They are called professionals for the kind of work they perform and for the type of social status and technical know-how they possess.

³¹ Interview with researcher of Mr Rashed Khna Menon, Secretary, BWP and one of the key movement leader during the field work in Bangladesh in March 2003.

³² Motiur Rahman P.K. "Decomposition of Income Inequality in Rural Bangladesh", a paper presented in a Seminar organised by the National Association of Social Sciences, Bangladesh, held in Dhaka on December 10-11, 1988, pp.10-11. The survey report mentioned that about 63 per cent of the Union Parishad Chairmen came from households having land more than 7.5 acres and 75 per cent Chairmen had marketable surplus after meeting their own needs. According to this survey report, in 1980, about 91 per cent, 81 per cent and 54 per cent of the total Union Parishad Chairmen were members of local school committees, Integrated Rural Development programme and Deep Tube-well Managing Committees respectively. The report also pointed out that about 45 per cent of the Chairman and 54 per cent Union Parishad Members gained land after being elected to this body as peoples representatives.

³³ Along with existing political movement against the dictator, there was menace of financial extortion including collection of illegal tolls and protection money under the auspices of ruling JP musclemen patronised by the military government.

³⁴ Dickenson in Alan B Mountjoy ed. *The Third World Problem and Perspectives*, 6th edition, London: Macmillan Educational Ltd., 1987, p. 94. Dickenson wrote: "Colonial policies served to inhibit industrialisation and though political independence has afforded opportunities for development, progress has been comparatively slow in the face of various obstacles. The resource endowment in general is not an inhibiting factor, given the sustenance that third world raw materials give to first world industries. Nevertheless, individual countries lack particular resources, and resource exploitation is often impeded by infra-structural deficiencies. More important are shortage of educated and skilled labour, and of physical and financial capital. The former may be obtained by education and training programmes and the latter sought from savings, export earnings and foreign investment and aid"

³⁵ For details of industrial and non-agricultural growth in the 1980s Bangladesh and the relative changes in the subsequent years, see *The Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, Report of the Asian Development Bank, 1999*. See also, Mozammel Haque and Jim Love, "Bangladesh Industrialisation since Independence." Chapter 1 in *Strategies for Industrialisation: The Case of Bangladesh*, edited by Mozammel Haque and Jim Love, Dhaka: UPL, pp.1-23

³⁶ Dickenson in Alan B. Mountjoy, ed. p.102

³⁷ See *Ibid*, p.110. Dickenson categorically has described the reasons behind this problem in nice manner, which is also pertinent to Bangladesh: "In the advanced countries alternative employment grew up during a period of change and increasing efficiency in agriculture. Urban mortality levels remained higher than those of the countryside and help to dump down the gap between growing numbers of worker and work available. Mass transport, allowing cheap long-distance migration permitted millions to bypass the new industrial towns and cities and to seek a new life overseas. Thus

although a vast movement from the land took place, it was spread over a greater period of time and was not focused solely on the towns. The flood to the towns currently sweeping through the third world no longer bears any relationship to expanding urban economics and opportunities: under employment in village is being exchanged for unemployment in towns. The flood of people to the larger towns in the third world is now at a rate far in excess of the possible provision of jobs in those towns, and this rate of population accretion outpaces the provision of the utilities and services that are the hallmark of an urban community. There are also political overtones. It is in the town that much of the political life of the third world is to be found: meetings, newspapers, a speaker can bring new ideas and stir opinions. A discontent urban proletariat can become a far more effective force for change than ten times its number of dissatisfied farmers; it is more easily swayed by demagogues and provides an uncertain but volatile element in the urban community. More serious, to the detriment of long time national development plans, pressures may be exerted to channel more and more development capital to the short term end of alleviating urban distress. Increasingly political decisions in the social and economic fields may be affected by discontented urban masses.’

³⁸ Ray Bromley and Chris Gerry, *Casual Work and Poverty in Third World Cities*, Chichester : Wiley, 1979, p.19

³⁹ In the 1991 census of Bangladesh, the definition of urban areas are adopted as follows: a) All places with City Corporation, Municipality or Town Committee and Cantonment area, Thana Headquarters, Industrial areas or development centres and notified towns having distinctly urban characteristics such as railway, tourists, administrative, educational and big market centres. b) All other places which satisfy the following criteria i) Majority of male working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits ii) An identifiable central place where amenities like roads, electricity, community centres, water supply, sanitation, sewerage system etc. exist and iii) which are densely populated. Apart from these, the outgrowth of cities and towns have also been treated as urban or an urban agglomeration. An urban agglomeration forms a town and its adjoining urban outgrowths or two or more physically contiguous towns together with contiguous well-recognised outgrowths, if any of such towns. In Bangladesh the urban areas have been classified in to five categories according to their functions and sizes: i) Megacity ii) Statistical Metropolitan Areas (SMA) iii) Municipality iv) Thana Headquarters v) Other Urban Area. Dhaka, a divisional city and the capital of Bangladesh, is only the Mega city, the other three divisional cities Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna are categorised as Statistical Metropolitan Area (SMA), Municipality means areas designated as such under municipality ordinance which is a statutory town. 464 Thana Headquarters and other urban areas are non-municipal towns, usually are places of commercial, industrial, educational and tourists importance. These urban areas consists of some smaller units such as Ward (in corporation and municipal areas only), Mauza (in other urban areas only) and Mahalla (in corporation and municipal areas only).

⁴⁰ The Zilla (District) wise urban area expansion indicates the highest urban area expansion in Gazipur Zilla with 823.7% followed by Nawabgonj and Rajshahi Zilla with 291.61% and 287.30% respectively. The Division wise urban area expansion has shown that decadal area expansion has taken place in Rajshahi (121.91%) followed by Dhaka division with (115.34%). All the Zillas of four divisions also showed similar urban area expansion was highest 30 in addition new urban areas came under urban frame in consequence of which number of urban centres rose to 522 in 1991 from 492 in 1981. It appeared that urban dwelling households of Dhaka Zilla have the highest involvement in secondary and tertiary activities like non-agricultural labour, handloom, business, construction, transport employee and others with 20784, 3849, 209860, 24540, 80567, 288,237 and 154145 households respectively. Chittagong zilla ranked second highest in this activities like agricultural labour (9807), business(70747), employee (115836) and other(62461) For the primary activities like cultivator/share-croper Dhaka Zilla ranked highest while Jamalpur zilla ranked second highest with 33512. Chittagong Zilla ranked highest for livestock/forest/fisheries with 6751 households while Dhaka ranked second highest with 5627 households. The above figures indicated that the involvement of urban dwelling households of Dhaka Zilla in non-agricultural pursuits, which supported Dhaka at the most urbanised Zilla and Chittagong as the second urbanised Zilla of the country. The urban sex ratio (number of male per 100 female) was 118.1 where national figure was 106.1 which indicate that the sex ratio of urban population was higher than the national one The sex ratio of urban population had come down to 118 in 1991 from 125 in 1981 and this might be due to better coverage of females and more male international migration in 1991 census. It was found in Zilla wise urban population by age that 14.51% were under 10 years and 13.94% were under 15 years of age and 1.59% older population who were dependent on 84.44% working population, and was also found that the age 15-44 years percentage of males was perceptibly higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas. This fact might be attributed to age selective male migration to urban areas for better employment and education. The trend was found noticeable both in

1974, 1981 and 1991. For details changes in the expansion of urban area and trends of the change of different characteristics of urban population, see *The Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh 1991*.

⁴¹ *The Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, 1991*

⁴² Sirajul Islam, a review article of *Social Formation in Dhaka City: a Study in Third World Urban Sociology*, edited by Kamal Siddiqui et al, Dhaka, UPL, 1990, See also, *The Bangladesh Observer*, July 20, 1990, p.9. The main feature of this study included: the land of Dhaka city was highly unevenly distributed. Only 30 per cent people control 80 per cent land of the city; and the process of differentiation were increasing fast. In the name of 'housing society' the affluent families were getting exemption of the ceiling of city land ownership and grabbing the city land by sheer might of money. The city land was mostly used in residential purpose which covers 88 per cent. Demographically the Dhaka city showed another major deviation. Unlike other major cities, Dhaka was highly youthful. Among its inhabitants 41 per cent are below forty and only 29 per cent are above fifty. The average size of the city family was 6.7 as against 5.5 in village. This fact might suggest that Bangladesh was an over-urbanised society which is one of the characteristics of the peripheral capitalist countries. About 37 per cent do not have any property in the city. Education is positively related to property ownership. The higher the education the greater is the chance of having property. About 55 per cent live in their own houses and 44 per cent in rented accommodation. About 66 per cent of the people are first generation residents and the second generation residents made only 17 per cent and third generation only 8 per cent. About 85 per cent inhabitants have a rural linkage and 51 per cent people visit their village home regularly. Only 21 per cent of household heads were more or less associated with political and other organisations. Asked about the best possible economic system that may be adopted in the country in the above study, 45 per cent of the households supported an Islamic system, 24 per cent supported a socialist system followed by mix economy 16 per cent and capitalist economy 7 per cent. In 1947, all the top rich families of Dhaka were local Hindus and expatriate Marwaries. In the middle of 1980s, among the 68 multi-millionaire families none is Hindu. At present all the Dhaka tycoons are Muslims and most of them became rich after 1971. The secrets of their success were brokerage in big state purchases and projects involving aeroplane, transport, communication equipment, ships, bridges and roads, agricultural machinery, oil drilling and deals and so on. Becoming rich through industrial or other productive activities was rare. The early fortune was made by 'theft', embezzlement, forcible occupation, etc involving government funds and stores, abandoned property, smuggling, narcotic trade, defaulting bank loans, commission agency, bribes and so on. The rich people mostly introduce themselves as industrialists; for it is prestigious to call oneself industrialist but actually most of them were found to businessmen and traders. They are in fact comprador bourgeoisie patronised by the state machinery.

⁴³ Most of them are squatters and tenants in squattering settlements. Richshaw-pullers constituted the single largest occupational group of about a million which means that about one sixth of the city population were directly or indirectly dependent on the rickshaw industry. For details, S Alam Khan, *Social Classes in Bangladesh*, MNO Publications Pvt. Ltd., Dhaka, 1991, pp.3-4

⁴⁴ Wahiduddin Mahmud, "GDP Per Square Kilometre in Bangladesh: Implication for Sustainable Development" in W. Mahmud, ed. *Popular Economics—Unpleasant Essays*, Dhaka: UPL, 2002, pp.21-22

⁴⁵ For details of the concepts of compact townships, habitation centres, or rural growth centres, see Rasid Salim, "Compact Townships as a Strategy for Economic Development," University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, memo. July 2000

⁴⁶ See Wahiduddin Mahmud, "Informal Sector in Bangladesh: A Micro Economic Perspective," Dhaka: ILO, memo. February, 2001.

⁴⁷ The Military Regime of General Ershad Proclaimed 'Local Government Reform Ordinance, 1984' by which it divided the whole country in 64 districts and 464 Upgraded Upazilla (sub districts). There were found rigorous movements later in these new towns in the country side organised by different political forces. In this movement, Salim and Delwar, two Student League workers were killed brutally, when police car went by force on the students' procession in the city. There were participating in a protest march against government decision to holding Upazilla elections in the country, which was boycotted by the main stream opposition parties.

⁴⁸ Abraham Guillier (1966), the intellectual mentor of urban guerrillas in Uruguay, quoted in Wilson, John. *Introduction to Social Movements*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p.238. He wrote, "strategically, in the case of a popular revolution in a country in which the highest percentage of the population is urban, the centre of operations of the revolutionary war should be in the city. Operation should consist of scattered surprise attacks by quick and mobile units superior in arms and numbers at designated points, but avoiding barricades in order not to attract the enemy's attention at one place. The

units will then attack with the greater part of their strength the enemy's least fortified or weakest links in the city....The revolution's potentials is where the population is."

⁴⁹ Gilbert Alan and Gugler Josef, *Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanisation in The Third World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 159-160. They wrote, "the demographic observation reflects an economic reality: the surplus is increasingly produced in the urban sector... It is the urban economy that finances the state apparatus –the state is dependent on urban economy. there are limits to repression in the urban context. Manager, professionals, skilled workers and even semi-skilled workers in great numbers can not be replaced at short noticed. To imprison them for any length of time, to push them into exile, or to kill them entails severe economic losses. This means not only a reduction in the resources available to the state, but also deterioration in living conditions for the population at large that is likely to foster discontent."

⁵⁰ The survey statistics in table 4.4.1 shows that 77.2% respondents (with 47.6% completely agree) and 78.6% (with 46.6% completely agree) consider the presence of acute poverty and high illiteracy respectively in the 1970s-80s Bangladesh, which, as a whole, supports primarily a characteristic towards the rise of authoritarian dictatorship in a society. In addition, 64.1% (with 34.5% completely agree) recognise the absence of efficient leadership in civilian politics, which also ultimately favour the rise of authoritarian regime in society. Population growth, unemployment and uncontrolled corruption in all government and non-government sectors and sharp inequality in socio-economic life are seen as the most significant issues in the survey. 75.7% (with 33% completely agree) feels that population growth was major problem and 74.7% (with 39.3% completely agree) supports the views that corruption was one of the most important national setback while 78.2% (with 38.8% completely agree) has identified the most significant socio-economic problem as unemployment of the educated youth. In adding together, 65.1% (with 30.6% completely agree) finds the increasing trend of social differentiation in the society. These observations expose the trends of socio-economic and political unrest of society, which bred the movement against the military regime. This has demonstrated further when 66% respondents (with 39.5% completely agree) characterise the regime of General Ershad as an authoritarian dictatorship. The change in rural society was also significant. The survey shows that 65% (32% completely agree) respondents support the increasing trend of landlessness while 53.4% (and 28.2% not replied) identify the problem of the increasing considerable economic miseries of the peasants, farmers and landless households due to informal money lending—presence of interest bearing capital—in rural Bangladesh. These features portray a tendency of rural-urban migration for the people of small earning, which raised the pressure on the city life and expanded the urbanisation without proper utilities. This was also an important factor to be considered for the socio-economic and political unrest in the main cities of Bangladesh. Moreover, 56.3% respondents support the rise of religious fundamentalism, which could be related with the increasing threat to the existing communal harmony (which is already agreed by 43.2%)—one of the fundamental components of democracy. This was only because of the dictator had no acceptance in the democratic and progressive forces so as to hunt for a support base in the religious fanaticism patronising the fundamentalist forces in the power structure. All of his socio-economic programmes were aimed at the factional religious groups to increase the support base for the military regime. Another significant feature is the dependence on the foreign aid and debts of military dictatorship in running the economy of the country. According to the observation of 81.6% respondents (with 45.6% completely agree), the country under the military dictatorship was completely dependent on the foreign aid and debts, which reveals that the regime sustained its power with the support of outside forces conceiving the fact that the domestic economic growth was not satisfactory. These findings disclose the fact that the level of socio-economic development of the country was far lower under the military regime.

⁵¹ The survey statistics in table 4.5.1 shows a precise trend of evolution of the mode of economic life of Bangladesh in her post-independent years, which might have link with the democracy movement against the military regime of General Ershad. The survey (95.6%) agrees the fact that the mode of production in the economy was mainly agricultural in the 1970s. Although some agro based industries established under the British period was still continued under the nationalisation system. However, 87.9% considers an evolution of the economy in the later stage that a number of smaller industries based on a modest capital had increased in the beginning of 1980s, even though the main mode of economy was led by agriculture. The denationalisation process under the post-1975 regimes encouraged the private enterprises that initiated a landed upper class to be transformed into an urban middle class. This stage was found to be strengthening the non-agricultural initiatives in the urban areas through out the 1980s under international and local auspices. As 91.3% respondents believes that the export oriented small-scale industries were increased proportionately in this decade—in return boosting imports. This reveals a further boost in the size of middle class in the urban areas. Sizable service oriented industries also grew up in this period. These came across in the expansion of urbanisation in

Bangladesh. Moreover, 82.5% believes that these evolutions of the economy in the direction of entrepreneurs were exaggerated in the 1980s to the 1990s, which added a considerable return in the GDP. These non-agricultural industrial initiatives were the source of a change in the class and class conflict in the social structure of Bangladesh society. This change generates a kind of middle class who although took advantage of the western life style, but still bear the norms and values of an agro based society. They want to be a bourgeoisie over the nights, but do not have sufficient means to do so. They consider the new civil-military quarters and their patronised political agents as opponents in their ways to do so in this regard. This antagonist middle class, in some views, took the lead at the intermediate level of different socio-cultural and political organisations of Bangladesh society under the movement for restoration of democracy. In the same trend, 56.8% respondents have agreed that the contribution of NGOs evolved mainly in the rural society of Bangladesh. They identified these NGOs in the building up of political consciousness along with the economic self-sufficiency in the rural masses of the society, which also created an anti-autocracy support base among the rural people. The evolution of the Bangladesh economy through out the 1970s and 1980s towards the urban based non-agricultural, service and small-scale industrial initiatives might be seen as one of the main factors behind the sustainable development of the democratic forces against the military regime.

⁵² The data in table 4.7.1 present the perception of various constituents of the movement for democracy. The class and class conflict was seen as a cause, but was not seen as a major factor in the movement. Only 36.9% (with 12.1% highly accepted) respondents believe that the Bangladesh democracy movements involved the rise of class conflict in her society while 57.3% (with 11.2% highly rejected) rejects the same cause in this regard. 85% respondents (with 24.3% highly rejected) also reject any kind of participation on the basis of religious conflict in the movement while 77.7% (with 10.7% highly rejected) does not agree with the participation of any gender groups that evolved from any kind of gender discrimination. It is important that 95.6% respondents (with 63.6% highly accepted) recognises the high participation of the youth age group in the movement, which is related to the unrest in the student community of society. This is linked with the youth problems i.e. unemployment, problems of higher education at the university level, etc., which were not met under military regime. The highest response of 98.1% (with 57.3% highly accepted) consider the involvement of huge urban participation in the movement, which is related to the different kinds of urban problems that increased immensely under the military regime leading to the development of an indispensable movement force in the cities and towns of the country. The military regime could not also able to take into consideration the demands of different interest groups i.e. students, professionals, intellectuals and trade unions of the society. The student unrest in the higher education institutions, lower wages of the govt and non-govt working class employees in the industrial and non-agricultural enterprises in the urban area, demands of professionals and the limitations of freedom to express the views of the intellectuals, demands of the press freedom etc steered the movement against military autocracy. This is unveiled in the survey by 98% respondents (with 62.6% highly accepted) that the movement involved the high participation of different interest groups of the society. However, the main problem was political. The rise of civil-military intrigues in the power structure deflected the normal course of the political institutions in the country, which developed a conflict with the political forces of the country. The military junta floated a new political party—JP and practised power with a non-elected cabinet and army advisory council and their collaborators from centre to grass roots, which created an uneven relationship with the existing political forces in all sphere of the society. The survey discloses this with the supports of 97.1% respondents (with 63.6% highly accepted) that the movement was organised and led by the political forces—the elementary battle forces for democracy of the country.

⁵³ Under the socio-economic context in the 1980s, the higher class included landlord, industrialists and high position bureaucrats whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 25000+; middle upper class included big businessmen, university professors and that range of bureaucrats whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 15000-25000; middle class included middle rank college teacher, government employees, businessmen whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 10000-15000; lower middle class included small businessmen, school teachers, third and fourth class government employees whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 5000-10000; lower class included small shop businessmen, owner of small land, labourers of the industries whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 3000-5000; and the distress class at the lowest stage of the society included landless, day labourers, rickshaw pullers, porters etc whom monthly income was supposed to be under Taka 3000.

⁵⁴ For example, Dhaka city had nearly 8 million populations in the end of 1980s. The whole population did not require fulfilling the all indicators of the development for the necessary structural change for the movement. The movement was taken off when all indicators of the development covered only 40% to 50% of the population.

Chapter Six

The Development of the Democratic Forces for the Movement

6.1. Introduction

Since the military aggression took place in 1982 the socio political forces of the country were alienated by many factors engineered mainly by inter party collisions and intra party factionalism. The ideological alignment: socialism vs. capitalism; intra party leadership discrepancies; inconsistency between power elites: politician vs. civil-military bureaucracy; underdeveloped political institutions: revolutionary party rather than parliamentary party; geopolitical and super power variables; suffering related to the indecision regarding religious impetus in society and non-existence of popular administration were some of the major factors that delayed the process of the development of opposition forces in Bangladesh to initiate a movement for democracy in the early days of the aggression of General Ershad. At the same time, political power both in the opposition and the ruling group was mainly held by the landed upper class¹; the industrial class was still waiting for its slow take-off after denationalisation at the end of 1970s. The socio-economic status and financial circumstances of civil-military servicemen was far better than a group of new-born political elites of society in the post independent period, which however, might be related to the success of the military in the power race. At the moment of aggression, the political forces of both the ruling BNP and the main opposition AL were fragmented over many of their internal issues; leftist forces were dispersed by ruling repressions and the potential student forces of the country was crippled with many divisions. Moreover, a clandestine support of the collaborating and defeating forces of the national liberation war for military power elite in the cover of safeguarding the Islamic values was an open secret. The process, however, took time to change this stage of political circumstances in the next couple of years and to develop a democratic force in Bangladesh society.

The forces for the movement for democracy that developed in the later years mainly consisted of political forces and many other interest and pressure groups of the society. The interest and pressure groups, who played splendid roles, among other, were the students, labourers, professionals and intellectuals. Some other interest groups like business associations, NGOs and religious groups were also involved indirectly in the movement. It would be worth mentioning here the pattern and issues of conflicts in political parties and interest and pressure groups of that time and the process of how these conflicts transformed these socio political forces into unified democratic forces in the long run in organising a successful movement against the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

6.2. The Development of the Democratic Political Forces

The political forces of the country were segregated into many rival groups during the installation of military seizure of power in 1982. The AL was the main stream opposition to the ruling BNP before the takeover by General Ershad. A '10-party opposition alliance'² under the leadership of AL was already in the movement for democracy against the ruling BNP—founded under the military administration of General Zia. As Zia was from the Army, the party had always a blessing of the Army until General Ershad was in the scene of power.³ However, a significant group of power elites including cabinet members and high officials of the BNP had joined with the new military dictator; some of them were jailed⁴, and many of them were hiding to avoid the arrests and abuses. On the other hand, the main opposition AL (Hasina) had been facing an intra party leadership brawl.⁵ As a result of the deepening of their intra party conflict, the 10-party alliance under AL, in a real sense, failed to build any active movement against the new military junta. The other opposition political parties including leftist JSD, WPB, NAP and *Somajbadi Dal*, and the rightist and religious base—JIB, ML and other IPs were also found to have splitting tendencies until the General election of 1986. In this period, the AL and the BNP were able to stay with their independent current in politics as well as lead the 15-party and 7-party alliances respectively. In question of the participation in the JS election of 1986, a faction of 5 parties under the decision for non-participation in the election left the 15-party alliance, which formed later an independent 5-party alliance known as radical leftist in Bangladesh politics. An 8-party pro election alliance under the leadership of the AL participated in the election. However, the leftist parties could be divided into two major currents: first: leftist-1 parties who were pro-Moscow group and stayed with main opposition AL in all time of the movement including CPB, NAP, *Somajbadi Dal* and *Ekota* party and the like. Second, the leftist-2 parties who were known as pro-china revolutionary group, a majority of them were with AL led 15-party alliance until the election of 1986 and later formed 5-party alliance. The same category—leftist-2 parties like UPP and RCP was aligned with the BNP under 7-party alliance. The deep organisational and leadership crisis of the country's two biggest political parties brought the military ruler space to form his new party—JP and evolved its own line of political thinking. However, the detailed discussion of the developments in the opposition political parties is related to the understanding of the development of the democratic political forces for the movement for restoration of democracy.

6.2.1. The Developments in the AL in the 1980s

In the August of 1983, the main opposition AL (Hasina)⁶ faced the major splitting into two separate parties as AL (Hasina) and AL (Razzak) as a result of the ideological scuffle between the two factions under Sheikh Hasina and Abdur Razzak.

Sheikh Hasina had the emotional acceptance as the daughter of *Bangabandhu* to the millions of grass root workers and supporters of the party while Mr Abdur Razzak had the organising capacity following a large cadre force with him. The root of the split started from the conflict of the two factions of the BCL—BCL (Jalal-Jahangir) and BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu).⁷ Since January 1983, statements and counter statements in the press by the two factions of AL (Hasina) and BCL reached the worst and sharpened the divisions in July 1983. On 17 April 1983, on the occasion of '*Mujib Nagar Dibash*'⁸, although it was found the both faction leaders Sheikh Hasina and Abdur Razzak was together in the party programme in Meherpur, there was no sign of reunification between them in later days. On 17 July 1983 in a *Eid* reunion gathering in Chittagong, three Presidium Members including Mohiuddin Ahmed, Abdul Momin Talukder and Abdul Malek Ukil, and ALGS Abdur Razzak accused a vested group of destroying the unity of the party, which were encountered by Tofael Ahmed, ALOS and asked these leaders to leave, who had broken with the decision of the party. In the same day, two factions in Chittagong and Khulna released statements against each other accusing them of breaking the party. It was just in the final stage of a cold war between two factions, and on 18 July 1983, an emergency meeting of the Presidiums in the chair of Sheikh Hasina, called an extended council of the party on 31 July and a meeting of the ALWC on 1 August 1983. On 19 July 1983, Syed Ahmad, Office Secretary of the party protested the statement of Mr Tofael Ahmed, which charged with many allegations. In this critical juncture, on 20 July 1983 the Presidium of the party sat again and condemned the speech of Malek-Razzak in Chittagong and also decided to send this observation to the forthcoming meeting of the ALWC for final decision.⁹ The whole process at this stage sparked attacks and counter attacks between the two factions all over the country, especially in Dhaka city.¹⁰ The ALWC meeting in the chair of President Sheikh Hasina on 1st August 1983 decided to expel six leaders of the Razzak faction including GS Abdur Razzak on charge of breaking the disciplines of the party. This decision was approved by the presence of 35 members out of 52 of the ALWC, which was encountered by rebel leader Abdur Razzak shortly.¹¹ In this connection, forced retired Presidium Member Abdul Malek Ukil made the accusation that the designer of this meeting came from abroad to split the party of *Bangabandhu* and his design was successful. But he did not expose the name of the person.¹² The rebel faction under the leadership of Abdur Razzak decided later in November 1983 to form a new party in the original line of socialist spirit on which cause *Bangabandhu* died, named *Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League* (BKSAL). Since then, the AL under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina grew stronger and became the leading opposition political party in the democracy movement against the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

The AL held its National Council on 1-3 January 1986 for the first time since the introduction of the Martial Law in 1982. Sheikh Hasina was re-elected to the post of the President unopposed and Begum Sajeda Choudhury became GS. It was widely believed that the council failed to resolve the leadership issue—particularly the position of the GS—setting instead for a compromise. A baseless counter faction committee of the party was also published in news papers in the following day.¹³ In the late 1988, the AL was embroiled in an internal conflict—between Sheikh Hasina and its senior leaders including Dr Kamal Hussain—regarding the decision of senior leaders for the resignation of the party MPs from the JS while Sheikh Hasina was detained in early December 1987. In the event, the JS was dissolved and elections were called in March 1988, which Sheikh Hasina considered a major setback for the interest of the party.

6.2.2. The Formation of the 15-Party Alliance

On 14th January 1983, ‘some comments of General Ershad’¹⁴ in a meeting of *madrasha* teachers under *Mudasserine* in Dhaka presided by Mowlana Mannan¹⁵, State Minister for religion, created a bitter reaction in opposition political parties. In an attempt to protest against these comments by major opposition allied forces and in the ensuing developments, the 15-party alliance was established. At first, four veteran leaders of the opposition including ASM Abdur Rab of the JSD, Haider Akbar Khan Rano and Rashed Khan Menon of the WPB and Siddiqur Rahman of *Samajbadi Dal* initiated to protest these comments of the military junta. They considered including all major opposition parties to protest against the junta together, which followed an all-party meeting soon.¹⁶ In the residence of Mowlana Tarkabughis in Dhaka, an all-party meeting was held under his chair in the evening of 16th January 1983.¹⁷ The first statement against the military junta was released by the 15 opposition democratic and progressive parties from this meeting. In fact, this statement was signed by 14 parties, which was extended later into 15 parties by the joining of the AL (Farid Ghazi). However, on 16th January 1983, when these parties met for a joint statement, there were no plan for the building an alliance among them. Only there was a choice at that time if it was possible to observe together the forthcoming ‘Language Martyr Day’ on 21st February. In the mean time, as it was beyond their expectation and imagination, there was a bloody carnage on the wake of student movement on 14th February 1983 in protest of the new Education Policy of the junta in the Dhaka University campus and suburbs, which took many lives and casualties. The leaders of these 15 parties sat in a meeting for action programmes in the residence of the AL leader Dr Kamal Hussain on 15th February 1983, which followed an arrest of all of them.¹⁸ They were all sent blind folded to the torture cell in the cantonment.¹⁹ On 1st March 1983, the majority of these leaders

including Sheikh Hasina were released. Since then these parties tried meeting together on every issue against the military junta.

In April, 1983 there was an initiative to extend the earlier 10-party alliance into a '15-party alliance'²⁰, which was completed by the end of the month on the basis of an '11-point demand', although the left-linked 11 parties—based on peasants, labourers and workers—were still in dissatisfaction and doubt about the leading role of AL (Hasina) in the alliance. However, these 11-points included the demands of withdrawal of the martial law and the reintroduction of the parliamentary system of government. In the mean time, the JSD—one of the main members of the alliance—faced intra-party conflict over the issue of Sheikh Mujib. The JSD chief Major (Rtd) Jalil stated that he had no longer any reservation to see Sheikh Mujib as the father of the nation as recognised in the constitution of the country, which sparked opposition in his party.²¹ On 9 April 1983 at Hotel Eden, Dhaka in the observance of the 'Demand Day', the disintegration of the alliance was exposed when Siddiqur Rahman of *Samajbadi Dal* objected to the '*Joy Bangla*'²² slogan delivered by AL chief Sheikh Hasina as she finished her speech. However, it was accepted later by all members of the alliance that they could use their own party slogans in their respective deliveries. On 13 April 1983 in a meeting of the alliance presided by Khalequzzaman Bhuiya, Convenor of the BSD formed a mass tour programme all over the country under 10 teams of the alliance leaders to build up consciousness among the people against the new military dictator. The alliance on 18 June 1983 in a meeting at Hotel Eden demanded the date of JS elections first than any other elections. If not, the alliance was agreed to organise movement against the dictator. The alliance was in a critical stage in July 1983 when a break away faction of the JSD and AL (Mizan) joined the dialogue with the military dictator evading the alliance decision. But in November 1983, the dissident of AL and the newly formed BKSAL under the leadership of Abdur Razzak joined the 15-party alliance, which replaced the AL (Mizan) that joined later with the political front of the dictator in 1984. However, until the JS election of 1986, the number of member parties of the 15-party alliance were sometimes decreased and sometimes increased, but continued with a stable number of 15 parties in the long run.²³

6.2.3. The Breakdown of 15-Party Alliance: the Formation of the 8-Party and 5-Party Alliances

The issue of participation in the election of 1986 split the 15-party alliance. At the midnight, 21st March 1986 in a meeting of the alliance, those who favoured the participation in the election including AL, CPB, NAP, BKSAL, *Sammya Badi Dal*, WPB (Nazrul), JSD (Siraj) and GAL formed the 8-party alliance. The another faction of alliance those who disfavoured the participation in the election including WPB (Basher-Menon), JSD (Inu), BSD (Mahbub), BSD (Khalequzzaman) and

Samaj Badi Dal formed a new left linked 5-Party alliance. The election, however, divided the JSD in which JSD (Siraj) joined with 8-party alliance and JSD (Inu) joined with 5-Party alliance. In the later couple of years until the end of the military regime, the number and party members of the 5-party alliance were stable, but, the 8-party alliance was not. In the issue of seats sharing in the election, the BKSAL left the alliance and boycotted the election. In the same issue, the JSD (Siraj) also left the alliance and participated in the election individually. After the election, the UCL and *Sammya Badi Dal* also left the alliance for some time. However, in the later stages, the BKSAL and *Sammya Badi Dal* returned to the alliance and as a result the 8-party alliance returned in the same format until the end of military dictatorship in 1990.

6.2.4. The BNP and the Formation of 7-Party Alliance

In the beginning of April, 1983 the BNP (Satter) divided into two factions as BNP (Huda) under the leadership of Shamsul Huda Choudhury and BNP (Satter) under ousted President Justice Abdus Satter.²⁴ The JCD—student wing of the BNP could not also survive the split as 23 executive members joined with newly formed pro-dictator student organisation '*Nutan Bangla Chattra Somaj*'. However, on 12 April 1983, a meeting of BNP (Satter) Executive Committee was chaired by Justice Abdus Satter, in which Vice President Shah Azizur Rahman withdrew his resignation and a decision was made to observe an organising tour all over the country from 15-20 April, 1983. Another faction of the BNP (Huda)—as trying to earn their strength as well²⁵—subsequently joined the newly formed pro-junta *Jano Dal* (Peoples Party). On 25th May 1983, the BNP (Satter) formed a national unity with the Jatya League of Mr Aatur Rahman Khan. In the same day, Begum Zia, Senior Vice-President of the BNP (Satter), urged the workers to elect the new leader of the party.²⁶ On 12 August 1983, BNP (Satter) started the discussion with six other parties to form an alliance, which was completed as the '7-party alliance'²⁷ by the end of August 1983. On 6th September 1983, the BNP and pro-BNP political forces reached an action based unity with 15-party alliance on the basis of 5-point demands, and at the same time, the formation of 7-Party alliance was announced.²⁸

On 24th September 1983, the extended meeting of the BNP (Satter) was held under the chair of Begum Khaleda Zia due to the illness of Chairman Justice Satter. The party hailed the leadership of Begum Zia, when she first on 30 September 1983 attended the public rally of 7-party alliance in front of the city BNP office in Dhaka. On 28 November 1983, the junta administration put Begum Zia under house arrest, and forced her to attend the dialogue with the dictator.²⁹ However, Mr Satter resigned as Chairman on 13 January 1984 and was replaced by Begum Zia who was elected to the position unopposed in May 1984. The 7-Party alliance faced difficulties in the mid-January 1984 when some member parties and leaders joined

the dialogue with the junta. The Jatya League of Aatur Rahman Khan, NAP of Nurur Rahman, and KSP of the Syed Azizul Haque Nanna Mia of 7-party alliance joined the dialogue, who also formed earlier an '11-party National United Front'³⁰ on 28 November 1983. On the other hand, a break away faction of DL (Moazzem) under the leadership of Abdur Rouf Chowdhury joined the 7-Party alliance. The BNP (Dudu-Nilu) a dissident of BNP (Huda) divided again on 5th July 1984 into two factions and one of them under Khalequzzaman Khan Dudu joined later with pro-dictator *Jana Dal*. In the beginning of 1985, the main stream BNP under the leadership of Begum Zia survived an intense intra-party conflict from the ex-Muslim League faction under the leadership of Shah Azizur Rahman.³¹ In June 1985, Shah Aziz faction formed a dissident BNP (Shah) and included them with the formation of the 'National Front'³² in support of the military dictator. In the end of 1986, the party was facing the deep internal organisational crisis evident in the surprising resignation of the Dhaka City President Abul Hasnat—the former Mayor of the capital.³³ In late July 1988, six prominent leaders including Secretary General K.M. Obayedur Rahman were expelled from the party.³⁴ Mr Obaidur Rahman was suspected of planning to form a breakaway faction of the BNP aligned with the dictator to contest the JS elections rumoured for next March 1989. However, these severe divisions in the opposition political parties were not able to put any effective change in their central command of leaderships of the movement.³⁵

6.2.5. The Leftist-1 and Leftist-2 Political Forces

The pro-Moscow leftist-1 parties mainly the CPB and NAP (M) were aligned with the progressive and pro-liberation forces without major intra-party collisions during the whole movement. On the other hand, the majority parties of the leftist-2 category faced bitter splits, which sometimes affected the unity in the movement for democracy. The factions prone JSD—the main component of this group became topsy-turvy in 1983.³⁶ On 5th November 1983, the BSD—another component of the leftist-2 forces divided again³⁷ into two parties: BSD (Khalequzzaman) and BSD (Mahbub) after the expulsions of two prominent leaders Mahmudur Rahman Manna and Kamrunnher Beby for their alleged immoral relationships. This largely affected the anti-Ershad student movement as their student wing was running the DUCSU³⁸--the 'second parliament of the country'. However, the internal frictions of the JSD came to light in the beginning of February 1984 when the party split into two factions: JSD (Rob) and JSD (Siraj).³⁹ A smaller faction under Major (Rtd) Jalil later formed a new party as '*Bangladesh Jatyatabadi Oikya Andolon*'. The three smaller leftist components of 15-party alliance including NAP (Haroon), NAP (Muzaffar) and Ekota Party started the process of unity into a single party on 5th July 1984. In the mid-1985, '9 leftist parties'⁴⁰ excluding pro-Moscow CPB under 15 alliance tried to form a 'greater communist unity' which did not come to light. On

18 July 1985, the WPB faced a major split in question to participate in the JS election under junta administration. This brought into a new dissident WPB under the leadership of Menon and Rano.⁴¹

6.2.6. The Pro-Islamic Parties

The pro-Islamic forces at the beginning of 1980s included mainly the anti-independence 'fundamentalist forces'⁴² of the country. In fact, major parties of these religious forces prefer Islam mostly for use to secure power than that of for practice in life and maintained a pro-Pakistani link in Bangladesh politics.⁴³ These pro-Islamic forces included mainly the ML, JIB, BKA, DL, and IDL etc. However, these forces, although in opposition, were considered as the associative inlets in the rise of anti-liberation forces in the post-independent Bangladesh. In the beginning of the Martial Law, they were trying to cope with the new military leader. Some of them supported the new junta in the name of dialogue.⁴⁴ In April 1983, the 11-party NUF was formed under the auspices of Khondoker Mostak Ahmed and later was extended into the 14-party Front. The JIB was trying to reinstate in politics at this stage.⁴⁵ In the mid-July 1983, two initiatives of round table discussion under the auspices of Moulana Hafezzi Hoozur of the BKA and the NUF for unity in the opposition forces were failed.⁴⁶ The ML was present in this time of politics with five factions: ML (Siddiquee), ML (Sabur), ML (T. Ali), ML (Huda) and Nikhil Bangladesh Muslim League (Faiz Box).⁴⁷ In March 1984, 18 leaders of ML (Siddiquee) joined the newly formed pro-dictator National Front. On 14 March 1984, Hafezzi Hoozoor of the BKA called the government to cancel the Upzilla election and to form a national government under the leadership of Chief Justice of the country. On 30th March 1984, the Jatya League chief Aaur Rahman Khan took the oath as Prime Minister of the junta cabinet, who just two days ago on 28th March 1984 branded the dictator as the 'killer of democracy'.⁴⁸ Many leaders and parties of pro-Islamic ideology based on 11-party Front joined the dialogue with the military junta and as a result, the Front' became divided.⁴⁹

In December 1984, the baseless smaller right wing Islamic components tried to reorganise under a Front that consisted of 17 parties⁵⁰ under the leadership of Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad, which formally opened on 10th December 1984. The manifesto of the Front supported the revival of the post-1975 politics and seemed to oppose the ongoing anti-junta movement of 22-parties. Also this Front in accordance with the BKA of Mowlana Hafezzi Hozoor united to contest the forthcoming elections in the view of the formation of a national government that would declare Bangladesh as an Islamic Republic. The ML (T. Ali) split again on 11 February 1985 with a new faction under Shamsul Huda and Jamir Ali as President and Secretary General respectively, while the ML (Siddiquee became into three factions in 1985.⁵¹ The majority of these pro-Islamic parties joined with the junta until 1990

and those who were in the opposition had a very insignificant role against the military junta.

6.2.7. The Liaison Committee and the Unity of the Opposition Forces

Since the ban on politics was withdrawn in April 1983, the opposition political parties and alliances tried to form a liaison among them so that the united movement against the military junta could get momentum. In this stage, all member parties of the 15-party alliance tried to include the BNP in the movement as well as for the formation of a single platform of all opposition parties.⁵² But the BNP itself became the main obstacle in the way of greater unity at this stage. They proposed that the movement could be built from two different platforms on the basis of joint action schedule.⁵³ Later, the political liaison committee of the BNP (Satter) took the initiative to discuss with the AL and the 15-party alliance to settle the issues related to the formation of indifferent schedule of actions which came to light on 7-8 August 1983. However, the stand of the BNP was found contradictory from the difference of the statement of their two leaders and it was found later that the BNP was not in favour of unity with 'only 15-Party alliance'.⁵⁴ It was very difficult to form any type of unity between AL and BNP as both of the parties had many differences in regard to their ideology, political roles in the near past and between their present aims and objectives.⁵⁵ However, at one stage of discussion of the last one and half months, Ferdous Ahmad Koreishi, Mohammad Forhad, Haider Akbar Khan Rano and Rahed Khan Menon prepared a draft of joint action programmes for both alliances. On 6 September 1983, at the resident of Siddiqur Rahman, a leader of *Samajbadi Dal* of the 15-party alliance, the inception of the unity between 15-party and 7-party alliances was approved on the basis of '5-points Demand'⁵⁶, under which they agreed to observe all actions together from their own platform in the struggle for restoration of democracy. Both of the alliances decided to observe a 'Demand Day' all over the country on 30 September 1983. Both parties—AL and BNP were able to eschew the debate of constitutional form of government in this crucial stage.

The state of unity of the opposition alliances became delicate for the time being when the junta tried to shade under the shelter of a new political party in the end of 1983.⁵⁷ In this process, the junta cleverly communicated with 299 leaders of around 50 parties in the name of 'political dialogue' on 7th January-7th February 1984, in which only 1/2 parties and some leaders of the 15-party and 7-party alliances joined.⁵⁸ Many of these parties that responded to the invitation of the junta had no longer any base or full committee or any office in the country and even the names of some parties were never known. However, 30 parties including the main stream AL and BNP boycotted this dialogue of the junta,⁵⁹ and this created some instability in both of the mainstream opposition alliances for the time being. The 15-

party alliance was in a critical phase in relation to participation in the *Upazilla* election and the JSD—the strong alliance member became divided in February 1984 when a strong faction of the party lobbied for participation in this election. Although, the military junta invited again the main opposition forces to the dialogue, the 15-party and 7-party alliances were committed to boycott the junta as they observed ‘Demand Day’ on 6th February 1984 and ‘Protest Day’ on 14th February 1984. However, the action based unity between the 15-party and 7-party alliance was working through out the 1984-1985 on the basis of the 5-point demand, although the basic difference between these two leading parties could never be resolved. The role of the JSD in the alliance was very critical. It was found that the JSD was not happy with the leadership of main stream parties of the opposition including AL and BNP, which was seen in an interview of the JSD chief Major (Rtd) M.A Jalil in January 1984—that criticised both Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia.⁶⁰ This was promptly countered by the two leaders in their interviews in the following months.⁶¹ Therefore it was clear that the command of the opposition forces under Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia was still at stake and could not win over the member parties of their alliances.

Historically Bangladesh had some experience of ‘crucial political dialogues’ that resolved the crisis.⁶² Hence, 15-Party and 7-party alliances took the strategy to participate in the dialogue—in the sake of imprisoned and hiding away party workers, in the hope if then normal course in daily life returned—when the dictator threatened to impose stiff Martial Law regulations.⁶³ On 26 March 1984 although they informed their consent for dialogue, they changed their position on 27 March 1984, not to attend. On 3 April 1984, the 15-party alliance wrote to the dictator to reschedule the date and set some preconditions to create a peaceful environment, which included mainly the release of political prisoners and 5-points demand of the opposition forces.⁶⁴ However, the dictator was successful in creating divisions in the opposition line in the name of dialogue as both alliances presented their separate fresh demands—the 15-party for 10-point and 7-party for 33-points.⁶⁵ At this stage, although the 5-points demand was still working as the means of unity in actions and programmes between the two alliances, the dissimilarity of demands in the dialogue with the junta—especially in the question of constitutional revival and the closer relationship of the BNP with JIB became the content of mistrust, doubt and cold war between them. The leaders of the 15-party alliance never recognised the JIB as a democratic force in the ongoing movement, although the BNP was completely silent in this regard, which reacted among the youth of the country.⁶⁶ However, the dialogue of the junta became a drama and false initiative and clever handling of opposition forces no sooner than General Ershad had formally recognised the National Front—transformed into *Jano Dal* as his party around the middle of May

1984.⁶⁷ The opposition alliances became divided and could not announce united actions due to the differences since their unification in demands in September 1983.

The Liaison Committee of the 15-party and 7-party alliances sat together again on 9 June 1984 and evaluated the dialogue and exposure of the dictator in the connection of *Jano Dal*. Both of the alliances condemned the decision of the junta to participate in 'politics with uniform'.⁶⁸ However, they agreed to maintain their united actions against the junta and called the public meeting on 5th August 1984: the 15-party alliance at the south premise of BM mosque and the 7-party alliance at the holy shrine of *Hazrat Gulap Shah (R)* at Gulistan Square that followed an united action of a half day *hartal* on 27th August 1984 to realise their 5-point demand. On 14 September 1984, the two main opposition leaderships, Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia, for the first time, addressed a meeting of the SCBA from a single platform, which sparked a new hope in the opposition forces, although the two leaders sat separately by the side of the Bar President Shamsul Huda Choudhury and did not exchange any word between them.⁶⁹ However, there arose some dissatisfaction in the opposition alliance when BNP chairperson Begum Zia, in an interview with the BOA, favoured the Presidential form of Government in the country, which was strongly criticised by the leaders of 15-party alliance as well as faced some opposition from her own 7-party alliance members, although Ahmad Nazir, a middle rank leader of the party informed later that it was their own stand of the BNP. The state of difference at this stage between the AL and the BNP were far and wide.⁷⁰

In November 1984, the political ambience of the country glimpsed a possibility of a peaceful solution of the current crisis. The leaders of the 15-party and 7-party alliance projected their shadow cabinet or a possibility of national government that would replace the junta administration and the news media put forward the framework of a caretaker government under the leadership of Justice Kamal Uddin Hossain following a discussion among civic quarters.⁷¹ Side by side, there was found a possibility of division in both of the major alliances as the *Sammya Badi Dal* and both factions of the BSD under 15-party alliance and UPP, DL (Rouf), NAP (Bashani) and RCP under 7-party alliance were about to leave the alliance politics as they thought that they were not considered properly by the bigger parties of the alliances. Some of them could have joined with the dictator, although finally the dissatisfactions among these smaller components were mitigated. The unity of the 22-party alliance was again threatened by a statement of BNP youth front *Jubo Dal* President Abul Kashem and Secretary Saifur Rahman on 16 November 1984, later denied on 20 November 1984, which recklessly criticised the role of AL in the liberation war and raged severe dissatisfaction in the AL workers following an encounter statement by the AL Youth Secretary Mohammad Nasim on 17 November 1984. At this stage of crisis, in a public meeting at Mirpur on 23

November 1984, the AL chief Sheikh Hasina, assured that the unity of people built through the movement could not be broken down and the united movement would continue at any cost. She compared the cooptation of opposition leaders in the junta cabinet with the fall of stars from the unaffected sky that could not do any harm to opposition mass movement against the military dictator. This assurance of the AL President however removed possible obliteration of 22-party unity at this time and the Liaison Committee of both of the alliances sat again to formulate the action programmes of the movement.

In the beginning of 1985, in relation to participation in the JS elections dated on 6th April 1985—the date postponed later, the two alliances and their member parties faced intense cold war. Although the many leaders of leading AL were silent, two components of 15-party alliance, the *Samajbadi Dal* and the Mazdur Party denied participation in the election under military dictator. However, the BNP was keen to boycott as many of its leaders were in jail while the UPP and the GP, two major components of their 7-party alliance favoured participating in the election to end Martial Law. In fact, the delicate issues like the election always disrupted the unity of the opposition. The announcement without preparation and cancellation of the date of election were just white wash to avoid the international pressure that became a usual and clever practice of the dictator to prolong his power. However, the AL President Sheikh Hasina authorised the senior leaders of his party to take a decision on forthcoming elections in the three day extended meeting of party held on 7-8 & 10 February 1985, which reiterated its determination to resist any farcical election drama that was designed to legalise the illegal power. On 11 February 1985 at IEB, BNP Chairperson was denied participation in the election as she denounced the step as ‘high drama on our national political stage’.⁷² Both of the major alliances along with the JIB and some other smaller components in the opposition were in a firm stance to resist any attempt of the election that led again to a stiffer phase of Martial Law in the country.⁷³ The military dictator formally entered into politics with the formation of the Jaty Party (JP), the political party no. 116, under his direct auspices on 1st January 1986.⁷⁴ However, some factions of the BNP (Shah), ML (Siddiquee) and the GP disagreed with their involvement in the formation of the JP.⁷⁵ On 26th January 1986, in a representative’s council of his party at DDSA auditorium, Shah Azuzur Rahman, who was not given any position in the newly formed JP supported the 5-point demands of the mainstream opposition alliances. In the end of January 1986, a statement of the JIB leader Abbas Ali Khan published in the Pakistan Dawn on 15 January sparked a country wide protest by pro-liberation forces both in ruling and opposition parties, in which he mentioned that ‘the people of Bangladesh was then repented to be isolated from Pakistan.’⁷⁶

The opposition 22-parties under two major alliances announced a unity Council on 14th February 1986 at the BM mosque south premise, where they wanted to reach a single demand—‘the resignation of the military dictator from power’. At the same time, there was also an expectation from the workers as well as pressure from the smaller segments of both alliances that the two key leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia would address the council from the same platform, which never came to light. In this milieu, there were also found two separate initiatives to form a greater alliance of all opposition forces, which were failed.⁷⁷

At mid night of 21st February 1986, ‘a clash between the rival youth and student factions of the AL and the BNP at the *Central Shaid Minar*’⁷⁸, for the first time, caused problems in the course of united actions between the main stream opposition alliances. Although, the neutral political analyst believed that this incident was designed and implemented by the DGFI to dislodge the unity of opposition forces. At this stage, on 2nd March 1986, the dictator announced the date of JS elections under a revived article of the suspended constitution, which again brought both of the opposition alliances together.⁷⁹ In this stage of the political situation, on 17th March 1986, the leaders of the mainstream opposition alliance sat together, for the first time in their history of three and half years’ anti-autocracy movement, to reach a decision regarding the participation in the election. Comrade Mohammad Forhad, GS of the CPB made a proposal for united participation of all opposition forces, so that a ballot revolution could oust the military dictator, which was knocked out by the BNP leaders along with 5 radical leftist parties under 15-party alliance. The AL was found soft and silent. However, at mid-night, the alliance leaders together announced to the media that the opposition 15-party and 7-party alliance agreed to participate in the election if the 5-points demand was to be fulfilled. This announcement was ultimately a signal for the boycott of the election.⁸⁰ In this situation, the 15-Party alliances did not want to allow the dictator to have a walk-over and decided to contest elections as part of the movement in the late hours of the night 21 March 1986—a deadline set by military administration. The AL with a faction of its 15-party alliance—newly renamed as the 8-Party alliance and the JIB announced on 23 March 1986 their intention to participate in the elections. This decision was subsequently criticised by Begum Zia of the BNP and 5 other leftist components of the 15-party alliance. The unity between the two major opposition alliances was thus broken on this issue. After the general election of 1986, although the AL boycotted the Presidential poll in October 1986, this period led to many events of the opposition movement on the basis of parliamentary debates. But the street agitation of the 8-party alliance—in the failure to realize their demands in the JS—brought them again closer to the street movement forces of the 7-party and

5-party alliances, which culminated in their united action of 'Dhaka Seize' in November 1987 leading to the dissolution of the JS in December 1987.

6.3. Interest Groups and Pressure Groups

6.3.1. The Student Organisations and Alliances

The students and youth of the universities and colleges of Bangladesh society were the principal components and pioneer forces to build the movement against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. The opposition student forces were mainly divided into two distinct currents: *Kendryo Chattra Sangram Parishad* (Central Students Actions Committee—CSAC) and *Sangrami Chattra Jote* (Student Alliance for Actions—SAA). The CSAC was formed with 14 leftist and liberal right wing student organisations at first on 21st November 1982 as the pioneer and advanced force of the student movement,⁸¹ and announced historic '10-points demands'⁸² of the students in a huge gathering on 26th March 1983 at the APARAJEYA BANGLA in the Dhaka university. Later, the SAA was formed in the wake of the movement consisting of purely right wing components of the student forces.

The CSAC protested the education policy of Dr Mazid Khan that announced in September 1982. The CSAC leaders organised the countrywide tour and signature campaign in November against the education policy of the junta, which was able to collect more than two hundred thousand signatures of students all over the country. After the countrywide tour, they organised a huge protest on 11 January 1983 in Dhaka University campus during their planned 'Secretariat Siege' action. At this stage, an initiative of the dialogue between student leaders and the junta was failed.⁸³ Through out the movement against the military dictatorship, the CSAC was a principal spokesman of the students of the Bangladesh. It was the fact that the CSAC dominated the major part of the student forces before the JS election of 1986 on the wake of which a major part of the 15-party alliance along with their student wings joined. As a result, the CSAC was broken down; however, the different parts of the CSAC had tried to forge unity again, and at the end, were able to restore their unity from the middle of 1987 in the face of their united struggle against the fundamentalist BICS all over the country. In 1988, two thirds of the country including the capital city of Dhaka went under the devastation of the flood and the massive relief distribution by the student organisations took them closer, and this unity had been recuperated further in 1989 in their protest again against BICS which culminated in their victory in the DUCSU election in February 1989 against the SAA. The unity among them was broken down again on 22 October 1989 in the wake of conflict between VP and GS of the DUCSU. A new break away faction consisting of '9 pro-leftist student organisations'⁸⁴ quit the CSAC under the leadership of DUCSU GS Mushtaque Hossain.

At this point of the unexpected division of the CSAC—from center to periphery—in all higher educational institutions through out country, their rival, the JCD led SAA, grew stronger among the students of the society, and in 1990, they won more than two-thirds of the university and college unions of the country along with the key seats of the DUCSU that had an enduring glimpse in the movement all through the history of political development of the country. In the first half of 1990, the major two opposition student wings—BCL and JCD were found to fight against the BICS in parallel, which again brought them closer. In this suitable political atmosphere, they took the first chance to protest the military dictator while the all mainline opposition political forces called a day long sit-in action round the Government Secretariat on 10 October 1990 resulting 6 killings and hundreds of injury. The student forces participated in the said sit-in snatched the dead body of a fellow student to the campus. The dead body lay down at the premises of the *Aparajeyo Bangla* (invincible Bangladesh) in the Dhaka University campus. In a moment, the leaders of all student organisations came to the *Aparajeyo Bangla* and stood side by side along with thousands of student supporters that filled up all of the walkways of campus. This unity was caught by an event of a spontaneous emotional outburst, not by the pre designed decision of their own, from which the student leaders could not slip back and had to sit for the formal declaration of the APSU in an evening meeting at the DUCSU office in the Dhaka University campus on 10th October 1990. Since then the APSU was the sources of more inspiration than that of the opposition political parties to all corners of the society up to the removal of the junta on 6th December in 1990.

6.3.2. The Intellectual Forces

The movement of the intellectuals against the military regime of General Ershad was found in their participation in all actions with opposition political forces of the country. Although they are too differentiated to be regarded as a single class, there is, however, one unifying sociological bond between all groups of intellectuals namely education, which binds them together in a striking way.⁸⁵ The teachers of different universities and colleges, poets, authors, novelist, columnists, dramatists, sculpturists, painting artists, television performers, journalists, cultural workers and head of religious institutions etc were defined as the intellectual communities of Bangladesh. They were the ‘persons possessing knowledge or in a narrower sense those whose Judgement based on reflection and knowledge, derives less directly and exclusively from sensory perception than in the case of non intellectuals’.⁸⁶ They were a distinct group in the society ‘whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society.’⁸⁷ Like most other categories of the educated groups, intellectuals in Bangladesh were overwhelmingly public or semi-public sector employees. They were mainly university professors, or employed by

some research institute. In addition some full-time bureaucrats were also noted as part-time intellectuals. For the rest, the journalists employed by private dailies or weeklies, party intellectuals and a very few individuals who support their intellectual activity on private means.⁸⁸ They were mainly involved in the movement under a kind of their own interest group associations, for example, teachers associations of different universities, colleges and schools, poetry council, Combined Cultural Alliance, Press Club, Union of Journalists and women bodies in the form of local and national control. Although they had some professional demands while they were exposed under group formation, their main agenda was to free the country from the military dictatorship, which was purely for the wellbeing of whole society and therefore was regarded as an event of intelligentsia. The famous individuals of these groups sometimes became a symbol of the movement for their outstanding expression in the form of writing of poems, novels, drama or column against the military dictatorship. Any attempts by these kinds of intellectuals were able to move the citizens and that was also exactly what happened in Bangladesh. However, the intellectual community of the country were exposed under the non party Combined Cultural Alliances (CCA) which united more than 200 socio-cultural organisations of the country. The eminent singers, poets, authors, actors and actress and artists of all corners of the non-party civic quarters were united under this alliance, which directed a non-political cultural movement that was able to attract a huge general mass to the mainstream opposition political movement.

6.3.3. Professional Forces in Bangladesh Democracy Movement

The professionals in 1980s Bangladesh were defined as the skilled manpower in their specialised area of the educated middle class of the society. Although they struggled primarily to establish their own professional standing in terms of economic rights like other middle stage interest groups of the society, they moved quickly into the movement with the cause of national issues in their professional circle. From the experiences of their movements, they reached an ultimate conclusion that the absence of a democratic and accountable government in the state system had laid down the main barrier to solve their own professional problems and related issues in national sphere.

The lawyers, for their professional position, felt first that the damage to the constitution and suspension of the fundamental rights of the people in the interest of the military junta had endangered the rule of law in the country.⁸⁹ In the October 1982, the lawyers of the Supreme Court started demonstrations, processions and strikes in protest of the steps of the dictator taken regarding judiciary and a number of eminent lawyers leaders were arrested in these events.⁹⁰ On 19 November 1983 lawyers presented '6-point demands'⁹¹ for establishing the free and fair judicial system. In favour of their demands, the lawyers observed the historical non-stop 17

days strikes and boycott of the courts all over country from 20th January to 5th February 1985. On 9 April 1985, the convener of the CCBA Shamsul Haq Chowdhury was arrested and all the lawyers of Dhaka metropolitan area boycotted the courts and brought out huge demonstrations. On that very day the dictator was compelled to free him. On 10 November 1987 in the program of Dhaka siege by the opposition forces, lawyers participated and took the historical step to close the Supreme Court and other courts all over the country. Hundreds of lawyers all over the country were arrested in this event. The SCBA, DCBA, NLA and their units all over the country spontaneously participated in these movements. In the frustration stage of the political movement in 1988, the success of the SCBA in 'the verdict of High Court against the junta regarding the Eighth Amendment of the constitution'⁹² had revealed a new hope for non-communal democratic forces of the country. The CCBA first formulated the provision for a 'Neutral Care Taker Government' to conduct a fair election, when the political parties of the country did not agree to participate in the election under the administration of the military junta.

The engineers, agriculturalists and medical doctors (PROKRICHI⁹³) first organised a movement to protect their rights and status after the publication of the report on national salary scales of the Rashid Commission in 1978,⁹⁴ which led to the formation of the Senior Service Pool in 1979, Cadre Service in September 1980 and the BCS Coordination Committee excluding the BCS (administration) cadre in November 1981.⁹⁵ In 1984, the activities of the PROKRICHI revived and a '9-point demand' was formulated. In the end of 1984 to January 1985, they tried to build up a countrywide movement to protect their professional status, which, in the end of December 1985, led all professional cadres in the administration into extreme actions like strikes, hunger strikes and demonstrations. In this period, all professional cadres under BCS Coordination Committee raised their '17-points demand.'⁹⁶ However, this turned into a painful history in the movement of the professionals as the military junta took hard-line policy including sackings, transfers, harassment and arrest of many professional leaders.⁹⁷ After this painful event, there was no effective initiative found until 1989. But the BMA in accordance with their '21-point demands'⁹⁸ continued the movements every year in which the movement on the issues related to the status of the In-Service Internee Doctors in 1987 and health policy and health budget in 1989 were most inspiring. This movement was able to earn the support of all democratic and opposition political forces and other professional groups. Although there were some 'conflicts between the graduate engineers and diploma engineers'⁹⁹ the overall participation of the engineers in the line of the PROKRICHI movement were spontaneous through out the whole period of the military dictatorship. The leading unions of the journalists including the Dhaka Union of Journalists (DUJ), Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists (BFUJ) etc of

the country agitated with their professional demands including the abolishment of the black laws that prohibited the freedom of publishing the news, freedom of speech and writing and independence of journalism.¹⁰⁰ Although there was press censorship all through the period of military rule, the journalists of the country were also found to take the streets along with the political forces of the country and their role of 1987 during the Dhaka Siege and final mass upsurge of 1990 must be regarded as a praiseworthy contribution to establish democracy in the country.¹⁰¹ The teachers' associations of different universities and colleges, primary, secondary and higher secondary educational institutions and their national bodies were involved directly and indirectly in the movement with their professional demands that also leaned into national issues i.e. for establishing democracy in the country. In this way, many professional groups had taken part actively in the movement for the implementation of their own demands as well as national cause.¹⁰²


6.3.4. The Development of the Trade Union Forces

The history of the TU movement of the Indian subcontinent is very old and carries very rich events since the British rule in this region, which strengthened under the repressive rule of Pakistan.¹⁰³ After independence, the military dictator in the early 1980s banned all TU activities in the country. Then an alliance of the National Federation of the Trade Unions (NFTUS) emerged in the name of *Sramik Karmachari Oikkya Parishad* (SKOP) to establish the democratic rights of the workers as well as to fulfil their economic demands.¹⁰⁴ The members of this alliance reached 11 towards the end of 1982. On 6 December 1982 the BNP labourer's wing—Nationalist Labour Party presented 8-points demand before Ershad. The mainstream TU movement under SKOP in the country was established following a joint meeting of the top leaders of 12 national trade unions in Dhaka on 13 April 1983 including the labourers' wing of the BNP. At this time, they put forward their 5-points demand to the junta government. From then on the SKOP became the pioneer of many movements in the country and secured support from the opposition political forces of country. Under the command of the SKOP the labourers and workers of the country observed many strikes which brought them in the lime light. In the middle of 1983, the labourer wing of the AL, the *Jatya Sramik League* joined the SKOP. The SKOP movement reached the pinnacle in the May 1983 and in the face of 48-hours *hartal* on 21st May 1984, the military administration reached the '21-points agreement'¹⁰⁵ with the SKOP. Although, some of the SKOP leaders including Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Sirajul Alam Khan as ministers and Ruhul Amin Bhuiya and Shah Md. Abu Zafar joined the side of dictator in the period of 1984-86, the leftist factions of the SKOP were still in the control of large part of the working class in all industrial sectors. However, the unity of the SKOP was broken down in the wake of the decision to participate in the JS election of 1986 and became

reunited after the dissolution of the JS in the end of 1987. The SKOP with its own charter of demands participated in all actions with the opposition political forces and students side by side; they became a militant component of all opposition actions in the final stage movement in 1990. There were some peasant organizations that also had very active participation in the movement. The composition of the 8-organisations¹⁰⁶ of the peasants and agricultural labourers were mainly working as leftist forces in the line of Marx's 'class in itself. These peasants and agricultural labourers' forces had also their own charter of demands, which was accommodated in the demands of opposition political forces.

6.4. Empirical Observation on the Role Importance of Different Movement Forces

The participants and organising forces of the movement were mainly in five categories: political parties in non-parliamentary alliances, students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions. The course of conflict in the movement was solely a political event. Hence the democracy movement was always led and controlled by the opposition political parties of the country. However, the data in table 6.4.1 presents the primary role¹⁰⁷ of all of these movement forces. In between their relationship, overall, the 'fair important role' of students and political parties has been supported by 96%-100% of all forces membership. The same role of the students has been seen as distinctive, by 100% of S, I, P, TU and NPG groups while the political parties has gained same supports from the last four of the above five memberships. However, the role of rest three forces has also revealed mostly as fairly important in which the TU is found distinctive to have the highest support of S (80%) while the professionals and intellectuals have been supported with more than 80% by TU membership. However, the role of Intellectuals has achieved the highest support from PP (89.1%), P (90%) and NPG (95%) memberships.




Graph 6.4.1: The level of the roles of the opposition forces in the movement in terms of the relationship of six movement forces membership.

However, the role of the student forces in this regard is found to have great importance which was accepted unanimously by all movement forces memberships.

6.5. The ‘Order of Participation’ of the Movement Forces

The respondents of the survey have been asked to rank these forces according to their role and participation in the movement. In table 5.5.1, 37.9% respondents consider the “S-PP-TU-I-P-O” order, in which the S as first preference, PP as second, TU as third, I as fourth, P as fifth and then as all other forces according to their role importance and participation in the movement. The other orders for these movement forces have also gained some significant supports of the respondents.¹⁰⁸



Graph 6.5.1: The roles of the different ‘order of participants’ in the movement in terms of the six movement forces membership

In the views between the respondents of six forces’ memberships (Table 5.5.1 and graph 5.5.1), overall, the highest supports of the S (56.7%) followed by the NPG group (47.5%) is found for “S-PP-TU-I-P-O” order. However, the lowest support of PPs (26.1%) for this order is distinctive. In contrast, they are found to lend their highest support (47.8%) for the order “PP-S-TU-I-P-O” following the TU in the second place (36.7%). I and P memberships are found distinctive as they do not have any support (0%) for this order. I (52.4%) and TU (45%) memberships are distinctive to support ‘other orders’ of the movement forces, in which they have given priority mainly to their own position, mostly in second and third places of the order.

Table 6.4.1 Statistics on the Role Importance of Six movement forces in the movement for restoration of democracy against the military regime of General Ershad.

	Types of the movement forces																				
	Total			PPs			Students			Intellectuals			Professionals			TU			NPG		
	Fair imp.	Some imp.	Fair imp.	Fair imp.	Some imp.	Fair imp.	Fair imp.	Some imp.	Fair imp.	Fair imp.	Some imp.	Fair imp.	Fair imp.	Some imp.	Fair imp.	Fair imp.	Some imp.	Fair imp.	Fair imp.	Some imp.	
PPs & alliances	99.0%	.5%	97.8%	.0%	96.7%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	
Students bodies	99.5%	.0%	97.8%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	.0%	
Intellectuals	88.3%	11.2%	89.1%	8.7%	76.7%	96.7%	96.7%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	96.7%	96.7%	3.3%	90.0%	10.0%	20.0%	80.0%	95.0%	5.0%	5.0%	
Professional	78.6%	20.9%	78.3%	19.6%	63.3%	83.3%	83.3%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%	83.3%	83.3%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%	16.7%	83.3%	80.0%	20.0%	20.0%	
TU workers	86.9%	12.1%	87.0%	10.9%	80.0%	90.0%	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	90.0%	10.0%	76.7%	23.3%	6.7%	93.3%	92.5%	5.0%	5.0%	

PPs for Political Parties, TU for Trade Unions and NPG for Non-Participatory Groups

Table 6.5.1 Statistics on the 'Order of Role Importance' of the Movement forces in the movement for the restoration of democracy against General Ershad

	Types of the movement forces																				
	Total			PPs			Students			Intellectuals			Professionals			TU			NPG		
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No		
S-PP-TU-I-P-O	37.9%	55.8%	26.1%	71.7%	56.7%	33.3%	56.7%	40.0%	60.0%	26.7%	60.0%	47.5%	45.0%								
PP-S-I-TU-P-O	12.1%	81.6%	15.2%	82.6%	3.3%	20.0%	73.3%	13.3%	86.7%	6.7%	80.0%	12.5%	80.0%								
S-PP-P-I-TU-O	6.8%	86.4%	2.2%	95.7%	16.7%	.0%	90.0%	23.3%	76.7%	.0%	86.7%	2.5%	90.0%								
PP-S-TU-I-P-O	23.3%	73.3%	47.8%	50.0%	20.0%	.0%	90.0%	.0%	100.0%	36.7%	63.3%	22.5%	72.5%								
Others	24.6%	72.5%	8.1%	89.2%	5.6%	52.4%	38.1%	33.3%	66.7%	45.0%	55.0%	16.0%	80.0%								

PPs -Political Parties, S-for students, TU- Trade Union, I- intellectuals, P- Professionals, NPG- Non-Participatory Groups and O-Other movement forces

6.6. Conclusion

The development of the socio-political forces in organising a successful movement for the restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad took a long voyage to reach a formative democratic force in the post-independence Bangladesh. The history of political development in the post-colonial years does recognise a development of a kind of socio political democratic forces that aimed at fighting the authoritarian regimes rather than a history of practising any form of parliamentary or constitutional democracy. This force fought the Pakistan colonial military dictatorships, and its revolutionary formation liberated the country in 1971 from Pakistan. In the post-independence years, a socialist, leftist and revolutionary trend under the leadership of the ruling AL promoted the development of the democratic forces in the pure parliamentary form, which deteriorated later in the series of military coups and counter coups. The new struggle was started to build up democratic forces that grew under the leadership of the AL during the military regime of General Zia and General Ershad. In the assassination of General Zia and then, nearly a year later, the overthrow of his BNP regime by General Ershad, added the BNP to opposition, although it remained as the civilian face of the Army. The AL seemed to grappling for the trust of the Army to secure the state power, which also undermined the foundation of this growing independent democratic force in the country. This stance of the AL was considered suicidal for losing its popular civilian image during the movement against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. The military administration cleverly used this weakness of the civilian political forces to divide the opposition and was able to establish the supremacy of military employees over the state elites of the country.

However, the revolutionary component of the opposition political forces including the students and trade unions of the lower middle and lower class of society were basically uncompromising to the repressive military dictatorship that was only made it possible to unite the opposition political forces. Moreover, the component of the civil society including the intellectuals, professionals, NGOs, religious leaders and several other interest and pressure groups of the society had their own charter of demands and therefore, took the strong voice against the military autocracy that also influence the development of democratic political forces in the country. In the beginning of the military regime in 1982, the leading opposition political parties including AL, BNP, JSD and ML were suffering from intra-party factionalism leading to many divisions and birth of new parties almost in every month that was triggered by the military intelligence as part of the strategy to keep the opposition forces weakened. Although, there were huge debates on the participation or non-participation of the opposition forces in the JS election of 1986, it was found that there was less conflict inside the opposition forces after this

election. This election compelled the dictator to withdraw several measures of the Martial Law after which the opposition forces were found to become more consolidated and cooperative in all actions of the movement. The veteran workers, those who were underground, got the opportunity to come out to daylight and many imprisoned activists became released, which made the street agitations and actions more effective that was tremendously seen first in the Dhaka siege action of 1987, although the military dictator was able to escape in this time. There was some imposition of military measures again in the country in the 1988 and 1989, but the intra-party and inter-party relationships in and between all opposition political parties became stable in this stage as well as opposition socio cultural groups. In 1990, the supremacy of democratic forces over the military became established and found a way to establish democracy in the country. This was possible only when the social composition of democratic forces including the consolidation of all classes, interest and pressure groups and divergent opposition political elites was able to ensure minimum consensus between them in terms of what they were getting after the military dictator to be out of power.

Notes

¹ See details in Rangalal Sen, *The Political Elites in Bangladesh*, University Press Limited, Dhaka 1986, pp.321-23, p. 327. He categorically stated: "the vestiges of feudalism still exist in land relations to Bangladesh, because there has been no fundamental reform", which however was serving, in his word, the interest of 'rural propertied class' who were the supporter of ruling BNP. Sen again demarcated the BNP as the party of big businessmen and rural rich people in Bangladesh regarding the failure of solving the crisis of government of the BNP under Justice Sattar. In his conclusion of the book, he wrote, "in terms of the social background it may be said that the Bengali Muslim political elites belonging to the democratic-progressive opposition parties who fought against the conservative Muslim League as well as the civil military elites of Pakistan during the period from 1947 to 1970, largely emerged from the rural sector. This is also valid in the post-independence period of Bangladesh. Their origins were likely to be found in the Jotedar and other similar social categories, and self-sufficient-owner-cultivating families which greatly benefited by the concurrent shift in the agrarian economy in favour of the jute cultivation in the first two decades of the twentieth century." This was the direction of the analysis of the class character of the political elites of Bangladesh in the beginning of 1980s.

² The member parties of this 10-party alliance that formed in January-February, 1980 included Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Malek), Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Mizan), National Socialist Party (JSD), Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB), National Awami Party (NAP-Muzaffar), National Awami Party (NAP-Haroon), Jatiya Ekota Party, Bangladesh Workers Party, Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal, and Gono Azadi League (GAL).

³ After the assassination of Zia in 1981, the ruling BNP became topsy-turvy by the sufferings of the conflict of intra party power elites, which welcomed the military leaders in power. Immediate after the loosing power as well as loosing the blessing of the Army, this party was no longer in strength for couple of years to organise any movement against the new military leader until Begum Zia—the widow of President Zia, become the chief of the party.

⁴ Leaders of Jessore, Ex-State Minister Tarikul Islam, Professor MA Ohab, Professor Golam Mostafa, Ali Reza, Jubo Dal Leader Advocate Kazi Monirul Huda, Abdus Salam, Abu Yusuf, student leader Aminul Islam Shaheen, include the name of those of the ruling BNP, who were sent to jail on charge

⁵ AL—the party that had only mass support in the grass root of Bangladesh society, but major portion of cadres and workers were still in good faith with socialist spirit was not accepted to be in power by the external forces especially to the US, which in fact, went in favour of the military aggression in power. The party was deeply tormented and turned upside down by intra party conflict. Sheikh Hasina the daughter of the founding father of the county was warmly welcomed as the President of

the party in 1981 from exile in Great Britain, as the symbol for the reconciliation of the intra-group conflict. However, Abdur Razzak remained as the General Secretary of the party. A very strong group under the leadership of Dr Kamal Hossain and Tofael Ahmed developed a pro-capitalist US lobby and reversely, more stronghold part under the leadership of Mr Abdur Razzak vowed with socialist spirit were leading this intra-party brawls. The divisions and conflicts sharpened inside its entire branch organisations including student wing, labour and youth front immediately after the aggression of General Ershad. In particular, the BCL, student wing of the party took the shape into two factions under separate leadership in the beginning of 1983. Sheikh Hasina, leaving her fathers' way to socialism, took the side of pro capitalist group. A leadership race was also active between Mr Tofael Ahmed and Mr Abdur Razzak for the position of General Secretary of the party.

