

**The local prevention of terrorism
in strategy and practice: 'Contest'
a new era in the fight against
terrorism**

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Abstract

The thesis evaluates the impact the inclusion of *Prevent* had on CONTEST, the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, both in terms of innovative and tension which arose throughout the three stages of the policy process: its formation, implementation and social impacts. Many of the tensions identified are not unique to *Prevent* and appear to be inherent in prevention and policing policies more generally. The thesis relies on qualitative interviews with national policy makers, and local professionals in a case study area in the North of England, as well as focus groups with members of Muslim communities in the same case study area. Three broad areas of tensions were identified. The first policy tensions centred on the debate about how to prevent violent extremism, communication of the strategy and the merits of excluding community cohesion as a means of tackling extremism *per se*. The majority of the national policy makers, including senior police officers and local professionals, agreed that contrary to the *Prevent Review 2011*, community cohesion should remain an integral part of *Prevent*. Secondly, there are organizational tensions. These tensions mainly relate to inter- and intra-organizational issues such as funding, information-sharing and evaluation. One of the main areas of conflict identified was the relationship between the national and local authorities. Thirdly, the thesis identified tensions relating to *Prevent's* impact on the local community. This thesis suggests that *Prevent* had little influence, and that most perceptions about counter-terrorism and *Prevent* were shaped by negative political and media discourse about Islam and British Muslim communities. This has led to disengagement amongst the Muslim communities in the case study area with *Prevent* and local authorities in general, the limiting of freedom of expression through external social control, and the inability/unwillingness of these communities to tackle such extremism as might exist in their midst.

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Abbreviations

ACPO	<i>Association of Chief Police Officers</i>
BME	<i>Black and Minority Ethnic population</i>
CBRN	<i>Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear</i>
CCP	<i>Community Crime Prevention</i>
CDRP	<i>Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships</i>
CEO	<i>Community Engagement Officers</i>
CSP	<i>Crime Safety Partnership</i>
CTLP	<i>Counter Terrorism Local Profiles</i>
CTU	<i>Counter-Terrorism Unit</i>
DCLG	<i>Department of Communities and Local Government</i>
DFID	<i>Department for International Development</i>
DoE	<i>Department of Educations</i>
DoH	<i>Department of Health</i>
DWP	<i>Department for Work and Pensions</i>
ECHR	<i>European Convention of Human Rights</i>
EDL	<i>English Defence League</i>
FoI	<i>Freedom of Information Request</i>
HMIC	<i>Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary</i>
IHL	<i>International Humanitarian Law</i>
IRA	<i>Irish Republican Army</i>
JTAC	<i>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre</i>
LPA	<i>Local Police Authority</i>
LSP	<i>Local Service Providers</i>
NI 35	<i>National Indicator 35</i>
NPIA	<i>National Police Improvement Agency</i>
NSA	<i>National Security Agency</i>
NSS	<i>National Security Strategy</i>
OSCT	<i>Office of Security and Counter Terrorism</i>
PACE	<i>Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984</i>
PET	<i>Preventing Extremism Together</i>
PIRA	<i>Provisional Irish Republican Army</i>
PLO	<i>Palestine Liberation Organization</i>
PoW	<i>Prisoners of War</i>
PSNI	<i>Police Service of Northern Ireland</i>
PVE	<i>Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder</i>
TPims	<i>Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures</i>
UDHR	<i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</i>

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

CONTEST, which stands for COuNterTerrorism STrategy,¹ is, as the name suggests, the UK government's principal strategy to counter terrorism. Its purpose is to reduce 'the risks to the United Kingdom ... from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence'.² The strategy has four main work streams, *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect*, and *Prepare*, referred to as the four *Ps*. This thesis focuses primarily on *Prevent*, a policy which aims to 'stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism',³ and argues that the innovative inclusion of *Prevent* within the established institutional framework has caused tensions between government agencies and departments at national and local levels. The thesis is structured around two key elements: (1) a policy analysis of the formulation of *Prevent* which explores the potential conflicts and tensions between *Prevent* and *Pursue* - a police and security led work stream - and which is discussed in parts of Chapters 2 and 3 and all of Chapter 5; and (2) a study of the policy's local implementation, which is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. These latter chapters consider the relationship between the national policy and its local delivery, as well as the impact *Prevent* has had on Muslim communities.

This chapter provides a brief overview of CONTEST, particularly *Prevent* and *Pursue*, and discusses changes which have occurred over the last three years. This is followed by an introduction to some of the key literature and the conceptual ideas which have emerged and which underpin the *Prevent* policy. Gaps within the research literature are identified, setting the context for the thesis. Subsequent sections specify the purpose of the thesis and its originality, and introduce the data collection methods. The concluding section outlines the further chapters and their content.

1.2 The background

This thesis focuses mainly on *Prevent* and *Pursue*. Both of these work streams fall under the umbrella of CONTEST. The four *Ps*, mentioned above, provide the

¹ David Omand, *Securing the State* (Hurst & Co Publishers 2010) 86

² HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (HMSO 2011) 6

³ *ibid* 10

government with a comprehensive domestic counterterrorism strategy which goes beyond the police and the security services. CONTEST, which has been around since early 2003, combines aspects of criminal justice, prevention, protection of the public, and preparation for the aftermath of possible terror attacks. Despite the evolution of each of the work streams, CONTEST remains structured around the four *Ps*. Since its initial publication in 2006, it has become more transparent, and two comprehensive and declassified versions have been published since.⁴ Sir David Omand, the original architect of CONTEST, notes that:

In the light of a realistic view of the nature and seriousness of the major risks facing the public we should look at what it would take to reduce those risks to the level at which we would all feel sufficiently confident to get out and get on with our normal lives taking reasonable precautions for our collective safety but not such as to inhibit our sense of freedom and self-confidence.⁵

Within CONTEST there is an emphasis on anticipatory risks and the proactive countering of terrorism because the risk of mass casualties is unacceptable.⁷ To achieve CONTEST's aims, multi-agency partnerships have been developed. These partnerships, and the government's recognition that it needs to be seen to uphold human rights and the freedoms and liberty granted by the law, are key to CONTEST's success.⁸ 'This strategy gives us a more effective, better focused, and more flexible response to the changing terrorist threat we face.'⁹ The rest of this section focuses on *Prevent*, but more detail about CONTEST, *Prevent*, and *Pursue* can be found in Chapter 2. Unless stated, any further references to CONTEST and *Prevent* refer to the 2011 versions.

Prevent was first introduced by the New Labour government in 2003 as part of CONTEST,¹⁰ which remained secret until its publication in 2006. The 2005 London attacks appear to have brought about a shift, challenging the notion of the archetypal terrorist embodied by incoming foreign enemies inspired by Osama Bin Laden. This is because the perpetrators had lived in Britain almost since birth and came from local communities in the north-east of England.

⁴ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (n 2); Frank Gregory, 'An Evaluation of Revision to the UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy with a Special Focus on the CBRNE Threat' (Real Instituto Elcano 2009)

⁵ Omand (n 1) 86

⁷ Clive Walker, 'Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom' (2005) 44 *Crime, Law and Social Change* 387; Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11* (Simon & Schuster 2006)

⁸ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (n 2)

⁹ *ibid* Foreword

¹⁰ Communities and Local Government Select Committee, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10' (HMSO 2010)

In old times, anyone fitting a stereotype – be it national, ethnic, racial or cultural – could be marked out as a potential foe. ... Yet whilst foreigners remain a threat, the menacing figures in the contemporary stage of terrorism are often our neighbours from within.¹¹

In its revised 2009 version of CONTEST, the government acknowledged that *Prevent* had been underdeveloped, and that more needed to be done to address the evolution of the threat as well as the government's understanding of it. The realisation that jihadi extremism was not only an international problem but also existed within UK communities meant that more effort was placed into developing *Prevent*.¹² As the title suggests, *Prevent* was about preventing individuals and communities from supporting and/or engaging in extremism and terrorism. It derived from the notion that the socio-economic issues which give rise to anti-social behaviour and criminality are similar to those leading to extremism and terrorism.¹³

The New Labour government believed that engaging local Muslim communities and increasing their resilience against extremist ideologies was key to successfully countering extremism and terrorism. Collaboration between the police and local authorities, as well as working with at-risk communities and the voluntary and private sectors, were seen as central to successfully challenging extremist ideologies, increasing levels of trust, and fostering cooperation between affected communities and authorities.

Strong and empowered communities are better equipped to effectively reject the ideology of violent extremism, isolate apologists for terrorism and provide support for vulnerable institutions and individuals.¹⁴

Under New Labour, *Prevent* focused primarily on community cohesion projects in Muslim communities – a claim which the government and successive CONTEST documents refute.

Although *Prevent* has changed over time, its aims remain focused on groups of people who are vulnerable to persuasion to provide tacit or even active support to terrorist groups.¹⁵ Often, however, these individuals may not break the law, and to this extent legislation and police action can be ineffective.¹⁶ Under the New Labour

¹¹ Clive Walker, ‘“Know Thine Enemy as Thyself”: Discerning Friend from Foe Under Anti-Terrorism Laws’ (2008) 32 *Melbourne Law Review* 275, 276

¹² HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (HMSO 2009) 15

¹³ Omand (n 1) 92

¹⁴ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 12) 83

¹⁵ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (HMSO 2011)

¹⁶ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 10)

government, the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) took a lead role within *Prevent*. This is reflected in the core aims and objectives listed in the 2009 version of CONTEST. These were:

- (1) to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices;
- (2) to disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support people living in the communities where they may operate;
- (3) to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists;
- (4) to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism;
- (5) to address grievances which ideologies are exploiting;
- (6) to develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information; and
- (7) to improve strategic communication.¹⁷

Integrating *Prevent* into CONTEST has led to allegations of spying, and some have argued that *Prevent* was attempting to securitise community cohesion and social policy.¹⁸ *Prevent* also included a more hard-edged programme titled *Channel*, which focused on individuals identified as being at risk of engaging in extremism, and programmes within prisons. Such programmes moved to centre stage under the *Prevent Review*. Some critics argued that *Prevent's* breadth was too wide, and gave the impression that the government only included cohesion projects to securitise integration.¹⁹

Much of the *Prevent* work has been carried out by local authorities across the UK. Over time, local councils have developed their own *Prevent* policies based on national policy. Local councils have been given broad autonomy, something which many national policymakers and politicians have criticised. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.

Until 2011, the *Prevent* policy focused principally on broad secondary prevention. However, it also included specific programmes such as *Channel* and tertiary prevention in prisons. Over the last five years, *Prevent* has been accused of mainly targeting and spying on Muslim communities, misusing funds, funding groups and individuals perceived to be extremist, and paying for spuriously related local authority projects.²⁰

¹⁷ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 12) 14

¹⁸ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 10)

¹⁹ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 15) 30

²⁰ See: Chapter 2,5 and 6

In 2011, the coalition government published its *Prevent Review*. The *Review* heralded significant changes, shifting *Prevent's* focus from community cohesion to challenging extremist ideology (although generally not through community cohesion projects), and identifying those at risk of radicalisation.²¹ Although local authorities are still at the heart of delivering *Prevent*, funding and guidance is now tightly controlled by the Home Office's OSCT (Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism) rather than the DCLG. Tackling extremism not linked to jihadi ideologies, and addressing real and perceived grievances, are no longer key elements of the new *Prevent* policy. The new aims and objectives demonstrate this. These are:

- (1) responding to the ideological challenges of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- (2) preventing people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- (3) working with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.²²

This policy focuses on working with national and local government agencies, and the voluntary and private sectors. Aside from the organisations already engaged in *Prevent* such as the police, the government aims to involve health care and education professionals. It also intends to increase cooperation, and identify and share information about individuals perceived to be involved in, or at risk of, radicalisation.²³ Essentially, the policy has moved from broad secondary prevention to focused secondary and tertiary prevention. *Prevent* has shifted towards a programme of net-widening and surveillance, although aspects of this were already present.²⁴ As Power observes: 'The management of uncertainty is inherently paradoxical, an effort to know the unknowable.'²⁵ This quest for knowledge and the gathering of as much information as possible, focusing on Muslim communities and individuals with perceived links to jihadi extremism, has become ingrained within *Prevent's* purpose.

Pursue aims to stop terrorist attacks through detection and by investigating threats 'at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorists' activities before they can endanger

²¹ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 10)

²² *ibid* 7

²³ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 15)

²⁴ Lucia Zedner, 'Fixing the Future? The Pre-Emptive Turn in Criminal Justice' in Bernadette McSherry and others (eds), *Regulating Deviance: The redirection of criminalisation and the futures of criminal law* (Hart Publishing 2009)

²⁵ Michael Power, *The Risk Management of Everything of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty* (Demos 2004) 59

the public and, whenever possible, prosecuting those responsible'.²⁶ Essentially, *Pursue* is the criminal justice response to terrorism, albeit intelligence gathering by the police and the security services also plays a large role. This thesis argues that counterterrorism operations and measures influence public perceptions to either undermine or strengthen trust in government authorities.²⁷ Negative media and political discourses, and their portrayal of counterterrorism policing such as stop-and-searches, dawn raids, and arrests, appear to have influenced public perceptions – particularly those of Muslim communities – thereby affecting the level of trust these communities and individuals place in the police/authorities and their willingness to engage with them.²⁸

Local police work on both *Prevent* and *Pursue*. More specialised units, such as the regional Counter-Terrorism Units, have taken on the traditional role of counterterrorism policing, while local police forces have taken on *Prevent* and community engagement. At times there have been tensions between the *Pursue* and *Prevent* work streams. These tensions centre on information sharing and on the value given to community cohesion work in the area of counterterrorism. They are discussed in more detail in later chapters.

1.3 The thesis and its purpose

The hypothesis of this thesis is that *Prevent* is innovative but embodies inherent policy and organisational tensions which are difficult to resolve. These tensions have a direct impact on community perceptions and the success of *Prevent*. The thesis is structured around the two aforementioned key elements, namely a policy analysis of the formation of *Prevent*, and a study of its local implementation and impact. These two key elements are further broken down and organised around the following four research objectives:

- a) analyse and critique the ideas which inform the *Prevent* policy;²⁹
- b) analyse and critique the conflicts and tensions which have arisen within the *Prevent* policy at national level, as well as the implications for local delivery;³⁰

²⁶ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (n 2) 45

²⁷ David Weisburd and others, 'Terrorist Threats and Police Performance A Study of Israeli Communities' (2010) 50 *British Journal of Criminology* 725

²⁸ Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing' (2003) 37 *Law & Society Review* 513; see Chapter 3 and 6

- c) analyse and critique the tensions and conflicts which have arisen between organisations involved in the local implementation of *Prevent* such as the police and local authorities, and consider the implications for the delivery process;³¹ and
- d) analyse and critique how counterterrorism policing and prevention have affected local Muslim communities, and how they have shaped community perceptions and willingness to engage with authorities in counterterrorism policing and the *Prevent* agenda, while considering the wider implications for *Prevent* and *Pursue*.³²

Each of these objectives is individually addressed in the chapters which follow, providing a policy analysis and study of *Prevent's* implementation in Maybury.

The success of CONTEST and *Prevent* must also be measured against the declared aims, although evaluation is a contested issue. The following chapters ask questions such as, how does the policy ensure that the freedoms outlined in the policy document are upheld? And, what safeguards are undertaken to ensure that the policy does not become a programme of surveillance akin to a police state? The thesis also examines how the freedoms of Muslim communities are protected and what impact the perceived lack of protection has on their level of engagement in both *Prevent* and *Pursue*.

To answer these questions and identify tensions, the thesis takes a holistic approach, examining the 'three stages' of the policy process in the context of *Prevent*. These stages are formation, implementation, and impact, as described by Rose.³³ Policymakers and academics recognise that the policy process is not static and confined to these three silos, and that the relationships between the policy, its delivery, and its impact could affect the dynamics of the policy process. Tensions exist between and within the stages of the *Prevent* policy. As Lipsky notes, much of the policy process transpires and is far removed from the daily lives of those subject to it.³⁴ The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to capture the non-static nature and

²⁹ See: Chapter 2 and 3

³⁰ See: Chapter 5

³¹ See: Chapter 6

³² See: Chapter 7

³³ Richard Rose, 'Comparing Public Policy: An Overview' (1973) 1 *European Journal of Political Research* 67

³⁴ Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* (Russell Sage Foundation 1980)

interrelated aspects of the *Prevent* policy, seeking to examine how this policy was reshaped during its local implementation.³⁵

1.4 Thesis originality within its wider context

This thesis fills a gap within the academic literature around the *Prevent* policy. In their report about *Prevent*, Innes et al. note that:

To date, there have been numerous commentaries and policy-level analyses of *Prevent* and of the legislative framework associated with it. There have been far fewer fieldwork-based studies that have systematically sought to gather evidence about how *Prevent* interventions are being delivered, perceived and experienced in different areas.³⁶

Published studies and reports have generally focused on *Prevent's* delivery and impact on Muslim communities. A recent study by Thomas provides a good overview of *Prevent* and its links to community cohesion.³⁷ This study examines some of the policy, organisational, and impact tensions of *Prevent* in the context of community cohesion. Other studies, such as the aforementioned published by Innes et al., provide insights about its impact on a number of Muslim communities in the UK. Studies by Spalek et al. and Lambert also focus, although more broadly, on the impact of *Prevent* and community-based counterterrorism policing and prevention.³⁸ Spalek's latest edited volume on this subject pays particular attention to community experiences, the engagement of young people, and the role of gender within the context of counterterrorism.³⁹ Many recent articles also focus on *Prevent's* community impact.⁴⁰ Numerous media articles and publications by think tanks add to the wider discourse of *Prevent's* community impact. One notable publication, *Spooked*, has been referred to in academic literature and numerous media and government articles. It claims that the purpose of *Prevent* is to spy on Muslim communities.⁴¹ The *Spooked* report focuses mainly on local professionals working

³⁵ James Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* (Praeger 1975)

³⁶ Martin Innes and others, 'Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers' (UPSI 2011) 3

³⁷ Paul Thomas, *Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism - Failing to Prevent* (Bloomsbury 2012)

³⁸ Basia Spalek and others, 'Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination' (University of Birmingham 2009); Basia Spalek and Robert Lambert, 'Muslim Communities, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation: A Critically Reflective Approach to Engagement' (2008) 36 *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 257

³⁹ *Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012)

⁴⁰ Suraj Lakhani, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities' (2012) 51 *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 190

⁴¹ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

on the delivery of *Prevent*, although this thesis disputes and challenges some of the claims made therein.⁴²

Unlike other *Prevent* studies, this thesis examines the inherent tensions which have arisen within CONTEST and *Prevent* since 2003, while acknowledging the changes in the UK government's approach to counterterrorism since the Northern Ireland conflict. This study is also more comprehensive because it analyses the whole *Prevent* policy from formation and implementation to its impact on national, local, and community levels. Rather than focusing on *Prevent's* impact alone, this thesis examines the policy process and how the different stages of the process have been affected by the tensions identified. Three broad areas of tensions are highlighted throughout the thesis: policy, organisational, and impact. Some of these tensions have been identified in other works, such as those of Thomas and Innes et al.,⁴³ but no other study has examined their impact and the wider *Prevent* policy together. Raising awareness of these tensions is important because some of them undermine *Prevent's* potential for success. It is hoped that highlighting them may provide direction to future research and add knowledge to the policy debate, particularly about how to improve *Prevent's* service provisions, communications, and evaluation, and the need to increase understanding of radicalisation and extremism.

1.5 Methodology and fieldwork

Most of the academic literature used for this thesis was obtained through the Leeds University library, the British Library, and the Bodleian Library. Policy documents, and government and think tank reports, such as the CONTEST and *Prevent* documents, were generally obtained through the Internet. In addition, a number of Freedom of Information requests were made to the British Transport Police, Maybury Council (Maybury is the pseudonym given to the case study area to maintain the anonymity of professionals and local community members), the local police force, and other regional agencies with links to *Prevent* in the Maybury area. The information gathered includes stop-and-search data, as well as internal reports on the impact of *Pursue* and *Prevent* on communities. Qualitative research methods were employed. Specifically, data was collected through semi-structured interviews and focus groups. This approach meant that professional and personal experiences and perceptions could be gathered to develop a detailed picture of the issues within

⁴² See: Chapter 4.10

the *Prevent* policy process at national, local, and community levels.⁴⁴ Fifty-seven participants took part including national policymakers such as former ministers, senior officials within the Home Office and DCLG, and local professionals such as senior police officers and professionals working on *Prevent* for the local authority. Also, individuals from five focus groups drawn from local Muslim communities in a case study area in the North of England participated.⁴⁵

1.6 The structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 contextualises CONTEST and *Prevent*. To demonstrate that CONTEST, with its inclusion of *Prevent*, is innovative, Chapter 2 analyses three counterterrorism models: the war, criminal justice, and extended criminal justice models, all of which have become established in academia. This is further demonstrated through comparative analyses with the American ‘war on terror’ and by highlighting the differences between CONTEST and the approach taken in the Northern Ireland conflict. With the context in place, Chapter 2 examines the CONTEST strategy, focusing on *Prevent* and *Pursue* in more detail, and emphasising the tensions which have been identified within the literature. In addition, Chapter 2 highlights tensions related to the organisational structures and tensions which have arisen due to the inclusion of prevention within the existing institutional framework, and which place additional strain on limited resources. It further highlights tensions in relation to the impact of *Prevent* on Muslim communities in the UK.

Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical concepts which underpin *Prevent* and *Pursue*. It examines terrorism and extremism as political, legal, and social constructions and the impact which these have on shaping counterterrorism laws and policy. The chapter further explores how CONTEST has shaped and redefined jihadi extremism and terrorism, after which issues of policing and prevention are addressed. This is followed by a theoretical discussion about policing and prevention, and their impact on trust and legitimacy within Muslim communities. Before concluding this chapter, the thesis returns to the issue of tensions, especially those between policing and prevention, and examines their possible impact on these Muslim communities.

⁴³ Innes and others (n 36); Thomas (n 37)

⁴⁴ Marie Smyth, ‘A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror’ (2007) 6 *European Political Science* 260

⁴⁵ See: Appendix A

The purpose of Chapter 4 is to introduce the research design and methodology used to gather data for this project. The chapter considers why the approach taken was appropriate and how it enabled the researchers to gather the data in accordance with the four research objectives. The chapter further considers participant selection and ethical issues, and introduces the participants and the case study area, Maybury. Data analysis methods are also discussed.

Chapter 5 considers the opinions and perceptions of fifteen policymakers, politicians, civil servants, senior police officers, and human rights and anti-racism activists, all of whom are involved in *Prevent* work nationally. Initially, the chapter revisits the subject of CONTEST's innovativeness, exploring the possible consequences of *Prevent's* inclusion. The remainder of the chapter is structured around two tensions, policy and organisational, with the aim of analysing and disseminating the data. First, the chapter examines the aim and scope of *Prevent* and tensions relating to the inclusion/exclusion of community cohesion. *Prevent's* target population and its assumed impact on Muslim communities is also discussed. Second, it analyses some of the organisational tensions between national and local authorities, together with issues such as funding and evaluation.

Chapter 6 also focuses on policy and organisational tensions but examines them from the perspective of twenty local professionals. The chapter explains the organisational structure in Maybury and discusses the impact of the *Prevent Review*. Initially, it examines the tensions between national policymakers and local professionals in relation to the inclusion/exclusion of community cohesion and whom the policy should target. Next, the chapter examines the organisational tensions between national and local organisations and between local authorities. In conclusion, this chapter analyses local professionals' attitudes towards the funding and evaluation of *Prevent*.

Chapter 7 addresses the issue of impact, relying on five focus groups from Maybury's Muslim communities. Emphasising the influence of local and national media discourse on local attitudes towards *Prevent* and *Pursue*, the chapter compares such influence to the actual impact of *Prevent* and counterterrorism policing programmes. The chapter asserts that perceptions influenced by a negative media and political discourse about Islam and the Muslim identity have had a negative effect on engagement with the *Prevent* policy in Maybury, and demonstrates why the policy

has had little effect locally. In addition to perceptions, the chapter examines other barriers which have influenced the success of *Prevent* in Maybury.

Chapter 8 evaluates the findings of the preceding chapters and reiterates the tensions identified previously. It is organised around the three main conflicts which tie national, local, and community experiences together. This final chapter highlights the results and conclusions of the thesis, examines future lessons, and discusses possible areas of future research.

Chapter 2: Is CONTEST innovative? Counterterrorism and *Prevent*

2.1 Introduction

The first part of this chapter is a policy analysis of *Prevent*. It is based on already available academic literature and publicly available policy documents including the CONTEST strategy and the *Prevent Review*. The literature and policy analysis is complemented by new data from interviews with national politicians and policy makers in Chapter 5. The thesis asserts that CONTEST is an innovative counterterrorism strategy because of its comprehensive nature, which is primarily achieved through the inclusion of *Prevent*, thereby providing the UK with a broader strategy to tackle radicalisation and terrorism. *Prevent*, however, must be seen in the wider context of the CONTEST strategy of which it forms an integral part. Key to CONTEST are its four *Ps*: *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Prepare*, and *Protect*. Traditional counterterrorism activities focused on the work of law enforcement agencies such as the police, work carried out by the security services, and, as in Northern Ireland, the work of the military. This aspect of counterterrorism, led by the police and security services, is now encapsulated under the umbrella of *Pursue*, which as the name suggest focuses on pursuing, disrupting, and prosecuting individuals and organisations involved in terrorism-related activities.¹ This chapter asserts that CONTEST is innovative for two reasons: (1) it has broadened the traditional approach to counterterrorism by including *Prevent*, and (2) it has developed into a much more holistic strategy by going beyond *Pursue* and *Prevent*. The focus in this chapter is on *Prevent*; it is however worth noting that *Prepare* and *Protect* also add to CONTEST's comprehensive nature. These two work streams focus on preparing for the eventuality of terrorist attacks and protecting the critical national infrastructure as much as possible. They rely on the cooperation of the emergency services, local authorities, and the private sector. A revised definition of terrorism means that this work can also be carried out under the auspices of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.²

¹ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (HMSO 2011)

² Andrew Staniforth, *The Routledge Companion to UK Counter-Terrorism* (Routledge 2013)

The policy analysis given here demonstrates that the inclusion of *Prevent* has led to tensions within the overall strategy, particularly between *Prevent* and *Pursue*. The implications of these tensions on *Prevent's* delivery are examined in later chapters. The analysis in this chapter is based on the theoretical context of counterterrorism models, namely the war, criminal justice,³ and extended criminal justice models.⁴ The war and criminal justice models, though useful, often do not represent the complex reality of counterterrorism strategies and operations. However, the extended criminal justice model converges the war and criminal justice models and thus more accurately reflects real-world complexities.⁵ This context provides the backdrop for the discussion which follows in this chapter on the 'war on terror' and the British experience, which ultimately led to the conception of CONTEST and *Prevent*. The thesis further asserts that interdepartmental and institutional tensions have arisen during the conception and implementation of the strategy, especially *Prevent*. These have affected the strategy's delivery and the willingness of communities to engage with the authorities in counterterrorism matters. The latter sections highlight issues that are discussed as part of the policy analysis in Chapter 5, but which have also become reoccurring issues during the study of *Prevent's* implementation in Chapters 6 and 7.

2.2 The war and criminal justice models

In a democracy, the primary objective of a counterterrorism strategy, Wilkinson argues, should be the protection and maintenance of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of its citizens.⁶ These aims, he stresses, override the importance of eliminating terrorism and political violence by means which undermine democratic values. 'Any bloody tyrant can solve the problem of political violence if he is prepared to sacrifice all considerations of humanity, and to trample down all constitutional and judicial rights.'⁷ The war and criminal justice models conceptualise two different approaches to tackling terrorism.⁸ The war model

³ Paul Wilkinson, 'Pathways Out of Terrorism for Democratic Societies. In: P Wilkinson, and A Stewart' in Paul Wilkinson and Alastair Stewart (eds), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen University Press 1987)

⁴ Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, 'A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel' (2001) 13 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1

⁵ Ronald Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies' (1998) 44 *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 389

⁶ '*McCann and Others V The United Kingdom*' (1995) 18984/91 (note)

⁷ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (MacMillan 1986) 125

⁸ Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures* (Cambridge University Press 1989) 90

advocates the utilisation of maximum force to achieve its aims, whereas the latter advocates the rule of law, using minimal force in only exceptional circumstances.⁹ These two models appear incompatible; however, they often converge or are used in tandem. How the threat of terrorism is framed underpins the approach. Chalk argues that counterterrorism measures must be effective and must also conform to the principles of liberal democracies.¹⁰

Terrorism is not primarily about the people and the objects attacked; it is about the construction of the ‘threat’, the identification of its source, and the response that is appropriate.¹¹

Most liberal democracies see terrorism as a crime rather than the manifestation of insurgent political violence; consequently it becomes a matter for criminal justice agencies.¹² Hence, actions taken are bound by the rule of law, which grants suspects rights and protections such as fair trials. In the US, these rights are enshrined in the United States Constitution. In the EU and the UK, individual rights, such as the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial, are guaranteed by ECHR.¹³ According to Weber, the state holds a monopoly on violence. He describes the state as ‘a relationship of rule by human beings over human beings, and one that rests on the legitimate use of violence (that is, violence that is held to be legitimate)’.¹⁴ Domestically, the police use violence in extreme circumstances. They investigate and pursue those who infringe the law, whereas the courts convict and penalise those found guilty.¹⁵

The war model assumes that terrorism is not merely a criminal act, but an act of aggression against the established order and its values.¹⁶ Terrorists are perceived as enemies of the state and are often framed as evil individuals who threaten the established way of life.¹⁷ Terrorism may be framed in this manner to justify military intervention. Theoretically, international humanitarian law (IHL) and the other laws

⁹ Crelinsten (n 5)

¹⁰ Peter Chalk, ‘The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism’ (1995) 7 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10

¹¹ Talal Asad, ‘Thinking About Terrorism and Just War’ (2010) 23 *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 3, 6

¹² Doron Zimmerman, ‘Between Minimum Force and Maximum Violence: Combating Political Violence Movements with Third-Force Options’ (2005) 1 *The Quarterly Journal* 43

¹³ European Convention of Human Rights (1950)

¹⁴ Max Weber, *Weber: Political Writings* (Peter Lassman ed, Ronald Speirs tr, Cambridge University Press 1994) 311

¹⁵ Noah Feldman, ‘Choices of Law, Choices of War’ (2002) 25 *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 457, 468

¹⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *The Spirit of Terrorism* (Verso 2003)

¹⁷ Stanley Cohen, ‘Some Thoroughly Modern Monsters’ (2000) 29 *Index on Censorship* 35

of war govern these interventions.¹⁸ Terrorism is seen through a manichaeist world perspective, polarising society¹⁹ and dividing the world into two factions, 'one responsible the other irresponsible, which requires some kind of initiative on the part of the former to [pre-empt] dangers that issue from the latter'.²⁰ This situation can be exploited by the dominant culture, legitimising it with political 'them versus us' rhetoric. 'The enemy ... represents absolute evil ... it follow[s] that any past or future agreement with him [is] impossible.'²¹

Justifications for the war approach are based on the perception of terrorists as 'the other', and deal with the threat of terrorism accordingly. Rousseau and other social contract theorists argue that those who infringe the social rights of the public are no longer members of the state. Rather, they are at war with it.²² Breaching the social contract, they argue, removes all legal connections between the person and the state.²³ Some posit that the state is responsible for providing security and protection for its citizens, even if extraordinary measures are required. Further, some argue that the legal order rests on the sovereignty of the state and that the rule of law can temporarily be transcended to restore public confidence and order. Schmitt insists that:

All law is situational ... To pretend that one can have ultimate rule of law is to set oneself up to be overtaken by events at some unpredictable but necessarily occurring time and it is to lose the human element in and of our world.²⁴

In Schmitt's view, the enemy becomes more than just 'the other' with whom one has a dispute; rather, the process is an intense separation between them and us. This, according to Schelling, leads to conflict where the interests of the actors are opposed and must end in the extermination of one or the other.²⁵ Schmitt explains that 'an enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collective of people confronts a similar collective. The enemy is solely the public enemy'.²⁶

Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will; each endeavours to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further

¹⁸ Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, *Constraints on the Waging of War* (ICRC 2011)

¹⁹ A Hanson, 'Culture Against Society' (2005) 42 *Society* 59, 65

²⁰ Asad (n 11) 3

²¹ George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (Penguin Books 1954) 31

²² Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract Or Principles Of Political Right* (Wordsworth 1998)

²³ Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, 'Enemy Combatants Versus Enemy Criminal Law' (2008) 11 *New Criminal Law Review* 529, 542

²⁴ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theory: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (George Schwab tr, 1st edn, University Of Chicago Press 2006) XVII

²⁵ Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press 1960) 5

²⁶ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (University of Chicago Press 1996) 28

resistance. War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.²⁷

The aim of the war model strategies, Schmitt argues, is to eliminate terrorists who threaten the status quo and to re-establish order.²⁸ Overwhelming force is central to this model.

Although rules of war exist within international law, they differ markedly from domestic criminal law.²⁹ The Geneva Conventions ‘remain the cornerstone for the protection and respect of human dignity in armed conflict’,³⁰ outlawing practices of torture, the maltreatment of prisoners, and the intimidation of civilians during conflict. Theoretically, signatories of the Conventions are bound by their rules, giving protection to civilians and military personnel engaged in hostilities.³¹

Critically, as war whose objectives is destroying terror or terrorist networks of global reach, may never end, the terminology of war provides a pretext, ... to detain persons by reference to provisions of IHL [international humanitarian law] that permits detention of combatants during armed conflict, but on an indefinite basis.³²

The lack of strong international enforcement agencies, however, complicates the enforcement of IHL.³³ According to Goldsmith and Posner, compliance occurs either when it is economically and politically costless or promoted by powerful states.³⁴ A lack of enforceability leads to the loss of respect for international bodies and international law as a whole.³⁵ Military interventions which adhere to IHL limit civilian casualties and damage. Distinguishing between civilians and terrorists is tricky; thus it is difficult to target only those causing harm.³⁶ Collateral damage has

²⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (JJ Graham tr, Penguin Classics 1982) 101

²⁸ Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars and Other Essays* (Harvard University Press 1983) 35

²⁹ Helen Duffy, ‘Lecture by Helen Duffy Exploring Some of the Key Human Rights Challenges Posed by the “war on Terror”’ (*International Centre for the legal protection of human rights*, no date) <<http://www.interights.org/staff-helen-duffy/index.html>> accessed 6 August 2010

³⁰ ICRC, ‘The Geneva Conventions Today’ (*ICRC Resource Centre*, 2009) <<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-090709.htm>> accessed 10 May 2011

³¹ ICRC, ‘Geneva Convention IV’ (1948) <<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5>> accessed 6 July 2010

³² Helen Duffy, *The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law* (Cambridge University Press 2005) 272

³³ Asad (n 11)

³⁴ Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, *The Limits of International Law* (Oxford University Press 2007)

³⁵ Duffy, *The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law* (n 32) 272

³⁶ Michael Walzer, *Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations* (Basic Books 2006)

wider implications because it erodes public confidence and perceptions of authorities' legitimacy.³⁷

The differences between the war and criminal justice models appear at three different stages: pursuit, capture, and sanction.³⁸ Pursuit and capture entail the capturing of suspected offenders, maintaining procedural justice, and ensuring the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. During the pursuit and capture phases, lethal force is limited to exceptional circumstances. Only courts may decide on the suspects' guilt and punish offenders accordingly. The three stages, however, take on new dimensions during armed conflict, and are 'subject to loose international law norms of necessity and proportionality'.³⁹ Pursuit may include the intention to kill, and detention is not a sanction determined by guilt or innocence but prevents the detainee from participating in further combat. Therefore, the length of the detention is not determined by the individual's actions but by the duration of the conflict.⁴⁰

Both models provide a one-tier solution to a multi-tier problem. The criminal justice model deals with the after-effects of terrorism, attempting to bring those responsible to justice; the war model deals with terrorism through pre-emptive military interventions. According to Albrecht, counterterrorism strategies shaped by the war model undermine or even annihilate the rule of law⁴¹ because they fail to deal with separatism or other forms of rebellion with 'due regards to human rights principles, democracy and the rule of law'.⁴² Jakobs argues that:

The state has no need to deprive enemies of all of their rights. The state does not need to do everything it can do, but actually may refrain from doing so in order to leave the door open to a future peace agreement with the enemy.⁴³

The war model transforms a potential bargaining situation into conflict, depriving both sides of the possibility of reaching a mutually beneficial outcome.⁴⁴ Military interventions, Malvesti argues, are 'a blunt, ineffective instrument that create a cycle

³⁷ Gray Younge, 'The War on Terror Has Been About Scaring People, Not Protecting Them' (*the Guardian*, 2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2010/jan/03/yemen-anti-terrorism-rendition-security>> accessed 23 January 2010

³⁸ Feldman (n 15)

³⁹ *ibid* 468

⁴⁰ Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law* (n 32)

⁴¹ Peter-Alexis Albrecht, '„Krieg Gegen Den Terror“ – Konsequenzen Für Ein Rechtsstaatliches Strafrecht' (2006) 117 ZStW 852

⁴² Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (Frank Cass Publishers 2007) 89

⁴³ Gómez-Jara Díez (n 23) 542

⁴⁴ Schelling (n 25)

of vengeance with minimal gains at best'.⁴⁵ Unaccompanied, the war model does not present the most effective model to tackle terrorism because it ignores root causes. Notably, the war model has evolved towards a more criminal justice approach.⁴⁶

2.3 The extended criminal justice model

Criminal justice agencies are the main actors in this model. Political interference in the operational aspects of the police and the courts is limited. Thatcher stated that 'there can be no question of political status for one serving a sentence for a crime. Crime is crime is a crime, it is not political.'⁴⁷ Committing crimes, Wilkinson asserts, implies the moral responsibility of the offender; hence, terrorists criminalise themselves because they follow a systematic policy of terror, rendering their acts synonymous to crime.⁴⁸ In this model, terrorists are treated within the confines of domestic law. It is the rule of law, its respect for the rights of individuals, and the perception of a fair process which give this model its legitimacy.⁴⁹

There is a demand that the rules be legitimate, not only in emanating from established authority, but also in the manner of formulation, in a way they are applied, and in their fidelity to agreed-upon institutional purposes ... The obligation to obey has some relation to the quality of the rules and integrity of their administration.⁵⁰

Perceptions of legitimacy increase cooperation through reliance on feelings of responsibility and obligation.⁵¹ Legitimacy is the basis of police action in democratic societies.⁵² In an attempt to deal with terrorism, states have developed complex legal frameworks. The criminal justice model not only neutralises individual threats but has 'symbolic, denunciatory functions which strengthen faith in societal values. The

⁴⁵ Michele Malvesti, 'Bombing Bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy' (2002) 26 *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 17, 18

⁴⁶ Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, 'Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models' (2008) 60 *Stanford Law Review* 1079; Donald Campbell and Kathleen Campbell, 'Soldiers as Police Officers/ Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States' (2010) 36 *Armed Forces & Society* 327

⁴⁷ BBC, 'What Happened in the Hunger Strike?' (*BBC*, 2006) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4941866.stm> accessed 6 June 2010

⁴⁸ Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy* (n 42) 69

⁴⁹ Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing' (2003) 37 *Law & Society Review* 513

⁵⁰ Justice Tankebe, 'Public Confidence in the Police Testing the Effects of Public Experiences of Police Corruption in Ghana' (2010) 50 *British Journal of Criminology* 296

⁵¹ Tom Tyler, 'Enhancing Police Legitimacy' (2004) 593 *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, 84

⁵² Tankebe (n 50)

idea that justice can better be achieved in the context of executive measures is implausible'.⁵³

Reconciling the war and criminal justice models is difficult as there are political, legal, and policy implications which may jeopardise the policy of criminalisation.⁵⁴ The extended criminal justice model acknowledges this difficulty, and according to Pedahzur and Ranstorp it is probably the most adopted strategy.⁵⁵ Walker notes that the state should be empowered to act in defence of its interests because democracy is not meant to be a suicide pact.⁵⁶ In an emergency, the ECHR allows for derogations when there is a continuing and viable threat, limiting emergency powers and ensuring they are proportionate to the threat. Governments are not, however, given *carte blanche* because derogations can be challenged in the courts and certain rights are absolute.⁵⁷

The extended criminal justice model allows the state, under certain circumstances, to infringe civil liberties. This falls outside normal criminal justice practices. Executive measures are regulated by law and must be relevant to the threat, accountable, and constitutional.⁵⁸ Walker notes that the only correct counterterrorism policy should be 'consistent with the rule of law and proportionate response'.⁵⁹ The war on drugs demonstrates that counterterrorism is not the only instance where the extended criminal justice model has been used.⁶⁰ Pre-emption remains necessary to avoid the loss of life.⁶¹

Special anti-terrorism measures have given the police more powers. Adjusted judicial processes and special courts have been established to deal with suspected terrorists. Crelinsten calls this the elasticity of the criminal justice model. Drawing the line between political violence and criminality is difficult because they could both stem from political motives.⁶² It is because of these adaptations that the pure

⁵³ Clive Walker, *Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation* (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 210

⁵⁴ Feldman (n 15) 468

⁵⁵ Pedahzur and Ranstorp (n 4) 3

⁵⁶ Walker, *Blackstone's guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53) 15

⁵⁷ Joan Hartman, 'Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies' (1981) 22 *Harvard Journal of International Law* 1

⁵⁸ Walker, *Blackstone's guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53) 309

⁵⁹ Clive Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (2006) 4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 1137, 1145

⁶⁰ Paul Finkleman, 'The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs' (1993) 66 *Southern California Law Review* 1389

⁶¹ Walker, *Blackstone's guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53) 23

⁶² Crelinsten (n 5)

form of the criminal justice model is insufficient, and attempts are being undertaken to strengthen counterterrorism efforts. The adaptations centre on pre-emption and net widening to avoid harm to the public and effectively tackle individuals who may be involved on the fringes of terrorism or who represent a future threat.⁶³ The extended criminal justice model does not deviate from the rule of law because special measures within domestic law allow for governmental and judicial oversight. However, executive measures usually deviate from liberal democratic principles and at times violate civil liberties.⁶⁴ ‘It has primarily been via deformations of the criminal justice system that liberal democracies have moved away from the rule of law and democratic acceptability.’⁶⁵ Examples of special measures include internment in Northern Ireland, the establishment of special courts in France and Spain, and the limitation of defendants’ rights in Germany. Many of these features are found in CONTEST and in the American led ‘war on terror’.

After a period of clear distinction between policing and war, internal and external security is merging.⁶⁶ Liberty is no longer the limit of security as the line between the two blurs. But if liberty becomes the condition of security, security has no limits.⁶⁷ Governments attempt to legitimise exceptional measures with reference to the new threat of terrorism. Coordination and cooperation become the new paradigm and new structures are put into place, forging a closer working relationship between police, intelligence services, and international partners.⁶⁸

Within the extended criminal justice model, executive measures strengthen the ability of the police and judiciary to deal with terrorism. If deemed necessary for the protection of the public, executive measures may deviate from democratic and human rights principles. The law limits executive measures to extreme circumstances, while the responsible agencies are accountable to the judiciary and the government. As with the other two models, the root causes of radicalisation and terrorism are insufficiently dealt with. However, unlike the war model, both criminal

⁶³ Clive Walker, ‘Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency’ in *Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency: Security and Human Rights in Countering Terrorism* (Springer 2012)

⁶⁴ Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid, ‘Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty - five Year Balance Sheet’ (1992) 4 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 307

⁶⁵ Crelinsten (n 5) 399

⁶⁶ David Bayley, ‘The Police and the Political Development in Western Europe’ in *The formation of National states in Europe* (Princeton University Press 1975)

⁶⁷ Barry Buzan and others, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc 1998)

justice models offer the legitimacy of the rule of law. The extended criminal justice model also allows for the adoption of executive measures into the domestic legal framework to strengthen police and judicial powers, and improve their ability to tackle terrorism.

2.4 The American ‘war on terror’

To illustrate the stark difference between these two approaches, and to highlight the innovativeness of CONTEST, it is helpful to examine the American ‘war on terror’. The former Foreign Secretary David Miliband states that ‘the phrase gives a false idea of a unified global enemy, and encourages a primarily military reply’.⁶⁹ The ‘war on terror’ rhetoric was not used by many other nations. Surprisingly, the American legislative response to terrorism after 9/11 was ‘mild compared to the responses of other democracies’.⁷⁰ The US government took different approaches domestically and internationally.

The international approach is based on risk elimination and is represented in the political rhetoric of the Bush administration, which declared the attacks of 9/11 an ‘act of war’, and used phrases such as ‘good versus evil’, ‘fighting for freedom’, and ‘axis of evil’.⁷¹ The Obama administration toned down the rhetoric,

but not the underlying assumptions or the sense of imperative in the *war* against terrorism. ... Far from being trapped in the Bush narrative, Obama has always shared its core assumptions ... he was a *true believer* in the war against terrorism. Indeed, his key criticism of the Bush administration was not that it was giving too much emphasis to terrorism in its foreign policy, but that it allowed itself to be distracted from the ‘real’ war on terror by invading Iraq.⁷²

The Bush administration’s narrative cast jihadi terrorists as ‘the heirs of fascism, totalitarianism and Nazism’.⁷³ This political rhetoric based on manichaeism, a perspective of the world as black and white, has galvanised the present conflict and cast terrorists as adversaries. Such views are reciprocated with Al Qaeda casting the

⁶⁸ D Bigo, ‘When Two Become One. Internal and External Securitisation in Europe’ in Morten Klestrup and Michael Williams (eds), *International relations theory and the politics of European integration: Power, security and community* (Routledge 2000)

⁶⁹ David Miliband, ‘“War on Terror” Was Wrong’, *The Guardian* (15 January 2009) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/15/david-miliband-war-terror>> accessed 5 April 2013

⁷⁰ Kent Roach, *The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press 2011) 162

⁷¹ Douglas Kellner, ‘Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the “War on Terror”’ (2007) 37 *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 622

⁷² Trevor McCrisken, ‘Ten Years on: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice’ (2011) 87 *International Affairs* 781, 786, 800

⁷³ J Maggio, ‘The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately After 9/11’ (2007) 35 *Politics & Policy* 810, 822

fight as a cosmic struggle against the great Satan.⁷⁴ If politicians are to be believed, this is not a political feud, and with both sides perceiving the conflict as one between good and evil, the outcome must be the extermination of one of the antagonists.⁷⁵ Terrorism is seen through the prism of the cold war, an outlook which has influenced contemporary US counterterrorism strategy.⁷⁶ The Bush administration's political rhetoric attempted to legitimise the use of maximum force. 'The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life, is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.'⁷⁷

Many believe that the New York terror attacks in 2001 were the opening scenes of the unfolding 'war on terror', which eventually led to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Tens of thousands of civilian lives have been lost during these campaigns.⁷⁸ Despite perceptions, the 'war on terror' has not been a one-tier counterterrorism strategy. Rather, it is a twin track approach to counterterrorism, and a continuation of previous American policy. The 'war on terror' is a combination of military and international collaboration abroad, with criminal justice agencies at the forefront domestically.⁷⁹ Prior to 9/11, the US was relatively restrained in the use of military force as an expression of its counterterrorism strategy.⁸⁰ Exceptions include the 1986 air strikes in Libya, a response to the bombing of a Berlin discothèque frequented by American soldiers,⁸¹ and a number of strikes against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in response to terrorist attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by Al Qaeda.⁸²

After 9/11, pre-emptive military intervention, extraordinary rendition, and images of torture in places such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib characterise the 'war on terror'.⁸³ Such practices, Duffy argues, violate international law.⁸⁴ Wilkinson notes

⁷⁴ Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books 2004) 107

⁷⁵ Schelling (n 25) 5

⁷⁶ Bruce Hoffman, 'Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?' [1999] *Foreign Policy* 62, 64

⁷⁷ CNN, 'Transcript of President Bush's Address' (2001) <<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>> accessed 4 August 2010

⁷⁸ Casualty Monitor, 'Monitoring and Analysis of Data on Civilian and British Military Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq' (2010) <<http://www.casualty-monitor.org/>> accessed 12 December 2011

⁷⁹ Benjamin Wittes, *Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror* (Penguin 2008)

⁸⁰ Michele Malvesti, 'Explaining the United States' Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists' (2001) 13 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 85

⁸¹ Global Security, 'Operation Eldorado Canyon' (2010) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/el_dorado_canyon.htm> accessed 8 May 2010

⁸² Hoffman (n 76)

⁸³ Leila Sadat, 'Extraordinary Rendition, Torture and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror' (2007) 75 *George Washington Law Review* 1200

that ‘there is much greater danger of military overreaction that undermines the values of the rule of law and the protection of human rights, which democracies have a duty to uphold’.⁸⁵ The US government has adopted ‘a revised legal regime ... loosening restrictions on security agencies, [hoping to] yield consequential anti-terror benefits’.⁸⁶ This strategy utilises a combination of military forces, security agencies, and law enforcement bodies to fight terrorism both domestically and abroad.⁸⁷

Despite political rhetoric and active military interventions, the US has repeatedly shown that its criminal justice agencies are capable of pursuing terrorists through the criminal justice system.⁸⁸ For example, the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings were pursued through the courts.⁸⁹ Since 9/11, individuals involved in forty-six terror plots between 2001 and 2009 have been successfully prosecuted.⁹⁰ The last few years have revealed both a sharp demarcation between the purposes of the police and the armed forces, and convergence between criminal justice and military practices within American society.⁹¹ The NSA has conducted warrantless electronic surveillance of enemies both in the US and abroad.⁹² Chesney and Goldsmith conclude that there has been a convergence between the military and criminal justice detention models.

Convergence itself has helped flesh out the contours of a more appropriate model, but the ... ultimate unpredictable nature of the convergence process is no receipt for sustainable reform.⁹³

Although the rhetoric around the ‘war on terror’ seems to have disappeared under Obama, military interventions continue. These interventions, which include drone attacks, have killed and injured tens of thousands and form part of the US’s counterterrorism strategy abroad.⁹⁴

⁸⁴ Duffy, *The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law* (n 32) 441

⁸⁵ Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy* (n 42) 91

⁸⁶ Campbell and Campbell (n 46)

⁸⁷ Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy* (n 42) 62

⁸⁸ Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy* (n 42)

⁸⁹ ‘*United States of America V Ramzi Ahmed Yousef*’ [2003] (note)

⁹⁰ Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001’ (RAND 2010)

⁹¹ Campbell and Campbell (n 46)

⁹² U.S. Department of Justice, ‘Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President’ (2006)

<<http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf>> accessed 6 September 2010

⁹³ Chesney and Goldsmith (n 46) 1132

⁹⁴ Oliver Burkeman, ‘Obama Administration Says Goodbye to “War on Terror”’ (*the Guardian*, 2009) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-overseas-contingency-operations>> accessed 3 December 2010

In the long term, the ‘war on terror’ has undermined America’s reputation and cast doubts on the legitimacy of the war approach.⁹⁵ Although the US counterterrorism strategy contains aspects of both the war and the extended criminal justice models, the growing perception that certain aspects are based on military power and commercial interests has led to an escalation of violence and increased sympathy towards extremists.⁹⁶

Despite US government efforts to use a combination of criminal justice agencies and the military, the overarching perception is that the US is leading a war. The US approach fails to address causes of radicalisation and terrorism because it is based on risk elimination. Also, US policy illustrates the effects which military interventions can have on perceptions of legitimacy. The fundamental rights of ordinary civilians are disregarded, strengthening extremism. ‘The current practices are unprecedented and they conflict with the legal values reflected in established principles of extradition, refugee and human rights norms.’⁹⁷

2.5 The British experience

Throughout its colonial history to the present day, various British governments have dealt with political violence in the UK and its territories and protectorates. Military interventions and the use of violence and torture were common practice across parts of the British Empire and its territories such as Palestine, Kenya, Malaysia, Cyprus, and Aden.⁹⁸ Current military operations in Afghanistan could give one the impression that the British government continues to use a war approach to tackle terrorism. However, the British government rejected the rhetoric and actions related to the ‘war on terror’ such as renditions, torture, and Guantanamo Bay.⁹⁹ In contrast to Iraq, the counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan were backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1368.¹⁰⁰ Unlike the US, the British government acknowledged its obligations to the Geneva Conventions in both conflicts, as outlined in CONTEST.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ James Fallows, ‘Declaring Victory’ (2007) 9 *Atlantic Monthly* 60

⁹⁶ Malvesti, ‘Explaining the United States’ Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists’ (n 80)

⁹⁷ Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond’ (2003) 25 *Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review* 457, 491

⁹⁸ Susan Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960* (Leicester University Press 1995) 171; Walker, ‘Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom’ (n 59)

⁹⁹ Miliband (n 69)

¹⁰⁰ ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368’ (2001)

¹⁰¹ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (HMSO 2009) 76

During the uprising in Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s, the British government developed an approach which attempted to capture the 'hearts and minds' of the people.¹⁰² Jackson points out that the hearts and minds campaign was as much about creating fear as it was about winning the social and economic battle.¹⁰³ Force was still used systematically, and the campaign was akin to imposing an armed coup.

Different rules applied in Northern Ireland, a country whose political status fell between not-quite-Empire and not-quite-England. The approach in Northern Ireland bridged the hearts and minds campaign in Malaysia with the contemporary policy of *Prevent*. Since the partition of Ireland, UK governments have increased legislation to give criminal justice agencies more powers to tackle terrorism in Northern Ireland.¹⁰⁴ With the growing political violence in the country in the 1970s, the military was deployed to support the police within a civil power framework.¹⁰⁵ At first the military was seen as neutral, but its role changed from peacekeeping to counter-insurgency.¹⁰⁶ With the Unionist government too slow to address the grievances of the civil rights movement of the 1960s,¹⁰⁷ the IRA, whose main objective was to remove the Unionist regime, received growing support from disadvantaged Catholic communities.

As the civilian death toll in the street fighting rose, the Londonderry and Belfast Catholics began to arm themselves and took to the IRA as the only available armed Catholic defence organization.¹⁰⁸

Government counterterrorism legislation veered from a militaristic to a criminal justice approach as evidenced by 'internment without trial, inhuman treatment of detainees and lethal confrontations such as the bloody Sunday in 1972 when 13 people ... were shot dead by the Army'.¹⁰⁹

Hickman et al. argue that from the 1970s onward, British anti-terror legislation, government policies, and negative media coverage led to the isolation of Irish

¹⁰² Paul Dixon, 'Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq' (2009) 32 *Journal of Strategic Studies* 353

¹⁰³ Laura Donohue, *The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty* (Cambridge University Press 2008) 49

¹⁰⁴ Rogelio Alonso, *The IRA and Armed Struggle* (Taylor & Francis 2007) 3

¹⁰⁵ Laura Donohue, *Counter-Terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom, 1922-2000* (Irish Academic Press 2001)

¹⁰⁶ Jonathan Tonge, *Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change* (2nd edn, Longman 2002) 94

¹⁰⁷ Peter Neumann, *Britain's Long War* (Macmillan Palgrave 2003)

¹⁰⁸ Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy* (n 42) 28

¹⁰⁹ Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (n 59) 1138

communities in Britain.¹¹⁰ Large numbers were arrested, interrogated, and released without charge. Broad stop-and-search powers at ports and airports allowed the state to gather intelligence. Coercion and repression were dominant features of the government's approach, a far cry from policing by consent.¹¹¹

A criminal justice centred approach was adopted as a result of the Diplock review in the 1970s.¹¹² Special powers remained available to the security services in Northern Ireland, but military numbers continued to decrease from their peak in 1992.¹¹³ An integral part of the government's counterterrorism strategy was intelligence gathering. Informants were given protection even at the cost of civilian lives.¹¹⁴ Political prisoners were deliberately turned into common criminals¹¹⁵ and a veiled dirty war continued well into the 1990s.¹¹⁶ Even after the Good Friday agreement and the diminishing army presence, all PSNI officers routinely carry firearms.¹¹⁷

Although less coercive force was used during the hearts and minds campaign in Northern Ireland than in Malaya, many interventions were still illegitimate and counterproductive.¹¹⁸ Although the military was there to support the civil authorities, its use of excessive force could be seen as undermining police primacy.¹¹⁹ The government's counterterrorism strategy in Northern Ireland included aspects of the war and extended criminal justice models. Although the strategy required a strong degree of cooperation from some of the local population (the Unionist), the importance of addressing inequality between the communities was belatedly recognised.¹²⁰

Unless ... trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the government and the security forces the chance of success is greatly reduced. If

¹¹⁰ Mary Hickman and others, "Suspect Communities"? Counter-Terrorism Policy, the Press, and the Impact on Irish and Muslim Communities in Britain' (London Metropolitan University 2011)

¹¹¹ Paddy Hillyard, *Suspect Community: People's Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain* (Pluto 1993)

¹¹² Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (n 59) 1157

¹¹³ Martin Melaugh and others, 'Background Information on Northern Ireland Society - Security and Defence' (*CAIN Web Service*, 2013)

¹¹⁴ Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, *Stakeknife: Britain's Secret Agents in Ireland* (O'Brien Press 2004)

¹¹⁵ Donohue, *The Cost of Counterterrorism* (n 103) 10

¹¹⁶ Ingram and Harkin (n 114)

¹¹⁷ Police Service of Northern Ireland, 'Freedom of Information Request' (2007) <http://www.psni.police.uk/firearms_held_by_psni.pdf> accessed 8 May 2010

¹¹⁸ Brice Dickson, 'Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland' (2009) 32 *Journal of Strategic Studies* 475, 490

¹¹⁹ Paul Dixon, 'Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq' (2009) 32 *Journal of Strategic Studies* 353

¹²⁰ Neumann, *Britain's Long War* (n 107) 183

the people support the government and the security forces the insurgents become isolated and cut off from their supplies, shelter and intelligence.¹²¹

Security operations and the penetration of Loyalist groups and the Provisional IRA, as well as political and economic reforms, led to the Good Friday agreement.¹²² As part of the agreement, and the decommissioning of weapons by the IRA, a number of powers such as justice and policing have devolved to Stormont. The British government also repealed the Government of Ireland Act 1920.¹²³ This has led to relative peace in Northern Ireland. However, the unpredictable implementation of constitutionalism in Northern Ireland diminished the success of establishing Britain's legitimacy.¹²⁴

Since the 1970s, the focus in Great Britain turned from domestic to international terrorism and circled back to 9/11 and the legislation it has spawned.¹²⁵ However, the Terrorism Act 2000 was introduced prior to 9/11 to deal with the rise of jihadi terrorism abroad, which suggests that the government was not entirely caught by surprise. This Act of Parliament forms the basis for further counterterrorism legislation introduced in the years following 9/11. Legislation such as the Terrorism Act 2006 was hurriedly introduced to tackle the 'new' threat of domestic jihadi terrorism.¹²⁶ Referred to as the politics of the last atrocity, it represents a reaction to the public outrage about terrorist attacks in the US and the UK.¹²⁷ Until 2003, the UK was a safe haven for Islamic extremists and its supporters.¹²⁸ With the risk of home-grown jihadi terrorism, new legislation shifted from reactive to proactive policing and risk management. Public safety has taken precedence over the gathering of evidence.¹²⁹

The 1996 Lloyd Report sets out four main principles which contemporary counterterrorism legislation should consider. '(i) Legislation should be aligned as close as possible to criminal law. (ii) A balance between security and liberty is

¹²¹ Dixon (n 119) 364

¹²² Peter Taylor, *The Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (Bloomsbury Publishing 1998)

¹²³ Northern Ireland Office, 'Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement' (HMSO 2001)

¹²⁴ Neumann, *Britain's Long War* (n 107)

¹²⁵ Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (n 59) 1142

¹²⁶ Ian Cobain, 'London Bombings: The Day the Anti-Terrorism Rules Changed', *The Guardian* (7 July 2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/07/london-bombings-anti-terrorism>> accessed 5 April 2013

¹²⁷ Michael Humphrey, *Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror to Drama* (Routledge 2002)

¹²⁸ Peter Clark, 'Learning from Experience – Counter Terrorism in the UK Since 9/11' (*Metropolitan Police*, 2007) <<http://content.met.police.uk/News/DAC-Peter-Clarks-speech-on-counter-terrorism/1260267589755/1257246745756>> accessed 13 May 2010

¹²⁹ Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (n 59) 1142

attained, meaning that additional powers should only be introduced when there is sufficient need. (iii) Additional powers should have additional safeguards. (iv) Legislation should comply with Britain's international law obligations.¹³⁰ The report led to the Terrorism Act 2000, which replaced the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provision) Act 1973 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974.¹³¹ Its aim was to launch a more unified and permanent regime reflecting a move towards dealing with international terrorism.¹³² Both Labour's 2008 National Security Strategy,¹³³ and the coalition's NSS are committed to the rule of law and to upholding civil rights.¹³⁴

In 2003, CONTEST united different elements to tackle terrorism including criminal justice and other central government agencies. After the London bombings in 2005, there was a shift within CONTEST which widened preventative efforts.

There is an acknowledgement that the rather blinkered approach to recognising causal factors and providing supporting material to justify particular threat responses, characterised by the years of the Blair-Bush partnership, was both wrong and unhelpful. Secondly, and more importantly, there is the belated recognition that: Communications are a vital part of our work on counterterrorism, CONTEST depends for its success on partnerships. The partnership ... depends on openness and trust, both of which depend upon accurate communications about the threat and responses.¹³⁵

The London bombings challenged the notion of the archetypical terrorist.¹³⁶ The line between friend and foe blurred. There was a sudden realisation that the foe was no longer an outsider but possibly a neighbour, a colleague, or friend. The London bombings also seem to have been a catalyst for a substantial shift in government responses to terrorism. Recent decades have seen a gradual integration of all aspects of counterterrorism, including prevention, protection from attacks, and attack preparation, into one strategy, CONTEST. This strategy acknowledges that a one-tier approach to terrorism is no longer sufficient, partly because the threat of terrorism comes from British communities. That said, CONTEST is still dominated by counterterrorism policing, mirroring the extended criminal justice system. War model aspects, particularly the use of the military, do not feature in CONTEST.

¹³⁰ Lloyd Report, 'Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism' (HMSO 1996) para 3.1

¹³¹ Walker, *Blackstone's guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53)

¹³² Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (n 59) 1142

¹³³ HM Government, 'A Stronger Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' (HMSO 2010)

¹³⁴ Cabinet Office, 'The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom' (HMSO 2008)

¹³⁵ Frank Gregory, 'An Evaluation of Revision to the UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy with a Special Focus on the CBRNE Threat' (Real Instituto Elcano 2009)

¹³⁶ Clive Walker, "'Know Thine Enemy as Thyself': Discerning Friend from Foe Under Anti-Terrorism Laws' (2008) 32 *Melbourne Law Review* 275

CONTEST is a domestic strategy and does not include military strategies abroad such as Afghanistan.