⁶ In the brief history of AL, in the middle of 1949, in a workers meeting, Shawkat Ali called a workers conference at 250 Mugal Tuli, Dhaka in which Mowlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and Yare Mohammad Khan were elected President and Secretary respectively. Under their auspices the AL was born on 23-24 June, 1949 in a workers meeting at the Rose Garden resident of Kazi Bashir in Humayun Road, Dhaka as the East Pakistan Muslim Awami League (EPMAL) with Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani as President and Shamsul Haque as General Secretary. The other two Joint Secretaries were Khondoker Mostaq Ahmad and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In February 1957, the party faced splitting in which Moulana Bhasani left the party and formed East Pakistan National Awami Party (EPNAP) and the main stream AL were led by Hossein Shahid Sohrwardy as President and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as General Secretary. After the death of Sohrwardy in 1964, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the President of the Party and continued until his end of life in 1975. In the mean time, there were also some splitting of the as NDF (1963), AL-Amena (1967), Jatya League (1970) and JSD (1972). In this period, the party under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib became popular and well organised which reflected in their overwhelming victory in the general election of 1970. The party then successfully turned this victory to lead the national liberation war of 1971 and make it possible of the independent Bangladesh. In the post independent period, there was a major change in the party in January 1975 when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman replaced the AL with the Bangladesh Kriśak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), which was protested by General MAG Osmani, who formed later Jatya Janta Party. After the brutal carnage of 1975, the BAKSAL was banned by Martial Law regulations. AL leader and coup leader of 1975 Khondoker Mostaq Ahmad formed Democratic League. The new regulations for political parties in 1976 enhanced the chance to revive the post-Bangabandhu AL with his socialist philosophy of BAKSAL under the leadership of Abdul Malek Ukil. This BAKSAL, however, became the core of conflict in the party. The conservative and hardliner Mujib followers, specially the youth and students supporters of the party wanted to preserve this philosophy anyhow on the one hand and democratic and pro capitalist block in the party also slowly advanced as oppositely on the other. In December 1976, a 55-Member Convening Committee was formed under the leadership of Mullah Jalal Uddin and Mizanur Rahman Choudhury as Joint Convenors. In April 1977, the widow of Tajuddin Ahmad Mrs Zohra Tajuddin was selected as Convenor of the Party in a special council, although many old guards of the party including Malek Ukil, Mizan Choudhury and M Korban Ali were main contenders for the Convenor. However, in the Council of 1977, the factions of the party became exposed. The liberal and democratic faction was dominated by Zohra Tajuddin and Malek Ukil, Abdul Mannan, M Korban Ali, Sajeda Choudhury and Tofael Ahmad and conservative and pro BAKSAL group was dominated by Abdur Razzak. The council of 1978 at Hotel Eden, Dhaka considered these main streams of the party and elected Abdul Malek Ukil as President and Abdur Razzak as General Secretary. Mizanur Rahman Choudhury formed new dissident of AL (Mizan). In 1981, Dewan Farid Gazi left the party and formed another dissident AL (Gazi).

⁷ See the Bengali weekly, *The Weekly Bichitra*, Dhaka, 28 January, 1983, p.12. The two groups were as the BCL (Jalal-Jahangir) with only loyal to leadership of Sheikh Hasina and her pro capitalist path and by contrast, the BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu) with pure socialist spirit in the line of socialist Sheikh Mujib guided by Abdur Razzak. Both factions of the BCL were ordered not to organise any rallies on the 35th anniversary of their organisation as the part of the reconciliation of the two factions. But the BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu) organised the rallies in the Carzon Hall campus in the University of Dhaka in violation of the parent party order on 4th January 1983. This made strong resentment in the party leadership, in particular, for Sheikh Hasina. She asked the student leaders of the BCL (F-C) faction to beg excuse for their misdeeds to the probe committee set by the party. This order of Sheikh Hasina created strong dissatisfaction in Abdur Razzak and on 18 January 1983, a statement bearing the news of resignation of Abdur Razzak from the position of GS for discontent with Sheikh Hasina was published in daily news papers, although the news was rejected in a further statement by the office secretary of the party after two days. On 20th January, 1983, Fazlur Rahaman and Bahalul Maznun

Chunnu, the President and Secretary respectively, of the BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu) in a statement in the newspapers urged the AL central leadership to be united first as a part of the re-unification of the BCL. On 18 May 1983, the BCL (F-C) organised a rally in Mymensing Agricultural University campus on the occasion of conference of the party, which was encountered by another faction BCL (J-J) resulted in many casualties in both sides.

⁸ The Mujib Nagar Dibash on 17 April have been observing every year in the post independent Bangladesh by mainly the Awami League leaders and workers along with other progressive and pro independence political forces of the country. In this day of 1971, the First Bangladesh Government in Exile was formed at Baiddyanath Tala Mango orchard under a border District of Meherpur in Bangladesh under the leadership of Prime Minister Taj Uddin Ahmad, Temporary President Syed Nazrul Islam, Captain (Rtd) Monsur Ali, and Advocate Kamaruzzaman. Bangbandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the conquered national leader of the people of the then East Pakistan was sworn as President of the Independent Bangladesh at the state of his imprisonment in Pakistan.

⁹ See *The Bichitra*, 29 July, 1983, p.14. Although Mr Abdur Razzak, at once, in a telephone statement in the press informed that there was no decision in the Presidium meeting, which was again supported by Abdul Malek Ukil, Mohiuddin Ahmad and Abdul Momin Talukder and Adur Razzak himself in a further statement on 22 July 1983. However, this fact was encountered by rest of six Presidium Members of the party including M Korban Ali, Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, Abdul Mannan, Dr Kamal Hossain, Abdus Samad Azad and Zillur Rahman on 23 July 1983.

¹⁰ On 31st July 1983, it was reported that the supporters of Razzak took the position in the party office premises and protested the illegal council meeting that resulted in the day long attacks and chaos in the whole area between the supporters of two factions. This made Sheikh Hasina to shift the next day ALWC meeting to Bangbandhu Bhavan in Dhanmondhi 32 no. house.

¹¹ It was encountered in the Executive Committee meeting on 3rd August 1983 in the chair of Abdul Malek Ukil at the resident of Abdur Razzak, which also expelled 9 leaders of AL (Hasina) including Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, Dr Kamal Hossein and Tofael Ahmed., for details, see *The Weekly Bichitra*, 12 August, 1983, p.11

¹² See *The Bichitra*, 12 August, 1983, p.11. The name of the person was believed to be Dr Kamal Hussein, who proposed the name of Sheikh Hasina as the President of the party in the council of 1981. Since the brutal assassination of Bangabandhu in 1975 he was in abroad for five years. Then, he was first seen on 10 October 1980 in a meeting of the party at Baitul Mukarram, Dhaka. However, It became evident of division of the party and a break away group under the leadership of Abdur Razzak formed AL (Razzak) in which along with many other old guards of the party and majority student cadres of the BCL, President and Secretary of the Dhaka City AL Mohammed Hanif and Hashim Uddin Paheri joined.

¹³ A group of dissident party members attending the session, headed by an unknown Prof. Iqbal Hossain also announced of a 51-member committee in protest of leadership of Sheikh Hasina—the occurrence was treated as a drama arranged by the dictator.

¹⁴ General Ershad commented on the paintings and drawings of the students and cultural activists on the city streets on the occasion of Language Martyr Day (21st February) that these activities were unlawful in the eye of Islamic Sharia Law. In fact, he wanted to secure the support of the fundamentalist and religious groups of the society for his military rule.

¹⁵ Mowlana MA Mannan was known as a self confessed anti-liberation collaborator element in the post independent politics of Bangladesh. He was one of the collaborating leaders with Pakistan Army against the national liberation war of Bangladesh. The immediate government after the independence, the AL, announced bounties to arrest and bring him to justice as a war criminal for rape and genocide.

¹⁶ For this, they first communicated General Osmani and Aatur Rahman Khan. Both of these two leaders, however, denied calling such all-party meeting during the stiff Martial Law. Then the four leaders communicated Mowlana Tarkabagish, who was agreed to invite all opposition political parties in a meeting. The opposition AL, CPB, NAP (M), NAP (H) and Ekota Party, at first, were not agreed to join this type of meeting.

¹⁷ A representative from AL (Mizan) and major leftist parties joined this meeting. The main participants in the meeting were the AL (Mizan), Gano Azadi League, JSD, Workas Party, BSD, Sammyabadi Dal (both factions), Krishak Sramik Samajbadi Dal, NAP (both factions), Ekota Party and Mazdur Party. The AL and the CPB were absent and although the representatives of two NAPs and Ekota party were present, they were not agreed to sign the statement protesting the junta over the said issue. In this stage, Abdus Samad Azad of the AL made a phone to this meeting that was received by Haider Akbar Khan Rano. Mr Samad Azad inquired whether it was possible to include him individually as he was personally interested to sign for the statement although his party was not still agreed to join. The meeting was agreed to include him. Just sometimes later, the phone came

again from the AL side and requested the meeting to wait for them and they would be present in the meeting within an hour and urged not to send the statement to press until they had reached there. At 9:30 pm, some representatives from the AL reached this meeting and the 'All Parties' statement protesting the junta was signed by Tofael Ahmed on behalf of Sheikh Hasina, President of the AL. At this stage, the two factions of the NAP and Ekota Party were also agreed to sign it. Then Pankaj Bhattachargia of the NAP took the responsibility of the CPB and asked to set the name of Moni Sing and Comrade Farhad in the statement. In fact, Pankaj Bhattachargia signed the statement on behalf of the CPB. In this way, the first statement against the military junta was released by the 15 opposition democratic and progressive parties.

¹⁸ The number of the arrested leaders of the opposition progressive democratic forces were 39 in this operation including AL chief Sheikh Hasina, Dr Kamal Hussain, Tofael Ahmed, Comrade Mohammad Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon, Syed Altaf Hossain, Dilip Barua, Siddiqur Rahman and others.

¹⁹ The information is included here from the exclusive audio interview of AL President Sheikh Hasina with researcher in May 2003.

²⁰ The member parties of the '15-party alliance' formed in April 1983 included Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Hasina), Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Mizan), Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Gazi) Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB), National Awami Party (NAP-Muzaffar), National Awami Party (NAP-Haroon), Jatiya Ekota Party, Bangladesh Workers Party, Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal, Gono Azadi League (GAL), Sammyabadi Dal (Toha), Sammyabadi Dal (Nagen) Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (BSD), Jatiya Mazddoor Party,

²¹ The JSD was formed from a pro-socialist dissident group of AL in the post-independent period during the AL regime. The party had also an underground military unit who believed to capture the power by armed struggle. But the Mujb regime treated this kind of revolution as anti-state treason acts, which was controlled strongly and in some cases brutally. Therefore many JSD workers still could not forget their movement against AL regime. But their ideological leader Col. Taher was hanged by Zia Government in charges of mutiny in the Army. Till then, they were anti-Zia and in times, although got in alliance with AL. Moreover, in a meeting of 10-party alliance at the Baitul Mukarram mosque premises on 6th April 1981, there were a clash between AL workers and JSD workers for chanting 'Joy Bangla' slogans by AL workers, which spread to the nearby area. AL workers attacked the JSD office and set ablaze the properties of JSD. Since then, some of their leaders and workers still disliked the AL.

²² 'Joy Bangla' (Victory of Bangladesh) was, in fact, the slogan of Bangladesh Awami League in the pre independence period. But it got unanimous popularity in the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971 against Pakistan Army. The freedom fighters of all forces and all parties in the war showed their sign of guerrilla attacks applauding this slogan and expressed their victory with this slogan. However, in the post independent periods, there developed many leftist revolutionary parties who were repressed by the AL regime and naturally anti-AL forces grew day by day as well as a boycott to this slogan. However, in times these forces came into the alliance with AL and still exposed their negative attitudes in this regard. But the AL chief Sheikh Hasina was strict to this slogan as she argued that there should not be any difficulties in 'Joy Bangla' as we all fought together against Pakistan Army in our liberation war with this slogan. For details of this inter party collision, please see *The Weekly Bichitra*, 15 April, 1983, p.14 however, the 'Joy Bangla' slogan was no longer a problem in the alliance. Although many of them did not use this slogan, it ran the acceptance of the alliance day by day.

²³ For example, the development of the BKSAL from AL and the divisions in BSD and WPB increased the members of the alliance. By contrast, leaving of AL (Mizan), Unity of AL (Hasina) and AL (Farid Gazi), unity of two NAPs and Ekota Party and the unity of WPB and Mazdur Party decreased the members of the alliance. All this splits and re-unions of these parties were happened between 1983 and 1986.

²⁴ On 2 April, 1983 at Beauty Cinema Hall in a close door meeting by pro conference group, a strong faction cancelled the Committee of the BNP, the main stream under the leadership of Justice Satter, which was promptly rejected by the party Secretary General Badruddoza Choudhury and treated the initiative of the new committee as 'unconstitutional and undemocratic'. They expelled 43 officials and members of the newly formed BNP (Huda) on 5 April 1983²⁴. This did not create any reaction in the Huda camp. Moreover, the secretary General of BNP (Huda), Dr MA Matin on 7 April 1983 urged the BNP (Satter) to transfer the charges of BNP office and properties immediately. As a result, the wing of Sheccha Sebi Dal divided into three parts in which one group under the leadership of Kazi Siraj joined with BNP (Huda) and the rest two factions remained loyal to the BNP (Satter). For details, see the *The Bichitra*, 15 April, 1983, p.15

²⁵ See *The Bichitra*, 6 May 1983, p.11. On 26 April 1983, the BNP (Huda) organised a workers meeting of Dhaka city unit at Mirpur Beauty Cinema Hall in which SA Khaleque and Hazi Salim were elected as President and Secretary respectively. In this meeting, the Secretary General Dr MA Matin accused that Justice Satter had no right to demand to return of power as he willingly resigned from the post of President, which was broadcasted by the national radio and TV and even he took his pension as Ex-President, not as Justice. Therefore he had no longer moral right to lead the BNP.

²⁶ See *The Bichitra*, 27 May, 1983, p.12. It should be mentioned here that the widow of late President Ziaur Rahman, Begum Khaleda Zia was given the portfolio of Senior Vice President of the party immediate after the assassination of General Zia in 1981. However, on 25th May 1983, the party organised a gathering at the Mahbub Ali Institute, Dhaka demanding the release of all political prisoners of the party in which the Senior Vice President Begum Zia joined in an hour late due her illness. She could not speak out due to her sickness, which followed the read out of her written speech in this meeting.

²⁷ The member parties of 7-party alliance were Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP-Satter), United Peoples Party (UPP-Zafar), Bangladesh Jatyia League, Ganatantrik Party, Revolutionary Communist League of Bangladesh, National Awami Party (NAP-Nuru) and Krisak Sramik Party (Nanna)

²⁸ In the later years, the number of the member parties of this 7-party alliance was not stable and some factions of the member parties joined with pro-junta groups.. Many insignificant smaller components joined with junta, for example, Jatyo Dal, UPP, Ganotantrik Party, KSP etc and some other smaller parties joined with the alliance. One important thing was that the BNP was always overwhelming dominant in this alliance as the other components have few supports while the AL was not—in the 15-party alliance.

²⁹ See the interview of Begum Khaleda Zia with Kazi Jawad, staff reporter, *The Weekly Bichitra*, 2 March 1984, pp. 23-26

³⁰ The member parties of this National Front were Jatyia League, NAP(Nuru), KSP, Islamic Democratic League(Shafique), Social Democratic Party, Bangladesh Democratic Party, Bangladesh Islami Biplobi Parishad, Jana Gonatantrik Dal, Nikhil Bangladesh Muslim League (Faiz Box) and Hindu Oikya Front.

³¹ Begum Zia suspended Choudhury Kamal Ibne Yusuf of and two other leaders in an indisciplinary charge connected with an incident in Faridpur on 10th January 1984. In February 1985, a group of leaders of the BNP known as ex-Muslim Leaguers including Shah Azizur Rahman, Abdul Alim, Abdur Rahman Bishwas, Azizul Haque, Afaz Uddin Fakir, Abdul Matin Choudhury, Maidul Islam Mukul, and Kamal Ibne Yusuf met in the resident of Maidul Islam Mukul. Some of them went to Justice Sattar and requested him to take the leadership of the party. However, Justice Sattar did not agree with their proposal. This faction of the BNP prepared to participate in the election under junta administration. On 1st February 1985, B. Choudhury, the Secretary General of Party denounced the news of the meeting of Shah faction saying that Shah Azizs' were no longer the factors in the politics of the BNP which was however encountered in the next day, although in a further statement on 5th February 1985, B. Choudhury denied his earlier position. However, the crisis was resolved later for the time being in the mid-February 1985 under the direct initiative of Begum Zia.

³² The pro-dictator *Jana Dal*, BNP(Shah), UPP, GP and a faction of the ML already consented to the formation of Front and signed on a draft in this regard. However, Begum Zia, who still headed the mainstream BNP, slugged this split saying that the leaving of Shah Aziz would not make any harm to the party. In the following couple of weeks, the two faction of the BNP went into a race of press statement against each other that ultimately weakened the strength of the BNP under Begum Zia, an arch opposition to the dictator.

³³ It seemed to have been losing its strength in the city and scratched its ability to sustain any prolonged movement. The resignation of Mr Hasnat followed the appointment of Col (Rtd) Mutfizur Rahman as Secretary General of the Party, even though Begum Zia agreed earlier to appoint K.M. Obayedur Rahman to this position. It was also reported in the FEER that the majority of the leaders were pressing for a party council convention to elect a new set of top office bearers and 'democratise the party set-up', but there was no move to replace Begum Zia as Party Chairperson.

³⁴ Syed Kamal Uddin, 'Politics of Splitting', *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 August 1988, p.25. It was reported engineering of these six leaders' moves by Kazi Zafar Ahmed, political advisor of the dictator, had happened against backdrop of manoeuvrings leading to parliamentary elections. The confrontation between BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia and whom she sacked, climaxed immediately after the dissolution of the party's standing and executive committee. It was prompted by the suspicions of Begum Zia about Obaidur Rahman who was known to have links with the dictator. However, Obaidur Rahman and his supporters claimed that they were expelled because they had tried to create a democratic milieu inside the party. The new BNP Secretary-General Barrister

Abdus Salam Talukdher denied this accusation. He said that the expulsions had been imperative as the party was slipping into confusion due to manoeuvring of Obaidur Rahman to create a parallel leadership.

³⁵ The practice of breaking up political parties in the third world as well as in Bangladesh was as old as the country itself. Although any splitting inside the AL and the BNP would weaken them it would not spell their end. Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia had inherited and added to the party leadership that was passed on to them as from her father late Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and from her husband late General Ziaur Rahman respectively. It was this more than organisation abilities which had helped them withstand repeated defection and party splits. The two women had developed into powerful personalities who used this charisma and the politics of agitation to command the loyalty of the mainstream of their party members who had given them sweeping powers to deal with any situation.

³⁶ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, 20 May, 1983, p.13. In their Working Committee meeting on 13 May 1983 raised many accusations against the party President Major (Rtd) MA Jalil, which was sent for discussion in the next meeting of national committee set for 9 June 1983. A 5-member committee was also formed to present all accusations in peaceful way, so that factions' prone party could revive a chance for unity. In the next couple months, the internal chaos of this party became worst. The popularly called theoretical leader of this party Sirajul Alam Khan gave his resignation and remained absence in the meeting of the National Committee 9-12 June 1983, which pushed the party into a possibility of further division. On 30 August 1983, the JSD Working Committee imposed 'quarantine' on the party chief Major (Rtd) MA Jalil, in which he was forced to stop any correspondence or make any comment or statement in the press and even ordered to abstain from going outside Dhaka without the permission of the JWC.

³⁷ It should be mentioned here that the Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (BSD) was formed as a dissident group of the *Jatya Samajtantrik Dal* (JSD) on 5th November 1980. The cause of that division was also mainly personal affairs of the party leaders.

³⁸ The Dhaka University Central Student Union had been considered to the socio-political and intellectual corners of Bangladesh society as the second parliament of the country. Since the post-British politics during Pakistan Period until the birth of independent Bangladesh, the University of Dhaka and its student community played the key roles in all movements. Many students' organisations including socialists and capitalists with progressive thought and actions took place in this university and built up a very wide intellectual community around the regions. It was the Dhaka University that sacrificed its students for upheld the honour of mother tongue in 1952; brought the parliamentary victory for regional autonomy in 1954; protested the Martial Law of Ayub Khan in 1958-69, led the violent student movement in 1962 against the Education Commission Report of Justice Hamidur Rahman and took the six-points of Sheikh Mujb as the charter of freedom for the people of the then East Pakistan; and the last, led the national liberation war of the independent Bangladesh. In the post-independent period, the left link students of this university even challenged the regime of country's ever popular leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This is the University, where its students burned the meeting stage of Military ruler General Ziaur Rahman in 1980 in his presence and never allowed the entrance of another military ruler General Ershad in its campus. All of these glorious events was led and guided by the DUCSU along with many other students' organisation. It was popularly accepted superb that 'what the DUCSU says today, Bangladesh will tell it tomorrow'.

³⁹ See the *Weekly Bichitra*, 17 February 1984, p.14. The Chief Major (Rtd) Jalil scratched his all relation with the JSD on 3rd February 1984. On 12 February 1984, the intra party conflict became worst when ASM Rob who resigned from party secretary ship 7 months before, later withdrawing his resignation, called the party working meeting and tried to get into the party office forcefully. In the clash with his rival group, five JSD workers wounded including women workers. He failed to hold the meeting in the party office. The root of the conflict was the issue of participation in Upazilla election and 5-points demand of 22 parties, in which Rob wanted to participate in the election and favoured the 18-points own party demands in the movement. However, in his meeting Chitta Guho became President and ASM Rob as General Secretary. On the other hand, Joint Secretary Shajahan Siraj called the party working meeting on 9 February 1984, according to him, where 9 out of 21(in which 18 present, 2 neutral) members of executive committee attended, in which Mirza Sultan Raza elected President and Shajahan Siraj as Secretary.

⁴⁰ The Nine parties under proposed Greater Communist Unity were Two dissidents of Samaj Badi Dal, Two groups of BSD, JSD (Siraj), Warkas Party, Majdur Party, NAP(Haroon) and Ekota Party

⁴¹ In the brief history of Bangladesher Warkas Party, the party was formed from the original Bangladesher Communist Party (Leninist) which was in the underground until 1978. In the pre-

independence period, this was named as the pro-china Communist Party. After the independence, in 1972 a dissident group under the leadership of Amal Sen, Nazrul Islam, Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Haider Akbar Khan Rano, Rashed Khan Menon, and Nasim Ali form this party. Amal Sen, the peasant leader of Narail, was mainly a leader of subgroup of the pro-china communist party and communist revolutionary Kazi Zafar, Rano and Menon for a Coordination Committee, which joined the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 on the one hand, and Nasim Ali came from pro-Moscow CPB, a revolutionary led a faction who worked under the cover of a news paper 'Hatier' (arms). In 1974, a part of this party formed the UPP together with a dissident group from the NAP of Mowlana Bhasani and other part remained in the underground under the leadership of Amal Sen. In 1978, the party faced a split in question to join the Nationalist Front under General Ziaur Rahman, the then new military leader and of the country, although a underground part of the party tried in 1975 to join the BAKSAL of socialist Sheikh Mujib, which was not agreed by the 'open' party leadership. However, in the same year, the Bangladesher Communist Party (Leninist) was finally changed into the Bangladesher Warkas Party (Marxist-Leninist) in a secret Congress, in which Amal Sen elected its leader. Side by side, in accordance with the international communist movement, the party followed the independent programmes as this had been seen some sorts of similarities in the Indian Communist Party. In 1979, the open part of the party participated in parliamentary election in the name of Ganatantrik Andolon leaving their cover as the UPP. In the same year, the party fell into the conflict with pro-Moscow CPB, when their peasant wing was failed to earn the recognition of Prague based International Peasant Labour Federation in which CPB opposed the initiative. In the mean time the conflict between the open leaders and secret leaders of the party reached extreme in the beginning of the 1980s. In November 1983, in question of the movement against military dictator, the faction of Amal Sen, Nazrul Islam and Nasim Ali favoured the participating the election and by contrast, Rano-Menon followed the hard line against the dictator. As a result, in January 1984, Rano was replaced by the Nazrul Islam in the position of General Secretary. However, the split became unavoidable when a faction under the leadership of Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam was serious to form a greater unity of communist parties excluding CPB, where Rano-Menon, the youth faction opposed the initiative. On 17 July 1985, the party in their meeting of Working Committee decided to remove Rano and Menon from the 16-member Executive Committee, in their word, for the greater interest of communist unity and asked to work in the lower level peasant wing which was seen as a part of punishment. This attempt brought the split inevitable.

⁴² Here fundamentalist forces are defined as 'the individual, groups or parties who prefer to use the religion i.e. Islam mostly in their own interest or to climb up the power than that of for proper practice in life'. The period under which Bangladesh was the part *vis-à-vis* colony of Pakistan, the ruling military cliques and their political allies Muslim League and Jamat-I-Islami exploited the people of the then East Pakistan in the name of Islam avoiding ethnic, cultural and language identity of Bengali people, and they were considered as fundamentalist forces.

⁴³ In the post-1975 politics, they were revived in full swing under the auspices the military administration of General Zia. It should be mentioned here that the ML and the JIB were the main collaborator of aggressor forces of Pakistan in the national liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971.

⁴⁴ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, Dhaka, 29 April, 1983, p. 12. For example, On 24 April 1983, a meeting of the PDF was held in the Chair of its President Amzad Ali Khan, in which *Ittefaq* editor Anwar Hossen Monzu urged to solve the political crisis by dialogue.

⁴⁵ The JIB was trying to reorganise at this stage as they organised a 3-days Central Mazlish-e-Shura meeting on 16 April 1983 and a workers meeting of Dhaka city unit at Dhaka Krira Samittee auditorium on 30th April 1983. Since then, it was only the JIB in the pro-Islamic bloc that took the anti-Ershad stance as the part of their strategy to go in touch of mass politics. From the very beginning of the military intervention, they followed all along the path of mainstream alliances to accomplish the design of their rehabilitation in post independent Bangladesh politics. In their part, they also evaluated that the boycott of the election might prolong the withdrawal of Martial Law.

⁴⁶ Moulana Hafezzi Hozoor invited all opposition parties in this round table conference at his Madrasha complex situated on the opposite bank of the Buriganga. None of the major political parties including AL (Hasina), two groups of BNP, JSD, different factions of Muslim League, 10-parties of Khondoker Mostaque Ahmed, Jamat-I-Islami Bangladesh. But a group of representatives from 15-party alliance under the leadership of Peer Habibur Rahman of NAP(Muzaffar) including two General Secretaries of AL (Mizan) and AL (Gazi) as Nur-e-Alam Siddiquee and Mozaffar Hossen Paltu respectively, Dilip Barua of Sammya Badi Dal, Monzurul Ahsan Khan of CPB; Moulana Abdur Rahim of IDL, Abdul Matin of Revolutionary Communist League, Nur Mohammad Kazi of Peoples' League, Shahidul Alam Said of Democratic League (Moazzem), Moulana Khairul Islam Jessori of Awami Olema League, Dr Abu Taher of Adarsha Samajtantrik Dal, Abdul Khaleque of

Labour Party (Mostafa), Syed Mahbub Sobhan of Islamic Republican Party, and Abdur Razzak of Bangladesh Hedayetul Islam party and Abdur Rahim Azad as observer from the UPP. However, the meeting was ended without any decision. In the meeting, Peer Habibur Rahman for 15-party alliance proposed three points for the unity: withdrawal of Martial Law; restoration of fundamental rights of politics and specific date for parliamentary election in the winter of 1983-84, which however were not finalised in the discussion. The same arrangement for unity in the right wing opposition forces under the auspices of Khondoker Mostak Ahmed was failed due to lack of responses from opposition forces, although a statement released to the press said that a consensus was made among all participant parties and groups for a demand of holding JS elections in March 1984.

⁴⁷ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, Dhaka, 6 May 1983, p.11 and 20 May, 1983, p.12. In this period, all factions of the ML tried to unity. On 29 April 1983, the steering committee for unity of ML elected a new committee with Justice BA Siddique as President and Begum Razia Faiz as Secretary General. This committee was encountered by the formation of another committee on 14 May 1983 with T. Ali as President and MA Matin as Secretary General. However, the ML under the leadership of Faiz Box remained independent.

⁴⁸ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, 6 April, 1984, p.10

⁴⁹ At the last stage, the IDL (Rahim) and the Khelaphat Andolon of Hafezzi Hoozoor participated in the dialogue on 26 March 1984 and 29 March 1984 respectively. On 20 April 1984, 11-party National United Front under Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad divided when six leaders of 6 parties out of 11 including called an emergency meeting without the concern of Front Chief. The dissident leaders of six parties under 11-party National United Front were ASM Solaiman, Mohammad Altaf Uddin Talukder, Sharafat Hossain Choudhury, Nur Mohammad Kazi, Mohammad Khalid Hossain and Mrs Amena Begum. This normally was considered as the starting point of abolishing the Front under Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad. The JIB on 17 April 1984 went in dialogue with the dictator in which they demanded the parliamentary election on the basis of 5-points along with a demand of the return of citizenship of their leader Golam Azam,⁴⁹ the main collaborator leader of aggressor Pakistan Army in the liberation war. The Golam Azam issue just set fire on the spirit of pro-liberation forces and the demand of his citizenship was protested by the freedom fighters and political parties from every sphere of Bangladesh society. For details, see *The Weekly Bichitra*, 27 April, 1984

⁵⁰ The 17 parties included the KSP of ASM Solaiman, Labour Party of Moulana Matin, Muslim Jatiyata Badi Dal of Principal Sirajul Haque Gora, Progatishil Jatiyata Badi Dal of Sheikh Showkat Hossain Nilu, Bangladesh Islami Andolon of Maj.(Rtd) Jainul Abedeen Khan, Nejami Islam of Syed Nazrul Islam, Republican Party of Sharafat Hossain Choudhury, Peoples' League of Professor Nur Mohammad Kazi, Olema Dal of Mohammad Delwar Hossain, Tanshimul Olema of Mowlana Ruhul Amin, Jamiate Olema Islam of Mowlana Shamsuddin Kashemi, Nejame Islam Party of Hazi Mohammad Akil, Islami Sanghati Parishad of Mowlana Mohammad Habibullah, Islahool Muslimeen of Mowlana ABM Ishaque, Islamic Party of Sheikh Ashraf Hossain and Islamic Democratic League of Advocate Shafiqur Rahman. See details of the Front on the *Weekly Bichitra*, 14 December 1984, pp. 12-13

⁵¹ The ML (Siddiquee) had joined with the pro-dictator Jano Dal in June 1985 and Salauddin Quader Choudhury of this ML faction was rewarded a portfolio in the cabinet. In this process, the ML (Siddiquee) was split again into three rival factions. One faction under the leadership of ANM Yusuf and Syeda Razia Faiz remained in the opposition, which was formed on 23 December 1985 in a council at the Dhaka Metropolitan Bar Auditorium. The leader of another faction BA Siddiquee on 24th December 1985 appointed as permanent representative at the UNO and rest one faction elected Sala Uddin Kader Choudhury as the President at DDSA, who joined later with the JP.

⁵² Abdul Mannan and Tofael Ahmed of the AL were in favour of this initiative. Rashed Khan Menon and Haider Akbar Khan Rano of the Workas Party went to the residence of Begum Zia to discuss the possibility of unity with her party. The purpose of the 15-Party leaders was to form a single platform of all opposition forces.

⁵³ The pro-BNP political parties and groups, mainly Kazi Zafar Ahmed of the UPP was against the single platform. Even, they were against the joint-programme movement as there was a dispute between the AL and the BNP over the system of Government in the country: the AL for parliamentary form of government and the BNP for presidential form of government.

⁵⁴ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, Dhaka, 19 August 1983, p.13. The Joint Secretary of the BNP (Satter), Ferdous Ahmad Koreishi told the ENA that the successful discussion was held with 15-party alliance to form united programmes of the movement while the Secretary of the BNP political liaison committee, Captain (Rtd) Shah Abdul Halim Choudhury informed that there was the 'progress' of discussion for united programmes and actions with all parties: 15-party alliance, 6-party alliance and 14-party NUF. Ferdous Ahmed Koreishi gave importance for unity to the 15-party alliance while

Capt (Rtd.) Abdul Halim Choudhury emphasized all opposition parties of country in regard to the unity of the opposition forces. It should be mentioned here that both of the Front and Jote were extremely anti-AL

⁵⁵ In the historical point of view, just a couple of years ago, the AL was struggling along with its 10-party alliance against the ruling BNP to restore democracy in the country. Regarding the past political roles of the BNP, the AL had many causes in to account to believe that General Zia, founder of the BNP, had indirect linkage with the coup makers of August 1975 that killed Bangabandhu and many of his family members. According to Major (Rtd.) Hafiz Uddin Ahmad, Birbikram (a second highest title of the country for the contribution in the national liberation), immediate after the coup event, he went to the resident of Zia, the Deputy Chief of the Army and informed that the President Sheikh Mujib was killed. Zia replied without hesitation "so what, President is killed, Vice President is there." Moreover, using cleverly many stages of political process, Zia later sworn-in as the President of the country. Zia government rewarded the killers of Bangabandhu by giving them job of diplomats and established them in business. Under his regime, many AL workers found lost or killed and thousands of them were tortured in the torture cell of the cantonment. The leaders and workers of AL still in 1983 could not forget those cruel memories. Regarding their ideological stands, the AL believed in four fundamental principal of states: Bengali nationalism, socialism for economic development programmes including nationalisation of private sector, which in 1983 reshaped with mix-economy in the incest of welfare state, democracy in parliamentary politics and secularism as every citizens have the right in their own religious functions. In oppositely, the BNP believed in: Bangladeshi nationalism, pro capitalist economic programme emphasizing private sector, secularism with absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah and presidential form of government. In their present aim and objectives, the AL wanted to return to the original constitution of 1972 to parliamentary form of Government and the BNP wanted to return to the presidential form of government on the basis of suspended constitution of 1982.

⁵⁶ The five points demand formulated by main stream opposition included: (1) Immediate lifting of Martial Law and the Army must be sent back to the barrack; (2) Immediate restoration of democratic environment in the country including all fundamental rights of people and withdrawal of ban on political activities; (3) Holding the elections to the sovereign parliament only under the non-partisan and neutral caretaker government in the country before any other polls. Power to take any decisions regarding constitutions only lies with the sovereign parliament elected by the people and none else; (4) Immediate release of all political leaders and workers arrested and punished under Martial Law for political reasons and withdrawal of all political cases against them. Stop the harassment and arrest of political leaders and workers; and (5) Enquiry into the students, labourers, political leaders and workers killed so far including those students murdered in the mid-February 1983 incident, trial and punishment of those responsible for it, publications of the list of those killed and injured, and giving compensation to them. Accept the demands of all including students, teachers, industrial workers, employees, peasants and agricultural labourers.

⁵⁷ It was commonly used practice in the third world backward politics that a uniform man, immediate after his aggression in power, suddenly took out a political party from the pocket of his uniform and some opportunists, outlawed and hatred politicians were always ready to join there for bounties. In his utmost, General Ershad was even able to buy some student leaders and eminent politicians from the opposition. First the dictator started with his so called 18-points programme in the beginning of 1983 and treated these as his visions of development. According to the intimate discussion by researcher with the leaders of movement, it was found that the DGFI—military intelligence along with all other intelligence agencies of the military administration mainly involved in this process to build the new party for the dictator. Their target was fulfilled anyhow: sometimes threatening of life, arrest, lawsuits or sometimes the bounties for high rank positions.

⁵⁸ The invitation was sent to the 75 parties of the country, in which 43 responded. It should be mentioned here that many of these parties even had no any office or complete committee. Sometime the dictator and his agencies created these parties for the interest of dialogue or participation in the elections. Because, the mainstream oppositions including the AL, BNP, JSD, CPB and JIB were not agree to go to dialogue. The leaders who joined this dialogue were Mizanur Rahman Choudhury of AL-Mizan, Shamsul Huda Choudhury, Dr MA Matin of BNP-Huda., Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad of 12-party United Front, Shah Moazzem Hossain of DL, T. Ali, BA Siddiquee, Faiz Box, and Abu Ala from each faction of four f Muslim League. Mrs Amena Begum of Jatya Dal, Major(Rtd) Joinul Abedin of Justice Party, Principal Raisuddin Ahmed of Bangla Muslim League. ASM Solaiman of Krishak Sramik Party, Advocate Sharafat Hossain Choudhury of Republican Party, Syed Monzurul Ahsan of Nejame Islami Party, Altab Uddin Talukder of PGS(Shahriar), Nur Mohammad Kazi of Peoples League. Khalequzzaman and Sheikh Showkat Hossain Nilu of BNP(Dudu-Nilu), Afazuddin

Choudhury of Jatyatabadi Chashi Dal, Salina Majumder of Bhasani-NAP(Salina), Dr Shahab uddin of National Labour Party, Azizul Islam Rana of National Perity Party, Waliul Islam Sukku Mia of Republican Party, Mohammad Zahir Khan of National Republican Party, Nurul Islam Mollah of Banglar Communist Party, Mowlana Abdul Matin of Bangladesh Labour Party, Dr A Motaleb Sikder of National Labour Party(Sikder), Hasmad Ullah of Bangladesh Social Democratic Party, Mafizur Rahman Rokon of Bangladesh Progressive Party, Major(Rtd) Afser Uddin of National Democratic Party, MA Samad of Democratic Party, Mawlana Obaidullah Bin Said Jalalabadi, Asraf Ali of Janata Party, Shafiqur Rahman of Islamic Democratic League, Syed Sirazul Huda of Jaty Dal(Huda), Syed Sirazul Huda of Front for Natioanal Solidarity, Ruhul Amin of Janoganotantik Dal, Md. Bajedur Rahman Khan of United Republican Party, Rafiqullah Choudhury of Khelafate Rabbani Party, MA Malek of Bangladesh Islamic Party, A.K.M Shamsul Huda of Liberal Democratic Party, and Dr Abu Taher of Adarsha Samajtantrik Party. See the *Weekly Bichitra*, 13 January 1984, pp. 9-10

⁵⁹ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, 17 February 1984, p.7. Of those who joined the dialogue, “11 parties demanded the Presidential election first; 3 parties for parliamentary election first and 28 parties for Presidential and parliamentary election in the same day. In addition, 49 parties demanded the normal political activities. Among them 28 parties demanded the cancellation or the shift of Upazilla elections while in opposite 15 parties demanded the Upazilla election in date. Moreover, 5 parties of them demanded to announce the country as ‘Islamic Republic of Bangladesh’ and 6 demanded to form Islamic advisory council. However, 17 parties demanded the release or legal rights of political prisoners punished by the military tribunal.”

⁶⁰ For details of the interview of Major (Rtd) Jalil, President of the JSD, see “*The Weekly Bichitra*” 27 January 1984, pp. 21-26; the interview however, described the state of politics in his own JSD and overall condition of national politics of the time. He gave birth to a debate on the leadership of AL in which argued that ‘Sheikh Hasina might be the antecedent of the properties of Sheikh Mujib, not at all of his politics’ and commented on BNP chief Begum Khaleda Zia that ‘if Zia was alive, Begum Khaleda Zia did never get into politics and she came in politics only when Zia was dead. This did not mean when Zia was alive, the Bangladesh was not in distresses.

⁶¹ It should be mentioned here that Sheikh Hasina encountered this allegation in an interview with the *Bichitra* on 3 February 1984 in which she replied that she was in abroad when AL delegates in 1981 elected her as President of the party, which was quite democratic and inconsistent with the allegation of ancestral selection. See the details interview of Sheikh Hasina with *Bichitra* Staff Reporter Kazi Jawad, ‘*The Weekly Bichitra*, 10 February 1984, pp. 19-23. In the same way, the leader of 7-Party, Begum Zia replied this accusation of Jalil in an interview in the end of February 1984 in which she defended her selection of the party leader as the result of good wishes of BNP workers. For details, See the interview of Begum Khaleda Zia with Kazi Jawad, staff reporter, *The Weekly Bichitra*, 2 March 1984, pp. 23-26.

⁶² In the pre-independent period, in 1969, when the then East Pakistan was passing the waves of mass upsurge, the AL chief Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman attended a round-table conference with the military leaders of West Pakistan in Lahore and presented his historical six points demand. At the same time the NAP leader Mowlana Bhasani was against the dialogue and moved with demonstrations and rallies all over the country. But the dialogue made Sheikh Mujib more efficient and acceptable leader than that of Bhasani to military authority as well as among the people of East Pakistan. In 1971, when the AL achieved the absolute majority, the military ruler of Pakistan Yahya Khan invited Sheikh Mujib for dialogue and Mujib attended the discussion, which was broken down following a massacre and genocide on the people of East Pakistan on 25 March 1971. In 1976, General Zia, the new military leader of the country invited the political leaders in dialogue to discuss the way of how the political parties would be restored which was following a restoration of political parties and several stage elections in 1976-1979. In the present situation, General Ershad invited the political dialogue when he found the two rival stream of opposition political alliance were united on 5-points demand and that was following a possibility of mass upsurge. He took this initiative to communicate political leaders directly as to find out the leaders for his planned political Front. On the other hand, the opposition political parties created the space of dialogue for security and release of their thousands of imprisoned party workers.

⁶³ On March 26 1984, while a political front consisting of 26 parties in support of military dictator was completed, the dictator withdrew the ban on political activities. The dictator threatened the mainstream opposition that he would return in full swing Martial Law, if they continued their boycott the dialogue.

⁶⁴ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, Dhaka, 6 April, 1984, p.10

⁶⁵ For the details of the dialogue and the 33-points demand of 7-party alliance and 10-points demand of 15-party alliance, see *The Weekly Bichitra*, 20 April 1984, pp.19-26. Both of the opposition

alliance presented their separate points of demand to way out a passage to democracy, ignoring their 5-points demand, although both of the alliance treated these demands as extension of 5-points. The 7-party alliances sit with dictator three times on 9, 12, and 20 April 1984, in which they presented their '33-points demand' to restore democracy, in which they demanded to reinstate the related article of election matters of suspended constitution of 1982, withdrawal of Martial Law and holding first the parliamentary election. On other hand, the 15-party alliance attended the dialogue on 11, and 21 April 1984 in which they presented '10-points demand'. The 15-party alliances demanded a proclamation on the withdrawal of Martial Law and gave importance on the holding the parliamentary election and thereafter an elected parliament would decide to reinstate the constitution. There it was clear that the 7-party alliance was in favour of suspended constitution of 1982 and 15-party alliance favoured the original constitution of 1972.

⁶⁶ The rise of JIB in the post-1975 politics was patronised mainly by Zia regime. As a collaborator forces, the new generation of the society could not accept this forces in Bangladesh politics. About the role of the JIB in present political situation, many students wrote their reactions to the *Weekly Bichitra* which was published on 25th May 1984, p. 41-43. Among other, Syed Istaqur Reza, a student of Mass Communication and Journalism, University of Dhaka, wrote: 'those who compared the freedom fighters of national liberation war with the unbelievers Jews; considered the country's peoples for independence as the shoals of India-Russia; destroyed the *Shahid Minar* (martyr memorial), blood-strained their hands with the killings of 3million Bengali people and raped the two hundred thousands mothers and sisters during the period of liberation war; that one of the main enemy of '52 and '71, the JIB began to vaunt in the cover of democracy. He expressed his deep hatred to the 22-party leaders in regard to considering the JIB as the force of democratic movement while the pointed claw of the evil hands of this anti-liberation force tear asunder of Bangladesh society.

⁶⁷ The dictator started joining the public meeting and rallies under the banner of *Jana Dal* and called the opposition to participate in the forthcoming election, in his word, to restore democracy in the country.

⁶⁸ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, 15 June 1984, p.11. In the advancement of the *Jano Dal*, at this stage, some leaders of the both alliances including the senior leader of the AL Mr Korban Ali and top level leader of the BNP and one of the main member of the opposition Liaison Committee Captain (Rtd) Abdul Halim Choudhury joined the cabinet of the dictator in August 1984. This co-optation by the dictator brought the opposition alliances closer to choose the hard-line against the dictator until the end of 1984.

⁶⁹ See the *Weekly Bichitra*, 21 September 1984, p.8. Moreover, AL President Sheikh Hasina in her delivery told that the all regimes in the politics of post independent Bangladesh were illegal, which generated scrupulous dissatisfaction in the opposition BNP. The pro-dictator *Jana Dal* tried to break this unity asking Sheikh Hasina in a press statement by Secretary General Mahbubur Rahman if she considered the post 1975 regimes illegal. However, the charge was dumped by her counter accusation of legality of politics of the Generals in uniforms

⁷⁰ See details in the *Weekly Bichitra*, 28 September 1984, p.20. The AL considered Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib as the founding father of Bangladesh while the BNP did not recognise it; the BNP considered Major Zia (later President of the country and the founder of the BNP) as the announcer of the independence of the country while AL did never agree it; the AL government under Bangabandhu established one-party socialist government while the BNP set up multiparty politics; the main policy of the AL government under Mujib was the nationalisation of industrial sector and set up limitation of capital investment while the BNP withdrew the capital from nationalised sector and encourage privatisation and free market; the BNP was formed mainly by ex- Muslim League leaders while the AL treated these ML leaders as the collaborator with the aggressor Pakistan Army during the liberation war of 1971; the AL upheld the Bengali nationalism while the BNP supported the Bangladeshi nationalism; the AL wanted to restore the original constitution of 1972 while the BNP was strict to the suspended constitution of 1982; the BNP put forward 33-points demand in the dialogue with the Junta while the AL formed a 10-points demand and a sub committee for the dialogue; the AL demanded first the sovereign parliamentary election while the BNP was for parliamentary election under the rules of suspended constitution; the AL demanded the trial of killing of Bangabandhu while the BNP supported the ordinance of Khondoker Mostaque that prohibited the trial of killers. In this way, there were many doubts about the longevity of the unity between two parties in the nearer future. But both of the parties were under pressure from their support base for stiffer actions against the junta, which led them to organise a national level rally in Dhaka on 14 October 1984—the AL at MM Avenue and the BNP at BM mosque premise in which they demanded the full lifting of Martial Law. The 15-party alliance repeated their 5-point demand

holding the JS elections immediately under the neutral caretaker government and the BNP demanded the release of their leaders and workers before the elections.

⁷¹ See details report "Sarker: Saya o' Nirdaliyo" (Government : Shadow and Neutral) by *Shariar Kabir* and Kazi Jawad in the *Weekly Bichitra*, 16 November 1984, pp.21-28

⁷² See *The Bangladesh Observer*, February 10, 12, 1985.

⁷³ On February 22, the nomination filing date for General Election on 24th February was postponed and the top level military commanders in a meeting with General Ershad in the chair in the following day decided for a possible seizure of political rights and revival of Zonal, Sub-Zonal and District Martial Courts, which was announced on 1 March 1985 by the dictator in his address to nation.

⁷⁴ The party of the dictator was formed with former pro-dictator *Jana Dal*, UPP, GP, BNP (Shah) and ML (Siddiquee). The primary allies of the dictator under the JP were found into three stages- Presidium (18-members), National Executive Committee (57-members) and National Committee (601-members). The dictator tried to uncover his uniform with the formation of the JP. The primary allies of the junta under the JP, is therefore important to mention here. The members of the JP Presidium were Mizanur Rahman Choudhury, Moudud Ahmad, Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Sirajul Hossain Khan, Riaz Uddin Ahmed (Bhola Mia), Saluddin Kader Choudhury, Barrister Sultan Ahmed Choudhury, M Korban Ali, Shah Moazzem Hossain, Barrister Anisul Islam Mahmud, Anwar Hossain Manzu, Humayun Rashid Choudhury, A.K.M. Maidul Islam, Air Vice Marshal (Rtd.) Aminul Islam, Captain Abdul Halim Choudhury, Shamsul Huda Choudhury, M A Satter and Justice A.K.M. Nurul Islam. All of them except the last two were the member of the cabinet of the military government. The members of 57-Executive Committee including 10 Ministers were Professor MA Matin (Secretary General), three Joint Secretary Generals as Shafiqul Gani Shapan, Lt Col (Rtd.) Zafar Imam and Motafa Jamal Haider. The members included Anwar Zahid, Sunil Gupta, Mainuddin Bhuiya, Ziauddin Bablu, Mesbauddin Babul, Sheikh Shahidul Islam, Mamata Ohab, Ex-Minister Professor Yusuf Ali, Ex-Minister Shamsul Haque, Col (Rtd) M. Anwar Ullah, Upendra Lal Chakma, Ex. State Minister Kamrun Naher Zafar, Ex Minister Barrister Abdul Haque, S A Khaleque, Jahangir Mohammad Adel, Nazim Uddin Al Azad, Mahabubul Haque Dolon, Monirul Haque Choudhury, Tajul Islam Choudhury, Ex State Minister Nur Mohammad Khan, Enamul Karim Shahid, Ex State Minister Professor Abdus Salam, Dr Mansur Ali, Ex State Minister Ruhul Amin Howlader, Palas Anwar Moti, Advocate Faiz, Sekander Mia, Shamsuzzaman Mintu, Khurrom Khan Choudhury, Hashim Uddin Ahmed, M B Zaman, Asraf Ali Khan, Mumdood Choudhury, Nurunnabi Khan, Abul Khair Choudhury, Redoanul Haque Choudhury (Idu), Ismail Hossain Bengal, Kazi Mujibur Rahman, Barrister Jamal Hossain Bhuiya, Advocate Riazul Haque Choudhury, Abdur Rahim Azad, Bulbul Khan Mahabub, Haroonur Rashid, Khaledur Rahman Tito, Ashgar Ali, Ekramul Rasul, K G Karim, Ali Nur Rahman Khan Sajo, Adeel Uddin Howlader, Sarder Sultan Mahmud, Abdul Ali Bulbul, Advocate Mohammad Mohsin and Saifuddin Ahmed. The 601members National Committee mainly recruited the district and Thana level intermediary leaders.

⁷⁵ A large faction of the BNP (Shah) and ML (Siddiquee) did not join the JP. Ex-Secretary General of the *Jana Dal* Mr Mahbubur Rahman was also not happy with the formation of the JP. Ex-Prime Minister Aaur Rahman Khan and Shah Azizur Rahman of the BNP (Shah) were not given any position in the new JP. Ex- Minister for Food and former *Jana Dal* leader Air Vice-Marshal A.G. Mahmud disagreed his involvement in the formation of the JP. On 1st January 1985, Shah Azizur Rahamn in a meeting in Kustia told that he and his party had no involvement in the formation of the JP. But it was found later that Land Reform Minister AKM Maidul Islam and Panning Minister Barrister Sultan Ahmed Choudhury of his party joined the JP. A faction of the GP under the leadership of Tajul Islam Choudhury and Abdur Razzak protested the vanishing of their party on 2 January 1985. On the same day, a large faction of the ML (Siddiquee) under the leadership of ANM Yusuf and Syeda Razia Faiz protested their involvement in the formation of the JP and expelled SK Choudhury and two others from the ML (Siddiquee).

⁷⁶ See the *Weekly Bichitra*, 31 January 1986, pp12-14

⁷⁷ In this connection, the BNP (Shah) leader Shah Azizur Rahman had a meeting with Sheikh Hasina of the AL, which however, was failed to gain the approval from BNP leader Begum Zia, even though, a strong unity of the workers in all actions against the dictator was glimpsed in the main line opposition alliances. However, another initiative in the same time to form an 'All Party Struggle Unity' by BNP Chairperson Begum Zia was not successful.

⁷⁸ On the occasion of observing the Language Martyr Day (21st February) a clash involving guns and bomb blasts between the rival youth and students factions of the AL and the BNP at the *Central Shaid Minar* (Language Martyrs Memorial) killed an AL worker named Sohrab and many others were injured including AL Dhaka City Secretary Mofazzel Hossain Choudhury Maya.⁷⁸ The clash started from the unruly attempts by the rival BCL and JCD workers to set the portraits of

Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and General Zia—the two political icons of the AL and the BNP respectively, on the main pillars of the Memorial structure. The AL leader accused armed gangsters of the dictator for this brutal event who were hiding inside the BNP and the JSD. See the *Weekly Bichitra*, 28 February, 1986, p.12

⁷⁹ See the *Weekly Bichitra*, 21 March, 1986, p.13. On 3rd March 1986, Begum Zia of 7-party alliance in a gathering in Begumgonj, Noakhali said that the election was nothing but a farce and this date of election was announced to destroy the movement. The AL President Sheikh Hasina on 7th March 1986 in a gathering of her party urged the workers to form the 'Mass Struggle Committee' from the capital to the peripheral village community to achieve the 5-points demands aiming at the collapse of the dictator from power, which vowed for 'no election' under Martial Law. However, there was seemed to be a dramatic change in the opposition front. It was reported that Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Begum Khaleda Zia of the BNP secretly met together for two times, one on 9th March and another on 13th March 1986 and discussed the possible course of actions in the eve of the announcement of the election by the dictator. Their summit was arranged secretly by a non-political group. Only 2/1 senior leaders of both parties were present in these meetings of the two key opposition leaders. Even the other components of both of the alliances were not communicated the contents of their discussion. However, it became clear that both of the two leaders prepared for a united participation in the election. However, the participation of all opposition forces was enlightened by a dramatic proposal by Comrade Forhad in which the two key leaders—Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia were proposed to participate in 150 seats each that covered whole 300 constituencies of the JS. This proposal possibly was passing the extreme debates towards an acceptance to the two rival opposition alliances. No sooner this decision of the opposition was announced, the dictator on 15th March 1986 had proclaimed a military order with an emergency amendment of the Electoral Representatives Order of 1972 of the constitution, which limited at best 5 seats to be contested by a single candidate.

⁸⁰ It was believed that the military dictator was in fear to contest the both alliance in the election. The popular argument regarding the participation of the AL was that this party was in the opposition for long time. They had lost many leaders and workers in the process of movement against the both military regime of General Zia and General Ershad. In this stage, the leadership of the party felt a transition of peaceful environment that would be favourable to increase their support base. Therefore they chose the participation in the election to protect their organisational strength rather than removal of the dictator. In addition, the AL was not still trusted by the Armed Forces in the post-1975 politics. They had needed to regain the trust of the military. On the other hand, the ideologies of the BNP and pro-dictator JP were same. The participation of the AL in the election might be a part of this necessity. By contrast, the BNP had acceptance in the Army as its founder General Zia was popular officer during his service in the army as well as serving as President of the country. Zia protected the interest of the Army over the political elites of Bangladesh society. The BNP leadership was very much understood that win over of the JP in the election must ruin their support base. Moreover, it was believed that General Ershad managed the pro-Zia military officers who also worked to restrain BNP from the election, so that it would be easier for the dictator to face a single opposition group in the election that ultimately strengthen his power under a legal shape of constitution. Political analyst believed that the organisational strength of the AL was far better than that of the BNP, which led them to be soft for election. Although, the BNP was more united at this time under the leadership of Begum Zia, still their many leaders were either in jail or joined the side of the dictator, which predicted a loosing the party in the election. This fear of defeat along with a pressure from a group of military allies, who were soft for General Zia, was believed to restrain them from the elections

⁸¹ Mohammad Khusbu, *Bangladesher Chatra Andoloner Itihas: Ershader Shamoykal* (The History of Student Movement in Bangladesh: Ershad Period), Student Ways, Dhaka, p.13. The 14-student organisations included: Bangladesh Chatra League (Jalal-Jahangir), Bangladesh Chatra League (Fazlu-Chunnu) Bangladesh Chatra League (Inu), Bangladesh Student Union, Bangla Chatra Union, Bangladesh Chatra Moitree, Bangladesh Chatra League (Aziz-Musharraf), Ganotantrik Chatra Union, Biplobi Chatra Dhara, Chatra Oikya Forum, Bangladesh Chatra Kendra, Samajbadi Chatra Jote and Samajtantrik Chatra Front, Revolutionary Student Union (Israfil) and Bangla Student Union (Shahid). The birth of the CSAC was not planned. It started with an event on 5 November, 1982 in which 5 left lining student components including BCL (Inu), Revolutionary Student *Moitree*, Student Unity Forum, Revolutionary Student Union (Israfil) and Bangla Student Union (Shahid) released a joint statement against the military junta. After this statement, on the observance of 'Taher Day' on 7th November 1982, the BCL (Inu) brought out a procession in the Dhaka University Campus on 8th November as the previous day was a closing in the campus. Police attacked on the procession and

arrested a woman teacher of the University. 14 student organisations protested this arrest together. This was considered as the first step in the formation of the CSAC

⁸² The historic 10-points demand of the CSAC included 1.(a) Issue and materialize an universal, scientific, discrimination-less, democratic education policy in no time, taking the opinions of students, teachers, intellectuals political activities and the guardians concerned with a view to democratic rights and exploitation free of the general people placed before. Education has to be recognized as a basic right in the constitution. (b) The autonomous rights of universities have to be kept intact. Instead of the government or the president being the chancellor of the university, an educationist has to be selected as a chancellor, by rejecting the principle issued before. Reject the undemocratic executive bodies introduced in agricultural universities, Islamic and Shahajalal and Khulna Universities and introduce democratic executive bodies like other ones. In Islami university, like other universities all the departments and subjects must be introduced..(c) Ensure the real autonomy in all the educational institutions and compile educational programmes. In the need of general people the right of changing all the principles and amendment has to be given to the educational institutions. Ensure and increase the participation of teachers, students, officials, educationist and guardians in the management of educational institutions and the illogical power of the bureaucrats has to be stopped. Stop the interference of the government and the imperial organizations on educational institutions and its programmes. (d) Remove the discrimination in educational sectors like public, private, village and towns (Cadet College, Kindergarten, Residential Model School, Pre-Cadet, Tutorial Homes and Madrasa etc.) and introduce all over the country one channel of education through the same education system. Education has not to be used from commercial point-of-views. Stop non-governmental medical colleges and universities etc. (e) Prescribe the text book at the aim of building the learners as a conscious patriot civilian belonging to democratic scientific and positivistic ideas. In the text books the real history and sentiments of freedom struggle, the bravery movements of the students against the dictator, national prides and different movements at the aim of freeing the mass people have to be included. Redeem all backdated elements from the text books. (f) Select the text books according to the capability of the students belonging to those levels. The compulsory 'Diniat' and Arabic have to be discarded. All types of terrorism have to be stopped in the educational institutions so that teachers are able to teach in classes and laboratories routinely and complete the syllabuses in due time. Allot seats according to merits. (g) Education to be free and compulsory upto class X. Distribute the essentials books freely and to arrange educational allowances for the poor students regularly in every month. Serve free food and uniform for the students in the primary level. To develop the higher education in the case of socio-economic conditions of the country, increase the number of medical, engineering, agricultural and polytechnic colleges, including houses, books of the primary and higher secondary schools. (h) Confirm at least 8 percent of the national budget in to the educational sectors according to the request of UNESCO. Reduce the expenditure given in the under developmental sectors including military one. Compulsory military education to be given to all the young boys and girls. (i) Mother language has to be the process of learning. The books of foreign languages have to be rendered into mother language and those have to be made easy for the students and establish the national redesign society. General libraries have to be established and regular money to be provided at the initiative of the government from the up level to the capital city. Note books business to be stopped. (j) Examination system must be modern and scientific. Unfair means and corruption in the examination to be stopped. Necessary steps have to be taken against corruption, negligence, inactivity and irresponsibility of educational sectors including education ministry. Democratization and autonomization have to be given to the primary education official and the secondary and higher secondary education board. (k) At the aim of spreading women education, necessary steps have to be taken. A large number of women halls and hostels to be set up. In order to eradicate illiteracy and materialize adult education by taking necessary steps the illiterate people of the country have to be taught and make conscious. Steps must be taken to the backward situation of the minority groups. 2 (a) In no time, increasing student fees have to be rejected. Increase budget in educational sectors and make student fees equal in public and private ones. Adjusted to the education expenditure, the number and amount of student-scholarship to be increased. Ensure the student life so that no student can stop their education life due to economic problem. Part time jobs have to be given to the students. (b) 50 percent to be made concession for the students in the rent of rail, buses, steamers, launches and all the vehicles including air lines. Remove the bureaucratic and administrative complexity related to it. A huge amount of subsidy has to be provided for dining and canteen of the halls and hostels. By founding a shop at the initiative of the governing bodies, books, notes-books, pen, pencils to be served to the students at the produced price. The educational implements imported from abroad have to be tax-free. Stop the scandals about the board-books, and ensure the books to be available to the students on due time at the initiative of the government.(c) Seats have to be increased in every

educational institution from university level to lower educational institutions according to the proportion of the people and their demands. New schools, colleges and universities have to be set up. Expand every education institution by building up class rooms, laboratory, halls and hostels. Affiliations and allowances of the educational institutions have not to be rejected due to political reasons. Free the session Jam and complete the educational courses and ensure the result publishing on due time. Remove the V.I.P. quota in admitting students. (d) Increase the opportunities in educational institution health check for students regularly, free treatment, gymnasium and play ground, including training centres for athletes. (e) Necessary steps have to be taken up at the aim of increasing status including the prestigious salary of the teachers and the guarantee of jobs. Lack of teaches have to be filled up by employing a large number of capable teachers in the educational institutions. Except for any apparent reasons, the teachers living in abroad have to be brought back to the country. The problems of the workers in the educational institution have to be solved. (f) At the end of education life, the jobs of the students have to be ensured. The age of governmental jobs have to be limited to 30 years. Prohibitions of the governmental jobs have to be lifted out. In no time 1 lack and 35 thousand empty cadres have to be employed. (g) Necessary steps have to be taken to desert the armed and terrors from the educational institutions. Ensure peace and safely educational environment. 3. Immediately arrest the companions of Ershad corrupted Ministers M.P.S jobbers politicians plunderers businessmen military and non-military bureaucrats in the objection of illegal possession and corruption, trial them and forfeit all the properties earned in and illegal ways . There should prescribe a list of those who had come to help Ershad in various ways and opened fire on the students and general people during the long nine years. Arrange their trials. In democratic movement from 1982 to date, form a fair investigation committee with teacher's students, Journalist, officials and lawyers, make a complete list of the wounded and exhibit a report with real facts. The criminals of the crucial killings and tortures have to be punished, The martyrs should be given status by the state, They have to be given economic support and reemploy the people who lost their jobs in the democratic movement. 4. Ensure the freedom of Voice, Journals, the autonomy of judicial branches and all the basic needs and reject all the undemocratic section of the constitution and the amendments; issue a democratic constitution and establish the full democratic orders. Laws against the basic rights have not to be issued. He has to be accountable to the peoples' parliament. Accountable parliament has to be set up. In the last 9 years the student, and the politicians who had been given punishment in the military law, involved in the anti-autocratic and communal movement, have to be freed; all the false suites to be rejected. In the military court and law the punished people have to be given opportunities for appeal and review. The special power act 74, and the printing press and publications act 73, to be rejected. The prisoners act introduced in the colonial regime to be changed. State prisoners have to be given political status, introducing state prisoner's rules. 5.(a) Reducing the price of Daily and customary things including food, and facing the famine and economic crisis have to be removed. Increasing rail, bus, launch rent have to be reduced. The rationing system across the country to be introduced. In the rationing the existing discrimination in the various services has to be removed and follow the balanced principle. Make the treatment facilities expansion and easy for the people. Increase the number of health centers. The decision of taking fees from the patients in the hospital to be changed the privatization of the health sectors not to be done. Stop all kinds of luxurius things to be imported.(b) Increase the government expenditure in the necessary sectors like education, agriculture, treatment, vehicles and residence. Ensure the residents of the shelter less people. (c) The government has to bear the every responsibility of the wounded freedom fighters, orphans and disabled old people. 6 (a) Mass sentiment and aspirations grown out of independence and freedom war, have to be made standing high. Ensure the democratic success through freedom struggles. (b)There must be rooted out the political bases of Jobbers of 71, reactants fundamental religious preachers and communal political forces. (c) Democratic administrations have to be set up. Stop the militarization of administration in every sector. Dissolve the retired military officials appointed in the private and public autonomous organization by contact. (d) Give autonomy all types of mass media including radio, television free from government control on the basis of democratic principles. 7.In economy the arsons of lending capital have to be banned. Stop the arsons by the multinational corporations. From the state bank the loans of millions taken by the people have to be recovered. Reject the given lease to the foreign companies the Haripur oil mine. and for the search and extraction of any other material resources no steps against national interest would be taken. Reject all the unequal economic and commercial contact with the foreign countries. Ensure all the right of the labors according to the ILO convension. Make the EPZ in to general industrial sectors make the democratic rights of the labors sure. 5 points demand of the Sramik Karmachari Oikkya parishad have to be materialized. Child labor has to be banned. Necessary steps have to be taken for protecting the environment, trail jobbers of 71 and killers of the general people. Rusticate in no time. Golam

Azam; all the debts of Pakistan have to be taken. Religion must not be used in state activities, derogating the bases of the movement of freedom struggles. All the civilians will exercise their own religious values in their personal life. On the basis of religion determination of the status of the civilians and religious tortuous will not be held. The state cannot patronize religion and come as a barrier. Ban the communal and religious business politics. Religious temples can not be used as political activities. 8(a) Stop the expansion and publicity/ broadcasting of the obscene, superstitious and the foreign culture. Build up the mass media as the centers of the exercise of public and creative arts culture. For the good and mobile movies, in the theater movement and publication, forfeit and make open national stage. The report of cultural commissions has to be rejected. Allow the demands of the united cultural alliances. The public advertising principles have to be banned. (b) Defense all the activities against morality including bribe, corruption, nepotism, smuggling black marketing luxury squandering prostitution drugs like heroine, gambling housing have to be banned completely, rehabilitate the prostitute socially. (c) Reform the lands. Stop the activities of all the imperialistic aid organization for the anti national interest. Permit 10 point demands of 17 peasant and artisan organization. Ensure the easy peasant loan and the proper price of agricultural products. Stop certificate suite, crock arsons in the name of peasant loan. (d) Ensure the equal rights and status of women and men. Make rooms for the salvation of women by ensuring the right of political lawful economic, social ones. Women and child trafficking and women and child have to be prohibited strongly, bring back the trafficked women and children imprisoned in the foreign countries. In the time of working of the women workers in the absence of mother, Nurseries have to be opened up with the cost of the state to look after the children. The demands raised by the progressive democratic societies have to be accepted. (e) During the 9 year movement. all the equity demands of all the classes and professions have to be granted. Ensure the right of living of all the people in every profession. 9. The Enemy property Act has to be cancelled. Minority groups across the country including the Chittagong Hill Tracts, have to be given recognition and ensure the rights of self defiance and should take steps for their cultural and economic development. Stop military torture on the minority groups of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and solve the problem politically. 10. Foreign policies based on imperialism have to be rejected and introduce the alliance free foreign policies. Play the strong role in support of all freedom struggle including Palestine and also against was design in the struggle of establishing world peace, Take a strong stand against imperialism foreign aggression, hegemonism, racism, fascism, Colonialism and neo-colonialism. Bring back the Bangladeshi soldiers sent Saudi Arabia in no time. Solve the legal solution with the neighboring countries keeping the national interest intact about Farakka south Talpatti, Three Bigha Corridors. Make a friendly relationship with the third world underdeveloped nations and nonaligned countries.

⁸³ It should be mentioned here that the junta administration sent a proposal through Fazlul Halim Choudhury, VC, University of Dhaka, to discuss the issue with the CSAC leaders on 8 January 1983. After this proposal, the student leaders were adamant not to sit with the junta until the midnight of 9th January 1983. Some bodies could not fix the decision in this stage. In this milieu, the student leaders discussed the issue with the leaders of their parent political parties. The political leaders advised them to postpone the action plan of 11th January 1983. Because, the opposition political parties themselves were not ready to encounter the junta at this moment. As a result, after 9th January 1983, student politics became divided and unable to forge any direct movement against military junta. In this stage, in a meeting of 14th student organisations on 10th January 1983, the CSAC took the decision to discuss the issue with the government. Shortly afterwards, it was not successful as the junta was not serious to discuss the issue with the CSAC leaders to avoid direct harassment of the government by the student leaders. The junta feared that the discussion might lead to a more difficult situation for the military administration.

⁸⁴ The newly formed alliance for 9-student organisations consisted of Bangladesh Chatra League (Nazmul-Shafi), Bangladesh Chatra Moitree, Bangladesh Chatra League (Aziz-Musharraf), Ganotantrik Chatra Union, Biplobi Chatra Dhara, Chatra Oikya Forum, Bangladesh Chatra Kendra, Samajbadi Chatra Jote and Samajtantrik Chatra Front

⁸⁵ Karl Mannheim (1936), "The sociological Problem of Intelligentsia" in *Ideology and Utopia :An Introduction to the sociology of knowledge*, for details see Chapter-III, Section- 4, , London, pp. 136-146

⁸⁶ Roberto Michels, "Intellectuals" in *The Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, Vol-8,

⁸⁷ Karl Mannheim, *op.cit.*, p.9

⁸⁸ Abu -Abudullah (ed) (1991), *Modernisation At Bay*, University Press Limited, Dhaka, p.117

⁸⁹The orders and amendments of the dictator regarding the judiciary from 12 April 1982 to 8 May 1982 destroyed the honest sprit of the judiciary in accordance with the articles of the fundamental rights in the constitution. In this period, the dictator amended the rules of the appointment of Chief

Justice of the country and appointed his own man in this position. In the name of decentralisation of the judiciary, the dictator established three permanent benches of the High Court outside the capital in order to disperse the lawyers' movement in the country.

⁹⁰ On 16th October 1982, 12 eminent lawyers of the country were arrested under the military order of 14/15/17 including Sirajul Haque, the then President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Shamsul Haque Choudhury, Khondoker Mahbubuddin Ahmed, Shawkat Ali Khan, Shudangshu Shekhor Halder, Mohammad Yasin, Mahfuzur Rahman, Kaiser Uddin Ahmed, Syed Sirajul Huda, Khademul Islam Choudhury, MA Wahab and on 19 June in the same year Mohammad Hannan was arrested. In protest of their arrest, the dictator had to face bitter protest and pressure from the national and international forces that were able to release these 13 lawyers on 26th October 1982.

⁹¹ The six-point demands of the lawyers included: 1. The provisions and articles of the basic rights in the constitution shall be reinstated immediately, 2. to withdraw The martial law shall be withdrawn and the transfer of the power to an interim national government shall be ensured and it must be ensured that this interim government arrange the parliamentary election before the Presidential election of 31st March 1984 and transfer of power immediately to that elected government 3. to withdraw The military orders that deny the principals of the constitution and established permanent bench of high court in the district levels must be withdrawn and reinstate immediately the provisions and rights of writ that was stopped by the military orders must be reinstated immediately by which the basic rights of the constitution would be safeguarded and removal of the administrative injustice would be ensured, 4. The Muncif and Magistrate court in Thana level that was established in the name of restructuring and decentralisation of the judiciary, which was unnecessary and an obstacle for the healthy judiciary system and created pressure on the overall economy of the country shall be cancelled 5. All illegal regulations, ordinances and amendments including the rules of civil and criminal procedures, penal codes and civil courts shall be cancelled as these are not helpful for the development of free and fair judiciary, 6. The nominated council that was formed by military order after the cancellation of the elected Bar Council must be cancelled and the new election date of the Bangladesh Bar Council should be announced immediately. However, in favour their demands, they started a long-term movement against the attempt of the decentralisation of judiciary, amendments of the constitution and against the appointment of the Chief Justice by junta government. They used all their efforts like protests in the street and fights in the court for their demands for a fair and free judiciary in the country.

⁹² The Eighth Amendment of the constitution which ensured the Islam as state religion in the country and six branches of the High Court in six regional areas was challenged by the first line eminent lawyers of the country. This was declared in appropriate in accordance with the main articles in the constitution for the fundamental rights of the people by the High Court verdict by 3:1 judges on 2nd September 1989. After the hearing of 31 days, the panel of the full bench of the Supreme Court consisting 4-members including Justice Badrul Haider Choudhury, Justice Shahabuddin (later the chief of the caretaker government immediately after the fall of General Ershad), Justice M H Rahman, and Justice ATM Afzal. Among them, Justice Afzal rejected the Appeal.

⁹³ PROKRISI means *Prokoushalee* (Engineer), *Krishibid* (Agriculturists) and *Chikitshak* (Doctors), which is the Bengali term of the Central Coordination Committee of the Engineers, Agriculturists and Medical Doctors. It was formed in February 1978. The first chairman and convener were Engineer M K A Siddiquee and Agriculturist Mirja M A Jalil.

⁹⁴ In the beginning of March 1978 the Central Coordination Committee of the Engineers, Doctors and Agriculturists announced some actions in which wearing black batch, two hours strike and full strike were mainly. The then government gave hope to fulfil some of their demands, but found no progress immediately. As a result, in the third week of April 1978, the Coordination Committee of these three professional groups again announced the actions for the movement, which included the extreme programme like mass resignation.

⁹⁵ In this movement, they won over their demands and the government was forced to announce the amendment of the salary scale on 13 May 1978 according to their demands. However, they demanded the establishment of rights of all professional cadres in their movement in the next couple of years when the Senior Service Pool in 1979 and Cadre Service in September 1980 were formed to ensure the participation of all professional groups in the administration. The BCS (Administration) association in September 1981 protested this initiative of the government with an advertisement in the newspapers, which created bitter reaction among all professional cadres in the administration. As a result, they became united and the BCS Coordination Committee excluding the BCS (Administration) cadre was formed in November 1981. The primary members of the Central BCS Coordination Committee were 21 Cadre Association and later it increased to 23 during the Ershad

regime. In 1990, the members increased to 26. These are: BCS (General Education), BCS (Health), BCS (Audit and Accounts), BCS (Taxation), BCS (Custom and Excise), BCS (Economic), BCS (Statistics), BCS (.....), BCS (Public health and engineering) BCS (Telecom), BCS (Roads and High ways) BCS (Technical education) BCS (Anser), BCS (Information, radio) BCS (Postal) BCS (Railway engineer), BCS (Railway transport) BCS (Police), BCS (Information, General), BCS (Agriculture), BCS (Forest), BCS (Fisheries) BCS (Animal assets), BCS (Information engineering) BCS (Food , General, technical), and BCS (trade). In the same month, Coordination Committee of these 23 BCS professional cadres, BMA, Institution of Agriculturists and Central Engineers Action Committee signed in a joint declaration, and send their demands to the then Government. The Government reached some crucial progress under a Cabinet Committee of the then Premier Shah Azizur Rahman, which was later completely ignored with the proclamation of Martial Law in March 1982. The primary members of the Central BCS Coordination Committee were 21 Cadre Association and later it increased to 23 during the Ershad regime. In 1990, the members increased to 26. These are: BCS (General Education), BCS (Health), BCS (Audit and Accounts), BCS (Taxation), BCS (Custom and Excise), BCS (Economic), BCS (Statistics), BCS (.....), BCS (Public health and engineering) BCS (Telecom), BCS (Roads and High ways) BCS (Technical education) BCS (Anser), BCS (Information, radio) BCS (Postal) BCS (Railway engineer), BCS (Railway transport) BCS (Police), BCS (Information, General), BCS (Agriculture), BCS (Forest), BCS (Fisheries) BCS (Animal assets), BCS (Information engineering) BCS (Food , General, technical), and BCS (trade)

⁹⁶ See the leaflet in Bengali circulated by the BCS Cordination Committee in 1990 undersigned by MA Hena, as Chairman and Engineer Md Nurul Huda, In-charge Secretary General. The 17-points demand of the Central BCS Coordination Committee included: 1. People through their elected representatives, not the civil servants, shall be the ‘eyes and ears’ of the government. The long practiced autocratic process of control in all stages of the administration should be ended by taking the steps to transfer power institutionally to the people’s representatives from centre to grass roots level of the country. It shall be ensured the active and full participation of the people in the administration by appointing the people’s representatives as coordinator and controlling agent in all stages, which would be able to end the long alienation of the people in developmental activities, 2. It should take steps to establish democracy as an institution permanently and ensure the accountability of the administration to the parliament by appointing the Ministers as the Administrative Head of the concern Ministry in stead of Secretary by changing the present rules of business of the government, 3. The government should increase the technical and expertise persons in all functional ministries and departments to establish stable and skilled administration and fill up all positions from Assistant Secretary to Secretary in all ministries and all positions of the field level departments under the ministry by the members of the BCS functional cadres under the concern ministry and members of the functional chief of the same departments, boards and corporations under the ministry, 4. There were some ministries that were mainly for the professionals including doctors, engineers and agriculturists, etc but there was not created any cadre service for them; The government should formulate definite functional base and employment policy to upgrade their position immediately into the cadre service and should create new cadre in this regard, where necessary. And also, the government should include the professionals in the cadres in some ministry in which there were the cadre services, but many qualified professionals were not still included, 5. It should be ensured that 95% participation of all BCS professional cadres in ratio excluding the BCS (Administration) must be considered in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Cabinet Division and Ministry of Establishment including the positions of the Secretary; especially it must be ensured immediately that the participation of the BCS professional cadres would be appointed in the positions of Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Cabinet Division and Ministry of Establishment and in the same way, ensure the representatives of all professional cadres to be appointed in all departments and ministries of the government, 6. The chiefs of the Functional Directorate and Corporations should report directly to the Ministers so that they would be able to participate in the policy making of the government. It should be ensured that the representatives of all functional cadres shall be incorporated in the policy making and planning process of the government. The chief of the functional directorate and corporations should be given highest scale salary in conjunction with national pay scale. 7. According to the new policies in the reorganised employee structure announced by the government, the ranks of the national pay scale of the employees are only the parameters of their status in the administration. The government should announce each of these scales to a grade for the implementation of the policies in real sense. As a result, the functional officials will be introduced according their grade irrespective of their working offices and therefore the warrant of presidency of the government should be reorganised, 8. There should not have any BCS cadre without the functional necessity of diiferent ministries. The government should end all

misunderstanding by taking steps to incorporate the BCS (administration) cadre to their main line of function and accordingly, this cadre should be named as the BCS (Land) and BCS (Magistracy) and should be subordinated under the concern functional ministry, 9. Coordination of the Districts: In the name of coordination of the district, the DCs (Deputy Commissioners), the members of a functional cadre i.e. BCS (administration), were given all responsibilities of the development works and they became the functional head of the district administration. This is the complete violation of the policy of the equality and status of the inter-cadre service regulations. This has mainly interrupted the development activities all over the district. Moreover, an undue chaotic situation through out the administration all over the district is happened while these DCs were renamed as the District Commissioner, which means, all the members of the other cadre service were to be subordinated under the same rank of these DCs. The government should stop use the name these DCs as District Commissioner immediately and order for the DCs to coordinate the district should be cancelled. Public representatives should run the local administration at District, Thana and Union levels with the provision of reviewing the operational aspects of various functional heads working in the District, Thana and Union, 10. The government should unite and incorporate the secretariat administration with field level public administration and accordingly, the rules of business 1975 and secretariat instructions 1976 should be reorganised, 11. The government should build the development oriented administration. According to this aim and objectives, the following proposals from the recommendations of the Public administration Efficiency Study Group should be implemented: a) the field level divisions and corporations should be given economic and administrative powers and these should be established as the basic operating units of the government, b) the inter-ministry coordination should be ensured in all stages of the administration and accordingly, the formality of unnecessary coordination of the officials excluding the function base relative cadres of the department and ministry should be stopped. c) The process of policy making should be more wide and enlarged and the chiefs of the corporations, directorates, departments, divisions and units should be incorporated in full and active participation of the decision making process up to the ministry level. d) The schedule-2 of the rules of business of the government should be reorganised and the first class gazetted officers should be given power to sign papers and agreements etc for the government, e) The project authorities should be given all economic and administrative powers including the appointment of manpower and buying of vehicles etc in the approved projects of the government that will end taking the long time in the implementation of the project. f) The real and experimented process of inspiration should be innovated to increase the skills of the officials and employees in the administration. 12. Accountable management should be ensured in all stages of the administration and accordingly, all subordinated positions under every ministry should be incorporated in line of their responsibilities and duties and the interruption of the external authority in breaking the pyramidal shape of each functional ministry should be stopped permanently. In the same way, the appointments of outside cadres including the chiefs, executive and top level positions of different corporations and autonomous bodies should be stopped immediately (For example, according to the report of the Fulton Commission, the accountable management means clear cut responsibilities and commensurate authority and being held accountable for performance against budgets, standards of achievement and other tests,) 13. A professional civil service ministry should be established in stead of Ministry of Establishment and a United Civil Service College should be established for the training of all professional groups of the civil service. At the same time, as like as the pattern of Great Britain, a Senior Professional Administrative Training Scheme should be developed for all higher level officers of different functional groups which would be able to ensure the careful appointments in these top level functional administrative and policy making positions. 14. The differentiations in the national pay scale for the professional officials of different cadres that is created by Motin Committee should be removed and the pay scales of the positions of all professional cadres including doctors, engineers and agriculturists of different corporations and departments should be re-established to the same status of other cadre service scales in accordance with the equal status that was ensured in the national pay scale of 1977-78. 15. The main causes of the frustrations of the professionals or cadres are the lack of opportunities for promotions, entrance of the outsider cadres in their own professional field and limitation of reorganising the institutional structure. The equal opportunity for the promotion of all cadres and professionals in all level of the administration should be increased immediately in ratio according to the total number of cadres or officials of the concern departments and corporations. For this, any department or corporation shall reorganise their present cadre structure or create new positions, if necessary. 16. In light of the recommendations of the Fulton Commission, Second Cornwallis Commission, Power Commission, Muzaffar Commission and Rashid Commission the 'Specialists' employed in different professions and functions in all stages of the administration should be established with full power and status and these specialists

who are experienced in different functions should be ensured to be employed in the top level positions of the administration of the state. In light of the recommendations of the Fulton Commission, a policy of accountable and corporate management on the basis of management by objectives and corporate planning should be implemented. A policy making unit should be established with the long experienced specialists in different functions at the top level of all ministries so that specialists of substantive knowledge in different professions and functions could be able to provide their valuable contribution in the long term policy making process of the government.

17. The separation of the judiciary from the executive division is one of the main preconditions to establish the legal rights of the people. For that reason, the government should free the judiciary from the present control of the administration and hence, the judiciary must be separated from the executive division that will establish the freedom and neutrality of this department in the country.

⁹⁷ In this period, the PROKRICHI started movement in favour of their 9-points demand. As a result of their movement in December 1984 to January 1985, the junta administration discussed some issues with them and assured to fulfil these immediately. But it was found no progress within next couple of months. Therefore, the PROKRICHI was returned into actions in December 1985. They moved in full strikes from 22nd December 1985 to 5th January 1986 during the full Martial Law period. This was the country wide glorious movement of the mainstream professionals, which could reach to grass root. The centers of this movement included the all public hospitals' campuses, agricultural building and the IEB. In this period, police seized the homes of the professional leaders. On 31st December 1985, hundreds of engineers were arrested from the IEB and were sent to custody of the Ramna Thana. The arrested persons included the IEB elected GS MA K Azad, Engineer Ibrahim Mia, Samir Kuzmer Bhattachargia, Md. Moniruzzaman, Simam Fahim, Jauti Das Kundu, Haroon Al Rashid, and Dr Shisir Kumer Ghosh. The junta administration, as a part of repressive measures sacked the leaders of the movement, which included the Engineers: M AK Azad, Aminul Haque, MH Khan, AH Molla, Mirja Shafiq Ibrahim, Abul Kashem, Md Masud Jamal Jahidi, Md. Mostafa Kamal, Somnath Das Gupta, Md. Motiur Rahman and Golam Morshed; doctors: Martyr Dr Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, Dr AKM Mohibullah, Dr Md. Nazrul Islam; agriculturists: Mirja MA Jalil, Shahidul Islam, Nitish Kumer Devnath and D. Wahidul Haque. Even, the then BMA President and member of the PSC, a constitutional body Dr Abul Kashem was sacked unconstitutionally. In the same manner, the President of Agriculturists Institution Dr Mirja MA Jalil was sacked from his service because of his leadership in the movement. Clearly, the end of this movement was painful and the junta temporally could establish control over the movement.

⁹⁸ The 21-points demand of the BMA included: 1. The budget for the health sector should be increased, 2. The infrastructures of primary health care at the aim of safe health for all by 2000 should be developed immediately, 3. Extension of the number of hospitals and adequate medical facilities for the overall development of health sector should be implemented and the necessary health manpower should be appointed immediately, 4. The recommendations of the BMA for equal staffing pattern and equal opportunities for promotions for all staffs of the health service should be implemented, 5. The problems of the doctors engaged in the health and population control sector must be solved immediately, 6. The order of the government of upgrading the salary scale of the Thana Health and Family Planning Officer should be implemented immediately, 7. An equal policy of appointment and transfer of the health service officials should be formulated and implemented accordingly, 8. to give The autonomy of medical colleges and institutes should be given immediately and the government should take immediate initiatives for the establishment of a new medical university in the country 9. The order to downgrade the salary scale of the Assistant Surgeon and Assistant Medical Officer must be cancelled, 10. The senior scale (4800 taka) of the doctors should be implemented, who were already due for this scale, 11. All top level posts of the health service must be filled up immediately, which were vacant for long time, 12. The Grade-1 scale and status to at least 25% of the medical teachers, professors and directors according to the recommendation of the National Salary Commission, 1977 should be implemented 13. The problems of the doctors of autonomous, semi-autonomous and non-government organisations should be solved and take initiatives for the extension of medical facilities in the industrial sectors and ensure the employment of doctors and medical staff in industrial set ups, 14. The problems of the medical doctors and staff in private clinics should be resolved and ensure the safe medical treatment for public interest in these clinics and hospitals, 15. to extend The facilities of getting the drug licence for doctors should be extended; tariff in importing the medical books and machineries should be withdrawn; easy loans to doctors should be given and the training facilities for the doctors of the private and non government organisations need to be arranged, 16. The medical doctors in the related cadres those who were employed in Bangladesh Rail Way, Bangladesh Police, Bangladesh Telephone and Telegraph should be encadred., 17. The regulations for giving renewal fees for registration of the doctors should be

cancelled and the BMDC Ordinance should be more democratised, 18, The equal status of the doctors in the administration according to the warrant of Precedence, which was recommended by the office order of Admin/1/1-E-9/90/1979, should be implemented immediately 19. The illegal business in the name of medical education in the private medical colleges should be stopped, 20. An equal and permanent policy in awarding the fellowships and scholarships for the higher education and training in abroad for the doctors should be formulated and accordingly to be implemented and 21. An accountable, democratic and functional administration on the basis of profession in the line of fulfilling the 17-point demands announced by Central Coordination Committee of the PROKRISHI should be developed. For details of these 21-point demands of the BMA, see the booklet, '*Sober Jannye Shastha' Nischit Korte Hoele 21 Doafa Bastabayan Korte Hoebe* (Implement the 21-points to ensure the 'health for all'), published by Bangladesh Medical Association (BMA), 1990

⁹⁹ Interview of the researcher with Professor Rangalal Sen, Department of Sociology, University of Dhaka, on 23 March 2003 is included here. In his interview Prof. Rangalal Sen says "as an activist I'm saying when we arranged meeting at the foot of Shahid Minar. Doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers of college and universities and diploma engineers were present there. A peculiar happening happened on that day. Diploma engineers did not want to obey the leadership to the engineers passed from BUET. There was an occupational conflict between them. The Diploma engineers said, 'the task we performed and they only sign sitting idly in the office. You are the teachers of schools and universities': you will be the chairperson in the meeting. For the conflict an engineer could not take the chair. They accepted the leadership of the university teachers but they would not accept the president ship of engineers."

¹⁰⁰ Motiur Rahman, "*Andolone Sangbadpatra o Sagbadik*" (The News Papers and the Journalists in the Movement) in Sirajul Islam Chowdhury (ed) *Gono Ovyuththan O Bangali Modhyabitya Samaj* (The Mass Uprising and the Bengali Middle Class Society), Muktaadhara Dhaka, 2001, p.45

¹⁰¹ The role of journalists in the emergency situation of 1987 and for eight days from 27 November to 4 December 1990 could be cited in this regard. The journalist took risk of their lives in publishing detailed events of the movement disregarding the press censorship of the junta administration. Especially, on 27 November 1990 Ershad declared that it would have to take permission from the Joint Secretary of the Home Ministry if any newspapers wanted to publish news. From that on the journalists came to know that the state of emergency was going to be imposed. In this situation, they decided in the afternoon that they would not publish newspapers in protest if the emergency was imposed in the country. The foreign magazines were giving fresh news and people were feeling aspirations. The fall of Ershad was a matter of time. Political parties were praising the journalists. The leaders of journalist thought that they should not refrain from the movement of the nation and they played a historic role in this regard.

¹⁰² The main objectives of their struggle were to establish a democratic society, rule of law, freedom of press, communal harmony and free and fair mass media. They forged movements to increase the funds in health and education sectors rather than the defence. They raised the demand to give priority of indigenous technology, administrative reforms and the full autonomy of educational institutions.

¹⁰³ The period from 1924 to 1935 may be considered as the era of revolutionary trade union movement. M.N. Roy, Muzaffer Ahmed, S.A Dange and Shawkat Osman led the trade union movement and as a result, the political consciousness among industrial workers was increased. The then British Government in India adopted ruthless measures (e.g. Kanpore conspiracy case and Meerat conspiracy case) against the militant workers and trade union leaders. But this strategy could suppress the trade union movement against them. Later the trade union movement became closely linked with nationalist movement and the working class started vigorous struggle for the emancipation from extreme repression and economic exploitation. After the independence of the Subcontinent, Bangladesh, the then East Bengal under Pakistan had also a valuable history of trade union movement in conjunction with the movement of political autonomy and later independence of the country.

¹⁰⁴ Sirajul Islam (ed) *Banglapaedia*, Vol.10, Asiatic Society Press, Dhaka, 2003 p.193

¹⁰⁵ 1) Re-establishment of trade union rights. 2) Job-security of union leaders. 3) no officer of a union is to be transferred without his or her consent. 4) Resignation of union can not be cancelled without Prior permission of the labour court. 5) The workers shall continue as union leaders even when they are sacked from the job by the employer. 6) Ex-workers can become union leaders in the establishment where they worked. 7) Termination benefit to be raised from 90 days to 120 days for regular workers and from 45 days to 60 days for temporary workers. 8) General members can lodge cases against termination like union leaders. 9) Dismissed worker to get full benefit of provident fund and gratuity. 10) Labour court to review cases of dismissal. 11) All workers to be provided with letter of appointment and service book. 12) Temporary workers working for more than 3 years are to be

regularized. 13) All cases of loss of jobs during martial law are to be reviewed for re-instatement. 14) Arrested workers and leaders shall be released. 15) 30% DA to be allowed with areas from July 1982 in the public sector and the government would try to ensure the same benefit in the Private sector with effect from 1984. 16) Additional 30% DA to all workers under Pay and Wages Commission from 1st June 1984, 17) Advance of taka 500 paid to workers is to be treated as grant. 18) Minimum pay or wage shall not be less than taka 460. 19) There would be workers' representative in the wages' commission. 20) Gratuity to be increased from 14 days' wage to 30 days' wage. 21) The workers who have not been allowed festival bonus under pay commission will get the same. See also Sirajul Islam (ed) *Bangla Pedia*, Asiatic Society, Dhaka 2003 pp. 404-405

¹⁰⁶ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, 14 January 1983, p.14. The 8-peasant organisations included Bangladesh Krishak League, Bangladesh Krishak Shamitee, Jatya Krishak League, Bangladesh Krishak Muktee Shamitee, Bangladesh Krishak Shava, Jatya Krishak Shamitee, Krishi Farm Shramik Federation and Bangaldesh Khetmazur Shamitee.

¹⁰⁷ Although the political forces had been suffering from the lack of unity and integration in many occasions and even if many other socio-cultural forces were seeking to topple the dictator, it was not at all possible to forge a vital movement without their support, which is supported fairly by 99% (in which 76.2% for 'great importance') respondents. The students are regarded as the militant forces in all actions. In toppling the dictator in 1990, the students played a pioneering role in forging the united movement. This fact has come across the survey by 99.5% respondents in which 83.5% has supported their role as 'great importance'. The fair important role of the intellectuals is supported by 88.3% (including 34% for 'great importance') following the professionals for the same role supported by 78.6% respondents (in which 21.8% for 'great importance'). The TU workers and labourers that linked with mainly with liberal right and leftist political forces had fair important role in the movement, which is supported by 86.9% respondents (including 41.3% for 'great importance').

¹⁰⁸ It is important to mention here that only 23.3% supports the "PP-S-TU-I-P-O", in which the respondents rated the role of PP as first position and S as the second. Although another order "PP-S-I-TU-P-O" put the role of PP and S as first and second place respectively (12.1%) where the role of I is found to surpass the role of TU. And a significant group of 24.6% supports the 'other orders' of the movement forces for their participation and respective roles and sacrifices in the movement.

PART III

**THE MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF
DEMOCRACY IN BANGLADESH 1982-1990**

Chapter Seven

The Democratisation Movement in Bangladesh 1982-1990

7.1. Introduction

The prospect of democratic rule and the fate of the people of Bangladesh were turned back for a 'second time'¹ at the foot of 'military gangsters'² no sooner had General Ershad assumed the office of the CMLA. The state apparatus and the will of the civilian administration became shattered under the military orders following the frequent forceful repressive activities. But a real strength—the basic instinct of a possible democratic society that was developed over the hundreds of years among the people of this region in their struggle for freedom, equity and liberty against the British and Pakistani rules—was still found breathing in their third and fourth generation—the repression-shattered post independent opposition democratic forces in the 1980s. Since the seizure of state power took place, the pioneering forces of democracy under the leadership of the AL and the BNP—two lost power forces along with huge leftist militant components turning on the street agitations were fighting for the return of the democratic rule in the country. The political forces and other interest and pressure groups including students, intellectuals, professionals, trade unions workers and labourers were the key actors of this historic uneven political victory that was come to the fact through the collapse of the military dictatorship of General Ershad. The actions of the opposition forces saw no limit from protest marches to more stiffer actions of *hartal* and non-cooperation etc in the face of which the dictator imposed a ban on political activities on several occasions leading to frequent killings of leaders and organisers of the actions and forced imprisonments and arrest of thousands of participants. These measures might have saved the junta for the time being, but eventually, the regime was defeated by the power of the people. This chapter is therefore designed to disclose the discourses of the continuous events of the political actions against the military junta, which presents, in depth, the consequential interactions between the junta and the opposition forces in the process of democratisation.

7.2. The Beginning of the Resistance against the Military Junta

Since political activities under Martial Law were banned it was the students of the universities and colleges of the Dhaka city who, at first, organised themselves against the military seizure of power on the occasion of observing the 'Education Day'³ on 17 September 1982. Different student bodies organised the rallies in the university campus and vowed a sturdy oath against the military rule in the country. On 24 September 1982, the Education Minister Dr Abdul Majid Khan announced a new Education Policy⁴, which was completely denounced by the students.⁵ The students protested against the junta's proposal for introducing Arabic as a

compulsory language in Primary Education, which was 'being seen as an attempt to islamicize the country's secular educational system'.⁶ On 16 October 1982, the junta declared that he preferred a constitution based on the principles of the Quran and he wished to foster an Islamic revival movement by introducing a compulsory Islamic education. Thousands of students under different ideological streams in the DU campus protested this blueprint by the junta to sustain power by using the religious infatuation of the people. There took place a serious clash between the students and police in the campus on 08 November 1982 which resulted in more than 150 injuries and 38 arrests of the students. This united the 14 different student streams under the CSAC affiliated with democratic and leftist political parties on 14 November 1982. They announced an action of 'Secretariat Seize' on 14 February, 1983. There was chaos when a mammoth student procession to break a police blockade set up where the Dhaka University campus adjoins to the MOE Building and the Government Secretariat. They were demanding the end of military rule and protesting against the new Education Policy of the junta. At the outset, the police used batons, water hoses and tear gas on the participants to extricate them from the streets, which forced the students to throw house-bricks towards the police forces and tried to break through the police ranks. The police opened fire on the protesting students' marches. In the melee, more than hundred students and 63 police men were injured and one man identified as Zainul Abedin, an electrician, the representative of the lower class of the society, was knifed to death.⁷ In the pro tem situation, the CSAC was disgruntled with the lukewarm support from various political parties and the leaders of their parent political parties went to campus to lend their support to the students' cause though they 'did not endorse openly the CSAC's call for a general strike next day'.⁸ The military authorities were stimulated promptly to close the campus and imposed the curfew from the very night on 14 February 1983. As the protests increased, the junta responded on February 15 by extending the curfew to the four other divisional cities, closing all universities and colleges, imposing press censorship and arresting 1400 demonstrators. A number of opposition political leaders were arrested including Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia of the AL and BNP respectively. Besides the above consequences, two former Foreign Ministers: Dr Kamal Hussain and Abdus Samad Azad of AL were detained.⁹ Begum Zia was sent under house arrest in the cantonment while Sheikh Hasina with more than 100 top rank close associates of her 15-Party alliance were taken blind folded to the military torture cells.¹⁰ The students attempted to stage a further demonstration on February 16 in the port city of Chittagong. In the face of this huge movement, General Ershad suspended the proposed Education Policy on 18 February 1983. The 8 peasant groups on 2nd January 1983 raised their demands¹¹ and in a joint-statement, criticised the land reform policy of the junta that eliminated

the share-crop farmers from the land. The lawyers took part in demonstrations in the mid-October, 1982 against the government measures for decentralizing the judiciary that extended the six High Court branches to the different parts of the country to segregate the group of vast lawyers, who were considered as strong power house of legal assistance for political prisoners. They organised a boycott of the Supreme Court on October 10, 1982 to oppose this outrageous design of the junta that resulted into the arrests of 14 eminent lawyers including a former Attorney General for alleging anti-junta activities.¹²

7.3. The Stage of Indoor Politics and Dialogues in 1983

The martial law ban on ‘indoor political meetings’¹³ was lifted on 25 March 1983 while the campaigning in public remained illegal which came into work from 1st April 1983.¹⁴ At this stage, the junta proposed a national dialogue between his administration and all political groups to defuse the crisis resulting from the student-police riots of the 14 February 1983 and to discuss matters such as the drafting of a new constitution and transfer of power to a civilian government. The press censorship was ceased in order to facilitate discussion of the proposals the junta opened with the leaders of individual political parties scheduled from 28 April 1983. But only 10 minor parties agreed to participate. In this connection, he also took steps to release all the students and political leaders connected with the February riots to create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue. This also followed the release of 26 political leaders including Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia on 1 March 1983.¹⁵ The NUF—an alliance of 11 rightwing Islamic parties was formed on 9 April 1983 led by Mr Khondhoker Mustaque Ahmed¹⁶—one of the main criminals of August coup, which was believed to have support from military leaders to suppress the strength of the AL—the principal opposition to military rule.

The announced political dialogue between the junta and opposition political parties, in the end, started on 29th April 1983 in the wake of strictly controlled indoor politics under military auspices in which some minor parties attended. The 15-party alliance set a condition in a statement to press on 19 May 1983 to join the dialogue that ‘they would participate if it be called with all member parties of the alliance together’.¹⁷ The junta invited the political leaders, in his second bid, to attend an *Iftar Party* (fast breaking) get together on 8 July 1983. Some political leaders belonging to minor parties and the NUF attended the invitation. The major oppositions including 15-Party and 7-Party alliances did not take part, though one component of 15-Party alliance, the AL (Mizan) did attend. A three stage time table for local elections was announced on 8 July 1983: the UP elections were to take place on December 27, 1983; the rest municipal elections on 11 February 1984 and the *Upazilla* (sub-district) elections on 24 March 1984. Although some smaller parties hailed the announcement of elections saying that it had shown Ershad’s good

intentions, the AL-led 15-Party alliance described the announcement as 'a deception and a grand design to institutionalise an undemocratic system under the shade of the umbrella of martial law by trampling people's democratic aspirations under foot.'¹⁸ In the August 1983, the lower and distress class farmers of 20 North Bengal districts organised a programme named '*matir dak*' (call from the soil) against military administration to discharge the farmers from agricultural loan they took from bank in the wake of drought that ceased their crops resulted severe starvation of the people in the region.

Slowly and vigilantly, the latent intention of the junta became manifest in the beginning of 1983, when a pro-junta group of students—named *Nutun Bangla Chatra Samaj*¹⁹ with arms and ammunitions under military auspices started to capture the different residential halls of the University of Dhaka that extended very quickly through out the educational institutions of the country from January to May 1983. After the consolidation of his political position, General Ershad announced on 14 November 1983 that the presidential election would be held on 24 May 1984 and the parliamentary elections on 25 November 1984 under the suspended constitution of 1982. He also insisted that all the restrictions on political activity would be lifted immediately, if peace and discipline were ensured.²⁰ President Justice A.F.M. Assan Uddin Choudhury announced the formation of *Jano Dal* (People's Party), a pro-junta party with a manifesto advocating Islamic ideas and values, democracy and progress, and working for Bangladeshi nationalism, which were quite similar to those of the BNP. The party provided the dictator with a platform to contest the forthcoming national elections. Although Ershad had extended his term for two years as the Chief of the Armed Forces on 27 October 1983, he indicated in a number of statements and interviews during 1983 about his intention to retire from the Army and cross the threshold of a presidential election: 'if the people of the country so desire and they would like me to join politics, I will. If I join politics, naturally I will have to leave uniform but when and how have not been decided yet'.²¹

7.4. The Actions of the MRD after Lifting the Ban on Political Activities

The ban on political activity was lifted from 1 September 1983 so that the junta could be able to put a legal cover on his illegal military rule adopting a 'farcical practise at the polls'²². In this phase, the 22-Party MRD organised a series of demonstrations in the late 1983 in protest of the election timetable. Upon the joint call of a one day *hartal* that was observed on 1 November 1983 throughout the country, they announced a further action of sit-in in front of Government Secretariat on 28 November 1983, which was largest ever mobilisation of masses, and was dispersed by brutal police atrocities. This took 11 lives, injured thousands and indiscriminate arrest of political activists. The junta imposed a curfew in Dhaka on

that day and later extended it to the port city of Chittagong on 30 November, where two demonstrators were also killed during their protest against the police brutality in Dhaka. Following this mass protest, the dictator suspended the two week relaxation of martial law regulation, thereby restoring the ban on political activities and accused opposition leaders of seeking to undermine his attempts. Consequently, the two key opposition leaders Sheik Hasina and Begum Zia were put under 'protective custody'. In the later weeks, General Ershad again lifted all restrictions from political activities, which allowed the opposition anti-government campaign that got momentum very soon. The junta surmounted the mass movements for the time being and risibly termed his success as 'Democracy Day' for the event of 28 November 1983 while the opposition hailed it as 'Mass Resistance Day' against the regime. However, the 'Democracy Day' was later cancelled without any explanation as the opposition campaign grew stronger and as some opposition politicians including AL (Hasina) leader Tofael Ahmed expressed their concern that a confrontation between opposition and junta forces would push the country towards the civil war.²³

The opposition political forces asserted that the elections were a contrivance to perpetuate the power of military authority. They alleged that the reforms of local government by the military dictator would ensure his position in the grass root level and would lead to his success in the local and forthcoming presidential election. Thus an opposition victory in the parliamentary elections would be increasingly difficult. As a result, the opposition demanded first the withdrawal of the Martial Law and return of power to the elected government of former President Satter, which would oversee early parliamentary elections. In this connection it is also interesting to note that in a ground convention organised by the SCBA, held on 20 May 1983, the representatives of the various Bar Councils of the country adopted as many as seventeen resolutions for the restoration of constitutional rule including the independence of judiciary and other socio-political issues. Extensively, the CCBA in their meeting on 19 November 1983 limited their demands to 6-points emphasizing only the most urgent and relevant ones in order to return to constitutional rule that left an ultimatum to the military dictator to hand over power to the elected representatives before 31 March 1984.²⁴ On 11 December 1983, the junta announced that he had assumed the office of the President vice Mr Assan Uddin Choudhury who became the convenor of the *Jano Dal*. The erstwhile members of the councils of ministers were reappointed as members of a presidential cabinet. The appointment of the cabinet was seen as a move to consolidate his position as a presidential figure prior to the elections and to increase his room for manoeuvre with the opposition over the proposed elections. There were reports that he was also seeking to recruit Begum Zia into his cabinet whose popularity had become evident in rallies held after the lifting of the ban on politics.²⁵

The military leader made a number of conciliatory moves in early 1984 in order to bring the opposition parties into dialogue. The talks with 41 minor opposition parties began on 7 January 1984 in which a section of rightwing and opportunist political leaders like Khondoker Mustaque Ahmed, Mizanur Rahman Choudhury, Aaur Rahman Khan and Nanna Mia participated in the so called dialogue with Ershad. But the mainstream opposition forces of 22-Party MRD mainly the AL, BNP and the CPB were distracted in slowing in the momentum of campaign. The united boycott call of the elections under Ershad came at a time from the MRD when there appeared to be a split opening up between the two opposition alliances. The alliance led by Begum Zia seemed to move towards a compromise with the junta by stating that it had not opposed, in principle, joining a political dialogue, although she attached a condition that the President would lift the ban on political activities and allow press freedom. As she decided to join the dialogue with the dictator, she turned her back on the MRD—the position of the 15-Party alliance—the opposition group that was still firm in its position of boycotting the talks. In this process, the junta came close to this political circle and were able to make split in the opposition camp.²⁶ On this understanding, the military ruler reinstated limited political activities on 7 January 1984. In an attempt to avert a *hartal* on 1 March 1984, he announced on 29 February 1984 that the elections for parliament would be brought forward concurrently with presidential elections on 27 May 1984. The leaders of the MRD had called off an earlier *hartal* scheduled for December 20, 1983 due to informal talks with the junta while another call for a *hartal* on 4 January 1984 went largely unheeded. It should be noted here that the first two stages local elections in December 1983 and February 1984 were reported as it was received enthusiastically by voters despite incidents of violence which left 8 killed and many other injured, and caused voting to be suspended in a number of polling centres.²⁷

The AL demanded the immediate postponement of the proposed *Upazilla* elections and called the JS elections at once in the recent two day meeting of the ALWC. The resolution argued that the *Upazilla* elections were being organised to implement the decentralisation policy which it claimed was a basic administrative reform that the junta had no right to introduce without the peoples' verdict. In protest against the *Upazilla* election, the CSAC organised a protest march on 28 February 1984 in support of the *hartal* scheduled on 1 March 1984. A police van on patrol to control the students had hit the procession, which killed two BCL leaders of Dhaka University named Salim and Delwar. In the 8 hours *hartal* on 1 March 1984, it was reported that two opposition activists were killed and 150 injured in clashes between demonstrators and police. Notwithstanding the junta announcement to bring forward the date of the JS poll, the opposition leaders challenged the

dictator that the *Upazilla* elections scheduled on 24 March 1984 would be held 'over our dead bodies' and declared the day of election a 'black day' which would be preceded by an 'election resistance fortnight'.²⁸ The political scene of the country took a violent turn following the *hartal* when a labour leader, named Tajul Islam²⁹ was killed in the *Adamji* industrial area by the armed hooligans—popularly believed to be military intelligence—to dismantle the labourers movement, which caused serious reaction through out the country. The EC admitted on 5 March 1984 that 499 candidates had withdrawn their candidature from *Upazilla* elections. In the subsequent police crack down, the AL chief Sheikh Hasina and the BNP chief Begum Zia were placed under house arrest—and later were released on March 7—and more than 300 opposition activists were detained including Shah Azizur Rahman of BNP and Mr Abdul Mannan of AL. However, there were further anti-junta demonstrations during March and April 1984 in which more than a million people staged anti-junta rally in Dhaka. General Ershad on 18 March 1984 postponed the scheduled *Upazilla* elections until after the presidential and JS elections, uttering he wish 'to pave the way for national unity, dialogue and understanding for reaching the ultimate objective of transition to democracy by maintaining a peaceful atmosphere'.³⁰

7.5. The Movement for Holding the Parliamentary Election 1984

Having headed off confrontation with mainstream opposition political parties by postponing controversial *Upazilla* elections, the military dictator added an other ball to his political juggling act by appointing 79-year old Aaur Rahman Khan as PM with a mandate to negotiate with the political parties on a return to democracy. In the meantime, the BNP chief Begum Zia called on the junta in a huge gathering on 1 April 1984 to hold JS elections on 27 May 1984 as he promised earlier saying 'if you have the courage to face the people and keep your promise at least once'. But she deliberately left the situation blurred by not stating whether her party would concur to participate in the presidential and JS election as planned. The AL-chief Sheikh Hasina pronounced her concern on 2 April 1984 that the JS election should precede the presidential one. Therefore it became clear that the opposition had pulled out from their previous stands to boycott the JS polls. It happened since they were pleased with the uneven situation within the military administration. The pro-junta *Jano Dal* had its own problems in organising different party units through out the country that was not good in shape for the May polls and 'Begum Zia did not wish to give Ershad any more time to pull it together.'³¹

The 15-Party alliance agreed on 28 March 1984 to join the dialogue with the dictator on the basis of their 5-points demand. On the other hand, General Ershad met Begum Zia, the chief of 7-Party alliance on 12 April 1984. The talks between the two were on some developments and the military ruler was agreed to leave some

concessions to the demands of the opposition. As a result, the military authorities released 224 out of 300 people detained following the last 1 March *hartal* while a pardon was made for the students of Rajshahi University imprisoned under Martial Law. The restrictions on trade unions were repealed on 11 April 1984. Following the talks, it was announced on 21 April that the junta had agreed to draw up procedures for lifting up Martial Law and on 29 April 1984, he stated that the forthcoming elections would be held on the basis of the suspended constitution setting up a presidential form of government. As this announcement was the evasion of the opposition demands, the fact was that the military dictator took a malicious strategy by playing a dialogue drama with the oppositions, and after the reports on 2 May 1984 that the talks had broken down, Ershad in a broadcast through military controlled national TV, postponed the presidential elections until after the JS elections which had been rescheduled for 8 December 1984. On 17 May 1984, the FEER reported that the junta in preparation for the elections was making arrangements to close all the military tribunals and special Martial Law Court (MLC) and abolish all the post of local martial law administration to create a more congenial atmosphere. However, one military tribunal and a few special MLCs would be retained for specific purposes until the full pledged lifting of Martial Law rule. However, in May 1984 there was a serious discussion among the leaders on some debates in history- 'Mujib: ratting skeletons' in the intellectual level as well as in the political leaders' emotional worthy speeches that brought again Bangabandhu—the founding father of country in the limelight since his brutal assassination in 1975.³²

In June 1984 General Ershad decided to hold JS elections later that year before presidential elections in accordance with the demands of the two major opposition coalitions. The opposition had brought to the surface their political differences and could not reach the unified stand against the dictator. The 7-Party alliance argued that the election should be conducted under the suspended constitution while the 15-Party alliance opposed that, and insisted that the old constitution being abandoned and elections being held under a martial law proclamation, under which Ershad would exercise power as President with the resultant assembly then deciding on a form of government.³³ But the junta was determined to hold the elections in accordance with the suspended constitution and seemed to have no wish to lift the Martial Law until after elections at the first session of the newly elected JS. The opposition alliances firmly discarded the idea of holding the elections under martial law as they were aware that Ershad could then easily scampered the results in his favour. A precise date for the elections had yet to be announced and both opposition groups complained that Ershad was stalling while he mustered support for his *Jano Dal*. Further more, both of the opposition coalitions had retained the options of

either participating in or boycotting the elections. At this stage, the dictator sneakily put forward his offer to the opposition to lift the Martial Law in the phases of before and after elections. But the opposition forces were strict to their demands to withdraw martial law before elections. They were likely to press the dictator for interim government in accordance with their 3-points demands.³⁴ In their part of the movement, the 7-party alliance held a countrywide 'Mass Resistance Day' on 9 July 1984. Both of the main alliances observed countrywide 'Demand Day' on 27 August 1984 that included half day countrywide *hartal*, protests and gatherings, and the JSD (S-R) pushed forward their six-point demand to the dictator.³⁵ In the mean time, all lawyers groups of the country decided to observe 'Oath Taking Day' on 26 August and 'Solidarity Day' on August 27, 1984 in support of the 22-party opposition's actions including boycott of the courts, protest march and demonstrations all over the country.³⁶

In support of their demand for the immediate withdrawal of Martial Law, the opposition forces called the countrywide *gherao* and demonstrations from 16-20 September and a full day *hartal* on 27 September 1984. In this stage, the BMA urged the junta to implement their 20-point charter of demands. The lawyers groups and 7-party leaders met on 12 September 1984 for exchange of views. The leaders of both side discussed steps to strengthen the ongoing movement, and held that 'the united democratic movement launched by the political parties and the professional groups would end the Martial Law once for all from the soil of Bangladesh'.³⁷ On 15 September 1984 at the SCBA Building in an extended meeting of the CCBA, the mainstream opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia announced together that they would not accept any election under Martial Law and *Jano Dal*³⁸ of the junta, and in the next couple of weeks, the solidarity between the two main opposition alliances became strengthened as their Liaison Committee sat on 25-26 September 1984 that released their firm stand to boycott the elections. However, the *hartal* was observed following 2 killings and more than 200 injuries including a veteran AL leader ex-MP Moizuddin Ahmed in Kaligonj, Dhaka. More than 500 opposition workers were arrested in connection with the *hartal* through out the country.³⁹ A joint declaration released by the two major opposition alliances called countrywide 'Mourning Day' on 29 September 1984 and also reiterated the dictator to resign as the countrywide dawn to dusk successful *hartal* amply proved the moral and political defeat of the dictator. All opposition forces again called the people to observe a 'Mass Resistance Day' and 'Protest Day' on 3 October 1984. In the face of the opposition movement, the dictator extended the summer closing of the universities up to the middle of October 1984, which followed a massive suspension of examinations due in the beginning of the October 1984. He was keen to hold election according to his plan which followed an announcement of the JS

polls on 1st October 1984 to be held on 8 December 1984. The 15-party alliance organised a grand rally in the MM Avenue—the largest location for political gatherings in the capital, which was attended by several hundreds thousands of opposition participants while the 7-party alliance organised a grand rally at the premise of BM mosque on 14 October 1984 in which both of opposition forces demanded the cancellation of election date and announced new schedule of actions in December 1984 to realise their 5-point demand. The 15-party alliance announced a broad based 21-point⁴⁰ declaration for the socio-economic and political emancipation of the people and asked the workers to form ‘Action Committees’ everywhere while the 7-party alliance called to form ‘Resistance Committees’ to the grassroots to intensify the movement. The lawyers groups observed the ‘Black Day’ from 16-26 October 1984 in memories of the event of arrest and detention of the 13 eminent lawyers that happened in 1982 while the engineers of the country observed ‘Demand Day’ on 23 October 1984 in favour of their professional demands.

The opposition threatened the junta either to fulfil their demands or to face the civil disobedience and non-cooperation movement that was planned by them in the December 1984. This had set the junta and the opposition on a collision course. The dictator announced in Dhaka on 11 October 1984 at a public rally organised by *Jano Dal* that he would withdraw his 30 months old military rule in three phases if the major opposition parties agreed to participate in the JS elections. Otherwise, the ruler warned ‘Martial Law will continue with stiff measures’. The opposition alliances in three huge gatherings in Dhaka on 14 October 1984 rejected the offer saying they would not participate in the elections unless the Martial Law was lifted immediately and a neutral government formed for holding ‘free and fair elections.’ The opposition proposed actions including a ‘Resistance Fortnight’ from 27 October 1984, a 24- hours *hartal* on 8 December, the day scheduled for JS elections and a civil disobedience movement from 9 December 1984.

The BNP chief Begum Zia asked the dictator to handover to another General on his retirement as Army Chief in November 1984 and urged not to seek another extension if he wanted the ‘good of the Armed Forces and the country’. At the same time, the AL chief called on the Armed Forces to ‘resist those who are playing the anti-people role’; should they fail to resist the anti-people elements, the people would force to confront them’.⁴¹ Then the junta was compelled to postpone the JS elections scheduled on 8 December 1984. Shortly after, the EC announced again the date of JS elections on 15 January 1985 to be held on 6 April 1985 in accordance with junta’s plan for the relaxation of the Martial Law as announced on 15 December 1984. This was the fourth bogus announcement drama of the clever military for elections since 1983, which had to be postponed on each previous occasion due to the failure of the dictator to fulfil the opposition’s preconditions.

The two main opposition alliances were still undecided on whether to accept the recent proposal of the dictator for JS elections and the democratisation of the country under military auspices. The latest proposal set out a five-point *modus vivendi* which was paralleled closely to the opposition long standing condition for election participation.⁴² The 15-Party alliance had not rejected proposal of the junta, but it had issued an expanded set of pre-conditions for participation in the elections and announced that it still planned to go ahead with a country wide anti-Martial Law movement. The pre-conditions were mostly concerned with getting guarantees from the junta that he and all his agencies would remain neutral in the elections and would not interfere, in any way, on the electoral process and all political prisoners should be released prior to the elections. On the other hand, the BNP chief Begum Zia seemed to be ready to take part in the elections on one condition that nine former BNP ministers convicted by military courts on charge of 'moral turpitude' must be made eligible to contest' which was not possible according to the article 66 of the suspended constitution.⁴³ It seemed to be a crucial political development as the opposition took the new strategy to challenge the dictator through the mandate of the people. The military ruler was aware of his probable defeat if both the opposition alliances would decide to challenge him under a united platform.

7.6. The Movement against the Ban on Political Activities in 1985

On 1 March 1985, the junta imposed a ban again on all political activities and cancelled the planned 6 April JS polls, and announced that a referendum seeking support for his continued rule until elections at a future date would be held on 21 March 1985. He also announced that reforms which had been introduced on December 31 last year and January 16 this year would be rescinded and that the Martial Law would be 'applied with full force'. The universities of the country were forced to close down indefinitely and a curfew was imposed in Dhaka between midnight and dawn. The BNP chief Begum Zia and the AL chief Sheikh Hasina were placed under house arrest on 2 March 1985 and not released until after the *Upazilla* elections in May 1985. Most of the opposition leaders were also detained at this time and a number of them went underground in order to escape arrest.⁴⁴ The latest crackdown was not a bolt from the blue, feelers had been sent out by the dictator to opposition leaders after they had decided to boycott the April polls despite the concessions he had granted on their demands for the move back. But while a faction of AL followers tried to create a pro-election tempo, the BNP supporters pre-empted them by declaring that there could not be free and fair elections under Martial Law and that the 7-Party alliance would resist filing of nomination papers. Begum Zia warned that anybody participating in the polls would be deemed to have betrayed the people.⁴⁵

Since the emergence of Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia as the leaders of the country's largest opposition parties, they had monitored each other carefully and adjusted their programmes accordingly. In doing so, they had been playing more to the gallery than following their own political inclinations. As a result, Begum Zia's hard-line stance pushed Sheikh Hasina into difficulty because the majority of the 15-Party alliance—mostly small parties without much hope of individual electoral success were pressing the AL to follow Ershad's concessions notwithstanding. Begum Zia had her own problems in justifying the hard-line stance although the majority of the BNP stalwarts favoured elections and apparently the politicians were concerned only with their own problems. In the quest for legitimating his rule, the dictator had controlled the referendum of 21 March 1985—basically a voter less farcical election drama⁴⁶—announcing himself with a mandate to rule the country until elections he had agreed to hold under the provisions of the suspended constitutions.

The elections for 406 *Upazilla* chairmen⁴⁷ were held in two stages, the first one on 6 May 1985 and the second on 20 May 1985. A notable feature of this election was the use of strong arm tactics and huge expenditure for the theft of the results in favour of the candidates.⁴⁸ However, the mainstream opposition had launched a week long protest action from 23 March 1985 in an effort to force the cancellation of the *Upazilla* elections. Three police men were seriously wounded by explosions in Dhaka on 23 March 1985. Explosions also killed two people and injured 50 on 13 May, and on the first day of polling on 16 May, at least four people were killed and about 200 were injured in clashes between supporters of rival candidates. At least another 7 people were killed in similar incidents during the second phase of voting on 20 May 1985. Mr K.M. Obayedur Rahman of the BNP was arrested on 13 April 1985 along with other opposition figures. After the *Upazilla* elections, the junta insisted that he would soon relax the Martial Law and also invite political leaders to confer with him on the future of the country. The military dictator then seemed to be more confident about his position than previous one and was likely to make some gestures before the Muslim Festival *Eid-ul-Fitr* falling around 18 June 1985. The first step of these was the release from house arrest of two key opposition leaders—Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia on 25 May 1985. In the mean time, a natural disaster—the cyclone of 24 May 1985 gave the dictator political exposure at national and international level for the activities he had made for the cyclone-affected people in the next couple of months.⁴⁹

The military ruler rescinded the closure decree on universities on 18 July 1985 and the students were allowed to come back on 23 July. There were wide spread student demonstrations against the Martial Law as well as clashes between rival groups of students' organisations in subsequent weeks. The ban on political

activities was partially lifted, in effect from 1 October 1985, when the political parties in the opposition were allowed to re-open their offices and to hold gatherings inside them, but demonstrations and rallies in the streets remained prohibited. Begum Zia denounced so called 'indoor politics' as the 'politics of conspiracy by the government'. At least four students were killed and about 50 were injured in a clash between pro and anti-government student groups at a college in Dhaka on 9 October 1985. Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia joined meetings at their respective offices on 14 October 1985. They called for the cancellation of Martial Law and holding the elections under neutral government, because, they were fully aware that the elections held under Martial Law would astutely legitimize the illegal military rule under the cover of democracy. At the same time, at a rally near Dhaka on 15 November 1985, the dictator declared that he would hold JS elections early in 1986 even if the opposition groups boycotted them.⁵⁰

In the year 1984-85, the anti-autocracy movement by two mainstream opposition alliances had produced many chances of getting rid of the military rule in the country. But, the splitting of the main parties, constitutional debates between them meant they undecided to what to do, which ultimately outlived the dictator in power. Especially the events of some killings like ex-MP and AL leader Moizuddin of Kaligonj on 27 September 1984 and JSD student leader Shajahan Siraj on 22 December 1984 by the junta forces had created utmost condemnation in the minds of people, which reached the brinks to topple the dictator by huge resistance. Moreover, a prominent JCL leader Raufun Basunia, MSS final year student of D.U. Sociology Department, was murdered by the armed gangsters belonging to pro-dictator student organisation '*Natun Bangla Chatra Samaj*'. This event had turned into a violent student movement and the dictator was compelled to a close of his newly formed student front. It should be mentioned here that in the midst of these murders of the anti-junta activists, the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh became more radicalized and consolidated. As many as 17 organisations of agricultural labourers, the 15-Party alliance and the SKOP put forward charters of demand as 10 points in May 1984, 21-points on 14 October 1984 and 5-points on 10 September 1985 respectively to the military dictator. It could be relevant to state here that the charter of 21-points demand by the said political alliance was announced in the historic public meeting attended by many from all walks of life.

7.7. The Parliamentary Election of 1986

The formation of the pro-dictator political party—JP was announced on 1st January 1986.⁵¹ In a broadcast address to the nation on 2 March 1986, the junta swore that the elections to the JS would be held in the final week of April and it was 26 April, 1986. He also announced 'a number of measures'⁵² which would be

brought into force as of 22 March 1986, the final day for electoral nominations to be submitted for JS, on condition that the opposition parties would compete in the forthcoming elections. Both the opposition alliances issued separate but identical statements on 3 March 1986 rejecting the proposal of the dictator. The leaders of the opposition alliances discussed the issue on 9 March 1986 that followed a declaration of election boycott on 18 March 1986. Following this boycott announcement, the junta, in a radio and television broadcast on 21 March 1986, offered the reschedule of the elections for early May that later announced on 22 March as 7 May 1986. The causes of this were that he was convinced that some parties in the opposition gave him assurances to participate in the elections and all 'anti-election programmes and activities' were banned from the morning of 22 March 1986. A serious disagreement arose within the opposition camp concerning its contest in the polls under the illegitimate military regime of General Ershad. Seat sharing issue stood in the way of united participation in the elections. The political situation took a dramatic turn when the CPB General Secretary Comrade Mohammad Farhad presented a formula of seat sharing (i.e. 150 and 150) to Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia—two key alliance leaders. But the military ruler hurriedly changed the existing rules of contesting the elections by promulgating a new ordinance limiting the maximum number of seats to 5 in which one candidate could seek elections.⁵³ In this situation the 15-Party alliances did not like Ershad in walk-over and decided to contest elections as part of the movement in the late hours of the night 21 March 1986—a deadline declared by the dictator. The AL with a faction of its 15-party alliance and the JIB announced on 23 March 1986 their intention to participate in the elections. This decision was subsequently criticised by Begum Khaleda Zia of the BNP that boycotted the election under Martial Law.⁵⁴ On the question of the participation in the election, the 15-Party alliance was divided. A report in the Guardian in early July 1986 stated that the alliance had eight strong members to participate in the polls. The squabbling within the opposition camp brought about distrust and frustration in the minds of the people. The 8-Party alliance also had to shroud bitter criticism for their participation in the polls. It was reported on 7 April 1986—the revised final day for electoral nominations to be received that 1527 nominations had been filed and the JP and the AL had named candidates for all constituencies. At this stage, there was a rumour that the BNP Chief Begum Zia was arrested.⁵⁵

The BNP-led 7-party alliance and the newly formed 5-party alliance could not be able to take any effective line of resistance against the elections. However, the plan of the dictator was exposed for holding the elections as he was trying to win the elections at any rate. The elections for JS were held in date and ended with 12 deaths and a number of other injured on the elections day violence, the official sources revealed, which was protested by the main opposition leader Sheikh Hasina. She

claimed that 25 AL workers had been killed and 50 other injured all over the country by the pro-junta JP supporters. Reports suggested that the electoral malpractice were wide spread and included the physical intimidation of returning officers, the early closers of polling booths and the mass falsification of votes by JP supporters. However, the EC reported on 10 May 1986 that the polling had been suspended in 284 centres under 109 seats where re-elections were eventually considered necessary that took place on 19 May 1986. The British observers led by Mr Ennals, a Labour peer, Mr Martial Brando-Smith, a conservative MP and Mr David Lay, a BBC election observer had arrived in Dhaka on 5 May 1986 at the request of the Peoples Commission for Free Elections (PCFE) and reported huge frauds in the election by the dictator.⁵⁶ In the evening of polling day, the opposition AL-leader Sheikh Hasina called for an immediate re-elections in 50 constituencies, a figure later raised to 100, accusing the military leader of 'vote piracy'. She had laid the blame on that the Army was used in rigging the elections in favour of JP candidates—particularly in constituencies, where fresh balloting was ordered by the authorises. In protest against the fraudulent elections, Sheikh Hasina, at a public meeting organised by AL on 9 May 1986, called for a six hour *hartal* on 14 May through out the country, which caused 5 wounded when a bomb was thrown at a bus in the capital. The EC announced on 20 May 1986 that the JP had gained enough of 300 directly elected seats to command an absolute majority in parliament. The JP also gained 30 seats reserved for women as the majority party in the parliament. The Final results of the JS elections for directly elected seats were announced on 29 May 1986 as follows:

Table 7.7.1 The Results of General Elections 1986.⁵⁷

Political Parties	Seats
Jatiya Party (JP)	153
Awami League(AL)	76
Jamat-I-Islami(JIB)	10
Communist Party of Bangladesh(CPB)	5
National Awami Party (NAP Bhashani)	5
Bangladesh Muslim League(ML)	4
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD-Rob)	4
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD- Siraj)	3
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL)	3
Workers Party of Bangladesh (WPB)	3
National Awami Party (NAP-Muzaffar)	2
Independents	53
Total	300

The dictator announced on 17 June 1986 that the 'revival of certain provisions' of the suspended constitution would only be operational on 10 July 1986—next day of the first session of the JS on 9 July 1986. Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the opposition, demanded the full restoration of the constitution and announced on 23 June 1986 that her party and alliance MPs had decided to boycott the JS session until the withdrawal of Martial Law. They began to launch procession and campaign of civil agitations in protest against the constitution of Martial Law.

The inaugural session of the JS started in on 9 July 1986 in which 204 MPs attended—the majority being the members of pro-dictator JP while 119 opposition and Independent MPs boycotted the session. Sheikh Hasina refusing her entry to the JS launched the alternative ‘Peoples Parliament’ outside the JS Building on the opening session, where she was elected Leader and Mr Abdul Malek Ukil as Speaker and warned the dictator that the ‘People’s Parliament would meet until the Martial Law was revealed. Under these circumstances, the dictator was likely to encompass his own design in the parliament despite Hasina’s determination to non-cooperation with the passing of ‘Indemnity Bill’—the 7th Constitutional Amendment Bill, which would legalize the all orders and activities of the dictator since Martial Law was proclaimed. In the People’s Parliament with 104 MPs, Sheikh Hasina criticised the Bill saying that, “the Indemnity Bill is his baby and I do not see why we should help him”.⁵⁸ There was a violent clash between the police and the supporters of the BNP on 9 July 1986—the first day of the opening session of the JS which caused at least 30 injured and 100 arrested. It was again violent clash on 11 July 1986 between the supporters of the opposition in Parliament and police that resulted many injuries in the capital. At this critical juncture, most neutral observers, however, ruled out the re-emergence of the pre-election opposition unity between AL and BNP. Even in the unlikely event of the two leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia joining the hands would not be able to destabilize the dictator through violent extra-parliamentary agitations. The popular mood was against violence, and street agitations could not last for a more than a couple of days at a time. The recent elections had also stood as a hindrance in the way of both the alliances for a united movement. Through the elections the AL had retained its countrywide bases as a major well-organised party with a large network of dedicated cadres while Begum Zia and her BNP, by boycotting the polls, had secured the genuine popularity to the urban educated and progressive middle class of the society who were regarded as the direct opposition to military regime.

In an interview with the FEER, Begum Zia affirmed with clear arguments that she was kept away from the polls because she knew there were some kind of dealings between the junta and the AL adding that there was widespread talk about Ershad allocating the seats to be contested by the AL and some other parties, which was denied promptly by all of the alleged parties and individuals. In her part, Sheikh Hasina, by contrast, was somewhat defensive and pointed out that Begum Zia had first agreed to contest personally 150 seats leaving the other 150 to her—in an attempt to turn the parliamentary elections into anti-junta ballot revolution. The military ruler prevented such an eventuality laying a new law under which no candidate could contest from more than five constituencies. According to Sheikh Hasina, the BNP chief later agreed that her party would contest 120 seats but

withdrew her stand at the last moment. The two leaders in the opposition were highly reticent about their next moves including participation in the forthcoming presidential polls: “both argued that it was too early to talk about it and also that they could not express their views without the decision by their own parties and other opposition parties aligned with them. Sheikh Hasina said ominously, ‘we are not sitting idle, we are working’... for 11 years the AL had been in opposition, it had avoided confrontation and suffered army rule quietly. She added that the people had shown that they did not want Army rule and it was up to the Army to decide if it wanted to force the country to the brink of a civil war. On the other hand, asked if the BNP posed a serious challenge to Ershad, Begum Zia replied: if it is not why it is that at every occasion—referendum, local self-government elections and parliamentary elections—we are put in jail and why it is that even today a number of my party men are in prisons.”⁵⁹ In fact, Begum Zia faced a dilemma. She could keep out of the presidential polls later that year if Martial Law would remain in force. But if Martial Law was withdrawn she would be under public pressure to contest and should she be defeated in the elections, many suspected, that would destroy her BNP. Except for the promise of a return to civil rule, her platform was similar to Ershad’s, who was also a strong believer in her party’s main ideological planks: Bangladeshi nationalism, patronage to the religious element and an unarticulated but unambiguous suspicion of India. At this stage of the movement, the junta was found more consolidated than any time it had passed before, as the main oppositions—the AL and BNP—were found to be in a foolish and suicidal competition to capture the trust of the military to their safe return in power.⁶⁰

The dictator resigned on 28 August 1986 as the Chief of Army Staff, a post he had been holding since 1978, to smooth the progress of his nomination as JP candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections. The retirement from the post of army chief had set off a new chapter for the dictator without military *urdi* (uniform)—the same process of rehabilitation of the ambitious Generals in politics that was introduced in Bangladesh first by his predecessor General Zia. In an interview with the BSS on 14 July 1986, the dictator announced that the Presidential elections would take place in the first half of the October, uttering the words ‘to complete the constitutional process to establish an elected government’ and that was confirmed on 1 September 1986 when he announced the 15 October of the same year as polling day. At the same time, he played the drama of his joining to the JP, which had been formed in the last January largely at his behest. In the following day, he was elected Chairman of the JP, and on 17 September 1986 he was formally nominated its candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections. Among other candidates, the most notable were Mr Mohammadullah Hafezzi Hoozoor, leader of the Muslim Khelafat Andolon—a candidate in the previous presidential elections

held in November 1981 and Lt. Col. Syed Faruk Rahman—one of the leaders of the August 1975 coup in which the country's founding father *Bangabandhu* was murdered; after a further coup in November 1975, he fled to Libya and returned to Bangladesh in 1985. The whole country including intellectuals, teachers, professionals and all conscious corners of the society promptly reacted against the entry of a murderer into politics. In fact, the dictator was frustrated with the stance of the AL and the rehabilitation of a killer of *Bangabandhu* under the auspices of military ring leaders was considered as the psychological and political treatment for AL. Sheikh Hasina and the front line AL leaders had charged the military junta for encouraging Faruk Rahman to contest the election. It was significant as the BNP had not put across any comment against Faruk's entry in the political foray. Despite their differences on many issues, the AL and the BNP had made common cause in opposition regarding presidential polls. The military dictator nonetheless would like to win, but thought at the same time that 'the emergence of Faruk could weaken the opposition's joint stand'.⁶¹

The AL chief Sheikh Hasina announced the boycott of the presidential polls and called for a countrywide *hartal* on polling day that gave confidence to the BNP, which was boycotting the elections under military regime from the very beginning and Begum Zia announced her decision on 7 September 1986 to boycott this elections on the ground that the results had 'already been prepared'. However, the military dictator launching the campaign on 18 September 1986, declared at a youth rally in Dhaka that the forthcoming election would be free, fair and peaceful, and no one will be able to resist it. The SCBA, which was protesting several government moves involving the legal profession, for example, decentralisation of the High Courts etc, had demanded the resignation of the military ruler and urged political parties and the organisations of students, intellectuals, professionals, trade unions and journalists to launch united actions against the dictator. The dictator repeated the old pattern of abusing the power as he proclaimed a Martial Law Order on 6 October 1986 prohibiting anti-elections rallies and publishing of any views opposing the elections. It was reported that approximately 70 opposition supporters were arrested and detained under new regulations in between 8 and 10 October 1986. The two main opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia were put under house arrest on October 13, 1986 and were not released until after the elections. Sheikh Hasina described the elections as a 'momental fraud' and the Reuters on the same day reported frequent instances of voting irregularities, including the use of pre-marked ballots, forging of voting registers and multiple voting by individuals.⁶² In the event, the dictator—a General-turned politician, was declared President of the country and fulfilled his promised so called transition to democracy. The military autocracy was thus seemed to be shaped as a civilian dictator with the full support from the

politicised military institution—the army was still running their full activities in force throughout the country—a new definition of the Martial Law—the deception of the people repeating in this way, the second phase of the military aggression started in the garb of civil-military administration.

7.8. The Opposition Movement in the Parliament and Streets

For the second time in the brief history of independent Bangladesh, parliament had put a legal cover of an existing Martial Law regime. The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution⁶³ ratifying all actions, reforms and laws created by the dictator since the introduction of Martial Law and the suspension of the constitution in March 1982, was passed on 10 November 1986 by 223 votes to none. The AL-led mainline opposition MPs and the fundamentalist JIB boycotted the session. The BNP Chairperson Begum Zia, who called a half-day *hartal* on 10 November in protest of the Bill, was placed under house arrest on the same day. There were violent clashes in the capital through out the morning between police and students of different universities and colleges that resulted in one death and at least 10 injuries. The BNP supporters set fire to the Dhaka office of the CPB in protest of the decision of the AL-led alliance for not supporting the *hartal*. In a televised address to the nation on 10 November 1986, the dictator announced the lifting of Martial Law and the restoration of the constitution first adopted in November 1972. The AL President Sheikh Hasina told a hurriedly called press conference at her official chamber in the JS Building that the Bill was a ‘black chapter’ in the nation’s history, adding that it was a fraud perpetuated through the Parliament without the approval of the people. Sheikh Hasina also described the support of the Bill by two smaller component parties of her alliance as ‘betrayal of the people’.⁶⁴ The 7-Party and 5-Party alliances who were left out from the parliamentary poll, however, continued their anti-junta agitations in the street that kept the AL under pressure to return to the opposition movement outside the parliament.

The opposition movement began to get further impetus in January 1987. The majority of the opposition 8-Party alliance MPs—the principal ‘left of centre components’ under the leadership of AL President Sheikh Hasina attended the Parliament on 24 January 1987 for the first time since initiating a boycott at the inaugural session in July 1986. The opposition MPs stayed in the session for a very short time before staging a walk out in protest at the formal address of the dictator to JS as President, in which he emphasized the so called ‘role of the Armed Forces in establishing a democratic set up’ in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the opposition, assured later: “we have boycotted (dictator’s speech) as we did not want to listen to the speech of a ‘self proclaimed’ President.”⁶⁵ The same afternoon, the 7-Party alliance BNP called for the dissolution of the Parliament with a rally in downtown Dhaka, where political assembly were banned and which sparked

violence. A police crack down on the rally resulted in the arrest of 15 top-leaders of the alliance including the BNP Chairperson Begum Zia who was released a few hours later. The BNP supporters had, by then, burnt several public and private vehicles in protest. The following evening, Begum Zia attacked the AL for the first time saying that its character was identical with that of the Government. She defended her stand: “we are on the street and our movement will continue till the removal of this autocratic government.”⁶⁶

The three main opposition alliances—the 8-Party, 7-Party and 5-Party observed ‘Black Day’ on 24 March 1987—the day in which the dictator seized power in 1982. The military administration was facing a number of civil unrests from the very beginning of this year. Many opportunities were created to strengthen the movement against the dictator both inside and outside the parliament in connection with the passing of anti-people budget, decentralisation of judiciary and administration, policies for the formation of holding company, denationalisation and militarization of the civil administration. In every step, the dictator was facing serious challenges from the people through out the country. In fact, it was the first time for the opposition alliances to organise their movement against the autocratic regimes of General Ershad from a relatively comfortable position. They demanded the resignation of the dictator as President. The *hartal*, a serious effective action against the military autocracy called ostensibly in protest at the government’s economic record—actually indicative of wider political and social discontent, was observed in Dhaka and other major cities on 16 February and 30 June 1987 respectively. These were not supported only by AL and the BNP and their alliances but also participated by Marxist-Leninist 5-Party alliance and students, trade unions, professionals and intellectuals, and many others interest and pressure groups of the society. A 24 hour *hartal* on July 12-13, 1987 originally called by the SKOP in protest at the privatisation plan of the Government, turned into the longest and most violent anti-government protest since Martial Law was lifted in November 1986. The *hartal* coincided with the unexpected passing through JS, on 12 July 1987, of the controversial Local Government (District Council) Bill which gave the Armed Forces a constitutional right to share administrative power with the civilians of the country’s 64 rural district councils.

The opposition in the JS, who had staged a walkout during the Bills’ passage, alleged that the Bill was part of a ‘gradual militarization of the entire administration’. The pro-dictator JP, however, defended the Bill on the grounds that any military personnel sitting on the District Councils would have no voting rights and would be there only as so called development work expert. According to the *Times* of July 1987, the 24-hour *hartal* included over 100 injuries including 20 policemen and 35 arrested in Dhaka as riot police attempted to disrupt opposition rallies which

continued through out 14 July 1987. In the aftermath of the July 12-13 strike, Sheikh Hasina issued an ultimatum to the dictator to resign by midnight on 18 July 1987, when he failed to do so the combined opposition announced a 54-hour *hartal* falling 22 July 1987 with the specific aim of forcing the downfall of the military ruler. Although this was a significant and seemingly united move by the two major opposition alliances, the decision for the joint action was announced separately by the two groups. Begum Zia, the BNP chief, said, “we prefer to unite on the streets rather than at meeting.”⁶⁷

However, the current offensive against the government had been spearheaded by the AL chief Sheikh Hasina. According to a report in the FEER on 30 July 1987, Sheikh Hasina wanted to strengthen her party’s image which had been suffering because of its last-minute participation in the elections last year. The political analysts of the country explained the situation that Sheikh Hasina had taken the lead of ongoing anti-Ershad actions equally inside and outside the parliament as she was convinced that her competitor, the BNP chief Begum Zia, was gaining popularity by sticking to the persistent demand for the resignation of the military dictator. According to the political observers, domestic compulsion had long been at logger heads with the military establishments. Sheikh Hasina was convinced that as long as the military was able to call the shots, it would try to prevent her from coming to power. Therefore, she had tried to take advantage of the District Council Bill. On the first day of the 54 hour *hartal* on 22 July 1987, at least 100 people were reported injured in wide spread violence which included an arson attack on the Army Recruitment Centre in Dhaka Residential District at Azimpur. According to the Financial Times of 24 July 1987, 7 people were killed on the second day of the *hartal* and many more were injured in clashes between police and anti-junta protesters. Street fighting between opposition demonstrators and junta supporters occurred in Dhaka, Chittagong and Sirajgonj. At a rally on 24 July 1987 to mark the end of the *hartal*, Begum Zia claimed that the opposition had ‘inflicted a serious blow to the hatred dictator’. According to the press note by police on 24 July 1987, 700 people including 100 police men were injured and 300 people were arrested during the *hartal*. Sheikh Hasina on 30 July 1987 led a protest march at the government offices in Dhaka in an attempt to force the resignation of the dictator despite the imposition on previous order of 15 days ban on rallies within one mile of the area. On 1 August 1987, the dictator sent back the Local Government (District Council) Bill to parliament with a request that would be reconsidered. He argued that there was ‘scope for detailed discussion of the Bill. This was widely interpreted as an attempt to defuse the confrontational situation between the dictator and the democratic forces. At this stage, Freedom Party—a new party was launched on 3rd

August 1987 by the August coup leaders under the green signal of the dictator—the move widely accepted as to suppress the strength of the opposition AL.⁶⁸

The opposition alliances announced a plan on 22 October 1987 to observe a 'Dhaka Seize' action on 10 November 1987—the anniversary day of fake lifting Martial Law in last year. They planned to assemble millions of people on that day to overthrow the dictatorship. The military leaders were frightened and banned all activities and publicity relating to this action plan on 9 November 1987. In the three weeks period leading up to 10 November a large number of opposition activists, between 1000-4500, including at least 12 prominent leaders were arrested. Frequent clashes between junta forces and opposition supporters in the major cities resulted in over 200 injured including a member of the dictator's cabinet, Lt.Col. Rt. HMA Gaffar on 1 November 1987.

During this period, the two key opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia met at least on two occasions. Both of them made up a joint statement on 9 November 1987 expressing their strong commitment to the successful culmination of the struggles. As a part of the security built up in preparation for the 'Dhaka Seize', the dictator banned all gatherings of more than five people; closed the University of Dhaka and drafted troops and paramilitary forces in the city. On the day of 'Dhaka Seize', thousands of cadres of the opposition political parties put the capital under siege, mounting massive demonstrations to force the dictator to resign. In the rare show of the opposition unity, agitators led by trained political cadres fought pitched street battles with the military, para-military and police forces. Instead of all efforts of the opposition to bend on forcing the hands of the wily dictator, for this time, he was able to survive his worst political crises. The Home Minister of the junta cabinet announced on the evening of the siege day that three people had been killed during the day's 'disturbances' and 73 were arrested. The counterclaims made by Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia had put the number of deaths at 12 when police opened fire on the demonstrators. The main area of conflict had been at an intersection between the BM mosque of the capital and the government secretariat, where the members of dictator's cabinet had their offices. Thousands of demonstrators congregated at this point chanting "we have one point, one demand—Ershad must go."⁶⁹ A representative of the working class of the Dhaka city, Nur Hussain (scooter driver, a worker of the AL youth front) sacrificed his life while carrying the slogans: "*Swairachar Nipat Jak, Gonotantra Mukti Pak*" (Let despotism be destroyed and democracy be established) written on his chest and back. Nur Hussain came to join a procession which was passing near the secretariat where the police opened fire and he was killed along with at least six others and many injured.⁷⁰ The heroic sacrifice of Nur Hossain was undoubtedly an uncommon instance for democracy around the world. This however, was undermined by the

dictator when he arrogantly termed the event: “a drag addict was hired in the marches by opposition and shoot out.”⁷¹

In protest of this killings and atrocities, the opposition called for a nation wide *hartal* in the following two days. As a pre-emptive measure, the military junta on 11 November 1987 arrested the two leading opposition figures—Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia and put them under house detention for a month. Their continued detention led to further *hartal* and street violence up to 17 November 1987. According to the FEER, “Khaleda’s arrest was dramatic; she was picked up in a downtown Dhaka hotel (Hotel Purbani) suite after the police broke open the door. She was later detained at her residence in the military cantonment, where access to the public was restricted. Sheikh Hasina had been confined to her late father’s house, *Bangabandhu Bhavan* in the Dhanmondhi residential area under heavy police guard.”⁷² The military dictator told the foreign reporters on 13 November 1987 that he was willing to meet Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia for discussions. Attributing the week long demonstration to ‘street urchins, miscreants and criminals’, the dictator stated that the security situation, in his words, was ‘very much under control’, and he warned that the police had been issued with orders to ‘take very serious measures’ in the event of fresh disturbances. *The Financial Times* of 18 November 1987 reported that two Cabinet Ministers had met with Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia late on 16 November 1987 in order to discuss the possible government concessions including an increase in the powers of parliament and of the Prime Minister. The initial opposition response had been reported negatively. Speaking to the police forces and volunteer guards on 20 November 1987, the dictator stated that parliamentary elections might be held earlier than the scheduled for 1991 if the opposition would enter into the dialogue with the government. Three people were killed and over 250 injured in a bomb attacks and fighting through out the country during a *hartal* held on 21-22 November 1987. The dictator on 23 November 1987 detained Mr Ataus Samad, a famous journalist and BBC chief in Dhaka, under the 1974 Special Act.⁷³

The struggle for pushing the dictator out of power was not an end in itself as the opposition would not be catapulted into power automatically. The opposition to the dictator had two contenders for power- Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. Their two alliances agreed to install a caretaker government which would hold ‘free and fair’ general elections. And the party that wins would form the next government. The AL favoured a Westminster-style parliamentary form while the BNP preferred the existing presidential system, which was also enshrined in its party constitution. Political analysts believed that the BNP could be persuaded to back a parliamentary system. However, any prospect of the AL, which was known as anti-military, coming to power was likely to alarm the Armed Forces. In that situation, the AL was

unsuccessful to have the confidence of the Army. On the contrary, the Army feared that the AL was bent on cutting the military down to size. But the longstanding rivalry between the AL and the BNP was unlikely to forge a sustainable mass movement to oust the military dictator. Their leaders were also worried over the strength of the leftist parties in the alliances. In the first few years of the street politics, the CPB had emerged as the single largest organised and disciplined leftist force.

At this stage of the movement, the demand for the resignation of the dictator from power easily incorporated the demand for the dissolution of the JS. The various organisations of the students, professionals and intellectuals including cultural activists, notably the CCA and NPC, brought out processions one after another in the city streets and voiced their demands for the resignation of the dictator and dissolution of the JS laid making various statements both severally and collectively, or all the elected members belonging to opposition camp should quit the JS.⁷⁴ In this situation the dictator on 27 November 1987 proclaimed the 'state of emergency' throughout the country. The introduction of the state of emergency was enthusiastically protested by the mainstream three opposition alliances as they announced three day *hartal* from 29 November to 1 December 1987.⁷⁵ The military dictator, having arms with him under emergency provision, addressed the nation on the state owned TV on 28 November 1987 with a proposal to the opposition to reach a negotiated settlement of the political crises,⁷⁶ which was considered as his old style to overcome the crisis.

Reports from India alleged that police in Bangladesh killed five people and injured over 350 whilst suppressing demonstrations throughout the country on 29 November 1987 and a police press note on 30 November 1987 recognised two killed and some 2500 opposition supporters had been arrested since the introduction of the state of emergency. The dictator, in an unexpected move on 6 December 1987, dissolved the parliament to pre-empt collision of the opposition AL to resign from the legislature, which could have resulted in a constitutional crises. However, he later recognised this step as his great political blunder in his period of reign.⁷⁷ The move cleared the way for new elections to the parliament. In this dilemma, 10 MPs of the JIB supported the call of the BNP to quit the parliament, who therefore, resigned on 5 December 1987 pulling the main opposition AL to do like wise. Sheikh Hasina, and Begum Zia remained under house arrest since the state of emergency was declared. The AL Presidium met and indeed took the similar decision in the chair of Presidium member Abdul Mannan who along with other opposition leaders including Dr Kamal Hossain had been released from detention by the military authorities—popularly believed as an arranged release—on 30 November 1987. However, a split developed in the parliamentary group of the AL,

which challenged the decision of the Presidium of the party, and resolved that matter of the resignation of the AL MPs from the JS should be settled by the party President Sheikh Hasina. Asadul Haque Khosru, a leading AL MP described the decision of the Presidium as “an attempt coup by the section of the party old group which has failed”.⁷⁸ However, leaving Sheikh Hasina under house arrest, Kamal Hossain had played a remarkable active role during the recent ALWC meeting, which took the decision for party MPs to resign from the JS. This helped him reassert his individual position in the party.

7.9. The Movement against the Civilian Face of the Military Dictatorship

Maudud Ahmed, a high rank political parasite and intellectual collaborator to all military regimes in the post independent Bangladesh politics, and the then Deputy Prime Minister of the dictator’s cabinet, asserted that a new general election must be held within 90 days from the date of the dissolution of JS. Before a firm polling date was announced, the dictator was likely to dissolve his Cabinet to form a new one, which he might call his ‘caretaker’ cabinet, demanded by the opposition and reconstituted the EC according to his evil design to sustain the power under civilian cover. The JS elections were scheduled for 3 March 1988. Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia along with 20 opposition leaders were released from detention on 10 December 1987 that followed a further release of 430 political detainees in the same week. The Liaison Committee of the three main alliances on 20 December 1987 raised the demand for holding the elections to the JS under the caretaker government. The election to 4400 UPs⁷⁹ were held amidst, possibly the worst election related violence in the country’s history. According to the Hindu on 12 February, 1988 at least 150 people were killed, although the official statement supported the deaths of 80 and over 8000 injured during the polls. The voting was suspended in a large number of polling centres and wide spread rioting was reported in many areas. The election was non-partisan and had not been directly opposed by the main opposition parties. The Times on 6 February 1988 reported that much of the violence in the run up to the elections had been exacerbated by family feuds and the ‘setting of old scores among land barons’. According to the FEER on 25 February 1988, time round, most political parties including the AL and the BNP who were boycotting the general election became involved in supporting local candidates—favoured by them, where the organised parties were interested in getting their supporters elected. The major opposition parties had held the dictator and his JP responsible for the violence during the local elections. The AL chief Sheikh Hasina accused that the dictator had destroyed ‘all democratic institutions’ in which the junta under civilian cover did not hesitate to massacre the people to cling the power. The BNP chief Begum Zia also condemned the violence and reiterated its stand that only an election

under caretaker government could control the violence and could overcome the present national crises.⁸⁰ The run-up to next months' parliamentary polls, boycotted by the major opposition parties, had been blemished by widespread violence, but the dictator was determined to go ahead with his plan of elections.⁸¹

The fourth parliamentary polls since the independence of Bangladesh and the second since the military dictator came to power were held to 282 elective seats in the 330 member JS; unopposed in 18 seats and election in the one constituency had been post-poned after a candidate was shot dead. The remaining 30 seats were traditionally reserved for women and were filled with indirect election by the JS. The elections was originally set to be taken place on 18 February 1988, but rescheduled in mid-January to avoid a clash with Muslim holidays of Ramadan, which was later announced by the EC on 1 January 1988. Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia, the two main opposition leaders issued a statement immediately denouncing the electoral process of the country as meaningless and calling for a fresh programme of the anti-government agitation. However, the leaders of 76 political parties, most of whom had few members and little public support, issued a statement on 2 January 1988 saying that they had formed a Combined Opposition Group (COG) to contest the forthcoming elections. The COG was led by Mr A.S.M Abdur Rob, who was described by the FEER on 28 January 1988 as the dictators's 'loyal' opposition leader. In the period leading up to the election, the opposition alliances held a number of rallies calling for non-participation in this JS polls and *hartals* were frequently called in the major cities that were spontaneously supported by the masses of the all corners of the society. The dictator—mindful of unprecedented violence that had accompanied the local elections—banned all public rallies; closed educational institutions and deployed the Army as additional support force for the police and paramilitary BDR troops who had already been posted in preparation for polling. The security police arrested over 20 senior opposition leaders on 16 February 1988 including the AL-GS Sajeda Choudhury and a number of former ministers and BNP officials. According to the government press note, 5 people were killed and 80 injured on the Election Day violence, but the police report suggested that the number of deaths might have been as high as 13. Most of the western media reports were agreed that the vast majority of the country's 48,000,000 voters had obeyed the guidelines of the opposition to boycott the election. The Guardian of 4 March 1988 commented that the ruling JP had 'showed its contempt for the electorate with massive rigging of the polls' and the Independent, on the same day, reported that 'none of the 65 foreign correspondents there for the elections reported witnessing normal voting at any of the polling stations in Dhaka'. As of late March 1988, the unofficial results of the elections were as JP-251, COG-18, Freedom Party-2, JSD-2 and Independants-26.