2.6 The CONTEST strategy

Unlike previous counterterrorism strategies, CONTEST takes a more holistic approach. It unites various aspects related to terrorism and the possible aftermath of a terrorist attack. Unlike the ‘war on terror’, the aim of CONTEST is to pre-emptively reduce the risk of terrorism,¹³⁷ ‘so that people can go about their normal lives, freely and with confidence’.¹³⁸ Despite changes by the coalition government, CONTEST’s structure remains unchanged. Unless stated, any further references to CONTEST and *Prevent* refer to its 2011 version. There is an emphasis on anticipatory risk and the proactive countering of terrorism¹³⁹ because the risks of mass casualties are unacceptable.¹⁴⁰ It is therefore necessary to stop terrorists before they achieve their objectives. Based on the rule of law, CONTEST widens the traditional boundaries of the criminal justice system through, for example, the proliferation of precursor criminal offences.¹⁴¹ The coalition government has made some changes such as repealing the section 44 stop-and-search policy and replacing it with more limited powers.¹⁴² Other measures such as control orders have also been replaced with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs).¹⁴³ Walker argues that some executive measures are rather excessive; nevertheless, they remain an integral part of the CONTEST strategy.¹⁴⁴

The 2009 version of CONTEST acknowledges that winning over Muslim communities is essential to reducing the threat of terrorism.¹⁴⁵ CONTEST assumes that disregarding the rule of law and individual rights may alienate communities which are vital to the prevention process, leading to conflict and mistrust with

¹³⁷ David Omand, *Securing the State* (Hurst & Co Publishers 2010)

¹³⁸ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 101) 5

¹³⁹ Clive Walker, ‘Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom’ (2005) 44 *Crime, Law and Social Change* 387

¹⁴⁰ Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11* (Simon & Schuster 2006)

¹⁴¹ Walker, *Blackstone’s guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53) 212

¹⁴² Home Office, ‘Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011’ (2011) <<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/terrorism-act-remedial-order/>> accessed 30 October 2009

¹⁴³ Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011

¹⁴⁴ Walker, *Blackstone’s guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53)

¹⁴⁵ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 101)

authorities. Upholding human rights has become a central part of CONTEST.¹⁴⁶ Although the concept of *Prevent* is not entirely new, previous UK counterterrorism strategies have mainly focused on *Pursue*, and to a limited extent *Protect* and *Prepare*.

The reason for the inclusion of *Prevent* is that terrorism motivated by fringe movements within Islam poses a significant threat to the public because self-starting groups and individuals are more difficult to detect through conventional methods.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, 'religious extremism has ... become the most powerful motivational and ideological basis for groups engaged in terrorist activities'.¹⁴⁸ As Walker points out, the next terrorist may be our neighbour.¹⁴⁹ Other factors such as conflict and instability, aspects of modern technology, a persuasive ideology, and radicalisation continue to enable terrorist groups to grow and operate.¹⁵⁰

It is intent on inflicting mass casualties without warning, motivated by a violent extremist ideology, and exploits modern travel and communications to spread through a loose and dangerous global network.¹⁵¹

The government and media reinforce this message, perpetuating the stereotypical image of jihadi terrorists.¹⁵² Over the last decade, policymakers and the media have framed jihadi terrorism as a new phenomenon, introducing laws that rely on the arguments of the novelty of the threat while ignoring past lessons.¹⁵³ 'Linguistically, the adjective *new* does not depict phenomena that are unprecedented. Rather, it tends to be used in the context of evolutionary change.'¹⁵⁴ This matter is often ignored, as new laws are rushed through, often ignoring the root causes of terrorism, past lessons, and the contribution of the state in creating conditions in which terrorist actions by non-state actors occur.¹⁵⁵

Although integral aspects of CONTEST are based on the extended criminal justice model, CONTEST provides a broader approach to counterterrorism, bringing

¹⁴⁶ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (n 1)

¹⁴⁷ *ibid*

¹⁴⁸ Ekaterina Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects* (Oxford University Press 2008) 5

¹⁴⁹ Walker, "'Know thine enemy as thyself': Discerning friend from foe under anti-terrorism laws' (n 136)

¹⁵⁰ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (n 1) 9

¹⁵¹ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 101) Foreword

¹⁵² Frank Furedi, *Invitation to Terror: Expanding the Empire of the Unknown* (Continuum 2007)

¹⁵³ Alexander Spencer, 'Questioning the Concept of "new Terrorism"' (2006) 8 *Peace Conflict & Development* 1, 24

¹⁵⁴ Peter Neumann, *Old and New Terrorism* (Polity 2009) 12

¹⁵⁵ Richard Jackson and others (eds), *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Routledge 2009)

together counterterrorism policing, prevention, protection, and coordinated responses in the event of a terrorist attack. Building on Garnett's arguments, CONTEST focuses its attention on a purely rational level, on the 'reasonable, conscious, artful behaviour motivated by the cold calculated interested; and ... at the level that examines the participations in a conflict in all their complexity'.¹⁵⁶ Within this strategy, *Prevent*, *Protect*, and *Prepare* supplement *Pursue*, addressing problems which cannot be tackled by security services or the criminal justice agencies.

2.6.1 *The Prevent policy*

The concept of *Prevent* is not entirely new. A community-based approach to counterterrorism formed a cornerstone of the approach taken in Northern Ireland in the later years of the conflict, and was brought back to centre stage after the 7/7 London bombings.¹⁵⁷ The *Prevent Review* has taken *Prevent* back to its 2003 origins by separating the prevention of extremism from preventing extremism leading to terrorism. The objectives of the revised *Prevent* policy are to '(i) respond to the ideological challenges of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; (ii) prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and (iii) work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization which we need to address'.¹⁵⁸ Two key objectives of the previous version have been either sidelined or dropped altogether. These are 'increasing resilience of communities to violent extremism, and addressing the grievances which ideologies exploit'.¹⁵⁹

It falls to the Integration Strategy, published by the DCLG, to tackle extremism, while dealing with grievances has been removed from *Prevent* by the government altogether.¹⁶⁰ There has also been a shift in language. The *Prevent Review* no longer uses the term 'violent extremism', stating that it is too broad. Instead, it refers to 'extremism', with *Prevent* focusing on extremism which leads to terrorism.¹⁶¹ However, extremism is defined in such broad terms and with reference to ambiguous British values that its use becomes as meaningless as violent extremism. At the same

¹⁵⁶ John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions' in John Baylis and others (eds), *Contemporary Strategy* (2nd edn, Routledge 1987)

¹⁵⁷ Rachel Briggs, 'Community Engagement for Counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom' (2010) 86 *International Affairs* 971

¹⁵⁸ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (HMSO 2011) 7

¹⁵⁹ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 101) 80

¹⁶⁰ Department for Communities and Local, 'Creating the Conditions for Integration' (HMSO 2012)

¹⁶¹ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 158)

time, it allows the government to class as extreme those who oppose its policies.¹⁶² The *Prevent Review* acknowledges that other forms of extremism, such as right-wing extremism need tackling, but *Prevent* focuses on jihadi terrorism because it poses the greatest risk to the UK's national security at the present time.¹⁶³

The government envisions an approach where a partnership of local authorities and the police takes the lead in close conjunction with central government departments. Other agencies are brought in if needed.¹⁶⁴ The new maxim is 'communities defeat terrorism'.¹⁶⁵ Initiatives such as the Radical Middle Way, initiated under the old *Prevent* strategy, brought together authoritative voices to speak to Muslim communities in the UK and abroad.¹⁶⁶ These projects engaged in topics such as Islamic theology, terrorism, and citizenship.¹⁶⁷ Other initiatives included creating young peoples' forums across the UK, increasing citizenship education at mosques, the promotion of Islamic studies in higher education, and the creation of a Muslim board to articulate an understanding of Islam in Britain.¹⁶⁸

The revised policy, however, makes clear that the government will no longer engage with groups espousing extremism, even non-violent forms such as the Street Project in East London.¹⁶⁹ Rather, the *Review* shifts preventative efforts to interventions, targeting those at risk of radicalisation through the improvement of information sharing. *Prevent* is meant to act as an early warning system,¹⁷⁰ identifying those engaged in extremism through ever increasing involvement of government agencies, and private and voluntary sector organisations, such as the Department of Health and universities.¹⁷¹

¹⁶² Joshua Skoczylis, 'Keep Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer. The Prevent Review, a Missed Opportunity?' (European Society of Criminology Conference, Vilnius, Lithuania, 2009)

¹⁶³ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 158) 15

¹⁶⁴ Basia Spalek, 'Terrorism: Emerging Critiques' (2008) 73 *Criminal Justice Matters* 10

¹⁶⁵ Rachel Briggs and others, 'Brining It Home: Community-Based Approach to Counter-Terrorism' (Demos 2006)

¹⁶⁶ HM Government, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery' (HMSO 2009) 4

¹⁶⁷ Radical Middle Way, 'Information, Guidance & Expression' (no date) <<http://www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk/topics>> accessed 8 June 2010

¹⁶⁸ HM Government, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: A strategy for delivery' (n 166)

¹⁶⁹ Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, 'Should Britain Work with "extremists" to Prevent Terrorism? Where Do We Draw the Line?' (*OpenDemocracy*, 2011) <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/jamie-bartlett-carl-miller/should-britain-work-with-extremists-to-prevent-terrorism-where>> accessed 12 December 2011

¹⁷⁰ Clive Walker and Javid Rehman, "'Prevent" Responses to Jihadi Extremism' in Victor Ramraj and others (eds), *Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy* (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2011)

¹⁷¹ HM Government, 'Channel: Supporting Individuals Vulnerable to Recruitment by Violent Extremists. A Guide for Local Partners.' (HMSO 2010)

The aim is to support mainstream voices and undermine extremist ideologies by collaborating with Muslim scholars and other faith groups.¹⁷² Since its inception, the *Prevent Review* has placed even more emphasis on working with universities to tackle extremism on campuses, while closing the gap in Islamic studies.¹⁷³ Trained police officers develop contacts with Muslim communities, helping them deal with issues of extremism. Other schemes include young Muslim consultative groups which create space for individuals to voice their concerns and contribute to policy development.¹⁷⁴ The *Prevent* policy promotes shared values and a broader debate about citizenship rights and responsibilities. It attempts to ‘distil attractive rallying points for the potentially disaffected and emphasis[es] that Britishness is no enemy’ to Islam.¹⁷⁵

Under the Labour government, *Prevent* work was linked with community cohesion and integration. The *Review* has moved the tackling of non-violent extremism to the integration strategy, but acknowledges that the success of *Prevent* relies on community engagement.¹⁷⁶ The *Review* challenges those who do not support fundamental British values, however ambiguous they may be. Briggs raises a number of concerns about how proportionality is ensured, and whether Muslims will be held to standards that are not expected of others within wider British society.¹⁷⁷ *Prevent* has changed from a policy which attempted to work with communities and to some extent allowing them to tackle extremism, to a policy which is primarily aimed at identifying those at risk of radicalisation and putting formal interventions in place. The promulgation of special offences represents a ‘false and extravagant presumption about the ability of harsh criminal law to stop terrorism’.¹⁷⁸ Such a tactic serves political, symbolic, and denunciatory functions.¹⁷⁹ This, Walker and Rehman argue, has led to net-widening, policing and demonising trivial behaviour seen as a risk factor, focusing on Muslim communities, and the creation of a surveillance state.¹⁸⁰ The perception of *Prevent* as another gimmick to gather

¹⁷² HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 1)

¹⁷³ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 158)

¹⁷⁴ HM Government, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: A strategy for delivery’ (n 166) 7

¹⁷⁵ Walker and Rehman (n 170)

¹⁷⁶ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 158) 44

¹⁷⁷ Briggs, ‘Community engagement for counterterrorism’ (n 157) 975

¹⁷⁸ Kent Roach, ‘The Criminal Law and Terrorism’ in Victor Ramraj and others (eds), *Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy* (Cambridge University Press 2005)

¹⁷⁹ Clive Walker, *Terrorism and the Law* (Oxford University Press 2011) 252

¹⁸⁰ Walker and Rehman (n 170)

intelligence about Muslim communities through local services, Kundnani argues, generates a lack of trust in the programme and state authorities.¹⁸¹

2.6.2 *The Pursue policy*

Pursue is the criminal justice tier of CONTEST. Counterterrorism policing actions often have a direct and indirect effect on the delivery of *Prevent*, and how communities perceive counterterrorism in general. Its purpose

is to stop terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible prosecute those responsible.¹⁸²

Intelligence is vital to this work stream. ‘Close dialogue between the police, security and intelligence agencies is the basis of successful counterterrorism work.’¹⁸³

Because of the nature of jihadi terrorism, everyone is treated as a potential suspect, particularly individuals within Muslim communities.¹⁸⁴ Police operations and executive actions are often intelligence-led and allow the police and the security services to identify, monitor, and disrupt potential terrorist plots. ‘The embedded nature of terrorist risk seems to demand the application of all-risk security and policing measures, such as stop-and-search powers.’¹⁸⁵ These powers are often linked to intelligence rather than evidence-gathering. All-risk policing presumes that risk could come from anywhere and is not ‘exclusively raised by non-citizens or other obvious “outsiders” traditionally considered most in need of scrutiny’.¹⁸⁶ There is a danger that insufficient intelligence may lead to actions based on information which is vague or even haphazard.

The risk posed by terrorism has led to a more pre-emptive approach; consequently, pursuit now includes prevention.¹⁸⁷ There is the possibility that this approach forestalls ‘risks, [and] competes with and even takes precedence over responding to wrongs done’.¹⁸⁸ Legislation potentially criminalises behaviour which may be

¹⁸¹ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

¹⁸² HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 1) 45

¹⁸³ HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 1)

¹⁸⁴ Walker, ‘“Know thine enemy as thyself”: Discerning friend from foe under anti-terrorism laws’ (n 136) 130

¹⁸⁵ Clive Walker, ‘Neighbor Terrorism and the All-Risk Policing of Terrorism’ (2009) 3 *Journal of National Security Law and Policy* 121, 130

¹⁸⁶ *ibid* 122

¹⁸⁷ Lucia Zedner, ‘Fixing the Future? The Pre-Emptive Turn in Criminal Justice’ in Bernadette McSherry and others (eds), *Regulating Deviance: The redirection of criminalisation and the futures of criminal law* (Hart Publishing 2009) 37

¹⁸⁸ Lucia Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?’ (2007) 11 *Theoretical Criminology* 261, 262

construed as potentially dangerous and supportive of terrorism. Trigger offences, such as s. 57 and s. 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, are aimed at preventing more serious terror-related activities. This approach ignores broader social and environmental factors.¹⁸⁹ Walker argues that the introduction of pre-emptive laws would not be supported outside a time of crisis.¹⁹⁰ A fine balance needs to be struck to avoid abuse of the powers given to police and security services to uphold the lives and liberty of citizens.¹⁹¹ Anti-terror laws should not be used to victimise, stifle freedom of speech, or undermine privacy because of the communities' and individuals' ethnicity or religious views.¹⁹²

Pursue measures include TPIMs, which have replaced control orders;¹⁹³ data mining; port controls; and stop-and-search powers.¹⁹⁴ These measures can be used to gather intelligence as an alternative to the criminal justice process, bypassing trial proceedings.¹⁹⁵ Intelligence is not necessarily synonymous with evidence used in judicial proceedings. CONTEST argues that non-prosecution options need to be available to disrupt plots before they take place, even if this means jeopardising a successful prosecution.¹⁹⁶

The UK government has rejected even the terminology of the war on terror and claims instead that prosecution is – first, second and third – the government's preferred approach when dealing with suspected terrorists.¹⁹⁷

By 2015, the government aims to improve the ability to prosecute and deport those suspected of terrorist offences. In addition, it is working on improving judicial proceedings so that these are better able to handle sensitive and secret material to 'serve the interests of both justice and national security'.¹⁹⁸ This is because conflict between protecting the public and securing convictions sometimes arises, especially when terrorism plots are disrupted early in an investigation.

These measures, as well as laws pertaining to non-disclosure, have been criticised for their austerity, disregard of the due process of law, and their potential to discriminate

¹⁸⁹ Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering, 'Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism Imagining Future Crime in the "War on Terror"' (2009) 49 *British Journal of Criminology* 628, 629

¹⁹⁰ Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (n 59) 1147

¹⁹¹ S Wallerstein, 'The State's Duty of Self-Defence: Justifying the Expansion of Criminal Law' in Ben Gould and Liora Lazarus (eds), *Security and Human Rights* (Hart Publishing 2007)

¹⁹² Abie Longstaff and John Graham, 'Anti-Terrorism and Police Powers: Should We Be Concerned?' (2008) 73 *Criminal Justice Matters* 15

¹⁹³ 'Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act' (2011)

¹⁹⁴ Walker and Rehman (n 170)

¹⁹⁵ Gregory (n 135)

¹⁹⁶ Clark (n 128)

¹⁹⁷ Walker, *Blackstone's guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53) 5

¹⁹⁸ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (n 1) 45

and alienate.¹⁹⁹ The use of s. 44 stop-and-searches has raised concerns about targeting Asian males, increasing racial and ethnic tensions, and creating barriers of trust between Muslim communities and the police.²⁰⁰ In 2010 the European Court of Human Rights declared s.44 stop-and-searches incompatible with the ECHR.²⁰¹

Pursue attempts to combine effective intelligence gathering with democratic accountability.²⁰² Responsibility and accountability provide two moral cornerstones for public service in a democracy.²⁰³ Walker notes that the idea that justice can be better achieved in the context of executive measures is implausible.²⁰⁴ Security and human rights are not opposites and should be protected rather than infringed upon, even in times of emergency.²⁰⁵ *Pursue*, although the dominant pillar of CONTEST, relies on the other three *P*'s. Particularly, it relies on *Prevent* in order to stop individuals from becoming radicalizing and going down the path of terrorism.

2.7 Is CONTEST innovative?

CONTEST is innovative as it goes beyond the boundaries of traditional counterterrorism strategies by successfully combining the extended criminal justice model with prevention, protection, and preparedness.²⁰⁶ CONTEST acknowledges that it cannot achieve its objectives without the support of local communities in which extremism is rooted. Because the threat has shifted from abroad to British communities, gaining local support in the process has become more important. CONTEST combines the reactive elements of the extended criminal justice system with a preventative element.

Winning in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive meaning; it is not winning relative to one's adversary. It means gaining relative to one's own value system; and this may be done by bargaining, mutual accommodation, and by avoidance of mutually damaging behaviour. ... Concepts like deterrence, limited war, and disarmament, as well as negotiations, are concerned with the

¹⁹⁹ Darren Thiel, 'Policing Terrorism: A Review of the Evidence' (The Police Foundation 2009) 31

²⁰⁰ Gabe Mythen and others, "'I'm a Muslim, but I'm Not a Terrorist': Victimization, Risky Identities and the Performance of Safety' (2009) 49 *British Journal of Criminology* 736, 739

²⁰¹ *Gillan and Quinton v UK* App no 4158/05 (ECHR 12 January 2010)

²⁰² Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, *Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today* (Zed Books Ltd 2003)

²⁰³ Harold Gortner, *Ethics for Public Managers* (Praeger 1991)

²⁰⁴ Walker, *Blackstone's guide to the anti-terrorism legislation* (n 53) 210

²⁰⁵ Steward Weir and Andrew Blick, 'The Rules of the Game: Britain's Counter-Terrorism Strategy' (*OpenDemocracy*, 2005) <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/defeat_3015.jsp> accessed 23 January 2010

²⁰⁶ Pedahzur and Ranstorp (n 4)

common interest and mutual dependence that can exist between participants in a conflict.²⁰⁷

CONTEST acknowledges that military interventions abroad and criminalisation alone cannot solve the problems of extremism and terrorism. *Prevent* attempts to deal with the issue of extremism, although there has been an unfortunate return to its 2003 version which is more aligned with *Pursue* and is about streamlining the gathering of information. The Home Affairs Committee stated that

prevention - that is, stopping people from supporting or embracing violent extremism of whatever kind - is not solely a function of a counter-terrorism strategy, but in fact must be regarded as part of a much wider approach to attitudes and attitudinal change.²⁰⁸

The *Review* has separated community cohesion from *Prevent*, and focuses on extremism that leads to terrorism.²⁰⁹ Nevertheless, CONTEST remains innovative because it continues to include *Prevent*, a policy which aims to divert people from the criminal justice system altogether through target intervention and community engagement.²¹⁰ To gain support from Muslim communities, the government needs to maintain the 'moral high ground' and tackle injustices and grievances both here and abroad.²¹¹ In the long term, *Prevent* allows local authorities and the police to build bridges with communities, and to develop capabilities to protect them from extremism.²¹²

2.8 The implications of innovation: Tensions within CONTEST and Prevent

The inclusion of *Prevent* has caused tensions within the CONTEST strategy. These tensions appear at a number of different levels such as the interdepartmental/inter-institutional level, between *Prevent* and *Pursue*, and within *Prevent* itself. Tensions arise between the performance-orientated facets of policy and the facets which encourage the breakdown of segment boundaries in pursuit of public service improvement.²¹³ Tensions also arise between national and local priorities about how

²⁰⁷ Schelling (n 25) 5

²⁰⁸ Home Affairs Select Committee, 'Project CONTEST: The Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy' (HC 212 of 2008-09, HMSO 2009) 10

²⁰⁹ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 158)

²¹⁰ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 101) 91

²¹¹ Briggs, 'Community engagement for counterterrorism' (n 157) 973

²¹² Garry Hindle, 'Policing Terrorism in the UK' (2007) 1 Policing 38, 39

²¹³ Graeme Currie and Olga Suhomlinova, 'The Impact of Institutional Forces Upon Knowledge Sharing in the UK NHS: The Triumph of Professional Power and the Inconsistency of Policy' (2006) 84 Public Administration 1, 22

much discretion local authorities should be given.²¹⁴ Tensions within CONTEST are not limited to inter-institutional antagonisms, and have arisen between policymakers, senior management, and frontline staff. ‘The policy delivered ... is most often immediate and personal’,²¹⁵ but there are many different stages which are usually ‘played out in arenas far removed from the daily life of neighbourhood residents’.²¹⁶ Policy process is fluid and traverses a set of stages. Any policy must be conceived, agendas set, and alternatives excluded, before it can be accepted by senior management and implemented by frontline staff.²¹⁷ And there is always the impact of the policy to consider. There is no simple top-down effect, and intentions do not always have the desired outcomes.²¹⁸

The role of counterterrorism policing is characterised and

based around complex and wider ranging special legislation which emphasizes intelligence-gathering and pre-emptive intervention in order to combat the anticipatory risk of terrorism. Special laws augment policing powers, alter criminal justice processes, institute loosely worded criminal offences, and offer administrative alternatives to criminal justice, such as detention without trial and control orders.²¹⁹

This style of policing undermines the perception of legitimacy of the police and other state authorities due to its lack of transparency, accountability, and, at times, disregard of human rights.²²⁰ Policing style affects community response. For example, communities with high social bonding capital, which is prominent in many Muslim communities, respond negatively to *Pursue*-style policing.²²¹ Not only does this style of policing undermine the perception of legitimacy, it has a negative effect on these communities’ relationship with the wider society, affecting integration and cohesion work. The lack of community engagement negatively affects neighbourhood policing and intelligence operations, and impairs the ability to gather local intelligence.²²²

²¹⁴ Josie Brooks, ‘Labour’s Modernization of Local Government’ (2000) 78 *Public Administration* 593

²¹⁵ Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* (Russell Sage 1980) 8

²¹⁶ Lipsky (n 215)

²¹⁷ John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Longman Classics Edition)* (2nd edn, Longman 2002)

²¹⁸ Adam Crawford, ‘Making Strategic Choices in Developing a Research Design’ (2010)

²¹⁹ Walker and Rehman (n 170) 254

²²⁰ David Bayley and David Weisburd, ‘Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counterterrorism’ in David Bayley and others (eds), *To Protect and To Serve* (Springer New York 2011)

²²¹ James Hawdon, ‘Legitimacy, Trust, Social Capital, and Policing Styles A Theoretical Statement’ (2008) 11 *Police Quarterly* 182

²²² Hickman and others (n 110)

According to a House of Commons Select Committee report, prior to the *Review*, there is logic behind combining *Pursue* and *Prevent* into one strategy. However, ‘the current breadth of focus of *Prevent* – from community work to crime prevention – sits uncomfortably within a counterterrorism strategy’.²²³ This recommendation was accepted by the *Review*, which separated community cohesion from counterterrorism. Traditional pursuit tactics alone are no longer appropriate when dealing with extremism which may be embedded within local communities. The support of Muslim communities is vital to the overall success of CONTEST. There is pressure from the government to bring about the organisational changes needed to integrate *Prevent* into neighbourhood policing and local authority approaches to crime prevention.²²⁴

Local crime prevention partnerships have existed for some time.²²⁵ A similar approach is needed if *Prevent* is to be successful. Social institutions such as the police ‘mould and constrain the actions and attitudes of individuals that constitute them’.²²⁶ Sampson et al. note that the police are often enthusiastic proponents of the multi-agency approach, but prefer to set the agenda and dominate forum meetings, ignoring the multi-agency framework when it suits them.²²⁷ Masculine action-orientated roles, such as chasing criminals, are given priority over prevention. Such attitudes may affect inter-agency collaboration efforts, particularly on sensitive issues such as counterterrorism.²²⁸ This is reflected by Sir Norman Bettison: ‘I am very clear that if *Prevent* were left to the Police it would fail ... because the police have got to undertake the full gamut of the four Ps.’²²⁹ The blurring of the boundaries between *Pursue* and *Prevent* gives the impression that all community work within Muslim communities is linked to counterterrorism objectives, and ‘there is always the potential for those different responsibilities to be confused’.²³⁰

The aims of *Pursue* and *Prevent* represent another source of potential conflict.

²²³ Communities and Local Government Select Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10’ (HMSO 2010) 3

²²⁴ Home Office, ‘From Neighbourhood to National’ (HMSO 2008) 24

²²⁵ Nick Tilley and Ross Homel (eds), ‘Developmental Crime Prevention’ in *Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety* (Willan 2005)

²²⁶ Adam Crawford, *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships* (Oxford University Press 1997) 95

²²⁷ Alice Sampson and others, ‘Crime, Localities and the Multi-Agency Approach’ (1988) 28 *British Journal of Criminology* 478, 491

²²⁸ Crawford, *The Local Governance of Crime* (n 226) 134

²²⁹ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 223) 53

²³⁰ *ibid*

Given the dependence of democracies upon the mobilization of the masses, both at the political and the practical levels, care must be taken to avoid alienating the public by counter-terrorism measures that appear disproportionate or senseless.²³¹

Public perception is that counterterrorism measures focus almost exclusively on Muslim communities, which are often already stigmatised.²³² *Prevent* work depends on these communities.²³³

There is a demand that the rules be legitimate, not only in emanating from established authorities, but also in the manner of their formulation, in the way they are applied, and in their fidelity to agreed-upon institutional purposes ... [The] obligation to obey has some relation to the quality of the rules and the integrity of their administration.²³⁴

Prevent is based on voluntary community participation, which is more reliable than coerced cooperation and does not depend on the authorities' effective application of incentives or sanctions.²³⁵ Counterterrorism policing must ensure that police and government actions do not undermine *Prevent's* legitimacy because it depends on community engagement and participation.²³⁶

Conflicts exist within *Prevent*. There are politicians and policymakers who believe that the state should not engage with those who hold extreme views which oppose British values.

If we leave the field clear to extremists, without engagement at all we embolden them and undermine our own objectives. With groups that call for or support terrorist acts ... there is no room whatsoever for debate, only vociferous opposition. ... Those extremist groups that engage in democracy ... are doing so for political tactic.²³⁷

Blears' view is shared by many across the political spectrum including Prime Minister Cameron.²³⁸ Others argue that it is precisely these groups that need to be engaged because they often offer the best antidotes to Al Qaeda inspired propaganda.²³⁹ This debate further erodes the rights of the already economically deprived Muslim communities because the press and the state scrutinise their actions.

²³¹ Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (n 59) 1147

²³² Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 223) 10

²³³ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 158)

²³⁴ Philip Selznick, *Law, Society and Industrial Justice* (Transaction Publishers 1969) 29

²³⁵ Tom Tyler, 'Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation' (2001) 81 *Boston University Law Review* 361

²³⁶ Tyler, 'Enhancing Police Legitimacy' (n 51) 84

²³⁷ Hazel Blears, 'We Must Engage with Extremists' (*the Guardian*, 2009) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/25/extremism-islam>> accessed 19 May 2011

²³⁸ David Cameron, 'PM's Speech at Munich Security Conference' (*Downing Street 10*, 2011) <<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/>> accessed 19 May 2012

²³⁹ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 223) 84

These communities are the new folk devils, the enemy within,²⁴⁰ and at times are excluded from mainstream society.

Collective identities are defined negatively; that is to say against others. We recognize ourselves as *us* because *we* are different from *them*. ... Collective identities are based not on what their members have in common – they may have very little in common except not being the *others*.²⁴¹

Patterson argues that most people choose to belong to a certain group: ‘It is a choice predicated on the strongly held, intensely conceived belief that the individual has absolutely no choice but to belong to that specific group.’²⁴²

Alienating Muslim communities leads to heightened identification with the wider Muslim community in Britain and abroad. The plight of Muslim communities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan becomes the plight of the collective Muslim identity, the Ummah.²⁴³ At the same time it becomes harder for Muslim communities to see themselves as British because they are portrayed as outsiders by the media.²⁴⁴ ‘Whether *responsible* Muslims are the same thing as politically or religiously *moderate* Muslims is an on-going tension within *Prevent*.’²⁴⁵ CONTEST homogenises Muslim communities, despite all of the ethnic and religious divisions which exist within them.²⁴⁶ Greer sees such views as a stumbling block.²⁴⁷ These perceptions strengthen the collective Muslim identity and lead to the exclusion of Muslims, which is at times self-imposed, from the mainstream.²⁴⁸ Media coverage and the occasional encounter with the police serve as constant reminders of Muslim identity, leading to marginalisation, the loss of trust in public institutions, and an unwillingness to engage with the police and authorities.²⁴⁹ This reinforces the false

²⁴⁰ Liz Fekete, ‘Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State’ (2004) 46 *Race & Class* 3

²⁴¹ Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Identify Politics and the Left’ (1996) 217 *New Left Review* 38, 41

²⁴² Orlando Patterson, ‘Implications of Ethnic Identification’ in Charles Fried and Ann Dummett (eds), *Minorities: community and identity : report of the Dahlem Workshop on Minorities : Community and Identity, Berlin 1982, Nov 28-Dec 3* (Springer-Verlag 1983) 28

²⁴³ Derek McGee, *The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights* (Open University Press 2008)

²⁴⁴ Timothy Ash, ‘What Young British Muslims Say Can Be Shocking - Some of It is Also True’ (*the Guardian*, 2006) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/aug/10/comment.race>> accessed 25 January 2010

²⁴⁵ Paul Thomas, *Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism - Failing to Prevent* (Bloomsbury 2012) 79

²⁴⁶ HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 1)

²⁴⁷ Steven Greer, ‘Human Rights and the Struggle Against Terrorism in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 2 *European Human Rights Law Review* 163, 169

²⁴⁸ Thiel (n 199)

²⁴⁹ Briggs and others (n 165) 31

notion that one's identity must come first because collective identities are social constructions.²⁵⁰

Despite its importance, *Prevent's* budget is meagre compared to the other three Ps. However, funds are needed to protect the national infrastructure and to conduct difficult and lengthy investigations.

In the overall scheme of public spending and even within CONTEST itself, *Prevent* is relatively small beer. Nevertheless it is enormously sensitive and important politically, and this is why it deserves close attention ...²⁵¹

Kundnani believes that *Prevent* is simply another tool used to alienate Muslim communities. He views it as an ideological tool, used to win the hearts and minds of these communities with the help of pro-government Muslim organisations, rather than a tool to prevent extremism.²⁵² 'The push for Britishness causes alienation. We become the *other*. We need to be studied, managed, and contained. Every conference we go to on *Prevent* frames things this way.'²⁵³ Some studies find merit in this view.²⁵⁴ However, Kundnani's sample size is inadequate to objectively cover both sides of the argument. He focuses on dissenting voices and overgeneralises his findings. Despite its flaws, *Prevent* is a step forward because it aims to tackle extremism. Issues with community identities remain unaddressed, while local authorities' knowledge of their local communities is patchy at best.²⁵⁵ Community engagement is central to an effective counterterrorism strategy. Sustaining an effective response is impossible without the trust and partnership of the affected Muslim communities.²⁵⁶ Although budget cuts were predictable, with the coalition government consequently reshaping a number of aspects within *Prevent*, local authority and community partnerships remain essential tenets of the UK's counterterrorism strategy.

²⁵⁰ Hobsbawn (n 241) 41

²⁵¹ Yahya Birt, 'Promoting Virulent Envy? Reconsidering the UK's Terrorist Prevention Strategy' (2009) 154 *Royal United Service Institute* 52, 52

²⁵² Kundnani (n 181)

²⁵³ *ibid*

²⁵⁴ Basia Spalek and others, 'Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination' (University of Birmingham 2009)

²⁵⁵ Rachel Briggs, '7 July Bombings Five Years on: Is There Still a Role for Communities in Tackling Terrorism?' (*Royal United Services Institute*, no date) <<http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C4C331519B8C90>> accessed 25 July 2010

²⁵⁶ Briggs, 'Community engagement for counterterrorism' (n 157) 976

2.9 Conclusion

Successful strategies must go beyond military and/or criminal justice solutions and include legal, political, economic, and ideological dimensions. Such strategies address the complexity of the problem and acknowledge that casting terrorists as the personification of evil is often counterproductive.²⁵⁷ Garnett argues that any strategy should have two-tiers, one to deal with the rational level of the actors and the other to deal with the actors in all their complexities.²⁵⁸ Neither the war nor the extended criminal justice model has been successful in stopping radicalisation, and there remains the ever-present threat of terrorism. The ‘war on terror’ has particularly alienated Muslim communities worldwide, increasing the potential for terrorist recruitment. Many of these movements, Burke argues, are ‘rooted in social, economic and political contingencies’.²⁵⁹ There must be an acknowledgement that war and criminal justice approaches are simply not enough to defeat terrorism. Any terrorist organisation and its associated ideology which has anchored itself in society, claiming to correct prevailing grievances, will not just wither away because of harsh criminal measures or reforms. Ignoring real or perceived grievances achieves little. Rather, institutional responses should place a high priority on communication in order to counteract prevailing extremist ideologies so that the state is able to fulfil one of its primary functions, namely that of generating a reasonable degree of security.²⁶⁰

CONTEST attempts to combine the reactive aspects of the criminal justice model with prevention, within criminal justice itself and beyond. It is innovative precisely because it draws together all aspects related to counterterrorism, streamlining these aspects into one policy. Unlike the ‘war on terror’, which focuses on risk elimination, CONTEST focuses on managing down the risk. CONTEST is about ‘promoting the values on which this society depends, whichever government is in power, and there is more about that than counter-terrorism ... it can so easily get lost in the wash’.²⁶¹

The inclusion of *Prevent* has led to tensions between the different organisations involved. ‘Coordination across government ... is very difficult to achieve’,²⁶² and a

²⁵⁷ Edward Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Palgrave Macmillan 2001) 85

²⁵⁸ Garnett (n 156)

²⁵⁹ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story Of Radical Islam* (IB Tauris 2007) XXV

²⁶⁰ Kundnani (n 181)

²⁶¹ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 223) 10

²⁶² *ibid* 19

number of tensions relating to policy process, organisations, communities, and authorities have been identified.

A fundamental flaw of *Prevent* was that it never maintained a clean separation between counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism, and that as a consequence, it became to be regarded as an instrument for ‘spying’ on Muslim communities.²⁶³

The coalition government has attempted to remove this flaw by separating community cohesion from counterterrorism prevention. Only time will tell if this will be successful. Several studies suggest that there are tensions between the delivery of *Pursue* and *Prevent* and the impact they have on Muslim communities. These studies suggest that certain actions taken within *Pursue* and *Prevent* undermine the confidence of Muslim communities and their perception of legitimacy.²⁶⁴ Other studies suggest that the opposite is true and that *Prevent* has increased levels of trust towards the police in Muslim communities.²⁶⁵ Further research is needed to examine the impact of national and local tensions on *Prevent* delivery. Despite these tensions, CONTEST should be seen as a leap forward because it is much more holistic than previous approaches. The *Prevent Review* shows that the coalition government remains committed to the ideas of *Prevent*, acknowledging it as a long-term solution, rather than a short-term fix.

²⁶³ Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America* (Bipartisan Policy Center 2011) 22

²⁶⁴ Suraj Lakhani, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities’ (2012) 51 *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 190

²⁶⁵ Martin Innes and others, ‘Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (UPSI 2011)

Chapter 3: Key concepts and tensions which affect CONTEST and *Prevent*

3.1 Introduction

There are key concepts which underpin and affect CONTEST, and in particular *Prevent* and *Pursue*. Terrorism, policing, prevention, and communities are examined in this chapter. Most articles and books about terrorism start by defining it; this chapter is no different. The chapter then examines how social, political, and legal constructions of terrorism have shaped British counterterrorism legislation and policy. CONTEST policy plays an important role in re-enforcing the social construction of terrorism, and acts as an agent to legitimise the government's response to jihadi terrorism. The legal construction is important because it provides CONTEST with a framework in which the police and other agencies can act to combat terrorism. This chapter argues that terrorism's framework is not abstract, and that it is the law through its agents which has a real impact on the 'lived realities' of Muslim communities in the UK. The second concept is policing which is vital to *Pursue*. Police and policing are not synonymous. Policing is much broader, and this chapter examines its different aspects. How communities are policed affects their perceptions of legitimacy and procedural fairness, and influences the trust placed in government authorities. *Prevent* relies on the help of local Muslim communities to tackle violent extremism. This chapter argues that because of low levels of trust in the police and other state authorities, it becomes much harder to successfully deliver *Prevent*. This chapter then examines the concept of prevention and what it is. There are various approaches to prevention. Currently, the police and CONTEST rely mainly on secondary prevention, which targets at-risk groups and individuals. This can be problematic because it singles out communities and essentially labels them as the 'other'. It is also important to look at the concept of communities. This discussion focuses on the construction of Muslim communities in Britain and the effects that CONTEST has on them. Finally, the chapter discusses the tensions which arise between policing, prevention, and communities, and how these affect *Prevent* and *Pursue*.

3.2 Terrorism and extremism: Political, legal, and social constructions

People assume an intuitive understanding of what terrorism is. However, many lack a

concrete, precise, and explanatory definition of the term 'terrorism'.¹ Although terrorism, just like crime, may appear to be a natural class of human action and behaviour, this is an artificial categorisation. Terrorism, as crime, is a social, political, and legal construction. Therefore, the concept of terrorism is constructed from the cultural, social, and political context. If the context changes so does its definition. This means that terrorism is a value-laden concept with multiple meanings based on the dominant social, cultural, and political values of society.² The concept of terrorism is shaped by public perceptions, its representation in the media, and government policy, all of which reinforce or reshape cultural norms and perceptions, which in turn influence social culture and the perceived risks to its norms and values. To better understand the tensions within CONTEST, and between *Prevent*, *Pursue*, and Muslim communities, it is imperative to establish how the UK government frames terrorism and why this is important.

The phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' crops up in most debates about terrorism.³ It highlights the banality of the concept, relying on the perception and construction of the context and the individual's relationship with it rather than the actual event in question.

Alexander the Great ... asked him: 'How dare you molest the sea?' 'How dare you molest the whole world?' The pirate replied, 'Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you doing it with a great navy are called an emperor.'⁴

St Augustine's tale illustrates the dichotomy which exists while accentuating that it is ultimately the more powerful who are able to brand the actions of the less powerful as criminal or terrorist. Through a hegemonic process, the media feeds the dominant frame of what terrorism is to the public, who tacitly agree to the categorisation, acting as if it actually exists.⁵ Such frames create a new reality, a reality which is constructed rather than natural, and a reality which can be reshaped. Thus, differentiating between criminal and terrorist behaviour is an artificial differentiation

¹ Pippa Norris and others (eds), *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public* (Routledge 2003) 5

² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press 2006)

³ Alex Schmid and A Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature* (Transaction Publishers 2005)

⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Pirates and Emperors, Old and New: International Terrorism in the Real World* (South End Press 2003) VII

⁵ Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (Penguin 2003) 20

determined by a certain degree of perspectivation.⁶ Searle sees such objects as ontologically subjective though epistemologically objective.⁷ To some degree a line can be drawn between the social, political, and legal construction of any given subject. To assume, however, that these are completely auto-poetic and can be divorced from each other is a false assumption because each influences, and is influenced by, the other.

Social construction does not just refer to things, kinds, and facts but also to our beliefs about them. Acknowledging that terrorism is a social construction allows one to expose the way in which social forces shape beliefs about this concept and about the type of people who engage in this type of behaviour.⁸

A frame gives to an object its place in space and separates it at the same time from its environment. ... A frame thus gives structure to both an object and the way the object is perceived.⁹

Where the frames are placed is critical because their boundaries define and shape what is and is not acceptable. Further, these frames can become powerful symbols to identify with and share for social purposes.¹⁰ Because of their manufactured nature, frames are subject to change over time and context. 'Reality' is shaped by man's conception of certain actions, objects, and theories which give meaning to, and formulate, our experiences.¹¹ These social constructions and frames draw on the Durkheimian notion of the collective conscience and the assumptions that all members of society share common morals, values, and, more importantly, cultural knowledge.¹² There is the additional assumption that differences can be reconciled through legitimate and institutional means. 'Consensual views of society represent society as if there were no major cultural or economic breaks, no major conflicts of interest between classes and groups.'¹³ These frames generally reinforce social rule and the 'elite consensus'. The elite generally dominate the 'marketplace of ideas' and

⁶ José Sanders and Gisela Redeker, 'Perspectives and the Representation of Speech and Thought in Narrative Discourse' in Gilles Fauconnier and Eve Sweetser (eds), *Spaces, Worlds, and Grammar* (University of Chicago Press 1996) 290

⁷ John Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New Ed, Penguin 1996) 63

⁸ Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Harvard University Press 2000)

⁹ Titus Ensink and Christoph Sauer, *Framing and Perspectivising in Discourse* (John Benjamins Publishing 2003) 3

¹⁰ Charikleia Kapellidi, 'Framing and Perspectivizing in Discourse' (2008) 40 *Journal of Pragmatics* 577

¹¹ Richard Quinney, *The Social Reality of Crime* (Transaction Publishers 2001) 4

¹² Steve Fenton, *Durkheim and Modern Sociology* (Cambridge University Press 1984)

¹³ Stuart Hall and others, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (Palgrave Macmillan 1978) 55

are therefore in the position of shaping and reshaping political and social realities as they perceive them. Freedom of opinion often gives way to the hidden forces of the 'free market', which can be as powerful as the hand of the state.¹⁴ The role of the media is critical in shaping social realities.¹⁵ Koch writes that journalists in need of sources often rely on official sources and therefore function as tools to legitimise the views of the 'elite consensus'.¹⁶ To a certain extent, the role of the media has been challenged by the Internet, which empowers the less affluent and powerless within society.¹⁷ The Internet has also allowed those engaged in terrorism and criminal activities to publish and disseminate their message to the public.¹⁸ An in-depth examination is, however, outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice to say, both the media and Internet have the power to disseminate, distribute, and shape frames on a national and international scale. The symbols which are created inspire and give meaning to activities whether individual or collective. These activities can then be utilised as rallying points by government, the media, and social and community groups and/or individuals, giving meaning to new or established frames.¹⁹

The dichotomy of the freedom fighter shows that there is no consensual view and that obtaining one is nearly impossible. To quote Tucker: 'Above the gates of hell is the warning that all that enter should abandon hope. Less dire but to the same effect is the warning given to those who try to define terrorism.'²⁰ Counterterrorism policies are based on the social and legal constructions of terrorism, which, as mentioned, contain a certain amount of bias towards the dominant social culture. Glossing over this and imposing a one-size-fits-all approach may cause tension when implementing such policies. By relying on certain frames and symbols, it is possible to construct terrorism and make it appear black and white. Such frames were frequently used by the Bush administration, promoting an 'us versus them' approach

¹⁴ Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power* (Basic Books 1986) 55

¹⁵ Michael Gurevitch and Mark Levy (eds), *Mass Communication Review Yearbook* (Sage 1985) 19

¹⁶ Tom Koch, *The News as Myth: Fact and Context in Journalism* (Greenwood Press 1990) 110

¹⁷ Bharat Mehra and others, 'The Internet for Empowerment of Minority and Marginalized Users' (2004) 6 *New Media & Society* 781, 781

¹⁸ Timothy Thomas, 'Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of "Cyberplanning"' (2003) 33 *Parameters* 112

¹⁹ Robert Wuthnow and others, *Cultural Analysis: The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas* (Routledge 1984) 37

²⁰ David Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism* (Praeger 1997) 51

and creating the misconception that there are no grey areas.²¹ Such constructed ‘realities’ can reinforce the government’s message, providing a convenient excuse to blame ‘undesirable’ groups in a time of crisis,²² such as the marginalised, ethnic minorities, youths, or immigrants. In the case of terrorism, there is a danger that the ‘usual suspects’, Asians and particularly Muslim youths, are labelled extremists or even terrorists because of their ethnicity and faith.²³

The qualities of terrorism are determined by cultural, social, and political context and a perception about the identity of the perpetrators. Although the notion of terrorism appears black and white to many, the term remains highly subjective and has aggressive connotations.²⁴ The connotations constitute a ‘value judgment about the perpetrator of the alleged act and about the circumstances of their actions’.²⁵ To ‘identify someone as a terrorist is to render judgment on them, not simply to make a discovery’.²⁶ This social and political construction has a real impact on people’s perceptions about certain individuals, religions, and communities, and influences their ‘lived reality’.²⁷ Labelling a certain action or actor as terrorist carries strong normative overtones; the construction of such a reality is also an intensely political contest.²⁸ These social and political forces also impact the legal construction of the same concept. The rule of law has the power to influence and shape the lived reality of individuals and communities who are perceived to be involved in terrorist-related activities. Communities and individuals experience this through the intrusion of state agencies into their communal and private spheres.

The social and legal aspects are hard to divorce from each other. Although they influence each other, they are also auto-poetic. As Smart points out, the power of the law depends on the capacity of the legal discourse to construct itself and generate

²¹ The Situationist, ‘The Bush Frame: Us Vs. Them; Good Vs. Evil; Intentions Vs. Consequences’ (2009) <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2009/01/16/the-bush-frame-us-vs-them-good-vs-evil-intentions-vs-consequences/>> accessed 12 December 2010

²² Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (Verso Books 2000)

²³ Clive Walker, ‘The Legal Definition of “Terrorism” in United Kingdom Law and Beyond’ [2007] Public Law 331, 332

²⁴ Daniel Filler, ‘Terrorism, Panic and Pedophilia’ (2003) 10 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 345, 345

²⁵ Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (Macmillan 1974) 24

²⁶ Claudia Card, ‘Making War on Terrorism in Response to 9/11’ in James Sterba (ed), *Terrorism and International Justice* (Oxford University Press 2003) 178

²⁷ Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Anchor 1967)

²⁸ Norris and others (n 1)

'truths' which are impervious to critical scrutiny from other perspectives.²⁹ This holds true with social and political constructions also. Although the law may be able to solve legal matters, it is not well placed to deal with the issues which arise in the social, cultural, political, or economic spheres. A contested legal construction, for example, may create more problems within the social and political realm than it solves. This does not, however, influence the drip effect of public opinion into a legal construction and the reinforcement of social constructions through the law, particularly as the law and policy affect real communities and individuals.

3.3 Shaping terrorism through law and policy

Framing terrorism, like crime, is therefore a process whereby perceptions are constructed, and criminal laws are enacted and then administered by the state.

As well as the specific legal controversies, there is a more deep-seated political problem inherent in the task of defining 'terrorism'. Powerful polities have long sought to exercise hegemonic control over the depiction of emergencies.³⁰

The law is a tool used by polities to qualify and categorise certain behaviour as acts of terrorism or crime, and to affect behaviour in relation to these definitions.³¹ In some sense, this process strengthens the legitimacy and authority of the state, allowing it to establish official policies in the name of the common good.³² The framing of terrorism is linked with the imperative of legitimising the authority of the state, and this 'construction is typically adopted discursively by the state to represent threats against its sovereignty'.³³ Legislation frames the issues, whereas government policies ensure that these frames are interpreted, shaped, and administered. These issues are different but interrelated. As St Paul asserted two thousand years ago: 'I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.'³⁴ Although the concept of terrorism may already exist as a social concept, it is the law which enables the government to develop policies and react to the perceived threats against society and the state. The law formalises and institutionalises terrorism and crime, thereby shaping and associating certain types of

²⁹ Carol Smart, *Feminism and the Power of Law* (Routledge 1989)

³⁰ Walker, 'The Legal Definition of "Terrorism" in United Kingdom Law and Beyond' (n 23) 332

³¹ Norris and others (n 1) XV

³² Quinney (n 11)


³³ Annamarie Oliverio, *The State of Terror* (State University of New York 1998) 27

³⁴ Romans 7:7 (King James Bible, 1769)

behaviour with them.³⁵ Figure 3.1, illustrates the intricacies of how terrorism and extremism is shaped and framed by society, the media, and government institutions.

Figure 3.1

Framing and shaping terrorism and extremism



Source: Graph generated by author

Once legally defined, the consequences become real. Special powers are bestowed upon government agencies such as the police and other criminal justice professionals. Stigmatisation and the use of these powers affect the lives of those at the receiving end of the new policies.³⁶ Rather than separating legal and social constructionism, it is important to acknowledge that the legal construction of any given concept harnesses social forces, which in turn help shape the legal construction and public policy. In a sense, the law reinforces and legitimises the public's perception of terrorism. As Figure 3.1 shows, government agendas, policy, and the law are influenced by public opinion and the dominant social culture. Policy and legislation reinforced through social perceptions and by the media gradually shape/reshape public perceptions of issues through the 'marketplace of ideas', which

³⁵ Jerome Michael and Mortimer Jerome Adler, *Crime, Law and Social Science* (K Paul, Trench, Trubner & co ltd 1933)

³⁶ Quinney (n 11)

generally rely on an ‘elite consensus’.³⁷

This thesis is particularly interested in how British legislation and policy shapes terrorism. How terrorism is framed differs from country to country. The official definition is outlined in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which states:

(1) Terrorism means the use or threat of action where ... (b) the use of threat is designed to influence the government or an international organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing political, religious, racial or ideological cause. (2) Actions falls within this subsection if it – (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system.

This broad definition is subject to legal interpretation and underpins the CONTEST strategy. Interpretation takes place within a particular legal context and in relation to the criminal law, which is also a product of political and social engineering and has relevance to law enforcement.³⁸ The Act acknowledges the commonly held belief that terrorism is ‘the deliberate creation of fear, usually through the use (or threat of use) of symbolic acts of violence, to influence the political behaviour of target groups’.³⁹ Political motivation is the dividing line between criminality and terrorism. This line, however, is vague.⁴⁰ Walker writes that

the core is violence, and terrorism involves violence of a kind which causes terror. ... The second aspect is purpose – that a political end is in sight and that can be facilitated through instilling terror.⁴¹

With such a broad definition capturing such a wide range of political activities, the immediate danger is that ‘new security measures will find wider application against ordinary criminals who pose a far less serious threat’.⁴² Because of the perceived nature of terrorism, numerous other Acts qualify other terrorist-related behaviour as criminal, providing the criminal justice agencies with powers to tackle it. This, as Reiner points out, also shapes practices of punishment with precursory offences often carrying ‘draconian’ sentences.⁴³

³⁷ Ginsberg (n 14)

³⁸ Mike Maguire and others (eds), ‘Legal Construction of Crime’ in *The Oxford Handbook Of Criminology* (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2007)

³⁹ Peter Neumann, *Old and New Terrorism* (Polity 2009) 25

⁴⁰ Bruce Hoffman, ‘Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?’ [1999] *Foreign Policy* 62, 23

⁴¹ Walker, ‘The Legal Definition of “Terrorism” in United Kingdom Law and Beyond’ (n 23) 334

⁴² William Stuntz, ‘Local Policing After the Terror’ (2002) 111 *The Yale Law Journal* 2137, 2157

⁴³ Tim Newburn and others (eds), ‘Beyond Risk: A Lament for a Social Democratic Criminology’ in

Nevertheless, the definition is vague. Acts of civil disobedience, for example, could technically qualify as acts of terrorism. There should, however, be a clear difference between these two very different acts. Violent actions by student protesters in the winter of 2010 could be considered acts of terrorism under the provided definition, although no one would describe them as such; rather, they are seen as criminal actions by both the media and politicians alike.⁴⁴ Paradoxically, although certain actions fall within the official definition of terrorism, they may not be perceived as such. Government policy refines and further qualifies when certain behaviour is linked to terrorism or criminality.

The definition found in the Terrorism Act 2000 lists numerous terrorist offences and provides enhanced powers to the police, security services, and other government agencies. It also provides the legal framework for CONTEST. Moreover, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and CONTEST shape the threat of terrorism because these documents further determine context and what threat is included in the national strategy. One notable example is the reshaping of the CBRN threat in the coalition government's NSS, which has been replaced with the threat of cyberterrorism.⁴⁵ CONTEST, for example, remains relatively silent on the issues of Irish terrorism. The coalition government acknowledges a resurgence of Irish terrorism in its NSS but glosses over this in CONTEST, which remains solely focused on jihadi terrorism.⁴⁶ Dominant societal perceptions about jihadi terrorism are reflected in CONTEST and *Prevent*. This suggests that terrorism has not only fundamentally changed in the last decade or so but that a new form has emerged. This new form of terrorism is cast as international or jihadi terrorism motivated by radical versions of Islam.⁴⁷ According to Furedi, such perceptions are commonplace not only amongst policymakers but also among the public.⁴⁸ The CONTEST agenda relies on the perception that the current scale of religiously motivated terrorism is unprecedented in militancy and activism, and is indicative of the perception that

The Politics of Crime Control: Essays in Honour of David Downes (Oxford University Press 2009)

⁴⁴ Esther Addley, 'Student Fees Protests: Who Started the Violence?', *The Guardian* (London, 12 October 2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/dec/10/student-protests-tuition-fees-violence>> accessed 12 November 2010

⁴⁵ HM Government, 'A Stronger Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' (HMSO 2010); Cabinet Office, 'The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom' (HMSO 2008)

⁴⁶ Home Office, 'Our Response to the Terrorist Threat' (2010) <<http://homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/speeches/terrorist-response>> accessed 11 December 2010

⁴⁷ See: Chapter 3.4

⁴⁸ Frank Furedi, *Invitation to Terror: Expanding the Empire of the Unknown* (Continuum 2007)

communities and their respective faiths, currently Islam, are at a critical juncture.⁴⁹ CONTEST, and particularly *Prevent*, assumes that Muslim communities provide violent extremists with the fertile ground needed to spread their seeds. Hence, *Prevent* aims to work with these communities to combat the spread of such ideologies and discontent. Rhetoric within CONTEST portrays terrorists as criminals who are ‘intent on inflicting mass casualties without warning, motivated by a violent extremist ideology’. Such rhetoric is based on selective interpretations of Islam.⁵⁰ The impression CONTEST gives, therefore, is still one of them versus us, with very little middle ground.

We will also continue to challenge views which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardize community cohesion.⁵¹

According to Stohl, such views are misconceived because they reinforce the stereotypical image of a terrorist.⁵²

In sum, the context and frames given to specific actions shape the definition of terrorism. These frames are in turn shaped by cultural and social norms which feed into public opinion, government agendas, policy, and the rule of law. At the same time, these frames rely on powerful symbols such as 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings, confirming, shaping, and reinforcing the stereotypical image of a terrorist – the jihadi terrorist. These stereotypes become difficult to challenge because CONTEST and the associated discourses perpetuate the notion that Islam, and by implication Muslim communities in the UK,⁵³ are linked to extremism and terrorism. This may have a negative impact on these communities and may even lead to individuals internalising these labels and identifying with extremism according to expectation. The way in which the general public perceives these communities is also affected. As Becker points out, deviance, in this case terrorism, is not a product of bad behaviour per se; rather, deviant behaviour is shaped by society. This means the rules are not universally shared, and change with time and context.⁵⁴ Labelling has less to do with

⁴⁹ Magnus Ranstrop, ‘Terrorism in the Name of Religion’ (1996) 50 *Journal of International Affairs* 41

⁵⁰ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (HMSO 2009)

⁵¹ *ibid* 87

⁵² Michael Stohl, ‘Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism’ (2008) 1 *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5

⁵³ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50)

⁵⁴ Howard Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (Free Press 1963)

culture than the enforcement of a hegemonic discourse.⁵⁵ Terrorism – or deviance – is, as Simmons argues, literally in the eye of the beholder, and this is often forgotten.⁵⁶ The artificial line between terrorism and criminality is drawn because it goes beyond the accepted norms of social and political agitation within society and its symbolic nature.⁵⁷

3.4 The CONTEST frame – terrorism

CONTEST provides a narrow summary of the history of ‘international terrorism’⁵⁸ and is influential in constructing narratives around terrorism. The term ‘international terrorism’ gives the impression that those engaged in this type of activity operate on an international scale. The boundaries between local and international have become diffused and conceal the fact that many terrorist-related activities in Britain, such as the 7/7 bombing, are carried out by locals. Using international as a prefix distances oneself from national and local problems and shifts the blame. This may result in ignorance of unresolved perceived and real grievances linked to cultural and social issues within British society. The term is political and deflects attention away from Islam while ignoring the fact that the terrorism addressed by CONTEST is fuelled by radical versions of Islam, something which is acknowledged in *Prevent*.⁵⁹ For these reasons, this thesis refers to international terrorism as jihadi terrorism. A speech of the Home Secretary made numerous references to jihadi terrorism, Al Qaeda, and extremism, yet the link to Islam was only implicit.⁶⁰ Most people reading CONTEST or listening to the Home Secretary would have understood the implicit message, relying on existing values, attitudes, and old frames.⁶¹

Frames serve multiple functions for different actors. Political leaders can respond to events and communicate policy priorities simply and effectively by adopting pre-dominant cultural frames to streamline and simplify their message.⁶²

The message is clear despite its concealment in politically correct jargon: Islamic and

⁵⁵ Marta Bolognani, *Crime and Muslim Britain: Race, Culture and the Politics of Criminology Among British Pakistanis* (I B Tauris & Co Ltd 2009)

⁵⁶ Jerry Simmons, *Deviants* (University of California 1969)

⁵⁷ Harry Eckstein and Thomas Thornton (eds), ‘Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation’ in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (Free Press 1964)

⁵⁸ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50)

⁵⁹ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (HMSO 2011)

⁶⁰ Home Office (n 46)

⁶¹ Adam Briggs and Paul Cobley, *The Media: An Introduction* (Pearson Education 2002) 2

⁶² Norris and others (n 1) 5

Muslim communities in Britain are linked to terrorism. An additional reason for referring to jihadi terrorism is because this thesis focuses on *Prevent*, which is mainly based on Islamic extremism and Muslim communities in Britain.⁶³ Though not the only threat to Britain's national security, jihadi terrorism is, according to CONTEST, a major threat.⁶⁴

The roots of the contemporary Islamic movement and its associated ideologies can be traced back to the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah in the thirteenth century.⁶⁵ In contrast, CONTEST traces its origins only as far as the more modern writings of Sayyid Qutb, who it states 'was greatly influenced by the Indian-born Islamist thinker Abul-Ala al Madudi'.⁶⁶ CONTEST links jihadi terrorism to the rise of jihadi-inspired violence in Egypt in the 1980s, the rise of the PLO, and the Afghanistan conflict in the early 1980s. The 2011 version of CONTEST does not provide any such background.⁶⁷ The PLO is a movement based solely on the liberation of Palestine and which underwent a 'radical transformation, socially and institutionally, that turned it into an authentic Palestinian national organization'. It is not religiously motivated, and hardly fits the label of 'Islamist terror' as CONTEST suggests.⁶⁸ From the late 1970s onwards, the PLO actually opposed Islamist groups, whom it viewed as serious political challengers.⁶⁹ Gunaratna links the emergence of the current wave of jihadi terrorism to

two landmark events – the Islamic revolution in Iran – and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan – both in 1979, marked the emergence of a contemporary wave of Islamist guerrilla and terrorist groups.⁷⁰

It is these politico-religious groups, especially Islamist groups, who now pose the single biggest threat. CONTEST treats Islamism as a monolithic movement which is

⁶³ HM Government, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery' (HMSO 2009)

⁶⁴ HM Government, 'A Stronger Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' (n 45)

⁶⁵ Zeyno Baran and Hussein Haqqani (eds), 'Understanding Hizb Ut-Tahir Ideology' in *The challenges of Hizb ut-Tahir: Deciphering and combating radical Islamist ideology - Conference Report* (Nixon Center 2004)

⁶⁶ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 50) 22

⁶⁷ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (HMSO 2011)

⁶⁸ Avrāhām Sela' and Moshe Ma'oz, *The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964-1994* (Palgrave MacMillan 1997)

⁶⁹ Glenn Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (John Wiley & Sons 1997) 136

⁷⁰ Rohan Gunaratna, 'The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda' (2003)
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-gunaratna.htm>
accessed 22 February 2011

dedicated to violence and terrorism. ‘Despite the global aspirations of the ideology, Islamists have no centre; there is no overall pan-Islamic leadership.’⁷¹ The jihadi movement is all but monolithic, and the use of violence is not as systematic as CONTEST suggests. Some Islamist groups do indeed resort to violence whereas others do not. Sayyid Qutb, a prominent Egyptian member of the Muslim Brotherhood who demanded the return to salafiyya, the revival of religious reforms based on the Koran which some argue incorporate certain aspects of Western modernity and Marxism,⁷² was tortured and executed under Nasser in 1966, and is seen as one of the most influential thinkers of the contemporary movement.⁷³ Co-existence with Western values was seen as undesirable.⁷⁴ The interpretation of his works has given the concept of jihad its modern meaning – waging war as an eternal armed struggle

against every obstacle that comes into the way of worshipping God and the implementation of the divine authority on earth ... and returning this authority to God and taking it away from rebellious usurpers.⁷⁵

Qutb's writings form part of the ideological foundation of Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic movements which have adopted his concept, although groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have been around since the late 1920s.⁷⁶ From the mid-1970s to the 1990s, Islamist groups attempted to islamise their own states, focusing on the ‘near enemy’. Following failed attempts in Egypt to establish an Islamic state, many of them migrated and joined the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Many of the Afghan veterans returned causing unrest, or engaged in activities in other conflict zones such as Algeria, Chechnya, and Bosnia.⁷⁷ According to CONTEST, their activities were no longer confined to the Middle East as the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the attempted attack on the Eiffel Tower in Paris in 1995 show.⁷⁸ But not all saw violence and terror as a means to their stated ends. Over recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has eschewed violence and is even attacked by Al Qaeda for

⁷¹ Michael Whine, ‘Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences’ (2001) 2 *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 54, 60

⁷² Malise Ruthven, *Islam in the World* (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2006); Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books 2004)

⁷³ Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy* (Cambridge University Press 2005)

⁷⁴ Norbert G Pressburg, *Good Bye Mohammed: Das Neue Bild Des Islam* (Lightning Source UK Ltd 2012)

⁷⁵ Sayed Qutb, *Milestones* (Islamic Book Service 2006)

⁷⁶ Mehdi Mozaffari, ‘What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept’ (2007) 8 *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 17

⁷⁷ Gerges (n 73)

⁷⁸ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50)

encouraging people to vote rather than taking part in jihad.⁷⁹ Other groups such as Hizb al-Tahir, an organisation which goes back to the 1950s,⁸⁰ also encourages non-violent ways of achieving its goals. Hizb-al-Tahir espouses extremist Islamist ideology, which strives towards an Islamic caliphate encompassing not only the Muslim world but the entire globe. Its ideological position has led to calls for it to be proscribed because it is seen as a gatekeeper to other, violent, terrorist groups.⁸¹ The first Afghan conflict provided the backdrop for the formation of further Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda. During the Afghan years, Bin Laden established a large network with many terrorist groups.⁸² Today, Al Qaeda's ideology is easily available online. In their online magazine *Inspire*, they openly discuss their ideology, promote violent jihad, and praise those who take violent actions in its name.⁸³

The involvement of Western states with autocratic regimes and states with poor human rights' records, and Western military interventions in international conflicts, is glossed over.⁸⁴ Foreign policy, for example, would appear to be a major factor in the radicalisation of the 7/7 bombers. CONTEST avoids the issue of foreign policy, but acknowledges the difficulties of the Iraq war which, it states, have led to insurgency in the region and abroad.⁸⁵ Fundamentalists and groups such as Al Qaeda have exploited conflicts such as Palestine, and the UK's foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, to spread hatred and garner support for their violent ideologies.⁸⁶ These extremist groups draw upon the 'language of religion, and its objectives are linked to a religious cause'.⁸⁷ The following extract demonstrates how foreign policy, and other real and perceived grievances, motivated Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the 7/7 bombers.