The mainstream opposition forces mentioned that only about 1% had exercised their franchise and accused the ruling JP of massive ballot rigging. According to the FEER of 17 March 1988, the AL President Sheikh Hasina accused the dictator of destroying the electoral process under which either the polling officer did not turn up or the ballot boxes were missing. She also claimed that the government owned radio and TV networks had announced predetermined results. The abnormal situation created by the dictator resolved to announce the predetermined results. Sirajul Islam, the AL secretary for International Affairs told the Review that the JP candidate was declared elected with 1, 27,000 votes though registered voters were only 99000 at Burichang seat under Comilla District. Sheikh Hasina assured that the opposition would continue its 'peaceful and constitutional struggle to oust Ershad whom she termed a 'shameless liar'. The BNP chief Begum Zia staged a rally with several thousands supporters admittedly not a significant number by the country's standard to protest against election fraud.⁸²

The 8-Party alliance organised a mammoth rally at Chittagong on 24 January 1988 which was led among others by the alliance chief Sheikh Hasina. The police without any cause, opened fire on the peaceful procession that marched from the airport to *Laldighi*, which killed 24 activists on the spot and injured and arrested thousand others, most of whom belonged to the poorer sections of the society. The countrymen were stunned at this tragic incident. Sheikh Hasina immediately charged the dictator of repeating the massacre of unarmed people as like as the Pakistan Army against Bengali people during the liberation war in 1971, and vowed that the people would take appropriate revenge by ousting the dictator from power. She subsequently softened her stance and stated that too much blood had already spilled. She also absented herself from a later procession in Dhaka to mourn the Chittagong killings in the following day at Central *Shahid Minar*. The presence of Begum Zia—a rival leader of Sheikh Hasina in the opposition camp—at the procession made the latter's absence all the more conspicuous. Questioned about her absence, Sheikh Hasina replied: "... I had information that an attempt would be made to kill me if I was there—Could anyone guarantee that the presence of the two of us [Hasina and Khaleda] on one platform would have toppled the government?" Although her critics were quick to accuse Sheikh Hasina of 'providing a fresh lease of life to the Ershad regime' by diluting the strength of the opposition movement,⁸³ the political analyst believed that Sheikh Hasina was keen to prevent a further military takeover by another General that would create an opportunity for Begum Zia to be in power.

There was a National Poetry Festival on 1-2 February 1988 at the TSC area of Dhaka University which inspired the activists of the opposition movement specially the students of colleges and universities who profusely shed their blood for the restoration of democracy.⁸⁴ The Poetry Council organised poetry festivals

consecutively from 1987 in the first week of February in every year with the theme of burning political issues, for example, 'poetry against autocracy', 'poetry against communalism' and 'poetry for democracy'.

The opposition in Bangladesh like the partisans of many other third worlds' domestic conflicts had brought its battle to the Washington, the capital of the USA—the super power of world politics. The recent Washington visit of the Foreign Minister H.R. Choudhury tried to portray the US blessing for the latest controversial JS elections. On the contrary, the two opposition leaders Dr Kamal Hossain of the AL and B Choudhury of the BNP arrived at Washington, soon after the visit of the Foreign Minister, to lobby against the military dictator. They urged the US Congress and administration to use the leverage of aid to restore democracy in Bangladesh. Kamal Hossain told a press conference, the "Noriega of South Asia should not be treated differently from the Noriega of Central America or else where."⁸⁵ In a bid to oust the Panamanian military strongman, General Manuel Noriega, the US had recently cut off all aid and credit to Panama. However, the analogy used to catch public attention was interpreted as an appeal for a total cut in aid to the military dictator; the opposition representatives repeated by saying that US food aid to Bangladesh should not be touched. Although the Bangladesh opposition leaders were received accordingly to protocol by a mid-level state department official they had meetings with a number of powerful congressional leaders and addressed other influential policy makers. It was reported that the two opposition leaders made a strong impression on congressional leaders with their agreement that the rule of Ershad had eroded faith in democratic process, institutions of the government and the independence of the judiciary causing instability and violence that could not affect only Bangladesh but also the region. Edward Kennedy, a supporter of Bangladesh since its birth, was going to introduce a resolution expressing concern about the situation in Bangladesh and influential members of House of Representatives were looking into the possibility of partial suspension of aid, if the Ershad regime did not take steps to restore democracy. In the meantime, the House Sub-committee of Asian and Pacific Affairs was scheduled to hold hearings on Bangladesh, and the USA administration was likely to come under congressional pressure to look a tougher approach to Ershad—the Noriega of Bangladesh. The House in December 1987 passed the Foreign Assistance Act with an amendment, which required the US President to take into consideration the existence of a credibly eligibly elected government, free press and judiciary while offering aid. Once the Bill was passed by the Senate in the summer, the administration had put to a test in the light of last parliamentary polls, marked as 'voter less election' by one congressional member, which created serious difficulties in providing Bangladesh with the proposed US \$133 million in aid. Inconsequentially, Dhaka had hired a

lobbying firm for reported US \$200,000 initial fee to promote the interests of the military dictator in the US congress.⁸⁶

The dictator on 13 March 1988 announced at a religious gathering in Barisal, a southern district of the country, that the JS would consider a Bill in its coming session to 'provide religious identity to the nation by incorporating Islam as a state religion'⁸⁷ which in fact was regarded as a new fundamentalist cover of the dictatorship to sustain its power. Moudud Ahmed, the Prime Minister, introduced a Bill into parliament on 11 May 1988 to amend the constitution to make Islam the state religion. The move came as a surprise. It was generally believed that he would not act on such a critical issue during the first session of new JS. The new article 2A to be inserted in the constitution read: "the state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic."⁸⁸ Besides, introducing new article 2A related to the state religion, the Constitution (8th Amendment) Act 1988 also aimed to amend article 100, which would allow, the setting up of six permanent branches of the High Court divisions of the Supreme Court at Barisal, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rangpur and Sylhet.

The AL chief Sheikh Hasina accused the dictator of using Islam as a tool to cling to power and exploit popular religious sentiment. The BNP chief Begum Zia said that it was a useless step in an overwhelming Muslim majority country to proclaim Islam the state religion as she said that he had little regard for Islam and that its move would be harmful for religion. The opposition alliances reacted sharply and condemned the Bill soon after its introduction. At least seven vehicles in Dhaka including six government buses were damaged in opposition inspired protests against this Bill. Begum Zia declared that 'vigorous movement' would be launched later in the month 'to topple the Ershad government' and the people did not recognise the new JS and that it had no legal right to enact a new law or amend the constitution. Sheikh Hasina said, "the love for religion does not mean [Ershad's] respect for it."⁸⁹ However, 'the Bill was passed in the JS on 7 June 1988. The passage of the Bill was opposed in parliament by the so called 'loyal' opposition which staged a walk out. The leader of the parliamentary opposition, A.S.M Abdur Rob said that the move would divide the nation further. Protest marches and one-day *hartal* were organised by the mainstream three opposition alliances. The 8-party alliance chief Sheik Hasina told a large protest meeting on 9 June 1988 that that it was 'a heinous move to destroy the spirit of the liberation war and reunite Bangladesh with Pakistan'.⁹⁰

The BNP Chief Begum Zia termed the amendment as 'highly politically motivated' and was an attempt to exploit religion to divide the nation and would generate a communal atmosphere. While the move had cut the ground formed under fundamentalist groups calling for an Islamic state, it continued a trend towards

Islamisation which began in late 1979 by the Constitutional (5th amendment) Act that removed four state principles including secularism, and inserted '*Bismillah-ar-Rahmanir Rahim*' (in the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful) in the preamble to the constitution. The actual features in the reactions of the state religion bill were different. According to the FEER on 26 May 1988, senior BNP and AL leaders publicly expressed their anger at the Ershad regime, but privately said that it would be extremely difficult to organise any effective movement on such a sensitive issue.⁹¹ However, Abdur Razzak, GS of the BKSAL, said that the new Act would 'negate the spirit of the liberation struggle' and 'I think we can mount an effective movement to force the government to withdraw the bill.'⁹² A well known poet and agnostic who asked not to be named, told the FEER correspondent: 'Jackfruit is our national fruit but we are not obliged to eat it everyday... so let the state religion safely be tucked in its exalted position. How does it matter?''⁹³

The intellectuals agreed that no special honour would be shown to country's predominant religion by making Islam as state religion. At this stage, there were not many people appeared ready to risk alienating people by contesting the move of the dictator. Actually there were no strong movement launched outside the JS by any of the three main opposition alliances against the decisive measures of the dictator accepting making some statements and organising few demonstrations. According to Rangalal Sen, 'the making of Islam the state religion of the Muslim majority of Bangladesh only further alienated the non-Muslim minorities from the socio-political life of the nation. It may be argued that the failure to organise any effective movement against the passing of the state religion bill on the part of the mainstream opposition forces only demonstrated their fragile commitment to upholding secularism which was one of the state principles enshrined in the constitution of 1972. It is sometimes said that the people belonging to the major religious group did not demand that Islam should be made state religion. It is also equally true that the people did not oppose it openly. What really happened politicians and professionals appeared to be helpless and seemed to be shy in this delicate issue.'⁹⁴ However, the diplomatic missions in Dhaka felt that an Islamic constitution could possibly hurt the government and they predicted that a fundamentalist could question the government policy in future on the grounds that it did not confront with Islamic Sharia (Law). Since there were no strong protests against the state religion bill from the political elites, some secular and progressive intellectuals of the country formed an organisation called '*Swairachar-Sampradayikata Pratirudh Parishad*' (Council for Resisting Autocracy and Communalism) which on 2 June 1988 declared its sincere desire to defeat despotism and to maintain communal harmony at any cost. In a protest on 10 June 1988, they warned the dictator that the amendment would result in 'religious extremism and discrimination' (against minority groups),

obstruct intellectual freedom and ultimately put medieval restrictions on the rights of women.⁹⁵ In addition to that the *Hindu-Buddha-Christian Oikya Parishad* (Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council—HBCUC) also came into being which had indirect patronage and support from the secular and non-communal elements belonging to major religious group of Bangladesh society.⁹⁶

The minorities, secularists and womens' organisations of the country had also roundly criticised the move of the dictator. The different women groups thought that the law was unnecessary and could even erode the rights of women. The minorities argued that the move would negate the spirit of liberation war, which was fought by all citizens regardless of their religious identity. Despite repeated assurances of the dictator that the new law would not affect the minority communities, non-Muslims of the country appeared deeply concerned. Secular Muslims of the society seemed to be thoughtful that the move was uncalled for in a country where more than 87% of the population are Muslims, Hindu less than 10%, with Christians and Buddhist making up the rest. The HBCUC organised several protest meetings and managed to stage a march on JS, where 20000 demonstrators handed a petition to the Speaker. The petition said, "declaration of Islam as the only state religion will result in destroying national unity, curtail equal rights of other communities and even encourage them to take separatist stands."⁹⁷ The Christian churches led by the Archbishop of Dhaka, Michael Rozerio, and Bishop Barnabas Mondal of the Church of Bangladesh ran a front page advertisement in an English language Daily appealing to the President, government leaders and MPs to reconsider the move to 'preserve the patrimony of independent Bangladesh'.⁹⁸ Independent MP Nurul Islam Moni in the JS, asked: "will the corrupt give up taking bribes after the Bill is passed? Will everyone become religious? Will all become angels? And he added, 'Are you sure you are not creating Move problems?'"⁹⁹

Among the problems the new law would create was the fear of the rise of fundamentalism and curbing the rights of women. The women's bodies argued that the new law is unnecessary as it was well served by the 1937 legislation on Muslim personal law incorporating aspects of the religious Shariah (Islamic law). They were also deeply frustrated at the half hearted protests mounted by the mainline opposition parties and termed that the opposition leaders had chickened out because of the fear that any concerted protest against the Bill could be used by dictator to claim that the opposition was agitating against Islam itself. Various women organisations including the United Women's Forum, National Women's Lawyer Association, *Jatyo Mahila Parishad* (National Women Council), and *Nari Pakhya* (Women Sides) continued to protest so that any attempts at introducing fundamentalist laws, especially those discriminating against women, became frustrated. Sigma Huda, GS of the NWLA told that 'she had never believed that

Bangladesh would become officially an Islamic country, but that process had just started.”¹⁰⁰ The United Women’s Forum organised a number of rallies and procession led by well known poets and authors including Begum Sufia Kamal and Nilima Ibrahim, but it failed to dislodge the administration from its chosen path. Though communal harmony had been maintained with no major communal disturbance since the riots in 1964, the reports of wide spread insecurity was being exaggerated. But the rumble of a united opposition movement to unseat the dictator had turned into a whimper of protest unity, totally demoralising the political activists. As a result, the danger of the fundamentalist factions reviving communal forces was not ruled out.

Although the half day *hartal* called by the 7-party alliance and the JIB on 28 November 1988 was successful, the various opposition groupings remained as divided as ever. The last *hartal* was ignored by the two other major opposition alliances—8-party and 5-party alliances, and thus neither marked a revival of last year’s popular anti-dictator protest nor proved there was wide support for the BNP led 7 party alliance. The close link of the BNP with the anti-liberation force and fundamentalist JIB had widened the rift between itself and two other opposition alliances. A left wing activist said, “it was clear from past *hartals* that such actions can not effectively change the government and people were increasingly feeling that suffering” and added “it is a waste of time and energy.”¹⁰¹

The Constitutional (9th Amendment) Act passed hurriedly on 6 July 1989 that limited a President to two elected terms of five years each and creating the post of an elected Vice-President that came into effect from 1st March 1990. Predictably, the mainstream opposition reacted sharply to the Bill and described it as a step to prolong the rule of the dictator. The BNP described the present government as illegal and said it had no right to amend the constitution. Sheikh Hasina of the AL said, “when the nation is continuing the mass movement to remove the present regime from power and establish a democratic government through a free and fair election, this amendment has been moved to perpetuate the rule of the present autocratic regime.”¹⁰² Dr Kamal Hossain of the AL described the amendment as ‘contemptuous not only of the constitution of the republic but also of the people as well as of democracy’. A former Attorney-General and President of the SCBA, Barrister Syed Istiaq Ahmed said that it was a clever attempt by the government to ‘confuse the people’. It should be importantly mentioned here, in the amendment debate, Ali Ashgar Khan, a retired Major, and an independent MP even suggested that the Army Chief of Staff should be made the Vice-President of the country to remove any apprehensions of a violent army take over.¹⁰³ In August 1989, while the elevation of Moudud Ahmed to Vice-President had not been entirely unexpected the unceremonious ousting of retired High Court judge Nurul Islam from the Vice-

presidency and the appointment of Kazi Zafar Ahmed as PM had sparked a row within the ruling JP.¹⁰⁴ In fact, the dictator never did care about the provisions of the constitution and had already established his desires and orders to be treated as the laws and constitution of the country.

The anti-autocracy movement remained disorganised throughout 1989. Early in this year, Moulana Delwar Hussain Saeedi, a self-styled Muslim fundamentalist leader of the JIB, had enraged large segments of the Muslim clergy because of his unorthodox interpretation of the Holy Quran. As a result, he had become one of the most quoted personalities in the national press. Saeedi was invited to attend a religious meeting in the early January 1989 in Chittagong by Tafsirul Quran, a body devoted to discussions on Islamic matters. The meeting acquired distinct political overtones. He reportedly accused government and secular opposition leaders of letting women out in the street, which claimed was eroding Islamic values.¹⁰⁵ He targeted mainly, among other, the opposition women leaders i.e. the AL President Sheikh Hasina and the BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia. He also accused government ministers of shaking hands with women to 'please their sexual instinct'. Saeedi went on openly to argue those present in the meeting to join the JIB and the BICS, its student wing.

The provocations of Saeedi led to citywide *hartal* in Chittagong for several days by anti-JIB forces, which included the AL and its allies, leftwing 5-party alliance, the Freedom Fighters Association and all national level student organisations. The JIB supporters and their opponents were involved in violent clashes on the streets in Chittagong. There was also another reason for the violence against JIB. A few days before its surrender on 16 December 1971, the Pakistan Army worked out a plan for the large scale killing of Bengali intellectuals. As the active collaborators with the Pakistan Army at that time, the JIB implemented the plan ruthlessly. Large numbers of mutilated bodies of executed Bengali intellectuals were found at Rayer Bazaar *Baddah Bhumi* in Dhaka on 14 December 1971, the day has since then been observed as the 'Intellectual Martyr's Day'. Sheikh Hasina in her statement called upon the people to unite against increased provocation from the fundamentalist and anti-liberation forces. She warned the anti-liberation forces to watch their words, 'otherwise, people will tear off (their) tongues'.¹⁰⁶ The political analysts of the country pointed out that strong measures were not used against Saeedi and his party because they were actively supported by the Saudi and Middle East countries, which were also a major donor to Bangladesh. It was reported that the Macca-based non-official humanitarian body, Rabita-ab-Alamal-Islame, which was currently raising funds to repatriate some 250,000 stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh, used its influence to push for Saeedi's participation at the meeting in Chittagong.¹⁰⁷ The JIB had gained considerable strength in recent years despite

opposition from secular parties and rival religious groupings. The mainline opposition alliances were disunited and individual parties were toned by factionalism that had strengthened the JIB argument in the minds of people that it deserved to wield power for its so called Islamic approach to national problems.

In the second week of September 1989, the 8th amendment to constitution, which was passed on 9 June 1988 for judicial reforms, received a block when the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court declared ultra-vies a constitutional amendment that would have allowed the creation of permanent High Court branches outside Dhaka. The ruling had restored article 100 of the constitution, which stated that 'the permanent seat of the Supreme Court shall be in the capital, but sessions of the High Court division may be held at such other place or places as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the President from time to time, appoint.'¹⁰⁸ The legal battle began soon after the passages of the amendment by parliament. The original writ by three private citizens challenging the constitutional validity of the amendment bill was dismissed by the High Court. But the appeal was supported by some leading lawyers of Bangladesh including President of the SCBA, Barrister Syed Istiaq Ahmed and Dr Kamal Hossain. Kamal Hossain, giving his reaction, said, "the judgement is a milestone in the history of constitution and it is a victory of the people who want to live under constitutional rule.....the case involved two parties-one is favour of constitutional rule and other desirous of disrupting it by arms and forces". Istiak Ahmed said that the verdict proved we are capable of discharging our constitutional responsibilities.¹⁰⁹ However, political observers believed the court verdict was unlikely to lead to any major political changes in the country, given the absence of a united opposition movement. Not surprisingly, opposition political parties were delighted by the verdict calling it a major victory for their movement against what they called the 'undemocratic measures' taken by the parliament whose election the opposition boycotted last year.

It seemed in the last week of September 1989 that the opposition parties had transferred their battle from street to court. Four writ petitions, in which three challenging the 8th amendment that established the Islam as state religion and other challenging certain provisions of 9th amendment passed by the parliament in last July, were awaiting the courts' decision. The Supreme Court judgement in early September affecting the 8th amendment did not touch on the state religion provisions of the amendment. The three writ petitions challenging the declaration of Islam as the state religion were filed by lawyer Shakti Das Goswami, *Naripakhya*, a women's rights organisation and *Nagarik* (citizens) Committee, an organisation comprising the prominent personalities of Dhaka city. The writ petition challenging the 9th amendment's contingency provision filed by former ambassador Abdul Barek MP was being supported by the lawyers belonging to the contingency provision: "if for

any reason the President can not discharge his functions, parliament is automatically summoned the next day to make alternative arrangements. After that the parliament stands dissolved or prorogued as the case may be,'¹¹⁰ critics maintained, would be used to legitimate the coup through this provision. In the mean time, the lawyers of the opposition AL were planning to challenge the 5th amendment passed on 6 April 1979, which gave legal force to all proclamations and martial law regulations set out by the governments of the day between 15 August 1975 and 5 April 1979. The AL lawyers were seeking to remove the provision of the amendment only that prohibited the trial of those responsible for killing the founding father of the country, *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.¹¹¹

The opposition political parties were disorganised through out the year 1989. The clash between BCL and JCD in the Dhaka University campus and gun battles, bombings and killings of the members of rival student factions had become almost routine affairs in the universities. A report showed that a total of 116 students were killed on the campuses in 1971-1987 when student riots took place during this period, injuring thousands and leaving many crippled for life. Some 219 rooms in the student dormitories and 12 houses and shops were burned in clashes between rival student groupings. In late September 1989, police raided DU dormitories and seized large quantities of modern weapons and arresting 33 JCD supporters. The VC of the University issued a statement holding the BNP and its leader Begum Zia responsible for campus casualties. The student body of AL in the opposition received similar treatment in the early October 1989 when police arrested 29 supporters of the BCL and confiscated large quantity of arms. The AL President Sheikh Hasina insisted that campus should be made violence free by ensuring that no weapons could slip into the area. A university teacher told the FEER that October action had seemingly restored the balance of forces within the campus, but also provided rival students with the steps to be united against the dictator. However, the police raid was 'only the tips of the iceberg.....much of the arms have been moved elsewhere or are lying in other halls.'¹¹² The violence in student politics had been a recent event under the auspices of the military intelligence—tactful handling to destroy the image of glorious student politics, which represented a remorseful degeneration of original political activity of the students in Bangladesh society. The students' bodies had a vanguard role in the 1950-60s in helping to evolve democratic values that glorified the national liberation struggle of the nation. The political analyst argued that the student groups under military regime had become the appendage of their parent political parties and the tools to orchestrate political manoeuvres of these parties.¹¹³ However, the dictator made a comment—making him a laughing stock—that 'the son who was sent to the university for building a career was returning home as a dead body' and said in crocodile tears: 'What a

shock to the parents who sold their land or livestock for financing the son's education'.¹¹⁴ But it nothing was done by his administration to prevent the violence in the campus. It was clearly understood that the students were the major threat to the dictator that led him to employ his all efforts to disunity of the opposition student leaders. The violence among the student bodies in the campus was popularly believed as a part of the blueprint by military intelligence so that the uniformed student movement could not be launched against the dictator.

7.10. The Mass Uprising of 1990 and the Removal of the Dictator

The movement for restoration of democracy could not make any further headway until the middle of 1990. It was only the month of June and July of 1990 that some sort of unity and understanding were restored within the three main opposition alliances. The various cultural and professional groups became united and urged the opposition political alliances to formulate a realistic programme for removing the dictator from power in the shortest possible time. In a seminar held at Chittagong on 28 September 1990 under the *Mukta Forum* (open forum), this idea was categorically communicated to some central leaders belonging to three alliances. The dictator, in late May 1990, announced his candidacy for the next Presidential election with Moudud Ahmed as Vice-President running mate. In this situation the main opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia had, on occasions, managed to put aside their past differences to forge united movement. The dictator had caused further confusion by telling his JP officials that major opposition parties would take part in the presidential polls and he was looking forward to having a strong opponent. The BNP chief Begum Zia repeated her demand that the election should be held under neutral government while the AL chief Sheikh Hasina had described the candidature of Ershad as a 'bluff' and demanded the prior holding of JS elections which currently were scheduled for early 1993. But the past record of AL to participate in the election of 1986 made its credibility suspect. The BNP which had been more consistent in its demand had yet to announce its course of actions and was then taking to other political parties to coordinate its programme. In June 1990, the dictator in a recent party address criticised the previous regime of the opposition AL,¹¹⁵ however, spared the BNP from criticism on this occasion, which prompted the AL to accuse the BNP of conniving with the dictator. This seemed likely a tactics of the dictator to keep the two opposition groups on the wrong-foot.

However, the three main opposition alliances after a long time organised a 'Secretariat Siege' on 10th October 1990 that resulted in 5 killings including some students by police shooting on the participants. It should be pointed out here that it was the students who joined this opposition action in large numbers. They forcibly took away from the hands of the police the dead body of a fellow student named

Nazir Hossain Jihad of Ullapara College, Sirajgonj and held a mourning rally at the foot of 'APARAJEYA BANGLA'¹¹⁶ in the premises of Arts Building of the University of Dhaka that attended by national leaders where Sheikh Hasina conducted the oath to the students at the rally who stood besides the dead body of Jihad.¹¹⁷ The move to develop a solid anti-dictator opposition suffered a jolt, when a terrorist JCD cadre named Danny brought out a knife to hurt the AL chief Sheikh Hasina who ended the speech with her party slogan 'JOY BANGLA'¹¹⁸ (win for Bangla)—a slogan largely used for inspiration of the freedom fighters in the country's liberation war of 1971—at this APSU gatherings. The leaders of the mainstream opposition were still hesitating to take this killings issue in forging a united movement against the dictator, which was clinched by the APSU leaders. On the other hand, the student wings of respective political parties announced their combined actions to dethrone the dictator since the formation of the APSU. They called on the two key opposition leaders—Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia for unity disregarding their past differences in order to throw out the dictator regime. They warned: "otherwise [two leaders'] offices will be seized by the students to force them to unite".¹¹⁹

The APSU on 11 October 1990 called a half day *hartal* through out the country. Almost all the top leaders of the APSU were injured with police attack at Shahabugh crossing, a place adjacent to the north of the Dhaka University, when they were organising a protest rally and sent to the hospitals. In protest against this police atrocity on the procession, the students burned scored of cars and stormed and ransacked the Atomic Energy Commission Office adjacent to Dhaka University, after police shot on the student marches. The response of the dictator to turmoil was dismissive and very rough and ready, when he commented: "a sit-in of a few thousand people in a city of 7 million people can not change the government."¹²⁰ It was out of the ordinary to note here that in this critical juncture of the movement, all the political, cultural, professional alliances and groups came very close to the APSU which began to demonstrate it's pre-eminence in the current political situation of the country as if they became a deciding factor for the success of struggle that carried on for the last nine years against the junta. However, there was another mammoth rally held in the Dhaka University campus on 13 October 1990 to protest the murder of Moniruzzaman, a student of Dhaka Polytechnic Institute at which the mainline opposition leaders also attended and gave their unanimous support to the students' actions.

In this situation the dictator adopted two different strategies simultaneously to stop the tide of this vigorous student movement. First, the dictator in the Gazette Notification dated 13 October 1990 promulgated the Educational Institutions (Law and Order) Ordinance, 1990 by which it closed down the educational institutions of

Dhaka city at different levels including the University of Dhaka.¹²¹ Second, it tried hard to win over some influential student leaders by any means so that the unity established among the various student organisations could be impaired. The military intelligence of the dictator used the ideological and organisational differences between the components of the APSU. But all of those evil designs of the dictator were disclosed in an official document.¹²² There was an adverse reaction to the closure of all educational institutions of Dhaka city among the conscious section of its population. Dr Kamal Hossain, a prominent lawyer, challenged the ordinance of the government in the court. The teachers of the University of Dhaka demanded its opening immediately. Otherwise, they threatened to open the University themselves. In fact, they had to do so by taking classes on 11 November 1990 in order to safeguard the autonomy of the University in the utter disregard of the said prohibitive ordinance of the government with great indignation against the alleged connivance of the VC of the University at it.¹²³ At this stage of the movement, as many as 14 teachers associations forged unity and formed the 'Combined Teacher's Movement'. The teachers of all levels were thus drawn into the political movement of the country.¹²⁴ The APSU organised a mammoth rally in front of the Educational Ministry Building at the Secretariat on 25 October 1990 to protest against the new ordinance.

It was evident that the urban middle class became more active and bold enough against the dictator as the movement achieved greater momentum in Dhaka, which had a profound impact upon the agitating masses of other big and small towns including divisional cities of Chittagong, Rajshahi and Khulna. On account of the continuous strikes and wide spread agitations through out the country, the administration of the dictator appeared to have collapsed in October 1990. When the dictator failed to distract the rising student movement in spite of its various tricky steps, it let loose the anti-social elements to create communal frenzy as a reaction to the heinous attack on the historic Babri Mosque by the Hindu fundamentalist forces in India. The destructions of temples and looting of properties in Hindu houses in the different parts of Bangladesh included Dhaka and Chittagong for at least 3 days from 31 October to 1-2 November 1990. But the tactics of the dictator could not be successful. Rather people joined the anti-autocracy movement in large numbers in a more conscious and determined way.

At this stage of the movement, the students and political leaders undertook countrywide tours in order to maintain communal harmony and to spread the movement to the grassroots rural masses. There was serious clash between police and students on 4 November 1990 at the Gulistan Square in the capital in which as many as 15 prominent student leaders were seriously injured. The APSU took a vow in a very sentimental voice by saying that they would not go home before the

removal of the dictator. The 8-party alliance chief Sheikh Hasina, in a well attended public meeting at '*Panth Path*' of Dhaka city on 6 November 1990, explicitly stated the constitutional provisions to removal of the dictator under which a Caretaker Government could also be formed for free and fair elections. On 19 November 1990 the three main alliances published the historic 'Joint Declaration'¹²⁵ in which the outlines of the removal of the dictator, holding of sovereign parliament elections under the interim government, and the establishment of the government by elected representatives in the country were clearly defined. The administration of the dictator, for the first time, became really perturbed, when the joined declaration by the opposition was published.

The dictator was particularly concerned in this time by the unusual unity among the student bodies of the various opposition political parties of the country. These groups had even threatened their own political leaders that they would take the movement into their own hands if the parent parties did not unite to oust the dictator. The military intelligence had tried to split the APSU during the movement in October and November 1990. The administration of the dictator used many anti-social elements including some armed student hooligans who were expelled then from the JCD for their alleged linkage with the junta administration that turned the Dhaka University campus into battle field on 25 November 1990. The dictator said that a 'foreign country', a euphemism for India, was involved in conspiracy to destabilise his regime which was dismissed hurriedly by all opposition parties. In the mean time, a retired army officer on 20 November 1990 attacked the cantonment house of the BNP chief Begum Zia and assaulted her son and two servants. The BNP condemned the incident as an attempt on its leader's life. At a rally held after this incident, Begum Zia, for the first time, accused Ershad of being involved in the death of her husband—General Ziaur Rahman. It was reported that the army officer was the DGFI chief during Zia regime and was very close to the Zia's family. Although *The Banglar Bani*, a Bengali daily, presented a photograph of attesting two family's members closely on the occasion of a picnic party, this incident created a large reaction in the people's sentiment and added new dimension to anti-autocracy movement.

The APSU announced a '*Chattra-Gono Jamayet*' (student-people's gathering) on 25 November 1990 in the afternoon at the Zero Point (presently Nur Hussain Square) in the Capital. But the Dhaka University campus became a battle field from the morning. The armed student hooligans backed by the DGFI—the military intelligence—of the dictator, attacked the APSU rally held at the foot of APARAJEYA BANGLA and were being resisted by the thousands of the APSU supporters. After two hours battle, the armed hooligans were defeated and compelled to leave the campus through a safe way created secretly by military patrol.

In the afternoon, when the students were preparing themselves in organising the announced rally at Zero Point, the armed activists again attacked on the students from the side of the Bangla Academy premises and Curzon Hall, the way by which thousands of students were going to student-peoples gathering at Zero Point. The APSU and the general students were resisting them until they were leaving the area at 10 pm. In this clash, Kanai Shil, a TSC tea stall keeper was killed and many students were injured including the researcher himself sent to the hospitals. In protest, the APSU had called a *hartal* on 26 November in Dhaka and other cities. In fear of this huge students resistance, the ruling JP postponed its own rally in the capital.

On 27 November 1990, Dr. Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, joint-Secretary of the BMA, was seriously injured by the bullets of unknown armed gangster near the TSC crossing in the Dhaka University campus who died later on the day at DMCH. The professional bodies of the country, especially the medical doctors in all government and non-government hospitals, became furious with this killing and turned into an indefinite strike throughout the country and demanded the immediate resignation of the dictator. In the evening of 27 November 1990, the dictator in an unscheduled address on the state owned TV proclaimed a state of emergency, a draconian measure in an attempt to suppress the movements throughout the country. He said that he was taking the measures, in his word, to 'preserve national security and save the national economy from the clutches of violence and destructive politics'¹²⁶ of the opposition. The ordinance, which went into effect soon after the proclamation suspended civil rights and banned all processions, meetings, rallies, demonstrations, strikes and lock outs. Under this emergency powers' ordinance 1990, the dictator imposed press censorship stating that it would 'control the receiving and sending of news through post, radio, telegram, telex and telephone. The curfews were imposed for an indefinite period, along with the capital city of Dhaka and port-city of Chittagong, in the major cities of the country. The state owned TV also announced that all the school, colleges and universities of the country would remain closed for a month. As troops moved to impose the curfew in Dhaka on 27 November 1990, the students of the Dhaka University had broken the curfew and came out of the campus shouting: "we do not accept emergency" and "down, down with Ershad."¹²⁷ Large numbers of students and common men of Dhaka paraded the city streets protesting the proclamation of the state of emergency. The people in this time staged demonstrations against the arrest of Sheikh Hasina, when she was moved from her house into detention. There were several clashes between the protesters and the police in different parts of the country. The union of journalists stopped publication of news papers in protest. The union of Dhaka University teachers announced their resignation in a body on 29 November 1990 in front of the APARAJEYA BANGLA.

Many government officials also threatened to resign. In this respect, it was rather surprising to see that a patriotic part of the police forces in a secret circular expressed their total solidarity with the people who were fighting for the restoration of democracy in the country. It was also more astonishing to know that in an extended meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) Association on 3 December 1990 had adopted certain resolutions in favour of the mass movement against the autocratic regime of General Ershad. At least 100 civil servants including some top officials also resigned demanding the resignation of the dictator. The bureaucrats held their own demonstration chanting: “we will not serve under Ershad.”¹²⁸ The mainstream political leaders utilised the situation adroitly by showing their astuteness, which was reflected in their appeal to the Army, BDR and Police so that these regular forces remained restrained in dealing with the struggling masses.¹²⁹ In this situation, the government machinery was practically paralysed. The strikes and demonstrations severed roads, rails and air links in the country and the normal business came to a standstill in the capital and the port city of Chittagong. The security forces that had fired on demonstrations in the previous week stood by and watched everything in silence when crowds of thousands masses chanted anti-Ershad slogans in the capital on 4 December 1990. In this situation, supporting the popular feeling, 19 MPs of the ruling JP including Deputy Prime Minister MA Matin resigned their seats.

7.11. The Departure of a Military Tyranny—the Arrest of General Ershad

The dictator was known to have hurriedly consulted with the key Generals as the mass movement continued on 4 December 1990. It was reported that the top Generals were unwilling to take over as the mass revolution achieved the power to put at risk the survival of whole military institution. There were rumours spread throughout the capital that the dictator was planning to flee the country and thousands of opposition supporters converged at the Dhaka airport ostensibly to abstain him from leaving the country. The Generals thought that if Ershad fled or were allowed to leave, they would have been in a worse situation to maintain law and order as well as it would place at risk of ring leaders of the military takeover. In the event, the early resignation was only available option for the dictator. In this grave moment, the dictator announced on national television on the night of 4 December 1990 that ‘he would resign as soon as the opposition alliance named the successor’. ‘The ball’, Ershad declared ‘is now in the opposition’s court.’¹³⁰ The decision of Ershad was welcomed by two key opposition leaders—Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. Both of them, who had their own ambitions heading the future government hailed it as a ‘people’s victory’. But since the previous week had seen

so much violence, they called on the people to maintain calm and not jeopardise the political process. Under the proposed plan, the Vice-President Moudud Ahmed would resign to help the parliament, which was scheduled to be convened on 8 December 1990 to name another candidate. Upon the election of the new Vice-President, Ershad would hand over the power to him. The mainstream opposition lost no time in responding to the challenge.

The imminent departure of the dictator from the office of the President was celebrated on 6 December 1990 by millions of democracy loving people of Bangladesh when they paraded the streets of the capital and all over the country. According to the joint declaration of the three alliances, the opposition leaders nominated the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr Shahabuddin Ahmed to head a caretaker government until the national elections to be held in early next year. The successor of the dictator hailed the ousting of dictator as 'the victory of democracy' and called on the countrymen to 'build up democratic institutions and establish the rule of law'. For a moment, however, the opposition seemed to be more bent on punishing the dictator and his associates. In a public statement, the opposition leaders demanded to the interim government to seize the passport of Ershad, freeze his bank accounts and place him on trial for alleged corruption. The opposition demanded that the dictator must be held for substantial misuse of his power during the nine year reigns. The BNP chief Begum Zia said, "we want a trial of those who committed crimes, atrocities and injustices during the last nine years" and the AL President Sheikh Hasina said, "we want the fair elections that Ershad could never give, he has resigned, and the nation is relieved of a stifling situation. It has been once again proved that people's power is stronger than bullets."¹³¹ Under the pressure of the militant opposition supporters, the interim government on 9 December 1990 arrested the dictator and detained in a resident at Gulshan in the capital which was declared later on as sub-jail and was shifted to central jail after a few days under the pressure of people's demand. The bullet of the assassin military coup leaders fell down the founding father of the country—Bangabandhu, and several military coups toppled others, however, the people's power brought down the General Ershad—the last foot-step of military terrorism in nearly 20 years of the nationhood. Thus the black chapter of nine years regime of the dictator came to an end and the ground was prepared for the restoration of the democracy in Bangladesh. According to the editor of the independent weekly, 'Holiday': "it took over eight years to eliminate only one element of authoritarian state power namely personal rule. Now Bangladesh must look ahead to life after Ershad. Transition under an interim government, and subsequent democratic revival, will have to be undertaken painstakingly and patiently."¹³²

7.12. Conclusion

Bangladesh, a poor country with limited wealth fighting with its huge problems in socio-economic and demographic life, was pushed into political struggle by its military in an attempt to tear down the rule of democracy. The nine years of military rule of General Ershad from 1982 to 1990 was indeed the darkest episode in the history of post independent Bangladesh in terms of killings and injuries, arrests and warrants, lies and blunders, corruptions and plundering, and degradations of moral values of the society that all together triggered the annihilation of liberty, equality and freedom of the nation. The period was regarded as the hoard of heroic stories of the thousands of political activists who sacrificed their lives and limbs to guns, times and tides to prison and embraced huge trouncing of their social life at the trance to establish a dream worthy democratic society for the people of Bangladesh. This movement of the people was non-stop since the aggression of the military took place—a dragon tyranny theft the peoples' wisdom; a servant institution began to destroy its master's institutions—government, parliament, elections, bureaucracy and political parties etc, and was, however, never defeated under curfew, and was always unlocked to ban; appeared to be win over the bullets, tanks, gas, batons and prisons, and even a civilian hooliganism under the patronisation of military itself—could not be able to hold back the peaceful and huge upsurge of masses ardent for democracy. The students were the first vanguard element of this society who embarked on this resistance as well as a great mode of their contribution essentially merited the removal of the military junta. The dictator took many ill-tactics—what these militia men do elsewhere to sustain the power. In his nine years malice and repressive rule, he started with ban on political activities under Martial Law regulations—setting the guns to the back of the innocent people, imprisoning the thousands of political leaders, took some times to collect his civilian plunderers and played some drama of indoor and open door and dilemma of dialogue politics. This also included some staging of the political show—the announcement and cancellation of election dates to consume the times until he completed to collect some *mastans*, robbers and hooligans to rigging the polling centres throughout the country. Bangladesh saluted those of her heroic sons who sacrificed their lives and limbs and lost their valuable times and tides in uprooting the draconian military dictatorship of General Ershad—the most oppressing despotism on her heart—that opened the vast sky of the freedom of mankind—a realm of democratic society.

Notes

¹ The first time robbed of the constitutional government was occurred in the wake of military coup in August 1975 following the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of independent Bangladesh nation, the black event which later had followed a visible rise of the military rule of General Ziaur Rahman.

² The term military gangsters would be more appropriate to use here as the military men using their bulk of arms and ammunitions did the huge crimes to innocent mankind. In sense, they robbed the state power and snatched the ability of free thoughts and choice of the people of Bangladesh.

³ The 'Education Day' on 17 September had been observing every year since 17 September 1962. On that day a number of students including Babul and Wajiullah were shot dead by police in Dhaka, the capital of the then Eastern wing of Pakistan. The students brought out processions in protest of the proposed Education Policy by Justice Hamidur Rahman Education Commission. In the ensuing milieu, the then Pakistan Government was compelled to reject the report of the Commission. For details, see, Rafikul Islam, in Bengali, *Shoiro Shasoner Naya Bochor*, (The Nine Years of the Autocratic Rule), UPL, Dhaka, 1991, p.17

⁴ The education advisor of the military junta Dr Majid Khan announced new education policy of the country on 24th September 1982. The main dispute of the education policy was to make Arabic compulsory at the primary level, which was protested by all most all student organisations of the country, who were struggling to establish a non-communal democratic values in all stages of the society.

⁵ Rangalal Sen, "The Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh: A Theoretical Framework and Social Background" 1994 ..p.22

⁶ Longman, *Kessings Contemporary Archives: Records of World Events*, Volume XXX1, p. 32918

⁷ See *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 24, 1983 pp.14-15

⁸ See *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 24, 1983 p.15

⁹ Longman, *op.cit*, p.32918

¹⁰ The information is given by Sheikh Hasina who later became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 1996 in a personal interview with the researcher in April 2003

¹¹ For details of their demand, see, *The Weekly Bichitra*, 14 January 1983, p.14

¹² See *The Bangladesh Times*, 11 October, 1982

¹³ The 'indoor politics' may be defined as a kind of controlled political activities under military order which allowed existing opposition political parties to work only at home. They were allowed to arrange in-house meetings and to hold discussions among the top-level leaders of the parties. They were not allowed to organise any action in the street.

¹⁴ On the first day of the indoor politics, the offices of the small and big political parties were picturesque. There were limited activities of the indoor politics in which the main function was an extended meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the BNP. The JSD organised a workers meetings in their office and the ML arranged the same meeting at the auditorium of the IEB. The Workers Party, Labour Party, Republican Party, Nikhil Bangladesh Muslim League, Samyabadi Dal and JIB also held their meetings of the Central Executive Committees. For details, see the Daily Ittefaq, 2nd April 1983, pp.1-6

¹⁵ *The Bangladesh Observer*, (a national daily), March 2, March 20, 1983

¹⁶ Mr Khondhoker Mustaque Ahmed was in charge of Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Government in exile during liberation war in 1971 and was known as an extreme rightwing political leader in the factional politics of Bangladesh Awami League. He captured the office of the President with the killing of Bangabandhu Sheik Mujib in a military coup on 15 August 1975. For details of the formation of pro-Islamic 11-Parties alliance, see *The Daily Sangram*, 10 April 1983

¹⁷ See *The Weekly Bichitra*, 27 May 1983, p.12

¹⁸ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Promise and Promise", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 July 1983, p.30

¹⁹ For details activities and the formation of the *Nutaun Bangla Chatra Samaj*, see the *Weekly Bichitra*, 15 April 1983, pp.15-16 and 27 May 1983, p.15

²⁰ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 15 November 1983

²¹ See *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 September 1983

²² Like all other military dictators' attempts around the world to give a legal cover of their rules under voter less election frauds, the Bangladesh military gangster was also found to be serious to hold that kind of elections to run his acceptance to the international communities.

²³ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 30 November 1983. See also, Syed Kamal Uddin, "Thrust Counter Thrust", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 December 1983 p.31

²⁴ Rangalal Sen *op-cit*, p-24

²⁵ Longman, *Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Record of World Events*, 1984, Vol. XXX P-32918

²⁶ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 8 January 1984

²⁷ Syed Kamal Uddin, "A tactical withdraw", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 January, 1984, pp.22-23. The Review reported the situation of local elections in a village named *Harvait*, 18 miles away from the capital and showed: "twelve villagers are contesting the Chairman post-three of them

are AL candidates. The candidates were also found too busy campaigning to pay much attention to the November protests in Dhaka'. It might be the strategy of the AL to contest the local elections to spread out the anti-junta movement among the grass root masses. However, The FEER reported that the local elections had been received enthusiastically by voters and that for the moment villagers were not interested in the opposition's political programmes, which seemed to have had strengthened the position of military dictator. Even the AL chief Sheikh Hasina conceded to the Review before the local elections began, 'that is the reason why we are not taking about boycotting the local elections'.

²⁸ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Opposition road block", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 March 1984, p.14

²⁹ Tajul Islam passed MA from the University of Dhaka in 1973 and belonged to the residential student of Sergeant Jahurul Haque Hall. In his student life he was devoted activist of the pro-CPB Bangladesh Chatra Union (BCU). He was married with two children while he was shot dead. His wife was a teacher of Primary School. For his details, see *The Dainik Desh*, 2nd March 1984, pp. 1-2

³⁰ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 19 March 1984

³¹ Syed Kamal Uddin "Ershad's Juggling act", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 April 1984, p.36

³² Arnold Zetlin, "A taboo subject Comes out of the closet and in to the open", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 May 1984, pp. 62-63. In May 1984, there was a serious pinnacle discussion on some debates in history-'Mujib: ratting skeletons' in the intellectual level as well as in the political leaders' emotional worthy speeches. It all happened at a meeting at Dhaka University called to debate on the book 'Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman' by Mr Moudud Ahmed, the former Deputy Prime Minister under Zia Government. Arnold Zetlin quoted the annotations of Mr Moudud Ahmed on Far Eastern Economic Review that Sheikh Mujib, the founding father of Bangladesh, should be regarded as the 'phenomenon of history' while Mr Anwar Zahid, executive editor of the Bangladesh Times, felt 'he should be seen as a freak'. But it was so much sharp contrast to their views that raised the major interest in the exchange the way they were expressed in publicly. It should be worth mentioning here that these two people who commented on country's founding father were linked to every military aggression in the post independent history of Bangladesh. However, the cabinet ministers, retired ministers, retired generals, economists, journalists and professor presented hard public discussion on what virtually had become a taboo subject-the history of Bangladesh since the former East Pakistan Province was wrenched from Pakistan in 1971. After years of embarrassed silence, the history of the independence movement and subsequent event was finally being given a public airing.³² General Ershad had a point to make his remark illustrated in part why references to history again had become pertinent in Bangladesh and why they tended to be dangerous. As the Bangladesh Today reported it: "Ershad recounted events from Bangladesh's brief history to prove that it was professional politicians who had destroyed democracy while the military stepped in only one -in March 1982 when Ershad seized power in a coup d' etat-to save the country from sliding in to chaos". 'Ershad said it was a shame that while Mujib's body lay bleeding the latter's former colleague was gleefully taking the presidential oath at Banga Bhaban' (Presidential Palace). This was a bizarre statement and served to polarize groups effectively and 'it now appears that the General's plan to rehabilitate the country's history'. Deeply affected by Bangladesh's bloody history of two coups and two assassinations of heads of state, Ershad had used such references to justify his repeated demand that Bangladesh military must have constitutional role in governing the country.³² In Bangladesh many as Ershad observed had much to explain their behaviour. And this was one reason in the open discussion on Bangladesh's history particularly the Mujib's episode 'can be dangerous: it rattles too many skeletons in too many cupboards'. Although it may have produced some substances for Sigmund Freud's theory on the tendency of societies eventually to slay their father figures, Mujib and his murder did provoke relief, grief and guilt. 'What kind of people Mujib relied upon.... became clear only after his death'. Moudud wrote in his book: "the character of these comrades remained no longer unknown once Mujib was killed. Despite his failure and mistakes, Mujib's return to Bangladesh in itself saved the new country from further and perpetual subjugation.³² 'Had Mujib been killed by the Pakistan Janta, he would have been immortal.... but in that case the cost to the people in physical terms would have been much higher.' The assessment was remarkably generous coming from an Attorney who though defended Mujib against treason charges in 1969 Agartala Conspiracy in Pakistan, later was jailed by Mujib in Bangladesh for political reasons.

³³ Syed Kamal Uddin , "Concessions and divisions", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 June 1984, p.32

³⁴ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 9 July 1984. The 3-point demands included the complete withdrawal of Martial Law, handing over the power to a non-political interim government and holding of parliamentary elections first.

³⁵ For the 6-points demand of the JSD (S-R), see *The Bangladesh Observer*, 20 August 1984. The 6-points demand included the firm date of the withdrawal of Martial Law, establishment of the seat in parliament with representatives from various professions, restoration of democratic rights, holding of Upazilla elections to create situation positive to holding free and fair parliamentary elections and constitution of an all party relief committee with representatives from all section of people to relief the flood affected people in the country.

³⁶ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 27 August, 1984

³⁷ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 13 September, 1984

³⁸ *Janadal* was the formatting stage of the JP, the party of the dictator

³⁹ For details of the measures taken by dictator, see *The Bangladesh Observer*, 28 September 1984

⁴⁰ For the brief of 21-point declaration of 15-party alliance which was read out by the BAKSAL Chairman Mohiuddin Ahmed, see *The Bangladesh Observer*, 16 October 1984. The declaration included rename the radio Bangladesh as Bangladesh Betar, abolition of the present education policy, stoppage of anti-people propoganda in the radio and television, full freedom of the press and repeal of the Printing and Publication Act, reform of the colonial bureaucratic administrative system, demand for absolute freedom of judiciary and abolition of the decision of decentralisation of the High Court benches, restoration of four state pillars which are democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism, reduction of dependence on foreign aid, implementation of the agreement signed with SKOP, introduction of *tebagha* system for share-croppers, setting up fair price shops all over the country and stern actions against the hoarders and profiteers, permanent solution of floods, rightful solutions of the problems of different professional classes including those of weavers, fishermen and labour classes etc.

⁴¹ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Bangladesh: Unyielding Opposition", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 October, 1984, p.32

⁴² Syed Kamal Uddin, "Decision time in Dhaka," *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 February, 1985, p.21. The five-point *modus vivendi* included (1) Withdrawal of the posts and offices of district and sub-zonal martial law administrator by 31st December last year and those of sub-district martial law administrators by 31st January 1985, (2) Simultaneous withdrawal of especial military tribunal and special military courts, (3) Revival of the suspended constitution and withdrawal of Martial Law after the new parliament is called to session, (4) Restoration of fundamental rights and in some cases writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court divisions through the revival of portions of the constitution-effective from 15 January 1985, and (5) Elimination of political parties members from the Cabinet, effective from the day of the EC announces the elections schedules and barring of government ministers from contesting the parliamentary elections

⁴³ *Ibid*, pp-21-22

⁴⁴ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Back to Squire one", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 March 1985, p.14. In fact, it appeared that the measures taken by the junta was a bid to prevent the desperate situation arising when the opposition decided to resist the filing of nomination papers on 24 February 1985 in order to smooth the boycott of the parliamentary polls on 6 April 1985. The dictator in his address to the nation laid blame on the opposition leaders of having miserably failed, in his word, to discharge their duties by depriving the people of an elected parliament and government. In his defence, he explained the prevailing situation as: "following the relaxation in the application of martial law, the abolition of the posts of martial law administrators at different levels and the release of the convicted and detained political workers (to create congenial atmosphere as demanded by the opposition), the law and order situation deteriorated ... frequent strikes, abstention from work and interruption of production, killings, hijackings, use of arms on campus, setting fire to student resident halls, violence, oppression of the peace loving people by anti-social elements, masquerading as student clashes between students and people in Dhaka and attacks on police stations and outposts and looting of arms from there, are some of the burning examples. As a result, the public has become miserable."

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.15

⁴⁶ Salamat Ali and Syed Kamal Uddin "A Margin of Surprise", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 April 1985, p.20. According to the official figure 32,539,264 people voted 'yes' in the referendum when they were asked 'do you support the policies and programmes of President Ershad' and 'do you want him to continue to run this administration until a civilian government is formed through election?', only 1,890,217 negative votes were registered. This figure representing a 71.5% turn out and a positive response from 94.15% of those who voted, were questioned by opposition

representative—some of them denounced the result as ‘fraudulent’—this was a record for even in the 1970 elections that led to the creation of independent Bangladesh—a benchmark that remained unsurpassed in terms of genuine participation—the voter turn out was 57%. A press release by BKSAL, a member of 15-Party alliance, congratulated the people for rejecting the referendum, declaring that except for a few junta touts, none went to vote. The BNP went a step further and claimed not even 1% of the electorate participated in the referendum and also that 7000 of its activists were arrested as a prelude to the polling day.

⁴⁷ The Upazilla was a rural sub-district established by junta’s administration—a decentralisation programme which was a part of his local government reform. The Upazilla chairman responsible for all administrative and development issues in their areas and they were dependent upon the central government for finance.

⁴⁸ Syed Kamal Uddin, ‘High Price of Votes’, *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 June 1985, p.44. It was found a great change in voting behaviour in the country. As Syed Kamal Uddin reported on the FEER: ‘Non political candidates spent on average at least taka 500,000 each during the campaign for a total of nearly taka 1.2 billion (US\$43 million)- enough to attract a large number of volunteers as well as musclemen, several thousand motorcycles, most of them new, were provided by the pro-government candidates for their volunteers to go out in groups of 10 or more to campaign and impress the voters which told heavily against the oppositions as did apparently the violence.’ The elections were contested on a non-party basis and were officially boycotted by the two opposition alliances. One report, however estimated that of the 406 successful candidates, 206 belonged to *Jano Dal*, at least 48 to the AL and 47 to the BNP. Officials of these two opposition parties later said that those members who had ignored the boycott of the election had been expelled from the parties. The junta was reported to have said that 85% of the successful candidates supported him but that they were not necessary members of the *Jano Dal*.

⁴⁹ The country was struggling to cope with after the devastating storm on 24 May 1985, which struck in the coast mainly over the ‘*Urir Char*’ taking the lives of 15000 people and 100,000 cattle and leaving more than half a million people home less. Such a natural calamity was not a new phenomenon to this disaster-prone over populated country, where land hungry peasants tended to settle on newly emerged fertile chars or islets long before they were ready for habitation. The southern coasts of the country bear the brunt of storms and tidal surges from the unpredictable Bay of Bengal. General Ershad cancelled his week long state visit to China scheduled from 29 May 1985 to personally supervise the relief operation. Though he did not seek any emergency assistance from outside, the international community had responded generously on its own accord. The government estimated that a minimum of US\$50 million would be needed to rehabilitate the victims. But judging the emergency aid already received and committed, it was unlikely to get anywhere near that amount. The two mainstream opposition alliances accused the Ershad administration of not informing people of the impending danger in time but the criticisms fell on deaf ears largely because of the initiatives taken by the Ershad himself. The AL President Sheikh Hasina and the BNP chief Begum Khaleda Zia visited the affected areas separately along with many of their top most leaders and distributed relief goods among the victims. Ershad toured all the affected areas and inland and spent a night on *Urir Char*, the most affected island ‘to be with the people’. Although he asserted that he did not want to make political capital out of people misery, he seemed to have achieved tremendous political gains from the disaster, as the dramatic flying visit taken place by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Srilankan President Julius Joyewardene to Dhaka and *Urir Char* respectively to inspect the damages. It was a highly successful visit described by Ershad as ‘unique in the region’s history’ in which Gandhi had also earned many friends in Bangladesh. In the meantime, the President of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq who had earlier decided to despatch his Foreign Minister Sahebzada Iqub Ali Khan to Bangladesh had decided to come himself. A separate plane-load of relief goods would accompany him. While the gesture of good-will was to be well-taken, ‘the limelight had already been stolen by Gandhi whose diplomatic coup’ was, by far, ‘difficult to match’.⁴⁹ According to the national and international political observers, the natural disaster gave the dictator a political focus for the activities he had made for the cyclone-toned people. For details, see Syed Kamal Uddin, ‘Aftermath of disaster’ *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 June 1985, p.15

⁵⁰ Longman, *Kessing’s Contemporary Archives, Records of World Events* edited by Roger East, Volume XXXI (1985), p.34051

⁵¹ Dr MA Matin, Minister of Works, announced the formation of the Jatiya (National) Party (JP) on 1 January 1986 of which he became Secretary General. Speaking to the press at the Party’s launch Dr Matin stated that General Ershad though having no formal position in the party had nevertheless been source of inspiration behind its formation. It was reported that all members of the Cabinet had joined the JP and that a 57 member national executive committee had been formed. The Party’s basic

principles were to be independence and sovereignty, the establishment of Islamic ideals, Bangladeshi nationalism, democracy and social progress through economic emancipation. At the same time, after the launch of his political platform, JP, the military ruler allowed open politics in the country.

⁵² Longman, *Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Records of World Events* edited by Roger East, Volume XXXII (1986), p.34480. The proposed measures were (1) the abolition of all positions and offices of Zonal Martial Law Administrators (2) the abolition of Martial Law courts (3) the resignation of any member of the councils of ministers standing as a candidate for elections.

⁵³ Rangalal Sen, *op.cit*, p.26

⁵⁴ Quoted in M.U. Patwari, *Mass Movement 1982-90, Background Album* edited by Yusuf Mohammad (Chittagong, April 1993), p.18. The understanding between the two major opposition alliances was thus broken on this issue. Begum Khaleda Zia insisted that the BNP participation was conditional on (1) the restoration of fundamental rights (2) the release of all political prisoners and (3) the cancellation of all convictions of politicians by military courts. At a public meeting in the capital on 25 March 1986, she accused Sheikh Hasina of betrayal and asserted that the elections held without prior lifting of Martial Law would only serve to legitimize an 'illegal military government'. Begum Zia said, "we want elections and will contest it. We believe in going into power through election. But we can not go to the polls prior to the realization of 5-point demands— the promise to which we made earlier to the people."

⁵⁵ It was confusing about the arrest of the BNP chief Begum Zia in the end of April 1986. The FEER reported on 29 April 1986 that Begum Zia had called on the Armed Forces to join her in resisting the fourth coming elections. The Times on 2 May 1986 reported that she had been arrested on 30 April 1986 as she returned from an anti-election rally in Northern Bangladesh and was being held in a police cell on the outskirts of Dhaka. This was confirmed by Begum Zia on 4 May 1986—the alleged day of her release. But the National Radio news denied such incident of arrest on 5 May 1986 as the event was 'entirely concocted and unfounded'. It was reported that 37 pro-boycott politicians including a former Speaker of the Parliament, Mirza Golam Hafiz were also arrested at sometime in early May 1986.

⁵⁶ The British observers reported on the election that the principal offenders on polling day had been the supporters of the JP. The British observers suggested that the election procedures had effectively been destroyed by the afternoon in the Election Day. A television broadcast was scheduled to provide continuous monitoring of the elections' results, which were suddenly stopped broad casting around mid-night on 8-9 May 1986 and did not resume announcement until 10 May 1986. Prior to the break in transmission the JP had been credited with 78 seats and the AL 55. On 11 May 1986, Reuters reported that the latest figure was now JP 118 and the AL 67. The PCFE commented that during 9 May, the computation of the final results might have been made at the offices of the EC.

⁵⁷ Longman, *op.cit*, p.34480

⁵⁸ Salamat Ali, "Divide and Rule", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 July, 1986, p.21.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p.22

⁶⁰ Salamat Ali, "Divide and Rule," *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 July, 1986, p.22. The position of the dictator became stronger after elections as well as he represented the Army consensus against total civilian supremacy and insulation of the military from national affairs. Although the AL chief Sheikh Hasina wanted to convince the Armed Forces that it would be safe in an AL government as the military was bent on retaining a direct control on the Government. Sheikh Hasina clearly rendered her feelings as "the Bangladesh Army is our Army and those in it are our brothers or sons."⁶⁰ However, the political analyst in the country contemplated that the AL took part in the parliamentary elections as it wanted to alley the long standing suspicions of the Army and to convince the officers that it was capable of providing a better alternative to either JP or the BNP. The boycott of the elections by the BNP was also based on its expectations of the Army. Foreign diplomats in Dhaka and sources in JP believed that the BNP chief Begum Khaleda Zia, as a widow of General Zia, had considerable followers in the Army, especially among a section of middle-ranking officers. It was also reported that 'some officers in the Army helped Begum Zia with her party's anti-elections posters in May 1986 and she was kept house-detention during the May polling to put off the possibility of her stirring up trouble among her troops.'⁶⁰ According to a reporting in the FEER on 10 July 1986, in a bid to civilian, the military ruler formed the JP; held the elections and was preparing to seek a popular mandate for himself through presidential polls. With kind sights of his predecessor's experiences he was then searching for a way to formalise the Army's direct association with political power before he stepped down as Army Chief. The military officers had played a key role in forming the JP behind the scene, whose manifesto, without going in to details, had called for associating the role of Army with national affairs. The lack of details obviously arose out of differences between the Generals and the civilian politicians in the JP. The General had examined the

Turkish constitution under which the Army Chief of Staff became the President of the country automatically. They had also looked in to the Indonesian Model, but had found both these unsuitable for the wholesale adaptation to local conditions. It was believed that the Generals had evolved some formula but were still reluctant to talk about it, preferring their civilian associates in the government to come up with their own ideas. Therefore, the political future of the military dictator could depend on how he would manage to evolve a well defined role for the army in running the country.

⁶¹ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Military Maverick", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 October 1986, p.44

⁶² The dictator in his old fashion, however, denied accusation of large scale electoral malpractices but admitted that minor instance might have occurred. Some foreign observers including journalists claimed a very low voter turn out and did not exceed 15%. But the EC declared that 55% eligible voters cast their ballots. In a crowded field of 12 candidates Ershad scored 21.7 million votes or 83% of the total, while his nearest rival religious leader Moulana Hafezzi Hoozoor notched a mere 1.5 million votes. However, the day of polling for presidential elections was marked by a country wide *hartal* organised by the mainstream opposition groupings to boycott the polls and an official ban on all anti-election activities.

⁶³ The National Assembly amended the Constitution for seventh time ratifying all actions of the military dictator which had been in effect since March 1982. Early in 1979, General Ziaur Rahman, another military leader sworn in President of the country, who was concurrently the CMLA, also enacted the Martial Law rule after the passage of a similar constitutional amendment and that was the fifth. The only difference, this time, was that while Zia had not himself brought in Martial Law in the country as his ruling BNP had the two-third majority to pass the Amendment Bill. The Bill was eventually passed when 13 opposition MPs from four smaller parties and 2 independent MPs voted along with the 208 JP MPs. Six of the MPs who voted with the JP were reported the members of the JSD (Siraj) and BKSAL, both members of the AL led alliance which had boycotted the Parliament in July 1986

⁶⁴ Syed Kamal Uddin, "President and Parliament", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 November 1986, p.37

⁶⁵ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Lacking in Leadership", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 February 1987, p.22

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p.22

⁶⁷ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Socking it to the Soldiers", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 July 1987, p.33

⁶⁸ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Divide and Poll", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 September 1987, p.25. On 3 August 1987, a new party named Freedom Party was launched by Col. (Rt.) Faruk Rahman and Col. (Rt.) Abdur Rashid—the two ring leaders of the 1975 military coup that followed the assassination of Bangabandhu, the founding father of the nation. It was assumed in the political arena that the military dictator was clandestinely related to the formation of the party to subvert the opposition AL. Soon after the formation of the party, the former Colonels unleashed a tirade against the AL. The AL leaders responded in strong revulsion accusing the dictator of sponsoring the Freedom Party indicating that the BNP was also favouring the coup leaders. The AL-GS Mrs Sajeda Choudhury said on 15 August 1987 that none of the Mujib's Killers and their associates would be speared. She also pointed a finger at the BNP-SG Obayedur Rahman and the GS of the ruling JP Shah Moazzem Hussain, both of whom were the Ministers under Bangabandhu government, and also stayed on with the successor government. The other AL stalwarts described the former colonels and the Ershad-BNP coalesces as two side of the same coin. Predictably, the BNP chief Begum Zia shot back charging that the AL itself was using double standards remaining in the parliament while supporting the agitations on the street. According to the political analysts, the BNP was formed 10 years ago on an ultra-nationalist and anti-Indian platform. This stance of the BNP became moderated in recent years after it had begun cooperating with the AL. But the rift between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia declined the BNP to its original platform. In the event, the BNP moved closer to the formation of the Freedom Party—further spoiling the AL chances to power.

⁶⁹ Lonman, *op.cit.*, p.35572

⁷⁰ Rangalal Sen. *op. cit.* p.29

⁷¹ Interview of the dictator with researcher during his fieldwork in Bangladesh in March 2003

⁷² Syed Kamal Uddin, "Dhaka under seize", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 November 1987, p.22

⁷³ Longman, *op. cit.* p. 35572

⁷⁴ Rangalal Sen, *op.cit.* p.29

⁷⁵ The proclamation stated that the military ruler was satisfied that an emergency situation existed which threatened the 'internal security and economic life' of the country. Under the state emergency (i) all fundamental rights were suspended and all courts were barred from trying any case related to them; (ii) strikes and lock outs were banned for a period of two months (iii) processions, demonstrations and meetings were prohibited, and (iv) the publication of news, views or comments on prohibited activities was banned. The violation of the regulations was punishable with 'rigorous imprisonment' for a maximum period of three years. The Home office also announced on the day that a curfew had been imposed on the metropolitan areas of Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna and in the cities of Narayangong and Rajshahi.

⁷⁶ The four points of the dictator's proposal were: (i) he was prepared to discuss all reasonable questions with opposition parties (ii) fresh election would be held based on the consensus of such discussion (iii) the government would implement the measures recommended by the consensus of the political parties to hold free and fair elections (iv) he would not object if any party winning the elections were to table a motion in the parliament to amend the constitutions. The dictator claimed that he had imposed a state emergency in an attempt to 'maintain the democratic system, the national economy, social peace and political stability. He also declared that the opposition demand for his resignation was not acceptable to him, because he was elected by the people. Neither was he prepared to alter the country's constitution as demanded by the AL, nor did he not have the people's mandate to change the nature of the constitution.

⁷⁷ Interview of the Dictator with researcher during his field work in Bangladesh in March 2003. He told, "it was my first and great political blunder of my life. I was not a politician you know. The reason of dissolving JS was the agitation of the opposition in the street in which AL, BNP and JIB were involved. Suddenly 10 JS members of JIB resigned and Hasina was not present and his party men were threatening to resign. So I dissolved the JS and that was a great mistake."

⁷⁸ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Promise of polls", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 December 1987, p.24. The division in the AL seemed to have improved the position of the party's old-guard, including Abdul Mannan and Dr Kamal Hussain, who were expected to assert their position in the party. The younger group supporters in the party who were more closed to Sheikh Hasina fade them side-tracked in recent years supposedly they were 'old fashioned politicians'.

⁷⁹ The lowest unit of Local Government consisting of several villages and each represented more than 20000 people. The Union Parishad is consisted of one chairman and at least nine members who are elected in the direct participation of the population in a poll by the interval of every five years.

⁸⁰ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Street violence takes its tolls", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 February 1988, pp.20-21

⁸¹ An Interview of General H.M. Ershad with Syed Kamal Uddin, Review's Dhaka correspondent reported as "Press, on with the polls", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 February 1988, pp.20-21. In an interview with the FEER Dhaka correspondent, the dictator asserted his assessment of the situation when he was asked, "without the participation of the major opposition parties, will the parliamentary polls be credible?" He replied: the elections are a constitutional requirement, which can not be violated because some parties may not like to participate. The credibility of an election does not depend on political parties, but on the participation of the people and its acceptability to the people." Again the dictator was asked "do you propose to hold discussions with the two major opposition leaders on this issue?" He replied: "I am prepared to do so but will they come (to the negotiating table)? There are two major opposition leaders and if I talk to one of them, the other one will say that we were conspiring against her.....but we have got to improve the system. I have tried my best and I can not do any more." And in the answer to another question, he said "the movement led by the BNP and the AL is to undo the gains of post-1975 politics. The irony is that the BNP, a product of post-1975 politics, is a partner with AL, which stands for the pro-1975 politics of secularism and one party system

⁸² Salamat Ali and Syed Kamal Uddin, "A matter of credibility", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 March 1988, p.33

⁸³ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Campaign of confusion", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 February 1988

⁸⁴ Rangalal Sen, *op.cit.* p.30

⁸⁵ Nayan Chanda "Calling of Uncle Som", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 April 1988, p.35

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p.80

⁸⁷ Longman, *Kessings Records of World Events*, edited by Roger East, vol.XXXIV 1988, p. 35836

⁸⁸ Syed Kamal Uddin, "A religious wrangle", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 May 1988, p.40

⁸⁹ Syed Kamal Uddin, *op.cit.* p.40

- ⁹⁰ Syed Kamal Uddin, "The Islamic way", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 June 1988, p.14
- ⁹¹ Syed Kamal Uddin, "A religious wrangle", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 May 1988, p.41
- ⁹² *Ibid*, p.41
- ⁹³ *Ibid*
- ⁹⁴ Rangalal Sen, *op.cit*, pp. 30-31
- ⁹⁵ Syed Kamal Uddin, "The Islamic Way", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 June 1988, p.14
- ⁹⁶ Rangalal Sen *op.cit*, pp.30-31
- ⁹⁷ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Voice of the victims", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 June 1988, p.16
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid*, The advertisement also said that whenever a religion became a concern of the state, it passed into the hands of those who possessed political power and added: "it is our belief that religion can not be legislatedOnly...under the guidance of authentic religious persons will religion grow and advance properly."
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid*
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*
- ¹⁰¹ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Shuffling the opposition", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 December 1988, p. 21
- ¹⁰² Syed Kamal Uddin, "Politics of legitimacy", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 July 1989, p.28
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid*
- ¹⁰⁴ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Rank and File now", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 September 1989, p.30. Dr M A Matin, Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Leader in the JS resigned his all positions in protest over the appointment of Kazi Zafar Ahmed as he felt Ershad had treated him unfairly. Ex. Vice-President Justice Nurul Islam said, he was asked to resign by the cabinet secretary, a request he refused insisting that his removal was illegal and 'not consistent with the provisions of the constitution.' Sometime later he received a letter from the Cabinet Secretary relieving him of his responsibilities
- ¹⁰⁵ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Pulpit Politics", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 February 1989, p.30
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p.31
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*
- ¹⁰⁸ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Objection sustained", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 September 1989, p.26
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*
- ¹¹⁰ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Court room politics", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 October 1989, p.26
- ¹¹¹ The challenge to the 5th amendment could be construed as an effort to restore the earlier basic principles of the state: democracy, socialism, secularism that would remove the prefix of the constitution, which contains 'Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim.'(Begin in the name of Allah, the benevolent and merciful...). The removal of the prefix would be the most sensitive issue to be dealt with by any court of law in the country where 90% of the population of 110 million are Muslims. The opponents to the AL argued that the writ challenging the 5th amendment would open a Pandora's Box as many more serious and constitutional issues could be raised in the process. For example, setting aside the 5th amendment, they argued, would restore the one party presidential system. The question of the legality of the framing the constitution in 1972 just after the liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan by those who were elected to the Pakistan Parliament in December 1970, could also be raised in the process.
- ¹¹² *The Bangladesh Observer*, 31 September 1989
- ¹¹³ According to a senior academic of the University of Dhaka, it was reported that the students were no longer capable of playing a decisive role in national politics let alone shaping it their way.¹¹³ The causes in changing the scenario of the student politics as identified were lack of unity, absence of idealism, increased individualism and opportunism to establish personal interest. It was found no one to have thought deeply about the long term implications of the worsening campus violence. S.M. Ali, the editor of Bangladesh Observer, tried to lead a discussion in the national news papers on the issue of ongoing campus violence and the fate of student politics in the early September 1989. He wrote, "to outsiders, it is far from clear if the opposition leaders of national stature appreciate that the situation has gone out of control. What they regard as their power base is, in effect an extremely volatile explosive situation which they are enable of both the Awami League and the BNP continue to calls upon their student followers to help in toppling the present regime. But they seldom say how this should be done. Student activists take these calls as signals for the continuance of their present

struggle, whatever it may be, not a plea to discard violence or go back to classes''. Syed Kamal Uddin, "Campus Chaos", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 November 1989, p.27

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*

¹¹⁵ For details criticism of the dictator against AL, see Syed Kamal Uddin, "Early Warning", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 June 1990, p.21

¹¹⁶ A sculpture symbolising invincible Bangla in memory of the liberation war of 1971

¹¹⁷ *The Daily Ittefaq* (Dhaka), 11 October 1990. This Bengali daily news paper has the highest circulation in Bangladesh, quoted in Rangalal Sen, *op. cit.* p.32

¹¹⁸ It was the slogan of the country's national liberation war of 1971. After the assassination of the founding father of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975, the slogan was opted out by the anti-liberation forces established in the state power. But still now the AL itself owned this slogan as the symbol of freedom war. The researcher himself was present at the APARAJEYA BANGLA on this occasion as a participant of the movement. The researcher felt nothing wrong with Sheikh Hasina who voiced the 'Joy Bangla' slogan and it was her credit that she could still then upheld the slogans of the liberation war of the nation.

¹¹⁹ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Politics of disarray", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 October 1990, p.21

¹²⁰ *Ibid*

¹²¹ Syed Kamal Uddin, "Politics of Disarray", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 October 1990, p.21

¹²² See *The Bangladesh Gazette*, published by the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh dated 13 October 1990 (Extra number), and quoted in Rangalal Sen, *op.cit.* p.33

¹²³ There appeared to be an oblique reference to it in an article written by the then Pro-Vice Chancellor (later became Vice-Chancellor during the BNP regime 1991-1996) of the University of Dhaka Professor Emaj Uddin where he said, "What has shocked the university communities in the country most is that some of those who were activist in the struggle for university autonomy in the sixties have been the enthusiastic authors of this ordinance." Emaj Uddin Ahmad, "Opinion: the Educational Institutions (Law and Order) Ordinance, 1990" *The Bangladesh Observer*, 10 October 1990, p.5 and see also Rangalal Sen, *op.cit.* p.41, F.N.-28

¹²⁴ Mahbub Ara, "Teachers in the Movement of 1990" in *Shiksha Barta*, a monthly magazine on education and culture published from Dhaka, January-February, 1991, pp 14-16. Also for specific and pertinent role the Dhaka University teachers played in the anti-autocracy movement in 1990, see the *Shikshak Samiti Samachar*, (a Bulletin of Dhaka University Teacher's Association, December 1990, pp.11-16

¹²⁵ See the leaflet of 21 November 1990, which contained the details of the joint declaration of 8-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances. In the said joint declaration it was categorically stated that these struggling political alliances were opposed to autocracy and communalism. The central theme of the demands of their struggle was to establish a sovereign parliament by holding a free and fair election. It was also explicitly mentioned that they would resist any attempt capturing power through unconstitutional means and would always uphold the spirit of independence and liberation war in order to establish a fully democratic system in the country. The preservation of the fundamental rights of the people, independence and neutrality of the judiciary and the rule of law were high lightened in the declaration. And as such, all existing black laws repugnant of fundamental rights were to be repealed.