⁷⁹ Ian Black, 'Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood is a Force the World Can No Longer Afford to Ignore' (*The Guardian*, 2 June 2011) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/06/egypt-muslim-brotherhood>> accessed 21 February 2011

⁸⁰ Lorenzo Vidino, 'Islamism and the West: Europe as a Battlefield' (2009) 10 *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 165

⁸¹ Zeyno Baran, *Hizb Ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency* (The Nixon Center 2004)

⁸² Mark Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (University of Pennsylvania 2004)

⁸³ Public Intelligence, 'Complete Inspire Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Magazine' (2010) <<http://publicintelligence.net/complete-inspire-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-aqap-magazine/>> accessed 2 May 2011

⁸⁴ BBC, 'London Bomber: Text in Full' (2005) <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/-/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm>> accessed 23 February 2011

⁸⁵ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 50)

⁸⁶ Gerjes (n 73)

⁸⁷ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 50)

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight.⁸⁸

Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have angered many Muslims, although many other groups and ethnicities also opposed the Iraq war,⁸⁹ providing fertile ground for jihadi ideologies to take root within British communities. ‘Throughout this period, emerging British violent Islamist organizations publicly encouraged participation in violent *Jihad* overseas.’⁹⁰ The July 2005 bombings bear witness that the threat of terrorism is not confined to Al Qaeda as a group. The threat to the UK comes from groups which are either affiliated to, or who have no actual connection to, Al Qaeda.⁹¹ They see their world threatened by the new *jahilya* and have adopted the radical jihadist worldview. As freelance operators,⁹² they are willing to cause mass casualties through the use of unconventional weapons such as chemical or radiological devices.

Isolated diaspora communities here in Britain retain bonds with relatives left behind as well as their grievances. The alienation from mainstream British society can lead to the creation of a bond between British Muslims and those who are deprived in war-torn areas, sympathising with them and their grievances, and creating a feeling of kinship.⁹³ How CONTEST frames terrorism is therefore important because its work stream affects the target communities, in this case Muslim communities in Britain. How it frames these communities is equally important. Islamic and Muslim communities are framed monolithically, which is problematic; this is misleading and does not capture the broad religious, cultural, or ethical diversity within and between Muslim communities in Britain. CONTEST not only determines the qualities of terrorism but informs the police and other agencies how to police, prevent, and respond to terrorism. This is, as shown later, problematic.

⁸⁸ BBC (n 84)

⁸⁹ Patrick Barkham, ‘Iraq War 10 Years on: Mass Protest that Defined a Generation’, *The Guardian* (15 February 2013) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/15/iraq-war-mass-protest>> accessed 13 April 2013

⁹⁰ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50) 27

⁹¹ MI 5, ‘International Terrorism’ (2010) <<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/international-terrorism.html>> accessed 2 May 2011

⁹² Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story Of Radical Islam* (IB Tauris 2007) 297

⁹³ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50)

3.5 Policing and the police

Policing and prevention are closely linked and central to CONTEST and *Prevent*. Understanding these two concepts and how they relate is crucial to understanding the tensions between *Pursue* and *Prevent*. Although terrorism adds another dimension to the tensions between these two work streams, these conflicts are not unique to counterterrorism. Rather, conflicts between policing and prevention are projected into the counterterrorism arenas and must be confronted in order to successfully implement a joint policing and prevention strategy. In 1829, Mayne, quoted by Ratcliffe, stated that: ‘The primary objective of an efficient police is the prevention of crime: next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all of the efforts of the police must be directed.’⁹⁴

Therefore, the starting point for the debate about policing and prevention must be an examination of these concepts and how they are linked. The Oxford English Dictionary states that policing is an activity which concerns itself with the enforcement of rules and regulations.⁹⁵ A common misconception is that the police, an institution, and policing are synonymous; they have therefore become conflated.

Police refers to a particular kind of social institution while *policing* implies a set of processes with specific social functions. ... *Policing* is arguably a necessity in any social order, which may be carried out by a number of different processes and institutional arrangements. A state-organized specialist *police* organization of the modern kind is only one example of policing.⁹⁶

According to Weber, the state lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence.⁹⁷ ‘Whether the modern state’s claim to a monopoly of violence was, in practice, realized through the engine of the police or was rather a highly effective, though illusory, ideological construction is open to questions.’⁹⁸ ‘The threat of the application of this power is linked to a legitimate office created by the normative-legal order of the political community.’⁹⁹ Conflict resolution in the political community is limited, and is determined by the system of the normatively anchored

⁹⁴ Jerry Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-Led Policing* (Willan 2008) 15

⁹⁵ Oxford English Dictionary Online, ‘Police - Verb’, *Oxford English Dictionary Online* (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010)

⁹⁶ Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police* (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 1

⁹⁷ Max Weber, ‘The National State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)’ (1980) 9 *Economy and Society* 428

⁹⁸ Lucia Zedner, ‘Policing Before and After the Police The Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime Control’ (2006) 46 *British Journal of Criminology* 78, 78

⁹⁹ Karl Dusza, ‘Max Weber’s Conception of the State’ (1989) 3 *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 71, 77

powers acquired by the state.¹⁰⁰ Public policing is one of the defining characteristics of state power, and its institutions are synonymous with the modern state. These powers are not limited to the police. The state, through the institution of the police, lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence. Police officers routinely use their powers while enforcing the law and maintaining order. Although activities such as investigating crimes, gathering evidence, and preparing cases for the prosecution have become staples, they also engage in public order maintenance, crime prevention, and traffic regulation.¹⁰¹

However, policing is much broader than the police as an institution and encompasses other forms of social control.¹⁰²

Policing is no longer monopolized by the public police, that is the police created by government. Policing is now being widely offered by institutions other than the state, most importantly by private companies ... and by communities on a volunteer basis.¹⁰³

Although Sir Robert Peel introduced the police as a preventative force for Britain in 1829, the concept of prevention soon gave way to catching criminals, and the targeting of criminal areas and certain social groups.¹⁰⁴

The resultant criminal justice infrastructure was built around responding to, processing and seeking to know and correct, its objective – the apprehended offender. Proactive crime prevention had little place, except as an element of lingering general or individual deterrence engendered by the limited prospects of apprehension and punishment for those who transgressed the criminal law.¹⁰⁵

Neocleus asserts that a police force is a state institution used to consolidate social power and to administer civil society in general, those who have been socially excluded, and the working class.¹⁰⁶ ‘The prime aim of the police has always been

¹⁰⁰ Theda Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’ (Cambridge University Press 1985)

¹⁰¹ Chris Hale, ‘The Criminal Justice System’ in Chris Hale and others (eds), *Criminology* (Oxford University Press 2005)

¹⁰² Robert D Storch, ‘The Policeman as Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline and Popular Culture in Northern England, 1850-1880’ (1976) 9 *Journal of Social History* 481

¹⁰³ David Bayley and Clifford Shearing, ‘The Future of Policing’ (1996) 30 *Law & Society Review* 585, 585

¹⁰⁴ Eugene McLaughlin, ‘The Origins and Development of the Police’ in Eugene McLaughlin and others (eds), *Controlling Crime* (Sage 2002)

¹⁰⁵ Adam Crawford, ‘Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices’ in Mike Maguire and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 868

¹⁰⁶ Mark Neocleus, ‘The New Police Science’ in Markus Dirk Dubber and Mariana Valverde (eds), *The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic And International Governance* (Stanford University Press 2006)

about "law and order" preservation rather than crime conviction. The same is true within anti-terrorism work.¹⁰⁷ Police powers are not just passive tools used to respond to disorder. According to Neocleus, these powers no longer simply maintain or reproduce order but fabricate and shape it.¹⁰⁸ McLaughlin suggests that a police force is a multi-purpose 24-hour order maintenance service.¹⁰⁹ The traditional image of the police as crime fighters is questionable because non-crime-fighting tasks take up about seventy per cent of their time. The crime-fighting elements fall comfortably into the area of order control and the continuation of the status quo. The idea of the 'thin blue line', however, remains firmly embedded in the mind of the public, the media, and even within the occupational self-image and culture of the police. Quoting Reiner, Crawford writes that this organisational subculture is action-orientated and celebrates a macho culture which values crime detection and 'thief taking, while devaluing preventative work as unglamorous'.¹¹⁰ Racial prejudice, sexism, and machismo are also common in the police subculture. Such a culture results in resistance to engage in certain crime-fighting tasks, and is at times even reluctant to delegate other policing tasks to 'inexperienced' local authorities or volunteer organisations.¹¹¹

Sir Robert Peel's notion of preventative policing is only one of the paradigms of policing, which Brodeur calls 'low policing'.¹¹² Manning equates 'low policing' with criminal policing.¹¹³ As mentioned above, this idea soon evolved into a more reactive approach to crime management. This reactive model is popular and often seen as the 'standard model of policing' today.¹¹⁴ Peel's idea of preventative policing relied more on the notion of deterrence than intervention in social processes to prevent

¹⁰⁷ Clive Walker, 'Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom' (2005) 44 *Crime, Law and Social Change* 387, 389

¹⁰⁸ Mark Neocleus, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (Pluto Press 2000)

¹⁰⁹ Eugene McLaughlin, 'Key Issues in Police Work' in John Muncie and Eugene McLaughlin (eds), *Controlling Crime* (Sage 2002)

¹¹⁰ Crawford, 'Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, Policies and Practices' (n 105) 870

¹¹¹ Trevor Jones, 'Policing' in Chris Hale and others (eds), *Criminology* (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007)

¹¹² Jean-Paul Brodeur, 'High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks About the Policing of Political Activities' (1983) 30 *Social Problems* 507

¹¹³ Peter Manning, *Police Work* (MIT Press 1977)

¹¹⁴ David Weisburd and John E Eck, 'What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?' (2004) 593 *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 42

criminality. This, according to Reith, stands in sharp contrast to ‘high policing’.¹¹⁵ High policing ensures that the distribution of power in a given society is preserved by systematically targeting those who threaten the status quo. Its paradigm is actually that of political policing.¹¹⁶ In short, low policing consists of law enforcement and high policing of political surveillance.¹¹⁷ According to Brodeur, high policing evolved in seventeenth century France and throughout the Napoleonic era. It was, however, also common during the Tudor era and is therefore not uniquely French.¹¹⁸ It is described as ‘forceful reactions to *conspicuous* signs of disorder whether or not of a criminal nature.’¹¹⁹ Peel, the champion of preventative policing, is ironically credited with the establishment of the forerunner of the Irish police force in 1814 which was based on the values of high policing.¹²⁰ The English police in contrast were localised, unarmed, and accountable.

The subsequent *grudging acceptance* of the police was secured on the basis of locally *negotiated compromise* often implying a downgrade of activities that might conjure up images of sinister surveillance. ... The Peelian legacy embodied a tension. While its philosophy lay in the notion of prevention, its legitimacy was legalistic, professional and bureaucratic, as institutionalized through greater standardization of practice and centralization of command. This often pulled policing away from its preventive functions, notably local intelligence gathering.¹²¹

Both high and low policing stood as alternatives to the military. In recent years, a trend to militarise the police has appeared, particularly in the US but also internationally.¹²² ‘This is unavoidable given that the foundation of the police and military power is the same – the ability to threaten and use force, lethal if necessary, to accomplish state objectives.’¹²³ Militarisation of the police influences its organisational culture and model as well as the crime solutions it chooses. This issue

¹¹⁵ Charles Reith, *The Blind Eye of History: A Study of the Origins of the Present Police Era* (Patterson Smith 1975)

¹¹⁶ Brodeur (n 112)

¹¹⁷ Jean-Paul Brodeur and Stephane Leman-Langlois, ‘Surveillance-Fiction or High Policing?’ in Kevin Haggerty and others (eds), *The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility* (University of Toronto Press 2005)

¹¹⁸ Peter Evans and Charles Tilley, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’ in Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge University Press 1985)

¹¹⁹ Brodeur (n 112) 512

¹²⁰ Galen Broeker, ‘Robert Peel and the Peace Preservation Force’ (1961) 33 *The Journal of Modern History* 363

¹²¹ Crawford, ‘Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, Policies and Practices’ (n 105) 868

¹²² Derek Lutterbeck, ‘Between Police and Military The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries’ (2004) 39 *Cooperation and Conflict* 45

¹²³ Peter B Kraska, ‘Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police’ (2007) 1 *Policing* 501, 511

assumes particular urgency because of the emergence of mass terrorism, ‘which fits, ... neither the legal category of crime nor the political category of war as an aggression perpetrated by an enemy state’.¹²⁴

Before turning to prevention, it is important to take a closer look at Brodeur’s concept of high policing. High policing is all-absorbent and underpinned by a drive to gather intelligence ‘while making parsimonious use of this information in the actual prosecution ... neutralized only when deemed strictly necessary’.¹²⁵ Flood claims that governments are increasingly turning to crime reduction policies which rely on intelligence to manage crime risks.¹²⁶ High policing also blurs the boundaries between the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive powers of a state. This is particularly noticeable in counterterrorism powers given to criminal justice agencies.¹²⁷ The objectives of high policing are the preservation of the state and the status quo rather than civil society. Individuals assume that the interests of citizens and the state coincide, creating the illusion that high policing is devoted to public protection. Crime control can be used by the state to gather information and is used to maximise state coercion of those who threaten the established order. Further, high policing engages in undercover work and makes use of informants who infiltrate all walks of civil society. ‘These features traditionally were combined within a police paradigm where the protection of the political status quo was the primary goal.’¹²⁸

The police, as an institution, have been tasked with law enforcement and order maintenance. Policing, on the other hand, is an activity concerned with the enforcement of laws and social norms. The British police model, based on low policing, is reactive in nature. Over the last few decades, however, there has been renewed interest in prevention and intelligence-based policing. Because it is reactive, low policing is inadequate for dealing with terrorism. Therefore, as CONTEST indicates, prevention is becoming more important. The relationship between prevention and policing is fraught with tensions and conflicts. Some of these tensions become clear in the following debate about prevention.

¹²⁴ Brodeur and Leman-Langlois (n 117) 186

¹²⁵ *ibid* 171

¹²⁶ Jerry Ratcliffe and Brian Flood (eds), ‘Strategy Thinking in Criminal Intelligence’ in *Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence* (Federation Press 2004)

¹²⁷ Brodeur (n 112)

¹²⁸ Brodeur and Leman-Langlois (n 117) 171

3.6 The concept of prevention

Broadly speaking, the aim of crime prevention is to alter the behaviour or the flow of events by pre-emptive measures in such a way that crimes' harmful impact is reduced.¹²⁹ The three most common distinctions are primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.¹³⁰ These distinctions illustrate different approaches, such as corrective and punitive preventative measures.¹³¹ Primary prevention is the most holistic approach and focuses on universal education policies and on the general public environment in the hope of preventing criminality at an early stage. Primary interventions are 'the ideal objective'.¹³² Secondary prevention focuses on those groups who are at risk of offending. Delinquent groups 'premised upon differentiating logic that focuses upon target groups as a sub-population from those who do not occupy the same risk grouping' are identified in order to focus prevention activities.¹³³ Finally, tertiary prevention focuses on those who have already engaged in criminality. For many decades, the state focus has been on tertiary prevention.¹³⁴ It was not until the 1990s that there was a shift to mainly secondary prevention. Zedner argues that there has been a shift from focusing on post-crimes to pre-crimes. This shifts the 'temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so'.¹³⁵ The pursuit of security is the overarching principle of a pre-crime society along with calculation, surveillance, risk, and uncertainty.¹³⁶ Another feature of prevention is the pluralisation of the agencies. No longer is prevention limited to the state, police, or even state agencies. The private security industry is burgeoning with a host of charities and volunteer organisations.¹³⁷

¹²⁹ Crawford, 'Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, Policies and Practices' (n 105) 871

¹³⁰ David Farrington, 'Developmental Criminology and Risk-Focused Prevention' in Mike Maguire and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook Of Criminology* (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2002)

¹³¹ Elmer H Johnson, *Handbook on Crime and Delinquency Prevention* (Greenwood 1987)

¹³² Paul Brantingham and Frederic Faust, 'A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention' (1976) 22 *Crime & Delinquency* 284, 292

¹³³ Nick Tilley and Ross Homel (eds), 'Developmental Crime Prevention' in *Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety* (Willan 2005)

¹³⁴ Crawford, 'Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, Policies and Practices' (n 105)

¹³⁵ Lucia Zedner, 'Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?' (2007) 11 *Theoretical Criminology* 261, 261

¹³⁶ Ian Loader and Richard Sparks, 'Contemporary Landscapes of Crime, Order, and Control: Governance, Risk and Globalization' in Mike Maguire and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook Of Criminology* (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2002)

¹³⁷ Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, 'The Transformation of Policing? Understanding Current Trends in Policing Systems' (2002) 42 *British Journal of Criminology* 129

Inspired by Peel's concept of the police, contemporary policing has seen a shift back to crime reduction initiatives focusing on prevention. According to Johnson and Shearing, this shift prioritises future governance or security over justice.¹³⁸ This has been accompanied by legislation such as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, creating Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) which give local authorities and the police joint responsibility for community safety. The Police and Justice Act 2006 brought in further reforms hoping to break down silo working between the different agencies involved to 'install a more consistent joined-up approach' to crime prevention.¹³⁹ This new supportive infrastructure is strongly orientated towards harm, loss, fear-reduction, and prevention. This is 'different from the traditional goals of the police – prosecution, punishment and criminal justice'.¹⁴⁰

Risk factors indicate which individuals and families may benefit from secondary or risk-focused prevention programmes such as skill training, general parent education, pre-school programmes, or a combination thereof.¹⁴¹ This type of prevention is premised on the idea that minor incivilities such as graffiti, vandalism, and drunkenness lead to a rise in crime and the ultimate decline of a neighbourhood if not addressed. Wilson and Kelling call this the 'broken windows theory'.¹⁴² The main argument is that the cycle of decline can be halted by focusing on order maintenance through the policing of incivilities and minor crimes, thereby stopping an escalation to more serious criminality.¹⁴³ The idea of zero tolerance towards minor incivilities and petty crime has become a mantra used by politicians and the public. As attractive as it may sound, zero tolerance oversimplifies the solutions to crime. Because secondary prevention focuses on incivilities and intrudes on those individuals at risk, it has a net-widening effect. It presupposes that there is a link between incivilities and future criminality. The measures under the guise of prevention are precautionary. In times of uncertainty, governments often choose to take the precautionary

¹³⁸ Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, *Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice* (Routledge 2003)

¹³⁹ Community-Safety, 'CDRP Reform' (2011) <<http://www.community-safety.info/51.html>> accessed 23 February 2011

¹⁴⁰ David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society* (University Of Chicago Press 2001) 16

¹⁴¹ David Farrington, 'Childhood Risk Factors and Risk—focused Prevention' in Mike Maguire and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook Of Criminology* (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2007)

¹⁴² James Wilson and George Kelling, 'Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood Safety' (1982) 249 *Atlantic Monthly* 29

¹⁴³ George L Kelling and Catherine M Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities* (1st edn, Simon & Schuster 1998)

approach.¹⁴⁴

Rather than acting in the present to avoid occurrence in the future, pre-emption brings the future into the present. It makes present the future consequences of an eventuality that may or may not occur, indifferent to its actual occurrence.¹⁴⁵

As Zedner notes, knowledge has been moved from centre stage and replaced with precaution. Precaution is often used as a justification for government action.¹⁴⁶ Targeting incivilities and criminalising at-risk individuals and communities serve to supplement rather than supplant crime.¹⁴⁷ Prevention stimulates the development of profiling, targeted surveillance, and the categorisation of suspect communities on the basis of risk, and could lead to the social exclusion of ethnic and religious groups. In the current climate of austerity, there is pressure to target and minimise the burden of security on the general public. This means that the freedoms of minorities may be infringed in order to create a feeling of greater security for the dominant majority.

Thus, subjective perceptions (rather than objective risks) become more important in informing a process that is increasingly arbitrary as it is based on generic factors such as religion, ethnicity or economic factors rather than a detailed more nuanced approach.¹⁴⁸

Throughout, there have also been other subtle shifts away from the requirements of due process and proportionality used as the defining ideals of justice to security and 'public perceptions as predominant overarching preoccupations'.¹⁴⁹ Burney points out that the threshold for intervention has also been lowered, and the lines between due process and intervention have blurred.¹⁵⁰

Community-based interventions frequently lack a clear purpose. Rather than being problem-orientated, these programmes are often based on preconceived notions on how to tackle crime and/or terrorism. This approach stems from pressure on

¹⁴⁴ Adam Crawford, 'Regulating Civility, Governing Security and Policing (dis)order Under Conditions of Uncertainty' in John R Blad and others (eds), *Governing Security Under the Rule of Law?* (Boom International Publishing 2011)

¹⁴⁵ Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Duke University Press 2002) 7

¹⁴⁶ Lucia Zedner, 'Fixing the Future? The Pre-Emptive Turn in Criminal Justice' in Bernadette McSherry and others (eds), *Regulating Deviance: The redirection of criminalisation and the futures of criminal law* (Hart Publishing 2009) 37

¹⁴⁷ David J Rothman, *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America* (Transaction Publishers 2002)

¹⁴⁸ Bernard Harcourt, *Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age* (University Of Chicago Press 2006) 145

¹⁴⁹ Adam Crawford, 'Governing Through Anti-Social Behaviour Regulatory Challenges to Criminal Justice' (2009) 49 *British Journal of Criminology* 810, 810

¹⁵⁰ Elizabeth Burney, *Making People Behave: Anti-Social Behaviour, Politics and Policy* (Taylor & Francis 2009)

policymakers and criminal justice practitioners to implement programmes rather than spend time and scarce resources on problem-solving.¹⁵¹ It further assumes that the values and ethics it engenders are not only ‘good for society’ but also essential for communities at risk of radicalisation. ‘Off the shelf’ solutions should therefore be avoided. Programmes should be tailored to specific problems and localities.¹⁵²

Implicitly, community crime prevention seeks to strengthen latent social control mechanisms and/or provide people with a stake in their own conformity through a diverse array of interventions.¹⁵³

Community crime prevention is generally not about the community as a collective; rather, the community focus is developed to reach out to individuals in households who are at risk. ‘The language of the community-based or multi-agency approach has permeated police discourse about crime prevention, which increasingly emphasizes community involvement.’¹⁵⁴ These points show that there are not only conflicts between policing and prevention, but also within prevention itself.

3.7 Legitimacy and the tensions between policing and prevention

Legitimacy underpins all other concepts. The state relies on citizens' cooperation. The withdrawal of cooperation undermines the moral and political authority – the legitimacy – of the state.¹⁵⁵ The withdrawal of cooperation and the resultant loss of legitimacy can, in extreme cases such as Egypt or Tunisia, lead to the fall of a government.¹⁵⁶ The cornerstone for public cooperation and police legitimacy is public confidence in local and national authorities.¹⁵⁷ To state the obvious, effective policing and prevention requires citizens' participation.¹⁵⁸ Increasing residents' willingness to engage with the police and other state agencies is essential to maximise perceptions of legitimacy and trust.¹⁵⁹ The obligation to obey the law is

¹⁵¹ Adam Sutton and others, *Crime Prevention: Principles, Perspectives and Practices* (Cambridge University Press 2008)

¹⁵² Crawford, ‘Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, Policies and Practices’ (n 105)

¹⁵³ *ibid* 875

¹⁵⁴ *ibid* 872

¹⁵⁵ Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (New Press 2012)

¹⁵⁶ Black (n 79)

¹⁵⁷ Dennis Rosenbaum and others, ‘Attitudes Toward the Police: The Effects of Direct and Vicarious Experience’ (2005) 8 *Police Quarterly* 343

¹⁵⁸ Dennis Rosenbaum and others (eds), ‘The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity and Efficiency in Community Policing’ in *The Challenge of community policing: testing the promises* (Sage Publications 1994)

¹⁵⁹ Sara E Stoutland, ‘The Multiple Dimensions of Trust in Resident/Police Relations in Boston’ (2001) 38 *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 226

linked ‘to the quality of the rules and the integrity of their administration’.¹⁶⁰ It is important, therefore, that rules and laws are perceived to be legitimate not only because they emanate from established authority, but also because of their formulation. This means that policing and prevention activities must conform to accepted norms and standards of procedural justice and fairness.

When these standards are adhered to, most people engage in self-policing and conform to the law, perceiving policing and prevention as legitimate.¹⁶¹ Police corruption, the lack of procedural justice and fairness, and the inability to provide effective and equitable policing undermines the individual’s sense of belonging.¹⁶² Trust is withheld from state authorities for sensible and rational reasons if personal interests are better served through other arrangements including vigilantism.¹⁶³

According to Karstedt, quoted by Tankebe, trust is

mostly not based on individual experience but generated through collective perceptions and vicarious experience ... Trust in the police and the justice system is therefore less dependent on how these agencies act, and more on how they are collectively perceived.¹⁶⁴

Bad perceptions of the police and other state agencies foster distrust. This has the tendency to endorse, and reinforce itself in, the social interactions of individuals and communities alike.¹⁶⁵ The judgement that one has been treated fairly by the police enhances people’s willingness to voluntarily accept decisions even if the outcomes are not favourable, as well as engage in self-control over their actions. People’s deference to law continues over time and shapes their law-abiding behaviour in the future.¹⁶⁶ People confer legitimacy on institutions because these represent certain normative and ethical values. A sense of moral alignment is a necessary component of legitimacy.¹⁶⁷ The police must therefore demonstrate a certain moral authority, embodying the shared moral values of society and a shared sense of right and

¹⁶⁰ Philip Selznick and others, *Law, Society, and Industrial Justice* (Russell Sage Foundation 1969) 29

¹⁶¹ Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing’ (2003) 37 *Law & Society Review* 513

¹⁶² Ian Loader and Neil Walker, ‘Policing as a Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections Between Policing and the State’ (2001) 5 *Theoretical Criminology* 9

¹⁶³ Andrew Goldsmith, ‘Police Reform and the Problem of Trust’ (2005) 9 *Theoretical Criminology* 443

¹⁶⁴ Justice Tankebe, ‘Public Confidence in the Police Testing the Effects of Public Experiences of Police Corruption in Ghana’ (2010) 50 *British Journal of Criminology* 296, 312

¹⁶⁵ Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power: Two Works* (Wiley 1979) 74

¹⁶⁶ Tom Tyler, ‘Enhancing Police Legitimacy’ (2004) 593 *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, 92

¹⁶⁷ David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Palgrave Macmillan 1991)

wrong.¹⁶⁸

This is, however, problematic because it is built on the Durkheimian notion of a collective conscience. Viewing society in a monolithic way¹⁶⁹ glosses over the differences within society.¹⁷⁰ There are also issues of accountability and legitimacy, particularly with high policing, as well as with all other forms of policing and prevention. Proactive, or high policing, has become increasingly popular;¹⁷¹ intelligence is its lifeblood.¹⁷² Proactive or covert investigations use ‘informers, undercover police officers and surveillance to produce an integrated intelligence led approach’.¹⁷³ High policing increasingly relies on innovative technologies to gather an even greater amount of intelligence.¹⁷⁴ Such methods are considered less accountable and transparent because they are associated with a lack of respect for, and even the violation of, human rights and procedural justice.¹⁷⁵ Procedural justice is central to perceptions of legitimacy. High policing may change the orientation of serving the public to controlling them, which may have detrimental effects on perceptions of legitimacy and trust.¹⁷⁶ It also focuses less on controlling the kind of crime and disorder which affects the daily lives of individuals living in communities with high rates of crime.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the task of high policing is preferred over the traditional low functions of policing. Skolnick noticed this trend in relation to the so-called ‘war on drugs’.¹⁷⁸

High policing is underpinned by secretive and coercive measures, and affects the

¹⁶⁸ Mike Hough and others, ‘Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy’ (2010) 4 Policing 203, 205

¹⁶⁹ Fenton (n 12)

¹⁷⁰ Hall and others (n 13)

¹⁷¹ Mike Maguire, ‘Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence - led Crime Control’ (2000) 9 Policing and Society 315

¹⁷² HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Policing with Intelligence: Criminal Intelligence – a Thematic Inspections on Good Practice’ (Home Office 1997)

¹⁷³ Robert Heaton, ‘The Prospects for Intelligence - led Policing: Some Historical and Quantitative Considerations’ (2000) 9 Policing and Society 337, 315

¹⁷⁴ Ben Bowling and Janet Foster, ‘Policing and the Police’ in Mike Maguire and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (Oxford University Press 2002)

¹⁷⁵ Tal Jonathan, ‘Police Involvement in Counter-Terrorism and Public Attitudes Towards the Police in Israel—1998–2007’ (2010) 50 British Journal of Criminology 748

¹⁷⁶ David Weisburd and others, ‘Terrorist Threats and Police Performance A Study of Israeli Communities’ (2010) 50 British Journal of Criminology 725

¹⁷⁷ David Bayley and David Weisburd, ‘Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counterterrorism’ in David Bayley and others (eds), *To Protect and To Serve* (Springer New York 2011)

¹⁷⁸ Jerome Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society* (3rd edn, Macmillan 1994)

perception of legitimacy, thereby undermining the trust of the communities.¹⁷⁹ Low policing, on the other hand, relies more on the tactics of persuasion and negotiation, and is therefore less damaging to the perception of legitimacy and trust. Such measures, according to Tyler, have the potential to increase cooperation with police and state agencies.¹⁸⁰ With the shift towards prevention and high policing, the lines between low and high policing have blurred. Brodeur acknowledges that although high policing does not match up to the Orwellian notion of a surveillance society, there are still issues of accountability.¹⁸¹ Though state bureaucracies – in particular those devoted to policing in the broader sense – strive to impose and secure legitimacy, there is a growing feeling that the nation state as the linchpin for governance and good social order has become an increasingly tenuous concept.¹⁸² Ideally, Parliament represents the will of the people, something which should be reflected in the body of law which governs the police.

‘Through ongoing processes of political accountability, mandates are allegedly refreshed.’¹⁸³ In recent years, however, the police in liberal democracies have seen a crisis of legitimacy.¹⁸⁴ Failure to tackle crime, changing sources of trust, and the burgeoning of private policing have all played their role.¹⁸⁵ In such situations, procedural justice is critical because it is central to creating perceptions of trust and legitimacy.¹⁸⁶ Severe and unusual measures to preserve the status quo must come in the context of a perceived or creditable threat if the state is to remain securely founded on the legitimacy of popular representation. The state must therefore ‘continually shape and structure that consent, to which it in turn refers itself to’.¹⁸⁷ This contractual consent between the people and their government has legal and political dimensions. Morgan, however, challenges the idea that there is an acceptable level of consent in these two dimensions.¹⁸⁸ Loader and Walker argue that

¹⁷⁹ Joseph S Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New edition, Public Affairs 2005)

¹⁸⁰ Tyler (n 166)

¹⁸¹ Brodeur (n 112)

¹⁸² James Sheptycki, ‘High Policing in the Security Control Society’ (2007) 1 *Policing* 70

¹⁸³ Rod Morgan and David J Smith (eds), *Coming to Terms with Policing: Perspectives on Policy* (Routledge 1989) 219

¹⁸⁴ Rod Morgan and Tim Newburn, *The Future of Policing* (Oxford University Press 1997)

¹⁸⁵ Andrew Von Hirsch and others (eds), ‘Situational Crime Prevention, Urban Governance and Trust Relations’ in *The Ethics of Situational Crime Prevention* (Hart Publishing 2000)

¹⁸⁶ Neocleous, *The fabrication of social order: a critical theory of police power* (n 108)

¹⁸⁷ Hall and others (n 13) 220

¹⁸⁸ Morgan and Smith (n 183)

the issue of consent gives rise to a sort of ‘Westphalian’ fatalism where state-based police authorities are said to hold an ‘in-the-final-instance’ authority over the governance of insecurity.¹⁸⁹ The issue of legitimacy provides the link between policing, prevention, and communities. The police need the consent of communities to successfully carry out their duties.

3.8 Communities and CONTEST

Understanding ‘communities’ is central to *Prevent*. CONTEST continually refers to Muslim ‘communities’ without qualifying the term.¹⁹⁰ These communities are represented in a monolithic way, ignoring cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity. *Prevent* relies on Muslim communities to fight violent extremism yet CONTEST promotes the myth of a single Muslim community, which Greer argues is a stumbling block.¹⁹¹ The term ‘community’ evokes sentiments of security, trust, and confidence. ‘In short, “community” stands for the kind of world which is not, regrettably, available to us.’¹⁹² ‘Never was the word “community” used more indiscriminately and emptily than in the decades when communities in the sociological sense became hard to find in real life.’¹⁹³ Hobsbawm further believes that it is natural for everyone to seek a place of belonging in a world which is forever changing.¹⁹⁴ This, even in the age of globalisation, leads to the creation of virtual communal identities and boundaries rather than physical demarcation. These boundaries go up on the ‘street corner of every declining neighbourhood of our world’.¹⁹⁵ Like terrorism, communities are social and political constructions. They divide the world into spaces, which leads to exclusion and a vision of ‘us versus them’.¹⁹⁶ The security which communities have to offer comes at the price of

¹⁸⁹ Neil Loader and Walker, ‘Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing’ in Andrew Goldsmith and James Sheptycki (eds), *Crafting Transnational Policing: Police Capacity-building and Global Policing Reform* (Hart Publishing 2007)

¹⁹⁰ HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 67); HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50)

¹⁹¹ Steven Greer, ‘Human Rights and the Struggle Against Terrorism in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 2 *European Human Rights Law Review* 163

¹⁹² Zygmunt Bauman, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World* (Reprint, Polity Press 2000) 3

¹⁹³ Eric J Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (Michael Joseph 1994) 428

¹⁹⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Identify Politics and the Left’ (1996) 217 *New Left Review* 38, 40


¹⁹⁵ Jonathan Friedman, ‘The Hybridization of Roots and the Abhorrence of the Bush’ in Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (eds), *Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World* (Sage 1999) 241

¹⁹⁶ Bauman (n 192)

personal freedom and/or autonomy. ‘Security and freedom are two equally precious and coveted values which could be better or worse balanced, but hardly ever fully reconciled and without friction.’¹⁹⁷

Figure 3.2

Ethnicity and Religion in Great Britain.



Source: Office of National Statistics, 2011 Census (2012), ons.gov.uk/census

Group identification is characteristically constructed across social boundaries in interaction with others. ‘Boundaries are permeable, persisting despite the flow of personnel across boundaries. During these transactions a balance is struck between (internal) group identification and (external) categorization by others.’¹⁹⁸ Identification by others has consequences, and it is this which matters. ‘Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference.’¹⁹⁹ Despite the religious and ethnic differences within Muslim communities in Britain, the notion of a single Muslim community increasingly permeates the social conscience. In fact, Muslims in Britain come from a host of different countries, and ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Figure 3.2, on the previous page, shows the diversity which exists within their various communities. Over 60 per cent have an Asian/Asian British

¹⁹⁷ *ibid* 3

¹⁹⁸ Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity* (3rd edn, Routledge 2008) 44

¹⁹⁹ Stuart Hall, ‘Our Mongrel Selves’ (1996) 19 June Supplement *New Statesman and Society*, 3

background which includes Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi heritage. Around 10 per cent trace their roots to Africa, whereas 6 per cent have a white British background.

As in Christianity, there are many divisions within Islam.²⁰⁰ Why is this relevant? The topics of terrorism, identity, community, and policing are intrinsically linked. The idea that one identity must come first is a fallacy because collective identity is a social construction.

Identity is ... as much about difference as about shared belonging ... identity can help us comprehend the formation of the fateful pronoun *we* and to reckon with the patterns of inclusion and exclusion that it cannot help but create. This may be one of the most troubling aspects of all: the fact that the formation of every *we* must leave out or exclude a *they*, that identities depend on the marking of difference.²⁰¹

The way in which CONTEST has shaped terrorism has led to the redrawing of group boundaries, turning Muslim communities into outsiders against whom emergency powers may be exercised.²⁰² In reality, the balance between liberty and security is a trade-off between the liberties of a few for the security of the majority.²⁰³ In this case, it is Muslim communities who represent the minority. Alienating Muslim communities through social control and legal measures such as *Pursue* and *Prevent* leads to a heightened sense of identity, and a move towards identifying not only with other British Muslims but with those further afield in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁰⁴ This alienation is a by-product of social tensions and plays into the hands of those who uphold and support violent extremism because it becomes harder for disaffected Muslims to identify themselves as British.²⁰⁵ Constant media attention and actions taken under the banner of *Pursue* and *Prevent* provide continual reminders of their Muslim identity, leading to further, at times self-imposed, alienation, loss of trust in public institutions, and unwillingness to work with

²⁰⁰ Ruthven (n 72)

²⁰¹ Paul Gilroy, 'Diaspora and the Detours of Identity' in Kathryn Woodward (ed), *Identity and Difference* (Sage 1997) 301

²⁰² Oren Gross, 'Cutting down Trees: Law-Making Under the Shadow of Great Calamity' in Patrick Macklem and others (eds), *The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill* (University of Toronto Press 2001)

²⁰³ Jeremy Waldron, 'Safety and Security' (2006) 85 *Nebraska Law Review* 455

²⁰⁴ Derek McGee, *The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights* (Open University Press 2008)

²⁰⁵ Timothy Ash, 'What Young British Muslims Say Can Be Shocking - Some of It is Also True' (*the Guardian*, 2006) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/aug/10/comment.race>> accessed 25 January 2010

authorities.²⁰⁶

Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam are revealing. A third of those questioned for the British Social Attitude survey felt negatively towards Muslims, whereas only a quarter felt positive. Only 39 per cent disagreed with the contention that ‘Muslims living in Britain really want to fit in’. The majority of respondents were willing to limit freedom of speech in order to curb and silence religious extremism.²⁰⁷ Osborne, cited by Lambert and Githens-Mazer, argues that it has become ‘permissible to fabricate malicious falsehoods and therefore foment hatred against Muslims in a way which would be regarded as immoral and illegal if perpetrated against any other vulnerable sections of society’.²⁰⁸ The notion is that Muslims, either actively or tacitly, support extremism and/or terrorism. This notion is gaining traction amongst groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party (BNP). Such views are, at times, also presented in sections of the mainstream media. Groups such as the EDL continue to challenge Britain’s ‘political correctness’ which, they argue, panders to the ‘Islamists’.²⁰⁹ The EDL shares characteristics with established far-right movements, fusing football violence with extreme political views and populism. Protests accompanied by acts of violence are not uncommon.²¹⁰ Islamist groups which are perceived to have extreme views such as Islam4UK, have been banned after announcing their plans to protest in Wootton Bassett against the war in Afghanistan.²¹¹ How the EDL and Islam4UK are dealt with demonstrates the selectiveness of counterterrorism legislation and how freedom of expression and speech is interpreted differently in each case. The government argue that a key reason behind the threat of jihadi terrorism is the lack of social and cultural

²⁰⁶ Rachel Briggs and others, ‘Brining It Home: Community-Based Approach to Counter-Terrorism’ (Demos 2006) 31

²⁰⁷ Elizabeth Clery and others, *British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report* (SAGE Publications 2010)

²⁰⁸ Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer, ‘Hatred Exposed’, *The Guardian* (London, 6 January 2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/jun/01/english-defence-league-islamophobia>> accessed 12 September 2010

²⁰⁹ Christopher Allen, *Islamophobia. Christopher Allen* (Ashgate 2010) 92

²¹⁰ James Treadwell and Jon Garland, ‘Masculinity, Marginalization and Violence: A Case Study of the English Defence League’ (2011) 51 *British Journal of Criminology* 621; Matthew Taylor, ‘English Defence League: Inside the Violent World of Britain’s New Far Right’, *The Guardian* (2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/may/28/english-defence-league-guardian-investigation>> accessed 17 April 2013

²¹¹ Alan Travis, ‘Islam4UK to Be Banned, Says Alan Johnson’, *The Guardian* (London, 1 December 2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jan/12/islam4uk-banned-alan-johnson-islamist>> accessed 24 February 2011

integration into British society.²¹² Allen argues that Islamophobia has indeed become normalised over the last decade or so and is being exploited not only by far-right extremists, but even amongst mainstream politicians.²¹³ Muslim communities are continually accused of not assimilating to Western liberal attitudes and lifestyles.²¹⁴ Radical Islamic ideologies seamlessly link historic identities and narratives with current political and personal experiences. Jihadism mobilises people by relying on feelings of fear, injustice, and real or perceived grievances.²¹⁵ *Prevent* and *Pursue* do not acknowledge these grievances and perceived injustices, and fail to provide a mechanism which allows disaffected individuals to address them. Conflict between groups, in this case between Muslim communities and British mainstream society, is often rooted in perceived differences. *Prevent* is an attempt to reconcile these groups which to some degree have been unwittingly created by government policy. But this comes at the expense of Muslim identity and does not create a situation where both groups can reach an outcome which is not enormously destructive to the values of both sides.²¹⁶

Kaman et al. argue that powerless groups 'do not always avoid or yield in conflicts. The powerless behave constructively when they do have a chance, but tend to be more unconstructive when their position seems hopeless'.²¹⁷ Threats by an out-group such as the police, and the general dislike shown by the rest of society, heighten in-group solidarity and increase bias against out-group members.²¹⁸ Therefore, how marginalised groups are policed affects the groups' perception of procedural justice and fairness. This in turn influences the level of trust, and ultimately the perception of legitimacy.²¹⁹ As Kundnani points out, *Prevent* work can too easily become perceived as a mode of embedding political policing within local services so as to allow intelligence gathering and intrusion which generate a lack of interest in the

²¹² Johnathan Githens-Mazer, 'Causes of Jihadi Terrorism: Beyond Paintballing and Social Exclusion' (2008) 73 *Criminal Justice Matters* 26

²¹³ Allen (n 209)

²¹⁴ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton University Press 1970)

²¹⁵ Ruthven (n 72)

²¹⁶ Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press 1960) 6

²¹⁷ Elanor Kamans and others, 'How Groups Contest Depends on Group Power and the Likelihood that Power Determines Victory and Defeat' (2010) 13 *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 715, 715

²¹⁸ Leonie Huddy and others, 'Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies' (2005) 49 *American Journal of Political Science* 593

²¹⁹ James Hawdon, 'Legitimacy, Trust, Social Capital, and Policing Styles A Theoretical Statement' (2008) 11 *Police Quarterly* 182

programme.²²⁰

3.9 Tensions between Prevent, Pursue and Muslim communities

Tensions between policing and prevention affect *Pursue* and *Prevent*. The inclusion of *Prevent* has made CONTEST innovative. CONTEST, however, is not immune to the issues which affect both policing and prevention generally. A good starting point is *Pursue*. In the past, counterterrorism has been the preserve of the police, falling under Brodeur's concept of high policing. This has had an overriding effect on established political conventions, and political and legal processes.²²¹ Within the CONTEST framework, the police are required to share information with local authorities, and volunteer and private sector organisations which are seen as partners under the *Prevent* agenda. The traditional measures of counterterrorism, with the police at the forefront, sit uncomfortably in *Prevent*. Jihadi terrorists and their ideologies are no longer confined to other countries; rather, some of these ideologies have become embedded in Muslim communities here. To be effective, the police can no longer rely exclusively on proactive policing and the support of local communities. These pressures have led to organisational changes and practices within the police.²²² Authorities need to engage in an open and transparent process, which is based on procedural justice and fairness, in order to increase levels of engagement amongst deprived and/or alienated communities.

A lack of respect for procedural justice and human rights may lead to the withdrawal of communities' trust as well as loss of legitimacy. Walker asks whether the odd download from the Internet or scribbled comment could be forgiven or dealt with by way of a caution, relying on the 'belief that the marketplace of ideas will render an overwhelming rejection of political violence'.²²³ Pursuing such individuals harms community relations and undermines prevention efforts because counterterrorism policing undermines the perception that they have been dealt with fairly. This further undermines perceptions of legitimacy and procedural fairness, and ultimately the

²²⁰ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

²²¹ David Cole, 'The Priority of Morality: The Emergency of Constitution's Blind Spot' (2004) 113 *The Yale Law Journal* 1753

²²² Clive Walker and Javaid Rehman, "'Prevent' Responses to Jihadi Extremism' in Victor Ramraj and others (eds), *Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy* (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2011)

²²³ Andrew Staniforth, *Blackstone's Counter-Terrorism Handbook* (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 205

trust which these communities have in the police and other state authorities.

The success of *Prevent* depends on a multi-agency approach which includes the police, local authorities, and other stakeholders. It is worth reiterating a point made in the previous chapter that although the ‘police are often enthusiastic proponents of the multi-agency approach, ... they tend to prefer to set the agendas and to dominate forum meetings and then ignore the multi-agency framework when it suits their needs’.²²⁴ The following chapters assess whether the police dominate the multi-agency approach to terrorism prevention because this could cause problems between police and other involved agencies. Further, some agencies often refuse, for operational reasons, to disclose relevant information and to account for their actions. ‘There is also limited accountability to the courts. Much of the executive actions or interventions fall short of prosecution and so never darken the doors of the courts.’²²⁵ This sort of policing does not engender trust in the police, and questions over its legitimacy and procedural justice arise. Effective policing of communities requires the support of the communities.²²⁶

Perceptions of trustworthiness and legitimacy are critical if the police and the government want the support of communities in general.²²⁷ ‘The likelihood of citizens' compliance is strongly affected by procedural justice tactics.’²²⁸ In order for *Prevent* to work, the police and local authorities need to establish relationships of trust which foster perceptions of legitimacy within Muslim communities. Accountability, and oversight over covert policing practices, are essential to bolster perceptions of procedural fairness. A lack of accountability runs contrary to key values of liberal democracies because it results in the suspension of citizens' rights in an effort to fabricate enhanced security for the majority.²²⁹ The exact relationship between the police, local authorities, other stakeholders, and local Muslim communities within the context of CONTEST is examined further in the following chapters.

²²⁴ Alice Sampson and others, ‘Crime, Localities and the Multi-Agency Approach’ (1988) 28 *British Journal of Criminology* 478, 491

²²⁵ Walker and Rehman (n 222) 35

²²⁶ Wesley Skogan, ‘The Impact of Community Policing on Neighbourhood Residents: A Cross-Site Analysis’ in Dennis P Rosenbaum (ed), *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises* (Sage 1994)

²²⁷ Sunshine and Tyler (n 161)

²²⁸ Tyler (n 166) 92

²²⁹ Martin Innes, ‘Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror Through Community Intelligence’ (2006) 605 *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 222

The continued use of high policing, with its limited success, undermines procedural justice and leads to a collective perception, particularly in Muslim communities, of being targeted and treated unfairly. No terrorist-related arrests were made out of the 101,248 s. 44 stop-and-searches carried out in 2009/10. Further, out of the 1,834 individuals arrested for terrorist-related offences, only 228 were convicted.²³⁰ The coalition government has changed some of the powers the police currently hold. Examples include the reduction in pre-charge detention from twenty-eight to fourteen days and the replacement of control orders with a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Order.²³¹ These new prevention orders have already attracted some controversy and have been labelled control order ‘lite’.²³² In the past, such actions have affected perceptions of trust and legitimacy in state agencies. It cannot be overemphasised that the continuing support of Muslim communities is essential for *Prevent* to be effective. Suspicion breeds distrust in the authorities. ‘There is the assumption that terrorism resonates with Muslim communities and therefore that community-based partners can strive to reduce that appeal, can identify sources of disaffection, can aid those at risk, and can bolster police legitimacy.’²³³ Hebert refutes such thinking and states that ‘in reality a thousand flowers are abloom in the realm of Islamic activism: to approach such diversity with a simple with-us-or-against-us dichotomy primarily in mind is a hopeless, futile task’.²³⁴

It appears that actions taken under *Pursue* influence perceptions of trust and legitimacy. As such, a loss of trust would also undermine communities’ willingness to engage in *Prevent* programmes. ‘Uncertainty slowly extends profiling to the entirety of populations.’²³⁵ This is certainly the case with the *Prevent* policy, which to a certain extent is already engaged in profiling, as highlighted in CONTEST. Harcourt points out that profiling based on ethnicity and religious affiliation can be

²³⁰ Alan Travis, ‘No Terror Arrests in 100,000 Police Counter-Terror Searches, Figures Show’, *The Guardian* (London, 28 October 2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/28/terrorism-police-stop-search-arrests>> accessed 20 November 2010

²³¹ HM Government, ‘Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Summary of the Responses to the Consultation’ (HMSO 2011)

²³² Alan Travis, ‘Civil Liberty Campaigners Fear “control Orders Lite” Regime’, *The Guardian* (London, 25 January 2011) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/jan/25/control-order-reform-fears>> accessed 28 January 2011

²³³ Walker and Rehman (n 222) 32

²³⁴ Matthew Herbert, ‘The Plasticity of the Islamic Activist: Notes from the Counterterrorism Literature’ (2009) 32 *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 389, 390

²³⁵ Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future’ (2007) 13 *European Journal of International Relations* 89, 104

arbitrary. These affiliations have little in common except that they fit the picture of the stereotypical terrorist.²³⁶ This can be problematic in two ways. First, this type of profiling misses those who do not fit the stereotypical image. Second, it labels entire communities, which as the labelling theory suggests, can be counterproductive and may lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. Further, Crawford notes that in the context of terrorism, radicalisation becomes the pre-crime equivalent.²³⁷ Intelligence is ‘information that has been processed to provide foresight – a predictive capacity about how to act at some point in the future to achieve particular objectives given certain conditions’.²³⁸ Suspicion becomes actionable intelligence.²³⁹ According to Lambert and Githens-Mazer, *Prevent* ‘is as much about government inspired social engineering as it is about stopping terrorist attacks’.²⁴⁰ *Prevent* is a blanket approach to promote British values through the guise of a counterterrorism policy which does not address root causes. Rather, *Prevent* provides the minimum means for disaffected individuals and communities to engage in a democratic process capable of listening to views which society may find offensive or discomforting. ‘The *Prevent* programme is doing the exact opposite.’²⁴¹ Instead of supporting frank and open debates on radical ideologies and the grievances which Muslim communities face, such communities are discouraged. Branded as un-British, young Muslims are deprived of an opportunity to voice their concerns and opinions, or to respond to concerns. The inability to speak to teachers, youth workers, or moderate Islamic clerics because of possible repercussions may increase the likelihood of encouraging those already committed to violent extremism.²⁴²

Rather than providing a platform for airing radical views and a form of self-governance, the government is expending energy on governing behaviours believed

²³⁶ Harcourt (n 148)

²³⁷ Crawford, ‘Regulating civility, governing security and policing (dis)order under conditions of uncertainty’ (n 144)

²³⁸ Innes (n 229) 229

²³⁹ Clive Walker, ‘Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism’ (2007) 59 *Stanford Law Review* 1395, 1455

²⁴⁰ Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer, ‘Prevent is Dead. What Next?’, *The Guardian* (London, 14 July 2010) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/jul/14/prevent-counter-radicalisation-terrorism-islam>> accessed 12 October 2010

²⁴¹ Arun Kundnani, ‘Trust Made Meaningless’, *The Guardian* (London, 19 October 2009) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/18/surveillance-prevent-muslim-extremism/print>> accessed 12 October 2010

²⁴² Kundnani, *Spooked: How not to prevent violent extremism* (n 220)

to transcend acceptable moral values and which challenge public propriety.²⁴³ Radicalisation is seen as a risk factor which must be dealt with through *Prevent* programmes or the criminal justice system. *Prevent* is based on the notion that radical views are malign and must be related to some form of violent extremism, whether overtly or through tacit support. Mills concludes that freedom of speech should not be curtailed except in the face of a real and present danger of incitement to violence. He further argues that the curtailment of speech not only deprives the speaker of his or her right but deprives oneself of potential knowledge and truth. This may include the knowledge and ability to challenge false ideologies and notions. The ability to challenge these notions puts both parties on a level playing field.²⁴⁴ As Jacobs points out, ‘public peace is ... not kept by the police, it is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.’²⁴⁵ Discouraging discussion of these issues removes them from the public sphere and eliminates the possibility of determining and challenging grievances. The mantra appears to be ‘out of sight, out of mind’. How this affects Muslim communities is addressed in Chapter 7.

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that there are a number of tensions which affect policing and prevention, and that these tensions have been projected into the area of counterterrorism. Evidence suggests that due to the nature of terrorism and its links to often deprived and marginalised communities, such tensions have become magnified. These tensions are linked to two areas: policy and community impact. Policy tensions relate to conflicts within a policy, whereas organisational tensions refer to the inter/intra-organisational behaviour linked to the implementation of a policy, in this case *Prevent*. This distinction is carried forward, and tensions in the research chapters are categorised into three areas: policy, organisational, and impact. However, there may be some overlap between these three areas. This chapter highlights policy, organisational, and impact tensions in relation to policing and prevention generally, and demonstrates how these have been projected into the area

²⁴³ Frank Field, *Neighbours from Hell: The Politics of Behaviour* (Politico 2003)

²⁴⁴ John Stewart Mills, *On Liberty* (Penguin Classics 1985)

²⁴⁵ Jane Jacobs, ‘The Death and Life of Great American Cities’ in Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson (eds), *The Blackwell City Reader* (John Wiley & Sons 2010)

of counterterrorism policing and prevention.

This chapter suggests that styles of policing affect perceptions of legitimacy and procedural justice. Negative perceptions correlate with low levels of trust. Academic papers suggest that counterterrorism policing and prevention are often regarded as suspicious, and at times as unfairly targeting Muslim communities in the UK. This implies that levels of trust amongst such communities may be low, making policing and prevention in them more difficult. However, some research carried out on *Prevent* suggests that trust between Muslim communities and the police is actually higher than expected.²⁴⁶ How levels of trust are affected, and how they affect *Prevent* work, is discussed in Chapter 7.

The policy and organisational tension highlighted in this chapter centres on the multi-agency approach needed to carry out preventative work effectively. Research suggests that this may be due to the lack of willingness by the police to cooperate and/or share information with other *Prevent* partners. Other issues highlighted are net widening, freedom of speech, and profiling. How much the tensions between policing and prevention affect the actual delivery of *Prevent* is discussed in detail in Chapters 5 to 7 which are based on the research findings. It should be remembered that these conflicts are not unique to CONTEST, and that the solutions may have to be sought in other areas of police and prevention research. Before the research findings, the next chapter addresses the data collection methods.

²⁴⁶ Martin Innes and others, 'Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers' (UPSI 2011)

Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the research design and the methodologies used to gather the primary data for this thesis. As stated in Chapter One, the purpose of the thesis was to identify and explore conflicts and tensions that arose between *Pursue* and *Prevent*, as well as within *Prevent*, and consider the implications for local Muslim communities and the *Prevent* agenda. Earlier chapters, which were literature-based, provided an insight into some of the possible sites of tensions and conflicts. The insight gained through previously published government policy documents and academic research,¹ informed and shaped the research design, enabling me to link the research design to the research objectives.² It is important to briefly re-state these objectives as outlined in Chapter One. These were to:

- a) Analyse and critique the ideas that inform the Prevent policy (see Chapter 2 and 3);
- b) analyse and critique the conflicts and tensions that arose within the Prevent policy on a national level, as well as its implications on the local delivery of Prevent (see Chapter 5);
- c) analyse and critique the tensions and conflicts that arose between organizations involved in the local implementation of Prevent, such as the police and the local authorities, and consider the implications on the delivery process (see Chapter 6); and
- d) analyse and critique what impact counter-terrorism policing and prevention have had on local Muslim communities, and how it has shaped community perceptions and the willingness of these communities to engage with authorities in counter-terrorism policing and the Prevent agenda, while considering its wider implications on Prevent and Pursue (see Chapter 7).

Chapters Two and Three suggest, that potential conflicts and tensions within CONTEST, and within *Prevent* may arise between the different organizations involved, and at the intersections of the national and local level. The literature further

¹ John Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Second Edition, Sage 2002)

² Yvonne Darlington and Dorothy Scott, *Qualitative Research in Practice: Stories from the Field* (Open University Press 2002)

suggests that there may be tensions between the national/local authorities and Muslim communities on whom this policy has had an impact. The research design has been shaped by the literature review and is divided into three categories. These categories reflect Rose's argument that differentiates between three levels of the policy process namely: policy formation, policy implementation and policy impact.³ This research design and its in-depth qualitative methods, was designed to capture the non-static and interrelated nature of the *Prevent* policy, seeking to examine whether *Prevent* follows this simple top down process or whether the *Prevent* policy 'is being made as it is being administered and administered as it is being made.'⁴ The purpose of the research design was to gather empirical data, which would either support or disprove the thesis.

This chapter outlines the reasons for using qualitative methods, while also acknowledging that there are limitations. The research design is based on interviews with individuals involved in the national formation and delivery of *Prevent*, as well on interviews and focus groups in a case study area. The thesis was able explore issues around *Prevents*' local delivery and the impact it had on local communities rather than focusing on a broader coverage of the subject only.⁵ Further, as with any research project there were ethical issues that needed to be considered.⁶ The research design and the problems encountered are not original in terms of its structure or set-up, as it follows a similar pattern to other criminological and terrorism related research projects. It is the data obtained through this research that is original. According to Innes *et al.*, a limited number of fieldwork-based studies have been carried out. These have 'systematically sought to gather evidence about how *Prevent* interventions are being delivered, perceived and experienced in different areas.'⁷ This study fills this gap and aims to add knowledge to the wider policy debate about terrorism prevention and particularly the *Prevent* policy.⁸

³ Richard Rose, 'Comparing Public Policy: An Overview' (1973) 1 *European Journal of Political Research* 67, 79

⁴ James Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* (Praeger 1975) 79

⁵ Sheila Stark and Harry Torrance, 'Case Study' in Cathy Lewin and Bridget Somekh (eds), *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (Sage 2004) 33

⁶ Joseph Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach* (Sage 2005) 6

⁷ Martin Innes and others, 'Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers' (UPSI 2011)

⁸ Lyn Richards and Janice Morse, *Readme First for a User's Guide to Qualitative Methods* (Sage 2002) 79

4.2 Qualitative research, its qualities and limitations

Qualitative research offers a number of methods, which involve ‘an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the subject matter.’⁹ Qualitative research involves the study and collection of a variety of materials such as case studies, personal experiences, life stories, in-depth interviews and ethnography. These methods, and the materials gathered turn ‘the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews [and] conversations.’¹⁰ Qualitative methods study people in their natural settings, attempting to understand or interpret a phenomenon in terms of its wider context and the meaning that individuals bring to it.

This study relies on in-depth individual and group interviews at a national level as well as in a case study area. These methods are able to describe routine, problematic moments and the meaning individuals ascribed to them, and are suited to policy research. This approach is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, a state-centric perspective on counter-terrorism has dominated research relying on secondary sources, which lack the input of primary data collection and analysis. Smyth argues that there is a failure to understand both terrorism and counter-terrorism in terms of those experiencing state action and as seen out of the perspective and experience of practitioners.¹¹ Second, individuals’ perspectives and experiences can produce new and alternative ways of viewing and understanding counter-terrorism policy, and as such constitute a way by which social policy can be explored.¹²

Further, qualitative methods provided a degree of flexibility enabling the exploration of social problems or policy, in this case the *Prevent* policy, in greater depth. There is some uneasiness about studying the implementation of policies in general, as this raises the most fundamental questions about the relationship between thoughts and actions, namely: ‘how can ideas manifest themselves in a world of behaviour?’¹³ This study used qualitative methods to explore the ideas that have informed the *Prevent* policy, the relationship between the policy and its delivery, and the impact of this policy on Muslim communities. This study was able to explore to what extent

⁹ Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, ‘Entering the Field of Qualitative Research’ in Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), *Handbook of qualitative research* (Sage 1994) 1

¹⁰ Norman Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2nd edn, Sage 2000) 7

¹¹ Marie Smyth, ‘A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror’ (2007) 6 *European Political Science* 260

¹² Basia Spalek and others, ‘Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination’ (University of Birmingham 2009)

¹³ Laurence O’Toole, ‘Research on Policy Implementation: Assessment and Prospects’ (2000) 10 *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 263, 266

managers and local bureaucrats have reinterpreted and even resisted national policy in its implementation when using their own discretion, by employing qualitative research methods.¹⁴ Rather than simply focusing on street level policy alone, this thesis examined several levels of the policy processes and the tensions that ensued between organizations, and authorities and communities at the different stages of *Prevent*. As mentioned in Chapter Two, ‘the policy delivered ... is most often immediate and personal,’¹⁵ but there are many different stages, which are usually ‘played out in arenas far removed from the daily life of neighbourhood residents.’¹⁶ This study sought to capture both the national and local aspects of *Prevent*.

However, there are limitations to qualitative research. One criticism levelled at qualitative research is, that it amounts to anecdotalism. Bryman argues that conclusions and explanations based on qualitative research are based on ‘brief conversations, snippets from unstructured interviews ... [which] are used to provide evidence of a particular contention. There are grounds for disquiet in that the representativeness or generality of these fragments is rarely addressed.’¹⁷ On a more practical level, qualitative research is labour intensive, ‘not only in relation to fieldwork, but also in the way in which qualitative data must be analysed and reported on.’¹⁸ Time and finances have also influenced what could realistically be achieved over a three-year period – hence this study is limited to one case study area.

The issue, Silverman points out, is not about the type of data collected, but about the way in which this data is analysed and placed in its wider context. The analysis of qualitative data should not be based on a few ‘telling’ examples alone, but should also include analysis of the less clear or even contradictory data.¹⁹ It is important to ensure the research findings are based on sufficient number interviews, in order to place the anecdotes into their wider context. As Adelman *et al* note, the knowledge

¹⁴ Zachary Oberfield, ‘Rule Following and Discretion at Government’s Frontlines: Continuity and Change During Organization Socialization’ (2010) 20 *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 735

¹⁵ Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* (Russell Sage 1980) 8

¹⁶ *ibid*

¹⁷ Alan Bryman, *Quantity and Quality in Social Research* (Routledge 1988) 76

¹⁸ Office for National Statistics, ‘What is Qualitative Research?’ (2008) <<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/general-methodology/data-collection-methodology/what-is-qualitative-research-/index.html?format=hi-vis>> accessed 30 June 2011

¹⁹ David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction* (2nd edn, Sage 2004)

gained through qualitative research is significant in its own right.²⁰ This is because, as Huberman argues, qualitative analysis can identify mechanisms, going beyond sheer associations.

It is unrelentingly local, and deals well with complex network of events and processes in a situation. It can sort out the temporal dimension, showing clearly what preceded what, either through direct observation or retrospection. It is well equipped to cycle back and forth between variables and processes – showing that ‘stories’ are not capricious but include underlying variables, and that variables are not disembodied, but have connection over time.²¹

For this thesis 35 in-depth semi-structured interviews and five focus groups were conducted. A thorough analysis of the data helped to identify tensions and provided a rich picture, placing the data collected into the wider context of CONTEST and the *Prevent* policy both nationally and locally. Inferences and comparisons were drawn based on existing research literature, adding to the existing knowledge around terrorism prevention and associated policies. The second point about generalization will be addressed later in the chapter.

In this thesis, the benefits of qualitative methods outweighed the limitations as they provided in-depth accounts of professionals involved in *Prevent* and of those whom the this policy had an impact on. Further, the limitations were overcome by comparison with existing research. Quantitative methods are not always able to capture the complexity of social problems adequately. The chosen methods on the other hand, provide a holistic overview, as these methods allow one to capture these complexities through in-depth studies.²²

4.3 The research design

This research design aimed to integrate both the research concepts and research logistics, to improve the quality of data generated.²³ The research concepts and its context were discussed in chapters Two and Three and have played a major role in designing the research objectives, interview schedules, and participant selection. The second aspect is the research logistics or research design. Well-designed research helps to generate what King *et al* call, ‘observable implications,’ which either

²⁰ Clem Adelman and others, ‘Re-Thinking Case Study: Notes from the Second Cambridge Conference’ (1976) 6 *Cambridge Journal of Education* 139

²¹ Matthew Miles and A Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook* (2nd edn, Sage 1994) 147

²² Hugh Lauder and others, ‘Sociology and Political Arithmetic: Some Principles of a New Policy science1’ (2004) 55 *The British Journal of Sociology* 3

²³ JD Congdon, ‘Defining the Beginning: The Importance of Research Design’ in Karen Eckert and others (eds), *Research and Management for the conservation of Sea Turtles* (IUCN/SSC no date)

substantiate or disprove a theory. For Popper, ‘observations ... are always interpretations of the facts observed; they are interpretations in the light of the theory.’²⁴ Research design, which is based on previously established research objectives, produces better and more relevant data, improving ‘inferences more than the necessary after-the-fact ... solution.’²⁵ Knowing what type of data one wants to collect and planning ahead enhances the research results precisely because there is a link between the research objectives and the research project.²⁶ The research design attempted to gain an emic perspective; this is an insider’s perspective of events or the study of behaviour within a system.²⁷ This approach ‘seeks experience from within ... and attempt(s) to capture the meaning and experiences of *interacting* individuals.’²⁸ This study enabled developments that have taken place within *Prevent* to be understood from an insider’s perspective.²⁹ It is the participants’ ideas, perceptions and interpretations of events in relations to the *Prevent* policy that have shaped the outcome of this thesis.

The research was designed to be flexible enough to allow it to evolve, when necessary, in a controlled manner rather than an *ad hoc* way.³⁰ Interviews with professional and focus groups, with members of local communities, were identified as being particularly suitable for this type of research and have been powerful tools for assessing causality and exploring the conflicts and tensions that have arisen within CONTEST and *Prevent*. The research was set up along the lines of policy formation, policy implementation and policy impact.³¹ Figure 4.1 provides a brief overview of those involved in the research. More details about participants and about their selection can be found in the subsequent sections.

²⁴ Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (Harper and Row 1968) 104

²⁵ Gary King and others, ‘The Importance of Research Design in Political Science’ (1995) 89 *American Political Science Review* 475, 476

²⁶ Congdon (n 23) 83

²⁷ John Berry, ‘Introduction to Methodology’ in Harry Triandis and John Berry (eds), *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Methodology* (Allyn and Bacon 1982)

²⁸ Norman Denzin, *Interpretive Interactionism* (2nd, Sage 2001) 40

²⁹ Kenneth Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior* (2nd edn, Mouton De Gruyter 1967) 11

³⁰ Lesley Noaks and Emma Wincup, *Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Methods* (Sage 2004) 68

³¹ Rose (n 3)

Figure 4.1

Number of Professional and community participants nationally and in the case study area.

	Professional Interviewees	Community members
Involved Nationally	15	-
In Case Study area	20	22
Total	35	22

As seen above individuals were allocated into three groups, namely those involved in the national policy formation/delivery, those involved in the local delivery, and those on whom the *Prevent* policy had an impact. The interview schedules were designed to reflect the different roles and experiences of those involved in the research. Rather than viewing these groups in isolation, the nature of the questions allowed the study to explore the relationship between the national and the local level, identifying conflicts and tensions. In this way Anderson's assertion that 'policy is being made as it is being administered and administered as it is being made,'³² could be explored. The chosen methods allowed direct engagement with individuals involved at the various stages of the policy process of *Prevent*; perceptions and interactions were not only collected, but could also be questioned.

Many researchers treat case studies as more or less synonymous with qualitative research;³³ this is however not necessarily the case.³⁴ According to Ying, a case study is an 'empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident.'³⁵ Case studies are descriptive and illuminate the readers understanding of a subject.³⁶ A case study can provide invaluable data, and help in understanding the context and its subject matter.³⁷ The local nature of this project provided the study with a snapshot of an instance in action,³⁸ providing a rich picture from the perspective of the participants. Essentially this thesis involves a case

³² Anderson (n 4) 79

³³ Ray Rist, 'On the Application of Qualitative Research to the Policy Process: An Emergent Linkage' in Len Barton and Stephen Walker (eds), *Social Crisis & Educational Research* (Routledge 1984)

³⁴ Alex Piquero and David Weisburd, *Handbook of Quantitative Criminology* (Springer 2010)

³⁵ Robert Yin, *Applications of Case Study Research Second Edition* (2nd edn, Sage 2003) 13

³⁶ Malcom Parlett and David Hamilton, 'Evaluation, and Illumination' in Roger Murphy and Harry Torrence (eds), *Evaluating Education: Issues and Methods* (Chapman Publishing 1988)

³⁷ Robert Stake, 'Case Study Method in Social Inquiry' in Roger Gomm and others (eds), *Case Study Method* (Sage 2000)

³⁸ R Walker, 'The Conduct of Educational Case Studies: Ethics, Theory and Procedure' in *Rethinking educational research* (Hodder and Stoughton 1980)

study of the *Prevent* policy within a wider policy debate about prevention of terrorism. Major aspects of this research were based on interviews with professionals and community members in one local authority area – the case study area of this research. This supplemented the national interviews, providing local context. A case study provided rich local context and a deeper understanding of interactions and perceptions of those involved or impacted by the *Prevent* policy in the selected location.³⁹

4.4 The methods: Interviews and focus groups

Essentially interviews are a mode of communication between two or more individuals.⁴⁰ They are a ‘powerful way of helping people to make explicit things that have hitherto been implicit – to articulate their tacit perceptions, feelings and understandings.’⁴¹ There are various forms of interviews, ranging from un-structured to structured, from a one-to-one to group interviews or discussion. The continuum of the interviews depends on the amount of control the researcher exercises over the structure and development of the interview.⁴² ‘Semi-structured interviewing is more flexible than standardized methods such as structured interviews;’⁴³ and proved ideal. The semi-structured approach allowed me to explore and uncover areas of reality that have been neglected and would otherwise have remained hidden,⁴⁴ revealing ‘what is on a person’s mind, ... to access the perspective of the person being interviewed, ... to find out from them the things that we cannot directly observe.’⁴⁵

The semi-structured approach provided sufficient control over both the structure and development of the interview. At the same time it gave me the opportunity to deviate from the plan and to follow original thoughts, or to probe answers given, when the need arose.⁴⁶ This approach also gave participants the opportunity to introduce and

³⁹ Stake (n 37)

⁴⁰ Richard Bauman, *Story, Performance, and Event: Contextual Studies of Oral Narrative* (Cambridge University Press 1986) 3

⁴¹ Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight, *Interviewing for Social Scientists* (Sage 1999) 32

⁴² B Dohrenwend and S Richardson, ‘Directiveness and Nondirectiveness in Research Interviewing: A Reformulation of the Problem’ (1963) 60 *Psychological Bulletin* 475

⁴³ Economic and Social Data Service, ‘Semi-Structured Interviews’ (2007) <<http://www.esds.ac.uk/qualidata/support/interviews/semi.asp>> accessed 7 February 2010

⁴⁴ Anssi Peräkylä, ‘Analyzing Talk and Text’ in Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials* (3rd edn, Sage 2008)

⁴⁵ Michael Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (3rd edn, Sage 2002) 278

⁴⁶ H Russell Bernard, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Sage 2000)

develop issues important to them.⁴⁷ The interview schedules provided the necessary outline and direction, listing important questions and topics. The interview questions drew on the participants' knowledge focusing on gathering information about the research objectives – the innovativeness of *Prevent* and the conflicts and tensions that arose throughout its formation, delivery and the impact the policy has had on communities.⁴⁸ Some of the questions were phrased in such a way as to encourage positive or negative responses, which meant that some of the data could be quantified.

A focus group is an example of a group interview where the role of the interviewer merges with that of the facilitator.⁴⁹ Using focus groups was appropriate because they have the potential of revealing 'social dynamics which occur between group members,'⁵⁰ and provide a collective community perspective.⁵¹ This approach also saved time and allowed me to speak to a number of participants simultaneously. Sim argues that

it is difficult, and probably misguided, to attempt to infer an attitudinal consensus from focus group data. An apparent conformity of view is an emergent property of the group interaction, not a reflection of individual participants' opinions.⁵²

Rather than gaining individualized accounts about the impact of the *Prevent* policy, focus groups allowed me to gather community perceptions,⁵³ giving the participants an active voice. This method highlights a minorities' perspective about the impact of counter-terrorism measures and the *Prevent* policy on Muslim communities in the case study area.⁵⁴

4.5 The case study area

All of the interviews with local authority, police and voluntary organization staff as well as the community groups took place in a case study area in a town in Northern England. From the outset, it was decided that the name of the town should remain anonymous and was therefore given the pseudonym of *Maybury*. It is important to

⁴⁷ David Gray, *Doing Research in the Real World* (2nd edn, Sage 2009) 273

⁴⁸ Harry Wolcott, *The Art of Fieldwork* (Alta Mira 1995)

⁴⁹ Michael Bloor and others, *Focus Groups in Social Research* (Sage Publications 2000)

⁵⁰ Noaks and Wincup (n 30) 81

⁵¹ *ibid*

⁵² J Sim, 'Collecting and Analysing Qualitative Data: Issues Raised by the Focus Group' (1998) 28 *Journal of advanced nursing* 345, 350

⁵³ Bloor and others (n 49) 8

⁵⁴ Coretta Phillips and Benjamin Bowling, 'Racism, Ethnicity and Criminology. Developing Minority Perspectives' (2003) 43 *British Journal of Criminology* 269

briefly state the reasons why. A discussion about the ethical concept of anonymity will follow later.⁵⁵ A simple call to the local authority or an Internet search would have revealed the identity of most of the participants. Because of the sensitive nature of their work, a number of participants only agreed to take part on the condition that they would remain anonymous. Lavin and Maynard argue that concerns over a lack of confidentiality and anonymity could lead to participants withholding information and may chose not to take part in the research.⁵⁶ For the purpose of this study it was vital to speak to individuals from the police, the local authority, and volunteer organizations involved in *Prevent*. For these reasons it was decided that the town would remain anonymous, to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. This meant that the participants' personal, and any local information was anonymized, making it more difficult to identify participants.⁵⁷ However, although individuals were anonymized, their roles within their respective organizations were not. By doing this, more or less weight could be attached to their comments, depending on their role and experiences within counter-terrorism and *Prevent*, when analysing the data.

Maybury was selected because the local authorities and police were involved in delivering *Prevent*. There were also some personal considerations that played a role in the selection of this town. These were, prior knowledge of the area, a personal contact within the local authority and ease of access, which meant that time and travelling costs were kept to a minimum. Prior knowledge and a personal contact within the council helped me identify the right people quicker.

In the 1950s many economic migrants moved to *Maybury*, from South Asia, particularly from Muslim communities in Pakistan and India and today *Maybury* has a population of approximately 150,000. *Maybury* currently has one of the highest rates of BME communities in England and Wales. Since the 1980s, *Maybury* a manufacturing town has suffered economic decline and is now amongst some of the most deprived areas England. The economic decline has hit BME communities disproportionately. Around two thirds of them live in the most deprived neighbourhoods of *Maybury*. Ethnic communities often live segregated from each

⁵⁵ Anthony Kelly, 'In Defence of Anonymity: Rejoining the Criticism' (2009) 35 British Educational Research Journal 431

⁵⁶ Danielle Lavin and Douglas Maynard, 'Standardization Vs. Rapport: Respondent Laughter and Interviewer Reaction During Telephone Survey' (no date) 66 American Sociological Review 453

⁵⁷ Economic and Social Research Council, 'Framework for Research Ethics' (2010) <http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/_images/Framework_for_Research_Ethics_tcm8-4586.pdf> accessed 15 November 2011

other, and there is a notably higher than usual segregation rate between the Asian and White communities.

The local authority of *Maybury* was initially awarded funding from the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) pathfinder fund early on,⁵⁸ and continues to receive funding ever since. The *Prevent* Review in 2011 listed *Maybury* amongst its 25 priority areas.⁵⁹ Over the last few years, the town has seen a number of high profile terrorist related arrests. These arrests and the associated police operations have caused tensions between the local authorities and Muslim communities.⁶⁰ Because of the focus on *Jihadi* terrorism, many Muslims in the community felt they were being singled out and labelled as criminals by society in general, and especially by the media.⁶¹ The perception that PVE and *Prevent* targets solely Muslim communities persists.

4.6 National policy formation and delivery: Selection and issues

A total of fifteen individuals involved in the national formation and implementation of *Prevent* took part in this research. Figure 4.2 provides an overview of all of the national interviewees. Due to the nature of *Prevent* and its affiliation with counter-terrorism, gaining access to policy makers and professionals was not always easy and was time consuming.⁶² Potential candidates were identified through the Internet, policy documents and academic conferences. Potential candidates had to, at some point, be involved in the formation and/or national implementation of *Prevent*. After the initial contact in person, over the phone or through email, they were sent additional information about the project to help them decide whether or not to take part.⁶³ Everyone contacted, with the exception of two people, eventually agreed to take part. Using a technique called snowballing;⁶⁴ many participants recommended others who they felt might be able to contribute to the project. Using this method

⁵⁸ Preventing violent extremism in Maybury, 'Report Anonymized.' (2009)

⁵⁹ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (HMSO 2011)

⁶⁰ News Paper Article: Anonymized, 'News Story About Terrorism Arrests in Maybury', *The Guardian* (2007)

⁶¹ Report: Community Cohesion in Maybury, 'Report Anonymized.' (2009)

⁶² Charles Morrissey, 'On Oral History Interviewing' in Lewis Anthony Dexter (ed), *Elite and Specialized Interviewing* (Northwestern University Press 2006)

⁶³ William Harvey, 'Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews' (2011) 11 *Qualitative Research* 431

⁶⁴ William Vogt, *Dictionary of Statistics & Methodology: A Nontechnical Guide for the Social Sciences* (Third Edition, Sage 2005)

allowed me to engage with participants that would otherwise have been difficult, if not impossible, to identify and reach.⁶⁵

Although anonymity was offered to all of the participants listed in Figure 4.2 on the next page, a number of participants waived their right to anonymity. Naming some national participant did not compromise the identity of those participants who chose to remain anonymous, which meant that they could be named. The majority of the participants involved in *Prevent* nationally are based in London. A considerable amount of time was spent travelling to and from London, as meetings were held at times and locations convenient for the participants. A number of interviews were also held in Leeds, Bradford and Wakefield. Despite the occasional setback, policy makers were very open and forthright, offering assistance by sending reports or suggesting others who might be able to contribute to this project. Aberbach and Rockman's assertion that elite interviewees prefer to articulate their views and do not like closed questions held true.⁶⁶ All of the interviews were recorded, or notes taken, and then later transcribed.

This approach raises two further points. Firstly, the wider issue of anonymity, and secondly the issue of generalization. This part of the research is based on interviews with individuals who have been involved in *Prevent* nationally, which means that there are generalizations that can be drawn from the content of the interviews. Not only are these individuals in a position to say something on the matter, they also have a say about the national implementation of *Prevent*. This makes these findings all the more relevant because they shed light on the national context of *Prevent* through an understanding of policy makers and other national figures' interactions, perceptions and reactions.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ J Faugier and M Sargeant, 'Sampling Hard to Reach Populations' (1997) 26 *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 790

⁶⁶ Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, 'Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews' (2002) 35 *PS: Political Science & Politics* 673

⁶⁷ Miles and Huberman (n 21)

Figure 4.2*Details of National professional interviewees conducted in 2011*

Hazel Blears, former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Currently MP for Salford and member of the Security and Intelligence Committee (NP1).

Lord Alex Carlile, former Independent Reviewer of UK Terrorism Legislation (NP2).

Baroness Pauline Neville Jones, former Minister for Security and Counter-terrorism (NP3).

Senior Home Office Official, involved with the delivery of *Prevent* since 2005. White Male, late 40's (NP4).

Jack Straw, former Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, and Secretary of State for Justice. Currently MP for Blackburn with Darwen (NP5)

Sir Norman Bettison, former Head of *Prevent* at ACPO and former Chief Constable (NP6).

Junior Cabinet Office Official, involved with *Prevent* since 2009. White male, late 30's (NP7).

Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government, involved with *Prevent* since 2004. Asian male, late 50's (NP 8).

Male Police Officer, seconded to the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery unit. White male, late 30s (NP9).

Female Police Officer, seconded to the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit. Asian female, late 30s (NP10).

Senior NPIA Official, involved in the delivery of *Prevent* from its early stages. Black male, mid 40s (NP11).

Junior NPIA Official previously seconded to the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery unit. Also worked on the *Prevent Review* equality impact assessment. Asian female mid 30s (NP12).

Police Inspector, previously seconded to HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. Now leading the implementation of *Prevent* in a Midlands Police Force. Asian male, mid 50s (NP13).

Director of a Human Rights and Anti-racism Organization, involved in *Prevent* work nationally. Asian female, mid 50s (NP14).

Former Member of the National Young Muslim Advisory Group, a youth worker previously involved in *Prevent* programmes in the North of England. Asian Female, late 20s (NP15).

Total: 15 interviews with national professionals

4.7 Case Study area: Professional selection and issues

The selection approach in *Maybury* was similar to the approach described above, using the Internet and snowballing.⁶⁸ The criterion for selection was involvement by the participant in the delivery of *Prevent* in *Maybury*. Directed by a former council employee, initial contact was made with the Community Safety Team. After a meeting, at the local council, with a seconded police officer, my research proposal was submitted to a council committee for further consideration. All police officers involved in *Prevent* were identified through the Internet and then contacted. Once access was granted, I was given files, which contained the names and contact details of most individuals and organizations that worked on *Prevent* in *Maybury*. Potential participants on this list were contacted. All approached agreed to take part with the exception of the *Prevent* lead at the National Probation Service, who refused to take my calls or answer my emails. Those who agreed to take part often identified others with whom they had worked. Snowballing was particularly effective, as participants introduced me to several others who had previously declined to take part. All in all, a total of 20 professionals participated. As outlined above, all individuals in *Maybury* remain anonymous. Figure 4.3 on the next page provides an overview of the interviewees and their role within the local authority.

Semi-structured interviews also proved to be well suited for this part of the research as they allowed me to explore the professionals' experiences, knowledge and perceptions of *Prevent* and their local context. Although following a set agenda, the interviews were conducted in a flexible manner. This was advantageous, and on a number of occasions, due to time constraints, previous answers and participants straying from point, allowing me to reshuffle the questions.⁶⁹ Participants were forthcoming and helpful during the interview, provided additional relevant documents, studies and reports.

⁶⁸ Vogt (n 64)

⁶⁹ Patton (n 45)

Figure 4.3

Details of Professional interviewees in Maybury (2011)

Local Police Authority Prevent lead, Asian female, mid 40s (LP1).

Local Police Authority Deputy Director, White female, mid 50s (LP2).

Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council. Used to oversee the local delivery of *Prevent*. White male, mid 30s (LP3).

Police Superintendent (Area Commander), sits on the *Prevent* and CONTEST board. White male, early 40s (LP4).

Police Inspector and Force Prevent Lead (Special Branch), White female, early 40s (LP5).

Local authority Chief Executive, Member of the CONTEST board, white male, early 60s (LP6).

Head of Safeguarding, Social Services, sits on the Channel board and is involved in the delivery of Channel. White male, early 50s (LP7).

Community Safety Team member, has been involved with *Prevent*. Asian female, late 20s (LP8).

Prevent Lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council, White female, mid 40s (LP9).

Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council, delivered a *Prevent* programme. White female, mid 40s (LP10)

Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council, coordinated the delivery of *Prevent*. Asian male, mid 30s (LP 11).

Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant), White male, mid 30s (LP12)

Community Engagement Officer (Civilian Police Staff), Asian female, mid 20s (LP13)

Police Inspector and lead on the Channel programme, Asian male, early 50s (LP14)

Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council and community volunteer, developed and delivered a community *Prevent* programme. White male, late 30s (LP 15)

Local Authority Educational Consultant, *Prevent* lead in Education. Worked with schools to deliver a number of *Prevent* programmes. White female, mid 40s (LP16).

Community Volunteer, lead an interfaith programme funded by *Prevent*. White male, late 50s (LP 17).

Community Volunteer, lead a number of *Prevent* funded programmes. Asian female, late 50s (LP18).

Neighbourhood Police Officer in a predominately Muslim area. Joined the police 3 years ago. White male, late 20s (LP19).

Neighbourhood Police Officer in a predominately Muslim area. Has been with police for many years. White female, early 30s (LP 20).

Total: 20 interviews with professionals in Maybury

4.8 Local Muslim Communities in Maybury: Selection and issues

The third and final part of the research focused on the Muslim communities in *Maybury* and was carried out using focus groups. Access was negotiated through a number of gatekeepers, which proved more difficult than anticipated.⁷⁰ This problem is not unique to this project. Other researchers carrying out work on *Prevent* related projects such as Githens-Mather,⁷¹ and Lakhani faced similar difficulties.⁷² Focus groups were used to explore the perceptions of the Muslim communities regarding counter-terrorism policing and prevention, and considered the impact of their experiences with the police and the local authorities on their willingness to engage in *Prevent*. Lacking contacts within the Muslim communities, I relied on a number of gatekeepers to gain access.⁷³ The Community Safety Team Manager and applications for *Prevent* funds, a number of potential gatekeepers were identified. Using these contacts snowballing was used to find further potential gatekeepers. In the end two organizations agree to help setup focus groups within Maybury's Muslim communities. These organizations were well placed, due to their close links to the various local communities to recruit a cross-section of the Muslim communities in *Maybury*. These gatekeeper organizations, the local Council of Mosques - an umbrella organization for all of the mosques in the city, the Community Volunteer Service (CVS), a contact at ACPO, and a neighbourhood manager, help to negotiating access to the Muslim communities and help recruit focus group participants. Participants reflected the cross-section of the community, with some having been previously involved in *Prevent* programmes.

It is through these contacts within both the Indian and Pakistani communities that participants were recruited. The involvement of gatekeepers meant that there was limited control over the selection process.⁷⁴ Contacts within the gatekeeper organizations distributed flyers, which clearly stated that this project was supported by the University of Leeds and funded by the ESRC. Two focus groups, arranged without the help of gatekeepers were unsuccessful as no participants showed up. Further negotiation between gatekeepers and members of the communities, and

⁷⁰ Rosalie Wax, *Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice* (University of Chicago Press 1986)

⁷¹ Jonathan Githens-Mazer and others, 'Muslim Communities Perspectives on Radicalisation In Leicester, UK' (Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalization 2010)

⁷² Suraj Lakhani, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities' (2012) 51 *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 190, 195

⁷³ Robert Broadhead and Ray Rist, 'Gatekeepers and the Social Control of Social Research' (1976) 23 *Social Problems* 326

offering a reward of £5, attracted a total of 22 participants, spread across five focus groups. The initial application to the ethics committee stated that participants would not receive any remuneration for participation. However, because no one showed up to the first two focus groups, one of my contacts suggested offering a small reward. The gatekeeper organizations assured participants that neither the police nor Home Office had funded this research project, a misconception that persisted. This latter point suggests that the research would have been more successful if the question had been hidden in a discussion about crime or public health issues.

Those who did take part came from a cross-section of the Muslim communities in the case study area.⁷⁵ Figure 4.4 on the next page provides a detailed overview of all of Focus Groups and its participants. To gain a better understanding of the participants understanding and attitudes towards *Prevent* focus groups were divided into two all-female groups, one all male group, a mix group and one group consisting of community volunteers and religious leaders. Organizing the groups in this way allowed me to differentiate between opinions shared by gender and some degree age. During the focus groups I provided the topics for the conversations enabling the participants to discuss issues surrounding *Prevent*.⁷⁶ As with the individual interviews the focus group interviews were also semi-structure. At times, it was more difficult to keep the discussions on topic, because they became discussions between participants exploring the issues amongst themselves. This was especially the case in the group with the Imams, where it proved difficult to bring the discussion back to the relevant topics.

It is worth pointing out that throughout the course of the research numerous people in *Maybury* expressed their opinions on terrorism, policing, and *Prevent*, but were unwilling to take part in the formal research. Many of those spoken to confirmed the sensitivity of the topic, and explained that it was considered a taboo subject within their communities.⁷⁷ These conversations do not form part of the data, but allowed me to follow certain lines of inquiry during the interviews later on.

⁷⁴ Michael Tushman and Ralph Katz, 'External Communication and Project Performance: An Investigation into the Role of Gatekeepers' (1980) 26 *Management Science* 1071

⁷⁵ Robert Burgess, *In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research* (Psychology Press 1984) 45

⁷⁶ Bloor and others (n 49)

Figure 4.4 <i>Focus Group participation information</i>	
Focus Group One	
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, late 50s	
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, early 60s	
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, mid 30s	
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member and community volunteer, Mid 40s	
Total:	4 females
Focus Group Two	
Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens	
Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s	
Asian Male, attending the local college, working part time, early 20s	
Asian Male, working on a vocational course, early 20s	
Asian Male, unemployed, late teens	
Asian Male, unemployed, early 20s,	
Total:	6 Males
Focus Group Three	
Asian Female, parent of five, not working, mid 40s	
Asian Female, parent of three, working part-time, mid 30s	
Asian Female, parent of one, working part-time, late 20s	
Asian Male, parent of five, Mechanic, mid 40s	
Asian Male, parent of four, not working, late 30s	
Total:	3 Females 3 Males
Focus Group Four	
Asian Female, parent of three, mid 30s	
Asian Female, Social Worker, late 20s	
Asian Female, attending the local college, early 20s	
Total:	3 Females
Focus Group Five	
Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s	
Asian Male, local imam, Chaplin at the local hospital, early 30s	
White Male, community volunteer, involved in inter-faith activities, mid 30s	
Asian Male, Imam at a local mosque, works for the local council of mosques, mid 30s	
Total:	4 Males
Total Participation: 22	

⁷⁷ Murtaza Shibli, 'British Muslims After 7/7' (*the Guardian*, 2010)
<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/06/british-muslims-disenfranchised-july-bombings>> accessed 25 November 2011

4.9 Ethical Issues

Issues such as confidentiality, informed consent and privacy are crucial elements when conducting interviews.⁷⁸ ‘Informed consent requires complete understanding on the part of those participating in the research.’⁷⁹ The University of Leeds guidelines state that all research should be conducted ‘openly and without deception.’⁸⁰ To comply with these guidelines, and those of the British Society of Criminology,⁸¹ all participants were provided with information summarizing the purpose of the study prior to agreeing to take part. The purpose of the study was re-emphasized at the beginning of the event and participants were given a chance to ask questions.⁸² On the day, each participant was presented with a consent form, which they were asked to sign. Participants were warned verbally and on the consent form of the consequences of revealing any criminal activities during the interview or focus group. The groups were informed that everything they said would remain anonymous and that their details would not be disclosed to a third party. Noakes and Wincup argue that informed consent goes further than just the initial consent; rather the research is obliged to ensure that the participants understands at all times what they are engaging in.⁸³ Informed consent was important for two reasons. Firstly, because the participant needed to understand all of the implications that participating in this project would have. Secondly, it was important that those taking part understood the nature of the debate and the context, as this was crucial in obtaining the relevant data. Participation was voluntary and individuals were told that they could withdraw at any time, if they so wished.⁸⁴

Israel argues that confidentiality should be offered to every participant.⁸⁵ Ethics literature commonly views confidentiality akin to the principle of privacy.⁸⁶ ‘This

⁷⁸ Barrie Thorne, ‘“You Still Takin’ Notes” Fieldwork and Problems of Informed Consent’ (1980) 27 *Social Problems* 284

⁷⁹ Noaks and Wincup (n 30) 46

⁸⁰ University of Leeds, ‘Information Consent Protocol’ (2011)
<<http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/images/uploads/docs/InformedConsentProtocol.pdf>> accessed 25 January 2012

⁸¹ British Society of Criminology, ‘Code of Ethics’ (2008)
<<http://www.britsoccrim.org/codeofethics.htm>> accessed 2 September 2012

⁸² Katherine Borland, ‘“That’s Not What I Said”: Interpretive Conflict in Oral Narrative Research’ in Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai (eds), *Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History* (Routledge 1991)

⁸³ Noaks and Wincup (n 30)

⁸⁴ Ian F Shaw, ‘Ethics in Qualitative Research and Evaluation’ (2003) 3 *Journal of Social Work* 9

⁸⁵ Mark Israel, ‘Strictly Confidential: Integrity and Disclosure of Criminological and Sociological Research’ (2004) 44 *British Journal of Criminology* 715

⁸⁶ Paul Oliver, *The Students’ Guide to Research Ethics* (Open University Press 2003)

principle is integral to our societal beliefs that individuals matter and that individuals have the right for their affairs to be private.’⁸⁷ In an information-led society upholding privacy is not always straightforward.⁸⁸ This meant that all of the information gathered such as addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses as well as the interview transcript would have to be stored securely. All of the data gathered was held on an encrypted external hard drive, which was password protected. The signed consent forms were also kept in a locked draw for the same purpose. This allowed me access to the data on demand while preventing unauthorized access, complying with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998. Although, the Act does not proscribe periods of retention, the data acquired will be retained for a period of five years. This period would allow me to re-use relevant data for other projects, bearing in mind the confidentiality of the participants as outlined in the consent form.⁸⁹

Confidentiality and anonymity are closely linked. ‘Confidentiality is the process of not disclosing to other parties opinions or information gathered in the research process,’⁹⁰ while anonymity is about none disclosure of participants identity.⁹¹ Anonymity is a paramount aspect of qualitative research.⁹² As described above, much of the data gathered for this research has been anonymized using pseudonyms, this being standard practice in social science research.⁹³ As mentioned, throughout the research a number of individuals on the national level consented to be named. On the national level it was possible to reveal the identity of those participants. This was however not possible in the case study area. To ensure complete anonymity of all participants in *Maybury*, all personal and demographic data, which could be used to identify participants, were removed. At the same time great care was taken to ensure that this anonymity did not damage the data. ‘Some damage to analysis is

⁸⁷ Rose Wiles and others, ‘Anonymity and Confidentiality’ (ESRC National Centre for Research Methods NCRM Working Paper Series, ESRC 2006) 3

⁸⁸ Martin Bulmer, ‘The Ethics of Social Research’ in G Nigel Gilbert (ed), *Researching social life* (Sage 2001)

⁸⁹ Economic and Social Research Council, ‘Research Data Policy’ (2012) <<http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/data-policy.aspx>> accessed 14 March 2012

⁹⁰ Libby Bishop, ‘Protecting Respondents and Enabling Data Sharing: Reply to Parry and Mauthner’ (2005) 39 *Sociology* 333, 333

⁹¹ Andrew Clark, ‘Anonymising Research Data’ (ESRC National Centre for Research Methods NCRM Working Paper Series, ESRC 2006)

⁹² K Sharpe, ‘Sad, Bad and (sometimes) Dangerous to Know: Street Corner Research with Prostitutes Punters and the Police’ in Roy King and Emma Wincup (eds), *Doing Research on Crime and Justice* (Oxford University Press 2000) 367

⁹³ Ann Cordon and Roy Sainsbury, *Research Participants’ Views on Use of Verbatim Quotations* (Social Policy Research Unit, University of York 2005) 22

unavoidable in these circumstances, but it needs to be weighed against the potential damage to the sources of data in the absence of such action.’⁹⁴ The decision to offer anonymity is a balancing act, weighing the potential harm to the participants against the benefits of making information public.⁹⁵ As Lee points out, the harm to participants may range from embarrassment to violence.⁹⁶ In my case the decision to offer anonymity to all participants was based on the notion that many would not have taken part in the research, had anonymity not been granted. This was confirmed during a number of interviews. Whilst anonymity protects the participants’ identity, it is still possible to identify the position of participants in their respective organization. This is important as it places the remarks made into the wider context of the individuals’ position and their knowledge of *Prevent*. Some of those involved in the policy formation and national delivery of *Prevent* stated that they did not need anonymity. As revealing them would not compromise any other participants they will be named throughout this thesis.

4.10 Data analysis

The data gathered throughout the research were analysed using a process called data reduction. How to code data, what to leave out, and which evolving stories to tell, are all analytical decisions that are left to the discretion of the researcher. ‘Data reduction is a form of analysis that sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that *final* conclusion can be drawn.’⁹⁷ Usually the interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed, although on four occasions only notes were taken either because the equipment stopped working or because the participant asked not to be recorded. Combined the transcripts constitute a 450-page document. Other data sources include Freedom of Information request, policy documents and related studies. The discussions and conclusions drawn in the next four chapters rely on the acquired data.

In addition to the interview and focus group data, a number of original documents, in addition to the policy documents widely available on the Internet such as the *Prevent* policy, were collected. These documents related to the local implementation of

⁹⁴ Social Research Association, ‘Commissioning Social Research: A Good Practice Guide’ (2003) <<http://www.the-sra.org.uk/documents/pdfs/commissioning.pdf>> accessed 12 January 2011

⁹⁵ Howard Becker, ‘Problems in the Publication of Field Studies’ in Arthur Vidich and others (eds), *Reflection on communities studies* (Wiley 1964)

⁹⁶ Raymond Lee, *Doing Research on Sensitive Topics* (Sage 1993) 191

⁹⁷ Miles and Huberman (n 21) 11

Pursue and *Prevent*. These documents were obtained through Freedom of Information requests to the local council, police and the British Transport Police. These documents contain information about terrorism related stop-and-searches and arrests in the *Maybury* area, the local council's local *Prevent* policy, and some information about the nature and content of local *Prevent* programmes.

The researcher has an ethical obligation towards the participants, in terms of how the data are interpreted. 'The pattern upon which we base our interpretation can be shown to inhere in the *original* narrative,'⁹⁸ although the intentions of the original narrative may differ in terms of pointing out certain features or in making certain connections within larger cultural formations. To ensure rigour when interpreting the data, including the documents obtained through Freedom of Information request, a number of different approaches to data analysis were taken. In the first instance, the transcripts and other relevant documents were read and re-read, searching for and identifying patterns, links and relationships.⁹⁹ Once familiar with the data, other tools that visualized the data were used to corroborate or identify new patterns. Figure 4.5 on the next pages, gives three examples of data visualization using, Tag Clouds, Word Trees and Phrase Nets. These visualizations were created using a service called *Many Eyes* provided by IBM.¹⁰⁰ All visualizations created in *Many Eyes* are publicly available on the Internet. To ensure confidentiality and anonymity all data was anonymized before it was uploaded. For added security, once the visualizations were created and saved all data was deleted from the *Many Eyes* Website, removing them from the public domain.

This analysis focused on the interactions between the national and local narratives. The data were analysed, searching for areas of commonality and/or differences between the views and experiences expressed by individuals on the national and local level. Tag clouds were able to compare interviews on both the national and local level, highlighting areas of commonality but also differences. The analysis also focused on the interactions and between the national/local narratives. Initially the data were coded in NVivo, however technical difficulties proved distracting and the more traditional methods of pen and paper was used.

⁹⁸ Borland (n 82) 64

⁹⁹ Margaret LeCompte and others, *Ethnography and Qualitative Design in Educational Research* (2nd edn, Academic Press 1993)

¹⁰⁰ IBM Research, 'Many Eyes' (2012) <<http://www-958.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/manyeyes/>> accessed 20 April 2012

Figure 4.5

Data analysis through visualization

'A tag cloud is a visualization of word frequencies. Our tag cloud enables you to see how frequently words appear in a given text ... The size of the word corresponds to the quantity associated with that word.'

Tag Cloud



'A word tree is a visual search tool for unstructured text, such as a book, article, speech or poem. It lets you pick a word or phrase and shows you all the different contexts in which the word or phrase appears. The contexts are arranged in a tree-like branching structure to reveal recurrent themes and phrases.'

Word Tree



'A phrase net diagrams the relationships between different words used in a text. It uses a simple form of pattern matching to provide multiple views of the concepts contained in a book, speech, or poem.'

Phrase Net



Source: IBM Many eyes. 2012

<http://www-958.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/manyeyes/>

‘Coding is how you define what the data you are analysing are about. It involves identifying and recording one or more passages of text or data items ... that exemplify the same theoretical or descriptive idea.’¹⁰¹ When coding a combination of concept-driven and data driven coding was used. The interview transcripts were coded using different colours pens, each representing different topics. Some of the predefined codes included ‘policy tensions’, ‘organizational tensions’, ‘impact of *Prevent*’ and ‘impact of media perceptions’. Throughout the detailed analysis supplementary codes were added as new patterns and themes emerged, such as ‘political apathy’, and ‘perceived and/or real impact of *Prevent*.’ Notations were made on the transcripts, and also recorded on MS Word document with the relevant page numbers to keep track of the themes and ideas expressed within the data.

This, combined with the above-mentioned visual text based analysis and word searches, allowed for the coding of the data. The data were evaluated in terms of evidence that might support or disprove the idea of tension and conflicts within *Prevent*. The data were then further interrogated to explore how the tensions and conflicts manifested themselves and what implications there were on the wider *Prevent* agenda. ‘The meanings emerging from the data have to be tested for their plausibility sturdiness, their conformability,’¹⁰² and conclusions drawn need to be credible and withstand other possible explanations. In this case qualitative data analysis helped in understanding internal patterns and provided support for theoretical ideas about social processes and cultural behaviour that can be taken far beyond the data itself.

4.11 Data generalization and comparison

Whilst the findings that emerged from those involved in the national formation and delivery are more easily generalizable, the findings from the case study area are not necessarily as easily generalizable, as they rely on single case study area, which limits the generalizability of the research findings. However, the findings are highly contextual and provided a local dimension of the *Prevent* policy process and its impact, understanding people’s interactions, perceptions and re-actions in terms of the local context and its relationship to national counter-terrorism and prevention.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Graham Gibbs, *Qualitative Data* (London, Sage 2008) 38

¹⁰² IBM Research, ‘Tag Cloud Guide’ (2012) <http://www-958.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/manyeyes/page/Tag_Cloud.html> accessed 3 December 2012

¹⁰³ Miles and Huberman (n 21)

Generalizing these findings across wider society proved more difficult,¹⁰⁴ although there were a number of solutions. It is possible, Skolnick argues, to compare similar case studies; thus placing the single case study into its wider context, while highlighting similarities and differences.¹⁰⁵ This meant that certain inferences and generalizations could be drawn.¹⁰⁶

Because this research partially relied on a case study area in *Maybury*, generalizing the findings was more difficult. To overcome this problem, the emerging patterns, and conflicts were compared with other research and academic literature to examine whether any general patterns and trends could be identified to allow broader generalization of the findings. A number of studies were of particular interest, as they also focused on the delivery of *Prevent* and included case studies. A study by Thomas examined some of the tensions within *Prevent*.¹⁰⁷ Innes *et al* took a similar approach to this subject matter, examining the effects of *Prevent* and counter-terrorism policing on Muslim communities,¹⁰⁸ while Spalek *et al* carried out similar research through using case studies to study the impact of *Prevent* on communities.¹⁰⁹ Lakhani focused on perceptions of the *Prevent* policy from grassroots and communities, again using case studies.¹¹⁰ These various studies covered parts of London, Surrey, the Midlands, the North West and East, Greater Manchester and Cardiff. The results of these studies have been published and certain inferences and generalization were drawn. The findings of this thesis were compared to these studies of *Prevent*, drawing on commonalities and/or differences allowing for some generalization and broader conclusions.¹¹¹

There is, however, an inherent danger of over generalizing research findings.¹¹² Kundnani's study about practitioners' perceptions of *Prevent* shows how easy it is to over-generalize research findings.¹¹³ His study relies on data gathered in 16 cities

¹⁰⁴ Stark and Torrance (n 5)

¹⁰⁵ Jerome Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society* (3rd edn, Macmillan 1994)

¹⁰⁶ Bryman (n 17) 88

¹⁰⁷ Paul Thomas, *Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism - Failing to Prevent* (Bloomsbury 2012)

¹⁰⁸ Innes and others (n 7)

¹⁰⁹ Spalek and others (n 12)

¹¹⁰ Lakhani (n 72)

¹¹¹ Skolnick (n 104)

¹¹² Bryman (n 17) 87

¹¹³ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

throughout England and Wales. Despite this, his sample size was much too small to be representative of all those involved in *Prevent* in those localities, let alone to generalize the findings across the UK. In *Maybury*, over 50 people were involved in the delivery of *Prevent* and their opinions varied, depending on the individuals' role, and ethnicity. Inherently, this is an issue of selection, but also about analysis and data comparison, allowing for broader inferences to be drawn. Kundnani's study highlights some mistakes, which have been avoided in this study by way of comparison with the above-mentioned studies, other corroborating data and academic literature. The results of the data analysis will be discussed in the following three chapters that follow. There, the patterns and trends that have emerged from this research will be discussed in terms of their wider context and will be linked to other academic research, available information such as policy documents, and social theory.

4.12 Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to identify and explore conflicts and tensions that arose between *Pursue* and *Prevent*, as well as within *Prevent* itself, and consider the implications for local Muslim communities and the *Prevent* agenda. The purpose of this chapter was to reflect upon the how's and why's of the research design and the related fieldwork. The outcome of the data generated during the fieldwork links the research design with the purpose of the thesis. Much of the success of this project was dependant on speaking to professionals involved nationally, locally and with members of those communities affected by *Prevent*. Using a qualitative approach, the data generated revealed the immediate and personal effects of the *Prevent* policy, while also exploring the aspects of this policy that are mostly played out in 'far removed from the daily life of neighbourhood residents.'¹¹⁴ That said, throughout the fieldwork there were minor problems and setbacks all related to negotiating access to professionals and to the Muslim communities in *Maybury*. This process proved more time consuming than first anticipated. Other researchers have noted that it is not always easy to obtain access to BME communities, particularly when sensitive issues are discussed.¹¹⁵ A way of increasing participation amongst the Muslim communities could have been a higher financial reward. A late interviewee, the local police *Prevent* lead suggested that approaching a senior manager first, thereby opening the

¹¹⁴ Lipsky (n 15) 8

¹¹⁵ Lakhani (n 72)

door to all of the perspective interviewees within those organizations, might have been better. That said, the approach taken proved to be successful and I was able to speak to everyone with only one exception. The three tier set up, reflecting Rose's argument,¹¹⁶ allowed me to contrast and compare the perceptions and attitudes of national and local professionals and the affected communities. As the next few chapters will show, the findings of this thesis suggest that the *Prevent* policy is indeed 'being made as it is being administered and administered as it is being made.'¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Rose (n 3)

¹¹⁷ Anderson (n 4) 79

Chapter 5: The national implementation of *Prevent*

5.1 Introduction

The Communities and Local Government Select Committee has stated that ‘the current breadth of focus of *Prevent* – from community work to crime prevention – sits uncomfortably within a counterterrorism strategy’.¹ The Committee implies that there is uneasiness between the traditional counterterrorism aspects of CONTEST and *Prevent*. Possible conflicts and tensions exist within CONTEST and within *Prevent* itself. Interview, focus group, and Freedom of Information request data is analysed and disseminated in terms of these conflicts and tensions. Many of the issues dealt with in this and the following chapters are interrelated and presented from three different perspectives, namely national policy level, local professional delivery, and the community. This, the first of the three chapters, focuses on the national level and is based on the experiences, opinions, and perceptions shared by fifteen interviewees, which include national policymakers, politicians, civil servants, senior police officers, and human rights and anti-racism activists, all of whom are involved in *Prevent* work nationally.

This chapter starts by revisiting the subject of CONTEST’s innovation, and exploring the possible consequences of *Prevent*’s inclusion in terms of the conflicts and tensions this gave rise to. The tensions have been categorised into two broad areas, namely policy and organisational tensions. Although separate, there are areas of overlap. The data suggest that tensions have arisen around the purpose and scope of *Prevent*, around who should lead *Prevent*, and around how it is funded. Other tensions, the findings suggest, centre on the negative perception of counterterrorism policing and *Prevent*, whom to engage with, how to communicate the purpose of *Prevent* to the media and the wider public, and evaluation.

5.2 Understanding CONTEST and *Prevent*’s innovations

The issue of innovation shows that CONTEST has turned away in part from the traditional models of counterterrorism. The strategy’s aim is to manage down the risk of terrorism to the UK.² A former Secretary of State at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) believes that ‘because it was

¹ Communities and Local Government Select Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10’ (HMSO 2010) 3

² David Omand, *Securing the State* (Hurst & Co Publishers 2010) 90

innovative some things worked and some things didn't work so well, [nobody] had attempted to enter this territory'.³ This chapter explores why those interviewed perceive CONTEST and *Prevent* as innovative and what consequences arise in terms of conflicts and tensions because of these innovations. Lord Carlile, the former independent reviewer of the terrorism legislation, has anticipated problems with *Prevent's* onset but does not specify them. *Prevent*, he states, 'is an art not science, and so there were bound to be mistakes, and there have been mistakes. ... I think that it was very carefully thought out. Everyone knew that there would be problems with it'.⁴

5.2.1 CONTEST's innovativeness

Two broad areas of innovation emerge from the interview data; first, CONTEST brings together for the first time in a consolidated and comprehensive form the different aspects of counterterrorism. The coalition government remains committed to the 2009 CONTEST framework, although some changes have been made, stating that 'our counterterrorism strategy will continue to be organised around four work streams'.⁵ According to the 2009 CONTEST strategy document, its framework reflects the importance of tackling the root causes of instability and terrorism. CONTEST provides the framework which brings different departments and government agencies together to work on counterterrorism issues such as policing, prevention, protection, and emergency planning. 'CONTEST was extremely innovative, the framework of the four *P's*, which is much broader obviously, than just *Prevent*,'⁶ says Baroness Neville-Jones, a former Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism. A former Secretary of State for CLG believes that CONTEST provides a legislative and community response in an attempt to prevent individuals getting involved in terrorism. It is 'tremendously innovative and groundbreaking'.⁷

Second, CONTEST broadens the scope of counterterrorism policy to include prevention, which according to Lord Carlile is the 'first time that the government had gone down this sort of conceptual line towards preventing this particular form of

³ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1), 'Hazel Blears, Currently MP and Member of the Security and Intelligence Committee.' (2011)

⁴ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2), 'Former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislations.' (2011)

⁵ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (HMSO 2011) 10

⁶ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6), 'Former Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and ACPO Prevent Lead.' (2011)

⁷ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

criminal activity'.⁸ CONTEST applies prevention to counterterrorism in a strategic way. The need for prevention is widely accepted now, even by the government.⁹ Sir David Omand, the architect of CONTEST, argues that it is important that the CONTEST policy goes beyond the police and the security services to avoid new generations falling prey to violent extremist ideology. After the London bombings, 'the whole country realised, perhaps for the first time, that we had home-grown, domestic terrorism in our midst'.¹⁰ Sir Norman Bettison, the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire and the ACPO *Prevent* lead, states that initially CONTEST and *Prevent* were not innovative because *Prevent* was only an extension of *Pursue*. Prior to 2007, *Prevent* was

interpreted as getting to somebody before they actually pulled the trigger or pressed the detonator. So *Prevent* was actually a very close relation to *Pursue* ... the way that it was first envisaged didn't take us as far as we've taken *Prevent* since then.¹¹

Prevent, in its early stages, was probably seen as oversimplistic, focusing on a combination of diplomacy and, where necessary, military intervention.¹² Since its inception in 2003,¹³ changes relating to *Prevent* brought about CONTEST, which was made more imperative by the 2005 London bombings, and have made CONTEST innovative.¹⁴

A senior civil servant at the DCLG believes that the London bombings marked a turning point in political and public opinion. '*Prevent* was a reaction to the calamity of innocent human beings killed by home-grown terrorists.'¹⁵ The government needed to be seen to be doing something.¹⁶ Since 2001, the perceived threat to the UK has shifted from international terrorism to home-grown terrorism driven by individuals inspired by jihadi ideology and living in British communities. This is reflected in the boarder scope of *Prevent* after 7/7.¹⁷ From the 1970s onward, British counterterrorism strategy was dominated by the criminal justice agencies and the

⁸ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

⁹ Senior Home Office Official (NP4), 'Name Anonymized. Involved with Prevent Since 2005.' (2011)

¹⁰ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

¹¹ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

¹² Omand (n 2) 101

¹³ HM Government, 'Countering Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy' (HMSO 2006) 3

¹⁴ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

¹⁵ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8), 'Name Anonymized. Worked on Prevent Since 2004.' (2011)

¹⁶ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

¹⁷ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

security services,¹⁸ and lacked a preventative dimension.¹⁹ In the later years of the Northern Ireland conflict, the government took a more community-centred approach. However, this was never as organised and transparent as CONTEST, a Home Office official concludes.²⁰ Peace in Northern Ireland became possible after the political reforms which led to the Good Friday Agreement. These political reforms formed the main preventative policy.

5.2.2 *Prevent's innovativeness*

Prevent is innovative because it occupies the 'space somewhere in the middle, between extremism and violent extremism'.²¹ Thus, individuals and communities are given a space where honest engagement can take place which was not part of the security and intelligence world, and where they can share the responsibility of preventing extremism and terrorism.²² This space allows local authorities and Muslim communities to work together to increase community resilience against extremism, ideally without intervention from the police or the security services. Increased trust leads to better engagement and information sharing by communities.²³ The majority of the interviewees see this approach as innovative (thirteen of the fifteen national participants). Research suggests that many Muslim communities are increasingly taking the lead in challenging violent extremism, working in partnership with the police and local authorities,²⁴ although negative perceptions of *Prevent* have had a negative effect on community participation and engagement with the police and *Prevent* programmes.

After 2007, CONTEST, and particularly *Prevent*, went beyond the traditional boundaries of counterterrorism. The general perception was that the terrorist threat no longer came predominantly from abroad, but also from within British communities.²⁵ Whereas the Irish conflict was ingrained in local culture, home-grown jihadi terrorism, with its associated ideologies, appeared as a fairly new phenomenon.

¹⁸ Clive Walker, 'Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom' (2006) 4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 1137

¹⁹ Peter Neumann, *Britain's Long War* (Macmillan Palgrave 2003)

²⁰ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²¹ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

²² Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²³ Tom Tyler, 'Enhancing Police Legitimacy' (2004) 593 *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84

²⁴ Martin Innes and others, 'Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers' (UPSI 2011)

Young men and women were driven by a variety of forces, from history that set the framework of the state in which they lived, to the circumstances that conditioned the way they felt, thought and acted.²⁶

The historical and cultural dimensions inherent in the Irish conflict are largely absent within home-grown jihadi terrorism. A senior official within the DCLG, himself a Muslim, also questions jihadi terrorists' 'Islam and their religious reality'.²⁷

Choudhury argues that

the appeal of extremist groups reflects, in part the failure of traditional religious institutions ... to connect with young people and address their questions and concerns. ... The most vulnerable are those who are religious novices exploring their faith for the first time.²⁸

These differences are important because the belief of jihadi extremists is often shallow, suggesting susceptibility to preventative attempts.

All the interviewees agree that aspects of CONTEST and *Prevent* are innovative. In their short lifespan, CONTEST and *Prevent* have constantly evolved. This has led to tensions when defining the scope of the policy because it has not settled, as well as tensions when communicating its purpose to both practitioners and the public. A human rights and anti-racism activist highlights this tension. She sees *Prevent* simply as a response to the riots in the North of England in early 2001 and 9/11. She regards *Prevent* as a policy which represents institutional racism and fosters negative community relationships.²⁹ All national participants agree that CONTEST, or parts thereof, are innovative while acknowledging the policy and organisational conflicts and tensions it has created. The Home Affairs Select Committee agrees.³⁰

5.3 Policy Tensions: The aims and scope of Prevent

Policy and organisational tensions overlap. There are tensions regarding the aim and scope of the *Prevent* policy. These tensions also affect the organisational set-up, which drives this policy, and issues around evaluation, engagement, and perceptions. On the face of it, all interviewees agree that the key aims and objectives of *Prevent*

²⁵ Clive Walker, "'Know Thine Enemy as Thyself': Discerning Friend from Foe Under Anti-Terrorism Laws' (2008) 32 Melbourne Law Review 275

²⁶ Peter Taylor, *The Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (Bloomsbury Publishing 1998) 6

²⁷ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

²⁸ Tufyal Choudhury, 'The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalization' (*Department of Communities and Local Government*, 2007)

<<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628.pdf>> accessed 28 March 2012

²⁹ Director of a Human Rights and Anti-Racism Organizations (Asian Female), NP 14, 'Name Anonymized. Worked on Prevent Nationally and Was Provided Evidence to Parliamentary Select Committees About a Need to Review Prevent.' (2011)

are as stated ‘on the tin, to prevent people being radicalised and becoming terrorists and also to ensure that communities do not feel under the sort of pressure which may lead to ... individuals being radicalised’.³¹

The earlier *Prevent* strategy focused on community cohesion,³² whereas the *Prevent Review* shifted the focus to information gathering and sharing.³³ The data reflect this division about the basic aims and objectives of *Prevent*. Lord Carlile maintains that the ‘key aims and objectives remain ... both prior and after the *Prevent Review*’.³⁴ However, close reading of both policy documents suggests that there has been a shift away from community cohesion, ushering in some significant changes. Both versions of *Prevent* state that it aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. However, the methods for achieving this aim have changed. Under the Labour government, *Prevent* had five main objectives.³⁵ The *Prevent Review* reduced these to three. Notably, the two objectives absent in the *Review* are ‘increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism, and to address the grievances which ideologies exploit’.³⁶ Under the Labour government, the DCLG was a major player within *Prevent*,

ensuring that communities are at the centre of our response to violent extremism ... *Prevent* is closely coordinated with work in three other policy areas: community cohesion, community empowerment, and race and equality.³⁷

The *Prevent Review* diminished the role of the DCLG within *Prevent*.

Whereas *Prevent* is part of CONTEST, a counter-terrorism strategy, and deals with terrorism, the Government will address the challenge of extremism – and extremist organizations in particular – primarily through other means.³⁸

The role of cohesion was devolved to the DCLG, separating it from the more counterterrorism-focused *Prevent*. ‘There was a demarcation between engaging with a certain community on the normal engagement basis, and then we’re going to have *Prevent* as a method of counterterrorism.’³⁹ DCLG's recently published integration

³⁰ Home Affairs Select Committee, ‘Roots of Violent Radicalization: Nineteenth Report of Session 2011-2012’ (HC II, 2012)

³¹ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

³² HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (HMSO 2009)

³³ HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 5)

³⁴ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

³⁵ See: Chapter 2.6

³⁶ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 32) 80

³⁷ *ibid* 84

³⁸ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (HMSO 2011) 24

³⁹ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

strategy tackles extremism as part of a wider approach to integration and community cohesion,⁴⁰ whereas *Prevent* focuses exclusively on extremism which leads to terrorism.⁴¹ This separation between community cohesion and *Prevent* is a policy rather than an organisational decision, and has had implications for the organisations involved in delivering *Prevent*.

Identifying individuals vulnerable to extremism through the collaboration of various local and national governments and NGOs remains central to *Prevent*. The *Review* shifts the focus from community integration and cohesion to collaboration and safeguarding, and extends its reach to the higher education and health care sectors to identify those posing a risk to security and to provide relevant support.⁴² As a policy, *Prevent* does not appear to be designed as a surveillance programme, although elements of *Prevent* may intentionally or unintentionally generate information as a by-product which can then be shared between the various departments and agencies. There has been a significant shift within the *Prevent Review* from ‘building the resilience of local communities to the extremist message’,⁴³ to the safeguarding of the public through more specialist programmes such as *Channel*.

According to Sir Norman Bettison, the fundamental aim of *Prevent* should be

to build engagement and trusting relationships, so that we can have conversations about the risk and how to deal with it, but we also can have conversations, whites-of-the-eye conversations, when there might have been a clumsy operation, that is being misunderstood within the community.⁴⁴

This view is supported by a police officer seconded to the ACPO *Prevent Delivery Unit* who states that *Prevent* should help communities to break the cycle of ‘hate breeds hate’, reducing the potential of violence while increasing integration and cohesion.⁴⁵ Lord Carlile claims that there is only one major difference between *Prevent* under Labour and the *Prevent Review*:

There’s been a phrase floating around for years: violent extremism — the meaning of which is very unclear. It has been recognized in the new strategy that there is no distinction to be drawn, for this purpose between extremism and violent extremism. That’s what I think is the major change.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Creating the Conditions for Integration’ (2012) <<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/2092103.pdf>> accessed 5 July 2012

⁴¹ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

⁴² HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38)

⁴³ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

⁴⁴ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

⁴⁵ Male Police Officer, Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit (NP9), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

⁴⁶ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

Arguably, there are other major differences between the two *Prevent* policies. Broadening the term ‘violent extremism’ to ‘extremism’ allows the government to pass on the responsibility of cohesion and integration to the DCLG because this broader focus does not fit with the coalition government’s *Prevent* aims and objectives.

All participants agree that understanding extremism, what it is, what its causes are, and how it links to political violence is fundamental to a successful *Prevent* strategy. When asked in further detail about this, the only commonality that emerges is the belief that in the context of the current terrorism threat, jihadi ideologies often, but not always, bridge the gap between extremism and political violence. The lack of a clear definition and understanding is acknowledged by Blears, a former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government.⁴⁷ Lord Carlile states that

it is often said that British foreign policy, now unused stop-and-search powers, the power to stop people at the ports that these radicalises. ... I think that the causes of extremism are proselyting, and proselytisation of extremism by a small number of very powerful voices, who use word of mouth and Internet ... to radicalise young people.⁴⁸

There was a perception amongst the frontline staff interviewed that British foreign policy plays a key role in the radicalisation process, a view that is supported by Brighton.⁴⁹ Focus group data suggest that foreign policy, although disliked, is less of an issue for communities in Maybury.⁵⁰ A DCLG official states that although foreign policy plays a role, it is not the only reason for extremism.⁵¹ The line between extremism and violent extremism, according to Sir Norman Bettison, is ‘the distinction ... where someone crosses the line between hatred to actually seeking, or being willing, to do something about it, that has the potential to do harm to people or property’.⁵² The lack of a common notion about extremism and its links to terrorism causes tensions because it is unclear how *Prevent* aims to achieve its objectives. This policy is not settled in terms of its long-term intentions. In part, this is due to its innovative nature: it has not been established long enough.