¹²⁶ V.G. Kulkarni, "Cycle of the repression returns with emergency rule: Full circle", *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 December 1990, p.13

¹²⁷ *Ibid*

¹²⁸ *Ibid*

¹²⁹ Album, *op.cit.* pp. 517-18, 614-16, 642

¹³⁰ Angus Deeming with Hassan Shahariar, "Ershad Faces the Music: A Victory for people power politics in Bangladesh.", *The News Week*, a International news magazine, 17 December 1990, p.36

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p.36

¹³² *Ibid*, pp. 36-37

Chapter Eight

The Actions of the Movement

8.1. Introduction

The opposition democratic forces used a variety of actions in the movement for the restoration of democracy. These continuous actions of the organised political parties and interest (pressure) groups of the society constituted a significant political development in the history of the post independent Bangladesh. These were the contents of conflict between the opposition forces and the military administration of General Ershad. The forms of collective action the opposition organised against the military rule could be subsumed under two dimensions: first, the actions that operated during the ban on political activities—under the period of stiffer Martial Law and second, actions under the period of normal political activities. However, the both dimensions of the actions are considered under two broad categories according to their character of formation: violent and non-violent. The non-violent actions included protest marches, signing petitions, petition marches, mass gatherings or public meetings, demonstrations, sit-in, *hartal*¹ (strikes), hunger strikes, non-cooperation or civil disobedience, human chains, Dhaka siege, elections etc. The violent actions included attacks, barricades, blockades, riots, damaging public transport, guerrilla fights resulting harassing, bombing, setting fires, killing of forces and government officials etc. These actions created a precarious and menacing situation for the citizen's lives during the whole period of the military regime. However, the details, as follows, of the actions organised by the opposition democratic forces received a great deal of support from the all walks of the society.

8.2. Actions under the Ban on Political Activities

The opposition political parties and their frontier wings including students, youths, labourers, peasants and women as well as the rest of these groups outside the political affiliation challenged the proclamation of the Martial Law of General Ershad from the very moment it happened in March 1982. The political veterans of the students and youth groups risked their lives to protest against the military junta, even under the strict period of Martial Law—under curfew and ban on political activities in the country. According to a student activist, on the very next morning of the declaration of the Martial Law, the student wings of different progressive and democratic political parties in the Dhaka University campus and the main colleges of the capital brought out protest marches against the new military junta under the strict period of the curfew, although they were afraid of being arrested at any time². Even when the Martial Law measures became stricter, it was the veteran students and youth political workers, who continuously tried, on many occasions, to break the military ranks and orders of the ban on political activities. The members of the

military and police intelligence were moving in 'white dress'³ in the important areas of the cities including the campuses of academic institutions, city centres, press club, business areas, market places, bus terminals, offices of political parties and the trade unions etc, and the army along with all other law and order forces were patrolling throughout the country ensuring compliance with the Martial Law regulations.

During this period, the pattern of the various actions of the opposition forces was very exciting and was able to draw significant attention and popularity among the general mass of society. First, the youth and students political activists carried on the *chicka mara* (wall writing) and labelling posters on the walls in the curfew imposed mid-night in the cities that retained many slogans against military rule.⁴ Second, they circulated secret leaflets in the crowded areas, for example, canteens, common rooms, teacher's lounges of the academic institutions, market places, cinemas, press club etc, which carried the flare-up theme against the military rule in the country. Third, the '*hit and run*'⁵ protest march was very exciting and challenging for the veteran youth and student cadres in which came in close contact planning the location and timing of the protest, and took position distantly around the locations and suddenly, one of them shouted the slogans against the junta and all together came out running into the street and joined the protest march.⁶ Fourth, there were some instances of the defiant actions like guerrilla attacks on the army convoys in the night in Dhaka when the forces were patrolling throughout the city. On some occasions, *ittas* (pieces of bricks and stones), bombs and crackers were thrown at the military officials and convoys. However, only the youth cadres of the political parties under definite instructions were involved in this type of protest. Fifth, the gatherings and meetings of the unit and branches' officials of the political parties did not stop during this period and were held very secretly at very insignificant spots i.e. in slum houses or infamous restaurants, or home of normal political supporters where the plan of actions against the junta was mapped. Sixth, the indoor politics, however, was a pattern of permitted political activities under the pre relaxed Martial Law period—a part of test case played by junta side to estimate the political strength of the opposition—in which the opposition were able to organise gatherings and discussions only 'inside' their party office or at home—any type open of actions like rallies, gathering or processions in the street were still prohibited under this controlled political activities.

8.3. The Actions under the Normal Course of Political Activities

The military leader outlawed all political activities on several occasions during his nine years' rule. Once the ban on political activities was relaxed or withdrawn, the opposition democratic forces went ahead to organise their support base very quickly and organised various actions in support of their demand of the withdrawal

of Martial Law and the resignation of junta from power. All of their actions took several strategic, non-violent or even violent turns in the different stages of the movement. However, the actions under the normal course political activities could be divided into five distinct forms according to different pattern of their uses by opposition forces: (i) actions to increase mainly the mass supports and awareness, which includes protest march, public meeting or gathering, long march, hunger strike, human chain, signing petition, torch light procession, press conference and press release etc., (ii) actions to create direct pressure on the military regime to compel the dictator to relinquish the power, which includes *auvorudh* (block traffic), *gherao* (block govt. office), *hartal* (general strike), Dhaka siege, non-cooperation, civil disobedience and setting fire on the portrait of the dictator etc., (iii) actions to protest specific issues, decisions or policies of the junta, which includes demonstration, *gherao*, strike in the academic institutions and non-agricultural and industrial sectors, (iv) uses of the violence as the part of drastic actions, which included setting fire on effigies, setting fire and destroy public and private transport, disruptions in the road or rail networks, charging crackers and bombs, preventing the govt. and non-govt employees to work, guerrilla attacks on the army and law and order forces, gun fights with govt. forces and killing junta officials and supporters etc., and finally, (v) programmes of the CCA—a distinct cultural and intellectual movement, mainly to awake the mass people against military dictatorship, which includes *patha natak* (open drama), popular songs, arts and crafts symbolic march and writing and reciting poems etc. Outside these dimensions, there were the uses of slogans in the actions, painting on the wall and distribution of the leaflets had become a very popular part of the movement.⁷ Details of these actions—as follows—could be considered as the components of the history of the movement against a military autocracy in 1980s Bangladesh, which created a passage to the re-birth of a democratic nation in the world.

8.3.1 Actions to Increase Mass Supports and Awareness

The opposition forces observed various types of *protest march* during the whole period of the movement. First, *general protest marches* were held almost regularly in the late morning mainly in the campuses of the universities and colleges of the major cities all over the country, and sometimes, there were also organised marches in the residential halls of the students in the late evening.⁸ The political parties and alliances and the TU workers also organised marches in every evening from their office premises to the press clubs or city centres through the designated locations. However, the main rationales of these marches were twofold. The student organisations demonstrated their strength in a competitive manner on the one hand, and laid bare their objections to the military junta composing and popularizing many 'anti-Ershad slogans'⁹, on the other. In the same way, it became a practice for

political parties and their different wings to bring out marches, by and large, every evening through their network of units all over the country.¹⁰

Second, the *planned protest marches* were organised on the specific issues ranging from arrests, attacks, killings and injuries, lawsuits etc to any type of policy decision by junta administration against the interest of people. In these marches, the opposition forces organised a mass protest, in which they ensured a large participation and used to carry different placards—marking the issues and demands—with themselves.¹¹ The type of issue shaped the demeanour of the protest march. Issues like killings and injuries, attacks on the procession and arrest of vital political or student leaders, however, led the protest to become violent, i.e. clashes with police forces or setting fire to the public or private vehicles. This was called the *sudden action protest march*, in which a sudden crack down of the protesters moved forward with an attacking temper on the forces of law and order, and the whole area fell into turmoil in a moment and resulted into huge casualties¹². This type of action however, brought immediate outcomes and compelled the military authority to give a positive announcement on the concerned issue. These marches started with limited participants, however, ended, by and large, with a mass protest. Third, *stick protest marches* were belligerent in nature and took place suddenly on several occasions.¹³ The participants of these marches, normally carrying 3-4 feet long bamboo sticks or other sticks, showed their extreme resentment that broke out with the mass upsurge in a greater sense, which happened several times against the military autocracy of General Ershad. Besides, at a micro level, during the observance of important actions like *hartal* or *aborodh* (*blockade around the communication*), as a part of counter protest, a smaller group of participants came out with sticks or anything they had had with them to confront the junta forces.¹⁴

Fourth, *running protest marches* were organised by the brave political cadres—mostly the students and youth participants, to create panic among the forces of junta. Generally the police baton charged on the marches to disperse participants; but a daring part of the participants continued their protest in running until the end.¹⁵ This inspired the youth forces largely to participate in the movement. The participants of this action were limited to 20-30. They were running through and around a specific location and shouted anti-military slogans for 10-20 minutes. Sometimes, they became partially bared with several anti-Ershad slogans written on their chest and backs, which created a very emotional reaction among the general masses. However, the cruelty of the junta forces led to the killing these protesters in several occurrences at the pinnacle of the movement.¹⁶ Fifth, *torch light protest marches* were organised in the evening mostly in support of pre announced actions

like *hartal* or bigger public meetings and gatherings¹⁷. These started from the premises of political parties and were normally due to finish at the same place after moving round the main streets of a specific area, but sometimes they had to end it suddenly due to the baton charges by police forces¹⁸.

Sixth, *mourning protest marches* were organised all over the country in protest of the killing of the participants. The aggrieved student bodies or political parties along with all other socio cultural components like TU workers, professional and intellectuals participated in these marches. They wore black badges and carried placards with many anti-military slogans.¹⁹ However, all these marches were organised in a peaceful situation mostly on the following day or two after the killing, and was always cordoned by the police forces. Seventh, *petition marches* were organised in protest of a specific issue, like price increases, arrest of leaders etc that carried a written memorandum. These marches reached to the authority concerned and their leaders handed it over on behalf of the marchers.²⁰ Eighth, *corpse or coffin protest marches* were organised that carried the dead body of the killed participants or leaders of the movement both in peaceful and turmoil situations.²¹ Ninth, *long marches* were organised from the countryside to urban agglomerations or from the capital to smaller towns in the demand or protest of specific issues related to the greater interest of the people.²² Tenth, *rides using vehicles or trains* were organised when the key leaders of the party or alliance moved from city to city or one region to another region to recruit the masses to the movement.²³ Eleventh, *marches of joy* were organised by the political parties and students when they won over any legal or political victory against the military dictator at any stage of the movement.²⁴

Janoshova and Somabesh (Public meetings and gatherings) were mainly mass oriented non-violent actions that showed the strengths and ability of opposition forces. They announced their upcoming programmes and activities in these actions. These were several types. First, the opposition forces organised *large public meetings* in the bigger locations in the cities,²⁵ and warned the junta on the vital issue where the key leaders delivered their speeches and set in motion a series of programmes and actions. The opposition political cadres joined these meetings with musical bands and banners by marches on foot, buses and trains from the different corners of the city and the suburbs.²⁶ Second, *meetings in cities and towns*²⁷ were organised in the district and sub-district metropolises where the first line opposition leaders diffused their plan of actions.²⁸ Third, *spot* (street corner) *meetings* were always smaller that organised in the different important locations in the cities such as bus terminals, rail stations, launch *ghat*, academic institutions, community centres, important streets, and premises of the DC office, municipality office, language martyr minaret, shrine, monument, mosque, cinema hall, super markets and press

clubs and road junction etc.²⁹ The main aim of these meetings was twofold: linking all sections of the masses in the movement and making close union to their demands. Fourth, *support action meetings* were organised mainly in support of the hard line actions i.e. large public meetings, *hartal*, student or industrial strike, Dhaka siege, blockade etc.³⁰ Fifth, *meetings on the actions* were organised during the observance of hard line actions,³¹ and were swallowed by the sense of turmoil and revulsion in their attitude. Sixth, *sudden protest gatherings* were organised by the opposition student and youth forces mainly, when any of their leaders was arrested or killed.³² Sometimes, these gatherings turned to violence that set fire on the vehicles or attacked the police forces. Seventh, *routine gatherings* were organised regularly or once after a particular interval of time. After the end of marches or without marches, the student bodies organised these gatherings in their academic campuses.³³ The aims of these gatherings were to uphold their continuous agitation against military dictator and to show down their strength of supporters. Eighth, *protest meetings of interest groups* were organised in their respective offices to support the opposition movement for democracy. The SKOP and the unions of professionals and intellectual bodies including university teachers, doctors, engineers, journalists, lawyers etc were in the forefront of this action.³⁴ Ninth, *Pre-fixed gatherings* were organised at least once in a year on the occasion of annual councils and anniversaries and conventions of political parties and student, youth, labourer, professional and intellectual bodies.³⁵ Tenth, *condolence or mourning meetings* were organised by the opposition political parties, trade unions, bodies of students, professionals and intellectuals, when any of their activist were killed by the regime.³⁶ Sometimes the mourning meetings were also organised on the observance of the anniversary of the death of the veteran activists of the movement and the founding leaders of the parties or organisations. Eleventh, *gatherings at cultural functions* were organised by different cultural groups under the auspices of the UCA which always maintained their link with the opposition political forces, and designed their cultural programmes in accordance with their support and directions.³⁷

The *Anoshon Dharmaghat* (hunger strike) was an extreme non-violent action organised by the opposition socio-cultural political groups in which the participants put their lives at risk by taking no food until their demands were accepted.³⁸ Sometimes it was a famous personality, who observed the hunger strike in support of his personal demand or to protest a burning national issue. However, sometimes the opposition political parties announced this action as a 'mass hunger strike' to force the junta to take immediate steps on the issue concerned, for example, communal riots and the brutality of the police forces. The duration of the action ranged from a day to several weeks until an assurance came from the government.

The *Manov Bondhan* (human chain) was a non violent action that manifested into calm and quiet lines of the participants alongside the important and busy roads of the city.³⁹ The length of a chain was 5-50 kilometres or more in many occasions. Sometimes, they had placards attached to their bodies that referred to the military dictator, for example, '*Desh Aj Bishaya Behayar Khappore*' (The country is in the grasp of a world class impudent)⁴⁰ '*Shairature, Santrash, Moulobad-Nipat Jak, Nipat Jak*' (Down, down with autocracy, terrorism and fundamentalism) etc. In most cases, the issues of this protest included the memories of the killing of popular leaders and participants of the movement or the terrorism and fundamentalism instigated by military autocracy.⁴¹ The depth of this protest seemed to be very effective as it was able to attract all stopping the city life in the action area.

The *procession* was a non violent and malleable kind of march in the movement that was organised widely by the socio-cultural components—the exteriors to the political forces of the society. The intellectuals and professionals of the society—teachers of the university and colleges, poets, authors, journalists, lawyers, doctors, engineers and the like—were the main participants in the processions. This march was very quite and grave for a near destination,⁴² and did not involve any loud slogans, although it used placards concerning the issues or demands of the time. The rallies were the non violent peaceful marches or gatherings organised by the different socio-cultural and political forces on the occasion of their annual conferences or anniversaries.⁴³

A major task of the opposition forces was to handle the press in a proper way.⁴⁴ In this interaction process, the opposition used three means of action: press releases, press conferences and press statements. The *press releases* were sent to the offices of the dailies in the every evening, which contained details of day activities of the individual party and organisation, where they also included their next action schedules. In this way, the present dimensions of the movement and future action plan of the opposition could reach by far to the general masses of the society. The *press conference* was called in emergencies on the event of killings or arrest of leaders of the opposition forces,⁴⁵ where the opposition leaders explained their concern over the issue and declared hard line actions on the spur of the moment. The news editors of the national dailies as well as many journalists of international news agencies like BBC, VOA, PTI and AFP were present in these press conferences. The *press statements* were given by an individual or group of participants in support of the opposition movement against any decision of the junta. In most cases, a group of intellectuals or professionals that included university teachers, honoured citizens and notable personalities who organised a signature campaign on the issue concerned and sent their opinion in a body to the press in the form of a statement.⁴⁶

8.3.2. Actions to Create Direct Pressure on the Dictatorship

The *Abosthan Dharmaghat or Aborodh* (stay-in strike) and sit-in were very important and effective actions of the movement in which the participants were asked to arrive at a defined location individually or in a number of smaller marches. These were non-violent actions by definition, although changed to an offensive violent one due to the police incursion on the crowds. The opposition forces organised these actions normally in and around the government secretariat, DC office and MOH while the students mostly observed these around the MOE and the offices of the chiefs of the academic institutions. The thousands of the opposition activists used to join the stay-in-strike or sit-in in front of the entrance premises and around the all entry points of the office buildings. They tried to observe their action peacefully by 'sitting-in' at the location. But, due to the police attacks, they could not do so peacefully and had to stay on the location forcefully which was, therefore, being termed as a 'stay-in strike'.⁴⁷ The period of this action usually took 8 office hours of the day. They were chanting anti-junta slogans and their leaders used to deliver speeches demanding the resignation of the military dictator. This, in fact, left the capital paralyzed—exactly seemed to have the full preparation of battle between two sides—none of either the opposition or the junta could be able to predict the day for the range of violence and casualties that were to be occurred in both sides. The stay-in actions especially in the capital, ended with many casualties and mass arrests in most cases, which hastened the announcement of more violent actions by the opposition.⁴⁸ The peaceful sit-in, however, was observed mainly by the various trade unions of government and non-government employees demanding the nationalisation of the employments, increase in salaries, in most cases at the press club premises. The students, teachers and intellectuals used mainly the premise of central *Shahid Minar* or other famous places in the city.⁴⁹

The *Rajpath- Railpath Aborodh* (blockade of high ways and train lines) was an action used very effectively by the opposition forces, which was non-violent in definition, however, often turned into offensive violent actions.⁵⁰ The opposition forces ordered their thousands of cadres to block the high ways, naval and water ways and train lines to disrupt the communication networks throughout the country that turned the junta under pressure. In these actions, the participants always encountered clashes with the police and paramilitary forces and armed men employed by the junta that resulted into many fatalities in both sides. The participants brought out marches in support and responded violently to any disruptive measures of the junta. These kinds of blockades, however, usually lingered from eight hours to two or three days.

The *Hartal* (general strike) was an extreme action used frequently by the opposition democratic forces. This has been widely used in all political movements

since the middle of twentieth century throughout the whole region of the Indian subcontinent. This action was announced as an ultimatum for the resignation of junta and in protest against the brutal killings, injuries and arrest of vital leaders, election frauds, price increases, anti-people budget, and the like. The main aim and objective of this action was to isolate the junta from its socio-economic and political control of the country.⁵¹ The people were requested to stop their all works and transportation that led to a total closure of all academic institutions, offices of government and non-government organisation, industrial set up, service sector, road, rail, air and water communication etc excluding some emergency units of ambulances, fire service, electricity and water supply etc.

There were three geographic varieties of the *hartal*: local—district and sub-district level, regional—divisional level and national—countrywide. The opposition activists took the position for picketing in many of their planned locations of the cities and towns during this strike. They tried to stop the vehicles, and stooped employees from working, if any body was found to break the conditions of the *hartal*. They also brought out a number of marches and protest gatherings surrounding their areas to ensure the proper observance of the action. The working class activists of political parties were the main participants in these picketing marches under a lower middle class or middle class leadership. The floating *tokys* (street urchins)—the boys from the lower lower-class of landless and day labourers living in urban slums were also the vital participants in these picketing marches.⁵² Although all activists brought out the marches under the banner of their party and alliance, it was the students of colleges and universities who always organised separate picketing and marches in this action. The junta troops patrolled to arrest the picketers. Although the action was non-violent in nature, it usually turned into a violent milieu that led clashes between the opposition groups and junta forces which caused many casualties and arrests and law suits against the activists. The length of *hartal* ranged from 6 hours to 96 hours, even for indefinite period at the pinnacle of the movement.

Dhaka siege was an offensive and extreme action of the opposition against the military dictator. It paralysed the capital city of Dhaka on 10 November 1987, which was organised to overthrow the military dictator. All the cadres and supporters of opposition forces from the countryside were ordered to march towards the capital by any means. The military junta became frightened that led them to deploy thousands of troops on the all adjacent entrances of highways-water ways-train lines, which stopped all communications to the capital. The key opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia were put under house arrest. Many repressive measures were used by the junta to oppose this action. The middle class of the capital led this action while the working class ensured huge participation. Among 6 others, a veteran

activist of the working class of Dhaka city, Nur Hussain was killed and hundreds other arrested.⁵³ Non cooperation was an action organised by the opposition in the climax of the movement as a hard-nosed political protest that refused to cooperate the junta no longer in running the state power.⁵⁴ Similarly, civil disobedience was a peaceful political protest that refused to obey particular law, for example, to pay taxes, which was organised against the military junta in different places in the country.⁵⁵

The *portrait ablaze* was organised by the enthusiastic youth participants of the opposition. The students of different universities and colleges were uncompromising in their character and the gatherings and protest marches they organised usually took a violent turn where they set ablaze the portraits of the junta and associates passing their anger to military regime.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the students of the Art Institute of the University of Dhaka brought out many protest marches that carried countless bizarre cartoon caricatures, banners and festoons reflecting the heinous activities of the junta, which echoed to the end of military rule in the country.⁵⁷ Sometimes, the violent youth or student mob forcefully entered the offices of academic, government and semi-government offices and pulled down the portrait of the dictator from the office wall and trampled it under foot and enjoyed burning it.

8.3.3. Actions to Protest against Specific Issues and Policy of the Junta

The *Gherao* (besiege) of a government authority was organised to force them to accept the demands of the opposition generally concerned with education and foreign affairs and release of the prisoners or the resignation of the Ministers. The opposition forces, in most cases, the students' marches from their party offices or academic campuses went forward to the MOE, MOH or MOFA or DC offices and siege them until the authority agreed to accept their demands.⁵⁸ The participants used to block the office for some hours, however, in most cases, the forces of junta dispersed the gathering with baton charges, shootings and arrest of the participants. At the peak of the movement, the students organised the *Gherao* of the *Montri para* (residential area of ministers) in Dhaka city, which panicked the junta machinery and attracted huge public attention.⁵⁹ Besides, different student groups used to organise the *Gherao* of the head of academic institutions—mainly the universities and colleges—in protest of the failure of peaceful situation in the campus.⁶⁰

The *Chatra Dharmoghat* (student strike) was observed in all higher educational institutions including colleges and universities of Bangladesh. During this action period, the student bodies called the general students to stop attending the classes in their respective academic institution. The academic and non-academic administrative staffs were also included in the action and were urged to boycott the offices. On the strike day, the workers of the student bodies came in groups to the campus in the dawn and locked up the entrance gates of the academic buildings.

Sometimes, they started protest marches with slogans in favour of the issue concerned. The police forces on the campus kept their position silent unless there was any turmoil. However, this was mainly related to the various demands of the students. The first issue was the resignation of the military dictator from power and the restoration of democracy in the country. All student organisations in a body or individually or along with their parent political parties called the strikes in the universities and colleges through out the country in this cause.⁶¹ In this case, the strike was called for an indefinite period and the military junta was forced to close the higher academic institutions. Second, the students called strikes against the specific policy of the military administration like education and foreign policy and differentiations in annual budget allocation.⁶² Third, the strikes were called in protest against the severe repressions including arrest of leaders, baton charges on the marches and killings of the student participants in the movement.⁶³

Fourth, the students had also their own charter of demands including the demand for free education, lower costs of academic instruments—books, pen and papers etc and the implementation of Dr Khuda Education Commission Reports etc. The student bodies, mostly the leftists were very vocal in these issues and were more active to organise frequent strikes⁶⁴. Fifth, the strikes were also called in protest of any decision of the authority of academic institution that went against the interest of students. In this situation, the authorities discussed the issue with the student leaders concerned or called a meeting of the *Sharbo Dolyo Shikkha Paribesh Parishad* (All Party Academic Environment Council) and resolved the problem.⁶⁵ Sixth, sometimes, the student organisations had their own problems—conflict between two rival organisations—for example, BCL and JCD, or intra party conflict, which became manifested and clashes grew between the factions. In protest of an attack or clash event, the victim organisation or the student bodies outside the event called strike demanding a peaceful academic environment in the respective campuses.⁶⁶ Seventh, the rise of fundamentalist BICS—the student wing of JIB, an anti-liberation force and their subsequent clashes with progressive student forces was also a vital issue during the Ershad period. It was found that the BICS was attacking the progressive student forces under the direct instruction of the military dictator. They came to the centre of attention for the cruel methods they applied in their attacks, in which they abducted the progressive student leaders and workers, and used to cut the arteries and veins on the joints of the hands and legs by knives that left them disabled, and killed them with Chinese hatchets. This kind of cruelty produced huge anger all over the country and in protest, the progressive student organisations called a number of strikes in the academic campuses demanding a ban on the political activities of fundamentalist BICS.⁶⁷ Eighth, it was a normal event during the period of the military regime that police and paramilitary troops entered

the university and college campuses and residential halls without any prior permission of the authorities to arrest the student leaders. For this, the sufferings of the normal student reached an intolerable level, which led them to call strikes against the authorities of the concerned academic institutions.⁶⁸ Ninth, the student wing of the military junta started the capture of campuses of the universities and colleges, and the opposition student wings tried to resist them, which also resulted in protest strikes in the academic institutions.⁶⁹ Finally, the students also observed strikes called by the International Student Union.⁷⁰

The *Demonstration* was a kind of non violent protest action—turned into a defensive violence by the participants—in the movement. The political cadres organised marches leading to gatherings—in chanting slogans—towards the distinctive offices of the military administration in favour of their demand concern. Sometimes, the participants were asked to arrive individually at the planned location. However, they took a position in front of the entrance or premises of the office, and chanted slogans and after sometimes, the leaders used to deliver speeches in support of their demands.. Normally, the student bodies organised this type of protest in front of the office of the chief of higher educational institutions, DC offices, MOH and MOE buildings.⁷¹ The issues of these demonstrations included the demand for the release of political prisoners, price rise and the demand of the resignation of the military dictator.

8.3.4. Use of violence in the actions of the movement

The use of violence in the movement was not deliberate on the part of opposition forces. Most occurrences of violence came out with steps taken unwittingly for the sake of their own protection. Some use of violence, however, had been designed to play an associative role to stimulate the planned actions. In fact, the use of violent measures by the junta forces produced counter violence in the opposition actions. However, there were several uses of violence found in the opposition actions in the movement. First, the planned use of violence was found during the observance of *hartal* and student or industrial strikes and other major actions. In the midnight to the dawn of the day of these actions, the whole city and vicinity shook with the sounds of bombs and Molotov cocktails. The opposition youth and student forces were engaged mainly in these kinds of violent activities, which alerted the public and private transports authority not to go outside with their vehicles, and all employees and business groups to stop work during the strike hours. Second, the most usual violence by the opposition came suddenly when the police, BDR or paramilitary troops dispersed the opposition marches or gatherings, and used batons, gases and firing on the participants of the actions. In clashes with the police, the participants threw house bricks, stones and shoes on the police target, and a furious part of them set fire to the public vehicles and then ran from the scene. In

extreme cases, they destroyed the government office setting it ablaze.⁷² Third, the daring participants used to throw patrol bombs or cocktails on the police and troops convoys during the curfew hours, which panicked the junta.⁷³ They even used to throw bombs on the police camps, government secretariat and important offices and the homes of civilian associates of the junta. These uses of violence, in most cases, were pre-planned and were agreed by the commanding leaders of the opposition political forces. Fourth, in the violent situation, the exasperated opposition participants snatched the members of military forces from market places or vicinities who were stripped off their uniforms by angry mobs and mass beaten to death⁷⁴—an extreme outburst of political resentment against the repression of the military dictator. Fifth, the gun battle with the junta forces were also in the part of action of the opposition youth and student forces. The furious youth cadres of the opposition opened fire on the police ranks when the veteran student and opposition leaders were arrested. It was a normal trend found during the military rule of General Ershad. In the fight between the opposition forces and the civilian supporters of the junta, the later were given full backing from the military intelligence with arms and forces.⁷⁵ Sixth, the actions like the blockade of train lines and high ways always caused severe violent activities in which the opposition participants used to pull out the train lines and set fires on the trains and rail stations, and destroyed the culverts and bridges to disrupt the communication network.⁷⁶ Seventh, the physical attack on the members of the military cabinet by opposition forces was a very attracting event that carried huge mass interest. The opposition youth and student participants were ordered to beat up the civilian and military associates of the junta at once, whenever they would be found. It was maintained strictly, and many cabinet members and high officials of the junta administration were assaulted by the opposition forces when they were found in public places.⁷⁷

8.3.5. Actions of the Cultural Forces


The cultural forces of country under the banner of the CCA organised many cultural functions to raise awareness amongst the non-political general masses against the military autocracy of General Ershad. These actions attracted millions of people especially on the occasion of Independence Day (16 December), Mother Tongue Day (21 February) and Bengali New Year (1st *Baishakh*). Many cultural groups organised concerts of popular songs, open dramas, comedies, cartoons, placards processions and poems recitations, which inspired people to adore their mother land, language, culture and the like. The cities and towns were infatuated by the charms of these cultural functions. The themes of the drama, comedy, poems and popular songs were most patriotic and demonstrated the misdeeds of military dictator. These cultural functions were five types. First, *concerts of popular songs* included a new style of folk melody that mixed up the rural and urban life styles and

thematized the problems of city life under military rule. Thousands of city dwellers with a rural origin enjoyed these popular songs.⁷⁸ Second, *open drama* written by famous dramatists carried a humorist theme and was popularly able to characterize the repressions, corruptions and misrule of military leaders. The presence of the national level artists of TV and cinema in public at these drama locations carried a unique mass attraction leading to a huge gathering. Third, *cartoon and caricature*, were sketched in groups and protests were organized by mainly the students and staff cartoonists of the Art Institute of Dhaka University.⁷⁹ The target of these caricatures was none but the military leader, which also gripped a huge mass at the institute galleries and premises and in their march in the city streets. Fourth, *poem recitations* were a different kind of cultural protest in which rebellious, humorous and patriotic poems were recited by the famous poets in many occasions, and that attracted the thousands of citizens in the movement. The annual poem festivals in the Dhaka University campus were the gatherings of poets with thousands of their poems against military rule.⁸⁰ Fifth, the *short film show* was an attractive means, free of cost, in which the huge mass could watch the rural and urban social problems and repressions under military rule including killings, injuries and arrest of political workers. These cultural events, however, were organized in the crowded famous corners of the cities, for example, Martyr Minarets, residential halls of students, on a closed road or big street, designated open spaces and public library premises.

8.4. The Analysis of the Frequencies of Four Major Actions: Marches, Public Meetings, Hartal and Use of Violence

The frequencies of the four major actions have been collected from the three national dailies by dates from 1982 to 1990—the period of the movement for democracy against the military dictatorship. It should be mentioned here that these frequencies of actions are able to reflect only a little of the original number of actions of the opposition forces as there was the strict press censorship imposed in publishing news on the movement. The Graph 8.4.1⁸¹ shows the comparison of the frequency curves between four major actions—protest marches, meetings (public), *hartals* and use of violence during the whole period of the movement.

Broadly speaking, the years under political ban and stiffer Martial Law were found to have least frequencies of actions than the years under those measures were relaxed as well as the level of unity between opposition became an imperative factor for the account of actions of the movement.⁸² For example, the years 1982, 1983, and 1985 were under these measures that led to the lower frequencies of four actions—total frequency was only 2, 59 and 48 respectively in which 34 meetings and 5 hartals in 1983 and 26 meetings and 8 hartals in 1985 are worth mentioning.



Graph 8.4.1: Comparison of the frequency curves for four major actions 1982-1990

In comparison, the years under relaxation of these measures are found to have most high frequencies of actions. Especially, in 1990—the year in which the dictator was ousted from power—was seen to have highest frequencies of actions (total 560) including highest count of each actions—marches (62), meetings (107), hartals and strikes (54) and use of violence (64). However, the level of consolidation of the opposition unity could also be regarded as one of the most important factors that determined the frequencies of actions. The consolidation of the opposition unity in 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 were found to have been lower to moderate—these years were also marked by sudden disruptions of political activities by military order of the dictator. The chronological and continuous rise of violence was found distinctive—41, 48, 51 and 75 respectively for these four years. Although the frequency of protest marches did not vary sharply between these years (33-39), the rise of public meetings in 1988 and 1989 were found distinctive which was 90 and 85 respectively. This may be regarded as that the political forces were engaged to building up their organisation and support base in these years. The rise of violence denotes the increase of inter-party clashes—ruling vs. opposition, AL vs. BNP and inter-party clash between rival student organisations. The rise of *hartal* and strike are also related to the rise of violence as these actions observed as the follow up protest of the violent repressive measures of the junta forces. However, the lower frequency of *hartals* and strike in 1988 was found distinctive (only 20), which was related to the large scale floods in the country that discouraged the opposition forces to take such stiffer actions.

The statistics in Table 8.4.2 and graph 8.4.2 presents the relationship between the five movement forces and their participation in four major actions from 1982 to 1990. In this relationship, the frequency of public meeting were found most likely

actions participated by all movement forces memberships. For example, 90-100 in 1984, 59-65 in 1986, 79-85 in 1988 and 90-99 in 1990 are found as the highest frequencies for this action by all of the five movement forces. Comparatively, protest march, hartal-strike and the use of violence were dominated by students followed by the political parties. For example, the number of protest marches by students in 1984 and 1990 were 35 and 58 respectively while this was 28 and 36 respectively for political parties. The number of hartals and strikes by students in 1989 and 1990 was 49 and 48 while this was 34 and 33 respectively for political parties. The use of violence by students in 1987 and 1990 was 47 and 53 respectively while this was 21 and 33 respectively for political parties. In this way, the student forces were found distinctive to be dominant participants for protest marches, *hartal* and use of violence through out the whole period of the movement. However, for use of violence, the TU workers were seen close to the PP forces in all the years of the movement. The intellectuals and professionals were found to have a lower proportion participation in violence and strikes-*hartal*—which considered perhaps when they participated as their direct involvement with political forces rather than individually or in bodies. Their distinct participations in violent activities were mostly limited in setting fire on effigies or on portraits of the dictators and its collaborators. The relationships shows a strong coherence between all movement forces regarding their desire of higher participation in non-violent protest march and meetings or gatherings rather than violent *hartals* and strikes and use of violence as the means of the movement for the restoration of democracy.


8.5. Empirical Observation on the Effectiveness of the Actions of the Opposition Forces

Table 8.5.1 also presents the statistics on the relationships between the memberships of six social movement forces and their views about the effectiveness of different types of actions. Broadly speaking, the non-violent forms of actions were more likely to be seen more effective than violent actions. For example, extreme violent actions like guerrilla attack, gunfights with junta forces and killings of junta supporters have been supported by 30%-35% respondents and were all seen as ineffective tactics by a majority of all types of respondents. In comparison, overall, over 95% respondents in the first stage have considered the non-violent actions as much more effective means of the movement including public meeting, protest march, block traffic, *gherao*, press conference, press release, *hartal*, student strike, and cultural movement actions like street drama, poems, popular songs and caricature arts and crafts by artists.

Table 8.4.2: The distribution of frequencies of four major actions organised by the major movement forces for restoration of democracy 1982-1990

Year	PPs					Students					Intellectuals					Professionals					Trade Unions				
	Protest March	Meeting (public)	Hartal/strike	Violence	Protest March	Meeting (public)	Hartal/strike	Violence	Protest March	Meeting (public)	Hartal/strike	Violence	Protest March	Meeting (public)	Hartal/strike	Violence	Protest March	Meeting (public)	Hartal/strike	Violence	Protest March	Meeting (public)	Hartal/strike	Violence	
1982	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
1983	8	26	4	2	8	22	5	11	9	9	3	1	1	22	3	1	1	22	3	4	8	22	4	1	
1984	28	100	9	17	35	89	14	17	22	23	7	7	23	90	7	7	25	95	10	13	25	95	10	13	
1985	2	23	4	4	3	22	7	9	2	2	4	0	2	22	4	0	2	23	5	4	2	23	5	4	
1986	16	61	14	24	33	59	23	40	16	16	16	10	16	60	16	10	17	59	15	20	17	59	15	20	
1987	27	41	21	36	32	40	30	47	26	26	21	25	26	40	21	26	27	42	24	35	27	42	24	35	
1988	21	80	16	25	36	80	19	50	23	23	16	11	23	81	16	11	21	79	17	23	21	79	17	23	
1989	18	79	34	25	28	72	49	70	20	20	34	6	20	72	36	7	19	73	46	18	19	73	46	18	
1990	36	99	33	32	58	90	48	53	37	38	31	13	38	91	32	13	34	90	32	27	34	90	32	27	

Sources: Collected by dates from three major dailies of Bangladesh including Ittefaq, Sangram and Sangbad, 1982-1990



Graph 8.4.2: The Four major actions of the democracy movement organised by each of the five movement forces in years 1982-1990

In the second stage, more than 80% (below 95%) have categorised non-violent torch light procession, long march, Dhaka siege, non-cooperation, civil disobedience, setting fire on the portrait of military dictator and demonstration as effective while hunger strikes, human chain and signing petition have gained 77%-80% support. All of these non-violent forms were seen as effective ways of opposing the military regime. In between these extremes of violent and non-violent forms of protest were actions such as setting fire to effigies and transport and properties, use of crackers and bombs and preventing employees to entering places of work. In these cases opinion about their effectiveness were more evenly divided, which have gained supports from more than 50% respondent social movement memberships.



In the relationship on the views of movement forces, public meeting and all kinds of Gherao (block government offices) have earned 100% supports as effective actions from the student, professional, TU and NPG while protest march finds the same supports from the above first three forces' respondents. The student strikes have been considered 100% effective by students, professionals and NPG while hartal has gained the same support from the professionals. On the other hand, most of the cultural actions have gained 100% support from the students, professionals and TU. Generally speaking the professionals and TU and NPG, in most cases, are distinctive in finding many actions as effective as they have rendered their 100% supports for protest march, public meeting, *gherao*, hartal, demonstrations, student strikes and most of cultural actions followed by the close supports of the student forces. It is also distinctive in the statistics that more support in favour of violent actions has come from the intellectuals and TU social movement memberships whilst the supporters of other forces had not. The relationship shows a strong coherence between all movement forces regarding their difference and support for the use of non-violent and violent actions as the means of the movement for opposing the military regime in which the non violent and peaceful forms of protest have been found favourable for the movement for restoration of democracy.

The statistics shows that the views of six movement forces memberships have no major differences regarding the effectiveness of all of these actions to oppose the military regime of General Ershad. The actions of the opposition democratic forces to oppose the military dictator were more or less effective and these tools of the actions increased the chances of the removal of the junta in every moment in the years of the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh.

Table 8.5.1: The survey statistics on the relationships of six movement forces' memberships regarding the effectiveness of the actions of the movement

	Types of the movement forces													
	Total		PP		Students		Intellectuals		Professionals		TU		NPG	
	Effective ve	Non-effective ve	Effective ve	Non-effective ve	Effective ve	Non-effective ve	Effective ve	Non-effective ve	Effective ve	Non-effective ve	Effective ve	Non-effective ve	Effective ve	Non-effective ve
Protest March	98.1%	0.5%	95.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	96.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%	97.5%	2.5%
Public Meeting	98.5%	0%	95.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	96.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%
Long march	82.4%	8.8%	80.0%	6.7%	76.7%	0%	80.0%	10.0%	83.3%	13.3%	90.0%	10.0%	85.0%	12.5%
Hunger strike	80.0%	8.8%	80.0%	6.7%	66.7%	0%	80.0%	16.7%	80.0%	16.7%	80.0%	10.0%	90.0%	5.0%
Human Chain	77.6%	9.8%	73.9%	10.9%	60.0%	0%	83.3%	10.0%	93.1%	6.9%	70.0%	20.0%	85.0%	10.0%
Signing petition	77.6%	8.3%	76.1%	8.7%	62.1%	0%	80.0%	16.7%	93.3%	0%	73.3%	16.7%	80.0%	7.5%
Torch light procession	91.7%	3.4%	91.3%	2.2%	76.7%	3.3%	86.7%	10.0%	100.0%	0%	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%	0%
Press conference	97.1%	0%	93.5%	0%	93.3%	0%	96.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%
Press release	97.1%	0%	91.3%	0%	96.7%	0%	96.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%
Block traffic	95.1%	1.5%	89.1%	2.2%	93.1%	0%	93.1%	3.4%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%	97.5%	2.5%
Gherao (block G.office)	96.1%	1.0%	93.5%	0%	100.0%	0%	93.1%	0%	93.3%	3.3%	100.0%	0%	97.5%	2.5%
Hartal (General Strike)	97.6%	1.0%	97.8%	0%	96.7%	0%	96.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	96.7%	3.3%	97.4%	2.6%
Dhaka Seize	90.1%	1.0%	91.1%	0%	96.7%	0%	82.8%	0%	90.0%	6.7%	90.0%	0%	89.7%	0%
Non-cooperation	89.7%	4.9%	91.3%	2.2%	93.3%	3.3%	82.8%	6.9%	100.0%	0%	93.3%	3.3%	79.5%	12.8%
Civil disobedience	86.2%	8.4%	82.6%	6.5%	96.6%	3.4%	86.2%	6.9%	89.7%	10.3%	86.7%	10.0%	80.0%	12.5%
Set fire on portrait of MJ	83.7%	6.4%	88.6%	4.5%	86.7%	0%	86.2%	3.4%	93.3%	0%	80.0%	16.7%	70.0%	10.0%
Demonstration	88.3%	1.9%	84.8%	2.2%	76.7%	0%	93.3%	0%	100.0%	0%	83.3%	10.0%	92.5%	0%
Gherao by students	96.1%	1.0%	93.5%	0%	100.0%	0%	93.3%	0%	100.0%	0%	90.0%	6.7%	100.0%	0%
Student strike	97.6%	5%	95.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	96.7%	0%	100.0%	0%	93.3%	3.3%	100.0%	0%
Set fire on effigies	67.3%	23.3%	67.4%	16.3%	58.6%	24.1%	73.3%	16.7%	60.0%	33.3%	70.0%	30.0%	72.5%	22.5%
Set fire on vehicles	59.2%	31.6%	52.2%	28.3%	66.7%	26.7%	63.3%	30.0%	53.3%	40.0%	60.0%	40.0%	62.5%	27.5%
Use of bombs	54.9%	34.5%	45.7%	28.3%	53.3%	30.0%	56.7%	36.7%	50.0%	43.3%	60.0%	36.7%	65.0%	35.0%
Stop employees to work	57.1%	32.7%	48.9%	28.9%	63.3%	30.0%	70.0%	20.0%	43.3%	46.7%	63.3%	36.7%	57.5%	35.0%
Gue. attack on the LOF	35.1%	51.2%	26.7%	42.2%	36.7%	53.3%	43.3%	46.7%	30.0%	60.0%	36.7%	60.0%	40.0%	50.0%
Gun fight with LOF	30.4%	52.0%	24.4%	44.4%	26.7%	53.3%	31.0%	55.2%	26.7%	60.0%	40.0%	53.3%	35.0%	50.0%
Killing junta supporters	29.3%	51.7%	22.2%	40.0%	26.7%	53.3%	33.3%	60.0%	23.3%	63.3%	40.0%	50.0%	32.5%	50.0%
Patha Natak (s. drama)	97.1%	1.5%	97.8%	0%	96.7%	3.3%	93.3%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	100.0%	0%	97.5%	0%
Popular songs	95.6%	1.0%	95.7%	0%	90.0%	0%	93.3%	3.3%	100.0%	0%	100.0%	0%	95.0%	2.5%
Grotesque by ACI	95.6%	2.4%	91.3%	4.3%	100.0%	0%	93.3%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	100.0%	0%	95.0%	2.5%
Poem against M. regime	95.1%	2.4%	93.5%	2.2%	96.7%	3.3%	93.3%	3.3%	100.0%	0%	93.1%	6.9%	95.0%	0%

G-Government, MJ-Military Junta, Geu - Guerrilla, LOF-Law and Order Forces, S. -Street, ACI-Arts and Crafts Institute, PP-Political Parties, TU-Trade Union, NPG- Non-participatory Group



Graph 8.5.1: Effectiveness of the actions of the movement according to the respondents of six movement forces' memberships

8.6. Conclusion

The actions of the opposition democratic forces—violent and non-violent—against the military junta received continuous and spontaneous supports from the general mass of the society. In fact, the dictator became a most hatred individual in the eyes of democracy loving people of Bangladesh society. These actions seemed to have involvement of the participants in four stages: first, the leaders who planned the actions; second, the organisers who constructed the constituent of participants; third, the participants who chose to be involved directly with the actions; and finally, the general masses who were the sources of huge inspiration. None of these four groups of people of the society liked the dictator. Only the branded thieves, plunderers, robbers, killers, collaborators, loan defaulters and the like under the auspices of armed men—civilian and military, who were the main impediments to the development of democracy, had supported him. In the face of draconian repressive measures of the junta, these actions seemed to become ineffective sometimes, but the influence of each action on the individuals, groups or on society were very active—functional—concurrent—alive for ever—psychologically and spiritually—that slowly built up the structure in the peoples' mind for uprooting the military junta. Although these actions have their own literary definitions like violent or non-violent, the practice of them in the Bangladesh movement was always violent. Beyond doubt, they started in a non-violent form, but turned, in almost all cases, into a violent shape in the wake of the harsh measures by the junta forces. The actions of the opposition were generally planned and designed earlier but the follow-up actions went after the demand of the turmoil situation—mostly were out of the control of the leaders and organisers on the wake of using repressive measures by junta forces. Sometimes it was found that the vested groups, party, factions or individuals could influence the actions of the movement—when the variety of their interests involved with the issue—however, none could ignore the popular sentiment of the issue—if anybody did so, just had the risk to distract them from the central and popular stance of the movement which also carried in some instances—for example, the participation of the AL in the general election of 1986 had detached them from the mass base. The success of the actions depends on the level of the unity of participants—between individuals, groups, parties, and interest and pressure groups of the society. In the Bangladesh case, the participants of the political parties were divided and that sometimes limited the strength of the actions, but they could not ignore the popular expectation for the unity of the movement forces. Once the unity of the opposition forces was achieved in 1990, all of their actions gained strength leading to the success. Although various actions were organised against the junta regime, the most used and effective actions were protest march and hartal that always turned into violence, where were able to paralyse the junta administration.

The actions are the components for the construction of the movement. The patterns, strategies, methods of use, strength of the frequencies and the strength of their participations—both in number and courage can ensure the success of the movement. The culmination of all of these attributes of the actions led the Bangladesh democracy movement to success in uprooting the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

Notes

¹ 'Hartal' is one kind of frequent movements' programme taken by the opposition forces to military regime. It is a country wide large scale general strike under which the whole country seems to be paralysed as everything has been urged to keep stop. The business centres, academic institutions, road communication everything except some emergency units are urged to keep close by the movements forces, which ultimately leads to the violence resulting killings, injuries, arrests, riots and clash between police and hartal protesters

² Personal interview of Mr Maruf Ahmed with researcher, who was the Secretary of the Bangladesh Student League (BCL) of the Dhaka College unit, Dhaka at the time of military intervention in 1982. The importance of Dhaka Colleges was that it was famous for the student movement next to the Dhaka University in the capital. He has described details of how they organised protest actions from his unit against the declaration of Martial Law along with other fellow progressive student bodies. He described that they operated all actions from hiding and underground including non-violent marches and violent use of cocktails and crackers and firing on the military patrolling during the strict curfew imposition.

³ The 'white dress' was always used to mean the dress of the normal civilian. In the emergency situation of the period of the Martial Law, the intelligence agencies were moving in civilian dress. It was only because the veteran political leaders could easily avoid the military and police with formal uniform. In this stages, thousands members of military forces and police unit were deployed in civilian dress under all intelligence machineries including DGFI, SB, DB and NSI. They were frequently successful to arrest thousands of opposition political leaders and workers in the beginning of the Martial Law. Even the term 'white dress' was frequently used to create fear in normal socio-political life. The mighty man in a social setting used the term popularly to threat his rivals. They always free to use modern arms and suddenly opened fire in many operations that created terror feelings in the normal social life. They were entitled to arresting, beating and even to kill the political opposition of the military government. For this reasons, many political leaders and workers were caught and lost; there was no news of them of still they were alive or not. Sometimes they were found to misuse their ranks and files were engaged with anti-social activities like snatching, smuggling and robberies, which however, were believed to have connection to the top of the military administration in terms of monitory arrangement. These were the normal activities of the 'white dress' intelligence of the military administration. In fact, they were the main agent of the administration that directed the political decisions of the military dictator in the period of Martial Law.

⁴ The '*chicka mara*' or wall writing is popularly used means of protest of the student, youth units of the political forces. They used to paint and write popular and famous words, sentences, slogans or lines of famous poems and slogans on the walls of big buildings around the city, markets, and academic institutions regarding the demand of peaceful social and political life. These writings and painting carried the themes against military dictator, freedom, liberty and democracy, against state terrorism, their own political philosophy and many patriotic verses for the nation which attracted the general mass and made a political consciousness among them in favour of democracy. In particular, the walls of the higher academic institutions all over the country wore the black and red paintings of writing during the period of military rule of General Ershad. As a student of the time at the University of Dhaka, the researcher is able to describe the Dhaka University situation in this regard that there was hardly any space left on the walls of all buildings around the university without the paintings of writing against the military administration of General Ershad.

⁵ The 'hit and run' approach was used to mean the actions of the students and youth units of the opposition political forces that they operated from the hide out during the imposition of the curfew in the city. In most case, a group of participants came out suddenly in or close the street; threw the bombs on the military patrolling and went way in a moment. Sometimes, especially in the early moment-in the dawn of the day military intervention, some smaller groups of students especially in

the campuses of university and colleges in some part of the city brought out protest marches suddenly in the street and went away before the military patrol reached the location.

⁶ This type of protest march continued for only 200-300 yards along the streets and maintained a perfect timing and lasted for 10-15 minutes. The number of participants of these marches was not more than 30 to 50. However, to escape arrest, they fled away from the locations according to their pre-designed plan before the army and police patrol could reach the scene. Many student and youth protesters, however, could not avoid arrest in this type of risky protests in the very early stage of the military rule. This type of protest march was frequent mainly in the campuses of the universities and colleges, outside the cinema halls, crowded market places, and the terminals of the bus, trains and launches, press club premises and city centres of the major cities, especially the capital city of Dhaka.

⁷ Slogans give life to the actions of the movement. Among the protesters, those who had a very strong and high range—clear and loud tone—of voice were selected to be leaders to command the slogans in marches and gatherings and rest of the participants used to carry out and to follow the same together in a more strong and loudly tone in favour of their demand—the general masses came out with applause at the actions. There was a range of slogans that used in various actions in many issues in the movement. These elevated the huge hatreds, revulsion, horrors and gripes against the military regime that always aimed at the forced removal of the dictator from power. First, slogans directly against the dictator: *Ek dafa—ek dabi, Ershad tui Ekhon jabi* (One point—one demand, Ershad you quit just now); *Ershad Shairature—Ei Muhurte Bangla sar* (Autocratic Ershad—leave Bangladesh just now); *Ershader Shamarik Shashan—Mani na Manbo na* (Military rule of Ershad—never obey, will not obey); *Ershader dui gale, joota maro taale taale* (On the two checks of Ershad—give drubbing with shoes every times); *Dafa ek—dabi ek, Ershader podotag* (one point, one demand—resignation of Ershad); *Ershader chamra—tule nibo amra*(the skin of Ershad—pull out now); *Shairature nipat jak, Gonotantra mukti pak* (let despotism be down, democracy be restored); *Police tumi jotoi maro—beton tomer noisho baro*—Police! You beat ever so—salary your only nine hundred twelve (very small); *Chatra beton briddhee kore army posha cholbe na* (let not maintain the army while increase the student fees); *Shikkha aane chetona, chetonai biplob—biplobe mukti* (Education brings spirit, spirit brings revolution and revolution brings freedom); *Je jibon shahosher, shae jibon amader*(The brave the life—is the life of us); *Jamat-shibir rajakar ei muhurte bangla sar* (Jamat-shibir collaborators(with Pakistani army in the liberation war of 1971)—leave the land of Bangla just now); *Shamarik khate bai komao, shikkha khate bai barao* (decrease the expenditure in defence, increase the expenditure in education), *Diechi to rokto—aaro debo rokto, rokker bonnaye, bheshe jabe oinnyae* (we have sacrificed bloods—will sacrifice more bloods—the flood of our bloods would remove all unjust (of the junta)); *Chatra shramik jonota, gore tolo ekota* (students-labourers-people—build up the unity against junta); *Amader dhamanite shaheeder rokta, e rokta konodino parajoy mane na* (Bloods of the martyrs are flowing in our vein—that knows never to be defeated!); *Shaheeder rokta—britha jete pare na* (Bloods of the martyrs—can not be go in vein!); *Jamil tomai kotha dilam—tomer hottyer badla nebo* (Jamil! You are given the word—we must take revenge of your killing); *Fatta! Tomai kotha dilam—tomer hottyer badla nebo* (Fattah! You are given the word—we must take revenge of your killing); *ek Basu lokantare—lakkha Basu rajpathe* (One Basu is dead—hundred thousands Basu (s) have born in the movement); *Shamraik junter kalo hath, Bhenge dao, guriea dao*—Black hands of the military junta— break down, destroy at once); *Deichi tou rokta —eber nebo rokta* (already sacrificed much bloods—time to take bloods now (of the junta); *Shamrajyabader dalalera—Hushier shabdhan* (the collaborators of the imperialism—caution and warning! For you all); Moreover, the participants used to carry out slogans in the name of their party key leaders: *Amra shabai Mujib sena, netri moder Sheikh Hasina* (We all are the soldiers of Mujib and Sheikh Hasina is our leader); *Ek Mujib locantare, lakkha Mujib ghare ghare* (One Mujib is dead, but hundred thousands Mujib have born in all houses); *Amra shabai Mujib hobo—Mujib hottyer badla nebo* (We all will be Mujibs and will take revenge of the killing of Mujib); *Desh Gorechen Shaheed Zia—netri moder Khaleda Zia* (Mertyr Zia has built up the country—Khaleda Zia is our leader); *Gonotrer Manash Konna—Jano netri Sheikh Hasina* (Pupular leader Sheikh Hasina—spiritual daughter of democracy); etc.

⁸ For example, see the Daily Ittefaq, Daily Sangbad and Daily Banglar Bani on 11 November 1989. All these news paper covered the news of the student protests in the mid-night of Dhaka University North campus, where there were also clash between rival student organisations. However, in every morning of opening days of the universities and many important colleges all over the country became full of processions of various student organisations in demand of the resignation of General Ershad. Normally these marches were organised in between 11 am to 1 pm of the day. All student organisations brought these marches generally to show their strength as well as protest the military junta. Normally, the individual student bodies first brought their own party marches. Later they

brought their marches together under alliances and unity. However, sometimes they started the marches under the banner of the alliances such as the SSU, SAS and APSU. However, the frequencies of individual protest of these organisation became decreased while the APSU was formally came into light and since then all protests were organised under the banner of the APSU in the final days of the mass upsurge.

⁹ The main slogans of the oppositions political forces of the country included: *Ek Dafa Ek Dabi-Ershad Tui Ekhon Jabi* (One point one demand- Ershad you quit now), *Ershader Dui Gale, Juta Maro Tale Tale* (Let give a drubbing of shoes on two cheeks of Ershad), *Ek Dafa Ek Dabi Kuttha Ershad Ekhon Jabi* (One point one demand, dog Ershad- quit now) *Abilombe Shamarik Ayne, Protthere Koro, Korte Hobe* (let it ensure of immediate lifting of Martial law), *Ganotantra Hottyakari-Ershader Bicher Hobe Bangler Matithe* (Trial of Ershad, the killer of democracy, would be happened on the soil of Bangladesh), *Chor chor Bara Chor-Ershad Tui Bhishya Chor* (Thief! thief! big thief!- Ershad is world thief!), *Ershader Chamra, Tule Nebo Amra* (we must pull out the skin of Ershad!), *Khuni Ershader Bicher Hobe, Bangler Matithe* (Trial of killer Ershad must tale place on the soil of Bangladesh)etc

¹⁰ It was really beyond belief that the opposition forces in Bangladesh were able to demonstrate their grievances with these marches to the junta almost in every day. The participation of these regular general marches was always countable, i.e. 50-500 on the basis of the strength of an individual student organisation and 500-5000 participants for major political parties.

¹¹ For major student bodies, the participation was more than a thousand while many thousands for mainstream political parties. If the issue was strong enough, the protest marches of students and political parties came out of their campuses and party office premises respectively, and marched around the important locations of the city.

¹² In many occasions, marches were brought out suddenly in the protest of the arrest of the leaders or killing of participants of the movement. The arrest of JCD Publicity secretary Mahabubul Haque Bablu and International secretary Sanaul Haque Niru on 30th December 1985 had sparked a huge protest in the campuses all over the country 31st December 1985. For details of the event, see daily *Ittefaq*, 1st January 1986, see also *Weekly Bichitra*, 10th January 1986. The killing of prominent student leaders Salim and Delwar of BCL also provoked huge sudden protest all over the country as they were killed while a police truck went over the student procession of the SSU in 1985. The arrest of main line opposition leaders including Sheikh Hasina, Begum Khaleda Zia, Comrade Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon and Hasanul Haque Inu also influenced huge sudden protests and processions all over the country many times under the period of military regime. Even, sudden protest marches were brought out in the campuses of universities and colleges all over the country while police or military forces had entered into the residential halls of the students without genuine causes.

¹³ In protest of forgery and cheating of military dictatorship, on many occasions, for example 10 November 1987 and the final days of the mass upsurges in December 1990, the thousands people of Bangladesh under the banner of anti-autocratic opposition democratic forces came out with bamboo sticks and pieces of branches of trees to the street on the turmoil situation in the wake of huge protests. This was happened several times in the peak of the protest against the military dictatorship of General Ershad, which were brutally controlled by the military of Bangladesh In this regards, it should be mentioned here that there been a history of this stick protest marches as the Bengali people also showed against the military dictatorships of General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan while Bangladesh was under the then Pakistan before 1971.

¹⁴ Almost all of important actions like bloc traffic or full range hartal (general strike), there were many events of clashes of oppositions' forces with the junta forces. In these clashes, the participants of opposition actions used bamboo sticks, pieces of stones and bricks. In the extreme situation, the participants came out with stick to street and carried these up their head in the procession, which also developed fear in the junta forces. For example, see the news of all events of the long hour strikes observed by the opposition forces. See the *Bangladesh Observer*, 11 November 1987

¹⁵ In the final stage of the mass upsurge, when the military administration of General Ershad announced the special ordinance to close down the Educational Institutions in October 1990, the student workers of the APSU brought out huge processions in the capital city of Dhaka, which was dispersed by the junta forces. In the day long conflict, the hundreds of students were running through streets from DU campus to Zero point under the leadership of Moniruzzaman Badal (BCL President, DU unit) and Mahabubul Alam (mid-rank leader of JSD). However, the researcher was also participant of this running march that was followed continuously by the military, BDR and police to arrest the participants. However, this type march was able to challenge the junta forces and also developed courage in the dispersed participants to reunite them immediately.

¹⁶ Nur Hossain, a youth veteran in the history of democracy movement of Bangladesh on 10 November 1987, with many others, was killed brutally in the wake of police shooting while he was participating in a running march in the Paltan Area of Dhaka city. For details, see Daily Ittefaq, Daily Bangler Bani and Daily Sangbad 11 November 1987.

¹⁷ For example, see *Bangladesh Observer* 10 October 1990 in which torch light procession was organised in the last evening by the 6-party alliances in support of today's sit-in demonstration in front of secretariat. See *Bangladesh Observer* 15th October 1990 in which the same procession was organised by Jatyo Gantantrik Party last evening in support of two days hartal for next Monday and Tuesday. Almost all major parties brought out torch light processions in the evening in support of their large scale actions against the military dictatorship.

¹⁸ See the *Bangladesh Observer* 10 November 1987 in which the police forces dispersed the torch light processions of the major opposition parties in the capital city of Dhaka.

¹⁹ The slogans included 'khooni Ershader patan hobe, Banglar Matithe', 'Ershader Bicher hobe Banglar Matithe', 'down, down with killer Ershad'. 'Ek dapha Ek Dabi, Khooni Ershad Ekhon jabi'. 'Amar Bhaiyer Rakta, Briitha Jete Debo Na' etc. For example, See the *Bangladesh Observer* on 16th February 1983 in which the students of Dhaka university under the banner of the CSAC brought out the mourning procession in protest of the killing of Zafar, Jainal, Kanchan, Mozammel, Dipali Shaha and unknown many others on 14th February 1983. See also Daily Ittefaq, 17th February 1985, in which the student of Dhaka University brought out procession in protest of the killing of Jatyo Chatra League leader Raofun Basunia, a meritorious student of the department of Sociology, University of Dhaka on 16th February 1985. However, in protest of many killings in many places from capital to Thana level, participants of opposition democratic forces including students and youth in huge number organised this kind mourning protest. See also *ibid*, 13 November 1986 in which the 5-party alliance observed a mourning day on Wednesday as a mark of respect to the departed soul of Shadat, who was killed on the hartal hours of last Monday, 10th November 1986. See also *ibid*, 17 February 1985 in which the main opposition alliances including 15-party and 7-party alliances observed separate mourning procession on 16th February 1985 in the capital in protest of the killing of Raofun Basunia.

²⁰ Normally what happened in this regard was that the marches were blocked before end and the leaders were allowed to hand over their memorandum to the police official on the spot or at best, the leaders were carried by the police vehicles to the authorities. There the leaders handed over their written demands to them. For example of petition march, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 18 December 1984. The Central Student Action Committee (CSAC) and Bangladesh Jatytabadi Chatra Dal (JCD) brought out protest march towards the National Broadcasting Authority (NBA) and thereafter staged a sit-in demonstration following the handing over of a memorandum for equal coverage of the opposition parties in the state owned radio and television.

²¹ In peaceful protests, the outbursts of the grief of the opposition forces were expressed where the general masses along with thousands of political workers participated and this alienated the dictator from the general masses of the society. However, in the turmoil situation, the participants snatched the corpse from the hospital morgue or police custody instantly after the occurrences, and brought out the protest marches carrying the corpses which turned into mass revolt in a moment. For that reason, the military authority always tried to capture the dead body of the victim as a first and foremost priority. Even the junta employed all their efforts to capture of the dead body if it was already held by the protesters. For example see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 14 October 1990. The student of the Dhaka University took the dead body of Maniruzzaman Azad, a first year student of Polytechnic Institute, Tazgaon, Dhaka who was killed by police shooting during the observance of protest on 13th October 1990. The students along with the political leaders brought the procession at 2 pm and they were obstructed at Doyel Square by the police and in the event of pitched battle for two hours between police and students, Maniruzzaman Azad was killed. The dead body was taken first from the Dhaka medical college hospital through the back gate to adjacent Jagannath Hall and later to the Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Hall of the Dhaka University. The students decided to bring corpse procession which took a huge gathering in the campus in a moment. The angry students during the melee set on the vehicles of Atomic Energy Centre on fire and also earlier one red plate (foreign agencies') car was burnt in the Topkhana Road in front of National Press Club. All opposition key leaders rushed to the campus immediately including Sheikh Hasina of the AL and 5-party leaders and Afser Ahmed Siddique of the BNP. They all gathered at the Aparajaya Bangla in the campus. Sheikh Hasina delivered oath for the thousands of students in front of the dead body of Maniruzzaman Azad that we must not go home until the resignation of the military dictator.

²² In the direction to the countryside, the opposition forces organised *long marches* to spread the movement among the rural masses while the marches towards the capital or city towns were

organised to demonstrate strong resentment to any decision of the junta against the public interest. These mass marches with hundreds of thousands participants passed long way that took 1-4 weeks to reach the destination. For example, see the long march of the Bangladesh Communist Party on 5th January 1989. The party organised this action from four periphery routes of the country from Tetulia, Sylhet, Chattagram and Khulna which ended at Dhaka on 28th January 1989. For this, see, Mohammad Khusbu, *Bangladesher Chattra Andoloner Itihas: Ershader Shomoykal* .(The History of Student Movement in Bangladesh) Dhaka: Student Ways, 1991, p.144.

²³In the train march, the key leaders rode on the trains and stopped in the every city or smaller town stations, where they delivered their speeches against the Martial Law rule at the gatherings of the general mass. Similarly, vehicle marches included the cars, motor cycles, motor vehicles or track lorries to carry the leaders and supporters of the political parties and moved round the city streets chanting the anti-Ershad slogans, which also attracted a great interest of the general mass of the society.

²⁴Sometimes, the opposition student bodies' victory of the elections against the candidate supported by junta in the colleges or universities, or the opposition supported candidate's winning against the candidate of the junta in any local elections led a protest march with joys that accelerated the opposition movement. For example, The winning of the CASC (Central Student Action Committee) in February 1989 in the DUCSU or the winning of the JCD in the DUCSU in 1990 was celebrated with huge marches with joys as these were regarded as the victory against the military regime. In this way, the winning of most of the student unions in universities and colleges was found to be welcomed by huge processions and marches with joys that, in fact, vulcanized the student movement against the military dictator in 1989-1990.

²⁵For example, the MM Avenue, BB Avenue, Gulistan Square and BM Mosque premise of Dhaka city, Lal Dhigi ground of Chittagong, Alya Madrasha ground of Rajshahi, and Shaheed Hadis Park of Khulna, Bangabandhu Uddhan of Barisal and Alya Madrasha ground of Sylhet, were, among others, the main places for these kinds of large public meetings in which several hundreds of thousand people could gather at a time. For example of these meetings and gatherings, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 15 February, 1985. In a separate public meeting, Sheikh Hasina of 15-party alliance at Central Shaheed Minar and Begum Zia of 7-party alliance at Baitul Mukarram, Dhaka on 14th February 1985 announced to resist the farcical holding of general election by the military dictator.

²⁶A huge quantity of non-political masses also joined these meetings to hear and see the key opposition leaders in public. The military administration took measures to prevent possible outburst damages by the participants on their way to return home.

²⁷For example of smaller public gathering addressed by opposition leaders through out the country, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 10 August 1987, in which Sheikh Hasina of the AL addressed at Nagarbari Ghat, Pubna, demanding the resignation of Ershad while Begum Zia of the BNP addressed at Rangpur demanding the declaration of Rangpur as flood victim distressed area. See also, *Ibid*, 1 August 1987 in which Begum Zia addressed at Faridpur, a district town, demanding the dissolution of the parliament. See also, *Ibid*, 12 August 1987 in which Sheikh Hasina of the AL addressed at the district town of Rangpur in which she complained against the Government for inadequate relief operation for flood victims and also urged the military dictator to resign immediately. See also *ibid*, 12 April 1987 in which Begum Zia addressed at the district town of Jhenidah and urged for the dissolution of parliament.

²⁸The general masses from the country side were the main participants of these peaceful and non-violent gatherings, which turned out to 25-50 thousands in number. Sometimes, the opposition leaders planned the medium level public meetings throughout the country to increase the mass awareness which developed movements in the countryside

²⁹The number of the participants of this meetings and gatherings was always smaller ranging from 500-5000. For the examples of the street corners meeting, see the *Bangladesh Observer* 6 December 1984. 7-party alliance held street corners meetings at Gulistan, Fulbaria, Sadar Ghat, Badamtali, Chawkbazar, New Market, Mauchak MARKET, Farmgate and Kamlapur on 5th December 1984. For this kind of spot meeting, see also *Bangladesh Observer*, 10 April, 1987 in which the BNP chief addressed a gathering at Nawab Yusuf Market and urged all opposition MPs to quit the parliament immediately. In the same day, acting Ameer of the JIB, Mowlana Abbas Ali Khan addressed at the premise of Baitul Mukarram Mosque, who urged for fresh polls. See also *ibid*, 21 April 1987 in which BKSAL Chairman Mohiuddin Ahmed addressed at the central Shaheed Minar in the capital and accused the AL to stab the movement from the back by participating in the poll under military administration. See also *Ibid*, 21 February 1985 in which the leaders of 15-party alliance including Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabugish (GAL), Mrs Sajeda Choudhury (AL), Mr Shajahan Siraj (JSD-Siraj), Rashed Khan Menon (WP), Comrade Forhad (CPB), Altaf Hossain (EP), Md. Toha (SD),

Pankaj Bhattacharya (NAP), Khalquzzaman(BSD), Kamal Haider (NAP-Muzaffar), Shah Alam (Majdur Party), Mahamudur Rahman Manna (BSD-Mahbub), and Dilip Barua (SD-M-L) addressed the meeting at stadium gate in protest of filing nominations and holding the pre-designed polls by the military dictator. See also, *ibid*, 29 May 1989. AL presidium member Dr Kamal Hossain addressed a public meeting at Nayatola Shishu Park and urged to people to unseat the present autocratic government.

³⁰ The policy makers of the movement normally organised smaller support meetings in different spots in the cities in the day or days before the observance of the main action as a part of the preparation of activists. These support meetings sometimes ended with a torch light procession passing through the main spots of the city. For the example of support meeting, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 15 February 1985 in which the CSAC brought out many support meetings through out the campuses of educational institutions of the capital following the *hartal* in the next day in the city in protest of the killing of CSAC leader Raofun Basunia. See also, *Ibid*, 5 November 1989 in which the 7party alliance brought out torchlight procession in the previous evening in support of the hartal in the following day. See also, *Ibid*, 27 September 1989 in which the SCOP brought out torch light procession from the National Press Club in the previous evening in support of their half day hartal on 27th September 1989.

³¹ On the day or days of the hartal, strike and blockades, the opposition activists took the position in important spots for picketing and brought out marches. At the end of these picketing marches, they gathered on the roadside of the spots or party office where the leaders used to deliver their thanks through speeches to the participants. For example, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 6th November 1989 in which 8-party, 7-party, 5-party and 6-party organised many meetings, rallies and gatherings in the hartal day in the different part of the city on 5th November 1989. Among other, a meeting of 6-party alliance was held near the HBFC office in the post-hartal period that demanded the resignation of military dictator.

³² The students came out of their rooms following news of this kind of events, and demanded the immediate release of their leaders or expressed their deep concern over the killing in these action gatherings. For an example of sudden protest gathering, see *Bangladesh Observer, Daily Ittefaq, Daily Sangbad*, 28th November 1990 in which huge sudden protest were brought out to streets, hospitals and medical colleges, when Dr Shamsul Alam Khan, the Joint Secretary of the BMA was killed by miscreant hooligans on the eve of mass upsurge on 27th November 1990. See also, *ibid*, 11 October 1990 a huge sudden protest marches were brought in the campuses of the educational institutions all over the country, while the news of the killing of six people at the sit-in demonstration on 10th October was broken out.

³³ Personal interview the APSU leaders including Mr Ashim Kumer Ukil, JS of the BCL(H-A), Mr Shafi Ahmed, JS of the BCL (N-S), Mr. Khairul Kabir Khokon, JS of the JCD, Mr. Mostafa Farook, GS of the Socialist Student Front (SSF) and Mrs. Moshrefa Mishu, President of the Chatra Oikya Forum. These leaders informed the researcher that the units of their student organisation through out the academic institutions, all most all public universities and colleges of the country, from capital to thana area, brought out processions in all opening days. The aim of these regular processions showed the strength of their own organisations as well as stayed behind the continuous protest against the junta administration.

³⁴ These meetings were organised to protest the repressions of the dictator and to support of their respective demands and immediate resignation of the junta for the sake of democracy. They passed many resolutions in these meetings in support of the opposition movement. For the meetings of different interest and pressure groups, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 5 March 1990. The meetings of the BMA was held at the IPGMR premise in the wake of two days doctors strike through out the country, See also, *ibid*, 1-15 August 1990, Doctors held several meetings and rallies as their part of strike against the government health policy. See also, *ibid*, 12 September 1990. Journalists, newspaper workers observed pen-down strike on 11 September 1990 and held a rally in protest of conspiracy against the wage board reports regarding their salary and allowances at the press club premise in Dhaka. See also *ibid*, 9 December 1984. The Dhaka Union of Journalists (DUJ) in an emergency extended meeting condemned the 'barbaric attack' on the photographers and reporters by police on 8th December 1984 and demanded the exemplary punishment of responsible police personnel and officials connected in this event. See also, *ibid*, 15 December 1984, the SKOP in a public meeting on 14th December 1984 at Baitul Mukarram Mosque premise urged the military government to implement their charter of demands that was signed with government before 22 December 1983; See also, *ibid*, 16 December 1984, an extended meeting of the central executive committee of the coordination council of the bar associations of Bangladesh held on 15th December 1984 decided to abstain from attending courts through out the country from 20 January 1985; See

also *ibid*, 23 October 1984, the Engineers services structure and welfare committee of the Institution of Engineers observed 'demand day' on 22nd October 1984 for the implementation of order issued by his secretariat for a solution to their professional problems;

³⁵ These meetings designed their plan of actions for the next one year so that the workers could have sufficient time to prepare themselves for the movement. Although these were mainly related to the improvement of their organisational structure, all decisions of these meetings had been jeopardized by the repressive measures of the dictator. For prefixed rally of the student, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 26 December 1984. The Central Student Action Committee (CSAC) would hold a rally on 26th December at 11 am at the premises of Dhaka University in protest against the killing of three persons including a student leader Shajahan Siraj in police firing at Rajshahi on the Saturday last. For political parties; see *ibid*, the 15-party alliance would hold a rally followed by a protest march in the following day at the Stadium Gate in protest of the arrest of political leaders during last hartal hours; for professionals, see *ibid*, 5 December 1984, The central Action Committee of the News Papers and News Agencies would hold a rally that day (10:30 am) at the National Press Club in protest of the Government ban on the publication of Dainik Desh and retrenchment order served on the journalists press workers and the general employees of the daily by its management; for pre-fixed meetings of the student, see the DUCSU convention on on 1st October 1990 where 12-points action programme announced; the pre-fixed meeting of the ALWC on 24th March 1988; the meeting of professionals on 27th February 1988 at Dhaka Press Club, and poem festival of the poets on 02 February 1988 and the like.

³⁶ The objective of these meetings was to inspire the new generation to learn about the sacrifice of their antecedents, which in turn, reinforced the movement in progress. For the meetings of condolence and death anniversary, see the *Bangladesh Observer* 16 August 1989. The Bangladesh Awami League observed the death anniversary of the father of the nation Bnagabandhu Shaikh Mujibur Rahman. See also *ibid*, 1st June 1989. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party observed the death anniversary of its leader late President General Ziaur Rahman. See also, *ibid*, 15-17 February, 1985. The student organisations and major two alliances of the opposition political parties arranged condolence meetings and moruning rallies in protest of the killing of JCL leader Raufun Basunia in the Dhaka University campus.

³⁷ They performed mass songs, stage drama, jokes and poem recitations etc mainly in the university and college campuses and Language Martyr Minarets all over the country, which exposed the tyranny of the dictator, and inspired the masses to join in the opposition movement. In the final stage of the movement, the activities of the UCA were extended though out the country and helped to uproot the support base of the dictator in the country side. For example, see the theatre festival of the Dhaka Theatre in mid-November 1989 for 11-days in Mohammad Khusbu, *op.cit*, p.138. Most of the cultural functions organised on the occasion of the important days of the nation such as Independence Day, Victory Day, Language Martyrs Day and 1st *Boishakh* (Bengali New Year).