⁴⁷ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

⁴⁸ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

⁴⁹ Shane Brighton, ‘British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: “integration” and “cohesion” in and Beyond the State’ (2007) 83 *International Affairs* 1

⁵⁰ See: Chapter 8

⁵¹ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

⁵² Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

5.4 Policy tensions: Community cohesion and counterterrorism prevention

Under the Labour government, the *Prevent* policy was seen as a way to promote engagement and to challenge violent extremism.⁵³ The policy states that ‘*Prevent* [is] closely coordinated with work in three other policy areas: community cohesion, community empowerment, and race and equality’.⁵⁴ Hindle argues, however, that those involved in the delivery of *Prevent* felt that they were not given sufficient autonomy or resources needed to effectively prevent extremism. ‘Dissatisfaction arising from this doesn’t mean current practices are entirely wrong but that such views on both sides, in retrospect were naïve.’⁵⁵ The *Review* shifted the balance from community cohesion and integration to an approach based on *Channel*. The *Channel* framework has information gathering and sharing at its heart, and is aimed at implementing targeted interventions. The current Home Secretary, Theresa May, expresses the view that the Labour policy was flawed because it

confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and trying to reach those at risk of radicalization, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organizations that *Prevent* should have been confronting.⁵⁶

Implicit within the policy were tensions between how to best prevent individuals from becoming radicalised and how to deal with extremism in general. The tensions were about whether broader community cohesion, with *Channel* attached, or a more targeted *Channel*-like approach was more appropriate for the *Prevent* policy. The former was based on secondary prevention because it targeted specific communities, but it also focused more broadly on universal education policies and on the general public environment in the hope of preventing criminality at an early stage.⁵⁷ The latter focused on secondary prevention and therefore on individuals and groups at risk of radicalisation.⁵⁸ That said, Labour’s retired *Prevent* policy had some aspects of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, while the *Review* also has aspects of

⁵³ Garry Hindle, ‘Prevent and Intelligence’ (*RUSI*, no date)

<<http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4ADEF3390A96C/>> accessed 15 May 2012

⁵⁴ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 32) 84

⁵⁵ Hindle (n 53)

⁵⁶ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38) Foreword

⁵⁷ Paul Brantingham and Frederic Faust, ‘A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention’ (1976) 22 *Crime & Delinquency* 284, 292

⁵⁸ Adam Crawford, ‘Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices’ in Mike Maguire and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2007)

primary and tertiary prevention.⁵⁹ Disagreement between the interviewees centres on whether *Prevent* should have a primary (a view supported by nine of the fifteen national participants) and/or secondary preventative focus (a view shared by six national participants). This raises the question of whether *Prevent* criminalised social policy by criminalising behaviour which is seen as a precursor to terrorism-related activities, as spoken of by Zedner.⁶⁰ Alternatively, did *Prevent* socialise counterterrorism policy through the inclusion of integration and community cohesion into counterterrorism policies?

Early on, *Prevent* was a holistic preventative strategy which included a ‘more broad-brush community cohesion approach’.⁶¹ The more individualised aspect of this strategy was the *Channel* project, a secondary prevention approach. Under the Labour government, many *Prevent* programmes focused on secondary prevention because they targeted specific communities. However, these programmes generally had a broad focus.⁶² This broad-brush approach taken by the early policy was criticised by many of its participants. Lord Carlile insists that *Prevent* was less effective as a community cohesion strategy.⁶³ According to a senior Home Office official, *Prevent*, particularly after the *Review*, became about counterterrorism and not community cohesion. Extremist groups which only posed a threat to community cohesion were considered significantly different from extremist groups engaged in or planning acts of terrorism, and hence should not be covered by *Prevent*.⁶⁴ The focus of *Prevent* shifted to identifying, and intervening, when individuals or groups engage in extremism leading to terrorism, rather than extremism per se.⁶⁵ According to the government, work on integration and extremism will not stop; but how much money will be spent remains to be seen because the government’s integration strategy has only recently been published.⁶⁶ Because both approaches targeted Muslim communities, these continued to feel stigmatised and excluded.⁶⁷ Cattle, giving evidence to a House of Commons select committee, stated:

⁵⁹ See: Chapter 3.6

⁶⁰ Lucia Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?’ (2007) 11 *Theoretical Criminology* 261, 262

⁶¹ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1) Ev 1

⁶² Crawford, ‘Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, Policies and Practices’ (n 58) 868

⁶³ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

⁶⁴ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

⁶⁵ Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, ‘Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups’ (Policy Exchange 2009)

⁶⁶ Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Creating the conditions for integration’ (n 40)

⁶⁷ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1) 10

I think the *Prevent* agenda has had a great deal of difficulty with the Muslim communities ... precisely because it has been seen as a part of the counter-terrorism strategy, because it has associated the Muslim communities – with terror. The *Prevent* agenda really should be separate.⁶⁸

A former DCLG minister disagreed and was worried

that this is a dishonest approach because the integration strategy will not recognise that one of the reasons you're doing integration is because you face a threat. And I think unless you are clear about that in your mind, that you're doing this work, yes, generally, because it's a good thing to do, but also because it has to reduce the threat to the national security of the country.⁶⁹

Links between *Prevent* and integration remain. However, the *Review* makes it clear that any community cohesion projects need to focus on extremism leading to terrorism. '*Prevent* must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects, which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitize its strategy. This is a mistake in the past.'⁷⁰

In contrast, Sir Norman Bettison sees *Prevent* as the intersection of *Pursue* and community cohesion. 'In the middle, interlocking with both those circles, is the circle that I call neighbourhood policing. So neighbourhood policing has got to straddle both community engagement and *Pursue*.'⁷¹ It is this approach, straddling community cohesion and prevention that has made CONTEST particularly innovative, according to a police officer from the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit. 'Not just in terms of reducing the likelihood of reducing terrorist attacks, I think it has been useful in ... producing more cohesion in communities.'⁷² He continued to argue that *Prevent* needed to include engagement and cohesion in order to build the trust of communities, linking *Pursue* with *Prevent*.

Under Labour, *Prevent* securitised community cohesion in terms of engaging with communities because of terrorism concerns. According to Lachman, 'the sooner local authorities move away from the entire security agenda, the better it is in terms of restoring the confidence and trust of the communities that it works with.'⁷³ A senior official at the NPIA stated that

the old strategy, there's a lot more community participation within that. I think some of the confusion was what sits in cohesion and what sits in *Prevent*. I don't think that conversation was healthy because what it ended up doing was creating a massive schism which made the new *Prevent* strategy much more,

⁶⁸ *ibid* Ev 1

⁶⁹ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

⁷⁰ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 6

⁷¹ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

⁷² Male Police Officer, Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit (NP9) interview (n 45)

⁷³ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1) Ev 13

let's do this ... at the community and let's sit cohesion so far away that where on earth do you get into *Prevent* work? So this sort of underlying community cohesion work that was *Prevent*-connected in the old strategy allowed communities to build a sort of resilience and become stronger against the grooming and the extremism because they're complex communities with a lot of complex issues.⁷⁴

Yet some of the community cohesion work done by local authorities, under the banner of *Prevent*, has little in common with the *Prevent* objectives.⁷⁵ Such concerns were raised in the *Review*. 'We won't kid anyone, that the links with *Pursue* are very close because what do I do with the information I get?'⁷⁶ Baroness Neville-Jones argues for a split between Home Office counterterrorism work and community cohesion. It has become clear that integration is being tainted by the activities of the police and intelligence.⁷⁷ Bad perceptions and distrust have a tendency to reinforce themselves in the social interactions of individuals and communities alike.⁷⁸ 'When you haven't got that basis of trust, actually that pushes us further apart,' Sir Norman Bettison states. Baroness Neville Jones admits that

on the local level, community policing is precisely, actually, a combination of the trust engendered by the people feeling that the police are actually fair-minded, on their side and looking after them and protecting them on the one hand. But the police can't do that effectively unless they actually receive information from a ... community about where the dangers lie.⁷⁹

According to Hough et al., the police and authorities must demonstrate a certain moral authority embodying the shared moral values of society and a shared sense of right and wrong in order to gain the public's trust.⁸⁰

Twelve of the fifteen participants agree that community cohesion and integration need to be separated from the hard-core aspects of *Prevent*, while continuing to acknowledge the importance of community cohesion work. The consensus amongst these twelve participants is that *Prevent* needs to be more problem focused. Lord Carlile states: 'I think the right balance is struck by the new *Prevent Review* which

⁷⁴ Senior NPJA Official (NP11), 'Name Anonymized. Involved in Delivering Prevent from Its Early Stages.' (2011)

⁷⁵ Junior NPJA Official (Asian Female, NP12), 'Name Anonymized. Worked on the Equality Impact Assessment of the Prevent Review. Previously Seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit.' (2011)

⁷⁶ Former Member of the National Young Muslim Advisory Group (Asian Female, NP15), 'Name Anonymized. Also Involved a Youth Worker Previously Involved in Prevent Programmes in the North of England.' (2011)

⁷⁷ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3), 'Former Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism.' (2011)

⁷⁸ Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power: Two Works* (Wiley 1979) 74

⁷⁹ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

⁸⁰ Mike Hough and others, 'Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy' (2010) 4 *Policing* 203, 205

passes communities and local governments the responsibilities of community cohesion work.’⁸¹ According to Sir Norman Bettison, some local authorities want to maintain the focus on community cohesion. Although community cohesion is a necessary part of *Prevent*, ‘it is not a sufficient part, it doesn’t do enough’.⁸² As aforementioned, he further believes that police-led *Prevent* would fail. *Prevent*, as recognised by a number of the interviewees, should be based on the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership Model (CDRP), which is already in place, bringing the police and local authorities together to reduce crime. Throughout its evolution, *Prevent* has shifted its focus to narrower secondary prevention and identifying individuals at risk of radicalisation. It has increasingly been driven by the logic of pre-emption, allowing for earlier interventions and relying on an ever-increasing array of partnerships including the Health Service and the Department of Education. *Prevent* has criminalised some aspects of community cohesion policy while socialising aspects of counterterrorism. Tensions remain, as policymakers and politicians disagree about how to best prevent terrorism, and about the merits of including community cohesion into a wider terrorism prevention strategy.

5.5 Policy tensions: Reactions to allegations of spying and targeting Muslim communities

The tensions are twofold. The first set is about whether *Prevent* is concerned with prevention, surveillance, or a combination of the two. The second set of tensions is about whether *Prevent* is concerned with preventing extremism or encouraging extreme reactions. Often, the media has framed *Prevent* as a policy that uses various forms of surveillance to target predominantly Muslim communities.⁸³ This perception has influenced how communities see *Prevent*.⁸⁴ Consequently, Muslim communities feel increasingly alienated from wider society and government.⁸⁵ When writing about *Prevent* in the media, the term spying has been used, which implies that sinister and clandestine methods are used to gather information. Certain aspects of *Prevent* are about gathering information and encouraging individuals to share

⁸¹ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

⁸² Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

⁸³ Vikram Dodd, ‘MPs Demand Investigation into Muslim Spy Allegations Against Prevent’, *The Guardian* (London, 30 May 2010) <www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/mar/30/prevent-islam-muslim-communities> accessed 6 August 2012

⁸⁴ See: Chapter 7

⁸⁵ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

information with the police, which can be used against individuals.⁸⁶ This begs the question whether *Prevent* is a viable policy without aspects of surveillance.

Critics say that *Prevent* is a top down approach which only engages with the ‘usual suspects’, such as imams and other male community leaders, who pedal mainstream Islamic and populist values and ideologies to their Muslim communities. Those rejecting such ideologies are seen as ‘suspect’ and possible targets of *Prevent*.⁸⁷ A director of a human rights and anti-racism group believes that *Prevent* is intentionally designed to target Muslim communities and is based on prejudicial perceptions, which are not challenged by the government or the media. She further argues that *Prevent* is a by-product of the race relations policies, which present an alternative way for the government to marginalise Muslim communities in the UK.⁸⁸ The community cohesion agenda introduced by New Labour also initially influenced *Prevent* and is seen by some academics as the new framework for governing race relations.⁸⁹ *Prevent* attempts to integrate Muslim communities. However, Kundnani argues that *Prevent*, in fact, alienates Muslim communities from mainstream society. In his view, *Prevent* is an ideological tool used to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim communities with the help of pro-government Muslim organisations.⁹⁰ Although this view is not commonly shared amongst those interviewed (only two of the fifteen interviewees supported such views), Hickman et al. argue that public policies represent ‘a prevalent discourse of Britishness and of a unified nation in the face of the threat, with *us* and *our* people and values diametrically opposed to ... Muslim extremists’.⁹¹ In his Munich speech in early 2011 just prior to the launch of the *Review*, Prime Minister Cameron emphasised this point, restating the importance of integration over multiculturalism in the fight against terrorism.⁹² The *Review*’s

⁸⁶ John Parkinson, ‘West Yorkshire Police and 7/7: Engaging, Accessing, Investigating and Reassuring Communities in the Complex Aftermath of the July Bombings’ (Religion, Policing and Security Conference, Leeds, 2011)

⁸⁷ Former Member of the National Young Muslim Advisory Group (Asian Female, NP15) interview (n 76)

⁸⁸ Director of a Human Rights and Anti-Racism Organizations (Asian Female), NP 14) interview (n 29)

⁸⁹ Claire Worley, ‘“It’s Not About Race. It’s About the Community”: New Labour and “community Cohesion”’ (2005) 25 *Critical Social Policy* 483

⁹⁰ Kundnani (n 85)

⁹¹ Mary Hickman and others, ‘“Suspect Communities”? Counter-Terrorism Policy, the Press, and the Impact on Irish and Muslim Communities in Britain’ (London Metropolitan University 2011) 3

⁹² David Cameron, ‘PM’s Speech at Munich Security Conference’ (*Downing Street 10*, 2011) <<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/>> accessed 19 May 2012

definition of extremism also appears to confirm such claims, defining extremism as the opposite of British values.⁹³

5.5.1 Surveillance, spying, or prevention?

There appears to be a conflict between what the policy documents state in respect to gathering intelligence, and comments from a number of interviewees who deny that intelligence gathering takes place under *Prevent*. A senior civil servant at the DCLG claims that under the Labour government there was

no intention of intelligence gathering under the guise of *Prevent*, let's be clear about that. ... We have no spies or relation to that. I think that when it came to the actual implementation of the policy, the practitioners may have gone beyond their limit. ... I think it may have been misunderstood or misrepresented.⁹⁴

This is a common response to the allegations of *Prevent* being used as a vehicle for gathering overt or covert intelligence. Only two of the fifteen national participants believe that *Prevent* is deliberately designed for surveillance purposes, acknowledging though that intelligence might be obtained inadvertently and shared with partner agencies. However, this is perceived as a by-product of *Prevent* work rather than a direct objective of *Prevent*.⁹⁵ The director of a human rights and anti-racism organisation believes that because *Prevent* has been securitised, it is simply a guise for the gathering of intelligence.⁹⁶ Hidden within the 2009 version of *Prevent* is a reference to two supporting objectives aimed at 'supporting intelligence, analysis and information; and to improve our strategic communication.'⁹⁷ Kundnani's report is often cited in support of the view that *Prevent* has been used to spy on Muslim communities.⁹⁸ These perceptions have antagonised Muslim and Hindu communities alike.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the consensus amongst thirteen of the fifteen national participants is that *Prevent's* aim has never been about surveillance or spying. This perception, they argue, stems from overzealous council workers and the media who have given *Prevent* a bad name. 'As a consequence of this, the public believe that *Prevent* is about spying and some Muslim communities think it is about spying on

⁹³ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 107

⁹⁴ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

⁹⁵ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

⁹⁶ Director of a Human Rights and Anti-Racism Organizations (Asian Female), NP 14) interview (n 29)

⁹⁷ HM Government, 'The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' (n 32) 80

⁹⁸ Kundnani (n 85)

⁹⁹ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

them in particular.¹⁰⁰ This has been reinforced by events such as Project Champion, which attempted to use *Prevent* funds to set up CCTV cameras around two mainly Muslim communities in Birmingham. In the aftermath, this incident has been cited as proof that *Prevent* is about spying on Muslim communities.¹⁰¹

Sir Norman Bettison acknowledges that there have been some ‘clumsy operations’ which have negatively affected the public’s perceptions of *Prevent*. It is unclear, however, whether ‘clumsy’ refers to operations which have received negative public attention or to those which were poorly executed. He cites the example of Project Champion, which could be an example of both because it was unfortunate that the media found out about it, and because it should never have been carried out in the first place. He further states that there have been a number of misunderstood consequences of *Prevent*.

People misunderstand what we’re trying to achieve, as unfairly targeting ... Muslim communities. Actually 10 per cent of the people that we’ve intervened with on our *Channel* scheme have been young people with right-wing tendencies. So it isn’t exclusively about the Al Qaeda inspired threat. So people have felt targeted which is a pity, but I have the belief, a genuine belief, that the more we work with communities and the more that we show ourselves to be transparent and to be honourable, the more the suspicion will recede.¹⁰²

A senior NPIA official argues that

I think there was a sort of fear that [*Prevent*] was ... a spying tool, but actually ... I think that very rarely really happened. I think the relationship we’d built with the community support officers of *Prevent*, ... didn’t really create an environment where they would then go to a CT person. ... It wasn’t clever enough in many ways. The people they were engaging with, were already very engaged people so really there was, I don’t think, as much information shared as possibly.¹⁰³

Perceptions matter, and the perception that *Prevent* is used as a surveillance tool may have damaged the relationship between communities and authorities, even if those already engaged with *Prevent* know that it is not about surveillance. All of the interviewees recognise that accusations of spying have tarnished *Prevent*’s reputation and perpetuated a negative perception.

A consequence is that the public thinks that *Prevent* is about spying, and some Muslim communities think it’s about spying on them particularly. So that’s one of the unintended consequences ... it’s perceived that *Prevent* is a bad thing.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Female Police Officer (NP10), ‘Name Anonymized. Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit.’ (2011)

¹⁰¹ Birmingham City Council, ‘Project Champion: Scrutiny Review into ANPR and CCTV Cameras’ (2010) <<http://www.birmingham.gov.uk>> accessed 4 March 2012

¹⁰² Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

¹⁰³ Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74)

¹⁰⁴ Female Police Officer (NP10) interview (n 100)

Interviewees acknowledge the importance of maximising communities' willingness to engage with authorities, an engagement based on a perception of legitimacy and trust rather than coercion.¹⁰⁵ The obligation to obey the law is linked 'to the quality of the rules and the integrity of their administration'.¹⁰⁶ The perception of spying has undermined communities' trust in authorities.

5.5.2 Legitimacy, trust, and engagement

It is important that the police and local authorities are more sensitive when engaging affected communities.¹⁰⁷ A DCLG official points out that the aim of *Prevent* is to engage with Muslim communities to build their trust and resilience against violent extremism so that they might be willing to share information freely.¹⁰⁸ This information is central for the success of *Prevent* and *Pursue*.¹⁰⁹

We know quite a lot about *Prevent* but the way it links into the other elements of CONTEST, which are very much more intelligence-based and stuff ... we don't really know where a lot of that information goes.¹¹⁰

It is because of a lack of trust and transparency that people generally regard *Prevent* as a spying operation used by an intrusive government.

Negative perceptions of the police and other state agencies foster distrust which, according to Luhman, endorses and reinforces itself in the social interactions of individuals and communities alike.¹¹¹

Well there clearly ... there are points at which ... *Pursue* and *Prevent* would clash. The police do have to conduct operations. If they are going to go in and pick up some terrorists they have to do it in a way and at a time of day when they're likely to get their birds, simple. Has it always been handled with the greatest skill? No. Is the resentment that may have been stirred up deliberately exploited by people who see it in their interests and as a weapon to exploit it? Absolutely ... So you've got fault on both sides and there certainly has been exploitation of anxious communities.¹¹²

Legitimacy is conferred on institutions because they respect certain normative and ethical values.¹¹³ On the flip side, this can mean that the perception of legitimacy can be withdrawn when the police fail to respect community values and subcultures.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁵ Sara Stoutland, 'The Multiple Dimension of Trust in Resident Police Relations in Boston' (2001) 38 *Crime and Delinquency* 226

¹⁰⁶ Philip Selznick and others, *Law, Society, and Industrial Justice* (Russell Sage Foundation 1969) 29

¹⁰⁷ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

¹⁰⁸ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

¹⁰⁹ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

¹¹⁰ Former Member of the National Young Muslim Advisory Group (Asian Female, NP15) interview (n 76)

¹¹¹ Luhmann (n 78)

¹¹² Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

¹¹³ Tyler (n 23)

On the local level, community policing is precisely, actually, a combination of the trust engendered by the people feeling that the police are actually fair-minded, on their side and looking after them and protecting them on the one hand. But the police can't do that effectively unless they actually receive information from a community about where the danger lies.¹¹⁵

According to Sir Norman Bettison, trust is the basic principle which underpins *Prevent*, and the fundamental aim must be to build trusting relationships with communities so that *Prevent's* purpose can be understood and supported by the affected communities.¹¹⁶

Having the trust of communities is imperative for the success of both *Prevent* and *Pursue*. *Prevent*, as Sir Norman Bettison argues, is that all-important link between community cohesion and *Pursue*.¹¹⁷ Summing up the purpose of *Prevent*, he says that: 'The central ethos of the *Prevent* strand is safeguarding – not spying or demonising, but simply seeking to protect the vulnerable.'¹¹⁸ However, neither the government nor the media have been successful in communicating this simple message, and Muslim communities continue to feel that they are being antagonised and spied on. The ensuing tensions highlight issues about how *Prevent's* purpose is communicated to the wider public, including its need for information sharing and surveillance, without which this policy is not viable, while maintaining or generating high levels of trust within the affected communities. Bad communication has led to extreme reactions. Some argue that Muslim communities have developed a siege mentality, rather than preventing extremism.¹¹⁹

5.6 Policy tensions: Prevent's target population and engagement with Muslim communities

Close examination of *Prevent* policy documents reveal the targeting of primarily Muslim communities because they are seen as the source of the jihadi ideologies in the UK.

Because the greatest threat at present is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam, much *Prevent* activity takes place in and with Muslim

¹¹⁴ David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Palgrave Macmillan 1991)

¹¹⁵ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

¹¹⁶ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

¹¹⁷ *ibid*

¹¹⁸ Norman Bettison, 'Extremism Measures' (*Public Service*, 2011)

<http://www.publicservice.co.uk/feature_story.asp?id=16896> accessed 14 February 2012

¹¹⁹ Anne Aly and Mark Balnaves, 'The Atmosfear of Terror: Affective Modulation and the War on Terror' (2005) 8 M/C Journal

communities. But the principles of our *Prevent* work apply equally to other communities who may be the focus of attention from violent extremism.¹²⁰

The *Prevent Review* concludes that although ‘*Prevent* should address all forms of terrorism ... as a whole, the priority will be to focus on terrorism associated with Al Qaida’.¹²¹ Initially, target areas and communities were selected according to demographic data.¹²² Under the *Review*, these are selected through a more intelligence-led approach, though the areas remain largely the same.¹²³ Although some of the *Channel* referrals have included individuals who hold right-wing views,¹²⁴ a Home Office official confirms that *Prevent* should focus on jihadi extremist groups because these are the perceived source of the threat. Groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party (BNP), although extreme, do not merit counterterrorism interventions. According to the same official, the Home Office and government ministers perceive the EDL as a nuisance and public order problem rather than as a problem of political violence. *Prevent’s* main concerns lie with groups which sympathise with extreme jihadi ideologies such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir.¹²⁵ In principle, *Prevent* remains focused on Muslim communities, although this may change in the future if there is a shift in the terrorist threat. This focus has caused tensions between *Prevent* and the target communities.¹²⁶

The *Prevent* policy implies a certain level of engagement between the authorities and Muslim communities. A junior official at the NPIA argues that *Prevent* is a

massive opportunity for Muslim communities to have a say in what happens within Muslim communities, in terms of radicalisation, vulnerable young people going down the route of radicalisation. ... It is in some ways a huge opportunity to lead on that particular area rather than have a strategy that is done at the community.¹²⁷

Those working on *Prevent* present it as an opportunity for communities to engage authorities rather than the state helping affected communities to address deeply rooted problems related to extremism and terrorism. Successive governments have stated that *Prevent* is key to building communities’ resilience to extremism and

¹²⁰ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 32) 81

¹²¹ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38) 25

¹²² HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 32)

¹²³ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38)

¹²⁴ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

¹²⁵ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

¹²⁶ See: Chapter 7

¹²⁷ Junior NPIA Official (Asian Female, NP12) interview (n 75)

terrorism, and communities are key to *Prevent*.¹²⁸ The *Review* argues that preventative work should include communities because they are often in a better position than the government to challenge and disprove claims made by terrorist groups and their associated ideology.¹²⁹ ‘It was really important that we didn’t simple have a group of older men speaking for the Muslim community, because the people I met said that these people do not represent me in a modern world.’¹³⁰ Strengthening communities and building the confidence of women and young people within these communities is seen as key to the long-term success of *Prevent*.¹³¹ According to Maher and Frampton, however, *Prevent* has failed to break the stranglehold of key gatekeeper groups, and councils continue to engage with them.¹³² The desire for the government to work with affected communities is fairly uncontroversial, but it leaves a fundamental question unanswered: is *Prevent* about community empowerment to solve the problem of extremism, or about overt surveillance and the gathering of intelligence – or both?

There has certainly been a shift from the earlier version of *Prevent*, which was delivered within a community cohesion framework, to the *Prevent Review* which focuses more on information gathering and cooperation amongst involved agencies. All interviewees at the local and national level deny that *Prevent* is about overt or covert surveillance. What is not denied is that certain aspects of *Prevent* are about gathering information, through overt means, about activities in Muslim communities. A police officer seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit states that *Prevent* work is about information sharing, ‘and some perceive information sharing as being spying. It is not. It’s about looking after individuals. If you look after individuals they don’t become terrorists’.¹³³

Prevent work is not confined to those Muslim communities and groups who support the government position, and at times includes groups who are perceived as holding extremist views. This caused tensions amongst politicians and policymakers when devising *Prevent*.¹³⁴ The government’s view was to promote core British values.

¹²⁸ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 32) 80

¹²⁹ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38) 8

¹³⁰ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

¹³¹ Junior NPIA Official (Asian Female, NP12) interview (n 75)

¹³² Maher and Frampton (n 65)

¹³³ Male Police Officer, Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit (NP9) interview (n 45)

¹³⁴ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

We should properly judge these organizations: do they believe in universal human rights – including for women and people of other faiths? Do they believe in equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encourage integration or separation? These are the sorts of questions we need to ask. Fail these tests and the presumption should be not to engage with organizations – so, no public money, no sharing of platforms with ministers at home.¹³⁵

Essentially, the Prime Minister argues that the assimilation of different cultures to British values, as ambiguous as they may be, should be government policy. Assimilation requires the acceptance of minority groups by the majority, otherwise ‘assimilation is hardly a viable political or cultural option’.¹³⁶ Racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia reinforce the tendency of minority groups to retain their cultural and ethnic heritage.¹³⁷ This, Soria argues, has ‘inevitable repercussions on the essence of the new *Prevent*, which seems to explicitly mirror the Prime Minister’s hard-line stance.’¹³⁸ Despite Muslim communities rejecting terrorism, they

are increasingly, in political discourse, being asked questions about their patriotism and stance on British values. These are deliberate attempts that provide a nuance for discrimination and prejudice.¹³⁹

The *Prevent Review* has adopted a hard-line approach; authorities no longer engage with groups which espouse extremist views, even if these are non-violent.¹⁴⁰ A Home Office official states that there is no need to work with extremist groups because there are sufficient alternative resources available.¹⁴¹ Such a view is shared by only a third of the participants, although similar views are espoused by think tanks on the Right such as Policy Exchange.¹⁴² A number of interviewees share similar opinions. A former DCLG minister states:

I took a very strong stance about not engaging with people who, you know, weren’t prepared to sign up to our values of democracy, equal rights for women, and freedom and liberty or, you know, the basic British values. So I took a very strong view on that.¹⁴³

¹³⁵ Cameron (n 92)

¹³⁶ University of Wolverhampton, ‘Health and Ethnicity’ (no date) <<http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/learningpackages/package4/health/assimilation.htm>> accessed 30 May 2012

¹³⁷ Susan Brown and Frank Bean, ‘Assimilation Models, Old and New: Explaining a Long Term Process’ (*Migration Information Source*, 2006) <<http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=442>> accessed 30 May 2012

¹³⁸ Valentina Soria, ‘The New Prevent Strategy: Establishing Realistic Expectations’ (*RUSI*, 2011) <<http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4DF08BD1BB00F/>> accessed 4 April 2012

¹³⁹ Imran Awan, ‘“Paving the Way for Extremism: How Preventing the Symptoms Does Not Cure the Disease of Terrorism”’ (2011) 2 *Journal of Terrorism Research*

¹⁴⁰ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38)

¹⁴¹ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

¹⁴² Maher and Frampton (n 65)

¹⁴³ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

Some within the Labour Party disagree, the most prominent being the former Home Secretary Jack Straw who was also interviewed for this research.¹⁴⁴ The idea of the centrality of British values is not new to the Conservative Party. The community cohesion agenda emerged as a government discourse following the riots in Burnley and Bradford in 2001, and was the ‘new’ framework governing race relations policy in the UK.¹⁴⁵ There was a

veiled attempt to control those non-white communities designated a risk to *Britishness* because of their resistance to even more intrusive control. Moreover those targeted were expected to feel a sense of gratitude for receiving such attention.¹⁴⁶

Baroness Neville-Jones supports the hard-line approach that groups who espouse extremist ideology are a catalyst for future violence. ‘It is hard to see many people who have aspired to violence who don’t have extremist views.’¹⁴⁷ According to Jackson, the assumption that there is a generic process, which leads from extremism to terrorism, is flawed. Individuals rarely follow a linear path from moderate to radical.

Rather, everyone holds a variety of views at different times and places in their lives, on different subjects, which are usually a mix of “moderate”, “radical” or in the case of the many millions of conspiracy theorists, downright “loony”! Moreover, people’s viewpoints are continuously being revised through interaction with others and are always in a state of evolution.¹⁴⁸

The *Prevent* policy, nevertheless, embodies the notion that Islamism is related to terrorism.

While such views appear to be more common amongst the public, only a third of the participants hold such hard-line views. Other politicians and practitioners, such as the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, argue that an open and more tolerable society towards ethnic minorities and other faith groups is needed.¹⁴⁹ Both NPIA officials agree that groups such as Street and Active Way have done very good grass roots work, diverting individuals away from violent extremism.¹⁵⁰ This is disputed by

¹⁴⁴ Jack Straw (NP5), ‘Former Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Justice.’ (2011)

¹⁴⁵ Worley (n 89)

¹⁴⁶ Jonathan Burnett, ‘Community, Cohesion and the State’ (2004) 45 *Race & Class* 1, 8

¹⁴⁷ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

¹⁴⁸ Richard Jackson, ‘The Failed Paradigm of Prevent’ (*Soundings*, 2011)
<<http://soundings.mcb.org.uk/?p=35>> accessed 30 May 2012

¹⁴⁹ Mark Townsend and Hannah Olivennes, ‘PM Wins Row with Nick Clegg over Crackdown on Muslim Extremists’, *the Guardian* (London, 4 June 2011)
<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/04/pm-nick-clegg-muslim-extremists>> accessed 4 April 2012

¹⁵⁰ Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74); Junior NPIA Official (Asian Female, NP12) interview (n 75)

numerous organisations.¹⁵¹ After the publication of the *Review*, and despite the effective work of groups such as Street, engagement with such groups was stopped because they were deemed to hold extreme views which were perceived to be opposed to the core ‘British values’ outlined in *Prevent*.¹⁵² Not all interviewees agreed.

I think the very grass roots organisations that work with youth is a big mistake not to support them. ... They’re labelling them as ex-extremist groups or groups that are slightly dodgy and we are not going to fund them anymore, that is a huge mistake, because actually when you look at the portfolio of the work that they have done ... Organisations like that have a huge contribution to make.¹⁵³

A Home Office official, who argues that there should be no engagement with extremist groups at any level, did not share these sentiments. There are, he admits, certain circumstances where working with extremist groups may be beneficial, but this would certainly not work as a national strategy.¹⁵⁴ Others, such as Lambert, point out that it is important to work with these extremist groups because they often have the best antidotes to violent extremism.¹⁵⁵ Tensions remain between policymakers, politicians, civil servants, and researchers about whom to work with to effectively tackle extremism.

5.7 Organisational tensions: An overview

The police are central to *Prevent*. However, success relies on collaboration between different government agencies, an unnamed Cabinet Official states.¹⁵⁶ Tensions arise between the performance-orientated facets of policy, and the facets of policy which encourage the breakdown of segment boundaries in pursuit of public service improvement.¹⁵⁷ Within organisations exist different purposes, objectives, interests, and cultures. These distinct identities have been shaped by interactions within and

¹⁵¹ Maher and Frampton (n 65); Ed Husain, *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left* (Penguin 2007)

¹⁵² Andrew Gilligan, ‘How Taxpayers Are Still Funding the Extremists’, *Telegraph.co.uk* (3 March 2012) <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/9121313/How-taxpayers-are-still-funding-the-extremists.html>> accessed 6 April 2012

¹⁵³ Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74)

¹⁵⁴ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

¹⁵⁵ Robert Lambert, ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study’ (2008) 41 *PS: Political Science & Politics* 31

¹⁵⁶ Junior Cabinet Office Official (NP7), ‘Name Anonymized. Involved in Prevent Since 2009, White Male, Mid 30s.’ (2011); HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38)

¹⁵⁷ Graeme Currie and Olga Suhomlinova, ‘The Impact of Institutional Forces Upon Knowledge Sharing in the UK NHS: The Triumph of Professional Power and the Inconsistency of Policy’ (2006) 84 *Public Administration* 1, 22; See: Chapter 2

across these organisations.¹⁵⁸ Institutions such as the police and the Home Office ‘mould and constrain the actions and attitudes of individuals that constitute them’.¹⁵⁹ Generally, the policy process is not fluid and goes through different stages that are influenced by departmental culture, leading to potential tension between the different departments, policymakers, senior management, and frontline staff; *Prevent* is not an exception.¹⁶⁰ The police, Sampson et al. note, are often enthusiastic proponents of the multi-agency approach, but usually prefer to set the agenda and dominate forum meetings, ignoring the multi-agency framework when it suits them.¹⁶¹ Organisational cultures create invisible boundaries between formal and informal groups.¹⁶² ‘This ... often leads to the creation of barriers that inhibit cross-functional collaboration and the implementation’¹⁶³ of government-wide initiatives such as *Prevent*. These different organisational cultures may impact collaborative efforts in sensitive areas such as counterterrorism because organisational identities are reflected in the norms, values, mindset, and ethos of the organisations involved.¹⁶⁴

Prevention is a form of policing and is much broader than the service provided by the police.¹⁶⁵ The concept of policing ‘lies between the fuzzy and rather nebulous concept of *social control* and the narrower definition of police work’.¹⁶⁶ Despite the broad range of activities encompassed by policing, the public tends to have an ‘intuitive notion of what the police are’.¹⁶⁷ Rather, effective policing is carried out by numerous agencies working alongside the police.¹⁶⁸ Aspects of policing and prevention within the CONTEST framework are devolved from the police to other agencies. According to Lord Carlile, it was inevitable that tensions and conflicts

¹⁵⁸ Robert Wuthnow and Marsha Witten, ‘New Directions in the Study of Culture’ (1988) 14 Annual Review of Sociology 49

¹⁵⁹ Adam Crawford, *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships* (Oxford University Press 1997) 95

¹⁶⁰ John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Longman Classics Edition)* (2nd edn, Longman 2002)

¹⁶¹ Alice Sampson and others, ‘Crime, Localities and the Multi-Agency Approach’ (1988) 28 British Journal of Criminology 478, 491

¹⁶² Edgar Schein, ‘Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies’ (1996) 41 Administrative Science Quarterly 229

¹⁶³ Jimmy Huang and others, ‘The Impact of Organizational Sub-Cultures on the Implementation of Component-Based Development’ in (ECIS, Gdańsk, Poland, London School of Economics 2002) <<http://is2.lse.ac.uk/asp/aspecis/20020061.pdf>> accessed 22 February 2012

¹⁶⁴ Henri Tajfel and John Turner, ‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour’ in Stephen Worchel and William Austin (eds), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (Nelson-Hall 1985)

¹⁶⁵ David Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society’ (1996) 36 British Journal of Criminology 445; See: Chapter 3.5

¹⁶⁶ Adam Crawford, ‘Plural Policing in the UK: Policing Beyond the Police’ in *Handbook of Policing* (2nd edn, Willan 2008) 149

¹⁶⁷ Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police* (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 1

¹⁶⁸ Crawford, ‘Plural policing in the UK: policing beyond the police’ (n 166) 151;

would arise because the various departments have different roles and functions.¹⁶⁹ A former DCLG minister states that

you're looking at different perspectives, mechanisms for operating across government, which I think are particularly poor, the way that we organise government is still in silos and it's very departmentalised and if you think about *Prevent*, it should be involving virtually every government department.¹⁷⁰

A Home Office official points out that similar tensions and conflicts persist across all government departments, particularly when delivering cross-departmental projects.¹⁷¹ Lord Carlile states that there are also tensions between the Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Department of Health (DoH), and the Department of Education (DoE). Part of the *Review* focuses on integrating the latter two departments into the institutional structure of *Prevent* more effectively. The DoH has never been engaged in counterterrorism prevention.¹⁷² A police officer seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit confirms that there are tensions between the Department of Education and local authorities. Summing up these tensions, he states, 'I wouldn't say that there are any particular conflicts or tensions, but there is the everyday stuff about working together'.¹⁷³

5.8 Organisational tensions: Should the police drive Prevent?

The Home Office designed *Prevent* and is ultimately responsible for its delivery. The Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, a department of the Home Office, is the lead department and coordinates *Pursue* and *Prevent* efforts. Although other government departments and agencies have their own *Prevent* teams, overall control remains with the OSCT, which works in partnership with them and liaises 'with local authorities on *Prevent* delivery and funding issues; [and] cooperate[s] with community groups of all kinds with *Prevent* interest'.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, *Prevent's* success is still tied to the collaborative efforts of the OSCT and its local and national partners. Since 2003, there has been pressure from the government and Parliament to improve *Prevent's* integration into the CONTEST framework, neighbourhood policing, and local authorities' approaches to crime prevention.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁹ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

¹⁷⁰ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

¹⁷¹ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

¹⁷² Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

¹⁷³ Male Police Officer, Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit (NP9) interview (n 45)

¹⁷⁴ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 96

¹⁷⁵ Home Office, 'From Neighbourhood to National' (HMSO 2008); Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1)

Despite participants disagreeing on who should ultimately drive *Prevent*, there is a general consensus that the police are still the driving force behind this policy.

Baroness Neville-Jones states that

if the police don't drive it actually, you don't have the motor. I think they are the motor. ... They should be the motor because I don't think that the motor will come from local authorities and it shouldn't come from the security services. ... I don't object to the police lead but I wouldn't want to see it as being police dominated.¹⁷⁶

The interview data reveal that most interviewees see the police as the most qualified organisation to do *Prevent* work (ten out of fifteen), while some portray local authorities as incompetent or unwilling to take the lead (four out of ten).¹⁷⁷ The general perception remains that the police should continue as the lead agency.¹⁷⁸

The *Prevent Review* acknowledges that

the role of policing has been important in the development of *Prevent* to date. *Prevent* is not, however, a police programme and it must not become one: it depends on a wide range of organisations in and out of Government. Some changes to the police role in *Prevent* are essential to enhance confidence in the programme.¹⁷⁹

Sir Norman Bettison, giving evidence to the Communities and Local Government Select Committee, argues that he was

very clear that if *Prevent* were left to the Police it would fail ... because the police have got to undertake the full gamut of the four Ps ... There is always the potential for those different responsibilities to get confused.¹⁸⁰

Thirteen of the fifteen participants agree that the police, despite being seen as the most qualified organisation, should not dominate *Prevent*. A former Inspector with HMIC states that

Prevent is about community policing, it's the only pillar of the counterterrorism strategy, which should be led by the local authorities and we should be playing a supporting part, so should probation, so should social services, so should education, everyone should be playing a supporting part. But it worked completely opposite, everything is usually police-led.¹⁸¹

According to a police officer seconded to ACPO, the police, rather than being the lead agency, should be an equal partner and not 'the loudest voice at the table. ...

Prevent is about not getting the police involved, not making [individuals] into

¹⁷⁶ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

¹⁷⁷ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

¹⁷⁸ Male Police Officer, Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit (NP9) interview (n 45)

¹⁷⁹ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 9

¹⁸⁰ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1) 53

¹⁸¹ Police Inspector, previously seconded to HMIC (NP13), 'Name Anonymized. Previously Seconded to HM Inspectorate of Constabulary Working on Prevent. Now Leading the Delivery of Prevent in a Midlands Police Force.' (2011)

criminals. It's about dealing with them before they become criminals'.¹⁸² Despite this, police forces continue to fulfil *Prevent* coordination and engagement roles.¹⁸³

A police officer seconded to the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit highlights that police organisational and cultural barriers exist within the police service.

Prevent has been an uphill battle, it's been an uphill battle within the organisation itself as well as outside the organisation ... First introducing it within the police service getting them to acknowledge it ... that we need to do something about this, around preventative work. But then again it's been the same uphill battle with partners outside, health, education, and again with the community because people are seeing *Prevent* linked to religion. ... We need to understand this, throughout the police service, throughout the outside organisations; *Prevent* is about safeguarding individuals from becoming radicalised.¹⁸⁴

Police culture is action-orientated and celebrates a macho culture which values crime detection and 'thief taking, while devaluing preventative work as unglamorous'.¹⁸⁵

The ACPO officer further highlights tensions between the police and other *Prevent* partners such as the Departments of Education and Health. Negative attitudes towards *Prevent*, which was seen as a waste of time and money, are highlighted in informal conversations with police officers from three different forces. Although the police remain the driving force behind *Prevent*, there are problems motivating police officers and other partners to engage in *Prevent* work. Such attitudes may be counterproductive and have a negative impact on inter-agency collaboration.¹⁸⁶

5.9 Organisational tensions: Funding as a source of inter-organisational tensions

The allocation of funds represents another source of organisational tensions. Compared to CONTEST's overall budget, the funding allocated to *Prevent* is meagre. How *Prevent* funding has been allocated in the past has been controversial and politically sensitive.¹⁸⁷ Many interviewees raise concerns about this. A senior official at the NPIA points out that 'in terms ... of joined up work around this, it was hampered ... where the funding is really going to come from'.¹⁸⁸ Tension over the use of *Prevent* funds extends beyond organisational tension. Project Champion, and other examples collected and published in a Policy Exchange report, illustrate this

¹⁸² Female Police Officer (NP10) interview (n 100)

¹⁸³ Home Affairs Select Committee (n 30) 9

¹⁸⁴ Female Police Officer (NP10) interview (n 100)

¹⁸⁵ Crawford, 'Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, Policies and Practices' (n 58) 899

¹⁸⁶ Crawford, *The Local Governance of Crime* (n 159) 124

¹⁸⁷ Yahya Birt, 'Promoting Virulent Envy? Reconsidering the UK's Terrorist Prevention Strategy' (2009) 154 Royal United Service Institute 52

point.¹⁸⁹ Numerous media stories claim that *Prevent* funds are channelled into extremist anti-democratic Islamic groups,¹⁹⁰ claims acted upon in the *Review*. Initially, grants were allocated to local authorities; these funds were not ring-fenced. Sir Norman Bettison argues that ‘money got in the way. The money was made available for *Prevent* and therefore it got distorted into activities that were a priority for the different councils’.¹⁹¹ This was in part possible because the objectives within *Prevent* were vague, allowing councils to spend *Prevent* funds on community cohesion and integration projects, which were often only loosely connected to counterterrorism.¹⁹²

The Labour government spent considerably more money on *Prevent* than the coalition government. In 2008/9, the Labour government allocated £140 million to *Prevent*.¹⁹³ These funds were allocated according to demographics – ethnicity played a major role – and councils with a population of more than 2,000 Muslims received money.¹⁹⁴ Groups such as the Institute of Race Relations and the Quilliam Foundation criticised this approach.¹⁹⁵ The *Review* reallocates funds to twenty-five priority areas, which it claims are based on a process which aggregates information ‘and policing indicators of terrorist activity to understand areas where *Prevent* work needs to be prioritised’.¹⁹⁶ That said, the councils receiving *Prevent* funding remain largely the same. A former DCLG minister argues that the *Prevent Review* is a cover for budget cuts.¹⁹⁷ Annual government spending on *Prevent* in 2010/11 shrunk to around £21 million,¹⁹⁸ and £9.1 million in 2011/12.¹⁹⁹ Over the same period (2011/12), DCLG’s annual accounts show that an additional £1.5 million, approximately, was spent on cohesion and integration. Additional money from the neighbourhood and localism budgets may have also gone towards integration and cohesion projects, though how much is unclear. It is unclear how much has been

¹⁸⁸ Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74)

¹⁸⁹ Birmingham City Council (n 101); Maher and Frampton (n 65)

¹⁹⁰ Alan Travis, ‘Axe Funding for Anti-Democracy Muslim Groups, Says Former Minister’, *the Guardian* (2 May 2011) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/07/muslim-groups-counter-terrorism-funding>> accessed 4 April 2012

¹⁹¹ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

¹⁹² Police Inspector, previously seconded to HMIC (NP13) interview (n 181)

¹⁹³ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 32)

¹⁹⁴ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1) 50

¹⁹⁵ *ibid* Ev 122

¹⁹⁶ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38) 97

¹⁹⁷ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

¹⁹⁸ Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Prevent Payments Made by DCLG Between 1 April and 31 March 2011’ (2011)

<<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/corporate/pdf/1942863.pdf>> accessed 6 July 2012

¹⁹⁹ Paul Bowers, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (SN05993, House of Commons Library 2013)

spent on tackling extremism because this comes out of the three different budgets just mentioned, though the total is unlikely to exceed £2 million. Therefore, the total spent on *Prevent* could be around £11 million, which is significantly less than the amount spent on *Prevent* by the Labour government.²⁰⁰ Although *Prevent* funding has been cut, this is only in part due to the government's austerity measures, a Home Office official has said.²⁰¹

Shortly after the publication of the *Review*, a former DCLG minister raised concerns about the separation of integration from *Prevent*.

I think there will be much less funding, certainly from the communities department going into this work. ... The integration strategy will be quite minimal in terms of where it operates, what it does and what resources there are to do it. I am afraid that the Home Office end of *Prevent* will all be about security.²⁰²

The Prime Minister's views are that

Prevent programmes must not assume control or allocate funding to integration projects, which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the government will not securitize its integration strategy.²⁰³

The new integration strategy does not specify expenditure for tackling extremism, though it is significantly less than what was previously spent on *Prevent*. A Home Office official states that *Prevent* does not require the amount of funds needed for *Pursue* or *Protect* because it works with people, and requires very little expensive equipment or the funds needed for complex police investigations.²⁰⁴ With fewer funds and a shift towards localism, some services provided by local authorities are due to be replaced by services from voluntary and third sector organisations, with only some money coming from local authority grants.²⁰⁵ There is a perception amongst politicians and policymakers that with the devolution of integration to the DCLG, and more responsibility going to local councils, less money needs to come from the Home Office for *Prevent* and community cohesion projects.²⁰⁶

The *Review* addresses two specific funding issues. The first concerns funding about projects based on their effectiveness and relationship to the counterterrorism objectives of *Prevent*. The second is a concern about funding 'anti-democratic' and

²⁰⁰ Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12' (HMSO 2012)

²⁰¹ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²⁰² Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

²⁰³ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 6

²⁰⁴ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²⁰⁵ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 24

²⁰⁶ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

extremist groups.²⁰⁷ A Cabinet Office official states that due to a lack of effective oversight of *Prevent* programmes, many projects previously had a community cohesion or integration focus, rather than a counterterrorism one.²⁰⁸ In the early stages of *Prevent*, projects were set up and funded after consultations with communities ‘so we actually didn’t end up doing hard-core *Prevent* ... work. It was more around ... building capacity and resilience in communities’.²⁰⁹ Collaboration between the police and local authorities on how to spend *Prevent* money was partly what made *Prevent* innovative. According to a senior NPIA official, Labour’s *Prevent* policy produced some great projects such as the Street project in East London and the Active Change project, but many of these will not continue because they are perceived as not truly *Prevent*. ‘I think a lot of innovation has come from that and a lot of hope as well.’²¹⁰ Baroness Neville-Jones, on the other hand, argues that due to a lack of guidance, ‘not only did you get some things ... which we regard as objectionable but you got an awful lot of money just wasted’.²¹¹ On the second point, criticisms were levelled at *Prevent* because it funded a number of organisations, such as Street, which were deemed extremist because of their religious and political views.²¹² As David Cameron made clear, even before the publication of the *Review*, such groups would not receive government money under his stewardship, whether through *Prevent* or from the DCLG.²¹³

Conservative, and even several Labour, politicians find it unacceptable to fund organisations which hold anti-democratic values.²¹⁴ A senior NPIA official believes that doing so is a mistake ‘because actually when you look at the portfolio of the work that they have done ... Organisations like that have a huge contribution to make.’²¹⁵ The NPIA official acknowledges that, at times, *Prevent* funds were used at events as platforms to promote non-violent extremism, rather than doing grass-roots preventative work. This is where he believes the line should be drawn. The issue of funding is critical and links to the question of *Prevent*’s aims. With less expenditure on community cohesion, the *Prevent* policy becomes ‘harder’ because it focuses

²⁰⁷ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38) 24

²⁰⁸ Junior Cabinet Office Official (NP7) interview (n 156)

²⁰⁹ Junior NPIA Official (Asian Female, NP12) interview (n 75)

²¹⁰ Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74)

²¹¹ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

²¹² Maher and Frampton (n 65)

²¹³ Cameron (n 92)

²¹⁴ Travis (n 190)

²¹⁵ Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74)

more on information sharing and *Channel*. The level of funding, and how it is spent, therefore has a direct impact on the direction of *Prevent*.

5.10 Organisational tensions: National/local tensions

Local authorities and the police carry out much of the *Prevent* agenda, working with affected communities.²¹⁶ The *Prevent* policy, however, is driven by a set of national objectives as set out by central government. ‘The number one national objective is to have no terrorism and local activities are directed towards this.’²¹⁷ The *Review* reaffirms the position taken by the Labour government that local communities are often in a better position than the government to tackle issues of extremism, and to challenge and even disrupt claims made by terrorist groups.²¹⁸ According to the interview data, tensions arise because there is disagreement on how much freedom local authorities should be given, and whether central government objectives or local concerns should be prioritised throughout local *Prevent* delivery.

According to Lord Carlile, *Prevent* and counterterrorism work is not about addressing local issues. Although local councils can be very skilful in bringing people together, *Prevent* is about achieving national rather than local objectives.

There should be a clear national strategy so that we don’t have idiosyncratic local authorities going off on a frolic of their own ... which is not consistent with the national strategy. And for any local authority, for any volunteer organisation that is in doubt as to how they can play their part in national counterterrorism strategy, well there’s plenty of advice available. ... I think they should be given reasonable freedom. ... They would be very wise to obtain advice from central government if they think they are going to do something eccentric. I don’t think they should have the freedom to deal with extremists. It is unnecessary now.²¹⁹

The argument advanced by Lord Carlile suggests that there are reservations about certain local authorities, while recognising that they have an important part to play in achieving the national objectives of *Prevent*, but within certain parameters. Such a view is supported by eleven of the fifteen participants, although there is disagreement about how restrictive these parameters should be, with some arguing that local authorities should be given greater scope.²²⁰

²¹⁶ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38)

²¹⁷ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

²¹⁸ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38)

²¹⁹ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4); Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77); Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²²⁰ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6); Junior NPIA Official (Asian Female, NP12) interview (n 75); Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74); Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

Other interviewees and the *Prevent Review* support this view, arguing that ‘the Government’s commitment to localism will support the *Prevent* strategy’.²²¹ According to the *Review*, communities and local authorities continue to have a role within *Prevent*, but because of national security concerns, central government departments rather than local authorities should develop the policy. A senior Home Office Official acknowledges that there are tensions between the national and local level, particularly about the decision not to include far-right extremism, despite local authorities’ claims that it was a catalyst for community tensions. He further states that local leaders are often blinded by their local problems and do not grasp the whole picture because they are not privy to all the available intelligence.²²² It is essential, he argues, that some local authorities are told what to do. Within *Prevent*, local discretion takes over unless there are wider national security concerns which cannot be dealt with at a local level.

Sir Norman Bettison takes the opposite position, and states that *Prevent* is actually a comfortable bedfellow with neighbourhood policing. ‘You can’t have a *Prevent* strategy unless you’ve got a neighbourhood-policing infrastructure.’²²³ He believes that a national set of objectives are needed, but ‘how these are fulfilled and implemented needs to have a nuanced local understanding and feel’.²²⁴ Jones suggests that there is unwillingness within the police service to devolve crime-fighting tasks to inexperienced local authorities.²²⁵ The interview data, however, suggest that the police are the strongest supporters of a multi-agency approach within *Prevent*, and want to include local authorities in *Prevent* work. A police officer seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit argues that the *Prevent* policy provides the guidelines. ‘The national strategies should just be basic guidelines to steer you in the right direction. But with *Prevent*, if you’ve got that national support, what more do you need?’²²⁶ Being new to the world of counterterrorism, local authorities should be able to access appropriate materials and guidance from central government departments, where needed.²²⁷ A civil servant at the DCLG argues that local

²²¹ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38) 6

²²² Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²²³ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 6)

²²⁴ *ibid*

²²⁵ Trevor Jones, ‘Policing’ in Chris Hale and others (eds), *Criminology* (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007)

²²⁶ Female Police Officer (NP10) interview (n 100)

²²⁷ Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1) interview (n 3)

authorities should be given as much autonomy as possible, adapting *Prevent* to the needs of local communities,

because that is where the local people live, that's where the real issues happen and that is where real solutions will come from. However, if local authorities feel they need help from the centre that option should be given.²²⁸

The former Home Secretary Jack Straw asserts that there is a very close day-to-day working relationship between the police, including the CTU, and the local authorities in regard to *Prevent*.²²⁹

Successive governments have made it clear that communities are central to *Prevent*. Local knowledge is needed to set up appropriate programmes and target those vulnerable to extremism. If central government departments drive *Prevent*, one must assume that they possess some knowledge about target communities. Yet, a senior DCLG official states that amongst the central government departments there is 'absolutely zero knowledge'²³⁰ about local communities. This creates tensions between national and local authorities because both the local authorities and the police believe that it is important to include far-right extremism within the *Prevent* policy because this is seen as a catalyst for fermenting jihadi extremism.²³¹ A lack of understanding of local issues also creates tensions. Other interviewees do not mention this lack of local knowledge or its associated tensions. However, academic literature suggests that a lack of community knowledge, in the form of external consultants carrying out community-mapping exercises, deprives both national and local authorities of crucial local knowledge.²³²

At the local level, *Prevent* is organised along similar lines to the Crime Safety Partnerships (CSP). The *Review* envisages a local framework where 'locally, *Prevent* work is accountable to the elected councillors and the new police and crime commissioners'.²³³ Local *Prevent* partners are familiar with this framework because it is often the same people who previously worked on local CSPs.

You have all the range of partners, all of the emergency services, education, health, social services and youth services. ... They all have a part to play in that the solution is a joint decision, never a local authority making unilateral decisions.²³⁴

²²⁸ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

²²⁹ Jack Straw (NP5) interview (n 144)

²³⁰ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

²³¹ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²³² Rachel Briggs, 'Community Engagement for Counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom' (2010) 86 *International Affairs* 971

²³³ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 96

²³⁴ Male Police Officer, Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit (NP9) interview (n 45)

This supportive infrastructure is strongly orientated towards objectives similar to those of *Prevent*, such as crime prevention and harm reduction.²³⁵ As one of the police officers from the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit states, decision making should be driven by partnerships instead of the police or local authority alone.²³⁶ This is because of the various skills and knowledge each partner organisation brings to the table. According to some interviewees, some local authorities have been overzealous, and have gone beyond the set boundaries of *Prevent*.²³⁷ A partnership approach, however, is vital to *Prevent* because it allows local authorities and the police to carry out work at the grass roots level of communities.²³⁸

Despite the local infrastructure, tensions remain between national and local authorities regarding information sharing. ‘The nature of the work and the sensitivity became so confidential, in parts, that people weren’t sharing information properly’,²³⁹ and they were particularly unwilling to share such information with local authorities. Information sharing between agencies and departments has improved. ‘It is a lot better now than it was’ when *Prevent* was first launched.²⁴⁰ Some police forces are still reluctant to share information with their partners and the wider community. The Home Office claims that maximal information is shared with its local partners. Some of this information is shared through counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLP),²⁴¹ which provides those vetted within the local authorities and the police with intelligence about extremism in their communities. Many local authorities’ chief executives have received security clearance so that relevant intelligence can be shared.²⁴² This is the case in Maybury. Some information is also shared with Independent Advisory Groups, community representatives who meet with the police ‘to form a two way dialogue and provide opportunity to give feedback, advice and input into community perspectives on a range of local policing issues.’²⁴³ There are issues with this process because it relies on gatekeepers within the Muslim

²³⁵ David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society* (University Of Chicago Press 2001) 16

²³⁶ Male Police Officer, Seconded to ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit (NP9) interview (n 45)

²³⁷ Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15)

²³⁸ Female Police Officer (NP10) interview (n 100)

²³⁹ Senior NPIA Official (NP11) interview (n 74)

²⁴⁰ *ibid*

²⁴¹ Association of Chief Police Officers, ‘Prevent Counter Terrorism Local Profiles’ (*Scribd*, 2010) <<http://www.scribd.com/doc/29365471/Prevent-Counter-Terrorism-Local-Profiles-CTLPs>> accessed 4 December 2012

²⁴² Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²⁴³ Association of Police Authorities, ‘Independent Advisory Groups’ (2012) <<http://www.apa.police.uk/your-police-authority/get-involved/independent-advisory-groups>> accessed 4 April 2012

communities, which according to a junior NPIA official are comprised of the

usual sort of suspects. ... The sharing of information structures are there and they are good in terms of the structure and the relationships that they build but it's the quality of what they are actually sharing and understanding, some of the community issues of what makes communities vulnerable to extremism.²⁴⁴

Progress has been made, and the government has addressed some of the tensions with regard to information sharing, whereas other tensions between central government and local authorities remain generally unaddressed. Despite the *Review's* claims, the shift towards localism has left local authorities with less say about how to implement *Prevent* in their areas. National oversight has been tightened, budgets cut, and the issues of extremism and integration have devolved to DCLG with little or no funding.

5.11 Organisational tensions: Evaluation of Prevent

According to HM Treasury: 'All policies, programmes and projects should be subject to comprehensive but proportionate evaluation, where practicable to do so.'²⁴⁵ The *Prevent Review* acknowledges that the evaluation of preventative programmes is challenging because 'success is often reflected in changing attitudes as much as behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure'.²⁴⁶ The aims and objectives of *Prevent* have been in flux over the last few years, change being the norm. As a relatively new policy, it has not settled and its aims and objectives are still changing – with the *Review* representing the latest shift. The Communities and Local Government Select Committee found that evaluation of *Prevent* is poor because its aims and objectives are unclear.²⁴⁷ The *Review* states that under the Labour government there was a lack of evaluation of *Prevent* programmes.

The monitoring of *Prevent* projects has not been robust enough to justify the sums of public money spent on them. ... Unless there is evidence that they are effective and of value for money, projects will lose their funding.²⁴⁸

According to Chelimsky, the purpose of evaluation is threefold: accountability, development, and increased knowledge.²⁴⁹ Without a clear purpose, evaluation cannot provide the answers to questions it is not designed to resolve and cannot,

²⁴⁴ Junior NPIA Official (Asian Female, NP12) interview (n 75)

²⁴⁵ HM Treasury, 'The Magenta Book: Guidance for Evaluation' (London 2011) 7

²⁴⁶ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) 36

²⁴⁷ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1)

²⁴⁸ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38) Foreword

²⁴⁹ Eleanor Chelimsky, 'Making Evaluation Units Effective' in Joseph Wholey and others (eds), *Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation* (Joessy-Bass 1994)

therefore, reliably inform the policymaking process.²⁵⁰ If evaluation is done with a clear purpose, the outcome can inform the future development of policy as well as add to the knowledge base. Under the Labour government, an evaluation framework was in place, known as NI 35,²⁵¹ although the *Review* claims that evaluation was neglected.²⁵² The *Review* features a section on evaluation but fails to answer the question of what *Prevent* is evaluated against.²⁵³ Are the aims of *Prevent* to stop radicalisation and change hearts and minds, or are they about community cohesion? The latter can now be ruled out because community cohesion has been moved to the integration strategy by the *Review*.

The interviewees agree that monitoring and evaluation for *Prevent* is difficult and underdeveloped. Baroness Neville-Jones states that evaluation of *Prevent* is very difficult, but needs to be done,²⁵⁴ a common ‘criticism being that it lacked a focus on outcomes and failed to provide a clear picture at national level of how *Prevent* money is being spent and whether it is providing value for money’.²⁵⁵ This goes back to the point made by Chelmisky: evaluation makes policy more accountable. The idea is that *Prevent* is sustainable over time. ‘The requirement to deliver *Prevent* quickly, combined with generous funding allocation, led to limited quality control.’²⁵⁶ A senior Home Office official states that more risk-based models need to be developed. He adds that it is better to try prevention and fail because it sends out the message that we are doing something.²⁵⁷ *Prevent*, the Home Office official says, is about doing something to reassure communities. De Graaf supports this position, arguing that the message communicated to the public is closely linked to levels of violence and radicalisation.²⁵⁸ ‘Consequently, public perceptions of government performance in addressing the threat and securing citizens can provide one measure of effectiveness of counterterrorism and terrorism prevention efforts.’²⁵⁹

²⁵⁰ HM Treasury (n 245) 32

²⁵¹ Audit Commission, ‘NI 35 Building Resilience to Violent Extremism’ (2010) <<http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/performance-information/performance-data-collections-and-guidance/nis/Pages/NI035Buildingresiliencetoviolentextremism.aspx>> accessed 1 August 2012

²⁵² HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 32)

²⁵³ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38)

²⁵⁴ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3) interview (n 77)

²⁵⁵ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 1) 51

²⁵⁶ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 38) 36

²⁵⁷ Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 9)

²⁵⁸ Beatrice de Graaf, *Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study* (Routledge 2011)

²⁵⁹ Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdury Fink, ‘From Input to Impact: Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs’ (Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2012) 6

Evaluation is important to improve any policy, and its importance is highlighted in the *Review*. Lord Carlile suggests that a PDA-type system, where participants are asked questions before and after the programme to provide a sense of how effective it has been, might be part of an evaluation solution.²⁶⁰ Such a solution may be part of a wider framework, but it is not a comprehensive solution for evaluating *Prevent* programmes. A junior official at the NPIA agrees, stating that more scrutiny and evaluation is needed because it is just not there.²⁶¹ Lord Carlile argues that despite difficulties with assessing *Prevent* and *Channel*, there are ways and means to get a better picture of what is going on nationally.²⁶² Accessing preventative counterterrorism projects, academics and professionals agree, is difficult.²⁶³

If *Prevent* is about reducing extremism that leads to violence, this implies the need for understanding extremism and how it is linked to terrorism. The *Review* suggests that the Labour government's use of the term 'violent extremism' was too broad and replaced it with 'extremism'.²⁶⁴ This seems absurd because violent extremism, although problematic, actually has a much narrower focus than extremism per se. The *Review* argues that *Prevent* focuses on extremism leading to terrorism, whereas the integration strategy focuses on all other forms of extremism. Where the line is drawn between extremism and extremism leading to terrorism is not entirely clear, but the policy document suggests that the difference is that extremist Islamic ideology drives the latter.

Good-quality evaluations can play important roles in setting and delivering on government priorities and objectives, demonstrating accountability, and providing defensible evidence to independent scrutiny processes. They also contribute valuable knowledge to the policy evidence base, feeding into future policy development and occupying a crucial role in the policy cycle. ...