³⁸ The opposition socio cultural and political activists or bodies expressed their support for them, which always turned into a mere mass attention, when it exceeded generally more than a week. The locations of this action were normally the Language Martyrs Minaret or the premises of Press Club and DC office or other notable places of the cities. Sometimes the students observed this action in their own academic campuses. The bodies of the professionals, intellectuals and labourers linked indirectly with opposition political parties used this action as the last means to actualize their demands to the military dictator. The unions of teachers, journalists, and government and non-government employees were among other main groups, who organised hunger strikes in favour of their demands. Although it was very much an inoffensive and peaceful action in nature, generally were dispersed by the baton charges by the police following the arrest of the participants. For example of hunger strike, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 21 October 1984. The leaders of Central Action Committee of Bangladesh News Papers and News Agencies broke their 24-hours token hunger strike at 6 pm on last Saturday (1st October 1984) A total number of 17 leaders including journalists, general employees and press workers joined the hunger strike to press the demand of withdrawal of ban on the publication of Dainik Desh, warrant of arrest against two journalists and publisher of the Daily and lay-off order by the Dainik Desh Management. See also *ibid*, 25th October 1990. Many students under the banner of Bangladesh Chatra Kallyan Sangstha observed a one day token hunger strike on 24th October 1990 at the premise of National Press Club in protest of Presidential ordinance that had closed down the educational institutions all over the country. They were demanding the immediate reopening of the educational institutions all over the country. See also *Ibid*, 14 November 1989 in which opposition backed 9-student parties including JCD backed SAS and pro-CPB BSU took up the fasting programme as part of their action plan simultaneously announced on 10 November 1989. Their demands included the end of campus violence and

resignation of General Ershad, etc. See also, *Ibid*, 2nd November 1989. Begum Zia with her party's central leaders had participated in a token hunger strike on 1st November 1989 at Mukhtangan, Dhaka. See also, the hunger strike of the students in Sylhet on 6th May 1990 for the release of Bighit Choudhury—a veteran student leader who was in jail with 40 false law suits against him.

³⁹The time and locations were scheduled earlier by leaders and participants of the action. The responsible leader used a loud speaker to deliver the announcement and sometimes, whistles were used to give the signal for the beginning and finishing of the action. The participants were mainly the supporters of the political parties, intellectuals and general masses of the society. They stood side by side and fastened their hands with each other, which produced a long chain of people on the roadside and stayed at a standstill in this way for 30 minutes to an hour.

⁴⁰ Artist *Patua* Kamruul Ahsan originally hailing from village *Narayanga* of *Kalna* Subdivision of *Burdwan* district was born on December 2, 1921, in Calcutta in a respectable Muslim family. He graduated in Fine Arts from the Calcutta Art College in 1947. He settled down in Dhaka and joined the Government Institute of Art, which was later renamed as the College of Arts and Crafts. He played a pivotal role in establishing the Art College under the leadership of *Shilpacharya* Zainul Abedin. He earned his name and prominence as a very distinguished painter through using folk Motifs in his works. He held the first solo exhibition in Lytton Hall of Dhaka University in 1951. He designed the National Flag of Bangladesh, the official monograms of Bangladesh government. He built three main den sculptures for Bangladesh Biman, Bangladesh Bank, Parjatan Corporation and Muktijuddah Kallyan Trust. He died on 2nd February 1988. For details about his life and works, see *Bangladesh Observer*, 3rd February 1988. He was regarded as one of the pioneer leadership of the cultural movement against the military regime of General Ershad.

⁴¹ The action of human chain was first introduced in the country to demand the trial of the killers of the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rhaman on every 15th August, the day in which he was killed brutally with most of his family members. Then it was turned with many issues against the military rule of General Ershad. Mostly, the intellectuals including poets, famous novelist, all types of artists, authors, university teachers and social and cultural activists of the society participated in this action. The action with silent mood could touch the heart of the general mass and was able to soften the people by emotional appeal.

⁴² In the foremost cases, the participants in the procession walked one by one in two lines along the planned direction and expressed their apprehensions regarding the specific steps taken by military government. For example, the procession of the students, political parties, intellectuals, professionals and TU on the observance of 21st February—the Language Martyr Day. Moreover, the Coordinating Committee of the Professional groups and intellectuals frequently organised this type of processions in protest of different issues.

⁴³ The participants carried the banners, festoons, placards and different colourful decorations concerning the objectives of the day. These rallies were eye-catching and could attract the general masses of the society. The number of the participants at a rally depended, however, on the size of the support base of the organisation. Although the overall situations was found to be very much joyful with the sound of bands' melody, these rallies turned into a protest rally as all the banners, festoons and placards carried the anti-junta slogans along with the objectives and ideologies of their parties. For example, see the *Bangladesh Observer* 10th January 1989. The huge processions with colourful banners and posters were held on the birth anniversary of Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL). In this way, JCD, BSU and JSD, *Oikya* Forum and many other student organisations brought out rallies on the birth anniversaries. These also led an anti-autocracy oath to establish democracy in the country.

⁴⁴ In this connection, it would be worth mentioning here that press freedom was suppressed under Martial Law regulations and the professionals and intellectuals of the press community were opposed to the dictator from the very beginning of the military aggression. The opposition groups in all unions of journalists were strong enough to play a role in relation to the media. However, the dailies and weeklies of the printed media mainly came forward to expose the brutality of the dictator.

⁴⁵ For the examples of press conference, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 24 October 1989. In a press conference, on 23 October 1989, the pro-CPB, BSU accused the BCL for foiling the move for greater student unity and blamed the nine students' organisation for splitting the CSAC. See also *ibid*, 26 October 1989. In a separate press conference on 25th October 1989, the JCL called for greater unity of the students. See also, *ibid*, 15 September 1990. The leaders of three major road transports organisations in joint press conference at press club in Dhaka on 14 September 1990 announced country wide indefinite strike from 18 September 1990 to press home their six point demands. See also *ibid*, 26 November 1984, the press conference of Bangladesh Non-Government College Teachers Association on 25th November 1984 demanded the announcement of the policy for the nationalisation of college education by November 30 and its implementation by 1985.

⁴⁶ For press statement by the eminent citizens of the country, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 3 April 1987. 31 eminent persons chose to ignore the offensive language used against them by the government leaders but restated in a press statement issued on 2nd April 1987 (Thursday) for the demand of interim government under article 55 of the constitution which had no conflict with present constitutional process. Notable among those who had signed the statement were Prof. Abdur Razzak, Kamaluddin Hossain, Debesh Chandra Battacherjee, Sufia Kamal, Dr AR Mallik, Dr Nilima Ibrahim, Dr Khan Sarwar Murshid, Prof. Zillur Rahman Siddiquee, A.K.M. Ahsan, Sanaul Haque, Abdul Khaleque, ABMG Kibria, Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Kabir Choudhury, Sarder Fazlul Karim, Dr. Salauddin Ahmed, Dr. Iqbal Mahmud, Dr. Anisuzzaman, Kamrul Ahsan, Shamsur Rahman, Fayez Ahmed, Dr. Muzaffar Ahmed, Dr. Mosherraf Hossain, Mainul Hossain and Dr. Fasihuddin Mahtab. See also *ibid*, 19 July 1990. The leaders of the lawyers, university teachers, journalists and cultural activists in a joint press statement demanded the repeal of black laws including Special Power Act, Printing Press and Publications Act and Drama censorship laws. See also, *ibid*, 13 September 1990. 56 DU teachers in joint statement to press slated sending of troops to Saudi Arabia.

⁴⁷ In fact, the military authority hardly allowed the participants to reach the planned areas and set blockades earlier round the ways of action location. What happened in this regard was that the opposition participants were compelled to take the position for the stay-in strike around the blockaded location—for example, around the far ways to the secretariat, radio and TV relay centres in the capital and the DC office in the district towns.

⁴⁸ For example, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 11 October 1990. The sit-in demonstration action was observed by 8-party, 7-party, 6-party, 5-party alliances and Jamaat-I-Islami around the Government Secretariat on 10th October 1990. The streams of processions and marches from different corners of the metropolis converged at *Bangabandhu* Avenue, Northern Gate of *Baitul Mukarram* and General Post Office (GPO) area chanting anti-government slogans. However, in the mid day, police started batons and shooting on the sit-in participants continuously. Five people were killed and over 2000 other injured in a series of pitched battles between the police and political activities during the observance of this sit-in demonstration by the opposition forces of the country. The clashes were concentrated mostly at the Motijheel Commercial Area, Gulistan, Nawabpur and New Market Area. All of five persons killed in the incident had bullet wounds. Three of them were identified as Najir Hossain Jehad of Ullah Para College, Sirajgong, Zahid Hossain, a student of the Finance Department of Dhaka University and other as Monowar Hossain of Kazi Alauddin Road of Old Dhaka.

⁴⁹ For example, see *Bangladesh Observer* 2nd November 1989, the stay in strike of 127 leaders of 7-party alliance under the leadership of Begum Zia at Gulistan Square for 10 hours on 1st November 1989 see also, the *Bangladesh Observer*, 29 May 1990. 20 persons on hunger strike at the Shaheed Minar of Comilla in protest of eviction of 8000 families of 11 villages of the district, which was supported by all socio-political forces of the areas.

⁵⁰ The opposition blockaded the major high ways by destroying the small bridges; created obstacles with falling the pieces of big trees, and digging holes on the roads etc. They removed the sleepers of the rail lines that disrupted the rail network to and from the capital. The dock or port labourer groups did not allow the docking in of the launches and ships alongside the shore, which almost stopped the water and naval communication all over the country. This was not a very easy task for the opposition, and they had to be forceful and strategic to counter the forces deployed by the military administration. For example see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 28th November 1990. Normal life all over the country came to a halt on 27th November, Saturday, following road and rail way blockade by opposition alliances and parties. The day was marked by sporadic violence in the city and elsewhere in the country. Leaders of the 8-party and 7-party alliances took their positions on the main road in front of the Science Laboratory, Dhanmondhi, Dhaka. All over the country, the action was organised successfully by the opposition forces.

⁵¹ This action involved several objectives. First, the political objective of the *hartal* was to dislocate the military junta from the general masses of the society. The sixth sense that was developed by picketing, marches and gatherings of the opposition forces were able to motivate the people against the corruption, inefficiency and atrocities of the military dictator. Second, the social objective was more significant. The action of hartal created more mass involvement. All corners of the society—top to bottom, upper class to lower class, and business elites to landless floating people—were involved in this action. Subsequently, the junta and his associates became unwanted hateful group that was socially isolated. Third, the economic objective was very cruel and carried a huge financial setback in the national economy. In the domestic account of a hartal day, due to the disruption in the export-import business, service and entertainment sectors, transports and industrial sector etc, the country lost billions of currency in a financial year. The intense use of this action let down the foreign investment that also led domestic loses. This however, according to the objective of the opposition,

detached the junta from the direct involvement of international bourgeoisie or multinational companies to extend their business in Bangladesh. Hence, the opposition used it repeatedly to keep incessant economic pressure on the military dictator. The distresses of the landless class day labourers, who earned their livelihood by manual labour, i.e. rickshaw pullers, porters and the like became helpless as they had no work for day long, for which, they had to starve occasionally at nights. However, this class was allowed to work during the long hours' *hartal*. But interesting enough, this class was also a significant participant in the political activities during the *hartal* hours. Fourth, the cultural objective of the *hartal* was distinctive. The action made it clear that politics was for politicians, not for the armed forces. The political workers practiced a culture of political action i.e. marches, gatherings, peaceful picketing, whereas the army practiced a culture of repression i.e. baton charge, arrest, shooting, killing and chaos. The two distinct cultures by the two actors, however, revealed the acceptance of a courageous resistance of political workers among the general masses of the society. It was established that the culture of the army institution was to fight external forces, not to create any chaos in the domestic politics. Even the culture of chaos in the Army leading to the cruel repression on their own people frightened the youth of the new generation in the 1980s that discouraged them to choose the Defence as their future carrier.

⁵² The Tokys (street urchins) were the despised floating children, 5-14 years old, who, in fact, did not have any guardian and were displaced from their shelter or homestead. The social background of these children was very heart-rending. They were grown up as the remnants of the city life. They did not have any connection with schooling and did not have either adequate food nor proper dress up. In most cases, they had rare connections with their mothers who lived in the street or in the slum and their fathers left them with their mother or died. They had been growing up in the street of the cities in a huge quantity in the 1980s Bangladesh society. They became sometimes very important component of the actions to be successful. As they do not have food or money to buy food, they were given food or very small money to participate in the actions. Especially, in the days of the actions like *hartal* and use of violence, in the very stiff situation, they were used as the carriers of violence elements and could easily use it on the law and order forces. In this way, when they became habituated with the actions in the streets, they willingly participated in all actions especially, in the actions of protest marches and *hartal*. In the *hartal* days, although it was immaterial and less important, but a very cruel and real fact, these urchins of the street (first 10-12 in number, then became in huge number within hours) started slogans in the early dawn before the veteran picketers of the political parties had been in the street. In most cases, they were always in front or in the side of violent processions and had many instances of being killed and injured along the political workers in the wake of police shooting on the marches.

⁵³ For details of the Dhaka Siege action organised by the all alliances and parties of the opposition democratic forces, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, *Daily Ittefaq*, *Daily Sangbad*, and *Daily Bangler Bani* of 11-19 November 1987. The action was called by the opposition forces to overthrow the military administration of the dictator by closing all networks between the capital and rest of the country. According to the instruction, the opposition forces marched towards Dhaka on 10th November 1987, which was obstructed by huge deployment of junta forces including army, police and BDR. In the ensuing violent clash and shooting by the forces of junta on peaceful marches for democratic aspiration, many uncounted participants were killed in which 4 was exposed to press and thousands others got injuries. In protest, there was continuous *hartal* observed from 12-19 November, 1987, which was marked by the thousands of opposition leaders to be arrested including the house arrest of Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Begum Zia of the BNP.

⁵⁴ See the *Bangladesh Observer*, 9 December 1984. The main opposition alliances called upon the people to observe the non-cooperation action and urged to stop payment of land revenue, tolls on hats and bazaars and municipal and union parishad taxes. See also, *Bangladesh Observer*, 29 December 1984. The two day meeting of the Organising Committee of the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) called to intensify the ongoing non-cooperation movement against the military regime of General Hussein Muhammad Ershad.

⁵⁵ See, *The Bangladesh Observer*, 31 December 1984. The advisory committee of the BAKSAL called the people for carrying forward the civil-disobedience movement for the realisation of five-point demands.

⁵⁶ For many events, see the *Daily Bangler Bani*, *Daily Khobar* and *Daily Songbad*, from 4-7th December 1990. The events of the removal of portrait and photos of the dictator in the wake of mass uprising in 1990 are worth mentioning here. From 1st December to 6th December 1990, the portraits of the junta were damaged and ablaze. However, the students of the universities and colleges pull down many portraits of the junta from the offices of VCs and Principals in a number of events during their movement.

⁵⁷ For marches of the students of the Arts Institute of the University of Dhaka, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 16 April 1990. They students brought out huge grotesque processions that carried different pattern of caricatures criticising the military junta and many cultural symbols of the nation.

⁵⁸ For example of the *Gherao* by student forces, see *Bangladesh Observer*, 15 November 1990 in which the APSU on 14th November 1990 observed countrywide *Gherao* of Union, *Upazilla* and *Zilla Parishad* offices to press for various demands including the repeal of Educational Institutional Ordinance 1990. The resignation of the military dictator, reduction of fare on transport and release of detained student leaders were also included as their major demands. The APSU units across the country commenced their day's programme with hoisting of black badge and flags and holding rallies in educational institutions. In the capital itself, the unified body of all student organisations brought out processions which marched towards the office of the Deputy Commissioner at the Johnson Road, Dhaka. See also, *Ibid*, 19 April 1987 in which the 7-party alliance observed the action to *Gherao* offices of the Deputy Commissioners in all districts of the country on 18th April 1987 for the realisation of their 15-points demands. See also, *ibid* 14 October 1989, the 8-party alliance announced *Gherao* of *Upazilla Parishad* all over the country.

⁵⁹ Although the supporters of the dictator organised several pre-caution gatherings in different locations in this secure area, thousands of students' marching from the university campus and different city areas to the *Montri para* just compelled them to run away from the scene. However, the crackdown by troops cordoned the secure zone from any kind of damage. For the example of the *Gherao* of the Ministerial residential area by students, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 18 November 1990 in which the APSU brought out marches with thousands of the students to the Minto Road, the designated and secured residential area of the cabinet members of the military administration on 17th November 1990. Pitched battle with exchange of Gun shots and bomb explosions between the students and supporters of the ruling JP disrupted the city life during the *Gherao* action. The angry students set fire to five vehicles and three motorbikes of police and damaged the police box near the Science Laboratory crossing and also a BRTC double Decker was set ablaze in front of New Market. The Sicily.a Chinese restaurant was ransacked near Jonaki Cinema Hall during their sporadic clashes with police and ruling JP workers on the day. The students also stormed and destroyed a pro-junta Bank Employees Federation's gatherings in front of Sheraton Hotel. It was assumed that all residents of the ministers became emptied in fear of this action of the students on that day., See also, *Ibid*, 10 December 1989 in which the 7-party alliance observed *Gherao* action around the office of the Bangladesh Biman on 9 December 1989 on their part of nation-wide anti-corruption campaign. See also *ibid*, 21 December 1989, the same alliances observed *Gherao* around the Ministries of Food, Agriculture, Industries and Education on 20 December 1989 on their part of anti-corruption campaign.

⁶⁰ For example, see the *gherao* of VC resident of the University of Dhaka by the JCD on 5th February 1987 in protest of the arrest of their 12 leaders from the Hazi Mohammad Muhasin Hall, and at one stage, they attacked on the resident of the VC. For this, see Mohammad Khusbu, *op.cit*, pp.55-56. See also, the *Gherao* of the VC office by the BICS at Chittagong University on 4th September 1990. Mohammad Khusbu, p.153.

⁶¹ In fact, all strikes of students, along with other issues, always include their prior demand for the resignation of the junta and to begin the process of democratic rule in the country.

⁶² For example, see the student strike of the JCL—the student wing of the BKSAL in Dhaka University on 30th November 1986 in protest of the government withdrawal of law suits and all charges against the killers of Raofun Basunia who was killed on 14th February 1985 by the pro-junta student groups. This student strike was supported by all other student organisations and alliances in the opposition. For this, see Mohammad Khusbu, p.42.

⁶³ For example, see the student strike of all major student organisations on 13 December 1982 in protest of the Education Policy formulated by Majid Khan Commission. See also the student strike in educational institutions on 14th March 1986 in the capital and on 16th March 1986 all over the country for the release of the student leaders arrested in the wake of the events related to the death of JCD secretary Mahbubul Haque Bablu in a bomb blasts in Dhaka University. For this, see Mohammad Khusbu, p.15 and p.61.

⁶⁴ For example, see the student strike called the CSAC and SAA on 1st July 1987 in protest of the increased tuition fees for the students in higher educational institutions all over the country. For this see *Daily Sangbad*, and *Daily Angler Bani* 2nd July 1987. p. 1

⁶⁵ For example, see the strike of the JCD on 16 August 1988 for the withdrawal of the expulsion of the JCD leader Sanaul Haque Niru from the University of Dhaka. However, this strike was protested by the CSAC and the University Academic Environment Council also requested to the JCD to abstain their demand. For this, see Mohammad Khusbu, pp.102-03.

⁶⁶ For the examples of the strikes flowing student clashes, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 4 October 1989. Following a student clash between the BCL(H-A) and JCD on 3rd October 1989 in the Dhaka University campus, the JCD called student strike in protest of violence by the armed hooligans of the BCL. See also, *Bangladesh Observer* 13th February 1989, the CSAC called strike in Dhaka University Campus in protest of the attacks of the JCD on the processions of the girls' students on 10th February 1989 on the wake of victory of the CSAC in the DUCSU election.

⁶⁷ For the strike due to clash between the anti-communal student forces and BICS, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 20 September 1989 in which the general students of the university of Dhaka under the banner of all anti-communal student organisations observed student strike on 19 September 1989(Tuesday) in the Dhaka University in protest of ransack and damage of Institute of Social Welfare and Research (on Monday) by the BICS, the fundamentalist and anti-liberation forces of the country. See also, *ibid*, 3 September 1989 in which the JCD observed strike on 2nd September 1989 in all educational institutions in the capital in protest of the killing of their veteran worker, Habibur Rahman Kabir by the BICS at Jahangir Nagar University, Saver, Dhaka

⁶⁸ For example, the strike of the student organisations on 14th March 1987 in protest of the police raid and repression of students at Dhaka University on 11-12 March 1987. See *Bangladesh Observer* 15 March 1987.

⁶⁹ For example, see the student strikes on the wake of clash between pro-junta student groups and opposition mainstream student organisation in Dhaka University after the killing of Raofune Basunia—a prominent JCL leader on 13th February 1985.

⁷⁰ For example, see the student strike on 6th December 1989 called by International Student Union to open the schools of Palestine that captured by the Israel. This strike was also observed in Bangladesh by the opposition student organisations and their alliances.

⁷¹ When the demonstrators reached the locations, the sounds of the closing of the gates of the entrance and other protective measures by the authority created a horror in the whole area. It was a rare event if any official came out to face the demonstrators to give any consolation on their demands. The gatherings, almost always, lasted not more than an hour. For example, see the *Daily Sangbad*, 15th February 1983. The students organised the demonstration around the Ministry of Education Building in protest of the New Education Policy of the military government. In the event, some students were killed and many other injured in the wake of police shooting on the demonstration.

⁷² For setting fire on transports and vehicles, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 12 August 1989. The unruly mobs burnt and damaged 22 vehicles through out the day in protest of attack on 23 Dhanmondhi Mujib's residence widely known as Bangabandhu Bhavon by unknown gunmen where the AL chief Sheikh Hasina had been living.

⁷³ Personal Interviews of the researcher with the CSAC leaders including Mr. Akhteruzzaman, VP, DUCSU, Mr Mostafa Jalal Mohi uddin and Mr. K.M. Jahangir of the BCL (J-J), Mrs. Shirin Akhter of BCL(Inu), Mr. Fazlur Rahman of BCL (F-C). The CSAC leaders informed the researcher that the veteran students of their organisations took part in the risky operation from the under ground to throw bombs on the military patrolling, especially in the areas of the capital and divisional cities where most of public universities were located. In these operations many members of the junta forces were injured.

⁷⁴ Personal interview of the researcher with a CSAC leader, who did not want to be named. It was reported, some members of the military on patrolling were trapped and abducted by the guerrilla insurgencies and later, at least one of their dead bodies was found in the hitch of the city. As there was strong press censorship, this news of the brave activities of the students of Bangladesh against the military rule could not be published.

⁷⁵ In opposing these armed hooligans employed by the military dictator, the opposition youth and student participants had to collect illegal arms to forge a counter attack. It was, however, true that the illegal arms became a part of the opposition action against military administration that frequently led to gun battles resulting many casualties in both sides. For example, see the gun battle between APSU supporters and Niru-Ovi group patronized by junta forces on 25th November 1990 in the morning in the Dhaka University campus and around the Bangla Academy to Education Building area in the evening. In this battle, the dictator group ran way the scene in the face of huge protest by the APSU. For this see *Daily Ittefaq* and *Daily Inqilab* 26th November 1990. See also, the battle between CSAC supporters and pro-junta student groups on 13th February, 1985 around A.F. Rahman Hall at the University of Dhaka, in which pro-junta students factions used guns against the opposition students' organisation. This resulted the killing of Raofune Basunia, a veteran JCL leader and MSS student of the sociology department of the University of Dhaka. cite example of the gun battle between the opposition and JP supporters or police

⁷⁶ For example, the opposition forces pulled out rail line at Tongi near Dhaka on 12th November 1987 after the police atrocities in the opposition Dhaka Siege action on 10th November 1987. The researcher himself was staying in this area at that time. See also, the pulling out the rail line on the occasion of the opposition actions—'Railpath, Rajpath and Pani Path Avorodh' on 27th October 1990. For this, see *Daily Sangbad* 28 October 1990.

⁷⁷ For example, among many other such events, Mr Mizanur Rahman Choudhury, the Vice Chairman of the pro-junta *Jana Dal* party was badly humiliated and assaulted at the midnight 21st February 1984 at Central Shahid Miner on the observance of National Language Martyr Day. The opposition student forces made him naked, however, later rescued by the junta forces.

⁷⁸ For example, see the cultural functions on the occasion of the observances of Language Martyr Day (21st February) 1st *Boishakh* (Bengali New Year) and victory day (16th December). These national level cultural programmes were organised mostly in the superb of the Dhaka University campus. These popular songs included the traditional folk songs, Najrul Shangeet (songs written by famous poet Nazrul Islam), Robindra Shangeet (songs of Robindranath Tagore). These reflected themes of socio-cultural life of the Bengali people as well as reflected their heroic events in the history of struggle for nation-building and liberation of the country.

⁷⁹ The students of the Arts and Craft Institute and painting and solo artists of the country organised these caricature and grotesque marches mainly on the observance of Bengali new year (1st *Boishakh*, mostly 14th April in English). This attractive and huge participated grotesque marches carry many effigies and caricatures that reflected the repressions of the junta.

⁸⁰ For poetry festival, see the *Bangladesh Observer*, 2nd February 1988 in which the two days Second National Poetry Festival began on 1st February 1988 (Monday) at the TSC crossing of Dhaka University with a clarion call to turn the grief of the language martyrs into strength for the ousting of the military regime. The main theme of the festival was poetry against autocracy. The country's eminent poet, Begum Sufia Kamal in her address to the festival regretted that there was no justice in the country as lawyers were passing days in the dark cells of the jail. She called upon the youth of the country to come forward with courage to fight the autocracy.

⁸¹ The graph 7.4.2 is constructed according to the statistics of the table 7.4.1. below:

Table 8.4.1: The frequencies of four major actions by years 1982 -1990

Year	Four Major Actions of the Movement				Total of Four Actions by year
	Protest March	Meeting (public)	Hartal /strike	Use of Violence	
1982	0	0	1	1	2
1983	9	34	5	11	59
1984	40	109	16	23	188
1985	4	26	8	10	48
1986	33	67	25	41	166
1987	36	42	34	48	160
1988	39	90	20	51	200
1989	32	85	66	75	258
1990	62	107	54	64	287
Total freq. of each action	255	560	229	324	1368

Sources: Collected by dates from *Daily Ittefaq*, *Daily Sangram* and *Daily Sangbad*, 1982-1990

⁸² In the first year of the military rule in 1982, there were no actions at all due to stiffer press censorship and the ban on political activities. The indoor politics was allowed by junta from 25 March 1983 to 1st September 1983. From September 1983 to December 1983 under the relaxation of the ban on opposition political activities, there were found some frequencies of actions in which public meetings were found higher than rest of three actions, however, overall frequencies of the actions were still lower in the year 1983. Comparatively, the frequencies of all major four actions became very high in the year 1984 in which the frequency of public meetings (109) was found very high followed by the protest march (40). The number of *hartal* and use of violence was also higher in this year following an increasing trend for the rest of years except the year 1985. It was only because of the absence of the ban on politics in the year 1984 in which there were huge protests against the Upazilla election and in favour of the opposition demand for JS polls. The unity of the opposition forces in this year was also very strong, which led the higher frequency of all actions. Overall, public meeting was the most likely actions followed by protest marches in all the years of the movement from 1982 to 1990. Comparatively, the frequencies of these two actions have been found higher in 1984 and 1990. The frequencies of these four actions became lowest ever in 1985. Almost all the year of 1985—March 1985 to December 1985—was under the ban on political activities and there

were also cyclone disaster in May preceding the calm political mood leading to a lower frequency of actions. In 1986, although there was a split in the opposition unity in the wake of JS elections in which the AL led 8-Party alliance joined and the 7-Party and 5-Party alliance boycotted, the trend of increasing frequency of these actions was continuing where the public meeting followed by protest march was still dominating. The *hartal* and use of violence were comparatively higher in 1986 than all previous years which continued up to 1990 in addition to meetings and marches. In 1986-87, the unity of the opposition was worst that continued up to 1989 in the same level. However, the *hartals* and strikes became higher in 1989 distinctively. This was only because, there was frequent clash between student organisations that ascended the student strikes—especially the protest of progressive student forces—both of BCL and JCD against the fundamentalist BICS was significantly higher. The overall trend of these actions unveils the fact that the *hartal* and strike and the use of violence were the growing use of actions by years against the dictator while the protest march found, more or less, static between the years 1986 to 1989 and the public meeting was found to have no clear dimension, although the frequencies of this action were always dominating. However, in the end of 1990—from October to December, when the opposition unity was very strong—the student forces became united under the APSU and therefore, the movement was getting strength—in fact, in these four months of 1990, more or less 90% actions of the year for all four actions were organised that was continuous and spontaneous, which ended with the mass upsurge.

Chapter Nine The Leadership of the Movement

9.1. Introduction

The leadership is the fundamental concern of any movement that concentrates on any change of power in the society. The leadership of the democratic forces in the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh against the military regime of General Ershad was a dichotomous exertion of two women leaders of two opposing opposition political parties. The two supreme leaders, Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Begum Khaleda Zia of the BNP, had some intrinsic worth of charisma that was achieved from their own political performance as well as from the political background of their family dynasty. The two women leaders had some parallel—painful and emotional—setbacks in the ways they were sworn into political leaderships.¹ The socio-economic background of the two did not differ much as both of them inherited an upper middle class position by status—but had a sense of proletarian grace in their livelihood.² Both were born and brought up prior to general civilian environment, although Sheikh Hasina had more popular connection since her father was a genuine public figure while Begum Zia had also some sorts of public image as she was arrested and held as a ‘prisoner of war’ during the whole period of liberation war in the Pak army barrack in Dhaka while her husband Major Zia was genuinely leading a sector command of the liberation war of Bangladesh in the battle field under the supreme leadership of *Bangabandhu*. In this connection, her acceptance was further accelerated as General Zia, the Army’s own man, was a member of the military institution that was built as a popular Army through the liberation war. These similarities of the background of popular images between the two leaders could be a formative force for an affirmative union of the opposition forces, which, however, did not happen due to their diverse political as well as ideological background.³ This difference leading to the failure in the unity of the opposition forces was considered as the serious limitation of the foresight and grave disadvantage of the leadership that developed major frustrations in all stages of the movement. This situation was considered by the leading intellectuals of the country as the ‘crisis of leadership’ in the opposition forces.⁴ Consequently, the evaluation of the political leadership became a matter of civic concern in the wake of different issues related to their success as well as failure in the movement: their personality, leadership performance, experience, stand on issues, level of non-cooperation with regime and the popular political decisions they took during the movement period. The conflicts between the two central leaderships of movement were,

however, overcome by the effective and genuine functioning of different sectarian leaderships as of student community, trade unions, intellectuals and professionals groups of the society, who were competent enough, at critical stages, to establish control over the whole movement leadership. In particular, the diverse student bodies beyond their direct affiliations with contrasting political parties had a genuine aspiration for the removal of the military dictatorship. These sectarian leaderships had to play a greater important role over the frustrating central political leadership. This was also seemed to be interesting to describe the fact how the various level of leaderships of the movement were acting from center to periphery, urban to rural and '*Teknaf theke Tetulia, Rupsha theke Pathuria*.'⁵ The analysis of the divisions between the leaders—in addition to political forces, is, therefore, also necessary to uphold the genuine contributions of the students, youths, intellectuals, professionals, trade unions, peasants and many other socio-cultural forces in the movement for restoration of democracy.

9.2. The Division of the Leaderships

The strong and effective division of leadership in the opposition democratic forces had a greater function in organising the successful movement. The intra-party or intra-organisation leadership structure, according to their division of work and command, could be seen in two functional dimensions: vertical and horizontal structure.

9.2.1. Vertical Dimension of the Leadership

In the vertical dimension⁶, all types of leadership, in particular, the opposition political parties had have five stages leaderships pattern—from top to bottom—in accordance with the division of local government units i.e. central (capital), city (divisional), district level, *thana* (police station) and union or ward. All of the actions of the movement were designed, planned and announced by the key leaderships under the central command, which were coordinated and followed by all of the five stages of leaderships. Each of these stages had also the own power to organise any action on their local issues, which in foremost cases, took place in accordance with the permission of the central command. Although, the vertical dimension of leaderships involves mainly the political forces, a number of socio-cultural forces including students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions had also the same functional division of leadership in organising the actions of the movement.

9.2.2. Horizontal Dimension of the Leadership

The horizontal structures of leaderships were mainly the expansion of each vertical unit leadership paralleled to the horizontal line in different magnitudes—associated groups, which follow the role importance and the division of work of the

leaderships. This horizontal expansion was mainly integrated into the wings of students, youth, women, peasants and the labourers and workers of political parties. In some cases, professional and intellectuals bodies were also found to be affiliated with the main political forces. Each of the five stages—a unit of the vertical leadership had their own scope to form the horizontal leadership through the individual wing of students, youths, labourers and workers, women and peasants committee. The numbers of the members of these leaderships' committees were always pre-designed. All vertical stages of the parties and organisations maintained their own horizontal characteristics. In contrast, all of these horizontal components—student, youths, women, trade unions or any other occupational or professional groups—in an individual point of view—could form and expand their command in the vertical dimension. Although every vertical unit maintained individual horizontal wings of different forces, the student leaderships were more functional as if in the educational institutions; professionals and intellectuals in their respective government and semi-government set ups while the labourers and workers leaderships were found more effective in the industrial base.

9.2.3. Interaction of Vertical-Horizontal Leadership

All types of leaderships including political parties and alliance, students, trade unions, women, youths and peasants or farming labourers were diversified under their own separate leadership, and were coordinated with the central and supreme political leaderships of the movement. Consequently, when the supreme command or central leadership announced the actions from the capital, this was strictly followed through the vertical stages along with their horizontal wings to the lowest unit of the UP command and in this unique manner, leaderships in all these stages were involved to organise the actions through out the country. The communication of the announcement of actions, first, followed the all vertical stages up to the grass root UP unit and secondly, was again expanded through the horizontal wings. The horizontal wings also carried out the announcement through their own vertical units, for examples, students followed the command through their committees in the center-city-district-thana-UP and unit of educational institutions, however, the similar instructions came from the vertical units of professional, intellectuals, women and trade unions of the society. At one stage, this seemed to be the cyclical process of interaction between the vertical and horizontal leaderships, although the beginning of the command used to follow absolutely the vertical dimension of leadership (see below: Figure 9.2.3).




Figure 9.2.3.: The interaction between the horizontal and vertical leadership.

9.2.4. The Command of the Leadership

The vertical and horizontal structures of the leaderships were always controlled by the supreme and central leaderships of the movement through their subordinate stages and wings up to the bottom of the Union level units. Every subordinate stage followed the instructions of the immediate upper vertical stage leaderships in this regard. In the Bangladesh case, the major two opposition parties along with their leftist allies maintained this sort of the chain of command in organising the actions of the movement. In the part of the controlling the subordinate stages and wings or branches, the supreme

leaders enjoyed extra ordinary power to the formation of the new leadership or cancellation of any leadership following the disciplinary actions against the concern stage or units of the political party or socio-cultural organisations. In this process, many leaders of the opposition forces become opted out while they seemed to have engrossed in the cooptation of junta administration.

9.2.5. The Formation of the Joint Leadership

The formation of the alliances with like minded groups and parties was a unique phenomenon in opposition forces that gave birth to a structure of joint leadership in the decision making process, which developed a consensus of sharing the power in a unified political formation. The individual or the top level leaderships of each of the member parties of the alliances were included in the joint leaderships. This kind of joint leadership was found more effective in forging stronger movement as well as activating and practicing the democratic values between them, although the principal leadership of the alliance was focussed according to the strength of the support base of their party. The development of the 15-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances of opposition political parties, the APSU of the student community and the SKOP of the trade unions or the PROKRICHI of the professionals (doctor, engineers and agriculturist), BCS Coordination Committee etc had developed this kind of joint leaderships in the movement.

9.2.6. The Formation of the Liaison Committee Leadership

The formation of the Liaison Committee with the potential leaderships between the individual political parties or alliances was also a crucial phenomenon in the analysis of the division of leaderships of the movement. The joint leaderships of the diversified political parties and alliances used to take a uniformed decision to organise the actions in joint endeavour in wider unity of the opposition forces. In this regard, the strategic leaders of the political parties and alliances formed a committee, and maintained liaison among them in the crucial stage of the movement. In the Bangladesh movement, there was an effective Liaison Committee between the 8-party, 7-party and 5 party alliances. They held many meetings, secretly or openly, to formulate the plan and schedules of the joint opposition actions against the military dictator. This type of joint leadership under the formation of the Liaison Committee in Bangladesh democracy movement was an effective alternative to the failure of the unity of whole opposition forces. These liaison leaderships might be considered as a last hope—linking the ways to maintain least amount unity between the diversified opposition forces—the basis on which they were able to formulate plan and organised the actions together.

9.3. The Key Leaderships of the Movement

The Bangladesh movement was not able to give birth to a single supreme leadership as the divergent opposition forces could never be united under a single platform against the military dictator. The key leaderships of the movement were therefore formed on the basis of each individual political party and in a more stretching way, there developed a joint leadership under the structure of coalition or alliances. This limitation of the political parties led to the formation of many sectarians' leaderships from students, trade unions, professional and intellectual groups who also became important to play key role in leading the movement, however, they were always in touch with the major political parties. Overall, the leaderships of the major political parties, the AL and the BNP, were able to keep the supremacy over the all other sectarian movement forces in their individual line of liaison. However, key leaders of the movement were divided into eight categories: supreme leaderships, alliance leaderships, strategic leaderships, leaderships of students (APSU) leaderships of the trade unions (SKOP) and peasants groups, leaderships of the youth groups and leaderships of socio-cultural forces.

The executive heads of the two major opposition political parties, i.e. Sheikh Hasina, the President of the AL and Begum Khaleda Zia, the Chairperson of the BNP, were considered jointly as two *supreme leaderships* of the movement. They played the decisive roles in determining the dimensions of the movement. They led the major two alliances in the movement: Sheikh Hasina for the 15-party and Begum Zia for the 7-party alliance. The *alliance leaderships* consisted of the executive heads of all opposition political parties under alliances other than the AL and the BNP i.e. in most cases, Presidents for right wing political parties and Secretaries for the left wing political parties. Under the 15-party alliance, the main leaders of this category included Comrade Forhad, Saifuddin Ahmed Manik of the CPB, Professor Mozaffar Ahmed, Pankaj Bhattachargia of the NAP, Abul Basar and Rashed Khan Menon of the WPB, Kazi Aref Ahmed, Hasanul Haque Inu and Shajahan Siraj of the JSD, Mohiuddin Ahmed and Abdur Razzak of the BKSAL, Advocate S.M. Nurul Islam and Alhaj Abdus Samad of the Gono Azadi League, Nirmal Sen of Samajbadi Dal, A F. M Mahabubul Hauque and Mirza Sultan Raza of the BSD, Comrade Khalequzzaman Bhauiya and Najrul Islam of the UCL were worth mentioning. A detail of the leaders for shadow cabinet of this alliance had also been come under public attention in 1984.⁷ Under the 7-party alliance Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Shamsul Arefin Khan of the UPP and Sheikh Showkat Hossain Nilu were notable leaders. Details of possible shadow cabinet of this alliance came under huge discussion in 1984.⁸ Among Islamic parties, Moulana Abbas

Ali Khan, Motiur Rahman Nizami and Delwar Hossain Saidi of the JIB, M A Matin of the ML (Matin), A.N.M. Yusuf, Faiz Box Kaderi of ML-(Yusuf) and Hafezzi Hozoor, Mowlana Azizul Haque and Mowlana Mohiuddin of Islami Shashontantra Andolon were prominent figures of religious group political parties.⁹ Oli Ahad and Mohammad Toha of 6-party alliance were two other prominent leaders, although they did not have any effective support base. On the question of participation in the 1986 general election, 5 radical leftist parties split from the 15-party alliance under the leadership of Menon, Inu, Nirmal Sen who became later the core leaderships of the 5-party alliance. However, Comrade Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon, Hasnul Haque Inu and Abdur Razzak of this category of leadership were the dominant figures in planning the strategies and stimulating the actions and took part in all crucial decision with the supreme leaders of the movement. Moulana Abbas Ali Khan and his party JIB had distinct strategies and separate way of actions in the movement.¹⁰

The *strategic leaderships* of the movement were responsible for planning all kinds of strategies and the actions. In the party level, they were known as the nucleus members, who were exceptionally influential and senior position leaders. They were also members of the Liaison Committee of the 8-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances. The strategic leaders or the leaders of the opposition liaison committee included many second line prominent leaders of the opposition political parties.¹¹ The *leaderships of the students* under the APSU had a central role in the movement. The students' organisations were united under two broad alliances: CSAC and SAA from the beginning of the military seizure of power and continued until the formation of the APSU in October 1990, although the CSAC split in the wake of JS polls in 1986. Almost 22 student organizations were united under the banner of the APSU in which a joint leadership of the students' community formed that controlled the student movement throughout the country. Although almost all student bodies were basically the students' wings of major political parties, the 'leaderships of the APSU'¹² enjoyed all types of freedom in the formation of their own plans and strategies of the actions. The *leadership of the TU and Peasants groups* had also an important role in the democracy movement who mobilized vast working class—industrial laborers, government and non-government lower grade employees under their national alliance—SKOP. They had their own actions against the junta as well as followed directly the actions of the opposition forces. The majority leaderships of TU were attached directly or indirectly to the opposition political forces, in particular, to the leftist parties. Moreover, the labourer wings of the AL and the BNP were also the members of the SKOP. Therefore the TU leaderships always maintained a political liaison with the

central leadership of the movement for restoration of democracy.¹³ The *leadership of the socio-cultural forces* under the UCA included the famous personalities of the different socio-cultural, professional and intellectual bodies of Bangladesh society who had the vital role to bring the huge non political section of the mass in the movement against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. The leaderships of these socio-cultural forces consisted of the leaders of different professional and intellectual groups including doctors, engineers, agriculturalists, lawyers, diploma engineers, university teachers and the teachers of all level—primary, secondary and college, cultural activists, dramatists, poets, authors, all types of performers and artists including singers, actors and actress, officers of the government and non-government organisations and many others.¹⁴ The *leaderships of the youth groups*¹⁵ were mainly attached with the youth wings of the political parties who also played a key role in organising the youth movement against the military junta.


9.4. The Evaluation of the Political Leaderships

The evaluation of the political leaderships included three stage leaders of the political parties and alliances. They were supreme leaders of the movement, party chiefs of major political parties and the second rank senior and influential leaders of the political parties and alliances. In the process of evaluation, the survey interviewees were asked to evaluate the leaders with six criteria which determined their leadership choice in the movement. The six criteria included personality, leadership qualities, experience in leadership career, strength to stand on issues, non-cooperation with military dictator and capacity of taking popular decision. The survey respondents of six movement forces memberships including PP, students, intellectuals, professionals, TU and NPG were asked to grade these criterions of the leaders, listed in the table 8.3.1, by (1)like most, (2)like, (3)like least and (4) no answer .

In category one, the survey presents a comparison between the two supreme leaders of opposition democratic forces: Sheikh Hasina, President of the AL and Begum Khaleda Zia, Chairperson of the BNP. There were 'some resemblances as well as difference between the two leaders'¹⁶ in their personal political careers that influenced widely their pattern of leadership through out the movement for restoration of democracy. Even though, there had been a number of controversies between the two key leaderships regarding their failure in the formation of a united front of the opposition democratic forces for movement, the fact was that both of the two leaders—Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia had achieved a range of support and popularity among the democracy loving people of Bangladesh society.

In the table 9.4.1 the survey shows a very impressive rating for the personality of both of the two leaders, although a marginal higher support has gone in favour of Sheikh Hasina. She has gained the support of 79.6% respondents (with 57.3% like most) while Begum Zia has secured the support of 74.7% (with 51.9% like most) respondents. 14.1% respondents have rated 'like least' for the personality of Begum Zia, which was for Sheikh Hasina 11.7% only. In the evaluation of leadership performance, both of them have been considered to inspire support, although more support is found in favour of Sheikh Hasina. She has earned the support of 82.1% respondents (with 54.4 % like most) while Begum Zia for 72.8% (with 43.2% like most). The 'like least' rating for the leadership performance of Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia was, however, supported by 9.7% and 16.0% respectively. In relation to their experiences in leadership, both of them have been considered as the most insightful in their thoughts and actions in steering the movement. Nevertheless, 79.1% respondents (with 49% like most) respondents have chosen Sheikh Hasina while 64.1% (30.1% like most) considers Begum Zia as the most experienced leader of the movement. In the same attribute, 27.2% respondents have rated 'like least' for Begum Zia in comparison to Sheikh Hasina with 13.1% only. Concerning their ability to stand on the issues in the movement, the survey has given a variable verdict for both of them; although a marginal higher support is found in favour of Sheikh Hasina. She has been provided with the support of 78.6% respondents (with 51.9% like most) in comparison to Begum Zia with 73.8% (with 50% like most). However, 17% negates her position falling into the 'like least' scale following Sheikh Hasina with 13.6%. In the same way, in question to their level of non-cooperation with military regime, both of them are competing for the same position, although an inconsiderable slightly higher rating is found for Sheikh Hasina with 79.1% supports (with 58.7% like most) in comparison to Begum Zia with 72.8% (57.3% like most). Sheikh Hasina again has been with lower 'like least' rating from 13.1% only contrasting Begum Zia with 17%. In relation to the ability of taking popular decision in the movement to achieve the trusts of the people, Begum Zia has gained the genuine support of 73.8% respondent (with 54.9% like most) followed by Sheikh Hasina with 77.2% (with 53.9% like most) support. The 'like least' rating has been left in favour of Sheikh Hasina with 14.6% contrasting that of Begum Zia (16.5%).

Table 9.4.1: The Evaluation of the major political leadership of the Movement



Graph 9.4.1: Leadership comparison between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia according to the respondents in terms of six leadership criteria.

The most noticeable trend of the survey is that respondents are mainly interested to evaluate the two key leaders, i.e. Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. They are found comparatively less interested to evaluate the leaders other than these two prime leaders of the movement. This trend is reflected for category two with more than 25% to 63% without any rating; however, they were also able to achieve satisfactory ratings for all of these leadership criteria.¹⁷ In category three, the leaders in the senior position of the main line opposition parties mostly from the AL and the BNP were supposed to be comparatively more accepted by the respondents. Although 50%-60% respondents did not evaluate them, their level of acceptance, however, has achieved the limit of all standards set for them.¹⁸

The relationship between six movement forces membership in all criteria of leadership are more likely for Begum Zia than that of Sheikh Hasina, although Sheikh Hasina, in general, won the opinions for her weight of personality, leadership performance, experience, stand on issues and non-cooperation with military junta while Begum Zia won the verdict for her capacity of taking popular decision..

9.5. Social Background of the Movement Leaderships

In the post independent years, two distinct political and business elites have been developed on the basis of a more progressive orientation—in both senses of either capitalist democracy or socialist-leftist ideas. In both sides, a richer section grew on the basis of capturing enemy property—left by the West Pakistani bourgeoisie and their local collaborators. The development of these two distinct

political currents in the ruling elites fell soon into conflict in which the socialist and leftist forces was thrown out of power by the military coup in 1975 in support of bourgeoisie section in the background. Under the post 1975 administration of the military regimes of General Zia and General Ershad, another richer section was in the process of the formation of new power elites—most of them were from the quarter of military and civil bureaucracy.

For the first time, General Zia floated his BNP with a significant number of retired members of the army and civil administration along with a section of ultra leftists from the NAP and the UPP as well as anti-liberation forces of the ML and extreme rightist faction of the post independent AL government. The new power elites—dominated by military-turned politicians became the owners of huge wealth irrespective of their positions in the party—from centre to periphery leaders. General Ershad was the representative of the same quarter—what was the difference from his predecessor General Zia was that he was cleverly able to manage all these new elites—keeping them with him in cabinet and administration as well as giving them business outside. Although the BNP lost some oldguard in the rise of new junta—Ershad in power, but did not face any problem to running their business and capital safely staying in opposition—as they were the similar characters of interest. On the other hand, the opposition AL, which was out of power since 1975 and were under stiff repressions by military regimes of Zia and Ershad became set free following the relaxation of Martial law in the country after the General election of 1986. The thousands of AL and leftist workers and leaders who got the break to return to the normal life considered at any rate as the genuine participants of all actions, and posed a huge threat to the existence of military dictatorship within next two years. A group of neutral civilian businessmen and industrialists were developed as partners of the leaders of military richer sections as well, who became in the internal competition and conflict while they were not able to compete with military business groups, had also turned their support in fuelling the opposition movement. This pattern of capitalist and bourgeois class configuration was effective in patronizing a movement against the military dictatorship. However, the more change of this class is required to the effective practise of democracy in the society. In fact, the sense of capitalist development and its ensuing conflict—in any sense and shape—was not matured yet in western sense, but a ‘locally-fitted symbolic constructive’¹⁹ presence of this class and ensuing conflict in the class structure surely was able to steer the movement for democracy.

A noteworthy characteristic in the transformation of the political elites into the bourgeois class in third world authoritarian nations are always required to be ruling class in which they are found to increase their wealth by illegal influence on government machineries. The formation of the political elites—especially the

military turned politicians—as they were the owner of the guns and uniform in addition—were found to have huge assets while they were attached with the ruling party. Almost all of the leaders of major opposition parties—at least in the cities and towns of Bangladesh society were found to have this basic characteristic. Almost all the opposition parties in the movement for democracy were ruling parties at least once since the Pakistan period so their financial circumstances were sound enough to maintain them and their parties. For example, the ML was the main partner the ruling civil military government of Pakistan—a significant leaders and workers joined the BNP in later stage, which also ruled the country until the take over by Ershad. The undivided AL was in the provincial government of the East Pakistan under UF and again was in power until 1975 in the independent Bangladesh. Many radical leftists joined either to BNP or took the incentives from the military regime of General Zia. The JIB and some other IPs were also the partners of ruling military government of Pakistan who were also richer section of the society. Only some leftist components in the opposition including CPB, JSD and WPB and the like were not solvent enough to lead them and their parties as well, but their militant forces of cadres added a revolutionary surge in the movement along with huge lower class and lower middle support base of the AL. Hence, the financial circumstances of the opposition political elites were protected enough to provide the expenses of the movement. Therefore, the main opposition political elites—of the AL, BNP, JIB and ML—were in the process of bourgeois development while they were leading these party institutions and was able to provide the financial security of the movement in which their lower class mass supports along with the huge leftist militants workers provided the ideological, spiritual and uncompromised participants for the movement that was functional enough to uproot the military dictatorship of General Ershad in Bangladesh.

The social background of the leaderships of different political parties was not different from the usual socio-economic circumstances of the third world countries. Most of the senior leaderships of opposition political parties were from the far-flung rural socio-economic background. Although their life styles through their educational qualifications and occupations adapted to urban culture, they could never be segregated from their original traditional values of the rural agricultural society. Comparatively, younger leaders those who participated and organised the liberation war in their students and youth age, were faster to change their life style from the rural backgrounds. However, this social context of the leaderships was changing very quickly in the touch of the opportunity for education, urban utilities and westernised life style of the cities. This was found in the comparison of the differences of change in family pattern, occupation and livelihoods etc of the leaderships. The size of the households of the political leaderships was different

from generation to generation leaders. This size of their families was found greater, (5-10) in the leaders who were brought up in the pre Bangladesh period than that of the young leaders (1-4) who were grown up in their career in the post Bangladesh period.²⁰ The monthly expenditure of the livelihood of the leaders was taka 7000-15000 in an average, which was the income of upper middle class in Bangladesh society. In the sense of third world patrimonial society, the father of the majority leaders were land lords, school teachers, business men, servicemen and advocates; majority of them were not agreed to provide the market value of their own property and other investments; all of them had own telephone and majority of them had cars and homes in the capital city and some of them paid more than 3000 Taka for rent, which was also considered as the upper class rental expenditure.²¹ Although, each of the leaders had a parental home in the village, they used to live in the city. All of these middle range leaderships had at least graduation from the universities and were settled in the city. It was widely believed that they were more habituated with informal income than formal earnings. The informal incomes mainly included the money that they received from the businessmen, servicemen and foreign agencies for the expenditure of political activities for which, in fact, there was no process of declaration.²²

9.6. The Success and Failure of the Leadership

The immense achievement of the leaderships of the opposition democratic forces was to throw out the military dictatorship of General Ershad from power by a mass uprising in the form of an urban revolution. By contrast, a huge failure of the leadership was 'not to bring the military leaders and their civilian collaborators under trial' for their illegal act of aggression into the state power and their crimes against humanity—killings and jailing and destroying the lives of a number of thousands of political workers, unlimited spread of corruptions in every sphere of society and wild repressions on the peaceful masses. In this regard, the leaderships failed to consider the possibility of a further intervention or else pressures with inevitable further influence on the civilian rule from the same quarter as these state terrorists escaped punishment. This developed into an enduring risk in the growing democratic norms and values of the society. The unprecedented success of the principal leaderships was to build up a charisma, both for Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia, among their own supporters and workers of the party and in the same time, they failed to restore a unity of leaderships and to stand together in public voices under a single platform for the united movement in response to the popular expectation of the participants of the movement as well as general mass of the society.

The success of the opposition leadership, in particular, for the leaders of the AL and the BNP, was to create the strong support base of their parties from urban

vicinity to the rural periphery through their struggle for democracy. Since being sworn in as President of the AL, Sheikh Hasina struggled to return in the constitutional rule through election. For the AL leadership, since the party was out of power for almost a decade, it was popularly accepted for them to participate in the general election of 1986 that was widely believed to retain its support base all over the country. The party needed to increase the grass root support base which depends only on the participation in the elections. Until 1990, the AL leadership allowed its periphery leaders to participate in the *Upazilla* and UP elections that basically organised the party in the rural periphery. However, Sheikh Hasina was praised as a very strategic leader to keep the military dictator under pressure both inside and outside the parliament until the dissolution of the JS in the end of 1987. By contrast, since her election as the Chairperson of the BNP in 1984, Begum Zia was able to stop the flow of the party leaders joining with junta side. Since then, she slowly organised her party and the brave decision of her non-participation in the election of 1986 under military regime had developed—for her party and herself—a huge popularity in the youth and student sections of the society. Until 1990, she was able to achieve her party acceptance to the all possible power elites including military and civil bureaucracy of the country. The popular image of the leftist leaderships and their attached students and TU leaderships were the key element of the violent and non-violent protest. Also, the leaderships of all quarters including PP, students, intellectuals, professionals and TU reached their maturity in the beginning of 1990 that did not compromise with the movement and made it all success in the removal of the junta from power.

The leaderships of the leftist political forces, above all, the leaders of the CPB, JSD, WPB, BKSAL and the *Samaj Badi Dal* were always considered as experienced, dynamic and strategic in planning the actions of the movement. The leaderships of their students and TU wings were more organised, articulate and sacrificing than that of the others. Sometimes it seemed to be the fact, for the success of the hard line actions, that the true movement leadership was meant the leaderships of the leftists. The JIB and some IPs' leaderships were the innovators of the religious fanaticism in the movement. Although they were on the side of the movement, they in fact made stronger the position of military dictator who also followed a phoney life style in the line of religious zeal that implanted the seeds for the rise of fundamentalism contrasting the 'communal harmony in the society'—the main spirit of the Bengali nation that had been brought up since the creation of independent Bangladesh. However, the opposition leaderships of all of the secondary and tertiary stages—intermediate and peripheral organisers of the actions at the divisional, districts and thana (sub districts) levels—through movement—became well capable to resist the

autocracy independently, who could be regarded as the new architects for the advancement of the democracy in Bangladesh society.

9.7. Conclusion

In all consideration, the leaderships of all stages of the movement—from the capital to UP or central to peripheral or principal to tertiary—were successful to organise a historic mass upsurge *vis-à-vis* the urban revolution that resulted in the overthrow of an autocratic military dictatorship from the edge of power interior of Bangladesh society. It was the fact that the politics of Bangladesh opposition forces in the beginning of the 1980s started with completely new hands in leaderships in comparison with the experienced form of the military intrigues—that had grown-up in the wake of clutches of coups and counter coups involving both of the local and international patronisation in the illegal capture of the state power. However, these new leaderships—especially Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia, however, became experienced shortly through the movement for democracy and repressions of the junta—harassments, house arrests, batons and tear gases and shootings, losing hundreds of workers and witnessing the pools of blood and discarded bodies. Beyond these two supreme leaderships, there were some notable strategic and alliance leadership in opposition forces, most of them from AL and leftist parties, who led the liberation war of the country, posed a real threat to the military intrigues for their existence in power. The supreme leaders were more accepted as the emotional icons for the unity of the parties and participants of the movement while these strategic leaderships could be considered as the architects of the success of the movement. The absolute credit for the unity of opposition movement that ousted the junta must be conferred to the APSU leadership. However, in the final stage, the opposition leaderships were found to have been in a compromising state to leave the culprit military leaders under immunity of trial that left a threat from the same quarters for the future growth of democracy in Bangladesh society. Let it to be left for the potential aptitude of how the political leaderships and military of the country would interact in the process of democratisation.

Notes

¹ Sheikh Hasina, a daughter of *Bangabandu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of independent Bangladesh who was assassinated in his period of Presidency in a military coup in August 1975. This dark and painful event was however, treated later as a capitalist move of the country from the ongoing socialist reform by Sheikh Mujib, one of the ever popular leader of the world political history. Sheikh Hasina, the first daughter of Sheikh Mujib, was elected President of her father's party AL in 1981 while she was in abroad in Great Britain. On the other hand, Begum Khaleda Zia, a widow of General (Rtd) Ziaur Rahman, who was one of the pioneer field commander of the liberation war of the nation, later President of the country and was able to gain popularity in building an alternative political approach with his BNP. He was also killed in a similar military coup in May 1981. Begum Zia was sworn in as the Chairperson of her late husband's party, BNP in 1984.

² The socio-economic background of the AL leader Sheikh Hasina belongs to an upper middle class phenomenon. Since the grand father of the AL leader Sheikh Hasina was in a clerical job in a court

under British period, thereafter the generation of Sheikh Mujib, as a popular leader, did not have any possessions, and as President of the country, his whole family was killed except the survival of his two daughters and as a leader of party, Sheikh Hasina had to struggle against the military rule. In this socio-economic formation, she was a member of middle class inherited by status as well as a proletariat leader in the sense of her financial condition. On the other hand, the position of Begum Zia was not so much up to date, although she was a widow of an army officers leading a luxurious life style of socio economic background of General Zia and Begum Zia were not satisfactory. Both of them originated from a middle class farming background of the rural Bangladesh. General Zia, being a junior officer as Major, joined liberation and thereafter, the economic situation of the nation as well as our military was not as much as satisfactory that Zia could be able to earn a huge possession. In this sense, Begum Zia was also a member of upper middle class by status and might have a feeling of proletarians in his leadership.

³ The differences between the two parties are mainly ideological. Moreover, the AL had been suffering from bitter experiences of the repressions under the military regime of General Zia, which were the events of recent past for them. These things did not allow both of the two parties to be close in the movement.

⁴ Ahmed Nur-e- Alam, "The Discussion of the CPB with Intellectuals— Only the Crisis of Leadership is the Main Problem of the Opposition Forces" in *The Weekly Bichitra*, 16 March 1990, p.19.

⁵ Teknaf is the last south-east border location of the country while Tetulia in the North-west. In the same way, Rupsha is last west-south Border River of the country and Pathuria in the East-north. The verse has covered here the whole geographical boundary of the country.

⁶ For example, in the vertical structure of leadership, the AL under the central command of Sheikh Hasina is divided into five stages: Central Executive Committee, divisional city committees, district committees, Thana Committees and union/ward committees. Seemingly, the BNP and other parties are also divided into same stages leadership from center to grass root of the country. All of leaderships of the movement including students, intellectual, professionals and trade unions were also constructed in the same way, which was mainly centred on the leadership of the political parties. However, the major parties including AL and BNP have one or more upper layer leadership over the central committee, such as, presidium and advisory board for the AL and standing committee for the BNP, polite bureau for CPB and Majlishe Sura for JIB and other Islamic parties.

⁷ Please see *The Weekly Bichitra*, 16 September 1984, p.25. A possible shadow cabinet of the 15-party alliance has been published here in which the name of major leaders of this alliance include Sheikh Hasina, Abdul Malek Ukil, Syeda Johra Taj Uddin, Abdus Samad Azad, Abdul Mannan, Dr Kamal Hossain, Abdul Momin Talukder, Tofael Ahmed, Mohammad Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon, Syed Altaf Hossain, Professor Mozaffar Ahmed, Surunjit Sen Gupta, Mohammad Toha, Shajahan Siraj, Nirmal Sen, Khalequzzaman, Mirza Sultan Raza, Mohiuddin Ahmed and Abdur Razzak.

⁸ *Ibid.*, A possible shadow cabinet of the 7-party alliance include the names of Begum Khaleda Zia, Shah Azizur Rahman, Barrister Moudud Ahmed, Kazi Jafar Ahmed, Abdul Matin, K.M. Obayedur Rahman, Sirajul Hossain Khan, Anwar Zahid, Saifur Rahman, Zahir Uddin Khan, Col. (Rtd.) Mustafizur Rahman, A.K.M. Zia Uddin, Mazedul Haque, Dr AR Gani, Barrister Salam Talukder, Mostafa Zamal Haider, Kazi Mujibur Rahman, Barrister Sultan Ahmed, Jamal Uddin Ahmed, Col.(Rtd.) Waliur Rahman, Dr Akhtaruzzaman, Aminul Haque Bishwas Tipu and Farida Rahman.

⁹ In the leadership of the JIB, Ameer—Mowlana Abbas Ali Khan, Deputy Ameer—Motiur Rahman Nijamee, Dhaka City JIB—Ali Ahsan Mujahid, Abdul Kader Molla, Azharul Islam and Senior member of the Central Majlishe Sura—Mowlana Delwar Hossain Saidee and Muhammad Kamruzzaman.; For Islamic Shashon Tantra Andolon, Ameer Mowlana Hafeezi Hozoor and Naebe Ameer, Mowlana Allama Azizul Haque and Senior Leader Moulana Mohiuddin; For divided Muslim League, MA Matin, President of ML(Matin), Mowlana ANM Yusuf (President) and Faiz Box Kadri (Secretary) of ML (Yusuf) were prominent political figures.

¹⁰ Some times, the leadership of the JIB followed the schedule of the actions of the mainstream opposition forces. As they were regarded as the anti-liberation and collaborating forces and were completely isolated from all the mainstream political parties of the opposition, the leaderships of this party were not allowed to gain entry to any alliance of the opposition forces. In any case, the JIB chief Moulana Abbas Ali Khan was considered as a close ally of the right wing BNP leadership Begum Zia.

¹¹ Among them, the most notable strategic leaderships of different parties and alliances included Abdus Samad Azad, Syeda Johra Tajuddin, Abdul Mannan, Dr Kamal Hossain, Zillur Rahman (Presidium Members), Sajeda Choudhury (GS, AL), Amir Hussain Amu (JS), Tofael Ahmed (OS), Sheikh Fazlur Rahman Salim, Salauddin Yusuf, Motia Choudhury, Mohammad Nasim and Mozaffar

Hossain Paltu of the AL¹¹; KM Obaidur Rahman Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder (SG), Barrister Rafiqul Islam Mia, Saifur Rahman, Col(Rt) Mustafizur Rahman, Major General (Rtd) Mazid-ul-Haque, Col.(Rt) Oli Ahmed., Col (Rt) Akbar Hossain, Barrister Nazmul Huda, Abdul Matin Choudhury and Jahanara Begum of the BNP; Comrade Shaidullah, Comrade Mujahidul Islam Salim, Nurul Islam Nahid, Monzurul Ahsan Khan and Shamsuzzoha of the CPB; Ahmedul Kabir, Shurunjit Sen Gupta and Peer Habibur Rahman of the Gonotantri Party; Kamal Haider, Fakir Abdur Razzk and Professor Abdul Hafiz of the NAP; Sharif Nurul Ambia, Mainuddin Khan Badal, Nazrul Islam, Mahmudur Rahman Manna, Siddiqur Rahman, Bimol Bishawas, Comrade Sushanta Das, Khorshed Alam, Abdullah Sarker, Comrade Tipu Bishawas Haider Akbar Khan Rano of the 5-party alliance; There were also some prominent organising leaders of the opposition democratic forces in the divisional cities of the country. In Dhaka, Mozaffar Hossain Paltu (President), Abdul Aziz (GS), Mohammad Hanif and Mofazzal Hossain Choudhury Maya of the AL. In Chittagong, M A Mannan (President.), ABM Mohiuddin Choudhury (GS), Md. Ishaq Mia, Ataur Rahman Kaiser, and Akhteruzzaman Choudhury Babu of the AL; Md. Ekramul Karim Choudhury and Abdullah-al-Islam Noman (President), M Kofil Uddin, Sirazul Islam and Golam Akbar Khondoker of the BNP, Shahe Alam and M A Wahab of the CPB, Ahsan Ullah Choudhury, Abdul Hye, Kamal Azizul Haque, Nuruddin Zahid Monzu and Advocate Abul Kalam Azad of 5-party-A were distinguished opposition leaders. In Rajshahi, Ad. Mozaffar Hossain (President), M Moniruzzaman(GS) and Khairuzzaman Liton (OS) of the AL, M Kabir Hossain (President), Mizanur Rahman Minu(GS) and Saleh Uddin Baby(OS) of the BNP, Mohsin Pramanik of the NAP, Mohammad Nasim and Mohammad Shafiqur Rahman, Fazle Hossain Badsha and Liakat Ali Liku were prominent leftist leaders. In Khulna, Md Monzurul Imam (President), Sheikh Haroon-or-Rashid(Secretary), Talukder Abdul Khaleue and Mostafa Rashidi Suza of the AL, Sheikh Razzak Ali(President), M. Nurul Islam(GS) and Shajalal Bablu of the BNP, Sheikh Moniruzzaman, ABM Nurul Islam and M Hafizur Rahman of the left-wing parties were prime organisers of the actions as strategic leaders of the opposition movement.

¹² The central leaderships of the APSU included Aman Ullah Aman, Khairul Kabir Khokon, Habibur Rahman Habib, Ashim Kumer Ukil, Mustafizur Rahman Khan Babul, Nasiruddoza, Nazmul Haque Prodhan, Shafi Ahmed, Jahir Uddin Shwapan, Nur Ahmed Bakul, Mostafa Faruk, Bazlur Rashid Firoj, Jahangir Satter Tinku, SM Kamal Hossain, Akhter Sobhan Masroor, Moshrefa Mishu, Abdus Satter, Aminul Islam, Anwar Hossain Mintu, Obaidullh Sagar, M A Awal, Faizul Hakim, Razekuzzaman Ratan, Abu Bakar Iqbal, Kazi Shafi Uddin and Mukhlesur Rahman.¹² In the divisional cities, there were some prominent APSU leaders, who organised the students in the movement. In Chittagong, Nazim Uddin, Azim Uddin, Rafiqul Islam Khokon, Sadek Hossain, M Razekuzzaman, M Mansur Ahmed and Md. Mamun were prominent student leaders of the APSU. In Rajshahi, Mr Haroon-or-Rashid, Ragib Ahsan Munna, Ruhul Kuddus Babu, Md. Rabiul Alam Budu, Helal Uddin, Salauddin Baby, Nafiqul Islam Setu and Shariful Islam Babu were worth mentioning. In Khulna, Mr Shameem Reza, Rafiqur Rahaman Ripon, Mr Ruhul Azim Rumi, Mezbaul Razon, Shameem Ahsan, Ismail Hossain, Lahuar Rahman, and Moniruzzaman were notable traits among others in organising the students' movement.

¹³ The central leaderships of the SKOP during the period of whole movement period, above all, in the mass upsurge against the military dictator included Mohammad Toha (), Habibur Rahman Siraj, Dinen Sen, Kamrul Ahsan, Ayubur Rahman, Mahmudur Rahman Manna, Golum Mohiuddin (BSL-AL), Choudhury Haroon-ur-Rashid, Saifuddin Ahmad Manik (TUC), Shah Atiul Islam, Shafiqur Rahman Mazumder (TUC and President, JSF), Yakub Ali Bhuiya, Shahe Alam (Joint Secretary, Secretariat Combind Workers Union), Abdur Razzak, Abdul Wahed (JSJ), Nurul Islam (TUC), Nazrul Islam Khan (Secretray, JSD-BNP), SM Rumi (BSL-AL), Shohorab Hossain, Shariat Ullah, Shukur Mahmud, Shirin Akhter, Nurul Haque Zahid, Nasim Ali (TUC), Ali Azam, Syed Kutubur Rahman and Rafiqul Islam (President and Secretary, BTESKOP), Iskander Ali (President, JSD-BNP), Abdus Salam Khan (TUC), Wazi Uddin Khan and Shajahan Khan (President and Secretary, Bangladesh Road Transport Federation), Mukhlesur Rahman (President, BSSF), Protap Uddin(TUC), Fazlul Haque Montu (BSL-AL), Dr Wazedul Islam Khan (GS, TUC), Abdullah Sarker (SSF), Abdul Matin Master (BSL-AL), Ahsan Ullah Master (Joint Secretary, BSL-AL), Abul Basar, Abul Hossain (JSF) Mezba Uddin (JSJ), Manzurul Ahsan Khan (TUC), Habibur Rahman Khan (Vice-President, Bangladesh Transport Labourers Federation), Abdur Rashid (Secretary, Bangladesh Transport Labourers Federation) Ray Romesh (Secretary, Bangladesh Track Shramik Union), Ramesh Chandra Sheel (Joint Secretary, Bangladesh Transport Labourers Federation), Rehan Uddin (JSJ, Adamjee Jute Mills), Abul Hossain, Khan and Rafiqul Islam,

¹⁴ The leading intellectuals of the country those who had a very active participation in the movement for restoration of democracy included Poet Sufia Kamal, Patua Kamrul Ahsan, Professor AR Mallik, Professor Kabir Choudhury, Professor Ajoy Roy, Justice K.M. Sobhan, Justice Kamal Uddin

Hossain, Faiz Ahmed, Dr Ahmad Hossain, Kalim Sharafi, Gaziul Haque, Dr Khan Sarwar Murshid, Dr Zillur Rahman Siddiquee, Barrister Moinul Hossain, Poet Shamsur Rahman, Professor Sarder Fazlul Karim, Professor Anisuzzaman, Artist Kaiyum Choudhury, Artist Rafikkunnabi, Bazlur Rahman, Professor Rangalal Sen, Professor Sirazul Islam Choudhury, Professor Saa'd Uddin, Professor Moniruzzaman Mia, Professor Zahurul Haque, Professor Abul Kalam Azad Choudhury, Professor Sultana Shafi, Professor Durga Das Bhattachargia, Professor Abdul Mannan (Chittagong), Professor Anupam Sen (Chittagong), Professor Abdul Khaleque (Rajshahi), Professor Abdul Kader Bhuiya (Rajshahi) Zahanara Imam, Belal Choudhury, Dr Muntasir Mamun, Poet and author Syed Shamsul Haque Poet Nirmalendu Goon, Poet Mohadeb Shaha, Syed Hassan Imam, Shahariar Kabir, Kamal Lohani, Poet Rudra Muhammad Shahidullah, Ali Zaker, Aatur Rahaman, Maidul Hasan, Shahidullah Khan Badal, Sheikh Muhammad Shahidullah, Engr. Shahidullah, Aziz Meher, Binod Das Gupta, Abdul Matin Khan, Professor Mansoor Musa, Ramendu Majumder, Ferdousi Mazumder, Dr Enamul Haque, Lucky Enum, Nasir Uddin Yusuf Baschu, Pijush Bandopadhyay, Asaduzzaman Noor, Hashem Khan, Mamunur Rashid, Jamal Uddin Hossain, Golum Mostafa, Shubarna Mustafa, Humayun Faridi, Fakir Alamgir, Professor Humayun Azad, and Professor Abul Kashem Manzoor Moshed, Golum Kuddus, Panna Kaiser, Kamruzzaman, Poet Muhammad Samad and many others. Most of these intellectuals leadership were the Persona Greta—famous personalities of the country: famous poets, selection grade professor of the university, eminent authors and columnist, journalists, dramatists, TV artist, singers, and leaders of the United Cultural Forces (UCF). In broader sense, the UCF included primarily a non-political educated, skilled and cultural groups and sections of the society—regarded as cultural and social activists—more specific, a new dimension in the formation of the civil society. The intellectuals included all civic quarters—professionals and interest or pressure groups in the sense when they were involved outside the primary business related to their specialised field. In Bangladesh, all of these professionals and skilled interest groups were also treated at one stage as the intellectuals of the society, mostly under the banner of the UCF through out the country. The prominent professional leaderships of country included Advocate Shamsul Haque Choudhury, Dr Kamal Hossain, Barrister Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Barrister Amirul Islam, Advocate Ozaer Farook, and Syed Altaf Hossain of lawyers' groups. Among them, Advocate Shamsul Haque was the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association and also convenor of the United Professionals Struggle Committee which was formed in the early 1990. Advocate Ozaer Farook was the General Secretary of Supreme Court Bar Association. Barrister Syed Istiaq Hossain and Dr Kamal Hossain, Barrister Amirul Islam and others were also the leaders of different national level lawyers association. In the final stage of the movement in the 1990, the 13 national level teachers' organisations together formed United Teachers Movement (UTM) in which Professor Iazuddin was the Convenor who was the President of the Dhaka University Teachers Association (DUTA) at that moment. The others members of the UTM included Professor Nurul Amin Bapery (in-charge General Secretary of the DUTA), Professor M Akhtaruzzaman (President, Bangladesh College-University Teachers Associations), Professor A.N. Rasheda (Joint Secretary, Bangladesh College-University Teachers Associations), Md. Badruddin Howlader (President, Bangladesh Secondary School Assistant Teachers Associations), Nazrul Islam (Secretary General, Bangladesh Teachers Associations), Professor M Shariful Islam (Secretary General, Bangladesh College Teachers Association), Dr Muhammad Shahidullah Talukder (Secretary, Bangladesh Agricultural University Teachers Association), Dr Alauddin Ahmed (Secretary, Jahangir Nagar University Teachers Association), MA Jalil (Secretary General, Bangladesh National Teacher Associations Federation), Fazlur Rahman (President, Bangladesh Primary Teachers Associations), Md. Khalilur Rahman (Bangladesh College Teachers Association), Professor Abul Kashem (Additional Secretary General, National Teachers Association Federation.), Dr Salim Jahangir, Hena Das, Mrs. Sufia Khatun and Abdul Karim and many others: Professor Mujibur Rahman, Professor Yusuf Sharif Ahmed, Professor Zoinul Abedin, Professor Abdur Razzak, Professor Abul Kalam Azad, and Professor Abul Hassem., M. Muzaffar Hossain, of the Federation of University Teachers and the United Teachers Movement; The leaderships of the BMA included Professor Dr MA Mazed (President, BMA), Dr Mostafa Jalal Mohiuddin (Secretary General, BMA), Dr Shamsul Alam Khan Milon (Joint Secretary, BMA killed), Dr MA Hadi, Dr Rashid-I-Mahbub, Dr Sarwar Ali (Chittagong), Dr Ibrahim Hossain Choudhury Babul (Chittagong), Dr Abdus Zalil (Chittagong). However, Dr Milon was killed by an unknown arms hooligan on 27th November 1990. Through the killing of Dr Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, the mass upsurge against the dictator got momentum and the military leader was compelled to leave the power. There were also many active BMA leaders in divisional cities who organised the professionals' movement through out the country. The leadership of the engineers included Professor Anwar Hossain (President, Institute of Engineers, Bangladesh (IEB)), Eng. Abul Kashem (Vice-President, IEB) and Ibrahim Mia (Secretary, IEB, Dhaka Centre). The

leadership of the Bangladesh Economical Association included Professor Mozaffar Ahmed, Professor Rehman Sobhan, Dr Atiur Rahman, Dr Abul Barakat as economists; The leadership of the NGO movement included Fazle Hossain Abed (BRAC), Kazi Farook Ahmed (PROSHIKA) and Shafiqul Islam (ASA) under the ADAB; the leaderships of the journalists included Md. Riaz Uddin Ahmed (President, BFUJ), Mozammel Haque, Shafiqur Rahman, Amanullah Kabir (Secretary, BFUJ), Jahurul Haque (President, DUJ) and Ruhul Amin Gazi (Secretary, DUJ), of the BFUJ and DUJ; the leadership of agriculturalists included Dr Mirza Abdul Zalil (President, Bangladesh Agricultural Institutions), Abdul Mannan, Badiuzzaman Badsha and others of agriculturists institutions;

¹⁵ On 17 November 1990, eight leading youth organisations of the country formed the Juba Sangram Committee (Youth Struggle Committee) and announced 14-point actions programme against the military dictator. The central leadership of this Youth Struggle Committee included Mostafa Mohshin Montu and Fulu Sarker (Youth League-AL), Mirza Abbas and Gayesshor Roy (Youth Dal-BNP), Mahbub Jaman and Muhammad Helal Uddin (Youth Union), Nurul Fazal Bulbul and Mujibur Rahman Choudhury (Jatyo Jubo League), Fazle Hussain Badsha and Anil Chandra Moron (Bangladesh Jubo Moitree), Pijoosh Benerjee and Farook Ratan (Bangladesh Jubo Oikkya) Parimal Guha and Ruhul Amin (Jubo Oikkya Samittee), and Altaf Ali Hasu and Ayub Khan (Jatyo Jubo Oikkya)

¹⁶ Both of them inherited political leadership as to function of their dynasty in the politics of Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of the country's founding father Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was assassinated in a military coup in 1975. During this brutal event, she was in abroad and took political shelter of the British government for the period until her return to Bangladesh in May 1981. Before her return home, she was elected President of the AL in the early period of the same year. On the other hand, Begum Khaleda Zia is the widow of the late President General Ziaur Rahman, who climbed up in the state power in the wake of clutches of coups after the first military coup in 1975 and was also assassinated in a further unsuccessful military coup in the end of May 1981. After Zia's death, his BNP was still in power and had been suffering from a leadership crisis. It fell into conflict among several factions of the party under the leadership of Justice Abdus Satter. Begum Zia as the symbol of unity, well accepted to major factions, however, took the charge of the BNP in 1984 and slowly encapsulated the control of the party. The two women leaderships, who were representing the two antagonistic political dynasties, were however, accepted by a Muslim majority society of Bangladesh and were able successfully to lead the movement for democracy against a vicious military dictatorship of General Ershad. But the prehistory of the AL and the BNP were completely poles apart which did not allow them to make it possible for the unity between the two parties through out the whole period of the movement. The AL was originally born at the aim of protecting the interest of Bengali population under a new colonial state of Pakistan. It grew up with a Bengali nationalist sprit and gained colossal popularity among the Bengali population that led, in fact, the birth of Bangladesh. This party was, no doubt, the pioneer of an independent nation and the reign of the party was stroked and ended with the killing of its leader Bangabandhu in 1975. By contrast, the BNP was born on the strength of the unusual change in the state power in the post 1975 politics of Bangladesh that was largely supported by the pro-Islamic groups and defeated forces of the liberation war of 1971.