Not evaluating, or evaluating poorly, will mean that policy makers will not be able to provide meaningful evidence in support of any claims they might wish to make about a policy's effectiveness. Any such claims will be effectively unfounded.²⁶⁵

This suggests that *Prevent*'s success, at least in part, relies on the understanding of the problem, and that evaluation is an essential part for future development of this policy.

²⁶⁰ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

²⁶¹ Junior NPIA Official (Asian Female, NP12) interview (n 75)

²⁶² Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 4)

²⁶³ Beatrice de Graaf, 'Why Communication and Performance Are Key in Countering Terrorism' (2011) *Counter-terrorism, Communication and Performance*

²⁶⁴ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 38)

²⁶⁵ HM Treasury (n 245) 11

5.12 Conclusion

CONTEST and *Prevent* are innovative compared to previous counterterrorism strategies in terms of what they are trying to achieve – the prevention of terrorism. The majority of interviewees agree that *Prevent*, although innovative, is problematic and creates tensions on policy and organisational levels around issues such as how it should be set up to prevent individuals becoming radicalised; how and whom to engage with; how to tackle issues of extremism; and how to evaluate the policy project's outcomes. As *Prevent* is relatively new, its scope has been constantly changing. Although there is a consensus amongst interviewees that prevention is important, there was no consensus about how to achieve it. More striking, interviewees disagree on the causes of extremism, and where and how extremism is linked to political violence. Withers comments that 'there remains only a partial understanding of both the ideological dimension of the threat and the motivation of terrorists', thereby supporting this argument.²⁶⁶ *Prevent* remains an uncomfortable bedfellow within the CONTEST framework, an issue that the *Review* attempts to address.

Even after the *Review*, *Prevent* remains organised around Muslim communities in the UK on policy and organisational levels, creating and perpetuating tensions between central government, local councils, and Muslim communities. Those interviewed maintain that the policy is not designed to target Muslim communities per se, although some recognised that this was an inevitable outcome based on the threat which jihadi terrorism poses. The *Review* claims that it does not want to criminalise community cohesion, thereby separating work on extremism from *Prevent*. The *Review* represents a shift from broad secondary to focused secondary prevention and the identification of individuals, focusing primarily on those within Muslim communities at risk of radicalisation. The new process focuses more on information sharing between government agencies and local authorities rather than on community involvement and empowerment, and helping affected communities to deal with extremism. Whether this new approach will work remains to be seen. With sectarian divisions, a growing siege mentality amongst Muslim communities,²⁶⁷ and a *Prevent* policy which appears to focus more on surveillance and information sharing rather

²⁶⁶ James Withers, 'A Work in Progress: The United Kingdom's Campaign Against Radicalization' (George C Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Occasional Paper, 2007) 18

²⁶⁷ Aly and Balnaves (n 119)

than community empowerment, the notion of *Prevent* as a tool to spy on Muslim communities may persist in the future.

Chapter 6: *Prevent* and its local professional delivery

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapters examined the national *Prevent* framework, its aims and scope, its set-up, and the conflicts and tensions that arise at national level. This chapter outlines how the national *Prevent* policy has been implemented in Maybury, the pseudonym given to the case study area in the North of England, between 2007 and 2012 in terms of its governance and organisational structure, and includes the impact of the 2011 *Prevent Review*.¹ Maybury's local authorities have been involved in the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) pilot since 2006, and *Prevent* since 2007.² In 2011, the *Prevent Review* designated Maybury a priority area, and the local authorities there continued to receive *Prevent* funding.³ One fifth of the population is Muslim with South Asian heritage. This case study relies on the data gathered from twenty interviews with local professionals such as senior managers of the local authority, senior police officers, front line council staff, police, and voluntary and private sector professionals involved in delivering *Prevent*.

This chapter is structured similarly to the previous chapter and focuses first on policy and organisational tensions which were identified earlier, but examines them from the perspective of the local professionals and in the context of *Prevent's* local delivery in Maybury. Initially, this chapter examines policy tensions. The data suggest that there are tensions between the local and national levels in terms of the direction *Prevent* is moving towards – from community cohesion to *Channel*-like interventions which focus solely on Muslim communities. A further issue raised is the exclusion of far-right extremism by the *Prevent Review*, something that is regarded as important locally, but rejected nationally. The second part of this chapter focuses on organisational tensions which include a perception that there is a lack of information sharing between the Home Office, the police, and the local authorities in Maybury. This chapter argues that this has undermined the trust that Maybury's Muslim communities have in the police and the local authorities. The chapter closes by examining pressures associated with the funding and evaluation of *Prevent* projects, and perceptions of success or failure of the *Prevent* policy in Maybury.

¹ See: Chapter 4.5

² Preventing violent extremism in Maybury, 'Report Anonymized.' (2009)

³ See: Chapter 4.5

6.2 Delivering Prevent in Maybury

Maybury Council has been delivering *Prevent* programmes since 2007, and was continuing to do so at the time of writing in 2012. The programmes include ‘Channel’, and a number of community cohesion projects which focus on awareness-raising and interfaith programmes. These programmes are discussed at length later in the chapter. This section highlights how *Prevent* has evolved in Maybury during 2007-11. The findings are based on interviews with local professionals, documents provided by the council, and documents obtained through a number of Freedom of Information requests.⁴ Documents include the local authority’s *Prevent* delivery plan, and its revised version which complies with the requirements of the *Prevent Review*. Overall responsibility for delivering CONTEST, including *Prevent*, in the county lies with the county’s CONTEST board. Members of the board include senior managers from the local authorities and police. According to Maybury Council’s chief executive officer,⁵ the CONTEST board devolved *Prevent*’s delivery to local authorities’ community safety partnerships through its local councils’ chief executives.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Maybury is a mill town in the North of England and has one of the highest proportions of BME communities in the UK. The majority of these communities are from South Asia with links to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Over the years, there have been a number of incidents in the Maybury area which could suggest that pockets of jihadi extremism exist there. At the same time, the data does not suggest that extremism is common. In 2009, a number of individuals in the Maybury area were arrested on suspicion of terrorism-related offences.⁶ All were later released without charge. This incident, more so than any other terrorism-related arrest in the area, appears to have affected Maybury’s Muslim communities and has led to Maybury’s Council of Mosques disengaging with *Prevent*. Throughout the interviews, local professionals and members from Maybury’s Muslim communities refer to this particular incident as a turning point in the relationship between the local authorities and Muslim communities in Maybury.

⁴ See Chapter 4.5

⁵ Local Authority Chief Executive (LP6), ‘Name Anonymized. Member of the CONTEST Board. White Male, Early 60s.’ (2011)

⁶ BBC News, ‘Title Anonymized. Terrorism Arrests in Maybury’ (2009); The Telegraph, ‘Title Anonymized. Terrorism Related Arrest and Guilty Verdicts in Maybury’ (2010)

6.2.1 Delivering Prevent in Maybury, 2008-2011

In 2008, Maybury council drew up a *Prevent* delivery plan which included staffing the community safety team to coordinate, implement, monitor, and review the delivery of *Prevent*.⁷ Maybury's *Prevent* policy documents provide a very brief overview of the national *Prevent* strategy and sketch out the local socio-economic issues faced by the local authorities. Little in-depth detail about how the national objectives are to be translated into a local strategy is present. The excerpts below are the most substantive two bullet points about how implementation is to be achieved.

We aim to reflect the national strategy and meet local need through a programme that is proportionate, based on best practice and evidence, effective and financially sustainable. ... Our approach is based on a prevention model of community, targeted and specialist interventions.⁸

Through in-depth interviews and other documents provided, the local *Prevent* programme could be pieced together. Much of the *Prevent* work in Maybury is delivered by the various organisations shown in Figure 6.1. Following a public tendering process, the successful programmes are delivered by the police, the local council, charities, private sector organisations, and community groups. It is worth noting that only seven of the twenty local professionals and providers of *Prevent* programmes had read the full *Prevent* policy document. During one of the interviews, the researcher was asked to summarise *Prevent* and the *Prevent Review* to save the participant having to read the document. This suggests that information about *Prevent* is either gathered through media representations and/or hearsay from colleagues about what *Prevent* aims to do. As will be shown later, the majority of the programmes delivered community cohesion, community engagement, and interfaith or awareness-raising related content. Work carried out by these organisations was originally overseen and evaluated by the community safety team, and later by the council's *Prevent* lead.

From 2010 to 2011, a police officer was seconded to the community safety team and assigned to coordinate the delivery of *Prevent* within the council. After a short period, this individual became the lead officer for *Prevent*.⁹ In mid-2011, Maybury

⁷ Community Safety Team – Roles and responsibilities, 'Website Anonymized' (no date)


⁸ Policy Document: Prevent Implementation Plan, 'Policy Document Anonymized.' (Maybury Council 2009)

⁹ Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council, 'Name Anonymized. Coordinated the Delivery of Prevent. Asian Male, Mid 30s (LP11).' (2011)

council established a dedicated post embedded within the community safety team to coordinate and monitor *Prevent*'s local delivery and to liaise with other *Prevent* partners both nationally and locally.¹⁰ Figure 6.1 shows the organisational structure of *Prevent* in Maybury.

Figure 6.1

Prevent organisational structure in Maybury between 2007 and 2011.



Source: Maybury 'Prevent Implementation Plan'. Obtained through a FOI request. Details anonymised.

Prevent's organisational structure draws upon the already established community safety partnership (CSP) which was formed as a 'result of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which placed a duty on local services such as the police, council, Fire Service, Children's Services, Housing, and Probation to work together to reduce

¹⁰ Prevent lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9), 'Name Anonymized, White Female, Mid 40s.' (2011)

crime'.¹¹ This multi-agency approach to *Prevent* is reflected in Figure 6.1. The community safety team, a member of the CSP, is central to the delivery of *Prevent*, coordinating and monitoring *Prevent* activities and the distribution of its funds in consultation with other CSP partners such as the police, the probation service, and the voluntary and private sectors. Its aims are to embed *Prevent's* delivery 'through an effective programme of action across the borough'.¹² Between 2008 and 2011, the police also received separate funding from the Home Office. This was ring-fenced for dedicated *Prevent* staff such as community engagement officers and a *Channel* inspector.¹³

Prior to 2008, Maybury council had been involved in delivering the PVE pathfinder programme. Between 2008 and 2011, the community safety team invited statutory, voluntary, and private sector organisations to bid for and deliver *Prevent* projects. These projects were funded through a non-ring-fenced area grant provided by DCLG.¹⁴ Between 2007 and 2011, the community safety team approved thirty-eight programmes which appeared to meet the five *Prevent* objectives outlined in the *Prevent* policy.¹⁵ As these funds were not ring-fenced, Maybury Council had considerable freedom to allocate them. The council claims that it engaged in a 'clearly tasked strategic partnership with the police and other partners to deliver an effective programme of action' in the area,¹⁶ working within the national *Prevent* framework. The council further claims that it was able to respond to the needs of the local communities, delivering multi-agency interventions appropriate to the level of threat within the locality. As documented by the media, the lack of national oversight allowed local authorities across the UK to exploit these funds for loosely connected projects.¹⁷

¹¹ Maybury Council Community Safety Strategy 2010-2013, 'Policy Document Anonymized.' (Maybury Council 2010)

¹² Policy Document: Prevent Implementation Plan (n 8)

¹³ Police Inspector and Lead on Channel (LP14), 'Name Anonymized. Asian Male, Early 50s.' (2011)

¹⁴ Department for Communities and Local, 'Prevent Funding' (2011)

<<http://www.communities.gov.uk/corporate/foi/disclosure-log/disclosurelog2011/jul2011/preventfunding/>> accessed 1 August 2012

¹⁵ Prevent lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

¹⁶ Policy Document: Prevent Implementation Plan (n 8)

¹⁷ Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, 'Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups' (Policy Exchange 2009); See: Chapter 7

6.2.2 The 2008 *Prevent* delivery plan

The purpose of the 2008 *Prevent* delivery plan was to ‘ensure that in conjunction with local partnerships ... the delivery of a jointly agreed programme of action’ was driven forward.¹⁸ The plan stated that

there will be effective collaboration with the [police] and the [Counter-Terrorism] hub and Government Offices in the use of intelligence to inform different *Prevent* strategies and interventions.¹⁹

This delivery plan centred on the five objectives outlined in the 2009 CONTEST strategy. These were

to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate; support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists; increase resilience of communities to violent extremism; and address grievances which ideologues are exploiting.²⁰

Other objectives included developing *Prevent*-related intelligence analysis and research, and improving strategic communications. Where appropriate, *Prevent* programmes included joint interventions to identify vulnerable individuals and provide support, disrupt individuals promoting violent extremism, work with institutions where individuals could be promoting violent extremism, and work with communities vulnerable to violent extremism.

From 2008 to the end of 2010, central government measured *Prevent* and the progress of local authorities through national indicator 35 (NI 35). The purpose of this national assessment framework was to evaluate *Prevent*'s effectiveness. The indicator was based on four main criteria. These were:

Understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities; knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent extremism and the *Prevent* objectives; development of a risk-based preventing violent extremism action plan, in support of the delivery of the *Prevent* objectives; effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects and actions.²¹

After the removal of this indicator in November 2010, the government failed to replace the assessment with an alternative framework. Even after the publication of the *Prevent Review*, which bemoans the lack of evaluation and national oversight of

¹⁸ Policy Document: *Prevent* Implementation Plan (n 8)

¹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰ HM Government, ‘*Prevent* Strategy’ (HMSO 2011) 80

²¹ Audit Commission, ‘NI 35 Building Resilience to Violent Extremism’ (2010) <<http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/performance-information/performance-data-collections-and-guidance/nis/Pages/NI035Buildingresiliencetoviolentextremism.aspx>> accessed 1 August 2012

local *Prevent* projects,²² the coalition government has not introduced a new assessment framework up to the present time.

In Maybury, the CONTEST steering group was given responsibility to evaluate *Prevent* projects²³ and assess their local delivery in accordance with NI 35. This task, carried out by members of the community safety team, became part of the steering group's responsibilities. They were engaged on a strategic level with neighbourhood engagement projects, developing internal and external *Prevent* community strategies, and also with 'a CT specific group of independent advisors to ensure that information from minority communities [helped] to direct [the councils] approaches to communication'.²⁴ The role of the CONTEST advisory group, also included in Figure 6.1, was to work with the voluntary, community, and faith sectors to develop and carry out the CSP's *Prevent* communication strategy. The community safety team worked closely with its CSP partners, and particularly with the dedicated *Prevent* team from the police and its regional counterterrorism intelligence units, to coordinate *Prevent* activities.

The data suggest that basing the *Prevent* delivery on the already established CSP framework worked well in Maybury because it drew on the knowledge and skills of individuals who had already worked in a multi-agency environment. One of the police community engagement officers stated that the majority of individuals working on *Prevent* had had previous experience of community policing and inter-agency work.²⁵ These experiences appear to have improved cooperation and information sharing.

6.2.3 *The impact of the Prevent Review on Maybury*

The *Prevent Review* lists twenty-five priority areas, one of which is Maybury. Maybury's local authorities revised their *Prevent* delivery plan in 2011 to meet the new criteria as outlined in the *Prevent Review*. These amended objectives are reflected in the Maybury *Prevent* delivery plan and are: challenging extremist ideology, supporting individuals, and supporting work with institutions in the voluntary and private sector.²⁶ Maybury's revised policy document is much clearer

²² HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 20)

²³ See: Figure 6.1

²⁴ Policy Document: Prevent Implementation Plan (n 8)

²⁵ Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant, LP12), 'Name Anonymized. White Male, Mid 30s' (2011)

²⁶ Maybury's Prevent Delivery Plan, 'Policy Document Anonymized' (Maybury Council 2011)

about its aims and objectives, which are analysed below. A clearer distinction is made between *Prevent* work and wider community cohesion and integration work.²⁷ The community safety team manager states that since the *Review* there have been some minor organisational changes but failed to explain what they are.²⁸ Apart from these changes, the new *Prevent* delivery plan, as well as the governance and organisational structures, remain basically the same. They are built ‘on our experience of previous *Prevent* work within the [council area, aligning] our approach to the new strategy’, the document states.²⁹ According to this plan, the county CONTEST board still oversees *Prevent*’s delivery, while delivery within the council is devolved to the *Prevent* forum, which ‘coordinates all the work of the ... partners on the *Prevent* agenda’.³⁰ It is unclear who sits on this forum; however, the council’s *Prevent* lead continues to have a prominent role in the delivery of the strategy.

The *Review* ushered in significant changes, some of which are reflected in Maybury’s *Prevent* delivery plan. First, the *Review* changed the way *Prevent* was funded locally. The DCLG area-based grant was replaced with a system whereby a designated individual submits project proposals on behalf of the local authorities to the Home Office’s OSCT.³¹ This may explain the lack of a national assessment framework. However, there remains a lack of post-project evaluation. Second, the local strategy reflects the national shift from a community-orientated towards a sector-orientated approach. This means an expansion of institutions engaged in delivering *Prevent* to help the authorities identify vulnerable individuals and organisations. Surprisingly, Maybury’s *Prevent* delivery plans remain relatively quiet about who these new partners might be, although the local health and education sectors are mentioned. This expansion may have worrying ramifications for Muslim communities, and may increase the perception that *Prevent* is about spying on them.³²

²⁷ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 20)

²⁸ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3), ‘Name Anonymized. Used to Oversee the Local Delivery of Prevent. White Male, Mid 30s.’ (2011)

²⁹ Policy Document: Prevent Implementation Plan (n 8)

³⁰ Maybury’s Prevent Delivery Plan (n 26)

³¹ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 20) 9

6.2.4 The 2011 Prevent delivery plan

Local delivery is broken down into three national *Prevent* objectives and three prevention levels; the latter are specialised, targeted, and community interventions.³³ Figure 6.2 illustrates the local *Prevent* objectives. The Challenge Ideology objective encapsulates central government’s agenda that there ‘should be no ungoverned spaces in which extremism is allowed to flourish without firm challenges, and where appropriate, by legal intervention’.³⁴ The *Review* and the local delivery strategy seem to suggest that local institutions and places of worship need to be regulated and monitored. The community interventions listed in the local delivery plan include the development of a local communication plan and the delivery of ACT NOW, an awareness-raising programme. The second strand in the local delivery plan, Supporting Individuals, is about identifying vulnerable individuals and using *Channel* to implement appropriate interventions. The final objective, Sector and Institutions, deals with the engagement with institutions in the private and voluntary sectors to monitor and regulate local institutions and public places of worship. Community interventions include Internet awareness campaigns and training faith leaders.

Figure 6.2

Maybury’s revised Prevent objectives

		Challenge Ideology	Support Individuals	Sector and Institutions	
Prevention Levels	Specialist Interventions		Identification and targeting of appropriate interventions	Clear referral pathways for at risk individuals	Maybury Objectives
	Targeted Interventions	Develop capacity to challenge any form of extremism and displace ideology	Support and protect people who might be susceptible to radicalisation	Staff in key sectors and institutions trained and supported	
	Community Interventions	Provision of factual information to facilitate ideological challenge	Increased awareness, confidence, and trust amongst communities and in local response	Increased awareness of <i>Prevent</i> amongst key professionals and leaders	

Source: Maybury’s ‘Prevent Implementation Plan’. Obtained through a FOI request. Details anonymised.

³² Therese Toole and others, ‘The New Prevent: Will It Work? Can It Work?’ (Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance Working Paper, Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship 2011)

³³ Maybury’s Prevent Delivery Plan (n 26)

³⁴ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 20)

Following the *Review*, the content of the local *Prevent* delivery changed dramatically. In line with central government's *Prevent* policy, most community cohesion work moved away from it. Unlike the national *Prevent* policy, the local strategy attempts to highlight that the threat of extremism does not come solely from Muslim communities. With this in mind, the strategy refers, albeit fleetingly, to far-right extremism. This reflects a concern raised by many of those interviewed for this study. Unlike the national policy, which ignores far-right extremism, the local *Prevent* policy attempts to be as inclusive as possible within the restraints given by central government.

The document also lists a number of other significant threats and vulnerabilities. These include economic deprivation, the use of the Internet to access motivational extremist websites, the use of legitimate charitable fundraising to fund extremism, the increased profile of far-right extremism, and vulnerabilities within the family setting. As there is still confusion about *Prevent's* objectives, the revised plan acknowledges that more needs to be done to explain its benefits to individuals and communities. The document further states that Maybury Council faces the ongoing challenge of working in partnership to implement a local strategy to win community support and engagement.³⁵

6.3 Outlining national/local tensions

Policy and organisational tensions are not confined to the national level; similar themes reoccur at the local professional level. This section outlines the main frictions between the *Prevent* policy and its local implementation. The tensions identified concern policy content, particularly about whether *Prevent* should focus more on community cohesion, with *Channel* attached, or narrow secondary prevention and the identification of those engaged or vulnerable to jihadi extremism. The second category, organisational tensions, identifies inter and intra organisational tensions that affect the local delivery of *Prevent*. There is some overlap between them.

6.3.1 Policy tensions

Since the coalition government assumed power, Maybury's local professionals have become increasingly concerned about the way *Prevent* is taking shape. Policy tensions mainly centre on whether community cohesion and addressing grievances

³⁵ Policy Document: Prevent Implementation Plan (n 8)

should play a role within the local and national *Prevent* framework or not.³⁶ One would have expected a similar debate between local professionals. The data, however, show that the majority, seventeen of the twenty participants, believe that community cohesion is an essential part of *Prevent* alongside aspects of safeguarding those vulnerable to extremism per se. When interviewed about the changes brought in by the *Prevent Review*, Maybury's community safety manager stated: 'We were surprised actually when the national strategy came out ... We don't agree with the current scenario.'³⁷ This view resonates with the statements made by a number of national policymakers such as Sir Norman Bettison, the ACPO *Prevent* lead, who states that 'the central ethos of [the] *Prevent* strand is safeguarding – not spying or demonising, but simply seeking to protect the vulnerable'.³⁸ (Nine of the fifteen national professionals agree with this).

Although local professionals mainly agree (fifteen of the twenty participants) that the New Labour *Prevent* strategy was flawed and to some degree tainted, there remains a sense of ambiguity about the *Prevent Review* and how it is meant to achieve its stated objective. There appears to be considerable tension between the view of the government and local professionals in Maybury about the removal of community cohesion from *Prevent*. The view that aspects of community cohesion should remain part of *Prevent* is not only held by local authority officials, but also by front line and senior police officers. The area commander, a superintendent with the police, states that

the emphasis ought to be on community cohesion and creating cohesive communities by concentrating on those things that fracture communities such as the presence of hate crime, low cost housing, poverty, etcetera, etcetera and the reason for that is, because these ... create the conditions that may alienate some people into extremism.³⁹

Maybury's chief executive expresses similar views, arguing that *Prevent* and the social cohesion agenda are all part of the same continuum, and that the changes made by the *Prevent Review* are a concern because they focus *Prevent* entirely on Al Qaeda. 'I think it will turn negative', the local council's chief executive remarks.⁴⁰ Six other local practitioners express similar views and concerns.

³⁶ See: Chapter 5.3-4

³⁷ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

³⁸ Norman Bettison, 'Extremism Measures' (*Public Service*, 2011)

<http://www.publicservice.co.uk/feature_story.asp?id=16896> accessed 14 February 2012

³⁹ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4), 'Name Anonymized. Sits on the Prevent and CONTEST Board. White Male, Early 40s.' (2011)

⁴⁰ Local Authority Chief Executive (LP6) interview (n 5)

The obligation to obey the law and to work with the authorities is linked ‘to the quality of the rules and the integrity of their administration’.⁴¹ The general perception amongst local professionals is that isolating Muslim communities achieves the opposite (seventeen of the twenty local professionals agree),⁴² fostering distrust and reinforcing ethnic stereotypes within the communities, and negatively affecting social interactions between affected communities and the local authorities.⁴³ A police inspector, who is also the police force *Prevent* lead, expresses her concerns about the *Prevent Review* by stating that Al Qaeda and its affiliated ideologies are a significant threat,⁴⁴ but there is no need to keep

banging on about Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda. People get cheesed. All they have to do is make one significant statement that at the moment Al Qaeda remains the most significant threat. You don’t have to go all the way through it. ... It is more of a political statement, to think about one government divorcing itself from a strategy. ... In terms of direction, three-quarters of that document is about slagging off the previous government, and that might be great for politics but it isn’t any good for safeguarding our communities. Well, that’s political, I’m sorry [but] that’s not leading agencies and partners in a way forward.⁴⁵

This analysis of the *Prevent Review* resonates with the views of sixteen of the twenty local professionals who are concerned that central government, rather than listening to their concerns, is more concerned with distancing itself from previous Labour policies.⁴⁶ At the same time, few (only five of the twenty participants) have read the 2009 *Prevent* policy, or the 2011 *Prevent Review*. There is broad agreement amongst local professionals that community cohesion must form part of any successful *Prevent* strategy in the future. They feel concerned about the negative media attention it has attracted, and how it has developed under the coalition government, particularly in terms of targeting Muslim communities.

Our work is around Al Qaeda inspired terrorism ... That’s where we’re at. However, that’s not to say that we won’t look at the far right, the Irish, and I think that’s how we’ve won quite a lot of battles really. It’s the national pressure from the national media that people read because that just reinforces everything we’re trying to break down.⁴⁷

All the local policymakers and front line staff interviewed agree that *Prevent* should be about primary prevention, community engagement, and safeguarding.

⁴¹ Philip Selznick and others, *Law, Society, and Industrial Justice* (Russell Sage Foundation 1969) 29

⁴² Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10), ‘Name Anonymized. Delivered a Prevent Programme. White Female, Mid 40s.’ (2011)

⁴³ Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power: Two Works* (Wiley 1979) 74

⁴⁴ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 20)

⁴⁵ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5), ‘Name Anonymized. White Female, Early 40s.’ (2011)

⁴⁶ *ibid*; Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

The support for the inclusion of primary prevention and community engagement not only comes from local authorities, who some argue are just protecting their own interests, but also from all national and local junior and senior police officers interviewed. This national/local policy conflict is about fundamental disagreements between local professionals and official government policy. The local professionals in Maybury are concerned about the negative side effects that the new *Prevent* policy, a policy that seems to ignore all other forms of extremism except jihadi extremism, may have on local Muslim communities in Maybury. Despite the sense of ambiguity about the *Prevent Review* in particular, there remains the resolve that something needs to be done about extremism within communities, whether jihadi or far-right extremism. These policy tensions run throughout all of the issues discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

6.3.2 Organisational tensions

The previous chapter identified organisational tensions which include tensions between national and local authorities. Thomas and Grindle state that strains between bureaucracy and the executive are inevitable as players compete over preferred options and use the resources available to them – for example, hierarchy, control over information, and access to key decision makers – to achieve their goals. ‘Decision makers assume that fate or implementation managers will take care of carrying out the desired changes and that there is little reason for a specific implementation strategy.’⁴⁸ The *Prevent Review* emulates a top down approach, but is vague about the local governance of *Prevent* while removing some of the freedoms granted to local councils by the Labour government. The *Review* fails to consider the policy process and Anderson’s argument that policy has the tendency to be ‘made as it [is] being administered and administered as it [is] being made’.⁴⁹ The removal of NI 35 in November 2010 suggests that local resistance against this assessment framework has been successful to some degree. The *Review* otherwise signifies a shift towards centralisation and more national oversight by the government.⁵⁰

On the other hand, many policymakers, and those involved in the national delivery of *Prevent*, feel that the Labour government accorded too much freedom to local

⁴⁷ Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant, LP12) interview (n 25)

⁴⁸ John Thomas and Merilee Grindle, ‘After the Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in Developing Countries’ (1990) 18 *World Development* 1163, 1178

⁴⁹ James Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* (Praeger 1975) 79

⁵⁰ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 20)

authorities to deliver *Prevent* within the broad confines of the NI 35 framework.⁵¹ Between 2008 and 2011, the media released a number of stories claiming that local authorities had misspent *Prevent* funds on unrelated community cohesion projects.⁵² The Communities and Local Government Select Committee notes that although community cohesion and *Prevent* are linked, and that extremism appears to be more isolated in cohesive communities, there is a need to separate *Prevent* activities from most community cohesion work.⁵³ Throughout its lifetime, and particularly after the *Review*, there has been confusion about *Prevent's* content and purpose. This confusion has affected *Prevent's* local delivery. The community safety manager stated that:

I don't think the actual government agrees with itself on some of these counts. I think ... Whitehall, the Home Office, and the Ministry of Justice ... all have different views about what should be done, ... [we] have different views about what should be done and how it should be run which doesn't make it any easier for us, it has to be said. ... However, we will do the best with what we're given and we will deliver what's been asked of us, but we'll try to do it in a way that we feel [will bring] a good result locally.⁵⁴

This statement points to two things: (1) that there remains a perception of ambiguity amongst local professionals about what the *Prevent* objectives are, and how to achieve them locally; and (2) it highlights the main organisational tensions, which are about access to information and how much freedom local authorities should have in dealing with related local problems such as right-wing extremism.⁵⁵

The *Prevent Review* denies local authorities this freedom to deal with far-right extremism. From 2011 until now, all *Prevent* projects have had to be submitted to the Home Office for approval and funding.⁵⁶ Since the election of the coalition government, Maybury's local authorities have been repeatedly directed by the Home Office not to target right-wing extremism under the *Prevent* umbrella.⁵⁷ Specifically, the tension is about how much freedom to give to the local authorities to allow them to deal with local issues around extremism per se. Because terrorism is seen as a national security issue, the *Prevent* policy is developed and controlled by central

⁵¹ See: Chapter 5.10

⁵² Matthew Sinclair, 'Our Flawed Anti-Terrorism Strategy' (*the Guardian*, 8 September 2009) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/08/terrorism-politics-tax-spending>> accessed 15 August 2012

⁵³ Communities and Local Government Select Committee, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10' (HMSO 2010) 56

⁵⁴ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

⁵⁵ *ibid*

⁵⁶ *Prevent* lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

⁵⁷ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 39)

government, which separates community cohesion work from tackling extremism per se, with the exception of jihadi extremism.⁵⁸ A few national policymakers, such as Lord Carlile, favour this move (five of the fifteen national interviewees share this view).⁵⁹ Prior to the *Review*, local authorities in Maybury were satisfied with the amount of freedom granted to them under the Labour government's *Prevent* strategy, a view which shifted after the coalition government took over. Interviewees perceive the coalition government as apathetic towards the concerns of local authorities, and determined to target Muslim communities despite their concerns.

6.4 Policy tensions: Delivering community cohesion or counterterrorism prevention in Maybury

Part of the previous chapter examined the tensions between community cohesion and *Prevent's* focus on counterterrorism.⁶⁰ The coalition government, and groups such as the TaxPayers' Alliance, argue that 'funding projects carried out by community groups is a method that is doomed to failure'.⁶¹ They further claim that 'skilled policing and robust intelligence are the most effective ways of tackling violent extremism'.⁶² Such views are supported by several of those interviewed nationally, although there are a number of opponents. In Maybury, the commonly held perception is that community cohesion is 'key in allowing discussions to take place between people who have different ideas, different philosophies, different thoughts on life, and so on and so forth.'⁶³

6.4.1 Delivering Prevent in Maybury – a community cohesion exercise

Data indicate that prior to the *Prevent Review*, *Prevent's* delivery in Maybury focused on community cohesion. This is reflected in the types of programme funded by the CSP since 2007. A document obtained through a Freedom of Information request shows that between 2007 and 2011, forty-three programmes were commissioned and delivered in Maybury alone. Aside from *Channel*, only three programmes were aimed at direct interventions, targeting specific behaviour, groups, and individuals. One of the programmes funded in the period from 2007 to 2009 is described as follows:

⁵⁸ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 20) 6

⁵⁹ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2), 'Former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislations.' (2011)

⁶⁰ See: Chapter 5.3-4

⁶¹ The Taxpayer's Alliance, 'The Prevent Strategy' (Council Spending Uncovered II, 2009) 2

⁶² *ibid*

⁶³ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

The Youth Offending Team provided appropriate interventions, including spot purchasing of specialist services as required, to identify vulnerable young people diverting them from extremist influence by building resilience and linking them to the appropriate services.⁶⁴

This programme was not exclusively focused on jihadi extremism. Maybury's chief executive stated that

we've always focused on right-wing extremism as well as Muslim, Al Qaeda inspired terrorism. So we had a more even-handed approach, which has actually, I think, convinced people that it is violence we're against, not Muslim radicalism or any other sort of radicalism. It's the violence, whether it be right-wing violence or violence that's Al-Qaeda inspired.⁶⁵

Figure 6.3 provides some data about the interventions run in Maybury. Some argue that right-wing extremist groups in Maybury, such as the EDL, are stoking jihadi extremism and vice versa.⁶⁶ Media reports suggest that the EDL is deliberately stirring up trouble nationally,⁶⁷ but also in the Maybury area. There have been a number of EDL demonstrations in Maybury, and a member of the EDL was jailed for attacking a local politician.⁶⁸ Over recent years, members of the EDL have skilfully used the conviction of a number of Asian men in the area as propaganda for their cause. Some incidents involved violence.⁶⁹ Tommy Robinson, founder of the EDL, tweeted that they would be screening an anti-Islamic film⁷⁰ which has already led to riots and civil unrest across the Middle East.⁷¹

In 2010/2011, the only other direct intervention programme aside from *Channel* focused solely on working with

individuals at risk or involved in extreme right-wing activity. The project used experienced and qualified mediators and offered a two-stage intervention to explore grievances and empower individuals to make positive choices.⁷²

Other programmes focused on community cohesion and awareness-raising. Programmes, many of which were delivered by community engagement officers,

⁶⁴ Freedom of Information Request: Programs funded by Prevent in Maybury, 'Document Anonymized.' (Maybury Council 2012)

⁶⁵ Local Authority Chief Executive (LP6) interview (n 5)

⁶⁶ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

⁶⁷ Mark Townsend, 'British Far-Right Extremists Voice Support for Anders Breivik' (*the Guardian*, 1 September 2012) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/sep/01/far-right-support-anders-breivik>> accessed 20 September 2012

⁶⁸ Media article in the Guardian – anonymized

⁶⁹ BBC News article; Article in the Guardian; Article in the local newspaper – All have been anonymized.

⁷⁰ Tommy Robinson, 'Tommy Robinson, EDL' (*Twitter*, 16 September 2012) <<https://twitter.com/EDLRobinson>> accessed 20 September 2012

⁷¹ Julian Borger, 'New Attacks on Embassies in Wake of Anti-Islamic Film' (*the Guardian*, 15 September 2012) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/14/attacks-embassies-anti-islam-film>> accessed 20 September 2012

⁷² Freedom of Information Request: Programs funded by Prevent in Maybury (n 64)

included interfaith forums, roadshows, discussion groups, and Internet awareness. The programme described below had only tenuous links to *Prevent* objectives. It was designed to

tackle underachievement of Pakistani boys (Year 9 who are underachieving and displaying challenging behaviours at home and in the community) in secular (GCSE) education by means of a Pakistani achievement forum/study centre.⁷³

Another programme aimed to establish a forum for mosque committee members and scholars to identify workshops needed to improve community leadership.

Figure 6.3

Purpose of Prevent funded programmes in Maybury between 2007-11

	Community cohesion, awareness-raising or myth-busting	Direct interventions
2007/8	6	1
2008/9	8	1
2009/10	6	0
2010/11	20	1
Total	43*	3

*Channel was not counted in these numbers, but ran alongside the above programmes.

Source: Data obtained through a FOI request to Maybury Council

Other programmes such as ACT NOW, an interactive counterterrorism exercise which provides communities with an insight into ‘how police officers make decisions in the event of a terrorist incident’,⁷⁴ were run annually. Other programmes, such as an animation project, were aimed at ‘primary schoolchildren, to explore sensitive issues and vulnerabilities in very simple terms’.⁷⁵ One cannot fail to notice that the majority of these projects had a mostly primary prevention focus. The document provided under the Freedom of Information Act reads like a catalogue of community cohesion projects, many of which are only vaguely linked to the aims and objectives of *Prevent*.

The *Prevent* lead at the local police authority reiterates a point made in a 2006 Demos report, stating that ‘a lot of work has been around cohesion work activities. Doing activities that bring communities back together – that’s one element ... The

⁷³ *ibid*

⁷⁴ Association of Chief Police Officers, ‘Prevent: ACT Now for Schools’ (no date) <www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/ACTNOW_ForSchoolsHEFE.pdf> accessed 30 July 2012

⁷⁵ Freedom of Information Request: Programs funded by Prevent in Maybury (n 64)

other element is also massively engaging communities'.⁷⁶ One of the central conclusions of the Demos Report was that

communities offer important sources of information and intelligence; they are our own in-built early warning system. ... The police and the security services cannot act without the consent of the communities they are there to protect.⁷⁷

This argument goes back to the issue of policing and government legitimacy, and the building of trust between state authorities and communities.⁷⁸ Local professionals see *Prevent* as a tool to engage with vulnerable communities to increase levels of trust between communities and the local authorities; this is regarded as one of the central arguments for including community cohesion work in *Prevent*. Such an attitude towards *Prevent's* perceived purpose demonstrates how local delivery can affect and alter the policy in practice.

6.4.2 Policy tensions between the local authorities and the national Prevent policy

The previous section highlighted a fundamental shift within the *Prevent* policy which took it away from community cohesion. It also highlighted that much of the *Prevent* work in Maybury has been based on community cohesion. The debate about whether or not to include community cohesion has been going on for quite some time, even prior to the *Review*. One would therefore have expected a similar debate between local authority staff and the police throughout the UK. However, the interview data show that this is not the case in Maybury. Rather, the local/national tensions are based on a fundamental disagreement, with local professionals believing that community cohesion should be a central part of *Prevent* work there. This relates back to a point made in 6.4.1 that local perceptions and skill sets have altered how the policy is delivered in Maybury, deviating from the national *Prevent* policy. This disagreement at policy level has affected the organisational set-up and its delivery in Maybury. The police area commander states that

you know some of the governments [have] said, ... you've got to more or less say something isn't a community cohesion initiative ... [and is] purely a *Prevent* initiative to get the funding, and I actually think divorcing *Prevent* from community cohesion is the wrong thing to do.⁷⁹

Aspects of community cohesion receive negative media attention, and consequently the *Review* removed these aspects from local *Prevent* implementation. Prior to the

⁷⁶ Local Police Authority Prevent Lead (LP1), 'Name Anonymized. Asian Female, Mid 40s.' (2011)

⁷⁷ Rachel Briggs and others, 'Brining It Home: Community-Based Approach to Counter-Terrorism' (Demos 2006)

⁷⁸ See: Chapter 3.5

⁷⁹ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 39)

Review, *Prevent* had an integration and cohesion focus. ‘Since the *Review*, that’s changed. The focus is very much now on counterterrorism activity.’⁸⁰ ‘Security is always delivered through consent, never through force. ... Sustaining this ... over the long term will only be possible if the police secure active consent from the community.’⁸¹

A report commissioned by Maybury Council, based on focus groups in the community, has found that *Prevent’s* focus on Muslim communities is

very divisive and has alienated members of communities that the agencies need to work with. Specifically, there is a sense that the *Prevent* agenda is stigmatised, and that agencies need to move away from the label and address the issues.⁸²

All of the local professionals interviewed agree that focusing entirely on Muslim communities, using overt and covert surveillance, only fosters distrust, and reinforces itself through the social interactions of individuals and communities alike.⁸³ They agree that without the trust and support of these communities, it is much more difficult to prevent the spread of extremism.⁸⁴

The police *Prevent* inspector states that tackling grievances and prevention are intrinsically linked.

It is all right to say we will separate the two, but we can’t work in solo. ... We don’t see it as a massive issue for us, because locally we think we know the issues are local and we do think we can pick it up, but we think it would be better if there were some clear guidance from the top.⁸⁵

The above comment highlights a general feeling amongst local Maybury professionals that they know what the local issues are. The local police authority lead agrees that the *Prevent* strategy should be about engaging communities and identifying individuals at risk through a partnership approach, and challenging their extremist values. At the same time, she believes that *Prevent* does not go far enough. She argues that *Prevent* has fallen in the usual trap by focusing heavily

on men in the community ... and women have not been involved in [the] degree that they should have been. ... The kids themselves haven’t been involved. Young people can influence other young people. There are good examples of how that happened. You have good young people and bad young people but that

⁸⁰ Prevent lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

⁸¹ Briggs and others (n 77) 58

⁸² Report for Maybury Council: Understanding Communities, ‘Report Anonymized.’ (2011)

⁸³ Luhmann (n 43)

⁸⁴ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

⁸⁵ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

peer pressure can help ... if that's supported, it does need some support from the organisations.⁸⁶

The idea of being more inclusive and extending the reach of *Prevent* is seen as controversial. Kundnani argues that this only extends the state's ability to spy on Muslim communities.⁸⁷

The guiding principle behind the local approach in Maybury is encapsulated by a comment made by the police *Prevent* inspector:

We ... almost tried to disengage from the ... national view on *Prevent* and deliver it locally which didn't make it so much around specifically ... terrorism and more about wider cohesion and integration; and used that almost as a banner for delivery so you are better able to engage with people across [Maybury] and also pick out individuals you consider to be at risk with the views that they have and not work with them and single them out for the police to come crashing through the window ... but more in a way that they can have forums to discuss their view and it can be challenged by their own peers and their own communities and residents and people living in [Maybury] so creating that dialogue element.⁸⁸

The *Prevent Review* makes the coalition government's intentions clear, separating community cohesion from more focused *Prevent* work. This is not a position shared by local professionals in Maybury (none of the participants share this view). One interviewee states that

Unless you deal with the grievance, and that's where we had some success, you cannot divorce the grievance from the reality of what manifests itself in pursue terms, and we need that confidence that the government really understands that. We're not convinced that they do.⁸⁹

This section demonstrates that tensions between national policy and local practitioners have led to alterations to the local *Prevent* policy in Maybury, deviating from the national objectives and adapting it to local needs.

6.5 Policy tensions: Reactions to the allegations of spying and targeting Muslim communities

A report commissioned by Maybury Council states that the language used around *Prevent*, extremism, and counterterrorism has generally been

very divisive and has alienated members of communities that the agencies need to work with ... For these reasons, local agencies and policymakers, within whatever scope is allowed by national policy developments, should make clear

⁸⁶ Local Police Authority Prevent Lead (LP1) interview (n 76)

⁸⁷ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

⁸⁸ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

⁸⁹ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

that, when they are talking about ‘extremism’, they are focused on problems that everybody can recognise.⁹⁰

After the 2005 London bombings, national politicians refused to engage with actual motivation, articulating instead the dangerousness of multiculturalism and the disassociation of some Muslim communities from mainstream society.⁹¹ Muslim communities in Britain were seen as the ‘other’, set apart from mainstream British society. This implied that multiculturalism, and specifically Islamic culture, was seen as responsible for the UK’s security woes. Muslim communities were seen as particularly prone to extremism, and an existential threat to the security of Britain and its values.⁹² Professionals in Maybury agree that *Prevent* specifically targeted Muslim communities in the area and across the UK. A neighbourhood manager comments, ‘It was, to be fair, let’s be real about that. ... It reminded me of being Irish Catholic in the 1970’s in England. You know ... everybody was a suspect and that’s how it probably felt.’⁹³

6.5.1 *Prevent targets Muslim communities*

Prevent’s targeting of all Muslim communities on a national scale was originally seen as an attempt by the government to conflate issues of counterterrorism and community cohesion.⁹⁴ Professionals in Maybury agree that *Prevent* targeted Muslim communities. A member of the community safety team states that:

Something ... needs to be done because there are so many grey lines and so many conflicting views because it is such a sensitive area and regardless of what [the government said that] it is all extremism, ... it is everyone ... it’s a violent aspect and these are the things that were coming out last year ... it is targeting the Muslim communities whether you like it or not.⁹⁵

Fourteen of the twenty local professionals share a similar view. There is a realisation amongst professionals in the case study area that *Prevent* needs to be more inclusive. ‘They should be targeting all communities’,⁹⁶ according to the local police authority

⁹⁰ Report for Maybury Council: Understanding Communities (n 82)

⁹¹ George Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson, ‘British Muslims and the Discourse of Dysfunction: Community Cohesion and Counterterrorism in the West Midlands’ (2012) 5 *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 179, 182

⁹² Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, ‘The Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims, “Multiculture” and the “Civic Re-Balancing” of British Multiculturalism’ (2009) 57 *Political Studies* 473, 481

⁹³ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

⁹⁴ Jonathan Githens-Mazer, ‘Reshaping Prevent’ (*the Guardian*, 2009)
<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/oct/31/counter-terrorism-prevent-muslims>>
accessed 20 September 2012

⁹⁵ Community Safety Team member (LP8), ‘Name Anonymized. Has Been Involved with Prevent. Asian Female, Late 20s.’ (2011)

⁹⁶ Local Police Authority Prevent Lead (LP1) interview (n 76)

Prevent lead. As stated before, there is a strong belief in Maybury that *Prevent* should target extremism per se, including far-right extremism.

Al Qaeda inspired [extremism] is still very much a focus with that being the main risk. ... But like I [said] until we get over the perception that actually we're only targeting one sector of the community it will always be very difficult. But the fact that they've removed extremism from it ... We [looked] at groups like the EDL, that we can't work with through *Prevent* funding, [and this] exacerbates that myth around targeting Muslim communities.⁹⁷

Despite the assurances of the council's *Prevent* lead that the strategy does not solely target Muslim communities, the list of commissioned projects tells a different story.⁹⁸ Several projects target both ethnic and white communities; however, the majority focus on Maybury's Muslim communities. The neighbourhood manager of a heavily Asian-populated area comments as follows.

I think there have been community tensions with the Muslim community in particular because obviously when *Prevent* was first launched it was launched in, you know, a fanfare of media and news, whatever, and the Muslim community felt it was targeting them. It was, to be fair, let's be real about that.⁹⁹

Seventeen of the twenty local professionals interviewed agree; however, only three claim that *Prevent* is being used to covertly gather intelligence. Maybury Council was able to use some *Prevent* money to tackle far-right extremism, and groups which support or share views similar to the EDL and BNP, under the New Labour government. Even before the publication of the *Prevent Review*, the coalition government made it clear to local officials that *Prevent* money should no longer be used to tackle far-right extremism.¹⁰⁰

6.5.2 Responding to the allegations of spying

Kundnani's allegation that *Prevent* is a tool used to spy on Muslim communities across the UK is a view also held by many within Maybury's Muslim communities.¹⁰¹ A police inspector states that community members 'say that it's a spying tool used by the police and is also a criticism of *Prevent*'.¹⁰² A member of the community safety team denies this, arguing that if *Prevent* were used for spying it wouldn't work 'because the interventions aren't there'.¹⁰³ Consequently, and despite the denials, this perception has led to some individuals within the local Muslim

⁹⁷ *Prevent* lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

⁹⁸ Freedom of Information Request: Programs funded by *Prevent* in Maybury (n 64)

⁹⁹ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

¹⁰⁰ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 39)

¹⁰¹ Kundnani (n 87)

¹⁰² Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council (LP11) interview (n 9)

¹⁰³ Community Safety Team member (LP8) interview (n 95)

communities disengaging.¹⁰⁴ One of the neighbourhood police officers acknowledges that the police gather information through engagement with the community, but that there is nothing sinister or covert about the approach.¹⁰⁵ The local authority police *Prevent* lead comments:

Can we come in and talk to them about *Prevent*? We want them to be the eyes and ears in their community and tell us information. One of the things these kids said to me, and one of their complaints, ‘How dare they come in here taking my kids. They want them to spy in their own communities’. Wrong. No, they put them at risk. They put them at harm. What would they tell? It’s really difficult. So the real anger about that side of it, how that was managed, and potentially there’s negativity towards the police service because of that and a few individuals. I don’t know if that’s unintended.¹⁰⁶

According to the police area commander, the ‘conversation about *Prevent* [used to] spy on communities, we don’t pick it up anymore, but having said that *Prevent* has, I think, as a term, been discredited because of all that’.¹⁰⁷

The data suggest that although there are allegations of spying through *Prevent* nationally, such as *Project Champion* in Birmingham,¹⁰⁸ there is no suggestion that covert intelligence gathering has taken place in Maybury. The purpose of engaging with Muslim communities, a police officer seconded to the community safety team explains, is to build trust between the communities and the local authorities. ‘We have always been really clear with our staff, if your engagement is really good you will [gain] intelligence as a by-product, but you are not there to seek it out.’¹⁰⁹ Trust between the police, local authorities, and communities is based on collective perceptions and vicarious experiences. All the local professionals accept Rosenbaum’s assertion that citizen participation is required to find those engaged in extremism and terrorism.¹¹⁰ In Maybury, professionals agree that they want communities to be their eyes and ears, but that this can only be achieved through

¹⁰⁴ Police Inspector and Lead on Channel (LP14) interview (n 13); Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council and community volunteer (LP15), ‘Name Anonymized. Developed and Delivered a Community Prevent Programme. White Male, Late 30s.’ (2011)

¹⁰⁵ Neighbourhood Police Officer (LP19), ‘Name Anonymized. Joined the Police 3 Years Ago. Currently Working in a Predominately Muslim Area. White Male, Late 20s.’ (2011)

¹⁰⁶ Local Police Authority Prevent Lead (LP1) interview (n 76)

¹⁰⁷ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 39)

¹⁰⁸ Birmingham City Council, ‘Project Champion: Scrutiny Review into ANPR and CCTV Cameras’ (2010) <<http://www.birmingham.gov.uk>> accessed 4 March 2012

¹⁰⁹ Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council (LP11) interview (n 9)

¹¹⁰ Dennis Rosenbaum and others (eds), ‘The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity and Efficiency in Community Policing’ in *The Challenge of community policing: testing the promises* (Sage Publications 1994)

good community policing and engagement, and not through coercion.¹¹¹ To get communities' willingness to engage with the police and local authorities, it is essential to maximise perceptions of legitimacy and trust,¹¹² because the obligation to obey the law is linked 'to the quality of the rules and integrity of their administration'.¹¹³

6.6 Organisational tensions: A multi-agency approach in Maybury

Contrary to expectation, the multi-agency approach appears to work well in Maybury. Rather than having the police direct *Prevent*,¹¹⁴ the different local agencies, including the police, cooperate on a multi-agency platform. In Maybury, *Prevent's* organisational structure is based on the local community safety partnership (CSP), with many of the individuals involved having prior experience of working with CSPs or on neighbourhood policing teams. A police officer was seconded to work as the local council's *Prevent* lead for a short period to help with its delivery and ensure smooth coordination between the different services. However, there were tensions when attempting to deliver *Prevent* programmes to schools and their staff. It appears that schools had no interest in participating.

6.6.1 A multi-agency approach

Twelve local professionals agree that the CSP is well placed to coordinate *Prevent* activities throughout the town. The council's *Prevent* lead states that the very 'fact that the community safety team are a multi-agency team, meant that the right people [were] involved from the start'.¹¹⁵ A policy officer and the *Prevent* lead for the council explains that 'although we had a lead for it, it was just part of the other work of the team'.¹¹⁶ Since 1998, the council's community safety team has been working with numerous statutory agencies and voluntary organisations to prevent crime and disorder. One of the community engagement officers at the police states that:

Under the community safety team or partnership we've always had police involvement in the council, we've always had strong partnership working and I know for a fact that I was brought into the *Prevent* side because of the multi-agency working and that's where my history has been. The inspector has also

¹¹¹ Justice Tankebe, 'Public Confidence in the Police Testing the Effects of Public Experiences of Police Corruption in Ghana' (2010) 50 *British Journal of Criminology* 296

¹¹² Sara Stoutland, 'The Multiple Dimension of Trust in Resident Police Relations in Boston' (2001) 38 *Crime and Delinquency* 226

¹¹³ Philip Selznick, Philippe Nonet, and Howard Vollmer, *Law, society, and industrial justice* (Russell Sage Foundation 1969) 29

¹¹⁴ See: Chapter 2.9 and 5.8

¹¹⁵ *Prevent* lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

¹¹⁶ *ibid*

been the inspector in community safety. So, there are a lot of links already and I think an awful lot of the people I now talk to about *Prevent* were the same people in the same organisations that I talked to about anti-social behaviour, child safety, child cruelty, so it's just a different form of safeguarding. That's where we're at really, it's not different to what we used to do but the consequences are different, that's all.¹¹⁷

A member of the community safety team referred to the multi-agency approach in Maybury as

second to none. It's been really good and I think that's why the projects have delivered what they have. They may not have achieved in my opinion what they should have achieved, but they have delivered projects really well and it is around, sort of, the contact with the voluntary groups, the statutory organisations in taking the agenda forward.¹¹⁸

The approach of local authorities in Maybury through the already established CSP appears to have minimised tensions between the different partners. Neighbourhood policing is common practice and has served as a model for setting up *Prevent* based on the 1998 community safety partnership arrangement in Maybury.¹¹⁹

6.6.2 Tensions within the multi-agency approach

Nonetheless, there are a number of tensions. A minor one, mentioned by one of the neighbourhood managers, is funding in relation to cooperation rather than amounts received. She states that such a funding regime gets in the way and prevents a better, more cooperative work process with various organisations. 'I know for a fact that there were several people who had several good ideas, who, if they had joined forces could have had a better idea.'¹²⁰ Other conflicts are about the inclusion of education and schools, and information sharing between local and national partners.

An education consultant at Maybury Council, whose role it is to engage schools in *Prevent* projects, states that

in the big scheme of education, [*Prevent* is] actually not that important, as important that we might think it is for safety. As far as schools are concerned it is really not even on the radar. I am aware that there is an issue there for policing, but actually in the grand scheme of things, in the day-to-day running of people's lives, I doubt very much whether it is high on the agenda.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant, LP12) interview (n 25)

¹¹⁸ Community Safety Team member (LP8) interview (n 95)

¹¹⁹ Home Office, 'From Neighbourhood to National' (HMSO 2008)

¹²⁰ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

¹²¹ Educational Consultant at Maybury Council and *Prevent* lead in Education (LP16), 'Name Anonymized. Worked with Schools to Deliver a Number of *Prevent* Programmes. White Female, Mid 40s.' (2011)

She further states that because of their semi-autonomous status, schools are able to say ‘no, thank you very much, and in fact they did’.¹²² The education lead admits it is difficult to engage schools in the *Prevent* agenda due to other pressures, and a feeling that it was not necessary to engage with it.

The bottom line for them is, they are asked to do so many things within this very short school day, it is unbelievable really, which takes them off their task. You know, we ask them to be social workers and to do all sorts of things and at the end of the day they have to say well is it statutory? Do I have to do this? Because it sometimes gets to that point and we won’t even consider anything that they don’t have to do. So yes, there is some conflict there because everybody thinks their agenda is as important or more important than anyone else’s but at the end of the day it is the school’s choice whether or not they take that on board. *Prevent* was just the same.¹²³

However, a full timetable and other priorities are not the only reasons for the schools’ hesitancy. Many schools, if not most, have never engaged in such a sensitive area and feel they lack the necessary skills.

Staff in schools are very reluctant to let that happen because they are insecure in their knowledge and haven’t got the confidence ... They’re worried that that can of worms is going to lead to something [that will] get out of control in the classroom.¹²⁴

Lack of skills is an issue which is not only a problem for schools, but across many of the sectors involved in the delivery of *Prevent*.

The *Prevent* police inspector and the police officer seconded to the community safety team both raise this issue,¹²⁵ the former stating that there are indeed

serious limitations. The skills per se in the organisation as the council and all the different partners, [the] Home Office organisations that work within [Maybury], the lack of awareness around *Prevent*, the lack of the kind of confidence in delivering on *Prevent* – massive issues – and I think that is in itself is a hurdle that needs to be kind of, to be passed, to be honest. I think that’s a challenge in its own right.¹²⁶

Although both agree that the work in Maybury is going well, they argue that local professionals need to develop relevant skills. In fact, one of the funded projects carried out by a neighbourhood manager centred on improving these skills, and was seen as a great success by all who took part.¹²⁷

Another major tension is information sharing. In Maybury, information is shared between the different partners based on the protocols of the 1998 Crime and Disorder

¹²² *ibid*

¹²³ *ibid*

¹²⁴ *ibid*

¹²⁵ Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council (LP11) interview (n 9)

¹²⁶ Police Inspector and Force *Prevent* lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

Act. Eleven local professionals agree that information sharing between local partners, though in no way perfect, is reasonably good. A police officer seconded to the community safety team agrees that there is room for improvement, but complains that

there isn't any national guideline on information sharing so reasonably the best agreements are made by people that are delivering *Prevent*. And I think of all, it's got better and I think it's called for improvement.¹²⁸

The *Prevent* lead at the local police authority believes that information is being shared between partners, but that this is not always effective because the information is not necessarily captured in one place.¹²⁹ The police area commander notes that partners accept the police withhold sensitive information.¹³⁰ However, in Maybury the chief executive officer has received the required security clearance and is well informed.¹³¹ A satisfied *Prevent* police inspector states that 'it's getting a lot better. There are good examples of where [uniformed] and covert staffs are working together really well and they're learning. What I would say is that work could be further developed'.¹³²

Seventeen of the twenty local professionals interviewed agree with the last statement, acknowledging that there have been teething problems. Issues such as local information sharing have been resolved over time. In general, the multi-agency approach seems to be working well. Greater tension in Maybury relates to what information should be shared between national and local organisations. The council's *Prevent* lead states that

the issue is that the messages from the Home Office aren't always clear; we're still sort of working through some of the stuff that they've sent out, so the information is filtering through slowly as to what their expectations are, what they're going to do for us nationally as a national resource, what we need to be doing locally.¹³³

Similar issues are raised in eight of the twenty interviews. One of the claims made by the *Prevent Review* is that the twenty-five priority areas were selected on the basis of known intelligence. *Prevent* programmes are meant to target the individuals and groups vulnerable to extremism.¹³⁴ Yet, relevant information is often not shared with

¹²⁷ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

¹²⁸ Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council (LP11) interview (n 9)

¹²⁹ Local Police Authority *Prevent* Lead (LP1) interview (n 76)

¹³⁰ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 39)

¹³¹ Local Authority Chief Executive (LP6) interview (n 5)

¹³² Police Inspector and Force *Prevent* lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹³³ *Prevent* lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

¹³⁴ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 20)

local authorities. 'Identifying individuals that could be at risk in the future is like trying to find a needle in a haystack. A lot of what we have to do, although we [have] tried our best, has to be generic.'¹³⁵ The community engagement officers make similar claims. The government claims that counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLTPs) would enable local authorities to identify vulnerable areas.¹³⁶ 'There is certain information available to the police and the council through the ... counter-terrorism local profiles, CTLTPs. They are perhaps not always as up-to-date as we would like.'¹³⁷ A CTLTP copy, seen by the researcher, provides some additional information. However, not enough information is available to design projects to tackle specific individuals and groups. Without this information, it is extremely difficult for local authorities to design anything but generic projects.

Overall, the multi-agency approach in Maybury works well. Eleven participants (although the issue is not raised in six of the interviews) agree that cooperation between Maybury Council, the police, and other agencies has been successful, and that tensions are resolved over time. 'Newer' partners such as schools, however, are reluctant to engage with *Prevent*, and show little interest in taking part. Problems acknowledged by many of the professionals include a lack of knowledge and skills related to extremism; how to tackle extremism; and a lack of support and information sharing from national agencies, which would allow local authorities to design specific programmes.

6.7 Organisational tensions: Funding and evaluation of Prevent

This section tackles two related issues, *Prevent* funding and its local evaluation. At first glance they may seem an odd pair. However, local professionals in Maybury perceive that if *Prevent* projects had been evaluated better, less money would have been wasted. The Communities and Local Government Select Committee has found that the evaluation of *Prevent* has generally been very poor across the board.¹³⁸ Academics and professionals agree that assessing preventative counterterrorism projects can be difficult.¹³⁹ The *Prevent Review*, which bemoans the lack of

¹³⁵ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

¹³⁶ Association of Chief Police Officers, 'Prevent Counter Terrorism Local Profiles' (*Scribd*, 2010) <<http://www.scribd.com/doc/29365471/Prevent-Counter-Terrorism-Local-Profiles-CTLTPs>> accessed 4 December 2012

¹³⁷ Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant, LP12) interview (n 25)

¹³⁸ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 53)

¹³⁹ Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdury Fink, 'From Input to Impact: Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs' (Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2012); Beatrice de Graaf,

evaluation, acknowledges that ‘success is often reflected in changing attitudes as much as behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure’.¹⁴⁰

6.7.1 *Prevent* funding

Prior to the *Prevent Review*, funds were allocated based on the size of the Muslim population, and provided to local authorities through a non-ring-fenced area-based grant.¹⁴¹ The Taxpayer’s Alliance claimed that central government was affording local authorities the freedom to spend *Prevent* funds as they saw fit.¹⁴² This 2009 analysis of *Prevent* was in line with the coalition government’s concerns, which raised the following three issues:

The degree to which it is subject to central control and ring-fencing; the type of organizations who may receive it; and the relative balance between the three areas which currently receive the bulk of the funding (local authorities, policing and the FCO for *Prevent* work overseas).¹⁴³

The funding issue links back to the community cohesion debate. The change in focus meant that local authorities would receive less funding for *Prevent* projects. Prior to the *Prevent Review*, approximately £250,000 was allocated to *Prevent* projects in Maybury. Though funding has been halved, the exact amount had not been confirmed at the time of the interviews. This ‘makes it difficult, like I say, actually because we don’t know what we’ve got or what we’re going to get going forward’,¹⁴⁴ the council’s *Prevent* lead states in interview. She continues by noting that the ‘argument for that is, that a lot of it might have been spent on cohesion activities, and this is very much focused on that counterterrorism stuff’.¹⁴⁵

Maybury’s chief executive states that prior to the 2010 general election, funding for *Prevent* had been adequate, a view shared by fourteen of the twenty local professionals interviewed. National/local tensions had been less about the amount of money available, as one would have expected, but more about what that money could be spent on. After the election, the concern was more about the short-term nature of the funding. During and after the *Review*, however, the mood amongst the local professionals changed. As a local volunteer and neighbourhood manager puts

Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study (Routledge 2011); See Chapter 5.11

¹⁴⁰ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 20) 36

¹⁴¹ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (HMSO 2009) 88

¹⁴² The Taxpayer’s Alliance (n 61) 2

¹⁴³ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 20) 34

¹⁴⁴ Prevent lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

¹⁴⁵ *ibid*

it, the perception is that funding ‘is skewed towards finding potential terrorists and should be about undermining the support for extremist views – in both communities’.¹⁴⁶ As mentioned earlier, the view shared amongst seventeen of the twenty local professionals in Maybury is that the strategy needs to tackle extremism per se, including far-right extremism. The council’s *Prevent* lead states that ‘the focus is very much now on counterterrorism activity ... so much so that we’ve been told that ... we’re not allowed to give funding to integration activity’.¹⁴⁷ A senior Home Office official believes that *Prevent* is not the medium through which local authorities should challenge extremism per se, and regards far-right extremists, and groups such as the EDL, as no more than a ‘bunch of street thugs’ who pose no immediate threat to national security. *Prevent* funds, he says, should therefore be directed towards counterterrorism.¹⁴⁸ Funding cuts, or the redirection of funds, which is a term favoured by the Home Office, is an issue raised in twelve interviews. Maybury Council’s chief executive worries that

it’s not resourced the way it used to be. The cutting of all the funding for integration and cohesion ... I think has really impacted upon deprived communities. So what we’ve got now is the funding for just a *Prevent* strategy based purely on Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism ... little funding or attention to the right-wing or Irish terrorism and no money for cohesion and integration. So I think that is a danger if we don’t approach it properly.¹⁴⁹

Similar views are held by thirteen of the twenty participants in Maybury. These arguments link back to the issue of *Prevent’s* aims and how to achieve them. Most front line staff believe that community cohesion is an integral part of *Prevent* and needs to be resourced accordingly.

The second point, raised by nine interviewees, is the short-term nature of *Prevent* funding (it is worth noting that this is not a problem confined to *Prevent* alone) and the practical consequences. An inspector and the police force *Prevent* lead explains that

funding ...[was] coming in very short term and therefore it is difficult to maintain core staff one week to the next. They don’t know if they are going to be there. ... You will struggle to get good people because if a better offer comes in they are going to go. ... What seems to be [happening is that] short term funding [was coming in] half way into the year before they actually [knew] if they had funding or not, and by the time they set about anything they [were] into

¹⁴⁶ Community Volunteer (LP 18), ‘Name Anonymized. Lead a Number of Prevent Funded Programmes. Asian Female, Late 50s.’ (2011)

¹⁴⁷ *Prevent* lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

¹⁴⁸ Senior Home Office Official (NP4), ‘Name Anonymized. Involved with Prevent Since 2005.’ (2011)

¹⁴⁹ Local Authority Chief Executive (LP6) interview (n 5)

that programme again, so you are getting this time lag stuff. Whereas people if they knew they were working within a five-year framework or whatever ...¹⁵⁰

Amicus argues that short-term funding is a problem across the government sector, and that it can have severe ramifications for service provision, and a negative impact on staff morale, causing stress and affecting long-term planning.¹⁵¹ The *Channel* inspector in Maybury, for example, had waited months to find out whether his post would be funded in the future. How many members of staff have been negatively affected, and even resigned, due to short-term funding is unclear, but there are those who worry about *Prevent's* long-term viability considering the short-term funding issue and government commitment. The *Prevent* inspector remarks about concerns that the government might have withdrawn *Prevent* funding completely after the London Olympics.¹⁵² The problem is summed up in the words of one of Maybury's community engagement officers who notes that he would 'like to see, and this is with every programme, once they've got a successful programme that it doesn't need to scabble around for the funding every year'.¹⁵³ Limited funding also creates tension between organisations which all want a slice. A neighbourhood manager argues that this hinders cooperation between partners in their search for creative and innovative solutions to problems.¹⁵⁴

6.7.2 Linking evaluation and funding

To reiterate, funding is less of an issue than expected in Maybury. Despite being concerned about funding cuts, seven participants feel that the allocation of funding could be improved through more cooperation, and through a more rigorous bidding and evaluation process.¹⁵⁵ Evaluation, rather than funding, appears to be a main concern. Professionals in Maybury feel that the projects carried out are often poorly evaluated. However, professionals at national and local levels recognise that evaluation of *Prevent* programmes is difficult because if 'we [were] measuring it, have we stopped terrorists from becoming terrorists? Really difficult to say'.¹⁵⁶ Evaluation is made harder because a large number of the organisations which take *Prevent* money do not advertise their projects as *Prevent*-funded. Because of

¹⁵⁰ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁵¹ Amicus Union, 'Short-Term Funding: Short Term Thinking' (Amicus Union no date)

¹⁵² Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁵³ Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant, LP12) interview (n 25)

¹⁵⁴ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*

¹⁵⁶ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 39)

Prevent's tarnished reputation, advertising the source of funding could diminish community participation.

Evaluation in the context of terrorism attempts to answer the issue of how we know what works in the fight against terrorism. Numerous factors are taken into consideration such as the objectives of the counterterrorism strategy, what terrorists want, how to measure success, and the strategy's purpose (i.e. is it about winning hearts and minds, or about reducing the levels of fear amongst the public?) Extremism is a value-laden concept, and cannot be addressed in a vacuum or raised without considering its ethics.¹⁵⁷

There is no such thing as effectiveness at any cost – at least not in a democratic society where the rule of law is applied. Measuring the effectiveness can, therefore, never be a question of simple arithmetic.¹⁵⁸

Anyone attempting to evaluate preventative counterterrorism projects must keep these considerations in mind, thereby making evaluation more difficult.

In Maybury, the community safety team was responsible for ensuring that all successful project bids met the NI 35 standards before 2010, and that these projects were supported and evaluated on a monthly basis by a member of the team.

We funded about between forty to sixty projects in total ... [and] made sure the projects were running as we wanted to achieve what we desired, although it was quite difficult to quantify in the end on this agenda and, ultimately, writing up the evaluation and the feedback.¹⁵⁹

The community safety manager comments that national guidelines were conveniently ignored and facts made to fit.

Performance targets for *Prevent*, and that questionnaire that we had to sell to them, was an absolute waste of time. We used our own performance targets. ... It was ridiculous as you read through, it was almost comical.¹⁶⁰

This links to the point made earlier about altering the policy to suit the needs and skill sets of local professional staff. At the same time, this does not improve the task of evaluating *Prevent* on a local and national level. The *Review* bemoans the lack of evaluation and the general feeling amongst professionals in Maybury is that the new strategy provides no evidence of best practice examples, or any support in terms of

¹⁵⁷ Peter Chalk, 'The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism' (1995) 7 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10; Ted Honderich, *Terrorism For Humanity: Inquiries in Political Philosophy* (Pluto Press 2003)

¹⁵⁸ Beatrice de Graaf, 'Why Communication and Performance Are Key in Countering Terrorism' (2011) *Counter-terrorism, Communication and Performance*, 2

¹⁵⁹ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

evaluation.¹⁶¹ The council's *Prevent* lead states that central government 'still [hasn't] communicated any decision to us whether there is going to be a national indicator for *Prevent* or whether locally it's something we need to decide. ... Well there's nothing – nothing's replaced it'.¹⁶²

According to Maybury's chief executive, a local evaluation process was set up early on. After the initial round of bidding, numerous projects were rejected and 'gradually [we] weeded out some of the less effective programmes. I think any programme naturally will take ... a while to get their feet and find out which of them is an effective intervention'.¹⁶³ A document detailing all bids, proposed projects, and evaluations of some of the successful ones, reveals a long list of community cohesion projects bidding for *Prevent* money. Many of these were completely unrelated to *Prevent* and were rejected. Despite this, some projects, which were only vaguely connected to *Prevent*, still received funding. The community safety team manager emphasises that an 'industry' has grown up around *Prevent* with private and voluntary sectors attempting to get as much money as possible from local authorities (a view which is shared by five other participants).¹⁶⁴ The police officer seconded to the community safety team states that: 'I think there's certain organisation[s] ... money-making organisations who charge a lot of money to deliver some very simple projects, some very simple outcomes to be honest.'¹⁶⁵ The aforementioned document reveals that the evaluation of projects is inadequate. In particular, the statistical data of one project makes no sense at all.

HM Treasury guidelines suggest that evaluation should be an integral part of a broader policy cycle, and should be designed into each policy.

Monitoring seeks to check the progress against planned targets and can be defined as the formal reporting and evidencing that spent outputs are successfully delivered and milestones met. ... Evaluation is the assessment of the policy effectiveness and efficiency during and after the implementation. It seeks to measure the outcomes and impacts in order to assess whether the anticipated benefits have been realized.¹⁶⁶

When asked about whether or not the funding allocated to *Prevent* in Maybury is adequate, the *Prevent* police inspector reveals that it was

¹⁶¹ Police Inspector and Force *Prevent* lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁶² *Prevent* lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

¹⁶³ Local Authority Chief Executive (LP6) interview (n 5)

¹⁶⁴ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

¹⁶⁵ Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council (LP11) interview (n 9)

¹⁶⁶ HM Treasury, 'The Magenta Book: Guidance for Evaluation' (London 2011) 14

difficult because the biggest cost of doing anything is in the evaluation cost, and the management cost of evaluating and programming, and that's probably where our difficult area comes.¹⁶⁷

Because of cuts to *Prevent*, local authorities need to be more 'clever and strategic about how we access the funding, [and] use the funding, and have an audit trail about the impact',¹⁶⁸ a neighbourhood manager says. Evaluating *Prevent* projects is difficult because central government has not provided guidelines on how to measure success.

They haven't told us how they're going to measure us as yet. They're talking about having some measurements in place but they haven't. So, the only thing we can go off is ... either case studies that we've done or some feedbacks that we've had, or some evaluations that have been carried out with the stuff that we've been doing around *Prevent*.¹⁶⁹

Consequently, there is a lack of clear methodologies and guidelines on how to evaluate projects locally. 'I think they've got to ask what is your method of evaluation and monitoring process before they give anybody funding', a neighbourhood manager concludes.¹⁷⁰

In the words of the *Prevent* police inspector, 'evaluating what works and what doesn't work is probably the hardest area'.¹⁷¹ Although there have been attempts to evaluate *Prevent* projects in Maybury, overall evaluation appears to be poor. The community safety manager admits that it is

very, very difficult to prove that what work you've done has ultimately stopped someone from taking the next step, should we say, in committing an atrocity in some points in the future. ... [Success] would be so difficult to quantify.¹⁷²

The interview data highlights that there are few clear national guidelines, and fifteen local professionals agree that more needs to be done to evaluate successes and failures.

6.8 The perceived successes of Prevent

Data suggest achievement in two broad areas, namely awareness-raising and increasing levels of trust between the local authorities and local Muslim communities. It is apparent though, that levels of success are not based on rigorous evaluation, but on personal observations and experiences. These perceptions,

¹⁶⁷ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁶⁸ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

¹⁶⁹ Police Inspector and Lead on Channel (LP14) interview (n 13)

¹⁷⁰ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

¹⁷¹ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁷² Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3) interview (n 28)

experiences, and knowledge of local needs and risks appear to have shaped Maybury's *Prevent* delivery. Innes et al. make similar observations, noting that in their case study areas the local delivery of *Prevent* does not appear to derive 'from evidence-based assessments. Rather they [are] products of system legacies and opinion'.¹⁷³ This assertion also appears to be true in Maybury, although a number of police-led *Prevent* projects such as ACT NOW and Not in My Name have been evaluated by a university in the North of England.¹⁷⁴ The evaluation report was not obtained for this research project.

6.8.1 Perceptions of success

Despite the difficulties in quantifying *Prevent's* success, there have been some success stories. A number of professionals believe that the strategy has, at least to some degree, been successful in Maybury.¹⁷⁵ A member of the community safety team believes that awareness-raising has been

fantastic, so around the Internet safety project that [the police have] run ... those aspects [of] the awareness-raising have been fantastic. ... Yes, we have been very successful around the cohesion sort of element, the awareness-raising. ... But it's about the awareness-raising; it's not about tackling the underlying causes.¹⁷⁶

Awareness-raising, Maybury's *Channel* inspector believes, has led to an increase in people coming forward, which leads to a higher number of *Channel* referrals.¹⁷⁷

Prevent, the police area superintendent believes, creates the

conditions for people to separate themselves from extremism. And I think, yes we are. And I think we are creating conditions of trust, confidence. I think we're creating conditions where people would not want to get involved in extremism, not for everybody, but they would want to distance themselves from that sort of behaviour because they have seen what has happened. You know, you didn't get the communities clapping their hands when the 7/7 happened, when 9/11 happened you did.¹⁷⁸

It is interesting to note that, particularly amongst the police in Maybury, the perception prevails that *Prevent* has been a success in increasing levels of trust between communities and the authorities.

Part of the success, a police inspector and the force *Prevent* lead claims, comes from 'not ramming it down their neck and it [is] proportionate to each of the areas. ... We

¹⁷³ Martin Innes and others, 'Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers' (UPSI 2011) 3

¹⁷⁴ Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant, LP12) interview (n 25)

¹⁷⁵ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁷⁶ Community Safety Team member (LP8) interview (n 95)

¹⁷⁷ Police Inspector and Lead on Channel (LP14) interview (n 13)

[feel we are] achieving success, we have people switched on to the agenda.’¹⁷⁹ She further states that:

I could tell you that through building trust and confidence, people have come to us with concerns about honourable individuals, and I know that they have been on the fringe of national operations that CT officers have been looking at, and we know that we have diverted them away from that, so that must therefore be a success there. The partners felt empowered, or the school or whoever it was felt empowered to come, and share with us that person is now not facing a criminal charge and hopefully they will have a brighter future.¹⁸⁰

An analysis of British crime survey data by Innes et al. suggests that ‘community perceptions of the police have been remarkably stable, and largely positive’, and concludes that ‘*Prevent* policing does not appear to be causing widespread damage to police and Muslim community relations’.¹⁸¹ Lakhani suggests that there is an increase in trust between *Prevent* partners, community members, and professionals who are closely involved in *Prevent* work.¹⁸² Similar trends are observed in Maybury, although after some terrorist-related arrests in the county,¹⁸³ many groups such as the local Council of Mosques have refused to take part in further *Prevent*-funded activities.¹⁸⁴ Interestingly, the 2011/12 BCS suggests that attitudes towards the police are more positive amongst Asians, and over 60 per cent of those questioned in the county in which Maybury is situated believe that the police and the local council are addressing their concerns.¹⁸⁵ Without further research, it is, however, impossible to determine whether the upward trend in perceptions of the police is related to *Prevent* or improved neighbourhood policing as outlined in a Home Office paper.¹⁸⁶ Innes et al. note that across other areas in the UK where *Prevent* has been delivered, feelings of success are mainly based on personal experience and gut feeling rather than facts.¹⁸⁷ Whether these findings hold true in Maybury is the subject of the next section.

¹⁷⁸ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 39)

¹⁷⁹ Police Inspector and Force *Prevent* lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁸⁰ *ibid*

¹⁸¹ Innes and others (n 173) 7

¹⁸² Suraj Lakhani, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities’ (2012) 51 *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 190

¹⁸³ News Paper Article: Anonymized, ‘Terrorism Arrests in the North of England’ (2009)

¹⁸⁴ *Prevent* lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council (LP9) interview (n 10)

¹⁸⁵ Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales: Crime in England and Wales Quarterly First Release to March 2012 - Police Force Area Table’ (*ONS*, 2012) <<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/search/index.html?nscl=Crime+in+England+and+Wales&nscl-orig=Crime+in+England+and+Wales&content-type=Dataset&content-type=Reference+table&sortDirection=DESCENDING&sortBy=pubdate>> accessed 9 April 2012

¹⁸⁶ Home Office (n 119)

¹⁸⁷ Innes and others (n 173)

6.8.2 Perception of failure?

Although many interview participants believe that some aspects of *Prevent* have been unsuccessful, the word failure is used just once. A community volunteer categorically states that *Prevent* has failed. The policy, she says, has

failed to engage with the real issues that lead to terrorism and refused to engage with these difficult issues. *Prevent* programmes in [Maybury] were all about awareness-raising, about what extremism is and how it can be found rather than talking about extremism and its causes. It encourages those who hold extreme views to go underground.¹⁸⁸

Eight participants share similar experiences. Aspects of *Prevent* are described as unsuccessful rather than as failures.

The police authority *Prevent* lead, when asked whether she believes if *Prevent* has been successful in Maybury candidly states: ‘Simple answer, no.’¹⁸⁹ This view is supported by others such as a neighbourhood manager and fellow volunteers who deliver *Prevent* programmes. ‘Limited’, is the short answer of one volunteer.¹⁹⁰ Another neighbourhood manager, who also delivers a *Prevent* project, states cautiously:

I don’t think we have. I don’t think nationally or even internationally there’s been a willing ability to tackle grievance, because we’ve actually tried to put a lid on the voice of that grievance. And so if you hide it away then you don’t have to engage with it. ... Locally I think we do ... we have tried to create opportunities where there have been different voices heard. I still think ... we’re only tinkering at the edges of it. I think there’s a heck of a lot more work to be done there.¹⁹¹

Similar views are shared by sixteen of the twenty interviewees.

Earlier on, most of the programmes procured and delivered in Maybury focused on awareness-raising and building community trust.¹⁹² There are a number of local professionals who argue that this entire approach to *Prevent* was wrong and ineffective. One female officer argues:

If you see something suspicious — somebody’s house has been emptied, there’s a broken window ... just report it. Let us know because they might be away on a holiday. Generally, I think that kind of approach would’ve been better than going out ‘we want you to tell us about terrorists in your community’. It doesn’t work like that. I know they didn’t say *terrorist* in your community, but that’s how it equates to the community. ‘You want to tell us if there’s a terrorist in our

¹⁸⁸ Community Volunteer (LP 18) interview (n 146)

¹⁸⁹ Local Police Authority Prevent Lead (LP1) interview (n 76)

¹⁹⁰ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council and community volunteer (LP15) interview (n 104)

¹⁹¹ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42)

¹⁹² Freedom of Information Request: Programs funded by Prevent in Maybury (n 64)

community.' It's really difficult when you hear somebody talk about another community.¹⁹³

She further criticises *Prevent* for heavily focusing on 'men in the community. ... Men provide the solutions and women [have] not been involved in any degree that they should have been.'¹⁹⁴ The police *Prevent* lead states that a further barrier to success is the lack of skills per se, and the lack of awareness around *Prevent* within organisations. 'The lack of ... confidence of delivering on *Prevent* – massive issues – and I think that is in itself a hurdle that needs to be ... passed to be honest. I think that's a challenge [in its own right].'¹⁹⁵

In summary, certain aspects are seen as successful, some as having limited success, and others no success at all. Despite the perception of those who see success in certain aspects of *Prevent*, it is hard to validate these claims, especially in light of the common opinion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure success in the first place. Whether *Prevent* has been successful or not remains to be seen. Further in-depth evaluations of delivered *Prevent* programmes are still needed to establish a conclusive answer. The next chapter attempts to shed some light on the impact of *Prevent* on local Muslim communities in Maybury. Should the claims concerning increased levels of trust hold true, this development would have ramifications which go beyond *Prevent* and could positively affect not only policing in general, but counterterrorism policing because of the information volunteered by members of local communities.¹⁹⁶ It would then become possible to gather information and intelligence through improved community engagement rather than through uniformed and covert surveillance, which may be perceived as spying by Muslim communities.¹⁹⁷

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that there are fundamental differences between national and local policymakers, and front line staff, about how to implement *Prevent*. These differences relate to how the original policy was formulated and conceived. The data above demonstrate that the 2009 *Prevent* policy was interpreted quite broadly in Maybury, at times focusing more on community cohesion and integration than

¹⁹³ Local Police Authority Prevent Lead (LP1) interview (n 76)

¹⁹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁹⁵ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 45)

¹⁹⁶ Tom Tyler, 'Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation' (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 361

¹⁹⁷ Toole and others (n 32) 7

disrupting and challenging extremism. The use of community cohesion and integration by local authorities has been identified as a constant source of tension between the government, national and local policymakers, and front line staff.¹⁹⁸ Maybury's professionals acknowledge that the boundaries between counterterrorism, prevention, and community cohesion are blurred. The ambiguity of the *Prevent* policy, and the belief that broad community cohesion is essential to *Prevent*'s success, perpetuate national and local tensions because professionals in Maybury 'exploit' the policy's ambiguities by providing projects which focus mainly on community cohesion. To some degree, community cohesion is seen as a means to increase trust between authorities and communities, and between different communities. It is also seen as a way to increase the flow of information.¹⁹⁹ Interestingly, all police officers, whether nationally or in Maybury, agree that good neighbourhood policing and engagement with Muslim communities is vital. It is police officers who were not involved, or who had little knowledge, who said that *Prevent* was a waste of time and money.²⁰⁰

Part of the problem, as noted in 6.1, also stems from the fact that many of the local professionals implementing the policy or delivering a *Prevent* programme have not read the policy documents, and/or disagree with aspects of the policy. In particular, they disagree with the separation of *Prevent* and community cohesion, and the exclusion of far-right extremism from *Prevent*. The data demonstrate that most programmes in Maybury relate to precisely the types of activity criticised by the media, parliamentary committees, the government, and the *Prevent Review*. The nature of these programmes further suggests that there is: a) a lack of knowledge, and relevant skills, to tackle extremism; or b) a commitment by the local authorities to tackle extremism through wider community cohesion; or c) both. The data indicate the latter, pointing to a lack of skills, something that is acknowledged by a number of professionals in Maybury, while also acknowledging the commitment of local professionals to a more inclusive approach to *Prevent*. Local professionals believe that this approach leads to greater engagement of communities, ultimately increasing the flow of information and decreasing levels of extremism.

There are also a number of organisational tensions which centre on information sharing, funding, and evaluation. This chapter highlights particular issues about

¹⁹⁸ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 53)

¹⁹⁹ See: Chapter 3.7

information sharing between national and local government agencies. Some local professionals argue that the lack of information sharing means that local *Prevent* programmes have to be more generic, and that the programmes are unable to work with the communities and individuals who are at risk because these are not identified. *Channel* appears to be an exception because relevant information is shared between different organisations. If the coalition government aims to increase more targeted *Prevent* interventions, more information needs to be shared to allow local authorities and neighbourhood police teams to put in place specific, rather than generic, interventions. Attitudes towards funding are surprising. Local professionals argue that it is not the level of funding that is the problem, but rather how it is spent, and that competition between different providers limits the ability to generate more effective multi-organisation projects. Funding is also linked to evaluation, which is acknowledged to be difficult but essential. The *Prevent* inspector argues that the cost of project evaluation can be considerable compared to the cost of project implementation. In the future, this may mean either less evaluation or less money for *Prevent* projects because there may not be enough money for both. Overall, the evaluation of *Prevent* projects is poor and needs improvement. As noted earlier, perceptions of success are often not based on fact, but on personal experiences and gut feelings. This pattern has also been identified in other areas in the UK where *Prevent* is delivered.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ See: Chapter 5.4

²⁰¹ Innes and others (n 173)

Chapter 7: Local communities and *Prevent*

7.1 Introduction

This chapter differs somewhat from the previous two because it explores the impact of the *Prevent* policy process on Maybury's Muslim communities.¹ This impact was explored through five semi-structured focus groups in Maybury to determine how perceptions of *Prevent* have been formed. Three focus groups were divided by age and gender, one was a mixed group, and the final focus group was an all-male group which included community leaders, voluntary workers, and imams. The data not only suggest that to a large extent negative media discourses of Islam, Muslim communities, and *Prevent* appear to have shaped the public's perceptions about *Prevent* in Maybury, but also that the media in general has had an important role in shaping the perceptions of the local Muslim communities. This chapter argues that these perceptions have been reinforced by negative personal and vicarious experiences of counterterrorism and *Prevent*. It is the perceived impact of stop-and-searches and other terrorism powers, rather than their implementation, which appears to have influenced and perpetuated negative perceptions about *Prevent*. The hostile media discourses of *Prevent*, and local counterterrorism policing activity, appear to have led to a degree of alienation from mainstream British society and other local communities in Maybury.

This chapter examines the impact this perceived alienation has had on Muslim communities in Maybury, and in particular on the communities' engagement with *Prevent* and the authorities more generally. It further examines extremism, communication, and the issues of trust and legitimacy. After a brief discussion about extremism in general, it examines the same issues in the context of *Prevent*. This chapter argues that *Prevent* is unable to address the issues of extremism because of alienation and the government's unwillingness to address underlying causes. *Prevent* is seen as a tool which propagates British values, values accepted by large sections of the Muslim communities throughout the country. Despite this, perceptions that Muslim communities oppose these values persist. The policy ignores diversity, and limits freedom of expression through informal social and political control. The final parts of this chapter examine the impact that communication between the authorities

¹ Richard Rose, 'Comparing Public Policy: An Overview' (1973) 1 *European Journal of Political Research* 67

and communities has had on levels of trust in authorities, and communities' willingness to engage with *Prevent*.

7.2 Shaping local perceptions of counterterrorism policing and Prevent: The influence of the local and national media

Perceptions about *Prevent*, and counterterrorism policing more generally, have largely been shaped by local and national media representation in print and online. The focus group and interview data suggest that such media is the main source of information in Maybury. This section examines the role of the media in shaping local perceptions of *Prevent*, rather than what these perceptions are. Other sources of information, such as the Internet and personal experiences, appear to have had only a limited effect on local perceptions.

7.2.1 Local and national media as gatekeepers of information: Shaping negative perceptions of Prevent

Media representation of *Prevent* has generally been negative, and a search in any of the major newspapers, including the broadsheets, reveals numerous articles accusing *Prevent* of wasting public money, funding Islamic extremist groups,² and spying on Muslim communities.³ According to Kundnani's report, published by the Institute of Race Relations, *Prevent* marginalises Muslim communities. The report also claims that *Prevent* is being used as a spying tool.⁴ Negative headlines about extremism and *Prevent* in general, and their implied connection with Muslim communities, appears to reinforce the notion that 'Islam is profoundly different from, and a serious threat to, the West; and that within Britain, Muslims [are] a threat to – us.'⁵ Both the 2009 version of *Prevent* and the 2011 *Prevent Review* reflect similar views, seeking to justify why *Prevent* should primarily target Muslim communities. Hostile media depictions of Muslims and Islam, it is suggested, are based on a long tradition of cultural stereotypes and deeply held beliefs of the 'other'.⁶ The media has employed

² Alan Travis, 'Axe Funding for Anti-Democracy Muslim Groups, Says Former Minister', *the Guardian* (2 May 2011) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/07/muslim-groups-counter-terrorism-funding>> accessed 4 April 2012

³ Vikram Dodd, 'Government Anti-Terrorism Strategy "Spies" on Innocent' (*the Guardian*, 2009) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/anti-terrorism-strategy-spies-innocents>> accessed 11 October 2012

⁴ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

⁵ Greater London Authority, 'The Search for Common Ground - Muslims, Non-Muslims and the UK Media: A Report Commissioned by the Mayor of London' (GLA 2007) XVII

⁶ Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (2nd edn, Vintage 1997)

frameworks centring on violence, extremism, and fanaticism,⁷ portrayals that have proven resilient over the last fifteen or so years – perhaps because, as Said claims, they reflect deeper social and cultural fears, and an anxiety of the ‘other’ which goes back to the imperial age.⁸ Ericson et al. note that the media, in general, often serves as a gatekeeper, reinforcing ‘discourses of morality, procedure, and hierarchy, providing [a] symbolic representation of order in these terms’.⁹ The negative media characterisations of Muslim communities and *Prevent* emphasise cultural, ethnic, and religious differences, serving the hegemonic purpose of inculcating ‘individuals with values, beliefs, and the codes of behaviour that will integrate’¹⁰ or alienate groups who do not meet the status quo as conceived by the institutional structure of the larger society. In response to the negative media coverage, the public, including Muslim communities, appear to have tacitly accepted the representation that *Prevent* partially funds Islamic extremist groups, wastes public money, and spies on Muslim communities.

A report commissioned by Maybury Council acknowledges that the media plays a key role in constructing the public’s understanding of terrorism and, by implication, government responses.¹¹ The report further states that those interviewed are sceptical of the accuracy of media reports, and suspicious of the motives of the media when reporting on terrorism or extremism. One interviewee states: ‘The media goes overboard and it’s the way that it’s reported ... the media promote fear, and the language used can make the situation worse.’¹² Despite being sceptical of the news media, none of the focus groups’ participants question the prevalent negative representation of counterterrorism policing and *Prevent*. Data from the five focus groups indicate that, despite being sceptical, participants concede that media representations of counterterrorism and *Prevent* are a major factor in shaping local perceptions of counterterrorism and the *Prevent* policy. Hall et al. reiterate that the

⁷ Elizabeth Poole and John Richardson, *Muslims and the News Media* (IBTauris 2006)

⁸ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Vintage 1979)

⁹ Richard Ericson and others, *Representing Order: Crime, Law and Justice in the News Media* (Open University Press 1991) 5

¹⁰ Noam Chomsky and Edward S Herman, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (Vintage 1995) 1

¹¹ Report for Maybury Council: Understanding Communities, ‘Report Anonymized.’ (2011)

¹² *ibid*

media is often the primary, if not the only, source of information beyond individuals' immediate environment.¹³

Figure 7.1

Local newspaper circulation: on and offline access.

Number of article headlines (articles) referring to one, or a combination of, the following keywords: terrorism, Islam, Muslim, and Prevent, between Dec. 2004 and Dec. 2012.

	Print	Online	Terrorism, Muslim, Islam <i>Headlines (articles)</i>	Prevent <i>Headlines (articles)</i>
<i>Maybury Citizen</i>	18%	4%	Not known	Not known
<i>Maybury Telegraph</i>	25%	49%	91 (772)	0 (15)

Source: mediauk.com and lexisnexis.co.uk

Although participants were not asked which media outlets they obtain their information from, a 2012 Reuters Institute of Journalism study suggests that approximately 50 per cent of people in the UK are interested in local news.¹⁴ Figure 7.1 shows that about a quarter of the adult population in Maybury read the *Maybury Telegraph* in print, while almost 50 per cent access its website for local news. These data suggest that the local media plays a significant role in shaping opinions and perceptions about local and national issues. Data obtained from the Nexis database suggests that over an eight-year period, the *Maybury Telegraph* published 772 stories with the following keywords: terrorism, Islam, Muslim, and *Prevent*. Of these, only fifteen stories relate to *Prevent*, indicating that the policy was less of a local issue.¹⁵ Therefore, much of the information about *Prevent* must come from other sources such as the national media, social media, the Internet, personal experiences, and family and friends. Focus group data suggest that the media is the main source of information about *Prevent*. The implication is that it is the national media's portrayal which has largely shaped views about *Prevent*. Participants of a report commissioned by Maybury Council recognise that newspapers have a

¹³ Stuart Hall and others, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (Palgrave Macmillan 1978)

¹⁴ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 'Reuters Institute Digital Report 2012' (Oxford University 2012)

¹⁵ Newspaper and website audience report for the location: Maybury, 'Website Anonymized.' (2012)

great deal of power in creating resentment about the allocation of resources – and this happens whether it is a right-wing or left-wing paper. The media help shape people’s opinions – even if what they say is factually incorrect.¹⁶

This acceptance of media representation is highlighted by one of the participants who confirms that something could be perceived as true ‘because it has been in the newspapers’.¹⁷ Similar comments supporting this view were made in three of the five focus groups. Only two focus group participants, both imams, have attempted to verify the content of the *Prevent* policy, downloading it from the Home Office website only to glance briefly at the document.¹⁸ The majority of the participants acknowledge the power of the media in shaping their communities’ attitude towards counterterrorism policing and *Prevent*.

7.2.2 Reinforcing negative perceptions of counterterrorism policing and prevent

Focus group data suggest that part of the issue is the existing negative representation of Muslim communities in general, and their exacerbated links with extremism and terrorism. The data further indicate that Muslim communities in Maybury feel uneasy about how they are being stereotyped by the media. This is a recurring theme in all five focus groups. Participants state that ‘Muslims will never get away from stereotypes, there is always going to be something or other’,¹⁹ and ‘they are not looking at us [women] as being like a potential suicide bomber, but with guys it tends to happen a lot’.²⁰

People get upset, but that doesn’t mean that all Muslims are extremists. That’s what you get from the media. A lot of Muslims get dissed because what you ... hear in the media, the same if someone was to target Christians and Jesus. I feel that all Christians would feel offended as well and they would speak out.²¹

Prevent’s negative characterisations reinforce the prevalent beliefs of the participants that their communities are seen as troublesome; a view shared in all five focus groups.

I think you just get stereotyped, like a lot of the times people presume that people who cover their faces, they’re doing it not by choice, but out of force and

¹⁶ Report for Maybury Council: Understanding Communities (n 11)

¹⁷ Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011); Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

¹⁸ Asian Male, local imam, Chaplain at the local hospital, early 30s (FG 5), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011); Asian Male, Imam at a local mosque, works for the local council of mosques, mid 30s (FG 5), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

¹⁹ Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

²⁰ Asian Female, parent of three, working part-time, mid 30s (FG 3), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

²¹ Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 17)

they think it's impinging on their rights ... again presuming and not realising that we have choices of what we can do.²²

One of the imams states that:

I used to follow the media very closely. But as a Muslim community, we've had so much exposure in the media that many of us have become very thick-skinned. It doesn't interest me anymore.²³

Malik points out that the media, policymakers, and security experts have accused Muslim communities of having links to extremism and/or terrorism, and of holding political views contrary to the norms of liberal state democracy and British values, and that these Muslim communities should therefore be excluded from consultation and engagement.²⁴ Even Muslim communities have accused other Muslim communities along the same lines.

It appears that negative media representation of Muslim communities, especially when linked to extremism and terrorism, has led to feelings of alienation and an attitude of resentment and indifference amongst the residents of Maybury towards local authorities and the police in the wider context of counterterrorism. Frustration, and a degree of indifference, reinforce negative media representations within Maybury's local communities. The symbolic language and graphic images used by the media turn selective events into a view of the world, which influences personal and collective perceptions of reality, and in this case *Prevent*.²⁵ General media representation, Allen argues, provokes feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and alienation amongst Muslim communities in ways which weaken the government's measures to reduce and prevent extremism, and are likely to act as a barrier, 'preventing the success of the government's community cohesion policies and programmes' of which *Prevent* is a part.²⁶ The focus group participants share these feelings, in particular those of alienation and marginalisation. Perceptions, Wuthnow et al. state, inspire and give meaning to activities whether individual or collective, and can legitimise or delegitimise 'activities and bring to bear the forces of social control'.²⁷ 'They are targeting us; we wouldn't want to be involved with something

²² Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19)

²³ Asian Male, Imam at a local mosque, works for the local council of mosques, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

²⁴ Maleiha Malik, 'Engaging with Extremists' (2008) 22 *International Relations* 85

²⁵ Brian McNair, *An Introduction to Political Communication* (5th edn, Routledge 2011)

²⁶ Chris Allen, 'A Review of the Evidence Relating to the Representation of Muslims and Islam in the British Media' (University of Birmingham 2012) 10

²⁷ Robert Wuthnow and others, *Cultural Analysis: The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas* (Routledge 1984) 37

that targets us',²⁸ one participant says. This statement epitomises the negative perceptions towards *Pursue* and *Prevent* which appear to be prevalent amongst the participants of all five focus groups. Participants of the five focus groups claim that these negative perceptions, frustrations, and feelings of indifference towards the issues of terrorism and *Prevent* have led to disinterest and inaction amongst Muslim communities in Maybury and the withdrawal of cooperation of a number of local organisations.

7.3 The impact of 'stop and search' and local counterterrorism activities

Between 2006 and 2011, few S. 43 and S. 44 'stop-and-searches' were carried out in Maybury. A Freedom of Information request shows that the local police force used S. 43 and S. 44 only fifteen times during this period, making no arrests.²⁹ During the same period, the British Transport Police carried out 11,255 S. 43 and S. 44 stop-and-searches in the north-west of England. The majority of these occurred prior to 2009. No British Transport Police officers are based at Maybury's small train station, which suggests that few, if any, of the aforementioned stop-and-searches occurred in Maybury.³⁰ It is important to note, however, that the regional counterterrorism unit carried out a number of terrorism-related arrests in the Maybury area. Whether any stop-and-searches occurred at the same time is unclear because the counterterrorism unit refused to provide any details in response to an FOI request. The use of these S. 43 and S. 44 stop-and-searches was controversial, and its practice has now been stopped.³¹ Parmar argues that such stop-and-searches were often counterproductive, creating barriers, and straining relations, between local communities and the police.

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All participants are aware of these powers granted to the police, and although none of the participants had been stopped and searched, a number of them know someone who had. Many stop-and-searches occurred in the London area, or at the airport. One of the participants states: 'I know with my brother-in-law, they stopped him because

²⁸ Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17)

²⁹ Letter from Freedom of Information Request: Arrests and Stops and Searches Carried Out in Maybury between January 2006 and December 2011, 'Anonymized, Local Police Force' (2012)

³⁰ Letter from British Transport Police, 'S.43 and 44 Stop and Searches in the North West' (2012)

³¹ Home Office, 'Statement by the Home Secretary on 'stop and search' Powers Under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Section 44)' (2010) <<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/parliamentary-business/oral-statements/stop-and-search-statement/?view=Standard&pubID=821759>> accessed 30 October 2010

³² Alpa Parmar, 'Stop and Search in London: Counter-Terrorist or Counter-Productive?' (2011) 21 *Policing and Society* 369

he was driving a nice car and they followed him from his house ... and it is all those kind of things. ... They have these stereotypes.’³³ Another participant claims that her son and his friends had been stopped because of their Muslim apparel. ‘They didn’t do anything wrong, they just had beards.’³⁴ Some of these experiences appear to be routine PACE, rather than S. 43 and S. 44, stop-and-searches. It appears that the perceived use of counterterrorism stop-and-search, rather than its actual use, generated resentment towards the police, an attitude reflected in all five focus groups. One of the participants states that he saw the police pull over ‘kids in a car, youngsters getting stopped by the police, an Asian bloke. What for? He wasn’t speeding or underage’.³⁵ Although there is agreement amongst participants of all five focus groups that the police were treating Muslims unfairly when making decisions about who to stop, participants of Focus Groups Two and Three feel much stronger than the others about this subject (these two groups consisted of males and females under thirty). This study confirms Parmar’s findings that negative perceptions about stop-and-search are not confined to the London area, but also occur in areas such as Maybury.³⁶ It appears that these negative perceptions are often influenced by the experiences of others outside their personal sphere, experiences which also have the capacity to trigger social perceptions.³⁷ At least one participant within each of the five focus groups shared such a vicarious experience.

Perceptions about stop-and-search and other counter-terrorism activities, it appears, may have created barriers between the authorities and Maybury’s Muslim communities. Over the last few years, there have been a number of high profile terrorism arrests in Maybury. Front line staff repeatedly state that an incident in 2009 created barriers between the police, the local authority, and Maybury’s Muslim communities (see Chapter 6). A neighbourhood manager admits that ‘people were very angry about that convoy being stopped. And again people were feeling they’d been victimised and, you know, targeted’.³⁸ As a direct result of this counterterrorism operation, the local Council of Mosques and affiliated organisations refused to provide services to, and engage with, the *Prevent* programme. Since then, the police

³³ Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19)

³⁴ Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member and community volunteer, Mid 40s (FG 1), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

³⁵ Asian Male, working on a vocational course, early 20s (FG 2), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

³⁶ Parmar, ‘Stop and search in London’ (n 32)

³⁷ Diana Mutz, *Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes* (Cambridge University Press 1998)

believe that their efforts to increase community engagement have broken down some of these barriers.³⁹ However, contrary to the belief of front line staff, this incident appears to have been less of a barrier for local Muslim communities, and was only mentioned briefly by participants in two of the five focus groups. This incident is seen as a tipping point, highlighting that Muslim communities are repeatedly targeted because of their religion and ethnicity. ‘The police do the right thing to terrorists, but sometimes people are not terrorists and they label them as terrorists and that is wrong.’⁴⁰ A participant states that the police

admitted to making mistakes. And I think they’re looking at things in a very mature way of late. But I do feel that the wider public ... don’t trust the police as much as they should.⁴¹

Another participant states that: ‘We are happy that they are trying to stop terrorism. What else do we want? It’s for our security.’⁴² However, this same level of enthusiasm is only shared by Focus Groups One, Two, and Three, with the other two focus groups grudgingly accepting that certain aspects of counterterrorism policing are a necessary evil, and blaming extremists and terrorists for the negative media coverage. It is worth noting here that perceptions amongst the older participants towards counterterrorism policing are much more positive than those amongst the younger participants. A young male participant states that: ‘Being a practicing Muslim, [is not the same as] being an extremist, because that’s just two different things. Extremists are people that are off their heads basically.’⁴³ Similar sentiments are shared across each of the five focus groups, viewing violent extremists rather than Islam as the problem. Participants of all five focus groups feel wrongly labelled, and often – unjustly – linked to terrorism. Scholarship over the last decade recognises that there has been a shift, indicating that Asian males are perceived as the new folk devils.⁴⁴ Moral panic links Asian communities to violence, drugs, and

³⁸ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10), ‘Name Anonymized. Delivered a Prevent Programme. White Female, Mid 40s.’ (2011)

³⁹ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5), ‘Name Anonymized. White Female, Early 40s.’ (2011)

⁴⁰ Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, late 50s (FG 1), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

⁴¹ Asian Male, Imam at a local mosque, works for the local council of mosques, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

⁴² Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, early 60s (FG 1), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

⁴³ Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 17)

⁴⁴ Alpa Parmar, ‘Policing and Ethnic Profiling’ in Kjartan Sveinsson (ed), *Ethnic profiling: The use of ‘Race’ in UK law enforcement* (Runnymede 2010)

terrorism, perpetuating the image of stereotypical Muslims as extremists and terrorists.⁴⁵

7.4 The impact of perceptions of Pursue and Prevent on alienation, extremism, and identity

Generally, negative media discourse links Islam and British Muslim communities to extremism and terrorism. This in turn has increased a sense of alienation and isolation that these communities experience ‘both as a result of ascription and of active acquisition of an identity as the classic *other*’.⁴⁶ Moore et al. write that Islam and Muslims are depicted as being opposed to dominant British cultural and political values, as elusive as those values may be. The most common words they found ‘in relation to British Muslims were terrorist, extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and militant, with very few positive nouns used’.⁴⁷ Political and social discourses, selective representations, and fast dissemination of biased messages through the media have created a hostile environment for Muslims in the UK and worldwide. This is felt acutely in minority communities in the midst of alien and alienating societies. A programme such as *Prevent* causes, according to some,⁴⁸ the further alienation of Muslim communities because it is led by government imperatives, which operate on the assumption that there are legitimate and illegitimate Muslims, with the latter group being excluded from participating as active citizens. The *Prevent Review* makes it clear that

the ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem; legitimate religious belief emphatically is not. But we will not work with extremist organisations that oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and full participation in our society.⁴⁹

What is not clear is where the line between legitimate and illegitimate Islam is drawn. Further, such an approach assumes a direct link between radicalisation and

⁴⁵ Claire Alexander, *The Asian Gang: Ethnicity, Identity, Masculinity* (Berg Publishers 2000); Babara Hudson, ‘Diversity, Crime and Criminal Justice’ in Mike Maguire and others (eds), *The Oxford Handbook Of Criminology* (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2007)

⁴⁶ Saleha S Mahmood, ‘A Word About Ourselves’ (2006) 26 *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 293, 293

⁴⁷ Kerry Moore and others, ‘Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000-2008’ (University of Cardiff 2008) 3

⁴⁸ Asim Qureshi, ‘New Prevent Strategy Hails Further Alienation of Muslim Community’ (*Cageprisoners*, 2011) <<http://www.cageprisoners.com/our-work/opinion-editorial/item/1671-new-prevent-strategy-hails-further-alienation-of-muslim-community>> accessed 1 August 2013

⁴⁹ HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (HMSO 2011) Foreword

violent extremism, despite evidence to the contrary.⁵⁰ A sense of alienation has had a direct impact on how *Prevent* is perceived by Maybury's Muslim communities.

7.4.1 Understanding alienation and its effects on Muslim communities

According to Dean, alienation can be categorised into three subtypes: powerlessness, normlessness, and social isolation.⁵¹

By alienation is meant that men pursue goals, and use means in their pursuit, determined either by social entities with which they do not feel intimately identify or by forces which they may be unable to recognize at all. ... The growth of alienation implies that the range of choice open to the ordinary individual, the area of discretion available to him, is declining.⁵²

The three elements mentioned above are all evident within the focus groups' data. Powerlessness is a feeling of separation from effective control over one's economic destiny, and a sense of helplessness – of being used for a purpose other than one's own. Further, helplessness can also be ascribed to other power relations and is not solely ascribed to economic barriers.⁵³ Those in positions of relative powerlessness 'may be constrained or marginalized whilst the perspectives of those in positions of relative power in the engagement process may dominate'.⁵⁴ It is those with power who define Muslims, and the media plays a large role in this process.⁵⁵ The secular Muslim emerges in close connection with the exertion of power by the state, and presents an identity which ruptures 'political designations and normative designations by Muslims of what Islam is or Muslims are'.⁵⁶

Individuals in mass society ... are to an ever-increasing extent involved in public affairs; it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore them. But *ordinary* individuals have ever less of the feeling that they can understand or influence the very events upon which their life and happiness is known to depend.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Basia Spalek and Alia Imtoul, 'Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror Responses: "Hard" Approaches to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia' (2007) 27 *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 185

⁵¹ Dwight Dean, 'Alienation and Political Apathy' (1960) 38 *Social Forces* 185

⁵² Alvin Gouldner, *Studies in Leadership* (Harper and Brothers 1950) 86

⁵³ Dwight Dean, 'Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement' (1961) 26 *American Sociological* 753

⁵⁴ Basia Spalek and Robert Lambert, 'Muslim Communities, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation: A Critically Reflective Approach to Engagement' (2008) 36 *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 257, 263

⁵⁵ Riem Spielhaus, 'Media Making Muslims: The Construction of a Muslim Community in Germany Through Media Debate' (2010) 4 *Contemporary Islam* 11

⁵⁶ Ruth Mas, 'Compelling the Muslim Subject: Memory as Post-Colonial Violence and the Public Performativity of "Secular and Cultural Islam"' (2006) 96 *The Muslim World* 585, 611

⁵⁷ Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, 'Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda' in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (eds), *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication* (Free Press 1950) 283

There is agreement amongst participants of all five focus groups that they and their communities feel a sense of helplessness in shaping how they and their communities are seen by wider British society.

Feelings of powerlessness and fatalism discourage political action while increasing political apathy. Apathy is defined as diminished motivation, and is not attributable to decreased levels of consciousness, cognitive impairment, or emotional distress.⁵⁸ Helplessness is accompanied by fatalism. Fatalism represents a prolonged frustration of urgent need, which stems from individuals attempting to measure up to unrealistic goals, which in turn comes from the disparity between individuals' aims and accomplishments.⁵⁹ Similar sentiments are shared amongst all five focus groups. One participant states that:

Terrorism in principle may have a particular definition, but then, in effect discriminates against a particular group of people and puts them at a disadvantage. And I think that's what seems to be happening with [us] around terrorism and extremism.⁶⁰

Another participant states that media representation and government policies 'certainly cause anger within the community'.⁶¹ Over time, this anger, and an inability to do something about negative perceptions and the continuing state of affairs, turns to political apathy and fatalism, as described by Rosenberg.

Normlessness is a lack of clear norms, or norm conflict. Horney writes that feelings of normlessness emerge from conflicts such as religion versus the success imperative, the stimulation towards materialism versus the ability to obtain such, and the alleged freedoms of the individual versus their actual limitations.⁶² This aspect of alienation becomes particularly clear when discussing freedom of expression and British values later in the chapter. One of the participants expresses his concerns, stating that:

People should have the ability to have their own choices and not be oppressed, but I think sometimes, in a way we oppress, the British oppress, they are kind of oppressing us because they want us to act and live the way they are living.

⁵⁸ RS Marin, 'Differential Diagnosis and Classification of Apathy' (1990) 147 *The American journal of psychiatry* 22

⁵⁹ Morris Rosenberg, 'The Meaning of Politics in Mass Society' (1951) 15 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 5

⁶⁰ Asian Male, local imam, Chaplain at the local hospital, early 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

⁶¹ White Male, community volunteer, involved in inter-faith community work across the North of England, mid 30s (FG 5), 'Name Anonymized.' (2011)

⁶² Karen Horney, 'Culture and Neurosis' in Logan Wilson and William Kolb (eds), *Sociological Analysis* (Harcourt Brace and Company 1949)

The concepts of normlessness and social isolation are based on Durkheim's notion of anomy.⁶³ Normlessness has three characteristics: a 'painful uneasiness or anxiety, a feeling of separation from group standards, and a feeling of pointlessness or purposelessness that no certain goals exist'.⁶⁴ This purposelessness is described as 'the absence of values that might give purpose or direction to life, the loss of intrinsic and socialized values, the insecurity of hopeless disorientation'.⁶⁵ Ruesch links the concept to social mobility. Some cultural differences, such as not drinking alcohol or the wearing of the hijab, hinder the social mobility of Muslims in the UK.⁶⁶ Social isolation is also linked to the above characteristics. It includes 'a feeling of separation from the group or of isolation from group standards'.⁶⁷ This sense of separation centres on the issue of British values. Members of all five focus groups are confused about what exactly these values are, an issue which appears to concern the participants of Focus Group Five most (the focus group with community leaders and imams); but all note that the media represents Muslim communities in opposition to them. The collapse of religious values 'hollowed out the edifice of the British national identity'.⁶⁸ In this development, alternative ideologies such as socialism have also become less powerful. Despite the fact that Britishness remains an obscure set of values, politicians and the media continue to refer to them, and they are linked to democracy, equality for women, and the rights of the individual.

7.4.2 Alienation in the context of Prevent and other counterterrorism measures

Despite the fact that all focus group participants are second and third generation British, there is a general consensus that they are often not accepted as such but seen as Muslims first. One participant states:

We don't get treated British. ... Like you are from Germany ... you probably know people that get targeted as German Nazis. But not all of you are the same are you? That is how we feel as well.⁶⁹

Another participant states that:

⁶³ Peter Hamilton and Emile Durkheim (eds), *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments* (Routledge 1990)

⁶⁴ Sebastian DeGrazia, *The Political Community: A Study of Anomie* (University of Chicago Press 1978) 3

⁶⁵ Robert Morrison MacIver, *The Ramparts We Guard* (Macmillan 1950) 87

⁶⁶ Muhammad Anwar, 'Muslims in Britain: Issues, Policy and Practice' in Tahir Abbas (ed), *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure* (Zed Books 2005)

⁶⁷ DeGrazia (n 64) 3

⁶⁸ Rosemary Sales, 'Britain and Britishness: Place, Belonging and Exclusion' in Waqar Ahmad and Ziauddin Sardar (eds), *Muslims in Britain: Making Social and Political Space* (London, Routledge 2012) 39

I think in a way we ... try to mix in more with other communities. ... Say someone was white British, we might try to mix in with them ... social, or we'll do something else, but we wouldn't talk about religion openly because we feel awkward about it.⁷⁰

Participants across all five focus groups feel a sense of isolation because of their Muslim heritage and identity.

There's a sense of Muslims overall feeling they are British, but ... when there's a double standard taking place, like, for example, when it comes to the EDL, then Muslims have a sense of concern. Why is this happening to us when we also feel that we're an important part of this community? We want to contribute to the benefit of this community. Why are we, as Muslims, discriminated against, and isolated and targeted? Marginalised? So then, obviously it creates further frustrations for many Muslims.⁷¹

Similar experiences are shared by participants from each of the five focus groups. One of the participants, an imam and chaplain at the local hospital, links the isolation to the *Prevent* policy stating:

I don't think they're doing themselves many favours in how they're dealing with this strategy. If you isolate a community then because there's not that equilibrium, there's not that balance across the board, then one community is going to feel disgruntled, frustrated, because they may be always under the spotlight whilst another community gets away with it.⁷²

The findings are also corroborated by a Maybury Council report titled 'Understanding Communities', which reveals that many Muslims in Maybury feel that racism is on the increase. A rise in prominence of groups such as the EDL and the BNP highlights this. The report further states that 'language around the *Prevent* agenda [has] been very divisive and [has] marginalized communities that we need to work with'.⁷³

When asked, participants across all five focus groups report being frustrated because they are linked to extremists and terrorists by the media and members of other communities in Maybury. Focus Groups One and Five appear to be least concerned about this. One of the participants shares an experience where one of her white neighbours is reported to have said:

The only thing that you guys will do is strap a bomb to yourself. That really hurts when somebody says that because you've been brought up here, we

⁶⁹ Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17)

⁷⁰ Asian Female, parent of three, working part-time, mid 30s (FG 3) interview (n 20)

⁷¹ Asian Male, local imam, Chaplain at the local hospital, early 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

⁷² *ibid*

⁷³ Report for Maybury Council: Understanding Communities (n 11)

believe that this is our country and when someone else says that to you it really hurts.⁷⁴

Comparable experiences are shared by two other participants, in Focus Groups One and Three.⁷⁵ This type of experience, and a number of similar experiences shared by the participants, highlights how neighbours and colleagues link them to extremism and terrorism, though often unwittingly and in innocent situations, because they are Muslim. A myriad of similar experiences within Muslim communities appear to have led to a collective sense of marginalisation, often based on the vicarious experiences of others and media representation.⁷⁶ The data suggest that because of the preconceived notion that other communities expect cultural assimilation and are not as open to cultural differences, Muslim communities perceive being Muslim as a barrier to integration. One of the participants states that she does not feel comfortable talking about her religion because of her preconceived belief of being labelled a terrorist by those from other faiths. Being Asian, she feels, marks her out as a Muslim, making integration more difficult.⁷⁷ There is a shared feeling amongst participants of all five focus groups that counterterrorism policing and *Prevent* are isolating their communities.

I don't think they're doing themselves many favours in how they're dealing with this strategy. If you isolate a community then ... there's not that equilibrium, there's not that balance across the board, then one community is going to feel disgruntled, frustrated, because they may be always under the spotlight whilst another community gets away with it. Now, in terms of communities, some people may look at that and say no, no, that's certain parts of the government that are to blame for that and they'll leave it there. But other people will take that to the extreme and associate that with, for example, the white community. And then obviously it can create tensions amongst communities as well.⁷⁸

A House of Commons Select Committee, reporting on the prevention of violent extremism, and a Demos report, support this view.⁷⁹ Both state that the language used around *Prevent* is leading to an increase in intercommunity tensions, and even

⁷⁴ Asian Female, Social Worker, late 20s (FG 4), 'Name Anonymized.' (2011)

⁷⁵ Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member and community volunteer, Mid 40s (FG 1) interview (n 34); Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19)

⁷⁶ Tom Tyler and Jeffery Fagan, 'Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?' in Stephen Rice and Michael White (eds), *Race, Ethnicity, and Policing: New and Essential Readings* (NYU Press 2010)

⁷⁷ Asian Female, parent of three, working part-time, mid 30s (FG 3) interview (n 20)

⁷⁸ Asian Male, local imam, Chaplain at the local hospital, early 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

⁷⁹ Communities and Local Government Select Committee, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10' (HMSO 2010)

threatens ‘to undo a number of good initiatives that contribute to the community cohesion because of the link to counter-terrorism’.⁸⁰

Prevent, and counterterrorism policing activities, it appears, are seen as a tipping point, a confirmation that authorities are targeting Muslim communities because of their faith and ethnicity. As mentioned earlier, participants of all five focus groups acknowledge the need for some counterterrorism measures, although some participants within Focus Group Two do so grudgingly. However, the use of stop-and-search, *Prevent*, and other *Pursue* measures heightens the sense of alienation felt by Maybury’s Muslim communities. Over the years, a general sense of resentment has led to feelings of indifference, and ultimately political apathy. Rather than recognising *Prevent* as an opportunity to engage with wider society and the authorities, it is perceived as yet another threat to these communities.

This fatalistic attitude receives general expression in the idea that we will always have wars, depressions, corruptions and prejudice and that there is no point in trying to do anything about it.⁸¹

Despite the efforts of front line staff in Maybury, and their attempts to socialise counterterrorism policy, reinforced negative perceptions of *Prevent* have created barriers which are difficult to overcome. Participants perceive that *Prevent*, and its damaging monolithic media representation of Muslim communities, are a barrier towards integration and tackling extremism.

They shouldn’t treat the Muslim community as a monolith but understand the diversity within that. And when I mean monolith, I mean not just monolith in terms of ethnicity, they might recognise ethnicities, but also the religious traditions that we come from. Because the antidote for any type of terrorism or violence or any kind of extremism is good grounded, founded on Islamic teachings.⁸²

Participants of four of the five groups perceive *Prevent* programmes as a front for police action and intelligence gathering rather than a community cohesion project; thus the programmes have become a major cause of resentment and disinterest within the Muslim communities. Interestingly, Focus Group One, a group whose participants have worked with community engagement officers, does not feel that *Prevent* is being used for this purpose. Three participants acknowledge that resentment and discontent could lead to extremism within communities, although

⁸⁰ Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, ‘From Suspect to Citizen: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society’ (Demos 2010) 3

⁸¹ Rosenberg (n 59) 10

⁸² Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s (FG 5), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

they reiterate that this has not happened in Maybury. ‘But it does cause anger within the Muslim community’, one said.⁸³ *Pursue* and *Prevent* have reinforced the community’s feeling of alienation, increasing the sense of political apathy and fatalism amongst Muslim communities in Maybury.⁸⁴ Therefore, these communities are less likely to engage with the government ‘because they [are] more cynical towards what the government [is] trying to achieve’.⁸⁵ All focus group participants feel that counterterrorism policing and *Prevent* have heightened their sense of alienation. This has led to divisions between Maybury White and Asian communities, but also to political apathy because participants feel that nothing can be done.⁸⁶

7.5 Extremism and Prevent

Prevent’s main purpose is to respond to jihadi extremism. ‘In doing so, we must be clear: ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem.’⁸⁷ Focus group data indicate that individuals in Maybury do not see extremism as a top local priority. *Pursue*, and particularly *Prevent*, are seen as inadequate responses to extremism per se. In fact, they may even exacerbate the problem. Data further suggest that *Prevent* is unable to address the issues of extremism in Maybury’s Muslim communities because it does not provide opportunities to openly address relevant issues within these communities. According to the *Prevent Review*, there are 25 priority areas in the UK, Maybury included, where intelligence suggests that extremism and terrorism-related activities may be occurring. This implies that communities in these areas are either seen as vulnerable to, or supportive of, extremist ideology, justifying *Prevent* interventions.

7.5.1 Understanding extremism in the context of Prevent

It is important to briefly define extremism because Maybury’s Muslim community’s perceptions about what extremism is, and when it is acceptable, differ significantly from the views presented in the *Prevent* policy and in the media. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, extreme is defined as ‘not usual; exceptional; ... far from

⁸³ White Male, community volunteer, involved in inter-faith community work across the North of England, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 61)

⁸⁴ *ibid*; Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 82); Asian Male, Imam at a local mosque, works for the local council of mosques, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

⁸⁵ Asian Male, local imam, Chaplain at the local hospital, early 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

⁸⁶ FG Five (2011)

⁸⁷ HM Government (n 49) Foreword

moderate, especially politically'.⁸⁸ Extremism is the holding of extreme political or religious views; it is a form of fanaticism.⁸⁹ Defining extremism is therefore problematic because political and religious views are contextual and based on 'value judgments, not objectively identifiable features of someone's belief systems or rhetoric'.⁹⁰ *Prevent* seems to view extremism as a readily identifiable characterisation and causation of political violence. The coalition government replaced the phrase 'violent extremism', used by Labour's *Prevent* strategy, with 'extremism', claiming that the term was ambiguous and caused confusion, thus giving the impression 'that the scope of *Prevent* [is] very wide indeed and included a range of activities far beyond counter-terrorism'⁹¹. All of those interviewed regard extremism per se as a problem. That said, when asked what extremism is, and how it links to political violence, all national and local professionals have different opinions and definitions. Most agree on one point, that criminal behaviour and the use of violence differentiate terrorism from extremism. Many involved nationally, although acknowledging that extremism is problematic, associate extremism, in the context of *Prevent*, with Islam and its opposition to British values.⁹² A senior Home Office Official refers to groups such as the EDL as hooligans and a nuisance, but argues that they are not a threat to UK national security.⁹³ Some national policymakers and politicians (four out of fifteen) link extremism to the rejection of British values. All five focus group participants, and many of the front line staff in Maybury (fifteen out of twenty) take a much broader interpretation of extremism, and include far-right activism as well as the 'hijacking' of Islam for political and violent purposes.⁹⁴ Senior local officials, front line staff, and focus group participants believe that to be successful, *Prevent* must address all forms of extremism, arguing that the far-right is

⁸⁸ Oxford English Dictionary Online, 'Extreme - Adjective' (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013)

⁸⁹ Oxford English Dictionary Online, 'Extremism - Noun' (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013)

⁹⁰ Richard Jackson, 'Prevent: The Wrong Paradigm for the Wrong Problem'

(*richardjacksonterrorismblog*, 2011)

<<http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2011/06/09/prevent-the-wrong-paradigm-for-the-wrong-problem/>> accessed 9 January 2013

⁹¹ HM Government (n 49) 25

⁹² Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (NP1), 'Hazel Blears, Currently MP and Member of the Security and Intelligence Committee.' (2011); Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3), 'Former Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism.' (2011)

⁹³ Senior Home Office Official (NP4), 'Name Anonymized. Involved with Prevent Since 2005.' (2011)

⁹⁴ Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19); Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3), 'Name Anonymized. Used to Oversee the Local Delivery of Prevent. White Male, Mid 30s.' (2011)

feeding off jihadi extremism and vice versa.⁹⁵

In an attempt to narrow the definition of extremism, the *Prevent Review* constructs a definition that is much broader and ambiguous than the previous phrase. It describes extremism as the

vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.⁹⁶

According to this definition, one might surmise that groups such as the Scottish National Party and Sinn Fein should also be categorised as extremist groups. However, despite this broad definition, it appears that in the context of terrorism and *Prevent*, extremism is viewed in terms of jihadi extremism, Al Qaeda ideology, and the failure of migrant and Muslim communities in particular to integrate and adopt British values.⁹⁷ Politicians and the media depreciate other forms of extremist ideology such as the far-right and nationalism, which are not framed as being opposed to British values and are often linked to hooliganism and criminality rather than political violence,⁹⁸ despite the attacks in Norway in 2011.⁹⁹ Despite comments by politicians and the odd paragraph in the *Prevent* document about the far-right, the strategy remains almost exclusively based on jihadi extremism. Local officials were told by the Home Office not to include groups such as the EDL in *Prevent* work in Maybury (see 6.2 and 6.3).¹⁰⁰

According to Pratt, extremism suggests fanaticism, and connotes a degree of intensity or sharpness of focus. He suggests that extremism may also refer to the opposite of being ‘at the margins’, and that it is being at, or claiming, the centre. Any group or ideology which excludes alternative solutions while claiming the relevant central position exclusively and proclaiming the normative tradition intensively, should also be considered extreme in its nature. Religious or traditional group

⁹⁵ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5) interview (n 39); Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4), ‘Name Anonymized. Sits on the Prevent and CONTEST Board. White Male, Early 40s.’ (2011); Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 38)

⁹⁶ HM Government (n 49) Glossary

⁹⁷ David Cameron, ‘PM’s Speech at Munich Security Conference’ (*Downing Street 10*, 2011) <<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/>> accessed 19 May 2012

⁹⁸ HM Government (n 49); Senior Home Office Official (NP4) interview (n 93)

⁹⁹ Matthew Goodwin, ‘Wade Michael Page and the Rise of Violent Far-Right Extremism’, *the Guardian* (London, 8 August 2012) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/08/wade-michael-page-violent-far-right>> accessed 15 January 2013

identities are taken to the extreme, not by moving away from the centre but conversely, by intensifying self-understanding and self-proclamation as representing, or being, the centre.¹⁰¹ Any policy which seeks to challenge any form of extremism must therefore clearly articulate its purpose and provide guidance about what is considered unacceptable, and when a certain viewpoint crosses the line from moderate to extreme.¹⁰² The *Prevent Review* fails to clearly articulate what extremism is, and does not state when it becomes so. It states that the

purpose of *Prevent* is not to convince the majority of people that terrorism is wrong – they need no convincing. Rather, the purpose is to enlist the support of the people in our country to reach the much smaller minorities who may be drawn to terrorism, often through extremist views.¹⁰³

In line with its definition of extremism, the solution presented in the *Review* is to increase a sense of belonging and citizenship to make communities more resilient to extremist ideology and terrorism. ‘We believe that *Prevent* depends on integration, democratic participation, and a strong interfaith dialogue.’¹⁰⁴ *Prevent* attempts to achieve its purpose through its three objectives, which are: to challenge extremist ideology, to protect vulnerable communities, and to support sectors and institutions where a risk of radicalisation exists. Notably, addressing the underlying causes of extremism per se is absent.