¹⁷ Comrade Forhad of the CPB has been evaluated as the most accepted leader in the second line key leader followed by others in the category two. Respondents of the survey evaluated his personality as up to medium (59.2% with 28.6% like most), leadership (58.7% with 25.7% like most), experience (60.2% with 34.5% like most), stand on issues (55.4% with 21.4% like most), non-cooperation with military regime (54.9% with 23.8% like most) and popular decision (53.4% with 18% like most). The 'like least' rating for his all these criteria is ranging from 12% to 18% while 28% around were not interested to evaluate him. The second accepted leader in this category is Rashed Khan Menon of the WPB. The survey has evaluated his personality as medium (55.9% with 21.4% like most), leadership (54.3% with 16% like most), experience (59.2% with 28.6% like most), stand on issues (53.9% with 19.4% like most), non-cooperation with military regime (52.5% with 17.5% like most) and popular decision (48.5% with 13.1% like most). The 'like least' rating for his all of these criteria is ranging from 15% to 25% while 24%-26% respondents were not interested to comment on him. Hasnul Haque Inu of the JSD and Abdur Razzak of the BAKSAL have been revealed as close to medium level leader in the survey. Inu has secured the support of 44.7% (with 14.1% like most) for his personality, 48.1% (with 10.2% like most) for leadership, 50% (with 19.4% like most) for experience, 45.2% (with 14.1% like most) for stand on issues, 44.2% (with 13.1% like most) for non-cooperation with military regime and 43.2% (with 9.2% like most) for his ability of taking popular decision. Comparatively, Mr Razzak's acceptances in these criterions are 43.7 (17% like most), 43.7% (14.1% like most), 44.7% (23.3% like most), 42.7% (16.5% like most), 44.2% (17.5% like most) and 41.3%

(11.2% like most) respectively. The 'like least' rating for Inu and Razzak in these criteria are 15%-22% and 7%-11% respectively that favours Abdur Razzak overall while 33%-35% and 47%-48% in the same order are not interested to comment on them. Interestingly, acceptance level for Moulana Abbas Ali Khan of JIB has been found very low in the survey with only 13%-20% support by these criteria. Even, more than 60% respondents were not interested to comment on him while the highest 18%-24% has rated him 'like least'. In table 8.3.2., the test statistics for category-2 shows that Comrade Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon and Abdur Razzak possessed close similarity in the strength of relationships between the same types of respondents followed by the Hasanul Haque Inu while Mowlana Abbas Ali Khan kept a considerable distance from the above four.

¹⁸ In the first consideration of this category, the respondents have supported Tofael Ahmed of the AL (37%-41%), Mr B. Choudhury of the BNP (36%-39%) Nirmal Sen of the BSP (37%-41%) and Abdus Samad Azad of the AL (35%-39%) in an average in all criteria set for evaluation. They are identified as the key policy maker of the parties as well as of the movement. The 'like least' rating for them are 6%-10%, 8%-11%, 9%-13% and 8%-12% respectively while 49-51% for Nirmal Sen and 52%-53% each for the rest of three leaders are not interested to comment on them in these criteria. In the second stage consideration, the survey has supported Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder, Secretary, BNP-SG (28%-30%), Syeda Sajeda Choudhury, AL-GS (32%-34%), Saifur Rahman of the BNP (22%-24%) and Amir Hussain Amu of the AL (22%-25%) in an average almost in all of the criteria set for evaluation. The 'like least' rating for them are 14%-16%, 12%-14%, 17%-19% and 14%-18% respectively while 'no answer' have been found for them as around 56%, 55%, 59% and 60% respectively. When the respondents are asked to name any other leaders beyond this list many respondents have considered Motia Choudhury of the AL. The test statistics in table 8.3.2 shows that the strength of relationship between the respondents of different movement forces memberships for Nirmal Sen, B Choudhury, Amir Hossain Amu and Tofael Ahmed are more likely than that of the Abdus Samad Azad, Sajeda Choudhury and Saifur Rahman leaving Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder at the end

¹⁹ See Jocelynn Linnekin, "Why 'Exporting Democracy' Is a Contradiction in Terms", a paper presented in a conference on *Exporting Democracy* organised by Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, USA, at Ascona, Switzerland, 22-24 April, 2004. pp. 6-7. Although Linnekin used the term in regard to the local socio-cultural tradition for democracy, the researcher has borrowed the term to use for the locally fitted bourgeois development prone to democracy movement.

²⁰ Elahi Neyaz Khan and Amir Khusru, "*Rajnitibidder Paribarik Jibon*" (The Family Life of the Politicians) which included a series of interviews with 24 contemporary political leaders of the country, *The Weekly Bichitra*, 8 February 1985, pp. 19-26

²¹ *Ibid*, this expenditure was accounted in 1985 that the leaders agreed in their interviews with the correspondent of the *Weekly Bichitra*, 8 February 1985, pp. 19-26

²² The more mighty the leader or the party was, the more money they were able to earn. However, sometimes these contributions were voluntary and sometimes it was forceful. Sometimes, even the big men that included high rank military and police officials, civil bureaucrat and the cabinet members of the junta administration were reported to donate money to the opposition leaders as they could be protected after the change of the regime. The military and civil bureaucrats and political leaderships both in opposition and ruling military administration had no any accountability for their sources of income. But it was widely alleged that the most of the corrupted politicians and bureaucrats were always sided with the military rule and that was teeming in Bangladesh under the military dictatorship of General Ershad.

Chapter Ten

The Analysis of Some Critical Issues of the Movement

10.1. Introduction.

The movement for the restoration of democracy went through many critical stages in its nine years journey since 1982 to culminate in success in 1990. There had been many differences between the opposition forces during this period on many issues of the movement. The divisions of the opposition forces delayed the intensification of their principal objective of the movement to restore the democratic rule in the country. Sometimes, these differences came across the controversies in their decisions regarding the plan and strategies of the movement, and even could not escape the personal wrangles between the supreme leaderships of the opposition forces. This division in political forces swelled up among the students, TU, professionals and intellectuals from central leaders to grass root workers, which undermined the aspiration for democracy of the non-political mass of the society. The divergent opposition forces took many critical decisions in the wake of uprisings that thwarted many opportunities for the forced exit of the military dictator, which created huge frustration in the constituents of the movement. This chapter is designed to investigate some key issues of the movement that developed grave discontent between the opposition forces. The major issues included pre-movement debates on the link of political parties, if any, with the military in power, the role of opposition in the student movement of 1983, the failure of the formation of UMP, the issue of the participation in the elections under the military regime, the formation of the caretaker government, the formation of the APSU, the failure of the Dhaka siege actions, the different sacrificing role of the individual movement forces and the role of the diplomatic missions in the process of democracy.

10.2. The Pre-movement Debates on the Role of Political Parties

The division of the ruling BNP that lost power with the introduction of military seizure of power by General Ershad anticipated some ambiguities about their future steps in the movement for democracy. A huge number of ruling BNP stalwarts took the side of the new junta. The opposition AL was already in the 'movement for democracy'¹ against the ruling BNP during the takeover. The debates centred on whether the ruling BNP or the opposition AL was responsible, if at all, for bringing the military into power. It was argued that the conflict between the top officials and the fragile chain of command led the civilian BNP administration to fail to rule the country. The structural weakness of the BNP—having in its fold divergent political elements ranging from the liberation forces to the fundamentalist and collaborators anti-liberation forces, were also perceived by the military junta as advantageous to their interest. The BNP—cemented mainly by Zia's military power—'protected

under uniforms’—returned automatically to the hand of Generals after its leader’s death. The conflict between Ershad and Begum Zia—as both of them were the representative of the barracks—was who would be sworn into power.² After the election as President in November, 1981, Justice Sattar was never able to be free from the control of the military leaders, and within a very short period of time, the BNP became factionalised in the hands of army coterie under the leadership of General Ershad.³ On 15 February, 1982 President Satter in his speech in the JS admitted the fact that the country was passing through a great crisis and there was rampant corruption at all levels particularly on the top.⁴ The BNP government failed to solve this crisis because ‘this party was composed of big businessmen and rural rich people in Bangladesh’.⁵ It was even reported that Begum Zia, who was nominated once as party chairman and later was forced to withdraw by Satter groups, had withdrawn her support from the Government—as it was believed that the Army Chief gave her an assurance to reinstate as President, which was later betrayed. In the course of inevitable outcome, President Satter lost all of his control over the administration that gave a passage to military leaders to takeover with the support of the right wing rebel group of the BNP, who later became the cabinet associates of the military junta. By contrast, the opposition AL along with its leftist allies was trying to restore a parliamentary democracy as they participated in the all elections under Zia and Satter administration. Being disliked by the dominant repatriated faction who controlled the Army at this stage, it was likely that the AL was not in favour of military intervention in their own interest. Moreover, it was presumed at that very moment that the failure of the Satter administration could bring the AL into power in the next general election. However, General Ershad argued that he took power with the support of both the ruling BNP and the opposition AL.⁶


10.3. The Critical Steps of the Students Movement in 1983

The debates mounted about whether the mainstream opposition political forces of the country approved the bloody student movement started on 14 February 1983 that took a number of lives in protest of the Education Policy of the Junta Government. It was found that the leaders of the opposition AL and 14 other leftist and progressive political parties went to the campus to lend their support to the student cause, but they did not endorse the strike of the CSAC in the following day. The movement spread within hours from cities, towns to rural areas, which panicked the junta administration. In this stage, it was claimed that none of the BNP or their student front supported this student movement. In this critical stage, more than 50 leaders of the opposition AL and leftist parties were arrested on 15 February 1983, while they were said to plan an action schedule in support of the student movement. On the same cause, Begum Zia of the BNP was under strict intelligence observation in her cantonment residence. Later it was claimed that the JCD, the student wing of

the BNP, became interested in forging a united action, which was not accepted by the BCL and the extreme left wing components of the CSAC, which was dominating the student movement at that time.⁷ Thus, the possibility of a grave student uprising against the junta went out of the hands of the movement forces.

10.4. The Issue of Elections under the Military Dictator

The issue of the participation and non participation of the opposition forces in the election under the military administration of General Ershad developed an indefinite series of debates in the history of the movement for restoration of democracy. In fact, the JS election of 1986 created numerous debates that stunned the ongoing movement and had developed many puzzling questions whether the participation in or boycott the election had lingered the military rule. Since the military seizure of power General Ershad tried his utmost to give a civilian contour to his regime. In this process, he was partly successful in 1986, when a very popular section of opposition group under the control of AL-A, JIB and IPs had decided to participate in the JS election designed by the military dictator. It was, however, argued that both of the opposition the AL-A and the BNP-A were agreed primarily to participate in the election. Later the BNP-A had withdrawn its decision to participate in the late hour of the deadline declared by the dictator while the AL and a major part of its alliance, newly renamed as 8-party alliance stayed behind the decision to participate in the election. This major debacle in the opposition forces merely stopped the spirit and wisdom of the movement against military rule.⁸ In the end of November 1987, the opposition bench in the parliament under the leadership of AL-A was about to resign from the parliament⁹ and compelled the junta to dissolve the JS. However, the decision of the AL-A to participate and the BNP-A to boycott had a long-standing impact on the movement which had weakened the opposition forces.¹⁰ It was also mysterious whether these two opposition parties were the victims of the tacit policy of the junta to take one in the election and keep another out of election so that the passage to power through election would be easier for the military authority.¹¹ The debates on this issue however, took a sharp turn over whether the decision of AL or the decision of the BNP was right in the course of the movement. The survey statistics in table 10.4.1 and graph 10.4.1 could also be a rich source to answer this historical debate.



Graph 10.4.1: General views of the respondents of six movement forces memberships regarding the decision of AL and BNP on the 1986 election.

The table 10.4.1 gives a clear indication that the decision of the AL-alliance to participate in the JS election of 1986 was seen as immoral by the movement forces. The decision of the BNP to boycott the election was accepted by the highest 55.8% respondents while 51.0% supports the participation of the AL. However, only 35.9% respondents disagree the decision of the BNP while a major part, 44.2% disagree the decision of the pro-election group. It further strengthens the decision of the BNP alliance and the 5-party group when 58.7% respondents disagree with the claim that the boycott of the election lingered the military rule in the country, which differs clearly with 45.6% for the decision of the pro-election group. However, only 25.2% of respondents for BNP agree with this accusation while a major section of the respondents, 40.3% agree the same content for AL.

The statistics in table 10.4.1 and graph 10.4.1 also shows the relationship between the respondents of six movement forces' memberships and their position over the issue of participation and non participation in this election. Overall, the decision the BNP for the boycott of the election was more likely, more or less, to the all groups of respondents although TU (66.7%) and NPG (60%) favoured slightly the decision of AL to participate. The intellectuals (50%) and professionals (56.7%) stand out with disagreeing the decision of the AL while PP (50%) took the middle view in this regard. However, the statistics unveiled the truth that the decisions of these two parties on election did not influence widely in the length of the military regime apart from the views of the PPs (54.3%) and students (50%).

10.5. The Failure of the Exultant Dhaka Siege Action 1987

The opposition 8-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances called a non-cooperation and civil disobedience 'Dhaka Siege' action on 10 November 1987.¹² Although the unity between the opposition forces was close and effective on the actions, there was still a lack of trusts between the supreme leaderships of the movement. On the day


of the siege, Sheikh Hasina with her alliance leaders took the position in the streets of the center of the city—Press club to Zero Point to *Gulistan Square*—in which a number of her party's veteran workers were shot dead by junta forces—while Begum Zia was found by police in the *Hotel Purbani*, a very restricted five star hotel and later she was sent back to cantonment under house arrest. On the other hand, Sheikh Hasina was arrested with her car and forcefully taken to her residence in Dhanmondhi.¹³ Moreover, all killings and the majority of the injuries of this action were by participants in the 8-party alliance. The internal doubts and mistrust of the leaderships led to the failure of this action. There might be many explanations. However, the popular explanation was that the BNP might have doubts about the sincerity of AL in the actions, and thought that this action might be a way for the AL to take any latent concession from the junta administration. Therefore, they maintained a counterfeit liaison with the 8-party and 5-party alliances. Another popular view was that the BNP never did want any popular movement against the Armed Forces as this party was born in and within the army coterie. Moreover, this was clear to the conscious quarters of politics that the dictator expected Sheikh Hasina and her party as an obliged opposition in the JS, which was not fulfilled with the AL in opposition. This led the JS to the annulment. The junta then tried to manage the BNP, the other opposition which they thought of as their own party of General Zia.¹⁴

10.6. The Failure in the formation of the UMP

The extensive differences between the two mainstream opposition forces were the central barrier to forge the UMP against the military dictator. There were frequent and severe clashes and counter activities in the opposition groups that in fact, always created the door way for the military leaders to linger in power.¹⁵ The non-communal AL and leftist progressive forces had to resist the fundamentalist JIB side by side in the movement for democracy that resulted in frequent clashes, killings and injuries between the two groups. The military junta cleverly used this conflict patronising the JIB to keep the opposition 8-party alliance under pressure that undermined the strength of the opposition in the movement. However, the main conflict was between the AL and the BNP, which was the main barrier to form the UMP of the opposition forces. Both of the parties were ideologically separated from each other and might have the issue of leadership conflict that they were not sure of who would be in power in the post-junta period. The AL always feared the BNP, the party basically guided by heavy weight retired army Generals and believed to be favoured by the Armed Forces. By contrast, the BNP was always afraid of the organisational strength of the AL. They were not happy to share power under a national government in the end of military regime—the popular demand of the grass root participants of the movement.

There were also some in-group conflicts in both of the AL and the BNP, which also influenced the party decisions regarding the movement for democracy. The AL had been suffering from factionalism of left wing and right wing groups since the independence of the country.¹⁶ On the other hand, there were two distinct factions inside the politics of the BNP, which was marked by the liberation force and anti-liberation forces.¹⁷ However, the BNP under the leadership of Begum Zia was under the firm control of the pro-liberation forces during the movement for democracy, although a significant part was still remaining as pro-Islamic forces inside the party. Moreover, the retired General turned politician group in the BNP were also a vital factor, which influenced the decisions of the movement against Ershad regime. Another important factor was that both parties were rivals since the assassination of Bangabandhu in 1975 and the AL considered the BNP as the main beneficiary of the post 1975 politics.

In general, all of these differences between the two currents of opposition political forces that were barrier to the formation of the UMP have been supported by the survey.¹⁸ The survey statistics in table 10.6.1 and graph 10.6.1 presents the relationship between six movement forces' memberships and their views about the failure to form the UMP. The students are least likely (46.7% and 56.7%) to support the 'SID between AL and BNP' and 'COL between SH and BKZ' respectively to be barrier in the formation of the UMP while the intellectuals (86.7% and 83.3%) and professionals (90% and 83.3%) have considered both as major factors for the same cause.



Graph 10.6.1: The Causes behind the failure of the formation of UMP against the military regime in terms of the relationships of six movement forces membership.

The NPG (70%) along with intellectuals and professionals (56.7% each) stands out with many disagreeing that the AL was not interested in the UMP while the NPG (67.5%), PP (60.9%) and the students (63.3%) are found distinctive in

disagreeing in this cause for BNP. The intellectuals (83.3%) and professionals (90%) are identical to support the UPC between the two parties and an 'up to moderate position' is found for PP (69.6%), TU (66.7%) and NPG (70%) while the students (53.3%) have shown comparatively a lower concern for the same factor.

10.7. The Failure of Opposition Unity in the Aftermath of Chittagong Massacre in January 1988

The brutal event of the genocide by the military junta in Chittagong on 24 January 1988—barbaric and heinous brush fires on the procession of Sheikh Hasina created a wave of united protests all over the country irrespective of parties and opinions, which produced an immediate hope to forge long expected unity in opposition movement that had lost the chance to do so. In protest of this genocide, all opposition forces observed a countrywide *hartal* on 26th January 1988 and the three main opposition alliances organised a joint rally on 30th January in Dhaka at central *Shaheed Minar* which was participated by all veteran opposition leaders including Begum Zia of the BNP, Dr Kamal Hossain and Abdul Mannan of the AL, Mohiuddin Ahmed and Abdur Razzak of BKSAL, Saifuddin Ahmed Manik of the CPB, Pankaj Battachargia of NAP, Hasanul Haque Inue of the JSD and Rashed Khan Menon of the BWP, which was turned into a popular demand for the unity between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. The thousands of participants voiced eagerly—*ai michil karo noy, ai michil janater* (this march is of none, this march is of the people), in which AL Chief Sheikh Hasina did not join. Since the attack was targeted on Sheikh Hasina, she wished to avoid the chance of further such events—in her words, 'in fear of the possibility of further brutal attack on her way to procession'.¹⁹ There might have many reasons in the dark—behind the scene, but the popular mood was expecting Sheikh Hasina to be present for the greater unity of movement, which was shattered due to her absence from the rally.

10.8. The Issue of the Formation of the APSU in 1990


The formation of the APSU was expected for a long time by all students and political forces of the country. Since the formation of the nationhood and language movement in 1952, the students of this bank of the *Bay* had developed a trustworthy position in the heart of the general mass as an imperative force of their freedom.²⁰ Once the APSU was formed on 10th October 1990—the long expecting unity of the student community against the military junta, none had taken the risk of splitting it as it would be a parallel risk to collapse the whole movement.²¹ However, in the beginning of the formation of the APSU, the popular section of the JCD under the leadership of Sanaul Haq Niru and Golum Faruk Ovi started to move against the APSU and its own DUCSU leadership. Once the situation became worse that the JCD and their DUCSU leaders were compelled to stop coming to the campus in fear,

which however, came to control within the couple of days by the united resistance of the thousands of students under the leadership of the APSU. Once it was spread that Aman Ullah Aman—the VP of the DUCSU—one of the ring leaders of the APSU was about to join the side of military dictator as he was not found for some days. However, he returned to the movement later on, and rejected all kinds of rumour against him. Besides, a strong counter faction of the BCL known as ‘pro-conference group’²² was also not in favour of the steps taken in this regard. In this way, the APSU beyond the snags from their political setback, was able to keep the opposition forces—the two arch rivals, AL and BNP—unyielding to the movement, the key role that, in fact, provided a long expected passage to democracy in Bangladesh.

10.9. The Debates on the Role of Movement Forces in the Final Stage of the Movement in 1990

In the end, the military junta was forced by a mass upsurge on 6th December 1990 to give up power to the Chief Justice of the country.²³ Although the student wings of all the major political parties including AL and the BNP were united under the single platform of the APSU, the mainstream political parties still failed to come in a united platform for movement. However, they agreed to follow similar schedule of programmes in the movement and formed a Liaison Committee to sort out the plan of actions. It seemed that the whole opposition was now keen to remove the dictator from power. It was the first time since the liberation war of the country that the student forces of the society became wholeheartedly united and promised to remove the junta and their all efforts were concentrated to achieve this objective. The trade unions of the country came to the forefront all together with students and political parties in observing the all actions. The professionals and intellectuals became involved in opposition actions with their own demands.

The evaluation of the role of the different movement forces in the formation of this great political event—the mass upsurge in 1990 is, therefore, essential in the understanding of the movement for democracy. In the event of the ousting of the dictator, the important role of all of the political forces has been primarily recognised by the survey²⁴, along with variations of the views of six groups of the respondents. The statistics in table 10.9.1 and graph 10.9.1 on the relationship between the movement forces respondents present a unanimous acceptance of the students’ credibility (100% supports) from the PP, P, TU and NPG memberships while the S and I memberships supports them with 96.7% as ‘a good deal’ to unseat the regime along with disagreeing by none.



Graph 10.9.1: The role of the opposition forces in the 1990 uprising in terms of their relationships of six movement forces' memberships.

It is interesting that the PP (95.7%), S (90%) and TU (93.3%) supports more role of the BNP-A in the uprising than that of the AL-A credited oppositely by I (93.3%) and P (100%) for same cause and the NPG (87.5%) considers an equal role for both of them. Generally, the role of 5 Party-A is recognised moderately by all forces memberships with a higher supports from S and TU memberships (80% with 'a good deal') while the JIB & IPs are unable to reach a satisfactory supports including more lower rating from TU, NPG and the I memberships (13.3% 15% and 16.7% respectively). The role of I is highly supported, more or less, in the same level by all groups' memberships allowing a comparatively lower supports from PP membership (76.1% with 'a good deal'). The P follow the same dimension of higher supports from all groups' respondents with a limitation of lower acceptance comparatively from the S memberships (66.7%) while the TU has found lower supports from the I respondents (73.3%) in comparison to the other forces memberships.

10.10. The Issue of the Formation of the Caretaker Government

The *modus operandi* of the Caretaker Government was formulated by a pro-AL lawyers group of the SCBA including Advocate Shamsul Haque Choudhury, Barrister Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Dr Kamal Hossain and Barister Amirul Islam and many others, which later was discussed and accepted in the meeting of the Liaison Committee of three main opposition alliances. On 6 November, 1990, in the afternoon, AL President Sheikh Hasina in a huge gathering of the 8-party alliance at Panthapath, Dhaka, for the first time, declared the formula of the constitutional removal of the junta regime. This later evolved into a common formula to all the opposition forces for the transfer of power to a transient administration who would be accepted by all existing political forces, in particular, by the three main opposition alliances. The complete damage of the electoral system by junta created the basis of the long standing demand of the opposition for caretaker government.²⁵

The opposition forces declared that they would not participate in any elections under a junta government and would prevent the holding of elections by any means. They would participate only in the election of a sovereign JS under a non-partisan neutral caretaker government. The main demands and aims formulated in this regard were known as '*Teen Joter Ruporekha*' (The Joint Declaration of Three Alliances).²⁶

However, there was a debate on the constitutional basis of the formation of the Caretaker Government. The dictator rejected its formation as an unconstitutional process.²⁷ As it was argued by the pro-junta group in their word, the President (junta) could never ask the Vice President to resign as he was elected by the JS and moreover, the question was raised 'what would have happened if the Vice-President had refused to resign'.²⁸ The fact was that the whole regime of the junta was unconstitutional and illegal, and there was not any scope of constitutional arguments under the constitutional provisions enacted by the junta in the face of peoples' revolution. The gun the junta once pointed to the people's back was now pointed by people to the junta's back. In the face of the mass uprising, while crowds were setting fire to army vehicles, allies of the junta fled the country, went hiding or were dragged into mass beatings to death, setting fire to their residences and offices, employees of the junta took to the street in fear; a revolution swept the country on 1st December, 1990—the realm was that the millions of the opposition forces marched forward towards the cantonment that was about to be burnt if the junta waited to resign more than 48 hours. The legacy of the Caretaker Government was that they were able to calm down the situation—a genuine and legitimate peoples' revolution and consequently, the junta and many of his army and civilian allies were safeguarded without minimum trial, which would endanger—as widely argued—the future passage of a new born democracy. In this critical juncture, there was also the point who would be the non-partisan personality to be the chief of the Caretaker Government. The whole military mechanism and some of their latent allies in the opposition forces tried their utmost to transfer the power to the Speaker of the JS—a trustworthy personality to the Army. However, popular sentiment was for a more neutral man—that was named first as the Chief Justice of the country by AL chief Sheikh Hasina with which the last effort of the heinous militia men was defeated. This enacted the people's message for them that the military must be sent to the barracks, which would be their permanent address in the process of nation building through the supremacy of political elites in state power in the practice of democracy.

10.11. The Sacrifice of the Movement Forces' Constituents

The sacrifice of the movement forces constituents mainly includes the loss of life, injuries, lawsuits, arrests, detentions and individual harassments of the leaders, organisers, workers and participants of opposition democratic forces in the course of

actions of the movement. The propensity of participation and sacrifice in the movement, however, varied between different constituents of the participants. The opposition democratic forces were divided into various constituents that consisted of different political, student, intellectual, professional and trade union groups of the movement. Although all of the opposition forces had a general stand to establish democracy in the country, the way of their thought and actions were not similar. The socio-economic status, demographic variables, class position and different political stands, urban-rural variance of the movement participants were important constituents that led to a diverse effort of their participation and therefore, made a difference in their levels of sacrifice in the movement. The survey statistics has 'primarily supported the sacrifices of the all participant constituents of the movement'²⁹ focusing on the variation of views of six groups of the respondents.

The statistics in table 10.11.1 and graph 10.11.1 also present the relationships between six movement forces' memberships on the level of sacrifices of different constituents of the participants. Overall, the sacrifice of the students is accepted by all forces memberships (100%) with slightly lower supports by PP (97.8). Regarding the political workers, the BNP-A secures more 'LOS' supports from PP (93.5%), S (90%), TU (86.7%) and NPG (92.5%) in comparison to that of the AL-A from I (100%) and P (96.7%) memberships. The constituents of the leftist participants are provided with a moderate rating from all group membership along with the highest 93.3% of 'LOS' support from TU membership. By contrast, the workers of the JIB &IPs are found with no significant sacrifices that is supported in lower proportion by all types of memberships and are distinctive in getting lowest support from TU and NPG memberships (6.7% and 7.5% respectively). The sacrifices of the TU workers are next to the students, who are provided with the higher proportion 'LOS' supports from all types of the memberships and distinctive in achieving highest supports from both of S and TU respondents (96.7% each). The sacrifices of the intellectuals and professionals have been supported by all forces memberships moderately, although the sacrifice (LOS) of the intellectuals is slightly higher than that of the professionals. In class constituents, the participants of the middle class followed by lower class advances the higher proportion supports of LOS from most memberships except I respondents as distinctive, who support equally each of two classes (90%). By contrast, the sacrifice of the higher class is supported with very lower proportion by all types of memberships, however, distinctive in lowest rating by PP(4.3%) and I (3.3%) memberships.

Table 10.4.1: The Survey statistics on the debates on participation in the election of 1986 in terms of the views between six forces membership

Factors	Type of movement forces													
	Total		PP		Student		Intellectual		Professional		TU		NPG	
	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.
The participation of AL-A	51.0%	44.2%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	36.7%	43.3%	50.0%	33.3%	56.7%	66.7%	30.0%	60.0%	40.0%
The Boycott of BNP-A	55.8%	35.9%	60.9%	34.8%	56.7%	26.7%	46.7%	40.0%	60.0%	26.7%	50.0%	46.7%	57.5%	40.0%
Dec. of AL lingered the MRE	40.3%	45.6%	54.3%	39.1%	50.0%	36.7%	26.7%	43.3%	33.3%	53.3%	43.3%	53.3%	30.0%	50.0%
Dec. of BNP lingered the MRE	25.2%	58.7%	21.7%	65.2%	20.0%	66.7%	33.3%	36.7%	16.7%	63.3%	33.3%	63.3%	27.5%	55.0%

MRE- Military Regime of General Ershad, AL-A –Awami League Alliance, BNP-A- BNP Alliance.

Table 10.6.1: The survey statistics on the causes behind the failure in the formation of the UMP in terms of the views between six forces membership

Factors	Type of the movement forces													
	Total		PP		Student		Intellectual		Professional		TU		NPG	
	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.	Agree	Dis.
SID between AL and BNP	74.8%	17.5%	69.6%	19.6%	46.7%	43.3%	86.7%	3.3%	90.0%	10.0%	80.0%	10.0%	77.5%	17.5%
COL between SH and BKZ	68.0%	21.4%	65.2%	23.9%	56.7%	36.7%	83.3%	3.3%	83.3%	10.0%	60.0%	16.7%	62.5%	32.5%
AL disagreed for UMP	41.7%	50.0%	54.3%	39.1%	66.7%	30.0%	26.7%	56.7%	30.0%	56.7%	53.3%	46.7%	20.0%	70.0%
BNP disagreed for UMP	32.5%	56.8%	26.1%	60.9%	30.0%	63.3%	46.7%	36.7%	36.7%	46.7%	40.0%	60.0%	22.5%	67.5%
UPC between AL & BNP	71.8%	17.5%	69.6%	19.6%	53.3%	33.3%	83.3%	6.7%	90.0%	10.0%	66.7%	13.3%	70.0%	20.0%

SID- Sharp Ideological Difference, COL-Conflict of Leadership, SH-Sheikh Hasina, BKZ-Begum Khaleda Zia, UMP-United Movement Platform, UPC-Unforgettable Past Conflicts

Table 10.9.1: The Survey statistics on the role of different forces in the mass uprising of 1990 in terms of the views between six forces memberships

Factors	Types of the movement forces																			
	Total		PP			Student			Intellectual			Professional			TU			NPG		
	GD	NVM	GD	NVM	GD	NVM	GD	NVM	GD	NVM	GD	NVM	GD	NVM	GD	NVM	GD	NVM		
APSU	99.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	96.7%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%		
AL-A(8-party)	84.0%	14.6%	73.9%	26.1%	70.0%	26.7%	93.3%	3.3%	100.0%	.0%	83.3%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%	87.5%	10.0%	87.5%	10.0%		
BNP-A (7-party)	90.3%	8.3%	95.7%	4.3%	90.0%	6.7%	80.0%	16.7%	93.3%	6.7%	80.0%	16.7%	93.3%	6.7%	87.5%	10.0%	87.5%	10.0%		
Sparty-A	68.0%	27.7%	67.4%	30.4%	80.0%	16.7%	50.0%	40.0%	63.3%	36.7%	80.0%	16.7%	80.0%	16.7%	67.5%	25.0%	67.5%	25.0%		
JI and IPs	22.3%	69.9%	32.6%	60.9%	23.3%	60.0%	16.7%	76.7%	30.0%	63.3%	13.3%	83.3%	13.3%	83.3%	15.0%	77.5%	15.0%	77.5%		
Professionals	81.1%	17.5%	78.3%	21.7%	80.0%	13.3%	66.7%	30.0%	86.7%	13.3%	86.7%	13.3%	86.7%	13.3%	87.5%	12.5%	87.5%	12.5%		
Intellectuals	85.9%	12.6%	76.1%	23.9%	93.3%	.0%	83.3%	13.3%	86.7%	13.3%	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%		
TU	86.9%	11.7%	93.5%	6.5%	90.0%	6.7%	73.3%	20.0%	86.7%	13.3%	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	85.0%	15.0%	85.0%	15.0%		

GD-Good Deal, NVM-Not Very Much, PP-Political Parties, TU-Trade Union

Table 10.11.1: The Survey statistics on the issue of sacrifice of different forces in the movement in terms of the views between six forces memberships

Factor	Types of the movement forces																					
	Total			PP			Student			Intellectual			Professional			TU			NPG			
	LOS	ALS	ALS	LOS	ALS	ALS	LOS	ALS	ALS	LOS	ALS	ALS	LOS	ALS	ALS	LOS	ALS	ALS	LOS	ALS	ALS	
Students	99.5%	.0%	.0%	97.8%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Labourers	88.3%	10.7%	10.9%	87.0%	10.9%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	13.3%	86.7%	13.3%	20.0%	76.7%	20.0%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	3.3%	87.5%	3.3%	12.5%	87.5%
Professionals	62.6%	36.4%	43.5%	54.3%	43.5%	36.7%	63.3%	36.7%	30.0%	70.0%	30.0%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	36.7%	63.3%	36.7%	36.7%	62.5%	36.7%	35.0%	62.5%
Intellectuals	66.0%	32.5%	39.1%	58.7%	39.1%	26.7%	73.3%	26.7%	20.0%	80.0%	20.0%	46.7%	50.0%	46.7%	30.0%	70.0%	30.0%	30.0%	67.5%	30.0%	30.0%	67.5%
Workers of AL	84.0%	13.6%	17.4%	76.1%	17.4%	30.0%	66.7%	30.0%	6.7%	100.0%	0.0%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	3.3%	83.3%	16.7%	16.7%	85.0%	13.3%	5.0%	85.0%
Workers of BNP	90.8%	7.3%	2.2%	93.5%	2.2%	6.7%	90.0%	6.7%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	10.0%	86.7%	13.3%	13.3%	92.5%	6.7%	7.5%	92.5%
Workers of Leftists	83.0%	15.0%	17.4%	78.3%	17.4%	13.3%	83.3%	13.3%	20.0%	80.0%	20.0%	26.7%	73.3%	26.7%	26.7%	93.3%	6.7%	6.7%	90.0%	6.7%	7.5%	90.0%
Workers of JIB-IPs	17.0%	75.2%	56.5%	34.8%	56.5%	70.0%	20.0%	70.0%	80.0%	13.3%	80.0%	80.0%	13.3%	80.0%	80.0%	6.7%	80.0%	80.0%	7.5%	90.0%	82.5%	7.5%
Higher class	7.8%	88.8%	84.8%	4.3%	84.8%	86.7%	10.0%	10.0%	96.7%	3.3%	96.7%	90.0%	10.0%	86.7%	90.0%	13.3%	86.7%	86.7%	7.5%	86.7%	90.0%	90.0%
Middle class	92.7%	6.3%	4.3%	91.3%	4.3%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	13.3%	86.7%	13.3%	13.3%	96.7%	3.3%	3.3%	95.0%	3.3%	5.0%	95.0%
Lower class	80.6%	18.4%	17.4%	78.3%	17.4%	26.7%	73.3%	26.7%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%	16.7%	86.7%	13.3%	13.3%	75.0%	13.3%	25.0%	75.0%
Urban area	97.6%	1.5%	.0%	95.7%	.0%	6.7%	93.3%	6.7%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Rural area	24.3%	74.8%	63.0%	32.6%	63.0%	70.0%	30.0%	30.0%	60.0%	40.0%	60.0%	16.7%	16.7%	83.3%	83.3%	13.3%	86.7%	86.7%	12.5%	86.7%	87.5%	12.5%
Male participants	98.5%	.5%	.0%	95.7%	.0%	3.3%	96.7%	3.3%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Female participants	41.3%	57.3%	65.2%	30.4%	65.2%	63.3%	33.3%	33.3%	46.7%	53.3%	46.7%	53.3%	53.3%	46.7%	46.7%	46.7%	53.3%	53.3%	37.5%	53.3%	62.5%	37.5%
Youth (age 15-35)	99.0%	.0%	.0%	95.7%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Adult (age 36-55)	88.8%	9.7%	8.7%	87.0%	8.7%	16.7%	80.0%	16.7%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%	6.7%	93.3%	6.7%	6.7%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	90.0%	.0%	10.0%	90.0%
Older 55+	18.4%	78.2%	65.2%	23.9%	65.2%	83.3%	13.3%	13.3%	83.3%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%	16.7%	83.3%	83.3%	13.3%	86.7%	86.7%	22.5%	86.7%	75.0%	22.5%
Toky (urchins 5-12)	53.7%	21.5%	23.9%	50.0%	23.9%	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	26.7%	50.0%	26.7%	3.3%	80.0%	3.3%	3.3%	40.0%	36.7%	36.7%	61.5%	36.7%	17.9%	61.5%



LOS-Lot of Sacrifice, ALS- A Little Sacrifice

Table 10.12.1: Survey statistics on the role importance of the diplomatic missions in the movement in terms of the views of six forces memberships

Factors	Types of the movement forces																					
	Total			PP			Student			Intellectual			Professional			TU			NPG			
	IR	NIR	ALS	IR	NIR	ALS	IR	NIR	ALS	IR	NIR	ALS	IR	NIR	ALS	IR	NIR	ALS	IR	NIR	ALS	
USA Embassy, Dhaka	31.1%	25.2%	21.7%	26.1%	21.7%	23.3%	40.0%	23.3%	43.3%	33.3%	26.7%	33.3%	23.3%	23.3%	13.3%	46.7%	32.5%	32.5%	15.0%	32.5%	15.0%	15.0%
EEC mission, Dhaka	21.4%	30.1%	21.7%	17.4%	21.7%	33.3%	23.3%	33.3%	23.3%	33.3%	33.3%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	13.3%	50.0%	22.5%	22.5%	20.0%	22.5%	20.0%	20.0%
British High Com., D	28.2%	26.2%	21.7%	23.9%	21.7%	30.0%	33.3%	30.0%	36.7%	26.7%	26.7%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	43.3%	32.5%	32.5%	12.5%	32.5%	12.5%	12.5%
Indian High Com, D	28.6%	24.8%	19.6%	26.1%	19.6%	30.0%	26.7%	30.0%	43.3%	16.7%	16.7%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	43.3%	22.5%	22.5%	22.5%	22.5%	22.5%	22.5%
Commth. Secretariat	15.0%	31.1%	17.4%	17.4%	17.4%	36.7%	16.7%	36.7%	23.3%	23.3%	23.3%	16.7%	16.7%	33.3%	3.3%	56.7%	12.5%	12.5%	27.5%	12.5%	27.5%	27.5%
Japan Embassy, D	10.7%	35.0%	28.3%	6.5%	28.3%	36.7%	16.7%	36.7%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	13.3%	13.3%	36.7%	3.3%	56.7%	7.5%	7.5%	35.0%	7.5%	35.0%	35.0%
UNO Mission, D	20.5%	27.3%	19.6%	21.7%	19.6%	40.0%	16.7%	40.0%	23.3%	16.7%	16.7%	23.3%	23.3%	30.0%	13.8%	48.3%	22.5%	22.5%	17.5%	22.5%	17.5%	17.5%
W. Bank and IMF	27.2%	24.3%	21.7%	26.1%	21.7%	33.3%	20.0%	33.3%	33.3%	20.0%	20.0%	33.3%	33.3%	20.0%	16.7%	43.3%	32.5%	32.5%	12.5%	32.5%	12.5%	12.5%
F. Aid Consortium	25.7%	25.2%	19.6%	23.9%	19.6%	30.0%	23.3%	30.0%	30.0%	20.0%	20.0%	36.7%	23.3%	23.3%	6.7%	53.3%	32.5%	32.5%	12.5%	32.5%	12.5%	12.5%

IR-Important Role, NIR-No Important Role

The 'LOS' of the urban participants is again accepted unanimously with the highest rating by all of six memberships, in which I, TU and NPG memberships (100%) are found distinctive following the rest memberships for more than 90% supports in the same scale. However, for rural participants, the LOS supports from the PP (32.6%) and S (30%) membership are slightly higher than that of the other memberships. It was only because of the students and PP forces had the support base up to rural periphery for which other forces had not. In gender category, the male participants are accepted with highest proportion of LOS supports from all types of memberships including 100% from I, P, TU and NPG memberships in comparison to 95.7% and 96.7% supports from the PP and S memberships respectively. On the contrary, the sacrifice (LOS) of the female participants is accepted with proportion from almost all types of membership except I and P (50% each) as distinctive. In the sacrifice level of age-group constituents, the youth age group (15-35) is accepted by the unique recognition from 100% respondents with LOS from almost all six memberships with exception of the PP (95.7%) followed by the adult age group (35-55) from more than 80% with 'LOS' support from all forces' memberships. The sacrifices of the older age group participants (55+), however, are not ignored and proportionately lower supports from all forces respondents in which a slightly higher rating is counted as LOS by PP and NPG (23.9% and 22.5% respectively). The street urchins, a minor constituent of the least developed city life, had many sacrifices in the movement. They are supported for LOS by 50% around from almost all six memberships, although gains significant supports from P and NPG memberships (80% and 61.5% respectively).




Graph 10.11.1: The level of sacrifices of the movement forces in terms of interest/pressure groups, political parties, class, area, gender & age

10.12. The Role of Diplomatic Missions and Foreign Aid Groups

The role of diplomatic missions and foreign aid organisations in the process of democratisation of any peripheral third world nation is a belligerent but important factor. This usually depends on how much strong or weak are the political institutions of the affected society. Generally, they seem to be sinuous and ardent to serve their own political and economic interest at any change of power. They also often try to cope with the changing circumstances and substantiate their control over the state of affairs. For the Bangladesh case, it has been widely argued that the international power hubs bolstered the military intervention in 1982.³⁰ Since then to the end of military regime in 1990—nearly a decade long struggle of the people for democracy concluded with pools of blood, discarded human bodies, secrete and arranged killings and countless events of suppressions of thousands of political workers of the country. These events were associated with many attempts and efforts from all corners of socio-political aspiration for democracy. There was not any effective initiative from the international community against these suppressions of the junta, and this perhaps was limited in a statement or letter from the human rights groups of the west. This was beyond the imagination of the conscious quarters of any society, how the leaders of the democratic nations could support an undemocratic, authoritarian and autocratic military dictatorship for other nations around the world. It was the painful truth, this had happened in the event of Bangladesh where a military dictator, ‘as the CMLA and in uniform to boot’ was able to get entrance to Capital Hill and the White House.³¹ This was regarded as cheating by the then White House leader to the struggle of the people of Bangladesh for democracy. However, in the early part of this period of military aggression, the diplomatic missions and foreign aid organisations played their accommodating role towards the new military leader as well as for the opposition political forces in their movement for democracy. In the end, when the opposition movement grew stronger and went beyond the control of international core allies of the military dictatorship, the diplomacy became an inevitable negotiator between the opposition forces and the junta, and that was to favour the military leaders in the process of how it would be possible to save the lives of the later. Like other democratic transitions in third world nations, the diplomatic representatives of the international core countries mainly the USA and geopolitical forces, to some extent, also became involved in the democratisation process of Bangladesh in 1990. All of their efforts in Bangladesh were mainly latent and purely moulded within the diplomatic norms and values. However, a moderate role of the diplomatic missions in Bangladesh has been supported generally by the survey statistics³², where there is range of variations between the views of six groups’ respondents of movement forces membership.

However, the survey statistics shows that the involvement of the diplomatic missions and aid organisations in favour of democracy movement is supported by 52.9% respondents in general and in their sense, it was only limited in the wake of the mass upsurge in 1990, when the international community did not agree to continue their support for military dictator. But there were also significant parts (47.1%) of the respondents, who do not believe in any such role played by them in the process of democratisation, and many of them especially PP (52.2%), P (53.3%) and TU (56.7%) memberships accused the international powers for lending their continuous support to sustain the military autocracy. These groups of memberships believe in the peoples' power, which was only able to throw the military junta out of power. By contrast, the S (63.3%), I (66.7%) and NPG (52.2%) memberships have supported the role of international communities in the process of democratisation.



Graph 10.12.1: The role of the diplomatic missions in Dhaka in the democratisation process in terms of the relationships of six movement forces memberships.

The statistics in table 10.12.1 graph 10.12.1 also presents the relationships of six movement forces memberships and their views on the level of involvement of different diplomatic missions in the process of democratisation. Overall, majority of those respondents who consent the positive role of the diplomatic missions, have supported, first of all, the greater role of the USA mission in Dhaka. Among them, S (40%) and I (43.3%) memberships are found distinctive in lending their highest support while the TU membership (46.7%) undermines them for the same cause. In the second stage, the Indian High Commission in Dhaka accomplishes the highest supports from I (43.3%) and P (36.7%) membership as 'geo-political forces'³³ followed by the British High Commission from S (33.3%) and I (36.7%) memberships in their respective roles in this regard. The EEC mission, Commonwealth Secretariat, UNO mission and Japanese Embassy in Dhaka have also some moderate supports from all types of the movement forces memberships.³⁴ In general, I memberships have been found for higher supports for an important role

of diplomatic missions in the process of democratisation while TU position has a lesser support for the same cause. Among the donor organisations, the World Bank and IMF are provided with the higher supports from I (33.3%), P (33.3%) and NPG (32.5%) memberships followed by the Foreign Aid Consortium from the same membership respondents (30%, 36.7% and 32.5% respectively) for their important role in the process of democratisation.³⁵ The result does imply that a moderate initiative of the international communities in a sensible removal of the military regime was visible without major interruption in which they had played a role of negotiator between the junta and democratic forces.

10.13. Conclusion

These critical issues of the movement for restoration of democracy had developed many discontents among the main stream opposition democratic forces and delayed the success of the movement. This was widely argued that the dictator was cleverly involved in making the most of these issues to keep the opposition divided. Sometimes, the divergent opposition forces could not compromise with their own political interest that developed a sense of conflict among each other. Although the military autocracy was sustained in power by applying all of his means for nearly a decade, none of the major opposition, having a very popular party institution with vast mobilisation ability, could evade their own responsibility in this regard. The debates on the JS election of 1986 that divided the opposition has developed into a long standing argument; although it has got a definite momentum by the survey that different corners of the movement forces did not favour the participation in the election, it also keeps alive the fact whether the united participation in the election could be able to eliminate the military dictatorship. In this way, the failure of the formation of the UMP for the opposition movement was not possible as they could not be able to compromise over ideological and leadership conflicts, individual party interest and competition for future power etc. The pre-movement debates mainly have focused on the accusation and counter accusation of the political parties on whom is responsible for welcoming the military leaders to power. The student movement of 1983 evolved the argument whether both of the main opposition including the AL and BNP were equally serious to the student aspiration for building the movement. The critical review of the failure of Dhaka siege in 1987 or brutal shooting on the procession of Sheikh Hasina in Chittagong in 1988 has developed the similar arguments whether these were consequence of uncompromising stands of the opposition or the pre-designed factors of the junta administration. The credibility of the formation of a caretaker government or the different sacrifices of the constituents of the movement forces were also of some debate and conflict and an issue of accusation and counter accusation among the opposition democratic forces. The role of diplomatic missions had also some critical

substance, as they had never taken any manifested role against the military dictator, though people always had some ambiguity about their role, however, had found some lower conformity in the survey statistics. The presence of these critical issues could never be ignored nor could be resolved in any sense; and this was the reality of Bangladesh democracy movement.

Notes

¹ The opposition AL was leading a 10-party alliance in the movement against the ruling BNP as they did never believe the BNP as a democratic party. The AL often accused General Zia, the founder of the BNP for stopping the trial of the killers of the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the commanding leader of the independence of the nation and ideological leader of AL supporters by 7th amendment of the constitution in 1979. Also General Zia gave top jobs and bounties to the 1975 Coup makers in home and abroad. It is evident to mention here that General Zia became Chief of the Army after the 1975 coup and dictated the civil-military government until he became a full-pledged Martial Law administrator in 1976. He started his regime with Martial Law along with a puppet democracy until there was a rubber stamp parliament in the country in 1979. The all opposition forces along with mainstream AL were in the movement against the Martial Law regime of General Zia. After the killing of General Zia in May 1981, his civilian Deputy, Justice Abdus Satter became President in November 1981. Still then the opposition forces of the country along with mainstream AL was in the movement for the restoration of democracy.

² As Begum Zia came into the limelight on the huge emotional events relayed by the media after Zia's death—after failing to declare Martial Law, General Ershad as Army Chief cleverly took the side of constitution to bring hospitalised—unable to walk and speak—Vice President Justice Sattar as acting President, before the popular sentiment had reached to ripe for the election of Begum Zia as President.

³ Consequently, President Justice Satter faced a great problem after his election in regard to the formation of the new ministry which comprised 42 members with old and new politicians. In this context, a conflict developed between the civilian government and the army. The difference of opinion also assumed a serious proportion in the ruling party and a right wing strong rebel group composed of a few high level leaders and member of parliaments having linkage with the military intrigues demanded the restoration of democracy within the party. At this stage, the ruling BNP could not be able to compromise its splitting opinions and in the outcome, the said large ministry was dissolved and a small cabinet was formed comprising 18 members of whom 14 were from dissolved one. The motive behind the changes in the ministry was to strengthen the right-wing and pro-Pakistani elements in the cabinet including former members of Muslim League, which supported Pakistan Army in the liberation war of 1971 at the 'expense of freedom fighters'. This action aroused strong opposition from the left-wing elements of the BNP under the leadership of its General Secretary of the party, Professor B Choudhury on 1st February 1982. The drama of the 'arrest of a serial killer named Imdu on 8 February 1982'³ from the ministerial resident of Abul Kashem, a pro Satter cabinet member push the credibility of the ruling administration into crisis.

⁴ See *The Bangladesh Observer*, 16 February, 1982, p.1

⁵ Sen., R. *The Political Elites of Bangladesh*, Dhaka, UPL, 1986, P.323

⁶ General Ershad in an exclusive audio interview with the researcher in May 2003 exposed the fact that a right wing segment of ruling party and a faction of the opposition AL supported him to take over. Asked about the name of the leaders who communicated him, he unfolded the name of Sheikh Hasina and Dr Kamal Hossain of the AL, but was not agreed to mention any particular name of the then ruling BNP, although they all were exposed as his associates within the very few days after the military take over. The time of the interview between the ex military leader and the researcher was during the second phase of the BNP regime after the fall of the military dictatorship since 1990 under which the verdicts for him for a number of lawsuits for corruptions and misuse of power were pending. Therefore, it was not unlikely for him to name the Sheikh Hasina, the arch political rival of the Begum Zia, hiding the truth in fear since he was lobbying to get the relief from the lawsuits by the then BNP government in 2003. Moreover, it is not unlikely for the ousted dictator to take the side of the BNP in crocodile tears—both of them homogenous representatives of the barrack—trapping and disclosing the name of the AL leaders Sheikh Hasina and Kamal Hossain who have been widely accepted as the genuine and pioneer civilian and democratic leaders of the country.

⁷ In fact, the leftist and progressive student components of the CSAC were in the movement against the military regime of the General Zia and later the BNP administration under Justice Satter. Many workers and supporters of these student groups were suppressed and jailed and still these were visible in their mind. There fore, within the short span of time of the departure of the BNP from power, these student bodies were not ready to incorporate them under the CSAC.

⁸ Under the new circumstances, General Ershad survived by an elected JS with the AL in opposition bench; while the BNP-A and the newly formed 5-party alliance took the street as the means of their resistance. However, the AL-A could not successfully hold back the autocratic activities of the dictator by the parliamentary process. They also went back to the street confrontation bit by bit.

⁹ In fact, it was argued that the AL high command was not in favour of resignation of the party MPs. The AL leader Sheikh Hasina was kept under house arrest in the peak stage of the movement in November 1987. At this stage, the opposition BNP-A and 5-party alliance was strict to suspend the parliament that was further fuelled by the resignation of 10 MPs of the JIB. In this critical moment, a group of senior AL leaders including Dr Kamal Hossain and Abdul Mannan, Abdul Momen those who could not be able to be elected in the election decided to resignation of the party MPs in an emergency working committee meeting, which however closed the pressure on the dictator to dissolve the parliament.

¹⁰ It was argued that the AL could have its own way of thinking to build their party organisation through election and the BNP was in fear if they would not be able to win the elections according to their target as many leaders of the party were in the underground. However, the pro-AL political analyst argued that if the whole opposition including BNP-A had participated in the election; there had been a chance to wipe out the military rule by the ballot verdict of the people. On the other hand, the pro-BNP intellectuals argued that there had not any possibility of free and fair elections under the junta administration, which became partly true later when the AL claimed that the massive frauds had taken place in the elections.

¹¹ For details see Moudud Ahmed, *ibid*, p. 316, where he categorically mentioned that 'the strategy of keeping the two female leaders apart was the cornerstone of Ershad politics-not so much for the benefit of AL but for his own political survival', although the researcher feels the later stage explanation of the author was inappropriate and politically biased by his own quarter of political opportunity.

¹² Since the parliamentary election of 1986, the divergent opposition forces tried to be reunited on the basis, at least, for same action schedules against the dictator. The AL led 8-party alliance tried to oppose the activities of the military administration inside the parliament and in the tail end of their failure to protest the autocracy in the parliament drama, they took the street agitations, which speeded up the ongoing movement under the leadership of Begum Zia. In the end, two central leaderships of the opposition forces, Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia met twice before the non-cooperation civil disobedience movement of Dhaka siege that had been taken place in the beginning of November 1987. The aim of the action was to blockade round and to discommunicate the capital by peaceful mass gathering, marches and procession and slowly, to paralyse the state machinery which would alienate the junta in the cantonment and would compel him to surrender to people's movement.

¹³ If anybody would like to see the photos of the news papers of the following days, it was easily observed, the car with Sheikh Hasina inside had been picked up by the police crane in a violent attack, a medieval barbarism by the junta forces while Begum Zia was sweeping her hand to the people freely from the police van. Please see the photo released in the news paper. For the photo of the arrest of Begum Zia, see *The Daily Inqilab*, 12 November, 1987 p. 8 and for the arrest and atrocities on Sheikh Hasina, see *The Daily Sangbad*, 11 November 1987, p.1

¹⁴ There was every consideration to believe this fact from the later political events of the country including shooting on the resident of Sheikh Hasina and a number of brutal killings in her procession at Chittagong in January 1988. There might also have another dimension that it was the policy of the junta to sow the seeds of doubts and mistrusts between the two parties—AL and BNP—to spoil the opposition unity that would be able to weaken the strength of the movement.

¹⁵ The opposition forces were mainly divided in to three currents. First, the non-communal progressive and leftist political forces that included mainly the AL led 8-party alliance and 5-party group. Second, the pro-Islamic rightist and a part of anti-liberation pro-China radical leftist elements that were integrated into BNP led 7-party, and third, the fundamentalist and anti-liberation forces that included the JIB and some other IPs in the country. The political activity of the JIB was banned during the AL period under Bangabandhu government as they were the collaborating force with the Pakistan Army against the country's liberation war of 1971. But the JIB was revived during the BNP regime under General Zia. The anti-liberation role of this party isolated them to form any type of unity with other opposition during the movement against General Ershad.

¹⁶ During the liberation war, the leadership of this party was concentrated on the left wing groups and lost their control over the party with the killing of Bangabandhu in 1975. The right wing faction established their full control over the party in 1983 when left wing group under the leadership of Abdur Razzak left the party and formed the BAKSAL with a full socialist spirit. However, the split in AL had weakened its organisational strength for the time being to challenge the military intervention in the country.

¹⁷ In the post-1975 politics, the BNP was formed under the military regime of General Ziaur Rahman, who mainly gathered some veteran politicians of different political parties mainly from anti-liberation forces and some of his army colleagues who fought together with him in the field of liberation war. After the killing of General Zia, the new leadership of the party Justice Abdus Satter could not deal properly with these rivalry factions of the party that led the failure in power. The pro-Islamic anti-liberation forces inside the BNP welcomed the new military leader and joined in the military cabinet, while the pro-independence faction faced the arrest and law suits from the new military regime, some of those also joined in the military government of General Ershad

¹⁸ The statistics in table 9.6.1 shows that the SID between the AL and the BNP was responsible in the failure to form the UMP, which is supported by 74.8% respondents (with 48.1% strongly agree). In the same way, 68% (with 27.2% strongly agree) supports the COL between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia, while 71.8% (with 35.4% strongly agree) blame the many appalling experiences in their past history (UPC) between the two parties. However, 50% (with 6.3% strongly disagree) disagree with the fact that the AL independently was responsible in the failure to form an UMP in contrast to that of the BNP 56.8% (14.1% strongly disagree). It is interesting that the respondents identify other major factors responsible in this regard. It is that the major two parties were not sure who would be the next to the military leader in power and the ever-hostile two parties were not agreed to share power in the post-junta period. This is the prior cause supported by the 100% (83.3% strongly agree) respondents. The factional cleavages in the major opposition parties, by a minor group of respondents, were also found as responsible in the same cause.

¹⁹ In fact, it was found that the opposition AL leader Sheikh Hasina became the target of attack by the military dictator after the dissolution of parliament following a mass upsurge of Dhaka Siege action in November 1987. Comparatively, there was no repression on the opposition BNP leaders and workers from the military administration. Killing, arrest and lawsuits became a daily events for the supporters and leaders of AL. On the other hand, it was believed that a pro-BNP faction of army officer was trying to plot a coup that would make it easier for Begum Zia to ride on the power. For Sheikh Hasina, she did never support a further military intervention that would create another new military leader. Hence, she was absent in such kind of unity gatherings that would have chances of further massacre which may broaden the possibility of promulgation of stiff military orders or a new military coup.

²⁰ The longstanding practice of the student bodies— independent soul of the students—lost their freedom of the thoughts and actions by the military order of General Zia that attached them as the student wing of the political parties. This law ceased the individual political role of the students leading them to follow the instruction of their parent political parties. However, the two major opposition parties—the AL and the BNP— were under conflicting atmosphere all through the movement against the military administration of General Ershad, which developed two different current of political forces in the opposition politics. The AL forged unity with leftist, socialist, communist and the parties with mixed economy while the BNP developed an opposite current with right wing capitalist, fundamentalist and religious forces of the society. Consequently, the student wings of these two parties, BCL and JCD respectively, had followed the same path and developed two different unity of students' forces as the CSAC and SAA, which had no alternative rather than to go after the their parent political parties. In this critical juncture, it was the toughest job ever to unite these two opposite and rivalry forces of the student community.

²¹ Since the killing of their fellow student Najir Hussain Zehad including other three participants on 10th October 1990, they were observing continuous and spontaneous actions through out the country including hartal, gatherings, protest marches and demonstration, strike, seize of the residential area of the ministers, boycott, non-cooperation leading the civil disobedience at the end of the regime. These actions ceased many lives and casualties following the repressive measures taken by junta administration. At this stage, none of the student organisation had the moral courage to stay back from the unity of the APSU

²² In fact, the BCL President Habibur Rahman Habib was under serious pressure to hold the conference of his student organisation and its parent organisation—the AL was planning to fix a date of the conference to elect new leadership. At this stage, the BCL—the strong rival of the JCD in all through student politics under military regime—has went to the unity of the APSU under the absolute

decision of Habib without prior concern of its other factions those who were expecting to be sworn in leadership in the forthcoming conference. Habib with this decision was able to survive his leadership crisis and was credited for the formation of the APSU—this was true, but widely criticised for his incapability to reserve the interest of his own party in leading the movement.

²³ Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed headed a temporary neutral caretaker government formulated under the constitutional provision and supported by the opposition political forces of the country. General Ershad and his many associates were arrested and jailed and sent for trial. The final stage movement that removed the junta started when mainstream opposition including 8-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances observed the action of Secretariat seize on 10th October 1990 following 5 killings and many other injuries and arrests. Among the killings, the dead body of a fellow student of Ulla Para College, Pubna named Najeeb Hussain Zehad was brought in to the Dhaka University campus by the fellow student protesters. The disintegrated student forces, in a sudden move, came together to the APARAJEYA BANGLA premises, where the crowd of students was mounting around the dead body of Zehad. All of a sudden, the student organisations, forgetting their all divisions, vowed in front of the dead body of their fellow student that they would never go back home until the removal of the military junta, and thereafter, in an hour move, the All Party Student Unity (APSU) was formed at the DUCSU office in the Dhaka University campus. All the main line political leaders including Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia came to the campus and gave their support to the declaration of the student forces of the country. However, the military junta tried to divide the opposition forces, specially the student forces of the country. A major faction of the JCD, the student wing of the BNP, joined the junta side and moved forward against the APSU in the Dhaka University campus with the protection of the Army and police forces in November 1990. In the united resistance, the APSU with the support of thousands of neutral students won over the battle in the campus, in which the nasty design of the junta to divide the student forces had been foiled and the student s supporters of the junta ran away from the campus forever. The military administration promulgated a new Educational Institution Law and Order Ordinance that permitted the sudden closing of all educational institutions all over the country in November 1990, which made all the parents anxious for the annual examinations of their children. Curfew and security measures were imposed and the Armed Forces along with the Police and BDR were moving in the major cities including the capital city of Dhaka. Arrest and jail of the vital student and political leaders were being operated through out the country. But all of these measures turned ineffective to the united resistance of the opposition. However, the movement turned in to a violent and turmoil itinerary when the armed hooligans killed a veteran professional leader, Dr Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, Joint Secretary, BMA in the adjacent area of TSC in the Dhaka University campus on 27 November 1990. The professionals and intellectuals segment of the society came into the street for protest along with the students, trade unions and political forces of the country. In the face of millions of protesters, the junta declared state of emergency and called the armed forces to restore law and order situation. The army moved to the major cities including the capital of Dhaka. The armed forces understood that the situation of mass upsurge was now beyond the limit of their control and they did not agree to back the junta anymore. In the end, losing the support of the armed forces and peaceful exit guarantee led the junta to the announcement of the giving up power on 6th December 1990. Millions of the people came to street with joys for the victory of democracy throughout the country in a couple of seconds at night with this announcement, which was relayed by the BBC evening service special news bulletin. However, this was a great political event of the country in the post independent period.

²⁴ According to the survey statistics in table 9.9.1, almost all of the respondents have recognised unanimously the central role of the APSU in making the final stage mass revolution. In fact, they were considered as the commanding force of this movement. Overall, 99% of respondents (in which 83.5% approve 'a very good deal') have recognised their contribution as 'a good deal'. In the second stage, the respondents have recognised the role of political parties and alliances. In general, 'a good deal' contribution of the BNP-A (90%) is found slightly higher than that of the AL-A (84%). By contrast, in the highest scale—'a very good deal' is found slightly higher for AL-A (39.8%) than that of the BNP-A (35.9%). The leftist 5 party-A is also found with some contribution by 68% (in which 13.1% approve 'a very good deal') even though a significant section of 24.8% have rejected their role as 'not very much' and 3.3% for 'none at all'. The role of the JIB and IPs in the uprising was insignificant.²⁴ In the third stage, the role of the TU played a fundamental role in the movement which is supported by 86.9% respondents (in which 30.1% for 'a very good deal'). In the fourth stage, the respondents considered the contribution of the intellectuals and professionals as supported by 85.9% and 81.1% respectively (in which 18.4% and 16.5% respectively approve them 'a very good deal') while a small parts of 12.1% and 11.2% respectively disagree with their role as 'not very much.'

²⁵ The people of all classes and occupations were coming under a heroic struggle in the on-going mass movement for a single demand of the resignation of autocratic military dictator General Ershad, to re-establish the spirit and values of liberation war and to create a permanent democratic way of life in the country. In the different stages of this movement, the people embraced the arrests and jails, killings and injuries and false lawsuits to establish a real representative democratic government in the country. The aim of this struggle that took pools of bloods of thousands of countrymen was to resist the unconstitutional capture of power. The central aim of all of demands was to establish a sovereign parliament of the people representatives by a free and fair electoral practice. But, General Ershad who seized power was playing a continuous election fraud to sustain his illegal power. There were frequent and wide spread false votes, robbery of ballot boxes, capture of polling centres, media coup in announcing results and voter less elections were the main characteristics of every election held under his military regime. At this stage, the main opposition force felt that it was not possible to hold free and neutral elections under military administration.

²⁶ For Details of the formula of the Caretaker Government, please see Mizanur Rahman Choudhury, in Begali, *Rajnitir Tinkal* (Three Generations of Politics), Hafez Mahmuda Foundation, Dhaka 2001, Appendix-27, pp. 394-395. The main points of this guidelines included 1. Setting free of the country from the autocratic General Ershad and the misrule of his government which was established by killings, coups, conspiracy and aggression, in the aim of re-establishing the spirit of independence and liberation war that would be able to establish a democratic rule in the country, (a) Under the regular provision of the constitution, President (General Ershad) would be forced to dissolve his cabinet and parliament under Article 58(5) and Article 72 (1) of the constitution. The present Vice-President (Barrister Moudud Ahmed) would resign under Article 51 (A)(1) and the junta President would be forced to appoint a new Vice-President (Chief Justice of the Country) who would be non-partisan, neutral and accepted to all anti-autocratic and anti-communal opposition democratic forces under Article 51(3) and thereafter the junta would resign from the office of the President and promptly transfer his power to the newly appointed Vice-President. (b) In this process, immediately after the resignation of the junta, the new Vice-President would take the charge of the office of the President as the Acting President under Article 51 (1) of the constitution. Thereafter, under the leadership of the Acting President, a non-partisan interim caretaker government would be formed including a council of advisors, where the Acting President would be regarded as Chief Advisor under Article 58. The principal task of this interim government is to ensure a free and fair election of the sovereign parliament within three months of the dissolution under Article 123 (3) of the constitution. 2. (a) The Chief Advisor of the Caretaker Government would be non-partisan and neutral, i.e. he would not be a follower of or would not have any relation with any political party of the country i.e. he would not be allowed to participate in the election for the post of President, Vice-President or Member of the Parliament; and any other advisor of the council would not be allowed to participate in the election; (b) This interim Government would reconstitute the Election Commission and re-evaluate and recast its powers and functions under Article 118 (1) ensuing a free and fair election of the sovereign parliament including the day to day basic duties of the regular administration.; (c) To restore the confidence of the voters and ensure the guarantee so that they could be able to cast their vote independently without any influence according to their wisdom and consideration; (d) To ensure the full neutrality in the public media, all state-run media including radio and TV would be transformed to full autonomous and independent bodies and all competitive political parties in the election should be provided equal chances for the advertisement of their agenda of the election; 3. The interim Caretaker Government is bound to transfer its power to the representatives of the elected sovereign parliament and would be accountable to the elected parliament. 4. The provision of the constitutional rule in the country would be absolute and would be continued on the basis of the appreciation of the sovereignty of the people and must be averted of any unconstitutional attempt to capture the power; (a) under no circumstances, a constitutional and elected government would be removed in any unconstitutional way without a due process of election; (b) The protection of the fundamental rights of the people, independence and neutrality of the judiciary and the rule of law would be guaranteed; (c) Any law inconsistent with fundamental rights of the people would be rescinded.

²⁷ Interview of the General Ershad with researcher during his fieldwork in Bangladesh in March 2003. He told that "I handed over power to my Vice-President. It was done by force."

²⁸ See Moudud Ahmed, *op.cit*, p.338

²⁹ The survey statistics in table 9.11.1 presents the level of sacrifice of different constituents of the participants in the movement. First, the survey has recognised the single highest sacrifice of the student constituents and 99.5% respondents have considered their effort as 'LOS' in which highest 85.4% has supported their sufferings as 'quite a lot of sacrifice'(quite a LOS). Second, the statistics

considers the sacrifices of the constituents of the workers of major political parties in which 84% respondents speak out 'LOS' for the 'workers of the AL' supporting them again for the highest 47.6% for 'quite a LOS' while 90.7%, 83% and 17% support the BNP, leftists and JI& IPs respectively in the same scale for the same cause (in which 35.4%, 30.1% and 2.9% respectively have supported for 'quite a LOS'). However, it is distinctive that the highest 42.7% respondents have considered the JI & IPs for 'ALS' (in a further down grading their role, 32.5% by 'no sacrifice' rejects their any kind of sacrifice in the movement). Third, 88.4% respondents stand out with 'LOS' for the huge sufferings (37.4% for 'quite a LOS') for the TU constituents. Comparatively, the contribution of the professionals and intellectuals are found lower than that of the TU constituents. Only 62.7% and 66% respondents have considered 'LOS' for both of them respectively (with 8.3% and 6.8% for 'quite a LOS' respectively). However, a considerable section of the respondents, 36.4% and 31.1% respectively have considered them for 'ALS', and none, however, deny their contribution in the movement. Fourth, the socio-economic status i.e. class constituent also marks the sacrifice of its participants. The 'LOS' for the middle class participants has received the highest response by 92.7% (including 59.2% for 'quite a LOS') followed by the lower class by 80.6% (with 31.6% for quite a LOS') along with the higher class by the lowest 7.8% in the same scale.²⁹ Fifth, the survey reveals a significant characteristic that the movement was centred mainly in the urban area than that of the rural periphery of the country. 97.6% respondents (including 80.6% for 'quite a LOS') have considered of 'LOS' for the urban constituent in comparison to that rural area by 24.2% only. It is significant that 74.8% also considers 'ALS' for the rural supporters, which is almost none (1.5% only) to urban constituent. The sacrifice of some demographic characteristics of the participants i.e. gender and age constituent have also been identified in the movement. There was no significant foundation of the gender issue in the movement.²⁹ The survey has revealed the fact that 98.5% respondents support the 'LOS' of the male participants in the movement (including 85.4% for 'quite a LOS') in comparison to female participants by 41.3% only, although 57.3% respondents consider the sufferings of the women as 'ALS' in comparison to their male counterpart with almost none in the same scale. The findings of the survey present a general but significant length of the variations in the age group participants. 99% respondents (with 82% for 'quite a LOS') have recognised the 'LOS' of the youth (15-35 age group) opposing by almost none while 88.8 % support the adult participation (35-55 age group) in the same scale (with 17% for 'quite a LOS'). In general, only 18.5 % supports the 55+ age group by 'LOS' while a major part of respondents (78.1%) marks their anguish by 'ALS' other than the leaderships of the movement, in which a considerable part of 13.1% deny their cause. Another important constituent of participants of the movement was the *Toky* (5-12 age groups)—the street urchins or floating children, who might be considered as a fatal socio-economic legacy for their rootless ness in the cities beyond their age group identity. In general, 53.7% respondents (21.5% for 'quite a LOS') however, supports their contributions as 'LOS' who always participated in a number in all types of actions of the oppositions, and frequently embraced baton charges, shootings, tear gas and even precaution jail by the police

³⁰ In his interview with researcher, the military dictator argued that all foreign missions were aware about the military takeover.

³¹ See Moudud Ahmed, *op.cit*, Footnote-1, p.303

³² The statistics in table 9.12.1 presents the level of involvement of different diplomatic missions and agencies in the democratic transition in Bangladesh. The survey findings reveal the view that USA played a central role as the directive of international forces at any change in the state power. The USA mission in Dhaka played such key role behind the scene for the safe transfer of power to the representatives of democratic forces of the country, which was supported by 31.1% respondents (with 13.1% for 'most important role'). By contrast, 25.2% disagree with the fact while 43.7% remains silent. The presence of the role of the 'geopolitical forces' is also revealed in the survey. In second position, 28.6% respondents believe the Indian government to have played necessary role in this regard in which 13.6% consider their 'most important role'. However, 24.8% do not believe in any such role played by them and 46.6% are unable to answer on such event. As a member of the Commonwealth, Bangladesh has been following the British customs in her politics, economy, judiciary, education and bureaucracy and in intelligentsias. Therefore, the survey also shows the British influence on the political affairs of the country. 28.1% respondents (with 6.3% 'most important role') consider the necessary role played by British High Commission in Dhaka, in the democratisation process differing by 26.2% with no such role while 45.6% remains unvoiced. The EEC, UN, Commonwealth and Japanese mission in Dhaka had also some significant role along with USA and British initiative in this process. Besides the diplomatic angle, there are some key foreign aid organisations such as World Bank, IMF and Foreign Aid Consortium and donor agencies, which had direct influence on the political economy of the country. The political role of the IMF and World

Bank in giving their financial assistance to Bangladesh military dictatorship as well as their pressure for establishing democracy in the country was nonetheless countable as supported by 27.2% respondents. In the same way, the Foreign Aid Consortium, which organised the meeting of the donors in Paris every year to support many development projects in Bangladesh, also favoured to establish democratic rule in the country, as supported by 25.8% respondents.

³³ Bangladesh is bordered by India from three sides; except only in the south by Bay of Bengal and a smaller touch with Myanmar in the southeast. The business and commerce of the country especially the imports of every day commodities by roads are mainly dependent on India. As very influential geopolitical forces, India, therefore, had also a greater influence on the state affairs of the country.

³⁴ The EEC mission is also considered by 21.3% and differed by 30.1% as well for their individual important role in the democratisation process. They might have the participation in the collective endeavour along with USA and British missions in Dhaka. Side by side, the UN mission in Dhaka had also similar role, which is supported by 20.5% respondents while 27.3% rejects such kind of initiative by them. Among other diplomatic missions, the Commonwealth Secretariat in London (15.1%) and the Japanese Embassy in Dhaka (10.7%) are considered to have played some significant role in the democratisation process in the final stage of the movement in 1990.

³⁵ It is widely believed that the international core countries including USA, Great Britain, and Japan etc have control on these organisations and can influence the aid flows to the affected country.

Chapter Eleven

Conclusions

The sociological understanding of the movement for the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh against the military dictatorship of General Ershad, as found in this research, demonstrates the power and strength of the people in making the revolution against the 'satanic nest of the power greedy military intrigues'. The findings of the research have shown the military dictatorship was in every respect a betrayer and most vociferous opponent to the process of democratisation as well as for the institution of military itself in the 1980s Bangladesh. This also shows that the growth of uneven class composition in the social structure of pre and post independent Bangladesh leads to the rise of dictatorship and the movement for the social and political emancipation of the people. The latter became powerful due to the incapacity of the military dictatorship to adapt to the changing social formation—social differentiation, conflicts of new socio-economic groups and classes in the wake of reshaped modes of new economic life. Consequently, a slow but sturdy development of political and socio-cultural forces was able to start a revolution in building a capitalist democracy. The chronological order and effective events of the movement—actions, counter actions, violence, repressions, rebellions and vengeance, and the overthrow of the Ershad regime by the democratic people reflect the inability of the military in running the state. Even if there was a minimal unity in the diverse opposition political forces in the pre and post takeover periods of the junta, these dragons of military could not have the ability to seize the power and keep it for nearly a decade. The end of the cold war between the main powers in the global political order in the end of 1980s had also determined the fate of dictatorial regimes around the world and somewhat influenced the process of democratisation in Bangladesh

The movement for restoration of democracy forced the military to abstain from the political process in Bangladesh. This could be regarded as a partial achievement of the democratic forces, which, however, might have posed threats to the continuation of the democratisation process. The success of the movement and the nature of the departure of the military dictatorship in Bangladesh are likely to have been exceptional compared to the patterns of exit of the authoritarian regimes around the world. Some observations in this whole process are crucial in this regard. The Bangladesh movement could have brought the criminal coup leaders to trial. Only the ring leader of the coup, General Ershad was placed under house arrest. Although some civilian associates of the dictator were put into the central jail in the capital, no other military officials were given any sentences for their misdeeds during the decade long military suppression of the people. This pattern of succession

of the democratic process did not have any effect on the movement participants and democratic people as it happened after the fall of many military dictators around the world. The divergent political leaderships of the movement had failed either to do so or did not take part in the prosecution of the coup leaders in order to keep the military in their favour in the ensuing power struggle. It is also relevant to argue that the coherence of military in their interest, status, power and privilege was also a crucial factor that might have influenced the leaderships of the movement to choose the Armed Forces as a whole without General Ershad. This happened in three ways. First, it would have reserved a possibility of the truce between central leaderships of the movements and the leaders of the Armed Forces that formulated an exit plan with guarantee of no loss for the latter and only after that assurance, the Army left power. Second, any one of the two major political alliances—widely believed to be the BNP—in the opposition democratic forces might have an understanding with the military leaders that they would not demand the trial of the army criminals of the regime so that this section of the army would favour them coming to power—for the victory in the upcoming JS elections. This process, if any, has also made weaker the demands of the movement to bring the coup leaders to justice. Under the darkness of the conflict of the race for power between the two major opposition forces, the demands of the people to hang the culprit military dictator was lost—a mistake was made to let off the Generals without punishment, which in fact, has left the chances for a return of the military to power in future greater. Third, the clever high ranking Generals of the military willingly left power before the movement had risen to a revolutionary stage that could wipe out the whole military institution, while there was an absence of active unity among the opposition forces in all stages of the movement. It is also argued with a sound academic expression by the scholars related to the military's vested interests that the beginning of the democratic process in the country was a peaceful transition of power by the military itself. But this does avoid the arguments if the sentences of the coup makers were inevitable for the safe development of the democratic process in the country, and in the ensuing struggle, it does not give any guarantee that the military institution would have lessened their control over the political process and would not be involved further in state power. How all of these arguments would be resolved and would be able to find a gateway for the resurrection of a democratic society, depends on how much the political institutions are able to train up a professional—rather than a political—military institution in the future political process of the country.

However, the rudimentary passion of the movement, according to its leaders and participants, was to place the coup's army officers and their civilian collaborators under trial—that would strictly rule out any such ambition in future from the same vested quarter. The military personnel—officers and soldiers who

were drawn into the intervention following the torture of the civilians should be removed for the sake of democracy and to safeguard the discipline of the military itself. If necessary, the entire Armed Forces in service under Martial Law should be replaced by a completely new one. The collaborators among the high ranking personnel of the bureaucracy, police and BDR must be treated in the same manner for their misdeeds.

There are the following options for the survival of the military institution as a supporting force for the development of full pledged democracy to practice in the country. First, if Bangladesh does not encounter any threats from neighbours or international forces to her sovereignty, she may consider the abolition of the military as a war necessity and to employ more effort to construct a more powerful domestic and border forces, so that the democracy would be free from the internal threat of the military fascism. Second, as a poor nation, Bangladesh has to spend a lot of revenue to maintain it's military. So Bangladesh may raise a small Army as a symbol that may be used to maintain ceremonies where it is so necessary. Third, although popular support is being aired in favour of building the huge military abilities that would be considered as a money earning force—as is being used now—in international peacekeeping mission. However, the question of who would maintain the expenditure to raise these extra forces when they return, as there will be an end to the necessity of peacekeeping missions and who would give the guarantee that they would not again be a threat to democracy needs to be resolved. Fourth, Bangladesh would have a military in collaboration with international superpowers so that its army and democracy would equally benefit, in which they can fight in favour of any international force and would be maintained by them. In this regard, the Bangladesh Army may be adjoined with the US military, NATO or even the Indian Army, if there was have been a guarantee of no threat to our sovereignty. Fifthly, Bangladesh could maintain a strong military that is guaranteed only in their institutional framework and would have legal restrictions to maintain a distance from the pure political institutions until they are retired from service. The careful implementation of any one or more of all these options may, however, be able to ensure Bangladesh is free from further military led destruction of democracy and the military institution itself.

The social formation—primarily the necessary class developments—required for the movement was critical in the Bangladeshis case. First, a left linked pro-movement class formation, middle and lower class, originating mainly in the agricultural land, but having a link with urbanised and non-agricultural culture through their formative education, which had been configured under the phase of colonial rule of the British and Pakistan. This limited their objectives in the

nationalist and freedom movement from any kind of extreme or revolutionary change of society. These classes remained as the decisive and participatory forces in any kind of movement for social and political change in this region. Second, the infrastructural, administrative and industrial development under British rule had also contributed in building a non-agricultural reservoir of working and lower middle class who later had mostly developed to an independent non-agricultural middle class under Pakistan rule, and at a later stage into an affluent middle class in the wake of the introduction of a free economy and private entrepreneurship in the post independence Bangladesh. This already affluent class always maintained a clever balance between the ruling dictatorship and pro-movement forces—slightly leaned with latter assuming that any change may create further opportunity for the enhancement of their wealth with civilian regime. Third, as Bangladesh has a long experience of the chronic dominance of non-political military vested interest groups in state power in her pre and post independent history—for nearly thirty years, a pattern of an intolerant and coercive dominant class under the consolidation and patronage of military vested interest had been rooted in the society who were brought up all through the malpractices and illegal means in their socio-economic and political life. This class, in and outside power, had always played a subsequent role in the formation of class configuration in the power structure—center to periphery—of Bangladesh society. The success of the democratisation movement in Bangladesh against the military dictatorship of General Ershad wholly depended on how far the opposition democratic forces were able to curtail the influence of this third category class in the socio-economic and political atmosphere of the country.

The movement for democracy in fact, originated in the development of the nationalist and independence struggle of the people of the Indian subcontinent in the end stage of the British period. This was mainly speeded up with the development of universities and colleges, the rail network, industrial development and huge expansion of administrative and judiciary infrastructure under British rule from the end of nineteenth century to the beginning of twentieth century. Through the start of the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885 and the Muslim League (ML) in 1906, the struggle for political emancipation of the Indian nations began. The establishment of Dhaka University in 1921 in Dhaka became the center of the growth of an educated middle class in the capital of the then East Bengal, now Bangladesh. The birth of the Krishak Proja Party of Sher-e-Bangla in the 1930s was accepted popularly mainly in Bengal, which was centred on the landed middle and lower class. The growth of Bengali nationalist movement took place side by side with the INC and the ML. After the end of British rule, the birth of the East Pakistan Muslim *Awami* League (EPMAL) in 1949 took the leadership of this landed middle class along with the new educated salaried middle class in the capital to district

towns. The expansion of this class continued indefinitely under the new colonial Pakistan military regimes up to the birth of independent Bangladesh in 1971. The character of this middle class comprised of education based urban professionals and business men mainly who maintained a strong link with rural periphery through their ownership of land that was cultivated by sharecroppers or lease keepers. A major part of them were brought up in a left leaning revolutionary and nationalist spirit—carrying strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist beliefs, but still could not disconnect them from the magnetism of the growing westernised culture of the cities and towns. This nationalist and pro-socialist middle class mainly came to power with the liberation of Bangladesh. The upper layer of this middle class—the leadership of the nationalist forces was mainly educated salaried professionals and business men of the cities and towns, while the lower layer of this class—the pro socialist forces was trade union workers, students of rural background and working class of the non-agricultural sectors. Immediately after independence, the first category of the middle class took the chance to establish democratic rule in the country—the parliamentary form government—a constitutional democracy took off. In the next three years, the pro-socialist middle class became consolidated under a section of nationalist forces, which led the government to turn down the path of the democracy—a socialist reform with one party government took place in the beginning of 1975. Before the full operation of this socialist movement in the power base of all levels in the society, the leader of this section—country's founding father *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed in a triangular conspiracy of the anti-liberation forces, anti-socialist forces and the military institution of the country.

The post-independence nationalist middle class that was just removed from power—pro democratic and pro-socialist—was pushed to the street in the movement for democracy from 1975 to 1981 under the military regimes of Khondoker Mostaque Ahmed, Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Saem and General Ziaur Rahman. However, General Zia enacted the regulation for multi-party democracy under which he revived the opportunity for political activities in the name of religion that was banned in the original constitution of the country. Although he was a freedom fighter and a genuine field commander of the liberation war, he allowed many anti-liberation personnel in his military cabinet and in his umbrella party, the BNP—to face the movement of genuine democratic forces in opposition under the leadership of the AL. This was the beginning of the creation of a pro-religious new middle class by state patronage—which was only the career of plundering state wealth without having any modern education, culture, norms and values of democracy. As a result, soon after the death of General Zia, due to lack of democratic culture and values in his party—the BNP collapsed from power and was simply taken over by another traitor General Ershad. The new General employed his effort to dress up his

activities with a full fundamentalist cover—the expansion of an illiterate wealthy middle class as well as the destruction of democratic values of the nationalist and original educated middle class by the patronage of military institution, thus, reinforced until his oust from power in 1990.

The collapse of the military dictatorship of General Ershad in the face of a mass uprising in Bangladesh has many resemblances and contrasts to the similar kind of events around the contemporary world. This was especially true in the aftermath of Second World War, when the popular military institutions of many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, even some part of Europe used their war gained popularity to capture the state power, in most cases, in favour of western capitalism as a counter force to the rise of popular leftist movements of the time. The small but coherent unity of the military institutions became monopoly forces serving the interest purely of capitalism to destroy the chances of the civilian aspiration— whether for nationalist democracy or socialism or communism—to establish their own choice of rule in these societies. The birth of the Bangladesh military through the liberation war—although a repatriated faction inside the army, in addition, was functioning—had a resemblance of this type of popularity that was shrewdly used later for the intervention in state power for several times. There were also many resemblances of huge genuine movements of the democratic people in Bangladesh with these countries to expel the Generals from power. In all respects, the peoples' victory was inevitable and the Generals were compelled to step down. In this situation, the dictatorship was either fully uprooted and killed in the wake of a mass revolution, or fled the country for shelter, for example—General Chaucheshku in Rumania, Ferdinand Marcos in Philippines or Noriega in Panama and the like. In Bangladesh, the fall of the dictatorship of General Ershad clinches the difference in the similar contemporary events in that he was able to survive any kind of serious punishment according to the strongest demands of the pro-democratic revolution. Hence, they would remain as an indirect latent functional and elementary forces to the discourses of the process of democratisation—a permanent constraint on the democratic administration. The prospect of the advancement of a democratic society expressing the aspirations of the scarifies of thousands of the martyrs was completely dependent on how far the many divided democratic forces would be able to congregate under a broad based national reconciliation—a minimum consensus in all national issues and debates. Only this unity of political elites in all national causes could keep alive the possibility of the institutionalization of the democracy in Bangladesh society.

The guarantee of the holding of a free and fair and trustworthy election seemed—from the experiences of the polls under military dictatorships—to have

been a necessary requirement to the smooth practice of democracy. Bangladesh, by virtue of its inherent desire of the movement, established a Caretaker Government—a non-partisan interim election supervising authority—to operate the election. The matter of the fact was that they used to deploy a corrupt and distracted army that had already lost its trust in the operation of many bogus and voter less elections to justify the reign of military dictatorships. The fair truth, if anybody listens during the election season, it would not be impossible to find many instances of the bundles of unseen money is being handed over secretly to the in-charge military officials—where there was no accountability, chain of command, morals, values of this army that had already been lost under the military regime and would never be regained. For the sake of democracy, the deployment of the army in any election is to be stopped, which is the fundamental precondition of the free and fair election. The trained police forces and the wisdom of the political institution is enough to ensure free and fair elections. Sometimes, the army was found to elect their favourable candidates in the elections. The experiences of deployment of the military in the elections in post-independent Bangladesh may support this truth in practice. Hence, the army must be separated from any kind of popular events for the safety and prospect of democracy.

Through the aggression, interventions and the seizure of state power by the military institution, the spirit, ethics and culture of the middle class that were the vital supports to the rule of democracy were completely destroyed. In fact, the one and half decade military rule from August 1975 to December 1990—direct or indirect, in ‘uniform’ or in civilian cover—was responsible for dividing this middle class or had even created a separate but new trend that was used to counter the existing middle class leaned to the rule of democracy. The existing middle class—developed mainly in the movement for autonomy and independence against the ruling military cliques of Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s and was born with the birth of independent Bangladesh—stood with the fundamental values of nationalism and democracy while the new middle class—grown during the phase of military rule—did not have such values, which was mainly produced as the outcome of the plundering the wealth of the people in association with military leaders to counter the forces of the pro-democratic middle class. This existing middle class—the fundamental base of any democratic society—is developed in a definite time in a society in accordance with the development of education, economy and culture that, in fact, is the practised tradition of the society. The military rulers were keen to develop a new middle class by distributing the illegal and plundered wealth of the state without proper education and culture. This class became affluent quickly by the direct patronage of the petrodollar from Middle East countries—mostly in the name of development of the religious institutions like mosques and *madrasha* (Islamic

schools). By the regular expansion of this plundering middle class under military rule, the original educated and cultured middle class that developed earlier became disconnected from the main current of the society. As a result, the basic, liberal and mild instinct of the modern society became distorted—all institutions became affected—mostly in the thoughts of the people where they became powerless to judge the difference between honest and dishonest, wrong and right, and good and bad in their ways of life. A large section of the population of Bangladesh became powerless in this way so that a General like Ershad was able to become forcibly their leader. In this trend, the military rule in Bangladesh was not only involved in plundering the economy but also had destroyed her social and political culture and was responsible for the rise of fundamentalism—the basic and foremost enemy of the rule of democracy. The military rule of General Zia was responsible for sowing the seeds of fundamentalism when he had revived and endorsed—by military order and later was accepted under Fifth Amendment of the constitution—the religious groups in politics, which was debarred in the original constitution of 1972. General Ershad fuelled these legacies and shrewdly used this approach of running fundamentalism in every sphere of social life—facilitating their wealthy roots that transferred them into a middle class prone to fundamentalism—a permanent setback to the establishment of the values of modern democracy in Bangladesh society. The task that military leader General Zia started with the distribution of incentives by plundering the wealth of the state among these groups to create his own support base against the ongoing democratic values of the society was taken further under General Ershad. This class—in military as well as in civilians of religious quarters under the patronage of the state became the main share of power of General Ershad under the umbrella of his JP as well as what was remained in the opposition force—that struggled to establish a democratic rule—as a significant faction in the BNP and anti-liberation forces JIB. In the post-Ershad period, these middle class fundamentalist factions of political forces in the country became the main counter forces to the middle class committed to the practice of modern democracy.

The end of the military dictatorship of General Ershad—the restoration of constitutional rule—in fact, was the starting point of the aspiration for the institutionalization of the democracy in the country. The establishment of democracy in government as well as in all stages of the socio-political life of the people depends on how far the democratic forces—political parties and interest and pressure groups including students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions and democratic vicinity, as well as the tools of democracy—elections, law and order, norms and values, and culture—could operate successfully in every sphere of the society. In necessary condition, the democratic forces must be reinstated in all public functions replacing the presence of any type of defence forces—specially the

military and para military BDR forces. In an emergency situation like flood, famine, drought and storms, there are many examples to deploy the military to public activities in the name of their assistance, which, definitely, is suicidal to the governments of new democracies—especially which have just experienced the military aggressions into the power. In stead, the democratic forces—all party students brigade, all party emergency committee, all party intellectuals and professional bodies or all party trade unions unity could operate such activities that would enhance further the chances to foster democracy among the general public. To bring up democracy in a society like Bangladesh—a backward, underdeveloped countryside with limited opportunities, the government for democracy must be sincere to the regular practise of democratic culture among the conscious quarters—the universities and colleges, the professional and intellectual institutions and trade union organisations, which are regarded as the breeding ground of democratic culture and leaderships—of the society. In Bangladesh, from the experiences of the many events in the nation's history, the student community who represent all classes—lower class illiterate farming labourers to middle class government officers and industrial and agricultural upper class—has been the regulatory force in any change—peaceful or revolutionary—in the society. Hence, the regular operation of the elections in the universities and colleges that would expand huge new leaderships for democracy, and a constructive and peaceful management of the student politics is able to broaden the taste of democracy from the urban cities and towns to the rural periphery. It was the examined instances in Bangladesh society that the regular elections in the universities and colleges and in the trade unions of intellectuals, professionals and working class labourers enhanced the base of the middle class support for democracy as well as diminished the chances of the rise of any unconstitutional forces allied to root the fundamentalism in society. It was observed in the post-Ershad period, the democratic governments of Begum Zia and Sheikh Hasina did not encourage any such activities prone to the extension of the democratic forces. There were many reasons behind their decisions—the pressure from military vested interests under their false intelligence reports or to earn cheap popularity raising the slogan of banning student and trade union politics or to secure their dynasty—as believed by many political critiques—in the competition of the future leadership of the country. The absence of the participation of the democratic forces everywhere in the administration, however, led to the instability of their democratic reigns and showed their empty abilities that made much dissatisfaction among the countrymen, which enhanced the problems for the future prospect of democracy in the country. In the failure of their dynasty, the chances of the unconstitutional forces for power would be increased—the land of freedom, liberty and equalities—the terms of democracy would be missing forever, and that would

even be more dangerous for the safety of their dynasty for which the people of Bangladesh is proud for—the heroic leaderships of the democracy.

The chances of a further military takeover in Bangladesh power not are anymore possible in any kind—in any shape. Because, in the post independent years—through the struggle and movements against the authoritarian regimes—a sizable civil society and democratic forces necessary in the radius of the cities and towns has been developed that is enough to the forced removal of—if any—future unconstitutional forces from power. Hence, this kind of further attempt would bring events of great bloodshed and chronic instability in the political process of the country, and would increase the possibility of the complete destruction of military institution itself. After the collapse of the Ershad dictatorship, the channels in the military were able, for only once and that must be for the last, to manage the top level political leaders to release them from death-sentence, but the would-be success of the future movement—if this would have needed to do so against such a military dictatorship again—would be able to deracinate their last root from the hinterland of democratic society. However, a tolerant and civic as well as respectful to democratic rule and solely professional military institution is to be developed for the smooth continuation of the process of the democratisation. For that, the governments should strengthen their ties and friendships with other democracies around the world and so on, for the military of the country. For this objective, our military could work closely with the nations of leading democracies—USA, European Union and India—so that the military of this country would be enriched by the frequent training of democratic norms and values, and culture and in the same way, they must be detached from the connection of any sorts of authoritarian regimes around the world.

The success of the movement for the restoration of democracy was partial and unfinished. It was nipped in the bud and was thwarted before it was ripe in the interest of the military itself. In the dazzling mass uprising, although it was true that the military leaders were compelled to disappear from the power race—a temporary supremacy of political and state elites was established over these power greedy militia service men—who are led only by the power of their guns rather than any other qualifications comparing to other leading professions under the republic, virtually the failure of the opposition democratic forces to ensure the cautionary and instanced retribution of the criminal coup leaders has put the fate of democracy at great risk. This failure of the opposition forces was long standing in their palpable disunity on which the military was able to sustain the power as well as escaped the charges for their crimes against humanity after the exit of the power. Although the divisions in the original civilian democratic secular nationalist pro liberation forces—between the AL and some other popular leftist forces—were already

functioning that led their unity of 15-party alliance an ultimate failure, however, the adding of the BNP—another civilian face of the military—as the opposition force and a latent and continuous patronage of the military for setting this party as an alternative power element in the wake of the imminent failure of Ershad dictatorship had weakened the pure non-military civilian secular opposition political forces under the AL and leftists force in the drama of raising the cheap slogan for the unity in the movement. This sharp disunity has been an ongoing situation and could not be resolved. Therefore, the aspiration for the development of strong democratic forces and institutions would be only in the expectation of the people rather than in reality until some measures—to stop patronizing any political party by military vested quarter—were taken in this regard for sensible solution.

The popularity of the political parties is also a condition for the development of strong democratic forces—the lack of which decrease the power of general mass to protest against the brute forces in power like military. In Bangladesh, except the leftists and fundamentalist forces, the functioning of the leadership of the main power-contender civilian political parties—from center to periphery—were not clear and fair—did not reflect the opinions of the party workers that was to be a temporary solution, but was never a permanent policy for the development of a democratic society. This always created factionalism in the party institutions due to their limitation in a fair leadership selection process. This sometimes questioned the popularity of the leaders which ultimately detached the political parties from their mass base, and the military leaders used to collect their civilian associates from these dissatisfied leaders of the factions and used them to run through the general masses. For their own interest and security of democratic society, the functioning of leaderships in political parties should be fair and out of question. This was also one of the setbacks of the mainstream political parties that weakened the opposition movement many times and facilitated the monstrous military forces to sustain their power.

The people of Bangladesh never wanted military rule nor did they want to fight against the independent military institution that respects the civilian rules. However, they had to fight against this military power in their long history of struggle for nation building that saw the military as a betrayer of the people's interests—to democracy. This military killed two Presidents of the country, and thousands of political workers in the movement for democracy as well as thousands of soldiers in the clutches of coups and counters coups in the very short period of post-independent Bangladesh. In the post-Ershad period, the military was still found to try to rehabilitate General Ershad in civilian politics, which posed a great threat to the continuation of the process of democracy. This has thrown the military in

opposition to the civilian political elites. In the same way, the uneven rift between the civilian political forces in the ensuing power struggle has been badly used by the military to keep their control on civilian politics. Consequently, since the military left power in 1990 they failed to achieve the trust of democratic forces of the country. The way out of this question of image of the military has to be conceived by military itself as well as by the careful interactions of the civilian political forces while they are in power. A national reconciliation between all civilian political forces and civil society has been an incessant feature of popular demand to uproot this 'dragon seed' from the last edge of power politics.

The history of destruction of civilisation and human beings beyond natural causes in nations around the world consequential in the huge cries of the human soul and mankind is the history of war and military. The characteristics of their invasion, intervention, seize and aggression may be different, but their faces of the despotic and cruel repression—genocide, killing, raping, plundering and arresting the freedom, liberty, impunity and equality of the mankind—are unchanged and indifferent. Oppositely, the honest and worthwhile impulse of democracy is to protect this domain of human civilisation—to uphold the voices of the mankind in every sphere of national to international brim of conflict resolution. In a word, democracy is the life to mankind. Let the movement of gleaming the light of this life of democracy be upheld forever in nations around the world until the end of the life of this human civilization.

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D. News Papers

1. International:

Dailies: *The Guardian* (London), *The Times* (London), *The Financial Times* (London), *The New York Times* (New York), *The International Herald Tribune*

Weeklies: *The Far Eastern Economic Review, The Kessing's Contemporary Archives: Record of International Current Affairs with Continually updated Indexes, The Newsweek, The Time*

2. Local:

Bengali Dailies: *Dainik Ittefa, Dainik Banglar Bani, Dainik Sangbad, Dainik Azker Kagoj, Dainik Sangram, Dainik Inqilub, Dainik Janakantha, Dainik Desh,*

English Dailies: *The Bangladesh Observer, The Bangladesh Times, The Daily Star, The New Nation, The New Age, The Financial Express,*

Bengali Weeklies: *Bichitra, Bartaman Dinkal, Jay Jay Din, Ekota, Purvavus,*

English Weekly: *Holiday*

APPENDIX-ONE

Interview Questionnaire

Dear Interviewee

I am a PhD research student in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Leeds, UK. My research is: "The Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 1982-1990: A Study of Political Sociology". In my research, I am trying to analyse the social characteristics and actions of the mass movements against the military regime of General Ershad from 1982 to 1990. May I please request you to spend some time to answer the following questions, which will contribute to the research aiming at the objective analysis of the democracy movements in Bangladesh in 1980s?

--A.K.M. Jamal Uddin

Four sections of the Questionnaire

Section-1: Introduction of the Interviewee

Q. 1.0: Name / code no.....

Q.1.1:

Address:
.....

Q.1.2: Age in 1990... (a) Under 25 (b) 26-35 (c) 36-45 (d) 46-55 (e) 56-65 (f) Over 65

[Coding: under 25 (1), 25-35 (2), 36-45 (3), 46-55(4), 56-65(5), over 65(5)]

Q.1.3: Gender: (a) Male (b)Female

[Coding, male-1, Female- 2]

Q.1.4: Educational qualifications: (a) under S.S.C (b) S. S.C (c) H.S.C (d) graduate (e) post-graduate

[Coding, under S.S.C -1, S. S.C-2, H.S.C-3, graduate -4, and post-graduate-5]

Q.1.5: Occupation in 1980s/ 1990...?

[Coding: Buisness-1, lawyers-2, Service-3, industrialist-4, landlord-5, student-6, politicians-7, physician-8, teacher-9, journalist-10, engineer-11, others-12]

Q.1.6: Designation in the organisation from 1982-1990: (a) President (b) Executive secretary (c) Presidium member... (d) Other (please specify) (in 1982—1990)

[Coding: President-1, Executive Secretary-2, Presidium member-3, other-4]

Q.1.7: Religion: (a) Islam (b) Hindu (c) Buddhist (d) Christian (e) others (please specify)

[Coding: Islam-1, Hindu-2, Bhuddhist-3, Christian-4, Others-5]

Q.1.8: Were you an active participant / member of any political party? Yes..... No...[Coding, Yes-1, No-2]

If yes, which party? : (a) Bangladesh Awami League, (b) Bangladesh Nationalist Party, (c) Bangladesh Communist Party, (d) Bangladesh Workers Party, (e) Jamat-I-Islami Bangladesh, (f) others (please specify)...[AL-1, BNP-2, CPB-3, BWP-4, JIB-5, others-6.....]

Q.1.9: Are you a member of any interest groups/pressure group? Yes No...[Coding, Yes-1, No-2]

If yes, which of the following group you will be incorporated

(a) Politician (b) student (c) intellectual (d) professional (e) member of trade union (Labourer/worker)

(f) Non-participant pressure/interest group [Coding: politician-1, student-2, intellectual-3, professional-4, TU-5, NPG-6]

Q.3.5: Absence of stable political culture and institution in the post-independent Bangladesh

Q.3.6: Bangladesh society was fit for an authoritarian regime as it was mainly an agrarian economy with high illiteracy, poverty and sharp inequality in her social life

Q.3.7: Corruption, inefficiency and autocracy of civilian regime prevailed in society

Q.3.8: Sharp and conflictual division among civilian political forces

Q.3.9: Others, (if any, please specify)
 [Coding, strongly agree-1, agree-2, disagree-3, strongly disagree-4, never agree-5 can't rate-6; recoding: agree-1+2 >2 and disagree- 3+4+5>3]

Q.4.0: Now I would like to draw your attention to the effects of military regime of General Ershad in Bangladesh. The major effects of the regime are cited in the following. See how closely the statements fit your opinion. (INSERT TERM...ROTATES... is very closely, fairly closely, not too closely, not at all closely; don't know)

	Very closely	Fairly closely	Not too closely	Not at all closely	DK
Q.4.1: Military regime destroyed the constitutional process of the change of government in the country.
Q.4.2: Military regime damaged the political institutions of the country
Q.4.3: Politicised the Armed Forces and destroyed the image of the Army as a professional institution
Q. 4.4: Spread and rooted corruption and the black economy in the country
Q.4.5: It destroyed the election process
Q.4.6: Responsible for underdevelopment and acute poverty of the people
Q.4.7: It destroyed the rule of law resulting in killing, arrest, trial of thousands of political activists
Q.4.8: Some steps of the regime could be appreciated (like Upazilla system,)
Q.4.9: It made the country totally dependent on international political forces
Q.4.10: Others, (if any, please specify)

[Coding: very closely-1, fairly closely-2, not too closely-3, not at all closely-4, DK-5; recoding: Closely- 1+2 > 6 and not closely- 3+4 > 7]

Section 3: Social Background of the Movement

Q.5.0: Some social problems are cited below which could be considered to reflect the structure of Bangladesh society in the 1970s and the early 1980s. Could you please make your opinion on the following problem as a whole? (INSERT TERMS...ROTATES ... is completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, completely disagree, don't know.)

	Completely Agree	Mostly Agree	Mostly Disagree	Completely Disagree	Don't know
Q.5.1: Acute poverty
Q.5.2: High illiteracy
Q.5.3: Sharp inequality in social life For example, social class, caste, religion etc.
Q.5.4: Absence of communal harmony.....
Q.5.5: High rate of population growth
Q. 5.6: Unemployment of educated youths
Q.5.7: Corruption in all sectors
Q.5.8: Absence of the right leadership in power
Q.5.9: Absence of democracy or presence of the authoritarian regime
Q.5.10: Increased rate of the landless
Q.5.11: Dependence on foreign aid
Q. 5.12: Informal money lending in rural society (Mahajoni protha)
Q.5.13: Rise of fundamentalism
Q.5.14: Others, (if any, please specify).....

[Coding: completely agree-1, mostly agree-2, mostly disagree-3, completely disagree-4, don't know-5; recoding: agree 1+2>6, disagree 3+4>7]

Q.6.0: We all agree to a basic point that the agriculture has led the Bangladesh economy from time immemorial. Some steps by different regimes in 1970s, however, changed the trend to increase industrialisation, which might be seen related to the democracy movement. Could you please make your opinion overall on the trends cited below, (INSERT TERM.....ROTATES... is yes, no, don't know)

	Yes	No	Don't know
Q.6.1: Bangladesh economy was led mostly by Agriculture in the 1970s and older industries were mainly agro-based.
Q.6.2: Bangladesh economy was led by Agriculture but found increase of small batch industrial activity in early 1980s
Q.6.3: Bangladesh economy was led by Agriculture but non-agricultural activities were found increased

mostly in urban areas in the mid-1980s

Q.6.4: Bangladesh economy was led by agriculture but industrial activities were found proportionally major increase in early 1990s

Q.6.5: NGO operation in rural area was able to change the rural economy (agriculture and non-agricultural) positively through out the 1980s

[Coding: agree-1, disagree-2 and DK-3]

Q.7.1: Social scientists normally find many inequalities and differentiations in society. Bangladesh, a third world poverty prone country, in the 1980s had also many inequalities in her social life. The major criteria are cited below. Could you please make your judgement by using (INSERTED TERMROTATES...) strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, no answer.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No answer
Q.7.1: Bangladesh society was mainly differentiated by income group i.e. social class (for example, lower, middle, higher class)
Q.7.2: It was differentiated by religion
Q.7.3: It was differentiated by caste system prevailed inside the specific religious community
Q.7.4: It was differentiated by gender
Q.7.5: It was differentiated by age group (high dependency ratio age group)
Q.7.6: Differentiated by giving more urban utilities rather than rural ones

[Coding: strongly agree-1, agree-2, disagree-3, strongly disagree-4 and no answer-5; recoding: agree 1+2>2 and disagree 3+4 >3]

Q.8.0: I, now, want to move your attention to the democracy movement against the military regime in the 1980s. Different social groups like, as mentioned above, have different roles in the movement. How will you rate the participation of these groups in the movement from the following statements...? (INSERTED TERM....ROTATES... is highly accepted, accepted, rejected, highly rejected, no answer)

	Highly accepted	Accepted	Rejected	Highly rejected	No answer
Q.8.1: Bangladesh democracy movements mainly involved the rise of conflict between the social classes in her society
Q.8.2: It involved the religious conflict of the society.
Q.8.3: It involved gender discrimination
Q.8.4: It involved the high participation of youth age group
Q.8.5: It involved more urban participation than rural one

Q.8.6: The movements involved different interest groups of society i.e. students, intellectuals,

professionals, labourers etc

Q.8.7: The movement was organised and led
By the political forces of society

[Coding: highly accepted-1, accepted-2, rejected-3, highly rejected-4
and no answer-5, recoding: accepted 1+2 >2, rejected 3+4>3]

Q.9.0: This query draws your attention to the class participation of the movement. Major classes of Bangladesh society in the 1980s are given below. Could you please make your opinion, adjusted from the rating criteria cited in the right side by using ...? (INSERT TERMROTATES... is greatly participated, fairly participated, very little participated, not participated, don't know.)

Greatly Fairly Very little Not Don't know
Participated participated participated participated

Q.9.1: Higher class: included landlord, industrialists, high position bureaucrat whose monthly income was supposed to be Tk.25000+

Q.9.2: Middle upper class: included big businessmen, university professors, bureaucrat, whose monthly income was supposed to be Tk.15000-25000

Q.9.3: Middle class: included middle rank college teacher, government employee, businessmen whose monthly income was supposed to be Tk.10000-15000

Q.9.4: Lower middle class: included small businessmen, school teachers, third and fourth class government employees whose monthly income was supposed to be Tk. 5000 -10000

Q.9.5: Lower class: included small shop businessman, owner of small-size land, labourers of the industries whose monthly income was supposed to be Tk.3000-5000

Q.9.6: Distressed class at the lowest stage of the society: included landless, day labourers, riksha puller, porter etc, whose monthly income was supposed to be under Tk. 3000.

Q.9.7: others, (if any, please specify)
[Coding: Greatly participated-1, fairly participated-2, very little participated-3, not participated-4, and DK-5; recoding: fairly participated 1+2>2 and very little participated 3+4>3]

Q.10.0: I have divided the participants and organising forces of the movement mainly into five interest group categories. They are politicians, students, intellectuals, professional, trade union workers and labourers. How important was their role in the success of the movement? Please follow the rating criteria in the right side of the following... (INSERTED TERM.....ROTATES... is great importance, fair importance, some importance, no importance, no answer)

Great Fair Some No No answer
Importance Importance Importance Importance

Q.10.1: Political parties and alliances.....

Q.10.2: Students organisations (APSU).....

Q.10.3: Intellectuals of the society

(teachers, journalists, poets, cultural activists, artists, and the like)

Q.10.4: Professional groups (doctors, engineers, bureaucrats and the like)

Q.10.5: Trade union workers and labourers (labourers of industry, day labourers, landless, lower class employees of govt. non-govt., semi-govt. organisations)

[Coding, great importance-1, fair importance-2, some importance-3, no importance-4 and no answer-5; recoding: fair importance 1+2>2, some importance 3+4> 3]

Q.11.0: In this question, I have categorised different 'orders of the movement forces' according to their roles in the movement that ousted General Ershad. Different orders are given below. Could you please choose one order that is sufficient enough to identify their position in the movement by using...? (INSERTED TERM.....ROTATES) yes, no, don't know

Here, Students=S, Political party=PP, Trade Union= TU, intellectual, Professionals=P and Others= O

	Yes	No	Don't know
Q.11.1: S--PP--TU--I--P--O
Q.11.2: PP--S--I--TU--P--O
Q.11.3: S--PP-- P--I- TU--O
Q.11.4: PP--S--TU--I--P--O
Q.11.5: Others, (if any, please specify)

[Coding: yes-1, No-2, and DK-3]

Q.12.0: It was said that 'urban middle class' had the main role in organising the anti-autocracy movements. It was mainly concentrated in the urban areas: cities and towns. Could you please rate the party that had earned the support base of this urban middle class by giving your overall opinion (INSERT TERM...ROTATES...is Very high, High, Medium, Low, and No answer)

	Very high	High	Medium	Low	No answer
Q.12.1: Bangladesh Awami League (AL)
Q.12.2: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
Q.12.3: CPB and other Leftist parties
Q.12.4: 5-Party alliance (radical leftist)
Q.12.5: JIB and other Islamic parties
Q.12.6: JP (Party of Military ruler)

[Coding: very high-1, high-2, medium-3, low-4, no answer-5; recoding: high 1+2>2, and low 4+5>4]

Section-04: Actions of the Movement

Q13.0: I want to request you to move your attention on the actions of the movements-- in fact, what happened in Bangladesh in the 1980s during the period of Martial Law regime. Opposition political forces had a number of actions against the regime to establish democracy in the country. Among other, hartal (general strike), Dhaka seize, protest march, public meeting, gherao (block govt. office), long march, block traffic, hunger strike, human chain, signing petition, use of violence, etc. might be of some examples. Could you please rate these

- Q.13.4.4: Preventing govt. and Non-govt. employees to go to workplaces
- Q.13.4.5: Guerrilla attack on the law and order forces of the military administration
- Q.13.4.6: Gun fight with govt. forces
- Q.13.4.7: Killing govt. supporter including military and political official
- Q.13.5.0: *Programmes given by United cultural Jote (alliance)*
- Q.13.5.1: Patha Natak (street drama with theme against military regime
- Q.13.5.2: Singing songs to awaken the mass people against the regime
- Q.13.5.3: Symbolic march by Arts and crafts institute against military exploitation
- Q.13.5.4: Poems against military regime.....

[Coding: mostly effective-1, effective-2, a little effective-3, non-effective-4 , no answer 5; recoding: effective 1+2+3 >2,]

Q.14.0: You possibly know that many repressive measures were taken by the military regime to denounce the opposition movements. How can you put your opinion by rating these measures overall by using (INSERT TERM.....ROTATES...) mostly effective, effective, a little effective, non-effective, don't know

Mostly Effective	Effective	A little effective	Non-effective	DK	Were you affected
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- Q.14.1.0: *Repressive measures taken during the normal course of the movement*
- Q.14.1.1: Lathi (baton) charge on the procession
- Q.14.1.2 Block the protest march/ demonstration
- Q.14.1.3: Charging tear gas and rubber bullet on procession
- Q.14.1.4: Guarded and cordoned the procession by Police Forces
- Q.14.1.5: Suiting false case against the participants of the movements
- Q.14.2.0: *Repressive measures to associative groups and individuals*
- Q.14.2.1: Restrictions on news media i.e. on Newspapers, radio, TV and the like
- Q.14.2.2: Harasments in service i.e. transfer, sacking, demotion, etc.
- Q.14.2.3: Making different type of threats individually to demoralise them.

- Q. 15.3.3 Mrs Syeda Sajeda Choudhury.....
- Q. 15.3.4: Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder.....
- Q.15.3.5: Mr. Amir Hossain Amu
- Q.15.3.6: Mr Saifur Rahman
- Q.15.3.7: Mr. Tofael Ahmed
- Q.15.3.8: Mr Nirmal Sen

Q.15.4.0: *Leaders from non-political socio-cultural Organisations (please consider three popular leaders)*

Q.15.4.1:

Q.15.4.2:

Q.15.4.3:

[Coding: like most-1, like-2, like least-3 and no answer-4]

Q.16.0 Different political parties and their alliances had different roles in the movement. Could you please rate their role by giving your opinion overall of ... (INSERTED TERM ...ROTATES) ... excellent, good, only fair, poor, and DK?

	Excellent	Good	Only fair	poor	Don't know
Q.16.1: Bangladesh Awami League (AL) with their alliance.
Q.16.2: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) with their alliance
Q.16.3: Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB) with their alliance
Q.16.4: Bangladesh Workers Party with their alliance
Q.16.5: National Socialist Party with their alliance
Q.16.6: Jamat-I- Bangladesh and other Islamic Parties
Q.16.7: Others, (if any, please specify)

[Coding: excellent-1, good-2, only fair-3, poor-4 and no answer-5; recoding: good 1+2>2 and only fair 3+4>3]

Q.17.0: The movements' places or centres are very important to get a fair idea about the different events of the movements. Could you please tell me particular centres or places where frequency and effectiveness of the movement actions we brought about..... (INSERT TERMROTATES)...is high, medium, low, DK ?

Most High High Medium Low Very low DK

Q.17.1.0: *Category one:*

Q.17.1.1: Urban area (from the capital city to the thana headquarter and municipality)

Q.17.1.2: Rural area (rest of the urban area)

Q.17.2.0: *Category two:*

Q.17.2.1: University and all other higher educational institutions

- Q.17.2.2: Premises of the offices of the different political parties
- Q.17.2.3: Press Club premises
- Q.17.2.4: Area concentrated on the offices of professional bodies
- Q.17.2.5: Area concentrated on the offices of the intellectual bodies
- Q. 17.6: Bigger streets of the city
- Q. 17.6: Others, (if any, please specify)

[Coding: most high-1, high-1, medium-3, low-4 and very low-5 no answer-6; recoding high 1+2+3 >3, low 4+5 >4]

Q.18.1.0: The issue of parliamentary election in 1986, in which AL and its 8-party alliance participated, and BNP and 7-party alliance did not, had created countless debates in the political arena. Could you please tell me which decision was to be right or wrong by giving your opinion overall of.... (INSERTED TERM....ROTATES).... agree, disagree, and don't know ?

	agree	disagree	don't know
Q.18.1: The decision of AL and alliance to participate

Q.18.2: The decision of BNP to boycott
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Q.18.3: The decision of AL made longer the military regime.....
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Q.18.4: The decision of BNP made longer the military regime
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[Coding: agree-1, disagree-2 and do n't know-3]

Q.19.0: You probably know that the general sentiment of the mass people of anti-martial law regime was found always in favour of a united movement from a single platform of all political forces, but it could not be in effect. Could you please give your opinion on the following causes behind the disintegration of opposition forces by using (INSERTED TERM....ROTATES...) strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, and don't know (DK)?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK
Q.19.1: Sharp ideological distance between AL and BNP

Q.19.2: Conflict of leadership might be seen between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia
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Q.19.3: AL was not interested to forge united movements
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Q.19.4: BNP was not interested to forge united movements
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Q.19.5: Many contradictions existed between AL and BNP in their past history
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Q.19.6: Others, (if any, please specify)
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[Coding: strongly agree-1, agree-2, disagree-3, strongly disagree-4 and DK-5; recoding: agree 1+2 > 2 and 3+4 > 3]

Q.20.0: In 1990 the movement was finally successful; opposition political forces were united at least by their joint programmes, and students' organisations forged unity. The movements reached the climax, and consequently, General Ershad was removed when a Caretaker Government took the power. After a peaceful general election under the Caretaker Government, a democratic government was established. For all these

successes, to whom do you give the creditability making your opinion overall of ...(INSERTED TERM...ROTATES)... very great deal, good deal, not very much, none at all, don't know

	Very great deal	Good deal	not very much	none at all	DK
Q.20.1: All Party Students Union (APSU)
Q.20.2: AL and 8-party alliance
Q.20.3: BNP and 7-party alliance
Q.20.4: 5-party alliance
Q.20.5: JI and Islamic Parties
Q.20.6: Professional bodies
Q.20.7: Intellectual groups
Q.20.8: Labourers and workers of Trade Unions

[Coding: very great deal-1, good deal-2, not very much-3, none at all-4 and DK-5; recoding: good deal 1+2>2 and not good deal 3+4>3]

Q.21.0: Thousands of participants, party workers and supporters of parties were killed, injured, arrested and faced with great deal of repressive measures through out the 1980s, the period of military dictator. How will you judge the sacrifice of following groups in the movement giving your overall opinion of (INSERT TERM...ROTATES) quite a lot sacrifice, mostly sacrifice, a little sacrifice, no sacrifice, not known?

	Quite a lot sacrifice	Mostly sacrifice	A little sacrifice	No sacrifice	Not know
Q.21.1.0: <i>Category one</i>					
Q.21.1.1: Students community
Q.21.1.2: Labourer and workers
Q.21.1.3: Professionals
Q.21.1.4: Intellectuals
Q.21.2.0: <i>Category two</i>					
Q.21.2.1: Workers and supporters of AL
Q.21.2.2: Workers and supporters of BNP
Q.21.2.3: Workers and supporters of Leftist Parties
Q.21.2.4: Workers and supporters of Islamic Parties.....
Q.21.3.0: <i>Category three</i>					
Q.21.3.1: Participants of higher class
Q.21.3.2: Participants of middle class
Q.21.3.3: Participants of lower class
Q.21.4.0: <i>Category four</i>					
Q.21.4.1: Participants of Urban area
Q.21.4.2: Participants of rural area

Q.21.5.0: *Category five*

Q.21.5.1: Male participants

Q.21.5.2: Female participants

Q.21.6.0: *Category six*

Q.21.6.1: Youth (age 15 -35)

Q.21.6.2: Adult (Middle age group
Age 36-55)

Q.21.6.3: Older 55+

Q.21.7.0: *Others*

Q.21.7.1: Tokai (street boys: age 5-12)

[Coding: quite a lot of sacrifice-1, mostly sacrifice-2, a little sacrifice-3, no sacrifice-4 and DK-5; recoding: lot of sacrifice (LOS) 1+2>2, and a little sacrifice 3+4.>3]

.22.0. It seemed that several diplomatic missions in Bangladesh had some catalytic roles in this movement. Do you think that the involvement of such outside forces had really an effective role to establish democracy in Bangladesh? Yes..... No.....[Coding: yes-1 and No-2].

If yes, how will you judge their role in establishing the democracy in the country? Choose the diplomatic mission and their role importance from the following

	Most Important role	Important role	No important role	don't know
Q.22.1: American Embassy, Dhaka
Q.22.2: EEC diplomatic mission, Dhaka
Q.22.3: British High Commission, Dhaka
Q.22.4: Indian High Commission, Dhaka
Q.22.5: Commonwealth Secretariat
Q.22.6: Japanese Embassy, Dhaka
Q.22.7: United Nations Organisation
Q.22.8: World Bank and IMF
Q.22.9: Foreign Aid Consortium
Q.22.10: Others, (if any, please specify)

[Coding: most important role-1, important role-2, no important role-3 and do n't know-4; recoding: important role 1+2 > 2]

APPENDIX—TWO

Audio Interview of Key Leaders and Military Dictator

List of Key Movement Leaders (1-5) and An Interview Guidelines used to Interview them

1. Sheikh Hasina, President, Bangladesh Awami League 1981-to date
2. Begum Khaleda Zia, Chairperson, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 1984 to date
3. Rashed Khan Menon, General Secretary, Bangladesher Workers Party 1990
4. Hasanul Haque Inu, General Secretary, Bangladesh Socialist Party 1990
5. Mujahidul Islam Salim, Bangladesh Communist Party, 2003
6. Professor Rangalal Sen, one of the key political sociologists of Bangladesh and
7. General H.M. Ershad, the military dictator of the country 1982-1990

Questionnaire for the in-depth interview with key leaders of the movement

The movement for the restoration of democracy against military regime of General Ershad is very important event in the history of post-independent Bangladesh. The key leaders, mainly the chief of different political parties, were directly involved in planning of every action and certainly gathered much experience. In-depth interviews with these leaders on many issues, debates, failures, successes of the movement, might be able to provide some supportive evidences in favour of getting answers of my research questions. Incorporation of their experiences and opinions of different issues could be considered rich documents for the research. Every question, of course, will be extended with necessary follow-up questions. The questions to interview them may be extended on form and shape during my field research. A structure of questionnaire reflecting the central arguments of the research—‘sociological analysis of a political event’ regarding Bangladesh democracy movement—is given below.

Structure of open questions

1. I would like to seek your attention on the military intervention in Bangladesh, which is recognised as basis of the democracy movement. Could you please tell me, what are the causes of military take-over in the state apparatus in the post-independent Bangladesh? What causes you can explain behind the military take-over of General Ershad?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) Whom do you make responsible for military regime? Military leaders? Civil bureaucracy? politicians? Others?
- ii) Why and how they are responsible?
- iii) Do you find any difference between the military regimes in Bangladesh and those in other nations around the world?
- iv) Could you please explain how the armed forces of Bangladesh maintained a total unity in favour of the military rule in the country? And what happened regarding the military regime of Ershad?
- v) For the military intervention in Bangladesh, how will you explain the personal interest of the leaders of the coup, and the collective interest of the Armed Forces?

2. The military regime of General Ershad sustained for almost a decade. What causes can you identify with this military rule to prolong in Bangladesh?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) Strong unity inside the armed forces? How?
- ii) Failure of the opposition forces? How?
- iii) Bangladesh social structure was in favour for authoritarian regime? How? Please describe.
- iv) International auspices? How? Please explain.

3. In Bangladesh, there were a great number of socio-economic problems in the post-independent period i.e. its poor economy, primordial loyalties, kinship, illiteracy, post-war conflicts and the like. Can you see any social causes for the rise of an authoritarian military regime in Bangladesh society, especially regarding the military regime of General Ershad?

Follow-up questions may be related to the issues as follows:

- i) Pattern of social change inside the social structure of Bangladesh?
- ii) Post war conflicts inside armed forces and in civilian politics?
- iii) Change in Economic policy- socialist economy to capitalist entrepreneurship?
- iv) Urbanisation and small batch industrialisation?

4. There were many consequences of military rule in Bangladesh society. How will you explain them? What were the impacts of military regime of Gen. Ershad on the economy, polity and society of Bangladesh?

Follow-up questions may be related to the issues as follows:

- (i) Destroying constitutional process? Political institutions?
- (ii) Corruption in different sectors?
- (iii) Major destructions in macro and micro economy?
- (iv) Poverty and illiteracy and foreign aid dependence?
- (v) Militarization of civilian administration?

5. You are one of the main key leaders of the movement against the military regime of Gen. Ershad. How will you make a difference of this democracy movement against the autocratic military regime of Gen. Ershad with the fall of other military regimes around the world? What special factors can you identify to compare this movement with the other anti-autocracy movements around the world?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) Is it an urban mass revolution led by urban middle class? If yes, please explain how?
- ii) Is it a proletariat revolution to change the society? If yes, please explain how?
- iii) Is it a political reform movement? If yes, please explain how?
- iv) Do you think any other different character of the movement? Please explain.

6. I want to know about the participants of the movement. Could you please tell me who mainly were the participants, and organised the movement in different stages of the movement?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) How was the economic condition of different level organisers—Union, ward, thana and district and divisional city level leaders of party/organisations? What was their position in society?
- ii) Which class were largely affected by the causalities of the movement? How was their financial condition or education level or position in society?
- iii) What were the roles of students, labour unions, intellectuals, professionals, intellectuals in the movements.

7. Could you please tell me the events you can recall, by which you were directly affected. Were you harassed by the repressive actions of the military ruler?

Follow-up questions may be as follow:

- i) Please describe situation when you were arrested, attacked and repressed by the regime.
- ii) Please describe if you have any experience of brutality of the dictator as witness.
- iii) Please describe if you have any emotional experiences that you could never forget.

8. I want to let your attention to the different alliances of opposition forces. Could you please describe the background of the alliances: 15-party alliance, 7-party alliance, 5-party alliance etc? Especially how they were formed?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) Why and how was 15-party alliance formed? What was the basis (where applicable)?
- ii) Why and how was 7-party alliance formed (where applicable)?
- iii) How was 5-party alliance formed (where applicable)?

- iv) Why it was not possible to make a united platform for the movement?
- v) How did the formation of alliances help the movement?
- vi) How did three alliances maintain liaison among themselves? If any, please explain.

9. I want to draw your attention to an important debate on the parliamentary election of 1986 under the military regime. How will you describe the participation or non-participation in the parliamentary election of 1986?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) Participation in the election might help the military leaders to prolong in power. How? Please explain how they benefited or lost?
- ii) Non-participation in the election might help the military leaders to prolong in power. How? Please explain how they benefited or lost.

10. Please, feel free to describe the effectiveness of different movement actions against military regime of General Ershad.

Follow-up questions may be on each action as follow:

- i) Hartal? How it did it work as an effective movement action
- ii) Dhaka seize?
- iii) Non-cooperation?
- iv) Blocking communication network?
- v) Violence?
- vi) Protest march?
- vi) Public meeting?

11. In the military regimes around the world, a common tendency was found that the military rulers tried to allure opposition leaders offering different port-folio in the cabinet. Either you or any other leaders of your party might have such offers? How did you face these kinds of problem in your party?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) How you have personally faced this problem, if any?
- ii) How you have faced this problem inside your party, if any?
- iii) How these problems influenced the movements?

12. It has been found in almost every event that there are influences of International centre countries on the change of political power in third world countries. Do you recognise any kind of influences of international forces in Bangladesh democracy movement? Who are those forces? World Bank? IMF? USA,? EEC? UK etc?

Follow-up questions may be related with issues as follows:

- i) What are the patterns of influences or Assistance?
- ii) Wave of democratisation in 1970s and 1980s around the world?
- iii)Threaten the military regimes to quit power

13 It has been found in different nations all over the world that when a military or authoritarian regime falls, the ring leaders of military rule were given brutal punishment. In Bangladesh, nothing was happen to those military leaders? How will you explain this fact?

Follow-up questions may be as follows:

- i) Is there any exit guarantee to the military leaders?
- ii) Political leaders were failed to do it?
- iii) Is there any secret understanding between opposition political leaders and military leaders?

N.B: This open questionnaire may include more issues and debates of the movement, if it is found important during the check of secondary sources, especially 9-years news papers.

APPENDIX- THREE:

A Chart is used to collect the frequencies of the four actions (*Hartal*, protest march, public meeting and violence) by dates for the whole period of military rule (1982-1990) from major national dailies.

1. Movement action: Hartal (General Strike)

Date	Issue	Political Parties/ interest groups					Place of <i>hartal</i>				Period of hrs.						
		AL-A	BNP-A	5-P-A	Jl&IPs	Interest Groups	Other	All Parties	Place Name	Dhaka Capital		Div. Name	Dist. Name	T. Name			
						Students	Others										

N.B. Four separate checklist charts have been used for the collection of frequencies of the four actions: first one for hartal, second one for protest march, third one for public meeting, and fourth one for violence. After collection of the frequencies, a combined file under SPSS programme has been made for the entry of the data coding by protest march>1, public meeting>2, hartal>3 and violence>4.

APPENDIX--FOUR

List of Survey Respondents

1	Mr. Zillur Rahman (AL-PP)	27/6 Dhanmondhi, Dhaka
2	Mr. Amir Hossain Amu (AL-PP)	42, Eskaton Road, Magbazar Dhaka
3	Mrs Sajeda Choudhury (AL-PP)	12, Dhanmondhi (Office of AL)
4	Mr. Mozaffor Hossain Paltu (AL-PP)	3/2 Chameli Bag, Dhaka
5	Mr. Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan (BNP-PP)	25, Mintu Road, Dhaka
6	Mr. Akbar Hossain (BNP-PP)	H-63, R-79, Gulshan-2, Dhaka-1213
7	Mr. Abdus Salam (BNP-PP)	29/2 Mohakhali, Dhaka
8	Mr. Sadek Hussain Khoka (BNP-PP)	Mayor, Dhaka City Corporation, Dhaka
9	Mr. Pankaj Bhatyacharya (L-1-PP)	B.kunja-1, R-5, S-c, Banasree, Rampura, D
10	Mr. Muzahidul Islam Salim (L-1-PP)	2/3 Naya Paltan Dhaka
11	Mr. Pir Habibur Rahman (L-1-PP)	Office of Ganatantri Party, Dhaka
12	Alhaj Abdus Samad (L-1-PP)	President, Gano Ajadi League
13	Mr. Sharif Nurul Ambia (L-2-PP)	JSD, 35-36, BB Avenue, Dhaka
14	Mr. Haider Akbar Khan Rono (L-2-PP)	Bangaladesh Workas Party, Dhaka
15	Mr. A F M Mahbubul Haq (L-2-PP)	BSD Gono Ist. office Motijil, Dhaka
16	Mr. Bimol Bishuash (L-2-PP)	31/F Topkhana Road, Dhaka
17	Mr Nurul Islam Nahid (L-1-PP)	95/G, Azimpur Estate, Dhaka-1205
18	Mr Nirmol Sen (L-2-PP)	23/2 Topkhana Road, Dhaka
19	Mr. Abdul Kader Mollah (JIB-IPs-PP)	493, Baramaghbazar, Dhaka
20	Mr. Mowlana Keramat Ali (JIB-IPs-PP)	H-4, R-3 Tajmahal Road, Md-pur D.
21	Mr. Azharul Islam (JIB-IPs-PP)	Central JI B Office, Maghbazar, Dhaka
22	Mr. Mowlana Mohiuddin Khan (JIB-IPs-PP)	337, DIT Road, Rampura, Dhaka
23	Mr Aman Ullah Aman (VIP-NPG)	VP, DUCSU (1990)
24	Mr. Khairul Kabir Khokon (S)	93, Motijheel c/a Dhaka
25	Mr. Ashim Kumer Ukil (S)	9/12 Dhanmondhi, Dhaka
26	Mr Nazmul Haque Prodhan (S)	R-5, 128, Mohammodi Housing, Dhaka
27	Mr Shafi Ahmed (S)	73, Green Road, Dhaka
28	Mr. Nur Ahmed Bakul (S)	HDRC, H-59, R-8/A, Dhanmondhi, Dhaka
29	Mr. Mostafa Farook (S)	23/2 Topkhana Road, Dhaka
30	Mr. Jahangir Satter Tinku (S)	Sabbir Tower (3rd Floor), Dhaka
31	Mr. Mohammad Yasin (S)	H-20/A, R-32 (old), Dhanmondhi, Dhaka
32	Mr. SM Mosherof Hossain (S)	33/5 Khilgoan, Dhaka
33	Mr. Akther Sobhan Mashrur (S)	2/13 Mohammadi Housing, M.pur, Dhaka
34	Mr. Md Shajahan (advocate) (VIP-NPG)	Excellenet intern. Maghbazar, Dhaka
35	Mr. Shamsur Rahaman (poet) (VIP-NPG)	Shayamoli, Dhaka
36	Professor Anisuzzaman (I)	Deptt. of Bengali, DU
37	Professor Sarder Fazlul Karim (I)	Deptt of Political Science, DU
38	Mr. Kalim Sharafi (art singer) (I)	MD G. Insurence, Motijeel, Dhaka
39	Prof. Rafikun Nabi (Painting) (I)	Charukala Institute, DU
40	Mr. Mamunur Rashid (Dramatist) (I)	Aryannak, Baily Road, Dhaka
41	Mr. Ali Zaker (TV artist) (I)	Nimco International, Dhaka
42	Professor Rangalal Sen (I)	Deptt of Sociology, DU
43	Professor Kabir Choudhury (I)	National Professor
44	Prof. M Moniruzzaman Mia (I)	Ex. VC (1990), DU
45	Prof. Sirajul Islam Choudhury (I)	Deptt. of English, DU
46	Ad. Gaziul Haque (I)	66/7 DIT Road, E. Hazipara, Dhaka
47	Mr Ramendu Majumder (I)	20, Central Road, Dhaka
48	Mrs Maleka Begum (I)	F-5A, H-8, R-2/B, Lalmatia, Dhaka
49	Mr Pijush Bondopaddya (I)	56, Siddasshari C Road, Dhaka
50	Mr. Nasiruddin Yusuf Bachu (I)	11/1 Kha, Purana Paltan L Dhaka
51	Mr Bellal Choudhury (I)	41, Purana Paltan, Dhaka
52	Prof. M A Mazed (DMCH) (P)	Ex-President (1990), BMA
53	Prof. Nurul Amin Bapary (DU) (P)	Acting Sec. DUTA (1990)
54	Prof. Anwar Hossain (BUET) (P)	Ex-President, IEB (1990)
55	Prof. M Akteruzzaman (DU) (P)	President, BCUTA (1990)
56	Mr. Amanullah Kabir	(P) President, BFUJ (1990)

57	Dr Mirja MA Jalil	(P)	President, BAGI (1990)
58	Mrs Hena Das	(P)	President, BSSTA (1990)
59	Mr Kazi Golam Mahbub	(P)	H5, R10, Dhanmondi R/A Dhaka
60	A.K.M. Mustafa	(P)	7/5 B-C, Lalmatia, Dhaka
61	Dr Mostafa Jalal Mohiuddin	(P)	H20, R8A, Dhanmondi, Dhaka
62	Dr Sarwar Ali	(P)	273, New Iskaton Road, Dhaka
63	Mr. Quazi Lutful Kabir	(P)	Executive Secretary, DESSP(1990)
64	Mr. Raisul Islam Asad	(P)	Group Theatre Federation(1990)
65	Mr. Wasche Ansari	(P)	President, BFJA(1990)
66	Mr. Fakir Alamgir	(P)	Hrishijo Shilpa Goshthi, Dhaka
67	Mr. Muklesur Rahman	(TU)	President, BSSF(1990)
68	Mr. Nurul Islam	(TU)	TUC, 23/2 Topkhana Road, Dhaka
69	Mr. Nazrul Islam Khan	(TU)	H-2, R-13, Dhanmondhi, Dhaka
70	Mr. Md. Ahsan Ullah Master	(TU)	Noagaon, Tongi, Gajipur. Dhaka
71	Mr. Shafiqur Rahman Majumder	(TU)	76/1/Q N atrabari, B. Bagicha, Demra, Dh
72	Mr. Dr Wazedul Islam Khan	(TU)	23/2 (2nd Floor) Topkhana Road, Dhaka
73	Mr Rai Romesh	(TU)	Secretary, BTSU, Dhaka
74	Mr. Bakir Hossain	(TU)	42/12 Sonali B Staff Q, Motijeel, Dhaka
75	Mr. Shah Alam	(TU)	Staff Q, Paikpara, Mirpur, Dhaka
76	Mrs Shirin Akther	(TU)	JSD Office, Paltan GPO, Dhaka
77	Mr Shajahan Khan	(TU)	B1, R9, MP Hostel, S. Nagar, Dhaka
78	Mr Abdulla Sarker	(TU)	BSD Office, Topekhan Road, Dhaka
79	Mr Waziuddin Khan	(TU)	Vangura, Faridpur, Pabna
80	Mr Mezba Uddin	(TU)	13/1A G Lane, Ganderia, Dhaka
81	Mr Rahmat Ali	(TU)	338, Shankor Dhanmondi, Dhaka
82	Prof. L M Nath	(RG-NPG)	4/204 73, Green Road, Dhaka
83	Mr. Shiril Sikder(Advocate)	(RG-NPG)	21/9 Green Road, Dhaka
84	Mr Bodhipal Mohathero	(RG-NPG)	Atisa Dipanker Sarak, Dhaka
85	Mrs. Khushi Kabir	(NGO-NPG)	3/3 Block-A, Lalmatia, Dhaka
86	Mrs Salma Ali	(NGO-NPG)	BNWLA Lalmatia Dhaka
87	Mr. Mostak Ahmed	(NGO-NPG)	ASHA, Asad Gate, Dhaka
88	Mr. Mujibur Rahman	(NGO-NPG)	AUPP, 83/23, New Circular Road, Dhaka
89	Mr Latifur Rahman	(B-NPG)	Chairman, Transcom Group, Dhaka
90	Alhaz Md Akram Hossain	(B-NPG)	Janata Travels, 128 B Maghbazer, Dhaka
91	Mr Sharif Afsal Hossain	(B-NPG)	Simtex Fashion(BD)Ltd Motijeel, Dhaka
92	Mr A.R.S Mahmood	(B-NPG)	Debon Air Complex, Gulshan, Dhaka
93	Mr Abdul Malek	(W-NPG)	Shopkeeper, Press club, Dhaka
94	Mr Arun Kumer De	(W-NPG)	Madhur Canteen, DU, Dhaka
95	Mr. Gopal Das	(W-NPG)	Photographer, DUCSU, Dhaka
96	Mr. Gias Kamal Choudhury	(VIP-NPG)	Reporter, VOA, Dhaka
97	Mr. Shafiq Rehman	(VIP-NPG)	15, Eskaton Garden, Dhaka
98	Mr Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir	(P)	H-60, R-25, Bonani, Dhaka
99	Mr Wahidul Haque	(W-NPG)	198/West Kafrul, Rokeya S, Dhaka
100	M.A Mannan	(AL-PP)	82, J.I Madrasa road, Dampara, Chtg
101	A.B.M Mohiuddin Chou	(AL-PP)	Mayor, City Corporation Chtg.
102	Md. Ekranul Karim	(BNP-PP)	23/2 M.M Ali Road, Dampara, Chtg
103	Mr. Shah Alam	(L-1-PP)	44. Hajary Lane, Chittagong
104	Mr. Afser Uddin Chowdhury	(JIB-IPs-PP)	19, Jamal Khan Chittagong
105	Mr. Kazi Mohammad Yousuf	(JIB-IPs-PP)	252, Parade Sqr. Chittagong
106	Mr. Rafuqul Islam (Khokon)	(S)	KN Traders Raz Market, DT Road, Chtg
107	Mr Sadek Hossian	(S)	18, Harish D. Lane N Khanan Chittagong
108	Mr Razekuzzaman	(S)	Dost building 4th floor, Chittagong
109	Mr Mausur Ahmed.	(S)	H-16, R-01 Blook-A, Chadga Chtg
110	Mr. Md. Mamun	(S)	NDF Dus Building(3rd floor)Chtg
111	Prof. Abdul Mnnan	(I)	Former V.C CU, Chittagong
112	Mr Mohammad Ibrahim Khan	(I)	15 OR Nizam Road, Panchalish Chtg
113	Mr. Dipak Chowdhury	(I)	Room-75, Court Building, Chittagong
114	Dr. Muinul Islam	(I)	Dept. of Economics. CU, Chittagong
115	Mr Muhammad Khaled	(I)	ICDA. C/ A, Momin Road, Chittagong
116	Ad. Ibrahim Hossain Choudury	(P)	18 Horish D Lane. N. Kanon, Chittagong

117	Mr Nazir Ahmed (P)	92A Katalgonj Panchalwish Chittagong
118	Engr. Suttan Mahmood (P)	611.S Mirja lane Mahedibag Chittagong
119	Mr Sunil Chakrabarthy (P)	GS, BTA, 400 Andarkilla, Chittagong
120	DR. A.Q.M. Serajul Islam (P)	GS, BMA, Chittagong
121	Mr Md. Nurul Islam (TU)	'WASA' Chittagong
122	Mr Abdul Khalek (TU)	City Corporation Chittagong
123	Mr Sirajul Islam (TU)	No-1 MPB Gate Port Chittagong
124	Mr Md. Abdur Rashid (TU)	No-1 Jetty Gate Barik Bldg Chittagong.
125	Mr Azizur Rahman (TU)	Bandar Tila, Sagarica, Chittagong
126	Maolana M Jalal Uddin K(RG-NPG)	Sunia Madrasa Sholo Shahar Chittagong
127	Mr Sukesh Kumer Das (RG-NPG)	121, Andarkilla, Chittagong
128	Mr Md. Arifur Rahman, (NGO-NPG)	YPSA, H-2, Road-1, Block-B Chand
129	Mr Kamal Sengupta (NGO-NPG)	'Codcc' H-62, R-3 Chandgaon R/A, Chtg
130	Mr Abdul Mandal (W-NPG)	Not Mentioned, Chtg (hired. participants)
131	Mr Rashidur Rahman (W-NPG)	Station Road, Railway. Chittagong
132	Mr Md. Nizam uddin (VIP-NPG)	29 ORNizam Road Panchlaish Chtg
133	Mr. Shishir Datta (VIP-NPG)	Bitra, Mahedibag Chittagong
134	Mr Mozaffr Hossian Advocate. (AL-PP)	Kadirgang, P.S. Boalia, Rajshahi,
135	Mr Mizanur Rahman Minu (BNP-PP)	Vadrra, Rajshahi
136	Mr Salehudin Baby (BNP-PP)	B/102, Laxmipur Zautota, Rajshahi,
137	Mr Mohammad Nassim (L-1-PP)	Asso. Prof, Dptt. of Stat, RU.
138	Mr Md. Safiqur Rahman. (L-1-PP)	Principal, Rajshahi Court College.
139	Mr Fazle Hossain Badsha. (L-2-PP)	Haragram, PO Rajshahi court, Rajshahi
140	Mr Md. Liakat Ali (Liku) (L-2-PP)	F-1245, Ghoramara, Rajshahi
141	Mr Md. Abul Kalam Azad (JIB-IPs-PP)	Hetem Khan, Rajshahi
142	Mr Md. Aatur Rahman (JIB-IPs-PP)	Terokhadia-Rajpara, Rajshahi
143	Mr Md. Said Hasan (S)	D-184, Pathan Para, Rajshahi, 6000
144	Mr Robiul Alam Budu (S)	Horroqrqm, Rajshahi, court, Raj
145	Mr Salauddin Baby (S)	Mohish-Batra, Rajshahi
146	Mr Nafiqul Islam Settu (S)	Ganak Para, Rajshahi.
147	Mr Sariul islam Babu. (S)	Kumur para. Rajshahi.
148	Mr F.R Khan (I)	Dpt.of Sociology.RU.
149	Mr Tariq Saiful Islam (I)	Professor, Dpt. of Economics, RU.
150	Mr Sahidul Islam (I)	Director, IER, RU
151	Mr Hassan Azizul Haque (I)	Prof., Dptt. of Philosophy, RU
152	Mr Abdul Khaleque (I)	Prof., Deptt. of Bengali. RU
153	Mr Md. Tazul Islam (P)	31, 46. New Market, Razshahi
154	Mr Rezaul Karim Razu (P)	President of City Press Club (88-89)
155	Mr Ghulam Arif (P)	160/2 Housing State, Rajshahi
156	DR. Md. Dayem Uddin (P)	Xylia Medicare, Laximpur more. Rajsha
157	Mr Bulbul Choudhury. (P)	3rd Lane, Serial colony, Rajshahi
158	Mr Zulfiquir Ahmed (TU)	Kumar para, P.O. Ghoramara, Rajshahi.
159	Mr Md. Enamul Haque. (TU)	Khargora, Ghoramara, Rajshahi.
160	Mr Rafique Uddin Ahmed (TU)	Rajarhata, P/O /Dist. Rajshahi
161	Mr Md. Abdus Sattar. (TU)	Vill. Tolimaie, Boolia Rajshahi
162	Mr. Rafiqul Islam Dulal(TU).	Hossanigong, Rajshahi.
163	Mr Nur Mohammad (RG-NPG)	Nur Homio Farmecy, Barakuti Road. Raj
164	Mr M.K.B. (RG-NPG)	Dpt. of Management, RU.
165	Mr Mustafizur Rahman Khan (NGO-NPG)	F-1237, Ghoramara, Rajshahi
166	Mr AKM Mustafizur Rahman Suza (B-NPG)	Razar Hata, Boalia, Rajshahi
167	Mr Minhaj Uddin Mintu (W-NPG)	Studio, New Market, Rajshahi
168	Mr Mosarraf Hossain Akunjee(W-NPG)	No-1 Godi, Shahed Bazar, Raj
169	Mr Azhar Uddin (VIP-NPG)	Sagarpara Shiptala, Ghoramara, Raj
170	Dr. M. Mizanuddin (VIP-NPG)	Professor, Depart. sociology, Rajshah
171	Mr Md. Monjurul Imam (AL-PP)	51, Samsur Rahman Road, Khulna
172	Mr Sheikh Harun Ar Rashid (AL-PP)	24/8, Rupsha Stand Rd. Khulna
173	Mr M. Nurul Islam (BNP-PP)	20, Babu khan Road, Khulna.
174	Mr Shahjalal Bablu.(BNP-PP)	6/1 Oraroga Para, Khulna.
175	Mr SK. Moniruzzaman. (L-1-PP)	Anjuman Road, Daulatpur, Khulna.
176	Mr A.B.M. Nurul Islam (L-2-PP)	91 Mia Para, Main Road, Khulna.

177	Mr Hafizur Rahman	(L-2-PP)	Platinum Jubilee Jute Mills Abasic ar
178	Mr Answer uddin.	(JIB-IPs-PP)	Pabla, Doylotpur, Khulna.
179	Mr S.A.Wahab	(JIB-IPs-PP)	8,Gazi Ahsan Ali Lane,Hazi Mohsin R.D
180	Mr Md . Shahidul Haq	(S)	1/6,Fire Brigade Road Khulna,-PH-7258
181	Mr Sarder Ruhin Hossain Prince	(S)	45,hagi ismail link road-2 bonar khul
182	Mr Ruhul Azim Rumi	(S)	20/Munshpara,Khulna.
183	Mr Diponkar Shah Dipu	(S)	31F topkhyana road.shaka
184	Mr Md Ilash Hossain	(S)	Boira,Khulna.
185	Mr Mina Mizanur Rahman	(I)	24,B.K west road khulna
186	Mr A.K .Hiru (Sk Abul)	(I).	177.B.K main road khula
187	Mr H,M.Shahdat (Abdur Rauf)	(I)	Munshi Para ,2nd Lane Khulna
188	Mr Tarak Chandra Kundu	(I)	39, Mia Para Main Road ,Khulna
189	Dr .Md.Samsur Rahman	(P)	17,Kh A Salsu8m road,Khulna
190	Mr Mokbul Hossain Mintu	(P)	Tutpara central road, khulna.
191	Mr F.M Maksudur Rahman	((P)	Chotto Boyra,Khulna.
192	Mr S M Moslem Uddin	(P)	Messer Monjil,26 B ,K East,Road,Khuln
193	Mr B.M.Jafar	(TU)	Tut para, Khulna.
194	Mr Abdul Latif	(TU)	37/A,Boira,Khulna.
195	Mr Abdul Malek	(TU)	Khalispur,Khulna.
196	Mowlana A.B.M Habuber Rahman	(TU)	K/4,Khalispur H,Estate,Khulna.
197	Mr Md Mojibur Rahman	(TU)	Khalispur ,Khulna.
198	Mr Md Solaimen Ibne Faruk	(RG-NPG)	Boira, Khulna.
199	Mr Rabindranath Taposhi	(RG-NPG)	Shibbari,Kalimondir .Palpara Road,Khu
200	Mr Moheshor Raza	(NGO-NPG)	13,F.Sir Iqbal Road,Khulna.
201	Mr Abdul Goni	(NGO-NPG)	Wobax,Boira,Khulna.
202	Mr Sharif K Jaman	(B-NPG)	Khalispur Housing Estate, Khulna
203	Mr Abdur Rob	(W-NPG)	Mia Para Gamaya Mosqu, Khulna
204	Mr Jotirmoy Mollik	(W-NPG)	211,Khan jhan ali Road.Khulna.
205	Mr Jakirul Islam	(VIP-NPG)	Officer,Islami Bank,(JS, BLC)
206	Mr Motiar Rahman	(VIP-NPG)	133/B,Tut Para ,Khulna.(VP BLC)