7.5.2 *Prevent’s inability to address extremism*

So why does all of the above matter? Jackson suspects that the real hoped-for purpose of *Prevent*, both old and new, is to produce docile subjects who accept British government policy and its values without seriously questioning or opposing them, rather than engaging citizens who, if necessary, are willing to challenge them.¹⁰⁵ One of the key dangers, according to Jackson, is that the *Prevent* strategy does not facilitate robust and open debate on controversial issues of foreign policy and securitising particular viewpoints. Focus group participants share similar views.

They have their own opinions and ... they’re strong about their opinion. ... And if you try to debate that then they think that you’re a bit of an extremist, so

¹⁰⁰ Police Superintendent (Area Commander, LP4) interview (n 95); Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 38)

¹⁰¹ Douglas Pratt, ‘Contemporary Christian Extremism: Fundamentalism, “Extreme Religion”, and the Threat of Terror’ (2008) *Religion, Terrorism and the Limits of Freedom*

¹⁰² Jackson (n 90)

¹⁰³ HM Government (n 49) 41

¹⁰⁴ *ibid* 26

¹⁰⁵ Jackson (n 90)

you're afraid of that, being labelled as something so you wouldn't even try to defend ... it.¹⁰⁶

The fear of being labelled an extremist, or worse, has made the subject of extremism and terrorism a 'taboo' subject amongst Maybury's Muslim communities.¹⁰⁷ This point is confirmed by fifteen people the researcher spoke to, but who did not formally want to participate in the research. According to the focus group data, and contrary to Jackson's arguments, it is not the *Prevent* policy itself which created this situation, but its negative media representations over the last decade or so. These negative perceptions, participants argue, are stifling their freedom of expression and driving those with extremist views underground, where resentment and anger can fester and where views and resolutions to adopt violence go unchallenged.

In Maybury, *Prevent* fails to create the safe space spoken of by Sir Norman Bettison,¹⁰⁸ which should occupy the middle ground between extremism and violent extremism, because of the stigma attached to it. Paradoxically, this is exactly the situation *Prevent* aims to avoid. 'In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalization tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge.'¹⁰⁹

Freedom of expression is an issue that was raised in the focus groups. Participants in these four groups feel that social and political pressures are inhibiting their freedom of expression, which in turn affects their willingness to engage with *Prevent*. Afghanistan and Iraq appear to be less of an issue than the ability to freely discuss and hold dissenting views without the fear of being branded extreme by the state. Such an opinion is shared by participants from four of the five focus groups. None of the participants or professionals make any claims that *Prevent* is used to spy on Muslim communities in Maybury. However, all the participants rely on the media and/or the experiences of friends and family to shape their opinions about *Prevent*. The older participants, and the carers in Focus Group One, rely more on word of mouth, while the younger participants, the imams, and community volunteers rely on the media and word of mouth. Despite the lack of evidence to support the assertion

¹⁰⁶ Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 81)

¹⁰⁷ Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 82);
Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19)

¹⁰⁸ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6), 'Former Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and ACPO Prevent Lead.' (2011)

¹⁰⁹ HM Government (n 49) 63

that *Prevent* is a guise for surveillance in Maybury, participants still have their suspicions.

If someone is going to pay the police to look up on Muslim communities and then target them, I'm not going to have faith in them. Like someone getting paid to spy on you, would you trust them?¹¹⁰

I think it could be true because it has been in the newspapers a few times that people have been spied on. And I don't think that it is right as well. ... It is an invasion of privacy ... It's like they want privacy and it is being exposed.¹¹¹

According to four of the five focus groups, the notion of being monitored by the state, as well as the possibility of statements being picked up and misconstrued by the media, means that participants and their communities are less willing to talk about issues of extremism and terrorism.

I think it has impacted on communities a great deal over the past five years ... People do [worry about it], yes people don't talk. ... Because they scrutinise everything, like documentaries [have] recordings of what the imams have said, and I think they ... read more into it than what they actually said. So I think people ... just don't, or won't [talk].¹¹²

Especially people who are religious, they may be afraid to ... with people from other cultures, because they feel like they might be judged. If there is a social gathering or something ... they might be reluctant to go to that because they think that other people might be judging.¹¹³

These statements illustrate why participants feel reluctant to discuss these issues or engage with *Prevent* programmes. One of the participants states that not addressing extremism is partly cultural.

Because of our culture, our faith, we all keep silence within. If there is an issue taking place within our community we see it, but we don't realise that it is actually happening. So I think we are kind of blind [and ignore] that there is a problem.¹¹⁴

These are all contributing factors as to why focus group participants feel that they would not challenge extremism in their communities even if it existed. There is also the fear of becoming stigmatised and labelled as an extremist, or upsetting the community by saying the wrong thing.¹¹⁵ These topics are avoided because cultural values produce negative reactions to extremism, and because of their failure to satisfy the positive pressing needs of individuals and their communities.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹¹¹ Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹¹² Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19)

¹¹³ Asian Female, parent of three, working part-time, mid 30s (FG 3) interview (n 20)

¹¹⁴ Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹¹⁵ B Latané and JM Darley, 'Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies' (1968) 10 *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 215

¹¹⁶ Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (Fordham University Press 2005)

Participants across all five focus groups feel alienated from the economic and political process because they are Muslims.

If we were allowed to talk, we would have more freedom of speech, then people would tell you their stories and then you can see where they are coming from as well.¹¹⁷

According to Grimm, public discourse is fundamental to any healthy democracy, and is based on the premise of the freedom of expression, allowing individuals to express opinions and learn from one another, or challenge them if necessary. These ‘rights constitute a comprehensive freedom of communication’.¹¹⁸ It is the deprivation of these rights through political and media discourse which has created a feeling of alienation from mainstream British society. One of the imams states that *Prevent* needs to create a space to bring together affected parties and discuss extremism without the fear of becoming a state target, even if this means speaking about uncomfortable and even offensive matters.¹¹⁹ Because *Prevent* does not allow for such an open debate, these thoughts, feelings, and aspirations are hidden from others and remain unchallenged. John Stewart Mill writes that such a state of affairs not only deprives society of truths, but also removes from individuals the ability to challenge misrepresentations.¹²⁰ Further, because of the possible consequences, these topics are eschewed and ignored in social interactions and conversations; the issues therefore remain unaddressed.¹²¹

The Home Affairs Committee notes the effects of alienation. They comment that although violent radicalisation is declining within Muslim communities, there is

growing support for non-violent extremism, fed by feelings of alienation, and while this may not lead to a specific terrorist threat or be a staging post for violent extremism, it is nevertheless a major challenge for society in general and for the police in particular. There also appears to be a growth in more extreme and violent forms of far-right ideology.¹²²

Participants across all five focus groups repeatedly state that extremism is not a problem within their communities in Maybury; they acknowledge, however, that foreign policy, media perception, counterterrorism measures, and the perception that *Prevent* might have been used to spy on their communities has an alienating effect on

¹¹⁷ Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹¹⁸ Peter Grimm, ‘Freedom of Speech in a Globalized World’ in *Extreme speech and democracy* (Oxford University Press 2009)

¹¹⁹ White Male, community volunteer, involved in inter-faith community work across the North of England, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 61)

¹²⁰ John Stewart Mills, *On Liberty* (Penguin Classics 1985)

¹²¹ Rosenberg (n 59) 7

their communities, causing a possible increase of individual and community vulnerability to extremism. This alienation reinforces political apathy within these communities. Apathy, Rosenberg writes, is self-reinforcing, deterring even active individuals from becoming involved because of the widespread absence of support.¹²³ Political apathy is exacerbated by the decision of the local Council of Mosques and its affiliated organisations to withdraw their support for *Prevent* following the counterterrorism operation which led to the arrests of local people.

7.6 Communication and trust: Other barriers for Prevent

The majority of participants in all five focus groups have heard about *Prevent*, although there is one participant in Focus Group One and two in Focus Group Two who have not heard of the policy.¹²⁴ Some of the participants have taken part in *Prevent* programmes, or worked with the community engagement officers. *Prevent* as a brand creates barriers between the communities in Maybury and front line staff. Levels of trust vary, but nonetheless create barriers. All of the national and local professionals interviewed are aware of the negative connotations associated with the *Prevent* brand. *Prevent* courses are often advertised as interfaith or community cohesion programmes, which tags on some work in the area of extremism.¹²⁵

I didn't advertise my project when I was recruiting people and saying this is a big *Prevent* project. What I said is, this is a project about exploring extremism and we're going to use Northern Ireland as a model ... *Prevent* can be in small letters, it doesn't have to be in the poster advertising the thing. I know who's funded it, I'll write the report to the funders.¹²⁶

Despite this negative association, participants in Focus Groups One, Three, and Five describe openly who has worked with community engagement officers funded by *Prevent*. This work is seen as positive. Overall, it appears that it is media representation, and a limited number of vicarious experiences of counterterrorism policing which have shaped negative local perceptions. Perceptions about local *Prevent* programmes are also largely shaped by national media reports, as most communities are often unaware that they have been engaging in *Prevent* programmes.

¹²² Home Affairs Select Committee, 'Roots of Violent Radicalization: Nineteenth Report of Session 2011-2012' (HMSO 2012) 12

¹²³ Rosenberg (n 59)

¹²⁴ Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17); Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, late 50s (FG 1) interview (n 40); Asian Male, working on a vocational course, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 35)

¹²⁵ Community Volunteer (LP17), 'Name Anonymized. Lead an Interfaith Programme Funded by Prevent. White Male, Late 50s.' (2011)

¹²⁶ Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 38)

This highlights a major deficiency in the local *Prevent* delivery plan. The research data suggest that there are discussions between the council and gatekeepers within the local Muslim communities; however, the message about *Prevent* does not appear to have penetrated beyond a narrow set of individuals within the community. The disruption of the flow of information means that Muslim communities in Maybury continue to rely on media coverage and the vicarious experience of others to shape their opinions of *Prevent*, exacerbating negative perceptions.

In Maybury, community engagement officers increase awareness of *Prevent* by attending local mosques and other local meetings. ‘In the mosque we had police come in constantly. They did target our mosque a lot. ... They told us about counterterrorism and so forth.’¹²⁷ Similar comments are made within all five focus groups, suggesting that participants and the communities are, at least to some degree, aware of counterterrorism policing and even some of the *Prevent* programmes going on in Maybury. Community engagement officers introduced *Prevent* to members of Focus Groups One and Five. Speaking about an encounter with one of the local community engagement officers, a participant states that ‘because of the lack of understanding, we [did] not fully understand police work ... we were able to speak in our language, he helped us understand the police better’.¹²⁸ It is because of the engagement work of these police officers, after the counterterrorism incident in Maybury in 2009, that barriers between the authorities and the communities have begun to come down. The front line staff and focus group participants acknowledge this.

7.6.1 Trust, legitimacy, and Prevent

Issues of trust and legitimacy have already been mentioned implicitly in the above discussions. Legitimacy represents an ‘acceptance by people of the need to bring their behaviour into line with the dictates of an external authority’.¹²⁹ It reflects social values such as normative, moral, or ethical feelings of responsibility which defer towards institutions.¹³⁰ Public support, and the legitimacy accorded to

¹²⁷ Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹²⁸ Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member and community volunteer, Mid 40s (FG 1) interview (n 34)

¹²⁹ Tom Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law* (Yale University Press 1990) 25

¹³⁰ Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing’ (2003) 37 *Law & Society Review* 513

institutions and/or individuals, are based on performance.¹³¹ How communities and the authorities interact is crucial. Fairness, Sunshine and Tyler write, is central, and levels of trust increase or decline accordingly.¹³² Trust is central: ‘To say we trust you means we believe you have the right intentions towards us and that you are competent to do what we trust you to do.’¹³³ Conferring legitimacy on to organisations supposes that they are trustworthy, effective, and fair, and that they share similar social and cultural values, and interests, and have a strong commitment to local communities.¹³⁴ Part of the process of obtaining communities’ consent relies in the sharing of information and listening to the problems of these communities.¹³⁵

One of the most important sources of dissatisfaction is unequal treatment.¹³⁶ In Maybury,

you have Christian and Muslim communities that are often segregated in terms of where they live, where they are educated and work. This lack of interaction fuels mistrust between communities. The extremists feed on this mistrust.¹³⁷

Further, participants of all five focus groups feel that younger Asian Males in particular are being unfairly treated by the police, a situation which adds to the distrust between communities and the police. The local council is seen in a harsher light. ‘I’d say the council are just going to s*** all over you.’¹³⁸ This comment highlights how the majority of participants feel about Maybury Council. When asked whether and how the police could improve tackling terrorism, the common response is: ‘Yes it could. ... Everyone wants to be treated equally and also have a little bit of freedom.’¹³⁹ Another participant states that

We should have justice, equal opportunities and equal treatment. When you get treated differently, you get aggressive and angry about the whole situation. And if you want to get your voice heard you have to get aggressive.¹⁴⁰

Similar experiences are shared within all five focus groups. Loader and Mulcahy note that public perceptions towards the police are fraught with issues of authority,

¹³¹ John P Robinson and others (eds), ‘Trust in Government’ in *Measures of Political Attitudes* (1st edn, Academic Press 1999)

¹³² Sunshine and Tyler (n 130) 520

¹³³ Russell Hardin, *Trust* (Polity 2006) 17

¹³⁴ Jonathan Jackson and Ben Bradford, ‘What is Trust and Confidence in the Police?’ (2010) 4 *Policing* 241

¹³⁵ Sunshine and Tyler (n 130)

¹³⁶ Austin Sarat, ‘Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence’ (1977) 11 *Law & Society Review* 427

¹³⁷ Report for Maybury Council: Understanding Communities (n 11)

¹³⁸ Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹³⁹ Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹⁴⁰ Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member and community volunteer, Mid 40s (FG 1) interview (n 34)

social order, and security. Figures from the 2010/11 British Crime Survey suggest that 72 per cent of Asians across the UK are confident that the criminal justice system is fair. This, it must be noted, is considerably higher than amongst the general population.¹⁴¹ In their study about *Prevent*, Innes et al. reiterate this point, stating that ‘this is an important finding because it challenges the often repeated claim that Muslim communities in the UK are being profoundly alienated and disenchanted with the workings of the *Prevent* programme ... The actual situation is somewhat more complex’.¹⁴²

As suggested, the situation in Maybury is more complex. Willingness to engage with *Prevent*, it appears, is based on a number of factors: a distrust in the police and the local council in general, the work carried out by the community engagement officers, and the perception that *Prevent* propagates British values at the expense of diversity and local issues. The data suggest that Muslim communities prefer to resort to their informal social control resources to solve problems, including extremism, if at all feasible, before getting the police involved. Innes et al. arrive at a similar conclusion.¹⁴³ Many participants share negative experiences about the police, or how they feel perceived by the police.

Because I am a Muslim I am fearful, the way people look at me and the police look at me because since all this terrorism things happened, the image has changed. It’s a negative image.¹⁴⁴

Despite some negative experiences, participants across all five focus groups note that they still have a certain degree of trust in the police, though not in the local council.¹⁴⁵ Levels of trust in the police appear to depend on gender and age. Focus group data suggest that older Muslim males (aged 23 and over), and females who speak English, have more trust in the police compared to younger males (aged 18-23), and females who speak little or no English.

When asked to measure their level of trust in the police on a scale of 1-10, younger males indicate 5, whereas females and older male participants indicate between 6 and 8. Once again, the true significance of this evaluation may be appreciated only when comparing these levels to those given by the general public. According to one imam, despite the police admitting mistakes, the wider public do not trust the police as

¹⁴¹ Home Office, ‘Crime in England and Wales 2010/11’ (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, HM 2011)

¹⁴² Martin Innes and others, ‘Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (UPSI 2011) 7

¹⁴³ Innes and others (n 142)

¹⁴⁴ Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, mid 30s (FG 1), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011)

much as they should. ‘I think the police are trying [to improve community relations]. ... I think they are looking at things in a very mature way of late.’¹⁴⁶ The work of the community engagement officers is seen in a positive light by the participants of Focus Groups One and Five who state that their work, and an increase in ethnic minority police officers who speak their language, have improved their knowledge of policing and their levels of trust in the police. Conversely, participants of Focus Group Two, all younger males, have less faith in Asian police officers. ‘No, Asians seem worse’,¹⁴⁷ one participant comments.

I know the police, in terms of Asian police officers especially if they work on *Prevent* sort of things, they tend ... [to] look at us as if we are terrorists more than a white person would.¹⁴⁸

Overall, despite the trust in the police, participants still feel that *Prevent* does not address the concerns of the local community. Extremism and terrorism remain taboo subjects within Maybury’s Muslim communities, not because of *Prevent* but because of the aforementioned external factors.

7.8 Conclusion

Academic literature and media commentary about *Prevent*, such as the works of Awan, Githens-Mazer, and Lambert, and Pantazis and Pemberton, indicate that *Prevent* may have an adverse effect on Muslim communities in the UK.¹⁴⁹ This assumption, however, is not supported by the evidence gathered throughout the research project. It appears that *Prevent* has had only a limited effect on Maybury’s Muslim communities. The data suggest that it is the media, and the vicarious experiences of others, that have had a major impact on Muslim communities in Maybury, and how they perceive *Prevent*. It appears that *Prevent* has not been able to address extremism in the area for two reasons: (1) participants are not aware of, or are unwilling to acknowledge, problems of extremism in the area; and (2) people in

¹⁴⁵ Asian Male, working on a vocational course, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 35)

¹⁴⁶ Asian Male, Imam at a local mosque, works for the local council of mosques, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 18)

¹⁴⁷ Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 17)

¹⁴⁸ Asian Male, working on a vocational course, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 35)

¹⁴⁹ Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton, ‘From “Old” to the “New” Suspect Communities: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation’ (2009) 49 *British Journal of Criminology* 646; Imran Awan, ‘Paving the Way for Extremism: How Preventing the Symptoms Does Not Cure the Disease of Terrorism’ (2011) 2 *Journal of Terrorism Research*; Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer, ‘The Fiery Birth of the Prevent Counter-Terrorism Strategy: England’s Summer of Discontent, Ten Years On.’ (*OpenDemocracy*, 2011) <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/robert-lambert-jonathan-githens-mazer/fiery-birth-of-prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy>>

these communities are unwilling to acknowledge that there might be a problem. It should be acknowledged that although *Prevent* programmes do not appear to have had a substantial impact and influence on perceptions, the work of the community engagement officers is seen as positive, particularly because of their open approach. In fact, both the focus group and interview data appear to indicate that the work of these officers has broken down some of the barriers which appeared after a major counterterrorism operation in the area. The data also indicate that the officers have increased levels of trust in the police in those sections of the communities in which they have worked.

This chapter and the data indicate that there is a sense of ambiguity present in the participants' perceptions of *Prevent*. These ambiguities relate to the understanding of how *Prevent* works nationally and in Maybury. Despite efforts by the local authorities, and the media coverage, *Prevent* remains associated with surveillance, and focus group participants still feel that *Prevent* is too narrowly focused on Muslim communities. At the same time, participants across all five focus groups admit that more needs to be done to tackle extremism, including far-right extremism. Participants acknowledge that although they do not feel comfortable about current *Prevent* and counterterrorism strategies, or their perceptions thereof, something needs to be done to prevent extremism taking hold in Muslim communities. Many attributes of *Prevent* are perceived as ambiguous, such as how extremism is defined in reference to British values and linked to jihadi extremism rather than extremism per se. Participants admit that both they and their communities are burying their 'heads in the sand'. This may be due to an increased sense of alienation, set in motion by hostile national political and media discourses. Consequently, feelings of anger and resentment have turned into political apathy and fatalism. Negative perceptions, mostly based on vicarious experiences and/or media discourses about *Prevent* and Muslim communities, have created an environment where Maybury's communities have self-imposed restrictions on their freedom of expression because of possible adverse consequences. Although there is no evidence of spying, as described by Kundnani,¹⁵⁰ the media discourse is sufficient to place doubts in the minds of the participants. Before *Prevent* can be successful, these barriers need to be broken down, and a space created where extremism can be addressed without fear or favour with a government willing to listen to the problems of local Muslim

¹⁵⁰ Kundnani (n 4)

communities rather than pushing an agenda based on populism, assimilation, and integration.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This thesis is structured around two key elements: (1) a policy analysis of *Prevent*, and (2) a study of the policy's implementation and impact in Maybury. The main body of the thesis is organised around the following research objectives as outlined in Chapter 1, which are:¹

- a) analyse and critique the ideas which inform the *Prevent* policy;²
- b) analyse and critique the conflicts and tensions which have arisen within the *Prevent* policy at national level, as well as the implications for local delivery;³
- c) analyse and critique the tensions and conflicts which have arisen between organisations involved in the local implementation of *Prevent* such as the police and local authorities, and consider the implications for the delivery process;⁴ and
- d) analyse and critique the impact of counterterrorism policing and prevention on local Muslim communities, and how they have shaped community perceptions and willingness to engage with authorities in counterterrorism policing and the *Prevent* agenda, while considering the wider implications for *Prevent* and *Pursue*.⁵

This chapter is primarily organised around the latter three objectives: the policy analysis and the study of the policy's implementation and impact, and the insights provided by the research into policy, organisational, and impact tensions. Each section also refers to the two literature review chapters mentioned in the first objective. The purpose of this chapter is to synthesise the findings of the thesis, bringing together the national, local, and community aspects, while considering the wider implications of the policy, the identified organisational tensions, and the impact on Muslim communities. The thesis captures the non-static nature of the

¹ Chapter 1.3

² Chapter 2 and 3

³ Chapter 5

⁴ Chapter 6

⁵ Chapter 7

Prevent policy, and demonstrates that the policy was developed as it was administered, and administered as it was being developed.⁶

The *Prevent* policy blurs the boundaries between crime prevention and social policy, creating a sense of ambiguity amongst national and local professionals. Associated tensions and ambiguities refer to the scope of *Prevent*, and whether social policy should be criminalised, or whether crime prevention should be socialised. In the case of *Prevent*, these tensions centre on the roles of community cohesion and policing in preventing violent extremism. Organisational tensions refer to managerial and inter/intra organisational problems which have arisen throughout *Prevent's* implementation, and which highlight the extent to which policymakers, bureaucrats, and local managers have reinterpreted and even resisted features of the *Prevent* policy when using their own discretion.⁷ The implementation of *Prevent* has blurred the organisational boundaries between the agencies involved. The difficulties associated with delivering *Prevent* in Maybury highlight the impact of the ambiguities around *Prevent's* purpose and its associated tensions, and demonstrate the difficulties associated with evaluating preventative programmes.

National and local professionals and policymakers believe that *Prevent* represents an important innovation in counterterrorism policy in the UK. However, *Prevent* was conceived in a way which embodied inherent policy and organisational tensions and which are difficult to resolve. These tensions relate to the aforementioned ambiguities and to the blurring of counterterrorism, prevention, and social policy. As highlighted in Chapter 5, national policymakers and professionals are divided about the inclusion, and benefits, of community cohesion in *Prevent*. Most local professionals believe that the inclusion of community cohesion is essential to the success of *Prevent* in Maybury.⁸ In part, the implementation problems related to the ambiguous nature of the 2009 *Prevent* policy, which provided local authorities with a significant degree of autonomy. As discussed in Chapter 6, Maybury's local authorities mainly focused on community cohesion, and interfaith and awareness-raising programmes, rather than the 'hard core' *Prevent* programmes such as *Channel* favoured by the government. Even after the publication of the *Review*, there remains a sense of uncertainty about how to achieve *Prevent's* aims and objectives,

⁶ James Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* (Praeger 1975)

⁷ Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* (Russell Sage Foundation 1980)

⁸ Chapter 6.4

knowing that community cohesion, an approach favoured by local professionals, is now separated from *Prevent*. In the words of Maybury Council's chief executive:

We had a more even-handed approach, which has actually, I think, convinced people that it is violence we're against, not Muslim radicalism or any other sort of radicalism. It's the violence, whether it be right-wing violence or violence that's Al Qaeda inspired.⁹

Although there is a sense that something needs to be done, some national and most local policymakers and professionals do not agree with the changes made by the *Prevent Review*, in particular the separation of *Prevent* and community cohesion.¹⁰

As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, *Prevent's* ambiguities, the support for community cohesion, the autonomy granted to Maybury's local authorities, and the fact that many of those delivering *Prevent* programmes in Maybury are unfamiliar with national policy, means that the delivery of *Prevent* is altered to suit the knowledge and skills of local professionals, and to tackle the perceived needs/problems of local communities. Contrary to expectation, the local delivery of *Prevent* has little direct impact on community perceptions, and a limited impact on community engagement. Rather, negative perceptions of *Prevent* and *Pursue* are largely formed through exposure to the media, and the experiences of friends and family, perceptions which are difficult to challenge.

8.2 Policy tensions: Blurring of policy agendas

CONTEST aims to 'reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence'.¹¹ As demonstrated in Chapter 2, and supported by the research data in Chapters 5 and 6, CONTEST is regarded as innovative for two reasons: (1) it is divided from traditional approaches to counterterrorism, and (2) it has developed into a much more holistic counterterrorism strategy by pulling all aspects of counterterrorism, including prevention, together into one transparent strategy. Prevention, as acknowledged by the Home Affairs Committee, is 'not solely the function of a counter-terrorism strategy, but in fact must be regarded as a part of a much wider approach to attitudes and attitudinal change'.¹² As Lord Carlile points out, this is the 'first time that a government had gone down this sort of conceptual line towards

⁹ Local Authority Chief Executive (LP6) interview (n 5)

¹⁰ Chapter 5.4 and Chapter 6.4

¹¹ HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (HMSO 2011) 6

¹² Home Affairs Select Committee, 'Roots of Violent Radicalization: Nineteenth Report of Session 2011-2012' (HMSO 2012) 10

preventing this particular criminal activity'.¹³ The research participants generally agree that both CONTEST and *Prevent* are innovative approaches to counterterrorism, but acknowledge that its innovativeness has caused tensions as the different agencies have adjusted to the inclusion of new partner agencies who have not traditionally been involved in counterterrorism.¹⁴ However, 'the current breadth of focus of Prevent – from community work to crime prevention – sits uncomfortably within a counter-terrorism strategy'.¹⁵ Many of the policy tensions and problems with implementation relate to the newness of the policy, which is ambitious but remains ambiguous in nature, particular in regards to local delivery options.

Prevent's overarching purpose, to reduce the support for extremism and terrorism within British communities, is clear enough. It aims 'to prevent people being radicalised and becoming terrorists and also to ensure that communities do not feel under the sort of pressure, which may lead to ... individuals being radicalised'.¹⁶ Further, it attempts to address

all forms of terrorism. ... We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. *Prevent* will also mean intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity.¹⁷

However, hidden behind this simplistic notion are a number of fundamental, though disputed, concepts. First, how does a society challenge extremist ideology and prevent individuals and communities from supporting and engaging in terrorist-related activities? Second, how can criminal/social policy increase the resilience of vulnerable communities? Further, *Prevent* also relies on the simplistic notion that radicalisation and extremism result in violence. Rather, as Bartlett and Miller suggest:

Radicalization is simply the process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate beliefs towards extreme views. To be radical is to reject the status quo, but not necessarily in a violent or even problematic manner. Some

¹³ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2), 'Former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislations.' (2011)

¹⁴ Chapter 5.2

¹⁵ Communities and Local Government Select Committee, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10' (HMSO 2010) 3

¹⁶ Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 10)

¹⁷ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (HMSO 2011) 6

radicals conduct, or encourage terrorism whilst many others do no such thing, and actively and often effectively agitate against it.¹⁸

Rather than answering these questions, this thesis examines the tensions which arise between politicians, policymakers, front line staff, and communities as a result of the fundamental challenges, conflicting ideologies, simplistic notions, and approaches to preventing extremism and terrorism. Despite its clear mission statement, local and national policymakers and professionals feel a sense of ambiguity about how to delivery *Prevent* locally within the confines of its national framework.

By comparison, Crawford distinguishes two different approaches to crime prevention: situational crime prevention centres on criminal events and aims to reduce opportunities to offend; social crime prevention focuses on people and their dispositions towards committing acts of criminality.¹⁹ Aspects of situational crime prevention, in particular target hardening, feature in *Prepare*. Social crime prevention, or the prevention of extremism, is suitably defined as ‘the total of all policies, measures and techniques ... aiming at the reduction of the various kinds of damage caused by acts defined as criminal by the state’.²⁰ As discussed in Chapter 3, the academic literature separates prevention into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.²¹ Although there has been a shift within *Prevent*, policy continues to focus on secondary prevention, a move which is only partially supported by local and national professionals. Instead, this approach should be part of a wider *Prevent* strategy including primary prevention.

As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, policy tensions relate to the ambiguities which exist within the *Prevent* policy and to ideological differences. The *Prevent Review* claims that New Labour’s *Prevent* policy had criminalised community cohesion, a view supported by many experts.²² Under New Labour, the *Prevent* agenda was closely linked to, and coordinated with, three other policy areas: community cohesion, community empowerment, and race equality. The policy claimed to tackle all forms of extremism,

¹⁸ Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, ‘The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization’ (2012) 24 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1, 2

¹⁹ Adam Crawford, *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships* (Oxford University Press 1997) 17

²⁰ *ibid* 10–11

²¹ Chapter 3.6

²² Chapter 5.4

A community which isolates extremism of all forms is likely to be one where people have more confidence to build relationships with one another and increase community cohesion.²³

However, both *Prevent* policies target Muslim communities in the UK, one of the reasons why this approach represents secondary prevention.

The House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee states that community cohesion needs to be separated from its counterterrorism aspects because prior to 2011, *Prevent* blurred the line between social and criminal policy.²⁴

Too often matters of vital public importance – jobs, homes, schools – are swallowed up in the maw of ‘law-and-order’ discourse, and publicly addressed as if the only important consideration was whether these deficiencies might lead to crime, vandalism and hooliganism.²⁵

Muslim communities under New Labour were at the heart of *Prevent*. ‘They offered important information and intelligence: our own in-built early warning system.’²⁶ This raised the question of whether *Prevent*, as some believed,²⁷ was built to gather intelligence rather than tackle extremism through community cohesion.²⁸ The government failed to communicate *Prevent*’s purpose, which remained ambiguous. Chapter 7 highlights the impact of negative perceptions on the local delivery of *Prevent*. The *Prevent Review* attempts to address these tensions, separating the prevention of extremism from community cohesion. The *Review* continues to target Muslim communities, and focuses even more than the previous policy on identifying individuals at risk through its local partners. As such, the *Review* is moving *Prevent* to the ‘hard’ end of secondary prevention, using social policy as surveillance tools – an attempt to criminalise social policy.

A shift from community cohesion towards intelligence gathering and information sharing has caused tensions between national and local authorities. The research data suggest that most participants agree that changes were necessary but disagree with the shift away from community cohesion. These tensions are particularly pronounced between those involved with *Prevent* nationally and local professionals in Maybury, who also do not agree with the government’s shift away from community cohesion

²³ HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (HMSO 2009) 84

²⁴ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 12)

²⁵ Geoffrey Pearson, *Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears* (MacMillan 1983) 239

²⁶ Rachel Briggs and others, ‘Brining It Home: Community-Based Approach to Counter-Terrorism’ (Demos 2006) 15

²⁷ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Institute of Race Relations 2009)

²⁸ Chapter 5.5

and its more narrow focus on jihadi extremism.²⁹ ‘We were surprised actually when the national strategy came out ... We don’t agree with the current scenario.’³⁰ As noted in Chapter 6, without exception, local professionals believe that community cohesion, or aspects of it, should remain part of *Prevent*, arguing that *Prevent* is becoming disconnected from the day-to-day experiences of people within their communities.³¹ Maybury’s Muslim communities perceive *Prevent* and the government approach to community cohesion as a top down attempt intended to integrate Muslim communities into British society. It is perceived as an instrument used to gather intelligence, rather than a policy to address social and economic deprivation and inequality.³²

As noted in Chapter 6, local professionals feel that the government is not listening to their concerns, and that the changes to *Prevent* are driven by politics rather than evidence. There are further worries that the *Review* is driven by concerns about Al Qaeda and not the broader issues of extremism. In the view of local professionals, the *Prevent Review* creates barriers rather than opportunities to develop the informal and neutral spaces spoken of by Sir Norman Bettison.³³ These barriers include how extremism is defined, the targeting of Muslim communities, and the exclusion of non-violent groups with extremist opinions which are perceived to oppose the British values supported by the government.³⁴

As noted in Chapter 6, there is no agreement amongst the local and national participants on what extremism is and what its links are to political violence and extremism. Although *Prevent* provides a clear definition of extremism, a definition seen as too narrow by the majority of participants, its message remains ambiguous, precisely because of the lack of knowledge about the factors that lead from extremism to political violence. In the absence of agreement, and the acknowledgement by participants that further research is needed in this area, tensions about how to respond to extremism are inevitable. These tensions appear during *Prevent’s* local implementation where a lack of central government direction, and a lack of skills and knowledge at local level, have led to an array of community cohesion projects aimed at reducing extremism. At the same time, this outcome is

²⁹ Chapter 5 and 6

³⁰ Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council (LP3), ‘Name Anonymized. Used to Oversee the Local Delivery of Prevent. White Male, Mid 30s.’ (2011)

³¹ Chapter 6.3-4

³² Chapter 7

³³ Chapter 5.3

³⁴ Chapter 6.3

criticised by the government and parliamentary committees, which argue for a separation of community cohesion and *Prevent*.

One might argue that it is not surprising that Maybury's local professionals support community cohesion projects aimed at reducing extremism within communities under the guise of *Prevent*. This support could be perceived as an attempt to secure self-preservation by maintaining levels of funding for local community cohesion projects which may otherwise have not been funded. Crawford suggests that front line practitioners have the capacity to capture resources designed for crime prevention and channel them into community cohesion activities. This would suggest that the inverse of the criminalisation of social policy, the socialisation of criminal policy, could also occur.³⁵ Chapter 6 highlights this point, and demonstrates that most *Prevent* programmes in Maybury focus on community cohesion, including work on far-right extremism, a practice which was stopped under the coalition government.³⁶ What is more surprising, however, is the support of the police officers working on *Prevent*, who appear to have realised the importance of community engagement and cohesion as a tool to prevent radicalisation. 'Security is always delivered through consent, never through force. ... Sustaining this ... over the long term will only be possible if the police secure active consent from the community.'³⁷

Community-centred projects, led by the local authority in partnership with the police, are regarded as integral to *Prevent's* long-term success. The support of the police for community cohesion, primary prevention, and the inclusion of local authorities is surprising because previous research suggests that the organisational subculture of the police devalues preventative work.³⁸ As argued in Chapter 3, and reiterated in Chapter 5, some police officers still resist the devolution of certain crime-fighting tasks, such as counterterrorism, to inexperienced local authorities, the private sector, or voluntary organisations.³⁹ According to the academic literature, police officers involved in *Prevent* all recognise the role community cohesion plays in preventing extremism.⁴⁰ In Maybury, there is no evidence to suggest that the police are obstructive or unwilling to engage in community cohesion and *Prevent* work. On the contrary, counterterrorism officers and community engagement officers are

³⁵ Crawford (n 16)

³⁶ Chapter 5.6 and 6.4

³⁷ Briggs and others (n 23) 58

³⁸ Chapter 3.5-6

³⁹ Chapter 5.8

⁴⁰ Trevor Jones, 'Policing' in Chris Hale and others (eds), *Criminology* (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007)

supportive, and even encourage this approach to prevent extremism in Maybury, recognising its long-term value.⁴¹

Further tensions have emerged between Muslim communities and the *Prevent* policy, especially as it is seen to target solely Muslim communities. The *Review's* re-definition of extremism, casting it as views and behaviours which oppose British values, is also questioned by many of the focus group participants who see themselves as both British and Muslim. Participants in Maybury agree that extremism is defined too narrowly, and is often seen as regressive. Maybury's Muslim communities do not perceive extremism as a priority.⁴² Furthermore, participants contend that *Prevent's* definition is much too narrow, focusing on ambiguous values while devaluing the cultural and ethnic heritage of minority communities. Most participants argue that the political rhetoric and the media discourse about extremism centre on jihadi extremism and its connection to terrorism, marginalising groups and even entire communities because of their ethnicity, religious beliefs, and perceived links to violent and non-violent jihadi ideologies. Focus group data suggest, however, that extremism is not seen as a top local priority in Maybury.

The data suggest that policy tensions have affected the delivery of *Prevent*, partly because of disagreements about how to tackle extremism locally. As stated in Chapter 7, negative media reaction has led to a decrease in participation amongst local communities in Maybury. These tensions highlight the difficulty of implementing preventative policy, as well as the ease with which social policy can become criminalised. Cohen argues that general prevention should be supported because of its intrinsic merits, and not just as an adjunct to criminality and, in this study, extremism.⁴³ *Prevent* fails to engage in broad primary prevention, and more importantly it fails to communicate the purpose of this policy to the public, and to the agencies and front line staff involved in designing and delivering local *Prevent* projects. The breakdown of communication between central government and local authorities means that *Prevent* continues to focus on jihadi extremism and not extremism per se. Despite political rhetoric and the odd paragraph in *Prevent*, the data and other evidence suggest that *Prevent* is actually mainly about jihadi

⁴¹ Chapter 5

⁴² Chapter 7.2 and 7.4

⁴³ Stanley Cohen, 'Western Crime Control Models in the Third World' in *Against Criminology* (Transaction Publishers no date)

extremism. This is despite local officials pointing out that intolerance of religious and cultural differences feeds both jihadi and far-right extremism. Whether other local authorities have raised similar concerns is unknown because this study focuses on *Maybury*. This is one of the limitations of this thesis, the inability to generalise the concerns of local officials and *Maybury*'s Muslim communities.

Policy tensions can be summarised in a number of key points. Despite support from government, the *Prevent Review* appears to have received lots of criticism. The criticism focuses on the exclusion of community cohesion from *Prevent*. The government has not convinced many of those working on *Prevent* that the changes in the *Review* were necessary and effective. The separation of community cohesion allows *Prevent* to focus on terrorism prevention, while the Integration Strategy can focus on community cohesion and tackling extremism. This allows for greater policy cohesion and better management of these different policies because it is somewhat clearer what the policy objectives are. Yet, despite support for the inclusion of community cohesion, there is little evidence to support the contention that community cohesion has had a positive or negative impact on extremism in *Maybury*. Chapter 6 demonstrates poor evaluation of *Prevent*, and a lack of evidence for either success or failure of the *Prevent* programmes. Figure 6.3 in Chapter 6 demonstrates that the majority of programmes have a community cohesion focus, and have had little or no impact on levels of extremism in *Maybury*'s Muslim communities. Due to the lack of evaluation and evidence, it is difficult to measure the impact of community cohesion on extremism. With the separation of the two policies, each with its own defined policy objectives, it should be easier to measure policy impacts and outcomes. Any reversal to an approach focused on community cohesion should be based on stronger qualitative and quantitative research. The above suggestion does not imply that there is no need for investment in community cohesion. On the contrary, primary prevention and community cohesion have merits but should be separated from the narrower focus of *Prevent*. The drawbacks of divorcing these two policies result in the downplaying of cohesion, increasing the vulnerability of its funding and paving the way for austerity.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Patrick Wintour, 'Theresa May Lines up New Measures to Combat Terrorism' (*The Guardian*, 26 May 2013) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/may/26/theresa-may-measures-combat-terrorism>> accessed 19 June 2013

8.3 Organisational tensions

Many of the organisational tensions are linked to the aforementioned policy tensions. The data highlight that most organisational tensions appear between various central government agencies, and between central government and local authorities. Cross-departmental tensions persist across government, a phenomenon which is not unique to *Prevent*.⁴⁵ Within the multi-agency framework of *Prevent*, it is not surprising that interests and priorities differ amongst the different partners.⁴⁶ In his earlier work on crime prevention, Crawford notes that there is a tendency for the police and the Home Office to ‘mould and constrain the actions and attitudes of individuals that constitute them’.⁴⁷ The *Review* consolidates many aspects of *Prevent*, centralising it and giving more oversight to the Home Office. The *Review* greatly diminishes the role of the Department of Communities and Local Government, while increasing cross-departmental work with, for example, education.

Since its inception, there has been pressure to integrate *Prevent* more effectively into neighbourhood policing and local crime prevention initiatives.⁴⁸ This integration has, however, been problematic. Many policymakers are suspicious of local authorities’ motives, and question their ability to carry out counterterrorism prevention work effectively. Some criticise the management of *Prevent* funds and the lack of evaluation, and question the value of ‘misguided’ or spuriously related community cohesion projects by local authorities. The police are seen as the ‘motor’ of *Prevent* because they are perceived as the most qualified organisation. There is, however, a consensus that a successful *Prevent* policy relies on partnerships, though some participants argue that the freedom of local authorities should be limited.⁴⁹ Giving evidence to a Select Committee, Sir Norman Bettison states: ‘I am very clear that if *Prevent* [is] left to the police it would fail.’⁵⁰ The majority of the participants, both nationally and locally, share this view.

Preventing extremism is also not a priority for Maybury’s schools, which are very reluctant to engage with *Prevent*.⁵¹ This demonstrates the difficulty of integrating prevention into sectors such as education where it competes with a myriad of other

⁴⁵ Chapter 5.7

⁴⁶ Chapter 2.10

⁴⁷ Crawford (n 16) 95

⁴⁸ Chapter 2.6

⁴⁹ Chapter 5.8

⁵⁰ Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 12) 53

⁵¹ Chapter 6.6

priorities. How the *Review* will achieve and push the prevention of extremism in the education sector remains to be seen.

Further, organisational tensions are also linked to funding and evaluation.⁵² Rigorous evaluation can be costly, at times costing more than the actual programme. With a smaller budget, evaluation is less rigorous, and success is often based on the perceptions of those delivering a programme.⁵³ Although government austerity is mentioned, many of the arguments related to funding are not necessarily about amounts but about its allocation and how it has been spent. ‘Money got in the way ... it got distorted into activities that were a priority for the different councils.’⁵⁴ Baroness Neville-Jones points out that ‘not only did you get some things ... which were regarded as objectionable, but you got an awful lot of money just wasted’.⁵⁵ The media ran a number of stories claiming that *Prevent* funds had been used to fund non-violent jihadi extremist groups such as Street in East London, while other local authorities funded projects such as Champion. These projects became symbols of state intrusion and mismanagement, with *Prevent* becoming synonymous with spying and intelligence gathering.⁵⁶ The *Review* states that funding should be based on effectiveness, and that the government would no longer fund organisations which oppose fundamental British values, even if these groups are not engaged in or supportive of violence. As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 5, some academics and policymakers believe that some of these groups have been successful in turning those at risk of radicalisation away from violence.⁵⁷ Politically, the funding of such groups became untenable after a series of newspaper articles accusing the government of supporting extremist organisations.⁵⁸

Interviewed professionals in Maybury argue that the short-term nature of funding makes it difficult to set up long-term projects. Most local professionals agree that *Prevent* funding in Maybury has been adequate, but the evaluation of the projects has been weak. Some local professionals argue that the competition for funding in Maybury has led to tensions between various providers rather than cooperation to

⁵² Chapter 5.9

⁵³ Chapter 6.7

⁵⁴ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6), ‘Former Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and ACPO Prevent Lead.’ (2011)

⁵⁵ Baroness Pauline Neville Jones (NP3), ‘Former Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism.’ (2011)

⁵⁶ Chapter 5.9

⁵⁷ Chapter 5 and 6

⁵⁸ Chapter 5.9

improve the delivery of *Prevent* programmes.⁵⁹ A police officer seconded to Maybury Council confirms that ‘certain organisations ... [are] moneymaking organisations who charge a lot of money to deliver some very simple projects, with some very simple outcomes’.⁶⁰

Finally, as highlighted by the police *Prevent* lead,⁶¹ and discussed in Chapter 6, there appears to be a lack of skills and knowledge amongst the local front line staff and third sector providers of *Prevent* projects. At the same time, there also appears to be a lack of knowledge at the national level about the problems local communities face and why they are vulnerable to extremist ideologies.⁶² This lack of knowledge, and the apparent failure of the coalition government to engage with the concerns of local authorities, appears to have altered what the policy in practice has become: an exercise in community cohesion and awareness-raising, rather than projects which tackle the issues of extremism and radicalisation within affected communities. As aforementioned and in Chapter 6, the lack of central government direction and a clear and precise policy on how extremism should be prevented locally, has led local authorities in Maybury to concentrate exactly on the sort of project which has a community cohesion focus.

To summarise, organisational and policy tensions are closely linked. There are few local organisational tensions because the police and the local authority rely on the existing CSP framework together with the expertise of individuals who have worked in a multi-agency environment before.⁶³ There does, however, appear to be a lack of practical skills and knowledge in the area of extremism. However, organisational tensions remain between the regional CTU and the Home Office because information sharing is often inadequate. The information provided on the counter-terrorism local profiles is non-specific and means that many of the projects in *Maybury* are generic. This raises the question about the *Review's* purpose because generic projects are more suited to primary prevention. If *Prevent* focuses mainly on community cohesion, the role of the police should be minimal. Under the *Review*, with a more

⁵⁹ Chapter 6.7

⁶⁰ Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council (LP11), ‘Name Anonymized. Coordinated the Delivery of Prevent. Asian Male, Mid 30s.’ (2011)

⁶¹ Police Inspector and Force Prevent lead (Special Branch, LP5), ‘Name Anonymized. White Female, Early 40s.’ (2011)

⁶² See Chapter 5

⁶³ Chapter 6.6

counterterrorism-focused *Prevent*, the role of the police is crucial because it solves many of the issues related to information transfer.

8.4 Community perceptions

The aforementioned tensions appear to have a limited impact on community perceptions. Rather, Maybury's Muslim communities' perceptions and willingness to participate in *Prevent* projects appear to have been shaped largely by a prevailing negative media and political environment, and the shared experience of others. Despite the participants' acknowledgement that media characterisations of Muslims in the UK and *Prevent* are flawed, their representation is generally accepted. Participants feel that they are stereotyped and seen as extremists or terrorists because of their ethnicity and faith. Provoking feelings of insecurity and alienation creates barriers between their communities, other local communities, and the authorities.⁶⁴ These barriers combine with the negative experiences of acquaintances and others with the police, influencing their levels of trust in local authorities and the police, and shaping their perceptions of the state's legitimacy.⁶⁵

The media frequently portrays *Prevent* as a surveillance programme which relies on ethnic and religious profiling, and as a programme which funds groups which support the state's policies as well as extremist organisations.⁶⁶ National and local professionals admit that *Prevent's* image is tainted, but deny that *Prevent* has been designed for surveillance purposes. Local communities doubt this and feel that *Prevent* could be used for surveillance, and to subjugate their communities to normative British political and cultural values.⁶⁷ These ideas continue to permeate the public conscience despite a lack of supporting evidence in Maybury. Rather, focus group participants acknowledge that their perceptions about *Prevent* have been shaped largely by national media coverage. It appears from these findings that the government has failed to clearly articulate *Prevent's* purpose to the public, and that front line staff also fail to challenge the negative characterisation.⁶⁸

Focus group participants also confirm that adverse media coverage has led to a sense of alienation, though they admit that this is at times self-imposed rather than driven by local events. Media representations and government policies 'certainly caused

⁶⁴ Chapter 7.2

⁶⁵ Chapter 7.6

⁶⁶ Chapter 5.5 and 6.5

⁶⁷ Chapter 7

⁶⁸ Chapter 7.2-3

anger within the community'.⁶⁹ The inability to challenge and change these prevailing perceptions and the status quo, have over time led to political disengagement and fatalism. As expected, many participants and members of their communities feel both British and Muslim, a problematic notion given that Islam is often depicted as a religion opposed to fundamental British values. Participants feel a sense of isolation because of the dual aspects of their identity which appears not to conform to public perceptions. A House of Commons Select Committee acknowledges that the language used around *Prevent* is at times counterproductive, and even threatens to undo some good work that has been done under the banner of counterterrorism.⁷⁰

Prevent's inability to create a safe space is linked to a negative political discourse around terrorism, Islam, and Muslim communities in the UK. Participants agree that extremism and terrorism have become taboo subjects within Maybury's Muslim communities. *Prevent* is regarded as a policy which, according to one participant, 'peddles government values' and does not oppose or challenge the status quo and government policy.⁷¹ The fear of becoming stigmatised by an extremist label, individually or as a community, means that extremism goes unchallenged. Negative rhetoric around *Prevent*, it appears, deters those in the position to challenge extremism from doing just that. Limiting freedom of expression, participants argue, means that extremist attitudes often go unchallenged because of the fear of incrimination. Sensitive topics such as extremism and terrorism are eschewed in social interactions, while its causes remain unaddressed. Media representation, counterterrorism policing, and negative perceptions about *Prevent* have a marginalising effect, increasing communities' sense of vulnerability to extremism precisely because grievances remain unaddressed. As a result, extremism often remains unchallenged within affected communities.⁷²

Despite the limited impact of *Prevent*, aspects of *Pursue*, in particular a number of terrorism-related arrests in the Maybury area in 2009, have had a direct impact on local participation in *Prevent* programmes. As discussed in Chapter 7,

⁶⁹ White Male, community volunteer, involved in inter-faith community work across the North of England, mid 30s (FG 5), 'Name Anonymized.' (2011)

⁷⁰ Home Affairs Select Committee (n 9)

⁷¹ Former Member of the National Young Muslim Advisory Group (Asian Female, NP15), 'Name Anonymized. Also Involved a Youth Worker Previously Involved in Prevent Programmes in the North of England.' (2011); Richard Jackson, 'The Failed Paradigm of Prevent' (*Soundings*, 2011) <<http://soundings.mcb.org.uk/?p=35>> accessed 30 May 2012

⁷² Chapter 7.5

counterterrorism raids led to the disengagement of Maybury's Council of Mosques from *Prevent*.⁷³ Due to the Council of Mosque's position as gatekeepers between Muslim communities and local authorities, the communities' engagement with *Prevent* programmes has been low. Nevertheless, as a result of efforts by the police, the council, and community engagement officers (CEOs), community relations have improved. The data indicate that individuals and groups who work with community engagement officers show increased levels of trust in the police but not in the local council. It appears that the CEOs' open and honest approach, and willingness to listen to the concerns of local communities and share information when possible, are major factors in the increased levels of trust in the police. Yet, younger males often regard police officers from Muslim communities with disdain. Their levels of trust are the lowest, whereas trust towards the same officers from older generations has increased.⁷⁴ The interviews reveal that experiences with the police mainly relate to criminal activities rather than counterterrorism, and perceptions of the latter are based on the experiences of others who mainly reside in the Midlands and London.

8.5 Concluding remarks

This thesis has achieved its initial fieldwork objectives in seeking to explore the implementation of the *Prevent* policy at national and local levels. With the exception of two people, the former head of MI5 and the local *Prevent* lead from the Probation Service, all of those approached participated. Sufficient data were gathered to explore and analyse each of the latter three research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 and reiterated in this chapter. The participation of former Cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, and senior police officers on the one hand, and front line staff and members of Muslim communities on the other, has allowed this thesis to bring together the local and national aspects of *Prevent* policy between 2007 and 2012, and explore the tensions, issues, and impact of this policy nationally and locally. This study also provides additional insights and knowledge to the policy debate on preventing violent extremism, and complements a number of related studies.⁷⁵ When appropriate, and with reference to the study results, some findings were generalised. Innes et al. note, for example, that *Prevent's* successes are often based on personal

⁷³ Chapter 7.3

⁷⁴ Chapter 7.6

⁷⁵ Martin Innes and others, 'Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers' (UPSI 2011); Basia Spalek and Alia Imtoul, 'Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror Responses: "Hard" Approaches to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia' (2007) 27 *J Muslim Minor Aff* 185; Suraj Lakhani, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities' (2012) 51 *Howard J Crim Justice* 190

experiences and gut feelings. The research data suggest that this is also the case in Maybury.

There are some limitations to this study. As discussed in Chapter 4, qualitative research is time consuming, thereby limiting the fieldwork coverage. The resulting findings, therefore, are open to interpretation and may be considered to be location-specific. Hence, it is difficult to generalise the findings of this small-scale case study. Aspects of this study, though, are more generalisable than others. The findings from the interviews with national policymakers, for example, provide a broad insight into the tensions which exist at national level, and are easier to generalise than the case study findings. The difference between the experiences of Maybury's Muslim communities to those in London and Birmingham is hard to gauge. Studies by Innes et al. and Spalek suggest that communities in their study areas have become more involved in *Prevent* than those in Maybury.⁷⁶ Local factors such as the decision by Maybury's Council of Mosques to disengage from *Prevent*, and a lack of local awareness of *Prevent*, may account for the difference in willingness to engage with local authorities. Also, the fieldwork was carried out prior to and just after the publication of the *Prevent Review*, before the *Review's* changes could have any real impact on the local delivery of *Prevent* and its projects.

Due to time limitations and the broad focus of the thesis on the *Prevent* policy, specific *Prevent* programmes such as *Channel* or local programmes could not be examined in any great detail. Rather, the thesis provides the broad context for future research into programmes such as *Channel*, the study and evaluation of local *Prevent* programmes, and more detailed comparative research with other local crime prevention initiatives such as work on gangs, to examine what lessons can be learned and knowledge transferred. Further studies might include case studies to measure the impact of the *Prevent Review* on local delivery and its impact on local Muslim communities.

The *Prevent Review* has entrenched *Prevent's* focus on jihadi extremism and on assimilation, which is based on the adoption of British cultural values. According to community participants, this focus on the adherence to 'British values', which has been emphasised by the media and politicians, has been counterproductive.⁷⁷ As demonstrated in Chapter 7, assimilation to these values appears problematic because

⁷⁶ Innes and others (n 70); Spalek and Imtoul (n 70)

⁷⁷ Chapter 7.5

Prevent not only fails to define them but also frames them as British rather than universal.⁷⁸ The first point is about communication, and the second is about exclusion. Sales notes that British values are linked to identity.⁷⁹ The political environment and the portrayal of Muslim communities in the media have created ‘a feeling of separation from the group or of isolation from group standards’.⁸⁰ The findings in Chapter 7 suggest that participants feel that being Muslim excludes them from mainstream society because of their cultural and religious affiliation to Islam, despite the fact that they cherish many of the same universal values as the mainstream. The idea that a person can only have one identity is contentious, and many people have multiple identities, Hobsbawn argues.⁸¹ Rather, *Prevent* should focus on the promotion of good values, regardless of whether these are universal, British, or even religious. Shifting the focus to good values would be less exclusive, allowing communities and individuals to maintain multiple identities rather than being expected to conform to one overarching identity. Accepting and tolerating multiple identities and associated values would allow individuals to be British and Muslim because one should not preclude the other.

Throughout this thesis, participants mention the need for community cohesion and primary prevention. The *Prevent Review* has moved *Prevent* away from community cohesion and towards surveillance, using the social, health, and education sectors to increase the flow of information. How this will affect *Prevent* in the future remains to be seen. However, the *Review* fails to resolve tension about the merits of community cohesion in tackling extremism. As noted in Chapter 6, front line staff repeatedly comment that jihadi extremism leads to the mobilisation of far-right extremism, which in turn leads to more extreme reactions from jihadists, a phenomenon called cumulative extremism.⁸² ‘The risk is that cumulative extremism leads to a spiral of mobilization and counter-mobilization, which requires an altogether different set of policy and security tools.’⁸³ As Sir Norman Bettison sagely

⁷⁸ The Avalon Project, ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man - 1789’ (*Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library*, 2008) <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp>

⁷⁹ Rosemary Sales, ‘Britain and Britishness: Place, Belonging and Exclusion’ in Waqar Ahmad and Ziauddin Sardar (eds), *Muslims in Britain: Making Social and Political Space* (Routledge 2012)

⁸⁰ Sebastian DeGrazia, *The Political Community: A Study of Anomie* (University of Chicago Press 1978) 3

⁸¹ Eric Hobsbawn, ‘Identify Politics and the Left’ (1996) 217 *New Left Review* 38

⁸² Roger Eatwell, ‘Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain’ (2006) 77 *Political Quarterly* 204

⁸³ Matthew Goodwin, ‘Woolwich Attack and the Far Right: Three Points to Consider When the Dust Settles’, *The Guardian* (2013) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/23/woolwich-attack-far-right-three-points>> accessed 28 May 2013

states: ‘We won’t arrest our way of this problem. ... What are we doing about festering hatred?’⁸⁴ Indeed, what happens when those imprisoned for terrorism offences are released from prison? The long-term success of *Prevent* should be based on diverting those with extremist beliefs away from violence.

Consecutive Parliamentary committees have suggested that *Prevent*, community cohesion, and tackling extremism per se should be separated. The *Review* attempts such separation, but the government’s Integration Strategy fails to provide a complementary approach to tackling extremism based on primary prevention and community cohesion. This approach needs to be better resourced and driven by local authorities rather than the police, because local authorities have a better knowledge of their communities. Sufficient support from the centre must also be given. The Integration Strategy is well placed, but it is insufficiently developed to complement *Prevent* and address real and perceived grievances which can be exploited by extremist groups.

Recent events in Woolwich have reignited the debate about the legacy of the *Prevent* policy, and whether the blurring of social and criminal policy is, or would be, helpful.⁸⁵ As demonstrated, there are inherent tensions relating to the policy content and organisational issues within *Prevent*. Some of these tensions are addressed in the *Review*, and going back would only reopen similar policy debates and tensions. However, other recent events may also reshape the future of *Prevent*. The Boston bombings and the attacks in Norway demonstrate the threat of the ‘lone wolf’ and radicalisation through the Internet.⁸⁶ How will *Prevent* tackle extremists who have little connection to any communities and even less contact with state agencies?

The role of the newly elected police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in 2012, and the availability of resources to *Prevent* and the Integration Strategy represent ongoing concerns. PCCs, elected on their ‘ability’ to tackle local crime issues, may not share the government’s priorities around extremism and terrorism, and may

⁸⁴ Sir Norman Bettison (NP6) interview (n 51)

⁸⁵ Roland Watson and others, ‘Woolwich “killers” Were Known to Security Services’ (*The Times*, 23 May 2013) <<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/article3772783.ece>> accessed 19 June 2013; The Guardian, ‘David Cameron Launches Anti-terror Task Force to Tackle Extremism’ (*David Cameron launches anti-terror task force to tackle extremism*, 26 June 2013) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/may/26/david-cameron-anti-terror-task-force>> accessed 19 June 2013

⁸⁶ Eric Schmitt and others, ‘Boston Plotters Said to Initially Target July 4 for Attack’ (*The New York Times*, 5 February 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/us/Boston-bombing-suspects-planned-july-fourth-attack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 19 June 2013; Norwegian Government, ‘Rapport Fra 22. Juli-kommisionen: Preliminary English Versions of Selected Chapters’ (Oslo, 2013)

divert funds to projects that have higher local priorities.⁸⁷ The national government's attempts to assert national priorities, such as terrorism, may lead to further tensions which have not been explored in this thesis but may affect *Prevent* in the future.⁸⁸

This thesis has demonstrated that ambiguity has caused tensions within *Prevent*. *Prevent*'s intentions, though multiple, need to be clearer. The policy needs to be clear about where the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of extremism is drawn. The policy needs to be clear about how rights, such as the freedom of speech, are protected, especially within communities where extremist views are held. Further, if the separation between *Prevent* and tackling extremism remains, questions should be raised about what resources should be available to the Integration Strategy. In the long-term, *Prevent*'s success relies upon the success of the Integration Strategy, which has broader aims, including tackling the root causes of extremism per se.

As demonstrated throughout the thesis, the effectiveness of *Prevent* also relies on successful evaluation. The *Review* and participants acknowledge that evaluation needs to be improved.⁸⁹ It is important to make this point because it is widely acknowledged by academics and governments that the threat of extremism will remain indefinitely. Evaluation is crucial to improve efficiency and find what works and what does not, as well as to make sense of implementation effects and unintended consequences. This would increase the evidence base, and best practice could then be shared amongst practitioners.

Recent events in Norway, Boston, and Woolwich have highlighted the problem of 'lone wolves'. Thus, *Prevent* needs to adapt to current challenges, which include threats from jihadi extremism and the far-right.⁹⁰ Recent events have demonstrated the need for *Prevent*. This thesis maps some of the tensions which any future review of *Prevent* should take into consideration, ensuring that delivery provides the desired policy outcomes. The thesis further supports the case for better evaluation and knowledge transfer to improve activities and outcomes.

⁸⁷ Home Office, 'The Strategic Policing Requirements' (London, HMSO 2012)

⁸⁸ The Policing Protocol Order 2011 SI 2011/2744

⁸⁹ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy' (n 14) 24

⁹⁰ Ed Pilkington, 'Boston Bombings: "Did You Hear About the Explosion? ... I Did That"', *The Guardian* (23 April 2013) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/22/boston-explosion-charge-sheet-dzhokhar-tsarnaev>> accessed 28 May 2013; Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Woolwich Attack is Unprecedented Test for MI5 Oversight Body', *The Guardian* (no date) <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/defence-and-security-blog/2013/may/28/mi5-woolwich-attack-parliament>> accessed 28 May 2013; Norwegian Government, 'Rapport Fra 22. Juli-kommisionen: Preliminary English Versions of selected Chapters' (Oslo, 2013)

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